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## 1NC Case Frontline

### 1. Solving nuclear prolif causes a shift to bio-weapons

**Cordesman '00** (Anthony, Senior Fellow for Strategic Assessment – CSIS, Federal News Service, 3-28, L/N)

New, critical technologies are escaping our control One of the problems I have noticed in US government efforts to analyze proliferation is that they focus on past and current threats. As result, our studies tend to give primary weight to ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. Advances in genetic engineering, biotechnology, medicine, pharmaceuticals, and food processing, however, are making it progressively easier to manufacture biological weapons with nuclear lethalties, to do so under breakout conditions, and do so with little or no warning of the precise nature of the threat. The engines and guidance systems needed for cruise missiles are becoming industrial devices like GPS, sensor-triggered fuses, cluster munitions, drones, crop sprayers, cellular phones interaction with the steady growth in global commerce, shipping, and labor migration to make covert and proxy attacks steadily more effective. Ironically, controlling ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons alone tends to simply push proliferation into other weapons systems and modes of delivery.

### b. Bio-weapons represent the single greatest risk of extinction

**Ochs, 2** [Richard, BS in Natural Resource Management from Rutgers University, with honors, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MUST BE IMMEDIATELY ABOLISHED, [http://www.freefromterror.net/other\\_articles/abolish.html](http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html)]

Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE.

## 1NC Case Frontline

### 2. Prolif dramatically decreases the risk of full-scale war. Robust empirical evidence proves.

**Asal and Beardsley '7** (Victor, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – SUNY Albany, and Kyle, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – Emory U., Journal of Peace Research, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”, 44:2, Sage)

As Model 1 in Table IV illustrates, all of our variables are statistically significant except for the protracted conflict variable. Our primary independent variable, the number of nuclear actors involved in the crisis, has a negative relationship with the severity of violence and is significant. This lends preliminary support to the argument that nuclear weapons have a restraining affect on crisis behavior, as stated in H1. It should be noted that, of the crises that involved four nuclear actors – Suez Nationalization War (1956), Berlin Wall (1961), October Yom Kippur War (1973), and Iraq No-Fly Zone (1992) – and five nuclear actors – Gulf War (1990) – only two are not full-scale wars. While this demonstrates that the pacifying effect of more nuclear actors is not strong enough to prevent war in all situations, it does not necessarily weaken the argument that there is actually a pacifying effect. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the variable that counts the number of crisis actors has a magnitude greater than that on the variable that counts the number of nuclear actors. Since increases in the number of overall actors in a crisis are strongly associated with higher levels of violence, it should be no surprise that many of the conflicts with many nuclear actors – by extension, many general actors as well – experienced war. Therefore, the results can only suggest that, keeping the number of crisis actors fixed, increasing the proportion of nuclear actors has a pacifying effect. They do not suggest that adding nuclear actors to a crisis will decrease the risk of high levels violence; but rather, adding more actors of any type to a crisis can have a destabilizing effect.

Also in Table IV, Model 2 demonstrates that the effect of a nuclear dyad is only approaching statistical significance, but does have a sign that indicates higher levels of violence are less likely in crises with opponents that have nuclear weapons than other crises. This lukewarm result suggests that it might not be necessary for nuclear actors to face each other in order to get the effect of decreased propensity for violence. All actors should tend to be more cautious in escalation when there is a nuclear opponent, regardless of their own capabilities. While this might weaken support for focusing on specifically a ‘balance of terror’ as a source of stability (see Gaddis, 1986; Waltz, 1990; Sagan & Waltz, 2003; Mearsheimer, 1990), it supports the logic in this article that nuclear weapons can serve as a deterrent of aggression from both nuclear and non-nuclear opponents.<sup>6</sup> Model 3 transforms the violence variable to a binary indicator of war and demonstrates that the principal relationship between the number of nuclear actors and violence holds for the most crucial outcome of full-scale war. Model 4 demonstrates that accounting for the presence of new nuclear actors does not greatly change the results. The coefficient on the new nuclear actor variable is statistically insignificant, which lends credence to the optimists’ view that new nuclear-weapon states should not be presupposed to behave less responsibly than the USA, USSR, UK, France, and China did during the Cold War. Finally, Model 5 similarly illustrates that crises involving superpowers are not more or less prone to violence than others. Superpower activity appears to not be driving the observed relationships between the number of nuclear-crisis actors and restraint toward violence. It is important to establish more specifically what the change in the probability of full-scale war is when nuclear actors are involved. Table V presents the probability of different levels of violence as the number of nuclear actors increases in the Clarify simulations. The control variables are held at their modes or means, with the exception of the variable that counts the number of crisis actors. Because it would be impossible to have, say, five nuclear-crisis actors and only two crisis actors, the number of crisis actors is held constant at five. As we can see, the impact of an increase in the number of nuclear actors is substantial. Starting from a crisis situation without any nuclear actors, including one nuclear actor (out of five) reduces the likelihood of full-scale war by nine percentage points. As we continue to add nuclear actors, the likelihood of full-scale war declines sharply, so that the probability of a war with the maximum number of nuclear actors is about three times less than the probability with no nuclear actors. In addition, the probabilities of no violence and only minor clashes increase substantially as the number of nuclear actors increases. The probability of serious clashes is relatively constant. Overall, the analysis lends significant support to the more optimistic proliferation argument related to the expectation of violent conflict when nuclear actors are involved. While the presence of nuclear powers does not prevent war, it significantly reduces the probability of full-scale war, with more reduction as the number of nuclear powers involved in the conflict increases. As mentioned, concerns about selection effects in deterrence models, as raised by Fearon (2002), should be taken

seriously. While we control for the strategic selection of serious threats within crises, we are unable to control for the non-random initial initiation of a crisis in which the actors may choose to enter a crisis based on some ex ante assessment of the out-comes. To account for possible selection bias caused by the use of a truncated sample that does not include any non-crisis cases, one would need to use another dataset in which the crisis cases are a subset and then run Heckman- type selection models (see Lemke & Reed, 2001). It would, however, be difficult to think of a different unit of analysis that might be employed, such that the set of crises is a subset of a larger category of interaction. While dyad- year datasets have often been employed to similar ends, the key independent variable here, which is specific to crises as the unit of analysis, does not lend itself to a dyadic setup. Moreover, selection bias concerns are likely not valid in disputing the claims of this analysis. If selection bias were present, it would tend to bias the effect of nuclear weapons downward, because the set of observed crises with nuclear actors likely has a disproportionate share of resolved actors that have chosen to take their chances against a nuclear opponent. Despite this potential mitigating bias, the results are statistically significant, which strengthens the case for the explanations provided in this study.

## 1NC Case Frontline

### b. Conventional war outweighs nuclear war

**Arbatov et al, 89** (Alexei, Head, Nikolae Kishilov, Head of Section, and Oleg Amirov, Senior Researcher, Department on Problems of Disarmament – Institute of world Economic and International Relations, in “Conventional arms Control and East-West Security”, Ed. Robert Blackwill and F. Stephen Larrabee.)

A large-scale conventional war, even if would not quickly boil over into a nuclear war, would have numerous unpredictable features that would make it quite dissimilar to World War the experience of which continues to be used even now as the point of departure for the strategic and operational planning of combat operations for NATO and WTO ground forces, air forces and naval forces. The fact that during the past an years incomparably greater changes have taken place in technology than those that took place in the earlier interwar periods of 1870-1914 and 1918-1939 supports such a conclusion. Therefore, war in the modern era is even less similar to World War II than that war was to War World I, and the latter in turn to the Franco-Prussian war. It is exceptionally difficult, if it is possible at all, to predict its course. But there is every justification to say that the numerous contradictions and paradoxes of a hypothetical new war would in practice have the most unexpected consequences, consequences most likely incompatible with the concept of "protracted" conventional combat on the European continent or on a global scale. This concerns, for example, the fact that the sharply increased interdependence of different types of armed forces and troops, individual formations and units and various weapons systems is a distinguishing feature of the functioning of enormous and highly complex organizations, which is what modern armed forces are. A great spatial scope of operations (on the scale of entire TVDs), the rapidity and intensity of combat actions, and the multinational structure of opposing coalitions of states will characterize their actions. All of this poses unprecedentedly high demands for coordinating the actions of all elements of military potentials and for carefully planning operations, their priority, sequence of interaction and so on. At the same time, the character of modern warfare makes inevitable the constant and rapid change of the combat situation on the fronts, deep breakthroughs and envelopments, and the intermixing of one's own and others' formations. units and subunits. In view of the high maneuverability of troops even the traditional FBA may no longer exist. In place of it zones of combat contact of a depth of dozens of kilometers will arise and rapidly change and shift. The unpredictability, mutability and intensity of probable combat actions would so overload the capabilities of a centralized command and control in the theater of war and the separate TVDs that they would most likely rapidly lead to total chaos. The intensity of the anticipated combat also renders inevitable exceptionally great losses in arms and equipment. At the same time, because of the rapid increase in the cost of weapons systems, the quantitative levels of armed forces and arms on the whole have a tendency to decrease. Fewer but much improved and more powerful arms have a much lesser chance than in World War I/ of being used repeatedly in several battles. Their longevity will entirely depend on how successfully they may outstrip the opponent and destroy his forces and capabilities earlier than they will be destroyed by him. Therefore, combat actions will in any event most likely have a short-term character, if not for both, then at least for one of the sides. And this is not to mention the enormous loss. among the civilian population and the damage to the economic infrastructure in the region of combat, which may now envelop the greatest and most densely populated portion of the European continent. Neither the population, economy nor ecology of Europe can withstand a large-scale conventional war for any amount of time—even in the improbable event that nuclear power stations, chemical enterprises and nuclear and chemical weapons depots are not destroyed. The limited capabilities of the "human factor" in conditions of modern battle are clearly demonstrated by the experience of the local wars of the 1970s and the 1980s. Thus, for maintaining the combat capability of troops at a "sufficiently high level" during the Falklands conflict (1982), the British command was forced to replace forward units every two days. Furthermore, the high sortie rate of Great Britain's air force and naval aviation M this period was guaranteed largely thanks to the use of special medicinal preparations. Naturally, it is impossible to compare and carry over the experience of individual local conflicts to potential large-scale combat operations on the European continent, where their character would be quite different both in terms of intensity and scope. This concerns the anticipated transient "fire contacts" with the rapid change of the tactical and operational situation, the threat of using nuclear weapons at any moment, the swift advance of enemy troops, the simultaneous envelopment of large territories with combat actions, the premeditated violation of lines of communication and CI, and the conduct of combat operations at any time of the day (including at night) and under any weather conditions—all of which maximally Morocco the physical and psychological stress on a person, and cannot be compared with what took place in the years of World War II, in the Middle East in aim or in the Falkland Islands in 1982. It is also necessary to observe that the replacement of the leading units by their withdrawal to the rear for rest and replenishment, as was done in the past, becomes practically impossible in the conditions of large-scale combat operations. Where to withdraw the units for rest, and at what time, if just 30-50 kilometers horn the front there would be a zone of combat operations just as intense as at the forward line? Any assessments of the losses of the sides participating in the conflict can only be highly abstract. Only one thing is clear—the human and material losses in the event of a "general conventional war" will be characterized, undoubtedly, by a scale many hundreds of times greater than that in analogous conflicts of the past, and, what is especially important, by a significantly higher "attrition rate" of people and equipment, of the share of irreplaceable losses.

## 1NC Case Frontline

### 3. Proliferation causes satellite surveillance expansion.

**Norris '7** (Pat, Space Strategy Manager – Logica UK, “Spies in the sky: surveillance satellites in war and peace”, p. 169-170, Google Print)

Surveillance satellites that are specifically military in nature are operated by seven countries, namely Russia, the US, France, Japan, Germany, China, and Britain (although Britain's is only a technology demonstrator satellite, not an operational system). The impetus for new countries to build these satellites has come from the fragmentation of the world's military threats since the end of the Cold War. Where before the main threat was a US-Soviet confrontation – either directly or via satellite states – military forces from the developed countries are not involved in actions across the globe. The proliferation of missile and nuclear technology has also motivated countries to have an autonomous satellite-monitoring capability. Japan's decision to build a fleet of radar and visible imaging satellites stems from concerns about missile tests undertaken by North Korea.

### b. That's key to global environmental sustainability.

**Reibaldi '95** (Giuseppe, European Space Agency, Acta Astronautica, “Contribution of Space Activities to Peace”, 35:8, ScienceDirect)

The 1970s have seen the rise of ecological movements, originating from the view of the fragile Earth, as photographed by the Apollo astronauts on the way to the Moon. The human species already consumes or destroys 40% of all energy produced by terrestrial photosynthesis, that is, 40% of the food potentially available to living things on land. Predictions for the future indicate that tropical forests will continue to be destroyed, arable land will shrink because of the top soil pollution that cannot be repaired. The control of the environment is no longer the issue of a single state but its implication is international, so it requires close monitoring to avoid disputes in this matter, eventually generating situations of conflict. Governments realized that pollution had reached unsurpassed levels and after several years of futile discussions they agreed on several environmental treaties which limited the use of substances which proved to be dangerous to the environment (i.e. Montreal Accord which seeks to limit the global emission of CFCs to protect the ozone layer). The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 was a significant step in this direction, since it was attended by Heads of State and Government. Delegates from rich and poor countries participating in the Rio Conference worked out agreements to protect biodiversity, control carbon dioxide emission and slow deforestation. Those agreements require verification in order to be credible and binding for the countries which adhere to it. Earth observing satellites can bring awareness of any violation of environmental treaties as an independent source of information. For example, the European Space Agency's Earth Remote Sensing 1 (ERS-1) satellite can detect, by day and by night, river pollution and identify the potential responsible, or oil leakage generated by a transport ship which is washing its tanks in international waters. Furthermore, space technology can provide easier access to “soft technology” such as education and health care as well as “hard technology” such as telecommunication and discovery of natural resources and this will help developing countries in achieving a policy of sustainable development.

## 1NC Case Frontline

### c. The impact is extinction.

**Cairns '4** (John, Distinguished Emeritus University Prof. Env. Biology – Virginia Tech, “Future of Life on Earth,” Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics, <http://www.int-res.com/cespbooks/EB2Pt2.pdf>)

One lesson from the five great global extinctions is that species and ecosystems come and go, but the evolutionary process continues. In short, life forms have a future on Earth, but humankind's future depends on its stewardship of ecosystems that favor *Homo sapiens*. By practicing sustainability ethics, humankind can protect and preserve ecosystems that have services favorable to it. Earth has reached its present state through an estimated 4550 million years and may last for 15 000 million more years. The sixth mass extinction, now underway, is unique because humankind is a major contributor to the process. Excessive damage to the ecological life support system will markedly alter civilization, as it is presently known, and might even result in human extinction. However, if humankind learns to live sustainably, the likelihood of leaving a habitable planet for posterity will dramatically increase. The 21st century represents a defining moment for humankind—will present generations become good ancestors for their descendants by living sustainably or will they leave a less habitable planet for posterity by continuing to live unsustainably?

