**\*\*PROLIF GOOD\*\***

# \*Prolif Slow\*

# 1NC/2AC

**Prolif slow – nukes decrease likelihood of arms race**

**Waltz 81 –** London International Institute for Strategic Studies (Kenneth, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better”, 1981; < <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm)//AB>

What can one say? Four things primarily. First, **Possession of nuclear weapons may slow arms races down,** rather than speed them up, a possibility considered later. Second, for **less developed countries to build nuclear arsenals requires a long lead time.** Nuclear power and nuclear weapons programmes, like population policies, require administrative and technical teams able to formulate and sustain pro­grammes of considerable cost that pay off only in the long run. The **more unstable a govern­ment, the shorter becomes the attention span of its leaders**. They have to deal with today's problems and hope for the best tomorrow. In countries where political control is most diffi­cult to maintain, governments are least likely to initiate nuclear-weapons programmes. In such states, soldiers help to maintain leaders in power or try to overthrow them. For those pur­poses nuclear weapons are not useful. Soldiers who have political clout, or want it, are less interested in nuclear weapons than they are in more immediately useful instruments of poli­tical control. They are not scientists and tech­nicians. They like to command troops and squadrons. Their vested interests are in the military's traditional trappings.

# Ex: No Arms Race

**No domino effect—empirically denied**

**Alagappa ‘8** (Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow – East-West Center, in “The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, Ed. Muthiah Alagappa , p. 521-522)kyan

It will be useful at this juncture to address more directly the set of instability arguments advanced by certain policy makers and scholars: the domino effect of new nuclear weapon states, the probability of preventive action against new nuclear weapon states, and the compulsion of these states to use their small arsenals early for fear of losing them in a preventive or preemptive strike by a stronger nuclear adversary. On the domino effect, India's and Pakistan's nuclear weapon programs have not fueled new programs in South Asia or beyond. Iran's quest for nuclear weapons is not a reaction to the Indian or Pakistani programs. It is grounded in that country's security concerns about the United States and Tehran's regional aspirations. The North Korean test has evoked mixed reactions in Northeast Asia. Tokyo is certainly concerned; its reaction, though, has not been to initiate its own nuclear weapon program but to reaffirm and strengthen the American extended deterrence commitment to Japan. Even if the U.S. Japan security treaty were to weaken, it is not certain that Japan would embark on a nuclear weapon program. Likewise, South Korea has sought reaffirmation of the American extended deterrence commitment, but has firmly held to its nonnuclear posture. Without dramatic change in its political, economic, and security circumstances, South Korea is highly unlikely to embark on a covert (or overt) nuclear weapon program as it did in the 1970s. South Korea could still become a nuclear weapon state by inheriting the nuclear weapons of North Korea should the Kim Jong Il regime collapse. Whether it retains or gives up that capability will hinge on the security circumstances of a unified Korea. The North Korean nuclear test has not spurred Taiwan or Mongolia to develop nuclear weapon capability. The point is that each country's decision to embark on and sustain nuclear weapon programs is contingent on its particular security and other circumstances. Though appealing, the domino theory is not predictive; often it is employed to justify policy on the basis of alarmist predictions. The loss of South Vietnam, for example, did not lead to the predicted domino effect in Southeast Asia. In fact the so-called dominos became drivers of a vibrant Southeast Asia and brought about a fundamental transformation in that subregion (Lord 1993, 1996). In the nuclear arena, the nuclear programs of China, India, and Pakistan were part of a security chain reaction, not mechanically falling dominos. However, as observed earlier the Indian, Pakistani, and North Korean nuclear tests have thus far not had the domino effect predicted by alarmist analysts and policy makers. Great caution should be exercised in accepting at face value the sensational predictions of individuals who have a vested interest in accentuating the dangers of nuclear proliferation. Such analysts are now focused on the dangers of a nuclear Iran. A nuclear Iran may or may not have destabilizing effects. Such claims must be assessed on the basis of an objective reading of the drivers of national and regional security in Iran and the Middle East.

# Ex: Prolif Slow

**Prolif Slow**

**Waltz 81 –** London International Institute for Strategic Studies (Kenneth, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better”, 1981; < <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm)//AB>

What will the spread of nuclear weapons do to the world? I say ‘spread rather than prolifer­ation’ because so far nuclear weapons have proliferated only vertically as the major nuclear powers have added to their arsenals. **Horizontally, they have spread slowly across countries, and the pace is not likely to change much**. Short-term candidates for the nuclear club are not very numerous. and they are not likely to rush into the nuclear military busi­ness. Nuclear weapons will nevertheless spread, with a new member occasionally join­ing the club. Counting India and Israel, membership grew to seven in the first 35 years of the nuclear age. A doubling of membership in this decade would be surprising. Since rapid changes in international conditions can be unsettling, the slowness of the spread of nuclear weapons is fortunate.

**Prolif slow – multiple reasons**

**Edelman et. Al, 11** (Eric S. Edelman is a former [Under Secretary of Defense for Policy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Under_Secretary_of_Defense_for_Policy), former [U.S. Ambassador to Turkey](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Ambassador_to_Turkey) (2003–2005), former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of [Finland](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finland) (1998–2001), and former Principal Deputy Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs (2001–2003). A career [Foreign Service Officer](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Service_Officer), Edelman entered the Senior Foreign Service in 1992. He is a recipient of the [Secretary of Defense](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Secretary_of_Defense)’s award for Distinguished Civilian Service (1993) and the [State Department](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._State_Department)’s Superior Honor Award (1990 and 1996).¶ He retired from the [U.S. Foreign Service](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Foreign_Service) in May 2009 and is a visiting scholar at the [Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Philip_Merrill_Center_for_Strategic_Studies&action=edit&redlink=1) at the[Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_H._Nitze_School_of_Advanced_International_Studies) (SAIS), and Distinguished Fellow at the [Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Center_for_Strategic_and_Budgetary_Assessments).[[1]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_S._Edelman#cite_note-0); Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. is a defense policy analyst who currently serves as President of the [Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Center_for_Strategic_and_Budgetary_Assessments); Evan Braden Montgomery is a senior research fellow at The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran”; pg 5; January/February 11)

 Developing nuclear weapons remains a slow, expensive, and difficult process, even for states with considerable economic resources, and  especially if other nations try to constrain aspiring nuclear states’ access to critical materials and technology. Without external support, it is unlikely that any of these aspirants could develop a nuclear weapons capability within a decade.

**\*Solves War – Generic\***

**1NC/2AC**

**Prolif good—disincentives conflict and solves nuclear war—our evidence is comparative**

**Asal and Beardsley 07** (\*Victor, Department of Political Science, State University of New York, Albany and \*\*Kyle, Department of Political Science, Emore Universtiy “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 44, no. 2, 2007, pp. 139–155 Sage Publications [www.saramitchell.org/Asalbeardsley.pdf](http://www.saramitchell.org/Asalbeardsley.pdf)) kyan)

Other, more optimistic, **scholars see benefits to nuclear proliferation** or, perhaps not actively advocating the development of more nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapon states, see that the presence of nuclear weapons has at least been stabilizing in the past. For example, some scholars are confident of the promise of the ‘nuclear peace’. 4 While those who oppose proliferation present a number of arguments, those who contend that nuclear weapons would reduce interstate wars are fairly consistent in focusing on one key argument: **nuclear weapons make the risk of war unacceptable for states**. As Waltz argues, **the higher the stakes and the closer a country moves toward winning them, the more surely that country invites retaliation and risks its own destruction. States are not likely to run major risks for minor gains**. War between nuclear states may escalate as the loser uses larger and larger warheads. Fearing that, states will want to draw back. Not escalation but deescalation becomes likely. **War remains possible, but victory in war is too dangerous to fight for**. (Sagan & Waltz, 2003: 6–7) ‘**Nuclear war simply makes the risks of war much higher and shrinks the chance that a country will go to war’** (Snyder & Diesing, 1977: 450). Using similar logic, Bueno de Mesquita & Riker (1982) demonstrate formally that a world with almost universal membership in the nuclear club will be much less likely to experience nuclear war than a world with only a few members**.** Supporters of proliferation **do not see leaders of new nuclear states as being fundamentally different from those of the old nuclear states in terms of their levels of responsibility** (Arquilla, 1997), **nor do they see them facing unique challenges in managing and securing these weapons** (Feaver, 1992/93: 162–163). The response to the argument that small powers, non-Western powers, and military powers will behave less responsibly than the USA and other ‘responsible’ powers is that the evidence does not support the view that new nuclear powers are ‘different’ in the worst sense of the word (Lavoy, 1995; Hagerty, 1998; Arquilla, 1997; Feldman, 1995; Karl, 1996/ 97). Van Creveld (1993: 124) sums up this viewpoint when he points out that ‘**where these weapons have been introduced, large-scale interstate warfare has disappeared’**. Dismissing the fear that deterrence will not work if the arsenal is not big enough or under enough control, Chellaney (1995) contends that **the Cold War is evidence that even minimum deterrence is sufficient**. In support, Feaver (1992/93: 186) argues that ‘even a modest nuclear arsenal should have some existential deterrent effect on regional enemies, precisely because decapitation is so difficult’. There are those **who argue that security is increased at a systemic level when the number of nuclear states increases because of the level of uncertainty created when more than one or two players are playing with a nuclear deck**. **When this happens, ‘**the probability of deliberate nuclear attack falls to near zero **with three, four, or more nuclear natio**ns’ (Brito & Intriligator, 1983: 137). Cimbala (1993: 194) agrees, arguing that ‘it is only necessary to threaten the plausible loss of social value commensurate with the potential gains of an attacker’.

# Ex: Solves War

**Prolif solves conflict—4 reasons**

**Waltz 81** (Kenneth, pol sci prof at Berkeley “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better,” Adelphi Papers, Number 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981)kyan

Weapons and strategies change the situation of states in ways that make them more or less secure, as Robert Jervis has brilliantly shown. If weapons are not well suited for conquest, neighbours have more peace of mind. A**ccord­ing to the defensive-deterrent ideal, we should expect war to become less likely when weaponry is such as to make conquest more difficult, to discourage pre-emptive and pre­ventive war, and to make coercive threats less credible.** Do nuclear weapons have those effects? Some answers can be found by con­sidering how nuclear deterrence and how nuclear defence may improve the prospects for peace. **First, wars can be fought in the face of deter­rent threats, but the higher the stakes and the closer a country moves toward winning them, the more surely that country invites retaliation and risks its own destruction. States are not likely to run major risks for minor gain**s. Wars between nuclear states may escalate as the loser uses larger and larger warheads. Fearing that.states will want to draw back. Not escalation but de-escalation becomes likely. **War remains possible. but victory in war is too dangerous to fight for. If states can score only small gains because large ones risk retaliation, they have little incentive to fight. Second, states act with less care if the expect­ed costs of war are low and with more care if they are high. In 1853** and 1854, **Britain and France expected to win an easy victory if they went to war against Russia**. Prestige abroad and political popularity at home would be gained. if not much else. **The vagueness of their plans was matched by the carelessness of their acts**. **In blundering into the Crimean War they acted hastily** on scant information, pandered to their people's frenzy for war, showed more concern for an ally's whim than for the adversary's situation, failed to specify the changes in behaviour that threats were supposed to bring. and inclined towards testing strength first and bargaining second. **In sharp contrast,** **the presence of nuclear weapons makes States exceedingly cautious. Think of Kennedy and Khruschev in the Cuban missile crisis. Why fight if you can't win much and might lose everything? Third**, the question demands a negative answer all the more insistently when the deter rent deployment of **nuclear weapons contributes more to a country's security than does conquest of territory.** **A country with a deter-rent strategy does not need the extent of terri­tory** required by a country relying on a conven­tional defence in depth. A **deterrent strategy makes it unnecessary for a country to fight for the sake of increasing its security, and this removes a major cause of war. Fourth, deterrent** effect **depends both on one's capabilities and on the will one has to use them. The will of the attacked, striving to preserve its own territory, can ordinarily be presumed stronger than the will of the attacker striving to annex someone else's territory**. Knowing this, the would-**be attacker is further inhibited.**

**Proliferation is crucial to preventing future conflicts and global wars.**

**Haggerty 98** (Dean Haggerty, lecturer of International Politics at the University of Illinois, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons of South Asia. 1998.)kyan

**Twenty five years have now passed since the last Indo-Pakistani war. During** that period, both **New Delhi and Islamabad have moved** steadily **down** the path opaque **nuclear weaponization**. South Asia’s long transition to nuclear weapons has seen two crises and several additional instances of serious tension between India and Pakistan. A quarter-century of peaks and valleys in one of the contemporary world’s most volatile relationships is enough time to begin drawing some meaningful conclusions about the effects of nuclear proliferation South Asia, and about how well this empirical evidence matches the two logics that I surveyed and analyzed in Chapter 1. As I noted in this chapter's introduction**, the Indo-Pakistani experience with nuclear weapon capabilities lends more support to the logic of nuclear deterrence than to its competitor, the logic of non-proliferation**. All but a handful of proliferation **analysts would expect that South Asia's small, crude nuclear forces; intense, high-stakes political conflicts, history of warfare, and possibly irrational decision making should add up to a formula for nuclear disaster on the subcontinent**. Indeed, for those analysts persuaded by the logic of nonproliferation, the **Indo-Pakistani nuclear security competition could serve as a paradigm for every conceivable calamity that might ensue from the spread of nuclear weapons** to Third World countries. **However, contrary to these grim expectations, nuclear weapons evidently deter war in South Asia, much as they did between the United Slates, the Soviet Union, and China during the Cold War**. As in the U.S. Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Sino-Soviet cases, **preventative nuclear strikes were** early on considered and **rejected**, **first-strike uncertainty has dampened the "reciprocal fear of surprise attack," and loose nuke fears have gone unrealized**. Furthermore, Indian and Pakistani decision makers appear to be no less deterrable than their U.S., Russian, and Chinese counterparts These two -and-a-half decades of sub continental peace stand in stark contrast to the first twenty-five years of Indo-Pakistani relations, which saw war erupt on three different occasions over Kashmir.

**The more the merrier.**

**Asal and Beardsley ‘7** - Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – SUNY Albany/ Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – Emory U., Journal of Peace Research (Victor and Kyle, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”, 3/22/07; < http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/44/2/139.full.pdf+html>))//AB

As we can see, the impact of an increase in the number of nuclear actors is substantial. Starting from a crisis situation without any nuclear actors, including one nuclear actor (out of five) reduces the likelihood of fullscale war by nine percentage points. As we continue to add **nuclear actors**, the **likelihood of full-scale war declines sharply**, so that the probability of a war with the maximum number of nuclear actors is about three times less than the probability with no nuclear actors. In addition, the probabilities of no violence and only minor clashes increase substantially as the number of nuclear actors increases. The probability of serious clashes is relatively constant. Overall, the analysis lends significant support to the more optimistic proliferation argument related to the expectation of violent conflict when nuclear actors are involved. While the presence of **nuclear powers** does not prevent war, it **significantly reduces the probability of full-scale war**, with more reduction as the number of nuclear powers involved in the conflict increases.

**Checks war.**

**Asal and Beardsley ‘7** - Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – SUNY Albany/ Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – Emory U., Journal of Peace Research (Victor and Kyle, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”, 3/22/07; < http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/44/2/139.full.pdf+html>))//AB

The presence of nuclear weapons has an important and pacific impact, a finding that lends support for an optimistic view of the **stabilizing effect of nuclear weapons**. Waltz’s (Sagan & Waltz, 2003: 7) contention that ‘the presence of nuclear weapons makes states exceedingly cautious’ seems to be borne out. Simply put, **when nuclear actors are present, states – both nuclear and non-nuclear – resort to violence less often, because they do not want to risk the exceptional costs of a nuclear strike**. Given the fact that much of the examination of this issue has been impressionistic (Geller, 2003), this finding is important for our continuing effort to better understand the advantages and disadvantages of nuclear proliferation, as well as its effects. We should also note that this was a ‘hard’ test for the pro-proliferation argument – we are not asking if nuclear dyads are less likely to go to war. Our analysis indicates that the presence of nuclear-weapons states as crisis actors, regardless of which side they are on, decreases the likely level of violence.

# Ex: Conventional War

**Prolif prevents conventional warfare**

**Sechser, 2009** [Todd, Assistant Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia, “The Stabilizing Effects of Nuclear Proliferation”,]

A final question asks whether possession of **nuclear weapons encourages states to restrain their spending on conventional arms and avoid arms races.** Optimists argue that **even a few nuclear weapons will provide adequate deterrence and security for new proliferators**. As a result, **those states will not need to remain as carefully attuned to the balance of forces as they would in a purely conventional world**. Moreover, **since nuclear weapons negate the offensive advantages of conventional forces, nonnuclear-arms racing among rivals will become both unnecessary and unlikely**. Does the evidence bear out this prediction? The charts in figure 2 provide a tentative answer by tracking the proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) that **China, Israel, South Africa, India, and Pakistan** each devoted to military spending from 1960 to 2000. If the optimistic view is correct, then these **states should exhibit general declines in military expenditures following the acquisition of nuclear weapons.** Indeed, **this prediction is largely vindicated: all five of these states spent a smaller share of their GDP on defense in 2000 than in the year they first acquired nuclear weapons**. To be sure, military spending did not immediately decline in all cases. But the **acquisition of nuclear weapons appears to be associated with long-run declines in conventional military spending**. Indeed, **none of these states has exhibited any inclination to participate in the sort of tit-for-tat nuclear arms competition that characterized** U.S.–Soviet relations during the Cold War. Even China, the only major power in this group, has remained content for decades with the security provided by its small strategic nuclear force (Lewis 2007).

**Nuklear prolif deters conventional conflict and prevents war**

**Gartzke & Jo, 2009** [Eric, Associate Professor of Political Science at UCSD, PhD from University of Iowa, 1997, International Relations, Formal/Quantitative Methods, Doon-Joon, Department of International Relations, University of Seoul, Korea, “Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, April, JSTOR]

Where **pessimists fear conflict resulting from nuclear proliferation, optimists see the opportunity to promote stability.** Precisely **because nuclear contests promise to inflict unprecedented trauma, nuclear war is unlikely to occur. A looming risk of nuclear conflagration will tend to deter conventional forms of international violence, given the risk of escalation faced by nuclear powers**.4 Waltz (1990) argues that the **chilling effect of nuclear weapons means that proliferation among “stable powers” is bound to promote peace**. Mearsheimer (1984, 1990) suggests that proliferation generally is defensible and that the desire for nuclear weapons is understandable. Jervis (1989b) claims that **nuclear deterrence can be credited with the lack of major war since 1950. Was it not nuclear weapons that kept the United States and the Soviet Union at bay during the Cold War?**

**Proliferation effectively deters conventional war**

**Rauchhaus, 2007** [Robert W. Rauchhaus\* Assistant Professor Department of Political Science University of California, Santa Barbara, “Evaluating The Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach”, <http://iicas.ucsd.edu/papers/PIA/rauchhaus_paper.pdf>]

From the early days of the nuclear revolution, proponents of nuclear deterrence have argued that **atomic weapons have the capacity to reduce the probability of conventional war** (Brodie 1946, 1947). Reflecting on the Cold War, some **scholars argue that this is indeed what happened: despite dozens of crises and several proxy wars, the United States and USSR avoided a direct military conflict because each feared that matters might escalate to nuclear war** (Gaddis 1986, 1987; Waltz 1990, 1993, 2000). **Unlike conventional deterrence in previous eras, nuclear deterrence is extremely robust because even irrational or unintelligent leaders are likely to recognize the exceedingly high cost of nuclear war.** Thus, proponents of nuclear deterrence claim with a high degree of confidence that “**the probability of major war among states having nuclear weapons approaches zero**” (Waltz 1990, 740). **Scholars who are critical of nuclear deterrence have generally avoided questioning whether nuclear weapons make war less likely**. Instead, they usually take one of two approaches. “Safety critics” warn that the nuclear weapons pose a danger because of accidental detonations and inadvertent escalation (Sagan 1993). In contrast, “moral critics” argue that nuclear weapons should be eliminated because they violate international law, are immoral, or both (Falk and Lifton 1991). Oddly enough, neither safety critics nor moral critics tend to question whether nuclear weapons deter war. To the contrary, some critics have assumed that nuclear weapons do indeed reduce the chance of conflict, but argue instead that their deterrent value is outweighed by safety concerns and the prospects of more proliferation (Sagan 1994). **The theoretical underpinnings of nuclear deterrence have received considerable treatment over the years. Using game theory and other formal methods, scholars have examined crisis stability, various deterrent strategies, the credibility of threats, and the consequences of proliferation** (Berkowitz 1985; Brito and Intriligator 1996; Bueno de Mesquita and Riker 1982; Harvey and James 1996; Intriligator and Brito 1981; Nalebuff 1988; Powell 1985, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990; Schelling 1960, 1966; Wagner 1991). Others have scrutinized the psychological underpinnings of deterrence and the assumption of rationality (Jervis 1984; 1989; Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1985). **Despite the potential problems associated with nuclear deterrence, their pacifying effects are seldom challenged**. The concern is generally for deterrence *failure* and other safety or moral concerns, not the *irrelevance* of nuclear deterrence. John Mueller remains one of the few scholars to categorically reject the deterrent value of nuclear weapons (Mueller 1988, 1989). **Unlike the proliferation of both formal and informal analytic work on nuclear deterrence, there are only a few efforts to evaluate statistically the nuclear peace hypothesis**. Considering the importance of this question, the availability of new datasets and modern statistical software, and the trends in other areas of international relations and political science, it is surprising that this literature has generally not transitioned to more rigorous forms of empirical analysis.

**The Cold War proves that nuclear proliferation deters conventional war.**

**Rauchhaus, 2007** [Robert W. Rauchhaus\* Assistant Professor Department of Political Science University of California, Santa Barbara, “Evaluating The Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach”, <http://iicas.ucsd.edu/papers/PIA/rauchhaus_paper.pdf>]

**From the vantage point of 19 46, few were optimistic about the stability of emerging postwar order and the long-term prospects for peace. The interwar period** (1918-1939) **had shown the ineffectiveness of collective security,** the fragility of the international political economy, and the danger of nascent democracies. As the wartime alliance between the United States and USSR deteriorated and each side implemented new strategic doctrines, many suspected that another great military contest was inevitable (Lippmann 1947). **The fear of another world war was only compounded by the splitting of the atom and the spread of nuclear weapons. Although the Cold War was often fierce, especially in the developing world where it frequently played out, it never managed to escalate to World War III**. Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight, **this has prompted some to argue that Cold War is better thought of as the “Long Peace”** (Gaddis 1986; Gaddis 1987; Kegley 1991).1 Despite the worries of some, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of bipolarity has not, or at least has not yet, undermined the Long Peace. At present, we remain in the longest period of great power peace since the advent of the modern state system. **Despite the mutation of violence into other forms, we can point to World War II as a watershed event that was followed by a sixty year decline in battle deaths from interstate war** (*Human Security Report 2005;* Lacina, Gleditsch, and Russett 2006).2 **What is responsible for the Long Peace over the last six decades? The three main approaches to international relations (IR) have each offered answers to this question**.3 The most widely cited explanation is that of neo-liberals. Building on Kant’s *Perpetual Peace* (1795), modern liberals point to democracy (Maoz and Russett 1993), trade (Keohane and Nye 1977), and international organizations (Keohane 1984) as key causes of peace. As a related approach, constructivism also views democracy, trade, and international organizations as important factors, but it parts company with neo-liberalism by attributing the root cause of the Long Peace to evolving norms and the social construction of identity (Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1992; Wendt 1999).4 Neo-realism, in contrast, is fundamentally at odds with both approaches and rejects the importance of the Kantian Tripod and evolving norms. **Instead, the Long Peace is generally attributed to** absence of multi-polarity and **the presence of nuclear weapons** (Waltz 1979; Waltz 1990).5

**Prolif solves for conventional warfare**

**Preston, 2007** [Thomas, Associate Prof. IR at Washington State U., Faculty Research Associate, Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, “From Lambs to Lions: Future Security relationships in a World of Biological and Nuclear Weapons”, p. 31-2]

The Cost of Deterrence Failure Is Too Great Advocates of **deterrence** seldom take the position that it will always work or that it cannot fail. Rather, they take the position that if one can achieve the requisite elements required to achieve a stable deterrent relationship between parties, it **vastly decreases the chances of miscalculation and resorting to war—even in contexts where it might otherwise be expected to occur** (George and Smoke 1974; Harvey 1997a; Powell 1990, 2003; Goldstein 2000). Unfortunately, **critics of deterrence take the** understandable, if **unrealistic, position that if deterrence cannot be 100 percent effective under all circumstances, then it is** an **unsound** strategic approach for states to rely upon, especially considering the immense destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Feaver (1993, 162), for example, criticizes reliance on nuclear deterrence because it can fail and that rational deterrence theory can only predict that peace should occur most of the time (e.g., Lebow and Stein 1989). Yet, **were we to apply this standard of perfection to most other policy approaches concerning security matters** — whether it be **arms control** or **proliferation regime efforts, military procurement policies**, alliance formation strategies, **diplomacy, or sanctions —none could be argued** with any more certainty **to completely remove the threat of** equally **devastating wars either**. Indeed, one could easily make the argument that **these alternative means have shown themselves historically to be far less effective than nuclear arms in preventing wars**. Certainly, **the twentieth century was replete with examples of devastating conventional conflicts which were not deterred through nonnuclear measures. Although the potential costs of a nuclear exchange between small states would indeed cause a frightful loss of life, it would be no more costly** (and likely far less so) **than large-scale conventional conflicts have been for combatants**. Moreover, **if nuclear deterrence raises the potential costs of war high enough for policy makers to want to avoid** (rather than risk) **conflict, it is just as legitimate** (if not more so) **for optimists to argue in favor of nuclear deterrence in terms of the lives saved through the avoidance of far more likely recourses to conventional wars**, as it is for pessimists to warn of the potential costs of deterrence failure. And, while some accounts describing the "immense weaknesses" of deterrence theory (Lebow and Stein 1989, 1990) would lead one to believe deterrence was almost impossible to either obtain or maintain, since 1945 there has not been one single historical instance of nuclear deterrence failure (especially when this notion is limited to threats to key central state interests like survival, and not to minor probing of peripheral interests). Moreover, **the actual costs of twentieth-century conventional conflicts have been staggeringly immense, especially when compared to the actual costs of nuclear conflicts** (for example, **210,000 fatalities in the combined 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings compared to 62 million killed overall during World War II**, over three million dead in both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, etc.) (McKinzie et al. 2001, 28).3 Further, as Gray (1999, 158-59) observes, "**it is improbable that policymakers anywhere need to be educated as to the extraordinary qualities and quantities of nuclear armaments**." Indeed, **the high costs and uncontestable, immense levels of destruction** that would be **caused by nuclear weapons** have been shown historically to be facts that have not only been readily apparent and salient to a wide range of policy makers, but ones that **have clearly been demonstrated to moderate extreme policy or risk-taking behavior** (Blight 1992; Preston 2001) Could it go wrong? Of course. There is always that potential with human beings in the loop. Nevertheless, it has also been shown to be effective at moderating policy maker behavior and introducing an element of constraint into situations that otherwise would likely have resulted in war (Hagerty 1998).

# Ex: Escalation

**Even if a conflict arises, prolif ensures they’ll stay small**

**Sechser, 2009** [Todd, Assistant Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia, “The Stabilizing Effects of Nuclear Proliferation”, http://faculty.virginia.edu/ tsechser/Sechser-Haas-2009.pdf]

**What about conflicts which, despite the shadow of nuclear weapons, nevertheless occur?** Proliferation optimists argue that **even if nuclear-armed states fight one another, their wars will not be intense: leaders will prevent such conflicts from escalating to avoid the risk that nuclear weapons might be used**. As Waltz writes, “**Everyone knows that if force gets out of hand all the parties to a conflict face catastrophe. With conventional weapons, the crystal ball is clouded. With nuclear weapons, it is perfectly clear**” (Sagan and Waltz 2003, 114). This reasoning was borne out clearly by the 1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan—the only war ever to occur between two nuclear states. The episode is instructive because the war entailed far fewer causalities than any of the prior wars between India and Pakistan (see table 1), **owing in part to the restraint of the Indian military in expelling Pakistani insurgents from the Kargil region. The Indian military could have reduced its own losses and ended the war more quickly by attacking critical communication and supply lines in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, yet because crossing into Pakistani territory might have widened the war and risked provoking a Pakistani nuclear threat, Indian leaders instead opted for caution. It is not hard to find other military crises in which the risk of nuclear escalation induced restraint**. In March **1969, Chinese forces ambushed Russian troops along the Ussuri River in northwest China, prompting a Soviet counterattack**. But one important reason we do not read about the catastrophic Sino- Soviet War of 1969 is that **a Soviet threat to launch preventive strikes against Chinese nuclear targets induced Chinese leaders to de-escalate the crisis**. Despite having initiated the challenge, **China backed down rather than risk letting events get out of hand. The Soviet Union**, of course, had **itself recently backed down from a crisis it precipitated when** Nikita **Khrushchev agreed** in 1962 **to remove Soviet missile bases** from Cuba **rather than risk a potentially nuclear conflict with the United States**. These examples make clear that **nuclear weapons cannot prevent all conflicts**: indeed, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Ussuri River crisis, and the Kargil War all came about because one nuclear power was bold enough to challenge another. But **in a world without nuclear weapons, these clashes might have escalated to large-scale conventional wars**. Instead, **in each case the shadow of nuclear weapons helped to cool tempers and contain the crisis: retaliation remained limited, escalatory options were rejected, and eventually the challenger backed down.**

# Ex: Alliances

**Proliferation strengthens alliances – common security interests.**

**Kroenig 09 –** Assistant Professor of Government at Georgetown University and Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations (Matthew Ph.D., “Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation”, November 2 [http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Beyond-Optimism-and-Pessimism.pdf>)//AB](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Beyond-Optimism-and-Pessimism.pdf%3e)//AB)

One could argue that **nuclear proliferation may also serve to strengthen alliances because the spread of nuclear weapons to a hostile state threatens both patron and client states** and provides patron states with a strong incentive to **extend the nuclear umbrella** over the heads of nonnuclear allies. While this may be true in some cases, there are at least three reasons to be skeptical that the spread of nuclear weapons generally strengthens alliance rather than innervates them. First, the very reason that the extension of a nuclear umbrella is necessary in these situations is precisely because client states are less confident in the ability of their power-projecting patrons to defend them against a nuclear-armed adversary. Second, even the extension of a nuclear umbrella may not be enough to repair an alliance in the face of nuclear proliferation, as allies may still question the patron’s willingness to fight a nuclear war on their behalf. Third, the very fact that the extension of a nuclear umbrella and not the direct transfer of of nuclear weapons to allied states, is powerful states’ preferred response to enemy nuclear proliferation strongly suggests that power-projecting states believe that they can better maintain their alliances by keeping their allies nonnuclear.

