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Inherency – 1AC – Congress

Status quo ideas of “inherently governmental functions” are too vague – reform is needed.

Luckey, Grasso and Manuel 10 (“Inherently Governmental Functions and Department of Defense Operations: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress” John R. Legislative Attorney Valerie Bailey Specialist in Defense Acquisition Kate M. Legislative Attorney February 1, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40641.pdf)KM

One common theme in the recent literature on inherently governmental functions is that there are numerous and/or inconsistent definitions of inherently governmental functions within federal law and policy. For example, in its report on the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009, the House of Representatives noted that the task of determining which functions must be performed by government employees: ... is made even more difficult by the lack of a single definition and accompanying guidance on what constitutes an “inherently governmental function.” Currently, the Federal Acquisition Regulation defines that term in multiple places, the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 also defines the term, and there is yet another definition in the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act (P.L. 105-270). There is also the additional DOD-specific definition of [functions] “closely associated with inherently governmental functions.”168 Similarly, in its report Changing the Culture of Pentagon Contracting, the New America Foundation noted that the phrase “inherently governmental functions” appears 15 times in the United States Code “without a clear or consistent definition.”169 Commentators raising this point appear to be suggesting that agencies would not contract out allegedly inherently governmental functions if (1) they did not have to determine which definition applied in particular cases and/or (2) they had clear definitions to guide their decision making in particular cases.

And, bush blocked regulation of PMCs- plan could happen now

Lendman 10 (Stever, MA @ Harvard, *Steve Lendman Blog*, jan 19-10) ET

Others followed, especially during the 1980s Reagan-Thatcher era when privatizing government services began in earnest. As vice-president, GHW Bush applied it to intelligence, and then defense secretary Dick Cheney hired Brown and Root Services (now KBR, Inc., a former Halliburton subsidiary) to devise how to integrate private companies effectively into warfare.

Status quo forces have significant PMC involvement, changing that is key to mission success.

Shakowsky 10 (Jan Shakowsky, House of Representatives, January 24, 2010, http://www.uslaboragainstwar.org/article.php?id=22078)

WASHINGTON, DC (January 24, 2010) – A troubling report from the Congressional Research Service found that private security contractors, like Blackwater, comprise nearly one-third of the armed force in Afghanistan and nearly one-fifth in Iraq. Rep. Jan Schakowsky, D–IL, wrote to Secretary Robert Gates following the release of the report urging him to scale down security contractors and return those functions to U.S. military forces. The report, “The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress,” was released January 19, 2009. “Our reliance on private security contractors has created a situation that jeopardizes the national security of the United States and threatens our mission in Iraq and Afghanistan. The proliferation of private security contractors on inherently military missions is troubling on several levels. It is dangerous to rely on hired guns to provide vital security services in war zones, and I believe that the United States must move toward responsibly returning these essential armed functions to U.S. government and military personnel.”

Inherency – PMC’s Now

The war in Afghanistan relies on PMC – recent trends increase the security role of contractors

Schwartz 10 (Moshe, Specialist in Defense Acquisition, Congressional Research Service, 1–19–10, “The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress”, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi–bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA513870)KFC

The United States relies on contractors to provide a wide variety of services in Iraq and Afghanistan, including security. Private firms known as private security contractors (PSCs) are hired to protect individuals, transport convoys, forward operating bases, buildings, and other economic infrastructure, as well as train security forces. While DOD has previously contracted for security in Bosnia and elsewhere, it appears that in Iraq and Afghanistan DOD is for the first time relying so heavily on armed contractors to provide security during combat or stability operations. As of September 2009, there were almost 22,000 armed private security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. Recent contracting trends indicate that the number of such contractors in Iraq may decline while the number in Afghanistan may continue to increase. Many analysts and government officials believe that DOD would be unable to execute its mission without PSCs

PMC’s in Iraq set dangerous precedent – contractors undermine accountability and oversight with corruption.

**Hefling 08** (Kimberly, Boston Globe, “Contracts have cost taxpayers $85 billion”, 8–13–08, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2008/08/13/contracts\_have\_cost\_taxpayers\_85\_billion/)KFC

Military contracts in the Iraq theater have cost taxpayers at least $85 billion, and, when it comes to providing security, they might not be any cheaper than using military personnel, according to a report released yesterday. The release of the Congressional Budget Office study comes on the heels of increased scrutiny of contractors in the last year, some of whom have been investigated in connection to shooting deaths of Iraqis and the accidental electrocutions of US troops. The United States has relied more heavily on contractors in Iraq than in any other war to provide services ranging from food service to guarding diplomats. About 20 percent of funding for operations in Iraq has gone to contractors, the report said. Currently, there are at least 190,000 contractors in Iraq, which is a ratio of about one contractor per US service member, the report says. The study does not include monetary figures for 2008, so the total paid to contractors for work in the Iraq theater since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 is probably much higher. If spending for contractors continues at about the same rate, by the end of the year, an estimated $100 billion will have been paid to military contractors for operations in Iraq. Senator Kent Conrad, a North Dakota Democrat, chairman of the Senate budget committee, which requested the CBO review, said the Bush administration's reliance on military contractors has set a dangerous precedent. The use of contractors "restricts accountability and oversight; opens the door to corruption and abuse; and, in some instances, may significantly increase the cost to American taxpayers," he said in a statement.

The US is still employing PMC – even with their massive issues

Democracy Now 6/21 (June 21, 2010 ,http://www.democracynow.org/2010/6/21/headlines/us\_awards\_blackwater\_120m\_contract\_in\_afghanistan)KFC

The Obama administration has awarded a new contract to the private military firm Blackwater in Afghanistan. The Blackwater offshoot US Training Center will receive over $120 million to guard US consulates in two Afghan towns. The Obama administration has continued to employ Blackwater despite numerous controversies, including the indictments of five former company executives on weapons charges and the massacre of seventeen Iraqi civilians by Blackwater guards in September 2007.

Solvency – 1AC – Congress

Contention \_\_\_ is solvency:

Congress solves – debates over inherently governmental functions can be resolved with legislation.

Elsea 9 (“Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Legal Issues” Jennifer K. Legislative Attorney December 22, , http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/135010.pdf)KM

There has been debate about the extent to which private security functions are “inherently governmental” in nature and therefore ought to be performed by public officials.59 Congress defined “inherently governmental function” in the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act of 199860 to mean a function that is “so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by Federal Government employees.”61 Under the FAIR Act, the term “includes activities that require either the exercise of discretion in applying Federal Government authority or the making of value judgments in making decisions for the Federal Government....” It involves functions that can “determine, protect, and advance United States economic, political, territorial, property, or other interests by military or diplomatic action, civil or criminal justice proceedings,” contract management, and functions that can “significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of private persons....”62 Infrequently, Congress has provided by statute that a function is “inherently governmental.”63 Congress may also directly forbid or limit the use of contractors for certain functions64 or forbid the contracting of certain kinds of employees,65 where the functions or employment may be considered inherently unsuitable for association with the government. In the case of defense contractors in areas of combat operations, Congress expressed its sense in the FY2009 NDAA that private security contractors should not perform certain functions, such as security protection of resources, in high-threat operational environments, and that DOD regulations “should ensure that private security contractors are not authorized to perform inherently governmental functions in an area of combat operations.”66

Legislation solves – forces transparency and professionalism.

Nance 7 (Malcolm, September 22, , *Small Wars Journal,* “All Hands On Deck – Radically Reorienting Private Security in Iraq” http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/09/all-hands-on-deck-radically-re/)KM

8. Make PSCs An Integral Part of the Strategy … Legally. Congress needs to introduce legislation that would essentially force professionalism and transparency on PSCs. It would also place them in a legally binding framework and protect them under the Geneva Conventions. It should also serve as a reminder that they are being paid to represent the interests of the ultimate paying client, the American people. As for the Department of State, CIA and others? Here contracting has gotten out of control – the PSC forces they contract should be commissioned as officers in those agencies. If PSCs can act as Diplomatic Security officers, CIA interrogators or even clandestine collection officers then those contractors should be directly deputized into the organization. It will save an enormous quantity of money and may even improve their own in-house security operations. Some may see such a PSC regulating law and heavy-handed contracting sensibility as a reason to leave the business … and good riddance. Those that would remain will reap the benefits of an integral and enduring relationship with lower overhead costs. If there is any reluctance, the simple answer is to break their contracts and competitively bid to find companies that are more cooperative.

Solvency – Congress

More regulation is needed- Britain proves

Kwok 6 (James, Sr Editor @ Harvard Review, Spring 6, *Soviet Legacies* vol 28) ET

South Africa’s tighter control is just one type of regulation. Another type of regulation concerns employees within a PMC itself. Licenses for its members and more thorough background checks for its employees are necessary to ensure that those serving in Iraq will behave responsibly. In a recent interview with PBS, Peter Singer, a fellow at the Brookings Institution, provided an example of the dangers of not looking carefully at whom the US is hiring for services in Iraq: “[a British PMC employee] had been thrown out of the British Army and put in jail for cooperating with Irish terrorists. The British Army was certainly not happy to find out that he was in Iraq working as a contractor, carrying a submachine gun on the ground.” Stricter US legislation regarding PMC employee background checks will go far in ensuring that incidents like those at Abu Ghraib will not reoccur.

Congress solves – it can redefine “inherently governmental functions” to exclude PMC’s.

Luckey, Grasso and Manuel 10 (“Inherently Governmental Functions and Department of Defense Operations: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress” John R. Legislative Attorney Valerie Bailey Specialist in Defense Acquisition Kate M. Legislative Attorney February 1, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40641.pdf)KM

Another option, not widely discussed, would be to define terms within the existing definition of inherently governmental functions. The existing definition of inherently governmental functions could, perhaps, be made clearer by establishing the meaning of key terms under it. Statutes could prescribe what it means for a function to be “intimately related to the public interest” or “performed by the federal government,” for example. Defining “performance by the federal government,” in particular, could potentially help remove the distinction between performing and assisting with inherently governmental functions that characterizes GAO opinions and executive branch discussions of inherently governmental functions.182 For example, in its consideration of the IRS’s proposed private debt collection program—which was one of the most prominent non- DOD examples of an agency contracting out allegedly inherently governmental functions—GAO distinguished between collection of taxes, which is inherently governmental, and assisting in collecting taxes by locating and contacting taxpayers to remind them of their tax liability and suggest payment methods, which is not inherently governmental.183

Congressional action solves – it can prohibit certain actions from being contracted out.

Luckey, Grasso and Manuel 10 (“Inherently Governmental Functions and Department of Defense Operations: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress” John R. Legislative Attorney Valerie Bailey Specialist in Defense Acquisition Kate M. Legislative Attorney February 1, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40641.pdf)KM

Prohibiting agencies from contracting out specific functions, or from using appropriated funds to contract out specific functions, would also serve to ensure that certain allegedly inherently governmental functions are not contracted out. Section 730 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2008, for example, specifies that ...[n]one of the funds made available in this Act may be used to study, complete a study of, or enter into a contract with a private party to carry out, without specific authorization in a subsequent Act of Congress, a competitive sourcing activity of the Secretary of Agriculture, including support personnel of the Department of Agriculture, relating to rural development or farm loan programs.193 Such approaches do not require any changes in the definition of inherently governmental functions, and they remove all possible questions about whether the executive branch will categorize a function as Congress might wish. These approaches are probably best utilized as tailored responses to specific concerns, however, because they are reactive and potentially timelimited. Congress generally uses these approaches on an ad hoc basis in response to agencies’ contracting out, or proposed contracting out, of specific functions. Moreover, if included in an appropriations bill, such prohibitions could be limited to specific agencies or time periods. Prohibitions in a DOD appropriations bill would not necessarily apply to the Department of State, for example, and prohibitions could be limited to funds covered by the appropriation, or automatically carried over to future appropriations bills long after the situation prompting the prohibition has otherwise been resolved.

Solvency – USFG

PMC’s want a small definition of inherently governmental.

Isenberg 10 (David, Author, Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq April 15, “To Be, or Not to Be, Inherent: That is the Question” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/to-be-or-not-to-be-inhere\_b\_539933.html)KM

There are two words which strike fear in the hearts of all those who follow the private contracting issue. And by private contractors I just don't mean those carrying out security or military function. Rather I mean any task that at some point was considered the domain of someone in the public sector. Those two words are inherently governmental. Far stronger men than I have cowered in fear when asked to define what an inherently governmental task is. Trying to define the term is like trying to nail Jell-O to the wall; only nailing Jell-O is easier. Yet the stakes are enormous. Obviously private sector companies would like the definition to be crafted as narrowly as possible as it potentially means more work for them. Years ago it was reported that the use of private contractors as interrogators at Abu Ghraib and other prisons in Iraq violated an Army policy that requires such jobs to be ﬁlled by government employees because of the "risk to national security." An Army policy directive published in 2000 classiﬁes any job that involves "the gathering and analysis" of tactical intelligence as "an inherently governmental function barred from private sector performance." The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) lists the following functions as inherently governmental: interpreting and executing laws; ordering military or diplomatic action on behalf of the United States; conducting civil or criminal judicial proceedings; performing actions that signiﬁcantly affect the life, liberty, or property of private persons; and collecting, controlling, or disbursing appropriated and other federal funds.

The USFG should move to standards where PMC’s must be unarmed – status quo policy is failing.

Singer 5 (“Outsourcing War” Peter W., Director, 21st Century Defense Initiative, *Foreign Affairs http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2005/0301usdepartmentofdefense\_singer.aspx*)KM

To start changing matters, clients—namely, governments that hire PMFs—must exercise their rights and undertake a comprehensive survey to discern the full scope of what they have outsourced and what have been the results. Washington should also require that, like most other government documents, all current and future contracts involving nonclassified activities be made available to the public on request. Each contract should also include "contractor visibility" measures that list the number of employees involved and what they are to be paid, thus limiting the possibility of financial abuse. The U.S. military must also take a step back and reconsider, from a national security perspective, just what roles and functions should be kept in government hands. Outsourcing can be greatly beneficial, but only to the point where it begins to challenge core functions. According to the old military doctrine on contracting, if a function was "mission-critical" or "emergency-essential"—that is, if it could affect the very success or failure of an operation—it was kept within the military itself. The rule also held that civilians were to be armed only under extraordinary circumstances and then only for self-protection. The United States should either return to these standards or create new ones; the present ad-hoc process is yielding poor results.

And, restricting contractors from military actions would solve

Soder 10 (Brenda, June 18, Media Relations Director Joined Human Rights First, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/usls/2010/alert/624/index.htm , *Human Rights First*) ET

In an effort to address these problems, Human Rights First today outlined a series of key steps the U.S. government could take to minimize the likelihood that security contractors will be drawn into hostilities, as well as to ensure appropriate accountability and oversight of these contractors. Among the recommendations were the following key steps: Clarify private security contractors' functions and conduct: Restrictions on what functions private security contractors are asked to fulfill and on when they are permitted to use force are essential to maintaining the important distinction between combatants, who are legitimate military targets, and civilians who are not engaged in combat and so are not legitimate targets of war. Current U.S. policy on what functions and conduct private security contractors are allowed to engage in threatens to blur the essential international humanitarian law (IHL) distinctions between civilians and combatants, and jeopardize other civilians performing important roles in theater.

Solvency – USFG

Specifically, government management is key to avoiding perpetual war – the US is missing from key policy discussions.

Avant 6 (“Private Military Companies and the Future of War” Institute for Global and International Studies at George Washington University, Deborah April, http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200604.military.avant.privatemilitarycompanies.html)KM

How does all this bode for the future of war? There are two views. The worst-case scenario sees the use of PSCs as an unleashing of the dogs of war that will undermine democratic control of force and security as a public good. Security will become a private good leading to less public order and more anarchy. This vision of the future is similar to the portrait Martin Van Creveld painted in The Transformation of War. The best-case scenario, though, suggests that PSCs may be the beginnings of a class of global private professionals. PSCs will be a tool for spreading order and the potential for stability and economic growth to less ordered parts of the world. There are, of course, many possibilities in between these two scenarios, but I contend what will determine which path private security lead toward is how private security is managed. PSCs respond to market incentives. A purely free market is most likely to lead to a “race to the bottom” like the worst case scenario predicts. States may be tempted to use PSCs to enhance their security vis-à-vis others, but in a global market individual state action cannot solve risks on its own. Individual state policy will only have influence if the state is also a consumer and unilateral reliance on PSCs may tempt states to take actions that their citizens view as illegitimate. The path toward international private professionals will require some level of cooperation among consumers (states, private companies, NGOs, etc.) at the global level. This kind of cooperation will be most likely to generate professional, ethical, and legal standards that both inform PSCs of proper behavior and reward those that behave properly. Many in the private-security industry claim to welcome such standards and suggest that they can enhance the legitimacy of reputable firms, reduce risk, and ease the operational inefficiencies associated with a market of multiple standards. There are some efforts to move forward on discussions about this kind of framework. At present, however, the U.S. (the single largest consumer) is missing from there discussions, partly due to U.S. government worries that global standards may impinge on the flexibility that PSCs can offer to the U.S. Other states, international organizations and NGOs also refuse to engage in such discussions, citing moral or ethical reasons.

The government has to limit the function of PMCs

Kidwell 5 (Deborah, September 13, , <http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/kidwell.pdf>, date accessed: 6/26/2010) AJK  
Although the previous discussion is somewhat speculative, it raises important questions for further study. A few certainties, however, emerge from the discussion. Political and military leaders must clearly define the role of contractors—the nature of the work they are allowed to perform and the legal and geographical limitations of civilians on the battlefield—and the core competencies of the military services. The legal status of contractor employees as noncombatants must be firm, and the US govern­ment must resolve the ambiguity of contractual and criminal jurisdiction when American taxpayers foot the bill. Strategy, not politics, must deter­mine the resources provided to the military and adequate policies put into place to assure accountability of both the military service commands and contractors. Reforms and competition must truly guide competitive sourc­ing if the goal of cost-efficiency is to be reached; but there will also be an inherent cost to society if the US continues on its present course. Officials 58 must address the impact of the current system on civil-military relations, particularly those identified by Singer as negative influences. Leaders must carefully consider the psychological limits of endurance of frequent combat and repeated deployments, and weigh the costs of military experi­ence and education against the potential benefits. Military effectiveness is really the bottom line, and the evidence indicates that this is where several factors intersect: ideologies of the cost-effectiveness of privatization, a fac­tionalized political process, but perhaps most of all, a nation that believes it can go to war without full mobilization of its citizens and economy. In this respect, the ghosts of the past still haunt us; from Korea, Vietnam, DESERT STORM, and the end of the Cold War, Americans learned to rely heavily on foreign labor, conduct limited war as inexpensively as possible, and that PMCs could serve certain political objectives.

Iraq Forces Adv. – Uniqueness – Iraq Military

Competence in Iraqi troops is growing but they have a while to go

Mahmudiya 8 (Abigail Hauslohner, Staff Writer for Time, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1732617,00.html, AD: 6/24/10) jl

The top U.S. military commanders in Iraq and the Iraqi government have been trumpeting the growing confidence and successes of the Iraqi army and police force, since [Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki](http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1725526,00.html) launched an offensive against Basra last month, with the aim of reclaiming control of the southern port city from the Mahdi Army militia of radical [cleric Moqtada al-Sadr](http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1732495,00.html). Despite meeting powerful resistance from the Mahdi Army, and suffering the desertion of roughly 1,300 soldiers who refused to fight, the Iraqis' performance was commended by the U.S. as a show of their newfound competence. "Iraqi forces are taking the lead," Rear Admiral Patrick Driscoll told journalists in Baghdad last week.

But for many American troops, the picture of Iraqi troop performance is not quite as rosy. In Hilla, the largest town in the central Iraqi province of Babil, soldiers and residents say the violence was fiercest on March 25. And at least one American soldier said he was angry that the role of Iraqi troops was exaggerated after the battle. "A gunfight broke out and we were fighting [the Mahdi Army] for about four hours," the soldier told TIME. "The army article made it sound like we were just there supporting the Iraqi Army, but we did all the work. We just had four humvees out there with some Iraqi [troops]."

Another soldier at Forward Operating Base Kalsu in north Babil said he has little confidence in the battle abilities of the Iraqi forces. "Sometimes they start shooting because they heard or saw something, but then there's nothing there," he said.

Iraq Forces Adv. – Iraq Forces Solve

Creation of Local Military key to Counterinsurgency success

Cordesman & Burke 6(Chairmen in Strategy for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1/03/06)

Third, stability operations, counterinsurgency, armed peacemaking, and many aspects of nation building must focus on creating effective local military, security, and police forces as a primary objective from the initial planning for military operations to their completion. The creation of effective host country forces must be given the same priority as effective operations by the invading or occupying force. Providing the proper resources in terms of training teams, equipment, facilities, and money is an essential aspect of planning and operations, and officers and officials who do not act on this principle should be removed from command. The time in which occupying forces could act independently is over, particularly in countries and areas with different religions, ideologies, cultures, political systems, and values. Political legitimacy and stability will almost inevitably depend on the level of success in creating effective national forces. So will political and operation acceptance and support by the people in the country where operations take place. To ignore this reality, is to breed insurgency and resistance, and cede a fundamental advantage to opponents in asymmetric warfare or efforts to go from peace enforcement to internal stability.

Local coalitions are key to fighting counterinsurgency- Iraq proves

Cordesman & Burke 6(Chairmen in Strategy for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1/03/06)

Iraq, like so many other serious Post-WWII insurgencies, shows that successful counterinsurgency means having or creating a local partner that can take over from US forces and that can govern. Both Vietnam and Iraq show the US cannot win an important counterinsurgency campaign alone. The US will always be dependent on the people in the host country, and usually on local and regional allies. And to some extent, will be dependent on the quality of its operations in the UN, in dealing with traditional allies and in diplomacy. If the US can’t figure out a way to have or create such an ally, and fight under these conditions, a counterinsurgency conflict may well not be worth fighting. This means the US must do far more than creating effective allied forces. In most cases, it find a ways to help its partners reshape their process of politics and governance so that the development of security forces is matched by the steady development of governance, and a matching civil presence and the provision of effective government services.

Local militia is key – overstretch and civilians

Cordesman & Burke 6(Chairmen in Strategy for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1/03/06)

If the creation of effective police forces is neglected, or treated as somehow separate from the need for the kind of police and security forces that can operate and survive in areas that remain under terrorist or insurgent threat, military forces will have to perform security duties that will overstretch military forces, and bring the military into constant contact with civilians in ways they are not trained or structured to deal with. The alternatives are to deploy police that cannot perform their mission and survive, or to leave a void where insurgents can return or local militias and forces attempt to perform the security role without being linked to the central government or overall nation building and stability program. Like Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, Iraq shows that that the effort to create effective police and security forces should take place simultaneously with the creation of local military forces, and must be given the same priority. Planning and strategy must similarly see the deployment of police and paramilitary security functions as an essential part of military operations, "pacification," and winning hearts and minds. Advisory efforts and funding must be shaped accordingly.

Iraq Forces Adv. – Link – Counterinsurgency

PMC’s destroy efforts at counterinsurgency in Iraq – it reveals double-standards in our military and ruins our image.

Singer 7 (Peter, Brookings Institution, <http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/0927militarycontractors.aspx>, date accessed: 6/24/2010) AJK

The recent incident involving Blackwater contractors in Iraq has brought to light a series of questions surrounding the legal status, oversight, management, and accountability of the private military force in Iraq. This for-hire force numbers more than 160,000, more than the number of uniformed military personnel in Iraq, and it is a good thing that attention is finally being paid to the consequences of our outsourcing critical tasks to private firms. An underlying question, though, is largely being ignored: whether it made sense to have civilians in this role in the first place. Regardless of whether the Blackwater contractors were right or wrong in the recent shootings, or even whether there is proper jurisdiction to ensure their accountability or not, there is a crucial problem.  The use of private military contractors appears to have harmed, rather than helped the counterinsurgency efforts of the U.S. mission in Iraq. Even worse, it has created a dependency syndrome on the private marketplace that not merely creates critical vulnerabilities, but shows all the signs of the last downward spirals of an addiction. If we judge by what has happened in Iraq, when it comes to private military contractors and counterinsurgency, the U.S. has locked itself into a vicious cycle. It can't win with them, but can't go to war without them. The study explores how the current use of private military contractors:  Allows policymakers to dodge key decisions that carry political costs, thus leading to operational choices that might not reflect public interest. The Abrams Doctrine, which has stood since the start of the all-volunteer force in the wake of Vietnam, has been outsourced. Enables a "bigger is better" approach to operations that runs contrary to the best lessons of U.S. military strategy. Turning logistics and operations into a for-profit endeavor helped feed the "Green Zone" mentality problem of sprawling bases, which runs counter everything General Petraeus pointed to as necessary to winning a counterinsurgency in the new Army/USMC manual he helped write. Inflames popular opinion against, rather than for, the American mission through operational practices that ignore the fundamental lessons of counterinsurgency. As one set of contractors described. "Our mission is to protect the principal at all costs. If that means pissing off the Iraqis, too bad." Participated in a series of abuses that have undermined efforts at winning "hearts and minds" of the Iraqi people. The pattern of contractor misconduct extends back to 2003 and has involved everything from prisoner abuse and "joyride" shootings of civilians to a reported incident in which a drunken Blackwater contractor shot dead the security guard of the Iraqi Vice President, after the two got into an argument on Christmas Eve, 2006. Weakened American efforts in the "war of ideas" both inside Iraq and beyond. As one Iraqi government official explained even before the recent shootings. "They are part of the reason for all the hatred that is directed at Americans, because people don't know them as Blackwater, they know them only as Americans. They are planting hatred, because of these irresponsible acts." Reveals a double standard towards Iraqi civilian institutions that undermines efforts to build up these very same institutions, another key lesson of counterinsurgency. As one Iraqi soldier said of Blackwater. "They are more powerful than the government. No one can try them. Where is the government in this?" Forced policymakers to jettison strategies designed to win the counterinsurgency on multiple occasions, before they even had a chance to succeed. The U.S. Marine plan for counterinsurgency in the Sunni Triangle was never implemented, because of uncoordinated contractor decisions in 2004 that helped turn Fallujah into a rallying point of the insurgency. More recently, while U.S. government leaders had planned to press the Iraqi government on needed action on post-"surge" political benchmarks, instead they are now having to request Iraqi help in cleaning up the aftermath of the Blackwater incident. The U.S. government needs to go back to the drawing board and re-evaluate its use of private military contractors, especially armed roles within counterinsurgency and contingency operations. It needs to determine what roles are appropriate or not for private firms, and what roles must be kept in the control of those in public service. As part of this determination, it is becoming clear that many roles now outsourced, including the armed escort of U.S. government officials, assets, and convoys in a warzone, not only are inherently government functions, but that the outsourcing has created both huge vulnerabilities and negative consequences for the overall mission. A process must immediately begin to roll such public functions back into public responsibility.

Iraq Forces Adv. – Link – Counterinsurgency

PMC’s hurt counterinsurgency efforts – objectives run counter to military goals.

Petersohn 8 (Weatherhead Center for International Affairs No. 08-0129 “Outsourcing the Big Stick: The Consequences of Using Private Military Companies” Ulrich, June 24, pg 48, http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Petersohn\_Outsourcing.pdf)KM

Even if such incidents could be reduced, it is unlikely that the security providers could be included in the unity of effort. Although security providers and the military both work to stabilize areas, their particular objectives are different. PSCs are hired to protect the client, while the army provides public security. To achieve the latter goal, the commander has to fight the insurgency. This is done by engaging in actual combat against the enemy and by winning the hearts and minds of the people. The problem is that PSCs can harm the counterinsurgency strategy when they perform their tasks. In order to protect a client in a war zone, PSCs must be aggressive, and their tactics can offend residents. Sometimes—for example—local bystanders are forced to the side of the road; they can be intimidated, and even killed. By providing exactly the service they are asked to perform, the PSCs’ actions can run counter to the military’s counterinsurgency effort (Singer 2007, 6; PBS interview, Hammes, 2005).

PMCs destroy counterinsurgency efforts.

Singer 7 (P.W. Senior Fellow and Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution, *Salon*) ET

When we evaluate the facts, the use of private military contractors appears to have harmed, rather than helped, the counterinsurgency efforts of the U.S. mission in Iraq, going against our best doctrine and undermining critical efforts of our troops. Even worse, the government can no longer carry out one of its most basic core missions: to fight and win the nation's wars. Instead, the massive outsourcing of military operations has created a dependency on private firms like Blackwater that has given rise to dangerous vulnerabilities.

The Taliban targets contractors-undermines US efforts at anti insurgency

Khan and Sullivan 10 (Noor & Tom, Staff writers for the Huffington Post, *The Huffington Post*, 4-23-10) ET

Contractors say they are staying in the country, but they have been forced to retreat even further behind blast walls and heavily armed security perimeters. The security drives up costs, making interaction with regular Afghans harder and slowing reconstruction projects. "We have become the targets of the Taliban," said Azizullah, the owner of a construction company that builds bridges and irrigation projects in the southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand, insurgent strongholds. "If we travel, they try to kidnap us and hold us for huge ransoms. If we don't pay, they kill us," said Azizullah, who like many Afghans has only one name. His workers travel in U.S. military convoys for protection whenever possible, he said. That doesn't surprise Gulali, a tribal elder from Kandahar province. "Of course the Taliban are against any of these people working for the Afghan government or the Americans or other foreigners," said the elder, who also uses only one name. He believes many of the recent attacks are by militants simply looking for softer targets. While nearly all foreign companies in Afghanistan now work out of guarded compounds, they do not have the massive fortifications and overwhelming firepower found at nearly any American military installation. The Taliban "want to use the easiest option," he said. But the attacks are challenging a key part of America's aims in Afghanistan. Washington's counterinsurgency plans call for aggressive development to build up everything from Afghanistan's roads to its sewer systems to its irrigation networks. Much of the actual work is paid for by USAID, the government's main international aid agency, then contracted through corporations that often subcontract the actual the work to smaller companies. On the ground, many employees are Afghans overseen by small groups of Western administrators. The attacks "are not about armed confrontation. They are about subversion of the government," said Terrence K. Kelly, a senior researcher at the Washington-based RAND Corporation who has studied how rebuilding efforts work in war zones. America's strategy counts on development work to increase the legitimacy and reach of the Karzai government. With these attacks the Taliban can "turn off the delivery of services – which makes the government look bad," he said. USAID insists it will not scale back its work in Afghanistan because of the attacks, according to Rebecca Black, the agency's deputy mission director for Afghanistan. Contractors insist they are also staying.

Iraq Forces Adv. – Link – Hearts and Minds

PMC’s lose hearts and minds

Schwartz 9 (Moshe Specialist in Defense Acquisition December 14 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40764.pdf TBC 6/25/10)

Some analysts believe that DOD strategy and doctrine does not sufficiently address the issue of contractors. These analysts argue that the public backlash following Abu Ghraib and other such incidents, as well wasteful spending, should compel DOD to reexamine the role contractors play in contingency operations and the way DOD integrates contractor support into current strategy and doctrine.47 For example, then Senator Barack Obama stated that “we cannot win a fight for hearts and minds when we outsource critical missions to unaccountable contractors.”48 The Gansler Commission echoed a similar sentiment, finding that segments of the Army have not recognized the important role contractors now have in DOD operations and the ability of contractors to influence the success of a contingency operation.49 Further integrating contractors into doctrine and strategy could help DOD better manage contractors, which in turn may mitigate the negative effects that some contractors have on DOD operations.

PMC’s kill Iraq effort – Undermines troop commitment and loses hearts and minds

Kovach 10 (Christopher M. Connections Quarterly Journal // Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes June 7th http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/PfPConnections\_CowboysInTheMiddleEast\_PrivateSecurityCompanies.pdf TBC 6/25/10)

Waging war with a combination of regular troops and private security company (PSC) contractors can be done; however, at times the contractors act at cross-purposes with the stated objectives of the campaign. Abuses by PSCs in the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have, according to some analysts, undermined the mission.5 Local inhabitants are not the only people who object to these incidents. Regular troops do so as well; discipline suffers. And even the President of the United States, before assuming the responsibilities of commander-in-chief of the nation’s armed forces, presciently noted that “we cannot win a fight for hearts and minds when we outsource critical missions to unaccountable contractors.”6 The issue of accountability remains salient. While the United States’ criminal justice system has made strides toward holding PSCs accountable—namely by extending military court-martial jurisdiction over PSC troops and permitting federal district courts in the United States to try certain crimes committed abroad—these advances do not go far enough. Haling civilians before courts-martial may be unconstitutional, and the framework for bringing accused criminals back to the U.S. is rarely used. Ultimately, these approaches ignore the military need for swift, visible punishment; the lack of teeth also sends the dangerous message to troops that tossing off a uniform leads to a tripling of one’s salary and freedom from obeying those pesky laws of war.

Iraq Forces Adv. – Link – Backlash

PMC’s create backlash which undermines the US mission

Soder 10 (Brenda Bowser February 2 Human Rights First http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/usls/2010/alert/576/index.htm TBC 6/25/10)

"Failing to hold contractors accountable for serious crimes in war zones abroad has created a culture of impunity which has fostered hostility among civilian populations towards the United States. This increases the threat to U.S military personnel and contractors and undermines the U.S. mission," wrote Human Rights First President and CEO Elisa Massimino in a letter to Senator Leahy and Representative Price. Human Rights First notes that there are currently more private contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan than U.S. military forces serving there. A significant number of these contractors are armed and carrying out security functions. According to a Congressional Research Service report released in January 2010, there were over 22,000 armed private security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan in September 2009. The U.S. government has never before relied on contractors to such a degree. "With this increased reliance on contractors, there has been an increase in serious criminal conduct, including high-profile incidents of excessive force against civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan," Massimino noted. "Despite Congress' elevated scrutiny and oversight over contractors, accountability gaps persist. To date, only a handful of U.S. contractors have been prosecuted for violent criminal abuses in Iraq and Afghanistan."

PMC impunity causes resentment and makes enemies

Luban 7 (Daniel September 19 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/II19Ak04.html TBC 6/26/10)

"The problem is in protecting the principal they had to be very aggressive, and each time they went out they had to offend locals, forcing them to the side of the road, being overpowering and intimidating, at times running vehicles off the road, making enemies each time they went out," Hammes told Public Broadcasting Service in 2005. Sunday's firefight in Baghdad was only the latest in a series of tense incidents involving Blackwater employees in Iraq that have highlighted the ambiguous legal status of private security contractors. On December 24, 2006, an off-duty and inebriated Blackwater employee shot and killed an Iraqi bodyguard of vice president Adil Abdul-Mahdi. The employee was fired and brought back to the US, but as of yet no charges have been filed in the case. And in May, a Blackwater guard killed an Iraqi driver near the Interior Ministry in Baghdad, which set off an armed standoff between the Blackwater convoy and Interior Ministry forces. As private-sector employees, security contractors are not subject to military court-martial, but under a 2004 decree of the Coalition Provisional Authority, they cannot be tried by the Iraqi justice system, either. As of yet, no US contractors have been convicted for killing Iraqi civilians. The perception among Iraqis that US security contractors can act with impunity has engendered widespread resentment, and led the Iraqi government to vow on Monday that the perpetrators of Sunday's deaths in Baghdad will be tried in Iraqi courts.

Iraq Forces Adv. – Link – Resentment

PMC’s create resentment and anger in the Iraqi people. They are seen as independent threats.

Chakrabarti 9 (Shantanu “Privatisation of Security in the Post-Cold War Period” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses December http://www.idsa.in/system/files/Monograph\_No2.pdf TBC 6/25/10)

In Iraq, like in Afghanistan, there has been a strong link between the private sector led reconstruction effort and the surrounding security apparatus and the Iraqi population’s perception of socio-economic exploitation. In the eyes of the local Iraqi population there are blurred boundaries between the foreign armies, international private contractors and PSCs who work for both—the occupying army and foreign private contractors.36 Such growing resentment among the local population adversely affects the counter-insurgency campaign and emboldens the various insurgent groups. Very recently, for instance, an Iraqi militant group, the Islamic Army, has released a propaganda film on the Internet, which has targeted the PSCs operating in Iraq. The release note of the propaganda film is titled ‘Bloody Contracts’. It says: In God’s will, the brothers in Central Media Department of the Islamic Army In Iraq are pleased to present this special segment about private security companies in Iraq and the role of their criminal acts under the umbrella of the occupation and how our brothers (the Mujahideen) have taught them lessons in retaliation for their crimes.37 According to Ben Venzke, the chief of Intel Center, an organisation which meticulously tracks insurgent and jihadist propaganda, the film ‘Bloody Contracts’ shows that the private security personnel are not being targeted just as an extension of the US forces but rather as a direct threat. While attacks on contractors are nothing new, this video is a sign that the threat profile for contractors has continued to increase and more direct threats are expected to take place in the future as the distinction between combat and non-combat duties begin to further erode.38

PMC’s generate anger and undermine the mission

Miller 5 (T. Christian Los Angeles Times December 4 http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168/37230.html 6/25/10)

The private guards' sometimes aggressive behavior has created a wellspring of anger at the U.S. presence in Iraq. Countless Iraqis have had to endure the humiliation of being forced to stop or pull off the road as a convoy of unmarked SUVs races past, filled with men waving guns and making threatening gestures. "This is not a particularly effective way to win the hearts and minds of Iraqis," said Joshua Schwartz, co-director of George Washington University's government procurement program. "The contractors are making the mission of the U.S. military in Iraq more difficult." An incident in May is a case in point. Robert J. Callahan, wrapping up his tour as spokesman for the U.S. Embassy in Iraq, was returning to his offices in the U.S.-controlled Green Zone when his convoy turned onto a broad thoroughfare running through Baghdad's Masbah neighborhood, said U.S. officials and Iraqi witnesses interviewed by The Times. At the same moment, Mohammed Nouri Hattab, 32, was headed north on the road in his Opel. He was moonlighting as a taxi driver, transporting two passengers he had picked up moments earlier. Hattab looked up and saw a five-car convoy speed out of a side street in front of him. He was slowing to a stop about 50 feet from the convoy when he heard a burst of gunfire ring out, he said. Bullets shot through the hood of his Opel, Hattab said, cut into his shoulder and pierced the chest of Yas Ali Mohammed Yassiri, who was in the back seat, killing him. The second passenger escaped without serious injury. The convoy roared on, leaving chaos in its wake. "There was no warning. It was a sudden attack," said Hattab, a slight man who can no longer freely move his right arm. Hattab said it was the third time since the U.S. invasion in 2003 that he had been fired on by Americans. On the first two occasions, U.S. troops who had mistakenly fired at him later apologized, he said. This time, he said, he has drifted in an endless legal fight for compensation, bouncing between Iraqi courts and U.S. officials. Hattab, an Oil Ministry employee now on disability leave, has seen his pay cut in half to $51 a month. "We thought [the Americans] would bring freedom. They got rid of Saddam," Hattab said. "Now it's going on three years and what? Where is this freedom?" The family of his passenger, Yassiri, has fared no better. The 19-year-old newlywed, a Shiite from an impoverished neighborhood in Najaf, was on a trip to Baghdad. Sitting in their two-room home on a dusty, unpaved street, family members said it wasn't until a Times reporter told them that they realized Yassiri had been killed by private guards and not U.S. soldiers, as they had been told. "We lived in poverty and oppression during the time of Saddam and we were expecting the opposite when he left," said Adil Jasim, 26, a family friend. "I say that the situation is the same and even worse. American forces came to occupy and to achieve their goals. They don't care about Iraqis."

Iraq Forces Adv. – Link – Perception

PMC’s destroy perception of the war – they obscure the true mission

Nandi and Mohanty 10 (Tanay Kumar Satabdee National Law University, Jodhpur, Gujarat National Law University, April 23 The Emergence of Private Military Firms and Their Impact on Global Human Rights SSRN TBC 6/26/10)

The privatisation of the military industry signals a blurring of the lines between public and private interests.64 It is often uncertain whether a state acts out of principle or simply out of the desire to make a profit. When private and public lines are perceived to blur it also becomes difficult for states to claim their policy follows a general and justifiable interest beyond that of the specific contract or firm65. This perception impacts on the legitimacy with which a security operation is viewed and leaves affected populations with feelings of injustice and resentment66.

PMC’s destroy perception of the war – Lobby for military solutions

Nandi and Mohanty 10 (Tanay Kumar Satabdee National Law University, Jodhpur, Gujarat National Law University, April 23 The Emergence of Private Military Firms and Their Impact on Global Human Rights SSRN TBC 6/26/10)

As PMFs develop into independent players in the market for force – and engage in extensive lobbying efforts67 – their interests are increasingly a decisive factor when determining the proper course of action in areas of conflict and crisis. As a result, policies focus on immediate security operations and military style solutions, in isolation from the social context and root causes of isolated or expanded conflict68. Social, economic and/or environmental issues are excluded from the analysis, providing additional justification for local populations to feel that the ‘West’ is less concerned about the human security and human rights of civilians and more about securing access to resources69.

PMC’s destroy the legitimacy of the war

Zedeck 7 (Rachel MA in international security and counterterrorism studies Private military/security companies, human security, and state building in Africa African Security Review 16.4 Institute for Security Studies pg. 99 December TBC 6/26/10)

The operations of PMSCs in conflict regions have historically been problematic. Lack of transparency, democratic oversight and accountability inevitably lead to a decreased perception of legitimacy on the part of these actors in the eyes of local governments and civilian populations. Increasingly, civilian populations perceive PMSCs as showing disdain for human rights, operating outside the framework of the rule of law and without accountability to the state in which they operate or regulation by the state in which the company originates (predominately the United Kingdom and United States). This culture of impunity leads to resentment of PMSCs who profi t from war in these regions. The feeling of resentment is exacerbated by the fact that many employees of PMSCs receive neither proper screening nor training in understanding or asserting human rights within the frame of established, international legal standards. This fundamental set of rights was defi ned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations in 1948. According to Laura Dickinson (2003:403, 405), a professor at the University of Connecticut School of Law, of the 60 publicly available Iraq contracts she examined, ‘None contains specifi c provisions requiring contractors to obey human rights, anticorruption, or transparency norms,’ nor do they appear to require training concerning the appropriate ‘use of force’. Dickinson cites an army inspector-general report on the conditions leading to the Abu Ghraib scandal which concluded that ‘35% of US contractor CACI’s Iraqi interrogators had no formal training in military interrogation policies and techniques, let alone training in international legal norms’.

Iraq Forces Adv. – Impact – Iraqi Instability

Iraqi instability causes global catastrophe – spills over to the rest of the middle east

Ben-atar 6 (Doron– July 11, “Immediate withdrawal: power vacuums in gaza and Iraq” http://www.theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=5488 TBC 6/26/10)

The governments of both Iraq and the Palestinian authority are weak, ineffective and corrupt. Iraq, like the Gaza strip, is caught in a turf war between armed militias. Islamist militants in both places have created a culture that glorifies ethnic-based murder. And while the focus of the insurgency in Iraq at the moment is on the outside enemy, just as the focus of the militants in Gaza was on fighting the Israeli army, the conflict between ethnicities, regions and interests in Iraq is flaring into a brutal civil war. Americans should not fantasize, as Israelis did a year ago, that once the hated enemy is gone, the crazy quilt of militias could find a peaceful way to negotiate their differences. A state of chaos If the departure of the U.S. troops is followed by Gaza-like chaos, Iraq would become a failed state in the most strategic location on earth. Unlike the Vietnam scenario, the turmoil would not remain confined to the international boundaries of Iraq. Just as Hamas terror spread to Egypt, Iraqi terrorism would destabilize societies all over the region. The misery in Gaza is purely a local humanitarian issue. A global threat But the prosperity of the entire world is threatened by anarchy in Mesopotamia. And once American troops depart, no politician would dare to send American soldiers back into the quagmire. Republicans and Democrats should eschew the popular impulse to bring our boys home. The strategic blunder of invading Iraq could turn into a global catastrophe if a fully functioning state with an effective army and absolute monopoly over the exercise of power is not secured before the departure of U.S. troops.

Iraq instability causes World War 3

Corsi 7 (Jerome R. senior staff reporter for WND Ph.D. from Harvard University in political science http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE\_ID=53669 TBC 6/26/10)

If a broader war breaks out in Iraq, Olmert will certainly face pressure to send the Israel military into the Gaza after Hamas and into Lebanon after Hezbollah. If that happens, it will only be a matter of time before Israel and the U.S. have no choice but to invade Syria. The Iraq war could quickly spin into a regional war, with Israel waiting on the sidelines ready to launch an air and missile strike on Iran that could include tactical nuclear weapons. With Russia ready to deliver the $1 billion TOR M-1 surface-to-air missile defense system to Iran, military leaders are unwilling to wait too long to attack Iran. Now that Russia and China have invited Iran to join their Shanghai Cooperation Pact, will Russia and China sit by idly should the U.S. look like we are winning a wider regional war in the Middle East? If we get more deeply involved in Iraq, China may have their moment to go after Taiwan once and for all. A broader regional war could easily lead into a third world war, much as World Wars I and II began.

Iraq Forces Adv. – Impact – Iraqi Instability

Iraq instability is the scariest scenario imaginable – sparks massive nuclearization, instability, wars, and collapses heg

Mauro 7 (Ryan Jan 25 Director of Intelligence at IWIC http://97.74.65.51/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=496 TBC 6/26/10)

Good news from Iraq is scarce. Over 3,000 Americans have been killed. Iraqi casualties, depending on which number you believe, are either in the tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands. Progress has been stalled, mistakes have been made, and the purpose of the mission seems unclear. Precipitous withdrawal from Iraq has never seemed more tempting. But to yield to this temptation would be a grave mistake. Leaving Iraq now will not restore order to the country. On the contrary, a premature withdrawal is likely to result in consequences disastrous not only for Iraq and the wider region, but also for the cause of combating Islamic radicalism and the health of the U.S. military. The success of democracy in Iraq threatens nearby tyrannies and empowers those fighting within them. On the other hand, withdrawal would lead to a collapse of the elected Iraqi government, and all the work done to bring democracy to Iraq would be in vain. In southern Iraq, the “Islamization” process would accelerate and sharia law would most likely be implemented, stripping away individual rights, particularly for women. As Iran would grow more powerful, the chances of a radical Shiite state being created in Iraq would also increase. Such a state would oppress its own citizens and pose a regional threat. Sectarian violence would spiral out of control, killing millions of Iraqis, both Sunni and Shiites. Many Iraqis would be forced to flee their homes as radical militias would seek to create homogenous regions. Shiite terrorist groups like Hezbollah would likely find safe haven and support. Abandoning Iraq, therefore, means watching from the sidelines while Iraqis are slaughtered and neighboring states -- including Iran -- divide the spoils. If such a scenario were to take place, Iran -- the main sponsor of terrorism and a home to numerous al-Qaeda leaders -- would grow in power and become the leader of the region. It would become easier for Iran’s government, which denies the Holocaust and has repeatedly called for the destruction of Israel and the United States, to obtain nuclear weapons. The West would also find its options to affect Iran’s behavior increasingly limited. In response to the growth of Iran’s power, countries in the region like Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Gulf states would seek nuclear weapons (in fact, many of these states already indicate that they plan to develop nukes). Already, Iran’s leadership has expressed willingness to share its nuclear technology with other rogue states like Syria and Venezuela. This nuclear arms race could reach another key battleground in the war against radical Islam: Africa. A nuclear arms race triggered by American withdrawal may force Libya, fearing its nuclear neighbors more than American repercussions, to re-start its nuclear program. Insurgency in North Africa would likely expand, as Iran may increase support to organizations like the GIA in Algeria, furthering the civil war there. The United States would not have the will to stop the genocide in Sudan. The Sudanese government, an ally of Iran (and previously of Saddam Hussein), may find hope in America’s withdrawal and increase their brutal activities in Darfur. In Latin America, Venezuela’s nuclear cooperation with Iran would continue. The weakness of the United States would further encourage the formation of an anti-American bloc in South America, led by Cuba and Venezuela, that would ally itself with Iran, China and Russia. Asia may appear far removed from the military theater, but even there the consequences of premature withdrawal may make themselves felt. The perception of American weakness could lead to a struggle for supremacy among rival Asian powers. With China ascendant, Japan would have no option but to develop nuclear weapons. Two scenarios could then arise: China would dominate the Pacific and America’s status as a superpower would quickly recede; or there would be a region-wide nuclear stalemate involving Burma, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and possibly Taiwan and Australia. But most of all, withdrawal from Iraq may prove very damaging to the U.S. military, as it would likely lead to the collapse of morale among the troops. Senator John McCain, a former P.O.W. in Vietnam, said it best recently when he noted that “the only thing worse than a stressed military, is a broken and defeated military.” On the policy front, it would probably translate into a reluctance by the public to support a responsible military budget. The disastrous security situation in Iraq will lead to a terrorist sanctuary that the United States will in due course have to confront. Our uniformed men and women who came home the first time will have to enter again under much harsher and costlier conditions.

Hollow Forces Adv. – Uniqueness – Tipping Point

The brink is now – continued PMF influence collapse troop retention

Singer 4 (Peter W, director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings, http://www.dcaf.ch/\_docs/pp04\_private–military.pdf, AD: 6/22/10) jl

The issue has become pointed for Special Forces units, as they have the most skills (from the longest human capital training investment) and, in turn, are the most marketable for the firms to their clients. Special Forces commanders in Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States have all expressed deep concern, with the policy responses ranging from the creation of special working groups of NCOs to explore the retention issue to allowing troopers to take a year’s leave of absence, in the hope that they would make their quick money and return, rather than be lost to the market forever. In the U.S., the issue of retention among the tier one Special Forces operators, the absolute best in the field, has not yet weakened the units, but is “at a tipping point” in the words of one interviewee. This is particularly the case among the most experienced (10 plus years), members of the units who are so integral to long-term unit cohesion.

Hollow Forces Adv. – Uniqueness – Afghanistan Military

Afghan forces are down severely now

Crowley 9 ( Michael, sr editor on New Repub Magazine, *The Observer,* dec 27) ET

Admittedly, that was possible only because Mullen was flanked by a fearsome contingent of rifle-bearing combat troops. But, speaking to reporters, he said the American presence in the area was focused on building up Afghan security forces so they can handle security for themselves. "The plan for all of us is to transition security to the local forces," Mullen said. "I am confident the Afghan national security forces will be able to do this job." This was in keeping with the vision Barack Obama offered in his 1 December speech announcing 30,000 more troops for Afghanistan. Along with those troops – and another 7,000 from Nato – came a pledge to start transferring security duties to the Afghans and begin withdrawing US forces by July 2011. That raised the hope that an end to America's eight-year entanglement with Afghanistan might be in view. For Europe, where doubts about the war run even higher than in the States, that day can't come soon enough, a point underscored when Mullen visited French troops stationed near Kabul. "I'm reminded in particular of the 10 [French] soldiers that were lost out here about a year ago," he said. But a few days of travel in the country offers a different view. Consider the perspective of Brigadier General Maharuddin Ghori, commander of Afghan forces around Nawa. He told reporters it may be five years before Afghan troops can assume security duties from the Americans. (An off-message Afghan President Hamid Karzai said much the same earlier this month, standing alongside an unhappy US defence secretary Robert Gates in Kabul.) If he's right – and there is ample reason to think so – then Obama has to make a choice. He can mount a quick surge in Afghanistan and leave. Or he can commit America to staying until the Afghans can defend themselves from the Taliban. But he can't do both. And neither option will make his difficult presidency any easier.

Hollow Forces Adv. – Link – Generic

PMC’s hollow out the military

Valero 8 (Rafael Enrique National Journal January 9 http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0108/010908nj1.htm TBC 6/25/10)

To be fair, the benefits of a private sector supporting stability operations in failing states are significant. Contractors and their "on call" employees -- former soldiers and officers -- have experience aplenty. But as stability operations become the norm worldwide, it is certainly possible that civilian and military interests could blur into a self-perpetuating, symbiotic relationship. Experts wonder if it could lead the United States into a period of "liberal imperialism" that oddly mirrors the British, French, and Dutch East India companies of the 1600s and 1700s -- private entities sanctioned by governments to do their bidding. Furthermore, as soldiers look to lucrative futures in the private sector while serving a national flag, the military's traditional political neutrality could erode. Working closely with highly paid contractors, envious soldiers from the enlisted and officer ranks might gravitate to the private security field and, over time, hollow out the Army.

PMC’s hollow out the military

Valero 8 (Rafael Enrique National Journal January 9 http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0108/010908nj1.htm TBC 6/25/10)

He also argues that the Bush administration, through its heavy reliance on private contractors for the Iraq war and its refusal to demand sacrifice from Americans, has widened this "schism" even as it has undermined the military services. By augmenting the military with private contractors in Iraq, Wrona says, the Bush administration hurt recruitment and retention. Many soldiers left for better pay in the private sector; those still in uniform feel some jealousy and resentment toward the better-paid hired guns. The private contractors "contradict the military culture's foundation of sacrifice for the collective good," writes Wrona, who has taught at West Point and served with the 82nd Airborne Division and 173rd Airborne Brigade. Furthermore, he warns, with the growing demand for seasoned soldiers from private security contractors, "there is an increasing likelihood that the best segments of the military will vote with their feet, leaving the armed services to the control of less capable actors and leaving the country as a whole with a less effective military." Could the military's new embrace of stability operations create such a condition and hollow out the Army? Soldiers could enlist just to gain the experience needed to join the better-paying private armies. And the Army would then lose its necessary ethic of self-sacrifice, so crucial to defending the country.

Privatization of the army represents the emergence of the hollow army- enables rampant abuse for cheap labor

Scahill 7 (Jeremy, Puffin Foundation Writing Fellow at The Nation Institute, is the author of the bestselling Blackwater, *The Independent,* Aug 10, http://www.uruknet.info/?p=35239 ) ET

In many ways, it is the same corporate model of relying on cheap labor in destitute nations to staff their uber-profitable operations. The giant multinationals also argue they are helping the economy by hiring locals, even if it’s at starvation wages. "Donald Rumsfeld’s masterstroke, and his most enduring legacy, was to bring the corporate branding revolution of the 1990s into the heart of the most powerful military in the world," says Naomi Klein, whose upcoming book, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, explores these themes.

"We have now seen the emergence of the hollow army. Much as with so-called hollow corporations like Nike, billions are spent on military technology and design in rich countries while the manual labor and sweat work of invasion and occupation is increasingly outsourced to contractors who compete with each other to fill the work order for the lowest price. Just as this model breeds rampant abuse in the manufacturing sector — with the big-name brands always able to plead ignorance about the actions of their suppliers—so it does in the military, though with stakes that are immeasurably higher." In the case of Iraq, the U.S. and U.K. governments could give the public perception of a withdrawal of forces and just privatize the occupation. Indeed, shortly after former British Prime Minister Tony Blair announced that he wanted to withdraw 1,600 soldiers from Basra, reports emerged that the British government was considering sending in private security companies to "fill the gap left behind."

Hollow Forces Adv. – Link – Generic

PMC’s compete with regular armies

Shishkov 9 (Viktor, Information Liberation staff writer, *Information Liberation*, Mar 2-9)

Private military companies (PMC’s) have become rather popular nowadays in terms of providing specialized expertise or services of a military nature. These units can compete with special services and regular armies. There are such companies in Russia, although they are not so widely spread in the country in comparison with their prototypes in the West. As experience shows, the PMC’s will prevail in the future. The history of private military companies started on June 24, 1997, when experts of the US Intelligence Department proclaimed the PMC’s as a major tool in the implementation of the military security policy of the United States and its allies in other countries. The professional level of a private military company is its major advantage. Inexperienced military men are not welcome there. A PMC member is usually a man between 35-40 years of age. A human being of this age is resistant to stresses and emergency situations. In addition, a man of this age can also do routine work very well, which can not be said about younger men.

PMC’s are luring away the best members of the military

BASIC 4 (Vritish American Security International Council, <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2004PMC2iii.pdf>, date accessed: 6/25/2010) AJK  
A drain on the regular armed services? The lure of higher salaries is reportedly causing an exodus of the U.S. military’s most seasoned members of Special Operation Forces (SOF) to higher-paying civilian security jobs in places like Baghdad and Kabul, just as the special forces are being asked to play an increasingly pivotal role in combating terror and helping to conduct nation-building operations worldwide. Of course the same problem exists in many other areas of military specialism, such as information technology. Why work in the Army’s tech operations when you can get a job at three times the remuneration in the private sector? Reportedly, exhausted American and British special forces personnel are resigning in record numbers and taking highly-paid jobs as private security guards in Iraq and Afghanistan. Competition over elite troops from private companies is so intense that the U.S. Special Operations Command has formulated new pay, benefits, and educational incentives to try to retain them. “Competition with the civilian world has never been greater,” said Gen. Bryan "Doug" Brown, commander of the 49,000-strong U.S. Special Operations Command, in congressional testimony.59 Senior enlisted members of the Army Green Berets or Navy Seals with 20 years or more experience now earn about $50,000 in base pay, and can retire with a $23,000 pension. But private security companies, whose services are in growing demand in Iraq and Afghanistan, are offering salaries of $100,000 to nearly $200,000 a year to the most experienced of them.60 But there is no guarantee beyond the contracted period and it is only paid when deployed, i.e., two on, one off – only paid in effect two-thirds of the annual sum. Similarly, British officials say more than 300 soldiers have left the armed forces in six months to take up lucrative jobs with private companies such as Olive Security, Armour Security, Global and USDID.61 In particular, the demand from PMC’s operating in Iraq for former Special Air Service and Special Boat Service soldiers is such that between May 2003 and December 2004, between 40 and 60 men are expected to have sought premature voluntary release from the army and Royal Marines. In operational terms, this could mean that the equivalent of one entire Sabre squadron out of a total of six in the SAS and SBS is on its way to seek its fortune in the new Iraq. 62 According to one British press report there are more ex-SAS soldiers acting as advisers for “private military companies” than currently serving in the elite, 300-man regiment based near Hereford. More than 40 regular SAS soldiers are understood to have applied to leave the Army in the last year, many because of the lure of short-term contracts in Iraq.63

Hollow Forces Adv. – Link – Police Training

Conractors fail at even training local police

Engelhardt 9 (Tom, Fellow @ Nation Institute, teaching fellow @ berk, Jan 11-9, *Tom Dispatch*)

Afghans protest that such a plan amounts to sponsoring civil war, which, if true, would mean that American involvement in Afghanistan might be coming full circle -- civil war being the state in which the U.S. left Afghanistan at the end of our proxy war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. American commanders, however, insist that they must use militias because Afghan Army and police forces are "simply not available." Maj. Gen. Michael S. Tucker, deputy commander of American forces, told the New York Times, "We don't have enough police, [and] we don't have time to get the police ready." This, despite the State Department's award to DynCorp last August of another $317.4 million contract "to continue training civilian police forces in Afghanistan," a contract DynCorp CEO William Ballhaus greeted as "an opportunity to contribute to peace, stability and democracy in the world [and] support our government's efforts to improve people's lives."

Contractors kill education

Engelhardt 9 (Tom, Fellow @ Nation Institute, teaching fellow @ berk, Jan 11-9, *Tom Dispatch*)

In other areas less obviously connected to security, American aid policy is no less self-serving or self-defeating. Although the Bush administration handpicked the Afghan president and claims to want to extend his authority throughout the country, it refuses to channel aid money through his government's ministries. (It argues that the Afghan government is corrupt, which it is, in a pathetic, minor league sort of way.) Instead of giving aid money for Afghan schools to the Ministry of Education, for example, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funds private American contractors to start literacy programs for adults. As a result, Afghan teachers abandon the public schools and education administrators leave the Ministry for higher paying jobs with those contractors, further undermining public education and governance.

Hollow Forces Adv. – Link – Afghan Retention

Most American PMC’s in Afghanistan hire locals to work.

Schwartz 9 (“Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis” Moshe Schwartz Specialist in Defense Acquisition December 14, 2009 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40764.pdf)

An analysis of contractor data appears to indicate differences in how DOD uses contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, contractors made up 62% of DOD’s combined uniformed and contractor personnel workforce in Afghanistan compared to 47% of the workforce in Iraq. In addition, 75% of contractors in Afghanistan are local nationals compared to only 26% in Iraq (see Table 2 and Table 4). Some analysts contend that understanding these differences–and why they occur–could help DOD to strategically plan for the management and use of contractors in future operations. For example, had DOD understood the extent to which it would rely on private security contractors in Iraq, DOD might have put in place a more robust oversight and coordination mechanism earlier. 26

PMF’s drain from local areas – high pay incentivizes people to quitting jobs and joining security firms.

Nassar 8 (“Privatising war”, Galal Nassar, 2008, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/899/focus.htm)KM

PMFs in Iraq are equipped with or have access to the most sophisticated military equipment (armoured four–wheel vehicles, helicopters, super computers and various satellite surveillance, positioning and guidance services). They offer very attractive incentives, more than enough to tempt individuals into quitting their jobs at home as truck drivers, prison wardens or private security guards and seeking employment in a PMF that will send them to the world's most violent hotspots. Pay ranges from $500 to $1,500 a day, whereas an ordinary career army soldier earns around $3,000 a month and an Iraqi policeman earns less than $400 per month. Such figures cast new light on ways Iraq is being drained of its national resources. Consider, too, that private security firms represent $100 billion worth of contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan and that one of these companies –– a British one –– increased its revolving capital from ¨554,000 in 2003, before the war on Iraq, to ¨62 million in 2005.

PMC undermine the training of Afghan police through carelessness

Huffington Post 4/19 (19 APR 2010 http://huffpostfund.org/stories/2010/04/auditor-finds-poor-controls-expenses-afghan-police-program-0)

The private contractor that trains the Afghan police force, a U.S. military program long criticized for wasting money, has failed to document millions of dollars in expenses, according to a leading defense audit agency. A November 2009 audit by the Defense Contract Audit Agency, made public Friday by a Senate subcommittee on contracting oversight, uncovered serious deficiencies in how DynCorp International tracks payroll, bills from subcontractors, cost vouchers and millions of dollars in labor costs. In sum, the audit found many of DynCorp’s billing and financial controls to be inadequate. The audit is notable for providing the first hard look at the company’s financial accountability in Afghanistan, where since 2004 it has played a key role training the Afghan National Police. This effort is critical to the drawdown of U.S. troops.

Hollow Forces Adv. – Link – Afghan Retention

PMC’s hollow out Afghan army and police – destroying Afghan governance

Honda 10 (Rep. Michael M. June 10 chairman of the Congressional Progressive Caucus' Afghanistan Taskforce http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jun/10/our-longest-war/

I have similar concerns with the sustainability of U.S.-led training of Afghanistan's security forces. Recent reports show attrition rates in the Afghanistan National Police at a whopping 70 percent, surpassing equally untenable attrition rates within the National Army. In allocating hundreds of billions of dollars toward a training curriculum for Afghan security forces - without good monitoring and evaluation - it is difficult to change to a more efficient tack. It makes it much more difficult to stem the attrition trends of former Afghan army and police foot soldiers, who once made $200 per month as government employees, as they leave for private security contractors who pay several hundred dollars per day. It makes it much more difficult to evaluate why violent attacks on U.S. troops are on the rise and why the Marjah offensive fell far short in providing security and stability. Without this necessary evaluation, we will continue to implement ineffective strategies indefinitely. Finally, our good-governance approach is equally ill-footed. In recent past, we have circumvented Afghanistan's central government on most governance strategies (80 percent of all military and nonmilitary aid bypassed the government) colluding, ironically, with known warlords and corrupt figures. Now we're trying to team up with President Hamid Karzai, yet we continue to undermine his authority by building parallel local structures that rival the highly effective, government-run National Solidarity Program's Community Development Councils. To add insult to injury, U.S. and foreign contractors who offer substantially higher salaries snatch up the best and brightest of the Afghan government's young recruits, leaving Kabul with little self-governing potential and heavily reliant on international consultants.

PMC’s steal from Afghan forces and undermine US mission

Jordan 10 (Bryant June 18th Defense Tech Chief Investigative Correspondent http://defensetech.org/2010/06/18/big-bucks-lure-crack-afghan-troops-to-private-security-firms/ TBC 6/25/10)

Private security companies working under Defense Department contracts in Afghanistan are siphoning off some of the best and brightest from that country’s security and police forces, Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee says. That’s the finding of a committee investigation into private security contractors in Afghanistan. The reason the Afghans are taking the contract jobs is simple — money. “Many of them are recruited by higher-paying private security firms,” Levin said in a statement released during Gen. David Petraeus’ testimony to the committee. Levin said he is concerned that the U.S.‘s own contracting practices may be harming the war effort by luring away from the Afghan forces that are expected to take over the fight many of its best people. He also noted that private security contractors often draw from militia forces, thereby “empowering local powerbrokers and warlords who operate outside the government’s control.” Levin said Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. military leader in Afghanistan, has acknowledged there are problems with the contracting practices and that the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force would assess what needs to be done to reform them.

Hollow Forces Adv. – Link – Afghan Retention

And, contractors are 95% made up of locals- takes away from possible army

Tierney 10 (John, Chair of National Security of foreign affairs in US House of reps, *US Congress*, june 10, P.2) ET

According to the Afghan Ministry of Interior, there are currently 52 licensed private security companies with a total of roughly 25,000 registered armed guards in Afghanistan.42 There are also hundreds of additional unregistered private security providers and some estimate up to 70,000 total private armed guards.43 Given perilous security conditions in Afghanistan, U.S. and allied contractors in Afghanistan have little choice but to employ private security companies. Whether securing truck convoys, guarding a road project, or providing personal security details, private security services are widely used. The U.S. military increasingly relies on private security contractors in Afghanistan for a variety of significant security needs, from transportation to static protection of U.S. bases.44 Unlike in Iraq where a majority of the armed guards are third-country nationals (e.g., Peruvians, Ugandans, Nepalese), 95 percent of the private armed guards used by the Department of Defense in Afghanistan are local nationals. Indeed, the Department’s “Afghan First” campaign directs contractors to hire at least half of all workers from nearby towns or villages.

Afghan can’t recruit because of the contractors

Stokes 10 (Jacob, Business week journalist, Feb 25, *Democracy Arsenal*) ET

Security, which is the Afghan and foreign governments’ primary objective, is seriously struggling. Afghan army and police remain ill equipped not because Afghans are indifferent about their country’s security. In fact, Afghans are quite entrepreneurial and industrious. A primary reason why the security sector is struggling is because the attrition rate is dangerously high due to poor wages, soaring casualty rates, insufficient training, and the fact that the soldiers and police are deployed away from their homes to other provinces, where they are viewed as outsiders. The low recruitment rates for Pashtuns in the south and southeast hardly helps either. Additionally, some 2,000 U.S. trainer positions for the Afghan army and police have remained unfilled for the second year running. The persistence of these obstacles, along with the inefficiency of military spending, where the cost of one American soldier, at $1 million annually, could provide salaries for several hundred Afghan soldiers, makes it difficult to help Afghans stand up. Afghans remain convinced that the conflict cannot be solved through military means, which is why we are losing the goodwill of the Afghan people with continued night raids, dog attacks and detentions. Transitioning security responsibilities to Afghans sooner than later is critical, but without a political solution that is inclusive and Afghan-led, involving the insurgency’s top leadership, stability will remain elusive.

Hollow Forces Adv. – Link – Afghan Readiness

The use of contractors destroys readiness of militias in Afghanistan

Jora 8 (Ulrike, PHD Economic Geography @ U of Aachen, *Swisspiece*, pg 31) ET

The fears expressed were two-fold. Firstly, interviewees wondered about the readiness of militias embedded in PSCs to engage in another civil war. Secondly, some civil society representatives saw the proliferation of local PSCs (especially those owned by family members of high ranking government officials) and their links to militias as an uneasy reminder of the last days of the former communist government under Najibullah who enlisted pro-government militia to kill opponents.136 The ownership of some PSCs by family members of high-ranking Afghan government officials was also potentially seen as a way to undermine accountability and using government connections to obtain big international contracts. An operations manager for USPI said their rationale for working with commanders is that “We’d like to think that we know who’s in control and, whereby knowing who’s in control, we’d like to set lines at what point to use which kind of commander.”137 Even if such behaviour is an expedient way to receive protection, it is not without risk for security firms. PSCs are essentially paying those individuals for protection that might be the main source of insecurity in the region to begin with. A western diplomat suggested, for example, that USPI hired Zabet Jalil in Farah even though there were allegations that he had killed a USPI advisor and three of his security guards in early 2006.138 Some respondents felt that this practice sent a message to the militia that by remaining a threat (and also increasing the feeling of insecurity within the general population in those regions where these practices are used) they are likely to be hired in the future.139

PMC’s deliberately don’t train the army destroying Afghanistan’s military forces

Charlier10(Marie- political adviser to the commander of ISAF, 2-16, *Middle East Online*) ET

“General” Gulbahar, in charge of doctrine at the Afghan National Army Training Command’s doctrine office, says he has been given no target date for the handover of the drafting of ANA military doctrine to Afghan control. Gulbahar is not unhappy to be supervised: He is in fact a colonel serving in a position normally occupied by a general and has everything to lose by questioning the status quo. MPRI, therefore, has what amounts to a monopoly on the drafting of Afghan army doctrine, which allows it to justify the prolongation of its assisting role. But MPRI also shows solidarity with other PMC’s: The ANA’s logistical doctrine, drafted by MPRI, names DynCorp as the organization responsible for providing logistics support to the ANA’s air corps, without specifying any restrictions or limitations on the duration of this role. The “training” element is highly profitable. The PMC’s are recruiting and training 800 instructors as part of a program to combat illiteracy in the ANA, but their determination to secure the greatest possible return on investment has encouraged them to extend the duration of the training provided. It would seem that fostering the ANA’s own training capabilities is not a priority. The same applies to logistics (currently provided by RM Asia), another key element of the PMC monopoly: no deadlines have been set for the training of Afghan technicians. Here again, the financial interests of the PMC’s, which employ several thousand contract staff, differ from the military interests of ISAF: But they do not wish to see operational systems change too rapidly any more than they hope for a swift victory. They need to be able to influence events and, if necessary, to steer policy at the operational and strategic levels.

Most of the PSC’s are locals

Barakat 8 (Dep of politics, NYU, *University of New York*, Nov 8 P. 24) ET

The influx of international civilian organizations in Afghanistan in the wake of the Taliban’s fall coupled with the persistence of high levels of insecurity—a result of general criminality, terrorism and the anti-government insurgency—generated a sustained demand for private security providers. It is difficult to determine the number of private security companies (PSCs) or individual contractors working in Afghanistan given that, until the recent promulgation of the Private Security Company Law, no regulatory framework existed to monitor and govern their activities. PSCs tend to eschew transparency, augmenting suspicion of their activities by local and international actors. Almost every category of international actor employs PSCs in Afghanistan, including the United Nations, donor governments, private sector companies and NGOs. They have become an omnipresent feature of the Afghan security landscape. Estimates of the number of international private security contractors working in Afghanistan range from 3,000 to 4,000. Contractors are generally divided into two groups: Western expatriates, consisting primarily of nationals from Britain, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Canada, Zimbabwe and the United States; and third party nationals, predominantly comprising Ghurkhas who previously served in the Indian, British and Nepalese militaries. The Ghurkhas play a crucial role for the PSCs, serving, as one UN official puts it, as a ‘middle link between the Afghans and the internationals.’ While the core staff of the PSCs are international, they rely heavily on locally engaged staff. The bulk of man-guarding or static guarding - safeguarding fixed locations or facilities - is undertaken by Afghan staff. It is even more difficult to provide a precise figure regarding the number of Afghan staff employed by PSCs, as several PSCs sub-contract to regional warlords or small Afghan PSCs.

Hollow Forces Adv. – Link – Afghanistan Instability

The use of contractors co-opt local police and destroy stability locally.

Jora 8 (Ulrike, PHD Economic Geography @ U of Aachen, *Swisspiece*, pg 32) ET

Especially the inability of the Afghan government to regulate PSCs and hold them accountable was interpreted as a weakness of the government (specifically the MoI) during focus group discussions:145 • “PSCs show lack of respect toward local security forces, and do not collaborate with them.” • “PSCs are able to wear similar uniforms to the ANA and ANP, drive around in unmarked cares, and ignore traffic rules, without being told to do so otherwise by the Afghan government.” The worst allegation was that PSC staff wearing ANA and ANP uniforms were committing criminal acts such as robberies. • The ability of PSCs to block roads at will and limit access to important facilities such as hospitals is perceived as a major problem: “They tell you not to go here, or not to go there, they block the road – who are they to do this?” • Ignoring the authority of local police and lacking respect of traffic laws and inappropriate driving styles, such as not stopping at intersections, using one-way roads in the wrong direction, driving too fast and pushing people to the side of roads. A DynCorp guard was also once seen slapping an Afghan Minister. During focus group discussions the implication of a weak government versus strong PSCs was debated. As noted earlier, there are fears among those interviewed that strongmen who are able to “preserve” their “personal army” in form of, or through PSCs may at one point challenge the government and re-ignite civil war.146 In addition, some considered PSCs as a potential threat to the state: “We saw how a small riot [May 2006] shocked the government, we saw how unarmed people shocked the government and the police was not able to control them and had to call in the national army. If the police cannot control an unarmed mob, how could they control an armed one? If anybody can buy the service of PSCs, what if people who want to overthrow the government hire them? What happens then? Who is going to take responsibility?”147

PMCs steal the best operatives away from local Afganistan police and military

Jordan 2010 (Bryant, http://defensetech.org/2010/06/18/big-bucks-lure-crack-afghan-troops-to-private-security-firms/ , date accessed: 6/28/2010) AJK

Private security companies working under Defense Department contracts in Afghanistan are siphoning off some of the best and brightest from that country’s security and police forces, Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee says. That’s the finding of a committee investigation into private security contractors in Afghanistan. The reason the Afghans are taking the contract jobs is simple — money. “Many of them are recruited by higher-paying private security firms,” Levin said in a statement released during Gen. David Petraeus’ testimony to the committee. Levin said he is concerned that the U.S.‘s own contracting practices may be harming the war effort by luring away from the Afghan forces that are expected to take over the fight many of its best people.

Hollow Forces Adv. – I/L – Afghan Police Key

The Afghan police is key to stability in Afghanistan after the scheduled pullout.

Simao 6/20 (Paul, Jun 20, 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65J1M520100620?type=politicsNews>)KFC

"That absolutely has not been decided," Gates said. President Barack Obama decided in December to send 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan as part of a revised strategy that focuses on securing Kandahar, the Taliban's birthplace, to try to turn the tide in the nearly nine-year-old war. Obama also announced the July 2011 date for the gradual withdrawal of troops. Transferring responsibility for security to Afghan troops in certain parts of the country is one of the linchpins of the Obama strategy. But doubts remain that Afghan troops will be able to assert control if given broader authority next year -- recent reports have suggested that Kabul's army is poorly trained and suffers high rates of desertion. Some top military officials have said privately that they doubt they will really know if the war strategy is working or not until next summer, around the time Obama plans to begin a troop withdrawal, conditions permitting. White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel told ABC's "This Week" program that the July 2011 drawdown date was "firm," adding that Washington was seeing signs that the Afghan government was making headway on security. "We are now at that point in Afghanistan, and in fact for the first time in eight years, nine years, they're actually meeting their police recruitment requirements as well as their army recruitment requirements," he said in an interview aired on Sunday. Gates said he was confident that Afghan troops would be ready to take over primary responsibility for security in some parts of Afghanistan.

Hollow Forces Adv. – I/L – Afghan Army Key

The lack of an army cripples Afghanistan

Jora 8 (Ulrike, PHD Economic Geography @ U of Aachen, *Swisspiece*, pg 37) ET

First, the reported difficulty to clearly distinguish between different security actors in Afghanistan creates a sense of vulnerability among those interviewed, as to whom they are dealing with. This was enhanced by perceptions that local strongmen were using PSCs as a front in order to stay in power and legitimise keeping their militia. The latter was even considered as potentially threatening to the weak Afghan state, including fears of renewed conflict. Second, even though Afghans who participated in this study acknowledged that internationals and wealthy businessmen needed protection in Afghanistan, there is perceived resentment against security becoming a commodity of the rich. Furthermore, many focus group participants felt that PSCs had a negative impact on the security in the neighbourhoods they worked in, due to bad behaviour of PSC staff, their heavy armament and the increased exposure to insurgency attacks and criminal gangs. Third, the perceived high cost of private security was also criticized as diverting needed reconstruction funds back to the countries needing PSCs to begin with. Even though it was acknowledged that PSCs could make a positive contribution to unemployment by providing jobs for low-skilled labour and previous militia fighters, the Afghans who participated in this study felt that PSCs could improve on salaries paid, hiring practises, quality of training and supervision of staff.

Use of contractors and lack of an army destroys stability

Januzzi 2 (Charles, prof of human culture @ U of Fukai,  *Mail Archive,* oct 1, 2) ET

In Afghanistan, the plan is for up to 150 U. S. Special Forces troops to begin training Afghan recruits, then to turn the effort over to private U. S. contractors. Defense officials have said for months that only by having an army of its own can Afghanistan hope to create the stability that is critical if the country is to avoid remaining a haven for terrorists. DefSec. Rumsfeld has said he might seek money from Congress and other foreign govts to finance the army. Some basic training of several hundred Afghan recruits is already underway, led by British & German members of the international security force there. But thousands of other potential Afghan soldiers have yet to be tapped, and international financial support for building Afghanistan's army has been slim.

The lack of having one military incites conflict in Afghanistan

Barakat 8 (Dep of politics, NYU, University of New York, Nov 8 P. 24) ET

From this history, it is apparent that Afghan men are loathe to permit the presence of outside forces or actors intent upon influencing the qawm. This dynamic is most evident in the anti-Soviet jihad. The response to the Taliban was weaker only because of the war-weariness of the Mujahidin and the support the movement received from ethnic Pashtuns, Hizb-e Islami defectors and existing movements such as Harakat-e Enqelab which, like the Taliban, was rooted in a conservative network of mullahs. The only recent conflict which fails to meet this pattern is, potentially, the internal conflict which raged in Afghanistan from 1992 to 1996. This conflict reflects another historical dynamic of conflict in Afghanistan, an exceptionally sensitive perception of threat which is most commonly applied to other tribal and ethnic groups. The victorious Mujahidin groups entered into conflict out of concern that another group would take the reigns and attempt to subjugate all others. While this threat perception was also driven by ‘warlords’’ pursuit of power and wealth, the individual soldiers were motivated by fear of repression by another faction. As such, threat does not require any inciting gesture but is provoked in Afghans simply by the presence of multiple sources of power and authority.

Making afghan police more effective solves the impact

Jones 8 (Seth, prof- security studies @ Georgetown, *International Security,* Vol. 32, No. 4 Spring 8) ET

In sum, improving essential services and the effectiveness of the Afghan police in rural areas of the country could have a stabilizing affect over the long run. Together they would likely undermine the Taliban’s support base and increase the government’s monopoly of the legitimate use of force within Afghanistan. So would greater efforts to counter insurgent ideology in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Most Afghans are not asking for much. They crave security and a reason for hope, and perhaps something to make their difficult lives a bit better. After thirty years of near-constant war, they certainly deserve it.

Hollow Forces Adv. – I/L – Supply Chain

PMC control of the supply chain is a major source of Taliban funding

Supply Chain Standard 10 (25 June Europe’s strategic supply chain management publication http://www.supplychainstandard.com/Home/Default.aspx TBC 6/25/10)

In his introduction to the report John Tierney, chair of the House of Representatives sub-committee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, says: “The findings of this report range from sobering to shocking. In short, the Department of Defense designed a contract that put responsibility for the security of vital US supplies on contractors and their unaccountable security providers. “This arrangement has fuelled a vast protection racket run by a shadowy network of warlords, strongmen, commanders, corrupt Afghan officials, and perhaps others. Not only does the system run afoul of the Department’s own rules and regulations mandated by Congress, it also appears to risk undermining the US strategy for achieving its goals in Afghanistan,” says Tierney. The report focuses on the principal contract supporting the US supply chain in Afghanistan, which is called Host Nation Trucking – a £1.5billion ($2.16bn) contract split among eight Afghan, American, and Middle Eastern companies. Although there are other supply chain contracts, the HNT contract provides trucking for over 70 per cent of the total goods and materiel distributed to US troops in the field, roughly 6,000 to 8,000 truck missions per month. The trucks carry food, supplies, fuel, ammunition, and even Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. Under the HNT contract, the prime contractors are responsible for the security of the cargo that they carry. Most of the prime contractors and their trucking sub-contractors hire local Afghan security providers for armed protection of the trucking convoys. The report points out that transporting valuable and sensitive supplies in highly remote and insecure locations requires extraordinary levels of security. “A typical convoy of 300 supply trucks going from Kabul to Kandahar, for example, will travel with 400 to 500 guards in dozens of trucks armed with heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades.” “The private security companies that protect the convoys are frequently involved in armed conflict with alleged insurgents, rival security providers, and other criminal elements. The security providers report having lost hundreds of men over the course of the last year alone, though the veracity of these reports is difficult to judge. Many of the firefights purportedly last for hours and involve significant firepower and frequent civilian casualties. Indeed, in an interview with the Subcommittee staff, the leading convoy security commander in Afghanistan said that he spent $1.5 million on ammunition per month,” the report says. The congressional report points out that during the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan from1979-1989 its army devoted a substantial portion of its total force structure to defending its supply chain and the HNT contract allows the United States to dedicate a greater proportion of its troops to other counterinsurgency priorities instead of logistics. However, in a key conclusion the report says: “ But outsourcing the supply chain in Afghanistan to contractors has also had significant unintended consequences. The HNT contract fuels warlordism, extortion, and corruption, and it may be a significant source of funding for insurgents. In other words, the logistics contract has an outsized strategic impact on US objectives in Afghanistan.” And it accuses the Department of Defense of being “largely blind to the potential strategic consequences of its supply chain contingency contracting”.

PMC control of the supply chain funds the Taliban

Weigant 10 (Chris, June 23, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chris-weigant/were-emallem-terrorist-su\_b\_623500.html TBC 6/25/10)

If they even notice, that is. Case in point, we are already paying off the Taliban. We're paying them (through their warlord fellow-travelers) a lot of money not to shoot at our convoys. Tens of millions of American taxpayer dollars. This story broke late last year, and then promptly sank in the American media without making much of a ripple. It did spur Congress to investigate, however, and they just released a report (ominously titled "Warlord, Inc.") which confirmed and expanded upon what was known about the practice. The American military contracts out its supply lines these days. What this means is that the Pentagon pays private companies to truck their supplies around Afghanistan. The only problem with this is that the security for the convoys is up to the private company, and not the Pentagon. And Afghanistan's roads (what little of them exist at all) are controlled by various warlords. The private contractors, in what surely must be a bottom-line type of decision, have decided that it is easier and cheaper to pay protection money to the warlords, so they won't shoot at the trucks. Some of these warlords are middlemen who funnel American money to the Taliban (again, so the Taliban won't shoot at the trucks).

Hollow Forces Adv. – I/L – Supply Chain

PMC control of the supply chain undermines Afghan government stability

FILKINS 10 (DEXTER June 21http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/22/world/asia/22contractors.html TBC 6/25/10

The 79-page report, entitled “Warlord Inc.,” paints an anarchic picture of contemporary Afghanistan, with the country’s major highways being controlled by groups of freelance gunmen who answer to no one — and who are being paid for by the United States. Afghanistan, the investigation found, plays host to hundreds of unregistered private security companies employing as many as 70,000 largely unsupervised gunmen. “The principal private security subcontractors,” the report said, “are warlords, strongmen, commanders and militia leaders who compete with the Afghan central government for power and authority. “The warlords thrive in a vacuum of government authority, and their interests are in fundamental conflict with U.S. aims to build a strong Afghan government,” the report said. At the heart of the problem, the investigation found, is that the American military pays trucking companies to move its supplies across Afghanistan — and leaves it up to the trucking companies to protect themselves. The trucking companies in turn pay warlords and commanders to provide security. These subcontracts, the investigation found, are handed out without any oversight from the Department of Defense, despite clear instructions from Congress that the department provide such oversight. The report states that military officers in Kabul had little idea whom the trucking companies were paying to provide security or how much they spent for it, and had rarely if ever inspected a convoy to find out.

Contractors higher locals to secure the supply line transportation

Tierney 10 (John, Chair of National Security of foreign affairs in US House of reps, *US Congress*, june 10, P.1) ET

In Afghanistan, the U.S. military faces one of the most complicated and difficult supply chains in the history of warfare. The task of feeding, fueling, and arming American troops at over 200 forward operating bases and combat outposts sprinkled across a difficult and hostile terrain with only minimal road infrastructure is nothing short of herculean. In order to accomplish this mission, the Department of Defense employs a hitherto unprecedented logistics model: responsibility for the supply chain is almost entirely outsourced to local truckers and Afghan private security providers. The principal contract supporting the U.S. supply chain in Afghanistan is called Host Nation Trucking, a $2.16 billion contract split among eight Afghan, American, and Middle Eastern companies. Although there are other supply chain contracts, the HNT contract provides trucking for over 70 percent of the total goods and materiel distributed to U.S. troops in the field, roughly 6,000 to 8,000 truck missions per month. The trucks carry food, supplies, fuel, ammunition, and even Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPs). The crucial component of the HNT contract is that the prime contractors are responsible for the security of the cargo that they carry. Most of the prime contractors and their trucking subcontractors hire local Afghan security providers for armed protection of the trucking convoys. Transporting valuable and sensitive supplies in highly remote and insecure locations requires extraordinary levels of security. A typical convoy of 300 supply trucks going from Kabul to Kandahar, for example, will travel with 400 to 500 guards in dozens of trucks armed with heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).

Hollow Forces Adv. – I/L – Causes Insurgency

And, the use of Afghanis by PMC’s fuels the funding of the insurgency

Tierney 10 (John, Chair of National Security of foreign affairs in US House of reps, *US Congress*, june 10, P.2) ET

The private security companies that protect the convoys are frequently involved in armed conflict with alleged insurgents, rival security providers, and other criminal elements. The security providers report having lost hundreds of men over the course of the last year alone, though the veracity of these reports is difficult to judge. Many of the firefights purportedly last for hours and involve significant firepower and frequent civilian casualties. Indeed, in an interview with the Subcommittee staff, the leading convoy security commander in Afghanistan said that he spent $1.5 million on ammunition per month. From one perspective, the HNT contract works quite well: the HNT providers supply almost all U.S. forward operating bases and combat outposts across a difficult and hostile terrain while only rarely needing the assistance of U.S. troops. Nearly all of the risk on the supply chain is borne by contractors, their local Afghan truck drivers, and the private security companies that defend them. During the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1989), by contrast, its army devoted a substantial portion of its total force structure to defending its supply chain. The HNT contract allows the United States to dedicate a greater proportion of its troops to other counterinsurgency priorities instead of logistics.

But outsourcing the supply chain in Afghanistan to contractors has also had significant unintended consequences. The HNT contract fuels warlordism, extortion, and corruption, and it may be a significant source of funding for insurgents. In other words, the logistics contract has an outsized strategic impact on U.S. objectives in Afghanistan. The Department of Defense has been largely blind to the potential strategic consequences of its supply chain contingency contracting. U.S. military logisticians have little visibility into what happens to their trucks on the road and virtually no understanding of how security is actually provided. When HNT contractors self-reported to the military that they were being extorted by warlords for protection payments for safe passage and that these payments were “funding the insurgency,” they were largely met with indifference and inaction.

Hollow Forces Adv. – Afghanistan Forces Solve

Local forces key to Afghanistan war

Atlantic Council 9( Policy and Analysis magazine, http://www.acus.org/new\_atlanticist/where-are-local-forces-afghanistan-and-iraq,07/09/09)

General Nicholson and others say that the long-term success of the operation hinges on the performance of the Afghan security forces, which will have to take over eventually from the American troops.

General Nicholson said the American force of almost 4,000 had been joined by about 400 effective Afghan soldiers.“The net increase in Afghan security forces is zero” since the brigade arrived a few months ago, he said. The lack of Afghan forces “is absolutely our Achilles’ heel,” added Capt. Brian Huysman, commander of Company C of the First Battalion, Fifth Marines in Nawa.Captain Huysman said the Afghan forces were critically important in establishing trust and communication with citizens. “We can’t read these people; we’re different,” he said. “They’re not going to tell us the truth. We’ll never get to build and transition” — the last phase of the operation — “unless we have the Afghans.”

Local militias solve – troop training

NYTimes 8(12/24/08 , http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/24/world/asia/24afghan.html)

The formation of the militias is at least a partial answer to the question of how American commanders intend to wrest back the initiative from the Taliban over the next 12 months. While some elected officials in the United States have suggested that the Americans and Afghans might try to exploit fissures in the Taliban, possibly breaking off some groups that can be reconciled, the plan for the militias — coupled with the influx of fresh American forces — suggests that American commanders intend to squeeze the Taliban first. American and Afghan officials say they intend to set up local militias of 100 to 200 fighters in each provincial district, with the fighters being drawn from the villages where they live. (Wardak has eight districts.) To help ensure the dependability of each fighter, the Americans and Afghans are planning to rely on local leaders, like tribal chiefs and clerics, to choose the militiamen for them. Those militiamen will be given a brief period of training, along with weapons like assault rifles and grenade launchers, and communication gear, said Abdul Rahim Wardak, the Afghan defense minister.

Local militia effective in Afghanistan war

Chandrasekaran 10 ( Rajiv ,Washington Post Staff Writer, 4/27/10 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/26/AR2010042604215.html)

Then, beginning in late February, a small detachment of U.S. Special Forces soldiers organized nearly two dozen villagers into an armed Afghan-style neighborhood watch group. These days, the bazaar is thriving. The schoolhouse has reopened. People in the area have become confident enough to report Taliban activity to the village defense force and the police. As a consequence, insurgent attacks have nearly ceased and U.S. soldiers have not hit a single roadside bomb in the area in two months, according to the detachment. "Everyone feels safer now," said Nasarullah, one of two gray-bearded tribal elders in charge of the village force. "Nobody worries about getting killed anymore." The rapid and profound changes have generated excitement among top U.S. military officials in Afghanistan, fueling hope that such groups could reverse insurgent gains by providing the population a degree of protection that the police, the Afghan army and even international military forces have been unable to deliver.

Hollow Forces Adv. – Impact – Afghanistan Failure = NW

Failure in Afghanistan sends the largest possible signal of american defeat to al-qaeda and international jihadists at large – emboldening new waves of terrorism.

KORB 7 [11.6 Lawrence J., Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, & Caroline Wadham, National Security Senior Policy Analyst, November 6, 2007, “The Forgotten Front” Center for American Progress http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/11/pdf/afghanistan\_report.pdf p. 5]

Al Qaeda Central is based in the borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan and threatens the United States, its allies, and its interests. From their sanctuary in Afghanistan in 2001, Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda trained for and organized the attacks of September 11. During the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, they were mostly driven from this base. But Al Qaeda has reconstituted itself, and the borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan now serve as a territorial hub for Al Qaeda Central, the core leadership of Al Qaeda.5 While Al Qaeda has become a more dispersed, decentralized enemy since 2001, it now uses its sanctuary in the tribal areas of Pakistan to plan and launch attacks against Afghan, NATO-International Security Assistance Force, and U.S. forces in Afghanistan.6 This haven provides Al Qaeda with the space to train, recruit, and rebuild in order to achieve its objective of attacking the United States, its allies and interests. The Afghan insurgency includes elements with purely local objectives—groups who hope to topple the Karzai government and establish control—but it also includes members that are directly linked to the international jihadist network of Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda supports the Taliban and other insurgents by providing training, technical skills, manpower, and financing. A failed mission in Afghanistan could allow the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and its affiliates to gain control of a significant amount of territory in Afghanistan, or even to seize control of the entire state apparatus and operate with impunity. Failure in Afghanistan would be a nearmortal strategic and psychological blow to U.S. efforts in the fight against international terrorist networks and a tremendous boost to the global jihadist movement. Defeat for the United States and the international community would allow Al Qaeda to claim that it has defeated two superpowers in Afghanistan— the United States and the former Soviet Union—and that history is on its side.

Terrorism causes extinction.

Sid-Ahmed 4 (Mohamed, political analyst for the 'Al-Ahram' newspaper, 26 August, [http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm] AD:6/23/10)JM

A nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nagazaki, even if -- and this is far from certain -- the weapons used are less harmful than those used then, Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear technology, had no choice but to capitulate. Today, the technology is a secret for nobody. So far, except for the two bombs dropped on Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten. Now we are at a stage where they can be detonated. This completely changes the rules of the game. We have reached a point where anticipatory measures can determine the course of events. Allegations of a terrorist connection can be used to justify anticipatory measures, including the invasion of a sovereign state like Iraq. As it turned out, these allegations, as well as the allegation that Saddam was harbouring WMD, proved to be unfounded. What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive.  But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

Hollow Forces Adv. – Impact – Prolif

Collapse of Afghanistan would destroy the NATO alliance, destabilize the region, and cause proliferation of nukes from Pakistan.

Patel 9 (Nirav- research analyst at CSIS, M.A. internt’l rel @ Georgetown, 4-1-9, *Small Wars Journal*) ET

Afghanistan is not only an Article 5 mission for NATO, but also represents a major test for the organization. Despite beliefs among many in the U.S. national security community that failure for NATO-members to take a lead in Afghanistan operations will sound the death knell for the Alliance; it seems more likely that Afghanistan will impel a major strategic reassessment of the function of NATO. Regardless, these debates often induce policy paralysis and are part of a condition that frames American strategic engagement through a transatlantic perspective. In many ways, cooperating with Europe has almost become an a priori issue of diplomatic protocol and a pillar of politically correct behavior. If America is to succeed in Afghanistan it must begin to think beyond how Europe fits into the equation and start a process of better integrating emerging powers, particularly China into its strategic process. One just needs to look at a map of the region to understand how instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan can destabilize the entire region. Transnational terrorist groups who enjoy safety in the lawless frontiers of Central Asia have exploited weaknesses in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan which has spilled over into the hinterlands of China. This fear has not gone unnoticed in China where its leaders have taken unprecedented acts (afforded by their autocratic system) to counter radical groups and separatists in its Uighur dominated provinces. Witness the rigidity of Chinese counter-terror policies in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic games. Perhaps most worrisome to Beijing is the prospect of Pakistan’s weak central government being unable to secure its nuclear weapons --- a strategic concern not only for America but the world. China also views Afghanistan as a promising future business partner. To date, China has linked the largest foreign direct investment project in the history of Afghanistan by winning rights to develop the Aynak copper field. The contract valued at $3.5 billion USD not only demonstrates Chinese willingness to invest in Afghanistan but also its deep pockets and capital. Moreover, Chinese investments could compliment coalition efforts to jumpstart Afghanistan’s economy. Jonathan Landay, an award winning journalist with the McClatchy group notes, “China's investment in Aynak dovetails with the administration's emerging strategy for ending the war in part by delivering on unfulfilled vows to better the lives of the poor Afghans who constitute the vast majority of the Taliban's foot soldiers.” Beijing also sees vast opportunities in developing roads, bridges, and other critical infrastructure projects in Afghanistan. China – as evinced by recent stories highlighting its tremendous capital wealth – is a potentially prime partner in footing the bill for expensive reconstruction operations which hold the key for the future of Afghanistan’s stability. The global financial crisis, however, has made it evident that resource scarcity and domestic political will in the U.S. will eventually limit the amount of assistance the U.S. and Europe can pledge overseas. As the focus turns to support internal economic development in both Europe and the United States public support for Afghanistan is decreasing.