### 4. Deterrence failure is very unlikely. Proliferation saves far more lives than it costs.

**Preston '7** (Thomas, Associate Prof. IR – Washington State U. and Faculty Research Associate – Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, “From Lambs to Lions: Future Security relationships in a World of Biological and Nuclear Weapons”, p. 31-32)

1.) The Cost of Deterrence Failure Is Too Great Advocates of deterrence seldom take the position that it will *always* work or that it *cannot* fail. Rather, they take the position that if one can achieve the requisite elements required to achieve a stable deterrent relationship between parties, it vastly decreases the chances of miscalculation and resorting to war—even in contexts where it might otherwise be expected to occur (George and Smoke 1974; Harvey 1997a; Powell 1990, 2003; Goldstein 2000). Un- fortunately, critics of deterrence take the understandable, if unrealistic, position that if deterrence cannot be 100 percent effective under all circumstances, then it is an unsound strategic approach for states to rely upon, especially considering the immense destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Feaver (1993, 162), for example, criticizes reliance on nuclear deterrence because it *can* fail and that rational deterrence theory can only predict that peace should occur *most* of the time (e.g., Lebow and Stein 1989). Yet, were we to apply this standard of perfection to most other policy approaches concerning security matters—whether it be arms control or proliferation regime efforts, military procurement policies, alliance formation strategies, diplomacy, or sanctions—none could be argued with any more certainty to completely remove the threat of equally devastating wars either. Indeed, one could easily make the argument that these alternative means have shown themselves historically to be far less effective than nuclear arms in preventing wars. Certainly, the twentieth century was replete with examples of devastating conventional conflicts which were *not* deterred through non- nuclear measures. Although the potential costs of a nuclear exchange between small states would indeed cause a frightful loss of life, it would be no more costly (and likely far less so) than large-scale conventional conflicts have been for combatants. Moreover, if nuclear deterrence *raises* the potential costs of war high enough for policy makers to want to *avoid* (rather than risk) conflict, it is just as legitimate (if not more so) for optimists to argue in favor of nuclear deterrence in terms of the lives saved through the avoidance of far more likely recourses to conventional wars, as it is for pessimists to warn of the potential costs of deterrence failure. And, while some accounts describing the “immense weaknesses” of deterrence theory (Lebow and Stein 1989, 1990) would lead one to believe deterrence was almost impossible to either obtain or maintain, since 1945 there has not been one single historical instance of nuclear deterrence failure (especially when this notion is limited to threats to key central state interests like survival, and not to minor probing of peripheral interests). Moreover, the *actual costs* of twentieth-century conventional conflicts have been staggeringly immense, especially when compared to the *actual costs* of nuclear conflicts (for example, 210,000 fatalities in the combined 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings compared to 62 million killed overall during World War II, over three million dead in both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, etc.) (McKinzie et al. 2001, 28).<sup>3</sup> Further, as Gray (1999, 158–59) observes, “it is improbable that policy-makers anywhere need to be educated as to the extraordinary qualities and quantities of nuclear armaments.” Indeed, the high costs and uncontestable, immense levels of destruction that would be caused by nuclear weapons have been shown historically to be facts that have not only been readily apparent and salient to a wide range of policy makers, but ones that have clearly been demonstrated to moderate extreme policy or risk-taking behavior (Blight 1992; Preston 2001) Could it go wrong? Of course. There is always that potential

with human beings in the loop. Nevertheless, it has also been shown to be effective at moderating policy maker behavior and introducing an element of constraint into situations that otherwise would likely have resulted in war (Hagerty 1998).

### 5. Uncertainty makes costs of war too high – nuclear weapons deter all military aggression

**Karl '96** (David, PhD in International Relations from USC, International Security, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers", Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter, p. 95-96)

Optimists have relaxed views of the preventive-war dangers entailed in situations in which a nuclear power confronts a nuclearizing rival. The practical difficulties of ensuring a disarming strike to preclude any possibility of nuclear retaliation make preventive actions a military gamble that states are very unlikely to take. As Waltz explains, "prevention and pre-emption are difficult games because the costs are so high if the games are not perfectly played.... Ultimately, the inhibitions [against such attacks] lie in the impossibility of knowing for sure that a disarming strike will totally destroy an opposing force and in the immense destruction even a few warheads can wreak."<sup>25</sup>To optimists, states will have to learn to live with a rival's emerging nuclear armory. Because strategic uncertainty is seen as having a powerful dissuasive effect, optimists usually view the very increase in the numbers of nuclear-armed states as an additional element of stability. Dagobert Brito and Michael Intriligator, for instance, argue that uncertainty over the reaction of other nuclear powers will make all hesitant to strike individually.<sup>26</sup> As an example, they point to the restraint the superpowers exercised on each other in the 1960s, when first the United States and then the Soviet Union contemplated military action against China's nascent nuclear weapon sites. The net effect of the uncertain reaction of others is that "the probability of deliberate nuclear attack falls to near zero with three, four, or more nuclear nations."<sup>27</sup>Similarly, Waltz reasons that even in cases of asymmetric proliferation within conflict dyads, nuclear weapons will prove "poor instruments for blackmail" because a "country that takes the nuclear offensive has to fear an appropriately punishing strike by someone. Far from lowering the expected cost of aggression, a nuclear offense even against a non-nuclear state raises the possible costs of aggression to incalculable heights because the aggressor cannot be sure of the reaction of other nuclear powers."<sup>28</sup>

### 6. No risk of fast proliferation – nuclear weapons are too technical and expensive to spread rapidly

Jason **Tepperman**, September 7, **2k9**. Reporter, Newsweek. <http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248/page/1>

The risk of an arms race—with, say, other Persian Gulf states rushing to build a bomb after Iran got one—is a bit harder to dispel. Once again, however, history is instructive. "In 64 years, the most nuclear-weapons states we've ever had is 12," says Waltz. "Now with North Korea we're at nine. That's not proliferation; that's spread at glacial pace." Nuclear weapons are so controversial and expensive that only countries that deem them absolutely critical to their survival go through the extreme trouble of acquiring them. That's why South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan voluntarily gave theirs up in the early '90s, and why other countries like Brazil and Argentina dropped nascent programs. This doesn't guarantee that one or more of Iran's neighbors—Egypt or Saudi Arabia, say—might not still go for the bomb if Iran manages to build one. But the risks of a rapid spread are low, especially given Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent suggestion that the United States would extend a nuclear umbrella over the region, as Washington has over South Korea and Japan, if Iran does complete a bomb. If one or two Gulf states nonetheless decided to pursue their own weapon, that still might not be so disastrous, given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior.

## 2NC: Nuclear War Outweighs

### **Nuclear weapons reduce the risk and impact of nuclear war**

**Asal and Beardsley '7** (Victor, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – SUNY Albany, and Kyle, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – Emory U., *Journal of Peace Research*, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior\*”, 44:2, Sage)

Other, more optimistic, scholars see benefits to nuclear proliferation or, perhaps not actively advocating the development of more nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapon states, see that the presence of nuclear weapons has at least been stabilizing in the past. For example, some scholars are confident of the promise of the ‘nuclear peace’.<sup>4</sup> While those who oppose proliferation present a number of arguments, those who contend that nuclear weapons would reduce interstate wars are fairly consistent in focusing on one key argument: nuclear weapons make the risk of war unacceptable for states. As Waltz argues, the higher the stakes and the closer a country moves toward winning them, the more surely that country invites retaliation and risks its own destruction. States are not likely to run major risks for minor gains. War between nuclear states may escalate as the loser uses larger and larger warheads. Fearing that, states will want to draw back. Not escalation but deescalation becomes likely. War remains possible, but victory in war is too dangerous to fight for. (Sagan & Waltz, 2003: 6–7) ‘Nuclear war simply makes the risks of war much higher and shrinks the chance that a country will go to war’ (Snyder & Diesing, 1977: 450). Using similar logic, Bueno de Mesquita & Riker (1982) demonstrate formally that a world with almost universal membership in the nuclear club will be much less likely to experience nuclear war than a world with only a few members. Supporters of proliferation do not see leaders of new nuclear states as being fundamentally different from those of the old nuclear states in terms of their levels of responsibility (Arquilla, 1997), nor do they see them facing unique challenges in managing and securing these weapons (Feaver, 1992/93: 162–163). The response to the argument that small powers, non-Western powers, and military powers will behave less responsibly than the USA and other ‘responsible’ powers is that the evidence does not support the view that new nuclear powers are ‘different’ in the worst sense of the word (Lavoy, 1995; Hagerty, 1998; Arquilla, 1997; Feldman, 1995; Karl, 1996/ 97). Van Creveld (1993: 124) sums up this viewpoint when he points out that ‘where these weapons have been introduced, large-scale interstate warfare has disappeared’. Dismissing the fear that deterrence will not work if the arsenal is not big enough or under enough control, Chellaney (1995) contends that the Cold War is evidence that even minimum deterrence is sufficient. In support, Feaver (1992/93: 186) argues that ‘even a modest nuclear arsenal should have some existential deterrent effect on regional enemies, precisely because decapitation is so difficult’. There are those who argue that security is increased at a systemic level when the number of nuclear states increases because of the level of uncertainty created when more than one or two players are playing with a nuclear deck. When this happens, ‘the probability of deliberate nuclear attack falls to near zero with three, four, or more nuclear nations’ (Brito & Intriligator, 1983: 137). Cimbala (1993: 194) agrees, arguing that ‘it is only necessary to threaten the plausible loss of social value commensurate with the potential gains of an attacker’.

## 2NC: Nuclear War Outweighs

### **Nuke war is bad but won't cause extinction.**

**Martin '84** (Brian, Research Associate – Australian National University, SANA Update, “Extinction Politics”, No. 16, May, <http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/84sana1.html>)

Yet in spite of the widespread belief in nuclear extinction, there was almost no scientific support for such a possibility. The scenario of the book and movie *On the Beach*,<sup>[2]</sup> with fallout clouds gradually enveloping the earth and wiping out all life, was and is fiction. The scientific evidence is that fallout would only kill people who are immediately downwind of surface nuclear explosions and who are heavily exposed during the first few days. Global fallout has no potential for causing massive immediate death (though it could cause up to millions of cancers worldwide over many decades).<sup>[3]</sup> In spite of the lack of evidence, large sections of the peace movement have left unaddressed the question of whether nuclear war inevitably means global extinction. The next effect to which beliefs in nuclear extinction were attached was ozone depletion. Beginning in the mid-1970s, scares about stratospheric ozone developed, culminating in 1982 in the release of Jonathan Schell's book *The Fate of the Earth*.<sup>[4]</sup> Schell painted a picture of human annihilation from nuclear war based almost entirely on effects from increased ultraviolet light at the earth's surface due to ozone reductions caused by nuclear explosions. Schell's book was greeted with adulation rarely observed in any field. Yet by the time the book was published, the scientific basis for ozone-based nuclear extinction had almost entirely evaporated. The ongoing switch by the military forces of the United States and the Soviet Union from multi-megatonne nuclear weapons to larger numbers of smaller weapons means that the effect on ozone from even the largest nuclear war is unlikely to lead to any major effect on human population levels, and extinction from ozone reductions is virtually out of the question.<sup>[3]</sup> The latest stimulus for doomsday beliefs is 'nuclear winter': the blocking of sunlight from dust raised by nuclear explosions and smoke from fires ignited by nuclear attacks. This would result in a few months of darkness and lowered temperatures, mainly in the northern mid-latitudes.<sup>[5]</sup> The effects could be quite significant, perhaps causing the deaths of up to several hundred million more people than would die from the immediate effects of blast, heat and radiation. But the evidence, so far, seems to provide little basis for beliefs in nuclear extinction. The impact of nuclear winter on populations nearer the equator, such as in India, does not seem likely to be significant. The most serious possibilities would result from major ecological destruction, but this remains speculative at present.

### **Same effect as nuclear war – attacks on plants**

**Jianguo 95** [ Major General Wu former Associate Professor and Dean of the Antichemical Warfare Academy “Nuclear shadows on high-tech warfare” <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/jianguo.htm>]

What merits our attention is that in a high-tech conventional war, a nuclear environment may still emerge even if nuclear weapons are not used. The more society advances, the greater the demands for energy will be. In order to satisfy the demands for energy, nuclear power stations were built. According to the data released by the International Atomic Energy Agency in March 1994, at the end of 1993 there were 430 nuclear power plants with a total installed capacity of approximately 345 million kw operating in various places throughout the world; these accounted for more than 17 percent of the world's gross power generation. It is predicted that by 2001, there will be 558 nuclear power generating units with a total installed capacity of approximately 460 million kw all worldwide, which will account for 24 percent of the world's gross power generation. The peaceful utilization of nuclear energy is a piece of joyous news to mankind. Meanwhile, the extensive use of nuclear energy also constitutes a latent threat to peace and the existence of human beings. The accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant that occurred in April 1986 inflicted air pollution on 16 Russian oblasts and victimized 250,000 people. In Ukraine, 370,000 people suffered injuries in varying degrees as land covering 40,000 square meters was polluted, and more than 2,000 residential areas were evacuated. In future high-tech warfare, if an enemy intentionally or unintentionally attacks nuclear power plants or other facilities using nuclear energy with high-tech conventional weapons, the secondary nuclear radiation produced and the nuclear environment brought about would likewise do harm. In June 1981, Israel dispatched four aircraft to launch a sudden attack on an Iraqi nuclear reactor southeast of the capital Baghdad, dropping 16 tons of bombs in two minutes and hitting all the targets. Fortunately, the reactor was not yet operational; otherwise the attack would have resulted in very serious consequences.

## 2NC: Nuclear War Outweighs

**Conventional weapons outweigh – they’ve killed more people, encourage war, and trade off with other social initiatives which threatens state collapse**

**DIS 99** [Disarmament and International Security, Background Guide, Fall, <http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~ucbmun/materials/disecFall99.doc>, accessed 1/7/03]cn

Limitless and unrestricted, small arms and conventional weapons have led to the death of more people and the squandering of more money than nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons combined and remain to have a much greater impact upon human population and world politics. Many experts believe that nuclear disarmament will never be realized until progress has been made toward general and complete disarmament. The theory is that countries develop nuclear weapons as protection against the conventional weapons of opposing states. Recent history and the Cold War serve as an example that nations are more likely to use their small arms and conventional weapons in aggressive acts than alternative forms of warfare. The build up of small arms and conventional weapons also spurs the tensions amongst neighboring nations even further. As nations increase their forces and the stockpiles of weapons, surrounding nations feel compelled to increase their own forces and weapons supplies. The arms race destroys the trust and diplomatic relationships between neighboring nations thus inhibiting international and interregional peace. A major concern with conventional weapons is with the use of those that have indiscriminate effects, which involves the use of land mines, booby traps, and other weapons in the process of being developed, such as blind laser weapons. In the end, these weapons harm more innocent civilians than members of an opposing army and their effects remain long after conflict resolution. The market for small arms and conventional weapons is immense and costly. Both the legal proliferation and black market proliferation of these weapons have created international tensions. Many believe that terrorism cannot be abated as long as their weapons of choice remain completely accessible on the world market. The greatest victim of small arms and conventional weapons are the underdeveloped and developing nations. Instead of spending money on economic and social incentives - such as education, welfare, medical treatment, treatment of water, the production of food, and the building of factories and a workforce - these nations purchase these weapons at high prices and maintain armies that are not proportionate to their country's size. Despite the lack of progress, an obligation covering General and Complete Disarmament was included in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It commits all parties to the treaty "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." But in spite of this renewed pledge of the NPT parties, no negotiation on general disarmament is taking place today, and none is planned and 45 million people have died since the end of World War II at the expense of these weapons.

## 2NC: Nuclear War Outweighs

### 40 to 1 benefits outweigh

**De mesquite and Riker 82** [Department of Political Science, University of Rochester “An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 26:2.]