# \*Deterrence\*

# 1NC/2AC

**Prolif is key to detterence—increases the possibility a nuclearized state will be involved**

**Asal and Beardsley 07** (\*Victor, Department of Political Science, State University of New York, Albany and \*\*Kyle, Department of Political Science, Emore Universtiy “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 44, no. 2, 2007, pp. 139–155 Sage Publications [www.saramitchell.org/Asalbeardsley.pdf](http://www.saramitchell.org/Asalbeardsley.pdf)) kyan)

**The causal mechanism in a proliferation** optimist argument like that of Waltz (Sagan & Waltz, 2003), **which expects war** **to be less likely as the number of nuclear actors increases, is connected to a rationalist view of nuclear deterrence** (see Zagare & Kilgour, 2000; Huth, 1999). Proliferation optimists implicitly contend that, **as the** **number of nuclear actors in the system increases, the proportion of disputes involving nuclear actors** should **increase as wel**l. 5 That is, all else being equal, **the more of any type of actor you add to the playing field of international politics, the more likely that that type of actor will be involved in a crisis.** If **nuclear** **weapons increase the prospects of deterrence**, **then proliferation** should **result in more crises with restrained actors** that are prone to back down instead of escalate. Rational deterrence advances the notion that actors are effectively able to deter other states from aggression if they can credibly posture themselves as resolute and strong states. **States with nuclear weapons should be especially effective at deterrence if they can convince their adversary that there is some possibility nuclear weapons would be use**d. Nu**clear states may resort to brinkmanship or costly signals to overcome the credibility problem (**Schelling, 1960, 1962, 1966; Powell, 1988, 1989, 1990; Fearon, 1994). As long as there **is some probability that a state would use a nuclear weapon** against an opponent, **the enormity of the costs of that event should be enough to deter opponents** from escalating in a conflict **even if the probability of that event is low**. While Zagare & Kilgour (2000) point to a number of inconsistencies in ‘classical deterrence theory’, as advocated by such scholars as Waltz, the general argument that **nuclear weapon**s can **decrease the willingness of actors to** **engage in** violent **conflict** is consistent with Zagare & Kilgour’s ‘Perfect Deterrence Theory’. In their view, **deterrence is a function of both capabilities and credibility.** The capability to inflict great damage is the only necessary condition for deterrence, and the strength of deterrence will generally be improved as the credibility of nuclear use increases. Relevant to Perfect Deterrence Theory, this article does not advance the notion that deterrence will never fail, just as Zagare & Kilgour (2000) formally demonstrate that deterrence can fail in many instances. Our logic is probabilistic in that nuclear weapons should decrease the likelihood of violent conflict, not eliminate it. The formal models of Zagare & Kilgour (1993, 2000) and Kilgour & Zagare (1991) suggest that as an actor increasingly values the status quo more than fighting, the ability for deterrence to succeed increases. Applied to nuclear weapons, **if a state** making a demand **faces higher expected costs of war because of the threat of nuclear retaliation, then that actor is more likely to prefer backing down** to fighting. Kilgour & Zagare (1991: 321) state**, ‘by increasing the costs of warfare, deterrence becomes more likely as the credibility requirements of a deterrent threat become less onerous’**. This leaves one to wonder why the state with nuclear weapons does not then try to exploit the willingness of the other side to shy away from conflict and simply make large demands of its own. Under this logic, the nuclear actor might raise its demands until the other actor has a reasonable relative valuation of fighting and the probability of war is roughly the same as if there were no nuclear deterrent. But if demands are made according to a risk-return-tradeoff, under similar assumptions modeled by Powell (1999: 101), then increases in the expected costs of war of an opponent should be greater than any increases in the demands of exploitive actors. So, **the probability of war should decrease as the costs of war increase**, even if the demands also increase in response.

**Deterrence solves all conflicts - credible threats and moderate demands check back even ‘irrational’ actors from striking**

**Colby, 07** (Elbridge Colby, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, United States Regarding weapons of Mass Destruction, “Restoring Deterrence”, Orbis**¶** Volume 51, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 413–428, 18 May 2007, jld)

The leading charge made against the deterrence strategy is that America's modern enemies cannot be deterred. Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Syria, and the rest of the rogue states’ gallery are, in this view, actors bent on hostile action against the United States, our interests, and our allies. The risk of allowing these powers to obtain WMD—particularly nuclear weapons—is so great that it outweighs the costs of initiating preventive steps up to and including war. Advocates of this position point wistfully to the “easier” days of the Cold War, when the West faced only the “rational” Soviets and, to a lesser extent, Chinese. Why this argument has achieved such dominance is a mystery. **There is no reason to think that America's enemies cannot in significant respects be deterred**. **There is plenty that each of these rogue states holds dear that the United States can threaten**. Though little is known of the “Hermit Kingdom,” it is certainly clear that North Korea's Kim Jong-Il and his family very much value his place as the great leader. Indeed, the brooding specter of American nuclear and conventional forces striking down the Kim regime was enough to end the war in 1953 and maintain a very cold peace for half a century.11 Syria's weak Assad family dictatorship is probably even more susceptible to threats to its hold on power than the Kims. Iran's mullahcracy and revolutionary leadership are deeply committed to maintaining their regime (probably the reason they are developing their nuclear capability in the first place). **All of these perverse dictators share a common devotion to their own power, a devotion that the United States can easily exploit. Nor is the United States limited only to threatening the ruling clique's hold on power. These regimes exhibit a host of other vulnerabilities. America can, for instance, target things that high officials, military officers, and other important decision makers hold dear**. This strategy has been underway in our activities against the North Korean regime's ability to garner money, luxuries, and other goods from abroad. Similar ideas have been discussed as ways to influence members of the Iranian nuclear community**. James Baker famously issued a stern threat to Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz before the Persian Gulf War, making clear the terrible consequences should the Iraqis use WMD against Coalition forces—and the threat worked**.12 During the second Iraq war, and tacking against the very logic of the invasion, the U.S. apparently issued grave and personal warnings to military leaders in the Iraqi Army not to use WMD against Coalition forces. All these suggestions derive from the simple intuition central to deterrence theory: that your **opponents value something and that holding that valued thing or things at risk is the best way to ensure security.** Security—not necessarily dominance. Deterrence is not a silver bullet; it will not ensure others’ compliance with our every whim. But **if a demand is reasonable and a threat credible, the system is likely to work**.13 **Thus, if we demand that no rogue state launch or enable through third parties (i.e., terrorists) a WMD strike against the United States or its allies—a reasonable, defensive demand—and back that provision up with a threat—clearly credible—to respond with crushing force, there is every reason to believe that such a policy will work. No regime, no matter how aggressive and risk-inclined, would be so foolish as to attack the United States, a move that would yield little advantage, and thereby incur an attack's clear consequence—utter destruction**. There is important evidence to this effect. The Cold War experience shows that such defensive demands backed by believable threats can stave off attacks by even the most aggressive foes. It is **amusing today to hear the Soviet Union referred to as a rational and reliable power, a tagline that would have been news to the Western officials who had to deal with the USSR during those years. This was, after all, the power that threatened to “bury” the West, brandished its awesome military forces with little restraint, developed an enormous nuclear arsenal that peaked at something on the order of 45,000 nuclear warheads (including over 10,000 “strategic” warheads), and tried to cow Western Europe into submission. Without the threat of American nuclear retaliation, the Soviets likely would either have intimidated the Western Europeans into fealty or invaded to make it so.** **Only the threat of U.S. nuclear strikes placated this ideological behemoth,** destined by its holy book to spread Marxism worldwide, from starting the third world war. If the United States was able to deter perhaps the most aggressive, most powerful force in human history, why can’t we deter Iran or North Korea or Syria?14

# Ex: → Deterrence

**Prolif good—it’s the only effective deterrence, purely defensive measures fail**

**Waltz 81** (Kenneth, pol sci prof at Berkeley “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better,” Adelphi Papers, Number 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981)kyan

**Nuclear weapons have been the** second **force working for peace** in the post-war world**. They make the cost of war seem frighteningly high and thus discourage states from starting any wars that might lead to the use of such weapons**. Nuclear weapons have helped main­tain peace between the great powers and have not led their few other possessors into military adventures.5 Their further spread, however, causes widespread fear. Much of the writing about the spread of nuclear weapons has this unusual trait: It tells us that what did no, happen in the past is likely to happen in the future, that tomorrow's nuclear states are likely to do to one another what today's nuclear states have not done. A happy nuclear past leads many to expect an unhappy nuclear future. This is odd, and the oddity leads me to believe that we should reconsider how wea­pons affect the situation of their possessors. The Military Logic of Self-Help Systems States coexist in a condition of anarchy. Self-help is the principle of action in an anarchic order, and the most important way in which states must help themselves is by providing for their own security. Therefore, in weighing the chances for peace, the first questions to ask are questions about the ends for which states use force and about the strategies and weapons they employ. The chances of peace rise if states can achieve their most important ends without actively using force. War becomes less likely as the costs of war rise in relation to possible gains. Strategies bring ends and means toget­her. How nuclear weapons affect the chances for peace is seen by considering the possible strategies of states. Force may be used for offence, for defence, for deterrence, and for coercion. Consider offence first. Germany and France before World War 1 provide a classic case of two adversaries each neglecting its defence and both planning to launch major attacks at the outset of war. France favoured offence over defence, because only by fighting an offensive war could Alsace-Lorraine be reclaimed. This illustrates one purpose of the offence: namely, conquest. Germany favoured offence over defence. believing offence to be the best defence, or even the only defence possible. Hemmed in by two adversaries. she could avoid fighting a two-front war only by concen­trating her forces in the West and defeating France before Russia could mobilize and move effectively into battle. This is what the Schlief­fen plan called for. The Plan illustrates another purpose of the offence: namely, security. Even if security had been Germany's only goal, an offensive strategy seemed to be the way to obtain it. The offence may have either or both of two aims: conquest and security. An offence may be conducted in either or in some combination of two ways: preventively or pre-emptively. If two countries are unequal in strength and the weaker is gaining, the stronger may be tempted to strike before its advantage is lost. Following this logic, a country with nuclear weapons may be tempted to destroy the nascent force of a hostile country. This would be preventive war, a war launched against a weak country before it can become disturbingly strong. The logic of pre-emption is different. Leaving aside the balance of forces, one country may strike another country's offensive forces to blunt an attack that it presumes is about to be made. If each of two countries can eliminate or dras­tically reduce the other's offensive forces in one surprise blow, tlien both of them are encour­aged to mount sudden attacks, if only for fear that if one does not, the other will. Mutual vulnerability of forces leads to mutual fear of surprise attack by giving each power a strong incentive to strike first. French and German plans for war against each other emphasized prevention over pre­emption - to strike before enemies can become fully ready to fight, but not to strike at their forces in order to destroy them before they can be used to strike back. Whether pre-emptive or preventive, an offensive first strike is a hard one. as military logic suggests and history confirms Whoever strikes first does so to gain a decisive advantage. A pre-emptive strike is designed to eliminate or decisively reduce the opponent's ability to retaliate. A preventive strike is designed to defeat an adversary before he can develop and deploy his full potential might. Attacks. I should add, are not planned according to military logic alone. Political logic may lead a country another country to attack even in the absence of an expectation of military victory, as Egypt did in October of 1973. Ho**w can one state dissuade another state from attacking**? In either or in some combination of two ways. **One way to counter an intended attack is to build fortifications and to muster forces that look forbiddingly strong**. To build defences so patently strong that no one will try to destroy or overcome them would make international life perfectly tranquil. I call this the defensive ideal. **The other way** to inhibit a country's intended aggressive moves **is to scare that country out of making them by threatening to visit unacceptable punishment upon it**. 'To deter' literally means to stop someone from doing something by frightening him. In contrast to dissuasion by defence, dissuasion by **deterrence operates by frightening a state out of attacking**, not because of the difficulty of launching an attack and carrying it home, but because the expected reaction of the attacked will result in one's own severe punish­ment. Defence and deterrence are often confused. One frequently hears statements like this: 'A strong defence in Europe will deter a Russian attack'. What is meant is that a strong defence will dissuade Russia from attacking. Deterrence is achieved not through the ability to defend but through the ability to punish. Purely deterrent forces provide no defence. The message of a deterrent strategy is this: 'Although we are defenceless, if you attack we will punish you to an extent that more than cancels your gains'. **Second-strike nuclear forces serve that kind of strategy. Purely defen­sive forces provide no deterrence**. They offer no means of punishment. The message of a defensive strategy is this: 'Although we cannot strike back, you will find our defences so difficult to overcome that you will dash yourself to pieces against them'. The Maginot Line was to serve that kind of strategy.

**Prolif Good—convention and CBW deterrence**

**Alagappa 09** ( Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow, East-West Center PhD, International Affairs, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University “Reinforcing National Security and Regional Stability The Implications if Nuclear Weapons and Strategies,” The Long Shadow, p. 487)kyan

﻿The primary function of nuclear weapons in the Asian security region is basic deterrence-that is, preventing large-scale conventional attack and deterring any form of nuclear attack against the homeland of a nuclear weapon state. China, Russia, India, and Pakistan all see nuclear weapons as essential to balance and deter stronger powers that threaten or might threaten their interests and to preserve policy autonomy in a context of American dominance and a rising China and India. The United States views nuclear weapons as necessary for contingencies involving China and to deter Russia if relations with that country deteriorate. It is unclear if the U.S. nuclear arsenal has a counterforce role against Russia and China and if it is developing BMD against both these countries. Even if the United States were successful in developing these capabilities, the political purposes for which it would use them is unclear. Some states see a role for nuclear weapons to deter chemical and biological attacks on their homelands as well. And some countries have attempted to deploy nuclear weapons in coercive diplomacy, war fighting, and strategic defense roles. In 1999, Pakistan engaged in coercive diplomacy by exploiting the risk of escalation to nuclear war. In response, India too engaged in coercive diplomacy and explored limited war under nuclear conditions. In its 2002 NPR (U.S. Department of Defense 2002), the United States indicated a shift in emphasis from deterrence to offensive and defensive strategies. The ensuing discussion of nuclear policies and strategies of relevant states and their behavior in conflict situations reveals the limitations of the offensive and defensive roles of nuclear weapons and highlights basic deterrence as the most important role for nuclear weapons

**Proliferation doesn’t produce more intense conflict, and deterrence checks nuclear use.**

**Waltz 81 –** London International Institute for Strategic Studies (Kenneth, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better”, 1981; < <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm)//AB>

The sprea**d of nuclear weapons threatens to make wars more intense** at the local and **not at the global level**, where wars of the highest intensity have been possible for a number of years. If their national existence should be threatened, weaker countries, unable to defend at lesser levels of violence, may destroy them­selves through resorting to nuclear weapons. Lesser nuclear states will live in fear of this possibility. But this is not different from the fear under which the United States and the Soviet Union have lived for years. **Small nuclear states may experience a keener sense of desperation because of extreme vulnerability to** conventional as well as to nuclear **attack**, but, again, in desperate situations what all parties become most **desperate to avoid is the use of strategic nuclear weapons**. Still, however improbable the event, lesser states may one day fire some of their weapons. Are minor nuclear states more or less likely to do so than major ones? The answer to this question is vitally important because the existence of some States would be at stake even if the damage done were regionally confined.

**Possession of nuclear weapons leads to less chance of use- states are reassured when they possess nukes and a psychological taboo holds them back from use**

**Walker, 10** (William Walker is Professor of International Relations, “The absence of a taboo on the possession of nuclear weapons”,

Review of International Studies (2010), 36, 865–876 0 2010 British International Studies Association doi:10.1017/S0260210510001324, jld)

Wherever one stands in this debate, **there seems to be agreement that inhibitions on the actual use**, although not on the imagined and threatened use, **of nuclear weapons have been strong, largely cumulative and surprisingly pervasive**. The **evidence points towards an exceptional restraint exhibited by all kinds and sizes of nuclear-armed state, apparently unaffected by the nature, location and severity of conflict. Such behaviour cannot just be attributed to fear of devastating retaliation, important though that may be**, not least because since 1945 there has been no use of nuclear weapons against states that lack retaliatory capacities or the protection of nuclear alliances. **The embedded restraint seems tantamount to a taboo, a prohibition felt instinctively and routinely by individuals and social groups**. With caveats and recognising the complications, I therefore find myself drawn towards acceptance, if mainly for metaphorical purposes, of the term ‘nuclear taboo’ to signify inhibitions that demonstrably exist and exert a powerful hold. ‘Restraint’ and ‘inhibition’ are more comfortable words and risk less misunderstanding, but they often seem inadequate, usually requiring addition of ‘strong’ or some other adjective to convey an accurate meaning. Nina Tannenwald’s book focuses mainly on the use of nuclear weapons in war.2 **I wish to turn attention towards the possession of nuclear weapons, without which there would be no prospect of use.** Why have the strong inhibitions on military use in war not resulted in greater desire to abandon nuclear weapons – to cease possessing as well as using them – than has been evident to date? Does the answer lie partly in the absence (why?) of equally strong and pervasive inhibitions on the possession of nuclear arms and associated capabilities, and in the fear and mistrust that those capabilities engender? Why do some states and peoples even glorify possession of nuclear weapons while still recoiling from their use? How does the strong inhibition on the use of nuclear weapons, yet the variable inhibition on their possession, play within the international nuclear ‘order of restraint’ that has been constructed with such effort over the past several decades? One of my points is that denial of the existence of a taboo on use is as engrained as the taboo itself. It feeds, often contrarily, into each of the discourses on deterrence, non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament and into the policies and practices associated with them. The taboo and its denial interact in complicated ways that Tannenwald does not adequately explore. I shall also draw attention to the opposing effects of prestige on the taboo on use and possession. **Whilst preoccupation with esteem discourages the use of nuclear weapons in war, limiting them to defence in extremis, it may strongly encourage states to acquire and hold on to them. Possession as insurance against breach of the nuclear taboo** The answers to the first of the above questions are familiar from the literatures on realism and nuclear deterrence, but they have interesting twists. **A breach of the nuclear taboo would be catastrophic for the state and society that fell victim to it, given the nuclear weapon’s immense destructiveness**. This is self-evident unless nuclear weapons are used precisely and tactically to destroy military targets such as missile launch sites. But states have not trusted rivals to honour this restriction. Nor have they considered it plausible that civilian populations would escape terrible injury in a ‘limited nuclear war’. Furthermore, governments have perpetu- ally worried about their and their opponents’ ability to prevent escalation to all-out nuclear war. From time to time, nuclear war planners have convinced themselves that limited nuclear war is feasible and desirable.3 However, their views have not carried the day.

# Ex: Deterrence Solves

**Empirics prove deterrence works- it’s the better alternative**

**Washington Post, 12** (Fareed Zakaria, “Deterrence works”, The Washington Post. Washington, D.C.: Mar 15, 2012, Proquest, jld)

I am reminded of that turbulent meeting as I listen to the debates over Iran's nuclear ambitions because it highlights a strange role reversal in today's foreign policy discourse. It used to be the left that refused to accept the idea of deterrence - searching instead for options such as a nuclear freeze. And it used to be those on the right who would patiently explain the practical virtues of deterrence. "About once every 25 years, a new generation discovers the horrors of the bomb and the paradoxes of deterrence, and begins looking for a way out. But there are only so many times that one can present the apocalypse . . . so many beguiling alternatives to pursue and discard. **Inevitably, the debate grinds to a halt pretty much where it began: affirming, while deploring, the necessity of relying on the balance of terror to preserve the peace**." That was Charles Krauthammer, writing in the New Republic in 1984. "**Deterrence, like old age, is intolerable, until one considers the alternative**," he explained. Yet today it is the right that has decided that deterrence is a lie. Krauthammer, the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute and others denounce containment and deterrence and would lead us instead to a policy that culminates in a preventive war. It is the right's version of the nuclear freeze - a simple solution that actually doesn't solve anything. Strikes on Iran would probably delay its program a few years while driving up domestic support for the government in Tehran and providing it with a much stronger rationale for pursuing nuclear weapons. Yet sophisticated conservatives insist that this route is preferable to deterrence. **Deterrence is a difficult concept to accept because it is counterintuitive: The prospect of destruction produces peace. And yet its record is remarkable. Great powers went to war with brutal regularity for hundreds of years. Then came nuclear weapons, and there has not been a war between great powers since 1945 - the longest period of peace between great powers in history. The United States and the Soviet Union had a more intense and far-reaching rivalry than almost any two great powers ever. Each thought the other wanted to destroy its way of life. And yet, this rivalry did not result in war**. Both sides were deterred. In 1989, Margaret Thatcher said in a toast to Mikhail Gorbachev, "Both our countries know from bitter experience that **conventional weapons do not deter war in Europe, whereas nuclear weapons have done so for over 40 years. As a deterrent there is no substitute for them**." If deterrence doesn't work, then why are we not preparing preventive war against Russia, which still has a fearsome arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles? Or against Pakistan, home to a military-intelligence regime that has been implicated in more major acts of terrorism in the past 10 years than Iran has in the past hundred? **The argument that Iran would be deterred does not rest on its reasonableness but on the regime's desire to survive.** "Rulers want to have a country that they can continue to rule," says Kenneth Waltz, one of the most distinguished theorists of international relations.

**Research proves deterrence works- empirics and cost-benefit analysis in actors**

**Newsweek International, 09** (Jonathan Tepperman, Foreign Affairs, “Learning to Love The Bomb“, Sept. 14, 2009, jld)

**A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not in fact make the world more dangerous**, as Obama and most people assume. **These weapons may actually make us safer**. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that's a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama's idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it's not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn't be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nuke-free planet) that's both unrealistic and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, **nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a non-nuclear, war between two states that possess them**. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "**We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states**." To understand why--and why **the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way**--you need to start by recognizing that **all states are rational on some basic level**. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: **a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price**. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side--and millions of innocents pay the price. **Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable**. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a -button--and everybody knows it--the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and therefore not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, "Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?" Why indeed? **The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling it's led to what's known as the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world's major powers have avoided coming to blows**. They did fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matched the furious destruction of full-on great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50amillion to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there's very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuring--because in each instance, very different leaders all came to the same safe conclusion. Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, "It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time." **The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear-armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons**. The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both **countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests**. Sumit Ganguly, an Indiana University professor and co-author of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders on each side did what they had to do to avoid it.

**Proliferation of WMD is inevitable- deterrence is the only option**

**Colby, 07** (Elbridge Colby, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, United States Regarding weapons of Mass Destruction, “Restoring Deterrence”, Orbis**¶** Volume 51, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 413–428, 18 May 2007, jld)

Reasonable minds may differ on points in deterrence's favor. The strategy is no panacea, after all. It could fail. But at least it is based on reality. Indeed, **perhaps the strongest argument in favor of deterrence is that no other option is really plausible.** Critics of deterrence inevitably point to the possibility of WMD falling into the hands of hostile rogue states or terrorists as proof that this strategy is unworkable. Friends of deterrence may retort, as laid out above, that the policy actually can work, if rigorously applied. But understanding the argument on these grounds alone misses a major point in deterrence's favor: **proliferation of WMD is inevitable**. Critics argue against deterrence and for a prevention policy as if the diffusion of deadly technologies can be halted. Nothing in human history gives grounds for such a hope. The reality is that **technology, as it becomes cheaper and more abundant, will inevitably flow outwards, to smaller and weaker states, and downwards, to sub-state actors**. Consider the rapid proliferation of computer technology, inconceivable only several decades ago; the average personal computer, for example, has considerably more computing power than the Apollo missions of the 1960s. **Weapons are no different, especially those that have asymmetric properties—these include increasingly powerful explosives, surface to air missiles, anti-computing weapons, and, of course, WMD.** Biological weaponry, initially the preserve of the great powers, can now be developed in small labs at relatively modest cost and, with some work, tailored to do enormous damage.26 There is little that the United States or any other power can do to alter this fundamental reality. It is the logical underside of the much-heralded advent of incredibly powerful technologies—the Pandora's Box effect. We see this dynamic playing out in the Iran and North Korea contexts. **While it remains difficult to develop nuclear weapons, North Korea and (apparently) Iran are showing that today even the most marginal states can do so if sufficiently dedicated**. India, Pakistan, South Africa, and Israel showed it a generation earlier, and today a number of states could do so very quickly if they desired.27

# Ex: Solves Terror

**Not only does deterrence work against terrorist organizations- it is the best policy to retain operational readiness but not aggressive warlike activities**

**Colby, 07** (Elbridge Colby, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, United States Regarding weapons of Mass Destruction, “Restoring Deterrence”, Orbis**¶** Volume 51, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 413–428, 18 May 2007, jld)

The second charge leveled against deterrence is that it is too passive in today's threatening world, particularly in the face of terrorism. In this view, deterrence imbues our defense with a too sluggish and reactive modus operandi. In the wake of 9/11, and in the face of the proliferation of WMD, it is contended that deterrence is not proactive enough and is too accepting of terrorism as a way of war. The current administration, backed by vocal commentators, has outlined a much different strategy—a “war on terror.” This strategy, seeing terrorism as such as a threat to America and its interests, seeks to combat it wherever it may be found. The objective of the policy is, in principle, to suppress the very practice of terrorism. It is clear that the problem of radical catastrophic terrorism demands an active defense and that the struggle against Al Qaeda is and should be viewed as in key respects a war. But critics err in arguing that a deterrence strategy does not provide a suitable superstructure for such policies. **While deterrence is a policy that seeks to use the threat of violence to avoid violence, it is also a policy that is prepared to—and indeed must—use force if challenged. It is a defensive policy, but not a passive one. When “red lines” are crossed, it demands severe and thoroughgoing retaliation**.16 The current struggle against Al Qaeda falls on the reactive side of the deterrence divide. Both the neoconservatives and the liberal internationalists on the other stray from this sensible policy. On the one hand, we should not confuse our strategy by declaring war on terror as a tactic, because such a war can never be won. There is no reason to think that the use of terror—the perennial weapon of the weak—can be ended. On the other hand, liberal critics of the struggle against Al Qaeda would bind America's hands based on unrealistic views of international law and implausible humanitarian aspirations. They decry detention, interrogation methods, cooperation with unpleasant regimes, and so forth—the very steps that are central to a successful struggle against a fanatically dedicated enemy. They would cripple our response, leaving us more at peril, without justice, and with a fangless deterrent. **Deterrence provides a saner understanding of how to combat Al Qaeda than either the open-ended war on terror or the liberal model of hoping for security through seeking to solve “root cause” problems. In line with this understanding, the United States should convey a clear policy in which strikes by terrorist groups against the American homeland will result in, at the very least, the destruction of those groups and those complicit with them.** The logic of our response to 9/11 is therefore clear. Al Qaeda clearly crossed our “red line.” Atop the demands of justice and our future security, deterrence requires that the United States take every step to destroy Al Qaeda in order for our deterrent against terrorists to be credible. The United States must show to all other terrorist groups—such as Hezbollah—that catastrophic attacks against Americans will result in their destruction. The American focus should be single-minded. While we may detest other groups, it was Al Qaeda that struck us, and so Al Qaeda must be destroyed. Even if the Pakistanis are devious and the Afghans truculent, we must push to unearth and punish bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, no matter how arduous the search. Furthermore, **deterrence is a valuable concept at the operational level as well. A counterterrorism strategy animated by deterrence theory would take advantage of all the vulnerabilities and pressure points in the terrorist system. Suicide bombers might not value their lives, but they likely value their cause, their homes, and so forth. The United States could, therefore, focus on each of these value points: causes and groups can be singled out for hostile attention, both “kinetic” and diplomatic; homes can be seized or even bulldozed, as the Israelis do with the homes of Palestinian suicide bombers; allies can be pressured or otherwise inconvenienced**. Nor does America need to limit its view only to those who carry the bombs themselves. The same rationales can be applied outwardly, throughout the terrorist network, to the faceless men of the organization, individuals no doubt more easily intimidated than the bombers themselves. Such a campaign's objective would be to spread fear about the American response to complicity in terrorist activity against our nation.17 Such a strategy would also be an object lesson to other terrorist groups. It would certainly send the message that attacks against Americans or complicity in such attacks is gravely dangerous and costly. Given that it is quixotic for the United States to seek to eliminate all terrorist groups that potentially threaten us, **a counterterrorism strategy of deterrence is a far more proportional, effective, cost efficient, and sane policy.**