Hollow Forces Adv. – Impact – Prolif

Prolif is the most probably scenario for extinction – we should do everything possible to prevent it.

Miller`2(James D. Miller**,** professor of economics, Smith College, NATIONAL REVIEW, January 23, 2002, p. http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-miller012302.shtml)KM

The U.S. should use whatever means necessary to stop our enemies from gaining the ability to kill millions of us. We should demand that countries like Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea make no attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction. We should further insist on the right to make surprise inspections of these countries to insure that they are complying with our proliferation policy. What if these nations refuse our demands? If they refuse we should destroy their industrial capacity and capture their leaders. True, the world's cultural elites would be shocked and appalled if we took preventive military action against countries that are currently doing us no harm. What is truly shocking, however, is that America is doing almost nothing while countries that have expressed hatred for us are building weapons of mass destruction. France and Britain allowed Nazi Germany's military power to grow until Hitler was strong enough to take Paris. America seems to be doing little while many of our foes acquire the strength to destroy U.S. cities. We can't rely upon deterrence to prevent an atomic powered dictator from striking at us. Remember, the Nazi's killed millions of Jews even though the Holocaust took resources away from their war effort. As September 11th also shows, there exist evil men in the world who would gladly sacrifice all other goals for the opportunity to commit mass murder. The U.S. should take not even the slightest unnecessary chance that some dictator, perhaps a dying Saddam Hussein, would be willing to give up his life for the opportunity to hit America with nuclear missiles. Once a dictator has the ability to hit a U.S., or perhaps even a European city, with atomic weapons it will be too late for America to pressure him to give up his weapons. His ability to hurt us will effectively put him beyond our military reach. Our conventional forces might even be made impotent by a nuclear-armed foe. Had Iraq possessed atomic weapons, for example, we would probably have been unwilling to expel them from Kuwait. What about the rights of those countries I have proposed threatening? America should not even pretend to care about the rights of dictators. In the 21st century the only leaders whom we should recognize as legitimate are those who were democratically elected. The U.S. should reinterpret international law to give no rights to tyrants, not even the right to exist. We should have an ethically based foreign policy towards democratic countries. With dictatorships, however, we should be entirely Machiavellian; we should deal with them based upon what is in our own best interests. It's obviously in our self-interest to prevent as many dictators as possible from acquiring the means to destroy us. We shouldn't demand that China abandon her nuclear weapons. This is not because China has proved herself worthy to have the means of mass annihilation, but rather because her existing stockpile of atomic missiles would make it too costly for us to threaten China. It's too late to stop the Chinese from gaining the ability to decimate us, but for the next ten years or so it is not too late to stop some of our other rivals. If it's politically impossible for America to use military force against currently non-hostile dictators then we should use trade sanctions to punish nations who don't agree to our proliferation policy. Normal trade sanctions, however, do not provide the punishing power necessary to induce dictators to abandon their arms. If we simply don't trade with a nation other countries will sell them the goods that we used to provide. To make trade sanctions an effective weapon the U.S. needs to deploy secondary boycotts. America should create a treaty, the signatories of which would agree to: · only trade with countries which have signed the treaty, and · not trade with any country which violates our policy on weapons proliferation. I believe that if only the U.S. and, say, Germany initially signed this treaty then nearly every other country would be forced to do so. For example, if France did not sign, they would be unable to trade with the U.S. or Germany. This would obviously be intolerable to France. Once the U.S., Germany and France adopted the treaty every European nation would have to sign or face a total economic collapse. The more countries which sign the treaty, the greater the pressure on other countries to sign. Once most every country has signed, any country which violated America's policy on weapons proliferation would face almost a complete economic boycott. Under this approach, the U.S. and Germany alone could use our economic power to dictate the enforcement mechanism of a treaty designed to protect against Armageddon. Even the short-term survival of humanity is in doubt. The greatest threat of extinction surely comes from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. America should refocus her foreign policy to prioritize protecting us all from atomic, biological, and chemical weapons.

Hollow Forces Adv. – Impact – Prolif

Proliferation ensures nuclear war and extinction

Utgoff 2002 (Victor A., Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis, Survival Vol 44 No 2 Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions, p. 87-90)KM

Many readers are probably wilting to accept that nuclear proliferation is such a grave threat to world peace that every effort should be made to avoid it. However, every effort has not been made in the past, and we are talking about much more substantial efforts now. For new and substantially more burdensome efforts to be made to slow or stop nuclear proliferation, it needs to be established that the highly proliferated nuclear world that would sooner or later evolve without such efforts is not going to be acceptable. And, for many reasons, it is not. First, the dynamics of getting to a highly proliferated world could be very dangerous. Proliferating states will feel great pressures to obtain nuclear weapons and delivery systems before any potential opponent does. Those who succeed in outracing an opponent may consider preemptive nuclear war before the opponent becomes capable of nuclear retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt their opponent's nuclear programme or defeat the opponent using conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of building nuclear weapons may still be able to join in this arms race by building other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons. Second, as the world approaches complete proliferation, the hazards posed by nuclear weapons today will be magnified many times over. Fifty or more nations capable of launching nuclear weapons means that the risk of nuclear accidents that could cause serious damage not only to their own populations and environments, but those of others, is hugely increased. The chances of such weapons falling into the hands of renegade military units or terrorists is far greater, as is the number of nations carrying out hazardous manufacturing and storage activities. Increased prospects for the occasional nuclear shootout Worse still, in a highly proliferated world there would be more frequent opportunities for the use of nuclear weapons. And more frequent opportunities means shorter expected times between conflicts in which nuclear weapons get used, unless the probability of use at any opportunity is actually zero. To be sure, some theorists on nuclear deterrence appear to think that in airy confrontation between two states known to have reliable nuclear capabilities, the probability of nuclear weapons being used is zero." These theorists think that such states will be so fearful of escalation to nuclear war that they would always avoid or terminate confrontations between them, short of even conventional war. They believe this to be true even if the two states have different cultures or leaders with very eccentric personalities. History and human nature, however, suggest that they are almost surely wrong. History includes instances in which states known to possess nuclear weapons did engage in direct conventional conflict. China and Russia fought battles along their common border even after both had nuclear weapons. Moreover, logic suggests that if states with nuclear weapons always avoided conflict with one another, surely states without nuclear weapons would avoid conflict with states that had them. Again, history provides counter-examples. Egypt attacked Israel in 1973 even though it saw Israel as a nuclear power at the time. Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands and fought Britain's efforts to take them back, even though Britain had nuclear weapons. Those who claim that two states with reliable nuclear capabilities to devastate each other will not engage in conventional conflict risking nuclear war also assume that any leader from any culture would not choose suicide for his nation. But history provides unhappy examples of states whose leaders were ready to choose suicide for themselves and their fellow citizens. Hitler tried to impose a 'victory or destruction' policy on his people as Nazi Germany was going down to defeat.} And Japan's war minister, during debates on how to respond to the American atomic bombing, suggested 'Would it not be wondrous for the whole nation to be destroyed like a beautiful flower''- If leaders are willing to engage in conflict with nuclear-armed nations, use of nuclear weapons in any particular instance may not be likely, but its probability would still be dangerously significant. In particular, human nature suggests that the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons is not a reliable guarantee against a disastrous first use of these weapons. While national leaders and their advisors everywhere are usually talented and experienced people, even their most important decisions cannot be counted on to be the product of well-informed and thorough assessments of all options from all relevant points of view. This is especially so when the stakes are so large as to defy assessment and there are substantial pressures to act quickly, as could be expected in intense and fast-moving crises between nuclear-armed states.' Instead, like other human beings, national leaders can be seduced by wishful thinking. They can misinterpret the words or actions of opposing leaders. Their advisors may produce answers that they think the leader wants to hear, or coalesce around what they know is an inferior decision because the group urgently needs the confidence or the sharing of responsibility that results from settling on something. Moreover, leaders may not recognise clearly where their personal or party interests diverge from those of their citizens. Under great stress, human beings can lose their ability to think carefully. They can refuse to believe that the worst could really happen, oversimplify the problem at hand, think in terms of simplistic analogies and play hunches. The intuitive rules for how individuals should respond to insults or signs of weakness in an opponent may too readily suggest a rash course of action. Anger, fear, greed, ambition and pride can all lead to bad decisions. The desire for a decisive solution to the problem at hand may lead to an unnecessarily extreme course of action. We can almost hear the kinds of words that could flow from discussions in nuclear crises or war. 'These people are not willing to die for this interest'. 'No sane person would actually use such weapons'. 'Perhaps the opponent will back down if we show him we mean business by demonstrating a willingness to use nuclear weapons'. 'If I don't hit them back really hard, I am going to be driven from office, if not killed'. Whether right or wrong, in the stressful atmosphere of a <CONTINUED>

Hollow Forces Adv. – Impact – Prolif

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nuclear crisis or war, such words from others, or silently from within, might resonate too readily with a harried leader. Thus, both history and human nature suggest that nuclear deterrence can be expected to fail from time to time, and we are fortunate it has not happened yet. But the threat of nuclear war is not just a matter of a few weapons being used. It could get much worse. Once a conflict reaches the point where nuclear weapons are employed, the stresses felt by the leaderships would rise enormously. These stresses can be expected to further degrade their decision-making. The pressures to force the enemy to stop fighting or to surrender could argue for more forceful and decisive military action, which might be the right thing to do in the circumstances, but maybe not. And the horrors of the carnage already suffered may be seen as justification for visiting the most devastating punishment possible on the enemy.' Again, history demonstrates how intense conflict can lead the combatants to escalate violence to the maximum possible levels. In the Second World War, early promises not to bomb cities soon gave way to essentially indiscriminate bombing of civilians. The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980's led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and exchanges of missiles against each other's cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East escalated in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other. Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants beforehand.' Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible. In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

Hollow Forces Adv. – Impact – Asian Instability

Further Taliban power would enable them to destabilize central Asia- routes already exist.

Kalburov 9 (Ivan, Reuters, Nov 25) ET

Afghanistan’s Taliban may seek to establish a foothold in ex-Soviet Central Asia to recruit supporters and disrupt supplies for U.S. troops in Afghanistan, regional security officials said Tuesday. Former Soviet republics Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan act as transit nations for U.S. Afghan supplies and all but Kazakhstan have reported armed clashes with Islamists this year. In the past year, the Taliban insurgency has spread to parts of northern Afghanistan that had long been relatively peaceful, even as violence raged in the south and east of the country. ‘The deteriorating situation in northern Afghanistan enables the Taliban to spread their influence in that region, giving international terrorists more opportunities to infiltrate the territory of Central Asian states,’ Mikhail Melikhov, a senior official at the Common Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), told a conference in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek. CSTO, dominated by Russia, is a defense bloc of ex-Soviet republics. Marat Imankulov, the head of the anti-terrorist center of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), another post-Soviet bloc that focuses on economic and political ties, said security risks were compounded by the economic downturn. ‘Frankly speaking, the economic crisis in the CIS countries is turning into a social one,’ he told the conference. ‘We cannot avoid talking about the growing risks of extremist and terrorist activities.’ Imankulov said some security analysts expected the Taliban to try destabilizing Central Asian states ‘to disrupt equipment and food supply channels for coalition forces.’ Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan said this year they had smashed Taliban-linked gangs in operations that involved armed clashes.

Afghan collapse would spill over to asia

Kalburov 9 (Ivan, Reuters, Nov 25) ET

Analysts forecast instability can spread from Afghanistan to other states in central Asia. The landlocked war-torn Afghanistan heavily depends on deliveries through its neighbors for all kinds of supplies. We already wrote about the difficulties in transporting goods in the country, but if the insurgents stretch beyond its borders, it will become even more difficult for logistics companies to supply Afghanistan with products and equipment. As the long-lasting post-Soviet crisis is being further fueled by the current economic one, social problems are starting to create fertile ground for radical religious movements such as the one in Afghanistan.

Asian Instability causes nuclear war

Ahriri 1 (ehsan, Professor of Nat’l Security/ Strategy @ Armed Force College @ VA, *Strategic Studies Institute* ) ET

South and Central Asia constitute a part of the world where a well-designed American strategy might help avoid crises or catastrophe. The U.S. military would provide only one component of such a strategy, and a secondary one at that, but has an important role to play through engagement activities and regional confidence-building. Insecurity has led the states of the region to seek weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and conventional arms. It has also led them toward policies which undercut the security of their neighbors. If such activities continue, the result could be increased terrorism, humanitarian disasters, continued low-level conflict and potentially even major regional war or a thermonuclear exchange. A shift away from this pattern could allow the states of the region to become solid economic and political partners for the United

Hollow Forces Adv. – Impact – Afghan Instability – Taliban Power

Government instability will collapse the country – the Taliban will gain power.

**LA Times 10** (Jan. 4 2010, http://www.gazette.com/articles/worries–91758–afghanistan–government.html)IM

KABUL — U.S. forces in Afghanistan suffered their first combat deaths of the new year, the military report Monday, with four troops killed a day earlier in the country’s violent south. The battlefield losses came as Afghan President Hamid Karzai faced a fresh political confrontation, ordering parliament to put off its winter recess and vote on a new Cabinet lineup as soon as this weekend. On Saturday, lawmakers defied the president by rejecting two-thirds of his Cabinet picks. Western officials are worried about the weakness of the Karzai government as the Obama administration embarks on a troop buildup that will nearly double the American military presence in Afghanistan. The Afghan leader is also under pressure to form a government before a major conference of international donors in London beginning Jan. 28. As the first of 30,000 new U.S. troops begin flowing into the country, adding to some 68,000 already deployed here, Western commanders have warned that a commensurate increase in casualties is likely. That is in part because the additional American forces will push into parts of the country that were previously under the sway of the Taliban and other insurgents. In 2010’s first reported battlefield deaths, military officials said four American troops had been killed in a roadside bomb in the south. A British soldier was also killed in a separate explosion. Roadside bombs are the No. 1 killer of Western forces in Afghanistan, and have become the signature weapon of the Taliban and other insurgents. Multiple fatalities in a single incident, such as the strike that killed the four Americans, have become commonplace, because members of the Taliban are using larger and more powerful improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, capable of destroying armored vehicles and killing most or all of those inside. The military did not reveal the location of the latest U.S. deaths, but most Americans in the south are based in Helmand and Kandahar provinces, where the Taliban movement is the strongest. Those provinces are also a center of Afghanistan’s drug trade, which has close links to the insurgency. Most of the arriving reinforcements are to be deployed in the south, where thousands of U.S. Marines have been trying to secure a key swath of the Helmand River valley. Other U.S. troops are working to quell a rising insurgent presence around the city of Kandahar, the Taliban’s spiritual center. Fighting also has flared recently in Afghanistan’s north, where the insurgency has strengthened in recent months. Afghanistan’s Defense Ministry said at least 10 Taliban fighters were killed in a clash Sunday with Afghan troops. The Western war effort has been complicated by months of political paralysis, and the deadlock may deepen in coming days. While parliament’s weekend rejection of 17 of Karzai’s 24 Cabinet choices was seen in some quarters as a welcome display of independence on lawmakers’ part, it has also left the government barely functioning. Setting the stage for a potential showdown, senior aides to Karzai suggested that the president may put forth some of the same Cabinet nominees when the issue comes up for a second vote. Among those rejected was Ismail Khan, a powerful warlord who is the incumbent minister of energy. The support of a number of onetime militia leaders such as Khan helped Karzai win a second term in office, though the August election was clouded by massive fraud. While Karzai was eventually declared the winner, international auditors stripped him of nearly a million votes, depriving him of the clear mandate he had sought. If Karzai is able to strong–arm his Cabinet choices through parliament, it may add to widespread public disillusionment over corruption and inefficiency in the government. But a new political defeat for the president could open the door to prolonged infighting that could render his government completely useless, opening the door for the Taliban to control the country.

Hollow Forces Adv. – Impact – Taliban = Nuclear War

Further Talibanization of Afghanistan spillover in Pakistan, wars across Central Asia, and escalatory nuclear strikes against India and Israel.

Morgan 6 (Stephen J, British Labour Party Exectutive Committee, Electric Articles) KFC

Musharraf probably hopes that by giving de facto autonomy to the Taliban and Pashtun leaders now with a virtual free hand for cross border operations into Afghanistan, he will undercut any future upsurge in support for a break–away independent Pashtunistan state or a “Peoples’ War” of the Pashtun populace as a whole, as he himself described it.  However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. As the war intensifies, he has no guarantees that the current autonomy may yet burgeon into a separatist movement. Appetite comes with eating, as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer al of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtun caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan. Then, the likely break up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead the way to the break up of Pakistan, as well.  Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and, in the context of the new world situation, the country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings, probably including a military-fundamentalist coup d’état. Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was “Osama” (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup d’état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take power.   Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations.  The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast.   Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could no be ruled out. Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a “Pandora's box” for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US.  What is at stake in “the half–forgotten war” in Afghanistan is far greater than that in Iraq. But America’s capacities for controlling the situation are extremely restricted. Might it be, in the end, they are also forced to accept President Musharraf's unspoken slogan of «Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan!

Hollow Forces Adv. – Impact – Taliban = Nuclear War

Afghanistan Taliban resurgence would cause regional instability, spilling over to Asia, and nuke war from Iran

Brookes 10 (Peter-Fellow for National Security Affairs, June-2, *Right Side News*) ET

There are challenges in South Asia, too, where terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban are seeking to take and hold terrain to train, plan, and operate in places like Pakistan's tribal areas. Next door in Afghanistan, more than 90,000 American troops are fighting a Taliban insurgency that has persisted for nearly nine years. Failure in Afghanistan could allow that country once again to become a terrorist safe haven and endanger the region. The Middle East is rife with challenges as well. While some 90,000 American troops are drawing down in Iraq, violence still occurs and the peace is fragile, in large part due to continuing political reconciliation challenges and meddling by Iraq's neighbor, Iran. But Iranian troublemaking is not limited to Iraq or Afghanistan; Tehran is unsettling the entire region with its belligerency and nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Indeed, it is very likely that Iran will join the once-exclusive nuclear weapons club in the near future, despite its insistence that there is no military dimension to its nuclear program. Frankly, there is no reason to believe Tehran's assertions, considering the hiding of its nuclear program for more than 20 years, a violation of its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations. Moreover, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is still having trouble developing a comprehensive picture of Iran's nuclear program. No surprise: The international community continues to discover additional undeclared nuclear facilities in Iran. Iran is making matters worse with its ballistic missile efforts, including a long-range program that it is operating under the cover of a civilian space program. In fact, the Pentagon estimates that Iran will be able to field an intercontinental ballistic missile by 2015. The IAEA also believes Iran may be working on a nuclear warhead to be affixed to one of its growing classes of ballistic missiles. And don't forget that Iran is still the world's most active state sponsor of terrorism, providing financial, moral, and military support to a number of terrorist groups, including Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran, along with Syria, arms both terrorist groups, destabilizing the region and undermining the chances for Middle East peace.

Hollow Forces Adv. – Impact – Oil Prices

Middle Eastern instability sky rockets oil prices, causing economic collapse.

Islam Online.Net 6 (“Frequently Asked Questions About Iraq”, http://www.islamonline.net/english/In\_Depth/Iraq\_Aftermath/topic\_15.shtml, March 21, 2006)

Oil is the lifeblood of the global economy. The Middle East has about 65% of the world’s total oil resources. With this in mind, it becomes clear that any instability in the Middle East would threaten the global oil trade. If the global oil trade were disrupted, it would cause a shortage in supply which would cause oil prices to skyrocket. Skyrocketing oil prices hamper global economic growth and threaten the world’s economies. At worst, it could cause a recession in many of the world’s oil dependent countries.

Continued economic decline will result in global war.

**Mead, 9** (Walter Russell Mead, [Henry A. Kissinger](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_A._Kissinger) senior fellow for [U.S. foreign policy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._foreign_policy) at the Council on Foreign Relations. The New Republic, “Only Makes You Stronger,” February 42009.  http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2)

Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, **financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth.** This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well.**If financial crises have been a normal part of life** during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, **so has war**. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. **Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a** depression, what **rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born**? The United States may not, yet, decline, but**, if we can't get the world economy back on track,** **we may still have to fight**.

Hollow Forces Adv. – Impact – Afghan Instability – Nuclear War

Instability in Afghanistan leads to nuclear war.

**Wesley 10** (Michael, Exec. Director of the Lowy Institute for Int. Policy. Professor of Int. Relt’s @ Griffith U, Feb. 25 2010 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2010/02/25/A–stable–Afghanistan–Why–we–should–care.aspx)IM

We do have an interest in the future of domestic stability within Afghanistan, but we need to think much more clearly about which countries build and guarantee that stability. An Afghan state built just by the US and its allies will be inherently unstable because, as we demonstrated after the Soviet Union withdrew, we have little stomach for any continued strategic involvement in the region. Pakistan, India and China, on the other hand, have deep and enduring strategic interests there, and their competition would soon undermine anything ISAF and NATO leave behind. Understanding the dynamics of strategic competition among Asia's rising behemoths has to be the first step in trying to figure out how to mitigate it. Great power competition in the twenty-first century will be different because of the depth and extent of the dependence of national economies on the global economy. National economies are now less self–sufficient and more vulnerable to the disruption of trading and investment relations than at any time in history. What stops great power confrontations getting out of hand these days is not so much the fear of nuclear annihilation as the fear of global economic ruin – and the resulting national ruin.The danger is that in the heat of the competition, the great powers will lose sight of this fact. This is why instability and weakness in Afghanistan is so dangerous – because in the fog of proxy war, intensely jealous great powers will assume their rivals have the upper hand and redouble their own efforts to exert influence and control, leading to a vast, very likely nuclear, conflict. To avoid the worst possible outcome, all three rivals must be engaged in the process of building a stable Afghanistan – and collectively guaranteeing it. The most realistic route is to actively involve the SCO in the future of Afghanistan while broadening that organisation to include India and Pakistan. This solution ties the stability of the northern and southern tiers of Central Asia to each other, thereby broadening the stakes of those involved. The one hope and one fear that bind China and Russia together are also remarkably relevant to the SCO's proposed new members.

Hollow Forces Adv. – Impact – Afghan Instability – Nuclear War

Failure in Afghanistan means Indo–Pak nuclear war.

Steve Coll NOVEMBER 16, 2009 “WHAT IF WE FAIL IN AFGHANISTAN?” http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/stevecoll/2009/11/what–if–we–fail–in–afghanistan.html

First, the question requires a definition of failure. As I’ve argued, in my view, a purpose of American policy in Afghanistan ought to be to prevent a second coercive Taliban revolution in that country, not only because it would bring misery to Afghans (and, not incidentally, Afghan women) but because it would jeopardize American interests, such as our security against Al Qaeda’s ambitions and our (understandable) desire to see nuclear–armed Pakistan free itself from the threat of revolutionary Islamist insurgents. So, then, a definition of failure would be a redux of Taliban revolution in Afghanistan—a revolution that took control of traditional Taliban strongholds such as Kandahar and Khost, and that perhaps succeeded in Kabul as well. Such an outcome is conceivable if the Obama Administration does not discover the will and intelligence to craft a successful political-military strategy to prevent the Afghan Taliban from achieving its announced goals, which essentially involve the restoration of the Afghan state they presided over during the nineteen–nineties, which was formally known as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. What would be the consequences of a second Islamic Emirate? My scenarios here are intended analytically, as a first–draft straw–man forecast: The Nineties Afghan Civil War on Steroids: Even if the international community gave up on Afghanistan and withdrew, as it did from Somalia during the early nineties, it is inconceivable that the Taliban could triumph in the country completely and provide a regime (however perverse) of stability. About half of Afghanistan’s population is Pashtun, from which the Taliban draw their strength. Much of the country’s non–Pashtun population ardently opposes the Taliban. In the humiliating circumstances that would attend American failure, those in the West who now promote “counterterrorism,” “realist,” and “cost-effective” strategies in the region would probably endorse, in effect, a nineties redux—which would amount to a prescription for more Afghan civil war. A rump “legitimate” Afghan government dominated by ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks would find arms and money from India, Iran, and perhaps Russia, Europe and the United States. This would likely produce a long–running civil war between northern, Tajik–dominated ethnic militias and the Pashtun–dominated Taliban. Tens of thousands of Afghans would likely perish in this conflict and from the pervasive poverty it would produce; many more Afghans would return as refugees to Pakistan, contributing to that country’s instability. Momentum for a Taliban Revolution in Pakistan: If the Quetta Shura (Mullah Omar’s outfit, the former Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, now in exile in Pakistan) regained power in Kandahar or Kabul, it would undoubtedly interpret its triumph as a ticket to further ambition in Pakistan. Al Qaeda’s leaders, if they survived American drone attacks, would encourage this narrative and support it as best they could. The Pakistani Taliban would likely be energized, armed and financed by the Afghan Taliban as they pursued their own revolutionary ambitions in Islamabad. In response, the international community would undoubtedly fall back in defense of the Pakistani constitutional state, such as it is. However, the West would find the Pakistan Army and its allies in Riyadh and perhaps even Beijing even more skeptical than they are now about the American–led agenda. In this scenario, as in the past, Pakistan’s generals would be tempted to negotiate an accommodation with the Taliban, Afghan and Pakistani alike, to the greatest possible extent, in defiance of Washington’s preferences. The net result might well be an increase in Islamist influence over the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, if not an outright loss of control. Increased Islamist Violence Against India, Increasing the Likelihood of Indo-Pakistani War: The Taliban and Al Qaeda are anti–American, yes. But they are equally determined to wage war against India’s secular, Hindu–dominated democracy. The Pakistani Taliban, whose momentum would be increased by Taliban success in Afghanistan, consist in part of Punjab–based, ardently anti-Indian Islamist groups, such as Lashkar–e–Taiba, which carried out the spectacular raid on Mumbai a year ago. The probable knock–on effect of a second Taliban revolution Afghanistan would be to increase the likelihood of irregular Islamist attacks from Pakistan against Indian targets—not only the traditional target set in Indian–held Kashmir, but in New Delhi, Mumbai, and other cities, as has occurred periodically during the last decade. In time, democratic Indian governments would be pressed by their electorates to respond with military force. This in turn would present, repetitively, the problem of managing the role of nuclear weapons in a prospective fourth Indo-Pakistani war.

Hollow Forces Adv. – Impact – Afghan Instability – Nuclear War

Afghan failure leads to Al-Qaeda nukes – Most likely scenario and it swamps alt causes

Biddle 9 (Stephen Biddle senior fellow for defense policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. July - August 2009 issue: Is It Worth It? The Difficult Case for War in Afghanistan http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=617 TBC 6/24/10)

The more important U.S. interest is indirect: to prevent chaos in Afghanistan from destabilizing Pakistan. With a population of 173 million (five times Afghanistan’s), a GDP of more than $160 billion (more than ten times Afghanistan’s) and a functional nuclear arsenal of perhaps twenty to fifty warheads, Pakistan is a much more dangerous prospective state sanctuary for al-Qaeda. Furthermore, the likelihood of government collapse in Pakistan, which would enable the establishment of such a sanctuary, may be in the same ballpark as Afghanistan, at least in the medium to long term. Pakistan is already at war with internal Islamist insurgents allied to al-Qaeda, and that war is not going well. Should the Pakistani insurgency succeed in collapsing the state or even just in toppling the current civilian government, the risk of nuclear weapons falling into al-Qaeda’s hands would rise sharply. In fact, given the difficulties terrorists face in acquiring usable nuclear weapons, Pakistani state collapse may be the likeliest scenario leading to a nuclear-armed al-Qaeda. Pakistani state collapse, moreover, is a danger over which the United States has only limited influence. We have uneven and historically fraught relations with the Pakistani military and intelligence services, and our ties with the civilian government of the moment can be no more efficacious than that government’s own sway over the country. The United States is too unpopular with the Pakistani public to have any meaningful prospect of deploying major ground forces there to assist the government in counterinsurgency. U.S. air strikes can harass insurgents and terrorists within Pakistan, but the inevitable collateral damage arouses harsh public opposition that could itself threaten the weak government’s stability. U.S. aid is easily (and routinely) diverted to purposes other than countering Islamist insurgents, such as the maintenance of military counterweights to India, graft and patronage, or even support for Islamist groups seen by Pakistani authorities as potential allies against India. U.S. assistance to Pakistan can—and should—be made conditional on progress in countering insurgents, but if these conditions are too harsh, Pakistan might reject the terms, thus removing our leverage in the process. Demanding conditions that the Pakistani government ultimately accepts but cannot reasonably fulfill only sets the stage for recrimination and misunderstanding. If we cannot reliably influence Pakistan for the better, we should at least heed the Hippocratic Oath: Do no harm. With so little actual leverage, we cannot afford to make the problem any worse than it already is. And failure in Afghanistan would make the problem in Pakistan much harder. The Taliban are a transnational Pashtun movement active on both sides of the Durand Line and are closely associated with other Pakistani insurgents. They constitute an important threat to the regime in Islamabad in rough proportion to the regime’s inherent weaknesses (which are many and varied). If the Taliban regained control of the Afghan state, their ability to use the state’s resources to destabilize the secular government in Pakistan would increase the risk of state collapse there. Analysts have made much of the threat that Pakistani Taliban base camps pose to the stability of the government in Kabul, but the danger works both ways: Instability in Afghanistan also poses a serious threat to the secular civilian government in Pakistan. This is the single greatest U.S. interest in Afghanistan: to prevent it from aggravating Pakistan’s internal problems and magnifying the danger of an al-Qaeda nuclear-armed sanctuary there.

Hollow Forces Adv. – Impact – China Econ

Collapse of Afghanistan would destroy the NATO alliance, destabilize the region, including Pakistan with their nukes, and would harm china’s economy

Patel 9 (Nirav- research analyst at CSIS, M.A. internt’l rel @ Georgetown, 4-1-9, *Small Wars Journal*) ET

Afghanistan is not only an Article 5 mission for NATO, but also represents a major test for the organization. Despite beliefs among many in the U.S. national security community that failure for NATO-members to take a lead in Afghanistan operations will sound the death knell for the Alliance; it seems more likely that Afghanistan will impel a major strategic reassessment of the function of NATO. Regardless, these debates often induce policy paralysis and are part of a condition that frames American strategic engagement through a transatlantic perspective. In many ways, cooperating with Europe has almost become an a priori issue of diplomatic protocol and a pillar of politically correct behavior. If America is to succeed in Afghanistan it must begin to think beyond how Europe fits into the equation and start a process of better integrating emerging powers, particularly China into its strategic process. One just needs to look at a map of the region to understand how instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan can destabilize the entire region. Transnational terrorist groups who enjoy safety in the lawless frontiers of Central Asia have exploited weaknesses in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan which has spilled over into the hinterlands of China. This fear has not gone unnoticed in China where its leaders have taken unprecedented acts (afforded by their autocratic system) to counter radical groups and separatists in its Uighur dominated provinces. Witness the rigidity of Chinese counter-terror policies in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic games. Perhaps most worrisome to Beijing is the prospect of Pakistan’s weak central government being unable to secure its nuclear weapons --- a strategic concern not only for America but the world. China also views Afghanistan as a promising future business partner. To date, China has linked the largest foreign direct investment project in the history of Afghanistan by winning rights to develop the Aynak copper field. The contract valued at $3.5 billion USD not only demonstrates Chinese willingness to invest in Afghanistan but also its deep pockets and capital. Moreover, Chinese investments could compliment coalition efforts to jumpstart Afghanistan’s economy. Jonathan Landay, an award winning journalist with the McClatchy group notes, “China's investment in Aynak dovetails with the administration's emerging strategy for ending the war in part by delivering on unfulfilled vows to better the lives of the poor Afghans who constitute the vast majority of the Taliban's foot soldiers.” Beijing also sees vast opportunities in developing roads, bridges, and other critical infrastructure projects in Afghanistan. China – as evinced by recent stories highlighting its tremendous capital wealth – is a potentially prime partner in footing the bill for expensive reconstruction operations which hold the key for the future of Afghanistan’s stability. The global financial crisis, however, has made it evident that resource scarcity and domestic political will in the U.S. will eventually limit the amount of assistance the U.S. and Europe can pledge overseas. As the focus turns to support internal economic development in both Europe and the United States public support for Afghanistan is decreasing.

China economic decline would cause WWIII asian style

Strait Times 3 (UCLA Prof, June 27, *Strait Times¸* http://www.straitstimes.com.sg/commentary/...,197074,00.html ) ET

But imagine a China disintegrating - on its own, without neo-conservative or Central Intelligence Agency prompting, much less outright military invasion - because the economy (against all predictions) suddenly collapses. That would knock Asia into chaos. A massive flood of refugees would head for Indonesia and other places with poor border controls, which don't want them and can't handle them; some in Japan might lick their lips at the prospect of World War II Revisited and look to annex a slice of China. That would send Singapore and Malaysia - once occupied by Japan - into nervous breakdowns. Meanwhile, India might make a grab for Tibet, and Pakistan for Kashmir. Then you can say hello to World War III, Asia-style. That's why wise policy encourages Chinese stability, security and economic growth - the very direction the White House now seems to prefer. If neo-conservatives really care about Mr Bush, they ought to find their common sense and get off his back. He has enough on his plate with Iraq. In the final analysis, neo-conservative insanity is more of a danger to the Bush presidency than China.

Hollow Forces Adv. – Impact – Asian Wars/ Indo Pak War

Chinese economic collapse restarts avid nationalism – causes asian wars and Indian-Pakistan Wars

Emmot 8 ( Bill, *The Australian*, june 4-8, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/arts/power-rises-in-the-east/story-e6frg8px-1111116460128 ) ET

The plausibly pessimistic view begins with the risk that China will go through its Japanese-style adjustment to a lower investment economy in a rocky rather than a smoothly handled manner. (By Japanese-style, this means following Japan's example in the '70s, when Japan absorbed a currency revaluation and the aftermath of the oil shock by moving sharply up-market and becoming energy-efficient.) Recovery will eventually come and the Chinese growth story will resume, but only after a recession and asset price collapse, perhaps exacerbated by a recession in the US. Such a bruising experience will lead to public pressure for political reform, posing the biggest challenge to Communist Party rule since the Tiananmen Square uprising in 1989. But that pressure will again be violently rebuffed and the party will accentuate its nationalist credentials to retain its grip on power. Such a nationalist move would produce increased tension with Japan, a reduction in co-operation with the US over North Korea, and a spate of mutual truculence between China and India over their border disputes and over Chinese support for Pakistan and Bangladesh. Lord only knows what would happen if a terrorist attack on the US were to prompt a US invasion of Pakistan, since India would be tempted to cross Pakistan's southern border while the US was crossing from the west. In these awkward times, the deaths of Kim Jong-il and the Dalai Lama might occur, prompting China to install a new military government in North Korea, rejecting proposals for unification of the peninsula, and to use brutal methods to suppress an uprising by Buddhist monks in Tibet that would make the one in March look like a picnic. Pan-Asian institutions would be stillborn in this fractious environment, as would efforts at serious co-operation over global warming. Japan, becoming even more worried about North Korea and China, would finally revise its constitution to permit expanded military capabilities. Taiwan would be an ever-present source of worry over an imminent conflict between China, Japan and the US. There could even be a short, exploratory exchange of fire over that very issue. The warm glow of the 2008 Beijing Olympics would then be remembered only through a thick smog of tension.

Chinese reduction in growth devastates the economy, causes Taiwan War and ethnic conflict

Lewis 8 (Dan, news presenter and reporter for KOMO-TV, May 13, *World Finance*, http://www.worldfinance.com/news/home/finalbell/article117.html ) ET

A reduction in demand for imported Chinese goods would quickly entail a decline in China’s economic growth rate. That is alarming. It has been calculated that to keep China’s society stable – ie to manage the transition from a rural to an urban society without devastating unemployment - the minimum growth rate is 7.2 percent. Anything less than that and unemployment will rise and the massive shift in population from the country to the cities becomes unsustainable. This is when real discontent with communist party rule becomes vocal and hard to ignore. It doesn’t end there. That will at best bring a global recession. The crucial point is that communist authoritarian states have at least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic tensions – so far. But when multi-ethnic communist countries fall apart from economic stress and the implosion of central power, history suggests that they don’t become successful democracies overnight. Far from it. There’s a very real chance that China might go the way of Yugoloslavia or the Soviet Union – chaos, civil unrest and internecine war. In the very worst case scenario, a Chinese government might seek to maintain national cohesion by going to war with Taiwan – whom America is pledged to defend.

Hollow Forces Adv. – A2: PMC’s Can Solve

Private contractors ditch out after less than a year, leaving Afghanistan in a state of dismay.

Engelhardt 9 (Tom, Fellow @ Nation Institute, teaching fellow @ berk, Jan 11-9, *Tom Dispatch*)

Often, in fact, only one of the preselected contractors puts in for the job and then -- if you need a hint as to what's really going on -- just happens to award subcontracts to some of the others. It's remarkable, too, how many former USAID officials have passed through the famed revolving door in Washington to become highly paid consultants to private contractors -- and vice versa. By January 2006, the Bush administration had co-opted USAID altogether. The once independent aid agency launched by President Kennedy in 1961 became a subsidiary of the State Department and a partner of the Pentagon. Oh, and keep in mind one more thing: While the private contractors may be in it for the duration, most employees and technical experts in Afghanistan stay on the job only six months to a year because it's considered such a "hardship post." As a result, projects tend not to last long and to be remarkably unrelated to those that came before or will come after. Contractors collect the big bucks whether or not the aid they contracted to deliver benefits Afghans, or even reaches them. These arrangements help explain why Afghanistan remains such a shambles

Geneva Conventions – Uniqueness – PMC’s Violate

PMC’s violate Geneva Convention law that bans mercenaries, despite differences in language.

SALZMAN 9 (“PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE TAINT OF A MERCENARY” REPUTATION ZOE New York University School of Law INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:853 May 14, http://law.nyu.edu/ecm\_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu\_law\_website\_\_journals\_\_journal\_of\_international\_law\_and\_politics/documents/documents/ecm\_pro\_058877.pdf)KM

This Section examines the existing international law on mercenaries to illustrate that there are “disturbing similarities” between some of today’s private contractors and “the 1960sstyle soldiers of fortune.”150 I use the existing international law on mercenaries to illustrate that the concerns that led to the development of this body of law closely resemble the concerns that I raised in Part III with respect to private contractors. Mercenaries, much like private contractors, threaten states’ monopoly on the use of force, prioritize the private good over the public good, and generally undermine democratic checks on war-making and the emergence of new democratic regimes. Just as private contractors today can be hired to prevent the emergence of a new democratic regime, the initial laws on mercenaries were developed to check the hiring of mercenaries by racist regimes resisting the decolonization movement in Africa.151 The OAU Convention, in particular, reflects the concern that mercenaries can undermine the emergence of new, democratic governments. Citing “the grave threat which the activities of mercenaries represent to the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and harmonious development of Member States of OAU,”152 the OAU Convention determined to put an end to “the subversive activities of mercenaries in Africa.”153 The OAU specifically defines the mercenary as an individual aiming to overthrow the government or to undermine the independence or territorial integrity of a Member State, or to block the activities of an OAU recognized liberation movement.154 Furthermore, Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions appears designed to address the concern that mercenaries, just like private contractors, prioritize the private good over the public good. This concern is reflected in Protocol I’s definition of a “mercenary” as someone whose motivation to take part in the hostilities is “essentially . . . the desire for private gain and [who], in fact, is promised . . . material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces.”155 This provision reflects the intent to distinguish mercenaries from volunteers, who are not feared in the same way and to whom this condemnation does not extend.156 Protocol I’s definition of the term “mercenary” reflects a concern with the commodification of force and a fear of combatants who have allegiance only to profit (a private good), rather than the allegiance to the public good that national armed forces are traditionally assumed to espouse. Protocol I’s definition of “mercenary” also reflects the concern that mercenaries undermine states’ monopoly on the use of force by defining a mercenary as a combatant, a person who “is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict.”157 Protocol I is clear that it is targeting mercenaries who take a “direct part in the hostilities.”158 Most importantly, Protocol I also emphasizes that a mercenary must not be officially attached to a state—namely, that the mercenary cannot be a member of a Party’s armed forces or sent on official duty by a state not Party to the conflict.159

Geneva Conventions – Uniqueness – PMC’s Violate

PMC’s meet all four criteria for the mercenary bans in the Geneva Conventions.

SALZMAN 9 (“PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE TAINT OF A MERCENARY” REPUTATION ZOE New York University School of Law INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:853 May 14, http://law.nyu.edu/ecm\_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu\_law\_website\_\_journals\_\_journal\_of\_international\_law\_and\_politics/documents/documents/ecm\_pro\_058877.pdf)KM

V. THE LETTER OF THE LAW: APPLYING PROTOCOL I’S DEFINITION OF MERCENARY TO PRIVATE CONTRACTORS It is often assumed that the international legal definition of “mercenary” is so vague that no private military contractor could ever be found to qualify as such.168 In this Section, however, a close examination of Protocol I shows that at least some private military contractors may qualify as mercenaries under the four main criteria of Protocol I’s definition. First, private contractors can be deemed to have been “specially recruited”; second, private contractors frequently meet the direct participation requirement; third, private contractors will sometimes meet the foreign nationality requirement; and fourth, private contractors are even more likely to meet the financial motivation requirement than the traditional mercenary. I conclude this Section by rejecting two frequently asserted distinctions between mercenaries and private contractors: first, that contractors cannot be considered mercenaries because of their corporate structure, and second, that they cannot be considered mercenaries because they are employed by legitimate states. Ultimately, I demonstrate that at least some private contractors can be defined as mercenaries. I go on to conclude that defining private contractors as mercenaries will increase public debate surrounding their role and their overall democratic accountability, the lack of which, I have argued, currently characterizes the private military industry and threatens the democratic nation-state.

PMC’s meet the specially recruited requirement of the Geneva Convention ban on Mercenaries.

SALZMAN 9 (“PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE TAINT OF A MERCENARY” REPUTATION ZOE New York University School of Law INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:853 May 14, http://law.nyu.edu/ecm\_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu\_law\_website\_\_journals\_\_journal\_of\_international\_law\_and\_politics/documents/documents/ecm\_pro\_058877.pdf)KM

A. Private Contractors Can Meet the “Specially Recruited” Requirement The definition of “mercenary” contained in article 47 of Protocol I requires first that the mercenary be specially recruited to fight in an armed conflict.169 This provision was intended to exclude “volunteers who enter service on a permanent or long-lasting basis in a foreign army, whether as a result of a purely individual enlistment (French Foreign Legion, Spanish Tercio) or an arrangement concluded by their national authorities (for example, the Nepalese Ghurkhas in India, the Swiss Guards of the Vatican).”170 Many private contractors qualify as “specially recruited.” PMCs generally keep databases of personnel from which to re- cruit to fill contracts as they come up.171 Many private contractors appear in several databases and move easily from one contract to another or operate on a freelance basis.172 Given this arrangement, a private contractor called up from this kind of database when a PMC is awarded a particular contract is likely to be considered “specially recruited.”

Geneva Conventions – Uniqueness – PMC’s Violate

PMC’s meet the direct participation requirement of the Geneva Convention ban on mercenaries – PMC’s are key to combat functions and go through combat zones.

SALZMAN 9 (“PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE TAINT OF A MERCENARY” REPUTATION ZOE New York University School of Law INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:853 May 14, http://law.nyu.edu/ecm\_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu\_law\_website\_\_journals\_\_journal\_of\_international\_law\_and\_politics/documents/documents/ecm\_pro\_058877.pdf)KM

B. Private Contractors Can Meet the Direct Participation Requirement Under Protocol I, individuals must participate directly in combat in order to qualify as mercenaries175 because “[o]nly a combatant, and a combatant taking a direct part in hostilities, can be considered as a mercenary in the sense of Article 47.”176 The term “direct participation” is “highly ambiguous,” 177 however, and has been defined in various ways. For some scholars, the phrase requires “but for” causation178 and the ICRC Commentary similarly interprets it to require “a direct causal connection between the activity and the harm.”179 It is clear that the term is meant to narrow the application of article 47 so that it does not apply to the entire war effort, yet not narrow it to the point of being limited solely to active combat operations.180 At the very least, according to the authoritative ICRC Commentary, it clearly excludes “foreign advisers and military technicians.”181 Even under a fairly narrow understanding of the term, however, the conflict in Iraq has highlighted the involvement of private contractors in combat-like situations which are likely to meet the direct participation requirement.182 From maintaining complex weapons such as the B-2 bomber to performing interrogations to selecting targets and flying surveillance missions, private contractors in the Iraq conflict have shown that the industry is increasingly taking on core military responsibilities. 183 Moreover, in Iraq, private contractors are permitted to join coalition forces in combat operations for the pur- poses of self-defense and for the defense of people specified in their contract.184 Private contractors are also permitted to stop, detain, search, and disarm civilians if those actions are specified in their contract.185 Even those private contractors performing less clearly military functions, such as truck driving, may become involved in combat if they have to drive through combat zones.186

PMC’s now provide more than just support services, they meet clear military needs.

SALZMAN 9 (“PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE TAINT OF A MERCENARY” REPUTATION ZOE New York University School of Law INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:853 May 14, http://law.nyu.edu/ecm\_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu\_law\_website\_\_journals\_\_journal\_of\_international\_law\_and\_politics/documents/documents/ecm\_pro\_058877.pdf)KM

Nevertheless, some scholars claim that the great majority of private contractors do not provide combat services,187 but rather support services that do not appear mercenary in nature. 188 Private contractors themselves are quick to deny that they provide tactical military services,189 claiming to provide purely defensive and protective services190 “concerned with the protection of people and premises.”191 As a result, industry proponents argue that the majority of private contractors do not meet the direct participation requirement and thus cannot be conceived of as mercenaries. Instead, they are analogous to expert trainers and advisers192 and primarily fulfill logistical and support roles.193 One author opines that, so long as private contractors are not contracted specifically to engage in combat and do so only in self-defense, they fall outside of the definition of article 47.194 In fact, the line between combat and non-combat services is fuzzy, and private contractors perform a wide range of functions ranging from logistical support to training to more combat- like roles, including serving as commando troops, interrogators, and weapons operators.195 Although private contractors may have initially fulfilled purely support roles, they have today “spread across the full spectrum of government activi- ties.”196 PMCs tend not to openly advertise their more combat- like services197 (no doubt in order to avoid too closely resembling mercenaries), but private contractors are no longer “just running the soup kitchens.”198 Therefore, while it may be true that certain private contractors do not meet the direct participation requirement, an increasing number do.

Geneva Conventions – Uniqueness – PMC’s Violate

PMC’s meet the foreign nationality requirement to be mercenaries – Modern day PMC’s are recruited from all over the world.

SALZMAN 9 (“PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE TAINT OF A MERCENARY” REPUTATION ZOE New York University School of Law INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:853 May 14, http://law.nyu.edu/ecm\_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu\_law\_website\_\_journals\_\_journal\_of\_international\_law\_and\_politics/documents/documents/ecm\_pro\_058877.pdf)KM

C. Private Contractors Can Meet the Foreign Nationality Requirement Article 47 also requires that a mercenary be “neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict.”199 As with the previous requirements, it is clear that at least some private contractors will satisfy this condition. Private contractors are recruited from all over the world to work wherever their firm has been awarded a contract.200 For example, the majority of Executive Outcomes’ employees working in Sierra Leone were South African. 201

PMC’s hire foreign people and use them, classifying them as mercenaries.

SALZMAN 9 (“PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE TAINT OF A MERCENARY” REPUTATION ZOE New York University School of Law INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:853 May 14, http://law.nyu.edu/ecm\_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu\_law\_website\_\_journals\_\_journal\_of\_international\_law\_and\_politics/documents/documents/ecm\_pro\_058877.pdf)KM

Nevertheless, some scholars correctly argue that not all private contractors will satisfy this requirement. For example, the American PMC MPRI only hires ex-U.S. forces personnel. 202 It would therefore be inaccurate to claim that MPRI employees working alongside American troops in Iraq meet the article 47 definition of mercenary. PMCs also frequently subcontract out to local forces or individuals—a common occurrence in Iraq.203 Again, it would be impossible to claim that Iraqis hired to assist in the rebuilding in Iraq qualify as mercenaries under the article 47 definition. Even MPRI (and other PMCs with similar policies), however, operate in conflicts that do not involve their host state. MPRI itself has worked for the Taiwanese and Swedish militaries, as well as for the Croatian army204—situations in which their contractors would meet article 47’s foreign nationality requirement.

PMC’s are motivated essentially by profit, which defines them as mercenaries under the Geneva Convention.

SALZMAN 9 (“PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE TAINT OF A MERCENARY” REPUTATION ZOE New York University School of Law INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:853 May 14, http://law.nyu.edu/ecm\_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu\_law\_website\_\_journals\_\_journal\_of\_international\_law\_and\_politics/documents/documents/ecm\_pro\_058877.pdf)KM

D. Private Contractors Can Meet the Motivation of Financial Gain Requirement Article 47 defines a mercenary as an individual who is “motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised . . . material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces.”205 According to the ICRC Commentary, this requirement was introduced to distinguish the mercenary from the noble volunteer.206 At first glance, this requirement appears the easiest for private contractors to satisfy. A private contractor, like a mercenary, “however civilized, skilled, and professional he may be . . . [is still] a private agent, principally motivated by profit.”207 Likewise, private contractors are paid substantially more than their counterparts in the national armed forces, with some making up to $20,000 a month in Iraq.208 In fact, the incitement of the high salaries offered by PMCs has resulted in something of a brain drain from the special forces of countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom. 209

Geneva Conventions – Uniqueness – PMC’s Violate

PMC’s meet definitions for mercenaries better than traditional mercenaries do – the corporate structure makes them a for-profit business.

SALZMAN 9 (“PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE TAINT OF A MERCENARY” REPUTATION ZOE New York University School of Law INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:853 May 14, http://law.nyu.edu/ecm\_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu\_law\_website\_\_journals\_\_journal\_of\_international\_law\_and\_politics/documents/documents/ecm\_pro\_058877.pdf)KM

Nevertheless, this element of the Additional Protocol’s definition has been heavily criticized as the biggest loophole in the international definition of mercenary,210 leading some scholars to joke that anyone convicted under the current definition of mercenary should be shot, and their lawyer with them.211 Scholars argue that this requirement is almost impossible to prove: Many soldiers in the national armed forces are motivated to enlist for monetary gain, while many private soldiers (both mercenaries and private contractors) have nonmonetary motivations.212 It is important to note, however, that Protocol I does not require that mercenaries be motivated exclusively by financial gain, but only essentially.213 Thus, this requirement is not as high an evidentiary burden as some critics have suggested. In addition, Protocol I’s definition also requires that the mercenary actually be paid substantially more than the actual soldier. 214 According to the ICRC Commentary, this concrete qualification was introduced to facilitate proving financial motivation. 215 Indeed, as discussed above, this fact is relatively easy to prove with respect to today’s private contractors. Moreover, as applied to private contractors, this requirement is actually less problematic than when it is applied to traditional mercenaries.216 Unlike the mercenaries of the 1960s, contemporary private contractors do not pick and choose their conflicts on the basis of more or less noble ideas; today’s private contractors are essentially on call for the next available conflict. A private contractor whose name is maintained in at least one PMC database, ready to be called upon when a bid is won, can hardly claim that he operates without a desire for private gain. The very fact that private contractors are organized into a corporate structure to compete on the open, global market suggests that they are driven by business profit.217 While “mercenary labor is not fully commodified,” 218 a multinational PMC clearly has a “purely commercial purpose.”219 A private contractor employed by a PMC is thus more likely to meet the financial gain motivation requirement than is a traditional mercenary.

PMCs are bad when they perform military functions

Singer and Myers 5 (PW and Joanne, <http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/5287.html>, date accessed: 6/26/2010) AJK  
 Whether reading about abuses at Abu Ghraib prison or hearing about companies that overcharge the government for services provided in Iraq, some of the most disturbing news coming from this war zone has involved private military contractors who have been outsourced by the Pentagon to perform the duties once carried out by official military units. With U.S. forces increasingly overstretched, private companies are more and more providing a record number of armed personnel to offer services ranging from logistics and troop training to escorting of convoys and interrogations in conflict zones around the world. This new privatized military industry encompasses hundreds of companies, thousands of employees, and billions of dollars in revenue. While these new private solutions for public military ends is not necessarily a bad thing, when it comes to actual warfare the stakes are high. The entrance of the profit motive onto the battlefield raises a series of troubling questions, as these so-called private soldiers have been operating with previous few constraints to govern their activities. Therefore, if outsourcing of the military continues to be the trend, it would be prudent to ask: What ethical standards should apply when our national security is at issue and people's lives are constantly put at risk?

Geneva Conventions – Uniqueness – PMC’s Violate

PMC’s are within the bounds of the Geneva convention because they are hired by states and governments.

SALZMAN 9 (“PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE TAINT OF A MERCENARY” REPUTATION ZOE New York University School of Law INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:853 May 14, http://law.nyu.edu/ecm\_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu\_law\_website\_\_journals\_\_journal\_of\_international\_law\_and\_politics/documents/documents/ecm\_pro\_058877.pdf)KM

F. State Employ of Private Contractors Does Not Exempt Them from Anti-Mercenary Prohibitions Some scholars also argue that private contractors can be distinguished from mercenaries because they work only for legitimate states.227 As a result, the argument goes, such contractors cannot be considered ‘mercenaries’ because their activities have not challenged the sovereignty of states or the right of populations to self-determination. . . . [and because] they have restricted their contracts solely to work for legitimate regimes or organizations. 228 Mercenaries, on the other hand, supposedly operate without government support for their actions229 and serve employers considered illegitimate in the eyes of the state-based system, namely terrorists, arms and drug dealers, “alien governments,” and insurgencies.230 These scholars assert that the international norms against mercenaries were simply not designed “to deal with security corporations employed by recognized regimes.”231 This argument is both factually and legally unpersuasive. First, as I discussed in Part III, this purported distinction is factually inaccurate both because states do employ mercenaries and because private contractors do not work solely for states,232 but also for non-state actors ranging from NGOs and the UN to drug cartels and rebel factions.233 Second, this distinction is not legally supported by the existing international law on mercenaries. While the OAU Convention specifically defined mercenaries in such a way as to allow their continued employ by Member States,234 both Protocol I and the Convention Against Mercenaries moved in the opposite direction—to discourage the state employ of mercenaries. 235 Protocol I only applies to international armed conflicts— that is, conflicts between two or more State Parties.236 As a result, it directly targets the use of mercenaries by States. In addition, the Convention Against Mercenaries specifically prohibits State Parties from recruiting, using, financing, or training mercenaries.237 Thus, even if it were accurate to say that private contractors work only for states, this would not exempt their actions from the sanction of existing international anti-mercenary laws, which specifically target state-employ of mercenaries. It is possible, therefore, to bring at least some private contractors within the scope of article 47 of the First Additional Protocol. Doing so would strip private contractors of the right to combatant status and prisoner of war status upon capture. 238 Without combatant status, private contractors who engage in fighting would be unauthorized combatants, pariahs under international law just like traditional mercenaries, and subject to prosecution for their participation in the conflict.

If a PMC performs a military function they’re violating the Geneva convention

Atsqol (<http://www.atsqol.org/Private-military-company.html>, date accessed: 6/26/2010) AJK  
It is clearly cost-effective to have contractors for a variety of things that military people need not do, and that for whatever reason other civilians, government people, cannot be deployed to do. No such declaration was made in the Iraq conflict. They maintain an array of weapons systems vital to an invasion of Iraq. government officials in high risk areas all around the world. Much of the peacekeeper training the United States provides to African militaries is done by private firms, and with the increasing absence of Western military support to international peace operations, the private sector is commonly utilized to provide services to peace and stability operations from Haiti to Darfur. The Center for Public Integrity reported that since 1994, the Defense Department entered into 3,601 contracts worth $300 billion with 12 U.S. Thank you. Rumsfeld: Thank you. CLARIFICATION OF APPLICATION OF UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE DURING A TIME OF WAR. They also provide bodyguards for VIPs, guard installations, and escort supply convoys from Kuwait. If, however, the contractor engages in combat, he/she can be classified as a mercenary by the captors under the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol I) Article 47.c, unless falling under an exemption to this clause in Article 47. They have their laws and they re going to govern, the UN resolution and the Iraqi laws, as well as U.S. military bases throughout the Persian Gulf, from operating mess halls to providing security. procedures and laws govern behavior in that country depending on who the individual is and what he s doing.

Geneva Conventions – Link – Plan Key

Laws against PMC’s aren’t recognized in the status quo – the US has the unique opportunity to regulate them.

SALZMAN 9 (“PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE TAINT OF A MERCENARY” REPUTATION ZOE New York University School of Law INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:853 May 14, http://law.nyu.edu/ecm\_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu\_law\_website\_\_journals\_\_journal\_of\_international\_law\_and\_politics/documents/documents/ecm\_pro\_058877.pdf)KM

Nevertheless, while the international law against mercenaries may be strongly worded on the books, these laws are neither widely ratified nor respected in practice.162 The Convention Against Mercenaries only came into force in 2001, when Costa Rica became the necessary twenty-second state to ratify it.163 None of the states of the European Union or the G8 have signed the Convention Against Mercenaries, and the generally low level of ratification has led some to claim that the Convention is “anti-customary law.”164 Given the low level of ratification and the frequent use of mercenaries by states, there seems to be little state practice or opinio juris for a customary international law ban on mercenaries, let alone on the PMCs and private contractors that are used even more widely and more openly by states.165 Despite the low incidence of ratification of and the lack of respect for the mercenary prohibitions, the fact remains that these prohibitions do exist, at least in theory, and there is a general public perception that international law outlaws mercenaries. 166 As examined earlier, the private military industry has certainly attempted to distance itself from mercenaries,167 suggesting that the existing international law on mercenaries has at least some rhetorical clout, even if full legal clout is still lacking. This leads me to conclude that as American legislators begin to seriously consider how to regulate the private military industry, it is important that they remember the similarities between the concerns surrounding private contractors and those raised by mercenaries rather than readily accepting the industry’s attempt to distance itself from the taint of a mercenary reputation.

Geneva Conventions – Link – Congress Key

Congressional action to regulate PMC’s can give new strength to Geneva Convention laws indicting the use of mercenaries.

SALZMAN 9 (“PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE TAINT OF A MERCENARY” REPUTATION ZOE New York University School of Law INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:853 May 14, http://law.nyu.edu/ecm\_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu\_law\_website\_\_journals\_\_journal\_of\_international\_law\_and\_politics/documents/documents/ecm\_pro\_058877.pdf)KM

VI. CONCLUSION The pervasive use of private contractors by democratic states such as the United Stated, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia raises numerous concerns. It undermines the state’s monopoly on the use of force by de-privileging the role of the state as the primary protector of its citizens. More ominously still, it weakens democratic accountability and increases the executive’s power to make war unchecked by democratic constraints. The private military industry also prioritizes the private good at the expense of the public good, leading to the risk of an increasingly militarized world. The similarity of the concerns about the use of mercenaries and the use of private contractors suggests that laws that were written to apply to mercenaries can appropriately be extended to cover private contractors as well. Many private contractors do in fact come within the definition of mercenary adopted in Protocol I. By denying private contractors the benefit of combatant status, this solution opens the door to future regulation of the private military industry.239 Nevertheless, the existing prohibitions on mercenaries are undeniably full of legal loopholes and, more importantly, have not been widely ratified. Moreover, as my examination of Protocol I’s definition of mercenary demonstrates, it is by no means the case that existing anti-mercenary prohibitions can be applied to all private contractors, or even to the majority of them.240 The weaknesses of the existing prohibitions on mercenaries lend support to the claim that we ultimately need to redefine existing rules in order to apply them effectively to private contractors.241 Possible solutions short of complete prohibition include: requiring governments to formally incorporate private contractors into the national armed forces (much like the French Foreign Legion) by requiring the contractors to wear the uniform of the national armed forces; to count private contractors among the number of troops deployed and the official casualty counts; and to subject private contractors to national legislation regulating the conduct of the armed forces.242 It may, therefore, be primarily rhetorical to refer to private contractors as mercenaries. Nevertheless, I believe that this rhetoric can play an important role in the ongoing debate over the regulation of the private military industry. The industry’s eagerness to avoid the tarnishing effect of a mercenary reputation suggests that there is some strength to the anti-mercenary laws. I propose to leverage that clout to contribute to the public debate surrounding the use of private contractors, particularly in democratic states, in a manner similar to the way in which the human rights movement has shown that legal rhetoric can affect how states act,243 as the “[n]aming and shaming for human rights abuses now have real consequences.” 244

Geneva Conventions – I/L – US K2 Geneva Cred

Failure of the U.S. to adhere to the Geneva Conventions undermines the entire regime

Beard 7 [Jack Beard, Lecturer at UCLA and former Deputy General Counsel at the D.o.D., “The Geneva Boomerang: The Military Commissions Act of 2006 And US Counterterror operations,” The American Journal of International Law]KM

At a fundamental level, unilateral revision of the Geneva Conventions by the United States undermines the credibility of the U.S. commitment to the existing Geneva regime. In an international setting that lacks effective external enforcement mechanisms, allowing the easy violation of agreements, a state may seek to send a signal of credible commitment to other states by constraining its own ability to act in ex ante legal structures, institutions, or procedures that reduce ex post incentives for such noncompliance. n58 A legislative act that restrains or makes it [\*66] costly to exercise such discretionary power and reduces the attractiveness of breaching an agreement can serve such a signaling function. n59 To the extent, however, that the MCA is perceived as unilaterally revising key obligations in the Geneva Conventions and providing the president with the discretion to issue further reinterpretations, it undermines the credible commitment of the United States to other states in the international community. n60 And to the extent that the U.S. commitment is perceived as increasingly less credible, theory suggests that other countries are unlikely to maintain the stringency of their own commitments.

Geneva Conventions – Impact – Bioterrorism

The Geneva Conventions prevent the development and use of chemical and biological weapons.

GCSP 5 [Geneva Centre for Security Policy, “Biological and Chemical Weapons Seminar,” June 2005, <http://www.gcsp.ch/e/meetings/Security\_Challenges/WMD/Meeting\_Conf/2005/BC%20Weapons%20Seminar/summary.htm>]KM

On 9-10 June 2005, the GCSP hosted an international seminar initiated by France and Switzerland on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the signing of the Geneva Protocol prohibiting the Use of Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons in collaboration with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). Over 100 participants attended the event, representing 39 States Parties, 8 UN agencies and the European Union, 12 non-governmental organisations and 10 media organisations. Ambassador Raimund Kunz, Head of the Directorate of Security Policy of the Swiss Defence Department, and Ambassadors François Rivasseau and Jürg Streuli, respectively the French and Swiss Permanent Representatives to the Conference on Disarmament, opened the seminar. The first session considered the historical background to the adoption of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and why its prohibition was extended to include bacteriological weapons, and the philosophical and ethical reasons for preserving humankind from the scourge of weapons of mass destruction. The second session considered the current situation and why there is a continuing threat from biological weapons, including from non-State actors, as well as the measures that should be taken to counter this threat, including inter-governmental cooperation through Interpol. The WHO presented the global health response to epidemics, caused naturally, accidentally or deliberately, and the International Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) described its policies to prevent or cure animal epidemics. The session also considered the implications of industrial and scientific developments in biology and biotechnology as well as legal and ethical measures in relation to bio-security. The third session examined the possible responses of international law, including the classical rules of humanitarian law relating to poisoning and the deliberate spread of disease as related to modern responsibilities, and responses that could be based on traditional instruments of disarmament, namely the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. The final session considered emergency responses to the threat of biological and chemical weapons. The French Head of the MFA Disarmament Unit took stock of the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the UK Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, President of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Process, envisaged what the States Parties to the Convention might do at the Sixth Review Conference in 2006. Then the seminar considered the actions taken by groups of States such as the G8 (Global Partnership against Weapons of Mass Destruction) and the European Union (Common Strategy on the Non-Proliferation of WMD) to strengthen the regimes prohibiting chemical and biological weapons, as well as the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004). Thanks in particular to the active presence of NGOs, think tanks and journalists, the seminar was lively with a rich debate following the presentations that covered much ground and led to the recognition of a number of conclusions and points for further consideration: The 1925 Geneva Protocol was the cornerstone of a multilateral regime that now, through the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, totally prohibits not only the use but also the production and possession of both chemical and biological weapons.

Bioweapons are the most likely scenario for human extinction.

Ochs 2 (“BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MUST BE ABOLISHED IMMEDIATELY” Richard June 9th http://www.freefromterror.net/other\_articles/abolish.html)KM

Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE.

Geneva Conventions – I/L – Civilian Casualties

The Geneva Conventions are key to stopping civilian casualties.

ICRC 9 (International Committee of the Red Cross 3-09-2009 “The Geneva Conventions of 1949” http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/genevaconventions)KM

The Geneva Conventions, which were adopted before 1949. were concerned with combatants only, not with civilians. The events of World War II showed the disastrous consequences of the absence of a convention for the protection of civilians in wartime. The Convention adopted in 1949 takes account of the experiences of World War II. It is composed of 159 articles. It contains a short section concerning the general protection of populations against certain consequences of war, without addressing the conduct of hostilities, as such, which was later examined in the Additional Protocols of 1977. The bulk of the Convention deals with the status and treatment of protected persons, distinguishing between the situation of foreigners on the territory of one of the parties to the conflict and that of civilians in occupied territory. It spells out the obligations of the Occupying Power vis-à-vis the civilian population and contains detailed provisions on humanitarian relief for populations in occupied territory. It also contains a specific regime for the treatment of civilian internees. It has three annexes containing a model agreement on hospital and safety zones, model regulations on humanitarian relief and model cards.

The Geneva Conventions have global reach and influence.

Kahl 7 (“In the Crossfire or the Crosshairs? Norms, Civilian Casualties, and U.S. Conduct in Iraq” Colin H. *International Security* 32.1 7-46)KM

Norms are "collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity."6 The norm of noncombatant immunity has its roots in the legal and ethical tradition known as "just war."7 Internationally, the norm has been institutionalized as part of the Law of War, which encompasses all treaties, agreements, and customary law for the conduct of hostilities. During the twentieth century, the Law of War was codified in a series of international agreements and treaties, most notably the Hague Conventions of 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions adopted in 1977. These accords are among the most widely ratified international treaties, and the principles embodied in them are generally accepted as obligations that all nations must comply with.8 The United States has signed and ratified the Hague and Geneva Conventions; it is a signatory to the Additional Protocols but has not ratified them. Nevertheless, as it relates to the norm of noncombatant immunity, the United States recognizes the vast majority of Additional Protocol I's relevant articles as customary international law, and Department of Defense (DoD) policy holds that Law of War obligations apply regardless of how a given conflict is characterized.9

Geneva Conventions – Impact – Civilian Casualties

Civilian causalities are the Taliban’s biggest support- they blame the US military

Jaffe 9 (Greg, Washington Post Staff Writer, *Washington Post*, May 8—9) ET

The truth of what happened in Farah may be less important than what the Afghan people believe took place in the remote western region. Gates said that a cornerstone of the Taliban campaign is to blame civilian deaths on U.S. troops. And he suggested that the best way to counter the enemy's strategy would be to reduce civilian casualties throughout the country. "Even if the Taliban create these casualties or exploit them, we need to figure out a way to minimize them and hopefully make them go away," he said. The difficulty of the civilian casualty issue was evident in Farah, where anti-American protests erupted Thursday. The Associated Press reported that Afghan police wounded one demonstrator.

Increased Taliban power causes pakistan nuclear war  
Gregorian 1(Vartan, president of Carnegie Corporation of New York *NY Times* ,11/15/01) ET

After Sept. 11, with options and allies in short supply, Pakistani leader Pervez Musharraf agreed to cooperate with the United States against the Taliban. Both countries now face the thorny issue of the Pashtuns. Wiping out the Taliban won't end the prospect of Pashtunistan -- it may even energize it. If a government dominated by the Northern Alliance denies the Pashtuns power in Afghanistan proper, they will exert power elsewhere. Taliban forces could retreat into Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province and form alliances with their Pashtun cousins. If, on the other hand, Pashtuns were to become a dominant power in Afghanistan in the post-Taliban era, Pakistan could face a revival of Afghan interest in expanding into Pakistani territory. Pakistan cannot afford any movement that threatens to fragment it, and it cannot withstand simultaneous challenges in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Nor can it afford a civil war between disappointed fundamentalists and disappointed nationalists -- particularly given its possession of nuclear weapons.

Pre-emptive strike by India ensures nuclear confrontation

Ricks 1 (Thomas, Washington Post Staff Writer, *Washington Post*, Oct 21-1) ET

The prospect of Pakistan being taken over by Islamic extremists is especially worrisome because it possesses nuclear weapons. The betting among military strategists is that India, another nuclear power, would not stand idly by, if it appeared that the Pakistani nuclear arsenal were about to fall into the hands of extremists. A preemptive action by India to destroy Pakistan's nuclear stockpile could provoke a new war on the subcontinent. The U.S. military has conducted more than 25 war games involving a confrontation between a nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, and each has resulted in nuclear war, said retired Air Force Col. Sam Gardiner, an expert on strategic games.

And, the impact is extinction

Fai 1 (Dr. Ghulam Nabi, executive director of the Kashmiri American Council,  *The Washington Times*, 8 July 2001) ET

The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan.  It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe.  The United States would enjoy no sanctuary.

This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view.  The Director of Central Intelligence, the Department of Defense, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries.  Both India and Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations.  Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention.

Geneva Conventions – Democracy Module – Undermine the State

Private contractors undermine the state’s monopoly on violence by selling services to non-state actors and being outside of court jurisdiction.

SALZMAN 9 (“PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE TAINT OF A MERCENARY” REPUTATION ZOE New York University School of Law INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:853 May 14, http://law.nyu.edu/ecm\_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu\_law\_website\_\_journals\_\_journal\_of\_international\_law\_and\_politics/documents/documents/ecm\_pro\_058877.pdf)KM

Like mercenaries, private contractors also “undermine states’ collective monopoly on violence,”53 but unlike mercenaries, private contractors have so far escaped international condemnation. One reason that the private military industry has successfully avoided condemnation so far is that its major employers are states themselves. As a result, private contractors have been described as “the nation-state system’s bulwark against destabilization,”54 rather than as a threat to the state’s monopoly on force. Some scholars argue that so long as private contractors are employed by a state, they can be understood as “a type of state agent.”55 In Sierra Leone, for example, the weak government’s contract with the PMC Executive Outcomes saved it from imminent rebel takeover in 1995.56 In effect, the private nature of the PMC is subsumed by the public function that it has been hired to fulfill.57 Under this theory, private contractors pose a danger only “if they are taken out of the state-controlled system.”58 Private contractors do not, however, work solely for states; they are also hired by multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations to provide security for their personnel and facilities.59 As such, they operate outside of the state system, effectively breaking the state’s monopoly on force in the same way as other non-state actors that use violence. Private contractors also work for criminal organizations that di- rectly oppose states, such as the Colombian and Mexican drug cartels.60 For example, PMCs are involved on both sides of the conflict in Colombia.61 While American companies such as DynCorp have been hired by the U.S. government to assist in the Colombian government’s anti-drug activities, an Israeli PMC (Spearhead, Ltd.) is rumored to have been hired by drug cartels to provide combat training and support services.62 Similarly, in Mexico, drug cartels have hired private companies to train their forces in military tactics as well as in countersurveillance techniques.63 In short, since the private military market is unregulated, the companies and the contractors can, and do, work for whomever they choose.64 Although in some situations a PMC’s concern with its reputation might prevent it working for a less than savory client such as a drug cartel, in other situations the large financial rewards might trump reputational concerns.65 Some PMCs might even choose to base their reputation on being willing to work for anyone—producing a race to the bottom.66 It is a mistake, therefore, to dismiss private contractors as unproblematic because they are employed solely by states. Rather, like any other business, private contractors can sell their services to whomever they choose. Unlike other businesses, however, private contractors are engaged in selling the use of force. As a result, by creating a market for violence, they effectively break states’ monopoly on the use of force. Private contractors also threaten the state’s monopoly on the use of force because they frequently operate outside the control of any national laws.67 It remains unclear, for example, whether private contractors hired by the United States are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), as are members of the national armed forces.68 Indeed, at the time this Note goes to press, the debate continues over whether the private contractors involved in the September 16, 2007 shooting in Iraq can be prosecuted in U.S. courts: Because the contractors were employed by the Department of State rather than the Department of Defense, they appear to be outside the jurisdiction of American courts.69 Private contractors em- ployed in Iraq were also granted immunity from Iraqi laws by the Coalition Provisional Authority’s Order 17.70 Even where they are not exempt from local law, however, the situation on the ground in many of the states where private contractors operate is too unstable to guarantee any real accountability.71

Geneva Conventions – Democracy Module – Undermine the State

PMC’s take on government responsibilities, necessarily diminishing the role of the state.

SALZMAN 9 (“PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE TAINT OF A MERCENARY” REPUTATION ZOE New York University School of Law INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:853 May 14, http://law.nyu.edu/ecm\_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu\_law\_website\_\_journals\_\_journal\_of\_international\_law\_and\_politics/documents/documents/ecm\_pro\_058877.pdf)KM

Moreover, even if states could effectively control the private military industry, there is also a deeper-rooted objection to private companies taking on what are fundamentally governmental responsibilities.76 Successful national regulation of the private military industry may appear to re-impose state control over the industry, but by recognizing and accepting the state’s reliance on private contractors it also “communicates disregard for the norm that states have primary responsibility for and monopoly over legitimate security services.”77 If the state’s monopoly on the use of force is a “fundamental feature of the modern state system,”78 then the privatization of the state’s military functions will always be fundamentally problematic.79 Private contractors threaten the state’s monopoly on the use of force because they represent a clear alternative to state force—a purchasable alternative that has already proven alluring to criminal factions and other forces opposing legitimate governments—and because they generally operate outside of the control of national law. Even when private contractors are hired by a state, however, the role of the state as the primary provider of security is necessarily diminished.80

Geneva Conventions – Democracy Module – Undermine Demo

PMC’s undermine democracy by removing checks on the separation of powers and lowering the cost of war.

SALZMAN 9 (“PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE TAINT OF A MERCENARY” REPUTATION ZOE New York University School of Law INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:853 May 14, http://law.nyu.edu/ecm\_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu\_law\_website\_\_journals\_\_journal\_of\_international\_law\_and\_politics/documents/documents/ecm\_pro\_058877.pdf)KM

In addition to challenging the state’s monopoly on the use of force, the privatization of military force also threatens the democratic state because it allows governments to make war while avoiding democratic accountability.82 Democratic governments are entrusted with a monopoly on the use of force because their power to exercise that force is limited by the rule of law and by accountability to their citizens.83 Private contractors, however, greatly undermine democratic accountability, and in so doing circumvent the democratic reluctance for war. By undermining the public’s control over the warmaking powers of the state, private contractors threaten the popular sovereignty of the state.84 Thus, the problem with private military force may not be simply a lack of state control, as discussed above, but also too much government control, particularly executive control, at the expense of popular, democratic control.85 At an extreme, a government, even a democratic government, might use private violence as a brutal police force to ensure its control over the people.86 In reality, however, a democratic government’s outsourcing of military functions undermines the democratic process much more subtly than this far-fetched scenario. Because the executive branch is generally in charge of hiring contractors, private contractors allow the executive to evade parliamentary or congressional checks on foreign policy.87 Indeed, [t]o the extent privatization permits the Executive to carry out military policy unilaterally . . . it circumvents primary avenues through which the People are informed and blocks off primary channels (namely Congress) through which the People can register their approval or voice their misgivings.88 Privatizing military force results in a lack of transparency and puts the military effort outside of the scope of the democratic dialogue, “obscuring choices about military needs and human implications.”89 Notably, in the United States, private contractors are not subject to the scrutiny of the Freedom of Information Act,90 which greatly restricts the public’s ability to be well-informed about the government’s reliance on the private military industry. Thus, the privatization of military force allows the executive “to operate in the shadows of public attention” 91 and to subvert democratic political restraints.92 The privatization of combat duties is potentially much more problematic than the privatization of other government functions because the privatization of the use of force inherently removes many of the burdens of war from the citizenry, thereby reducing public debate about national involvement in the conflict.93 Indeed, governments may turn to private military forces not because they are cheaper, but because they are less accountable and less likely to attract political backlash.94 For example, by outsourcing military functions, the executive branch is able to evade certain forms of democratic accountability by circumventing congressional caps on the number of troops approved for deployment.95 Employing private contractors also allows the executive to avoid instituting a draft, keep official casualty counts and public criticism down, and even to avoid arms embargoes.96 The government is also able to distance itself from mistakes by blaming them on the contractors. 97 By subverting public debate and by undermining the separation of powers, the privatization of military force poses a direct threat to the democratic system.98 This impediment to public debate is important because, as Immanuel Kant famously reasoned, the chances for peace are greatly increased when the people control the decision on whether or not to go to war, since it is the people themselves who will suffer “the miseries of war.”99 If, on the other hand, the decision rests with the head of state, he has little incentive to refrain from war because he bears none of its costs.100 At a fundamental level, therefore, the use of private contractors subverts Kant’s reliance on the democratic reluctance to go to war by circumventing the public’s reluctance to sustain casualties. 101 In Iraq, for example, contractor deaths are not counted towards the official death toll,102 allowing the government to present a far lower number of American casualties. Recent estimates suggest that the total number of contractors killed in Iraq is 1,000, with over 10,000 wounded or injured on the job.103 But, as the daughter of one contractor killed in Iraq put it: “If anything happens to the military people, you hear about it right away . . . . Flags get lowered, they get their respect. You don’t hear anything about the contractors.”104

Geneva Conventions – Democracy Module – Undermine Democracy

PMC’s undermine democratic control of violence in developed democracies and destroy developing ones – Africa proves.

Avant 5 (The Market for Force The Consequences of Privatizing Security Deborah D., http://www.scribd.com/doc/24612306/The-Market-for-Force#page20)KM

As these statements attest, the implications of privatizing security for the control of force are debated. Pessimists claim that the turn to private security threatens to undermine state control and democratic pro- cesses.10Ken Silverstein characterizes this process as one “by which the responsibilities of government are transferred to corporate hands.”11 In the US this allows for foreign policy by proxy – where corporate entities do what the government cannot. The implication of Silverstein’s argument is that the institutions that contain violence in the US are undermined by privatization. Violence becomes a private commodity rather than a public good – and the result, Silverstein argues, is a defense policy that ignores the real issues and threats only to be shaped by “the profit motives and egos of a small group of hardliners.”12In Africa, according to Musah and Fayemi, the consequences are even more severe. Though contemporary mercenaries attempt to distinguish themselves from the lawless “guns for hire” that ran riot over Africa during the Cold War, their consortium with arms manufacturers, mineral exploiters, and Africa’s authoritarian governments and warlords sustains the militarization of Africa.13This poses “a mortal danger to democracy in the region.”14 Unregulated private armies linked to international business interests threaten to undermine democracy and development in Africa.

PMC’s create new situations for violence which greatly threatens democracy.

Lowell 10 (Devin, [http://www.kansan.com/news/2010/jan/21/PMC’s-are/](http://www.kansan.com/news/2010/jan/21/pmcs-are/) , date accessed: 6/24/2010) AJK

War breeds tragedy; this is inevitable. But, greater tragedy occurs when needless and preventable violence takes the lives of ordinary people living in a warzone. This truth is evident in the recent arrest of two former Blackwater employees working in Afghanistan. The unfortunate Blackwater example highlights the problematic issue of the use of private military contractors. Two Americans, Justin Cannon and Christopher Drotleff, formerly employed by Paravant LLC, a subsidiary of the company commonly referred to as Blackwater, were charged with the murder of two Afghan civilians in Kabul last year. The men allegedly opened fire on a vehicle involved in a traffic accident in front of their convoy. The men were armed, despite a U.S. military order forbidding the contractors from carrying weapons. Although more widely publicized than others, the incident is just one of many involving contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq. In another case in 2007, five Blackwater employees opened fire in Baghdad’s Nisour Square, killing 17 Iraqi civilians. Charges against these employees have been thrown out. For those unfamiliar, Xe Services, still referred to by its former name, Blackwater, is a private military corporation (PMC). PMC’s are essentially mercenary armies and guns-for-hire. In Blackwater’s case, this includes an air force and navy. The widespread use of PMC’s presents a unique dilemma in war: On the one hand, if they were to act in a responsible manner, they might have a role to play in peacekeeping around the globe. However, this never has been, and probably never will be, the case. What the use of these companies has done is to proliferate violence while creating a void of accountability, both to the contracting government and to the public. There exists a serious lack of government oversight with regard to the contracting and conduct of PMC’s. This often results in gross misconduct, not just limited to murder of civilians. Just one of many past examples is last year’s assault of a female contractor in Iraq by her coworkers. PMC’s allow the government to expand its use of force without the oversight or input of the public—the taxpayers funding these wars. The idea of armies loyal only to their salaries is a dangerous enough one. Couple that with secretive, often no-bid contracts, and it becomes an exponentially greater threat to democracy and international order. If, however, a system of international and domestic accountability and oversight could be established, and the PMC’s prove a willingness to take legal responsibility for their actions, then they might present an opportunity rather than a hazard. In instances of humanitarian crises, it might prove easier for a PMC to act than any national military to intervene. Until this becomes the case, the use of PMC’s should be severely restricted or entirely banned. The growing insurgency in Afghanistan is only fueled when Americans commit murder or otherwise cause unnecessary civilian deaths, and any new counterinsurgency strategy there should be wary of that.

Geneva Conventions – Democracy Module – Undermine Democracy

And, the privatization of the military undermines democracy- it creates a system that the executive systematically circumvents congress and the pubic while giving private corporations the ability to outgun our military

Scahill 7 (Jeremy, Puffin Foundation Writing Fellow at The Nation Institute, is the author of the bestselling Blackwater, *The Independent,* Aug 10, http://www.uruknet.info/?p=35239 ) ET

If you think the U.S. has only 160,000 troops in Iraq, think again. With almost no congressional oversight and even less public awareness, the Bush administration has more than doubled the size of the U.S. occupation through the use of private war companies. There are now almost 200,000 private "contractors" deployed in Iraq by Washington. This means that U.S. military forces in Iraq are now outsized by a coalition of billing corporations whose actions go largely unmonitored and whose crimes are virtually unpunished. In essence, the Bush administration has created a shadow army that can be used to wage wars unpopular with the American public but extremely profitable for a few unaccountable private companies. Since the launch of the "global war on terror," the administration has systematically funneled billions of dollars in public money to corporations like Blackwater USA , DynCorp, Triple Canopy, Erinys and ArmorGroup. They have in turn used their lucrative government pay-outs to build up the infrastructure and reach of private armies so powerful that they rival or outgun some nation’s militaries. "I think it’s extraordinarily dangerous when a nation begins to outsource its monopoly on the use of force and the use of violence in support of its foreign policy or national security objectives," says veteran U.S. Diplomat Joe Wilson, who served as the last U.S. ambassador to Iraq before the 1991 Gulf War. The billions of dollars being doled out to these companies, Wilson argues, "makes of them a very powerful interest group within the American body politic and an interest group that is in fact armed. And the question will arise at some time: to whom do they owe their loyalty?"Precise data on the extent of U.S. spending on mercenary services is nearly impossible to obtain — by both journalists and elected officials—but some in Congress estimate that up to 40 cents of every tax dollar spent on the war goes to corporate war contractors. At present, the United States spends about $2 billion a week on its Iraq operations. While much has been made of the Bush administration’s "failure" to build international consensus for the invasion of Iraq, perhaps that was never the intention. When U.S. tanks rolled into Iraq in March 2003, they brought with them the largest army of "private contractors" ever deployed in a war. The White House substituted international diplomacy with lucrative war contracts and a coalition of willing nations who provided token forces with a coalition of billing corporations that supplied the brigades of contractors.

Geneva Conventions – Democracy Module – Emerging Democracies

PMC’s hurt emerging democracies – they undermine the aim to redistribute power and resources.

SALZMAN 9 (“PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE TAINT OF A MERCENARY” REPUTATION ZOE New York University School of Law INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:853 May 14, http://law.nyu.edu/ecm\_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu\_law\_website\_\_journals\_\_journal\_of\_international\_law\_and\_politics/documents/documents/ecm\_pro\_058877.pdf)KM

Just as the private military industry poses a threat to established democratic regimes, it also potentially impedes the emergence of new democratic states. When private contractors become involved in a conflict, there is necessarily a danger that security will become a commodity that only the rich can afford.105 This tendency can undermine democratic movements that aim at a redistribution of resources and power.106 Fundamentally, private contractors “serve a commercial rather than a humanitarian purpose. . . . [T]hey are not drawn towards the interests of the poor, but towards those who can pay.”107

Geneva Conventions – Democracy Module – Emerging Demo

Emerging democracies solve all impacts – they offer pragmatic solutions to counter ideological standoffs between major powers – Kazakhstan proves.

Nazarbayev 9 (Nursultan, president of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “The promise of emerging democracies” September 8,

Sharing common values of freedom and peaceful development, democracies firmly support each other. That is why since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks that shocked the entirety of mankind, Kazakhstan has stood shoulder to shoulder with the United States in the fight against international terrorism and today provides much-needed assistance for the stabilization of Afghanistan. As an emerging democracy practicing cooperative leadership, Kazakhstan is able to encourage dialogue even among adversaries. Our recently concluded third annual Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions is only one example, with spiritual leaders attending from almost every faith and nation to promote tolerance and understanding. Likewise, our quest to establish an international nuclear fuel bank to be governed by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which would allow nations like Iran and others to openly and honestly pursue their energy agendas, finds support among leaders in the United States, Russia and China. Recently, Israeli President Shimon Peres proposed Kazakhstan as the site for a historic meeting with key leaders from his country, Saudi Arabia and the Islamic world. This is how emerging democracies can make a difference. In the absence of the entrenched and sometimes dogmatic divisions of the past, young entrants on the global stage of freedom can offer an environment for pragmatic solutions. Mr. Obama understands this. Two weeks after his election, he called to discuss regional cooperation, nonproliferation measures and energy cooperation. At that time, and many times since in public statements, he has favored pragmatism as the basis for civilized statecraft. Some have suggested this is an inadequate approach for charting the new direction in foreign policy that Mr. Obama has promised. However, I believe those criticisms are misconceived. Pragmatism is necessary in nation-building and more likely to evoke a positive response from allies than an ideological crusade. Emerging democracies understand this challenge, undertaking in decades an experiment that has engaged America for much more than 200 years. Cooperative leadership is the important role we can play and the example we can set for others.

Geneva Conventions – Democracy Module – Famine

1. Democracy Prevents Famine

Talbot 96 (Strobe, Deputy Secretary of State, Foreign Affairs, Nov./De,c, pg. l/n)

**In some of the world’s poorest countries**, such as Nicaragua and Malawi, **elected leaders have proved more inclined that their authoritarian or totalitarian predecessors to adopt policies that benefit their people. Democratic authorities, because of the way they came to power, have an important additional source of legitimacy that can reinforce their ability to make** painful but **necessary economic choices, including allocation of scarce natural resources**. Amartya Sen. **An economist at Harvard University, has argued that “no substantial famine has ever occurred in a country with democratic form of government and a relatively free press.”** He points out that throughout its history India endured widespread famines, including one in 1943 that claimed between two million and three million lives. But since becoming the world’s largest democracy in 1947, the country has not had a single substantial famine, despite frequent crop failures and food scarcities. Similarly, famine prevention programs run by democratically elected governments in Botswana and Zimbabwe enabled those nations to withstand crop failures in the early 1980s. During the same period, Sen. Notes, Sudan and Ethiopia, faced with relatively smaller declines in food output but ruled by authoritarian regimes, suffered severe famines.

2. Famine Will Kill 2 Billion People

Shah 1999 (Mahendra M2 Presswire, October 26)JFS

As the 21st Century dawns, the world faces the prospect of a new and complex food crisis that will require better ways of ensuring that the hungry and the malnourished will be able to meet their foods. **“If the world cannot make progress against hunger and poverty, by year 2025, there could be** 4 billion people living on less that US$ 2 per day and more than **2 billion living in extreme poverty,” says** James D. **Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank,** a founder and cosponsor of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). To tackle this enormous challenge, **the international community must launch a new “Green Revolution”, more powerful and encompassing than the one that thirty years ago** that doubled production of key crops such as rice and wheat. **The power of science** and information technology **must be harnessed for the benefit of the world’s poor**, says a new book released today by the CGIAR System Review Secretariat. “New scientific developments have the potential to radically reshape the world’s agriculture and food systems,” says Maurice Strong, Chairman of the CGIAR System Review and co-author of the Book. Food in the 21st Century: From Science to Sustainable Agriculture. “We need to recommit to science and research to ensure that the poor are not excluded, and that biodiversity and the environment are not undermined.”

Geneva Conventions – Democracy Module – Deterrence

1. Democratization Doesn’t Hurt, But Rather Helps Deterrence

Moore 2004 John Norton , Professor of Law, University of Virginia, VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, Winter , p. 391-2. (DRG/C821)

It is doubtful, however, that democracies are uniquely poor at deterrence. Rummel's analysis of major wars between 1816 and 1991 shows that there were 198 war pairings between non-democracies, the largest category of war in this period. If the earlier analysis of the importance of deterrence in war avoidance when dealing with potential aggressors is correct, then this level of war between non-democracies suggests that nondemocratic regimes also may have great, if not greater, difficulty deterring.

**2. Deterrence prevents nuclear annihilation**

Lee, 93 (Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons, , P. 39-40)

(P3)What would be the consequences if nuclear deterrence were abandoned mutually instead of unilaterally? Negative consequences, such as those outlines in (P2), would still follow. Nuclear deterrence deters not only nuclear war, but also conventional war between nuclear superpowers. Without nuclear deterrence, conventional war between superpower opponents would be more likely. Moreover, in one of the ironies of the nuclear age, the mutual abandonment of nuclear deterrence would actually make nuclear war more likely. For, in the midst of any conventional war that occurred after this abandonment, the erst-while nuclear powers are likely to race to re-arm themselves with nuclear weapons making it very possible that the conflict would become nuclear. In the midst of conventional war, each side would be likely to try and rebuild its nuclear weapons, first, because it would believe that a few such weapons would provide it with a decisive advantage in the war and, second, because it would suspect that the other side, believe this as well,was already secretly rearming. Each side would rearm in the hopes of gaining an advantage in the war and out of the fear that the other side might be trying to achieve that very advantage. The potential for or the actualization of this dynamic could lead other nations to behave in ways suggested in (P2). Instability would infect international relations weather the abandonment of nuclear deterrence were unilateral or mutual. (C) A consequentialist argument for some policy needs to show not only that a policy would have good (or not so bad) consequences, but that alternative policies would have consequences that are worse. (P1)-(P3) allows this comparative evaluation in the case of nuclear deterrence. On the positive side, mutual vulnerability and the stability it creates makes nuclear deterrence a reliable way if keeping the peace, with the beneficial consequences for all persons that this entails. On the negative side, the alterative to nuclear deterrence- its abandonment – whether unilateral or multilateral, would result in instability that would have consequences that are worse no only prudentially, but morally as well. Many nations would become less sure of their ability to avoid aggression or coercion on the part of other nations and so would make moves that would increase the likelihood of war. Part of this dynamic would be that nations fears of the potential for other nations to arm or rearm themselves with nuclear weapons would make their own nuclear armament or rearmament more likely. So the risk of nuclear war would also increase. The result would be a set of expected consequences of great disvalue for people all over the world. Thus, nuclear superpowers are morally required, in consequentionalist terms, to maintain their policies of nuclear deterrence.

Geneva Conventions – Democracy Module – Free Trade

**1. Democracy Causes International Interreliance and Free Trade**

Orneal and Russett 97 (John R. Bruce M. , Prof of Int’l Relations at Yale, International Studies Quarterly, , pp. 270-271)

Democracy may encourage interdependence. In democracies, economically powerful groups are likely to be political powerful as well (Papayoanou, 1996). Political and economic freedoms allow individuals to form transitional associations to influence policy (Veridier, 1994; Risse-Kappen, 1995). Trade agreements among democracies may also be particularly long lasting. Because executives in democratic countries must persuade and accommodate other powerful groups – the legislature, their party, interest groups – they are more likely to abide by their international commitments than are nondemocratic leaders whose power is less subject to checks and balances. Economic ties are required credible commitments regarding the terms of trade and capital flows; hence, democracies should be better at promoting and sustaining interdependence (Martin, 1995). In fact, democracies are inclined to trade with one another. (Bliss and Russett, 1996). With other democratic states, they need not fear entering into economic relationships for absolute gains in welfare for fear that trading partners’ greater relative gains will imperil their security (Powell, 1991; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993).

