**\*\*\*PROLIF CORE\*\*\***

**\*\*\*PROLIF BAD\*\*\***

**Accidents**

**Proliferation leads to miscalculation and accidents**

**ICNND, 9 –** International Commission of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, Co-Chairs of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (“Elimintating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda From Gloabal Policymakers” 2009 http://icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/part-ii-3.html) JB

3.1 Ensuring that no new states join the ranks of those already nuclear-armed must continue to be one of the world’s top international security priorities. Every new nuclear-armed state will add significantly to the inherent risks – of accident or miscalculation as well as deliberate use – involved in any possession of these weapons, and potentially encourage more states to acquire nuclear weapons to avoid being left behind. Any scramble for nuclear capabilities is bound to generate severe instability in bilateral, regional and international relations. The carefully worked checks and balances of interstate relations will come under severe stress. There will be enhanced fears of nuclear blackmail, and of irresponsible and unpredictable leadership behaviour. 3.2 In conditions of inadequate command and control systems, absence of confidence building measures and multiple agencies in the nuclear weapons chain of authority, the possibility of an accidental or maverick usage of nuclear weapons will remain high. Unpredictable elements of risk and reward will impact on decision making processes. The dangers are compounded if the new and aspiring nuclear weapons states have, as is likely to be the case, ongoing inter-state disputes with ideological, territorial, historical – and for all those reasons, strongly emotive – dimensions. 3.3 The transitional period is likely to be most dangerous of all, with the arrival of nuclear weapons tending to be accompanied by sabre rattling and competitive nuclear chauvinism. For example, as between Pakistan and India a degree of stability might have now evolved, but 1998–2002 was a period of disturbingly fragile interstate relations. Command and control and risk management of nuclear weapons takes time to evolve. Military and political leadership in new nuclear-armed states need time to learn and implement credible safety and security systems. The risks of nuclear accidents and the possibility of nuclear action through inadequate crisis control mechanisms are very high in such circumstances. If this is coupled with political instability in such states, the risks escalate again. Where such countries are beset with internal stresses and fundamentalist groups with trans-national agendas, the risk of nuclear weapons or fissile material coming into possession of non-state actors cannot be ignored. 3.4 The action–reaction cycle of nations on high alerts, of military deployments, threats and counter threats of military action, have all been witnessed in the Korean peninsula with unpredictable behavioural patterns driving interstate relations. The impact of a proliferation breakout in the Middle East would be much wider in scope and make stability management extraordinarily difficult. Whatever the chances of “stable deterrence” prevailing in a Cold War or India–Pakistan setting, the prospects are significantly less in a regional setting with multiple nuclear power centres divided by multiple and cross-cutting sources of conflict.

**Prolif exacterbates hair trigger responses and guarantees accidental nuclear war**

**Cimbala, 05 –** Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State and private defense contractors (Stephen J “East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies vol. 18 iss 4. 12/1/2005 Lexis) JB

The performance of forces in our illustrative and hypothetical case is also influenced by the command and control systems that connect political and military leaders with force operators, and with one another. Although command and control variables have not been built into the model, the implications for command decision making, and for the problem of control during crisis management, are clear enough. The forces most dependent on land based ballistic missiles show the most discrepancy between hair-trigger and slow-trigger responses. On the other hand, states with balanced forces such as Russia, or with major reliance upon sea based as opposed to land based missiles (Japan), are comparatively less reliant on jumpy warning and fast firing. If hair trigger responses are necessary for survivability, then policy makers and commanders will have few minutes in which to make life and death decisions for entire societies. And missiles of theater or shorter range offer even fewer minutes of decision time than ICBMs, whose intercontinental reach requires 20 minutes or so from silo to silo. Faced with this analysis, states might decide to supplement vulnerable and potentially provocative land based ballistic missiles with cruise missiles. Cruise missiles can be based in various environments; on land, at sea and in the air. They can be moved on relatively short notice and can attack from various azimuths with high accuracy. Other states cannot have failed to notice the U.S. use of cruise missiles to great effect during the Gulf War of 1991 and in punitive strike campaigns throughout the 1990s, as well as during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. Cruise missiles can be fitted with conventional or nuclear warheads: the choice obviously depends on the target and mission, and the decision whether to arm the missile with nuclear or non-nuclear munitions affects its operational range. But it is certainly conceivable that various states in our mix will turn to ALCMs (air launched cruise missiles), SLCMs (sea launched), and ground launched (GLCMs) as weapons of choice for high priority conventional, or nuclear, missions: the absence of air defenses of any consequence, in many states, invites their opponents to explore this option if they can.

# Arms Race

**Proliferation leads to arms race and heightens risk of conflict**

**Clinton, 10** – Secretary of state (Hiliary “Remarks on Nuclear Nonproliferation at the University of Luisville as Part of the McConnell Center’s Spring lecture Series” April 9, 2010 http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/04/139958.htm) JB

So, I want to speak about why nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear security matter to each of us, and how the initiatives and the acronyms that make up our bipartisan work on these issues are coming together to make our nation safer. There is a reason that presidents and foreign policy leaders in both parties are determined to address this danger. A nuclear attack anywhere could destroy the foundations of global order. While the United States and old Soviet Union are no longer locked in a nuclear standoff, nuclear proliferation is a leading source of insecurity in our world today. And the United States benefits when the world is stable: our troops can spend more time at home, our companies can make better long-term investments, our allies are free to work with us to address long-term challenges like poverty and disease. But nuclear proliferation, including the nuclear programs being pursued by North Korea and Iran, are in exact opposition to those goals. Proliferation endangers our forces, our allies, and our broader global interests. And to the extent **it pushes other countries to develop nuclear weapons in response**, it can threaten the entire international order.