# Ex: Moral

**Deterrence is the most moral strategy- it leads to conflict only when provoked and is key to a peaceful international system**

**Colby, 07** (Elbridge Colby, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, United States Regarding weapons of Mass Destruction, “Restoring Deterrence”, Orbis**¶** Volume 51, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 413–428, 18 May 2007, jld)

One might ask: If deterrence is so effective at providing security, then why has there been a rush to abandon it in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse and 9/11? Shouldn’t such a successful policy have earned greater loyalty? The answer to these questions illuminates the serious divisions among Americans about what the purpose of our foreign policy should be. **Deterrence was not a policy that won out in the Cold War because it was the most loved. It was, instead, the best of a menu of bad options**. Hard right anti-Communists thought deterrence weak, a concession of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and a failure of Western will. They called for the rollback of Communist suzerainty, even going so far as to advocate preventive strikes against the Soviet Union and China before they were able to field nuclear weapons. The left, meanwhile, detested deterrence as an immoral use of terror as a threat, a reliance on weapons whose very existence they decried. Believing that no state objective could justify the use of nuclear weapons, the left advocated reducing our strategic forces, moving towards abolition, and a conciliatory policy towards the Soviets. Since neither the right nor the left could win out—fortunately—deterrence arose as an option few liked but all responsible parties could endorse.20 With the collapse of the Soviet threat, this agreement lost its raison d’être. Interventionists left and right broke free of the restrictive bonds a deterrence and containment strategy had put in place. For hard-edged advocates for U.S. primacy, like Donald Rumsfeld or Dick Cheney, a deterrence posture would prevent the United States from exercising regional hegemony in the Middle East or East Asia. For neoconservative and liberal interventionists like Paul Wolfowitz, Tony Blair, or Michael Ignatieff, anxious to spread democracy, halt genocide and other humanitarian crises, and “end tyranny in our world,”21 deterrence was too hesitant about such interventions. And for pacifist leftists—and even a few old hawks—deterrence was a system of terror itself, one that could be discarded at the end of history. They, therefore, called for abolishing nuclear weapons, the end of using threats for security, and internationalizing security responsibility. Deterrence was left with few friends. Its erstwhile friends should now consider returning. **Contrary to the arguments of the pacifist-inclined left, a strategy of disarmament and conciliation is morally irresponsible in the face of Al Qaeda and its like. Despite what the neo-conservatives and the liberal interventionists had hoped, the high moral rhetoric of liberating Iraq has yielded to a grimmer sense of the moral duties of considering consequences, necessity, and proportion.** We have relearned the truth of the critiques of revolutionary France and of Woodrow Wilson—that even the honest pursuit of high-minded liberal aspirations can yield death and chaos. History has its own ways and means and we should moderate our hope for its coming with a reverential fear of its wrath. In between these two extremes, **deterrence is a security policy that offers a way forward for the United States that is not only more effective because more tailored, but is also more moral. It is more moral because a deterrent posture would entail a strategy that is more proportionate, more necessary, more responsive, and, ultimately, more just. Indeed, deterrence comports with the fundamental human intuition that it is generally only moral to fight when attacked**. In this **it complies with the classical conception of just war, which mandates that wars only be conducted when one's cause is just, waged by a legitimate authority, motivated by a right intent, fought with a real prospect of success, conducted proportionately, and undertaken only as a last resort**. Deterrence satisfies these criteria**. It is a defensive strategy that responds to invasions or attacks, and is therefore just**; it sets out relatively clear guidelines for when it mandates that the government fight, and, therefore, is governed by legitimate authority. It is driven by a desire to protect, deter, and avenge, and is therefore motivated by right intent; its realistic red lines and threats are backed up by the awesome power of the United States, and therefore likely to succeed; and it responds when attacked and asks from the rest of the international community only respect for its marked out positions rather than revolutionary transformation, and is therefore proportional.22 Finally, **by its nature it is undertaken as a last resort rather than preventively.**

# \*Warming\*

# 1NC/2AC

**Proliferation causes satellite surveillance expansion.**

**Norris, 07 –** Space Strategy Manager – Logica UK (Pat, “Spies in the sky: surveillance satellites in war and peace”, p. 169-170, Google Print) // JH

Surveillance satellites that are specifically military in nature are operated by seven countries, namely Russia, the US, France, Japan, Germany, China, and Britain (although Britain's is only a technology demonstrator satellite, not an operational system). **The impetus for new countries to build these satellites has come from the fragmentation of the world's military threats since the end of the Cold War.** Where before the main threat was a US-Soviet confrontation--either directly or via satellite states--**military forces from the developed countries are now involved in actions around the globe**. **The proliferation of missile and nuclear technology has also motivated countries to have an autonomous satellite-monitoring capability**. **Japan's decision to build a fleet of radar and visible imaging satellites stems from concerns about the missile tests undertaken by North Korea**.

**Sattelite monitoring is a prerequisite to international co-operation to solve warming**

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There has been speculation for more than a century on how human activity may change the Earth’s ¶ climate. **The era of speculation is over. If there has been any surprise, it has been that the pace ¶ and scope of change caused by “anthropogenic influences” have proven to be more rapid than ¶ expected**. While skeptics remain, most observers now agree that human activities (particularly the ¶ **burning of carbon fuels and deforestation) contribute to and accelerate climate change.¶** There is now broad consensus that **national interests are threatened by climate change**. Concern over the effect of climate change led to a discussion over its implications for national security ¶ and international stability.¶ 1¶ Many studies agreed that **climate change creates new risk for national ¶ and economic security, as a result of dislocation of populations or a scarcity of resources such as ¶ water or food.** To the extent climate change is a national security problem, it is a problem that is ¶ not amenable to solution by military tools. Instead, **progress will depend on diplomacy, science, ¶ and technology**. ¶ Climate change is a global problem. A global response is necessary, using existing or new ¶ vehicles for cooperation. While there is broad consensus that national interests are threatened by ¶ climate change, turning this consensus into meaningful action will be difficult. Negotiation takes ¶ place in the context of competing national economic interests. **The countries most vulnerable to ¶ the effects of a changing climate, mostly developing countries, do not have the capacity to cope** with these changes and look to developed countries for assistance. **Our understanding of how to ¶ mitigate and adapt to climate change is still at an early stage**. Remedies have been identified, but ¶ their effectiveness has yet to be measured. Finally, **the data necessary for assessing the effect of ¶ these efforts and the mechanisms for sharing that data are partial and incomplete, designed to ¶ inform science and not policy**.¶ There is still a great deal we do not know about the local and global effects of climate change. ¶ Several recent studies identified gaps and weaknesses in climate science activities. One of the main ¶ conclusions of this research is that climate science to date has been geared toward fulfilling needs ¶ within the scientific community rather than meeting the needs of decisionmakers who must determine how to adapt and respond to a changing climate.¶ **Managing climate-related risks requires accurate, robust, sustained, and wide-ranging climate ¶ information**. Sustained and continuous observations are needed for researchers to evaluate and ¶ test climate model accuracy and to identify causes of particular elements of climate change. The ¶ international community must address four key uncertainties and gaps in climate research if we ¶ are to significantly improve our confidence in climate change prediction and understanding: ¶ 2¶ ■ Incomplete global data sets for analysis and modeling uncertainties restrict the types of studies ¶ that can be performed.¶ ■ The lack of observational data restricts the types of climate change that can be analyzed.¶ ■ Multi-decadal changes in daily temperature range are not well understood.¶ ■ Confidence in attributing some climate change phenomena to anthropogenic (man-made) ¶ influences is limited. ¶ These gaps and uncertainties are directly related to the availability of adequate Earth observations. **Earth observation provides the evidence necessary for informed decisionmaking. It supports ¶ the monitoring and verification of emission reductions**. A comprehensive and global perspective ¶ in climate monitoring is needed to understand the interconnectivity of Earth’s terrestrial, atmospheric, and oceanic systems. ¶ Understanding the climate problem requires accurate, robust, sustained, and wide-ranging ¶ climate information. Masses of data are already collected for atmospheric, oceanic, and terrestrial ¶ phenomena.¶ 3¶ These data are shared among the research community through various international ¶ data centers, but the informational needs of policymakers are different from those of researchers. ¶ The primary requirements for policy are timely and consistent access to data for assessing actions ¶ and reducing uncertainty. The data (and improved models to use that data) that policymakers will ¶ need fall into several categories:¶ ■ Trend data that track the shrinking of the polar ice caps or forests, the presence of gases in the ¶ upper environment, or changes in ocean temperature or currents. Depending on the adequacy ¶ of predictive models, these data would allow assessment of the rate and nature of climate ¶ change.¶ ■ Regional data that enable the identification of specific regional problems to allow for tailored ¶ solutions or aid programs. The need for cross border collection complicates the gathering of ¶ these regional data. ¶ ■ Effects assessment data that would reduce uncertainty and allow policymakers to determine ¶ whether mitigation or adaptation policies implemented to address climate change are having ¶ any effect.¶ ■ Compliance data to monitor progress in support of an agreement**. One of the lessons of the ¶ recent climate negotiations in Copenhagen is that ensuring compliance with any future agreement to limit emissions will be politically sensitive for some countries and beyond the technical or financial means of many others.**¶ ■ Planning data that provide consistent and timely information that insurance companies, farmers, urban planners, major corporations, and others will need to reduce uncertainty. ¶ These data would allow local planners, governments, businesses, and private sector consumers like ¶ the insurance industry to assess the likelihood of certain impacts and conduct cost-benefit analysis ¶ of different response options (see appendix A for a more detailed discussion of such options). On ¶ the international level, this type of regional information is necessary for determining which areas ¶ of the world will be most affected and should receive a higher priority for aid, financing, technology, and capacity building.¶ **Monitoring and verifying of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is of particular importance.** ¶ **Reaching an agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is complicated because of the inherent scientific uncertainty and incomplete understanding of the carbon cycle and warming of the ¶ Earth**. Recent scientific advancements, however, allow us to conclude with a high level of certainty ¶ that climate change and global warming are unequivocal and that the primary driver is carbon ¶ dioxide produced by burning of fossil fuels and, to a lesser degree, by deforestation;¶ Currently, identifying trends in GHG emissions relies on weaving together data collected from ¶ existing ground-based networks and space-borne instruments, using a process called “trace-transport inversion**.” As the United States and other nations consider whether to adopt cap-and-trade ¶ policies, they will need a coordinated and efficient system for collecting and distributing data to ¶ support carbon markets and to promote transparency and accountability through accessible public ¶ information. Better climate information has helped us move beyond the question of whether action to manage climate change is warranted to what types of actions and polices are needed**. Information is ¶ key to an effective approach to climate change. At a national and international level, many countries are preoccupied with how to ensure that decisionmakers and user communities have access¶ to the types of information that will make the climate efforts successful. This includes coordinated systems for Earth observation, enhanced modeling capabilities, an organizational structure that ¶ allows science to be more responsive to relevant policy questions or functions, and places where ¶ information can be gathered and made accessible to broad-based user communities.¶ Meeting the needs of climate policy requires a transformation in how climate research is ¶ incorporated into public policymaking.¶ 4¶ “Operationalizing” information systems—investing in the ¶ Earth observation systems necessary for producing the right data over the right time and space ¶ horizons, coordinating data collection, interpreting and sharing to maximize the data’s benefits, ¶ focusing on the human and social science effects of climate change, improving modeling capabilities, and making this information accessible and relevant for a wide range of users—is a necessary ¶ step in designing effective U.S. climate policy. **It also represents an opportunity for America to ¶ demonstrate global leadership and contribute to building global capacity to understand and more ¶ effectively respond to the climate.**¶ **The climate negotiations in Copenhagen, Denmark, in December 2009, failed because of differences over how to share responsibilities and burdens.** The challenges inherent in these negotiations will not be easily overcome. However, the troubled negotiations in Copenhagen present ¶ the United States with an opportunity. The 2008 CSIS report, CSIS Commission on Smart Power: ¶ A Smarter, More Secure America, called for the United States to use its technology and scientific ¶ prowess to engage other nations in efforts that serve both U.S. interests and the interests of the ¶ global community. **This report identifies Earth observation and climate change as one such opportunity and provides recommendations on how the United States can, working with other nations, ¶ acquire the technology and build the institutions needed to assess and manage climate change**. It ¶ suggests three steps that the United States can take:

**Causes extinction**

**Henderson 06.** (Bill, “Runaway Global Warming – Denial”, CounterCurrents, August 19, countercurrents.org/cc-henderson190806.htm)

The scientific debate about human induced global warming is over but policy makers - let alone the happily shopping general public - still seem to not understand the scope of the impending tragedy. Global warming isn't just warmer temperatures, heat waves, melting ice and threatened polar bears. Scientific understanding increasingly points to runaway global warming leading to human extinction. If impossibly Draconian security measures are not immediately put in place to keep further emissions of greenhouse gases out of the atmosphere we are looking at the death of billions, the end of civilization as we know it and in all probability the end of man's several million year old existence, along with the extinction of most flora and fauna beloved to man in the world we share. Runaway global warming: there are 'carbon bombs': carbon in soils, carbon in warming temperate and boreal forests and in a drought struck Amazon, methane in Arctic peat bogs and in methane hydrates melting in warming ocean waters. For several decades it has been hypothesized that rising temperatures from increased greenhouse gases in the atmosphere due to burning fossil fuels could be releasing some of and eventually all of these stored carbon stocks to add substantually more potent greenhouse gases to the atmosphere.. Given time lags of 30-50 years, we might have already put enough extra greenhouse gases into the atmosphere to have crossed a threshold to these bombs exploding, their released greenhouse gases leading to ever accelerating global warming with future global temperatures maybe tens of degrees higher than our norms of human habitation and therefor extinction or very near extinction of humanity.

# Ex: Sats Key

Status quo efforts are insufficient – we need more information to act

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Until this year, America’s civil space policies—and the budgets that derive from it—were shaped to ¶ a considerable degree by the political imperatives of the past and by the romantic fiction of spaceflight. We believe there is a new imperative—climate change—that should take precedence in our ¶ national plans for space and that the goal for space spending in the next decade should be to create ¶ a robust and adequate Earth observation architecture.¶ There is unequivocal evidence, despite careless mistakes and noisy protests, that Earth’s ¶ climate is warming. While the effects and implications of this are subject to speculation, there ¶ should be no doubt that the world faces a major challenge. There are important shortfalls in data ¶ and analysis needed to manage this challenge. Inadequate data mean that we cannot determine the ¶ scope or nature of change in some key areas, such as the melting of Antarctic sea ice. Long-term ¶ changes in daily temperature are not adequately understood, in part because of limited observations of atmospheric changes. Our understanding of how some anthropogenic (man-made) ¶ influences affect climate change is still incomplete.¶ 1¶ These shortfalls must be remedied, if only to ¶ overcome skepticism and doubt.¶ Climate change now occupies a central place on the global political agenda, and the United ¶ States should adjust its space policies to reflect this. Assessing and managing climate change will ¶ require taking what has largely been a scientific enterprise and “operationalizing” it. Operationalization means creating processes to provide the data and analysis that governments will need if ¶ they are to implement policies and regulations to soften the effects of climate change. Operationalization requires the right kind of data and adequate tools for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating that data in ways that inform decisionmaking at many levels of society.¶ Satellites play a central role in assessing climate change because they can provide a consistent ¶ global view, important data, and an understanding of change in important but remote areas. Yet ¶ there are relatively few climate satellites—a total of 19, many of which are well past their expected ¶ service life. Accidents or failures would expose the fragility of the Earth observation system.¶ 2¶ We ¶ lack the required sensors and instruments for the kinds of measurement that would make predictions more accurate and solutions more acceptable. Weather satellites, which take low-resolution ¶ pictures of clouds, forests, and ice caps, are not adequate to the task. NASA builds impressive ¶ Earth observation satellites for climate change, but these have been experimental rather than ongoing programs.¶ Climate change poses a dilemma for space policy. The programs needed to manage climate ¶ change have been woefully underfunded for decades. The normal practice is to call uncritically¶ for more money for civil space and its three components—planetary exploration, Earth observation, and manned spaceflight. In fact, civil space has been lavishly funded. Since 1989, NASA has ¶ received $385 billion, with $189 billion in the last decade.¶ 3¶ This is more than the space budgets ¶ of most other nations combined. The problem is not a lack of money but how it has been spent. ¶ The bulk of this money went to NASA’s manned space program. This is a legacy of the Cold War. ¶ Manned spaceflight showed that market democracies could surpass scientific socialism. The point ¶ has been made. Spaceflight provides prestige, but a long series of miscalculations have left the ¶ United States with a fragile and fabulously expensive space transportation system. It will take years ¶ to recover, and some goals, such as a voyage to Mars, are simply unachievable absent major breakthroughs in physics and other sciences.¶ If we accept that climate change poses serious risks to regional stability, national security, and ¶ economic health, the United States needs to reconsider its funding priorities for civil space. Earth ¶ observation is crucial for national security and the economy; manned spaceflight programs provide prestige. The United States must make climate-monitoring satellites its priority for funding ¶ if it is serious about managing climate change. In practical terms, this means a reduction in the ¶ spending on human spaceflight in order to fund a sustained program of satellite-building to create a robust climate monitoring space system. This is, of course, not an all-or-nothing issue. The ¶ United States can fund a range of space programs, manned and unmanned, for exploration and ¶ for Earth sciences. It is a question of priorities. Our recommendation is that the funding given to ¶ Earth observation should increase, as it is more important now for the national interest to monitor ¶ and manage climate change, even if that means a slower pace for other programs, such as manned ¶ spaceflight, until a robust Earth observation system has been put in orbit.¶ Having the right data is only part of the challenge. The usefulness of that data depends on the ¶ strength of climate models and computing capabilities and our ability to make this information ¶ available to decisionmakers and user communities in a useful form. In the United States, these ¶ functions could be provided by a strengthened and reorganized interagency climate information structure bolstered by the creation of a National Climate Service, which could aggregate and ¶ analyze climate data in ways tailored to support management, policymaking, and the information ¶ needs of a broad-based user community.There is also an opportunity for the United States to lead ¶ an international effort that takes the many existing collaboration structures—such as the Global ¶ Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS) and the Global Climate Observation System ¶ (GCOS)—and operationalizes them. The Global Framework for Climate Services being advocated ¶ by the World Meteorological Organization could provide the platform to make climate data more ¶ accessible to policymakers.¶ The United States is the nation that is most active in space and the nation with the greatest ¶ need to demonstrate responsible leadership. A willingness to cooperate and share will help build ¶ America’s global influence. Operationalizing science to manage climate change, building the ¶ capacity to acquire the needed information and share it with a wide range of users, and bolstering ¶ these capabilities at the international level as a part of a productive engagement strategy in what ¶ has so far been a contentious road to international agreement should all be goals for the United ¶ States both to address climate change, contribute to solving a global problem, and rebuild U.S. ¶ leadership. To this end, our recommendations are as follows:¶ The U.S. approach to climate change policy should be shaped by the need to inform decisionmakers and planners in both government and the private sector by providing understandable ¶ metrics and analyses of the effectiveness of and compliance with mitigation programs and ¶ adaption plans. The customers for this should include federal agencies, state and local governments, private sector users, and other nations. ¶ ■ To better serve the national interest, the United States should increase its Earth observation ¶ capabilities—especially space-based sensors for carbon monitoring—to improve our ability to ¶ understand the carbon cycle and to inform any future international agreement. This means that ¶ until these capabilities are adequate for monitoring climate change, investment in Earth observation satellites should take precedence over other space programs. Increased spending on ¶ Earth observation satellites specifically designed for climate change should be maintained until ¶ the current capability shortfall is eliminated. The United States should accelerate the creation of ¶ a National Climate Service to improve climate information management and decisionmaking. ¶ In a related effort, the United States should support the World Meteorological Organization in ¶ its efforts to create a World Climate Service for similar reasons.¶ ■ The United States should complement its national effort by supporting and expanding multilateral efforts to coordinate Earth observation for climate change, building on existing international efforts such as the GCOS. This could entail coordinated investment in space and ¶ subsidies for ground facilities in developing countries, recognizing that the United States, the ¶ European Union, Japan, and Canada will bear the largest share of the cost at this time.

Sattelite monitoring is key to climate leadership

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Climate change will have pervasive and unavoidable effects on economic and national security. ¶ Managing these consequences and mitigating them when possible are new and difficult tasks ¶ for governments. Progress in mitigating and adapting to climate change will require the world’s ¶ countries to agree to coordinate their actions. Reaching such agreement will be no easy task. That ¶ said, climate change offers a unique opportunity for the United States to engage other nations in ¶ pursuing common interests and addressing future challenges. Not only is the United States well ¶ positioned to lead on this issue because of its significant space and scientific capacity, it also faces ¶ global expectations that it should shoulder the leadership burden for climate change. A commitment to building the space and information infrastructure needed to manage climate change could ¶ demonstrate the U.S. leadership, based on competence and advancing the global good, that the ¶ world respects and admires.

# \*North Korea War\*

# 1NC/2AC

**Proliferation is key to solve North Korean nuclear war – deterrence and political leverage prevent use**

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Proliferation. (Mark, “North Korean Proliferation Challeges: The Role of the European Union,” June 2012, sipri.org/research/disarmament

Under what circumstances North Korea might use nuclear weapons is a matter of conjecture. Most analysts assume that North Korea would only do so as a last resort if the regime were on the verge of military defeat.15 Any North Korean use of nuclear weapons before then would surely bring retaliation that would ensure defeat if not annihilation. This analysis is consistent with North Korea’s insistence that its nuclear weapons are for deterrence and state survival. 16 Apart from any future use, **North Korea’s nuclear weapons serve a political purpose**. In addition to their deterrence purpose, they are a way to bolster the regime’s status both internally and externally. In every other field of endeavour, North Korea is surpassed by South Korea by huge margins. Only in nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles does the North have the advantage. North Korea thus no longer refers to any possibility that it will barter away its nuclear arsenal. It insists it will give up nuclear weapons only if the American ‘nuclear threat is removed and South Korea is cleared of its nuclear umbrella’. 17 Whether or not a verification regime could be established that would convince North Korea that the USA really did remove all nuclear weapons from South Korea, **North Korea’s position in effect means it will keep nuclear weapons as long as the USA has them in its arsenal anywhere.** In the meantime, North Korea says it should be granted a status akin to the USA’s acceptance of India’s nuclear weapons.18 Given these positions and the recent history of broken agreements and failed negotiations, most outside analysts conclude that the military regime of North Korea will cling to its nuclear weapons to the end. They have become integral to North Korea’s sense of itself and are deemed as vital to ensuring the survival of the regime. 19 If North Korea ever was serious about using its nuclear assets as a bargaining chip for aid and diplomatic recognition, that is not the case today. To underscore its nuclear status, North Korea in April 2012 amended the preamble to its constitution to proclaim that Kim Jong-il had turned the nation into a ‘nuclear-armed state’. Concluding that North Korea is unlikely ever to give up its nuclear weapons does not mean concluding that negotiations are hopeless. While maintaining an end goal of North Korean denuclearization, its negotiating partners may be able to obtain secondary objectives in the nearer term. Worthy objectives include a suspension and rollback of the enrichment programme, a moratorium on testing and a ban on the transfer of nuclear weapons-related material and technology. A suspension of nuclear and missile tests is of particular value, in case further testing of both systems enables North Korea to mount a miniature nuclear warhead on its ballistic missiles. Concerned nations might also consider whether nuclear safety and security objectives might be worth pursuing with North Korea under certain conditions. If North Korea proceeds with constructing LWRs on its own, it could pose severe safety risks for neighbouring countries, risks underscored by the terrible accident at Fukushima in Japan.

**The impact is extinction.**

**Africa News ’99** (Pat Fungamwango, Times of Zambia, “Africa-at-Large; Third world war: Watch the Koreas”, 10-25)

If there is one place today where the much-dreaded Third World War could easily erupt and probably reduce earth to a huge smouldering cinder it is the Korean Peninsula in Far East Asia. Ever since the end of the savage three-year Korean war in the early 1950s, military tension between the hard-line communist north and the American backed South Korea has remained dangerously high. In fact the Koreas are technically still at war. A foreign visitor to either Pyongyong in the North or Seoul in South Korea will quickly notice that the divided country is always on maximum alert for any eventuality. North Korea or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has never forgiven the US for coming to the aid of South Korea during the Korean war. She still regards the US as an occupation force in South Korea and wholly to blame for the non-reunification of the country. North Korean media constantly churns out a tirade of attacks on "imperialist" America and its "running dog" South Korea. The DPRK is one of the most secretive countries in the world where a visitor is given the impression that the people's hatred for the US is absolute while the love for their government is total. Whether this is really so, it is extremely difficult to conclude. In the DPRK, a visitor is never given a chance to speak to ordinary Koreans about the politics of their country. No visitor moves around alone without government escort. The American government argues that its presence in South Korea was because of the constant danger of an invasion from the north. America has vast economic interests in South Korea. She points out that the north has dug numerous tunnels along the demilitarised zone as part of the invasion plans. She also accuses the north of violating South Korean territorial waters. Early this year, a small North Korean submarine was caught in South Korean waters after getting entangled in fishing nets. Both the Americans and South Koreans claim the submarine was on a military spying mission. However, the intension of the alleged intrusion will probably never be known because the craft's crew were all found with fatal gunshot wounds to their heads in what has been described as suicide pact to hide the truth of the mission. The US mistrust of the north's intentions is so deep that it is no secret that today Washington has the largest concentration of soldiers and weaponry of all descriptions in south Korea than anywhere else in the World, apart from America itself.

# \*Iran Prolif Good\*

# 1NC/2AC

**Iran proliferation stabilizes regional deterrence – key to check Israel.**

**Waltz 12** – Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Columbia University (Kenneth N., Foreign Affairs: “Why Iran Should get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability”, page 3, July-August 2012)//AB

**The third possible outcome of the standoff is that Iran continues its current course and publicly goes nuclear by testing a weapon. U.S. and Israeli officials have declared that outcome unacceptable, arguing that a nuclear Iran is a uniquely terrifying prospect, even an existential threat. Such language is typical of major powers, which have historically gotten riled up whenever another country has begun to develop a nuclear weapon of its own. Yet so far,** every time another country has **managed to** shoulder its way into the nuclear club, **the other** members have always **changed tack and** decided to live with it. **In fact,** by reducing imbalances in military power, new nuclear states generally produce more regional and international stability, **not less.** Israel’s regional nuclear monopoly**, which has proved remarkably durable for the past four decades,** has long fueled instability in the Middle East**. In no other region of the world does a lone, unchecked nuclear state exist. It is Israel’s nuclear arsenal, not Iran’s desire for one, that has contributed most to the current crisis. Power, after all, begs to be balanced. What is surprising about the Israeli case is that it has taken so long for a potential balancer to emerge. Of course, it is easy to understand why Israel wants to remain the sole nuclear power in the region and why it is willing to use force to secure that status. In 1981, Israel bombed Iraq to prevent a challenge to its nuclear monopoly. It did the same to Syria in 2007 and is now considering similar action against Iran. But the very acts that have allowed Israel to maintain its nuclear edge in the short term have prolonged an imbalance that is unsustainable in the long term. Israel’s proven ability to strike potential nuclear rivals with impunity has inevitably made its enemies anxious to develop the means to prevent Israel from doing so again. In this way, the** current tensions are best viewed **not as the early stages of a relatively recent Iranian nuclear crisis but rather** asthe final stages of a decades-long Middle East nuclear crisis that will end only when a balance of military power is restored.

**Extinction**

Hirsch 5 - Professor @ UC San Diego (Jorge, “Can a nuclear strike on Iran be averted,” November 21st, EMM - BRW)

The Bush administration has put together all the elements it needs to justify the impending military action against Iran. Unlike in the case of Iraq, it will happen without warning, and most of the justifications will be issued after the fact. We will wake up one day to learn that facilities in Iran have been bombed in a joint U.S.-Israeli attack. It may even take another couple of days for the revelation that some of the U.S. bombs were nuclear. Why a Nuclear Attack on Iran Is a Bad Idea Now that we have outlined what is very close to happening, let us discuss briefly why everything possible should be done to prevent it. In a worst-case scenario, the attack will cause a violent reaction from Iran. Millions of "human wave" Iranian militias will storm into Iraq, and just as Saddam stopped them with chemical weapons, the U.S. will stop them with nuclear weapons, resulting potentially in hundreds of thousands of casualties**.** The Middle East will explode, and popular uprisings in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries with pro-Western governments could be overtaken by radical regimes. Pakistan already has nuclear weapons, and a nuclear conflict could even lead to Russia's and Israel's involvement using nuclear weapons. In a best-case scenario, the U.S. will destroy all nuclear, chemical, and missile facilities in Iran with conventional and low-yield nuclear weapons in a lightning surprise attack, and Iran will be paralyzed and decide not to retaliate for fear of a vastly more devastating nuclear attack. In the short term, the U.S. will succeed, leaving no Iranian nuclear program, civilian or otherwise. Iran will no longer threaten Israel, a regime change will ensue, and a pro-Western government will emerge. However, even in the best-case scenario, the long-term consequences are dire. The nuclear threshold will have been crossed by a nuclear superpower against a non-nuclear country. Many more countries will rush to get their own nuclear weapons as a deterrent. With no taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, they will certainly be used again. Nuclear conflicts will occur within the next 10 to 20 years, and will escalate until much of the world is destroyed. Let us remember that the destructive power of existing nuclear arsenals is approximately one million times that of the Hiroshima bomb, enough to erase Earth's population many times over.