One might object further. Conceding that the likelihood of miscalculation does diminish as proliferation occurs, one might still contend that the costs of such a miscalculation are so large that they cannot conceivably justify even the diminished risk of war. If the expected costs from nuclear wars arising out of miscalculation or irrational acts exceed the expected costs from wars that could be prevented by proliferation, then, indeed, proliferation is a very dangerous thing. There is, of course, no precise way to measure these expected costs, but we do have some basis for estimating them. Using expected utility calculations similar to the one suggested here, one of us (Bueno de Mesquita 1981b) found that 65 of approximately 70,000 opportunities to initiate war rationally were seized in the period 1816 to 1974, with hundreds of other opportunities being used to threaten war. In that same study it was also found that only 11 of nearly 500,000 opportunities to initiate war were seized in violation of the expectations arising from the expected utility framework. In other words, the ratio of seemingly rational and correct calculations to either irrational calculations or miscalculations that have led to war is over 40 to 1. This implies that through symmetry-producing nuclear proliferation, we may expect to prevent approximately 40 conventional or one-sided nuclear wars for every one miscalculated or irrational bilateral nuclear exchange. Using the 40 most recent wars as a crude indicator, this analysis implies that a single miscalculated or irrational nuclear exchange in the third world would have to kill several tens of millions of people before some proliferation would be unjustified by yielding a higher expected loss of life. It seems to us unlikely that one such miscalculated or irrational act among third world countries, each with a very few warheads, could produce this level of loss. Still, we do not rule it out, but rather note that it is exactly such estimates that must be made in calculating the trade-offs between gains and losses from nuclear proliferation. One might expect, for instance, that selection of candidates for proliferation might be based partially on the calculation of the marginal effect on expected costs in life and property from not standing in the way of the candidate in question. Thus, proliferation would be resisted where the expected marginal effect would be an increase in loss of life and property over nonproliferation, but would be encouraged where the marginal effect was otherwise.

## 2NC Bio-Shift

### **Making nuclear prolif more difficult shifts to Bioweapons.**

**Roberts '96** (Brad, Ed. Washington Quarterly and Research Fellow – CSIS, “Weapons Proliferation and World Order: After the Cold War”, p. 59)

The factors stimulating such proliferation probably closely parallel those in the chemical area. Declining barriers to acquisition have played a role, particularly with the steady diffusion of dual-use technologies. The revolution in the bioengineering since the entry into force of the BTWC has raised concern about the ease with which bw agents can be produced, stockpiled, and used in war and about the new threats posed by novel, highly virulent agents. Regional conflict and strategic need may also have provided incentives as regional leaders have sought the means to deter well-armed neighbors or outside inventors, to coerce regional adversaries, or to seek victory in war. The difficulty of acquiring nuclear capabilities and the increasing political costs of chemical weapons, as well as their not inconsequential fiscal costs, may have stimulated specific interest in countries that pose a general proliferation risk. Mere curiosity may also explain some of the research work as some developing countries seek to understand the possible military application of the new biological sciences increasingly within reach.

### **Solving nuclear weapons cause bio-shift**

**Zilinskas '00** (Raymond A., Former Clinical Microbiologist and Dir. – Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program – Center for Nonproliferation Studies of Monterey Institute of International Studies, in “Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense”, Ed. Raymond A. Zilinskas, p. 1-2, Google Print)

There are many who believe that today's bioscientists and chemical engineers working in unison and wielding the techniques of molecular biology developed since the early 1970s could, if so commanded, develop military effective biological weapons within a fairly short time. If this supposition is correct, our perception of biological weapons as being undependable, uncontrollable, and unreliable must change. The reason is simple: if these weapons are demonstrated to possess properties that make it possible for commanders to effect controlled, confined mass destruction on command, all government would be forced to construct defenses against them and some undoubtedly would be tempted to arm their military with these weapons that would be both powerful and relatively inexpensive to acquire. Ironically, as tougher international controls are put into place to deter nations from seeking to acquire chemical and nuclear weapons, leaders may even be more drawn to biological arms as the most accessible form of weapon of mass destruction.

## 2NC Conventional War - Asia

### High Risk conventional war Asia

Walters 9 [The Australian, May 2, "PM's push for missile supremacy" Online]

THE navy will acquire a formidable arsenal of long-range cruise missiles for its new submarines, destroyers and frigates, able to strike at targets thousands of kilometres from Australia's shores. The new-generation submarines and major surface warships will be fitted with land-attack cruise missiles with ranges of up to 2500km as Australia becomes the first regional defence force to have the potent weapons system. The cruise missiles will give the Government "options to conduct long-range, precision-strike operations against hardened, defended and difficult-to-access targets, while minimising the exposure of ADF platforms and personnel to attack by enemy forces", the defence white paper says. Reflecting the Government's consciousness that the planned maritime defence build-up could provoke criticism from regional neighbours, the white paper asserts that acquisition of land-attack cruise missiles is "fully consistent with Australian treaty obligations and customary international law". The core of the Government's thinking about the far more potent next-generation defence force is that the risk of a major conventional war in the Asia-Pacific region cannot be ruled out. "It would be premature to judge that war among states, including the major powers, has been eliminated as a feature of the international system," the white paper says. "Shows of force by rising powers are likely to become more common as their military capabilities expand. Growing economic interdependence will not preclude inter-state conflicts or tensions short of war, especially over resources or political differences."

## 2NC Conventioanl War – Middle East

### **Middle East war likely**

**Oren 8** Washington Post, 3-2

But for all these transformations, the Middle East remains the same explosive context of conflict it was in the 1960s. The region is still bitterly divided -- not between Arab nationalism and conservatism but between religious moderation and the surge of Islamist extremism spurred, in part, by the Six-Day War. Backed by Syria and Iran, a phalanx of terrorist groups threatens Israeli and Arab societies alike. Israel has peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan and is engaged again in peace talks with the Palestinians, but it is still an object of abomination for the overwhelming majority of Middle Easterners. And violence in Gaza -- now run by a democratically elected Hamas government -- can still spark turbulent demonstrations throughout the region's streets. If anything, the Middle East is even more flammable today than in the 1960s because of the countless thousands of short- and long-range missiles in its armies' arsenals. These weapons vastly amplify the potential destruction of any military confrontation while slashing the amount of decision- making time that might be needed to avert all-out war. And modern weapons, including unconventional ones, make everything scarier. A conflict between Israel and Iran might not last six days but six hours, unleashing shock waves even more seismic than those of 1967. Contemporary Middle Eastern leaders cannot afford to ignore these lessons. Neither can decision- makers -- and would-be ones -- in the United States. Though the waning Bush administration is focused on trying to reach an Israeli-Palestinian peace treaty, shore up Iraq and flex its muscles at Iran, it should not downplay the danger that a seemingly limited border skirmish could rapidly escalate into a regional catastrophe.

## 2NC Middle East

### **You overstate the risk and speed of ME prolif**

**Carpenter 7** [Ted Galen, VP for defense and foreign policy issues at CATO “Toward a Grand Bargain with Iran”. Muse]

Finally, those who favor a more confrontational policy toward Iran warn that if Tehran succeeds in its quest for nuclear weapons, other nations in the region will quickly do the same, creating an especially dangerous security environment. As in the case of concerns about possible blackmail, this fear has some validity. Because of the uncertain reliability of the protection afforded by the US umbrella for some US allies and client states in the Middle East, there is a very real prospect that if Iran develops a nuclear arsenal, sooner or later such countries as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey might follow suit. Indeed, Egypt may already be thinking along those lines. In late September, Gamal Mubarak, President Hosni Mubarak's son and political heir apparent, stated that his country needed to develop a nuclear program for power generation.<sup>19</sup> Although he stressed that the program would be entirely peaceful, his proposal had all the earmarks of a hedging strategy. As we have seen with India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran, "peaceful" nuclear programs can easily become the foundation for a nuclear weapons program. Whether additional proliferation would reach epidemic proportions and create the nightmare scenarios forecast by some analysts is uncertain. It is important to recall that pundits and even international relations experts have tended to overestimate both the probability and the extent of proliferation in the past. The conventional wisdom in the 1960s was that there would be as many as two dozen nuclear weapons powers within a generation.<sup>20</sup> Similar predictions took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s.<sup>21</sup> **[End Page 22]** Moreover, it is not an established fact that nuclear weapons in the hands of a larger number of nations would necessarily be a bad development. Indeed, some respected international relations scholars have argued that nuclear proliferation might be stabilizing rather than destabilizing.<sup>22</sup> Given its volatile political makeup, though, the Middle East is probably not the best region to test that thesis.

### **Deterrence applies in the ME**

**Feldman 97** [Senior Researcher Fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's JFK School of Government. “Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East” p18-19.]

This logic of deterrence operates in the Middle East. Israel's reported nuclear potential has provided an effective existential deterrence by suggesting to the Arab states that they cannot destroy the Jewish state without risking their own annihilation, an acceptable price. In turn, this existential deterrence has contributed to Israel's simulative deterrence, its desire that the Arab states come to see that Israel must be considered a permanent feature of the Middle East and should therefore be accommodated politically. Indeed, the decisions of a growing number of Arab states to engage Israel in a peace process would be difficult to explain without reference to Israel's perceived nuclear potential. These states might have considered other aspects of Israeli cumulative deterrence – its qualitative edge in the conventional realm and the support it received from the United States – as transitory. By contrast, Israel's reported nuclear potential could not be eliminated, even by an Arab acquisition of nuclear weapons. Indeed, Arab states may have estimated that if other elements of Israel's deterrence were to deteriorate, it would be compelled to make its nuclear potential all the more explicit. Arab perceptions that Israel possesses a nuclear potential also provide it with considerable residual or specific deterrence. For example, during the 1990-91 Gulf War, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was probably deterring from attacking Israel with ballistic missiles armed with chemical warheads not because he was certain that Israel would retaliate with nuclear weapons, but rather because he could not rule out this possibility. In this case the heritage of the Holocaust, which made Israel particularly sensitive to "gas warfare," coupled with a number of statements issued at the time by Israeli leaders and by U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, made "specific deterrence credible" The logic of deterrence will prevail as long as Israel possess a nuclear potential. Thus, were Israel withdraw from the Golan Heights as part of a peaceful agreement with Syria, Syria would be dissuaded from mounting a major assault on Israel not by an certainty that such an attack would trigger Israeli nuclear retaliation, but because it would be unable to dismiss the possibility that Israel's response might result in a spiral of escalation, eventually leading to the crossing of the nuclear threshold.

## 2NC Heg

### Heg transition inevitable

**Haass 8** [Richard N, President of the Council on Foreign Relations. Foreign Affairs, "Bottom of Form: The Age of Nonpolarity What Will Follow U.S. Dominance" May/June]

But even if great-power rivals have not emerged, unipolarity has ended. Three explanations for its demise stand out. The first is historical. States develop; they get better at generating and piecing together the human, financial, and technological resources that lead to productivity and prosperity. The same holds for corporations and other organizations. The rise of these new powers cannot be stopped. The result is an ever larger number of actors able to exert influence regionally or globally. A second cause is U.S. policy. To paraphrase Walt Kelly's Pogo, the post-World War II comic hero, we have met the explanation and it is us. By both what it has done and what it has failed to do, the United States has accelerated the emergence of alternative power centers in the world and has weakened its own position relative to them. U.S. energy policy (or the lack thereof) is a driving force behind the end of unipolarity. Since the first oil shocks of the 1970s, U.S. consumption of oil has grown by approximately 20 percent, and, more important, U.S. imports of petroleum products have more than doubled in volume and nearly doubled as a percentage of consumption. This growth in demand for foreign oil has helped drive up the world price of oil from just over \$20 a barrel to over \$100 a barrel in less than a decade. The result is an enormous transfer of wealth and leverage to those states with energy reserves. In short, U.S. energy policy has helped bring about the emergence of oil and gas producers as major power centers. U.S. economic policy has played a role as well. President Lyndon Johnson was widely criticized for simultaneously fighting a war in Vietnam and increasing domestic spending. President Bush has fought costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, allowed discretionary spending to increase by an annual rate of eight percent, and cut taxes. As a result, the United States' fiscal position declined from a surplus of over \$100 billion in 2001 to an estimated deficit of approximately \$250 billion in 2007. Perhaps more relevant is the ballooning current account deficit, which is now more than six percent of GDP. This places downward pressure on the dollar, stimulates inflation, and contributes to the accumulation of wealth and power elsewhere in the world. Poor regulation of the U.S. mortgage market and the credit crisis it has spawned have exacerbated these problems. The war in Iraq has also contributed to the dilution of the United States' position in the world. The war in Iraq has proved to be an expensive war of choice -- militarily, economically, and diplomatically as well as in human terms. Years ago, the historian Paul Kennedy outlined his thesis about "imperial overstretch," which posited that the United States would eventually decline by overreaching, just as other great powers had in the past. Kennedy's theory turned out to apply most immediately to the Soviet Union, but the United States -- for all its corrective mechanisms and dynamism -- has not proved to be immune. It is not simply that the U.S. military will take a generation to recover from Iraq; it is also that the United States lacks sufficient military assets to continue doing what it is doing in Iraq, much less assume new burdens of any scale elsewhere. Finally, today's nonpolar world is not simply a result of the rise of other states and organizations or of the failures and follies of U.S. policy. It is also an inevitable consequence of globalization. Globalization has increased the volume, velocity, and importance of cross-border flows of just about everything, from drugs, e-mails, greenhouse gases, manufactured goods, and people to television and radio signals, viruses (virtual and real), and weapons. Globalization reinforces nonpolarity in two fundamental ways. First, many cross-border flows take place outside the control of governments and without their knowledge. As a result, globalization dilutes the influence of the major powers. Second, these same flows often strengthen the capacities of nonstate actors, such as energy exporters (who are experiencing a dramatic increase in wealth owing to transfers from importers), terrorists (who use the Internet to recruit and train, the international banking system to move resources, and the global transport system to move people), rogue states (who can exploit black and gray markets), and Fortune 500 firms (who quickly move personnel and investments). It is increasingly apparent that being the strongest state no longer means having a near monopoly on power. It is easier than ever before for individuals and groups to accumulate and project substantial power. **NONPOLAR DISORDER** The increasingly nonpolar world will have mostly negative consequences for the United States -- and for much of the rest of the world as well. It will

make it more difficult for Washington to lead on those occasions when it seeks to promote collective responses to regional and global challenges. One reason has to do with simple arithmetic. With so many more actors possessing meaningful power and trying to assert influence, it will be more difficult to build collective responses and make institutions work. Herding dozens is harder than herding a few. The inability to reach agreement in the Doha Round of global trade talks is a telling example. Nonpolarity will also increase the number of threats and vulnerabilities facing a country such as the United States. These threats can take the form of rogue states, terrorist groups, energy producers that choose to reduce their output, or central banks whose action or inaction can create conditions that affect the role and strength of the U.S. dollar. The Federal Reserve might want to think twice before continuing to lower interest rates, lest it precipitate a further move away from the dollar. There can be worse things than a recession. Iran is a case in point. Its effort to become a nuclear power is a result of nonpolarity. Thanks more than anything to the surge in oil prices, it has become another meaningful concentration of power, one able to exert influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, the Palestinian territories, and beyond, as well as within OPEC. It has many sources of technology and finance and numerous markets for its energy exports. And due to nonpolarity, the United States cannot manage Iran alone. Rather, Washington is dependent on others to support political and economic sanctions or block Tehran's access to nuclear technology and materials. Nonpolarity begets nonpolarity.

