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# 1NC Shell (1/3)

**The West creates a hypocritical global proliferation model that privileges western policy and constructs other nation’s proliferation efforts in Orientalist terms that create the problems they seek to prevent**

**Behnke, 2000** - Lecturer of IR at the University of Reading (January, Andreas, “Inscriptions of Imperial Order: NATO's Mediterranean Initiative” http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol5\_1/behnke.htm) BBL

David Mutimer (1997) has argued that the use of the metaphor 'proliferation' carries certain entailments. That is to say, it structures our understanding and handling of the problem. In particular, he refers to the "image of a spread outward from a point or source", and the "technological bias" introduced in the discourse (Mutimer 1997:201-2). As concerns the first point, 'proliferation' presupposes a center at which WMD are to be held and controlled, and from which these weapons disseminate into the body of the international society. To the extent that this process gets out of the center's control, certain measures have to be taken to 'suffocate', limit, or curb the 'spread' of these weapons. As concerns the second point, Mutimer (1997:203) points out the peculiar agency implied in the concept: "Notice that the weapons themselves spread; they are not spread by an external agent of some form - say, a human being or political institution". **The fact that a large number of these weapons were actually 'spread' by Western states is consequently hidden through this discursive structure**. These points are also relevant for the Mediterranean Initiative. We can add a third entailment to the list which appears through a critical reading of the NATO/RAND narrative. As the RAND authors (1998:15) observe, "The mere existence of ballistic missile technology with ranges in excess of 1,000 km on world markets and available to proliferators around the Mediterranean basin would not necessarily pose serious strategic dilemmas for Europe." In fact, we might even agree with the neorealist proposition that 'more might be better', above all in terms of nuclear weapons. This is certainly the preferred solution of John Mearsheimer (1990) for the stabilization of European political order after the end of the cold war. After all, conventional wisdom has it that nuclear weapons and the threat of mutually assured destruction preserved stability and peace during the Cold War. The RAND authors, however, fail to grasp the irony in their identification of WMD proliferation, which ends up denying this central tenet of cold war strategy. According to them, "the WMD and ballistic missile threat will acquire more serious dimensions where it is coupled with a proliferator's revolutionary orientation. Today, this is the case with regard to Iran, Iraq, Libya, and arguably Syria" (RAND, 1998:16). What preserved the peace during the cold war -- mutual deterrence -- is now re-written as a strategic problem: As a result of proliferation trends, Europe will be increasingly exposed to the retaliatory consequences of U.S. and European actions around the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin, including the Balkans. ... As a political threat and a weapon of terror capable of influencing the NATO decisionmaking during a crisis, their significance [of conventionally armed ballistic missiles] could be considerable (RAND, 1998:16). Two implications of these arguments deserve elaboration. First, there is the reversal of the traditional relationship between WMD and rationality. For what makes the presence of WMD in the South so worrisome is the absence of the requirements of reason and rationality. Within NATO's discourse on the South, 'revolutionary orientation' accounts for the undesirability of distributing these weapons to such unfit hands. In order to qualify for their possession, reason and rationality must be present -- as they are obviously assumed to be in the West. The discourse of proliferation consequently produces a third entailment by constructing the relationship between West and South in 'orientalist' terms. In this rendition, the South becomes the quintessential antithesis of the West, the site of irrationality, passion, and terror (Said, 1995). Within this site, different rules apply, which are not necessarily subject to Western ideals of enlightened reason. **'Proliferation' articulates a hierarchical structure in global politics, with the West as the privileged site** of from which to surveil, control, and engage the rest of the world. This privilege is further dramatized in the above complaint about the possibility of retaliation. For the South to achieve the possibility of influencing NATO decision making is to violate the epistemic sovereignty of the West. 'U.S. and European actions' and interventions have to be unrestrained in order to constitute proper crisis management. NATO demands a docile subjectivity and accessible territory from the South, the latter's identity cannot be ascertained against the West. Its arms have to be surrendered, its retaliatory capabilities to be revoked. 'Information' is the third mode besides 'Securitization' and 'Proliferation' within which we can discern the subjugation of the South to the strategic Western gaze. A central purpose of the Mediterranean Initiative/Dialogue is to improve 'mutual understanding' and to 'dispel some of the misperceptions and apprehensions that exist, on both sides of the Mediterranean' (Solana, 1997a:5). And both the RAND Corporation and NATO put some emphasis on public information and perception. Yet the structure of this relationship proves to be unbalanced and virtually unilateral. As mentioned above, for NATO, the prime task is above all the "further refinement of its definition of security" (de Santis, 1998). The general identity of the South as a site of danger and insecurity is consequently never in question. Western perceptions are never problematized. Knowledge of the South is, it appears, a matter of matching more and better information with proper conceptual tools

# 1NC Shell (2/3)

**The impact is racism. Racism serves the nefarious biopolitical goals of the state, making war permanent and forces us to reduce the enemy to nothing in a psychological and corporal sense**

**Mendieta 2** PhD and Associate professor of Stonybrook School of Philosophy (Eduardo, 4/25/02, “ ‘To make live and to let die’ –Foucault on Racism Meeting of the Foucault Circle, APA Central Division Meeting”) MH

This is where racism intervenes, not from without, exogenously, but from within, constitutively. For the emergence of biopower as the form of a new form of political rationality, entails the inscription within the very logic of the modern state the logic of racism. For racism grants, and here I am quoting: “the conditions for the acceptability of putting to death in a society of normalization. Where there is a society of normalization, where there is a power that is, in all of its surface and in first instance, and first line, a bio-power, racism is indispensable as a condition to be able to put to death someone, in order to be able to put to death others. The homicidal [meurtrière] function of the state, to the degree that the state functions on the modality of bio-power, can only be assured by racism “(Foucault 1997, 227) To use the formulations from his 1982 lecture “The Political Technology of Individuals” –which incidentally, echo his 1979 Tanner Lectures –the power of the state after the 18th century, a power which is enacted through the police, and is enacted over the population, is a power over living beings, and as such it is a biopolitics. And, to quote more directly, “since the population is nothing more than what the state takes care of for its own sake, of course, the state is entitled to slaughter it, if necessary. So the reverse of biopolitics is thanatopolitics.” (Foucault 2000, 416). Racism, is the thanatopolitics of the biopolitics of the total state. They are two sides of one same political technology, one same political rationality: the management of life, the life of a population, the tending to the continuum of life of a people. And with the inscription of racism within the state of biopower, the long history of war that Foucault has been telling in these dazzling lectures has made a new turn: the war of peoples, a war against invaders, imperials colonizers, which turned into a war of races, to then turn into a war of classes, has now turned into the war of a race, a biological unit, against its polluters and threats. Racism is the means by which bourgeois political power, biopower, re-kindles the fires of war within civil society. Racism normalizes and medicalizes war. Racism makes war the permanent condition of society, while at the same time masking its weapons of death and torture. As I wrote somewhere else, racism banalizes genocide by making quotidian the lynching of suspect threats to the health of the social body. Racism makes the killing of the other, of others, an everyday occurrence by internalizing and normalizing the war of society against its enemies. To protect society entails we be ready to kill its threats, its foes, and if we understand society as a unity of life, as a continuum of the living, then these threat and foes are biological in nature.

**The way they view nuclear weapons recreate the proliferation they try to stop**

**Whitney, 6** – Columnist, staff writer (February 9, Mike, Time to Scrap the NPT, www.dissidentvoice.org) BBL

The purpose of the NPT (Nonproliferation Treaty) is to reduce or eliminate the development of nuclear weapons. If it is to have any meaning at all it must be directed at nations that not only have weapons, but that demonstrate a flagrant disregard for the international laws condemning their use. The IAEA should focus its attention on those states that have a clear record of territorial aggression, military intervention, or who consistently violate United Nations resolutions. In its present form the IAEA and the NPT are utterly meaningless. Rather than leading the world towards nuclear disarmament, the agency and the treaty have simply ignored the misbehavior of the more powerful nations and humiliated the non-nuclear states with **spurious accusations and threatening rhetoric**. The NPT was never intended to be a bludgeon for battering the weaker nations; nor was it set up as a de-facto apartheid system whereby the superpower and its allies can lord above the non-nuclear states coercing them to act according to their diktats. It was designed to curb the development of the world’s most lethal weapons, eventually consigning them to the ash heap. The political maneuvering surrounding Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons programs demonstrates the irrelevance and hypocrisy of the current system. As yet, there is no concrete evidence that Iran is in non-compliance with the terms of the treaty. That hasn’t deterred the Bush administration from intimidating its allies and adversaries alike to assist them in dragging Iran before the Security Council. The Bush administration is asking the Security Council to enforce additional protocols which will preclude Iran from enriching uranium for use in electric power plants, a right that is clearly articulated in the NPT. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Iran’s determination to enrich uranium is protected under international law and should not be abridged to accommodate the regional ambitions of the United States. By giving up its legal rights Iran would be undermining the fundamental principle that underscores all such agreements and tacitly accepting that the Bush administration alone has the final say-so on issues of global concern. Why should Iran accept a standard for itself that is different than that for every other signatory of the NPT? No nation should willingly accept being branded as a pariah without evidence of wrongdoing. The fact that the United States is occupying the country next door and has yet to provide a coherent justification for the invasion is a poignant reminder of the irrelevance of both the United Nations and the IAEA. The two organizations have remained resolutely silent in the face of the massive incidents of human rights abuses, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. **While Iran is roundly condemned by heads-of-state and the corporate media, the greatest crime of our generation continues into its third year without a word of reproach from the world body. The international community simply looks away in fear. This alone should illustrate the ineffectiveness of the institutions that are designed to keep the peace.**  If the ruling body at the IAEA is to have any relevance, it must direct its attention to the real threats of nuclear proliferation posed by those nations that consider nuclear weapons a privilege that should be limited to a certain group of elite states. If the IAEA cannot perform its duties in a neutral manner that respects the rights of all nations equally, it should disband and abolish the NPT without delay. If the IAEA is uncertain about the real threats to regional peace, they should take note of the many recent polls that invariably list the same belligerent nations as the leading offenders. It is these countries that should be scrutinized most carefully. It is not the purview of the IAEA to keep the weaker nations out of the nuclear club. That simply enables the stronger states to bully their enemies with threats of using their WMD. **In fact, it’s plain to see that the current disparity in military power has created a perilous imbalance between nations that is rapidly spreading war throughout the world.**

# 1NC Shell (3/3)

**The alternative is to reject the 1ac as a construction of nuclear Orientalist discourse- This exposes the vulnerabilities of the West’s paradoxical posture on nuclear policy, refocuses the problem as a societal behavioral issue, and allows for cross-cultural understanding that solves the case**

**Gusterson 4-** professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University (Hugh, 7/14/04, Chapter 2 Nuclear Weapons and The Other, People Of The Bomb: Portraits of America's Nuclear Complex, p.46) MH

The third strategy, renunciation, breaks down the distinctions we have constructed between “us” and “them” and asks whether nuclear weapons are safe in anyone’s hands. “What-must-on-no-account-be-known,” says Salman Rushdie, is “the impossible verity that savagery could be concealed beneath decency’s well-pressed shirt.” Our orientalist discourse on nuclear proliferation is one of our ways not to know this. By breaking down the discourse, confronting those parts of our own personality and culture that appear as the childish, irrational, lawless, or feminine aspects of the other we could address our doubts about ourselves instead of harping continually on our doubts about others. Then we might accept that “the fact that we urge other nations not to depend on nuclear weapons in this way- and urge very strenuously- suggest that we have mixed feelings about how safe they make us.” This acceptance would lead us to the same conclusion reached by George Kennan, former ambassador to the Soviet Union and the originator of the policy of containment in the cold war: I see the danger not in the number or quantity of the weapons or in the intentions of those who hold them but in the very existence of weapons of this nature, regardless of whose hands they are in. I believe that unless we conscent to recognize that the nuclear weapons we hold in our hands are as much a danger to us as those that repose in the hands of our supposed adversaries there will be no escape from the confusions and dilemmas to which such weapons have brought us, and must bring us increasingly as time goes on. For this reason, I see no solution to the problem other than the complete elimination of these and all other weapons of mass destruction from national arsenals; and the sooner we move toward that solution, and the greater courage we show in doing so, the safer we will be.

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# Generic Links

**The 1AC’s Western framing of proliferation portrays Eastern culture as inferior, and the enemy. Racial hatreds, when combined with capitalist paradigm of exploitation have caused and inevitably will cause great power conflicts**

Pinar **Batur,** PhD @ UT-Austin – Prof. of Scociology @ Vassar**, ‘7** [“The Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide,” in Handbook of the The Soiology of Racial and Ethnic Relations, eds. Vera and Feagin, p. 441-443] BBL

War and genocide are horrid, and taking them for granted is inhuman. In the 21st century, our problem is not only seeing them as natural and inevitable, but even worse: not seeing, not noticing, **but ignoring them. Such act and thought, fueled by global racism, reveal that racial inequality has advanced from the establishment of racial hierarchy and institutionalization of segregation, to the confinement and exclusion, and elimination, of those considered inferior through genocide**. In this trajectory, global racism manifests genocide. But this is not inevitable. This article, by examining global racism, explores the new terms of exclusion and the path to permanent war and genocide, to examine the integrality of genocide to the framework of global antiracist confrontation. Racist legitimization of inequality has changed from presupposed biological inferiority to assumed cultural inadequacy. This defines the new terms of impossibility of coexistence, much less equality. The Jim Crow racism of biological inferiority is now being replaced with a new and modern racism (Baker 1981; Ansell 1997) with “culture war” as the key to justify difference, hierarchy, and oppression. The ideology of “culture war” is becoming embedded in institutions, defining the workings of organizations, and is now defended by individuals who argue that they are not racist, but are not blind to the inherent differences between African-Americans/Arabs/Chinese, or whomever, and “us.” “Us” as a concept defines the power of a group to distinguish itself and to assign a superior value to its institutions, revealing certainty that affinity with “them” will be harmful to its existence (Hunter 1991; Buchanan 2002). How can we conceptualize this shift to examine what has changed over the past century and what has remained the same in a racist society? Joe Feagin examines this question with a theory of systemic racism to explore societal complexity of interconnected elements for longevity and adaptability of racism. He sees that **systemic racism persists due to a “white racial frame,” defining and maintaining an “organized set of racialized ideas, stereotypes, emotions, and inclinations to discriminate” (Feagin 2006: 25). The white racial frame arranges the routine operation of racist institutions, which enables social and economic reproduction and amendment of racial privilege. It is this frame that defines the political and economic bases of cultural and historical legitimization.** While the white racial frame is one of the components of systemic racism, it is attached to other terms of racial oppression to forge systemic coherency. It has altered over time from slavery to segregation to racial oppression and now frames “culture war,” or “clash of civilizations,” to legitimate the racist oppression of domination, exclusion, war, and genocide. The concept of “culture war” emerged to define opposing ideas in America regarding privacy, censorship, citizenship rights, and secularism, but it has been globalized through conflicts over immigration, nuclear power, and the “war on terrorism.” Its discourse and action articulate to flood the racial space of systemic racism. Racism is a process of defining and building communities and societies based on racialized hierarchy of power. The expansion of capitalism cast new formulas of divisions and oppositions, fostering inequality even while integrating all previous forms of oppressive hierarchical arrangements as long as they bolstered the need to maintain the structure and form of capitalist arrangements (Batur-VanderLippe 1996). In this context, the white racial frame, defining the terms of racist systems of oppression, enabled the globalization of racial space through the articulation of capitalism (Du Bois 1942; Winant 1994). The key to understanding this expansion is comprehension of the synergistic relationship between racist systems of oppression and the capitalist system of exploitation. Taken separately, these two systems would be unable to create such oppression independently. However, **the synergy between them is devastating. In the age of industrial capitalism, this synergy manifested itself imperialism and colonialism. In the age of advanced capitalism, it is war and genocide. The capitalist system, by enabling and maintaining the connection between everyday life and the global, buttresses the processes of racial oppression, and synergy between racial oppression and capitalist exploitation begets violenc**e. Etienne Balibar points out that the connection between everyday life and the global is established through thought, making global racism a way of thinking, enabling connections of “words with objects and words with images in order to create concepts” (Balibar 1994: 200). Yet, global racism is not only an articulation of thought, but also a way of knowing and acting, framed by both everyday and global experiences. Synergy between capitalism and racism as systems of oppression enables this perpetuation and destruction on the global level. As capitalism expanded and adapted to the particularities of spatial and temporal variables, global racism became part of its legitimization and accommodation, first in terms of colonialist arrangements. In colonized and colonizing lands, global racism has been perpetuated through racial ideologies and discriminatory practices under capitalism by the creation and recreation of connections among memory, knowledge, institutions, and construction of the future in thought and action. What makes racism global are the bridges connecting the particularities of everyday racist experiences to the universality of racist concepts and actions, maintained globally by myriad forms of prejudice, discrimination, and violence (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Batur 1999, 2006). Under colonialism, colonizing and colonized societies were antagonistic opposites. Since colonizing society portrayed [CONTINUED]

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the colonized “other,” as the adversary and challenger of the “the ideal self,” not only identification but also segregation and containment were essential to racist policies. The terms of exclusion were set by the institutions that fostered and maintained segregation, but the intensity of exclusion, and redundancy, became more apparent in the age of advanced capitalism, as an extension of post-colonial discipline. **The exclusionary measures when tested led to war, and genocide. Although, more often than not, genocide was perpetuated and fostered by the post-colonial institutions, rather than colonizing forces, the colonial identification of the “inferior other” led to segregation, then exclusion, then war and genocide.** Violence glued them together into seamless continuity. Violence is integral to understanding global racism. Fanon (1963), in exploring colonial oppression, discusses how divisions created or reinforced by colonialism guarantee the perpetuation, and escalation, of violence for both the colonizer and colonized. Racial differentiations, cemented through the colonial relationship, are integral to the aggregation of violence during and after colonialism: “Manichaeism [division of the universe into opposites of good and evil] goes to its logical conclusion and dehumanizes” **Within this dehumanizing framework**, Fanon argues that **the violence resulting from the destruction of everyday life, sense of self and imagination under colonialism continues to infest the post-colonial existence by integrating colonized land into the violent destruction of a new “geography of hunger” and exploitation** (Fanon 1963: 96). The “geography of hunger” marks the context and space in which oppression and exploitation continue. The historical maps drawn by colonialism now demarcate the boundaries of post-colonial arrangements. **The white racial frame restructures this space to fit the imagery of symbolic racism, modifying it to fit the television screen, or making the evidence of the necessity of the politics of exclusion, and the violence of war and genocide, palatable enough for the front page of newspapers, spread out next to the morning breakfast cereal. Two examples of this “geography of hunger and exploitation” are Iraq and New Orleans.**

# Generic Links

**Western framing of nuclear proliferation portrays those of the East as the other, modifying the impact of their policies based in racism.**

**Behnke, 2000** - Lecturer of IR at the University of Reading (January, Andreas, “Inscriptions of Imperial Order: NATO's Mediterranean Initiative” http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol5\_1/behnke.htm) BBL

In responding to the rise of Islamism, Alliance countries must take three factors into account. The first is Islamic political thought, which is distinct from Western thought on a fundamental point, namely its difficulty in accepting the independence of politics from the religious and private spheres of human activity. ... Secondly, the present governments of the North African countries do not exhibit the main characteristics of democracy... Thirdly, Islam is thriving against a background of political and economic crisis generally linked to the failure of a mode of development which gave priority to major industry and state action at the expense of the peasantry, private enterprise and the development of the middle class (North Atlantic Assembly, 1994: ii-iii). This is a central statement in the re-constitution of the South: modernization has ended and failed, and it has produced a monster. The modernization paradigm that informed the identification of the South during most of the cold war would allow for manifestations of crisis as 'collateral damages' in a transition process to Western standards of economic, political and social modernity. The post-cold war texts presented here on the other hand turn political and economic crises into key features of these countries, features that now identify these countries as essentially anti-Western. A comparison of the security situations of the Middle East and of Europe discloses their asymmetry on many levels. Europe is a community of states engaged in a process of integration, while the Middle East remains an area where the dynamics of fragmentation can lead to conflicts among states; the common boundary between the two areas separates democracy from autocracy, market economies from under-developed economies, modern societies from archaic social structures torn asunder by the phenomena of modernization. (Gaspar, 1994:29). While there are faint echoes of the modernization paradigm resonating in this description (underdeveloped economies), they no longer hold the promise of ultimately becoming part of the West. Rather, against the 'anti-Western radicalization' (Gaspar, 1994:29) the West is recommended to use a strategy of containment. "In the Middle East, democratization does not seem to be on the agenda and there is no question of expanding the European security complex into this area or integrating it into European or Western institutions" (Gaspar, 1994:28). Rather, the identification of 'Islamism' could hold the promise of re-constituting the West as a common trans-Atlantic identity against the Islamic Other. "Thus, in the end, the post-Cold War crisis in the Middle East could serve as a catalyst to the consolidation of the European and Atlantic communities through their efforts to coordinate a coherent Middle East policy" (Gaspar, 1994:30). What is at work here is a spatial differentiation that constructs a boundary between the West and the 'Middle East', reminiscent of, and at the same time anticipating, the adversarial relationship between East and West in the days of the cold war. This argument is further supported by the increasing militarization of the identification of the South in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Here, NATO's texts are increasingly concerned with the proliferation of 'weapons of mass destruction'. "[The] Gulf crisis proved that the threats now facing Europe no longer come from only one direction, and has provided all too tangible evidence of the danger of a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction" (Colombo, 1992:3). The point here is, of course, that such weapons in themselves are not the problem. Rather, **they become dangerous in the hands of the Other, in the hands of the 'Saddams', 'rogue nations' and 'fundamentalists' of this world**. Thus, the current discussions on the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) already presupposes and at the same time reinforces an identity of the South as the Other (Mutimer, 1997).

Nuclear apartheid is a poison that will spread across the world leaving human rights violations in its wake.

Gopal,’98 - Prof. of History @ Jawaharlal Nehru Univ., (Sarvepalli, *International Social Scicence Journal* 50.157, “Images of world Society: a Third World View,”)BBL

A world society, of course, is not just the product of relations between the constituent states; perhaps even more important than international politics are domestic conditions. It goes without saying that our future can be neither just nor stable as long as racism is prevalent and in some areas is even the basis of state policy. Apartheid is not only an intolerable violation of human dignity and freedom; it fouls the atmosphere everywhere and endangers world peace. The inequality between races does not always take so ﬂagrant a form, but the poison is widespread and needs to be eradicated before we can even consider laying ﬁrm foun- dations for a world society. There are other forms of inequality which, if less criminal than racism, also call for our attention.The current efforts to secure for women a proper status in society will obviously have to continue. If the worth of a civilization is properly assessed by the way it treats its women, this criterion will apply to the world community as well.

# Generic Links

**Reps of the 1AC dichotomize Western security and Eastern proliferation.**

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In addition to using a dichotomous language, Orientalism uses an essentialist discourse, universalizing certain traits and characteristics to the Orient and the Islamic World (Said, 1978). Said considers the numerous writers, novelists, journalists, philosophers, political theorists, historians, economists, and imperial administrators, who have accepted the basic Oriental/Occidental distinction as the foundation for their work concerning the Orient, as Orientalists. Most significant for this study, Said says, “The Middle East experts who advise [U.S.] policymakers are imbued with Orientalism, almost to a person” (p. 321). According to Macfie (2000), Orientalism has come to signify an ideology justifying and accounting for Western imperialism. The notion of dividing the globe into dichotomous categories originates from a structuralist view of language (de Saussure, 1959). de Saussure argues that the universal structuring principle in all human language is that of binary oppositions. Language, viewed as a totality and as a social construction, is formed by the meanings assigned to objects and by those objects’ relationship to their opposites, for example, black versus white, man versus woman, and so on. **Objects are understood as to what they are not. Therefore, a dichotomous system governs the formation of language, and the numerous possibilities of meaning are restricted**. According to Switzer, McNamara, and Ryan (1999), news narratives are primarily based on binary signs, reducing reality to “discrete, dichotomous ‘facts’” (p. 33). Switzer et al. contend that binary language and the tendency to define the world in terms of opposites provide the sociocultural foundation of ideology. Similarly, Said (1978) argues that the process of identity formation and maintenance in every culture entails the existence of “another, different and competing alter ego” (p. 331). Said argues that, in the process of Western self-presentation, Orientalism is constructed as the West’s alter ego. The binary vocabulary of Orientalism includes East versus West, despotism versus democracy, cruelty versus fair treatment, irrational versus rational, and cunning versus trust (Baldwin, Longhurst, McCracken, Ogborn, & Smith, 2000, p. 171). By the absolute fixing of the meaning of the Orient, Orientalism functions as a Foucaultean discourse of power and domination (Said, 1978). Van Dijk’s (1998b) “ideological square” (p. 33) explains the dichotomous character of the prevailing discourses in societies. The ideological square gets its label from the four dimensions that make it up and acts as a justification for the presence of inequality in the society by polarizing in-groups and out-groups through a double process of emphasis and mitigation. **Ideological discourses emphatically present the good properties/actions of “us” and the bad properties/actions of “them.”** The discourse also mitigates the bad properties/actions of the in-group and the good properties/actions of the out-group. Van Dijk (1995) maintains that ideologies are often articulated on the basis of the ideological square.

**U.S. nuclear policies uphold a racist paradigm of the imperialist West.**

**Gusterson, 2-** Prof. Anthropology Department, MIT (Hugh, “The Second Nuclear Age”) BBL

To return to the discussion at the beginning of the paper, a key difference between the first and second nuclear ages, as Paul Bracken observes, concerns the larger number of players in the second nuclear age, the disappearance of the binary superpower conflict, and the emergence of proliferation, both to smaller states and to subnational actors, as a central issue in the system. The American national security state has been quick to recognize the aporia between the first and second nuclear ages and to remake its policies to take account of new threats and possibilities. Under the Clinton Administration we saw a (neo)liberal stategy to exercise nuclear hegemony in the international system; under George W. Bush we are seeing an imperial strategy. We should not lose sight of the fact that both were strategies for hegemony. Clinton’s overarching goal was to create a liberal international order that would facilitate the flow of goods and services in a globalized economy while controlling the underside of globalization in the form of a global black market for nuclear materials. **He also sought to isolate “rogue states” from international civil society**. Under Clinton the weapons labs were quick to absorb their former rivals in Russia into a cooperative clientilistic relationship and to develop global surveillance programs to interdict the flow of nuclear technology to states conceived through an orientalist lens as insufficiently mature to wield nuclear weapons. While the right wing in the weapons labs wanted to break out of the test ban regime with a new generation of mini-nukes optimized for a new global struggle against rogue states, Clinton held back on this for fear of the damage it would inflict on his vision of a liberal global order. Ever the genius at triangulation, Clinton found a way to surrender nuclear testing to the international community without giving up American nuclear domination, and a way to take testing away from the weapons labs while restoring their livelihood. By combining the test ban treaty with the Science Based Stockpile Stewardship Program, he sought to turn a test ban from an arms control initiative into a strategic firebreak between the advanced information economy of the U.S. and the industrial economies of possible nuclear challengers. Stockpile stewardship helps bring nuclear weapons deeper into the information age so that, increasingly, the essence of nuclear weapons is seen, like DNA, to consist of code. It is only in the context of this conceptualization that we can, for example, understand the extraordinary hysteria over allegations that the Chinese-American scientist Wen Ho Lee shared with China discs containing bomb simulation codes. By contrast with Bill Clinton George W. Bush seems, as far as we can tell, to be planning to develop mininukes and to withdraw from the nuclear test ban treaty. His is a unilateralist strategy to sum simulation technologies and nuclear testing rather than substitute one for the other, and to staunch nuclear proliferation by means of preemptive strikes on proliferators rather than through international regimes of surveillance and interdiction. **His vision is not of a liberal international order dominated by the United States, but of an American international imperium. It seems to be a rule that, among the many ways nuclear weapons corrupt those who develop them, they turn their owners into hypocrites.** The hypocrisy of the cold war was at least fairly transparent, as each superpower claimed that its own genocidal weapons were vital and virtuous, while the almost identical genocidal weapons of the enemy were hideous and evil. The hypocrisy of the second nuclear age is less transparent, and therefore in need of demystification. Our leaders, interpreting the world through an orientalist lens, behave as if the nuclear weapons of the advanced industrial powers are part of the natural order of things while the attempt by some developing countries to develop one ten thousands the destructive power currently wielded by the United States represents a calamitous threat to global civilization. Indeed, to listen to some of the official rhetoric around the recent war in Iraq, one would have thought that Iraq was trying to acquire uniquely evil weapons, not weapons that the U.S. and the UK already possess in abundance. This nuclear orientalist ideology, as old as colonialism and as new as the information age, is a fine place for anthropologists to enter the nuclear debate.

# Generic Links

**In the post-Cold War era, proliferation has been construed as a threat to international security simply because our discourse authoritatively states it to be a threat**

**Mutimer 2000** (David, PhD in political science and professor in York University, “The Weapons State,” p.60) GL

Following the Security Council's call to arms-or, perhaps more appropriate, its call away from arms--considerable action seems to have been taken to prevent the spread of technology related to research for and production of arms. Proliferation has become a primary security concern of the post-Cold War era. Proliferation is a threat, however, because it has been stated authoritatively to be a threat. More than that, weapons proliferation has itself been constructed as a problem of contemporary security. As with the creation of a threat by its being stated as a threat by the United Nations and other authoritative speakers, proliferation is a construction that begins with what is said and continues with what it was saying is embedded in the actions it makes possible. Because of the privileged position of the state in international relations, what is stated by the state-or by states when they gather as something like the Security Council-often has the greatest importance? The weapon state and the state of weaponry, as well as the weapons and states themselves, are made possible by being stated by the state. By invading Kuwait and triggering the spectacular response that was the Gulf War, Iraq has done the international community an unwitting service. All of the old truths about security seemed to have crumbled along with the Iron Curtain. In 1990 both practitioners and students of security needed a new set of guidelines for a new world order. Most of all, they needed a good new threat against which security could be organized. Iraq provided one, and with a little ingenuity it proved possible to generalize from Iraq to Krauthammer's weapon state. The weapon state was the product of a process that could be called proliferation, the spread of military and related technology to possible future Iraqs. To stem proliferation and prevent the creation of new weapon states, the international community needed to examine its systems for managing the movement of military technologies, as well as the conditions of the production and flow of those technologies. The experience in Iraq pointed to the state of weapons in order to prevent the weapon state. The state of weapons was found wanting, so much international action has taken place to gain a measure of control. The United States almost went to war with North Korea again because of that state's (possibly nuclear) weapons. All in all, we have gotten ourselves into quite a state over weapons.

**U.S. policymakers assume that an object threat to international security exist - non-Western countries cannot proliferate due to their subjectivity as a concealed hazard**

**Mutimer 2000** (David, PhD in political science and professor in York University, “The Weapons State,” p.12-13) GL

Krauthammer's claim also rests on the assumption that there is an unproblematic whole known as world security that can be threatened. He assumes, that is, that at some level the security of the world (whatever that may mean) is indivisible. But what of the last sentence of the quotation? Krauthammer argues that "it is slowly dawning on the West that there is a need to establish some new regime to police these weapons and those who brandish them." Within the space of a few lines, the "world security" with which Krauthammer appeared to be concerned has become a problem confronting "the West." Who are "those who brandish" these weapons after proliferation? They are not individuals or even groups of organized criminals, as his use of "police" might seem to suggest. Rather, it is "what might be called the “Weapon State" that is holding and brandishing these weapons. Weapon states are members of the international community Krauthammer cited Iraq, North Korea, and Libya but suggested that it is possible for Argentina, Pakistan, Iran, and South Africa to achieve this status. World security is perhaps less universal than first imagined. It is also worth considering the implications of Krauthammer's suggestion that the problem of proliferation, and the attendant growth of weapon states, is "slowly dawning" on the West. For this assertion to be meaningful, there must be a problem in the world somewhere (or in many places at once) that, for whatever reason, is hidden from the view of "the West." There must, in other words, be a rigid separation between the object in question-in this case, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction-and the viewing subject-in this case, the West. What is more, there must also be a clear, unproblematic subject. The West is taken as a subject that can view, on which something can "dawn." Phrased in this way, perhaps the meaning of Krauthammer's short quotation is less obvious. Although we conventionally speak of something called "the West," it is not readily apparent that it is sufficiently singular for problems to "dawn" on it. What ties much of this together, what makes the passage coherent, is suggested by Krauthammer's use of prudence, the watchword of the traditional study and practice of international security, a study founded on political realism in his classic statement of the principles of political realism. Hans Morganthau writes, "Realism, then, considers prudence ... to be the supreme virtue in politics ...” Realism has been increasingly criticized in recent years in ways that resonate with the questions I have posed regarding." Krauthammer's quotation. Realism, particularly the security study that forms a central clement of its opinion of international relations, has been accused of serving Western - particularly U.S. policy - the name of the international. What allows this political effect to go unnoticed is because to claim to objectivity-to the separation of subject and object, again, as Morganthau puts it so succinctly, "Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their root in human nature. "If international politics is governed by objective laws, then security is a neutral state of affairs rather than politically biased. This objectivity also requires that both the objects of study and the subjects who study or who view those objects are also objectively knowable. Realism takes the objects of social life and the subjects of social action to be constituted prior to their entry into that action: Charles Krauthammer's short summation of the problem of weapons proliferation is much richer in its meaning than it might first appear. His quotation is founded on a series of assumptions, which seem at least problematic once exposed to view. Michel Foucault has written that "practicing criticism is the art of making facile gestures difficult." By making difficult what seems at first blush so simple, not just in Krauthammer's formulations but in the general understanding of the agenda of proliferation control, I am joining a growing body of scholars who aim to practice criticism on questions of security. This scholarship begins by suspending what is commonly taken as given: the objects of international security (and security policy), the identities of the subjects of international actions, and even the interests these actors pursue. Each of these-the objects, identities, and interests-is assumed to be self-evident in Krauthammer's quotation, as in security studies in general. In the rest of this chapter I will question their self-evidence and suggest a way of thinking about how the formation of the objects, identities, and interests of weapons proliferation can be investigated rather than assumed.

# Generic Links

**Discourse of weapons proliferation is framed towards an image that identifies an international policy problem in which “international life” is endangered**

**Mutimer 2000** (David, PhD in political science and professor in York University, “The Weapons State,” p.23-24) GL

This chapter’s primary claim is that threats or policy problems do not dawn on states, as Krauthammer would have us believe the problem of proliferation dawned on the West. I argue, by can trust that these problems are produced through acts of interpretation and, what is more, that the states or other actors that threaten or are threatened are also produced in these same interpretive acts. To make use of these claims to examine the contemporary concern with weapons proliferation, I argue that social life framed in terms of a particular *image.* That image identifies the objects of social action and the identities of the relevant actors as objects and subjects of a particular kind. Only in terms of this image can policymakers or analysts know an international policy problem, and therefore only in terms of this image can action be taken. Therefore, the actions being taken by states and others in response to the problem of weapons proliferation are founded on an image that has constructed that problem in the first place. This means, in turn, that practices can be seen to instantiate the images that enable them and thereby become a central object of study in an analysis such as this, which seeks to reveal the images constitutive of international life. The images that frame policy problems and thereby produce those problems, the actors and practices of security, draw on discursive resources to tie the things imagined within the frame to other discursive frames-linking that which is framed to other things we understand in particular ways. Images therefore tie discourses together; by creating certain links and not others and by creating these links in particular ways, metaphors highlight, downplay, and hide other images that are operative in any given area of social life.

**Proliferation discourse represents a practical replication of the nuclear nonproliferation regime**

**Mutimer 2000** (David, PhD in political science and professor in York University, “The Weapons State,” p.6-7) GL

With the normative restraint on use seemingly under threat and the appearance of chemical arsenals outside the East-West security system, the problem came to be articulated in the language of proliferation, echoing that of nuclear proliferation. Thus, for example, in 1986 the British representative to the CD announced, "World-wide there may be more than 20 nations which now either possess chemical weapons or are looking at the option of acquiring them."13 Furthermore, the CD considered the possibility of a chemical nonproliferation treaty explicitly modeled on the NPT but rejected it because of the legitimating of "haves" and "have nots" in the NPT.14 Despite the rejection of a simple copy of the NPT for chemical weapons, the CWC as it was concluded is the result of a "proliferation" framing of the problem and represents a practical replication of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. This tentative consideration of chemical weapons as a proliferation problem marks the first step in expanding the "proliferation" image to frame weapons other than nuclear weapons and so in some ways is the beginning of the central story of this book. To see how the reframing of CW as a "proliferation" problem enabled the CWC and also what is entailed by reimagining any weapons technology in terms of "proliferation," it is necessary to examine the "proliferation" image in more detail.

**Proliferation creates a discursive construction of an international security problem**

**Mutimer 2000** (David, PhD in political science and professor in York University, “The Weapons State,” p.60) GL

To this point I have discussed the various images through which weapons technology has been framed in general terms. The central argument of this book is that these technologies have been reframed in terms of "proliferation," and that this has had particular practical and political consequences. To make this argument and to explore those consequences, it is necessary to fill in the "proliferation" frame in much more detail. This image joins together a number of discursive links to create a particular discursive construction of an international security problem. The central element of this image the one that draws the others together into a single image, is proliferation itself.

# Generic Links

**Images created through proliferation discourse entail a danger that justifies violence and prevents proliferation in the majority of states**

**Mutimer 2000** (David, PhD in political science and professor in York University, “The Weapons State,” p.74) GL

Thus in the late 1980s, the image of "proliferation," and the autonomous, technological object it constituted, began to encompass fill more than the nuclear technology that had been its object up to that point. It was at this moment that the United States led the global coalition against Iraq in the Gulf War. The subsequent interpretation of the danger Iraq posed was as the end product of an unchecked process of proliferation. Thus it became possible to think about providing security in the new world order in terms of preventing proliferation. Having extended the process of imagining military technologies other than nuclear in terms of proliferation, which had begun in the late 1910s, the leading states of the international system turned to devising practices by which to respond to this newly identified threat-taking "appropriate” action," in the term used by the Security Council. As the threat was a "proliferation" threat, the practices adopted were those of proliferation control. Those actions can be seen as developing or extending tiered practices mirroring those of the nuclear nonproliferation regime across the range of technologies of "proliferation" concern. Table 4.2 outlines the raw materials with which states set about this task at the time of the Gulf War. Till' table reproduces the tiered structure from Table 4.1 but expands it to include chemical and biological weapons, missile technology, and conventional arms. The elements in each cell show whether there was something comparable to an element of the nuclear proliferation control regime that could later be used to develop a parallel to the NPT; the parentheses indicate recognized shortcomings, which mean the element in question was only potentially comparable.

**The status qu0 views the lens of proliferation discourse as a dangerous “problem” that needs to be solved**

**Mutimer 1994** (David, PhD in political science and professor in York University, “Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation,” YCISS Occasional Paper Number 25, August 1994)

There has thus emerged a new image at the heart of international security. It is an image of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and of destabilising accumulations of conventional weapons. I have detailed how this image was constructed in the discourse of the leading actors and institutions of the international system. The importance of this new image is reflected in the academic literature on foreign and security problems. I conducted a review of the issues between 1985 and the present in five of the leading US foreign policy journals, journals which reflect and inform the policy debate within the United States. This review bears out the contention advanced here that 'proliferation' is a problem enunciated to fill the gap left by the Cold War, and catalysed by the experience in the Gulf. There were only 7 articles on the problem between 1985 and the fall of the Berlin Wall—of which five were concerned with nuclear proliferation. There were 9 articles in the year between 1989 and the Gulf War. Since the end of the Gulf War, there have been 56 articles in these journals concerned with proliferation. In addition to the new image, there is also a clear pattern to the strategy being employed in response. It is a three-tiered strategy, anchored at the global level by "formal multilateral non-proliferation arrangement[s]". At present there are four such arrangements: the NPT, the CWC, the BTWC and the UN Arms Register. This leaves only missile technology, of the identified concerns, without a global arrangement, and hence the proposal for the evolution of the MTCR. The second tier of the control strategy is a collection of supplier control regimes. The MTCR is joined by the Australia Group which controls Chemical and Biological technology, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and Zangger Committee which control nuclear technology, and the successor regime to the COCOM which is to control conventional and dual-use technology. Finally, these supplier controls are implemented nationally by export control systems.

**Generic Links**

**The alarmist language used by their authors depicts the proliferator in a colonial light as less responsible and backwards**

**Gusterson 4-** professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University (Hugh, 7/14/04, Chapter 2 Nuclear Weapons and The Other, People Of The Bomb: Portraits of America's Nuclear Complex, p.21-22) MH

There is a common perception in the West that nuclear weapons are most dangerous when they are in the hands of Third World leaders. I first became interested in this perception while interviewing nuclear weapons designers for an ethnographic study of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) - one of three laboratories where U.S. nuclear weapons are designed. I made a point of asking each scientist if he or she thought nuclear weapons would be used in my lifetime. Almost all said that they thought it unlikely that the United States or Russians would initiate the use of nuclear weapons, but most thought that nuclear weapons would probably be used- by a Third World country. The laboratory took a similar position as an institution. For example, using terminology with distinctly colonial overtone to argue for continued weapons research after the end of the cold war, an official laboratory pamphlet said: Political, diplomatic, and military experts believe that war of future will most likely be “tribal conflicts” between neighboring Third World Countries or between ethnic groups in the same country. While the Cold War may be over, these small disputes may be more dangerous than a war between the superpowers, because smaller nations with deep-seated grievances against each other may lack the restraint that has been exercised by the US and the USSR. The existence of such potential conflicts and the continued danger of nuclear holocaust underscore the need for continued weapons research. It is not only nuclear weapons scientists who believe that nuclear weapons are much safer in the hands of the established nuclear powers than in those of Third World Countries. There has long been a widespread perception among US defense intellectuals, politicians, and pundits- leaders of opinion on nuclear weapons- that, while we can live with the nuclear weapons of five official nuclear nations for the indefinite future, the proliferation of nuclear weapons to nuclear-threshold states in the Third World, especially the Islamic world, would be enormously dangerous. This orthodoxy is so much a part of our collective common sense that, like all common sense, it can usually be stated as simple fact without fear of contradiction. It is widespread in the media and in learned journals, and it is shared by liberals as well as conservatives. For example just as Kenneth Adelman, a senior official in the Reagan administration, has said that “the real danger comes from some miserable Third World country which decides to use these weapons either out of desperation or incivility,” at the same time Hans Bethe- a physicist revered by many for his work on behalf of disarmament over many decades- has said, “There have to be nuclear weapons in the hands of more responsible countries to deter such use” by Third World nations.

