PMC - Neoliberalism

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1AC – Inherency (1/16)

Contention 1 is Inherency

The prevalence of Private Military Contractors is on the rise – Obama will do nothing to stop it.

Lendman 1-20 (http://dissidentvoice.org/2010/01/outsourcing-war-the-rise-of-private-military-contractors-pmcs/, January 20th 2010)

In 2002, under Army Secretary Thomas White, the military planned to increase its long-term reliance on contracted workers, a plan known as the “Third Wave” after two earlier ones. Its purposes were to free up military manpower for the global war on terror, get non-core products and services from private sources so Army leaders could focus on their core competencies, and support Bush’s Management Agenda. In April 2003, the initiative stalled when White resigned, among other reasons for a lack of basic information required to effectively manage a growing PMC force, then estimated to be between 124,000-605,000 workers. Today, more precise figures are known and for what functions, but a lack of transparency and oversight makes it impossible for the public, Congress, the administration, or others in government to assess them with regard to cost, effectiveness, their services, whether government or business should perform them, and their effect on the nation for good or ill, with strong evidence of the latter. The 2008 Montreux Document is an agreement obligating signatories with regard to their PMCs in war zones. Seventeen nations ratified it, including America, Britain, France, Germany, Switzerland, Canada and China, pledging to promote responsible PMC conduct in armed conflicts. Divided in two sections, its first one covers international laws binding on private contractors, explains states can’t circumvent their obligations by using them, requires they take appropriate measures to prevent violations, address them responsibly when they do, and take effective steps to prevent future occurrences. The second section lists 70 practices for helping countries fulfill their legal obligations, including not using PMCs for activities requiring force, implementing effective control, using surveillance and sanctions in case of breaches, and regulating and licensing contracted companies, that in turn, must train their personnel to observe the rules of law. Given the obvious conflicts of interest, self-regulation won’t work. Unchecked, combatant PMCs are accountable only to themselves, operating secretly outside the law — for the Pentagon as an imperial tool. Given Obama’s permanent war agenda and how entrenched PMCs have become, expect little constructive change, save for tinkering around the edges and regular rhetorical promises, followed by new fronts in the war on terror and even greater numbers civilians and soldiers for them.

1AC – Plan Text (2/16)

Thus, the Plan:

The United States federal government should remove is private military presence from Iraq and Afghanistan.

1AC – Neoliberalism (3/16)

Contention 2 is Neoliberalism

PMC’s threaten state sovereignty by privatizing violence.

Sheehy & Maogoto 8 (Lexis, Benedict Sheehy and Jackson N. Maogoto, ARTICLE & ESSAY: THE PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANY--UNRAVELLING THE THEORETICAL, LEGAL & REGULATORY MOSAIC, Fall 2008)

Implicit in most commentaries concerned with the proliferation of PMC’s, and explicit on some occasions, [n70](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277495576896&returnToKey=20_T9629210703&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.105654.560203014#n70) is the belief that the State should have a monopoly over the use of violence. [n71](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277495576896&returnToKey=20_T9629210703&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.105654.560203014#n71) Although the modern formulation of the idea is attributable to Max Weber [n72](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277495576896&returnToKey=20_T9629210703&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.105654.560203014#n72) in States with a common law tradition, one finds earlier manifestations of the principle, such as the 1789 English Bill of Rights which states "[t]hat the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it is with consent of Parliament, is against law." [n73](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277495576896&returnToKey=20_T9629210703&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.105654.560203014#n73)  [\*174]  It is the State's monopoly of violence that underpins the international legal system and justifies the emphasis on State sovereignty. [n74](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277495576896&returnToKey=20_T9629210703&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.105654.560203014#n74) It is on this basis that States are recognized as having the right and capacity to declare war, act in self-defense, sign peace treaties, etc. [n75](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277495576896&returnToKey=20_T9629210703&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.105654.560203014#n75) A second dimension of the doctrine of sovereignty is that States have the responsibility for protecting individual rights, a function they could not purport to fulfill if they did not enjoy a monopoly over violence. [n76](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277495576896&returnToKey=20_T9629210703&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.105654.560203014#n76) Third, and often implicit in the discussion, is the notion that in some way the violence of the State is somehow limited by or answerable to the populace. [n77](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277495576896&returnToKey=20_T9629210703&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.105654.560203014#n77) Accordingly, any non-State actor engaging in violence, including mercenaries, PMC’s, and terrorists, can readily be classified as a threat to State sovereignty, and hence, illegitimate. Given that violence has been the State's ultimate guarantee of sovereignty, violence has traditionally been carefully regulated within the borders of States. On a practical level, States have insisted on the de facto control of violence. [n78](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277495576896&returnToKey=20_T9629210703&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.105654.560203014#n78) That is, the State's monopoly of violence has been guaranteed by the development and institutionalization of State-sponsored, nationalist-based standing armies and police, and the development of State controlled armaments manufacturers. [n79](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277495576896&returnToKey=20_T9629210703&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.105654.560203014#n79) By controlling both the personnel engaged or prepared to engage in violence, and the weapons they would use, the State secured to itself control of the means of challenging its sovereignty, and so ensured its continued existence at least as against those under its control. On the legal level, constraint on the use of State resort to violence has been through a combination of constitutional law, administrative law, and the important related legal principle, the Rule of Law, as it pertains to the State. The discussion now turns to an examination of the two forms for controlling violence within a sovereign State, namely practical or de facto control and legal or de jure control of the State and then the PMC.

1AC – Neoliberalism (4/16)

Privatizing violence blurs the line between the state and the market.

Chakrabarti 9 (Shantanu “Privatisation of Security in the Post-Cold War Period” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses December http://www.idsa.in/system/files/Monograph\_No2.pdf)

Max Weber’s notion of the state as possessing the monopoly of coercion in a given area is no longer as convincing—if it ever was.1 One of the fundamental tasks of a state is to provide physical security for its citizens, and to prevent the violent usurpation of political authority, from within or without. For that purpose, states have traditionally depended upon institutional providers of coercive force, such as the police and armed forces for the achievement of that task. What has been, however, a more significant development in the post-1990 period has been the proliferation of PMSCs assisting the state in its various security related initiatives in both domestic and external spheres. In case of the military in developed Western societies, the increased capacity of the global media to inflame and influence popular concerns regarding ‘casualty sensitivity’ or the ‘body bag syndrome’—in opposition to foreign intervention—has also been a subject of broad concern among the global strategic community, which has rendered the task of force deployment in actual conflict situations a difficult task for the policy makers. According to Edward Luttwak, for instance, most post-Cold War conflicts are regarded as ‘discretionary’ by nature, incapable of posing any serious existential threat to the state and thus, given the evolving moral and social norms in the ‘post-industrial’ societies, makes the issue of high military casualty a highly sensitive affair making military recruitment and deployment a difficult task.2 In this connection, extensive use of armed contract personnel to conduct missions such as security operations and training of personnel in combat zones apart from outsourcing of logistical and other non-core army functions, have led to the steady rise of such private companies. The rise has also been explained in terms of a part of the overall drive towards increasing efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Many functions, not so long ago, considered to be exclusively military functions are being outsourced. This includes, for instance, the task of intelligence operations on behalf of the state. Very recently, for instance, the US government has authorised the Prince Group, the owner of Blackwater Worldwide, a leading PSC, with the task of collecting information for the government on various issues including natural disasters, business-friendly governments, overseas regulations, and global political developments for clients in industry and government. The intelligence gathering operation, called Total Intelligence Solutions, has involved former high-ranking figures from agencies such as the CIA and other defence related establishments.3

1AC – Neoliberalism (5/16)

The PMC is the ultimate melding of the State and the Private – it forms the foundation of neoliberalism

Boggs 8 (http://www.uta.edu/huma/agger/fastcapitalism/4\_1/boggs.html, Privitized Militarism: A New Era?, Carl Boggs, April 1st 2008)

Military “privatization” in fact has a long and deep legacy dwarfing anything the PMC’s, including Blackwater, currently represent. (Blackwater received about one billion dollars from the State Department in 2007.) Compared to nearly a trillion dollars earmarked for military-related programs in 2008 – not to mention trillions more for future weapons programs – the money spent on PMC’s, while noteworthy, is scarcely enough to drive U.S. foreign and military policy or even trigger new alarms. Nor, for the most part, does it depart radically from established patterns. Writing as early as 1935 (and referring to World War I), General Smedley Butler commented that for the U.S. “war is a racket [and] always has been”, with corporations like DuPont, Bethlehem Steel, and Anaconda Copper reaping profits at roughly ten times their previous levels. According to Butler, a World War I marine hero, at least 21,000 new millionaires and billionaires were created by the Great War, capitalizing on the drive to “make the world safe for democracy”. (Butler 2005: 23) Later, books like C. Wright Mills’ The Power Elite (1956), Fred Cook’s The Warfare State (1962), and Seymour Melman’s Pentagon Capitalism (1970) would offer historical and theoretical perspective on the growth of an unprecendented corporate-military behemoth — the very topic that preoccupied President Eisenhower in his famous 1961 farewell address. The notion of a “privatized” military where corporations, the state, and the Pentagon forged a seamless whole, most systematically laid out in Melman’s The Permanent War Economy (1985), had become a durable element of American life. Since the U.S. had long been a state-capitalist society with a growing armed-services bureaucracy, all this was to be expected. Moreover, as the American postwar global presence expanded, it naturally followed that superpower economic, political, and military agendas would be advanced and consolidated in tandem. After all, by 2006 the U.S. had amassed more than five trillion dollars in overseas investments while accounting for some two trillion dollars in foreign trade yearly; its networks of finance, commerce, and trade ringed the planet, as did its system of military bases, deployments, and high-tech operations designed to protect corporate globalization. In this context the Pentagon has emerged as a central fixture in the development of modern U.S. capitalism to the extent that, as Melman long ago observed, “a modern military budget is a capital fund.” (Melman 1988: 9) Members of Congress are with few exceptions beholden to this system of “privatized” military goods and services, ready to support gargantuan Pentagon budgets in return for campaign funds and local boondoggles awarded to firms like Raytheon, General Dynamics, Lockheed-Martin, Honeywell, and Northrop-Grumman ostensibly for jobs and “growth”. In 2005 more than 35,000 lobbyists plied their trade in Washington -- 65 for every Congress member. As Chalmers Johnson notes, this form of “privatized” Keynesian militarism amounts to nothing less than full-scale corruption of the legislative branch. (Johnson 2007: 266) Blackwater and other PMC’s were of course late arrivals to the kind of racketeering that Smedley Butler anticipated many decades ago.

1AC – Neoliberalism (6/16)

**We’ll control the direction of the link – PMC’s are the biggest component of neoliberalism.**

Misencik 8 (http://socyberty.com/politics/the-military-industrial-complex-private-military-firms-and-the-effect-on-us-policy/, Jim Misencik, September 30th 2008)

With a rise in neoliberal ideology following the Cold War, a larger niche in the lucrative MIC had been created. Not only weaponry and technology but security services in general, manifested in the PMF, could be undertaken for private profit. According to international security expert P.W. Singer, PMFs are… “companies first and foremost… often tied through complex financial arrangements to other firms, both within and beyond their own industry…they can make use of complex corporate financing—ranging from the sale of [stock](http://socyberty.com/politics/the-military-industrial-complex-private-military-firms-and-the-effect-on-us-policy/) to intrafirm trade—and can engage in a wider variety of deals and contracts.” Like all companies, PMFs are reliant upon [financial](http://socyberty.com/politics/the-military-industrial-complex-private-military-firms-and-the-effect-on-us-policy/) relationships and are legally accountable to the bottom-line interests of increasing the [stock](http://socyberty.com/politics/the-military-industrial-complex-private-military-firms-and-the-effect-on-us-policy/) for their investors. PMFs, for very obvious reasons, make the greatest profits when they can participate in conflict. Additionally, through complex corporate financing arrangements, investors in seemingly unconnected sectors will also see their economic interests tied to warfare. This is candidly revealed by Fortune Magazine analysts when they note that… “[t]he upshot [to war in Iraq] is that the Pentagon is outsourcing as many tasks as possible…we wouldn’t be so crass as to describe it as a business opportunity—too many lives are on the line. But the fact is that if America goes to war, private companies are going to be deeply involved,” in both war and reconstruction. Statements to the contrary aside, they are precisely—and with depraving accuracy—describing war in Iraq as a ‘business opportunity’. But acknowledging the potential profitability of war is not a major departure from common understanding. The profitability of PMFs, however, combined with their direct war-fighting and support functions—thereby freeing up more soldiers to engage in direct combat—do, in fact, transcend the traditional MIC-sphere of political and economic influence. Neoliberal ideology demands the transfer of formerly public organizations to private hands. As “the ultimate representation of neoliberalism,” PMFs have moved the “control of force” farther from popular reach. This results in less popular control as one more layer insulates private organizations from the popular vote and creates greater ambiguity. Illinois Representative Jan Schakowsky affirms that… “[t]here’s a great lack of transparency when you contract out.” This substitution of public for private means of supporting military action allows the US to increase their actual numbers in conflict zones and to keep these numbers more or less concealed from the public eye. Additionally, because the executive branch of the US government maintains a large amount of budgetary discretion in allocating defense funds, these monies can be funneled to PMFs that become invisible when the official numbers of troops on the ground are made public.

1AC – Neoliberalism (7/16)

Neoliberal trickery spins PMC’s as beneficial – they have an unknown monopoly of force and we don’t even know about it.

Sheehy & Maogoto 8 (Lexis, Benedict Sheehy and Jackson N. Maogoto, ARTICLE & ESSAY: THE PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANY--UNRAVELLING THE THEORETICAL, LEGAL & REGULATORY MOSAIC, Fall 2008)

A common and appropriate starting point for discussion of the State-PMC relationship is the familiar and controversial figure, the mercenary soldier--the person who fights neither for patriotism nor legal duty, but for economic gain. Generally speaking, mercenaries are internationally condemned and outlawed, at least nominally. n11 The simple principle is that civilians should not engage in violence independent of state authorization or sanction. Indeed, this principle underlies much of criminal law. This principle encounters a sharp challenge in the instance of PMCs that carry on activities that seem to fall on the same paradigm as that of "traditional" mercenaries. n12 Three factors account for this state of affairs. n13 "Firstly, to the extent that such law can be identified, it provides little guidance regarding the services PMCs provide, whether training or actual combat." n14 "Secondly, despite a multitude of declarations and resolutions by the UN and several anti-mercenary conventions, State practice does not give rise to an absolute international norm banning the use of mercenaries." n15 "Lastly, States have been lax in promulgating and enforcing  [\*153]  municipal laws that restrict their citizens' ability to serve" PMCs. n17 The key reason is that the contemporary PMC, while bearing some philosophical similarities to the "traditional" mercenary, nonetheless differ in significant ways operationally. The primary four reasons why states do not equate mercenaries with PMCs, despite the fact that some PMCs provide combat services, are elucidated in the next three paragraphs. First, the definition of mercenary is aimed at identifying and deterring individual human actors. This aim is evident in the drafting of the 1989 International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, which concentrates on the recruitment and use of individual mercenaries or the status of individual mercenaries if they are captured during battle. n17 The modern-day reality is that corporations, and not individuals, are now providing private military services, including traditional mercenary services--i.e. the provision of offense oriented, combat troops. This corporate repackaging is the primary reason why States are unable or unwilling to make direct comparisons between the old individual mercenary and the new corporate PMCs. A second reason is that the hallmark of a mercenary--combat for sale--is not a hallmark shared by the majority of PMCs. Only a small number of PMCs provide offensive combat services. To date, States have not attempted to deconstruct the PMC industry by differentiating between the limited numbers of combat-ready PMCs and the more numerous PMCs that provide support and/or security services but do not engage in combat as a core business. Accordingly, for States to regulate PMCs they first must differentiate between a broad range of PMCs and distinguish not only between PMCs, but between the activities carried on within a single large PMC that may provide a broad range of services. n17 A third reason is that the refined marketing, sophisticated lobbying, and professional business practices of modern PMCs lends them credibility and encourages States to treat them differently from mercenaries. n19 While States view "traditional" mercenaries stereotypically as maverick, malevolent, and  [\*154]  individual misfits motivated solely by the prospect of gain they tend to view PMCs more positively. Indeed PMC executives and lobbyists have often been used to provide advice to government, and as a result, are viewed as professional and credible corporate partners. In contradistinction, "traditional" mercenaries are viewed by States as unreliable and without credibility. The fourth and final reason why States are reticent to equate PMCs with mercenaries involves economic rationalism and the trend toward policies that seek to increase efficiency in the public sector through the introduction of private-sector competition. In this context, States see financial and political advantage in using PMCs as cost- effective military service providers. A stark disparity exists between the international emphasis on prohibiting mercenary activity and the reality of a vigorous and expanding professional PMC industry that provides a full range of defense services. This disparity is significant for States considering how best to integrate PMCs into their national legal framework and whether or not to regulate the PMC industry. A significant tension exits between those who believe PMCs should be treated as just another growing industry able to provide services that were once government-provided services, and those who believe PMCs should be treated as pariahs and threats to national and international security--a conservative approach that parallels the historic perspective on mercenaries and opposes the commodification of violence holding to the potential of democratic accountability by maintaining the State monopoly of violence. Although in form resembling their antecedents, PMCs have developed a modus operandi compatible with the needs and strictures of the post-Cold War, state-based international system, leading to both implicit and explicit legitimacy. Explicit legitimacy is based on the increasing use of PMCs by countries which lends them a veneer of legitimacy. Implicit legitimacy is derived from both a lack of vociferous condemnation and their participation in normal business activities including developing industry associations, market formations, training, lobbying, and participation in traditional financial markets. To consolidate their legitimacy, PMCs have taken considerable steps to upgrade the image of what has historically been an unsavory profession.