# Ex: Solves Regional Stability

**Key to deterrence and regional stability.**

**Waltz 12 –** Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Columbia University (Kenneth N., Foreign Affairs: “Why Iran Should get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability”, page 5, July-August 2012)//AB

**In 1991, the historical rivals India and Pakistan signed a treaty agreeing not to target each other’s nuclear facilities. They realized that far more worrisome than their adversary’s nuclear deterrent was the instability produced by challenges to it. Since then, even in the face of high tensions and risky provocations, the two countries have kept the peace. Israel and Iran would do well to consider this precedent.** If Iran goes nuclear, Israel and Iran will deter each other, as nuclear powers always have**. There has never been a full-scale war between two nuclear-arms states.** Once Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, deterrence will apply**, even if the Iranian arsenal is relatively small.** No other country in the region will have an incentive to acquire its own nuclear capability**,** and the current crisis will finally dissipate**, leading to a** Middle East that is more stable **than it is today. For that reason, the United States and its allies need not take such pains to prevent the Iranians from developing a nuclear weapon. Diplomacy between Iran and the major powers should continue, because open lines of communication will make the Western countries feel better able to live with a nuclear Iran. But the current sanctions on Iran can be dropped: they primarily harm ordinary Iranians, with little purpose. Most important, policymakers and citizens in the Arab world, Europe, Israel, and the United States should take comfort from the fact that history has shown that** where nuclear capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability. When it comes to nuclear weapons, now as ever, more may be better.

**Iranian proliferation reinforces stability**

**Krepinevich et al 11** – President of Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and Contributor to Foreign Affairs (Andrew, “The War Over Containing Iran”, March/April 2011; < http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67474/dima-adamsky-karim-sadjadpour-and-diane-de-gramont-shahram-chubi/the-war-over-containing-iran>)//AB

The proponents of the first school -- those who subscribe to the Cold War notion of mutual assured destruction (MAD) -- would reconcile themselves to the new strategic environment. For political and operational reasons, the MAD school would consider military action against Iran ineffective and impossible after Iran's nuclearization. Assuming that **Iranian leaders are radical but reasonable**, MAD proponents would rely on Israel's ability to influence Iran's cost-benefit considerations. They would assume that **nuclearization reduced Iran's sense of vulnerability,** thus **enabling** more **constructive dialogue and a higher degree of stability** despite significant differences in strategic cultures and ideologies. They are likely to approximate the Iranian nuclear mentality to the Soviet one. Determined to construct a "balance of terror" model, the MAD school would favor termination of Israel's nuclear ambiguity policy. To them, revealing Israel's nuclear capabilities, outlining its nuclear posture, and communicating redlines and the prices for crossing them would to a certain extent bolster the credibility of Israeli deterrence

# Ex: Prolif Slow (Iran Specific)

**Prolif is slow.**

**Kahl 12** – Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Senior Fellow at Center for a New American Security; former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East (Colin H., “Not Time to Attack Iran”, March/April 2012; < [http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137031/colin-h-kahl/not-time-to-attack-iran>)//AB](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137031/colin-h-kahl/not-time-to-attack-iran%3e)//AB)

In arguing for a six-month horizon, Kroenig also misleadingly conflates hypothetical timelines to produce weapons-grade uranium with the time actually required to construct a bomb. According to 2010 Senate testimony by James Cartwright, then vice chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and recent statements by the former heads of Israel's national intelligence and defense intelligence agencies, **even if Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a bomb in six months, it would take it at least a year to produce a testable nuclear device and considerably longer to make a deliverable weapon**. And David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security (and the source of Kroenig's six-month estimate), recently told Agence France-Presse that there is a "low probability" that the Iranians would actually develop a bomb over the next year even if they had the capability to do so. Because there is no evidence that Iran has built additional covert enrichment plants since the Natanz and Qom sites were outed in 2002 and 2009, respectively, any near-term move by Tehran to produce weapons-grade uranium would have to rely on its declared facilities. The IAEA would thus detect such activity with sufficient time for the international community to mount a forceful response. As a result, the Iranians are unlikely to commit to building nuclear weapons until they can do so much more quickly or out of sight, which could be years off.

**Even if Iran does prolif the reactions will be slow and contained**

**Tepperman 09** (Jonathan, Newsweek International Deputy Editor, Former Deputy Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs magazine and wrote frequently on international affairs, politics, and books LL.M. in International Law from NYU, a member of the New York State bar and a Fellow of the New York Institute of Humanities.. Aug 28, 2009 “Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb” http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248/page/1)kyan

The risk of an arms race—with, say, other Persian Gulf states rushing to build a bomb after Iran got one—is a bit harder to dispel. Once again, however, history is instructive. "In 64 years, the most nuclear-weapons states we've ever had is 12," says Waltz. "Now with North Korea we're at nine. That's not proliferation; that's spread at glacial pace." Nuclear weapons are so controversial and expensive that only countries that deem them absolutely critical to their survival go through the extreme trouble of acquiring them. That's why South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan voluntarily gave theirs up in the early '90s, and why other countries like Brazil and Argentina dropped nascent programs. This doesn't guarantee that one or more of Iran's neighbors—Egypt or Saudi Arabia, say—might not still go for the bomb if Iran manages to build one. But the risks of a rapid spread are low, especially given Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent suggestion that the United States would extend a nuclear umbrella over the region, as Washington has over South Korea and Japan, if Iran does complete a bomb. If one or two Gulf states nonetheless decided to pursue their own weapon, that still might not be so disastrous, given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior.

**Middle East proliferation would be slow – tech, autocracy, and Islam make nuclear use and arms race unlikely**

**Procida, 09 –** National Intelligence Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (Frank, “Overblown: Why an Iranian Nuclear Bomb Is Not the End of the World,” Foreign Affairs Magazine, June 09, 2009) // JH

Since the advent of the nuclear age, scientists, activists, academics, and politicians have feared that the spread of atomic weapons would prove unstoppable. The rhetoric one hears today regarding the probable reaction of Middle Eastern countries to a nuclear Iran echoes concerns put forth by experts when the Soviet Union, China, and even France got the bomb. Yet the **worst-case scenarios rarely came to pass — Germany and Japan, for instance, remained nonnuclear despite expectations — and there is no reason to suspect that the Middle East will buck this historical trend**.¶ Analysts are particularly concerned about the reactions of countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia to an Iranian nuclear program. What they seem to forget is that **the Arab world already has been living with a nuclear neighbor, Israel — a state against which many Arab countries have fought wars and still do not recognize.** Still, the Arab world has been unable or unwilling to respond in kind. **An Iranian nuclear capability would not threaten these states more, or even as much as, an Israeli weapon**. And in terms of prestige and influence, a Persian bomb should not be any more significant to these states than a Jewish one.¶ Furthermore, **developing a nuclear weapon is not as simple as flipping a switch. Libya spent close to two decades trying to acquire a nuclear weapon before giving up its program in 2003. Technology has never been the region’s strong suit**, and even with A. Q. Khan-supplied centrifuge drawings readily available, **it would be foolish to expect a rash of nuclear successes in the near future**.¶ Fears that Iran actually plans to use nuclear weapons in an attempt to spread its Islamic revolution or to support fellow Muslims in Palestine are also exaggerated. Iran’**s governing elite is just as preoccupied with self-preservation as any other regime. Leaders in Tehran understand that Israel would react to a nuclear attack — or the genuine threat of one — with devastating force**. By most media accounts, Israel has upward of 200 nuclear weapons deployable via aircraft, ballistic missiles, and submarine, ensuring it the ability to respond quickly and decisively to any Iranian provocation. **A credible threat to use a nuclear bomb would mean the end of a theocratically ruled Iran because of Israel’s formidable preemptive capability**.¶ Ahmadinejad’s hyperbole aside, Iran’s actions in the past and recent public commentary by its clerics suggest that Iran would not risk facing such a devastating response. Iran’s foreign policy has been fairly risk-averse since the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989. Khomeini’s successor as supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, peppers his speeches with the usual condemnation of the United States and Israel, but he has also stressed that “**Islam condemns the massacre of defenseless people, whether Muslim or Christian or others, anywhere and by any means.”** It might be safe to conclude that he is less concerned with the fate of the “others,” but it is, of course, a fact that a nuclear attack against Israel would kill thousands, if not tens of thousands, of Muslims.¶ **The prospect of Iran deciding to give Hezbollah nuclear material is extremely remote, as it is hard to think of a scenario in which Iran would benefit from a terrorist client possessing a bomb.** Unlike Hezbollah’s Katyusha rockets, nuclear weapons are not malfunctioning devices that travel less than ten miles and rarely kill anyone. Israel would certainly know where to retaliate if Hezbollah brandished a nuclear weapon, and Tehran would be reckless to cede control of such a prized asset to an ally such as Hezbollah, thereby tying its own fate to that group’s decision-making.

# Ex: Solves Laundry List

**Iranian proliferation solves Chinese and Indian oil security, Russian economic diversification, Israeli strikes, and terrorism – no risk of an arms race**

**Romulous, 9** – Freelance writer for Asia Times (Aetius, “The benefits of a nuclear Iran,” Asia Times, November 18, 2009) // JH

**Iran could be building "the bomb".** Iran would then be the second power in the region to possess the bomb, and would certainly be the first of what will soon be a rapid escalation of regional states with the wealth and wherewithal to acquire the bomb. In addition, this proliferation of bomb-owning states is a function of economics, and as such, is inevitable, its containment improbable by any rational measure. ¶ Finally, **the "bomb" itself is nothing more than a bargaining chip¶ among established bomb-owning states to advance their own self interests- all hinging around ... oil**. **Pakistan has a lot of nuclear bombs, and is one of the most unstable nation-states in the world**. It has the bomb because its hated rival India has its own set of bombs. **Israel has a whack of over 200 bombs, none of which are regulated in any way by anybody.** It's a secret. Americans have the bomb. American has thousands of bombs, is the only nation to have ever used the bomb, and currently has a collection of the best of them scattered in and around their vassal state, Iraq. **There are lots of bombs in the Middle East**, their plurality irrelevant where the simple act of just firing a single one can and will do the job of melting down the Western world. ¶ **All the bombs that do exist in the Middle East** - or anywhere else there is land, sea, or space above - **are in the possession of well advanced technological states with the enormous amounts of wealth needed to design, build, and maintain a weapon of unimaginable cost.** Except Pakistan and North Korea, who simply stole their way in through the back door, and are the most poorly dressed members at the party. As it is the nature of our global economic system that wealth is power, and growth means wealth, the onward march of progress will bring more and more emerging nations into a position where they too can have the bomb. ¶ We have the first Muslim bomb in Pakistan, the first Jewish bomb in Israel, and we could soon have the first Persian bomb. We need an Arab bomb now, one would guess, to complete the set. **Turkey will need the bomb, and will soon be able to afford one**. That would be an unbroken chain of bomb-wielding states stretching from the Taiwan Strait to the Suez Canal, covering every major religion, culture, and form of politics. A veritable bomb "beltway" if you will. Poor Africa, no bomb for you. ¶ So, **there are lots of bombs in the most unstable region of the world, and there are destined to be more**. Iran could be one of them. Given the bigger picture, why does that matter? If Iran had the bomb - so what? In fact, Iran without a bomb makes the place just a smidgen less stable than Iran with the bomb, and a smidgen in the nuclear age is a lot. ¶ If nations feel compelled to carve gargantuan amounts of productivity out of their people for bombs, it is because of the lessons learned as worthless peons in the golden age of the Cold War. Money talks, and money is best represented by the bomb. Like feathered plumage, a radiating display of nuclear quills signals to everybody that there will be consequences to their most impolite actions. Far from being an offensive doomsday machine, **the lesson of the Cold War is that the bomb is a superb defensive weapon**. Fraught with the fear and danger of unknown futures, a parked nuclear warhead is a menacing threat. Once fired, it is useless, spent on well understood, mutual, and arithmetically assured destruction. ¶ To be effective, that parked nuke must have a threat of equal veracity to threaten it. Every nuke needs an enemy. The failure to provide a compensating catastrophic consequence for the use of a bomb makes it perfectly rational to use one. **Want to add stability to the world? Give Iran the bomb**. Just give them a bunch. That takes not just those, but all regional bombs off the table, turning a parcel of offensive weapons into a bushel of defensive ones. ¶ It's called "Game Theory", and is an essential component to every bomb-owner's manual. A perfectly rational series of mathematical equations that have ruled the atomic age since physicists played poker. A systems analysis of the range of decisions a bomb owner must make to maximize his position without breaking 21. Game Theory predicts that nuclear superiority rests on what the other guy is thinking about you. It insists that both parties must have a credible threat, each threat with consequences that each player feels is not in his long term interests. Mutually assured destruction rests on the balance and parity of each side's threat. **Without that parity, imbalance makes the use of a nuke almost certain in circumstances where parity would otherwise prevail.** ¶ This was, and is an American doctrine. However, **it has come to develop into the basic architecture of deterrence in the nuclear age**. When Americans struggle to insist that a nuclear Iran is bad for everybody, they understand perfectly the irrationality of the condemnation. Americans warn that an Iran with the bomb would use it on Israel, and is the sole reason Iran is possibly pursuing one at all. Israel argues it must stop Iran as it is an "existential" threat to their existence, and thus, an Iranian bomb the very end of that existence. ¶ Both know otherwise of course. Both know that should the Iranians get the bomb, **they will not fire the one or two they have at Israel and the United States. That action has virtually no offsetting effect on their enemies to ever come close to the punishment they would suffer in return for the decision**. They won't make that call, which explains why **they have not invaded another country for 600 years** and have a civilization that stretches back thousands. They are not a stupid people. ¶ So what's all the fuss about? ¶ Iran has oil. I**ran is the world's fourth-largest crude exporter**, a card carrying charter member of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries that pumps in excess of two-and-a-half million barrels a day of clean, inexpensive black goo. Iran's reserves of clean crude are the third-largest in the world. **Iran also controls the Strait of Hormuz, through which 40% of the Western world's oil flows**, and is a long fly ball from Saudi Arabia's biggest oil export hub at Ras Tanura. ¶ Iran is wealthy enough to build a bomb because Iran has oil. Iran is a threat to the West's oil supply, as well as the Arab players who are traditional enemies of the Persians. Iran is also across the street from Iraq and thus, in America's backyard. Israel is in Iran's front yard, the home of 5,000 years of history between Persians and Jews. ¶ **Iran sits atop a veritable sea of the world's most precious strategic commodity, and is surrounded by well-intentioned Western interests aligned with its enemies, all of whom possess the bomb**. So Iran wants a bomb. No kidding. ¶ **Iran sells 16% of its oil exports to China**, about 411 million barrels a day and rising, **and is China's second-largest source of crude after Saudi Arabia.** **China needs oil in quantities never before imagined to fuel its growth, and is scouring the world for wall flowers untouched by political ideology**. China is buying up Africa under the noses of the squabbling Cold War warriors, and has no dog in the ancient races of the Middle East. It needs oil and that's all, and it has invested over $100 billion in Iran to prove it. ¶ China considers Iran a new friend in a formerly insular world. And a friend in need is a friend indeed. China has its own regional threats, and one of them is India, another of those traditional enemy types that drive Western sensibilities nuts. A China-friendly, oil-soaked Iran is a wonderful way to influence India from another direction. China, of course, has the bomb. ¶ India has the bomb as well, but is also one of the world's other great centers of progress**. India needs as much oil as China for all the same reasons, and imports almost as much as China from Iran**. A full third of Iran's oil exports go to the super developing economies of China and India. In addition, Iran imports back a great deal of its oil exports to India in the form of refined gasoline, making it the perfect stratified business model, and stupid profitable for all concerned. **For both China and India, an Iranian bomb would mean security for their oil resources and investments. Without one, each would have to make decisions about threats to their oil supplies** - as they do now. It also helps to have a well-defended oil head that is willing to defend their price point interests as well. Having access to oil is one thing, being able to pay for it is another. ¶ Russia does not want Iran to have the bomb. Russia is in the enviable position of being a world leader in both the bomb and oil. They have loads of each. By supplying Iran with technological¶ support for their "civilian" nuclear program, the Russians are taking care of business on several different fronts. **If a bomb were built in Iran, it would cause instability in the short run, and that would help support the oil prices Russia needs to maintain its own progressive economic agenda. Furthermore, Russia can mitigate the speed and scope of Iranian nuclear development,** a fact not unknown to American statesmen. ¶ For Russia, the Iranian bomb thingy is a perfect bargaining chip for use in extracting both geographic security and open markets from the Americans. If the Iranians are going to develop a bomb, they figure, it might as well be with them. It's good business and it extends Russian influence into the Middle East through the regions latest hegemon. ¶ Russia shares nuclear proliferation concerns with America, however. It is absolutely essential that the former Cold War enemies contain the spread of bomb-equipped nations. Each is facing crippling expense in building and maintaining vast, unnecessary nuclear arsenals. Game Theory demanded an ever-increasing build up in arms to maintain the deterrent value and effect. ¶ The point at which theory left and insanity stepped in is hard to discern, however contemporary leaders in both America and Russia are learning that as long as each reduces arms at a rate that does not disturb the equilibrium, both can save a bunch of time, trouble and money. The increase in nuclear states threatens to keep this threat floor artificially high, and eat into projected billions of dollars saved. ¶ It would be tough to decide who needs oil more, America or China. Each is approaching the issue from different directions. China is quietly using its Goliath state industries to buy up the resources of the Earth necessary to power its future. It can do this because capitalism is becoming no match for state-controlled resource acquisition. At the same time, America has been foiled in its attempt to use its super power status and invincible military machine to project influence over the most important sources of ready oil in the world. ¶ Addicted to oil, America depends solely on the strength of free markets now to keep a tenuous grip on its future supply. America needs not just oil, however, but politically predictable prices for oil to defend its economy and the US dollar that the economy supports. ¶ America has an arsenal of bomb and bomb-like technology that has become so large it has made its investment pointless. Even an untoward glance towards the button, and an economic thermal nuclear explosion would blow through every household in America. $7.00 a gallon gasoline. War-making in America is approaching a trillion dollars a year and it has done nothing to protect America's most strategic asset, the oil it needs but doesn't have. ¶ America is also friends with both the Saudis and the Israelis, each of whom are sworn enemies of each other. America exchanges military hardware and their nuclear umbrella over the Saudis in exchange for oil, unfettered access to history's most epic sinkhole of energy, and simply scads of money. The Saudis need this protection from its neighbors, the late, great Saddam Hussein and his heretical secularist Islamic state, and the dreaded Persians. The shield is useless against a bomb-laden Israel though. ¶ Israel is justifiably nervous about the geographic reality the British left them in 1948. Israel imports absolutely everything of value, oil included. It also sits atop the most irrationally contested real estate in all of human civilization. Attacking threats without the bomb mercilessly has proven to be well worth the penalties on every occasion. That is because the penalty for attacking an existential threat that can unleash holy hell on its principal ally is several orders of magnitude greater. An Iranian nuclear response to an aggressive Israel would have ramifications that no theory of games could ever envision. Absolutely no one is in a position to imagine what may come next. ¶ What would China do about its investment in Iran? India? How would Pakistan react to India? What would the Russians do - sit back and watch the show, the price of their massive oil supplies rocketing skyward? What on earth would the Americans do? Who can tell and what's more, who wants to find out? Nobody. ¶ America should simply give Iran the bomb. That is the rational solution to the problem. Iran could most possibly get one regardless, and if it does it would lean on Russia for support. **A nuclear Iran would restore parity to the insanity of nuclear gamesmanship, and provide everybody with the same rational consequence to its foreign policy decisions.** Being supported by America, **an Iranian nuclear program would be inoculated against a very real and probable Israeli threat.** **Iran would have no further use for its traditional tools of regional power like Hezbollah in Lebanon**. This also guarantees China and India oil security, and checks the expansion of Russian influence over Iran which, incidentally, sits between Iraq and Afghanistan. America exchanges arms for oil market stability, and everybody wins.

# AT: Irrational

**All rhetoric – Iran is run by rational policymakers who won’t use the bomb.**

**Waltz 12** – Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Columbia University (Kenneth N., Foreign Affairs: “Why Iran Should get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability”, page 4, July-August 2012)//AB

One reason the danger of a nuclear Iran has been grossly exaggerated is that the debate surrounding it has been distorted by misplaced worries and fundamental misunderstandings of how states generally behave in the international system. The first prominent concern, which undergirds many others, is that the Iranian regime is innately irrational. Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, **Iranian policy is made not by “mad mullahs” but by perfectly sane ayatollahs who want to survive just like any other leaders**. Although Iran’s leaders indulge in inflammatory and hateful rhetoric, they show **no propensity for self-destruction.** It would be a grave error for policymakers in the United States and Israel to assume otherwise.

**Theories of Iran’s irrationality are based on flawed assumptions of Iranian foreign policy.**

**Debs and Monteiro 1/17** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale and Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University; Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University (Alexandre and Nuno, “The Flawed Logic of Striking Iran”, 1/17/12; < [http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137036/alexandre-debs-and-nuno-p-monteiro/the-flawed-logic-of-striking-iran>)//AB](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137036/alexandre-debs-and-nuno-p-monteiro/the-flawed-logic-of-striking-iran%3e)//AB)

Kroenig's view of the way Iranian leaders are willing to take on risks is deeply incongruous. In his view, a nuclear bomb will push Tehran to block U.S. initiatives in the Middle East, unleash conventional and terrorist aggression on U.S. forces and allies, and possibly engage in a nuclear exchange with Israel. This would mean Iranian leaders are reckless: given the United States' conventional and nuclear superiority, any of these actions would provoke considerable retaliation from Washington. And, of course, a nuclear exchange with Israel would invite annihilation. At the same time, Kroenig suggests that Tehran would remain remarkably timid after a preventive strike from the United States. Presented with clear redlines, Iran would not retaliate against U.S. troops and allies or attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz. Kroenig's inconsistency is clear: **If Iranian leaders are as reckless as he seems to believe, a preventive strike would likely escalate to a full-blown war. If they are not, then there is no reason to think that a nuclear Iran would be uncontainable**. In short, a preventive attack on Iran can hardly be both limited and necessary.

**Iran is rational in their attempts to acquire nuclear weapons.**

**Mullen 9** [Political theorist from UW-Milwaukee, Rene, “Nuclear Weapon Proliferation as a Rational Choice”, Sep 30, 2009, <http://voices.yahoo.com/nuclear-weapon-proliferation-as-rational-choice-4536211.html?cat=37>, Accessed July 17, 2012]//PJT

Recently, **Iran** tested 2 short range missiles and is said by the US and British intelligence to be **continuing to work on its nuclear program**. **Similarly**, as early as May, **North Korea** held similar missile tests. However, most commentary that discuss developing **world leaders** such as these, **discuss them in terms of being insane** or at the very least not acting rationally **when, truth is, they are acting very much in their interest**. Of course this stance requires explanation. First, **North Korea and Iran have little if any power in the international arena** (though Iran has regional power). **Having nuclear weapons give**s Kim Jong-il and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad the **power and influence** they desire **for their state.** **Nuclear weapons give these leaders the** only **leverage** their state could possibly muster over other states. And, with states that seek to both regain their place in the world and stop massive famine or leftist uprisings, they are positioning themselves quite well. I could have told you weeks before Kim Jong-il was going to test more nukes or that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was going to test missiles and is still working on a nuclear program. Why? Six party talks had halted with North Korea and oil prices are faltering again and news is focused on global economies, not on North Korea or Iran. Money is now being spent on local economies and protectionism, not North Korean or Iranian bribes. Those bribes were being used to not only feed Kim's personal wants, but also to feed people and keep his state from falling into absolute chaos. There is something else that most journalists, and most scholars too, miss. Saving face (or making sure you don't 'look' bad in the end). **In international diplomacy, not only the physical outcome matters but the psychological outcome also matters. If North Korea or Iran is going to lose a significant amount of face, the state is unlikely to bend to meet the demands or compromises of other states.** **Very few outcomes regarding** either state's **nuclear ambitions include saving face on the part of the two states.** Also, **being that nukes are North Korea and Iran's only source of leverage, they is not going to dismantle them completely**...ever. Unless they begin to have a vibrant economy (not for a long time) or they have something else the world wants. Some argue that by the world 'giving in' and providing incentives to drop nuclear ambitions, the world is somehow instigating further nuclear proliferation. To some twisted degree this is true. However, if the world decided to do nothing, these states would simply produce weapons and sell them off to other states. Weapons are a good source of income. North Korea's only real decent product is weaponry. Iran has oil, but that's relatively cheap right now. So, only one outcome is rational on the part of North Korea and Iran. Nuclear proliferation and long range weapon technology. So, Kim Jong Il and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are likely not crazy. **They are acting as rational as every other political leader in the world.** As soon as Western states learn that third world states are not acting irrational... the sooner we see less war. **Simply treat**ing **every political actor as a rational actor** changes the assumptions of the game, it changes the outcomes of the game.

**The Iranian government is rational- Israeli military chief agrees**

**New York Times 12-** [cites the Israeli military chief, “Israeli Army Chief Says He Believes Iran Won’t Build Bomb”, April 26, 2012,<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/26/world/middleeast/israeli-army-chief-says-he-believes-iran-wont-build-bomb.html>**,** Accessed July 18, 2012]//PJT

JERUSALEM — The **Israeli military chief described** the **Iranian government as “rational”** in interviews published Wednesday and said **he did not believe it would build a nuclear bomb**, appearing to put some distance between himself and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak. “I believe he would be making an enormous mistake, and I don’t think he will want to go the extra mile,” the chief of staff of the Israeli Defense Force, Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz, told the left-leaning newspaper Haaretz, referring to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. “I think **the Iranian leadership is composed of very rational people**,” General Gantz added. “But I agree that such a capability, in the hands of Islamic fundamentalists who at particular moments could make different calculations, is dangerous.” The question of whether the Iranians are rational has been a critical focus of international debate over how to handle Tehran’s nuclear program, which the government insists is for civilian purposes. Mr. Netanyahu has repeatedly invoked the Holocaust to describe Iranian nuclear capability as an existential threat to Israel, and he told CNN on Tuesday that he would not want to bet “the security of the world on Iran’s rational behavior,” according to The Associated Press. A “militant Islamic regime,” the A.P. quoted him as saying, “can put their ideology before their survival.” In a Holocaust Remembrance Day speech last week, Mr. Netanyahu warned ominously that Iran was “feverishly working to develop atomic weapons,” and he told CNN on Tuesday that “the centrifuges are spinning.” General Gantz, a former paratrooper who took the helm of the military last year, rarely gives lengthy public statements like the ones published here on Israel’s Memorial Day, a traditional period of national self-reflection. Several analysts saw his comments as more in line with the views of Israel’s military and intelligence establishment, including the former Mossad chief Meir Dagan, than with the harder line taken by the government. They were also seen as parallel to the position of his United States counterpart, Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “What he said,” said George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in an Associated Press article, is **“consistent with the views of the U.S. military leadership, the U.S. intelligence community.** What’s interesting is why he said it out loud.” Meir Javedanfar, an Iranian-Israeli expert who lives in Tel Aviv, told The Guardian newspaper that Mr. Gantz’s comments were “a welcome development” that “**takes the hysterics out of Israel’s public assessment of the Iranian nuclear program**.”

**Iranian Nukes are not that bad**

**Mueller 10** [John, Department of Political Science @ OSU, “Nuclear Weapons”, Foreign Policy Jan/Feb 2010, Proquest, Accessed July 18, 2012]//PJT

**"Iranian and North Korean Nukes Are Intolerable." Not unless we overreact**. **North Korea** has been questing after **nuclear** capability for decades and has now managed to conduct a couple of nuclear **tests** that **seem to** have **be**en mere **fizzles**. **It** has also **launched a few missiles that have hit their presumed target, the Pacific Ocean, with deadly accuracy**. It could do far more damage in the area with its artillery. **If the Iranians do break their solemn pledge not to develop nuclear weapons** (perhaps in the event of an Israeli or U.S. airstrike on their facilities), **they will** surely **find**, like all other countries in our nuclear era, **that** the **development has been a waste of time** (it took Pakistan 28 years) and effort (is Pakistan, with its enduring paranoia about India and a growing jihadi threat, any safer today?). Moreover, **Iran will most likely "use" any nuclear capability in the same way all other nuclear states have: for prestige** (or ego-stoking) **and deterrence**. Indeed, as strategist and Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling suggests, **deterrence is about the only value the weapons might have for Ira**n. Such devices, he points out, "should be **too precious to give away or to sell" and "too precious to 'waste' killing people" when they could make other countries "hesitant to consider military action."** If a nuclear Iran brandishes its weapons to intimidate others or get its way, it will likely find that those threatened, rather than capitulating or rushing off to build a compensating arsenal, will ally with others (including conceivably Israel) to stand up to toe intimidation. **The popular notion that nuclear weapons furnish a country with the ability to "dominate" its area has little or no historical support**- in the main, **nuclear threats over the last 60 years have either been ignored or met with countervailing opposition, not with timorous acquiescence.** It was conventional military might- grunts and tanks, not nukes- that earned the United States and the Soviet Union their respective spheres of influence during the Cold War. In his 2008 campaign, Obama pointedly pledged that, as president, he would "do everything in my power to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon ... everything." Let us hope not: **The anti-proliferation sanctions imposed on Iraq in the 1990s probably led to more deaths than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the same can be said for the** ongoing **war in Iraq, sold as an effort to root out Saddam Hussein's nukes**. There is nothing inherently wrong with making nonproliferation a high priority, so long as it is topped with a somewhat higher one: avoiding policies that can lead to the deaths of tens or hundreds of thousands of people under the obsessive sway of worst-case-scenario fantasies. Obama has achieved much in his first year as president on foreign policy through toning down rhetoric, encouraging openness toward international consultation and cooperation, and helping revise America's image as a threatening and arrogant loose cannon. That's certainly something to build on in year two. The forging of nuclear arms reduction agreements, particularly with the Russians, could continue the process. Although these are mostly feel-good efforts that might actually hamper the natural pace of nuclear-arms reductions, there is something to be said for feeling good. Reducing weapons that have little or no value may not be terribly substantive, but it is one of those nice gestures that can have positive atmospheric consequences- and one that can appear to justify certain Nobel awards. The confrontations with Iran and North Korea over their prospective or actual nukes are more problematic. Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have already contributed big time to the hysteria that has become common coin within the foreign-policy establishment on this issue. It is fine to apply diplomacy and bribery in an effort to dissuade those countries from pursuing nuclear weapons programs: We'd be doing them a favor, in fact. But, though it may be heresy to say so, the world can live with a nuclear Iran or North Korea, as it has lived now for 45 years with a nuclear China, a country once viewed as the ultimate rogue. If push eventually comes to shove In these areas, the solution will be a familiar one: to establish orderly deterrent and containment strategies and avoid the temptation to lash out mindlessly at phantom threats.

