**\*\*\*Demand K\*\*\***

**1NC**

**The ideal Keynesian government’s role in the economy is structured around managing greed---this approach is doomed to failure**

**Madra & Ozselcuk 10** Yahya Madra is an economics professor who holds a Ph.D. from University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Ceren Özselçuk is Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology of Bogaziçi University, Istanbul, “Enjoyment as an economic factor: Reading Marx with Lacan” http://www.communityeconomies.org/site/assets/media/yahyamadra/Subjectivityv2b.pdf

Nevertheless, if we are to define neoliberalism, following Foucault, as the art of governance of society through economic incentives, then it is necessary today to also consider the New Keynesian (or new information) approach as another position within the theoretical horizon of contemporary neoliberal creed. **The central tenet of the new information economics is that information, regarding the quality of goods delivered, is asymmetrically distributed among contracting agents**. This imperfect availability of information creates opportunities for rational economic agents to exploit them to their benefit, and most importantly, this endemic “opportunism” prevents markets from reaching mutually agreeable (hence optimal) outcomes (see, for instance, Stiglitz, 1994). Accordingly, **for New Keynesians, markets in themselves are not capable of governing greed**. The government, with the help of economic experts, should actively intervene in the market by designing and implementing incentive compatible (opportunism-proof) institutions with the aim of supplementing the price mechanism and regulating its “excessive” consequences (e.g., corruption, speculation, price gouging). Nevertheless, **since opportunistic economic agents always try to find new ways of sidestepping regulations, regulators always need to design new institutions that would address these “market failures**”. In other words, for New Keynesian economists, since markets will always fail to govern the excesses of self-interested behavior, **they always need to be supplemented by ever-smarter regulation** (Madra and Adaman, 2010). Even though New Keynesian “designers” differ from the “Chicago boys” in the way they parse out the questions of when greed becomes a problem and how to govern it, **they share the foundational figure of homo economicus as the working assumption regarding the behavior of individuals**. Moreover, New Keynesians concede that competitive behavior, if regulated in the correct manner through incentive-compatible institutions, will lead to social welfare and harmony. **Both of these two contesting “scientific” discourses within the neoliberal horizon 15 are structured like fantasy formations**. While they differ in the way they conceptualize the theoretical location of excessive gain-seeking, both discourses use it as that which legitimize their role as experts who will be able to perpetually produce an answer to the question “What is to be done?”. In presenting themselves as the correct Science of the economy, these discourses vie with each other for the position of agent in what Lacan called the discourse of the university (Lacan, 2007 [1991], Zizek, 1998, 2006, Zupancic, 2006). In Lacan’s formula of the university discourse, S2 designates the so-called neutral knowledge of experts (economics) and is conceived to be directed toward the object cause of desire (object a) which needs to be integrated, domesticated, and appropriated (Zizek, 2006, p. 107) by rendering the economy compatible with the postulated positivity of interests. While the underlying truth of the so-called neutral expert knowledge is the perpetuation of the social order under the direct rule of experts as the new masters of our times, the product of this social link is a population reduced to a bio-political object of governmentality.

**The affirmative has misrepresented the root cause of the economic crisis---the idea that the economy operates through transparent, greedy actors is no more than a fantasy that negates the role of unconscious forces in driving economic actions---this makes solvency impossible**

**Madra & Ozselcuk 10** Yahya Madra is an economics professor who holds a Ph.D. from University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Ceren Özselçuk is Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology of Bogaziçi University, Istanbul, “Enjoyment as an economic factor: Reading Marx with Lacan” http://www.communityeconomies.org/site/assets/media/yahyamadra/Subjectivityv2b.pdf

There is, then, still more to be done in order to stage a true encounter between the fields of psychoanalysis and political economy, one that would thoroughly subject the problematics of the latter to the founding psychoanalytical gesture of seating the constitutive negativity of the social within the subversive register of the unconscious and the ambiguity of subjective attachments.

This task is all the more urgent and necessary given how the mainstream (scientific and popular) narratives of global economic crisis explain the ensuing social dislocation in a fetishistic manner, by reducing it to the consequences of unbridled greed, thereby, submitting the prescriptions of recovery to a mastery of excessive gain seeking. The response from critical political economy, on the other hand, is also far from satisfying. To the extent of being caught up in a project of exposing the real form of totality—in the various guises of the drive of capital accumulation, structural character of ruling interests, the complete hold of neoliberal governmentality and so on— critical political economy continues to speak the truth of structure (and history) **to the illusive power of greed.**

From a psychoanalytical perspective, however, **reality is simply not invertible like that to its naked truth, precisely because there is no such comprehensive totality to be recovered**, subject as it is to the enigma of subjective investments that destabilize and make up for the absent totality, including the “structure of capitalism.” In keeping the remnants of economism and reproductionism, **critical political economy enters into an unlikely alliance with theoretical humanist discourses in disqualifying an active inquiry of the unconscious in the formation of economic subjectivity.**