# Generic Links

**The language of proliferation is tied with concepts such as cancer and “excessive growth” – this type of discourse makes a connection that makes us extremely reluctant to allow other countries to proliferate with weapons**

**Mutimer 2000** (David, PhD in political science and professor in York University, “The Weapons State,” p.12-13) GL

Animals produce offspring; they are procreative, that is, they are proliferous. To say that an animal proliferates is to say that it has young. Often, particularly when used for humans rather than for other animals, proliferation carries the connotation of excessive reproduction-humans proliferate when they have noticeably more than the accepted number of children rather than just when they have children. This implication is suggested in the Oxford English Dictionary's use of prolific in the definition I quoted earlier. Thus proliferation has two important entailments as the metaphor chosen to imagine the development of nuclear weapons. First, proliferation is a natural process that requires external intervention not to proceed but rather only for prevention (e.g., various forms of birth control). Second, the result of unchecked proliferation tends to be excessive growth in the originating organism. Both of these entailments are captured nicely in a use of the term proliferation in a discussion of metaphor by literary theorist Paul de Man: "Worse still, abstractions [tropes] are capable of infinite proliferation. They are like weeds, or like cancer; once you have begun using a single one, they will crop up everywhere." De Man's reference to cancer is rather ironic. Cell biologists have also adopted the language of proliferation to talk about the way in which cells In organisms multiply, 16 In particular, the language of proliferation is central to the study of cancers. The connection between cell proliferation and cancer throws the entailments of proliferation into stark relief. By itself, cell proliferation is a harmless, natural process-indeed, it is essential to life as we know it. This proliferation is managed by a series of biological control mechanisms that regulate the growth of cells so they faithfully reproduce what is coded into their genetic material. Once these mechanisms fail and the cells reproduce without control, cancers, often deadly to the organism as a whole result. As Andrew Murray and Tim Hunt write in the study of cell proliferation, "Without knowing the checks and balances that normally ensure orderly cell division. We cannot devise effective strategies to combat the uncontrolled cell divisions of the cancers that will kill one in six of us." Proliferation, as appropriated within the study of cancer, refers to an autonomous process of growth and spread, in terminally driven but externally controlled. Danger arises when the controls fail and the natural proliferation of cells produces excessive reproduction, When the language of proliferation was used in thinking about the development of nuclear technology after the discovery of controlled missile in the U.S. Manhattan Project, a process similar to that which product's cancer was imagined as a result. IS The U.S. nuclear program was the excessive technology that would multiply and spread. Such spread, when imagined as "proliferation," is a natural process and is inevitable without activity outside intervention. Once the development of nuclear technology is imagined as "proliferation," this entailment of a natural process of spread leads to the expectation of inevitable growth in the number of nuclear powers, This, of course, is precisely what was expected. Because such a condition was considered dangerous and undesirable, attempts were made to establish external controls over the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Again, this follows from imagining the problem in terms of "proliferation." SOll1l' form of external control is necessary to prevent the prolific growth of nuclear weapons outside the United States. Attempts to place such external. International controls on nuclear proliferation resulted in the NPT of 1970, which remains the principal mechanism of proliferation control. What are the implications of this image-with its understandings of autonomous, natural growth and external control-for the policy response to the development of nuclear technology?

# 3rd World Link

**Our discourse on proliferation currently transforms anxiety-provoking ambiguities into secure dichotomies - the alternative is a world where the dichotomy between the West and the “Other” will be effectively eliminated**

**Gusterson 1999** (Hugh, professor at MIT Anthropology Department, “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in West Imagination”) GL

In the following pages I examine four popular arguments against horizontal nuclear proliferation and suggest that all four are ideological and orientalist. The arguments are that (1) Third World countries are too poor to afford nuclear weapons; (2) deterrence will be unstable in the Third World; (3) Third World re- gimes lack the technical maturity to be trusted with nuclear weapons; and (4) Third World regimes lack the political maturity to be trusted with nuclear weapons. Each of these four arguments could as easily be turned backwards and used to delegitimate Western nuclear weapons, as I show in the following commen- tary. Sometimes, in the specialized literature of defense experts, one finds frank discussion of near accidents, weaknesses, and anomalies in deterrence as it has been practiced by the established nuclear powers, but these admissions tend to be quarantined in specialized discursive spaces where the general public has little access to them and where it is hard to connect them to the broader public dis- course on nuclear proliferation.7 In this article I retrieve some of these discus- sions of flaws in deterrence from their quarantined spaces and juxtapose them with the dominant discourse on the dangers of proliferation in order to desta- bilize its foundational assumption of a secure binary distinction between "the West" and "the Third World." It is my argument that, in the production of this binary distinction, possible fears and ambivalences about Western nuclear weapons are purged and recast as intolerable aspects of the Other. This purging and recasting occurs in a discourse characterized by gaps and silences in its representation of our own nuclear weapons and exaggerations in its representation of the Other's. Our discourse on proliferation is a piece of ideological machin- ery that transforms anxiety-provoking ambiguities into secure dichotomies. I should clarify two points here. First, I am not arguing that there are, fi- nally, no differences between countries in terms of their reliability as custodians of nuclear weapons. I am arguing that those differences are complex, ambiguous, and crosscutting in ways that are not captured by a simple binary division between, on the one hand, a few countries that have nuclear weapons and insist they are safe and, on the other hand, those countries that do not have nuclear weapons and are told they cannot safely acquire them. It is my goal here to demonstrate the ways in which this simple binary distinction works as an ideological mecha- nism to impede a more nuanced and realistic assessment of the polymorphous dangers posed by nuclear weapons in all countries and to obscure recognition of the ways in which our own policies in the West have often exacerbated dangers in the Third World that, far from being simply the problems of the Other, are problems produced by a world system dominated by First World institutions and states.

# “Rogue/Outlaw States” Link

**The use of the term “rogue” or “outlaw” state creates dichotomies dividing the “mature” West from the “indiscreet” East**

**Mutimer**, David. **2k** “The Weapons State” Mutimer has a PhD in political science from York University and is now an associate professor of political science there. p. 93-95

Both rogues and outlaws are used in everyday language to identify criminals, although generally not the worst and most hardened criminals. Indeed, a certain romanticism is attached to both the rogue and the outlaw. The rogue is one who steps outside the limits of acceptable behavior but in a way that tends to be appealing to those who do not dare to commit such transgressions—thus, for example, the definition of rogue as rascal. Similarly, the outlaw is a common figure in U.S. romantic Western literature. Outlaws roamed the frontiers of the central United States, at once dangerous and admired for the rugged individualism they portrayed. Little of this romanticism seems to remain in the use of rogues in official discourse, however, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher did not seem to admire the rugged individualism of potential rogues, for instance, when he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that : nuclear weapons give rogue states disproportionate power, destabilize entire regions, and t threaten human and environmental disasters. They can turn local conflicts into serious threats to our security. In this era, weapons of mass destruction are more readily available—and there are fewer inhibitions on their use.” Nevertheless, the use of rogue carries with it marked condescension. Rogues are, a soften as not, young men, indeed even little boys, who are acting naughtily—in the former case often in a sexual manner. One of the many ironies that emerges in stories of proliferation is that at the same time the primary international rogue, Iraq, was under intense U.S. pressure because of its refusal to allow UNSCOM unfettered access to its presidential palaces, the U.S. president was being labeled a rogue for reports that he had perhaps allowed too much access to presidential parts. “Some of the President’s intimates note his remarkable ability to compartmentalize his life: The policy wonk who genuinely admires his wife resides in one space; the rogue who risks political standing through personal indiscretion occupies another.” Put another way, the mature adult resides on the one side and the rather indiscreet little boy on the other. The use of rogue to label states behaving in ways deemed unacceptable identifies those states as immature compared with the mature states boing the labeling—foremost among these the United States. Such and entailment fits well with the practices established for proliferation control. The mature elders gather together to determine which states are sufficiently responsible to be trusted with advanced technologies and military equipment—indeed, the practice smacks of Star Trek’s Prime Directive. This notion of maturity is then reflected in academic commentary on contemporary security as Charles Krauthammer’’s characterization of the weapon state illustrates: “relatively small, peripheral and backward staes will be able to emerge rapidly as threats not only to regional, but to world, security.” Similarly, a repeated concern in the literature has been that new nuclear states would lack the maturity to control their weapons adequately, unlike the old nuclear states. Perhaps the most interesting definition of rogue and outlaw is the one they share: both terms are used to describe members of a community expelled from that community or no longer living within the constraints of communal life. In medieval Europe the outlaw was outcast, placed beyond the protection the law provided as punishment. Later, the outlaw in the mythology of the American West fled from life within the community to escape the (often rough) justice of the frontier. Similarly, the rogue animal is one that has been forced from the herd or that for some reason has left the herd. Evoking these terms in the proliferation discourse clearly marks the logic of identity and difference, of inside and outside, which were evident in the practices examined earlier. For there to be rogues and outlaws there must also be a larger, settled community whose rules the outlaws refuse to follow.

**The characterization of Rogue states creates proliferation discourse dichotomies**

**Mutimer**, David. **2k** “The Weapons State” Mutimer has a PhD in political science from York University and is now an associate professor of political science there. p. 96-97

In a sense, then, Iraq did emerge suddenly as a rogue in August 1990. Suddenly there was a new way of categorizing certain states’ actions, so Iraqi behavior suddenly became that of the rogue. To show how great a threat was rogue behavior, The United States mounted a massive response to the Iraqi invasion. Given the size of that response, the threat must have been supreme; thus by mounting such a large response the United States warranted the practices that followed—signaling the severity of the issue through the UN Security Council Summit in 1992. The “proliferation” image that was developed, and the practices that have instantiated the image, fill in the context in which rogues become the threat. Rogues and outlaws serve as markers of difference; they label the outsider against whom the insider is known. The insider is the state that follows the rules, that runs with the herd and is law-abiding. If we combine this labeling with the construction of identities in the practices of control and the identification of the security problems proliferation causes, we get a clear picture of the set of identities constituted by the “proliferation” discourse. The central practices of supplier groups and their attendant export controls construct a core set of inside states, those sufficiently responsible and mature to take it upon themselves to judge the behavior of other states and sanction them for troubling activities. That set overlaps notably with the club of advanced industrial states of the North. There is also a clear move from within this privileged group to draw in the old East and to reconstruct (or rebuild, as efforts at transition are often called) those countries as part of that inside. Outside this privileged core states are gathered into regions, each of which is expected to remain stable through the balancing of power. Proliferation, that autonomous process the image constructs, can upset these balances—nuclear weapons give certain states disproportionate power and thus destabilize entire regions; even conventional arms can be acquired in sufficient quantities to be excessive and destabilizing. If states act in such a way that they upset or threaten to upset these balances, they are rogues, outlaws, immature or backward states unwilling to conform to the rules of civilized behavior.

# “Stability” Link

**The need for stability is rooted in oriental notions of Western normality and superiority**

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 At its 1992 Summit, the UN Security Council determined that the proliferation of weapons was a threat to international peace and security. There are two indications in the council’s communiqué of what makes proliferation a thread: first, that the accumulation of (conventional) arms should not be excessive and, second, that the spread of arms should not disrupt regional or global stability. By characterizing the threatening effects of proliferation as those that disrupt stability, the proliferation image constitutes the space for the sort of state behavior that will cause serious concern for the guardians of international probity. It begins, in other words, to produce important subject positions within the “proliferation” image. The work of Michel Foucault increasingly defines the way in which we think about the constitution of the subject in modern society. Throughout his work, Foucault examines ways in which discourses of normality establish the confines in which the subject may operate. Normal behavior is defined largely through identification of the forms of abnormality that constitute its limits, which, in turn, are rigidly policed. The proliferation discourse defines normality in terms of regional and global stability, and hence abnormality (or behavior that causes serious concern) in terms of threats to or disruptions of that stability. It is a constitution of the normal international subject policed by the UN Security Council and by the advanced industrial states through their export control regimes. One notable feature of Foucault’s accounts of the constitution of the modern subject is the complicity of various academic disciplines in defining the contours of the normal. The idea of stability as the normal condition in international life also reveals academic complicity, having been produced and reproduced by the discipline of international relations. As I argue in Chapter 3, a particular characterization of balance has been defined in the practice of international relations scholarship largely with reference to the relationship among the Soviet Union, the United States, and the world order during the Cold War. This understanding of balance, particularly of balance of power, in turn, gave rise to stability as the normal condition of international life. Balances need to be maintained; instabilities upset these balances and produce disorder. By extension, those states that act to upset stable balances can be labeled in some way deviant.

# “Tactical” Link

**Use of the term “tactical” gives authority to those who justify the weapon as “safe for civilians”.**

**Chossudovsky 8** (Michel, 2/18/08 “The US-NATO Preemptive Nuclear Doctrine:Trigger a Middle East Nuclear Holocaust to Defend “The Western Way of Life”, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=8048) MH

Neither NATO nor the Pentagon use the term nuclear holocaust. Moreover, they presume that the "collateral damage" of a nuclear war will in any event be confined geographically to the Middle East and that Westerners will be spared... But since their in-house scientists have confirmed that tactical nuclear weapons are "safe for civilians", the labels on the bombs have been switched much in the same way as the label on a packet of cigarettes: "This nuclear bomb is safe for civilians" Nukes: Just Another Tool in the Military Toolbox The new definition of a nuclear warhead has blurred the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons: 'It's a package (of nuclear and conventional weapons). The implication of this obviously is that nuclear weapons are being brought down from a special category of being a last resort, or sort of the ultimate weapon, to being just another tool in the toolbox," (Japan Economic News Wire, , 30 December 2005) This re-categorization has been carried out. The " green light" for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in conventional war theater has been granted by the US Congress. " Let's use them, they are part of the military toolbox." We are at a dangerous crossroads: military planners believe their own propaganda. The military manuals state that this new generation of nuclear weapons are "safe" for use in the battlefield. They are no longer a weapon of last resort. There are no impediments or political obstacles to their use. In this context, Senator Edward Kennedy has accused the Bush Administration for having developed "a generation of more useable nuclear weapons."

# Korea Link

**Allegations of Korean “instability” take a racist undertone**

**Seng ‘2,** Prof of Security Studies @ IDSS Singapore, (Tan See , July, “What Fear Hath Wrought: Missile Hysteria and The Writing of America, http://www.sipri.org/contents/library/0210.pdf) MH

Otherness, in Wolfowitz’s rendition, is also discursively constituted along a moral/immoral – or, alternatively, responsible/irresponsible – axis. Equally interesting is the notion that authoritarian or rogue-state leaders, besides lacking in rationality and viewing problem solving as a form of weakness, are “ruthless and avaricious” – an intentional, not accidental, choice of predicates. That (and here we are left to infer) “North Korea” or “Iraq” is ruled by such roguish elements can only mean that such states can, indeed they should, therefore be properly referred to as rogue states. Against these inscriptions of immorality or amorality stand, in diametric contrast, moral “America.” And here the unequal adoption by Wolfowitz’s discourse, in the case of “democracies,” of the analytical level of state/regime connotes that all America, and not only its leaders or certain individuals, is thereby kind, compassionate, altruistic – the polar opposite of all that rogue states, and possibly even China and Russia, represent. To be sure, nowhere in his words does Wolfowitz imply that there are as such no immoral or irresponsible Americans. Nor does he even hint that all citizens of rogue states are therefore roguish; political correctness, after all, is the norm in these enlightened times. But the discursive effect is such that we are left with the impression that leaders of rogue nations – Saddam Hussein, Kim Chong-il, and their ilk – epitomize the darkest of the dark metaphysics of human nature. And roguish as such are their foreign policies. In his evaluation of the missile threat from North Korea, the deputy CIA director asserted: Like everyone else, we knew the [Pyongyang] regime was brutal within its borders and a menace beyond. Its commando raids into South Korea and its assassination attempts against successive South Korean presidents – including the 1983 bombings in Rangoon that killed 21 people – were clear windows into the minds and morals of North Korean leaders.62 Again, it bears reminding that the argument here does not refuse the historical “reality” and tragic consequences either of Pyongyang’s oppressive policies at home or its ruinous forays abroad. In terms of exclusionary practices, however, interpretive conclusions concerning the brutality of the Pyongyang regime cannot be separated from the morality axis on which this particular statement turns. What, for instance, is the effect created by the use of the opening phrase, “Like everyone else”? To who exactly does “everyone” refer? That this analysis is intelligible at all depends upon the presupposition that this particular reading – an American reading, to be precise – is universally accepted by one and all. But this is clearly not the case as implied by the vociferous and potentially violent tide of militant Muslims in Pakistan and parts of the Middle East, who hold Washington in contempt for the latter’s alleged “brutality” and “menace” toward, say, the Iraqis, (by proxy) the Palestinians, or (most recently) the Afghans. As such, the discursive effect of the preceding constructions is the naturalization of the Pyongyang regime as immoral, irresponsible, or just plain evil given the damning evidence of dastardly deeds that proffer “clear windows into the minds and morals of North Korean leaders.” Further, that the enumerated acts above were those perpetrated by Kim Il-song and not by his son, Kim Chong-il, seems not to matter in this analysis, although it is the latter Kim’s government with whom the Bush Administration must deal. This is not to imply that this intelligence estimate on Kim was essentially all caricature and thereby shorn of “truth.” The CIA official continues in his assessment: It is easy to caricature Kim Chong-il – either as a simple tyrant blind to his dilemma or as a technocratic champion of sweeping change. But the extreme views of him tend to be the product of bias, ignorance, or wishful thinking. The reality is more complex… Like his father, he has been shrewd enough to make bad behavior the keystone of his foreign policy. He knows that proliferation is something we want to stop. Thus, Kim Chong-il has tried to drum up outside assistance by trading off international concerns about his missile programs and sales. He has – more subtly, of course – done much the same thing with foreign fears of renewed famine and the chaos that could accompany any unravelling of his regime.63 The evident attempt at nuance in the above analysis, however, does not preclude the continued deployment of representational practices along the axis of responsibility. “Like his father,” we are told, the “shrewd” Kim makes “bad behavior the keystone of his foreign policy” – an indication of chronic irresponsibility in North Korea’s international relations. We may note here the likely intrusive influence of another discourse, particularly that on nineteenth-century European diplomacy as it figures in American intellectual and popular culture. As historian Barbara Tuchman once noted, for most Americans the notion of diplomacy carries with it “all the wicked devices of the Old World, spheres of influence, balances of power, secret treatises, triple alliances”64 and other such forms of Machiavellian intrigue for which America, idealized as the New World – a seemingly virginal, innocent, and righteous identity – had no place. Indeed, just such a pristine identity is often adduced as the universal ideal to which all nations and peoples are presumed to aspire – a point made forcefully in the earlier cited “end of history” thesis popular in mainstream political debate at the close of the Cold War.65 In other words, what is good for America is obviously good for the whole world (or, at least those parts that are “rational,” “responsible,” “moral”). “Missile defense,” one congressman averred, “is for Americans, for Europeans, for Russians, and for all peace-loving peoples on the face of the Earth.”66 Without ignoring or denying North Korean complicity in the light of its sizeable transfers of missile technology to the Middle East, what those exclusionary practices produce is the materializing effect of a Pyongyang regime that, if anything, can be expected to harm the US at the slightest provocation – a representation of danger that finds easy resonance with American policymakers because of its familiarity rather than any likelihood of such an eventuation. Further, what is effaced or erased by the above statement are plausible illustrations of bad behaviour in American foreign policy: a policy orientation that, even by most orthodox accounts, has been realist – in both its prudential as well as Machiavellian aspects – throughout much of the Cold War period.67 Indeed, this effacement stands out starkly in the light of resistant discourses – mostly but not exclusively from European sources – which portray America as a rogue state68 given the apparent lack of “strategic restraint” in its post-Cold War foreign policy.69 Hence the tenuousness of such constructions of identity through excluding contradictions and tensions that are as much a part of Self as it is of the Other.

# Korea Link

**The 1AC views Korea as a country to be dominated**

**Shim ‘8,** Phd Candidate @ GIGA Institute of Asian Studies, (David, Paper prepared for presentation at the 2008 ISA, Production, Hegemonization and Contestation of Discursive Hegemony: The Case of the Six-Party Talks in Northeast Asia, www.allacademic.com/meta/p253290\_index.html) MH

Laclau and Mouffe’s (2001: chapter 2) concept of hegemony, which is used here, rely on a notion developed by Antonio Gramsci (1971). Gramsci broadened the traditional notion of hegemony beyond the view of mapping hegemony in terms of leadership and dominance, which are based on material capabilities, by introducing inter-subjective and ideological aspects into this concept. Accordingly, hegemony contains the ability of a class (bourgeois) to project the world view over another (workers, peasantry) in terms of the former, so that it is accepted as common sense or reality. His merit was to conceptualize hegemony in terms of power without the use of force to reach consent by the dominated class through education and, what he calls, the role of intellectuals (“men of letters”) such as philosophers, journalists and artists (Gramsci 1971: 5-43). The process of fixing meaning, that is, in terms of Laclau and Mouffe (2001: 105), when an element (sign with unfixed meaning) is transformed through articulation into a moment (sign with fixed meaning), is hegemonic, since it reduces the range of possibilities and excludes alternative meanings by determining the ways in which the signs are related to each other. That is to say, when meaning is fixed, i.e. hegemonized, it determines, what can be thought, said or done in a meaningful way. 13 Applied to this case, the exclusive character of a hegemonic discourse makes it unintelligible to make sense of North Korea’s nuclear program in terms of, for instance, energy needs, because – as it is argued – practices of problematization hegemonized the ways of thinking, acting and speaking about North Korea. Discursive hegemony can be regarded as the result of certain practices, in which a particular understanding or interpretation appears to be the natural order of things (Laclau/Mouffe 2001). This naturalization consolidates a specific idea, which is taken for granted by involved actors and makes sense of the(ir) world. As Hall (1998: 1055-7) argues, common sense resembles a hegemonic discourse, which is a dominant interpretation and representation of reality and therefore accepted to be the valid truth and knowledge. Referring to the productive character of discursive hegemony, the Six-Party Talks can be regarded as an outcome of the dominating interpretation of reality (cf. also Jackson 2005: 20; Cox 1983; Hajer 2005). The hegemonic discourse regarding North Korea provides the framework for a specific interpretation in which the words, actions or policies of it are attached with meaning, that is, are problematized. As Jacob Torfing argues “a discursive truth regime […] specifies the criteria for judging something to be true of false”, and further states, that within such a discursive framework the criteria for acknowledging something as true, right or good are negotiated and defined (Torfing 2005a: 14; 19; cf. also Mills 2004: 14-20). However, important to note is, if one is able to define this yardstick, not only one is able to define what is right, good or true, but also what kinds of action are possible. In other words, if you can mark someone or something with a specific label, then certain kinds of acts become feasible.14 Basically, it can be stated that discursive hegemony depends on the interpretation and representation by actors of real events since the interpretation of non-existent facts would not make sense. But the existence of real events does not necessarily have to be a prerequisite for hegemonizing interpretational and representational practices because actions do not need to be carried out, thus, to become a material fact, in order to be interpreted and represented in a certain way (Campbell 1998: 3). Suh Jae-Jung (2004: 155) gives an example of this practice. In 1999 US intelligence agencies indicated to preparing measures taken by North Korea to test fire a missile. Although the action was not yet executed, it was treated as a fact, which involved and enabled certain implications and material consequences such as the public criticism of North Korea, the issuance of statements, diplomatic activity and efforts to hegemonize and secure this certain kind of reality, i.e. to build a broad majority to confirm this view on North Korea. In other words, the practices of problematizing North Korea took place even before an action was done.

# North Korea Link

**The portrayal of North Korea as a proliferation threat is inherently oriental—it caused North Korean proliferation in the first place**

David **Shim**, Phd Candidate @ GIGA Institute of Asian Studies, 20**08** [Paper prepared for presentation at the 2008 ISA, Production, Hegemonization and Contestation of Discursive Hegemony: The Case of the Six-Party Talks in Northeast Asia, www.allacademic.com/meta/p253290\_index.html]

However, the current interpretational and representational practices to make sense of North Korea’s actions or statements are not necessarily or naturally the only way to make its behavior intelligible. There can also be alternative interpretations (cf. e.g. Cumings 1999, 2004; Sigal 1998; Bleiker 2003, 2005; Smith 2000; Kang 2003; Suh 2006, 2007). For instance, the rationale behind North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons could be seen as a defensive measure or as a deterrent, particularly if one considers the ‘axis of evil’ rhetoric or the (nuclear) pre-emption policy4 of the United States and its military alliances with South Korea and Japan. Further, one could make sense of its nuclear program in terms of economic or energy needs or it could be interpreted as a bargaining chip.5 Its missile program or the test-firing of such a device could also be seen as the legal right of a sovereign state (cf. Smith 2000: 598; Suh 2007: 157). So, when other interpretations and representations of North Korea’s behavior are possible how does it come, that only the missiles or nuclear ownership of the DPRK seem to be a problem within regional security politics, although, for instance, the nuclear arsenals of China, Russia and the United States by far exceed that of North Korea or despite the knowledge that they – plus South Korea and Japan – belong to the world’s biggest producers, sellers and buyers of all kinds of weapons? By relying on post-structural discourse theory, this paper engages in the examination of the discursive practices of producing, hegemonizing and contesting a certain kind of meaning. The task is to show the mechanisms of how North Korea is signified as a problem, how this kind of meaning becomes fixed and how challenging discursive hegemony becomes possible.

**Characterizing North Korea as a proliferate threat is a prime example of the oriental discourse of the non-proliferation regime**

David **Shim**, Phd Candidate @ GIGA Institute of Asian Studies, 20**08** [Paper prepared for presentation at the 2008 ISA, Production, Hegemonization and Contestation of Discursive Hegemony: The Case of the Six-Party Talks in Northeast Asia, www.allacademic.com/meta/p253290\_index.html]

Starting point of the paper was the consideration that hegemonic practices of problematizing North Korea led to the ascription of a specific meaning, which attained the status of the reality or truth in Northeast Asian security politics. The productive character of the meaning ascribing practices was linked with the formation of the Six-Party Talks. However, at the same time, as it was stated, this framework is also the site to contest those hegemonic practices. Instead of summarizing results and give definite answers to afore raised questions, this preliminary conclusion illustrates the problems and further necessary steps regarding the research process. For it should be noted that this contribution can only be the first step in the analysis of the production, hegemonization and contestation of discursive hegemony. The preliminary examination of the documents of the Six-Party Talks points to the need to broaden the data base. That is to say, the text corpus has to be expanded in order to gain more comprehensive and meaningful results. The preceding processes and practices which led to the production of those texts have to be considered to account adequately for the assumption of discourse theory, in which meaning arises out of relations of difference. In other words, the intertextual linkages in the meaning constituting process has to be included in the analysis, since “[t]he meaning of a text is […] never fully given by the text itself but is always a product of other readings and interpretations” (Hansen 2006: 55).26 Also, the question how to integrate non-linguistic practices as elements in the production and contestation of discursive hegemony should be carried out in more detail in the analysis. To draw an analogy between Jacob Torfing’s remarks (2005a: 3) concerning the current state of post-structural discourse theory in political and social sciences and this paper, this study is also open and (yet) unfinished.

**Iraq Link**

**The affirmative exposes Iraq as a potential nuclear threat – our discourse towards the state instills images that construes Iraq a problem that needs to be controlled and fixed.**

**Mutimer 2000** (David, PhD in political science and professor in York University, “The Weapons State,” p.6-7) GL

By invading Kuwait and triggering the spectacular response that was the Gulf War, Iraq has done the international community an unwitting service. All of the old truths about security seemed to have crumbled along with the Iron Curtain. In 1990 both practitioners and students of security needed a new set of guidelines for a new world order. Most of all, they needed a good new threat against which security could be organized. Iraq provided one, and with a little ingenuity it proved possible to generalize from Iraq to Krauthammer's weapon state. The weapon state was the product of a process that could be called proliferation, the spread of military and related technology to possible future Iraqs. To stem proliferation and prevent the creation of new weapon states, the international community needed to examine its systems for managing the movement of military technologies, as well as the conditions of the production and flow of those technologies. The experience in Iraq pointed to the state of weapons in order to prevent the weapon state. The state of weapons was found wanting, so much international action has taken place to gain a measure of control. The United States almost went to war with North Korea again because of that state's (possibly nuclear) weapons. All in all, we have gotten ourselves into quite a state over weapons. Throughout 1998 the prospect of another war with Iraq over its weapons programs loomed before finally being realized at the end of the year. Seven years of international action the prototype weapon state was still proliferating. It is perhaps necessary to look again at all of that action to see just how "appropriate" it has been. The actions taken to control proliferation have certainly been effective, not because they have achieved the goals states have identified for them-or another war with Iraq would not have been necessary in 1998-but because they produce very real *effects.* To see whether the actions are appropriate, it’s necessary to ask questions about the effects of these actions. In this book I investigate the effects of the actions reviewed in this chapter to judge, ultimately, how appropriate they have been. I begin from the premise that social practices effect of a world of a particular kind rather than reflect a world that is there for them to find. In the chapters that follow I demonstrate the world that is created by the practices of proliferation control, the kinds of objects that populate that world, the identities of the actors who inhabit it, and the interests those actors pursue. I show it to be a contingent and created world, effected in practices that-ultimately and ironically-prove ineffective within the world they create. In Chapter 2 I defend this initial premise and set out the terms in which the substantive examination of the practices of proliferation control will proceed. Central to this examination is the argument that the social world is produced through intersubjective interpretations that *frame* parts of social life in terms of a particular *image.* It is through the construction of this image that an area of social life, and therefore of social action, is created and is populated with objects and with actors. "Proliferation" is one such image that frames problems of weapons, military technology, and security in a particular fashion.

**Iraq is used as a metaphor for the proliferation image of “rogue states”, entrenching oriental discourse**

**Mutimer**, David. **2k** “The Weapons State” Mutimer has a PhD in political science from York University and is now an associate professor of political science there. p. 93 LH

The U.S. military appears to have been central in the construction of a new category of threat, the rogue state governed by an outlaw regime. The timing of that construction was unfortunate for Iraq. As has been widely reported, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie met the Iraqi leadership a few days before the invasion of Kuwait. The message of that meeting seems to have been that the United States was not overly concerned with Iraq’s border dispute with Kuwait. Even if the meeting could not be read as a tacit approval of the invasion (and it is not impossible to reat it that way), it did not indicate the sort of response the United States mounted after 2 August. The problem is that the Rogue Doctrine was a construction of the military and had not yet been formally announced. It is reasonable to assume that a diplomat in a relatively minor posting would not be aware of the reworking of the U.S. military doctrine the president was to announce. There is, of course, a much more cynical interpretation of these events, which would argue that the United States sought a convenient illustration of its newfound enemy. Either way, in July 1990 there were no rogue states because the category had not been articulated. In July 1990, as Glaspie met Hussein, Iraq was a regional power that had been employed by both superpowers during the cold War and that had a not unreasonable grievance with one of its neighbors. On 2 August President Bush announced a new category, a new set of markers by which the identity of states could be interpreted. On 2 August Iraq acted in a fashion that fir this contemporaneously articulated set of markers. Other Iraqs, rogues, and outlaws are now the currency of the international discourse of proliferation that grew out of the Western response to the Gulf War. These are the labels, drawn from the debate in the United States, applied to states whose behavior causes serious concern to the Western powers in their supplier groups. What sort of labels are they? What lines of difference do these labels establish? To answer these questions, we can look at rogues and outlaws as metaphors that link the proliferation image to other, more widespread discourses and discover the entailments they draw from these discourses. Rogues and outlaws are used similarly in everyday language. A rogue is defined by the Oxford English Dictiornary as: “1. One belonging to a class of idle vagrants or vagabonds. … 2. A dishonest, unprincipled person; a rascal. . . . 5. An elephant driven away, or living apart from, the herd and of a savage or destructive disposition.” Similarly, an outlaw is “one put outside the law and deprived of its benefits and protection. . . . More vaguely: One banished or proscribed; and exile, a fugitive.”

# Iraq Link

**The discourse of Iraqi stability is rooted in the oriental proliferation discourse of western dominance**

**Mutimer**, David. **2k** “The Weapons State” Mutimer has a PhD in political science from York University and is now an associate professor of political science there. p. 95-96

Iraq is presently singled out as the preeminent villain of the proliferation discourse, identified as the paradigmatic rogue state. According to the conventional account, this rogue state sought the disproportionate power weapons of mass destruction provide to rogues. Iraq had built an excessive and destabilizing arsenal of conventional weapons throughout the 1980’s and was bent on using its conventional and unconventional arsenal to establish itself as the preeminent power in its region. On 2 August 1990, this rogue showed its true colors by invading its southern neighbor. This attempt to augment further its power, by capturing both Kuwait’s oil reserves and its access to the Gulf, was designed to upset the balance of power in the region in Iraq’s favor. The Response of the coalition forces marked the strength of the international community’s commitment to respond to states that placed themselves outside that community in such a fashion—by acting as rogues. Iraq, however, did not “suddenly emerge” as a heavily armed state; nor were its designs on regional hegemony any great secret. In 1980 it had invaded Iran and fought a long war that, in part, resulted in the arsenal it had accumulated by 1990. In this instance, those states that have subsequently gathered themselves into supplier groups to sit in judgment of others, ever alert for behavior that causes them concern, without question acted as suppliers. These same states supplied Iraq with the military technology—and even nuclear technology—it needed to build the arsenal that caused such concern. The invasion of Iran did not seem to mark Iraq for particular condemnation in 1980, and it seems the U.S. ambassador suggested to the Iraqi leadership that neither would an invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The categories through which states action was interpreted, however, had changed by 2 August 1990. In the same 1980s the Iraqi actions were interpreted within a Cold War frame that read regional conflicts as subordinate to the central confrontation and identified regional powers as clients of one or both the other superpower (or, for the skillful few like Iraq, of both). On 2 August 1990 U.S. President Bush announced a new interpretive frame, one that defined what Iraq was in the process of doing as the action of a rogue—the new enemy of the post-Cold War world.

# Japan Link

**Japanese politics have been riddled with discourse that view Japanese arms build-ups as highly “problematic”**

**Mutimer 1994** (David, PhD in political science and professor in York University, “Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation,” YCISS Occasional Paper Number 25, August 1994)

This definition of the proliferation problem—encompassing the full range of military technologies, and concerned with preventing the 'destabilising' effects of conventional arms procurement—was echoed in the resolution the Japanese and British introduced at the fall session of the UNGA. By Resolution 46/36L of 9 December 1991 the UNGA created "a universal and non-discriminatory Register of Conventional Arms,” to include data on international arms transfers as well as information provided by Member States on military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies...."17 The first preambular paragraph of that Resolution reads in part: "*Realizing* that excessive and destabilizing arms build-ups pose a threat to national, regional and international security ...."18 This text reaffirms the image put forward by the P-5 of 'excessive' and 'destabilising' arms build-ups as problematic. It also links this image directly to 'international security'. Finally, despite the fact that Resolution 46/36L is designed to address the problem of conventional arms, the relationship to weapons of mass destruction is not forgotten. In the final preambular paragraph, the Resolution reads: "*Recognizing also* the importance of the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction."

# Military Technology

**The idea that we must control the spread of military technologies is rooted in the representations of the “proliferation” image**

**Mutimer**, David. **2k** “The Weapons State” Mutimer has a PhD in political science from York University and is now an associate professor of political science there. p. 130-132 MH

Kenneth Waltz argues that it is both simple and important to recognize that a state acts in its national interest if it examines its security requirements and tries to meet them. Having listened to Weldes, we might now be prepared to agree with Waltz's formulation, although its meaning would be changed beyond recognition. Both the state which acts and the security requirements to which it responds do not exist prior to their discursive formulation-to that very act of examination to which Waltz refers. The examination of security requirements takes place in the form of a series of the sort of representations Weldes discusses, populating a world with objects and actors. Thus the act of examination constitutes the state that acts and the security requirements that are the subject of examination. Also entailed in that constitutive representation are the interests the state seeks to pursue. Read in this fashion, we can agree with Waltz about importance, although we might quibble with his assertion of simplicity. The "proliferation" image has emerged from just such a process of state examination of its security requirements. In particular, the United States and its allies have established proliferation as a threat to their security and have tried to meet that threat through the practices I discuss throughout this book. In Waltz's terms these states are acting in their interests, but the particular interests they are pursuing are a product of the identities produced by the image on which they are acting. States gain identities as suppliers, recipients, rogues, and weapon states only in the context of the practices of proliferation control. It is in this capacity that they can then exercise interests, as only within this image do those interests have meaning. What, then, are the interests attached to these identities in the "proliferation" image? Perhaps the most important but, ultimately, the most problematic interest constituted by the "proliferation" image is the interest in preventing the spread of military technology. The way in which the image frames the movement of technology-us inevitably producing military capability which, in turn, affects the regional and global balances of power-naturalizes a universal interest in preventing that movement in the first place. The preambles to the major treaties that form the global level of the proliferation control regime reflect the claims to universality of the interests represented by the "proliferation" image (Table 7.2). In each case the preamble makes at least one reference to the threat its object poses to the universal, in some form. The NPT, CWC, and BTWC refer to the interest of "all mankind" in achieving the target of the agreement. The CTBT and the UN Resolution establishing the Register of Conventional Arms claim to be contribute to "international peace and security." Even the Ottawa Convention prohibiting the production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines notes the "desirability of attracting the adherence of all states."41 The universality of the interest in preventing proliferation is an important warrant for practices of supplier control. The Wassenaar Arrangement, for example, "has been established in order to contribute to regional and international security and stability."42 Even NATO, in turning its attention to proliferation, bases its claim to a right of action on the threat posed to international security, not just to the security of the alliance itself.43 The presumption that suppliers act as arbiters of the consequences of the flow of military and related technology is therefore predicated on this universal interest in preventing proliferation. Only because it constructs this interest as universal, for example, can the Australia Group, made up of only 30 states, decide unilaterally to continue its activities even after the entry into force of the CWC. Such a universal construction of interest in preventing the spread of military technology is not necessarily found in the other frames through which this technology has been imagined. The "arms control" frame, for example, which was so important during the Cold War, acknowledges a universal interest in preventing nuclear war but does not translate that interest into a restriction on the spread of nuclear technology. The SALT agreements involved placing qualitative and quantitative limits on the superpowers' arsenals to maintain international stability. In some cases these limits were substantially above the levels of the extant deployed arsenals of the two sides. The interest in maintaining stability required not that nuclear technology be prevented from being turned into nuclear weaponry but rather that the levels of weaponry be maintained in some form of numerical and qualitative equivalence. In some circumstances seen through an "arms control" frame, the universal interest in avoiding nuclear war translated into an interest in the (vertical) proliferation of nuclear weapons. I do not intend to evaluate here these rival claims to the route to a secure and peaceful world, but they have given rise to extensive debate in U.S. scholarly and policy circles between so-called nuclear optimists and nuclear pessimists.44 Nuclear optimists point to the role of nuclear balance in maintaining a stable peace during the Cold War and counsel more of the same for the post-Cold War world. In its most extreme versions, the optimistic argument calls for deliberate provision of nuclear weapons to a number of new nuclear states.45 The very fact of this debate, which involves some of the leading names in U.S. strategic analysis and is carried out in the principal policy-relevant journals, reveals the ways in which interests are contingent upon the framing of a security problem. The universal interest in preventing the spread of military and related technology is not universal in the sense that it transcends all limitations of space and history; it is very much a contingent interest resulting from the framing of issues relating peace, war, and military technology in terms of the image of "proliferation.”

# Hegemony Link

**Conceptions of hegemony are just used to restrict the proliferation of other states**

Hugh **Gusterson**, @ MIT Antrhopology Department, 20**02** Gusterson has a PhD in anthropology from Stanford University. He used to be a professor at MIT and is now a professor at George Mason University. [The Second Nuclear Age, <http://insct.syr.edu/Research%20and%20Events/Gusterson%20-%20the%20Second%20Nuclear%20Age.doc>]

To return to the discussion at the beginning of the paper, a key difference between the first and second nuclear ages, as Paul Bracken observes, concerns the larger number of players in the second nuclear age, the disappearance of the binary superpower conflict, and the emergence of proliferation, both to smaller states and to subnational actors, as a central issue in the system. The American national security state has been quick to recognize the aporia between the first and second nuclear ages and to remake its policies to take account of new threats and possibilities. Under the Clinton Administration we saw a (neo)liberal stategy to exercise nuclear hegemony in the international system; under George W. Bush we are seeing an imperial strategy. We should not lose sight of the fact that both were strategies for hegemony. Clinton’s overarching goal was to create a liberal international order that would facilitate the flow of goods and services in a globalized economy while controlling the underside of globalization in the form of a global black market for nuclear materials. He also sought to isolate “rogue states” from international civil society. Under Clinton the weapons labs were quick to absorb their former rivals in Russia into a cooperative clientilistic relationship and to develop global surveillance programs to interdict the flow of nuclear technology to states conceived through an orientalist lens as insufficiently mature to wield nuclear weapons. While the right wing in the weapons labs wanted to break out of the test ban regime with a new generation of mini-nukes optimized for a new global struggle against rogue states, Clinton held back on this for fear of the damage it would inflict on his vision of a liberal global order. Ever the genius at triangulation, Clinton found a way to surrender nuclear testing to the international community without giving up American nuclear domination, and a way to take testing away from the weapons labs while restoring their livelihood. By combining the test ban treaty with the Science Based Stockpile Stewardship Program, he sought to turn a test ban from an arms control initiative into a strategic firebreak between the advanced information economy of the U.S. and the industrial economies of possible nuclear challengers. Stockpile stewardship helps bring nuclear weapons deeper into the information age so that, increasingly, the essence of nuclear weapons is seen, like DNA, to consist of code. It is only in the context of this conceptualization that we can, for example, understand the extraordinary hysteria over allegations that the Chinese-American scientist Wen Ho Lee shared with China discs containing bomb simulation codes. By contrast with Bill Clinton George W. Bush seems, as far as we can tell, to be planning to develop mininukes and to withdraw from the nuclear test ban treaty. His is a unilateralist strategy to sum simulation technologies and nuclear testing rather than substitute one for the other, and to staunch nuclear proliferation by means of preemptive strikes on proliferators rather than through international regimes of surveillance and interdiction. His vision is not of a liberal international order dominated by the United States, but of an American international imperium.