**It’s a giant bluff. Iran didn’t close the Strait of Hormuz – they won’t use the bomb.**

**Waltz 12** – Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Columbia University (Kenneth N., Foreign Affairs: “Why Iran Should get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability”, page 4, July-August 2012)//AB

Although it is impossible to be certain of Iranian intentions, it is far more likely that **if Iran desires nuclear weapons**, it is for the purpose of **providing for its own security**, **not** to improve its **offensive capabilities** (or destroy itself). Iran may be intransigent at the negotiating table and defiant in the face of sanctions, but it still acts to secure its own preservation. Iran’s leaders **did not**, for example, attempt to **close the Strait of Hormuz** despite issuing blustery warnings that they might do so after the EU announced its planned oil embargo in January. The **Iranian regime clearly concluded that it did not want to provoke** what would surely have been a swift and devastating **American response** to such a move.

**Will behave rationally - deterrence.**

**Debs and Monteiro 1/17** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale and Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University; Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University (Alexandre and Nuno, “The Flawed Logic of Striking Iran”, 1/17/12; < [http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137036/alexandre-debs-and-nuno-p-monteiro/the-flawed-logic-of-striking-iran>)//AB](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137036/alexandre-debs-and-nuno-p-monteiro/the-flawed-logic-of-striking-iran%3e)//AB)

Kroenig misreads history again when he considers a nuclear exchange between Iran and Israel. In his view, they "lack nearly all the safeguards that helped the United States and the Soviet Union avoid a nuclear exchange during the Cold War." Yet the United States and the Soviet Union avoided a nuclear exchange even during the hottest crisis of the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, at a moment in which Soviet retaliatory capability was still uncertain, there were no clear direct communication channels between the two leaderships, and Soviet experience managing their nuclear arsenal was no longer than five years. **Moreover, the historical record shows that even young and unstable nuclear powers have avoided nuclear escalation despite acute crises.** Pakistan and India avoided nuclear war in Kargil in 1999, as well as after the terrorist attacks targeting the Indian parliament in 2001 and Mumbai in 2008. When national survival is at stake, even opaque and supposedly "irrational" regimes with nuclear weapons have historically behaved in prudent ways.

# AT: Heg Solves !

**Iran prolif proves – US influence in the region declining now.**

**Krepinevich et al 11** – President of Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and Contributor to Foreign Affairs (Andrew, “The War Over Containing Iran”, March/April 2011; < http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67474/dima-adamsky-karim-sadjadpour-and-diane-de-gramont-shahram-chubi/the-war-over-containing-iran>)//AB

Many in the Israeli defense establishment would perceive **Iran's nuclearization as evidence of the United States' diminishing ability to resolve global and regional security issues**. In keeping with its basic instinct to remain under reliable great-power protection, Israel might abandon its exclusive reliance on the United States and focus more on strategic hedging. Although its preference for U.S. support would remain, Israel might be less inclined to follow directives from Washington.

# AT: Terrorism

**Iran won’t hand the bomb off to terrorists.**

**Waltz 12** – Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Columbia University (Kenneth N., Foreign Affairs: “Why Iran Should get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability”, page 4-5, July-August 2012)//AB

Nevertheless, even some observers and policymakers who accept that the Iranian regime is rational still worry that a nuclear weapon would embolden it, providing Tehran with a shield that would allow it to act more aggressively and increase its support for terrorism. Some analysts even fear **that Iran** would directly **provide terrorists with nuclear arms**. The problem with these concerns is that they **contradict the record of every other nuclear weapons state going as far back to 1945**. History shows that **when countries acquire the bomb**, **they feel** increasingly **vulnerable** and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them a potential target in the eyes of major powers. **This awareness discourages** nuclear states from bold and **aggressive action**. Maoist China, for example, became much less bellicose after acquiring nuclear weapons in 1964, and India and Pakistan have both become more cautious since going nuclear. There is little reason to believe that Iran would break this mold. As for the risk of a handoff **to terrorists, no country could transfer nuclear weapons without** running a high risk of **being found out**. U.S. surveillance capabilities would pose a serious obstacle, as would the United States’ impressive and growing ability to identify the source of fissile material. Moreover, **countries can never** entirely **control** **or** even **predict** the behavior of the **terrorist groups they sponsor**. Once a country such as Iran acquires a nuclear capability, it will have every reason to maintain full control over its arsenal. After all, building a bomb is costly and dangerous. It would make little sense to transfer the product of that investment to parties that cannot be trusted or managed.

**Iranian nuclear weapons limit action to support terrorists and stabilize the region**

**Procida, 09 –** National Intelligence Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (Frank, “Overblown: Why an Iranian Nuclear Bomb Is Not the End of the World,” Foreign Affairs Magazine, June 09, 2009) // JH

In fact, **once Iran is known to have the bomb, it would become imperative for the regime to avoid actions that could lead to escalation**. If anything, Iran might find that possession of a nuclear weapon actually diminishes its options in the Middle East and forces it to act with greater restraint. **Actions against superior powers that in the past might have been viewed as simple irritants — such as assenting to Katyusha launches against Israel and providing rudimentary explosives to groups challenging U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan — suddenly would seem, even with a limited nuclear capability, far more ominous and almost invite an overwhelming response**.¶ This, then, begs the question: If Iran does not plan on using a nuclear weapon, if the regime would never give a bomb to a terrorist group, and if a nuclear capability would not provide Iran cover to pursue its interests more aggressively, why are the mullahs challenging the West and enduring sanctions in order to acquire one?¶ **Iran might feel that a nuclear weapon**, with all of its inherent risk, **would at least rule out any serious talk of regime change**. Certain hard-line elements within Iran may view a small weapons capability necessary to prevent Washington from considering any operation designed to topple the regime. That said, **it is not entirely clear that the regime is seeking an actual weapon. Enriching uranium** to fuel nuclear power plants that do not yet exist **might not make sense economically or otherwise, but that has never stopped seemingly rational countries from making similar decisions in the past**. Moreover, Iran might be content to stop short of producing an actual weapon and settle for a latent capability. **The regime may believe the ability to produce fissile material alone is enough of a deterrent**, making the pain and cost of producing an actual bomb unnecessary. As noted above, U.S. policymakers have shown no hesitation in giving the impression that a nuclear Iran would change the region irrevocably. It is certainly not lost on Iran that Washington talks as if it already has been deterred by a country that has done nothing more than enrich a small amount of uranium and launch missiles that could hit the United States only after catching a 4,000-mile-per-hour tailwind.

# AT: Spreads

**Iranian prolif doesn’t spread regionally.**

**Waltz 12** – Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Columbia University (Kenneth N., Foreign Affairs: “Why Iran Should get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability”, page 5, July-August 2012)//AB

Another oft-touted worry is that if Iran obtains the bomb, other states in the region will follow suit, leading to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. But the nuclear age is now almost 70 years old, and so far, **fears of proliferation have proved to be unfounded**. Properly defined, the term “proliferation” means a rapid and uncontrolled spread. Nothing like that has occurred; in fact, since 1970, there has been a marked **slowdown in the emergence of nuclear states**. **There is no reason to expect that this pattern will change now.** **Should Iran become** the second Middle Eastern **nuclear** **power** since 1945, it would **hardly signal the start of a landslide**. When Israel acquired the bomb in the 1960s, it was at war with many of its neighbors. Its nuclear arms were a much bigger threat to the Arab world than Iran’s program is today. If an atomic Israel did not trigger an arms race then, there is no reason a nuclear Iran should now.

**Doesn’t spill over—structural and economic problems**

**Cook 12** (Steven A., Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of The Struggle from Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square “Don't Fear a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East.” [www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/02/don\_t\_fear\_a\_nuclear\_arms\_race](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/02/don_t_fear_a_nuclear_arms_race)

Multiple nuclear powers on a hair trigger in the Middle East -- the most volatile region on earth, and one that is undergoing massive political change -- is a nightmare scenario for U.S. and other security planners, who have never before confronted a challenge of such magnitude. But thankfully, all the dire warnings about uncontrolled proliferation are -- if not exactly science fiction -- further from reality than Shavit and Obama indicate. There are very good reasons for the international community to meet the challenge that Iran represents, but Middle Eastern nuclear dominoes are not one of them. Theorists of international politics, when pondering the decision-making process of states confronted by nuclear-armed neighbors, have long raised the fears of asymmetric power relations and potential for nuclear blackmail to explain why these states would be forced to proliferate themselves. This logic was undoubtedly at work when Pakistan embarked on a nuclear program in 1972 to match India's nuclear development program. Yet for all its tribulations, the present-day Middle East is not the tinderbox that South Asia was in the middle of the 20th century. Pakistan's perception of the threat posed by India -- a state with which it has fought four wars since 1947 -- is far more acute than how either Egypt or Turkey perceive the Iranian challenge. And while Iran is closer to home for the Saudis, the security situation in the Persian Gulf is not as severe as the one along the 1,800-mile Indo-Pakistani border. Most important to understanding why the Middle East will not be a zone of unrestrained proliferation is the significant difference between desiring nukes and the actual capacity to acquire them. Of all three states that Shavit mentioned, the one on virtually everyone's list for possible nuclear proliferation in response to Iran is Turkey. But the Turkish Republic is already under a nuclear umbrella: Ankara safeguards roughly 90 of the United States' finest B61 gravity bombs at Incirlik airbase, near the city of Adana. These weapons are there because Turkey is a NATO member, and Washington's extended deterrence can be expected to at least partially mitigate Turkey's incentives for proliferation. But even if the Turks wanted their own bomb, they have almost no capacity to develop nuclear weapons technology. Indeed, Turkey does not even possess the capability to deliver the 40 B61 bombs at Incirlik that are allocated to Turkish forces in the event of an attack, according to a report released by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Given the changes in Turkey's foreign policy and its drive for global influence, it is conceivable that it will want to develop a Turkish version of France's force de frappe. However, Ankara would literally be starting from scratch: Turkey has no fissile material, cannot mine or enrich uranium, and does not possess the technology to reprocess spent fuel, all of which are required for nuclear weapons development. This does not mean that Turkey is not interested in nuclear technology. Yet Ankara's efforts, to the extent that they exist beyond the two small-scale facilities in Ankara and Kucukcekmece, are directly related to the country's predicted energy shortfall resulting from the combination of a booming economy and growing population. The Turkish government has announced plans for civilian nuclear power to provide a quarter of Turkey's electricity needs by 2040. But even this three-decade timeline seems overly optimistic given the inchoate nature of Turkey's nuclear research. The Egyptians are way ahead of the Turks in developing nuclear infrastructure, but don't expect to see the rise of a nuclear power on the Nile anytime soon. Egypt's nuclear program is actually older than India's, and was established only three years after Israel founded its Atomic Energy Commission. The Egyptian Atomic Energy Commission, which Gamal Abdel Nasser established in 1955, was exclusively dedicated to the development of peaceful atomic energy, though there were suspicions to the contrary. The 1956 nuclear cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union transferred to Egypt a 2-megawatt light water reactor that only produced small amounts of plutonium. There were, of course, worrying signs about the Egyptian program -- specifically Cairo's refusal to open the Inshas reactor to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection until after the peace treaty with Israel. Yet neither President Anwar Sadat nor his successor, the recently deposed Hosni Mubarak, ever made any effort to develop nuclear weapons technology. Sadat signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1980, and Mubarak negotiated with the United States, France, Canada, and Germany for reactors and funding for Egypt's nuclear program. Nothing, however, ever came of these discussions because of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster -- and the fact that the Egyptians never signed what is known as the Additional Protocol, which gives the IAEA enhanced powers to inspect nuclear facilities. Given the trajectory of Egypt's nuclear development, Cairo's rejection of the Additional Protocol had more to do with politics and sovereignty than plans for a clandestine weapons program. Even after Mubarak's son Gamal triumphantly declared at the ruling party's 2006 convention that Egypt was going to ramp up its nuclear development program, it is hard to believe that Egyptians ever really took him seriously. Mubarak spent $160 million on consultants to tell him where to build 10 planned nuclear power plants, and selected a location along the Mediterranean for the first one. But each of the power plants comes with a price tag of $1.5 billion -- and this is a country that in the last 15 months has spent approximately $26 billion of its $36 billion foreign currency reserves just to stay afloat. One has to wonder about the pundits' warning of an Egyptian bomb: Have they even been to Egypt lately? If so, they might have a better grasp of Egypt's ramshackle infrastructure and the dire state of its economy, neither of which can support a nuclear program. What about Saudi Arabia, then, the Sunni power that is on the tip of most analysts' tongues when it comes to Shiite Iran getting the bomb? Saudi Arabia has the cash to make large-scale investments in nuclear technology. Indeed, the only factor that makes warnings about Saudi proliferation -- such as that delivered by former Ambassador the United States Prince Turki al-Faisal last year -- even remotely credible is the resources the Saudis can muster to buy a nuclear program. Yet, while Riyadh can outfit itself with nuclear facilities with ease, it does not have the capacity to manage them. Mohamed Khilewi, a former Saudi diplomat, claims that the kingdom has been developing a nuclear arsenal to counter Israel since the mid-1970s -- but he offers no substantiated evidence to support these claims. In fact, the country has no nuclear facilities and no scientific infrastructure to support them. It's possible that Saudi Arabia could import Pakistanis to do the work for them. But while Saudis feel comfortable with Pakistanis piloting some of their warplanes and joining their ground forces, setting up a nuclear program subcontracted with Pakistani know-how -- or even acquiring a nuclear device directly from Islamabad -- poses a range of political risks for the House of Saud. No doubt there would be considerable international opprobrium. Certainly Washington, which implicitly extends its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, would have a jaundiced view of a nuclear deal between Riyadh and Islamabad. Moreover, it's one thing to hand the keys to an F-15 over to a foreigner, but letting them run your nuclear program is another matter altogether. The concern about Saudi proliferation stems from fears that the kingdom would be forced to act if both Iran and Israel possessed a nuclear arsenal. "We cannot live in a situation where Iran has nuclear weapons and we don't," an unnamed Saudi official declared to the Guardian on the sidelines of a meeting between Prince Turki al Faisal and NATO officials in June 2011. "It's as simple as that. If Iran develops a nuclear weapon, that will be unacceptable to us and we will have to follow suit." Yet given the fact that the Saudis have very little nuclear infrastructure to speak of, this kind of statement is little more than posturing designed to force the U.S. hand on Iran. Unlike similar warnings by Israel, which has the capacity to follow through on its threat to attack Iran's nuclear sites, Riyadh's rhetoric about acquiring nuclear weapons is empty. What is amazing is how many people take the Saudis seriously. If Khilewi had been telling the truth, now would seem like a good time for the Riyadh to give Tehran a look at what the royal family has been hiding in the palace basement all these years -- but so far, we have only heard crickets.

**Won’t spread – US alliances check and empirics prove.**

**Debs and Monteiro 1/17** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale and Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University; Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University (Alexandre and Nuno, “The Flawed Logic of Striking Iran”, 1/17/12; < [http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137036/alexandre-debs-and-nuno-p-monteiro/the-flawed-logic-of-striking-iran>)//AB](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137036/alexandre-debs-and-nuno-p-monteiro/the-flawed-logic-of-striking-iran%3e)//AB)

Kroenig's final abuse of history comes when he posits a cascade of nuclear proliferation across the Middle East in response to an Iranian bomb. He mentions Saudi Arabia, and implies that Egypt, Iraq, and Turkey might all follow suit. Yet **none of these states,** which can count on U.S. support against Iran, **nuclearized in response to Israel's nuclearization** (against which they cannot count on U.S. backing, mind you). And more generally, the **United States has a successful record of preventing clients from acquiring nuclear weapons** in response to a regional enemy, such as South Korea and Japan in response to North Korean nuclear acquisition. (Washington agreed with Pakistani nuclearization in response to India.) Taking the long view, Kroenig's argument reveals an unwarranted skepticism about Washington's ability to contain a nuclear Iran. This skepticism is all the more surprising considering Kroenig's work on the benefits of U.S. nuclear superiority. Existing U.S. security guarantees, based on current capabilities, give allies little incentive to nuclearize. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are among the largest recipients of U.S. military support, and Turkey is a member of NATO. Reinforcing U.S. ties with friends in the region would be easier, cheaper, and less risky than attacking the Iranian nuclear program.

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# AT: Miscalc

**Proliferation prevents miscalculation—threat of nuclear retaliation is too high**

**Roth, 2007**(Ariel Ilan, Associate Dir. National Security Studies – Johns Hopkins U. and Visiting Assistant Prof. IR – Goucher College, International Studies Review, “REFLECTION, EVALUATION, INTEGRATION Nuclear Weapons in Neo-Realist Theory”, 9, p. 369-384)kyan

No such potential for miscalculation exists in a nuclear conflict. In several papers and articles, as well as a co-authored book, Waltz makes explicit his belief that nuclear weapons eliminate (or at least severely reduce) the likelihood of miscalculation of the degree to which a war will be costly. Because, according to Waltz, one of the main engines for war is uncertainty regarding outcomes and because the immense destruction that can come as the result of a nuclear exchange can be fully anticipated, it is never rational to engage in a war where the possibility of a nuclear exchange exists. Consequently, as Waltz (1990:740) forcefully argues, ‘‘the probability of major war among states having nuclear weapons approaches zero.’’

**Proliferation solves accidental launch**

**Tepperman 09** (Jonathan, Newsweek International Deputy Editor, Former Deputy Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs magazine and wrote frequently on international affairs, politics, and books LL.M. in International Law from NYU, a member of the New York State bar and a Fellow of the New York Institute of Humanities.. Aug 28, 2009 “Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb” <http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248/page/1)kyan>

A politically tougher but equally important step would be to make sure that any nuclear weapons state has what's called a "survivable second strike option," a means of ensuring that even if attacked, it could still shoot back, since this is the best way to persuade its enemies not to bother trying to incapacitate it through a surprise attack (as Joseph Cirincione of the Ploughshares Fund points out, this can be done with a small arsenal and need not necessitate a big buildup). Finally, Washington should continue doing what it's done with Russia and Pakistan to help those regimes keep their weapons safe. The administration has announced plans to help secure loose nukes, and that's all to the good. But it should be prepared to offer the same technology and training to other new nuclear states if they emerge—even if they're U.S. enemies. Critics will scream that doing so would reward bad behavior and encourage it in others. It might. But it would also help keep everyone safe from an accidental launch, which seems a lot more important. None of these steps will be easy to pitch to the public, even for a president as gifted and nimble as Obama. But as he heads into a rare nuclear summit in late September, the least he could do is hold a frank debate on what's really the best strategy for securing the world from—or with—these weapons. Given the stakes, he can hardly afford not to.

**Miscalculation is only possible when risks are not explicit – nuclear weapons solve this**

**Tepperman 09** (Jonathan, Newsweek International Deputy Editor, Former Deputy Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs magazine and wrote frequently on international affairs, politics, and books LL.M. in International Law from NYU, a member of the New York State bar and a Fellow of the New York Institute of Humanities.. Aug 28, 2009 “Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb” <http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248/page/1)kyan>

The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states." To understand why—and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way—you need to start by recognizing that all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side—and millions of innocents pay the price. Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button—and everybody knows it—the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, "Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?"

**New arsenals will be small—prevents miscalculations**

**Seng 98** (Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “Strategy For Pandora's Children: Stable Nuclear Proliferation Among Minor States”, p.203-206)kyan

However, this "state of affairs" is not as dangerous as it might seem. The nuclear arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will be small and, consequently, the command and control organizations that manage chose arsenals will be small as well. The small arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will mitigate against many of the dangers of the highly delegative, 'non-centralized' launch procedures Third World states are likely to use. This will happen in two main ways. First, only a small number of people need be involved in Third World command and control. The superpowers had tens of thousands of nuclear warheads and thousands of nuclear weapons personnel in a variety of deployments organized around numerous nuclear delivery platforms. A state that has, say, fifty nuclear weapons needs at most fifty launch operators and only a handful of group commanders. This has both quantitative and qualitative repercussions. Quantitatively, the very small number of people 'in the loop' greatly diminishes the statistical probability that accidents or human error will result in inappropriate nuclear launches. All else being equal, the chances of finding some guard asleep at some post increases with the number of guards and posts one has to cover. Qualitatively, small numbers makes it possible to centrally train operators, to screen and choose them with exceeding care, 7 and to keep each of them in direct contact with central authorities in times of crises. With very small control communities, there is no need for intermediary commanders. Important information and instructions can get out quickly and directly. Quality control of launch operators and operations is easier. In some part, at least, Third World states can compensate for their lack of sophisticated use-control technology with a more controlled selection of, and more extensive communication with, human operators. Secondly, and relatedly, Third World proliferators will not need to rely on cumbersome standard operating procedures to manage and launch their nuclear weapons. This is because the number of weapons will be so small, and also because the arsenals will be very simple in composition. Third World stares simply will not have that many weapons to keep track of. Third World states will not have the great variety of delivery platforms that the superpowers had (various ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, long range bombers, fighter bombers, missile submarines, nuclear armed ships, nuclear mortars, etc., etc.), or the great number and variety of basing options, and they will not employ the complicated strategies of international basing that the superpowers used. The small and simple arsenals of Third World proliferators will not require highly complex systems to coordinate nuclear activities. This creates two specific organizational advantages. One, small organizations, even if they do rely to some extent of standard operating procedures, can be flexible in times of crisis. As we have discussed, the essential problem of standard operating procedures in nuclear launch processes is that the full range if possible strategic developments cannot be predicted and specified before the fact, and thus responses to them cannot be standardized fully. An unexpected event can lead to 'mismatched' and inappropriate organizational reactions. In complex and extensive command and control organizations, standard operating procedures coordinate great numbers of people at numerous levels of command structure in a great multiplicity of places. If an unexpected event triggers operating procedures leading to what would be an inappropriate nuclear launch, it would be very difficult for central commanders to “get the word out' to everyone involved. The coordination needed to stop launch activity would be at least as complicated as the coordination needed to initiate it, and, depending on the speed of launch processes, there may be less time to accomplish it. However, the small numbers of people involved in nuclear launches and the simplicity of arsenals will make it far easier for Third World leaders to 'get the word out' and reverse launch procedures if necessary. Again, so few will be the numbers of weapons that all launch operators could be contacted directly by central leaders. The programmed triggers of standard operating procedures can be passed over in favor of unscripted, flexible responses based on a limited number of human-to-human communications and confirmations. Two, the smallness and simplicity of Third World command and control organizations will make it easier for leaders to keep track of everything that is going on at any given moment. One of the great dangers of complex organizational procedures is that once one organizational event is triggered—once an alarm is sounded and a programmed response is made—other branches of the organization are likely to be affected as well. This is what Charles Perrow refers to as interactive complexity, 8 and it has been a mainstay in organizational critiques of nuclear command and control s ystems.9 The more complex the organization is, the more likely these secondary effects are, and the less likely they are to be foreseen, noticed, and well-managed. So, for instance, an American commander that gives the order to scramble nuclear bombers over the U.S. as a defensive measure may find that he has unwittingly given the order to scramble bombers in Europe as well. A recall order to the American bombers may overlook the European theater, and nuclear misuse could result. However, when numbers of nuclear weapons can be measured in the dozens rather than the hundreds or thousands, and when deployment of those weapons does not involve multiple theaters and forward based delivery vehicles of numerous types, tight coupling is unlikely to cause unforeseen and unnoticeable organizational events. Other things being equal, it is just a lot easier to know all of what is going on. In short, while Third World states may nor have the electronic use-control devices that help ensure that peripheral commanders do nor 'get out of control,' they have other advantages that make the challenge of centralized control easier than it was for the superpowers. The small numbers of personnel and organizational simplicity of launch bureaucracies means that even if a few more people have their fingers on the button than in the case of the superpowers, there will be less of a chance that weapons will be launched without a definite, informed and unambiguous decision to press that button.

**Nuclear infrastructure is the most secure—empirics prove**

**Tepperman 09** (Jonathan, Newsweek International Deputy Editor, Former Deputy Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs magazine and wrote frequently on international affairs, politics, and books LL.M. in International Law from NYU, a member of the New York State bar and a Fellow of the New York Institute of Humanities.. Aug 28, 2009 “Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb” <http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248/page/1)kyan>

A much greater threat is that a nuclear North Korea or Pakistan could collapse and lose control of its weapons entirely. Yet here again history offers some comfort. China acquired its first nuke in 1964, just two years before it descended into the mad chaos of the Cultural Revolution, when virtually every Chinese institution was threatened—except for its nuclear infrastructure, which remained secure. "It was nearly a coup," says Desch, "yet with all the unrest, nobody ever thought that there might be an unauthorized nuclear use." The Soviets' weapons were also kept largely safe (with U.S. help) during the breakup of their union in the early '90s. And in recent years Moscow has greatly upped its defense spending (by 20 to 30 percent a year), using some of the cash to modernize and protect its arsenal. As for Pakistan, it has taken numerous precautions to ensure that its own weapons are insulated from the country's chaos, installing complicated firing mechanisms to prevent a launch by lone radicals, for example, and instituting special training and screening for its nuclear personnel to ensure they're not infiltrated by extremists. Even if the Pakistani state did collapse entirely—the nightmare scenario—the chance of a Taliban bomb would still be remote. Desch argues that the idea that terrorists "could use these weapons radically underestimates the difficulty of actually operating a modern nuclear arsenal. These things need constant maintenance and they're very easy to disable. So the idea that these things could be stuffed into a gunnysack and smuggled across the Rio Grande is preposterous."