## 2NC Impact Overview

**Conventional war outweighs the case – sixty two million died in World War II alone and Vietnam-Cambodia, Iran-Iraq, Iraq-Kuwait, Eretria-Ethiopia, Vietnam-China and El Salvador-Honduras all killed millions – that’s the Preston evidence.**

**And – future conventional wars will be a hundred times worse**

**Arbatov et al, 89** (Alexei, Head, Nikolae Kishilov, Head of Section, and Oleg Amirov, Senior Researcher, Department on Problems of Disarmament – Institute of world Economic and International Relations, in “Conventional arms Control and East-West Security”, Ed. Robert Blackwill and F. Stephen Larrabee, p. 76-78)

A large-scale conventional war, even if it would not quickly boil over into a nuclear war, would have numerous unpredictable features that would make it quite dissimilar to World War II, the experience of which continues to be used even now as the point of departure for the strategic and operational planning of combat operations for NATO and WTO ground forces, air forces and naval forces. The fact that during the past 40 years incomparably greater changes have taken place in technology than those that took place in the earlier interwar periods of 1870-1914 and 1918-1939 supports such a conclusion. Therefore, war in the modern era is even less similar to World War II than that war was to War World I, and the latter in turn to the Franco-Prussian war. It is exceptionally difficult, if it is possible at all, to predict its course. But there is every justification to say that the numerous contradictions and paradoxes of a hypothetical new war would in practice have the most unexpected consequences, consequences most likely incompatible with the concept of "protracted" conventional combat on the European continent or on a global scale. This concerns, for example, the fact that the sharply increased interdependence of different types of armed forces and troops, individual formations and units and various weapons systems is a distinguishing feature of the functioning of enormous and highly complex organizations, which is what modern armed forces are. A great spacial scope of operations (on the scale of entire TVDs), the rapidity and intensity of combat actions, and the multinational structure of opposing coalitions of states will characterize their actions. All of this poses unprecedentedly high demands for coordinating the actions of all elements of military potentials and for carefully planning operations, their priority, sequence of interaction and so on. At the same time, the character of modern warfare makes inevitable the constant and rapid change of the combat situation on the fronts, deep breakthroughs and envelopments, and the intermixing of one's own and others' formations, units and subunits. In view of the high maneuverability of troops even the traditional FEBAs may no longer exist. In place of it zones of combat contact of a depth of dozens of kilometers will arise and rapidly change and shift. The unpredictability, mutability and intensity of probable combat actions would so overload the capabilities of a centralized command and control in the theater of war and the separate TVDs that they would most likely rapidly lead to total chaos. The intensity of the anticipated combat also renders inevitable exceptionally great losses in arms and equipment. At the same time, because of the rapid increase in the cost of weapons systems, the quantitative levels of armed forces and arms on the whole have a tendency to decrease. Fewer but much improved and more powerful arms have a much lesser chance than in World War II of being used repeatedly in several battles. Their longevity will entirely depend on how successfully they may outstrip the opponent and destroy his forces and capabilities earlier than they will be destroyed by him. Therefore, combat actions will in any event most likely have a short-term character, if not for both, then at least for one of the sides. And this is not to mention the enormous losses among the civilian population and the damage to the economic infrastructure in the region of combat, which may now envelop the greatest and most densely populated portion of the European continent. Neither the population, economy nor ecology of Europe can withstand a large-scale conventional war for any amount of time—even in the improbable event that nuclear power stations, chemical enterprises and nuclear and chemical weapons depots are not destroyed. The limited capabilities of the "human factor" in conditions of modern battle are clearly demonstrated by the experience of the local wars of the 1970s and the 1980s. Thus, for maintaining the combat capability of troops at a "sufficiently high level" during the Falklands conflict (1982), the British command was forced to replace forward units every two days. Furthermore, the high sortie rate of Great Britain's air force and naval aviation in this period was guaranteed largely thanks to the use of special medicinal preparations. Naturally, it is impossible to compare and carry over the experience of individual local conflicts to potential large-scale combat operations on the European continent, where their character would be quite different both in terms of intensity and scope. This concerns the anticipated transient "fire contacts" with the rapid change of the tactical and operational situation, the threat of using nuclear weapons at any moment, the swift advance of enemy troops, the simultaneous envelopment of large territories with combat actions, the premeditated violation of lines of communication and C3I, and the conduct of combat operations at any time of the day (including at night) and under any weather conditions—all of which maximally increase the physical and psychological stress on a person, and cannot be compared with what took place in the years of World War II, in the Middle East in 1973 or in the Falkland Islands in 1982. It is also necessary to observe that the replacement of the leading units by their withdrawal to the rear for rest and replenishment, as was done in the past, becomes practically impossible in the conditions of large-scale combat operations. Where to withdraw the units for rest, and at what time, if just 30-50 kilometers from the front there would be a zone of combat operations just as intense as at the forward line? Any assessments of the losses of the sides participating in the conflict can only be highly abstract. Only one thing is clear—the human and material losses in the event of a "general conventional war" will be characterized, undoubtedly, by a scale many hundreds of times greater than that in analogous conflicts of the past, and, what is especially important, by a significantly higher "attrition rate" of people and equipment, of the share of irreplaceable losses.

## 2NC Impact Overview

### **We access their impact – prolif solves nuclear wars**

**Asal and Beardsley, 07** (Victor, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – SUNY Albany, and Kyle, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – Emory U., Journal of Peace Research, "Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior\*", 44:2, Sage)

Other, more optimistic, scholars see benefits to nuclear proliferation or, perhaps not actively advocating the development of more nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapon states, see that the presence of nuclear weapons has at least been stabilizing in the past. For example, some scholars are confident of the promise of the 'nuclear peace'.<sup>4</sup> While those who oppose proliferation present a number of arguments, those who contend that nuclear weapons would reduce interstate wars are fairly consistent in focusing on one key argument: nuclear weapons make the risk of war unacceptable for states. As Waltz argues, the higher the stakes and the closer a country moves toward winning them, the more surely that country invites retaliation and risks its own destruction. States are not likely to run major risks for minor gains. War between nuclear states may escalate as the loser uses larger and larger warheads. Fearing that, states will want to draw back. Not escalation but deescalation becomes likely. War remains possible, but victory in war is too dangerous to fight for. (Sagan & Waltz, 2003: 6–7) 'Nuclear war simply makes the risks of war much higher and shrinks the chance that a country will go to war' (Snyder & Diesing, 1977: 450). Using similar logic, Bueno de Mesquita & Riker (1982) demonstrate formally that a world with almost universal membership in the nuclear club will be much less likely to experience nuclear war than a world with only a few members.

### **Counterforce strikes mean that twenty million would die at most in a full-scale nuclear war**

**Mueller, 09** (John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies and Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University. "Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda" p. 8)

To begin to approach a condition that can credibly justify applying such extreme characterizations as societal annihilation, a full-out attack with hundreds, probably thousands, of thermonuclear bombs would be required. Even in such extreme cases, the area actually devastated by the bombs' blast and thermal pulse effects would be limited: 2,000 I-MT explosions with a destructive radius of 5 miles each would directly demolish less than 5 percent of the territory of the United States, for example. Obviously, if major population centers were targeted, this sort of attack could inflict massive casualties. Back in cold war days, when such devastating events sometimes seemed uncomfortably likely, a number of studies were conducted to estimate the consequences of massive thermonuclear attacks. One of the most prominent of these considered several possibilities. The most likely scenario--one that could be perhaps be considered at least to begin to approach the rational--was a "counterforce" strike in which well over 1,000 thermonuclear weapons would be targeted at America's ballistic missile silos, strategic airfields, and nuclear submarine bases in an effort to destroy the country's strategic ability to retaliate. Since the attack would not directly target population centers, most of the ensuing deaths would be from radioactive fallout, and the study estimates that from 2 to 20 million, depending mostly on wind, weather, and sheltering, would perish during the first month.

## 2NC Impact Overview

### And, counterforce strikes mean no nuclear winter

**Zutell, 88** (Eugene, Arizona Dept. of Emergency and Military Affairs, Division of Emergency Services. 6-19-88. <http://www.fortfreedom.org/s05.htm>)

To enumerate some other problems with the nuclear winter mechanism: 1. The cooling mechanism as Sagan and associates describe it, could only operate over land masses. Ocean surface water is continually supplied with heat from below. Even if sunlight were blocked for many months, the temperature at the ocean surface would remain virtually unchanged. Consequently, weather patterns would continue, with warm moisture laden air from the oceans sweeping over the land masses and as it cools, rain clouds would form and even more of the sun blocking smoke and dust particles would be washed out of the atmosphere. 2. Sagan et al indicated that at the very least, 100 million tons of smoke particles would have to be injected into the atmosphere if the nuclear winter mechanism were to be triggered. They also indicated that cities are the primary source of that smoke. They therefore proposed a nuclear war scenario in which cities are the primary targets. Since the mid 1960s, the primary targets for both U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles and nuclear bombs have not been population centers or cities. They have been the other guy's nuclear missile launch sites, nuclear bomber bases and other military targets. If those can be eliminated, the cities will be held hostage. The current list of ten target classes ascribed to Soviet planners by DOD and FEMA, does not specifically contain any population centers. The list does of course include target classes that in many instances will be located in or adjacent to metropolitan areas. But, even in those instances, the nuclear weapons employed will not be the huge multi-megaton area destruction bombs of the late 1950s and early 1960s. ICBM systems and MIRVs are now so accurate that a target may be pinpointed even within a metropolitan area, by a relatively small weapon. This is not in any way to say that the effects will not be catastrophic. It is to say though that the city wide firestorms necessary for the onset of nuclear winter as described by Sagan and associates, are less than predictable. In fact, they are improbable.

## 2NC Deterrence Stable

**Prefer our evidence – the only relevant case study goes negative – India and Pakistan have all the factors they say should have caused war but deterrence has been stabilizing**

**Hagerty, 98** (Devin, Associate Prof. Pol. Sci. – UMBC, “The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons From South Asia”, p. 177-178)

As I noted in this chapter’s introduction, the Indo-Pakistani experience with nuclear weapon capabilities lends more support to the logic of nuclear deterrence than to its competitor, the logic of nonproliferation. All but a handful of proliferation analysts would expect that South Asia's small, crude nuclear forces; intense, high-stakes political conflicts; history of warfare; and possibly irrational decision-making should add up to a formula for nuclear disaster on the subcontinent. Indeed, for those analysts persuaded by the logic of nonproliferation, the Indo-Pakistani nuclear-security competition could serve as a paradigm for every conceivable calamity that might ensue from the spread of nuclear weapons to Third World countries. However, contrary to these grim expectations, nuclear weapons evidently deter war in South Asia, much as they did between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China during the Cold War. As in the U.S.-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Sino-Soviet cases, preventive nuclear strikes were early on considered and rejected, first-strike uncertainty has dampened the "reciprocal fear of surprise attack," and loose nukes fears have gone unrealized. Furthermore, Indian and Pakistani decision-makers appear to be no less deterrable than their U.S., Russian, and Chinese counterparts. These two-and-a-half decades of subcontinental peace stand in stark contrast to the first twenty-five years of Indo-Pakistani relations, which saw war erupt on three different occasions, including twice over Kashmir.

### **Short range solves deterrence**

**Preston 7** (Thomas, Associate Prof. IR – Washington State U. and Faculty Research Associate – Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, “From Lambs to Lions: Future Security relationships in a World of Biological and Nuclear Weapons”, p. 72)

In addition, short-range systems potentially provide important de- escalation and deterrence bolstering effects. Bernard Brodie, one of the lead- ing strategic thinkers of the Cold War, noted the threat to use tactical weapons was appropriate for deterrence, or failing that, could serve as a “de-escalating device” if used in a “limited and essentially tightly controlled manner.” Brodie (1966, 28) noted that with the limited use of tactical weapons, “the possibility of further escalation will, to be sure, be unavoidably but also use- fully present. It will tend to induce caution on both sides, but it will especially tend to dissuade the aggressor from testing very far the efficacy of a *resolute* local defense.

## 2NC Deterrence Stable

### **Guarantee conflicts are only low level**

**Preston, 7**(Thomas, Associate Prof. IR – Washington State U. and Faculty Research Associate – Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, “From Lambs to Lions: Future Security relationships in a World of Biological and Nuclear Weapons”, p. 35-36)

In suggesting nuclear weapons likely prevented military skirmishes during the 1999 Kargil crisis between India and Pakistan from escalating to full-scale war, Waltz (2004, 386) notes “the evidence, accumulated over five decades, shows that nuclear states fight with nuclear states only at low levels, that accidents seldom occur, and that when they do they never have bad effects. If nuclear pessimists were right, nuclear deterrence would have failed again and again.” Indeed, as Hagerty (1998, 185) points out, the fundamental dynamic between nuclear powers in conflict is that the very existence of nuclear weapons deters war: In superpower crises over Berlin, Cuba, and the Middle East, the Sino-Soviet crisis of 1969, and the Kashmir crisis of 1990, the main impact of nuclear weapons on the disputants was to slow escalation to war. Rather than operationalizing the nuclear doctrines devised by their military planners, leaders have chosen instead to focus on how not to use the nuclear weapons they command.

### **Quantitative studies prove deterrence solves high level conflicts**

**Asal and Beardsley 9** [Victor, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Rockefeller College at the University at Albany, Kyle, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Emory University, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 26:235, “Nuclear Weapons as Shields”.

Table 2 presents the coefficients from the probit models of crisis aggression and participation. We start with a baseline model and then add the previous crisis rate and enduring rivalry variables to get a sense for the endogeneity issues in the data. Models 1 through 6 reveal, seen in the bolded coefficients (Row 2), that non-nuclear actors facing nuclear actors are less likely to be aggressive in the crises in which they participate. This relationship holds as statistically significant however aggression is measured and whether conflict history is controlled for or not. The findings strongly confirm the proposed hypothesis. For calculation of substantive effects, shown in Figure 1, we use Clarify (Tomz et al., 2003; King et al., 2000) to generate the predicted probabilities using the models with all the variables set at their median values, such that all the nuclear-weapon and nuclear-program variables are set at 0. Substantively, when a non-nuclear state faces a nuclear state, its probability of relying on violence to manage its crises is 60% less than against a non-nuclear opponent. Nuclear weapons thus, on average, increase a possessor’s security from major violence by almost threefold. An actor’s willingness to also manage its crises militarily or respond militarily to a crisis trigger similarly falls by 29% and 32% respectively when facing a nuclear opponent.