**2. Free Trade Key to Prevent Nuclear War**

Spicer 96 (Michael Former Member of the British Parliament, The Challenge from the East and Rebirth of the West, p. 121)

The choice facing the West today in much the same as that which faced the Soviet bloc after World War II; between meeting head-on the challenge of world trade with adjustments and the benefits that it will bring, or of attempting to shut out markets that are growing and where a dynamic new pace is being set for innovative production. The problem about the second approach is not simply that it won’t hold: satellite technology alone will ensure that he consumers will begin to demand those goods that the East is able to provide most cheaply. More fundamentally, it will guarantee the emergence of a fragmented world in which natural fears will be fanned and inflamed. A world divided into eight trade blocs will be a deeply troubled and unstable place in which suspicion and ultimately envy will possibly erupt into a major war. I do not say that the converse will necessarily be true, that in a free trading world there will be an absence of all strife. Such a proposition would manifestly be absurd. But to trade is to become interdependent, and that is a good step in the direction of world stability. With nuclear weapons at two a penny, stability will be at a premium in the years ahead.

Geneva Conventions – Democracy Module – Genocide

**1. Democracy Checks Genocide – Increases Pluralism**

Staub 1 (Ervin , Dept. of Psych @ Univ. of Mass, *Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict and Conflict Reduction*, Ed. By Richard D. Ashmore, , p. 177-178)

Another group level issue is culture change. Cultural devaluation and authority otentation shape identities. Monolithic cultures, with a limited set of values and limited access of at least some groups of people to the public domain, also make genocide more likely, while pluralistic cultures make genocide less likely. When respect for authorities is moderate and there are varied values and points of view that can be expressed in the public domain, people are more able to tolerate uncertainty and therefore social upheaval (Soeters, 1996).

Democracies, which are pluralistic, are unlikely to engage in genocide (Rummel, 1994). This, however, seems especially true of “Mature” democracies (Staub, 1996b). There are democracies in which laws are enforced, in which all groups can participate in public life, and which have a “civil society” (i.e., well-established civic institutions). Germany was not this kind of democracy at the time of the Weimar Republic, nor was Argentina at the time of “the disappearances” (Staub, 1989b), when elected government were regularly replaced by military rule. Working to create democracy and a civil society is one way to bring about culture change that makes genocide less likely. Such a culture is likely to form individuals whose relationship to the group is more akin to constructive rather than blind, patriotism and who are less likely to be embedded in their group.

Multiple group identities seem important in preventing genocide. When people can gain identity and fulfill other basic needs through connection to a variety of groups that turns against others. Their ability to oppose destructive ideologies and practices will increase.

**2. Genocide Outweighs Nuclear War – Its Intentional Nature Makes It Especially Horrible**

Lang 90 (Berel , Prof. of Humanities at Trinity College, *Act and Idea in the Nazi Genocide*, , p. 12-13)

Before considering further the two primary factors in the concept of genocide (the specification of the group and the intention related to its destruction), it is important to recognize the implied relation between these factors, on the hand, and the likely agents of genocide, on the other. That genocide entails the destruction of a group; but the practical implementation of a design for genocide would almost necessarily be so complex to assure this. Admittedly, the same technological advances that make genocide increasingly possible as a collective action also have increasingly possible as a collective action also have increased the possibility that an individual acting alone could initiate the process. (When the push of a single button can produce cataclysmic effects, we discover an order of destruction – “omnicide” – even larger than genocide). But the opprobrium attached to the term “genocide” seems also to have the connotation of a corporate action – as if this act or sequence of acts would be a lesser fault, easier to understand if not to excuse if one person rather than a group were responsible for it. A group (we suppose) would be bound by a public moral code; decisions made would have been reached collectively, and the culpability of individual intentions would be multiplied proportionally. Admittedly, corporate responsibility is sometimes invoked in order to diminish (or at least to obscure) individual responsibility; so, for example, the “quagmire” effect that was appealed to retrospectively by defenders of the United States’ role in Vietnam. But for genocide, the likelihood of its corporate origins seems to accentuate its moral enormity: a large number of individual, intentional acts would have to be committed and the connections among them also affirmed in order to produce the extensive act. Unlike other corporate acts that might be not only decided on but carried out by a single person or small group of persons, genocide in its scope seems necessarily to require collaboration by a relatively large number of agents acting both collectively and individually.

Geneva Conventions – A2: Not Specially Recruited

Arguments claiming PMC’s are long term and not “specially recruited” misconstrues the definition of “specially recruited”.

SALZMAN 9 (“PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE TAINT OF A MERCENARY” REPUTATION ZOE New York University School of Law INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:853 May 14, http://law.nyu.edu/ecm\_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu\_law\_website\_\_journals\_\_journal\_of\_international\_law\_and\_politics/documents/documents/ecm\_pro\_058877.pdf)KM

Some scholars argue, however, that a private contractor would not satisfy the “specially recruited” requirement because many private contractors work on long-term contracts and are not therefore “specially” recruited to fight in a specific armed conflict.173 This argument misconstrues the meaning of the term “specially recruited.” As an initial matter, it is possible to distinguish private contractors from forces like the French Foreign Legion, which are formally incorporated into the national armed forces in a way that private contractors never are, no matter how long-term their contract.174 While the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary on Protocol I (the “ICRC Commentary”) indicates that the term “specially recruited” was meant to exempt forces such as the Foreign Legion, it is not clear whether the key characteristic was the long-term nature of the French Foreign Legion, or the fact that Legionnaires essentially become members of the national army, thus eliminating the concern that mercenaries (and private contractors) are not accountable in the same way as the national armed forces. Were a state to formally incorporate its private contractors into its armed forces, the majority of the concerns discussed in Part III could be dismissed and there would be very little argument that such forces were anything like rogue mercenaries. As it stands, however, while PMC contracts may be long lasting, they certainly do not involve formal incorporation into the armed forces. As a result, private contractors are likely to qualify as “specially recruited.”

Geneva Conventions – A2: Corporate Exemption

PMC’s are not exempt because of corporate status – they still have the ability to under undermine democracies and usurp government function.

SALZMAN 9 (“PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE TAINT OF A MERCENARY” REPUTATION ZOE New York University School of Law INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:853 May 14, http://law.nyu.edu/ecm\_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu\_law\_website\_\_journals\_\_journal\_of\_international\_law\_and\_politics/documents/documents/ecm\_pro\_058877.pdf)KM

My examination of the existing law on mercenaries suggests, however, that it is possible to hold at least some private contractors accountable as individuals under the existing laws. The fact that they are employees of a corporation in no way affects the applicability of the mercenary laws, as there is no indication that the concerns underlying the mercenary laws would have been allayed had mercenaries been corporate em- ployees. Rather, as I argued in Section B of this Part, the concerns underlying the development of international law on mercenaries largely parallel the concerns that I expressed with regard to private contractors in Part III: namely, that mercenaries are generally perceived to threaten states’ monopoly on the use of force, to prioritize their desire for private profit over the public’s desire for security, and to undermine democratic government. There is no suggestion anywhere in the law that if mercenaries were to incorporate, these concerns would be in any way diminished.224 It is interesting to note, moreover, that much like PMCs and private contractors today, mercenaries were (and still are) most likely to be involved in conflicts where “vital economic interests are at stake, usually mining and oil interests.”225 While it is clear, therefore, that there are obvious structural differences in terms of how mercenaries and private contractors package their services, it does not follow that the services offered are substantively different. There is no indication that the mere “corporatization of military service provision”226 renders the privatization of force any less problematic. As suggested in Part III, the concerns about private contractors remain despite the fact that they are corporate employees.

Credibility Adv. – 1AC – Uniqueness

US of PMC’s is devastating our international image

Nényei 9 (Judit, http://www.grotius.hu/doc/pub/MYBSTD/2009\_123\_nenyei\_judit\_grotius\_e-konyvtar.pdf, AD: 6/24/10) jl

It seems obvious that the image formed about mercenaries has been far from positive - and not at all ‟honorable‟, as Lt. Col. Tim Spicer, founder of Sandline International puts it17 - ever since they appeared on the scene. Their bad reputation did not diminish in the ‟60s and ‟70s either – they were participants in (and often promoters of) coup d‟etats, human rights abuses, they fought against UN forces in Congo (ONUC, 1960-64), etc. Although present-day PMSCs are trying hard to prove their difference from their predecessors, public perception is still influenced by the former picture (and, deliberately, by the media). The UN Special Rapporteur on mercenaries has held PMSCs responsible for several criminal activities such as trafficking arms, drugs, and in humans and organs, extortion, kidnapping and links with terrorists. (Ballesteros [2001]). Crimes and abuses committed by private contractors will be discussed in detail later in Section 1.5.

Credibility Adv. – 1AC – Soft Power Scenario (1/2)

Soft power & perception are key to effective leadership – builds alliances, checks counter-balancing, maintains domestic support

Jervis 9 (Robert, professor of international politics at Columbia University, “Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective,” World Politics Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009, Muse) jl

To say that the system is unipolar is not to argue that the unipole can get everything it wants or that it has no need for others. American power is very great, but it is still subject to two familiar limitations: it is harder to build than to destroy, and success usually depends on others’ decisions. This is particularly true of the current system because of what the U.S. wants. If Hitler had won World War II, he might have been able to maintain his system for some period of time with little cooperation from others because “all” he wanted was to establish the supremacy of the Aryan race. The U.S. wants not only to prevent the rise of a peer competitor but also to stamp out terrorism, maintain an open international economic system, spread democracy throughout the world, and establish a high degree of cooperation among countries that remain juridically equal. Even in the military arena, the U.S. cannot act completely alone. Bases and overflight rights are always needed, and support from allies, especially Great Britain, is important to validate military action in the eyes of the American public. When one matches American forces, not against those of an adversary but against the tasks at hand, they often fall short.[54](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.jervis.html" \l "f54" \t "_blank)

Against terrorism, force is ineffective without excellent intelligence. Given the international nature of the threat and the difficulties of gaining information about it, international cooperation is the only route to success. The maintenance of international prosperity also requires joint efforts, even leaving aside the danger that other countries could trigger a run on the dollar by cashing in their holdings. Despite its lack of political unity, Europe is in many respects an economic unit, and one with a greater gdp than that of the U.S. Especially because of the growing Chinese economy, economic power is spread around the world much more equally than is military power, and the open economic system [End Page 210] could easily disintegrate despite continued unipolarity. In parallel, on a whole host of problems such as aids, poverty, and international crime (even leaving aside climate change), the unipole can lead and exert pressure but cannot dictate. Joint actions may be necessary to apply sanctions to various unpleasant and recalcitrant regimes; proliferation can be stopped only if all the major states (and many minor ones) work to this end; unipolarity did not automatically enable the U.S. to maintain the coalition against Iraq after the first Gulf War; close ties within the West are needed to reduce the ability of China, Russia, and other states to play one Western country off against the others.

But in comparison with the cold war era, there are fewer incentives today for allies to cooperate with the U.S. During the earlier period unity and close coordination not only permitted military efficiencies but, more importantly, gave credibility to the American nuclear umbrella that protected the allies. Serious splits were dangerous because they entailed the risk that the Soviet Union would be emboldened. This reason for avoiding squabbles disappeared along with the USSR, and the point is likely to generalize to other unipolar systems if they involve a decrease of threats that call for maintaining good relations with the superpower.

This does not mean that even in this particular unipolar system the superpower is like Gulliver tied down by the Lilliputians. In some areas opposition can be self-defeating. Thus for any country to undermine American leadership of the international economy would be to put its own economy at risk, even if the U.S. did not retaliate, and for a country to sell a large proportion of its dollar holding would be to depress the value of the dollar, thereby diminishing the worth of the country’s remaining stock of this currency. Furthermore, cooperation often follows strong and essentially unilateral action. Without the war in Iraq it is not likely that we would have seen the degree of cooperation that the U.S. obtained from Europe in combating the Iranian nuclear program and from Japan and the PRC in containing North Korea.

Nevertheless, many of the American goals depend on persuading others, not coercing them. Although incentives and even force are not irrelevant to spreading democracy and the free market, at bottom this requires people to embrace a set of institutions and values. Building the world that the U.S. seeks is a political, social, and even psychological task for which unilateral measures are likely to be unsuited and for which American military and economic strength can at best play a supporting role. Success requires that others share the American vision and believe that its leadership is benign. [End Page 211]

Credibility Adv. – 1AC – Soft Power Scenario (2/2)

US decline will explode into transition wars – Soft Power is key to maintain predominance

Brzezinski 5 (Zbigniew, National Security Advisor in the Carter Administration, Professor of Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University, *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership*, p. 2-4) jl

History is a record of change. a reminder that nothing endures indefinitely. It can also remind us, however, that some things endure for a long time, and when they disappear, the status quo ante does not reappear. So it will be with the current American global preponderance. It, too, will fade at some point, probably later than some wish and earlier than many Americans take for granted. The key question is: What will replace it? An abrupt termination of American hegemony would without doubt precipitate global chaos, in which international anarchy would be punctuated by eruptions of truly massive destructiveness. An unguided progressive decline would have a similar effect, spread out over a longer time. But a gradual and controlled devolution of power could lead to an increasingly formalized global community of shared interest, with supranational arrangements increasingly assuming some of the special security roles of traditional nation-states. In any case, the eventual end of American hegemony will not involve a restoration of multipolarity among the familiar major powers that dominated world affairs for the last two centuries. Nor will it yield to mother dominant hegemon that would displace the United States by assuming a similar political, military, economic, technological. and sociocultural worldwide preeminence. The familiar powers of the last century are too fatigued or too weak to assume the role the United States now plays. 0 is noteworthy that since 1880, in a comparative ranking of world powers (cumulatively based on their economic strength, military budgets and assets, populations, etc). the top five slots at sequential twenty-year intervals have been shared by just seven states: the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and China. Only the United States, however, unambiguously earned inclusion among the top five in every one of the twentyyear intervals. and the gap in the year 2000 between the top-tanked United States and the rest was vastly wider than ever before.' The former major European powers—Great Britain. Germany, and France—are too weak to step into the breach. In the next two decades, it is quite unlikely that the European Union will become sufficiently united politically to muster the popular will to compete with the United States in the politico-military arena. Russia is no longer an imperial power, and its central challenge is to recover socioeconomically lest it lose its far eastern territories to China. Japan's population is aging and its economy has slowed, the convenstional wisdom of 1980s that Japan is destined to be the next "superstate" now has the ring of historical irony. China, even if it succeeds in maintaining high rates of economic growth and retains its internal political stability (both are far from certain), will at best be a regional power still constrained by an impoverished population. antiquated infrastructure, and limited appeal worldwide. The same is true of India, which additionally faces uncertainties regarding its long-term national unity. Even a coalition among the above--a most unlikely prospect, given their historical conflicts and clashing territorial claims—would lack the cohesion. mind, and energy needed to both push America off its pedestal and sustain global stability. Some leading states, in any case, would side with America if push came to shove. Indeed, any evident American decline might precipitate efforts to reinforce America's leadership. Most important , the shared resentment a American hegemony would not dampen the dashes of interest among states. The more intense collisions—in the event of America's decline -could spark a wildfire of regional violence, tendered all the more dangerous by the dissemination of weapons of mass destruction. The bottom line is twofold: For the next two decades, the steadying effect of American power will be indispensable to global stability, while the principal challenge to American power can come only from within—either from the repudiation of power by the American democracy itself, or from America's global misuse of its own power. American society, even though rather parochial in its intellectual and cultural interests, steadily sustained a protracted worldwide engagement against the threat of totalitarian communism, and it is currently mobilized against international terrorism. As long as that commitment endures, America's role as the global stabilizer will also endure. Should that commitment fade—either because terrorism has faded, or because Americans tire or lose their sense of common purpose—America's global role could rapidly terminate. That role could also be undermined and &legitimated by the misuse of US. power. Conduct that is perceived worldwide as arbitrary could prompt America's progressive isolation, undercutting not America's power to defend itself as such, but rather its ability to use that power to enlist others in a common effort to shape a more secure international environment.

Those wars go nuclear and cause extinction

Nye 90 (Joseph, Dean of the Kennedy School of Gov’t at Harvard, *Bound to Lead*, p.17) jl

Perceptions of change in the relative power of nations are of critical importance to understanding the relationship between decline and war. One of the oldest generalizations about international politics attributes the onset of major wars to shifts in power among the leading nations. Thus Thucydides accounted for the onset of the Peloponnesian War which destroyed the power of ancient Athens. The history of the interstate system since 1500 is punctuated by severe wars in which one country struggled to surpass another as the leading state. If as Robert Gilpin argues, international politics has not changed fundamentally over the millennia,” the implications for the future are bleak. And if fears about shifting power precipitate a major war in a world with 50,000 nuclear weapons, history as we know it may end.

Credibility Adv. – Uniqueness – Human Rights

Human rights review coming now – Opportunity for human rights leadership but PMC’s deck credibility

Fisher 10 (William April 27 http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/154-general/49006-us-to-face-litany-of-complaints-at-un-human-rights-council.html TBC 6/25/10)

Human rights groups are telling the United Nations that the United States is failing to hold corporations, including private government contractors, accountable for human rights abuses ranging from human trafficking to murder. These and a plethora of other charges have been triggered by the U.N.'s formal process known as the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) for reviewing the human rights records of 192 U.N. member states by the U.N. Human Rights Council, scheduled for November, when the U.S. human rights performance will be reviewed for the first time. The UPR was established when the Human Rights Council was created in 2006 by the U.N. General Assembly. Numerous human rights groups have responded to the U.S. State Department's invitation to members of the U.S. public to present their concerns about human rights in the U.S. Chip Pitts, president of the Bill of Rights Defence Committee, has attended the predecessor U.N. Commission on Human Rights and now the Council for more than two decades, as a delegate of the U.S. government, Amnesty International, or other NGOs. "The Universal Periodic Review process is a welcome step forward, in that it subjects all states to regular review of their human rights records, in addition to the work done by other mechanisms such as the treaty bodies and special rapporteurs, as well as the Council's own retained ability to make recommendations regarding acute situations of gross and systematic violations," he told IPS. The problem, he said, is that "the process is far too slow, too limited in scope and authority, and still suffers from the inevitable politics that must be diminished if human rights implementation on the ground is to advance." "The U.S. government, in particular, should be the first to offer leadership and ensure authentic and full compliance with human rights law. But instead of setting this example, the United States all too often continues to seek refuge for itself and its allies in double standards," he added.

Credibility Adv. – I/L – Human Rights

Lack of legal clarity devastates perception of human rights and hostages

Singer 4 (Peter W, director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings, http://www.dcaf.ch/\_docs/pp04\_private–military.pdf, AD: 6/22/10) jl

Thus, the industry and its use has moved faster than what the legal side has been able to keep pace with. This creates a worrisome phenomenon, both for contractors and the broader public good. On the contractor side, the lack of clarity means that if they are captured, it is up to their adversaries to define their status. An illustrative example is the case of the three American employees of California Microwave Systems, whose plane crashed in rebel held territory in Colombia. These three PMFers have since been held for more than 18 months, with their Geneva rights as POWs not upheld by the rebels or their own U.S. government clients.

Insufficient screenings at PMFs means their soldiers are more likely to commit human rights violations

Singer 4 (Peter W, director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings, http://www.dcaf.ch/\_docs/pp04\_private–military.pdf, AD: 6/22/10) jl

On the human rights side, the vast majority of PMF employees are honourable men and women. However, many firms have had minimal or insufficient screening – or none at all – hiring individuals with questionable backgrounds that proved embarrassing and/or worrisome, not just for the firm, but for the wider public mission. Darker examples in Iraq range from one firm hiring an ex-British Army soldier who had earlier been jailed for having worked with Irish terrorists to another firm bringing in an ex-South African Apartheid soldiers, including one who had admitted to firebombing the houses of over 60 political activists back home.

Iraq scandal proves

Singer 4 (Peter W, director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings, http://www.dcaf.ch/\_docs/pp04\_private–military.pdf, AD: 6/22/10) jl

Where once this highly secretive industry was little known or heard of, a series of recent events have dragged it into the public limelight. These events range from controversy over the role of military contractors in the Iraq war to allegations of a bizarre ‘rent a coup’ scandal that spans from Equatorial Guinea to the United Kingdom.

PMC’s are more likely to violate human rights – they aren’t subject to the same legal processes.

Thurer and Maclaren 7 (DANIEL THÜRER & MALCOLM MACLAREN\* Military Outsourcing as a Case Study in the Accountability and Responsibility of Power”, The Law of International Relations - Liber Amicorum Hanspeter Neuhold, p 353, http://www.ivr.uzh.ch/lstthuerer/forschung/FSNeuholdt.pdf)KM

raises risk of violations of rights under (inter-)national law. The application of force can have grave consequences for human life, security, and liberty. Contractors, like public authorities, are in a position to drastically infringe the rights of individuals and to exact bodily harm. However, the murkiness of PMC’s’ legal position (see Section 4) allows PMC’s and their state employers to escape the strictures on human rights and humanitarian law, i.e. to operate beyond the control exerted by training and sanction that these bodies of law foresee. This is not to say that PMC’s necessarily engage in misconduct more often than their public counterparts, just that the likelihood of misconduct (and impunity) is greater given that PMC’s are to a large extent not bound by the same strictures.19

Credibility Adv. – I/L – Human Rights

PMC’s violate human rights including torture and murder with no reprecussions

Boggs 8 (PHD-Poli/Sci @ Berkeley, Prof @ Washington University in St. Louis, UCLA, USC, UC, Irvine, and Carleton University in Ottawa, *Fast Capitalism* vol 4.1, 8) ET

In a context of military occupation like Iraq, moreover, Blackwater Worldwide (formerly USA) and kindred contractors provide essential infrastructural and security functions, allowing the military to concentrate on combat operations, while the PMC’s manage to escape institutional responsibility for actions that are frequently criminal. Since PMC’s are largely outside the law – Congressional efforts in 2007 and 2008 to reign them in proving mostly futile – private contractors, often labeled “mercenaries”, can often get away with all kinds of anti-social behavior and human-rights violations leading up to torture and murder. Scahill’s main claim, which deserves more critical scrutiny than it has so far received, is that the rise of PMC’s “is an epic [story] in the history of the military-industrial complex . . . [and] a story about the future of war, democracy, and governance.” (Scahill 2007: xxvii)

PMC’s are allowed to violate human rights and commit torture with no repercussions

Boggs 8 (PHD-Poli/Sci @ Berkeley, Prof @ Washington University in St. Louis, UCLA, USC, UC, Irvine, and Carleton University in Ottawa, *Fast Capitalism* vol 4.1, 8) ET

The September 2007 incident was just one of many where contractors have shot and killed civilians. Despite reports of atrocities, including torture, no PMC employee has been prosecuted in Iraq or the U.S., although they are theoretically accountable to American domestic laws. Witnesses said dozens of people were wounded along with the 17 killed when the Blackwater convoy sped into Nisoor Square in western Baghdad. Although U.S. Embassy and Blackwater officials claimed the convoy had come under fire, Iraqi witnesses reported just the opposite – that no one had attacked the contractors.[2] Based in Moyock, North Carolina and founded by former Navy SEAL Erik Prince, Blackwater as of mid-2008 had nearly a thousand contractors in Iraq, its mission embraced by the State Department and Pentagon. The September 2007 assault was investigated by the Iraq Interior Ministry, which concluded the guards fired on civilians without provocation. Still, the U.S. quickly agreed to allow Blackwater to resume its work in Iraq, thumbing its nose at domestic authorities who, in any case, have little if any leverage in dealing with the heavy-handed American presence.

PMC’s are accountable to no one- they are an outlaw force

Boggs 8 (PHD-Poli/Sci @ Berkeley, Prof @ Washington University in St. Louis, UCLA, USC, UC, Irvine, and Carleton University in Ottawa, *Fast Capitalism* vol 4.1, 8) ET

Such interest is stimulated by a mixture of profit-making and patriotism, infused (for most) with a love of battlefield adventure. A major problem with PMC’s, as many critics stress, is their near-total immunity from legal sanctions in countries where they operate – and, to some extent, from established rules of warfare. There is growing agreement that, in the wake of repeated atrocities, PMC’s have come to represent an outlaw force beholden to no domestic or global authority.

PMC’s destroy human rights accountability

Nandi and Mohanty 10 (Tanay Kumar Satabdee National Law University, Jodhpur, Gujarat National Law University, April 23 The Emergence of Private Military Firms and Their Impact on Global Human Rights SSRN TBC 6/26/10)

It can be undoubtedly said that emergence of the PMFs, has not been very good for the human rights of the people of the regions where PMFs have set their foot. The lack of accountability makes sure that the human rights violators go scot free. The only positive aspect of having PMFs is that it reduced the casualty born by the armies. But this definitely does not mean that casualties as such come down. With improper training and sometimes no training at all in the fields of Human Rights and respecting the dignity of a fellow human being, Private Armies are nothing but a modern day version of age old clan of mercenaries.

Credibility Adv. – I/L – Human Rights

PMC operatives commit atrocities and face no repercussions- huge violations of human rights occur on a daily basis

Boggs 8 (PHD-Poli/Sci @ Berkeley, Prof @ Washington University in St. Louis, UCLA, USC, UC, Irvine, and Carleton University in Ottawa, *Fast Capitalism* vol 4.1, 8) ET

Scahill describes a series of abductions, killings, and torture at the hands of PMC operatives in Iraq, reminiscent of U.S.-sponsored horrors in Central America during the 1980s. By late 2006, when an average of nearly 1000 Iraqis were being killed weekly, “. . . the big-picture reality was that the country was quickly becoming the global epicenter of privatized warfare with scores of heavily-armed groups of various loyalties and agendas roaming the streets and countryside of Iraq.” (Scahill 2007: 289) Groups within the PMC’s took on the characteristics of storm troopers, with their own private aircraft, weapons caches, and communications systems. In February 2007, to cite another instance of PMC mayhem, a sniper killed three guards outside the state-run Iraqi Media Network office in Baghdad. An investigation quickly revealed that Blackwater was guilty, but no one was ever charged much less convicted of what was obviously an attack on a news outlet considered hostile to the U.S. occupation. As usual, everything was kept silent behind a wall of secrecy. One American official even conceded: “Because they [contractors] are security, everything was a big secret. They draw the wagon circle. They protect each other.”[5] Added one Iraqi official: “They don’t have car licenses. They don’t have any names. Nobody knows who they are. If they are asked anyway, they bully people.”[6] The PMC’s answer only to their American protectors which, for Blackwater, means the Embassy security staff. Regarded as a pack of criminals by most Iraqis, PMC operatives are understandably viewed differently by the people who run them – as vehicles of peace, democracy, and stability.

Past lawsuits have tried to fix human rights violations failed- 2007 proves

Boggs 8 (PHD-Poli/Sci @ Berkeley, Prof @ Washington University in St. Louis, UCLA, USC, UC, Irvine, and Carleton University in Ottawa, *Fast Capitalism* vol 4.1, 8) ET

In May 2007 the American Civil Liberties Union filed suit against a Boeing Company subsidiary accused of facilitating CIA programs involving torture and other abuses. Since 2001 Jeppeson Dataplan, Inc. of San Jose was reported to have provided services to the CIA for its “extraordinary rendition” programs at several locations. According to a suit filed by three plaintiffs, the firm assisted the CIA in more than 70 rendition activities, a charge based on investigations conducted in Spain, Sweden, Italy, and Pakistan. The company was said to be helping exact “confessions” in the war on terrorism. The ACLU went to court under the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789, which allows foreigners to file suits in U.S. courts for human-rights violations.[12]

Aside from questions of privatization, secrecy, and immunity from prosecution, the PMC hiring of mercenary soldiers (where that takes place) means that personnel killed and wounded do no enter the overall casualty count, keeping these costs of war hidden from public view. Statistics on PMC killed and wounded are elusive at best, one report (in August 2008) estimating more than 1200 deaths.[13] When this reality is added to contractors’ ability to operate largely outside rules of engagement, the logic behind the illegality of mercenaries contained in the Geneva Conventions becomes evident.

Shady PMC business means the US is no longer credible on the issue of human rights

Boustany 7 (Nora, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/11/AR2007011101658.html>, date accessed: 6/25/2010) AJK

The advocacy group Human Rights Watch said yesterday that Washington's once-powerful role as a prime defender of human rights had effectively ended because of arbitrary detentions and reports of torture since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and the group urged the European Union to step up as a leader of the cause. Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, released the group's World Report 2007, an assessment of last year's global human rights practices, by saying that the counterterrorism record of the United States over the past five years has tarnished its credibility as an influential moral voice. He listed several practices he said were being used by the Bush administration in its fight against terrorism, including torture, arbitrary detentions, allowing CIA interrogators to use coercive techniques and the unsupervised handling of so-called enemy combatants held in other countries. "This catastrophic path has left the United States effectively incapable of defending some of the most basic rights," Roth said in the report, released on the fifth anniversary of the arrival of the first detainees at the U.S. prison at Guantanamo Bay, [Cuba](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/cuba.html?nav=el).

Credibility Adv. – I/L – HRC in Iraq/Afghanistan Key

What we do in Iraq deeply affects perceptions of the US abroad

Duss 2010 (Matthew, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/matthew-duss/report-iraq-war-undercut_b_525859.html>, date accessed:6/25/2010) AJK  
A recently published [RAND study](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG892/) of the regional effects of the Iraq war should (but probably won't, as too many influential people have too much professionally and emotionally invested in the war being seen as a "success") put such claims to rest. The study finds that, in addition to facilitating the rise of Iranian power, undercutting perceptions of U.S. strength and influence, and increasing the profile of other actors like Russia and China, the war has seriously hurt the prospects for political reform in the region: On the domestic front, societal conflict in the broader region resulting from the war has not yet materialized to the extent forecast; rather, state power has strengthened and tolerance of domestic political opposition has decreased. Specifically, Iraq's instability has become a convenient scarecrow neighboring regimes can use to delay political reform by asserting that democratization inevitably leads to insecurity. And while the entrenchment of U.S.-allied regimes may be deceptively reassuring in the short term, it does little to address the more deeply rooted problem of regime illegitimacy or to mitigate the wellsprings of radicalism.

The war in Iraq is a critical component of US credibility, especially when it comes to human rights issues

Bennis, Honey & Zunes 1 (Phyllis, Martha and Stephen, <http://www.fpif.org/articles/the_failure_of_us_policy_toward_iraq_and_proposed_alternatives>, date accessed: 6/25/2010) AJK

Current U.S.-UN policy regarding Iraq has failed and has largely lost credibility. It is widely viewed internationally as reflecting U.S. (and, to a lesser degree, British) insistence on maintaining a punitive sanctions-based approach regardless of the humanitarian impact and it is increasingly regarded as having failed to bring about either democratic changes in Iraq or security for the Persian Gulf region. Numerous countries are challenging, if not directly violating, the sanctions regime, and international support has largely eroded. The U.S. is the driving force behind UN policy, since Washington wields effective veto power over any proposed changes. The U.S. is becoming increasingly isolated in the world body, with only Great Britain remaining in support of the American position. There is little question that a change to a more humane and practical policy by the U.S. would quickly be accepted by the UN Security Council as a whole. U.S. policy toward Iraq has also failed to take into account the consequences of widespread opposition in the Middle East—across the region at the street level and increasingly at the governmental level as well.

Credibility Adv. – I/L – Hurts US Credibility

PMC’s tank US credibility b/c people don’t distinguish them from the US military

Singer 7 (Peter, <http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/1002militarycontractors.aspx>, date accessed: 6/25/2010) AJK  
Yet, at the same time, contractors are one of the most visible and hated aspects of the American presence in Iraq. "They seal off the roads and drive on the wrong side. They simply kill," Um Omar, a Baghdad housewife, told Agence France Press about Blackwater in a report in mid-September. A traffic policeman at Al-Wathba square in central Baghdad concurred: "They are impolite and do not respect people, they bump other people's cars to frighten them and shout at anyone who approaches them ... Two weeks ago, guards of a convoy opened fire randomly that led to the killing of two policemen ... I swear they are Mossad," he said, referring to the Israeli spy service, which is a catch-all for anything perceived as evil in the Arab world. It is also important to note that Iraqi civilians do not differentiate the acts of the private military contractors from the overall U.S. military effort, just because they are outside the chain of command. The point here is not that all contractors are "cowboys," "unprofessional" or "killers," as Blackwater and other contractors are often described. Most are highly talented ex-soldiers. However, their private mission is different from the overall public operation. Those, for example, doing escort duty are going to be judged by their corporate bosses solely on whether they get their client from point A to B, not whether they win Iraqi hearts and minds along the way. Ann Exline Starr, a former Coalition Provisional Authority advisor, described the difference between when she traveled with a U.S. military escort and with guards from Blackwater and another State Department-contracted security firm, DynCorp. While the uniformed soldiers kept her safe, they also did such things as playing cards and drinking tea with local Iraqis. The private contractors had a different focus. "What they told me was, 'Our mission is to protect the principal at all costs. If that means pissing off the Iraqis, too bad.'" This "protection first and last" mentality has led to many common operating practices that clearly enrage locals. In an effort to keep potential threats away, contractors drive convoys up the wrong side of the road, ram civilian vehicles, toss smoke bombs, and fire weaponry as warnings, all as standard practices. After a month spent embedded with Blackwater contractors in Baghdad, journalist Robert Young Pelton said, "They're famous for being very aggressive. They use their machine guns like car horns." As far back as 2005, U.S. officers in Iraq such as Col. Hammes were worried that while contractors may have been fulfilling their contract, they were also "making enemies each time they went out." U.S. Army Col. Peter Mansoor, one of the leading experts on counterinsurgency, similarly noted in January 2007, that "if they push traffic off the roads or if they shoot up a car that looks suspicious, whatever it may be, they may be operating within their contract -- to the detriment of the mission, which is to bring the people over to your side. I would much rather see basically all armed entities in a counter-insurgency operation fall under a military chain of command."

Blackwater & other PMC’s commit crimes and tank US support

Singer 7 (Peter, <http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/1002militarycontractors.aspx>, date accessed: 6/25/2010) AJK  
U.S. military officers frequently express their frustrations with sharing the battlefield with such private forces operating under their own rules and agendas, and worry about the consequences for their own operations. As far back as 2005, for example, Brig. Gen. Karl Horst, deputy commander of the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division (responsible for security in the Baghdad area at the time), tried to keep track of contractor shootings in his sector. Over the course of two months, he found 12 shootings that resulted in at least six Iraqi civilian deaths and three more wounded. As Horst tellingly put it, "These guys run loose in this country and do stupid stuff. There's no authority over them, so you can't come down on them hard when they escalate force. They shoot people, and someone else has to deal with the aftermath." Several weeks before the most recent Blackwater incident, an Iraqi official explained how the contractors' actions were reverberating against the wider U.S. effort in Iraq and beyond. "They are part of the reason for all the hatred that is directed at Americans, because people don't know them as Blackwater, they know them only as Americans. They are planting hatred, because of these irresponsible acts."

PMC’s terrorize civilians and tank US credibility

Singer 7 (Peter, <http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/1002militarycontractors.aspx>, date accessed: 6/25/2010) AJK  
These perceptions of a contractor force run amok help to undermine the very justification for the U.S. effort in Iraq. As an Interior Ministry official said of the Blackwater contractors hired by the U.S., "They consider Iraqis like animals, although actually I think they may have more respect for animals. We have seen what they do in the streets. When they're not shooting, they're throwing water bottles at people and calling them names. If you are terrifying a child or an elderly woman, or you are killing an innocent civilian who is riding in his car, isn't that terrorism?" This statement is by an official ostensibly working with the U.S. Even worse is that incidents of contractor abuse have given America's foes yet another weapon in the war of information so critical to winning in a counterinsurgency. Much like the Abu Ghraib affair, the episode in which the civilians were killed by Blackwater employees may have been an anomaly. But it proved to be a perfect fact around which adversaries could wrap their wider propaganda.

Credibility Adv. – I/L – Hurts US Credibility

Illegal PMC behavior means no Iraqi support

Singer 7 (Peter, <http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/1002militarycontractors.aspx>, date accessed: 6/25/2010) AJK  
The formula for failure isn't hard to calculate. An Iraqi is driving in Baghdad, on his way to work. A convoy of black-tinted SUVs comes down the highway at him, driving in his lane, but in the wrong direction. They are honking their horns at the oncoming traffic and firing machine gun bursts into the road, in front of any vehicle that gets too close. The Iraqi veers to the side of the road. As the SUVs drive by, Western-looking men in sunglasses point machine guns at him. Over the course of the day, that Iraqi civilian might tell X people about how "the Americans almost killed me today, and all I was doing was trying to get to work." Y is the number of other people that convoy ran off the road on its run that day. Z is the number of convoys in Iraq that day. Multiply X times Y times Z times 365, and you have the mathematical equation of how to lose a counterinsurgency within a year.

Contractors are unaccountable and disrespectful- causes widespread perception of US troops as Foreign imperious jerks

Robichaud 7 (Carl, PROGRAM OFFICER, INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM at the carnegie institute, *World Politics Review,* 10/31/7) ET

In Afghanistan, problems with security contractors are hardly new. Their actions have attracted little media attention in the West but have sometimes outraged Afghans, as when, during the October 2004 Presidential campaign, one of President Karzai's DynCorps bodyguards slapped Afghanistan's minister of transport in the face. The action, a serious insult in Afghan culture, became for many Afghans as a symbol of foreign imperiousness. But while Afghans privately resent—and sometimes publicly denounce—security contractors, there has been no action against them. For years, several contractors have operated in Afghanistan with virtually no oversight or accountability. While foreign civilians operating in Afghanistan are generally subject to Afghan law and U.S. military personnel come under U.S. military jurisdiction, foreign security contractors fall into a legal gray area. Sometimes they are prosecuted in U.S. courts, as when a contractor working for the CIA in 2003 was convicted of misdemeanor assault for beating to death an Afghan detainee over the course of a two day interrogation (the lack of an autopsy prevented a murder charge). Other times there is no trial at all, as when a contractor with U.S. Protection and Investigations (USPI) was whisked out of the country after shooting and killing his interpreter in 2005.

Contractors lack of credibility makes them seem like the foreign enemy- spurs unrest towards the US forces

Mojumdar 9 (Aunohita, Freelance Journalist, Jul 7-9, *Eurasia.Net)* ET

A recent shootout in the southern Afghan city of Kandahar that left 10 people dead is helping to focus attention on the issue of private security companies, and the existing lack of accountability concerning their activities. The June 29 incident in Kandahar involved security contractors employed by coalition military forces. A group of the contractors attacked a local police station apparently in an attempt to free a colleague who had been taken into custody for supposedly forging documents. In addition to two senior police officers, eight civilians died in the armed confrontation. Hours after the shootout, Afghan President Hamid Karzai issued a statement asking the US-led coalition forces to hand over the private security contractors suspected of involvement in the killings. Later, 41 Afghan security contractors were placed under arrest. Representatives of coalition forces emphasized that no foreign troops and no "foreign nationals" were involved in the incident. A coalition spokesman went on to characterize the attack as "Afghan on Afghan." Nevertheless, the attack is prompting heightened scrutiny of the coalition practice of employing de-mobilized local militiamen to provide security. Up to 3,000 former Afghan militia fighters are directly employed by the US military in Operation Enduring Freedom, according to an estimate prepared by Swisspeace, a research outfit focusing on conflict resolution.

Credibility Adv. – I/L – Hurts US Credibility

Effects of PMC’s cause perception of immoral behavior and kill public support for the military

Kidwell 5 (Deborah C, Assistant Professor of Military History at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, “Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies”, http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/kidwell.pdf AD: 6/24/10) jl

Moreover, a combat-heavy military may detract from the prestige of national military service, discourage some from a military service career, and impair public support for military operations. Policy makers and lead­ers must consider the possible consequences of the current trends in con­tractor support on the long-term health of the military services, although, at present, the facts to conduct such analyses are sketchy. Current bonuses include lump-sum payments of up to $15,000 for immediate deployment to the active combat areas of Iraq and Afghanistan.74 Rising bonuses indicate recruitment deficiencies in dangerous positions—possibly result­ing in a downward spiral—with escalating bonuses necessary for what may become a less qualified applicant pool.75 Early in 2005, the military announced a more lucrative system of bonuses offered to many Special Forces troops to improve retention.76 The American public may well ques­tion the moral aspects of encouraging combat specific positions, which may result in a loss of support and confidence in military organizations. In addition, using American soldiers exclusively to provide combat “tooth” is a curious irony to historical precedent, where nations often hired for­eign nationals for some of their most dangerous fighting. Officials must examine the long-term consequences—military readiness, morale, public attitudes, and other issues—before continuing on the present path of rou­tine contractor support.

Contractors are funding the Taliban and warlords for protection- causes us to look like hypocrites

CNN 9 (*CNN World*, Dec 17-9) ET

"Serious allegations have been brought to [Congress'] attention that private security providers for U.S. transportation contractors in Afghanistan are regularly paying local warlords and the Taliban for security," said Rep. John Tierney, D-Massachusetts, who chairs the House National Security and Foreign Affairs Subcommittee. "After a preliminary inquiry, it has been determined these reports warrant a full-scale ... investigation. If shown to be true, it would mean that the United States is unintentionally engaged in a vast protection racket and, as such, may be indirectly funding the very insurgents we are trying to fight."

Eight companies currently split the Afghan host nation trucking contract, which went into effect in May. The contract, according to Tierney's subcommittee, provides ground transportation in Afghanistan for more than 90 percent of supplies for U.S. troops, including food, fuel and ammunition. Most supplies are shipped overland via Pakistan to Bagram Airfield, the main U.S. base in Afghanistan. They are then distributed to hundreds of other smaller airfields and bases. In the Senate, an oversight subcommittee headed by Sen. Claire McCaskill, D-Missouri, also is looking into how contractor money is being spent.mFederal auditors state that approximately $950 million in "questioned and unsupported costs" has been submitted by Pentagon contractors for work in Afghanistan, according to a report prepared for Congress. That amount represents 16 percent of the total contract dollars examined so far. The U.S. government has spent more than $23 billion on contracts in Afghanistan since 2002, the report states. There are currently 104,000 Pentagon contractors in Afghanistan -- a figure that could rise to 160,000 to support President Obama's planned troop increase, according to the report. Roughly 100,000 U.S. troops are slated to be in Afghanistan at the height of the coming surge.

Credibility Adv. – I/L – Hurts US Credibility

PMC’s lack oversight and accountability, their mistakes destroy the credibility of the US army as a whole.

Evans 6(Lieutenant Colonel Samuel, “There When You Need Them? Defining Reliability in Army Contracting for Operation Iraqi Freedom” 15 MAR, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA449435)KM

Another measure of contractor dependability is discipline. Once again, the rules that apply to soldiers do not apply to contractors. One of the first rules of applicability for the Uniform Code of Military Justice is being a member of the military. Keeping contractors disciplined in a war zone, where law and order is usually nonexistent all around them is often a challenge. For soldiers, the Uniform Code of Military Justice travels anywhere they go. Unfortunately, there is no similar code or set of standards that travels with contractors. Earlier descriptions of the indiscipline of armed contractors indiscriminately shooting Iraqi citizens, while in the performance of their personnel security tasks, demonstrates the issues with not having enforceable rules for military contractors. The lack of discipline for contractors in a stability operation can have severe negative effects for the soldiers working with the contractor. Unfortunately, the local populace in Iraq does not see the difference between the contractor and the soldier. To the local Iraqi, they are both Americans, often even wearing much of the same equipment and similar uniforms, making them indistinguishable. The recent involvement of contractors in the scandal at Abu Grahib has caused the U.S. government to take a closer look at what rules they can enforce on contractors. Depending on their employment (armed versus unarmed) contractors have different statuses under the Geneva Conventions. When unarmed, contractors would be considered to be “civilians authorized to accompany the force in the field.”20 If armed they lose their legal protection under the Geneva Conventions and could be charged with violations of the laws of war. Domestic law of the country they are working often does not affect the discipline of contractors, because it either is nonexistent in a stability operation, or as is the case in Iraq, the contractor has signed an agreement providing them with immunity from prosecution under Iraqi law. Contractors are only subject to military law under the Uniform Code of Military Justice during a declared war, which is a rare event and unlikely in a stability operation.21 Contractors working for the Department of Defense might be prosecuted under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-778), know as MEJA. This act was passed to protect U.S. soldiers and their dependents on U.S. bases abroad, who sometimes are victims of crimes committed by military contractors with effective immunity from prosecution. MEJA permits the prosecution in federal court of U.S. civilians who, while employed by accompanying U.S. forces abroad, commit certain crimes. Generally, the crimes covered are any federal crime that carries a punishment greater than one year.22 In July 2004, the first prosecution under MEJA ended in a mistrial in the case of a woman who admitted to stabbing to death her Air Force sergeant husband in Turkey. 23 The MEJA is obviously too new and untested, as well as too specific to be an effective tool to discipline contractors. Therefore, with no domestic law or effective specific law in place to control the behavior of contractors, the only recourse to deal with an ill disciplined contractor is to fire him from his job. The Army should continue to work to develop a tool to discipline deployed contractors as necessary. The Army should also be aware of this loophole for contractors and be careful to provide provisions in the contract to prevent the hire of potential discipline risks and to deal swiftly with those contractors that display a lack of discipline. Although it may be possible to hire a contractor to interrogate prisoners, it becomes a risky decision to use a contractor who is not governed by any law. Use of a contractor in this situation is clearly a risk to the reputation of the Army and the U.S. The Army should avoid using contractors in this scenario.

Contractors hurt our credibility- Karzai’s indicts show

Press TV 10 (Internationally acclaimed news source, *Press TV*, 13-Jun-10) ET

Afghan President Hamid Karzai has accused of foreign security contractors in the country of performing as militias amid increasing violence.  Karzai made the comments on Sunday in the presence of the top NATO commander in Afghanistan, US General Stanley McChrystal, in a meeting with key local and religious leaders in the volatile Kandahar province.  The visit comes ahead of a large-scale NATO operation in the province. Many of the 30,000 additional American troops to be deployed to Afghanistan are to participate in the operation.  Karzai said the security contractors are worsening the security situation in Afghanistan, calling for their contracts to be cancelled and new ones to be signed after consultations with Kabul.  Notorious American security firm Xe Services LLC, formerly known as Blackwater, has been reportedly involved in the civilian killings in several cases.  Growing discontent over the civilian causalities have sabotaged the chances of western forces victory in Afghanistan, analysts say.  Despite the presence of nearly 130,000 US-led soldiers in the war-torn country, civilians continue to pay the price for the 2001 invasion that sought to uproot the Taliban.

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PMC integration hurts the legitimacy of armed forces use – people perceive sovereign state action has been sold out to commoditized surrogates.

Anechiarico and Dehn 8 (“Ultimately Unaccountable: Governance of Private Military Companies Nationally, Supranationally and Internationally” Frank Anechiarico, Ph.D. Professor of Government and Law Hamilton College, and John Dehn, Professor of Law United States Military Academy, June, http://www.4tad.org/ws/paper\_wks4\_Anechiarico.pdf)KM

It is now that case that there are as many contract personnel in Iraq as soldiers and that half of the contractors are armed security personnel. (Hastings, 2008:1) This paper will examine the governance challenges, at various levels of government, of using private military companies (PMC’s) to perform the equivalent of military combatant functions.1 We contend that innovation in public management (the New Public Management), by encouraging the use of private companies to replace government provision of services – in our paper, PMC’s – has begun to undermine the legitimacy of the use of armed force. Based largely in their governmental character, uniformed forces are held to much higher standards of accountability than PMC’s. This lack of accountability makes PMC’s a more attractive option on many occasions, when a state considers the use of force. This situation, convenient to the state, undermines attempts to make PMC’s more accountable. Accountability deficits, both legal and democratic, are not limited to national governments or legal systems. Lacunae in the law, or more frequently its enforcement mechanisms, exist at every point where governance systems are weak, including at the international level. The less accountable these PMC’s are, the more it appears that the formal profession of arms has been replaced by commoditized surrogates.2 Commoditization of national defense, a defining element of sovereignty, has a direct and significant impact on governance, in particular the difficulty the state may encounter in claiming democratic authority when it uses private entities for military operations. Civil-military relations, as they are affected by increased government reliance on the private sector, are then a primary factor in the relative legitimacy of democratic governance.

PMC’s destroy the legitimacy of US military occupations – they are seen as external to the military.

Anechiarico and Dehn 8 (“Ultimately Unaccountable: Governance of Private Military Companies Nationally, Supranationally and Internationally” Frank Anechiarico, Ph.D. Professor of Government and Law Hamilton College, and John Dehn, Professor of Law United States Military Academy, June, http://www.4tad.org/ws/paper\_wks4\_Anechiarico.pdf)KM

Bovens defines accountability as “a social relationship in which an actor feels an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct to some significant other.” (2005:183) Accountability can be inefficient. It often requires more effort, at more cost, to demand or impose accountability than to overlook mistakes. Even in the best of circumstances, a government does not possess the resources to investigate and prosecute all potential procurement violations. The widespread use of PMC’s creates radical ambiguity in lines of command, accountability, and liability that threatens the legitimacy of civilian use of military force. The notion of a democratic nation at war, defending its security and way of life – a broad, public responsibility of great constitutional seriousness – is blurred by PMC combatants who take no official oath and who are, in Iraq, immunized from liability by Chief Administrator Paul Bremer’s CPA Order 17 (Order 17). Bremer mentions and defines PMC’s specifically: “Private Security Companies” means non-Iraqi legal entities or individuals not normally resident in Iraq, including their non-Iraqi employees and Subcontractors normally resident in Iraq, that provide security services to Foreign Liaison Missions and their Personnel, Diplomatic and Consular Missions and their personnel. . . Contractors shall be immune from Iraqi legal process with to acts performed by them pursuant to the terms and conditions of a contract or any sub-contract thereto.” (Bremer,2004:3,5)

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US Deployment of PMC’s are devastating our image abroad

Progress in Action 10 (“Legislation Introduced to Remove Private Military Contractors From Wars”, 1-23-10, http://www.progressinaction.com/afghanistan/legislation-introduced-to-remove-private-military-contractors-from-wars/)

U.S. Rep. Alan Grayson will introduce legislation that would de-fund private contractors who engage in illegal or unethical behavior like Blackwater. Contractors are already “barred by DOD regulations from taking part in ‘offensive’ operations,” but regularly take part in offensive operations despite the ban. Contractors like Blackwater have been involved in several bloody acts of violence against civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan. The use of private contractors has tarnished the image of the U.S. abroad and put our security goals in Iraq and Afghanistan at risk.

PMC’s destroy our image – torture proves.

Isenberg 4 (David, Researcher and Writer on PMC’s, http://www.pmcpsc.com/img/2004PMC.pdf, AD: 6/25/10) jl

The torture and abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib horrified people around the world and raised controversy over the role and activities of PMC personnel in the intelligence and interrogation process. But long before Abu Ghraib, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was preaching the virtues of using contractors in prisons, citing the success of private-run prisons in the United States. The number of PMC personnel at Abu Ghraib is far from clear, but at least 37 interrogators from private contractors were operating in the prison.

PMC’s defraud the USFG

Effect Measure 9 (<http://scienceblogs.com/effectmeasure/2009/12/10_reasons_to_oppose_the_escal.php>, date accessed: 6/24/2010) AJK  
10 Reasons to Oppose the Escalation of War in Afghanistan Human cost of war: Soldier and civilian deaths and injuries have been escalating each year since 2001. Nearly 1000 U.S. soldiers have been killed while 32,000 Afghan civilians have died as a result of the war. Economic cost of war: Each soldier in Afghanistan costs U.S. taxpayers $1 million per year. Private military contractors, known to de-fraud the Pentagon, exceed the number of soldiers in the war. No matter the war’s outcome, the defense industry wins with windfall profits.

PMC’s undermine government efforts and make US motives look bad.

Stokes 10 (Jacob, Business week journalist, Feb 25, *Democracy Arsenal*) ET

Lastly, the development agenda needs rethinking as Afghans see a foreign disinterest in the building of their country’s capacity. When $14,000 per day is spent to provide security for a private contractor to survey a project, when Provincial Reconstruction Teams import overpriced water and food from abroad when legitimate options exist locally, and when an initially funded $3 million project lands on the ground with only $300,000 to show for it due to the multiple sub-contracting and skimming, Afghans are understandably frustrated. Afghan alternatives — like the government’s Community Development Councils, which fund locally elected councils to design and manage their own projects — should be the focus instead. In order to build Afghan ownership and capacity, contractors may need to forgo the actual building and instead redistribute the funds into Afghan institutions and initiatives like the CDCs, as foreign affiliation with the CDCs will put council members at immediate risk. The key to the main challenges facing the country is to build Afghan acceptance and ownership. When 80 percent of all foreign aid dollars entirely circumvents the Afghan government, and when the same amount leaves the country in contractor hands — not Afghan ones — locals question America’s motive. If we want to win the Afghans, then we must listen to what they want.

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PMCs are seen as responsible for Abu Ghraib and other human rights violations

War Resisters 6 (<http://www.wri-irg.org/node/560> , date accessed: 6/26/2010) AJK  
The USA section of Amnesty International focuses in their 2006 annual report on the role of private military contractors. PMCs are one of the most scandalous part of the spectrum of war profiteering and the U.S. government is their main contract provider “the U.S. government is outsourcing key security and military support functions, particular in Iraq and Afghanistan, to private companies whose civilian employees carry out the work. The civilians conduct functions ranging from logistical support to providing security for US government personnel, and reconstruction projects, training military and security personnel, operating and maintaining weapons systems, and rebuilding schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure. But they also serve in more sensitive roles, such as interrogation and translating during questioning of alleged terrorist suspects” The same report denounces how the PMCs and the outsourcing of the military permit serious human right violations, as there are almost no regulations on these contractors, “Business outsourcing may increase efficiency, but war outsourcing may be facilitating impunity. Contractors illegal behaviour and the reluctance of the US government to bring them to justice are further tarnishing the United States reputation abroad” These companies committed to violent conflic are difficult to target as many of the companies involved do not provide any other services, and the companies generally are not visible in public. This makes them a difficult but most needed target for campaigns against war profiteers. Some of these PMCs: [Blackwater](http://www.blackwaterusa.org/) is well known because four of their employees were killed and hung from a bridge in Fallujah in 2004. Blackwater has been profiteering from the war with a number of “security” forces deployed in Iraq, as well as profiteering from the blast of hurricane Katrina, where they provided security to private business. [CACI Internationa](http://www.caci.com/)l Inc provides technology services, and was awarded a contract worth as much as US$155 million to provide technology to help commanders in the field to collect intelligence and to interrupt enemy communications and intelligence systems. Corporate Watch discovered that their private employees worked as interrogation experts at Abu Ghraib prison.

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Torture ruins the US image abroad

HRF 8 (Human rights first, <http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/etn/2008/alert/313/>, date accessed: 6/25/2010) AJK NEW YORKâ€”Fifteen former interrogators and intelligence officials with more than 350 years collective field experience have declared that torture is an â€œunlawful, ineffective and counterproductiveâ€ way to gather intelligence, in a statement of principles released today. The group of former interrogators and intelligence officials released a set of principles to guide effective interrogation practices at the conclusion of a meeting convened by Human Rights First last week in Washington. The meeting participants served with the CIA, the FBI and the U.S. military. The principles are based on the interrogators and intelligence officialsâ€™ experiences of what works and what does not in the field. Interrogation techniques that do not resort to torture yield more complete and accurate intelligence, they say. The principles call for the creation of a well-defined single standard of conduct in interrogation and detention practices across all U.S. agencies. At stake is the loss of critical intelligence and time, as well as the United Statesâ€™ reputation abroad and its credibility in demanding the humane treatment of captured Americans. The full text of the principles and brief bios of its signers follow below. The group gathered together in Washington last week for two days to discuss the most effective ways to obtain timely and credible information from suspected terrorists and other individuals who threaten the security of the United States, during which time they also met with Presidential campaign advisors and Members of Congress to discuss these issues.

Torture is immoral, ineffective, and decimates our global image

Jordan 9 (Chris, date accessed: 6/25/2010) AJK  
One principle we should accept as we conduct our foreign policy is that having more friends and fewer enemies in the world is a good thing. Getting people to admire and believe in the United States is preferable to being hated and despised. A tarnished image abroad is dangerous for our national security. The resulting widespread anti-Americanism helps lead to the conditions in which terrorism and militant extremists thrive. Recruiting efforts for these groups are naturally more successful in countries hostile to the United States. On the other hand, when the United States is viewed as a benevolent global leader — as opposed to a hypocritical bully — the country is made safer. Other nations are more likely to support our policy objectives and cooperate in intelligence-sharing to fight common threats. Also, it’s much more difficult for terrorists to find recruits among pro-American populations. Abu Ghraib and the waterboarding torture scandals have undermined U.S. moral leadership in the world, tarnished our image abroad and made us all less safe. Not only does torture hurt our national security, but it simply doesn’t work. Many U.S. interrogators from different generations and conflicts have come forward to say that the information gathered from torture is often inaccurate and that there are better, more effective ways to get even the toughest opponents to talk. Supporters of torture often resort to the “ticking-time-bomb scenario” to make their justification. Suppose a terrorist is in custody, and he has crucial information about the location of a nuclear bomb that is about to explode in a major U.S. city. They argue that torture would be justified in order to save American lives. They point out that as early as 2002, waterboarding and other techniques have foiled numerous terrorist plots. Former CIA al-Qaida interrogator Jack Cloonan told U.S. foreign policy that the ticking-time-bomb situation is “a red herring. In the real world, it doesn’t happen.” In a 2008 interview with Vanity Fair, when asked if these techniques had in fact foiled any terrorist plots, FBI Director Robert Mueller’s response was, “I don’t believe that has been the case.” The bottom line is that arguments in support of torture techniques such as waterboarding are highly suspect. Torture is morally wrong — and illegal under international law. It tarnishes the image of the United States in the world. It creates more enemies and hatred toward us. It fuels the recruitment efforts of terrorists, and it is ineffective at extracting accurate information.

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Torture damages US credibility abroad

Warrick 9 (Joby, <http://dailyuw.com/2009/5/6/torture-wrong-recent-scandals-have-undermined-us-i/>, date accessed: 6/25/2010) AJK  
The Obama administration's chief intelligence officer has told the White House that harsh interrogations of suspected al-Qaeda officials produced "valuable" information, but he added that it is impossible to tell whether the same intelligence leads might have been obtained using less controversial methods. "The information gained from these techniques was valuable in some instances," he said in a statement yesterday, "but there is no way of knowing whether the same information could have been obtained through other means." Blair, Obama's appointee to oversee the 16 U.S. intelligence agencies, summarized in the statement an assessment he gave his staff in a memo last week, according to U.S. officials familiar with the document. Blair is a participant in a White House-ordered review of CIA interrogation methods used on high-value terrorism suspects between 2002 and 2006. "The bottom line is these techniques have hurt our image around the world," Blair said in the statement. "The damage they have done to our interests far outweighed whatever benefit they gave us and they are not essential to our national security." Blair said he supported Obama's decision to ban "enhanced interrogation techniques," and he rejected assertions by former vice president Richard B. Cheney and others that the methods were crucial to protecting the country. He added that he had backed Obama's decision last week to order the release of Justice Department memos that authorized the use of harsh interrogation practices.

Torture devastates the perception of America abroad

Thomas and Hirsh 5 (Evan and Michael, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10020629/site/newsweek/print/1/displaymode/1098>, date accessed: 6/25/2010) AJK  
But at what cost? While many Americans probably don't wish to know too much about the "dark side" of intelligence gathering, the horrific images of tortured detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan have taken a terrible toll on America's standing in the world. "It's killing us. It's killing us," says Sen. John McCain of Arizona, whose NEWSWEEK essay on the subject follows this article. As a POW in Vietnam who had his arm broken and worse, McCain knows something about torture. His bill to ban "cruel, inhuman or degrading" interrogation techniques passed the Senate last month 90 to 9. But Cheney, with CIA Director Porter Goss in tow, has been lobbying against McCain. As written, the administration argues, the McCain legislation would tie the CIA's hands in the war on terror and potentially expose CIA operatives to prosecution at home and abroad. Compromises are possible. "There's a common desire to work this out," says the senior Bush aide. Torture lite—and its bastard child, detainee abuse—are coming out of the shadows into the political arena. Cheney sometimes seems like a quieter version of Jack Nicholson in "A Few Good Men" ("You can't handle the truth!"), and last week President George W. Bush in effect attacked the administration's critics as unpatriotic. Yet there is a growing willingness in the courts and body politic to deal with the sometimes unpleasant questions of how to incarcerate and question suspected terrorists, and not just because John McCain is gearing up to run for president. In Britain last week, Parliament rebuffed Prime Minister Tony Blair's bill to hold terror suspects without charging them for 90 days, and the U.S. Supreme Court has signaled that it will rule on the constitutionality of so-called military commissions set up to try terrorists after 9/11. Compromise Possible? Cheney and McCain (at a 2001 Washington event) don’t see eye-to-eye on the torture debate The American public seems split. According to the latest NEWSWEEK Poll, 44 percent of the public thinks torture is often or sometimes justified as a way to obtain important information, while 51 percent say it is rarely or never justified. A clear majority—58 percent—would support torture to thwart a terrorist attack, but asked if they would still support torture if that made it more likely enemies would use it against Americans, 57 percent said no. Some 73 percent agree that America's image abroad has been hurt by the torture allegations.

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Torture hurts the US image abroad, risks any opportunity to develop a relationship with the Arab world, and is the most repugnant act imaginable

Schell 5 (Jonathan, <http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0120-25.htm>, date accessed: 6/25/2010) AJK

The senators' language regarding torture reflected, with exceptions, the horror of the matter as dimly as their flowery praise of one another. None, it is true, went as far as to suggest that restrictions on the abuse of prisoners were "unilateral disarmament," as a recent Wall Street Journal editorial did. Most of the senatorial defenders of Gonzales's record concentrated on denying his responsibility for one or another of the damning memos. More striking were the arguments against torture by those skeptical of the nomination. Two dominated. One was that torture hurts the image of the United States in the world. In the words of Senator Lindsey Graham, "I can tell you that it is a club that our enemies use, and we need to take that club out of their hand." Or in the words of Senator Herb Kohl, "winning the hearts and minds of the Arab world is vital to our success in the war on terror," and "Photographs that have come out of Abu Ghraib have undoubtedly hurt those efforts." The second argument was that enemy forces would torture U.S. forces in retaliation. In Biden's words, "This is about the safety and security of American forces." Even Gonzales, who declined at every opportunity to repudiate the policies that had led to the torture, was ready to agree that Abu Ghraib had harmed the image of the United States. But are these the fundamental reasons that torture is unacceptable? Can this nation now understand pain only if it is experienced by Americans or, through some chain of consequences, it rebounds upon the United States? Have all the people in the world but Americans become invisible to Americans? Torture is not wrong because someone else thinks it is wrong or because others, in retaliation for torture by Americans, may torture Americans. It is the torture that is wrong. Torture is wrong because it inflicts unspeakable pain upon the body of a fellow human being who is entirely at our mercy. The tortured person is bound and helpless. The torturer stands over him with his instruments. There is no question of "unilateral disarmament," because the victim bears no arms, lacking even the use of the two arms he was born with. The inequality is total. To abuse or kill a person in such a circumstance is as radical a denial of common humanity as is possible. It is repugnant to learn that one's country's military forces are engaging in torture. It is worse to learn that the torture is widespread. It is worse still to learn that the torture was rationalized and sanctioned in long memorandums written by people at the highest level of the government. But worst of all would be ratification of this record by a vote to confirm one of its chief authors to the highest legal office in the executive branch of the government. Torture destroys the soul of the torturer even as it destroys the body of his victim. The boundary between humane treatment of prisoners and torture is perhaps the clearest boundary in existence between civilization and barbarism. Whether the elected representatives of the people of the United States are now ready to cross that line is the deepest question before the Senate as it votes on the nomination of Alberto Gonzales.

PMCs send the signal that the US condones torture

HRF 10 (Human Rights First, <http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/usls/2010/alert/617/index.htm>, date accessed: 6/26/2010) AJK

"The torture and abuse visited on detainees at Abu Ghraib was a violation of fundamental human rights and humanitarian law principles," noted the group in its Amici brief. "The decision by the D.C. Circuit to immunize the tortious conduct of private military contractors on the ground that such contractors were 'integrated into combatant activities over which the military retains command authority' is incompatible with principles of international law to which the United States has subscribed." The group notes that the decision is incompatible with international law in two ways. First, it leaves the detainees without a civil remedy for the violations of their human rights. Second, it ignores that individuals taken and detained in the course of combat are owed a duty of care under the Geneva Conventions and that civil liability arises from the violation of that duty. Human Rights First notes that the D.C. Circuit ruling in this case cannot be reconciled with those fundamental principles. The brief filed today notes that, unlike some military personnel involved in the Abu Ghraib abuses, the private military contractors who participated in torturing detainees have not been criminally prosecuted. The organization notes, "Immunizing government contractors for the acts alleged would create the appearance that the United States condones torture by proxy or is even willing to invite abuses by outsourcing certain military functions to private actors for whose conduct the government need not answer. The problem is not a small one, as there are more contractors than soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan." The case at hand stems from a federal lawsuit filed by more than 250 former Iraqi detainees held in various Iraqi detention facilities, including Abu Ghraib. The prisoners allege that private contractors from CACI and L-3 Services tortured and seriously abused them during interrogations. In 2007, U.S. District Court Judge James Robertson denied CACI's motion for summary judgment, but ordered a jury trial in the case. CACI appealed that ruling to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. In a separate ruling, Robertson granted L-3 Services' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case against the company. Two years later, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled 2-1 to uphold the dismissal of all claims against L-3 Services and, reversing the lower court's decision, dismissed all charges against CACI. The defendants are now seeking relief from the Supreme Court.

Credibility Adv. – China Module – US Credibility K2

Without US pressure, Chinese human rights violations will explode

Wang 3 (Dan, <http://www.cecc.gov/pages/roundtables/060203/wang.php>, date accessed: 6/26/2010) AJK

With respect to this latter situation I have five points to share with you today. I think we can admit that there has been some progress on human rights. But I think that this progress, at least partly, if not completely, is due to the pressure from the international community. As an example we can look at the period between 1992 and 1997. During that time there was consistent considerable pressure from the West and as a result human rights violations in China decreased notably. After 1997, however, when the pressure was relaxed, there was substantial erosion of China's human rights record. Therefore, I strongly believe that the United States and other Western countries should keep up their ongoing pressure on China to improve its human rights situation. I disagree with those who fear that if the U.S. keeps up its human rights pressures on China that this will have a negative effect on Sino-U.S. relations. Second, it is obvious that China still lacks a mature civil society. However, over the last fourteen years we have witnessed the gradual emergence of a developing civil society. I think that it is very important that the United States pay attention to these sprouts of civil society in China and do all that it can to cultivate them. I believe that it is short-sighted for the U.S. government only to focus on the actors in the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party. Therefore, I think that the United States China policy should move from attention only on human rights issues to other issues of political reform and democratic politics. One way that the U.S. can do this is to provide support for NGOs and universities in China as a way to promote social contacts. Third, as the U.S. is facing the challenge of terrorism in the new century, I can completely understand the necessity to strengthen its strategy against terrorism. However, I am worried that an unfortunate side-effect of this strategy may be a tightening of the U.S. policy that allows Chinese students and scholars to come to the States for exchanges, study, and visits. As one of the beneficiaries of this program myself, as well as a beneficiary of the human rights pressure from the international community, I sincerely hope that this will not occur. The current generation of overseas Chinese students, sooner or later, will return to China, and I believe they will be a motivating force for the further development of reform in China, including political reform. Therefore, I think it is important that the U.S. government allow this door to remain open, and even to open it wider by expanding its contacts with the Chinese students already in America. Fourth, it is not enough for the U.S. government merely to take a general stand to promote democracy in China. I think a more detailed and in-depth strategy is required, for instance based on specific cases, such as projects promoting the rule of law, freedom of the press, or workers rights. There are many worthwhile projects that are being undertaken in China today, and I and my colleagues would be happy to introduce them to you. However, I think a note of caution is necessary with respect to support from the U.S. to projects being carried out within China. This is a very sensitive issue and there is a thin line between seeing support for such projects because they are meant to help China and seeing support for such projects because they are meant to prevent China from becoming strong. It is very easy for many Chinese people to misinterpret the intentions from abroad. Therefore, it is advisable to first make contacts with the liberal intellectuals in China who are more open-minded about aid and support from abroad.

Credibility Adv. – China Module – US Credibility K2

Impossible to make progress with China when we’re seen as hypocritical on human rights issues

Reuters 2010 (<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62B0WQ20100312>, date accessed: 6/26/2010) AJK  
In its annual survey of human rights in 194 countries issued on Thursday, the U.S. State Department criticized China, along with Cuba, Myanmar, [North Korea](http://www.reuters.com/places/north-korea) and Russia. China's State Council Information Office, or cabinet spokesman's office, issued its own annual assessment of the United States' human rights record in response, and this year it dwelt on America's economic woes. "The United States not only has a terrible domestic human rights record, it is also the main source of many human rights disasters worldwide," the Chinese report said, according to the official Xinhua news agency. "Especially a time when the world is suffering serious human rights disasters caused by the global financial crisis sparked by the U.S. sub-prime crisis, the U.S. government has ignored its own grave human rights problems and reveled in accusing other countries." Washington has long criticized of China on human rights, and the subject has added to recent tensions with Beijing, which has also pushed back over arms sales to Taiwan and President Barack Obama's meeting with the Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetan leader. China has claimed sovereignty over Taiwan since their split in 1949 amid civil war, and reviles the Dalai Lama as a "separatist" for seeking self-rule for his Himalayan homeland. PELOSI TIBET REMARKS CONDEMNED China's Foreign Ministry, in a separate statement, also condemned U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi for comments earlier this week honoring "the many brave Tibetans who have sacrificed their lives fighting for freedom." "We advise the relevant U.S. congresswoman to respect the facts, abandon her prejudices and stop using the Tibet issue to interfere in China's internal affairs," spokesman Qin Gang said in a statement on the ministry's website ([www.fmprc.gov.cn](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn)). China's Internet controls have also thrust Beijing into a dispute with search engine giant Google, which has said it may shut down its Chinese-language Google.cn portal and draw back from the Chinese market out of concerns over censorship and a hacking attack from within the country. China has intensified restrictions on the Internet, imposed tight control over people seen as threats to Communist Party rule, and increased repression of Uighurs after ethnic violence and riots in Xinjiang, the country's restive far-western region, said the State Department report. China's Communist Party authorities have shown little patience with Western criticisms of Beijing's punishment of political dissidents and protesters. Late last year, U.S. officials decried the sentencing of prominent Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo to 11 years in jail on charges of "inciting subversion." The latest Chinese counter-blast to U.S. criticisms said Washington should concentrate on "improving its own human rights."

Double standards on things like torture make it impossible to pressure China

Hiram 2010 (<http://hiram1555.com/2010/03/14/russia-china-holds-u-s-hypocritical-human-rights-report-up-to-the-mirror-of-u-s-actions/> , date accessed: 6/26/2010) AJK

“The United States not only has a terrible domestic human rights record, it is also the main source of many human rights disasters worldwide: China. March 12, 2010 (Hamsayeh.Net) – China and Russia hold the mirror in front of the United States to see its own image on human rights issues just exactly how the rest of the world sees it. The ugly image being reflected back of the US’ human rights records was described in a Chinese report published by Xinhua, today. The report pointed at widespread human rights abuses committed by the US over the past several years. ‘At a time when the world is suffering a serious human rights disaster caused by the US subprime crisis-induced global financial crisis, the US government still ignores its own serious human rights problems but revels in accusing other countries. It is really a pity,’ the report said. China also criticized Washington over wiretapping ordinary citizens thereby infringing on their civil rights. ‘The United States not only has a terrible domestic human rights record, it is also the main source of many human rights disasters worldwide,’ the report said. The world remembers when a massive earthquake hit the island of Haiti last January. At the time when most of the world was concentrating on providing humanitarian relieves the US was trying to show off military power to quake stricken Haitians by sending thousands of fully armed troops into the region. The Chinese report lashed out at US’ inhumane treatment of its own citizens saying that most US citizens were threatened by “widespread violent crimes”, while abuses of power were common among law enforcement officials. In Moscow, Russian Foreign Ministry strongly criticized US’ 2009 report on human rights. The Russian Foreign Ministry said the report ignores US’ own record. ‘Everything is very traditional and even ritual in the report: approaches, theses, conclusions and informants. In this respect, we haven’t noticed much difference despite the ‘reset’ in our relations declared by today’s administration,’ the ministry said as reported by Ria Novosti.  ‘It is no secret to anyone that this opus is aimed primarily at solving the political issues of the U.S. establishment,’ it added. The ministry’s report said that it was interesting to know how the US State Department which issues this annual report would indeed comment on all the tortures, cruel and inhumane treatment of people in the US itself. In its annual report on Human Rights the US State Department commented on what it called human rights abuses by a number of countries including Russia and China.”

Credibility Adv. – China Module – US Credibility K2

We have no leverage on China’s human rights violations given our liberal use of torture

Eland 7 (Ivan, http://original.antiwar.com/eland/2007/03/13/china-returns-fire-on-us-human-rights-abuses/ , date accessed:6/25/2010) AJK  
The authoritarian government in China gleefully responded to the U.S. censure of its policies with return fire on the Bush administration’s abysmal record on civil liberties. Things are getting bad when an autocracy chastises a republic for its human rights abuses and the criticism has merit. The Chinese condemned U.S. practices of kidnapping, torture, and indefinite detention without the opportunity for legal challenge. They also pinged the U.S. government for increased spying on American citizens. Of course, these are the same abuses that the U.S. government has criticized the Chinese government of perpetrating. China also cited Martin Sheinin, UN special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as saying that parts of the U.S. Military Commissions Act violate the Geneva Conventions. In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that habeas corpus – the ancient right of a prisoner to challenge his or her detention – could not be denied to detainees at the U.S. prison at Guantanamo, Cuba, simply because they were not being held on U.S. territory. Despite this ruling, in late 2006, the Republican Congress passed, at the urging of President Bush, the aforementioned Military Commissions Act, which prohibited federal courts from hearing habeas petitions from prisoners at Guantanamo and elsewhere. The denial of habeas corpus rights for these prisoners – despite a February 2007 ruling by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upholding the act – is clearly unconstitutional. The Constitution clearly states that the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, except in times of rebellion or invasion – neither of which applies in this case. In addition, no exception is made for non-citizens or persons held by the U.S. government outside U.S. territory. The Chinese criticism has merit. If habeas corpus can be so denied, the U.S. government can kidnap people off the streets anywhere in the world, declare them "enemy combatants," and hold them secretly and indefinitely without being charged, having access to legal counsel, being able to challenge their detention, and having a trial. In fact, foreigners have been kidnapped, sent to foreign countries for torture, and are now rotting in perpetuity in Guantanamo and other secret prisons around the world. At Guantanamo, some prisoners have already been held for five years without proper due process.

Credibility Adv. – China Module – China Civil Unrest

Increased governmental repression causes civil unrest

Hartzell 9 (Kathryn, http://www.nixoncenter.org/index.cfm?action=showpage&page=Unrest-in-China-09 , date accessed: 6/27/2010) AJK  
Following the 2008 Olympic Games, there appeared to be a spike in the number of incidents of civil unrest, attributed by many – including the Chinese government - to the financial crisis.  Yet there is little evidence to support a direct causal link between the economy and unrest, though the Chinese government chooses to frame the discontent in that light. In fact, civil unrest has steadily increased over the past decade, even in times of historic levels of prosperity. The government’s responses to protests and petitions have created impediments to social justice and have continually failed to address the root causes of citizen dissatisfaction.  The Nixon Center’s May 1 roundtable, “The search for harmony: Prospects for social stability in China amid the global financial crisis,” with China experts Murray Scot Tanner of CNA and Louisa Coan Greve of the National Endowment for Democracy, focused on the rising number of mass incidents and protests in China's provinces over the last twenty years and the steps Beijing is taking to contain the problem.  Tanner began the discussion by examining what appears to be a dramatic increase in civil unrest in the past few months, which has coincided with the deepening of the global financial crisis.   The “spike,” contended Tanner, can be attributed to a deliberate attempt by the Chinese government to suppress statistics on social unrest during the last four years

Government repression leads to civil unrest, which quickly escalates

Allen 9 (Michael, http://www.demdigest.net/blog/backlash/chinas-repressive-policies-at-root-of-urumchi-unrest.html#hide , date accessed: 6/27/201)AJK  
At least [140 people have been killed](http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090706/ap_on_re_as/as_china_protest) and hundreds more arrested following [clashes](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9o5a0PCt1Vg) in China’s northwestern Xinjiang region, home to the country’s Uyghurs, a Turkic-speaking, predominantly Muslim ethnic group. The [World Uyghur Congress](http://www.uyghurcongress.org/En/home.asp), a grantee of the [National Endowment for Democracy](http://www.ned.org/grants/08programs/grants-asia08.html#ChinaXinjiang), explained that the [peaceful protests](http://uyghuramerican.org/content_images/urumchi-protest/urumchi1.jpg) were organized in response to a recent [attack on Uyghur workers at a toy factory in Guangdong](http://www.uhrp.org/articles/2353/1/UAA-condemns-killing-of-Uyghur-workers-at-Guangdong-factory-/index.html):“ On Sunday, July 5, 2009, Uyghur students organized a protest in Urumchi to express discontent with the Chinese authorities’ response to the mob killing and beating of Uyghur workers at a toy factory in Shaoguan, Guangdong on June 26, 2009. The aim of the protesters was to seek justice for the victims in Shaoguan and to express sympathy with the families of those killed and injured.   Reports indicate that between 1,000 to 3,000 protestors marched through the Döng Körük (Erdaoqiao) area of Urumchi on July 5, 2009, some of whom were waving the flag of the People’s Republic of China. The protestors were met by a fierce Chinese government response to quell the protest, which included the [deployment of four kinds of police](http://uyghuramerican.org/content_images/urumchi-protest/urumchi2.jpg) (regular police, anti-riot police, special police and the People’s Armed Police). Protest participants, who wish to remain anonymous for safety reasons, have indicated in phone conversations with the Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) that an unknown number of Uyghurs were fired upon by Chinese authorities and killed.

Credibility Adv. – China Module – Collapses CCP

Civil unrest will cause the collapse of the CCP  
Pan 4 (Philip, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23519-2004Nov3.html , date accessed: 6/27/2010) AJK  
As police battled to suppress deadly ethnic clashes last week in central China, tens of thousands of rice farmers fighting a dam project staged a huge protest in the western part of the country. The same day, authorities crushed a strike involving 7,000 textile workers. A week earlier, a large crowd of retirees demanding pension payments blocked traffic for days in a city in the east; nearly a thousand workers demonstrated outside a newly privatized department store in the northeast; and police used rubber bullets and tear gas to quell a giant mob of anti-government rioters in a western city. The string of disturbances, described by local journalists, witnesses and participants, highlights the daily challenge that civil unrest now poses to the ruling Communist Party. Despite historic economic growth that has lifted millions out of poverty, protests and riots in the world's most populous country are occurring with increasing frequency, growing in size and ending more often in violence. This expansion of social strife has yet to shake the party's authoritarian grip on power. But the trend, evident in the government's own police statistics, has prompted alarm at the highest levels of the Chinese leadership, which has repeatedly declared social stability its top priority. The Communist Party has indicated it is worried that these outbursts of discontent might coalesce into large-scale, organized opposition to its rule. The concern was apparent in a report by its Central Committee in September urging officials to improve governance and warning that "the life and death of the party" was at stake. "The Soviet Union used to be the world's number one socialist country, but overnight the country broke up and political power collapsed," Vice President Zeng Qinghong wrote last month in the People's Daily, the party's flagship newspaper. "One important reason was that in their long time in power, their system of governing became rigid, their ability to govern declined, people were dissatisfied with what the officials accomplished, and the officials became seriously isolated from the masses." There were more than 58,000 major incidents of social unrest in the country last year, about 160 per day on average, according to the party magazine Outlook. That was an increase of 15 percent over 2002 and nearly seven times the figure reported by the government just a decade ago. Another study of police statistics, by Murray Scot Tanner, a scholar at the U.S.-based Rand Corp., concluded the demonstrations were growing in size while violence, including attacks on party and state officials, was also on the rise. "Research institutes like our center are working on this issue day and night, and so is the government," said He Zengke, executive director of the China Center for Comparative Politics and Economics in Beijing. "We all know the importance and urgency of the problem." The incidents that erupted over the past two weeks illustrate the wide variety of factors behind this wave of unrest: tensions between the Han ethnic majority and ethnic and religious minorities such as the Muslim Hui; a widening wealth gap and persistent government corruption; the seizure of farmland for development; and layoffs associated with the transition from socialism to capitalism. The party once blamed domestic unrest on subversives and foreign agents, but it now acknowledges that many taking part in these protests have legitimate grievances. Officials also recognize that protests are inevitable in a rapidly changing country and can serve as a safety valve for pent-up public anger.

Even a small incident of civil unrest can unravel the CCP

Shuli 9 (Hu, http://english.caijing.com.cn/2009-07-07/110194415.html , date accessed: 6/27/2010) AJK

Yet the experiences should provide lessons. The dark cloud of economic crisis still looms, and the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China is upon us. For the sake of establishing rule of law and a harmonious society while modernizing China, we need to alleviate social discontent and reduce the frequency and seriousness of conflicts. It is high time to face reality and thoroughly review these incidents, with the goal of understanding why they occur. Although the origins and timing of recent mass incidents vary, they share common threads. The cause is often an isolated event, sometimes a police or criminal case. But because inept officials disregard the basic rights of individuals concerned, and stir public anger that boils over, the friction escalates. Once a conflict erupts, lives become entwined in legal affairs. That's when a local government is prone to mishandle an incident, abuse police power and bar information access. Invariably, the mishandled effort backfires, and a government loses credibility in the process. Even though calm eventually may be restored, the methods used in handling incidents and their durations can exact high societal and political costs. Ultimately, these incidents test the capabilities and sincerity of leaders whose job is to serve the people. They also leave a lasting imprint on a government's credibility.

Credibility Adv. – China Module – Collapses China

China won’t go peacefully: it’ll chaotically split into a bunch of smaller nations

Heilbrunn 1 (Jacob, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/THE+COMING+COLLAPSE+OF+CHINA-a076751689 , date accessed: 6/27/2010) AJK  
Who has it right? Is China, as the hawks would have it, a new Wilhelmine Germany, clamoring for its place in the sun? Or is it, as the business lobby promises, a formerly totalitarian country seduced into democratic ways by the lure of the market? In The Coming Collapse of China, Gordon G. Chang says that both sides have it wrong. China, he declares, is headed for the scrapheap of history. It's certainly a case worth considering. One empire after another collapsed in the past century. Why should China, an old-fashioned empire made up of hundreds of different ethnic groupings, be any different? Chang, a lawyer who worked for two decades in China, has written an impassioned book that rests on penetrating diagnoses and old-fashioned gumshoe reporting, conducting interviews with everyone from the high-and-mighty to the common peasant. His aim is to present an unvarnished portrait of China, free of the romanticism of the business lobby and the [alarmism](http://www.thefreedictionary.com/alarmism) a·larm·ist   n. A person who needlessly alarms or attempts to alarm others, as by inventing or spreading false or exaggerated rumors of impending danger or catastrophe.  of the new cold warriors. Chang focuses on the [Communist Party](http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Communist+Party) Communist party, in China Communist party, in China, ruling party of the world's most populous nation since 1949 and most important Communist party in the world since the disintegration of the USSR in 1991. , arguing that its failure to adapt to new economic and political challenges has made it as vulnerable to upheaval as previous Chinese imperial dynasties. He ascribes much importance to the emergence of the [Falun Gong](http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/falun+gong) Falun Gong  or Falun Dafa Controversial spiritual movement combining healthful exercises with meditation for the purpose of “moving to higher levels.” Its teachings draw from Buddhism, Confucianism, Daoism, and the Western New Age movement.  and contrasts it with the moral emptiness of the Communists. The best that Fu Qing-yuan, director of the Research [Institute of Marxism-Leninism](http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Institute+of+Marxism-Leninism) Institute of Marxism-Leninism was an association formed amongst radical elements within the Communist Party of India in West Bengal. It was founded on April 22, 1964. Leading figures were Sushital Roy Chowdhury, Asit Sen and Saroj Dutta (who joined the Institute at a later stage). , can tell him is that "Many people in China are facing a crisis of faith. But I still believe that the majority of the [Chinese people](http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Chinese+people) The following is a '''list of famous Chinese-speaking/writing people. Note in Chinese names, the family name is typically placed first (for example, the family name of "Xu Feng" is "Xu").  believe in [dialectical materialism](http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Dialectical+materialism) dialectical materialism, official philosophy of Communism, based on the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, as elaborated by G. V. Plekhanov, V. I. Lenin, and Joseph Stalin. " Chang notes that China is a [hotbed](http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Hotbed) hotbed, low, glass-covered frame structure for starting tender plants. It differs from a cold frame only in that the soil is heated—either artificially as by underground electric wiring or steampipes, or naturally with partially fermented stable manure, which  of religious growth. One sign of religious fervor has come in the mushrooming of so-called "house churches." These Christian evangelical churches are independent of the government and meet secretly. They have been the target of much persecution. Then there is the well-known Falun Gong, which first rang alarm bells among the Communist leadership when it became clear that the movement had numerous adherents among party cadres. As Chang puts it, "Guess which religion is more popular: the one that promises a life after this one or the one that decrees that there is none?" Chang goes on to remark that while Falun Gong is just a large sect, "tomorrow anything can happen. The Falun Gong episode highlights yet again the weakening grip of the apparently mighty Communist Party." This is too vague. "Anything can happen" is a meaningless phrase. What's more, the collapse of the party need not entail the disappearance of China. Chang believes that China will go the way of the Soviet Union, splitting into various states. Unfortunately, Chang does not provide particulars about how he envisions the breakup. Had he discussed the ethnic and geographic fault lines that he believes run through China, his argument would have been greatly strengthened. He seems to believe that the difficulties that the regime faces--unemployment, religious tensions, loss of faith in communism--will inevitably lead to collapse. He points to Tibet as an example of a native population that has resisted Chinese rule, but does not go beyond what is commonly known about the dreadful Chinese occupation of that country. Nor is there much reason to believe that an uprising is imminent in Tibet. Chang also cites the Falun Gong as a harbinger of potential revolt. But he skips too easily from religious to ethnic tensions. After discussing the Falun Gong, he moves to Central Asia, where Uighurs are revolting against Chinese rule. But there is a fundamental difference between religious and ethnic tensions: Religious claims are transcendent ones, whereas ethnic tensions almost [invariably](http://www.thefreedictionary.com/invariably)  rest on the claim of racial exclusivity.

CCP collapse means China becomes a failed state

Shorrock (Tim, http://www.ipsnewsasia.net/bridgesfromasia/node/26, date accessed: 6/27/2010) AJK

Pei argued that, while democratic pluralism is the preferred route to stability, there are dangers ahead as China approaches the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule. "The transition itself is fraught with upheaval," he said. "The current regime is poorly equipped to deal with a democratic transition. It hasn't really faced up to its misdeeds and atrocities over the past 50 years." As a result, Chinese-style 'glasnost' "is likely to unleash a flood of recrimination and anger" that would be "destabilising rather than enhancing stability". Part of the problem, he suggested, is that the Communist Party is in complete control of the Chinese state. "If the party were to collapse, there is a failed state, or there is no state." Pei cast doubt on whether overseas Chinese dissidents have the political capability to become a force in a post-communist China. Because dissidents are uprooted from their mother country, he said, their "voices are muted" and their ability to sustain themselves as a political force are limited. At the same time, within the United States dissidents are divided into factions that rarely compromise, further limiting their political effectiveness. "When a regime changes, they'd have to compete with other groups for power," he said of the overseas groups. When that happened in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, he noted, the "Soviet exiles returned but quickly disappeared".

Credibility Adv. – China Module – Taiwan Impact

China collapse causes war over Taiwan and global recession.

Lewis 8 (Dan, http://www.worldfinance.com/news/home/finalbell/article117.html , date accessed: 6/27/2010) AJK

That is alarming. It has been calculated that to keep China’s society stable – ie to manage the transition from a rural to an urban society without devastating unemployment - the minimum growth rate is 7.2 percent. Anything less than that and unemployment will rise and the massive shift in population from the country to the cities becomes unsustainable. This is when real discontent with communist party rule becomes vocal and hard to ignore. It doesn’t end there. That will at best bring a global recession. The crucial point is that communist authoritarian states have at least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic tensions – so far. But when multi-ethnic communist countries fall apart from economic stress and the implosion of central power, history suggests that they don’t become successful democracies overnight. Far from it. There’s a very real chance that China might go the way of Yugoloslavia or the Soviet Union – chaos, civil unrest and internecine war. In the very worst case scenario, a Chinese government might seek to maintain national cohesion by going to war with Taiwan – whom America is pledged to defend. Today, people are looking at Chang’s book again. Contrary to popular belief, foreign investment has actually deferred political reform in the world’s oldest nation. China today is now far further from democracy than at any time since the Tianneman Square massacres in 1989. Chang’s pessimistic forecast for China was probably wrong. But my fear is there is at least a chance he was just early.

Extinction

Straits Times, 00 [“Regional Fallout: No one gains in war over Taiwan,” Jun 25, LN]

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

Credibility Adv. – Impact – Human Rights

Human rights wars cause enormous casualties

Shattuck and Myers 3 (John and Joanne, <http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/1078.html>, date accessed: 6/26/2010) AJK  
By 1995, we saw that three million people since 1989 had been killed within their own countries, either by their own governments or by forces that were trying to fan these flames of ethnic, racial, and religious difference, in Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Bosnia, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Chechnya, and Haiti, just to name a few. These were the emerging wars against civilians which I call the human rights wars. They were not wars between armies; they were wars of ethnic cleansing and wars that were aimed at achieving political goals by manipulating ethnic and religious differences. Twenty-five million people had become refugees by 1995, almost the same number as at the end of the Second World War. The U.S. had spent twenty billion dollars on humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping in the old fashioned peacekeeping way, which was to go in and watch but not take any particular steps to stop the situation. These staggering figures and all of this information about what was happening did gradually have an impact on U.S. foreign policy and the foreign policy of other democracies, particularly in Europe. National security was slowly redefined as a concept beyond that which it had been in the Cold War, so that it became clear that it was not just the moral interest but the economic and security interest of democracies to do something to contain these forces of disintegration which were proving to be so expensive in lives, in dollars, in disruption, and in the total chaos that enveloped southeastern Europe.

Credibility Adv. – Impact – Torture Bad

Torture is revolting and can never be justified

Palmer 4 (Alasdair, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3606293/Americans-have-given-torture-a-bad-name.html>, date accessed: 6/25/2010) AJK  
The pictures, and now videos, recording the activity of some US soldiers inside Abu Ghraib prison seem to provide a definitive answer to the question of whether torture can ever be justified. The answer is an emphatic no. To look at the gloating faces of the servicemen and women as they exult at the suffering they have inflicted on their victims is to be repelled and revolted. The effect of the mixture of fear, pain and sexual humiliation on the victims is horrible. The effect on the perpetrators seems almost worse: they have sacrificed their humanity to a disgusting vortex of bestiality and perverted sexuality.   It is hard to believe that the purpose of what they were doing was the extraction of information. Yet according to that most experienced of Pentagon-watchers, Seymour Hersh, writing in this week's New Yorker, the perversions of Abu Ghraib were meant to be part of a concerted programme for "softening up" prisoners before interrogation.

Credibility Adv. – Impact – US Credibility/Soft Power

Torture undermines US credibility, justifies torture in other countries, destroys US soft power, and makes winning the war on terror impossible

Pasha 9 (Zain, http://www.rso.cornell.edu/ciar/journal/¸date accessed: 6/25/2010) AJK

First, using torture undermines international U.S. credibility because U.S. insistence on international adherence to human rights norms and simultaneous use of illegal torture practices casts the U.S. as a hypocrite in the eyes of the international community. Dr. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Richard L. Armitage agree when they argue “[America] cannot denounce torture and waterboarding in other countries and condone it home.”21 To be sure, a report released by China in 2008 used U.S. secret prisons and illegal U.S. torture practices to accuse the U.S. of hypocrisy in condemning China’s human rights record.22 Moreover, in 2006 Vladimir Putin accused the U.S. of hypocrisy in criticizing Russia’s human rights record with veiled references to illegal U.S. interrogation methods and use of force.23 Indeed, in maintaining a hypocritical policy of torture the U.S. not only undermines international human rights norms, but also subsequently harms its national interest when those norms become necessary for preserving U.S. national interests (e.g. when American soldiers are captured by other nations).24 Moreover, many nations use U.S. use of torture to justify their own policies. For example, when questioned by the UN in 2007 about its widespread and illegal torture practices, Sri Lanka defended itself by citing U.S. torture at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay and CIA “black sites.”25 Additionally, President Hosni Mubarak defended Egypt’s use of military tribunals for trying suspected terrorists by claiming that U.S. suspension of international human rights laws and use of military tribunals in cases of suspected terrorism vindicated Egypt of all criticism by international human rights groups.26 Indeed, then UN special rapporteur on torture Manfred Nowak agrees that U.S. use of torture has increased the global prominence of torture, as many nations view the U.S. as a model, or at the very least a justification, for their own policies.27 Similarly, Oxford University’s Henry Shue argues that use of torture by a superpower like the U.S. in particular sets an irresistible precedent for weaker nations who may not have alternative counterintelligence resources (i.e. if torture is universally outlawed weaker nations are forced not to use it, but if world leaders break torture laws weaker nations find it irresistible not to follow suit).28 Finally, U.S. use of torture undermines U.S. soft power leadership because it diminishes international opinion about the U.S.29 To be sure, a January 2007 World Public Opinion Poll of 26,000 people across 25 countries revealed that 67% of respondents disapproved of the way in which the U.S. treated Guantanamo Bay detainees and 49% of respondents (the largest plurality) felt the U.S. had an overall negative impact on the world.30 The implications of this are significant. For one thing, the U.S. relies on its soft power to gain the support of nations like Germany and Malaysia in the fight against terrorism. If public sentiment about the U.S. among the citizens of key U.S. allies is sufficiently negative, the U.S. may not be able to cooperate with those allies to confront a national security threat. For example, the U.S. may not be able to get permission to bomb an al-Qaeda terrorist cell in Malaysia, or it may not receive German political and military support in starting a campaign against terrorist groups. Moreover, soft power losses become self-perpetuating, as negative international opinion of the U.S. elicits isolationist responses from U.S. citizens that subsequently embolden U.S. enemies like al-Qaeda. Finally, winning the War on Terror necessitates moderate Muslim leadership in the Islamic world. For this, U.S. soft power diplomacy is crucial as it creates linkages between the U.S. and moderate Muslims that can subvert the influence of Muslim extremists.31 Indeed, without the support of our allies and those living in the Middle East, the U.S. will have a hard time winning the War on Terrorism.32

Torture makes it impossible to fight human rights violations, exercise soft power, and fight terrorists

Pasha 9 (Zain, http://www.rso.cornell.edu/ciar/journal/¸date accessed: 6/25/2010) AJK

U.S. use of torture under the Bush administration has had several negative consequences. First, U.S. torture has undermined international U.S. credibility as nations like Russia and China label the U.S. as hypocritical for advocating human rights and simultaneously using torture. Second, U.S. torture has undermined international human rights norms, which prevents the U.S. from condemning human rights violations and allows other nations to justify their torture policies (e.g., Sri Lanka). This harms the U.S. national interest when those norms become important for protecting the lives of captured American soldiers. Third, use of torture has undermined U.S. soft power leadership around the world, which impedes global cooperation on the War on Terror and harms the ability of moderates to gain power in the Islamic world. Fourth, torture increases global terrorism by radicalizing previously moderate segments of the international population, increasing sympathy for terrorist causes, and consequently bolstering the recruitment efforts of organizations like al-Qaeda. Fifth, use of torture decreases presidential approval ratings and thus reduces public support for U.S. national security policies. Moreover, torture offers little actual utility for preserving U.S. national security even in the case of a “ticking time bomb.” Indeed, the premises upon which the “ticking time bomb” justification is situated make the scenario very unlikely to occur in reality, which effectively makes it an argument for why torture should never be used. Furthermore, the vague time-horizon implied by the term “imminent” in the case of the “ticking time bomb” makes it a slippery slope that results in the use of torture against virtually anyone. Additionally, interrogators can never know with certainty that a detainee will provide actionable or accurate intelligence. To be sure, the cases of Abu Zubaydah and Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi demonstrate that torture oftentimes yields redundant and even false information, which makes it useless as a counterintelligence tool even in “ticking time bomb” scenarios.