No risk of miscalc – the risk of accidental launch is too high

**Karl ’96** (David, PhD in International Relations from USC, International Security, “Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers”, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter, p. 95-96) //JH

Optimists have relaxed views of the preventive-war dangers entailed in situations¶ in which a nuclear power confronts a nuclearizing rival. The practical¶ difficulties of ensuring a disarming strike to preclude any possibility of nuclear¶ retaliation make preventive actions a military gamble that states are very¶ unlikely to take. As Waltz explains, ”prevention and pre-emption are difficult¶ games because the costs are so high if the games are not perfectly played. . . .¶ Ultimately, the inhibitions [against such attacks] lie in the impossibility of¶ knowing for sure that a disarming strike will totally destroy an opposing force¶ and in the immense destruction even a few warheads can wreak.”25 To optimists,¶ states will have to learn to live with a rival’s emerging nuclear armory.¶ Because strategic uncertainty is seen as having a powerful dissuasive effect,¶ optimists usually view the very increase in the numbers of nuclear-armed¶ states as an additional element of stability. Dagobert Brito and Michael Intriligator,¶ for instance, argue that uncertainty over the reaction of other nuclear¶ powers will make all hesitant to strike individuallyz6 As an example, they point¶ to the restraint the superpowers exercised on each other in the 1960s, when¶ first the United States and then the Soviet Union contemplated military action¶ against China’s nascent nuclear weapon sites. The net effect of the uncertain¶ reaction of others is that ”the probability of deliberate nuclear attack falls to¶ near zero with three, four, or more nuclear nations.” Similarly, Waltz reasons¶ that even in cases of asymmetric proliferation within conflict dyads, nuclear¶ weapons will prove ”poor instruments for blackmail” because a ”country that¶ takes the nuclear offensive has to fear an appropriately punishing strike by¶ someone. Far from lowering the expected cost of aggression, a nuclear offense¶ even against a non-nuclear state raises the possible costs of aggression to¶ incalculable heights because the aggressor cannot be sure of the reaction of¶ other nuclear powers.”28¶ Proliferation pessimists, on the other hand, are doubtful that new nuclear¶ powers will remain immune to preventive-war temptations. Preventive-war¶ thinking was a staple of Cold War history. Prominent U.S. military leaders¶ advocated preventive action against the Soviet Union in the late 1940s and¶ early 1950s, and both superpowers contemplated military action to prevent¶ Chinese development of nuclear weapons in the 1 9 6 0 ~B.y ~so~m e accounts, the¶ 1967 Middle East war was caused by Egypt’s desire to thwart Israel’s development¶ of a nuclear weapon capability3’ In the mid-l970s, Moscow may have¶ also sounded out Washington on the preemptive destruction of South Africa’s¶ uranium enrichment plant, and the United States may have given serious¶ thought to sabotaging Pakistan’s fledgling nuclear program.31The post-Cold War period also resonates with preventive logic, most fully¶ exemplified by the U.S. “Counterproliferation Initiative.” U.S. attacks against¶ Iraqi nuclear development facilities in the Persian Gulf War and against the¶ Zaafarniyah nuclear fabrication complex in early 1993, as well as the Clinton¶ administration’s threat to strike North Korea’s nuclear installations, may¶ prefigure a policy of preempting the emergence of nuclear weapon capabilities¶ in the Third World.32 In 1991 the Bush administration reportedly directed the¶ Central Intelligence Agency to ”develop plans, including covert action, to block¶ proliferation of weapons of mass des t r~ct ion.R”e~c~en tly senior Israeli officials,¶ in a reprise of the fears that brought about their attack on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear¶ reactor, were reportedly considering attacks against Iranian react01-s.~~¶

# AT: Terrorism

**Nuclear terrorism won’t happen- too many variables**

**Chapman 11** [Steve, Writer for the Chicago Tribune, “The Implausibility of Nuclear Terrorism”, Dec 29, 2011, [http://townhall.com/columnists/stevechapman/2011/12/29/the\_implausibility\_of\_nuclear\_terrorism/page/full**/**](http://townhall.com/columnists/stevechapman/2011/12/29/the_implausibility_of_nuclear_terrorism/page/full/), Accessed July 18, 2012]//PJT

"Death tugs at my ear and says, 'Live, I am coming.'" Were Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. alive today, he might ascribe that line not to death but to nuclear terrorism. **Ever since Sept. 11, 2001, Americans have had to live with the knowledge that the next time the terrorists strike, it could be** not with airplanes capable of killing thousands but **atomic bombs capable of killing hundreds of thousands.** The prospect has created a sense of profound vulnerability. It has shaped our view of government policies aimed at combating terrorism (filtered through Jack Bauer). It helped mobilize support for the Iraq war. **Why are we worried? Bomb designs can be found on the Internet. Fissile material may be smuggled out of Russia. Iran, a longtime sponsor of terrorist groups, is trying to acquire nuclear weapons.** A layperson may figure it's only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard's Graham Allison, in his book "Nuclear Terrorism," concludes, "On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable." But remember: **After Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple** -- say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb -- **it's reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious.** Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a recent presentation at the University of Chicago, "**the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small**." The **events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks**. First, a **terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia's inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one already would have gone missing.** Besides, **those** **devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not scrupulously maintained (as those have not been)** **quickly become what one expert calls "radioactive scrap metal." If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally -- for reasons even the Iranians can grasp.** Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. The **terrorists**, notes Mueller, **would then have to spirit it "hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, and probably while being pursued by security forces." Then** comes the task of **build**ing **a bomb. It's not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment -- plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die** for the cause. **And** if al-Qaida could make a prototype, another obstacle would emerge: **There is no guarantee it would work, and there is no way to test it.** Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, **they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil.** Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time -- but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. **This**, like every other step in the entire process, **means expanding the circle of people who know what's going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up.** Mueller recalls that after the Irish Republican Army failed in an attempt to blow up British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, it said, "We only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." Al-Qaida, he says, faces a very different challenge: **For it to carry out a nuclear attack, everything has to go right. For us to escape, only one thing has to go wrong**. That has heartening implications. **If al-Qaida embarks on the project, they have only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit**. Given the formidable odds, they probably won't bother. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, the worst eventuality is one that will never happen.

**Chances of nuclear terrorism are massively overestimated- terrorists could not build or steal nuclear weapons.**

**Mueller 10** [John, Department of Political Science at OSU, “Calming Our Nuclear Jitters”, Issues in Science and Technology Winter 2010, Proquest, Accessed July 18, 2012]//PJT

**An exaggerated fear of nuclear weapons has led to many wrongheaded policy decisions. A more sober assessment is needed.** The fearsome destructive power of nuclear weapons provokes understandable dread, but in crafting public policy we must move beyond this initial reaction to soberly assess the risks and consider appropriate actions. Out of awe over and anxiety about nuclear weapons, the worlds superpowers accumulated enormous arsenals of them for nearly 50 years. But then, in the wake of the Cold War, fears that the bombs would be used vanished almost entirely. At the same time, **concerns that terrorists and rogue nations could acquire nuclear weapons have sparked a new surge of fear and speculation**. In the past, excessive fear about nuclear weapons led to many policies that turned out to be wasteful and unnecessary. We should take the time to assess these new risks to avoid an overreaction that will take resources and attention away from other problems. Indeed, a more thoughtful analysis will reveal that **the new perceived danger is far less likely than it might at first appear.** Albert **Einstein** memorably **proclaimed** that nucl**ear weapons "have changed everything except our way of thinking."** But the **weapons** actually **seem to have changed little except our way of thinking**, as well as our ways of declaiming, gesticulating, deploying military forces, and spending lots of money. To begin with, the bomb's impact on substantive historical developments has turned out to be minimal. **Nuclear weapons are, of course, routinely given credit for preventing or deterring a major war during the Cold War era. However**, it is increasingly clear that **the Soviet Union never had the slightest interest in engaging in** any kind of **conflict that would** remotely **resemble World War II**, whether nuclear or not. Its agenda emphasized revolution, class rebellion, and civil war, conflict areas in which nuclear weapons are irrelevant. Thus, there was no threat of direct military aggression to deter. Moreover, the **possessors of nuclear weapons have never been able to find much military reason to use them**, even in principle, in actual armed conflicts. Although they may have failed to alter substantive history, nuclear weapons have inspired legions of strategists to spend whole careers agonizing over what one analyst has called "nuclear metaphysics," arguing, for example, over how many MIRVs (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles) could dance on the head of an ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile). The result was a colossal expenditure of funds. Most important for current policy is the fact that contrary to decades of hand-wringing about the inherent appeal of nuclear weapons, most countries have actually found them to be a substantial and even ridiculous misdirection of funds, effort, and scientific talent. This is a major if much-underappreciated reason why nuclear proliferation has been so much slower than predicted over the decades. In addition, the proliferation that has taken place has been substantially inconsequential. **When** the quintessential rogue state, **Communist China**, **obtained nuclear weapons** in 1964, **C**entral **I**ntelligence **A**gency **Director** John McCone sternly **proclaimed that nuclear war was "almost inevitable." But** far from engaging in the nuclear blackmail expected at the time by almost everyone, **China built its weapons quietly and has never made a real nuclear threat. Despite this** experience, **proliferation anxiety continues to flourish.** For more than a decade, **U.S. policymakers obsessed about the possibility that Saddam Husseins** pathetic and technologically dysfunctional **regime** in Iraq **could** in time **obtain nuclear weapons**, even though it took the far more advanced Pakistan 28 years. **To prevent this** imagined and highly unlikely calamity, damaging and destructive economic sanctions were imposed and then **a war was waged, and** each venture has **probably resulted in more deaths than were suffered at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.** (At Hiroshima and Nagasaki, about 67,000 people died immediately and 36,000 more died over the next four months. Most estimates of the Iraq war have put total deaths there at about the Hiroshima-Nagasaki levels, or higher.) Today, alarm is focused on the even more pathetic regime in North Korea, which has now tested a couple of atomic devices that seem to have been fizzles. There is even more hysteria about Iran, which has repeatedly insisted it has no intention of developing weapons. If that regime changes its mind or is lying, experience suggests it is likely to find that, except for stoking the national ego for a while, the bombs are substantially valueless and a very considerable waste of money and effort. A daunting task Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be "the most immediate and extreme threat to global security." It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima- size device would "blow up" about 1% of the city's area- a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. **In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist** Theodore **Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be "immediate,"** explaining at length "how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb." At the time he thought it was already too late to "prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then," or "in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late." **Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their "easy" task.** In contrast to these predictions, **terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic**. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, **they**, unlike generations of alarmists, **have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful.** The most plausible route for **terrorists**, according to most experts, **would** be to **manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material** (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). **This task**, however, **remains** a **daunting** one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed **theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely** not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money- transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, "have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates." **If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would** then probably **have to transport it a long distance** over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. **Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland's Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task "could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group."** They point out that **precise blueprints are required**, not just sketches and general ideas, and that **even with a good blueprint the** terrorist **group would most certainly be forced to redesign.** They also stress that **the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting,** and that the **technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible.** Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that **uranium is "exceptionally difficult to machine"** whereas **"plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed."** Stressing the "daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues," Younger concludes, "**to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation** with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies" **could fabricate a bomb "is farfetched at best."** Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. **The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental**. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is "not impossible." But **although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small.** Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists' favor- for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles- the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, **the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed** drop to **one in well over three billion.** Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. **They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state** for delivery abroad **because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists**, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. **The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a "loose nuke" somewhere. However, it seems probable that none exist**. All **governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target**. Moreover, as technology has developed, **finished bombs have been outfitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with.** And there are other security techniques: **Bombs can be kept disassembled** with the component parts stored **in separate** high- security **vaults**, and **a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it.** As Younger points out, "**only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon**." There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled.

**Al Qaeda is not even close to nuclear weapons.**

**Mueller 10** [John, Department of Political Science at OSU, “Calming Our Nuclear Jitters”, Issues in Science and Technology Winter 2010, Proquest, Accessed July 18, 2012]//PJT

The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. **The 9/11 Commission stated that "al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years," but** the **only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium** that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Facll, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $1 10,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda's desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as "academic" in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda's bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. **After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons.** They did uncover, however, a "nuclear-related" document discussing "openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues." Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, "If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent." Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, "Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face." Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although "it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non- conventional weapons," there is "little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks." She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban's distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any "threat," particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. **From time to time some** of these **people**, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, **actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/1 1. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest.** Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: "Make use of that which is available . . . rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach." In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones**. Glenn Carle, a 23 -year CLA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, "We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are." al Qaeda**, he says, **has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, "its capabilities are far inferior to its desires."**

**The chances of nuclear terrorism and proliferation causing big problems are so small as to not even need to be conceded.**

**Mueller 10** [John, Department of Political Science at OSU, “Calming Our Nuclear Jitters”, Issues in Science and Technology Winter 2010, Proquest, Accessed July 18, 2012]//PJT

Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likelyindeed, exceedingly likely- to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. **At some point**, however, **probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them** or at least put them on the back burner; in short, **the risk becomes acceptable.** For example, **the British could at any time attack the U**nited **S**tates with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. **Yet the risk** that this potential calamity might take place **evokes little concern**; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls "a case for fear," Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are "not the most comforting." Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt. **As for** that other central policy concern, **nuclear proliferation**, it seems to me that **policymakers should maintain their composure.** The pathetic North Korean regime mostly seems to be engaged in a process of extracting aid and recognition from outside. A viable policy toward it might be to reduce the threat level and to wait while continuing to be extorted, rather than to carry out policies that increase the already intense misery of the North Korean people. **If the Iranians do break their pledge not to develop nuclear weapons** (a conversion perhaps stimulated by an airstrike on its facilities), **they will probably "use" any nuclear capacity in the same way all other nuclear states have: for prestige** (or ego- stoking) **and deterrence.** Indeed, suggests strategist and Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling, **deterrence is about the only value the weapons might have for Iran. Nuclear weapons, he points out, "would be too precious to give away or to sell" and "too precious to waste killing people" when they could make other countries "hesitant to consider military action."** It seems overwhelmingly probable that, if a nuclear Iran brandishes its weapons to intimidate others or to get its way, it will find that those threatened, rather than capitulating to its blandishments or rushing off to build a compensating arsenal of their own, will ally with others, including conceivably Israel, to stand up to the intimidation. The popular notion that nuclear weapons furnish a country with the capacity to dominate its region has little or no historical support. The application of diplomacy and bribery in an effort to dissuade these countries from pursuing nuclear weapons programs may be useful; in fact, if successful, we would be doing them a favor. But although it may be heresy to say so, **the world can live with a nuclear Iran or North Korea, as it has lived now for 45 years with a nuclear China, a country once viewed as the ultimate rogue**. Should push eventually come to shove in these areas, the problem will be to establish orderly deterrent and containment strategies and to avoid the temptation to lash out mindlessly at fancied threats. Although there is nothing wrong with making nonproliferation a high priority, it should be topped with a somewhat higher one: avoiding policies that can lead to the deaths of tens or hundreds of thousands of people under the obsessive sway of worst-case scenario fantasies. In the end, it appears to me that, **whatever their impact on activist rhetoric, strategic theorizing, defense budgets, and political posturing, nuclear weapons have had at best a quite limited effect on history, have been a substantial waste of money and effort, do not seem to have been terribly appealing to most states that do not have them, are out of reach for terrorists, and are unlikely to materially shape much of our future.**

**Reducing armaments is happening in the status quo and no terrorist will get their hands on nukes.**

**Mueller 10** [John, Department of Political Science @ OSU, “Nuclear Weapons”, Foreign Policy Jan/Feb 2010, Proquest, Accessed July 18, 2012]//PJT

President Obama's pledge to rid the world of atomic bombs is a waste of breath. But not for the reasons you might imagine. BY JOHN MUELLER "Nuclear Weapons Are the Greatest Threat to Humankind." No. But you might think so if you listen to world leaders right now. **In his first address to the U.N.** Security Council, U.S. President Barack **Obama warned** apocalyptically, "**Just one nuclear weapon exploded in a city** - be it New York or Moscow, Tokyo or Beijing, London or Paris - **could kill hundreds of thousands of people.** And **it would badly destabilize our security, our economies, and our very way of life."** Obama has put nuclear disarmament back on the table in a way it hasn't been for decades by vowing to pursue a nuclear-free world, and, with a handful of big treaty negotiations in the works, he seems to think 2010 has become a critical year. But the conversation is based on false assumptions. Nuclear weapons certainly are the most destructive devices ever made, as Obama often reminds us, and everyone from peaceniks to neocons seems to agree. **But for more than 60 years now all they've done is gather dust** while propagandists and alarmists exaggerate their likelihood of exploding - it was a certainty one would go off in 10 years, CP. Snow authoritatively proclaimed in 1960 - and nuclear metaphysicians spin fancy theories about how they might be deployed and targeted. **Nuclear weapons have had a tremendous influence on the world's agonies and obsessions, inspiring desperate rhetoric, extravagant theorizing, and frenetic diplomatic posturing. However, they have had very limited actual impact**, at least **since World War II.** Even the most ingenious military thinkers have had difficulty coming up with realistic ways nukes could conceivably be applied on the battlefield; moral considerations aside, it is rare to find a target that can't be struck just as well by conventional weapons. Indeed, **their chief "use" was to deter the Soviet Union** from instituting Hitler-style military aggression, a chimera considering that historical evidence shows the Soviets never had genuine interest in doing anything of the sort. In other words, there was nothing to deter. Instead, nukes have done nothing in particular, and have done that very well. They have, however, succeeded in being a colossal waste of money - an authoritative 1998 Brookings Institution study showed **the U**nited **S**tates had **spent $5.5 trillion on nukes since 1940**, more than on any program other than Social Security. The expense was even more ludicrous in the cash-starved Soviet Union. And that does not include the substantial loss entailed in requiring legions of talented nuclear scientists, engineers, and technicians to devote their careers to developing and servicing weapons that have proved to have been significantly unnecessary and essentially irrelevant. In fact, the only useful part of the expenditure has been on devices, protocols, and policies to keep the bombs from going off, expenditures that would, of course, not be necessary if they didn't exist. "Obama's Plan to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons Is a Good One." Not necessarily. Obama's plan, unveiled before the world in a speech in Prague last April, represents an ambitious attempt to rid the world of nukes. Under the president's scheme, developing countries would have access to an internationally monitored bank of nuclear fuel but would be barred from producing weapons-grade materials themselves. Existing warheads would be secured, and major powers such as Russia and the United States would pledge to scale back their weapons programs. In September, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution in support of Obama's proposal, giving his massive project some institutional backing. But all of this is scarcely needed. **Nuclear weapons are already disappearing, and elaborate international plans tike the one Obama is pushing aren't needed to make it happen.** During the Cold War, painstakingly negotiated treaties did little to advance the cause of disarmament- and some efforts, such as the 1972 SALT Agreement, made the situation worse from a military standpoint. With the easing of tensions after the Cold War, a sort of negative arms race has taken place, and the weapons have been going away more or less by themselves as policymakers wake up to the fact that having fewer useless things is cheaper than having more of them. **By 2002, the number of deployed warheads in Russian and U.S. arsenals had dropped from 70,000 to around 30,000, and it now stands at less than 10,000.** "Real arms control," wistfully reflected former U.S. assistant secretary of state for arms control Avis Bohlen in an essay last May, "became possible only when it was no longer necessary." Indeed, both sides have long found that arms reductions were made more difficult if they were accomplished through explicit mutual agreements requiring that an exquisitely nuanced arrangement be worked out for every abandoned nut and bolt. In 1991, for example, the Americans announced that they were unilaterally reducing tactical nuclear weapons, and the Soviet Union soon followed, a development hailed by a close observer, Brown University scholar Nina Tannenwald, as "the most radical move to date to reverse the arms race" and a "dramatic move away from 'warfighting' nuclear postures." This "radical" and "dramatic" feat was accomplished entirely without formal agreement. For the most part, the formal arms-control process has been left trying to catch up with reality. When the U.S. Senate in 1992 ratified a nuclear arms reduction treaty, both sides had already moved to reduce their weapons even further than required by that agreement. France has also unilaterally cut its arsenal very substantially- though explaining why France needs any nukes is surely a problematique worthy of several impenetrable dissertations. (Perhaps to threaten former colonies that might otherwise abandon French for English?) The British, too, are under domestic political pressure to cut their nuclear arsenal as they wrestle with how many of their aging nuclear subs they need to hang on to (how about: none?), and the Chinese have built far fewer of the weapons than they could have-they currently stock just 180. **A negative arms race is likely to be as chaotic, halting, ambiguous, self-interested, and potentially reversible as a positive one.** However, **history suggests that arms reduction will happen best if arms negotiators keep out oft he way. Formal disarmament agreements of the kind Obama seeks are likely simply to slow and clutter the process.** But all nukes are not likely to vanish entirely, no matter the method. Humanity invented these weapons, and there will still be nuclear metaphysicians around, spinning dark, improbable, and spooky theoretical scenarios to justify their existence. "A Nuclear Explosion Would Cripple the U.S. Economy." Only if Americans let it. Although former CIA chief George Tenet insists in his memoirs that one "mushroom cloud" would "destroy our economy," he never bothers to explain how the instant and tragic destruction of three square miles somewhere in the United States would lead inexorably to national economic annihilation. A nuclear explosion in, say, New York City - as Obama so darkly invoked - would obviously be a tremendous calamity that would roil markets and cause great economic hardship, but would it extinguish the rest of the country? Would farmers cease plowing? Would manufacturers close their assembly lines? Would all businesses, governmental structures, and community groups evaporate? Americans are highly unlikely to react to an atomic explosion, however disastrous, by immolating themselves and their economy. In 1945, Japan weathered not only two nuclear attacks but intense nationwide conventional bombing; the horrific experience did not destroy Japan as a society or even as an economy. Nor has persistent, albeit nonnuclear, terrorism in Israel caused that state to disappear - or to abandon democracy. Even the notion that an act of nuclear terrorism would cause the American people to lose confidence in the government is belied by the traumatic experience of Sept. 1 1, 2001, when expressed confidence in America's leaders paradoxically soared. And it contradicts decades of disaster research that documents how socially responsible behavior increases under such conditions - seen yet again in the response of those evacuating the World Trade Center on 9/11. "Terrorists Could Snap Up Russia's Loose Nukes." That's a myth. It has been soberly, and repeatedly, restated by Harvard University's Graham Allison and others that Osama bin Laden gave a group of Chechens $30 million in cash and two tons of opium in exchange for 20 nuclear warheads. Then there is the "report" about how al Qaeda acquired a Russian-made suitcase nuclear bomb from Central Asian sources that had a serial number of 9999 and could be exploded by mobile phone. If these attention-grabbing rumors were true, one might think the terrorist group (or its supposed Chechen suppliers) would have tried to set off one of those things by now or that al Qaeda would have left some trace of the weapons behind in Afghanistan after it made its very rushed exit in 2001. Instead, nada. **It turns out that getting one's hands on a working nuclear bomb is actually very difficult.** In 1998, a peak year for loose nuke stories, the head of the U.S. Strategic Command made several visits to Russian military bases and pointedly reported, "I want to put to bed this concern that there are loose nukes in Russia. My observations are that the **Russians are** indeed **very serious about security**." Physicists Richard Garwin and Georges Charpak have reported, however, that this forceful firsthand testimony failed to persuade the intelligence community "perhaps because it ) had ] access to varied sources of information." A decade later, with no credible reports of purloined Russian weapons, it rather looks like it was the general, not the spooks, who had it right. By all reports (including Allison's), **Russian nukes have become even more secure in recent years.** It is scarcely rocket science to conclude that any nuke stolen in Russia is far more likely to go off in Red Square than in Times Square. The Russians seem to have had no difficulty grasping this fundamental reality. Setting off a stolen nuke might be nearly impossible anyway, outside of TV's 24 and disaster movies. **Finished bombs are** routinely **outfitted with devices that will trigger a nonnuclear explosion to destroy the bomb if it is tampered with**. And, as Stephen Younger, former head of nuclear weapons research and development at Los Alamos National Laboratory, stresses, only a few people in the world know how to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon. Even weapons designers and maintenance personnel do not know the multiple steps necessary. In addition, some countries, including Pakistan, store their weapons disassembled, with the pieces in separate secure vaults.

**Afghanistan invasion ruined an chance of Al Qaeda nuclear capability**

**Mueller 10** [John, Department of Political Science @ OSU, “Nuclear Weapons”, Foreign Policy Jan/Feb 2010, Proquest, Accessed July 18, 2012]//PJT

"**Al Qaeda Is Searching for a Nuclear Capability." Prove it. Al Qaeda may have** had some **interest** in atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) before the 9/11 attacks. For instance, a man who defected from al Qaeda after he was caught stealing $110,000 from the organization- "a lovable rogue," "fixated on money," who "likes to please," as one FBI debriefer described Jamal al-Fadl - has testified that members tried to purchase uranium in the mid-1990s, though they were scammed and purchased bogus material. There are also reports that bin Laden had "academic" discussions about WMD in 2001 with Pakistani nuclear scientists who did not actually know how to build a bomb. **But the Afghanistan invasion seems to have cut off any schemes.** As analyst Anne Stenersen notes, evidence from an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan when the group beat a hasty retreat indicates that **only** some $2,000 to **$4,000 was earmarked for WMD research, and that was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons.** For comparison, she points out that the Japanese millennia) terrorist group, Aum Shinrikyo, appears to have invested $30 million in its sarin gas manufacturing program. Milton Leitenberg of the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland-College Park quotes Ayman al-Zawahiri as saying that the project was "wasted time and effort." Even former International Atomic Energy Agency inspector David Albright, who is more impressed with the evidence found in Afghanistan, concludes that **any al Qaeda atomic efforts were "seriously disrupted"**- indeed, "nipped in the bud"- **by the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and that after the invasion the "chance of al Qaeda detonating a nuclear explosive appears on reflection to be low."**

**It’s a lot harder to make a bomb than you think**

**Mueller 10** [John, Department of Political Science @ OSU, “Nuclear Weapons”, Foreign Policy Jan/Feb 2010, Proquest, Accessed July 18, 2012]//PJT

**"Fabricating a Bomb Is 'Child's Play." Hardly**. An editorialist in Nature, the esteemed scientific journal, did apply that characterization to the manufacture of uranium bombs, as opposed to plutonium bombs, last January, but even that seems an absurd exaggeration. Younger, the **former Los Alamos research director, has expressed his amazement at how "self-declared 'nuclear weapons experts,' many of whom have never seen a real nuclear weapon," continue to "hold forth on how easy it is to make a functioning nuclear explosive." Uranium is "exceptionally difficult to machine,"** he points out, **and "plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed." Special technology is required, and even the simplest weapons require precise tolerances.** Information on the general idea for building a bomb is available online, but none of it, Younger says, is detailed enough to "enable the confident assembly of a real nuclear explosive." **A failure to appreciate the costs and difficulties of a nuclear program has led to massive overestimations of the ability to fabricate nuclear weapons.** As the 2005 Silberman-Robb commission, set up to investigate the intelligence failures that led to the Iraq war, pointed out, it is "a fundamental analytical error" to equate "procurement activity with weapons system capability." That is, "simply because a state can buy the parts does not mean it can put them together and make them work." For example, **after three decades of labor and well over $100 million in expenditures, Libya was unable to make any progress toward an atomic bomb.** Indeed, much of the country's nuclear material, surrendered after it abandoned its program, was still in the original boxes.

# AT: Irrational Actors

**Foreign strategic policy does not reflect domestic radicalism – nations will proliferate responsibly.**

**Waltz 81 –** London International Institute for Strategic Studies (Kenneth, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better”, 1981; < <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm)//AB>

Third, many fear that states that are radical at home will recklessly use their nuclear weapons in pursuit of revolutionary ends abroad**.** **States that are radical at home, how­ever, may not be radical abroad.** **Few states have been radical in the conduct of their foreign policy**, and fewer have remained so for long. Think of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. States coexist in a competitive arena**. The pressures of com­petition cause them to behave in ways that make the threats they face manageable, in ways that enable them to get along**. **States can remain radical in foreign policy only if they are overwhelmingly strong—as none of the new nuclear states will be—or if their radical acts fall short of damaging vital interests of nuclear powers**. States that acquire nuclear weapons will not be regarded with indifference. States that want to be freewheelers have to stay out of the nuclear business. A nuclear Libya, for example, would have to show caution, even in rhetoric, lest she suffer retaliation in response to someone else's anonymous attack on a third state. That state, ignorant of who attacked, might claim that its intelligence agents had identified Libya as the culprit and take the opportunity to silence her by striking a con­ventional or nuclear blow. **Nuclear weapons induce caution, especially in weak states**.

**No Nuclear Hitlers—Mao, Khrushchev and Stalin prove**

**Tepperman 09** (Jonathan, Newsweek International Deputy Editor, Former Deputy Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs magazine and wrote frequently on international affairs, politics, and books LL.M. in International Law from NYU, a member of the New York State bar and a Fellow of the New York Institute of Humanities.. Aug 28, 2009 “Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb” <http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248/page/1)kyan>

Nuclear pessimists—and there are many—insist that even if this pattern has held in the past, it's crazy to rely on it in the future, for several reasons. The first is that today's nuclear wannabes are so completely unhinged, you'd be mad to trust them with a bomb. Take the sybaritic Kim Jong Il, who's never missed a chance to demonstrate his battiness, or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has denied the Holocaust and promised the destruction of Israel, and who, according to some respected Middle East scholars, runs a messianic martyrdom cult that would welcome nuclear obliteration. These regimes are the ultimate rogues, the thinking goes—and there's no deterring rogues. But are Kim and Ahmadinejad really scarier and crazier than were Stalin and Mao? It might look that way from Seoul or Tel Aviv, but history says otherwise. Khrushchev, remember, threatened to "bury" the United States, and in 1957, Mao blithely declared that a nuclear war with America wouldn't be so bad because even "if half of mankind died … the whole world would become socialist." Pyongyang and Tehran support terrorism—but so did Moscow and Beijing. And as for seeming suicidal, Michael Desch of the University of Notre Dame points out that Stalin and Mao are the real record holders here: both were responsible for the deaths of some 20 million of their own citizens. Yet when push came to shove, their regimes balked at nuclear suicide, and so would today's international bogeymen. For all of Ahmadinejad's antics, his power is limited, and the clerical regime has always proved rational and pragmatic when its life is on the line. Revolutionary Iran has never started a war, has done deals with both Washington and Jerusalem, and sued for peace in its war with Iraq (which Saddam started) once it realized it couldn't win. North Korea, meanwhile, is a tiny, impoverished, family-run country with a history of being invaded; its overwhelming preoccupation is survival, and every time it becomes more belligerent it reverses itself a few months later (witness last week, when Pyongyang told Seoul and Washington it was ready to return to the bargaining table). These countries may be brutally oppressive, but nothing in their behavior suggests they have a death wish.