\*\*\*Impacts

# \*Colonialism Impact

**Stopping proliferation is a way to subjugate the other countries into a colonialist stronghold**

**Gusterson 4-** professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University (Hugh, 7/14/04, Chapter 2 Nuclear Weapons and The Other, People Of The Bomb: Portraits of America's Nuclear Complex, p.45) MH

Noam Chomsky has suggested that the arms race between the superpowers was not really “about” the US-Soviet rivalry at all, but was a convenient way to assure the subjugation of smaller countries in the Third World under the guise of superpower competition. One does not have to swallow whole the simple reductionism of this argument to accept that there is obviously some connection between the nuclear stockpiles of some developed nations on the one hand and the political clientship and economic underdevelopment of Third World nations on the other. Just as some nations are allowed plentiful supplies of the ultimate weapon while others are prevented by elaborate treaties and international police activities from obtaining it. Without devising rigidly deterministic models connecting economic power and nuclear weapons- models that such states as Japan and Germany obviously would not fit- one can at least sketch the broad contours of this generalization: the nuclear underdevelopment of the developing world is one fragment in a wider systematic pattern of global disempowerment that ensures the subordination of the south. The discourse on nuclear proliferation legitimates this system of domination while presenting the interests the established nuclear powers have in maintaining their nuclear monopoly as if they were equally beneficial to all nations. And, ironically, the discourse on nonproliferation presents these subordinate nations as the principal source of danger in the world. This is another case of blaming the victim. The discourse on nuclear proliferation is structured around a rigid segregation of “their” problems from “ours.” In fact, however, we are linked to developing nations by a world system and many of the problems that, we claim, render other nations ineligible to own nuclear weapons have a lot to do with the West and the system it dominates. For example, the regional conflict between India and Pakistan is, in part at least, a direct consequence of the divide-and-rule policies adopted by the British raj; and the dispiute for nuclear war, has its origins not so much in ancient hatreds as in Britain’s decision in 1846 to install a Hindu maharajah as leader of a Muslim territory. The hostility between Arabs and Israelis has been exacerbated by British, French, and American intervention in the Middle East dating back to the Balfour Declaration of 1917. More recently, as Stephen Green points out, “Congress has voted over $36.5 billion in economic and military aid to Israel, including rockets, planes, and other technology which has directly advanced Israel’s nuclear weapons capabilities. It is precisely this nuclear arsenal, which the US Congress has been so instrumental in building up, this is driving the Arab state to attain countervailing strategic weapons of various kinds’

Colonialism inflicts massive daily suffering. The impact is sustained and perpetual. It outweighs their one-shot impact

Barsh 93, Professor of Native American Studies at the University of Lethbridge and United Nations Representative of the Mikmaq Grand Council and Four Directions Council, (Russel Lawrence, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Winter, 1993, 26 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 277) MH

If there is a fundamental cause of American Indian isolationism, it is 500 years of abuse. Colonialism and oppression operate at a personal, psychological, and cultural level, as well as in the realms of political and economic structures. The children of dysfunctional, abusive parents grow up in a capricious world of arbitrary punishment, humiliation, and powerlessness. They suffer from insecurity, low self-esteem, and a loss of trust in others. Colonialism is the abuse of an entire civilization for generations. It creates a culture of mistrust, defensiveness, and "self-rejection." The effect is greatest on women, who already are suffering from patriarchal domination in some cultures, and in others, are subjected to patriarchal domination for the first time by the colonizers. This can produce a politics of resignation, reactiveness, and continuing dependence on outsiders for leadership. Arguably the worst abuse of indigenous peoples worldwide has taken place in the United States, which not only pursued an aggressive and intrusive policy of cultural assimilation for more than a century, but also has preserved a particularly self-confident cultural arrogance to this day, denying Indians the recognition that they need to begin healing themselves. The negative effects of cultural abuse are proportional to the thoroughness with which the colonizer intervenes in the daily lives of ordinary people. Intense warfare can be less damaging than the captivity and daily "disciplining" of an entire population, which characterized reservation life at the end of the last century. Under these conditions, the only avenue of escape permitted is to embrace the habits and values of the oppressor, leaving people with a cruel choice between being victimized as "inferior" Indians or as second-class whites. In either case, much more was lost than cultural knowledge. Also lost was confidence in the possibility of genuine self-determination

# \*Dehumanization Impact

**A. Proliferation discourse is unbelievably dehumanizing- it’s roots come from disease growth. New nuclear states are wrongly blamed.**

**Woods 7** earned his doctorate at Brown University (Matthew, 2007, “Unnatural acts Nuclear language, proliferation and order”, p.94) MH

It is crucial to understand that the claim is not that states construct the threat of a new nuclear state but that states construct the reality of ‘proliferation.’ It is an ontological claim. States use language to create ‘proliferation’ as a first-order real and known thing in our shared global stock of knowledge in a manner that allows us to see and know nuclear acquisition as proliferation and behave accordingly. To sharpen this distinction, illustrate how its creation changed the world and indicate that it could have been otherwise, it may be helpful to recall that it is possible to discuss the way in which a nonnuclear entity seeks or acquires nuclear weapons without reference to ‘proliferation.’ ‘Proliferation’ did not exist until the 1960s. During the late 1950s, a prominent term states used to name the spread of nuclear arms was ‘dissemination.’ The problem was that ‘dissemination’ denotes distribution or strewing and so connotes giving or provision, and thus assigns to disseminators the guilt and responsibility for the consequences of any ‘dissemination.’ Because ‘dissemination’ holds nuclear states liable as source and solution for the spread of nuclear weapons, it faded from use rather than becoming a defining reality. Another prominent term was ‘dispersion.’ The problem was that when things disperse (such as an angry mob or a noxious gas) they become far less harmful. Because ‘dispersion’ suggests the spread of nuclear arms is less dangerous than the growing concentration of nuclear weapons within the arsenals of nuclear states, it too passed from use rather than becoming a defining reality. The nuclear states sought to retain supremacy while avoiding responsibility. The words ‘dissemination’ and ‘dispersion’ failed, because they cast the spread of nuclear arms as either eliminable by nuclear states or as a palliative for the increasing number of arms within nuclear states. They did not serve the interests of nuclear states. However, if states had constructed ‘dissemination’ as a real and known thing in the world, we might exist in a world in which nuclear states (rather than nonnuclear states) were most responsible for any spread of nuclear arms, where nuclear states (rather than nonnuclear states) were the prime subject of international surveillance and regulation and where spread was known as eminently preventable (rather than inevitable and unstoppable). Similarly, if states had constructed ‘dispersion’ as a real and known thing in the world, we might exist in a world in which the spread of nuclear weapons to more states would be a benign palliative for the dangerous concentration of nuclear arms within extant nuclear states. But they did not. States used a term from biology instead. In the early 1960s, biologists popularized the relationship between proliferation and pathological growth (Sonnenschein and Soto 1999). Soon after, states responded to its association with disease and death, its impartial nature, its resistance to cure and its status as an environmental constant (its autonomy), among many other qualities, and used the word ‘proliferation’ to name the spread of nuclear arms. We now live in a world in which we know the spread of nuclear arms is inevitable, unstoppable and dangerous (that is the only proper knowledge one can have, despite our general inexperience with that state of affairs) and nonnuclear (rather than nuclear) states are to be blamed for any actual spread and so submit themselves to the surveillance, regulation and denial institutions crafted by those states that possess nuclear weapons. The creation of ‘proliferation’ as an ontologically real and known thing changed the world. The purpose of this article is to examine the constructivist process and various discourse strategies that states used to create it (Fairclough 1997).

**B. Dehumanization outweighs nuclear war**
**Berube ’97** (David, Ph.D. in Communications, “Nanotechnological Prolongevity: The Down Side”, NanoTechnology Magazine, June/July 1997, p. 1-6, URL: http://www.cla.sc.edu/ENGL/faculty/berube/prolong.htm) MH

This means-ends dispute is at the core of Montagu and Matsou’s treatise on the dehumanization of humanity. They warn “its destructive toll is already greater than that of any war, plague, famine, or natural calamity on record – and its potential danger to the quality of life and the fabric of civilized society is beyond calculation. For that reason this sickness of the soul might well be called the Fifth Horseman of the Apocalypse… Behind the genocide of the Holocaust lay a dehumanized thought; beneath the menecide of deviants and dissidents… in the cuckoo’s next of America, lies a dehumanized image of man… (Montagu & Matsou, 1983, p. xi-xii). While it may never be possible to quantify the impacts dehumanizing ethics may have had on humanity, it is safe to conclude the foundations of humanness offer great opportunities which would be foregone. When we calculate the actual losses and the virtual benefits, we approach a nearly inestimable value greater than any tools which we can currently use to measure it. Dehumanization is nuclear war, environmental apocalypse, and international genocide. When people become things, they become dispensable. When people are dispensable, any and every atrocity can be justified. Once justified, they seem to be inevitable for every epoch has evil and dehumanization is evil’s most powerful weapon.

# \*Extinction Impact

**Imperialist paradigms enforced by the West culminate in extinction**
**Porter 98**(Robert B. Porter, Seneca and Professor of Law and Director of the Tribal Law and Government Center, University of Kansas, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Sac and Fox Nation, 21 University of Michigan Journal of Law and Reform, 1998)

Nonetheless, this otherwise natural process was dramatically altered by colonization. These colonizing efforts were accomplished by force and often with great speed, producing dramatic changes within Indigenous societies and interfering with the natural process of adaptation and change. This disruption has had a genocidal effect; groups of Indigenous peoples that existed 500 years ago no longer exist. **There should be no doubt that** their **extinction** was not an accident – it **was the product of a concerted effort to subjugate and eliminate the native human population in order to allow for the pursuit of wealth and manifest destiny**. As a result, extinction is the most dramatic effect of colonization. Allowed to run its full course, **colonization will disrupt and destroy the natural evolutionary process of the people being colonized to the point of extinction.**

# \*Imperialism Impact

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# \*Militarism Impact

**Nuclear discourse makes militarism inevitable because it normalizes the potential utilization of nuclear weapons, while inhibiting the meaning of true ethics**

**Taylor 98** (Bryan C., Associate Professor in the Department of Communication, University of Colorado, Boulder, ’98 Western Journal of Communication 62.3, “Nuclear weapons and communication studies: A review essay,” http://comm.colorado.edu/taylorbc/NuclearWeaponsandCommunicationStudies.doc) GL

In a conference held at Cornell University in April 1984, these scholars assembled to develop a uniquely nuclear criticism, one that would "demonstrate how the forms of the current nuclear discussion are being shaped by literary or critical assumptions whose implications are often, perhaps systematically, distorted" ("Proposal," 1984, p. 2). In his keynote address, Derrida (1984) delivered a mixed prognosis for the project from the vantage of deconstruction. The good news, he offered, was that since nuclear war had not (yet) happened and yet was the hotly-contested object of simulations (such as computer war-games), its ontological status was "fabulously textual"-- and thus uniquely suited for criticism. The bad news was that--for the very same reasons-critics had no more authority to make definitive claims about the nuclear "referent" than the speakers they were critiquing. This condition meant that critics could "speak" to nuclear "power"--but not with certainty of unproblematic "Truth" (see Ruthven, 1993). Confounded at launch, nuclear criticism fractured but still ignited. As a method for confronting the limits of knowledge, deconstruction seemed uniquely suited for the imagined catastrophe of nuclear war, which threatened to destroy the very grounds of speech--self, world, and other. In turn, the high stakes of this project offered to redeem deconstruction's alleged relativism (Chaloupka, 1992). Two genres of scholarship emerged in subsequent studies of public-policy, media journalism, and popular-cultural texts. One genre was metatheoretical, and embraced Derridean textualism to critique the possibilities of valid nuclear-critical discourse. The other was more pragmatic, and analyzed texts with the goal of ethical intervention in public deliberation. Generally, scholars of both genres agreed that "nuclearism"(n1) was intertextually configured by potent cultural discourses such as militarism, nationalism, bureaucracy, and technical-rationality. This hybrid discourse, they argued, suppressed its contingencies, normalized the presence and use of nuclear weapons, deferred the accountability of nuclear professionals, and inhibited ethical reflection about the risks and consequences of nuclear war (Aubrey, 1985; Chilton, 1986; Cohn, 1987). Beyond this initial spate of activity, however, scholarly interest in nuclear criticism per se proved temporary.

# \*Moral Obligation Impact

**The U.S. has a responsibility to give up its commitment to nuclear weaponry, or end it’s regime of hypocritical control of the East.**

Bernard **Lown**, Cofounder @ International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, **’95** [BMJ 310, “Education and debate: Time to leave behind genocidal weapons,” http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/310/6985/993] BBL

Soon we shall cross the threshold into a new millennium. It would be no small contribution, for generations yet unborn, to leave behind genocidal weapons as the property of the barbaric 20th century. Indeed, an unprecedented opportunity exists for achieving that seemingly quixotic goal. This spring, signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty will assemble in New York to decide whether to renew, modify, or reject the treaty. Certainly non-renewal would post a singular threat for global security and international peace. Would the treaty's indefinite extension then be a blessing, as is forcefully argued by the nuclear powers? The Non-Proliferation Treaty was drafted in 1968 and entered in full force two years later. This multinational instrument was intended as a firebreak against the spread of nuclear weapons. Many nations had foregone nuclearism because of the promises and commitments enshrined in this treaty. The treaty represented a bargain: in return for not acquiring nuclear weapons, the non-weapon states would have free access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy under international safeguards, while the nuclear powers would rapidly divest themselves of their nuclear arsenals. This second objective was clearly spelt out in the treaty and is explicitly stated in article VI. The words are precise, leaving little room for obfuscation--"to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race" and "to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of their nuclear stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." This article was intended to provide an acceptable balance of compensation to those who forswore possession by the obligations assumed by the possessors to divest expeditiously of their mass destructive armouries. For a discerning authority like Swedish ambassador for disarmament and Nobel peace laureate, Alva Myrdal, who helped incorporate article VI in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, this contract between nuclear "haves" and "have nots" raised apprehension that the treaty might constitute a licence to husband nuclear weapons in perpetuity. Furthermore, as long as the world lived in a state of imbalance, it would be difficult to resist acquiring the weapons that confer a special status of superiority. **In a sense the treaty was an inadequate quarantine against a virulent infection. In an age of nation states, nuclear apartheid could not long endure,** epecially as **the perception that was communicated was that world power closely parallels the possession of nuclear migh**t. **It is no coincidence that precisely the same nations are members of both the nuclear club and the Security Council of the United Nations.** A double standard. Now, 25 years later, the initial club of three nuclear states has grown to 11. Despite the nuclear arms reduction agreements of the late 1980s and early 1990s, none of the existing nuclear powers speaks seriously of abandoning its own nuclear arsenal, nor of the sovereign "right" to develop new, more sophisticated nuclear weapons systems. The message from the nuclear powers to the non-nuclear states, during the quarter century, has been as consistent as it has been clear: "Do as we say, not as we do; nuclear weapons are fine for us but not for you." The fear of proliferation has been a central preoccupation of the nuclear powers. In the case of the United States, such varying global strategies as the "selective engagement" of former Secretary of State James Baker, the "new world order" of President George Bush, or President Clinton's "democratic enlargement" shared one essential priority--namely, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Instruments of mass destruction are most threatening to the urbanised, highly industrialised Western world and must be contained at all costs**. The blatantly discriminating double standard accounts for the fragility of the non-proliferation regime and fuels the ambitions of many non-nuclear states. That danger could be defused if nuclear weapons were abolished universally**. Increasing numbers of nuclear hawks, such as former US Defence Secretary Robert MacNamara, are now promoting nuclear abolition. Even members in the active military leadership are coming around to this conclusion. American Air Force General Charles Horner, head of the US Space Command, was reported in the Boston Globe last year as saying, **"The nuclear weapon is obsolete. . . . I want to get rid of them all. . . . Think of the high moral ground we secure by having none. It's kind of hard for us to say to North Korea, 'You are terrible people, you are developing a nuclear weapon' when the United States has thousands of them."**

# \*Otherization Impact

**Otherization is the root of dehumanization and conflict. Nuclear wars and holocaust are made possible by otherization of the enemy**

**Kovel 84,** Prof Pol, Comm, & Psych @ Einstein**,** (Joel, 1984, *Against the State of Nuclear Terror*, p175-6) MH

The irrationality that often befalls groups on the margins of society reveals the working of a general mechanism that undoubtedly contributes in a major way to the stability of irrational and oppressive social orders. When society as a whole is irrational and permeated with violence and domination, then each individual within it will stand to internalize some of the same as he or she runs the gauntlet of personal development. By “internalize,” I mean the development of unconscious structured relations with others. We each have an internal (i.e., intrapsychic) group of relations between the “I” and the “Other” that is, on the one hand, quite fantastic and out of immediate contact with external reality, while, on the other, is shaped by that reality and is shaped by it in turn. Such shaping occurs through the mental processes called *introjection* (modeling of the self by the world) and *projection* (modeling of the world according to the self). The Other, being the negation of the self, can take on many characteristics, good or bad. The Other, therefore, is both a rough replication of the goodness and badness of the external world as well as a determinant of that goodness or badness. When we congregate into groups (including the society which is integral to these groups) the relations of Otherness take on a decisive importance. For in the formation of a group a kind of splitting necessarily takes place between elements of the Other. This splitting is shaped about the irreducible fact of the group (or society) and its identity. If there is a group, then one is either in it or not. From another angle, groups take shape about the deployment of the feeling of “insideness.” And once one is in, then there must be an outside. If there is an America, then one can be an American. If so, then all others become Other, and non-Americans or foreigners. A lot of history has turned around the fact that the basic inside-outside relations of groups have come to be fused with the goodness and badness of the Other. Then all those inside become good, and all outside, bad. The members of the group each return to being of the “purified pleasure ego,” described earlier when we were developing the notion of paranoia and the general psychology of technocracy. Insofar as the bad outside takes on a persecutory quality, the group itself becomes paranoid—with this key difference between the group and the individual level: that the individual paranoiac experiences the persecution immediately, while the member of the group is insulated by identification with the others and his or her participation in the group’s practice. In this way, the paranoia is delegated to the group as a whole. We might say that it becomes de-subjectified and passes beyond the psychologies of the individuals of the group. The individual mind remains under the sway of the affiliation of the good Other that remains inside group relations. Meanwhile the persecutory potential of the outsiders is reduced by dehumanization. This is how people remain “normal” individually while countenancing and even actively carrying out the most heinous and irrational acts on the “thingified” and dehumanized bodies of outsiders. It tells us a lot about how gracious and kindly white Southerners could lynch and castrate blacks; of how good, clean efficient Germans could turn Jews into lampshades; of how Israelis, with their ancient tradition of Jewish compassionateness, earned through centuries of suffering, could calculatedly dispossess the Palestinian people; and of course, how the friendly Americans could annihilate Hiroshima and cut their swath through history.

# Otherization Internal Link EXT

**Reps of the 1AC dichotomize Western security and Eastern proliferation.**

**Foad Izadi et. al** , master's degree in mass communication studies and his bachelor's degree in economics from the University of Houston.; Hakimeh Saghaye-Biria Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, 7 Journal of Communication Inquiry, Volume 31 Number 2 April 2007 SAGE) BBL

In addition to using a dichotomous language, Orientalism uses an essentialist discourse, universalizing certain traits and characteristics to the Orient and the Islamic World (Said, 1978). Said considers the numerous writers, novelists, journalists, philosophers, political theorists, historians, economists, and imperial administrators, who have accepted the basic Oriental/Occidental distinction as the foundation for their work concerning the Orient, as Orientalists. Most significant for this study, Said says, “The Middle East experts who advise [U.S.] policymakers are imbued with Orientalism, almost to a person” (p. 321). According to Macfie (2000), Orientalism has come to signify an ideology justifying and accounting for Western imperialism. The notion of dividing the globe into dichotomous categories originates from a structuralist view of language (de Saussure, 1959). de Saussure argues that the universal structuring principle in all human language is that of binary oppositions. Language, viewed as a totality and as a social construction, is formed by the meanings assigned to objects and by those objects’ relationship to their opposites, for example, black versus white, man versus woman, and so on. **Objects are understood as to what they are not. Therefore, a dichotomous system governs the formation of language, and the numerous possibilities of meaning are restricted**. According to Switzer, McNamara, and Ryan (1999), news narratives are primarily based on binary signs, reducing reality to “discrete, dichotomous ‘facts’” (p. 33). Switzer et al. contend that binary language and the tendency to define the world in terms of opposites provide the sociocultural foundation of ideology. Similarly, Said (1978) argues that the process of identity formation and maintenance in every culture entails the existence of “another, different and competing alter ego” (p. 331). Said argues that, in the process of Western self-presentation, Orientalism is constructed as the West’s alter ego. The binary vocabulary of Orientalism includes East versus West, despotism versus democracy, cruelty versus fair treatment, irrational versus rational, and cunning versus trust (Baldwin, Longhurst, McCracken, Ogborn, & Smith, 2000, p. 171). By the absolute fixing of the meaning of the Orient, Orientalism functions as a Foucaultean discourse of power and domination (Said, 1978). Van Dijk’s (1998b) “ideological square” (p. 33) explains the dichotomous character of the prevailing discourses in societies. The ideological square gets its label from the four dimensions that make it up and acts as a justification for the presence of inequality in the society by polarizing in-groups and out-groups through a double process of emphasis and mitigation. **Ideological discourses emphatically present the good properties/actions of “us” and the bad properties/actions of “them.”** The discourse also mitigates the bad properties/actions of the in-group and the good properties/actions of the out-group. Van Dijk (1995) maintains that ideologies are often articulated on the basis of the ideological square.

**Nuclear proliferation discourse imposes a self-determined us against a real or imagined antagonist**

**Frey 06** (Karsten, Post-doctoral Research Fellow at the Institute Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals, [IBEI WORKING PAPERS, “ Nuclear Weapons as Symbols: The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making,” http://ssrn.com/abstract=960762) **GL**

What is the link between fear and the nuclear arming behaviour of a state? To answer this critical question, one has to look at Hyman’s distinction between ‘oppositional’ and ‘sportsmanlike’ identity types. Whereas the oppositional identity denotes a dichotomised us-against-them pattern, the sportsmanlike identity concept places the us-against-them pattern “within a broader, transcendent identity conception” Through his multi-level identity, the sportsmanlike actor does not define his relationship to his antagonist in purely oppositional terms, but develops a sense of commonality by maintaining a certain we’re-all-in-the-same-boat attitude. This solidarity dimension is crucial in the translation of identity into the two fundamental norms, the ‘nuclear taboo’ norm (originating from the‘sportsmanlike’ identity conception) and the ‘nuclear myth’ norm (originating from the ‘oppositional’ identity conception). The stronger the actor’s sense of commonality is, the more likely he will develop a sense of abhorrence and opprobrium with regard to those weapons symbolising ‘the other’s’ potential total annihilation. In contrast, those actors defining the relationship to ‘the other’ exclusively in oppositional terms tend to be attracted by the sense of immunity symbolized by nuclear weapons as deterrent devices. Pride, or, for that matter, the desire for status, is the second crucial element of the identity concept. It denotes the vertical dimension of the relationship between the self-defined ‘us’, and the real or imagined antagonist. This desire for status translates into an attitude favouring acquisition of the bomb if a) the self-defined ‘us’ equals or tops ‘the other’ in terms of status, and b) ‘the other’ owns nuclear weapons which are perceived to contribute to its status. The latter is of particular importance. It is reasonable to assume that most states define their position at least in equal terms as compared to the antagonist15. Only if the antagonist is thought to derive its elevated status from nuclear weapons does the desire for status actually translate into the aspiration to seek the bomb. A historically rare exception is the case in which the self-defined ‘us’ is considered superior in status-terms, causing the state to build-up nuclear weapons even if its opponent is non-nuclear

# Otherization Internal Link EXT

**Their representations present a false us/them, problem/non-problem dichotomy**

**Gusterson 4-** professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University (Hugh, 7/14/04, Chapter 2 Nuclear Weapons and The Other, People Of The Bomb: Portraits of America's Nuclear Complex, p.24) MH

Thus in Western discourse nuclear weapons are represented so that “theirs” are a problem whereas “ours” are not. During the cold war the Western discourse on the dangers of “nuclear proliferation” defined the term in such a way as to sever the two senses of the word proliferation. This usage split off the “vertical” proliferation of the superpower arsenals (the development of new and improved weapons designs and the numerical expansion of the stockpiles) from the “horizontal” proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, presenting only the latter as the “proliferation problem”. Following the end of the cold war, the American and Russian arsenals are being cut to a few thousand weapons on each side. However, the United States and Russia have turned back appeals from various non-aligned nations, especially India, for the nuclear powers to open discussions on a global convention abolishing nuclear weapons. Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation treaty notwithstanding, the Clinton and Bush administrations have declared that nuclear weapons will play a role in the defense of the United States for the indefinite future. Meanwhile in a controversial move, the Clinton administration broke the policy of previous administrations in basically formalizing a policy of using nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states to deter chemical and biological weapons.

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**The identity of a state defines its discourse towards nuclear weapons and proliferation while perpetuating an us/them dichotomy or an imagined antagonist**

**Frey 06** (Karsten, Post-doctoral Research Fellow at the Institute Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals, [IBEI WORKING PAPERS, “Nuclear Weapons as Symbols: The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making,” http://ssrn.com/abstract=960762) **GL**

The normative disposition of a country towards nuclear weapons is rooted in the identity of its society. The conception of identity in the context of foreign policy choices reflects the idea a society has about what its country stands for in the world in comparison to other states. This comparative identity conception determines whether a country views its position as more competitive or accommodative, reclusive or inclusive, high or low in the perceived international status ranking. The concept of identity translates into norms as behavioral patterns determining foreign and nuclear policy choices. The way such intersubjectively established norms, stemming from a collective identity, manifest in nuclear policy is through an us-against-them pattern that contrasts the self-defined ‘us’ to a real or imagined antagonist. During the Cold War, this antagonism was defined through ideological antinomies; in postcolonial states – which most of the proliferating powers in the post-Cold War era are –, the role of the ‘ other’ is almost inevitably assigned to the former colonial power and/or its perceived successor. This pattern is most visible in the cases of India and Iran, in which the nuclear narrative carries a strong anticolonialist undertone. The discourse in these countries displayed emotional patterns, in which the opposition against the ‘global regime of nuclear apartheid’ resembled the struggle for independence. Postcolonial identities tend to add strong emotional dimensions of humiliation and pride to the definition of the us-against-them antagonism and strongly impact the collective sense of sovereignty.

# Otherization Internal Link EXT

**They use proliferation as a way to separate “us” from “them”**

**Gusterson 4-** professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University (Hugh, 7/14/04, Chapter 2 Nuclear Weapons and The Other, People Of The Bomb: Portraits of America's Nuclear Complex, p.45) MH

Noam Chomsky has suggested that the arms race between the superpowers was not really “about” the US-Soviet rivalry at all, but was a convenient way to assure the subjugation of smaller countries in the Third World under the guise of superpower competition. One does not have to swallow whole the simple reductionism of this argument to accept that there is obviously some connection between the nuclear stockpiles of some developed nations on the one hand and the political clientship and economic underdevelopment of Third World nations on the other. Just as some nations are allowed plentiful supplies of the ultimate weapon while others are prevented by elaborate treaties and international police activities from obtaining it. Without devising rigidly deterministic models connecting economic power and nuclear weapons- models that such states as Japan and Germany obviously would not fit- one can at least sketch the broad contours of this generalization: the nuclear underdevelopment of the developing world is one fragment in a wider systematic pattern of global disempowerment that ensures the subordination of the south. The discourse on nuclear proliferation legitimates this system of domination while presenting the interests the established nuclear powers have in maintaining their nuclear monopoly as if they were equally beneficial to all nations. And, ironically, the discourse on nonproliferation presents these subordinate nations as the principal source of danger in the world. This is another case of blaming the victim. The discourse on nuclear proliferation is structured around a rigid segregation of “their” problems from “ours.” In fact, however, we are linked to developing nations by a world system, and many of the problems that, we do with the West and the system, and many of the problems that, we claim, render other nations ineligible to own nuclear weapons have a lot to do with the West and the system it dominates. For example, the regional conflict between India and Pakistan is, in part at least, a direct consequence of the divide-and-rule policies adopted by the British raj; and the dispiute for nuclear war, has its origins not so much in ancient hatreds as in Britain’s decision in 1846 to install a Hindu maharajah as leader of a Muslim territory. The hostility between Arabs and Israelis has been exacerbated by British, French, and American intervention in the Middle East dating back to the Balfour Declaration of 1917. More recently, as Stephen Green points out, “Congress has voted over $36.5 billion in economic and military aid to Israel, including rockets, planes, and other technology which has directly advanced Israel’s nuclear weapons capabilities. It is precisely this nuclear arsenal, which the US Congress has been so instrumental in building up, this is driving the Arab state to attain countervailing strategic weapons of various kinds’

**The proliferation discourse produces otherization, even of “non-rogue” states**

**Mutimer**, David. **2k** “The Weapons State” Mutimer has a PhD in political science from York University and is now an associate professor of political science there. p. 97 LH

The proliferation image creates two clear lines of difference. The first marks the distinction between those who can be trusted to make the rules—signaled by inclusion in the ranks of suppliers—and those who must follow the rules—the recipients. The second line marks those who do follow the rules from those who refuse—the rogues from the herd, the outlaws from the law-abiding. This second line marks the emergence of an enemy in this discourse of military security, for it is rogue behavior that poses a threat, that causes concern to those who make the rules. Thus the recipients are accepted as part of the community of the law-abiding and thus have access to prized technology the suppliers can provide. The recipients, however, are also potential rogues. Their behavior must be policed through export control and compliance monitoring to ensure that they conform to the rules and do not become rogues. This policing gives in to the temptation of othering difference Connolly discussed. Not only are those not included in the supplier groups to be marked as different, but they are to be labeled as potential enemies and sanctioned as such. The proliferation image constructs states in the Third World as outsiders. Even if they do not become rogues, they are not permitted inside the privileged Northern club; if they do not behave in ways that cause concern to the privileged, they are labeled enemy and heavily sanctioned. Not surprisingly, not all Third World states are entirely happy with the “proliferation construction. Iran, for example, finds itself abiding by the rules of NPT membership, rules that are supposed to guarantee its access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, its behavior—in this case, the domestic politics of government—causes concern among members of this supplier groups, and so it is sanctioned. India has established itself as the preeminent critic of the proliferation discourse in the Third World. India does not accept the practices to which the construction has given rise. In Chapter 6 I examine the alternative framings produced in resistance and elsewhere to see the possible objects and identities hidden by the “proliferation” image that could serve as a basis for political opposition to that image.

# Otherization Terminal Impact EXT

**Without embracing the other, totalitarianism and nuclear apocalypse become possible**
**Fasching 93**, religious studies at University of South Florida (Darrell, 1993, The Ethical Challenge of Auschwitz, p. 5-8) MH
Nevertheless, I am only too aware how vulnerable are the arguments and methodologies that I use in this book. Many specialists will no doubt have serious questions about my grasp of materials that touch upon their areas. I too have such questions. But I see no point in playing it safe. I mean to provoke discussion, and I hope the dialogue that follows shall enrich and correct my perspective. Moreover, I confess my own perspective and its limitations at the outset because I believe that after Auschwitz and Hiroshima it is dangerous to write in the third person, as if no one in particular were having these thoughts. In our world we each need to take responsibility for our thoughts and their social consequences. I reflect further on these matters in the Epilogue, and some may find it helpful to read that concluding essay immediately after reading this Prologue to understand more clearly what I am attempting to do in the body of the text itself. The best way to describe the "style" of the theology of culture proposed in these books is to suggest that it is a "decentered" or "alienated theology." Alienated theology is the opposite of apologetic theology. Apologetic theology typically seeks to defend the "truth" and "superiority" of one's own tradition against the "false," "inferior," and "alien" views of other traditions. Alienated theology, by contrast, is theology done "as if" one were a stranger to one's own narrative traditions, seeing and critiquing one's own traditions from the vantage point of the other's narrative traditions. It is my conviction that alienated theology is the appropriate mode for theology in an emerging world civilization-a civilization tottering in the balance between apocalypse and utopia. There are two ways to enter world history, according to the contemporaryauthor John Dunne: you can be dragged in by way of world war or you can walk in by way of mutual understanding. By the first path, global civilization emerges as a totalitarian project of dominance that risks escalating into a nuclear apocalypse. By the second path, we prevent the first, creating global civilization through an expansion of our understanding of what it means to be human. This occurs when we pass over to an other's religion and culture and comebackwith new insight into our own. Gandhi is an example, passing over to the Sermon on the Mount and coming back to the Hindu Bhagavad Gita to gain new insight into it as a scripture of nonviolence. Gandhi never seriously considered becoming a Christian but his Hinduism was radically altered by his encounter with Christianity. One could say the same (reversing the directions) for Martin Luther King Jr., who was deeply influenced by Gandhi's understanding of nonviolent resistance in the Gita. When we pass over (whether through travel, friendship, or disciplined study and imagination) we become "strangers in a strange land" as well as strangers to ourselves, seeing ourselves through the eyes of another. Assuming the perspective of a stranger is an occasion for insight and the sharing of insight. Such cross-cultural interactions build bridges of understanding and action between persons and cultures that make cooperation possible and conquest unnecessary. "Passing over" short circuits apocalyptic confrontation and inaugurates utopian new beginnings—new beginnings for the "post-modem" world of the coming third millennium. Gandhi and King are symbols of a possible style for a postmodem alienated theology. To be an alien is to be a stranger. To be alienated is to be a stranger to oneself. We live in a world of ideological conflict in which far too many individuals (whether theists or a-theists) practice a "centered theology" in which they are too sure of who they are and what they must do. Such a world has far too many answers and not nearly enough questions and self-questioning. A world divided by its answers is headed for an inevitable apocalyptic destiny.However, when we are willing to become strangers to ourselves (or when we unwillingly become so), new possibilities open up where before everything was closed and hopeless. At the heart of my position is the conviction that the kairos of our time calls forth the badly neglected. When as a student I read Paul Tillich, I found it hard to believe him when he said that the questions were more important than the answers. I was so taken with his answers that I was sure he was just trying to be modest. What really mattered were the answers. Since then, I have come to realize that answers always seem more important and more certain to those who have come by them without wrestling with the questions. I know now that Tillich was quite serious and quite right-the questions are indeed more important. I have come to find a fullness in the doubts and questions of my life, which I once thought could be found only in the answers. After Auschwitz and Hiroshima. I distrust all final answers-all final solutions. Mercifully, doubts and questions have come to be so fulfilling that I find myself suspicious of answers, not because they are necessarily false or irrelevant, but because even when relevant and true they are, and can be, only partial. It is doubt and questioning that always lures me on to broader horizons and deeper insights through an openness to the infinite that leaves me contentedly discontent. Alienated theology understands doubt and the questions that arise from it as our most fundamental experience of the infinite. For,our unending questions keep us open to the infinite, continually inviting us to transcend our present horizon of understanding. In a like manner, the presence of the stranger continuously calls us into question and invites us to transcend the present horizon of the egocentric and ethnocentric answers that structure our personal and cultural identities. An alienated theology understands that only a faith which requires one to welcome the alien or stranger is truly a utopian faith capable of transforming us into "new beings" who are capable of creating a new world of pluralistic human interdependence.

# Otherization Terminal Impact EXT

**Survival is worthless in their world- existence at all costs mentality means we can justify any act of violence**

**Callahan 73** PhD in philosophy from Harvard, Senior Fellow at Harvard Medical School, former member of the Advisory Council, Office of Scientific Integrity, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Daniel, “The Tyranny of Survival”, 1973, p. 91-3) MH

The value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its evocative power. But abused it has been. In the name of survival, all manner of social and political evils have been committed against the rights of individuals, including the right to life. The purported threat of Communist domination has for over two decades fueled the drive of militarists for ever-larger defense budgets, no matter what the cost to other social needs. During World War II, native Japanese-Americans were herded, without due process of law, to detention camps. This policy was later upheld by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States (1944) in the general context that a threat to national security can justify acts otherwise blatantly unjustifiable. The survival of the Aryan race was one of the official legitimations of Nazism. Under the banner of survival, the government of South Africa imposes a ruthless apartheid, heedless of the most elementary human rights. The Vietnamese war has seen one of the greatest of the many absurdities tolerated in the name of survival: the destruction of villages in order to save them. But it is not only in a political setting that survival has been evoked as a final and unarguable value. The main rationale B. F. Skinner offers in Beyond Freedom and Dignity for the controlled and conditioned society is the need for survival. For Jacques Monod, in Chance and Necessity, survival requires that we overthrow almost every known religious, ethical and political system. In genetics, the survival of the gene pool has been put forward as sufficient grounds for a forceful prohibition of bearers of offensive genetic traits from marrying and bearing children. Some have even suggested that we do the cause of survival no good by our misguided medical efforts to find means by which those suffering from such common genetically based diseases as diabetes can live a normal life, and thus procreate even more diabetics. In the field of population and environment, one can do no better than to cite Paul Ehrlich, whose works have shown a high dedication to survival, and in its holy name a willingness to contemplate governmentally enforced abortions and a denial of food to surviving populations of nations which have not enacted population-control policies. For all these reasons it is possible to counterpoise over against the need for survival a "tyranny of survival." There seems to be no imaginable evil which some group is not willing to inflict on another for sake of survival, no rights, liberties or dignities which it is not ready to suppress. It is easy, of course, to recognize the danger when survival is falsely and manipulatively invoked. Dictators never talk about their aggressions, but only about the need to defend the fatherland to save it from destruction at the hands of its enemies. But my point goes deeper than that. It is directed even at a legitimate concern for survival, when that concern is allowed to reach an intensity which would ignore, suppress or destroy other fundamental human rights and values. The potential tyranny survival as value is that it is capable, if not treated sanely, of wiping out all other values. Survival can become an obsession and a disease, provoking a destructive singlemindedness that will stop at nothing. We come here to the fundamental moral dilemma. If, both biologically and psychologically, the need for survival is basic to man, and if survival is the precondition for any and all human achievements, and if no other rights make much sense without the premise of a right to life—then how will it be possible to honor and act upon the need for survival without, in the process, destroying everything in human beings which makes them worthy of survival. To put it more strongly, if the price of survival is human degradation, then there is no moral reason why an effort should be made to ensure that survival. It would be the Pyrrhic victory to end all Pyrrhic victories.

**Problem-solution dichotomies of nuclear war impacts otherize marginalized groups**

**Taylor 98** (Bryan C., Associate Professor in the Department of Communication, University of Colorado, Boulder, ’98 [Western Journal of Communication 62.3, “Nuclear weapons and communication studies: A review essay,” http://comm.colorado.edu/taylorbc/NuclearWeaponsandCommunicationStudies.doc]) **GL**

A few communication scholars, however, have displayed a persistence of nuclear vision. Goodnight (1997), for example, argues that despite the decline of Cold War frames, international crises remain available for prosecution by weapon-possessing states as 'problems' requiring nuclearist 'solutions.' As a result, the, Cold War may yet be read as simply the opening chapter in the evolving nuclear age. The condition of horizontal proliferation among "rogue" states provides an enduring opportunity for examination of the post-Cold War construction of strategic threat. Iraq is a spectacular case in point (as is North Korea.). Bjork (1995) argues that Orientalist "word politics" pervade U.S. discourse in these contexts, and solidify U.S. dominance of international affairs by demonizing emerging nuclear nations through racist and sexist language that perpetuates colonialist ideologies.(n6) Others (Mehan, 1997; Slayden, 1994) argue that the divisive, fear-mongering logics of the Cold War are so powerful and habitual that, despite being deprived of their Soviet object, they have, now been compulsively turned inward by domestic rhetors to demonize marginalized groups (e.g., liberals, homosexuals, and immigrants). Aesthetics and history, as a result, have been charged with violent energy as generic crucibles for the clash of cultural narratives about truth, power, and beauty.

# Otherization Terminal Impact EXT

Otherization ensures genocide

Levy 2k, Ph.D. at Baltimore Hebrew University (David , Review of The Wisdom of Love. Lincoln: Univ of Nebraska Press, 1997 by Alain Finkielkraut, www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php%3Fid%3D3842) MH

Finkielkraut brilliantly applies Levinas’ analysis of the other (l’autre), alterity, and the face-to-face encounter to the Holocaust, whereby he makes the following three points: (1) verminization is the equivalent of otherization, (2) bureaucratization and tech-nologizatioreak up Rin make for the banality of which Arendtspeaks, and (3) Kantian ethics are not adequate withregards to the Shoah. He shows that it is the Nazis who attempted to erase the trace of the Jews as “the other.” Writ-ing that “The Nazis hated Jews because they were‘other’,” Finkielkraut argues that the infamous Pro-tocols of the Elders of Zion and Mein Kampf prepared the way for the Holocaust in their concerns with the Jews’ invisible otherness by positing that the Jews have occult powers and insinuate them-selves into healthy institutions and nation-states in order to sap their blood, weaken them, and precipi-tate their eventual demise. These works, which sup-port the belief that the Jews are responsible for natu-ral catastrophes, financial crashes, floods, unemploy-ment, poverty, and wars, therefore belong to a long tradition of scapegoat literature and sentiment whose roots stretch back to the Medieval ages where Jews as the other were accused of being responsible for the Bubonic Plague, well-poisonings, host-desecrations,and ritual murders. Nazi ideology to make the world Judenrein stems from passionate hatred that rele-gates the Jews to exist outside of humanity, the zo-ological equivalent of bacilli, vampires, spiders, andblood suckers, who must be exterminated by the hu-man population without quarter asked or given. This commitment to extermination is justified by Nazi ideology as an act of defense to save the German Volk from the threats posed to it by the Jews as the other which cannot be assimiliated. Finkielkraut writes, “By ridding the world of the Jews, the Nazis promised to annihilate the curse of alterity (p.101).” In this, he is grounded in Levinas’ theory of the necessity to respect the rights of the other’s non-assimilatable dif-ference. The Nazis reformulated God’s law in Social Darwinian terms, so that a moral necessity derived to exterminate inferior and different groups who didnot conform to the supposed Aryan archetype. Thelogic that the Germanic nation constitutes the entity at the apex of existence, created as such by God, whoput it under the Fuehrer’s protection, ideologically le-gitimates the Nazi extermination of other races strug-gling for survival. The Volk therefore as a supposed act of self defense legitimates its extermination of the unassimilatable Jews who are defined as that which is other and different to the Nordic races. Throughout the Wisdom of Love Finkielkraut is haunted by a cynical view of man’s wolflike behav-ior unto his fellow man (homo homini lupus). While at the same time viewing the Jews as lambs preyedupon by wolflike nations who attempt to eradicateJewish existence, Finkielkraut asserts the need for re-sisting thought to wrestle with the ethical questionsthat arise when confronting the annihilation of Euro-pean Jewry, as the other eradicated in its difference from the ruling group. The ruling Nazi ideology rel-egates the Jew as other to a category of evil itself because it is other, and delegates out retribution tocombat and destroy the Jews’ otherness. The relega-tion of insider/outsider, us/them, we/other can leadto the perpetrating upon the other crimes of mon-strous violence in the name of the supposed salvation of the masterace. Thus, while Levinas says that it is the otherness of the other that makes one ethi-cal, Finkielkraut delimits how the otherization of the Jews led to the Nazis to act unethically.

# \*Genocide Impact

**A. Their discourse results in genocide
Mutimer**, David. **2k** “the weapons state” p. 80-81

Individual or collective identity involves both being and, importantly, recognition. Identity is inseparable from that which is outside the individual or the collective being identified because it is not only "what I am [or we are]" but "how I am [or we are] recognized." Identity depends on the ways in which the I (or we) is named, and it depends furthermore on the demarcation of limits that separate identity from a series of differences. 10 Identity can be founded, as Walker suggests, in the name of a class, a gender, a race-or even a nation. To express identity in these terms, however, is also to indicate that which is outside that class, gender, race, or nation the difference by which we know the same. The lines of identity/difference are lines of tremendous political and ethical potential and significance. The definition of difference is a requirement built into the logic of identity, and the construction of otherness is a temptation that readily insinuates itself into that logic-and more than a temptation: a temptation because it is constantly at work and because there may be political ways to fend it off or to reduce its power; more than a temptation because it typically moves below the threshold of conscious reflection and because every attempt to come to terms with it encounters stubborn obstacles built into the logic of identity and the structural imperatives of social organization. The move from "difference" to "other," as Connolly puts it, is the moment of politics. Although difference is essential to the construction of identity, the creation of difference as other marks the constitution of hierarchy and exclusion. The temptation to which Connolly refers is the temptation to secure the self through the identification of difference as the other. It ~s a temptation we have seen constantly, and with, devastating effects. Connolly speaks of the constitution of heretic and heathen in medieval Christianity as the internal and external others to the Catholic self. In both cases the confrontation with the other was violent, taking the form of conversions through individual and collective tortures or elimination through public executions and mass exterminations.12 Closer to home, the Cold War saw the constitution of the Communist other, both internal and external, which gave rise to new forms of heretic hunting and the possibility of mass exterminations on an altogether new scale.13 Crucially, Connolly notes that there are ways to counteract the temptation to "othering," but to do so one rnu.st first recognize the constructed and contingent nature of identity and difference:"", This conception of identity and difference as constructed, contingent, and contestable has led to two principal forms of research in critical IR literature. The most common is the Problematization of the state and nation as the locus of identity. By examining the various alternative forms of individual and collective identity, authors show how these forms intersect and transcend state practice and how they are subordinated and oppressed by the state and by the theoretical practice of statecentric IR theory.l4 The problematization of state and nation does not mean they are not real or meaningful, however. A second stream of critical IR research has explored the way in which states and *nations-particular* states and nations rather than the universalized state and nation of realist-inspired literature-are themselves constructed. IS Nation and state are important forms of collective and even individual identity, as anyone confronted by a border guard can attest. These forms of identity, however, arc constructed through social practices of recognition and differentiation as are any others, und so they are both as particular and tis contingent as any others.