1AC – Neoliberalism (8/16)

**PMCs commodifies violence – justifies endless atrocities as long as we can pay them**

Sheehy & Maogoto 8 (Lexis, Benedict Sheehy and Jackson N. Maogoto, ARTICLE & ESSAY: THE PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANY--UNRAVELLING THE THEORETICAL, LEGAL & REGULATORY MOSAIC, Fall 2008)

A safe peaceful environment and fair and effective political process are the driving and ultimate objectives in developing/maintaining paradigms of ordering human affairs; meaning achieving this is and ought to be the priority  [\*151]  of all policy decisions. The issue of whether the ordering involves public or private means, and the related issues of economic efficiency and market liberties are secondary, as the dominant values supporting human well-being are at stake. Accordingly, the matter of raw economic motivation for violence is problematic, and its related sub-issue of violence for profit is highly problematic. Humanity's history has demonstrated time and time again that mankind is not driven by a single over-riding concern, whether capitalism's economic dominance, communism's brutal equality, or Nietzsche's will to power. Humans are complex creatures working from a variety of different motivations, at times congruent and at times conflicting, all needed to make human life sustainable, worthwhile, and decent. This drive for a sustainable, worthwhile, decent life embodied in the political processes of the Nation-State should not be adumbrated by the will of a few with economic power who are prepared to pay others committed to the delivery of efficient violence to assist the wealthy who achieve their own narrow goals without due regard for the rest of the population and its interests. While Clausewitz feared that "political, social, economic, and religious motives" had become "hopelessly entangled" in modern warfare, n8 it may well be that it is and has always been that way. Nevertheless, his comment alerts us to an important reality--the resort to violence is too important an action to be left to the boardroom. Violence is the expression of a number of important complex human motivators and should not simply be a cheaper or easier means for the greedy or intransigent to gain power and/or monopolize resources. As these corporations become larger--both economically and politically--corporate managers increasingly engage in decision-making traditionally exercised by politicians. n9 While the political process has its own worries and politicians have their own agendas, it provides at least some level of transparency and accountability above that offered by the private corporate actor. It is thus unsettling that PMCs dedicated to profiting by violence or potential violence have amassed power such that they can affect conflict resolution, world economic stability, and geo-strategic negotiations, more so that their power stands unchecked. n10 A further alarm needs to be raised as the PMC, classified as a non-State actor, enjoys the rights and privileges of a private actor, including the privileges of free movement, relatively minor scrutiny of action, the privacy accorded to citizens, and lack of accountability to the general public, yet carries out the functions of violence traditionally accorded to the State and subject to the correlated scrutiny and accountability.

1AC – Neoliberalism **(9/16)**

Neoliberalism fosters inequality, cultures of fear, and rabid individualism - ultimately culminating in genocide and wars.

Giroux 6 (http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/symploke/v014/14.1giroux.html, The Emerging Authoritarianism in the United States: PolItical Culture Under the Bush/Chaney Administration, Henry A. Giroux)

It is virtually impossible to understand the rise of such multi-faceted authoritarianism in American society without analyzing the importance of neoliberalism as the defining ideology of the current historical moment.[17](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/symploke/v014/14.1giroux.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT16) While fascism does not need neoliberalism to develop, neoliberalism creates the ideological and economic conditions that can promote a uniquely American version of fascism.[17](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/symploke/v014/14.1giroux.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT17) Neoliberalism not [End Page 135] only undermines vital economic and political institutions and public spaces central to a democracy but also has no vocabulary for recognizing anti-democratic forms of power. Even worse, it accentuates a structural relationship between the state and the economy that produces hierarchies, concentrates power in relatively few hands, unleashes the most brutal elements of a rabid individualism, destroys the welfare state, incarcerates large numbers of its "disposable" population, economically disenfranchises large segments of the lower and middle classes, and reduces entire countries to pauperization.[17](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/symploke/v014/14.1giroux.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT18) Under neoliberalism, the state now makes a grim alignment with corporate capital and transnational corporations. Gone are the days when the state "assumed responsibility for a range of social needs"; instead, agencies of government now pursue a wide range of "'deregulations,' privatizations, and abdications of responsibility to the market and private philanthropy" (Steinmetz 337). Deregulation promotes "widespread, systematic disinvestment in the nation's basic productive capacity" (Bluestone and Harrison 6). Flexible production encourages wage slavery at home. And the search for ever greater profits leads to outsourcing, which accentuates the flight of capital and jobs abroad. Neoliberalism has now become the prevailing logic in the United States, and according to Stanley Aronowitz, "the neoliberal economic doctrine proclaiming the superiority of free markets over public ownership, or even public regulation of private economic activities, has become the conventional wisdom, not only among conservatives but among social progressives" (2003, 21). The ideology and power of neoliberalism also cut across national boundaries. Throughout the globe, the forces of neoliberalism are on the march, dismantling the historically guaranteed social provisions provided by the welfare state, defining profit-making as the essence of democracy, and equating freedom with the unrestricted ability of markets to "govern economic relations free of government regulation" (101). [End Page 136] Transnational in scope, neoliberalism now imposes its economic regime and market values on developing and weaker nations through structural adjustment policies enforced by powerful financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Secure in its dystopian vision that there are no alternatives, as Margaret Thatcher once put it, neoliberalism obviates issues of contingency, struggle, and social agency by celebrating the inevitability of economic laws in which the ethical ideal of intervening in the world gives way to the idea that we "have no choice but to adapt both our hopes and our abilities to the new global market" (Aronowitz 1998, 7). Coupled with a new culture of fear, market freedoms seem securely grounded in a defense of national security, capital, and property rights. In its capacity to dehistoricize and depoliticize society, as well as in its aggressive attempts to destroy all of the public spheres necessary for the defense of a genuine democracy, neoliberalism reproduces the conditions for unleashing the most brutalizing forces of capitalism and for accentuating the most central elements of proto-fascism. As the late Pierre Bourdieu argued, neoliberalism is a policy of depoliticization that attempts to liberate the economic sphere from all government controls: at the same time, neoliberalism uses the breathless rhetoric of the global victory of free-market rationality to cut public expenditures and undermine those non-commodified public spheres that serve as the repositories for critical education, language, and public intervention. Spewed forth by the mass media, right-wing intellectuals, and governments alike, neoliberal ideology, with its ongoing emphasis on deregulation and privatization, has found its material expression in an all-out attack on democratic values and on the very notion of the public sphere. Within the discourse of neoliberalism, the notion of the public good is devalued and, where possible, eliminated as part of a wider rationale for a handful of private interests to control as much of social life as possible in order to maximize personal profit. Public services [End Page 137] such as health care, child care, public assistance, education, and transportation are now subject to the rules of the market. Construing the public good as a private good and the needs of the corporate and private sector as the only smart investments, neoliberal ideology produces, legitimates, and exacerbates the existence of persistent poverty, inadequate health care, racial apartheid in the inner cities, and the growing inequalities between the rich and the poor.19

1AC – Neoliberalism (10/16)

**The privatization and outsourcing of war causes imperialist power wars**

Herrera 8 (http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/view/6373/1/310/, The Mercenary-Industrial Complex: Imperialism and Private Armies, Rémy Herrera, 1-17-08)

It is necessary for us to reflect theoretically in order to understand the functioning of the capitalist state today, especially its repressive apparatuses, whose social and ethnic composition has changed and which are also crossed by the class struggle – just like the ideological apparatuses of the state are, but in another, indeed much more violent manner. Born in 1967, during the Vietnam War, the movement Resistance Inside the Army (RITA) had a real impact on young draftees in the US. The relative loss of control by the military leadership over parts of the military partly explains the end of the draft and the professionalization of the armed forces. This is a quite global phenomenon, which can be observed with some differences from one country to another in all the capitalist states. We need to think deeply about the history of the popular resistances, including inside militaries. However, this reflection must also concern the fundamental current role of the armed forces within the revolutionary processes, especially in Latin America and the Caribbean, from Venezuela to Bolivia, for a better definition of how to appeal to progressive soldiers and officers in their crucial alliance with the people, in order to consolidate these revolutionary advances on the whole continent – and beyond this continent, for the long transition to world socialism. Apart from oil – and Iraq has enormous reserves – what makes these wars necessary for the US ruling classes is the hegemonic leadership by US financial capital over the collective imperialism of the triad of the US, Europe and Japan. It is not only Bush and Big Oil, but finance capital considered as a class, with its dominant global system that can only be maintained today by violence. Nevertheless, US imperialism will not be able to renew itself through war. The destruction of capital caused by these wars is considerable for the countries of the South in which they are fought, but insufficient to create a new long-run cycle of capital expansion, in terms of technological impacts – positive only for the military-industrial complex – as well as of effects of effective demand – observed only in the short run. The United States lacks the resources to finance new wars. The military burden (approximately four percent of the GDP) is not absolutely unbearable – it is lower than during the Vietnam war, and much lower than during World War II. But the public deficits and debts are huge and amplified by the neoliberal management of the capitalist structural crisis. Over-indebted, the US economy is at the edge of a major financial collapse. It depends too much on the exterior, grows at low intensity, and is plundered by its own high finance, which submits it to a logic of perpetual wars – at the detriment of all the peoples of the world as well as the US working classes. In general, as the state externalizes the logistical support of defense, more and more private military companies fall under the control of high finance. DynCorp was bought out by Veritas Capital, MPRI by L-3, Vinnell by the financial group Carlyle, then by Frank Carlucci, former vice-director of the CIA and Secretary for Defense for Ronald Reagan. And when this control includes pension funds, honest US citizens take part without knowledge. The economic and military dimensions of the crisis – profit and war – are narrowly dependent. Finance capital repatriates more and more benefits from the whole world that the US military bombards or threatens to bombard. But the world system will not be able to continue to function like this: it will have to change. For the US, the next target is Iran – one of the rare states in the South to keep a national bourgeois project (by the way, compatible with the capitalist system). We know that the key of the conflict concentrates on the nuclear problem. However, the US government refuses the general prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Will the “great democracies” never make use of such weapons? Did not the most perfect among them, the US, already use them? Are not the “most civilized” among these democracies – including Europe and Japan – responsible for genocides (colonization, slavery, Shoah and imperialist wars)? The question of the nature of the régime in Iran and of its eventual democratization must be dissociated from the threat of war directed against the Iranian people – which is absolutely unacceptable. Just like the recognition of Saddam Hussein’s crimes (those against our Iraqi communist comrades, among others) will never legitimate the aggressive war that imperialism makes suffer to the martyred, heroic and probably soon victorious Iraqi people. Following its defeat in Vietnam, US imperialism turned against the Latin American peoples, by imposing neo-fascist dictatorships on almost the whole continent. Thus, it would be useful to anticipate, right now, that its next targets could be – not only China, but also – the revolutionary advances realized by the people in Latin America and the Caribbean, after the defeat of imperialism – which comes, ineluctably, in Iraq. Consequently, without pessimism, let us be lucid, organized and above all united in our struggle against imperialism and for socialism.

1AC – Neoliberalism **(11/16)**

Imperialism and globalization causes endless wars.

Shariati 7 (http://payvand.com/news/07/dec/1262.html, 12-27-07 Research: Globalization, Imperialism, Militarism, Social Imperialism and The U.S. National Debt, Dr. Mehdi S. Shariati)

The occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan in the age of concerted and spreading challenges to global capitalism in general and neo-liberalism in particular attest to a global class conflict. And they remain and will continue to present the greatest imperial crises for America while in her neo-liberal and neo-conservative mode. The human cost at the present and the future and the devastating impact on future generations both in Iraq and in the United States will dwarf the current and future expenditures associated with actual use of personnel and weapons in the occupation and the attempt at subduing Iraq. But the cost of this neo-liberal/neo-conservative militarism and regime change/building, disguised as "war on Terror", and export of "democracy" produced by the contemporary "organic" as well as traditional intellectuals, ought to be viewed in the context of greater hegemonic strategy for world domination. This attempt however, has several obstacles none of which can easily be ignored. And it is a mistake to think that only a particular party in office rather than the structure itself creates such crises and/or show hegemonic tendencies. To attribute the imperial practices to a particular political party, then assumes a style of management or variations in the composition of the class (as often erroneously assumed) in each period a particular political party is in power. The "different and sometimes rival conceptions of empire can even become internalized in the same space" (Harvey, 1990:5) and only it is the expression of imperial tendencies that changes (i.e., alleged Clinton's "demilitarization" and Bush's militarism). The line of demarcation in all levels is blurred. In fact the identification of Keynesianism with the U.S. Democratic Party is increasingly a misplaced alliance. As Chalmers Johnson (2007:68) points out "Traditional Keynesianism is a stable two party system composed of deficit spending in bad times and debt payment in good times. Military Keynesianism is an unstable one party system. With no political check, debt accrues until it reaches a crisis point." The modern fiscal policy was born and nurtured in the context of Keynesian strategy of saving capitalism, but it neither prescribed nor forecasted such a fiscal crisis as the United States national debt. And certainly, as an ideology designed to save capitalism from without, did not and could not provide answers to its internal contradictions. "The public finances are one of the best starting points for an investigation of the society, especially though not exclusively for its political life" (cited in O'Connor, 1971:3). As one indicator of a well entrenched "aristocracy of finance" (O'Connor, 1971:190), are the endless tax breaks for the rich and a tax increase for the working class (exploitation). These tax cuts have generated massive windfall for he rich and well to do of this society. Certainly it has as expected by the proponents of the "trickle down" theory some jobs for the working class whose wage rate has not changed since 1972. As the interest payment on the debt is made, the working class must pay higher taxes to pay the interests and also more likely to fall victim to the austerity measures imposed by the condition of indebtedness. Tax cut for the rich, therefore becomes a coercive method in protecting and expanding the interests of the upper classes (17). Just to show that with regard to the national debt, political party affiliation and control of the United States congress is not an important determinant of debt. It is important to point out that since 1938, the democrats were in control of the White House for 35 years and Republican for 34 years. Over this period the national debt has increased at an average annual rate of 8.7%. For Democrats it was 8.3% and slightly higher for Republican at an average rate of 9.7%. (Cited in McGourty, 2007). Of course when correlated with the tax structure and the class aspect we can see the tilt in favor of the accumulation. Prior to World War II wealthiest Americans paid nearly all of the federal income tax. In order to finance the war, income taxes were increased and the majority of workers had to pay income taxes for the first time. As federal tax rates on the wealthy were decreased starting in the 1960s, the tax burden on middle and low income Americans began to grow. This is one of the largest opportunity cost imposed on the taxpayers, the working class and particularly for people on "desolation row." Today, it continues to be the case but is rarely viewed in the context of class struggle. Similarly, the outcome of that struggle, the national debt and all of its consequences is rarely viewed in that context. In the United States, the effects of neo-liberalism is more noticeable as the rich grow richer and the poor grow in numbers and poorer. Because of the inability of the borrowers whether it is the farmers in the United States or countries battered and robbed as colonial possession struggling on the periphery of the world capitalist system to meet debt service obligations. The result is debt trap, alienation, poverty and predisposition to violence. Militarization and war on the one hand, and the worsening position of the working class (both lower and the middle classes) within the advanced societies, on the other, thus rep resent two sides of the same coin, (Pollin, 2004; Wood, 2003, and Mann, 2003). Furthermore, this inequality is matched by a rising culture of violence, and intensification and glorification of unrestrained consumerism through indebtedness on the one hand and the evolving seclusion of the well to do behind gated communities. Schmitt and Zepperer (2006:17), have documented that the United States economy suffers from substantial "exclusion, including high level of income inequality, high relative and absolute poverty rates, poor and unequal educational outcomes, poor health outcomes, and high rates of crime and incarceration." Recently (2007) UNICEF reported that among the developed economies, the United States and England ranked 20 and 21 respectively in worsening condition of their children. In terms of happiness, the children of these two countries are at the bottom of the scale and the abuses of alcohol, prevalence of violence, drug abuse, sexual abuse and poor health are major concerns. Of course, United States and Britain have had many rising social problems. Nevertheless, the severity varied from period to period. However, with the advent of the neo-liberalism policies and accompanying globalization, militarism, global accumulation and debt service, their costs became increasingly socialized. U.S. corporations aided by subsidies are selling weapons systems to governments which are killing their own people. "Rogue" allies have terrible records of human rights violations including the murder of their own people. The need for overseas expansion of "surplus capital" and the expansion of American economic, political and cultural hegemony according to O'connor (1971:152-3) are the root causes of the American Militarism. The "Garrison State" (V.K. Dibble, cited in O'connor, 1971:156) produces a culture of militarism and military based patriotism enabling a worldwide chain of military "colonies." According to Johnson, oil and arms barons have created "a military juggernaut intent on world domination" and are exercising "preemptive intervention" for "oil, Israel, and... to fulfill our self-perceived destiny as a New Rome." (Johnson, 2001).

**1AC – Non-Combatants (12/16)**

Contention 3 is Non-Combatants

The use of contractors blurs the distinctions between soldiers and civilians.