**Countries that proliferate do so rationally for increased security**

**Moelwyn-Hughes 12** [Head of Politics at the King’s School of Canterbury, Owen, “Global Issues: WMD: Iran and the danger of Proliferation”, February 18, 2012, <http://tutor2u.net/blog/index.php/politics/comments/global-issues-wmd-iran-and-danger-of-proliferation>**,** Accessed July 17, 2012]//PJT

Iran’s nuclear ambitions could plunge the Middle East into “a new Cold War”, warns UK Foreign Secretary William Hague. In an interview with the Daily Telegraph (Iran risks nuclear Cold War), the Foreign Secretary said that if Iran developed nuclear weapon capability, other nations would want to as well. Mr Hague warned of a “crisis coming down the tracks” which could lead to a “disaster in world affairs”. Foreign Secretary says that Iran is threatening to spark a nuclear arms race in the Middle East which could be more dangerous than the original East-West Cold War as there are not the same “safety mechanisms” in place. Hague asserts: “It is a crisis coming down the tracks,” “Because they are clearly continuing their nuclear weapons programme … If they obtain nuclear weapons capability, then I think other nations across the Middle East will want to develop nuclear weapons. “And so, the most serious round of nuclear proliferation since nuclear weapons were invented would have begun with all the destabilising effects in the Middle East. And the threat of a new cold war in the Middle East without necessarily all the safety mechanisms … That would be a disaster in world affairs.” The **current** and ongoing **crisis over** the issue of **Iran’s nuclear ambitions** castes into relief the debate over nuclear proliferation. Does **proliferation seriously endanger global security?** William Hague’s interview would point in that direction, founded on his belief that a nuclear Iran would result in a cascade as the Middle East races to acquire them. However,importantly there has been alternative opinion’s expressed - RUSI’s [the defence think tank] Shashank Joshi is of the opinion that fears over Iran are being exaggerated. He asserts **“If we could live with nuclear weapons in the hands of totalitarian, genocidal states like Stalin’s Russia or Mao’s China, Iran** in contrast - whatever its repulsive internal policies and adventurism abroad - **is far more rational,”** Mr Joshi said **Iran may not be actively pursuing the creation of nuclear weapons but leaving the option open as an insurance policy. “If they feel their regime is under existential threat, if they feel they face a Libya-like situation, they would have the option of building a bomb.” Thus**, this **ties in with** the **realist argument that states act in their own self interest in seeking security** **but also linking in with Waltz’s idea that nuclear proliferation might** also **create security** by creating more rational actors understanding the consequences of a ‘balance of terror’.

**Nuclear weapons will transform their beliefs—strategy and empirically proven**

**Cha 01** (Victor D. Professor (Ph.D. Columbia, MA Oxford, BA Columbia) is director of Asian Studies and holds the D.S. Song Chair in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, The Deputy Head of Delegation for the United States at the Six Party Talks in Beijing, and received two Outstanding Service commendations during his tenure at the NSC. “The second nuclear age: Proliferation pessimism versus sober optimism in South Asia and East Asia”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 24:4, 79-120)kyan

Proliferation pessimists therefore underestimate the transformative effects of nuclear weapons on these new proliferators. They assume that the interests for aspiring nuclear powers remain constant in the pre- and post-acquisition phases. They do not consider that once states cross the nuclear threshold, they become acutely aware of the dangers and responsibilities that come with these new awesome capabilities. The likelihood of such a learning process occurring is even higher if nuclear weapons are valued for their political currency. As noted above, while security needs certainly drive proliferation in Asia, a predominant factor that cannot be disentangled from this dynamic is the striving for prestige and international recognition as an NWS state. Moreover, if the taboo equates the use of nuclear weapons with an 'uncivilized' or 'barbarian' state," then those states that are status-conscious will be that much more attuned to the taboo. The effects of the taboo on Asian proliferators are therefore both regulative and constitutive. In the former sense, as these states further embed themselves in the international community (discussed below), this change heightens the costs of breaking any rules regarding nuclear use. The taboo's constitutive effects also are evident in that any use would undermine one of the primary purposes for which the capabilities were sought (e.g., prestige, badge of modernity). Although it is still relatively early in the game, there is some evidence that the acquisition of nuclear capabilities has been accompanied by a change in preferences about what is acceptable behavior. While India has rejected any notions that it might roll back its newfound capability, it has readily admitted that as an incipient nuclear weapons state, it now has certain responsibilities that include a no-first-use policy and not sharing nuclear weapons technology with other irresponsible states. Similarly, Pakistan previously placed little value and even resented nonproliferation norms as these were seen as inhibiting and degrading to the national character. Otherwise, they might have been swayed by the benefits of not responding to the Indian tests as a shining example of a country adhering to nuclear nonproliferation norms. Arguably it is only after becoming an incipient nuclear weapons state that such arguments about nonproliferation gain value. Nowhere is this perverse dynamic more evident than in both sides' views of the CTBT. Previously perceived as an instrument intended to preempt nuclear spread beyond the first age, the CTBT is now arguably seen by India and Pakistan in less antagonistic terms, and even among some, as a responsibility to be borne as a nuclear state

**Prolif not the cause of war – Leaders use words not nukes**

**Gartzke & Jo 09** (Erik Gartzke is an associate professor of Political Science at Columbia University, Dong-Joon Jo is in the Department of International Relations at the University of Seoul; “Bargaining, Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes”; Journal of Conflict Resolution; 1/30/2009;  <http://jcr.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/53/2/209.full.pdf>)

Just right could result from mixing “too hot” and “too cold.” Yet there are tremendous incentives for leaders to correctly gauge strategic conditions. Proliferation¶ almost certainly alters the balance of power. States that acquire nuclear weapons see¶ their military capabilities change, increasing dramatically the ability of these states¶ to inflict harm. Nuclear nations and competitors will benefit most if they adjust¶ diplomatic bargains in response to evolving strategic conditions rather than choosing to fight costly and unnecessary battles. Whether leaders judge circumstances correctly or err in some manner is key to assessing the consequences of proliferation.¶ What evidence is there that leaders err in equilibrium? War is rare. Even perennial¶ rivals, with both means and motive, typically interact through words rather than force.¶ Many purported precursors are omnipresent. At the very least, the timing of conflicts¶ remains unclear. Conflicts should be more common if factors that are regularly present are the cause. If instead, disputes result from misperception, then it must be that¶ the errors that precipitate disputes occur relatively infrequently, implying that states¶ regularly identify mutually acceptable bargains, and that the presence of nuclear¶ weapons is not sufficient for war. It is easier to explain the infrequent, episodic nature¶ of warfare if leaders’ estimates and initiatives usually match empirical conditions.

# AT: NPT

# --Fails

**NPT fails – it only prevents peaceful states from gaining nuclear arsenals.**

**Carpenter 04** – CATO Institute vice president for defense and foreign policy studies (Ted Galen, “Not All Forms of Nuclear Proliferation are Equally Bad”, 11/21/04; < [http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/not-all-forms-nuclear-proliferation-are-equally-bad>)//AB](http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/not-all-forms-nuclear-proliferation-are-equally-bad%3e)//AB)

The conventional wisdom is that all instances of nuclear weapons proliferation threaten the stability of the international system and the security interests of the United States. Indeed, that is the underlying logic of the **Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty**, adopted by the bulk of the international community in the late 1960s, which is the centerpiece of the existing nonproliferation system. Members of the arms control community have over the decades spent an enormous amount of time and energy agonizing over the possibility that stable, democratic status quo powers such as Germany, Japan, Sweden and South Korea might decide to abandon the treaty and develop nuclear weapons. Indeed, they have devoted at least as much attention to that problem as they have to the prospect that unstable or aggressive states might build nuclear arsenals. The recent flap over the small scale (and probably unauthorized) nuclear experiments in South Korea is merely the latest example of such misplaced priorities. The hostility toward all forms of proliferation is not confined to dovish arms control types but extends across the political spectrum. As the North Korean nuclear crisis evolved in 2002 and 2003, some of the most hawkish members of the U.S. foreign policy community became terrified at the prospect that America's democratic allies in East Asia might build their own nuclear deterrents to offset Pyongyang's moves. Neoconservative luminaries Robert Kagan and William Kristol regarded such proliferation with horror: "The possibility that Japan, and perhaps even Taiwan, might respond to North Korea's actions by producing their own nuclear weapons, thus spurring an East Asian nuclear arms race . . . is something that should send chills up the spine of any sensible American strategist." That attitude misconstrues the problem. A threat to the peace may exist if an aggressive and erratic regime gets nukes and then is able to intimidate or blackmail its non-nuclear neighbors. **Nuclear arsenals in the hands of stable, democratic, status quo powers do not threaten the peace of the region**. Kagan and Kristol -- and other Americans who share their hostility toward such countries having nuclear weapons -- **implicitly accept** a moral **equivalence between a potential aggressor and its potential victims**. **America's current nonproliferation policy** is the international equivalent of domestic gun control laws, and exhibits the same faulty logic. Gun control laws have **had little effect on preventing criminal** elements from **acquiring weapons**. Instead, they **disarm honest citizens** and make them more vulnerable to armed predators. The **nonproliferation system** is having a similar perverse effect. Such unsavory states as **Iran and North Korea are well along on the path to becoming nuclear powers while their more peaceful neighbors are hamstrung by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty from countering those moves.**

**The NPT is failing – maintaining the agreement risks nuclear war.**

**Wesley 05** (Michael, executive director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney, Australia. “It's time to scrap the NPT”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 59:3, 283-299)kyan

Clearly the NPT’s days are numbered; the major policy challenge is how to design a more stable and effective nuclear weapons regime in a post-NPT world. Unlike the NPT, an effective new regime would concentrate mainly on the nuclear weapons states, and return the attention of the international community to the important issues surrounding the possession, storage and possible use of nuclear weapons. Once the inevitability of limited proliferation is accepted, it will free up the resources and attention needed to develop more traditional and stabilising arms control agreements. As several participants in the debate over proliferation have noted, the stakes are too high with nuclear weapons to rely on conventional risk analyses (Sagan and Waltz 1995). For this reason, it is dangerous to rely on a regime whose shortcomings are unlikely ever to be remedied. It is time to let the NPT go, and begin work on a regime that has a better chance of keeping ours and succeeding generations free of the horrors of nuclear war**.**

# --Turns

**NPT makes prolif opaque, causes nuke terror, and guarantees conflict**

**Wesley 05** (Michael, executive director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney, Australia. “It's time to scrap the NPT”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 59:3, 283-299)kyan

My central argument is that the horizontal **proliferation** of nuclear weapons **will** probably **continue at the rate of one or two additional nuclear weapons states per decade**, **whether or not the NPT is retained**. **Persisting with the NPT will make this proliferation much more dangerous t**han if the NPT is replaced with a more practical regime. I argue that the **NPT is a major cause of opaque proliferation, which is both highly destabilising and makes use of transnational smuggling networks which are much more likely than states to pass nuclear components to terrorists.** On the other hand, scrapping the NPT in favour of a more realistic regime governing the possession of nuclear weapons would help put transnational nuclear smuggling networks out of business and stabilise the inevitable spread of nuclear weapons. **The NPT was always a flawed regime, based on an unequal distribution of status and security**. Its apparent effectiveness in containing nuclear proliferation was largely due to other factors. The events of the past 15 years have only magnified the NPT’s flaws. The end of the Cold War decoupled the possession of nuclear weapons from the global power structure. While many commentators were applauding the expansion of the number of NPT signatories, and **South Africa, South Korea, Brazil and Argentina renounced plans to acquire nuclear weapons, deeper and more insistent proliferation** pressures were building among the emerging great powers of Asia. The succession of Persian Gulf wars demonstrated to many insecure states that only nuclear\*/not chemical or biological\*/weapons deter conventional military **attack. The international community was repeatedly surprised by the extent and sophistication of Iraq’s, Pakistan’s, North Korea’s and Libya’s progress in acquiring nuclear materials and know-how, each time underlining the inadequacies of the non-proliferation regime. After** the 1998 South Asian nuclear tests, India’s highly effective rhetorical defence of its policy and the world’s half-hearted and short-lived sanctions against India and Pakistan damaged the moral authority of the NPT regime, perhaps terminally. Even worse than being ineffective, **the NPT is dangerous, because it increases the pressures for opaque proliferation and heightens nuclear instability.** Equally flawed, I argue, is the current counter-proliferation doctrine of the United States. I advocate scrapping the NPT (and the doctrine of counter-proliferation) **and starting again, because the NPT is a failing regime that is consuming diplomatic resources that could be more effectively used to build an alternative arms control regime that is responsive to current circumstances**. We need to confront the practicalities of scrapping the NPT\*/the positives and the negatives\*/and think clearly about the requirements of a replacement regime.

**NPT causes opaque prolif--risks miscalculation and spread of nuclear materials to terrorists.**

**Wesley 05** (Michael, executive director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney, Australia. “It's time to scrap the NPT”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 59:3, 283-299)kyan

By prohibiting proliferation, without the capacity or moral authority to enforce such a prohibition, the NPT makes opaque proliferation the only option for aspiring nuclear weapons states.4 Opaque proliferation is destabilising to regional security. It breeds miscalculation\*/both overestimation of a state’s nuclear weapons development (as shown by the case of Iraq), and under- estimation (in the case of Libya)\*/that can force neighbouring states into potentially catastrophic moves. Even more dangerous, argues Lewis Dunn, is the likelihood that states with covert nuclear weapons programs will develop weak failsafe mechanisms and nuclear doctrine that is destabilising: In camera decision making may result in uncontrolled programs, less attention to safety and control problems and only limited assessment of the risks of nuclear weapon deployments or use. The necessary exercises cannot be conducted, nor can procedures for handling nuclear warheads be practised, nor alert procedures tested. As a result, the risk of accidents or incidents may rise greatly in the event of deployment in a crisis or a conventional conflict. Miscalculations by neighbours or outsiders also appear more likely, given their uncertainties about the adversary’s capabilities, as well as their lack of information to judge whether crisis deployments mean that war is imminent (1991: 20, italics in original). And because both the NPT and the current US counter-proliferation doctrine place such emphasis on preventing and reversing the spread of nuclear weapons, states such as Pakistan, which desperately need assistance with both failsafe technology and stabilising nuclear doctrine, have been suspicious of US offers of assistance (Pregenzer 2003). As the dramatic revelations of the nature and extent of the A. Q. Khan network showed, some states undertaking opaque proliferation have been prepared to rely on transnational smuggling networks to gain vital components, materials and knowledge. Quite apart from the incapacity of the NPT regime to deal with this new form of proliferation (Clary 2004), such non-state networks raise very real risks that for the right price, criminals or other facilitators could pass nuclear materials to terrorist groups or extortionists (Albright and Hinderstein 2005). Both through its inadequacies and its obsessive focus on stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, the NPT could be contributing to the ultimate nightmare: terrorists armed with nuclear or radiological weapons. 

**NPT spurs prolif—allows cover proliferators to steal tech**

**Wesley 05** (Michael, executive director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney, Australia. “It's time to scrap the NPT”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 59:3, 283-299)kyan

Some of the causes of the NPT’s declining effectiveness in containing nuclear proliferation have been rehearsed above. However the main cause of its ineffectiveness is structural: as Frank Barnaby observes, ‘The problem is that military and peaceful nuclear programs are, for the most part, virtually identical’ (1993: 126). This directly erodes the viability of the deal that lies at the heart of the NPT: that non-nuclear weapons states agree not to try to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for assistance with peaceful nuclear programs, should they want them. The NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are thus simultaneously engaged in promoting and controlling two types of nuclear technology that are virtually indistinguishable until a point very close to the threshold of assembling the components of a nuclear weapon. For many states that have contemplated the nuclear option, **adherence to the NPT thus actually makes it easier to obtain cutting edge nuclear technology and dual-use components** that could be applied to a nuclear weapons program (Dunn 1991: 23). As Barnaby argues, ‘Under [Article X of] the NPT, a country can legally manufacture the components of a nuclear weapon, notify the IAEA and the UN Security Council that it is withdrawing from the Treaty, and then assemble its nuclear weapons’(1993: 124). Although the IAEA’s inspections role has been strengthened during the course of the 1990s, there is little prospect that its powers will be increased to such a level that it will be able to counter the highly sophisticated deception programs mounted by most covert proliferators. The only remedy to this dilemma has been to question the need of states such as Iran for peaceful nuclear power and to doubt the veracity of their statements that they do not intend to acquire nuclear weapons. This only further opens the regime up to charges of selectivity, unfairness and politicisation (Jones 1998).

# AT: Instability

**Prolif doesn’t lead to regional conflicts – it’s the other way around**

**Gartzke & Jo 09** (Erik Gartzke is an associate professor of Political Science at Columbia University, Dong-Joon Jo is in the Department of International Relations at the University of Seoul; “Bargaining, Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes”; Journal of Conflict Resolution; 1/30/2009;  <http://jcr.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/53/2/209.full.pdf>)

The decision to proliferate is also endogenous to conflict. Nations are not assigned¶ nuclear weapons at random but select into nuclear status despite high costs, long¶ delays in development, and international opprobrium. Countries with significant¶ security problems or responsibilities and substantial governmental resources are more¶ prone to seek nuclear weapons (Jo and Gartzke 2007). These same nations fight more¶ often, not because they possess a nuclear arsenal but because the causes of conflict¶ also prompt states to proliferate. Nations with few enemies, modest resources, limited¶ technology, or little dissatisfaction about world affairs are unlikely to pursue nuclear¶ capabilities and also are less inclined to fight. Thus, nominal nuclear status probably¶ overstates the empirical effect of proliferation in propagating interstate disputes.

**Internal instability won’t trigger nuclear conflict, and, even if it did, it wouldn’t escalate.**

**Waltz 81 –** London International Institute for Strategic Studies (Kenneth, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better”, 1981; < <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm)//AB>

Third, although highly unstable states are unlikely to initiate nuclear projects, such projects, begun in stable times, may continue through periods of political turmoil and suc­ceed in producing nuclear weapons. A nuclear state may be unstable or may become so. But **what is hard to comprehend is why, in an inter­nal struggle for power, any of the contenders should start using nuclear weapons.** Who would they aim at? How would they use them as instruments for maintaining or gaining control? I see little more reason to fear that one faction or another in some less developed country will fire atomic weapons in a struggle for political power than that they will be used in a crisis of succession in the Soviet Union or China. One or another nuclear state will experience uncertainty of succession, fierce struggles for power, and instability of regime. Those who fear the worst have not shown with any plausibility how those expected events may lead to the use of nuclear weapons. Fourth, the **possibility of one side in a civil war firing a nuclear warhead** at its opponent's stronghold nevertheless remains. Such an act **would produce a national tragedy. not an inter­national one**. This question then arises: Once the weapon is fired, what happens next? The domestic use of nuclear weapons is, of all the uses imaginable, **least likely to lead to escalation and to threaten the stability of the central balance**. The United States and the Soviet Union, and other countries as well, would have the strongest reasons to issue warnings and to assert control.

# AT: CMR

**Military leaders will use nuclear weapons responsibly – they don’t like the uncertainties of nuclear conflict.**

**Waltz 81 –** London International Institute for Strategic Studies (Kenneth, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better”, 1981; < <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm)//AB>

Fifth, in some of the new nuclear states, civil control of the military maybe shaky. **Nuclear weapons may fall into the hands of military officers** more inclined than civilians to put them to offensive use. This again is an old worry. I can see no reason to think that civil control of the military is secure in the Soviet Union given the occasional presence of serv­ing officers in the Politburo and some known and some surmised instances of military inter­vention in civil affairs at critical times. And in the People's Republic of China military and civil branches of government have been not separated but fused. Although one may prefer **civil control, preventing a highly destructive war does not require it**. What is required is that decisions be made that keep destruction within bounds, whether decisions are made by civil­ians or soldiers. **Soldiers may he more cautious than civilians.** Generals and admirals **do not like uncertainty**, and they do not lack patriot­ism. They do not like to fight conventional wars under unfamiliar conditions. The **offen­sive use of nuclear weapons multiplies uncertainties.** Nobody knows what a nuclear battlefield would look like, and nobody knows what happens after the first city is hit. *Uncertainty* about the course that a nuclear war might follow, along with the *certainty* that destruction can he immense, **strongly inhibits the first use of nuclear weapons.**

# AT: Second Strike Key

**Second Strike not necessary—use it or lose it logic is flawed and empirically, first strike uncertainty checks**

**Cha 01** (Victor D. Professor (Ph.D. Columbia, MA Oxford, BA Columbia) is director of Asian Studies and holds the D.S. Song Chair in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, The Deputy Head of Delegation for the United States at the Six Party Talks in Beijing, and received two Outstanding Service commendations during his tenure at the NSC. “The second nuclear age: Proliferation pessimism versus sober optimism in South Asia and East Asia”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 24:4, 79-120)kyan

Proliferation pessimists fixate on assured second-strike capabilities as the primary agent of deterrence and underestimate the validity of other forms of deterrence among smaller nuclear powers. The pessimist's assessment rests on faith in the 'use or lose' logic - that is, that when states do not have assured second-strike capabilities, they live in constant fear of being vulnerable to a debilitating first strike. Thus, in a crisis between adversaries with small nuclear forces, the incentive to preempt (as well as the fear of being preempted upon) becomes high, giving rise to a destabilizing 'use-orlose' mentality. There are two problems with this argument. First, in deductive terms, there is no denying that assured second-strike capabilities can form the backbone of stable deterrence; however, it does not mean that the absence of this condition necessarily leads to instability. Second, the empirical record does not bear out the 'use-or-lose' argument. As Hagerty notes, in all of the crises involving smaller nuclear powers (Cuba 1962, Sino-Soviet 1969, Arab-Israeli 1973, Kashmir 1990), preemption has not occurred. Instead what appears to operate among smaller nuclear powers is existential deterrence: '...the mere existence of nuclear forces means that, whatever we say or do, there is a certain irreducible risk that an armed conflict might escalate into a nuclear war. The fear of escalation is thus factored into political calculations: faced with this risk, states are more cautious and more prudent than they otherwise would be.' What therefore prevails in the second nuclear age in Asia may not be assured second-strike capability but 'first-strike uncertainty'. Stable deterrence derives from having just enough capabilities to raise uncertainty in the mind of the opponent that s/he cannot neutralize you with a firststrike. The precedent for this form of deterrence had already been set by the second-tier nuclear powers in the first age. As Goldstein's study shows, existential deterrent doctrines drove China, Britain, and France's pursuit of an independent but not second-strike assured nuclear deterrent against their respective superpower adversaries. In the new nuclear age in Asia where cost constraints among new proliferators will be acute, smaller arsenals counter-intuitively will not incite attack. In addition, the opaque conditions under which programs in Asia develop enhance first-strike uncertainty, as worst-case assessments generally tend to err on the side of caution.

# \*\*Other\*\*

# Prolif → Stable Heg Transition

**Prolif makes heg transition stable preventing great power war.**

**Alagappa ‘8** (Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow – East-West Center, in “The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, Ed. Muthiah Alagappa , p. 484)kyan

The fear of escalation to nuclear war conditions the role of force in major power relations and circumscribes strategic interaction among them. By restraining measures and actions that could lead to conflict escalation, nuclear weapons limit the competitive strategic interaction of major powers to internal and external balancing for deterrence purposes; constrain their resort to coercive diplomacy and cornpellence; and shift the burden of international competition and adjustment in status and influence to the economic, political, and diplomatic arenas. **They also render remote the possibility of a hegemonic war should a power transition occur in the region**. More immediately, nuclear weapons enable Russia and China to deter the much stronger United States and mitigate the negative consequences of the imbalance in conventional military capability. Nuclear weapons reinforce India's confidence in dealing with China. By reducing military vulnerabilities and providing insurance against unexpected contingencies, nuclear weapons enable major powers to take a long view and engage in competition as well as cooperation with potential adversaries. Differences and disputes among them are frozen or settled through negotiations. Though they are not the only or even primary factor driving strategic visions and policies, nuclear weapons are an important consideration, especially in the role of force in major power strategic interaction. They prevent the outbreak of large-scale war. Military clashes when they occur tend to be limited.

# AT: Saudi Prolif

**Alt cause: Pakistan will give the Saudis nukes.**

**Edelman et al 11** – Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and US Undersecretary of Defense 2005-2009 (Eric S., “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran”, January/February 2011; < [http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran>)//AB](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran%3e)//AB)

Alternatively, **Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia** and **deploy nuclear weapons**, delivery systems, and troops **on Saudi territory,** a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India.

**That triggers Indo-Pak war.**

**Edelman et al 11** – Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and US Undersecretary of Defense 2005-2009 (Eric S., “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran”, January/February 2011; < [http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran>)//AB](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran%3e)//AB)

The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how **India would** respond. Would it **target Pakistan's weapons in Saudi Arabia** with its own conventional or **nuclear weapons**? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India's reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the **Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their** **own**. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT.

# Venezuela

**Venezuela cancelled its nuclear program.**

**BBC 11** – (“Hugo Chavez calls off Venezuela’s nuclear energy plans”, 3/17/11; < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12768148>)//AB

Venezuela signed a deal with a Russian company last year to develop a nuclear power plant over the next decade. But Mr. Chavez said events in Japan showed the dangers of developing nuclear power were too great. Chile has said it still aims to sign a nuclear accord with the US next week despite the crisis in Japan. Countries around the world have been reconsidering their nuclear policies in the face of the crisis at Japan's Fukushima nuclear complex triggered by last week's huge earthquake and tsunami. **President Chavez said he was calling off Venezuela's plans to build a nuclear plant.** "It is something extremely risky and dangerous for the whole world," he said. "Despite the great technology and advances that Japan has, look at what is happening with some of its nuclear reactors." Mr Chavez added that global concerns about the safety of nuclear power would boost demand for Venezuela's oil exports.

# Empirics

**Prefer our ev—empirics prove**

**Asal and Beardsley 07** (\*Victor, Department of Political Science, State University of New York, Albany and \*\*Kyle, Department of Political Science, Emore Universtiy “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 44, no. 2, 2007, pp. 139–155 Sage Publications [www.saramitchell.org/Asalbeardsley.pdf](http://www.saramitchell.org/Asalbeardsley.pdf)) kyan)

**To study the impact of nuclear weapons on international crisis** behavior, **we employ the International Crisis Behavior** (ICB) **dataset** (Brecher & Wilkenfeld, 2000). **The database includes 434 international crises from 1918 to 2001**. Following Huth & Russett (1990), **the set of crises should be an appropriate set of cases because these are all instances in which some challenge or threat is made**, and there is some possibility of deterrence success or failure. In this way, the mechanisms specific to immediate deterrence are tested, which Morgan (2003) notes are generally understudied in the deterrence literature. An actor is defined as being in crisis when some value is threatened, there is a finite time to react to the threat, and there is an increase in the perception of military hostilities.

**Cold war proves—prevented major conventional wars**

**Koehl 9**—Senior Fellow, Transatlantic Security and Industry Program (Stuart, “Destabilization and Disarmament: Fewer nukes mean more risk”, SEP 24, 2009, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/016/993kkohs.asp>,) kyan

Imagine, then, a world without any nuclear weapons whatsoever. Back in the days when Dr. Helen Caldicott was calling not just for a nuclear freeze, but for total nuclear disarmament, my friends and I sported buttons and T-shirts saying, "BAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS", in big, bold print; underneath, in smaller letters, they added, "Make The World Safe for Conventional War". It was sophomoric, sure (we were, after all, sophomores), but it raised a valid point. Without the inhibitions imposed by nuclear weapons, there was really nothing to constrain the propensity of some countries to settle disputes by warfare, and nothing to restrain the level at which wars were waged. That is, while the U.S. and USSR engaged in a deadly global conflict for forty years, during that time each was careful to avoid a direct confrontation with the other, fighting mainly through surrogates, and limiting both the geographic scope and levels of violence in these proxy wars. Given the superiority of the USSR in conventional armaments, it is most likely that, absent the extension of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, there would have been a major conventional war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact at some point in the Cold War. Only a massive expansion of U.S. and NATO conventional forces to match Soviet conventional forces could have prevented it. In turn, the U.S. and its allies would have had to expend far more on defense, and much less on peaceful activities. Instead of spending 3 to 5 percent of GDP on military forces, they would have had to spend somewhere in the vicinity of 15 to 20 percent (at its peak, the Soviet Union was spending somewhere between 40 to 50 percent of its GDP on the defense sector), which in turn would probably have depressed the rate of economic expansion. Nuclear weapons are cheap, and conventional forces are very, very expensive in comparison.

**India and Pakistan prove**

**Tepperman 09** (Jonathan, Newsweek international deputy editor, former deputy managing editor of Foreign Affairs magazine and wrote frequently on international affairs, politics, and books LL.M. in International Law from NYU, a member of the New York State bar and a Fellow of the New York Institute of Humanities.. Aug 28, 2009 “Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb” <http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248/page/1)kyan>

The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear-armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests. Sumit Ganguly, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it.

# Methodology

**Realist predictions fail with prolif**

**Hymans**, **06** ([Jacques E. C. Hymans](http://www.tandfonline.com/action/doSearch?action=runSearch&type=advanced&result=true&prevSearch=%2Bauthorsfield%3A%28Hymans%2C+Jacques+E.+C.%29) is an Assistant Professor at the School of International Relations University of Southern California; “THEORIES OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION¶ The State of the Field”; 2006; [http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~hymans/Hymans2006Theories.pdf](http://www-bcf.usc.edu/%7Ehymans/Hymans2006Theories.pdf))

The basic empirical problem for realism is on the macro level: its consistent overprediction of overall proliferation. Tomorrow, of course, may not be like today; but if we¶ wish to anticipate any significant changes to the status quo of widespread nuclear¶ abstention, we first have to admit and offer credible explanations for that status quo.¶ Realism has trouble doing this.¶ A second empirical problem is on a more micro-level; realism\*even in its ‘‘softer’’¶ forms\*is baffled by the empirical patterns of proliferation and nonproliferation. Why, for¶ instance, France but not Germany or Japan? Why South Africa but not Sweden or Saudi¶ Arabia? Why India in 1998 but not India in 1968? One can find ad hoc explanations for this¶ or that anomalous case, but the fact that there are so many anomalies suggests that a¶ more fundamental shift in our approach is needed. Indeed, even those cases that on the¶ surface seem to confirm realist intuitions actually become much cloudier on closer¶ inspection. For instance, the 1970s Argentine military junta, which many confidently list as¶ a former seeker of nuclear weapons, actually viewed the bomb as a ‘‘strategic absurdity.’’¶ 18¶ And even Israel’s path toward the bomb has been infinitely longer and more tortuous than¶ would seem to be ‘‘merited’’ by its technical capacities and difficult security position.¶ 19¶ In sum, while realists have rightly focused attention on the important supply side of¶ the proliferation equation, historical experience clearly disconfirms realist intuitions about¶ the likely level of demand for nuclear weapons.