**B.** **Genocide threatens extinction**

**Diamond 92** (Diamond, THE THIRD CHIMPANZEE, 1992, p. 277)

While our first association to the world “genocide” is likely to be the killings in Nazi concentration camps, those were not even the largest-scale genocide of this century. The Tasmanians and hundreds of other peoples were modern targets of successful smaller extermination campaigns. Numerous peoples scattered throughout the world are potential targets in the near future**.** Yet genocide is such a painful subject that either we’d rather not think about it at all, or else we’d like to believe that nice people don’t commit genocide only Nazis do. But our refusal to think about it has consequences we’ve done little to halt the numerous episodes of genocide since World War II, and we’re not alert to where it may happen next**.** Togetherwith our destruction of our own environmental resources, our genocidal tendencies coupled to nuclear weapons now constitute the two most likely means by which the human species may reverse all its progress virtually overnight.

# \*Racism Impact

**A. Their rationale for stopping proliferation is affirms orientalist and racist logic**

**Gusterson 4-** professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University (Hugh, 7/14/04, Chapter 2 Nuclear Weapons and The Other, People Of The Bomb: Portraits of America's Nuclear Complex, p.24) MH

The dominant discourse that stabilizes this form of nuclear apartheid in western ideology is a specialized variant within a broader system of colonial and postcolonial discourse that takes as its essentialist premise a profound Otherness separating Third World from Western countries. This inscription of Third World (especially Asian and Middle Eastern) nations as ineradicably different from our own has, in a different context, been labeled “Orientalism” by Edward Said. Said argues that orientalist discourse constructs the world in terms of a series of binary oppositions that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: where “we” are rational and disciplined, “they” are impulsive and emotional; where “we” are rational and disciplined, “they” are slaves to ancient passions and routines; where “we” are honest and compassionate, “they” are treacherous and uncultivated. While the blatantly racist orientalism of the high colonial period has softened, more subtle orientalist ideologies endure in contemporary politics. They can be found, as Akhil Gupta has argued, in discourses of economic development that represent Third World nations as child nations lagging behind Western nations in a uniform cycle of development or, as Catherine Lutz and Jane Collins suggest, in the imagery of popular magazines such as National Geographic. I want to suggest here than another variant of contemporary orientalist ideology is also to be found US national security discourse.

**B. Racism must be rejected in each instance**

**Barndt 91** (Joseph, co-director of Crossroads, a ministry to dismantle racism, "Dismantling Racism: The Continuing challenge to White A merica," p. 155-6.) MH

To study racism is to study walls. We have looked at barriers and fences, restraints and limitations, ghettos and prisons. The prison of racism confines us all, people of color and white people alike. It shackles the victimizer as well as the victim. The walls forcibly keep people of color and white people separate from each other; in our separate prisons we are all prevented from achieving the human potential God intends for us. The limitations imposed on people of color by poverty, subservience, and powerlessness are cruel, inhuman, and unjust; the effects of uncontrolled power, privilege, and greed, which are the marks of our white prison, will inevitably destroy us as well. But we have also seen that the walls of racism can be dismantled. We are not condemned to an inexorable fate, but are offered the vision and the possibility of freedom. Brick by brick, stone by stone, the prison of individual, institutional, and cultural racism can be destroyed. You The danger point of self-destruction seems to be drawing even more near. The overconsumption and environmental destruction may be reaching a point of no return. results of centuries of national and worldwide conquest and colonialism, of military buildups and violent aggression, of and I are urgently called to join the efforts of those who know it is time to tear down, once and for all, the walls of racism. A small and predominantly white minority of the global population derives its power and privilege from the sufferings of vast majority of peoples of all color. For the sake of the world and ourselves, we dare not allow it to continue.

# Racism Internal Link EXT

**The Western discourse on proliferation too often categorizes the Orient as just getting the bomb to show off- it’s paternalistic and only establishes the orientalist picture of the Third World**

**Gusterson 4-** professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University (Hugh, 7/14/04, Chapter 2 Nuclear Weapons and The Other, People Of The Bomb: Portraits of America's Nuclear Complex, p.37) MH

It is also assumed in the discourse on proliferation that Third World nuclear weapons exist to serve the end of despotic vanity or religious fanaticism and may be used without restraint. In the public discussion of India’s nuclear tests in 1998, for example, it was a recurrent theme that India conducted its nuclear tests out of a narcissistic desire for self aggrandizement rather than for legitimate national security reasons. This image persists in spite of the fact that India, with a declared nuclear power (China) on one border and an undeclared nuclear power (Pakistan) on the other, might be thought to have reasons every bit as compelling as the five official nuclear powers to test nuclear weapons. Strategic analyst Michael Krepon said on The News Hour with Jim Lehrer for May 29, 1990: “These test weren’t done for security purposes… They were done for reasons of domestic politics and national pride… We have street demonstrations to protest nuclear weapons. They have them to celebrate them.” Meanwhile, in an article titled “Nuclear Fear and Narcissism Shake South Asia,” New York Times reported Steve Weisman, speaking of India as if it were a spoiled child, wrote of India, “tired of what it considers to be its own second class status in world affairs… has gotten the attention it wanted.” Similarly, Senator Richard Lugar (Republican, Indiana) said that India tested in part because “there was a lot of indifference, under-appreciation of India… We were not spending quality time in the Administration or Congress on India.” And Edward Teller, the so-called father of the hydrogen bomb, when asked if India and Pakistan were following his motto that “knowledge is good,” replied: “These explosions have not been performed for knowledge. It may be to impress people. It may be a form of boasting.

**The United States religious fanaticism mirrors that of countries that the US uses as a reason not to get the bomb**

**Gusterson 4-** professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University (Hugh, 7/14/04, Chapter 2 Nuclear Weapons and The Other, People Of The Bomb: Portraits of America's Nuclear Complex, p.39-40) MH

Although the United States is not a theocracy, the American people have their own sense of manifest destiny and divine calling that is not always so different from that of the Islamist fundamentalists whose nuclear ambitions they so fear. Major Orvil Anderson was an officer who, in distinctly Manichean terms, publicly advocated a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union (and lost the job for it): “Give me the order to do it and I can break up Russia’s A-bomb nests in a week… And when I went up to Christ – I think I could explain to him that I had saved Civilization.” Nor is Anderson’s that the use of nuclear weapons would be sanctioned by God unique: in the course of my own research I have interviewed Amerian nuclear weapons scientists who believe that Christ would have pushed the button to bomb Hiroshima and that nuclear weapons are part of God’s plan to end the world as a prelude to the Day of Judgment and the Second Coming. One can easily imagine the Western media’s respsonse if India or Pakistani generals or weapons scientists were too say such things.

**Projecting the Third World as politically unstable maintains an orientalist view**

**Gusterson 4-** professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University (Hugh, 7/14/04, Chapter 2 Nuclear Weapons and The Other, People Of The Bomb: Portraits of America's Nuclear Complex, p.41) MH

These falsely obvious arguments about the political unreliability of Third World nuclear powers are part of a broader orientalist rhetoric that seeks to bury disturbing similarities between “us” and “them” in a discourse that systematically produces the Third World as Other. In the process, we also produce ourselves, for the Orient, one of the West’s “deepest and most recurring images of the other,” is essential in defining the West “as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience.” The particular images and metaphors that recur in the discourse on proliferation represent Third World nations as criminals, women, and children. But these recurrent images and metaphors, all of which pertain in some way to disorder, can also be read as telling hints about the facets of our own psychology and culture that we find especially troubling in regard to our custodianship over nuclear weapons. The metaphors and images are part of the ideological armor the West wears in the nuclear age, but they are also clues that suggest buried, denied, and troubling parts of ourselves that have mysteriously surfaced in our distorted representations of the Other. As Akhil Gupta has argued in Postcolonial Developments, his analysis of a different orientalist discourse, the discourse on development, “within development discourse… lies its shadowy doubly… a virtual presence, inappropriate objects that serve to open up the ‘developed world’ itself as an inappropriate object”.

# Racism Internal Link Ext

**Trying to prevent other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons endorses an orientalist stereotype of being a “liar” or “thief”- the US has no more legitimate intentions than any other**

**Gusterson 4-** professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University (Hugh, 7/14/04, Chapter 2 Nuclear Weapons and The Other, People Of The Bomb: Portraits of America's Nuclear Complex, p.41-42) MH

In the era of so-called rogue states, one recurrent theme in this system of representations is that of the thief, liar, and criminal: the very attempt to come into possession of nuclear weapons is often cast in terms of racketeering and crime. After the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, one newspaper headline characterized the two countries as “nuclear outlaws” even though neither had signed- and hence violated- either the Non Proliferation Treaty or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. When British customs officers intercepted a shipment of krytons destined for Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, one newspaper account said that Saddam Hussein was “caught red-handed trying to steal atomic detonators”- a curious choice of words given that Iraq had paid good money to buy the krytons from the company EG&G. (In fact, if any nation can be accused of theft here, surely it is the United States, which took $650 million from Pakistan for a shipment of F-16s, canceled the shipment when the Bush administration determined that Pakistan was seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, but never refunded the money.) According to an article in the New York Times, “it required more than three decades, a global network of theft and espionage, and uncounted millions for Pakistan, one of the world’s poorest countries, to explode the bomb.” Meanwhile the same paper’s editorial page lamented that “for years Pakistan has lied to the US about not having a nuclear weapons program” and insists that the United States “punish Pakistan’s perfidy on the bomb.” And Representative Steven Solarz (Democrat, New York) warns us that the bomb will give Pakistan “the nuclear equivalent of a Saturday Night Special.” The image of the Saturday night special assimilates Pakistan symbolically to the disorderly underworld of ghetto hoodlums who rob corner stores and fight gang wars. US nuclear weapons are, presumably, more “legitimate” weapons carried by the police to maintain order and keep the peace.

**The affirmative constructs the proliferating countries as feminine, inferior, and subhuman**

**Gusterson 4-** professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University (Hugh, 7/14/04, Chapter 2 Nuclear Weapons and The Other, People Of The Bomb: Portraits of America's Nuclear Complex, p.43) MH

Third World nations acquiring nuclear weapons are also described in terms of passions escaping control. In Western discourse the passionate, or instinctual, has long been identified with women and animals and implicitly contrasted with male human rationality. Thus certain recurrent figures of speech in the Western discourse on proliferation cast Third World proliferant nations in imagery that carries a subtle feminine or subhuman connotation. Whereas the United States is spoken of as having “vital interests” and “legitimate security needs,” Third World nations have “passions,” “longings”, and “yearnings” for nuclear weapons that must be controlled and contained by the strong male and adult hand of America. Pakistan has “an evident ardor for the Bomb,” says a 1987 New York Times editorial. Peter Rosenfeld, writing in the Washington Post, worries that the United States cannot forever “stifle [Pakistan’s] nuclear longings.” Representative Ed Markey (Democrat, Massachusetts), agreeing, warns in a letter to the Washington Post that US weakness in its relationship with Pakistan means that the Pakistanis “can feed nuclear passion at home and still receive massive military aid from America.” The image is of the unfaithful wife sponging off her cuckolded husband.

**Their language reinforces a child-like and inferior image of proliferators**

**Gusterson 4-** professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University (Hugh, 7/14/04, Chapter 2 Nuclear Weapons and The Other, People Of The Bomb: Portraits of America's Nuclear Complex, p.43) MH

Third World nations are also often portrayed as children and the United States, as a parental figure, The message is succinctly conveyed by one San Francisco Chronicle headline: “India, Pakistan Told to Put Weapons Away.” Ben Sanders praises the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a means to “protect the atomically innocent.” But what about when innocence is lost? Steve Chapman, speaking of India and Pakistan, argues that “it’s fine to counsel teenagers against having sex. But once they have produced a baby, another approach is in order.” A New York Times editorial speaks of US “scoldings” of Pakistan and “US demands for good Pakistani behavior from now on.” Hendrick Smith reports fears that the US parental style is too permissive and will encourage misbehavior by Pakistan’s naughty siblings: “those who advocated an aid cutoff said the time had come for the United States to Set an example for other would-be nuclear nations.” Warning that American parental credibility is on the line, the New York Times says that “all manner of reason and arguments have been tried with Pakistani leaders. It’s time for stronger steps.”

# Racism Internal Link EXT

**The discourse fearing rogue state proliferation is rooted in racist assumptions and justifies further militarization and violence**

**Gusterson 1,** @ MIT Center for International Studies, [ Hugh Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 57.6, “Tall Tells and Deceptive Discourses,” p. http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/1773264770n77769/fulltext.pdf] LIAM

 The Bush administration, on the other hand, has attempted to use the debate about ballistic missile defense to transform the official discourse on nuclear weapons and arms control. It has sought to dramatically redefine the U.S.-Russian relationship, the morality and effectiveness of deterrence, and the significance of arms control. If some of the statements made by administration officials had been uttered by President Clinton, they would have met with Republican derision. The Bush administration has also appropriated some of the anti-nuclear movement’s rhetoric, only to use it in support of a further round of militarization. The new discourse, like its predecessor, starts with the assumption that the world is a very dangerous place, although the source of danger is no longer Soviet-style militant communism, but the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to “rogue states.” As Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz recently testified to Congress: “The shortrange missile threat to our friends, allies, and deployed forces arrived a decade ago; the intermediate missile threat is now here; and the longrange threat to American cities is just over the horizon—a matter of years, not decades, away—and our people and territory are defenseless.”1 Within the old discourse, military threats from abroad were used to justify nuclear deterrence. No longer. Remarkably, it is now becoming axiomatic that leaders of “rogue states,” unlike the old Soviet leaders, cannot be deterred by nuclear weapons. This axiom is being used to justify not only the development of missile defenses but also a new, earth-penetrating “mini-nuke” that would supposedly hold the leaders of “rogue states” personally at risk in their underground bunkers. Although there is no evidence to support it, and the argument seems plausible only within the context of racist assumptions about Third World leaders’ lack of rationality, the proposition that nuclear deterrence does not work on “rogue states” is now treated as self-evident by government officials.

**These representations form a global hierarchy of nations with the West on top and East the Third World in an orientalist light**

**Gusterson 4-** professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University (Hugh, 7/14/04, Chapter 2 Nuclear Weapons and The Other, People Of The Bomb: Portraits of America's Nuclear Complex, p.43) MH

These metaphorical representations of threshold nuclear nations as criminals, women, and children assimilate the relationship between the West and the Third World to other hierarchies of dominance within Western culture. They use the symbolic force of domestic hierarchies- police over criminals, men over women, and adults over children- to buttress and construct the global hierarchy of nations, telling us that, like women, children, and criminals, Third World nations have their proper place. The sense in the West that Third world nations had their proper place at the bottom of a global order in which nuclear weapons are the status symbols of the powerful alone- that nuclear proliferation was transgressing important symbolic hierarchies- is nicely conveyed by the condescending reactions in the Western media to India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests of 1998. Here many commentators sounded like secretaries of exclusive members-only clubs blackballing nouveau riche applicants. “With scant regard for the admonitions of other members of the [nuclear] group, India has abruptly and loudly elbowed itself from the bottom into the top tier of this privileged elite,” said one commentator. Putting the upstarts back in their place, US Secretary of State Medeleine Albright said that it was “clear that what the Indians and Pakistanis did was unacceptable and that they are not now members of the nuclear club.” The same sentiment was expressed in stronger terms on the op-ed page of the New York Times by former national security adviser Robert McFarlane, whose characterization of India draws on classic orientalist imagery to make its point that the Indians are not “our “ kind of people: “We must make clear to the Indian government that it is today what it was two weeks ago, an arrogant, overreaching cabal that, by its devotion to the caste system, the political and economic disenfranchisement of its people and its religious intolerance, is unworthy of membership in any club.” Mary McGrory, an alleged liberal, writing for the Washington Post op-ed page, expressed the same reaction against people rising above their proper station in life. In a comment extraordinary for its simple erasure of the great literary and cultural achievements made by the persons of the Indian subcontinent over many centuries, she said, “People who cannot read, write or feed their children are forgetting these lamentable circumstances in the ghastly glory of being able to burn the planet to a crisp.”

# Racism Terminal Impact EXT

**Racism is the root cause of all violence**

**Foucault in'76** [Michel, Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the College de France, 1975-1976, p. 254-257 Trans. David Macey] MH

What in fact is racism? It is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power's control: the break between what must live and what must die. The appearance within the biological continuum of the human race of races, the distinction among races, the hierarchy of races, the fact that certain races are described as good and that others, in contrast, are described as inferior: all this is a way of fragmenting the field of the biological that power controls. It is a way of separating out the groups that exist within a population. It is, in short, a way of establishing a biological type caesura within a population that appears to be a biological domain. This will allow power to treat that population as a mixture of races, or to be more accurate, to treat the species, to subdivide the species it controls, into the subspecies known, precisely, as races. That is the first function of racism: to fragment, to create caesuras within the biological continuum addressed by biopower. Racism also has a second function. Its role is, if you like, to allow the establishment of a positive relation of this type: "The more you kill, the more deaths you will cause" or "The very fact that you let more die will allow you to live more." I would say that this relation ("If you want to live, you must take lives, you must be able to kill") was not invented by either racism or the modern State. It is the relationship of war: "In order to live, you must destroy your enemies." But racism does make the relationship of war-"If you want to live, the other must die" - function in a way that is completely new and that is quite compatible with the exercise of biopower. On the one hand, racism makes it possible to establish a relationship between my life and the death of the other that is not a military or warlike relationship of confrontation, but a biological-type relationship: "The more inferior species die out, the more abnormal individuals are eliminated, the fewer degenerates there will be in the species as a whole, and the more Ias species rather than individual-can live, the stronger I will be, the more vigorous I will be. I will be able to proliferate." The fact that the other dies does not mean simply that I live in the sense that his death guarantees my safety; the death of the other, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) is something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer. This is not, then, a military, warlike, or political relationship, but a biological relationship. And the reason this mechanism can come into play is that the enemies who have to be done away with are not adversaries in the political sense of the term; they are threats, either external or internal, to the population and for the population. In the biopower system, in other words, killing or the imperative to kill is acceptable only if it results not in a victory over political adversaries, but in the elimination of the biological threat to and the improvement of the species or race. There is a direct connection between the two. In a normalizing society, race or racism is the precondition that makes killing acceptable. When you have a normalizing society, you have a power which is, at least superficially, in the first instance, or in the first line a biopower, and racism is the indispensable precondition that allows someone to be killed, that allows others to be killed. Once the State functions in the biopower mode, racism alone can justify the murderous function of the State. So you can understand the importance-I almost said the vital importance-of racism to the exercise of such a power: it is the precondition for exercising the right to kill. If the power of normalization wished to exercise the old sovereign right to kill, it must become racist. And if, conversely, a power of sovereignty, or in other words, a power that has the right of life and death, wishes to work with the instruments, mechanisms, and technology of normalization, it too must become racist. When I say "killing," I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on. I think that we are now in a position to understand a number of things. We can understand, first of all, the link that was quickly-I almost said immediately-established between nineteenth-century biological theory and the discourse of power. Basically, evolutionism, understood in the broad sense-or in other words, not so much Darwin's theory itself as a set, a bundle, of notions (such as: the hierarchy of species that grow from a common evolutionary tree, the struggle for existence among species, the selection that eliminates the less fit) naturally became within a few years during the nineteenth century not simply a way of transcribing a political discourse into biological terms, and not simply a way of dressing up a political discourse in scientific clothing, but a real way of thinking about the relations between colonization, the necessity for wars, criminality, the phenomena of madness and mental illness, the history of societies with their different classes, and so on. Whenever, in other words, there was a confrontation, a killing or the risk of death, the nineteenth century was quite literally obliged to think about them in the form of evolutionism. And we can also understand why racism should have developed in modern societies that function in the biopower mode; we can understand why racism broke out at a number of .privileged moments, and why they were precisely the moments when the right to take life was imperative. Racism first develops with colonization, or in other words, with colonizing genocide. If you are functioning in the biopower mode, how can you justify the need to kill people, to kill populations, and to kill civilizations? By using the themes of evolutionism, by appealing to a racism. War. How can one not only wage war on one's adversaries but also expose one's own citizens to war, and let them be killed by the million (and this is precisely what has been going on since the nineteenth century, or since the second half of the nineteenth century), except by activating the theme of racism? From this point onward, war is about two things: it is not simply a matter of destroying a political adversary, but of destroying the enemy race, of destroying that [sort] of biological threat that those people over there represent to our race. In one sense, this is of course no more than a biological extrapolation from the theme of the political enemy. But there is more to it than that. In the nineteenth century-and this is completely new-war will be seen not only as a way of improving one's own race by eliminating the enemy race (in accordance with the themes of natural selection and the struggle for existence), but also as a way of regenerating one's own race. As more and more of our number die, the race to which we belong will become all the purer.

# Ethics Impact

**Ethics is the most important issue in debate- these questions need to be resolved before deciding if the aff is a good idea**

**Snider 84,** Edwin Lawrence Assistant Professor of Forensics @ University of Vermont (Alfred, The National Forensic Journal, II, Fall 1984, “Ethics in Academic Debate”) MH

Ethics concerns codes of behavior, specifically in the "ought to" or "should" sense of behavior. Duke notes that the ethics of game use is a very important issue.5 While an issue of importance should be dealt with by strict criteria in the game design process, this is not possible, since many ethical considerations cannot be anticipated during the design process and must be dealt with during the play of the game itself. In attempting to compose an ethical code for the game of debate, the options are either to state a small number of criteria which lack precision or to produce a long list of criteria which restrict the options of the participant. Almost all philo-sophical disputations which attempt to determine whether a given pattern of behaviors is "ethical" or not give special attention to the particulars of the situation and the ends which are at issue. While murder is seen as unethical behavior by most individuals, never-theless these same individuals might find it tolerable if it was committed in self-defense. Once we begin formulating ethical guidelines we are soon lost in a sea of "if. . . then" statements designed to take situational factors and the desirability of certain ends into account. What is true of general ethical guidelines is also true of ethical guidelines for debate. Recognizing that ethical considerations probably must be dealt with inside a given debate situation, it seems appropriate to opt for the course of generating a small number of generally applicable ethical standards.

# \*Scapegoating Impact

**A. The discourse of proliferation is a way of scapegoating the problems of the world on the victim.**

**Gusterson 4-** professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University (Hugh, 7/14/04, Chapter 2 Nuclear Weapons and The Other, People Of The Bomb: Portraits of America's Nuclear Complex, p.45) MH

Noam Chomsky has suggested that the arms race between the superpowers was not really “about” the US-Soviet rivalry at all, but was a convenient way to assure the subjugation of smaller countries in the Third World under the guise of superpower competition. One does not have to swallow whole the simple reductionism of this argument to accept that there is obviously some connection between the nuclear stockpiles of some developed nations on the one hand and the political clientship and economic underdevelopment of Third World nations on the other. Just as some nations are allowed plentiful supplies of the ultimate weapon while others are prevented by elaborate treaties and international police activities from obtaining it. Without devising rigidly deterministic models connecting economic power and nuclear weapons- models that such states as Japan and Germany obviously would not fit- one can at least sketch the broad contours of this generalization: the nuclear underdevelopment of the developing world is one fragment in a wider systematic pattern of global disempowerment that ensures the subordination of the south. The discourse on nuclear proliferation legitimates this system of domination while presenting the interests the established nuclear powers have in maintaining their nuclear monopoly as if they were equally beneficial to all nations. And, ironically, the discourse on nonproliferation presents these subordinate nations as the principal source of danger in the world. This is another case of blaming the victim.

B. That leads to the mindset that scapegoated party becoming symbolic of all evil and must be destroyed

Colman 95 (Arthur D. Colman, M.D., faculty member at the G.C. Jung Institute of San Francisco, professor of Psychiatry at the University of California, San Francisco. “Up from Scapegoating.” p. 7-11) MH

Unity is the important concept in all scapegoating activity; the scapegoat represents the group's push toward its own wholeness by excluding its disparate elements. Thus scapegoating can be detected anywhere there is a transfer of negative attribution from one part of the system to another, or from one part of the system to an object outside the system, in order to fulfill what is perceived to be a unifying survival function for the system as a whole. The creation of a scapegoat requires a process akin to the psychological mechanisms of projection and projective identification in that it uses an other to contain aspects of oneself. The scapegoat is created by "projecting" the darker side of group life, the darker side being the reality of evil and sin in society. For the individual, the shadow contains those elements of the psyche that are not accepted as his or her own. As individuals we attempt to project that shadow onto others. Likewise, the group finds common negative ground in the scapegoat. But the scapegoat is not identical to the shadow; the scapegoat is a collective creation, a symbolic compromise for many individuals' negative projections. One can say that the scapegoat is humanity's societal vessel for the shadow - a vessel which is, by definition, innocent of the burden it assumes. The scapegoat is a very ancient archetype and scapegoating an ancient activity, so ancient that there are few societies where evidence of the practice has not been found. We have records of animals used as scapegoats that go back to ancient Hittite and Sanskrit texts. The works of modern authors who have used the scapegoat as a major theme (Dostoyevsky, Jackson, Lessing, for example) all hearken back to ancient days and a collective symbol that incorporates the worst of our projections in a strange, inanimate object. It is an image that taps our most primitive parts even today. An early biblical story, the basis of Yom Kippur and one that underlies the crucifixion of Jesus captures the fundamental Western image of the scapegoat. The story begins with the Israelites fleeing Egypt. Aaron and God soon find that the law and monotheism are not sufficient to colltain the Israelites who, after years ofenf<)rced slavery, have no experience taking responsibility for their own behavior. The priests arc overwhelmed with the sin offerings of a guilty people and begin a return to primitive practices rather than staying within the new laws. After several priests have been killed for violating the law, God takes a new look at what is really possible with his chosen people. First the priests create a Day of Atonement, the current Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, during which individual and collective sins of omission and commission are acknowledged and forgiven. But even this symbolic process is not sufficient, and the scapegoat is added. Hilt the goat, Oil which the lot fell to be the scapegoat, shall he presented alive be/()re the Lord, to make an atonement with him, and to let him go for a scapegoat into the wilderness. (Lev. 16:10) The power of this biblical scapegoating process is seen in the phenomena of contagion. Referring to the man who takes the scapegoat into the wilderness, the narrative reads: And he that let go the goat, for the scapegoat shall wash his clothes, and bathe his flesh in water, and afterward come into the camp. (Lev. 16:26) The process of contagion underlines a frequent functional difference between group projection and the creation of the scapegoat and individual projection and the creation of the external bad object. In scapegoating, the projection is so generalized that there is little possibility of retrieval. A boundary is erected between group members and scapegoat – the wilderness or death itself – which insures what Hitler called "the final solution." Contagion requires this boundary. It is usually not enough for the scapegoat to be exiled. It must be destroyed. Even so, the symbolic vessel of the chosen animal cannot, because of its compromise quality, entirely contain the projected evil. The person who touches the scapegoat runs the risk of becoming the next scapegoat. Most horribly, the inadequacy of this process of containment gradually requires more and more potent symbols: objects or animals become increasingly inadequate and the flesh-and-blood scapegoating of humans and human subgroups becomes an acceptable practice. This has required sophisticated rationalizations based on what Eric Erickson (1972) has called pseudospeciation to describe how a ruling or dominant group can justify locating the scapegoat function in its slaves or any other group cast as different and lower than itself. We have many examples from modern times – Armenians, Amerindians, South African Blacks, European Jews, Palestinians – all used as scapegoats in order to serve the hoped-for but specious unity of nationhood, much as individuals use shadow projections to serve the hoped-for but conscious individuation of the person. And here we see a critical connection between the growth processes in individuals and in groups, for scapegoats not only deter group development but also hamper integration of shadow projections, a necessary step in the individuation process. As long as there are scapegoats – unintegrated shadow figures for the group – integration of the shadow within the individual is an illusion. One might even say that, for the individual, the process of individuation will always be held hostage to the presence of the scapegoat in the larger community. Perhaps this feels like too heavy a burden for the individual to accept-to take on the responsibility for the scapegoats of the world as part and parcel of one's own attempts to integrate the personal shadow. Religious traditions have encountered this dilemma in the personage of Torquemada and the Spanish Inquisition, for example, and in the modern-day "neutrality" of the Pope and other religious leaders during the Holocaust. As we have seen, Jung's definition of individuation does not emphasize this connection between individual shadow and group scapegoat. His model, including the way it has been interpreted, tends to deemphasize the need to burden ourselves with the suffering of others as part of our own growth processes. To imagine the individuation process this way, however, is to accept that man is an island, that the suffering in the world is someone else's responsibility and does not grow from us or affect us. I for one reject this possibility. Individuation is an awesome burden precisely because it requires a connected, integrated outlook. Individuation demands that our bonds with other humans be included in the equation of our own development. We are all part of the scapegoating process. We are all a part of others' suffering. By our silence, we give it passive support and supply our shadows with more energy, defeating each of our attempts at integrating the archetype. We must not only accept our responsibility for the scapegoat, we must do something about it. Individuation under any other terms can be just narcissistic play.

# Scapegoating Terminal Impact EXT

Scapegoating results in the end of the world

Fasching 93 Professor of Religious Studies at the University of South Florida [Darrell J, The Ethical challenge of Auschwitz and Hiroshima: Apocalypse or Utopia, pp. 175-176] MH

The fundamental problem as Richard Rubenstein viewed it is how we treat the stranger. The problem is the human penchant for creating "the self-defeating ethos of exclusivism and intol­erance . . . derived from a religious tradition that insists upon the dichotomous division of mankind into the elect and the reprobate."36 The logical outcome of such a civilization, Rubenstein argued, is noth­ing less than an apocalyptic "world-wide catastrophe in which hun­dreds of millions of human beings are destroyed and civilization as we know it disappears. . . . [And] we have the weaponry to bring it about."37 The ethical task as Arthur Cohen conceived it is to excavate the demonic, to descend into the abyss of the demonic. One must demythologize its overwhelming reality and uncover the human roots of its inhumanity. One must come to understand the many faces and hid­den depths of its manifestations so as to be able to build a wall of containment around it and a bridge capable of sustaining the traffic of human life over it. The challenge is to divert our present historical trajectory away from any possible apocalyptic outcome. "The task of excavating the demonic," said Cohen, "is no metaphor. How can we regard the atomic bomb, or Vietnam, or the revelations of Sol-zhenitzyn's Gulag, if not as modalities of the abyss, excavations and elaborations of the human penchant to self-infinity, to the ultimate hubris which brings not only Jews but all creatures to the borderlands from which there is return for none. It begins with the Jews and it may end with the habitable world."38 This self-infinitizing sacralization (absolutizing) of some portion of the finite as a substitute for the infinite leads to a dualistic division of the world into the elect (sacred) and the reprobate (profane) and the demand for unquestioning obe­dience to the genocidal imperative—killing in order to heal

# Case Turns

**Aggressive arsenals cause proliferation, only a new form of cooperative security can end it.**

**Herdman et. al ‘93** Director of the Technology Assessment, United States Congress [August 1993 Roger C. U.S. Congress, Office of “Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Rish, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,; http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ota/9341.pdf-;Adviosory Pannel: not listed too many, WBTR] MO

Technical assistance notwithstanding, the central bargain of consensual nonproliferation agreements is that states give up their own rights to acquire weapons of mass destruction on the condition that they will not be needed to deter the weapons of others. This deal underlies regional or global arms control arrangements such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone (Treaty of Tlatelolco), and the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone (Treaty of Rarotonga). These treaties codify the international norms against weapons of mass destruction and have value for that reason alone. Beyond that, however, most of them are also associated with verification regimes intended to permit parties to assure each other that they are in compliance (see box l-A). Nonproliferation treaties involve a “freerider” problem: states that remain outside the regime can sometimes enjoy the benefit of reducing the threat to themselves without having to pay the price of giving up their own weapon options. 19 Moreover, the NPT—which permits the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China to retain their nuclear arsenals--does not eliminate the potential nuclear threat that member states may believe these nations to pose. (It does, however, commit the nuclear weapons states to pursue nuclear disarmament and to assist nonnuclear states in their peaceful nuclear programs.) The long-run success of nonproliferation policy is likely to depend, at least in part, on the reduction of the security threats used to just in acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. The security problems in each region of proliferation concern are different; each will require specially tailored arrangements if parties are to trust one another enough to halt or reverse their military competitions. Such arrangements may consist of combinations of political accommodations, economic measures, military confidence-building a potential threat to their neighbors that will make measures, and arms control. They may also involve security guarantees provided to regional states by powers outside the region (positive security assurances), or assurances from extra regional powers that military force-or weapons of mass destruction-will not be used against regional states (negative security assurances). Regional security measures and nonproliferation policies have to proceed in tandem. States lacking confidence in regional security arrangements may be unwilling to forgo development of weapons of mass destruction, thus posing it harder to resolve the regional security situation. Some analysts go so far as to assert that a transformation of the whole basis of global security will be required to have any chance of inducing restraint among many of the states that might otherwise turn to weapons of mass destruction. Proliferation cannot be controlled, they argue, unless the international political system is fundamentally changed from one in which states assure their own security through their military forces and alliances, to a “cooperative security” regime in which states do not maintain forces sufficient to conduct aggression in the first place. With the Cold War over, these analysts believe it is now possible to move towards such a world.

**Proliferation freezes the use of the bomb**

**Baudrillard 95** Professor of Philosophy of Culture and Media Criticism at the European Graduate School in Saas-Fee, Switzerland (Jean, 2/15/95, Simulation and Simulcara, “The Precession of Simulcara” p.39-40) MH

This is why nuclear proliferation does not increase the risk of either an atomic clash or an accident- save in the interval when the “young” powers could be tempted to make a nondeterrent, “real” use of it (as the Americans did in Hiroshima- but precisely only they had a right to this “use of value” of the bomb, all of those who have acquired it since will be deterred from using it by the very fact of possessing it. Entry into the atomic club, so prettily named, very quickly effaces (as unionization does in the working world) any inclination toward violent intervention. Responsibility, control, censure, self-deterrence always grow more rapidly than the forces or the weapons at our disposal: this is the secret of social order. Thus the very possibility of paralyzing a whole country by flicking a switch makes it so that the electrical engineers will never use this weapon: the whole myth of the total and revolutionary strike crumbles at the very moment when the means are available- but alas precisely because those means are available. Therein lies the whole process of deterrence. It thus perfectly probable that one day we will see nuclear powers export atomic reactors, weapons, and bombs to every latitude. Control by threat will be replaced by the more effective strategy of pacification through the bomb and through the possession of the bomb. The “little” powers, believing that they are buying their independent striking force, will buy the virus of deterrence, of their own deterrence. The same goes for the atomic reactors that we have already sent them: so many neutron bombs knocking out all historical virulence, all risk of explosion. In this sense, the nuclear everywhere inaugurates an accelerated an accelerated process of implosion, it freezes everything around it, it absorbs all living energy. The nuclear is at once the culminating point of available energy and the maximization of energy control systems. Lockdown and control increase in direct proportion to (and undoubtedly even faster than) liberating potentialities. This was already the aporia of the modern revolution. It is still the absolute paradox of the nuclear. Energies freeze in their own fire, they deter themselves. One can no longer imagine what project, what power, what strategy, what subject could exist behind this enclosure, this vast saturation of a system by its own forces, now neutralized, unstable, unintelligible, non-explosive- except for the possibility of an explosion toward the center, of an implosion where all these energies would be abolished in a catastrophic process (in the literal sense, that is to say in the sense of a reversion of the whole cycle toward a minimal point, of a reversion of energies toward a minimal threshold).

# Case Turns

**One instance of proliferation makes further instances less likely- domestic politics.**

**Waltz 1981** (Kenneth, Emritus Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better,” *Adelphi Papers*, Number 171.)GL

What can one say? Four things primarily. First, Possession of nuclear weapons may slow arms races down, rather than speed them up, a possibility considered later. Second, for less developed countries to build nuclear arsenals requires a long lead time. Nuclear power and nuclear weapons programmes, like population policies, require administrative and technical teams able to formulate and sustain pro grammes of considerable cost that pay off only in the long run. The more unstable a govern ment, the shorter becomes the attention span of its leaders. They have to deal with today's problems and hope for the best tomorrow.  In countries where political control is most diffi cult to maintain, governments are least likely to initiate nuclear-weapons programmes. In such states, soldiers help to maintain leaders in power or try to overthrow them. For those pur poses nuclear weapons are not useful. Soldiers who have political clout, or want it, are less interested in nuclear weapons than they are in more immediately useful instruments of poli tical control. They are not scientists and tech nicians. They like to command troops and squadrons. Their vested interests are in the military's traditional trappings.

**Prolonged proliferation is good and solves their impacts- trying to prevent acquisition just makes it worse**

**Waltz 1981** (Kenneth, Emritus Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better,” *Adelphi Papers*, Number 171.)GL

Nuclear weapons in the hands of six or seven states have lessened wars and limited conflicts. The further spread of nuclear weapons can be expected to widen those effects. Should the United States then promote the spread of nuclear weapons for the sake of peace, even though we need not for the sake of stability? To do so would replace one extreme policy with another. Present policy works hard to prevent additional states from acquiring nuclear weapons. My examination of the effects of nuclear weapons leads to the conclusion that our policy is wrong without supporting the proposition that true proliferation—the rapid spread of nuclear weaponry—is desirable.Rapid change may be destabilizing. The slow spread of nuclear weapons gives states time to learn to live with them, to appreciate their virtues, and to understand the limits they place on behaviour.

**Proliferation solves war- empirics.**

**Waltz 1981** (Kenneth, Emritus Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better,” *Adelphi Papers*, Number 171.)

The world has enjoyed more years of peace since 1945 than had been known in this cen tury—if peace is defined as the absence of general war among the major states of the world. The Second World War followed the first one within twenty-one years. As of 1980 35 years had elapsed since the Allies’ victory over the Axis powers.  Conflict marks all human affairs. In the past third of a century, conflict has generated hostility among states and has at times issued in violence among the weaker and smaller ones. Even though the more powerful states of the world have occasionally been direct participants, war has been confined geographically and limited mili­tarily. Remarkably, general war has been avoided in a period of rapid and far-reaching changes—decolonization; the rapid economic growth of some states; the formation. tighten ing, and eventual loosening of blocs; the devel opment of new technologies; and the emer­gence of new strategies for fighting guerrilla wars and deterring nuclear ones. The pre valence of peace, together with the fighting of circumscribed wars, indicates a high ability of the post-war international system to absorb changes and to contain conflicts and hostility. Presumably features found in the post-war system that were not present earlier account for the world's recent good fortune. The biggest changes in the post-war world are the shift from multipolarity to bipolarity and the intro duction of nuclear weapons.

# Impact D

**Even if they win that the country is “irrational”, the nuclear taboo means they will become responsible once they get the bomb**

**Frey 6**, Post-doctoral Research Fellow at the Institute Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (Karsten, IBEI WORKING PAPERS, “Nuclear Weapons as Symbols: The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making,” http://ssrn.com/abstract=960762) MH

Since the detonations of atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, nuclear weapons have been considered to be the ultimate weapons, incomparable to any other weapon system. Over time, this understanding largely detached them from the portfolio of conventional military means available to strategists and defence planners and assigned them a symbolic meaning that influenced the identity and norms creation of nations. In most countries today, the development of nuclear weapons is considered morally prohibitive, incompatible with a country’s identity and international outlook. In some states, however, these negative norms are overridden by a positive set of norms, causing nuclear weapons to become either symbols of invulnerability to perceived threats or the regalia of major power status. Despite the vast literature on nuclear proliferation, more in-depth analyses have only recently been conducted to identify the conditions that cause most states to develop a moral aversion to nuclear weapons, yet effectively lead to their glorification in others. The studies on these aspects of nuclear arming behaviour consider the existence of a negative normative predisposition, often referred to as ‘nuclear taboo’1, as a major factor preventing their acquisition and use. Many do not just acknowledge the existence of a nuclear taboo inhibiting the use of nuclear weapons, but point to the existence of the opposing effect of norms, frequently referred to as ‘nuclear myth’2, when it comes to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. At this stage, it is important to note that the emergence of the nuclear myth relates to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, not to their use. The phenomenon that many countries which acquire nuclear weapons still maintain a taboo with regard to their use becomes visible in the self-perception as ‘responsible nuclear power’ which dominates the domestic discourses within these states. The myth emerges when certain symbolic meanings are attached to nuclear weapons, which are perceived to reflect a state’s identity, its self-image and its desired position in the international system. The concept of ‘nuclear myth’ is closely related to

**No prolif- cost deters**

**Herdman et. al ‘93** Director of the Technology Assessment, United States Congress [August 1993 Roger C. U.S. Congress, Office of “Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Rish, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,; http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ota/9341.pdf-; Adviosory Pannel: not listed too many, WBTR] MO

In terms of costs, resources required, and possibility of discovery, the difficulty of obtaining nuclear weapon materials—plutonium or highly enriched uranium—today remains the greatest single obstacle most countries would face in pursuing nuclear weapons. Even straightforward methods of producing such material indigenously (such as building a small reactor and a primitive reprocessing facility to produce plutonium and recover it from irradiated reactor fuel) would require at least a modest technological infrastructure and hundreds of millions of dollars to carry out. Moreover, once such a facility became known, it could generate considerable pressure from regional rivals or the international community. The costs of a full-scale indigenous nuclear weapon program-especially if clandestine--can be substantially higher than for a program largely aimed at producing just one or two bombs and carried out in the open. Iraq spent 10 to 20 times the cost of such a minimal program-many billions of dollars-to pursue multiple uranium enrichment technologies, to build complex and sometimes redundant facilities, to keep its efforts secret, and to seek a fairly substantial nuclear capability. Few countries of proliferation concern can match the resources that Iraq devoted to its nuclear weapon program. (Iran, however, probably could.) Since production of nuclear materials is generally the most difficult and expensive part of producing a nuclear weapon, the leakage of significant amounts of weapon-grade material from the former Soviet Union would provide a great advantage to potential proliferants. Indeed, the possibility of black-market sales of weapon-usable materials may represent one of the greatest proliferation dangers now being faced. Even the covert acquisition of low-enriched uranium, which can fuel nuclear reactors but is not directly usable for nuclear weapons, could be advantageous to a proliferant by enhancing the capacity of its isotope separation plants. This ominous prospect notwithstanding, nuclear materials suitable for weapon purposes have to date been extremely difficult to obtain from countries that already possess them. There is no reliable evidence that any militarily significant quantities of nuclear weapon material have been smuggled out of the former Soviet Union. The vast majority of nuclear material in nonnuclear weapon states is safeguarded by a comprehensive system of material accountancy and control administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These safeguards are not perfect, but they provide high levels of confidence that significant quantities of nuclear material have not been diverted from safeguarded nuclear reactors. Diversion would be more difficult to detect from facilities such as fuel fabrication plants, uranium enrichment plants, and plutonium reprocessing facilities that process large quantities of nuclear material in bulk form, as opposed to handling it only in discrete units such as fuel rods or reactor cores. At present, however, there are no large facilities of this type under comprehensive IAEA safeguards in countries of particular proliferation concern.25 At least in the short run, the diversion of safeguarded materials poses less of a threat to the nonproliferation regime than the black-market purchase or covert indigenous production of nuclear materials. Under current European and Japanese plans for reprocessing and limited reuse of plutonium from commercial reactor fuel, the current worldwide surplus of some 70 tomes of safeguarded, separated reactor-grade plutonium-the type produced by commercial nuclear reactors in normal operation-will likely continue to grow through the 1990s by more than 10 tomes per year. Reactor-grade plutonium is more radioactive and more difficult to handle than weapon-grade plutonium, which is produced specifically for use in nuclear weapons, but it can still be used to make a crude nuclear weapon of significant (though probably less predictable) yield. Nevertheless, the states that have sought nuclear weapons have gone to great lengths to produce weapon-grade materials--either highly enriched uranium or weapon-grade plutonium-rather than reactor-grade plutonium. (Note that some types of nuclear power reactors, including ones in India, South Korea, and North Korea, can produce either reactor-grade or weapon-grade plutonium, depending on how they are operated.)

