## \*\*\*Prolif Bad – Compilied Wave Four\*\*\*



## \*\*\*Offense \*\*\*

## \*\*\*Scenarios\*\*\*

## Accidents/Miscalc

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**Prolif drastically increases the risk of accidents – guarantees nuclear war**

**Sturm 09 –** Fellow at the National Truman Security Project, a national security based institute in Washington DC (Frankie, “Nuclear Weapons: A New Paradigm for the 21st Century, Truman National Security Project”)//AA

Accidents happen, but the price of a nuclear accident is impermissible. Yet, past incidents over the last several decades far less known than “Chernobyl” could very well have led to more catastrophic results: 1979, U.S. Mistakes Computer Exercise for Soviet Nuclear Strike. **When a realistic training tape was mistakenly inserted into the computer running the United States’ early warning system, launch control centers for Minuteman missiles received preliminary warning that the U.S. was under attack, while the entire continental air defense interceptor force was put on alert. In a country with less sophisticated systems, such an incident could have provoked a hasty retaliatory strike and accidental nuclear war**. 1988, Pakistan Mistakes Explosion for Indian Nuclear Attack. **When a massive conventional munitions explosion occurred at a secret ammunition dump near Rawalpindi, some Pakistani officials mistook it for the start of an Indian nuclear strike. Given the size of Pakistan’s conventional forces compared to India’s – and the proximity of the two nations, cutting down the decision time in the event of a launch – such an incident could easily have resulted in accidental nuclear war.** 1995, Russia Mistakes Weather Balloon for U.S. Nuclear Strike. **When Norway launched a weather rocket to investigate the Northern Lights, Russian radars mistook the rocket for a missile launched by a U.S. submarine. Russian officials scrambled their nuclear forces into position and activated President Boris Yeltsin’s “nuclear brief- case.”** A nation that feels vulnerable to nuclear attack might feel obligated to launch a retaliatory strike before all the facts are in, leading to an accidental nuclear war. The list of nuclear accidents and potential calamities goes on. As clearly put by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, “Mistakes are made in every other human endeavor. Why should nuclear weapons be exempt?” In addition to the threat of discrete nuclear accidents lies the broader problem of loose nuclear material. Russia possesses more than 10,000 nuclear warheads, many of which are poorly guarded and vulnerable to theft. Although the U.S. and Russia have worked together through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction initiative to secure nuclear material and deactivate thousands of warheads, analysts fear that underpaid scientists and lax security could create a situation in which a terrorist group could buy or steal a bomb. Meanwhile, the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal remains in question, stoking fears that state collapse in that volatile country could also enable terrorists to acquire a nuclear weapon. The accidental detonation of a single nuclear weapon could kill thousands; an accidental nuclear war could kill millions worldwide. This threat has been with us for decades, but the prospect that mistakes or mishaps could inadvertently help terrorists obtain nuclear weapons adds extra gravity to the threat.

## ---2nc XT/Link Wall

Nuclear weapons increase the risk of accidents occurring

Krieger 12 Pres. Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and Councilor – World Future Council (David “Nuclear Age Peace Foundation” https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:JMLVD0tU0wYJ:www.wagingpeace.org/menu/resources/publications/2012\_prepcom.pdf+&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESgupaZE4RffTv5cbp4QGWR3f7w8hcKjpYmRyVMCDyyoLBA\_7XPI4Jm\_FEbmqxoaacEol-dR5QCUdUYE\_NmvHxyCqycpbE8I47Z3XHv9lz7JjwppvxwsSHebzxGfDZq5qEVZUVMl&sig=AHIEtbSHFBBSQERq0zWBJJcBGxl2R-yycg))//AA

While a nuclear war is not likely, it is possible and could occur by accident, miscalculation or design. Just as the large-scale radiation releases from the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant seemed unlikely until they occurred, the possibility of nuclear war also may seem unlikely until deterrence fails and it occurs. Nuclear deterrence Human fallibility requires the constant maintenance of clear communications and rational and nuclear behavior on all sides and in all circumstances. weapons are a highly volatile mix. One thing we know about humans is that we are fallible. We are not capable of perfection and we cannot eliminate human error altogether no matter how diligently we try. Human fallibility and nuclear weapons are a highly volatile mix. Our best hope of preventing the use of nuclear weapons is to abolish them. That is the challenge that now confronts us. The question for us is: How can these most terrible weapons of mass destruction be eliminated most expeditiously and securely? Planning for and implementing the abolition of nuclear weapons must be done carefully with all necessary precautions, but time is of the essence. One important way to accelerate this process is to challenge the central justification for retaining or acquiring a nuclear arsenal – the theory of nuclear deterrence.

**High risk of a nuclear accident – experts confirm.**

**Below, 2008 -** Wing Commander for the Royal Air Force, Master of Arts degree in Defence Studies from Kings College London, (Tim, “Options For US Nuclear Disarment: Exemplary Leadership or Extraordinary Lunacy?,”)//AA

Despite his relative optimism that proliferation may not present the dangers that other commentators fear, Waltz can not escape the fact that the chances of an explosive accident or an unauthorized or inadvertent launch increase as the number of nuclear states increases. However, he retains his optimism, arguing against the notion that unstable and bordering states necessarily present higher risks than other nations. Ivan Oelrich contends that the real threat is not something external that needs to be countered. Rather, it is something internal that the United States is self-generating through its retention of nuclear weapons, and is worsened by maintaining high states of alert. He is particularly concerned that “we [the United States] are not looking at the risks which nuclear weapons create.”In his view, nuclear weapons are the only thing that today poses an existential threat to the United States, and the perpetuation of their existence simply prolongs that threat. Meanwhile, Barry Blechman and Cathleen Fisher view **the specific dangers of nuclear accident or inadvertent use as the greatest short term threat.**

**Prolif results in accidental nuclear war and miscalculation – irrationality ensures escalation**

**Berkowitz, 85 -** Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota, March, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, (Bruce D, “Proliferation, Deterrence, and the Likelihood of Nuclear War,” pp. 112-136,)//AA

The first argument holds that any increase in the number of nuclear powers in the world increases the likelihood of nuclear war. This argument can be traced back to the early 1950s, when the "n-th country" problem was first discussed. Up to that time, most writers had focused on the danger that nuclear weapons presented in the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the effect of these weapons on the likelihood of a SovietAmerican war. But after the Soviet Union and Great Britain developed nuclear weapons, it became apparent that a number of other countries had the combination of money, material, and know-how to build such weapons too. Writers began to turn their attention to the problems that resulted from a world in which many countries (i.e., the n-th country) had nuclear weapons. The n-th country problem referred to the danger of many hands being able to reach for the nuclear trigger. Writers holding this view gave several reasons for believing that this would be a dangerous situation. First, they said, proliferation would put nuclear weapons into the hands of less developed countries. These countries usually have primitive economies (e.g., few factories) and more dispersed populations-in other words, few attractive targets. Such countries would be more apt to start a nuclear war because they would have relatively little to lose. Second, the anti-proliferation writers claimed, the later members of the nuclear club might be led by "less responsible" rulers who, because they failed to appreciate the consequences of nuclear war, might be more likely to start one. And, third, these writers believed that proliferation would increase the likelihood of an "accidental" nuclear war as a result of miscalculation, a breakdown in communications between countries, the instigation of an agent-provocateur, and so on (e.g., see Davidson et al., 1958; Beaton and Maddox, 1962; Kahn, 1960, 1962; and more recently, Dunn, 1982). These writers believed that the addition of nuclear powers to the international system increased the likelihood of nuclear war geometrically (e.g., Aiken, 1961; see also Russett, 1983); whenever another state obtained nuclear weapons, all other states became potential targets. Logically, these writers opposed nuclear proliferation under any and all circumstances. This point of view is evident, for example, in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the various studies on proliferation published by the Stockholm Institute for Peace Research, and other informed opponents of proliferation.

**Increases chance of miscalc.**

**Waltz 81 –** London International Institute for Strategic Studies (Kenneth, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better”, 1981; < [https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm)//](https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm%29/)AB

Most people believe that the **world will become a more dangerous one as nuclear weapons spread**. **The chances that nuclear weapons will be fired in anger or accidentally** exploded in a way that prompts a nuclear exchange are finite,though unknown. Those chances **increase as the number of nuclear states increase**. More is therefore worse. Most people also believe that the chances that nuclear weapons will be used vary with the character of the new nuclear states—their sense of responsibility, inclination toward devotion to the *status quo,*political and administrative competence. Ifthe supply of states of good character is limited as is widely thought, then the larger the number of nuclear states, the greater the chances of nuclear war become. If nuclear weapons are acquired by countries whose governments totter and frequently fall, should we not worry more about the world’s destruction then we do now? And if nuclear weapons are acquired by two states that are traditional and bitter rivals, should that not also foster our concern?

Prolif makes accidental war probable

Sagan 95 - Co-director of CISAC and Co- director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, (Scott, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*)//AA

Such optimistic views of the effects of nuclear proliferation have not escaped criticism, of course, and a number of scholars have argues that nuclear deterrence may not be stable in specific regional settings. What is missing in the debate so far, however, is an alternative theory of the consequences of nuclear proliferation; an alternative that is a broader conception of the effects of nuclear weapons proliferation on the likelihood of war. In this chapter I present such an alternative, rooted in organization theory, which leads to a far more pessimistic assessment of the future prospects for peace. there are two central arguments. First, I argue that professional military organizations--because of common biases, inflexible routines. and parochial interests--display organizational behaviors that are likely to lead to deterrence failures and deliberate or accidental war. Unlike the widespread psychological critique of rational deterrence theory-which maintains that some political leaders may lack the intelligence or emotional stability to make deterrence work--this organizational critique argues that military organizations, unless professionally managed through a checks and balances system of strong civilian control, are unlikely to fulfill the operational requirements for stable nuclear deterrence.

**Even a moderate scenario for accidental launch would kill billions and cause global disease spread**

**FORROW ET AL 1998** (Lachlan Forrow, Bruce G Blair, Ira Helfand, George Lewis, et al, Author Affiliation: From the Division of Gencral Medicine and Primary Care, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center and Harvard Medical School, (L.F.); the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. (B.G.B.); Physicians for Social Responsibility, (I.H.); Massachusetts Institute of Technology, (G.L., TP); the Department of Epidemiology and Social Medicine, Montefiore Medical Center and Albert Einstein College of Medicine, (VS.); Barry S. Levy Associates and Tufts University School of Medicine, (B.S.L.); the Department of Radiology and the Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, (H.A.); and Mount Sinai School of Medicine; New England Journal of Medicine, April 30)

A missile launch activated by false warning is thus possible in both U.S. and Russian arsenals. For the reasons noted above, an accidental Russian launch is currently considered the greater risk. Several specific scenarios have been considered by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization of the Department of Defense.31 We have chosen to analyze a scenario that falls in the middle range of the danger posed by an accidental attack: the launch against the United States of the weapons on board a single Russian Delta-IV ballistic-missile submarine, for two reasons. First, the safeguards against the unauthorized launch of Russian submarine-based missiles are weaker than those against either silo-based or mobile land-based rockets, because the Russian general staff cannot continuously monitor the status of the crew and missiles or use electronic links to override unauthorized launches by the crews. Second, the Delta-IV is and will remain the mainstay of the Russian strategic submarine fleet.27,32,33 Delta-IV submarines carry 16 missiles. Each missile is armed with four 100-kt warheads and has a range of 8300 km, which is sufficient to reach almost any part of the continental United States from typical launch stations in the Barents Sea.34,ss These missiles are believed to be aimed at "soft" targets, usually in or near American cities, whereas the more accurate silo-based missiles would attack U.S. military installations.36 Although a number of targeting strategies are possible for any particular Delta-IV, it is plausible that two of its missiles are assigned to attack war-supporting targets in each of eight U.S. urban areas. If 4 of the 16 missiles failed to reach their destinations because of malfunctions before or after the launch, then 12 missiles carrying a total of 48 warheads would reach their targets. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT We assume that eight U.S. urban areas are hit: four with four warheads and four with eight warheads. We also assume that the targets have been selected according to standard military priorities: industrial, financial, and transportation sites and other components of the infrastructure that are essential for supporting or recovering from war. Since lowaltitude bursts are required to ensure the destruction of structures such as docks, concrete runways, steel-reinforced buildings, and underground facilities, most if not all detonations will cause substantial early fallout. Physical Effects Under our model, the numbers of immediate deaths are determined primarily by the area of the "superfires" that would result from a thermonuclear explosion over a city. Fires would ignite across the exposed area to roughly 10 or more calories of radiant heat per square centimeter, coalescing into a giant firestorm with hurricane-force winds and average air temperatures above the boiling point of water. Within this area, the combined effects of superheated wind, toxic smoke, and combustion gases would result in a death rate approaching 100 percent.3' For each 100-kt warhead, the radius of the circle of nearly 100 percent short-term lethality would be 4.3 km (2.7 miles), the range within which 10 cal per square centimeter is delivered to the earth's surface from the hot fireball under weather conditions in which the visibility is 8 km (5 miles), which is low for almost all weather conditions. We used Census CD to calculate the residential population within these areas according to 1990 U.S. Census data, adjusting for areas where circles from different warheads overlapped.38 In many urban areas, the daytime population, and therefore the casualties, would be much higher. Fallout The cloud of radioactive dust produced by lowaltitude bursts would be deposited as fallout downwind of the target area. The exact areas of fallout would not be predictable, because they would depend on wind direction and speed, but there would be large zones of potentially lethal radiation exposure. With average wind speeds of 24 to 48 km per hour (15 to 30 miles per hour), a 100-kt low-altitude detonation would result in a radiation zone 30 to 60 km (20 to 40 miles) long and 3 to 5 km (2 to 3 miles) wide in which exposed and unprotected persons would receive a lethal total dose of 600 rad within six hours.39 With radioactive contamination of food and water supplies, the breakdown of refrigeration and sanitation systems, radiation-induced immune suppression, and crowding in relief facilities, epidemics of infectious diseases would be likely.40 Deaths Table 1 shows the estimates of early deaths for each cluster of targets in or near the eight major urban areas, with a total of 6,838,000 initial deaths. Given the many indeterminate variables (e.g., the altitude of each warhead's detonation, the direction of the wind, the population density in the fallout zone, the effectiveness of evacuation procedures, and the availability of shelter and relief supplies), a reliable estimate of the total number of subsequent deaths from fallout and other sequelae of the attack is not possible. With 48 explosions probably resulting in thousands of square miles of lethal fallout around urban areas where there are thousands of persons per square mile, it is plausible that these secondary deaths would outnumber the immediate deaths caused by the firestorms. Medical Care in the Aftermath Earlier assessments have documented in detail the problems of caring for the injured survivors of a nuclear attack: the need for care would completely overwhelm the available health care resources.1-5,41 Most of the major medical centers in each urban area lie within the zone of total destruction. The number of patients with severe burns and other critical injuries would far exceed the available resources of all critical care facilities nationwide, including the country's 1708 beds in burn-care units (most of which are already occupied).42 The danger of intense radiation exposure would make it very difficult for emergency personnel even to enter the affected areas. The nearly complete destruction of local and regional transportation, communications, and energy networks would make it almost impossible to transport the severely injured to medical facilities outside the affected area. After the 1995 earthquake in Kobe, Japan, which resulted in a much lower number of casualties (6500 people died and 34,900 were injured) and which had few of the complicating factors that would accompany a nuclear attack, there were long delays before outside medical assistance arrived.41 FROM DANGER TO PREVENTION Public health professionals now recognize that many, if not most, injuries and deaths from violence and accidents result from a predictable series of events that are, at least in principle, preventable.44,45 The direct toll that would result from an accidental nuclear attack of the type described above would dwarf all prior accidents in history. Furthermore, such an attack, even if accidental, might prompt a retaliatory response resulting in an all-out nuclear exchange. The World Health Organization has estimated that this would result in billions of direct and indirect casualties worldwide.4

**Disease Spread Causes Extinction**

**Yu ‘9** [Victoria, “Human Extinction: The Uncertainty of Our Fate,” Dartmouth Journal of Undergraduate Science, May 22, http://dujs.dartmouth.edu/spring-2009/human-extinction-the-uncertainty-of-our-fate]

**In the past, humans have indeed fallen victim to viruses**. Perhaps the best-known case was the bubonic plague that killed up to one third of the European population in the mid-14th century (7). **While vaccines have been developed for the plague and some other infectious diseases, new viral strains are** constantly emerging **— a process that maintains the possibility of a pandemic-facilitated** human extinction**.** Some surveyed students mentioned AIDS as a potential pandemic-causing virus.  It is true that scientists have been unable thus far to find a sustainable cure for AIDS, mainly due to HIV’s rapid and constant evolution. Specifically, two factors account for the virus’s abnormally high mutation rate: 1. HIV’s use of reverse transcriptase, which does not have a proof-reading mechanism, and 2. the lack of an error-correction mechanism in HIV DNA polymerase (8). Luckily, though, there are certain characteristics of HIV that make it a poor candidate for a large-scale global infection: HIV can lie dormant in the human body for years without manifesting itself, and AIDS itself does not kill directly, but rather through the weakening of the immune system.  However, **for more easily transmitted viruses such as influenza, the evolution of new strains could prove far more consequential. The simultaneous occurrence of antigenic drift (point mutations that lead to new strains) and antigenic shift (the inter-species transfer of disease) in the influenza virus could produce a new version of influenza for which scientists may not immediately find a cure. Since influenza can spread quickly, this lag time could potentially lead to a “global influenza pandemic,” according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention** (9). The most recent scare of this variety came in 1918 when bird flu managed to kill over 50 million people around the world in what is sometimes referred to as the Spanish flu pandemic. Perhaps **even more frightening is the fact that only 25 mutations were required to convert the original viral strain — which could only infect birds — into a human-viable strain** (10).

## Alliance

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**Prolif breaks down alliance credibility.**

**Kroenig 09 –** Assistant Professor of Government at Georgetown University and Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations (Matthew Ph.D., “Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation”, November 2 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Beyond-Optimism-and-Pessimism.pdf>)//AB

**Nuclear proliferation undermines the alliance structures of power-projecting states** because the spread of nuclear weapons **reduces the value of the security guarantees that power-projecting states extend to their allies**. Power-projecting states use the promise of military protection as a way to cement their alliance structures and to cultivate patron-client relationships. The client states are asymmetrically dependent on a relationship that ensures their survival, allowing power-projecting states influence over their clients’ foreign policies. Power-projecting states can dangle, and threaten to retract, the security guarantee cannot prevent client states from acting contrary to their interests. **As nuclear weapons spread**, however, **alliances** held together by promises of military protection are **weakened** in two ways. First, **client states** may **doubt the credibility of** their **patron’s** **commitments to** provide a **military defense** against nuclear-armed states, leading them to weaken ties with their patron. Second, nuclear proliferation could **encourage client states to acquire nuclear weapons** themselves, making them less dependable allies. If client states have their own nuclear arsenal, their **need for an external security guarantee is reduced**, giving them greater security independence and making them less compliant to their patron’s demands.

**US/Japan Alliance solves Asia conflict and peace**

Most experts believe that the series of alliances the United States created after World War II was one of the most astute and far-sighted acts of diplomacy in history. The alliance with Japan laid the foundation for reconciliation between two enemy nations and the groundwork for the reconstruction of a nation whose industrial power, infrastructure, and morale lay in shambles but which rose to become the world’s second largest economy. The alliance played a key role in the Cold War by allowing the United States to cover the USSR's eastern flank and demonstrating to China and North Korea that we would defend our interests and those of our allies in East Asia.? The arrangements with Japan provided a base from which the U.S. was able to defend its Republic of Korea ally from aggression by the North. Although the Korean War ended in an armistice—not a victory for the ROK, U.S., and their allies—without the use of facilities in Japan the peninsula could have been lost. Another plus was that American protection relieved Japan of having to acquire an offensive military capability, possibly including nuclear weapons. This reassured Japan’s neighbors that it would not again become a threat to their independence.? The result has been five decades of peace in Northeast Asia without a serious arms competition and remarkably few serious threats to the peace. This, along with the stimulus of Korean War procurement, enabled Japan to devote its resources to economic development which resulted in a previously unimaginable economic expansion and improvement in living standards. The ROK, Taiwan, and later China, piggy-backing on Japan's success and partaking of Japan's foreign aid and investment policies, replicated Japan's experience and delivered even faster rates of economic growth and prosperity to their people. None of this would have been possible without the American alliance system and the stability it provided throughout the region. The American presence in East Asia has been reassuring to allies, and our naval and air deployments beyond the region have played a major role in protecting the key energy trade routes through the Malacca Strait and Indian Ocean.?

## Arms Race

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**Nuclear prolif changes strategic calculations – guarantees escalating nuclear arms races.
Krieger & Ong, 02** -\*David - Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and Councilor – World Future \*\*Carah Research at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (“No First Use,” [http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2002/04/00\_krieger\_no-first-use.htm](http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2002/04/00_krieger_no-first-use.htm%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank))//AA

In March 2002, major US media reported that the new and still classified US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) indicated contingency plans for using nuclear weapons against seven states: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, North Korea, Russia and China. This indication of US planning to use nuclear weapons is contrary to international law as well as to long-standing US assurances not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states. It also constitutes a disturbing threat to the named states and others as well as to international peace and security overall. The provocative US approach to planning nuclear weapons use will affect the approach taken to non-proliferation by all countries, promoting nuclear proliferation and further eroding the non-proliferation regime. US policy toward nuclear weapons use, combined with its plans to develop and deploy missile defenses, will encourage the expansion of nuclear weapons programs by Russia and China as well as the development of nuclear weapons by other countries. This could also lead to destructive new nuclear arms races. The fact that the US is developing contingency plans to use nuclear weapons is viewed by most of the world as a dangerous expression of bad faith. In the past, nuclear weapons have been viewed as a deterrent against the use of nuclear weapons by other states. The US Nuclear Posture Review reveals that nuclear weapons are apparently being integrated into a full spectrum of war fighting capabilities. US policy makes nuclear weapons no longer weapons of last resort, but rather instruments that may be used in fighting wars, even against non-nuclear weapons states. Following the US lead, the UK also announced that it is prepared to use nuclear weapons against any state that may attack it with a weapon of mass destruction

**Global Nuclear Extinction**

**O’Harra ’07** – (Doug O’Harra is a writer and science journalist based in Anchorage, Alaska, he’s appeared in the Smithsonian and runs a non-profit website; “[Threat of Nuclear Autumn](http://www.farnorthscience.com/2007/03/03/news-from-alaska/threat-of-nuclear-autumn/)”; April 1, 2007; <http://www.farnorthscience.com/2007/03/03/news-from-alaska/threat-of-nuclear-autumn/>)//GS

While the United States and Russia may be much less likely to lob missiles into each other’s heartland, the chances of a regional nuclear conflict using much smaller weapons has dramatically increased, Toon and coauthors argue. “A de facto nuclear arms race has emerged in Asia between China, India and Pakistan and could expand to include North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan,” they write. “In the Middle East, a nuclear confrontation between Israel and Iran would be fearful. Saudi Arabia and Egypt could also seek nuclear weapons to balance Iran and Israel.” It’s relatively easy to build dozens of 15-kiloton bombs and stockpile them, similar in yield to Hiroshima. Plans can be found on the Internet. The bombs are small enough to be delivered by truck, car, boat, small plane. “The only serious obstacle to constructing a bomb is the limited availability of purified fissionable fuels,” they write. So how bad could it be? If 100 small nuclear bombs blasted cities and set them on fire, 1 to 5 million tons of soot, particles and smoke would spread into the sky. It would impact the atmosphere and darken the sky more than a huge volcanic eruption like Pinatubo in 1991. This would cut growing seasons by 10 to 30 days — especially hitting the Russian Arctic, central Europe and the heartland of North America. Southcentral Alaska — where most people in the state live and the focus of the Alaska’s small agricultural industry — would lose 20 days of growing season. And that’s not all. The authors speak of “climate anomalies” threatening the world in unexpected ways. Droughts, freezes, shifts in storm tracks, heat waves. The threat of such a conflict “may constitute one of the greatest dangers to the stability of society since the dawn of humans,” they conclude.

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**Prolif causes arms races across the globe that culminate in nuclear war**

**Sturm 2009 –** Fellow at the National Truman Security Project, a national security based institute in Washington DC (Frankie, “Nuclear Weapons: A New Paradigm for the 21st Century, Truman National Security Project”)//AA

The prestige and power widely associated with nuclear weapons drives countries to pursue them as a means of asserting power beyond actual security needs. Iran presents an instructive case. Recent protests illustrate that the Iranian people have significant qualms with their government, yet 94% support a nuclear energy program and 52% support a nuclear weapons program. Al though Iran is run by a government that does not command the respect of its people, Iranians seem to believe their government’s nuclear program will win the respect of the world. Hence head of the International Atomic Energy Agency Mohamed El-Baradei’s description of Iran’s nuclear program as “the road to get…recognition and power and prestige.” When this desire for prestige becomes intertwined with security concerns, the rationale for nuclear weapons deepens. As this scenario plays out in Iran and North Korea, there is a risk that their neighbors – motivated by security concerns – will develop nuclear weapons of their own. Increasing the likelihood of nuclear accidents and nuclear terrorism, a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and/or Asia would pose a tremendous threat to international peace and security. In the Middle East, the combination of unstable states and jihadist networks yields an unpredictable combination of potential suppliers and determined consumers. Given the wars that have taken place between Muslim nations and Israel in the last half-century, the possibility of nuclear conflict could drastically escalate threats to regional security. In Asia, North Korea’s nuclear program and erratic behavior could convince Japan and South Korea to develop their own nuclear weapons. Japan’s civilian nuclear capacity could be quickly converted into a weapons program. In a region with longstanding hostilities, especially between China and Japan, this could add yet another layer of distrust and insecurity to an already tense region. In fact, responding to North Korean missile and nuclear tests in 2009, politicians in both Japan and South Korea have begun to call for the development of nuclear weapons in their respective countries. If North Korea proceeds on its current trajectory, such calls are sure to increase. This plausible chain of events suggests that a new arms race could be significantly more dangerous than the U.S.-Soviet arms race of the 20th century. It is in this realm of guaranteeing the security of our allies—so they do not pursue nuclear deterrents of their own—that the U.S. nuclear arsenal still plays a crucial role. Without extended deterrence – extending our nuclear umbrella to allies such as Japan and Saudi Arabia – it is likely that more countries will develop their own nuclear weapons, increasing the overall threat of nuclear terrorism and accidents.

**Proliferation of nuclear weapons leads to preemptive strikes, biological warfare, and increased risk of catastrophic accidents**

**Utgoff ‘2** (Victor, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses and former Senior Member of the National security Council Staff, Survival, “Proliferation, Missile Defense and American Ambitions”, 44:2, Summer, p. 87-90)

Many readers are probably willing to accept that nuclear proliferation is such a grave threat to world peace that every effort should be made to avoid it. However, every effort has not been made in the past, and we are talking about much more substantial efforts now. For new and substantially more burdensome efforts to be made to slow or stop nuclear proliferation, it needs to be established that the highly proliferated nuclear world that would sooner or later evolve without such efforts is not going to be acceptable. And, for many reasons, it is not. First, the dynamics of getting to a highly proliferated world could be very dangerous. Proliferating states will feel great pressures to obtain nuclear weapons and delivery systems before any potential opponent does. Those who Downloaded by [University of Michigan] at 11:31 20 July 2012 88 Victor A. Utgoff succeed in outracing an opponent may consider preemptive nuclear war before the opponent becomes capable of nuclear retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt their opponent’s nuclear programme or defeat the opponent using conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of building nuclear weapons may still be able to join in this arms race by building other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons. Second, as the world approaches complete proliferation, the hazards posed by nuclear weapons today will be magnified many times over. Fifty or more nations capable of launching nuclear weapons means that the risk of nuclear accidents that could cause serious damage not only to their own populations and environments, but those of others, is hugely increased. The chances of such weapons falling into the hands of renegade military units or terrorists is far greater, as is the number of nations carrying out hazardous manufacturing and storage activities.

**Prolif causes arms races, risks accidents, causes states to act aggressively, and increases the risk of terror.**

**Perry et. al, 2009 - \***William United States Secretary of Defense from 1994-1997 \*\* James R. Schlesinger. – Prior Secretary of Defense and Center for Strategic and International Studies and Prior Director of the CIA of 1973. \*\*\* Fred Ikle, United States Department of Defense Official Under Reagan Director of the CIA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1973-1977 and a Distinguished Scholar with the Center for Strategic and International Studies whose expertise fell in defense and foreign policy, nuclear strategy and the role of technology in the world order. \*\*\*\* Keith Payne- President and Cofounder of the National Institute for Public Policy and a Professor and Head of the Graduate Defense and Strategic Studies and was previously the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for foreign Policy in the Department of Defense and co – chair of the US Nuclear Strategy Forum. \*\*\*\*\*John Glenn Former US Senator, ,(“America’s Strategic Posture”)//AA

During the Cold War, proliferation was strongly inhibited by the relationships of extended deterrence established by the United States (and also by the Soviet Union) and by creation of the nonproliferation regime. As noted above, there were even instances of successful proliferation “roll back” during the Cold War, including that of South Africa among others. But since the end of the Cold War, proliferation has also continued, as demonstrated by Iraq’s nuclear weapons program and by nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998 and North Korea in 2006. Today, Iran stands at the brink of nuclear weapons capability. Such proliferation is troubling for various reasons. It calls into question, in the minds of some, the viability of the nonproliferation regime. It stimulates interest in further proliferation among neighboring states. It raises questions about the safety and security of the nuclear arsenals and weapons establishments in these countries. It creates new supplier networks outside of existing international control mechanisms. Proliferation to belligerent states opposed to the United States and/or the regional status quo is particularly troubling for various reasons. It could lead some leaders to believe that they are able to use nuclear threats to coerce their neighbors or to deter the United States and/or international coalitions from protecting those neighbors. This could embolden belligerent states to commit acts of aggression or domestic transgressions that would require very risky efforts to redress. Such proliferation also increases the risk that nuclear weapons will end up in the hands of a terror group.

## Bioweapons

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**absent anti proliferation attempts bioweapons will quickly spread to terrorists groups – its quick and easy**

**Danzig 05 –** Chairman of the Center for a new American Security, a Washington based think tank which specializes in US National Security Concerns, The Aspen Institute (Richard “Proliferation of Biological Weapons into Terrorist Hands” <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CFEQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.aspeninstitute.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fcontent%2Fdocs%2Fasg%2Fasgdanzigchallenge.pdf&ei=ugoHUPGGMILJ6wGT0-S6CA&usg=AFQjCNF6x2nESWVMmgWteRs386PHVmDO_A&sig2=CptOxxDpquFVr18mRzxyDw>)//AA

First, there is a large range of biological weapons; it is too facile to speak generally of their simplicity or complexity of development. It is altogether too easy to harvest some agents and apply them to some uses; other uses require some craftsmanlike skills for amplification and perhaps adaptation; some catastrophic opportunities with aerosolized weapons require substantial effort and absent classified military knowledge will take considerable trial and error before they are likely to be mastered. Second, notwithstanding the above, it seems fair to say that biological weapons as they are now understood (for example in Cases 1-4) fall between conventional explosives and nuclear weapons. On one hand, the technologies have not yet been integrated and weaponization mastered by substantial numbers of terrorists the way explosives have. On the other hand, it is much easier and cheaper to master and covertly exercise these skills than it is with nuclear weapons. Over time, the skills associated with biological weapons are likely to be acquired and exercised, first in more rudimentary forms and then with increasing sophistication.? Only a thin wall of terrorist ignorance and inexperience now protects us. Third, there is a frightening category of biological weapons – those that do not exist in nature –in the wings. The ability to generate these Case X weapons is proliferating with the expansion and spread of biological knowledge and biotechnology, and their diversity will make it harder to predict and harder to defend against their use than against pathogens that exist in nature. Preparing for them will be yet more difficult and more dangerous than preparing for nuclear weapons. OUR ABILITY TO LIMIT PROLIFERATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS Confronted by weapons of mass destruction, a wise country pursues non-proliferation as a part of its repertoire of defensive steps. World efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation have been difficult, but for six decades they have substantially constrained the spread of these weapons. We must make similar efforts with respect to illegitimate uses of biotechnology – attempting to control pathogens, equipment, people, and the pursuit or publication of certain kinds of knowledge.

**Bioweapon Usage risks massive disruption and extinction**

**Danzig 05 –** Chairman of the Center for a new American Security, a Washington based think tank which specializes in US National Security Concerns, The Apsen Institute (Richard “Proliferation of Biological Weapons into Terrorist Hands” <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CFEQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.aspeninstitute.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fcontent%2Fdocs%2Fasg%2Fasgdanzigchallenge.pdf&ei=ugoHUPGGMILJ6wGT0-S6CA&usg=AFQjCNF6x2nESWVMmgWteRs386PHVmDO_A&sig2=CptOxxDpquFVr18mRzxyDw>)//AA

The Challenge of Proliferation employed tens of thousands of people in an ongoing biological weapons program. Intelligence estimates reported in the press reference a number of other countries as having experimented with biological weapons – in particular, North Korea. There is no doubt that some biological agents can be weapons of mass destruction. Anthrax is prevalent in every program. Bacillus anthracis, the bacterium that causes the disease of anthrax, commonly exists in a dormant, sporulated form that germinates in a benign environment such as the human lymphatic system to produce the disease-causing bacillus. A gram or so of anthrax mailed to Senator Daschle was reported to have contained over one trillion spores. Ten thousand anthrax spores, if untreated, will induce death in the average person. 8 Thus, in theory, if perfectly distributed, one gram can kill millions of people. Of course, perfect distribution is unattainable but if the material were increased to a kilogram and released over an urban area, it could reasonably be expected to infect more than a hundred thousand people. Smallpox is perhaps the most feared of agents because, unlike anthrax, it is contagious. Victims shed the virus; if uninhibited, a smallpox shedder can be expected to infect two or three others. Smallpox is also highly lethal, killing about 30 percent of those who contract it. The horror of the disease drove the world to unite in eradicating it three decades ago… yet ironically, because of our success in that noble endeavor, we find ourselves more vulnerable today to a deliberate smallpox outbreak. Much of the world population is now in the same position as the Incas when the Spanish inadvertently introduced this disease into the New World – they have no immunity (either by experience or by vaccination against the disease. A state might pursue biological weapons as a means of deterrence or coercion. Beyond the dangers of state use, however, these programs risk leakage of capabilities to terrorists that are notably higher than with nuclear programs. The small size and low visibility of biological agents make them more vulnerable to theft or acquisition by bribery. Moreover, biological agents do not require substantial delivery systems. Even if terrorists do not obtain weapons from states, they may nonetheless tap into the knowledge developed in state programs to accelerate their own abilities to produce and employ biological weapons. While biological weapons are thought of predominantly as mass casualty weapons, there are, unfortunately, other uses that may make them attractive to terrorists – in particular, their employment as narrowly targeted weapons, as weapons of mass disruption, and as campaign, rather than incident, weapons. Targeted weapons. Terrorists typically have focused on particular targets of symbolic and practical value. It is sometimes thought that biological weapons, though effective mechanisms for inducing terror, are not readily targeted because winds and other uncertainties make aerosol attacks difficult to focus. Yet the anthrax letters sent in the fall of 2001 demonstrate that B. anthracis can be aimed at particular people or sets of people. Similarly, an aerosol bacterial or viral attack can be disseminated through the air intake of a critical building. Toxins have successfully been used as assassination weapons. Even a large food supply contamination could be aimed at a relatively narrow target – for example, a military base. Foot and mouth disease or crop attacks can be aimed at a nation’s economy rather than its people. Weapons of mass disruption. In addition to their human toll, the anthrax letters gravely disrupted the U.S. mail system. An attack of this kind at a time tax payments are due or a continued attack that impeded all billing and payment systems would have substantial effects on the The Challenge of Proliferation 67? The Nature of the Challenge: Intelligence Concerns & New Weapons of Choice American economy. More generally, biological weapons could be deployed as area denial weapons. The anthrax letters closed four major facilities. It took three months to return the Hart Senate? Office Building to use, two years to complete clean-up of the Brentwood and Trenton postal facilities, and three years before the American Media Building in Florida was decontaminated. The total cost of these four efforts was almost $250 million. A broader attack would be extremely disruptive. We have only a rudimentary understanding of decontamination, including how to decontaminate, how to measure what we have decontaminated, how to preserve electronic and optical equipment, how to preserve precious assets such as paper records and paintings, and, above all, “how clean is clean?” – that is, to what standard we need to decontaminate. We also have very limited assets for what is presently our most effective means of decontamination, producing and spraying chlorine dioxide gas. A meticulous analysis has calculated that with present technologies and engaging all potential assets, the cleanup of an aerosol dissemination of one kilo of B. anthracis over Manhattan would take 42 years. 14 Anthrax is not alone as a contamination problem. An aerosol release of a virus such as smallpox or SARS in a subway system, tunnel or airport would have similar area denial effects with grave economic consequences. In both civilian and military contexts, we also should be concerned about biological attacks on ports, not only for their effects on people but for their effects on commerce and on the flow of military goods. In a foreign contingency, for example, 95 percent of military supplies are carried by sea. It is not uncommon for there to be only one port of debarkation abroad. That port will depend on immovable assets and on civilians who are likely to be unwilling to enter a contaminated area. Biological weapons can also achieve mass disruption by attacks on our economic system. The damage from Cases 3 (poisoning the food supply) and 4 (attacking animals) can readily be envisioned. The 2001 British foot and mouth disease outbreak is estimated to have cost the UK on the order of $15 billion.

## ---2nc XT/Impact

**The impacts the equivalent of nuke war**

**Danzig 09 –** Chairman of the Center for a new American Security, a Washington based think tank which specializes in US National Security Concerns, The Aspen Institute (Richard “A policy Makers Guide to Bioterrorism and What to Do About It” <https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:j1gishFLjEoJ:www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/A%2520Policymaker's%2520Guide.pdf+&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESi6xSO0uw-ph6aZ0SE_rndvCYOGLUbCks0Lggg8Rf8IQ5bfpGJNdhUbksCVfrkLsfr9vNj2yUYAM4blBbeoHklHINy6h-44g16Q1utgy9rIRaO948p7q0lxhJ1fupKEL3N3hsrI&sig=AHIEtbSeRl2SNq9ESh3I5unxv8S0w8jwkQ>)//AA

Biological terrorism involves the use of pathogens—bacteria, viruses, and toxins produced by living things—as a means of attacking civilian populations. The methods by which these pathogens might be dispersed are diverse. They include employing aerosol sprayers, contaminating food or drink (including water supplies), and using people or animals as vectors by infecting them with contagious pathogens. Attacks may aim at killing people, burdening our health care and protective systems, decimating agricultural and animal industries, contaminating equipment, facilities, or areas, or simply distracting our government’s energies and causing confusion, hysteria, and perhaps panic. An aerosol attack using a kilogram of anthrax (bacteria that would be inhaled) configured to disperse fairly efficiently, or an attack that introduced smallpox (a contagious virus) into our presently unvaccinated population could reasonably be expected to kill tens of thousands of people. It could take decades after an anthrax attack before Manhattan could be restored to the point where deaths were not caused by residual contamination. A communicable disease like smallpox would have smaller enduring effects from contamination, but could kill more people and inspire more fear, with consequent collateral effects on our economy and our society. These facts put biological weaponry on the same plane as nuclear weapons; they can be catastrophic, whether measured by deaths and injuries or economic, operational, or psychological effects. Conventional explosives, radiation-enhanced conventional explosives, chemical attacks, and cyber attacks all can do great damage, but they do not have such broad-scale potential. Without belaboring the point, it is appropriate to observe that biological and nuclear attacks can be an order of magnitude more consequential than attacks employing other weaponry.

**Extinction.**

**Ochs, 2002**

[Richard, Naturalist – Grand Teton National park with Masters in Natural Resource Management – Rutgers, “Biological Weapons must be abolished immediately” 6-9, http://www.freefromterror.net/other\_articles/abolish.html]

Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE.

**Bioweapon spread risks extinction**

**Roberts 99** (Researcher at the Institute for Defense Analysis, Research Institute for Defense Analysis, The Nonproliferation Review Fall)

This brings us then to the question of what is at stake in the effort to combat proliferation. There are two standard answers to the question of what is at stake: human lives, and stability.   Nuclear Biological Chemical weapons are weapons of mass destruction, all of them, though in different ways. The most deadly of these weapons systems can kill millions, and much more quickly than conventional weaponry (though it too is capable of killing millions). A regional war employing mass destruction as a matter of course could cause suffering and death unknown in human experience. Such a war would cast a harsh light on the argument now in vogue that landmines, small arms, even machetes in the hands of drunk young men are the real weapons of mass destruction. Strictly from the perspective of limiting the effects of war, then, the world community has an interest in preventing the emergence of an international system in which the possession and use of Nuclear Biological Chemical weapons is accepted as normal and customary.   The stability argument relates to the unintended consequences associated with acquiring weapons of mass destruction. It focuses on the weapons-acquiring state and its neighbors and the risk of war that grows among them, including both preemptive and accidental war.

**Prefer our evidence – its comparative. A bioterror attack is more likely than nuclear**

**Danzig 09 –** Chairman of the Center for a new American Security, a Washington based think tank which specializes in US National Security Concerns, The Aspen Institute (Richard “A policy Makers Guide to Bioterrorism and What to Do About It” <https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:j1gishFLjEoJ:www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/A%2520Policymaker's%2520Guide.pdf+&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESi6xSO0uw-ph6aZ0SE_rndvCYOGLUbCks0Lggg8Rf8IQ5bfpGJNdhUbksCVfrkLsfr9vNj2yUYAM4blBbeoHklHINy6h-44g16Q1utgy9rIRaO948p7q0lxhJ1fupKEL3N3hsrI&sig=AHIEtbSeRl2SNq9ESh3I5unxv8S0w8jwkQ>)//AA

In a conducive environment, pathogens reproduce. In such an environment, anthrax bacteria double their population every 20 to 30 minutes. In a day, a properly supported population will grow a billion-fold at the low end. Some bacteria and viruses are more difficult to grow than others, but the science and art of fermentation are well documented and are facilitated by ever- improving technologies. As a result, the nuclear and biological threats are fundamentally different. The nuclear threat arises from the risk of theft or illegal seizure or purchase of nuclear material that can be fabricated into one or a few weapons. The biological threat is that terrorists will obtain the skills and materials for producing weapons. Once obtained, these skills and materials can all too easily be disseminated.

## ---North Korea Specific

**North Korea is producing biological weapons and has incentive to use them against South Korea**

Fitzpatrick, 12 – Director of IISS Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme, expert in US foreign policy and Asian

Proliferation. (Mark, “North Korean Proliferation Challeges: The Role of the European Union,” June 2012, sipri.org/research/disarmament//*HO*

Clarifying the nature and significance of North Korean chemical and biological weapons-related capabilities is subordinate to nuclear weapon concerns. These weapons have not been the subject of negotiations between North Korea and its adversaries and literature on the subject is sparse, in part because of lack of reliable data. Yet North Korea's chemical weapons are not just a tactical concern to South Korean and US forces. They also pose a strategic threat because of the proximity of the South Korean capital Seoul to the border. North Korea has several hundred long-range artillery pieces deployed within range of Seoul, and all are thought to have chemical weapon munitions. According to most estimates, North Korea has the world's third-largest chemical weapon stockpile (after Russia and the USA), however, North Korea denies having any chemical weapons at all. The nation is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and there have never been any official declarations and international inspections of its chemical infrastructure. In assessing the status of its chemical weapon programme, therefore, one must rely on defector reports and information by governments, which might not always be impartial or accurate. Although North Korea in 1989 acceded to the Geneva Protocol, pledging not to use chemical weapons against other signatory states, South Korean and US military commanders assess that North Korean offensive military plans include the use of chemical agents delivered by a variety of means against both military and civilian targets. The South Korean Government estimates that North Korea has a range of between 2500 and 5000 tonnes of chemical agents, including blister (sulphur mustard) and some organophosphorus nerve agents." According to some South Korean experts, the stockpile includes first-generation blister agents, nerve agents such as sarin, soman, tabun and V-agents, and blood agents such as hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride. The South Korean estimate of North Korea's stockpile has not changed appreciably in recent years. There are no reports of new facilities that would indicate that the stockpile is increasing and it is uncertain how well North Korea has been able to maintain a chemical weapon stockpile in light of the condition of disrepair into which many of its chemical plants sank during the prolonged economic crisis of the past two decades. The stockpile is likely to be limited mostly to unitary munitions that are less stable, durable and safe than binary chemical weapon munitions." South Korea believes North Korea has the capability to produce 4500 agent tonnes of chemical weapons a year." The US Government also believes that North Korea has an active chemical weapon programme, but unclassified reports provide few details. A 2007 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) proliferation report to Congress was the most thorough, saying that North Korean chemical weapon capabilities "probably included the ability to produce bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking and blood agents and a stockpile of unspecified agents." More recent CIA unclassified reports only assess that North Korea has a longstanding programme and a stockpile. The most recent open-source indication of a possible North Korean chemical weapon programme was the interdiction by port authorities in Busan, South Korea, in October 2009 of four containers from North Korea bound for Syria that contained protective garments that were deemed to have military utility for protection against chemical weapons. “However, North Korean production of such protective garments is not proof of an offensive chemical weapon programme; they could be part of a defensive programme that is completely legal under international law. North Koreans are taught that US forces used chemical and biological weapons against them in the Korean War (this has been disputed by most reputable analysts as disinformation) and that the nation therefore has had to prepare defensive measures." Shortly after the Korean War armistice in 1953, the KPA reportedly created biological and chemical defence units." In the 1960s North Korea reportedly added an offensive chemical weapon programme."And in 1980 Kim Il-sung reportedly boasted of the nation having "succeeded in producing poisonous gas and bacterial weapons through our own efforts and supported by Soviet scientists in the {ield'.31 The latter may have been a reference to having received afteraction reports of Egyptian chemical weapon use in Yemen in the 1960s. Various defector reports indicated that the chemical weapon arsenal expanded in the 1990s. When Russia abandoned its chemical weapon programme, however, the help it apparently was giving to North Korea in this field also stopped. In recent years, as part of a broader effort to achieve universal adherence to the CWC, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has attempted to engage North Korean officials to discuss the country's possible accession to the convention without success. For example, Ambassador Ahmet Uziimcfl of Turkey who became the third Director-General of the OPCW in July 2010, wrote letters to all non-parties requesting informal dialogues and possible visits from the Technical Secretariat to discuss accession to the CWC. Only North Korea declined to respond." Moreover, in 2009-2010 a special adviser was hired on a temporary contract by the OPCW Director-General to informally engage states not party to the CWC. However, these efforts to enter into a dialogue with North Korea were unsuccessful." The outside world knows less about North Korea's biological weapon capability. The South Korean Ministry of National Defense's 2010 Defense White Paper assessed that North Korea is able to produce anthrax (Bacillus anthracis), smallpox (Variola) and cholera (Vibrio cholerae).34 Previous versions of the white paper assessed that North Korea had actually weaponized one or two biological agents. A 1993 report by the Russian intelligence service stated that North Korea was performing "applied military-biological research' with the causative agents for anthrax, cholera, bubonic plague and smallpox at a number of institutes and universities and testing biological weapons on North Korean islands." More recent Russian and US oflicial reports have only characterized North Korea as "˜capable' of producing a variety of agents, including anthrax, cholera and plague. There is little authoritative information on the potential role of biological weapons in KPA strategy, beyond speculation that because biological weapons have less utility as a battlefield weapon, they are probably less significant than chemical weapons. Like nuclear weapons, biological weapons are essentially weapons of terror. North Korea joined the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) on 13 March 1987, but only once, in 1990, submitted a declaration within the framework of annual, politically binding information exchanges agreed by the states parties that are designed to serve as confidence-building measures. North Korea has never participated in discussion over potential verification mechanisms or the periodic review conferences of the convention.

**North Korea is ready to go to war with the United States and South Korea now**

Hancocks, 12 – Citing the reaction of Kim Jong-Un to US and South Korean Military Drills, in addition to talks between the countries (Paula, “North Korea: Ready to go to war with U.S., South Korea,” 27 February 2012, cnn.com//*HO*

North Korea said it's ready to fight a war with the United States and South Korea, as the two allies kicked off their annual joint military drills Monday, according to state-run media. "Hundreds of thousands of troops are poised for a war carrying nuclear war equipment," North Korea's KCNA news agency reported, saying Pyongyang considers the drills to be practice for a preemptive strike on the North. The international community has been negotiating with North Korea over its nuclear program for years. The most recent talks between North Korea and the United States ended Friday with little visible progress. They were the first high-level talks since the death of North Korea's longtime leader, Kim Jong Il, in December and the subsequent transition of power to his youngest son, Kim Jong Un. Kim's death threw into flux U.S. plans for renewed diplomacy with North Korea, including formal talks on ending Pyongyang's nuclear program and possible resumption of U.S. food assistance. The North Korea government was expected to suspend its uranium enrichment in exchange for food assistance as part of a deal that was to be announced around the time of Kim's death. The annual Key Resolve military drills that began Monday involve 2,100 U.S. troops with their South Korean counterparts. Washington insists the exercises are defensive in nature and unrelated to any geopolitical events. The current military drills are scheduled through March 9, with a second set of overlapping exercises beginning March 1 and running through the end of April. South Korea and the United States regularly hold military drills, and just as often North Korea denounces them as a provocation. KCNA reported Saturday that Kim Jong Un, the new North Korean leader, visited military units in the southwest of the country, including one that fired upon a South Korean island in November 2010, killing two civilians and two marines. North Korea said its forces were responding to a South Korean military drill in the area. While visiting the troops, Kim Jong Un "ordered them to make a powerful retaliatory strike at the enemy, should the enemy intrude even 0.001 mm into the waters of the country where its sovereignty is exercised," KCNA reported.

**Extinction**

**Hayes and Hamel-Green 09** (Peter and Michael, “The Path Not Taken, The Way Still Open: Denuclearizing The Korean Peninsula And Northeast Asia,” <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Michael-Hamel_Green/3267//MGD>)

At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack1, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. **Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions**. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

## ---AT: Too hard to make

**No they aren’t.**

**Danzig 09 –** Chairman of the Center for a new American Security, a Washington based think tank which specializes in US National Security Concerns, The Aspen Institute (Richard “A policy Makers Guide to Bioterrorism and What to Do About It” <https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:j1gishFLjEoJ:www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/A%2520Policymaker's%2520Guide.pdf+&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESi6xSO0uw-ph6aZ0SE_rndvCYOGLUbCks0Lggg8Rf8IQ5bfpGJNdhUbksCVfrkLsfr9vNj2yUYAM4blBbeoHklHINy6h-44g16Q1utgy9rIRaO948p7q0lxhJ1fupKEL3N3hsrI&sig=AHIEtbSeRl2SNq9ESh3I5unxv8S0w8jwkQ)//AA>

General knowledge should not be equated with the ability to make and sustain an efficacious weapon. In some instances, practically nothing needs to be done to obtain and deploy a pathogen. The foot and mouth virus, for example, can readily be obtained from the snot or blood of an animal suffering from the disease, preserved by rudimentary techniques, and disseminated by rubbing it on the nostrils of another animal. The contagion rate is so high, and animals so frequently and variably exposed to one another, that if undetected and unchecked (difficult tasks for a defender), a few initial cases will rapidly multiply into the millions. Other viruses and bacterial strains are more difficult to obtain (for example, smallpox no longer exists naturally), require more precautions for those who would work with them, and are more difficult to amplify and sustain. Between these two poles, a bacterium like anthrax readily can be obtained in relatively benign forms, but is more difficult to obtain in a form that would be highly virulent to humans. Genetic manipulation to convert a benign strain into a more virulent strain, and then amplify a manipulated strain, can be challenging. The most effective form of dissemination, aerosol spraying, introduces some further, modest complexity. But compared to working with nuclear materials, the challenges of developing the requisite know-how and obtaining the required equipment for bioterrorism are modest.

**Its easy to spread and easily undetected – empirics prove.**

**Danzig 09 –** Chairman of the Center for a new American Security, a Washington based think tank which specializes in US National Security Concerns, The Aspen Institute (Richard “A policy Makers Guide to Bioterrorism and What to Do About It” <https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:j1gishFLjEoJ:www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/A%2520Policymaker's%2520Guide.pdf+&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESi6xSO0uw-ph6aZ0SE_rndvCYOGLUbCks0Lggg8Rf8IQ5bfpGJNdhUbksCVfrkLsfr9vNj2yUYAM4blBbeoHklHINy6h-44g16Q1utgy9rIRaO948p7q0lxhJ1fupKEL3N3hsrI&sig=AHIEtbSeRl2SNq9ESh3I5unxv8S0w8jwkQ)//AA>

The envelopes mailed to the Senate in the 2001 anthrax attacks contained only about a gram of material, but each was composed of approximately a trillion spores of b. anthracis, the pathogen that causes anthrax. If inhaled, some 10,000 spores of virulent b. anthracis would typically kill a person, so a kilogram of these bacteria could theoretically kill every person on the planet. In fact, impurities, additives, and, most importantly, imperfections in distribution will render a kilogram likely to kill “only” tens of thousands of people, if effectively distributed. From this example, it will be seen that no more than small production facilities and low- visibility transport and storage mechanisms are required for effective biological terrorism. Unfortunately for our intelligence and law enforcement agencies, these facilities have low signatures. The equipment they require—fermenters, test tubes, microscopes, freezers, dryers, and sprayers for dissemination—is commonplace in academia, the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, breweries, and veterinary and agricultural enterprises. This wide availability not only corrodes nonproliferation but also makes it typically infeasible to identify proliferators by tracking equipment. Facilities that operate this equipment can be as small as a garage or storage room and do not have exceptional power, water, or air conditioning requirements. They do not emit readily detectable pollution or effluents. Testing with laboratory animals or by other means is also normally inconspicuous. As a result, while a nuclear program is likely to be marked by special mechanisms for handling materials, uniquely configured, large buildings, and readily detectable tests, a biological program is readily concealed. Our record of detection is miserable. A Soviet biological program that employed thousands of people escaped notice until a defector revealed it after almost two decades of operation. A cult attack with salmonella that sickened 600 people in Oregon was ascribed to natural causes until, more than a year later, a defector reported otherwise. Aum Shinrikyo experimented with anthrax and botulinum for 3 years without any awareness by authorities in Japan or elsewhere. Iraq’s biological program was little understood before one of Saddam’s sons-in-law (and former head of the program) defected, and was grossly overestimated in the years after that source was lost.18 The 2001 anthrax letter attacks came without warning, and it took a half dozen years and much misdirected effort before the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) identified the source. The dispersion of biological skills and equipment will only intensify difficulties.

## Dominoe/Spillover

## ---1nc

**Causes further proliferation.**

**Kroenig 09 –** Assistant Professor of Government at Georgetown University and Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations (Matthew Ph.D., “Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation”, November 2 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Beyond-Optimism-and-Pessimism.pdf>)//AB

The strategic consequences of nuclear proliferation listed above are reasons why power-projecting states are threatened by nuclear proliferation in and of itself. Because nuclear proliferation is so threatening to power-projecting states, **nuclear proliferation imposes** an additional, secondary cost on power-projecting states: **further nuclear proliferation**. When a state acquires nuclear weapons, other states may seek to develop their own nuclear arsenal in response, setting off a **chain reaction of nuclear proliferation.** **Power-projecting states are disproportionately threatened** by reactive proliferation. Because they have the ability to project power over the initial nuclear proliferator, it is also likely that they **will** be able to **project power over any other regional states that proliferate in response**, **compounding** the **strategic costs** enumerated above. There is **empirical support** for the idea that proliferation begets proliferation. Many countries have developed nuclear weapons as a response to nuclear programs in other states. The U.S. Manhattan project was inspired by reports of a nuclear research program in Nazi Germany. The Soviet Union pursued nuclear weapons to undercut America’s nuclear monopoly. Nuclear programs in Britain and France were intended to deter the Soviet Union’s potential conventional and nuclear aggression. Furthermore, the Chinese bomb was a contributing cause to the development of nuclear weapons in India and, in turn, India’s program led to nuclear proliferation in Pakistan.