# Escalation

**Proliferation causes regional conflicts to escalate**

**Sokoski, 09** - Former Director Nonproliferation Education Center served on the US congressional commission of the prevention of weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism (Henry “Features: Avoiding a Nuclear Crowd” Policy Review, June/July 2009 http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/46390537.html) JB

There are limits, however, to what this approach can accomplish. Such a weak alliance system, with its expanding set of loose affiliations, risks becoming analogous to the international system that failed to contain offensive actions prior to World War I. Unlike 1914, there is no power today that can rival the projection of U.S. conventional forces anywhere on the globe. But in a world with an increasing number of nuclear-armed or nuclear-ready states, this may not matter as much as we think. In such a world, the actions of just one or two states or groups that might threaten to disrupt or overthrow a nuclear weapons state could check U.S. influence or ignite a war Washington could have difficulty containing. No amount of military science or tactics could assure that the U.S. could disarm or neutralize such threatening or unstable nuclear states.22 Nor could diplomats or our intelligence services be relied upon to keep up to date on what each of these governments would be likely to do in such a crisis (see graphic below): (Graph Omitted) Combine these proliferation trends with the others noted above and one could easily create the perfect nuclear storm: Small differences between nuclear competitors that would put all actors on edge; an overhang of nuclear materials that could be called upon to break out or significantly ramp up existing nuclear deployments; and a variety of potential new nuclear actors developing weapons options in the wings. In such a setting, the military and nuclear rivalries between states could easily be much more intense than before. Certainly each nuclear state’s military would place an even higher premium than before on being able to weaponize its military and civilian surpluses quickly, to deploy forces that are survivable, and to have forces that can get to their targets and destroy them with high levels of probability. The advanced military states will also be even more inclined to develop and deploy enhanced air and missile defenses and long-range, precision guidance munitions, and to develop a variety of preventative and preemptive war options. Certainly, in such a world, relations between states could become far less stable. Relatively small developments — e.g., Russian support for sympathetic near-abroad provinces; Pakistani-inspired terrorist strikes in India, such as those experienced recently in Mumbai; new Indian flanking activities in Iran near Pakistan; Chinese weapons developments or moves regarding Taiwan; state-sponsored assassination attempts of key figures in the Middle East or South West Asia, etc. — could easily prompt nuclear weapons deployments with “strategic” consequences (arms races, strategic miscues, and even nuclear war). As Herman Kahn once noted, in such a world “every quarrel or difference of opinion may lead to violence of a kind quite different from what is possible today.”23 In short, we may soon see a future that neither the proponents of nuclear abolition, nor their critics, would ever want.

# Pre-Emptive Strikes

**Prolif exacterbates hair trigger responses and guarantees accidental nuclear war**

**Cimbala, 05 –** Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State and private defense contractors (Stephen J “East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies vol. 18 iss 4. 12/1/2005 Lexis) JB

The performance of forces in our illustrative and hypothetical case is also influenced by the command and control systems that connect political and military leaders with force operators, and with one another. Although command and control variables have not been built into the model, the implications for command decision making, and for the problem of control during crisis management, are clear enough. The forces most dependent on land based ballistic missiles show the most discrepancy between hair-trigger and slow-trigger responses. On the other hand, states with balanced forces such as Russia, or with major reliance upon sea based as opposed to land based missiles (Japan), are comparatively less reliant on jumpy warning and fast firing. If hair trigger responses are necessary for survivability, then policy makers and commanders will have few minutes in which to make life and death decisions for entire societies. And missiles of theater or shorter range offer even fewer minutes of decision time than ICBMs, whose intercontinental reach requires 20 minutes or so from silo to silo. Faced with this analysis, states might decide to supplement vulnerable and potentially provocative land based ballistic missiles with cruise missiles. Cruise missiles can be based in various environments; on land, at sea and in the air. They can be moved on relatively short notice and can attack from various azimuths with high accuracy. Other states cannot have failed to notice the U.S. use of cruise missiles to great effect during the Gulf War of 1991 and in punitive strike campaigns throughout the 1990s, as well as during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. Cruise missiles can be fitted with conventional or nuclear warheads: the choice obviously depends on the target and mission, and the decision whether to arm the missile with nuclear or non-nuclear munitions affects its operational range. But it is certainly conceivable that various states in our mix will turn to ALCMs (air launched cruise missiles), SLCMs (sea launched), and ground launched (GLCMs) as weapons of choice for high priority conventional, or nuclear, missions: the absence of air defenses of any consequence, in many states, invites their opponents to explore this option if they can.

# Terrorism

**Prolif makes nuclear materials more accessible to terrorists, risks extinction**

**ICNND, 9** – International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament - Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, Co-chairs of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (“Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Pratical Agenda for Global Policymakers” 2009 http://icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/part-ii-4.html) JB

4.1 There is a significant and continuing fear internationally of nuclear terrorism – shared by the public and decision-makers alike. The UN Secretary-General has labelled nuclear terrorism “one of the most serious threats of our time”. U.S. President Obama has been equally blunt: “There is no graver danger to global security than the threat of nuclear terrorism, and no more immediate task for the international community than to address that threat.” 4.2 That fear is justified. There are terrorist actors in existence – as the whole world has known since Al Qaeda’s orchestration of 9/11 – who would, if they could, cause massive and indiscriminate havoc in almost any one of the world’s major cities. And there is every reason to fear that they can match that intent with capability. There is quite a high risk that they could produce a “dirty bomb”, combining conventional explosives with radioactive material, to devastating psychological effect. The risk is very much smaller that they could produce a far more physically destructive nuclear explosion, given the scale of the technical and logistical problems that would have to be overcome. But it is not negligible. And the possibility of cyber attacks on nuclear command and control centres is growing ever more significant. 4.3 Possible terrorist actors might either be acting independently of state backing, or have state sponsors. Since 1995, there have been several cases that confirm the danger that either group of actors can have access to – and no scruples about using – devices or substances with the potential for mass killings. The Aum Shinrikyo attacks in Tokyo in 1995 and the unsolved anthrax attacks in the United States in 2001 were the first two. Another was the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko in London in 2006 with Polonium-210, which reminded the world that individuals can obtain a key material for detonating nuclear weapons and smuggle it undetected through the airports of countries on high alert against terrorist threats. 4.4 In the case of a nuclear weapon, it would require a large, well organized and well funded group to build, let alone buy, such a weapon, maintain security at all stages, and successfully transport it to the intended site for detonation. It is now known that Al Qaeda some years ago attempted to obtain enriched uranium, and that senior members of the group had at least one meeting with two Pakistani nuclear experts. The apparently dispersed and diffuse nature of its current organization and funding, after being under siege for most of the last decade, make the central organization, such as it is, a less likely candidate now than in the past for such a role. But it has offshoots and imitators in many countries. 4.5 The danger posed by any such group would be much enhanced by state backing, whether for nuclear materials or know-how, or simply for the necessary funding. The number of states likely to give deliberate support of this kind would be very small. Even regimes with a long history of, if not irrationality, at least playing by different rules to everyone else, would be unlikely to lend such assistance without first making an assessment of the likely consequences should they be identified – including the possibility of nuclear retaliation (the chances of which would be significantly higher if those states were already nuclear-armed themselves). A more substantial concern is that states with weak or fragile institutions, multiple internal power centres, and imperfect arrangements for securing weapons and dangerous materials, might end up providing such support even in the absence of any explicit government intent or direction to do so.