# Impact D

**Their impacts will never occur- nuclear weapons have a stabilizing effect.**

**Kroenig 08** (Matthew, Assistant professor in the Department of Government at the University of Georgetown, 6/17/08, Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation, page , http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig\_Beyond%20Optimism%20and%20Pessimism.pdf) AG

Kenneth Waltz, and other “proliferation optimists” argue that “more may be better” because nuclear weapons increase the cost of conflict, deterring leaders from engaging in war against nuclear-armed states. The spread of nuclear weapons, in the optimists’ conception, has a pacifying effect on international politics, leading to international stability.

**The true dangers of nuclear weapons are socially-constructed, reflecting the identities of the actors involved**

**Frey 06** (Karsten, Post-doctoral Research Fellow at the Institute Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals, [IBEI WORKING PAPERS, “ Nuclear Weapons as Symbols: The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making,” http://ssrn.com/abstract=960762) **GL**

In constructing defensible postures to support their self-images, people must often rearrange their perceptions, evaluations, and opinions. To see that their decisions were correct may involve increasing the value they place on what they have achieved and devaluing what they sacrificed. By spreading apart the earlier alternatives 8- and heavily weighting sunk costs, inertia and incrementalism are encouraged. Each step in the process of developing a policy adds psychological pre s s u res to take further steps 11.The starting point of any comprehensive explanatory approach to nuclear choice is the understanding that a clear distinction exists between conventional and nuclear weapons. This distinction does not rest on the differences in military application or level of destructive power. Rather, the distinction is socially created, reflecting the identities of the actors involved. Identities translate into norms determining behavioural patterns. As previous sections have shown, in the process of norms creation emotions such as pride and fear are attached to the nuclear issue. In this process, nuclear weapons emerge as symbols of immunity and prestige.

**Nuclear weapons influence the identity and norms creation of international relations**

**Frey 06** (Karsten, Post-doctoral Research Fellow at the Institute Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals, [IBEI WORKING PAPERS, “Nuclear Weapons as Symbols: The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making,” http://ssrn.com/abstract=960762) **GL**

Since the detonations of atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, nuclear weapons have been considered to be the ultimate weapons, incomparable to any other weapon system. Over time, this understanding largely detached them from the portfolio of conventional military means available to strategists and defence planners and assigned them a symbolic meaning that influenced the identity and norms creation of nations. In most countries today, the development of nuclear weapons is considered morally prohibitive, incompatible with a country’s identity and international outlook. In some states, however, these negative norms are overridden by a positive set of norms, causing nuclear weapons to become either symbols of invulnerability to perceived threats or the regalia of major power status. Despite the vast literature on nuclear proliferation, more in-depth analyses have only recently been conducted to identify the conditions that cause most states to develop a moral aversion to nuclear weapons, yet effectively lead to their glorification in others. The studies on these aspects of nuclear arming behaviour consider the existence of a negative normative predisposition, often referred to as ‘nuclear taboo’1, as a major factor preventing their acquisition and use. Many do not just acknowledge the existence of a nuclear taboo inhibiting the use of nuclear weapons, but point to the existence of the opposing effect of norms, frequently referred to as ‘nuclear myth’2, when it comes to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. At this stage, it is important to note that the emergence of the nuclear myth relates to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, not to their use. The phenomenon that many countries which acquire nuclear weapons still maintain a taboo with regard to their use becomes visible in the self-perception as ‘responsible nuclear power’ which dominates the domestic discourses within these states.

# Impact D

**Nuclear Proliferation is fabulously textual because there has never been a nuclear war on a large scale**

**Taylor, 98 -** Associate Professor in the Department of Communication, University of Colorado, Boulder (Brian C. Western Journal of Communication 62.3, “Nuclear weapons and communication studies: A review essay,”

http://comm.colorado.edu/taylorbc/NuclearWeaponsandCommunicationStudies.doc) LUKE

In a conference held at Cornell University in April 1984, these scholars assembled to develop a uniquely nuclear criticism, one that would "demonstrate how the forms of the current nuclear discussion are being shaped by literary or critical assumptions whose implications are often, perhaps systematically, distorted" ("Proposal," 1984, p. 2). In his keynote address, Derrida (1984) delivered a mixed prognosis for the project from the vantage of deconstruction. The good news, he offered, was that since nuclear war had not (yet) happened and yet was the hotly-contested object of simulations (such as computer war-games), its ontological status was "fabulously textual"-- and thus uniquely suited for criticism. The bad news was that--for the very same reasons-critics had no more authority to make definitive claims about the nuclear "referent" than the speakers they were critiquing. This condition meant that critics could "speak" to nuclear "power"--but not with certainty of unproblematic "Truth" (see Ruthven, 1993). Confounded at launch, nuclear criticism fractured but still ignited. As a method for confronting the limits of knowledge, deconstruction seemed uniquely suited for the imagined catastrophe of nuclear war, which threatened to destroy the very grounds of speech--self, world, and other. In turn, the high stakes of this project offered to redeem deconstruction's alleged relativism (Chaloupka, 1992). Two genres of scholarship emerged in subsequent studies of public-policy, media journalism, and popular-cultural texts. One genre was metatheoretical, and embraced Derridean textualism to critique the possibilities of valid nuclear-critical discourse. The other was more pragmatic, and analyzed texts with the goal of ethical intervention in public deliberation. Generally, scholars of both genres agreed that "nuclearism"(n1) was intertextually configured by potent cultural discourses such as militarism, nationalism, bureaucracy, and technical-rationality. This hybrid discourse, they argued, suppressed its contingencies, normalized the presence and use of nuclear weapons, deferred the accountability of nuclear professionals, and inhibited ethical reflection about the risks and consequences of nuclear war (Aubrey, 1985; Chilton, 1986; Cohn, 1987). Beyond this initial spate of activity, however, scholarly interest in nuclear criticism per se proved temporary.

**Nuclear Threat is blown way out of proportion Western Society has fantasized a nuclear holocaust**

**Taylor, 98 -** Associate Professor in the Department of Communication, University of Colorado, Boulder (Brian C. Western Journal of Communication 62.3, “Nuclear weapons and communication studies: A review essay,”

http://comm.colorado.edu/taylorbc/NuclearWeaponsandCommunicationStudies.doc) LUKE

Rhetorical-critical studies also have depicted the different theoretical resources which communication scholars bring to bear on nuclear weapons discourse. One related tension in these studies is that between formalist and post-formalist orientations to criticism. One group of scholars has been concerned with characterizing the unique structural properties (such as metaphor and fantasy themes) and strategies (such as domestication and bureaucratization) of nuclear discourse (Ausmus, 1998; Foss & Littlejohn, 1986; Kauffman, 1989; Schiappa, 1989). Drawing on Burke, Brummet (1989) made an argument that is foundational for this orientation: that nuclear weapons reflect and exacerbate pernicious qualities of language such as reification, hierarchy; and an "entelechical" compulsion to perfect technological possibilities. Potentially, however, this synchronic focus can limit critical appreciation of history and culture as contexts for nuclear discourse (Krug, 1995). It also elides a dilemma in which--as a professionalized activity--criticism may be contaminated with the very qualities of nuclearist language that it opposes: abstraction, objectivity, dualism, literalism, hierarchy, and patriarchy (Bjork, 1996).

# Turns Relations

**Only in the world of the alternative can true international relations be obtained - proliferation discourse creates a spillover of suspicion and paranoid towards other states**

**Mutimer 2000** (David, PhD in political science and professor in York University, “The Weapons State,” p.29-30) GL

The first attempts to gain some control over the nuclear genie, which had been so drastically released from its bottle in 1945, foundered on the failure of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom to agree on the 1947 Baruch Plan. The plan called for the international control of nuclear energy, centered on the creation of a UN agency that would have control over all aspects of the field. The United Nations would also hold in trust the only legal arsenal of atomic weapons in the world. The Acheson-Lilienthal report, which is the basis of the Baruch Plan, pointed out the benefit of this arrangement over contemporary proposals for the elimination of atomic weaponry: When the news of the atomic bomb first came to the world there was an immediate reaction that a weapon of such devastating force must somehow be eliminated from warfare; or to use the common expression, that it must be "outlawed." That efforts to give specific content to a system of security have generally proceeded from this initial assumption is natural enough. But the reasoning runs immediately into this fact: The development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and the development of atomic energy for bombs are in much of their course interchangeable and interdependent. From this it follows that although nations may agree not to use in bombs the atomic energy developed within their borders the only assurance that a conversion to destructive purposes would not be made would be the pledged word and the good faith of the nation itself. This fact puts an enormous pressure upon national good faith. Indeed it creates suspicion on the part of other nations that their neighbors' pledged word will not be kept. This danger is accentuated by the unusual characteristics of atomic bombs, namely their devastating effect as a surprise weapon, that is, a weapon secretly developed and used without warning. Fear of such surprise violation of pledged word will surely break down any confidence in the pledged word of rival countries developing atomic energy if the treaty obligations and good faith of the nations are the only assurances upon which to rely. Thus for Dean Acheson and David Lilienthal, although the expressed goal was to eliminate nuclear weapons, the best that could reasonably be achieved was a form of regulation. As it turned out, even this form of control was more than could reasonably be achieved in the early days of the Cold War. The report, however, articulated and linked the elements of two images that would frame the nuclear weapons problem and around which practices would develop: a "disarmament" image and an "arms control" image.

**Countries recognize this- that leads to straining US relations with the potential proliferators**

**Gusterson 4-** professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University (Hugh, 7/14/04, Chapter 2 Nuclear Weapons and The Other, People Of The Bomb: Portraits of America's Nuclear Complex, p.42) MH

Reacting angrily to this system of representations, the scientist in charge of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, said, “Anything which we do is claimed by the West as stolen and we are never given credit except for things like heroin… You think that we people who also got education are stupid, ignorant. Things which you could do fifty years ago, don’t you think that we cannot do them now?”

# 2NC Error Replication

**The “proliferation” image ignores the actual problem by just focusing on the spread of technology, this only replicates the harms**

**Mutimer**, David. **2k** “The Weapons State” Mutimer has a PhD in political science from York University and is now an associate professor of political science there. p. 156 LH

I have shown that the "proliferation" image is rooted in a technological rendering of the security problem of weapons. By generalizing to all forms of weaponry the view that nuclear technology of any kind produces the capacity for nuclear weapons, "proliferation" constructs as its object of security concern the movement of that underlying technology. This frame highlights the connections between technological development and capacity while downplaying or hiding other crucial features of the practices of arms production and transfer. These masked features include the reasons for which states produce, transfer, and acquire arms-including, crucially, links between the possession of arms in general and certain categories of arms in particular and claims to statehood and status within the international hierarchy of states. "Proliferation" hides the fact that to be a state in the contemporary world means having certain military assets; moreover, to be a leading state means, among other things, having access to a wide range of highly advanced military technologies. Indeed, and ironically, the "proliferation" image tends to hide weapons themselves in its focus on the technological underpinnings of those weapons.

\*\*\*Framework

# Discourse Shapes Reality

**Proliferation discourse just naturalizes the bomb and makes it more likely that it will be used**

**Woods 7** earned his doctorate at Brown University (Matthew, 2007, “Unnatural acts Nuclear language, proliferation and order”, p.95-6) MH

Naturalization is a general process that accounts for the way in which humans render the world and its things as given. Within nuclear language studies, the term refers Unnatural acts 97 most frequently to how things which should be alien or repulsive acquire an ordinary or attractive appearance. Scholars assert the aim of nuclear language is sequential naturalization: to naturalize nuclear weapons by first naturalizing the language used to speak and think about them. Naturalization is thus approach and outcome. As approach, naturalization captures how language associated with nuclear arms — language which should be repugnant — acquires the neutral or appealing meaning which renders it transformational. Scholars of nuclear language agree four intuitions impel naturalization. The first is that language engenders dominant views. Costigliola writes: “Language is a coded, and often loaded, system of meaning. The language with which we describe a concept or a policy shapes our understanding and feelings about that concept or policy, often without our being completely cognizant of the process” (Costigliola 1997: 164). The second is that molding language directs dominant views. “The covert nuclearization of language functions to neutralize, sanitize and cleanse the terminology used in the nuclear discourse in order to make nuclear weapons and nuclear war appear more acceptable and respectable” (Hook 1985: 69; Bowker and Star 1999). The third intuition is to replace repugnant with natural or familiar meanings, as molded language must be used widely to be transformational (Nelkin and Pollack 1980; Schiappa 1989; Mead and Lee 1990). The fourth intuition is to maximize transformational capacity by appropriating those deeply and eminently natural and familiar modes of expression: tropes, metaphors and euphemisms (for instance) of body, gender and home. Costigliola reveals how body and gender operate when he contends: “US officials used language that depicted difficult allies as beings that were in some way diminished from the norm of a healthy heterosexual male: sick patients, hysterical women, naive children, emasculated men. Such images of the needy activated altruistic language and so helped transform American control into American caring” (Costigliola 1997: 165; Hook 1984; Gyi 1984; Cohn 1987a; Lawrence 1996). Naturalization accounts for the way words connected to nuclear weapons acquire the meanings which ultimately render nuclear weapons normal and familiar devices — which credits it with the nuclear order, as well. In this respect, naturalization refers to a state of affairs in which an arrangement once deemed illegitimate or iniquitous now seems normal and proper. It describes legitimation and pivots on the impulse within an actor to reconcile itself to a distasteful situation by receiving and promoting it as how such a situation should be. In this sense, scholars claim nuclear language naturalizes the prevailing nuclear order as it renders nuclear arms easier to accept and dilutes the guilt and conflict associated with promoting and relying upon apocalyptic weapons as a fount of human security. While this collection of scholars agree on the way nuclear language coalesces and transforms views, they debate its motive. Some receive nuclear language as volitional. These scholars emphasize lexis and maintain actors intentionally devise word meanings to realize a desired outcome. Naturalization is a deliberate instrument to a preferred state of affairs (Kauffman 1989). May says a response to the hazard of female sexual and economic liberation (licentious or working women threatened families which supplied Cold War personnel) was the intentional union of domesticity and nuclear purpose (May 1989; Mechling and Mechling 1991; Fischer 1988; Mehan and Wills 1988). And Holt inquires into the association of nuclear arms with children and contends it stems from its ability to simultaneously alleviate guilt and render the nuclear arrangement as inevitable as birth (Holt 1990). Certain scholars, in sum, claim motive directs word choice. Others say words induce motive. These scholars emphasize the structural rather than volitional dimension of language. In this view, actors dwell in discourse which effects behavior which, in turn, yields unsought consequences (Wertsch 1987; Wertsch 1988; Mehan et al. 1990). This general claim has two dimensions: motive vocabularies and insidious modes of expression. First, scholars unite Burke’s theory of perfection (all things proceed inexorably toward their ideal) with the notion that language shapes views and action to claim discourses (as things that contain meanings) advance toward their perfection, as well (Brummett 1989; Williams 1988; Schiappa 1989; Kauffman 1989). Second, scholars declare natural and familiar forms of expression serve at once as unseen, constraining and corrupting wellsprings of discourse (Easlea 1987; Brown 1989; Caputi 1994; Taylor 1997). Scholars combine these two elements and contend that what actors do with nuclear arms stems from how they speak about them, and how they speak about them stems from insidious forms of natural expression. Regarding gender, for instance, such scholars argue the masculine aggression evident in nuclear discourse will be perfected as intractable nuclear weapons and inevitable nuclear violence (Derrida 1984; Klein, 1990; Scheick 1990; Krug 1995).

# Discourse Shapes Reality

**Critical Discourse key to deconstruct our racist representation**

**Izadi and Saghaye-Biria, 07**- received his doctoral degree from the Manship School of Mass Communication at the Louisiana State University. Comm & Public Affairs @ LSU Baton Rouge, (Foad, Hakimeh Journal of Communication Inquiry 31.2, “A Discourse Analysis of Elite American Newspaper Editorials,” p. sage) LS

Henry and Tator (2002) consider critical discourse analysis as “a tool for deconstructing the ideologies of the mass media and other elite groups and for identifying and defining social, economic, and historical power relations between dominant and subordinate groups” (p. 72). Media studies scholars have used critical discourse analysis to discover the underlying ideologies of mediated racist representations of minorities and immigrants (Hall, 2000; Henry & Tator, 2002; van Dijk, 1987, 1991a, 1992, 1993). In addition to sustaining and reproducing the dichotomy of “us” versus “them” (van Dijk, 1991a, 1993), the discourse of “democratic racism” (Henry & Tator, 2002, p. 23) in effect reproduces a lack of support for policies and practices that “require changes in the existing social, economic, and political order” (p. 24). Whereas democratic racism (Henry & Tator, 2002) underlies the ideology of media representations of racial minorities, Orientalism functions as a Eurocentric ideology for media representations of Islam and Muslims (Said, 1978, 1981). Although Orientalism has received substantial scholarly criticism (Abdel-Malek, 1963; Alatas, 1977; Djait, 1985; Hodgson, 1993; Said, 1978, 1981; Tibawi, 1963), few studies (e.g., Karim, 1997) have used critical discourse analysis to study Orientalism in the news media. Downloaded from jci.sagepub.com at UNIV OF UTAH on July 5, 2010 142 Journal of Communication Inquiry Media, Ideology, and Orientalism Understanding the ideological functions of news media has been the subject of much scholarly interest. Herman and Chomsky (2002) argue that commercial media institutions form and define people’s norms and beliefs according to the social, political, and economic interests dominating the state. Thus, the media mobilize the public to support the social interests of the elite. Societies’ dominant ideology operates as their criteria for common sense and rational understanding. The dominant ideology also tends to expel those contesting beliefs, values, and worldviews that undermine each specific society’s worldview (Knight & Dean, 1982). Gramsci (1971) contends that the ruling groups in democratic societies gain dominance through a double process of coercion and persuasion and that the media are among the key institutions of persuasion in modern societies. Gitlin (2003) notes that “in liberal capitalist societies, no institution is devoid of hegemonic functions, and none does hegemonic work only” (p. 254). He and Madrid (1986) argue that the media have become the dominant sources of hegemony in the civil societies of the modern capitalist states. Gitlin (2003) considers influential media such as the networks and the major print media organizations as part of the corporate elite, committed to the maintenance of the existing system. However, he contends that this hegemonic process is subtle and indirect: Every day, directly or indirectly, by statement and omission, in pictures and words, in entertainment, news and advertisement, the mass media produce fields of definition and association, symbol and rhetoric, through which ideology becomes manifest and concrete. (p. 4) As a consequence, with ideology defined as “the ways in which the meaning conveyed by symbolic forms serves to establish and sustain relations of power” (Oktar, 2001, p. 320), far from being neutral agents, “the media perform a function that is both ideological and political” (p. 320). In addition, the idea that media criticism is bound by boundaries acceptable to the ruling elite receives substantial empirical support (Bennett, 1990; Billeaudeaux, Domke, Hutcheson, & Garland, 2003; Entman, 1991, 2004; Lee, 2003; Malek, 1997; Mowlana, 1997).

**Discourse of proliferation images these weapons to be initially benign but with the possibility of excess-replication as deadly**

**Mutimer 2000** (David, PhD in political science and professor in York University, “The Weapons State,” p.62) GL

A "proliferation" image produces a particular kind of object. It imagines a technology that reproduces naturally and autonomously, moving outward from an identifiable origin by relentlessly multiplying. The image imagines this technology is initially benign but with the possibility of excess-reproduction is dangerous, expected even desirable, but prolific reproduction is dangerous. To permit the benign spread of technology while preventing the dangerous conclusion to that spread, external controls are required. Because the object of "proliferation" is imagined in this fashion, the forms of control that can be applied are constrained. Put another way, the particular imagination of the object of "proliferation" enables a specific series of control practices. The reverse is also true: creating given practices will construct the object of those practices in particular ways. The result is a neatly closed circle it is simple to reify-we face this particular problem with these practices; these practices are employed, so we are facing this problem. Read in either direction, the contingent becomes seen as the natural.

# Discourse Shapes Reality

**In the post-Cold War era, proliferation discourse is tied to concepts like destabilization and “problematic” arms building**

**Mutimer 1994** (David, PhD in political science and professor in York University, “Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation,” YCISS Occasional Paper Number 25, August 1994)

There are two important aspects of the language Bush adopted to address the problem in his speech to the Air Force Academy. The first is that Bush uses the term 'proliferation' to refer to all forms of weapons: "the proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons". During the Cold War, 'proliferation' was used exclusively to discuss weapons of mass destruction, and primarily to refer to the spread of nuclear weapons. A key feature of the way in which proliferation is being constructed as a post-Cold War security problem is the broad technological sweep of the concept. The move to join conventional weapons to unconventional in a proliferation control agenda poses a particular problem, however. As Bush notes, states are considered to have a right to arms in support of the "legitimate needs of every state to defend itself.” If conventional arms are to be controlled along side WMD, a means to distinguish the legitimate from the illegitimate needs to be devised. This is the second important aspect of Bush's language. The President equates problematic arms building—what was termed in the Canadian proposal "massive build-ups"—with "destabilizing" accumulations. In other words, while states have a right to conventional arms, they do not have a right to acquire conventional arms in such a way that they are destabilising. Thus, in this address, Bush provides the two metaphorical pillars of the new security image: proliferation and stability. Since this speech, the discourse and practice of states has refined this image and drawn it to the centre of international security policy in the post-Cold War world.

**Discourse towards weapons proliferation allows Western societies to determine which states are “stable” or not**

**Mutimer 1994** (David, PhD in political science and professor in York University, “Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation,” YCISS Occasional Paper Number 25, August 1994)

In July of 1991, this broad proliferation agenda was advanced beyond the Middle East by the five permanent members of the Security Council. The Five met to "review issues related to conventional arms transfers and to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction". They noted with concern the dangers associated with the excessive buildup of military capabilities, and confirmed they would not transfer conventional weapons in circumstances which would undermine stability. They also noted the threats to peace and stability posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, and missiles, and undertook to seek effective measures of non-proliferation and arms control in a fair, reasonable, comprehensive and balanced manner on a global as well as a regional basis. The statement of the Five echoed closely Bush's May speech, accepting as problematic the full range of military technology, while broadening the geographic concern. The statement also followed Bush's lead in focusing on 'stability' as the marker of problematic transfers.

# Discourse Shapes Reality

**Discourse shapes policymaking**

**Mutimer 1994** (David, PhD in political science and professor in York University, “Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation,” YCISS Occasional Paper Number 25, August 1994) GL

The problem can be stated in general terms: rational choice theory assumes: a) a set of preconstituted utilities (or interests) and b) a pre-constituted problem. Lebow and Stein, along with Sagan's organizational corrective, draw attention to the first, but only hint at the second. The argument I am advancing is that the problem, interests and possible solutions are shaped, at least in part, metaphorically. Lebow and Stein's formulation and reformulation of a problem' involves adducing and refining an image. In the preceding section I have detailed the emergence in state pronouncements and practices of an image of the international security environment following the Cold War. In other words, a problem is not presented to policy makers fully formed, but is rather constituted by actors in their (discursive) practices. This practically constituted image of a security problem shapes the interests states have at stake in that problem, and the forms of solution that can be addressed to resolve it. Central to this function of shaping interests and responses is the metaphorical character of the image so constituted. To understand how an image shapes interest and policy is it first necessary to consider how metaphor shapes understanding. Paul Chilton has provided a useful example of the role of metaphor in shaping understandings in international relations, particularly concerning the Cold War discourses around nuclear weapons and the relationship of 'the West' to 'the Soviet Union'. In doing so, he illustrates how the metaphor naturalises a policy, and the apparent interests underlying it—in this case, the central security policy of Cold War Europe. Chilton works with the example of a fairly common speech from the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, John Nott. Nott used a metaphor of 'a dying giant' to argue that there is a possibility of the Soviet Union attacking Western Europe in order to defend the 'peace through strength' policy of then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and her American mentor Ronald Reagan. As Chilton notes, "What Nott wants to do, it seems, is to assert the likelihood of Russia attacking Europe." On the basis of such an assertion, 'proven' through the analogical reasoning of metaphor, the government can justify a policy of military hostility, to insure against the lashing out of a dying giant.35 Chilton argues that policy makers address problems by means of what I have called 'images'36—that is, the student or policy maker constructs a metaphorical image of problem, an issue or even other actors.37 This image relates the thing being imagined to another, in terms of which the first is understood. These images comprise metaphors, which are used to structure and support our understanding of a problem, and therefore our response to the problem. In Chilton's example, the key relationship is the support the image and its metaphors provide for pre-existing policy. His political concern is with the bellicose nuclear strategy pursued by the Western Alliance, and the consequent danger of nuclear 'war' that the governments foist on the people of Europe and North America through the metaphors supporting the image of the Soviet Union. However, the general relationships between the image of a policy problem, the condition of the problem itself and the policy solution to that problem allow the ideas he develops to be given wider scope than Chilton provides. The metaphors entailed by a given image do more than simply support a policy choice, they structure the way in which the image holder can think about a problem, and so shape that choice in the first place. Chilton's use of metaphor is rooted in a prior argument, advanced by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. By considering their arguments directly, we can see how metaphor shapes problems and solutions in international relations, as in other areas of our lives. The common understanding of metaphor is that it is a literary tool, allowing an author to provide descriptive depth and allegorical commentary by means of establishing a relationship between two separate objects or ideas. Lakoff and Johnson argue that metaphor is much more than this, that it is absolutely fundamental to the way in which people understand and live in the world around them. "The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another."38 [Emphasis in the original] They begin with an example of the way in which the concept of 'argument' is understood in our society, suggesting that we understand argument in terms of warfare. To illustrate, they provide examples from our everyday language.

# Discourse Shapes Reality

**Discourse- specifically nuclear discourse- shapes reality**

**Woods 7** earned his doctorate at Brown University (Matthew, 2007, “Unnatural acts Nuclear language, proliferation and order”, p.95-6) MH

I am a scholar of international relations. The broad features of the approach I develop to execute this inquiry, however, have much in common with the perspective known as Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA, a list of abbreviations follows the text) (Wodak 1995; Titscher et al. 2000; van Dijk 2001). I assume the domain of international nuclear politics contains a dominant, commonsense, incorrigible3 reality — the existence of ‘proliferation’ as the inevitable, unstoppable and dangerous spread of nuclear arms — that shapes our views, behavior and identity. This reality is the product of a dialectical process of human creation that comprises everything from initial externalization, to reification, to reproduction (Fairclough 2001; Weiss and Wodak 2002). I assume the performative or creative force within this process of creation is language use, or discourse conceived as any spoken or written language use that evinces a particular social or political domain (Fairclough and Wodak 1997; Weiss and Wodak 2002); neither discourse nor process on its own can account for the creation of reality. The discourse this study examines is that of international arms control during the late 1950s and 1960s as evidenced in US and UN documents. I assume one aspect of the performative function of language use is to induce assent or persuade the audience to embrace the new reality. This implies that discursive practices and particular expressions convey some choice (even if not wholly conscious) and are not solely the unmotivated reflections of deep cognitive mappings (particularly when the construct is quite novel) (Charteris-Black 2003; Musolff 2004). The claim that language use creates reality and that its aim is to induce assent also implies that discursive practices and linguistic expressions that contribute to what Austin (1997 [1962]) deems ‘uptake’ and Fairclough (2001) sees as ‘bringing off ’ new realities should be of serious concern (Grace 1987). While metaphor has long been known as a resource for the creation of novel ontological reality (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Johnson and Erickson 1980; Charteris-Black 2003), in this sense, I assume other aspects and elements of discourse can be equally performative. In this view, I agree with Fairclough that one vital resource for the creation of new realities is what I term ‘fictions’ and he terms ‘imaginaries,’ representations of worlds or states of affairs that are not but that might, could or should be (Fairclough 2001; Clark and van der Wege 2001). Finally, since I assume that language use is to persuade or induce assent, it is evident that the reality it creates is ‘ideological’ in that it benefits some more than others, highlights some features while hiding others, decrees what is possible and impossible and seeks to legitimate and perpetuate this state of affairs (van Dijk 1993; van Dijk 2001). What is real and known imposes meaning and order on our lives. Embracing what is real and known allows us to live in the ‘real world.’ For this reason, because real and known things define and so dictate ‘normal’ views, behavior and identity, it is both vital and difficult to expose them as products of human creation. Revealing their standing as constructs requires tracing the process of their linguistic creation to achieve a level of defamiliarization necessary to make evident their evitable rather than inevitable essence. As a result, the purpose of this article is to examine the “ways in which linguistic forms are used in various expressions and manipulations of power” (Weiss and Wodak 2002: 15; Koller 2004) to elicit ‘uptake’ or ‘bring off ’ the creation of a dominant reality, one that changed our world and imposes as much meaning and order upon the life of any single individual who recoils from the prospect of the spread of nuclear arms as it does the organization of international politics: namely, ‘proliferation.’ Two main sections follow. The first identifies and delineates the deficiency within nuclear language studies. The second introduces, briefly, the version of constructivism I develop to demonstrate how language accounts for order. The second section then presents how, within this process, states use discourse strategies that often emphasize the ‘unnatural’ to create ‘proliferation’ as a commonsense and normativized social reality during UN disarmament discussions between 1958 and 1968.

# Discourse Shapes Reality

**Narrative standpoint key to understanding American fascination with nuclear war**

**Taylor, 98 -** Associate Professor in the Department of Communication, University of Colorado, Boulder (Brian C. Western Journal of Communication 62.3, “Nuclear weapons and communication studies: A review essay,”

http://comm.colorado.edu/taylorbc/NuclearWeaponsandCommunicationStudies.doc) LUKE

Bryan Hubbard's essay "Reassessing Truman, the Bomb and Revisionism" questions the appropriateness of stances taken by critics towards nuclear history and its representation. Finding fault with both orthodox and progressive narratives of the decision to drop the Bomb, Hubbard advances the Burkean concept of "burlesque" as a critical tool for diagnosing the constraints surrounding this event, in the process, he renews critical debate about the agency of nuclear actors and the ideological saturation of their organizational milieux. Indirectly, he raises a critical question involving the relative effects of tragic, comedic, and ironic frames for representations of nuclear history. As the Mechlings (1992) argue, these narrative frames create fateful interpretations of the relationships between nuclear actors, actions, and their consequences. None, it would seem, is unproblematic for political purposes. Theodore Prosise's essay, "The Collective Memory of the Atomic Bombings as Public 'History,'" involves a further layer of textualization. Its topic involves a bitter struggle conducted among curators, World War II veterans, military-industrial lobbyists, academics, and politicians over a planned exhibit of the Enola Gay fuselage in the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum in Washington, D.C. In tracing the censorship of that planned exhibit, and its replacement with ,another deemed more politically correct, Prosise is concerned with the possibilities of nuclear deliberation in the public sphere. His account; of populist-orthodox miscrecognition of nuclear history as fixed, objective Truth raises troubling questions for academics and other custodians of culture. What criteria should be used to evaluate the validity and legitimacy of historical narratives? How should conflict among and between popular memories and professional histories be conducted and resolved? How is nuclear culture served by the histories it produces?

# Discourse Shapes Reality

**Non-traditional narratives are a crucial complement to successful policy making. Only opening space for discussion of discourse of the West allows for problem solving.**

Alexandra **Homolar-Riechmann**, @ Peace Research Institute Frankfurt & Kings College**, ‘9** [Prepared for delivery at the 2009 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, “Rebels without a cause: US foreign policy and the concept of rogue states,” p. allacademic] BBL

**In the process of defense policymaking, narratives matter**. Similar to the end of the Second World War (cf. Chilton 1996: 123), with the end of the Cold War the United States defense policymaking community lacked a clear overarching security narrative that furnished policymakers with an interpretive framework to make sense of the new strategic environment the US now faced, after half a century of having a clearly identifiable ‘enemy’ in the Soviet Union. Security narratives help to establish a discursive connection between the articulation of a country’s national interests, the identification of specific security threats they may face, and how potential risks to the broader international environment are understood. In short, the construction of a new security **narrative enables defense policymakers to make sense of an uncertain strategic environment, and provides cues that aid the recognition and construction of national security threats** (see Chilton 1996: Ch. 3; cf. Hansen 2006: Ch. 2). This paper examines the process of how the location of the principal threat to US national security gradually shifted away from an ideologically opposed and powerful enemy towards small and isolated developing countries to provide a new rationale for defense planning in the post- Cold War era. In particular, this paper shows how **the concept of ‘rogue states’ first entered contemporary US security discourse and how it has since evolved, which provides a framework for understanding how it has been used to advance particular policy agendas.** The paper is organized as follows. The first section explores how actors seek to navigate a new and uncertain policy environment following a systemic shock such as the end of the Cold War. Here I argue that while systemic crises are commonly assumed to provide a window of opportunity for actors to drive through rapid institutional change and policy reform, the uncertainty generated by a sudden shift to a new international security environment may also serve to constrain the potential for significant change to be achieved. Section two examines the evolution of the principal characteristics of the rogue state concept in **US security discourse,** which **is disaggregated into three key aspects of state behavior: human rights violations; sponsoring or engaging in international terrorism, and the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.** Sections three and four examine the two catalytic events in the early 1990s that I identify as crucial elements in the development of an overarching rogue states security narrative in the US. Section three focuses on Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the War in the Persian Gulf in 1991, which increased the salience of the rogue states concept within the US defense policymaking community. This is followed, in section four, with an analysis of the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993-94, and how this event served to consolidate the place of the terminology of rogue states within the US defense policymaking lexicon and to orient the focus of US defense planning towards ‘deviant’ regimes as the principal threat to US national security. Section five builds on the examination o these two catalytic events by exploring the conceptual foundations for why rogue states became understood as the chief source of systemic uncertainty in the post-Cold War era. Here I argue that the key defining feature of rogue states, which, more than any other attribute, makes them appear ‘irrational’ and ‘unpredictable in the eyes of US defense policymakers, is not the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction or engaging in international terrorism per se.

**Discourse matters**
**Gusterson,** @ MIT Center for International Studies, 20**01** [Hugh Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 57.6, “Tall Tells and Deceptive Discourses,” p. http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/1773264770n77769/fulltext.pdf] LIAM

Weapons systems, treaties, and strategies come to seem right (or wrong) in the context of the stories we tell ourselves about them. Social scientists and historians call these stories discourses. Sometimes new discourses (like our discourse on civil rights) originate from below and eventually gain enough credibility that they are coopted by the government. Other discourses (like the discourse on deterrence during the Cold War) originate within the government, and within the tight circle of think tanks that speaks to the government, and are then propagated outward through society by waves of speech-making and media dissemination. From time to time there are sharp historical breaks as new stories and propositions become accepted with startling suddenness. Senior officials in the Bush administration are now trying to create this kind of radical shift in our discourse about nuclear weapons. The Cold War saw the rise of an official discourse on nuclear weapons that is now looking more than a little tattered. Its chief assumptions were: that the genie having escaped the bottle in a dangerous world, nuclear weapons could not be abolished, and anyone who thought otherwise was näive or worse; that even though the two superpowers were inevitable rivals racing to improve their arsenals, they were rational enough to manage their competition in ways that would not cause a nuclear war; that the arms race could be channeled and disciplined, though not prevented, by arms control treaties; and that certain avenues of competition were destabilizing and should therefore be foreclosed by mutual agreement. These included a race to build defensive anti-missile systems and a race to put nuclear, anti-satellite, or anti-ballistic weapons in space.

# Epistemology

**The negative poses an a priori question- we’re not questioning the dangers of the bomb, just whether that danger outweighs the costs**

**Mueller 8**  Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center Professor of Political Science (John, 7/16/08, “ THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF EFFORTS TO PREVENT PROLIFERATION”, polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSA08.pdf) MH

Many foreign policy efforts to increase the difficulties for additional states to enter the nuclear club and for terrorists to get the bomb are justified. For example, since a terrorist group cannot manufacture fissile material itself, it makes sense to try to secure existing material around the world.2 However the obsession over nuclear proliferation and atomic terrorism has had a number of other, more questionable, effects on foreign policy. In particular it leads to a damn-the-costs perspective. For example, in his influential book, Nuclear Terrorism, Graham Allison argues that "no new nuclear weapons states" should be a prime foreign policy principle, and he goes on to pronounce it to be no less than a "supreme priority" that North Korea be stopped from joining the nuclear club.3 Similarly, Joseph Cirincione labels nonproliferation "our number one national-security priority."4 There is nothing wrong with making nonproliferation a high priority. However, it ought to be topped with a somewhat higher one: Not killing hundreds of thousands of people in the service of worst case scenario imaginings. And the obsessive bipartisan quest to control nuclear proliferation--particularly since the end of the Cold War--has sometimes inflicted major costs on innocent people.

**The discursive taboo surrounding “proliferation” is a self-fulfilling prophecy that triggers all of their impacts.**

**Waltz 1981** (Kenneth, Emritus Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better,” *Adelphi Papers*, Number 171.)

What are the principal worries? Because of the importance of controlling nuclear weapons—of keeping them firmly in the hands of reliable officials—rulers of nuclear states may become more authoritarian and ever more given to secrecy. Moreover, some potential nuclear states are not politically strong and stable enough to ensure control of the weapons and of the decision to use them. If neighhouring, hos tile, unstable states are armed with nuclear weapons, each will fear attack by the other. Feelings of insecurity may lead to arms races that subordinate civil needs to military neces sities. Fears are compounded by the danger of internal coups in which the control of nuclear weapons may be the main object of the struggle and the key to political power. Under these fearful circumstances tomaintain governmental authority and civil order may be impossible. The legitimacy of the state and the loyalty of its citizenry may dissolve because the state is no longer thought to be capable of maintaining external security and internal order. The first fear is that states become tyran nical; the second, that they lose control. Both these fears may be realized, either in different states or, indeed, in the same state at different times.

**The West has deemed proliferation as a discourse to justify multilateral military action and makes war inevitable – images of proliferation are merely a false perception of the world**

**Mutimer 1994** (David, PhD in political science and professor in York University, “Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation,” YCISS Occasional Paper Number 25, August 1994)

It would seem, then, that it has dawned on the West that proliferation is a serious security problem—indeed, in January 1992, an unprecedented Summit meeting of the UN Security Council declared proliferation a threat to international peace and security. Such a determination opens the way for multilateral military action to respond to proliferation, under the terms of the United Nations' Charter. 'Proliferation' appears to have been developed as a central image in the new international security agenda in the time between Krauthammer's article and the recent NATO summit. The spur to the construction of this image was the war in the Gulf. In the first section of this paper, I trace the construction of the image of proliferation in the pronouncements and practices of the Western states following the Gulf War. This image of proliferation as a security problem is, as Krauthammer noted, a perception of the state of the world. That perception is a metaphorical one, as the image of a security problem which is created is grounded in metaphor. In the second section I discuss the nature of image and metaphor as they relate to the constitution of international security. Finally, I examine the particular metaphors of the proliferation image, in order to show how they shape the understanding of a problem, and the policy solutions which are developed in response.

# Epistemology

**They can never solve their impacts- the nuclear sheriff mentality only reinforces proliferation**

**Herdman et. al ‘93** Director of the Technology Assessment, United States Congress [August 1993 Roger C. U.S. Congress, Office of “Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Rish, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,; http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ota/9341.pdf-;Adviosory Pannel: Mark

Throughout history, human beings have been able to annihilate each other without weapons of mass destruction. However, the development of such weapons has greatly reduced the time and effort needed to kill, giving small nations and even subnational groups the ability to destroy lives on a scale that few nations could otherwise manage. Such mass killing does not require state-of-the-art technology; the basic technologies underlying chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons date back to World Wars I and II. Now, modern technologies—and the ever-increasing flow of goods, information, and people across national borders-can place these deadly capabilities in many more hands. Occasionally, the United States may directly influence another state’s decision to pursue weapons of mass destruction. More often, nonproliferation efforts of the United States-together with other countries and international institutions such as the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency—must operate indirectly. By establishing a system of obstacles, disincentives, rewards, and international norms or rules of behavior, nonproliferation measures are intended to lessen the desire for and increase the costs of acquiring these weapons. The challenge is to accomplish this objective in a world where states still threaten one another, and where military power is still viewed as the ultimate guarantor of national survival. Even so, several recent international trends offer us hope that proliferation might be slowed or even reversed. OTA has been asked by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, with the endorsement of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, to assist Congress in its efforts to strengthen and broaden U.S. policies to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This report describes what nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons can do, analyzes the consequences of their spread for the United States and the world, and summarizes technical aspects of monitoring and controlling their production. (A separate background paper analyzes the technologies underlying nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and delivery systems in greater depth.) This report also explains the array of policy tools that can be used to combat proliferation, identifying tradeoffs and choices that confront policymakers. A forthcoming report will analyze specific sets of nonproliferation policy options in detail. OTA gratefully acknowledges the contributions of many individuals, firms, and government agencies who assisted its research and writing for this report. Since the end of the Cold War, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has become much more prominent in U.S. national security and foreign policy planning. Revelations about Iraqi, North Korean, South African, and Israeli nuclear weapon programs, the possibility of a nuclear arms race in South Asia, and the multidimensional conflicts in the Middle East all point to the immediacy of this problem. Adding a dangerous new twist is the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a superpower armed with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons whose successor states are wracked by economic crises and political instability. At least three main factors underlie this renewed emphasis on proliferation. First, the reduced military threat from the former Soviet Union has increased the relative importance of lesser powers, especially if armed with weapons of mass destruction. Second, certain international political and technological trends are increasing the threat to international security from proliferation. Third, new opportunities are opening for enhancing the current international regimes designed to stem proliferation. Since at least as far back as the 1960s, when it sponsored the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the United States has recognized that proliferation is a global problem and combating it requires high levels of international cooperation. This country has also exerted unilateral influence, successfully in several cases, to discourage proliferation; it will no doubt continue to do so. Nevertheless, placing priority on nonproliferation will require the further development and enforcement of international norms and behavior supporting that objective. International conditions today offer significant opportunities for such cooperation.