## 2NC AT: Accidents

### Accidental nuclear war is science fiction – motives are for de-escalation not escalation

**Quinlan, 09** (Michael, Former Permanent Under-Sec. State – UK Ministry of Defense, “Thinking about Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects”, p. 63-69)

Even if initial nuclear use did not quickly end the fighting, the supposition of inexorable momentum in a developing exchange, with each side rushing to overreaction amid confusion and uncertainty, is implausible. It fails to consider what the situation of the decisionmakers would really be. Neither side could want escalation. Both would be appalled at what was going on. Both would be desperately looking for signs that the other was ready to call a halt. Both, given the capacity for evasion or concealment which modern delivery platforms and vehicles can possess, could have in reserve significant forces invulnerable enough not to entail use-or-lose pressures. (It may be more open to question, as noted earlier, whether newer nuclearweapon possessors can be immediately in that position; but it is within reach of any substantial state with advanced technological capabilities, and attaining it is certain to be a high priority in the development of forces.) As a result, neither side can have any predisposition to suppose, in an ambiguous situation of fearful risk, that the right course when in doubt is to go on copiously launching weapons. And none of this analysis rests on any presumption of highly subtle or pre-concerted rationality. The rationality required is plain. The argument is reinforced if we consider the possible reasoning of an aggressor at a more dispassionate level. Any substantial nuclear armoury can inflict destruction outweighing any possible prize that aggression could hope to seize. A state attacking the possessor of such an armoury must therefore be doing so (once given that it cannot count upon destroying the armoury pre-emptively) on a judgement that the possessor would be found lacking in the will to use it. If the attacked possessor used nuclear weapons, whether first or in response to the aggressor's own first use, this judgement would begin to look dangerously precarious. There must be at least a substantial possibility of the aggressor leaders' concluding that their initial judgement had been mistaken—that the risks were after all greater than whatever prize they had been seeking, and that for their own country's , survival they must call off the aggression. Deterrence planning such as that of NATO was directed in the first place to preventing the initial misjudgement and in the second, if it were nevertheless made, to compelling such a reappraisal. The former aim had to have primacy, because it could not be taken for granted that the latter was certain to work. But there was no ground for assuming in advance, for all possible scenarios, that the chance of its working must be negligible. An aggressor state would itself be at huge risk if nuclear war developed, as its leaders would know. It may be argued that a policy which abandons hope of physically defeating the enemy and simply hopes to get him to desist is pure gamble, a matter of who blinks first; and that the political and moral nature of most likely aggressors, almost ex hypothesi, makes them the less likely to blink. One response to this is to ask what is the alternative—it can only be surrender. But a more positive and hopeful answer lies in the fact that the criticism is posed in a political vacuum. Real-life conflict would have a political context. The context which concerned NATO during the cold war, for example, was one of defending vital interests against a postulated aggressor whose own vital interests would not be engaged, or would be less engaged. Certainty is not possible, but a clear asymmetry of vital interest is a legitimate basis for expecting an asymmetry, credible to both sides, of resolve in conflict. That places upon statesmen, as page 23 has noted, the key task in deterrence of building up in advance a clear and shared grasp of where limits lie. That was plainly achieved in cold-war Europe. If vital interests have been defined in a way that is clear, and also clearly not overlapping or incompatible with those of the adversary, a credible basis has been laid for the likelihood of greater resolve in resistance. It was also sometimes suggested by critics that whatever might be indicated by theoretical discussion of political will and interests, the military environment of nuclear warfare—particularly difficulties of communication and control—would drive escalation with overwhelming probability to the limit. But it is obscure why matters should be regarded as inevitably so for every possible level and setting of action. Even if the history of war suggested (as it scarcely does) that military decision-makers are mostly apt to work on the principle 'When in doubt, lash out', the nuclear revolution creates an utterly new situation. The pervasive reality, always plain to both sides during the cold war, is 'If this goes on to the end, we are all ruined'. Given that inexorable escalation would mean catastrophe for both, it would be perverse to suppose them permanently incapable of framing arrangements which avoid it. As page 16 has noted, NATO gave its military commanders no widespread delegated authority, in peace or war, to launch nuclear weapons without specific political direction. Many types of weapon moreover had physical safeguards such as PALs incorporated to reinforce organizational ones. There were multiple communication and control systems for passing information, orders, and prohibitions. Such systems could not be totally guaranteed against disruption if at a fairly intense level of strategic exchange—which was only one of many possible levels of conflict—an adversary judged it to be in his interest to weaken political control. It was far from clear why he necessarily should so judge. Even then, however, it remained possible to operate on a general fail-safe presumption: no authorization, no use. That was the basis on which NATO operated. If it is feared that the arrangements which 1 a nuclear-weapon possessor has in place do not meet such standards in some respects, the logical course is to continue to improve them rather than to assume escalation to be certain and uncontrollable, with all the enormous inferences that would have to flow from such an assumption. The likelihood of escalation can never be 100 per cent, and never zero. Where between those two extremes it may lie can never be precisely calculable in advance; and even were it so calculable, it would not be uniquely fixed—it would stand to vary hugely with circumstances. That there should be any risk at all of escalation to widespread nuclear war must be deeply disturbing, and decision-makers would always have to weigh it most anxiously. But a pair of key truths about it need to be recognized. The first is that the risk of escalation to large-scale nuclear war is inescapably present in any significant armed conflict between nuclear-capable powers, whoever may have started the conflict and whoever may first have used any particular category of weapon. The initiator of the conflict will always have physically available to him options for applying more force if he meets effective resistance. If the risk of escalation, whatever its degree of probability, is to be regarded as absolutely unacceptable, the necessary inference is that a state attacked by a substantial nuclear power must forgo military resistance. It must surrender, even if it has a nuclear armoury of its own. But the companion truth is that, as page 47 has noted, the risk of escalation is an inescapable burden also upon the aggressor. The exploitation of that burden is the crucial route, if conflict does break out, for managing it, to a tolerable outcome—the only route, indeed, intermediate between surrender and holocaust, and so the necessary basis for deterrence beforehand. The working out of plans to exploit escalation risk most effectively in deterring potential aggression entails further and complex issues. It is for example plainly desirable, wherever geography, politics, and available resources so permit without triggering arms races, to make provisions and dispositions that are likely to place the onus of making the bigger, and more evidently dangerous steps in escalation upon the aggressor volub wishes to maintain his attack, rather than upon the defender. (The customary shorthand for this desirable posture used to be 'escalation dominance'.) These issues are not further discussed here. But addressing them needs to start from acknowledgement that there are in any event no certainties or absolutes available, no options guaranteed to be risk-free and cost-free. Deterrence is not possible without escalation risk; and its presence can point to no automatic policy conclusion save for those who espouse outright pacifism and accept its consequences. Accident and Miscalculation Ensuring the safety and security of nuclear weapons plainly needs to be taken most seriously. Detailed information is understandably not published, but such direct evidence as there is suggests that it always has been so taken in every possessor state, with the inevitable occasional failures to follow strict procedures dealt with rigorously. Critics have nevertheless from time to time argued that the possibility of accident involving nuclear weapons is so substantial that it must weigh heavily in the entire evaluation of whether war-prevention structures entailing their existence should be tolerated at all. Two sorts of scenario are usually in question. The first is that of a single grave event involving an unintended nuclear explosion—a technical disaster at a storage site, for example, or the accidental or unauthorized launch of a delivery system with a live nuclear warhead. The second is that of some event—perhaps such an explosion or launch, or some other mishap such as malfunction or misinterpretation of radar signals or computer systems—initiating a sequence of response and counter-response that culminated in a nuclear exchange which no one had truly intended. No event that is physically possible can be said to be of absolutely zero probability (just as at an opposite extreme it is absurd to claim, as has been heard from distinguished figures, that nuclear-weapon use can be guaranteed to happen within some finite future span despite not having happened for over sixty years). But human affairs cannot be managed to the standard of either zero or total probability. We have to assess levels between those theoretical limits and weigh their reality and implications against other factors, in security planning as in everyday life. There have certainly been, across the decades since 1945, many known accidents involving nuclear weapons, from transporters skidding off roads to bomber aircraft crashing with or accidentally dropping the weapons they carried (in past days when such carriage was a frequent feature of readiness arrangements---it no longer is). A few of these accidents may have released into the nearby environment highly toxic material. None however has entailed a nuclear detonation. Some commentators suggest that this reflects bizarrely good fortune amid such massive activity and deployment over so many years. A more rational deduction from the facts of this long experience would however be that the probability of any accident triggering a nuclear explosion is extremely low. It might be further noted that the

mechanisms needed to set off such an explosion are technically demanding, and that in a large number of ways the past sixty years have seen extensive improvements in safety arrangements for both the design and the handling of weapons. It is undoubtedly possible to see respects in which, after the cold war, some of the factors bearing upon risk may be new or more adverse; but some are now plainly less so. The years which the world has come through entirely without accidental or unauthorized detonation have included early decades in which knowledge was sketchier, precautions were less developed, and weapon designs were less ultra-safe than they later became, as well as substantial periods in which weapon numbers were larger, deployments more widespread and diverse, movements more frequent, and several aspects of doctrine and readiness arrangements more tense. Similar considerations apply to the hypothesis of nuclear war being mistakenly triggered by false alarm. Critics again point to the fact, as it is understood, of numerous occasions when initial steps in alert sequences for US nuclear forces were embarked upon, or at least called for, by indicators mistaken or misconstrued. In none of these instances, it is accepted, did matters get at all near to nuclear launch--extraordinary good fortune again, critics have suggested. But the rival and more logical inference from hundreds of events stretching over sixty years of experience presents itself once more: that the probability of initial misinterpretation leading far towards mistaken launch is remote. Precisely because any nuclear-weapon possessor recognizes the vast gravity of any launch, release sequences have many steps, and human decision is repeatedly interposed as well as capping the sequences. To convey that because a first step was prompted the world somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is wild hyperbole, rather like asserting, when a tennis champion has lost his opening service game, that he was nearly beaten in straight sets. History anyway scarcely offers any ready example of major war started by accident even before the nuclear revolution imposed an order-of-magnitude increase in caution. It was occasionally conjectured that nuclear war might be triggered by the real but accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic nuclear-weapon delivery system in the direction of a potential adversary. No such launch is known to have occurred in over sixty years. The probability of it is therefore very low. But even if it did happen, the further hypothesis of it initiating a general nuclear exchange is far-fetched. It fails to consider the real situation of decision-makers as pages 63-4 have brought out. The notion that cosmic holocaust might be mistakenly precipitated in this way belongs to science fiction.

## 2NC AT: Accidents

### **No historical precedent for accidental war**

**Hagerty, 98** (Devin, Associate Prof. Pol. Sci. – UMBC, “The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons From South Asia”, p. 192)

INADVERTENT WAR. Another possibility is inadvertent war. This is the notion that during a future crisis India and Pakistan might stumble into a conflict neither side actually wants. This fear of inadvertence stems from the supposedly inherent logic of preemption, each side's stated conventional military doctrine of "offensive-defense," and the shaky intelligence estimates of India's Research and Analysis Wing and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence. From this perspective, miscalculation of the adversary's intentions by one or both sides might lead inexorably to a shooting war. As the fighting progresses, either or both sides (but most likely Pakistan) might ready nuclear weapons for last-resort use. At this point, goes this reasoning, all bets are off and a nuclear exchange is a real possibility. While compelling on the surface, this logic does not hold up to sustained scrutiny. None of the three Indo-Pakistani wars began inadvertently; indeed, all of the major international wars since the end of World War II have been premeditated. It is even less likely that two nuclear powers would slide down the slippery slope into war, given the additional margin of caution induced by nuclear weapons

### **Proliferation stops accidental launch**

Jason **Tepperman**, September 7, **2k9**. Reporter, Newsweek. <http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248/page/1>

A politically tougher but equally important step would be to make sure that any nuclear weapons state has what's called a "survivable second strike option," a means of ensuring that even if attacked, it could still shoot back, since this is the best way to persuade its enemies not to bother trying to incapacitate it through a surprise attack (as Joseph Cirincione of the Ploughshares Fund points out, this can be done with a small arsenal and need not necessitate a big buildup). Finally, Washington should continue doing what it's done with Russia and Pakistan to help those regimes keep their weapons safe. The administration has announced plans to help secure loose nukes, and that's all to the good. But it should be prepared to offer the same technology and training to other new nuclear states if they emerge—even if they're U.S. enemies. Critics will scream that doing so would reward bad behavior and encourage it in others. It might. But it would also help keep everyone safe from an accidental launch, which seems a lot more important. None of these steps will be easy to pitch to the public, even for a president as gifted and nimble as Obama. But as he heads into a rare nuclear summit in late September, the least he could do is hold a frank debate on what's really the best strategy for securing the world from—or with—these weapons. Given the stakes, he can hardly afford not to.

### **Miscalculation is only possible when risks are not explicit – nuclear weapons solve this**

Jason **Tepperman**, September 7, **2k9**. Reporter, Newsweek. <http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248/page/1>

To understand why—and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way—you need to start by recognizing that all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side—and millions of innocents pay the price. Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button—and everybody knows it—the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, "Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?"

## 2NC AT: Blackmail

### No incentive for blackmail – multiple reasons

**Goldstein, 00** (Avery, Prof. Pol. Sci. – U. Penn., “Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century”, p.280-281)

The first of these choices, carrying out a threatened strike, though perhaps useful for sending a message of credibility to future adversaries, is not a plausible means for achieving the immediate objective and may be unacceptably risky if the rival has its own retaliatory capability or may be able to tap that of an ally. The second choice, attempting to make nuclear persuasion more effective, is also problematic. Thomas Schelling's seminal works on coercion and bargaining suggested the appropriateness of the use of limited force to demonstrate credibility and increase pressure on an adversary to comply with one's demands. But, as Schelling recognized, however logically straightforward, in practice devising appropriate catalyzing actions is likely to be difficult. How does one strike the correct balance between restraint and severity, especially when nuclear weapons are the military means behind a strategy of persuasion by compellence or offense? 40 With regard to compellence, nuclear forces provide evidence of an unmistakable ability to inflict horrifying punishment, but not the willingness to do so, evidence that may well be required in order to prompt costly visible compliance. Capabilities notwithstanding, a state's moral or political inhibitions on the use of force, its fears of uncontrollable environmental damage if the adversary is a regional neighbor, or concerns about third-party retaliation in kind may lead the targeted state to heavily discount nuclear compellent threats. With nuclear compellence, unlike nuclear deterrence, the burden of taking dangerous first steps rests with the party making the threats of catastrophic damage. This is not easily done. Resort to catalyzing actions that entail only conventional munitions, for example, or even very small nuclear explosions in remote areas in an attempt to signal the determination to take stronger steps, is unlikely to eliminate doubts about credibility. The choice of clearly safe opening gambits is more suggestive of the reluctance of a bluffer, rather than the resolve of the ruthless. In response, the victim can simply sit tight, effectively pushing the ball back into its adversary's court."

## 2NC AT: Blackmail

### Small arsenals are survivable – Iraq proves

**Preston, 07** (Thomas, Associate Prof. IR – Washington State U. and Faculty Research Associate – Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, “From Lambs to Lions: Future Security relationships in a World of Biological and Nuclear Weapons”, p. 79-80)

Another lesson of the Gulf War is that small states have begun to develop survivable means of retaliation against militarily superior opponents. The U.S. inability to successfully eliminate the Iraqi Scud threat, even after six weeks of extensive bombing and complete air superiority, clearly illustrates how even a small state with an antiquated mobile launch system can frustrate preemption efforts and maintain a credible retaliatory capability. Utilizing a strategy of "hide-and-seek," Iraq scattered its mobile Scuds throughout the countryside, deployed wooden decoys to confuse Allied reconnaissance efforts, and continued to launch missile attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia for six weeks after the beginning of the air war. The Iraqis were able to launch forty-nine Scuds during the first ten days of the war, and continued to launch thirty-nine more during the final thirty days of the conflict. As the Gulf War Air Power Survey (1993, 334) observed: In sum, Iraq's operational approach and employment tactics meant that the probability of finding Iraq's mobile launchers and destroying them from the air before they fired was very close to nil at the outset of the conflict. Nor did the chances of finding mobile Scuds before they fired improve appreciably as the campaign unfolded. Even with the use of platforms like JSTARS and special forces on the ground, Coalition forces had little success either detecting mobile launchers moving from their hide sites or catching them while they were setting up to fire from pre-surveyed launch points. (emphasis added) Had Iraqi Scuds been carrying nuclear warheads, dozens would have gotten through despite the unparalleled air campaign. Would the U.S. have been willing to trust that Saddam Hussein would not have dared strike its conventional military forces in the Saudi/Kuwaiti desert if a ground war began which actually threatened his regime's survival? Would any U.S. president trust that American nuclear superiority would deter such a leader to the extent that a risky policy, like the liberation of Kuwait or the overthrow of Saddam, would be attempted given the clear political risks of high U.S. casualties? Further, would the Saudis (like the Western Europeans during the Cold War) have been willing to serve as a nuclear battlefield in order to support U.S. policy in Kuwait or Iraq? Clearly, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which a nuclear-armed Iraq would not have significantly altered the course of recent events in the Gulf (whether in 1991 or 2003). Finally, although the Iraqi air force failed to play a significant role during the Gulf War, it still provides an important lesson which should not be overlooked by analysts. Specifically, the successful escape of over one hundred Iraqi aircraft into Iran, despite Allied air superiority and efforts to prevent it, demonstrated that although the Iraqi air force lacked the ability to directly engage Coalition air power, it still possessed some ability to escape interdiction and penetrate defenses (Freedman and Karsh 1991, 28). Had Iraq possessed nuclear weapons and the will to use them, a concerted effort to use its advanced strike aircraft, flying low to avoid radar, would have provided it with an effective and difficult-to-interdict delivery system. It should also be noted that in future great power—small state confrontations, the kind of overwhelming air superiority enjoyed by the Allies over Iraq is unlikely to be replicated in such a way as to render small state strike aircraft completely ineffective. Combined with the potential of mobile ballistic missiles, the possibility that only a few nuclear-armed aircraft could evade interception provides small nuclear states with the ability to develop redundant and survivable force structures capable of providing some degree of credible deterrence.