**Nuclear Terrorism is the greatest existential risk**

**Curtis, 07 –** President and Chief Operating Officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative Chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission from 1977 to 1981 and has held positions on the staff of the U.S. House of Representatives, the U.S. Treasury Department, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. He is a current member of the Council on Foreign Relations (Charles B. “Reducting the Global Nuclear Danger: International Cooperation – the Indispensable Security Imperative” November 2007 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/speech\_curtis\_reducing1107.pdf?\_=1316466791) JB

Leaders in the White House, the Congress and in the community of nations have repeatedly acknowledged the threat of a terrorist nuclear attack. They have used inspiring words and made solemn commitments to counter the danger. But our collective deeds have not matched our words – we need to re-invigorate our actions at home and abroad. If a 10-kiloton nuclear device goes off in any major city anywhere in the world, it could kill hundreds of thousands in a single stroke. The loss of life would not be the only impact, however. The world economy would suffer a substantial blow – damaging the weakest economies the most. Today’s levels of spending and global investment would plunge and might not recover for a generation, or more. The balance between security and liberty worldwide would move strongly against liberty. The effects would be far greater if there were not just one nuclear weapon, but the threat of a second or a third. This is a danger not just to life, but to our way of life. There is more talk today about the threat of a terrorist nuclear attack because we are finally coming to accept that the probability is much higher than we had thought. When Thomas Kean, the chairman of the U.S. 9/11 Commission 1 , was asked if he thought there was a real possibility of a nuclear attack on an American city in his lifetime, the former New Jersey governor replied: “We talked to nobody who had studied this issue who didn’t think it was a real possibility.” When you combine that “real possibility” with the destructive effects of a nuclear weapon, you have our greatest threat. With so much at stake, every one of us has reason to ask: “Are we doing all we can to prevent a nuclear attack?” The emphatic answer is “No, we are not.” Playing Defense What must be done to address the global nuclear danger? Here are four priority steps: • **Reduce the worldwide supply of nuclear weapons** by preventing the emergence of new weapons states and by taking concrete, verifiable actions to reduce the inventories of already-existing nuclear powers. • Limit the spread of nuclear weapons technology by putting in place a system of reliable fuel assurances to support peaceful uses of nuclear power. • Secure all nuclear weapons material such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium to the highest standards by promoting best practices and giving technical assistance to any and all states with nuclear capacity. • Gain agreement on and implement a multi-state effort to address the root causes of the discontent underlying the virulent form of radical Islam that seeks these weapons for the purpose of inflicting mass death. The U.S. and the international community – through a series of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral means – are doing some part of all of these things. Each step is recognized as important, but no step is seen as urgent. We have not acted and are not acting with the seriousness of purpose the threat demands.

# \*\*\*PROLIF GOOD\*\*\*

# Conventional War

**Proliferation solves conventional wars – that outweighs**

**Delvoie 02** [Louis, Former Assistant Deputy Minister – National Defense Headquarters (Canada) and Senior Fellow – Center for International Relations – Queens U., Canadian Military Journal, “VIEWS AND OPINIONS IN PRAISE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS”, Autumn, <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo3/no3/doc/66-69-eng.pdf>]

The first of these truths was that major conventional wars had become progressively more destructive and more murderous between the mid-19th and mid-20th centuries. What is often referred to as the first modern war in terms of military technology, the American Civil War (1860-65), produced a death toll of about 600,000. The First World War (1914-18) resulted in the deaths of some 15 million. The Second World War (1939-45) saw some 80 million die, including 20 million Russians and 20 million Chinese, all too often forgotten in the Western world. The idea of millions of people being killed in war is not solely the spectre of the nuclear age; it was the reality of the pre-nuclear age. The second truth is that the world was spared another war engaging the major powers throughout the second half of the 20th century. This was not because of a shortage of conflicts or events, which in an era of purely conventional weapons (regardless of their lethality) might well have precipitated a third world war. Indeed, any one of the following would probably have been viewed as a *cassus belli*: • The Berlin blockade of 1948; • The Suez Crisis of 1956; • The Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956; • The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962; • The American bombing of North Vietnam; • The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968; • The Arab-Israeli War of 1973; and • The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. That no new world war resulted from any of these events is largely due to the existence of nuclear weapons, and to the deterrent effect which their possession and deployment had on the actions of the major powers throughout the Cold War. Although the theories of nuclear deterrence are numerous and complex, the lesson learned by the governments of the major powers was expressed with eloquent simplicity by the historian Paul Kennedy: “It is now clear that the dropping of the atomic bombs in 1945 marked a watershed in the military history of the world, and one which throws into doubt the viability of mankind should a Great Power war with atomic weaponry ever be fought.”1 The third point is that hundreds of thousands of people were killed in civil and inter-state wars in the second half of the twentieth century. The carnage of the Algerian War of Independence, of the Vietnam War, of the Iran-Iraq War and of the civil wars in the Sudan, Afghanistan, Rwanda and Sri Lanka was and is horrendous. That carnage was, however, largely inflicted with weapons ranging from machetes and machine guns to howitzers and helicopter gunships; none of it was the result of the use of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, the deterrent value of nuclear weapons served to avoid the far worse carnage which would have attended a third world war among the major powers. There are those who, while prepared to recognize the merits of nuclear deterrence in the geo-strategic framework of the Cold War, consider that the concept is now obsolete in a post-Cold War world. This is a view which pays insufficient attention to the history of international relations and to the realities of world politics. The end of a fairly stable structure of politico-ideological competition and conflict between East and West does not mean the end of divergent interests and power struggles among the world’s principal politicomilitary actors. Countries such as the United States, Russia and China will not cease to pursue their own agendas, and will risk collisions in the process. When this occurs, nuclear deterrence will continue to serve as a moderating influence in their mutual relations, and will have a usefully restraining effect on any overly hegemonistic ambitions.