# Epistemology

**Be cautious of the benevolent advantage claims. Western imperialism is the most relevant determinant of war in the modern era.**

Nermeen **Shaikh**, @ Asia Source **‘7**, [Development 50, “Interrogating Charity and the Benevolence of Empire,” palgrave-journals]

It would probably be incorrect to assume that the principal impulse behind the imperial conquests of the 18th and 19th centuries was charity. Having conquered large parts of Africa and Asia for reasons other than goodwill, however, countries like England and France eventually did evince more benevolent aspirations; the civilizing mission it- self was an act of goodwill. As Anatol Lieven (2007) points out, even ‘the most ghastly European colonial project of all, King Leopold of Belgium’s conquest of the Congo, professed benevolent goals: Belgian propaganda was all about bringing progress, railways and peace, and of course, ending slavery’. Whether or not there was a general agreement about what exactly it meant to be civilized, it is likely that there was a unanimous belief that being civilized was better than being uncivilized ^ morally, of course, but also in terms of what would enable the most in human life and potential. But what did the teaching of this civility entail, and what were some of the consequences of changes brought about by this benevolent intervention? In the realm of education, the spread of reason and the hierarchies created between different ways of knowing had at least one (no doubt unintended) effect. As Thomas Macaulay (1935) wrote in his famous Minute on Indian Education, We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to re- fine the vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed from the Western nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the population. This meant, minimally, that **English** (and other colonial languages elsewhere) **became the language of instruction**, explicitly creating a hierarchy be- tween the vernacular languages and the colonial one. More than that, it meant instructing an elite class to learn and internalize the culture ^ in the most expansive sense of the term ^ of the colonizing country, the methodical acculturation of the local population through education. As Macaulay makes it clear, not only did the hierarchy exist at the level of language, it also affected ‘taste, opinions, morals and intellect’ ^ all essential ingredients of the civilizing process. Although, as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak points out, colonial- ism can always be interpreted as an ‘enabling violation’, it remains a violation: the systematic eradication of ways of thinking, speaking, and being. Pursuing this line of thought, Spivak has elsewhere drawn a parallel to a healthy child born of rape. The child is born, the English language disseminated (the enablement), and yet the rape, colonialism (the violation), remains reprehensible. And, like the child, its effects linger. The enablement cannot be advanced, therefore, as a justification of the violation. Even as vernacular languages, and all habits of mind and being associated with them, were denigrated or eradicated, **some of the native population was taught a hegemonic ^ and foreign ^ language (English) (Spivak, 1999). Is it important to consider whether we will ever be able to hear ^ whether we should not hear ^ from the peoples whose languages and cultures were lost?** The colonial legacy At the political and administrative levels, the governing structures colonial imperialists established in the colonies, many of which survive more or less intact, continue, **in numerous cases, to have devastating consequences** ^ even if largely unintended (though by no means always, given the venerable place of divide et impera in the arcana imperii). Mahmood Mamdani cites the banalization of political violence (between native and settler) in colonial Rwanda, together with the consolidation of ethnic identities in the wake of decolonization with the institution and maintenance of colonial forms of law and government. Belgian colonial administrators created extensive political and juridical distinctions between the Hutu and the Tutsi, whom they divided and named as two separate ethnic groups. These distinctions had concrete economic and legal implications: at the most basic level, ethnicity was marked on the identity cards the colonial authorities introduced and was used to distribute state re- sources. **The violence of colonialism, Mamdani suggests, thus operated on two levels:** on the one hand, there was the violence (determined by race) between the colonizer and the colonized; then, with the introduction of ethnic distinctions among the colonized population, with one group being designated indigenous (Hutu) and the other alien (Tutsi), the violence between native and settler was institutionalized within the colonized population itself. The Rwandan genocide of 1994, which Mamdani suggests was a ‘metaphor for postcolonial political violence’ (2001: 11; 2007), needs therefore to be understood as a natives’ genocide ^ akin to and enabled by colonial violence against the native, and by the new institutionalized forms of ethnic differentiation among the colonized population introduced by the colonial state. **It is not necessary to elaborate this point; for present purposes, it is sufficient to mark the significance (and persistence) of the colonial antecedents to contemporary political violence.** The genocide in Rwanda need not exclusively have been the consequence of colonial identity formation, but does appear less opaque when presented in the historical context of colonial violence and administrative practices. Given the scale of the colonial intervention, **good intentions should not become an excuse to overlook the unintended consequences**. In this particular instance, rather than indulging fatuous theories about ‘primordial’ loyalties, the ‘backwardness’ of ‘premodern’ peoples, the African state as an aberration standing outside modernity, and so forth, it makes more sense to situate the Rwandan genocide within the logic of colonialism, which is of course not to advance reductive explanations but simply to historicize and contextualize contemporary events in the wake of such massive intervention. Comparable arguments have been made about the consolidation of Hindu and Muslim identities in colonial India, where the corresponding terms were ‘native’ Hindu and ‘alien’ Muslim (with parti- cular focus on the nature and extent of the violence during the Partition) (Pandey, 1998), or the consolidation of Jewish and Arab identities in Palestine and the Mediterranean generally (Anidjar, 2003, 2007).

# Epistemology

**The affirmative’s logic is ideological and not rooted in truth**

**Gusterson 4-** professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University (Hugh, 7/14/04, Chapter 2 Nuclear Weapons and The Other, People Of The Bomb: Portraits of America's Nuclear Complex, p.24-25) MH

Following Anthony Giddens in his Central Problems in Social Theory, I define ideology as a way of constructing politics ideas, institutions, and behavior that (1) makes the political structures and institutions created by dominant social groups, classes, and nations appear to be naturally given and inescapable rather than socially constructed; (2) presents the interests of elites as if they were universally shared; (3) obscures the connections between different social and political antagonisms so as to inhibit massive, binary confrontations (i.e. revolutionary situations); and (4) legitimizes domination. The Western discourse on nuclear proliferation is ideological in all four of these senses (1) it makes the simultaneous ownership of nuclear weapons by the major powers and the absence of nuclear weapons in Third World countries seem natural and reasonable while problemitizing attempts by such countries as India, Pakistan, and Iraq to acquire these weapons; (2) it presents the security needs of the established nuclear powers as if they were everybody’s; (3) if effaces the continuity between Third World countries nuclear deprivation and other systematic patterns of deprivation in the undeveloped world in order to inhibit a massive north-south confrontation; and (4) it legitimates the nuclear monopoly of the recognized nuclear weapons.

# Epistemology

**Nuclear discourse creates a disconnect in policymaking between perception and reality**

**Frey 06** (Karsten, Post-doctoral Research Fellow at the Institute Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals, [IBEI WORKING PAPERS, “Nuclear Weapons as Symbols: The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making,” http://ssrn.com/abstract=960762) **GL**

More than on any other issue, the societal debate on the nuclear question is guided by emotions and passionately defended normative principles of good and evil. This raises the question about the role of emotions in foreign policy in general, and nuclear policy in particular. While a deeper analysis of the psychology behind the emergence of emotions is beyond the scope of the present study, it is worth exploring their impact on the creation of norms as behavioural patterns in the process of nuclear policy making. As defined within this study, emotions are socially constituted and exist only in relation to a social encounter. They are based on the shared values, beliefs, and desires articulated by society. Emotions are “constituted in order to serve sociocultural functions... to restrain undesirable attitudes and behaviour, and to sustain and endorse cultural values” 7. This social constructivist understanding of emotions is well suited to explaining cross-cultural variations in the role emotions play in states’ nuclear policy making. Emotions strongly impact actors’ perceptions of others’ intentions and capabilities and determine whether the relationship is perceived in reclusive or inclusive terms. The link between the cognition and perception of actors in the international arena is described by Robert Jervis: It is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision makers’ beliefs about the world and their images of others. That is to say, these cognitions are part of the proximate cause of the relevant behaviour and other levels of analysis cannot immediately tell us what they will be. And even if we found that people in the same situation... behave in the same way, it is useful to examine decision-making if there are constant differences between the decision-makers’ perception and reality.

**The existing order is skewed through nuclear discourse – oversimplification and stereotypization inherent to this discourse leads to irrational policymaking**

**Frey 06** (Karsten, Post-doctoral Research Fellow at the Institute Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals, [IBEI WORKING PAPERS, “ Nuclear Weapons as Symbols: The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making,” http://ssrn.com/abstract=960762) **GL**

An important feature of the actors’ perception is their displayed stereotypization of the imagined other. Oversimplification and demonization, both intrinsic features of stereotypes, cause people to reason along the simple moralistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil. A negative attitude towards the antagonist causes the actor to perceive the other’s various complex, often contradictory, policies with similar bias to what Jervis refers to as the source-message interaction. Stereotyped images are thereby remarkably persistent over time. Actors do not easily adapt their stereotyped perceptions to reality but, on the contrary, tend to adjust real facts to their perceptions: “Our stereotyped world is not necessarily the world we should like it to be. It is simply the kind of world we expect it to be”9. The persistency of pre-existing beliefs largely detaches nuclear policy making from short-term policy changes by outside powers or short term structural changes of the strategic environment. Further, oversimplification leads to irrational cognitive consistency: once the narrative on nuclear weapons shifts towards their affirmation, their value becomes attributed to several logically unrelated issues. When the decision is made in favour of acquiring the bomb, the affirmative position is defended v i g o rously and defectors within the domestic arena are categorically denied.

# Epistemology

**The problems stated in the affirmative aren’t as urgent or real as one perceives – proliferation discourse falsifies our conceptions of threat and security**

**Frey 06** (Karsten, Post-doctoral Research Fellow at the Institute Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals, [IBEI WORKING PAPERS, “ Nuclear Weapons as Symbols: The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making,” http://ssrn.com/abstract=960762) **GL**

This is the most significant of all behavioural consequences of the fear emotion, for the behaviours that decrease the fear are not always danger-decreasing as well. The urge to decrease the fear can be seen at the root of many seemingly irrational responses to threat, from the ‘ostrich’ approach of simply sticking one’s head in the sand, to witch hunts and the appeal to protective dieties, or to the acquisition of totems of power24. With all their inherent symbolism as ultimate weapons, nuclear bombs strongly impact the perception of fear. In contrast to the Rationalist conception of threat, fear tends to become ‘irrational’ by increasing the threat perception to a disproportional extent – in contrast to the actual threat level –, often triggering excessive reaction to its source. Further, fear increases the actor’s sense of urgency. This phenomenon impacts the willingness of the decision maker to take immediate action. It also reduces the set of variables he takes into account to reach that decision. Further, it impacts the process by which the decision is made by excluding expert advice, which might introduce differing opinions and increase the complexity of the decision, and shortcutting the institutional chain of decision making. The fearful actor’s sense of urgency and his preference for simple and clear-cut choices adds to the potential nuclear proliferators’ predisposition to act alone. It further interrelates with their pronounced perception of the nation’s relative potential power by creating an emotionally powerful sense of defiance, which forecloses fear reduction through reconciliation or accommodation. These negative effects are widely underproblematized in Deterrence Theory.

**Nuclear discourses about rogue states are just masking the states desire to increase its power and militarize more**

**Gusterson 1,** @ MIT Center for International Studies, [ Hugh, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 57.6, “Tall Tells and Deceptive Discourses,” p. http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/1773264770n77769/fulltext.pdf] LIAM

The new nuclear discourse holds out the hope that the United States and Russia can be friends and that, although rising military powers in the Third World may not be rational, we can be safe from their weapons of mass destruction, and indeed from the entire depressing logic of mutually assured destruction, if only we can let go of the ABM Treaty and build a new generation of defensive weapons that are almost within our technical grasp. Such weapons, being purely defensive, “threaten no one,” in the words of Donald Rumsfeld. “They bother no one, except a country . . . that thinks they want [to] have ballistic missiles to impose their will on their neighbors.”16 “Once people begin to realize that this is not something that is a matter of gaining advantage over anyone but is a matter of reducing vulnerability for everybody, then I think they begin to look at it differently,” Wolfowitz told a press conference in Paris.17 All discourses, especially government discourses, have something to hide, and this one is no exception. Although the Bush administration speaks of missile defense as a purely defensive technology designed to protect the United States from “rogue states” and not to change the balance of power with established nuclear powers, I have it on good authority from sources in the Clinton White House that, in their conversations out of public view, Pentagon planners are very interested in ways in which missile defense might be able to neutralize the 20 single warhead missiles in China capable of hitting the United States, thus effectively disarming China.

# Epistemology

**Be suspect of their overblown extinction claims- taking drastic measures to cut the spread has historically been counterproductive and lead to more proliferation**

**Mueller 8**  Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center Professor of Political Science (John, 7/16/08, “ THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF EFFORTS TO PREVENT PROLIFERATION”, polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSA08.pdf) MH

Since 1945 nuclear proliferation has been a major security policy preoccupation. However, compared to the dire predictions endlessly and urgently spun out over the decades, remarkably few countries have taken advantage of the opportunity actually to develop the weapons. Most important in this process perhaps is the realization, consistently underestimated by generations of somber alarmists, that the possession of such expensive armaments actually conveys in almost all cases rather little advantage to the possessor. Nuclear proliferation, while not necessarily desirable, is unlikely to accelerate or prove to be a major danger. However, the anxious quest to prevent the spread of these weapons has proved to be substantially counterproductive and has often inflicted dire costs. Judicious policies designed to hamper the proliferation of nuclear weapons are generally desirable. However, when the approach is pushed to a logical extreme as happens frequently, policies can emerge that are at once destructive of human life--sometimes even more destructive than atomic bombs themselves--and that may actually enhance the desires of some states to obtain a nuclear capability. The plea in this paper is not to abandon nonproliferation policies, but to warn about the dangers inherit in becoming obsessed by the issue.

# Epistemology

Under the framework of Western arms control plan establishes continued nuclear apartheid and fails to prevent proliferation.

Cooper, 6 - Phd-Lectuer in IR @ Plymouth International Studies Center[Neil, *Review of International Studies* 32, “Putting disarmament back in the frame,” p. Cambridge Journal]BBL

As with the move to forcible disarmament, this is not a particularly new development, but the advent of the Bush administration, and particularly the policies pursued after 9/11, have made the asymmetry in approach between the ‘legitimate rogues’ and the ‘illegitimate rogues’ even starker. Moreover, membership of these two camps is not fixed and permanent. Pakistan, for instance, has managed to move from illegitimate to ‘legitimate rogue’ as the politics of post 9/11 created new imperatives in US policy – a process that demonstrates the extent to which the rogue label has less to do with the particular characteristics of individual states and their NBC programmes, and more to do with the way in which these are framed. Indeed, despite emerging as the centre of a clandestine global proliferation network the country has, in the wake of 9/11, been the recipient of military aid, IFI funds and political legitimacy. Of course, whilst such discrimination between the legitimate and illegitimate ‘rogues’ may undermine the goals of arms limitation this is arguably not the point. The discourse around ‘illegitimate rogues’ is, ultimately, not one that can simply be understood in terms of any existential threats posed by North Korean, Iranian or Pakistani ‘WMD’ programmes. Rather, it can be understood as the product of the interrelationship between the process of identity construction within the US and other states, the construction of external interests and the legitimation of overwhelming military superiority. The second asymmetryThe second asymmetry is that established in traditional arms limitation agreements on NBC technology – the asymmetry between the ‘WMD’ haves (those states whose nuclear weapons are deemed legitimate under the terms of the NPT) and the ‘WMD’ have-nots. This enshrines a profoundly discriminatory system of ‘WMD’ apartheid, under which a small category of states are permitted to possess a class of ‘WMD’ denied to all others.74 Indeed, even in the case of the CWC which is supposedly universal, the US Senate made its ratification conditional on a set of provisions that contravene the letter and spirit of the CWC. For example, inspection of US facilities may be refused and, if allowed, collected laboratory samples may not be transferred for analysis to a lab outside the US.75 When combined with the first asymmetry, this essentially creates three classes of ‘WMD’ states – those formally permitted to hold WMD, those informally permitted to hold ‘WMD’ (the ‘legitimate rogues’) and those demonised for holding or attempting to develop ‘WMD’. In addition, there is also an asymmetry of approach towards failure to abide by the commitments implied by the various NBC treaties. The ‘illegitimate rogues’ face sanctions of various kinds, the ‘legitimate rogues’ experience a discourse of criticism but little concrete action, and the failure of the formal ‘WMD’ states to abide by their commitment to nuclear disarmament under the terms of the NPT is merely met with a faint descant from critics off-stage.*The third asymmetry* The third asymmetry is that between the disciplinary mechanisms deployed to enforce restrictions on NBC technologies and the disciplinary mechanisms surrounding conventional military expenditure, arms transfers and the conflict goods covered by the new arms limitation agenda. In the case of NBC technologies the mechanisms deployed are severe, ranging through pre-emptive attack, sanctions, loss of trade and diplomatic isolation.76 At the level of conventional arms exports and expenditure the disciplinary mechanisms deployed are either non-existent or are weak and tokenistic. Thus, the notable successes of civil society in successfully pushing for the creation of novel arms limitation regimes in this arena has been mitigated by the reality of the limits to either their effectiveness or their scope. For instance, with the notable exception of IFI/donor initiatives aimed at restricting the military expenditures of supplicant states,77 direct initiatives to restrict defence spending are notable by their absence. Similarly, initiatives to curb arms exports are either voluntary and/or focus on transparency (the UN arms register), weak regulatory mechanisms that have marginal impact on the volume of arms sales (the UK and EU arms export codes, current initiatives on small arms)78 or symbolic acts of tokenism that have little impact on the overall direction of the arms dynamic. Examples of the latter include the landmines treaty and UN arms embargoes. For example, UN embargoes usefully express diplomatic disapproval and may also raise the cost of arms acquisition by forcing states to source from the global networks of the black market. However, the record of such embargoes in actually preventing arms reaching targeted states is abysmal and the sanction for states that breach such embargoes rarely amounts to little more than an exercise in diplomatic finger-wagging.79 *The fourth asymmetry*The combined effect of the preceding asymmetries has been to produce a contemporary system of arms limitation that acts to preserve the profound military supremacy of the US in particular and the West in general. Thus, the NBC disarmament system now in place legitimises and – through the deployment of a range of disciplinary mechanisms – imposes both a ‘WMD’ supremacy for the US and its allies and the ‘WMD’ disarmament of other states. This is especially the case, of course, with respect to that imagined and shifting category of states constructed as ‘rogue’. In contrast, the mechanisms of control developed to cover military expenditure, conventional arms exports or conflict trade are weak or non-existent. It is, of course, precisely in these areas of conventional military expenditure and trade that the US and the developed world has a profound advantage. For instance: The US now accounts for virtually half (47 per cent) of global military expenditure, NATO countries for 70 per cent and OECD states 78 per cent.80 Eighty of the top 100 defence companies reside in North America or Europe.81 The US accounts for 35 per cent of all small arms companies in the world, with authorised exports of $741.4 million in 2001.82 Europe/CIS and North America/ Central America accounts for 79 per cent of all small arms companies in the world. In the period 2000–04 the US accounted for 31 per cent of global supplies of major conventional weapons and NATO countries for 57 per cent.83 In other words, the current disarmament and broader arms limitation system is structured to preserve and reinforce both the ‘WMD’ and conventional military hegemony of the US and its allies. To be sure, this same system also creates a permissive environment for other actors who may actively support specific aspects. Russia and China for instance, clearly benefit from the legitimisation of their nuclear weapons status enshrined in the NPT, although their conventional forces remain dwarfed by those of NATO. Similarly, rogues, guerrillas and warlords are all beneficiaries of the far more permissive regulatory frameworks that are applied to conventional weapons. This means that even the current asymmetric arms limitation system is not without its contradictions. For example, whilst the US has consistently opposed any substantive action on the problem of small arms and light weapons (SALW), its forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are facing insurgents mostly armed with these same weapons.84 However, for such actors, these kinds of tension in policy represent the collateral benefit from a legal and normative order that nevertheless broadly works to sustain and legitimise the kind of overwhelming militarytechnological superiority of the US and its allies that was demonstrated in the recent invasion of Iraq. *The fifth asymmetry* The final asymmetry is that which exists between the level of resources expended on the military sector, compared with those devoted to development and human security. The contrast is startling. For instance, in 2001 the 32 richest countries (those classified as high income countries by the World Bank) allocated ten times more resources to the military ($555 bn) than to official development assistance. Indeed, in 2001 the combined annual military expenditure of the 32 richest states was roughly equal to the aggregate debt of all low income countries and US defence expenditure alone amounted to 60 per cent of the total.85 In a world of postmodern irony this is perhaps the biggest irony of all – we have, to a large degree, achieved the general and complete disarmament agenda of the 1950s and 60s, we are living in the disarmament system of a disarmament empire, but the funds expended on defence remain gross in absolute terms and both immoral and abhorrent relative to the funds spent on human security.

# Epistemology

**Affirmative representations of “managing” nuclear weapons recreate the harms of nuclear apartheid – causes increased prolif.**

**Whitney, 6** – Columnist, staff writer (February 9, Mike, Time to Scrap the NPT, www.dissidentvoice.org) BBL

The purpose of the NPT (Nonproliferation Treaty) is to reduce or eliminate the development of nuclear weapons. If it is to have any meaning at all it must be directed at nations that not only have weapons, but that demonstrate a flagrant disregard for the international laws condemning their use. The IAEA should focus its attention on those states that have a clear record of territorial aggression, military intervention, or who consistently violate United Nations resolutions. In its present form the IAEA and the NPT are utterly meaningless. Rather than leading the world towards nuclear disarmament, the agency and the treaty have simply ignored the misbehavior of the more powerful nations and humiliated the non-nuclear states with **spurious accusations and threatening rhetoric**. The NPT was never intended to be a bludgeon for battering the weaker nations; nor was it set up as a de-facto apartheid system whereby the superpower and its allies can lord above the non-nuclear states coercing them to act according to their diktats. It was designed to curb the development of the world’s most lethal weapons, eventually consigning them to the ash heap. The political maneuvering surrounding Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons programs demonstrates the irrelevance and hypocrisy of the current system. As yet, there is no concrete evidence that Iran is in non-compliance with the terms of the treaty. That hasn’t deterred the Bush administration from intimidating its allies and adversaries alike to assist them in dragging Iran before the Security Council. The Bush administration is asking the Security Council to enforce additional protocols which will preclude Iran from enriching uranium for use in electric power plants, a right that is clearly articulated in the NPT. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Iran’s determination to enrich uranium is protected under international law and should not be abridged to accommodate the regional ambitions of the United States. By giving up its legal rights Iran would be undermining the fundamental principle that underscores all such agreements and tacitly accepting that the Bush administration alone has the final say-so on issues of global concern. Why should Iran accept a standard for itself that is different than that for every other signatory of the NPT? No nation should willingly accept being branded as a pariah without evidence of wrongdoing. The fact that the United States is occupying the country next door and has yet to provide a coherent justification for the invasion is a poignant reminder of the irrelevance of both the United Nations and the IAEA. The two organizations have remained resolutely silent in the face of the massive incidents of human rights abuses, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. **While Iran is roundly condemned by heads-of-state and the corporate media, the greatest crime of our generation continues into its third year without a word of reproach from the world body. The international community simply looks away in fear. This alone should illustrate the ineffectiveness of the institutions that are designed to keep the peace.**  If the ruling body at the IAEA is to have any relevance, it must direct its attention to the real threats of nuclear proliferation posed by those nations that consider nuclear weapons a privilege that should be limited to a certain group of elite states. If the IAEA cannot perform its duties in a neutral manner that respects the rights of all nations equally, it should disband and abolish the NPT without delay. If the IAEA is uncertain about the real threats to regional peace, they should take note of the many recent polls that invariably list the same belligerent nations as the leading offenders. It is these countries that should be scrutinized most carefully. It is not the purview of the IAEA to keep the weaker nations out of the nuclear club. That simply enables the stronger states to bully their enemies with threats of using their WMD. **In fact, it’s plain to see that the current disparity in military power has created a perilous imbalance between nations that is rapidly spreading war throughout the world.**

# Epistemology

Aff is masked to preserve US asymmetric strength – ensures policy failure

Cooper, , ‘6 **-** Phd-Lectuer in IR @ Plymouth International Studies Center [Neil *, Review of International Studies* 32, “Putting disarmament back in the frame,”Cambridge Journals] BBL

However, whilst it is important(if only to counter the pessimistic discourse surrounding this issue)to recognise the variousdisarmament outcomesthat have been generatedunder the current arms limitation system, it is also important to recognise the contextin which these have occurred**.** In particular,both disarmament and broader arms limitation initiatives are now taking place as part of an asymmetrical arms limitation system that has replaced the emphasis on balance between the superpowers that dominated Cold War practice.34 It is sufficient at this juncture to note that whatcharacterises this system of arms limitation is the way in which it isstructured to consolidate and preserve the military superiority of the US in particular and the West in general. Moreover,rather than reinforcing security this profound military imbalance promotes insecurity– bothby creating incentives for other actors to pursueasymmetric technologies **(**NBC) or strategies (terrorism)that offset the US’s conventional superiority**,**35 and bydiverting resources thatcould be expended on human security to militarism**.** At best, the contemporary arms limitation system aims to keep the lidon such contradictions by setting in place a variety of disciplinary mechanisms that attempt to constrain asymmetric military responses whilst simultaneouslypreserving the asymmetrical advantages of the West**.** At worst, in attempting to contain pressures that may ultimately be uncontainable, the contemporary arms limitation system may promote an illusion of relative security whilst positively fostering a variety of insecurities**.** However, a few more comments are in order before we proceed to consider this system of asymmetrical arms limitation in more detail.

# Epistemology

**Be cautious of the benevolent advantage claims. Western imperialism is the most relevant determinant of war in the modern era.**

Nermeen **Shaikh**, @ Asia Source **‘7**, [Development 50, “Interrogating Charity and the Benevolence of Empire,” palgrave-journals]

It would probably be incorrect to assume that the principal impulse behind the imperial conquests of the 18th and 19th centuries was charity. Having conquered large parts of Africa and Asia for reasons other than goodwill, however, countries like England and France eventually did evince more benevolent aspirations; the civilizing mission it- self was an act of goodwill. As Anatol Lieven (2007) points out, even ‘the most ghastly European colonial project of all, King Leopold of Belgium’s conquest of the Congo, professed benevolent goals: Belgian propaganda was all about bringing progress, railways and peace, and of course, ending slavery’. Whether or not there was a general agreement about what exactly it meant to be civilized, it is likely that there was a unanimous belief that being civilized was better than being uncivilized ^ morally, of course, but also in terms of what would enable the most in human life and potential. But what did the teaching of this civility entail, and what were some of the consequences of changes brought about by this benevolent intervention? In the realm of education, the spread of reason and the hierarchies created between different ways of knowing had at least one (no doubt unintended) effect. As Thomas Macaulay (1935) wrote in his famous Minute on Indian Education, We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to re- fine the vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed from the Western nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the population. This meant, minimally, that **English** (and other colonial languages elsewhere) **became the language of instruction**, explicitly creating a hierarchy be- tween the vernacular languages and the colonial one. More than that, it meant instructing an elite class to learn and internalize the culture ^ in the most expansive sense of the term ^ of the colonizing country, the methodical acculturation of the local population through education. As Macaulay makes it clear, not only did the hierarchy exist at the level of language, it also affected ‘taste, opinions, morals and intellect’ ^ all essential ingredients of the civilizing process. Although, as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak points out, colonial- ism can always be interpreted as an ‘enabling violation’, it remains a violation: the systematic eradication of ways of thinking, speaking, and being. Pursuing this line of thought, Spivak has elsewhere drawn a parallel to a healthy child born of rape. The child is born, the English language disseminated (the enablement), and yet the rape, colonialism (the violation), remains reprehensible. And, like the child, its effects linger. The enablement cannot be advanced, therefore, as a justification of the violation. Even as vernacular languages, and all habits of mind and being associated with them, were denigrated or eradicated, **some of the native population was taught a hegemonic ^ and foreign ^ language (English) (Spivak, 1999). Is it important to consider whether we will ever be able to hear ^ whether we should not hear ^ from the peoples whose languages and cultures were lost?** The colonial legacy At the political and administrative levels, the governing structures colonial imperialists established in the colonies, many of which survive more or less intact, continue, **in numerous cases, to have devastating consequences** ^ even if largely unintended (though by no means always, given the venerable place of divide et impera in the arcana imperii). Mahmood Mamdani cites the banalization of political violence (between native and settler) in colonial Rwanda, together with the consolidation of ethnic identities in the wake of decolonization with the institution and maintenance of colonial forms of law and government. Belgian colonial administrators created extensive political and juridical distinctions between the Hutu and the Tutsi, whom they divided and named as two separate ethnic groups. These distinctions had concrete economic and legal implications: at the most basic level, ethnicity was marked on the identity cards the colonial authorities introduced and was used to distribute state re- sources. **The violence of colonialism, Mamdani suggests, thus operated on two levels:** on the one hand, there was the violence (determined by race) between the colonizer and the colonized; then, with the introduction of ethnic distinctions among the colonized population, with one group being designated indigenous (Hutu) and the other alien (Tutsi), the violence between native and settler was institutionalized within the colonized population itself. The Rwandan genocide of 1994, which Mamdani suggests was a ‘metaphor for postcolonial political violence’ (2001: 11; 2007), needs therefore to be understood as a natives’ genocide ^ akin to and enabled by colonial violence against the native, and by the new institutionalized forms of ethnic differentiation among the colonized population introduced by the colonial state. **It is not necessary to elaborate this point; for present purposes, it is sufficient to mark the significance (and persistence) of the colonial antecedents to contemporary political violence.** The genocide in Rwanda need not exclusively have been the consequence of colonial identity formation, but does appear less opaque when presented in the historical context of colonial violence and administrative practices. Given the scale of the colonial intervention, **good intentions should not become an excuse to overlook the unintended consequences**. In this particular instance, rather than indulging fatuous theories about ‘primordial’ loyalties, the ‘backwardness’ of ‘premodern’ peoples, the African state as an aberration standing outside modernity, and so forth, it makes more sense to situate the Rwandan genocide within the logic of colonialism, which is of course not to advance reductive explanations but simply to historicize and contextualize contemporary events in the wake of such massive intervention. Comparable arguments have been made about the consolidation of Hindu and Muslim identities in colonial India, where the corresponding terms were ‘native’ Hindu and ‘alien’ Muslim (with parti- cular focus on the nature and extent of the violence during the Partition) (Pandey, 1998), or the consolidation of Jewish and Arab identities in Palestine and the Mediterranean generally (Anidjar, 2003, 2007).

# A2: Policymaker

We can’t solve the system from the inside – we have to break down the barriers of the system rather than adjusting mechanisms of security.

Burke**, 20**02 (Alternatives 27, 2002, Anthony, Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland “Aporias of Security,”)BBL

Ur-theorist of realisrn Hans Morgenthau, surprisingly enough, expressed some qualms about such an image of security, even as he did so much to entrench national security at the apex of modern policy making. With the advent of the nuclear age, he argued, no state could purchase its security at the expense of another; now diplomacy must seek to make all nations equally secure.18 However**,** this insight was lost on a generation of later theorists and policy makers, for whom security would inevitably imply the sacrifice of the other**.** Consider George Kennan's argument, in 1948, that the United States would have to "to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to retain our position of [economic] disparity without positive detriment to our national security.... We should cease to talk about vague-and for the Far East-unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratisation." One of' Australia's most senior and influential policy makers of the post Vietnam era, Richard Woolcott, underlined the continuing power of this view when he argued in 1995 that "sentimental notions" of self-determination for East Timor and Bougainville were a threat to Australia's national security (a security that for two decades had been premised on close relations and military cooperation with the murderous Soharto regime). This highlights an urgent need to interrogate the images of self and other that animate (in)secure identities, and to expose the violence and repression that is so often relied on to police them. I am serious in arguing that the aporias of security do create important room to move, to disrupt its claim to universality and truth, to imagine new possibilities that escape its repressive dialectic of self and other. Yet here we also encounter a disturbing irony. Security forms a political technology whose power partly derives from its aporetic structure. A generalized opposition between society and its others has worked as an effective technology of fear to construct and police forms of national and ethnic identity; while illusions of universal security have simultaneously worked as a smokescreen for a realpolitik that purchases the security of the self at the expense of the other. In short,security's power lies in the very slipperiness of its significations, its ironic structure of meaning, its ability to have an almost universal appeal yet name very different arrangements of order and possibility for different groups of people. This is why it is pointless to try and stabilize security's ontology. It is better to track security's tactical and discursive power though its development as a constitutive account of the political-one that is simultaneously structured, enabled, and fissured by its aporias.

\*\*\*Alternative

# Orientalism Alternative

**The alternative is to reject the affirmative’s affirmation of the Orientalist dogmas. Only though total rejection can one de-Orientalize yourself and abandon political identity**

 **Nayak 03** Political Science PhD candidate, University of Minnesota (Meghana V., 2003, The Orientalism of Mapping Bodies and Borders: Postcolonial (In) Security and Feminist Contentions on the India-Pakistan Border, [www.southwestern.edu/academics/bwp/pdf/2003bwp-nayak.pdf](http://www.southwestern.edu/academics/bwp/pdf/2003bwp-nayak.pdf)) MH

More importantly, how can one intervene in such gestures that authorize Orientalist mapping of borders and bodies, that are ironically in the guise of having some agency in the international hierarchy? Krishna argues: We are back in the realm of the ironic: the definitive marker of the postcolonial society is that of one trapped in time, post-colony but prenation. And yet, the way to modern nationhood can only be through the complete colonization of the self. Thus, to decolonize the self may mean denationalizing the narratives that embody space and time. (Krishna 1996, 209) Partha Chatterjee’s (1986) treatment of nationalism as a “problem in the history of political ideas,” contrasts nationalism’s appeal in approaching liberty and progress with its practices of chauvinism, xenophobia, and organized violence. The ideology of nationalism faces this contradiction because of its acceptance of East-West division. Thus, I would also pose Krishna’s call as one to de-Orientalize the self. De-Orientalizing the self, like decolonizing the self, is to explicitly recognize that attempts to belong and to own political discourses are so very tempting but also counterproductive. Participation by Others to frantically hold on to their identities (and the boundaries of such identities) will not eradicate such logic but may recreate the very frameworks and modalities that created conditions of oppression. What kind of response should there be? 16 First, critical scholars and activists must actively confront and destabilize the four dogmas of Orientalism. …one is the absolute and systematic difference between the West, which is rational, developed, humane, superior, and the Orient, which is aberrant, undeveloped, inferior. Another dogma is that abstractions about the Orient, particularly those based on texts representing a “classical” Oriental civilization, are always preferable to direct evidence drawn from modern Oriental realities. A third dogma is that the Orient is eternal, uniform, and incapable of defining itself; therefore it is assumed that a highly generalized and systematic vocabulary for describing the Orient from a Western standpoint is inevitable and even scientifically “objective.” A fourth dogma is that the Orient is at the bottom something either to be feared (the Yellow Peril, the Mongol hordes, the brown dominions) or to be controlled (by pacification, research and development, outright occupation whenever possible). (Said 1979, 300-301). But they must confront Orientalism without being obsessed with Orientalism as the point of departure for resistance. Colonialism did not “remould[sic] … indigenous structures, making them dependent or derivative” (Sarkar 2000: 242). The attempt to “fix” India occurred long before the colonialist enterprise. In fact, the consent and participation of Orientals in Orientalism occurred because Orientalism was feeding on exisiting Brahmanical discourses. The Brahman elites acted as intellectual intermediaries who created internal consistency about a [gendered] static, timeless, spaceless, advanced Sanskritic civilization that would provide the basis for Indian unity (Breckenridge and van der Veer 1993). In effect, I am calling for a deconstruction of authoritative Brahmanical discourses and codes. Such a move is much more painful than attacking Orientalism but it is a necessary recognition of what constitutes Indian actors.

# Chernus Alternative

**The alternative is to reject the affirmative’s politics of fear. The only way to create change towards REAL security is to imagine and hope for a better world communally as a society. It’s the first and only step.**

**Chernus 5** Professor of Religious Studies at University of Colorado at Boulder (Ira, 2005, “Beyond the In-Security State; Where Fear Can’t Take Us, <http://spot.colorado.edu/~chernus/NewspaperColumns/OtherTopics/GripOfFear.htm>) MH

The Price of Fear Fear can be an energizing emotion. It can move us to fight or flight. But fear, when it becomes overwhelming, is more likely to paralyze -- think of the proverbial deer in the headlights. Long ago, in Hiroshima, psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton discovered that when there’s too much fear, it curdles into despair. If threat seems to be everywhere, with no escape in sight, people stop trying to imagine how things could get better. In fact, it seems that they stop imagining anything at all, except more peril. Lifton called this condition “psychic numbing.” His great insight was that the bomb didn’t have to fall for this tragedy to befall us. In a sense, Hiroshima had already come to America. All those Cold War years when Americans lived under the shadow of superpower “mutual assured destruction” or MAD (as the madly accurate acronym of that moment had it), seeing no way out, psychic numbing took its toll. What historians often call the “national security state” has actually been a national in-security state, based on the sort of numbing fear that was bound to make Americans more conservative, more fearful of change. The idea of a whole society working together to imagine a better world, and then turning imagination into reality, has been off the American radar screen for some six decades now (except for a brief ray of light in the 1960s). When it seems safer to allow no significant change at all, politics naturally becomes an exercise in circling the wagons and hunkering down for an endless siege. The 9/11 attack and the Bush-orchestrated response insured that the United States would continue to be a hunkered-down national insecurity state (and now a homeland insecurity state) well into the 21st century. All of us, supporters and critics alike, have absorbed this lesson. When we criticize Bush because he has failed to keep us safe, we score valuable political points. But we may pay a price for those points, because we reinforce the basic premises of the national insecurity state -- that danger is everywhere and can never be eliminated; that all significant change is dangerous; and that our best hope is a government strong enough and pugnacious enough to prevent significant change and so protect us from fear’s worst effects. The urge to be safe, to keep fear at bay, is certainly natural and understandable. But after more than a half-century in a state of heightened national insecurity, Americans have largely forgotten the other side of the human coin: the urge to be daring, to take chances that can lead to positive change. Insecurity is now in the national bloodstream. That’s why anti-Bush campaigns that evoke fear can be so successful. To be successful in the longer term, though, we have to constrict that sense of insecurity, to return it to the more modest place where it belongs, until actual security comes into sight. Otherwise, no matter how much the anti-Bush campaigns weaken the president, they end up reinforcing the pervasive insecurity that has been the key to his political success. They make it more likely that the public will want future leaders in the Bush mold, who demand “peace through strength.” No flip-flops need apply. Securing A Politics of Hope The human resource -- potentially so readily available -- that can help us break out of this cycle of fear and numbing is imagination. Imagine American political language and life no longer based simply on the question, “How can we be safe?”, but on the question: “How can we make life better for all of us?” Imagine it for a little while, and you begin to realize that such a profound shift would give us the best chance -- maybe the only chance -- to be really secure. Consider, for example, Class 5 hurricanes. It’s a good idea to build stout levees, if they are just a first step. For real security, though, we have to move beyond fear to hope. We have to focus on the positive changes that will help everyone, even if there is never another great storm. We should reclaim wetlands -- nature’s own buffer against flooding -- to create a stable environment where a myriad of species, including humans, can flourish creatively. We should support the decades-old local organizations in poor stricken areas, the folks who know how to build vibrant communities in their own neighborhoods. We should take steps to cool down the earth to make wetlands more stable, growing seasons more predictable, and harvests more bountiful. The prospect of really making things better gives people a reason to think and act together. It makes them feel empowered. Once set loose, hopeful attitudes and actions build on each other. That’s when genuine change begins, whether its wetlands, poverty, global warming or any other issue -- including the “war on terrorism.” You hardly have to be as well educated as the average Al Qaeda activist (who, it turns out, is pretty well educated) to see that present American efforts to “make the world better” are mainly efforts to protect U.S. power and interests. The president and the power brokers can hide that truth behind a verbal smokescreen, using words like “protect America,” “keep our nation safe,” and “defend our homeland” against “foreign enemies.” It’s an easy rhetorical trick. Once you start talking the language of “protecting and defending,” though, you’re on your way into the land of self-fulfilling prophecies. To make the smokescreen work, the administration has to turn everyone who disagrees with them into “the enemy.” Then it’s a natural step to set out to destroy them, which, of course, turns them into genuine enemies. But suppose the U.S. had spent the last six decades out there in the world letting other people decide what “a better world” means to them, and then helping them achieve their own goals. That’s so far from the pattern of our foreign policy, it takes a wrenching effort just to imagine. Try to make that effort, and then ask what kind of “terrorist threat” we would have. There’s no way to know for sure. But it seems a reasonable bet that we’d be a lot safer than we are today. It makes sense to join the liberal chorus of “End the war in Iraq so we can protect ourselves against terrorists” as long as it’s just a first step, as long as we go on to say things like: “Instead of draining our national treasury for endless war, we demand that our tax dollars be used to repair the damage done to Iraq and to fund services in our communities.” Those words, from the United for Peace and Justice website, echo the sentiment of hundreds of groups that are imagining a better future. Many demand that our tax dollars be used to fund services and repair the damage the U.S. has done all over the world. That’s actually the best way to begin to protect ourselves from danger. But it won’t work if we do it simply because we are scared. We’ll never be safe if we make safety our ultimate goal. We’ll be safe only if we let safety be a by-product of a society working together to improve life for everyone. The best way to be secure is to imagine a genuine politics of hope. Imagine. Unfortunately, when John Lennon said, “It’s easy if you try,” he was quite wrong. After six decades of our national insecurity state, it’s incredibly hard. But it’s an effort that anti-Bush forces ought to make. The alternative is, however inadvertently, to reinforce the politics of fear that Bush and his kind thrive on. The belief that danger is everywhere -- that we must have leaders whose great task is to keep us safe -- is the one great danger we really do need to protect ourselves against.