Credibility Adv. – Impact – Soft Power K2 Warming

Soft power is key to solve climate change and terrorism.

**Khanna 8** (Director of the Global Governance Initiative and Senior Research Fellow in the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation. Council on Foreign Relations: “The United States and Shifting Global Power Dynamics”) online: http://www.cfr.org/publication/16002/united\_states\_and\_shifting\_global\_power\_dynamics.html

To the extent that our grand strategy will involve elements of promoting good governance and democracy, we will have to become far more irresistible as a political partner, offering incentives greater than those of other powers who do not attach any strings to their relationships. Even if you are agnostic on this issue, we are all aware that this is a perennial plank of American diplomacy and if we want to be even remotely effective at it, we have to up our ante in this arena of rising powers. This I believe is part of what you would call “non-military spending on national security,” a course of action I strongly advocate for the Middle East and Central Asia. An equally important component of grand strategy will have to be a realistic division of labor with these rising powers, something both of us clearly emphasize. Whether the issue is climate change, public health, poverty reduction, post-conflict reconstruction, or counterterrorism, we do not have the capacity to solve these problems alone—nor can any other power. I argue that we need serious issue-based summit diplomacy among concerned powers (and other actors such as corporations and NGOs) to get moving quickly on these questions rather than (or in parallel to) allowing things to drag through their course in cumbersome multilateral fora. This last point is crucial: the missing ingredient to a globalized grand strategy is the U.S. foreign policy community cleverly leveraging the strengths, activities, and global footprint of the U.S. private sector and NGO communities into what I call a diplomatic-industrial complex. It is in changing our foreign policy process, as much as some of the goals, that our success lies.

Second is the environment - Warming leads to environmental collapse through biodiversity loss, natural disasters, and destruction of water and food supplies.

IPCC ‘7 (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report”, 12/12-17, p. 26)KM

The resilience of many ecosystems is likely to be exceeded this century by an unprecedented combination of climate change, associated disturbances (e.g. flooding, drought, wildfire, insects, ocean acidification) and other global change drivers (e.g. landuse change, pollution, fragmentation of natural systems, overexploitation of resources). {WGII 4.1-4.6, SPM} Over the course of this century, net carbon uptake by terrestrial ecosystems is likely to peak before mid-century and then weaken or even reverse16, thus amplifying climate change. {WGII 4.ES, Figure 4.2, SPM} Approximately 20 to 30% of plant and animal species assessed so far are likely to be at increased risk of extinction if increases in global average temperature exceed 1.5 to 2.5°C (medium confidence). {WGII 4.ES, Figure 4.2, SPM} For increases in global average temperature exceeding 1.5 to 2.5°C and in concomitant atmospheric CO2 concentrations, there are projected to be major changes in ecosystem structure and function, species’ ecological interactions and shifts in species’ geographical ranges, with predominantly negative consequences for biodiversity and ecosystem goods and services, e.g. water and food supply. {WGII 4.4, Box TS.6, SPM}

Environmental collapse means human extinction.

Irish Times 02 (7/27,KM)

Such pleasure is probably the least important reason why biodiversity is a good thing: human survival is more to the point. Conservationists insist that biodiversity is basic to the Earth's life-support system and that the progressive loss of species - as in the current destruction of natural forest - could help destabilise the very processes by which the planet services our presence and wellbeing. Most ecologists, probably, go along with the idea that every species matters. Like rivets in an aeroplane, each has its own, small importance: let too many pop and things start to fly apart. But some are now arguing that since so many species seem to do much the same job, mere "species richness" may not be essential: so long as "keystone species" are identified and cared for, their ecosystems will probably still function.

PMC’s Bad – National Security

PMC’s compromise national security by taking over inherently governmental functions.

Isenberg 8 (David Isenberg, United Press International, May 9th, 2008 http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=15028) km

Second, on April 29 CorpWatch, an Oakland, Calif.–based group that investigates various corporate crimes, issued a report on L–3, a U.S. defense contractor that plays a key role in staffing and maintaining what was once considered an inherently governmental function: the acquisition and analysis of human intelligence during war. The company is now probably the second–largest U.S. contractor in Iraq, after Kellogg, Brown & Root. The report found that "there are significant problems with L-3's Iraq contracts, notably with the hiring and vetting practices of both interrogators and translators, many of who are unqualified or poorly qualified for the work. This failure has the potential to seriously compromise national security." While outsourcing of various military functions is now generally accepted as a given, some tasks, such as interrogation, are still considered to be a job for government, not private sector, employees. After all, in the aftermath of Abu Ghraib it was reported that the use of private contractors as interrogators there and in other prisons in Iraq violated an Army policy that requires such jobs to be filled by government employees because of the "risk to national security." An Army policy directive published in 2000 and still in effect today classifies any job that involves "the gathering and analysis" of tactical intelligence as "an inherently governmental function barred from private sector performance."

PMC’s endanger the mission – quality control.

Media Matters 6/21 (June 21, 2010, <http://mediamatters.org/research/201006210047>)KFC

KBR's faulty work in Iraq allegedly killed U.S. soldiers and civilian contractors. KBR, which received more than $24 billion in military contracts through May 2008 in exchange for performing a wide array of services related to the Iraq war, was allegedly responsible for the fatal electrocutions of 16 U.S. service members between the start of the war and October 2008 due to faulty electrical work. In July 2008, The New York Times reported that the Department of Defense ordered electrical inspections of all buildings in Iraq maintained by KBR because of the deaths. The Times reported in October 2008 that the Pentagon "rebuked its largest contractor in Iraq after a series of inspections uncovered shoddy electrical work and other problems on American military bases there." Additionally, in September 2006, a group of truckers who had worked for KBR provided congressional testimony against the company, claiming that its practices had unduly endangered them and contributed to the deaths of seven workers and two soldiers in an ambush.

PMC’s Bad – National Security

PMC’s are used in so many government functions that they compromise security and intelligence gathering.

Isenberg 10 (David Isenberg Author, Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq, June 2, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david–isenberg/are–private–contractors–t\_b\_597778.html)KM

We hear so much about the use of private military and security contractors by the Defense and State departments that it is easy to forget that outsourcing goes far beyond those two government departments. Private contractors are present in every aspect of government; constituting a fourth branch of government from homeland security to public diplomacy As a case in point nearly two years ago I reviewed Spies For Hire: The Secret World of Intelligence Outsourcing by Tim Shorrock; an excellent book on the intelligence community's use of private contractors. It is an important topic which does not receive the attention it merits so I was happy to see it discussed in this 2009 paper "Security outsourced: is it safe?" by Judit Nénye . Here is what she writes: But what happens if the work of such US governmental organizations as the CIA, the DIA (Defence Intelligence Agency), the NRO (National Reconnaissance Office) or the NSA (National Security Agency) is outsourced? Strange as it may seem at first sight, the US government spends on foreign and domestic intelligence about 60 billion USD each year, 42 billion USD of which was the cost of activities outsourced to private contractors in 2006. The number of contractors exceeds the CIA‟s full-time workforce of 17,500. In 2006 it was altogether 5,400 companies that sought to do business with CIA. The activity of NRO, responsible for the maintenance of reconnaissance satellites, is outsourced to contract employees of private companies. It is the most privatized part of the intelligence activity, controlling over 7 billion USD of the entire annual budget (which is about 8 billion). A case–study of such public–private partnerships can be Retired Admiral John Michael "Mike" McConnell, Director of National Intelligence (DNI) since February 2007. Beforehand, he was vice president and director of Booz Allen & Hamilton's Infrastructure Assurance Center of Excellence. He was also the former chair of the board of the Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA), the private intelligence industry‟s lobbying arm, of which Booz Allen & Hamilton is a founding member. One would expect a considerable rise in effectiveness to justify such a degree of outsourcing. However, it is not the case. The NSA was unable to analyze much of the gathered information in 2006. Only 5 % of it was translated from its digital form into text and sent for analysis. The rest was thrown away. The dependence of the government intelligence on private companies makes every phase of intelligence gathering, processing and preserving extremely vulnerable. Even one of the most sensitive U.S. intelligence documents, the Presidential Daily Briefing, is prepared in part by private companies, despite having the official seal of the U.S. intelligence apparatus! It is better not to think of how a private company could tamper intelligence and thus influence national or even international policy if its corporate interest requires so. Consequently, the same risks apply to the outsourcing of intelligence tasks as to the privatization of other military and security activities: impunity for abuse, lack of oversight (public or congressional), leakage of classified information and loss of such traditional professionalism that can only be formed in the course of long years of service – but in the service of state and not of corporate institutions. As Tim Shorrock points out, the joining of former intelligence officers to the private sector (and this phenomenon started in the early 1990s) means that the institutional memory of the United States intelligence community now resides in the private sector.

And, PMCs even control national security documents

Scahill 7 (Jeremy, Puffin Foundation Writing Fellow at The Nation Institute, is the author of the bestselling Blackwater, *The Independent,* Aug 10, http://www.uruknet.info/?p=35239 ) ET

Perhaps it is no surprise then that the current head of the DNI is Mike McConnell, the former chair of the board of the Intelligence and National Security Alliance, the private intelligence industry’s lobbying arm. Hillhouse also revealed that one of the most sensitive U.S. intelligence documents, the Presidential Daily Briefing, is prepared in part by private companies, despite having the official seal of the U.S. intelligence apparatus.

PMC’s Bad – Security Coalitions

PMCs turn any NATO NB – PMC’s undermine functions that should be exclusive to the state, rendering security coalitions obsolete.

Scahill 7 (Jeremy Scahill August 15, 2007 from Indypendent Website, http://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/sociopolitica/sociopol\_blackwater08.htm)KM

This unprecedented funding of such enterprises, primarily by the U.S. and U.K. governments, means that powers once the exclusive realm of nations are now in the hands of private companies with loyalty only to profits, CEOs and, in the case of public companies, shareholders. And, of course, their client, whoever that may be. CIA–type services, special operations, covert actions and small-scale military and paramilitary forces are now on the world market in a way not seen in modern history. This could allow corporations or nations with cash to spend but no real military power to hire squadrons of heavily armed and well–trained commandos. “It raises very important issues about state and about the very power of state. The one thing the people think of as being in the purview of the government — wholly run and owned by — is the use of military power,” says Rep. Jan Schakowsky. “Suddenly you’ve got a for-profit corporation going around the world that is more powerful than states, can effect regime possibly where they may want to go, that seems to have all the support that it needs from this administration that is also pretty adventurous around the world and operating under the cover of darkness. “It raises questions about democracies, about states, about who influences policy around the globe, about relationships among some countries. Maybe it’s their goal to render state coalitions like NATO irrelevant in the future, that they’ll be the ones and open to the highest bidder. Who really does determine war and peace around the world?”

PMC’s undermine the monopolization of force by states, undermining the credibility of international coalitions like the UN.

SALZMAN 9 (“PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE TAINT OF A MERCENARY” REPUTATION ZOE New York University School of Law INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:853 May 14, http://law.nyu.edu/ecm\_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu\_law\_website\_\_journals\_\_journal\_of\_international\_law\_and\_politics/documents/documents/ecm\_pro\_058877.pdf)KM

The monopolization of force by states allows states, at least in theory, to regulate the use of force under international law through Security Council sanctions, International Court of Justice decisions, and political and economic pressures on other states. If force is a commodity that can be bought and sold like any other, however, these limits are likely to become even less effective than they are now. The underlying concept of the United Nations system fails where there are powerful actors outside of the control of states in possession of the means of violence.

PMC’s Bad – Profit Motive

PMC’s are motivated by profit and work to prolong conflicts in order to maximize profit.

Charlier 10 (Afghanistan’s outsourced war Le Monde Diplomatique 02/09/2010 Marie–Dominique Charlier, http://www.e–ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allDocs/22DDA29D4BA662F7872576C5006FA59A?OpenDocument)KM

According to official sources in the French ministry of defence, the budget allocated to MPRI for drafting the ANA’s military doctrine is some $200m; the training of ANA troops will cost nearly $1.7bn. So the PMC’s have no interest in stabilising the situation or in the successful Afghanisation of the ANA. That would lessen the need for contractors, which would be against their financial interests. So they take great care not to pass on their knowledge, and prefer to deputise for Afghan organisations rather than giving them useful advice. Solidarity among PMC’s “General” Gulbahar, in charge of doctrine at the Afghan National Army Training Command’s doctrine office, says he has been given no target date for the handover of the drafting of ANA military doctrine to Afghan control. Gulbahar is not unhappy to be supervised: he is in fact a colonel serving in a position normally occupied by a general and has everything to lose by questioning the status quo. MPRI, therefore, has what amounts to a monopoly on the drafting of Afghan army doctrine, which allows it to justify the prolongation of its assisting role. But MPRI also shows solidarity with other PMC’s: the ANA’s logistical doctrine, drafted by MPRI, names DynCorp as the organisation responsible for providing logistics support to the ANA’s air corps, without specifying any restrictions or limitations on the duration of this role. The “training” element is highly profitable. The PMC’s are recruiting and training 800 instructors as part of a programme to combat illiteracy in the ANA, but their determination to secure the greatest possible return on investment has encouraged them to extend the duration of the training provided. It would seem that fostering the ANA’s own training capabilities is not a priority. The same applies to logistics (currently provided by RM Asia), another key element of the PMC monopoly: no deadlines have been set for the training of Afghan technicians. Here again, the financial interests of the PMC’s, which employ several thousand contract staff, differ from the military interests of ISAF: but they do not wish to see operational systems change too rapidly any more than they hope for a swift victory. They need to be able to influence events and, if necessary, to steer policy at the operational and strategic levels.

Instead of providing security, PMC’s profit from war

RT Politics 2010 (<http://rt.com/Politics/2010-01-06/afghanistan-gold-mine-security.html>, date accessed: 6/24/2010) AJK  
Private military companies are being criticized for profiteering from the conflict in Afghanistan while the number of deadly attacks keeps rising and the local population remains in an insecure environment. General Khatool Mohammadzai from the Afghan National Army notes, “This is war. President Karzai says it will take fifteen years for our army to be able to stand on its own. When the President talks, I know he has considered everything, so he must be right.” But does this mean for the next 15 years the country will be unstable until the government gets it right? That is the reason foreign security companies give to explain why they are in the country. At least 17 of them are operating in Afghanistan, including the infamous Blackwater, which was accused in 2007 of killing civilians in Iraq. Regardless, not even foreign contractors are still unable to prevent bomb explosions, so the feeling of fear and panic is everywhere. Yama Saifi, former owner of Shield Security Company, says that sentiment wasn’t around when it was his job to provide security for the cabinet. That was before the Taliban came to power and people then were not afraid of random suicide bombings like they are today. “I really don’t believe most foreign security companies are actually here to provide security. It is very clear they come here to make money. I am sure Afghan security companies can provide better security than them. And anyway, they use our people; it’s just that all the directors are from abroad,” thinks Yama Saifi. There are big bucks to be made in Afghanistan. Each of the hundreds of non-governmental organizations working in the country put aside between thirty and forty percent of their budget for security. Even the US army and foreign militaries use private security companies.

PMC’s Bad – Profit Motive

PMC’s are at their core profit driven corporations who will always seek to cut corners to maximize profit.

Isenberg 9 (David Isenberg, Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq, December 28, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david–isenberg/money–isnt–everything–its\_b\_405089.html)KM

One can argue about many different aspects of private contracting but you can't have an honest discussion unless you are willing to acknowledge the profit motive. To paraphrase the old sports quote, money isn't everything; it's the only thing. Trying to wrap private contractors in the Stars and Stripes as a way of describing their motivation is simply not credible. Those wanting detail on this should read this law journal article "Wrapping Themselves in the American Flag: The Alien Tort Statute, Private Military Contractors, and U.S. Foreign Relations. That is why it is important to ponder what Jake writes. Here is what he says: The first thing you need to understand is that the private security industry is made up of a group of for-profit corporations, businesses and individuals. Despite the fact that the term Private Military Company (PMC) contains the word 'military' there is almost nothing about the modern PMC which resembles the military. Certainly not in the areas of discipline, accountability, oversight, capability, capacity, troop welfare, tactical prowess or quality of leadership. Private security contracting is the ultimate game of market capitalism. It makes Wall Street competition look like a child's game. Private security contracting is a lion's den of ferocious and vicious cut–throat competition where the law of jungle is all that exists. Only the strongest survive and they will do by consuming the weak. I don't say this in a gratuitousness derogatory manner. I am just stating the facts as they are. Money, profit, the–bottom–line, what ever you choose to call them are the sole and driving force behind these businesses. While PMC’s will often cloak themselves in patriotic terms and talk about their contribution to the country's foreign policy this is all window dressing. Were they really and truly motivated by patriotism or service to country they would provide their services at a deep and significant discount in an effort to 'contribute' to the cause. But this is not the case and again I do not begrudge the companies for doing what companies do...making money. But have no illusions about their motivation as it will drive all their decision making and this may or may not be aligned with your own personal best interests. However, once you realize this and come to terms with the fact that in this industry money is always the primary and most cases the sole motivation for existence they are able to see other facts more clearly and learn to operate in a world which really has many unwritten codes but very few enforceable laws. The primary facts, the common laws of contracting if you like, are: No one person or even small group of contractors, no matter their tactical skills, will ever stand in the way of company profit. The clients needs and wishes will almost always trump contractor/employee requests or requirements because it is the client who pays the invoices which create the profit. Corners will be cut at every possible opportunity in an effort to reduce costs and thus increase profits. This will manifest itself in nearly every aspect of the operation from the equipment chosen, the maintenance cycles, the quality of the staff, staff training, the site, the facilities, the salaries, per diem, travel expenses, work rotations/shifts, etc, etc... Some companies are more egregious than others but all do this to some extent. Just remember, no matter what, the profit train is not one you want to jump out in front of as it will run over you every time. If you ever find yourself standing between your convictions on one hand and the impact to company profits on the other you better have your go-bag to hand because you're about to be placed on the next thing smoking and headed outta town. There may come a day when a company is formed which puts the well being of the employee and the client ahead of the all–mighty profit margin but to my knowledge that company does not currently exist. pp. 8–9.

Profit motive devolution of the military creates a world of perpetual war for money and a police state in the US.

Lendman 10 (“Outsourcing War – Rise Of Private Military Contractors (PMC’s)” Stephen Lendman 1–19–10, http://www.rense.com/general89/outs.htm)KM

5. Increasing PMC use also "raises some deep questions about the military itself." How do you retain the most talented combat troops when they can sell their skills for far greater pay? Also consider the uniqueness of the military. "It is the only profession that has its own court system, its own laws; the only profession that has its own grocery stores and separate bases;" its own pensions and other benefits for those staying around long enough to qualify. So what happens when it's transformed into a business with profit the prime motive? Simple - more wars, greater profits. The same idea as privatizing prisons – more prisoners, fatter bottom line. Another consideration is also worrisome. Given America's imperial ambitions, global dominance, permanent war agenda, and virtual disregard for the law, public distrust is growing for politicians who never earned it in the first place. Given the Pentagon's transformation since 1991, the number of services it privatized, and America's permanent war agenda, what will conditions be in another decade or a few years? How much more prominent will PMC’s be? How much more insecurity will result? How soon will it be before hordes of them are deployed throughout America as enforcers in civilian communities outside of conflict zones, with as much unaccountability here as abroad? What will the nation be like if it happens?

PMC’s Bad – Profit Motive

And, PMCs are in it for profit

Khan 2 (Mafruza, Associate Director of Corporate Research Project ,*Good Jobs First*, 17 Dec) ET

Some question the propriety of selling military services for profit, particularly because of the strong links that exist between the U.S government and the PMCs that contract with them. As Defense Secretary, Dick Cheney helped command the Gulf War and launched into one of the largest privatization efforts in the history of the Pentagon. The Pentagon, under his leadership, also paid KBR (then known as Brown and Root Services) $3.9 million to produce a classified report detailing how private companies, like itself, could help provide logistics for American troops in potential was zones around the world. Soon after he left his federal job, Cheney joined KBR parent Halliburton. More recently, as the war on terrorism has brought significant additional business for KBR, the company categorically stated that Mr. Cheney played no role in helping the company win the contracts.

PMC’s Bad – Covert Ops Bad

PMC’s change warfare and allow for covert operations that ignore the will of the population.

Boggs 8 (Carl Boggs, 4–1–2008, “Privatized” Militarism: A New Era? http://www.uta.edu/huma/agger/fastcapitalism/4\_1/boggs.html)KM

Aside from questions of privatization, secrecy, and immunity from prosecution, the PMC hiring of mercenary soldiers (where that takes place) means that personnel killed and wounded do no enter the overall casualty count, keeping these costs of war hidden from public view. Statistics on PMC killed and wounded are elusive at best, one report (in August 2008) estimating more than 1200 deaths.[13] When this reality is added to contractors’ ability to operate largely outside rules of engagement, the logic behind the illegality of mercenaries contained in the Geneva Conventions becomes evident. Revelations by Scahill, Silverstein, Singer, and others about PMC activity have broadened public awareness about how the U.S. nowadays goes about its military operations. The picture, as we have seen, is not a pretty one. Cusack is surely correct in stating that “what we have here is a protectionist racket” whose managers “should be sent to prison.”[14] And it might be possible, as Scahill argues, that “with an adventurous president in the White House, mercenaries could enable an endless parade of invasions, covert operations, occupations, coups d’etat – all with layers of bureaucratic protections, plausible deniability, and disregard for the will (or lack thereof) of the population.” Scahill 2007: 366)

PMC’s Bad – Fraud

PMC’s commit fraud – monetary and through stealing

Media Matters 6/21 (June 21, 2010, <http://mediamatters.org/research/201006210047>)KFC

DOD audits of KBR's Iraq and Afghanistan contract found at least $3.2 billion in questioned and $1.5 billion in unsupported costs. The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) –– a Department of Defense agency that audits Pentagon contracts –– presented a report in May 2009 on its audits of KBR's contract for troop support in Iraq and Afghanistan, which found more than $3.2 billion in questioned costs and $1.5 billion in unsupported costs out of $28.7 billion in audited task orders claimed under the contract. DCAA suspended or disapproved more than $553 million in costs claimed by KBR through the contract. Blackwater accused of taking weapons designated for Afghan police. During a February 24 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, Sen. Carl Levin stated that Blackwater had acquired, without any apparent authorization, hundreds of weapons from a U.S.–operated facility that stores weapons and ammunition for use by the Afghan National Police. Levin said that in one transfer of weapons, "[r]eceipts show that the guns were issued to an 'Eric Cartman' or 'Carjman' from 'BW CNTU' –– shorthand for Blackwater, Counter Narcotics Training Unit. ... In a February 4, 2010 letter to the Committee, a lawyer for Blackwater said it has no records of a person named Eric Cartman or Carjman having ever been employed by the company." Eric Cartman is the name of a character in the TV show South Park.

And more examples of PMC fraud.

Media Matters 6/21 (June 21, 2010, <http://mediamatters.org/research/201006210047>)KFC

A Halliburton worker pleaded guilty to taking kickbacks on Iraqi subcontracts. According to an August 23, 2005, Washington Post article, Glenn Allen Powell, a KBR employee in Iraq from October 2003 to January 2005, "admitted to taking 20 percent off the top of a subcontract, or more than $110,000." The Post also noted: "While the scheme was ongoing, KBR had been unwittingly billing the U.S. government an inflated amount for reimbursement because of the 20 percent kickback. The difference has since been refunded."KBR employee pleaded guilty to participating in kickback scheme with a Kuwaiti contractor. In July 2007, the Houston Chronicle reported that former KBR employee Anthony Martin "pleaded guilty to participating in a kickback scheme related to the award of a $4.7 million contract in 2003 to a Kuwaiti firm, the Department of Justice said." The Chronicle reported that Martin told a federal jury that in 2003, "he worked with the manager of the Kuwaiti firm to hide more than $50,000 in kickbacks within a subcontract for heavy trucks and refrigerator trailers."

PMC’s Bad – War

PMC involvement perpetuates war – governments of rising nations choose cheap brute force over expensive peace settlements.

Beutel 5 (PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES: THEIR EMERGENCE, IMPORTANCE, AND A CALL FOR GLOBAL REGULATION by M. Dee Beutel A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Norwich University, June 2005, http://princess.digitalfreaks.org/thesis/beutelmdthesis.pdf)KM

The PMC’s’ involvement in the continually conflicted regions of the world provides states with the easy answer of buying military force rather then seeking expensive or complicated peace building policies. Regardless of the wishes of the sponsoring government, these private contractors have no desire to pause and seek peace as they are employed by combat. However, in these deep-rooted conflicts between nations, the answer is not going to be illuminated by a continual cycle of death. The repeated use of private contractors allows for the malevolence within the region to continue rather than forcing alternative issues to the table.188 Neither the major world powers nor the local governments are under pressure for a long term solution to the problem when it is clear that the option of force will always be present.189 The departure of a PMC leaves the hiring government in an uncomfortable situation regarding sovereignty. The state wishes to maintain and control its newly won (or reclaimed) country; the tools that it has used to gain control, and may need to continue to use to maintain control, are that of an outside corporation which has no obligation or accountability to the state once the terms of a given contract have been fulfilled.190 The use of PMC’s does not assist states with conflict resolution nor does it address any of the underlying issues; it simply places a band-aid on the unresolved internal strife. In order to make the use of force beneficial, a plan for reconciliation must be ready for implementation with the international community’s support. It must address the underlying causes of the conflict, not simply finance a PMC to provide stopgap solutions.191

PMC’s are bad – destroys efficiency and makes conflict worse

Jennings 6 (Kathleen, Researcher M.Phil in Politics, St. Antony's College, University of Oxford, www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/532/532.pdf, AD: 6/22/10) jl

The efficiency argument is perhaps the easiest for PMC sceptics to rebut. Indeed, we have seen above that, even for those not wholly opposed to the use of PMC’s, it is not difficult to challenge the assertion that using private contractors leads to greater efficiency and savings (see for example Bouckaert & Pollitt 2000l Avant 2000; Singer 2004b; Holmqvist 2005). The distortion of the private military market neutralise or disproves many of the assumptions underlying the economic efficiency argument.

Critical analysts also content that the effectiveness argument – that is , that PMC’s are decisive in ending wars – is overstated. Examining the involvement of Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone in the 1990s, Spear (2006) writes that EO provided short-term tactical successes that bought breathing space for the government, but notes that it was ultimately unable to comprehensively defeat the rebels of the Revolutionary United Front and lay the proper groundwork for peace to be negotiated and sustained. Her conclusion brings together several key points:

Because PMC’s can do very little to solve the root problems that underlie the conflict, they may in fact worsen the situation...PMC’s are employed as a temporary solution to problems that have much deeper and more challenging roots, and which therefore remain unresolved at a fundamental level even if events at the surface–level seem settled. The primary benefit of PMC’s therefore seems to be that they can provide a beleguered government with a 'strategic pause', which can be vital for a government on the edge of collapse... [T]he medium to long-term effects of PMC operation is to undermine the reconstitution of state effectiveness, primarily through the violence unleashed by reversion to the military option combined with the decreased perception of the government as the provider of security (Spear 2006: 40).

PMC’s Bad – War

Growing influence of PMC’s allows them to unleash global instability

Pieterse 4 (Jan Nederveen Pieterse is professor of sociology at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign Neoliberal Empire Theory, Culture & Society 2004 (SAGE, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi), Vol. 21(3): 119–140 TBC 6/24/10)

One of the implications of neoliberal empire is that distinctions between public and private domains have eroded; the public domain is privatized. What matters is not merely the link between threat and profit and war and business, but what kind of business: privileging military contractors means that the US economy has become uncompetitive. The military-industrial complex has been a major source of distortion (as in the economic shift from the Frost Belt to the Sunbelt and the consequent rise of the conservative South) and structural inequality in the American economy and politics. The growing role of private military contractors who operate outside national and international law implies that private actors can unleash global instability or global crisis.

PMC dependency will perpetuate and intensify any war and create instability.

Thurer and Maclaren 7 (DANIEL THÜRER & MALCOLM MACLAREN\* Military Outsourcing as a Case Study in the Accountability and Responsibility of Power”, The Law of International Relations - Liber Amicorum Hanspeter Neuhold, p 353, http://www.ivr.uzh.ch/lstthuerer/forschung/FSNeuholdt.pdf)KM

The potentially adverse effects of PMC’s’ growing power on the international system, national societies, and the rule of law are manifold and serious, as the incidents cited at the outset indicate. An uncontrolled military industry: poses a threat to world peace and stability by accelerating the end of the exclusive entitlement of states to use force in international relations. Normative concerns that led states to establish this pillar of the modern international system in the aftermath of the Thirty Years War and to try to end the use of mercenaries in the 20th century remain relevant. State control is the most effective means of limiting violence and its loss might well lead to an increase in the incidence and intensity of confl ict, by rendering recourse to arms easier, by providing additional means with which to fi ght and by making equilibrium between the confl ict parties harder to reach.17 In particular, there is the danger that PMC’s could aid a corrupt regime in suppressing a people’s right to self-determination or lend support to rebels, warlords, organized criminals, and terrorists in undermining legitimate regimes; that the growth of the private military industry might weaken the enforceability of arms control / reduction agreements through the resultant links between PMC’s and armed forces; and fi nally, that the employment of PMC’s will lead to small arms proliferation and contribute to greater instability in particular areas.18

PMC’s Bad – War

The use of PCMs for war is bad- hurts human rights and encourages prolongued violence for profit

Hynes 10 (Patricia- Pres of NY bar association, *War Times,*1/8/10) ET

After 9/11 one of the few sectors to enjoy growth was the young market niche of private military contractors, known as “privatized military companies” or PMC’s. These are lean, nimble global companies formed and managed in many cases by former military men and specialized in armed conflict services. They offer "expertise" for combat in conventional and counterinsurgency warfare; intelligence and spying; war logistics and strategy; training militaries and operating drones; building and servicing military bases; post-war de-mining operations and peacekeeping. Their clients include governments of all ilk from “democratic” to “rogue,” the UN and NGOs, rebel groups, paramilitaries and drug cartels. Sometimes they contract with both sides of a conflict. Some garner business concessions in oil and natural resources in client countries, thus the cachet of conflict in resource-rich countries. According to Allison Stanger, author of One Nation Under Contract (2009), PMC’s have made the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan possible, given the low support of Allies. Stanger observes that the core pillars of national security – intelligence, diplomacy, development and defense - are increasingly handled by private contractors, a troubling trend unremarked by most Americans. Peter Singer of the Brookings Institute generated a detailed taxonomy of their militarized services and case examples of their clients and covert activities in his book Corporate Warriors (2003). He raises many vital concerns about the impact of war profiteering by military mercenaries - namely the jeopardizing of human rights in war, the increased traffic in arms, the profit motive as stimulant for armed conflict, and little public scrutiny.

PMC’s cause the government to start more conflicts- less political backlash

Boemcken 3 ( Marc Von,  BICC's Project Leader in the field of arms, *Peace and Conflict Monitor*, Dec 13) ET

Maybe the figure will be even much higher. With an incessantly rising body count of US soldiers in Iraq paralleled by a growing unpopularity of the Bush administration, the prospect of further accelerating the privatization of military tasks in the Gulf may appear to behold some distinct advantages. Outsourcing the provision of security in Iraq to private companies could give the US government a much-needed exit-strategy, thus avoiding a strenuous entanglement of American soldiers. The death of private employees generally attracts a lot less media attention than the killing of soldiers wearing US uniforms (see Yeoman, 2003). Indeed, given the approaching presidential elections, such concerns are likely to be high on the administration's agenda. In particular, PMCs can be expected to be heavily involved in Iraqi security sector reform. Halliburton's contract in Iraq has already been extended to January 2004 (Margasak, 2003). And the controversial company DynCorp, which was allegedly implicated in the sex and arms trade on the Balkans and is presently also providing close protection for Afghan President Hamid Karzai, was tasked to train the Iraqi police force. More contracts of a similar nature are likely to follow suit in due course. Other corporate consultants are reportedly going to facilitate the build-up of the new Iraqi military (Singer, 2003b). Moreover, in the long run, the increasing employment of PMCs by the Pentagon could considerably lessen the United States' inhibitions concerning the use of force in many other areas of the world, since the political risks associated with such operations are much lower.

PMC’s Bad – War

PMC’s are economically inclined to perpetuate instability to make more profits – this outweighs any short term gains they bring.

SALZMAN 9 (“PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE TAINT OF A MERCENARY” REPUTATION ZOE New York University School of Law INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:853 May 14, http://law.nyu.edu/ecm\_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu\_law\_website\_\_journals\_\_journal\_of\_international\_law\_and\_politics/documents/documents/ecm\_pro\_058877.pdf)KM

Similarly, there is often a vast difference between the public good that the state’s use of force is meant to achieve and the private good that is the desired result for a PMC.118 A PMC is a corporation and, like any other corporation, it “work[s] for the shareholder . . . [and its] job is to go out and make the most money for those people.”119 Unlike a state, which is under pressure to resolve conflicts, there is little incentive for private contractors to encourage the resolution of the conflicts120 that motivated their hire in the first place. Thus, when military force is sold as a commodity on the market, there is a risk that private contractors, who “directly benefit from the existence of war and suffering,”121 will aggravate a conflict situation in order to keep their profits high.122 For example, “[t]here have. . .been allegations that Halliburton has run additional but unnecessary supply convoys through Iraq because it gets paid by the trip”—a clear case of a company’s incentive to turn a higher profit leading it to risk aggravating the conflict.123 In sum, “[s]oldiers serve their country; contractors serve their managers and shareholders.”124 Nevertheless, a PMC does have reputational concerns that generally encourage it to perform its contract successfully, which in many cases may help resolve the conflict.125 Even if their participation can sometimes assist in the immediate, short-term resolution of a given conflict, however, on a broader level contractors can “worsen the conditions for long-term stability.”126 Private contractors can be used to “help prop up rogue regimes, resist struggles for self-determination, and contribute to the proliferation and diffusion of weaponry and soldiers around the world—axiomatically a destabilizing and thus undesirable phenomenon.”127 In addition, private contractors sometimes remain in a country after the conflict (and their contract) has ended. This happened in Sierra Leone, where the government paid for the contractors’ services in mining subsidiaries, leading the PMC Executive Outcomes to retain a militarized presence in Sierra Leone long after its contract had ended in order to protect these mining assets.128 This militarized presence destabilized the already vulnerable country by creating a parallel force that ultimately became a challenge to the national army.129

PMC’s thrive in conflict – their profit motive privatized force means any peace is impossible.

SALZMAN 9 (“PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE TAINT OF A MERCENARY” REPUTATION ZOE New York University School of Law INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:853 May 14, http://law.nyu.edu/ecm\_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu\_law\_website\_\_journals\_\_journal\_of\_international\_law\_and\_politics/documents/documents/ecm\_pro\_058877.pdf)KM

Zarate suggests that PMCs’ links to other companies are not of concern, because these links “give [the PMCs] an economic stake in the peace and stability of a country and region.” 133 According to Zarate, no business can profit in chaos.134 This reasoning assumes, however, that the public good and the private good are one and the same. Clearly, businesses often thrive in the midst of conflict and chaos: From conflict diamonds to oil, history has shown us that conflict and profit frequently go hand in hand, and that the private good of profit can all too easily eclipse the public good of peace and security. Nowhere is a company’s profit more explicitly linked to chaos and conflict than in the private military industry, which would quickly cease to exist in the event of world peace.

PMC’s Bad – Conflict Escalation

PMC’s make every conflict escalate faster – they prompt first strikes and free market arms races

Singer 2 (P.W. Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution. Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security International Security 26.3 186-220 TBC 6/26/10)

The privatized military industry lies beyond any one state's control. Further, the layering of market uncertainties atop the already-thorny issue of net assessment creates a variety of complications for determining the balance of power, particularly in regional conflicts. Calculating a rival's capabilities or force posture has always been difficult. In an open market, where the range of options is even more variable, likely outcomes become increasingly hard to discern. As the Serbs, Eritreans, Rwandans, and Ugandans (whose opponents hired PMFs prior to successful offensives) all learned, not only can once-predictable deterrence relationships rapidly collapse, but the involvement of PMFs can quickly and perhaps unexpectedly tilt local balances of power. In addition, arms races could move onto the open market and begin to resemble instant bidding wars. (In the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, a new spin on the traditional arms race emerged when both countries competed first on the global military leasing market before taking to the battlefield.) The result is that the pace of the race is accelerated, and "first-mover" advantages are heightened. Indeed such changes could well influence the likelihood of war initiation. 57 Conventional arms control is also made more difficult with the existence of this market, because actual force capacities can be lowered without reducing the overall threat potential.

PMC’s Bad – Lower The Cost Of War

Military privatization lowers the cost of war, making economic power deadly

Singer 2 (P.W. Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution. Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security International Security 26.3 186-220 TBC 6/26/10)

The military privatization phenomenon means that military resources are available on the open market. Where once the creation of a military force required huge investments in both time and resources, today the entire spectrum of conventional forces can be obtained in a matter of weeks, if not days. The barriers to acquiring military strength are thus lowered, making power more fungible than ever. For example, economically rich but population-poor states such as those in the Persian Gulf now hire PMFs to achieve levels of power well beyond what they otherwise could. The same holds for new states and even nonstate groups that lack the institutional support or expertise to build capable military forces. With the help of PMFs, not only can clients add to their existing military forces and obtain highly specialized capacities (e.g., expertise in information warfare), but they may even be able to skip a whole generation of war skills. The result, however, may be a return to the dynamics of sixteenth-century Europe, where wealth and military capability went hand in hand: Pecunia nervus belli (Money nourishes war). 55 This ability to transform money into force also means a renewal of Kantian fears over the dangers of lowering the costs of war. Economic assets can now be rapidly transformed into military threats, making economic power more threatening, which runs contrary to liberalist assumptions Likewise, modern liberalism tends to assume only what is positive about the profit motive. It views the spread of capitalism and globalism as diminishing the incentives for [End Page 209] violent conflict and the rise of global civil society as an immutable good thing. 56 The emergence of a new type of private transnational firm that relies instead on the existence of conflict for its profits counters the assumption that nonstate actors are generally peace orientated.

PMC’s profit-based mindset leads to the hiring of foreigners – they’re dying for a US cause, and the lowered political costs of war resulting from this make war more popular

Krauss 6 (Alexander, researcher at International Peace Bureau, http://www.ipb.org/Private%20Military%20Contractors%20by%20Alex%20Krauss.pdf ) GAT

Thirdly, when the US initiates a war, it is the US government that should carry all aspects of the costs of a war: economically, politically, and the human cost of casualties. The Pentagon however hires, funds, and gives orders to PMCs, and the PMCs in turn function as corporations concerned with their bottom line budget. This has led to most PMCs hiring mercenaries from Latin America, Africa, and other less-developed regions due to the cheap labor costs. In this respect it is then foreigners dying for a US cause, which raises an essential moral question. Both democracy and common sense would dictate that, if a country begins a war, it should have to bear the burden. It can be argued PMCs have also led to a lower level of resistance and opposition to recent wars, and within the US they have undoubtedly reduced the political costs of going to war, since less casualties must be carried by the initiating country.

PMC’s Bad – Prolong and Cause Wars

PMC’s prolong and cause wars – financial incentives

Singer 2 (P.W. Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution. Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security International Security 26.3 186-220 TBC 6/26/10)

Another difficulty is the firms' focus on the bottom line: PMFs may be tempted to cut corners to increase their profits. No matter how powerful the client, this risk cannot be completely eliminated. During the Balkans conflict, for example, Brown & Root is alleged to have failed to deliver or severely overcharged the U.S. Army on four out of seven of its contractual obligations. 43 A further manifestation of this monitoring difficulty is the danger that PMFs may not perform their missions to the fullest. PMFs have incentives not only to prolong their contracts but also to avoid taking undue risks that might endanger their own corporate assets. The result may be a protracted conflict that perhaps could have been avoided if the client had built up its own military forces or more closely monitored its private agent. This was certainly true of mercenaries in the Biafra conflict in the 1970s, and many suspect that this was also the case with PMFs in the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict in 1997-99. In the latter instance, the Ethiopians essentially leased a small but complete air force from the Russian aeronautics firm Sukhoi--including Su-27 jet fighter planes, pilots, and ground staff. Some contend, though, that this private Russian force failed to prosecute the war fully--for example, by rarely engaging Eritrea's air force, which itself was rumored to have hired Russian and Ukrainian pilots. 44

PMC’s Bad – Outsourcing War Bad

Outsourcing the war bad- 8 reasons

Singer 7 (Peter, <http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/1007militarycontractors.aspx>, date accessed: 6/27/2010) AJK  
Iraq, the clear pattern shows that military outsourcing:  Lets policymakers dodge tough, politically costly decisions, which makes for bad operational choices. Since the end of the Vietnam War, the United States has sought to ensure that there's a link between the public and the costs of war, so that good decisions would be made and an ethos of responsibility fostered. With about half our operation in Iraq in private hands, that link has been jeopardized. Encourages a "bigger is better" approach to operations, contrary to the best lessons of U.S. military strategy. Turning logistics and operations into a for-profit endeavor helped feed the "Green Zone mentality" of having Americans huddle inside sprawling bases in Iraq. Bigger bases may yield bigger profits for the private firms, but they also entail an isolation that runs counter to everything your field commander, Gen. David H. Petraeus, told us we need to win a counterinsurgency campaign in the new Army-Marine Corps manual he helped write.   Inflames popular opinion about the U.S. mission. Even when no one gets hurt, the standard tactics used by Blackwater and other private military firms ignore the fundamental lessons of counterinsurgency warfare. Of course, not all contractors are "cowboys" or "mercenaries," as they are often described; many are talented ex-soldiers (for whose training we are now being doubled-billed, but that's another memo). But their "job," as Prince put it at the hearings, is quite different from the broader mission. Focused only on their contract, the private firms' standard practices include driving their convoys up the wrong side of the road, ramming civilian vehicles, tossing smoke bombs and opening fire with machine guns as warnings. As one contractor hired to guard U.S. officials put it, "Our mission is to protect the principal at all costs. If that means pissing off the Iraqis, too bad." Produces a series of abuses that undermine efforts to win Iraqi hearts and minds. The pattern of contractors hurting or killing civilians extends back to 2003, involving everything from prisoner abuse and "joyride" shootings to an alleged incident in which a drunken Blackwater contractor shot dead the bodyguard of Iraq's vice president after the two got into an argument inside the Green Zone on Christmas Eve 2006. Hurts American efforts in the "war of ideas," in Iraq and beyond. As one Iraqi official explained, even before the recent shootings: "They are part of the reason for all the hatred that is directed at Americans because people don't know them as Blackwater, they know them only as Americans. They are planting hatred because of these irresponsible acts." The recent shootings were covered extensively across the wider Muslim world, yet again hammering U.S. attempts at public diplomacy. Undermines efforts to build up Iraqi civilian institutions, the very things we need to get our troops out. Iraqi officials say that recent incidents have "embarrassed the government," making it seem as if the contractors were above the law. As one Iraqi soldier said of Blackwater: "They are more powerful than the government. No one can try them. Where is the government in this?" Creates huge vulnerabilities that undermine the overall mission. When the insurgency flared dramatically in 2004, contractor convoys suspended operations, leading one retired U.S. Army general to describe our military supply system as a "house of cards." When the Iraqis recently banned Blackwater, it wasn't just the firm that stopped operations for five days; so, in effect, did all U.S. diplomatic and intelligence efforts in Iraq, because they were completely reliant on Blackwater guards to leave the Green Zone. Forces policymakers to jettison promising counterinsurgency strategies before they even have a chance to succeed. The success or failure of the troop "surge" hinges on senior U.S. officials' ability to pressure the Iraqi government to share power more effectively and reach other political benchmarks. Instead of doing so, you and President Bush are now having to ask for Iraqi help and understanding to clean up the aftermath of the Blackwater fiasco.

PMC’s Bad – Rape

PMC’s have a history of raping young children

Isenberg 4/21 (David, Huffington Post, April 21, 2010, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david–isenberg/pmc–and–sex–crimes\_b\_546169.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/pmc-and-sex-crimes_b_546169.html))KFC

My first thought is how is it that some contractors can't seem to keep it in their pants? This is an issue that seems to keep happening over the years; from the days when DynCorp contractors were involved in a sex trafficking scandal in Bosnia when employees and supervisors engaged in sex with 12 to 15 year old children, and sold them to each other as slaves to the gang–rape of Jamie Leigh Jones a former KBR employee who claimed that seven KBR employees drugged and gang–raped her on July 28, 2005 at Camp Hope, Baghdad, Iraq. For those who like to dismiss such things as isolated occurrences just head on over to the "Rape, Hazing, Discrimination & Harassment" section of Ms, Sparky's blog and you will be promptly disabused of such a notion. In fact the situation is serious enough that the sexual assault of employees of U.S. military contractors working in Iraq and Afghanistan will be tracked by the Pentagon under a system it is setting up. Evidently the fact that the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) declares that sexual assault committed by the Armed Forces and DOD civilians and contractors accompanying Armed Forces in contingency operations is a criminal offense that is punishable by court-martial is not enough to keep assaults from happening. The IG report reviewed contracts that support Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom for language in clauses that address the prevention of sexual assault or harassment of or by contractor personnel. It also determined whether DOD and/or DOD contractors provided sexual assault/harassment prevention and response training to contractor employees prior to deployment. What it found was: That of the 10 DOD contractors reviewed, 8 did not have policies or training requirements for sexual assault prevention and response. This condition occurred because contractual requirements were not established to ensure that contractors were aware of DOD's definition of sexual assault or that contractors should report sexual assault complaints to Military law enforcement during contingency operations. In addition, sexual assault prevention and response policy was not applied to contractors and contractors were not required to complete such training as part of theater–specific individual requirements training. The Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7, and Air Force contracting officers did not provide adequate oversight of contractor deployment training for sexual assault prevention and response. This condition occurred because the Kellogg, Brown, and Root Services, Inc. Continental United States Replacement Center (CRC) and Fluor Corporation CRC operations were inappropriately approved, despite the contractors' sexual assault awareness and reporting training not meeting the minimum training requirements. Further, contractor employees were processed through pre–deployment sites without ensuring that sexual assault prevention and response training was completed.

PMC’s risk overthrowing host governments and taking advantage of legal ambiguity for things like rape.

Beutel 5 (PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES: THEIR EMERGENCE, IMPORTANCE, AND A CALL FOR GLOBAL REGULATION by M. Dee Beutel A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Norwich University, June 2005, http://princess.digitalfreaks.org/thesis/beutelmdthesis.pdf)KM

A further fear is that the PMC will gain sovereign control over the state, leaving the current government as nothing but a puppet. Tim Spicer, the former CEO of Sandline, denies that such a thing could ever happen due to the small deployment of contractors to any given conflict situation. Since so few troops are active, PMC’s do not have enough muscle on the ground to dictate national policy.197 This reassurance does not address the situations where almost full armies worth of troops are deployed. In the current Iraq War, contractors are the second largest force, surpassing even the United Kingdom. Under these rapidly changing conditions, reassurances from only five years ago lack conviction. Spicer also offers reassurance that PMC’s hold themselves to local and global laws.198 While this may have been true for Sandline, DynCorp has proven this to be a fallacy. A concern in hiring mercenaries is that the selected soldiers would be unstable, a group of sadists, and misfits. This apprehension led to the large PMC’s’ assurances that they can provide vetted, stable soldiers.199 DynCorp disgraced this process when its contractors established a sex ring in Bosnia. This is a well established PMC that provides protection to major figures in Afghanistan, as well as State Department employees, and is active in Latin America. In 2002 two employees of DynCorp accused their co-workers of keeping underage women as sex slaves, video taping rapes, and the trafficking of women. Some of these women were as young as 13 years old trapped in the situation as the DynCorp contractors confiscated their passports. After the scandal broke, the soldiers involved were simply fired and sent home. They were outside of military justice as they were not part of the military, and used their position as military contractors to avoid local law as well. Outside of firing the whistleblowers and the offenders, DynCorp ignored the incident all together.200

PMC’s Bad – Genocide/Terrorism

PMC’s fail to install ethical standards in training and create trained genocidal forces.

Beutel 5 (PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES: THEIR EMERGENCE, IMPORTANCE, AND A CALL FOR GLOBAL REGULATION by M. Dee Beutel A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Norwich University, June 2005, http://princess.digitalfreaks.org/thesis/beutelmdthesis.pdf)KM

Even the most professional of companies are careful of public fear and perception; MPRI does everything it can to avoid being labeled a mercenary. Tom Marks, a writer for Soldier of Fortune, views this overly cautious attitude in a very derogatory manner. “They’re a glorified transportation corps, as opposed to a military outfit. They’re like the FedEx of government service.”196 Yet it was this “glorified transportation corps” that became affiliated with ethnic cleansing in Croatia. There are few labels worse than “mercenary;” “Ethnic cleansing” is one of them. Training a military to the standards of the developed world when the country does not have a history of upholding humanitarian rights is risky. Additionally, bringing a military force to a level of training and technology that its neighbors do not possess is dangerous to the stability of the region. In Croatia, the United States and MPRI were irresponsible in their training of the national armed forces that promptly returned to the ideas of ethnic cleansing. The last thing the world needs is well–equipped, well–trained armies who believe genocide is acceptable. The Rwandan genocide took place with machetes, sticks, and handmade weapons. If they had been a trained force, rather than an unruly mob, their efficiency would have been even more devastating.

PMC’s are the Al Capone of Afghan – they terrorize Afghan citizens.

Gaston 8 (E. L., J.D Harvard Law School, Harvard International Law Journal, 49 (1), pg 229, <http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/HARVARDILJ_mercenarism.pdf>)KFC

Much of the controversy surrounding PMSCs has been due to frequent reports of unpunished criminal misconduct, human rights abuses, and potential war crimes by PMSC personnel. In the 1990s, DynCorp employees hired to represent the U.S. contingent in the U.N. Police Task Force in Bosnia were involved in a sex-trafficking scandal.33 During many of its oper- ations in Africa, the private military firm Executive Outcomes was criticized for using cluster bombs and other military methods that were questionable under international humanitarian law.34 In the context of PMSC involve- ment in Iraq, security contractors employed as interrogators by CACI Inter- national and Titan were involved in the Abu Ghraib prison abuses.35 A few months after Abu Ghraib, a video surfaced on the Internet showing Aegis contractors on patrol in Iraq apparently arbitrarily shooting at Iraqi civil- ians.36 In February 2007, a former CIA contractor named David Passaro was convicted in U.S. federal court for beating an Afghan prisoner to death.37 In the fall of 2007, Blackwater contractors came under heavy fire for the appar- ently unjustified killing of 17 Iraqi civilians in September 2007 while they were providing mobile convoy protection for USAID employees.38 Investiga- tions spurred by this Blackwater incident revealed evidence of even more widespread, and perhaps unjustified, attacks against Iraqi civilians or Iraqi civilian property.39 Beyond these more serious incidents of abuse, many have argued that PMSC contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan generally treated local civilians disrespectfully and exacerbated local hostility to coalition operations.40 As one journalist described it, Blackwater’s thugs with guns now push and punch Iraqis who get in their way: Kurdish journalists twice walked out of a Bremer press con- ference because of their mistreatment by these men. . . . [T]here is a disturbing increase in reports that mercenaries are shooting down inno- cent Iraqis with total impunity.41 In Afghanistan, the PMSC originally hired to protect Afghan President Hamid Karzai, DynCorp, was fired because of repeated incidents of disre- spect or abuse to local Afghans.42 The fact that DynCorp actually suffered some financial repercussions for misconduct on the Karzai contract is nota- ble because for most incidents PMSCs and their employees have suffered no legal or financial consequences. Of the thousands of PMSC contractors that have served in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001, only one has ever been prosecuted.43

PMC’s Bad – Bad people

PMC’s are staffed by people like the KGB and Apartheid security forces and cannot be prosecuted

Singer 2 (P.W. Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution. Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security International Security 26.3 186-220 TBC 6/26/10)

There may also be an adverse selection mechanism at work in the industry that attracts disreputable players looking for the cover of legitimacy. PMFs provide a new outlet for individuals who may be naturally drawn to mercenary work or have been forced out of the public sphere. It is not reassuring, for example, that many of the major actors in the Iran-Contra illegal arms trade and the BCCI bank fraud scandals are currently affiliated with the industry. As employers, PMFs want to hire individuals who will be effective, even if this sometimes means casting a blind eye on past human rights abuses. As a result, many members of the most ruthless military and intelligence units once affiliated with either the communist regime in the Soviet Union or the apartheid regime in South Africa have found employment in the industry. Even when firms scrupulously screen prospective employees (which is easier said than done, given that most CVs do not have an "atrocities committed" section), it is still difficult to monitor troops in the field. If employees do commit violations, there is little incentive for firms to report them. A firm that does so risks scaring off both clients and prospective employees. The ultimate problem with PMFs is that they diffuse responsibility. Questions about who monitors, regulates, and punishes employees or companies that go astray are still to be fully answered. That many of these firms are chartered in offshore accounts complicates matters even further. Traditionally, a state's security institutions are responsible for enforcing the laws within its sovereign territory. However, it is usually the very weakness of these institutions that results in the hire of a PMF. Furthermore, even if external legal action or sanction were attempted, it is doubtful whether any firm would ever allow its employees to be tried in a weak client state's judicial system. 71 Moreover, even when a PMF operates with good intent, there is no assurance that its employees and their military skills will not be used in ways unanticipated by either the PMF or its client. For example, a number of soldiers in the Croatian army who received MPRI military training subsequently resigned to join the rebel Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Among those who resigned was the KLA's commander. Many of these same soldiers have since become involved in the Macedonian conflict across the border. In sum, privatization provides no greater assurance of moral military behavior. It may even produce countervailing incentives. Just as state institutions can serve both good and evil ends, so too can PMFs. [End Page 215]

PMC’s Bad – Vulnerability

PMC’s leave power projection at the hands of a small number of private individuals

Singer 2 (P.W. Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution. Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security International Security 26.3 186-220 TBC 6/26/10)

As PMFs become increasingly popular, so too does the danger of their clients becoming overly dependent on their services. Reliance on a private firm means that an integral part of one's strategic success is vulnerable to changes in market costs and incentives. This dependence can result in two potential risks to the security of the client: (1) the agent (the firm) might leave its principal (the client) in the lurch, or (2) the agent might gain dominance over the principal. A PMF may have no compunction about suspending its contract if a situation becomes too risky in either financial or physical terms. Because they are typically based elsewhere, and in the absence of applicable international laws to enforce compliance, PMFs face no real risk of punishment if they or their employees defect from their contractual obligations. Industry advocates dismiss these claims by noting that firms failing to fulfill the terms of their contracts [End Page 205] would sully their reputation, thus hurting their chances of obtaining future contracts. Nevertheless, there are a number of situations in which short-term considerations could prevail over long-term market punishment. In game-theoretic terms, each interaction with a private actor is sui generis. Exchanges in the international security market may take the form of one-shot games rather than guaranteed repeated plays. 45 Sierra Leone faced such a situation in 1994, when the type 1 firm that it had hired (the Gurkha Security Guards, made up primarily of Nepalese soldiers) lost its commander in a rebel ambush. Reports suggest that the commander was later cannibalized. The firm decided to break its contract, and its employees fled the country, leaving its client without an effective military option until it was able to hire another firm. 46 The loss of direct control as a result of privatization carries risks even for strong states. For U.S. military commanders, an added worry of terrorist targeting or the potential use of weapons of mass destruction is that their forces are more reliant than ever on the surge capacity of type 3 support firms. The employees of these firms, however, cannot be forced to stay at their posts in the face of these or other dangers. 47 Because entire functions such as weapons maintenance and supply have become completely privatized, the entire military machine would break down if even a modest number of PMF employees chose to leave.

PMC’s Bad – Don’t Solve

PMCs don’t solve manpower

Isoldi 4 (Brooks 28 Oct http://www.mail-archive.com/osint@yahoogroups.com/msg01078.html TBC 6/27/10)

A new study has ruled out use of private military contractors as a major element in any international effort to stabilize an Arab or developed state. The International Institute for Strategic Studies said the war in Iraq has demonstrated the failure of PMCs to replace military troops or security forces. The London-based institute said despite the profusion of PMCs, private contractors have been unable to resolve manpower shortages facing the U.S.-led coalition. "They could not provide the answer to the manpower problem," the report said.

PMCs can’t solve – no training

Isoldi 4 (Brooks 28 Oct http://www.mail-archive.com/osint@yahoogroups.com/msg01078.html TBC 6/27/10)

The institute, which released its annual military balance on Oct. 19, cited such difficulties as the lack of military supervision over PMCs. The key example cited in the report was the abuse of detainees at Abu Gharib prison north of Iraq in late 2003, an incident that involved private contractors. The report said PMCs were not sufficiently trained or capable of replacing combat troops in Iraq or in any other country wracked by insurgency. The institute warned that any counter-insurgency operation would depend far more on trained manpower than on technology. "Governments need to realize that such operations are manpower-intensive, as the human component replaces the weapon system as the key enabler to success," the report said. The report said the key lessons in the insurgency war in Iraq included a realization that post-conflict and peacekeeping operations required extra skills to those deployed in the warfighting phase. Militaries would also require the capability to move from a combat posture to operations that support civilians. "Secondly: the use of partially trained reservists, or reservists with the wrong skills, is no substitute for fully trained soldiers, as the U.S. learned to its cost in the Iraq prison scandal," the report said.

A2: PMC’s Good

Even if PMC’s give short term flex they constrain long term options

Avant 7 (Deborah Avant Professor, Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University, “Contracting to Train Foreign Security Forces: Benefits, Risks and Implications for US Efforts in Iraq” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2007\_hr/070425–avant.pdf)KM

The private option also enables US government officials to forgo investment in (or reorganization of) military forces for new problems – using PSCs one time make it more likely that they will be used in the future.25 While the private option provides flexibility in the short run, then, it is harder to control and frequently more costly than its public alternative and reduces incentives to reorganize the force.26 This is dramatically illustrated by the US use of DynCorp for fielding international civilian police. Initially DynCorp allowed the US to field a force of international civilian police in Haiti that it had no other way of fielding. Over the long term, however, the DynCorp option has allowed the US government to avoid the creation of an international civilian police capacity – despite the fact that such forces have been routinely sent abroad over the last 10 years and much evidence that these forces lack the requisite strategic vision for effective action.27

The violations by contractors of the security contract result in a 100% turnover rate, undermining any possible change

Schulman 9 (Daniel, assistant editor at Columbia Journalism Review, Sep 1-9, *Mother jones*) ET

Underscoring the scope of the problems within ArmorGroup's Afghanistan operation, POGO says that nearly a tenth of the company's 450-man embassy security force contacted the watchdog group to "express concerns about and provide evidence of a pattern of blatant, longstanding violations of the security contract, and of a pervasive breakdown in the chain of command and guard force discipline and morale." In the letter to Clinton, POGO executive director Danielle Brian writes: This environment has resulted in chronic turnover by U.S./ex-pat guards. According to the State Department, "nearly 90% of the incumbent US/Expats left within the first six months of contract performance." According to POGO sources, the U.S./ex-pat guard turnover may be as high as 100 percent annually. This untenable turnover prevents the guard force from developing team cohesion, and requires constant training for new replacement recruits. The guards have come to POGO because they say they believe strongly in the mission, but are concerned that many good guards are quitting out of frustration or being fired for refusing to participate in the misconduct, and that those responsible for the misconduct are not being held accountable

No impact to reputation

Chesterman and Lehnardt 7 (Simon and Chia, Prof. of Law at Univ. of Singapore, consultant at Institute for International Law and Jusstic, *From Mercenaries to Market. The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companie,* pp. 9-10) GAT

The fourth and last part turns on the role of market mechanisms in regulation. The commercial military sector falls short of being a fully developed market in several areas. Chapter ten, by Deborah Avant, examines the emergence of this market, focusing on the peculiarities of the industry — in particular the lack of competition and transparency, and the tendency of individuals to move easily between firms — and the limitations of market mechanisms when applied to extreme situations where the security of a state is threatened. The lack of other regulatory tools has increased the importance of the market, but this potential tool is too weak to maintain specific standards, since clients tend to disagree about the relevant benchmarks. The diversity of interests among PMC clients therefore significantly diminishes the importance of reputational costs of the industry.

Readiness – 1AC – Uniqueness

Status quo budget allocations increase dependency on PMC’s.

Isenberg 10 (David Isenberg Author, Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq February 1, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david–isenberg/the–qdr–and–private–milit\_b\_444706.html)KM

For decades Silicon Valley inventors and entrepreneurs have been boasting that they, not the government, are responsible for the rise and growth of the Internet. But the truth is, as most people, who have ever studied it for a bit know, that without the early funding from government agencies like the Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency people would still be limited to reading books on paper, not Kindles. Similarly, private military and security contractors claim that they are more cost effective and organizationally agile than their public sector counterparts. But the truth is that they generally live or die on government contracts. That said, the largest governmental employer of private military and security contractors is the Pentagon. And today it released its latest, long awaited, Quadrennial Defense Review. If any contractors were worried about their future they can relax. While the Defense Department confirms old news, i.e. that it is taking some acquisition positions back in–house and realigning the mix of public and private workers in the overall workforce, the bottom line is what everyone expects. The Department of Defense is not significantly lessening its dependence on private military contractors. In fact, given the future security environment the QDR says the U.S. military must prepare for (See Chap 1, "Defense Strategy") which will be marked by the need to respond to a broad range of contingencies including more Iraqs/Afghanistans, major humanitarian crises, failing states and natural disasters, one can see that that the future will be a target rich environment for PMC’s. Trade groups like the Professional Services Council and IPOA have much to smile about.

Readiness – 1AC – Professionalism Scenario (1/3)

PMC’s undermine US efforts to win public support in Iraq because citizens attribute unprofessional actions done by PMC’s to the military.

Cotton et al 10 (Sarah K. Cotton, Ulrich Petersohn, Molly Dunigan, Q Burkhart, Megan Zander–Cotugno, Edward O’Connell, Michael Webber, “Hired Guns”, RAND, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND\_MG987.pdf)KM

Th e damage done by such alleged abuses of power by private security contractors, carried out with impunity, reportedly goes far beyond merely fostering a dim view among Iraqis of the contractors themselves. Extrapolating from their experiences with private security contractors, Iraqi citizens may take a negative view of the entire military occupation and coalition forces as a whole. According to media reports and interviews, resentment occurs mainly because Iraqi civilians do not distinguish between private contractors and U.S. or coalition forces in Iraq. Rather, they see them all as part of the same occupying force (Montagne and Temple–Raston, 2007). With regard specifi cally to the Nisour Square shooting, a National Public Radio report observed the following: Th e more immediate concern is that Blackwater’s actions in Iraq don’t just refl ect on the security company. It has become a broader American problem because Iraqis don’t distinguish between the Blackwater employees and the American military more generally (Montagne and Temple–Raston, 2007). When asked if he had learned who perpetrated the Nisour Square shootings after the fact, a family member of two of the Nisour Square victims answered, “You mean, like, security company? What diff erence this makes? Th ey are Americans” (Montagne and Temple–Raston, 2007).

Readiness – 1AC – Professionalism Scenario (2/3)

Independently, PMC’s risk corruption that allow them to pursue opportunistic parallel forces, perpetuating instability.

Avant 7 (Deborah Avant Professor, Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University, “Contracting to Train Foreign Security Forces: Benefits, Risks and Implications for US Efforts in Iraq” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2007\_hr/070425–avant.pdf)KM

3. Political direction from civilians that are poor or opportunistic can undermine stability no matter how good the training. Military capacity need not translate into stability. Capable security instruments can overthrow governments or allow individual leaders or groups to pursue private or partisan ends. While the efforts of US troops are not impervious to this dynamic, PSCs are more likely to feed into opportunism. By their very nature, the flexibility of private forces can more easily be taken advantage of for private gain. This was immediately apparent in the creation of the Facilities Protection Services in Iraq. Reports were that whole militia groups joined in force leading salaries and training to further strengthened the militias. Erinys did not violate the terms of its contract by training these people: the contract did not anticipate this opportunistic action. Initially each Iraqi ministry had armed units from this force to protect their infrastructure and other units protected private property but the Facilities Protection Services is now being moved under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. As indicated above, though, similar infiltration has been reported to have occurred in the police forces. The Ministry of the Interior, under whom the Iraqi Police Service, the National Police and the Directorate of Border Enforcement serve, is also reported to have strong ties with Shiite militia groups. In response to concerns about the infiltration of the Iraqi police, DynCorp spokesman Greg Laguna said, “We don’t control the political situation, the political loyalties of the people.” There are two kinds of opportunism at work in Iraq. One is a very dangerous potential for a diffusion of control that could result in the development of parallel forces that do not work together under central government command. Lessons from a wide variety of transitional states suggest that parallel forces loyal to different leadership can undermine prospects for peace. A crucial element for the development of civilian control is a civilian hierarchy that centralizes command over all forces. The second is lower level corruption where officers pay kick backs to their superiors in order to get supplies and ghost soldiers and police help line political pockets. This second problem is exacerbated by the degree to which governance by local tribal and religious leaders take precedence over or are not well coordinated with the Iraqi constitution and Iraqi law. Both work to undermine training efforts and often they work together. Setting up a system where contracted trainers think it is their job to contribute to managing this kind of opportunism is quite difficult – but it is also vital if we are to avoid US dollars being used to undermine stability in Iraq. Coordination among the different forces in Iraq and the tensions between the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defense, and the national leadership is something that needs to be monitored carefully.

Readiness – 1AC – Professionalism Scenario (3/3)

Iraqi instablity spills over and causes terrorism.

The National Interest 7 (“Keeping the Lid On”, Lexisnexis, May–June 2007)

THE COLLAPSE of Iraq into all-out civil war would mean more than just a humanitarian tragedy that could easily claim hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives and produce millions of refugees. Such a conflict is unlikely to contain itself. In other similar cases of all–out civil war the resulting spillover has fostered terrorism, created refugee flows that can destabilize the entire neighborhood, radicalized the populations of surrounding states and even sparked civil wars in other, neighboring states or transformed domestic strife into regional war. Terrorists frequently find a home in states in civil war, as Al–Qaeda did in Afghanistan. However, civil wars just as often breed new terrorist groups-Hizballah, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat of Algeria, and the Tamil Tigers were all born of civil wars. Many such groups start by focusing on local targets but then shift to international attacks-starting with those they believe are aiding their enemies in the civil war.

Terrorism risks extinction

Kirkus Reviews, 99 (Book Review on “The New Terrorism: Fanatiscism and the Arms of Mass Destruction”, http://www.amazon.com/New–Terrorism–Fanaticism–Arms–Destruction/dp/product–description/0195118162)

Today two things have changed that together transform terrorism from a ``nuisance'' to ``one of the gravest dangers facing mankind.'' First terroristsbe they Islamic extremists in the Middle East, ultranationalists in the US, or any number of other possible permutationsseem to have changed from organized groups with clear ideological motives to small clusters of the paranoid and hateful bent on vengeance and destruction for their own sake. There are no longer any moral limitations on what terrorists are willing to do, who and how many they are willing to kill. Second, these unhinged collectivities now have ready access to weapons of mass destruction. The technological skills are not that complex and the resources needed not too rare for terrorists to employ nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons where and when they wish. The consequences of such weapons in the hands of ruthless, rootless fanatics are not difficult to imagine. In addition to the destruction of countless lives, panic can grip any targeted society, unleashing retaliatory action which in turn can lead to conflagrations perhaps on a world scale. To combat such terrorist activities, states may come to rely more and more on dictatorial and authoritarian measures. In short, terrorism in the future may threaten the very foundations of modern civilizations.

Readiness – 1AC – Retention Scenario (1/5)

Retention low now – PMC’s create a cycle where military talent is hired away which creates demand for more PMC’s who steal more talent.

Cotton et al 10 (Sarah K. Cotton, Ulrich Petersohn, Molly Dunigan, Q Burkhart, Megan Zander–Cotugno, Edward O’Connell, Michael Webber, “Hired Guns”, RAND, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND\_MG987.pdf)KM

Th e diff erence in pay between private security contractors and troops is a recurring theme in interviews, anecdotal accounts, and analyses of how contractors are aff ecting the military. Christopher Spearin, for instance, notes that the employment decisions of special operations forces (SOF) are aff ected mainly by remuneration and operational tempo, and that private sector employment off ers both better remuneration and more moderate operational tempo than military employment (Spearin, 2006). In July 2005, former SOF personnel in Iraq were earning approximately $12,000–$13,000 per month. In contrast, some private security contractors were being paid as much as $33,000 per month (GAO, 2005). At the same time, the Global War on Terrorism has only increased the operational tempo for U.S. special forces, which had already seen a threefold increase from 1991 to 1997 in the number of soldiers deployed every week. Employment with private security fi rms off ers a more fl exible schedule, with better leave options and greater choice of deployment locations (Spearin, 2006). Arguments have been made that the comparatively desirable work conditions off ered by the private security industry have the unintended side eff ect of reducing rates of military retention. Because private security fi rms generally hire only those with at least some former military experience, military retention rates (or continuation rates, as noted below), rather than recruitment rates, can off er some insight into the question of a tug–of–war between the military and private sector over skilled personnel. As Ralph Peters, a retired Army offi cer and frequent commentator on military issues, suggested in 2007, Th e disgraceful cycle works like this: Contractors hire away military talent. Th e military fi nds itself short of skilled workers, so contractors get more contracts. With more money, they hire away more uniformed talent (quoted in Lardner, 2007, p. 3).

Prolonged retention problems will cripple American hegemony

Kagan and O’Hanlon, 2007 (Frederick and Michael \*P.h.d from Yale, professor at Westpoint\*\* Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution, April 2007 “The Case for Larger Ground Forces” Stanley Foundation, Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide)KM

The Future of the Two–War Planning Framework—and Future Military Contingencies for the United States US defense planning since the end of the Cold War has been organized around the need to be prepared to fight two overlapping wars. In 2001 the George W. Bush administration modified the two–war concept somewhat, but kept much of the basic logic and the associated force structure (which Kagan has argued was, from the beginning, always inadequate to support the strategy).1 In the aftermath of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, further changes are now needed in America’s armed forces and their undergirding defense strategy. The deterrent logic of being able to do more than one thing at a time is rock solid. If involved in one major conflict, and perhaps occupied in one or more smaller ongoing operations around the world, the United States also needs additional capability to deter other crises—as well as maintain its forward presence at bases around the world and on the seas, carry out joint exercises with allies, and handle smaller problems. The current conflict in Iraq highlights the limitations of our two–war force structure, since the US military is patently unable to contemplate another “major theater war” at the present with anything other than horror. But our inability to cope with such a scenario only increases the likelihood that one will emerge, as opportunistic enemies take advantage of our perceived weakness and overcommitment.

Readiness – 1AC – Retention Scenario (2/5)

Readiness is key to prevent war.

Spencer 00 (Jack, Policy Analyst – Heritage Foundation, The Facts About Military Readiness, 9–15, http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/ BG1394.cfm)KM

The evidence indicates that the U.S. armed forces are not ready to support America's national security requirements. Moreover, regarding the broader capability to defeat groups of enemies, military readiness has been declining. The National Security Strategy, the U.S. official statement of national security objectives,3 concludes that the United States "must have the capability to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames."4 According to some of the military's highest–ranking officials, however, the United States cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan have all expressed serious concerns about their respective services' ability to carry out a two major theater war strategy.5 Recently retired Generals Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps and George Joulwan of the U.S. Army have even questioned America's ability to conduct one major theater war the size of the 1991 Gulf War.6 Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace.

Tech isn’t enough – a large ground force is key to solving all threats.

Peters 6 (Ralph, former Army officer, “The Counterrevolution in Military Affairs,” The Weekly Standard, 2/6,

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/649qrsob.asp)KM

From Iraq's Sunni Triangle to China's military high command, the counterrevolution in military affairs is well underway. We are seduced by what we can do; our enemies focus on what they must do. We have fallen so deeply in love with the means we have devised for waging conceptual wars that we are blind to their marginal relevance in actual wars. Terrorists, for one lethal example, do not fear "network–centric warfare" because they have already mastered it for a tiny fraction of one cent on the dollar, achieving greater relative effects with the Internet, cell phones, and cheap airline tickets than all of our military technologies have delivered. Our prime weapon in our struggles with terrorists, insurgents, and warriors of every patchwork sort remains the soldier or Marine; yet, confronted with reality's bloody evidence, we simply pretend that other, future, hypothetical wars will justify the systems we adore––purchased at the expense of the assets we need. Stubbornly, we continue to fantasize that a wondrous enemy will appear who will fight us on our own terms, as a masked knight might have materialized at a stately tournament in a novel by Sir Walter Scott. Yet, not even China--the threat beloved of major defense contractors and their advocates--would play by our rules if folly ignited war. Against terrorists, we have found technology alone incompetent to master men of soaring will--our own flesh and blood provide the only effective counter. At the other extreme, a war with China, which our war gamers blithely assume would be brief, would reveal the quantitative incompetence of our forces. An assault on a continent-spanning power would swiftly drain our stocks of precision weapons, ready pilots, and aircraft. Quality, no matter how great, is not a reliable substitute for a robust force in being and deep reserves that can be mobilized rapidly.

Adversaries are constantly sizing up U.S. force capabilities – only a bigger military can address threats in Iraq, Afghanistan and North Korea

Army Times 6 (Rick Maze, "A bigger military in the long term; It's too late to ease current personnel crisis but not future problems, officials say," 12/11, www.armytimes.com/issues/stories/0–ARMYPAPER–2393732.php)KM

But retired Gen. John Keane, a former vice chief of staff, said it is “self-evident” that the Army and Marine Corps are too small — not just to sustain their commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, but to remain ready to cope with other contingencies. With almost all deployable Army forces focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, the service’s ability to provide forces that would be able to win a conventional conflict in Korea or elsewhere is atrophying, Keane said in a Nov. 30 interview. “What [Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter] Schoomaker needs right now is a larger Army, which would give him the capability to set aside three or four divisions to focus on conventional war,” Keane said. No such force exists, and its absence is not unnoticed, he said. “Our adversaries know exactly what the readiness is of every one of our divisions. They have people working this full time.”

Readiness – 1AC – Retention Scenario (3/5)

Lack of readiness causes North Korean conflict.

Carpenter 8 (1/9/08 Ted Galen, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=16622)

At the same time, U.S. officials must stop letting hope triumph over experience when it comes to dealing with North Korea on the nuclear issue. Those officials also need to consider a fall-back plan if the six-party talks fail to produce an effective and worthwhile solution. Relying on deterrence supplemented by a regional missile defense program may be the most feasible option. Another possibility is to induce China to remove the current ruling elite in its troublesome client state and replace it with a more pliable regime, in exchange for a U.S. promise to end its military presence on the peninsula.

Readiness – 1AC – Retention Scenario (4/5)

North Korean conflict would escalate to nuclear war – the impact is obliteration of the environment and erosion of hegemony

Hamel–Green 10 (“the Path Not taken, the way still open” 1/5/10 http://www.japanfocus.org/–Michael–Hamel\_Green/3267)km

The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack1, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima–sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6–8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next–use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first–use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain–reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community. North Korea is currently believed to have sufficient plutonium stocks to produce up to 12 nuclear weapons.6 If and when it is successful in implementing a uranium enrichment program – having announced publicly that it is experimenting with enrichment technology on September 4, 20097 in a communication with the UN Security Council – it would likely acquire the capacity to produce over 100 such weapons. Although some may dismiss Korean Peninsula proliferation risks on the assumption that the North Korean regime will implode as a result of its own economic problems, food problems, and treatment of its own populace, there is little to suggest that this is imminent. If this were to happen, there would be the risk of nuclear weapons falling into hands of non-state actors in the disorder and chaos that would ensue. Even without the outbreak of nuclear hostilities on the Korean Peninsula in either the near or longer term, North Korea has every financial incentive under current economic sanctions and the needs of its military command economy to export its nuclear and missile technologies to other states. Indeed, it has already been doing this for some time. The Proliferation Security Initiative may conceivably prove effective in intercepting ship–borne nuclear exports, but it is by no means clear how air–transported materials could similarly be intercepted. Given the high stakes involved, North Korean proliferation, if unaddressed and unreversed, has the potential to destabilize the whole East Asian region and beyond. Even if a nuclear <CONTINUED>

Readiness – 1AC – Retention Scenario (5/5)

<CONTINUED>

exchange does not occur in the short term, the acute sense of nuclear threat that has been experienced for over five decades by North Koreans as a result of US strategic deterrence is now likely to be keenly felt by fellow Koreans south of the 38th Parallel and Japanese across the waters of the Sea of Japan. China, too, must surely feel itself to be at risk from North Korean nuclear weapons, or from escalation that might ensue from next–use in the Korean Peninsula resulting not only in the environmental consequences noted above, but in regime collapse and massive refugee flows. South Korea and Japan appear willing to rely on their respective bilateral security pacts with the United States to deter North Korean nuclear attack for the time being. However, should South Korea and/or Japan acquire nuclear weapons, the outcome would be destabilizing, especially if this resulted from rupture of their alliance relationships with the United States. Both have the technical capability to do so very rapidly. South Korea has previously engaged in nuclear weapons research but desisted after US pressure. Japan still proclaims its adherence to the three Non–Nuclear Principles although recent confirmation that the United States routinely transited nuclear weapons through Japan and retains the right of emergency reintroduction of nuclear weapons has tarnished Japan’s non–nuclear image. Moreover, it has large stockpiles of plutonium that could rapidly be used to produce nuclear warheads. Such responses, already advocated by conservative and nationalist groups within South Korea and Japan, could trigger a regional nuclear arms race involving the Koreas, Japan, Taiwan, and China, with incalculable wider consequences for Southeast Asia, South Asia and the whole Pacific and beyond. These developments would spell the demise of the current global non-proliferation regime as underpinned by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Failure to reverse the DPRK’s nuclear breakout is also an important factor driving a general malaise in the exercise of American power which one of the authors has characterized elsewhere as “the end of American nuclear hegemony.”8

Readiness – Uniqueness – No Oversight Now

Status quo PMC’s lack oversight – they assume critical roles on the ground without governmental oversight.

Schwartzkopf 10 (Matt Schwartzkopf Thursday, May 13 2010 http://pmc.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2010/05/13/the–commission–on–wartime–contracting–part–two/)

“The issue of the Army’s commitment to aggressive and effective contract management shows up in other ways. After more than seven years of war in Southwest Asia—typically with a 1–to–1 ratio of contractor employees to warfighters—it is astonishing, but apparently true, that no one in DoD or the Army has either a department-wide or a theater-wide view of contracts, contracting activity, or the numbers and locations of contractors. And with the massive draw–down operation underway in Iraq, it is also astonishing to hear a three-star Army general confirm at our last hearing that there is no single entity with the power to monitor operational needs and order appropriate adjustments in the scope of contracts.” – Chairman Michael Thibault, April 19th This statement perfectly sums up one of the major problems the government faces with private military contracting; a lack of oversight. Though the situation is improving, oversight is still far from where it should be. The Army and Defense Department, until recently, seemed to lack the urgency to fix this problem, the same lack of urgency they were chided for by the Commission on Wartime Contracting. This sort of behavior on the government’s part has lead to publicized news stories about waste and fraud problems out in the field, with the primary blame being put on the private contractors. Contractor cooperation is a much needed aspect, but the burden lies with the government to ensure there are adequate personnel in place to oversee contractors and contracts in the field and to provide assistance to contractors when needed. The problem of oversight ranges from the top of the government to the ground level in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is no better example of oversight problems on the ground than in the Contracting Officer Representative (COR) for the Army. The COR is “a Federal employee appointed in writing, delegated limited responsibilities related to technical oversight and management of a specific contract” (COR Training Manuel). The Commission has described the COR as an “inherently governmental position” and has been rather disturbed by the fact that, often times, contractors are placed in COR roles instead of government personnel. This creates a situation where you have contractors reporting to and being accountable to other contractors in the field, not to a certified representative of the United States Government. The Contracting Officer Representative is a crucial “on the ground” link between the government and the contractors in the field. This is the person dealing with contractors and contracting needs on a daily basis and reporting back to the government on what is happening in the field. These reports are vital to ensure important contracts that are crucial to military operations are being carried out effectively and efficiently. These contracts range from the training of the Afghan National Police to ensuring our bases are provided with basic services such as electrical upkeep. As you might assume, this person undergoes years of training and has extensive experience in dealing with private contractors before being appointed to this important task. A college professor of mine once said, “assumption is a dangerous notion.” In many cases they do not undergo years of training, the training time for a COR is roughly two weeks, plus an online course.

Readiness – Uniqueness – Dependent on PMC’s Now

Dependence on PMC’s now – they were key to the initial Iraq invasion.

Kurlantzick 3 (Outsourcing the Dirty Work The military and its reliance on hired guns By Joshua Kurlantzick The American Prospect, May 2003, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/New\_World\_Order/Outsourcing\_Dirty\_Work.html)KM

The war in Iraq could not have taken place without a network of for profit contractors upon which the U.S. military has come to depend. Some 20,000 employees of private military companies (PMC’s) and of more traditional military contractors accompanied the U.S. forces in the buildup to war in the Middle East. They maintained computers and communications systems in Kuwait, Qatar and other locations, handled many aspects of logistics as the military's supply lines moved through Iraq and helped the Pentagon identify key targets in Iraq. As hostilities began, many of these PMC employees were integral to the American effort, keeping communications secure, assisting with the reopening of Iraq's southern oil fields and performing many other crucial tasks, often right behind the front lines. Brookings Institution fellow Peter W. Singer, author of the forthcoming Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, believes that the number of contract employees used by the military in this Iraq War is significantly higher than in the Gulf War. In fact, Singer estimates, the Pentagon may be using nearly 1o times as many contract employees as it did in 1991. Indeed, whereas there were fewer than 1o PMC’s in the United States two decades ago, today there are more than 30. Many are based in northern Virginia, giving them close access to Pentagon officials. Reston, Va.-based DynCorp, one of the larger companies, saw its revenues increase by more than 15 percent in 2002. According to Ed Soyster, former head of the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency and now a spokesman for Alexandria, Va.-based Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI), his PMC has grown from eight employees in 1988 to more than goo today. Meanwhile, shares of publicly traded PMC’s, such as DynCorp, have skyrocketed even as the broader American stock markets have tanked. This dependence on PMC’s is a relatively new phenomenon. During most of the 20th century, such organizations established reputations for brutal behavior. Hard-drinking European guns-for-hire such as "Mad" Mike Hoare took part in bloody coups in Africa. One infamous mercenary, Bob Denard, even made himself dictator of Africa's Comoros Islands. The end of the Cold War helped fuel the rise of PMC’s by reducing the need to maintain an enormous standing military capable of fighting another superpower. The Pentagon reduced the armed forces from ~ million in 199l to 1.4 million today. "Because conflicts now are more localized, smaller numbers of soldiers can win a battle, and there was more fear in the Pentagon about sending soldiers on dangerous missions, so they began turning to contractors," says PMC expert Deborah D. Avant, an associate professor at George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs.

Readiness – Uniqueness – Dependent on PMC’s Now

US remains dependent on PMC’s – post-Cold War downsizing of the government and changes in military strategy created demand.

Weiner 8 (The Hidden Costs of Contracting: Private Law, Commercial Imperatives and the Privatized Military Industry Rebecca Ulam Weiner, December 2008, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Hidden%20Costs%20of%20Contracting\_Dec%202008.pdf)KM

In the U.S., the proliferation of PMC’s owes more to changes in policy than to changes in geopolitical circumstance. Here, the demand for outsourced force was driven by the coalescence of two philosophical and strategic trends in post Cold War statecraft and military policy. The first was widespread downsizing of the government, which was motivated by the assumption that public-private partnerships can harness the efficiency of the market economy to improve even the most vital state functions, including the administration of violence. 8 Because the demand for military services fluctuates so drastically, the military was thought to be particularly well-suited to respond to the advantages of outsourcing.9 According to proponents of military privatization, PMC’s provide valuable “surge capacity” that makes it more efficient for the military to hire from a pool of temporary, highly trained experts in times of war, even at a cost premium, than to rely on a permanent standing army that drains resources in peacetime with pension plans, health insurance, education benefits and child care aid.10 The second is a series of dramatic changes in military technology, which some have termed a Revolution in Military Affairs.11 By relying on surgical strikes by precision-guided munitions and stealth weaponry, and by focusing on joint-service operations that flatten and decentralize the command structure, the military has transformed warfare by using the tools of the information revolution.12 As it has done so, it has relied increasingly upon civilian contractors for their technical expertise. 13 During the Iraq war, for instance, civilian contractors ran the computer programs that generated the tactical air picture for the Combined Air Operations Center, supported the data links that the Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) used to transmit information, operated the guided missile systems on some naval brigs, and supervised the digital command-and-control systems of ground troops. Contractors continue to maintain the Army’s Guardrail surveillance aircraft.14

Readiness – Uniqueness – No End Strength Now

End strength is strained now with troop deployments, future conflicts will demand greater troop numbers.

AUSA 9 (Association for the United States Army,“Exceeding active duty end strength would reduce strain on force, personnel officials say” 7/1 http://www.ausa.org/publications/ausanews/archives/2009/july/Pages/Exceedingactivedutyendstrengthwouldreducestrainonforce,personnelofficialssay.aspx)KM

The Army’s senior personnel officer said “we see an increase in demand” in the near term for soldiers to be deployed but discussions were being held in the Pentagon about “seeking authority to temporarily exceed” that active-duty end strength of 547,400 to reduce the strain on the force. Lt. Gen. Michael Rochelle, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee May 20, said the ratio of “one year deployed for 1.3 years home” for the active force was “absolutely unsustainable” and the “one year deployed to three years home” for the reserve components was “equally unsustainable.” The key factor in reducing stress on soldiers and their families is to increase dwell time, he told the subcommittee. Rochelle said that to have a “healthy, balanced and prepared force” would be a challenge “directly in front of us for the next several years.”

Readiness – I/L – General

PMC’s kill key internal links to readiness

Kidwell 5 (Deborah C, Assistant Professor of Military History at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, “Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies”, <http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/kidwell.pdf> AD: 6/24/10) jl

Remember that the increased reliance on PMC’s to conduct US mili­tary operations is a conscious choice made by national political and mili­tary leaders. The current role of corporate entities on the battlefield blends the public and private spheres of interest in unique and uncharted ways. A number of risks, to include mission completion, force protection, loss of command and control, and disruption of civil-military relations, accrue to the growing dependence of national military forces on contracted services. Policy makers must continually revisit the lessons learned from experi­ence, examine theoretical projections, and revise military policy and doc­trine if the US is to manage effectively its resources and to maintain the military capabilities to achieve national security objectives

Multiple reasons PMC’s kill readiness – No competition, lack of oversight, dependency, kills public support

Kidwell 5 (Deborah C, Assistant Professor of Military History at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, “Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies”, http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/kidwell.pdf AD: 6/24/10) jl

The current use of contractor support, from historical and practical perspectives, includes elements from the worst-case scenarios. No-bid and cost plus contracts thwart the very competition and financial incen­tives the government hoped to benefit from by using PMC’s. The lack of oversight and visibility of the contracting process encourages fiscal abuse and poor performance. Taken together, these factors make it difficult to establish the cost efficiency of the current system of military contract­ing. Moreover, evidence suggests military effectiveness is impaired by a growing dependency on contractor support, a lack of command authority over contractor personnel, and the unclear boundaries between private and public (military) organizations. The very real change in the civil-military relationship presented by the overuse of contractor support and the social consequences of war without public mobilization detracts from a consis­tent national foreign policy and national security. The roles of the public and private spheres in government have intertwined so completely that a complex, and often vague, body of regulations is inadequate to untangle them.

PMC’s make it HARDER for the military to fight effectively

RAND 2010 (Sarah K. Cotton, Ulrich Petersohn, Molly Dunigan, Q Burkhart,

Megan Zander-Cotugno, Edward O’Connell, Michael Webber, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG987.sum.pdf>, date accessed: 6/24/2010) AJK

Skeptics, however, hold that the operations of PSCs may inadvertently place additional strain on the armed forces. Th is is because, when contractors engage the enemy in the course of their work, they may require rapid support from the military.1 In short, this school of thought holds that PSCs can at times cause more strain than relief for the armed forces, because they may need military aid when under attack. Although such logic applies to both armed and unarmed contractors, the fact that armed contractors have the ability to engage the enemy in a fi refi ght makes this line of thought more applicable to them than to other types of contractors.

Readiness – I/L – General

PMC’s make the regular military too reliant and kill readiness

Kidwell 5 (Deborah C, “Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies”, http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/kidwell.pdf)

The United States has long utilized private military contractors to augment regular military forces in support of its national foreign policy and security needs. Commonly referred to as Private Military Companies (PMC’s), contractors employ and manage civilian personnel from the private sector in areas of active military operations. Frequently, regular troops become dependent on the services contractors provide—a situation that may negatively impact military effectiveness. Since 1991, contractor support on and off the battlefield has become increasingly more visible, varied, and commonplace. Given the current manpower and resource limitations of the national military, the US will likely continue its extensive use of PMC’s in support of military operations. This work addresses historical precedents and trends in American logistics, the current scope of contractor involvement in support of regular military forces, and the challenges posed as traditional military institutions integrate increasing numbers of civilian workers and privately owned assets into the battlespace. These problems increase the risk to US personnel and can induce budget overuns rather than savings, disrupt civil-military relations, and have detrimental consequences for the American economy and society. The work concludes by proposing a useful rubric to evaluate this "new" American way of war.

Contractors hurt our war effort- five reasons- Corporate profit, no accountability, drug lords, sex trafficking, and sustaining war for personal interests

Hynes 10 (Patricia- Pres of NY bar association, *War Times,*1/8/10) ET

Here are five caveats regarding military merchants in corporate clothing: 1. Corporate profit vs. public good. Being in the “marketplace of violence,” PMC’s rely upon and are positioned to promote continuous armed conflict, with few, if any, public checks and balances. Fraud is common: According to a federal audit of Pentagon contractors in Afghanistan, 16% of monies paid the contractors has been for “questioned and unsupported costs." 2. Global glut in ex-soldiers and arms. Since the end of the Cold War, the market has been saturated with ex-soldiers and military weapons unloaded by governments to arms brokers. On the “demand” side of violence, the incidence of conflicts within countries has doubled since the end of the Cold War and zones of conflict have doubled as well, creating a perfect storm of opportunity for corporatizing war. 3. Under the radar screen and outside the law. Contract and subcontract oversight of private firms in Afghanistan is severely compromised, due to distance and dependency on their services. Case in point: a two year paper trail and a recent lawsuit reveal that ArmorGroup security guards for the U.S. embassy in Kabul have been involved in security lapses, drunken and lewd hazing rituals, intimidation of whistleblowers, petty corruption, abusive work conditions, and sexual predation. With little evidence of disciplinary action, except company assurance, and with virtually no other option at hand, the State Department renewed the ArmorGroup contract in 2008 and 2009. See: 4. Abuse; here are a few from a huge list: \* Afghan militias hired and armed as security contractors. Having fewer soldiers than needed for a counterinsurgency war, the U.S. and NATO depend heavily on private security firms for security and training of Afghan police. According to one expert on Afghanistan, security contractors “have hired, armed and trained local militias that were supposed to be demobilized and disarmed, enabling them to persist and profit as part of the ‘private sector,’ awaiting the spark that will set off another civil war.". Between 10 and 20% of the Pentagon’s logistics contracts in Afghanistan – hundreds of millions of dollars - end up as extortion payments to the Taliban for protection of U.S. supply convoys from attacks on Afghan roads and highways. Further, many of the local security companies hired by the U.S. for the war effort are run by warlords. The “right war” is riddled with crime and contradiction as the Pentagon pays its enemies for protection \* Sexual Exploitation and Trafficking of Women. The patterns of sexual exploitation by military contractors in the Iraq war provide insight into the war in Afghanistan. In an original study of military prostitution and trafficking during the Iraq war, the researcher concludes that the privatization of war – through heavy reliance on military contractors – has worsened the prostituting of women in war zones. Private military contractors are more seasoned and sophisticated about prostitution and trafficking of women and they have more disposable income than the military (some earning between $650US and $1000US per day). When violating the U.S. military prohibition against involvement in prostitution they are not prosecuted; and they are accountable only to their companies According to a former manager of the PMC ArmorGuard security guards for the U.S. Embassy routinely frequented brothels in Kabul where Chinese girls had been trafficked for sexual exploitation. One guard bragged of planning to buy a prostitute for pimping her. Other guards were alleged to be involved in sex trafficking also. The whistleblower was forced from his job, and his requests to the company and the State Department for investigation were ignored for two years. 5. Risk of militarizing governments and non-state networks. There are many risks to peace and security in the proliferation of PMC’s, among them: abetting repressive and criminal clients; promoting and sustaining conflict; enabling covert warfare; and moving the military industrial complex even more centrally from the public sphere to the private where the only checks and balances are shareholders.