# Deterrence

# ---All Actors

**Nuclear Weapons deter all major wars**

**Waltz, 2000­ ­–** Kenneth, political science professor at Berkley (Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Volume 1, Number 1, Winter/Wpring 2000, “Interview: Is Kenneth Waltz Still M.A.D. about Nukes?” http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/gjia/gjia\_winspr00f.html) JB

Waltz Well, that is a different question. The United States and the Soviet Union developed peculiar ideas of nuclear deterrence: namely that thousands of warheads are required for deterrence. That notion was always crazy. At the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis our estimates were that the Soviet Union had only about seventy true strategic systems. We had thousands. Were we deterred? Yes we were. We did not strike at the nuclear warheads that the Soviet Union had in Cuba. The Air Force was asked if they could hit and destroy all the targets. And remember that they were close by, and there were not that many of them. The Air Force answered: “We promise we can get 90 percent.” Not enough. We were deterred. Now, nuclear weapons do not deter everybody from doing everything. They do not deter forays. They do not deter, for example, Arab countries from starting wars over the disputed terroritories. But they did dissuade the Egyptians and Syrians from trying to divide Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. They pulled back for fear that the threat of the destruction of the Israeli State would prompt the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons deter threats to the vital interests of the state, and they have done so in every case that comes to mind.

# ---Rogue

**Prolif allows us to deter rogue states**

**Carpenter, 04 –** Cato Institute vice president Ph.D. in U.S. diplomatic history from the University of Texas (Ted Galen, “Not All Forms of Nuclear Proliferation Are Equally Bad” Cato Institute November 21, 2012 http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/not-all-forms-nuclear-proliferation-are-equally-bad#) JB

The conventional wisdom is that all instances of nuclear weapons proliferation threaten the stability of the international system and the security interests of the United States. Indeed, that is the underlying logic of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, adopted by the bulk of the international community in the late 1960s, which is the centerpiece of the existing nonproliferation system. Members of the arms control community have over the decades spent an enormous amount of time and energy agonizing over the possibility that stable, democratic status quo powers such as Germany, Japan, Sweden and South Korea might decide to abandon the treaty and develop nuclear weapons. Indeed, they have devoted at least as much attention to that problem as they have to the prospect that unstable or aggressive states might build nuclear arsenals. The recent flap over the small scale (and probably unauthorized) nuclear experiments in South Korea is merely the latest example of such misplaced priorities. The hostility toward all forms of proliferation is not confined to dovish arms control types but extends across the political spectrum. As the North Korean nuclear crisis evolved in 2002 and 2003, some of the most hawkish members of the U.S. foreign policy community became terrified at the prospect that America's democratic allies in East Asia might build their own nuclear deterrents to offset Pyongyang's moves. Neoconservative luminaries Robert Kagan and William Kristol regarded such proliferation with horror: "The possibility that Japan, and perhaps even Taiwan, might respond to North Korea's actions by producing their own nuclear weapons, thus spurring an East Asian nuclear arms race . . . is something that should send chills up the spine of any sensible American strategist." That attitude misconstrues the problem. A threat to the peace may exist if an aggressive and erratic regime gets nukes and then is able to intimidate or blackmail its non-nuclear neighbors. Nuclear arsenals in the hands of stable, democratic, status quo powers do not threaten the peace of the region. Kagan and Kristol -- and other Americans who share their hostility toward such countries having nuclear weapons -- implicitly accept a moral equivalence between a potential aggressor and its potential victims America's current nonproliferation policy is the international equivalent of domestic gun control laws, and exhibits the same faulty logic. Gun control laws have had little effect on preventing criminal elements from acquiring weapons. Instead, they disarm honest citizens and make them more vulnerable to armed predators. The nonproliferation system is having a similar perverse effect. Such unsavory states as Iran and North Korea are well along on the path to becoming nuclear powers while their more peaceful neighbors are hamstrung by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty from countering those moves. The focus of Washington's nonproliferation policy should substitute discrimination and selectivity for uniformity of treatment. U.S. policymakers must rid themselves of the notion that all forms of proliferation are equally bad. The United States should concentrate on making it difficult for aggressive or unstable regimes to acquire the [technology](http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/not-all-forms-nuclear-proliferation-are-equally-bad) and fissile material needed to develop nuclear weapons. Policymakers must adopt a realistic attitude about the limitations of even that more tightly focused nonproliferation policy. At best, U.S. actions will only delay, not prevent, such states from joining the nuclear weapons club. But delay can provide important benefits. A delay of only a few years may significantly reduce the likelihood that an aggressive power with a new nuclear weapons capability will have a regional nuclear monopoly and be able to blackmail non-nuclear neighbors. In some cases, the knowledge that the achievement of a regional nuclear monopoly is impossible may discourage a would-be expansionist power from even making the effort. At the very least, it could cause such a power to configure its new arsenal purely for deterrence rather than for aggressive purposes

# MisCalc

**Proliferation solves miscalculation**

**Wood 02** (Matthew, "Reflections on nuclear optimism: Waltz, Burke and proliferation", Review of International Studies, Vol. 28, Issue 1, p. 5-6, pdf)

Optimism appears in four waves. It arises in Europe during the 1950s as a response to Europe’s perceived vulnerability to Soviet aggression and its unsettled post-war relationship with America. Gallois says the destructiveness of nuclear weapons transforms states and alters both immediate and extended deterrence.18 Existing under the prospect of annihilation gives self-interested states a reason to constrain their activity and a universal standard against which to assess the rationality of their behaviour. This transformation enhances immediate deterrence by rendering threats to retaliate with nuclear arms at once more credible and less susceptible to misinterpretation.19 Gallois writes that when: ‘the evaluation of the risks to be taken is made by leaders who have all learned to calculate according to the same measuring system [nuclear annihilation], a major error of interpretation is less and less plausible and … the dangers inherent in the policy of dissuasion grow less and less likely.’20 On principle, nuclear-rational states are secure from attack. Yet the inspiration for this argument also leads Gallois to view the extended deterrent threats and collective security arrangements meant to protect non-nuclear allies in a nuclear world as unworkable.21 When the risk of nuclear war confronts states motivated by self-interest and survival, nuclear retaliation for attacks upon others is untenable. Moreover, this reasoning undermines even the uncontroversial commitments accorded allies by denuding the notion of ‘limited nuclear war’ and bolstering the threat of ‘escalation’.22 There is only one solution to this problem, contends Gallois, the intentional proliferation of nuclear weapons.