# Conversion Alternative

**We must refuse to accept the proliferation discourse and demand a movement for conversion**

**Mutimer**, David. **2k** “The Weapons State” Mutimer has a PhD in political science from York University and is now an associate professor of political science there. p. 112-114 LH

Little headway in opposing the proliferation agenda is likely to be made with an argument that suggests diffusing military technology as a means of economic development-although such arguments were current in the early period of decolonization, during which modernization theory cmerged.27 The links between civilian and military technology, however, have given rise to a new discourse that is potentially fruitful for an oppositional strategy founded on a development framing of technology. With the end of the Cold War and the consequent reduction in military budgets and arsenals in Europe and North America, the question was posed about what to do with the industrial resources that had been devoted to production. The answer is broadly identified as conversion, which tends to encompass three rather different processes: the redirection of military budgets to other uses, the transformation of military assets into something else, and the conversion of military to civilian industry. One of the most notable efforts at conversion has been made in the field of nuclear weapons. Part of this effort concerns coping with the quantities of high-quality fissile material freed from nuclear weapons under the START agreements. In particular, the United States has agreed to finance the conversion and storage of fissile material from the former Soviet Union for use in nuclear power facilities.28 Such a use is the basis for nuclear weapons conversion: the fissile material can be downgraded and burned in nuclear generators. Somewhat broader conversion issues are raised by nuclear weapons production facilities. In the former Soviet Union these are the focus of considerable "proliferation" concern, as former nuclear scientists are seen as a potentially dangerous source of weapons expertise for rogue states. In the United States, by contrast, weapons makers are reinventing themselves as key contributors to future U.S. competitiveness. Los Alamos National Laboratory describes itself these days as "a national resource for solving complex problems where science makes a difference. The laboratory's core competencies include advanced computing, computer simulation and computer modeling, sensors and instrumentation for complex experimentation and measurements, nuclear weapons, earth and environmental science, bioscience and biotechnology, materials science, and nuclear science, plasmas, and beams."29 Hidden in the middle of this impressive list are nuclear weapons, until recently Los Alamos's raison d'etre-the laboratory was founded as part of the Manhattan Project and was the location for most of the final research that developed the first atomic bomb. Since then, it has played a central role in developing each new generation of U.S. nuclear weapons and is still charged with the stewardship of the U.S. nuclear force. The laboratory acknowledges the continued importance of its national security role but places it in the context of this range of scientific expertise. In reality, all of the scientific and technological resources were a result of the laboratory's role in building and maintaining nuclear weapons; in other words, a nuclear weapons program can produce what the director of Los Alamos calls "one of the leading scientific institutions in the world."3o With the reduced need for nuclear weapons development, Los Alamos has turned that resource toward industry. The laboratory created a new Commercialization of Technology Office, which seeks to develop links with private industry to use its scientific and technological expertise to improve U.S. competitiveness and to create jobS.31 Military technologies, it would seem, can be usefully "converted" to provide new business, create job opportunities, and even improve the industrial competitiveness of the leading world economy. Conversion is taking place not only in nuclear technology. Across the range of military technologies now considered to be problems of "proliferation," producers are engaged in sometimes desperate processes of conventional arms producers are turning to civilian production in an attempt to adjust to reduced arms sales in the post-Cold War world. The Bonn International Centre for Conversion publishes an annual Conversion Survey, which examines conversion across the full range of military technology in the past year. The 1997 report examined the conversion efforts of the 75 largest arms producers and concluded: For 67 of the 75 firms, arms sales decreased in real terms between 1990 and 1994.... Adding the figures for the 67 companies with decreasing defense sales, civilian sales increased by US $18.8 billion while military sales decreased by US $55.3 billion. More than 1.1 million jobs were lost in these 67 companies. Excluding the "failure" cases-those companies losing more civilian than defense sales-the picture looks somewhat brighter, with gains in civilian sales of US $102.5 billion, more than making up for defense sale losses of US $42.9 biIlion.32 Clearly, arms producers have the capacity to satisfy more than military demands. In fact, the United States has formally reworked its military spend11'1g policy to make use of the overlap between military and civilian technologies. As part of the 1996 national security strategy the U.S. administration wrote, "We are structuring our defense R&D effort to place greater emphasis on dual-use technologies that allow the military to capitalize on commercial sector innovation for lower cost, higher quality and increased performance.”33 The move to conversion provides an important resource for those contesting the proliferation agenda. Conversion of all kinds of weapons—conventional and weapons of mass destruction—makes problematic the simple linear relationship between military technology and civilian industrial development. The practice of conversion also demonstrates that so called military technology does not inevitably lead to increased arsenals. Indeed, conversion arguments reverse the relationship between weaponry and its underlying technology by showing that military technology can give rise to civilian industry. The conversion discourse allows the simple inevitability of the relationship between civilian and military technology to be made more complex-at least bidirectional. Such a framing of the relationship of technology to arms opens space for imagining that technology in a number of ways, particularly for locating industrial development within a free market.

# Disarmament Alternative

**The Alternative is to view the world through a “disarmament” frame instead of a “proliferation” frame—solves the case while breaking down oriental proliferation discourse**

**Mutimer**, David. **2k** “The Weapons State” Mutimer has a PhD in political science from York University and is now an associate professor of political science there. p. 103-105 LH

The argument that we should see problems of military technology through a “disarmament” frame rather than through the “proliferation: frame is potentially very creative. Such a framing of the problem would not necessarily deny the importance of tackling proliferation—the nonproliferation treaty initially emerged out of a “disarmament” practice, and the non-aligned states’ submission to the NPT extension conference recognized the importance of proliferation control as part of a disarmament agenda. How would a “disarmament” image differ from the “proliferation” image were it to be the basis on which the control of military technology was enabled? What objects would a “disarmament” frame constitute, what identities would it constitute in relation to those objects, and how would they differ from those constituted by “proliferation”? The first, most obvious, and most important difference is that a “disarmament” framing of the problem of military technology would highlight weapons themselves. The “proliferation” image has constituted as its problem the technologies that give rise to a military capability—up to and including their weaponization. “Proliferation” highlights the technological precursors and downplays, in many instances, the actual weapons. A “disarmament” image would reverse this emphasis, focusing in the first instance on existing rather than potential arsenals. By highlighting the weapons and therefore downplaying the technological precursors, a “disarmament” image would open possibilities for a different relationship between broad technologies and weapons from that warranted by the technologically determinant “proliferation” image. The difference between the problematic object being constituted in terms of weapons rather than of the technological precursors to those weapons is seen even more clearly when the identities constituted by each frame are considered. The “proliferation” image constitutes states in the first instance, as suppliers or recipients, reflecting their position in the technological flow of concern to proliferation controls. “Disarmament,” by contrast, constitutes states in the first instance as armed and would differentiate among states by the degree of arming. Whereas the “proliferation: discourse places the onus on recipients not to translate that technology into weaponry, a “disarmament” image places the onus on armed states to reduce and ultimately eliminate the weaponry they possess. Suppliers and recipients are not the only terms by which states are identified in the “proliferation” image. It is not certain how the construction of regional balances or of rogues would change in a problematic framed in terms of “disarmament” rather than “proliferation,” but certain tendencies are worth considering. The first is that a “disarmament” frame would not necessarily construct regions in terms of binary balances—although that is still a clear possibility. A primary identification in terms of relative level of armaments allows for defining regions in terms of that level and differentiating states by the sizes of their arsenals or disarmament practices. Given the way regions were constructed in the Cold War, however, which reference to the superpower balance and the role that “balance” played in the superpower arms control and disarmament practices, the regions could be constructed in precisely the same way they are at present. On the other hand, the rogue state construction would be difficult to establish or maintain within a “disarmament” image. By downplaying potential arsenals relative to existing arsenals, the sorts of exaggerated claims about future threats that sustain the notion of rogues and weapons states would be almost impossible to make. Only in the context of an image that constructs the security problematic in terms of future arsenals, of weapons falling into the wrong hands, can rogues or weapon states be elevated to the level of a primary threat. If the security problematic focused on the threat posed by existing arsenals, any possible future arsenal, although still a concern, would be greatly discounted in the present.

# Disarmament Alternative

**A disarmament view of proliferation solves the negative aspects of the status quo proliferation image**

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Despite drawing on many of the same resources as the “proliferation” image, the objects and identities constructed by an alternative image of "disarmament" paired with "development" are strikingly different. The "proliferation" image constructs an object that fundamentally connects the technology underlying weaponry to the weaponry itself and directs attention to that technology in the first instance. This technology, if left unchecked, will produce deleterious effects-the technological cells will proliferate outward from their source inevitably to produce the cancer of destabilizing weapons. This natural, autonomous process of spread must be controlled to prevent the cancerous outcome or be excised through "surgical" strikes. The object of the "disarmament-development" image is in many ways the reverse of that constructed by "proliferation." Here weaponry is disconnected from its underlying technology, and it is the existence of the weapons themselves that is the problem rather than the movement of the technology on which they are based. That technology is then framed as instrumental to economic development, as well as potentially producing military capability. In this counter image, the security focus is on the weapons, particularly their possession, and the emphasis is placed on the civilian side of the dual-use technology. If the discourse on conversion can be tied to this alternative image, the relationship between arms and their technological underpinnings can be reversed in a fruitful fashion-arms can now produce civilian technology as well as the reverse. Such a shift, which makes use of discursive resources articulated by defenders of the "proliferation" image in other contexts, allows the development discourse to be framed in terms of competitiveness and markets-language central to the political discourse of the global economy. By framing the objects of the problem in different ways, these two images also construct a different range of identities in relation to that problem. As we saw in Chapter 5, the "proliferation" image constructs suppliers, recipients, and rogues or outlaws. This identity set can easily be read from the linear relationship between technology and weapons: the technology originates at a source (suppliers) and spreads outward (recipients); if left uncontrolled, it gives rise to problematic weaponry (rogues/outlaws). The "disarmament-development" image, by contrast, begins by constructing identities around axes of armed-unarmed and developed-undeveloped. In this framing the armed have an obligation to disarm, and the developed an obligation to aid in the development of the less developed-an obligation now phrased in terms of the need for an open and growing economy at the global scale. Suppliers and recipients are recast in the familiar terms of global capital, and the security problem is the armed state. Indeed, it would not be difficult to label the identity of the security problem as the weapon state, not in Krauthammer's terms but in the more intuitive formulation of the state with the largest number of weapons. The practices that would be enabled by a "disarmament-development" image are also rather different from those of the "proliferation" image, Most important, supplier groups aimed at technological denial would have no place in a security environment framed in this fashion. Practices to manage global flows of technology, to the degree that they would be institutionalized, would aim at promoting technological flow for the purposes of global growth. Again, the resources exist within the range of practices inherited from the Cold War to facilitate this form of practical inscription of "disarmament-development." The IAEA was founded to facilitate the spread of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes-precisely the form of activity a "disarmament-development" frame would warrant.

# Alt Solvency

Challenging a resign of nuclear racism is a prior question to the prevention of Eastern proliferation.

Gopal,’98 - Prof. of History @ Jawaharlal Nehru Univ., (Sarvepalli, *International Social Scicence Journal* 50.157, “Images of world Society: a Third World View,”)BBL

It is clear, too, that no world society, even if it comes into existence, can endure, so long as a few countries possess nuclear weapons and seek to prevent, by political and economic sanc tions, other countries from securing them**.** Knowledge and technological capacity cannot be withheld; so only pressure can be applied to enforce non-proliferation**.** Nations which are close allies of the nuclear powers may agree to such renunciation, at least in the short term; but there is no logic in this position and it cannot therefore be maintained for long. In particular, those countries which attach value to independence and self-reliance cannot be expected to abide by a position which enables some countries to build up nuclear stockpiles while forbidding others even to undertake nuclear testing. This implies the acceptance of a hierarchy, of a new category of haves and have-nots, which cannot be part of an image of a fair and equitable world society.There are two alternatives, both of which have their limi- tations. The hope of non-proliferation can be abandoned, and the new political world order would be one where all countries which can afford nuclear weapons and are capable of pro- ducing them would possess them. This would have the merit of not placing the decision of whether we are to be destroyed by a nuclear catastrophe in the hands of a few governments as at present. Indeed, it has been argued, for example by Ali Mazrui, that if some countries of the Third World possessed nuclear weapons, this would not only restore a measure of egali tarianism in world affairs but would strengthen the forces working for peace.

# Alt Solvency

**We must question the Western fear of the spread of proliferation to eliminate this oriental mindset**

Hugh **Gusterson**, @ MIT Antrhopology Department, 20**02** Gusterson has a PhD in anthropology from Stanford University. He used to be a professor at MIT and is now a professor at George Mason University. [The Second Nuclear Age, <http://insct.syr.edu/Research%20and%20Events/Gusterson%20-%20the%20Second%20Nuclear%20Age.doc>]

At this point it might be useful to introduce as a foil for my argument – and an illustration of the ideological stakes of our discussion -- a recent article titled “The Structure of the Second Nuclear Age,” by the conservative Yale political scientist Paul Bracken. Bracken argues that the first nuclear age, dominated by the rivalry of the two superpowers, was characterized by a strategic stability that he explains both in terms of game theory and the characteristics of the two superpowers themselves. He attributes the alleged stability of deterrence during the cold war to the geometric predictability of two-player rivalries, and to the “icy rationality” and “noble internationalisms” (p.407) shared by American and Russian leaders linked as they were -- or at least as he says they were -- by an Enlightenment tradition of civility and reason. Bracken expects the second nuclear age to be volatile and dangerous since the number of nuclear players will increase, rendering the nuclear game less stable and predictable, and because new and immature players in the Third World, using nuclear weapons as state-building symbols rather than as rational tools of security, will be driven by what he calls “the kinds of ludicrous behavior that arise out of nationalism” (p.408). In other words for Bracken the hallmark of the second nuclear age is the dangerous proliferation of nuclear weapons to what he calls “small and economically unserious countries” seeking to change the international order. Writing before the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the U.S. and the UK, he gives as an example of such a country “Iraq, with a GDP 15 percent the annual revenues of Wal-Mart” (p.412). Bracken advocates missile defense and preemptive attacks on countries seeking nuclear weapons as ways of increasing the security of the West in the second nuclear age. In the account that follows I want to work my way toward a different characterization of the Second Nuclear Age. This account will also foreground nuclear proliferation as a defining theme of the new nuclear order, but will frame this more in the context of the American imperial project than in terms of a neocolonial vocabulary of evolutionary fitness to possess nuclear weapons. Rather than taking it for granted that international security is threatened by the rise of what policymakers and pundits have taken to calling “rogue states,” I want to ask how the longstanding Western anxiety about nuclear proliferation has been recoded – both in discourse and in strategic doctrine – since the end of the cold war and to enquire into not only the shifting structure of nuclear deterrence but also the relationship between nuclear weapons and the global order itself since the fall of the Berlin Wall. I also want to juxtapose the increasing anxiety in the West about non-Western nuclear weapons with the rise of simulations in the practice of contemporary nuclear weapons science, since the emergence of powerful new simulation technologies among the established nuclear powers in the 1990s enabled the negotiation of a new treaty regime vis-à-vis nuclear weapons and offered American policymakers a symbolically rich new way to imagine the military hierarchy of nations.

# Alt Solvency

**Non-traditional narratives are a crucial complement to successful policy making. Only opening space for discussion of discourse of the West allows for problem solving.**

**Homolar-Riechmann 9**, @ Peace Research Institute Frankfurt & Kings College**, [**Alexandra, Prepared for delivery at the 2009 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, “Rebels without a cause: US foreign policy and the concept of rogue states,” p. allacademic] BBL

**In the process of defense policymaking, narratives matter**. Similar to the end of the Second World War (cf. Chilton 1996: 123), with the end of the Cold War the United States defense policymaking community lacked a clear overarching security narrative that furnished policymakers with an interpretive framework to make sense of the new strategic environment the US now faced, after half a century of having a clearly identifiable ‘enemy’ in the Soviet Union. Security narratives help to establish a discursive connection between the articulation of a country’s national interests, the identification of specific security threats they may face, and how potential risks to the broader international environment are understood. In short, the construction of a new security **narrative enables defense policymakers to make sense of an uncertain strategic environment, and provides cues that aid the recognition and construction of national security threats** (see Chilton 1996: Ch. 3; cf. Hansen 2006: Ch. 2). This paper examines the process of how the location of the principal threat to US national security gradually shifted away from an ideologically opposed and powerful enemy towards small and isolated developing countries to provide a new rationale for defense planning in the post- Cold War era. In particular, this paper shows how **the concept of ‘rogue states’ first entered contemporary US security discourse and how it has since evolved, which provides a framework for understanding how it has been used to advance particular policy agendas.** The paper is organized as follows. The first section explores how actors seek to navigate a new and uncertain policy environment following a systemic shock such as the end of the Cold War. Here I argue that while systemic crises are commonly assumed to provide a window of opportunity for actors to drive through rapid institutional change and policy reform, the uncertainty generated by a sudden shift to a new international security environment may also serve to constrain the potential for significant change to be achieved. Section two examines the evolution of the principal characteristics of the rogue state concept in **US security discourse,** which **is disaggregated into three key aspects of state behavior: human rights violations; sponsoring or engaging in international terrorism, and the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.** Sections three and four examine the two catalytic events in the early 1990s that I identify as crucial elements in the development of an overarching rogue states security narrative in the US. Section three focuses on Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the War in the Persian Gulf in 1991, which increased the salience of the rogue states concept within the US defense policymaking community. This is followed, in section four, with an analysis of the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993-94, and how this event served to consolidate the place of the terminology of rogue states within the US defense policymaking lexicon and to orient the focus of US defense planning towards ‘deviant’ regimes as the principal threat to US national security. Section five builds on the examination o these two catalytic events by exploring the conceptual foundations for why rogue states became understood as the chief source of systemic uncertainty in the post-Cold War era. Here I argue that the key defining feature of rogue states, which, more than any other attribute, makes them appear ‘irrational’ and ‘unpredictable in the eyes of US defense policymakers, is not the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction or engaging in international terrorism per se.

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Fear of the unknown empowers the state to commit violence against the other, ensuring destruction.

Beres 96 (Louis Rene, Professor of International Law, Department of Political Science at Purdue University, “Genocide, Death and Anxiety, a Jurisprudential/Psychiatric Analysis,” Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, 10 Temp. Int'l & Comp) BBL

The State that commits itself to mass butchery does not intend to do evil**.** Rather, according to Hegel's description in the Philosophy of Right, "the State is the actuality of the ethical Idea." It commits itself to death for the sake of life, prodding killing with conviction and pure heart. A sanctified killer, the State that accepts Realpolitik generates an incessant search for victims. Though mired in blood, the search is tranquil and self-assured, born of the knowledge that the State's deeds are neither infamous nor shameful, but heroic. 65  With Hegel's characterization of the State as "the march of God in the world," John Locke's notion of a Social Contract -- the notion upon which the United States was founded 66 -- is fully disposed of, relegated to the ash heap of history. While the purpose of the State, for Locke, is to provide protection that is otherwise unavailable to individuals -- the "preservation of their lives, liberties and States" -- for Hegel, the State stands above any private interests. It is the spirit of the State, Volksgeist, rather than of individuals, that is the presumed creator of advanced civilization. And it is in war, rather than in peace, that a State is judged to demonstrate its true worth and potential.   [\*22]  How easily humankind still gives itself to the new gods. Promised relief from the most terrifying of possibilities -- death and disappearance **--** our species regularly surrenders itself to formal structures of power and immunity.Ironically,such surrender brings about an enlargement of the very terrors that created the new gods in the first place, but we surrender nonetheless.In the words of William Reich, we lay waste to ourselves by embracing the "political plague-mongers," a necrophilous partnership that promises purity and vitality through the killing of "outsiders."  Fear of death,to summarize**,** not only cripples life, it also creates entire fields of premature corpses. But how can we be reminded of our mortality in a productive way, a way that would point to a new and dignified polity of private selves and, significantly, to fewer untimely deaths? One answer lies in the ethics of Epicurus, an enlightened creed whose prescriptions for disciplined will are essential for international stability.

**Alt Solvency**

**We have a solvency advocate – our politics can be emancipated from arms buildup and overcome the “supremacy” of power politics**

**Cooper 2006** (Neil, Ph.D of international relations at Plymouth International Studies Center, “Putting disarmament back in the frame,” Cambridge Jounrals Online) GL

Conclusion: towards disarmament from below The preceding analysis has attempted to demonstrate how, contrary to the impression given in the mainstream literature on arms limitation, there has in fact been a great deal of disarmament – at least in the terms understood in the disarmament negotiations of the 1950s and 60s. Yet these very successes have been coopted by arms controllers in ways that function to delegitimise disarmament as utopian and appear to confirm realist representations of a world system with limited potential for transformation. This article has also demonstrated the way in which global civil society has been able to set an apparently more radical, new arms limitation agenda for the new wars – one in particular which has emphasised human and economic security rather than state and military security. These factors then, represent a basis for optimism about the future prospects for further disarmament. However, it is also the case that the contemporary disarmament and broader arms limitation system is a highly asymmetric one geared to preserving the military hegemony of the US and its allies. Moreover, even the new arms limitation agenda is characterised by its own asymmetries. In particular, civil society has manifestly failed to gain the same level of influence over core military security issues – for example, NBC or the trade in major conventional weapons that keeps Western defence industries viable. In some respects then, this analysis shares certain commonalities with offensive realist critiques that emphasise the problematic nature of arms control theory (albeit from a different standpoint) and the supremacy of politics and power in determining the possibilities for the control of arms.86 One response, therefore, might be to adopt a similar attitude of resigned cynicism in the face of the overwhelming influence of power and interest in shaping discourse and practice – and to conclude that a truly emancipatory, as opposed to asymmetric, disarmament agenda is unrealisable. However, there are both material and ideational factors immanent in the contemporary international system that suggest a politics of radical emancipatory disarmament can be constituted. First, the success of existing disarmament initiatives – albeit under asymmetry – highlights the real-world relevance of disarmament proposals still dismissed as failed and utopian. This illustrates the potential for a more radical disarmament agenda to be realised by simultaneously deconstructing hegemonic framings of the arms limitation problem and developing alternative narratives that contain inherently transformatory meanings – a powerful political act in itself. Second, the influential role of global civil society in new arms limitation suggests the possibility of a truly progressive practice of arms limitation – a kind of disarmament from below.87 In particular, campaigns such as those on landmines or conflict diamonds demonstrate the (as yet unfulfilled) potential for networked and adaptive rhizomatic movements to envision and realise radical alternative security futures. This is not to deny the significant power differentials that exist between states and civil society movements that may themselves have different goals. However, the flexibility of such movements contrasts sharply with the rigid and sclerotic statist institutions most immediately geared to dealing with the diplomacy of arms limitation. Moreover, at their optimal, such swarming resistances to hegemony have the potential to exploit the uncontrollable spaces and flows of a networked information age88 to generate focused policy goals and shared understandings; to generate political and cultural power by exploiting global media tropes (Princess Diana as beatified saint opposed to landmines) or creating their own (diamonds as blood diamonds);89 to challenge both the threat discourses that underpin the arms dynamic and the counsels of despair in the face of anarchy and a supposed military technological imperative that lie at the heart of arms control theory; and to thus effect change by eroding the legitimacy of institutions and actors upholding militarism.90 Moreover, such movements have the potential to resolve the perennial debate over what has to come first before disarmament is realised – radical reduction of armaments or radical political change. The inevitable corollary of the emergence of such rhizomatic social movements is that the very act of campaigning for a radical disarmament agenda presages radical change in the nature of local-global politics – the one brings the other into being, and vice versa.

**The only way to step away from the implications of proliferation discourse is to recognize academic analyst and policy in the images and practices to which they give rise**

**Mutimer 2000** (David, PhD in political science and professor in York University, “The Weapons State,” p.74) GL

This chapter has shown how this seemingly passive examination, "largely reactive" in Brad Roberts's words, has, in fact, been an active constitution of a problem. The full range of military technology has come to be imagined in terms of a single frame, a frame founded on the image of "proliferation." This image constitutes a particular object at its focus: an autonomous technology that will spread if left unchecked, with potentially devastating consequences. In turn, this frame enables certain practices that aim to check this autonomous technological diffusion. The foundation of these practices is supplier groups, small groups of states that coordinate their own export controls on technologies now identified as proliferation concerns. This construction of the problems associated with weapons technology, however, is not universally welcomed--or accepted. The possibility for opposing dominant framings is one of the most important reasons for developing alternatives. Unless the objects of both academic analysis and policy are first recognized as constructed in the images and practices to which they give rise, such opposition becomes much more difficult. Opposing the proliferation discourse, for example, comes to be-seen as arguing in favor of proliferation and all of the ills that image ascribes to proliferation. The fact that military technology *has* been imagined in these various other ways, however, provides a powerful rhetorical tool for the critic to argue that it *can* now be imagined in other ways. . To see why someone might want to oppose this discourse, it is necessary to look at what else is constructed by particular frames. These frames and the practices they enable constitute not only the objects of those practices but also the subjects. The identities of those who act and those who are acted upon are no more given than the objects of practices. These identities are also constituted in and by practices, and the way in which they are constituted gives rise to subject positions that might object to the framing of issues of military technology in terms of "proliferation."

# Alt Solvency

**Discourse addresses the relationship between nuclear actors and their terminal actions**

**Taylor 98** (Bryan C., Associate Professor in the Department of Communication, University of Colorado, Boulder, ’98 [Western Journal of Communication 62.3, “Nuclear weapons and communication studies: A review essay,” http://comm.colorado.edu/taylorbc/NuclearWeaponsandCommunicationStudies.doc]) **GL**

Bryan Hubbard's essay "Reassessing Truman, the Bomb and Revisionism" questions the appropriateness of stances taken by critics towards nuclear history and its representation. Finding fault with both orthodox and progressive narratives of the decision to drop the Bomb, Hubbard advances the Burkean concept of "burlesque" as a critical tool for diagnosing the constraints surrounding this event, in the process, he renews critical debate about the agency of nuclear actors and the ideological saturation of their organizational milieux. Indirectly, he raises a critical question involving the relative effects of tragic, comedic, and ironic frames for representations of nuclear history. As the Mechlings (1992) argue, these narrative frames create fateful interpretations of the relationships between nuclear actors, actions, and their consequences. None, it would seem, is unproblematic for political purposes. Theodore Prosise's essay, "The Collective Memory of the Atomic Bombings as Public 'History,'" involves a further layer of textualization. Its topic involves a bitter struggle conducted among curators, World War II veterans, military-industrial lobbyists, academics, and politicians over a planned exhibit of the Enola Gay fuselage in the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum in Washington, D.C. In tracing the censorship of that planned exhibit, and its replacement with another deemed more politically correct, Prosise is concerned with the possibilities of nuclear deliberation in the public sphere. His account; of populist-orthodox miscrecognition of nuclear history as fixed, objective Truth raises troubling questions for academics and other custodians of culture. What criteria should be used to evaluate the validity and legitimacy of historical narratives? How should conflict among and between popular memories and professional histories be conducted and resolved? How is nuclear culture served by the histories it produces?

# Alt Solvency

**Only through creating a movement and breaking down the racist discourse can we overcome the problems they create**
**Kato, 1993, (**Masahide, **“**Nuclear Globalism: Traversing Rockets, Satellites, and Nuclear War via the Strategic Gaze,” Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, p. 339

The dialectic (if it can be still called such) should be conceived in terms of resistance to and possibly destruction of global space, time, perception, and discourse for the possibility of reinventing space. The nuclear warfare against the Fourth World and Indigenous Peoples should be viewed in this context. It is not their expendability or exclusion from the division of labor; rather it is their spatial-temporal construction that drives transnational capital/state to resort to pure destruction. In other I words, what has been actually under attack by the nuclear state/capital are certain political claims (couched in the discourse of "sovereignty") advanced by the Fourth World and Indigenous Peoples for maintaining or recreating space against the global integration of capital.55 The question now becomes: Can there be a productive link between the struggles of the Fourth World and Indigenous Peoples against the exterminating regime of nuclear capital/state, and First World environmentalist and antinuclear social movements? This link is crucial and urgent for a subversion of the global regime of capital/state. Nevertheless, we have not yet seen effective alliances due to the blockage that lies between these social movements." The blockage, as I have shown 1 in this article, is produced primarily by the perception and discourse of the social movements in the North, which are rooted in technosubjectivity. The possibility of alliances, therefore;, depends on how much First World environmentalist and antinuclear movements can overcome their globalist technosubjectivity, whose spatio-temporality stands in diametrical opposition to the struggles of the Fourth World and Indigenous Peoples. In other words, it is crucial for the former to shatter their image-based politics and come face to face with the "real" of the latter.

**Alt Solves Prolif**

Pieces of paper that limit the proliferation of arms are not enough because it only perpetuates a failure to prevent proliferation and nuclear apartheid result from arms control plans

**Cooper 2006** (Neil, Ph.D of international relations at Plymouth International Studies Center, “Putting disarmament back in the frame,” Cambridge Jounrals Online) GL

As with the move to forcible disarmament, this is not a particularly new development, but the advent of the Bush administration, and particularly the policies pursued after 9/11, have made the asymmetry in approach between the ‘legitimate rogues’ and the ‘illegitimate rogues’ even starker. Moreover, membership of these two camps is not fixed and permanent. Pakistan, for instance, has managed to move from illegitimate to ‘legitimate rogue’ as the politics of post 9/11 created new imperatives in US policy – a process that demonstrates the extent to which the rogue label has less to do with the particular characteristics of individual states and their NBC programmes, and more to do with the way in which these are framed. Indeed, despite emerging as the centre of a clandestine global proliferation network the country has, in the wake of 9/11, been the recipient of military aid, IFI funds and political legitimacy. Of course, whilst such discrimination between the legitimate and illegitimate ‘rogues’ may undermine the goals of arms limitation this is arguably not the point. The discourse around ‘illegitimate rogues’ is, ultimately, not one that can simply be understood in terms of any existential threats posed by North Korean, Iranian or Pakistani ‘WMD’ programmes. Rather, it can be understood as the product of the interrelationship between the process of identity construction within the US and other states, the construction of external interests and the legitimation of overwhelming military superiority. The second asymmetry The second asymmetry is that established in traditional arms limitation agreements on NBC technology – the asymmetry between the ‘WMD’ haves (those states whose nuclear weapons are deemed legitimate under the terms of the NPT) and the ‘WMD’ have-nots. This enshrines a profoundly discriminatory system of ‘WMD’ apartheid, under which a small category of states are permitted to possess a class of ‘WMD’ denied to all others.74 Indeed, even in the case of the CWC which is supposedly universal, the US Senate made its ratification conditional on a set of provisions that contravene the letter and spirit of the CWC. For example, inspection of US facilities may be refused and, if allowed, collected laboratory samples may not be transferred for analysis to a lab outside the US.75 When combined with the first asymmetry, this essentially creates three classes of ‘WMD’ states – those formally permitted to hold WMD, those informally permitted to hold ‘WMD’ (the ‘legitimate rogues’) and those demonised for holding or attempting to develop ‘WMD’. In addition, there is also an asymmetry of approach towards failure to abide by the commitments implied by the various NBC treaties. The ‘illegitimate rogues’ face sanctions of various kinds, the ‘legitimate rogues’ experience a discourse of criticism but little concrete action, and the failure of the formal ‘WMD’ states to abide by their commitment to nuclear disarmament under the terms of the NPT is merely met with a faint descant from critics off-stage. The third asymmetry The third asymmetry is that between the disciplinary mechanisms deployed to enforce restrictions on NBC technologies and the disciplinary mechanisms surrounding conventional military expenditure, arms transfers and the conflict goods covered by the new arms limitation agenda. In the case of NBC technologies the mechanisms deployed are severe, ranging through pre-emptive attack, sanctions, loss of trade and diplomatic isolation.76 At the level of conventional arms exports and expenditure the disciplinary mechanisms deployed are either non-existent or are weak and tokenistic. Thus, the notable successes of civil society in successfully pushing for the creation of novel arms limitation regimes in this arena has been mitigated by the reality of the limits to either their effectiveness or their scope. For instance, with the notable exception of IFI/donor initiatives aimed at restricting the military expenditures of supplicant states,77 direct initiatives to restrict defence spending are notable by their absence. Similarly, initiatives to curb arms exports are either voluntary and/or focus on transparency (the UN arms register), weak regulatory mechanisms that have marginal impact on the volume of arms sales (the UK and EU arms export codes, current initiatives on small arms)78 or symbolic acts of tokenism that have little impact on the overall direction of the arms dynamic. Examples of the latter include the landmines treaty and UN arms embargoes. For example, UN embargoes usefully express diplomatic disapproval and may also raise the cost of arms acquisition by forcing states to source from the global networks of the black market. However, the record of such embargoes in actually preventing arms reaching targeted states is abysmal and the sanction for states that breach such embargoes rarely amounts to little more than an exercise in diplomatic finger-wagging.79 The fourth asymmetry The combined effect of the preceding asymmetries has been to produce a contemporary system of arms limitation that acts to preserve the profound military supremacy of the US in particular and the West in general. Thus, the NBC disarmament system now in place legitimises and – through the deployment of a range of disciplinary mechanisms – imposes both a ‘WMD’ supremacy for the US and its allies and the ‘WMD’ disarmament of other states. This is especially the case, of course, with respect to that imagined and shifting category of states constructed as ‘rogue’. In contrast, the mechanisms of control developed to cover military expenditure, conventional arms exports or conflict trade are weak or non-existent. It is, of course, precisely in these areas of conventional military expenditure and trade that the US and the developed world has a profound advantage.

# Alt Solves Prolif

**Western proliferation are just a construction of false security and western alarmism**

**Gusterson 1999** (Hugh, professor at MIT Anthropology Department, “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in West Imagination”) GL
Western alarmism about the dangers of nuclear weapons in Third World hands was particularly evident when India and Pakistan set off their salvos of nuclear tests in May 1998. Many analysts had already identified South Asia as the most likely site in the world for a nuclear war. After India's tests, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (Democrat, New York) said, "If Pakistan tests the bomb, we are on the edge of nuclear warfare" (1998). Three days later, follow- ing Pakistan's tests, Moynihan elicited agreement from Senator John McCain (Republican, Arizona) when he said that the world was "closer to nuclear war than we have been any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis" (Abrams 1998). Speaking to Reuters wire service, David Albright, president of the liberal Insti- tute for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., opined, "I don't think they [India and Pakistan] are up to the task of preventing a conventional conflict from accidentally slipping into a nuclear exchange." 2 The Wash- ington Post agreed: "Today, in the aftermath of a series of test explosions set off by the bitter rivals, there is no place on earth with greater potential for triggering a nuclear war" (Moore and Khan 1998:1).

# A2: Perm

**The perm fails. Competing policies causes proliferation to be less important**

**Herdman et. al ‘93** Director of the Technology Assessment, United States Congress [August 1993 Roger C. U.S. Congress, Office of “Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Rish, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,; http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ota/9341.pdf-;Adviosory Pannel: not listed too many, WBTR]

Many of the choices to be made in designing and implementing nonproliferation policies are between potentially conflicting objectives; that is, the extent to which nonproliferation should take precedence over other objectives of U.S. policy when they cannot both be pursued simultaneously. Certainly the end of the Cold War has removed one such conflict, eliminating what had been an overriding concern and permitting nonproliferation to take much greater priority. Yet tensions between nonproliferation and other policy objectives continue to force tradeoffs. Many conflicts between competing goals are mirrored in the organizational structure of the U.S. Government, with particular agencies pursuing missions that at times conflict with each other. With the possible exception of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, whose complete agenda in the post-Cold War organization of the U.S. Government is still evolving, no single agency has nonproliferation as its primary mission. The other agencies that have the greatest roles in nonproliferation policy-the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, and Commerce— are all charged with pursuing other goals that can compete with nonproliferation, some of which are described below. The pairings depicted in figure 1-2 and summarized below are not discrete alternatives, but rather opposite poles of a continuum. Intermediate positions are certainly possible, but seeking one goal will generally imply lessening emphasis on the other. These choices must be made on a case-by-case basis, since the appropriate balance between conflicting objectives varies depending on the individual situation.

**A2: Perm**

**Perm fails- any contradiction or gap in anti-nuclear rhetoric will gut the Kritik’s solvency**

**Taylor 98** (Bryan C., Associate Professor in the Department of Communication, University of Colorado, Boulder, ’98 [Western Journal of Communication 62.3, “Nuclear weapons and communication studies: A review essay,” http://comm.colorado.edu/taylorbc/NuclearWeaponsandCommunicationStudies.doc]) **GL**

A final group of rhetorical critics has been generally concerned with the interaction of nuclear interests in the public sphere, and the specific fates of social movements that challenge nuclear hegemony. In a series of skillful analyses, the Mechlings (Mechling & Mechling, 1991; 1992) have demonstrated how Cold War texts embody a complex, historical 'war of position' between normalizing and oppositional discourses. Their work suggests that the very gaps and contradictions in official rhetoric (such as the embrace of war as a solution to war) which incite anti-nuclear groups to discourse can also diffuse and undermine their success. For this group of critics, the struggle between the Nuclear Freeze and SDI campaigns is a compelling topic, and it has been punctuated in various ways. For example, Hogan and Dorsey (1991.) focused exclusively on deliberation of the Freeze resolution in the House of Representatives as a case-study of rhetorical invention of "the people." Other critics (Goodnight, 1986; Manoff, 1989; Mosco, 1987; Rushing, 1986) have focused on SDI as a paradoxical vision that drew for its legitimation on compelling cultural myths (e.g., about the restorative powers of Science and the Frontier), that disguised its limited function as a missile--not population--defense, that encouraged the misrecognition of technological possibilities as actualities, that perpetuated the strategic conditions it claimed to transcend, and that indirectly restructured relationships among economic, political, and military spheres. While the relationship between SDI and the Freeze is implicit in all of these studies, two studies have emphasized their interaction (King & Petress, 1990), although they focus more broadly on official de-legitimation of the Freeze, examine the counter insurgency rhetoric that contributed to SDI and that undermined the-in theory-superior universalism of Freeze claims. Bjork's (1992) study systematically evaluates the tropes and strategies of each side to demonstrate how SDI successfully trumped the moral grounds of the Freeze critique (see also Schiappa, 1989). Rhetorical-critical studies also have depicted the different theoretical resources which communication scholars bring to bear on nuclear weapons discourse. One related tension in these studies is that between formalist and post-formalist orientations to criticism. One group of scholars has been concerned with characterizing the unique structural properties (such as metaphor and fantasy themes) and strategies (such as domestication and bureaucratization) of nuclear discourse (Ausmus, 1998; Foss & Littlejohn, 1986; Kauffman, 1989; Schiappa, 1989). Drawing on Burke, Brummet (1989) made an argument that is foundational for this orientation: that nuclear weapons reflect and exacerbate pernicious qualities of language such as reification, hierarchy; and an "entelechical" compulsion to perfect technological possibilities. Potentially, however, this synchronic focus can limit critical appreciation of history and culture as contexts for nuclear discourse (Krug, 1995). It also elides a dilemma in which--as a professionalized activity--criticism may be contaminated with the very qualities of nuclearist language that it opposes: abstraction, objectivity, dualism, literalism, hierarchy, and patriarchy (Bjork, 1996).

**Judge decision-making is impossible without the separation of nuclear rhetoric and the case’s nuclear war impacts**

**Taylor 1998** (Bryan C., Associate Professor in the Department of Communication, University of Colorado, Boulder, ’98 [Western Journal of Communication 62.3, “Nuclear weapons and communication studies: A review essay,” http://comm.colorado.edu/taylorbc/NuclearWeaponsandCommunicationStudies.doc]) **GL**

The two essays which follow this review depict these recent trends in nuclear-cultural debate, and illustrate the forms of scholarship which take their measure. As studies of nuclear history, they follow in the wake of others which have established three important claims. The first is that nuclear history is the site of fierce struggle between ideological narratives seeking to establish their authority by asserting and confirming the truth of exceedingly complex institutional events (Newman, 1995). The second is that significant events in nuclear history from case-studies of how powerful rhetoric potentially constrains official decision-making (Hikins, 1983). The third claim is that these events, following their occurrence, are appropriated as "rhetorical artifacts" by nuclear interests, and refashioned as "composites" that advance their ideological narratives. Sedimented with viscerally-defended common-sense, these composites subsequently stand for and obscure the complexities of these events, and the contingencies of their representation (Kane, 1988). Viewed critically, their referents are not only events per se, but also how, for whom, and to what effect these events may be made to mean. Both essays, additionally, spring from cultural activity surrounding the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II, and of the atomic bombings.

\*\*\*A2

# A2: Security Arguments

**Traditional security arguments don’t apply to the kritik – we inspect security on a deeper level - to analyze interests pursued by states that seek security rather than generic threat construction**

**Mutimer 2000** (David, PhD in political science and professor in York University, “The Weapons State,” p.59-60) GL

Security concerned the disposition of weapons and the use of those weapons to protect the state-in particular the United States and, somewhat more generally, its (European) allies but at root the state as an institution and an actor in international relations. With security considered in this way, through the missile tube, the development of a proliferation control agenda following the breakup of the Soviet Union is not overly surprising. The Soviet threat was no longer an issue, but weapons still exist. Krauthammer's suggestion that the weapon state might supplant the Soviet state as the source of threat is a direct response to this change within the context of security as traditionally conceived. Nevertheless, the idea that security is provided through the acquisition of weaponry, that security is what is achieved when you look at world politics through a missile tube or a gun sight, has come in for sustained criticism in recent years. This criticism was originally motivated by a recognition that it was more than just the potential for interstate violence that rendered people insecure-even during the Cold War with its ever-present possibility of nuclear annihilation. The edifice of traditional security, or strategic, studies proves much less stable than it might have appeared at its Cold War height. Once questions were asked about the adequacy of an exclusive focus on weapons as a source of security, the very foundations of that building needed to be reformed? As with any conceptual building, security study rested on a set of foundational assumptions, which were usually unstated and unremarked. Once you probe a little into the sources of threat, you run into these assumptions, and it becomes difficult to the point of impossible to leave them unexamined. When you look a little more closely, they turn out to be the same set of assumptions I revealed in discussing the short passage from Krauthammer. Strategic studies has taken as given a number of important aspects of its field of study, of which the nature of the subject-the military nature of security-is first and foremost. Strategic studies also take as given the referent object of that security and the subjects of security practice, which turn out to be one and the same. It is *states* that are to be secured through the deployment of particular weapons (or through their elimination, or some other alteration in the disposition of the arsenal). It is also states that are to do the securing through the "threat or use of military force." At the deepest and least examined level, strategic studies take as given the interests pursued by states in seeking security. It is generally recognized, even by those who adhere to a traditional understanding of security, that problems other than military problems exist in international relations-they are just not to be considered problems of security. Similarly, most would accept that there are actors other than the state and even that the reason for providing security for the state is ultimately to provide security for those who live in that state. Interests, however, are sacrosanct. These crucial aspects of the study of security can be restated using the same formulation I adopted earlier. Traditional approaches to security take as given the objects, the identities of those who act, and the interests they have. The critique of security studies began with the first of these, suggesting that the object of study in security was, at the least, too narrow. Once that was opened to question, however, identities of the actors could no longer be assumed. If, for example, as Ken Booth has argued, security is emancipation, then thinking of identities defined solely in terms of the state is nonsensical. Similarly, although perhaps less obvious, the nature of interests is also changed as the object at issue and the identities of the actors involved change-a point to which I return in some detail later. The critique of traditional security studies has therefore opened to question the objects of security study-and, by extension, the practices through which security is sought-as well as the identities of those who act to secure and, finally, the interests these actors pursue. In doing so, critical security studies connects with currents of critique that have been developing in the discipline of international relations and, more broadly, within social theory generally.

**A2: Deterrence Solves**

**Concepts like deterrence don’t solve – it only suggests that a rational nuclear power would perceive defenders of nuclear attacks aggressively in order to promote conflicts**

**Mutimer 2000** (David, PhD in political science and professor in York University, “The Weapons State,” p.37) GL

The problem arms control confronted was that of a military relationship between potential enemies that could lead to war. Arms control represented nuclear weapons as weapons, although of a different character from others, as ACDA recognized: "These risks, arising out of conditions which are novel in history and peculiar to the nuclear-armed missile age can of course threaten all countries, directly or indirectly." Although the threat is general, the possibilities for control rest with the two superpowers. In most points, the image of the problem embedded in the practice of arms control echoes the 1946 Acheson-Lilienthal report. The major difference between the later practice and the earlier report, of course, is the resort to a bilateral rather than a multilateral system of control. The practice of arms control is comprehensible only in terms of the particular weapon constructed by the "deterrence" image. For example, "deterrence" suggests that a rational nuclear power, in a condition of MAD, would not start an all-out nuclear war, but it does not rule out that such a war could happen by mistake. Hence, the first concrete outcome of the arms control practice was a communication system designed to insure against accidental nuclear war. More important, the strategic context of deterrence was essential to agreements based on equality, strategic stability, and vulnerability. So important, in fact, is this particular context that U.S. arms control negotiators saw it as their task to educate their Soviet counterparts in deterrence. The importance of this discursive context is most easily seen with reference to the ABM treaty. It is counterintuitive to argue that a system for defending against an enemy attack is dangerous, yet the ABM treaty clearly states that an agreement between the United States and the USSR held that "effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems ... would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons."26 When framed in terms of deterrence resting on mutual assured destruction, however, it makes perfect sense. Effective defenses against nuclear attack eliminate the destruction on the threat of which deterrence rests. Even if the defense is not necessarily effective, it removes the assurance of destruction, which is central to deterrence arguments. Once nuclear weapons are framed in terms of mutual deterrence resting on assured destruction, defense against nuclear attack becomes dangerous. The mutuality of deterrence gives rise to the symmetry, or principle of equality, on which the SALT process was predicated.