Readiness – I/L – General

Contractors are bad- they undermine US efforts because of lack of management

Glanz 9 (James, Baghdad Bureau chief of the NY Times, *NY Times,* Sep 1-9) ET

On a superficial level, the shift means that most of those representing the United States in the war will be wearing the scruffy cargo pants, polo shirts, baseball caps and other casual accouterments favored by overseas contractors rather than the fatigues and flight suits of the military. More fundamentally, the contractors who are a majority of the force in what has become the most important American enterprise abroad are subject to lines of authority that are less clear-cut than they are for their military colleagues. What is clear, the report says, is that when contractors for the Pentagon or other agencies are not properly managed — as when civilian interrogators committed abuses at Abu Ghraib in Iraq or members of the security firm Blackwater shot and killed 17 Iraqi citizens in Baghdad — the American effort can be severely undermined. As of March this year, contractors made up 57 percent of the Pentagon’s force in Afghanistan, and if the figure is averaged over the past two years, it is 65 percent, according to the report by the Congressional Research Service. A copy of the report was posted online by Secrecy News, a publication of the Federation of American Scientists. The 68,197 contractors — many of them Afghans — handle a variety of jobs, including cooking for the troops, serving as interpreters and even providing security, the report says.

Contractors hurt our war effort- they are less willing to take risks and are overpaid

Glanz 9 (James, Baghdad Bureau chief of the NY Times, *NY Times,* Sep 1-9) ET

Responding to the Congressional research report, Frederick D. Barton, a senior adviser to the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said it was highly questionable whether contractors brought the same commitment and willingness to take risks as the men and women of the military or the diplomatic services. He also questioned whether using contractors was cost effective, saying that no one really knew whether having a force made up mainly of contractors whose salaries were often triple or quadruple those of a corresponding soldier or Marine was cheaper or more expensive for the American taxpayer. With contractors focused on preserving profits and filing paperwork with government auditors, he said, “you grow the part of government that, probably, the taxpayers appreciate least.” Congress appropriated at least $106 billion for Pentagon contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2003 through the first half of the 2008 fiscal year, the report says. The report said the combined forces in Iraq and Afghanistan still had more uniformed military personnel than contractors over all: 242,657 contractors and about 282,000 troops as of March 31.

Outsourcing to contractors undermines the military’s effectiveness

Hedahl 9 (Marc, Captain USAF, http://isme.tamu.edu/JSCOPE05/Hedahl05.html) ET

However, as I noted earlier it is the professional and consequential issues that those of us in the military are best suited to consider, so I will spend the remainder of the discussion on those issues. Now, the most fundamental reason one could argue against a particular act of outsourcing would be because of the impact that action would have on the profession itself. Any organization that is contemplating outsourcing needs to first and foremost think about their own core functions that should never be outsourced This is true in any industry but it takes on special importance when we are talking about a profession that is considering outsourcing duties to members outside their profession. A few examples may help illustrate this point. For instance, there is a risk when members of a company disclose proprietary sales numbers to an outside consultant. This risk would count as a good consequential reason not to hire a consultant for this purpose. It is important to note, however, that that is merely a risk to be weighed in the over-all cost benefit analysis. There will be many cases in which the expertise gained from outsourcing is worth the risk. There is no foundational and irrevocable damage done to the occupation of being a salesman in the unlikely occurrence that this information is leaked to a competitor. In fact the very notion of such a harm being done to an occupation is almost nonsensical. Compare this case with a hospital that is considering exposing outside researchers to client information. Here, there is not merely an issue of consequential value but an issue for the medical profession itself, since patient confidentiality is one of the tenants of the medical profession.[14] This is not to say that this action cannot be taken, merely that there is more to consider, and in effect more to risk when we are discussing a profession and not merely an occupation.

Readiness – I/L – General

Contractors are illegal and ruin accountability, ethical codes, and make the real military seem a sham

Hedahl 9 (Marc, Captain USAF, http://isme.tamu.edu/JSCOPE05/Hedahl05.html) ET

Furthermore, there is the very real possibility of damage to the morale of our troops when the contractors they are fighting alongside have better equipment and get paid significantly better. [31] The Outsourcing can also negatively impact the ability to retain crucial, skilled personnel within the military itself. For example, there are reportedly more former British Special Forces soldiers working for PMFs in Iraq than in the entire British Armed Services.[32] There are even more severe consequences, however, if we let PMFs operate independently of the military professionals within our nations military. We have similar issues of moral and retention. In addition, the negative consequence of the breakdown in a cohesive battle plan when you have in essence two groups fighting along side each other using separate communications systems are even troubling . Furthermore, these contractors cannot be considered “lawful combatants” under the 3rd Geneva Convention so long as they remain outside of a unified chain of command working directly for the state.[33] Worst of all, we have ripped the profession apart. We have fractured our training, our accountability, and our ethical codes. I do not believe that the crisis has yet reached the point where talk of the military profession is meaningless, but I know that we cannot fight alongside and independently of large numbers of mercenaries for extended periods of time without becoming mercenaries ourselves, not because of the effect that their actions will have on ours, but merely because their existence destroys the ability for the profession to exist at all. If we ever reach such a point, our uniforms, our medals, and even our codes of honor truly will become nothing more than anachronistic window dressing.

Readiness – I/L – Casualty Aversion

PMC’s are used to lower domestic casualties, they use hired soldiers from local regions as cannon fodder.

Scahill 7 (Jeremy Scahill August 15, 2007 from Indypendent Website, http://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/sociopolitica/sociopol\_blackwater08.htm )KM

NEW WORLD DISORDER The Iraq war has ushered in a new system. Wealthy nations can recruit the world’s poor, from countries that have no direct stake in the conflict, and use them as cannon fodder to conquer weaker nations. This allows the conquering power to hold down domestic casualties — the single-greatest impediment to waging wars like the one in Iraq. Indeed, in Iraq, more than 1,000 contractors working for the U.S. occupation have been killed with another 13,000 wounded. Most are not American citizens, and these numbers are not counted in the official death toll at a time when Americans are increasingly disturbed by casualties. In Iraq, many companies are run by Americans or Britons and have well–trained forces drawn from elite military units for use in sensitive actions or operations. But down the ranks, these forces are filled by Iraqis and third–country nationals. Indeed, some 118,000 of the estimated 180,000 contractors are Iraqis, and many mercenaries are reportedly ill-paid, poorly equipped and barely trained Iraqi nationals. The mercenary industry points to this as a positive: we are giving Iraqis jobs, albeit occupying their own country in the service of a private corporation hired by a hostile invading power. Doug Brooks, the head of the Orwellian named mercenary trade group, the International Peace Operations Association, argued from early on in the occupation, “Museums do not need to be guarded by Abrams tanks when an Iraqi security guard working for a contractor can do the same job for less than one–fiftieth of what it costs to maintain an American soldier. Hiring local guards gives Iraqis a stake in a successful future for their country. They use their pay to support their families and stimulate the economy. Perhaps most significantly, every guard means one less potential guerrilla.” In many ways, it is the same corporate model of relying on cheap labor in destitute nations to staff their uber–profitable operations. The giant multinationals also argue they are helping the economy by hiring locals, even if it’s at starvation wages. “Donald Rumsfeld’s masterstroke, and his most enduring legacy, was to bring the corporate branding revolution of the 1990s into the heart of the most powerful military in the world,” says Naomi Klein, whose upcoming book, The Shock Doctrine – The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, explores these themes. “We have now seen the emergence of the hollow army. Much as with so–called hollow corporations like Nike, billions are spent on military technology and design in rich countries while the manual labor and sweat work of invasion and occupation is increasingly outsourced to contractors who compete with each other to fill the work order for the lowest price. Just as this model breeds rampant abuse in the manufacturing sector — with the big–name brands always able to plead ignorance about the actions of their suppliers—so it does in the military, though with stakes that are immeasurably higher.” In the case of Iraq, the U.S. and U.K. governments could give the public perception of a withdrawal of forces and just privatize the occupation.

Readiness – I/L – End Strength

Hiring PMC’s forces the US government to bid against itself for the services of young Americans.

Krepinevich 8 (Andrew F. President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, “An Army at the Crossroads,” CSBA Publication, http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20081117.An\_Army\_At\_The\_Cro/R.20081117.An\_Army\_At\_The\_Cro.pdf)KM

The US Government also has sought to make up for the shortage of soldiers by relying increasingly on private security contractors. Some 30,000 are currently deployed performing duties once performed by soldiers. (Nearly 200,000 private contractors in all were supporting the war effort in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2007.) It is far from clear that this approach has merit. Retired Army General David M. Maddox, who reviewed the impact of contractors as part of an Army review commission, cautions that the Army “has not fully recognized the impact of a large number of contractors” in a war zone, or “their potential impact to mission success.”77 Another Army general officer who observed private security contractors in Iraq was more direct: These guys run loose in this country and do stupid stuff. There’s no authority over them, so you can’t come down on them hard when they escalate force. They shoot people, and someone else has to deal with the aftermath. It happens all over the place.78Simply stated, it is far from clear that private security contractors are a good substitute for Army soldiers. They may not even constitute a net benefit when one realizes that, by engaging private security firms, the US Government (i.e., the armed forces) is bidding against itself for the services of young Americans.

End strength and PMC dependency are correlated – continued useage will only make problems more challenging.

Gallup 8 (Heather L, 01-Mar “Blending the Battlefield: An Analysis of Using Private Military Companies To Support Military Operations In Iraq; AIR FORCE INST OF TECH WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING, http://www.stormingmedia.us/77/7714/A771484.html)KM

Over the past fifteen years, the Department of Defense has experienced an increasing trend in the outsourcing and privatization of military operations. Key factors contributing to the growth include declines in military budgets, reductions in active duty end-strength, increases in operational deployments, advancements in weapon system technology, and evolutions in the nature of warfare. However, the continued escalation of incorporating Private Military Companies (PMC’s) on the battlefield creates unique challenges. The purpose of this exploratory and descriptive research is to identify utilization rates, describe the types of roles being fulfilled, and synthesize the challenges of augmenting military manpower with civilian contractors. For this effort, the research scope is primarily focused on exploring the use of PMC’s to support battlefield operations in Iraq. The research strategy involves the collection, reduction, and analysis of existing census data and secondary archival data from multiple sources. To add flexibility to the study, interactive data analysis techniques are employed using a combination of several qualitative methodologies. The conclusions drawn from the resulting data analysis framework are intended to facilitate a better understanding of the complexities of using civilian contractors in a war zone as well as outline key focus areas for improving the planning, management, and oversight of PMC operations. In addition, this research expands the existing body of knowledge on this dynamic topic.

Readiness – I/L – Professionalism

PMC armies are unprofessional – there’s no one there to control what they do.

Scahill 7 (Jeremy Scahill August 15, 2007 from Indypendent Website, http://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/sociopolitica/sociopol\_blackwater08.htm )KM

Dozens of American soldiers have been court-martialed - 64 on murder-related charges alone - but not a single armed contractor has been prosecuted for a crime against an Iraqi. In some cases, where contractors were alleged to have been involved in crimes or deadly incidents, their companies whisked them out of Iraq to safety. U.S. contractors in Iraq reportedly have their own motto: “What happens here today, stays here today.” International diplomats say Iraq has demonstrated a new U.S. model for waging war; one which poses a creeping threat to global order. “To outsource security–related, military related issues to non–government, non–military forces is a source of great concern and it caught many governments unprepared,” says Hans von Sponeck, a 32–year veteran U.N. diplomat, who served as head of the U.N. Iraq mission before the U.S. invasion. In Iraq, the United States has used its private sector allies to build up armies of mercenaries many lured from impoverished countries with the promise of greater salaries than their home militaries can pay. That the home governments of some of these private warriors are opposed to the war itself is of little consequence. “Have gun, will fight for paycheck” has become a globalized law. “The most worrying aspect is that these forces are outside parliamentary control. They come from all over and they are answerable to no one except a very narrow group of people and they come from countries whose governments may not even know in detail that they have actually been contracted as a private army into a war zone,” says von Sponeck. “If you have now a marketplace for warfare, it is a commercial issue rather than a political issue involving a debate in the countries. You are also marginalizing governmental control over whether or not this should take place, should happen and, if so, in what size and shape. It’s a very worrying new aspect of international relations. I think it becomes more and more uncontrollable by the countries of supply.” In Iraq, for example, hundreds of Chilean mercenaries have been deployed by U.S. companies like Blackwater and Triple Canopy, despite the fact that Chile, as a rotating member of the U.N. Security Council, opposed the invasion and continues to oppose the occupation of Iraq. Some of the Chileans are alleged to have been seasoned veterans of the Pinochet era. “There is nothing new, of course, about the relationship between politics and the economy, but there is something deeply perverse about the privatization of the Iraq War and the utilization of mercenaries,” says Chilean sociologist Tito Tricot, a former political prisoner who was tortured under Pinochet’s regime. “This externalization of services or outsourcing attempts to lower costs - third world mercenaries are paid less than their counterparts from the developed world – and maximize benefits. In other words, let others fight the war for the Americans. In either case, the Iraqi people do not matter at all.”

PMC’s are unprofessional – some straight up kill everything that moves.

Ricks 9 (Thomas E. Ricks Tuesday, November 24, 2009, http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/11/24/hiring\_trigger\_happy\_heroin\_addicts\_as\_security\_guards) KM

Call me a fuddy–duddy, but I don't think hiring heroin addicts as security guards makes sense. Especially when they seem to open fire with little provocation. The district chief in Maywand, in southwestern Afghanistan, says that is what is happening. And American officers in the area agree that the guards are a problem, according to a fine article by Sean Naylor in the November 30 edition of Army Times. "They'll start firing at anything that's moving, and they will injure or kill innocent Afghans, and they'll destroy property," Lt. Col. Jeff French, a battalion commander, told Naylor. "We're getting fairly consistent complains about them," added Capt. Casey Thoreen, one of French's company commanders. "Everybody knows somebody who's been shot by the contractors." French has taken to pulling over convoys at gunpoint and taking their security chiefs in for questioning at his base.

Readiness – I/L – Professionalism

PMC employed troops are unprofessional – employers don’t put them up to military standards, and civilian business is by definition incompatible with military professionalism.

Isenberg 10 (“The Presumed and Possible PMC Professionalism”, David Isenberg, Huffington Post March 19, 2010, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11592)KM

In truth there has always been an element of unreality about the argument. One would never find military leaders saying about their troops, well, he's a soldier or marine so I can just trust him. Military leaders understand that part of professionalism means constantly checking and double–checking and training and retraining to ensure that people act the way you want them to. No officer would ever assume that once you achieve a certain degree of professionalism that it stays that way without continued effort. But even if you accept the industry argument there is always one or even a few in the crowd who are an exception. And when you have literally hundreds of thousands of PMC working around the world it only takes a few screw-up's to cause significant problems. Consider Daniel Fitzimons, who worked for British PMC ArmorGroup. Last August, after just three days in Iraq on a third tour as a private security contractor since leaving the British army he killed two of his fellow guards in a drunken brawl. And in December 2006 an off–duty Blackwater employee, Andrew J. Moonen, who served previously in the 82nd Airborne Division of the United States Army, had been drinking heavily and tried to make his way into the "Little Venice" section of the Green Zone, which houses many senior members of the Iraqi government. He was stopped by Iraqi bodyguards for Adil Abdul–Mahdi, the country's Shi'ite vice president, and shot one of them, Raheem Khalif, who died from three gunshot wounds. Are incidents like these just the inevitable death attributable to the fog of war? Or is there something more at work? A recent article in Parameters, the journal of the U.S. Army War College took a look at this in its most recent issue. The article "Contractors as Military Professionals?" by Gary Schaub, Jr., assistant professor at the Air War College and Volker C. Franke, associate professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University suggests that the military has a different view of what constitutes professionalism. Membership in the military profession traditionally has been limited to the uniformed personnel employed by the state. Although there is some debate regarding whether all military personnel are military professionals––be they officers, noncommissioned officers, career enlisted members, conscripts, reservists of any rank, or national guardsmen––there is a consensus that persons who utilize or manage violence as employees of private entities are not members of the military profession. The authors also write that in modern democracies, the military profession derives legitimacy from its license to implement the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force in combination with its subordination to civilian command and control. Submission of the military to civil authority is the sine qua non of military professionalism. Civilian professionals, by contrast, gain legitimacy through commitment to their employer's or client's interests. As employees of private firms, security contractors at best have divided loyalties, answering as they do to their employer for their performance rather than directly to their client.

Readiness – I/L – Professionalism – Instability

Private guards undermine stability and safety in regions where they’re deployed, empirically proven.

Naylor 9 (Sean D. Naylor – Staff writer Dec 2, 2009, http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/11/army\_convoy\_security\_112909w/ )KM

HUTAL, Afghanistan — Ill-disciplined private security guards escorting supply convoys to coalition bases are wreaking havoc as they pass through western Kandahar province, undermining the coalition’s counterinsurgency strategy here and leading to at least one confrontation with U.S. forces, say U.S. Army officers and Afghan government officials. The security guards are responsible for killing and wounding more than 30 innocent civilians during the past four years in Maywand district alone, said Mohammad Zareef, the senior representative in the district for Afghanistan’s intelligence service, the National Directorate of Security. Highway 1, the country’s main east–west artery, runs through Maywand and is the route taken by logistics convoys moving west from Kabul and Kandahar to coalition bases in Helmand province. The Afghan government’s district chief for Maywand says the men hired to protect the convoys are heroin addicts armed with rocket-propelled grenades and assault rifles. The contractors’ actions are frustrating U.S. military leaders in Maywand and undermining coalition efforts to bring a greater sense of security to the Afghan people, particularly because the locals associate the contractors with the coalition. “They’ll start firing at anything that’s moving, and they will injure or kill innocent Afghans, and they’ll destroy property,” said Lt. Col. Jeff French, commander of 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment and Task Force Legion, the main coalition force in Maywand since mid–September. French has vowed to take tough action against contractors involved in violent acts against civilians.

Readiness – I/L – Professionalism – Instability

PMC’s risk corruption that allow them to pursue opportunistic parallel forces, destroying prospects for peace.

Avant 7 (Deborah Avant Professor, Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University, “Contracting to Train Foreign Security Forces: Benefits, Risks and Implications for US Efforts in Iraq” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2007\_hr/070425–avant.pdf)KM

3. Political direction from civilians that are poor or opportunistic can undermine stability no matter how good the training. Military capacity need not translate into stability. Capable security instruments can overthrow governments or allow individual leaders or groups to pursue private or partisan ends. While the efforts of US troops are not impervious to this dynamic, PSCs are more likely to feed into opportunism. By their very nature, the flexibility of private forces can more easily be taken advantage of for private gain. This was immediately apparent in the creation of the Facilities Protection Services in Iraq. Reports were that whole militia groups joined in force leading salaries and training to further strengthened the militias. Erinys did not violate the terms of its contract by training these people: the contract did not anticipate this opportunistic action. Initially each Iraqi ministry had armed units from this force to protect their infrastructure and other units protected private property but the Facilities Protection Services is now being moved under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. As indicated above, though, similar infiltration has been reported to have occurred in the police forces. The Ministry of the Interior, under whom the Iraqi Police Service, the National Police and the Directorate of Border Enforcement serve, is also reported to have strong ties with Shiite militia groups. In response to concerns about the infiltration of the Iraqi police, DynCorp spokesman Greg Laguna said, “We don’t control the political situation, the political loyalties of the people.” There are two kinds of opportunism at work in Iraq. One is a very dangerous potential for a diffusion of control that could result in the development of parallel forces that do not work together under central government command. Lessons from a wide variety of transitional states suggest that parallel forces loyal to different leadership can undermine prospects for peace. A crucial element for the development of civilian control is a civilian hierarchy that centralizes command over all forces. The second is lower level corruption where officers pay kick backs to their superiors in order to get supplies and ghost soldiers and police help line political pockets. This second problem is exacerbated by the degree to which governance by local tribal and religious leaders take precedence over or are not well coordinated with the Iraqi constitution and Iraqi law. Both work to undermine training efforts and often they work together. Setting up a system where contracted trainers think it is their job to contribute to managing this kind of opportunism is quite difficult – but it is also vital if we are to avoid US dollars being used to undermine stability in Iraq. Coordination among the different forces in Iraq and the tensions between the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defense, and the national leadership is something that needs to be monitored carefully.

Readiness – I/L – Unit Cohesion

Contractors destroy inter–agency coordination and cohesion.

Avant 7 (Deborah Avant Professor, Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University, “Contracting to Train Foreign Security Forces: Benefits, Risks and Implications for US Efforts in Iraq” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2007\_hr/070425–avant.pdf)KM

2. Coordinating civilian, military and police forces for counterinsurgency missions – even in purely operational terms – is difficult. Here the additional risks posed by contracting loom large. With different entities training the various armed services in Iraq, the potential for coordination difficulties goes up. The very fact of contracting often divides what should be an integrated set of policies into a number of discreet tasks. Writing contracts to insure communication and coordination with a variety of entities is often difficult. This is particularly the case when events on the ground change in ways the contract has not anticipated. Unlike US forces, which are placed under a commander in the field and thus subject to his command, contractors are ultimately subject to the contract rather than to a commander.

Readiness – I/L – Unit Cohesion Key to Retention

Unit cohesion is key to morale, troop effectiveness and retention.

Hamilton 10 (Lieutenant–Colonel K.J. Hamilton, 2010 9–20 http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol\_12/iss\_3/CAJ\_Vol12.3\_06\_e.pdf)KM

Today, cohesion is still seen as a critical characteristic of military forces, with more emphasis being placed on its value. Achieving and maintaining cohesion affords the unit the opportunity for higher morale, increased effectiveness and hopefully greater retention. Its absence brings quick disintegration to the fi ghting force, low morale, and little desire to stay the course, a course fraught with high operational tempo and increasingly long periods of time separated from family and friends on dangerous missions abroad. Unfortunately, “…international and domestic realities have resulted in a paradox of declining military resources and increasing military missions.”2 Canada, like many nations, is being called upon to participate in many non–traditional operations that pose new challenges.3 Be it Haiti, Afghanistan or Sudan, these operations are calling more often upon our soldiers to work in a number of diverse locations under stressful and unfamiliar conditions, while simultaneously having to deal with government–dictated force structures for each mission. These force structures may be unsuitable for the tasks assigned.4 This operationallyfocused environment is the Canadian Forces (CF) of the future. With greater emphasis being placed on failed and failing states by many western governments, the CF, as one tool in the Canadian Government’s box of diplomacy options, will see ever increasing, high–risk operational deployments as Canada attempts to become a larger player on the international stage.

Cohesion is key to solvency – it’s required for unit strength and effectiveness.

Hamilton 10 (Lieutenant–Colonel K.J. Hamilton, 2010 9–20 http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol\_12/iss\_3/CAJ\_Vol12.3\_06\_e.pdf)KM

Cohesion is a characteristic that will enhance group effectiveness and is essential for combat forces to attain before being committed into harm’s way. This paper has suggested that there are variables that directly infl uence cohesion and which can be manipulated to enhance cohesion in units. “It is essential to strengthen unit cohesion because, during combat, isolation and loneliness assault the cohesive power of a unit.”62 With the introduction of MR, the Canadian Army is experiencing the challenges in building and fostering cohesion within the HR unit. Signifi cant attention has been focused on the Canadian Army’s plan of bringing together small groups of soldiers from across the country to form one cohesive task–tailored force for operations. Although the task is a diffi cult one, it is one that is achievable.

Readiness – I/L – Morale

Disparity in pay between US military and PMC’s hurts morale and reenlistment rates – it’s a disincentive to stay in the military.

Cotton et al 10 (Sarah K. Cotton, Ulrich Petersohn, Molly Dunigan, Q Burkhart, Megan Zander–Cotugno, Edward O’Connell, Michael Webber, “Hired Guns”, RAND, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND\_MG987.pdf)KM

Th e question of morale is closely related to the debate about the eff ect of higher contractor salaries on retention. Should the pay disparity between private security contractors and members of the armed forces dampen military morale, this could fuel the argument that higher contractor pay has a negative eff ect on retention, because lower morale would understandably be a disincentive to reenlist. Th e military personnel surveyed—all of whom had served in Iraq—did believe that the disparity in pay had been detrimental to morale in their units while they had been in the Iraqi theater (Figure 3.4). Again, this was the majority view regardless of age or rank. But more lower–ranking and younger military personnel were of this opinion than their higher–ranking and older counterparts. Th e fact that older and higher–ranking military personnel seem less bothered by the pay disparity with private security contractors suggests that one’s own fi nancial situation and, possibly, comfort with career decisions over a longer time horizon, may play a role in shaping perceptions on this issue.

PMC’s risk desertion, destroy morale, and destabilize the military they support.

Beutel 5 (PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES: THEIR EMERGENCE, IMPORTANCE, AND A CALL FOR GLOBAL REGULATION by M. Dee Beutel A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Norwich University, June 2005, http://princess.digitalfreaks.org/thesis/beutelmdthesis.pdf )KM

PMC’s that focus on supporting national militaries come with their own complex issues. The US military, for example, has very advanced weapons systems that it contracts the maintenance of to PMC’s. It is cheaper to hire a firm than train its own maintenance specialists. David Young, a deputy commander at the Defense Contract Management Agency, notes the major problem inherent in this system. "When you take these weapons systems into a combat zone, is contract support still reliable, especially if you are facing weapons of mass destruction? It's a source of worry when you're talking about chemical or biological weapons.”193 This high level of dependency on contractors leaves armed service personnel without a way to maintain such machinery if the PMC reneges on the contract. Not only is desertion by the PMC a concern, but also the morale of the national soldiers. As the government hires contractors to do these highly technical jobs but does not educate its own soldiers, it creates a sense of resentment. The situation escalates since these PMC’s’ employees receive up to triple in compensation than that of the national soldier. This reliance on contractor support makes it appear like a government cannot trust its own military, and creates destabilization within the regime itself. Sierra Leone is a perfect example of this; Executive Outcomes was contracted to provide security, and the state’s soldiers felt disenfranchised and disempowered. This loss of face was a natural progression to yet another coup.194

PMC’s reduce military morale

Naing 10 (Eric, writer for Open Congress, 2/23, http://www.opencongress.org/articles/view/1624-Sanders-Schakowsky-Push-Military-Contractor-Ban)

Two liberal Democrats are teaming up to stop the government from hiring private military contractors like Blackwater in war zones. Rep. Jan Schakowsky [D, IL-9] and Sen. Bernie Sanders [D, VT] today announced the introduction of the Stop Outsourcing Security Act, which prevents the government from using private firms for security, law enforcement, rescue and intelligence purposes. However, the act does allow for the use of contractors if the president notifies Congress why the military is incapable of taking on those jobs. The two Democrats argue that hiring private contractors is an unfair use of tax dollars and that it harms the morale of those in the armed services who are often paid far less to do the same jobs: High pay for contract workers in war zones both burdens taxpayers and saps military morale, Schakowsky and Sanders said. While some soldiers who risk their lives for their country struggle to support their families, private security company employees are paid two or three times as much, sometimes pocketing as much as $1,000 a day.

Readiness – I/L – Morale

PMC’s’ shorter deployments and higher pay hurts military morale

Harwood 8 (Matthew, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jul/23/military.iraq> , July 23, date accessed: 6/24/2010) AJK  
Besides the heightened risk Blackwater's actions have conferred on American troops, there is another reason American troops would like to see them go or at least shrink in size: Blackwater reminds them how much they put on the line for so little compensation. Blackwater contractors can deploy for small periods of time, perform similar tasks and take home a small fortune, making $600 a day. Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama summarised the hostility soldiers feel for contractors, [telling Defense News](http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3615116&c=FEA&s=INT): "I think it creates some difficult morale issues when you've got private contractors getting paid 10 times what an army private's getting paid for work that carries similar risks." And with such disproportionate pay for the same, if not less, work, it's no wonder military men with special forces training are reportedly leaving the military for PSCs, according to a study by the British-American Security Information Council.

Low morale leads to suicide & depression

Gordon 9 (Bob, <http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/282121> , date accessed: 6/24/2010) AJK  
Morale has fallen sharply among U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan since 2005 according to an Army mental health survey released on Friday. In Iraq, morale has increased slightly. Those were among findings of two teams of behavioral health experts who surveyed and interviewed troops in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of the sixth [Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT)](http://www.armymedicine.army.mil/news/releases/20091113mhatvi.cfm). According to the Army media release: The teams, working in Iraq from February to March and in Afghanistan from April to June, formed the sixth Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT VI) since the start of the wars, evaluating the psychological health of troops and the behavioral-health care resources in theater. The teams included research psychologists, a social worker, a psychiatric nurse and enlisted behavioral-health specialists. The survey tells a story of [two very different wars](http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20091114/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/us_troops_mental_health_22): The war in Iraq is drawing down, an end appears to be visible and mental health indicators are improving, while the war in Afghanistan is ramping up, with no end in sight and mental health indicators are declining. In Afghanistan, suicide rates are increasing while in Iraq the suicide rate did not go up in 2008 for the first time since 2004. Statistics on depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are mirror images. In Iraq this situation peaked in 2006 at 22 percent and fell to 13.3 for the survey period. In Afghanistan the figure was 21.4 percent. This represents a slight improvement over 2007 (23.4 percent) but double the 10.4 percent figure in 2005. The report also identified a link between lower morale accompanied by more mental health problems and [number of deployments](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/13/AR2009111304266.html?wprss=rss_nation). Three or more deployments and the likelihood of mental health problems increases significantly.

Depression in soldiers can be deadly

National Institute of Mental Health (<http://www.mhawisconsin.org/Uploads/business/bus_employee_depressed.pdf> , date accessed: 6/24/2010) AJK  
Symptoms of depression include Persistent sad or “empty” mood Feelings of hopelessness, pessimism Loss of interest or pleasure in ordinary activities, including sex Feelings of guilt, worthlessness, helplessness Decreased energy, fatigue, being “slowed down” Thoughts of death or suicide, suicide attempts Sleep disturbances (insomnia, early-morning waking, or oversleeping) Irritability Eating disturbances (loss of appetite and weight, or weight gain) Excessive crying Difficulty concentrating, remembering, making decisions Chronic aches and pains that don’t respond to treatment Symptoms of mania include Inappropriate elation Irritability Decreased need for sleep Increased talking, moving, and sexual activity Racing thoughts Disturbed ability to make decisions Grandiose notions Being easily distracted In the workplace, symptoms of depression often may be recognized by Decreased productivity Morale problems Lack of cooperation Safety risks, accidents Absenteeism Frequent statements about being tired all the time Complaints of unexplained aches and pains Alcohol and/or drug abuse If four or more of the symptoms of depression or mania persist for more than two weeks, or are interfering with work or family life, a thorough diagnosis is need. This should include a complete physical checkup and history of family health problems as well as an evaluation of possible symptoms of depression. Depression affects your employees Depression can affect your workers’ productivity, judgment, ability to work with others, and overall job performance. The inability to concentrate fully or make decisions may lead to costly mistakes or accidents. In addition, it has been shown that depressed individual s have high rates of absenteeism and are more likely to abuse alcohol and drugs, resulting in other problems on and off the job.

Readiness – I/L – Morale

PMC’s hurt military morale

RAND 2010 (June 16, <http://www.rand.org/news/press/2010/06/16/> , date accessed: 6/24/2010) AJK  
While U.S. government officials working in Iraq believe the use of armed private security contractors has been a useful strategy, many worry that the contractors have not always had a positive effect on U.S. foreign policy objectives, according to a new RAND Corporation [study](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG987/). A survey of staffers from the U.S. military and the U.S. State Department who worked in Iraq during 2003 to 2008 found that a sizeable minority viewed the widely reported abuses of power and the killing of civilians by security contractors as potentially detrimental to the overall American mission in the country. "While U.S. government workers don't believe these armed private security companies are 'running wild' in Iraq, they do have serious concerns about behavior that is unnecessarily threatening or belligerent," said Molly Dunigan, an author of the study and an associate political scientist with RAND, a nonprofit research organization. Most U.S. officials surveyed said they had not witnessed power abuses by contractors, but having even a few officials observe such behavior is troubling, particularly in the context of a continuing stability operation in which poor contractor behavior can very quickly become detrimental to U.S. goals. "Our research found evidence to support the view that, extrapolating from their experiences with private security contractors, Iraqis may take a negative view of the entire military occupation and coalition forces," Dunigan said. "However, we also found that certain private security firms were able to be flexible in their standard operating procedures and keep a 'low profile' among local civilians." The largest clients for armed security contractors in Iraq have been the U.S. Department of State, the Department of Defense and the U.S. Agency for International Development. In addition, news media companies, reconstruction contractors and nongovernmental organizations also hire contractors to fill security needs. However, there have been numerous reports of private security contractors committing serious and sometimes fatal abuses of power in Iraq, raising questions about the strategy. RAND researchers surveyed workers from the U.S. military and State Department who had been deployed to Iraq at least once between 2003 and 2008 to find out the extent to which armed private security contractors impose costs on the U.S. military effort, whether the costs are tempered by benefits, and how the use of private security contractors has affected military operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Armed private security contractors or similar forces have been used by the U.S. military in conflicts dating back to the American Revolution, but the extent of their use in the Iraq war has been unprecedented. The number of armed contractors employed in Operation Iraqi Freedom grew from approximately 10,000 in 2003 to 30,000 in 2007 before receding to 10,422 in 2009. At times, the number of all types of contractors—armed and unarmed—has exceeded the number of U.S. military personnel in the country. After a shooting incident in 2007 at Nisour Square where 17 Iraqis were shot and killed by an armed personal security detail working for Blackwater Worldwide, U.S. government officials improved oversight of contractors. Despite several reasons for skepticism about the impact of these measures, they do appear to have had at least somewhat of a beneficial effect thus far, Dunigan said. "We discovered much of the problem is that the international law covering these kinds of operations is murky—from 2003 to 2008, these firms were essentially legally immune to prosecution in Iraq," Dunigan said. "The 2009 Status of Forces Agreement between Iraq and the United States has given Iraq jurisdiction over these contractors, but they still are thought to, in effect, be legally immune from prosecution under U.S. law." Based on the findings, Dunigan and her colleagues said there are several things the U.S. could do to improve relations with the military and private security contractors. Since the survey findings indicate that contractors' higher pay relative to military employees has had a negative effect on military morale, the researchers recommend that the military pre-deployment training regimen could be improved to give more information on contractor functions, in an effort to increase the level of understanding and cohesion between contractors and the military in the field. Given the United States' counterinsurgency goals in Iraq, disconcertingly high numbers of surveyed Department of State personnel believed that contractors do not respect local and international laws and do not display an understanding of and sensitivity to the Iraqi people and their culture, Dunigan said. Further legal regulation via contract law, or a heightened determination on the part of the Department of Justice to utilize existing regulations to hold private security contractors accountable for their actions, might help alleviate the problems associated with contractor recklessness.

PMC’s hurt military morale & retention  
RAND 2010 (Sarah K. Cotton, Ulrich Petersohn, Molly Dunigan, Q Burkhart,

Megan Zander-Cotugno, Edward O’Connell, Michael Webber, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG987.sum.pdf>, date accessed: 6/24/2010) AJK Th e diff erence in pay between PSCs and troops is a recurring theme in interviews, anecdotal accounts, and analyses of how contractors are aff ecting the military. Employment with private security fi rms off ers signifi cantly better remuneration than military employment (Spearin, 2006). It also off ers a more moderate operational tempo, with better leave options and greater choice of deployment locations. Th e argument has been made that these more desirable work conditions have the unintended side eff ect of reducing rates of military retention. However, offi cials from the private security industry insist that their companies pose no challenge to military retention rates. Although data on U.S. military continuation rates indicate a fairly steady rate of continuation across the services throughout OIF, our survey data indicate that the prevailing perception among military personnel themselves is that the higher levels of pay earned by armed contractors do indeed adversely aff ect retention in the services (Figure S.1).

PMC’s adversely affect military morale  
RAND 2010 (Sarah K. Cotton, Ulrich Petersohn, Molly Dunigan, Q Burkhart,

Megan Zander-Cotugno, Edward O’Connell, Michael Webber, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG987.sum.pdf>, date accessed: 6/24/2010) AJK

A majority of the lower-ranking and younger military personnel surveyed also believed that the disparity in pay had been detrimental to morale in their units while they had been in the Iraqi theater.

Readiness – I/L – Morale

High pay for PMC’s undermines military morale

Sweet 2010 (Lynn, <http://blogs.suntimes.com/sweet/2010/02/schakowsky_sanders_push_to_ban.html>, date accessed: 6/24/2010) AJK

Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-Ill.) and Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) today introduced legislation that would phase out private security contractors in war zones. The United States last year employed more than 22,000 hired guns in Iraq and Afghanistan. They protected diplomats, trained military and police officers, repaired and maintained weapons systems. Contractors also were involved with interrogations and intelligence gathering. "The American people have always prided themselves on the strength, conduct, and honor of our United States military. I therefore find it very disturbing that now, in the midst of two wars and a global struggle against terrorism, we are relying more and more on private security contractors - rather than our own service members - to provide for our national defense," Sanders said. "The behavior of private contractors has endangered our military, hurt relationships with foreign governments, and undermined our missions overseas," Schakowsky added. The Stop Outsourcing Security Act would restore the responsibility of the American military to train troops and police, guard convoys, repair weapons, administer military prisons, and perform military intelligence. The bill also would require that all diplomatic security be undertaken by U.S. government personnel. The White House could seek exceptions, but those contracts would be subject to congressional oversight. The legislation also would subject contracts exceeding $5 million to congressional oversight. Agencies with military contractors would have to report the number of contractors employed, disclose the total cost of the contracts, and make public any disciplinary actions against employees. High pay for contract workers in war zones both burdens taxpayers and saps military morale, Schakowsky and Sanders said. While some soldiers who risk their lives for their country struggle to support their families, private security company employees are paid two or three times as much, sometimes pocketing as much as $1,000 a day.

High pay for PMC’s undermines military morale

Grim 2010 (Ryan, 2/23, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/02/23/house-dems-want-to-phase_n_473784.html>, date accessed: 6/24/2010) AJK  
One morning, Uncle Sam woke up and his military had been privatized. There had been no national debate. No congressional action. No sweeping White House order. It just happened. Today, the Pentagon employs more than 217,000 contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, doing the kind of work that enlisted military personnel would have performed in the past, according to a Congressional Research Service report. Now, there's a move in Congress to change that. On Tuesday, Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-Ill.) introduced the Stop Outsourcing Security Act, which would make it the military's responsibility to use its own personnel to train troops and police, guard convoys, repair weapons, run military prisons and do military intelligence activity. There are strategic reasons to move away from a reliance on contractors, says Schakowsky, a senior member of the intelligence committee. They damage the U.S. reputation with reckless behavior, are overly costly and hurt the morale of troops, who see private guards earning much more money than they do.

PMCs demoralize troops

McGarvey 4 (Ayelish, The American Prospect, <http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=outsourcing_private_ryan>, date accessed:6/27/2010) AJK  
I would imagine that the troops on the ground find this contracting business to be demoralizing. After all, they are paid relatively little for risking their lives. Is this correct? Have you heard any such sentiments from military personnel regarding the contractors? There are several sentiments. On one hand, people in the military often feel caught between challenges and pressures. There is so much work to be done, and contractors can fill some of the roles that they don't have the capacity to accomplish. In other cases, contractors do work that military personnel would prefer not to do. But the flip side? The pay for contractors is sometimes mind-boggling, especially when compared to the money soldiers are making. A good example of this difference: A truck driver for Halliburton is making the same amount as four-star General John Abizaid -- he's in charge of [everyone] … that's absurd! This can lead to some resentment, but it also affects the numbers of troops who re-up, resulting in retention problems. And finally, there are issues of chain of command, and appropriateness of roles. There are many people moving in and out of these zones who are not officially part of the military chain of command. This is [cause for concern] for many local commanders.

Readiness – I/L – Morale and Retention

PMC’s drain human capital and destroy morale

Kidwell 5 (Deborah C, Assistant Professor of Military History at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, “Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies”, <http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/kidwell.pdf> AD: 6/24/10) jl

Several of the factors identified by Singer as destabilizing influences exist in current deployments. Contractor employees can receive higher pay and more generous benefits for similar work. The yearly base pay for an Army specialist or corporal with more than four years of experience is $21,769, while civilian truck drivers can earn $80,000 to $100,000 annually.70 Blackwater USA compensates private security contractors in the range of $450 to $800 per day.71 The first $80,000 of civilian pay is nontaxable if the employees meet certain “days in-country” requirements, while soldier bonuses (combat pay) are tax free. Civilians also retain the right to resign whenever they feel uncomfortable with their working con­ditions, a luxury not generally afforded to military personnel. One civilian driver recently claimed that only three employees remain from his original group of about 20.72 Pay differentials may eventually lead to lower levels of retention (as enlistments expire, former soldiers may opt to work for contractors) and the necessity of higher bonuses (enlistment and reten­tion) and hazard pay. Reductions in the military force and the proliferation of PMC’s translate into fewer promotion opportunities and the eventual elimination of many uniformed positions. Moreover, a recent DOD review of 32,155 positions identified 9,500 additional positions that were “candi­dates for military to civilian conversion.”73 Unequal economic advantages and sense of well-being—especially when regular military units provide security for contractor convoys, essentially taking more risk for less pay and less job security—can be extremely detrimental to soldier morale.

PMC’s trade-off with military retention and recruitment and hurt morale.

Kupcu and Cohen 5 (“Privatizing Foreign Policy” Maria Figueroa Kupcu and Michael A. Cohen, New America Foundation Fall 2005 http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2005/privatizing\_foreign\_policy\_6702)KM

In addition to thorny political and legal issues, the increasing reliance on PMC’s may also be eroding the capacity of the very states that employ them. If not properly managed, contracting can hamstring a government’s ability to innovate and also retain skilled individuals. An experienced Special Forces operative can earn up to $250,000 annually with a PMC -- two to ten times more than in the military -- plus benefits, vacation, and the choice to opt out of risky operations. The exodus of military personnel to the private sector has significant longterm implications for a military that has spent years and taxpayers’ money preparing highly trained soldiers. To take one example, there are more former members of Britain’s elite Special Air Service (SAS) serving with PMC’s in Iraq than there are members of the SAS in the British force there.32 Mixing public and private warriors in security operations is also affecting the morale of enlisted troops and is leading to practical dilemmas in the field. In Fallujah, the political ramifications of the violent deaths of Blackwater employees forced military planners to engage insurgents sooner than they would have preferred. The subsequent combat operations resulted in significant U.S. casualties and further strained relations between the military ranks and contractors.33

Readiness – I/L – Morale Key to Readiness

Morale key to readiness

The Washington Times 2 (9/23, “Military Morale for the Long Haul”, Questia)

President Bush was right to say that the war on terrorism will be long and hard. Our military planners are undoubtedly looking not only at the coming campaign in Iraq, but what will come after it, and how we will meet those challenges. One part of any military force's ability to fight is its morale. The morale of our front-line forces - the Special Operations troops, Air Force and Navy pilots, and the others who are first to go in harm's way - is very high. Morale is a key to fighting readiness, and the great majority of the people serving in these high-profile forces have a concomitantly high morale. But our sources tell us that all is not well with many of the others, including many who may have to go into combat in the near future.

Moral is key to sustainability and retention

MacLellan 10 (Kylie, Reuters, 28 Feb 2010, <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE61Q0HS.htm>)KFC

A lack of support for British soldiers between deployments is damaging morale and risks undermining the army's ability to sustain its campaign in Afghanistan over the coming years, the head of the army said. In a memo to the Defence Ministry published in the Sunday Times newspaper, General Sir David Richards said that while improvements had been made to operational resources, the treatment of soldiers on their return home could have a long term impact on retention. "The deteriorating experience of soldiers and their families in the period between tours...is disaffecting attitudes, damaging morale and risks undermining our ability to sustain the campaign over the next years," he said. "We need our soldiers to be ready, mentally and physically, to endure repeated tours in Afghanistan in a harsh environment, with the real prospect of significant casualties each time." Rising British casualties in the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan have brought criticism that Britain's armed forces are poorly equipped and underfunded. With an overhaul of defence strategy due after an election expected in May and severe public spending cuts needed to tackle a record budget deficit, many have warned of the risk of squeezing defence spending. Richards' gives a summary of the findings of his briefing team, who provide regular direct feedback on what the army is thinking and feeling, which had highlighted issues such as shortages of training equipment and poor housing. The team spent four months visiting 44 army units in Britain, Germany, Northern Ireland and Cyprus, collecting the views of more than 5,000 soldiers and their families, he said. "Investing in the deployed operation is only part of the requirement," said Richards. "Support to our service personnel between deployments and to their families' quality of life must become a fundamental tenet of sustaining the main effort."

Moral and retention have a direct correlation.

Klein 6 (Avi, May 2006, <http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2006/0605.klein.html>)KFC

In addition to direct surveys, statistics on retention—the number of soldiers eligible to reenlist who do so—can also provide hints about morale. Although the army has had to use sleight of hand to mask its faltering recruitment rates, reenlistment numbers have actually been better than expected. Indeed, since 2003, the Army has been revising its expected retention numbers upwards. In 2000, the Army projected that 20,000 soldiers completing their first term would reenlist, and 21,402 took up the challenge. In 2005, it expected 26,935 to re-up, and 27,818 did. The Marines—who invariably have the strongest combat morale—have also been successful, retaining 6,152 troops in 2005, 300 more than in 2000. "High retention is a reflection of high morale," says Army spokesman Sheldon Smith, "and, conversely, low retention would reflect low morale." (The big exception to the trend is the reserves, where retention numbers have been declining. But experts attribute that outlier not to political criticism of the effort but with other factors particular to the reserves: Namely, reservists have been required to stay in the theater and away from their homes and families for far longer than they expected to upon signing up. This is a reality that Republicans would have trouble blaming on anyone else.)

Readiness – I/L – Morale Key to Readiness

Military readiness dependent on morale

Spencer 00 (Jack, Policy Analyst for Defense and National Security for the Institute for International Studies, The Facts About Military Readiness)

In recent months, the major foreign policy issue debated by the candidates in the 2000 presidential election campaign has been military readiness. Governor George W. Bush has accused the Clinton Administration of neglecting the military, referring to the status of the U.S. armed forces as “a military in decline.” Vice President Al Gore, on the other hand, countered that the military is the “strongest and the best” in the world. Readiness measures the ability of a military unit.to accomplish its assigned missions. Logistics, available spare parts, training, equipment, and morale all contribute to readiness.

**Morale key to military readiness**

Spencer 00 (Jack, Policy Analyst for Defense and National Security for the Institute for International Studies, The Facts About Military Readiness)

According to an August 1999 U.S. General Accounting Office review, more than half of the officers and enlisted personnel surveyed “were dissatisfied and intended to leave the military after their current obligation or term of enlistment was up.” Because U.S. servicemen are the military’s greatest asset, a ready U.S. military requires bright, well-trained, and highly motivated active and reserve personnel. Unfortunately, due largely to low morale, the services are finding it difficult to recruit and retain servicemen. Conclusion. Under the Clinton Administration, the U.S military has suffered under a dangerous combination of reduced b gets, diminished forces, and increased missions. The result has been a steep decline in readiness and an overall decline in U.S. military strength. Nearly a decade of misdirected policy coupled with a myopic modernization strategy has rendered America’s armed forces years away from top form. To deny that the United States military has readiness problems is to deny the men and women in uniform the respect they deserve. America’s military prowess can be restored, but policymakers must first admit there is a problem. Only then can the President and Congress work together to reestablish America’s top readiness capabilities.

Readiness – I/L – Generic Retention

PMFs drain the militaries human capital

Singer 4 (Peter W, director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings, http://www.dcaf.ch/\_docs/pp04\_private–military.pdf, AD: 6/22/10) jl

While soldiers have always had competing job options in the civilian marketplace, such as the ballyhooed example of Air Force pilots leaving to fly airliners, the PMF industry is different in two key manners. The first is that offers from PMFs keep the individual within the military sphere, meaning that there is not a requisite additional training and the transition is far smoother, in some cases effortless. Many PMF employees also believe that, as they are carrying out a public function, they carry on the same code of honour and patriotism, the only difference being that they are being better paid. But, the PMF industry also differs by being directly competitive with the military. It not only draws its employees from the military, it does so to fill military roles, thus shrinking the military’s purview. The overall process is thus brilliant from a business standpoint and self-defeating from the military’s perspective. The PMF uses public funds to provide higher pay and then charges back the military at a higher rate, all for the human capital investment that the public institution originally paid for.

Private firms crush force retention – massive pay difference

Singer 4 (Peter W, director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings, http://www.dcaf.ch/\_docs/pp04\_private–military.pdf, AD: 6/22/10) jl

While the data is still hard to come by, as the retention issue in the U.S. has become politicized and “stop–loss” programs that force soldiers to stay in the military skew the results, it is inarguable that the PMF industry draws its employee base from former soldiers who are often exceptionally talented. It is also inarguable that PMFs directly recruit both soldiers in Iraq and those just returned (indeed, beyond the advertisements in military magazines and handing out of cards in the operational zone, most job fairs take place at military base areas), offering them an opportunity to face the same risks, just at several times the pay.

PMFs destroy retention – economic incentives for PMFs

Singer 4 (Peter W, director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings, http://www.dcaf.ch/\_docs/pp04\_private–military.pdf, AD: 6/22/10) jl

A more particular problem area that Iraq has brought to the fore is how an expanding PMF marketplace has the potential to hurt the military’s retention of talented soldiers. Soldiers in the PMF industry can make anywhere from 2-10 times what they make in the regular military. In Iraq, the rates have grown astronomically, with former U.S. special forces garnering as much as $1000 a day, former South African troops making as much as $4–6000 a month, and Nepalese Ghurka fighters making more than $2000 a month, each far past what they would make at home.

Readiness – I/L – US Retention

PMC’s destroy retention – no incentives to join the military

Kidwell 5 (Deborah C, Assistant Professor of Military History at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, “Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies”, http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/kidwell.pdf AD: 6/24/10) jl

The third critical question that policy makers must consider is far-reaching and more difficult to assess. Does the current extensive use of private military companies ultimately benefit American society and its citizens? Government managers must consider the potentially signifi­cant implications that derive from the increased use of contractors on the battlefield. Americans may do well to consider the social legacy of par­ticipation in World War II—the competency and independence women gained in the home and workplace, the educational levels attained through GI Bill benefits, and the affluence that resulted from full employment. It is reasonable to assume the current policy will have a similarly unique legacy. It is too early to identify many of these possible changes; however, a few are clear. The extensive use of private military companies can be disruptive to civil-military relations. More study is necessary to determine the long-term implications of change to the traditional dynamic. The loss of an avenue of national service for young people not bound for college may lead to a loss of prestige for military service. In turn, recruitment and retention may become more costly and difficult as the private sector offers more lucrative employment opportunities for military skills. The psycho­logical cost of more frequent combat engagements is unknown and may be an untenable choice.

PMC’S don’t only destroy readiness – they make conflict worse

Kidwell 5 (Deborah C, Assistant Professor of Military History at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, “Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies”, http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/kidwell.pdf AD: 6/24/10) jl

The second relevant question requires a consideration of the com­plex relationship between the social, economic, and political aspects that contribute to military capabilities. Does the use of private contractors in the current environment contribute to military effectiveness? The present military force structure shows signs of fatigue and instability that indicate the overuse of contractors may detract from overall military effectiveness and capability. Certainly, PMC’s contribute skills that can be costly to acquire and maintain in the military; in addition, significant cost savings can result from a smaller core of military personnel in times of relative peace, while retaining the capability to respond to contingencies. These concepts also conform to the political traditions of smaller government and the traditional distaste for a large “standing army” that are the corner­stones of American government. Theories of business management also point toward the useful aspects of structuring military forces with a mix of private and public assets. However, overreliance on theory rather than practice and private assets rather than public, particularly during prolonged periods of conflict, has no precedent. In sum, PMC’s lack the exemplary performance record of American military forces in combat, coordinated action and protection is more difficult, costs rise unpredictably, and legal ambiguity often leads to great personal risks to both contractor employees and military units. Thus, a number of significant risks accrue to the exten­sive use of contractors on the battlefield. This increased risk detracts from overall military effectiveness.

Readiness – I/L – US Retention

PMC’s create a cycle where military talent is hired away which creates demand for more PMC’s who steal more talent.

Cotton et al 10 (Sarah K. Cotton, Ulrich Petersohn, Molly Dunigan, Q Burkhart, Megan Zander–Cotugno, Edward O’Connell, Michael Webber, “Hired Guns”, RAND, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND\_MG987.pdf)KM

Th e diff erence in pay between private security contractors and troops is a recurring theme in interviews, anecdotal accounts, and analyses of how contractors are aff ecting the military. Christopher Spearin, for instance, notes that the employment decisions of special operations forces (SOF) are aff ected mainly by remuneration and operational tempo, and that private sector employment off ers both better remuneration and more moderate operational tempo than military employment (Spearin, 2006). In July 2005, former SOF personnel in Iraq were earning approximately $12,000–$13,000 per month. In contrast, some private security contractors were being paid as much as $33,000 per month (GAO, 2005). At the same time, the Global War on Terrorism has only increased the operational tempo for U.S. special forces, which had already seen a threefold increase from 1991 to 1997 in the number of soldiers deployed every week. Employment with private security fi rms off ers a more fl exible schedule, with better leave options and greater choice of deployment locations (Spearin, 2006). Arguments have been made that the comparatively desirable work conditions off ered by the private security industry have the unintended side eff ect of reducing rates of military retention. Because private security fi rms generally hire only those with at least some former military experience, military retention rates (or continuation rates, as noted below), rather than recruitment rates, can off er some insight into the question of a tug–of–war between the military and private sector over skilled personnel. As Ralph Peters, a retired Army offi cer and frequent commentator on military issues, suggested in 2007, Th e disgraceful cycle works like this: Contractors hire away military talent. Th e military fi nds itself short of skilled workers, so contractors get more contracts. With more money, they hire away more uniformed talent (quoted in Lardner, 2007, p. 3).

High salaries of PMC’s create tradeoffs with military retention.

Isenberg 4 (David Isenberg Research Report 2004, BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL, http://www.scribd.com/doc/9572460/Private–Military–Companies–in–Iraq)km

The lure of higher salaries is causing an exodus of U.S. and British special forces to PMC’s just as these military forces are being asked to play an increasing role in combating terrorism and helping to conduct nation–building operations worldwide. Competition over elite troops from private companies is so intense that the U.S. and British military commanders are formulating new pay, benefits, and educational incentives to try to retain them.

Readiness – I/L – US Retention

PMC’s hurt readiness – they divert soldiers to the private sector and lack the same military discipline that makes an army effective.

Gulam 10 (‘The rise and rise of Private Military Companies’ By Hyder Gulam, BA, BN, LLB, Post Grad Dip (Advanced Clinical Nursing), March 12, 2010 http://www.peaceopstraining.org/theses/gulam.pdf)KM

A 1991 RAND report looking at private provision of professional military education programs in the U.S. found no cost savings. Privatising training may actually undermine the U.S. military’s potential for military engagement. When the U.S. government poured funds for training into PMC’s rather than into its armed forces, it buoyed private expertise over public expertise. It also altered the career aspiration of military personnel, adding the private sector into consideration and highlighting to the armed force that training was ‘not a core task’.114 Employing PMC’s reduces the need to involve both Parliament and the Australian public in foreign policy. Using private contractors may make foreign operations easier in the short run, because politicians do not have to make the case to send ‘our boys (and girls)’overseas into harms way.115 The other problem is that PMC’s might gain access to classified information or defence forces training manuals or equipment. The presence of PMC’s in other countries could also cause confusion between their activities and official activities being conducted by Government agencies or the military in those countries.116 PMC’s often have a weak command structure and disciplinary problems. Unlike State armed forces, where the legitimacy of command rests unquestioningly in its officers, PMC’s are often characterised by requiring that commanders prove their strength. The imposition of military discipline within PMC’s has generally required violence.117 The deterrence on wrongdoing – military discipline law – does not really operate. Regular military personnel are subject to courts–martial or international law, but for PMC employees it is not clear what law applies.

Readiness – I/L – US Retention

PMC’s hurt military retention – people leave their jobs to get better pay at PMC’s.

Isenberg 4 (David Isenberg Research Report 2004, BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL, http://www.scribd.com/doc/9572460/Private–Military–Companies–in–Iraq)km

The lure of higher salaries is reportedly causing an exodus of the U.S. military’s most seasoned members of Special Operation Forces (SOF) to higher-paying civilian security jobs in places like Baghdad and Kabul, just as the special forces are being asked to play an increasingly pivotal role in combating terror and helping to conduct nation–building operations worldwide. Of course the same problem exists in many other areas of military specialism, such as information technology. Why work in the Army’s tech operations when you can get a job at three times the remuneration in the private sector? Reportedly, exhausted American and British special forces personnel are resigning in record numbers and taking highly-paid jobs as private security guards in Iraq and Afghanistan. Competition over elite troops from private companies is so intense that the U.S. Special Operations Command has formulated new pay, benefits, and educational incentives to try to retain them. “Competition with the civilian world has never been greater,” said Gen. Bryan "Doug" Brown, commander of the 49,000–strong U.S. Special Operations Command, in congressional testimony.59 Senior enlisted members of the Army Green Berets or Navy Seals with 20 years or more experience now earn about $50,000 in base pay, and can retire with a $23,000 pension. But private security companies, whose services are in growing demand in Iraq and Afghanistan, are offering salaries of $100,000 to nearly $200,000 a year to the most experienced of them.60 But there is no guarantee beyond the contracted period and it is only paid when deployed, i.e., two on, one off – only paid in effect two–thirds of the annual sum. Similarly, British officials say more than 300 soldiers have left the armed forces in six months to take up lucrative jobs with private companies such as Olive Security, Armour Security, Global and USDID.61 In particular, the demand from PMC’s operating in Iraq for former Special Air Service and Special Boat Service soldiers is such that between May 2003 and December 2004, between 40 and 60 men are expected to have sought premature voluntary release from the army and Royal Marines. In operational terms, this could mean that the equivalent of one entire Sabre squadron out of a total of six in the SAS and SBS is on its way to seek its fortune in the new Iraq.62 According to one British press report there are more ex–SAS soldiers acting as advisers for “private military companies” than currently serving in the elite, 300–man regiment based near Hereford. More than 40 regular SAS soldiers are understood to have applied to leave the Army in the last year, many because of the lure of short–term contracts in Iraq.63

PMC pay is skewed which exacerbates retention problems and creates competition with the military.

Isenberg 4 (David Isenberg Research Report 2004, BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL, http://www.scribd.com/doc/9572460/Private–Military–Companies–in–Iraq)km

As an article in Fortune magazine noted, once the big PMC’s started competing for contracts in Iraq the economics of the industry changed: They lured many of the firms’ finest with what mercenaries respond to best: money. Standard wages for PSD (personal security detail) pros were previously running about $ 300 a day, according to people who know this market. Once Blackwater started recruiting for its first big job, guarding Paul Bremer, the rate shot up to $ 600 a day. Global Risk no longer had a lock on the market for Gurkhas, whose monthly wages rose from $ 800 to as high as $ 2,000 today. The big firms didn’t grab all the business by any means, but they squeezed the margins and exacerbated small firms’ biggest problem: a shortage of people with management skills.64 Largely lost in all the usual media blather about “supporting our boys” is the fact that the migration of active duty soldiers to the PMC sector reflects an obsolete military pay system, at least in the United States. As one former U.S. marine wrote: Paying civilians to play soldier makes no sense. Today the United States employs between 7,000 and 17,000 civilians in infantry roles. The pay is extraordinary, hovering between $500 per day and $1,000 per day for everything from site security (for government compounds throughout Iraq) to convoy/company security to personal security (for dignitaries). This money comes tax-free in a combat zone. There are four problems here: morale deflation, gross monetary waste, tactical confusion, and direct competition for a tiny talent pool. Soldiers look at security contractors and think: Why the hell is he making eight times my salary for performing the same job? Is the military that pock–marked with overage and inefficiency? Using bottom–up cost–accounting, the military is essentially buying out its most experienced soldiers and luring them out of the active ranks (if Stop– Loss is ever lifted, that is) with rich contracts, even as it desperately seeks new recruits. Worse, it’s paying introduction fees to private security companies like Dynacorps and Blackwater for the people it recruited in the first place. How in the world did this happen?

Readiness – I/L – US Retention

The benefits of PMC’s incentivize people into joining contractors instead of reenlisting, there are more PMC’s than soldiers in combat.

Ward 10 (10, 2010 Wolfgang Ward, “Many Choose Private Security over Reenlistment” http://www.militaryspot.com/news/item/many\_choose\_private\_security\_over\_reenlistment/)KM

Before the modern wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the ratio of military to private security contractors was 50:1. Now with the increase in outsourcing, private security pulls ahead with 1.6:1. That’s right; there are more contractors on the ground in Iraq, Afghanistan and Israel, than the military. There are many choices that you can make when you are looking into your career opportunities and choices as you are coming up on the end of your enlistment term. Many veterans, whether combat or not, consider looking at the advantages of going into private military companies (PMC) as an alternative. Wasn’t this the warning of President Eisenhower claiming the military–industrial complex? Or is it this just another case of changing times and the inevitable? “Why wouldn’t I just go into one of the millions of security companies if they are willing to pay me ten times as much and do one-quarter of the work,” says Marine Corps veteran Scott Olson, a recently discharged veteran. “All my friends are doing it.” Is it really all that surprising that people are choosing to go into these PMC’s and not reenlisting? Veterans have the opportunity to weigh the benefits of how they think the best option is for them and their family. Both military and private security delivers benefits for both. Which one provides you the best benefits and options is an individual choice. An increasing awareness of these companies has had different perceptions from people getting into the military and people coming out of the military. “I have a friend who is a contractor in Iraq and makes over $100K a year,” stated Neil Fogel, a recent high–school graduate entering the Navy. “That’s why I’m going in. To get my military experience to get a job with a private security company.” Recruiters from PMC’s are not setting up booths at high–schools to get these young Americans to join. There seems to be a common viral message encompassing the route of how people should consider their career. Should they go into the military or into private security?

Readiness – I/L – 5 Star Generals Retention

Private firms destroy professional development in the career military – eliminates the best 5 star generals

Singer 4 (Peter W, director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings, http://www.dcaf.ch/\_docs/pp04\_private–military.pdf, AD: 6/22/10) jl

However, there are also brewing concerns within the military itself about what this industry will mean for the health of the profession, as well as general resentment over firms and individuals using the profession (and the training and human investment that the military provided) for personal or organizational profit. Soldiers look at many of the roles taken over by firms – from training to technical support – and understand why they were outsourced, but worry whether the loss of these professional skills and functions will be permanent and/or hamstring the military in the future. For example, interviewees in both the military and the PMF industry agree that many of the top logisticians and combat skills trainers in the world (including those that train U.S. forces before they deploy into Iraq) now lie in the PMF industry,. Likewise, an increasing number of the teaching slots at military command staff colleges are outsourced. In the past, such warrior-intellectual slots served as the breeding ground for future generals (by some reports almost half of all U.S. Army division commanders in World War II). With military privatization, this is lost.

Readiness – I/L – Retention Key to Heg

Prolonged troop shortages will cripple American hegemony

Kagan and O’Hanlon, 2007 (Frederick and Michael \*P.h.d from Yale, professor at Westpoint\*\* Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution, April 2007 “The Case for Larger Ground Forces” Stanley Foundation, Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide)KM

The Future of the Two–War Planning Framework—and Future Military Contingencies for the United States US defense planning since the end of the Cold War has been organized around the need to be prepared to fight two overlapping wars. In 2001 the George W. Bush administration modified the two–war concept somewhat, but kept much of the basic logic and the associated force structure (which Kagan has argued was, from the beginning, always inadequate to support the strategy).1 In the aftermath of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, further changes are now needed in America’s armed forces and their undergirding defense strategy. The deterrent logic of being able to do more than one thing at a time is rock solid. If involved in one major conflict, and perhaps occupied in one or more smaller ongoing operations around the world, the United States also needs additional capability to deter other crises—as well as maintain its forward presence at bases around the world and on the seas, carry out joint exercises with allies, and handle smaller problems. The current conflict in Iraq highlights the limitations of our two–war force structure, since the US military is patently unable to contemplate another “major theater war” at the present with anything other than horror. But our inability to cope with such a scenario only increases the likelihood that one will emerge, as opportunistic enemies take advantage of our perceived weakness and overcommitment.

Readiness key to hegemony

**Spencer 00** (Jack, Policy Analyst for Defense and National Security for the Institute for International Studies, http://www.heritage.org/Research/ MissileDefense/BG1394.cfm )

Military readiness is vital because declines in America’s military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace.

Readiness – I/L – Ground Forces Key

Ground forces key – they’re critical to deterrence in multiple scenarios and need expansion now.

Kagan and O’Hanlon, 2007 (Frederick and Michael \*P.h.d from Yale, professor at Westpoint\*\* Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution, April 2007 “The Case for Larger Ground Forces” Stanley Foundation, Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide)KM

Sound US grand strategy must proceed from the recognition that, over the next few years and decades, the world is going to be a very unsettled and quite dangerous place, with Al Qaeda and its associated groups as a subset of a much larger set of worries. The only serious response to this international environment is to develop armed forces capable of protecting America’s vital interests throughout this dangerous time. Doing so requires a military capable of a wide range of missions—including not only deterrence of great power conflict in dealing with potential hotspots in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Persian Gulf but also associated with a variety of Special Forces activities and stabilization operations. For today’s US military, which already excels at high technology and is increasingly focused on re–learning the lost art of counterinsurgency, this is first and foremost a question of finding the resources to field a large-enough standing Army and Marine Corps to handle personnel intensive missions such as the ones now under way in Iraq and Afghanistan. Let us hope there will be no such large–scale missions for a while. But preparing for the possibility, while doing whatever we can at this late hour to relieve the pressure on our soldiers and Marines in ongoing operations, is prudent. At worst, the only potential downside to a major program to strengthen the military is the possibility of spending a bit too much money. Recent history shows no link between having a larger military and its overuse; indeed, Ronald Reagan’s time in office was characterized by higher defense budgets and yet much less use of the military, an outcome for which we can hope in the coming years, but hardly guarantee. While the authors disagree between ourselves about proper increases in the size and cost of the military (with O’Hanlon preferring to hold defense to roughly 4 percent of GDP and seeing ground forces increase by a total of perhaps 100,000, and Kagan willing to devote at least 5 percent of GDP to defense as in the Reagan years and increase the Army by at least 250,000), we agree on the need to start expanding ground force capabilities by at least 25,000 a year immediately. Such a measure is not only prudent, it is also badly overdue.

Ground forces key to solvency – no tech can substitute a large force as a stabilizing force.

Kagan and O’Hanlon, 2007 (Frederick and Michael \*P.h.d from Yale, professor at Westpoint\*\* Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution, April 2007 “The Case for Larger Ground Forces” Stanley Foundation, Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide)km

Moreover, if there was any doubt, Iraq proves technology will not let us cut back on people. Other recent operations in Afghanistan (as well as Bosnia, Kosovo, Panama, and so on) also revealed the ineffectiveness of attempting to replace people with machines on a large scale. In most of the post–conflict stabilization (or counterinsurgency) operations we have seen or can foresee, there can be no substitute for large numbers of trained and capable ground forces, deployed for a long time. It is unacceptable, therefore, simply to demand a zero-sum soldiers-versus-systems trade-off in the defense budget. Prioritizing systems at the expense of soldiers has had dreadful consequences. If we overcompensate by now doing the reverse, it would store up enormous danger for the future. The truth is that the nation is at war now, the strategic horizon is very dark, and armed forces that were seized in the strategic pause of the 1990s are inadequate today. Transformation must proceed, possibly with a change in its intellectual basis and its precise course, and the ground forces must be expanded significantly. Meeting both requirements will demand increased defense expenditures for many years into the future, although there are some approaches we could pursue to mitigate that increase. But whatever the cost, a nation at war and in a dangerous world must maintain military forces adequate to protect its vital interests, or else face an intolerable degree of national insecurity.

Readiness – Impact – Solves War

Readiness is key to prevent war.

Spencer 00 (Jack, Policy Analyst – Heritage Foundation, The Facts About Military Readiness, 9–15, http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/ BG1394.cfm)KM

The evidence indicates that the U.S. armed forces are not ready to support America's national security requirements. Moreover, regarding the broader capability to defeat groups of enemies, military readiness has been declining. The National Security Strategy, the U.S. official statement of national security objectives,3 concludes that the United States "must have the capability to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames."4 According to some of the military's highest–ranking officials, however, the United States cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan have all expressed serious concerns about their respective services' ability to carry out a two major theater war strategy.5 Recently retired Generals Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps and George Joulwan of the U.S. Army have even questioned America's ability to conduct one major theater war the size of the 1991 Gulf War.6 Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace.

Tech isn’t enough – a large ground force is key to solving all threats.

Peters 6 (Ralph, former Army officer, “The Counterrevolution in Military Affairs,” The Weekly Standard, 2/6,

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/649qrsob.asp)KM

From Iraq's Sunni Triangle to China's military high command, the counterrevolution in military affairs is well underway. We are seduced by what we can do; our enemies focus on what they must do. We have fallen so deeply in love with the means we have devised for waging conceptual wars that we are blind to their marginal relevance in actual wars. Terrorists, for one lethal example, do not fear "network–centric warfare" because they have already mastered it for a tiny fraction of one cent on the dollar, achieving greater relative effects with the Internet, cell phones, and cheap airline tickets than all of our military technologies have delivered. Our prime weapon in our struggles with terrorists, insurgents, and warriors of every patchwork sort remains the soldier or Marine; yet, confronted with reality's bloody evidence, we simply pretend that other, future, hypothetical wars will justify the systems we adore––purchased at the expense of the assets we need. Stubbornly, we continue to fantasize that a wondrous enemy will appear who will fight us on our own terms, as a masked knight might have materialized at a stately tournament in a novel by Sir Walter Scott. Yet, not even China--the threat beloved of major defense contractors and their advocates--would play by our rules if folly ignited war. Against terrorists, we have found technology alone incompetent to master men of soaring will--our own flesh and blood provide the only effective counter. At the other extreme, a war with China, which our war gamers blithely assume would be brief, would reveal the quantitative incompetence of our forces. An assault on a continent-spanning power would swiftly drain our stocks of precision weapons, ready pilots, and aircraft. Quality, no matter how great, is not a reliable substitute for a robust force in being and deep reserves that can be mobilized rapidly.

Readiness – Impact – Threat Perception

The perception of U.S. military weakness is also giving the green light to adversaries to proliferate – only the plan can roll back this threat

Kagan 6 (Frederick, former professor of military history at West Point and resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, “New Thinking, Old Realities”, National Security Outlook, 10/16/06 http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25010,filter.all/pub\_detail.asp)KM

Above all, America’s conventional military strength remains critical, traditional power politics continue to control the world, and the lessons of thousands of years of human history still apply. In counterinsurgencies, the first requirement of success is the establishment of security throughout the country or region. This task is manpower-intensive and incompatible with a small footprint approach. Political, economic, and reconciliation tracks are not sustainable without security, as countless historical examples show. Success in Iraq––and Afghanistan––requires a heavier deployment of U.S. forces with orders not just to train indigenous soldiers, but also to bring peace to those troubled lands. Military strength and the visible will to use it is also essential to persuading regimes like those in Tehran and Pyongyang to abandon programs they wish to pursue. We have been trying the diplomatic approach, unsupported by meaningful military threat, for nearly fifteen years with North Korea, and the result has been utter failure. A similar approach in Iran will not be more successful. It may not be necessary to attack those two states to force them to give up their weapons of mass destruction programs, but there is no hope of convincing them to do so if they do not believe that we can and will defeat them. Nor is there any likelihood that a “small footprint” (almost a “no footprint”) approach in the Horn of Africa will contain the Islamist threat there. The United States is at war, and the enemy is the same one we have been fighting for sixty years. A totalitarian regime controls North Korea. Totalitarian ideologues hold power in Iran, have just seized power in southern Somalia, and seek power throughout the Middle East. Their goals are subtly different, but they share several key features: the destruction of democracy, which they hate; the elimination of liberalism and religious toleration; and the destruction of the United States. Victory will require a mobilization of America’s military might and the willingness to use it. Adaptive and unpredictable enemies like al Qaeda will require us to change part of our approach and some of our forces constantly. Winning throughout the Muslim world will require economic, political, and cultural initiatives alongside the use of military power. But nothing will be possible without adequate military force, which the United States is currently lacking. If we do not begin the necessary mobilization of our resources now, then our military power will become irrelevant, our strategies will fail, and our security will falter.

Adversaries are constantly sizing up U.S. force capabilities – only a bigger military can address threats in Iraq, Afghanistan and North Korea

Army Times 6 (Rick Maze, "A bigger military in the long term; It's too late to ease current personnel crisis but not future problems, officials say," 12/11, www.armytimes.com/issues/stories/0–ARMYPAPER–2393732.php)KM

But retired Gen. John Keane, a former vice chief of staff, said it is “self-evident” that the Army and Marine Corps are too small — not just to sustain their commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, but to remain ready to cope with other contingencies. With almost all deployable Army forces focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, the service’s ability to provide forces that would be able to win a conventional conflict in Korea or elsewhere is atrophying, Keane said in a Nov. 30 interview. “What [Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter] Schoomaker needs right now is a larger Army, which would give him the capability to set aside three or four divisions to focus on conventional war,” Keane said. No such force exists, and its absence is not unnoticed, he said. “Our adversaries know exactly what the readiness is of every one of our divisions. They have people working this full time.”

Readiness – Impact – Miscalculation

These adversaries will be tempted to challenge the U.S. – sparking war through miscalculation.

Gordon 7 (Michael, chief military correspondent for the New York Times, Survival, Winter 06–07, Break Point? Iraq and America’s Military Forces, http://www.journalsonline.tandf.co.uk/media/e2wquwrwth0v8u1trg3h/contributions/m/7/6/7/m76738823338363h.pdf)KM

Levels of availability A greater worry has been the operational availability of American ground forces. The army has a system for deploying the 42 new Brigade Combat Teams it is establishing as part of an ongoing programme to restructure its units. The goal is for an active brigade to spend two years at home for each year it is deployed overseas. So many units are needed for the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, that combat brigades are generally spending only a year at home for each year they are deployed. As one general put it, the brigades are either deployed, have just got back or are preparing to rotate back to Iraq and Afghanistan again. As a consequence, no more than a handful - perhaps as few as two or three Brigade Combat Teams - are immediately available for contingencies elsewhere.

Readiness – Impact – North Korea

Lack of readiness causes North Korean conflict.

Carpenter 8 (1/9/08 Ted Galen, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=16622)

At the same time, U.S. officials must stop letting hope triumph over experience when it comes to dealing with North Korea on the nuclear issue. Those officials also need to consider a fall-back plan if the six-party talks fail to produce an effective and worthwhile solution. Relying on deterrence supplemented by a regional missile defense program may be the most feasible option. Another possibility is to induce China to remove the current ruling elite in its troublesome client state and replace it with a more pliable regime, in exchange for a U.S. promise to end its military presence on the peninsula.

That escalates to nuclear war

Ogura and Oh 97 Professor of Economics at Toyama University, Professor of Innovation Management at the Middle East Technical University in Northern Cyprus[Toshimaru and Oh, “Nuclear Clouds Over the Korean Peninsula and Japan” Monthly Review, April]

North Korea, South Korea, and Japan have achieved quasi- or virtual nuclear armament Although these countries do not produce or possess actual bombs, they posses sufficient technological know-how to possess one or several nuclear arsenals. Thus, virtual armament creates a new nightmare in this region – nuclear annihilation. Given the concentration of economic affluence and military power in this region and its growing importance to the world system, any hot conflict among these countries would threaten to escalate into a global conflagaration.

Readiness – Impact – North Korea

North Korean conflict would escalate to nuclear war – the impact is obliteration of the environment and erosion of hegemony

Hamel–Green 10 (“the Path Not taken, the way still open” 1/5/10 http://www.japanfocus.org/–Michael–Hamel\_Green/3267)km

The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack1, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima–sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6–8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next–use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first–use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain–reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community. North Korea is currently believed to have sufficient plutonium stocks to produce up to 12 nuclear weapons.6 If and when it is successful in implementing a uranium enrichment program – having announced publicly that it is experimenting with enrichment technology on September 4, 20097 in a communication with the UN Security Council – it would likely acquire the capacity to produce over 100 such weapons. Although some may dismiss Korean Peninsula proliferation risks on the assumption that the North Korean regime will implode as a result of its own economic problems, food problems, and treatment of its own populace, there is little to suggest that this is imminent. If this were to happen, there would be the risk of nuclear weapons falling into hands of non-state actors in the disorder and chaos that would ensue. Even without the outbreak of nuclear hostilities on the Korean Peninsula in either the near or longer term, North Korea has every financial incentive under current economic sanctions and the needs of its military command economy to export its nuclear and missile technologies to other states. Indeed, it has already been doing this for some time. The Proliferation Security Initiative may conceivably prove effective in intercepting ship–borne nuclear exports, but it is by no means clear how air–transported materials could similarly be intercepted. Given the high stakes involved, North Korean proliferation, if unaddressed and unreversed, has the potential to destabilize the whole East Asian region and beyond. Even if a nuclear <CONTINUED>

Readiness – Impact – North Korea

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exchange does not occur in the short term, the acute sense of nuclear threat that has been experienced for over five decades by North Koreans as a result of US strategic deterrence is now likely to be keenly felt by fellow Koreans south of the 38th Parallel and Japanese across the waters of the Sea of Japan. China, too, must surely feel itself to be at risk from North Korean nuclear weapons, or from escalation that might ensue from next–use in the Korean Peninsula resulting not only in the environmental consequences noted above, but in regime collapse and massive refugee flows. South Korea and Japan appear willing to rely on their respective bilateral security pacts with the United States to deter North Korean nuclear attack for the time being. However, should South Korea and/or Japan acquire nuclear weapons, the outcome would be destabilizing, especially if this resulted from rupture of their alliance relationships with the United States. Both have the technical capability to do so very rapidly. South Korea has previously engaged in nuclear weapons research but desisted after US pressure. Japan still proclaims its adherence to the three Non–Nuclear Principles although recent confirmation that the United States routinely transited nuclear weapons through Japan and retains the right of emergency reintroduction of nuclear weapons has tarnished Japan’s non–nuclear image. Moreover, it has large stockpiles of plutonium that could rapidly be used to produce nuclear warheads. Such responses, already advocated by conservative and nationalist groups within South Korea and Japan, could trigger a regional nuclear arms race involving the Koreas, Japan, Taiwan, and China, with incalculable wider consequences for Southeast Asia, South Asia and the whole Pacific and beyond. These developments would spell the demise of the current global non-proliferation regime as underpinned by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Failure to reverse the DPRK’s nuclear breakout is also an important factor driving a general malaise in the exercise of American power which one of the authors has characterized elsewhere as “the end of American nuclear hegemony.”8

Readiness – Impact – Iraq Instability – Terrorism

Iraqi instablity spills over and causes terrorism.

The National Interest 7 (“Keeping the Lid On”, Lexisnexis, May–June 2007)

THE COLLAPSE of Iraq into all-out civil war would mean more than just a humanitarian tragedy that could easily claim hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives and produce millions of refugees. Such a conflict is unlikely to contain itself. In other similar cases of all–out civil war the resulting spillover has fostered terrorism, created refugee flows that can destabilize the entire neighborhood, radicalized the populations of surrounding states and even sparked civil wars in other, neighboring states or transformed domestic strife into regional war. Terrorists frequently find a home in states in civil war, as Al–Qaeda did in Afghanistan. However, civil wars just as often breed new terrorist groups-Hizballah, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat of Algeria, and the Tamil Tigers were all born of civil wars. Many such groups start by focusing on local targets but then shift to international attacks-starting with those they believe are aiding their enemies in the civil war.

Terrorism risks extinction

Kirkus Reviews, 99 (Book Review on “The New Terrorism: Fanatiscism and the Arms of Mass Destruction”, http://www.amazon.com/New–Terrorism–Fanaticism–Arms–Destruction/dp/product–description/0195118162)

Today two things have changed that together transform terrorism from a ``nuisance'' to ``one of the gravest dangers facing mankind.'' First terroristsbe they Islamic extremists in the Middle East, ultranationalists in the US, or any number of other possible permutationsseem to have changed from organized groups with clear ideological motives to small clusters of the paranoid and hateful bent on vengeance and destruction for their own sake. There are no longer any moral limitations on what terrorists are willing to do, who and how many they are willing to kill. Second, these unhinged collectivities now have ready access to weapons of mass destruction. The technological skills are not that complex and the resources needed not too rare for terrorists to employ nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons where and when they wish. The consequences of such weapons in the hands of ruthless, rootless fanatics are not difficult to imagine. In addition to the destruction of countless lives, panic can grip any targeted society, unleashing retaliatory action which in turn can lead to conflagrations perhaps on a world scale. To combat such terrorist activities, states may come to rely more and more on dictatorial and authoritarian measures. In short, terrorism in the future may threaten the very foundations of modern civilizations.

Readiness – Impact – Economy

Heg is key to economic growth – nations only trade in a stable world.

Walt 2 (Stephen, JFKSchool of Government Professor at Harvard Univiversity Naval War College Review, Spring, www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2002/spring/art1-sp2.htm)

By facilitating the development of a more open and liberal world economy, American primacy also fosters global prosperity. Economic interdependence is often said to be a cause of world peace, but it is more accurate to say that peace encourages interdependence-by making it easier for states to accept the potential vulnerabilities of extensive international intercourse. Investors are more willing to send money abroad when the danger of war is remote, and states worry less about being dependent on others when they are not concerned that these connections might be severed. When states are relatively secure, they will also be less fixated on how the gains from cooperation are distributed. In particular, they are less likely to worry that extensive cooperation will benefit others more and thereby place them at a relative disadvantage over time. By providing a tranquil international environment, in short, U.S. primacy has created political conditions that are conducive to expanding global trade and investment. Indeed, American primacy was a prerequisite for the creation and gradual expansion of the European Union, which is often touted as a triumph of economic self-interest over historical rivalries. Because the United States was there to protect the Europeans from the Soviet Union and from each other, they could safely ignore the balance of power within Western Europe and concentrate on expanding their overall level of economic integration. The expansion of world trade has been a major source of increased global prosperity, and U.S. primacy is one of the central pillars upon which that system rests. The United States also played a leading role in establishing the various institutions that regulate and manage the world economy. As a number of commentators have noted, the current era of “globalization” is itself partly an artifact of American power. As Thomas Friedman puts it, “Without America on duty, there will be no America Online.”

Continued economic decline will result in global war.

**Mead, 9** (Walter Russell Mead, [Henry A. Kissinger](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_A._Kissinger) senior fellow for [U.S. foreign policy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._foreign_policy) at the Council on Foreign Relations. The New Republic, “Only Makes You Stronger,” February 42009.  http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2)

Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, **financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth.** This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well.**If financial crises have been a normal part of life** during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, **so has war**. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. **Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a** depression, what **rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born**? The United States may not, yet, decline, but**, if we can't get the world economy back on track,** **we may still have to fight**.

Readiness – Impact – Economy

Economic collapse exacerbates tensions in Asia –North Korea and Iran will resort to nukes.

Green, 9 (Michael J., Senior Advisor and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Associate Professor at Georgetown University. Asia Times Online, “It's not just the economy” March 26 2009. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Asian\_Economy/KC26Dk01.html)

Facing the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, analysts at the World Bank and the US Central Intelligence Agency are just beginning to contemplate the ramifications for international stability if there is not a recovery in the next year. For the most part, the focus has been on fragile states such as some in Eastern Europe. However, the Great Depression taught us that a downward global economic spiral can even have jarring impacts on great powers. It is no mere coincidence that the last great global economic downturn was followed by the most destructive war in human history. In the 1930s, economic desperation helped fuel autocratic regimes and protectionism in a downward economic-security death spiral that engulfed the world in conflict. This spiral was aided by the preoccupation of the United States and other leading nations with economic troubles at home and insufficient attention to working with other powers to maintain stability abroad. Today's challenges are different, yet 1933's London Economic Conference, which failed to stop the drift toward deeper depression and world war, should be a cautionary tale for leaders heading to next month's London Group of 20 (G-20) meeting. There is no question the US must urgently act to address banking issues and to restart its economy. But the lessons of the past suggest that we will also have to keep an eye on those fragile threads in the international system that could begin to unravel if the financial crisis is not reversed early in the Barack Obama administration and realize that economics and security are intertwined in most of the critical challenges we face. A disillusioned rising power? Four areas in Asia merit particular attention, although so far the current financial crisis has not changed Asia's fundamental strategic picture. China is not replacing the US as regional hegemon, since the leadership in Beijing is too nervous about the political implications of the financial crisis at home to actually play a leading role in solving it internationally. Predictions that the US will be brought to its knees because China is the leading holder of US debt often miss key points. China's currency controls and full employment/export-oriented growth strategy give Beijing few choices other than buying US Treasury bills or harming its own economy. Rather than creating new rules or institutions in international finance, or reorienting the Chinese economy to generate greater long-term consumer demand at home, Chinese leaders are desperately clinging to the status quo (though Beijing deserves credit for short-term efforts to stimulate economic growth). The greater danger with China is not an eclipsing of US leadership, but instead the kind of shift in strategic orientation that happened to Japan after the Great Depression. Japan was arguably not a revisionist power before 1932 and sought instead to converge with the global economy through open trade and adoption of the gold standard. The worldwide depression and protectionism of the 1930s devastated the newly exposed Japanese economy and contributed directly to militaristic and autarkic policies in Asia as the Japanese people reacted against what counted for globalization at the time. China today is similarly converging with the global economy, and many experts believe China needs at least 8% annual growth to sustain social stability. Realistic growth predictions for 2009 are closer to 5%. Veteran China hands were watching closely when millions of migrant workers returned to work after the Lunar New Year holiday last month to find factories closed and jobs gone. There were pockets of protests, but nationwide unrest seems unlikely this year, and Chinese leaders are working around the clock to ensure that it does not happen next year either. However, the economic slowdown has only just begun and nobody is certain how it will impact the social contract in China between the ruling communist party and the 1.3 billion Chinese who have come to see President Hu Jintao's call for "harmonious society" as inextricably linked to his promise of "peaceful development". If the Japanese example is any precedent, a sustained economic slowdown has the potential to open a dangerous path from economic nationalism to strategic revisionism in China too. Dangerous states It is noteworthy that North Korea, Myanmar and Iran have all intensified their defiance in the wake of the financial crisis, which has distracted the world's leading nations, limited their moral authority and sown potential discord. With Beijing worried about the potential impact of North Korean belligerence or instability on Chinese internal stability, and leaders in Japan and South Korea under siege in parliament because of the collapse of their stock markets, leaders in the North Korean capital of Pyongyang have grown increasingly boisterous about their country's claims to great power status as a nuclear weapons state. The junta in Myanmar has chosen this moment to arrest hundreds of political dissidents and thumb its nose at fellow members of the 10-country Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Iran continues its nuclear program while exploiting differences between the US, UK and France (or the P-3 group) and China and Russia - differences that could become more pronounced if economic friction with Beijing or Russia crowds out cooperation or if Western European governments grow nervous about sanctions as a tool of policy. It is possible that the economic downturn will make these dangerous states more pliable because of falling fuel prices (Iran) and greater need for foreign aid (North Korea and Myanmar), but that may depend on the extent that authoritarian leaders care about the well-being of their people or face internal political pressures linked to the economy. So far, there is little evidence to suggest either and much evidence to suggest these dangerous states see an opportunity to advance their asymmetrical advantages against the international system.

CMR Adv. – I/L

PMCs hurt civil-military relations: pay disparity results in loss of soldier’s morale.

Kidwell 5 (Deborah C, Kidwell, “Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies”, <http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/kidwell.pdf> )

PMCs can destabilize the traditional civil-military relationship. Singer identified several conditions where PMCs will have a negative impact: the pay differential for similar tasks favors contractors, private forces detract from the reputation of the local military, contractors remain segregated from regular units, employment of PMCs impairs advancement opportuni­ties or has authority over military units, and where private forces threaten to replace uniformed military personnel.69 While current policy advocates a seamless integration of military and contracted personnel, training, pay differential, and other factors may upset the balance of military and civil­ian interests. Several of the factors identified by Singer as destabilizing influences exist in current deployments. Contractor employees can receive higher pay and more generous benefits for similar work. The yearly base pay for an Army specialist or corporal with more than four years of experience is $21,769, while civilian truck drivers can earn $80,000 to $100,000 annually.70 Blackwater USA compensates private security contractors in the range of $450 to $800 per day.71 The first $80,000 of civilian pay is nontaxable if the employees meet certain “days in-country” requirements, while soldier bonuses (combat pay) are tax free. Civilians also retain the right to resign whenever they feel uncomfortable with their working con­ditions, a luxury not generally afforded to military personnel. One civilian driver recently claimed that only three employees remain from his original group of about 20.72 Pay differentials may eventually lead to lower levels of retention (as enlistments expire, former soldiers may opt to work for contractors) and the necessity of higher bonuses (enlistment and reten­tion) and hazard pay. Reductions in the military force and the proliferation of PMCs translate into fewer promotion opportunities and the eventual elimination of many uniformed positions. Moreover, a recent DOD review of 32,155 positions identified 9,500 additional positions that were “candi­dates for military to civilian conversion.”73 Unequal economic advantages and sense of well-being—especially when regular military units provide security for contractor convoys, essentially taking more risk for less pay and less job security—can be extremely detrimental to soldier morale. Moreover, a combat-heavy military may detract from the prestige of national military service, discourage some from a military service career, and impair public support for military operations. Policy makers and lead­ers must consider the possible consequences of the current trends in con­tractor support on the long-term health of the military services, although, at present, the facts to conduct such analyses are sketchy. Current bonuses include lump-sum payments of up to $15,000 for immediate deployment to the active combat areas of Iraq and Afghanistan.74 Rising bonuses indicate recruitment deficiencies in dangerous positions—possibly result­ing in a downward spiral—with escalating bonuses necessary for what may become a less qualified applicant pool.75 Early in 2005, the military announced a more lucrative system of bonuses offered to many Special Forces troops to improve retention.76 The American public may well ques­tion the moral aspects of encouraging combat specific positions, which may result in a loss of support and confidence in military organizations. In addition, using American soldiers exclusively to provide combat “tooth” is a curious irony to historical precedent, where nations often hired for­eign nationals for some of their most dangerous fighting. Officials must examine the long-term consequences—military readiness, morale, public attitudes, and other issues—before continuing on the present path of rou­tine contractor support.

PMCs undermine the balance between civil and military authorities

Kidwell 5 (Deborah C, Kidwell, “Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies”, <http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/kidwell.pdf> )

The current use of contractor support, from historical and practical perspectives, includes elements from the worst-case scenarios. No-bid and cost plus contracts thwart the very competition and financial incen- tives the government hoped to benefit from by using PMCs. The lack of oversight and visibility of the contracting process encourages fiscal abuse and poor performance. Taken together, these factors make it difficult to establish the cost efficiency of the current system of military contract- ing. Moreover, evidence suggests military effectiveness is impaired by a growing dependency on contractor support, a lack of command authority over contractor personnel, and the unclear boundaries between private and public (military) organizations. The very real change in the civil-military relationship presented by the overuse of contractor support and the social consequences of war without public mobilization detracts from a consis- tent national foreign policy and national security. The roles of the public and private spheres in government have intertwined so completely that a complex, and often vague, body of regulations is inadequate to untangle them.

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PMC’s kill civil-military relations

Kidwell 5 (Deborah C, Assistant Professor of Military History at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, “Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies”, <http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/kidwell.pdf> AD: 6/24/10) jl

PMC’s can destabilize the traditional civil-military relationship. Singer identified several conditions where PMC’s will have a negative impact: the pay differential for similar tasks favors contractors, private forces detract from the reputation of the local military, contractors remain segregated from regular units, employment of PMC’s impairs advancement opportuni­ties or has authority over military units, and where private forces threaten to replace uniformed military personnel.69 While current policy advocates a seamless integration of military and contracted personnel, training, pay differential, and other factors may upset the balance of military and civil­ian interests.