# A2: Terrorism

**Nuclear proliferation would not lead to nuclear terrorism**

Tepperman 09 (In the years before turning to journalism, Tepperman worked in publishing and at the United Nations as a speechwriter. He has a BA in English Literature from Yale University, an MA in Jurisprudence from Oxford University (New College), and an LL.M. in International Law from NYU. Tepperman is a member of the New York State bar and a Fellow of the New York Institute of Humanities. The Daily Beast “Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb” <http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/08/28/why-obama-should-learn-to-love-the-bomb.html>) SS

Still, even if Iran or North Korea are deterrable, nuclear pessimists fear they'll give or sell their deadly toys to terrorists, who aren't—for it's hard to bomb a group with no return address. Yet look closely, and the risk of a WMD handoff starts to seem overblown. For one thing, assuming Iran is able to actually build a nuke, Desch explains that "it doesn't make sense that they'd then give something they regard as central to their survival to groups like Hizbullah, over which they have limited control. As for Al Qaeda, they don't even share common interests. Why would the mullahs give Osama bin Laden the crown jewels?" To do so would be fatal, for Washington has made it very clear that it would regard any terrorist use of a WMD as an attack by the country that supplied it—and would respond accordingly. A much greater threat is that a nuclear North Korea or Pakistan could collapse and lose control of its weapons entirely. Yet here again history offers some comfort. China acquired its first nuke in 1964, just two years before it descended into the mad chaos of the Cultural Revolution, when virtually every Chinese institution was threatened—except for its nuclear infrastructure, which remained secure. "It was nearly a coup," says Desch, "yet with all the unrest, nobody ever thought that there might be an unauthorized nuclear use." The Soviets' weapons were also kept largely safe (with U.S. help) during the breakup of their union in the early '90s. And in recent years Moscow has greatly upped its defense spending (by 20 to 30 percent a year), using some of the cash to modernize and protect its arsenal. As for Pakistan, it has taken numerous precautions to ensure that its own weapons are insulated from the country's chaos, installing complicated firing mechanisms to prevent a launch by lone radicals, for example, and instituting special training and screening for its nuclear personnel to ensure they're not infiltrated by extremists. Even if the Pakistani state did collapse entirely—the nightmare scenario—the chance of a Taliban bomb would still be remote. Desch argues that the idea that terrorists "could use these weapons radically underestimates the difficulty of actually operating a modern nuclear arsenal. These things need constant maintenance and they're very easy to disable. So the idea that these things could be stuffed into a gunnysack and smuggled across the Rio Grande is preposterous."

# \*\*\*DEFENSE\*\*\*

# Can’t Solve

**Can’t solve proliferation**

**The Economist 08** (“What to do with a vision of zero; Nuclear disarmament”, November 15th 2008, Lexis)

But how to go about it? George Bush was hammered for preferring unilateral cuts and so agreed to a treaty with Russia. Setting 1,000 as a target, give or take weapons in reserve, while offering to negotiate along these lines would reassure all round (as would the binding new verification rules Mr Obama s expected to seek before existing ones run out next year). Cash-strapped Russia always worries that unilateral American cuts can easily be reversed. But after the Georgia crisis, many of America's friends would like to see Russia held to tight treaty limits too. Expect anxieties from the Baltic states to Turkey, if Mr Obama acts early on to remove America's last few tactical nuclear weapons from Europe (where Russia has many more). Yet the problem for zero-boosters is that the lower you go, the trickier things get, argues Henry Sokolski of the Washington-based Non-proliferation Policy Education Centre. Crises may prove harder to manage when the nuclear gap between America and Russia and other potential contenders is not thousands, but hundreds. One answer could be to widen arms-control talks to include China, Britain and France too. But neither China nor France has ever signalled interest. And what about India, Pakistan and Israel? As for more global treaty commitments, Mr Obama is expected to try to get Congress to ratify the test-ban (it refused in 1999). That could prod others, like China, to do likewise. He has also said he will not authorise the building of new nuclear weapons. That is music to disarmers' ears. But there may eventually have to be a trade-off: ending testing in return for building some simpler, safer warheads (based on a previously tested design). The upside is that modernisation could enable America to make far deeper cuts than does tinkering with old warheads in today's stockpile. Anyway, Britain, France, Russia and China are modernising their weapons (only China is enlarging its arsenal, albeit from a low base). The downside is that others will cry foul. The going for a fissile-material cut-off treaty at the log-jammed Conference on Disarmament could be harder still. Long blocked by China, the last try was stymied by Pakistan and Iran. Clever diplomats are paid to find ways round such obstacles—but it will take ingenuity of an untried sort to navigate the minefield between today's world and one of very low nuclear numbers or none. A recent Adelphi Paper from the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies explores just some of the technical and political obstacles. What would be acceptable standards of verification when controls can never in fact be "airtight" and weapons-making knowledge still has to be protected? What are the trade-offs between imperfect verification and enforcement, since the UN Security Council seems unable to agree on enforcing its resolutions on Iran or North Korea? What might a residual deterrence capability against cheats look like? How might conventional military imbalances be managed in a nuclear-free world, without cascading back towards the carnage that blighted the first half of the 20th century? The British government has taken a lead, co-operating with the Norwegians to explore techniques for verifying warhead dismantlement without giving nuclear secrets away. But this is the merest tip of the technical work needed to track and secure the world's dangerous nuclear materials.

# No Impact

**Democratic Nations never cheat on anti-proliferation policies**

**Sagan 11** (Scott D., Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, “The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” *Annual Reviews.org*, June, 2011, *Proquest*, ADP)

These findings oversimplify the role of regime type in determining nuclear proliferation behavior. Democratic countries have certainly both pursued and acquired nuclear weapons, but the new quantitative literature has ignored the important observation that no NNWS democracy has cheated on its commitments under the NPT. In all past cases, democracies that started and either abandoned or completed nuclear weapons programs either did so before the NPT came into force or did not join the NPT at all ([Müller & Schmidt 2010, Miller & Sagan 2009](javascript:void(0);)). [Figure 4](javascript:void(0);) reproduces the data from [Figure 2](javascript:void(0);) on when different states started nuclear exploration and nuclear programs, adding their NPT ratification dates and a measure of their regime type based on the Polity IV data set ([http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm](javascript:newWindow('http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm'))). This figure clearly shows that democracies have behaved differently with respect to nuclear weapons proliferation. Democracies have both sucessfully developed nuclear weapons and started but then abandoned nuclear programs. But no democratic NNWS has ever started a covert nuclear weapons program after the government ratified the NPT.