Isenberg 9 (U.S. Navy veteran David Isenberg is a researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, Jan 23, 2009, http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Dogs\_of\_War\_Slippery\_slope\_999.html) KM

Like Dunlap, he is critical of the increasing military involvement in domestic operations. Back in the 1980s it was the congressionally mandated military involvement in anti–drug trafficking efforts. Nowadays it is homeland security, as evidenced by the creation of the Northern Command. He also points out how the use of contractors can confuse the distinction between combatants and non-combatants. During the first combat deployment of the RQ–4A Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, 56 contractors deployed as part of an 82–member military, civil service and contractor "team." Subsequently, the use of contractors in this type of role grew further, to the point that contractors began "conducting combat-type operations" that included operating the Global Hawk and even piloting it. He writes that this could create numerous issues -– not the least of which was the fact that UAV contractor pilots could be considered unlawful combatants under the Law of Armed Conflict, yet the American military continued to rely upon contractors. A publication generated at Maxwell AFB in Alabama even addressed this issue in 2004, warning that "the citizen must be a citizen not a soldier. Â… War law has a short shrift for the non–combatant who violates its principles by taking up arms." And the military has even specifically designed some weapon systems to rely upon contractor support, instead of uniformed personnel, claiming it is more cost effective. How did this all start? Watson says in the 1950s, when the federal government "required its agencies to procure all commercial goods and services from the private sector, except when 'not in the public interest.'" Fifty–one years later, Congress required federal agencies to examine the outsourcing of all staff positions that were not "inherently governmental." Of course, the requirement applied to positions held by military personnel, and the Defense Department complied, mandating that "functions and duties that are inherently governmental are barred from private sector performance." In the United States the PMC industry has been fueled by the same zeal for market-based approaches that drove the deregulation of the electricity, airline and telephone-service industries. The military was considered to be particularly well-suited to public-private partnerships, because its need for services fluctuates so radically and abruptly. In light of such sharp spikes in demand, it was thought, it would be more efficient for the military to call on a group of temporary, highly trained experts in times of war –– even if that meant paying them a premium –– rather than to rely on a permanent standing army that drained its resources (with pension plans, health insurance and so forth) in times of peace. But here is the problem for Watson. He writes, "The ability to apply military force is an obligation of profound significance for the American people, and we didn't fully appreciate that idea in the context of contractors. I think of a great quotation that I wish I had heard back when I sat where you do now: Democratic government is responsible government -- which means accountable government -- and the essential problem in contracting out is that responsibility and accountability are greatly diminished." Watson wonders whether military forces have the means to effectively control contractors. He does note the amendments to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act which have expanded its scope over contractors, but notes that prosecution still remains at the discretion of a district attorney. This contrasts starkly with provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which has worldwide applicability to American military personnel and whose use resides with commanders. While he is aware that a change in the law supposedly made contractors subject to the uniform code in times of a "declared war or a contingency operation," he still finds that as a matter of practicality, political realities rendered the change exceedingly difficult to implement. He also finds the debate about some jobs being inherently governmental –– and thus, theoretically, off limits to contractors –– becoming increasingly meaningless. He notes that because of advancements in technology, even the operation of major weapon systems –– such as the F–117A stealth fighter, M1–A tank, Patriot missile and Global Hawk have became "contractor dependent." In his view this helps erode military culture. He sees military customs being changed into mere "customer service," not all that different from calling for assistance regarding your computer and being connected to a help center in India. Watson's core argument is that the U.S. government has "long recognized that the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society." But in the future, if soldiers and civilian contractors are equally important parts of a unified military structure, military law may no longer apply, which would mean commanders will no longer be involved in even the most serious disciplinary issues affecting their troops. And then George Washington's famous quote, "Discipline is the soul of an army," may become just a historical memory.

**1AC – Non-Combatants (13/16)**

This means we don’t care about the lives of contractors because they are not ‘honorable soldiers’. As a result, the state views all of our lives as inconsequential.

Taussig-Rubbo 9 (Lexis, Outsourcing Sacrifice: The Labor of Private Military Contractors, Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, Winter, 2009)

Rather than foregrounding the legal liability of private military contractors and their employers, this Article has addressed the sacrificial liability of the U.S. government. Having described the traditional structure linking sacrifice and citizenship in the United States, I asked what the contractor's relationship was to this tradition and found that it  [\*173]  was one of exclusion. However, among contractors, and even among high-level officials, there is some recognition, albeit informal and ad hoc, that contractors' deaths can be considered "sacrifices." This was especially evident when contractors were U.S. citizens, although I offered a few examples of how this recognition extended to contractors from other parts of the world, such as Fiji. These were sacrifices to or for a range of entities and ideas: the client, the country, freedom, or the war on terror. In the examination of one noteworthy case, the killing of four armed U.S. citizen contractors in Fallujah, I urged that the U.S. reception of that event could be seen in relation to a concept of popular sovereignty. This conceptualization of sovereignty designates ordinary citizens as latent vehicles for or of the sovereign - even though "the People" are ephemeral, their attackers targeted them as relating to the collectivity and thereby summoned it for an American audience, illuminating the latent potential of the part (the citizen) to stand in for the larger whole (the sovereign). The designation "independent contractor" was overwhelmed by the status of "American" and "citizen." I turned to this analysis in an effort to grasp why it was that the legal relation of "independent contractor" was not adequate to grasping the event, and why it was that the contractors' deaths could not or would not remain banal and insignificant to the U.S. I then examined the contractors' employer, Blackwater, in its attempts to assert sovereign immunity from the litigation commenced by the contractors' families. The status of governmental sovereign promised a position of no legal liability - and thus in the context of my narrative, served precisely the opposite ends of the relation between part and whole in relation to the popular sovereign. It served to ensure that the sovereign would not be liable to citizens - since an essential feature of the relation is one in which the sovereign - at war - can ask for life and cause death. Two strong forces seem to be at work: a centrifugal force that pushes responsibility and liability outwards through contracting and privatization; and a centripetal force that pulls the privatized sector back towards the sovereign in order to be immune and remain a viable business model. Were the contractor companies successful in their arguments - which thus far they have not been - and were contractors' deaths not considered sacrifices, we would see a new alignment, one in which the government had neither sacrificial liability nor legal liability for those who die undertaking work on its behalf. The emergent and largely informal recognition of sacrifice I describe raises an obvious question: should contractors be officially included in the tradition of national sacrifice? Should they be given Purple Hearts and buried at Arlington? If contractors are to act on behalf of the sovereign - if they are to kill or be killed in the interests of the United States - perhaps their deaths should be recognized as sacrifices. Or, if our concern is only the discrepancy between the recognition offered soldiers and contractors,  [\*174]  both could be leveled downwards. To the extent we share Scarry's concern about a standing army, and to the extent we are skeptical that seeing their losses as sacrifices actually furthers the goal of governmental accountability, perhaps we should not honor either. Both contractors and soldiers, from this radical viewpoint, can be seen as examples of an outsourcing of the duties of the citizen-soldier. Calling contractors' deaths sacrifices would increase the prestige of contractors, perhaps definitively freeing them of the mercenary stigma. If the goal of granting such recognition is to duplicate the costs which officials confront when soldiers die carrying out national policy, it is not clear that this would happen. The likely problem is that the citizenry would not see the contractors' deaths as relating to themselves, and thus the deaths would not trigger them to ask their representatives for an accounting of why the loss (the sacrifice) was justifiable. Indeed, it seems plausible that such a policy would have the opposite outcome by offering a vision of government as ever more autonomous and present the public with private sacred sites - such as that at the Blackwater headquarters - over which they have little claim. The specter of a government which engages in violence but avoids sacrificial meaning has been raised by Giorgio Agamben in his book Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. [n215](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277518163523&returnToKey=20_T9629972810&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.661297.0754099819" \l "n215) He urges that sovereign power describes the actor who/which can kill without committing a sacrifice or a homicide. Sovereignty exists in a double exception from human law and divine law. Drawing on the work of Paul Kahn, my analysis has supposed a different point of departure: that sacrifice and sovereignty are deeply intertwined. In the United States, the link seems to have been critical to the understanding of citizenship and of slavery. At the core of my analysis, then, is an entirely different point than that which Agamben advances: the enormous difficulty and, in the instance of the Fallujah incident, the failure of the attempt to construct the actor who is unsacrificeable. And yet our examination of the attempt to outsource sacrifice provides a point of contact with Agamben; it is precisely in order to avoid the fact that the deaths of soldiers are considered to be sacrifices that the contractor seems to have emerged. It is the contractor whom law and policy attempts to designate as one whose death is not a sacrifice. Perhaps, then, we see the United States attempting to become a sovereign in Agamben's sense, attempting to shed this layer of liability.

**1AC – Non-Combatants (14/16)**

The state viewing people as disposable populations turns the world order into a machine of horror and destruction. This is the internal link into every single impact.

Santos 3 (http://bad.eserver.org/issues/2003/63/santos.html, Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Issue #63, April 2003)

According to Franz Hinkelammert, the West has repeatedly been under the illusion that it should try to save humanity by destroying part of it. This is a salvific and sacrificial destruction, committed in the name of the need to radically materialize all the possibilities opened up by a given social and political reality over which it is supposed to have total power. This is how it was in colonialism, with the genocide of indigenous peoples, and the African slaves. This is how it was in the period of imperialist struggles, which caused millions of deaths in two world wars and many other colonial wars. This is how it was under Stalinism, with the Gulag, and under Nazism, with the Holocaust. And now today, this is how it is in neoliberalism, with the collective sacrifice of the periphery and even the semiperiphery of the world system. With the war against Iraq, it is fitting to ask whether what is in progress is a new genocidal and sacrificial illusion, and what its scope might be. It is above all appropriate to ask if the new illusion will not herald the radicalization and the ultimate perversion of the Western illusion: destroying all of humanity in the illusion of saving it. Sacrificial genocide arises from a totalitarian illusion manifested in the belief that there are no alternatives to the present-day reality, and that the problems and difficulties confronting it arise from failing to take its logic of development to ultimate consequences. If there is unemployment, hunger and death in the Third World, this is not the result of market failures; instead, it is the outcome of market laws not having been fully applied. If there is terrorism, this is not due to the violence of the conditions that generate it; it is due, rather, to the fact that total violence has not been employed to physically eradicate all terrorists and potential terrorists. This political logic is based on the supposition of total power and knowledge, and on the radical rejection of alternatives; it is ultra-conservative in that it aims to reproduce infinitely the status quo. Inherent to it is the notion of the end of history. During the last hundred years, the West has experienced three versions of this logic, and, therefore, seen three versions of the end of history: Stalinism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the plan; Nazism, with its logic of racial superiority; and neoliberalism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the market. The first two periods involved the destruction of democracy. The last one trivializes democracy, disarming it in the face of social actors sufficiently powerful to be able to privatize the state and international institutions in their favor. I have described this situation as a combination of political democracy and social fascism. One current manifestation of this combination resides in the fact that intensely strong public opinion, worldwide, against the war is found to be incapable of halting the war machine set in motion by supposedly democratic rulers. At all these moments, a death drive, a catastrophic heroism, predominates, the idea of a looming collective suicide, only preventable by the massive destruction of the other. Paradoxically, the broader the definition of the other and the efficacy of its destruction, the more likely collective suicide becomes. In its sacrificial genocide version, neoliberalism is a mixture of market radicalization, neoconservatism and Christian fundamentalism. Its death drive takes a number of forms, from the idea of "discardable populations", referring to citizens of the Third World not capable of being exploited as workers and consumers, to the concept of "collateral damage", to refer to the deaths, as a result of war, of thousands of innocent civilians. The last, catastrophic heroism, is quite clear on two facts: according to reliable calculations by the Non-Governmental Organization MEDACT, in London, between 48 and 260 thousand civilians will die during the war and in the three months after (this is without there being civil war or a nuclear attack); the war will cost 100 billion dollars, enough to pay the health costs of the world's poorest countries for four years. Is it possible to fight this death drive? We must bear in mind that, historically, sacrificial destruction has always been linked to the economic pillage of natural resources and the labor force, to the imperial design of radically changing the terms of economic, social, political and cultural exchanges in the face of falling efficiency rates postulated by the maximalist logic of the totalitarian illusion in operation. It is as though hegemonic powers, both when they are on the rise and when they are in decline, repeatedly go through times of primitive accumulation, legitimizing the most shameful violence in the name of futures where, by definition, there is no room for what must be destroyed. In today's version, the period of primitive accumulation consists of combining neoliberal economic globalization with the globalization of war. The machine of democracy and liberty turns into a machine of horror and destruction.

**1AC – Non-Combatants (15/16)**

When the state views us as disposable, it justifies atrocities like the Holocaust – we are nothing more than objects to be killed.

Dillon 99,( Michael Dillon, Professor, University of Lancaster, **19**99, “Another Justice,” Political Theory 27(2), JSTOR)

Otherness is born(e) within the self as an integral part of itself and in such a way that it always remains an inherent stranger to itself." It derives from the lack, absence, or ineradicable incompleteness which comes from having no security of tenure within or over that of which the self is a particular hermeneutical manifestation; namely, being itself. The point about the human, betrayed by this absence, is precisely that it is not sovereignly self-possessed and complete, enjoying undisputed tenure in and of itself. Modes of justice therefore reliant upon such a subject lack the very foundations in the self that they most violently insist upon seeing inscribed there. This does not, however, mean that the dissolution of the subject also entails the dissolution of Justice. Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism. They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability. Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, "we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure. But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being.

A loss of value to life precedes all other impacts – death is preferable to a valueless life

Mitchell 5 [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and Terrorism," [Research in Phenomenology](http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/brill/rip;jsessionid=7macig5us3335.victoria), Volume 35, Number 1, 2005 , pp. 171-217]

Devastation (Verwistung) is the process by which the world becomes a desert (Wfiste), a sandy expanse that seemingly extends without end, without landmarks or direction, and is devoid of all life.20 If we follow the dialogue in thinking an ancient Greek notion of "life" as another name for "being," then the lifeless desert is the being-less desert. The world that becomes a lifeless desert is consequently an unworld from which being has withdrawn. The older prisoner makes this connection explicit, "The being of an age of devastation would then consist in the abandonment of being" (GA 77: 213). As we have seen, this is a process that befalls the world, slowly dissolving it of worldliness and rendering it an "unworld" (cf. GA 7: 88, 92f./EP, 104, 107f., etc.). Yet this unworld is not simply the opposite of world; it remains a world, but a world made desert. The desert is not the complete absence of world. Such an absence would not be reached by devastation (Verwisiung), but rather by annihilation (Vernichtung); and for Heidegger, annihilation is far less of a concern than devastation: "Devastation is more uncanny than mere annihilation [blofle Vernichtung]. Mere annihilation sweeps aside all things including even nothingness, while devastation on the contrary orders [bestelht] and spreads everything that blocks and prevents" (WHD, 11/29-30; tin). Annihilation as a thought of total absence is a thought from metaphysics. It is one with a thinking of pure presence: pure presence, pure absence, and. purely no contact between them. During another lecture course on H6lderlin, this time in 1942 on the hymn "The Ister," Heidegger claims that annihilation is precisely the agenda of America in regards to the "homeland," which is here equated with Europe: "We know today that the Anglo-Saxon world of Americanism has resolved to annihilate [zu vernichten] Europe, that is, the homeland, and that means: the inception of the Western world. The inceptual is indestructible [unzersto'rbar]" (GA 53: 68/54; tm). America is the agent of technological devastation, and it operates under the assumptions of presence and absence that it itself is so expert at dissembling. America resolves to annihilate and condemns itself to fdilure in so doing, for the origin is "indestructible." We could take this a step further and claim that only because the origin cannot be annihilated is it possible to destroy it. This possibility of destruction is its indestructible character. It can always be further destroyed, but you will never annihilate it. Americanism names the endeavor or resolution to drive the destruction of the world ever further into the unworld. America is the agent of a malevolent being. This same reasoning explains why the older man's original conception of evil had to be rethought. Evil is the "devastation of the earth and the annihilation of the human essence that goes along with it" (GA 77: 207), he said, but this annihilation is simply too easy, too much of an "Americanism." The human essence is not annihilated in evil-who could care about that? Instead it is destroyed and devastated by evil. Devastation does not annihilate, but brings about something worse, the unworld. Without limit, the desert of the unworld spreads, ever worsening and incessantiy urging itself to new expressions of malevolence. Annihilation would bring respite and, in a perverse sense, relief. There would be nothing left to protect and guard, nothing left to concern ourselves with-nothing left to terrorize. Devastation is also irreparable; no salvation can arrive for it. The younger man is able to voice the monstrous conclusion of this thinking of devastation: "Then malevolence, as which devastation occurs [sich ereignet], would indeed remain a -basic characteristic of being itself" (GA 77: 213, 215; em). The older man agrees, "being would be in the ground of its essence malevolent" (GA 77: 215). Being is not evil; it is something much worse; being is malevolent.

1AC – Solvency (16/16)

Contention 4 is Solvency

**The plan solves our advantages – governmental abandonment of contractors is key to break down the industry.**

Sheehy & Maogoto 8 (Lexis, Benedict Sheehy and Jackson N. Maogoto, ARTICLE & ESSAY: THE PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANY--UNRAVELLING THE THEORETICAL, LEGAL & REGULATORY MOSAIC, Fall 2008)

A second remedy, revocation of a charter, is limited to the power of the State. It is not at all clear why this remedy, so carefully reserved to the State, is so seldom invoked. While it may be undesirable to over use it--it is the equivalent of the death penalty for corporations. Given the interests and high stakes involved in PMC activities, it should be brought to the forefront as a remedy to control PMC behavior. Despite States' aversion to using this remedy against corporate serial offenders, the bleak enforcement and accountability regime seems to strongly suggest that it is high time the remedy is re-visited. n172  [\*170]  A second set of recommendations arising from corporate law is the notion of some form of vetting and control of directors. This could be done by setting standards to be required of PMC directors. These standards would require knowledge of more than business or even military matters. It would require a certain standard of understanding of the laws governing war and human rights. Where the directors are directing the utilization of the corporation's assets for such risky, potentially fatal ends, surely something more ought to be demanded of them than a mere nose for business and a sharp eye for profit. Like other professionals taking the lives of others into their hands, they ought to be held to a higher standard--the standard of a professional. Just as doctors and attorneys are required to have particular education and to swear certain oaths to pursue something more than mere profit and self-interest, society could certainly require of directors of PMC’s the same. Indeed, given the vast powers bestowed on directors in the common business corporation, there are increasing calls among corporate governance experts for just such a regulatory system to be implemented in various jurisdictions. Experts are suggesting that professional bodies with examinations, regulation, and powers need to be established with directors obligated to comply with the regulations. n173 Indeed, current law in some jurisdictions precludes certain people from being directors on the basis of prior misdeeds. n174 There is no reason such a framework could not be developed tailored specifically to the issues surrounding PMC’s.