**PMCs destroy CMR – independent actors create a rift between military and politics**

Schreier and Caparini 5 (Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini , March 2005,

Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies,, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/issueareas/security/security\_pdf/2005\_Schreier\_Caparini.pdf )

Maintaining proper control of the military is essential to good governance. But keeping civil-military relations in balance have traditionally been a delicate task. A state and its government require effective, functioning armed forces for the survival of both. The government must give the leadership of the armed forces the resources to accomplish its missions, a certain amount of professional autonomy, and the leeway to make the proper technical decisions for preparing defence and applying violence. To deny this may put domestic stability at risk or provoke external aggression. Thus, the armed forces can either be the bulwark of security or can become a risk to the state and society. A real dilemma in civil-military relations traditionally has been finding a way to cultivate and sustain a body of people with the ability to do things considered abnormal by civilians – to transcend physical discomfort, master fear, and kill and coerce enemies – without undercutting the day-to-day comity that undergirds society. Stable civil-military relations have kept warfighters separate from the rest of society without allowing them to become so isolated that they might turn against society. Though this risk is rather limited in Western democracies, the privatization of warfare is likely to widen the gap between soldiers and civilians and to weaken the link between the armed forces and society – a process that started with the abolition of mandatory conscription in most Western countries. Since PMCs generate military power that does not reside in the nation-state, the balance in Clausewitz’ trinity between the people and passion, the commander, his army, and creativity, and the government and rationality will be disrupted.186 Adding the private military industry as a third and outside party will not only reshape civil-military relations, but will complicate control and good governance, and may even destabilize the delicate balance. In stable democracies, where the risk of mutiny or coups is remote, the addition of that industry will raise concerns about relations between public authorities and the PMCs. But in weak or developing states, where power often comes from the barrel of a gun, the hiring of PMC services may undermine the regime’s control over the military. Civil-military theory and practice require a clear separation of the military institution from the domains of politics and economics: … the military profession is monopolized by the state. …The skill of the officer is the management of violence; his responsibility is the military security of his client, society. The discharge of the responsibility requires mastery of the skill; mastery of the skill entails acceptance of the responsibility. Both responsibility and skill distinguish the officer from other social types. All members of society have an interest in its security; the state has a direct concern for the achievement of this along with other social values; but the officer corps alone is responsible for military security to the exclusion of all other ends”. … Does the officer have a professional motivation? Clearly he does not act primarily from economic incentives. In western society the vocation of officership is not well rewarded monetarily. Nor is his behaviour within his profession governed by economic rewards and punishments. The officer is not a mercenary who transfers his services wherever they are best rewarded, nor is he the temporary citizen-soldier inspired by intense momentary patriotism and duty but with no steadying and permanent desire to perfect himself in the management of violence. The motivations of the officer are a technical love for his craft and the sense of social obligation to utilize this craft for the benefit of society. The combination of these drives constitutes professional motivation. Society, on the other hand, can only assure this motivation if it offers its officers continuing and sufficient pay both while on active duty and when retired”.187 And the military professional’s “relation to society is guided by an awareness that the skill can only be utilized for purposes approved by society through its political agent, the state.188

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**PMCs destroy CMR – act as a threat to a states sovereignty**

Schreier and Caparini 5 (Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini , March 2005,

Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies,, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/issueareas/security/security\_pdf/2005\_Schreier\_Caparini.pdf )

The potential exists that PMCs and PSCs can violate the sovereignty of states and the right of peoples to self-determination. In the 1960s and 1970s, mercenaries were a threat to legitimacy and self-determination, and they took part in a number of attempted coups. While today it is difficult to see what a modern PMC would have to gain from taking over a state, the risk that PMCs could become a threat to governments that employ them cannot be completely discounted. Thus, a less reputable PMC might act in support of a coup against an established state – as mercenaries did in the Maldives in 1988,203 and attempted in Côte d’Ivoire in August 2003.204 Most recently, in March 2004, a coup attempt was undertaken by mercenaries against the regime in Equatorial Guinea.205 Although an act like this would certainly damage the PMCs reputation, greatly reduce its prospects of obtaining business elsewhere, and would probably not be tolerated by the international community, sovereignty and self-determination – as well as civil-military relations – are complex issues which PMCs can have significant impact upon and therefore should be key considerations of any regulatory system. The fact that a force is private or foreign does not prevent it from being under the control of the state. While such arrangements may not be ideal, they may be far less damaging to state sovereignty than an unchecked rebel movement.206

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**Bruneau & Matei 8** **(**Thomas C. Bruneau is Program Manager for Latin America and Florina Cristiana Matei is a Research

Associate at the Center for Civil–Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Californi, *Democratization*, Vol.15, No.5, December 2008, pp.909–929, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/5541/Bruneau\_final\_file.pdf )

Although it may seem counter-intuitive, increased democratic control can improve effectiveness in military, intelligence, and police forces. Based on historical research, Deborah Avant concludes, ‘Having more civilians control the army made it easier, not harder, for the army to maintain its focus.’56 While too much direction and oversight obviously can hamper security services’ capabilities or reveal sources and methods in intelligence, implementing ‘good’ control, i.e., instituting control and oversight in a way that provides top-level direction and general oversight guidance, as opposed to malfeasance or cronyism, leads to improved effectiveness. For example, one of the few acknowledged successes in US civil military relations, the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, both reinforced democratic civilian control and mandated ‘jointness’ for the military services in the United States. Although some interoperability issues certainly remain, US forces have been more effective at fulfilling their various roles and missions since this level of democratic control was enacted. Operation Desert Storm, operations in the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, and the initial combat success in Iraq bear witness to these improvements. Romania provides a good example of how democratic control can improve effectiveness in an intelligence organization, which is positive for legitimacy of the government (and facilitated NATO membership and European Union accession). As Romania made its transition to democracy, its intelligence structure consisted of as many as nine agencies with little oversight, direction or clear roles and missions. As both the executive and legislative branches implemented control mechanisms, the intelligence community in Romania began to improve. For example, the executive branch created the National Supreme Defence Council (CSAT), which organizes and coordinates all intelligence activities.57 The CSAT monitors and validates national security and military strategies, as well as intelligence products from the agencies. Similarly, legislative control and oversight of intelligence agencies is exercised through specialized parliamentary committees. Together, the CSAT and parliament have reduced the Romanian intelligence community from nine organizations to six; improved recruitment, training and professionalism; and clarified the mission of each agency. As a result of these measures, the Romanian intelligence apparatus is both more effective and more efficient.58 Colombia is also an interesting case. When the Colombian Armed Forces were left to their own, based on an understanding during the return to democracy in 1958, with minimal civilian control, they emulated the US, with whom they served in the Korean Conflict in the 1950s, and bought equipment and trained as though they were the US, rather than a developing country confronting violent domestic insurgents. Meanwhile the guerrillas, especially the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), increasingly took control over large sections of the country, stimulating the emergence of a competing body of paramilitary organizations, which resulted in a spiral of violence that made Colombia all but ungovernable. With the election of President Alvaro Uribe in 2002, and his taking strong personal control over the armed forces, police, and intelligence organizations, they were forced to confront the internal conflict with the result that security has greatly improved, the legitimacy of the government increased (with President Uribe re-elected in 2006), and development promoted. Democratic policing involves the executive (including mayors, and governors in the case of federal systems) and judicial branches, from within the police forces and, in particular, from civil society, where there is naturally a greater emphasis on the direction and oversight of police activity than on the military. Case studies in Colombia, Brazil, and Chile show that the institution of democratic reforms and control mechanisms produces more professional, trusted, and effective police, with more public support.59

CMR Adv. – Impact – Extinction

Flawed CMR creates ‘military war gods’ – goes global, kills democracy, World War 3, and ends in extinction.

Cohen 97 (Cohen, Eliot A. "Civil-military relations." *Orbis* 41, no. 2 (Spring97 1997): 177. *MasterFILE Premier*, EBSCO*host* (accessed June 27, 2010))

No one at the conference suggested that absent these recommendations the republic would be in mortal danger. But it is worth speculating about the direction of American civil-military relations without the kinds of measures indicated above to correct current adverse trends. An ever more inbred military elite would evolve, recruited largely from families of military personnel and increasingly educated at the service academies. Confronted (as appears likely) by a steadily shrinking defense budget, this group would not retire into frosty isolation but would attempt to influence the political process directly. Military officers might, within the bounds of the law (but just barely), attempt to throw support to the political party most favorable to their interests. At the same time, a political elite generally ignorant of military affairs would divide into three groups: The first, and largest, would simply be indifferent to defense matters and would be inclined to regard military expenditure as wasteful unless proven otherwise. Another group would view the military with suspicion, believing its notions to be both retrograde and at odds with those of society on a variety of issues, most notably homosexuality. And a third group would regard the military with unthinking admiration as the embodiment of virtues shunned by the rest of society. Oddly enough, this last group could prove to be the most dangerous. Democratic society normally produces a certain amount of healthy suspicion of the military--distaste for the hierarchy, subordination of self, and adherence to discipline that military life requires. Unrestrained deference to military authority and expertise, on the other hand, can lead to gross errors in both foreign and defense policy. The horrifying experience of World War I, when deference to military authority was at an all-time high, offers an important warning. The generals repeatedly resorted to strategies of appalling bloodshed, not merely out of arrogance, but because of the adulation from journalists and politicians, who made them into gods of war rather than what they were--fallible men, albeit well-educated, patriotic, and determined. By the end of that conflict, mutual confidence at the top and throughout society had broken down, politicians mistrusted their military subordinates, and more than one military leader was willing to endorse the theory of the "stab in the back." Healthy civilian control of the military requires a political leadership that understands how uncertain of a business war is, and that recognizes that even the best-trained and most dedicated military professionals can err. Such politicians can exert effective civilian control because they appreciate military virtues, can discern which military officers are the best, and can weigh the relative importance of political and military requirements. On the other side of the equation, civil-military relations require officers who understand and accept the preeminence of political considerations in the conduct of war, and who can cope with civilian intrusion into their realm whether or not they like it. And at the very top, a dialogue must exist between statesmen and generals, unequal though that dialogue may be. Overall, healthy civil-military relations need a military with standards distinct from those of general society and a society that appreciates the need for the difference, even if it does not always approve of the military's views. Left uncorrected, the trends in American civil-military relations could breed certain pathologies. The most serious possibility is that of a dramatic civil-military split during a crisis involving the use of force. In the recent past, such tensions did not result in open division; for example, Franklin Roosevelt insisted that the United States invade North Africa in 1942, though the chiefs of both the army and the navy vigorously opposed such a course, favoring instead a buildup in England and an invasion of the continent in 1943. Back then it was inconceivable that a senior military officer would leak word of such a split to the media, where it would have reverberated loudly and destructively. To be sure, from time to time individual officers broke the vow of professional silence to protest a course of action, but in these isolated cases the officers paid the accepted price of termination of their careers. In the modern environment, such cases might no longer be isolated. Thus, presidents might try to shape U.S. strategy so that it complies with military opinion, and rarely in the annals of statecraft has military opinion alone been an adequate guide to sound foreign policy choices. Had Lincoln followed the advice of his senior military advisors there is a good chance that the Union would have fallen. Had Roosevelt deferred to General George C. Marshall and Admiral Ernest J. King there might well have been a gory debacle on the shores of France in 1943. Had Harry S Truman heeded the advice of his theater commander in the Far East (and it should be remembered that the Joint Chiefs generally counseled support of the man on the spot) there might have been a third world war. Throughout much of <CONTINUED>

CMR Adv. – Impact – Extinction

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its history, the U.S. military was remarkably politicized by contemporary standards. One commander of the army, Winfield Scott, even ran for president while in uniform, and others (Leonard Wood, for example) have made no secret of their political views and aspirations. But until 1940, and with the exception of periods of outright warfare, the military was a negligible force in American life, and America was not a central force in international politics. That has changed. Despite the near halving of the defense budget from its high in the 1980s, it remains a significant portion of the federal budget, and the military continues to employ millions of Americans. More important, civil-military relations in the United States now no longer affect merely the closet-room politics of Washington, but the relations of countries around the world. American choices about the use of force, the shrewdness of American strategy, the soundness of American tactics, and the will of American leaders have global consequences. What might have been petty squabbles in bygone years are now magnified into quarrels of a far larger scale, and conceivably with far more grievous consequences. To ignore the problem would neglect one of the cardinal purposes of the federal government: "to provide for the common defense" in a world in which security cannot be taken for granted.

CMR Adv. – Impact - Genocide

Flawed CMR results in genocide and a nazi-esque state, while reducing the state’s military’s effectiveness

Biddle & Long 4 (Stephen Biddle, Stephen Long The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Aug., 2004), pp. 525-546 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4149807)

Conflictual civil-military relations could interfere with battlefield effectiveness in a variety of ways. At the highest levels, civil-military conflict can interfere with the smooth functioning of senior policy-making councils and thereby undermine national strategy. Sound grand strategy requires that military considerations be integrated with nonmilitary concerns involving diplomacy, economic policy, and domestic politics (Kennedy 1991; Liddell Hart 1954). To bring such disparate elements together requires close collaboration and frank, honest exchanges between civilian and military leaders. Friction, distrust, dislike, or simply unfamiliarity between the civil leadership and senior officers can impede such collaboration and result in poorly formulated strategy and military policy (Kennedy 1988; Feaver 2003; Feaver and Kohn 2001).'o This in turn can undermine battlefield performance: strategic or policy choices that leave an army with outdated or insufficient arms, commit it to battle in an unpopular cause, or compel it to fight at prohibitive odds against a coalition of enemies obviously make battlefield success less likely. Civil-military conflict can also interfere with the officer corps' military proficiency per se. In states where the military poses a threat of political violence against the regime, for example, civilian leaders often adopt self-defensive measures that interfere with the effective conduct of war. Such interventions can include frequent rotation of commanders and purges of the officer corps, restriction of enlisted service time, sup-pression of horizontal communications within the military hierarchy, divided lines of command, isolation from foreign sources of expertise or training, exploitation of eth-nic divisions in officer selection or combat unit organization, surveillance of military personnel, promotion based on political loyalty rather than military ability, or execu-tion of suspected dissident officers (Huntington 1957, 82; Perlmutter and Bennett 1980, 205-8; Cohen 1986, 168; Kier 1997). Such techniques can be effective barriers to coups d'dtat, but they systematically discourage soldiers from focusing on disinter-ested technical expertise, and they make such expertise hard to obtain for those few who seek it anyway (Biddle and Zirkle 1996; Brooks 1998; Kier 1997; Pollack 1996). One might thus expect highly conflictual civil-military relations to reduce a state's military effectiveness.

CMR Adv. – Impact – Iraq

Effective CMR is critical to solving the situation in Iraq – war is unconventional

Cronin '8 (Patrick, "Irregular Warfare: New Challenges for Civil-Military Relations")

Success in the highly political and ambiguous conflicts likely to dominate the global security environment in the coming decades will require a framework that balances the relationships between civilian and military leaders and makes the most effective use of their different strengths. These challenges are expected to require better integrated, whole-of-government approaches, the cooperation of host governments and allies, and strategic patience. Irregular warfare introduces new complications to what Eliot Cohen has called an “unequal dialogue” between civilian and military leaders in which civilian leaders hold the true power but must modulate their intervention into “military” affairs as a matter of prudence rather than principle. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that irregular warfare - which is profoundly political, intensely local, and protracted—breaks from the traditional understanding of how military and civilian leaders should contribute to the overall effort. One of the key challenges rising from irregular warfare is how to measure progress.

While there is disagreement about the feasibility or utility of developing metrics, the political pressure for marking progress is unrelenting. Most data collection efforts focus on the number of different types of kinetic events, major political milestones such as elections, and resource inputs such as personnel, money, and materiel. None of these data points serves easily in discerning what is most needed - namely, outputs or results. A second major challenge centers on choosing leaders for irregular warfare and stability and reconstruction operations. How to produce civilian leaders capable of asking the right and most difficult questions is not easily addressed. Meanwhile, there has been a general erosion of the traditional Soldier’s Code whereby a military member can express dissent, based on legitimate facts, in private to one’s superiors up to the point that a decision has been made. Many see the need to shore up this longstanding tradition among both the leadership and the ranks. A third significant challenge is how to forge integrated strategies and approaches. Professional relationships, not organizational fixes, are vital to succeeding in irregular war. In this sense, the push for new doctrine for the military and civilian leadership is a step in the right direction to clarifying the conflated lanes of authority.

The wars that follow in Iraq will spur World War III

Corsi 7 (Jerome R. Corsi, http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE\_ID=53669, January 8th 2007)

If a broader war breaks out in Iraq, Olmert will certainly face pressure to send the Israel military into the Gaza after Hamas and into Lebanon after Hezbollah. If that happens, it will only be a matter of time before Israel and the U.S. have no choice but to invade Syria. The Iraq war could quickly spin into a regional war, with Israel waiting on the sidelines ready to launch an air and missile strike on Iran that could include tactical nuclear weapons. With Russia ready to deliver the $1 billion TOR M-1 surface-to-air missile defense system to Iran, military leaders are unwilling to wait too long to attack Iran. Now that Russia and China have invited Iran to join their Shanghai Cooperation Pact, will Russia and China sit by idly should the U.S. look like we are winning a wider regional war in the Middle East? If we get more deeply involved in Iraq, China may have their moment to go after Taiwan once and for all. A broader regional war could easily lead into a third world war, much as World Wars I and II began.

I-Law – Legal Accountability Good

Holding client states accountable solves

Jennings 6 (Kathleen, Researcher M.Phil in Politics, St. Antony's College, University of Oxford, www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/532/532.pdf, AD: 6/22/10) jl

Taken together, it is evident that the crux of the argument against PMC’s centres on norms of accountability, transparency, and legitimacy. Simply put, accounta­bility for PMC’s' actions on the ground, including serious human rights abuses, is rarely levied by client or host states. This creates a situation in which clearly po­litical actors — which PMC’s arc when in the employ of states, being agents hired to pursue state policy ends through non-state means — remain outside the normal constraints of political accountability and military justice and chain of command.

Furthermore, to the extent that remedies exist, it is unclear in most cases what they arc. This is in part because of the lack of national and international regulato­ry clarity in this field, and in part because of the confidentiality around contracts that characterises the industry.'6 Significantly, there has been great operational ambiguity over the extent to which states arc responsible for the actions of "their" PMC’s, especially when contractors then sub-contract and/or employ third-party nationals to lower costs. So far, ambiguity that has translated into inaction. Even in clear cases of wrongdoing, countries have shown little willingness to punish companies registered on their soil: Singer (2004a) relates that when the U.S. PMC Airscan was involved in coordinating air strikes in Colombia that killed civilians (including nine children), a U.S. State Department official brushed off the possi­bility of legal charges against Airscan with the explanation, "Our job is to protect Americans, not investigate Americans".17 These problems arc further exacerbated by the fact that, as mentioned above, some PMC’s — those with a more "virtual" operating structure — have shown an ability to shut up shop only to reopen under a new name and with a different country registration, so as to circumvent possi­ble legal or financial troubles.

A loss of accountability is of course inherent in the contracting out of former­ly state-run services: the government (or any other client) is unable to exert the same amount of direct control and oversight of contractors versus its own employ­ees. Yet the nature of military action raises important questions as to whether this tradeoff is similarly acceptable in all circumstances and for all services. Although these questions have been taken up by concerned civilian and military analysts, they have been largely ignored by the policymakers responsible for outsourcing decisions. As Bcrgncr (2005) notes, the current dependency of the U.S. armed forces on contractors has occurred in the absence of any open policy debate on even fundamental questions regarding the appropriateness, utility, and necessary boundaries of such a course of action. Instead, "isolated decisions [on the use of private actors] are taken without a wide perspective on the cumulative effects of privatizing security (Holmqvist 2005:58)". One effect of such decision-making in the U.S. context is a general lack of understanding, even within the military; of just how dependent the armed forces are on contractors.

The lack of debate on the use of PMC’s is both a cause and effect of the lack of transparency in the industry, both on the micro level (individual companies and contracts) and macro level. For the most part, it is unclear even to those respon­sible for procurement and oversight what exactly most PMC’s are doing, how much they're paid, and who they answer to. much less the possible sanctions when things go wrong. Lack of transparency is of course a key contributor to the accountabil­ity gap: levying accountability requires information and evidence, not just hunches and accusations. Yet lack of transparency is neither one-sided nor solely attribut­able to PMC’s. As noted above, client states may also have an interest in muddy­ing the waters on the issue of their involvement with PMC’s - for example, to prevent accusations of cronyism and corruption, or divert attention away from "foreign policy by proxy" activities.

I-Law – Legal Accountability Good

Legal accountability is key to clear up jurisdictional dilemmas and prosecution of criminal activity overseas

Singer 4 (Peter W, director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings, http://www.dcaf.ch/\_docs/pp04\_private-military.pdf, AD: 6/22/10) jl

Finally, action must be taken on the issue of legal accountability. This is not only important for the task of regulating the industry and the individuals within it, but also to our responsibility to our public military. To pay contractors more than our soldiers is one thing; to give them a legal free pass (as is currently happening with Abu Ghraib) on top of that is unconscionable. Loopholes must be filled and new laws developed that control for the variety of legal and jurisdictional dilemmas that the industry has raised. A key requisite is to extend legal clarity to the questions of who can work for the firms, who the firms can work for, and what bodies and codes will investigate, prosecute, and punish any wrongdoing and in which domains. Clearly, as a transnational industry, there is the need for international involvement, with proposals ranging from an updating of the international anti-mercenary laws to creating a UN body that sanctions and regulates PMFs. However, one must realize that any movement on the international front will takes years if not decades, while the PMF industry is in the here and now. This means that each state that has any involvement with the industry, either as client or home base, has an imperative need to develop and amend its laws that are relevant to PMFs. This may sound like an extreme burden, but dealing with the new legal challenges of new industries is a requirement to ensure a living law, the same as states have had to do with the rise of telecommunications or the internet. In an ideal arrangement, states will coordinate their efforts and attempt to involve regional bodies to maximize coverage and ease the path to international standards. For example, the discussions about regulation that are set to begin in the United Kingdom would do well to coordinate their efforts with the EU states. The U.S. would similarly do well to communicate on this issue with its friends and allies. It is to be expected that many firms will argue and lobby against regulation (not all though, as the top-market firms will benefit), asserting that market forces and industry self-regulation is sufficient. This is not only easily disproved by the variety of PMF examples cited throughout the text (which should have been prevented if market forces were sufficient), but also by the failures of past self-regulation in fields from oil and gas to mining. It is for this reason that no other industry is entirely self-regulated and neither should the PMF one be, particularly given the stakes of its business. Moreover, the legal gap extends to the individual conduct level, not just corporate behaviour; the best industry of self-regulation lacks any sanction beyond market punishment, which is clearly insufficient for actual crimes, including felony offences like rape or torture in a prison. We have laws to govern for the worst of human behaviour; in no other domains than this do we simply hope for the best in their absence.

I-Law Adv. – 1AC– Internals 1/2

International law is inevitable – US participation is key to modeling and its effectiveness

Institute for Energy and Environmental Research 2 (and the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, <http://www.ieer.org/reports/treaties/execsumm.pdf>, AD: 6/23/10) jl

The evolution of international law since World War II is largely a response to the demands of states and individuals living within a global society with a deeply integrated world economy. In this global society, the repercussions of the actions of states, non-state actors, and individuals are not confined within borders, whether we look to greenhouse gas accumulations, nuclear testing, the danger of accidental nuclear war, or the vast massacres of civilians that have taken place over the course of the last hundred years and still continue. Multilateral agreements increasingly have been a primary instrument employed by states to meet extremely serious challenges of this kind, for several reasons. They clearly and publicly embody a set of universally applicable expectations, including prohibited and required practices and policies. In other words, they articulate global norms, such as the protection of human rights and the prohibitions of genocide and use of weapons of mass destruction. They establish predictability and accountability in addressing a given issue. States are able to accumulate expertise and confidence by participating in the structured system offered by a treaty. However, influential U.S. policymakers are resistant to the idea of a treaty-based international legal system because they fear infringement on U.S. sovereignty and they claim to lack confidence in compliance and enforcement mechanisms. This approach has dangerous practical implications for international cooperation and compliance with norms. U.S. treaty partners do not enter into treaties expecting that they are only political commitments by the United States that can be overridden based on U.S. interests. When a powerful and influential state like the United States is seen to treat its legal obligations as a matter of convenience or of national interest alone, other states will see this as a justification to relax or withdraw from their own commitments. If the United States wants to require another state to live up to its treaty obligations, it may find that the state has followed the U.S. example and opted out of compliance.

Despite illegality of PMC’s under I-Law, the US is expanding PMC’s in Afghanistan and Iraq

Higgins 7 (Alexander, Associated Press Staff Writer, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-10-17-3392316246\_x.htm, AD: 6/23/10) jl

Although the use of mercenaries is discouraged in international rules of conduct of war, the hiring of foreign soldiers by one country for use in a third is specifically illegal only for the 30 countries that ratified a 1989 treaty. The U.S. and Iraq are among the many countries that never signed the accord.

"The trend toward outsourcing and privatizing various military functions by a number of member states in the past 10 years has resulted in the mushrooming of private military and security companies," the U.N. panel's report said.

The "tremendous increase" in the number of such companies -- including those working for the U.S. State and Defense departments -- has occurred in Afghanistan and Iraq, said the report, which will be presented to the U.N. General Assembly next month.

A joint U.S.-Iraqi panel has been created to review the practices of security companies, and Congress has opened inquiries into the role of the contractors. Multiple U.S. investigations into the Baghdad shooting are under way.

Gomez del Prado said the panel has been studying the use of contractors for two years and found that they were being hired from all over the world.

I-Law Adv. – 1AC– Internals 2/2

Domestic jurisdiction on PMC’s is key to I-law

Jennings 6 (Kathleen, Researcher M.Phil in Politics, St. Antony's College, University of Oxford, www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/532/532.pdf, AD: 6/22/10) jl

Three problems in legal responses to PMC’s were identified above: confusion over the applicability of existing law; lack of enforcement of existing law; and simple lack of law. Creating more effective legal responses to the private military industry will require a concerted response to remedy these railings by legislators, poli­cymakers, and legal activists at national and international levels.

At the international level, an important step would be the expansion of the mandate of the International Criminal Court to include legal persons within the scope of the Court's jurisdiction, so that prosecution for corporate violations of international law could be brought in an international forum. This would send a strong message to private military companies - and any other companies operat­ing outside their home jurisdictions, including resource extraction companies -that violations of international humanitarian and criminal law will be taken seri­ously. Relatedly, domestic civil or criminal actions against companies implicated in such crimes would be an extremely effective deterrent to criminal misbehav­iour, particularly when combined with regulation combating the "offshoring" of PMC’s. In both instances, unfortunately, the political and prosecutorial will to expand ICC jurisdiction or bring actions domestically has been thus far lacking.41 Conversely, attempts could be made to prosecute PMC’s for international crimes on the basis of the argument that they are agents of the state. This approach would also require a higher level of political will to hold corporate actors accountable than has heretofore been evident.

At a national level, the obvious remedy is for countries lacking regulatory re­gimes to establish them, without waiting for the promulgation of international regulation. Again, the registration and licencing schemes outlined above could be useful models to emulate, so long as oversight, monitoring, and reporting are mandated as a term of licencing or as separate regulation. Jurisdictional issues could also be clarified through the establishment (or expansion and implementation) of regulation dictating that civilian contractors working for all government agencies be subject to that government's military or civilian codes of justice. Further, mil­itaries that use contractors in support of military operations alongside their regu­lar armed forces must promulgate clear field rules for military commanders to use in managing those contractors. Incidentally, these rules should not be written by the contractors themselves, as has occurred in the United States - with the PMC MPRI paid to prepare the field manual governing Pentagon rules for contractors on the battlefield (Werve 2004).

National jurisdictions could also impose legal standards by putting conditions into government contracts to the effect that PMC’s be considered subject to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, thus making it easier for domestic prosecutions to proceed on the basis of violations of those conventions. Such contractual obligations could, for example, have provided a means by which to domestically prosecute Titan and CAC1, the contractors involved in the Abu Ghraib scandal, on the grounds of violation of international law (torture and cruel, hu­miliating, and degrading treatment). Such a condition could also present inter­esting dilemmas, for example in the case of non-U.S. contractors working on or with the U.S. military prison base on Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Bush admin­istration has consistently declared that it does not consider the prisoners confined in Guantanamo to be entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions, claiming instead that they are "unlawful combatants" outside the Conventions' purview.42 This view is almost unanimously rejected outside the United States. Thus, if such contract conditions were in place (alongside a home state licencing and oversight regime), a foreign company providing services to the U.S. base in Cuba - such as the Norwegian concern Aker Kvarrner - could theoretically be li­able for actions in support of a situation that its own government considers a violation of the Geneva Conventions, even if the client it works for considers it legal. It is worth noting, however, that a unilateral contracting requirement to adhere to the Geneva Conventions would probably not entitle PMC employees to POW protections outside the jurisdiction of the home state.

I-Law Adv. – 1AC – Leadership Module 1/4

Incorporation of international law overcomes resentment associated with military superiority – that’s key to credible and benign leadership and solves counterbalancing

Sadat 5 (Leila Nadya, Henry Obserschelp Professor of Law at the Washington University in St. Louis, 4. Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 329, Lexis) jl

America's preoccupation with foreign affairs also derives from its superpower status. While representing only about five percent of the world's population, the U.S. economy dwarfs the economies of other  [\*330]  nations, whether measured by GDP, purchasing power, trade, industrial output, or stock market capitalization. [n3](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277328085141&returnToKey=20_T9613899546&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.440465.10452261847" \l "n3) The United States is the world's largest consumer of energy, [n4](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277328085141&returnToKey=20_T9613899546&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.440465.10452261847" \l "n4) and Americans, by some estimates, consume twenty-five percent of the world's oil resources. [n5](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277328085141&returnToKey=20_T9613899546&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.440465.10452261847" \l "n5) This economic dominance has led to military predominance, and the emergence of the United States as the world's only superpower. Nearly fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, the other eighteen NATO countries combined spend less than half of what the U.S. spends on military defense. [n6](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277328085141&returnToKey=20_T9613899546&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.440465.10452261847" \l "n6) The 9/11 Commission Report notes that the U.S. Defense Department budget is greater than Russia's GDP. [n7](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277328085141&returnToKey=20_T9613899546&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.440465.10452261847" \l "n7) The United States military is engaged in operations across the globe, with more than 140,000 soldiers in Iraq [n8](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277328085141&returnToKey=20_T9613899546&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.440465.10452261847" \l "n8) and an additional 20,000 in Afghanistan. [n9](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277328085141&returnToKey=20_T9613899546&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.440465.10452261847" \l "n9) As a society, we have become more aware than ever of our increased stature in the world and the fact that, whether we like it or not, our upcoming Presidential election is being closely followed by observers all over the planet - becoming, as one British journalist recently remarked, the first "world election," but one in which only five percent of the world will vote. [n10](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277328085141&returnToKey=20_T9613899546&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.440465.10452261847" \l "n10)

At Washington University School of Law, we have taken cognizance of the globalization revolution by expanding our curriculum, admitting foreign students in record numbers, and sending our own students abroad. But our society, in general, has been relatively slow to think about globalization in legal terms. International law and international justice have become neglected elements of the U.S. foreign policy equation, as  [\*331]  the focus has shifted away from the exercise of diplomacy to the projection of power. Even the 9/11 Commission Report, which exhorts the United States to adopt a preventive strategy toward terrorism that is as much, or more, political than military in nature, [n11](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277328085141&returnToKey=20_T9613899546&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.440465.10452261847" \l "n11) barely mentions the need for international legal consensus-building and enforcement as means of constraining the spread of international terrorism. The United States has increasingly turned its back on the role that international law may play in helping to stabilize an often chaotic and violent world. Paradoxically, this trend appears to be peaking just at the moment when, outside U.S. borders, international law and lawmaking have risen to unprecedented prominence.

I would like to suggest that international law should be elevated from its current status as an occasional tool or convenient rhetorical device of U.S. foreign policy to a chief element both in international relations and United States diplomacy. Put another way, the United States needs to take its commitment to the rule of law to the global stage, thereby playing to American strengths, enhancing American legitimacy and moral authority, and perpetuating the leadership role that the United States has historically exercised in the conduct of international affairs. As the hegemon presiding over - and benefiting the most from - the global economy, the United States has both a vital interest in maintaining the stability of that system and a responsibility to ensure that the system is fair. While military force will surely continue to play a central role in the conduct of foreign affairs, coercion without legal authority lacks legitimacy and breeds resentment. As lawyers and as citizens, we understand the deep and abiding importance of law and legal institutions domestically - and it is virtually impossible to conceive of a just, peaceful, and stable international order without seeing a place for the rule of law within that order.

While the United States led the way in establishing the United Nations and promoting the rule of law during and following World War II, it has now either abandoned that perspective or embraces it only sporadically. As a result, the U.S. government has been slow in ratifying important treaties, such as the Genocide Convention of 1948 [n12](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277328085141&returnToKey=20_T9613899546&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.440465.10452261847" \l "n12) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, [n13](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277328085141&returnToKey=20_T9613899546&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.440465.10452261847" \l "n13) and the government has refused to sign or ratify many others, including: the International Covenant on  [\*332]  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, [n14](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277328085141&returnToKey=20_T9613899546&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.440465.10452261847" \l "n14) the Land Mines Convention, [n15](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277328085141&returnToKey=20_T9613899546&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.440465.10452261847" \l "n15) the Convention on the Rights of the Child, [n16](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277328085141&returnToKey=20_T9613899546&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.440465.10452261847" \l "n16) the Kyoto Protocol on Global Warming, [n17](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277328085141&returnToKey=20_T9613899546&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.440465.10452261847" \l "n17) the International Criminal Court Treaty, [n18](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277328085141&returnToKey=20_T9613899546&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.440465.10452261847" \l "n18) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, [n19](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277328085141&returnToKey=20_T9613899546&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.440465.10452261847" \l "n19) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. [n20](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277328085141&returnToKey=20_T9613899546&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.440465.10452261847" \l "n20)

Unpacking current American attitudes about international law and international legal regimes is a daunting

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task, but a few general patterns can be discerned. I will not discuss in detail two of the most obvious actors shaping the contours of American policy - Congress and the media - but it is well known that U.S. media coverage of foreign affairs is generally de minimus and that many members of Congress appear politically opposed to international law and international legal regimes on any terms. Yet other forces are at work as well - forces that affect the lawyer in particular.

In American legal culture, there has been a persistent notion that international law is not "real law." Legal theorists and lawyers often have expressed misgivings about the very use of the term "international law," arguing that in the absence of an international legislature, courts with compulsory jurisdiction, and centrally organized sanctions, international law has none of the attributes of municipal law and cannot be equated with it in stature, legitimacy, or binding force. [n21](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277328085141&returnToKey=20_T9613899546&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.440465.10452261847" \l "n21) These theoretical musings have given rise to a popular (mis)conception of international legal rules as precatory, and international institutions as wasteful because they do not  [\*333]  produce "binding" results. Indeed, the whole endeavor, particularly in the United States, has been imbued with a sort of second-class status. Many of these objections do not withstand thoughtful analysis, but to the extent that the critiques might have been tenable fifty years ago, they are no longer particularly viable today. [n22](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277328085141&returnToKey=20_T9613899546&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.440465.10452261847" \l "n22)

International law and adjudication, particularly with the development of the European Union as a supranational, twenty-five member-state legal system and the end of Cold War politics, have undergone a radical transformation in both form and function. Take, for example, the explosion in the sheer number of international courts and tribunals now producing judgments - there are now approximately ninety such bodies. [n23](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277328085141&returnToKey=20_T9613899546&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.440465.10452261847" \l "n23) The International Court of Justice, which initially decided only one or two cases per year, now has over twenty active cases on its docket. It is deciding and rendering advisory opinions on issues ranging from maritime boundary disputes to the interpretation and application of Genocide Convention and the legality of the threat or use of force. [n24](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277328085141&returnToKey=20_T9613899546&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.440465.10452261847" \l "n24)

Even more radical than the change in quantity, however, has been the change in the quality of international law-making and practice. Binding dispute settlement between states and even the imposition of sanctions upon individuals are now characteristic of international law and practice. International treaty-making, which formerly occurred behind closed doors and on a consensus-only basis, now takes place in the spotlight of global civil society. NGO representatives not only attend diplomatic conferences,  [\*334]  but also send daily transcripts home via the internet so that national and local organizations can rally followers to support or protest government actions at the conference. Indeed, when asked what led to the extraordinary success of the campaign to ban land mines, Nobel Prize winner Jody Williams, the organizer, reportedly replied: "e-mail." [n25](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277328085141&returnToKey=20_T9613899546&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.440465.10452261847" \l "n25)

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Hegemony is key to preventing great power wars and solves all your terminal impacts

Thayer 6 [Bradley A., Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, Duluth, The National Interest, November -December, "In Defense of Primacy", lexis]

A remarkable fact about international politics today--in a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display--is that countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes--their own protection, or to gain greater influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America--their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements--and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies. U.S. primacy --and the bandwagoning effect--has also given us extensive influence in international politics , allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States . They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates.The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba--it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations. THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists , most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned --between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with he United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third,

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along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy.4 As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides. Fourth and finally, the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War--and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"--it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington followed up with a large contribution of aid and deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort. No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces. American generosity has done more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg. THERE IS no other state, group of states or international organization that can provide these global benefits. None even comes close. The United Nations cannot because it is riven with conflicts and major cleavages that divide the international body time and again on matters great and trivial. Thus it lacks the ability to speak with one voice on salient issues and to act as a unified force once a decision is reached. The EU has similar problems. Does anyone expect Russia or China to take up these responsibilities? They may have the desire, but they do not have the capabilities. Let's face it: for the time being, American primacy remains humanity's only practical hope of solving the world's ills.

I-Law Adv. – 2AC – Solves Everything Module

US commitment to international law solves every impact

Koh and Smith 3(Harold Hongju - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School, and Bernice Latrobe - Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1479, Lexis) jl

Similarly, the oxymoronic concept of "imposed democracy" authorizes top-down regime change in the name of democracy. Yet the United States has always argued that genuine democracy must flow from the will of the people, not from military occupation. [n67](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277389719316&returnToKey=20_T9619349026&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.582223.2197311746" \l "n67) Finally, a policy of strategic unilateralism seems unsustainable in an interdependent world. For over the past two centuries, the United States has become party not just to a few treaties, but to a global network of closely interconnected treaties enmeshed in multiple frameworks of international institutions. Unilateral administration decisions to break or bend one treaty commitment thus rarely end the matter, but more usually trigger vicious cycles of treaty violation. In an interdependent world,  [\*1501]  the United States simply cannot afford to ignore its treaty obligations while at the same time expecting its treaty partners to help it solve the myriad global problems that extend far beyond any one nation's control: the global AIDS and SARS crises, climate change, international debt, drug smuggling, trade imbalances, currency coordination, and trafficking in human beings, to name just a few. Repeated incidents of American treaty-breaking create the damaging impression of a United States contemptuous of both its treaty obligations and treaty partners. That impression undermines American soft power at the exact moment that the United States is trying to use that soft power to mobilize those same partners to help it solve problems it simply cannot solve alone: most obviously, the war against global terrorism, but also the postwar construction of Iraq, the Middle East crisis, or the renewed nuclear militarization of North Korea.

I-Law Adv. – 2AC – PMC’s = No I-Law

PMC’s make international law credibility impossible

Avant 7 (Deborah, Prof of Polisci and Intl Affair and Director @ Institute for Global and International Studies, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2007\_hr/070425-avant.pdf, AD: 6/23/10) jl

Because contractors are not subject to the chain of command, however, the reliability of their behavior (even given recent attempts to make them liable to the US Code of Military Justice) is not as well reinforced as troops. According to Colonel Gerald Schumacher, a retired Special Forces officer, chaotic conditions in Iraq have led to an almost cavalier attitude among private security personnel toward international law, “I don’t know how anyone can function in an insurgent environment and have any regard for the laws of warfare and the Geneva Conventions.”16

PMC’s are structurally impossible to regulate under I-Law

Gaston 8 (E.L, J.D., Harvard Law School, http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/HARVARDILJ\_mercenarism.pdf, AD: 6/23/10) jl

The availability of advanced, independent security and military capabilities for hire enables states or nonstate actors to get around political or resource constraints that otherwise might limit the use of force. Moreover, since independent PMSCs are not considered part of a state’s armed forces or supporting militias under international humanitarian law (“IHL”), states have weak legal responsibility for the functions they outsource to PMSCs and for the conduct of individuals carrying those functions out. States therefore have few incentives to develop accountability and control mechanisms that would prevent or redress the type of misconduct and international law violations that have been associated with private military and security companies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I-Law Adv. – Solvency

Ruling on international law is key to PMC accountability

Ortiz 10 (Carlos, Prof at University of Sussex, http://www.privatemilitary.org/publications/ortiz\_2004\_regulating\_private\_military\_companies.pdf, AD: 6/23/10) jl

Given the complex embedding of PMC entities within the larger business structures we have seen, regulation must be focussed on the actual PMC activities and be specified by reference to the service being outsourced. This approach, while not diminishing the tensions that delegating authority generates, allows governments to determine in which form and to which extent they enable private contractors access to the management of the monopoly of legitimate violence of the state. Nossal comments that the problems associated with regulating PMC’s nationally have 'led to the view that this activity could be more effectively regulated by international agreement than by a patchwork of national regulation' (Nossal, 2001: 468). But as long as states regard controlling the exercise of legitimate violence their prerogative, PMC regulation, too, will be devised and implemented at a national level. Given existing asymmetries of private military power across borders, changing attitudes towards the use of PMC’s, and different political cultures impinging upon the legislative process, international agreement must remain an ideal, while regulation at the national level is a pragmatic responsibility that governments can neglect, but not fail to recognise in the end. National regulation is therefore the inevitable starting point if the anti-mercenary conventions are no longer seen to be applicable.

I-Law Adv. – Impact – Human Rights

International law and norms effective at solving human rights abuses.

Fox 2000 (Gregory H. assistant professor of law at Chapman University School of Law, *Law and Moral Action in World Politics*, , pg.- 77-78)

It is no small irony that the international law of human rights was both a product and a casualty of the Cold War era. International reaction to the horrors of World War II produced a host of legal norms designed to protect individual citizens from abuse by their governments, as well as numerous institutions dedicated to their realization. At the same time, superpower rivalry ensured that concern for how governments treated their citizens took a back seat to geostrategic considerations. For the vast majority of international relations scholars it came as no surprise that human rights norms should promise so much yet deliver so little. For the ever optimistic international lawyer, however, the creation of norms and institutions dedicated to human rights was important in itself. Once the political climate became less polarized, it was hoped, these legal processes might begin to function as intended.

Since 1989 the legal optimists have been increasingly vindicated. Normatively, issues of human rights now arise in virtually every area of diplomacy. Institutionally, the United Nations, while still struggling to find a secure role in a statist international order, has been the primary vehicle for resolution of many recent international crises. Clearly governments continue to violate human rights on an unacceptable scale. But increasingly, those that do so are beginning to pay a tangible cost in what might be termed "legitimacy capital"-the capacity to participate as a full and equal member in international organizations, aid programs, and other international entitlements. For examples one need only to look to regimes that have been the subject of mandatory UN sanctions-South Africa, Libya, Iraq, Haiti, Somalia, Liberia, and the states of the former Yugoslavia. These states rank among the world's worst human rights

violators. The inability of such regimes to retreat behind claims of absolute territorial sovereignty has been endlessly analyzed and commented upon in recent years.

In many areas of human rights the end of the Cold War put to rest two important questions raised by realist skeptics: first, whether international concern for the welfare of individuals is appropriate, and second, the precise contours of the rights to be protected. The UN's decision to create war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda is emblematic of how controversy on these issues has receded. The tribunals were made possible only by virtue of the broad consensus supporting the norms allegedly violated. These are embodied, principally, in the Genocide Convention of 1948, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the Nuremberg principles on crimes against humanity. Prosecutions before the tribunals are carried out on behalf of the international community as a whole. And the very existence of international criminal courts suggests that the legal standards to be applied have reached a level of specificity comparable to that of law in a domestic system: capable of being proven or disproved by evidence, applied by trial judges, and scrutinized on appeal.

I-Law Adv. – Impact – Laundry List

International law facilitates international cooperation which solves every impact

Damrosch 1995 (Professor of Law, Columbia, and Mullerson, Professor of International Law, King’s, Beyond Confrontation, International Law for the Post Cold War Era, p. 2-3)JFS

The contemporary world has an ever-increasing need for an international legal system that can respond to the demands of our time. Of the many reasons for this fact, we will survey only a few of the most salient. First and foremost is the increasing interdependence of all peoples. Even as the world is riven with many contradictions and conflicts, it is also becoming more integrated with a greater need for orderly, predictable conduct. Events, and especially natural and social disasters, even when they occur within a single country, have more noticeable effects on conditions in the world at large. The Chernobyl accident, the earthquake in Armenia, and even internal political processes underway in the territories of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe -- these and many other events occurring within separate countries or regions have a global significance affecting the destiny of all peoples. The intertwining of the economic life of diverse countries today is even greater than was the interdependence of different regions within the same state only half a century ago. Order and predictability of the behavior of actors on the international scene can be achieved first of all with the aid of social norms, among which international law occupies an important place.

A second reason for the growth of the role of international law is inextricably connected with the first. The threats of a thermonuclear catastrophe, universal ecological crisis, and acute economic problems in developing countries are of global concern and endanger the very existence of humanity. Resolution of these problems demands coordinated efforts of all states and peoples, which would be impossible to achieve without the aid of international norms, procedures, and institutions.

I-Law Adv. – Impact – Biodiversity

Broader incorporation of international law solves biodiversity loss

Glennon 90 [Michael, Board of Editors @ American Journal of Intl Law, Jan., 84 A.J.I.L. 1]

It is now possible to conclude that customary international law requires states to take appropriate steps to protect endangered species. Customary norms are created by state practice "followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." 250 Like highly codified humanitarian law norms that have come to bind even states that are not parties to the instruments promulgating them, 251 wildlife protection norms also have become binding on nonparties as customary law. Closely related to this process of norm creation by practice is that of norm creation by convention: customary norms are created by international agreements "when such agreements are intended for adherence by states generally and are in fact widely accepted." 252 Several such [\*31] agreements are directed at wildlife protection, 253 and CITES is one of them. It is intended for adherence by states generally 254 and is accepted by the 103 states that have become parties. In addition, some nonparties comply with certain CITES documentary requirements so as to trade with parties. 255 CITES is not "rejected by a significant number of states"; 256 only the United Arab Emirates has withdrawn from the agreement. In such circumstances, the International Court of Justice has observed, international agreements constitute state practice and represent law for nonparties. 257 Moreover, customary norms are created by "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." 258 Because CITES requires domestic implementation by parties to it, 259 and because the overall level of compliance seems quite high, 260 the general principles embodied in states' domestic endangered species laws may be relied upon as another source of customary law. 261 Even apart from the CITES requirements, states that lack laws protecting endangered species seem now to be the clear exception rather than the rule. 262 That there exists opinio juris as to the binding character of this obligation 263 is suggested by the firm support given endangered species [\*32] protection by the UN General Assembly and various international conferences. 264

Extinction

Diner 94 (Diner, David N. B.S. Recipient. Ohio State University. J.D. Recipient. College of Law. Ohio State University. LL.M. The Judge Advocate General’s School. United States Army. Judge Advocate’s General’s Corps. United States Army. “The Army and the Endangered Species Act: Who’s Endangering Whom?” Military Law Review. 143 Mil. L. Rev. 161. Winter, 1994. Lexis-Nexis.)

No species has ever dominated its fellow species as man has. In most cases, people have assumed the God-like power of life and death -- extinction or survival -- over the plants and animals of the world. For most of history, mankind pursued this domination with a singleminded determination to master the world, tame the wilderness, and exploit nature for the maximum benefit of the human race. n67 In past mass extinction episodes, as many as ninety percent of the existing species perished, and yet the world moved forward, and new species replaced the old. So why should the world be concerned now? The prime reason is the world's survival. Like all animal life, humans live off of other species. At some point, the number of species could decline to the point at which the ecosystem fails, and then humans also would become extinct. No one knows how many [\*171] species the world needs to support human life, and to find out -- by allowing certain species to become extinct -- would not be sound policy. In addition to food, species offer many direct and indirect benefits to mankind. n68 2. Ecological Value. -- Ecological value is the value that species have in maintaining the environment. Pest, n69 erosion, and flood control are prime benefits certain species provide to man. Plants and animals also provide additional ecological services -- pollution control, n70 oxygen production, sewage treatment, and biodegradation. n71 3. Scientific and Utilitarian Value. -- Scientific value is the use of species for research into the physical processes of the world. n72 Without plants and animals, a large portion of basic scientific research would be impossible. Utilitarian value is the direct utility humans draw from plants and animals. n73 Only a fraction of the [\*172] earth's species have been examined, and mankind may someday desperately need the species that it is exterminating today. To accept that the snail darter, harelip sucker, or Dismal Swamp southeastern shrew n74 could save mankind may be difficult for some. Many, if not most, species are useless to man in a direct utilitarian sense. Nonetheless, they may be critical in an indirect role, because their extirpations could affect a directly useful species negatively. In a closely interconnected ecosystem, the loss of a species affects other species dependent on it. n75 Moreover, as the number of species decline, the effect of each new extinction on the remaining species increases dramatically. n76 4. Biological Diversity. -- The main premise of species preservation is that diversity is better than simplicity. n77 As the current mass extinction has progressed, the world's biological diversity generally has decreased. This trend occurs within ecosystems by reducing the number of species, and within species by reducing the number of individuals. Both trends carry serious future implications. Biologically diverse ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches. These ecosystems inherently are more stable than less diverse systems. "The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a stress. . . .[l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple, unbranched circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." n79 By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, [hu]mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.

I-Law Adv. – Impact – Self-Determination

International law prompts self-determination

Naqvi 96 (Feisal Hussain, associate at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, “People’s Rights or Victim’s Rights: Reexamining the Conceptualization of Indigenous Rights in International Law,” Indiana Law Journal, Summer, pg.- l/n)

The proposal here though is to look at the right to self-determination not just from the perspective of to what "peoples" are entitled, but in light of Hohfeld's observation that "one person's right must mean another person's duty." 358 The question is who has the duty to provide the right to self-determination. In a classical context, this "duty" is basically the obligation of the colonial state to dismember itself. However, widening the concept of self-determination in turn widens the scope of state obligations to protect the right of self-determination by granting some limited degree of autonomy to parties deserving it. The right to self-determination envisioned here, at an irreducible minimum, encompasses both the right of all ethnic and indigenous communities to continue to exist, in Anaya's words, as "distinct units of human interaction," 359 and the duty of host states to protect that distinct status.   
Though international law cannot attempt to freeze the process of cultural change, "it can attempt to locate processes of change in the general context of human rights, so that members of groups can play a part in the development of their heritage and choose the basis on which their culture can adapt to the world." 360 Recognition of this right imposes a duty on the state to accomodate and preserve particular communities. Even if a community is too small to demand realistically even the most limited degree of partial autonomy, the right to self-determination -- that is, the right of a community to choose the basis on which its culture changes -- must still be preserved and exercised on its behalf by the host state as part of its obligations to that community.

Self determination fuses democracy and group autonomy, while protecting distinctive cultures.

Binder 1993 (Guyora professor of law at S.U.N.Y. at Buffalo, “The Kaplan Lecture on Human Rights: The Case for Self-Determination,” Stanford Journal of International Law, Winter, pg. – l/n)

My argument against reducing group self-determination claims to instruments for the protection of individual autonomy will proceed in three steps. First, I will show that one important benefit of group autonomy, the protection of distinctive cultures, must be seen as a collective good, not just a benefit to individuals. Second, I will argue that devotion to any moral end gives us reason to create a distinctive culture and embody it in an autonomous political institution. It follows that respecting the moral autonomy of individuals entails respecting the autonomy of the groups through which they pursue their moral ends. Third, I will show how this argument for group autonomy integrates the universalist and nationalist components of self-determination. On the one hand, building and sustaining democracy requires the  [\*250]  nurturing of a distinctive culture. On the other hand, groups best realize the moral autonomy of individuals if they are democratically governed.   
I conclude that the original romantic ideal of self-determination rightly fused democracy with group autonomy. Democracy depends upon group autonomy, while the autonomy rights of groups depend upon their democracy. These two aspirations are not, in the end, separable components of the principle of self-determination, but inextricable skeins of a single fabric.

**I-Law Adv – A2: Link Takeouts**

PMC’s violate international law – your authors assume they are civilian contractors

Cameron 7 (Lindsey, Teaching Assistant at the University of Geneva, International Review of the Red Cross 88(863)JFS

Some of the newest armed non-state parties operating in unstable states and conflict situations come from an unusual source: the private sector. Ever since the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq, with Coalition forces buoyed by the presence of upwards of 20,000 individuals employed by private military companies (PMC’s), the role, status, accountability and regulation of those companies has been hotly debated. States are vitally aware of the need to address the proliferation of private military companies – impelled as much by concerns about losing control of their monopoly over the use of violence and the impact of that industry on national military policy as by a willingness to uphold their obligations under international law. Two incidents in particular have driven the discourse.1 First, the killing and mutilation of four employees of the private military company Blackwater and the following assault on Fallujah in April 2004 using ‘‘over-whelming force’’ have led to questions about the relationship of the military to these contractors and the accuracy of calling them ‘‘civilian’’ contractors. Second, the implication of civilian contractors of the private military company CACI in the torture of internees at the Abu Ghraib detention facility has drawn attention to the qualifications of such contractors for the tasks they are performing, as well as to their accountability for human rights abuses they may commit.2 Although some US military personnel have been tried in courts-martial for their actions at Abu Ghraib, none of the private contractors allegedly involved has been brought to court on criminal charges.3 To a great extent the debates around private military companies fall within wider debates about the privatization of government functions.4 The myriad policy decisions that the rise of this industry demands are best left to others; this article does not seek to judge or condemn these companies but merely to provide a picture as to how international humanitarian law applies to them, for when it comes to the status of private military company employees, confusion abounds. Governments repeatedly assert that PMC employees are ‘‘civilian contractors’’, implying that they do not perceive these individuals as combatants. A minority of the international community treats all PMC’s as bands of criminal mercenaries,5 yet employees of some PMC’s are attempting to benefit from combatant status to protect themselves against civil lawsuits brought in the United States for their role in torturing prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison.6 In the burgeoning academic literature on the subject, many authors consider and reject the possibility that individuals employed by private military companies are mercenaries, but fail to elucidate what their status is if they are not mercenaries.7 This paper therefore seeks to set the record straight as to the legal status of PMC’s and their employees under international humanitarian law. This exercise is essential, as it is only when their status is understood and accepted that they can be regulated effectively. After an outline of the PMC industry, a brief overview will be provided of the law on mercenaries in international law and international humanitarian law, drawing on examples from Iraq. The question as to whether private military company employees are combatants or civilians according to accepted legal definitions will then be discussed. A word on their existing accountability for violations of international humanitarian law is also appropriate.8 The starting point is that it is patently incorrect to state that ‘‘these [private military companies] act in a void, virtually free from legal restraints’’.9 The paper will conclude with recommendations and considerations that states may wish to take into account when developing regulatory schemes for private military companies.

Executive Power Bad Adv. – 1AC 1/8

Deployment of PMC’s is causing overexpansion of executive power

Avant 7 (Deborah, Prof of Polisci and Intl Affair and Director @ Institute for Global and International Studies, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2007\_hr/070425-avant.pdf, AD: 6/23/10) jl

Contracting for foreign training has thus far changed the balance of control between the executive and legislative branches of government. The executive branch hires contractors, not Congress. Though Congress approves the military budget, it does not approve individual decisions to contract out training. It is harder for Congress to oversee PSC behavior in contract with the US government. The annual consolidated report on military assistance and sales, for instance, does not include information on who is conducting particular training missions.28 Examples of executive use of PSCs to evade congressional restrictions abound. For instance, when Congress institutes stipulations on the numbers of US troops – the executive has used contractors to go above this number. Sometimes Congress has innovated and stipulated an upper limit on the number of contractors, but this has simply led PSCs to hire more local personnel.29 Thus, the executive branch, in its decisions to hire contractors and in its day-to-day implementation. of policy is advantaged vis-a-vis Congress. Indeed, this change is often touted by members of the executive branch as one of the benefits of contracting out.30

This is not to suggest that congressional oversight of foreign training is easy or that the executive does not have an advantage in this arena in the first place. The institutional safeguards that give Congress indirect means of control over military forces, however, are not present with PSCs. For instance, Congress has long-standing ties to military organizations, which affect incentives for individual service members and provide mechanisms for congressional control. These mechanisms are not so readily available for PSCs. There are, of course, other ways to avoid congressional scrutiny – through the use of covert operations, for instance. PSCs simply add another tool to this list.

This is also not to suggest that Congress will not develop better tools for oversight of PSCs in the future. Given the stresses on US forces and the likelihood that contractors will be used for a wide variety of military tasks in the future, I hope that Congress along with the agencies of the executive branch will develop more effective strategies for managing these contracts.

Executive Power Bad Adv. – 1AC 2/8

Overexpansion of executive war powers is a slippery slope – Congressional reclaimation of this authority prevents spill over

Lobel 8 (Jules, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh Law School, Ohio State Law Journal, 69 Ohio St. L.J. 391, Lexis) jl

Many have criticized the Bush Administration's invocation of expansive Presidential war powers to interrogate prisoners, [n7](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277331032420&returnToKey=20_T9614109341&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.427454.0546060517#n7) engage in warrantless  [\*393]  wiretapping of American citizens, or conduct the Iraq war. [n8](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277331032420&returnToKey=20_T9614109341&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.427454.0546060517#n8) However, few of those critics have challenged the Administration's initial premise-that the Constitution gives the President as Commander-in-Chief unbridled power over battlefield tactical decisions in the conduct of war.

This Article, however, challenges that assumption and will demonstrate that it is not supported by the Constitution, history, or logic. Congress and the President have concurrent power to conduct warfare that has been authorized by Congress. Congress maintains the ultimate authority to decide the methods by which the United States will wage war. The President can direct and manage warfare, however, the only Commander in Chief power that Congress cannot override is the President's power to command: to be, in Alexander Hamilton's words, the nation's "first General and Admiral." [n9](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277331032420&returnToKey=20_T9614109341&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.427454.0546060517#n9)

The Administration's position that it has exclusive power over tactical or battlefield operations finds some support in legal scholarship and Supreme Court dicta. In his 1866 concurring opinion in Ex parte Milligan, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase observed that Congress could not enact legislation that "interferes with the command of the forces or the conduct of campaigns. That power and duty belongs to the President as commander-in-chief." [n10](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277331032420&returnToKey=20_T9614109341&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.427454.0546060517#n10) Chase's dictum that Congress "cannot direct the conduct of campaigns" was repeated by the Supreme Court two years ago in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. [n11](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277331032420&returnToKey=20_T9614109341&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.427454.0546060517#n11)

Justice Robert Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer also contains language that proponents of broad Presidential war power claim supports their position. [n12](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277331032420&returnToKey=20_T9614109341&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.427454.0546060517#n12) In addition, extrajudicial statements by Supreme Court Justices support the President's  [\*394]  exclusive Executive power to move troops and to direct campaigns. [n13](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277331032420&returnToKey=20_T9614109341&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.427454.0546060517#n13) These statements notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has never invalidated legislation because it interfered with the President's Commander in Chief power to conduct military operations. [n14](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277331032420&returnToKey=20_T9614109341&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.427454.0546060517#n14)

The Administration's claim of unchecked power to conduct battlefield operations, a position that is ironically accepted by both the Administration and many of its critics, raises difficult questions as to where to draw the line between congressional and Executive power over the conduct of warfare. The Administration's argument starts with the proposition that Congress could not statutorily require the President to shift the 101st Airborne division from Baghdad to Anbar province. Similarly, Congress could not have directed FDR to launch D-Day at Brittany rather than Normandy, or to initiate an invasion of France in 1943 instead of attacking Italy. The Administration and its critics appear to agree on this point.

The Administration then argues that actions that are important to military success on the battlefield also fall within the sphere of exclusive presidential power. So, for example, what if commanders believe that a prisoner captured on the battlefield possesses information critical to the success of the battle? Proponents of broad Presidential power would argue that the issue of how, when, and where you interrogate him or her is just as much a tactical military decision as the decision about where troops should be placed and how campaigns should be conducted. So too, the Administration would argue that the power to make decisions about how and where to place spies to obtain information about enemy plans is a part of the President's power to conduct military campaigns. [\*395]

Taking this premise a step further, the Administration argues that Congress could not interfere with the President's wartime decisions to engage in electronic surveillance against the enemy by requiring him to obtain a warrant. Similarly, if Congress could not limit the D-Day invasion force to a certain number of soldiers, then Congress could not disapprove the President's surge strategy in Iraq.

Once one accepts the Administration's starting proposition that the President has broad exclusive power to make tactical battlefield decisions, a proposition most commentators appear to accept, the possibilities for extension seem almost limitless. [n15](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277331032420&returnToKey=20_T9614109341&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.427454.0546060517#n15) Yet, as this Article will demonstrate, that starting proposition is erroneous.

The critical flaw in the basic premise supporting exclusive presidential powers in war is that it ignores Congress's own panoply of war powers. Arrayed against the President's sole war power as Commander in Chief, the Constitution vests Congress with powers to declare war, issue letters of marque and reprisal, to raise armies and navies, to make rules concerning captures on land and water, and to make rules for the regulation of the army and navy. [n16](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277331032420&returnToKey=20_T9614109341&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.427454.0546060517#n16) Furthermore, congressional authority to define offenses against the law of nations, its power to appropriate funds, and its power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution its powers are also important wartime powers. [n17](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277331032420&returnToKey=20_T9614109341&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.427454.0546060517#n17) Congressional power over warfare also seems logically limitless, and the Constitution seems to provide Congress with substantial power to check virtually all the President's Commander in Chief powers. Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall once observed that the "whole powers of war" are vested in Congress. [n18](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277331032420&returnToKey=20_T9614109341&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.427454.0546060517#n18)

Executive Power Bad Adv. – 1AC 3/8

Overexpansion of executive powers gets modeled – causes international preemptive wars, loose WMDs, destruction of human rights, and collapses US leadership.

Sloane 8 (Robert D, Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, 88 B.U.U. Rev. 341, Lexis) jl

There is a great deal more constitutional history that arguably bears on the scope of the executive power in the twenty-first century. But it is vital to appreciate that the scope of the executive power, particularly in the twenty-first century, is not only a constitutional or historical issue. As an international lawyer rather than a constitutionalist, I want to stress briefly that these debates and their concrete manifestations in U.S. law and policy potentially exert a profound effect on the shape of international law. Justice Sutherland's sweeping dicta in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., that the President enjoys a "very delicate, plenary and exclusive power ... as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations - a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress," [n52](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277332654452&returnToKey=20_T9614209063&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.530795.740417196" \l "n52) has been (correctly, in my view) criticized on a host of grounds. [n53](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277332654452&returnToKey=20_T9614209063&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.530795.740417196" \l "n53) But in practice, in part for institutional and structural reasons, [n54](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277332654452&returnToKey=20_T9614209063&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.530795.740417196" \l "n54) it accurately reflects the general preeminence of the President in the realm of U.S. foreign affairs. Because of the nature of the international legal and political system, what U.S. Presidents do and say often establish precedents that strongly influence what other states do and say - with potentially dramatic consequences for the shape of customary international law. The paradigmatic example is the establishment of customary international law on the continental shelf following the Truman Proclamation of September 28, 1945, [n55](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277332654452&returnToKey=20_T9614209063&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.530795.740417196" \l "n55) which produced an echo of similar claims and counterclaims, culminating in a whole new corpus of the international law of the sea for what had previously been understood only as a geological term of art. [n56](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277332654452&returnToKey=20_T9614209063&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.530795.740417196" \l "n56) Many states took note, for example, when in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States ("NSS"), President Bush asserted that the United States had the right under international law to engage in preventive wars of  [\*350]  self-defense. [n57](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277332654452&returnToKey=20_T9614209063&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.530795.740417196" \l "n57) While, contrary to popular belief, the United States never in fact formally relied on that doctrine in practice, many would argue that President Bush de facto exercised this purported right when he initiated an armed conflict with Iraq based on claims, which have since proved unfounded, about its incipient programs to develop catastrophic weapons. The 2006 NSS notably retreats from the 2002 NSS's robust claims of a right to engage in preventive wars of self-defense. [n58](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277332654452&returnToKey=20_T9614209063&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.530795.740417196" \l "n58) Yet even within this brief, four-year period, an astonishing number of other states have asserted a comparable right to engage in preventive self-defense. These include not only states that the United States has described as "rogue states," such as North Korea and Iran, but Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, China, India, Iran, Israel, Russia, and (though technically not a state) Taiwan. [n59](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277332654452&returnToKey=20_T9614209063&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.530795.740417196" \l "n59) I doubt we will welcome the consequences of this pattern for the evolving jus ad bellum of the twenty-first century. Equally, after President Bush's decision to declare a global war on terror or terrorism - rather than, for example, the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and their immediate allies - virtually every insurgency or disaffected minority around the world, including peoples suffering under repressive regimes and seeking to assert legitimate rights to liberty and self-determination, has been recharacterized by opportunistic state elites as part of the enemy in this global war. [n60](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277332654452&returnToKey=20_T9614209063&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.530795.740417196" \l "n60) The techniques employed and justified by the United States, including the resurrection of rationalized torture as an "enhanced interrogation technique," [n61](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277332654452&returnToKey=20_T9614209063&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.530795.740417196" \l "n61) likewise have emerged - and will continue to emerge - in the  [\*351]  practice of other states. Because of customary international law's acute sensitivity to authoritative assertions of power, the widespread repetition of claims and practices initiated by the U.S. executive may well shape international law in ways the United States ultimately finds disagreeable in the future. So as we debate the scope of the executive power in the twenty-first century, the stakes, as several panelists point out, could not be higher. They include more than national issues such as the potential for executive branch officials to be prosecuted or impeached for exceeding the legal scope of their authority or violating valid statutes. [n62](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277332654452&returnToKey=20_T9614209063&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.530795.740417196" \l "n62) They also include international issues like the potential use of catastrophic weapons by a rogue regime asserting a right to engage in preventive war; the deterioration of international human rights norms against practices like torture, norms which took years to establish; and the atrophy of genuine U.S. power in the international arena, which, as diplomats, statesmen, and international relations theorists of all political persuasions appreciate, demands far more than the largest and most technologically advanced military arsenal. In short, what Presidents do, internationally as well as domestically - the precedents they establish - may affect not only the technical scope of the executive power, as a matter of constitutional law, but the practical ability of future Presidents to exercise that power both at home and abroad. We should candidly debate whether terrorism or other perceived crises require an expanded scope of executive power in the twenty-first century. But it is dangerous to cloak the true stakes of that debate with the expedient of a new - and, in the view of most, indefensible - "monarchical executive" theory, which claims to be coextensive with the defensible, if controversial, original Unitary Executive theory. [n63](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277332654452&returnToKey=20_T9614209063&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.530795.740417196" \l "n63) We should also weigh the costs and benefits of an expanded scope of executive power. But it is vital to appreciate that there are costs. They include not only short-term, acute consequences but long-term, systemic consequences that may not become fully apparent for years. In fact, the exorbitant exercise of broad, supposedly inherent, executive powers may well - as in the aftermath of the Nixon administration - culminate in precisely the sort of reactive statutory constraints and de facto diplomatic obstacles that proponents of a robust executive regard as misguided and a threat to U.S. national security in the twenty-first century.

Executive Power Bad Adv. – 1AC 4/8

Global human rights violations create conditions where extinction is inevitable

Human Rights Web, 94 (An Introduction to the Human Rights Movement Created on July 20, 1994 / Last edited on January 25, 1997, <http://www.hrweb.org/intro.html>)

The [United Nations Charter](http://www.hrweb.org/legal/unchartr.html), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and UN Human Rights convenants were written and implemented in the aftermath of the Holocaust, revelations coming from the Nuremberg war crimes trials, the Bataan Death March, the atomic bomb, and other horrors smaller in magnitude but not in impact on the individuals they affected. A whole lot of people in a number of countries had a crisis of conscience and found they could no longer look the other way while tyrants jailed, tortured, and killed their neighbors.

In Germany, the Nazis first came for the communists, and I did not speak up, because I was not a Communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak up, because I was not a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak up, because I was not a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics, and I did not speak up, because I was not a Catholic. Then they came for me... and by that time, there was no one to speak up for anyone.

-- Martin Niemoeller, Pastor,

German Evangelical (Lutheran) Church

Many also realized that advances in technology and changes in social structures had rendered war a threat to the continued existence of the human race. Large numbers of people in many countries lived under the control of tyrants, having no recourse but war to relieve often intolerable living conditions. Unless some way was found to relieve the lot of these people, they could revolt and become the catalyst for another wide-scale and possibly nuclear war. For perhaps the first time, representatives from the majority of governments in the world came to the conclusion that basic human rights must be protected, not only for the sake of the individuals and countries involved, but to preserve the human race.

Executive Power Bad Adv. – 1AC 5/8

Key to universalize democratic peace – none of their impact takeouts assume changes in democratic structure

Damrosch 95 (Lori Fisler, Professor of Law, Columbia University, 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 181, Lexis) jl

The proposition is now firmly established that democracies virtually never go to war with each other; thus we now have empirical proof of Kant's philosophical speculation about peaceful relations within a league of democratic states - what some contemporary political scientists  [\*190]  call the theory of the "interdemocratic peace." [n23](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277333534248&returnToKey=20_T9614263458&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.167448.24096239652#n23) Yet the hypothesis that democracies are inherently more pacific than nondemocracies has not been empirically validated. To the contrary, the conventional wisdom is that the evidence tends to show that in their relations with nondemocracies, democracies are just as violence-prone and perhaps even just as likely to initiate conflict as other regimes. [n24](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277333534248&returnToKey=20_T9614263458&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.167448.24096239652#n24) The evidence on conflicts between democracies and nondemocracies, and especially on democracies as initiators of conflicts against nondemocracies, requires further consideration in order to arrive at a fair assessment of the Madisonian claims of the war-restraining characteristics of the American model of constitutional democracy. The political science literature on the democracy-peace linkage is not always attentive to questions of greatest interest to legal consumers of this research. Political scientists have adopted different definitions of "democracy" in their methodologies but have rarely attempted to ascertain whether, within the overall category of "democracies," there are subtypes that have been more successful than others in avoiding violent conflict. Although researchers have introduced some refinements of arguable relevance to legal concerns, the information bearing on a comparative assessment of differing forms of democratic control of warmaking is not easy to tease out. Interdisciplinary dialogue between lawyers and political scientists may help shed light on this question.

Michael W. Doyle (whose article set the tone for much of the research of the past decade) erects a dichotomy between "liberal" and "illiberal" regimes, with the former defined in terms of four basic attributes. One attribute is representative government, including "the requirement that the legislative branch have an effective role in public policy" and that "representative government is internally sovereign (... especially over military and foreign affairs)." [n25](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277333534248&returnToKey=20_T9614263458&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.167448.24096239652#n25) Doyle takes some account of the legislative role in formulating foreign policy. For example, he excludes pre-World War I Germany from his catalogue of liberal states, largely on the ground that the Kaiser's control of military policy was unchecked by a legislature that otherwise had substantial policy-making authority. Doyle, however, does not make a separate investigation of the  [\*191]  criterion of legislative constraint on the executive, apart from its use to assign states to either the "liberal" or "illiberal" category. While Doyle analyzes the democratic variable as a dichotomy, other commentators use three or more categories. Still others rank states in terms of scores assigned to various democratic attributes (such as the percentage of the adults enjoying suffrage, or the extent of freedoms of speech or press). [n26](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277333534248&returnToKey=20_T9614263458&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.167448.24096239652" \l "n26) Other researchers, while examining whether polities that undergo transformation from nondemocratic to democratic regime-types (or vice versa) are more or less likely to get involved in conflict during periods of democratization, have drawn attention to the destabilizing potential of turbulent transitions. [n27](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277333534248&returnToKey=20_T9614263458&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.167448.24096239652" \l "n27) Like Doyle's work, much of this literature treats substantial constraints over the executive in the foreign policy field (whether emanating from the legislature or otherwise) as among the factors relevant to ascertaining and/or ranking a state's "democratic" credentials; the extent of judicial independence is also sometimes factored in. [n28](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277333534248&returnToKey=20_T9614263458&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.167448.24096239652" \l "n28) Yet none of these inquiries gets very far in analyzing the extent to which structural features of different democratic types correlate with lesser levels of violence, especially with the initiation of violence. In particular, there is little explicit discussion of the constraining role of different modalities of controls on the war-initiating powers of the executive branch. Looking at the problem through the lens of comparative constitutional law challenges us to test the hypothesis that the phenomenon of  [\*192]  democracies initiating violence against nondemocracies might be explained partly in terms of imperfect subordination of executive war powers to constitutional controls. To the extent that executive warmaking is constitutionally constrained and made subject to prior legislative approval, democracies might become more pacific, not only in their relations with other democracies but with any type of regime. Although this hypothesis remains untested and unproved, important normative implications would flow from its being proved. Among those would be that it is not enough to favor democratization in the sense of periodic electoral validation of the government, or liberalization in the sense of respect for human rights and individual autonomy; rather, attention must also be given to whether particular political structures and systems of constitutional control might be more effective than others in checking the war-making potential of the executive branch. The role of the American President as initiator of several conflicts during the 1980s suggests some of the issues to be explored in attempting to understand conflicts between democracies and nondemocracies. U.S. involvement in Central America in the mid-1980s, and U.S. interventions in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989, are examples of imperfect constitutional control on the part of a democratic state that initiated conflict with nondemocratic states. As for the Central American controversy, the Reagan Administration (or at least some of its key figures) found ways to circumvent explicit congressional prohibitions on U.S. attempts to overthrow the Nicaraguan government or to provoke a military exchange with Nicaragua, [n29](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277333534248&returnToKey=20_T9614263458&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.167448.24096239652" \l "n29) and in this way (among others) undermined the proper functioning of our constitutional system of government. [n30](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277333534248&returnToKey=20_T9614263458&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.167448.24096239652" \l "n30) The Reagan and Bush Administrations acted without congressional authorization in undertaking the invasions of Grenada and Panama, even though the nature of the operations and the likelihood of combat implicated the constitutional prerogatives of Congress. The courts declined to articulate the boundaries of lawful executive action and left the President essentially free to implement an expansive view of his own constitutional powers. [n31](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277333534248&returnToKey=20_T9614263458&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.167448.24096239652" \l "n31)

Executive Power Bad Adv. – 1AC 6/8

Solves extinction

Diamond 95 (Larry, Hastings fellow, Foreign Policy)

The impact on democracies demonstrates the fallacy in thinking that “real” interests can be distinguished from the U.S. Interest in fostering democracy. A more democratic world would be a safer, saner, and more prosperous world for the United States. The experience of this century bears important lessons. Democratic countries do not go to war with one another or sponsor terrorism against other democracies. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to threaten one another. Democratic countries are more reliable, open, and enduring trading partners, and offer more stable climates for investment. Because they must answer to their own citizens, democracies are more environmentally responsible. They are more likely to honor international treaties and value legal obligations since their openness makes it much more difficult to breach them in secret. Precisely because they respect civil liberties, rights of property, and the rule of law within their own borders, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which to build a new world order of security and prosperity. A truly new world order means qualitatively different world, not just the temporary leashing of dictatorships or incremental progress on arms control, terrorism, and trade. Promoting democracy must therefore be at the heart of America’s global vision. Democracy should be the central focus--the defining feature – of US foreign policy.

No risk of their turns – unchecked executive authority outweighs congressional hindrance of military effectiveness

Lobel 8 (Jules, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh Law School, Ohio State Law Journal, 69 Ohio St. L.J. 391, Lexis) jl

One might argue, however, that the potential danger that Congress could enact impractical, and unduly restrictive legislation controlling the movement of troops in battle supports a constitutional rule that accords the President sole power in this area, even if the line that was drawn was somewhat vague or logically indefensible.

That argument fails for two reasons. First, such a line is unnecessary. Congress has never interfered with battle plans or troop movements in the course of battle, even during the Civil War when congressional intermeddling in military matters was at its height. There is no reason to believe that Congress is even remotely likely to do so in the future, or that it is even capable of doing so. The line drawing would not be in response to a real problem, but a speculative, highly remote hypothetical. Important constitutional distinctions ought not be based on imaginary problems.

Worse still, the purely speculative danger that Congress might in the future interfere with battle plans or troops movements in the course of warfare must be balanced against the very real and present danger that Presidents will use an exclusive power over troop movements to expand their power dramatically at Congress's expense.

Modern Presidents have done just that. They have sought to expand their narrow constitutional power to repel sudden attacks into a power to introduce U.S. troops into hostilities anywhere in the world where, in the President's opinion, the United States' national interests are threatened. They have argued that the President's narrow power to protect our troops precludes Congress from limiting offensive actions that significantly expand a war.

The current administration has gone further, arguing that the President's power to direct the movement of troops precludes Congress from absolutely forbidding torture, or warrantless spying against Americans. The potential for abuse of a narrow but theoretically expandable rule is enormous, ever-present, and demonstrated by history.

Congress has also generally not restricted the President's power to repel attacks on American troops. [n288](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277335072212&returnToKey=20_T9614352404&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.9935.324806362056" \l "n288) But the President's power to repel attacks  [\*462]  should be viewed as an independent power that permits the Executive to act with speed and flexibility in the absence of congressional authority, but that Congress has the right to regulate and limit that power.

Executive Power Bad Adv. – 1AC 7/8

Russia models lack of US Congressional constraints.

Becker 6 (Jonathan, Writer for Soft Skull Press - Independent News Organization, http://www.softskull.com/files/Bush\_and\_Putin.pdf, AD: 6/23/10) jl

If the war on terror is the policy that drives and unites Presidents Putin and Bush, a commitment to the supremacy of the executive branch gives them a shared approach to governance. The wars on terror have no doubt given pretext for the assertion of executive authority, but for both presidents the commitment to executive superiority reaches far beyond that. Three terms sum up Putin’s approach to governance: “managed democracy,” “dictatorship of the law,” and the “*vertikal*” (vertical power). Taken together, they mean that Putin has taken the Yeltsin-era constitution, which already places inordinate authority in the presidency, to an extreme. Russia will have a strong state, the state will be controlled by the president, and potential challenges to the state, whether they emerge from wealthy “oligarchs” or from upstart governors, will be crushed. Putin is unapologetic in this regard, as he said in his millennium speech “Russia will not become a second edition of, say, the U.S. or Britain, where liberal values have deep historic traditions. . . . For Russians, a strong state is not an anomaly to be got rid of. Quite the contrary, it is a source of order and the main driving force of any change.” Managed democracy, as its name suggests, implies significant limits on political freedoms, something which is far more akin to authoritarianism than democracy. In the political sphere, it has meant that the state and its allies have taken control over all major national television stations, which now serve to promote the policies of the president and that television and other so-called “administrative resources” have been manipulated generously to ensure the re-election of Putin and the election of his loyal majority parliamentary party, Unified Russia. It has also meant that electoral laws have been altered to make it more difficult for potential opposition parties to become elected in the future. Substantial limits have also been placed on civil society, including onerous registration requirements for non-governmental organizations that could challenge the government. These and other steps are designed to ensure that Russia will avoid the popular uprisings that led to the removal of old-guard governments in the “colored” revolutions of Ukraine (orange) and Georgia (rose). Dictatorship of law essentially boils down to the selective application of legal principles, often the tax code, to eliminate potential rivals. It has been particularly effective in being wielded against those from the private sector who deign to interfere with the actions of the state. Dictatorship of law has ensured that the likes of Vladimir Gusinsky and Mikhail Khodarkovsky have been, respectively, exiled and jailed, and that the state has stripped them of their media and energy assets. The *vertikal* has seen the further centralization of power through the emasculation of Russia’s system of federalism. The process began in the year 2000 with the creation of seven “super-regions,” overseen by presidentially appointed plenipotentiaries, to oversee the activities of the governors and legislatures in Russia’s eighty-nine territorial units. The process accelerated after the Beslan tragedy when Putin implemented a “reform” to ensure that that henceforth governors would no longer be popularly elected, but named by Moscow (subject to nominal approval by regional legislatures). To top things off, governor after governor then appeared on state-run television to stress how wise the decision was to ensure that they no longer be elected by the people. Such is the state of affairs in managed democracy. If Putin uses dictatorship of law to emasculate potential rivals, Bush uses unique legal interpretations, which are seemingly cooked up in the basement of the conservative Federalist Society, to arrogate to himself powers unheard of in U.S. history. The philosophy of the Bush administration, as is so often the case, was best articulated by Vice President Dick Cheney, who declared, “I believe in a strong, robust executive authority, and I think that the world we live in demands it.” This philosophy has led to a number of actions that, in the words of Elizabeth Drew, have made the executive “less accountable than at any time in modern American history.”7 The administration asserts that the primary sources of executive supremacy rest in the president’s power as commander in chief, under Article II of the Constitution, and Congress’ *Authorization for Use of Military Force* (AUMF), passed in the in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, which calls for “the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States.” The scope of actions which the Bush administration believes is justified under current circumstances knows no bounds. According to a white paper issued by the Bush’s Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, the combination of Article II and AUMF “places the president at the zenith of his powers,” granting him “all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.” Since the “war on terror” is, almost by definition, limitless in terms of time and space, this interpretation means that according to the White House, President Bush and future presidents will be at the apex of their powers in perpetuity. This Bush approach <CONTINUED>

Executive Power Bad Adv. – 1AC 8/8

<CONTINUED>

has permitted broad assertions of executive authority that have undermined the legislative branch and paved the way for violations of fundamental rights of citizens and non-citizens alike. The list of *known* activities justified by the force of Article II and AUMG includes, but is not limited to: the indefinite holding of American citizens without a hearing, charges, or a trial; the detention of non-U.S. nationals in Guantanamo Bay and in “black sites” throughout the world without any form of due process; the approval of activities which are prohibited by the Geneva conventions, including torture; the “extraordinary rendition” of terror suspects to third countries where they receive 13 The ties That Bind barbaric treatment; and, the creation of a program under the National Security Agency (NSA) which, without court approval, allows the monitoring of phone conversations and emails of thousands of citizens.8 All of these have been conducted with no, or absolutely minimal, Congressional oversight and without Congress’s express approval. The NSA case is particularly instructive, because in this circumstance the president had a tool that would permit such activities under the Congressionally-mandated Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. However, he chose to reject this option. His contempt for oversight by the legislative branch was exhibited in the limited way that congressmen were brought into the picture: rather than seeking legislative support for the program, or even consulting with the full intelligence committees, the administration briefed a handful of lawmakers about selected parts of the program, did not seek their approval, and prohibited them from consulting staff or counsel, or sharing the information with colleagues, including members of the intelligence committees. As Pennsylvania Republican Arlen Specter put it succinctly, the administration’s briefings did “not constitute a check and balance.” The idea that Bush’s commitment to executive supremacy is solely derived from the demands of the war on terror and the balance between safety and security is belied by his reliance, since the start of his administration, on the hitherto obscure notion of the “unitary executive.” As Elizabeth Drew has argued, “[t]he concept of the unitary executive holds that the executive branch can overrule the courts and Congress on the basis of the president’s own interpretations of the Constitution.”9 This is the moral equivalent of a *vertikal* for the federal government, with the executive at the top of the pyramid and the separation of powers obliterated. What this means in practical terms is that President Bush, instead of vetoing bills (something he has yet to do in his nearly six years in office), issues “signing statements” which are included in the *Federal Registrar*, a compendium of U.S. laws. In the signing statements he uses often opaque language which adds up to the notion that it is the executive, not the legislative branch, which defines the intent of laws and which determines the level of Congressional oversight of any action that concerns the executive. In all, he has issued more than 750 such statements. Perhaps the most egregious example of this was the signing statement for the McCain amendment that banned “cruel, inhuman or degraded treatment” of POWs. In the words of a protest letter signed by former government officials of both parties, the signing statement meant that the President “may or may not be bound” by laws enacted by Congress.10 After learning of a similar signing statement on amendments to the Patriot Act that required the FBI to report to Congress uses of its powers to search and seize records, Senator Patrick Leahy argued that the president “appears to believe that he can pick and choose which laws to obey and need never submit to Congressional oversight.” He also accused Bush of making “a radical effort to reshape the constitutional separation of powers and evade accountability and responsibility for following the law.”11 Discussion Presidents Bush and Putin value and trust each other enough, and see the world through sufficiently similar lenses, that one can be confident that the ties that bind them together will stay in place over the remaining years of their terms and perhaps beyond. The unfortunate reality is that their similar policy syles, their shared mission to fight terrorism, and their mutual assertion of executive authority have done more than just unite the leaders, they have caused considerable damage to democratic institutions in their countries and their countries’ reputations abroad. This is ironic, given that both repeatedly spout a rhetorical commitment to democracy.12 One should not lose perspective here. Russia under Putin is not democratic. Decision-making flows from the top and simply cannot be challenged either by the courts or the legislature, or questioned on television. Should Putin decide to alter the constitution and run for a third term, or change the shape of government so that, henceforth, he becomes the prime minister in a parliamentary system, he can do so relatively easily. In the United States, on the other hand, Bush’s actions can and have been curbed. Be it Franklin Roosevelt’s attempt to pack the Supreme Court or Richard Nixon’s use of security services to spy on his enemies, the American system has a way of righting itself. This happened recently when the Supreme Court ruled that Bush’s tribunals for Guantanamo detainees were illegal. Bush has also had difficulties getting his legislative priorities to move through Congress, something Putin has not had to face. Moreover, now that Iraq has gone bad, he is also regularly excoriated in the press, contributing to his low popularity rating. He will also certainly be out of the White House in 2008. In short, U.S. democracy may be under threat, but it has not crumbled.

Executive Power Bad Adv. – Solvency

Excessive executive war powers are the result of congressional inaction – Congressional act to end the war in the Middle East restores the balance of power

Bandow 7 (Doug, Senior Fellow at the CATO Institute, JD @ Stanford, Anti-War, http://original.antiwar.com/doug-bandow/2007/04/06/congress-must-end-the-iraq-war/)JFS

The Iraq war was a terrible mistake and should be ended as soon as possible. The Bush escalation might bring some temporary peace to Baghdad’s streets, but it won’t result in permanent peace in the region, let alone a liberal, pro-American democracy in Iraq. America is leaving; the only question is when? Iraq already is in a cauldron of sectarian violence; the only question is how bad?

No matter how effective the military’s tactics, the Bush administration cannot sustain a policy which fantasizes that Shi’ite politicians will stop acting like Shi’ite politicians. The administration cannot sustain a policy which promotes an Iraqi government allied with the greatest alleged regional threat for America, Iran. The administration cannot sustain a policy that attempts to develop a regional Sunni bloc to contain Shi’ite Iran while aiding the Shi’ite Iraqi government as it attempts to crush Iraq’s Sunni minority. Better to get out now than to make American troops suffer through the inevitable crash of these contradictory policies.

But President Bush, buoyed by the praise of his neoconservative Greek Chorus, remains trapped in a fantasy world of unlimited American power transforming the world in Washington’s image. Since global realities have no apparent impact on the president’s beliefs, one could imagine him 10, 20, and 30 years from now counseling continued patience in Iraq, since victory is just around the corner – at the light we can all see at the end of the tunnel.

Thus, more American and coalition personnel, and Iraqis, military and civilian alike, will die unless Congress acts. That will require political courage, a commodity usually in short supply on Capitol Hill. But that’s why we elect people to Congress. As Sen. Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.) pointed out with characteristic directness, “We tried a monarchy once. It’s not suited to America.”

In opposing congressional efforts to end the war, the administration and its supporters argue that the president is essentially a king. Thus, Congress has no right to do anything other than vote the funds that he requests. In this view, the executive makes the decisions and the legislature is window dressing, a convenient democratic gloss for executive decisions. Contrary to what Americans are commonly taught, their ancestors fought a revolution to enshrine executive power.

This is utter nonsense, of course.

The war powers are complex, a mix of concurrent authority that invites political struggle to sort out the boundary between executive and legislative action. Former Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) correctly observed that the president “is not the sole decider. The decider is a shared and joint responsibility.” There has been a recent presidential power surge, but because of congressional lassitude, not constitutional design.

The president has one clear, explicit grant of military authority: he is commander-in-chief (of the military, not the nation, it should be noted). Congress makes military policy: it provides for the common defense, raises the army, sets rules for war, approves treaties, and declares war.

In this system, the legislative power is supreme. The president’s authority is effectively contingent on congressional action: without a military – whether ground, naval or air units – being commander-in-chief is an empty position. Without a standing army of significant size, being commander-in-chief offers little power. Prior to 1946, when the U.S. first maintained a wartime military in peacetime, no president could initiate full-scale war without simultaneous legislative action to create a larger, better-trained, and more fully-equipped military.

Second, being commander-in-chief doesn’t mean much if Congress has not authorized use of the military in a war. True, this point is controverted: conservatives who otherwise prattle on about “original intent” contend that the president possesses imperial power, the authority to attack any nation any where at any time for any reason, without legislative constraint.

Executive Power Bad Adv. – I/L – PMC’s = Exec

PMC’s destroy balance of power by eliminating legislative oversight and falling exclusively under executive power.

Thurer and Maclaren 7 (DANIEL THÜRER & MALCOLM MACLAREN\* Military Outsourcing as a Case Study in the Accountability and Responsibility of Power”, The Law of International Relations - Liber Amicorum Hanspeter Neuhold, p 353, http://www.ivr.uzh.ch/lstthuerer/forschung/FSNeuholdt.pdf)KM

undermines democratic processes in Western countries.20 More specifi cally, civilian political control of PMC’s is lacking to the extent that PMC’s are not integrated into the regular armed forces. The widespread contracting between government authorities and PMC’s and the recourse to outsourcing of security functions by the executive have rendered legislative oversight impossible.21 These trends disturb the legitimacy of PMC’s’ activities and upset checks and balances in government. 22 Public participation in elementary questions of war and peace is an aspect of the freedom of citizens of Western countries or, more specifi cally, of their right as taxpayers and soldiers to have a voice in decisions that concern them. One cannot help but suspect that governments may profi t from – and are therefore not unhappy with or even deliberately exploit – the currently opaque process of diminished public oversight. Governments can thereby pursue geopolitical interests without deploying own troops, exercising power in a sensitive area with little need for explanation. Finally, in situations where a government considers going to war, PMC’s could try to infl uence that decision in their favor.23 PMC’s might have a particular interest in raising demand for their services that runs counter to the general interest.

PMC’s allow for the executive to fight a secret, private war

Valero 8 (Rafael Enrique National Journal January 9 http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0108/010908nj1.htm TBC 6/25/10)

Another problem, Avant says, is that contractor missions "accrue mainly to the executive branch," and although this "new tool" allows for flexibility, contractors are subject to little, if any, government oversight. She writes in The Market for Force that the licensing process for private security contractors, which is run by the State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls, is opaque and that Congress is notified of contracts only if one exceeds $50 million. And, she says, there is "no formal process" to ensure that contractors delivered as promised. As the nation grows accustomed to seeing contractors working, and even fighting, in the blurry asymmetrical wars of the future, how long will it be before a president decides to "go off the books" and hire a small private army to fight a war. It wouldn't be hard to do. "The big risk is not what the companies are going to do in and of themselves," Avant said. "The big risks are what the consumers are going to ask them to do."

PMC’s increase executive power at the expense of legislative power

Petersohn 8 (Ulrich, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs @ Harvard, June 24, http://tinyurl.com/268qklp)JFS

In military situations, political control refers to who “gets to decide about the deployment of arms and services” (Avant 2005, 6). Employing private military companies (PMC’s) has two effects on the decision-making process. One is that it might change the balance of control between executive and legislative powers. The decision to hire PMC’s is taken by the state’s leadership and is difficult to oversee by its parliament. Thus, the executive gains an advantage in relation to the legislative branch (Ibid., 128). In the following I do not focus on issues of political decision making, but rather on the role of the military commander in the theater. The increasing use of PMC’s might, secondly, constrain a commander’s leeway in making decisions regarding the use of force (Leander 2006, 75). More specifically, it might restrict his ability to decide if, when, where, and how force is used—which is not to say that the commander had absolutely freedom beforehand. A commander’s course of action is always influenced, to some extent, by enemy actions, weather, terrain, and equipment. But since the commander’s principal role is to manage the uncertainties on the battlefield, he strives to unite the efforts of all parts of the armed forces toward a commonly recognized objective. This requires a unity of command, which means a single commander has the authority to direct theefforts of his subordinate troops and continually adapt the actions when necessary (Department of the Army 1993, 2–5; BMVg 2004, 5.2.1 and 8.2). Contractors pose difficulties in this matter. Although they are part of the broader force that is necessary to support the forces in achieving their objective, they are not a part of the armed forces, and their efforts cannot be synchronized by direct command and control. Depending on the contractor’s relationship to the armed forces, its utility as a tool at the commander’s disposal is distinct.

Executive Power Bad Adv. – I/L – PMC’s = Exec

PMC’s are the **"private army" of the executive – there is no power check**

Armstrong 6 (Matt, December 5, 2006, http://mountainrunner.us/pmc/)KFC

There are multiple levels of control and accountability, not just criminal, that this article only hints at and I'm sure other Post and NYT authors will start to catch on to. The third aspect of this story, completely absent, is who pays for the contractors. With most of the security contractors under subcontract, awareness and control become increasingly unclear. The impact contractors have on our mission ranges from the daily drives to the guys taken down in Fallujah in 2004 that, as Thomas Ricks points out, weren't aware of changing conditions and tactics. But who pays for the contractors? Department of State? Department of Defense? Department of the Interior? All of it from budgets controlled by the executive branch, but funded by Congress? The Custer Battles trial showed that some monies were effectively "hidden" through the now defunct Coalition Provisional Authority, to what affect? One of the arguments in favor of contractors is the bang for the buck. How many bucks for what kind of bang is impossible to measure without transparency. The fourth issue is the most important and completely ignored in the article: the complete absence of these numbers being represented in either General Pace's or Jim Baker's study groups. Besides the expected virtual acknowledgement that we can't go to our allies for help, our paid friends in the country are ignored. More importantly, we apparently have 100,000 additional forces (not all are shooters) supplementing our mission in Iraq, but coordination is poor and the fact we are just getting a handle on them indicates an incredible lack of strategic vision. But that's no surprise. These contractors could be helping us, if it weren't for reconstruction failures and their held to a larger strategic task beyond getting from Point A to B and protecting each of those points. Last point to reiterate the control and accountability issue. American democracy relies, in part, on a democratic control of force. The Founding Fathers were intimately aware of the power of the military and gave us a Constitution that created a shared control of the armed forces between two masters, the legislative and the executive branches of government. Congress was empowered to “raise and support” the armed forces of the new nation and given the power “To declare War,” and the President was given the power to conduct the war. Further, of the 18 Congressional powers enumerated in the US Constitution 11 relate to security. (for more on this part, see [Charlie Stevenson's book](http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0415770084?ie=UTF8&tag=mountainrunne-20&linkCode=as2&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0415770084)ir?t=mountainrunne-20&l=as2&o=1&a=0415770084) The contractors in Iraq are generally, if not completely, outside the control and oversight of Congress. This "private army" of the executive branch isn't held to the same two-master standard as the military. Hence recent GAO and CRS reports on contractors. There's more to this issue than the numbers, although they indicate a problem more significant and severe than most are aware.