**Prolif escalates to nuclear war**

**Matheny 7**—Jason G. research associate with the Future of Humanity Institute at [Oxford University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oxford_University) (“Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction” 12/7/07, Risk Analysis]//AY

It is possible for humanity (or its descendents) to survive a million years or more, but we could succumb to extinction as soon as this century. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, U.S. President Kennedy estimated the probability of a nuclear holocaust as “somewhere between one out of three and even” (Kennedy, 1969, p. 110). John von Neumann, as Chairman of the U.S. Air Force Strategic Missiles Evaluation Committee, predicted that it was “absolutely certain (1) that there would be a nuclear war; and (2) that everyone would die in it” (Leslie, 1996, p. 26). More recent predictions of human extinction are little more optimistic. In their catalogs of extinction risks, Britain's Astronomer Royal, Sir Martin Rees (2003), gives humanity 50-50 odds on surviving the 21st century; philosopher Nick Bostrom argues that it would be “misguided” to assume that the probability of extinction is less than 25%; and philosopher John Leslie (1996) assigns a 30% probability to extinction during the next five centuries. The “Stern Review” for the U.K. Treasury (2006) assumes that the probability of human extinction during the next century is 10%. And some explanations of the “Fermi Paradox” imply a high probability (close to 100%) of extinction among technological civilizations (Pisani, 2006).4 Estimating the probabilities of unprecedented events is subjective, so we should treat these numbers skeptically. Still, even if the probability of extinction is several orders lower, because the stakes are high, it could be wise to invest in extinction countermeasures.

## Global Warming

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**Proliferation causes rapid climate change - extinction**

**Beyond Nuclear 8** – (“Nuclear Power and the Lethal Link to Nuclear Weapons” Beyond Nuclear, 4/17/08. http://beyondnuclear.squarespace.com/storage/BN\_Weapons\_Link\_fact\_sheet\_April\_22.pdf)//FK

Nuclear Proliferation and Climate Change • The use of nuclear weapons, whether accidental or deliberate, could change the climate more abruptly and catastrophically than global warming with no time to adapt, decimating agriculture worldwide and resulting in mass starvations. 20 • Wars are a distraction from addressing climate change, especially if they escalate into conflicts using nuclear weapons. The presence of a nuclear energy program can provoke war and conflict making nuclear power counterproductive to addressing climate change. • The effects of climate change itself – severe droughts, floods and forced population migrations – could exacerbate tensions between nations. Those possessing nuclear weapons, should the stresses become extreme, may find the temptation to use them irresistible. If a large-scale exchange occurred, the result could be a catastrophic change in the weather – a nuclear winter – which could end human life on earth as we know it. 21

## Hegemony

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The US is hit hardest by proliferation—our dominant position will be threatened collapsing hegemony

Kroenig ‘9 – Matthew Kroenig is an assistant professor of Government at Georgetown University and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (“Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation”, November 2009, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Beyond-Optimism-and-Pessimism.pdf)//GS

In fact, Russia and China have not been willing to authorize tough sanctions agains Iran’s nuclear program, not primarily because they have important economic interests in country as many analysts believe, but because they are not particularly threatened by Iran’s nuclear development. Russia and China are not currently operating military forces in the Middle East and, given the degradation of Russia’s military since the end of the Cold War and China’s military modernization focusing on a Taiwan Straits contingency, it is very unlikely that these countries will have the capability to do so for the foreseeable future. Fo this reason, they do not need to worry that nuclear proliferation in Iran will constrain the military freedom of action. They might be concerned that Iran could attack them in the bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear strike, or provide nuclear weapons to terrorists who might target them, but such scenarios are extremely unlikely. In sum, Beijing and Moscow have very little to fear from nuclear proliferation in Iran. They are unwilling to place serious pressure on Tehran and are willing to continue economic relations with the country, not because the economic benefits are so high, but because the strategic costs are so low. Indeed, given that many strategic thinkers in Russia and China believe that what is bad for Washington must be good for Moscow and Beijing, some foreign officials undoubtedly welcome Iranian nuclear development as a means of tying down the United States. In short, U.S. officials need to understand the difficulty to get international nuclear nonproliferation cooperation for what it is: **nuclear proliferation threatens the United States more than any other state on the globe.** The United States is a global superpower and nuclear proliferation anywhere threatens America’s dominant strategic position. For other states, with more limited spheres of influence, nuclear proliferation in a distant region is not a threat. In fact, these countries may even see a significant upside to the spread of nuclear weapons – because nuclear proliferation means a constrained and thus weakened United States. Foreign governments’ reluctance to bear a burden to stop proliferation in a distant region is not the result of their failure to understand the strategic consequences of nuclear proliferation; it is because they understand them perfectly well. The failure of understanding is on the U.S. side. Washington will continue to struggle to convince other states to join in a fight against nuclear proliferation that disproportionately threatens the United States.

**Threats are real and inevitable—heg is key to solve multiple scenarios for war**

**Thayer 6** - Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Study @ Missouri State University, Former Research Fellow @ International Security Program @ Harvard Belfer Center of Science and International Affairs (Bradley, “In Defense of Primacy,” The National Interest, November/December)

A grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the United States stays the world's number one power‑the diplomatic, economic and military leader. Those arguing against primacy claim that the United States should retrench, ei­ther because the United States lacks the power to maintain its primacy and should withdraw from its global commitments, or because the maintenance of primacy will lead the United States into the trap of "imperial overstretch." In the previous issue of The National Interest, Christopher Layne warned of these dangers of pri­macy and called for retrenchment.1 Those arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment are a diverse lot. They include isolationists, who want no foreign military commitments; selective engagers, who want U.S. military commitments to centers of economic might; and offshore balancers, who want a modified form of selective engagement that would have the United States abandon its landpower presence abroad in favor of relying on airpower and seapower to defend its in­terests. But retrenchment, in any of its guis­es, must be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it would be a profound strategic mistake that would lead to far greater instability and war in the world, imperil American security and deny the United States and its allies the benefits of primacy. There are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state? Should it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power capa­bilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has overwhelming military capa­bilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment acknowledge this. So the debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining American pri­macy. Proponents of retrenchment focus a great deal on the costs of U.S. action­ but they fall to realize what is good about American primacy. The price and risks of primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not. A GRAND strategy of ensur­ing American primacy takes as its starting point the protec­tion of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor. In contrast, a strategy based on re­trenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no mat­ter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington can­not call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terror­ists, rogue states or rising powers, his­tory shows that threats must be confront­ed. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvinc­ing half‑pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weak­ness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of interna­tional politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats. And when enemies must be confront­ed, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from .American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a phys­ical, on‑the‑ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing. Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S. primacy is secured because America, at present, commands the "global com­mon"‑‑the oceans, the world's airspace and outer space‑allowing the United States to project its power far from its borders, while denying those common avenues to its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the robustness of the United States' conventional and strategic deterrent ca­pabilities is increased.' This is not an advantage that should be relinquished lightly. A remarkable fact about international politics today‑-in a world where Ameri­can primacy is clearly and unambiguous­ly on display--is that countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes, ­their own protection, or to gain greater influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America‑-their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements‑and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this coun­try, or any country, had so many allies. U.S. primacy‑-and the bandwagon­ing effect‑has also given us extensive in­fluence in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to cre­ate coalitions of like‑minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Pro­liferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the where it can be stymied by opponents. American‑led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effec­tiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. You can count with one hand coun­tries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezeula. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and ac­tions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, re­sort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communica­tion and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates. The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases‑‑Venezuela, Iran, Cuba‑it is an anti‑U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrin­sically anti‑American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations. THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power‑‑Rome, Britain or the United States today. Schol­ars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we con­sider the current international order ‑ free trade, a robust monetary regime, increas­ing respect for human rights, growing de­mocratization‑‑is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages fol­lowed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. With­out U.S. power, the liberal order cre­ated by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Rai Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washing­ton and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated rela­tionships aligned‑-between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread de­mocracy and other elements of its ideol­ogy of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing inter­ests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. lead­ership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Admin­istration for attempting to spread democ­racy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's crit­ics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or sta­bilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Per­haps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Af­ghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threat­ened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Wash­ington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western‑style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Ku­wait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the glob­al economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network character­ized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mo­bility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a glob­al public good from which all states ben­efit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well‑being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin‑offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his ca­reer confident in the socialist ideology of post‑independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recog­nizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globaliza­tion, which are facilitated through Amer­ican primacy.4 As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides.

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**Proliferation Kills American power projection.**

**Kroenig 09 –** Assistant Professor of Government at Georgetown University and Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations (Matthew Ph.D., “Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation”, November 2 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Beyond-Optimism-and-Pessimism.pdf>)//AB

The **spread of nuclear weapons threatens power-projecting** states primarily because it **constrains their conventional military power**. The spread of nuclear weapons to states against which states once had the option to use conventional military force **erodes a source of strategic advantage**. These strategic costs are not as catastrophic as nuclear war, but they are costs that power-projecting states can count on incurring with near certainty as nuclear weapons spread. Power-projecting states also consider other **high-impact**, low-probability consequences of nuclear proliferation, such as **nuclear war, accidental nuclear detonation, or, in recent years, nuclear terrorism**, but power-projecting states are threatened by nuclear proliferation in large part because it **constrains their conventional military freedom of action.** To make this case, I will draw primarily on evidence from the U.S. experience with nuclear proliferation for two reasons. First, the **United States** is a global-power-projecting state and can use force against every other state in the international system.13 Second, abundant access to declassified and other archival materials provides excellent insight into how U.S. officials assess the threat posed by nuclear proliferation. To demonstrate that the constraining effects of nuclear proliferation extend beyond the United States, this section will also present available evidence from other power-projecting states. The Soviet Union, during the Cold War, was also a global-power-projecting state. I will also provide evidence from local-power-projecting states. Dyads of power-projecting states and potential target states considered here include: Egypt and Israel, India and Pakistan, Turkey and Iran, and South Korea and North Korea.

**Kills hard power force projection – empirics prove.**

**Kroenig 09 –** Assistant Professor of Government at Georgetown University and Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations (Matthew Ph.D., “Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation”, November 2 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Beyond-Optimism-and-Pessimism.pdf>)//AB

**Nuclear weapons** in other states **deter power-projecting states** from using conventional military force to pursue their interests. **Power-projecting states can use force** in an attempt to reduce the military capabilities, change the policies, or even overthrow the governments, of **threatening** **nonnuclear** weapons **states**. When **facing a nuclear power**, however, direct **military intervention** **becomes a much less attractive option**. Power-projecting states are deterred from using their conventional military power against threatening, nuclear weapon states, constraining their military freedom of action.14 Of course, nuclear deterrence may not always work. Nuclear-armed states, like Israel, have been attacked and theories of the stability/instability paradox claim that strategic nuclear deterrence could make the world safe for low-level conflicts.15 Still, nuclear weapons are widely regarded as having powerful deterrent effects. Even theorists of the stability/instability paradox admit that nuclear weapons impose constraints on the use of conventional military power because, while nuclear weapons may encourage low-level conflict, states could still be deterred from engaging in high-level conventional conflict that could escalate to the nuclear level.16 There is direct evidence that power-projecting states have been deterred from using military force by the fear of nuclear retaliation. The Soviet Union’s nuclear missiles in Cuba deterred the United States from using military force during the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Kennedy later explained that **just a few** **missiles in Cuba “had a deterrent effect on us.”**17 Nuclear weapons appear to have induced caution in both the Soviet Union and China during the Sino-Soviet Border War of 1969.18 Similarly, it appears that nuclear weapons in Pakistan may have deterred India from using large-scale military force against its neighbor in a series of militarized disputes in South Asia.19 Furthermore, the fledgling nuclear arsenal in North Korea deters U.S. leaders from seriously considering the use of force against Pyongyang. While it is true that North Korean conventional military forces could also inflict severe costs on the United States and its regional allies, it would be difficult to argue that North Korea’s fledgling nuclear capability does not provide an additional deterrent effect. Indeed, analysts suspect that one reason that the George W. Bush administration did not seriously consider the use of force against North Korea, a state designated by President Bush as a member of the “axis of evil,” was because the United States was deterred by North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.20 Finally, even in the case that is often cited as a failure of nuclear deterrence, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Arab states did not attack the Israeli homeland, and had no real intention of doing so, in part because they may have feared retaliation from Israel’s nuclear arsenal.21 These are a few of the many cases in which nuclear weapons have deterred power-projecting states from using, or seriously contemplating the use of, military force. The deterrent effects of nuclear weapons are recognized and feared by the leaders of power-projecting states. For example, a 1961 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff report concluded, “a nuclear China would only weaken Washington’s influence in the region and its capabilities to intervene on behalf of its allies there.”22 Similarly, a 1963 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessed that if China acquired nuclear weapons, “the U.S. would be more reluctant to intervene on the Asian mainland.”23 This view was shared by President John FKennedy, who “feared that even a minimal Chinese nuclear force could prevent U.S intervention” in China. Partly for this reason, Kennedy thought that China’s imminent ascendance to the nuclear club was “likely to be historically the most significant and worst event of the 1960s.”24

**Breaks down American diplomatic influence.**

**Kroenig 09 –** Assistant Professor of Government at Georgetown University and Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations (Matthew Ph.D., “Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation”, November 2 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Beyond-Optimism-and-Pessimism.pdf>)//AB

For power-projecting states, **nuclear proliferation reduces the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy**. Nuclear proliferation not only deters power-projecting states from using military force against adversaries, it **undermines the credibility of their threats** to use military force. Students of coercive **diplomacy** maintain that the **effectiveness** of deterrence and compellence policies **hinges on the credibility of** their associated **threats**.29 Adversaries are unlikely to be influenced by a threat that they believe will never be carried out. As the spread of nuclear weapons makes it difficult for power-projecting states to use military force, it also reduces their adversaries’ estimations of the probability that they will follow through on threats to use force. The presence of nuclear weapons places a limit on how hard leaders in power-projecting states believe they can push in a crisis and, accordingly, power-projecting states limit their aims and means in conflicts with nuclear-armed adversaries. Power-projecting states may be forced to consider the redeployment of military forces and bases beyond the range of the new nuclear weapon state’s delivery vehicles to minimize military vulnerability in a crisis. Power-projecting states may also be more likely to capitulate in political conflicts of interest against nuclear-armed powers. As a power-projecting state backs down in confrontations with a new nuclear-armed state, the influence of the new nuclear weapon state is enhanced at the expense of the power-projecting state. Nuclear weapons shift the bargaining space in favor, and increase the strategic influence, of their possessor. **At the extreme, the new nuclear weapon state could even become the dominant state in its geographic region.**

## Indo-Pak

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**Indo-Pak tensions high now – proliferation magnifies the risks of war**

NuclearFiles, 9 – A coalition of professors in international relations and other disciplines, also citing recent events in India and Pakistan (Nuclear Files, “India and Pakistan – Nuclear States in Conflict,” 11 August 2009, nuclearfiles.org//*HO*

Since the attack on the Indian Parliament building in December 2001, the tension and rhetoric have grown considerably. India accused Pakistan of supporting terrorist groups. Pakistan, in turn, pledges its support for Kashmiri freedom fighters. One state's terrorist is another's freedom fighter. Since the attack in December, Pakistan has arrested around 1500 'militants' and banned five groups, two said to be sectarian, one pro-Taliban and two who have been fighting Indian rule in Kashmir. However, Gen Musharraf has pledged continued support for Kashmir. Many people living along the border close to Kashmir have fled the area due to the large military presence being built up by both sides. From the end of 2001 there were clashes virtually every night in that border region, with sometimes one or two people being shot. There are claims that large numbers of military silos have been destroyed. In an atmosphere of increased tension and sabre-rattling rhetoric on both sides, this led to the situation in May 2002 where upwards of a million troops were gathered near the border. Any mistake or small incident runs the risk of setting off something far, far worse. Nuclear numbers Estimates on actual warhead numbers vary wildly with reports that India has anywhere between 50-150 warheads and Pakistan 10-100. There is a bit more clarity, however, regarding the missile systems that would deliver them. India: Agni (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile), nuclear capable and tested. Range: 1,500 miles. Could reach Karachi in about 14 minutes. Prithvi (Surface to Surface Missile), nuclear capable and deployed. Range: 90-220 miles. Could reach Islamabad or Lahore within three minutes. Trishul (Surface to Surface Missile), nuclear capable. Range: 6 miles. Pakistan: Ghauri (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile), nuclear capable in production. Range: 930 miles Could reach Bombay in 10 minutes. One medium-range and one short-range missile, both nuclear capable, were tested in May 2002. The current situation All this, of course, is fuelled by the continuing rhetoric on both sides. Officials in both countries claimed that they would not use nuclear weapons first, but they seem remarkably keen to use them second. Given the proximity of the two states, it is clear that millions of their own people would die along with millions of their nearest neighbours. India has said that it would not use nuclear weapons first, while Pakistan has clearly stated that it would. Whilst a 'no first use' policy is an important step towards disarmament, it is all too often used as an excuse to build a large 'second use' capacity. Eventually, of course, the 'second use' becomes indistinguishable from the 'first use'. As the tension mounts, the temptation grows to get your retaliation in first. But what are the immediate reasons for the current increasing tension and the risk of war? India appears to be escalating events but its argument is that it is following the lead of the US and the west by zero tolerance of terrorist attacks. It has identified what it sees as terrorists being harboured by another state so it threatens military retaliation. Both sides have had internal problems as well. In Pakistan, Musharraf has been promising a democratic election ever since the army took control, but there has been only a referendum. Though it was boycotted by many political parties, Musharraf claimed it as a mandate for him to continue. Meanwhile in India, the ruling BJP has lost every state election for over a year, so now uses the well-known tactic of uniting the country against an outside 'threat'. Whatever the reasons for the tensions, the crucial aim is to avoid the devastation of nuclear war. The British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, visited the region in January 2002 to try to persuade both sides that a war was not a good idea. This took place against the background of the bombing in Afghanistan, in which Britain was an enthusiastic participant. His approach raised concerns about Western hypocrisy, as if war is fine for some countries but not others. The sincerity of Blair's mission was also in question after it transpired that his plea for peace preceded two British trade missions to Delhi in February, both designed to sell weapons to India. Defexpo is an arms fair whose promotional material pushes the weaponry on sale, with everything from small arms to missile systems. India and Pakistan have long been valuable markets for British arms manufacturers. So this arms fair, combined with the resumption of arms sales to Pakistan, as a result of its support for the war in Afghanistan, means that Britain will be arming both sides in any future war. This is, of course, not unique. A similar thing happened during the Iraq-Iran war. So, what's the answer? The situation in south Asia shows the importance of nuclear disarmament. A war even with conventional weapons would be an appalling waste of life. But this would be turned into a complete disaster on an unimaginable scale if nuclear weapons were used. In the short term there must be more diplomatic language and there must be proper international negotiations at the UN to resolve the problem of Kashmir. Our own politicians could do more to help. How can the British Government's attempts to calm the situation be taken seriously when the Defence Minister, Geoff Hoon, appears on television saying that he would use nuclear weapons against any state if necessary?

**And, Indo-Pak war causes extinction**

**Fox,** Independent Journalist ‘**8** (Maggie, April 8, “India-Pakistan Nuclear War Would Cause Ozone Hole” <http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/47829/story.htm>)

WASHINGTON - Nuclear war between India and Pakistan would cause more than slaughter and destruction -- it would knock a big hole in the ozone layer, affecting crops, animals and people worldwide, US researchers said on Monday. Fires from burning cities would send 5 million metric tonnes of soot or more into the lowest part of Earth's atmosphere known as the troposphere, and heat from the sun would carry these blackened particles into the stratosphere, the team at the University of Colorado reported. "The sunlight really heats it up and sends it up to the top of the stratosphere," said Michael Mills of the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics, who chose India and Pakistan as one of several possible examples. Up there, the soot would absorb radiation from the sun and heat surrounding gases, causing chemical reactions that break down ozone. "We find column ozone losses in excess of 20 percent globally, 25 percent to 45 percent at midlatitudes, and 50 percent to 70 percent at northern high latitudes persisting for five years, with substantial losses continuing for five additional years," Mills' team wrote in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. This would let in enough ultraviolet radiation to cause cancer, damage eyes and skin, damage crops and other plants and injure animals. Mills and colleagues based their computer model on other research on how much fire would be produced by a regional nuclear conflict. "Certainly there is a growing number of large nuclear-armed states that have a growing number of weapons. This could be typical of what you might see," Mills said in a telephone interview. SMOKE IS KEY Eight nations are known to have nuclear weapons, and Pakistan and India are believed to have at least 50 weapons apiece, each with the power of the weapon the United States used to destroy Hiroshima in 1945. Mills said the study added a new factor to the worries about what might damage the world's ozone layer, as well as to research about the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange. "The smoke is the key and it is coming from these firestorms that build up actually several hours after the explosions," he said. "We are talking about modern megacities that have a lot of material in them that would burn. We saw these kinds of megafires in World War Two in Dresden and Tokyo. The difference is we are talking about a large number of cities that would be bombed within a few days." Nothing natural could create this much black smoke in the same way, Mill noted. Volcanic ash, dust and smoke is of a different nature, for example, and forest fires are not big or hot enough. The University of Colorado's Brian Toon, who also worked on the study, said the damage to the ozone layer would be worse than what has been predicted by "nuclear winter" and "ultraviolet spring" scenarios. "The big surprise is that this study demonstrates that a small-scale, regional nuclear conflict is capable of triggering ozone losses even larger than losses that were predicted following a full-scale nuclear war," Toon said in a statement.

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**Proliferation causes an india Pakistan war – disarmament is key**

**NuclearFiles, 10 –** A coalition of professors in international relations and other disciplines, also citing recent events in India and Pakistan (Nuclear Files, “India and Pakistan – Nuclear States in Conflict,” 25 February 2010, nuclearfiles.org)

All this, of course, is fuelled by the continuing rhetoric on both sides. Officials in both countries claimed that they would not use nuclear weapons first, but they seem remarkably keen to use them second. Given the proximity of the two states, it is clear that millions of their own people would die along with millions of their nearest neighbours. India has said that it would not use nuclear weapons first, while Pakistan has clearly stated that it would. Whilst a 'no first use' policy is an important step towards disarmament, it is all too often used as an excuse to build a large 'second use' capacity. Eventually, of course, the 'second use' becomes indistinguishable from the 'first use'. As the tension mounts, the temptation grows to get your retaliation in first. But what are the immediate reasons for the current increasing tension and the risk of war? India appears to be escalating events but its argument is that it is following the lead of the US and the west by zero tolerance of terrorist attacks. It has identified what it sees as terrorists being harboured by another state so it threatens military retaliation. Both sides have had internal problems as well. In Pakistan, Musharraf has been promising a democratic election ever since the army took control, but there has been only a referendum. Though it was boycotted by many political parties, Musharraf claimed it as a mandate for him to continue. Meanwhile in India, the ruling BJP has lost every state election for over a year, so now uses the well-known tactic of uniting the country against an outside 'threat'. Whatever the reasons for the tensions, **the crucial aim is to avoid the devastation of nuclear war**. The British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, visited the region in January 2002 to try to persuade both sides that a war was not a good idea. This took place against the background of the bombing in Afghanistan, in which Britain was an enthusiastic participant. His approach raised concerns about Western hypocrisy, as if war is fine for some countries but not others. The sincerity of Blair's mission was also in question after it transpired that his plea for peace preceded two British trade missions to Delhi in February, both designed to sell weapons to India. Defexpo is an arms fair whose promotional material pushes the weaponry on sale, with everything from small arms to missile systems. India and Pakistan have long been valuable markets for British arms manufacturers. So this arms fair, combined with the resumption of arms sales to Pakistan, as a result of its support for the war in Afghanistan, means that Britain will be arming both sides in any future war. This is, of course, not unique. A similar thing happened during the Iraq-Iran war. So, what's the answer? **The situation in south Asia shows the importance of nuclear disarmament. A war even with conventional weapons would be an appalling waste of life.** But this would be turned into a complete disaster on an unimaginable scale if nuclear weapons were used. In the short term there must be more diplomatic language and there must be proper international negotiations at the UN to resolve the problem of Kashmir. Our own politicians could do more to help. How can the British Government's attempts to calm the situation be taken seriously when the Defence Minister, Geoff Hoon, appears on television saying that he would use nuclear weapons against any state if necessary? In the long term, the declared nuclear weapon states (NWS) - US, UK, France, Russia and China - must carry out their obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and get rid of their nuclear weapons. The NPT was drawn up in 1968, giving the definition of a NWS as one that tested nuclear weapons before then. Because India was preparing its nuclear programme at that time, it would not sign. Because India would not sign, neither would Pakistan. Therefore, they cannot sign the NPT as NWS and, since the nuclear testing by both sides in 1998, they cannot sign as non-nuclear weapon states. The NWS made statements at the time of the tests saying how appalled they were at this development. But after 11 September, the US lifted sanctions imposed on both sides, in order to boost its coalition in the 'War on Terrorism'. If the NWS put the words of the NPT into action, they would be in a position to push India and Pakistan to sign the NPT themselves. After all, part of the excuse given by India and Pakistan for the 1998 nuclear tests was that those nuclear weapon states had done nothing about their NPT commitments, so if nuclear weapons were good enough for them... Both sides need to be persuaded that nuclear weapons make the world a more dangerous, not a safer, place and to take a step back and realise that peaceful resolutions to conflict are the best way forward. This should happen through the UN. But the UN also needs to look at the continuing nuclear policies of the NWS. There are peace activists in both India and Pakistan working hard to get their views across. Their work has been particularly difficult since the nuclear tests carried out by both countries in 1998. They have the entire might of the government and military propaganda machine ranged against them.

## ---2nc Impact

**Unintentional nuclear exchange**

**Rajaraman**, Theoretical Physics Professor at Jawaharlal Nehru, ‘**2** (November, “Nuclear Weapons in South Asia Risks and Their Reduction” Pugwash Workshop on South Asian Security, www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/Rajaraman.pdf)

The point is not that our own early warning systems in India will also be prone to false alarms. In fact we will probably not have the luxury of even such a fallible early warning system. This is not just because of the costs involved but also because of geography. The missile travel time between Pakistan and India is only about 5 minutes — far too short a time to provide any meaningful warning. (Bombs delivered by planes will take longer, but that is offset by the difficulty in spotting the bombers carrying nuclear weapons from the dozens of other similar planes in action during wartime.) One would therefore have to settle for indirect indicators that give a little more time to react — things like signs of unusual activity at missile launch sites . airfields and nuclear ammunition depots of the enemy, intelligence reports of their military plans and political intentions and so on. These can yield at best secondary evidence of an impending attack, much less concrete and more amenable to misinterpretation. A very plausible scenario is one where, at a time of wartime crisis, such indirect evidence suddenly peaks to a crescendo and points towards an imminent nuclear attack. Such evidence may be very strongly indicative, but it is unlikely to be one hundred percent certain. One can imagine the extraordinary dilemma that the country's political leadership would then face. They may find themselves under immense pressure from the more hawkish elements among them and the military to launch a preventive attack within a matter of hours if not minutes. Notwithstanding any declarations of No First Use. and no matter how responsible the leadership is or how conscious they are of the gravity of a wrong decision it is still hard to imagine them just sitting on their hands and waiting for the bombs from the other side to land before retaliating. Herein lies the serious risk of circumstances forcing a hasty panic-driven nuclear attack in response to a perceived threat that may eventually turn out to have been false.? The pressure to launch a preventive attack would be all the more intense if missiles and bombers loaded with nuclear weapons were already fully deployed and ready to take off in minutes. When such fire-power is kept primed day after day, ready to be used any moment, it is itching to be fired. The mere availability of such capability generates a momentum of its own to the decision making process. There is very little doubt that the decision to drop the bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki was in part influenced by the fact that the bombs, only recently fabricated after a massive military and scientific effort, were sitting there, waiting to be tested over a "real target".? Finally, the fact that the antagonist also carries a similar nuclear arsenal with very similar risks, increases the danger many-fold. What may be viewed as a purely deterrent weapon by one side cannot, if kept in a state of ready-to-fire alert, be distinguished by the other side from a capability mounted to make a surprise first attack. Each side, in evaluating the threat from the other, will not only have to consider the likelihood of a deliberate attack, but also factor in the possibility of inadvertent, unauthorised or hasty crisis driven attacks. Such increased perceptions of threat can bounce back and forth between the strategic calculations of the two countries, getting magnified in the process.

## Middle East

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**Political instability causes Middle-Eastern prolif – countries and radicals have the capability – multiple scenarios for nuclear war**

Sokolski, 11 - Executive director of The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, editor of *Nuclear Power’s Global Expansion: Weighing Its Costs and Risks* (Henry, “Egyptian revolution and nuclear proliferation…” 9 February 2011 jssnews.com//***HO***

When the Iranian Revolution overthrew the Shah in 1979, years of “peaceful” U.S. nuclear cooperation with the Persian dictator suddenly seemed like they had been a bad idea. In part as a result of this early assistance, Tehran is on the road to producing a bomb’s worth of weapons-grade uranium [in roughly a year or less](http://www.npec-web.org/article_file/The_Pleasures_of_Self-Deception_Fiction_010211_1501.pdf). And with protests upending governments in Egypt, Tunisia, and the rest of the Middle East, this sequence is on the cusp of repeating itself to produce a nuclear domino effect. Yet, remarkably—given its stated commitment to denuclearization—the Obama administration seems eager to pursue policies that will only make the threat worse. The United States has had formal civilian nuclear cooperation ties with Egypt since 1981, when the country ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Before that, Cairo made several haphazard attempts to get the bomb. Such flirtations with nuclear weapons were supposed to come to an end with ratification, but unfortunately, they didn’t. Instead, President Mubarak made several public statements that Egypt would not hesitate to get nuclear arms if necessary. He has refused U.S. requests to forswear making nuclear fuel (a process that can bring states to the brink of acquiring nuclear weapons). And in 2005, his nuclear scientists admitted they had violated Egypt’s pledge to declare all sensitive nuclear activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Even more dangerously, unlike Iraq, Syria, and Libya—all of which have been caught attempting to develop a nuclear weapons option—Egypt has the technological capability to separate weapons-usable plutonium from spent reactor fuel, and it operates a research reactor large enough to make a bomb’s worth of plutonium each year. Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s largest political party clamoring for a say in Cairo’s future, is on record demanding that Egypt develop nuclear weapons to balance those of Israel. We can only hope that most Egyptians ignore this group. If, however, Egypt goes radical or remains politically unstable, the country’s nuclearization would be a major danger. One of Europe’s leading nuclear experts [projects](http://www.npec-web.org/article_file/After_Iran_Prospects_For_Nuclear_Proliferation_in_North_Africa_0_030211_0740.pdf) that if this were to happen, Algeria—which also has the technology to extract nuclear-weapons–usable plutonium and a reactor making nearly a bomb’s worth of the stuff each year—would be politically compelled to match Egypt bomb for bomb. And such a nuclear domino effect could easily occur in the context of popular revolutions spreading throughout the Middle East: According to [Standard and Poor’s](http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/27/middleeast-ratings-sandp-idUSN2721790820110127) Jordan and Algeria are the next Arab states whose governments are likely to be destabilized. Jordan currently lacks any major nuclear facilities, but it is actively seeking French and South Korean help to build several large reactors, and it has resisted American pleas to forswear making nuclear fuel in exchange for U.S. nuclear assistance. Likewise, there is a proliferation threat from Saudi Arabia, a country that has more than [hinted](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/sep/18/nuclear.saudiarabia) that it will get its own bomb if and when Iran does. It, too, is seeking “peaceful” nuclear reactors and has rejected American pleas to forswear making nuclear fuel as a condition for securing U.S. nuclear cooperation.

## Nuke War (Generics)

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**Nuclear proliferation risks extinction – Deterrence and other factors don’t check in the context of mass prolif**

**Krieger, 2009** Pres. Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and Councilor – World Future Council, (David, “Still Loving the Bomb After All These Years”, 9-4, https://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2009/09/04\_krieger\_newsweek\_response.php?krieger)//AA

Jonathan Tepperman’s article in the September 7, 2009 issue of Newsweek, “Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb,” provides a novel but frivolous argument that nuclear weapons “may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous….” Rather, in Tepperman’s world, “The bomb may actually make us safer.” Tepperman shares this world with Kenneth Waltz, a University of California professor emeritus of political science, who Tepperman describes as “the leading ‘nuclear optimist.’” Waltz expresses his optimism in this way: “We’ve now had 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It’s striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states.” Actually, there were a number of proxy wars between nuclear weapons states, such as those in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan, and some near disasters, the most notable being the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Waltz’s logic is akin to observing a man falling from a high rise building, and noting that he had already fallen for 64 floors without anything bad happening to him, and concluding that so far it looked so good that others should try it. Dangerous logic! Tepperman builds upon Waltz’s logic, and concludes “that all states are rational,” even though their leaders may have a lot of bad qualities, including being “stupid, petty, venal, even evil….” He asks us to trust that rationality will always prevail when there is a risk of nuclear retaliation, because these weapons make “the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable.” Actually, he is asking us to do more than trust in the rationality of leaders; he is asking us to gamble the future on this proposition. “The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling,” Tepperman argues, “it’s led to what’s known as the nuclear peace….” But if this is a peace worthy of the name, which it isn’t, it certainly is not one on which to risk the future of civilization. One irrational leader with control over a nuclear arsenal could start a nuclear conflagration, resulting in a global Hiroshima. Tepperman celebrates “the iron logic of deterrence,” but deterrence is a theory that is far from rooted in “iron logic.” It is a theory based upon threats that must be effectively communicated and believed. Leaders of Country A with nuclear weapons must communicate to other countries (B, C, etc.) the conditions under which A will retaliate with nuclear weapons. The leaders of the other countries must understand and believe the threat from Country A will, in fact, be carried out. The longer that nuclear weapons are not used, the more other countries may come to believe that they can challenge Country A with impunity from nuclear retaliation. The more that Country A bullies other countries, the greater the incentive for these countries to develop their own nuclear arsenals. Deterrence is unstable and therefore precarious. Most of the countries in the world reject the argument, made most prominently by Kenneth Waltz, that the spread of nuclear weapons makes the world safer. These countries joined together in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, but they never agreed to maintain indefinitely a system of nuclear apartheid in which some states possess nuclear weapons and others are prohibited from doing so. The principal bargain of the NPT requires the five NPT nuclear weapons states (US, Russia, UK, France and China) to engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament, and the International Court of Justice interpreted this to mean complete nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. Tepperman seems to be arguing that seeking to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is bad policy, and that nuclear weapons, because of their threat, make efforts at non-proliferation unnecessary and even unwise. If some additional states, including Iran, developed nuclear arsenals, he concludes that wouldn’t be so bad “given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior.” Those who oppose Tepperman’s favorable disposition toward the bomb, he refers to as “nuclear pessimists.” These would be the people, and I would certainly be one of them, who see nuclear weapons as presenting an urgent danger to our security, our species and our future. Tepperman finds that when viewed from his “nuclear optimist” perspective, “nuclear weapons start to seem a lot less frightening.” “Nuclear peace,” he tells us, “rests on a scary bargain: you accept a small chance that something extremely bad will happen in exchange for a much bigger chance that something very bad – conventional war – won’t happen.” But the “extremely bad” thing he asks us to accept is the end of the human species. Yes, that would be serious. He also doesn’t make the case that in a world without nuclear weapons, the prospects of conventional war would increase dramatically. After all, it is only an unproven supposition that nuclear weapons have prevented wars, or would do so in the future. We have certainly come far too close to the precipice of catastrophic nuclear war. As an ultimate celebration of the faulty logic of deterrence, Tepperman calls for providing any nuclear weapons state with a “survivable second strike option.” Thus, he not only favors nuclear weapons, but finds the security of these weapons to trump human security. Presumably he would have President Obama providing new and secure nuclear weapons to North Korea, Pakistan and any other nuclear weapons states that come along so that they will feel secure enough not to use their weapons in a first-strike attack. Do we really want to bet the human future that Kim Jong-Il and his successors are more rational than Mr. Tepperman?

**Prolif causes war – it destroys good relations, prompts first strikes, and military doctrine ensures use**

Quester 2k [George, Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, "The Unavoidable Importance ofNuclear Weapons," Alternative Nuclear Futures, ed. Baylis and O'Neil, p. 33]cn

The outside world, and the countries directly within a region, will have to be very nervous about the transition periods where countries are coming into the possession of such weapons, and can deploy only rudimentary delivery systems, thus tempting an adversary to strike first in a preventive war. If the impact of nuclear proliferation on the likelihood of war might thus be mixed, the impact on the destructiveness of war will most probably be horrendous, as millions are killed in short bursts of warfare, rather than thousands. The spread of nuclear weapons to any large number of separate countries increases the chances of their coming into use, simply because they are embedded in the military forces that are committed to conflict. and come to be treated as 'just another weapon but with potential1y horrible results where the targets are the cities of south Asia or the Middle East. And yet another possibility, of course, is that a relatively irrational or actually crazy ruler would come into command of one of these arsenals, someone indifferent to the nuclear or other retaliation that his country would suffer, someone thus capriciously launching a local nuclear holocaust. Turning to the burdens in peacetime of being prepared for war, the spread of nuclear weapons can also poison the political relations in pairs of countries. Consider the normal relations of Brazil and Argentina today, as compared with what those relations might have become if each had acquired a nuclear arsenal, amid all the calculations and discussions of what each could do to the other's cities.

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Empirical data shows once proliferation starts, it never ends—conflicts can only escalate, when everyone has nukes its game over—history is on our side

Kroenig ‘9 – Matthew Kroenig is an assistant professor of Government at Georgetown University and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (“Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation”, November 2009, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Beyond-Optimism-and-Pessimism.pdf)//GS

The strategic consequences of nuclear proliferation listed above are reasons why power-projecting states are threatened by nuclear proliferation in and of itself. Because nuclear proliferation is so threatening to power-projecting states, nuclear proliferation imposes an additional, secondary cost on power-projecting states: further nuclear proliferation. When a state acquires nuclear weapons, other states may seek to develop t own nuclear arsenal in response, setting off a chain react e ability to project power over the initial nuclear proliferator, it is also likely that they will be able to project power over any other regional states that proliferate in response, compounding the strategic costs enumerated above. There is empirical support for the idea that proliferation begets proliferation. Many countries have developed nuclear weapons as a response to nuclear programs in other states. The U.S. Manhattan Project was inspired by reports of a nuclear research program in Nazi Germany. 86 The Soviet Union pursued nuclear weapons to undercut America’s nuclear monopoly. 87 Nuclear programs in Britain and France were in 88 a response to American nuclear threats. 89 Furthermore, the Chinese bomb was a contributing cause to the development of nuclear weapons in India and, in turn, I nuclear program led to nuclear proliferation in Pakistan 90 The nuclear domino effect is far from automatic, of course, and there are m states that did not pursue nuclear programs in response to a rival’s proliferation. Nevertheless, nuclear dominoes do sometimes fall. **Further proliferation is** probably **the most widely-cited, negative strategic consequence of nuclear proliferation recognized by analysts** **and policymakers in powerprojecting states.** For example, in 1964, U.S. Undersecretary of State George Ball predicted that a Chinese nuclear test would set off a wave of nuclear proliferation in Asia. He assessed that there was a “fifty-fifty” chance that India would follow China down the nuclear path. According to Ball, Pakistan would likely respond to India’s nuclear status by seeking its own nuclear arsenal. Ball further cited Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, and Taiwan as states that could eventually develop nuclear weapons as a counter to the Chinese arsenal. at ries, an, Israel, and the United Arab Republic.” U.S. officials also feared that Israel’s nuclear program would lead to further nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. In a letter to nd East r in South Korea, Taiwan and Japan. Similarly, in 2004, John Edwards, the Democratic Party’s Vice Preside g ber e officials working in nonproliferation policy. During World War II, Selby Skinner of the U.S. Strategic Services Unit warned, “French scientists have the formula and techniques 91 U.S. State Department official George McGhee also noted in 1961 that if India were to develop nuclear weapons, it could unleash “a chain reaction of similar decisions by other count such as Pakistan 92 David Ben-Gurion, President Kennedy argued that if Israel acquired nuclear weapons it would only encourage the Arab states to begin their own nuclear weapons programs. 93 In recent years, U.S. officials have stressed that nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea could encourage a cascade of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and Asia. For example, nonproliferation officials in the administration of President William Jefferson Clinton argued that nuclear proliferation in North Korea could lead to a nuclear arms race in Asia and the potential for future nuclear weapons arsenals 94 ntial Nominee, stated, “A nuclear Iran is unacceptable for so many reasons, including the possibility that it creates a gateway and the need for other countries in the region to develop nuclear capability – Saudi Arabia, Egypt, potentially others.” 95 Policymakers and analysts in power-projecting states further fear that proliferation breeds proliferation by enhancing the supply of, not just the demand for, nuclear materials and technology. As the number of nuclear weapon states increases, so too does the number of states that are able to provide sensitive nuclear material and technology to nonnuclear weapon states, contributing to the international spread of nuclear weapons. Scholars have recently examined the causes and consequences of nuclear transfers, and the relationship between sensitive nuclear transfers and nuclear proliferation has long been suspected by officials working in nonproliferation policy. During World War II, Selby Skinner of the U.S. Strategic Services Unit warned, “French scientists have the formula and techniques concerning atomic explosives, and they are now willing to sell this information…to one the smaller nations.” of Peter Brookes assessed that it is possible that, “Iran, as a nuclear weapons state, will involve itself in the dreaded ‘secondary proliferation,’ passing its nuclear know-h . ek in u becomes a suspected or a de facto nuclear weapons state, it is feared that its neighbors such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, (and) Syria…may consider their nuclear r proliferation because the spread of nuclear weapons imposes strategic costs on other, more powerful states. Next, I will provide empiric lear 97 In the early 1990s, U.S. officials worried that South Africa could transfer enriched uranium to other nations. 98 More recently, following North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006, George W. Bush announced, “The transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States, and we would hold North Korea fully accountable of the consequences of such action.” 99 Similarly, P w ow on to others.” 100 The fear that proliferation will beget proliferation is not limited to the United States Moscow feared that nuclear proliferation in Israel would lead Moscow’s Arab allies to sell nuclear weapons. 101 Presently, strategic thinkers in Turkey oppose nuclear proliferation neighboring Iran because they believe that an Iranian bomb could contribute to further nuclear proliferation in their own region.

**Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction is key to stability**

**Roberts ’99** (Brad, Member of Research Staff – Institute for Defense Analyses & editorial Board of Nonproliferation Review, Nonproliferation Review, “VIEWPOINT: PROLIFERATION AND NONPROLIFERATION IN THE 1990S: LOOKING FOR THE RIGHT LESSONS”, Volume 6, Fall, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol06/64/robert64.pdf)

This brings us then to the question of what is at stake in the effort to combat proliferation. There are two stan- dard answers to the question of what’s at stake: human lives, and stability. NBC weapons are weapons of mass destruction—all of them, though in different ways. The most deadly of these weapons systems can kill millions—and much more quickly than conventional weaponry (though it too is capable of killing millions). A regional war em- ploying mass destruction as a matter of course could cause suffering and death unknown in human experi- ence. Such a war would cast a harsh light on the argu- ment now in vogue that landmines, small arms, even machetes in the hands of drunk young men are the real weapons of mass destruction. Strictly from the perspec- tive of limiting the effects of war, then, the world com- munity has an interest in preventing the emergence of an international system in which the possession and use of NBC weapons is accepted as normal and custom- ary. The stability argument relates to the unintended con- sequences associated with acquiring weapons of mass destruction. It focuses on the weapons-acquiring state and its neighbors and the risk of war that grows among them, including both preemptive and accidental wars. Although it is an old truism that proliferation is destabi- lizing, it is not always true—not where the acquisition of strategic leverage is essential to preservation of a bal- ance of power that deters conflict and that is used to create the conditions of a more enduring peace. But those circumstances have proven remarkably rare. In- stead, the risks associated with the competitive acquisi- tion of strategic capabilities have typically been seen to outweigh the perceived benefits to states that have con- sidered nuclear weapons acquisition. Argentina and Bra- zil, for example, like Sweden and Australia before them, have gotten out of the nuclear weapons business because they see no reason to live at the nuclear brink even if living there is within their reach.

**Proliferation causes destabilization and crisis escalation**

**Cimbala, 2008 -** Professor of Political Science @ Penn. State and a consultant on arms control (Stephen, “Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia”, 27,)

If the possibility existed of a mistaken preemption during and immediately after the Cold War, between the experienced nuclear forces and command systems of America and Russia, then it may be a matter of even more concern with regard to states with newer and more opaque forces and command systems. In addition, the Americans and Soviets (and then Russians) had a great deal of experience getting to know one another’s military operational proclivities and doctrinal idiosyncrasies, including those that might influence the decision for or against war. Another consideration, relative to nuclear stability in the present century, is that the Americans and their NATO allies shared with the Soviets and Russians a commonality of culture and historical experience. Future threats to American or Russian security from weapons of mass destruction may be presented by states or nonstate actors motivated by cultural and social predispositions not easily understood by those in the West nor subject to favorable manipulation during a crisis. The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social, and cultural crosscurrents contributory to the possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War, in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.12 The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear-capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues.13 The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another’s vitals. But short-range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and NorthKorea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on. The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first strike–vulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policymakers and academic theorists. For policymakers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).14 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passe, on account of the emergence of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” and its encouragement of information-based warfare.15 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large-scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.16 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare.

Prolif causes regional instability—Pakistan and India prove

Kroenig ‘9 – Matthew Kroenig is an assistant professor of Government at Georgetown University and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (“Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation”, November 2009, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Beyond-Optimism-and-Pessimism.pdf)//GS

Triggers Regional Instability Nuclear proliferation can embolden new nuclear states, triggering regional instability that could potentially threaten the interests of power-projecting states and even entrap them in regional disputes. New nuclear weapon states may be more aggressive and this newfound assertiveness can result in regional instability. I define regional instability as a heightened frequency (but not necessarily the intensity) of militarized interstate disputes among states in a given geographical region. The threat that regional instability poses to power-projecting states is different from the concern about international instability expressed by the proliferation pessimists. Pessimists assume that international instability is bad in and of itself – and they may be right. But, power-projecting states have a different concern. They worry that nuclear proliferation will set off regional instability and that, because they have the ability to project power over the new nuclear weapon state, they will be compelled to intervene in a costly conflict. Power-projecting states could feel the need to act as a mediator between nuclear-armed disputants, provide conventional military assistance to one of the parties in the dispute, or because they have the ability to put boots on the ground in the new nuclear state, potentially be drawn into the fighting themselves. There is direct evidence that nuclear weapons can contribute to regional instability. Robert Rauchhaus has demonstrated that nuclear weapon states are more likely to engage in conflict than nonnuclear weapon states. 46 Michael Horowitz extends this analysis to show that aggressiveness is most pronounced in new nuclear states that have less experience with nuclear diplomacy. 47 These related findings are not due to the fact that dispute-prone states are more likely to acquire nuclear weapons; the scholars carefully control for a state’s selection into nuclear status. Rather, the findings demonstrate that nuclear weapons increase the frequency with which their possessors participate in militarized disputes. Qualitative studies have also provided supporting evidence of nuclear weapons’ potentially destabilizing effects. Research on internal decision-making in Pakistan reveals that Pakistani foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, encouraging them to initiate militarized disputes against India.

**Great power war – proliferating actors want to escalate conflict.**

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There is direct evidence that **regional conflicts** involving nuclear powers can **encourage power-projecting states to become involved in nuclear disputes**. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was reluctant to aid Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War until Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir threatened that, without U.S. assistance, she might be forced to use nuclear weapons against the Arab armies.52 In response, Kissinger reversed his decision and provided emergency aid to the Israeli Defense Forces.53 The Soviet Union also considered a military intervention to help its Arab proxies in the Yom Kippur War, causing the United States to go on nuclear alert, and leading leaders in both Moscow and Washington to consider the **very real possibility that a conflict involving a regional nuclear power could spiral into a superpower war**.54 Similarly, in 1999 and 2002, the United States became caught in diplomatic initiatives to prevent nuclear war in crises between the nuclear-armed countries of India and Pakistan.55 Indeed, the **expectation that powerful states will intervene in conflicts** involving a nuclear-armed state is so firmly **ingrained in the strategic thinking** of national leaders that small **nuclear powers actually incorporate it into their strategic doctrines**. South Africa’s nuclear doctrine envisioned, in the event of an imminent security threat, the detonation of a nuclear weapon, not against the threatening party, but over the Atlantic Ocean in an attempt to jolt the United States into intervening on South Africa’s behalf.56 Israel’s nuclear doctrine was also constructed along similar lines. While the Israelis are notoriously silent about the existence and purpose of their nuclear arsenal, Francis Perrin, a French official who assisted in the development of Israel’s nuclear program in the 1950s and 1960s, explained that Israel’s arsenal was originally aimed “against the Americans, not to launch against America, but to say ‘If you don’t want to help us in a critical situation, we will require you to help us. Otherwise, we will use our nuclear bombs.’”57 Similarly, Pakistan’s surprise raid on Indian-controlled Kargil in 1999 was motivated partly by the expectation that Pakistan would be able to retain any territory it was able to seize quickly, because Pakistani officials calculated that the United States would never allow an extended conflict in nuclear South Asia. 55 S. For these reasons, power-projecting states worry about the effect of nuclear proliferation on regional stability. U.S. officials feared that nuclear proliferation in Israel could embolden Israel against its Arab enemies, or entice Arab states to launch a preemptive military strike on Israel’s nuclear arsenal. In a 1963 NIE on Israel’s nascent nuclear program, the consensus view of the U.S. intelligence community was that if Israel acquired nuclear weapons, “Israel’s policy toward its neighbors would become more rather than a little rough…it would seek to exploit the psychological advantage of its nuclear capability to intimidate the Arabs.”59 President Kennedy concurred. In a letter to Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, Kennedy wrote that Israel should abandon its nuclear program because Israel’s “development of such (nuclear) weapons would dangerously threaten the stability other area.”60 Similarly, in the case of China’s nuclear program, U.S. officials believed that a nuclear-armed China would “be more willing to take risks in military probing operations because of an overoptimistic assessment of its psychological advantage. More recently, U.S. officials have continued to fear the effect of nuclear proliferation regional stability. In a 1986 Top Secret CIA Assessment, U.S. intelligence analysts predicted that a nuclear North Korea would have “a free hand to conduct paramilitary operations without provoking a response.”62 Similarly a U.S. expert testified before Congress in 2006 that “**A nuclear arsenal in the hands of Iran’s current theocratic regime will be the source of both regional and global instability**.” U.S. officials assessed that regional **instability set off by nuclear proliferation could compel them to intervene directly in regional conflicts.** In the early 1960s, U.S. officials speculated that Israel could potentially leverage its nuclear arsenal to compel the United States to intervene on its behalf in Middle Eastern crises.64 Similarly, in 1965, Henry Rowan official in the Department of Defense, assessed that if India acquired nuclear weapon could lead to a **conflict in South Asia** “with a fair chance of spreading and **involving the United States**.”65 At the time of writing, U.S. defense strategists are planning for the possibility that the United States may be compelled to intervene in regional conflicts involving a nuclear-armed Iran or North Korea and their neighbors. Leaders in power-projecting states also fear that **regional instability set off by nuclear proliferation could entrap power-projecting states in a great power war**. Other power-projecting states, facing a mirror-image situation, may feel compelled to intervene in a crisis to secure their own interests, entangling multiple great powers in a regional conflic1963 NIE, U.S. intelligence analysts assessed that “the impact of (nuclear proliferation in the Middle East) will be the possibility that hostilities arising out of existing or future controversies could escalate into a confrontation involving the major powers.”67 68 President Johnson believed that a nuclear Israel meant increased Soviet involvement in the MiddleEast and perhaps superpower war.If historical experience provides a guide, U.S. strategists at the time of writing are undoubtedly concerned by the possibility that **China** feel compelled to **intervene in any conflict involving a nuclear-armed North Korea**, making the Korean Peninsula another dangerous **flash-point in the uncertain Sino-American strategic relationship.**

**Proliferation causes instability and increases the likelihood of use, turning their security claims**

Krieger and McCraken, 9 – Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and McCracken is the 2003 Ruth Floyd Intern in Human Rights and International Law at the NAPF (David and Angela, “Ten Myths About Nuclear Weapons,” 20 July 2009, wagingpeace.org/menu/issues/nuclear-weapons//*HO*

There is a widespread belief in the United States that nuclear weapons are necessary for the US to defend against aggressor states. US national security, however, would be far improved if the US took a leadership role in seeking to eliminate nuclear weapons throughout the world. Nuclear weapons are the only weapons that could actually destroy the United States, and their existence and proliferation threaten US security. Continued high-alert deployment of nuclear weapons and research on smaller and more usable nuclear weapons by the US, combined with a more aggressive foreign policy, makes many weaker nations feel threatened. Weaker states may think of nuclear weapons as an equalizer, giving them the ability to effectively neutralize the forces of a threatening nuclear weapons state. Thus, as in the case of North Korea, the US threat may be instigating nuclear weapons proliferation. Continued reliance on nuclear weapons by the United States is setting the wrong example for the world, and is further endangering the country rather than protecting it. The United States has strong conventional military forces and would be far more secure in a world in which no country had nuclear arms.

**Many governments with nuclear weapons have incentive and are willing to use them – proliferation exacerbates the potential for war**

Krieger and McCraken, 9 – Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and McCracken is the 2003 Ruth Floyd Intern in Human Rights and International Law at the NAPF (David and Angela, “Ten Myths About Nuclear Weapons,” 20 July 2009, wagingpeace.org/menu/issues/nuclear-weapons//*HO*

Many people believe that the threat of using nuclear weapons can go on indefinitely as a means of deterring attacks because no leader would be crazy enough to actually use them. Unfortunately, nuclear weapons have been used, and it is likely that most, if not all, leaders possessing these weapons would, under certain conditions, actually use them. US leaders, considered by many to be highly rational, are the only ones who have ever actually used nuclear weapons in war, against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Outside of these two bombings, the leaders of nuclear weapons states have repeatedly come close to using nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence is based upon a believable threat of nuclear retaliation, and the threat of nuclear weapons use has been constant during the post-World War II period. US policy currently calls for the use of nuclear weapons in response to an attack with chemical or biological weapons against the US, its troops or allies. One of the premises of the US argument for preventive war is that other leaders would be willing to attack the United States with nuclear weapons. Threats of nuclear attack by India and Pakistan provide still another example of nuclear brinksmanship that could turn into a nuclear war. Globally and historically, leaders have done their best to prove that they would use nuclear weapons. Assuming that they would not do so is unwise.