In our project of staging an encounter between Lacanian psychoanalysis and political economy we begin by locating the moments of negation of the unconscious within the theoretical humanist tradition of political economy through a symptomatic reading of the theoretical dislocations and struggles that structure this field. **Theoretical humanist tradition posits a self-transparent self-consciousness—“a self-identical and self-identifiable unity**” (Althusser, 1996)—**as the ultimate ground of economic behavior** and searches for the idealized set of institutions that would reconcile the diverse and potentially conflicting passions and interests of rational individuals and achieve a harmonious social order. The proponents of this tradition argue that, in the absence of appropriate institutions, unrestrained individual “greed” will throw the social order out of balance and lead to social discord and economic imbalances. Accordingly, the task of the economist qua the expert is to make sure that the correct institutions that would govern (harness or regulate) this excess (“greed”) are in place.

In our symptomatic reading of the history of the theoretical humanist problematic, we mobilize the Lacanian concept of fantasy (Glynos, 2008, McGowan, 2007). A fantasy formation offers a narrative frame for the “subject to experience itself as a desiring subject” insofar as it finds “solutions” to the problem of subject’s desire by providing a rationale for dissatisfaction (McGowan, 2007, p. 24). **The theoretical humanist problematic of governing greed is a fantasy formation in this precise sense**. While the particular constellation of the fantasy narrative changes from one school of thought to another, for the tradition, **the figure of greed functions as that which simultaneously thwarts the realization of scenarios of best institutional arrangement** and propels the articulation of knowledge production pertaining to the economic (hence providing economic experts a frame within which to “desire”).

**And, this turns the case---we ignore the role of *jouissance*---pleasure to the extent of pain---in creating the very conditions that allow economic unsustainability in the first place**

**Madra & Ozselcuk 10** Yahya Madra is an economics professor who holds a Ph.D. from University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Ceren Özselçuk is Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology of Bogaziçi University, Istanbul, “Enjoyment as an economic factor: Reading Marx with Lacan” http://www.communityeconomies.org/site/assets/media/yahyamadra/Subjectivityv2b.pdf