**Civilian nuclear power makes proliferation highly probable**

**Sagan 11** (Scott D., Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, “The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” *Annual Reviews.org*, June, 2011, *Proquest*, ADP)

Does the civilian nuclear power industry constrain states or does it make nuclear weapons proliferation easier? Do expensive failures to produce efficient nuclear power increase the likelihood of proliferation? An important determinant of the nuclear future will be the degree to which the spread of nuclear power produces new actors in different states that want to maintain peaceful programs and oppose turning civilian energy programs into nuclear weapons programs. Indeed, how best to ensure that civilian nuclear power bureaucracies maintain a strong interest in opposing nuclear weapons proliferation may be the single most critical question to answer for reducing the potentially dangerous effect of the global spread of nuclear power on the likelihood of nuclear weapons proliferation. This is ironic, for although some nonproliferation specialists may not want more countries to start nuclear power programs, once a state starts a nuclear power program its nonproliferation behavior may be strongly influenced by the degree to which its civilian nuclear industry is a successful contributor to national energy production. The leaders and bureaucratic organizations that run successful nuclear power enterprises may have increased incentives to maintain strong ties to the global nuclear power industry, to international capital and technology markets, and to global regulatory agencies—and hence may be more likely to cooperate with the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Leaders of less successful or struggling nuclear power enterprises, in contrast, may be more likely to support clandestine or breakout nuclear weapons development programs to justify their existence, prestige, and high budgets within their state.

# Iran Prolif Defense

**Even if Iran somehow gets nukes, there’s no risk of an attack- empirics prove**

**Chapman 7/8/12** (Steve, writer for the *Chicago Tribune* on national and international affairs, “The Arms Race that Won’t Happen,” *Chicago Tribune*, July 08, 2012, Proquest, ADP)

If you want to understand the intensifying showdown between the United States and Iran, consider the headline in The Washington Post on the threat of rapid nuclear proliferation: "Many nations ready to break into nuclear club." It highlights one of the dangers cited by those who favor military action against Iran. President Barack Obama says that if Iran gets the bomb, "other players in the region would feel it necessary to get their own nuclear weapons. So now you have the prospect of a nuclear arms race in the most volatile region in the world." A plausible threat? It may sound that way. But it also sounded that way in 1981 -- when that Washington Post story ran. Nuclear proliferation is always said to be on the verge of suddenly accelerating, and somehow it never does. In 1981, there were five declared nuclear powers -- the U.S., the Soviet Union, China, Britain and France -- as well as Israel, which was (and is) undeclared. And today? The number of members added since then is not 15 but three: India, Pakistan and North Korea. Most of the other countries on the list of likely proliferators never came close -- including Argentina, Chile, Morocco and Tunisia. Iraq tried and failed. Libya made an effort and then chose to give up. The peril was greatly overblown. It probably is again. But our leaders are not about to let mere history debunk the apocalyptic scenarios. They are committed to a policy based on fear rather than experience. The United States keeps trying to force Iran to abandon its suspected efforts to build a nuclear arsenal, and so far it has been rebuffed. Both Obama and Mitt Romney have said they would use force rather than let Iran acquire nukes. Chances are good that whoever wins in November, we will be at war with Tehran sometime in the next four years. But there is no reason to think Iran would ever use such weapons, and there is little reason to think it would spur other countries to get them. If all it takes to unleash regional proliferation is one fearsome state with nukes, the Middle East would have gone through it already -- since Israel has had them for decades. Why would governments in the region respond differently to Iran? Many of them are allied with the U.S. -- which means Iran can't attack or threaten them without fear of overwhelming retaliation. Turkey, as a member of NATO, enjoys a formal defense guarantee from Washington. The U.S. might offer similar assurances to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other nervous neighbors. One way or another, they would probably find they can manage fine. Iran is no scarier than Mao's China was in 1964, when it detonated its first atomic device. Writes Francis Gavin, a professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, "It was predicted that India, Indonesia and Japan might follow." At the time, he noted in a 2009 article in International Security, "a U.S. government document identified 'at least 11 nations (India, Japan, Israel, Sweden, West Germany, Italy, Canada, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Rumania and Yugoslavia)' with the capacity to go nuclear, a number that would soon 'grow substantially' to include 'South Africa, the United Arab Republic, Spain, Brazil and Mexico.' " Mexico? In recent decades, some countries have actually given up their nukes -- including Ukraine and South Africa. Others, like Brazil and Sweden, have scrapped their weapons programs. After the Cold War, it was assumed the newly reunified Germany would want to assert its new status by joining the nuclear club. It has yet to exhibit a glimmer of interest. A nuclear Iran would soon learn something previous nuclear powers already know: These weapons are not much use except to deter nuclear attack. What help have they been for the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan?

**No reason for Iran to develop nukes- even if they did, it would take years**

**Buchanan 7/7/12** (Pat, Senior advisor to Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, and was White House Communications Director for Ronald Reagan, “Why this obsession with Iran?,Why this obsession with Iran? *,” Pittsburgh Tribune*, July 07 , 2012, Proquest, ADP)

Iran is not seeking to have the atomic bomb, possession of which is pointless, dangerous and is a great sin from an intellectual and a religious point of view." Thus did supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei declare in February that Iran's possession of atomic weapons would be a mortal sin against Allah. It is also the unanimous judgment of the U.S. intelligence community, declared in 2007 and affirmed in 2011, that Iran has abandoned any program to build nuclear weapons. Is the Ayatollah lying? Is the entire U.S. intel community wrong? Iran's plants at Natanz, where uranium is enriched to 5 percent, and at Fordow, where it is enriched to 20 percent -- both below weapons grade -- are under constant U.N. monitoring. Iran has offered to surrender its 20 percent uranium and cease enriching to that level if the West will provide isotopes for its nuclear medicine and lift some of the more onerous sanctions. No deal, says the United States. Iran must give up enrichment entirely and indefinitely. This is the sticking point in the negotiations. Iran contends that as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, she has the right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes. Should this deadlock be a cause for war? Assume Iran did divert low-grade nuclear fuel to some secret plant to enrich it to weapons grade. The process would take months, if not years. Iran would then have to build and test an explosive device that the world would know about in hours. Iran would then have to weaponize the device. The whole process would take longer than a year, perhaps several. We would learn about it and have time to exercise a military option long before it came to pass.