## 2NC AT: Blackmail

### **Massive retaliation checks and it's empirically disproven**

**Alagappa, 08** (Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow – East-West Center, in “The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21<sup>st</sup> Century Asia, Ed. Muthiah Alagappa , p. 523-524)

It has been argued that states with small or nascent nuclear arsenals might have strategic incentive to use them early in a conflict to secure a military advantage in an impending full-scale war or to prevent the crippling of their nuclear arsenals in the event of a preventive strike. Without survivable nuclear forces, these considerations would encourage launch-on-warning postures that could produce crisis situations and undermine stability. Park and Lee (Chapter 9 of this volume) discuss this theme in relation to North Korea. Although uncertain how this theoretical possibility might materialize, they posit that North Korea's nuclear armaments will generate continuous crises and threats to peace on the Korean peninsula. That North Korea's quest for nuclear weapons and the American responses have generated crisis situations and may do so in the future is not the issue. The question is whether nascent and small nuclear weapon states will adopt early-launch postures that produce crisis and undermine stability. There is little empirical evidence to support such a claim. In the abstract, it would be illogical for a nascent or small nuclear power to adopt such a posture against a much superior adversary, as for example in the standoff between North Korea and the United States. Even if North Korea were to inflict substantial damage on the United States or its allies, it is unclear what coercive value would accrue to it. It is almost certain, though, that it would not survive a massive retaliatory strike by the United States. An early use posture can only be rationalized on the basis of an irrational regime, as has been the case with North Korea. However, if North Korea develops a partially survivable nuclear force, early use could have some value; but still such use is likely to be deterred by the possibility of massive retaliation and destruction by the more powerful adversary. Early use postures may make more sense between powers of roughly equal capability with partially survivable nuclear forces. However, evidence from the India-Pakistan dyad, which has a relatively longer nuclear history, does not support this abstract possibility. Despite Pakistan's refusal to embrace an NFU policy and its attempt to exploit the risk of escalation to nuclear war, Islamabad has not opted for an early use posture (see Khan and Lavoy, Chapter 7 of this volume). India, which is committed to an NFU policy, has also not adopted an early use posture. As Devin Hagerty (1998) points out, despite the tensions between them, both countries have taken unilateral and bilateral measures to avoid early use. Deterrence, not early use, characterizes their nuclear postures. Evidence from Asia offers little support for the instability arguments. On the contrary, the claim that nuclear weapons have thus far contributed to security and stability rests on a relatively stronger empirical foundation. Stability has also been enhanced by the further circumscription due to nuclear weapons of the role of force in Asian international politics.

## 2NC AT: Blackmail

**This argument is purely theoretical – in practice states care far more about economic prosperity – that creates pressures against nuclear use**

**Alagappa, 08** (Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow – East-West Center, in “The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21<sup>st</sup> Century Asia, Ed. Muthiah Alagappa , p. 523-524)

Another major conclusion of this study is that although nuclear weapons could have destabilizing consequences in certain situations, on net they have reinforced national security and regional stability in Asia. It is possible to argue that fledgling and small nuclear arsenals would be more vulnerable to preventive attacks; that the related strategic compulsion for early use may lead to early launch postures and crisis situations; that limited war under nuclear conditions to alter or restore the political status quo can intensify tensions and carry the risk of escalation to major war; that inadequate command, control, and safety measures could result in accidents; and that nuclear facilities and material may be vulnerable to terrorist attacks. These are legitimate concerns, but thus far nuclear weapons have not undermined national security and regional stability in Asia. Instead, they have ameliorated national security concerns, strengthened the status quo, increased deterrence dominance, prevented the outbreak of major wars, and reinforced the regional trend to reduce the salience of force in international politics. Nor have nuclear weapons had the predicted domino effect. These consequences have strengthened regional security and stability that rest on multiple pillars. The grim scenarios associated with nuclear weapons in Asia frequently rely on worst-case political and military situations; often they are seen in isolation from the national priorities of regional states that emphasize economic development and modernization through participation in regional and global economies and the high priority accorded to stability in domestic and international affairs. The primary goal of regional states is not aggrandizement through military aggression but preservation of national integrity, state or regime survival, economic growth and prosperity, increase in national power and international influence, preservation or incremental change in the status quo, and the construction of regional and global orders in which they are subjects rather than objects. Seen in this broader perspective, nuclear weapons and more generally military force are of greater relevance in the defense, deterrence, and assurance roles than offensive ones. This does not imply that offensive use of force or military clashes will not occur; only that force is not the first option, that military clashes will be infrequent, and that when they do occur they will be limited in scope and intensity. Security interaction in Asia increasingly approximates behavior associated with defensive realism.

**Blackmail and domination are empirically false – allies and other nuclear states can counter balance**

**Mueller, '10.** [John, Professor of political science at Ohio State University "Think Again: Nuclear Weapons" Foreign Policy, January/February 10

If a nuclear Iran brandishes its weapons to intimidate others or get its way, it will likely find that those threatened, rather than capitulating or rushing off to build a compensating arsenal, will ally with others (including conceivably Israel) to stand up to the intimidation. The popular notion that nuclear weapons furnish a country with the ability to "dominate" its area has little or no historical support -- in the main, nuclear threats over the last 60 years have either been ignored or met with countervailing opposition, not with timorous acquiescence. It was conventional military might -- grunts and tanks, not nukes -- that earned the United States and the Soviet Union their respective spheres of influence during the Cold War.

## 2NC Irrational Leaders

**Rationality is a neg argument. Using a nuke isn't just irrational but suicidal and no leader, even Kim Jong Il wants that. On the other hand, starting a conventional war is irrational but not suicidal.**

**New state behavior is COMPLETELY rational. Contrary assert is ethnocentric.**

**Preston '7** (Thomas, Associate Prof. IR – Washington State U. and Faculty Research Associate – Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, “From Lambs to Lions: Future Security relationships in a World of Biological and Nuclear Weapons”, p. 37-38)

5.) New Nuclear States Will Not Act in the Same Rational, Mature Manner the Great Powers Did in the Stewardship of Their Nuclear Weapons **This represents an immensely ethnocentric line of argument, and one which is completely devoid of any historic empirical support.** In fact, if anything, the history of new nuclear state behavior over the past decades has shown nothing but rational, mature stewardship of their arsenals—and no recourse to war. Early new nuclear states (Britain, France, China) went on to develop fairly similar minimal deterrent doctrines and could certainly not be argued to have been irresponsible or irrational regarding their weapons (cf. Lewis and Xue 1988; Hopkins and Hu 1995; Johnston 1995/1996; Goldstein 1992, 2000). Similarly, the second wave of nuclear states (Israel, Pakistan, and India) have behaved responsibly as well, with all three adopting notions of minimal deterrence to prevent external attacks threatening their survival, while moving to make their arsenals more stable and secure (cf. Hersh 1991; Sundarji 1996; Cohen 1998; Hagerty 1998; Kampani 1998; Ahmed 1999; Tellis 2001). Even would-be nuclear states like North Korea and Iran, the long-standing favorites of worst-case scenario pessimists seeking "rogue states" governed by "crazy" leaders whose behavior would be irrational and aggressive (e.g., Dunn 1982; Martel 1998), **have not been shown to be any less rational** (if one understands their cultures and societies) than other states.

## 2NC Irrational Leaders

### No irrational leaders.

**Tepperman '9** (Jonathon, former Deputy Managing Ed. Foreign Affairs and Assistant Managing Ed. Newsweek, Newsweek, "Why Obama should Learn to Love the Bomb", 44:154, 9-7, L/N)

Nuclear pessimists--and there are many--insist that even if this pattern has held in the past, it's crazy to rely on it in the future, for several reasons. The first is that today's nuclear wannabes are so completely unhinged, you'd be mad to trust them with a bomb. Take the sybaritic Kim Jong Il, who's never missed a chance to demonstrate his battiness, or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has denied the Holocaust and promised the destruction of Israel, and who, according to some respected Middle East scholars, runs a messianic martyrdom cult that would welcome nuclear obliteration. These regimes are the ultimate rogues, the thinking goes--and there's no deterring rogues. But are Kim and Ahmadinejad really scarier and crazier than were Stalin and Mao? It might look that way from Seoul or Tel Aviv, but history says otherwise. Khrushchev, remember, threatened to "bury" the United States, and in 1957, Mao blithely declared that a nuclear war with America wouldn't be so bad because even "if half of mankind died ... the whole world would become socialist." Pyongyang and Tehran support terrorism--but so did Moscow and Beijing. And as for seeming suicidal, Michael Desch of the University of Notre Dame points out that Stalin and Mao are the real record holders here: both were responsible for the deaths of some 20 million of their own citizens. Yet when push came to shove, their regimes balked at nuclear suicide, and so would today's international bogeymen. For all of Ahmadinejad's antics, his power is limited, and the clerical regime has always proved rational and pragmatic when its life is on the line. Revolutionary Iran has never started a war, has done deals with both Washington and Jerusalem, and sued for peace in its war with Iraq (which Saddam started) once it realized it couldn't win. North Korea, meanwhile, is a tiny, impoverished, family-run country with a history of being invaded; its overwhelming preoccupation is survival, and every time it becomes more belligerent it reverses itself a few months later (witness last week, when Pyongyang told Seoul and Washington it was ready to return to the bargaining table). These countries may be brutally oppressive, but nothing in their behavior suggests they have a death wish.

## 2NC Irrational Leaders

**Statistical evidence disproves any rogue states. Don't rely on it for policymaking.**

**Caprioli and Trumbore '5** (Mary, Prof. Pol. Sci. – U. Minnesota Duluth, and Peter, Associate Prof. Pol. Sci. – Oakland U., Journal of Conflict Resolution, "Rhetoric versus Reality ROGUE STATES IN INTERSTATE CONFLICT", 49:5, October, Sage)

Overall, rogue states as a group are no more likely to become involved in interstate disputes in any given year, are no more likely to initiate militarized disputes, and are no more likely to use force first when disputes turn violent. In fact, rogue state may be a category with but a single example: only Iraq comes close to living up to the expectations policy makers have concerning the conventional military behavior of rogue states, but it comes very close indeed. During the period from 1980 to 2001, Iraq almost perfectly fits the rogue stereotype. It evidenced one if not both of the objective rogue criteria in every one of the twenty-two years under study, and it was both far more likely to be involved in a militarized interstate dispute and far more likely to use force first than other states during the same period. This latter point is particularly interesting because it fits neatly with another assumption that policy makers have made about the behavior of rogue states—that they are fundamentally undeterrable. This finding would tend to indicate that during this period, when involved in a militarized dispute, Iraq's tendency was not to back down when challenged or confronted but rather to lash out with violence. At the same time, though, the rogue stereotype is not perfect. While Iraq was more likely to be involved in a militarized dispute, it was no more likely to have been the initiator—as often as not, when Iraq found itself in a militarized dispute during the 1980s or 1990s, someone else started it. These results more likely reflect the idiosyncratic behavior of Iraq's leadership, a statistical anomaly when compared to the rest of the international community, rather than a confirmation of the rogue concept. The only other rhetorical rogue whose conflict behavior deviates from the norm is North Korea, which, like Iraq, is more likely to become involved in militarized interstate disputes. But tellingly, and as with Iraq, it was no more likely to initiate disputes than any other state during the period in question, further calling into question policy maker assumptions that rogues constitute an aggressive military threat to their neighbors and to international order. What, then, accounts for the finding that Iraq and North Korea were more likely to become involved in a militarized dispute but not necessarily as initiators? A partial explanation may lie in the intense American focus on rogues that began in the 1980s and emerged to dominate foreign and defense policy in the 1990s. For the next decade, this policy focus resulted in active policies of confrontation and containment of rogue states, with the vigorous enforcement of no-fly zones over Iraq being the most visible example of such efforts. While dyadic analysis will be necessary to confirm our suspicions about the role that U.S. policies surrounding the rogue doctrine played in Iraq's and North Korea's dispute involvement, we believe that possibility cannot be dismissed. In sum, and contrary to policy makers' assessment of rogue states, their behavior as a group appears no more militarily aggressive or defiant than that of any other member of the international community. The results of our analysis show that rogue states have not posed a generalized threat to international security as measured by interstate conflict behavior. As its critics have long suspected, the rogue concept seems to be at best a questionable foundation on which to build general foreign and defense policies.

## 2NC Irrational Leaders

### Western education checks.

**Van Creveld '93** (Martin, Israeli Military Historian and formerly Prof. – Naval War College, “Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict”, p. 122)

Ironically, perhaps, at a time when more countries than ever either possess nuclear weapons or are planning to acquire them, it appears that fears of the consequences of nuclear proliferation have been greatly exaggerated all along. The geopolitical circumstances surrounding the stances that such countries as China, India, Pakistan, and Israel have taken toward the Bomb remain very varied. So (as far as they are known) do the roads taken toward the Bomb, and the doctrines developed with respect to it. Nevertheless, there seems to be no factual basis for the claims that regional leaders do not understand the nature and implications of nuclear weapons; or that their attitudes to those weapons are governed by some peculiar cultural biases which make them incapable of rational thought; or that they are more adventurous and less responsible in handling them than anybody else. Given the fact that the latter countries in question were latecomers to the field, this result is not surprising. All over the developing world, the scientists who built the Bombs, the military personnel responsible for handling the delivery vehicles in case of war, and the political leaders authorized to order their use, originally looked either to the West or to the East for their ideas on nuclear technology and nuclear strategy. Over four decades, thousands of them attended universities and institutes of higher military learning in either the West or the East, where they received formal instruction in these ideas. In other cases the learning process was informal, taking place by way of the international strategic literature, the media, personal interchanges, and the like.

### “Rogue” dictators are not reckless only ruthless – they will be deterred.

**Waltz '95** (Kenneth, Prof. Emeritus of Pol. Sci – UC Berkeley, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate”, p. 97-98)

Sagan is leery of the cognitive abilities of political leaders. Aren't we all? Yet some do better than others. Survival is an interesting test of learning ability. We continually worry about the leaders of "rogue" states —the likes of Qaddafi, Saddam, and Kim Il Sung. Yet they survived for many years, despite great internal and external dangers. Their cognitive skills, in the crabbed language of social scientists, are more impressive than those of, say, Jimmy Carter or George Bush. Given all of the advantages of presidential incumbency, Carter and Bush managed to stay in office for only four years. American politics is gentle compared to the politics of the countries that have recently joined, or are likely to join, the nuclear club. Are hardy political survivors in the Third World likely to run the greatest of all risks by drawing the wrath of the world down on them by accidentally or in anger exploding nuclear weapons they may have? At least some of the rulers of new and prospective nuclear states are thought to be ruthless, reckless, and war-prone. Ruthless, yes; war-prone, seldom; reckless, hardly. They do not, as many seem to believe, have fixed images of the world and unbending aims within it. Instead they have to adjust constantly to a shifting configuration of forces around them. Our images of leaders of Third World states vary remarkably little, yet their agility is remarkable. The preceding points are important and often overlooked. Whatever the identity of rulers, and whatever the characteristics of their states, the national behaviors they produce are strongly conditioned by the world outside. With conventional weapons, a status-quo country must ask itself how much power it must harness to its policy in order to dissuade an aggressive state from striking. Countries willing to run high risks are hard to dissuade. The characteristics of governments and the temperaments of leaders have to be carefully weighed. With nuclear weapons, any state will be deterred by another state's second-strike forces. One need not be preoccupied with the qualities of the state that is to be deterred or scrutinize its leaders.