Specifically, government management is key to avoiding perpetual war – the US is missing from key policy discussions.

Avant 6 (“Private Military Companies and the Future of War” Institute for Global and International Studies at George Washington University, Deborah April, <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200604.military.avant.privatemilitarycompanies.html>)

**How does all this bode for the future of war?** There are two views. **The worst**-case scenario **sees** the use of **PSC**s as an **unleashing** of **the dogs of war** that will undermine democratic control of force and security as a public good. **Security will become a private good leading to less public order and more anarchy**. This vision of the future is similar to the portrait Martin Van Creveld painted in The Transformation of War. The best-case scenario, though, suggests that PSCs may be the beginnings of a class of global private professionals. PSCs will be a tool for spreading order and the potential for stability and economic growth to less ordered parts of the world.  There are, of course, many possibilities in between these two scenarios, but I contend what will determine which path private security lead toward is how private security is managed. PSCs respond to market incentives. **A purely free market is most likely to lead to a “race to the bottom**” like the worst case scenario predicts. **States may be tempted to use PSCs to enhance their securit**y vis-à-vis others, but in a global market individual state action cannot solve risks on its own. Individual state policy will only have influence if the state is also a consumer and unilateral reliance on PSCs may tempt states to take actions that their citizens view as illegitimate. **The path toward international private professionals will require some level of cooperation among consumers** (states, private companies, NGOs, etc.) at the global level. This kind of cooperation will be most likely to generate professional, ethical, and legal standards that both inform PSCs of proper behavior and reward those that behave properly.  Many in the private-security industry claim to welcome such standards and suggest that they can enhance the legitimacy of reputable firms, reduce risk, and ease the operational inefficiencies associated with a market of multiple standards. **There are some efforts to move forward on discussions about this kind of framework. At present, however, the U.S**. (the single largest consumer**) is missing from there discussions, partly due to U.S. government worries that global standards** may impinge on the flexibility that PSCs can offer to the U.S. Other states, international organizations and NGOs also refuse to engage in such discussions, citing moral or ethical reasons.

Inherency – Dependence on PMC’s Now

The war in Afghanistan relies on PMC – recent trends increase the security role of contractors

Schwartz 10 (Moshe, Specialist in Defense Acquisition, Congressional Research Service, 1–19–10, “The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress”, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi–bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA513870)KFC

The United States relies on contractors to provide a wide variety of services in Iraq and Afghanistan, including security. Private firms known as private security contractors (PSCs) are hired to protect individuals, transport convoys, forward operating bases, buildings, and other economic infrastructure, as well as train security forces. While DOD has previously contracted for security in Bosnia and elsewhere, it appears that in Iraq and Afghanistan DOD is for the first time relying so heavily on armed contractors to provide security during combat or stability operations. As of September 2009, there were almost 22,000 armed private security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. Recent contracting trends indicate that the number of such contractors in Iraq may decline while the number in Afghanistan may continue to increase. Many analysts and government officials believe that DOD would be unable to execute its mission without PSCs

PMC’s in Iraq set dangerous precedent – contractors undermine accountability and oversight with corruption.

**Hefling 08** (Kimberly, Boston Globe, “Contracts have cost taxpayers $85 billion”, 8–13–08, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2008/08/13/contracts\_have\_cost\_taxpayers\_85\_billion/)KFC

Military contracts in the Iraq theater have cost taxpayers at least $85 billion, and, when it comes to providing security, they might not be any cheaper than using military personnel, according to a report released yesterday. The release of the Congressional Budget Office study comes on the heels of increased scrutiny of contractors in the last year, some of whom have been investigated in connection to shooting deaths of Iraqis and the accidental electrocutions of US troops. The United States has relied more heavily on contractors in Iraq than in any other war to provide services ranging from food service to guarding diplomats. About 20 percent of funding for operations in Iraq has gone to contractors, the report said. Currently, there are at least 190,000 contractors in Iraq, which is a ratio of about one contractor per US service member, the report says. The study does not include monetary figures for 2008, so the total paid to contractors for work in the Iraq theater since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 is probably much higher. If spending for contractors continues at about the same rate, by the end of the year, an estimated $100 billion will have been paid to military contractors for operations in Iraq. Senator Kent Conrad, a North Dakota Democrat, chairman of the Senate budget committee, which requested the CBO review, said the Bush administration's reliance on military contractors has set a dangerous precedent. The use of contractors "restricts accountability and oversight; opens the door to corruption and abuse; and, in some instances, may significantly increase the cost to American taxpayers," he said in a statement.

The US is still employing PMC – even with their massive issues

Democracy Now 6/21 (June 21, 2010 ,http://www.democracynow.org/2010/6/21/headlines/us\_awards\_blackwater\_120m\_contract\_in\_afghanistan)KFC

The Obama administration has awarded a new contract to the private military firm Blackwater in Afghanistan. The Blackwater offshoot US Training Center will receive over $120 million to guard US consulates in two Afghan towns. The Obama administration has continued to employ Blackwater despite numerous controversies, including the indictments of five former company executives on weapons charges and the massacre of seventeen Iraqi civilians by Blackwater guards in September 2007.

Inherency – Dependence on PMC’s Now

Status quo forces have significant PMC involvement, changing that is key to mission success.

Shakowsky 10 (Jan Shakowsky, House of Representatives, January 24, 2010, http://www.uslaboragainstwar.org/article.php?id=22078)

WASHINGTON, DC (January 24, 2010) – A troubling report from the Congressional Research Service found that private security contractors, like Blackwater, comprise nearly one-third of the armed force in Afghanistan and nearly one-fifth in Iraq. Rep. Jan Schakowsky, D–IL, wrote to Secretary Robert Gates following the release of the report urging him to scale down security contractors and return those functions to U.S. military forces. The report, “The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress,” was released January 19, 2009. “Our reliance on private security contractors has created a situation that jeopardizes the national security of the United States and threatens our mission in Iraq and Afghanistan. The proliferation of private security contractors on inherently military missions is troubling on several levels. It is dangerous to rely on hired guns to provide vital security services in war zones, and I believe that the United States must move toward responsibly returning these essential armed functions to U.S. government and military personnel.”

Internal Link Extension – Privatization of the Military (1/3)

PMC’s are a revolution in military technique- they are the final privatizing of armies- Iraq and Afghanistan prove

Boggs 8 (PHD-Poli/Sci @ Berkeley, Prof @ Washington University in St. Louis, UCLA, USC, UC, Irvine, and Carleton University in Ottawa, *Fast Capitalism* vol 4.1, 8) ET

The growth of U.S. militarism over the past few decades appears to have moved beyond the confines of the Pentagon behemoth, with the rapid expansion of corporate warriors – referred to here as Professional Military Contractors (PMC’s) – that have taken off with the Bush presidency and its shift toward a “Revolution in Military Affairs”. These “private soldiers”, many regarded as highly-paid mercenaries, now perform a wide range of battlefield, security, and “reconstruction” activities at a time when U.S. armed forces face mounting recruitment crises as combat troops are stretched to exhaustion in Iraq and Afghanistan. PMC’s like DynCorp, KBR, Blackwater, and MPRI draw from combat veterans around the world to provide vital military-support, construction, and related functions. Predictably, those who run the PMC’s harbor a strong, even fanatical, interest in war, promoting an aggressive foreign policy where U.S. geopolitical ambitions are viewed as being at stake

**Post 9/11 America has privatized the military and PMC’s are who show the shift**

Boggs 8 (PHD-Poli/Sci @ Berkeley, Prof @ Washington University in St. Louis, UCLA, USC, UC, Irvine, and Carleton University in Ottawa, *Fast Capitalism* vol 4.1, 8) ET

In the specific case of Blackwater, its fortunes have skyrocketed in the wake of 9/11, the war on terrorism, and the U.S. invasion of Iraq, giving rise to what some call an out-of-control Praetorian Guard in the Middle East and beyond. According to Jeremy Scahill, whose book Blackwater has become a celebrated bestseller, winner of several awards, and equivalent to what Bill Moyers calls a “one-man truth squad”, PMC’s like Blackwater constitute a dramatic new phase in U.S. military evolution as “privatization” and outsourcing of armed-services functions combine greater flexibility with sharply-reduced political and legal accountability – not to mention skyrocketing corporate profits. (Scahill 2007: xvii-xxii) Thus: “With almost no debate the Bush administration has outsourced to the private sector many of the functions historically handled by the military.” (Scahill 2007: xx) Further, “Private forces are [now] almost a necessity for a United States bent on retaining its declining empire.” (Scahill 2007: xxiv)

Contractors have made the military privatized- destroying the idea of a separate military economy

Boggs 8 (PHD-Poli/Sci @ Berkeley, Prof @ Washington University in St. Louis, UCLA, USC, UC, Irvine, and Carleton University in Ottawa, *Fast Capitalism* vol 4.1, 8) ET

Zeroing in on new threats of military privatization, Scahill argues that Blackwater and kindred contractors have built a “permanent institutional presence for themselves within the structures of the state.” (Scahill 2007: 373) Perhaps, but what is so remarkable about such a development against the backdrop of a long-established military-industrial complex? It would be outlandish to suggest that, with a Pentagon budget now approaching one trillion dollars, that the PMC’s might be in a position to subvert government control of the armed forces or its capacity to plan and carry out military ventures. In foreign policy it has become a truism that corporations, government, and military work closely in tandem to pursue U.S. global interests – a truism that seems to carry more rather than less weight over time. In fact its was C. Wright Mills, writing in 1956, who first clearly illuminated the problem, noting that “during World War II, the merger of the corporate economy and the military bureaucracy came into present-day significance.” (Mills 1956: 212) Since then, at least, the idea of a separate military economy – or indeed separate government – has amounted to nothing but fiction.

Internal Link Extension – Privatization of the Military (2/3)

PMC’s destroy the ethos of the military – instead of selfless duty to the country, they kill for profit.

Gulam 10 (‘The rise and rise of Private Military Companies’ By Hyder Gulam, BA, BN, LLB, Post Grad Dip (Advanced Clinical Nursing), March 12, 2010 http://www.peaceopstraining.org/theses/gulam.pdf)

The proprietary basis of PMC employment contradicts the fundamental and inherent measure of legitimacy by the actions of a nation’s military. The measure of legitimacy afforded to PMC’s, according to Goddard, is a de facto and amoral legitimacy. Quite simply, ‘PMC’s contradict the military ethic of selfless service.’108 Traditionally, the ultimate symbol of the sovereignty of a nation is its ability to monopolise the means of violence; i.e. raise, train, and sustain the use military forces.109 The Australian Defence Force, like other military entities, promotes a particular ethical world–view. The ‘Defence Mission’ is to defend Australia and its national interests’. In fulfilling this mission, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) serves all Australians, and is accountable to the Commonwealth Parliament, on behalf of the Australian people.110 This statement displays a number of the fundamental underpinnings of State military ideology. The service that the military ostensibly provides is the defence of the polis. Military ethos reinforces the notion that becoming a member of the defence force, one serves the country selflessly. Military service may be viewed as an aspect of the rights and duties of citizenship. Individual members of the armed forces may be called upon to sacrifice their lives so that the state may continue to exist. The military demands this ‘sacrifice of the lives of its members in pursuit of the community's right to self– defence’.111 Among uniform members, this ethos of service is unchallenged - every ADF member is imbued to believe that h/she is performing a duty to his/her country. When asked why they serve, few defence members would reply that it is because they enjoy killing or blowing things up. Even should this be the case, the public acknowledgment of this secondary motivation would be clearly inappropriate.112 PMC’s challenge this selfless service by making war a business. PMC’s challenge the exclusion of military skills from the marketplace by engaging in the management and deployment of violence for profit. PMC’s, most of whom include former soldiers, ‘acquire’ the military training and education provided by states and practice these acquired skills outside the profession. By practicing their vocation and training outside of the confines of the State military system, PMC’s violate the concept of a ‘military profession’ since their motivation is financial rather than ideological. As an official of Executive Outcomes concedes PMC’s and their employees are driven mainly by self–interest. Discipline of PMC’s and mercenaries is inherently suspect.113

PMFs represent the end point of globalization – corporate military capabilities eliminate the state’s monopoly on the use of force.

**Singer 4** (Peter, National Security Fellow and Director of the Project on U.S. Policy towards the Islamic World at Brookings Institution, Geneva Centre for the democratic control of armed forces (DCAF), “The private military industry and Iraq: what have we learned and where to next”, November 2004)KFC

While novel, the rise of this industry actually illustrates how the defence contracting world is moving along the same lines of change that have enveloped many other industries in globalization. That is, it simply repeats a broader shift from the primacy of manufacturing to services that has taken place in other industries and reflects the increasing importance of outsourcing in global business practices. But what is distinct about PMFs is that the companies within this field embody an industry that represents a profound development in the manner that security itself is both conceived and realized. With the rise of this “privatized military industry”, clients can now access capabilities that extend across the entire spectrum of once state monopolized military activities, simply by writing a cheque.

Internal Link Extension – Privatization of the Military (3/3)

PMC’s are the last stage of globalizations devastation of the state

Singer 4 (Peter W. 26 September National Security Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington and author of 'Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry' http://www.abc.net.au/rn/nationalinterest/stories/2004/1205326.htm)

No, and I think you bring up two really interesting aspects of this. The first, a real fundamental difference between someone within the private military world and the regular military, is that private military companies depend on the existence of violence, not the potential of violence; not defending their nation from violence, but actually ongoing violence. Without it, they'd be out of a job. Now people within that sector will say, of course, well we may depend on it, but violence is going to happen anyway, it's just simply ... if you think the world's going to suddenly turn all that peaceful, you're really being optimistic. So that's a fundamental difference, though, between people in the two different worlds. Now the other thing to know is-you referred to the monopoly of violence that states used to have. What we're seeing now with this industry is really part of this broader breakdown and change of the state itself that's taken place in globalisation, and we've seen all sorts of what used to be integral public functions and tasks of government-garbage collection, prisons, schools ... in the west right now we spend more on private security in the domestic sense than we spend on our national police forces. Well the one area that everyone thought, oh well, surely the state will keep its monopoly over was the military. But guess what? That monopoly has broken. You don't have an industry that does $100 billion worth of business and operates in 50 different countries without the monopoly being gone. It simply changed, and so we've got to catch up to it.

PMC dependency will cause the detachment of the public from military activity.

Anechiarico and Dehn 8 (“Ultimately Unaccountable: Governance of Private Military Companies Nationally, Supranationally and Internationally” Frank Anechiarico, Ph.D. Professor of Government and Law Hamilton College, and John Dehn, Professor of Law United States Military Academy, June, http://www.4tad.org/ws/paper\_wks4\_Anechiarico.pdf)KM

Both Melville and Singer’s statements resonate with Harvey’s point about what Harvey calls the “dispossession” of what Singer calls the “core function of the military.” The remarkable growth and nearly universal involvement of PMC’s in conflicts of all kinds has changed the nature of national defense into an issue of procurement, in which governments – and only indirectly their citizens – become customers. The normalization of PMC’s, following Melville and Singer and also Eisenhower, may entail the detachment of the public from conflicts that rely on procurement, rather than sacrifice, efficiency, and patriotism. The low levels of interest by the public and by national politicians in PMC growth in U.S. defense strategy indicates that the darkside of the New Public Management’s “steering, not rowing” has begun to cast its shadow.

Internal Link Extension – Monopoly of Violence (1/2)

Use of contractors leads to the privatization of war which causes the break down of social order in the name of security

**Hynes 10** (Patricia- Pres of NY bar association, *War Times,*1/8/10) ET

In the end, the use of private military may be more palatable to the U.S. public whose media reports the numbers of U.S. military deployed, injured and killed yet rarely spotlights the number of corporate warriors employed in conflict, injured and killed. Thus, a private military can be politically expedient for the government, given the fear of arousing public “war fatigue” with news coverage of soldiers’ deaths. Further, private military employees – many of whom are not U.S. citizens -- relieved the government from instituting a draft to cover the personnel needs of two concurrent, stalemated wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Private militaries make it possible for even the poorest countries to purchase the most sophisticated systems in the world and the capacity to use them. The dreaded outcome of the privatization of war is that some military companies would arm and train traffickers in weapons, drugs, and humans; terrorist networks; and “rogue states” – with the rationalization that if they don’t do it, another company will. The inevitable breakdown of social order within war has hazardous results for civilians -- most particularly the sex trafficking, rape and torture of women. Ceding armed conflict and ultimately national security to the private market of military contractors is a dire and disastrous trend.

PMC’s amass unchecked geopolitical power and can take over the role of the state without any accountability

Nandi and Mohanty 10 (Tanay Kumar Satabdee National Law University, Jodhpur, Gujarat National Law University, April 23 The Emergence of Private Military Firms and Their Impact on Global Human Rights SSRN TBC 6/26/10)

International law has generally been considered by the students of law as a subject with little practical relevance. However, the importance of international law in legal practice is increasingly being recognized in recent years. This may, in great measure, be attributed to the impact of globalization. Great strides in the field of commerce, technology and communication make one doubt whether transnational boundaries are going to disappear. Environmental concerns and human rights issues really transcend state borders and assume global dimensions. International law and international institutions have to play a dynamic role in response to the new challenges. In current situation, the study of international law can no more remain uninspiring. Arising out of the dying embers of the Cold War, private military firms (PMFs)3 market their military force and skills primarily to decolonialized States, countries overrun with domestic conflict and unable to provide effectively for their own security needs4. As a result, PMFs amass unchecked power to affect conflict resolution, world economic stability, and geostrategic negotiations. Indeed, as corporations become larger--both economically and politically--corporate managers increasingly engage in decisionmaking traditionally exercised by politicians5. The decentralization of international security from state-organized militaries not only threatens the traditional Westphalian6 model of state-monopolized force7, but also accentuates the inability of international law to hold private actors accountable8 for their unchecked violation of basic human rights in conflict ridden regions.