# Won’t Prolif

**Countries don’t want to proliferate**

**Waltz 2k**(Kenneth, Prof. Emeritus of Pol. Science at UC Berkeley, “Interview: Is Kenneth Waltz Still M.A.D. about Nukes?” Winter/Spring, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/gjia/gjia\_winspr00f.html)

It is now estimated that about twenty–five countries are in a position to make nuclear weapons rather quickly. Most countries that could have acquired nuclear military capability have refrained from doing so. Most countries do not need them. Consider Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa. Argentina and Brazil were in the process of moving toward nuclear military capability, and both decided against it–wisely I believe–because neither country needs nuclear weapons. South Africa had about half a dozen warheads and decided to destroy them. You have to have an adversary against whom you think you might have to threaten retaliation, but most countries are not in this position. Germany does not face any security threats–certainly not any in which a nuclear force would be relevant. I would expect the pattern of the past to be the same as the pattern in the future, in which one or two states per decade gradually develop nuclear weapons.

# \*\*\*RANDOM\*\*\*

# Iran Impact Calc- T/F

**Iran could attack the US within minutes**

**Ferran 7/5/12** (Lee, Foreign Correspondent for ABC News“Iran: We Can Hit 35 US Bases in ‘Minutes,’” *ABC News*, July 5, 2012, http://news.yahoo.com/iran-hit-35-us-bases-minutes-151115760--abc-news-topstories.html, ADP)

An Iranian military commander said that his country has detailed contingency plans to strike nearly three dozen U.S. military bases in the region should Iran be attacked, local media reported Wednesday. Brig. Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force, told reporters the U.S. has 35 bases around Iran and all are "within the reach of our missiles" and could be hit "in the early minutes after an attack," according to an English-language report from Iran's semi-official Fars News Agency. The bases were no threat but instead an "opportunity" for the Iranian military, Hajizadeh said last month, according to Fars. Hajizadeh's claims come as the IRGC conducts a major military exercise in which it has fired a barrage of missiles at "mock enemy bases" set up in the Iranian desert. Another IRGC commander, Brig. Gen. Hossein Salami, told reporters Tuesday the main aim of the drill "was to demonstrate the Iranian nation's political resolve to defend [its] vital values and national interests," according to Iran's state-run Press TV. Press TV paraphrased Salami's description of the drills as a "firm response to those who threaten Iran with the option of military action." The United States and Israel have for years been locked in a struggle with Iran over its nuclear enrichment program and the leaders of both the Israeli and American governments have said that any option -- including military action -- was "on the table" should it become clear Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons. Iranian officials have denied the nation seeks nuclear weapons and said Iran is only enriching uranium for domestic nuclear power purposes. Press TV said that several different missile types were tested, including the Shabab-3, which reportedly has an operational range of over 900 miles, meaning it could reach potential targets throughout the Middle East. The U.S. and its allies have several military bases in the region, including the home of the Navy's 5th Fleet in Bahrain, a little over 120 miles from Iran's southern border. Israel's eastern border is about 600 miles from Iran's mainland.

# Nuclear Energy DA

**Nuclear Energy facilitates nuclear proliferation in Asia and the middle east- comparatively the greatest and most damaging scenario**

**Hoagland 11**(Jim, foreign policy writer for the Washington Post, foreign correspondent in Nairobi and Middle east, also won a Pulitzer Prize for international reporting, “Dangerous Fallout,” *The Washington Post*, October 07 , 2011, Proquest, ADP)

But developing countries with little nuclear experience and spotty industrial safety records are moving ahead with ambitious plans to expand generating capacity. China and India - after pausing briefly to review safety arrangements - are adding about 80 new reactors over the next two decades. (The United States has 104 of the 436 reactors worldwide.) India's expanding use of electricity obtained from enriched uranium - an essential ingredient in building nuclear weapons - is certain to spur Pakistan's already well-established atomic ambitions, at a time when many see Iran's nuclear research program as a prelude to a triangular nuclear arms race involving Israel and Arab states that covet nuclear power. In short, the proliferation of nuclear reactors across Asia is certain to facilitate and encourage nuclear weapons proliferation as well. "We are holding a pair of nuclear tigers by the tail," said George Shultz, secretary of state in the Reagan administration, at a conference on nuclear risk this week at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. The disaster at Fukushima, he said, "should prompt a deeper appreciation of . . . weak links in nuclear weapons . . . and in the humans who are charged with making decisions, not to mention those seeking to cause mass murder." It is progress of a kind that the nuclear disarmament movement is headed today by such establishment figures as Shultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry and Sam Nunn. This "Gang of Four" elder statesmen have for the past five years authored sober op-ed columns calling for the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons and given a more realistic cast to a cause once dominated by the street theater and emotionalism of pacifist movements of the Cold War era. Shultz and his Hoover colleague Sidney Drell, a nuclear physicist, organized this gathering of physicists, nuclear engineers, academics and journalists to try to extend the rational, cost-benefit analytical approach to the less-examined area of civil nuclear power. The calamity at Fukushima spread fears of radiation poisoning around the world - even though all but one or two of the estimated 14,000 deaths were thought to have been caused by the earthquake and tsunami that triggered the reactor meltdowns. Germany nonetheless has ordered its 17 nuclear reactors shut down by 2022. Polls in other countries show that, there too, anti-nuclear sentiment has regained ground that it had lost in recent years, as concern mounted in developed countries about atmospheric pollution caused by carbon dioxide and the instability of petroleum prices and supplies. This swing is notable even in countries that depend heavily on nuclear power, such as France, where Socialist Party leaders say they will raise the issue in next year's presidential elections. In Japan, public approval of adding more nuclear plants stood at 82 percent six years ago. After Fukushima, that number has plunged to 30 percent, according to Japanese newspaper polls. Industry representatives argued to the experts here that higher safety standards and tighter regulation protect U.S. reactors from a Fukushima-type disaster. No consensus was reached on the reliability of those assertions. Japan made similar claims before Fukushima revealed the deadly weaknesses in its crisis-management abilities and in the International Atomic Energy Agency's oversight capabilities. Next week marks the 25th anniversary of the Reykjavik summit, where Mikhail Gorbachev proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union abolish all their nuclear weapons - six months after he had seen the destruction and havoc wrought by a nuclear meltdown at Chernobyl. The primary threat of irremediable damage to the planet no longer comes from rocket forces commanded by the Kremlin and the Pentagon but from nuclear bureaucracies in Tehran, Jerusalem, New Delhi, Islamabad and other capitals in the developing world, as well as from terror networks intent on acquiring fissionable material.