**Proliferation increases the likelihood of irrational terrorists and rogue states acquiring weapons**

Krieger and McCraken, 9 – Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and McCracken is the 2003 Ruth Floyd Intern in Human Rights and International Law at the NAPF (David and Angela, “Ten Myths About Nuclear Weapons,” 20 July 2009, wagingpeace.org/menu/issues/nuclear-weapons//*HO*

Many people believe that nuclear weapons are well protected and that the likelihood of terrorists obtaining these weapons is low. In the aftermath of the Cold War, however, the ability of the Russians to protect their nuclear forces has declined precipitously. In addition, a coup in a country with nuclear weapons, such as Pakistan, could lead to a government coming to power that was willing to provide nuclear weapons to terrorists. In general, the more nuclear weapons there are in the world and the more nuclear weapons proliferate to additional countries, the greater the possibility that nuclear weapons will end up in the hands of terrorists. The best remedy for keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists is to drastically reduce their numbers and institute strict international inspections and controls on all nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear materials in all countries, until these weapons and the materials for making them can be eliminated.

9. The United States is working to fulfill its nuclear disarmament obligations. Most US citizens believe that the United States is working to fulfill its nuclear disarmament obligations. In fact, the United States has failed to fulfill its obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, requiring good faith efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament, for more than 30 years. The United States has failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The 2003 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) with Russia takes strategic nuclear weapons off active deployment, but has no provisions for verification or systematic reductions and it fails to adhere to the principle of irreversibility agreed to at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. The treaty seeks maximum flexibility for rearmament rather than irreversible reductions in nuclear arms. Nuclear weapons taken off active deployment will be put in storage where they will actually become more vulnerable in both the US and Russia to theft by terrorists. In the year 2012, the treaty will end, unless extended.

**Nuclear proliferation risks extinction – its only a matter of time**

**Krieger 97** - Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and Councilor – World Future Council (David Dangers of Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/1997/07/00\_krieger\_dangers.htm)//AA

The greatest nuclear danger that I am concerned with is not the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other states, though that is a grave danger. Of even greater concern is the invidious belief of policy makers in a small number of states that they have a right to maintain nuclear weapons indefinitely, and that in their hands nuclear weapons do not constitute a threat either to their own citizens or to the remainder of humanity. This is a foolish belief that discounts the principle that if something can go wrong it will go wrong. It is also a belief that is likely to encourage proliferation to other states and possibly to terrorist groups as well. There is no reason to be assured that nuclear weapons in the hands of the current nuclear weapons states will not result in tragedy surpassing all imagination. One can only wonder what it is that makes most citizens of nuclear weapons states so complacent under these circumstances. Clearly, for the most part, otherwise normal people have learned to live with the terror of nuclear weapons and, in doing so, have become accustomed to condoning terrorism at a national level. It is this situation that compounds the danger because without the vigorous protests of citizens in the nuclear weapons states, there is no impetus to change the status quo. And if the status quo with regard to reliance on nuclear weapons does not change, there will surely be proliferation and it will be only a question of time until nuclear weapons are again used in warfare. Due to the intransigence of the nuclear weapons states, there has been virtually no progress toward nuclear disarmament in the past five years. The START II Treaty, which was agreed to by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in January 1993, called for reductions in deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,500 on each side by January 1, 2003. Since then, Presidents .Clinton and Yeltsin have agreed to move this date back five years to December 31, 2007. The total number of nuclear warheads in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia at the completion of START II, if it is completed, will be around 10,000 on each side. ? For decades India has made it clear that it supports complete nuclear disarmament, but that it is not willing to live in a world of "nuclear apartheid." Indian leaders have stated that if all states will renounce nuclear weapons and agree to go to zero, India will happily join them. On the other hand, Indian leaders have said that if the nuclear weapons states insist on maintaining nuclear arsenals, India will do so as well. As we know, India gave the world a wake-up call in May when it tested nuclear weapons, followed a few weeks later by Pakistan's tests. In light of the testing by India and Pakistan, I would like to offer five propositions. My first proposition is that the nuclear testing by India and Pakistan does not constitute nuclear proliferation. Both states have long had nuclear weapons. India first tested a nuclear device, which it said was for peaceful purposes, in 1974. The world largely ignored the possession of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan by referring to them, along with Israel which also has a nuclear arsenal, as "threshold states." This was simply a euphemism to perpetuate the denial that nuclear proliferation had already occurred. It is interesting to note the reactions to the recent nuclear testing in South Asia. President Clinton responded to the Indian tests by stating, "To think that you have to manifest your greatness by behavior that recalls the very worst events of the 20th century on the edge of the 21st century, when everybody else is trying to leave the nuclear age behind, is just wrong. And they clearly don't need it to maintain their security." There are several points worth noting in President Clinton's response. Haven't the United States and the other nuclear weapons states sought to manifest their greatness in just this way? Isn't this the basis for UK's or France's claim to great power status, whatever that is, at this point in time? Where is the evidence that "everybody else is trying to leave the nuclear age behind"? Certainly it is almost impossible to find that evidence in President Clinton's own record. And if India does not need nuclear weapons to maintain its security, wouldn't that argument be even stronger for the United States and other countries infinitely more militarily powerful than India? Referring to this reaction by President Clinton, Henry Kissinger, who many would argue should rank among the greatest war criminals of the latter part of the 20th century, stated, "But he [Clinton] destroys the U.S. case by using hyperbole that cannot be translated into operational policy: by claiming a special insight into the nature of greatness in the 21st century; by the dubious proposition that all other nations are trying to leave the nuclear world behind (what about Iran, Iraq and North Korea?), and by the completely unsupported proposition that countries with threatening nuclear neighbors do not need nuclear weapons to assure their security." ? Mr. Kissinger has perhaps always felt that only he has "special insight into the nature of greatness." Unfortunately for humanity, the United States has allowed him an operational platform on which to act upon his insights in Chile, Iran, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and elsewhere. Clearly all other states are not trying to leave the nuclear world behind, but why does he pick out only Iran, Iraq, and North Korea? What about the nuclear weapons states themselves? And their NATO allies that join in a common nuclear strategy? What about Japan accumulating tons of reprocessed plutonium suitable for making nuclear weapons? What about Israel? Kissinger's final point about countries with threatening nuclear neighbors needing nuclear weapons to assure their security is a clear recipe for proliferation as well as disaster. Would he advise the countries of the Middle East to develop nuclear arsenals in response to Israel having done so? Perhaps Mr. Kissinger has calculated that the nuclear weapons of the United States and its allies are not threatening. Other states, with other experiences, may view U.S. nuclear weapons and those of its allies somewhat less benignly. My second proposition is that proliferation of nuclear weapons is virtually assured given the continuation of present policies by the nuclear weapons states. So long as the nuclear weapons states maintain that nuclear weapons are necessary for their security, we can expect that other countries will desire to have these weapons. Statements condemning proliferation by leaders of nuclear weapons states, like Mr. Clinton's response to India's testing, will not be taken seriously so long as the U.S. continues its current policy of maintaining its nuclear arsenal for the indefinite future. There is only one way to prevent nuclear proliferation. That is for the nuclear weapons states to make an unequivocal commitment to the elimination of their nuclear arsenals and to take steps, such as de-alerting their arsenals, separating warheads from delivery vehicles, and so on, to show that they are serious about their commitment. Short of moving rapidly in this direction and bringing all nuclear warheads and nuclear weapons materials under strict international controls, nuclear proliferation is assured. My third proposition is that nuclear weapons do not provide security. If you possess nuclear weapons, you will be the target of a threatened nuclear weapons attack. I wonder if the citizens of nuclear weapons states really understand the jeopardy in which they are placed by their governments' policies. Of course, there is also the risk to the security of the world. By the obscenely large arsenals created and maintained by the U.S. and Russia, the entire world is jeopardized -- the future of humanity, the future of most forms of life. It always amazes me that many people calling themselves environmentalists don't seem to understand that nuclear weapons pose a manmade environmental threat that exceeds all bounds of reason. Deterrence is simply a theory. It is not a shield. One cannot prove that a nuclear war has not occurred because of deterrence. There is no clear cause and effect linkage. In fact, it is not possible to prove a negative -- that because of one thing, something else does not happen. We may be just plain lucky that a nuclear war has not occurred since two or more countries have been in possession of nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan, countries that have warred three times in the past 40 years, will certainly put additional strain on the theory of deterrence.

Regional instability destroys involved countries’ economic performance

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We show that regional instability, defined as political instability in neighboring countries, has a strong negative effect on a country's economic performance. The magnitude of this negative externality is similar in size to that of an equivalent increase in domestic political instability. We also identify two main channels through which regional instability lowers economic performance. First, regional instability disrupts trade flows. The shares of merchandise and manufactured trade are lower in countries with high regional instability. Second, regional instability leads to increased military outlays. Defense expenditures are higher in countries with high regional instability. In contrast, the share of government expenditures allocated to education is lower in countries with politically unstable neighbors. Our results suggest the existence of negative spillovers among politically unstable neighboring countries. These adverse regional influences should be taken into account when projecting the future economic performance of countries. The evidence presented also suggests that the gains from reducing regional instability extend far beyond the welfare of the country experiencing political unrest. Policies directed at settling current territorial disputes in a peaceful and orderly manner can have large beneficial effects for parties not directly involved in the conflict.

Only decreasing regional instability can peacefully resolve economic and territorial conflicts

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This article shows that political instability in neighboring countries has a strong adverse effect on economic performance. We also find that this effect is quantitatively important. The impact on steady-state income is roughly equal to that of an equivalent increase in the index of domestic instability. Our regional instability index indicates that an increase of 1 in the average annual number of revolutions and coups in neighboring countries per decade reduces steady-state per capita income by about 17.6 percent. The empirical results are quite robust to various different measures of regional instability. We also find that there are two main channels through which regional instability affects economic performance. First, regional instability disrupts trade flows. We show that the shares of merchandise and manufactures trade in countries with high regional instability are lower. Second, regional instability forces increases in military outlays, even after controlling for the defense expenditures of neighboring countries. To the extent that these increased military outlays crowd out resources from other more productive forms of government expenditure, they will have a negative effect on economic performance. Our results provide evidence in favor of negative spillovers among politically unstable neighboring countries. These adverse regional influences must be taken into account when projecting the future economic performance of countries. The evidence presented suggests that the gains from reducing regional instability extend beyond the welfare of the country experiencing political unrest. In addition, policies directed at settling current territorial disputes in a peaceful and orderly manner could have large beneficial effects for parties not directly involved in the conflict

Impact- Prolif causes conflict escalation and nuclear war – deterrence doesn’t check

Muller 2008 (Harald Muller, Executive Director, Head of Research Department (RD) Peace Research Institute of Frankfurt, “The Future of Nuclear Weapons in an Interdependent World” The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2008, http://www.twq.com/08spring/docs/08spring\_muller.pdf EL)

A world populated by many nuclear-weapon states poses grave dangers. Regional conflicts could escalate to the nuclearlevel. The optimistic expectation of a universal law according to which nuclear deterrence prevents all wars rests on scant historical evidence and is dangerously naive. Nuclear uses in one part of the world could trigger “catalytic war” between greater powers, drawing them into smaller regional conflicts, particularly if tensions are high. This was always a fear during the Cold War, and it motivated nonproliferation policy in the first place. Moreover, **the more states that possess nuclear weapons** and related facilities, **the more points of access are available to terrorists.**

## Terrorism

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**Proliferation makes nuclear terrorism is inevitable**

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**Six nuclear warheads went missing from an air force base in the summer of 2007. For thirty-six hours**, military officials could not account for the whereabouts of the deadly weapons. For fifteen hours, the warheads were guarded by nothing more than a chain-link fence and roving patrols. After a day and a half the weapons were finally located, but not before the world was reminded that the security of nuclear weapons can too easily fall victim to human error. One might expect such an occurrence in anew nuclear weapons state, where military officials and technicians have less experience with safeguarding a nuclear arsenal. But the “Bent Spear” incident took place in the nation with the world’s most sophisticated military: the United States. Nuclear Weapons: The Problem, Not the Solution. **If nuclear weapons can go missing here in the U.S., they can go missing anywhere. In a world of terrorists determined to obtain a nuclear bomb, and a black market with state and non-state actors keen on profiting from the sale of necessary technology, the deterrence paradigm** that reigned during the Cold War **no longer works**. In a new era, we need new thinking grounded in a simple notion: nuclear weapons are not the solution to our security, they are the problem. Nuclear weapons now create more danger than security for two main reasons: nuclear terrorism and nuclear accidents. **Terrorist organizations are actively seeking nuclear weapons, while black market syndicates and rogue state suppliers are seeking to provide the necessary technology.** Nuclear accidents continue to pose a threat as they did during the Cold War, but the possibility that **accidents** – such as misplacing nuclear warheads – **could put nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists raises the stakes even higher**. To gain a full understanding of the problems posed by nuclear terrorism and nuclear accidents, one must examine each threat in turn. Why are Nuclear Weapons the Problem? Terrorist Intentions and Rogue Suppliers The possibility of terrorists attaining a nuclear weapon poses the single-greatest threat to U.S. national security, and terrorist groups are actively seeking these weapons. Osama bin Laden himself laid down the gauntlet on nuclear weapons: “To possess the weapons that could counter those of the infidels is a religious duty.” During the last two decades there have been at least 25 instances of nuclear explosive materials being lost or stolen, while several nuclear and near nuclear states maintain shadowy connections with terrorist groups. Iran is regarded by U.S. officials as the world’s single greatest state sponsor of terrorism, and is currently seeking nuclear technology that is probably intended for weaponization. North Korea already has nuclear weapons technology, is hard up for cash, and is suspected of providing arms to Hezbollah and the Tamil Tigers. It has supplied Libya with missile technology, and U.S. officials suspect it helped Syria construct a nuclear reactor which Israel destroyed last year. Pakistan is arguably the world’s most dangerous nuclear weapons state. Members of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence service (ISI) have provided support to the Taliban, al Qaeda, and terrorist organizations that have staged attacks in India. The father of Pakistan’s nuclear program, AQ Khan, headed a secret network that sold nuclear technology to Libya, Iran, and North Korea. Reports from U.S. officials and think tanks suggest that remnants of the Khan network are still active. Whether the network transferred nuclear technology to al Qaeda remains unknown. This adds up to a frightening reality: terrorists have more opportunities to acquire nuclear weapons than ever before. This makes the mere existence of nuclear weapons in any state a greater threat to U.S. security than at any time since the nuclear age began. In addition to these rogue states, accidents and misplaced weapons in friendly states can enable terrorists to gain weapons.

**Nuclear terrorism causes extinction – there are no diplomatic checks on terrorist organizations**

**Sid-Ahmed 4** (Mohamed Sid-Ahmed; former member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Egypt, leading member of the National Progressive Unionist Party, and leading journalist for Al-Ahmar; Accessed June 25, 2012; http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm; Written August 26, 2004; “Extinction!”)

The advent of the nuclear age, which began when America dropped two atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagazaki just before the end of World War II, introduced an altogether new dimension to the arms race worldwide. In fact, it changed the very notion of warfare as the realisation set in that humankind now had the means to turn the planet into a wasteland incapable of sustaining life. For the first time in its long history, the human race was at risk of extinction not through an act of nature but by its own hand. At the same time, however, the emergence of a new world order in the aftermath of the war served to prevent the risk from materialising even as it lent impetus to a deadly arms-race of the summit of the global community. The post-war world had become sharply polarised along ideological lines between a capitalist pole led by the United States and a communist pole led by the Soviet Union. As each sought to assert its supremacy over the other, the world was held hostage by an arms race between two camps capable of exterminating the inhabitants of the planet not once but several times over. Although one of the two poles developed a greater overkill capability than the other, this hardly mattered. After all, you can only die once. Thus despite this discrepancy the two poles enjoyed a kind of parity which prevented the Cold War between them from hotting up into an armed conflict. Mutual deterrence or, more precisely, mutual neutralisation, proved to be the most effective way of preventing the outbreak of what would have been the third, and probably final, world war. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the bipolar world order that had prevailed since the end of World War II came to an end. America, with its military and economic pre-eminence over all other nations combined, was now the sole remaining superpower, without any constraints on its freedom of manouevre. This created an imbalance in the world system and tempted the US administration to pursue its own agenda without regard to considerations of international law, state sovereignty or international public opinion. To give its exercise of brute force a semblance of legality, it came up with its doctrine of pre-emptive wars, like the one it launched against Iraq. It is becoming increasingly clear that the onset of a unipolar world system has made the world more dangerous place, not the opposite. The most critical moment was the one when the Soviet Union collapsed and fragmented into a number of independent republics. The lack of a central authority in a vast nation with massive arsenals of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction raised the nightmare prospect of those weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible parties who would not hesitate to use them. Despite the acute contradiction on which it was based, the bipolar world order was an international system in which nations could be in a state of conflict but where they were also members of the United Nations, related to each other via agreements, accords, treaties, etc.. that is, through a system of mutual obligations, which restricted, to one extent or another, their freedom of action. The disappearance of the Soviet Union left the field clear not only to the United States at the summit of the global community but to the forces of international terrorism at its base. These forces are waging a war on the international system unbound by any constraints. It is a war waged by "irresponsible" groups who do not expose themselves to the accountability of the world system, nor to transparency in any form. That is why terrorism is so difficult to cast light on and can represent a greater danger than wars waged by regular armies. During the Cold War, the overkill capabilities developed by the superpowers allowed them to use deterrence as a device to prevent nuclear conflagration; there was a tacit agreement between them that while they could, and did, engage in brinkmanship by threatening to use their weapons of mass destruction, they would desist from actually doing so. In the absence of any kind of parity between the protagonists in today`s shadowy war on terror, mutual deterrence has been replaced by a process of pre-emption that incites the enemy to take anticipatory measures. The devastating attack of 11 September 2001, which claimed nearly 3,000 victims, is a case in point. What provoked the attack? Why that particular type of anticipatory blow? Is there an explanation for the sequence of events that began with raids against two US embassies in Africa, followed by the attack on an American destroyer close to Aden and climaxed with 9/11? It was a practice run for an even more devastating attack involving nuclear weapons. But if Osama Bin Laden was in possession of nuclear weapons at the time, why did he choose to go for an intricate plan entailing the hijacking of four passenger planes, tight synchronisation and split-second timing? Surely triggering a nuclear device would have been easier. Settling for the low-tech alternative of turning planes into missiles indicates that Bin Laden was not then in possession of nuclear weapons. Actually, the idea of linking terrorism to prohibited weapons of mass destruction came from Bush, not from the terrorists themselves, and was aimed at establishing some sort of link between Iraq and terrorism to legitimise his war against Saddam Hussein. We have reached a point in human history where the phenomenon of terrorism has to be completely uprooted, not through persecution and oppression, but by removing the reasons that make particular sections of the world population resort to terrorism. This means that fundamental changes must be brought to the world system itself. The phenomenon of terrorism is even more dangerous than is generally believed. We are in for surprises no less serious than 9/11 and with far more devastating consequences. A nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nagazaki, even if -- and this is far from certain -- the weapons used are less harmful than those used then, Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear technology, had no choice but to capitulate. Today, the technology is a secret for nobody. So far, except for the two bombs dropped on Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten. Now we are at a stage where they can be detonated. This completely changes the rules of the game. We have reached a point where anticipatory measures can determine the course of events. Allegations of a terrorist connection can be used to justify anticipatory measures, including the invasion of a sovereign state like Iraq. As it turned out, these allegations, as well as the allegation that Saddam was harbouring WMD, proved to be unfounded. What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

## ---2nc XT/Link Wall

**Proliferation makes nuclear terrorism inevitable**

**IAEA, ’04** [http://www.iaea.org/ NewsCenter/Statements/2004/ ebsp2004n013.html]

Today, our focus is on nuclear proliferation and the potential threat of nuclear terrorism in Asia and the Pacific — and I am pleased at the opportunity to share with you my perspectives on the challenges we face, and how the IAEA is working to strengthen nuclear security and the nuclear non-proliferation regime. But I would emphasize at the outset that, while much of our work must begin locally and regionally, we must not forget to think globally, because ultimately the existence of a nuclear threat anywhere is a threat everywhere, and as a global community, we will win or lose this battle together. The threat of nuclear terrorism is real and current. Some experts share the view of the Director General of the United Kingdom Security Service, who said in August 2003: "It will only be a matter of time before a crude version of a [chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear] attack is launched at a major Western city." To date, the IAEA’s own database on illicit trafficking has recorded, since 1993, approximately 630 confirmed incidents of trafficking in nuclear or other radioactive material. Sixty incidents were reported in 2003, and it is clear that the total for this year will be even higher.

**Nuclear weapons states risk acting as nuclear terrorists – only by preventing prolif can we solve.**

**Krieger 97** - Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and Councilor – World Future Council (David Dangers of Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/1997/07/00\_krieger\_dangers.htm)//AA

The greatest nuclear danger that I am concerned with is not the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other states, though that is a grave danger. Of even greater concern is the invidious belief of policy makers in a small number of states that they have a right to maintain nuclear weapons indefinitely, and that in their hands nuclear weapons do not constitute a threat either to their own citizens or to the remainder of humanity. This is a foolish belief that discounts the principle that if something can go wrong it will go wrong. It is also a belief that is likely to encourage proliferation to other states and possibly to terrorist groups as well. There is no reason to be assured that nuclear weapons in the hands of the current nuclear weapons states will not result in tragedy surpassing all imagination. One can only wonder what it is that makes most citizens of nuclear weapons states so complacent under these circumstances. Clearly, for the most part, otherwise normal people have learned to live with the terror of nuclear weapons and, in doing so, have become accustomed to condoning terrorism at a national level. It is this situation that compounds the danger because without the vigorous protests of citizens in the nuclear weapons states, there is no impetus to change the status quo. And if the status quo with regard to reliance on nuclear weapons does not change, there will surely be proliferation and it will be only a question of time until nuclear weapons are again used in warfare. Due to the intransigence of the nuclear weapons states, there has been virtually no progress toward nuclear disarmament in the past five years. The START II Treaty, which was agreed to by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in January 1993, called for reductions in deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,500 on each side by January 1, 2003. Since then, Presidents .Clinton and Yeltsin have agreed to move this date back five years to December 31, 2007. The total number of nuclear warheads in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia at the completion of START II, if it is completed, will be around 10,000 on each side. ? For decades India has made it clear that it supports complete nuclear disarmament, but that it is not willing to live in a world of "nuclear apartheid." Indian leaders have stated that if all states will renounce nuclear weapons and agree to go to zero, India will happily join them. On the other hand, Indian leaders have said that if the nuclear weapons states insist on maintaining nuclear arsenals, India will do so as well. As we know, India gave the world a wake-up call in May when it tested nuclear weapons, followed a few weeks later by Pakistan's tests. In light of the testing by India and Pakistan, I would like to offer five propositions. My first proposition is that the nuclear testing by India and Pakistan does not constitute nuclear proliferation. Both states have long had nuclear weapons. India first tested a nuclear device, which it said was for peaceful purposes, in 1974. The world largely ignored the possession of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan by referring to them, along with Israel which also has a nuclear arsenal, as "threshold states." This was simply a euphemism to perpetuate the denial that nuclear proliferation had already occurred. It is interesting to note the reactions to the recent nuclear testing in South Asia. President Clinton responded to the Indian tests by stating, "To think that you have to manifest your greatness by behavior that recalls the very worst events of the 20th century on the edge of the 21st century, when everybody else is trying to leave the nuclear age behind, is just wrong. And they clearly don't need it to maintain their security." There are several points worth noting in President Clinton's response. Haven't the United States and the other nuclear weapons states sought to manifest their greatness in just this way? Isn't this the basis for UK's or France's claim to great power status, whatever that is, at this point in time? Where is the evidence that "everybody else is trying to leave the nuclear age behind"? Certainly it is almost impossible to find that evidence in President Clinton's own record. And if India does not need nuclear weapons to maintain its security, wouldn't that argument be even stronger for the United States and other countries infinitely more militarily powerful than India? Referring to this reaction by President Clinton, Henry Kissinger, who many would argue should rank among the greatest war criminals of the latter part of the 20th century, stated, "But he [Clinton] destroys the U.S. case by using hyperbole that cannot be translated into operational policy: by claiming a special insight into the nature of greatness in the 21st century; by the dubious proposition that all other nations are trying to leave the nuclear world behind (what about Iran, Iraq and North Korea?), and by the completely unsupported proposition that countries with threatening nuclear neighbors do not need nuclear weapons to assure their security." ? Mr. Kissinger has perhaps always felt that only he has "special insight into the nature of greatness." Unfortunately for humanity, the United States has allowed him an operational platform on which to act upon his insights in Chile, Iran, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and elsewhere. Clearly all other states are not trying to leave the nuclear world behind, but why does he pick out only Iran, Iraq, and North Korea? What about the nuclear weapons states themselves? And their NATO allies that join in a common nuclear strategy? What about Japan accumulating tons of reprocessed plutonium suitable for making nuclear weapons? What about Israel? Kissinger's final point about countries with threatening nuclear neighbors needing nuclear weapons to assure their security is a clear recipe for proliferation as well as disaster. Would he advise the countries of the Middle East to develop nuclear arsenals in response to Israel having done so? Perhaps Mr. Kissinger has calculated that the nuclear weapons of the United States and its allies are not threatening. Other states, with other experiences, may view U.S. nuclear weapons and those of its allies somewhat less benignly. My second proposition is that proliferation of nuclear weapons is virtually assured given the continuation of present policies by the nuclear weapons states. So long as the nuclear weapons states maintain that nuclear weapons are necessary for their security, we can expect that other countries will desire to have these weapons. Statements condemning proliferation by leaders of nuclear weapons states, like Mr. Clinton's response to India's testing, will not be taken seriously so long as the U.S. continues its current policy of maintaining its nuclear arsenal for the indefinite future. There is only one way to prevent nuclear proliferation. That is for the nuclear weapons states to make an unequivocal commitment to the elimination of their nuclear arsenals and to take steps, such as de-alerting their arsenals, separating warheads from delivery vehicles, and so on, to show that they are serious about their commitment. Short of moving rapidly in this direction and bringing all nuclear warheads and nuclear weapons materials under strict international controls, nuclear proliferation is assured. My third proposition is that nuclear weapons do not provide security. If you possess nuclear weapons, you will be the target of a threatened nuclear weapons attack. I wonder if the citizens of nuclear weapons states really understand the jeopardy in which they are placed by their governments' policies. Of course, there is also the risk to the security of the world. By the obscenely large arsenals created and maintained by the U.S. and Russia, the entire world is jeopardized -- the future of humanity, the future of most forms of life. It always amazes me that many people calling themselves environmentalists don't seem to understand that nuclear weapons pose a manmade environmental threat that exceeds all bounds of reason. Deterrence is simply a theory. It is not a shield. One cannot prove that a nuclear war has not occurred because of deterrence. There is no clear cause and effect linkage. In fact, it is not possible to prove a negative -- that because of one thing, something else does not happen. We may be just plain lucky that a nuclear war has not occurred since two or more countries have been in possession of nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan, countries that have warred three times in the past 40 years, will certainly put additional strain on the theory of deterrence. My fourth proposition is that arms control agreements have served largely as a "figleaf" of respectability for maintaining the two-tier structure of nuclear "haves" and "have-nots." The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty actually enshrines the proposition that there are two classes of states -- those that possessed nuclear weapons before January 1, 1967 as one class, and everyone else as the other class. The only way around this situation is for the nuclear weapons states to pursue good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament as set forth in the treaty. Unfortunately, the nuclear weapons states have not done this despite the strong reinforcement of this treaty provision by the World Court in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the general illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty may also be viewed as a treaty that supports the favored position of the nuclear weapons states. After conducting over 2,000 nuclear tests, the nuclear weapons states agreed to stop testing. However, they have interpreted this prohibition as not applying to so-called "sub-critical" tests that use conventional explosives around a nuclear core but do not result in a sustained nuclear chain reaction. The U.S. has already conducted three sub-critical tests, and Russia has announced that it also has plans to conduct such tests this year. My fifth and final proposition is that terrorism has become an accepted and integrated part of the national security policies of the nuclear weapons states. Terrorism is the threat to injure or kill innocent people unless the terrorist's demands are met. Nuclear weapons threaten to injure or kill innocent people. That is what they are designed to do. That is what they did at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That is what the nuclear weapons states threaten to do with them as a matter of policy. The nuclear weapons states, no matter how they argue their intentions, have become terrorist states. They have made their citizens either willing or unwilling accomplices in acts of terrorism. In time, if nothing is done to alter the present situation in the world, other states or criminal groups will obtain nuclear weapons and they too will act as terrorists. The current situation is fraught with danger. There seems to be a loss of moral bearing in the world. What is most tragic is that an opportunity to abolish nuclear weapons is being squandered in the nuclear weapons states by leaders with a lack of vision and citizens caught in an amoral drift of complacency. In order to change the world before it is too late, these citizens must awaken to their responsibilities as members of the human species and demand change from their governments. Otherwise significant progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons is unlikely to occur, and the result will be increased nuclear proliferation and terrorism and, as a certainty, disastrous consequences.

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Prolif escalates the risk for nuclear terror and irrational retaliation – Middle East proves

Taylor no date - chairman, NOVA, Damascus, nuclear weapons designer, PhD (Theodore B. Taylor, “Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” [http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/pdfs/taylor.pdf)//FK](http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/pdfs/taylor.pdf%29/FK)

Nuclear proliferation - be it among nations or terrorists - greatly increases the chance of nuclear violence on a scale that would be intolerable. Proliferation increases the chance that nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of irrational people, either suicidal or with no concern for the fate of the world. Irrational or outright psychotic leaders of military factions or terrorist groups might decide to use a few nuclear weapons under their control to stimulate a global nuclear war, as an act of vengeance against humanity as a whole. Countless scenarios of this type can be constructed. “… a nation in an advanced stage of ‘latent proliferation,’ finding itself losing a nonnuclear war, might complete the transition to deliverable nuclear weapons and, in desperation, use them.” Limited nuclear wars between countries with small numbers of nuclear weapons could escalate into major nuclear wars between superpowers. For example, a nation in an advanced stage of “latent proliferation,” finding itself losing a nonnuclear war, might complete the transition to deliverable nuclear weapons and, in desperation, use them. If that should happen in a region, such as the Middle East, where major superpower interests are at stake, the small nuclear war could easily escalate into a global nuclear war. A sudden rush of nuclear proliferation among nations may be triggered by small nuclear wars that are won by a country with more effective nuclear forces than its adversary, or by success of nuclear terrorists in forcing adherence to their demands. Proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations could spread at an awesome rate in such circumstances, since “latent proliferation” is far along in at least several dozen nations, and is increasing rapidly as more nuclear power plants and supporting facilities are built in more countries. In summary, much more serious international attention than is now evident needs to be given to the consequences of nuclear proliferation among nations, terrorists, or criminals. Continuing to neglect this menace is a recipe for disaster.

**Nuclear terror is the biggest threat to the US**

**Allison and Myers 4** – (Graham and Joanne J., “Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe” Carnegie Council. 16 November 2004, http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/transcripts/5049.html/\_res/id=sa\_File1/Nuclear\_Terrorism.)//FK

GRAHAM ALLISON: Thank you very much, Joanne, for that very generous introduction. Not all those things are true, but in any case they sounded very nice and I appreciate the generosity. It is now just six weeks since the first presidential debate, though it's hard to believe. But if you remember, in that first debate, Jim Lehrer, the moderator, asked the two candidates, "What is the single most serious threat to the national security of the United States?" The two parties agreed in answering nuclear terrorism. Here is what President Bush said, after Senator Kerry had gone first: "I agree with my opponent that the biggest threat facing this country is weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terrorist," and then he went on to talk about nuclear weapons. This moment of agreement was so surprising to Lehrer that he went back at it again and said, "Wait a minute, excuse me. Do you two agree about something?" And the answer was "Yes," which led a wag at the Philadelphia Inquirer to write the following: "The two most disagreeable men in America, at least with each other, agreed on something terribly important when they met in their first debate. John Kerry and President Bush both asserted that the single greatest danger facing the United States is nuclear terrorism. Their synchronized skating on this issue excited even the unexcitable moderator, Jim Lehrer, so much that he even paused to confirm it." In the final month of the presidential campaign which just concluded, Vice President Cheney picked up this theme as part of his stump speech. In various cities, including the small city of Carroll, Ohio, to take an example, he proposed to the citizens gathered there that, as he said, "This is the ultimate threat. The biggest threat we face now as a nation is the possibility of terrorists ending up in the middle of one of our cities with nuclear weapons that could threaten the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans." And he went on to say, "For us to have a strategy that's capable of defeating that threat you've got to get your mind around that concept."

## **---A2: Detterence**

Deterrence fails – terrorists are ideologically driven

Cirincione 11 – president of the Ploughshares Fund, a public grant-making foundation focused on nuclear weapons policy and conflict resolution. (Joseph Cirincione, “A Global Assessment of Nuclear Proliferation Threats” WMDC, 2011, <http://www.blixassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/No10.pdf>)//FK

While states can be deterred from using nuclear weapons by fear of retaliation, terrorists who have neither land, people nor national futures to protect, may not be deterrable. Terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons poses the greatest single threat to the United States. The nexus of greatest danger comes at the intersection of terrorists and state stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissile materials. It remains very difficult for a terrorist group to produce nuclear weapon material on its own. Therefore, the security and elimination of state stockpiles of weapons and weapon-usable materials must become the primary objective. 3 So-called outlaw states represent only one potential source of these weapons. An excessive focus on these states can divert attention from threats that are seemingly less frightening but, in fact, are more immediate. The most likely targets for terrorists include storage areas in the former states of the Soviet Union and Pakistan, and weapon-usable fissile material kept at dozens of civilian sites around the world. The former Soviet states possess thousands of nuclear weapons and hundreds of tons of loose nuclear material that remain inadequately secured. International programs to eliminate and secure these stockpiles have had great success but bureaucratic obstacles and inadequate funding impair them. Pakistan already has provided highly sensitive equipment and know-how to North Korea, Iran, and Libya. Pakistan also has terrorist organizations and radical fundamentalist groups operating within its borders. National instability or a radical change in government could lead to the collapse of state control over weapons and nuclear materials and to the migration of nuclear scientists to other nations or to the service of other groups. Until proven otherwise, Pakistan must be seen as a proliferation threat. A similar risk of collapse is true for North Korea. There are no mechanisms in place to locate, let alone secure, North Korea’s nuclear materials, facilities and scientists in the event of a government collapse. There is also a substantial risk of terrorist theft or diversion to other countries from the nuclear stockpiles in more than forty countries around the world. Many of these caches of materials consist of HEU that could be used in nuclear weapons or further enriched to 3 Former senator Sam Nunn notes that “acquiring weapons and materials is the hardest step for the terrorists to take and the easiest for us to stop.” Sam Nunn, “Address to Carnegie International NonProliferation Conference,” Remarks in Washington, D.C., November 14, 2002, available at www.ceip.org/.les/projects/npp/pdf/conference/speeches/nunntranscript.pdf (accessed April 27, 2004)4 weapons grade. There are also significant stockpiles of plutonium that could also be used in a weapon, though with more difficulty.

## \*\*\*Iran Specific\*\*\*

## Hegemony

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**Iranian prolif cripples US power projection in the Middle East.**

**Logan 09** – Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (Justin, “Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran: A Skeptic’s View”, October 2009; < http://www.cato.org/pubs/npu/npu\_october2009.pdf>)//AB

The main source of the disconnect between foreign capitals and Washington is not an American fear that Tehran may one day engage in a suicidal nuclear strike against Israel or another country. Rather, **many U.S. strategists fear that Iran’s possession of a nuclear capability would limit American military options in the Middle East**. In particular they fear that a nuclear Iran would be capable of deterring military action by the United States. As the political scientist Kenneth Waltz wrote in 1995, “a big reason for America’s resistance to the spread of nuclear weapons is that if weak countries have some they will cramp our style.” Since America’s “style” in the Middle East has differed radically from that of our allies, increased Iranian deterrent capabilities carry greater implications for Washington. If the United States were to rein in its grand strategy, however, it could bring its concerns about proliferation more neatly into line with its allies, enhancing the prospects for progress—and burden sharing—within multilateral efforts. The prevailing idea that nuclear proliferation holds more danger—and as a result is worth more to prevent—for the United States than for its allies speaks volumes about the grandiosity of post-Cold War U.S. grand strategy.

**Threats are real and inevitable—heg is key to solve multiple scenarios for war**

**Thayer 6** - Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Study @ Missouri State University, Former Research Fellow @ International Security Program @ Harvard Belfer Center of Science and International Affairs (Bradley, “In Defense of Primacy,” The National Interest, November/December)

A grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the United States stays the world's number one power‑the diplomatic, economic and military leader. Those arguing against primacy claim that the United States should retrench, ei­ther because the United States lacks the power to maintain its primacy and should withdraw from its global commitments, or because the maintenance of primacy will lead the United States into the trap of "imperial overstretch." In the previous issue of The National Interest, Christopher Layne warned of these dangers of pri­macy and called for retrenchment.1 Those arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment are a diverse lot. They include isolationists, who want no foreign military commitments; selective engagers, who want U.S. military commitments to centers of economic might; and offshore balancers, who want a modified form of selective engagement that would have the United States abandon its landpower presence abroad in favor of relying on airpower and seapower to defend its in­terests. But retrenchment, in any of its guis­es, must be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it would be a profound strategic mistake that would lead to far greater instability and war in the world, imperil American security and deny the United States and its allies the benefits of primacy. There are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state? Should it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power capa­bilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has overwhelming military capa­bilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment acknowledge this. So the debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining American pri­macy. Proponents of retrenchment focus a great deal on the costs of U.S. action­ but they fall to realize what is good about American primacy. The price and risks of primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not. A GRAND strategy of ensur­ing American primacy takes as its starting point the protec­tion of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor. In contrast, a strategy based on re­trenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no mat­ter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington can­not call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terror­ists, rogue states or rising powers, his­tory shows that threats must be confront­ed. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvinc­ing half‑pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weak­ness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of interna­tional politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats. And when enemies must be confront­ed, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from .American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a phys­ical, on‑the‑ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing. Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S. primacy is secured because America, at present, commands the "global com­mon"‑‑the oceans, the world's airspace and outer space‑allowing the United States to project its power far from its borders, while denying those common avenues to its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the robustness of the United States' conventional and strategic deterrent ca­pabilities is increased.' This is not an advantage that should be relinquished lightly. A remarkable fact about international politics today‑-in a world where Ameri­can primacy is clearly and unambiguous­ly on display--is that countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes, ­their own protection, or to gain greater influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America‑-their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements‑and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this coun­try, or any country, had so many allies. U.S. primacy‑-and the bandwagon­ing effect‑has also given us extensive in­fluence in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to cre­ate coalitions of like‑minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Pro­liferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the where it can be stymied by opponents. American‑led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effec­tiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. You can count with one hand coun­tries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezeula. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and ac­tions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, re­sort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communica­tion and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates. The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases‑‑Venezuela, Iran, Cuba‑it is an anti‑U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrin­sically anti‑American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations. THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power‑‑Rome, Britain or the United States today. Schol­ars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we con­sider the current international order ‑ free trade, a robust monetary regime, increas­ing respect for human rights, growing de­mocratization‑‑is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages fol­lowed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. With­out U.S. power, the liberal order cre­ated by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Rai Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washing­ton and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated rela­tionships aligned‑-between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread de­mocracy and other elements of its ideol­ogy of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing inter­ests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. lead­ership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Admin­istration for attempting to spread democ­racy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's crit­ics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or sta­bilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Per­haps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Af­ghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threat­ened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Wash­ington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western‑style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Ku­wait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the glob­al economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network character­ized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mo­bility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a glob­al public good from which all states ben­efit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well‑being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin‑offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his ca­reer confident in the socialist ideology of post‑independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recog­nizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globaliza­tion, which are facilitated through Amer­ican primacy.4 As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides.

## Hormuz

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**Iran will close Hormuz – disregard economics.**

**Kahl 12** – Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Senior Fellow at Center for a New American Security; former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East (Colin H., “Not Time to Attack Iran”, March/April 2012; < http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137031/colin-h-kahl/not-time-to-attack-iran>)//AB

Some analysts, including Afshin Molavi and Michael Singh, believe that the Iranians are unlikely to attempt to close the strait due to the damage it would inflict on their own economy. But Tehran's saber rattling has already intensified in response to the prospect of Western sanctions on its oil industry. In the immediate aftermath of a U.S. strike on Iran's nuclear program, **Iranian leaders might perceive that holding the strait** at risk would **encourage international pressure on Washington to end the fighting, possibly deterring U.S. escalation.** In reality, it would more likely have the opposite effect, **encouraging aggressive U.S. efforts** to protect commercial shipping. The U.S. Navy is capable of keeping the strait open, but the mere threat of closure could send **oil prices soaring, dealing a heavy blow to the fragile global economy.** The measures that Kroenig advocates to mitigate this threat, such as opening up the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve and urging Saudi Arabia to boost oil production, would be unlikely to suffice, especially since most Saudi crude passes through the strait.

**The Strait of Hormuz is a vital trade route – the Navy won’t tolerate any disruptions**

**Starr and Ghast, 11** – CNN Reporters (Barbara and Phil, “U.S. Navy Won't Tolerate 'Disruption' Through Strait of Hormuz”, CNN, 12/28, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-12-28/middleeast/world\_meast\_iran-us-hormuz\_1\_strait-iran-hormuz?\_s=PM:MIDDLEEAST)

The U.S. Navy said Iran's threat to block the strategically and economically important Strait of Hormuz is unacceptable. "**The free flow of goods and services through the Strait of Hormuz is vital to regional and global prosperity**," Navy 5th Fleet in Bahrain spokeswoman Cmdr. Amy Derrick Frost told reporters on Wednesday. "Anyone who threatens to disrupt freedom of navigation in an international strait is clearly outside the community of nations; **any disruption will not be tolerated**." The 34-mile-wide shipping channel leads in and out of the Persian Gulf between Iran and Oman. It is strategically important because tankers carrying oil travel through it. Iran's vice president has warned that the country could block the strait if sanctions are imposed on its exports of crude oil. France, Britain and Germany have proposed sanctions to punish Iran's lack of cooperation on its nuclear program. Physically closing the strait would require means that likely are not available to Iran, said Professor Jean-Paul Rodrigue of Hofstra University. "At best, Iran can posture and potentially disrupt traffic for a short duration," said Rodrigue, who specializes in global trade and maritime transportation issues. The 5th Fleet is based in Bahrain, and Frost noted that the Navy "maintains a robust presence in the region to deter or counter destabilizing activities." "We conduct maritime security operations under international maritime conventions to ensure security and safety in international waters for all commercial shipping to operate freely while transiting the region," she said. Asked whether the fleet would be able to keep the strait open if Iran moved to close it, she said, "The U.S. Navy is a flexible, multi-capable force committed to regional security and stability, always ready to counter malevolent actions to ensure freedom of navigation." Frost was also asked whether keeping the strait open is part of the fleet's mandate. She said it is "committed to protecting maritime freedoms that are the basis for global prosperity. This is one of the main reasons our military forces operate in the region. "The U.S. Navy, along with our coalition and regional partners, operates under international maritime conventions to maintain a constant state of high vigilance in order to ensure the continued, safe flow of maritime traffic in waterways critical to global commerce." The French Foreign Ministry stressed that the waterway is an international strait.

**That causes conflict over the Strait of Hormuz**

**Trombly, 11** – Research Assistant/Writer at Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Researcher at Wikistrat, Research Intern at Foundation for Defense of Democracy (12 29, Slouching Towards Columbia, "Gulf in expectations", 2011, http://slouchingcolumbia.wordpress.com/]

Even for the United States, the loss-of-strength gradient still applies. Without pre-positioned logistics, even for a purely aerial and naval operation to open the Strait of Hormuz, things could become extremely unpleasant extremely quickly. A forced entry into the Gulf would not be as easy as in the 1980s, when mobile replenishment was sufficient. Iran’s military vis-a-vis America’s is far improved from the lopsided 1980s, when Iran had to devote most of its military resources to the Iran-Iraq war on land. A forced entry would occur against a vastly improved constellation of Anti-Access/Area Denial systems that could do serious damage to a fleet that would be much harder to adjust against without friendly facilities and pre-positioned logistics onshore. Regrettably, the underway replenishment which supplied American fleets during the Cold War has actually become more difficult, as critical weapons systems such as VLS – the backbone of a modern US surface warship’s strike capability against shore targets – cannot be replenished while underway. Achieving the fire and sortie generation necessary for a hypothetical war with Iran, in the geographically unfavorable environment of the Gulf, while under fire from an enemy with already considerable and growing strength for local defense purposes (if not power projection) would be extremely challenging, and something very few of the wars the US has fought for decades will have prepared it for.

A foreign navy accomplishing a similar task would be even more unlikely; in fact, they would likely need to construct forward bases of their own. France, which has been trying to rebuild its power projection capability, has realized this itself, and opened a new base in Abu Dhabi for this express purpose. Notably, that base also supports French operations off the coast of the Horn of Africa – just as the US Fifth Fleet does. Nor would foreign navies necessarily want to cooperate in upholding US interests in the Gulf. India and China have notably more favorable attitudes towards Iran than the United States does, and vastly different attitudes about conditioning support or curtailing pursuit of geopolitical interests on the basis of a regime’s internal behavior.

There is a case that the direct US presence in the Gulf is too expensive or immoral to be worth the geopolitical benefits, but it is not a case that can reliably claim it will make the Gulf more economically stable, peaceful, or free. America’s leverage really will be much lower, because it will be forced to compete for influence with rival great powers, which will not share its ideological preferences about Gulf regime behavior. Gulf regimes are neither reliant on US military support for their own internal security, nor can the United States exert leverage effectively when other states will be able to compete for leverage and provide the arms sales the US did, and perhaps even assistance in internal security it was far less involved in furnishing. Even if these movements did succeed (and if they did, it would be highly unlikely US withdrawal of support is the deciding factor), it is far from clear that revolutions and mass politics will prove to be a blow to radicalism or a force for peace, as any student of European or Asian history can attest. At best, the US would be able to more credibly exonerate itself for the crimes of its clients. Our hands would be clean, but leverage would still be out of our reach.

Iranian threats to close the Straits of Hormuz, and the ability of a local war to escalate and spook markets will have greater credibility, and a conflict to force open the Straits will become increasingly costly. So too will the ability of the US to use economic and political leverage to pursue its own national interests be constrained. While a political solution for Iran would be desirable, and I am certainly no proponent of an offensive war for nuclear disarmament, a lack of US military presence would undermine many non-military efforts. Take the example of the proposed oil embargo to cripple the Iranian nuclear program – if Iran is denied access to oil, it has much **stronger incentives** to close the Gulf to punish the oil-importing states which imposed the sanctions and to prevent its Arab Gulf rivals from reaping the benefits of increased oil prices. But US naval force attempting to open such a blockade would face greater challenges and be a less credible threat to deter Iran from closing Hormuz – in other words, **the US would no longer dominate the middle rungs of the escalation ladder.**

**As an irrational actor, Iran has an incentive to stage a preemptive attack – this devastates oil supplies, sends massive shockwaves through the economy, and precipitates Israel strikes**

Williams, 10 [Adjunct Professor at Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology-Madras, PhD in Defense and Strategic Studies, U Madras, Lawrence, Peril Awaits at the Strait of Hormuz]

Five, In an event of a conflagration in the Strait of Hormuz, there are increasing possibilities of an Iranian **asymmetric move to use chemical or even radiation tipped warheads** that could completely wreck civilian shipping with enormous primary and collateral loss and the crippling of shipping leading to an intense bottleneck preventing the entry of US-lead western allied intervention forces. The possibilities of such scenarios serve as important operational options for an Iranian leadership that is determined to stall a US-led preemptive strike.
These naval operational realities cloud and condition the naval theatre of the Strait of Hormuz that is increasingly **vulnerable and prone to assertive asymmetric strikes / counter strikes by Iran**.

Sources of Iranian Conduct and Responses: Iran's template of operational conduct and responses is influenced by several political, economic, religious-ideological, regional rivalry and military factors. Iran is being painted as **an irrational actor** with an overdose obsession on brinkmanship. While the radical religious clerical leadership and the vanguard of the revolution viz: IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guards Council) would like to ratchet and escalate the conflicts in the region by the attempt of a WMD strike in the Strait of Hormuz and **even daring targeting Israel**, the Iranians in their strategic calculus have always been calculated in their responses.

The penchant of an Iranian overdrive by an asymmetric operational strategy either by missile strikes or by naval disruptions could be either as an initiative to subdue the militarily weaker but the oil-rich Sunni Gulf Arab states and Saudi Arabia or as an attempt to deflect US-Israeli targeting by inciting the Hezbollah-Hamas terrorist brigades which are in effect the auxiliary units of the IRGC.

A second source of Iranian strategic conduct emerges from its maritime aspirations to control the Gulf and Caspian Sea. With both seas being critically important as oil and natural gas rich repositories, Iran would prefer to maintain sea-control and sea-denial capabilities employing an asymmetric operational approach of sea-based strike missiles, submarines and aggressive naval posturing that could dent the effectiveness of any naval interventionist force.

The third possible source of Iranian asymmetric conduct could come from its keen interest in developing EMP weapons (Electromagnetic Pulse) that could have perilous consequences both for onshore and offshore assets. In the last eight years, Iran has tested its missiles over the Caspian Sea with a potential EMP effect. With such serious intent, an Iranian attempt either to launch a Shahab-3 missile with an EMP payload off the US coasts from an innocent looking freighter or even using the same in the approaches of the Strait of Hormuz off the Arabian Sea coast could simply paralyze all interventionist forces.

Iranian responses to an offensive strike could include the intense barrage of sea-skimming supersonic anti-ship missiles. The Iranian arsenal includes anti-ship missiles like the C-802 and Kowsar (the Chinese Silkworms and the Russian Sunburns) The C-802 anti-ship missiles are missiles that originate from China. Kowsar anti-ship missiles are basically land-based anti-ship missiles (land-to-sea missiles) which can dodge electronic jamming systems. Deploying an aggressive package of supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles and the employ of EMP weapons could be a deadly cocktail that would complicate intervention and set the stage for more escalation of strikes against Iran and counter strikes that would **cripple the maritime oil commerce** skyrocketing the oil price over US $300 per barrel or even more dealing with a decimation to the global economy.

**Israel strikes cause WWIII**

**Reuveny, 10**—Rafael, PhD, Professor in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University, "Unilateral Strike on Iran could trigger world Depression", op-ed distributed through McClatchy Newspaper Co, http://gazettextra.com/news/2010/aug/07/con-unilateral-strike-could-trigger-world-war-iii-/)

A unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely have dire consequences, including a regional war, global economic collapse and a major power clash. For an Israeli campaign to succeed, it must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would not dare to respond in full force. Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since the locations of some of Iran’s nuclear facilities are not fully known and known facilities are buried deep underground. All of these widely spread facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians but also the Chinese and, likely, the Russians as well. By now, Iran has also built redundant command and control systems and nuclear facilities, developed early warning systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and upgraded and enlarged its armed forces. Because Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike—or even numerous strikes—could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond. Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981, Iran has a second-strike capability comprised of a coalition of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and, perhaps, Turkish forces. Internal pressure might compel Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority to join the assault, turning a bad situation into a regional war. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President Nixon’s shipment of weapons and planes. Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more determined and better-equipped opponents. After years of futilely fighting Palestinian irregular armies, Israel has lost some of its perceived superiority—bolstering its enemies’ resolve. Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian coalition missiles, armed forces, and terrorist attacks would likely wreak havoc on its enemy, leading to a prolonged tit-for-tat. In the absence of massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its alleged nuclear weapons, as it had reportedly almost done in 1973. An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran’s capabilities, but a crippled Iran and its coalition could still attack neighboring oil facilities, unleash global terrorism, plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Middle Eastern oil shipments would likely slow to a trickle as production declines due to the war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients. Iran and Venezuela would likely stop selling oil to the United States and Europe. From there, things could deteriorate as they did in the 1930s. **The world economy would head into a tailspin**; international acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghani citizens might fully turn on the United States, immediately requiring the deployment of more American troops. Russia, China, Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and Turkey—all of which essentially support Iran—could be tempted to form an alliance and openly challenge the U.S. hegemony. Russia and China might rearm their injured Iranian protege overnight, just as Nixon rearmed Israel, and threaten to intervene, just as the U.S.S.R. threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama’s response would likely put U.S. forces on nuclear alert, replaying Nixon’s nightmarish scenario. Iran may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows that it could not take on the United States head-to-head. In contrast, if the United States leads the attack, Iran’s response would likely be muted. If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike, its allies would likely protest and send weapons but would probably not risk using force. While no one has a crystal ball, leaders should be risk-averse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed necessary, Israel must wait for an American green light. **A unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III.**

## Iran/Israel First Strike

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**Israel-Iran bipolar nuclear tensions guarantee nuclear first strike.**

**Edelman et al 11** – Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and US Undersecretary of Defense 2005-2009 (Eric S., “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran”, January/February 2011; < http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran>)//AB

Given Israel's status as an assumed but undeclared nuclear weapons state, the most immediate consequence of **Iran's crossing the nuclear threshold** would be the emergence of an **unstable bipolar nuclear competition in the Middle East**. Given **Israel's enormous** quantitative and qualitative advantage in **nuclear weapons** -- its arsenal is estimated to consist of anywhere from 100 to more than 200 warheads, possibly including thermonuclear weapons -- Tehran might fear a disarming preventive or **preemptive strike**. **During a crisis, then, the Iranian leadership might face a "use them or lose them" dilemma with respect to its nuclear weapons and resolve it by attacking first**. For their part, **Israeli** leaders might also be willing to **strike first**, despite the enormous risks. Israel's small size means that even a few nuclear detonations on its soil would be devastating; Iran's former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was exaggerating only slightly when he claimed that "even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything." Iran's nuclear arsenal is likely to be small at first and perhaps vulnerable to a preventive attack. Moreover, even if current and future Israeli missile defenses could not stop a full-scale premeditated attack by ballistic missiles, they might be effective against any retaliation Iran might launch if it were hit first. And the willingness to execute a preventive or preemptive strike when confronting a serious threat is a deeply ingrained element of Israel's strategic culture, as Israel demonstrated in its attacks against Egypt in 1956 and 1967, against Iraq's nuclear program in 1981, and against a suspected Syrian nuclear site in 2007. On the one occasion that Israel absorbed the first blow, in 1973, it came perilously close to defeat. In short, the early stages of an Iranian-Israeli nuclear competition would be unstable.