Internal Link Extension – Monopoly of Violence (2/2)

PMC’s are a self-sustaining movement to supplant the state’s monopoly on force

Taljaard 3 (Raenette Yale Global December 9, Yale World Fellowhttp://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/173/30558.html TBC 6/25/10)

PMC’s' visibly important role in the world's 'hot spots' lends weight to the notion that the nation-state is losing its jealously-guarded monopoly on the use of force - or in some cases voluntarily relegating it to the private sector. Private companies are coming to the fore, adopting the role of more than modern-day mercenaries. The companies the US and its allies have hired - like Kroll, Armor, Control Risks, Rubicon, and Global Risk - boast of a whole range of specializations and hail from a range of countries, but together they provide all the services normally carried out by national military forces, including intelligence, military training, logistics, and security. In addition to becoming an integral part of the machinery of war they are emerging as cogs in the infrastructure of peace. US-allied military officials and civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan are quickly becoming familiar with the 'brand services' provided by companies But the battlefield is not merely another arena for business, and the profit motive may distort security strategy decisions. The expansion of services performed by civilian entities raises several concerns: the lack of transparency and oversight common to their operations; the performance of companies motivated by profit, not national foreign policy or security interest; and revolving door-style nepotism and conflicts of interest. All these are concerns that grow ever more urgent as mega-corporation style military companies diversify even further. The PMC boom is partly a legacy of the military downsizing that followed the end of the Cold War. But the boom is also self-sustaining; the very existence of PMC’s is boosting demand for their services. Not only has it arguably become more cost effective to outsource certain military tasks to the private sector, but the insertion of PMC expertise - even in offering training and/or strategic advice - often changes the relationship between two parties in a conflict situation. This creates pressures for both parties to have a PMC's services on their side.

And, privatization through PMCs causes a change in who is allowed to use violence- huge repercussions

Petersohn 9 (Ulrich, Fellow, *Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University*, http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Petersohn\_Outsourcing.pdf ) ET

Anna Leander argues that outsourcing erodes the political, cultural, and symbolic foundation of states’ authority regarding the use of force. Private firms are increasingly accepted as actors in military matters. In the process, they gain more and more of a say in the use of force and are able to shape the understanding of security, threats, and national interests (Leander 2006, 137–43). Paul Verkuil (2006, 2) goes as far as to consider the trend toward privatizing and contracting of government functions as a threat to the democratic principle of accountability and a shift from public to private governance. Deborah Avant’s findings are similar. She shows that outsourcing enhances PMCs’ influence on the foreign policy process 2 and that purchasing services on the market undermines the collective monopoly of the state in controlling the use of violence

**Monopoly of violence by the state is threatened by PMCs**

Oritz 10 (Carlos- federal prosecutor, feb 13, *Global Regulation*, http://www.privatemilitary.org/publications/ortiz\_2004\_regulating\_private\_military\_companies.pdf ) ET

 If the monopoly of violence remains one of the prerogatives of the state, it seems paradoxical that states maintain authority at the same time as delegating it. This paradox can be understood in light of the contradictory pressures state authorities are subject to, negotiating the conflicting demands for the maintenance of state power, and those implied in the neoliberal attitudes towards public management and global markets.

Internal Link – PMCs Undermine the State

The neoliberalism of PMC’s undermine the state

Cypher 7 (James M. Cypher June 07 professor-researcher in the doctoral program in development studies From Military Keynesianism to Global-Neoliberal Militarism http://www.monthlyreview.org/0607jmc.htm TBC 6/24/10)

The new era of global-neoliberal militarism, following the debacle in Vietnam, began in the 1980s, not coincidentally with the onset of the Reagan/Thatcher era. In the United States, the objectives of global-neoliberal militarism are served by military spending, which boosts the profit rate of large corporations, creates new technologies such as the Internet, and contributes to policies that confront the onset of recessions. The objectives of lowering the unemployment rate, raising wages, and contributing to workers’ economic security are no longer a consideration, as they were in the days of military Keynesianism. Part of the neoliberal ideology is to destroy the state, except insofar as it defends the institutions of business ownership and the ability to project military power. But even military functions are to be privatized to whatever degree possible. Any conceivable activity in which the military sector engages is analyzed in terms of its potential to generate profit for the private sector. Hence, if potato peeling can be done at a profit, then this activity will be turned over to the private sector—assuming that such a change will not have a negative impact on the ability of military personnel to perform their functions. Even in the Keynesian era many operations and maintenance activities were spun-off to private contractors, but in the new era the search for possible privatizations has reached new heights. The logic of the privatization model is rather straightforward—for every billion dollars of expenditure on the military apparatus a larger percentage of these funds will circulate in the private sector where profit can be taken. Meals will be served, prisoners guarded, bases built, etc., but at a higher cost, and/or at lower wage and benefit levels, such that an impressive margin of profit can be extracted. Neoliberals believe, a priori, that all public sector activities are inefficient and that (thanks to the regulating role of the free market) private sector activities are a model of efficiency. Hence, get the military out of every sort of activity to the fullest degree possible. This model is now in place in Iraq, where private contractors (operating an unofficial army with over a hundred thousand employees) have apparently enjoyed unrestrained opportunities to amass quick profits. As a result, a new addition to the military-industrial complex—a vast constellation of contractors employing a shadow military with a vested interest in higher levels of military spending, particularly in the high-profit intervention/reconstruction business—has been created over the last fifteen years.

PMC’s at the heart of neoliberalism fragment the state

Cerny 8 (Philip G. Cerny Professor of Global Political Economy The Journal of International Trade and Diplomacy 2 (1), Spring 2008: 1-46 EMBEDDING NEOLIBERALISM: THE EVOLUTION OF A HEGEMONIC PARADIGM TBC 6/24/10)

Proponents argue that structural changes in the economy, especially the development of information and communications technology (ICT), have fundamentally transformed how firms work and shifted the boundaries between public and private sectors - not merely reinventing government but also reinventing governance. Opponents argue that such services have a public character that is undermined by privatization. A key example cited is the privatization of aspects of military and defense provision, from suppliers of materiel at home to the use of private military contractors (PMC’s) to support military activities in the field - as has been highlighted by the recent controversy over the role of Blackwater in Iraq - or even to substitute for them, as with mercenary forces in Angola, Sierra Leone, Fiji and elsewhere (Cowen, 2007; Leander, 2007). Another objection is that cost savings have not materialized and that governments have assumed private contractors’ financial risks where cost overruns and quality deficiencies have occurred, such as with Halliburton’s (and other firms’) activities in Iraq. This dimension is linked with the shift to the regulatory approach discussed earlier, in that contractualization, the use of financial performance indicators, and ex post enforcement are at the heart of the system. It also involves the development of hybrid forms of “governance” around special-purpose bodies such as development agencies at the local, sub-national-regional, national, supranational-regional, transnational and international levels. Indeed, the use of the word “governance” instead of “government” took its original inspiration for Rhodes, not simply from the traditional distinction between government as formal institutions and governance as informal processes, especially policy networks, but also from international regime theory discussed above (conversation with author, 1993). Neoliberalism involves the substitution, where deemed appropriate (this is a matter for debate among neoliberals), of purpose-built regimes for the organization of public life, regimes that straddle the public-private divide and involve market participants directly in the authoritative allocation of resources and values. In this sense, neoliberalism, like “neomedievalism,” involves the semi-fragmentation of government into crosscutting and overlapping institutions and processes - what Machin and Wright (1985) called the “splintered state” and Slaughter (2004) calls the “disaggregation” of the state.

Internal Link Extension – Global Neoliberalism (1/3)

PMC’s extend neoliberalism globally

Pieterse 4 (Jan Nederveen Pieterse is professor of sociology at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign Neoliberal Empire Theory, Culture & Society 2004 (SAGE, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi), Vol. 21(3): 119–140 TBC 6/24/10)

The nation’s shift to combat mode in the wake of 9/11 facilitated the authoritarian concentration of power, silenced criticism and widened the umbrella of ‘security’. Neoliberal practices of outsourcing (to focus on core business) now extend to security and war. Business conglomerates built during the neoliberal regime cash in on empire, such as the Carlyle Group in defence contracts and Halliburton and Bechtel’s contracts for building US bases and the reconstruction of Iraq (Shorrock, 2002, 2003). Under the security umbrella, government contracts for rebuilding Iraq were allocated without public accountability, or accountability was outsourced – to the companies themselves (Baum, 2003). Bypassing the CIA, FBI and Defense Intelligence Agency, circles within the administration set up their own intelligence units such as Team B and the Office of Special Plans in the Pentagon. Passing on the blame for intelligence failures regarding 9/11 and Iraq to the agencies – which had just been bypassed – weakens the agencies and maximizes executive privilege. The pervasive practice of cooking the books, Enron-style, now extends to policy in intelligence, security, the economy and the environment. Fudging data and deception become standard operating procedure. The judicial process in relation to suspected terrorists is politicized by reference to security. Terrorism Information Awareness means unlimited surveillance and limited accountability. Security voids the Freedom of Information Act. Security operations are increasingly outsourced to private military contractors such as DynCorp and MPRI, some of which are subsidiaries of Fortune 500 firms. The global market in private military contracts is estimated at $100 billion. These services include training foreign troops, lowintensity conflict overseas, security for President Karzai in Afghanistan, airport security and military recruitment. While these mercenary forces are paid for by American taxpayers, they don’t operate under military rules, are unaccountable and ‘allow the administration to carry out foreign policy goals in low-level skirmishes around the globe’ without attracting media attention (Wayne, 2002; cf. Singer, 2003). This turns overseas conflict into another business proposition – just as prisons in the US have been privatized and turned into a ‘prison-industrial complex’ (Dyer, 1999). Thus neoliberal empire extends profitable domestic practices overseas.

Internal Link Extension – Global Neoliberalism (2/3)

PMC’s are the ultimate form of neoliberalism

Singer 2 (P.W. Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution. Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security International Security 26.3 186-220 TBC 6/26/10)

Finally, the last few decades have been characterized by a normative shift toward the marketization of the public sphere. As one analyst puts it, the market-based approach toward military services is "the ultimate representation of neo- liberalism." 33 The privatization movement has gone hand in hand with globalization: Both are premised on the belief that the principles of comparative advantage and competition maximize efficiency and effectiveness. Fueled by the collapse of the centralized systems in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, and by successes in such places as Thatcherite Britain, privatization has been touted as a testament to the superiority of the marketplace over government. It reflects the current assumption that the private sector is both more efficient and more effective. Harvey Feigenbaum and Jeffrey Henig sum up this sentiment: "If any economic policy could lay claim to popularity, at least among the world's elites, it would certainly be privatization." 34 Equally, in modern business, outsourcing has become a dominant corporate strategy and a huge industry in its own right. Global outsourcing expenditures will top $1 trillion in 2001, having doubled in just the past three years alone. 35 Thus, turning to external, profit-motivated military service providers has become not only a viable option but the favored solution for both public institutions and private organizations. The successes of privatization programs and outsourcing strategies have given the market-based solution not only the stamp of legitimacy, but also the push to privatize any function that can be [End Page 197] handled outside government. As a result, the momentum of privatization has spread to areas that were once the exclusive domain of the state. The last decade, for example, was marked by the cumulative externalization of functions that were once among the nation-state's defining characteristics, including those involving schools, welfare programs, prisons, and defense manufacturers (e.g., Aerospatiale in France and British Aerospace). In fact, the parallel to military service outsourcing is already manifest in the domestic security market, where in states as diverse as Britain, Germany, the Philippines, Russia, and the United States, the number of private security forces and the size of their budgets greatly exceed those of public law-enforcement agencies. 36 That the norm of privatization would cross into the realm of military services is not surprising. As Sinclair Dinnen notes, "The current revival in private military security is broadly consistent with the prevailing orthodoxy of economic rationalism, with its emphasis on 'downsizing' government and large-scale privatization." 37 The privatized military industry has thus drawn on precedents, models, and justifications from the wider "privatization revolution," allowing private firms to become potential, and perhaps even the preferred, providers of military services.

Internal Link Extension – Global Neoliberalism (3/3)

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Internal Link – Neoliberalism 🡪 Realist, Securitizing Wars

**Neoliberalism is foundation of conflict in realism – greed fosters fear and misunderstanding of other nation’s intentions. The plan corrects the problem of security.**

Hongua 98 (http://www.irchina.org/en/pdf/mhh1.pdf, Critiques of the Theory of International Regimes: The Viewpoints of Main Western Schools of thought, Men Honghua)

The basic assumption of the regime theory of Neoliberalism is that, states are rational selfish actor in the anarchic international society, they cooperate for absolute gains.50 It inherits the views of liberal economics, regards each state as the absolute gain seeker and is uninterested in the gains of other states. Cheat is the greatest obstacle against cooperation among states, and international regimes can help to solve this situation. In the view of realists, other states’ gains should be taken into account. They find there are two types of obstacles against cooperation: cheat and other states’ gains (that is, the relative gains). Neoliberalism shows no concern to the latter factor. Realists argues that friends will become enemies tomorrow under anarchic world, cooperative gains could be the greatest potential threat, thus state must take the gains of its partners into account. Neoliberalism overlooks the relative gains, thus ignores an important obstacle to cooperation.51 Realists argue that state is the core actor in international affairs,52 it is “highly sensitive to cost”,53 anarchy is the main strength to shape state dynamics and conduct, state pursues power and security, sometimes cannot cooperate for common interest. State must concern relative gains, international regime can only affect international cooperation marginally.54 In the view of Kenneth Waltz, international regimes partially affect the future of international cooperation, so regimes are not independent strength for cooperation.55 The consideration in relative gains will substantially reduce international regimes’ effects on international cooperation, and becomes an important obstacle to cooperate. From the viewpoints of absolute and relative gain, “Realism provides more complete theory of international cooperation”.56

Internal Link – PMCs 🡪 Securitization

PMCs create privatized security

Oritz 10 (Carlos- federal prosecutor, feb 13, *Global Regulation*, http://www.privatemilitary.org/publications/ortiz\_2004\_regulating\_private\_military\_companies.pdf ) ET

The basic problem with using contractors for military tasks is that the practice introduces “market logic” to the production of security. If a state contracts out such work, it enters into a business relationship with a firm. This relationship can best be described by the principal agent model, in which there are two self-interested parties—an ordering party (principal) and another party (agent) who acts on the former’s behalf (Stöber 2007, 122). However, the interests of the principal and the agent never match completely. While the goal of the state, or principal, is to provide for the public good, the firm (agent) is a profit-driven entity. Its decision-making process is always based on a cost-benefit analysis. Taking this for granted, firms will always seek to maximize their profit at the client’s expense

**PMCs are the epitome of privatization of security**

Oritz 10 (Carlos- federal prosecutor, feb 13, *Global Regulation*, http://www.privatemilitary.org/publications/ortiz\_2004\_regulating\_private\_military\_companies.pdf ) ET

The Private Military Company (PMC) is a key phenomenon of the post- Cold War era, in which the erosion of state authority, the trend towards privatisation, the downsizing of the world's armed forces, and the insecurities created by a world economy in crisis, all come together. The spectacular growth of the PMC industry over the last decade, marks a profound change in the traditional state monopoly of the legitimate use of violence. The state's possession of the means of coercion has been integrated in a general trend towards commercialisation; its legitimacy, considered by Max Weber one of the defining criteria of the state, thus is being partly shifted onto the market along with the actual management of security. Like so many other instances of privatisation, this is best understood in the context of a 'new public management' approach to government, which prescribes the outsourcing of public functions to the private sector (Lane, 2000). The state in this new, post-modern constellation is in the process of exchanging traditional forms of authority for a new mode of control and organisation based on the principles of delegation and supervision. However, the arena in which PMCs are active, is the global one - more often than not, in the very areas where state authority has collapsed or is precarious. Regulation is the means by which efficiency and legitimacy may be re-articulated, but in the case of PMCs, this would ideally have to occur outside the jurisdiction of the single state. But neither the patterns of global governance developed among states with highly convergent social structures, nor the unilateral 'imperial turn' undertaken by the United States, seem to hold out an adequate solution here.