# Pakistan Prolif UQ

**Pakistan is not done developing nukes- they just doubled their stockpile**

**DeYoung 11**(Jim, associate editor and senior national security correspondent for the Washington Post, “Pakistan Doubles Nuclear Weapons,” *The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, January 31, 2011, Proquest, ADP)

Pakistan's nuclear arsenal now totals more than 100 deployed weapons, a doubling of its stockpile over the past several years in one of the world's most unstable regions, according to estimates by non-government analysts. The Pakistanis have significantly accelerated production of uranium and plutonium for bombs and developed new weapons to deliver them. After years of approximate weapons parity, experts said, Pakistan has now edged ahead of India, its nuclear-armed rival. An escalation of the arms race in South Asia poses a dilemma for the Obama administration, which has worked to improve its economic, political and defense ties with India while seeking to deepen its relationship with Pakistan as a crucial component of its Afghanistan war strategy. In politically fragile Pakistan, the administration is caught between fears of proliferation or possible terrorist attempts to seize nuclear materials and Pakistani suspicions that the United States aims to control or limit its weapons program and favors India. Those suspicions were on public display last week at the opening session of U.N. disarmament talks in Geneva, where Pakistani Ambassador Zamir Akram accused the United States and other major powers of "double standards and discrimination" for pushing a global treaty banning all future production of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium. Adoption of what is known as the "fissile materials cutoff treaty," a key element of President Barack Obama's worldwide non-proliferation agenda, requires international consensus. Pakistan has long been the lone holdout. While Pakistan has produced more nuclear-armed weapons, India is believed to have larger existing stockpiles of such fissile material for future weapons. That long-term Indian advantage, Pakistan has charged, was further enhanced by a 2008 U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement. The administration has deflected Pakistan's demands for a similar deal.

# A2: Nanotech breaks down deterrence

**Nanotech reinforces deterrence**

**Hayes 03** (Peter, November 5, “Global Insecurity and Nuclear Next-Use”, PDF)

2.1.3 Long-Term Structural Impact on Nuclear Deterrence: If and when ¶ nanotechnology moves from expensive materials to the revolutionary concepts of ¶ molecular assembly, possibly in conjunction with artificial intelligence derived from ¶ great leaps on computational power and software, and further spliced with advances in ¶ biotechnology, then some have argued that this synergistic and convergent technological ¶ shift will render nuclear deterrence obsolete and even unstable. (See Figure 2.2 for ¶ scenarios created by one such vivid imagination). ¶ This argument rests on undefined and unrealizable abstractions such as the ability of ¶ advanced nano-bio-informational hybrid technologies to construct physical defenses in ¶ very short terms in “nanotech arms races.” Without an exhaustive analysis, this vision is ¶ fundamentally flawed in that it neglects the absolute power of nuclear weapons to blast, ¶ irradiate, and vaporize matter that would be constructed as a defensive barrier by the ¶ ostensible countervailing power of combinatorial nano-bio-information technologies. ¶ Short of becoming North Korean and living underground in nano-constructed caves most ¶ of the time to escape nuclear retaliatory attack, nanotechnology defenses are fantastic ¶ ideas that do not undo the irresistible gravitational effects of nuclear weapons on minds ¶ and politics. ¶ In reality, realization of offensive nanotechnology weapons of mass destruction (WMD) ¶ would simply reinforce the existential deterrent effects of nuclear weapons unless one ¶ power managed to develop and deploy such weapons in complete secrecy. Given that ¶ only big powers are likely to mobilize the resources to make such an enormous ¶ technological breakthrough, let alone have the resources and military ability to deploy ¶ nanotechnology-WMD against other nuclear-armed states, this degree of secrecy seems ¶ unlikely—and the other great states allowing such an attempt to succeed once it became ¶ public is equally implausible.

# A2: Sanctions

**US-EU Nuclear Sanctions kill global energy market and risk an economic crisis**

**Asia News Monitor 7/5/12** (“Iran: Sanctions Endangering Global Energy Security,” *Thai News Service Group*, July 05 , 2012, Proquest, ADP)

Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehman-Parast warned that the US and EU sanctions against its oil supplies are endangering the global energy security.n The United States and the European Union (EU) have, by continuing the approach of sanctions and pressure, practically jeopardized the global energy security and balance, Mehman-Parast told the US Closeup Monday. "They (the US and the EU) should be held accountable for their irresponsible measures which will aggravate the economic crisis in the world, since (energy) security is an indispensable part of the global energy market," he added. Mehman-Parast described the unilateral US-engineered sanctions as illegitimate and in violation of the international rules and regulations, including those on free trade. He also pointed out that the US and the EU will face intensified financial woes as well as increasing social unrest as a result of their polices. The Iranian official noted that by imposing sanctions, the West showed that not only don't they follow a constructive approach to Iran's nuclear energy issue, but they also seek to create tensions at a time when the emphasis in the talks between Iran and the P5+1 group (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) is on building mutual trust to reach an acceptable resolution. The Iranian nation will not surrender under threats and pressures, he said, adding that sanctions will lead to the nation's unity against its enemies and will promote Iran's self-sufficiency. Mehman-Parast once again reiterated Iran's belief in the motto of "nuclear energy for all, nuclear weapon for none" and said in line with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Islamic Republic defends this approach in all international circles and organizations and is determined to restore its nuclear rights. The sanctions by the US and EU are meant to pressure the Islamic Republic over its nuclear energy program, which Washington, Israel and some of their allies claim includes a military aspect.