**Iran Israel war causes extinction**

**Hirsch 5 - Professor @ UC San Diego** (Jorge, “Can a nuclear strike on Iran be averted,” November 21st, EMM - BRW)

The Bush administration has put together all the elements it needs to justify the impending military action against Iran. Unlike in the case of Iraq, it will happen without warning, and most of the justifications will be issued after the fact. We will wake up one day to learn that facilities in Iran have been bombed in a joint U.S.-Israeli attack. It may even take another couple of days for the revelation that some of the U.S. bombs were nuclear. Why a Nuclear Attack on Iran Is a Bad Idea Now that we have outlined what is very close to happening, let us discuss briefly why everything possible should be done to prevent it. In a worst-case scenario, the attack will cause a violent reaction from Iran. Millions of "human wave" Iranian militias will storm into Iraq, and just as Saddam stopped them with chemical weapons, the U.S. will stop them with nuclear weapons, resulting potentially in hundreds of thousands of casualties**.** The Middle East will explode, and popular uprisings in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries with pro-Western governments could be overtaken by radical regimes. Pakistan already has nuclear weapons, and a nuclear conflict could even lead to Russia's and Israel's involvement using nuclear weapons. In a best-case scenario, the U.S. will destroy all nuclear, chemical, and missile facilities in Iran with conventional and low-yield nuclear weapons in a lightning surprise attack, and Iran will be paralyzed and decide not to retaliate for fear of a vastly more devastating nuclear attack. In the short term, the U.S. will succeed, leaving no Iranian nuclear program, civilian or otherwise. Iran will no longer threaten Israel, a regime change will ensue, and a pro-Western government will emerge. However, even in the best-case scenario, the long-term consequences are dire. The nuclear threshold will have been crossed by a nuclear superpower against a non-nuclear country. Many more countries will rush to get their own nuclear weapons as a deterrent. With no taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, they will certainly be used again. Nuclear conflicts will occur within the next 10 to 20 years, and will escalate until much of the world is destroyed. Let us remember that the destructive power of existing nuclear arsenals is approximately one million times that of the Hiroshima bomb, enough to erase Earth's population many times over

## ---2nc XT/Link

**Prolif guarantees first-strike.**

**Krepinevich et al 11** – President of Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and Contributor to Foreign Affairs (Andrew, “The War Over Containing Iran”, March/April 2011; < http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67474/dima-adamsky-karim-sadjadpour-and-diane-de-gramont-shahram-chubi/the-war-over-containing-iran>)//AB

**Uncertainty in the immediate aftermath of Iran's nuclearization** could increase the level of caution among both Iranian and Israeli leaders, but it could also have the opposite effect -- **leading to even greater danger**. As Edelman, Krepinevich, and Montgomery note, the standoff, whether with or without a communications channel, would be **inherently unstable since both parties would be predisposed to launching a first strike**: **Iran** would be tempted to "**use them or lose** **them**" by striking first and **Israel** would be determined to **exploit its edge** while it still had one. This dynamic would remain until Tehran acquired a second-strike capability. Moreover, during conventional conflicts, **potential miscalculations** might occur not only because reckless proxies could drag Iran into a direct clash but also because Iran and Israel would be in the midst of a nuclear learning period; intentional and unintentional nuclear signals might be misunderstood, and Iranian and Israeli inexperience, impulsiveness, and illiteracy when it comes to each other's strategic cultures could come into play.

**Israeli response to Iranian proliferation means terrorists will attack Israel**

**Cimbala ’07** – (Stephen Cimbala is the Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Penn State Brandywine, and is the author of numerous books and articles in the fields of international security studies, defense policy, nuclear weapons and arms control, intelligence and other fields, “East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia”, January 25, 2007, <http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/13518040500341809>)//GS

As for the Iranian nuclear case, both Israel and the United States have obliquely threatened preemption (presumably with conventional weapons) against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and against any nuclear capable military forces. But the costs of carrying out the threat of preemption against Iran must be factored into the equation. Iran is a large state and cannot easily be conquered and occupied by outside powers, unlike Iraq. Iran could therefore reconstitute any destroyed nuclear power plants or other infrastructure. An additional consideration is political. An Israeli preemption against Iran becomes a recruitment poster for another holy war by Jihadists against Israel. Iran has been one of the major sponsors of Hezbollah and other groups that have carried out past terror attacks in Palestine. An Israeli preemption against Tehran might reignite the intifada or otherwise destabilize the peace process headed toward political devolution and Palestinian self rule.

## Middle East

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**Iran proliferation will cause the rest of the Middle East to proliferate – that causes a nuclear free-for-all**

JVL, 12 – Citing nuclear action taken by Middle-Eastern countries and also Obama (Jewish Virtual Library, “Fact Sheet: Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East,” May 2012, jewishvirtuallibrary.org//*HO*

While the immediate focus of international attention has been on stopping [Iran](http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/arabs/Irantoc.html) from obtaining the ability to build nuclear weapons, an equally worrisome development is that the Iranian drive to obtain a nuclear bomb has stimulated a regional race for nuclear technology to counter the perceived threat from a nuclear Iran. Like [Iran](http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/arabs/Irantoc.html), at least twelve other Middle Eastern countries have either announced plans to explore atomic energy or have signed nuclear cooperation agreements: [Saudi Arabia](http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/arabs/satoc.html), [Algeria](http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/vjw/Algeriatoc.html), [Egypt](http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/arabs/egypttoc.html),[UAE](http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/arabs/uaetoc.html), [Jordan](http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/arabs/jortoc.html), [Morocco](http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/arabs/mortoc.html), [Tunisia](http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/arabs/Tunisiatoc.html), [Turkey](http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/vjw/Turkeytoc.html), [Syria](http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/arabs/syriatoc.html), [Kuwait](http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/arabs/kuwaittoc.html), [Qatar](http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/arabs/Qatartoc.html), and [Oman](http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/arabs/Omantoc.html) (Two other counties -[Yemen](http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/arabs/Yementoc.html) and [Libya](http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/arabs/Libyatoc.html) - cancelled their nuclear programs). Each of these countries, like Iran as well, have explicitly stated that they are only interested in peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The fear is now that these countries may follow the Iranian example and work toward building a nuclear bomb to protect themselves in any future nuclear arms race. As [President Obama](http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/obamatoc.html) noted in March 2012, "It will not be tolerable to a number of states in that region for Iran to have a nuclear weapon and them not to have a nuclear weapon ... so the threat of proliferation becomes that much more severe ... The dangers of an Iran getting nuclear weapons that then leads to a free-for-all in the Middle East is something that I think would be very dangerous for the world." These [Middle East nations](http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/arabtoc.html) are increasingly apprehensive about the [threat of a nuclear Iran](http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/talking/23_Iran.html) and the failure of the international community to take decisive actions to prevent Tehran from achieving its nuclear ambitions. If the West is going to protect its interests in the region and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it is vital now that [Iran](http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/arabs/Irantoc.html) be stopped so steps can be taken to rein in these new efforts to join the nuclear club.

**Iranian proliferation would escalate quickly throughout the middle east, this causes immediate instability**

**Skerritt et al. 12** (Nuclear Proliferation Policy Debate A Discussion of Nuclear Technology’s Impact on Foreign Policy Stephen Kressaty, Justin Torres, Mathew Skerritt 3/2/2012 WORCESTER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE –BRW)

The thought of having whole nations join into this kind of sectarian strife is frightening. **If the Shiites in Iran have the bomb, Sunnis in several other states will feel the need to be able to retaliate against a possible attack.** Nuclear arms proliferation will occur throughout the region starting with the oil rich Sunni states and quickly continue through the region. Radicals who intend on inflicting maximum damage are often limited by their resources and ability to acquire powerful weapons. **Proliferating nuclear weapons technology to such a violent part of the world increases the chances that the radicals will gain access to it.** This could potentially have devastating consequences that result in massive loss of life around the world. Considering that 88% of Iran‘s 98% Muslim population are Shi‘ites, allowing them to possess nuclear weapons would undoubtedly lead to an effort from Sunni nations to counter with their own bomb (CIA World Fact Book: Iran, 2012). Among the non-nuclear **nations leading a retaliatory drive against a Shi‘ite bomb would most likely be Turkey and Saudi Arabia**. According to the CIA World Fact Book, each of these countries has an overwhelming Sunni majority, with over 95% of Muslims being Sunni (CIA World Fact Book: Turkey, 2012) (CIA World Fact Book: Saudi Arabia, 2012). Iran‘s hostility and volatility coupled with Sunni fears in one wealthy and one technically advanced nation sets the stage for a nearly unavoidable nuclear arms race. An expensive weapons build up would surely come at the cost of many displeased taxpayers in Turkey, but in Saudi Arabia the government is not dependent on tax monies as it controls oil wealth. Either way, it would be diverting resources from domestic development programs and its own efforts to prepare for the post-oil era. More displeased citizens and weapons capable of wiping out massive amounts of people are two things that the Middle East does not need.

**Goes global and nuclear**

Gold, 07 [Thomas J., Masters in Strategic Intelligence, Joint Military Intelligence College, Nuclear Conflict in the Middle East: An Analysis of Future Events, p. 53-55]

If the political, ethnic, and military policies, and future nuclear weapons development in the Middle East continue in their present directions, Iran or Iraq will eventually initiate a nuclear conflict, probably in the 2005-2015 time frame. Major focal events such as total arms control (resulting in a regional NWFZ), individual acceptance of the NPT, or changes in Middle East leadership will ultimately determine which future happens. FUTURE INDICATORS A constant watch is needed to assess the actions, intentions, and progress of the Middle East countries with their nuclear programs. As well as the status of each country’s nuclear program, its military capability and intentions must also be monitored to determine which future direction is most likely and if the first use of nuclear weapons is likely. ‘Future Indicators” verify the progress of each country toward the most likely “Alternate Future”. Future No. 23 (most likely,): Israel, Iran, and Iraq have developed nuclear weapons. Israel and Iran have kept their weapons as a deterrent. Iraq is the first to use nuclear weapons, probably for aggression. Depending on which Middle East country is attacked by Iraq, either Israel or Iran will retaliate with a secondary nuclear strike. Actions by the U.S., Russia, or other countries will have little effect in deterring this retaliation. This future scenario also carries the risk of escalation into a regional or global nuclear conflict if the major nuclear powers become involved. This scenario can only take place if Iran chooses to retain its nuclear weapons for deterrence rather than be aggressive. Note that Iran has developed weapons approximately three years earlier than Iraq. Israel must also be complacent about Iraq’s program and not destroy the Iraqi reactors as it did in 1981. Transposition to Future No. 20: Iran becomes democratic and does not develop nuclear weapons. However, without the appearance of having a potential nuclear capability, Iran will surely become the most probable target of Iraq’s attack. Transposition to Future No. 14: Israel or one of the major nuclear powers takes a major action which deters Iraq from nuclear aggression. This scenario would result in a very unstable situation when all three countries have nuclear weapons. The potential would then exist for a regional dispute to escalate into nuclear conflict. Transposition to Future No. I: Prior to any conflict, all Middle East countries have agreed to a NWFZ, abandoned their nuclear development programs, and destroyed all nuclear weapons and related materials. Indicators for Future Scenario No. 23: A tier the development and assembly of a nuclear device, Iraq may test the weapon within Iraqi territory to verify its design, or politically move Iraq into being a nuclear power: this action would be a major step toward regional hegemony. After testing this weapon, Iraq may also begin a buildup of its nuclear capability for future deterrence or aggression. Future No. 17 (second most likely): Israel and Iran have developed nuclear weapons. Iraq program is not complete, and Israel has kept its weapons as a deterrent. Iran is the first to use nuclear weapons, probably for aggression. As the status of the Iraqi program is uncertain, the most probable target for an Iranian first strike using nuclear weapons is Israel. A nuclear retaliation by Israel would be certain. The potential now exists for the involvement of the major nuclear powers, the U.S. siding with Israel, and Russia siding with Iran. Escalation to regional or global nuclear war is now a possibility.

## ---2nc Impact Extinction

**Middle East war leads to nuclear war**

**London 10** (Herbert President Emeritus of [Hudson Institute](http://www.hudson.org/). Graduate of Columbia University, 1960 and the recipient of a Ph.D. from New York University, 1966, “The Coming Crisis In The Middle East,” 6/28/10, The Gatestone Institute, http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/1387/coming-crisis-in-the-middle-east)//PC

The coming storm in the Middle East is gaining momentum; like conditions prior to World War I, all it takes for explosive action to commence is a trigger. Turkey's provocative flotilla, often described in Orwellian terms as a humanitarian mission, has set in motion a gust of diplomatic activity: if the Iranians send escort vessels for the next round of Turkish ships, which they have apparently decided not to do in favor of land operations, it could have presented a casus belli. [cause for war] Syria, too, has been playing a dangerous game, with both missile deployment and rearming Hezbollah. According to most public accounts, Hezbollah is sitting on 40,000 long-, medium- and short-range missiles, and Syrian territory has been serving as a conduit for military materiel from Iran since the end of the 2006 Lebanon War. Should Syria move its own scuds to Lebanon or deploy its troops as reinforcement for Hezbollah, a wider regional war with Israel could not be contained. In the backdrop is an Iran, with sufficient fissionable material to produce a couple of nuclear weapons. It will take some time to weaponize the missiles, but the road to that goal is synchronized in green lights since neither diplomacy nor diluted sanctions can convince Iran to change course. From Qatar to Afghanistan all political eyes are on Iran, poised to be "the hegemon" in the Middle East; it is increasingly considered the "strong horse" as American forces incrementally retreat from the region. Even Iraq, ironically, may depend on Iranian ties in order to maintain internal stability. For Sunni nations like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, regional strategic vision is a combination of deal-making to offset the Iranian Shia advantage, and attempting to buy or develop nuclear weapons as a counterweight to Iranian ambition. However, both of these governments are in a precarious state; should either fall, all bets are off in the Middle East neighborhood. It has long been said that the Sunni "tent" must stand on two legs: if one, falls, the tent collapses. Should this tent collapse, and should Iran take advantage of that calamity, it could incite a Sunni-Shia war. Or feeling empowered, and no longer dissuaded by an escalation scenario, Iran, with nuclear weapons in tow, might decide that a war against Israel is a distinct possibility. However implausible it may seem at the moment, the possible annihilation of Israel and the prospect of a second holocaust could lead to a nuclear exchange. The only wild card that can change this slide into warfare is an active United States' policy. Yet, curiously, the U.S. is engaged in both an emotional and physical retreat from the region. Despite rhetoric which suggests an Iran with nuclear weapons is intolerable, the U.S. has done nothing to forestall this eventual outcome. Despite the investment in blood and treasure to allow a stable government to emerge in Iraq, the anticipated withdrawal of U.S. forces has prompted President Maliki to travel to Tehran on a regular basis. Further, despite historic links to Israel that gave the U.S. leverage in the region as well a democratic ally, the Obama administration treats Israel as a national security albatross that must be disposed of as soon as possible. As a consequence, the U.S. is perceived in the region as the "weak horse," the one dangerous to ride. In every Middle East capital the words "unreliable and United States" are linked. Those individuals seeking a moderate course of action are now in a distinct minority. A political vacuum is emerging, one that is not sustainable and one the Iranian leadership looks to with imperial exhilaration. It is no longer a question of whether war will occur, but rather when it will occur, and where it will break out. There are many triggers to ignite the explosion, but not many scenarios for containment. Could it be a regional war in which Egypt and Saudi Arabia watch from the sidelines, but secretly wish for Israeli victory? Or will this be a war in which there aren't victors, only devastation? Moreover, should war break out, what does the U.S. do? This is a description far more dire than any in the last century and, even if some believe that it is overly pessimistic, Arab and Jew, Persian and Egyptian, Muslim and Maronite tend to believe in its veracity -- a truly bad sign.

**Global nuclear war**

**Primakov 9**[September, Yevgeny, President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation; Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; member of the Editorial Board of *Russia in Global Affairs*. This article is based on the scientific report for which the author was awarded the Lomonosov Gold Medal of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2008, “The Middle East Problem in the Context of International Relations”]

The Middle East conflict is unparalleled in terms of its potential for spreading globally. During the Cold War, amid which the Arab-Israeli conflict evolved, the two opposingsuperpowers directly supported the conflicting parties: the Soviet Union supported Arab countries, while the United States supported Israel. On the one hand, the bipolar world order which existed at that time objectively played in favor of the escalation of the Middle East conflict into a global confrontation. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and the United States were not interested in such developments and they managed to keep the situation under control. The behavior of both superpowers in the course of all the wars in the Middle East proves that. In 1956, during the Anglo-French-Israeli military invasion of Egypt (which followed Cairo’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company) the United States – contrary to the widespread belief in various countries, including Russia – not only refrained from supporting its allies but insistently pressed – along with the Soviet Union – for the cessation of the armed action. Washington feared that the tripartite aggression would undermine the positions of the West in the Arab world and would result in a direct clash with the Soviet Union. Fears that hostilities in the Middle East might acquire a global dimension could materialize also during the Six-Day War of 1967. On its eve, Moscow and Washington urged each other to cool down their “clients.” When the war began, both superpowers assured each other that they did not intend to get involved in the crisis militarily and that that they would make efforts at the United Nations to negotiate terms for a ceasefire. On July 5, the Chairman of the Soviet Government, Alexei Kosygin, who was authorized by the Politburo to conduct negotiations on behalf of the Soviet leadership, for the first time ever used a hot line for this purpose. After the USS *Liberty*was attacked by Israeli forces, which later claimed the attack was a case of mistaken identity, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson immediately notified Kosygin that the movement of the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean Sea was only intended to help the crew of the attacked ship and to investigate the incident. The situation repeated itself during the hostilities of October 1973. Russian publications of those years argued that it was the Soviet Union that prevented U.S. military involvement in those events. In contrast, many U.S. authors claimed that a U.S. reaction thwarted Soviet plans to send troops to the Middle East. Neither statement is true. The atmosphere was really quite tense. Sentiments both in Washington and Moscow were in favor of interference, yet both capitals were far from taking real action. When U.S. troops were put on high alert, Henry Kissinger assured Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that this was done largely for domestic considerations and should not be seen by Moscow as a hostile act. In a private conversation with Dobrynin, President Richard Nixon said the same, adding that he might have overreacted but that this had been done amidst a hostile campaign against him over Watergate. Meanwhile, Kosygin and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at a Politburo meeting in Moscow strongly rejected a proposal by Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko to “demonstrate” Soviet military presence in Egypt in response to Israel’s refusal to comply with a UN Security Council resolution. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev took the side of Kosygin and Gromyko, saying that he was against any Soviet involvement in the conflict.  The above suggests an unequivocal conclusion that control by the superpowers in the bipolar world did not allow the Middle East conflict to escalate into a global confrontation. After the end of the Cold War, some scholars and political observers concluded that a real threat of the Arab-Israeli conflict going beyond regional frameworks ceased to exist. However, in the 21st century this conclusion no longer conforms to the reality. The U.S. military operation in Iraq has changed the balance of forces in the Middle East. The disappearance of the Iraqi counterbalance has brought Iran to the fore as a regional power claiming a direct role in various Middle East processes. I do not belong to those who believe that the Iranian leadership has already made a political decision to create nuclear weapons of its own. Yet Tehran seems to have set itself the goal of achieving a technological level that would let it make such a decision (the “Japanese model”) under unfavorable circumstances. Israel already possesses nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. In such circumstances, the absence of a Middle East settlement opens a dangerous prospect ofa nuclear collision in the region, which would have catastrophic consequences for the whole world**.** The transition to a multipolar world has objectively strengthened the role of states and organizations that are directly involved in regional conflicts, which increases the latter’s danger and reduces the possibility of controlling them. This refers, above all, to the Middle East conflict. The coming of Barack Obama to the presidency has allayed fears that the United States could deliver a preventive strike against Iran (under George W. Bush, it was one of the most discussed topics in the United States). However, fears have increased that such a strike can be launched *Yevgeny Primakov*1 3 2 RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS VOL. 7 • No. 3 • JULY – SEPTEMBER• 2009 by Israel, which would have unpredictable consequences for the region and beyond. It seems that President Obama’s position does not completely rule out such a possibility.

Instability goes nuclear

Steinback 02 [John Steinback, *Analyst at the Center for Research on Globalization,* March 3, 2002, “Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction: a Threat to Peace”, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html]

Meanwhile*,* the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy*.* (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)

## \*\*\*Japan Prolif Specific\*\*\*

## Asia Arms Race

## ---1nc

**Japanese prolif causes Asian arms race**

**Matthews ’03** – (Eugene A. Matthews, former senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and president of Nintai, an international education firm, “Japan’s New Nationalism,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no. 6, November/December 2003, JSTOR)//GS

Figuring out what Japan wants can sometimes be difficult for Americans. Given the patron-client nature of the security arrangement and U.S. leverage on international issues, Japanese officials do not always honestly express their real foreign policy desires. Washington should therefore get better at looking for subtle signs. At the moment, although Prime Minister Koizumi continues to support U.S. actions around the world, many in the Japanese public and government are starting to sense that the United States is preoccupied with matters that are not central to Japanese national security. The nationalists complain the loudest that had the United States focused more on North Korea, the situation there never would have gotten out of hand. More attention would therefore help matters, as would specific measures to moderate Japanese nationalism. For example, American officials should discourage Japan's neighbors from criticizing Japanese leaders every time they visit the Yasukuni Shrine or change their history textbooks. Washington should also encourage these countries to drop their objections to the revision of Article 9. After all, although it will almost surely occur, securing an amendment will take a great deal of time, requiring a two-thirds vote from both houses of Japan's legislature and ratification by a majority of the population in a special referendum. And Japan has the right to establish its own standing army, which need not threaten its neighbors. Having said that, Washington must persuade Tokyo not to acquire nuclear weapons. A nuclear Japan would make Asia a more dangerous place, starting an arms race unlike any the region has ever seen. China would increase its nuclear stockpile and seek more military resources, particularly nuclear submarines. Asia would suddenly have five nuclear powers-China, India, Japan, Pakistan, and North Korea-and South Korea would quickly follow, raising the potential for disastrous conflict.

**Global Nuclear Extinction**

**O’Harra ’07** – (Doug O’Harra is a writer and science journalist based in Anchorage, Alaska, he’s appeared in the Smithsonian and runs a non-profit website; “[Threat of Nuclear Autumn](http://www.farnorthscience.com/2007/03/03/news-from-alaska/threat-of-nuclear-autumn/)”; April 1, 2007; <http://www.farnorthscience.com/2007/03/03/news-from-alaska/threat-of-nuclear-autumn/>)//GS

While the United States and Russia may be much less likely to lob missiles into each other’s heartland, the chances of a regional nuclear conflict using much smaller weapons has dramatically increased, Toon and coauthors argue. “A de facto nuclear arms race has emerged in Asia between China, India and Pakistan and could expand to include North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan,” they write. “In the Middle East, a nuclear confrontation between Israel and Iran would be fearful. Saudi Arabia and Egypt could also seek nuclear weapons to balance Iran and Israel.” It’s relatively easy to build dozens of 15-kiloton bombs and stockpile them, similar in yield to Hiroshima. Plans can be found on the Internet. The bombs are small enough to be delivered by truck, car, boat, small plane. “The only serious obstacle to constructing a bomb is the limited availability of purified fissionable fuels,” they write. So how bad could it be? If 100 small nuclear bombs blasted cities and set them on fire, 1 to 5 million tons of soot, particles and smoke would spread into the sky. It would impact the atmosphere and darken the sky more than a huge volcanic eruption like Pinatubo in 1991. This would cut growing seasons by 10 to 30 days — especially hitting the Russian Arctic, central Europe and the heartland of North America. Southcentral Alaska — where most people in the state live and the focus of the Alaska’s small agricultural industry — would lose 20 days of growing season. And that’s not all. The authors speak of “climate anomalies” threatening the world in unexpected ways. Droughts, freezes, shifts in storm tracks, heat waves. The threat of such a conflict “may constitute one of the greatest dangers to the stability of society since the dawn of humans,” they conclude.

## ---2nc

**Japanese violation of the NPT leads to global proliferation and an end to US credibility**

**Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin ’09** – (Emma Chanlett-Avery is a specialist in Asian affairs in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade division of the Congressional Research Service. She focuses on security issues in the region, including U.S. relations with North Korea, Japan, Thailand, and Singapore; Mary Beth Nikitin has been an Analyst in WMD Nonproliferation in the Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library of Congress since 2007; “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests”; <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf>)//GS

Japan’s development of its own nuclear arsenal could also have damaging impact on U.S. nonproliferation policy. It would be more difficult for the United States to convince non-nuclear weapon states to keep their non-nuclear status or to persuade countries such as North Korea to give up their weapons programs. The damage to the NPT as a guarantor of nuclear power for peaceful use and the IAEA as an inspection regime could be irreparable if Japan were to leave or violate the treaty. If a close ally under its nuclear umbrella chose to acquire the bomb, perhaps other countries enjoying a strong bilateral relationship with the United States would be less inhibited in pursuing their own option. It could also undermine confidence in U.S. security guarantees more generally

## Indo Pak

## ---1nc

**Domino effect means once Japan gets the bomb, so do other Asian countries—specifically India and Pakistan—escalation guarantees conflict**

**Businessweek ’03** – (a weekly business magazine published by [Bloomberg L.P.](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bloomberg_L.P.); “Why Japan Just Might Build Nukes”; January 19, 2003; <http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2003-01-19/why-japan-just-might-build-nukes>)//GS

Granted, there are big legal, cultural, and political barriers to a nuclear Japan. The memory of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remains burned into the national psyche, and historically some 80% of Japanese are opposed. Furthermore, Japan would have to amend its constitution, which bans nuclear arms. "U.S. policymakers talk about getting Japan to make nuclear weapons, but it will never happen," insists former diplomat Satoshi Morimoto, now a Takushoku University security expert. If Japan could get beyond the hurdles, it likely wouldn't need long to develop a bomb. It has five tons of plutonium stored in the nuclear research center of Tokai-mura, north of Tokyo, and its scientists know how to convert it to weapons-grade material. Hideyuki Ban, director of the nonprofit Citizens' Nuclear Information Center, says Japan could build a nuclear bomb within months. And its civilian rocket and satellite launching system could easily be converted to military use. Japan also has superbly equipped land, sea, and air forces that could deliver medium-range nukes to North Korea. But if Japan decides to build its own nukes, get ready for an Asian arms race. China would likely want to boost its arsenal, which would prompt India to develop more nuclear weapons, which would spur Pakistan to do the same--and on and on into an ever more perilous future.

**Unintentional nuclear exchange**

**Rajaraman**, Theoretical Physics Professor at Jawaharlal Nehru, ‘**2** (November, “Nuclear Weapons in South Asia Risks and Their Reduction” Pugwash Workshop on South Asian Security, www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/Rajaraman.pdf)

The point is not that our own early warning systems in India will also be prone to false alarms. In fact we will probably not have the luxury of even such a fallible early warning system. This is not just because of the costs involved but also because of geography. The missile travel time between Pakistan and India is only about 5 minutes — far too short a time to provide any meaningful warning. (Bombs delivered by planes will take longer, but that is offset by the difficulty in spotting the bombers carrying nuclear weapons from the dozens of other similar planes in action during wartime.) One would therefore have to settle for indirect indicators that give a little more time to react — things like signs of unusual activity at missile launch sites . airfields and nuclear ammunition depots of the enemy, intelligence reports of their military plans and political intentions and so on. These can yield at best secondary evidence of an impending attack, much less concrete and more amenable to misinterpretation. A very plausible scenario is one where, at a time of wartime crisis, such indirect evidence suddenly peaks to a crescendo and points towards an imminent nuclear attack. Such evidence may be very strongly indicative, but it is unlikely to be one hundred percent certain. One can imagine the extraordinary dilemma that the country's political leadership would then face. They may find themselves under immense pressure from the more hawkish elements among them and the military to launch a preventive attack within a matter of hours if not minutes. Notwithstanding any declarations of No First Use. and no matter how responsible the leadership is or how conscious they are of the gravity of a wrong decision it is still hard to imagine them just sitting on their hands and waiting for the bombs from the other side to land before retaliating. Herein lies the serious risk of circumstances forcing a hasty panic-driven nuclear attack in response to a perceived threat that may eventually turn out to have been false.? The pressure to launch a preventive attack would be all the more intense if missiles and bombers loaded with nuclear weapons were already fully deployed and ready to take off in minutes. When such fire-power is kept primed day after day, ready to be used any moment, it is itching to be fired. The mere availability of such capability generates a momentum of its own to the decision making process. There is very little doubt that the decision to drop the bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki was in part influenced by the fact that the bombs, only recently fabricated after a massive military and scientific effort, were sitting there, waiting to be tested over a "real target".? Finally, the fact that the antagonist also carries a similar nuclear arsenal with very similar risks, increases the danger many-fold. What may be viewed as a purely deterrent weapon by one side cannot, if kept in a state of ready-to-fire alert, be distinguished by the other side from a capability mounted to make a surprise first attack. Each side, in evaluating the threat from the other, will not only have to consider the likelihood of a deliberate attack, but also factor in the possibility of inadvertent, unauthorised or hasty crisis driven attacks. Such increased perceptions of threat can bounce back and forth between the strategic calculations of the two countries, getting magnified in the process.

## ---2nc Impact

**And, Indo-Pak war causes extinction**

**Fox,** Independent Journalist ‘**8** (Maggie, April 8, “India-Pakistan Nuclear War Would Cause Ozone Hole” <http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/47829/story.htm>)

WASHINGTON - Nuclear war between India and Pakistan would cause more than slaughter and destruction -- it would knock a big hole in the ozone layer, affecting crops, animals and people worldwide, US researchers said on Monday. Fires from burning cities would send 5 million metric tonnes of soot or more into the lowest part of Earth's atmosphere known as the troposphere, and heat from the sun would carry these blackened particles into the stratosphere, the team at the University of Colorado reported. "The sunlight really heats it up and sends it up to the top of the stratosphere," said Michael Mills of the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics, who chose India and Pakistan as one of several possible examples. Up there, the soot would absorb radiation from the sun and heat surrounding gases, causing chemical reactions that break down ozone. "We find column ozone losses in excess of 20 percent globally, 25 percent to 45 percent at midlatitudes, and 50 percent to 70 percent at northern high latitudes persisting for five years, with substantial losses continuing for five additional years," Mills' team wrote in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. This would let in enough ultraviolet radiation to cause cancer, damage eyes and skin, damage crops and other plants and injure animals. Mills and colleagues based their computer model on other research on how much fire would be produced by a regional nuclear conflict. "Certainly there is a growing number of large nuclear-armed states that have a growing number of weapons. This could be typical of what you might see," Mills said in a telephone interview. SMOKE IS KEY Eight nations are known to have nuclear weapons, and Pakistan and India are believed to have at least 50 weapons apiece, each with the power of the weapon the United States used to destroy Hiroshima in 1945. Mills said the study added a new factor to the worries about what might damage the world's ozone layer, as well as to research about the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange. "The smoke is the key and it is coming from these firestorms that build up actually several hours after the explosions," he said. "We are talking about modern megacities that have a lot of material in them that would burn. We saw these kinds of megafires in World War Two in Dresden and Tokyo. The difference is we are talking about a large number of cities that would be bombed within a few days." Nothing natural could create this much black smoke in the same way, Mill noted. Volcanic ash, dust and smoke is of a different nature, for example, and forest fires are not big or hot enough. The University of Colorado's Brian Toon, who also worked on the study, said the damage to the ozone layer would be worse than what has been predicted by "nuclear winter" and "ultraviolet spring" scenarios. "The big surprise is that this study demonstrates that a small-scale, regional nuclear conflict is capable of triggering ozone losses even larger than losses that were predicted following a full-scale nuclear war," Toon said in a statement.

## Probability

**Best probability for conflict and escalation is East Asia—location means Japanese prolif would be devastating**

**Suto and Tosaki** **’09** – (Takaya Suto, special assistant to the minister of foreign affairs of Japan and director of the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, and Hirofumi Tosaki, senior research fellow at the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Japan Institute of International Affairs, "Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Japanese Perspective," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 2009, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Suto\_Tosaki.pdf)//GS

Northeast Asia is one of the most critical regions with regard to nuclear issues. Every state that has direct security stakes in the region has been closely engaged with nuclear weapons. The United States, Russia, and China are all parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), while North Korea possesses nuclear weapons in violation of the NPT. Although neither Japan nor South Korea possesses any nuclear weapons, both are under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. On top of all this, the security environment of this region has remained volatile, even since the end of the Cold War. The possibility of major armed conflicts erupting in the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait has long been worrisome. Additionally, several unsolved territorial disputes exist in Northeast Asia, and the relationships among regional countries are not necessarily amicable. Furthermore, a rising China has continued to modernize its military force, including its nuclear capabilities, while its intentions remain unclear. In the medium to long term, the United States and China may vie for hegemony and influence in the Asia–Pacific region, resulting in confrontation. The role of nuclear weapons in the Northeast Asian security environment cannot be lightly dismissed. Maintaining order and stability by deterring the use of military force is of prime importance, considering the confrontational or competitive relationship among the key countries. Moreover, simply eliminating nuclear weapons, without establishing an alternative security arrangement or framework that does not depend on nuclear threats, would increase the volatility of the region because conventional forces provide weaker deterrence than nuclear weapons. The result could be a possible heightening of the “security dilemma” as well as increased likelihood of an armed conflict caused by miscalculations or misperceptions. Specifically, one country might think it could achieve its (limited) objectives by force if it did not fear massive destruction by a United States, possessing only conventional forces.

## \*\*\*Venezuala Specific\*\*\*

## Hegemony

## ---1nc

**Venezuela proliferating – sparks Latin American nuclear arms race.**

**Logan 09** – Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (Justin, “Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran: A Skeptic’s View”, October 2009; < http://www.cato.org/pubs/npu/npu\_october2009.pdf>)//AB

While the international community focuses on the danger of **nuclear proliferation** in the Middle East and Northeast Asia, **Venezuelan** dictator Hugo Chavez is creating a similar **specter in the Western Hemisphere**. Chavez has recently indicated an intention to commence a nuclear program. There are signs that he hopes–and perhaps assumes–that Russia will aid the development of a Venezuelan nuclear program as it aided Iran’s program. Given the increasingly **cozy relationship between Moscow and Caracas**, which has **included** more than $4 billion in **arms sales**, that may not be an unrealistic expectation. Because of Chavez’s track record, Venezuela’s neighbors understandably view with some **skepticism** his assurances that a **nuclear program** would be solely for **peaceful purposes**. Relations between Venezuela and neighboring Colombia have deteriorated markedly in recent years, and tensions along their border have flared on several occasions. Most, although not all, of the **provocations have come from the Venezuelan** side. Chavez has asserted that the arms purchases from Russia are needed to dissuade the United States from contemplating forcible regime change. He would likely use a similar rationale to **justify a weaponized nuclear program**. The Obama administration should move to discredit such an argument. Washington should give assurances that if Chavez does not pursue the development of nuclear weapons and refrains from actions that threaten Colombia or other states in the hemisphere, the United States will not seek to undermine his regime. As a tangible reassurance, Washington ought to rescind plans to establish seven military bases in Colombia (ostensibly for counternarcotics missions), a step that has generated fierce criticism from governments throughout South America. Chavez argues that their actual purpose is to intimidate Venezuela–or worse, to serve as staging areas for an attack. Chavez is an odious, authoritarian ruler, but his abuses inside Venezuela are up to the Venezuelan people to deal with. They do not pose a threat to important U.S. security interests. **The possibility of a nuclear arms race in the Western Hemisphere,** though, is another matter entirely. Such a development would **menace the stability of the region** and undermine Latin America’s status as a nuclear weapons free zone. That prospect is very much a matter of legitimate concern to the United States. Washington should convey a blunt message to Caracas that it is playing a dangerous game. And Moscow needs to be told that good relations between Russia and the United States will depend significantly on the Kremlin’s restraint regarding arms sales—and avoidance of nuclear assistance— to Venezuela.

**Collapses US heg.**

**Hirst and Pearl 10** – International Affairs Fellow and Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, writing for Council of Foreign Affairs (Joel D., and Jonathon, “Venezuela’s Troubling Nuclear Ties”, 10/28/10; < http://www.cfr.org/venezuela/venezuelas-troubling-nuclear-ties/p23267>)//AB

**Venezuela's** PresidentHugo Chavez returned to Caracas last Sunday after completing a whirlwind tour of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Iran, Syria, Libya, and Portugal. Chavez's **goal was to** advance agreements "to **accelerate the fall of** imperialist (read **American) hegemony** and the birth of the new world of equilibrium and peace," as he stated in Damascus.While the rhetoric is familiar, the initiatives pursued on this trip could pose major challenges to the Obama administration. Washington must develop sensible policy options, particularly when it comes to Venezuela's cooperation with Iran and Chavez' own nuclear ambitions. Starting his tour in Moscow, Chavez finalized negotiations for Russia's state nuclear power company, Rosatom, to supply Venezuela with two 1,200 megawatt (BBC) nuclear power reactors and a smaller research reactor. This deal is the successor to a general agreement on nuclear cooperation signed in November 2008. Though completion of these reactors may take more than a decade, the possibility of an increasingly autocratic Chavez gaining access to nuclear technology should raise concern for Washington and its allies. The reactors may be of limited direct proliferation threat, but Venezuela's close ties with Iran and its significant untapped deposits of uranium--which might total as much as fifty thousand tons--raise questions about whether Caracas could pose a **proliferation risk in the future**. U.S. policymakers seem unsure of how to respond to the deal. As Chavez will be the first to remind Washington, Venezuela is well within its rights under the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to access nuclear technology for civilian purposes. Administration officials likely fear that vocal opposition to the deal could provide Chavez with a propaganda windfall at a time when President Barack Obama is seeking to reduce bilateral tensions (BBC). There may also be a concern that attempts to derail this deal could impede future progress with Moscow on arms control, missile defense, and other important issues. The Obama administration's response to the reactor deal has so far been limited to affirming Venezuela's right to peaceful nuclear power while urging (AFP) on October 19 that Caracas "act responsibly." Chavez retorted two days later (AFP) that "President Obama has started a war by spreading doubt with his words" about Venezuelan nuclear intentions.

**Threats are real and inevitable—heg is key to solve multiple scenarios for war**

**Thayer 6** - Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Study @ Missouri State University, Former Research Fellow @ International Security Program @ Harvard Belfer Center of Science and International Affairs (Bradley, “In Defense of Primacy,” The National Interest, November/December)

A grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the United States stays the world's number one power‑the diplomatic, economic and military leader. Those arguing against primacy claim that the United States should retrench, ei­ther because the United States lacks the power to maintain its primacy and should withdraw from its global commitments, or because the maintenance of primacy will lead the United States into the trap of "imperial overstretch." In the previous issue of The National Interest, Christopher Layne warned of these dangers of pri­macy and called for retrenchment.1 Those arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment are a diverse lot. They include isolationists, who want no foreign military commitments; selective engagers, who want U.S. military commitments to centers of economic might; and offshore balancers, who want a modified form of selective engagement that would have the United States abandon its landpower presence abroad in favor of relying on airpower and seapower to defend its in­terests. But retrenchment, in any of its guis­es, must be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it would be a profound strategic mistake that would lead to far greater instability and war in the world, imperil American security and deny the United States and its allies the benefits of primacy. There are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state? Should it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power capa­bilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has overwhelming military capa­bilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment acknowledge this. So the debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining American pri­macy. Proponents of retrenchment focus a great deal on the costs of U.S. action­ but they fall to realize what is good about American primacy. The price and risks of primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not. A GRAND strategy of ensur­ing American primacy takes as its starting point the protec­tion of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor. In contrast, a strategy based on re­trenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no mat­ter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington can­not call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terror­ists, rogue states or rising powers, his­tory shows that threats must be confront­ed. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvinc­ing half‑pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weak­ness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of interna­tional politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats. And when enemies must be confront­ed, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from .American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a phys­ical, on‑the‑ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing. Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S. primacy is secured because America, at present, commands the "global com­mon"‑‑the oceans, the world's airspace and outer space‑allowing the United States to project its power far from its borders, while denying those common avenues to its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the robustness of the United States' conventional and strategic deterrent ca­pabilities is increased.' This is not an advantage that should be relinquished lightly. A remarkable fact about international politics today‑-in a world where Ameri­can primacy is clearly and unambiguous­ly on display--is that countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes, ­their own protection, or to gain greater influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America‑-their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements‑and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this coun­try, or any country, had so many allies. U.S. primacy‑-and the bandwagon­ing effect‑has also given us extensive in­fluence in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to cre­ate coalitions of like‑minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Pro­liferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the where it can be stymied by opponents. American‑led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effec­tiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. You can count with one hand coun­tries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezeula. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and ac­tions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, re­sort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communica­tion and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates. The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases‑‑Venezuela, Iran, Cuba‑it is an anti‑U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrin­sically anti‑American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations. THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power‑‑Rome, Britain or the United States today. Schol­ars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we con­sider the current international order ‑ free trade, a robust monetary regime, increas­ing respect for human rights, growing de­mocratization‑‑is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages fol­lowed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. With­out U.S. power, the liberal order cre­ated by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Rai Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washing­ton and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated rela­tionships aligned‑-between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread de­mocracy and other elements of its ideol­ogy of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing inter­ests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. lead­ership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Admin­istration for attempting to spread democ­racy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's crit­ics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or sta­bilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Per­haps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Af­ghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threat­ened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Wash­ington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western‑style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Ku­wait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the glob­al economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network character­ized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mo­bility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a glob­al public good from which all states ben­efit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well‑being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin‑offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his ca­reer confident in the socialist ideology of post‑independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recog­nizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globaliza­tion, which are facilitated through Amer­ican primacy.4 As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides.

## \*\*\*Impact Framing\*\*\*

## o/w’s Nuke War

**A 1% risk of prolif being bad outweighs—even nuclear optimists agree**

**Knopf 02** (Jeffrey W, Department of National Security Affairs, Teaches at Naval Postgraduate School, Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University. “Recasting the proliferation optimism-pessimism debate” Security Studies 12, no. 1 (autumn 2002): 41—96. Published online Aug. 03 2006) kyan

Even some nonpessimists acknowledge this point. Peter Lavoy, in a review of the Waltz-Sagan debate that sides with Waltz on many of the issues, nonetheless concludes on a cautionary note: Policymakers must worry about exceptions to the rule. [O]ne exception would dwarf the significance of the theory. Even if Waltz is correct 99 percent of the time, the 1 percent of exceptional cases is what U.S. policymakers must worry about. 23 Richard Betts argues that this concern also follows from a classical realist outlook, which he takes pains to distinguish from Waltz’s neo- or structural realist approach. Betts notes further that it is not clear what else might happen once there is even a single exception to the prediction of stability and that this is a further reason for caution. As he puts it, the ramifications of the first breakage of the half-century taboo on nuclear use are too unpredictable to tempt us to run the experiment.

Nuclear Proliferation outweighs nuclear war – power plants create bigger explosions

Taylor 96 – chairman, NOVA, Damascus, nuclear weapons designer, PHd (Theodore B. Taylor, “Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, July 1996, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/1996/07/00\_taylor\_nuclear-power.htm)//FK

Another type of latent proliferation that I find especially worrisome is the possible bombardment of nuclear facilities that thereby would be converted, in effect, into nuclear weapons. Military bombardment or sabotage of nuclear facilities, ranging from operating nuclear power plants and their spent fuel storage pools to large accumulations of high level radioactive wastes in temporary or long term storage, could release large quantities of radioactive materials that could seriously endanger huge land areas downwind. Electric power plants and stored petroleum have often been prime targets for tactical and strategic bombing, and sometimes for sabotage. In the case of operating nuclear power plants, core meltdowns and physical rupture of containment structures could be caused by aerial or artillery bombardment, truck bombings, internal sabotage with explosives, or by control manipulations following capture of the facility by terrorists. For orientation to the scale of potential radioactive contamination, consider strontium-90 and cesium-137, two especially troublesome fission products with half-lives of about 30 years. The inventories of these radionuclides in the core of a typical nuclear power plant (1,000 electrical megawatts) are greater than the amounts released by a 20 megaton H-bomb explosion, assuming half the explosion energy is accounted for by fission.

**The costs of proliferation o/w the benefits**

**Booth ‘7** (Ken, Dept. Head and Prof. Int’l. Pol. – U. Wales, “Theory of World Security”, p. 406, Google Print)

It is my clear view that the balance of risks favours moving away from the accelerating threats of a proliferating world towards global nuclear abolition (the explicit goal of the NPT), and the parallel step of mov- ing away from the notion of nuclear weapons as the ultimate insurers of national security towards the unequivocal support for their illegal- ity.31 Pro-nuclear opinion in different countries claims that because we live in an uncertain world, it is rational that their own states develop or keep nuclear weapons (seemingly ignoring the point that what is rational for one country in this regard is the recipe for rational nuclear possession universally). There is no doubt that we live in an uncertain world, but the point is that the predictable uncertainties of nuclear pro- liferation (the increased dangers of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war, the increased risk of nuclear material being acquired by terrorists, etc.) are more threatening than the unpredictable uncertainties of aboli- tion (treaty ‘break-out’, cheating, etc.). If the trends to nuclear prolif- eration are not stopped almost immediately, then we face the prospect of a new nuclear age, this time with many more nuclear powers, com- plex security dilemmas, and the problems resulting from confrontations between states whose nuclear weapons systems and command and con- trol arrangements are less technologically sophisticated than those of the long-established nuclear powers. The world was lucky to escape the first (largely bipolar) nuclear age without a catastrophe; it will be luckier still to survive a multipolar age characterised by nuclear contagion.32

Prolif escalates scenarios for nuclear war – deterrence fails

Taylor no date - chairman, NOVA, Damascus, nuclear weapons designer, PHd (Theodore B. Taylor, “Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” [http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/pdfs/taylor.pdf)//FK](http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/pdfs/taylor.pdf%29/FK)

Nuclear proliferation is greatly enhancing the likelihood of nuclear war. It dramatically increases the number of scenarios for small-scale nuclear wars or nuclear terrorism, that could escalate to nuclear war between the superpowers. Deterrence, the cornerstone of national security in present strategies, fails against nuclear terrorism simply because there are no welldefined targets against which to retaliate.

Nuclear Proliferation threatens a collapse of global restraints – causing widespread nuclear use

Cirincione 11 – president of the Ploughshares Fund, a public grant-making foundation focused on nuclear weapons policy and conflict resolution. (Joseph Cirincione, “A Global Assessment of Nuclear Proliferation Threats” WMDC, 2011, <http://www.blixassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/No10.pdf>)//FK

Despite decades of disarmament efforts, global nuclear arsenals remain dangerously high and two new nations are now pursuing nuclear weapons programs. The danger is not just that the nuclear club could grow from the current eight to nine or ten nations, but that a new breach in the nuclear dam could unleash a flood of new entrants, collapsing global restraints and making every regional crisis a potential nuclear crisis. New nuclear weapon states may be less restrained in their nuclear use doctrines. Further, if North Korea, Iran or other nations in volatile regions develop nuclear weapons production capabilities, they might, willingly or unwillingly, share, sell or otherwise transfer weapons, materials or skills to terrorist groups.

Prolif destabilizes international norms – most likely scenario for nuclear conflict

Cirincione 11 – president of the Ploughshares Fund, a public grant-making foundation focused on nuclear weapons policy and conflict resolution. (Joseph Cirincione, “A Global Assessment of Nuclear Proliferation Threats” WMDC, 2011, <http://www.blixassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/No10.pdf>)//FK

There are also dangers inherent in the maintenance of thousands of nuclear weapons by the United States and Russia and the hundreds of weapons held by China, France, the United Kingdom, Israel, India, and Pakistan. While each state regards its nuclear weapons as safe, secure, and essential to its security, each views other nations’ arsenals with suspicion. The possibility of accidental or inadvertent use remains. A decade after the Cold War ended, thousands of warheads in the United States and Russia are on hair-trigger alert, ready to launch in 15 minutes. The centrality that each nuclear weapon state accords to its nuclear weapons raises the value other nations perceive in these weapons. Recent advocacy by some in the United States of new battlefield uses for nuclear weapons even in nonnuclear conflicts further expands their perceived utility. Russia, France, India and Pakistan match this advocacy with policies that also envision using nuclear weapons to counter conventional military threats or chemical or biological weapons use. 4 For a more complete treatment of this issue, see Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Carengie Endowment Report, June 2004). Available at www.ceip.org/strategy.5 The development of new warhead designs in the United States could soon lead to new nuclear tests. The five NPT nuclear weapon states have not tested since the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, and no state has tested since India and Pakistan did in May 1998. New U.S. tests would almost certainly trigger tests by other nations, collapsing the CTBT, which is widely seen as a pillar of the nonproliferation regime. To the extent that the leaders of a given state are contemplating acceding to U.S. or international nonproliferation demands, these leaders may feel a strong need for equity so that they can show their publics that giving up nuclear aspirations and capabilities is fair. It is more difficult to demonstrate such equity when nuclear weapon states reassert the importance of nuclear weapons to their own security, develop new uses for nuclear weapons, resist progress toward disarmament, or make veiled nuclear threats. If the number of states with nuclear weapons increases, the original nuclear-weapon states fail to comply with their disarmament obligations, and states such as India gain status for having nuclear weapons, it is possible that Japan, Brazil, or other nations will reconsider their nuclear choices. Most nations will continue to eschew nuclear weapons, if only for technological and economic reasons, but others may decide that nuclear weapons are necessary to improving their security or status. The result would destabilize the international security and political system

Extinction – small scale war would create global climate change and nuclear famine

Nuclear darkness.org 12 – (“Nuclear War threatens human existence” [http://www.nucleardarkness.org/index2.php)//FK](http://www.nucleardarkness.org/index2.php%29/FK)

In a nuclear war, immense nuclear firestorms in burning cities would create millions of tons of thick, black, radioactive smoke. This smoke would rise above cloud level and quickly surround and engulf the entire Earth. The smoke would form a stratospheric smoke layer that would block sunlight from reaching the surface of Earth for a period of about ten years. Heated smoke in the stratosphere would cause massive destruction of the protective ozone layer. Huge amounts of harmful Ultraviolet light would penetrate the smoke and reach the surface of the Earth. Warming sunlight would be blocked by the smoke layer and cause the Earth to rapidly cool. In a matter of days, Ice Age weather conditions would descend upon all peoples and nations. Prolonged cold, decreased sunlight and rainfall, and massive increases in harmful UV light would shorten or eliminate growing seasons for a decade or longer. Nuclear famine would result for the 800 million people who already suffering from hunger and malnutrition. A war fought with 1% of the deployed and operational nuclear weapons could cause up to a billion people to die from nuclear famine. A large nuclear war, fought with the nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, would surely kill most humans and many other complex forms of life on Earth.

Nuclear war creates extinction – forms a nuclear blackout

Nuclear darkness.org 12 – (“Nuclear War threatens human existence” [http://www.nucleardarkness.org/index2.php)//FK](http://www.nucleardarkness.org/index2.php%29/FK)

Nuclear Haze

Nuclear war between India and Pakistan could put 5 million tons of smoke in the stratosphere and produce a global Nuclear Haze that would block 7-10% of warming sunlight from reaching the surface of Earth and cause the blue skies of Earth to appear grey. Nuclear Twilight & Nuclear Darkness The U.S and Russia keep more than 2000 strategic nuclear weapons on high-alert. These weapons are 7 to 85 times more powerful than the atomic bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. They are mounted on many hundreds of missiles that can be launched with 30 seconds to 3 minutes warning. Scientists predict that urban firestorms ignited by a nuclear war fought with 4400 US and Russian strategic nuclear weapons could loft 180 million tons of smoke into the stratosphere. The resulting global smoke layer would block 35% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Southern Hemisphere, creating a Nuclear Twilight on Earth. In the Northern Hemisphere, 70% of sunlight would be absorbed by the stratospheric smoke layer. Beneath the smoke there would be Nuclear Darkness. Nuclear arsenals must be eliminated, because if they are left intact, they will eventually be used. Nuclear weapons must be outlawed, dismantled and abolished. A draft treaty, or Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, has been prepared by civil society organizations and submitted to the United Nations. Nuclear weapon states are obligated (under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) to negotiate in good faith to achieve such a treaty to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

## \*\*\*Defense \*\*\*

## \*\*\*Deterrence

## ---Defense

**Mutual deterrence does not hold up against terrorists and rogue states – their evidence assumes rationality**

Krieger and McCraken, 9 – Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and McCracken is the 2003 Ruth Floyd Intern in Human Rights and International Law at the NAPF (David and Angela, “Ten Myths About Nuclear Weapons,” 20 July 2009, wagingpeace.org/menu/issues/nuclear-weapons//*HO*

10. Nuclear weapons are needed to combat threats from terrorists and “rogue states.” It has been argued that nuclear weapons are needed to protect against terrorists and “rogue states.” Yet nuclear weapons, whether used for deterrence or as offensive weaponry, are not effective for this purpose. The threat of nuclear force cannot act as a deterrent against terrorists because they do not have a territory to retaliate against. Thus, terrorists would not be prevented from attacking a country for fear of nuclear retaliation. Nuclear weapons also cannot be relied on as a deterrent against “rogue states” because their responses to a nuclear threat may be irrational and deterrence relies on rationality. If the leaders of a rogue state do not use the same calculus regarding their losses from retaliation, deterrence can easily fail. As offensive weaponry, nuclear force only promises tremendous destruction to troops, civilians and the environment. It might work to annihilate a rogue state, but the amount of force entailed in using nuclear weaponry is indiscriminate, disproportionate and highly immoral. It would not be useful against terrorists because strategists could not be certain of locating an appropriate target for retaliation.

**Empirics prove – proliferation undermines deterrence.**

**Kroenig 09 –** Assistant Professor of Government at Georgetown University and Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations (Matthew Ph.D., “Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation”, November 2 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Beyond-Optimism-and-Pessimism.pdf>)//AB

Proliferation optimists counter that nuclear **proliferation should increase regional stability**, but the most recent **empirical investigations undermine** the stronger versions of the optimism argument.49 While nuclear-armed states may be less likely to experience full-scale war providing some support for the optimist position, the preponderance of evidence suggests that **nuclear-armed states are more likely to engage in** other types of **militarized disputes**.50 This is true whether only one state or all of the contentious actors in a region possess nuclear weapons.51 Furthermore, for the sake of argument, **even if nuclear proliferation does have stabilizing effects as optimists argue, as long as regional conflict among nuclear-armed states is possible,** the basic argument presented here still holds. This is because **power-projecting states may still feel compelled to intervene in the conflicts that do occur.** These are conflicts that they perhaps could have avoided had nuclear weapons been absent.

**Deterrence fails, based on flawed Cold War ideologies**

Gartzke and Jo 9 Department of Political Science University of California, San Diego and Department of International Relations University of Seoul, Republic of Korea (Erik Gartzke and Dong-Joon Jo, “Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes”, Journal of Conflict Resolution Volume 53 Number 2, April 2009, 211)//AS

Whether or to what degree efforts by advocates to engineer credibility succeeded and what effect these efforts had on the Cold War are subjects of considerable debate (Gaddis 1989; LeFeber 2002; Lebow and Stein 1995). Strategies such as brinkman- ship were perceived to be useful by some participants, while others practiced détente, presumably also out of a sense that this was in the national interest (Gaddis 1983). Part of the ambiguity may result from a false rhetoric of Cold War politics. Kennan’s (1947) influential notion of containment enshrined the status quo as the nominal U.S. strategic objective (Gaddis 2005).1 The Soviets pushed, and the United States resisted. Yet Kennan’s conception and most discussions of deterrence ignore a more dynamic reality in which the United States, protected by its nuclear umbrella, was able to pur- sue ambitious revisions of the international order. Nations that opposed U.S. interests were forced to decide whether they were willing to play chicken with a nuclear power in advancing preferred objectives. The United States probably was not willing to risk nuclear war over many policies, but opponents were similarly constrained. Few could credibly threaten the United States in more than a peripheral manner when a direct attack meant nuclear retaliation. Nuclear weapons thus provided a cushion permitting the freer exercise of conventional force and contained conflict to distant places.