PMC’s bypass the political capital of the executive

Armstrong 6 (Matt, October 10, 2006, http://mountainrunner.us/pmc/)KFC

This isn't to say all contractors or their companies are corrupt. There are good men with good intentions working hard and giving their lives in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, contractors, whether they are the "bad apples" or good guys doing good, shape the perceptions of America and our mission in troubled areas of the world. The reasons the Executive Branch turns to contractors in lieu of US Government resources varies from a lack of political or economic capital or expediency or political favoritism. Whatever the reason, private contractors are agents of the United States.

PMC’s are used to undermine congressional authority- causing an over powered executive

Khan 2 (Mafruza, Associate Director of Corporate Research Project ,*Good Jobs First*, 17 Dec) ET

The increased use of PMCs also raises the issue of the relationship between Congress and the executive branch. Critics contend that privatizing military functions undermines national security and by proxy, foreign policy, by circumventing accountability and information to Congress by giving more power to executive agencies. An October 13, 2002 New York Times article quotes a Vietnam veteran, “These new mercenaries work for the Defense and State Department and Congress looks the other way. It allows us to get into fights where we would be reluctant to send the Defense Department or the C.I.A.” By using for-profit soldiers, the executive branch can evade Congressional limits on troop strength. Experts have pointed out that the consequence of outsourcing strategic military training and advice has the consequence of the U.S government losing a foreign-policy tool to private companies whose central motive is profit, i.e., when a PMC provides a service to a foreign government, it is the company, and not the U.S. government, that establishes a direct relationship with that foreign government.

Executive Power Bad Adv. – I/L – PMC’s = Exec

PMC’s expand executive power and remove democratic accountability

Singer 2 (P.W. Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution. Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security International Security 26.3 186-220 TBC 6/26/10)

Another rationale for outsourcing is political expediency. In the United States, for example, the executive branch has used private military means to circumvent limits placed on it by the legislature or by public opinion. This proposition applies to all three firm types, but with vastly different ramifications. Much of the push behind the use of type 3 firms by the U.S. military in recent contingency operations resulted from two factors: congressional limits on troop numbers and the reluctance of the Clinton administration to deal with the potential political costs of calling up the National Guard and Reserves, who otherwise would have been required. 73 Although using private military support to circumvent legislative limits was technically against Congress's mandate, no members objected because it was in keeping with their original intent to minimize the number of U.S. troops put at risk (e.g., 9,000 fewer U.S. troops deployed in Bosnia because of military support outsourcing). Recourse to type 1 and type 2 PMFs can have more negative implications for the democratic principle of checks and balances, however. It may allow the executive branch to gain too much autonomy and power, which could lead to the authorization of public-private activities against the intent of Congress. [End Page 217] The rationale for using PMFs instead of official covert action is that they give the cover of plausible deniability that public forces lack. If an operation goes awry, the activities of a firm are easier for a government to deny and the blame simpler to shift. The current involvement of U.S.-based PMFs in the civil war in Colombia illustrates this point. Dyncorp is officially engaged there in "antidrug" operations. However, the firm utilizes armed reconnaissance planes and helicopter gunships, designed for counterguerrilla warfare, and has been involved in several firefights with local rebels. Dyncorp has lost several planes and employees to rebel fire, but there has been no public outcry in response to these losses. 74 Another possible advantage of using PMFs is that it may allow the executive branch to avoid public debate or legislative controls, and therefore undertake what it sees as a much more "rational" foreign policy. 75 As Arthur S. Miller avers, however, this is not always for the best: "Democratic government is responsible government--which means accountable government--and the essential problem in contracting out is that responsibility and accountability are greatly diminished." He goes on the say that the use of private firms places "the influence over, and sometimes even control of, important decisions one step further away from the public and their elected representatives." 76

Executive Power Bad Adv. – I/L – Accountability

PMC’s consider themselves above the law

Scahill 7 (Jeremy, <http://www.privateforces.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1656&Itemid=99999999>, date accessed: 6/24/2010) AJK  
As with Halliburton, the Pentagon’s largest contractor, Blackwater is set apart from simple war profiteers by the defining characteristic of its executives’ very long view. They have not just seized a profitable moment along with many of their competitors but have set out to carve a permanent niche for themselves for decades to come. Blackwater’s aspirations are not limited to international wars, however. Its forces beat most federal agencies to New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina hit in 2005, as hundreds of heavily armed Blackwater mercenaries — some fresh from deployment in Iraq — fanned out into the disaster zone. Within a week, they were officially hired by the Department of Homeland Security to operate in the US Gulf, billing the federal government $950 a day per Blackwater soldier. In less than a year, the company had raked in more than $70 million in federal hurricane-related contracts — about $243,000 a day. The company saw Katrina as another moment of great opportunity and soon began applying for permits to contract its forces out to local governments in all fifty states. Blackwater executives have met with California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger about deploying there in the aftermath of an earthquake or another disaster. “Look, none of us loves the idea that devastation became a business opportunity,” said the Blackwater official heading up its new domestic operations division formed after Katrina. “It’s a distasteful fact, but it is what it is. Doctors, lawyers, funeral directors, even newspapers — they all make a living off of bad things happening. So do we, because somebody’s got to handle it.” But critics see the deployment of Blackwater’s forces domestically as a dangerous precedent that could undermine US democracy. “Their actions may not be subject to constitutional limitations that apply to both federal and state officials and employees — including First Amendment and Fourth Amendment rights to be free from illegal searches and seizures. Unlike police officers, they are not trained in protecting constitutional rights,” says CCR’s Michael Ratner. “These kind of paramilitary groups bring to mind Nazi Party brownshirts, functioning as an extrajudicial enforcement mechanism that can and does operate outside the law. The use of these paramilitary groups is an extremely dangerous threat to our rights.”

PMC’s are never held accountable, even for their worst crimes

Lendmen 10 (Stephen, <http://www.rense.com/general89/outs.htm>, date accessed: 6/24/2010) AJK  
True enough. Those performing security functions are paramilitaries, hired guns, unprincipled, in it for the money, and might easily switch sides if offered more. Though technically accountable under international and domestic laws where they're assigned, they, in fact, are unregulated, unchecked, free from criminal or civil accountability, and are licensed to kill and get away with it. Political and institutional expediency affords them immunity and impunity to pretty much do as they please and be handsomely paid for it.

Executive Power Bad Adv. – I/L – Accountability

And these contractors are untouchable- Iraq officials prove

Boggs 8 (PHD-Poli/Sci @ Berkeley, Prof @ Washington University in St. Louis, UCLA, USC, UC, Irvine, and Carleton University in Ottawa, *Fast Capitalism* vol 4.1, 8) ET

Looking at Iraq alone, there has been more than enough PMC outlawry and criminality to lend credence to the criticisms leveled by Scahill, Cusack, and others. The most scandalous episode occurred in September 2007, when Blackwater guards were accused of shooting to death 17 Iraqi civilians while protecting a State Department motorcade in Baghdad. Angered Iraqi officials immediately moved to cancel Blackwater’s license to operate in the country – the first effort of a government compromised by occupation to assert itself against foreign contractors long accused of horrific acts that were never punished. (Within a few days, of course, the license was reaffirmed.) Since 2003 the PMC’s, crucial to U.S. operations at every level, had been subordinate only to their U.S. corporate and government employers, who gave them virtually unlimited scope to work. Iraq national security advisor Mowaffak Rubale said his government should use the Blackwater episode to overhaul private contractors’ immunity from Iraqi jurisdiction, granted by Coalition Provisional Authority head L. Paul Bremer in 2003 and later extended – a measure called CPA Order 17, passed outside any democratic process. While many Iraqis demanded Blackwater employees be held accountable for murder, no procedures were in place to do so. In fact PMC’s were not even subject to the Universal Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) in Iraq or anywhere else (although Congress moved to correct this problem in late 2007).

PMC’s lack accountability – the Iraqi government has no control and US officials ignore their violations.

Boggs 8 (PHD-Poli/Sci @ Berkeley, Prof @ Washington University in St. Louis, UCLA, USC, UC, Irvine, and Carleton University in Ottawa, *Fast Capitalism* vol 4.1, 8) ET

The State Department contends that PMC’s do not require a license from the Iraqi government since their contracts are sanctioned directly by U.S. officials – a peculiar notion for those pretending to bring democracy to Iraq. Even American officials, however, when speaking candidly, admit that previous PMC outlawry in Iraq has been ignored or swept under the rug. “It’s one of the big holes we’ve had in our policy, the lack of control, the lack of supervision over security forces”, according to one U.S. diplomat in the field. “No one took on the responsibility of policing these units – neither the military people, nor the regional security office [of the Embassy]. So many people, not just the Blackwater are there in Baghdad unsupervised with basically diplomatic immunity.”[3] PMC operations in Iraq have been aptly described as “carte blanche”, as in the Wild West, where armed mercenaries are said to roam the land freely. The diplomat said that incident reports amounted to a whitewash, nobody acting upon them, adding that in a few cases PMC managers fired employees for killing civilians, but those same workers could be back in Iraq with another firm in a few months, part of a “revolving door”. Observed one security contractor quoted in the Los Angeles Times, “They are all untouchable. They’ve shot up other private security contractors, Iraqi military police, and civilians, often pushing themselves through crowded urban streets in the process.”[4] Whether the September 2007 events will turn out to have any restraining impact on PMC behavior remains to be seen.

Contractors are ineffective and unaccountable- they make war efforts worse

Loyd 8 (Paula- US military- set on fire by a local and a contractor shot him, 26-Nov-8,

*Interview of Loyd by Zero Anthropology*) ET

Questioner:– that the PRTs [Provincial Reconstruction Teams] in Iraq, the Pentagon has just reluctantly agreed, as I understand it, to provide security for them. There still is a lot of question feeling, as I also understand that a lot of that, however, may fall to contractors who also do a lot of other security jobs in Iraq. My question is how do they fit in the equation. You talk about the sensitivity, particularly of different kinds of military units. How do contractors fit into that equation, which were playing, as I understand, an enormous role? Thanks very much. Paula Loyd: Well, that’s actually a very good question, because you’re right, that’s another very large component that we can’t ignore. A lot of my complaints also come about contractors. You know, sometimes there are certain contractors that are providing security for different projects, who are rearming previously disarmed militias. You know, there are contractors who have terrible reputations for driving worse than the military forces. So I think that if we also don’t address the issue of contractors and what they’re doing, and hold them accountable for some of their actions, then again, it’s not going to help us win the war, at least in Afghanistan. While some are appalled by the arrest and trial of Don Ayala, it is interesting to hear what Loyd had to say about the excesses of contractors (mercenaries) and how they impact on the U.S. campaign — not that the success of that campaign is in any way a goal valued by this blog. It does not sound as if she was ready to recommend medals for contractors or ask fellow citizens to set up defense funds on their behalf. In the meantime, Ayala has been indicted under the “Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act” — the meaning that is lost by such a masking is that this was an extrajudicial execution of a civilian prisoner, by all means a war crime, and far more than a mere jurisdictional matter.

Executive Power Bad Adv. – I/L – Accountability

Contractors undermine security through misbehavior – the supervisors are aware of and participate in misconduct.

Schulman 9 (Daniel, assistant editor at Columbia Journalism Review, Sep 1-9, *Mother jones*) ET

Guards have come to POGO with allegations and photographic evidence that some supervisors and guards are engaging in near-weekly deviant hazing and humiliation of subordinates. Witnesses report that the highest levels of AGNA management in Kabul are aware of and have personally observed—or even engaged in—these activities, but have done nothing to stop them. Indeed, management has condoned this misconduct, declining to take disciplinary action against those responsible and allowing two of the worst offending supervisors to resign and allegedly move on to work on other U.S. contracts. The lewd and deviant behavior of approximately 30 supervisors and guards has resulted in complete distrust of leadership and a breakdown of the chain of command, compromising security. Numerous emails, photographs, and videos portray a Lord of the Flies environment. One email from a current guard describes scenes in which guards and supervisors are "peeing on people, eating potato chips out of [buttock] cracks, vodka shots out of [buttock] cracks (there is video of that one), broken doors after drnken [sic] brawls, threats and intimidation from those leaders participating in this activity…." Photograph after photograph shows guards—including supervisors—at parties in various stages of nudity, sometimes fondling each other. These parties take place just a few yards from the housing of other supervisors.

Executive Power Bad Adv. – I/L – Accountability

And, PMC’s are unaccountable- congress can’t do anything about it

Scahill 7 (Jeremy, Puffin Foundation Writing Fellow at The Nation Institute, is the author of the bestselling Blackwater, *The Independent,* Aug 10, http://www.uruknet.info/?p=35239 ) ET

"These private contractors are really an arm of the administration and its policies," argues Kucinich, who has called for a withdrawal of all U.S. contractors from Iraq. "They charge whatever they want with impunity. There’s no accountability as to how many people they have, as to what their activities are." That raises the crucial question: what exactly are they doing in Iraq in the name of the U.S. and U.K. governments? Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-Ill.), a leading member of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, which is responsible for reviewing sensitive national security issues, explained the difficulty of monitoring private military companies on the U.S. payroll: "If I want to see a contract, I have to go up to a secret room and look at it, can’t take any notes, can’t take any notes out with me, you know — essentially, I don’t have access to those contracts and even if I did, I couldn’t tell anybody about it."

And, Contractors are unaccountable-they are above the law

Scahill 7 (Jeremy, Puffin Foundation Writing Fellow at The Nation Institute, is the author of the bestselling Blackwater, *The Independent,* Aug 10, http://www.uruknet.info/?p=35239 ) ET

On the Internet, numerous videos have spread virally, showing what appear to be foreign mercenaries using Iraqis as target practice, much to the embarrassment of the firms involved. Despite these incidents and the tens of thousands of contractors passing through Iraq, only two individuals have been ever indicted for crimes there. One was charged with stabbing a fellow contractor, while the other pled guilty to possessing child-pornography images on his computer at Abu Ghraib prison. Dozens of American soldiers have been court-martialed — 64 on murder-related charges alone — but not a single armed contractor has been prosecuted for a crime against an Iraqi. In some cases, where contractors were alleged to have been involved in crimes or deadly incidents, their companies whisked them out of Iraq to safety.

And, PMCs are accountable to no one

Scahill 7 (Jeremy, Puffin Foundation Writing Fellow at The Nation Institute, is the author of the bestselling Blackwater, *The Independent,* Aug 10, http://www.uruknet.info/?p=35239 ) ET

This unprecedented funding of such enterprises, primarily by the U.S. and U.K. governments, means that powers once the exclusive realm of nations are now in the hands of private companies with loyalty only to profits, CEOs and, in the case of public companies, shareholders. And, of course, their client, whoever that may be. CIA-type services, special operations, covert actions and small-scale military and paramilitary forces are now on the world market in a way not seen in modern history. This could allow corporations or nations with cash to spend but no real military power to hire squadrons of heavily armed and well-trained commandos.

Executive Power Bad Adv. – I/L – Destroys Democratic Checks

PMC’s allow for the executive to circumvent the military and Congress to take full control of foreign policy without public or democratic accountability.

Anechiarico and Dehn 8 (“Ultimately Unaccountable: Governance of Private Military Companies Nationally, Supranationally and Internationally” Frank Anechiarico, Ph.D. Professor of Government and Law Hamilton College, and John Dehn, Professor of Law United States Military Academy, June, http://www.4tad.org/ws/paper\_wks4\_Anechiarico.pdf)KM

Will grand strategy remain in the hands of elected officials, or only those at the highest levels of the executive branch? Many years of decisions about the weapons systems, fleet size, command and control systems, and even military justice have become significant influences and in many cases constraints on the implementation foreign policy through the use of military force. The growing importance and wider role for PMC’s in the military-industrial complex has altered the “balance” of control over the military in complex ways. What might be emerging is an entirely different effect on civil-military relations. Rather than the military, Congress and the defense industrial complex are influencing national policy choices through their actions. Thus, PMC’s might create democratic accountability deficits so significant that they and the executive branch can bypass both Congress and the military to seize complete control of significant aspects of foreign policy. That this might be the case is reflected in calls to send PMC’s to Darfur. (Boot,2006:cfr.org) When the U.S. or UN is unable to convince democracies to send their militaries due to internal public resistance, mercenaries allow the flexibility of enabling governments to “throw money at the problem” rather than risk the political accountability that comes with risking the sons and daughters of their constituents. In such cases, is the democracy unwilling or unable to send its soldiers likely to demand accountability for those sent in their place? The obvious answer is that it is highly unlikely.

And, contractors destroys any semblance of democratic control or responsibility

Scahill 7 (Jeremy, Puffin Foundation Writing Fellow at The Nation Institute, is the author of the bestselling Blackwater, *The Independent,* Aug 10, http://www.uruknet.info/?p=35239 ) ET

"Maybe the precedent was the British and the Hessians in the American Revolution. Maybe that’s the last time and needless to say, they lost. But I’m thinking that there’s no democratic control and there’s no intention to have democratic control here." The implications are devastating. Joseph Wilson says, "In the absence of international consensus, the current Bush administration relied on a coalition of what I call the co-opted, the corrupted and the coerced: those who benefited financially from their involvement, those who benefited politically from their involvement and those few who determined that their relationship with the United States was more important than their relationship with anybody else. And that’s a real problem because there is no underlying international legitimacy that sustains us throughout this action that we’ve taken."

Executive Power Bad Adv. – I/L – Destroys Democratic Checks 1AC

PMC’s decimate democratic checks on war – public debate, executive power, accountability, and emerging democracies [this should be in the 1ac]

Zalzman 8 (Zoe, International Legal Studies at NYU Law, http://tinyurl.com/2c2gbwy)JFS

In addition to challenging the state’s monopoly on the use of force, the privatization of military force also threatens the democratic state because it allows governments to make war while avoiding democratic accountability.82 Democratic governments are entrusted with a monopoly on the use of force because their power to exercise that force is limited by the rule of law and by accountability to their citizens.83 Private contractors, however, greatly undermine democratic accountability, and in so doing circumvent the democratic reluctance for war. By undermining the public’s control over the war-making powers of the state, private contractors threaten the popular sovereignty of the state.84 Thus, the problem with private military force may not be simply a lack of state control, as discussed above, but also too much government control, particularly executive control, at the expense of popular, democratic control.85 At an extreme, a government, even a democratic government, might use private violence as a brutal police force to ensure its control over the people.86 In reality, however, a democratic government’s outsourcing of military functions undermines the democratic process much more subtly than this far-fetched scenario. Because the executive branch is generally in charge of hiring contractors, private contractors allow the executive to evade parliamentary or congressional checks on foreign policy.87 Indeed, [t]o the extent privatization permits the Executive to carry out military policy unilaterally . . . it circumvents primary avenues through which the People are informed and blocks off primary channels (namely Congress) through which the People can register their approval or voice their misgivings.88 Privatizing military force results in a lack of transparency and puts the military effort outside of the scope of the democratic dialogue, “obscuring choices about military needs and human implications.”89 Notably, in the United States, private contractors are not subject to the scrutiny of the Freedom of Information Act,90 which greatly restricts the public’s ability to be well-informed about the government’s reliance on the private military industry. Thus, the privatization of military force allows the executive “to operate in the shadows of public attention”91 and to subvert democratic political restraints.92 The privatization of combat duties is potentially much more problematic than the privatization of other government functions because the privatization of the use of force inherently removes many of the burdens of war from the citizenry, thereby reducing public debate about national involvement in the conflict.93 Indeed, governments may turn to private military forces not because they are cheaper, but because they are less accountable and less likely to attract political backlash.94 For example, by outsourcing military functions, the executive branch is able to evade certain forms of democratic accountability by circumventing congressional caps on the number of troops approved for deployment.95 Employing private contractors also allows the executive to avoid instituting a draft, keep official casualty counts and public criticism down, and even to avoid arms embargoes.96 The government is also able to distance itself from mistakes by blaming them on the contractors.97 By subverting public debate and by undermining the separation of powers, the privatization of military force poses a direct threat to the democratic system.98 This impediment to public debate is important because, as Immanuel Kant famously reasoned, the chances for peace are greatly increased when the people control the decision on whether or not to go to war, since it is the people themselves who will suffer “the miseries of war.”99 If, on the other hand, the decision rests with the head of state, he has little incentive to refrain from war because he bears none of its costs.100 At a fundamental level, therefore, the use of private contractors subverts Kant’s reliance on the democratic reluctance to go to war by circumventing the public’s reluctance to sustain casualties.101 In Iraq, for example, contractor deaths are not counted towards the official death toll,102 allowing the government to present a far lower number of American casualties. Recent estimates suggest that the total number of contractors killed in Iraq is 1,000, with over 10,000 wounded or injured on the job.103 But, as the daughter of one contractor killed in Iraq put it: “If anything happens to the military people, you hear about it right away . . . . Flags get lowered, they get their respect. You don’t hear anything about the contractors.”104 Just as the private military industry poses a threat to established democratic regimes, it also potentially impedes the emergence of new democratic states. When private contractors become involved in a conflict, there is necessarily a danger that security will become a commodity that only the rich can afford.105 This tendency can undermine democratic movements that aim at a redistribution of resources and power.106 Fundamentally, private contractors “serve a commercial rather than a humanitarian purpose. . . . [T]hey are not drawn towards the interests of the poor, but towards those who can pay.”107

Counterinsurgency Add-On – 2AC

1. PMCs hurts the hearts and minds effort in local populations.

Kelemen 6/22 (Michele, NPR, June 22, 2010, “A 'Shocking' Report: U.S. Is Funding Afghan Warlords”, [http://www.scpr.org/news/2010/06/22/a–shocking–report–us–is–funding–afghan–warlords/](http://www.scpr.org/news/2010/06/22/a-shocking-report-us-is-funding-afghan-warlords/)) KFC

Another Pentagon official says a new Defense Department task force is already trying to get a better handle on how U.S. taxpayer dollars are flowing through Afghanistan. Moshe Schwartz of the Congressional Research Service says the Pentagon has improved the way it oversees contracts but still has a ways to go. He says that there are about 16,000 armed security contractors in Afghanistan, most of them Afghans, and that vetting them is key to U.S. strategy. "That is one of the concerns that has been raised by a number of analysts, which is, who are these people being hired by the Department of Defense to provide private security? To the extent that the local population does not look kindly on those individuals, that could hurt our effort to win hearts and minds," Schwartz says. Another analyst says the problem isn't just a contracting issue but the strategy the U.S. is pursuing. Frederick Starr, who runs the Central Asia–Caucasus Institute at Johns Hopkins University, says so far the U.S. is only worried about transporting military goods so the Afghans who want to help are only the ones the U.S. pays off.

1. Localities are the center of gravity in Afghani politics – any serious effort at stability must start there.

Jones 7 (Seth,prof of security studies @ Georgetown U,  Jan 31–7, The New York Times)KFC

The rising violence and the near certainty of a Taliban spring offensive have triggered calls for an increase in U.S. military forces in Afghanistan. But a military strategy is not likely to succeed. Counterinsurgencies are almost always won by establishing a viable and legitimate government at the local level that can win popular support. In Afghanistan, all politics is local. The country's history is littered with empires that failed to understand this reality, from Alexander the Great more than 2,000 ago to the British and Soviet empires more recently. The Taliban and its allies certainly understand the importance of local politics. They have successfully re–emerged by co–opting or threatening local villagers, and promising better governance and security than the current Afghan government. On my most recent trip to southern Afghanistan in January, I saw that the message of the Taliban clearly resonated with a growing number of locals in southern and eastern parts of the country. Afghans are frustrated by the lack of development over the past five years, and unhappy with widespread government corruption. This makes the Taliban's threat real and significant. The Taliban and its allies have a strong presence in local villages throughout such provinces as Kandahar and Helmand, and are preparing sustained operations. It is telling that the Taliban's primary target is not U.S. or NATO forces, but local Afghans. This reflects the understanding that the local population represents the center of gravity, as Mao Zedong famously wrote. The lesson for the United States and NATO is stark. They will win or lose Afghanistan in the rural villages and districts of the country, not in the capital city of Kabul. And if they are to win, they must begin by understanding the local nature of the insurgency

Counterinsurgency Add-On – 2AC

1. Hearts and minds are key to perception of government and troop legitimacy which is key to counterinsurgency.

Clarke 9 (“More Effort Needed to Win Hearts and Minds - Afghanistan Opinion Poll 2009” Michael Clarke, Director, Royal United Services Institute, http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4990051938E13/)KM

The news from these polls is not all bad. The investment put into infrastructural development over recent years is becoming evident to ordinary Afghans and the visibility of the benefit in terms of schools, roads, water, power and so on, is either increased or at least not diminished from previous polls. Support remains generally strong for women’s rights – a good indicator for the development of civil society as well as for the female population – though these rights will inevitably be expressed in an Afghan way. And there is no intrinsic love for the narcotics business, even if it is ubiquitous in many parts of Southern Afghanistan. Building on the results of last year’s polling, the Afghan people emerge from these surveys as patient, stoical, politically realistic and depressed. The battle for hearts and minds that will ultimately contain the Taliban and chase the jihadis out of Afghanistan is not yet lost, but it is further than ever from being won. The poll reinforces the idea that the credibility of the Afghan government in the eyes of ordinary people is the most critical commodity at stake. The military effectiveness of the Coalition is secondary to that, though important enough in itself; and the perception of that effectiveness may now have slipped to dangerous levels. This will be a difficult year in which Afghan elections will also have to take place and be seen to be successful. The Coalition must articulate a new strategy, based around the fresh approach of the Obama Administration, emphasising the centrality of governance, training and mentoring, and dealing with corruption. There is still something in the Afghan public’s well of patience to work with in these respects, but on the trends presently discernable, it will not last indefinitely.

1. Conflict in the Middle East escalates and goes nuclear.

Steinbach **2** (John, Hiroshima/Nagasaki Peace Committee, March 2002, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/02.03/0331steinbachisraeli.htm)IM

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon – for whatever reason – the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44).

Counterinsurgency Add-On – I/L – Hurt Hearts/Minds

PMC’s perpetuate corruption which hurts hearts and minds.

Schulman 6/21 (Daniel, Mother Jones' Washington–based news editor, Jan. 21, 2010, [http://motherjones.com/politics/2010/01/corruption–afghanistan–its–even–worse–you–think](http://motherjones.com/politics/2010/01/corruption-afghanistan-its-even-worse-you-think))KFC

The widespread corruption, Costa says, has given Afghans "the impression that it is cheaper to buy a judge than to hire a lawyer." And according to the UNODC's findings, Afghans don't believe the corruption problem is confined to their government. Fifty-four percent of those surveyed said they believed that international organizations and NGOs "are corrupt and in the country just to get rich." Costa told me that the large amounts of development money "consumed" by "transaction costs" (that is, funds eaten up by the organizations providing aid and heading up development projects), along with "all the opacity" surrounding procurement, has fueled the perception among Afghans that "the international community and NGOs are not as clean as they would like." These suspicions are surely warranted: Numerous instances of fraud and corruption in Afghanistan involving contractors, US military officials, and others have been extensively documented. Among those accused of corruption is the former Afghanistan country director of the UN's Office of Project Services, Gary Helseth, who allegedly used funds intended to rebuild Afghanistan's infrastructure to bankroll his own lavish lifestyle. And according to the office of the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, only a quarter of the corruption cases it's investigating involve Afghans—the rest are cases targeting at *l*east one Western suspect. Costa compares Afghanistan's corruption problem to a "cancer" that is eating away at Afghan society—and he says the remedy is both preventative and surgical. In addition to bolstering Afghanistan's lead anti–corruption authority, he says Afghan officials should be forced to file financial disclosures: "Let's see how senior officials can afford fancy cars and flashy villas with salaries of less than $500 a month!" And, when it comes to the appointment of provincial governors and district leaders, Costa suggests the vetting process should potentially include polygraph exams. As for the surgery, he says, "We need to remove the characters—the governors, the politicians, the members of parliament and whoever else has been tainted, not by the allegations, but by the evidence of corruption." He added, "Corruption in particular is an issue where the domestic leadership needs to manifest itself. There has to be leadership by the Afghans and in particular the president in bringing about integrity and fighting corruption." While Karzai has vowed repeatedly to tackle corruption, Western officials and analysts have privately expressed doubts about his commitment. And his comments to Al Jazeera downplaying the issue surely didn't help. If Karzai can't even acknowledge the extent of the problem, how can the US or its international partners rely on him to solve it?

PMC’s lose hearts and minds

Singer 7 (P.W. Director, 21st Century Defense Initiative, Brookings Institution Monday, October 8, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2007/10/05/DI2007100501642.html TBC 6/25/10)

Well said. We need to understand that the U.S. must sway a broader population from hostility to support if it ever wants to oust terror cells and shut down recruiting pipelines. As the newly revised foreword to the famous U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars manual notes, "Small wars are battles of ideas and battles for the perceptions and attitudes of target populations." Within these wars, it is non-kinetic tools (as opposed to fielded weaponry) that make up the fire and maneuvers of small wars. "They frequently are the main effort simply because of the criticality of the functions they perform." It is for this reason that many military experts have grown worried about the backlash that contractors cause unintentionally and how it is hurting the cause. U.S. Army Colonel Peter Mansoor is one of the most influential military thinkers on counter-insurgency. Well before the latest Blackwater episode, in January of 2007, he told Jane's Defense Weekly that the U.S. military needs to take a hard look at security contractors on future battlefields and figure out a way to get a handle on them so that they can be better integrated: "If we're going to allow them to be used in the first place ... if they push traffic off the roads or if they shoot up a car that looks suspicious, whatever it may be, they may be operating within their contract -- to the detriment of the mission, which is to bring the people over to your side. I would much rather see basically all armed entities in a counterinsurgency operation fall under a military chain of command."

Counterinsurgency Add-On – I/L – Key to Stability

Hearts and minds are key to perception of government and troop legitimacy which is key to solving the conflict.

Clarke 9 (“More Effort Needed to Win Hearts and Minds - Afghanistan Opinion Poll 2009” Michael Clarke, Director, Royal United Services Institute, http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4990051938E13/)KM

The news from these polls is not all bad. The investment put into infrastructural development over recent years is becoming evident to ordinary Afghans and the visibility of the benefit in terms of schools, roads, water, power and so on, is either increased or at least not diminished from previous polls. Support remains generally strong for women’s rights – a good indicator for the development of civil society as well as for the female population – though these rights will inevitably be expressed in an Afghan way. And there is no intrinsic love for the narcotics business, even if it is ubiquitous in many parts of Southern Afghanistan. Building on the results of last year’s polling, the Afghan people emerge from these surveys as patient, stoical, politically realistic and depressed. The battle for hearts and minds that will ultimately contain the Taliban and chase the jihadis out of Afghanistan is not yet lost, but it is further than ever from being won. The poll reinforces the idea that the credibility of the Afghan government in the eyes of ordinary people is the most critical commodity at stake. The military effectiveness of the Coalition is secondary to that, though important enough in itself; and the perception of that effectiveness may now have slipped to dangerous levels. This will be a difficult year in which Afghan elections will also have to take place and be seen to be successful. The Coalition must articulate a new strategy, based around the fresh approach of the Obama Administration, emphasising the centrality of governance, training and mentoring, and dealing with corruption. There is still something in the Afghan public’s well of patience to work with in these respects, but on the trends presently discernable, it will not last indefinitely.

Hearts and minds are key to stopping extremism but require coordination.

Mahmood 7 (Peace and Stability in Afghanistan: The Way Forward Sohail Mahmood, Pakistan Feb 27, 2007 http://usa.tigweb.org/express/panorama/article.html?start=11965&ContentID=11367)KM

The struggle to uproot extremism was described as a battle for hearts and minds and it was acknowledged that it would take time to achieve this objective. The emergence of extremism in South Asia was linked to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan when groups from around the world were brought to the region to fight the Soviet forces. Better coordination among the forces combating extremists and better and quick intelligence sharing were needed to tackle this problem, the audience was told.

Hearts and minds are key – any counter-insurgency strategy will rely on the Afghan people.

Mark 9 (Eugene Mark Political Science and International Relations at Australian National University, “The US-led Coalition and the Campaign Against the Taliban”, Jul 03, 2009 http://www.siiaonline.org/?q=blog/the-us-led-coalition-and-campaign-against-taliban)

In short, the US-led coalition is losing the anti-Taliban campaign in Afghanistan as the Taliban was able to regroup and launch an insurgency. It cannot be assumed that the US and its allies have achieved any form of stability in Afghanistan. The reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan have been rather slow as there are lack of improvements in education and the infrastructure. The absence of good governance also allowed the Afghan population to lose faith in the Karzai government. That in turn fuels political instability which the Taliban can feed on to recruit more members. In response, there was an initial US decision to reduce troop deployment. The lack of Pakistan’s cooperation in rebuilding Afghanistan also led to the failure to defeat the Taliban totally. Essentially, the US and its allies underestimated the pro-Taliban forces within Pakistan and their capacity to provide help to the Taliban. All these factors lead to the conclusion that there are many ways in which the coalition has failed to defeat the Taliban. The US-led coalition can only stand a chance if the reconstruction program can establish a certain level of good governance and security, which are important pre-conditions to winning. In order to defeat the Taliban, the coalition needs to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan population.

Unilateralism Bad Adv. – PMC’s = Unilateralism

PMC’s promote unilateral hegemony – market solutions are preferable to cooperation with allies because of interoperability.

Isenberg 9 (“Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand Strategy” 1/2009 DAVID researcher and leader of the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers, PRIO Report http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/isenberg-private%20military-contractors-2009.pdf)KM

As the United States relies more heavily upon military contractors to support its role as world hegemon, it reinforces the tendency to approach global crises in a unilateral, as opposed to multilateral manner, further ensuring that the burdens will be carried disproportionately by U.S. taxpayers, and especially U.S. troops.73 Other states have not kept up with the ongoing qualitative changes in the United States military; their armed forces are not readily deployable nor easily interoperable with American personnel and equipment. In contrast, military contractors have not only geared themselves to serving the American marketplace, they have been instrumental in bringing about those changes within the U.S. military. The marketplace, in other words, can often more readily satisfy the United States’ operational requirements than can our allies and prospective regional partners. 74

Unilateral hegemony only exists because of PMC’s – they fill the gap between geopolitical goals and strategic means, and allow the government to shift blame.

Isenberg 9 (“Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand Strategy” 1/2009 DAVID researcher and leader of the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers, PRIO Report http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/isenberg-private%20military-contractors-2009.pdf)KM

The truth is that the United States is by far the world’s largest consumer of such services. While contractors have worked with the government since the country’s founding their role has grown as Washington has reduced the size of the U.S. military in the post-Cold War era, and as those forces have become strained by the demands of U.S. grand strategy. This did not happen by accident. Decades ago the government made a deliberate decision to both privatize and outsource military functions and activities that had traditionally been done in the public sector. One can argue for and against such contractors but what nobody wants to discuss is that the U.S. government’s huge and growing reliance on private contractors constitutes an attempt to circumvent or evade public skepticism about the United States’ self-appointed role as global policeman. The U.S. government has assumed the role of guarantor of global stability at a time when the American public is unwilling to provide the resources necessary to support this strategy. Private contractors fill the gap between geopolitical goals and public means The low visibility and presumed low cost of private contractors appeals to those who favor a global U.S. military presence, but fear that such a strategy cannot command public support. And by using contractors the United States also shift responsibility and blame for its actions. As the United States relies more heavily upon military contractors to support its role as world hegemon, it reinforces the tendency to approach global crises in a unilateral, as opposed to multilateral manner, further ensuring that the burdens will be carried disproportionately by U.S. taxpayers. U.S. use of PMC’s is inevitable until people grasp the key point, which is that that contracting is both part of war and part of maintaining a global military hegemonic presence.

Unilateralism Bad Adv. – PMC’s = Unilateralism

PMC’s are the easy way out to pursue foreign policy goals that are unpopular because governments can shift responsibility.

Isenberg 9 (“Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand Strategy” 1/2009 DAVID researcher and leader of the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers, PRIO Report http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/isenberg-private%20military-contractors-2009.pdf)KM

Governments also rely on contractors in order to shift responsibility and blame for their actions. A state employing contractor personnel to advance its foreign policies faces less international responsibility in terms of attribution than would be the case if it relied on its own armed forces.71 But states bear responsibility for the actions of contractors they employ. They should not be allowed to evade responsibility, especially with respect to contractors functioning as the equivalent of the states’ armed forces. The United States is the world's leading user of private contractors because the U.S. government has assumed the role of guarantor of global stability at a time when the American public is unwilling to provide the resources necessary to support this strategy.72 Washington either has to use private contractors to fill the gap between goals and means or else change its goals, and policymakers have shown little interest in the latter.

PMC’s cheapen the cost of war perceptually – no one cares if a contractor employee dies, but the death of one soldier is front page news.

Isenberg 9 (“Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand Strategy” 1/2009 DAVID researcher and leader of the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers, PRIO Report http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/isenberg-private%20military-contractors-2009.pdf)KM

On a broader level, because the use of PMC receives less attention than the use of regular troops, this reduces the political cost of using force. Bluntly put, if someone is contributing to the war effort but is not on active duty in the U.S. military, nobody beyond his or her immediate family cares if they get killed. By contrast, the death of even a single infantryman or marine routinely winds up on the front page of the major papers.

PMC’s are used to change the focus of military deployments from substance to efficiency, justifying misplaced militarism.

Isenberg 9 (“Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand Strategy” 1/2009 DAVID researcher and leader of the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers, PRIO Report http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/isenberg-private%20military-contractors-2009.pdf)KM

TODAY, THE U.S. GOVERNEMENT’S growing reliance on contractors constitutes an attempt to circumvent or evade public skepticism about the United States’ selfappointed role as global policeman. Viewing PMC’s through a market framework focuses attention on questions of efficiency, at the expense of more fundamental considerations about the policy being pursued. The related question of whether force should be used – either by uniformed military personnel or else by private contractors – is often neglected. 69 In this respect, the low visibility and presumed low cost of private contractors appealed to those policy analysts who favor a global U.S. military presence, but fear that such a strategy cannot command public support. Max Boot, senior fellow for national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, has long championed the use of contractors on these grounds. Writing in The American Interest Boot explained: In a perfect world, Congress would bring the size of our armed forces into closer alignment with our massive defense commitments. But our legislature, like most democratic legislatures, is loath to spend what’s needed on defense, and it is even more reluctant to conscript its citizens... Just as Victorian parliaments stinted on the size of the British army, forcing reliance on regiments raised in India, so too our Congress will never provide enough uniformed personnel to address every perceived need... Thus, in all likelihood, we will continue to muddle along with a mixture of private and public providers of security services.70

Unilateralism Bad Adv. – PMC’s = Unilateralism

PSC’s are an extension of neo-colonialism through neoliberal market expansion into warfare, they are key to maintaining US dominance.

Chakrabarti 9 (Shantanu “Privatisation of Security in the Post-Cold War Period” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses December http://www.idsa.in/system/files/Monograph\_No2.pdf)KM

To many analysts, the rise of PSCs and their use while pursuing interventionist policies by the Western states, particularly the United States, is a cost-effective method of ensuring domination. It has been argued, for instance, that the United States, increasingly entwined in a multitude of smaller scale global conflicts, finds it useful to employ private contractors in such conflict zones.1 To many other analysts, however, the trend towards privatised security represents the ‘new face’ of neo-colonialism, operating under the guise of neo-liberal market policies through ‘corporate mercenarism’, providing viable foreign policy proxies for Western governments in the pursuit of their national interests.2 It has also been argued that PSCs provide the great powers, such as the United States, the opportunity to respond across the spectrum of conflict. Their use for peace and humanitarian operations, as well as to provide cutting-edge capabilities for combating transnational threats, conducting offensive information operations, or facing asymmetric threats at the lower end of the conflict spectrum represents untapped potential. Rather than a usurper of state legitimacy, the PSI, in this connection, has arguably become a tool to further American strategic interests.3 As an indication of their greater acceptability to policy makers, the recent US Army Manual on Counter-Insurgency, for instance, while highlighting the need for broad basing of the counter-insurgency agenda, is in favour of counter-insurgency related operation participants recruited from diverse backgrounds. The manual includes private security contractors in the list along other groups like diplomats, police, politicians, humanitarian aid workers, and local leaders. According to the Manual, the decision-making process must involve all the participants in order to solve problems in a complex and extremely challenging environment.4

Unilateralism Bad Adv. – Impact

That unipolar power projection is perceived as menacing.

Layne 6 (Christopher, Associate Professor of Bush School of Government and Public Service @ Texas A&M U, 2006, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisted: The Coming of the United States’Unipolar Moment”, International Security 31.2, 7-41, Project Muse)KM

Precisely because unipolarity means that other states must worry primar-ily about the hegemon’s capabilities rather than its intentions, the ability of the United States to reassure others is limited by its formidable—and unchecked— capabilities, which always are at least a latent threat to other states.55 This is not to say that the United States is powerless to shape others’ perceptions of whether it is a threat. But doing so is difªcult because in a unipolar world, the burden of proof is on the hegemon to demonstrate to others that its power is not threatening.56 Even in a unipolar world, not all of the other major powers will believe themselves to be threatened (or to be equally threatened) by the hegemon. Eventually, however, some are bound to regard the hegemon’s power as menacing. For example, although primacists assert that U.S. hegemony is nonthreatening because U.S. power is “offshore,” this manifestly is not the case. On the contrary, in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East, American power is both onshore (or lurking just over the horizon in the case of East Asia) and in the faces of Russia, China, and the Islamic world. Far from being an offshore balancer that is “stopped by water” from dominating regions beyond the Western Hemisphere, the United States has acquired the means to project massive military power into, and around, Eurasia, and thereby to establish extraregional hegemony in Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf.57

Clinging to unilateral power projection creates blowback – the US will always be perceived as an imperialist occupier.

Layne 2 (Christopher “Offshore Balancing Revisited” The Washington Quarterly, Volume 25, Number 2, Spring, pp. 240)KM

If any doubt remained that U.S. hegemony would trigger a nasty geopolitical “blowback,” it surely was erased on September 11. The Middle East is an extraordinarily complex and volatile place in terms of its geopolitics, and the reaction there to U.S. hegemony is somewhat nuanced. Nothing, however, is subtle about the United States’ hegemonic role in the Persian Gulf, a role that flows inexorably from the strategy of U.S. primacy. With the onset of the Persian Gulf War, the United States began to manage the region’s security directly. The subsequent U.S. policy of “dual containment”—directed simultaneously against the region’s two strategic heavyweights, Iran and Iraq—underscored the U.S. commitment to maintaining its security interests through a hegemonic strategy, rather than a strategy of relying on local power balances to prevent a hostile state from dominating the region or relying on other great powers to stabilize the Gulf and Middle East. The U.S. role in the Gulf has rendered it vulnerable to a hegemonic backlash on several levels. First, some important states in the region (including Iran and Iraq) aligned against the United States because they resented its intrusion into regional affairs. Second, in the Gulf and the Middle East, the self-perception among both elites and the general public that the region has long been a victim of “Western imperialism” is widespread. In this vein, the United States is viewed as just the latest extraregional power whose imperial aspirations weigh on the region, which brings a third factor into play. Because of its interest in oil, the United States is supporting regimes—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf emirates—whose domestic political legitimacy is contested. Whatever strategic considerations dictate that Washington prop up these regimes, that it does so makes the United States a lightning rod for those within these countries who are politically disaffected. Moreover, these regimes are not blind to the domestic challenges to their grip on power. Because they are concerned about inflaming public opinion (the much talked about “street”), both their loyalty and utility as U.S. allies are, to put it charitably, suspect. Finally, although U.S. hegemony is manifested primarily in its overwhelming economic and military muscle, the cultural dimension to U.S. preeminence is also important. The events of September 11 have brought into sharp focus the enormous cultural clash, which inescapably has overtones of a “clash of civilizations,” between Islamic fundamentalism and U.S. liberal ideology.

Unilateralism Bad Adv. – Impact

Attempts to cling to unipolarity will cause wars.

Layne 6 (Christopher, Associate Professor of Bush School of Government and Public Service @ Texas A&M U, 2006, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisted: The Coming of the United States’Unipolar Moment”, International Security 31.2, 7-41, Project Muse)KM

If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint, it probably will, at some point, have to fight to uphold its primacy, which is a potentially dangerous strategy. Maintaining U.S. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle, especially given that U.S. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. Paradoxically, attempting to sustain U.S. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States, thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power. Rather than risking these outcomes, the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. Unilateral offshore balancing, indeed, is America’s next grand strategy.

War on Drugs Add-On – Uniqueness – Warlords

PMC’s are key to Warlord uprisings – they finance them and encourage them on behalf of security contracts from the US.

Filkins 10 (DEXTER FILKINS June 5, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/06/world/asia/06warlords.html)KM

TIRIN KOT, Afghanistan — The most powerful man in this arid stretch of southern Afghanistan is not the provincial governor, nor the police chief, nor even the commander of the Afghan Army. It is Matiullah Khan, the head of a private army that earns millions of dollars guarding NATO supply convoys and fights Taliban insurgents alongside American Special Forces. In little more than two years, Mr. Matiullah, an illiterate former highway patrol commander, has grown stronger than the government of Oruzgan Province, not only supplanting its role in providing security but usurping its other functions, his rivals say, like appointing public employees and doling out government largess. His fighters run missions with American Special Forces officers, and when Afghan officials have confronted him, he has either rebuffed them or had them removed. “Oruzgan used to be the worst place in Afghanistan, and now it’s the safest,” Mr. Matiullah said in an interview in his compound here, where supplicants gather each day to pay homage and seek money and help. “What should we do? The officials are cowards and thieves.” Mr. Matiullah is one of several semiofficial warlords who have emerged across Afghanistan in recent months, as American and NATO officers try to bolster — and sometimes even supplant — ineffective regular Afghan forces in their battle against the Taliban insurgency. In some cases, these strongmen have restored order, though at the price of undermining the very institutions Americans are seeking to build: government structures like police forces and provincial administrations that one day are supposed to be strong enough to allow the Americans and other troops to leave. In other places around the country, Afghan gunmen have come to the fore as the heads of private security companies or as militia commanders, independent of any government control. In these cases, the warlords not only have risen from anarchy but have helped to spread it. For the Americans, who are racing to secure the country against a deadline set by President Obama, the emergence of such strongmen is seen as a lesser evil, despite how compromised many of them are. In Mr. Matiullah’s case, American commanders appear to have set aside reports that he connives with both drug smugglers and Taliban insurgents. “The institutions of the government, in security and military terms, are not yet strong enough to be able to provide security,” said Maj. Gen. Nick Carter, commander of NATO forces in southern Afghanistan. “But the situation is unsustainable and clearly needs to be resolved.” Many Afghans say the Americans and their NATO partners are making a grave mistake by tolerating or encouraging warlords like Mr. Matiullah. These Afghans fear the Americans will leave behind an Afghan government too weak to do its work, and strongmen without any popular support.

PMCs subcontract warlords instead of legitimate Afghan forces in the status quo.

Avant 7 (Deborah, Professor, Political Science and International Affairs, Director, Institute for Global and International Studies, Contracting to Train Foreign Security Forces, Pg. 8, [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2007\_hr/070425–avant.pdf](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2007_hr/070425-avant.pdf))KFC

The US often has many sub-goals in a conflict and the pursuit of one may undermine others (e.g., US forces working with warlords in Afghanistan to gain access to al Qaeda hideouts –one US goal– worked against President Karzai’s efforts to consolidate control over the country by training a national Afghan Army –another US goal).Contractors have frequently used the complexity of US goals to suit their interests in the continuation of a contract. When it looks as if their contract might be frozen because a host country is violating human rights concerns or misbehaving in some other way, a company may claim that its contract should not be frozen because “engaging” human rights abusers may lead to improvements in civil–military relations and democratization that may enhance attention to human rights in the long term. In a number of instances, these kinds of arguments have allowed a contract to continue even when a legal embargo is in effect.18 When confronted with evidence that the same company’s contract may be in violation of local laws or be used politically by host country politicians in violation of human rights norms, though, the company can turn around and claim that it is serving US interests by enhancing the capacity of the host government’s forces or rewarding cooperative behavior internationally. More than once, contractors told me that, “it is not our job to insure that our boss [the host country] abides by its own laws.”19 Similar issues have cropped up in the training of Iraqi security forces.

War on Drugs Add-On – Solvency

PMC’s uniquely make the drug problem in Afghanistan unsolvable. Withdrawal is key.

Larocca 10 (Felix 31 March “The US private drug war in Afghanistan” http://blogs.monografias.com/sistema-limbico-neurociencias/2010/03/31/the-us-private-drug-war-in-afghanistan/)KM

Short of another precipitous withdrawal akin to 1991, Washington has no realistic alternative to the costly, long-term reconstruction of Afghanistan’s agriculture. Beneath the gaze of an allied force that now numbers about 120,000 soldiers, opium has fueled the Taliban’s growth into an omnipresent shadow government and an effective guerrilla army. The idea that our expanded military presence might soon succeed in driving back that force and handing over pacification to the illiterate, drug-addicted Afghan police and army remains, for the time being, a fantasy. Quick fixes like paying poppy farmers not to plant, something British and Americans have both tried, can backfire and end up actually promoting yet more opium cultivation. Rapid drug eradication without alternative employment, something the private contractor DynCorp tried so disastrously under a $150 million contract in 2005, would simply plunge Afghanistan into more misery, stoking mass anger and destabilizing the Kabul government further.

War on Drugs Add-On – Warlords Module (1/3)

1. Warlords are feared and respected by the Afghanis

Chatterjee 6/23(Pratap, IPS news, Jun 23, 2010, <http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=51927>)KFC

Matiullah Khan, a former police officer and now top warlord in Uruzgan Province, just north of Kandahar, who commands an armed militia of over 2,000 men, called the Kandak Amniante Uruzgan (KAU), and controls all traffic along the main highway between Kandahar and Tarin Kowt, the provincial Uruzgan capital. One high–ranking Dutch official claimed that Matiullah is so feared that, "[i]f we appoint Matiullah police chief, probably more than half of all people in the Baluchi valley would run over to the Taliban immediately."

1. **US PMCs directly pay warlords.**

Filkins 6/5 (Dexter, NYT, June 5, 2010, [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/06/world/asia/06warlords.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1277329929–KocgEzeNks2SgFse9vCtYA](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/06/world/asia/06warlords.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1277329929-KocgEzeNks2SgFse9vCtYA))KFC

Mr. Matiullah does not look like one of the aging, pot–bellied warlords from Afghanistan’s bygone wars. Long and thin, he wears black silk turbans and extends a pinky when he gestures to make a point. Mr. Matiullah’s army is an unusual hybrid, too: a booming private business and a government-subsidized militia. His main effort — and his biggest money maker — is securing the chaotic highway linking Kandahar to Tirin Kot for NATO convoys. One day each week, Mr. Matiullah declares the 100-mile highway open and deploys his gunmen up and down it. The highway cuts through an area thick with Taliban insurgents. Mr. Matiullah keeps the highway safe, and he is paid well to do it. His company charges each NATO cargo truck $1,200 for safe passage, or $800 for smaller ones, his aides say. His income, according to one of his aides, is $2.5 million a month, an astronomical sum in a country as impoverished as this one. “It’s suicide to come up this road without Matiullah’s men,” said Mohammed, a driver hauling stacks of sandbags and light fixtures to the Dutch base in Tirin Kot. The Afghan government even picks up a good chunk of Mr. Matiullah’s expenses. Under an arrangement with the Ministry of the Interior, the government pays for roughly 600 of Mr. Matiullah’s 1,500 fighters, including Mr. Matiullah himself, despite the fact that the force is not under the government’s control.

War on Drugs Add-On – Warlords Module (2/3)

1. Warlords empower the Taliban to attack those with conflicting views.

Filkins 6/5 (Dexter, NYT, June 5, 2010, [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/06/world/asia/06warlords.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1277329929–KocgEzeNks2SgFse9vCtYA](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/06/world/asia/06warlords.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1277329929-KocgEzeNks2SgFse9vCtYA))KFC

General Carter said that while he had no direct proof in Mr. Matiullah’s case, he harbored more general worries that the legions of unregulated Afghan security companies had a financial interest in prolonging chaos. In Mr. Matiullah’s case, he said, that would mean attacking people who refused to use his security service or enlisting the Taliban to do it. Local Afghans said that Mr. Matiullah had done both of those things, although they would not speak publicly for fear of retribution. “Does he make deals and pay people to attack?” General Carter said. “I’m not aware of that.” Last fall, Mr. Atmar summoned Mr. Matiullah to his office and told him he wanted to give Mr. Matiullah’s army a license and a government contract. The warlord walked out. “I told him that it’s my men who are doing the fighting and dying,” Mr. Matiullah said. “The guys in Kabul want to steal the money.”

1. Warlords deal under the table with the Taliban – undermine the war on drugs.

Filkins 6/5 (Dexter, NYT, June 5, 2010, [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/06/world/asia/06warlords.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1277329929–KocgEzeNks2SgFse9vCtYA](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/06/world/asia/06warlords.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1277329929-KocgEzeNks2SgFse9vCtYA))KFC

A former senior official in the Kandahar government, who spoke on the condition of anonymity for fear of retribution by Mr. Matiullah and the Karzais, said he believed that Mr. Matiullah was facilitating the movement of drugs along the highway to Kandahar. “I was never able to look inside those trucks, but if I had, I am fairly certain what I would have found,” he said. Despite his relationship to the Special Forces, Mr. Matiullah has been suspected of playing a double game with the Taliban. Asked about Mr. Matiullah earlier this year, an American military officer in Kabul admitted that Mr. Matiullah was believed to have a relationship with insurgents. He spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was discussing intelligence matters. Asked again recently, the same officer said that Mr. Matiullah was suspected of drug smuggling. He provided no details. The next day, after consulting intelligence officers, the officer said Mr. Matiullah was a trusted ally. “Their assessment about him has changed,” he said.

War on Drugs Add-On – Warlords Module (3/3)

War on drugs is key to stability in Afghanistan.

Biehl 9 (Jonathan, “Counter-narcotics operations in Afghanistan: a way to success or a meaningless cause”, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA512380>, date accessed: 6/21/2010) AJK  
The CN effort contributes to four of the stability sectors in the model: security, justice and reconciliation, governance and participation, and economic stabilization and infrastructure. “Efforts in security focus on establishing a stable security environment and developing legitimate institutions and infrastructure to maintain that environment” (Department of the Army 2008, 2-6). The justice and reconciliation sector encompasses far more that policing, civil law and order, and the court systems of a state (Department of the Army 2008, 2-6). This sector is supported by eight key elements, one of which is: effective and scrupulous law enforcement institutions responsive to civil authority and respectful to human rights and dignity (Department of the Army 2008, 2-7). As of now, Afghan LE is unable to do this. “Governance is the states’ ability to serve the citizens 57 58 through the rules, processes and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed and power is exercised in a society, including the representative participatory decision-making processes typically guaranteed under inclusive, constitutional authority” (Department of the Army 2008, 2-8). This is not possible with a narco-based economy with corrupt government officials. In regards to economic stabilization, “much of the broader success achieved in stability operations begins at the local level as intervening actors engage the populace with modest economic and governance programs” (Department of the Army 2008, 2-8). The responsibility for reducing Afghanistan’s economic and social dependence on the cultivation and processing of opium poppies rests with the Afghan government. “Widespread instability--a direct result of that insurgency--makes it almost impossible for Afghan leaders to implement a counter-narcotics strategy” (Wood 2009, 51).

Instability in Afghanistan leads to nuclear war.

**Wesley 10** (Michael, Exec. Director of the Lowy Institute for Int. Policy. Professor of Int. Relt’s @ Griffith U, Feb. 25 2010 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2010/02/25/A–stable–Afghanistan–Why–we–should–care.aspx)IM

We do have an interest in the future of domestic stability within Afghanistan, but we need to think much more clearly about which countries build and guarantee that stability. An Afghan state built just by the US and its allies will be inherently unstable because, as we demonstrated after the Soviet Union withdrew, we have little stomach for any continued strategic involvement in the region. Pakistan, India and China, on the other hand, have deep and enduring strategic interests there, and their competition would soon undermine anything ISAF and NATO leave behind. Understanding the dynamics of strategic competition among Asia's rising behemoths has to be the first step in trying to figure out how to mitigate it. Great power competition in the twenty-first century will be different because of the depth and extent of the dependence of national economies on the global economy. National economies are now less self–sufficient and more vulnerable to the disruption of trading and investment relations than at any time in history. What stops great power confrontations getting out of hand these days is not so much the fear of nuclear annihilation as the fear of global economic ruin – and the resulting national ruin.The danger is that in the heat of the competition, the great powers will lose sight of this fact. This is why instability and weakness in Afghanistan is so dangerous – because in the fog of proxy war, intensely jealous great powers will assume their rivals have the upper hand and redouble their own efforts to exert influence and control, leading to a vast, very likely nuclear, conflict. To avoid the worst possible outcome, all three rivals must be engaged in the process of building a stable Afghanistan – and collectively guaranteeing it. The most realistic route is to actively involve the SCO in the future of Afghanistan while broadening that organisation to include India and Pakistan. This solution ties the stability of the northern and southern tiers of Central Asia to each other, thereby broadening the stakes of those involved. The one hope and one fear that bind China and Russia together are also remarkably relevant to the SCO's proposed new members.

War on Drugs Add-On – Uniqueness – Funded by PMC’s

PMC’s fund warlords and cannot handle the job

Ferdinando 6/23 (Lisa, 23 June 2010, “US Defense Officials Questioned About Afghan Trucking Contract”, [http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/usa/US–Defense–Officials–Questioned–About–Afghan–Trucking–Contract–96960954.html](http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/usa/US-Defense-Officials-Questioned-About-Afghan-Trucking-Contract-96960954.html))KFC

U.S. Defense Department officials say they take any allegation of corruption and wrongdoing seriously in response to a congressional report saying tens of millions of dollars in U.S. taxpayers' money have been paid as extortion money to Afghan warlords, public officials and even the Taliban to make sure U.S. supply convoys get to their destinations. The six–month investigation looked into the Department of Defense's $2.16 billion Afghan Host Nation Trucking contract that delivers 70 percent of the food, water, ammunition, weapons, and fuel used by American troops in Afghanistan. The chairman of the subcommittee, John Tierney, a Democrat from Massachusetts, says American taxpayers are feeding what he called a protection racket in Afghanistan and that the military appears to have ignored complaints by contractors who said they were being extorted. "This contract appears to have fueled warlordism, extortion, corruption, and maybe even funded the enemy," he said. Tierney says the report, done by the staff of the majority Democrats on the subcommittee, shows the Department of Defense's systematic failure of management and oversight of contractors. He says contractors had realized they could not manage and oversee the security that would be needed to move millions of dollars of critical supplies along extremely dangerous routes.

War on Drugs Add-On – Uniqueness – Funded by PMC’s

US PMC’s give money to warlords for protection – tens of millions

Allen 6/22 (JoAnne, Jun 22, 2010, “U.S. indirectly funding Afghan warlords: House report”)KFC

WASHINGTON (Reuters) – The United States is indirectly paying tens of millions of dollars in protection money to Afghan warlords, and potentially to the Taliban, to secure convoys carrying supplies to U.S. troops in Afghanistan, congressional investigators said in a report. The Pentagon's system of outsourcing to private companies the task of moving supplies in Afghanistan, and leaving it up to them to provide their own security, frees U.S. troops to focus on counterinsurgency. But its unintended consequences undermine U.S. efforts to curtail corruption and build an effective Afghan government, according to the report to be reviewed at a congressional hearing on Tuesday. "This arrangement has fueled a vast protection racket run by a shadowy network of warlords, strongmen, commanders, corrupt Afghan officials, and perhaps others," Representative John Tierney, chairman of a House of Representatives national security subcommittee, said in a statement. Tierney, a Democrat, said the system "runs afoul" of the Defense Department's own rules and may be undermining the U.S. strategic effort in Afghanistan. The report by the subcommittee's Democratic staff called protection payments "a significant potential source of funding for the Taliban," citing numerous documents, incidents reports and emails that refer to attempts at Taliban extortion along the road. Congressional investigators began looking into the Defense Department's $2.16 billion Host Nation Trucking (HNT) contract in November 2009. The contract covers 70 percent of the food, fuel, ammunition and other supply distributions to U.S. troops in Afghanistan. "HNT contractors and trucking subcontractors in Afghanistan pay tens of millions of dollars annually to local warlords across Afghanistan in exchange for 'protection' for HNT supply convoys to support U.S. troops," the report said. "The HNT contractors frequently referred to such payments as 'extortion,' 'bribes,' 'special security,' and/or 'protection payments,'" the document said. Many contractors have told U.S. military officials that warlords were demanding protection payments in exchange for safe passage and that these payments were funding the insurgency, the report said. But the contractors concerns were never appropriately addressed, it said. It faults the Pentagon for a lack of effective oversight of its supply chain and private security contractors. "The Department of Defense has little to no visibility into what happens to the trucks carrying U.S. supplies between the time they leave the gate to the time they arrive at their destination," the report said. The congressional investigators said the Defense Department must take direct res8ponsibility for the contractors to ensure robust oversight. They also recommended a top–to–bottom evaluation of the secondary effects of the HNT contract, including an analysis of corruption and the impact on Afghan politics.

And, the reforms on PMCs are corrupt- it only allows warlords to keep theirs

Robichaud 7 (Carl, PROGRAM OFFICER, INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM at the carnegie institute, *World Politics Review,* 10/31/7) ET

A "crackdown" on some of these firms may well be in order. According to some sources, however, the Ministry of the Interior's recent closures were not driven by a desire to achieve accountability but a desire to consolidate power. One Kabul insider, quoted by Rubin on his blog, noted that the timing of the "crackdown" is suspicious, since it comes just as the ministry completed a set of legal regulations that would bring the industry under control. The regulations, finalized on Aug. 5, have "since been put on the shelf by the [government of Afghanistan] which has started now to 'crack down' instead of introducing a legal procedure. . . . I cannot help the impression that some competitors closely linked to the president are trying to (a) extract bribes from the PSCs for not being shut down arbitrarily and (b) eliminate rivals." It is no coincidence, he argues, that "nobody so far has questioned the PSCs owned by illustrious people" or "operating under the control of local warlords . . . in the East and South either."

War on Drugs Add-On – Uniqueness – Funded by PMC’s

PMCs subcontract warlords instead of legitimate Afghan forces.

Avant 7 (Deborah, Professor, Political Science and International Affairs, Director, Institute for Global and International Studies, Contracting to Train Foreign Security Forces, Pg. 8, [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2007\_hr/070425–avant.pdf](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2007_hr/070425-avant.pdf))KFC

The US often has many sub-goals in a conflict and the pursuit of one may undermine others (e.g., US forces working with warlords in Afghanistan to gain access to al Qaeda hideouts –one US goal– worked against President Karzai’s efforts to consolidate control over the country by training a national Afghan Army –another US goal).Contractors have frequently used the complexity of US goals to suit their interests in the continuation of a contract. When it looks as if their contract might be frozen because a host country is violating human rights concerns or misbehaving in some other way, a company may claim that its contract should not be frozen because “engaging” human rights abusers may lead to improvements in civil–military relations and democratization that may enhance attention to human rights in the long term. In a number of instances, these kinds of arguments have allowed a contract to continue even when a legal embargo is in effect.18 When confronted with evidence that the same company’s contract may be in violation of local laws or be used politically by host country politicians in violation of human rights norms, though, the company can turn around and claim that it is serving US interests by enhancing the capacity of the host government’s forces or rewarding cooperative behavior internationally. More than once, contractors told me that, “it is not our job to insure that our boss [the host country] abides by its own laws.”19 Similar issues have cropped up in the training of Iraqi security forces.

PMCs hire Warlords directly – harms relations and the resources are used for personal gain

Gaston 8 (E. L., J.D Harvard Law School, Harvard International Law Journal, 49 (1), pg 239, <http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/HARVARDILJ_mercenarism.pdf>)KFC

A large-scale example of this phenomenon is the way that PMSC hiring practices and cooperation with local warlords have undermined the disarma- ment progress made in Afghanistan. Many of the large foreign PMSCs hire directly from local warlords. According to a senior political officer with the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (“UNAMA”), this significantly un- dermined the multimillion-dollar disarmament process by allowing war- lords to keep their militias active.91 “They don’t have the same heavy weapons, but . . . you don’t need heavy weapons to terrorize neighbors, commit crimes, maintain control over an area.” Because the warlords are able to provide jobs—a scarce resource in Afghanistan—for those men loyal to them, they have an additional source of power.92 The UNAMA official said this practice was particularly harmful when PMSCs hired large cont- ingents of former militias in blocks, often under their same former com- manders. The American PMSC hired to protect one of the largest road construction projects outside of Kabul, U.S. Protection and Investigations (USPI), has done this most extensively.93 The UNAMA official described one incident in which the former Governor of Ghazni, who was closely affili- ated with local warlords, “borrowed back” 200 men, along with their USPI equipment for two weeks to “settle a score.”94

The control of warlords over the contractors delegitimize the government

Tierney 10 (John, Chair of National Security of foreign affairs in US House of reps, *US Congress*, june 10, P.2) ET

P 19-20Not all warlords are created equal. At the top of the hierarchy are the well-known tribal leaders, former mujahedeen commanders, or local power brokers who command the loyalty of men beyond their ability to provide a paycheck. For these warlords, providing security to U.S. and NATO convoys is just the latest iteration of long and colorful careers in war-torn Afghanistan. Long after the United States leaves Afghanistan, and the convoy security business shuts down, these warlords will likely continue to play a major role as autonomous centers of political, economic, and military power.55 Other warlords are newer to the scene but have grown in strength based on their ability to feed off U.S. and NATO security contracting, particularly the highly lucrative business niche of providing private security for the coalition supply chain. Men serve and die for these warlords for money, not tribal, ethnic, or political loyalty. In Afghan culture, this new class of warlord is undeserving of that elevated title because their power is derivative of their business function, not their political or tribal clout.56 According to one expert on Afghanistan, “the partial conversion of Afghan warlords into businessmen resembles in many ways the establishment of mafia networks, which are active both in the legal and the illegal economy and are able to use force to protect their interests and possibly to expand.”57 Whether called “businessmen,” “commanders,” “strongmen,” “militia leaders,” or “warlords,” any single individual who commands hundreds or thousands of armed men in regular combat and operates largely outside the direct control of the central government is a competitor to the legitimacy of the state.58

War on Drugs Add-On – Uniqueness – Funded by U.S.

The security of the US supply chain comes from Warlords – The US supports Warlords!

USFG June (Report of the Majority Staff, Rep. John F. Tierney , June 2010 “Warlord, Inc.” pg 67–8)KFC

Security for the U.S. Supply Chain Is Principally Provided by Warlords. The principal private security subcontractors on the HNT contract are warlords, strongmen, commanders, and militia leaders who compete with the Afghan central government for power and authority. Providing “protection” services for the U.S. supply chain empowers these warlords with money, legitimacy, and a raison d’etre for their private armies. Although many of these warlords nominally operate under private security companies licensed by the Afghan Ministry of Interior, they thrive in a vacuum of government authority and their interests are in fundamental conflict with U.S. aims to build a strong Afghan government.

War on Drugs Add-On – I/L – Hurts War on Drugs

Growing reliance on contractors hurts the war on drugs- less accountable and makes the CIA too dependent on outside workers

Glanz 9 (James, Baghdad Bureau chief of the NY Times, *NY Times,* Sep 1-9) ET

The report says the reliance on contractors has grown steadily, with just a small percentage of contractors serving the Pentagon in World War I, but then growing to nearly a third of the total force in the Korean War and about half in the Balkans and Iraq. The change, the report says, has gradually forced the American military to adapt to a far less regimented and, in many ways, less accountable force. The growing dependence on contractors is partly because the military has lost some of its logistics and support capacity, especially since the end of the cold war, according to the report. Some of the contractors have skills in critical areas like languages and digital technologies that the military needs. The issue of the role of contractors in war has been a subject of renewed debate in Washington in recent weeks with disclosures that the Central Intelligence Agency used the company formerly known as Blackwater to help with a covert program, now canceled, to assassinate leaders of Al Qaeda. Lawmakers have demanded to know why such work was outsourced. The State Department also uses contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, although both the department and the C.I.A. have said they want to reduce their dependence on outside workers.

War on Drugs Add-On – Impact – War on Drugs Good

Drug trafficking finances terrorism, war on drugs is key to solve.

Koelbl 9 (Susanne Koelbl, 02/09/2009 “Afghanistan Foreign Minister 'We Need Help from the West'” http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,606481,00.html)KM

Do all Afghanistan's drug traffickers support terrorists, as NATO High Commander General Bantz John Craddock seems to assume? Spanta: That there is a close relationship between the drug mafia and terrorism is a fact. That's why Afghanistan's government has asked NATO to attack drug barons involved in armed combat whenever necessary, even if it means using deadly force. Drug caravans should, above all, be destroyed: heavily armed bands, moving westwards from the south in the direction of Iran.

War on drugs is key to all other successes in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan.

Lacouture 8 (Matthew Lacouture, University of Denver, “Narco-Terrorism in Afghanistan: Counternarcotics and Counterinsurgency”, 10/24/2008, http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/39)KM

Since the 2001 invasion and the lifting of the Taliban opium ban, opium production in Afghanistan has increased from 70 percent of the overall global illicit opium production to 92 percent today. This increase has occurred in tandem with the declining security situation precipitated by the 2001 coalition invasion of the country. The loose relationship between terrorist organizations, violence, decentralized governance, and poverty that existed prior to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in Afghanistan, has coalesced into a truly narco-terrorism-driven system. The implications of this are severe to both Afghanistan’s and America’s long-term goals. Corruption, lawlessness, instability, violence, and human suffering all contribute to, and result from, the precipitous increase in opium cultivation and narcotics production and trafficking. Thus, in attempting to subdue the Taliban- and al-Qaeda-led insurgencies, and to forge a stable and effective government in Afghanistan, there must also be effective and socially conscious measures undertaken to eliminate the pervasive narco-economy. As President Karzai has stated, “The question of drugs . . . is one that will determine Afghanistan’s future. . . . [I]f we fail, we will fail as a state eventually, and we will fall back in the hands of terrorism.”

Spending Adv. – PMC Profits

PMC’s are earning about $250 billion annually from Iraq and Afghanistan

Lendman 10 (Stephen, Research Assoc. of the Centre for Research on Globalization, http://www.rense.com/general89/outs.htm) GAT

Since 2003, Iraq alone represents the "single largest commitment of US military forces in a generation (and) by far the largest marketplace for the private military industry ever."   In 2005, 80 PMC’s operated there with over 20,000 personnel. Today, in Iraq and Afghanistan combined, it's grown exponentially, according to US Department of Defense figures - nearly 250,000 as of Q 3, 2009, mostly in Iraq but rising in Afghanistan to support more troops.   Not included are PMC’s working for the State Department, 16 US intelligence agencies, Homeland Security, other branches and foreign governments, commercial businesses, and individuals, so the true total is much higher. In addition, as Iraq troops are drawn down, PMC’s will replace them, and in Afghanistan, they already exceed America's military force.   According to a September 21, 2009 Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, as of June 2009, PMC’s in Afghanistan numbered 73,968, and a later year end 2009 US Central Command figure is over 104,000 and rising. The expense is enormous and growing with CRS reporting that supporting each soldier costs $1 million annually, in large part because of rampant waste, fraud and abuse, unmonitored and unchecked.   With America heading for 100,000 troops on the ground and more likely coming, $100 billion will be spent annually supporting them, then more billions as new forces arrive, and the Iraq amount is even greater - much, or perhaps most, from supplemental funding for both theaters on top of America's largest ever military budget at a time the country has no enemies except for ones it makes by invading and occupying other countries and waging global proxy wars.

Spending Adv. – Uniqueness – Military Spending High

Military spending is high right now

Garrett-Peltier 10 (Heidi, research fellow at PERI at Univ. of Mass., http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/2010/0310garrett-peltier.html) GAT

According to the National Priorities Project, military spending on the Iraq and Afghanistan wars has reached approximately $1 trillion since 2001, not including the cost of the surge of 30,000 troops. In fiscal year 2009, federal government outlays on the military were 17% of all outlays. Meanwhile, energy, resource conservation, and the environment accounted for only 1% of federal outlays, while education, training, and social services made up only 2%. Military spending is therefore eight to seventeen times as high as federal education- and energy-related spending. The Obama administration is facing increased pressure to reduce the size of the fiscal deficit and the national debt, both of which have grown partly as a result of military spending. At the same time, there is an urgent need to put people back to work and to move the country toward a low-carbon future. While military Keynesianism offers one strategy for recovering from the recession, it is by no means the most effective, even putting aside the other reasons for objecting to a war economy. By reducing military spending, we can channel some of those savings to clean energy, healthcare, education, and other matters of national and global importance.

Spending Adv. – Link – Trades Off

Military spending trades off with social spending

Naiman 6/20 (Robert, Policy Director at Just Foreign Policy, 6/20/10

<http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/06/20-3>) GAT

This week, House Appropriations Committee Chair David Obey [D-WI] told the White House that he was going to sit on the Administration's request for $33 billion more for pointless killing in Afghanistan until the White House acted on House Democratic demands to unlock federal money to aid the states in averting a wave of layoffs of teachers and other public employees. Obey didn't just link the two issues rhetorically; he linked them with the threat of effective action. At last, at long last. But why is David Obey standing alone? Perhaps, behind the scenes, the big Democratic constituency groups are pulling for Obey. But you wouldn't know it from any public manifestation. Why? This should be a "teachable moment," an opportunity to mobilize the majority of America's working families to push to redirect resources from futile wars of empire and the corporate welfare of the "base military budget" to human needs at home and abroad. Where is the public mobilization of the Democratic constituency groups? If we could shorten the Afghanistan war by a month, that would free up the $10 billion that Obey is asking for domestic spending. Rep. Jim McGovern's [D-MA] bill requiring a timetable for military redeployment from Afghanistan currently has 94 co-sponsors in the House (act here.) If McGovern's bill became law, it would surely save the taxpayers at least $10 billion. Why aren't the big Democratic constituency groups aggressively backing the McGovern bill, demanding that it be attached to the war supplemental? This isn't just a question of missing an opportunity. There is a freight train coming called "deficit reduction." If the big Democratic constituency groups continue to sit on their hands on the issue of military spending, then we can predict what the cargo of that freight train is likely to be: cut Social Security benefits, cut Medicare benefits, raise the retirement age for Social Security and Medicare, cut domestic spending for enforcing environmental regulations and civil rights and worker safety.

**Spending Adv. – Link – Trades Off**

**Military spending uses resources less efficiently, trades off with civilian investments, and hurts civilian innovation – any gains would take years to have an effect**

Gold 2 (David, Prof. of International Affairs at New School Univ, <http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Military_Budget/MilitaryBudget_Economy.html>) GAT

Military spending also has implications for the supply side of the economy. The people, equipment, materials, and production capacity that are used by military industries are similar to the resources needed for civilian research and new investment. While military spending accounted for about 6% of total output in 1983, about 30% of all durable goods output was for the military. Because there is direct competition for resources, military spending may reduce the ability of the economy to generate new products and rebuild production technology. Economists have researched this issue, also. There are a number of studies showing that high levels of military spending are associated with low rates of economic growth. British economist Ron Smith, after analyzing data for the United States and other advanced capitalist countries, concluded that there is a direct effect whereby countries that maintain large military establishments also have low rates of investment. This is because military spending can push civilian investment aside. Military industry firms outbid civilian companies for engineers, skilled workers, key materials, and even loans. Military firms use these resources less efficiently than would civilian ones because they are less concerned about controlling their costs. They know the Pentagon will foot the bill. The Department of Defense frequently argues that the civilian economy benefits from the spinoff from military research and development (R&D). Military investment probably had more impact on civilian products in the years after World War II than recently. Innovations in aircraft design and computer technology received a push from the military and space programs in the 1940s and 1950s. (So did nuclear power, which may be an example of a negative spinoff.) Today, military technology has become far too complex to have significant civilian applications. In any event, looking at the economy as a whole, it's likely that spinoff was never a very important phenomenon. Military priorities also have a qualitative impact on civilian innovation. In the United States, where transistors, semiconductors, and other electronics originated, the emphasis on military-oriented research has reduced the ability of companies to compete with Japanese and European companies. Military requirements emphasize high-speed applications and products that can withstand extreme pressures and stresses, with little regard for cost control. Civilian products need low cost and standardized components, an area of electronics where the Japanese, in particular, excel. Because of these differences, several U.S. companies have left the Pentagon's R&D program, fearing they will be unable to keep up with civilian market developments if they follow the military's lead. Whatever the actual effects of military spending on the U.S. economy. those who make decisions may still use the military budget in an effort to fight recession. A problem, however, is that in today's era of large weapons systems, it may not be possible to increase the military's budget fast enough to be an effective counter-cyclical tool. For example, the B-1 bomber was approved by President Reagan in October 1981, during a recession, but actual production was not scheduled to begin until the end of 1983, by which time the recession had ended. Similarly, the Pentagon spent $4 billion less in the 1983 fiscal year than planned, partly due to delays in the MX program. Other defense money can be allocated in a more flexible fashion, but there are severe limits to the extent that weapons purchases can be used to fight the business cycle. Since military spending is a poor way of fighting recession, and it imposes significant long-term costs in terms of undermining innovations and economic growth, one must also ask why the country's political leaders turn to the military budget as a means of economic stimulation. Is it misinformation? Or are there political constraints and rationales that override economic considerations?

Spending Adv. – Link – Trades Off

Military spending trades off with social spending

Huffington 4/22 (Arianna, Co-founder of the Huffington Post, 4/22/10, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/arianna-huffington/guns-vs-butter-2010\_b\_548620.html#) GAT

See if you can identify the bleeding heart liberal who said this: "Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children." Noam Chomsky? Michael Moore? Bernie Sanders? Nope, it was that unrepentant lefty, five-star general Dwight Eisenhower, in 1953, just a few months after taking office -- a time when the economy [was](http://www.data360.org/dsg.aspx?Data_Set_Group_Id=44) booming and unemployment was 2.7 percent. Yet today, while America's economy sputters down the road to recovery and the middle class struggles to make ends meet -- with [over 26 million people](http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t15.htm) unemployed or underemployed and record numbers of homes being lost to foreclosure -- the "guns vs. butter" argument isn't even part of the national debate. Of course, today, the argument might be more accurately framed as "ICBM nukes, Predator drones, and missile defense shields vs. jobs, affordable college, decent schools, foreclosure prevention, and fixing the gaping holes in our social safety net." We hear endless talk in Washington about belt-tightening and deficit reduction, but hardly a word about whether the $161 billion being [spent](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/13/war-cost-obama-wants-33-b_n_421229.html)this year to fight unnecessary wars of choice in Afghanistan and Iraq might be better spent helping embattled Americans here at home. Indeed, during his State of the Union [speech](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/27/state-of-the-union-2010-full-text-transcript_n_439459.html) in January, President Obama proposed freezing all discretionary government spending for three years -- but exempted military spending, even though the defense budget has ballooned over the last ten years. According to defense analyst Lawrence Korb, who served as Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan administration, the baseline defense budget has [increased](http://thinkprogress.org/2010/01/27/spending-defense-freeze/) by 50 percent since 2000. Over that same period, non-defense discretionary spending increased less than half that much. This is not about ignoring the threats to our national security. And it's certainly not about pacifism. To quote the president's [2002 speech](http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99591469): "I don't oppose all wars. What I am opposed to is a dumb war." Iraq was never about making us safer. And the original rationale for going to war in Afghanistan -- taking on al Qaeda -- has been accomplished, with [less than 100](http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/president-obamas-secret-100-al-qaeda-now-afghanistan/story?id=9227861) members of the terrorist group still there. As former Bush State Department official Richard Haas has [said](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/21/opinion/21haass.html), "If Afghanistan were a war of necessity, it would justify any level of effort. It is not and does not." In fact, by helping destabilize Pakistan and stretching our military to its limits, our presence in Afghanistan is actually making us less safe. The irrationality of continuing to spend precious resources on wars we shouldn't be fighting is all the more galling when juxtaposed with our urgent and growing needs at home. The LA Times' Doyle McManus [offers](http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/04/opinion/la-oe-mcmanus4-2010apr04) an eye-opening example of just how far our mission in Afghanistan has "creeped." His on-the-ground report on the military's upcoming push in Kandahar (cost: $33 billion) -- a surge the military considers as important as securing Baghdad was to Iraq -- doesn't include a single mention of taking on al Qaeda. Instead, McManus describes Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, telling an Afghan leader that the goals of the surge, as well as defeating the Taliban, include "reducing corruption, making local government work and, eventually, providing jobs." Is that why we are still fighting a war there nine years later, spending American blood and treasure -- to provide jobs for the people of Kandahar? It's like a very bad joke: "The good news is, the Obama administration is ramping up a multi-billion program that will create a host of new jobs. The bad news is, you have to move to Kandahar to apply." The Bush-era rationale for these overseas misadventures was always: We'll fight 'em over there, so we don't have to fight 'em over here. Today, it seems, we're fighting to create jobs for 'em over there, while we don't have enough jobs for our people over here. At a time when so many hardworking middle class families are reeling from the economic crisis -- and our country is facing the harsh one-two punch of more people in need at the exact moment social services are being slashed to the bone -- that seems like the most perverted of priorities. "Civilizations," argued historian Arnold Toyenbee, "die from suicide, not by murder." That is, our future is dependent on the choices we make and the things we decide to value. In a video [put together](http://act.bravenewfilms.org/go/17?akid=998.17807.dO6ml-&t=3) by Robert Greenwald's Rethink Afghanistan campaign, Berkeley professor Ananya Roy defines the troubled state of America not so much as a fiscal crisis as "a crisis of priorities." And Barney Frank, who has been one of the few in Washington [arguing](http://motherjones.com/politics/2009/02/barney-frank-obama-cut-military-spending) for the need to cut military spending, says that ." Looking at the money we've spent on Iraq and Afghanistan, Frank [says](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/diane-francis/cut-the-deficit-by-knifin_b_450286.html): "We would have had $1 trillion now to help fix the economy and do the things for our people that they deserve."

Spending Adv. – I/L – No Oversight

The “cost-plus” contracts of PMC’s encourage cost-raising – on top of that, the Army is spending even more attempting to keep soldiers from going private

Weiner 6 (Rebecca U., International Security Program fellow, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19402/private\_military\_contractors\_come\_with\_strings\_attached.html) GAT

On the other hand, as corporations, PSFs possess the leverage of private-sector mechanisms for structuring incentives. While even the most elite soldiers are compensated like mid-level bureaucrats, contractors are compensated like management consultants. The effect has been to cannibalize the military's labor pool-in particular the top echelon. Lured by salary increases of up to 400 percent, hundreds of soldiers have decided not to re-enlist but to "go private," adding to the resentment of the less-compensated and increasingly shorthanded force they leave behind. The Army has recently resorted to offering bonuses of up to $150,000 as incentive for soldiers to stay. Finally, there is the Pentagon's preference for "cost-plus" contracts, which treat PSFs as if they are on retainer-they respond quickly when they are needed, provide the service desired, and bill after the fact for the costs outlaid, adding a fixed award on top. The result encourages neither cost-cutting nor enhanced performance. The rationale for using this form of contract is efficiency: it allows PSFs to provide surge capacity. However, when the surge turns out to be chronic and constant, this logic should be re-examined.

Because of the lack of oversight for these PMC’s, they can overcharge the government by 40%

Burton 9 (Chris, member of the Seminar in Peace Operations, http://www.docstoc.com/docs/44001173/Private-Military-Companies) GAT

Another important issue about the costs of PMC’s is the cost of oversight mechanisms or the costs of lack of oversight. In order to ensure efficiency of PMC’s, oversight mechanisms are the most important tools. But they bring extra costs to their principals. Moreover, as mentioned by Ronou, absence of effective oversight mechanisms causes different types of cost; waste of resources, sacrifice of quality or overbilling. For example, Halliburton overcharged the U.S. by overpriced gasoline and for services not rendered (such as billing for meals not cooked). According to some Army auditors, it overcharged by an average of around 40 %.

Spending Adv. – I/L – No Oversight

Privatizing our military doesn’t save money – their wages are higher, and they have no incentive to keep costs down

Isenberg 6 (David, member of British American Security Information Council, http://basicint.org/pubs/Papers/PMC’s0603.pdf) GAT

Interestingly, though it is commonly asserted that the use of PMC’s has grown because they are far more cost-effective than the use of large standing military forces, with all their attendant overhead costs (recruiting, retention, training, and equipping, benefits) there is actually very little empirical evidence to confirm it.One academic wrote: Confronting the problem of controlling private contractors requires challenging a common myth – that outsourcing saves money. This philosophy stems from a wide craze of privatizing government services that began long before President Bush took office. But hiring private employees in Iraq at pay rates several times more than what soldiers make, plus paying the overhead at the private firms, has never been about saving money. It’s more about avoiding tough political choices concerning military needs, reserve call-ups and the human consequences of war.Writing in the New Yorker Magazine, James Surowiecki notes: Effective as outsourcing can be, doing things in-house is often easier and quicker. You avoid the expense and hassle of haggling, and retain operational reliability and control, which is especially important to the military. No contract can guarantee that private employees will stick around in a combat zone. After the Iraq war, some contractors refused assignments to dangerous parts of the country. That left American troops sitting in the mud, and without hot food… Outsourcing works well when there’s genuine competition among suppliers; that’s when the virtues of the private sector come into play. But in the market for big military contracts the bidders tend to be the usual few suspects, so that the game resembles the American auto or steel industries before Japan and Germany became major players: more comfortable than competitive. Sometimes the lack of competition is explicit: many of the contracts for rebuilding Iraq were handed out on a no-bid basis. And many of them are “cost-plus” contracts. This means that the contractors’ profit is a percentage of their costs, which gives them an incentive to keep those costs high. That’s hardly a recipe for efficiency or rigor.”

PMC’s waste money

AP 7 (Feb. 15 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17168266/ TBC 6/25/10)

$5 billion in bad paperwork According to their testimony, the investigators: Found overpricing and waste in Iraq contracts amounting to $4.9 billion since the Defense Contract Audit Agency began its work in 2003, although some of that money has since been recovered. Another $5.1 billion in expenses were charged without proper documentation. Urged the Pentagon to reconsider its growing reliance on outside contractors to run the nation's wars and reconstruction efforts. Layers of subcontractors, poor documentation and lack of strong contract management are rampant and promote waste even after the GAO first warned of problems 15 years ago.

Spending Adv. – I/L – Hidden Costs

And, we spend almost 300 million dollars a year on one security firm alone

Scahill 7 (Jeremy, Puffin Foundation Writing Fellow at The Nation Institute, is the author of the bestselling Blackwater, *The Independent,* Aug 10, http://www.uruknet.info/?p=35239 ) ET

The single largest U.S. contract for private security in Iraq was a $293 million payment to the British firm Aegis Defence Services, headed by retired British Lt. Col. Tim Spicer, who has been dogged by accusations that he is a mercenary because of his private involvement in African conflicts. The Texas-based DynCorp International has been another big winner, with more than $1 billion in contracts to provide personnel to train Iraqi police forces, while Blackwater USA has won $750 million in State Department contracts alone for "diplomatic security."

And, the pentagon spends a ton of money on contractors

Overall, the industry is huge and growing, grossing over $100 billion annually worldwide, operating in over 50 countries. By far, the Pentagon is their biggest client, and in the decade leading up to the Iraq War, it contracted with over 3,000 PMCs, and now many more spending increasingly larger amounts. A single company, Halliburton and its divisions grossed between $13 - $16 billion from the Iraq War, an amount 2.5 times America's cost for the entire Gulf War. The company profits handsomely because of America's commitment to privatized militarization. More about it below. Since 2003, Iraq alone represents the "single largest commitment of US military forces in a generation (and) by far the largest marketplace for the private military industry ever."

Congressional studies conclude that the expense is much bigger than PMCs are worth

Lendman 10 (Stever, MA @ Harvard, *Steve Lendman Blog*, jan 19-10) ET

According to a September 21, 2009 Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, as of June 2009, PMCs in Afghanistan numbered 73,968, and a later year end 2009 US Central Command figure is over 104,000 and rising. The expense is enormous and growing with CRS reporting that supporting each soldier costs $1 million annually, in large part because of rampant waste, fraud and abuse, unmonitored and unchecked. With America heading for 100,000 troops on the ground and more likely coming, $100 billion will be spent annually supporting them, then more billions as new forces arrive, and the Iraq amount is even greater - much, or perhaps most, from supplemental funding for both theaters on top of America's largest ever military budget at a time the country has no enemies except for ones it makes by invading and occupying other countries and waging global proxy wars.

And, contractors cost so much the dod chairman thinks it can’t be justified

Scahill 7 (Jeremy, Puffin Foundation Writing Fellow at The Nation Institute, is the author of the bestselling Blackwater, *The Independent,* Aug 10, http://www.uruknet.info/?p=35239 ) ET

At present, an American or a British Special Forces veteran working for a private security company in Iraq can make $650 a day. At times the rate has reached $1,000 a day; the pay dwarfs many times over that of active duty troops operating in the war zone wearing a U.S. or U.K. flag on their shoulder instead of a corporate logo. "We got [tens of thousands of] contractors over there, some of them making more than the Secretary of Defense," House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman John Murtha (D-Penn.) recently remarked. "How in the hell do you justify that?" In part, these contractors do mundane jobs that traditionally have been performed by soldiers. Some require no military training, but involve deadly occupations, such as driving trucks through insurgent-controlled territory.

Spending Adv. – I/L – Hidden Costs

And, securitization costs more than 90% of the taxes of the US

Scahill 7 (Jeremy, Puffin Foundation Writing Fellow at The Nation Institute, is the author of the bestselling Blackwater, *The Independent,* Aug 10, http://www.uruknet.info/?p=35239 ) ET

While Iraq currently dominates the headlines, private war and intelligence companies are expanding their already sizable footprint. The U.S. government in particular is now in the midst of the most radical privatization agenda in its history. According to a recent report in Vanity Fair, the government pays contractors as much as the combined taxes paid by everyone in the United States with incomes under $100,000, meaning "more than 90 percent of all taxpayers might as well remit everything they owe directly to [contractors]

Some of this outsourcing is happening in sensitive sectors, including the intelligence community. "This is the magnet now. Everything is being attracted to these private companies in terms of individuals and expertise and functions that were normally done by the intelligence community," says former CIA division chief and senior analyst Melvin Goodman. "My major concern is the lack of accountability, the lack of responsibility. The entire industry is essentially out of control. It’s outrageous."

PMCs are 70% of the US intelligence budget

Scahill 7 (Jeremy, Puffin Foundation Writing Fellow at The Nation Institute, is the author of the bestselling Blackwater, *The Independent,* Aug 10, http://www.uruknet.info/?p=35239 ) ET

RJ Hillhouse, a blogger who investigates the clandestine world of private contractors and U.S. intelligence, recently obtained documents from the Office of the Directorate of National Intelligence (DNI) showing that Washington spends some $42 billion annually on private intelligence contractors, up from $17.54 billion in 2000. Currently that spending represents 70 percent of the U.S. intelligence budget going to private companies.

**Spending Adv. – I/L – Hidden Costs**

**Insurance policies under PMC’s are often expensive, and the government often then has to reimburse the insurance companies**

BASIC 4 (British American Security Information Council, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2004PMC2iii.pdf) GAT

If an injury or death claim is related to a ‘war-risk hazard’, the U.S. War Hazards Compensation Act provides for government reimbursement to insurance carriers.The definition of a war-risk hazard is limited and does not apply to most deaths in Iraq today. U.S. employers are required to provide limited insurance to all employees in war zones who are not from the host country, under the Defense Base Act. This excludes Iraqi employees. Such coverage is usually limited to $4,000 a month in the event of death or disability.Policies for additional coverage, which have risen in price, are often needed to attract workers to Iraq, with potential payments ranging from $250,000 to more than $1m.Firms are reluctant to reveal how much they are spending on security and insurance. It is estimated that for every $100 in salary paid by the employer, around $20 is spent on the life-insurance premium. In light of the worsening security situation, the insurance companies are forced to raise tariffs on a weekly basis.

Wage details for these companies are usually not made public – this is because they’re often high and can sometimes be three times as costly as a usual soldier

Isenberg 4 (David, member of British American Security Information Council, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2004PMC2iii.pdf) GAT

Because such information is proprietary and has privacy implications PMC’s and their parent companies usually do not make details available concerning their contracts, salaries, or number of employees. Given the obvious danger of working in a war zone where personnel are potential targets it seems reasonable that PMC personnel, especially those with highly sought after skills in short supply, can command high salaries. This was especially the case when PMC’s first started operating in Iraq in the spring of 2003 but since then market forces have in many cases served to moderate salaries. Michael Grunberg, spokesperson of recently closed Sandline International, put it this way: The market is bleeding out. Payments in Iraq exceed everything known so far. The best can get up to $1,200 per diem. Small companies, like three people somewhere in an office in Washington, in need of some 250 trained former special forces and some 4.000 local support, have no chance. It’s only a small reservoir of well trained former commandos world wide. People formerly earning $400 to $500 per diem from us, tell us today: “Sorry Comrade, but in Iraq I will earn $1,000.”PMC personnel, especially those with highly sought after skills such as former SOF personnel, can still command high salaries. Some claim that they can earn more than £80,000 a year. Reportedly, companies are offering yearly salaries ranging from $100,000 to nearly $200,000 to entice senior SOF personnel to switch careers. Members of the SAS can earn three times their pay when working for PMC’s.Short-term, high-risk work can bring much higher rewards. It is claimed that security personnel working a seven-day contract in cities like Falluja can make $1,000 a day.Blackwater employees are said to have been paid up to $2,000 a day, probably for a “three day special”.The Steele Foundation said it pays people willing to work in Iraq anywhere from $10,000 to $20,000 dollars a month. Mike Battles, co-founder of Custer Battles, downplays the level of pay: “I hear a lot of mistakes where people say, you know, a thousand dollars a day. That’s not a thousand dollars a day the person is receiving. That’s what someone is paying for that person, which includes insurance, equipment, travel and all of those types of things.”