## 2NC Irrational Leaders

### **Leaders are deterrable – history proves**

Jason Tepperman, September 7, 2k9. Reporter, Newsweek. <http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248/page/1>

Nuclear pessimists—and there are many—insist that even if this pattern has held in the past, it's crazy to rely on it in the future, for several reasons. The first is that today's nuclear wannabes are so completely unhinged, you'd be mad to trust them with a bomb. Take the sybaritic Kim Jong Il, who's never missed a chance to demonstrate his battiness, or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has denied the Holocaust and promised the destruction of Israel, and who, according to some respected Middle East scholars, runs a messianic martyrdom cult that would welcome nuclear obliteration. These regimes are the ultimate rogues, the thinking goes—and there's no deterring rogues. But are Kim and Ahmadinejad really scarier and crazier than were Stalin and Mao? It might look that way from Seoul or Tel Aviv, but history says otherwise. Khrushchev, remember, threatened to "bury" the United States, and in 1957, Mao blithely declared that a nuclear war with America wouldn't be so bad because even "if half of mankind died ... the whole world would become socialist." Pyongyang and Tehran support terrorism—but so did Moscow and Beijing. And as for seeming suicidal, Michael Desch of the University of Notre Dame points out that Stalin and Mao are the real record holders here: both were responsible for the deaths of some 20 million of their own citizens. Yet when push came to shove, their regimes balked at nuclear suicide, and so would today's international bogeymen. For all of Ahmadinejad's antics, his power is limited, and the clerical regime has always proved rational and pragmatic when its life is on the line. Revolutionary Iran has never started a war, has done deals with both Washington and Jerusalem, and sued for peace in its war with Iraq (which Saddam started) once it realized it couldn't win. North Korea, meanwhile, is a tiny, impoverished, family-run country with a history of being invaded; its overwhelming preoccupation is survival, and every time it becomes more belligerent it reverses itself a few months later (witness last week, when Pyongyang told Seoul and Washington it was ready to return to the bargaining table). These countries may be brutally oppressive, but nothing in their behavior suggests they have a death wish.

### **New states rational – they're ethnocentric**

Preston 7 (Thomas, Associate Prof. IR – Washington State U. and Faculty Research Associate – Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, "From Lambs to Lions: Future Security relationships in a World of Biological and Nuclear Weapons", p. 37-38)

5.) New Nuclear States Will Not Act in the Same Rational, Mature Manner the Great Powers Did in the Stewardship of Their Nuclear Weapons This represents an immensely ethnocentric line of argument, and one which is completely devoid of any historic empirical support. In fact, if any- thing, the history of new nuclear state behavior over the past decades has shown nothing but rational, mature stewardship of their arsenals—and no recourse to war. Early new nuclear states (Britain, France, China) went on to develop fairly similar minimal deterrent doctrines and could certainly not be argued to have been irresponsible or irrational regarding their weapons Lewis and Xue 1988; Hopkins and Hu 1995; Johnston 1995/1996; Goldstein 1992, 2000). Similarly, the second wave of nuclear states (Israel, Pakistan, and India) have behaved responsibly as well, with all three adopting notions of minimal deterrence to prevent external attacks threatening their survival, while moving to make their arsenals more stable and secure (cf. Hersh 1991; Sundarji 1996; Cohen 1998; Hagerty 1998; Kampani 1998; Ahmed 1999; Tellis 2001). Even would-be nuclear states like North Korea and Iran, the long-standing favorites of worst-case scenario pessimists seeking "rogue states" governed by "crazy" leaders whose behavior would be irrational and aggressive (e.g., Dunn 1982; Martel 1998), have not been shown to be any less rational (if one understands their cultures and societies) than other states.

## 2NC Irrational Leaders

### Studies disprove "rogue" leaders are any more aggressive than other states

**Caprioli and Trumbore 2k5** [Mary, Department of Political Science University of Minnesota, Duluth. Peter F, Department of Political Science Oakland University Journal of Conflict Resolution 2005; 49“Rhetoric versus reality Rogue states and interstate conflict”]

Overall, rogue states as a group are no more likely to become involved in interstate disputes in any given year, are no more likely to initiate militarized disputes, and are no more likely to use force first when disputes turn violent. In fact, rogue state may be a category with but a single example: only Iraq comes close to living up to the expectations policy makers have concerning the conventional military behavior of rogue states, but it comes very close indeed. During the period from 1980 to 2001, Iraq almost perfectly fits the rogue stereotype. It evidenced one if not both of the objective rogue criteria in every one of the twenty-two years under study, and it was both far more likely to be involved in a militarized interstate dispute and far more likely to use force first than other states during the same period. This latter point is particularly interesting because it fits neatly with another assumption that policy makers have made about the behavior of rogue states—that they are fundamentally undeterrable. This finding would tend to indicate that during this period, when involved in a militarized dispute, Iraq’s tendency was not to back down when challenged or confronted but rather to lash out with violence. At the same time, though, the rogue stereotype is not perfect. While Iraq was more likely to be involved in a militarized dispute, it was no more likely to have been the initiator—as often as not, when Iraq found itself in a militarized dispute during the 1980s or 1990s, someone else started it. These results more likely reflect the idiosyncratic behavior of Iraq’s leadership, a statistical anomaly when compared to the rest of the international community, rather than a confirmation of the rogue concept. The only other rhetorical rogue whose conflict behavior deviates from the norm is North Korea, which, like Iraq, is more likely to become involved in militarized interstate disputes. But tellingly, and as with Iraq, it was no more likely to initiate disputes than any other state during the period in question, further calling into question policy maker assumptions that rogues constitute an aggressive military threat to their neighbors and to international order. What, then, accounts for the finding that Iraq and North Korea were more likely to become involved in a militarized dispute but not necessarily as initiators? A partial explanation may lie in the intense American focus on rogues that began in the 1980s and emerged to dominate foreign and defense policy in the 1990s. For the next decade, this policy focus resulted in active policies of confrontation and containment of rogue states, with the vigorous enforcement of no-fly zones over Iraq being the most visible example of such efforts. While dyadic analysis will be necessary to confirm our suspicions about the role that U.S. policies surrounding the rogue doctrine played in Iraq’s and North Korea’s dispute involvement, we believe that possibility cannot be dismissed. In sum, and contrary to policy makers’ assessment of rogue states, their behavior as a group appears no more militarily aggressive or defiant than that of any other member of the international community. The results of our analysis show that rogue states have not posed a generalized threat to international security as measured by interstate conflict behavior. As its critics have long suspected, the rogue concept seems to be at best a questionable foundation on which to build general foreign and defense policies. 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### **Proliferation is not dangerous – China was one thought to be the ultimate rogue**

**Mueller, '10.** [John, Professor of political science at Ohio State University "Think Again: Nuclear Weapons" Foreign Policy, January/February 10

The confrontations with Iran and North Korea over their prospective or actual nukes are more problematic. Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have already contributed big time to the hysteria that has become common coin within the foreign-policy establishment on this issue. It is fine to apply diplomacy and bribery in an effort to dissuade those countries from pursuing nuclear weapons programs: We'd be doing them a favor, in fact. But, though it may be heresy to say so, the world can live with a nuclear Iran or North Korea, as it has lived now for 45 years with a nuclear China, a country once viewed as the ultimate rogue. If push eventually comes to shove in these areas, the solution will be a familiar one: to establish orderly deterrent and containment strategies and avoid the temptation to lash out mindlessly at phantom threats.

## 2NC Small Arsenals

New proliferators will build small arsenals which are uniquely stable.

**Seng '98** (Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, p. 203-206)

However, this "state of affairs" is not as dangerous as it might seem. The nuclear arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will be small and, consequently, the command and control organizations that manage those arsenals will be small as well. The small arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will mitigate against many of the dangers of the highly delegative, 'non-centralized' launch procedures Third World states are likely to use. This will happen in two main ways. First, only a small number of people need be involved in Third World command and control. The superpowers had tens of thousands of nuclear warheads and thousands of nuclear weapons personnel in a variety of deployments organized around numerous nuclear delivery platforms. A state that has, say, fifty nuclear weapons needs at most fifty launch operators and only a handful of group commanders. This has both quantitative and qualitative repercussions. Quantitatively, the very small number of people 'in the loop' greatly diminishes the statistical probability that accidents or human error will result in inappropriate nuclear launches. All else being equal, the chances of finding some guard asleep at some post increases with the number of guards and posts one has to cover. Qualitatively, small numbers makes it possible to centrally train operators, to screen and choose them with exceeding care and to keep each of them in direct contact with central authorities in times of crises. With very small control communities, there is no need for intermediary commanders. Important information and instructions can get out quickly and directly. Quality control of launch operators and operations is easier. In some part, at least, Third World states can compensate for their lack of sophisticated use-control technology with a more controlled selection of, and more extensive communication with, human operators. Secondly, and relatedly, Third World proliferators will not need to rely on cumbersome standard operating procedures to manage and launch their nuclear weapons. This is because the number of weapons will be so small, and also because the arsenals will be very simple in composition. Third World states simply will not have that many weapons to keep track of. Third World states will not have the great variety of delivery platforms that the superpowers had (various ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, long range bombers, fighter bombers, missile submarines, nuclear armed ships, nuclear mortars, etc., etc.), or the great number and variety of basing options, and they will not employ the complicated strategies of international basing that the superpowers used. The small and simple arsenals of Third World proliferators will not require highly complex systems to coordinate nuclear activities. This creates two specific organizational advantages. One, small organizations, even if they do rely to some extent of standard operating procedures, can be *flexible* in times of crisis. As we have discussed, the essential problem of standard operating procedures in nuclear launch processes is that the full range of possible strategic developments cannot be predicted and specified before the fact, and thus responses to them cannot be standardized fully. An unexpected event can lead to 'mis-matched' and inappropriate organizational reactions. In complex and extensive command and control organizations, standard operating procedures coordinate great numbers of people at numerous levels of command structure in a great multiplicity of places. If an unexpected event triggers operating procedures leading to what would be an inappropriate nuclear launch, it would be very difficult for central commanders to 'get the word out' to everyone involved. The coordination needed to stop launch activity would be at least as complicated as the coordination needed to initiate it, and, depending on the speed of launch processes, there may be less time to accomplish it. However, the small numbers of people involved in nuclear launches and the simplicity of arsenals will make it far easier for Third World leaders to 'get the word out' and reverse launch procedures if necessary. Again, so few will be the numbers of weapons that **all** launch operators could be contacted directly by central leaders. The programmed triggers of standard operating procedures can be passed over in favor of unscripted, flexible responses based on a limited number of human-to-human communications and confirmations. Two, the smallness and simplicity of Third World command and control organizations will make it easier for leaders to keep track of everything that is going on at any given moment. One of the great dangers of complex organizational procedures is that once one organizational event is triggered—once an alarm is sounded and a programmed response is made—other branches of the organization are likely to be affected as well. This is what Charles Perrow refers to as *interactive complexity*, and it has been a mainstay

in organizational critiques of nuclear command and control systems.<sup>9</sup> The more complex the organization is, the more likely these secondary effects are, and the less likely they are to be foreseen, noticed, and well-managed. So, for instance, an American commander that gives the order to scramble nuclear bombers over [the U.S. as a defensive measure may find that he has unwittingly given the order to scramble bombers in Europe as well. A recall order to the American bombers may overlook the European theater, and nuclear misuse could result. However, when numbers of nuclear weapons can be measured in the dozens rather than the hundreds or thousands, and when deployment of those weapons does not involve multiple theaters and forward based delivery vehicles of numerous types, right coupling is unlikely to cause unforeseen and unnoticeable organizational events. Other things being equal, it is just a lot easier to know all of what is going on. In short, while Third World states may not have the electronic use-control devices that help ensure that peripheral commanders do not 'get out of control,' they have other advantages that make the challenge of centralized control easier than it was for the superpowers. The small numbers of personnel and organizational simplicity of launch bureaucracies means that even if a few more people have their fingers on the button than in the case of the superpowers, there will be less of a chance that weapons will be launched without a definite, informed and unambiguous decision to press that button.

### **New powers have better C and C**

**Seng '98** (Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, "STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES", p. 200-201)

Third World proliferators will have two important advantages in terms of command and control that help alleviate the concerns of analysts. One, because their arsenals will be so small, their launch bureaucracies and control organizations can be very small. Third World proliferators may well cultivate positive control by delegating launch capability to peripheral commanders, and/or the lack of electronic use-control devices may make it difficult for central commanders to physically prevent peripheral commanders from launching weapons inappropriately. However, the limited numbers of weapons in Third World arsenals will mean that there need not be more than a handful of peripheral launch commanders. There may be more than one 'finger on the button' in Third World nuclear states, but not many more. Peripheral commanders can be carefully screened and tightly supervised by central command. Moreover, because the numbers of personnel involved in nuclear launches will be very small, Third World proliferators will not suffer the dangers of large and complicated organizational routines and standard operating procedures that plagued the superpowers. The organizational simplicity of launch bureaucracies means that even if a few more people have their fingers on the button than in the case of the superpowers, there will be less of a chance that weapons will be launched without a definite and unambiguous decision to press that button. Finally, small arsenals Third World proliferators will be able to protect their weapons from first strikes by simply concealing them. Concealment strategies will give proliferators the luxury of time in their launch procedures, which means that proliferators need not eschew negative control features to ensure that nuclear counter-launches happen quickly and automatically. A quick reaction time is not crucial to concealment strategies; if adversaries cannot find weapons in the weeks and months before launching an attack, they will not be able to find them in the few days following. Counter-launches can proceed slowly. Launch commanders and operators can take their time in doublechecking the appropriateness of launches by confirming that attack alarms are not false and/or waiting to get 'go-aheads' from higher authorities. Also, because peripheral commanders and launch operators in the Third World will probably have launch capability (i.e., because they will not be restricted by electronic use-control devices or because they may be given launch capability by design), central authorities do not have to worry about decapitation strikes thwarting their counter-launches. If central command is destroyed, peripheral launch delegates can launch on their own-after taking the time to confirm that central command is indeed gone.

## 2NC De-escalation

### **Nuclear weapons causes de-escalation of conflicts**

Jason **Tepperman**, September 7, **2k9**. Reporter, Newsweek. <http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248/page/1>

Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, "It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time." The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear-armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests. Sumit Ganguly, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming *India, Pakistan, and the Bomb*, has found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it.

## 2NC De-escalation

### **Proliferation stops war by raising the costs of conflict**

Jason **Tepperman**, September 7, **2k9**. Reporter, Newsweek. <http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248/page/1>

The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states."

### **Proliferation prevents great power wars**

Jason **Tepperman**, September 7, **2k9**. Reporter, Newsweek. <http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248/page/1>

Why indeed? The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling, it's led to what's known as the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world's major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there's very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuring—because in each instance, very different leaders all came to the same safe conclusion.

### **Nuclear weapons have historically de-escalated conflicts**

**Roth 7** [ Ariel Ilan, Johns Hopkins University, "Reflection, Evaluation, Integration: Nuclear Weapons in Neo-Realist Theory" International Studies Review, Vol 9:3.

While critics of Waltz's "more are better" approach have pointed out flaws in his logic, among them, the risks of nuclear weapons in the hands of irrational leaders and instability during the phases of their development leading to efforts to preempt, such criticisms do not question the internal consistency of his theoretical logic (see [Waltz and Sagan 2003:46–87](#)). They are, rather, concerns about the junction between theory and practice. What might hold true on paper may still be something not to be risked in practice, especially when the costs of reality failing to live up to theory's predictions can be so dire. Nonetheless, the behavior of states since the end of World War II has conformed more closely with the expectations of Waltz's defensive neo-realism than with those of Mearsheimer's more expansionist offensive realism. And while there are many good reasons to be cautious in applying Waltz's suggestions about horizontal nuclear proliferation, the fact is that the enduring peace between the great powers continues despite the fact that the logic of bipolarity to which it was once ascribed no longer pertains. And, indeed, who can say that the crossing of the nuclear threshold by India and Pakistan in 1998 has not brought them to a greater sobriety. While sabers have rattled on the sub-continent over the last years, they have not been drawn in war. Might the awareness that any military escalation could lead to a nuclear exchange not have been a factor in diffusing crisis? It certainly could be.