Neoliberalism Impact – Democracy

Neoliberalism destroys democracy - perpetuates inequality

Giroux 6 (http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/symploke/v014/14.1giroux.html, The Emerging Authoritarianism in the United States: PolItical Culture Under the Bush/Chaney Administration, Henry A. Giroux)

The cult of traditionalism and a reactionary modernism are central features of proto-fascism and are alive and well in Bush's America. The alliance of neoconservatives, extremist evangelical Christians, and free-market advocates on the political Right imagines a social order modeled on the presidency of William McKinley and the values of the robber barons. The McKinley presidency lasted from 1897 to 1901 and "had a consummate passion to serve corporate and imperial power" (Moyers 2003c). This was an age when blacks, women, immigrants, and minorities of class "knew their place"; big government exclusively served the interests of the corporate monopolists; commanding institutions were under the sway of narrow political interests; welfare was a private enterprise; and labor unions were kept in place by the repressive forces of the state. All of these conditions were being reproduced under the leadership of the Republican Party that held sway over all branches of government. William Greider, writing in The Nation, observes a cult of traditionalism and anti-modernism within the Bush administration and its return to a past largely defined through egregious inequality,[3](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/symploke/v014/14.1giroux.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT3) corporate greed, hyper-commercialism, political corruption, and an utter disdain for economic and political democracy. A second feature connecting the old fascism to its updated version is the ongoing corporatization of civil society and the diminishment of public space. The latter refers to the fact that corporate space is destroying democratic public spheres, eliminating those public spaces where norm-establishing communication takes place. Viewed primarily as an economic investment rather than as a central democratic sphere for fostering the citizen-based processes of deliberation, debate, and dialogue, public space is consistently shrinking due to the relentless dynamic of privatization and commercialization. The important notion that space can be used to cultivate citizenship is now transformed by a new "common sense" that links it almost entirely to the production of consumers. The inevitable correlate to this logic is that providing space for democracy to grow is no longer a priority. As theorists such as Jürgen Habermas and David Harvey have argued, the idea of critical citizenship cannot flourish without the reality of public space.[4](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/symploke/v014/14.1giroux.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT4) Put differently, "the space of citizenship is as important as the idea of citizenship" (Kaiser 18-19). As a political category, space is crucial to [End Page 104] any critical understanding of how power circulates, how disciplinary practices are constructed, and how social control is organized. Moreover, as Margaret Kohn points out in her landmark study on radical space, "spatial practices can also contribute to transformative politics" (7). Space as a political category performs invaluable theoretical work in connecting ideas to material struggles, theories to concrete practices, and political operations to the concerns of everyday life. Without public space, it becomes more difficult for individuals to imagine themselves as political agents or to understand the necessity for developing a discourse capable of defending civic institutions. Public space confirms the idea of individuals and groups having a public voice, thus drawing a distinction between civic liberty and market liberty. The demands of citizenship affirm the social as a political concept in opposition to its conceptualization as a strictly economic category. The sanctity of the town hall or public square in American life is grounded in the crucial recognition that citizenship has to be cultivated in non-commercialized spaces. Indeed, democracy itself needs public spheres where education as a condition for democracy can flourish, where people can meet and democratic identities, values, and relations have the time "to grow and flourish" (Kaiser 17-18). Zygmunt Bauman captures the historical importance of public spaces for nourishing civic discourses and engaging citizens as well as the consequences of the current disappearance of non-commodified spheres as significant spaces in which powerful individuals can be held directly accountable for the ethical and material effects of their decisions: The totalizing belief that commercial interests and commodification should be free of any regulation is equally matched by the belief that "every domain of human life should be open to the forces of the marketplace" (Grossberg 112). The values of the market and the ruthless workings of finance capital become the template for organizing the rest of society. Neoliberalism Impact – Environment

Neoliberal Policies ensure extinction – greenhouse gas, acid rain, forests, desertification, and loss of biodiversity

Trainer, 96 (Ted, University of New South Wales, “Towards a Sustainable Economy”, Jon Carpenter Oxford Publishing, pages 42-43)

Our way of life is ecologically unsustainable Our resource-affluent way of life also causes many serious environmental problems. We are destroying vital ecological systems. Consider, for example, the greenhouse problem, acid rain, the destruction of forests, the spread of deserts and the loss of plant and animal species. At the present rate, more than a million species will disappear in the next 25 years, because the expansion of human economic activity is destroying habitats. We farm in ways that lose 5 tonnes of topsoil for each person on earth every year (that is 15 times the amount of food we eat), we are destroying the protective ozone layer in the atmosphere, and we are polluting the ground waters and seas. One ofthe most unsustainable aspects of our society is the way we continually take large quantities of nutrients from the soil, eat them and then throw them away. We are depleting our soils at a rapid rate. In Chapter 12 it will be argued that we can only have a sustainable agriculture if we change to highly localised economic systems in which most of our food is produced close to where we live and all food wastes can be recycled. Most of these ecological problems are direct consequences of the sheer amount of producing and consuming going on. There is, for example, no way of solving the greenhouse problem without drastically reducing the amount of fuel being burnt, and therefore the volume of production taking place. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has concluded that in order to keep the carbon content ofthe atmosphere from increasing, let alone reduce it (as we should be doing) we will have to cut carbon input to the atmosphere by 60-80 per cent. If by 2060 we achieve a 60 per cent reduction and share the energy among 11 billion people then world average fossil fuel use would be about one-eighteenth the present Australian average. How can we do anything like this unless we drastically reduce energy use and therefore fossil fuel use? One of the most disturbing recent observations is the fact that in the last decade a number ofcrucial biological and ecological indices seem to be approaching or to have passed their peaks. This is true of world cropland area, irrigated area, fertiliser use, and meat, timber, wool and grain production. Some key yields such as rice and wheat seem to be tapering towards upper limits. World fish catch has clearly fallen from levels that will not be attained again. Yet we are only providing well for one billion people, and we might soon have 11 billion on the planet. Now add to this analysis the implications of continued economic growth. Fig 6.la represents the present volume of world economic output, distributed across its 5.4 billion people. Figure 6.lb represents output assuming that all the people living in the Third World in 2060 have risen to the living standards the rich countries have now, and incomes in rich countries rise by 3 per cent p.a. until then. World output would be about 19 times as great as it is now. Anyone assuming that all the world's people can be as rich as the rich world's people would be by 2060, given only 3 per cent annual growth until then, must believe that the world's resources and ecosystems can sustain 88 times present annual volumes ofoutput. And 3 per cent growth rate is not sufficient to make our economy healthy! In the 1980s Australia averaged 3.2 per cent annual growth and just about all its economic and social problems became worse. Unemployment at least doubled and the foreign debt multiplied by 10. Prime Minister Keating has emphasised that we need 4.5 per cent growth to start bringing unemployment down. Let us assume we were to average 4 per cent annual growth until 2060, and that by then all the world's people had risen to the 'living standards' we would have then. Total world economic output would be 220 times what it is today. There is no chance whatsoever of reaching even a 19-fold increase in present output. Yet conventional economists proceed as if we can rise to and beyond these levels; they never acknowledge any need to worry about there being any limits to the growth of production and consumption. The environmental problem is basically due to overproduction and overconsumption, yet we have an economy in which there must be constant and limitless increase in production and consumption. Again, the problem is due to our economy and cannot be solved until we develop a quite different economy.

Neoliberalism Impact - Terrorism

Terrorism is a backlash to globalization- terror is an attempt to disrupt neoliberal policies

Cronin 03- Senior Associate at the Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changin Character of War (Audrey Kurth, “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism”, Project MUSE)

The objectives of international terrorism have also changed as a result of globalization. Foreign intrusions and growing awareness of shrinking global space have created incentives to use the ideal asymmetrical weapon, terrorism, for more ambitious purposes. The political incentives to attack major targets such as the United States with powerful weapons have greatly increased. The perceived corruption of indigenous customs, religions, languages, economies, and so on are blamed on an international system often unconsciously molded by American behavior. The accompanying distortions in local communities as a result of exposure to the global marketplace of goods and ideas are increasingly blamed on U.S.- sponsored modernization and those who support it. The advancement of technology, however, is not the driving force behind the terrorist threat to the United States and its allies, despite what some have assumed. Instead, at the heart of this threat are frustrated populations and international movements that are increasingly inclined to lash out against U.S.-led globalization. As Christopher Coker observes, globalization is reducing tendencies toward instrumental violence (i.e., violence between states and even between communities), but it is enhancing incentives for expressive violence (or violence that is ritualistic, symbolic, and communicative). The new international terrorism is increasingly engendered by a need to assert identity or meaning against forces of homogeneity, especially on the part of cultures that are threatened by, or left behind by, the secular future that Western-led globalization brings. According to a report recently published by the United Nations Development Programme, the region of greatest deficit in measures of human development—the Arab world—is also the heart of the most threatening religiously inspired terrorism. Much more work needs to be done on the significance of this correlation, but increasingly sources of political discontent are arising from disenfranchised areas in the Arab world that feel left behind by the promise of globalization and its assurances of broader freedom, prosperity, and access to knowledge. The results are dashed expectations, heightened resentment of the perceived U.S.-led hegemonic system, and a shift of focus away from more proximate targets within the region. Of course, the motivations behind this threat should not be oversimplified: Anti-American terrorism is spurred in part by a desire to change U.S. policy in the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions as well as by growing antipathy in the developing world vis-à-vis the forces of globalization. It is also crucial to distinguish between the motivations of leaders such as Osama bin Laden and their followers. The former seem to be more driven by calculated strategic decisions to shift the locus of attack away from repressive indigenous governments to the more attractive and media-rich target of the United States. The latter appear to be more driven by religious concepts cleverly distorted to arouse anger and passion in societies full of pent-up frustration. To some degree, terrorism is directed against the United States because of its engagement and policies in various regions. Anti-Americanism is closely related to antiglobalization, because (intentionally or not) the primary driver of the powerful forces resulting in globalization is the United States. Analyzing terrorism as something separate from globalization is misleading and potentially dangerous. Indeed globalization and terrorism are intricately intertwined forces characterizing international security in the twenty-first century. The main question is whether terrorism will succeed in disrupting the promise of improved livelihoods for millions of people on Earth. Globalization is not an inevitable, linear development, and it can be disrupted by such unconventional means as international terrorism. Conversely, modern international terrorism is especially dangerous because of the power that it potentially derives from globalization—whether through access to CBNR weapons, global media outreach, or a diverse network of financial and information resources.

Neoliberalism Impact – Endless Wars

Neoliberalism thinks every war is winnable, and will fight to win wars that cannot be won. This makes war endless. The quagmires in Afghanistan and Iraq prove.

Meszaros 3 – Chair of philosophy at Sussex University (Monthly Review, István Mészáros, “Militarism and the Coming of Wars,” 6-08, <http://monthlyreview.org/0603meszaros.htm>)

**1.**It is not for the first time in history that militarism weighs on the consciousness of the people as a nightmare. To go into detail would take far too long. However, here it should be enough to go back in history only as far as the nineteenth century when militarism, as a major instrument of policy making, came into its own, with the unfolding of modern imperialism on a global scale, in contrast to its earlier—much more limited—varieties. By the last third of the nineteenth century the British and French Empires were not the only prominent rulers of vast territories. The United States, too, made its heavy imprint by directly or indirectly taking over the former colonies of the Spanish Empire in Latin America, adding to them the bloody repression of a great liberation struggle in the Philippines and installing themselves as rulers in that area in a way which still persists in one form or another. Nor should we forget the calamities caused by “Iron Chancellor” Bismarck’s imperialist ambitions and their aggravated pursuit later on by his successors, resulting in the eruption of the First World War and its deeply antagonistic aftermath, bringing with it Hitler’s Nazi revanchism and thereby very clearly foreshadowing the Second World War itself. The dangers and immense suffering caused by all attempts at solving deep-seated social problems by militaristic interventions, on any scale, are obvious enough. If, however, we look more closely at the historical trend of militaristic adventures, it becomes frighteningly clear that they show an ever greater intensification and an ever-increasing scale, from local confrontations to two horrendous world wars in the twentieth century, and to the potential annihilation of humankind when we reach our own time. It is most relevant to mention in this context the distinguished Prussian military officer and practical as well as theoretical strategist, Karl Marie von Clausewitz (1780-1831), who died in the same year as Hegel; both of them killed by cholera. It was von Clausewitz, director of the Military School of Berlin in the last thirteen years of his life, who in his posthumously published book—*Vom Kriege* (*On War*, 1833)—offered a classic definition of the relationship between politics and war that is still frequently quoted: “war is the continuation of politics by other means*.”* This famous definition was tenable until quite recently, but has become totally untenable in our time. It assumed the *rationality*of the actions which connect the two domains of politics and war as the continuation of one another. In this sense, the war in question had to be winnable, at least in principle, even if miscalculations leading to defeat could be contemplated at the instrumental level. Defeat by itself could not destroy the rationality of war as such, since after the—however unfavorable—new consolidation of politics the defeated party could plan another round of war as the rational continuation of its politics by other means. Thus the absolute condition of von Clausewitz’s equation to be satisfied was the winnability of war in principle, so as to recreate the “eternal cycle” of politics leading to war, and back to politics leading to another war, and so on ad infinitum**.** The actors involved in such confrontations were the national states. No matter how monstrous the damage inflicted by them on their adversaries, and even on their own people (just remember Hitler!), the rationality of the military pursuit was guaranteed if the war could be considered winnable in principle. Today the situation is qualitatively different for two principal reasons. First, the objective of the feasible war at the present phase of historical development, in accordance with the objective requirements of imperialism—world domination by capital’s most powerful state, in tune with its own political design of ruthless authoritarian “globalization” (dressed up as “free exchange” in a U.S. ruled global market)—is ultimately unwinnable, foreshadowing, instead, the destruction of humankind. This objective by no stretch of imagination could be considered a *rational objective* in accord with the stipulated rational requirement of the “continuation of politics by other means” conducted by one nation, or by one group of nations against another. Aggressively imposing the will of one powerful national state over all of the others, even if for cynical tactical reasons the advocated war is absurdly camouflaged as a “purely limited war” leading to other “open ended limited wars,” can therefore be qualified only as total irrationality*.* The second reason greatly reinforces the first. For the weapons already available for waging the war or wars of the twenty first century are capable of exterminating not only the adversary but the whole of humanity, for the first time ever in history. Nor should we have the illusion that the existing weaponry marks the very end of the road. Others, even more instantly lethal ones, might appear tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. Moreover, threatening the use of such weapons is by now considered an acceptable state strategic device. Thus, put reasons one and two together, and the conclusion is inescapable: envisaging war as the mechanism of global government in today’s world underlines that we find ourselves at the precipice of absolute irrationality from which there can be no return if we accept the ongoing course of development. What was missing from von Clausewitz’s classic definition of war as the “continuation of politics by other means” was the investigation of the deeper underlying *causes* of war and the possibility of their *avoidance*. The challenge to face up to such causes is more urgent today than ever before. For the war of the twenty first century looming ahead of us is not only “not winnable in principle.” Worse than that, it is *in principle unwinnable*. Consequently,envisaging the pursuit of war**,** as the Bush administration’s September 17, 2002 strategic document does, makeHitler’s irrationality look like the model of rationality.

Neoliberalism Impact – Colonialism

**Neoliberalism creates an image of two different worlds, necessitating colonialism and pre-emptive U.S. military action.**

Roberts, Secor, & Sparke 3(Susan Roberts, Anna Secor and Matthew Sparke, *Neoliberal Geopolitic,* https://faculty.washington.edu/sparke/neoliberalgeopolitics.pdf)

Barnett’s neoliberal geopolitics is therefore ultimately calibrated to justify and promote the use of pre-emptive US military might across a huge swath of the globe. “Our biggest export is security,” he says of America. Building on this neat gloss of one of the defining economic asymmetries of global commerce under neoliberalism (ie America’s monumental trade deficit and its dependence on asymmetric investment capital inflows), Barnett goes so far as to claim that peace and prosperity can only truly blossom in areas where the US has established military ties, permanent military bases, and ongoing security alliances. “Show me the strongest investment relationships in the global economy,” he (2003) says, “and I will show you two postwar military occupations that remade Europe and Japan following World War II.” This appeal to history is useful in making the exceptional role allotted to the US in the neoliberal geopolitical vision seem as natural as globalization itself. Nevertheless, the problem of reconciling unilateralist American intervention with the broader multilateralist neoliberal picture of global integration remains something of a challenge. For Barnett, the solution takes a classically modernist Manichean form of dividing and distinguishing two different “rule sets” that apply in the Core and the Gap, respectively. The notion of “rule sets” is borrowed from cybernetics and works in tandem with Barnett’s other high-tech references to networks, feedback loops, threat and security environments, and “system perturbations” (as September 11 is characterized). This systemstheory technovernacular enables Barnett to refer to the US as the “System Administrator,” a metaphor that implies that the US alone has the ability to effect the rules and settings within which the other “users” on the network must operate. At the same time, the “rule sets” concept allows Barnett to parse the Core and the Gap into different security regimes. Thus, the Gap is a “strategic threat environment,” due to its inability to “harmonize” its “internal rule sets” with an “emerging global rule set” that Barnett (2003) equates in normative neoliberal fashion with “democracy, transparency, and free trade.” In the Core, deterrence still makes sense (regarding China, for example). But in the Gap, for such countries as Iraq and Iran, even diplomacy is exhausted. “Simply put,” says Barnett (2002a), “when we cross over into the Gap, we enter a different rule sets universe.” Thus the Core and the Gap are two “distinct venues” in which the US is bound to act according to entirely different rules. Barnett (2002b) writes in the Providence Journal: To accomplish this task we must be explicit with both friends and foes alike about how we will necessarily differentiate between oursecurity role within the Core’s burgeoning security community and the one we assume whenever we intervene militarily in the Gap. Seeking two sets of rules for these different security roles is not being hypocritical but honest and realistic. It might fairly be suggested that the ever-increasing circles of global capitalist prosperity imagined by other neoliberals cannot be effectively squared with this uneven and asymmetrical image of a divided world ruled by an aggressively assertive American systems administrator. Certainly, the common neoliberal imagined geography of the globe as a smooth, de-centered, borderless, level playing field does not seem to allow for such divisions and unilateral administration. But the inconsistency is not as great as it would seem at first. Faced with the same dilemma at the end of his own book on globalization, Friedman (1999:373) finesses the problem by arguing that the US military provides the “hidden fist” that enables the hidden hand of the global free market to do its modernizing business. And this pattern is actually quite common. It seems, in fact, that the double standard—“One rule set for us and one rule set for you”—is central to the wider neoliberal vision. It is worth recalling in this respect that liberalism itself was once similarly twinned, in the work of writers such as Locke and Mills, to a geopolitical division between an imagined liberal metropole and what was accepted as the necessary rule of authoritarian order in the colonies (see Mehta 1999)

Neoliberalism Impact - Biopolitical (1/2)

**Neoliberalism encourages the ‘rise of the entrepreneur’ with the assistance of the state.**

Protevi 9 (Protevi, John, http://www.protevi.com/john/Foucault\_28June2009.pdf, Forthcoming in Pli: Warwick Journal of Philosophy, vol. 21., 28 June 2009.)