# A2: Prolif Discourse Inevitable

**Characterizing prolif discourse as inevitable worsens weapons spread and ignores the problem—only the alt can solve**

**Mutimer**, David. **2k** “The Weapons State” Mutimer has a PhD in political science from York University and is now an associate professor of political science there. p. 109-110 LH

The importance of the attempted reframing of issues of "proliferation" in terms of "disarmament" is to allow for the dissociation of arms from, their underlying technology. By constructing the problem as one of armament, "disarmament" enables technology to be imagined differently than in "proliferation's" notions of the inevitability of technological development giving rise to weaponization. The irony is that by constructing the problem in terms of the inevitability of the spread of technology and the weaponry derived from it, "proliferation" misses one of the key moments of weapons development on which effective controls could be placed. Weaponization is far from automatic. In the case of weapons of mass destruction, the most technically demanding part of the process is the creation of usable weapons from the underlying technologies of concern. Iraq may have enough nerve agent to kill millions, but this does not mean it has a reliable system of delivery. Similarly, it is not tremendously difficult for a state with reasonable access to resources to build a nuclear explosive, but it is much more difficult to build a militarily effective nuclear weapon. The practices of proliferation control, however, miss this crucial step entirely. Supplier groups and export controls target the movement of underlying technologies. IAEA safeguards monitor the movement of fissile material to ensure that none is diverted from power generation to explosives production. Even the chemical weapons convention targets the production of chemical agents rather than chemical weapons. A “disarmament frame,” by contrast, would construct the problem of military technology to highlight weapons and thereby enable practices directed at preventing weaponization of technologies. Such barriers could then allow a reframing of issues related to the movement of technology in terms of "development.”

# A2: Prolif Discourse Inevitable—Economics

**Nuclear weapons are not inevitable—can be converted to safe science for economic purposes**

**Mutimer**, David. **2k** “The Weapons State” Mutimer has a PhD in political science from York University and is now an associate professor of political science there. p. 114-115 LH

By denying the inevitable and unidirectional link between arms and their underlying technologies, such an oppositional strategy opens the possibility for tying this alternative construction to one of the most potent international political discourses of the 1990s: economic competitiveness in an expanding global market. For the purpose of contesting the "proliferation" image, competitiveness has two important features. The first is that in the 1990s competitiveness is articulated as an issue of security, and the second is the centrality of free markets to economic competitiveness. These two features are neatly captured in the U.S. administration's 1996 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement: "The three central components of our strategy of engagement and enlargement are: (I) our efforts to enhance our security by maintaining a strong defense capability and employing effective diplomacy to promote cooperative security measures; (2) our work to open foreign markets and spur global economic growth; and (3) our promotion of democracy abroad."34 In filling in the economic component of this three-pronged strategy, the document tightens the linkage between security and economic competitiveness: "A central goal of our national security strategy is to promote America's prosperity through efforts both at home and abroad. Our economic and security interests are increasingly inseparable. Our prosperity at home depends on engaging actively abroad. The strength of our diplomacy, our ability to maintain an unrivaled military, the attractiveness of our values abroad-all these depend in part on the strength of our economy."35 This passage is immediately followed by the first element of the U.S. economic security strategy, "Enhancing American Competitiveness." The United States has therefore explicitly linked security to open foreign markets and global economic growth. The need for global growth provides an entry point for contesting the "proliferation" image in the name of development. Global growth depends on economic development in the less developed world; and that development, in turn, require access to technology. The U.S. national security strategy recognizes the "steps to improve American competitiveness: investing in science and technology; assisting integration of the commercial and military industrial sectors; improving information networks and other vital infrastructure; and improving £ education and training programs for America's workforce."36 Science and technology are vital to improved competitiveness-as we already know from the shifting functions of Los Alamos. Similarly, integration of the military and civilian sectors of industry improves economic performance, as does improved access to information technology and to training. Such integration is precisely what proliferation control practices seek to restrain. Science, or at least its technological output, is the target of export controls-in particular, the highest end of technology, which can be used to create the sort of smart weaponry the United States deploys. Safeguards and similar practices aim explicitly to segregate military and civilian sectors of industry. Finally, although there are no formal controls on education and training, the United States monitors foreign nationals coming to the United States for training in sensitive areas and has contributed to efforts to keep Russian nuclear scientists "safely" in the former Soviet Union.

**Prolif discourse isn’t inevitable—economics**

**Mutimer**, David. **2k** “The Weapons State” Mutimer has a PhD in political science from York University and is now an associate professor of political science there. p. 115-116 LH

Perhaps the greatest irony of the focus of proliferation control on technology denial is the coincident drive to end-other forms of state-intervention in the global economy. The 1980s witnessed a dramatic opening of markets in the advanced industrialized world as a result of the victory of neoliberal economics in the politics of almost all Northern states. Indeed, the U.S. national security strategy emphasizes the need to maintain open economies: "To compete abroad, our firms need access to foreign markets, just as foreign industries have access to our open market. We vigorously pursue measures to increase access for our goods and services-through bilateral, regional and multilateral arrangements."37 Competitiveness in a globally growing economy is central to U.S. security, and globally open markets' are vital to promoting competitiveness. At the same time, technology controls are imposed in the name of proliferation control, effectively closing markets rather than opening them. Finally, it must be recalled that the technologies of civilian trade and weapons proliferation are increasingly indistinguishable. The U.S. discourses of competitiveness and economic security provide potent resources for a strategy opposing "proliferation" in the name of "disarmament" and "development." The practices of proliferation control contradict the central features of the global economy the United States and its Northern allies are busy promoting in other areas. Importantly, these features of the global economy are increasingly discussed in terms of security, establishing the link between competitiveness and military technology without any effort. For the United States to achieve the sort of security it claims to be seeking in the open markets of a growing world economy, the restrictive practices at the heart of the proliferation control agenda must be discarded. Such an argument could prove politically potent, particularly if it is married to a plausible reframing of the "proliferation" problem. The goal of this chapter is to show that such a plausible reframing exists, that it is being articulated, and that it draws on discursive resources that are not foreign to those articulating the "proliferation" image.

# A2: Deterrence

**US deterrence has not always succeeded, Cold War proliferation proves.**

**Herdman et. al ’93** Director of the Technology Assessment, United States Congress [August 1993 Roger C. U.S. Congress, Office of “Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Rish, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,; http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ota/9341.pdf-; Adviosory Pannel: not listed too many, WBTR] MO

Deterrence of the United States The United States acted to protect its national interests against challenges from a Soviet Union heavily armed with nuclear, chemical, and possibly biological weapons aimed at U.S. territory, U.S. forces abroad, and U.S. allies. Nevertheless, the risk of direct conflict with the Soviet Union clearly constrained U.S. definitions of its national interests, its policies for defending those interests, and its strategies and tactics for managing clashes with Soviet international policies. Would other, though vastly smaller, nuclear (or biological or chemical) powers be able to deter the United States from regional interventions to protect its interests? Possibly, depending on whether U.S. leaders perceived the stakes to be worth the risks. In the case of Iraq, for example, the United States was concerned about, but not deterred by, the known Iraqi chemical arsenal and the possibility of a biological weapon threat. The United States would have had a different problem if Iraq had had nuclear weapons. If Iraq could have credibly threatened to use a few nuclear weapons against U.S. cities or those of U.S. allies, the calculus of U.S. intervention would have been even more different. The nature of U.S. decisions might have depended in part on whether U.S. leaders believed that the Iraqi rulers would have themselves been deterred from escalating to the use of nuclear weapons by U.S. nuclear retaliatory capabilities. (To the extent that U.S. military forces will be used in conjunction of those of other states, the dynamics of building and sustaining coalitions in the face of threats from weapons of mass destruction will also be important; this topic is discussed below.) We now know of one historical case in which the proliferant country hoped to use its nuclear weapon not to deter U.S. military intervention, but to cause it. Although South Africa kept its nuclear weapon program secret, the strategy was that if the situation in southern Africa were to deteriorate seriously, a confidential indication of the [nuclear] deterrent capability would be given to one or more of the major powers, for example the United States, in an attempt to persuade them to intervene.42 Thus, South Africa hoped to engage in a kind of reverse nuclear blackmail. Deterrence by the United States To some extent, the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals neutralized each other; the two nuclear superpowers never engaged in direct military conflict with one another at least in part because of the risk of escalation to mutual annihilation. Even in much more one-sided confrontations, the availability of nuclear weapons to the greater power did not deter, for example, the North Vietnamese from engaging the United States or the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan from taking on the Soviet Union. Nor did the nuclear stand-off deter the superpowers from arming each other's enemies in those two conflicts. In these cases, the lesser powers had good reason to believe that the nuclear superpowers were very unlikely to use their nuclear weapons-both because of the opprobrium that would come from such a disproportionate use of violence and because of the risk of escalation of conflict with the victim's nuclear-armed ally. Emerging nuclear powers that avoid direct attacks on the United States may justifiably doubt whether the United States would unleash nuclear weapons on them for conventionally armed acts of aggression elsewhere. Thus, U.S. nuclear deterrence, already a small factor in such situations, might not be much affected by nuclear proliferation. U.S. conventional military threats may have deterred less industrialized countries from attacking U.S. interests abroad. Would further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction weaken such deterrence in the future? The issue in this case is not just whether U.S. leaders decide that U.S. interests at stake justify deploying conventional forces in the face of the risks to them posed by weapons of mass destruction: it is also whether the nation to be deterred would believe that its own threats would counter-deter the United States, leaving itself free to act without fear of U.S. intervention. For the next several years, such a counter-deterrent threat might take the form of either limited unconventional attacks on U.S. cities, or somewhat larger, but still limited, attacks on U.S. forces intervening abroad. MILITARY OPERATIONS In preparing for war in Central Europe, U.S. forces had to take account of the possibility that they would confront Warsaw Pact nuclear or chemical weapons. They could probably learn to prepare to operate under such threats elsewhere in the world. Even so, having to cope with weapons of mass destruction would make U.S. foreign interventions costlier and more difficult. Nuclear or biological43 weapons (to a greater extent than chemical) would increase the risk of casualties. For Operation Desert Shield (preceding Desert Storm), the U.S. had to move in large quantities of troops and supplies through a few ports and airfields. An effective nuclear, chemical, or bio-logical threat against vital transportation nodes or staging areas would have caused great difficulty for the Coalition. (An alternative strategy might have been to rely on still more intensive long-range cruise-missile and bombing attacks than were used in Desert Storm; this strategy, however, would still leave the problem of occupying territory on the ground.) During the Cold War, part of U.S. preparedness in the European theater was based on the assumption that the United States would retaliate in kind against Soviet nuclear (and possibly against chemical) attacks; tither, the United States did not foreclose the possibility that it would initiate the use of nuclear weapons if it were losing a conventional battle. On the other hand, much of the world would probably see U.S. first use of nuclear weapons in the developing world as grossly disproportionate to any conceivable U.S. interests there.44 ALLIANCES OR COALITIONS A continuing theme of the Cold War was the West European fear that the superpowers would fight a ''tactical' nuclear war in Europe-with consequences for them similar to those of a ''strategic' nuclear exchange for the United States. In the case of the U.S.-Soviet contest, however, the United States shared at least some risk of nuclear devastation with its allies. In confrontations with proliferant nuclear powers lacking the means to attack the United States, U.S. allies abroad would bear heavier relative risks and may be reluctant to participate. On the other hand, some states facing a nuclear adversary might welcome an alliance with a nuclear power—if they believed that the adversary would be deterred by the possibility of U.S. nuclear retaliation. As noted above, though, such a deterrent threat might not be fully credible.

# A2: Current Countries are More Responsible

**That’s another link- these assumptions are a sham- nuclear states are as unstable as any other**

**Gusterson 4-** professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University (Hugh, 7/14/04, Chapter 2 Nuclear Weapons and The Other, People Of The Bomb: Portraits of America's Nuclear Complex, p.39-40) MH

But what if one tries to turn these contrasts inside out and asks whether the historical behavior of the Western nuclear powers might also give rise to concerns about undemocratic nuclear bullying, religious fanaticism, and unilateral initiatives by military officers? Because of its contradictions, gaps, and silences, the discourse on proliferation can always be read backward so that our gaze is directed not toward the Other but toward the author. Then the flaws and double standards of the discourse are illuminated. Thus, instead of asking whether Third World can be trusted with nuclear weapons, one can ask, how safe are the official nuclear powers from coups d’état, renegade officers, or reckless leaders? Perusing this line of inquiry, one notices that France came perilously close to revolution as recently as 1968 and that in 1961 a group of renegade French military officers took control of a nuclear weapon at France’s nuclear test site in the Sahara desert. Britain, struggling to repress the IRA bombing campaigns, has been engaged in low level civil war for most of the time it has possessed nuclear weapons. The United States has, since it acquired nuclear weapons, seen Presidents John F. Kennedy assassinated, Gerald Ford threatened with an empty gun by a member of the Manson family, and Ronald Reagan wounded by a gunman.

**That’s another link- their assumptions that democracies will be more responsible is false**

**Gusterson 4-** professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University (Hugh, 7/14/04, Chapter 2 Nuclear Weapons and The Other, People Of The Bomb: Portraits of America's Nuclear Complex, p.36) MH

The fourth argument concerns the supposed political instability or irrationality of Third World countries. Security specialists and media pundits worry that Third World dictators free from democratic constraints are more likely to develop and use nuclear weapons, that military offices in such countries will be more likely to take possession of the weapons or use them on their own initiative, or that Third World countries are more vulnerable to the kinds of ancient hatred and religious fanaticism that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons in anger. These concerns bring us to the heart of orientalist ideology. The presumed contrast between the West, where leaders are disciplined by democracy, and the Third World, where they are not, is nicely laid out by nonproliferation expert William Potter: Adverse domestic opinion may also serve as a constraint on the acquisition of nuclear weapons by some nations. Japan, West Germany, Sweden, and Canada are examples of democracies where public opinion, on the other hand, might be expected to be marginal for many developing nations without a strong democratic tradition. **This contrast does not hold up so well under examination.** In 1983 Western European leaders ignored huge grassroots protests against the deployment of the cruise and Pershing II missiles. President Reagan, likewise pressed ahead vigorously with nuclear weapons testing and deployment in the face of one million people- probably the largest American protest ever- at the UN Disarmament Rally in New York on June 12, 1982, despite opinion polls that consistently showed strong support for a bilateral nuclear weapons freeze. And the governments of Britain, France, and Israel, not to mention the United States, all made their initial decisions to acquire nuclear weapons without any public debate or knowledge. Ironically, of all the countries that have weapons, only in India was the question of whether or not to cross the nuclear threshold an election issue, with the Bharatiya Janata Party campaigning for office successfully in 1998 on a pledge to conduct nuclear tests. Pakistan also had a period of public debate before conducting its first nuclear test. Far from being constrained by public opinion on nuclear weapons, the Western democracies have felt quite free to ignore it. Yet the idea that Western democracies live with their nuclear arms half tied behind their backs recurs over and over in the discourse on nuclear proliferation.

\*\*\*AFF

# A2: No Impact to Prolif

**Even prolif of Low-tech Weapons still cause Mass Casualties**

**Herdman et. al ‘93** Director of the Technology Assessment, United States Congress [August 1993 Roger C. U.S. Congress, Office of “Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Rish, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,; http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ota/9341.pdf-;Adviosory

Frightening as they are, weapons of mass destruction-taken here to be nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons—represent only part of the world’s post-Cold War security problems. Diffusion of militarily useful advanced technology, continuing conventional arms sales, and the resurgence of hitherto suppressed regional and ethnic rivalries are spurring a broader problem: the growth of advanced military capability among states and sub-national groups that are potentially hostile toward each other. Not only are weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems spreading, but so are advanced conventional weapons (e.g., those other than nuclear, chemical, and biological), along with equipment needed to build a command, control, communication, and intelligence infrastructure. Even “low-technology’ weapons can produce massive casualties, as shown by the Allied fire bomb attacks in World War II that caused up to 100,000 deaths in Tokyo and 200,000 in Dresden. Nevertheless, proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons is of particular concern for at least two reasons: The large-scale and indiscriminate nature of their effects—particularly against unprotected civilians—differentiates mass destruction from conventional weapons. Mass destruction weapons make it possible for a single missile or airplane to kill as many people as thousands of planeloads of conventional weaponry. These weapons can give small states or subnational groups the ability to inflict damage that is wholly disproportionate to their conventional military capabilities or to the nature of the conflict in which they are used. Unlike most categories of conventional weapons, which will likely be considered legitimate instruments of national self-defense for the foreseeable future, weapons of mass destruction engender widespread revulsion. Some 150 nations have renounced nuclear weapons, formalizing their commitment by joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states. Moreover, the United States and many other nations have forsworn chemical and biological weapons completely, even in retaliation for in-kind attack, by joining the Biological Weapons Convention (with 125 parties) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (with more than 140 signatories). These three treaties codify strong, if not yet universal, international norms against weapons of mass destruction. The states seeking these weapons today are generally pursuing them covertly, attesting to the reluctance states have to admit to such developments. Thus, controlling weapons of mass destruction may well be feasible despite the dubious track record of past attempts to regulate or ban other weapons of war.

**Proliferation causes war and destabilizes global politics**

**Kroenig 08** (Matthew, Assistant professor in the Department of Government at the University of Georgetown, 6/17/08, Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation, page , http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig\_Beyond%20Optimism%20and%20Pessimism.pdf) AG

On the other hand, Scott Sagan, and other “proliferation pessimists” argue that “more will be worse” because more nuclear weapons in the hands of more states increases the chance of preventive wars, crisis instability, and accidental nuclear detonation. According to the pessimists, nuclear proliferation contributes to greater levels of international instability. The optimism/pessimism debate has done much to illuminate our understanding of the consequences of the spread of nuclear weapons. The existing scholarship, however, has been preoccupied with the study of the system-level effects of nuclear proliferation. In particular these scholars have examined whether nuclear proliferation increases or decreases the stability of the international system. For this reason, the existing scholarship has devoted less attention to unit-level effects. That is, optimists and pessimists do not explicitly attempt to explain how nuclear proliferation affects the individual states that compose the international system.

**Nuclear proliferation leads to nuclear war**

**Kroenig 08** (Matthew, Assistant professor in the Department of Government at the University of Georgetown, 6/17/08, Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation, page , http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig\_Beyond%20Optimism%20and%20Pessimism.pdf) AG

The spread of nuclear weapons threatens power-projecting states primarily because it constrains their conventional military power. These states understand that the spread of nuclear weapons states against which they have the option to use conventional military force will erode a source strategic advantage. These strategic costs are not as catastrophic as nuclear war, but they are costs that power-projecting states can count on incurring with near certainty as nuclear weapons spread. Power-projecting states also consider other high-impact, low-probability consequences nuclear proliferation, such as nuclear war, accidental nuclear detonation, or, in recent years, nuclear terrorism, but evidence from their own internal, strategic assessments reveals that statesmen in power-projecting states fear nuclear proliferation because they understand that it will constrain their conventional military freedom of action.

# Discourse Bad

**Discourse is flawed. Issues of war and peace are too important for self-indulgent discourse divorced from the real world – separating ourselves from policymaking gives rise to conflict**

**Mutimer 2000** (David, PhD in political science and professor in York University, “The Weapons State,” p.23-24) GL

Clearly, such a conception of understanding, 'and of the discursive construction of knowledge, carries its own problems. The most commonly raised concern is with the conclusion Campbell stated earlier as "there is nothing outside discourse." Certainly, to a community of security scholars and practitioners, the idea that there is only language is anathema. As Stephen Walt warned in a noted article, "Issues of war and peace are too important for the field to be diverted into a prolix and self-indulgent discourse that is divorced from the real world." The implication is obvious: there is a real world out there with which security scholars must be concerned because it gives rise to war if we are not careful. However, Campbell does not say there is nothing but discourse but rather that there is nothing outside discourse. Although the difference between the two phrases might seem insignificant, it is far from it. If we want to assert a real world entirely divorced from discourse, our own bodies use to likely place to start. Those who argue for unmediated access 10 the real world, argue. In fact, for access through our bodies whether that is sight, touch, or smell.

# Alt is Utopian/Alt Fails

**Double Bind: Either the alt is utopian or it isn’t feasible and fails**

**Mutimer**, David. **2k** “The Weapons State” Mutimer has a PhD in political science from York University and is now an associate professor of political science there. p. 105 LH

Here, then, is both the greatest potential and the greatest problem posed by a “disarmament” frame. With such a different object and set of identities, a “disarmament” image would enable a rather different series of practices. But on the other hand, the politics of instituting those practices would become somewhat more difficult because of the entailments of the “disarmament” image. Although considerable rhetorical support has been expressed for the goal of disarmament from the earliest days of the nuclear age, and before, concrete disarmament practices have been difficult to achieve. Part of the problem has been a series of discursive and practical links enabled by the “disarmament” image. The first and perhaps most damaging has been the connection between the language of disarmament and the program of general and complete disarmament. Although many analysts and even policymakers might be willing to concede the value of eliminating some weapons—notice the ability to generate support for bans on land mines and both chemical and biological weapons—and possibly even all nuclear weapons, few are willing to express support for a goal they characterize as hopelessly utopian. The utopian features of general and complete disarmament gesture toward another politically difficult entailment of “disarmament”—the link between disarmament and weakness. Several unfortunate links are created by the language of “disarmament” that inculcate an entailment of weakness. The first is characterization of those pressing for general and complete disarmament as pacifist, lefty, or even wimp by those entrusted with the arsenals of, certainly, the United States. The second problematic link is with the practices of the enforced disarmament that follows wars: losers are disarmed, so to disarm is to be a loser. This is not a promising way to generate political support. Finally, arms, in both senses of the word, are intimately tied to concepts of power and masculinity. To be disarmed is to be rendered powerless, to be emasculated. Even if the process of eliminating weapons produces enhanced security, the entailments of powerlessness and emasculation are difficult obstacles to overcome.

**A2: Discourse Shapes Reality**

**Censorship will be co-opted by conservative elements to destroy minority rights – instead language should be used to subvert the conventional meanings of the words.**

Nye 99 (Andrea, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin Whitewater, “Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative; In Pursuit of Privacy: Law, Ethics, and the Rise of Technology,” Jstor)BBL

Once the state has the power to legislate what can be said and not said, she ar­gues, that power will be coopted by conservative elements to defeat liberal causes and minority rights. State power will also curtail the freedom of speech of private individuals that is the very basis for effective antidotes to derogatory name calling. DeCew, however, painstakingly reviews the legal and philosophical history of privacy rights as well as current debates about its scope and status before she takes on the question of whether feminists have any interest in preserving a private sphere. For DeCew, too, a major target is MacKinnon, specifically her argument that leaving alone the pri­vacy of home and family means leaving men alone to abuse and dominate women. DeCew argues that decisions that protect the use of sexually ex­plicit materials in the home, consensual sex practices in private, and per­sonal decisions about abortion are in the interest of women as well as men, even though in some cases, such as wife beating, there may be overriding considerations that justify state intervention. Both authors argue persuasively for a more careful look at the dangers lurking behind calls for state action. For Butler, the danger is that the state becomes arbiter of what is and is not permissible speech, allowing rulings that the erection of burning crosses by the Ku Klux Klan is protected speech but that artistic expressions of gay sexuality or statements of gay identity are actions rather than speech and so are not protected. The danger DeCew sees is that once the right to privacy is denied or narrowly defined, the state can, on the grounds of immorality, move into women's personal lives to interfere with sexual expression, whether homosexual or heterosex­ual, or with the right to choose an abortion established in Roe v. Wade. Both DeCew and Butler, however, provide alternative remedies for the admitted harm that state action is intended to redress. For DeCew, the right to privacy is not absolute; like freedom, it can be overridden by other rights —thus the state can intervene in domestic abuse cases because of the physical harm being done. Butler's remedy for harmful hate language is more deeply rooted in postmodern theories of the speaking subject. Given the postmodern view that the subject can never magisterially use a lan­guage with fixed meanings according to clear intentions, it is always pos­sible to subvert the conventional meanings of words. What is said as a derogatory slur—"nigger," "chick," "spic," or "gay," for example —can be "resignified," that is, returned in such a manner that its conventional mean­ing in practices of discrimination and abuse is subverted. Butler gives as examples the revalorization of terms like "black" or "gay," the satirical cita­tion of racial or sexual slurs, reappropriation in street language or rap mu­sic, and expressions of homosexual identity in art depicting graphic sex. These are expressions that any erosion in First Amendment rights might endanger.

# Alt Turn

**Their efforts to represent those harmed by our language is EQUALLY as violent as our use of certain words. The Alt cannot solve.**

**Shapiro, 98**, Professor of Political Science – University of Hawaii, “Representational Violence,” Peace Review v. 10 i. 4, Michael J.) BBL

Of late, critical and polemical commentaries aimed at politicizing language have been focused on the damaging effects of what Judith Butler has called "excitable speech," utterances intended to incite violence toward persons with recognizable social identities: religious groups, ethnic groups, and gays and lesbians, among others. Apart from the problem of neglecting the meaning slippage involved in assigning an unmediated causal effect to speech acts, the position of those who are arguing, for example, in favor of juridical responses to censor hate speech confronts a paradox. In order to militate against one kind of linguistic violence-the damaging effects of utterances on persons--they have to commit another kind of violence. By assigning a unitary identity to the targets of hate speech, the protectors of vulnerable bodies engage in a violence of representation. They must attribute to speech-act victims a unitary and unambiguously coherent identity; they must dissolve hybridities, turning pluralistic and contingent historical affiliations into essential characteristics. As a result, their arguments in favor of protecting the vulnerable reinforce the identity perspectives presupposed in the discourses they oppose.   The paradox evident in juridically oriented attempts to sanction hate speech is part of a more pervasive historical phenomenon toward which Jacques Derrida has pointed in his warning about attempts at definitively expunging violence. As he has famously put it, a commitment to total non-violence risks the "worst violence;" it perpetuates the illusion that an absolute peace is possible. Strategies for attaining such a peace have varied from the structural approach, e.g. the Hobbesian idea of concentrating violence at one point above the social formation, to the conceptual approach, e.g. the Kantian commitment to a universalizing cognitive enlargement at the levels of both the individual and global society.

# Censorship Fails

**Censorship by the left prevents change**

**Wilson, 2000** – Editor and Publisher of Illinois Academe – 2000 (John K. Wilson, “How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People” p. 163) MH

The left must stand strongly on the side of free speech. Because there is so much censorship of progressive ideas, it can be tempting for the left to turn the tables and to try to silence far right advocates. But repression is unnecessary: progressive ideas are more popular than conservatives ones, and all the left needs to do is get a fair and open hearing. Censorship is not only wrong, it’s also a losing strategy for the left. Progressive attract more attention if they’re the censors. Because conservative censorship is largely taken for granted, news about intolerance on the right isn’t usually publicized. But when someone on the left seems guilty of censorship, the rights publicity machine quickly starts up. That’s why the right was able to push the myth of political correctness in the 1990s and invent the idea of a wave of left-wing oppression sweeping college at a time when there was more freedom of thought than ever before, and infringement of free speech on campuses by conservative forces was more prevalent than anything committed by the left. Progressives certainly need to better publicize incidents of censorship, but the left must also realize that the right will always win the suppression battles. It has all the resources and the media on its side. When some leftists are willing to make exceptions to the First Amendment to silence conservative hate mongers, it becomes even more difficult for progressive to draw attention to the censorship of left-wing ideas. The only winning strategy is to maintain a consistent commitment to freedom of speech.

**Without using those representations, we can’t change the meaning**

**Butler, 97**, Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature – University of California-Berkeley, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative p. 38 Judith MH

This story underscores the limits and risks of resignification as a strategy of opposition. I will not propose that the pedagogical recirculation of examples of hate speech always defeats the project of opposing and defusing such speech, but I want to underscore the fact that such terms carry connotations that exceed the purposes for which they may be intended and can thus work to afflict and defeat discursive efforts to oppose such speech. Keeping such terms unsaid and unsayable can also work to lock them in place, preserving their power to injure, and arresting the possibility of a reworking that might shift their context and purpose. That such language carries trauma is not a reason to forbid its use. There is no purifying language of its traumatic residue, and no way to work through trauma except through the arduous effort it takes to direct the course of its repetition. It may be chat trauma constitutes a strange kind of resource, and repetition, its vexed but promising instrument. After all, to be rained by another is traumatic: it is an act that precedes my will, an act that brings me into a linguistic world in which I might then begin to exercise agency at all. A founding subordination, and yet the scene of agency, is repeated in the ongoing interpellations of social life. This is what I have been called. Because I have been called something, I have been entered into linguistic life, refer to myself through the language given by the Other, but perhaps never quite in the same terms that my language mimes. The terms by which we are hailed arc rarely the ones we choose (and even when we try to impose protocols on how we are to be named, they usually fail); but these terms we never really choose arc the occasion for something we might still call agency, the repetition of an originary subordination for another purpose, one whose future is partially open.

# Censorship Petro Turn

**Censorship turns the K – blocking the freedom of speech will only guarantee the domination of current prevailing discursive practices.**

**Ward, 90** ( David V. Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy at Widener University in Pennsylvania. “Library Trends” Philosophical Issues in Censorship and Intellectual Freedom, Volume 39, Nos 1 & 2. Summer/Fall 1990. Pages 86-87) MH

Second, even if the opinion some wish to censor is largely false, it may contain some portion of truth, a portion denied us if we suppress the speech which contains it. The third reason for allowing free expression is that any opinion “however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, ... will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth” (Mill, 1951, p. 126).Merely believing the truth is not enough, Mill points out, for even a true opinion held without full and rich understanding of its justification is “a prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof against, argument-this is not the way in which truth ought to be held by a rational being. This is not knowing the truth. Truth, thus held, is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth” (p. 127).Fourth, the meaning of a doctrine held without the understanding which arises in the vigorous debate of its truth, “will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct the dogma becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience” (p. 149). Censorship, then, is undesirable according to Mill because, whether the ideas censored are true or not, the consequences of suppression are bad. Censorship is wrong because it makes it less likely that truth will be discovered or preserved, and it is wrong because it has destructive consequences for the intellectual character of those who live under it. Deontological arguments in favor of freedom of expression, and of intellectual freedom in general, are based on claims that people are *entitled* to freely express their thoughts, and to receive the expressions made by others, quite independently of whether the effects of that speech are desirable or not. These entitlements take the form of rights, rights to both free expression and access to the expressions of others.

**Freedom must be protected in every instance**

Sylvester **Petro**, professor of law, Wake Forest University, Spring 19**74**, TOLEDO LAW REVIEW, p. 480. MH

However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway – “I believe in only one thing: liberty.” And it is always well to bear in mind David Hume’s observation: “It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once.” Thus, it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no import because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism, and the end of all human aspiration. Ask Solzhenitsyn. Ask Milovan Djilas. In sum, if one believes in freedom as a supreme value, and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit.

# Liberalism solves the Impacts

**Liberalism solves—economic incentives prevent the impacts of the kritik**

**Mutimer**, David. **2k** “The Weapons State” Mutimer has a PhD in political science from York University and is now an associate professor of political science there. p. 160

Ironically, the second of the two features necessary for any alternative to “proliferation” provides a way in which those interests can be confronted. I have argued that the discourse of liberalism and economic growth, in many ways politically problematic discourses, provide and important oppositional opening in this case. Commercial interests in the West, particularly in the United States, oppose the imposition of export controls. If the security problems attendant on weapons are constituted in terms of the weapons themselves, the movement of technology can be freed from its proliferation-imposed limits. This is not to advocate a laissez-faire arms trade—indeed, precisely the opposite, as arms rather than their precursors would be seen as the problematic technology. By contrast, it is to recognize the multiple uses of most technologies and the importance in the contemporary economy of allowing those technologies to circulate. Such a move could mobilize powerful interests, at least within the United States, that might prove sufficient to counter those who would oppose a move away from “proliferation.”

# Framework

 **The role of the ballot is to focus on empirics a focus on philosophical representations is not sufficient**

**Carr, 89**- Prof of Philosophy of Edu @ U. of Sheffield UK ( Wilfred, “The Idea of an Educational Science,” Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vd. 23, No. 1, p 34 1989 <http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/119440829/abstract>)

“No one, I suppose” wrote D. J. O’Connor “believes that education is itself a science. . . . It is rather a set of practical activities which provide the focus for the application of various sciences” [2]. It is indicative of the power of the British empiricist tradition that this ‘applied science’ view of education is rarely challenged or opposed. On this view, ‘science’ is one thing, ‘education’ is something else. Science is a value-free theoretical activity concerned only with the disinterested pursuit of empirical knowledge; education is a value-loaded practical activity concerned with promoting human values and social ideals. Here, as elsewhere, empiricism imposes its rigid dualisms between facts and values, knowledge and action, theory and practice. And here, as elsewhere, these conceptual distinctions support an institutionalised division of labour based on the ideology of expertise. It is thus to the professional scientist that O’Connor reserves the right “to produce explanations of the workings of the educational process” [3]. The task he assigns to the educational practitioner is simply to put this explanatory scientific knowledge to effective practical use. During the last twenty years, the philosophical basis of this view of science has been “universally discredited” [4] and replaced by a “post-empiricist philosophy of science” which renders the traditional empiricist dualisms largely untenable [ 51. Although the educational implications of post-empiricist philosophy of science are far reaching, I do not intend to consider them here [6]. Instead, I intend to explore the idea of an educational science which does not appeal solely to philosophical arguments about the nature and purpose of science, but also draws on philosophical arguments about the nature and purpose of education itself. The central concern of my paper is thus with the idea of an educational science which is rooted in a general philosophy of education rather than a specific philosophy of science. No doubt the suggestion that an educational science can rest its claims to legitimacy on an educational philosophy will cause considerable confusion and unease. How can an educational philosophy provide the intellectual foundation for an educational science? Surely, an educational science requires a philosophical justification of what constitutes valid knowledge about education rather than a philosophical justification for education itself? In order to respond to these questions I have divided my paper into four parts. First, I shall describe a traditional and long-standing view of education in a way which clarifies the philosophical assumptions on which it rests. Secondly, I shall seek to show that, when elaborated in the context of contemporary social theory, these philosophical assumptions provide the foundations for a particular form of science. Thirdly, I shall try and defend the idea of an educational science which is ‘educational’ because it incorporates a view of science informed by precisely 30 W. Carr those philosophical assumptions informing our traditional conception of education. Finally, by contrasting this version of an educational science with the more conventional empiricist version, I shall identify its salient characteristics and describe some of the conditions necessary for its practical realisation.

# Framework

**Education centered around rational thinking and the ability of humans to think together and see themselves in a society.**

**Carr, 89**- Prof of Philosophy of Edu @ U. of Sheffield UK ( Wilfred, “The Idea of an Educational Science,” Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vd. 23, No. 1, p 34 1989 <http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/119440829/abstract>)

 One of the philosophical assumptions to which some of the exponents of this conception of education subscribe is that individuals qua human beings cannot be understood in isolation from the society of which they are a part. To be a human being is always to have acquired the concepts, language and modes of self-understanding embedded in a particular form of social life. Conversely, a particular form of social life is partially defined by the shared network of concepts and modes of discourse which individuals employ in understanding themselves and the ways in which they live. On this view, then, the idea of the individual as existing prior to, or separate from, society is just as incoherent as the idea of society as some kind of objective entity existing without the intervention of human activity or purpose. Individuals and society are dialectically related; each is constituted by, and constitutive of, the other. But, as well as being social animals, human beings are also rational animals who are able to use their powers of reason to reflect critically upon their conceptions of themselves and their shared forms of social life. Thus, what is distinctive of human beings is their capacity for critical self-reflection-the capacity to evaluate the sense of themselves that they have already acquired, to consider whether this inherited selfunderstanding is conducive to the promotion of their needs and interests and, on the basis of such rational self-examination, to transform themselves and their social world. What is distinctive of human beings qua rational animals is therefore that they can reappraise and reconstruct their conceptions of self and society on the basis of their own rational deliberations and reflections. To those subscribing to this view of human nature, education is the process An Educational Science 3 1 whereby individuals become more human by learning how to exercise their powers of rational thought. The aims and values of education are thus those associated with the development of rational autonomy-aims and values which, historically, have been articulated in a variety of different ways, but which always reflect the view that, through education, individuals may deepen their self-awareness, examine their existing desires, attitudes and beliefs, rid themselves of ignorance, prejudice and superstition and so transform themselves and the social context in which they live. The most influential contemporary exponent of this view of education is undoubtedly R. S. Peters [9]. Indeed, in many ways, Peters’s educational philosophy may be read as a sustained attempt to protect this concept of education from the kind of utilitarian thinking which now tends to dominate modern culture. Like his predecessors, Peters asserts that reason is central to any conception of human nature [ 101 and that the development of rational autonomy is a fundamental educational aim. And, like his predecessors, Peters insists that the freedom to rationally determine one’s own beliefs and actions always presupposes a freedom from any social influences or cultural constraints which may impede the development of autonomous rational thought [ 1 11. For education to promote rational autonomy, Peters argues [ 121, it must help individuals to understand themselves as both the producers and the products of their social world. By enabling individuals to recognise themselves in society, he maintains, education helps them to “purge” their thinking of “irrational allegiances” and so to transform their understanding of “the human condition”. Peters eloquently describes the transformative role of education in the following way: The individual brings to his experience a stock of beliefs, attitudes and expectations. Most of these rest on authority. . .. Many of them are erroneous, prejudiced and simple-minded, especially in the political realms where evidence shows that opinions depend overwhelmingly on traditional and irrational allegiances. One of the aims of education is to make them less so. . .. The individual can improve his understanding and purge his beliefs and attitudes by ridding them of error, superstition and prejudice. And, through the development of understanding, he can come to view the human condition in a very different light. New opportunities for action may open up as his view of people, society and the natural world changes. . . and he may be fired by the thought of participating in the change of institutions, that he had previously regarded as fixed points in his social world . . . [ 131

# Framework

**Our Epistemology needs to be rooted in science- if we get too far away from empirics we cant evaluate anything**

**Carr, 89**- Prof of Philosophy of Edu @ U. of Sheffield UK ( Wilfred, “The Idea of an Educational Science,” Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vd. 23, No. 1, p 34 1989 <http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/119440829/abstract>)

For Habermas, as for many other contemporary philosophers, one of the most disturbing features of contemporary culture is the threat it poses for the future of human reason [ 161. Modern societies, argues Habermas, have created conditions under which the classical concept of reason can no longer find adequate practical expression. Deprived of any significant role in the formulation of human purposes or social ends, reason has become an instrument for the effective pursuit of preestablished goals. Reduced to this kind of instrumental rationality, human reason has lost its critical thrust, judgement and deliberation have been replaced by calculation and technique, and reflective thought has been supplanted by a rigid conformity to methodical rules. Ours is a culture which, to use C. Wright Mills’s felicitous phrase, is dominated by “rationality without reason” [ 171. The mutilation inflicted on the classical concept of reason is seen by Habermas as an inevitable consequence of the successes and accomplishments of the natural sciences. This success has fuelled the belief that the scientific patterns of reasoning which have enabled us to extend our control over the world of nature can be used with equal success to extend our control over the human and social world as well. As a result, scientific rationality now operates as an uncritically accepted way of thinking that not only pervades modern intellectual disciplines-such as politics, history and economics-but also penetrates all aspects of everyday social life. Indeed, so powerful has been the spread of scientific rationality, Habermas argues, that our understanding of the relationship between philosophy and science has become seriously distorted. For, instead of accepting that science has to justify its knowledge claims against epistemological standards derived from philosophy, it is now assumed that epistemology has to be judged against standards laid down by science. Habermas calls this reduction of epistemology to the philosophy of science “scientism”, and he identifies it as “the most influential philosophy of our time”. “Scientism”, he says, means science’s belief in itself: that is, the conviction that we can no longer understand science as one form of possible knowledge, but rather must identify knowledge with science [ 181 For Habermas, one of the adverse effects of ‘scientism’ has been to produce an impoverished understanding of the nature and role of the human and social sciences. Under the impact of scientistic assumptions, social theorising has been transformed from an open-ended dialogue about the nature and conduct of social life into a valuefree science requiring methodological sophistication and technical expertise. Because of this, ordinary individuals’ confidence in their ability to determine the purposes and ends of their own actions has been eroded and they are now confronted by an image of the social world as an objective reality over which they themselves have no real control. In these circumstances, he argues, the fundamental task of modern philosophy is to refute the epistemological assumptions on which this view of social science has been erected and to develop a philosophical justification for a form of social science which can rehabilitate and cultivate the role of human reason in social affairs.

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**Proliferation is a true security concern – four specific warrants**

**Harvey 2001** (Frank P., a member of a the Canadian International Council, “National Missile Defence Revisited, Again a Reply to David Mutimer,” International Journal, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Spring, 2001), pp. 347-360, Canadian International Council)

'Before any argument supporting NMD can be taken seriously, there-fore, we must accept that a "rogue state threat" exists' (p 340). I couldn't agree more. But this is perhaps the most fascinating of all of Mutimer s assertions because he himself acknowledges the 'facts' of the rogue state threat - and I thought only proponents shared the burden of proving the case for NMD. Consider the following quotes: • The rogue state needs, therefore, to be seen for what it was: the creation of the United States military to justify its claim on resources ... The rogue state, however, is a myth. [It] is not mythical in the sense that it is not real, but rather in the sense that it has been vested with a totemic importance by the United States' (p 344) (emphasis added). • 'Rogues are the enemies that make high levels of military spending legitimate. They are not a lie told by knowing capitalists in an instrumental fashion to hoodwink Congress into passing over-inflated budgets (p 345, n 24) (emphasis added). I am not arguing that the United States fabricated evidence, but rather that it produced a particular frame within which to interpret that evidence' (p 345) (emphasis added). • 'The imagined nature of threats does not mean that there is no real danger or that nothing need ever be done about risks' (p 345). • 'The issue, therefore, is not the evidence but rather how the "facts" are "evidence" of a particular form of threat labelled "proliferation" by actors labelled "rogue"' (p 344, n22). • 'There is, therefore, no need for me to engage in a discussion of the evidence of proliferation assembled, for example, in the Rumsfeld Report to bolster the case for NMD. At issue are not "the facts" but the ways in which those facts are assembled and the interpretation that is given to them' (p 344, n 22). Mutimer s honesty is refreshing but not surprising. **Ballistic missile** proliferation is difficult to deny. It is a 'real' security threat, driven by technological progress, the spread of scientific knowledge related to these weapons systems, diminishing costs, ongoing regional security threats in the Middle East and Asia, and, most importantly, time