**Optimists are blind to the real world. Deterrence fails.**

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Existing arguments thus offer contradictory conclusions about nuclear prolifera- tion and its effects on conventional conflict. At least some of the source of the dialec- tic lies in differing (and incomplete) theoretical frameworks. Optimists, who focus on the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, ignore psychological and informational aspects of proliferation. Pessimists are more attuned to the role of perception in inter- national affairs but fail to differentiate the stochastic and equilibrium consequences of claims. Work in other contexts notes that contrasting conclusions about cause and effect in international competition derive from different, typically implicit assumptions about risk propensity (Bueno de Mesquita 1981). The nuclear dialectic appears also to hinge on contrasting claims about human behavior, with optimists arguing that fear inhibits, while pessimists emphasize that anger may spiral into aggression. At the same time, both perspectives assume that while capabilities evolve, policy positions do not. Shifts in military potential brought about by nuclear proliferation almost cer- tainly alter the balance of power, but whether capability shocks increase or decrease the likelihood of militarized disputes depends on how diplomats respond to these evolving conditions. Leaders might err on the side of caution or recklessness in esti- mating relative power. Citizens could become apprehensive or enraged by new strategic threats. But whether these reactions lead to war or to peace depends, in large part, on what diplomatic bargains nations fashion in the shadow of fear, anger, and nuclear weapons.

**Deterrence ignores global complexity**

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Deterrence is a special case of coercive foreign policy in which the demand the deterring nation makes is the status quo. The claims of proliferation optimists hinge on the assertion that nuclear nations do not expand their objectives as they increase their capabilities. Yet proliferators face incentives to do just this. While often couched in terms of deterrence, brinkmanship involves an attempt by at least one nation to challenge and alter the status quo. If a challenger is equipped with nuclear weapons, then either this capacity is not being exercised or the challenger is using its nuclear status to seek to compel not deter. Scholars generally agree that compellence does not reduce the risk of conflict. It follows that the risk of war is contingent on what is being demanded by both sides and that what is being demanded is in turn subject to the expectations of competitors. Countries with a nuclear advantage must choose between spending some or all of this advantage on security (freedom from harm) or influence (discretion over outcomes). The bounded nature of any budget means that a country cannot increase its security and influence with the same increment of power. A country that only sought to deter could lower the probability of experienc- ing a dispute, but to do so, the country must refrain from pursuing any changes in the status quo that might be opposed by other nations. Countries with nuclear weapons that want to alter the status quo have the potential to do so but again, only by increas- ing opposition and, in turn, the risk of conflict. Nuclear nations may prefer security to influence, but this is a more idiosyncratic claim than the assertion that nuclear sta- tus deters. There is a case to be made on either side of the debate. Not all nations pro- liferate. Those that do must be different in some way from those that do not. One way that proliferators might differ from nonproliferators is in their valuation for influence. The pessimist view sees proliferation porridge as hot. Nuclear weapons may feed a political appetite that exceeds the national grasp, exacerbating instability and encour- aging conflict. Proliferation might also cause other countries to underestimate the nuclear country’s capabilities or resolve. Disagreements about the efficaciousness of nuclear weapons, rapid changes in the balance of power brought about by nuclear weapons, or secrecy could lead nations to misperceive. Finally, nuclear weapons could encourage leaders to act precipitously or without consulting with opponents.

**Deterrence relies on one sided equilebria, which dooms the theory to failure**

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For nuclear weapons to inhibit conventional conflict, proliferation must discourage aggression from other states without at the same time encouraging the nuclear state to become more aggressive. For nuclear weapons to increase conventional dispute behav- ior, states with nuclear weapons must become more aggressive without their opponents responding by becoming more circumspect. Predictions from both perspectives hinge on partial equilibria frameworks in which one actor adjusts its behavior in response to the nuclear capability shock, while other actors do not. Instead, both nuclear nations and their opponents may adjust roughly simultaneously to the presence of nuclear capabilities. States with nuclear weapons become more ambitious, while their coun- terparts become more tractable. Indeed, if both powerful nations and pariahs prolifer- ate in large part to gain greater influence, then nuclear-capable countries are particularly likely to seek to realize increased influence through mechanisms that are more diplomatic than military. The spread of nuclear weapons is neither pacific nor chaotic but reflects an evolution of the struggle for influence that has always charac- terized world affairs. The largest impact of nuclear weapons is likely to be in terms of what nations bring to the bargaining table and what they take home. Our analysis offers some evidence that nuclear weapons matter less for war and peace than is generally presumed. Nuclear-capable states do not appear to differ sig- nificantly in terms of their dispute propensity once we address the tendency of states to proliferate. Instead, it is in the realm of diplomatic wrangling and bargained set- tlements that we observe a significant shift associated with nuclear weapons. Our analysis of diplomatic recognition shows that nations with nuclear weapons are more likely to garner attention from other countries. Similarly, opponents of nuclear states are more likely to attempt to settle ongoing conflicts and to settle them peacefully. If the acquisition of nuclear weapons is costly and time consuming, then prolifera- tion should appeal disproportionately to the most insecure countries or those with the biggest defense budgets. Nations facing major threats may find that proliferation is an avenue to secure primary interests, while affording greater freedom to pursue broader objectives, such as aiding allies or wielding influence in the face of powerful oppo- nents. The richest states have more flexibility in designing national defense. While nuclear weapons are less fungible than conventional forces, countries with substantial conventional capabilities may find that the declining marginal value of additional con- ventional defense effort reduces the opportunity cost of building nuclear weapons. In contrast, nations with friendly neighbors, limited budgets, or that are satisfied with their lot in the world system are unlikely to proliferate. While nuclear weapons may have little impact on the potential for conventional contests, our “middle path” argu- ment suggests that nuclear weapons significantly affect the international status quo. One need not draw a sword to make its presence felt. If diplomacy involves the poli- tics of the possible, then proliferation changes the possibilities. It is the parallel between shifts in relative power brought about by nuclear weapons and the diplomatic response that helps to explain the apparent nonimpact of nuclear weapons.

**Deterrence empirically fails prefer our ev. It is the only ev to incorporate the incomplete equilibria**

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The need for immediate deterrence indicates that general deterrence has previously failed (Danilovic 2001). If general deterrence succeeds, crises and wars do not occur. Since general deterrence necessarily precedes immediate deterrence, the analysis of general deterrence is more fundamental to an understanding of international conflict than is an analysis of immediate deterrence. Furthermore, because of selection effects, examining immediate deterrence without consideration of general deterrence can lead to mislead- ing empirical results. As Fearon (2002:15) observes, “hypotheses that are valid for general deterrence should appear exactly reversed if we look at cases of immediate deterrence.” Unfortunately, a divide exists between formal theories and the empiri- cal analysis of deterrence. One reason for this divide is that while formal theories have focused on general deterrence, the quantitative literature has focused almost exclusively on immediate deterrence (Huth 1999). Important exceptions include Weede (1983), who examined extended deterrence in the cold war, and Sorokin (1994), who examined the impact of alliance for- mation on extended general deterrence within the Arab–Israeli conflict. Given their focus on extended deterrence, these studies are unable to pro- vide insight on direct general deterrence. Huth and Russett (1993) did examine direct general deterrence within the context of enduring rivalries. They find that the balance of forces, arms races, and domestic conflict are all important determinants of deterrence outcomes. However, they do not directly test any specific theory of deterrence; indeed, formal theories of general deterrence have never been subjected to direct empirical testing. Indeed, this problem has unfortunately plagued formal theories through- out political science (Green and Shapiro 1994), not only in the study of deterrence. This is unfortunate since deterrence theory appears to shed great light on the dynamics of deterrence, yet without extensive empirical analysis, one cannot know how well these theories explain real-world phe- nomena. One reason for this lack of testing is that, while selection of imme- diate deterrence cases has received a great deal of attention (for example, Huth and Russett 1984, 1988, 1990; Huth 1988), criteria for the selection of general deterrence cases have remained elusive. This paper has two related purposes. The specific purpose is to fill this evidentiary gap by subjecting perfect deterrence theory—a recently devel- oped theory of general deterrence—to a systematic test. I do so for several reasons. First, perfect deterrence theory (Zagare and Kilgour 2000) is sup- ported by a formal logic with explicit theoretical expectations that facilitates empirical testing. Second, several preliminary tests of perfect deterrence theory have rendered promising, albeit provisional results (Senese and Quackenbush 2003; Quackenbush and Zagare 2006).1 And finally, as Huth (1999) points out, standard formulations of deterrence—to the extent that they have been explored empirically—are without compelling support. The more general purpose is to develop the conceptualization and pro- cedures to make such a test possible. This is necessary to bridge the divide between formal theories and quantitative analyses of deterrence. Key con- ceptualizations include case selection for direct general deterrence—I argue that identifying opportunity for conflict is the key. In addition, this paper offers the first direct test of incomplete information equilibrium predictions made by formal deterrence theory. Conducting such a test requires mea- surement of the utilities the actors have for the different outcomes that may emerge, so a modification of the measurement procedures developed by Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) is used. Also, since incomplete infor- mation equilibria depend on each state’s estimate of the opponent’s credi- bility, a nonlinear transformation technique is developed to estimate the credibility parameters. To test perfect deterrence theory, I examine general deterrence from 1816–2000. After detailing the equilibrium predictions of perfect deterrence theory’s unilateral deterrence game, I more fully discuss the research design used to test them, including case selection, measurement of variables, and statistical method. In the next section, I discuss the empirical results and the theory’s ability to explain general deterrence and international conflict. The results indicate that perfect deterrence theory is well supported by the empirical record. Finally, I compare these findings to previous results sup- porting Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman’s (1992) international interaction game that is the basis of one of the most influential and important theories of interstate conflict.

**Deterrence doesn’t check -- Realism.**

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Traditional Arguments: The Realist Camp Traditionally, thinking about proliferation has been dominated by one or another variant of realism. According to what one might call the ‘‘hard’’ realist point of view, in international anarchy the ‘‘absolute weapon’’ is so obviously beneficial for states that only supply-side factors such as the lack of enriched uranium can (temporarily) hold them back.3 Meanwhile, according to what one might call the ‘‘soft’’ realist point of view, states that acquire the bomb may be buying themselves problems as well as opportunities; but if a state is faced with existential threats and cannot rely on the help of a nuclear-armed ally, given sufficient means it will have to ignore the potential difficulties and go nuclear itself.4 In fact, when one considers the deductive logic of these claims, it becomes evident that the soft realist point of view\*though intuitively more appealing\*quickly slides into the hard one. For one thing, it is hard to see why, from a realist perspective, anything less than an indigenous nuclear arsenal would be sufficient to deter outside threats. Realists spent the entire Cold War bemoaning the lack of credibility of extended deterrence: Could anyone really expect us to trade New York for Berlin? This was a rhetorical question.5 Second, on a deeper level, even if nuclear guarantees could be made credible, from a realist perspective they would be woefully insufficient to guarantee a state’s long-term security. This is because at the very core of realism lies the notion that friends today may become enemies tomorrow \* and a nuclear war would be over in the blink of an eye, while nuclear weapons take a long time to develop and deploy. Thus, the dominant strategy of states is to go for the bomb themselves and thus avoid any unpleasant surprises.6 President Charles de Gaulle’s pointed declaration that France’s force de frappe was directed not only toward the east but tous azimuts \* in all directions \* was textbook realism.7 In sum, adopting the realist vision of international relations inexorably leads to the conclusion that all states that can go nuclear, should go nuclear\*and the sooner, the better. If they have not done so yet, it is simply a matter of time before they do. The core realist prediction about proliferation is that some event will inevitably come along \* sooner rather than later\*that finally causes the dam to break and the world to go nuclear.

**The deterrence theory is wrong- deterrence does not apply to preventing nuclear war**

**Arbatov ‘6** (Alexei, PhD History and Dir. Center for International Security, Institute of the World Economy and International Relations and Russian Academy of Sciences, Russian Politics and Law, “Nuclear Deterrence and Proliferation The Dialectics of “Doomsday Weapons””, 44:5, September-October, 35-60)

The enormous ambivalence of nuclear deterrence in the contemporary world)-brw

The enormous ambivalence of nuclear deterrence in the contemporary world can be explained by one factor: in contrast to prevailing views, deterrence has only rarely and for short periods of time been understood in the narrow sense, as a strategy for preventing nuclear war. Much more frequently, deterrence has been interpreted in the expanded strategic sense, usually implying that a country has to be the first to use nuclear weapons. That is another contradiction implicit in nuclear deterrence: it implies the readiness to unleash nuclear war. Fortunately, for the past half-century, this apocalyptic paradox has remained theoretical, but it threatens to become practical in the future because of nuclear proliferation and an increase in multilateral nuclear relations among countries. The idea of nuclear deterrence has become so much a part of international military and political relationships that it is perceived everywhere as quite rational, even inevitable. We agree that nuclear deterrence is, of course, less irrational than nuclear war, especially war between nuclear powers. If, however, we approach the problem not from a purely military and strategic standpoint but from a sociopolitical one, we cast serious doubt on the rationality of deterrence. Even “minimum deterrence,” the most defensive (because it rejects the idea of a first strike) and stabilizing version of this strategy, is rather paradoxical. After all, it proposes to kill tens of millions of another nation’s civilians in retaliation for an adversary’s nuclear strike. The act of retaliation is irrational, first, because the massacre of some other country’s population will not restore one’s own dead citizens to life or restore one’s own destroyed material values. Moreover, unlike the strategic bombing of Germany and Japan in World War II, a nuclear strike does not affect the enemy’s ability to continue the war, which depends entirely on what remains in the enemy’s nuclear arsenal and on the functioning of its command-and-control system. Second, in the pre-nuclear age a country could not begin and wage war without the support of at least part of its population. A nuclear war, however, can be unleashed without the consent of the people, merely by delivering the High Command’s order to those on duty in the controlrooms for the missile launchers (the latest command-and-control systems can even bypass these individuals by sending the signal directly to the launchers). Although the main target of a retaliatory nuclear strike, the public has no direct responsibility for its supreme leaders’ decision to initiate hostilities. This is especially true of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, where the public not only does not elect its leaders but may have no particular value in their eyes. The leadership of the People’s Republic of China, for instance, demonstrated such an attitude when, in the 1950s–60s, it preached total war as a path to “final victory” over imperialism. In the late 1970s, suspecting the Soviet leaders of similar attitudes, U.S. President Jimmy Carter approved what he referred to as a “countervailing strategy” in his Presidential Directive (PD) 59 [Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy—Ed.]. It ordered delivery of strikes against targets that presumably the Soviet leaders “valued” above all else—their own lives, meaning the destruction of protected underground bunkers and antinuclear shelters and other shelters for the party–state leadership.1 Understandably, this policy caused extreme pain in the USSR, where people dubbed it “the decapitating-strike strategy” and regarded it as a new, outrageously aggressive manifestation of U.S. strategy favoring a pre-emptive strike against the USSR. Other attempts to rationalize nuclear deterrence, as a rule, also had the opposite effect. For example, attempts to strengthen the capacity of strategic nuclear forces to deliver retaliatory strikes against an enemy’s reserve strategic forces—those that may not participate in a first strike—are invariably perceived as increasing the chances for a pre- emptive strike rather than for retaliation. This reaction is not entirely without foundation: missile launch silos, submarine and bomber bases, and regions of ground-based ICBM deployment are the same targets that a first strike must take out to avoid retaliation or to reduce its damage. The usual response to such strategic experiments, in addition to increasing the viability of one’s own strategic nuclear forces, was raising the priority of the concept and the technological systems that would be used in a retaliatory strike and plans for the more massive use of weapons. On the whole, if one side tried to give deterrence more credibility by making it more usable (through selective targeting and limited- impact schemes, plans to restrict the number of warheads, various combinations of small-scale nuclear strikes, etc.), the other side usually saw it as greater aggressiveness in nuclear strategy—an orientation toward a pre-emptive strike and plans for victory in a nuclear war. The greatest paradox of nuclear deterrence is that the potential outcome that best represents the unthinkable nature of nuclear war (massive strikes, maximum destructive consequences, rapid and unconditional retaliation) would be the worst option if at some point deterrence did not work and nuclear weapons were used in real life. At the same time, attempts to incorporate more “rational” options into nuclear forces and operative planning lower the “nuclear threshold” and inevitably weaken the concept of deterrence. One more, perhaps the most important, indication of the paradoxical nature of deterrence is that no other type of weapon so greatly requires effective control by the political leadership—taking into account the catastrophic consequences of using such weapons, especially by mistake. At the same time, it is without a doubt more difficult, if not impossible, to ensure real political control over the use of nuclear arms than over any other type of weapon. The travel time of ballistic missiles is so short (from ten to thirty minutes) that political leaders, even if they reached the command- and-control center in advance, would not have enough time to make a thorough assessment of the situation and a deep and well-considered decision on whether to use nuclear weapons, on which human survival depends. The leadership must, in essence, either act on autopilot— following the algorithm of a solution developed by experts in peacetime, long before the crisis arose and without making allowances for all the diversity of political reality—or do nothing at all, taking the chance that no retaliatory strike will take place. This makes it extremely likely that someone will unleash nuclear war through miscalculation or a technical error.

**Deterrence fails - Crisis’ change the decision making paradigm – actors will inevitably be irrational**

**Cimbala, 2007**

[Stephen, Distinguished Prof. Pol. Sci. – Penn. State Brandywine, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND DETERRENCE IN ASIA: THE VIEW FROM VLADIVOSTOK”, 20, InformaWorld]

There is no “magic number” of nuclear-armed states that guarantees a first use of nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century. States will not become irrational on account of the possession of nuclear weapons: indeed, there is some experience during and after the Cold War to suggest that states might become more careful, rather than less. Many variables intrude here: including the intensity of regional rivalries; ethno-national and religious feelings; and, most immediately pertinent to our concerns, the pros and cons for deterrence and crisis stability of the forces them- selves. Nevertheless, the propensity of heads of state for committing mili- tary follies should never be underestimated: especially by students of history and political science. The “rationalities” of states are not of the black box variety. States’ world views and decision making processes are the product of internal as much as external forces. A U.S. model of deterrence rationality may fail drastically in the imminent circumstances of a regional crisis. The strate- gic reach of Russian or American nuclear forces against lesser nuclear powers should not be overestimated. Iranians with scores to settle against Israel, Chinese intent upon annexation of Taiwan, or North Koreans seek- ing to intimidate Japan and South Korea, may not believe U.S. threats of preemption or retaliation. Russia’s policy of providing air defense mis- siles to Iran, increasing the difficulty of Israeli or American preemptive air strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities, ironically invites the erosion of Russia’s own deterrence perimeter once the Iranians are nuclear capable.Downloaded by [University of Michigan] at 12:36 20 July 2011 *Nuclear Proliferation, Deterrence in Asia* ***63*** U.S. intelligence cannot be guaranteed to provide timely and accurate warning of nuclear attack by regional revisionist actors against neighbors: or others. U.S. intelligence has not infrequently been the victim of strate- gic or operational-tactical military surprise by non-Western opponents: from Pearl Harbor to 9–11. Timely and accurate intelligence is even less likely on the intentions or capabilities of non-state actors, compared to states. Intelligence on the best of days can give likelihoods and maybes for policy makers to mull over. One of the major risks of nuclear weapons spread in Asia is the possibility that states with first strike vulnerable nuclear forces will “use them or lose them” on the basis of faulty indica- tions and warning.

**No deterrence—rogue regimes**

**Payne 6--** President and co-founder of the National Institute for Public Policy (“Nuclear Deterrence for a New Century” Spring 2006 - Number 10, http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2006/10/payne.php]//AY

War deterrence is *not* appropriate vis-à-vis contemporary opponents. As President Bush emphasized on May 20, 2003: *The contemporary and emerging missile threat from hostile states is fundamentally different from that of the Cold War and requires a different approach to deterrence and new tools for defense. The strategic logic of the past may not apply to these new threats, and we cannot be wholly dependent on our capability to deter them. Compared to the Soviet Union, their leaderships often are more risk prone … . Deterring these threats will be difficult. There are no mutual understandings or reliable lines of communication with these states…*[14](http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2006/10/payne.php#footnotes)The typical threat now confronting the U.S. is that of regional rogue powers led by a variety of tyrants and dictators who may not be the prudent, attentive, well-informed leaders we assumed the Soviets to be during the Cold War. Rogue leaders have few shared characteristics except, as Ian Buruma has observed in *The New York Review of Books*, “they all have one quality in common: striving for absolute power consigns them to a world of lies.”[15](http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2006/10/payne.php#footnotes) The contemporary challenge facing U.S. strategic planners is to understand such leaders sufficiently well to establish tailored policies of deterrence that “work” more by design than by luck. The difficulty of such an approach has been suggested by Mahdi Obeidi, the former director of Iraq’s nuclear centrifuge program: *…the West never understood the delusional nature of Saddam Hussein’s mind. By 2002, when the United States and Britain were threatening war, he had lost touch with the reality of his diminished military might. By that time I had been promoted to director of projects for the country’s entire military-industrial complex, and I witnessed firsthand the fantasy world in which he was living … sort of like the emperor with no clothes, he fooled himself into believing he was armed and dangerous. But unlike that fairy-tale ruler, Saddam Hussein fooled the rest of the world as well.*[16](http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2006/10/payne.php#footnotes)We believed we had great insight into the thinking of the Soviet leadership, could communicate well with its officials, and that those leaders ultimately would behave in well-informed, reasonable and predictable ways. Consequently, we could be wholly confident deterrence would “work.” But today, there is no basis for comparable faith with regard to rogue regimes. In their day, early proponents of the Cold War balance of nuclear terror claimed with great confidence that the “principles that underlie this diplomacy of violence” are valid across time, place and culture.[17](http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2006/10/payne.php#footnotes) More recently, journalists and editorials from prominent newspapers repeat the same Cold War mantra: “The logic of deterrence transcends any particular era or enemy.”[18](http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2006/10/payne.php#footnotes) If that were so, deterrence truly could be easily understood and practiced. But such a comforting notion was coherent only with the mirror-imaging and unique conditions of the Cold War—and even then only barely so. Today, confidence in the predictable functioning of deterrence is well and truly a thing of the past. It no longer can be considered predictable with confidence, nor can old axioms from MAD serve as a basis for designing our post-Cold War security policies and forces. This is certainly not a rejection of deterrence writ large,[19](http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2006/10/payne.php#footnotes) but a lowering of expectations that traditional deterrence can be expected to function reliably and predictably and a rejection of the old “good” and “bad” force categorizations derived from MAD.

## ---Offense

**Deterrence fails: it incentivizes an attack, success is non-verifiable, and interstate confusion**

Lebow 8 James O. Freedman Presidential, Professor of Government, Eneritus @ Dartmouth Professor of War Studies, King's College London, July 2012 Bye-Fellow, Pembroke College, Cambridge. B.A., University of Chicago M.A., Yale University Ph.D., City University of New York . (Richard Ned Lebow, “Deterrence”, Routledge International Encyclopedia of Peace, 2008, 8-10)//AS

From the beginning, deterrence theory and strategy has spawned critiques. The most interesting are those that evaluate deterrence strategy in the light of empirical evidence from historical cases. The work of Milburn (1959), Snyder and Diesing (1977), George and Smoke (1974), Lebow (1981), and Jervis, Lebow, and Stein (1984) is representative. George and Smoke recognized that challenges short of full-scale attacks – what they called “probes” – were difficult to deter and might be instituted by adversaries to test a state’s resolve. They and Milburn attempted to put deterrence into a broader context and argued that it might be made a more efficacious strategy if threats of punishment were accompanied by promises of rewards for acceptable behavior. An important distinction must further be made between general and immediate deterrence (Morgan 1983). General deterrence is based on the existing power relationship and attempts to prevent an adversary from seriously considering any kind of military challenge because of its expected adverse consequences. Immediate deterrence is specific; it attempts to forestall an anticipated challenge to a well-defined and publicized commitment. Immediate deterrence is practiced when general deterrence is thought to be failing. It is almost impossible to know when general deterrence succeeds because non-action by a target state can be the result of many reasons, including any lack of intention to use force. Because cases of immediate deterrence success and failure are somewhat easier to identify, most research has sought to explain their outcomes. Analyses of immediate deterrence that ignore its relationship to general deterrence offer a biased assessment of its success rate and an incomplete picture of the conditions and processes that account for its outcome. For many years, however, empirical research on deterrence, whether qualitative or quantitative, drew primarily on cases of immediate, conventional deterrence. Empirical studies of immediate deterrence are surrounded by considerable controversy in the absence of compelling evidence about the intentions and calculations of the leaders of target states (Huth and Russett 1984, 1988; Lebow and Stein 1990). Beginning in the late 1980s, evidence on Soviet and Chinese foreign policy began to become available, and it became possible for the first time to reconstruct critical Soviet-US and Sino-US deterrence encounters and to make some observations about the role of general deterrence in these relationships. It transpired that there had been striking differences among leaders on opposing sides about who was practicing deterrence and who was deterred. In many so-called deterrence encounters (Garthoff 1989; Lebow and Stein 1990), both sides considered themselves the deterrer. This is often due to different interpretations of the status quo. In the Cuban missile crisis (Lebow and Stein 1994), Khrushchev understood the secret Soviet missile deployment in Cuba to be part and parcel of his attempt to deter a US invasion of Cuba. Kennedy and his advisors interpreted the deployment as a radical and underhanded effort to upset the strategic status quo.

**Turn: Deterrence leads to more prolif**

**Hymans, 06** (JacquesE. C. Hymans is an Assistant Professor at the School of International Relations University of Southern California;

Second, on the specific conditions that might cause proliferation, idealists say: Watch the bomb’s stock price. Many idealists worry especially about the signals about the value of the bomb that are sent by the United States and the great powers more generally. For instance, the more blatantly nuclear weapon states disregard their prior commitments to engage seriously in nuclear disarmament negotiations and the more they incorporate the option of nuclear strikes in their war fighting doctrines, the stronger the signal they send that nuclear weapons are worth having. That signal will not go unnoticed.

## ---A2: US First Strike

**US first strike triggers every impact – war with China, Russia, global terrorism, and economic collapse.**

**Kroenig 12** – Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (Matthew, “Time to Attack Iran”, January/February 2012; [www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136917/matthew-kroenig/time-to-attack-iran](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136917/matthew-kroenig/time-to-attack-iran))//AB

The fact that the United States can likely set back or destroy Iran’s nuclear program does not necessarily mean that it should. Such an **attack could have** potentially **devastating consequences -- for** international security, the **global economy**, and Iranian domestic politics -- all of which need to be accounted for. To begin with, critics note, U.S. military action could easily **spark a full-blown war**. Iran might retaliate against U.S. troops or allies, launching missiles at military installations or civilian populations in the Gulf or perhaps even Europe. It could **activate its proxies abroad**, stirring sectarian tensions in Iraq, disrupting the Arab Spring, and **ordering terrorist attacks against Israel and the United States**. This could draw Israel or other states into the fighting and compel the United States to **escalate the conflict** in response. Powerful allies of Iran, **including China and Russia**, may attempt to economically and diplomatically isolate the United States. In the midst of such spiraling violence, neither side may see a clear path out of the battle, resulting in a long-lasting, devastating war, whose impact may critically damage the United States’ standing in the Muslim world. Those wary of a U.S. strike also point out that Iran could retaliate by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow access point to the Persian Gulf through which roughly 20 percent of the world’s oil supply travels. And even if Iran did not threaten the strait, speculators, fearing possible supply disruptions, would bid up the price of oil, possibly triggering a wider economic crisis at an already fragile moment.

**US first strike doesn’t solve Iranian proliferation – spurs even more development and hostility.**

**Kroenig 12** – Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (Matthew, “Time to Attack Iran”, January/February 2012; [www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136917/matthew-kroenig/time-to-attack-iran](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136917/matthew-kroenig/time-to-attack-iran))//AB

Critics have another objection: even if the United States managed to eliminate Iran’s nuclear facilities and mitigate the consequences, the effects might not last long. Sure enough, there is no guarantee that an assault would deter Iran from attempting to rebuild its plants; it may even **harden Iran’s resolve to acquire nuclear technology as a means of retaliating** or protecting itself in the future. The United States might not have the wherewithal or the political capital to launch another raid, forcing it to rely on the same ineffective tools that it now uses to restrain Iran’s nuclear drive. If that happens, U.S. action will have only delayed the inevitable.

**US first strike can’t solve proliferation – spurs hard-liners to prolif faster.**

**Kahl 12** – Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Senior Fellow at Center for a New American Security; former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East (Colin H., “Not Time to Attack Iran”, March/April 2012; < http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137031/colin-h-kahl/not-time-to-attack-iran>)//AB

Even if a U.S. strike went as well as Kroenig predicts, there is little guarantee that it would produce lasting results. Senior U.S. defense officials have repeatedly stated that an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities would stall Tehran's progress for **only a few years**. Kroenig argues that such a delay could become permanent. "Those countries whose nuclear facilities have been attacked -- most recently Iraq and Syria," he writes, "have proved unwilling or unable to restart their programs." In the case of Iraq, however, Saddam Hussein restarted his clandestine nuclear weapons program after the 1981 Israeli attack on the Osirak nuclear reactor, and it required the Gulf War and another decade of sanctions and intrusive inspections to eliminate it. Iran's program is also more advanced and dispersed than were Iraq's and Syria's, meaning it would be easier to reconstitute. A U.S. strike would damage key Iranian facilities, but it would do nothing to reverse the nuclear **knowledge Iran has accumulated** or its ability to eventually **build new centrifuges**. A U.S. attack would also likely **rally domestic Iranian support around nuclear hard-liners**, **increasing the odds** that Iran would emerge from a strike even **more committed to building a bomb.** Kroenig downplays the "rally round the flag" risks by noting that hard-liners are already firmly in power and suggesting that an attack might produce increased internal criticism of the regime. But the nuclear program remains an enormous source of national pride for the majority of Iranians. To the extent that there is internal dissent over the program, it is a discussion about whether the country should acquire nuclear weapons or simply pursue civilian nuclear technology. By demonstrating the vulnerability of a non-nuclear-armed Iran, a U.S. attack would provide ammunition to hard-liners who argue for acquiring a nuclear deterrent. Kroenig suggests that the United States should essentially ignore "Iran's domestic political tussles" when pursuing "its vital national security interest in preventing Tehran from developing nuclear weapons." But influencing Iranian opinion about the strategic desirability of nuclear weapons might ultimately offer the only enduring way of keeping the Islamic Republic on a peaceful nuclear path. Finally, if Iran did attempt to restart its nuclear program after an attack, it would be much more difficult for the United States to stop it. An assault would lead Iran to distance itself from the IAEA and perhaps to pull out of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty altogether. Without inspectors on the ground, the international community would struggle to track or slow Tehran's efforts to rebuild its program.

**US first strike breaks down deterrence and forces escalation.**

**Kahl 12** – Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Senior Fellow at Center for a New American Security; former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East (Colin H., “Not Time to Attack Iran”, March/April 2012; < http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137031/colin-h-kahl/not-time-to-attack-iran>)//AB

Kroenig nevertheless believes that the United States could limit the prospects for escalation by warning Iran that crossing certain "redlines" would trigger a devastating U.S. counterresponse. Ironically, Kroenig believes that a nuclear-armed Iran would be deeply irrational and prone to miscalculation yet somehow maintains that under the same leaders, Iran would make clear-eyed decisions in the immediate aftermath of a U.S. strike. But the two countries share no direct and reliable channels for communication, and the inevitable confusion brought on by a crisis would make signaling difficult and miscalculation likely. To make matters worse, **in the heat of battle, Iran would face powerful incentives to escalate.** In the event of a conflict, both sides would come under significant pressure to stop the fighting due to the impact on international oil markets. Since this would limit the time the **Iranians** would have to reestablish deterrence, they might **choose to launch a quick, all-out response, without care for redlines**. Iranian fears that the United States could success-fully disrupt its command-and-control infrastructure or preemptively destroy its ballistic missile arsenal could also tempt Iran to launch as many missiles as possible early in the war. And the decentralized nature of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, especially its navy, raises the prospect of unauthorized responses that could rapidly expand the fighting in the crowded waters of the Persian Gulf. Controlling escalation would be no easier on the U.S. side. In the face of reprisals by Iranian proxies, "token missile strikes against U.S. bases and ships," or "the harassment of commercial and U.S. naval vessels," Kroenig says that Washington should turn the other cheek and constrain its own response to Iranian counter-attacks. But this is much easier said than done. Just as Iran's likely expectation of a short war might encourage it to respond disproportionately early in the crisis, so the United States would also have incentives to move swiftly to destroy Iran's conventional forces and the infrastructure of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. And if the United States failed to do so, proxy attacks against U.S. civilian personnel in Lebanon or Iraq, the transfer of lethal rocket and portable air defense systems to Taliban fighters in Afghanistan, or missile strikes against U.S. facilities in the Gulf could cause significant U.S. casualties, creating irresistible political pressure in Washington to respond. Add to this the normal fog of war and the lack of reliable communications between the United States and Iran, and Washington would have a hard time determining whether Tehran's initial response to a strike was a one-off event or the prelude to a wider campaign. If it were the latter, a passive U.S. approach might motivate Iran to launch even more dangerous attacks -- and this is a risk Washington may choose not to take. The sum total of these dynamics would make staying within Kroenig's **proscribed limits exceedingly difficult**. **Even if Iran did not escalate**, purely defensive moves that would threaten U.S. personnel or international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz -- the maritime chokepoint through which nearly 20 per- -cent of the world's traded oil passes -- would also create powerful incentives for **Washington to preemptively target Iran's military.** Of particular concern would be Iran's "anti-access/area-denial" capabilities, which are designed to prevent advanced navies from operating in the shallow waters of the Persian Gulf. These systems integrate coastal air defenses, shore-based long-range artillery and antiship cruise missiles, Kilo-class and midget submarines, remote-controlled boats and unmanned kamikaze aerial vehicles, and more than 1,000 small attack craft equipped with machine guns, multiple-launch rockets, antiship missiles, torpedoes, and rapid-mine-laying capabilities. The entire 120-mile-long strait sits along the Iranian coastline, within short reach of these systems. In the midst of a conflict, the threat to U.S. forces and the global economy posed by Iran's activating its air defenses, dispersing its missiles or naval forces, or moving its mines out of storage would be too great for the United States to ignore; the **logic of preemption would compel Washington to escalate.**

**Kroenig is wrong – Arab states will hate us for first strike.**

**Kahl 12** – Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Senior Fellow at Center for a New American Security; former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East (Colin H., “Not Time to Attack Iran”, March/April 2012; < http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137031/colin-h-kahl/not-time-to-attack-iran>)//AB

A strike could also set off wider destabilizing effects. Although Kroenig is right that some Arab leaders would privately applaud a U.S. strike**, many on the Arab street would reject it**. Both **Islamist extremists** and embattled elites could use this opportunity to transform the Arab Spring's populist antiregime narrative into a decidedly anti-American one. This would rebound to Iran's advantage just at the moment when political developments in the region, chief among them the resurgence of nationalism in the Arab world and the upheaval in Syria, are significantly undermining Iran's influence. **A U.S. strike could easily shift regional sympathies back in Tehran's favor** by allowing Iran to play the victim and, through its retaliation, resuscitate its status as the champion of the region's anti-Western resistance.

**First strike makes containment and deterrence impossible.**

**Kahl 12** – Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Senior Fellow at Center for a New American Security; former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East (Colin H., “Not Time to Attack Iran”, March/April 2012; < http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137031/colin-h-kahl/not-time-to-attack-iran>)//AB

A strike carried out in the way Kroenig advocates -- a **unilateral preventive attack** -- **would** also **make** **postwar containment more difficult** and costly. Many countries would view such an operation as a breach of international law, shattering the consensus required to maintain an effective poststrike containment regime. The likelihood that the United States could "reduce the political fallout of military action by building global support for it in advance," as Kroenig suggests, would be extremely low absent clear evidence that Iran is dashing for a bomb. Without such evidence, Washington would be left to bear the costs of an attack and the resulting containment regime alone. Finally, the surgical nature of Kroenig's proposed strike, aimed solely at Iran's nuclear program, would make postwar containment much harder. **It would leave Tehran wounded and aggrieved but still capable of responding.** Kroenig's recommended approach, then, would likely be just enough to ensure a costly, long-term conflict without actually compelling Iran to change its behavior.

## ---AT: Cold War Proves

**Now is uniquely key—proliferation is at the heart of IR and less international checks than the Cold War**

**Keller 3—**Bill, former NYT executive editor and a Times columnist and a senior writer for the magazine.(“The Thinkable” 5/4/03,

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/04/magazine/04NUKES.html?pagewanted=all]//AY

What Pakistan has unwittingly memorialized is a new nuclear era. A dozen years after the Soviet Union crumbled, nuclear weapons have not receded to the margins of our interest, as many expected. On the contrary, in this second nuclear age, such weapons govern our foreign policy more than they have in decades. We have been slow to wake up to this new order, but now we are in it with a bang. We just fought a war that began as a drive to disarm one tyrant with nuclear ambitions and to demonstrate America's resolve to others. There are so many ways to think about the war we have just concluded in Iraq that it is easy to overlook this one: it is the most audacious attempt to change the rules of arms control in half a century. Nuclear proliferation is at the heart of our confrontations with North Korea and Iran, two states for whom the message of Iraq was intended. Proliferation is a persistent irritant in our relations with Russia and China, has contributed to America's official disappointment with the United Nations and is intimately intertwined with the consuming issue of our time, terrorism. The first nuclear age, which began over Hiroshima, eventually matured into a great standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union. Despite a number of nuclear near misses during that confrontation's first 20 years -- the Berlin showdown, the Cuban missile crisis -- the two rivals slowly brought their fearsome weapons under control and negotiated a protocol for living with them. During the same period, other potential nuclear states were restrained -- by treaties, by the threat of sanctions and other diplomatic pressures, by the superpowers' semi-monopoly on technology and by the fact that weak nations could huddle under the nuclear protection of one bloc or the other. The alliances, Soviet and American, had a strong interest in limiting the number of states with nuclear weapons, and they generally kept things in check. In its way, the cold war worked. In hindsight, you could say that the closing act of the first nuclear age took place in January 1994, when Ukraine agreed to give up the nuclear weapons it had inherited in the breakup of the Soviet Union. It was the last of the former Soviet states to relinquish its unconventional weapons, and probably the only one with the technological wherewithal to override Moscow's centralized control systems and become an overnight nuclear state. But at that time, possession of nuclear weapons was still understood as a serious impediment for a country seeking admission into the Western world. If you wanted to join the party, you checked your nukes at the door. The first Bush administration and then the Clinton administration bargained hard for the surrender of Ukraine's weapons, promising abundant financial aid and a military partnership that Ukrainians hoped would lead to American security guarantees. However, an attentive listener back then might have sensed that the old verities were beginning to lose their power. Ukrainian nationalists (including many Ukrainian-Americans) raised a serious clamor for retaining the weapons. Why should Russia, which has a history of throwing its weight around, be a nuclear power and not Ukraine? Who will take us seriously without the Bomb? Some of the diplomats who negotiated the end of Ukraine's nuclear interlude are not so sure that today their appeal would successfully withstand the riptide of nationalism.

**Terrorists change the game**

**Keller 3—**Bill, former NYT executive editor and a Times columnist and a senior writer for the magazine.(“The Thinkable” 5/4/03,

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/04/magazine/04NUKES.html?pagewanted=all]//AY

Moreover, there is the danger of third-world weapons or weapons-grade material falling into the hands of terrorists -- the one enemy we know would probably not hesitate to use them. Sympathy for Taliban-style fanaticism thrives in the lower ranks of Pakistan's military, for example. American and Pakistani officials, and experts in rival India, say that Gen. Pervez Musharraf has Pakistan firmly under his control, but nobody imagines that the situation is foolproof. Or that Musharraf will endure forever. ''Then it's not a question of one or two warheads being diverted,'' said a senior administration official. ''It's a question of a couple dozen Islamic bombs.'' Even if a rogue state does not share weapons with terrorists, a nuclear Iran or North Korea or an extremist-led Pakistan could provide sanctuary to terrorists, and the United States might hesitate to pursue killers into a nuclear-armed refuge. Add to this the fear that emotional temperatures can spike when patriotism is tied up with national or religious identity. These are the same passions that have, at their worst, fed outbreaks of genocide, sectarian atrocities and suicide bombing. At the Wagha border crossing, where I left India for Pakistan, soldiers of the two countries stage a ritual every day at dusk. They shoulder rifles, compose their faces in warlike resolve and march straight at one another, stopping only when they are close enough to smell one another's breath. It is purely symbolic, but the symbolism is not abstract. India and Pakistan have fought three wars -- and India has mobilized for war twice in the past 18 months, following terrorist attacks by Kashmiri militants based in Pakistan. In the first nuclear age, centered on Europe and the cold war, we were on familiar ground. The second, though, is happening across a swath of Asia and is steeped in historic grudges, suppressed national pride and regional ambitions that the West poorly understands, let alone controls. Henry Sokolski, who was Defense Secretary Dick Cheney's deputy for nonproliferation policy in the first Bush administration, recalls leaving office in 1993 brimming with optimism. Communism was dead. Rampant democracy and rising prosperity would dispel the appetite for these awful weapons. ''We had worked to end nuclear programs in Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Ukraine,'' said Sokolski, who now runs a conservative antiproliferation center. ''It seemed all these countries were drifting away from tyrannical, authoritarian rule, and I thought: There's the formula! It's working!'' The optimists were soon disillusioned, with regard to both the proliferation of democracy and the proliferation of weapons. With the demise of the two big alliances, countries that had existed in the shadows of the superpowers were left to settle their own scores and to see to their own security. For India, which conducted a nuclear test in 1974 but left the program on idle, the end of the cold war meant a rising profile for China, a longtime antagonist -- and a nuclear power. China, in turn, was helping arm Pakistan. And in this newly disordered world, nuclear weapons were a way to announce that India intended to be a player. ''Whatever Indians say officially, there is a status attached to the bomb,'' said Kanti Bajpai, a political scientist and nuclear critic, when I rode out to see him on the campus of Jawaharlal Nehru University. ''The five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council are all nuclear powers.''

**Counterproliferation and failed treaties reflect a new world order**

**Keller 3—**Bill, former NYT executive editor and a Times columnist and a senior writer for the magazine.(“The Thinkable” 5/4/03,

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/04/magazine/04NUKES.html?pagewanted=all]//AY

In the nuclear world, traditionalists talk about ''nonproliferation.'' The new school prefers the more muscular term ''counterproliferation,'' which refers to a subset of activities involving the military. It should not surprise you to learn that under President Bush, the White House office responsible for these issues has renamed itself to incorporate the word ''counterproliferation.'' Iraq was the first ''counterproliferation'' war. There are serious tactical differences within the administration about how thoroughly to purge the legacy of old-fashioned arms control. But the senior policy makers in the area of arms control -- at the Pentagon, the State Department and the White House -- are pretty uniformly of the diplomacy-has-failed school. The principal players, like Under Secretary John Bolton at State, Under Secretary Douglas Feith and Assistant Secretary J.D. Crouch at Defense and Robert Joseph, who runs the nuclear franchise at the National Security Council, have voluminous records as fierce critics of the arms-control gospel from their days on the outside. The counterproliferationists put little faith in treaties. Last year they successfully discarded the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, which prohibited weapons to shoot down incoming missiles for fear that this kind of defense would ignite a new arms race. The White House has sworn that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which would do what its name suggests, will never be ratified. As for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which entered into force in 1970 and is supposed to limit the spread of nuclear technology and material, the administration accepts it as a bequest from the past but regards it as pointless. Only those who find it in their interest to obey will do so, Bush officials say, and the rest will cheat. To the counterproliferators, the main problem is not nuclear weapons; it is bad regimes armed with nuclear weapons. Treaties and test bans, they say, limit the behavior of only the kinds of law-abiding people who obey treaties -- people like us. Thus the administration opposes any treaties that might inhibit us from developing new additions to our nuclear arsenal. And counterproliferators insist on our right to explore new species of nuclear weaponry, like precision-guided bunker-busters to cope with defenders who have buried their defenses under thick layers of concrete. The logic at times resembles the tautology of an N.R.A. bumper sticker: If nukes are outlawed, only outlaws will have nukes. The Bush policy is to worry about the outlaws rather than the nukes. In the world of nuclear affairs, they are the party of new ideas. The first was missile defense, reviving the Reagan-era scheme to intercept incoming ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads by using killer rockets, lasers and other devices. Since abandoning the A.B.M. treaty last year, the administration has raced to deploy the first antimissile batteries, even before demonstrating that they are reliable. Missile defenses are generally presented as the answer to a rogue nuke from a regime like North Korea or a missile obtained by terrorists. But their actual purpose is more complicated. What missile defenses are supposed to do is give America greater freedom of action as it goes about the missions it sets for itself -- protecting allies, for example, or disarming new threats. In theory, missile defense means a thug with a nuke cannot hold us at bay.

**Decline in US hegemony proves**

**Friedman 6—**Thomas L, written extensively on [foreign affairs](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_affairs) including global trade, the Middle East, and environmental issues and has won the [Pulitzer Prize](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pulitzer_Prize) three times (“The Post-Post-Cold War” NYT, 5/10/06,

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/10/opinion/10friedman.html?\_r=1&\_r%021.]//AY

I actually don't think we're going back to the cold war. I think we're going forward. We're leaving the world we've been in — the post-cold-war world — and entering the post-post-cold-war world. Americans won't like the post-post-cold-war world, unless they get serious about energy. The cold-war world was a bipolar world, stabilized by a nuclear balance between two superpowers. The post-cold-war world was, for Americans, a unipolar belle époque, in which an American Hyperpower, as the French dubbed it, seemed to dominate the global scene, economically and strategically — a scene characterized by a steady expansion of free markets and freely elected governments. The post-post-cold war is a multipolar world, where U.S. power is being checked from every corner. China is rising as a power, thanks to hard work and high savings. Beyond China, though, other powers are rising thanks only to soaring oil prices — powers that were on the decline in the post-cold war. These are: Vladimir Putin's Russia, which is countering the U.S. on a variety of fronts; Hugo Chávez's Venezuela, which is Castro's Cuba on steroids in the post-post-cold-war world, leading a new wave of nationalizations and anti-Americanism in Latin America; and, of course, Iran — using its oil windfall to go nuclear. Yes, $70-a-barrel oil is making this post-post-cold-war world a multipolar world. "It's the 'axis of oil,' " says Michael Mandelbaum, author of "The Case for Goliath." "It is more lasting and more important than terrorism — and we don't have any policy for it." Not only are others becoming more assertive: the U.S. has become less intimidating. With Americans bleeding in Iraq, with George Bush hugely unpopular in Europe and with the U.S. two-party system so warped it can't even respond to a crisis like energy, America is not as feared as it was. "In 2002 and 2003 everyone was talking about the American 'Hyperpower,' " said Eric Frey, editor of the Austrian daily Der Standard. "No one these days is talking about overwhelming American power, and that has even added to the anti-Americanism. Because before you had resentment and respect, and now you have resentment and scorn." At the same time, the re-emergence of Russia has gotten the attention of Eastern Europe. Hungary gets more than half of its natural gas from Russia. Lately, some Hungarians have started to recall an old cold-war joke: After the Hungarian soccer team beat the Soviet team, the Kremlin sent Hungary's leaders a brief telegram that read: "Congratulations on your victory. Stop. Oil stop. Gas stop." "If you had asked me five years ago, I would have told you the whole story is finished — no more Russian bear," said Pal Reti, editor of HVG, the Hungarian economic magazine. "They have so many problems themselves they would not have time to care about others' problems. But I've found that they have another set of priorities and they now have the muscle" to act on them. Yes, Russia no longer has much of an army or any ideology, but it still has a lot of brutish instincts, and now it has the oil money to push them. In the post-cold-war world, European integration and economic reform seemed irreversible and certain to make Europe into a world democratic power. But in the post-post-cold war, Europe can't unite on anything — even on an energy policy — so it is being pushed around by Russia. "I am very pessimistic about Western Europe — and that is new," remarked Lajos Bokros, a professor of economics at the Central European University in Budapest. Too many Western Europeans "are not competitive enough" and "do not want to implement the reforms." Unless Europe chooses the high-growth Irish model, as opposed to the French, Italian and German models, Mr. Bokros added, "the whole European region will decline further and become insignificant and irrelevant for this global game." For all these reasons, I don't miss the cold war, but I do miss the post-cold war. Because this post-post-cold-war world seems infinitely more messy, difficult to manage and full of way too many bad guys getting rich, not by building decent societies, but by simply drilling oil wells.

**Cold War models fail—deterrence theory has changed**

**Payne 6--** President and co-founder of the National Institute for Public Policy (“Nuclear Deterrence for a New Century” Spring 2006 - Number 10, http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2006/10/payne.php]//AY

From the outset, however, extreme confidence in Mutual Assured Destruction required specific assumptions about human decision-making, the character of the United States and the Soviet Union, and the context of the Cold War itself. For MAD to work predictably, certain conditions in the U.S.-Soviet relationship had to exist: leaders would communicate in times of crisis well enough to comprehend their respective threats and thresholds for nuclear retaliation; they would conduct a well-informed, unemotional, and rational cost-benefit assessment of the potential consequences of brinkmanship and conflict; and they ultimately would prudently decide that the disincentives to taking provocative actions would outweigh any incentives to the contrary. During the Cold War, each of these characteristics simply was assumed to exist in U.S.-Soviet deterrence relations. We chose to believe that Soviet leaders would be “sensible” and calculating after our own fashion, meaning that they would inevitably choose to be cautious in the face of a nuclear threat to cities; that caution was the only “rational” choice and guaranteed deterrence. By viewing Soviet leaders essentially as the mirror images of ourselves, we could take for granted the conditions necessary for stable deterrence, and conclude that it would function reliably. Over time, this proposition became a comforting Cold War tautology—the lethality of our strategic nuclear threat ensured deterrence against all but the irrational because only the irrational would not be deterred by the lethality of our strategic nuclear threat. Former National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy expressed this view all too well in his classic 1969 Foreign Affairs article. “In the light of the certain prospect of retaliation there has been literally no chance at all that any sane political authority, in either the United States or the Soviet Union, would consciously choose to start a nuclear war,” Bundy wrote. “This proposition is true for the past, the present, and the foreseeable future. For sane men on both sides, the balance of terror is overwhelmingly persuasive.”3 Why? Because, according to Bundy, “…a decision that would bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city of one’s own country would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder; ten bombs on ten cities would be a disaster beyond history; and a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are unthinkable.”4 Nuclear deterrence thus was considered “easy” to understand and to guarantee.5 It became a simple function of balance. Mutual nuclear threats to cities ensured stable mutual deterrence, and such vulnerability was easy to orchestrate with nuclear weapons. Viewing deterrence through this MAD prism led us to limit or reject supposedly “destabilizing” strategic forces, including imposing strict limitations on ballistic missile defense (BMD) development, testing and deployment, quantitative limitations on the deployment of Minuteman and later Peacekeeper ICBMs, and accuracy limitations on strategic ballistic missile warheads. In particular, missile defense became a long-term casualty of our confidence in MAD. Critics argued successfully for decades that because MAD could be made reliable through the balance of terror, BMD offered nothing of value and in fact could upset “stability” by threatening “the other side’s deterrent.” It came to be seen as the “enemy” of deterrence and U.S. arms control. To be sure, we did not limit or reject these capabilities solely because our preferred deterrence paradigm deemed them “destabilizing.” But, as Ted Greenwood concludes in his study of U.S. Cold War strategic force acquisition practices, its effect could be decisive.6 During the Cold War, MAD was the “the supreme dogma of the ascendant branch of the defense and arms control communities,”7 and it was solidly against BMD and other supposedly destabilizing strategic forces. The comforting but now vapid Cold War refrain that deterrence will “work” reliably certainly continues to be heard today—a sort of all-purpose argument against new nuclear capabilities, and against missile defense. The confidence in deterrence that typified the Cold War now is presumed to apply to post-Cold War rogue threats—as if the dramatic changes in opponent and context are irrelevant. Thomas Friedman of the *New York Times*, for example, has written: “What deters them today is what will always deter them—the certainty that if they attack us with weapons of mass destruction their regimes will be destroyed. In other words, what is protecting us right now from the most likely rogue threat … is classic deterrence.”[8](http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2006/10/payne.php#footnotes) One of the most important developments in the Bush administration’s thinking is a rejection of strategic planning based on unwarranted confidence in the predictability of deterrence. This more sober view of what to expect from deterrence is not predicated upon the simplistic assumption that rogues are somehow incapable of rational decision-making, or that deterrence must fail, as some have wrongly suggested.[9](http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2006/10/payne.php#footnotes)Rather, it is based on a recognition that the characteristics we assumed to be in place in the U.S.-Soviet deterrence relationship, courtesy of mirror imaging, manifestly do not pertain to America’s relations with rogue states. In the contemporary threat environment, there is quite likely to be a relative lack of mutual familiarity and understanding, leaders may not be well informed, communications may not be reliable, opponents may not calculate according to our definition of “sensible,” and deterrence may not be a simple function of force balances. In these circumstances the predictable functioning of deterrence is likely to be the exception, rather than the norm. McGeorge Bundy and others asserted as a universal proposition that deterrence would work because, “a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are unthinkable.”[10](http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2006/10/payne.php#footnotes) By doing so, Bundy revealed far more about what he believed to be “unthinkable” than articulating any universally shared sensibility or value. In the past, leaders have been more than willing to run the risk of utter societal destruction in pursuit of their goals. Some, such as Adolf Hitler and Japan’s War Minister in 1945, Korechiki Anami, welcomed the destruction of their own societies; Hitler actually promoted it. PRC Chairman Mao Zedong disparaged U.S. nuclear capabilities because, “Even if U.S. atom bombs… were dropped on China, blasted a hole in the earth or blew it to pieces, this might be a big thing for the solar system, but it would still be an insignificant matter as far as the universe as a whole is concerned.”[11](http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2006/10/payne.php#footnotes) Mao disdained the deterrent effect of U.S. nuclear forces, writing dismissively of potential Chinese losses, “All it is is a big pile of people dying.”[12](http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2006/10/payne.php#footnotes) A line from Mao’s poetry reads, “Atom bomb goes off when it is told./ Ah, what boundless joy!”13 The threat of “a hundred bombs on a hundred cities” may have been “unthinkable” to an American defense intellectual like McGeorge Bundy, but that tells us nothing about whether deterrence will or will not function reliably against others. Within the Bush administration and the armed services there is growing recognition of this reality, and of the fact that Cold

## ---EXT/New Actors

**New actors and information revolution prove—we assume your warrants**

**Dobbs 4--** attended the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in Medford, Massachusetts, funded by a job as feature writer for the Boston Globe, and graduated in 1975 with an M.A., M.A.L.D., and PhD in nuclear defence studies (“The world's most terrifying danger, then and now” *The Washington Post* [Washington, D.C] 17 Oct 2004, Proquest]//AY

When the father of the American atomic bomb, J. Robert Oppenheimer, first saw the now-familiar mushroom cloud rising from the desert of New Mexico in 1945, legend has it that he murmured a phrase from a sacred Hindu text, the Bhagavad Gita: "Now I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds." For the first half of the nuclear age, that ability to unleash Armageddon was confined to a select club of more-or-less "responsible" powers: the United States, the Soviet Union, and later Britain, France and China. While U.S. leaders hated the idea of their communist adversaries possessing the bomb, Washington at least trusted Moscow and Beijing to act in their own self-interest and refrain from blowing up the entire planet -- the grim premise behind the Cold War doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction. Over the past two decades, however, the nuclear club has burst wide open as Israel, Pakistan, India, North Korea and perhaps now Iran have gained access to "world-destroying" weapons. As three new books demonstrate, the rules of the nuclear game have changed radically since John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev went eyeball- to-eyeball in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The information revolution, combined with stunning scientific advances, permitted third-rank dictators Saddam Hussein and Kim Jong Il to pursue destructive technologies that were once the preserve of the great powers. It seems only a matter of time -- perhaps a decade or two, perhaps less -- before even nonstate terrorist groups are also able to get their hands on weapons of massive destruction. In their first presidential debate, both President Bush and Sen. John Kerry agreed that nuclear proliferation is the deadliest national security threat now confronting the United States. In The Bomb in My Garden: The Secrets of Saddam's Nuclear Mastermind (Wiley, $24.95), a former Iraqi nuclear scientist, Mahdi Obeidi, describes in jaw-dropping detail how Iraq acquired the means to produce highly enriched uranium, the key ingredient to building a nuclear weapon, by the eve of the first Gulf War. Had Saddam Hussein not made the fatal mistake of invading Kuwait in August 1990, he probably would have possessed a crude atomic bomb by 1992 or 1993, insulating his regime from the threat of foreign invasion. Relatively unknown in the West until recently, Obeidi was the Iraqi scientist responsible for developing a gas centrifuge, the most direct and efficient route to enriching uranium. After U.N. arms inspectors forced Iraq to close its nuclear weapons program following the 1991 Gulf War, he buried a prototype of his centrifuge in his backyard in Baghdad (hence his book's title). After the fall of Baghdad in April 2003, Obeidi turned over this last remnant of the Iraqi nuclear program to the United States and teamed up with American reporter Kurt Pitzer to write this book. The result offers insights into how a determined dictator, backed by sufficient resources, can come within reach of acquiring the world's most horrific weapons. It is a tale of cruelty and ruthlessness on the part of Hussein but also of naivete and greed on the part of Western scientists who enabled Iraq to take shortcuts toward becoming a nuclear power. Obeidi's early centrifuge experiments ended in failure in January 1988. But with the help of American, French and above all German scientists, he was able to create a reliable prototype by the spring of 1990, paving the way to mass production of enriched uranium. One German scientist, Bruno Stemmler, sold Iraq samples of many of the components of a centrifuge for just over a million dollars. A mysterious English- Pakistani businessman identified only as Malik agreed to provide 100 tons of high-grade hardened steel for $7 million. By Obeidi's calculations, this was enough steel to produce sufficient enriched uranium for 10 Hiroshima-type bombs a year. If a relatively well- off German scientist was willing to sell the key components of a centrifuge for $1 million, imagine how little it costs to bribe a desperately poor Russian or Ukrainian. Among the jarring juxtapositions in The Bomb in My Garden are the contrasts between the macabre nature of the nuclear-weapons trade and the reassuring surroundings in which the transactions took place: a tea shop in the London suburb of Wimbledon, a nightclub off the Champs-Elysees in Paris, a four-star hotel in Bonn. Strobe Talbott's latest book, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb (Brookings, $27.95), produces a similarly discombobulating effect on the reader. A former Time magazine journalist who served as deputy secretary of state under President Clinton, Talbott is at pains to present the Indian negotiators as cultured, reasonable individuals, even as they undermine the entire postwar system of international diplomacy. Talbott's account of the frenetic diplomacy that ensued after India tested three nuclear weapons on May 11, 1998, serves to underline why the bomb holds such allure for many developing-world governments. Until that moment, India was, in Clinton's phrase, the Rodney Dangerfield of nations -- never getting enough respect. Almost overnight, India shot to the top of Washington's agenda. After its enemy Pakistan replied with its own nuclear test a few weeks later, Clinton concluded that "the world was closer even than during the Cuban missile crisis to a nuclear war." Talbott's main Indian interlocutor was Jaswant Singh, the Indian foreign minister. Talbott presents Singh -- a leading foreign policy thinker from India's ruling Hindu nationalist party -- as charming and clubbable, the kind of person who would not seem out of place at a Georgetown dinner party. The two men quickly agree to first-name terms. Together they hold a series of 14 meetings in such agreeable surroundings as the rooftop restaurant of the Hotel Hassler in Rome and the Talbott kitchen table in Woodley Park. At the end of all this diplomacy, however, Talbott is forced to concede that Singh "came closer to achieving his objective in the dialogue than I did to achieving mine." He is taken aback when Singh has the poor taste to joke about the Indian bomb in a dinner skit at the end of a conference of Asian foreign ministers: Why such a fuss over a few crackers in the Thar? They weren't as loud as Nevada and Lop Nor. "There were a few more verses, all rubbing it in," sniffs Talbott. "The rest of the world would just have to get over its hypocritical tantrum and learn to live with an India that had the bomb. No one in the audience found Jaswant's performance amusing. " Such frustrations are enough to make Talbott nostalgic for the simple days when the United States and the Soviet Union stood ready to obliterate each other with tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. In High Noon in the Cold War: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Ballantine, $23.95), former New York Times editor and diplomatic reporter Max Frankel argues that the world did not come as close to nuclear annihilation in 1962 as is commonly believed. His thesis is that Kennedy and Khrushchev were "responsible and highly intelligent men" determined to prevent a nuclear war and "firmly in charge of both governments." Frankel believes that scholars, journalists and screenwriters have colluded with former Kennedy administration members like defense secretary Robert McNamara in a game of "literary brinkmanship" to exaggerate the danger the world faced during the missile crisis. Frankel has written an exciting, sparsely elegant account of the missile crisis, albeit one that contains little original research. But by focusing on what was happening in the White House and the Kremlin, he largely overlooks the much greater danger of events spinning out of control, despite Kennedy and Khrushchev's machinations. We now know that there were many more nuclear weapons in Cuba than the CIA believed, including dozens of tactical weapons whose primary purpose was to forestall an American invasion. While Khrushchev forbade use of these battlefield nukes without permission from Moscow, there were no physical controls over the weapons and no guarantees that they would not be used as part of a desperate last stand. Although Kennedy was working off of imperfect intelligence, he had a better intuitive understanding of the potential for disaster than most of his advisers. A commander of a Navy patrol boat in World War II, he had developed an acute awareness of the absurdities of war -- and the risks of miscommunication as orders worked their way down the chain of command. As JFK complained to an aide when a U- 2 spy plane on an air-sampling mission over the North Pole stirred Soviet fears of an imminent U.S. attack by blundering over Siberia at the height of the crisis, "There's always some sonofabitch who doesn't get the word." Four decades later, the world is in an infinitely more complicated -- and in some ways more dangerous -- place than it was during the Cuban missile crisis. Back then, at least we knew who the enemy was and where he would be most likely to strike. These days, we cannot be sure who the enemy is or who possesses the power to "destroy worlds."