2.2. A crisis of jouissance in the US capitalism When the economic crisis hit the US towards the end of 2008, the predominant explanations immediately found the culprit in unbridled greed—even if they identified its source in different sites and agents. For those who have been waiting for this moment to re-assert the role of the government, the culprit was excessive gain-seeking in Wall Street (leading to the invention of incomprehensively complex financial instruments) and the predatory lending practices of the mortgage industry; for those who were troubled by the prospects of a larger government involvement in the economy and believed in the corrective powers of the market system, the culprit ranged from the corruption of Washington DC (in particular, the 24 loose lending practices of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) all the way to the excessive greed of irresponsible homebuyers. 8 The Democratic “solution” to the economic crisis has so far been to reinstate some form of “responsible” and “intelligent” regulation over markets in order to limit the pursuit of excessive self-interest and to revitalize the American dream of “middle-class” (i.e., upward consumer mobility through hard work and ingenuity). 9 The Republican response, on the other hand, has been to resist the growth of government involvement in the economy and uphold the superiority of competitive outcomes of the private market economy. Nevertheless, these mainstream responses to the crisis, **by locking the discussion into one of identifying the precise bearer of “excessive greed” as the enemy of social order, skirt the question of the particular modes of “administering” jouissance that shore up and destabilize the subjective dynamics of production, appropriation, distribution and consumption in** US **capitalism**. In our alternative analysis of the crisis, we identify two different yet complexly articulated moments within the circuit of capital—the moment of consumption and the moment of the appropriation and division of social surplus—where the “administration” of jouissance, while shoring it up for a period, eventually destabilized the US capitalist formation in particular ways. During the post-war years, the economic and social institutions of the New Deal provided the framework for a Fordist accord between Labor and Capital, where the workers enjoyed high-wages, job security, health care, and a wide social security net and responded to this configuration with high rates of productivity and high rates of participation in mass consumption (Marglin and Schor, 1991). This highly regulated, corporatist model was informed by Institutionalist productivism and Keynesian demand management policies and 25 was made possible, in part, by the availability of cheap oil (Mitchell, 2009), and, in part, by the increasing importance of the US Military as an engine for economic growth (Nitzan and Bichler, 2002). The coordinates of this “administrative” configuration were given by the fantasy of the American Way of Life, which was further consolidated by accelerated suburbanization, the interstate highway system, the increasing social reach of the welfare state (“The Great Society” programs) and a long period of sustained economic growth. The social engineers (macroeconomists, urban planners, bureaucrats, actors of military-industrial complex, etc.) who tried to administer the economy (qua object a) occupied the position of the agent in the University Discourse and the intended product was a docile, productive middle class whose lifestyle would be the envy of the world. However, by the 1970s, the prohibitive super-ego of the Great Society was already beginning to be undermined by a transgressive jouissance as embodied in sexual liberation movements, draft dodgers, and neo-conservative critics of the welfare state (e.g., Irving Howe, Irving Kristol) whose common addressee was the “paternal” state. 10 Eventually, as a number of scholars of the Lacanian orientation have convincingly argued, the neoliberal Reagan Thatcher counter-revolution enacted a shift from the prohibitive and productivist super-ego of the corporatist capitalism of the liberal New Deal which elicited transgression, to a new era of a permissive and arguably more cruel super-ego which announced that complete and ultimate enjoyment is possible (McGowan, 2004, Stavrakakis, 2000, 2007, Zizek, 2007, Zupancic, 2006). This transformation manifested itself in a marked change in the representations of the citizen. From the producer-citizen of the New Deal and the Great Society an all-around shift occurred toward a consumer-citizen who, through the increasingly pre-dominant advertisement discourse, was not only perpetually invited, but also expected to find enjoyment in the ever-cheapening consumption goods that fill the racks of shopping 26 malls (Stavrakakis, 2000). While this new injunction to “Enjoy!” was an impossible command to fulfill, because it organized a circuit of desire that fed off of the very disappointment that consumption produces, as a mode of “administration” of jouissance **it enabled US capitalism to resolve,** at least for awhile, what Marx called **the crisis of underconsumption or what Keynes called the crisis of inadequate effective demand** (Harvey, 2005a). While we agree with the basic contours of this analysis of “the emerging society of enjoyment”, we further develop it around two points. Firstly, there is a second front on which the neoliberal revolution articulated a logic of exception that organized the libidinal economy of the US social formation. In this period, the Entrepreneur as the celebrated private appropriator of surplus regained prominence as the figure that fills the position X, the unquestionable limit that structures the struggles over the distribution of surplus within US corporations. The subjective position of setting a limit, embodied in the entrepreneurial injunction, fetishized certain uses of surplus and, due to the regime of scarcity it enacted, cultivated competitive behavior. A Chicago-style supply-side economic ideology, in the name of national competitiveness, by shifting the tax-burden from the capitalist class to working classes, by dismantling the welfare state, and by undermining unions and their promise of job security, gradually shifted the balance of power in favor of capitalist classes and compelled the working classes to work harder and accept lower real wages in return (Resnick and Wolff, 2006). As welfare turned into “workfare” during the Clinton Administration, employment ceased to be conceived as a social right and was transformed into a matter of individual responsibility, or better yet, into a duty under the entrepreneurial injunction to invest in one’s own “human capital”. 11 Similarly, despite the 27 fact that trade liberalization increased job insecurity, it was rigorously defended on the grounds that it made consumption goods more affordable. In short, the neoliberal “administration” of jouissance simultaneously installed the logic of exception on two fronts, at the shopping mall and within the corporation. Secondly, it is important to recognize the limits of the capacity of this (or, any) mode of “administration” to fix and regulate jouissance. The dynamics reversed, in an ironic twist, when the increasing productivity of US workers combined with declining real wages have left the Board of Directors of financial and non-financial corporations with soaring profits. By the end of the 1990s, corporations found an outlet for this over-accumulation of profits through investing them in the dot.com market, but this speculative bubble burst very rapidly (Marazzi, 2008). Nevertheless, overaccumulation continued throughout the 2000s; sustained increases in the profits of US corporations (especially the oil and armament industries, but also HMOs and insurance companies), combined with the increasing availability of pension funds for financial intermediation (401ks) and the surplus accumulated by oil-rich sovereign funds and by Chinese state and private capital, demanded new financial instruments to solve the problem of excess supply of capital (Harvey, 2005b). Consequently, a new breed of securities backed by workers’ mortgages, auto loans, and credit-card loans (i.e., the creditbased economy) came to the forefront precisely at this moment (Wolff, 2009). As Marxian economist Richard Wolff argues, “the extra profits made by keeping workers’ wages down [now] did double duty for employers who earned hefty interest payments by loaning part of those profits back to the workers” (2009, p. 76). To sum up, when the rising rate of exploitation, which initially enabled the system to thrive, brought up the problem of overaccumulation, the credit-based economy was offered as a bridge-gap, only to lead to 28 further problems (the financial crisis due to a system-wide default on securitized “subprime” mortgages). The current mortgage crisis, therefore, **is a symptom of a deeper libidinal crisis** **of the standard of living, conditioned not only by the super-egoic injunction to “Enjoy**!” (leading to overborrowing) but also by the limit that leaves the appropriative moment of surplus unquestioned and **subordinates the social surplus to a regime of scarcity and rivalry** (**leading to overaccumulation and speculative activity).** The credit economy, indeed, has been for three decades the link that connected the injunction to “Enjoy!” that administers the moment of consumption with the entrepreneurial injunction that delimited the appropriation and distribution of surplus. So, when McGowan notes that, “[by] allowing subjects easy and fast credit, today’s corporations create avenues through which subjects can pursue their enjoyment” (2004, p. 34), **what he leaves unaddressed is the other side of the neoliberal “administration” of jouissance,** the appropriative limit enacted by the entrepreneurial injunction. Moreover, we need to insist that **the credit economy is prone to crisis, and not simply because of the fragility of the financial system, or the lack of “smart” regulations**. In fact, **we propose to read the mortgage crisis as a crisis of jouissance**. If we are to take the excessive and unstable nature of jouissance seriously, we need to entertain the hypothesis that the unsustainable (and, from the perspective of neoclassical theory, “irrational”) increases in the consumer debt were, in part, due to what McGowan elsewhere calls “**the masochistic quality of desire”** (2007, p. 9) **where the consumers begin to derive enjoyment not only from prolonging dissatisfaction but also from the very process of participating in the repetitive cycles of the consumption economy day after day**, week after week, month after month. The 29 credit economy, precisely because it led the way for a by-product jouissance which knows nothing about rational moderation, when combined with the shrinking households budgets and soaring profits, **have led to unsustainable levels of debt.**