## 2NC De-escalation

### **Uncertainty makes the costs too high**

Karl 96 “proliferation pessimism and emerging nuclear powers”

Optimists have relaxed views of the preventive-war dangers entailed in situations in which a nuclear power confronts a nuclearizing rival. The practical difficulties of ensuring a disarming strike to preclude any possibility of nuclear retaliation make preventive actions a military gamble that states are very unlikely to take. As Waltz explains, "prevention and pre-emption are difficult games because the costs are so high if the games are not perfectly played.... Ultimately, the inhibitions [against such attacks] lie in the impossibility of knowing for sure that a disarming strike will totally destroy an opposing force and in the immense destruction even a few warheads can wreak."<sup>25</sup> To optimists, states will have to learn to live with a rival's emerging nuclear armory. Because strategic uncertainty is seen as having a powerful dissuasive effect, optimists usually view the very increase in the numbers of nuclear-armed states as an additional element of stability. Dagobert Brito and Michael Intriligator, for instance, argue that uncertainty over the reaction of other nuclear powers will make all hesitant to strike individually.<sup>26</sup> As an example, they point to the restraint the superpowers exercised on each other in the 1960s, when first the United States and then the Soviet Union contemplated military action against China's nascent nuclear weapon sites. The net effect of the uncertain reaction of others is that "the probability of deliberate nuclear attack falls to near zero with three, four, or more nuclear nations."<sup>27</sup> Similarly, Waltz reasons that even in cases of asymmetric proliferation within conflict dyads, nuclear weapons will prove "poor instruments for blackmail" because a "country that takes the nuclear offensive has to fear an appropriately punishing strike by someone. Far from lowering the expected cost of aggression, a nuclear offense even against a non-nuclear state raises the possible costs of aggression to incalculable heights because the aggressor cannot be sure of the reaction of other nuclear powers."<sup>28</sup>

### **Nuclear weapons reduce the risk of nuclear war**

Asal and Beardsley 7 “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”

Other, more optimistic, scholars see benefits to nuclear proliferation or, perhaps not actively advocating the development of more nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapon states, see that the presence of nuclear weapons has at least been stabilizing in the past. For example, some scholars are confident of the promise of the ‘nuclear peace’.<sup>4</sup> While those who oppose proliferation present a number of arguments, those who contend that nuclear weapons would reduce interstate wars are fairly consistent in focusing on one key argument: nuclear weapons make the risk of war unacceptable for states. As Waltz argues,

the higher the stakes and the closer a country moves toward winning them, the more surely that country invites retaliation and risks its own destruction. States are not likely to run major risks for minor gains. War between nuclear states may escalate as the loser uses larger and larger warheads. Fearing that, states will want to draw back. Not escalation but deescalation becomes likely. War remains possible, but victory in war is too dangerous to fight for. (Sagan & Waltz, 2003: 6–7)

‘Nuclear war simply makes the risks of war much higher and shrinks the chance that a country will go to war’ (Snyder & Diesing, 1977: 450). Using similar logic, Bueno de Mesquita & Riker (1982) demonstrate formally that a world with almost universal membership in the nuclear club will be much less likely to experience nuclear war than a world with only a few members.

## 2NC Catalytic War

**No state would risk a anonymous attack**

Waltz 95 [Kenneth, Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995, p. 29-30]cn

Some have feared that a radical Arab state might fire a nuclear warhead anonymously at an Israeli city in order to block a peace settlement. But the state firing the warhead could not be certain of remaining unidentified. Even if a country's leaders persuaded themselves that chances of retaliation were low, who would run the risk?

## 2NC Hair Trigger

### **New nuclear states won't adopt launch on warning – their arsenals won't be massive**

**Waltz 95** [Kenneth, Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate*, 1995, p. 29-30]

To be effective, deterrent forces, whether big or small ones, must meet these requirements. First, at least a part of a state's nuclear forces must appear to be able to survive an attack and launch one of its own. Second, survival of forces must not require early firing in response to what may be false alarms. Third, command and control must be reliably maintained; weapons must not be susceptible to accidental or unauthorized use. The first two requirements are closely linked both to each other and to measures needed to ensure that deterrent forces cannot be preempted. If states can deploy their forces in ways that preclude preemption and we have seen that they can then their forces need not be rigged for hair-trigger response. States can retaliate at their leisure. This question then arises: May dispersing forces for the sake of their survival make command and control hard to maintain? Americans think so because we think in terms of large nuclear arsenals. Small nuclear powers neither have them nor need them. Lesser nuclear states may deploy, say, ten real weapons and ten dummies, while permitting other countries to infer that numbers are larger. An adversary need only believe that some warheads may survive its attack and be visited on it. That belief is not hard to create without making command and control unreliable.

### **Proliferants can adopt ride-it-out strategies, preventing escalation**

**Seng 97** [Jordan, Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago, *Security Studies*, Summer, p. 79-80]

In all, the interaction between delegation and concealment will make it likely that minor proliferators' will have what might be called ride-it-out-and-retaliate strategies. Minor proliferators will have a second strike capability that is not time critical. They can wait for the dust to settle before executing counterlaunches. If a crisis occurs, if launch commanders have reason to think that a first strike might have happened, if central command might have been bombed and eliminated, launch commanders can ride out the initial panic and take the time to employ the procedures they have for confirming the appropriateness of nuclear retaliation. Ride-it-out-and-retaliate strategies are not without precedent in nuclear history. The negative control situation of minor proliferators will be similar to that of advanced states' ballistic missile submarine forces. Insofar as the history of submarine control is widely acknowledged as a favorable one, the similarities are encouraging and instructive.

## 2NC Terrorism

### **Nations would not supply terrorists with weapons**

Jason Tepperman, September 7, 2k9. Reporter, Newsweek. <http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248/page/1>

Still, even if Iran or North Korea are deterrable, nuclear pessimists fear they'll give or sell their deadly toys to terrorists, who aren't—for it's hard to bomb a group with no return address. Yet look closely, and the risk of a WMD handoff starts to seem overblown. For one thing, assuming Iran is able to actually build a nuke, Desch explains that "it doesn't make sense that they'd then give something they regard as central to their survival to groups like Hizbullah, over which they have limited control. As for Al Qaeda, they don't even share common interests. Why would the mullahs give Osama bin Laden the crown jewels?" To do so would be fatal, for Washington has made it very clear that it would regard any terrorist use of a WMD as an attack by the country that supplied it—and would respond accordingly.

### **Nations won't pass off nuclear material**

Kraig, 9. [Michael, Senior Fellow at the Stanley Foundation "Nuclear Network Theory" *Foreign Policy*, October 30.]

The key question, then, is how would terrorist groups get their hands on raw nuclear goods? Contrary to popular belief, a state like Iran is extremely unlikely to pass along its HEU to a nonstate group. States value nuclear material for its strategic prestige and deterrent value within the context of a central government arsenal; even the roughest of rogue states aren't in the business of giving highly coveted nukes to a group whose actions they cannot predict or control.

## 2NC Al-Qaeda

### **Al Qaeda is not seeking the bomb**

**Mueller, '10.** [John, Professor of political science at Ohio State University "Think Again: Nuclear Weapons" Foreign Policy, January/February 10

Al Qaeda Is Searching for a Nuclear Capability."

Prove it. Al Qaeda may have had some interest in atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). For instance, a man who defected from al Qaeda after he was caught stealing \$110,000 from the organization -- "a lovable rogue," "fixated on money," who "likes to please," as one FBI debriefer described Jamal al-Fadl -- has testified that members tried to purchase uranium in the mid-1990s, though they were scammed and purchased bogus material. There are also reports that bin Laden had "academic" discussions about WMD in 2001 with Pakistani nuclear scientists who did not actually know how to build a bomb.

But the Afghanistan invasion seems to have cut any schemes off at the knees. As analyst Anne Stenersen notes, evidence from an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan when the group beat a hasty retreat indicates that only some \$2,000 to \$4,000 was earmarked for WMD research, and that was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. For comparison, she points out that the Japanese millennial terrorist group, Aum Shinrikyo, appears to have invested \$30 million in its sarin gas manufacturing program. Milton Leitenberg of the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland-College Park quotes Ayman al-Zawahiri as saying that the project was "wasted time and effort."

Even former International Atomic Energy Agency inspector David Albright, who is more impressed with the evidence found in Afghanistan, concludes that any al Qaeda atomic efforts were "seriously disrupted" -- indeed, "nipped in the bud" -- by the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and that after the invasion the "chance of al Qaeda detonating a nuclear explosive appears on reflection to be low."

## 2NC Loose Nukes

### **Russia is increasing their security measures on loose nuclear weapons**

**Mueller, '10.** [John, Professor of political science at Ohio State University "Think Again: Nuclear Weapons" Foreign Policy, January/February 10

"Terrorists Could Snap Up Russia's Loose Nukes." That's a myth. It has been soberly, and repeatedly, restated by Harvard University's Graham Allison and others that Osama bin Laden gave a group of Chechens \$30 million in cash and two tons of opium in exchange for 20 nuclear warheads. Then there is the "report" about how al Qaeda acquired a Russian-made suitcase nuclear bomb from Central Asian sources that had a serial number of 9999 and could be exploded by mobile phone. If these attention-grabbing rumors were true, one might think the terrorist group (or its supposed Chechen suppliers) would have tried to set off one of those things by now or that al Qaeda would have left some trace of the weapons behind in Afghanistan after it made its very rushed exit in 2001. Instead, nada. It turns out that getting one's hands on a working nuclear bomb is actually very difficult. In 1998, a peak year for loose nuke stories, the head of the U.S. Strategic Command made several visits to Russian military bases and pointedly reported, "I want to put to bed this concern that there are loose nukes in Russia. My observations are that the Russians are indeed very serious about security." Physicists Richard Garwin and Georges Charpak have reported, however, that this forceful firsthand testimony failed to persuade the intelligence community "perhaps because it [had] access to varied sources of information." A decade later, with no credible reports of purloined Russian weapons, it rather looks like it was the general, not the spooks, who had it right. By all reports (including Allison's), Russian nukes have become even more secure in recent years. It is scarcely rocket science to conclude that any nuke stolen in Russia is far more likely to go off in Red Square than in Times Square. The Russians seem to have had no difficulty grasping this fundamental reality. Setting off a stolen nuke might be nearly impossible anyway, outside of TV's 24 and disaster movies. Finished bombs are routinely outfitted with devices that will trigger a nonnuclear explosion to destroy the bomb if it is tampered with. And, as Stephen Younger, former head of nuclear weapons research and development at Los Alamos National Laboratory, stresses, only a few people in the world know how to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon. Even weapons designers and maintenance personnel do not know the multiple steps necessary. In addition, some countries, including Pakistan, store their weapons disassembled, with the pieces in separate secure vaults.

## 2NC Iran/NoKo Sells

**Iran and North Korea would not sell the bomb – it would be too valuable**

**Mueller, '10.** [John, Professor of political science at Ohio State University "Think Again: Nuclear Weapons" Foreign Policy, January/February 10

"Iranian and North Korean Nukes Are Intolerable." Not unless we overreact. North Korea has been questing after nuclear capability for decades and has now managed to conduct a couple of nuclear tests that seem to have been mere fizzles. It has also launched a few missiles that have hit their presumed target, the Pacific Ocean, with deadly accuracy. It could do far more damage in the area with its artillery. If the Iranians do break their solemn pledge not to develop nuclear weapons (perhaps in the event of an Israeli or U.S. airstrike on their facilities), they will surely find, like all other countries in our nuclear era, that the development has been a waste of time (it took Pakistan 28 years) and effort (is Pakistan, with its enduring paranoia about India and a growing jihadi threat, any safer today?). Moreover, Iran will most likely "use" any nuclear capability in the same way all other nuclear states have: for prestige (or ego-stoking) and deterrence. Indeed, as strategist and Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling suggests, deterrence is about the only value the weapons might have for Iran. Such devices, he points out, "should be too precious to give away or to sell" and "too precious to 'waste' killing people" when they could make other countries "hesitant to consider military action."

## 2NC Prolif Slow

**Proliferation is slow – even if a state has all the necessary materials it does not mean they can put them together**

**Mueller, '10.** [John, Professor of political science at Ohio State University "Think Again: Nuclear Weapons" Foreign Policy, January/February 10

"Fabricating a Bomb Is 'Child's Play.'" Hardly. An editorialist in *Nature*, the esteemed scientific journal, did apply that characterization to the manufacture of uranium bombs, as opposed to plutonium bombs, last January, but even that seems an absurd exaggeration. Younger, the former Los Alamos research director, has expressed his amazement at how "self-declared 'nuclear weapons experts,' many of whom have never seen a real nuclear weapon," continue to "hold forth on how easy it is to make a functioning nuclear explosive." Uranium is "exceptionally difficult to machine," he points out, and "plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed." Special technology is required, and even the simplest weapons require precise tolerances. Information on the general idea for building a bomb is available online, but none of it, Younger says, is detailed enough to "enable the confident assembly of a real nuclear explosive." A failure to appreciate the costs and difficulties of a nuclear program has led to massive overestimations of the ability to fabricate nuclear weapons. As the 2005 Silberman-Robb commission, set up to investigate the intelligence failures that led to the Iraq war, pointed out, it is "a fundamental analytical error" to equate "procurement activity with weapons system capability." That is, "simply because a state can buy the parts does not mean it can put them together and make them work." For example, after three decades of labor and well over \$100 million in expenditures, Libya was unable to make any progress whatsoever toward an atomic bomb. Indeed, much of the country's nuclear material, surrendered after it abandoned its program, was still in the original boxes.

## 2NC: Nation Collapse

### **China demonstrates that nuclear weapons can survive a civil war**

Jason **Tepperman**, September 7, **2k9**. Reporter, Newsweek. <http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248/page/1>

A much greater threat is that a nuclear North Korea or Pakistan could collapse and lose control of its weapons entirely. Yet here again history offers some comfort. China acquired its first nuke in 1964, just two years before it descended into the mad chaos of the Cultural Revolution, when virtually every Chinese institution was threatened—except for its nuclear infrastructure, which remained secure. "It was nearly a coup," says Desch, "yet with all the unrest, nobody ever thought that there might be an unauthorized nuclear use." The Soviets' weapons were also kept largely safe (with U.S. help) during the breakup of their union in the early '90s. And in recent years Moscow has greatly upped its defense spending (by 20 to 30 percent a year), using some of the cash to modernize and protect its arsenal.

### **Nuclear weapons would not fall into the wrong hands – they need constant maintenance and technical expertise**

Jason **Tepperman**, September 7, **2k9**. Reporter, Newsweek. <http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248/page/1>

As for Pakistan, it has taken numerous precautions to ensure that its own weapons are insulated from the country's chaos, installing complicated firing mechanisms to prevent a launch by lone radicals, for example, and instituting special training and screening for its nuclear personnel to ensure they're not infiltrated by extremists. Even if the Pakistani state did collapse entirely—the nightmare scenario—the chance of a Taliban bomb would still be remote. Desch argues that the idea that terrorists "could use these weapons radically underestimates the difficulty of actually operating a modern nuclear arsenal. These things need constant maintenance and they're very easy to disable. So the idea that these things could be stuffed into a gunnysack and smuggled across the Rio Grande is preposterous."