**New nuclear states—North Korea, Iran prove a brutal new order**

**Keller 3—**Bill, former NYT executive editor and a Times columnist and a senior writer for the magazine.(“The Thinkable” 5/4/03,

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/04/magazine/04NUKES.html?pagewanted=all]//AY

Another reason nuclear weapons spread was that they could. In the first nuclear age, the secrets and ingredients of bomb-making were closely held. But the end of the cold war choked off political support for controls on the export of sophisticated technology and made borders more porous. In the second nuclear age, globalization seems to have made nuclear weaponry just another unsavory but probably uncontainable technology, like Internet porn. Poor countries can even finance their nukes by exporting other military material, as North Korea has done. ''Demand creates the market,'' George Tenet, the director of central intelligence, told Congress in February, and ''knowledgeable nonstate purveyors'' are increasingly available to supply it, leapfrogging the tedious pace of old-fashioned nuclear programs. ''The 'domino theory' of the 21st century may well be nuclear,'' Tenet said. Many critics, especially abroad, say the U.S. has played midwife to the new nuclear age by a lack of vigilance bordering on complicity. We may not be a peddler of nuclear weapons technology or a flouter of international protocols. But we are guilty of hypocrisy, bad example, permissiveness and carelessness. In the world's graduation from the first nuclear age to the second, we have been a great enabler. The United States has tended to look the other way when nuclear offenders happened to be useful allies. This is inarguably the case in Pakistan. We made little effort to shut down Pakistan's nuclear program during the 1980's, when the Pakistanis were valued partners in aiding Afghanistan's insurgency against the Soviet Union. We knew China was selling missiles to Pakistan, but we were also courting China to offset the Soviets. Although we have leaned recently on President Musharraf to make sure Pakistani nuclear capabilities stay home, we are reluctant to lean too hard, because he is now an indispensable ally against terrorists. ''We are doing pretty much what we did in the 80's,'' conceded an American official who deals with South Asia. ''The exigencies change, but the dilemma is still the same. You need Pakistan for some reasons, and therefore you cut the Pakistanis more slack than is prudent.'' Whether this is bad policy or just playing the hand history deals is a hard question. It is easy to say we should get tough on countries that fail to toe the line on proliferation, but how tough is enough? Do we crack down on Pakistan to the point where we endanger Musharraf, and get a new Taliban in his place? Some of our nuclear worries have grown because of a simple lack of attention. In 1994, President Clinton signed an agreement to supply North Korea with energy if it stopped reprocessing nuclear fuel into bomb-grade material. The deal averted a showdown, but afterward the Clinton administration -- diverted by other problems and intimidated by Congressional critics who said the deal was a sellout -- let things slide. Now, nine years later, the problem is back to haunt us. Bush officials love to castigate Clinton, calling his North Korea deal appeasement. In fact, the agreement could have been a successful first step in defusing a North Korean threat, but it became an excuse to kick the problem down the road. ''The United States has trained Iranian engineers at M.I.T., winked at Israel and certainly in the case of North Korea prevaricated and not paid enough attention,'' said Sokolski, the former Defense aide. ''Is it all our fault? No. But no American administration has done enough, not by a long shot.'' he world of people who worry about nuclear weapons for a living is divided into two hostile camps, which sometimes seem more absorbed in fighting each other than in containing the spread of nuclear weaponry. The traditional arms controllers are advocates of treaties, export controls, international agencies and sanctions -- an elaborate regime intended to avert the spread and use of nuclear weapons. They will tell you that arms control has worked, that the handful of countries we worry about as nuclear pretenders is the same handful we worried about 20 years ago. The number of nuclear states has held at eight (the U.S., Britain, France, Russia, China, Israel, India, Pakistan), plus, it is now presumed, North Korea. And several countries (Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan) have backed away. The arms controllers say that what is needed now is to shore up those multilateral disciplines, fortify their enforcement and restore the sense of taboo surrounding these weapons. At the heart of their argument is a conviction that nuclear weapons, per se, are a hazard of a unique kind, and that part of discouraging their spread is a willingness to reduce our own arsenals -- at least to minimal levels, and ideally, in some future verifiable realm, to nothing. Opposing the arms controllers is a new and ascendant camp, which asserts that the old constraints have broken down. Against the ineffectual diplomacy of traditional arms control, they offer a relatively coldblooded self-interest and confrontation most fulsomely demonstrated by the invasion of Iraq, although the menu of options includes surgical intervention, blockades, economic sanctions and the purely political muscle of public exposure and brutal candor.

**Cold War doesn’t prove—new nuclear actors and less control**

**Keller 3—**Bill, former NYT executive editor and a Times columnist and a senior writer for the magazine.(“The Thinkable” 5/4/03,

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/04/magazine/04NUKES.html?pagewanted=all]//AY

The second nuclear age was heralded by a rumble under the Rajasthani desert in 1998, as India's newly elected Hindu nationalist government detonated five test blasts. Two weeks later Pakistan followed suit. India's tests were a declaration of national pride, a sign of anxiety about its rival China and a caution to Pakistan. Pakistan's tests were more simply reciprocal. Announcing them, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif declared proudly, ''Today, we have settled the score.'' Both countries were known to be developing nuclear weapons, but they came out of the closet brazenly. These were nuclear weapons with a regional agenda, unveiled with a populist flourish. And they had a religious subtext -- the Hindu bomb, the Islamic bomb -- that has become more acute as fundamentalists of the two religions gain ground in their respective countries. India and Pakistan were, by many estimations, the forerunners of a new kind of nuclear power, ahead of the field but hardly alone. Iraq may be solved, but North Korea is regarded as already nuclear. Iran is believed to be moving rapidly toward acquiring nukes. Libya and Syria are watched with suspicion. Experts talk speculatively of the ripple effects -- of a nuclear Iran inspiring nuclear lust in Egypt, Turkey, even Saudi Arabia, of a nuclear North Korea prompting a breakout in Japan, South Korea, even Taiwan. Long experience without catastrophic mishap has made us, perhaps, a little complacent about nuclear weapons. The Indian and Pakistani tests caused a media frisson and some halfhearted sanctions, but the sense of urgency quickly passed. They were just tests, after all, and half a world away, and everyone knows using nuclear weapons at war is -- the word is on every diplomat's save-get key -- unthinkable. But each new country that gets nuclear weapons multiplies the potential for a war involving a nuclear state. And numbers are not the worst of it. The original nuclear era was primarily a boxers' clinch of two great industrial powers, each claiming to represent an ideology of global appeal. The second is about insecure nations, most of them led by autocrats, most of them relatively poor, residing in rough neighborhoods, unaligned with and resentful of Western power.

The arsenals of the first nuclear age were governed by elaborate rules and sophisticated technology designed to prevent firing in haste. Some of the newcomers are thought to have far less rigorous command and control, raising fears that the lines of authority could be abandoned in the heat of battle. The newer nuclear states, after all, are dealing with enemies close at hand -- minutes away by missile -- in conflicts that could unfold quickly.

## \*\*\*AT Iran\*\*\*

## ---A2: Deterrence

**Deterrence won’t stop Iran from acquiring weapons.**

**Edelman et al 11** – Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and US Undersecretary of Defense 2005-2009 (Eric S., “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran”, January/February 2011; < http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran>)//AB

Furthermore, the strategy that appears to be emerging as the default solution to these troubling outcomes -- a combination of **deterrence and extended deterrence -- has serious drawbacks**, and these are often downplayed or, worse, ignored. The conventional wisdom holds that U.S. security commitments can keep Iran in check, prevent U.S. allies in the Middle East from accommodating Tehran, and dissuade them from pursuing nuclear weapons. Yet both the willingness and the **ability of the United States to defend its partners in the region against a nuclear-armed Iran are questionable**. The United States was able to deter a nuclear-armed Soviet Union during the Cold War, but the foundations of its security arrangements then -- formal treaty guarantees and large U.S. military deployments on the territory of its allies -- are unlikely to materialize again soon. Although members of the Obama administration have stated that no option, including military force, should be taken off the table, they have done little to create a credible military option that would discourage Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons or contain it if diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions, or redlines fail to yield the desired results and Iran obtains nuclear weapons. By deploying additional U.S. air and naval forces in the Middle East, the United States could bolster its diplomatic efforts with coercive leverage, lay the foundation for an extended deterrence regime, and give itself the means to use force if a military campaign turns out to be the least bad option.

**Deterrence can’t contain the impact.**

**Edelman et al 11** – Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and US Undersecretary of Defense 2005-2009 (Eric S., “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran”, January/February 2011; < http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran>)//AB

One of the most important elements of a U.S. containment strategy would be extended deterrence, that is, discouraging Iran from attacking states in the Middle East. Over the past several years, it has become popular in policy circles to think that containing a nuclear-armed Iran, stabilizing relations between Iran and Israel, and preventing additional proliferation will require expanding U.S. security commitments to several U.S. allies and partners in the Middle East. In July 2009, for example, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton suggested that the United States would extend "a defense umbrella over the region" in order to prevent Iran from continuing to pursue nuclear weapons, to deter Iranian aggression if Tehran does acquire nuclear weapons, and also, presumably, to dissuade U.S. allies and partners from pursuing nuclear weapons as well. At first blush, a policy of extended deterrence might appear to be a sensible and effective approach. It played an important role in deterring a Soviet attack on the West and limiting nuclear proliferation during the Cold War. Seeking a nuclear-armed patron is an attractive option for states that are insecure but unwilling or unable to accept the burdens and risks of pursuing their own nuclear programs. In addition, the United States already has a strong foundation of alliances and security partnerships, including its long-standing "special relationship" with Israel; its close ties to Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates; and Turkey's membership in NATO. And it has unique capabilities that states in the region will almost certainly want to see used on their behalf, including ballistic missile defenses (which could be used to counter Iran's principal delivery methods) and early warning systems (which are particularly important given the short flight times of any missiles that might be launched from Iran toward its neighbors). **Yet a strategy rooted in extended deterrence could prove far more challenging and far less effective than most analysts and policymakers recognize.** Its proponents tend to draw heavily on the experience of the Cold War, but this parallel oversimplifies the problems that the United States would face if nuclear proliferation occurred in the Middle East. Throughout the U.S.-Soviet rivalry, the United States and the allies under its nuclear umbrella were not only aligned against a single overriding threat; they also had few serious security challenges among themselves, particularly as the rivalry between France and Germany dissipated in the 1950s and 1960s. Today, most Middle Eastern states view Iran as a threat, but their own relations remain tense, and in some cases even hostile. These cross-cutting rivalries could complicate U.S. efforts to establish an effective extended deterrence regime in the region, particularly if Washington pledged to defend both Israel and several Arab states.

**Iran will disregard deterrence – they’ll accept nuclear martyrdom or hand nukes off to terrorists.**

**Krepinevich et al 11** – President of Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and Contributor to Foreign Affairs (Andrew, “The War Over Containing Iran”, March/April 2011; < http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67474/dima-adamsky-karim-sadjadpour-and-diane-de-gramont-shahram-chubi/the-war-over-containing-iran>)//AB

The second school -- those subscribing to the hard-nosed doctrine of former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin -- would not accept the new strategic environment, maintaining instead that there is still time to forcibly remove Iran from the nuclear club, in much the same way as Israel approached Iraq's nuclear program in 1981 and, reportedly, the Syrian reactor in 2007. Many in this group would view Iranian leaders as reckless decision-makers, **ready to commit collective martyrdom or transfer nuclear weapons to radical proxies,** and therefore they would consider **nuclear deterrence irrelevant.** Others would argue that a stable MAD regime with Iran is impossible because Iranian decision-makers might misperceive Israel's strategic considerations. Appealing to the history of the Arab-Israeli wars, several of which were preceded by inaccurate Arab strategic estimates, the proponents of this view would emphasize the disproportionally higher price of miscalculation this time. Advocates of this school might question the value of terminating the policy of ambiguity, arguing that even a "bomb in the basement" preserves sufficient deterrent power, whereas disclosure might expose Israel to international pressure and stimulate a regional nuclear arms race.

**US extended deterrence can’t solve Iran prolif.**

**Krepinevich et al 11** – President of Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and Contributor to Foreign Affairs (Andrew, “The War Over Containing Iran”, March/April 2011; < http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67474/dima-adamsky-karim-sadjadpour-and-diane-de-gramont-shahram-chubi/the-war-over-containing-iran>)//AB

The first two strategies are already being applied, with greater than anticipated success. The Obama administration's unreciprocated attempts at engagement have exposed Tehran's intransigence, accentuated Iran's deep internal divides, and created an unprecedented degree of international cooperation to counter its nuclear program. Although the combination of robust **international sanctions and** high-tech **sabotage** **has not curtailed Iran's nuclear ambitions**, it has delayed their realization. The analysis provided by Edelman and his co-authors suggests that the third strategy -- beefing up U.S. **deterrence** capacity in the Persian Gulf -- **is unlikely to be effective.** They explain that Cold War-style **military deterrence will** probably **not wor**k with Iran because the **balance of power in the region is less stable**, Arab **governments are unlikely to welcome** more U.S. troops, and the United States' **commitment** to protecting the Middle East **is weaker** than its Cold War commitment to Europe.

## \*\*\*AT: Rationality\*\*\*

## ---Asymmetry

**Rationality doesn’t check—assymmetry, failed deterrence, and military power plays**

**McKenzie 1—**Kenneth F, Major General, honors graduate of the Armor Officer Advanced Course, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the School of Advanced Warfighting, include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit w/ two gold stars, the Bronze Star, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal w/2 gold stars, the Navy Commendation Medal, and the Combat Action Ribbon, John A. Lejeune Award from Marine Corps Command and Staff College, the Clifton B. Cates Award from the School of Advanced Warfighting, and the Thomas Jefferson Distinguished Professor Award from the Virginia Military Institute. (“The Rise of Asymmetric Threats: Priorities for Defense Planning” 2001, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CEYQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fkms1.isn.ethz.ch%2Fserviceengine%2FFiles%2FISN%2F101010%2Fichaptersection\_singledocument%2F101f39d5-6580-4e66-a186-c840ee989772%2Fen%2FChap03.pdf&ei=RqgFUNmRGoS69QTHtfHGBw&usg=AFQjCNFr3oJNZm4OCuqaLTalDiveyEiYAQ&sig2=VyKLBvCtEuZZrJ\_0cud3lA]//AY

It is difficult to conceive of a rational actor electing to employ nuclear weapons against the United States in a direct strategic attack. To do so would invite its own annihilation. The deterrent effect of a U.S. response, however, might erode in a war in which the regional actor sees events going badly against it. If it looked as though the United States and its al- lies planned either to bomb a country into submission or to occupy its capital, then that country would have little to lose; in such a Götterdäm- merung scenario, the possibility of actual use would become likely. In an extended MTW, aggressive U.S. efforts to destroy or to neutral- ize a foe’s nuclear delivery structure might result in another response fa- miliar from the Cold War: a “use ’em or lose ’em” response. An opponent cannot stand to see its strategic trump card taken away. This does not imply that the Armed Forces should never attempt to do this, but it must be prepared for an adversary to use its weapons if we engage in aggressive WMD reduction during a regime-threatening war. A threat to use nuclear weapons directly against the U.S. homeland is a powerful asymmetric measure. It achieves clear strategic effect and op- erates directly against the will of the United States. Such an approach might tend to make the United States rethink just where its vital national interests lie. Many of these asymmetric advantages could be lost, however, if a threat were actually carried out. A nuclear attack would provoke a powerful and unrelenting response from the United States. There is a fine line between the positive disproportionate strategic effect achievable bythe possession of nuclear weapons and the potentially disastrous conse- quences of their actual use against the United States. The use of nuclear weapons by nonstate actors against the United States is the least likely alternative because of the difficulty of procuring, infiltrating, and emplacing the weapon. It is, however, a possibility and may ultimately prove the most troubling of all the strategic nuclear threats. Such an attack could be just as damaging as anything launched by a state actor, but the United States would find it difficult to establish re- sponsibility. The threat of use of nuclear weapons thus has the greatest ef- fect at the strategic level, although threats on both the operational and tactical levels could create similar disproportionate benefits. In terms of actual employment, the use against regional supporting infrastructures is probably the most effective; it will never be a good idea to use nuclear weapons directly against the Armed Forces or the U.S. homeland.

**No rationality—assymmetry**

**Carpenter 9—**Ted Galen, senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. Dr. Carpenter served as Cato's director of foreign policy studies from 1986 to 1995 and as vice president for defense and foreign policy studies from 1995 to 2011. (“U.S. Conduct Creates Perverse Incentives for Proliferation” CATO, December, 2009, http://www.cato.org/pubs/npu/npu\_december2009.pdf]//AY

T here are important reasons why most nations choose not to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. For one thing, it is very expensive. The opportunity cost is usually regarded as prohibitive. Occasionally, even a poor country such as North Korea will be willing to make a nuclear weapons program the highest priority, but most governments will not make the sacrifice. A decision to go nuclear also has important adverse diplomatic repercussions. Trying to build a nuclear arsenal is not the way to win friends in the international community. The majority of governments become extremely agitated when a country seeks to break out of the nonproliferation system and become a nuclear weapons state, and any would-be nuclear power has to take that hostility into consideration. Finally, by trying to acquire a nuclear arsenal, a country may trigger or exacerbate a regional arms race, and at the end of the process be no more secure than it was at the beginning. In fact, it might be even less secure. Alternatively, there are important reasons why a country might decide to go nuclear. One reason is prestige. The global nuclear weapons club is a very exclusive association. All five permanent members of the UN Security Council are nuclear weapons states, and a sixth, India, is likely to become a permanent member of the Council in the next few years. Countries that have nuclear weapons are treated differently from nonnuclear powers. Before they became nuclear powers in 1998, India and Pakistan were treated with less than a great deal of respect by other international actors. India was considered a chronic Third World underachiever, and Pakistan was considered a problem state—if not a potential failed state. Consider how those countries are treated now, since they have joined the nuclear weapons club. It is markedly different. Another motive to go nuclear is to deter or possibly intimidate a regional adversary. That appeared to be a consideration for both India and Pakistan. India had long sought to overawe its smaller neighbor, and possessing a nuclear arsenal eventually became part of that strategy. Pakistan, in turn, concluded that it had to neutralize India’s growing conventional military advantage as well as its new nuclear capability. A nuclear deterrent was the most decisive and cost-effective way to achieve that goal. Beyond its regional rivalry with Pakistan, India was also concerned about China’s rising military power. There was no question the perceived Chinese threat was a factor in India’s decision to go nuclear, as then minister of defense George Fernandes emphasized. In addition to the motive of deterrence within a region, there is a potential motive of broader deterrence—especially to deter the United States. With regard to that factor, we need to be realistic about the unintended consequences of some U.S. actions. The United States has taken major military action on ten occasions just since the end of the Cold War. That is an extraordinary record of belligerence, and although many Americans may think that those episodes were justified, other countries don’t necessarily see it the same way. In particular, countries such as Iran and North Korea have seen how the United States has treated non-nuclear adversaries such as Serbia and Iraq, and that may have led to the conclusion that the only reliable deterrent to U.S. coercion is a nuclear arsenal. U.S. leaders can weaken most of the proliferation incentives only on the margins. But it can take a crucial step to reduce one major incentive—its own behavior toward non-nuclear adversaries. Washington’s tendency to use its incomparably capable conventional military forces for reasons other than its own national defense has created powerful pressures for countries to go nuclear. Especially after the Iraq episode, countries that are on bad terms with the United States fear that they might be the next candidates for regime change. Yet there is no way that they can match America’s vast conventional military power. Both the technological gap and the financial burden would be prohibitive. The temptation, then, is to see nuclear weapons as the only feasible option. It is a mistake to assume that countries fear only Washington’s huge nuclear weapons capability. Many of them also fear this country’s huge conventional military capability. It is imperative for the United States to offer reassurance on that front as well as the nuclear front. And that means changing U.S. behavior, especially by adopting a much higher threshold for launching conventional military interventions. A more restrained U.S. military role would not by itself guarantee the absence of new proliferation crises in the future. But it is one crucial component of a strategy to reduce the prospects of greater proliferation. And a more conciliatory, less threatening policy by Washington is imperative to improve the negotiating environment if there is any hope of solving the current Iranian and North Korean proliferation problems through diplomacy

## ---China

**China is proliferating now and cannot be trusted – violations of nonproliferation agreements prove**

Kan, 12 – Specialist in Asian Security Affairs (Shirley, “China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues,” 25 April 2012, Congressional Research Service, fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31555.pdf//*HO*

Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the national interest in reducing the role of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China’s technology reportedly include Pakistan and countries said by the State Department to have supported terrorism, such as Iran. This CRS Report, updated as warranted, discusses the security problem of China’s role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response since the mid1990s. China has taken some steps to mollify U.S. and other foreign concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies from China have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longer-range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. According to unclassified intelligence reports submitted as required to Congress, China has been a “key supplier” of technology, particularly PRC entities providing nuclear and missile-related technology to Pakistan and missile-related technology to Iran. Policy approaches in seeking PRC cooperation have concerned summits, sanctions, and satellite exports. On November 21, 2000, the Clinton Administration agreed to waive missile proliferation sanctions, resume processing licenses to export satellites to China, and discuss an extension of the bilateral space launch agreement, in return for another PRC promise on missile nonproliferation. However, PRC proliferation activities have continued to raise questions about China’s commitment to nonproliferation and the need for U.S. sanctions. The Bush Administration imposed sanctions on 20 occasions on various PRC “entities” (including state-owned entities) for troublesome transfers related to missiles and chemical weapons to Pakistan, Iran, or perhaps another country, including repeated sanctions on some “serial proliferators.” Among those sanctions, in September 2001, the Administration imposed missile proliferation sanctions that effectively denied satellite exports, after a PRC company transferred technology to Pakistan, despite the promise of 2000. In September 2003, the State Department imposed additional sanctions on NORINCO, a defense industrial entity, effectively denying satellite exports to China. However, for six times, the State Department waived this sanction for the ban on imports of other PRC government products related to missiles, space systems, electronics, and military aircraft, and issued a permanent waiver in 2007. Since 2009, the Obama Administration has imposed sanctions on nine occasions on multiple PRC entities for missile or other weapon proliferation.

**China is proliferating now and selling weapons and technology – the government will not cooperate with US nonproliferation efforts**

Mahley, 7 – Assistant Director for the Multilateral Affairs Bureau, Former Assistant Director for US Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency (Donald, Hearing before the US-China Economic and Security Review

Commission, 110th Congress, First Session, 12 July 2007, transcript available at

<http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2007hearings/transcripts/july_12_13/july_12_13_07_trans.pdf>

The bad news is, is that despite those kind of improvements, they are very far from where we would like them to be. There is in China a very serious lack of transparency. We therefore don't know and cannot be sure of what activity is going on, and we do not know and cannot find a way to discover, for example, whether or not China is aggressively pursuing enforcement of the very laws that they themselves have enacted and put in their books.

We do know that there are Chinese entities that continue to sell raw materials and dual-use items needed in WMD and missile production to places that we would like them not to be sold. That is to say they are proliferating and continue to proliferate those kinds of materials.

We do not in these transactions have evidence of witting compliance or encouragement by the Chinese government as a government. We simply lack the transparency. Therefore, what we can't say on the other side of that coin is we cannot say that there is not witting compliance or encouragement by the Chinese government.

We do know that there have been in a number of instances a lack of action where we have alerted Chinese authorities to suspected proliferation activity either ongoing, anticipated or past. There have been a number of occasions where we have provided very detailed information about what we knew to have occurred with respect to proliferation activities and the Chinese government has simply not acted.

Now where does all that leave us? Right back where I started. China is a very big place. They've done a number of good things, but there are a number of matters that continue to trouble us very deeply. We have no realistic option but to continue to work with China to improve transparency, to strengthen enforcement and to root out increasingly sophisticated proliferation networks and proliferation activities.

## ---General

**Rationality doesn’t check—mistrust and misperception**

**Avery 9—**Chris Van, Military Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii (“Reshaping Nuclear Deterrence For A New Age” USNI, 7/27/09, [http://blog.usni.org/2009/07/27/reshaping-nuclear-deterrence-for-a-new-age/]//AY](http://blog.usni.org/2009/07/27/reshaping-nuclear-deterrence-for-a-new-age/%5D//AY)

There appears to be some progress with respect to the SNF problems. India has made gains in stabilizing and securing their arsenal to address the dangers of SNF and anti-state actors as an example to other new nuclear powers. First, India has adopted a strict policy of no first use. Second, India asserts that it will not resort to nukes against non-nuclear and non-aligned states. India’s current doctrine is focused on denial by punishment, and they are pursuing a triad of air, land and sea based systems to ensure second strike capability. Third, India has enforced strict civilian control by democratically elected leaders through a survivable command and control system, and their arsenal is protected by adequate security and safety systems to prevent unauthorized use. And fourth, though India will not accept limitations on its maintenance, testing and research and development, its stated goal is to continue to emphasize and pursue global nuclear disarmament. Where no progress has been made is with regard to the irrational state and anti-state actors. The Bush Administration’s doctrine of preemptive war was intended as a step towards addressing the new security threats, but there are many dangers inherent in this approach. With the invasion of Iraq the Global War on Terror became as much a war of counterproliferation as a war on terrorism. In the past nonproliferation and counterproliferation entailed diplomacy, sanctions, deterrence, defenses and the capacity to strike at another nation’s nuclear arsenal, command and control and delivery systems. This shift is a tacit acknowledgement that the Non-Proliferation Treaty does not guarantee a nation will not develop or acquire nuclear arms. Deterrence now, at least for the time being, has broadened to include not just deterring a nuclear state from using their weapons, but also includes preventing non-nuclear states and non-state actors from acquiring nuclear weapons. In the case of North Korea, the traditional approach failed miserably and with respect to Iran, this approach appears destined to fail. Indeed, the Bush Doctrine and preoccupation of America’s conventional military on conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan may have actually had the opposite effect and accelerated development efforts by states that were already pursuing nuclear weapons. All of which raises an obvious question: where do the nuclear powers and deterrence go from here? The current global security situation has been and will continue to be a challenge to large and small powers alike. Major powers are confronted with threats that their vast arsenals appear useless to deter, and have reverted to risky, offensive doctrines of the past. In response, small powers and anti-state actors are deciding to pursue nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in attempts to deter powers they believe are irrational, uncontrollable threats. So, with the vexing problem of irrational states and anti-state actors rendering deterrence by denial and existential deterrence too difficult to rehabilitate, deterrence by punishment seems to be the only remaining option. And, given the inherent differences between irrational states and anti-state actors, a rehabilitation of deterrence by punishment requires two distinct doctrines.

**No rationality—perceived benefits**

**McKenzie 1—**Kenneth F, Major General, honors graduate of the Armor Officer Advanced Course, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the School of Advanced Warfighting, include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit w/ two gold stars, the Bronze Star, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal w/2 gold stars, the Navy Commendation Medal, and the Combat Action Ribbon, John A. Lejeune Award from Marine Corps Command and Staff College, the Clifton B. Cates Award from the School of Advanced Warfighting, and the Thomas Jefferson Distinguished Professor Award from the Virginia Military Institute. (“The Rise of Asymmetric Threats: Priorities for Defense Planning” 2001, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CEYQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fkms1.isn.ethz.ch%2Fserviceengine%2FFiles%2FISN%2F101010%2Fichaptersection\_singledocument%2F101f39d5-6580-4e66-a186-c840ee989772%2Fen%2FChap03.pdf&ei=RqgFUNmRGoS69QTHtfHGBw&usg=AFQjCNFr3oJNZm4OCuqaLTalDiveyEiYAQ&sig2=VyKLBvCtEuZZrJ\_0cud3lA]//AY

Nuclear weapons would have the most potential utility in the early stages of a major theater war, when they can threaten or deter U.S. de- ployment into a theater. They would be of less utility after U.S. forces close and the theater matures, but they would again become a significant factor in the end-state of an MTW, **particularly if the adversary saw the possibility of cataclysmic defeat**. In this case, the temptation would be strong to use any and all means in a spasmodic response to try either to change the tide of battle or simply to take revenge on the United States or its allies. The use of nuclear weapons against U.S. forces on the tactical level by a rational state actor is unlikely. The tactical employment of nuclear weapons against forces in the field is not really a practical asymmetric approach. If executed, it would tend to create a case of vital national interest for the United States, where perhaps there had not been one before. The concept of disproportionality would then be turned upon its head, and high risks would be accrued by the actor with little gain. The threat of use is more problematic, although threats against fielded forces also carry many of the risks of a deterring strategy while reaping few of the advantages. Nuclear weapons can be employed operationally against the deploy- ment and theater support infrastructure in order to deter, slow, or even halt the deployment of forces into a theater. Attacks against fixed targets would be easier to plan and to execute than attacks against forces in the field. The advantage of employment against fixed rear-area targets is that instead of targeting the most-prepared forces (usually tactical maneuver forces that possess organic mobility), targets could be selected from forces with less protection and little ability to move. It follows that, for a state actor, the greatest opportunity to employ or to threaten to employ nuclear weapons would be in the early stages of a conflict. The intent would be initially to deter and to complicate U.S. force deployment considerations and potentially to destroy critical infra- structure in order to prevent physical deployment. If employed early enough, they might destroy or degrade critical aerial and surface ports of debarkation before U.S. forces even arrive, creating a difficult situation for the National Command Authorities (NCA). If nuclear weapons were employed against U.S. forces, the response would clearly be overwhelm- ing and direct, but what if they were employed against an ally, and few, if any, U.S. forces felt the results? Such a use or even its threat might make potential U.S. allies more reluctant to participate in a coalition structure. The direct threat of nuclear employment against an ally or potential ally very early in a crisis might have the effect of dissuading that nation from participating in a coalition with the United States. Strategic employment is the threat or the use of a nuclear weapon against the U.S. homeland. Strategic effect is sought by direct strategic at- tack. For a regional power or rogue state, the greatest asymmetric utility for these weapons is in their deterring effect. A demonstrated or other- wise credible ability to strike the U.S. homeland would have a sobering ef- fect on any U.S. decisionmaker considering bombing a regional adver- sary’s capital or even deploying forces in the face of threats or warnings when vital national interests are not at stake. The possession of nuclear weapons, and the demonstrated (or even suspected) capability to deliver them against the American homeland, could have the effect of dampen- ing sentiment for intervention.

**No rationality—psychological factors**

**Ogilvie-White 96—**Tanya, B.A. (Hons.) (Exeter) M.A. (Warwick) Ph.D. (Southampton), Senior Lecturer at the University of Canterbury, (“IS THERE A THEORY OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION? AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE” University of Canterbury, http://cns.miis.edu/programs/eanp/ttt/sread/less03a/ogil96.pdf]//AY

Cognitive and psychological approaches to nuclear proliferation provide more pieces to the puzzle, helping to explain behavior that cannot be explained by any of the approaches discussed so far. For example, Allison’s bureaucratic politics model and Sagan’s use of organizational theory cannot explain the seemingly irrational decisions made at the pinnacle of the government hierarchy by leaders and national elites who are relatively free from organizational constraints. The concept of “belief systems” has been applied to explain exactly this type of phenomenon. 85 The approach is based on the assumption that beliefs and actions are linked, and that foreign policy decisionmaking (and instances of irrationality) cannot be fully understood unless the beliefs of the decisionmakers are taken into account. 86 For example, psychologists argue that irrational behavior often occurs during crisis situations, which increases the tendency of decisionmakers to apply simplified images of reality that are highly resistant to change. This simplification often ignores valid information contradicting their beliefs. 87 Irrational foreign policy decisions are also taken because decisionmakers have a tendency to presume that others share their world view and because they are not always aware of the impacts that their decisions will have. 88 Moreover, because decisionmakers’ understandings of the behavior of others is shaped by their own beliefs, they sometimes misinterpret the signals they receive from others, leading to unexpected behavior. 89 In psychoanalytical terminology: “belief systems impose cognitive restraints on rationality...erecting barriers to the types of information that [decisionmakers] consider valuable.”

**Rationality doesn’t check—multiple warrants**

**Waltz 81--** member of the faculty at the [University of California, Berkeley](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_California%2C_Berkeley) and Columbia University and one of the most prominent scholars of international relations alive today (Kenneth Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better,” Adelphi Papers, Number 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981[https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm]//AY](https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm%5D//AY)

The credibility of weaker countries’ deterrent threats has two faces. The first is physical. Will such countries be able to construct and protect a deliverable force? We have found that they can readily do so. The second is psychological. Will an adversary believe that retaliation threatened will be carried out? Deterrent threats backed by second-strike nuclear forces raise the expected costs of war to such heights that war becomes unlikely. But deterrent threats may not be credible. In a world where two or more countries can make them, the prospect of *mutual*devastation makes it difficult, or irrational, to execute threats should the occasion for doing so arise. Would it not be senseless to risk suffering further destruction once a deterrent force had failed to deter? Believing that it would be, an adversary may attack counting on the attacked country’s unwillingness to risk initiating a devastating exchange by its own retaliation. Why retaliate once a threat to do so has failed? If one’s policy is to rely on forces designed to deter, then an attack that is nevertheless made shows that one’s reliance was misplaced. The course of wisdom may be to pose a new ques­tion: What is the best policy once deterrence has failed? One gains nothing by destroying an enemy’s cities. Instead, in retaliating, one may prompt the enemy to unleash more warheads. A ruthless aggressor may strike believing that the leaders of the attacked country are capable of following such a ‘rational’ line of thought. To carry out the threat that was ‘rationally’ made may be ‘irrational’. This old worry achieved new prominence as the strategic capabilities of the Soviet Union approached those of’ the United States in the middle 1970s. The Soviet Union, some feared, might believe that the United States would be self-deterred.   Much of the literature on deterrence empha­sizes the problem of achieving the credibility on which deterrence depends and the danger of relying on a deterrent of uncertain credibility. One earlier solution to the problem was found in Thomas Sche!ling’s notion of ‘the threat that leaves something to chance’. No state can know for sure that another state will refrain from retaliating even when retaliation would be irrational. No state can bet heavily on another state’s rationality. Bernard Brodie put the thought more directly, while avoiding the slippery notion of rationality. Rather than ask what it may be rational or irrational for govern­ments to do, the question he asked, and repeated in various ways over the years, was this: How do governments behave in the pres­ence of awesome dangers? His answer was ‘very carefully’.   To ask why a country should carry out its deterrent threat once deterrence has failed is to ask the wrong question. The question suggests that an aggressor may attack believing that the attacked country may not retaliate. This invokes the conventional logic that analysts find so hard to forsake. In a conventional world, a country can sensibly attack if it believes that success is probable. In a nuclear world, a country cannot sensibly attack unless it believes that success is assured. An attacker is deterred even if he believes only that the attacked *may*retaliate. Uncertainty of res­ponse, not certainty, is required for deterrence because, if retaliation occurs, one risks losing all. In a nuclear world, we should look less at the retaliators conceivable inhibitions and more at the challenger’s obvious risks.   One may nevertheless wonder, as Americans recently have, whether retaliatory threats remain credible if the strategic forces of the attacker are superior to those of the attacked. Will an unsuccessful defender in a conven­tional war nave the courage to unleash its deterrent force, using nuclear weapons first against a country having superior strategic forces? Once more this asks the wrong ques­tion. The previous paragraph urged the impor­tance of shifting attention from the defender’s possible inhibitions to the aggressor’s unwil­lingness to run extreme risks. This paragraph urges the importance of shifting attention from the defender’s courage to the different valu­ations that defenders and attackers place on the stakes. An attacked country will ordinarily value keeping its own territory more highly than an attacker will value gaining some por­tion of’ it. Given second-strike capabilities, it is not the balance of forces but the courage to use them that counts. The balance or imbalance of strategic forces affects neither the calculation of danger nor the question of whose will is the stronger. Second-strike forces have to be seen in absolute terms. The question of whose inter­ests are paramount will then determine whose will is perceived as being the stronger.

**States are inherently irrational**

**Etzioni 7—**Amitai, Professor of International Relations at the George Washington University and, most recently, the author of *Security First: For A Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy* (Yale University Press, 2007 (“Security First Forum: Nuclear Proliferation” 10/9/07, National Interest,

http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/security-first-forum-nuclear-proliferation-1810?page=1]//AY

In fact, as critics long have shown, people often act irrationally both in the economic sphere (see e.g. ‘irrational exuberance' and ‘freakonomics'), as well as in many other aspects of life (from love to war). Nor are heads of state immune from irrational behavior (e.g. Hitler's irrational attack on the USSR, opening a second front, and leading to German defeat).  It seems unnecessary to add that religious fanatics, with their messianic ambitions, might not be accurately analyzable by this rational-actor model, nor effectively deterrable by a rational cost/benefit analysis. Further, many of those who say there is little to worry about from the proliferation danger assume that governments are in charge of their states. Yet, most of the small nuclear arms and good part of the fissile materials from which they can be made are to be found in a failing state, where the government clearly has limited degree of control. In Russia, the central government has been unable to prevent local commanders, criminals, or others who seek a quick profit-from wheeling and dealing in nuclear materials. True, so far none of them has sold a tactical nuclear weapon to a terrorist organization. But this is one of those situations in which the disutility of failure is so high that even a low probability deserves implementing counter-measures.

## ---Iran

**Rationality doesn’t check an attack—urgency and miscalculations. We assume your evidence**

**Lowry 2/24--** editor of National Review, a conservative American news magazine, and a syndicated columnist, (“Sure, Iran’s rational But still a big threat to peace” New York Post, 2/24/12,

[http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/sure\_iran\_rational\_pfqSjZ7qDR5Zc7ar63KY4J]//AY](http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/sure_iran_rational_pfqSjZ7qDR5Zc7ar63KY4J%5D//AY)

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Martin Dempsey, thinks that Iran is a “rational actor.” He is indisputably correct. Iran has, quite rationally, concluded that if it spins thousands of centrifuges to enrich enough uranium, it will soon have the bomb. Just as rationally, it believes it can string along the West. Then there’s its airtight chain of cause and effect in the alleged plot against the Saudi ambassador to America: If it hired a Mexican drug gang, and that gang blew up a Washington, DC, restaurant, and the Saudi ambassador was dining there at the time, the ambassador would die. Q.E.D. Gen. Dempsey said too little and too much about the Iranian regime. Tehran couldn’t have made itself into the world’s foremost exporter of terror and extended its tentacles throughout the Middle East without resorting to rational calculation. That’s obvious. What Dempsey is implying, though, is that a regime capable of such calculation can necessarily be deterred if it gets a nuclear weapon. That’s an unsupportable leap. If there’s one thing we should have established beyond doubt during the past decade, it is that involvement in terror attacks on American soil is extremely costly to the perpetrators. Nonetheless, according to the US government, the Iranians hatched a plot against the Saudi ambassador where the risk bore no relation whatsoever to the possible reward — from our perspective. More fundamentally from our perspective, there is no point in establishing a theocracy, killing innocents abroad, pursuing sectarian war, crushing protesters, denying the Holocaust and threatening Israel with annihilation, either. From the point of view of the Western liberal tradition, the Islamic Republic itself makes no sense. Yet there it is, withstanding punishing economic sanctions to pursue the weapon that the regime wouldn’t want in the first place if it accepted international norms. If the Soviets, the famous “evil empire” bristling with thousands of nuclear weapons, could be deterred, why not Iran? The Soviet leadership became more pragmatic over time. After Nikita Khrushchev renounced Josef Stalin, it didn’t believe that war with its enemies was imminent and inevitable. Iran’s religio-ideological fire, in contrast, is still burning hot. A highly ideological leadership with a sense of desperate urgency is the enemy of deterrence. In 1941, Dean Acheson rightly said: “No rational Japanese could believe an attack on us could result in anything but disaster.” Except the Japanese — driven by a sense of honor alien to us — believed that they only had two choices: getting squeezed out of China by America, or launching a risky war. Even in the Cold War, deterrence almost failed. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the airstrike and invasion pushed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff might well have unwittingly prompted a nuclear exchange. The defense secretary at the time, the late Bob McNamara, maintained that “we lucked out.” Ah, yes, that crucial backstop to deterrence — luck. The Israelis can be forgiven for not feeling lucky. Do we think Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei will establish a “red telephone” to smooth out misunderstandings after Iran goes nuclear? The Iranian regime is factionalized, and it is sure to be the most fanatical elements that control the nukes. It is also prone to bouts of popular unrest threatening its existence. If the regime ever believes it is going down, national martyrdom might look gloriously alluring. In March 1945, Adolf Hitler gave his infamous Nero Decree, essentially calling for the destruction of Germany. After the first US atomic attack on Hiroshima, the Japanese war minister mused about how wonderful it would be if his nation were destroyed “like a beautiful flower.” It is in this tradition that former Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani — a relative pragmatist — said that “even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything. However, it will only harm the Islamic world. It is not irrational to contemplate such an eventuality.” On his own perverse terms, Rafsanjani’s reasoning is unassailable. He’s just another “rational actor.”

**Iran is irrational—religious ideologies**

**Yemma 2/17—**John, Editor of the Christian Science Monitor, (“Is Iran rational enough for MAD?” CSM,

 February 17, 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/editors-blog/2012/0217/Is-Iran-rational-enough-for-MAD]//AY

We don’t know if Iran will go nuclear, but it appears to be gaining the scientific and industrial ability to do so. Attempts to stop Iran’s nuclear program through stealth or outright attack would, at best, only delay it. So let’s think the unthinkable for a minute. Let’s think about Iran getting the Bomb. If Iran’s leaders are rational, self-interest should keep them from doing anything rash, knowing they would face massive retaliation. But there is a troubling undercurrent in Iranian thinking. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and other Iranian leaders love to make apocalyptic threats, especially about the destruction of Israel. These are often wrapped into an eschatological vision involving the return of the Maadi, or 12th imam, of Shiite Islam, who is believed destined to wage an all-out holy war in which Islam will prevail. Iranian Shiism also glorifies martyrdom. Add the A-bomb and you can see why Israelis and many others are concerned that mutual assured destruction might not work with Iran. No one can say whether Iran’s threats are a clear and present danger or just political theater. But one thing Iran has in common with all other countries is that it is made up of millions of people interested in living a good life, building businesses, and raising families. It would take a very mad leader to rain down destruction on all those lives in the hopes of proving a theological point. Similar concerns about irrational ideologies and dark intentions were present when the USSR and China got the Bomb. Nuclear war with Russia or China is not unthinkable today, but it is far-fetched, even though we still live in a world where the United States has 8,500 nuclear weapons, Russia has 11,000, and China and six other nations have hundreds more. While MAD was the first, crude effort to keep nuclear ambitions in check, diplomacy, cultural exchanges, and trade have worn away suspicions over time. Although that pagan god is still being fed and placated in the Middle East today, the rest of the world has largely walked away from it.That Monitor editorial marking 40 years after Hiroshima said it best: “Mankind cannot for long be intimidated into peace.”

**Rationality doesn’t correlate with deterrence – Iran will act in its alleged rational self-interest, yet disregard deterrence.**

**Baram 12** – Professor Emeritus in the Department of Middle Eastern History at the University of Haifa (Amatzia, Foreign Affairs, “Deterrence Lessons from Iraq: Rationality is Not the Only Key to Containment”, page 76-77, July-August 2012)//AB

As Iran continues its pursuit of a nuclear capability, outside observers have debates just how worried the world should be. Optimists argue that since nuclear war would be suicidal, no government would ever risk it, and they think the Islamic Republic would be no exception. Pessimists argue that Iran’s radical and unstable regime might behave in unpredictable ways and cannot be trusted. Both camps seem to agree that rationality is key to deterrence; they disagree over whether a nuclear Iran would be rational. Unfortunately, things aren’t that simple. The **link between rationality and deterrence is less direct than people think**, and **what constitutes rational behavior for the leaders of a particular country can be hard to read.** Deterrence in short, is a more complex issue than generally assumed. These points are brought home forcefully by a careful look at attempts to keep Saddam Hussein in check, something that the recent release of a massive amount of captured Iraqi records finally makes possible. As a result of the Iraq war, the United States gained possession of a priceless cache of documents, records of interviews, and even tape recordings of many meetings that shed invaluable light on Saddam’s behavior – material that is now accessible to researchers at the Conflict Records Research Center, in Washington D.C. Taken together with previously available information, what these records show is **a leader** **who** **was** extremely hard, occasionally even **impossible**, **to deter**, but **for reasons that have little to do with irrationality**. Containing Saddam was difficult, even though he acted according to a **coherent set of self-interested preferences**.

**Theory of state’s rationality is flawed – look at Iran’s rhetoric first.**

**Baram 12** – Professor Emeritus in the Department of Middle EAsternHistory at the University of Haifa (Amatzia, Foreign Affairs, “Deterrence Lessons from Iraq: Rationality is Not the Only Key to Containment”, page 90, July-August 2012)//AB

The implications of the Iraq case for **dealing with Iran** and other problematic actors **are unsettling**. The one thing optimists and pessimists seem to agree on – **that rational regimes can be counted on to act in predictable ways- turns out not to be true**. So **policymakers cannot base** their decisions on **judgments** **about** what **hypothetical rational actors** would do **in abstract situations**. Instead, **they need to rely on fine-grained, case-specific analyses of particular political figures** and bureaucratic processes operating **in particular, local contexts**.

**No counterbalancing – Iran will become aggressive in the Middle East. Triggers first-strike and regional arms race.**

**Edelman et al 11** – Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and US Undersecretary of Defense 2005-2009 (Eric S., “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran”, January/February 2011; < http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran>)//AB

Yet this view is far too sanguine. Above all, it rests on the questionable assumptions that possessing nuclear weapons induces caution and restraint, that other nations in the Middle East would balance against Iran rather than bandwagon with it, that a nuclear-armed Iran would respect new redlines even though a conventionally armed Iran has failed to comply with similar warnings, and that further proliferation in the region could be avoided. It seems more likely that **Iran would become increasingly aggressive once it acquired a nuclear capability**, that the United States' allies in the Middle East would feel greatly threatened and so would increasingly accommodate Tehran, that the **United States' ability to promote and defend its interests in the region would be diminished**, **and that further nuclear proliferation, with all the dangers that entails, would occur**. The greatest concern in the near term would be that an unstable **Iranian-Israeli nuclear** contest could emerge, with a significant risk that either side would launch a **first strike** on the other despite the enormous risks and costs involved. Over the longer term, Saudi Arabia and other states in the Middle East might pursue their own nuclear capabilities, raising the possibility of a highly **unstable regional nuclear arms race.**

**Iran is already run by hard-liners.**

**Kroenig 12** – Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (Matthew, “Time to Attack Iran”, January/February 2012; [www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136917/matthew-kroenig/time-to-attack-iran](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136917/matthew-kroenig/time-to-attack-iran))//AB

Yet another argument against military action against Iran is that it would embolden the hard-liners within Iran’s government, helping them rally the population around the regime and eliminate any remaining reformists. This critique ignores the fact that the **hard-liners are already firmly in control.** The **ruling regime** has become **so extreme** that it has **sidelined** even those leaders once considered to be **right-wingers,** such as former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, **for their perceived softness**. And Rafsanjani or the former presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi would likely continue the nuclear program if he assumed power. An attack might actually create more openings for dissidents in the long term (after temporarily uniting Iran behind Ayatollah Ali Khamenei), giving them grounds for criticizing a government that invited disaster. Even if a strike would strengthen Iran’s hard-liners, the United States must not prioritize the outcomes of Iran’s domestic political tussles over its vital national security interest in preventing Tehran from developing nuclear weapons.

**Iran is not a rational state – proliferation risks destruction of MAD**

**Skerritt et al. 12** (Nuclear Proliferation Policy Debate A Discussion of Nuclear Technology’s Impact on Foreign Policy Stephen Kressaty, Justin Torres, Mathew Skerritt 3/2/2012 WORCESTER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE –BRW)

While becoming a nuclear capable state is one way Iran plans to assert dominance in the region, the Iranian government also has aspirations of using its Shi‘a influence in the Middle East to expand its borders. Many Iranian leaders view the 1979 Islamic Revolution as a regional change that is still going on today. The idea of exporting the Islamic Revolution‘ is endorsed by many Iranians, who believe that Shi‘a Islam should be spread throughout the world by any means necessary. The Iranian Constitution boldly calls for the ―continuation of the Revolution at home and abroad,‖ (Gold, 23, 2009) which has become increasingly militant and violent over the years. In addition to having influence in bordering countries, Iran has attempted to assert its presence in the region by founding and supporting Islamic militias throughout the Middle East. While Iran‘s involvement with some terror groups could possibly, but not strongly, be debated, its involvement with the Shi‘ite militia Hezbollah is open and strong. Hezbollah, which was secretly founded in part by ex-Iranian interior minister Ali Akbar Mohtashemi in 1982 to combat the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (Gold, 86, 2011), is considered a terrorist group by many nations including the United States. Iran has played a big part in Hezbollah becoming the powerful and dangerous resistance force it is today across the Middle East. For this reason, Iran is designated by the U.S. Department of Defense as a State Sponsor of Terrorism‘ (State Sponsors of Terrorism, 2011). Many extreme groups in the Middle East follow radical ideologies that include killing Americans, Jews, and other Westerners in what they see as an ongoing battle for the spread of Islam by any means necessary. Iran often uses these various militias as front groups for attacks on the West without having to bear responsibility for them. Iran‘s current president, Ahmadinejad, is a follower of an unusually extreme sect of Islam that has hauntingly apocalyptic visions about the end of the world. He has referred to the United States as ―the criminal America‖ who ―is the cause of all misfortunes of the Muslims (Gold, 73, 2009) and has repeatedly called for Israel to be ―wiped off the face of the world‖ (Gold, 206, 2009). Ahmadinejad has made his goals clear and has certainly given the world enough reasons to keep Iran nuclear free at all costs. Perhaps the scariest ideology endorsed by Iranians at the highest level of government is the level of sacrifice deemed acceptable for the spread of Islam. Right after the Islamic Revolution in 1979 was completed, the first Ayatollah of Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini, said, ―We do not worship Iran, we worship Allah… I say let this land go up in smoke, provided Islam emerges triumphant in the rest of the world‖ (Gold, 23, 2009). These radical views are particularly important to understand when dealing with nuclear weapons because of the scale of destruction they make possible. **If the Iranian leadership feels that it is justifiable to sacrifice their people and their land, then the deterrence concept of mutually assured destruction becomes meaningless and they become a significantly bigger threat as a nuclear capable state.** The historic volatility throughout the Middle East further points to the need to keep nuclear arms away from Iran under its current regime. Events over the last century have continually proven that it is unusually challenging to establish secular democracies across a region which has historically governed by regimes committed to a religion, though Turkey and Israel have had success and the Arab Spring gives a sense of hope**. An arms race triggered by Iran would only add fuel to the fire of many battles stemming from religious beliefs and associated power struggles in a region that is famous for them**. While the United States and its allies seem very determined to stop Iran at all costs from developing nuclear capabilities, they often find this task harder than it seems. Its strong Shi‘a following in the region coupled with their place in the global energy economy as an oil exporter has enabled Iran to continuously defy international agencies like the United Nations Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and withstand economic and political sanctions.