Spending Adv. – I/L – Hidden Costs

And, officials in charge of the contractors lie to the federal government- decreasing effectiveness of the contractors and wasting tax payers money

Schulman 9 (Daniel, assistant editor at Columbia Journalism Review, Sep 1-9, *Mother jones*) ET

Brian's letter suggests that Wackenhut Vice President Sam Brinkley, who testified before a Senate panel in June about ArmorGroup's performance of the embassy contract, may have misled Congress. Despite Wackenhut Vice President Sam Brinkley's sworn Senate testimony that "…the Kabul contract has been fully-staffed since January 2009…" the truth is that chronic understaffing of the guard force continues to be a major problem. And evidence suggests Mr. Brinkley knew that. Around March, according to numerous participants, he was confronted by some 50 guards at Camp Sullivan who complained to him directly about a severe, ongoing guard shortage. Then, in an April 2009 memo to a State Department official, U.S. Embassy Kabul guard force Commander Werner Ilic reported that guard shortages had caused chronic sleep deprivation among his men. He described a situation in which guards habitually face 14-hour-day work cycles extending for as many as eight weeks in a row, frequently alternating between day and night shifts. He concluded that "this ultimately diminishes the LGF's [Local Guard Force's] ability to provide security." The contract with the State Department specifies that guards may not be on duty for longer than 12 consecutive hours. Interviewees and documents reveal that short-staffing frequently results in the denial of contractually guaranteed leave and vacation, and that those who do not comply are threatened with termination or actually fired. But criticisms of failing to meet manpower obligations are nothing compared to the bacchanalian activities ArmorGroup's personnel were allegedly engaged in.

Spending money on contractors lie about everything- even numbers of people who they trained

Engelhardt 9 (Tom, Fellow @ Nation Institute, teaching fellow @ berk, Jan 11-9, *Tom Dispatch*)

The problem is not simply that the Bush administration skimped on aid, but that it handed it over to for-profit contractors. Privatization, as is now abundantly clear, enriches only the privateers and serves only their private interests. Take one pertinent example. When the inspectors general of the Pentagon and State Department investigated the U.S. program to train the Afghan police in 2006, they found the number of men trained (about 30,000) to be less than half the number reported by the administration (70,000). The training had lasted eight weeks at most, with no in-the-field experience whatsoever. Only about half the equipment assigned to the police -- including thousands of trucks -- could be accounted for, and the men trained were then deemed "incapable of carrying out routine law enforcement work."

We waste tons of money on contractors

Engelhardt 9 (Tom, Fellow @ Nation Institute, teaching fellow @ berk, Jan 11-9, *Tom Dispatch*)

The American privateer training the police -- DynCorp -- went on to win no-bid contracts to train police in Iraq with similar results. The total bill for American taxpayers from 2004 to 2006: $1.6 billion. It's unclear whether that money came from the military or the development budget, but in either case it was wasted. The inspectors general reported that police incompetence contributed directly to increased opium production, the reinvigoration of the Taliban, and government corruption in general, thoroughly subverting much ballyhooed U.S. goals, both military and political.

Outsourcing makes the military less cost effective- it’s a bad policy

Hedahl 9 (Marc, Captain USAF, http://isme.tamu.edu/JSCOPE05/Hedahl05.html) ET

It seems that there are, however, three reasons that one might regard a particular act of outsourcing a bad idea. The most frequently discussed reasons are economic. If it were more expensive to outsource a particular function, there would be one good reason not to do it. However, the ultimate goal of our military is not merely to be as cost effective as possible, so one could also argue that a particular type of outsourcing is problematic because of other direct consequences on the military mission. For example, one could argue that although it may be more cost effective to outsource certain military logistical functions, the impact to military effectiveness makes this a bad policy. Finally, one could argue that a particular act of outsourcing was misguided because of the long-term impacts to the profession of arms itself.[12]

Spending Adv. – Impact – Housing Module (1/3)

Dollar for dollar, social spending generates more jobs that are better-paying

Garrett-Peltier 10 (Heidi, research fellow at PERI at Univ. of Mass., http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/2010/0310garrett-peltier.html) GAT

The United States is currently preparing to send 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan by summer 2010. Military contractors, deeply integrated into the U.S. economy, will continue to prosper and profit from increased military spending resulting from this surge of troops. At a time when unemployment in the domestic economy remains near 10%, it may seem convenient to fall back on the principle of military Keynesianism: War is good for the economy. John Maynard Keynes, the British economist whose work has once again become popular in the wake of this most recent economic crisis, advocated increased government spending to lift an economy out of recession or depression. When consumers and businesses slow their spending, the government can step in to increase demand for goods and services so that businesses can continue to produce and people can remain employed. This fiscal stimulus could take the form of infrastructure projects, healthcare, education, or other productive endeavors. By this logic, military spending can lift an economy out of recession by creating demand for goods and services provided by military contractors, such as the production of tanks and ammunition or the provision of security services. Advocates of this strategy point not only to the widespread employment created by military spending, but also claim that military spending creates well-paying, stable jobs. It is true that military spending creates jobs throughout the economy, and that many of those jobs are well-paying. But at a time when our jobless rate is high, infrastructure is crumbling, and global climate change is becoming an increasingly urgent matter, we must ask whether military spending is truly a solution to our economic woes or whether we might be able to create more jobs in productive areas that also help us meet longer-term goals. In a recent paper that I co-authored with Robert Pollin, we show that dollar per dollar, more jobs are created through spending on clean energy, health care, and education than on the military. Further, we show that more middle-income and well-paying jobs are created in all of these areas. For each $1 billion of spending, over 17,000 jobs would be created in clean energy, close to 20,000 in health care, and over 29,000 in education. That same $1 billion would create only 11,600 jobs as a result of military spending. If we look at well-paying jobs, those that pay over $64,000 per year, these alternative domestic spending areas also outperform military spending. The same $1 billion would create 1,500 well-paying jobs in clean energy and just over 1,000 in the military—clean energy creates 50% more good jobs than military spending. Education, which is labor-intensive and creates many well-paying jobs per dollar of expenditure, creates close to 2,500 jobs paying over $64,000—that’s 2.5 times as many as the military.

Military spending generates fewer jobs than social spending

Gold 2 (David, Prof. of International Affairs at New School Univ, <http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Military_Budget/MilitaryBudget_Economy.html>) GAT

Military spending represents a direct demand by the government for products and services. An increase in military spending brings forward an increase in production and employment, and as military-industry workers spend their higher income, it generates further increases in jobs and income. The issue for debate, however, is not whether an increase in military spending stimulates employment and purchasing power, because of course it does, but whether military spending does so more effectively than other forms of government or private spending. Using a variety of methods, and covering different periods of time, researchers have found that spending on the military generates fewer jobs than spending the same amount of money on a wide range of alternatives. This conclusion is strongest when the military budget emphasizes weapons purchases and development, which is the case at present. For example, the Congressional Budget Office recently found that every $10 billion spent on weapons generates 40,000 fewer jobs than $10 billion spent on civilian programs. These numbers are not large, given the amount of unemployment in the economy. But they are important in the current situation, since a large part of the military buildup was financed by cutting civilian spending. Looking at its impact on jobs, it is hard to justify military spending as a means of stimulating the economy. The ability of military spending to stimulate demand and employment was probably greater in the 1950s than it is today. Weapons production was more jobs-intensive than it is now. Moreover, the economy was in greater need of the added stimulation that military purchasing power could provide; today, with growth in government social spending, and with the tremendous growth of credit over the last several decades, our problems are not lack of overall purchasing power. Current problems lie more in the area of innovation and investment, and inequalities of income and power- problems that high levels of military spending can only worsen.

Spending Adv. – Impact – Housing Module (2/3)

Jobs key to housing market recovery

Reuters 6/14 (6/14/10, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65D0NJ20100614) GAT

The U.S. labor market will hold the key to a recovery in the hard-hit housing sector, according to a Harvard University report released on Monday. Record high foreclosures and a high jobless rate both pose significant challenges to the housing market, but some recovery in labor markets and record low mortgage rates could partly overcome other pressures, said the study from the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard. "If history is a guide, what happens with jobs will matter the most to the strength of the housing rebound," Eric Belsky, executive director of the center, said in a statement. "Right now, economists expect the unemployment rate to stay high, but if employment growth surprises on the upside or downside, housing numbers could too." The researchers noted that homeowners would feel poorer with real household wealth declining on a per household basis to $486,600 from $503,500 over the past 10 years, in "the lost decade." Foreclosures have reduced some mortgage debt but the level of debt relative to equity still started 2010 at a record 163%, the report said. Despite falling home prices, loan modifications, and softening rents, the share of borrowers with severe housing cost burdens climbed, it said.

Housing market key to US economy

Klein 09 (Nick, contributor to Seeking Alpha, http://seekingalpha.com/article/145945-housing-market-recovery-is-the-key-to-real-stimulus) GAT

These fears are causing significant problems, especially in the housing market. Without a recovery in the housing market, things aren’t likely to improve anytime soon. Housing prices are the key to economic recovery. Higher home prices will relieve the number of homeowners currently underwater on their mortgages, thus reducing the risk of them simply walking away. Higher home prices also improve consumer sentiment, since more equity in their homes provides consumers with a sense of security. This would result in both an increase in home equity loans and in personal spending. But since mortgage rates are closely correlated with the 10-Year T-Note, the sudden jump in rates is threatening the economic recovery. The 30-year fixed-rate mortgage rate increased 81 bps from 4.78% on April 30 to 5.59% on June 12. Mortgage applications have been falling significantly, and it isn’t difficult to see why. 81bps adds $100 a month to a $200,000 mortgage. $100 per month could be the difference between keeping your home and losing it to foreclosure. If rates continue to climb, foreclosure activity will only get worse. Higher rates will also force out first time homebuyers, causing downward pressure on home prices. Though enticed with an $8,000 tax credit, higher monthly payments may cause them to rethink their decisions, and higher debt-to-income ratios may make it harder for them to get financing. Combine this with continued housing starts, and you have a housing glut, thus driving down home prices further. At this point, the Federal Reserve and federal government can’t do much to lower mortgage rates. If the Fed purchases more securities, the inflation screams will only get louder. If the Federal government spends more money, more investors will fear the government’s ability to repay its debt. The President talks about the importance of balancing the budget, so let’s see him put his money where his mouth is.

Spending Adv. – Impact – Housing Module (3/3)

Economic recovery is necessary to solve civil unrest and riots

**Klare 9** (Michael T., Professor of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College, http://thepinehillsnews.com/wp/2009/02/25/economic-crash-will-fuel-social-unrest/ AD 6/30/09) GAT

While most such incidents are triggered by an immediate event — a tariff, the closure of local factory, the announcement of government austerity measures — there are systemic factors at work as well. While economists now agree that we are in the midst of a recession deeper than any since the Great Depression of the 1930s, they generally assume that this downturn — like all others since World War II — will be followed in a year, or two, or three, by the beginning of a typical recovery. There are good reasons to suspect that this might not be the case — that poorer countries (along with many people in the richer countries) will have to wait far longer for such a recovery, or may see none at all. Even in the United States, 54% of Americans now believe that “the worst” is “yet to come” and only 7% that the economy has “turned the corner,” according to a recent Ipsos/McClatchy poll; fully a quarter think the crisis will last more than four years. Whether in the U.S., Russia, China, or Bangladesh, it is this underlying anxiety — this suspicion that things are far worse than just about anyone is saying — which is helping to fuel the global epidemic of violence. The World Bank’s most recent status report, Global Economic Prospects 2009, fulfills those anxieties in two ways. It refuses to state the worst, even while managing to hint, in terms too clear to be ignored, at the prospect of a long-term, or even permanent, decline in economic conditions for many in the world. Nominally upbeat — as are so many media pundits — regarding the likelihood of an economic recovery in the not-too-distant future, the report remains full of warnings about the potential for lasting damage in the developing world if things don’t go exactly right. Two worries, in particular, dominate Global Economic Prospects 2009: that banks and corporations in the wealthier countries will cease making investments in the developing world, choking off whatever growth possibilities remain; and that food costs will rise uncomfortably, while the use of farmlands for increased biofuels production will result in diminished food availability to hundreds of millions. Despite its Pollyanna-ish passages on an economic rebound, the report does not mince words when discussing what the almost certain coming decline in First World investment in Third World countries would mean: “Should credit markets fail to respond to the robust policy interventions taken so far, the consequences for developing countries could be very serious. Such a scenario would be characterized by… substantial disruption and turmoil, including bank failures and currency crises, in a wide range of developing countries. Sharply negative growth in a number of developing countries and all of the attendant repercussions, including increased poverty and unemployment, would be inevitable.” In the fall of 2008, when the report was written, this was considered a “worst-case scenario.” Since then, the situation has obviously worsened radically, with financial analysts reporting a virtual freeze in worldwide investment. Equally troubling, newly industrialized countries that rely on exporting manufactured goods to richer countries for much of their national income have reported stomach-wrenching plunges in sales, producing massive plant closings and layoffs. The World Bank’s 2008 survey also contains troubling data about the future availability of food. Although insisting that the planet is capable of producing enough foodstuffs to meet the needs of a growing world population, its analysts were far less confident that sufficient food would be available at prices people could afford, especially once hydrocarbon prices begin to rise again. With ever more farmland being set aside for biofuels production and efforts to increase crop yields through the use of “miracle seeds” losing steam, the Bank’s analysts balanced their generally hopeful outlook with a caveat: “If biofuels-related demand for crops is much stronger or productivity performance disappoints, future food supplies may be much more expensive than in the past.” Combine these two World Bank findings — zero economic growth in the developing world and rising food prices — and you have a perfect recipe for unrelenting civil unrest and violence. The eruptions seen in 2008 and early 2009 will then be mere harbingers of a grim future in which, in a given week, any number of cities reel from riots and civil disturbances which could spread like multiple brushfires in a drought.

Spending Adv. – Impact – Russia Module (1/3)

**The stimulus package proves that social spending is key to higher education**

Kever 9 (Jeannie, writer for Chron News, http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/front/6275906.html) GAT

Higher education executives still may be trying to determine what the federal stimulus package will mean for their schools. But students like Ulises Frias have a pretty good idea. “It helps me stay in school,” said Frias, a senior at the University of Houston-Downtown who pieced together a work-study job and a grant to help cover tuition. Details about how the $787 billion stimulus package will help colleges and universities — and even how much they might receive — haven’t been worked out. But a $30 billion increase in financial aid will begin with grants made this summer. Campus researchers also expect to receive a share of the $17 billion in federal research money included in the bill. The new financial aid money means more students will receive Pell Grants and jobs through campus work-study programs. The maximum Pell Grant, generally reserved for students from families earning less than $30,000 a year, will increase, too. The extra money will help pay for textbooks and other supplies, said Maria Hernandez, a UH-Downtown sophomore who says she couldn’t go to college without her Pell Grant and other financial aid. “The textbooks are going up now,” she said. “They’re so expensive.” The financial aid won’t go directly to college coffers, but should help more students attend college, said Ray Laughter, vice chancellor at Lone Star College. “When the economy is in a downturn, we have more interest and more demand, more people coming to get more skills.” The stimulus package also included $17 billion for research, including an additional $10.4 billion for biomedical research, available through the National Institutes of Health over the next two years, and an additional $2 billion at the National Science Foundation and $600 million for climate change research at NASA. The Department of Energy will get an additional $4 billion for research. University researchers will end up with most of that money, some of which is designated for renovating university research facilities, said Terry Hartle, senior vice president for the American Council on Education. Public colleges and universities also will be eligible for money meant to bolster state budgets during the recession.

Spending Adv. – Impact – Russia Module (2/3)

Higher education key to US-Russia relations

Dresen and Klump 8 (F. Joseph and Sarah D., Program Assoc. at Kennan Inst., Researcher for the Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic\_id=1424/&fuseaction=topics.event\_summary&event\_id=470500) GAT

On September 18, the Kennan Institute held a seminar to assess United States-Russian relations through the scope of cooperation in higher education and research. Seminar panelists discussed cooperation in the humanities and social sciences as well as in the natural and physical sciences. Blair A. Ruble, who co-chaired the seminar along with Harley Balzer, began by noting that during a time of escalating difficulty in U.S.-Russian relations, this seminar underscores an aspect of the relationship that is often overlooked. Education and science, he observed, has served as a basis for collaboration and contact between the U.S. and Russia since before the collapse of the Soviet Union. In discussing U.S.-Russian cooperation in the humanities and social sciences, panelists recounted the accomplishments of U.S.-Russian partnerships since 1991 and identified various challenges to and possibilities for such partnerships moving forward. Mark Johnson stated that U.S.-Russian cooperation in the humanities has been mutually beneficial and has continued to offset tension in other areas, as it did during the Cold War. Robert Huber explained how partnerships have worked to identify needs in the Russian system that had not been previously defined, such as sustaining social science knowledge and defining disciplines. Addressing these needs has engendered the growth of a social science community. Johnson also noted how programs like the Centers for Advanced Study and Education (CASE) have helped the Russian system recognize the benefits of linking research and teaching, resulting in more competitive, interdisciplinary research as well as higher quality education.  According to Huber, however, there are also weaknesses in U.S.-Russian partnerships. A desire on the part of Russian partners to please American donors, he stated, interferes with attempts at genuine participation in partnership programs. Panelists agreed that the current model of cooperation is no longer sustainable due to a decrease in funding from American assistance programs.

US-Russia relations are key to containing the threats of terrorism and proliferation

Ellsworth 3 (Robert F., Fmr. US ambassador to NATO, http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/Program%20Briefs/interim%20report%20final%20complete.pdf ) GAT

The public reconciliation of Presidents Bush and Putin in St. Petersburg and at the G-8 Summit in Evian has fostered the impression that all is well in the U.S.-Russian relationship.  This is a dangerous misimpression.  The U.S.-Russian dispute over Iraq exposed conflicts in the U.S.-Russian relationship and even cracks in its foundation that must be addressed to advance vital American interests. The tragic attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon rapidly crystallized American thinking about the interrelated threats of terrorism and proliferation.  Containing these threats has become the principal aim of U.S. foreign policy.  Today’s Russia can play a major role in advancing this aim—or in undermining it.  The combination of Russia’s size and strategic location; its relationships with, intelligence about and access to key countries; its arsenal of nuclear and other weapons and technologies; its enormous energy resources; and its ability to facilitate or block action by the United Nations Security Council places Moscow among America’s most important potential partners.  Fortunately, the interests America and Russia share greatly outweigh the interests that divide us.  Nevertheless, even before the dispute over Iraq, lingering resentment on both sides was undermining the relationship.  Russian opposition to one of the most significant American foreign policy initiatives of the last decade raised further questions and must be correctly understood not simply to avoid further problems, but also to get the most out of the U.S.-Russian relationship. Many Russians now believe that Moscow’s opposition to U.S. policy toward Iraq was a strategic blunder.  It also reflects shortcomings in America’s approach, however, including the delay in deepening the U.S.-Russian relationship, the concomitant absence of equities that would have encouraged Moscow to accommodate U.S. preferences, and the undisciplined pursuit of contradictory policies. Moving forward requires that Russian officials understand that the United States has been making a special effort to develop bilateral relations and that obstructionist conduct on key U.S. priorities is not cost-free.  It also requires a review of the U.S.-Russian relationship and the development of more reliable means to advance American interests within it and through it

Spending Adv. – Impact – Russia Module (3/3)

Proliferation is the greatest existential threat to the US – it’s a decision rule

Miller 2 (James D., Assistant. Prof. of Econ. at Smith College, http://old.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-miller012302.shtml) GAT

The U.S. should use whatever means necessary to stop our enemies from gaining the ability to kill millions of us. We should demand that countries like Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea make no attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction. We should further insist on the right to make surprise inspections of these countries to insure that they are complying with our proliferation policy. What if these nations refuse our demands? If they refuse we should destroy their industrial capacity and capture their leaders. True, the world's cultural elites would be shocked and appalled if we took preventive military action against countries that are currently doing us no harm. What is truly shocking, however, is that America is doing almost nothing while countries that have expressed hatred for us are building weapons of mass destruction. France and Britain allowed Nazi Germany's military power to grow until Hitler was strong enough to take Paris. America seems to be doing little while many of our foes acquire the strength to destroy U.S. cities. We can't rely upon deterrence to prevent an atomic powered dictator from striking at us. Remember, the Nazi's killed millions of Jews even though the Holocaust took resources away from their war effort. As September 11th also shows, there exist evil men in the world who would gladly sacrifice all other goals for the opportunity to commit mass murder. The U.S. should take not even the slightest unnecessary chance that some dictator, perhaps a dying Saddam Hussein, would be willing to give up his life for the opportunity to hit America with nuclear missiles. Once a dictator has the ability to hit a U.S., or perhaps even a European city, with atomic weapons it will be too late for America to pressure him to give up his weapons. His ability to hurt us will effectively put him beyond our military reach. Our conventional forces might even be made impotent by a nuclear-armed foe. Had Iraq possessed atomic weapons, for example, we would probably have been unwilling to expel them from Kuwait. What about the rights of those countries I have proposed threatening? America should not even pretend to care about the rights of dictators. In the 21st century the only leaders whom we should recognize as legitimate are those who were democratically elected. The U.S. should reinterpret international law to give no rights to tyrants, not even the right to exist. We should have an ethically based foreign policy towards democratic countries. With dictatorships, however, we should be entirely Machiavellian; we should deal with them based upon what is in our own best interests. It's obviously in our self-interest to prevent as many dictators as possible from acquiring the means to destroy us. We shouldn't demand that China abandon her nuclear weapons. This is not because China has proved herself worthy to have the means of mass annihilation, but rather because her existing stockpile of atomic missiles would make it too costly for us to threaten China. It's too late to stop the Chinese from gaining the ability to decimate us, but for the next ten years or so it is not too late to stop some of our other rivals. If it's politically impossible for America to use military force against currently non-hostile dictators then we should use trade sanctions to punish nations who don't agree to our proliferation policy. Normal trade sanctions, however, do not provide the punishing power necessary to induce dictators to abandon their arms. If we simply don't trade with a nation other countries will sell them the goods that we used to provide. To make trade sanctions an effective weapon the U.S. needs to deploy secondary boycotts. America should create a treaty, the signatories of which would agree to: · only trade with countries which have signed the treaty, and · not trade with any country which violates our policy on weapons proliferation. I believe that if only the U.S. and, say, Germany initially signed this treaty then nearly every other country would be forced to do so. For example, if France did not sign, they would be unable to trade with the U.S. or Germany. This would obviously be intolerable to France. Once the U.S., Germany and France adopted the treaty every European nation would have to sign or face a total economic collapse. The more countries which sign the treaty, the greater the pressure on other countries to sign. Once most every country has signed, any country which violated America's policy on weapons proliferation would face almost a complete economic boycott. Under this approach, the U.S. and Germany alone could use our economic power to dictate the enforcement mechanism of a treaty designed to protect against Armageddon. Even the short-term survival of humanity is in doubt. The greatest threat of extinction surely comes from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. America should refocus her foreign policy to prioritize protecting us all from atomic, biological, and chemical weapons.

**Canadian JTF Adv. – 1AC – Uniqueness and I/L**

Canada is increasing funding to the Joint Task Force – but PMCs kill the force

Spearin 8 (Chris, Political Science at University of British Colombia, Canadian Military Journal, http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo8/no1/spearin-eng.asp)JFS

In the 21st Century, despite a history of ad hoc reactions and indifference, Canada has certainly entered the elite ranks of the world’s Special Operations Forces (SOF) community.1 The December 2001 federal budget allocated an additional C$119 million to Joint Task Force 2 (JTF 2), Canada’s Tier One SOF organization, in order to double its capacity by increasing its ranks to as many as 600 frontline personnel. JTF 2’s traditional counter terrorism responsibilities, or “black” operations, have grown alongside “green” operations (i.e., direct action and unconventional warfare missions) in countries such as Afghanistan. Additionally, in January 2006, the government announced the creation of a 750-strong special operations regiment to conduct Tier Two/Tier Three-type SOF activities. Complementing all of these developments was the standing up, on 1 February 2006, of the Canadian Special Operations Force Command, with responsibility to conduct either supported or supporting operations. As a result, SOF personnel arguably have become the Canadian Forces’ (CF) fourth service.

Now that Canada, through its financial commitments, military operations, and personnel increases, has identified the important contribution of SOF, the challenge will be twofold: to maintain a robust SOF capability in a relatively small military and to massage a variety of concerns likely to be held by the army, the navy, and the air force regarding “the new kid on the block.” Unfortunately, these challenges will likely be heightened by the increased attractiveness of this more prominent and larger SOF pool to international private security companies (PSCs).2 Currently, the United States and the United Kingdom, even with their larger force structures, are feeling the strain caused by the drain of SOF expertise to the private sector. In Iraq alone, there are some 20,000 PSC employees, and a significant number of them possess SOF experience. This number reflects anecdotal assertions that Iraqi PSC service constitutes the largest reunion of American SOF personnel in history, and that there are more former British Special Air Service (SAS) personnel in Iraq than there are those currently serving in uniform.3 As for the CF, though official numbers have not been released, it has already lost valuable SOF personnel, thus reinforcing the CF view that, “[t]he world-renowned reputation of JTF 2 as a SOF...unit has drawn attention from many of these security firms.”4

This article will assert that augmented attention will continue, due to the SOF-focus of many PSCs, and the fact that there are considerable political and military limitations in formulating a Canadian response. Although the CF can utilize some means to overcome these limitations, those means are not likely to be entirely satisfactory. Therefore, the article will suggest further that an additional appropriate measure would be for the government to lobby the United States for support, given its heavy influence upon the international private security industry.

Canadian JTF Adv. – 1AC – Soft Power Scenario (1/2)

Scenario 1 is Soft Power

Canadian influence high now, but it’s fragile

Troope 7(Stephen Chancellor of UBC (Canada) “A Century Later, Aspiring to Global Influence” UBC Report Dec. 6)JFS

In the latter half of the 20th century Canada emerged as one of the world’s most successful societies, noted for its broadly shared commitment to social inclusion, its embracing of cultural diversity, its robust economy, and its strong public finances. Yet these successes are fragile, and could be undermined in the short term by Canada’s under-performance in social, economic, scientific and cultural innovation. Already, Canada’s performance on the measures of social development and productivity is falling in comparison to OECD leaders.

The JTF is key to Canadian influence internationally

Spearin 8 (Chris, Political Science at University of British Colombia, Canadian Military Journal, http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo8/no1/spearin-eng.asp)JFS

Clearly, a reduced Canadian SOF capability, despite hoped-for expansion, would pose several difficulties at different levels. As Colonel Horn observes: “Properly used, small, highly trained specialized units can give even a small state a deterrent power and military and political influence far in excess of that which the simply physical size of its armed forces might suggest.”17 Limited capabilities, therefore, would constrain Canada’s ability to contribute to a “SOF War” and thus have influence regarding policy. It would similarly reduce political capital Canada might accrue from other countries, particularly the United States.18

What is more, limited Canadian SOF abilities would restrict the particular activism of Canada’s executive branch of government. The increased centralization of government in Canada has long been noted, and, as identified by analysts such as Cohen and Deborah Avant, the manner by which the political control of violence is managed can further alter the distribution of power amongst governing institutions.19 In the particular case of SOF, because of the secrecy that often surrounds their operations and how they frequently relate directly to the achievement of strategic objectives, those in the highest echelons of government become the focus. Indeed, analysis of past operations finds that decisions to employ Canadian SOF helpfully work to deter criticism of government policy emanating domestically or internationally.20 However, the political elasticity of Canadian SOF would become brittle because of an increased brain/brawn drain to the private sector.

Canadian soft power allows for international conflict resolution, means that aff impacts won’t escalate

Marriot and Carment, 3 (Koren, Worked with the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy project as a researcher, and David, Director of the Centre for Security and Defence Studies at Carleton University and Associate Professor at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, “Conflict Prevention in Canada: A Survey of Canadian Conflict Prevention Professionals”, September)

The overriding theme that appeared in several of the responses was that Canada should support the work of international and regional organizations. UNICEF stated that by using soft power, “Canada is in a strong position to champion international laws and treaties through the UN and other regional and international bodies”. CUSO’s response reflected similar views, stating; “Canada is respected internationally for being a promoter of peace and human security, and should continue this role. It should continue to work within multi-lateral frameworks, including the UN, ensuring rule of law is adhered to in all its conflict prevention and interventions. Canada should support the reform of the UN in order to make it a more effective international body capable of effecting positive change in today's world. Canada should be more active in ensuring that people around the world share equitably in its resources. Canada should promote human rights and democratic development in all its international dealings including in trade and development.” Theresa Dunn expressed a related opinion, saying she believes Canada is strategically placed to become a leader in conflict prevention through its role as peace builder and often impartial agent. She went on to say that because of Canada’s size and commitment to conflict resolution through collaboration “we are able to move internationally with knowledge and expertise”. These views are fairly representative of a major portion of the responses received.

Canadian JTF Adv. – 1AC – Soft Power Scenario (2/2)

Canadian soft power key to solve Indo-Pak conflict

Axworthy 3, (Thomas, Chair of Asia-pacific foundation of Canada, National Post, www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2003/9/24\_1.html)JFS

Asia is the most dangerous place in the world. With Americans dying daily in Iraq; the Bush road map for Israel and Palestine in tatters; and the ghostly visage of Osama bin Laden broadcast to the world by al-Jazeera on the second anniversary of Sept. 11, threatening all of us with even worse horrors; it may be difficult to fathom that the greatest threats to peace and security reside outside the Middle East. But in this league of infamy, Asia leads the first division. The six-nation talks with North Korea, for example, have ended with no discernible progress and North Korea moving at full speed to expand its nuclear arsenal. Everything that George Bush went to war to prevent in Iraq is occurring irrefutably in North Korea: There a rogue regime has starved hundreds of thousands of its own citizens, attacked its neighbours, built a nuclear bomb, and trafficked with terrorists. North Korea is the world's most deadly problem. Right behind is the situation in Pakistan. The Pakistani intelligence service helped invent the Taliban; Islamists are honeycombed within the intelligence service and the armed forces. Pakistan has also developed nuclear weapons to protect itself in the 50-year conflict with India over Kashmir. Terrorists can either spark outrages in India hoping to bring about Armageddon in a nuclear war between India and Pakistan, or Islamists could promote a coup in Pakistan itself, putting a Taliban-style regime in power in Islamabad. The regime of President Pervez Musharraf presides over one of the world's most turbulent countries, and if you thought the Taliban in Afghanistan was a problem, what about if a similarly motivated group had its thumb on a nuclear trigger? In this Asian cauldron of animosity, one optimistic possibility is the emergence of a peaceful, engaged China. The Middle Kingdom has been the dominant player in Asia for 5,000 years, and in our time it has been a key ally of both North Korea and Pakistan. We are witnessing in the early years of the 21st century a China that is systematically turning away from the isolation and madness of the cultural revolution of Mao towards an engagement with its neighbours. This engagement is primarily economic. China's ascension to the World Trade Organization is of the utmost importance, but it is also strategic with China participating in the six-nation negotiations with North Korea. Encouraging China to take a constructive role in its own region is in the interests of us all. Canada might be able to play a small part in this engagement strategy. The National Post has recently run a foreign policy series with much debate about the utility of "hard views" and "soft power." Of course, you need both, and we need to invest more in both elements of power if we are to play a role in the world. With China, Canada does have some unique soft power assets.

Indo-Pak conflict escalates to global nuclear war

Fai 1 (Ghulam Nabi Washington Times)

The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crowned with a unilateral veto power) to aggressive involvement at the vortex. The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The director of central intelligence, the Defense Department, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention. The boiling witches' brew in Kashmir should propel the United States to assertive facilitation or mediation of Kashmir negotiations. The impending July 14-16 summit in New Delhi between President Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee featuring Kashmir on the agenda does not justify complacency.

Canadian JTF Adv. – 1AC – I-Law Module

Increased Canadian international influence spreads its respect for international law

Santarpia, 2004 (LCdr B.W, Master of Defence Studies at Canadian Forces College Taking the Fight to the Enemy: Terrorism and the Case for a Canadian Forces Expeditionary Orientation Syndicate 1/Groupe d’études 1 29 April)

Another important link between altruistic and self-interested agendas is their ultimate effect on the world.  The ultimate goal of the altruistic agenda is the betterment of the lives of the world's less fortunate citizens.  That betterment is contingent upon a more secure environment for them to pursue their own agendas and coincidently stability is an important goal of the national self-interest agenda.  A clear example of the crossover of altruism and self-interest exists with Canada's support for international law.  Most Canadians inherently believe that Canada should work to ensure that every person is treated fairly in accordance with the law.  At the same time a worldwide respect for the conventions of international law is essential to the stability of the world both inside and outside of Canada.  As a country of immigrants, including 579,600 Muslims, Canada would benefit from the perception that justice meted out to suspected terrorists was fair and based on international law.  Without a significant contribution to the war on terror, however, Canada will have no say in the form that the justice takes.  Equally, a worldwide respect for the legitimacy and efficacy of international law would serve Canada and Canadian citizens working abroad.

Fill in any I-Law impacts from the I-Law Advantage…

Canadian JTF Adv. – 1AC – Quebec Scenario (1/3)

Canadian soft power is key to prevent a Quebec secession

Choudhry ‘7 (Faculty of Law and Department of Political Science @ the University of Toronto, Sujit, “Does the World Need More Canada? The Politics of the Canadian Model in Constitutional Politics and Political Theory”, Forthcoming, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 19-22, http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/uploadedFiles/FLOERSHEIMER/Does%20the%20World%20Need%20More%20Canada%20paper%20draft%203.pdf)

A sub-literature assumed that Canada was doomed, and that the country should turn to the difficult question of how secession could occur. Issues such as the debt, borders, citizenship, the rights of aboriginal peoples, the nature of the economic and political relationship between Canada and an independent Quebec, as well as the process of those negotiations (who would participate, what would be the nature of public involvement) were debated at countless conferences and workshops. Again, the titles tell much of the story. Books such as The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada; The Referendum Papers: Essays on Secession and National Unity; Two Nations, One Money?; Closing the Books: Dividing Federal Assets and Debt if Canada Breaks Up; Broken Links: Trade Relations after a Quebec Secession; Negotiating with a Sovereign Quebec; Tangled Web: Legal Aspects of Deconfederation; Dividing the House: Planning for a Canada Without Quebec; The Partition Principle: Remapping Quebec after Separation; Dual Independence: The Birth of a New Canada and the Re-birth of Lower Canada; Beyond Quebec: Taking Stock of Canada; Economic Dimensions of Constitutional Change; If Quebec Goes … The Real Costs of Separation; Plan B: The Future of the Rest of Canada; Québec-Canada: What Is the Path Ahead?; and most poignantly Can Canada Survive? Under What Terms and Conditions? Turned to the grim task of grappling with these questions. 71 In an important respect, English Canada was catching up with Quebec, which had before long turned its mind to the modalities of secession. In the wake of the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, the Quebec government struck the Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec. One of the commission’s principal contributions to public debate within the province was in the form of a large number of original research studies which examined both the substance and process of Quebec secession. Moreover, these studies received widespread media coverage, and were debated widely in the national press. In fact, a large reason for the surge in interest in English Canada was precisely the fact that these issues had been discussed in Quebec for a long time. There are two important questions which need to be answered. The first is why Canada was in constitutional crisis for much of the 1990’s, and more precisely, what the exact character of the Canadian constitutional crisis was. I turn to this issue below. The20second is what the connection was between this debate – in which the future prospects for Canada looked dim indeed – and the rise of the Canadian model. The book titles listed above illustrate that the discussion over Canada’s future and the mechanics of taking it apart were far from marginal. On the contrary, they were at the very centre of academic and political discourse. Indeed, the country seemed to be able to talk about little else. And no Canadian could ever forget the near dissolution of the federation in 1995. So it is inconceivable that the proponents of the Canadian model could have been unaware of it. On the contrary, what I want to suggest is that many proponents of the Canadian model not only recognized the crisis gripping the Canadian constitutional order, but viewed the international promotion of the Canadian model as an important element in resolving problems at home. This link was first made by Pierre Trudeau, in an essay published in 1962, long before the near constitutional collapse of the 1990’s.72 In it, Trudeau responds to the case made by supporters of Quebec independence that every nation must necessarily have a state, by arguing that Canadian federalism should be preserved as something precious. For Trudeau, part of the reason for retaining multinational federalism is not only that it is right for Canada, but also that it is right for the world. Canadians should strive to ensure the survival of Canada so it can serve as an international role model, as a city on the hill, for countries facing the same linguistic and ethno national divisions which led to creation of the Canadian model in the first place. He writes:73It would seem, in fact, a matter of considerable urgency for world peace and the success of the new states that the form of good government known as democratic federalism should be perfected and promoted, in the hope of solving to some extent the world-wide problems of ethnic pluralism. …Canada should be called upon to serve as mentor, provided she has seen enough to conceive her own future on a grand scale. … Canada could become the envied seat of a form of federalism that belongs to tomorrow’s world. … Canadian federalism is an experiment of major proportions; it could become a brilliant prototype for the moulding of tomorrow’s civilization. To be clear, Trudeau is doing much more than highlighting a positive, incidental side effect to the success of the Canadian model. Rather, he makes the stronger claim that Canada’s success matters internationally because other countries face similar problems to Canada’s, and Canada’s potential influence as an international role model should serve not only as a21source of pride to Canadians, but also as a reason for Canadians to make its constitutional arrangements work. These themes were picked up and further developed nearly thirty years later by Charles Taylor.74 In an essay published in 1991, Taylor argues that Canada’s constitutional difficulties were traceable to the clash between two different visions of citizenship – one, captured and fuelled by the Charter, in which citizens consider themselves as bearers of constitutional rights and as equal members in the Canadian political community, unmediated by membership in any intermediate provincial political communities, and another, in which Quebecers view their membership in the Canadian political community as flowing from their membership in a constituent nation of Canada. For Taylor, the solution is to reject a model of uniform citizenship, and instead to opt for “deep diversity” as “the only formula on which a united federal Canada can be rebuilt”.75 But the case for deep diversity goes beyond Canada, because “in many parts of the world today the degree and nature of the differences resemble those of Canada” and so “the world needs other models to be legitimated in order to allow for more humane and less constraining modes of political cohabitation”.76 So Canada “would do our own and some other peoples a favour by exploring the space of deepdiversity”.77 After the failure of the Charlottetown Accord, and the near miss in the 1995referendum, Taylor continued to press the same themes, albeit with a greater sense of urgency and an acute awareness of the peril which Canada faced.78 Thus, “the principal threat” to Canada’s existence “comes from a problem which is in a sense everyone’s in this day and age” – that there are many more nations than states, that it would be impossible for each nation to have its own state, and so there needs to be some way for national groups to exist within the same state.79 “Canada’s inability to solve this problem, after what seemed like a promising start in favourable conditions, naturally causes consternation, and depressed spirits, abroad”, Taylor continues.80 If the Canadian model cannot work in Canada, it cannot work in circumstances which are far more difficult. Canada needs to try to make it work for the sake of the world. This is political theory doubling as constitutional therapy. So arguing for the success of the Canadian model was not just an academic endeavour. It was a political intervention in two different but interrelated arenas. It was an intervention in international politics, to offer a practical, viable model to deal with the issues of minority nationalism that were a source of political instability in ECE and beyond. It was also an intervention in domestic constitutional politics, to argue that Canada had hit upon one of the few workable solutions to the accommodation of minority nationalism within a liberal22democratic constitutional order. And there were multiple links between the two agendas. There was the argument made by Trudeau and Taylor, that Canada should make its constitutional arrangements work to help other countries. Foreign observers have often made this point. Charles Doran, writing on why Canadian unity matters to America, states that the “failure of the Canadian federal experiment … does not bode well for the ability of their democracies to establish political harmony among their own regional communities”, while conversely, success in Canada “will help to preserve democratic pluralism worldwide”.81Kofi Annan and Mikhail Gorbachev’s public interventions in the Canadian national unity debate demonstrate how important the success of the Canadian model was to the international community struggling with the destructive potential of nationalism. There are other links between the domestic and international political agendas. The promotion of the Canadian model abroad should be understood, at least in part, as an attempt to buttress support for the Canadian model at home, by instilling national pride. I think this is the way to make sense of the increasing prominence of the Canadian model in foreign policy. Canadian politicians have sought to place the Canadian model at the heart of Canadian foreign policy, by serving as a pillar of development assistance to deeply divided societies. The previous Liberal government’s International Policy Statement stated that development assistance should be focused on a few key areas, including the promotion of good governance, with “Canada’s commitment … to a federal system that accommodates diversity” as part of that agenda.82 Liberal MP Michael Ignatieff, in a speech to the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in 2004, stated that Canada has “more institutional memory about the legislative and legal requirements for the accommodation of linguistic and religious diversity than any other mature democracy in the world” and has a “comparative advantage in the politics of managing divided societies”, and should translate its institutional experience into advice for other countries struggling with similar issues.83Part of the motivation, no doubt, is to increase Canada’s influence abroad. Promoting the Canadian <CONTINUED>

Canadian JTF Adv. – 1AC – Quebec Scenario (2/3)

<CONTINUED>

model is an exercise in what Joseph Nye has termed soft power, whereby a country “may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness.”84Jennifer Welsh has written that simply being a bilingual, federal state should be regarded as a core element of Canadian foreign policy.85 But there is a domestic agenda at work as well. As the prestige of the Canadian model is enhanced abroad, so too is its prestige at home. This convergence of the domestic and the international is best summed up by the phrase used by a leading Canadian bookseller to promote Canadian literature, “The World Needs More Canada” – the marketing pitch being that the international reputation of Canadian authors is an additional reason for Canadians to value that work.

Quebec secession destroys U.S. leadership

Lamont, ‘94 (Lansing, Time Correspondent, Breakup, p. 229)

Most assuredly, the United States would lose a valued ally in an increasingly turbulent world, would see the North American partnership weakened and future relations with Canada cast in doubt. The United States would also confront to its north a prickly new nation of Quebec with dubious allegiances and an uncertain course. Canada's dissolution, if it comes, would not present the same dangers it might have twenty years ago when the separatists first came to power in Quebec. Then, the loss of a united Canada would have been a strategic blow to the Western alliance as it sought to maintain a solid front against Soviet expansion. The end of the Cold War has reduced the military dangers of a northern breakup, just as free trade has mitigated the economic perils. But the rupture of Canada would still put at risk many of America's commercial and continental defense arrangements, while entailing substantial costs to its export economy and foreign policy . Canada's relia­bility as our closest NATO and North American stalwart would be the first big casualty. No superpower like America can give full focus to, and effectively exercise, its worldwide leadership responsibilities with insecurity or turmoil in its backyard. Over the long term, a wounded Canada would act less boldly and swiftly in North America 's interests, and would take fewer risks in the international arena. U.S. designs in the hemisphere-for more dependable security structures in Central America arid the Caribbean, say, or for more durable democracies in the southern cone- would be that much more difficult to accomplish without Canada's committed support. A fractured Canada would gradually lose its international Boy Scout image, which U.S. diplomats have found immeasurably helpful. When America has wished some other power to take the lead on initiatives where U.S. credibility was weak, it has frequently used Canada as a stalking horse because, as one U.S. diplomat put it, 'They can do things that we can't."

Impact to US leadership

Canadian JTF Adv. – 1AC – Quebec Scenario (3/3)

****Quebec secession destroys NORAD.****

**Lamont, 1994** (Lansing, Time Correspondent and President of American Trust for the British Library, Breakup, p. 236)

America's foremost concern, however, would be the impact of a diminished Canada on continental security, the fact that Washington regards uninhibited access to Canadian territory, airspace, and waters as critical to U.S. defense. An independent, territorially sensitive Quebec could seriously complicate continental security arrangements affecting the use of its airspace, landing, and refueling privileges, the status of NORAD francophone units in Quebec, and the free flow of international shipping through the Quebec end of the St. Lawrence Seaway. The disbanding and relocation to Canada of its Armed Forces based in Quebec, for instance, would cause considerable disarray in Canada's operational effectiveness and its ability to meet its NORAD obligation s. A compromised tripartite NORAD command, including Quebec, would hardly appeal to the Pentagon, but remains a distinct possibility. Of graver import would be the will and capability of Canada itself to continue supporting the North American defense structure. With its ongoing debt crisis, its traditional aversion to U.S. military initiatives, and the fading of the Soviet threat, Canada might reduce even further its NORAD and NATO commitments .

NORAD prevents accidental launch   
CIMBALA, ’99 (STEPHEN J, professor of political science at the Pennsylvania State University Delaware County Campus, ARMED FORCES & SOCIETY, Vol. 25, No. 4)

A second requirement for the avoidance of accidental/inadvertent war is the validity of warning and attack assessment. Leaders must have confidence that they can distinguish between false and true warnings of attack. They must also expect, once received valid warning of attack, that they will have time to respond appropriately. U.S. nuclear warning and attack assessment evolved during the Cold War into a tightly coupled system of warning sensors, analysis and fusion centers, communications links, commanders, and command posts. The nerve center of U.S. Cold War warning and assessment was NORAD, located in an underground and hardened shelter complex at Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. Even after the Cold War, NORAD is the chef d'oeuvre of the elaborate U.S. warning system for surprise attack.

An accidental launch causes retaliatory strikes and extinction within half an hour

The American Prospect, 2/26/01 (Newspaper, Lexis)JFS

The bitter disputes over national missile defense (NMD) have obscured a related but dramatically more urgent issue of national security: the 4,800 nuclear warheads -- weapons with a combined destructive power nearly 100,000 times greater than the atomic bomb that leveled Hiroshima -- currently on "hair-trigger" alert. Hair-trigger alert means this: The missiles carrying those warheads are armed and fueled at all times. Two thousand or so of these warheads are on the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) targeted by Russia at the United States; 1,800 are on the ICBMs targeted by the United States at Russia; and approximately 1,000 are on the submarine-based missiles targeted by the two nations at each other. These missiles would launch on receipt of three computer-delivered messages. Launch crews -- on duty every second of every day -- are under orders to send the messages on receipt of a single computer-delivered command. In no more than two minutes, if all went according to plan, Russia or the United States could launch missiles at predetermined targets: Washington or New York; Moscow or St. Petersburg. The early-warning systems on which the launch crews rely would detect the other side's missiles within tens of seconds, causing the intended -- or accidental -- enemy to mount retaliatory strikes. "Within a half-hour, there could be a nuclear war that would extinguish all of us," explains Bruce Blair. "It would be, basically, a nuclear war by checklist, by rote."

Canadian JTF Adv. – 1AC – Arctic Conflict

Scenario 2 is Arctic Conflict

Now is key to solve the Arctic conflict – the arms race is happening now

Rogers 3/2(Walter Rogers, a former senior international correspondent for CNN. Christian Science Monitor. “War over the Arctic? Global warming skeptics distract us from security risks.”. March 2, 2010. [http://www.csmonitor.com/ Commentary/Walter-Rodgers/ 2010/0302/War-over-the-Arctic- Global-warming-skeptics- distract-us-from-security- risks](http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Walter-Rodgers/2010/0302/War-over-the-Arctic-Global-warming-skeptics-distract-us-from-security-risks))

This defiance of science isn’t just harmful for the environment. It’s also distracting us from growing threats to US national security. Actual – not theoretical – effects of climate change are turning the Arctic into a potential military flash point.

Expected melting of summer sea ice in the Arctic Ocean means greatly expanded access to increasingly scarce fossil fuels. It also means tensions over Arctic real estate. What the Middle East was to the second half of the 20th century, the Arctic could be to the first half of the 21st. Because America has been so slow to wake up to climate change, it’s lagging behind in protecting its Arctic interests.

“Since 1995 we have lost 40 percent of the North Pole’s icecap,” said Professor Robert Huebert, of the University of Calgary and an adviser to the Canadian government. Mr. Huebert and other experts spoke at a recent conference on climate change security risks hosted by the Center for National Policy. “It is not a matter of if, but when, the ice will be gone,” he said.

Moscow gets this, even if the US public does not. “The Arctic must become Russia’s main strategic resource base,” Nikolai Patrushev, the secretary of the Russian Security Council, declared last year. “It cannot be ruled out that the battle for raw materials will be waged by military means,” a Russian planning document has warned.

Partially because of years of climate change denial, “the United States remains largely asleep at the wheel,” according to a Foreign Affairs article last March by Scott Borgerson, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Meanwhile, other Arctic nations are moving to muscularly stake their sovereignty claims while prospecting for hundreds of billions of dollars of treasure buried on the ocean floor up there.

Major melting has spurred Russia, Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), and Norway into a new gold rush, except this time it’s about staking claim to huge reservoirs of natural gas, petroleum, and untold deposits of minerals previously inaccessible because of the polar ice shield. Much of the sub-sea Arctic wealth will of necessity be transported by ships because thawing tundra will be too unstable for pipelines. The South Koreans anticipated this more than a decade ago, building giant vessels to secure a big share of the shipping market.

The US and other Arctic nations are meeting this month to discuss Arctic sovereignty. Previous summits have included agreements to act responsibly and peacefully as the polar icecap recedes, but nearly all nations involved are rearming militarily to defend their sovereignty. “We are already in an Arctic arms race,” Huebert says. “The year 2010 in the Arctic is akin to 1935 in Europe.” Russia is building military bases on the Arctic coast and has 10,000 troops deployed near its northern border to assert its expanding claims.

Arctic conflict amounts to a nuclear war between the US and Russia

Buckley in ‘8(Dr. Adele Buckley, Vice President Technology and Research at the Ontario Centre for Environmental Technology Advancement. Canadian Pugwash Group. July 11, 2008. [http://www.gsinstitute.org/ pnnd/events/Pugwash2008/pres\_ Buckley.pdf](http://www.gsinstitute.org/pnnd/events/Pugwash2008/pres_Buckley.pdf))JFS

The polar ice that envelops the high Arctic is melting at a rate even faster than anticipated by climate change scientists. Providing an equitable regime to govern the results of these unprecedented challenges will require a high degree of global cooperation. With the opening of Arctic waters, and then opening of shipping lanes, comes the potential for economic gains in international trade and the search for seabed oil and gas and other resources. There is guaranteed territorial jurisdiction within the 200-nautical-mile limit, but elsewhere nations are taking measures to assure national access, rights and, in some cases, sovereignty over portions of the seabed. Security strategy will dictate the deployment of an increased military capability. Territorial claims and counter claims will be a source of tension that could degenerate into open conflict. Naval operations1 of both Russia and the United States will increase when there are open waters, creating a potential for military confrontation, especially because both have nuclear-armed submarines. The Arctic regions are host to the two major nuclear powers, and nowhere else are they in such close proximity to each other. There exists a potential for additional nuclearization, for both sea and land. Prudence suggests that nuclearization must diminish and sooner, rather than later; there must be no role for nuclear weapons in the Arctic (as it is now in the Antarctic). Nuclear weapons overtly stationed in the region present a multi-faceted danger to the Arctic lands and peoples, and, before it is too late, preventive measures must be taken. So while this issue may, at first, seem peripheral to adaptation to the new Arctic climate, it is actually central to the Arctic security environment.

Canadian JTF Adv. – 1AC – Arctic Conflict

Russia-US war leads to extinction

Bostrom 2 [Nick, Oxford philosophy faculty, “Published in the Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, March, <http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html>]JFS

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that *might* have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[[4]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html" \l "_ftn4" \o ")  Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently.

British Special Forces Adv. (1/3)

PMCs recruit directly from the SAS --- incentives them to quit for higher salaries in private military sector

Jennings 4 (Special forces quitting to cash in on Iraq, CHRISTIAN JENNINGS, The Scotsmen, Feb 21, 2004) http://www.sandline.com/hotlinks/Scotsman\_Spec-forces.html

BRITAIN’S elite special forces are facing an imminent crisis because record numbers of men are asking to leave their units early, lured by high wages on offer in a growing security industry in Iraq. Defence and special forces sources have told The Scotsman that such is the demand from private military companies in Britain and the United States who are operating in Iraq for former Special Air Service and Special Boat Service soldiers that, between May 2003 and December 2004, between 40 and 60 men are expected to have sought premature voluntary release, or PVR, from the army and Royal Marines. In operational terms, this could mean that this year, the equivalent of one entire special forces squadron out of a total of six in the SAS and SBS is on its way to seek its fortune in the new sIraq. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, anti-terrorism deployments in Europe, training commitments abroad as well as the need to have one entire SAS squadron of 65 men and one SBS unit of 20 men permanently on anti-terrorism standby in the UK, means that Britain’s special forces are very thinly stretched. British, US and South African private military companies are all making money in Iraq following the fall of Saddam Hussein last year. Former elite troops from the SAS and SBS, the US’s Delta Force, Navy SEALs and Green Berets, South Africa’s special forces and police, as well as ex-French Foreign Legionnaires, are queuing up to take up contracts safeguarding oil installations, as bodyguards or training the Iraqi police and army. In particular demand are former members of Britain’s special forces. "Security companies want ex-Brit SF [special forces] because they have the most amazing history," said John Davidson, who runs Rubicon International, a British security company whose interests in Iraq include contracts with BP and Motorola. "The SAS are extremely well-trained, low-profile, not waving flags. They go about things in a quiet manner, they are the crême de la crême," added Mr Davidson, an 11-year veteran of Britain’s special forces. An SAS captain serving in the regular regiment, 22 SAS, can earn up to £40-45,000 per year, with various allowances, while a junior sergeant or senior corporal can earn £30,000 per annum. Such is the demand for the security skills of former SAS NCOs and officers in Iraq that pre-tax pay can range from £200 to £700 per day. To leave his unit, any member of the British armed forces can request a PVR from his commanding officer, although the request can be turned down and the move blocked. In addition to men asking to leave the SAS prematurely, another 24 SAS soldiers trained in amphibious warfare will now be detached each year from the SAS to the SBS. Combined with the PVR requests, this could leave the Hereford-based 22 Special Air Service Regiment potentially depleted by nearly a quarter of its strength. Special forces soldiers cost up to £2 million each to train, and all must be chosen from men who have already served for several years in their parent units. Less than 20 men a year pass out into the regiment. This latest development puts pressure on the current commanding officer of 22 SAS, a decorated lieutenant colonel from the Irish Guards, either to lower the standards for entry to the unit or allow younger, less experienced soldiers to apply. To make up this shortfall, some 60 men from two Territorial Army special forces units, 21 and 23 SAS, are said to have been operating in Afghanistan.The Ministry of Defence said last night that it did not make comments specific to special forces.

British Special Forces Adv. (2/3)

PMCs kill British special forces – in the status quo the best 1/6th of the forces leave

Isenberg 4 (David BASIC RESEARCH REPORT September http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2004PMC2 TBC 6/25/10)

Similarly, British officials say more than 300 soldiers have left the armed forces in six months to take up lucrative jobs with private companies such as Olive Security, Armour Security, Global and USDID.61 In particular, the demand from PMCs operating in Iraq for former Special Air Service and Special Boat Service soldiers is such that between May 2003 and December 2004, between 40 and 60 men are expected to have sought premature voluntary release from the army and Royal Marines. In operational terms, this could mean that the equivalent of one entire Sabre squadron out of a total of six in the SAS and SBS is on its way to seek its fortune in the new Iraq. 62 According to one British press report there are more ex-SAS soldiers acting as advisers for “private military companies” than currently serving in the elite, 300-man regiment based near Hereford. More than 40 regular SAS soldiers are understood to have applied to leave the Army in the last year, many because of the lure of short-term contracts in Iraq.63

SAS key to preventing terrorism

Rayment 8 Sean, SAS kills hundreds of terrorists in 'secret war' against al-Qaeda in Iraq, By Sean Rayment, Defence Correspondent, Published: 8:57PM BST 30 Aug 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/2652496/SAS-kill-hundreds-of-terrorists-in-secret-war-against-al-Qaeda-in-Iraq.html

More than 3,500 insurgents have been "taken off the streets of Baghdad" by the elite British force in a series of audacious "Black Ops" over the past two years. It is understood that while the majority of the terrorists were captured, several hundred, who were mainly members of the organisation known as "al-Qa'eda in Iraq" have been killed by the SAS. The SAS is part of a highly secretive unit called "Task Force Black" which also includes Delta Force, the US equivalent of the SAS. The prime targets have been those intent on joining the wave of suicide car bombers that claimed around 3,000 lives a month in Baghdad at the height of the terrorist campaign in 2006. Using intelligence gleaned from spies and informers, Task Force Black has nearly broken the back of the terrorist network and reduced bombings in Baghdad from about 150 a month to just two. But the success of the covert mission came at a price – six members of the SAS were killed and more than 30 were injured. Delta Force has suffered in the region of 20 per cent casualties. A senior British officer told The Sunday Telegraph: "We took over 3,500 terrorists off the streets of Baghdad in around 18 months. "You could say it was a very successful period. But the butcher's bill was high. The attrition rate is equivalent to that experienced by the SAS during the Malayan insurgency 50 years ago. “The relationship between the SAS and Delta Force is very close,” he added. “If anything, the attrition rate in Delta Force is higher. Two years ago the SAS made a donation to Delta Force’s 'widows and orphans’ fund of £10,000.” Senior sources denied that the SAS was taking part in “extra-judicial killings” and added that any incident which appeared to be in breach of the British Army’s rules of engagement would be investigated internally by the unit and by the Royal Military Police if any wrongdoing was suspected. The source said: “There is no shoot-to-kill policy in Iraq, but there are only a few ways of stopping a suicide bomber. A British lawyer is present during the planning stages of every operation and our troops operate under British rules, not American rules.” The SAS began to concentrate almost exclusively on reducing the car bomb threat in Iraq at the same time that the US military launched its so-called “surge”, which saw an additional 30,000 American troops move into the most dangerous areas of Baghdad, in early 2007. Gen David Petraeus, the head of the US forces in Iraq, who is due to leave his post shortly, has praised the courage of the SAS. He said: “They have helped immensely in Baghdad?… they have done a phenomenal job.” In one incident, SAS troops rented a pink pick-up truck, removed their body armour to blend in with locals, and drove through the traffic to catch a key target. “It was brilliant, actually,” Gen Petraeus said. “They have exceptional initiative, exceptional skill, exceptional courage and, I think, exceptional savvy. I can’t say enough about how impressive they are in thinking on their feet.”

British Special Forces Adv. (3/3)

Extinction

Speice 6 (Speice 06 – 06 JD Candidate @ College of William and Mary [Patrick F. Speice, Jr., “NEGLIGENCE AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: ELIMINATING THE CURRENT LIABILITY BARRIER TO BILATERAL U.S.-RUSSIAN NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS,” William & Mary Law Review, February 2006, 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427])

Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or fissile material from Russia as a result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of stringent Soviet-era nuclear security measures. 39 Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods, including "steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by [\*1438] such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways." 40 Equally threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on their own. Very little material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon. 41 Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not significant. 42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear device into the United States makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it was built. 43 Accordingly, supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first place are the most effective means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44 Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. 46 Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there [\*1439] are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young to retire, 47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. 48 The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. 49 Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. 50 In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. 51 This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States [\*1440] or its allies by hostile states, 52 as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. 53

Spec. Ops. Adv. – 1AC – Colombia Module (1/5)

US special forces are key to protecting Columbian oil pipelines

Kouri 8 (Jim July 27 http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/69576 TBC 6/26/10)

With oil prices continuing to climb, oil production in South America becomes more important to American interests and the economy. The terrorists throughout the world know this. The Colombian pipeline has been a principal infrastructure target for terrorist attacks by Colombia's insurgent groups for many years. In just one year, attacks on the pipeline cost the Colombian government an estimated $500 million in lost revenues for the year. The United States agreed to assist Colombia in protecting the first 110 miles of the pipeline where most of the attacks were occurring. Since 2002, the United States has provided about $99 million in equipment and training to the Colombian Army to minimize terrorist attacks along the first 110 miles of the Cano Limon-Covenas oil pipeline, mostly in the Arauca department. US Special Forces have provided training and equipment to about 1,600 Colombian Army soldiers who comprise the security forces for the pipeline. However, the delivery of 10 helicopters purchased for the program was delayed -- arriving in mid-2005. Without the helicopters, the Colombian Army's ability to respond rapidly to pipeline attacks had been limited. In addition, some equipment, such as night vision goggles, has not arrived yet due to the long lead-time required to obtain these items because of US military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite the delays in equipment deliveries, the number of attacks on the Cano Limon-Covenas oil pipeline has declined and security in the area has improved. Also, the Colombian Army and Colombian National Police have improved relations with the civilian population and new oil exploration is occurring in the area due to the improved security. Still, challenges to securing the pipeline remain. More attacks are occurring on the Cano Limon-Covenas oil pipeline outside the 110-mile long area originally addressed. Most of the Colombian Army stationed in these other areas has not received US training. In addition, the insurgents have attacked the electrical grid system that provides energy to the Cano Limon oil field. Without electricity, oil cannot be pumped. Because the US funds provided for the program will be depleted, sustainability of the progress made is uncertain. Colombia cannot fully operate and maintain the helicopters provided without continued US support; and due to US commitments in other parts of the world, US Special Forces will be reducing personnel in Colombia, which will limit future training.

US Special Forces key to Colombian force effectiveness

DOD 7 (U.S. Department of Defense, Afis, Washington, 01feb http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/colombia/doc/gates.html TBC 6/27/10)

U.S. military support for Colombia, previously focused on combating drugs, has expanded to helping the Colombian military confront the country’s rebel insurgency, officials said. U.S. Special Forces troops in Colombia provide Colombian forces military training ranging from refresher training in skills such as reconnaissance, life-saving and air-assault operations, to human-rights training, Alberto Rodriguez, an embassy spokesman, told American Forces Press Service. Meanwhile, other U.S. troops in Colombia are training their Colombian counterparts to conduct critical support missions that keep the operational troops in the fight, including logistics and helicopter repair and maintenance, he said. At the same time, U.S. forces are helping the Colombians professionalize their noncommissioned officer corps and establish an equivalent to the U.S. warrant officer system, Rodriguez said. “The ultimate goal is that Colombia will have a more professional military that is able to conduct operations and sustain itself,” he said.

Spec. Ops. Adv. – 1AC – Colombia Module (2/5)

Columbian oil is key to US oil supply

Klare 0 (Micheal T. professor of peace and world security studies May 4 http://www.alternet.org/story/9111/ TBC 6/27/10)

This priority is clearly evident in the President's annual report on national security strategy. While much of our imported oil comes from the Persian Gulf, he reported in 1997, "we are ... undergoing a fundamental shift in our reliance on imported oil away from the Middle East. Venezuela is now the number one foreign supplier to the United States ... and Venezuela and Colombia are each undertaking new oil production ventures." These ventures will become increasingly important, he added, as domestic oil production declines and the United States becomes increasingly dependent on imported supplies. Assuming that Colombian oil production continues its upward climb, and new oil fields come on line, Colombia could become a major supplier of petroleum to the United States in the decades ahead. And the United States will need all of the imported oil it can get: While domestic oil production is expected to decline from 9.5 million barrels per day in 1997 to 8.7 million barrels in 2020, U.S. oil consumption is expected to rise during this period from 18 to 25 million barrels per day. This means, of course, that imports will have to grow substantially -- nearly doubling over the next 20 years. The Administration's effort to reduce dependence on Persian Gulf oil, combined with soaring U.S. demand, has given Colombia (along with Venezuela) greatly increased importance in American strategic calculations. Just as Washington has always placed a high priority on protecting the oil flow from the Middle East, it now seeks to ensure the security of oil supplies from South America. This means, of course, that the United States is paying much closer attention to internal developments in the region's major producing countries. And while conditions in Venezuela's oilfields seem, for now, to be relatively stable, this is hardly the case for Colombia.

Lack of oil supply necessitates military adventurism

Quinn 6 (Staff writer at Newsweek Jane Bryant, *Newsweek*, “The Price of Our Addiction; For years to come, we'll be paying for our oil in both treasure and blood, as we fight and parley to keep ever-tighter supplies flowing our way.” April 26th 2006, Proquest.com Accessed 6/27/10)

This throws our Iraq wars into a different light. To an extent that most Americans don't yet understand, the U.S. military has become a "global oil-protection force," says Michael Klare, an expert on natural-resource wars and author of the book "Blood and Oil." President Jimmy Carter declared the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to be a vital U.S. interest, enforced at the point of a gun, if necessary. Today, we patrol tanker routes not only in the gulf, but in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. Troops and advisers help protect pipelines in chaotic countries such as Colombia and the Republic of Georgia. We're planting military bases near oil supplies in Asia and Africa. Gulf War I was billed as a war to save Saudi oilfields from Saddam Hussein. Gulf War II was elevated to a "war against terror." But it's arguably still about oil--the Carter Doctrine reigns. One of the prizes in Iraq was to have been British and American access to its huge and unexploited oil reserves, Klare says.

Spec. Ops. Adv. – 1AC – Colombia Module (3/5)

Military adventurism will collapse the American system into a tyranny of the executive to support global militarism.

Lendman 7 (“Crisis and Military Adventurism A Review of Chalmers Johnson's "Nemesis"” Stephen Global Research, February 28, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=4964)KM

The darkest side of our adventurism is our global network of military prisons (authorized by the Secretary of Defense and Pentagon) where physical and mental torture are practiced even though it's known no useful information comes from it. Instead it's used for social control, vengeance and a policy of degrading people regarded as sub-human because they happen to be less-than-white Arab or Afghan Muslims. It's also a symbolic act of superpower defiance daring the world community to challenge us. International Geneva Convention laws and the 1984 UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment no longer matter for the lord and master of the universe. The US is accountable under them, but clever lawyers and a lawless Attorney General rewrite the rules of engagement claiming justification even when they don't have a leg to stand on. Imperial Pathologies - Comparing America to Rome and Britain Johnson makes his case citing ancient Rome to show how imperialism and militarism destroyed the Republic. He notes after its worst defeat at the hands of Carthaginian general Hannibal in 216 BC, Romans vowed never again to tolerate the rise of a Mediterranean power capable of threatening their survival and felt justified waging preemptive war against any opponent it thought might try. That was Paul Wolfowitz's notion as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in the GHW Bush administration in 1992 that he began implementing as Deputy Secretary of Defense in 2001 and made part of the National Security Strategy in 2002. It was an ancient Roman megalomanic vision called Pax Romana that post-WW II became Pax Americana with illusions of wanting unchallengeable dominance to deter any potential rival, and, like ancient Rome, wage preemptive or preventive war to assure it. A culture of corruption and militarism eroded the Roman Republic that effectively ended in 49 BC when Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon River in Northern Italy plunging the country in civil war that left Caesar victorious when all his leading opponents were dead. The Republic died with them as Caesar became the state exercising dictatorship over it from 48 to 44 BC when his reign ended on the Ides of March that year after his fateful meeting in the Roman Senate with Brutus, Cassius and six other conspirators whose long knives did what enemy legions on battlefields couldn't. It led to the rise of Caesar's grandnephew Octavian. In 27 BC, the Roman Senate gave him his new title, Augustus Caesar, making him Rome's first emperor after earlier ceding most of its powers to him. He then emasculated Rome's system of republican rule turning the Senate into an aristocratic family club performing ceremonial duties only. It was much the same in Nazi Germany only much faster. The German Reichstag made Adolph Hitler Reichschallcellor on January 30, 1933 ceding its power to him March 23 by enacting the Enabling Act or Law to Remedy the Distress of the People and the Empire establishing a Nazi dictatorship and allowing the Weimar Republic to pass quietly into history. With a whimper, not a bang, it gave Hitler absolute power and the right to enact laws and constitutional changes on his own with little more than rubber-stamping approval from an impotent Reichstag that anointed him Reichsfuhrer a year later allowing him supreme power to destroy the state he only got to rule for 12 years. Like Nazi Germany and other empires, Johnson explains the "Roman Republic failed to adjust to the unintended consequences of its imperialism (and militaristic part of it) leading to drastic alterations in its form of government" that was transformed into dictatorship. It's constitution became undermined along with genuine political and human rights its citizens once had but lost under imperial rule. Rome's military success made made it very rich and its leaders arrogant leading to what Johnson calls "the first case of what today we call imperial overstretch." It didn't help that a citizen army of conscripts got transformed into professional military warriors. It grew large and unwieldy becoming a state within a state like our Pentagon today. It created a culture of militarism that turned into a culture of moral decay leading to the empire's decline and fall. The US Republic has yet to collapse, but an imperial presidency now places great strain on it with a dominant Pentagon and culture of militarism undermining Congress, the courts and our civil liberties. Ancient Rome proved republican checks and balances aren't compatible with imperial dreams and a powerful military on the march for them. The US may have crossed its own Rubicon on September 18, 2001 with the passage of the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) by joint House-Senate resolution authorizing "the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the <CONTINUED>

Spec. Ops. Adv. – 1AC – Colombia Module (4/5)

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recent attacks launched against the United States (and) giving the President....authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States...." By this act alone, George Bush got congressional authority to seize near dictatorial power in the name of national security, ignore constitutional and international law, be able to wage aggressive war to protect the nation, and get repressive laws passed threatening citizens and others alike with loss of our freedoms. Then in October, 2002, Congress voted the president unrestricted power to preemptively strike Iraq whenever he believed it "appropriate" meaning he was free to wage aggressive war against Iraq or any other nation he henceforth called a threat using tactical nuclear weapons if he chooses. This kind of unrestricted power isn't just dictatorial authority. It's insanity courtesy of the Congress and supportive right wing courts. It's taking us the same way as ancient Rome assuring our fate will be no different unless it's stopped and reversed. It's the inevitable price of imperial arrogance making leaders feel invulnerable till they no longer are, and it's too late. We may still have a choice, and Johnson cites the one Britain took to explain. They sacrificed empire to preserve democracy knowing they couldn't have both. They earlier took up the "White Man's Burden" in a spirit of imperial "goodness" we now call "spreading democracy" believing Anglo-Saxons deserved to rule other nations, especially ones of color they thought inferior. Johnson explains "successful imperialism requires that a domestic republic change into a tyranny." It happened to Rome, and he sees it happening here under an imperial presidency with militarism taking ever greater root in society. Britain was spared by a democratic resurgence followed WW II. People finally freed from the scourge of Nazism said never again and chose democracy to assure it. We must now choose whether to return to our founding roots or stay on our present path heading to imperial tyranny. For Johnson, Rome and Britain are the "archtypes" defining where we stand and what we face. Rome chose empire, lost its Republic and then everything. Britain went the other way choosing democracy despite the Blair government's disgraceful post-9/11 imperial indiscretions acting as Washington's pawn in service to our adventurism. Now late in the game, we must choose one way or the other. We can either have our democratic "cake" or "eat it" and suffer the consequences. We can't have it both ways.

Oil shocks kill the economy

Roberts 4 (Paul, regular contributor to Harper's and NYT Magazine The End of Oil: On the Edge of a Perilous New World, p. 93-4. TBC 6/27/10)

The obsessive focus on oil is hardly surprising, given the stakes. In the fast-moving world of oil politics, oil is not simply a source of world power, but a medium for that power as well, a substance whose huge importance enmeshes companies, communities, and entire nations in a taut global web that is sensitive to the smallest of vibrations. A single oil "event" — a pipeline explosion in Iraq, political unrest in Venezuela, a bellicose exchange between the Russian and Saudi oil ministers — sends Shockwaves through the world energy order, pushes prices up or down, and sets off tec-Ionic shifts in global wealth and power. Each day that the Saudi-Russian spat kept oil supplies high and prices low, the big oil exporters were losing hundreds of millions of dollars and, perhaps, moving closer to financial and political disaster — while the big consuming nations enjoyed what amounted to a massive tax break. Yet in the volatile world of oil, the tide could quickly turn. A few months later, as anxieties over a second Iraq war drove prices up to forty dollars, the oil tide abruptly changed directions, transferring tens of billions of dollars from the economies of the United States, Japan, and Europe to the national banks in Riyadh, Caracas, Kuwait City, and Baghdad, and threatening to strangle whatever was left of the global economic recovery So embedded has oil become in today's political and economic spheres that the big industrial governments now watch the oil markets as closely as they once watched the spread of communism — and with good reason: six of the last seven global recessions have been preceded by spikes in the price of oil, and fear is growing among economists and policymakers that, in today's growth-dependent, energy-intensive global economy, oil price volatility itself may eventually pose more risk to prosperity and stability and simple survival than terrorism or even war.

Spec. Ops. Adv. – 1AC – Colombia Module (5/5)

Oil shocks could wipe out 95% of the US population

Lundberg 5 (Jan Lundberg, “End-Time for U.S.A. Upon Oil Collapse - A scenario for a sustainable future,” Culture Change, Published Jun 17 2005, pg. http://www.energybulletin.net/ node/6933. TBC 6/27/10)

There is no Plan B for coping with a terminal oil shock to the economy. Therefore, a breakdown of society must ensue, starting with "the trucks will not be pulling into Wal-Mart or Safeway," as I was quoted in Congress on May 12, 2005. When people cannot get transportation to their jobs, business stops. People will be panicking first about gasoline, and then about how much food and water they have -- tragically trying to protect those meager supplies in an unforgiving urban environment. Nature has been made to stop offering up the simple essentials of life, when the privatized fortress and paved-over toxic cities rely on money and cheap energy to move everything around the world. The world as we "know" it will end but we'll get to know the world as it really is a lot better. Die off will kick in first in terms of riots and killings by armed marauders, and "the police and military will not be able to keep order more than a few days, if at all" [my statement in Congress]. Next will come starvation, and cannibalism can only get people so far -- especially with rampant disease and lack of clean water to drink. Starvation will take care of perhaps 95% (ninety-five per cent) of the petroleum-dependent populations in the U.S. and perhaps elsewhere in modern industrialized countries. Did I mention overpopulation? The simple fact is that population has far overshot the ecological carrying capacity of the whole planet, especially in the fossil fuelish/foolish U.S.A. And petroleum is how food is grown, distributed, packaged and prepared.

Spec. Ops. Adv. – Uniqueness

Special Forces crisis now

Smith 4 (Richard Victor October 29-30 MA Candidate War Studies Programme, Royal Military College of Canada http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/uploads/cdai/2009/04/smith04.pdf TBC 6/25/10)

These private military corporations often hire former SOF members to partake in their contracts. According to the media a former SOF member can make up to $1500 a day in Baghdad and other high risk areas of the world.32 Many S.O.F organizations are actually losing men to PMC’s. In fact, elite forces could be facing an imminent crisis because of record numbers of men are asking for volunteer leave early because they are lured by the high wages offered by the growing defense industry.

Spec. Ops. Adv. – I/L – PMC’s Steal Spec. Ops.

PMC’s steal South African special forces

Isenberg 4 (David BASIC RESEARCH REPORT September http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2004PMC2 TBC 6/25/10)

PMC’s are employing personnel from several countries, not just the United States. Contractors from Britain, Nepal, Chile, Ukraine, Israel, South Africa and Fiji, are doing a wide variety of tasks in Iraq but the common link is helping, in one way or another, to provide security. According to David Claridge, managing director of Janusian, Iraq has boosted British military companies' revenues from £200m ($320m) before the war to over £1bn, making security by far Britain's most lucrative post-war export to Iraq.36 More than 1,500 South Africans are believed to be in Iraq under contract to various PMC’s, including members of the South African Police Services’ elite task force and former members of the South African National Defence Force. Reportedly some active members are resigning from the SANDF to go to Iraq.37 All South African security companies working outside the country are required by law to register with the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC), headed by Minister of Education Kader Asmal.

The higher salaries of PMC’s are causing an exodus of the most highly experienced SOF members just as special forces are becoming pivotal

Isenberg 4 (David BASIC RESEARCH REPORT September http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2004PMC2 TBC 6/25/10)

The lure of higher salaries is reportedly causing an exodus of the U.S. military’s most seasoned members of Special Operation Forces (SOF) to higher-paying civilian security jobs in places like Baghdad and Kabul, just as the special forces are being asked to play an increasingly pivotal role in combating terror and helping to conduct nation-building operations worldwide. Of course the same problem exists in many other areas of military specialism, such as information technology. Why work in the Army’s tech operations when you can get a job at three times the remuneration in the private sector? Reportedly, exhausted American and British special forces personnel are resigning in record numbers and taking highly-paid jobs as private security guards in Iraq and Afghanistan. Competition over elite troops from private companies is so intense that the U.S. Special Operations Command has formulated new pay, benefits, and educational 26 incentives to try to retain them. “Competition with the civilian world has never been greater,” said Gen. Bryan "Doug" Brown, commander of the 49,000-strong U.S. Special Operations Command, in congressional testimony.59

PMC’s kill British special forces – in the status quo the best 1/6th of the forces leave

Isenberg 4 (David BASIC RESEARCH REPORT September http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2004PMC2 TBC 6/25/10)

Similarly, British officials say more than 300 soldiers have left the armed forces in six months to take up lucrative jobs with private companies such as Olive Security, Armour Security, Global and USDID.61 In particular, the demand from PMC’s operating in Iraq for former Special Air Service and Special Boat Service soldiers is such that between May 2003 and December 2004, between 40 and 60 men are expected to have sought premature voluntary release from the army and Royal Marines. In operational terms, this could mean that the equivalent of one entire Sabre squadron out of a total of six in the SAS and SBS is on its way to seek its fortune in the new Iraq. 62 According to one British press report there are more ex-SAS soldiers acting as advisers for “private military companies” than currently serving in the elite, 300-man regiment based near Hereford. More than 40 regular SAS soldiers are understood to have applied to leave the Army in the last year, many because of the lure of short-term contracts in Iraq.63

Spec. Ops. Adv. – I/L – PMC’s Steal Spec. Ops.

PMC’s cause a brain drain of special forces

Holmqvist 5 (Caroline Stockholm International Peace Research Institute January http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP09.pdf TBC 6/25/10)

Finally, problems of oversight under skewed market conditions can also manifest themselves in a depletion of state resources. Given that the state has no influence over salaries or other conditions of employment in the private sector, it has no leverage over the ability of the private sector to entice away highly trained individuals from state service, especially in special operations forces.146 Concerns about a ‘brain drain’ of special operations forces as recruits begin to desert to private companies have been voiced by members of the US congressional House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, who warned that the US military may be losing covert forces faster than they can be replaced.147 Such is the level of exodus from both US and British special forces that military commanders are finding themselves obligated to formulate new financial and educational incentives to retain personnel.148

PMC’s drain special forces, they’re attracted by higher wages.

Chakrabarti 9 (Shantanu “Privatisation of Security in the Post-Cold War Period” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses December http://www.idsa.in/system/files/Monograph\_No2.pdf)KM

Another major concern, in this connection, has been the large scale exodus of highly skilled and trained personnel from the defence services into such PSCs. In particular, there is a high incidence of Special Operations Forces (SOF) members joining the PSCs in large numbers. The high salaries on offer for the PSC employees in Iraq and Afghanistan have reportedly caused record numbers of elite soldiers from the British and the American armies to retire early from their regular forces. According to one newspaper report, while senior enlisted members of the Army Green Berets or Navy Seals with 20 years of experience or more can earn about US$ 50,000 in base pay, and can retire with a US$ 23,000 pension, the PSCs are offering salary figures ranging from US$ 100,000 to nearly US$ 200,000 a year, to the experienced army veterans.27 According to another report prepared by the United States Congress Committee on Oversight and Government Reform in February 2007, salaries for private security personnel can be as high as US$ 33,000 a month.28 In order to stop the exodus, the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) came out with a special remuneration package plan worth US$ 168 million in 2004.29 In August 2006, the British army was also compelled to increase pay for Special Air Service (SAS) and other Special Forces personnel by 50 per cent in order to stem the rate of defection to PMSCs.30 So far, such policies have been unable to stop the attrition within the army units to any significant level. As the dependency on private contractors continues to rise, it has been suggested that the US policy should consider involving both the private contractors as well as soldiers in the SOFs.31 In spite of problems, the PSI, thus, seems destined to be a vital part of the Western (particularly, American), military interventions in the future. For the American policymakers, at present, the PSCs provide flexibility as an adjunct to the US military presence.32

PMC’s are financed by the government to hire away their best special forces units.

Pascal 6 (“How Privatized is War?” Pujya J, July 13, http://www.monitor.upeace.org/pdf/PMC’s.pdf)KM

The lure of higher salaries is reportedly causing an exodus of the U.S. military’s most seasoned members of SOF to higher-paying civilian security jobs. While few details have been released about the amounts involved in specific contracts, it is estimated that of the $18.6 billion allocated by the Bush administration for Iraq’s “reconstruction,” at least 25 percent will be used to pay security companies.13 David Claridge, director of a London based security firm has estimated that Iraq contracts have boosted the annual revenue of British-based PMC’s alone from $320 million to over $1.7 billion.14

Spec. Ops. Adv. – I/L – Training Colombia

US Special Forces are training Colombian forces

Rozoff 9 (Rick October 2 Global Research http://globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=14503 TBC 6/27/10)

In early 2007 Marine Gen. Peter Pace, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, traveled to Colombia and spent two days meeting with the country's military and political leadership. Shortly afterwards Colombian Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos, about whom more will be said later, returned the favor and visited the Pentagon where he met with US Defense Secretary Robert Gates. A Defense Department report of the visit quoted Pentagon officials as saying that "U.S. military support for Colombia, previously focused on combating drugs, has expanded to helping the Colombian military confront the country’s rebel insurgency" and that "U.S. Special Forces troops in Colombia provide Colombian forces military training...."[17]

Spec. Ops. Adv. – Colombia Module – Heg

**Instability in Latin America tanks hegemony**

Rochlin, 1994 (James Francis Professor of Political Science at Okanagan University College. “Discovering the Americas: the evolution of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America,” p. 130-131)JFS

While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security considerations were perhaps more important. Canada possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the Americas. Perceptions of declining U.S. influence in the region -- which had some credibility in 1979-84 due to the wildly inequitable divisions of wealth in some U.S. client states in Latin America, in addition to political repression, underdevelopment, mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to U.S. strategic and economic interests, and so on -- were linked to the prospect of explosive events occurring in the hemisphere. Hence, the Central American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic process throughout the region. Analysts at the time worried that, in a worst-case scenario, instability created by a regional war, beginning in Central America and spreading elsewhere in Latin America, might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the United States would be unable to perform adequately its important hegemonic role in the international arena -- a concern expressed by the director of research for Canada's Standing Committee Report on Central America. [88](http://www.questia.com/read/48760472) It was feared that such a predicament could generate increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war. This is one of the motivations which led Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be seen in the next chapter.

Spec. Ops. Adv. – Colombia Module – China Econ

Colombian oil pipelines are key to oil exports to China

Ellis 5 (Evan, June, Strategic Security Institute, http://tinyurl.com/2bd4o9d)JFS

Although Chinese trade with Colombia is small, it is both expanding and touches upon strategically important industries. In terms of volume, Colombia-China bilateral trade grew by 60 percent over 2003. One of the most strategically significant emerging relationships between Colombia and China involves petroleum products. Although China does not currently have a publicly acknowledged role in the deal, Colombia and Venezuela are currently engaged in engineering-level talks concerning the construction of a series of oil and gas pipelines that ultimately would allow Colombia to export significant quantities of these products to China via its Paciﬁc ports. With respect to oil, the Colombian oil ﬁrm, Ecopetrol, and the Venezuelan national oil company, PDVSA, began studies in 2002 on the construction of a 1,100-1,300 km-long petroleum pipeline to carry Venezuelan oil from the Maracaibo region across Columbia to the Choco region of Colombia, and potentially to the Paciﬁc port of Tribugal. The pipeline would thus facilitate the export of oil to the Western United States and Asian markets, including China. Commitment to the pipeline was a key element of recent summits between Chávez and Uribe, including meetings on July 14 and September 9, 2004. although recent statements by both governments have raised some doubts about the future of the deal. In conjunction with the pipeline, Colombia has discussed the construction of a future oil port on its Paciﬁc Coast with the explicit purpose of reﬁning and exporting petroleum products to China and other Asian markets.92 Such a pipeline would not only provide an outlet for Colombian oil sales to China, but would also significantly increase the viability of Venezuelan oil sales to China, given the inability of modern supertankers loading on Venezuela’s Atlantic coast to pass through the Panama Canal.

Chinese oil imports are key to the Chinese economy

Franz 8 (Paris, International Affairs at Suite 101, http://internationalaffairs.suite101.com/article.cfm/chinas\_economy\_and\_the\_importance\_of\_oil)JFS

China’s economic boom has changed the situation drastically. The economic reforms of the late 1970s have lead to an annual growth rate of nearly 10 percent on average, a rate that has only slowed with the onset of the global financial crisis. Chinese oil demand is increasing by around one billion barrels per day annually. The International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts that by 2030 Chinese oil imports will equal those of the US.

China became a net importer of oil in 1993, surpassing Japan in 2003 to become the second largest international oil consumer after the US. The new economic realities have pushed the search for a stable supply of energy to the top of the Chinese agenda, as continued economic growth is central to the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy. In a speech celebrating 30 years of reform in December 2008, Chinese President Hu Jintao emphasized the importance of maintaining stable and relatively rapid growth.

Such growth looks set to continue, if at a reduced rate, and China’s search for secure energy supplies will also continue, along with its wooing of the oil-rich Middle East. To quote the movie *Casablanca*, this could be the start of a beautiful friendship.

China economic decline would cause WWIII asian style

Strait Times 3 (UCLA Prof, June 27, *Strait Times¸* http://www.straitstimes.com.sg/commentary/...,197074,00.html ) ET

But imagine a China disintegrating - on its own, without neo-conservative or Central Intelligence Agency prompting, much less outright military invasion - because the economy (against all predictions) suddenly collapses. That would knock Asia into chaos. A massive flood of refugees would head for Indonesia and other places with poor border controls, which don't want them and can't handle them; some in Japan might lick their lips at the prospect of World War II Revisited and look to annex a slice of China. That would send Singapore and Malaysia - once occupied by Japan - into nervous breakdowns. Meanwhile, India might make a grab for Tibet, and Pakistan for Kashmir. Then you can say hello to World War III, Asia-style. That's why wise policy encourages Chinese stability, security and economic growth - the very direction the White House now seems to prefer. If neo-conservatives really care about Mr Bush, they ought to find their common sense and get off his back. He has enough on his plate with Iraq. In the final analysis, neo-conservative insanity is more of a danger to the Bush presidency than China.

Spec. Ops. Adv. – Impact – Spec. Ops. Good

Special forces rock – they have much more experience and training that is key to mission success

Isenberg 4 (David BASIC RESEARCH REPORT September http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2004PMC2 TBC 6/25/10)

Many PMC personnel, hired as independent contractors (IC), are not merely ex-military, but former members of elite units, usually in the special operations forces community (SOF).42 In the United States that means former Rangers, Green Berets, Delta Force, and SEALs.43 In the United Kingdom it means former Special Air Service (SAS),44 former police officers from Scotland Yard's royalty protection squad (SO14), who specialize in close protection work, and members of the Special Boat Service (SBS), the Royal Navy equivalent of the SAS.45 Why SOF? Within the contracting world the type of individuals working as security contractors escorting convoys or providing static and roving protection of individuals and installations are far more likely to have a background in the combat arms sector, or policing at a minimum, if not special operations training and experience. In the role of security operator they are able to bring a lifetime of training and experience to a specific job. Most of the actual security teams operating on the ground frequently are composed of former and retired senior NCOs, men in their 30s and early 40s. This level of experience contributes to a more relaxed environment that simplifies operations. Leaders trust their operators to ensure basic tasks have been performed as second nature, and that their staff is highly professional and disciplined. In contrast a young Army soldier or Marine, recently graduated from his or her basic training and specialty school is just that: young and inexperienced. The typical SOF soldier is far more accustomed to interacting with foreign nationals than the average service member. Language skills and cultural appreciation are skills taught in their military training and carried over into the professional approach taken as a civilian specialist. Reconnaissance and tactical analysis of intelligence is a basic part of any special operations mission; within the conventional military, analysis is the realm of a limited few.

British special forces key to operations in Iran

Smith 7 (Michael October 21st The Sunday Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle\_east/article2691726.ece TBC 6/25/10)

BRITISH special forces have crossed into Iran several times in recent months as part of a secret border war against the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s Al-Quds special forces, defence sources have disclosed. There have been at least half a dozen intense firefights between the SAS and arms smugglers, a mixture of Iranians and Shi’ite militiamen. The unreported fighting straddles the border between Iran and Iraq and has also involved the Iranian military firing mortars into Iraq. UK commanders are concerned that Iran is using a militia ceasefire to step up arms supplies in preparation for an offensive against their base at Basra airport. An SAS squadron is carrying out operations along the Iranian border in Maysan and Basra provinces with other special forces, the Australian SAS and American special-operations troops.

Spec. Ops. Adv. – Impact – Military Adventurism

Unrestrained military adventurism ensures cycles of endless war and termination of the planet

Kellner 3 (pf social sciences- ucla, Douglas, An Orwellian Nightmare: Critical Reflections on the Bush Administration, http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/essays/orwelliannightmare.pdf)KM

Moreover, it is by now well known and documented that Bush’s policy of launching a preemptive strike on Iraq was based on deception and lies. Bush and others in his administration constantly made false claims about alleged Iraqi “weapons of mass destruction” and the threat that the Iraqis posed to the U.S. and the entire world. The failure to find such threatening weapons and media exposure of claims that U.S. and U.K. intelligence agencies were skeptical of these claims have led to critical scrutiny of the case for war offered by the U.S. and Britain. In the latter country, a major inquiry is now going on presided by Lord Hutton into government deception over Iraq. Robert Greenwald’s remarkable 2003 documentary Uncovered contrasts statements by members of the Bush administration including George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Condoleeza Rice with critique by former members of the US intelligence and political establishment demonstrating that Bush administration claims were utterly bogus. Former intelligence analysts dissect Colin Powell’s address to the United Nations claiming to document Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction and show in detail how key statistics Powell appealed to were simply false, his satellite imagery pictures claiming to present Iraqi weapons were appallingly misinterpreted, and his major claims concerning the immediate threat of Iraqi weapons were utterly fictitious in what has to be the nadir of US diplomatic argumentation before an international audience. The documentary also presents critics such as former Ambassador Joseph Wilson convincingly arguing that Bush administration claims concerning ties between Al Qaeda and the Iraqi regime are completely unproven, while a variety of critics argue that the Iraq occupation has created new terrorist enemies for the US and has not made the US safer, as Bush administration officials continually claim.11 After the collapse of the Baath regime in April 2003, the Bush administration began threatening Syria and there have been reports that the neo-conservatives in the administration have planned five more wars (see Clark 2003). The Bush administration policy of Terror War raises the possibility that Orwell's 1984 might provide the template for the new millennium, as the world is plunged into endless wars, as freedom and democracy are being snuffed out in the name of freedom, as language loses meaning, and as history is constantly revised (just as Bush and his scribes constantly rewrote his own personal history). There is thus the danger that Orwell’s dark grim dystopia may replace the (ideological) utopia of the “information society,” the “new economy,” and a prosperous and democratic globalization that had been the dominant ideology and vision of the past decade. Questions arise: Will the Bush administration Terror War lead the world to apocalypse and ruin through constant war and the erection of totalitarian police states over the façade of fragile democracy? Or can more multilateral and global solutions be found to the dangers of terrorism that will strengthen democracy and increase the chances for peace and security? There is indeed a danger that Terror War will be a force of historical regression, and the motor of destruction of the global economy, liberal polity, and democracy itself, all to be replaced by an aggressive militarism and totalitarian police state. It could well be that Orwell will be the prophet of a coming New Barbarism with endless war, state repression, and enforced control of thought and discourse, and that George W. Bush and his minions are the architects of an Orwellian future. It could also be the case, however, that the Taliban, bin Laden, Al Qaeda, Saddam Hussein, and the Bush administration represent obsolete and reactionary forces that will be swept away by the inexorable forces of globalization and liberal democracy. The opposing sides in the current Terror War of the Bush administration reactionaries and Al Qaeda could be perceived as representing complementary poles of an atavistic and premodern version of Islam and nihilistic terrorism confronted by reactionary rightwing 9 conservatism and militarism.12 In this scenario, both poles can be perceived as disruptive and regressive forces in a global world that need to be overcome to create genuine historical progress. If this is the case, Terror War would be a momentary interlude in which two obsolete historical forces battle it out, ultimately to be replaced by more sane and democratic globalizing forces. This is, of course, an optimistic scenario and probably, for the foreseeable future, progressive forces will be forced to confront intense battles between the opposing forces of Islamic terrorism and rightwing militarism. Yet if democracy and the human species are to survive, global movements against militarism and for social justice, ecology, and peace must emerge to combat and replace the atavistic forces of the present. As a <CONTINUED>

Spec. Ops. Adv. – Impact – Military Adventurism

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new millennium unfolds, the human race has regressed into a New Barbarism unforeseeable prior to September 11. If civilization is to survive, individuals must perceive their enemies and organize to fight for a better future. And now is the time for liberals, conservatives and those who believe in truth in politics to demand straight talk from the Bush administration and other politicians, and for the media and critics of the politics of lying to take the Bush administration to task for its Big Lies. As the history of recent totalitarian regimes demonstrates, systematic deception and lying rots the very fabric of a political society, and if U.S. democracy is to find new life and a vigorous future there must be public commitments to truth and public rejection of the politics of lying. To conclude: as a response to the September 11 terror attacks, the Bush administration has answered with an intensified militarism that threatens to generate an era of Terror War, a new arms race, accelerated military violence, U.S. support of authoritarian regimes, an assault on human rights, constant threats to democracy, and destabilizing of the world economy. The Bush regime also provides political favors to its largest corporate and other supporters, unleashing unrestrained Wild West capitalism, exemplified in the Enron scandals, and a form of capitalist cronyism whereby Bush administration family and friends are provided with government favors, while social welfare programs, environmental legislation, and protection of rights and freedoms are curtailed. Consequently, I would argue that Bush administration unilateralist militarism is not the way to fight international terrorism, but is rather the road to an Orwellian nightmare in which democracy and freedom will be in dire peril and the future of the human species will be in question. These are frightening times and it is essential that all citizens become informed about the fateful conflicts of the present, gain clear understanding of what is at stake, and realize that they must oppose at once international terrorism, Bushian militarism, and an Orwellian police-state in order to preserve democracy and a life worthy of a human being.