Neoliberalism, however, Foucault insists, is something other than liberalism (NB 136F / 130-131E); neoliberals "break" [rompent] with classical liberalism (NB 123F / 119E); we must "avoid at all costs" seeing neoliberalism as a mere "repetition" of classical liberalism after a Keynesian interlude (NB 136F / 131E). So for Foucault neoliberalism is a modification of the art of governing as an exercise of political sovereignty; it is another turning point in the history of the state seen through the grid of governmentality. Its novelty consists in an interventionist state which creates conditions for the artificial or purely competitive market in which homo economicus makes choices as rational self-entrepreneur.28 For Foucault, neoliberal macroeconomics is not so much a shift from the Keynesian objective of full employment to the monetarist control of inflation (although it does of course entail that as well), as it is a change in government's relation to market structure. For classical liberals, the market was a natural mechanism for the exchange of commodities. For the neoliberals, the market is an ideal structure of competition, fragile and in need of construction and support. Thus neoliberalism is not laissez-faire, but interventionist, though neoliberal intervention into society occurs at the level of the conditions of market, and its intervention must take the form of the "rule of law" (176-179F / 171-174E). Let us repeat the key contrast. Classical liberals want the market to be a free natural zone where government can't interfere, precisely to let the invisible hand provide for social benefits from individual self-interest. There's a whole anthropology here of the natural homo economicus as only an abstraction from concrete man living in civil society, of which the juridical subject is another abstraction. But the important thing for classical liberals, ignored by the neoliberals, is the Smithian analysis of moral sentiments and the need for government to provide the moral framework that the market erodes.29 So the classical liberal formula is "protect the market from government in order to allow social benefits from natural exchange."30 The neoliberals say we must proceed on two paths: (1) we must have government intervention at the level of the conditions of the market in order (2) to spread the enterprise form throughout the social fabric. So the neoliberal formula here is "use government to change society to constitute an artificial and fragile market." For Foucault, the American neoliberals are more radical than their German counterparts. They share the desire to intervene at the level of market conditions to support fragile competition. But for government / market relations they also want to refuse to shield government from market relations: they want to submit all government actions to cost-benefit analysis. But this is just macro-level reflection of the move to insert market relations throughout the social fabric. This is not simply the drive to privatize government services; it also entails making the surviving government agencies into enterprises, so that we must ask what is bottom line for, in the American system, agencies such as Amtrak, the Post Office, the National Parks, and so on). And this is not just the drive to make any multi-unit organization into a collection of enterprises (each department in a university has its own bottom line and its own contribution to the university bottom line: e.g., loss of subventions for university presses). It goes further than that: each individual becomes an enterprise, a self-entrepreneur.

The ‘self-entrepreneur’ subjugates humanity, shifting them into a resource to power the biopolitical machine.

Protevi 9 (Protevi, John, http://www.protevi.com/john/Foucault\_28June2009.pdf, Forthcoming in Pli: Warwick Journal of Philosophy, vol. 21., 28 June 2009.)

But perhaps the most striking difference between the two is revealed by Harvey's claim that neoliberal states treat "labour and the environment as mere commodities" (Brief History 70). This classical political economy standpoint cannot be reconciled with Foucault's treatment of Gary Becker's human capital theory, which undercuts the (Marxist) treatment of commodified labor power and enables Foucault to inscribe neoliberal governmentality in his history of subjectification practices. In other words, for Foucault, neoliberal governmentality conducts our conduct by inducing us to subjectify ourselves as self-entrepreneurs concerned with obtaining a return on our human capital (NB 227-232F / 221-226E).31 So for Foucault, we best see the radicality of American neoliberalism by concentrating on its mode of subjectification. And the most radical mode of homo economicus is reached when the self-entrepreneur takes up the challenge of managing its genetic capital.32 Although Foucault felt the need to apologize for introducing the "science fiction" aspects of genetic capital (NB 233-235F / 226-229E), we are now deep into an era in which "biocapital" is an unavoidable horizon for social-political-economic analysis; as we might expect, these analyses invariably take Foucault as one of their starting points.33

Neoliberalism Impact - Biopolitical (2/2)

The continuation of biocapital creates a logic of extermination, justifying the worst atrocities in history

Stohler 95 (Anne Stohler, Professor of Anthropology at the University of Michigan, Race and the Education of Desire, 1995, P. 81-82)

Biopower was defined as a power organized around the management of life, where wars were waged on behalf of the existence of everyone, entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of the life necessity, massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many to be killed, at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large scale phenomena of the population. The sovereign right to kill appears as an "excess" of biopower that does away with life in the name of securing it. How does this power over life permit the right to kill, if this is a power invested in augmenting life and the quality of it? How is it possible for this political power to expose to death not only its enemies, but even its own citizens. This is the point where racism intervenes. "What inscribes racism in the mechanisms of the state is the emergence of biopower.... racism inscribes itself as a fundamental mechanism of power that exercises itself in modern states" racist discourse it is a "means of introduction a fundamental division between those who must live and those who must die. It fragments the biological field it establishes a break inside the biological field, it establishes a break inside the biological continuum of human beings by defining a hierarchy of races, a set of subdivisions in which certain races are classified as "good," fit, and superior. It establishes a positive relation between the right to kill and the assurance of life. It posits that the more you kill and let die, the more you will live." It is neither racism nor that state that invented this connection, but the permanency of war-like relations inside the social body. Racism now activates this discourse in a novel way, establishing a biological confrontation between "my life and the death of others" The enemies are those identified as external and internal threats to the population. "Racism is the condition that makes it acceptable to put certain people to death in a society of normalization" The murderous function of the biopolitical state can only be assured by racism, which is indispensable to it. Racism will develop in modern societies where biopower is prevalent and with colonizing genocide." How else, could a biopolitical state kill civilizations if not by activating the themes of evolutionism and racism. War "regenerates" one's own race. In conditions of war proper, the right to kill and the affirmation of life productively converge. Discourse has concrete effects; its practices are prescribed and motivated by the biological taxonomies of the racist state.

PMCs Impact – Justice/Endless War

Additionally, PMCs collapse justice and create unending war by continuing conflict.

Sheehy & Maogoto 8 (Lexis, Benedict Sheehy and Jackson N. Maogoto, ARTICLE & ESSAY: THE PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANY--UNRAVELLING THE THEORETICAL, LEGAL & REGULATORY MOSAIC, Fall 2008)

The PMC is an institution established to facilitate and conduct war on solely and exclusively economic grounds. This issue has been dealt with historically in discussions on mercenarism and legal instruments designed to deal with that phenomenon, and need not be dealt with here. However, as the PMC industry has taken root and boomed, and significant, dramatic military involvements have occurred, the discussion has morphed from mercenarism into a discussion of State and international legal and policy response to the PMC. Predictably, the issues, parties, and position have changed over time. It is within this emerging dynamic that the authors' contextualize the Article's central themes and hypotheses. In this regard, delineating the distinction between mercenary and PMC coupled with the elucidation in the above section, offers further traction for the subsequent, discussions. One of the many significant distinctions between the PMC and the traditional Soldier of Fortune is that unlike the odd or casual mercenary whose participation may be seen as a form of slippage in the regulation of the battlefield, but unlikely to significantly alter the outcome of the battle, the PMC is a different type of actor. It has the potential to drastically alter outcomes on the battlefield. This is mainly because the corporate form and organization of the PMC allows the massing of resources for conducting warfare well beyond  [\*156]  that of individual mercenaries, thus placing it in a position to significantly impact outcomes on the battlefield. A further significant distinction involves the PMC shielding. Unlike the private mercenary, the corporate form allows the PMC to completely escape legal censure unlike the mercenary who was subject to censure by both local and international law. PMC involvement in war is shielded as it is deemed the action of private actors, unaccountable to the public at large, and in many instances, at arm's length from governmental supervision via private contract. n25 Traditionally the right to amass for use of such extensive resources for war required the scrutiny, approval of and accountability of government and indirectly the populace, the corporate form of the PMC allows the amassing and deployment of extensive violent or potentially violent resources to be expended outside of such an accountability framework. As a secondary consequence, the PMC is inherently anti-democratic on a scale that individual mercenaries were never able to attain. The anti-democratic nature and scale of the PMC, as opposed to mercenaries armed with light weapons, can further be seen where the PMC is called in by a government unable to muster sufficient support among the populace for causes, or where it and/or a government wishes to evade public scrutiny. n26 The undermining of democracy can be seen whether the PMC is aiding an unpopular dictatorship to maintain control over a restive populace in a banana republic, or the PMC is the agent of a first-world government assisting the achievement of its geo-political aims, or aiding multinational corporations in the suppression of opposition to their operations. A related concern and distinction between PMCs and mercenaries is that whereas wars are lost on many issues beyond economic power, the PMC allows raw economic power to occasionally tip the balance in armed conflicts, exclusive of all other concerns including rights, justice, equity, and self-determination. While the principle of "economic might is right" has a long history in warfare, it has not been determinative, and indeed has on occasion failed. Despite this poignant factual landscape, the PMC stands to, among other things, potentially raise the cost in human lives of combatants by causing a poorly armed but popularly supported uprising or army to continue a struggle that it may well otherwise have already won based on its wide, "democratic" support. Coupled with this operationally asymmetry is another pivotal policy issue--the question of the loss of statal control and oversight since even when  [\*157]  contractors do military jobs, they remain private businesses and thus fall outside the military chain of command and justice systems. n27

2AC – K of DA – Generic (1/2)

(2AC MUST READ) All of your impact turns and advantages are based on a flawed epistemology – they are constructed using untested and unverifiable models that incite fear to uphold the neoliberal utopia

**Bourdieu 98** (Pierre. French sociologist. December 1998. <http://mondediplo.com/1998/12/08bourdieu>.)JFS

Economists may not necessarily share the economic and social interests of the true believers and may have a variety of individual psychic states regarding the economic and social effects of the utopia which they cloak with mathematical reason. Nevertheless, they have enough specific interests in the field of economic science to contribute decisively to the production and reproduction of belief in the neoliberal utopia. Separated from the realities of the economic and social world by their existence and above all by their intellectual formation, which is most frequently purely abstract, bookish, and theoretical, they are particularly inclined to confuse the things of logic with the logic of things. These economists trust models that they almost never have occasion to submit to the test of experimental verification and are led to look down upon the results of the other historical sciences, in which they do not recognise the purity and crystalline transparency of their mathematical games, whose true necessity and profound complexity they are often incapable of understanding. They participate and collaborate in a formidable economic and social change. Even if some of its consequences horrify them (they can join the socialist party and give learned counsel to its representatives in the power structure), it cannot displease them because, at the risk of a few failures, imputable to what they sometimes call "speculative bubbles", it tends to give reality to the ultra-logical utopia (ultra-logical like certain forms of insanity) to which they consecrate their lives.

2AC – K of DA – Generic (2/2)

Neoliberalism constructs false threats to justify the market – we take arbitrary actions to avoid a perceived ‘threat’ – do not play into this neoliberal ideology

Stewart 99 (Kathleen Anthropology – UT Austin, & Susan Harding, Anthropology – UCSC,

Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 28: 285-310, “BAD ENDINGS: American Apocalypsis”)JFS

Modernity is both a condition of possibility for the contemporary apocalyptic field and an example of its sensibility. Rapid, large-scale technological and industrial developments and the explosion of a mass consumer culture transformed the texture of experience; the phenomenal world became more chaotic, fragmented, and disorienting; sensory stimulation took on a new intensity (Schivelbusch 1979). A new sensational fascination with spectacles of catastrophe in the media developed as an aesthetic counterpart to the radical transformations of space, time, and industry, by apocalyptic-millennial vacillations between utopian and dystopian visions in which antimodern nostalgia for origins and simpler times meets dreams of enlightenment and progress, instrumental rationality meets avant-garde experimentation with form, and oppositions between the rational and the irrational, center and margin, and order and disorder become charged (Buell 1998, Ivy 1995, Lears 1994, Marx 1964). The modern world is characterized by simultaneous overstimulation and numbness, alarm and anesthesia (Berlant 1996, Buck-Morss 1995, Feldman 1994, Ivy 1993, Terkel 1988), and it is imagined in terms of dialectical extremes, of heaven and hell, or of dreamworld and catastrophe. In the omnipresent media, world events are presented as a state of constant, tautological crisis. Talk shows suggest that social and psychological problems are everywhere, and that our job, as an audience, is to recognize them in everything we see (Mellencamp 1992:150). In movies so scripted they can only be described as mythic, superhuman (and heavily armed) heroes avert imminent social, moral, and/or environmental collapse in a final battle, leaving a budding nuclear family standing in the ashes to begin the world again (Lapham 1996). "Reality" TV shows (such as COPS, 911, America's Most Wanted, and Unsolved Mysteries) take us inside the houses of the stigmatized poor and marginal for a glimpse of personal and social collapse, while shows about glamorous media stars and the lifestyles of the rich and famous present the millennial dream of a sudden twist of fate. Finally, critiques of the media, like critiques of modernity, are themselves often apocalyptic and millennial, depicting the media as conspiratorial, totalitarian, and contagious, or as a technological means of promoting universal education, common citizenship, global religious conversion, or utopian global community (Bray 1996, O'Leary 1998). The dialectic is unstable and subject to sudden shifts. In 1997, for instance, the utopian view of the internet as a tele-democracy and information superhighway gave way, for some, to darker themes of paranoia and conspiracy, with images of child pornography and sex cults trying to recruit new members online (Dean 1998:14). Mediation itself raises questions of control. Fears of cover-ups or of disinformation campaigns easily slide into full-blown conspiracy theories, and millennial hopes often turn on the dream of a return to direct action, direct, unmediated communication, and simple, authoritative truths imagined as a premodern state of being (Stewart 1999).and as compensation for their alienating effects (B Singer 1995). But modernity itself is also already structured The transition to advanced capitalist, or neo- or post-Fordist economics (processes of deregulation, privatization, franchise, and differentiation, and a shift from a product economy to a service and information economy) has produced down-sizing, reengineering, volatile markets, corporate mergers, transformations in the relationship between governments and corporations, growing inequality of income and control, and global dependence on huge communications industries (Mellencamp 1992). The new complex, or "flexible," systems are large, diffuse, dynamic networks that are unpredictable and subject to sudden collapse or sudden shifts of control from one part of the system to another (Davis 1998, Martin 1994). Global scale means both unprecedented power and intense vulnerability to disruptions and outbreaks anywhere in the world, giving rise to fears of anarchy, terrorism, scarcity, crime, and overpopulation (R Kaplan 1994). Power and insecurity are expressed in apocalyptic and millennial idioms of breakthroughs and breakdowns, stock market crashes, and a New World Order. Contemporary "risk society" (Beck 1992, 1995) produces alarming worst-case scenarios in the very effort to calculate precise risks in order to insure against them (Buell 1998, Douglas 1985, Lupton 1993). Advertising commodifies both fear and the dream of personal, exceptional safety in selling everything from insurance to schools to cars to high-priced skin creams such as Charles of the Ritz "Disaster Cream," Estee Lauder "Skin Defender Cream," and Golden Door "Crisis Cream" (Mellencamp 1992). A nostalgia for a simple past and the figure of a utopian future are modeled, concretely, in master-planned and gated communities. The figure of a middle class has become a norm or ideal that signals safety, while the poor have dropped out of view except as criminals, spectacular "failures" as individuals, and dangerous urban mobs. Violence and abjection are seen as a contagion, like a virus: Self-control and social containment are the only known vaccine (W Brown 1995, Davis 1998). Brown (1995) argues further that we are seeing changes in the very conditions of democracy, including depoliticized, or naturalized, modes of domination; a state more obviously invested in particular economic interests, political ends, and social formations; the disintegration and fragmentation of forms of association other than those organized by the commodity market and the classificatory schemes of disciplinary society; an unparalleled powerlessness over the fate and direction of one's life coupled with an unrelieved individual responsibility without insulation from failure; and a politics of ressentiment, which takes suffering as a measure of social value. These changes challenge the presumption that there is a public that shares a notion of reality, a concept of reason, and a set of criteria by which claims to reason and rationality are judged (Dean 1998). The ideal of a central public sphere still sometimes animates the dream of a transcendent voice of reason, but it is no longer possible to deny fundamental differences between particular publics and counter-publics based on gender, race, class, sexuality, religion, and myriad other identities and socialities (B Robbins 1993, Gibbs 1996). These publics vie for a more general public voice and legitimacy (Dean 1998) through claims of suffering and heroism. Death, disaster, and impending catastrophe becomes the only thing that can unite a general "public" (Martin 1994), especially when apocalyptic threat is followed by millennial amnesia in the form of dreams of love and freedom achieved and miraculous new beginnings.

2AC – K of DA – Politics

When we buy into purported political scenarios, we accept social control from the government and media. Do not buy into this manipulation.

Bennett 96 (Lance, Professor of Communication and Political Science at the University of Washington, News: The Politics of Illusion, Third Edition, pg. 189)JFS

Beyond the social consequences of a mass-mediated reality, there are some important political effects. If people find emotional and social significance in the distant world of news politics, then the media and the government possess a powerful mechanism of political and social control. The temptation always exists for political actors to propose magical solutions and fantastic political scenarios through the use of myths, stereotypes, scapegoats, and other symbolic devices. When the media legitimize such techniques and in the process condition the public to accept them, there are few restraints on the fabrication of political reality. Under such circumstances, political actors can manage issues, conflicts, and crises by simply throwing symbols at them - symbols that may be irrelevant to the matters at hand yet provoke powerful emotional response from the public.