**Theocratic politics make the middle east especially unstable in the event of proliferation**

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While many of Iran‘s past theocratic leaders have been somewhat defiant or apathetic toward the West, the current leader, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, seems to have a unique hatred toward it. His radical ideologies and extreme statements undoubtedly raise red flags and are an obvious cause for concern. He is fiercely anti-American and anti-Semitic, believing that Americans, Jews, and other Westerners in the region are occupying Muslim land and slowing the export of the Islamic Revolution. While many Muslims across the Middle East also endorse the goal and share the dream of removing all Western influence, his strong animosity coupled with his influential position as president of Iran seems to set him apart from the rest of the extremists. Ahmadinejad‗s vision of the world includes a complete Shi‘a takeover and a return to the glorious Persian Era. These views are endorsed by many high-level officials of Iran, including the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, who ultimately has the last say on Iran‘s positions and decisions. While many governments would like to keep Iran‘s ambitions in check, the Shi‘a following in the region often expands Iranian influence beyond its geographical borders. The reason behind this leverage dates back to the 16th century Safavid dynasty, when Persian borders stretched from the far west into Iraq, Syria, and Turkey out to the east in Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, and Pakistan. It is also important to note that these borders extended south and encompass Kuwait, Bahrain, and parts of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, an extremely oil-rich region where a large portion of the world‘s energy comes from (Gold, 23, 2009). The significance of these extended borders lies in the strong Shi‘a following in neighboring countries and their support for Iran as a powerful and proactive Shi‘a state in the region.

**Nuclear deterrence breaks down in the Middle East.**

**Edelman et al 11** – Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and US Undersecretary of Defense 2005-2009 (Eric S., “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran”, January/February 2011; < http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran>)//AB

More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a **nuclear exchange**. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents' forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine-based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to "**launch on warning**" of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their **nuclear forces preemptively.** Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of **miscalculation and escalation.** Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or **accidental launch** would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially **triggering a regional nuclear war.**

## ---Middle East

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## ---North Korea

**Rationality doesn’t check—perceived aggression**

**McDevitt 11—**Michael, Vice President and Director, CNA Strategic Studies, (“Deterring North Korean Provocations” Brookings, February 2011, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/02/north-korea-mcdevitt]//AY

What makes this deterrent credible is the historic willingness of the Kim regime—father and son—to use force in ways that the alliance has perceived as reckless. It has convinced the leadership of the United States and South Korea that the Pyongyang regime might just be willing to unleash an escalatory cycle that could lead to all out war, even though it would probably lose. Pyongyang has created the impression that it does have the political will to act even in ways that appear irrational. The combination of its conventional military posture plus the perception of a ruthless and reckless leadership has made both the ROK and the U.S. unwilling to retaliate for killing South Koreans (numerous instances) or killing or imprisoning Americans (the 1969 shootdown of an EC-121 reconnaissance plane, the 1976 tree chopping incident, and the 1968 capture of the *USS Pueblo*). Despite its long history of violent hostile acts against South Koreans and Americans, the alliance has never retaliated to a premeditated violent/hostile act with force. (In December 2010, the ROK military did return artillery fire, in response to North Korea’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island.) Until very recently, the Alliance has been deterred because of its implicit threat of violence against Seoul, or more broadly because of worries over triggering another war.[[2]](http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/02/north-korea-mcdevitt%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn2) Why would Pyongyang wish to continue to execute hostile acts, such as the 2010 sinking of the ROK Navy ship *Cheonan* and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island? Decision making in Pyongyang is opaque, and trying to understand the rationale behind North Korean actions is really just speculation. Within the context of deterrence, one (and certainly not the only) possibility is that North Korean leaders understand that periodic violent acts against the alliance serve to reinforce the credibility of North Korea’s conventional deterrent by demonstrating a political willingness to risk war.[[3]](http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/02/north-korea-mcdevitt%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn3) Perhaps North Korean leaders believe that this advantage has to be periodically reinforced or refreshed by demonstrations that suggest a political willingness to take risks when it comes to the use of force. Adding the Nuclear Dimension to North Korea’s Deterrent A KCNA release on April 21, 2010 discussed a North Korean Foreign Ministry memorandum on nuclear weapons. The report includes the statement that, “The mission of the nuclear armed forces of the DPRK is to deter and repulse aggression and attack on the country and the nation till the nuclear weapons are eliminated from the peninsula and the rest of the world. The DPRK has invariably maintained the policy not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states or threaten them with nukes as long as they do not join nuclear weapons states in invading or attacking it.”[[4]](http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/02/north-korea-mcdevitt%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn4) If we accept this statement at face value, it sheds some light on North Korean’s perception of how it understands the deterrence dynamic on the peninsula. North Korea sees its nuclear capability as a deterrent against an attempt to overthrow the regime through an invasion. From Pyongyang’s perspective a CFC-led invasion may not seen farfetched. Over the years, the allied war plan in the event of an attack on South Korea from the north (OPLAN 5027) which apparently makes provisions for a North Korean regime change, has been openly discussed or leaked to the press, and we can only guess what information and opinions North Korea has gathered through espionage.

**North Korea irrational—would sell to terrorist groups**

**Bandow 9—**Doug, *senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author of*[Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World](http://www.cato.org/store/index.asp?fa=ProductDetails&method=cats&scid=19&pid=144156)*(Cato Institute) and co-author of*[The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea](http://www.cato.org/store/index.asp?fa=ProductDetails&pid=1441235&method=search&t=korean&a=&k=&aeid=&adv=&pg=)*(Palgrave/Macmillan). (“*Kim's Atom Project” 12/11/09, *CATO,*

http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/kims-atom-project]//AY

Pyongyang still might feel more secure with nuclear weapons, and thus be more willing to engage in other provocative behavior. However, if its ability to expand its arsenal was capped, it would have only limited ability to engage in further geopolitical extortion. Kim's most potent threat today is to produce more nuclear materials and make more bombs. A few weapons also would satisfy the other presumed objectives of a regime that does not appear bent on suicide; by all accounts Kim prefers his virgins in this life rather than the next one. The purpose of the DPRK's nuclear program always appeared to be more deterrence and defense rather than aggression and offense. Even a limited arsenal would fulfill these goals. (The North would have less ability to engage in extortion, but a Western benefits package would address that urge.) Most important, buying off the North's potential for future production would limit the threat of proliferation. Possessing the globe's most potent conventional and nuclear forces, America need not fear a minuscule DPRK nuclear capability. However, Washington cannot be so sanguine about the prospect of the spread of nuclear weapons. First, if Pyongyang proceeds to develop (and continues to expand) a larger arsenal, moving it toward mid-range nuclear powers such as India, Israel, and Pakistan, neighboring South Korea and Japan would feel greater pressure to develop countervailing capabilities. They could reasonably believe that an otherwise North Korean defensive potential would eventually turn into an offensive capability. Fearing national destruction, they might prefer to develop the ability to defend themselves rather than rely on Washington's willingness to go to war on their behalf. Second, if Pyongyang regularly produces nuclear materials, the regime might be tempted to take over the old Pakistani franchise of Nukes-R-Us and sell both materials and expertise around the world. North Korea already has supplied missile technologies and conventional arms to Iran and other nations. Such sales have been an important source of hard currency for the cash-poor regime. There are charges, backed by varying degrees of evidence, that the North has cooperated on nuclear matters with Burma, Syria and Iran. The first is an improbable nuclear power and the second is an ugly rather than frightful potential nuclear weapons state; the third, however, poses as great a geopolitical challenge as North Korea. Iran probably could develop a nuclear capacity on its own, but Pyongyang could accelerate the process. A greater fear is that the North might sell nuclear materials to terrorist groups. Absent unique circumstances, nation states, since they possess "return addresses," can be deterred. It is much harder to retaliate against groups and movements. Worse, some of them welcome or at least do not fear martyrdom. The possibility of proliferation requires attention irrespective of the state of nuclear negotiations with Pyongyang. The United States should work with allied states to interdict any nuclear shipments from the DPRK while informing the regime that proliferation to non-state actors would be a casus belli. Kim should be made to understand that there are far safer ways for the North to make money—particularly if he makes a deal.

**Rationality doesn’t check and would sell the nuclear tech**

**Maass 9—**Richard, BA from Middlebury College, PhD candidate whose primary research interests concern International Security, IR Theory, and US Foreign Policy, (“Nuclear Proliferation and Declining U.S. Hegemony” http://www.hamilton.edu/documents//levitt-center/Maass\_article.pdf]//AY

Nuclear weapons’ equalizing effect makes them increasingly appealing as an asymmetrical means to counter the United States’ conventional military superiority. North Korea currently pursues a controversial nuclear program to combat power disparities with the United States and other major powers in the Far East, such as China and Japan. North Korea’s proliferation is perhaps the most threatening of all, in terms of U.S. interests, for several reasons. A nuclear North Korea poses a major threat as a supplier of nuclear technology. According to the Central Intelligence Agency, North Korea already grosses an average of $580 million annually from missile sales to northern Africa and the Middle East, making it the single largest exporter worldwide (CIA, 2003, pg. 56). Should Pyongyang obtain nuclear weapons, it would become a major exporter of nuclear technologies. The emergence of new nuclear states in both northeast nsights 48 Asia and the Middle East, as a product of North Korean exports, would drastically exacerbate regional instability, seriously inhibiting U.S. influence and reducing the non-proliferation regime’s efficiency. Unstable regimes in these newly proliferated states establish a major threat not only to the U.S., but to global security. These regimes become prime sources for radical militant and terrorist groups to obtain nuclear weapons.

## ---Russia

**Failing warning system checks rationality and would supply to terrorists**

**Maass 9—**Richard, BA from Middlebury College, PhD candidate whose primary research interests concern International Security, IR Theory, and US Foreign Policy, (“Nuclear Proliferation and Declining U.S. Hegemony” http://www.hamilton.edu/documents//levitt-center/Maass\_article.pdf]//AY

In this same light, states currently maintaining arsenals of hundreds, or even thousands, of nuclear weapons pose a major international security hazard in terms of the safety and stability of their stockpiles; command and control issues do not only apply to proliferating states. Former Soviet Russia maintains an arsenal of roughly 7,200 active warheads with another 8,800 in reserve, or inactive. Moscow keeps these weapons “on hair trigger alert, ready to uclear Proliferation and Declining U.S. Hegemony 51 launch within fifteen minutes” (Cirincione, 2007, pg. 97). Its arsenal is, however, aging, and Russia’s early warning systems have inevitably fallen into disrepair with time. As stockpiles and intelligence capabilities deteriorate over time, the likelihood of an accidental or unauthorized launch greatly increases, forcing states to view each other’s arsenals with suspicion. Uncertainty raises political tensions, further escalating the likelihood of conflict between major powers in a nuclear world. Russia in particular is a source of major concern as it slowly loses control and vigilance over its vast nuclear arsenal. Existing stockpiles such as Russia’s present an appealing opportunity for radical militant groups to obtain nuclear weapons. In 2001-2002, Russian officials acknowledged four separate instances of terrorist groups conducting reconnaissance on its nuclear weapons (Cirincione, 2007, pg. 91). While the facilities housing these weapons were designed with security in mind, few if any could stand against an assault on scale with the September 11 th attacks in New York. Terrorists demonstrated the will and propensity for violence on an unimaginable scale. Former Senator Sam Nunn warned that Russian stockpiles “are the nuclear weapons most attractive to terrorists--even more valuable than fissile materials and certainly more portable than strategic warheads” (Ferguson and Potter, 2004, pg. 46). Russia’s arsenal is considered at such high risk because of the vast number of warheads within the state under weakened security arrangements due to a severely impoverished military structure.

**Early warning systems skirt rationality**

**FAS 2k—**Federal Association of Scientists, (“Strategic Command and Control” 10/5/00, FAS, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/c3i/]//AY

Until the disintegration of the Soviet Union its C3 system was built on the principle of launch-on-warning [LOW]. This posture remains in effect, and procedures are regularly exercised. The Russian command system is poised to obtain nuclear weapons release authority within 10 minutes from the President, the Defense Minister, or the Chief of the General Staff, through the Cheget nuclear suitcase. Physical control of the unlock and launch authorization codes resides with the military, the General Staff has direct access to these codes, and can initiate a missile attack with or without the permission of political authorities. The Russian General Staff has two methods for launching nuclear weapons. Following the American pattern, the unlock and launch authorization codes held by the General Staff at their command centers can be sent directly to individual weapons commanders, who would execute the launch procedures. The crews onboard docked submarines, have demonstrated the ability to fire while surfaced at pier-side within 9 to 15 minutes after receiving the order. Or, the General Staff could direct missile launches directly from command centers in the Moscow vicinity or alternative facilities at Chekhov, Penza, and elsewhere. This is a remote launch of land-based strategic missiles would bypass the subordinate chain of command and missile launch crews. The Russian early warning system is clearly not as robust as the system that the Soviets had. There has been deterioration in the system since the end of the Cold War, both the number of satellites, operational satellites on orbit, and in the radars that are operational. The Russian early warning system has deteriorated badly since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Only four satellites remain of more than a dozen that once watched the globe with their sensors. Some vital radar stations that once protected the Soviet Union are now closed because they are on territory no longer controlled by Moscow. The Russian system does provide them with adequate warning, but Russian early warning operators may not be able to tell the difference between a peaceful rocket and a military rocket from their computer screens. Command and control problems could lead to incorrect information being transmitted, received, displayed, or complete early-warning system failures. This was demonstrated by the convulsions the Russian command and control system endured on 25 January 1995 when a Norwegian sounding rocket launch activated President Yeltsin's nuclear briefcase. During this major malfunction in their early warning system, for a few minutes the Russians mistakenly thought the scientific sounding rocket was in fact a missile launched from a US submarine headed in their direction. Radar operators issued an alert that it was an unidentified missile, with an unknown destination. The alert went to a general on duty, who received his information from the radar operator on a special notification terminal, Krokus. The duty general decided to send the alert to the highest levels. One factor might have been fear that even a lone missile would trigger a debilitating electromagnetic pulse explosion to disrupt Russia's command-and-control system, as a prelude to a broader onslaught. At that point, the Russian electronic command-and-control network known as Kazbek, had come into play. Kavkaz is a complex network of cables, radio signals, satellites and relays that is the heart of the Russian command and control. From there, it caused an alert to go off on each of the three Chegets nuclear `footballs': one with Yeltsin, one with then-Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and a third with the chief of the General Staff, then Mikhail Kolesnikov. For the first time ever, the nuclear command system started the countdown to a launch decision, and President Yeltsin and his nuclear advisors began an emergency teleconference. Yeltsin and the others holding the black suitcases monitored the rocket's flight on their terminals. A signal was sent to the Russian strategic forces to increase their combat readiness, but the crisis then ended. After some eight minutes, perhaps two minutes short of the deadline for a decision to launch a response, the Russians realized their mistake. Russian officials later brushed aside questions about the incident, saying it had been overblown in the West. In January 1997 Defense Minister Igor Rodionov wrote an alarming letter to Yeltsin. He said the command-and-control systems for Russia's nuclear forces--including the deep underground bunkers and the early-warning system--were falling apart. "No one today can guarantee the reliability of our control systems," Rodionov said. "Russia might soon reach the threshold beyond which its rockets and nuclear systems cannot be controlled."

**Rationality doesn’t check—hundreds of actors**

**Etzioni 10—**Amitai, Professor of International Relations at the George Washington University and, most recently, the author of *Security First: For A Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy* (“Rational Actors: Neither Mad nor M.A.D. The Meanings of Rationality, Rogue States and Terrorists” George Washington University, December 2010, http://icps.gwu.edu/files/2011/02/Rational-Actors2.pdf]//AY

Rogue states that command nuclear arms can turn into unstable states and some unstable states already hold such arms. The proper question in these cases is not whether a head of state can be deterred from ordering a nuclear attack, but whether one can deter all the actors in a given state who have or may gain access to nuclear arms, or may use them or provide them to other states or to terrorists. That is, unstable states cannot be treated as if they were one actor, but may include scores and even hundreds of actors, each one of whom would have to be deterred. Scott Sagan covers this issue well and is hence quoted here at some length. Sagan explains: Nuclear weapons are horribly destructive. And, in theory, any statesmen in any state should be strongly influenced by the fear that his or her cities could be destroyed by an adversary. But in reality, as opposed to theory, nuclear weapons are not controlled by states. They are not controlled by statesmen. They are managed by imperfect, normal human beings inside imperfect, normal organizations. To understand in which situations nuclear weapons are likely to produce successful deterrence and in which situations they are less likely to, we need to open the black box of decision-making inside states to look at who controls and manages the actual nuclear weapons or devices that are being built. We fail currently to do that in our thinking about Iran. 16 Sagan contrasts the historical situations used by Kenneth Waltz and other deterrence advocates, 17 namely America’s successful deterrence of the USSR and China during the Cold War, with the situations in the world’s most dangerous countries today. “. . . Those two states were monolithic governments through most of the Cold War. Indeed, the rare moments when they were not monolithic were some of the most dangerous periods in recent history.” In unstable states, such as Pakistan, a general may order an attack with nuclear arms without the consent of the government (“unauthorized use”); terrorists may take over the government; terrorists may receive nuclear arms from those legally in control of some of these arms, or they may steal them. Sagan cites a plan by Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency, to place nuclear arms in Afghanistan to protect them from an Indian strike. 18 Also the record shows that some actors, such as A.Q. Khan, may provide nuclear know-how, materials and, even, bombs, to other states – Syria, for instance. The government of Russia also does not command a tight control over all the actors in its territory that have access to nuclear arms or the material from which they can be made. There are thousands of tactical nuclear weapons 19 of special attraction to terrorists that are not as well guarded as strategic nuclear arms, and quite a few of which are positioned close to Russia’s borders with several Muslim republics. In addition, Russia still has large amounts of fissile material which has not yet been reprocessed or blended down and is not well guarded. And though some former Soviet republics returned their nuclear weapons to Russia after the breakup of the USSR, there are still stockpiles of weapons-grade materials in Belarus and Kazakhstan, 20 and some held rather close to Iran. Other troubling examples include a 2007 incident, when a group broke into South Africa’s Pelindaba nuclear reactor and research center, which houses enough material to make approximately 25 nuclear weapons. 21 Even more worrisome, eight fuel rods went missing from a reactor in Kinshasa and only one has been recovered. 22 In short, in contrast to the application of deterrence during the Cold War – a situation which was itself far from risk-free – which entailed a very small number of actors, in the current situation there are many more actors, including numerous non-state actors. It stands to reason that the more actors that have access to nuclear bombs and the material from which they can be made, the more likely at least one of them will fail to be deterred.

**Poor warning systems check rationality—proliferation would escalate.**

**Martin 8—**Matt, program officer in Policy Analysis and Dialogue at the Stanley Foundation, bringing a wealth of experience working directly on nonproliferation, cooperative threat reduction, missile defense, and strategic security issues. Prior to joining the foundation in 2005, Martin spent ten years in Washington directing projects in the think tank world and serving as senior defense aide for former Senator Bob Kerrey (“Avoiding an Accidental Nuclear War” *July 2008* , http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/articles.cfm?ID=498]//AY

While no one believes that the chance of an intended US-Russian nuclear exchange is likely, the fact that the odds against an accidental nuclear exchange are not lower should give leaders and citizens on both sides pause, and encourage them to action to ensure that both sides avoid this fate. It should be shocking that nearly 20 years after the Cold War our nuclear stance toward Russia is largely unchanged. While strictly speaking we no longer "target" Russia, we still have the previous, longstanding targeting plans plugged into the system, and it would only take a few minutes to bring those plans back online and make Russia a target again. Similarly, we still maintain an overall policy of "launch on warning" that initiates plans for a nuclear response strike in the event of a ballistic missile launch against the United States. “Launch on warning” was instigated by fears of a massive Soviet nuclear strike on US intercontinental ballistic missile sites and nuclear-capable bomber airfields. The short window of decision making under such circumstances means that a US president, once informed of indications of an incoming missile strike, **would have as little as 15 minutes to decide whether or not to order a retaliatory nuclear strike.** Once those nuclear missiles have been launched, there is no way to call them back or to disable them. Under the best of circumstances, this "launch on warning" approach—or "hair trigger" as it has come to be known—put the MAD in the theory of Mutually Assured Destruction. But in several key senses, these are no longer the best of circumstances, and a set of seemingly unconnected issues raises the specter that an accidental nuclear launch, perhaps followed by a "launch on warning" exchange, could still occur. First, Russian early-warning detection satellites have been in a steady state of decline since the breakup of the Soviet Union and, according to intelligence estimates, significant swaths of the Russian horizon lie dark due to insufficient coverage. This "blindness" could lead to hyper-awareness within the ranges of the remaining sensors. Combined with the even shorter decision time frame that delayed awareness would bring, this does not lend itself to thorough and conservative judgment. Second, while each side denies it, both states are engaged in activities that could be perceived as threatening to the other, perhaps increasing tension that would make a rapid reaction to a perceived threat more likely. For its part, the US continues to push for missile defense deployments on the western edge of Russia, with the stated intention of guarding against Iranian missiles. US efforts to develop new nuclear warheads and a new conventional "global strike" capability are also seen by Russia as degrading their own deterrence capabilities. For its part, Russian deployments of new nuclear-tipped missiles looks like a jab directed at the United States**.** Finally, three disturbing lapses in US nuclear weapons safety and security reduce confidence that the overall US nuclear weapons infrastructure remains well-managed and under strict command and control. Last August, a B-52 bomber was accidentally loaded with six nuclear warheads and flown from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. The bomber was supposed to transport nonnuclear cruise missiles. Then, in March 2008, Defense Department officials learned and subsequently acknowledged that they had 18 months prior mistakenly shipped four nuclear missile fuses to Taiwan. Finally, an internal Defense Department review commissioned by Secretary Gates to study security of the US nuclear weapons complex concluded that the US military cannot locate hundreds of sensitive nuclear missile components. "According to previously undisclosed details obtained by the [*Financial Times*](http://www.ft.com/home/us), the investigation also concluded that the Air Force could not account for many sensitive components previously included in its nuclear inventory. One official said the number of missing components was more than 1,000." While none of these incidents directly indicates an increased danger of accidental launch, they do indicate an overall erosion of system robustness making accidents more prone to occur. Again, due to the reality that most of the world’s nuclear weapons remain under the control of the US and Russia, the likelihood is that if a serious accidental incident occurred, it would be within this legacy construct. Common sense might indicate that better relations between the two countries would mean that less oversight is needed. But due to the history of the Cold War and the nature of the arsenals as discussed above, precisely the opposite is true, especially if the goal is to reduce the danger of an accidental nuclear launch. Surviving the Cold War without a nuclear exchange demanded intense and sustained efforts on a range of fronts from the political to the military, and as the global community strives to move beyond a Cold War mindset, it is clear that succeeding in this new world will as well. It is good that President Bush has found in Russian president Medvedev a smart colleague who understands the issues. The question is how will these two leaders apply their smarts and understanding in order to avoid an accidental nuclear war.

**Nuclear proliferation highly probably in Eastern countries – Russian arsenal is vulnerable to theft**

**Allison and Myers 4** – (Graham and Joanne J., “Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe” Carnegie Council. 16 November 2004, http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/transcripts/5049.html/\_res/id=sa\_File1/Nuclear\_Terrorism.)//FK

Where could they get it? — The most likely place I believe would be Russia—not because the Russians want to lose anything, but because that's where the largest number of nuclear weapons and potential nuclear weapons and highly enriched uranium and plutonium are to be found, and particularly to be found in conditions where they might be vulnerable to theft. This is what I call the "Willie Sutton principle". Remember, Willie Sutton was a very famous American bank robber, and in his trial they asked him why did he rob banks, and he said, "Well, that's where the money is." So Russia would be the place to go looking first. But not only. In the "where" chapter I take you through Pakistan, where there are fifty nuclear bombs and enough material for another fifty weapons. And in the circumstances in which the President of Pakistan, President Musharraf, has come within a second and a half of being killed twice in the past year, is it likely that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are protected more securely than their President? I don't think so. Also, there are risky research reactors in a number of countries, including Uzbekistan and Belarus. So I take you through the "where."

**Russia is proliferating now and is selling weapons to China, Iran, North Korea and India**

Blank, 3 – Research Professor of National Security Affairs, with expertise in Russia (Stephen, “Russia: Proliferation personified,” Asia Times, 8 January 2003, atimes.com/atimes/Central\_Asia/EA08Ag01.html//*HO*
Wherever one looks, in Asia, the Middle East or Colombia, the proliferation of both conventional arms and of dual-use technologies often lies at the heart of the crisis or is a major facilitator of it. And more often than not, Russia is either clearly and deeply involved in this proliferation, or the evidence strongly points to it. In North Korea’s case, there have been repeated reports not only of North Korean efforts to obtain the services of Russian scientists, but also of more direct proliferation. And before the current Korean crisis reached its present stage, reports from Washington suggested Russian complicity in North Korean proliferation. In the mid-1990s, Russia clearly proliferated weapons technologies to Iraq, while Russian firms (along with a host of Western ones) were listed as having broken the United Nations boycott, though here there is sufficient guilt for virtually everyone. Russia remains Iran’s largest supplier and there can be little doubt that Iran is well on the way to imitating North Korea. Iran is not just the beneficiary of North Korean proliferation, it probably will obtain useable nuclear weapons within three to five years. India's nuclear program, likewise, substantially benefited from Russia's assistance, which was particularly visible in its program for building space launches, and thus missile capability for those weapons. More recently, India admitted that Russia was helping it build the Sagarika nuclear submarine. Repeated accounts of Sino-Russian military collaboration also point to Russian help with China’s missile defense and space launch programs, as well as the sale of nuclear powered submarines. Since China has recently insisted on total secrecy with regard to its purchases, it remains an open and critical question just what it is buying from Moscow and what kinds of technological interchanges are occurring between Russian and Chinese scientists. However, Russian arms salesmen are eagerly seeking to break out of their "client ghetto" and diversify arms sales beyond India and China. Even if we confine ourselves to purely conventional systems, Russian weapons have a nasty habit of ending up in strange places. Two years ago, Colombian authorities discovered a Kilo-class submarine that had been purchased by one of the drug cartels for the purpose of covertly transporting narcotics into the United States. The fact that a middleman with ties to the cartel could reliably obtain this submarine points to a very high degree of corruption in the Navy.

**Russia has a history of providing weapons to rogue states and will continue to**

Blank, 3 – Research Professor of National Security Affairs, with expertise in Russia (Stephen, “Russia: Proliferation personified,” Asia Times, 8 January 2003, atimes.com/atimes/Central\_Asia/EA08Ag01.html//*HO*

And beyond these reports, Moscow has also clearly used middlemen like Belarus and Ukraine to ship weapons it does not want traced back to it to rogue states and proliferators like Iraq. The current scandal over Ukraine's shipment of Kolchuga anti-aircraft radars to Iraq apparently involved the use of Ukraine as a cover for Russian factories, despite Kiev's adamant denials of responsibility for the entire affair. These denials would carry more weight were it not the case that already in 2000 the Russian press reported that Russia’s military-industrial complex output had started reaching the Iranians via Belarus, which had few commitments to Washington. Similarly, cooperation between Minsk and Baghdad has been developing rapidly of late. Official statistics confirm that Belarussian-Iraqi trade turnover in 1999 came to US$6 million. According to Kommersant's information at that time, that indicator was understated at least ten-fold. And since then Belarus and Iraq have steadily tried to expand military collaboration, as has Kiev. As Kommersant reported then, Iraq was eagerly pursuing other avenues for Russian spare parts and dual-use equipment, like optical equipment, in Belarus since Belarus made an excellent way station for the transfer of Russian equipment to Iraq and/or Iran. In 2000 it was reported that Iraq apparently had obtained from Russian sources a weapon that jams the global positioning system (GPS) of US missiles and satellites, rendering them useless. This product was made by Chelyabinsk University, a major center of military research. As the federal government had stopped financing it, the university helped set up a commercial firm to market its products, by 1998, including this system. Evidently, Russian State Duma Deputy Speaker Vladimir Zhirinovskii secured a contract for Mosenergo Montag Company from Saddam Hussein to reconstruct the Al Najibiyah power station for $65 million, but the company failed to carry out the contract. To placate Saddam, Zhirinovskii brought two models of this jamming device with him to Iraq, which he had obtained from a Moscow commission agency that marketed many military goods of numerous establishments. Because that agency was clearly engaged in price gouging the Iraqis, the professors at the university mobilized their firm and addressed Iraq and Yugoslavia concerning sale of these units, and this led Iraq to buy some 40-45 devices, which work effectively only at a range of 150-200 kilometers. While these episodes confirm the porosity and avarice of the Russian political establishment, they also show that the use of middlemen, like Belarus, Ukraine, and very probably Serbia, has long been established. A highly dangerous consequence of this proliferation is not only that rogue states are continuing to obtain what they want and need, these sales also encourage them to shop their wares around or to deploy these systems as generic threats against other states. This is not just a case of North Korea selling missiles and nuclear knowhow abroad, dangerous as that is. Iran has also undertaken to sell its Shahab-3 missile to buyers, has threatened to extend deterrence to Hizbullah if Israel retaliates against it, and is busy supplying the Palestinian Authority with weapons to extend and expand its campaign of terror.

## ---Terrorists

**No rationality—assymmetry**

**McKenzie 1—**Kenneth F, Major General, honors graduate of the Armor Officer Advanced Course, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the School of Advanced Warfighting, include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit w/ two gold stars, the Bronze Star, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal w/2 gold stars, the Navy Commendation Medal, and the Combat Action Ribbon, John A. Lejeune Award from Marine Corps Command and Staff College, the Clifton B. Cates Award from the School of Advanced Warfighting, and the Thomas Jefferson Distinguished Professor Award from the Virginia Military Institute. (“The Rise of Asymmetric Threats: Priorities for Defense Planning” 2001, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CEYQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fkms1.isn.ethz.ch%2Fserviceengine%2FFiles%2FISN%2F101010%2Fichaptersection\_singledocument%2F101f39d5-6580-4e66-a186-c840ee989772%2Fen%2FChap03.pdf&ei=RqgFUNmRGoS69QTHtfHGBw&usg=AFQjCNFr3oJNZm4OCuqaLTalDiveyEiYAQ&sig2=VyKLBvCtEuZZrJ\_0cud3lA]//AY

Strategic employment is the threat or the use of a nuclear weapon against the U.S. homeland. Strategic effect is sought by direct strategic at- tack. For a regional power or rogue state, the greatest asymmetric utility for these weapons is in their deterring effect. A demonstrated or other- wise credible ability to strike the U.S. homeland would have a sobering ef- fect on any U.S. decisionmaker considering bombing a regional adver- sary’s capital or even deploying forces in the face of threats or warnings when vital national interests are not at stake. The possession of nuclear weapons, and the demonstrated (or even suspected) capability to deliver them against the American homeland, could have the effect of dampen- ing sentiment for intervention.

**Terrorists aren’t rational—no checks of states**

**Avery 9—**Chris Van, Military Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii (“Reshaping Nuclear Deterrence For A New Age” USNI, 7/27/09, http://blog.usni.org/2009/07/27/reshaping-nuclear-deterrence-for-a-new-age/]//AY

In the case of nations possessing SNF, like Pakistan and India, the applicability of traditional theories of deterrence are shaky at best. Deterrence by denial by a SNF is useless against opponents with large nuclear forces (LNF), and against other SNF powers the applicability depends upon many other factors, like intelligence, delivery and early warning systems. Deterrence by punishment, again, may be effective against other SNF states, but against LNF states it has minimal value. And existential deterrence’s effectiveness depends heavily on the cultural and religious values of the SNF state and might be impossible to quantify. The dangers posed by anti-state actors in the nuclear balance of power are even more troubling. Deterrence is based on reason, and while states are generally “rational actors”, terrorist organizations (essentially “anti-state” actors) are often “irrational actors.” States have stable political and military systems and organizations, with checks and balances, populations, territory and resources to protect, and have a vested interest in being rational and predictable. Anti-state actors, however, have none of these elements, usually possess radical political or religious ideologies, and often take pride in their unpredictability and willingness to escalate conflicts. Complicating this is the fact that anti-state actors also work to destabilize the very systems and organizations that make state actors rational. In The Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The Clash Between State and Antistate Actors, Mohan Malik concludes that South Asia is particularly vulnerable to the influence of anti-state actors, as the nations in the region have yet to fully develop the checks and balances in their political systems and mature, redundant controls over their arsenals.

**Terrorists aren’t rational—different cost-benefit analysis**

**Kibaroglu 9—**Mustafa, Former Joint Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program and International Security Program, 2004–2005 at the Harvard Belfer Center, (“Dealing with the threat posed by non-state armed groups aspiring to weapons of mass destruction” 2009, Nuclear Files, http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/terrorism/PDFs/pdf-art2710.pdf]//AY

Deterrence is effective if several conditions are met. First, there must be an aggressor planning to use force against a defender. Second, there must be a defender planning to offset the potential act of the aggressor by exploiting threat methods. 4 Lastly, for deterrence to be successful, the aggressor must choose not to attack because of the threat posed by the defender. 5 Deterrence therefore requires clarity concerning both what the aggressor must not do and the potential consequences of persisting, since the success of deterrence depends on the aggressor's decision of whether to go ahead. The defender must be sure that the aggressor receives the message properly; even if the defender's threat is sincere, deterrence might still fail if the aggressor is ignorant of the threat. 6 Public statements and other methods are used to communicate the cost and risk of an action to an aggressor. However, the aggressor may fail to interpret the threat message correctly for numerous reasons—cultural barriers, internal concerns or emotional strain. 7 For deterrence to be successful, it must be credible, based on capability, cost and intentions. That is, the aggressor should understand that the defender is capable of taking action. 8 If the defender's statements seem hesitant or are expressed in vague terms then the threat in particular, and deterrence in general, will not prove persuasive. It is clear that deterrence brings into relief the psychological relationship among opposing sides. Hence, the emotions, perceptions and calculations of decision makers are at the centre of deterrence policy. 9 For this reason, a deterrence policy is based not only on the actual capability and the willpower of the defender to carry out commitments, but also on the defender's skill to convey this capability and determination to the aggressor. Unfortunately, the cautiously coded intentions of defenders frequently fail to make the expected impact on the aggressor because the aggressor is oblivious to the deterrent threat, or finds it incredible. 10 dealing with the threat posed by non-state armed groups aspiring to Wmd one • 2008 39 The challenges of confronting non-state armed groups' WMD threat The strategic context that had long rested on a delicate nuclear balance has come to an end. 11 Terrorist NSAGs, which have developed state-like hierarchical command structures, have started to become influential actors at the political and military arena. The appearance of these political and quasimilitary entities in the centre stage of international politics has disturbed the long-running stability and predictability of the international system, and threatened international peace and security. Our toolbox of responses is outdated or ineffective when it comes to the terrorist NSAG threat. Unlike the majority of the decision-making bodies of states in the international arena, **terrorist NSAGs and their members do not necessarily undertake classical, rational cost–benefit analyses**. 12 For most rational actors, the greatest cost might be to lose one's life—for an irrational one, this may not be considered a cost. Nor are material gains necessarily regarded as benefits. The terrorist NSAGs with which we are concerned here are not interested in classical separatist or ideological struggles, either. Again, contrary to states, whose capabilities are to a great extent visible and who disseminate some intelligence, accidentally or on purpose, about their intentions to resort to force within a foreseeable time frame (for instance, by conducting unusually large-scale military manoeuvres), many terrorist NSAGs are almost invisible, which makes it hard to track their capabilities, let alone to detect their intentions about when and where they plan to stage an assault. Under these circumstances, deterrence is unlikely to succeed. When a physical base can be located, NSAGs will be operating from within the physical territory of a state or multiple states—either with or without the support of a state. The difficulty of militarily engaging a NSAG includes that of launching an attack on a sovereign state's territory. In some cases, the only politically and militarily viable option seems to be to hold states responsible for giving logistical support to such entities and to threaten them with retaliation in kind. This was the case in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The United States held Afghanistan and Sudan responsible for providing support to the NSAG that staged the attacks and retaliated via a cruise missile strike. Some US authorities claimed that, had the attacks on their embassies been chemical or biological in nature, the response to Afghanistan and Sudan could have been with nuclear weapons.

**Deterrence fails—irrational**

**Kibaroglu 9—**Mustafa, Former Joint Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program and International Security Program, 2004–2005 at the Harvard Belfer Center, (“Dealing with the threat posed by non-state armed groups aspiring to weapons of mass destruction” 2009, Nuclear Files, http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/terrorism/PDFs/pdf-art2710.pdf]//AY

In the past, terrorist groups needed state sponsorship for shelter as well as logistical and financial support. Today, developments in technology and science may soon render such support unnecessary, (if such is not already the case). NSAGs have become very sophisticated in their operations. They may not always have specific headquarters, military bases, or standing armies against which an attacked country can launch retaliatory strikes. Efforts to convey a message of determination or to display the capability to strike back will therefore have no significant impact on covert and irrational groups. Traditional responses, like deterrence, are highly likely to fail. There is currently no confidence interval within the margins of which one may feel relatively safe against actual or potential adversaries in the form of NSAGs.

**Irrational—empirics**

**Etzioni 10—**Amitai, Professor of International Relations at the George Washington University and, most recently, the author of *Security First: For A Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy* (“Rational Actors: Neither Mad nor M.A.D. The Meanings of Rationality, Rogue States and Terrorists” George Washington University, December 2010, http://icps.gwu.edu/files/2011/02/Rational-Actors2.pdf]//AY

The treatment of suicide provides a unique focus for the issue at hand. At first blush one may take it for granted that a terrorist who is ready to commit suicide cannot be deterred by the threat of retaliation. The counter argument, that suicide bombers may be deterred by retaliation against their nation or community, disregards the fact that many terrorists hold that such retaliation will favor their cause because it would further alienate the population and drive others to support their cause. One must also take into account that despite advances in nuclear forensics, the nation that will be attacked may well be unable to determine from what source the terrorists acquired their nuclear bomb. The fact that suicide attacks keep occurring, in more and more nations, and that terrorists have made several attempts to obtain nuclear arms, should settle the argument that one cannot rely on deterrence to prevent such attacks. Robert Pape studied all the known suicide attacks from 1980 through to 2003. He concluded that suicide is a rational act because it is purposive. “What nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland.” 13 A critical reading of these finds a case of confusion of the frame of reference. It may indeed be rational(in the sense of serving the goal)for the terrorist organizations and their leaders to send some of their recruits to die in acts of suicide; but that does not make it rational from the viewpoint of the individual recruits. Others argue that committing suicide scores well in terms of a cost–benefit analysis, given that those who commit suicide are poor, unemployed and their families receive high death benefits. However, this claim flies in the face of the evidence that many suicidal terrorists’ income and assets are relatively high. In fact, through his study, Pape ascertained the terrorists were better educated and had higher incomes than the averages in their respective populations. 14 It has become common knowledge that the nineteen 9/11 hijackers were relatively well educated, and that Osama bin Laden is a billionaire. Ultimately, it matters little if one considers suicide irrational or purposeful. In either case it cannot be deterred. If it is irrational, the actors will not take into account the threat of retaliation. If it is purposive, unless one yields to the terrorist and fulfills their goals, they will not be deterred. Indeed, Pape argues that the West should withdraw from the nations at issue, given that he defines the terrorists’ goals as removal of military forces. However, terrorists have many other goals. Iran and Syria support terrorist groups in Lebanon, but do not seek the removal of foreign troops. For many terrorists the removal of foreign forces is but a step towards establishing the kind of regime they favor – say, one of extreme Sharia, as is the case for the Taliban. Furthermore, many terrorists argue for spreading their regimes to other nations, by use of force if necessary, or those states’ destruction. Hamas, for instance, calls for the destruction of Israel. The author served as what he considered a freedom fighter, but what the British considered a terrorist (he was a member of the Palmach from 1946 until 1948.) 15 Their immediate goal was indeed to compel the British to leave Palestine. This was an instrumental goal, leading to the establishment of the state of Israel, whose territory has expanded ever since. Nor can one assume that even if the West would satisfy all the current terrorists’ goals, no new demands would be made. At least in other situations, achievements have led to raised aspirations, not to satiation.

**Terrorists are irrational—multiple actors multiply probability**

**Etzioni 10—**Amitai, Professor of International Relations at the George Washington University and, most recently, the author of *Security First: For A Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy* (“Rational Actors: Neither Mad nor M.A.D. The Meanings of Rationality, Rogue States and Terrorists” George Washington University, December 2010, http://icps.gwu.edu/files/2011/02/Rational-Actors2.pdf]//AY

Proponents of deterrence seek to reconcile the fact that terrorists commit suicide – and hence cannot be deterred by threat of retaliation – by showing that most terrorists do not commit suicide. Waltz writes, “I don’t notice that many religiously-oriented people act in ways that will result in the massacre of thousands of people. I think people are people. I don’t think heavenly rewards motivate very many people.” Pape noted that of the billions of people in the world, only 315 committed acts of suicide terrorism in the 23-year period under review. 23 Bryan Caplan points out that though there may be many who claim to agree with what suicide terrorists do, they do not commit suicide themselves: “While millions believe that they earn vast rewards in the afterlife if they engage in terrorism or – better yet – suicidal terrorism, only a handful put their lives on the line.” 24 These observations are relevant to those who seek to minimize terrorist attacks and those who seek to understand the motives of terrorists, hoping to find peaceful ways to satisfy their demands. It is much easier to deal with a group if most of its members are sensible than if most are not. However, when one deals with nuclear terrorism, the fact that there were “only” 315 suicide attacks between 1980 and 2003, a number that does not include more recent attacks in Iran and Pakistan, does not lead to the conclusion that deterrence can be relied upon as a mainstay of national security. Even if merely 315 suicidal terrorists are irrational, one cannot conclude that “terrorists” are rational. One recalls that it took only 19 terrorists, not using nuclear arms to have a “game-changing” effect on the United States(and the West at large) on 9/11.All it takes is a handful of terrorists and a single nuclear device, who make their way to a major city hiding in a container or using a speed boat, to bring about a nuclear attack. And one cannot rely on the rationality of all the others – even if they are found to be rational – to deter such an attack. There is room for difference of viewpoints about the likelihood that deterrence can work in dealing with rogue states, unstable states, or suicidal terrorists. This Comment argues that the matter should not be settled by defining rationality is such a way, and that the definition will settle the matter. It also suggests that both evidence and deliberate reasoning indicate that although deterrence may work for these kinds of actors, one cannot treat it as reliable

## \*\*\*Prolifs Fast\*\*\*

## ---Generic

**We’re at a critical juncture-prolif will spiral out of control and cause nuclear war**

**Semmel 6** (Andrew, deputy assistant secretary for Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy and Negotiations for the US State Department, “Interview With Andrew Semmel,” The Stanley Foundation, June 2006, http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/resources.cfm?id=348&article=1)//KR

Very good question. I wish I had the answer to that. We, critically, we can always say this. It sounds like a cliché, but we're at a critical juncture right now. And if Iran were to develop these nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons capabilities and this would be a signal, let's say, for other countries in the region—whether they be the Saudis or the Egyptians, Syrians, perhaps others—that if the Iranians can do this, why shouldn't we?? And you then begin to get this out-of-control spiral of nuclear weapons states, and so forth. I think we're likely to see in that one juncture, in that one direction in which the world might go, a far more dangerous world in which only by arithmetic the prospects of the use, whether intended or accidental use, of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials is going to increase.

Prolif fast – fuel management programs allow easy access to plutonium

[**citizen.org**](http://www.citizen.org) 10 – (“Nuclear’s Fatal Flaws: Proliferation” PublicCitizen, <http://www.citizen.org/cmep/article_redirect.cfm?ID=13453)//FK>

Reprocessing—a technology that separates uranium and plutonium from irradiated fuel—runs counter to efforts to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies and materials. Separated plutonium is easier to steal and employ in nuclear weapons than plutonium in highly radioactive irradiated fuel, because the intense radiation of the latter form prevents easy acquisition of the plutonium. It is widely recognized by nuclear power experts that the “once-through” fuel cycle—without reprocessing—is the only truly proliferation-resistant form of fuel production.[6] Since the mid-1970s, the U.S. has maintained an official policy against the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, due to proliferation concerns. But recent trends indicate an increasing interest by the U.S. in this risky technology as a “fuel management program.” Plutonium separated from irradiated fuel can be used in some nuclear reactors in a form called mixed oxide (or MOX) fuel. In the past three years, the DOE has received more than $190 million for research and development of new reprocessing technologies for commercial irradiated nuclear fuel, and President Bush’s fiscal year 2006 budget request to Congress for this program includes another $70 million. Further, the NRC has just licensed a MOX fuel fabrication facility and has authorized the use of such fuel in a nuclear plant in South Carolina.[7] While the initial source of fuel would come from dismantled weapons from the U.S. stockpile, the production and use of MOX fuel from dismantled weapons could lead to an institutional push to reprocess irradiated fuel from commercial reactors.

Prolif is fast and widespread – few resources are required to create WMDS

Taylor no date - chairman, NOVA, Damascus, nuclear weapons designer, PHd (Theodore B. Taylor, “Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” [http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/pdfs/taylor.pdf)//FK](http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/pdfs/taylor.pdf%29/FK)

Detailed information needed to design facilities for producing nuclear weapon materials is public. Key components of such facilities can be purchased through international markets. Using plutonium extracted from spent fuel from nuclear reactors is also open to any country that has a2 / Inevitability civilian reactor or high-power research reactor. Another alternative, applicable to at least a dozen nations, is the diversion of highly enriched uranium or plutonium from other types of research facilities. These often contain enough material for at least several nuclear weapons. There are several ways that present safeguards against diversion of nuclear material from nonmilitary reactors and their supporting facilities could be defeated. These facilities produce nuclear material suitable for use in weapons and many, allegedly used for peaceful purposes, are not subject to proliferation safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Further, even where IAEA safeguards do apply, they cannot detect diversion of small amounts of nuclear material and, at many facilities, the annual threshold of detection is significantly greater than the amount of material needed for a nuclear explosive. In addition, even nations currently adhering to international safeguards can break the agreement at a later date if the nation decides its vital interests so dictate, for example if the nation is losing a conventional war. “By the year 2000, there will be more than 3 million kilograms of plutonium in the world, enough for at least 500,000 nuclear weapons.” Even where there is no current diversion of nuclear materials, the worldwide spread of plutonium produced in civilian nuclear power reactors has produced “latent proliferation” — the ability to produce nuclear weapons in short order — in every country with a nuclear power plant. Nuclear explosives can be made with less than 6 kilograms of plutonium (1), in size about enough to fill a coffee cup. The world’s present inventory of plutonium produced in civilian reactors is roughly 700,000 kilograms, greater than the total amount in the world’s nuclear arsenals. This plutonium is being produced in thirty-six countries. By the year 2000, there will be more than 3 million kilograms of plutonium in the world, enough for at least 500,000 nuclear weapons. (2) The plutonium produced in a reactor must be separated before it can be used in a weapon. While commercial facilities are more complex, a separation plant suitable for military purposes can be built for less than $50 million in several months time. (3) Every nation with a commercial nuclear power plant has such resources, since they are small compared with those needed for acquiring the power plant itself. Each year, the reprocessing plant can extract approximately 250 kilograms of plutonium from a single commercial reactor, enough for forty nuclear weapons at the very least.

**Prolif fast – several scenarios for escalation**

**Cirincione 7** - **Ploughshares Fund and Senior Fellow and Dir. Nuclear Policy – Center for American Progress, National Interest** (Joe, “Symposium: Apocalypse When?” November/December,)//FK

Let me be clear: Nuclear proliferation is a real danger. George Bush and John Kerry were correct when they agreed in a 2004 debate that it is the number one threat to America. The threat comes in four flavors. Most serious is nuclear terrorism. As terrible as another 9/11 attack would be, a nuclear 9/11 would destroy an entire city, kill hundreds of thousands, wreck the economy and change the political life of the nation, perhaps permanently. Our number one priority must be to make sure any further terrorist attack is non-nuclear. Second is the danger from existing arsenals. There are still 26,000 nuclear weapons in the world, enough to destroy the planet several times over. Even a small regional war in South Asia using one hundred weapons would trigger a nuclear winter that could devastate food crops around the world. Accidental or unauthorized use is a real risk. Consider the September flight of a B-52 with six nuclear weapons that the crew didn't know they had. If the most sophisticated command-and-control mechanism in the world fails to stop the unauthorized possession of the equivalent of sixty Hiroshimas, what is going on in other nations? Third is the risk of new nuclear nations. I agree with Mueller that the danger here is not that Iran or North Korea would use a nuclear bomb against America or their neighbors. Deterrence is alive and well; they know what would happen next. Nor is it that these states would intentionally give a weapon they worked so hard to make to a terrorist group they could not control. Rather it is the risk of what could happen in the neighborhood: a nuclear reaction chain where states feel they must match each other's nuclear capability. Just such a reaction is underway already in the Middle East, as over a dozen Muslim nations suddenly declared interest in starting nuclear-power programs. This is not about energy; it is a nuclear hedge against Iran. It could lead to a Middle East with not one nuclear-weapons state, Israel, but four or five. That is a recipe for nuclear war. Finally, there is the risk of the collapse of the entire non-proliferation regime. Kennedy was right to worry about ten, fifteen or twenty nuclear nations. He did not make this number up. It was based on a 1958 NPT that warned that while there were then only three nuclear nations (the United States, the USSR and the United Kingdom), "within the next decade a large number of individual countries could produce at least a few nominal-yield weapons." Indeed, several nations already had programs underway. Subsequent NPTs confirmed the proliferation danger and the linkage to existing arsenals. Other nations' decisions on proceeding with programs, the intelligence agencies concluded, were linked to "further progress in disarmament-aimed at effective controls and reduction of stockpiles." Kennedy negotiated a limited nuclear test ban and began the process to get the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty completed by Lyndon Johnson and ratified by Richard Nixon. This bipartisan dam held back the nuclear wave; its abandonment by the current administration risks a return to the 1950s nuclear free-for-all.

**Proliferation fast – terrorists, rogue states, and irrational actors create widespread escalation**

**Allison and Myers 4** – (Graham and Joanne J., “Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe” Carnegie Council. 16 November 2004, http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/transcripts/5049.html/\_res/id=sa\_File1/Nuclear\_Terrorism.)//FK

When the Cold War ended, many believed that the dangers of an accelerating nuclear arms race would disappear. But this idea has proved short lived. In fact, if anything, the 21st century seems to be even more dangerous and less predictable than the 20th century ever was. Although there may be fewer nuclear weapons in the collective stockpile of America, Russia, Britain, France, and China, the risk that someone, somewhere, might detonate a bomb in anger or with malice is arguably greater than any time since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The number of rogue states and terrorist groups seeking to acquire nuclear weapons is increasing. Osama bin Laden has talked about acquiring nuclear weapons as a "religious duty," and the confessions of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani scientist, have shed light on a vast underground quietly spreading nuclear materials. While everyone, including the two candidates of the recent presidential campaign, agrees in principle that the continuing spread of weapons of mass destruction poses a chief threat to international security, in practice there is little international accord on how to deal with that threat. We can only hope that Professor Allison's book, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, widely acknowledged as the single best book addressing the single most serious threat to American national security, will change this impasse.

## ---Iran

Iranian prolif quick – uses political safeguards to bypass treaties

[**citizen.org**](http://www.citizen.org) 10 – (“Nuclear’s Fatal Flaws: Proliferation” PublicCitizen, <http://www.citizen.org/cmep/article_redirect.cfm?ID=13453)//FK>

Non-nuclear weapons states that have been discouraged by Western states from developing fuel-cycle technologies such as uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing may view renewed U.S. interest in such technology capacity as hypocritical—making them less likely to fully abide by the terms of the NPT. Iran, a party to the NPT, has recently been a subject of international concern, as it is suspected of developing nuclear weapons capabilities as part of its nuclear program. Yet Iran has defended its right to enrich uranium under the NPT, and it has returned American accusations with criticisms of the Bush administration’s own failure to hold up its end of the bargain by conducting research into new nuclear weapons, spurning the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to prohibit explosive tests of nuclear devices, and unilaterally retreating from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia. The NPT requires weapons states to take steps towards total disarmament.

## ---Middle East

**Middle East prolif is fast-arms racing**

**JPost 6/21** (Jerusalem Post, staff writers, 'Nuclear Iran would trigger Middle East arms race’, <http://www.jpost.com/IranianThreat/News/Article.aspx?id=274690>, 6/21/12)//KR

If the international community allows Iran to achieve nuclear status, it will immediately trigger a proliferation race in the Middle East, Defense Minister Ehud Barak said Wednesday. Speaking in an interview with the Washington Post, Barak said "A nuclear Iran will be the end of the nonproliferation regime: Saudi Arabia will turn nuclear immediately, Turkey within several years, and probably the new Egypt will start moving to do it. Not to mention the potential of weapons-grade material leaking into the hands of terrorist groups from Iran."? Barak added: "We are living in a tough neighborhood — no mercy for the weak, no second opportunity for those who cannot defend themselves. We have to be able to defend ourselves."?