**Comprehensive analysis shows 6 broad trends—prefer, individual studies have flawed methodologies**

**Moore 11** (Jonathan D., Master thesis to the Josef Korbel School of International Studies University of Denver. “Products of their environment? nuclear proliferation and the emerging multipolar international system”)kyan

Even among forecasts with similar theories, vast differences in methodology exist. Moeed Yusuf of the Brookings institution demonstrates the history of nuclear forecasts and believes it a “paradox” that such a large number of forecasts of nuclear weapons proliferation have incorrectly predicted future proliferation.9 Yusuf explains that the failure is due to flaws in methodology10 and outlines 6 “broad lessons” that can be learned from past forecasting failures: 1. Consistent misjudgments regarding the extent of nuclear proliferation 2. While all the countries that did eventually develop nuclear weapons were on the lists of suspect states, the estimations misjudged *when* these countries would go nuclear. 3. The pace of proliferation has been consistently *slower* than has been anticipated by most experts due to a combination of overwhelming alarmism, the intent of threshold states, and many incentives to abstain from weapons development. 4. The debate concerning the size of future arsenals of the various nuclear powers produced mixed results. 5. The tone of predictive studies was not always consistent with contemporaneous events. 6. There is evidence that over the long-term, external assistance was a major factor in proliferation

**Their authors’ realist predictions on proliferation are empirically wrong**

**Hymans**, **06** ([Jacques E. C. Hymans](http://www.tandfonline.com/action/doSearch?action=runSearch&type=advanced&result=true&prevSearch=%2Bauthorsfield%3A%28Hymans%2C+Jacques+E.+C.%29) is an Assistant Professor at the School of International Relations University of Southern California; “THEORIES OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION¶ The State of the Field”; 2006; [http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~hymans/Hymans2006Theories.pdf](http://www-bcf.usc.edu/%7Ehymans/Hymans2006Theories.pdf))

The realist take on proliferation is straightforward and intuitive. But realist predictions of a¶ ‘‘nuclear-armed crowd,’’ made consistently since at least the advent of the French bomb in¶ 1960, have just as consistently turned out to be wrong.¶ 8¶ As Figure 1 shows, only about¶ one-fifth of the states that could have built nuclear weapons by now have in fact done so;¶ and this big gap between potential and actual nuclear weapon states hardly developed¶ yesterday.¶ 9¶ Moreover, the pace of proliferation has been essentially unchanged since the¶ 1950s. This stability has endured despite multiple and major shocks to the nonproliferation¶ norm. No wonder William Arkin has dubbed the study of proliferation ‘‘the sky-is-stillfalling profession.’’¶ 10

# “Nuclear Phobia”

**The neg is trapped in a logic of ‘nuclear phobia’- they play on irrational fears about nuclear weapons- prefer our rational analysis**

**Newsweek International, 09** (Jonathan Tepperman, Foreign Affairs, “Learning to Love The Bomb“, Sept. 14, 2009, jld)

Put this all together and nuclear weapons start to seem a lot less frightening. So why have so few people in Washington recognized this? **Most of us suffer from what Desch calls a nuclear phobia, an irrational fear that's grounded in good evidence--nuclear weapons are -terrifying--but that keeps us from making clear, coldblooded calculations about just how dangerous possessing them actually is. The logic of nuclear peace rests on a scary bargain: you accept a small chance that something extremely bad will happen in exchange for a much bigger chance that something very bad--conventional war--won't happen**. This may well be a rational bet to take, especially if that first risk is very small indeed. But it's a tough case to make to the public. Still, it's worth keeping in mind as Obama coaxes the world toward nuclear disarmament--especially because he's destined to fail. **The Russians and Chinese have shown little inclination to give up their nukes, for several reasons--chief among them that the U.S. is vastly more powerful in conventional terms, and these weapons are thus their main way of leveling the playing field**. Moscow and Beijing would likely be unmoved by anything short of a unilateral U.S. disarmament, which no one in Washington contemplates. And even if Russia and China (and France, Britain, Israel, India, and Pakistan) could be coaxed to abandon their weapons, we'd still live with the fear that any of them could quickly and secretly rearm. Meanwhile, the U.S. campaign to slow Iran's weapons program and reverse North Korea's is also unlikely to work. **States want nukes if they feel their survival is in jeopardy**. The Obama administration may have dropped talk of regime change, but it continues to threaten Pyongyang and Tehran. That ensures the standoff will continue**, for so long as these states feel insecure, they'll never give up their nuclear dreams. Given this reality, the Obama administration would be wiser to focus on making the world we actually live in--the nuclear world--safer.** This involves several steps, few of which the Obama administration has mentioned but which it should emphasize in its Nuclear Posture Review, due at the end of the year. To start, **the logic of deterrence works only if everybody knows who has a nuclear arsenal and thus can't be attacked**--as Peter Sellers puts it in Stanley Kubrick's Dr. Strangelove, "The whole point of a Doomsday Machine is lost if you keep it a secret!" So the United States should make sure everyone knows roughly who has what, to keep anyone from getting dangerous ideas.

# No Iran Bomb

**Iran can’t develop weaponized nukes – cyberattacks, costs, and internal crises.**

**Krepinevich et al 11** – President of Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and Contributor to Foreign Affairs (Andrew, “The War Over Containing Iran”, March/April 2011; < [http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67474/dima-adamsky-karim-sadjadpour-and-diane-de-gramont-shahram-chubi/the-war-over-containing-iran>)//AB](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67474/dima-adamsky-karim-sadjadpour-and-diane-de-gramont-shahram-chubi/the-war-over-containing-iran%3e)//AB)

Seen from Tehran, the world today does not look as rosy as it did a few years ago. The United States has taken steps to offset and dilute any strategic benefits that Iran might gain from a nuclear capability. Crossing the nuclear threshold would create a more united Gulf Cooperation Council while solidifying and possibly increasing the U.S. military presence in the region. The status motivations for a nuclear capability seem questionable in light of North Korea's unenviable condition and its fellow failing nuclear state, Pakistan. The Iranian nuclear program itself is facing difficulties as a result of its patchwork sourcing, the tightening **embargo on technology**, and **cyberattacks**. Crossing the weaponization threshold would require a **massive stock of indigenous fissile** **material**, which in turn would spell the **end of any future nuclear energy program**, whereas stopping short of that threshold could still confer many of the assumed benefits of crossing it. In the event of a strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, most of its potential avenues of retaliation would be either counterproductive (such as attacks on the Gulf states or the Strait of Hormuz) or difficult to carry out repeatedly (such as attacks by proxies). Meanwhile, Iran itself is in transition. The regime has swapped a degree of popular legitimacy for reliance on a more limited base and intensified repression. All political issues now revolve around succession struggles, namely, who will replace President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The Iranian government understandably feels vulnerable domestically due to generational and demographic changes and schisms among the elite. Under these circumstances, Iran's revolutionary model of strategic defiance may have begun to lose its appeal in the region. In Iran itself, bombastic rhetoric has largely been discredited in the eyes of citizens who prefer a government that can perform and deliver -- in short, Chinese-style performance-based legitimacy.

# Bioweapons Cards

Biological weapons outweigh nuclear weapons – they are cheaper, more likely, and not geographically limited

Washington Times, 08 – (editorial, “Worse than nuclear threat,” Washington Times, July 10, 2008) //JH

Of the three sorts, biological weapons might be the easiest to reproduce safely in a lab, assuming one knows what to do. A biological agent, as a weapon of mass destruction or a terror weapon, is the least expensive as well as the easiest to disseminate. A biological agent does not need a delivery mechanism and can be transported by one person. It can pass undetected through customs and border guards, given that it is odorless and colorless.¶ All that is needed to spread an epidemic of botulism, for example, or mad cow disease is to hang around a truck stop for a few hours until a semi pulling a load of cattle on its way to market drives in. Wait until the driver leaves his load unattended, then scrub a previously infected rag around the railings and the mouths of a few of the cattle, and let nature do the rest. The disadvantage, for the terrorist, is that the person carrying the rag is likely to become infected. However, with no shortage of jihadists queuing up to become “martyrs,” finding two or three volunteers willing to die a horrible, slow and excruciatingly painful death should be no problem.¶ From a financial and cost-effective perspective, biological agents remain the cheapest and, in all probability, the most likely agents of mass destruction to become available to terrorist groups.¶ In their haste to leave training camps and bases of operation in Afghanistan in the wake of rapidly advancing U.S. forces, al Qaeda agents left behind piles of documents, including videotapes showing tests and the effects of chemical agents on animals.¶ Chemical weapons are more cumbersome to produce, require larger amounts to cause enough damage to leave a psychological scar and require a delivery mechanism such as an artillery shell.¶ A biological agent can cause far more deaths than a nuclear weapon, because it is not limited geographically, unlike a nuclear bomb. For example, an infected truck driver in Omaha, Neb., infects an Army sergeant he meets in a diner outside Tulsa, Okla.¶ The sergeant travels by plane to New York, where he changes planes, boarding one bound for Frankfurt, Germany. Again, he changes planes, this time flying to Kuwait, where he joins up with several members of his unit heading into Iraq. Along the way, the sergeant has infected scores of people at every airport between Omaha and Baghdad. Those people in turn would have traveled on to Australia, South America, Canada, European cities and other parts of the world. Within a few days, people from Sydney, Australia, to Seattle could start dying.

Fastest timeframe – weaponized versions of the worst diseases in human history will exist within the decade

Kellman, 08 -- the director of the International Weapons Control Center at the DePaul University College of Law (Barry, “Bioviolence: A Growing Threat,” The Futurist, June, 2008) // JH

A looming danger confronts the¶ world—the threat of bioviolence.¶ It is a danger that will only grow in¶ the future, yet we are increasingly¶ failing to confront it. With every¶ passing day, committing a biocatastrophe¶ becomes a bit easier, and this¶ condition will perpetuate for as long¶ as science progresses.¶ Biological warfare is as old as conflict,¶ of course, but in terms of the¶ objectives of traditional warfare—¶ gaining territory or resources, compelling¶ the surrender of an opposing¶ army—biological weapons weren’t¶ very effective. If the objective is to¶ inflict mass death and panic on a¶ mixed population, however, emerging¶ bioweapons offer remarkable potential.¶ We would be irresponsible to¶ presume that radical jihadists like al-¶ Qaeda have ignored said potential.¶ What’s New in Bioviolence?¶ Bioviolence refers to the many ways¶ to inflict disease as well as the many¶ people who might choose to do so,¶ whether heads of states, criminals, or¶ fanatics. Fortunately, doing bioviolence¶ is technically far more difficult¶ than using conventional explosives.¶ Natural pathogens like anthrax are¶ difficult to weaponize. Smallpox remains¶ unavailable (presumably);¶ plague is readily treatable; Ebola¶ kills too quickly to ignite a pandemic.¶ But emerging scientific disciplines—¶ notably genomics, nanotechnology,¶ and other microsciences—¶ could alter these pathogens for use¶ as weapons. These scientific disciplines¶ offer profound benefits for humanity,¶ yet there is an ominous security¶ challenge in minimizing the danger¶ of their hostile application.¶ For example, highly dangerous¶ agents can be made resistant to vaccines¶ or antibiotics. In Australia, scientists¶ introduced a gene into mousepox¶ (a cousin of smallpox) to reduce¶ pest populations—it worked so well¶ that it wiped out 100% of affected¶ mice, even those that had immunity¶ against the disease. Various bacterial¶ agents, such as plague or tularemia¶ (rabbit fever), could be altered to increase¶ their lethality or to evade antibiotic¶ treatment.¶ Diseases once thought to be eradicated¶ can now be resynthesized, enabling them to spread in regions¶ where there is no natural immunity.¶ The polio virus has been synthesized¶ from scratch; its creators called it an¶ “animate chemical.” Soon, it may be¶ resynthesized into a form that is contagious¶ even among vaccinated populations.¶ Recreation of long-eradicated¶ livestock diseases could¶ ravage herds severely lacking in genetic¶ diversity, damage food supplies, and cause devastating economic¶ losses.¶ Perhaps the greatest biothreat is¶ the manipulation of the flu and other¶ highly contagious viruses, such as¶ Ebola. Today, scientists can change¶ parts of a virus’s genetic material so¶ that it can perform specific functions.¶ The genomic sequence of the Spanish¶ flu virus that killed upwards of¶ 40 million people nearly a century¶ ago has been widely published; any savvy scientist could reconstruct it. The avian flu is even more lethal, albeit¶ not readily contagious via casual¶ aerosol delivery. A malevolent bioscientist¶ might augment its contagiousness.¶ The Ebola virus might be¶ manipulated so that it kills more¶ slowly, allowing it to be spread farther¶ before its debilitating effects altogether¶ consume its carrier. A bit¶ further off is genetic manipulation of¶ the measles virus—one of the great¶ killers in human history—rendering¶ useless the immunizations that most¶ of us receive in early childhood.¶ Soon, laboratory resynthesis of smallpox may be possible.¶ Advanced drug delivery systems¶ can be used to disseminate lethal¶ agents to broad populations. Bioregulators—¶ small organic compounds¶ that modify body systems—¶ could enhance targeted delivery¶ technologies. Some experts are concerned¶ that new weapons could be¶ aimed at the immune, neurological,¶ and neuroendocrine systems. Nanotechnology¶ that lends itself to mechanisms¶ for advanced disease detection¶ and drug delivery—such as gold¶ nanotubes that can administer drugs¶ directly into a tumor—could also deliver¶ weaponized agents deep into¶ the body, substantially raising the¶ weapon’s effectiveness.¶ Altogether, techniques that were¶ on the frontiers of science only a decade¶ or two ago are rapidly mutating as progress in the biological sciences¶ enables new ways to produce lethal¶ catastrophe. Today, they are on the¶ horizon. Within a decade, they will be pedestrian. According to the National¶ Academies of Science, “The¶ threat spectrum is broad and evolving—¶ in some ways predictably, in¶ other ways unexpectedly. In the future,¶ genetic engineering and other¶ technologies may lead to the development¶ of pathogenic organisms¶ with unique, unpredictable characteristics.”¶ For as far into the future as we can¶ possibly see, every passing day it becomes¶ slightly easier to commit a¶ violent¶ catastrophe than it was the¶ day before. Indeed, the rapid pace of¶ advancing science helps explain why¶ policies to prevent such a catastrophe¶ are so complicated.

Biowar comparatively outweighs and turns nuclear war

Stirling, 07 -- former Scottish Editor at Burke's Peerage in London, B.Sc. in Pol. Sc. & History; M.A. in European Studies; B.Sc. in Education. (Lord, “War on Iran = You Die from Biowar” Op Ed News, October 22, 2007) // JH

We have been conditioned, by seeing films of mushroom clouds and images of nuclear destruction in Japan at the end of WWII, to have some understanding of the horrific effects of a nuclear war. We have NOT been conditioned to understand the effects of Twenty-first Century advanced biological war. The kill numbers are very similar, just with biowar you don't get the "big bangs", the mushroom clouds, the nuclear bombers, the ICBMs, etc. Just sub-microscopic genetically engineered super killer viruses that we have absolutely no defense against, delivered in secret, with a slow horrifying unstoppable migration through the global human population. All the fear of a naturally mutated form of "bird flu" that might kill tens of millions is simply "child's play" compared to multiple designer military viruses that are built to kill in the many hundreds of millions to billions of people globally.¶ It costs approximately US$1 million to kill one person with nuclear weapons-of-mass destruction but only approximately US$1 to kill one person with biological weapons-of-mass destruction. Bioweapons are truly the "poor man's nukes". The Iranians are known to have a biological weapons program and they, and their allies, certainly have the means to deliver biowar agents into the Israeli and European and North American homelands. Bioweapons do not have to be dispersed via missiles or bombs, they are perfect for non-traditional normally non-military delivery systems. Being very small (there are, for example, typically approximately 40 million bacterial cells in every gram of soil and massively more viruses in the same gram), they lend themselves to an enormous variety of non-detectable methodologies for delivery and use in war, both regionally and globally.¶ What is being missed here, with all the talk of Iran developing nuclear weapons or not (depending on one's viewpoint), is that Iran is already a state that possesses WMD. HELLO, ANY WAR WITH IRAN IS HIGHLY APT TO INVOLVE LARGE SCALE DEATHS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE IRANIAN WMD THREAT. Hello again, this means that YOU...the person reading this...is apt to die from biowar in event of a war with Iran! We are in a MAD....mutually assured destruction....pre-war state with Iran, just as we are with Russia and to a lesser extent with China when it comes to nuclear weapons. A famous line from the movie "Wargames" (referring to engaging in nuclear war and the odds of "winning" such a war) is "the only winning move is not to play". Sad to say, this does not seem to have any bearing on the apocalyptic strategy of the neocon push for war with Iran.¶ The nature of biowar is that it is a "gift that keeps on giving". Once released, advanced recombination DNA based viral bioweapons will continue to spread and kill and kill ....regardless if Iran (and its ally Syria) are but a sea of green radioactive glass devoid of all life. With advanced biowar agents, it is not the quantity that counts but the quality; humans themselves become the vectors and delivery systems of the bioweapons. It does not require large amounts of weapons running into the millions or billions of tons of high explosives; nor does it require ICBMs and cruise missiles and $100 million dollar warplanes to deliver the bioweapons. A very small group of human assets, prepositioned with small amounts of easily hidden biowar weapons (submicroscopic viruses), in the Middle East, Europe, Canada, and America can begin the process that will result in the deaths of hundreds of millions or even billions of human beings. When you get right down to it, does it matter if you die from some exotic bioengineered hemorrhagic fever or from radiation poisoning/nuclear blast .......dead is still dead. ¶ To begin to understand the truly horrific nature of the biowar threat, one only has to look to history for some "mild" examples. The Black Death bubonic pandemic, believed caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis, is estimated to have killed between a third and two-thirds of Europe's population after it spread to Europe in 1347 from South-western/Central Asia. ¶ Yersinia pestis, being a bacteria is massive when compared to a virus, and is easily treated with modern antibiotics. However, the Soviet Union's Biopreparat organization turned Black Death from a medieval plague into a 20th Century bioweapon. The Yersinia pestis bacteria was exposed to every then-known antibiotic, in a process that any advanced high school or early undergraduate college level biology class student could undertake, and the resulting antibiotic resistant Y. pestis was bred and loaded into a small number of Soviet ICBMs aimed at America. The resistant Y. pestis had also been exposed to various levels of radiation to "radiation harden" the bacteria. The intent was to hit American survivors of a nuclear war with a new and untreatable form of Black Death that itself could survive the effects of nuclear fallout. ¶ As frighting as a totally antibiotic resistant Yersinia pestis bacteria is, it remains "child's play" compared to the more advanced recombination DNA technology used in most biowar programs. This typically involves the recombining of viral DNA into new virus, "designer virus". The Soviets, years ago, engineered a new virus that combined elements of Smallpox and Ebola. With the genetic engineering of viruses those doing the "designing" can engineer into the virus a wide number of different characteristics. For instance, an advanced hemorrhagic fever can be designed to be: airborne (capable of being transmitted via sneezing), with a very small amount of viral material required to infect a human host, with a incubation period of 14 days or longer, with most of the incubation period that is both highly contagious and at best looks like a mild version of the common cold, with the resulting hemorrhagic fever having a mortality of 90% or more.¶ The same technology can be used to create a large number of different viruses which can all be released on a target population at the same time, vastly complicating detection and containment and treatment programs. In fact the normal research and development process used in genetic engineering results in a large number of different new viruses. ¶ Those nations not directly involved in a strike upon Iran, that is most of the rest of the world, will nevertheless face massive deaths within their nations...they will lose more of their citizens to the war, that we are about to unleash, than they lost in World War II and ALL THE OTHER WARS IN HISTORY COMBINED. Needless to say, this will have a profound effect on their actions towards those nations who have started the mess in the first place. The global military, political, economic, and medical chaos resulting from global biowar will make the use of nuclear weapons a likely outcome as America, the United Kingdom, France and other nations starting the war will be seen as out-of-control "mad dogs" who have unleashed World War III. The Book of Revelations speaks of one-third of the world dying, in the Final Battle, from plague ....biowar; and another one-third of the world dying from "wormwood"....which we now know to be nuclear war effects ...Chernobyl, which comes from the Ukrainian word "chornobyl", translates into wormwood (or its close relative mugwort). (Chernobyl is the site of a massive uncontrolled nuclear meltdown disaster in the Ukraine on the 26th of April 1986). ¶ We are in a period of extreme danger to us all. Even more dangerous than the Cuban Missile Crisis of the 60s. Yet far too many people are so uneducated as to the real dangers from advanced Twenty-first Century biowar that they are totally blind to the profound risk to their own lives.

# Prolif Bad = Racist

**Western fears of proliferation are rooted in racist, imperialist perceptions of the Third World.**

**Waltz 81 –** London International Institute for Strategic Studies (Kenneth, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better”, 1981; < <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm)//AB>

Many **Westerners who write fearfully about a future in which third-world countries have nuclear weapons seem to view their people in the once familiar imperial manner as 'lesser breeds without the law'**. As is usual with **ethno­centric views**, speculation **takes the place of evidence**. How do we know, someone has asked, that a nuclear-armed and newly hostile Egypt or a nuclear-armed and still hostile Syria would not strike to destroy Israel at the risk of Israeli bombs falling on some of their cities? More than a quarter of Egypt's people live in four cities: Cairo, Alexandria, Giza, and Aswan. More than a quarter of Syria's live in three: Damascus. Aleppo, and Homs.What government would risk sudden losses of such proportion or indeed of much lesser propor­tion? Rulers want to have a country that they can continue to rule. Some Arab country might wish that some other Arab country would risk its own destruction for the sake of destroying Israel, but there is no reason to think that any Arab country would do so. One may be impres­sed that, despite ample bitterness, Israelis and Arabs have limited their wars and accepted constraints placed on them by others. Arabs did not marshal their resources and make an all-out effort to destroy Israel in the years before Israel could strike back with nuclear warheads. We cannot expect countries to risk more in the presence of nuclear weapons than they have in their absence.

# \*\*Cards that Flow the Other Way\*\*

# AT: Iran Prolif Good

# --1st Strike Solves Iranian Prolif

**First strike prevents future prolif in Iran.**

**Kroenig 12** – Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (Matthew, “Time to Attack Iran”, January/February 2012; [www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136917/matthew-kroenig/time-to-attack-iran)//AB](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136917/matthew-kroenig/time-to-attack-iran)//AB)

Yet according to the IAEA, Iran already appears fully committed to developing a nuclear weapons program and needs no further motivation from the United States. And it **will not be able to simply resume its progress after its entire nuclear infrastructure is reduced to rubble**. Indeed, such a **devastating offensive could well force Iran to quit the nuclear game altogether**, as Iraq did after its nuclear program was destroyed in the Gulf War and as Syria did after the 2007 Israeli strike. And even if Iran did try to reconstitute its nuclear program, it would be forced to contend with continued international pressure, greater difficulty in securing necessary nuclear materials on the international market, and the lurking possibility of subsequent attacks. **Military action could, therefore, delay Iran’s nuclear program** by anywhere from a few years to a decade, and perhaps even **indefinitely**. Skeptics might still counter that at best a strike would only buy time. But time is a valuable commodity. Countries often hope to delay worst-case scenarios as far into the future as possible in the hope that this might eliminate the threat altogether. Those countries whose nuclear facilities have been attacked -- most recently Iraq and Syria -- have proved unwilling or unable to restart their programs. Thus, what appears to be only a temporary setback to Iran could eventually become a game changer.

# --Deterrence Solves !

**Deterrence solves – Iran won’t provoke the US.**

**Edelman et al 11** – Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and US Undersecretary of Defense 2005-2009 (Eric S., “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran”, January/February 2011; < [http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran>)//AB](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran%3e)//AB)

If **Iran** did acquire **nuclear weapons**, would a containment strategy preserve stability in the Middle East? Some analysts, including Lindsay and Takeyh, argue that although Iran can be aggressive at times, it also regulates its behavior to avoid provoking retaliation. Since the regime is sensitive to costs, the logic goes, it **recognizes the dangers of escalation**; hence, **containment would work**.

**Deterrence specifically checks Iranian and Israeli nuclear action**

**Russell, 08 –** Professor of National Security Affairs in the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. (Dr. Richard L., “Israel’s Survival Instincts and the Danger of Nuclear Weapons in Iranian Hands,” National Defense University JFQ, Issue 50, 3rd quarter, 2008) // JH

Brutal Logic of Deterrence¶ **The Israelis might** throw up their hands ¶ and **conclude that any military options are simply too hard or risky and offer too limited prospects for success**. Tel Aviv could ultimately ¶ and reluctantly calculate that **the political costs coupled with the slim prospects for entirely eliminating Iran’s nuclear weapons infrastructure rule out unilaterally moving with military means. The** easiest and **default policy**—one that is not without risks but that perhaps has ¶ fewer risks and more rewards than a military ¶ showdown with Iran and political fallout with ¶ Israel’s security partners—**would be to rely on deterrence**. The Israelis might calculate that  **no matter how ideologically motivated Iran’s president and its Revolutionary Guard are, or how warped their perception of reality is, there will be no escaping the brutal logic of massive nuclear retaliation.** The **Iranians would have to realize that**, notwithstanding the geographic vulnerability of Israel, **they would never be able to achieve a strategic surprise and launch barrages of nuclear weapons loaded on ballistic missiles to decapitate Israeli leadership in order to prevent Israel from launching its own nucleartipped Jericho missiles to wipe out Tehran**. ¶ **The Israelis could impress upon the Iranians this cold-blooded logic**—informed by Cold ¶ War history—via **thinly veiled public pronouncements that stop short of acknowledging Israel’s nuclear weapons capabilities**.¶ Tel Aviv also could use a variety of ¶ behind-the-scenes diplomatic and intelligence channels to privately, quietly, confidently, and ¶ authoritatively convey the same message to ¶ Iran’s Foreign Ministry, intelligence services, ¶ Revolutionary Guard, and regime advisors ¶ to ensure that **Israeli “red lines” for Iran’s handling of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons in a crisis, as well as the dangers should Tehran be tempted to transfer nuclear weapons to a transnational group such as Hizballah, are understood by Iranian leadership**. The problem from the Israeli standpoint ¶ is that the regime in Tehran more nearly ¶ resembles a circus-like contest for political ¶ power than a unitary, contemplative, deliberate decisionmaking body.¶ Some strategists point to Saddam Hussein’s restraint in not firing biological and ¶ chemical weapons–tipped ballistic missiles at ¶ Israel during the 1991 Gulf War as evidence ¶ that nuclear deterrence is robust. The late ¶ national security expert Ze’ev Schiff put the common Israeli lesson of the 1991 war this ¶ way: **“The fact that Saddam did not use chemical weapons against Israel even when he was under great stress from attacking forces shows that he understood there are some things Israel simply could not tolerate, even if Washington was opposed to any Israeli response.”**¶ 23¶ But if Saddam simply withheld the use of ¶ weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against ¶ Israel during the 1991 war because coalition ¶ forces were not marching on Baghdad and ¶ directly threatening his regime, then any ¶ Israeli confidence in their ability to deter a ¶ nuclear-armed Iran would be misplaced.

**US deterrence solves regional conflict**

**Kahl 12** – Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Senior Fellow at Center for a New American Security; former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East (Colin H., “Not Time to Attack Iran”, March/April 2012; < [http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137031/colin-h-kahl/not-time-to-attack-iran>)//AB](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137031/colin-h-kahl/not-time-to-attack-iran%3e)//AB)

But the United States already has a large presence encircling Iran. Forty thousand U.S. troops are stationed in the Gulf, accompanied by strike aircraft, two aircraft carrier strike groups, two Aegis ballistic missile defense ships, and multiple Patriot antimissile systems. On Iran's eastern flank, Washington has another 90,000 troops deployed in Afghanistan and thousands more supporting the Afghan war in nearby Central Asian states. Kroenig claims that it would take much more to contain a nuclear-armed Iran. But U.S. forces in the Gulf already outnumber those in South Korea that are there to deter a nuclear-armed North. It is thus perfectly conceivable that the **existing U.S. presence in the region,** perhaps supplemented by a limited forward deployment of nuclear weapons and additional ballistic missile defenses, **would be sufficient to deter a nuclear-armed Iran from aggression** and blackmail. To be sure, such a deterrence-and-containment strategy would be an extra-ordinarily complex and risky enterprise, and there is no doubt that prevention is preferable. Given the possible consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran, the price of failure would be very high. But Kroenig's approach would not solve the problem. By presenting the options as either a near-term strike or long-term containment, Kroenig falls into the same trap that advocates of the Iraq war fell into a decade ago: ignoring postwar scenarios. In reality, the strike that Kroenig recommends would likely be a prelude to containment, not a substitute for it. Since a military raid would not permanently eliminate Iran's nuclear infrastructure, the United States would still need to construct an expensive, risky postwar containment regime to prevent Iran from reconstituting the program, much as it did in regard to Iraq after the Gulf War. The end result would be strikingly similar to the one that Kroenig criticizes, requiring Washington to maintain sufficient air, naval, and ground forces in the Persian Gulf to attack again at a moment's notice.