2AC – K of DA – Environment (1/2)

Apocalyptic rhetoric regarding the environment leads to a feeling of despair – this discourages action and simply allows for more environmental destruction

Faust 8 (Christina, Apocalyptic Framing RUNNING HEAD: APOCALYPTIC FRAMING Global Warming and Apocalyptic Rhetoric, November 2008, http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/2/6/0/1/2/pages260125/p260125-1.php)

Apocalyptic Framing Since the release of Al Gore’s award-winning documentary, An Inconvenient Truth, the American public has been faced with an increasing amount of discourse on climate change. Leiserowitz (2007) concludes that “Large majorities of Americans believe that global warming is real and consider it a serious problem, yet global warming remains a low priority relative to other national and environmental issues” (p. 44). Indeed, though the United States emits a shockingly disproportionate amount of greenhouse gases, large-scale policy changes or even a precursory conversation about changing the energy economy have been slow in coming. Meanwhile, climate scientists and others concerned about global warming have continued to sound the alarm with increasing urgency (Moser & Dilling, 2004). In her review of the 1999 book, The Heat is On, Catherine Keller (1999) identifies a tendency to “read [climate change] data apocalyptically” (p. 42), which has devastating consequences for motivating the public to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The apocalyptic tone of climate change discourse may not only encourage a feeling of despair in the face of impending disaster, but also contributes to skeptics’ ability to discredit climate scientists as alarmists (Leiserowitz, 2007).

2AC – K of DA – Environment (2/2)

**The disad endorses ‘want’ over ‘need’ in the neoliberal structure– their attempt to ‘fix’ the ecological crisis only results in more environmental degradation and inequality.**

Kütting 4 (Gabriela Kütting, International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 9, Number 1, Spring/Summer 2004 http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol9\_1/Kutting\_91IJPS.pdf) NAR

Global political economy approaches to International Relations are generally focused on the productive aspects of politico-economic organization and neglect both the concept of consumption and the consumer as an actor. Without going into theoretical and conceptual detail which has been covered in the literature elsewhere (Princen et al., 2002; Kütting, 2004), the argument is put forward here that especially in the environmental field the relationship between productive and consumptive relations are pertinent for an understanding of environmental degradation in a social and political context. The environmental side of consumption is a major consideration for several reasons. First of all, the social and structural origins of environmental degradation can be found in the excessive consumption of the planet’s resources. Second, the dominant neoliberal or even liberal approach in global management institutions is based on the assumption that the current standard of living enjoyed by the richest 20 per cent of the world population can be extended to the whole globe. In terms of resource availability, this is clearly a myth and leads to serious environmental and equity questioning. Third, consumption is not the last stage in the production chain, rather the last stage is disposal of the product consumed. Waste is a serious environmental problem not just for local authorities but also at the global level and it affects the earth’s capacity to act as a sink. This article will focus on the first two points made. The argument that excessive consumption leads to environmental degradation is not a new argument and dates back to the late 1960s and early 1970s and the beginnings of the environmental movement and The Limits to Growth: A Report on the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind (Meadows, 1972). It is based on the ‘need not want’ philosophy. The early environmental movement in the 1970s questioned the ideology of consumerism in the period of unlimited expectations of the late 1960s and argued that the ideology of wanting more and more was fundamentally flawed and would lead to the ecological collapse of the planet. Rather, there should be an ideological shift to considering what people actually needed for a fulfilled life rather than wanted (i.e. a questioning of the ideology of unlimited economic growth and of an expected rise in the standard of living of those who had already achieved a high level). This movement coincided with the first oil crisis and the first United Nations Conference for the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972. The idea that there are insufficient resources has often been discredited with the discovery of new oil fields and the introduction of more energy-efficient technologies. Apart from the oil resources problem, there have been various predictions of disasters or shortages that have not come true. Hardin’s (1968) tragedy of the commons has not happened, and the idea that an increasing world population cannot be fed with the agricultural resources of the planet has been discredited, thus also incidentally denying the need for genetically manipulated/modified crops. These are problems of distribution and access to resources rather than availability. Therefore the concern about running out of resources and the need not want campaign have lost their immediate urgency and have fizzled out. However, all this does not change the fundamental truth that there is only a fixed amount of resources on this planet, and although we are not in danger of running out in the near future, these resources are being used up at an unsustainable rate by only a small percentage of the world population. The neoliberal economic order like its preceding economic orders treats the natural environment as if there was an unlimited supply of natural resources. The ‘goods and services’ provided by the planet are not costed, unlike capital goods and resources owned by a supplier; therefore they are externalized by economists and taken for granted in economic valuations. Environmental economists such as David Pearce et al. (1988) have overcome this shortcoming by integrating previously ‘free’ goods into the economic system through price mechanisms, but in essence this still does not change the fundamental paradox of externalizing the resource or energy supply that underlies social survival. In addition, by pricing environmental goods they can become luxury goods, and only available to those who can afford them which often makes environmental quality a preserve of the rich rather than a human right. Again, this raises questions of equity and access.

2AC – K of DA – Economy

The theory of economic decline is an elitist fantasy to maintain the status quo

**Tuathail 00** (Tuathail Gearoid, Professor at Virginia Tech University, 2000 “the Postmodern Geopolitical Condition: States, Statecraft, and Security at the Millennium) NAR

In the 1990s, new discourses blurring old fashioned geopolitical rhetoric with new geofinancial concerns, have gained prominence, with teetering emerging markets being described as “dominoes” and threats being cast in terms of financial proximity (“we must prop up Brazil’s economy to protect ourselves”). Such hybrid discourses are elite constructions that do not necessarily enjoy widespread popular support. Whether they can be successful in galvanizing political action in the times of crisis that will inevitably come remains to be seen. From a critical geopolitical perspective, these discourses are saturated with relationships of power that represent the interests of a transnational economic elite at the expensive of a more democratic, egalitarian, and sustainable vision of the world economy.

2AC - Generic CP Block (1/2)

Perm: do the counterplan.

Our standard for competition is that the neg must prove that it is an ethically competitive option in order to justify voting for it- if it is not then you vote aff because it is functionally plan-plus.

**Tooze 2k** (Roger, Former Professor – London School of Economics, Strange Power, Ed. Thomas Lawton, James Rosenau, and Amy Verdun, p. 187-8)JFS

In identifying the knowledge structure as one of her four ‘primary structures’ of IPE, Strange was able to place the analysis of the power of beliefs and ideas in IPE within this structure. Power derived from the knowledge structure ‘comprehends what is believed (and the moral conclusions and principles derived from those beliefs); what is known and perceived as understood; and the channels by which beliefs, ideas and knowledge are communicated – including some people and excluding others’ (Strange 1994: 119). She thus identifies and defines a knowledge structure in the following way: “a knowledge structure determines what knowledge is discovered, how it is stores, and who communicates it by what means to whom and on what terms’ (ibid.: 121). As Mytelka emphasized in Chapter 3 of the present volume, this definition explicitly recognizes the production, possession, control, communication and, above all, the legitimization of knowledge as a prime structure of political economy – one that is as important for the distribution and realization of power as any of the other three structures in her frame of analysis. Within the knowledge structure, Strange has a particular notion of the relationship of belief systems to structures of power which seems very lcose to the critical conception of the relationship between materiality and systems of meaning (Sayer 1992: 35). For Strange, ‘structural analysis suggests that technological changes do not necessarily change power structures. They do so only if accompanied by changes in the basic belief systems which underpin or support the political and economic arrangements acceptable to society’ (Strange 1994: 127, emphasis added). In other words, power is constructed and maintained not by material means alone but with necessary supportive ‘belief systems’ or ‘systems of meaning’ or, even, ‘ideology’ (Bauman 1999). However, and crucially, Strange differs from Sayer, and the critical realists, by not wanting to recognize the reflexive nature of knowledge and the consequences that this might have for her own analysis as well as her analysis of GPE.

Reject the counterplan– the counterplan is an example of a neoliberal bureaucratic exercise that seeks to delay social change by arguing about insignificant questions of process.

**Jones ‘5** **(**Dr Kevin Edson, Lecturer at The University of Liverpool Management School, Dep’t for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, http://www.liv.ac.uk/~kejones/riskpolicy.pdf)JFS

48 While progress is certainly being made, the full potential of these exercises has not been fully explored by policy-makers. In large part, this is a consequence of an overarching concern with the desire to generate public confidence and legitimacy in policy and decision-making. Alternatively, little value is given to the potential cognitive gains to be derived from engagement exercises. Simply, policy-makers do not always enter an engagement asking what they might gain in terms of an understanding of a risk, or potential solutions to a hazard problem. This may at times contribute to the relegation of engagement to simple bureaucratic exercises, as opposed to processes guiding policy maker’s approaches to risk. As engagement develops in CEER there is a need to evaluate much more systematically how participants are informing policy-making, and how open the process has been to encouraging meaningful and influential participation.

2AC – Generic CP Block (2/2)

How we justify policy has independent impacts – you can only view the counterplan in the context of its net benefit – so if we win our kritik of the DA, the CP has a flawed justification and needs to be rejected

Hall ’93 (Peter A. , Krupp Foundation Professor of European Studies - Harvard University,

(*Comparative Politics* 25.3, “Policymaking Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State”)JFS

Only in some cases, then, will it be appropriate to speak of a fully elaborated policy paradigm. In others, the web of ideas affecting the direction of policy will be looser and subject to more frequent variations. Even here, however, we should not discount altogether the impact that an overarching set of ideas can have on policy. The most cynical bureaucrats and politicians must still rationalize their actions in terms that will draw popular support, provide a semblance of consistency, and motivate those who have to carry out the relevant policies. Moreover, their actions are invariably based on a particular understanding of that sphere of the world which policy addresses. The terms of discourse in which that sphere and the policies appropriate to it are discussed constrain and enable often in highly specific ways. Even where the Leitmotiv of policy is simply an overarching metaphor, such as the "war on drugs" or the "problem of welfare mothers," the metaphor and its attendant elaborations can structure many aspects of what is to be done. Policymaking in virtually all fields takes place within the context of a particular set of ideas that recognize some social interests as more legitimate than others and privilege some lines of policy over others.64

Without denying the impact of material interests on the policy process, we need to know much more than we now do about the role that ideas play in policymaking and in the process whereby policies change. I have suggested a number of hypotheses here with specific applications. The most important step we can take, however, is to note that it is not necessary to deny that politics involves a struggle for power and advantage in order to recognize that the movement of ideas plays a role, with some impact of its own, in the process of policymaking. This analysis cautions us against positing too rigid a distinction between "politics as social learning" and "politics as a struggle for power." It suggests that "powering" and "puzzling" are often intertwined in the formation of public policies. To see this most clearly, we need more studies of the evolution of policy over time, a subject that has often been neglected relative to static, one-shot comparisons of policy across nations.65

Nothing less than an absolute rejection solves

Singer 7 (Peter, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, Harpers Magazine, Sept 3,7, <http://harpers.org/archive/2007/09/hbc-90001311>)JFS

As you know, I was in this camp for several years, trying to analyze and suggesting policy ideas for finding our way out of the issues of outsourcing–through better oversight procedures, improved laws, etc. But I have simply come to the conclusion that it just keeps sending us further down the rabbit hole. The emperor has no clothes on, and the solution is not to say, “well, let’s put a scarf on him.”

K of T (1/2)

The 1AC is a disad to their interpretation.– the negatives desire to ‘exclude’ the PMC from military service masks true role, and ignores that they are our military

Walker 4 (Clive Walker, 2004, WAR FOR HIRE? ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES, http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/2004/Walker.pdf)

Moreover, the idea that the state, and by implication the rule of law, is in retreat under the neoliberal conditions of deregulation and privatisation begins to look rather misleading. From this perspective, the opening up of legitimate markets to PMCs looks less like a transfer of power from the public to the private sector, but the re-regulation of security provision, from international human rights or humanitarian law to contract and civil law. There are two elements of this process of re-regulation (which in this case also implies legitimisation of the industry) that are significant in constitutional terms: the transfer of *121/pmc/isrcl04 © Clive Walker, 2004* 15 institutional responsibility for absorbing risk, both in financial terms and in terms of political exposure, and the undermining of democratic accountability that this shift implies. The latter is not to imply that the executive branch has, or ever can, ‘contract out’ democratic accountability. Governments and their institutions in modern democracies cannot function without some level of popular legitimacy. In this sense, what the privatisation of some military functions does is mask, rather than dissolve, government responsibility for foreign policy. To the extent that governments can now distance themselves from the body bags, human rights abuses and war crimes, the use of PMCs provides new opportunities to mystify the state’s directing role in military violence. What this process of mystification does imply is that lines of public-private accountability are increasingly blurred. Finally, PMCs afford the possibility of greater adventurism in foreign policy and allow a western constructed order to be imposed on a much wider range of conflicts to be settled according to the interest of western states which can foster and afford the services of PMCs. If their technical success masks underlying socio-political problems, then they cannot be blamed, but we must be careful to avoid the impression that the official paymasters also incur no responsibilities. If the United Kingdom government does follow the road to re-regulation/legalisation of the industry, a looming constitutional fissure in the mantle of democratic accountability must also be addressed.

To remove PMCs from the scope of the topic is exactly what we are kritking – PMCs serve the function of soldiers and are used by the executive branch conducting policy abroad.

Chwastiak 7 (Michele Chwastiak, April 2007, War, Incorporated: Private, Unaccountable and Profitable, http://www.mngt.waikato.ac.nz/ejrot/Vol\_10\_cms2007specialedition/chwastiak.pdf)

Hence, privatized warfare allows the executive to “rationalize” foreign policy by bypassing the inefficiencies of democracy or just overriding democratic resolutions (Singer, 2003, 2005). As even the GAO (2003) admitted, PMCs allow the executive to get around Congressional restrictions on US troop deployments. For example, when Congress constrained the US involvement in Bosnia to 20,000 troops, the executive overrode this limit by hiring 2,000 private contractors. Similarly, the executive circumvented the Congressional upper bound on troops for the war on drugs in Columbia through the use of PMCs (Macomber, 2004; Wayne, 2002). While the Bosnia limit was primarily the result of Congressional concern regarding the loss of US soldiers’ lives, in Columbia Congress did not want the US to be perceived as supporting a military with an egregious human rights record (Singer, 2003; Yeoman, 2003). Thus, PMCs give the executive the flexibility to conduct foreign policy at a distance with the cover of plausible deniability. Unlike CIA front companies, etc

K of T (2/2)

As the military continues hampering itself, it hires PMCs to pickup the slack – to assert PMCs are not part of the armed forces continues to separate ‘civilian contractors’ from ‘soldiers’, despite that they are exactly the same.

Anechiarico and Dehn 8 (“Ultimately Unaccountable: Governance of Private Military Companies Nationally, Supranationally and Internationally” Frank Anechiarico, Ph.D. Professor of Government and Law Hamilton College, and John Dehn, Professor of Law United States Military Academy, June, http://www.4tad.org/ws/paper\_wks4\_Anechiarico.pdf)KM

The original mandate (A-76 Circular) to move towards contracting out portions of Army missions specified that any mission that could be accomplished by a civilian contractor should be contracted out.11 The intent was that contractors would take over tasks that were not critical to the military mission. Routine, non-tactical tasks such as gate guard, facilities attendants, dining facility operators, drivers, and rear area mechanics were to be turned over to contractors, whenever possible, to free up the available soldier end strength for tactical missions. Unfortunately, while preoccupied with important missions and continuously pressured to do more with less, the Army has allowed the role of contractors to expand to the point where critical deployment and war fighting tasks now are dependant on reliable contractors. To understand the criticality of contractors in Iraq we must first understand what roles they are filling. As I have already alluded, many contractors are in Iraq maintaining complex weapons systems or providing some level of support for those weapons systems. Other contractors are providing specialized tactical protection for critical Iraqi and U.S. government officials. The vast majority are filling less visible and potentially less critical support functions such as logistics support at base camps throughout Iraq. Also the vast majority of interpreters working to enable our military forces and interagency experts to communicate throughout the region are contractors. As described in this paper’s opening vignette, the loss of a critical contract support role at the wrong moment has the potential to cause failure of a critical mission. Because U.S. forces have found themselves in the position of having to depend on contractors in many critical positions, it is essential to ensure that the contractors in these critical positions are reliable. Contractors must be reliable so that our forces can get to the fight, win the fight, and reestablish stability after the fight. Although this is not strictly in contravention with the original A-76 mandate it nonetheless is an unsettling trend that the Army must address. The current environment in Iraq demonstrates both the metamorphosis in the use of contractors and the issues with that change. Contractors in Iraq are currently providing personal security detachments for important government figures. Although many of these specific contractors are hired by other U.S. government agencies and not the U.S. Army, this move to armed contractors sets a precedent that is damaging to the U.S. Army. This employment of contractors not only moves them outside the commonly accepted logistic support role, but places weapons in their hands. This is a whole new dynamic, which in several instances placed contractors in direct and potentially deadly contact with Army soldiers.12 In a 26 August 2005 meeting with the Defense Writers Group, in regards to the pervasiveness of armed contractors in Iraq, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker was quoted as saying, "I can see where, on the battlefield, there would be issues that could be problematic in terms of the rules of engagement, what kind of controls were placed on people that are roaming the battlefield."13 The potential for conflict between armed contractors and soldiers was especially evident when Marines in Fallujah detained a group of security contractors working for North Carolina-based Zapata Engineering . The Marines claimed the contractors shot indiscriminately at civilians and fired on Marine observation posts; Zapata employees denied firing at the Marines. The poor discipline of armed contractors seemed to be verified in an interview with Brig. Gen. Karl R. Horst, deputy commander of the 3rd Infantry Division. After allegations of indiscriminate shootings and other recklessness. BG Horst said, “These guys run loose in this country and do stupid stuff. There's no authority over them, so you can't come down on them hard when they escalate force. They shoot people, and someone else has to deal with the aftermath. It happens all over the place." BG Horst further hypothesized that some insurgent attacks on his soldiers were the direct result of Iraqi retaliation to indiscriminate shootings by the contractors in his area of operations.14