## ---North Korea

**North Korea is proliferating now and cannot be negotiated with – action is key to prevent further proliferation**

Fitzpatrick, 12 – Director of IISS Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme, expert in US foreign policy and Asian

Proliferation. (Mark, “North Korean Proliferation Challeges: The Role of the European Union,” June 2012, sipri.org/research/disarmament//*HO*

North Korea's nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 marked a stunning milestone in a weapons programme that began in the 1960s, building on Soviet technological assistance centred at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Centre. Although the Soviet Union did not intend to support a weapons programme, the small reactor and radioisotope-production laboratory it supplied allowed North Korea to master the production and reprocessing of plutonium. As detailed in 2011 by US academic Jonathan Pollack, Soviet and Chinese archives show that North Korea's nuclear programme from its very onset was designed with weapons in mind.1 In around 1980 North Korea began a programme to build three graphite-moderated, natural uranium-fuelled reactors to produce plutonium and, ostensibly electricity, along with a reprocessing plant. Only the smallest of the reactors, rated at S megawatt electric (MW (e)), was completed, in 1985.2 When operated at full capacity, it was able to produce about 7.5 kilograms of plutonium annually, enough for one weapon? In 1984 construction was started on a 50 MW(e) reactor at Yongbyon, which, if completed, would have been able to produce about 55 kilograms of plutonium per year, enough for around 10 weapons. Construction of a 200-MW(e) reactor was later started at Taechon, which, if completed, would have been capable of producing about 200 kg of plutonium annually, enough for about three dozen weapons. Although North Korea in 1985 acceded to Soviet pressure to join the NPT, it never declared the full extent of its nuclear infrastructure or its plutonium production prior to concluding a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1992. The USA estimated that, before 1992, North Korea |might have produced enough plutonium for one to two weapons! IAEA inspections that year revealed inconsistencies in North Korea's declaration and, based on US-supplied overhead imagery, the IAEA was aware of two undeclared underground nuclear waste sites. North Korea's refusal to allow inspector access to the sites, even when the IAEA in 1993 called for a rarely requested "˜special inspection', sparked the first Korean nuclear crisis.5 Rejecting a bombing option because of the massive casualties of the war that would surely ensue, the administration of US President Bill Clinton reached a diplomatic solution with the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il. Under the terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea froze its plutonium production facilities and the USA agreed to arrange for the provision of two light-water reactors (LWRs), which would be more proliferation-resistant than the indigenous reactors that North Korea agreed to shutter." Before the LWRs were completed, the USA agreed to provide 500 000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil annually as compensation for the electricity that North Korea supposedly would be foregoing by stopping operation of the 5-WM(e) reactor and the construction of the larger reactors. North Korea also agreed to fully account for its pre-1992 plutonium production before significant nuclear components for the LWRs were delivered-milestones that were never reached. Some 8000 spent fuel rods containing plutonium were to be removed from the country. The Agreed Framework also provided for the exchange of diplomatic missions and the lifting of sanctions on trade and investment. Japan, South Korea and the USA established an international consortium, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), to build the twin LWRs, with the largest pledges from South Korea and Japan and significant assistance from the EU through the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). Three years before the Agreed Framework, North Korea and South Korea agreed bilaterally to "˜denuclearize' the Korean Peninsula and to each forgo uranium enrichment and reprocessing. The 1991 North-South Denuclearization Agreement was facilitated by the 1989 US removal of tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea and from surface ships.7 The Agreed Framework froze the plutonium programme for eight years, but not long after it was signed North Korea began a uranium-enrichment programme through transfers of technology from Pakistan, via the head of its enrichment laboratories, A. Q. Khan. When US intelligence agencies became convinced that North Korea's enrichment programme was reaching an industrial scale, the USA in October 2002 confronted North Korea with an ultimatum and stopped the fuel oil shipments. Thus, the second Korean nuclear crisis ensued. North Korea responded by expelling IAEA inspectors, withdrawing from the NPT and reprocessing the plutonium in the 8000 spent fuel rods (sufficient for plutonium for up to six weapons). KEDO eventually was disbanded, having spent $1.9 billion (the bulk of it from South Korea and Japan, but also 120 million of EU money plus lesser amounts from others, including from several EU member states in their national capacity) and leaving behind, at the port city of Sinpho, the concrete foundations for the first LWR. A diplomatic track led by China created a multinational negotiating framework in 2003 known as the Six-Party Talks (China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Russia and the USA). In September 2005 those talks produced a joint statement, under which North Korea agreed to denuclearization and full disclosure of its nuclear activities, while the USA recognized North Korean sovereignty, pledged not to attack and agreed, in the future, to again discuss the provision of a LWR. Almost immediately however, the USA made clear that the LWR discussions were only theoretical. The 2005 joint statement also came under severe strain as a result of the US imposition of sanctions against the Macao-based Banco Delta Asia because of its money laundering of North Korean bank accounts connected with currency counterfeiting and other illicit activity. This was the backdrop of North Korea's first nuclear test, in October 2006. Although it was a technical fizzle, producing a yield of 0.5 kilotonnes (compared to the 4 kt yield forecast North Korea had provided China and the 10-20 kt yield of the first generation weapons produced by other states), the test was seen by North Korea as a political and diplomatic success. China went along with tough UN sanctions under Security Council Resolution 1718, which, among other things, banned North Korea from importing or exporting major arms. After the test, however, bilateral talks resumed with the USA. Those bilateral talks, always "˜in conjunction' with Six-Party Talks, led in 2007 to the lifting of Banco Delta Asia sanctions, a new suspension of the plutonium programme, the provision of 18 000 pages of reactor operating records, and the partial dismantlement of the 5-MW (e) reactor and other facilities. However, a dispute in the autumn of 2008 over verification procedures stopped the dismantlement process. Turning down incoming US President Barack Obama's offer of a "˜hand of engagement', North Korea tested a space launch vehicle in defiance of a UN Security Council mandate and then, when mildly reproached by the UN, conducted its second nuclear test, this time with a yield of 2-4 kt. As of mid-2012 North Korea has not restored the plutonium production facilities, but it did move quickly to build other nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. In November 2010 North Korea stunned the world by revealing to a visiting group of US academics a uranium-enrichment facility with 2000 new second-generation gas centrifuges, of a type more advanced than those on which Iran relies. North Korea claimed the plant was operational and was set up to produce fuel for an experimental LWR under construction. At the time of writing, the outer portions of the experimental LWR appear to be nearing completion, but there is grave doubt about whether North Korea can safely build and operate the reactor components on its own. It is unclear why North Korea appears to have abandoned the plutonium programme in favour of uranium enrichment, but the most likely reason is that enrichment plants are easier to conceal. North Korea may also have seen an advantage in being able to produce gun-type highly enriched uranium (HEU)| weapons, which do not need to be tested. If the centrifuge plant were operational, it would be able to produce about 30-40 kg of HEU a year, enough for at least one implosion weapon a year. It is widely believed that North Korea could not have constructed the 2000-centrifuge plant at Yongbyon in 19 months without first having constructed at least one pilot plant elsewhere. Raw materials and components for the programme were procured from Pakistan, Russia, Europe and Japan beginning in the 1990s, although it is not clear whether such procurement has continued in recent years. There is no public information about the location and size of the pilot plant or a facility to produce uranium hexafluoride (UF6) for the enrichment plant. The existence of a UF6 production line has been assumed ever since it was discovered that Libya in 2000-2001 purchased 1.65 tonnes of UF6 from the Khan network that all signs pointed to as coming from North Korea? In addition to this assistance to Libya's fledgling nuclear weapon programme, North Korea helped Syria to secretly construct a plutonium-production reactor near Deir Ez-Zor, similar to the 5-MW(e) reactor at Yongbyon.1Â° The Syrian reactor was destroyed by an Israeli airstrike in September 2007 before it was fuelled. Rumours of North Korean cooperation with Myanmar on an unannounced nuclear weapon programme have not been confirmed. The USA does appear to have some intelligence information to this effect, which would explain why in Mav 2009, in Bangkok, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said the US Government was worried "˜about the transfer of nuclear technology and other dangerous weapons' from North Korea to Myanmar." The intelligence discovery of the assistance to Syria and of the uranium-enrichment programme greatly complicated US efforts to reach a diplomatic settlement with North Korea. After the 2010 revelation of the centrifuge facility, former US lead negotiator Chris Hill said that, in light of North Korea's lies about its enrichment programme, there was "absolutely no value' in restarting the Six-Party Talks." North Korea today is believed to possess enough separated plutonium for approximately eight implosion devices, although it might be as few as| four and as many as 12, depending on unknown variables concerning the amount of plutonium production, the separation losses, the amount used in the two tests and the amount needed for each weapon." This stockpile could grow by one weapon a year if North Korea restarted its plutonium programme, which would take about six months, or if it began to produce HEU at Yongbyon. Faster accumulation would be possible if North Korea had larger undeclared enrichment facilities. Although there is no public evidence to date of production of HEU, South Korean officials believe that North Korea has solved all the technical challenges involved and appear to assume that HEU production must be underway somewhere. They predict, off the record, that North Korea is likely to use HEU in a test, possibly later in 2012. In April 2012, overhead imagery showed growing piles of dirt next to a previously used nuclear test shaft, which prompted China to strongly but quietly counsel prudence. Unconfirmed press reports suggested that North Korea had given the USA a pledge to forgo a third nuclear test. Whether North Korea can be said to possess deliverable nuclear weapons is another matter. Rather than be seen to be recognizing North Korea as a nuclear-armed nation, officials from Japan, South Korea and the USA try to avoid speaking of North Korean "nuclear weapons”. Their caution is defensible because there is no proof that North Korea can fit a nuclear weapon into the nose cone of one of its ballistic missiles. Such a capability is more likely if North Korea obtained the designs for a tested weapon, such as A. Q. Khan sold to Libya. At least one more test is probably necessary before North Korea would feel confident that it had a reliable nuclear weapon." Even if it could produce a weapon small enough for its missiles, the KPA cannot be certain that bomb components could survive the severe heating and vibration caused by atmospheric re-entry of the missile warhead. North Korea may feel the need to conduct more missile tests to enhance warhead re-entry survivability, although test data in this regard may have been obtained from Iran and Pakistan. It should also be kept in mind that missiles are not North Korea's only means of delivering nuclear weapons. In addition to aircraft, which are an unlikely choice because of their vulnerability to detection and kill, North Korea conceivably could deliver nuclear weapons by ship or midget submarine.

**North Korea is capable of making weapons now – the government can’t be reasoned with**

Fitzpatrick, 12 – Director of IISS Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme, expert in US foreign policy and Asian

Proliferation. (Mark, “North Korean Proliferation Challeges: The Role of the European Union,” June 2012, sipri.org/research/disarmament//*HO*

Under what circumstances North Korea might use nuclear weapons is a matter of conjecture. Most analysts assume that North Korea would only do so as a last resort if the regime were on the verge of military defeat." Any North Korean use of nuclear weapons before then would surely bring retaliation that would ensure defeat if not annihilation. This analysis is consistent with North Korea's insistence that its nuclear weapons are for deterrence and state survival." Apart from any future use, North Korea's nuclear weapons serve a political purpose. In addition to their deterrence purpose, they are a way to bolster the regime's status both internally and externally in every other field of endeavour, North Korea is surpassed by South Korea by huge margins. Only in nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles does the North have the advantage. North Korea thus no longer refers to any possibility that it will barter away its nuclear arsenal. It insists it will give up nuclear weapons only if the American "˜nuclear threat is removed and South Korea is cleared of its nuclear umbrella'.17 Whether or not a verification regime could be established that would convince North Korea that the USA really did remove all nuclear weapons from South Korea, North Korea's position in effect means it will keep nuclear weapons as long as the USA has them in its arsenal anywhere. In the meantime, North Korea says it should be granted a status akin to the USA's acceptance of India's nuclear weapons." Given these positions and the recent history of broken agreements and failed negotiations, most outside analysts conclude that the military regime of North Korea will cling to its nuclear weapons to the end. They have become integral to North Korea's sense of itself and are deemed as vital to ensuring the survival of the regime.” If North Korea ever was serious about using its nuclear assets as a bargaining chip for aid and diplomatic recognition, that is not the case today. To underscore its nuclear status, North Korea in April 2012 amended the preamble to its constitution to proclaim that Kim Jong-il had turned the nation into a "nuclear-armed state”. Concluding that North Korea is unlikely ever to give up its nuclear weapons does not mean concluding that negotiations are hopeless. While maintaining an end goal of North Korean denuclearization, its negotiating partners may be able to obtain secondary objectives in the nearer term. Worthy objectives include a suspension and rollback of the enrichment programme, a moratorium on testing and a ban on the transfer of nuclear weapons-related material and technology. A suspension of nuclear and missile tests is of particular value, in case further testing of both systems enables North Korea to mount a miniature nuclear warhead on its ballistic missiles. Concerned nations might also consider whether nuclear safety and security objectives might be worth pursuing with North Korea under certain conditions. If North Korea proceeds with constructing LWRs on its own, it could pose severe safety risks for neighbouring countries, risks underscored by the terrible accident at Fukushima in Japan."

**North Korean proliferation spreading through Asian countries**

**Fidler 8 - Defence and Security Editor** (Fidler, Stephen. “Proliferation: Fast spread of nuclear weapons erodes stability” 6 July 2008. [http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e863de96-4966-11dd-9a5f-000077b07658.html)//FK](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e863de96-4966-11dd-9a5f-000077b07658.html%29/FK)

Japan’s decision to place the spread of nuclear weapons technologies on the agenda of the Group of Eight summit reflects, in significant part, Tokyo’s long- standing disquiet about developments in nearby North Korea. The isolated dictatorship has missiles easily capable of reaching Japan, and tested a nuclear weapon in October 2006. Since then, the US government has provided evidence suggesting North Korea helped Syria build a nuclear reactor that was destroyed in an Israeli raid last September, perhaps indicating that Pyongyang has been more active than hitherto believed in spreading nuclear technologies and know-how. In spite of signs of deep divisions within the US government about policy on North Korea, this evidence has not so far derailed negotiations – in which the US participates in so-called six-party talks with North and South Korea, Japan, China and Russia – aimed at persuading Pyongyang to end its nuclear programme. Last month, North Korea issued a declaration of its past nuclear activities. It also demolished a cooling tower that was part of its ageing Yongbyon nuclear reactor, the probable source of the plutonium used in its weapons test. Even though the declaration was judged incomplete, reportedly missing out details of its suspected uranium enrichment programme and its proliferation activities, President George W. Bush said the US would respond by taking North Korea off its list of state sponsors of terrorism, paving the way for a lifting of some US economic sanctions. The process is likely to be protracted, even if successful, but it has not been the sole Japanese concern. Tokyo has also been worried by China’s military modernisation and the fact that its neighbour, with which relations have been frosty for decades, is the only established nuclear power – the others being the US, Russia, France and the UK – expanding its nuclear arsenal. This combination of factors has resulted in the erosion of a long-standing taboo against domestic discussion of the possibility that Japan should leave the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and develop its own independent nuclear deterrent. It is widely assumed to be technically capable of doing this rapidly. In recent months, there have been signs of a warming relationship with China, motivated partly perhaps by Beijing’s concerns that its hostility with Tokyo could trigger unwelcome strategic instability in the region. Beijing was also said to be relieved when, following the North Korean nuclear test, US officials strongly suggested that Japan remained under Washington’s nuclear “umbrella”.

## ---Pakistan

**Pakistan prolif quick – exponential increase in nuclear capabilities and unknown safeguards prove**

**The Economic Times 11** – (“Pakistan has world’s fastest-growing nuclear stockpile: Experts”, 7 July 2011, [http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-07-07/news/29747959\_1\_hans-m-kristensen-robert-s-norris-nuclear-arsenal)//FK](http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-07-07/news/29747959_1_hans-m-kristensen-robert-s-norris-nuclear-arsenal%29/FK)

WASHINGTON: Pakistan has the world's fastest-growing nuclear stockpile and it could achieve 150-200 warheads in a decade despite the political instability in the country, two top American atomic experts have said. Pakistan is in the process of building two new plutonium production reactors and a new reprocessing facility to fabricate more nuclear weapons fuel, wrote nuclear experts Hans M Kristensen and Robert S Norris in the latest issue of Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. In their paper 'Pakistan's nuclear forces, 2011', the authors estimate that if Pakistan's expansion continues, its nuclear weapons stockpile could reach 150-200. "Despite its political instability, Pakistan continues to steadily expand its nuclear capabilities and competencies; in fact, it has the world's fastest-growing nuclear stockpile," they wrote. "We estimate that Pakistan has a nuclear weapons stockpile of 90-110 nuclear warheads, an increase from the estimated 70-90 warheads in 2009," the paper said. "It is also developing new delivery systems. Enhancements to Pakistan's nuclear forces include a new nuclear capable medium-range ballistic missile, the development of two new nuclear-capable short-range ballistic missiles, and the development of two new nuclear-capable cruise missiles," they wrote. "With four new delivery systems and two plutonium production reactors under development, however, the rate of Pakistan's stockpile growth may even increase over the next 10 years," they warned. "The Pakistani government has not defined the number and type of nuclear weapons that its minimum deterrent requires. But Pakistan's pace of nuclear modernization and its development of several short-range delivery systems indicates that its nuclear posture has entered an important new phase and that a public explanation is overdue," the experts said. Pakistan may be producing 120-180 kg of HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) per year, an amount sufficient for 7-15 warheads, they said, adding that the uranium ore is mined at several locations throughout Pakistan, with more mines scheduled to open in the future. The revelation that Osama bin Laden was hiding for years in Abbottabad, only 16 km from a large military weapons depot with underground facilities, raised new questions about the security and control of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. "Outside Pakistan, observers wondered if the nuclear arsenal was secure from potential terrorist theft; inside Pakistan, observers wondered whether the arsenal was safe from a possible US or Indian incursion," the article said. "Exactly how Pakistan safeguards its nuclear weapons, and what type of use-control features its weapons have, is unclear," they wrote, adding that the weapons are thought to have some basic use-control features to prevent unauthorized use. "Its facilities and weapons are said to be widely dispersed in the country with most of the arsenal located south of Islamabad. Furthermore, the weapons are thought to be stored unassembled, with the cores separate from the weapons and the weapons stored away from the delivery vehicles," the report said.

## ---Terror

Nuclear Terror is fast and widespread – barriers to WMDs are easily surpassed

Taylor no date - chairman, NOVA, Damascus, nuclear weapons designer, PhD (Theodore B. Taylor, “Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” [http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/pdfs/taylor.pdf)//FK](http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/pdfs/taylor.pdf%29/FK)

Proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations is terrifying enough. But, starting in the mid-1960s, there has been a steadily increasing concern that non-national organizations might acquire nuclear weapons. Such organizations include established terrorist organizations; new terrorist groups, possibly including criminals planning to use the weapons for extortion; and desperate factions of an established government during a coup. An extensive and detailed expression of this concern and possible ways for alleviating it has recently been published by the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism. (1) The most straightforward way for terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons would be to steal complete weapons from military facilities or transport vehicles. The terrorist’s job is complicated somewhat because many weapons are protected by Permissive Action Links (PALs). PALs are like combination locks which prevent the weapon from being detonated until the correct secret access code (“combination”) has been entered. Some PALs go further and are designed to make the nuclear weapon inoperable after any unsuccessful attempt to bypass the PAL. While detailed assessment of the effectiveness of PALs is classified info-Proliferation of Nuclear Wearpons / 5 rmation, they are not an insurmountable obstacle. Organizations with access to skilled technicians (internal or hired) could disassemble the stolen weapon and build a new one detonated in a different way. And smart terrorists would focus on weapons that are not protected. Terrorist organizations could also construct a nuclear weapon from scratch. As with nations, the main technical barrier is the acquisition of the required plutonium or highly enriched uranium. This material could be obtained by theft, by “donation” from a nation sympathetic to the terrorists, or by purchasing it on a black market. The problem of theft brings out an important difference in protecting against national versus terrorist diversion of nuclear materials. In the case of national diversion, only detection is required. But in the case of terrorist diversion, strong physical security is also needed since terrorists or criminals might obtain material through a physical attack. While the details of the physical security mechanisms to counteract such threats are classified, what has been publicly revealed tends not to inspire confidence. It is highly doubtful that the physical security afforded to plutonium and highly enriched uranium would be effective against thefts involving the sophistication displayed in many modern thefts of money or other materials less valuable than a nuclear weapon; the value of stolen nuclear materials would be measured in millions of dollars and a complete weapon would be worth many times more. “The most straightforward way for terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons would be to steal complete weapons from military facilities or transport vehicles.” Whether they obtain nuclear material by theft, diversion, or purchase on a black market, nuclear terrorists would require less material if they could obtain metallic plutonium or highly enriched uranium rather than the more commonly available plutonium oxide or uranium oxide. Even if an organization only had access to the oxides, weapons in the kiloton range could still be made. While they would require several times as much material and would be less reliable than weapons made from metallic material, with proper design they still would present an awesome threat. (1) Although, to date, there has been no reported evidence of nuclear weapons possession by terrorist organizations, the likelihood of nuclear terrorism is increasing for several reasons. The incidence, sophistication, and lethality of acts of “conventional” terrorism have increased dramatically in recent years. There is growing evidence of state support, or even sponsorship, of terrorist groups (one nation’s “freedom fighters” are6 / Inevitability often another’s terrorists). Nuclear weapons are often stored and deployed in areas of increasing terrorist activity. The number of places where nuclear weapon materials or assembled military nuclear weapons are in storage or in transport are increasing. Several hundred threats of nuclear terrorism based on claimed possession of at least one nuclear explosive have been investigated by authorities and found to be hoaxes. Some of these threats have been credible enough to cause serious concern.

## ---Tipping Point

**Prolif fast-we’re approaching the tipping point**

**Ash 10** (Timothy Garten Ash, Professor of Euopean Studies, Oxford, “Nuclear arms will soon proliferate. So here's a plan to scrap them all”, Guardian, 2/3/12, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/feb/03/nuclear-non-proliferation-france)//KR

What matters is the direction of travel. To decide which way you're heading, it does usually help to identify a final destination. At the moment – let us be very clear – the world is going in the opposite direction. We are close to a nuclear proliferation tipping point. As the strategic expert [François Heisbourg](http://www.iiss.org/events-calendar/2008-events-archive/june-2008/discussion-meeting-franois-heisbourg/) warns in an interview in Le Monde, "if the non-proliferation regime is not reinforced, we risk returning to the dynamics of the 1950s when every country wanting the bomb could have it – except that now it's much easier to get". If the established nuclear weapons states do not this year take a decisive lead in reducing the number and diffusion of nuclear weapons, it may soon be too late. And, by the way, in the excruciating choices about public spending that now confront us all, they can save some much-needed money this way, too.

## \*\*\*AT: Small Arsenals\*\*\*

## ---1nc

**Small arsenals still have the capability to kill million – even if there is a small chance of deterrence its not worth the risk of not acting.**

**Basur et al 8** - \*Rajesh - Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and the Director at the Center for Global Studies. \*\*Michael Cohen PhD in the department of the Political Science (“Do Small Arsenals Deter” <http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2008.32.3.202>)//AA

Finally, a word about damage. Studies have shown that even small arsenals have the capacity to cause immense destruction. One study replicating the Hiroshima bombing with respect to Mumbai (earlier known as Bombay) shows that a single 15-kiloton fission bomb would cause anywhere between 160,000 and 866,000 fatalities, depending on the precise location of ground zero.[23](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v032/32.3basrur.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT23) Another simulation calculates that a 50-kiloton bomb dropped over Mumbai would take 994,626 lives, and one dropped over Lahore would kill 723,970.[24](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v032/32.3basrur.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT24) Note that these estimates are for a single bomb and that the level of damage could conceivably occur at the outset of nuclear war. As the evidence above demonstrates, it seems extremely doubtful that any Indian or Pakistani leader would not be deterred by the risk of such levels of potential damage. Most striking is that, notwithstanding the volatile mix of a history of war, conflicts of identity centered on disputed territory, and mutual distrust, India and Pakistan have refrained from deploying their nuclear weapons even at the peak of crisis. Consider too that the level of damage required to deter may be related to a nation's experience. In the case of India and Pakistan, all of their wars (in 1947–48, 1965, and 1971) involved limited destruction and deliberate eschewal of city targeting. In contrast, Hiroshima may not have seemed revolutionary in the closing years of World War II. But again, that is no reason to expect that the prospect of one Hiroshima-type bomb dropped on one city has been an acceptable risk for any decisionmaker in the postwar era. From the evidence available, it has not.

## ---2nc

**Proliferation causes destabilization and crisis escalation**

**Cimbala, 2008** - Professor of Political Science @ Penn. State and a consultant on arms control (Stephen, “Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia”, 27,)

If the possibility existed of a mistaken preemption during and immediately after the Cold War, between the experienced nuclear forces and command systems of America and Russia, then it may be a matter of even more concern with regard to states with newer and more opaque forces and command systems. In addition, the Americans and Soviets (and then Russians) had a great deal of experience getting to know one another’s military operational proclivities and doctrinal idiosyncrasies, including those that might influence the decision for or against war. Another consideration, relative to nuclear stability in the present century, is that the Americans and their NATO allies shared with the Soviets and Russians a commonality of culture and historical experience. Future threats to American or Russian security from weapons of mass destruction may be presented by states or nonstate actors motivated by cultural and social predispositions not easily understood by those in the West nor subject to favorable manipulation during a crisis. The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social, and cultural crosscurrents contributory to the possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War, in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.12 The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear-capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues.13 The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another’s vitals. But short-range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and NorthKorea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on. The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first strike–vulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policymakers and academic theorists. For policymakers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).14 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passe, on account of the emergence of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” and its encouragement of information-based warfare.15 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large-scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.16 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare.

**Small arsenals aren’t stable – they’re still vulnerable to terrorist attacks and they are untested and unproven – ensures that people will still want to build up arsenals.**

**Busch 4** PhD in specialization of international relations and political philosophy. Co Director of CAS, the Center for American Studies (Nathan *No End in Sight: The continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation* pg 8)//AA

Both sides of the debate agree that NWS must have adequate controls to prevent unauthorized use. As we have seen, optimists are confident that NEWs will implement adequate controls against the unauthorized use of their nuclear weapons because it is so clearly in their interest to do so. Moreover optimists argue that it will be relatively easy for emerging NWSs to ensure proper security for their weapons because their arsenals will be small and their operational systems simple. Because they will have fewer nuclear weapons to control, emerging NWSs will be able to protect their weapons much more effectively, even without the sophisticated command – and – control systems employed by the United States and the Soviet Union. Pessimists argue that use-control devices are still necessary for preventing terrorist seizure of nuclear weapons and unauthorized launches. These problems will remain even if there are fewer weapons to control. In addition, pessimists argue, even though financial constraints will make arsenals smaller, the arsenals will tend to be “untested, unproven, and probably unsafe.” And finally, pessimists argue, even though emerging NWSs will initially have smaller arsenals, there is no guarantee that they will remain satisfied with the “minimal deterrence” that small arsenals provide. If the emerging NWSs decide to build up their arsenals, they could then encounter the organizational problems that pessimists have associated with large arsenals.

**Future proliferators will use nukes, not deter. Preemption is likely.**

**Cimbala ‘7** (Stephen, Distinguished Prof. Pol. Sci. – Penn. State Brandywine, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND DETERRENCE IN ASIA: THE VIEW FROM VLADIVOSTOK”, 20, InformaWorld)

Deterrence (or compellence) theories depend for their effectiveness on an understanding of war or crisis as a bargaining process, in which utilities are defined commensurably as between the belligerents. The existing and future probable proliferators in the Middle East and Asia may see nuclear weapons as absolutes or gold standards of modern military power. They may also believe that preemptive (or preventive) war is preferable to riding out an attack that appears to be imminent (or inevitable). Smaller nuclear arsenals may tempt nuclear first strikes or first uses as the cutting edge of a first strike. From a systems perspective, deterrence in a multipolar nuclear world is not necessarily more likely to break down than in a bipolar one: but the term “necessarily” is used advisedly. More nuclear-armed states with dyadic or other conflicts may create a tipping point, beyond which deterrent fatigue gives way to competition in preemptive strategies. Such a process occurred on the eve of World War I, escalating the assassination of an archduke **into a war of unprecedented destruction**.

## \*\*\*AT: Safe Guards Check\*\*\*

**Safeguards insufficient-IAEA limitations and differences between paper and practice**

Kusumi 5 (Ryoko Secretary General. European Nuclear Education Network Association, “Recent developments in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons”, Science and World Affairs, http://www.scienceandworldaffairs.org/PDFs/Kusumi\_vol1.pdf)//KR

As mentioned above, the implementation of the NPT is secured by the IAEA according to INFCIRC/153-type agreements, but INFIRC/153 has two major controversial points. Firstly, the IAEA was not designed to be an organisation for verification of the NPT, so that the objectives of the NPT are not always consistent with those of the IAEA. As a result, there are some variations between the scope of the NPT and that of the IAEA safeguards. In reality, theIAEA cannot work on the verification of the receipt of nuclear weapons among the duties imposed on NNWSs as provided in Article 2 of the NPT. Also, whereas the NPT aims to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in general (NPT Article 1 and 2), the IAEA aims solely to prevent nuclear energy from being diverted to ‘any military purpose’ (the Statute Article 2). This means that the NPT requires verification of not only nuclear materials for peaceful purposes but also military not-nuclear-explosive devices (e.g., nuclear fuel for nuclear-powered submarines), while at the same time the application of IAEA safeguards is limited to nuclear materials used exclusively for peaceful purposes [6]. The other point is that the provisions require the safeguards to be applied on ‘all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities’ (NPT Article 3, INFCIRC/153 Para- graph 2), whereas in practice the safeguards are applied only on nuclear materials ‘declared’ voluntarily by each State.

**Safeguards ignore isotopic composition-North Korea proves that allows proliferators to subvert the system**

Carlson et al 99 (John Carlson, Director General of Australia's Safeguards and Nonproliferation Office, and member of the IAEA's standing advisory committee, with John Bardsley, Victor Bragin, and John Hill, Researchers at ASNO, “Plutonium Isotopics - Non-Proliferation And Safeguards Issues”, ASNO, 1999, http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/O\_9705.htm)

As a consequence of most plutonium under safeguards to date being "reactor-grade", the isotopic composition of plutonium has received only limited attention. Events in the DPRK serve to highlight an issue which, in the absence of appropriate action, can be expected to assume increasing importance - that the production and possession of significant quantities of plutonium at or near weapons-grade has the potential to undermine the confidence on which the non-proliferation regime is built. Accordingly, the authors argue that such material should be subject to the most rigorous control - the most effective measure being to limit its production and separation to the greatest possible extent.

**Safeguards don’t check-low-burn plutonium**

**Carlson et al 99** (John Carlson, Director General of Australia's Safeguards and Nonproliferation Office, and member of the IAEA's standing advisory committee, with John Bardsley, Victor Bragin, and John Hill, Researchers at ASNO, “Plutonium Isotopics - Non-Proliferation And Safeguards Issues”, ASNO, 1999, http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/O\_9705.htm)

While non-proliferation arrangements along these lines can limit the production of low burn-up plutonium, where such plutonium does exist there is the question whether current safeguards measures are appropriate. If diversion of plutonium from safeguards were contemplated, it seems reasonable to assume that low burn-up plutonium would be of greatest interest to the diverter. The assurance derived from safeguards would be enhanced if safeguards approaches took this into account. Where there are significant holdings of unirradiated plutonium, it is debatable whether the current timeliness goal of one month is appropriate as far as low burn-up plutonium is concerned, and remote surveillance with real-time, or near real-time, reporting to the IAEA would represent a considerable improvement. It can also be argued that the current timeliness goal of three months for irradiated plutonium is not appropriate in the case of low burn-up plutonium - while this conclusion might suggest the need for more frequent timeliness inspections, these could be obviated through the introduction of remote monitoring. In the case of both unirradiated and irradiated plutonium, unannounced inspections would be an important part of the safeguards approach. In addition, an increased concentration of verification activities is suggested for low burn-up plutonium.

## \*\*\*NPT Fails\*\*\*

**The NPT is no longer effective—technological advancements and terrorism**

**Cimbala ’07** – (Stephen Cimbala is the Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Penn State Brandywine, and is the author of numerous books and articles in the fields of international security studies, defense policy, nuclear weapons and arms control, intelligence and other fields, “East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia”, January 25, 2007, <http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/13518040500341809>)//GS

Events since the end of the Cold War have challenged U.S. reliance on the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and other measures of nuclear arms control as the principal bulwark against nuclear weapons spread. Briefly put, the NPT has been extended legally beyond the international circumstances that gave weight to its ambitions. The bipolar international system of the Cold War allowed the Americans and Soviets to keep their respective blocs and allies within a security umbrella that discouraged states from acquiring their own WMD. In a very different and evolving international system since the end of the Cold War, available technology has combined with new ambitions and opportunities to bring nuclear capabilities within reach of more states. At the same time, U.S. and allied intelligence have been challenged to follow the flows of money, of weapons-grade material, of scientific expertise, and of shadow networks creating new linkages between rising demand for WMD and eager suppliers. The difficulties in containing the spread of nuclear weapons and delivery systems among states are only compounded by the possibility that materials or technology could find its way into the hands of terrorists, to deadly effect. Reportedly, al-Qaeda has tried to obtain weapons grade material (enriched uranium and plutonium) and assistance in assembling both true nuclear weapons and radiological bombs (conventional explosives that scatter radioactive debris). Nuclear weapons are in a class by themselves as weapons of “mass destruction”: thus, a miniature nuclear weapon exploded in an urban area could cause much more death and destruction than either biological or chemical weapons similarly located.

## \*\*\*NPT Works\*\*\*

**NPT successful**

Walsh, 2005 Ph.D (Jim Walsh, a Research Associate at MIT, was previously Executive Director of the Managing the Atom Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, Learning from Past Success:The NPT and the Future of Non-proliferation, October 5, 2005, WMDC, 10-13)//AS

B1. Evidence and arguments for success. There are several types of arguments that support the view that the NPT has been a success. The first type is statistical. Statistical One set of statistics looks at nuclear outcomes in the aggregate. In particular, one can point to a) the declining rate of proliferation over time, b) the small percentage of countries that became nuclear weapons states compared with the number of countries that considered doing so, and c) the declining number of countries interested in acquiring nuclear weapons. Proponents cite this record of restraint and make the additional point that these positive developments follow or coincide with the establishment of the treaty. Consider, for example, the rate of proliferation. Measured as number of new nuclear weapons states per decade, the rate of proliferation peaked in the 1960s and began to decline in the 1970s. Perhaps not coincidentally, the NPT came into force in 1970. Sceptics could rightly point out that the chart does not include North Korea. Moreover, it might be argued that the chart, while dramatic, is an artefact of small numbers. With so few cases, one cannot be especially confident in the conclusions. North Korea is not reflected in the chart, in part, because their nuclear status is unclear. Most analysts believe that, consistent with North Korean claims, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) possesses at least one device. On the other hand, some long-time observers would not be surprised if it turned out that Pyongyang, in fact, had no nuclear weapons. More importantly, the DPRK has repeatedly suggested that it is willing to renounce its arsenal, in which case the corrected chart would nevertheless exhibit a declining rate of proliferation. Indeed, as Matthew Bunn has observed, even if one includes the DPRK as a weapons state, there are the same number of nuclear weapons states today as there were 15 years ago.21 It is certainly true that the chart reflects a small number of cases, but that, of course, is the point. The very fact that there are a small number of cases suggests that the treaty has been successful. Regardless, one has to use the data that is available, and it points to a thirty-year decline in the rate of proliferation. As discussed above, the number of countries that became nuclear weapons states is relatively small, but evidence of nuclear restraint is not only found in this small number of states but in the modest percentage of countries that acquired nuclear weapons. A much larger number of countries considered, inherited, or acquired a nuclear option but maintained or reverted to a non- nuclear status. Indeed, 75% of countries that could have become nuclear weapons states are instead non-nuclear weapons states. A final statistical measure is the number of countries that aspire to become nuclear weapons states. Contemporary analysts focus on North Korea and Iran, but how does that compare with previous decades? There are, in fact, fewer states seeking nuclear weapons today than at any point since WWII. The 1960s had the most nuclear aspirants. Indeed, the number of countries that were interested in acquiring nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 1960s is roughly double the total number of countries seeking nuclear weapons for the subsequent three decades combined. As threatening as it may seem that a DPRK or Iran might seek to be nuclear weapons states, policy makers from decades past found themselves in a far more threatening situation in terms of proliferation.22 Simply put, since the NPT, fewer countries have had nuclear ambitions.

**Behavior prove NPT successful**

Walsh, 2005 Ph.D (Jim Walsh, a Research Associate at MIT, was previously Executive Director of the Managing the Atom Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, Learning from Past Success:The NPT and the Future of Non-proliferation, October 5, 2005, WMDC, 13-16)//AS

Behavioural A second set of arguments draws on information about the behaviour of particular countries. Take, for example, the behaviour of countries that wanted to keep a nuclear weapons option. In general, these countries did not join the treaty immediately, despite the widespread belief at the time that joining the treaty would make the import of nuclear technology substantially easier. In other words, countries that had an interest in nuclear weapons did not view the treaty as just a bit of paper. They viewed it as a threat to a future nuclear weapons option and so avoided the treaty. Some of these countries, such as India and Pakistan, went on to build nuclear devices. Others remained outside the treaty until such time as subsequent governments were willing to renounce their nuclear ambitions. Consider the examples of Egypt and Australia, both of which repeatedly sought the acquisition of nuclear weapons.23 Once joining the treaty, however, their nuclear acquisition activities went to near zero. The chart below maps nuclear decision-making in Australia from 1954 to 1998. The black bars indicate the number of pro-acquisition decisions in a given year. The white bars reflect the number of pro-renunciation decisions. “Decisions” consist of official governmental actions such as commissioning a study on the feasibility of building nuclear weapons, asking an ally for the transfer of nuclear weapons, or signing an arms control treaty. As the chart indicates, Australia’s government made a number of pro-nuclear decisions for decades, but that came to an abrupt end once the government ratified the NPT in 1973. A map of Egypt’s nuclear decision making between 1954 and 1998 reveals a similar pattern. Prior to Egypt’s 1981 ratification of the NPT, Cairo made numerous pro-acquisition decisions. Following ratification, that number goes nearly to zero. (The exceptions revolve around the activities of Minister of Defence who was later sacked by President Mubarak.) This pattern can be observed in other states such as well Sweden, Germany, Italy, Canada, and others. While not universal, the dynamic is strongly representative of state behaviour. Once countries ratify the NPT, their pro-acquisition activities go to zero or decline precipitously. (The important exceptions of Iraq, the DPRK, and Libya will be discussed in a later section.)

**Discourse prove NPT successful**

Walsh, 2005 Ph.D (Jim Walsh, a Research Associate at MIT, was previously Executive Director of the Managing the Atom Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, Learning from Past Success:The NPT and the Future of Non-proliferation, October 5, 2005, WMDC, 16)//AS

Discourse A third type of argument points to contemporary discourse on proliferation. In the 1950s and 1960s, leading figures in the United States and elsewhere, viewed nuclear weapons as “normal,” i.e., weapons that the militaries of most industrial states would incorporate into their forces. It was expected that not only would countries acquire nuclear weapons but that tactical nuclear weapons would be used in limited wars. Today, countries accused of seeking nuclear weapons are called “rogue states.” In other words, they are not the norm; they are outliers—the exceptions that prove the rule. The mental and normative conception of proliferation changed dramatically in the decades following the NPT.

**NPT successful – institutional success**

Walsh, 2005 Ph.D (Jim Walsh, a Research Associate at MIT, was previously Executive Director of the Managing the Atom Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, Learning from Past Success:The NPT and the Future of Non-proliferation, October 5, 2005, WMDC, 17-18)//AS

 Institutional A fourth set of arguments and evidence focuses on the regime itself, and in particular on various institutional indicators regarding the health of the regime. There are several measures that suggest that the NPT has gotten progressively stronger over time. To begin with, more and more countries have joined the regime—so many that it now has almost the same number of members as the United Nations itself. This is a claim that few international conventions can make. It might be argued, however, that large membership may not mean much, if membership is easily acquired and does not require that a country actually alter its behaviour. Even if one sets aside the fact that renouncing the most powerful weapon in human history is not exactly a trivial decision for many governments or that safeguards carry costs for member states, other aspects of the NPT point to growing strength rather than weakness. First, the safeguards regime has gotten progressively stronger over time—a process that has made it more intrusive, more demanding, more costly, but also more effective. A second and related process has been the development of new non-proliferation instrumentalities—from the interviewing of nuclear scientists to the use of environmental sampling. Here again, sceptics might respond that these innovations happened in response to regime failures, e.g., full scope safeguards following the 1974 Indian test or the Additional Protocol following the revelations about Iraq’s nuclear program in the early 1990s. It is a fair argument, but in this case, the objection actually proves the point: the system’s response to crisis was the development of new strength rather than collapse. Damage followed by repair and growth is usually associated with robust systems. Failing systems, in fact, do not respond to challenges and therefore grow weaker and die. A final indicator of the regime’s increasing rather than declining strength is the growing political significance of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Today, if the IAEA issues a finding that a country is violating its safeguards agreement, it has major political and policy consequences. It is a result that most states will vigorously seek to avoid. It is also a result that the United Nations Security Council and the major powers will find difficult to ignore even if they prefer to do so. Granted, in the Iraq-case the IAEA could not stop a superpower from going to war in the name of non-proliferation—a result no international organization or country could have accomplished—but the agency was strong enough to issue a finding that ran contrary to the desires of the world’s only superpower. Indeed, it is difficult to name many, if any, international organizations that have the same power to affect national policy as the IAEA. Taken together, these institutional measures of health and weakness are strikingly inconsistent with the portrait of the NPT as failing or near collapse. If the treaty system were failing, one would not expect more countries to be joining the treaty, stronger and evolving inspection instrumentalities, and increasing political influence for the agency that implements the treaty. If one adds the institutional indicators to the statistical, behavioural, and discourse trends, the result is a very powerful and consistent picture of a regime that has had a remarkable effect on nuclear outcomes.

**NPT success is ignored**

Walsh, 2005 Ph.D (Jim Walsh, a Research Associate at MIT, was previously Executive Director of the Managing the Atom Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, Learning from Past Success:The NPT and the Future of Non-proliferation, October 5, 2005, WMDC, 25-27)//AS

D. Why Is the NPT’s Success Ignored? The NPT’s contribution to nuclear restraint is arguably one of the 20th century’s biggest—and unheralded—public policy achievements. This success raises a number of questions. First and foremost, it raises the question of causes. What accounts for the treaty’s success? That fundamental question is addressed in the next section. Here the focus is instead on the apparent disconnection between performance and perception. Why do policy makers and scholars continue to emphasize failure in the face of unprecedented and unexpected success? The focus on failure is pervasive and consistent over time, i.e., it is systematic. Are there reasons that explain this bias? What does the bias tell us about ourselves and our theories of international behaviour? Explaining the systematic bias on the part of policy makers would appear to be fairly straightforward. Decision makers understandably tend to concentrate their attention on present and near-term dangers, not on comparing relative risk over time. And as with the media, there is a natural preoccupation with danger rather than success. In the triage of policymaking, a danger (something not working) will receive greater attention than a success (something that is working). More speculatively, it might be said that inevitability arguments (e.g., it is inevitable that nuclear weapons will spread, it is inevitable that country X will acquire nuclear weapons) are especially seductive. It may be that the strong premises (e.g., capability will spread over time, countries face security threats) combined with a simplifying frame (inevitability) are hard to resist. Issues of political self-interest may also contribute to a pre-occupation with faults and failures. Regime critics, who would prefer that states give increasing attention to non-regime based policy instruments such as defences and preventive war, are naturally going to challenge the value of the treaty. In the run up to the 2003 war in Iraq, for example, American officials repeatedly questioned the effectiveness of the regime as part of their public case for preventive war. Paradoxically, regime advocates indulge in similarly negative rhetoric. In order to muster political support for the treaty, they claim that the NPT is in danger of collapse or that a crisis is at hand. Thus, both critics and proponents have their own reasons for emphasizing failures rather than successes. The apparent bias of scholars is more difficult to explain. Part of the reason may be related to the fact that for most of the nuclear age, the focus in security studies has been on the U.S., the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent on the other nuclear weapons states. In other words, the primary cases in the field are all countries that acquired nuclear weapons (non-proliferation failures), not countries that abstained from nuclear weapons (non-proliferation successes). In the last ten years, there has been more attention paid to the nuclear histories of other countries and somewhat more attention to regime successes, but the change has been limited. Alternatively, it may have something to do with the evolution of the field of international relations. Scholars drawn to the Realist school of international relations may be more likely than others to pursue work in security studies. They, in turn, come to the topic with a firmly entrenched scepticism about the importance of international institutions. Looked at from a different angle, it may be that Institutionalists tend to go into the field of political economy rather than security studies. The post-modernists, for their part, have not had much to say about the issue. Of course, these are just musings and guesses, but the disconnect is sufficiently wide and the topic sufficiently important that it is probably worth pursuing the question. An answer might tell us a lot about ourselves as analysts and help us avoid similar errors in the future.

**NPT successful -- international law and international public opinion**

Walsh, 2005 Ph.D (Jim Walsh, a Research Associate at MIT, was previously Executive Director of the Managing the Atom Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, Learning from Past Success:The NPT and the Future of Non-proliferation, October 5, 2005, WMDC, 17-28)//AS

IV. What Accounts for the Success of the NPT Regime? With the success of the NPT being largely ignored, it is not surprising that the causes of that success have also received short shrift. Regime sceptics have contended that the NPT is just a piece of paper, subject to the whims of great powers and vulnerable to cheaters. Regime advocates, while not offering a clearly stated theory of success, implicitly suggest that the power of the NPT is the power of international law and international public opinion. In this section, these claims are reviewed, and both are found wanting. Critics fail to appreciate the constraining effect of the NPT, and advocates provide a narrow explanation for a dynamic that goes well beyond a respect of the law. It will be argued that the power behind the NPT is not legal but rather institutional and political. Before explaining why the NPT has enjoyed unexpected and little appreciated success, it is useful to first step back and consider the broader context of nuclear restraint. This restraint presents somewhat of a puzzle. In solving this puzzle, one can better understand how the NPT achieved its goals. A. The Puzzle A major mystery confronting any student of international affairs is that virtually every indicator and historical development since 1970 would suggest that nuclear weapons should have spread faster than they have. Consider the period between the birth of the NPT and the collapse of the Soviet Union. During these two decades, civilian nuclear technology spread, and thus the technical barriers to acquisition became progressively lower. States with nuclear weapons paid few if any costs for their status as nuclear weapons states. (The possible exception might be India, which endured modest but relatively short-lived penalties following its 1974 test.) If anything, nuclear-weapon states enjoyed or were perceived to enjoy benefits from their nuclear weapons status, including everything from increased prestige to enhanced political power (e.g., permanent seats on the UN Security Council). Moreover, as was discussed in previous sections, the NPT seemed to suffer from a number of important flaws: the absence of an enforcement provision, weak verification, and a withdrawal clause that would permit countries to acquire nuclear technology and then renounce their obligations. Most important of all, the treaty did not address the underlying security motivations that were and are widely believed to fuel the spread of nuclear weapons. The puzzle, plainly put, is thus the following: How could a treaty with no enforcement, weak verification, and no ability to remove or resolve security threats be so successful?

## \*\*\*Waltz Indict\*\*\*

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**Waltz analysis of proliferation’s stabilizing effect ignores the human factor of using the bomb and alternate risks making the risk of world annihilation overwhelm any potential stabilizing effect.**

**Krieger 12** - Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and Councilor – World Future Council (David “Why Waltz is Wrong” http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/db\_article.php?article\_id=377)//AA

The lead article in the July/August 2012 issue of *Foreign Affairs* is titled “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb.” The author, Kenneth Waltz, a former president of the American Political Science Association, argues that the world should stop worrying about Iran getting the bomb. He sums up his basic argument this way: “If Iran goes nuclear, Israel and Iran will deter each other, as nuclear powers always have. There has never been a full-scale war between two nuclear-armed states. Once Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, deterrence will apply, even if the Iranian arsenal is relatively small.”? In essence, Waltz puts his faith in nuclear deterrence and justifies this in historical terms. But the history is short and there have been many close calls. During the 67-year period since the dawn of the Nuclear Age there have been numerous accidents, miscalculations and threats to use nuclear weapons. Fifty years ago, the US and Soviet Union stood at the precipice of nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Waltz’s faith in nuclear deterrence reflects a belief in rationality, a belief that all leaders will behave rationally at all times, including under conditions of extreme stress. This defies our understanding of human behavior and the ever-present potential for human fallibility. ? Another way to view the historical data from which Waltz finds comfort is by an analogy of a man jumping off a hundred-story building. As he passes floor after floor, he wonders why people on the ground are showing concern for his well-being. He ignores the approaching ground and focuses his attention on the fact that nothing bad has happened to him yet. In Waltz’s theory of nuclear deterrence, there is no hard ground below, nor gravity acting upon the jumper. He argues that “history has shown that where nuclear capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability. When it comes to nuclear weapons, now as ever, more may be better.” While having more may be better, it may also be far worse. ? Martin Hellman, a professor emeritus of electrical engineering at Stanford University and an expert in risk analysis, argues that a child born today has a ten percent or greater chance of having his or her life cut short by nuclear war. Unlike Waltz’s analysis, risk analysis takes into account the odds of an event occurring and doesn’t base its analysis of the future simply on what the historical record shows at a given point in time. Ten coin flips may produce ten straight “heads,” but it would be unwise to assume that the results between heads and tails would not even out over time. With nuclear weapons, the consequences of being wrong in one’s projections are, of course, far more dire than with coin tosses.? Another analogy that has been used to describe the standoff between nuclear-armed powers, particularly the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War, was of two men standing up to their waists in the same pool of gasoline and each man being ready to strike an unlit match. If either man struck the match, both men would be consumed by the fire that would result. With nuclear weapons, the conflagration would not stop at the two men – it would include their families, their communities, their countries and the world. ? Waltz makes the bet that no leader of a nuclear weapon state will ever strike the match or allow the match to fall into hands that will strike it. It is a foolish bet to make. The two men, and the rest of us, would be far safer if the gasoline were drained from the pool. In the same way, the world would be much safer if nuclear weapons were abolished, rather than shared in the hope they would enhance security in the Middle East or elsewhere.? Waltz may believe that it is precisely the threat of conflagration that keeps the men from striking the matches. For many, even most, men he may be correct, but the fact is that neither Waltz nor anyone else can predict human behavior under all conditions. There may be some leaders in some circumstances for whom striking the match would seem rational. In addition, even if neither man were to strike a match, lightning may strike the pool of gasoline or other sparks may ignite the pool from unforeseen causes. Instances of accidents, madness and human fallibility abound.? Nuclear weapons have brought humankind to the precipice. These weapons threaten cities, countries, civilization and complex life on the planet. It is the responsibility of those of us alive on the planet now to abolish these weapons of mass annihilation, not justify their spread, as Waltz would have us do.

## ---Iran Specific

**Waltz is wrong—8 reasons**

**Mousfavian and Afrasiabi 12** (\*Hossein, former Iran nuclear negotiator and a research scholar at Princeton University and author of the new book, Iranian Nuclear Crisis, A Memoir and \*\*Kaveh, former advisor to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team from 2005 to 2006, political science professor at Tehran University, author of books on Iran’s foreign affairs

“Eight Reasons Why Waltz Theory On Nuclear Iran Is Wrong” www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2012/al-monitor/eight-reasons-why-the-waltz-theo.html) kyan

In a recent influential article in Foreign Affairs, Kenneth Waltz has challenged the conventional wisdom on Iran’s nuclear program and asserted that Iran “should get the bomb.” About this Article Summary: A recent article in Foreign Affairs by Kenneth Waltz made the provocative claim that Iran should possess nuclear weapons — for the sake of global stability. Hossein Mousavian and Kaveh Afrasiabi strongly disagree. They argue that Waltz's argument relies on erroneous assumptions about Iran that generate "a dangerous fallacy." Author: Hossein Mousavian and Kaveh Afrasiabi Written by one of America’s most influential international-relations theorists, Waltz’s article makes a strong case for Iranian nuclear proliferation. He argues that this would bring more stability to the Middle East by ending Israel’s destabilizing nuclear monopoly and introducing a much-needed nuclear balance in the turbulent region. Coinciding with the imposition of fresh oil and financial sanctions on Iran by the US and the European Union, Waltz’s theoretical contribution challenges western and Israeli policy makers to re-think the wisdom of their coercive approach toward Iran. He argues that sanctions have actually added to Iran’s national security threats and thus fueled the country’s purported proliferation drive. Although Waltz’s arguments — particularly about the destabilizing effects of Israel’s nuclear arsenal — make sense, the main problem is that his core assumptions about Iran are simply wrong and do not correspond with Iran’s behavior and intentions. First, Iran does not share Waltz’s Israel-centric view of the proliferation dynamic in the Middle East. Iran’s political leaders have repeatedly described Israel’s nuclear arsenal as “irrelevant” and “useless,” and suggested that it has not been a factor in various Arab-Israel conflicts. Second, only by its constant threats of military action against it has Israel raised its threat status to alarming levels in Iran. Normally, Israel does not rank at the top of Iran’s national security considerations, in light of Iran’s preoccupation with its border security and stability in its vicinity — above all in the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea region, Iran’s two main energy hubs. Third, Waltz’s nuclear realpolitik misses the special attributes of Iran’s post-revolutionary political order and lumps Iran with other states in the international system, thus ignoring the distinctions between revolutionary and status-quo powers. Following Waltz’s logic of balancing, during the Iran-Iraq war when Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein repeatedly used chemical weapons against Iran, Tehran would have reciprocated by stockpiling and using weapons of mass destruction. But, under the moral guidance of the late Imam Khomeini, Iran did not do so, despite the heavy toll of some 60,000 casualties of Iraq’s chemical warfare. Indeed, it is doubtful that Iran’s behavior can be captured by the narrow prism of the realist paradigm, and alternative paradigms must be found to explain this “anomaly.” Fourth, yet another, and even more important, anomaly is that Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the successor to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, has re-confirmed a religious edict, or fatwa, that explicitly and unequivocally bans the manufacturing, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons, which are deemed “inhuman” and “weapons of the past.” Fifth, backing words with action, Iran has placed its entire uranium-.enrichment program under the scrutiny of International Atomic Energy Agency inspections, which have repeatedly confirmed the absence of military diversion. Lest we forget, in May 2010, Iran signed an agreement with Turkey and Brazil to ship out the bulk of its medium-enriched uranium for a fuel swap. More recently, Iran has said that it is willing to reach a compromise on the issue of 20% enrichment provided that the world powers reciprocate in terms of sanctions. Clearly, these actions do not fit the portfolio of a nuclear proliferator and, indeed, are anomalous to the theory of Iranian proliferation. Sixth, yet another key flaw in Waltz’s argument is that he focuses narrowly on the Middle East and ignores the international dimension of Iran’s foreign behavior, namely the fact that since the 1979 Islamic revolution, Iran has acted as a revisionist power committed to the ideal of restructuring the unjust global hierarchy and democratizing the hierarchical world order. This was perfectly understood by the late French thinker Michel Foucault, who observed the revolution first-hand and had a premonition that this was a truly historical event that contested not just the ancient regime in Iran but also “the weight of the entire world order.” Seventh, during the past 33 years, Iran has been remarkably consistent in its foreign policy of supporting the third world and disarmament causes, championed by the Non-Aligned Movement, a grouping of some 120 nations that is slated to be led by Iran as of August 2012 for the next three years. Undoubtedly, Iran will utilize its NAM leadership to advance the movement’s multiple causes, including fighting global poverty, inequality and proliferation and promoting disarmament. Simultaneously, this will enable Iran to further defend its “inalienable nuclear right” to possess a civilian nuclear fuel cycle, while vigorously pushing for a Middle East nuclear weapons-free zone. Put simply, Iran does not want nuclear weapons, nor does it think that there is any compelling reason that it should get them. Eighth, yet another important issue overlooked by Waltz and a number of other western pundits spinning out theories about Iranian proliferation is that most Iranians believe that an Iranian bomb would spur the Gulf Cooperation Council states headed by Saudi Arabia to get their own bombs, thus hurling the sub-region into a costly, dangerous and ultimately unnecessary nuclear arms race. In conclusion, the whole Waltzian idea that “more nuclear weapons” is better for world security is a dangerous fallacy irrespective of his good intentions and an affront to the important objective of global disarmament, which would put this goal on an indefinite backburner.