**It is this very desire to “enjoy” that results in environmental destruction**

Richard **Wilk 2** Anthropology Department, Indiana University “Consumption, human needs, and global environmental change” Global Environmental Change 12 (2002) 5–13 http://www.ethree.com/downloads/Climate%20Change%20Readings/International%20Climate%20Policy/Wilk%20-%20Consumption%20human%20needs%20envr%20change.pdf

**A wide variety of scholars and activists have identiﬁed modern mass consumer society as a fundamental driver o**f both global economic growth and **environmental damage** (Redclift, 1996; Stern et al., 1997). The spread of **high-level consumption practices across the planet has the potential to dramatically** increase human impacts on both local and global resources, and **contribute to** continuing **climate change** (Myers, 1997; Wilk, 1998). Direct consumption of food, water, construction materials, energy and other renewable and nonrenewable resources is the easiest to track and quantify. Indirect consumption also has major impact on the environment; extraction, production, disposal and transportation of goods are linked together in complex ‘commodity chains’ that can make it very difﬁcult to assess the full environmental effects of even common and everyday products like coffee and running shoes (Ryan and Durning, 1997). Nevertheless, the World Wildlife Foundation estimates that the consumption of resources and consequent pollution are currently increasing by around 2 per cent per year (WWF, 1999). On a global basis the demand for consumer goods is not a simple consequence of income levels. Economic historians now argue that consumer demand has historically been highly variable, and is a fundamental cause of economic growth, rather than a consequence of it (Mukerji, 1983; Tiersten, 1993; Belk, 1995). It is also apparent that populations at the same income levels can have drastically different levels of environmental impact, consuming different bundles of resources, using different mixes of energy resources, and emitting widely varying amounts of greenhouse gases. For these reasons, consumption is a key issue in both predicting future environmental change, and in formulating policies that can lead towards sustainable resource use (Cohen and Murphy, 2001). Environmental scientists should also be concerned with issues of consumption because they have become a key element in international dialogue about environmental change, and a major obstacle to effective international agreements that could control resource use and emissions. The dramatic differences in consumption between rich and poor countries--some have estimated that **during a lifetime one US citizen represents 200 times the environmental impact of a child born in a country like Mozambique--**raiseobvious questions about the equity of global agreements. When people in developing countries hear scientists decry global warming, what they hear is ‘‘you’re going to have to stay poor to save the planet’’ (Camacho, 1995).

**The alternative is to embrace an enjoyable democratic ethics of the political---that’s key to taking jouissance and using it productively to challenge the transition to a consumerist post-democracy**

Slavoj **Zizek 7** prof of sociology @ the univ of Ljubljana “The Liberal Utopia section I: Against the Politics of Jouissance” http://www.lacan.com/zizliberal.htm

Modern society is defined by the lack of ultimate transcendent guarantee, or, in libidinal terms, of total jouissance. There are three main ways to cope with this negativity: utopian, democratic, and post-democratic. The first one (totalitarianisms, fundamentalisms) tries to reoccupy the ground of absolute jouissance by attaining a utopian society of harmonious society which eliminates negativity. The second, democratic, one enacts a political equivalent of "traversing the fantasy": it institutionalizes the lack itself by creating the space for political antagonisms. The third one, consumerist post-democracy, tries to neutralize negativity by transforming politics into apolitical administration: individuals pursue their consumerist fantasies in the space regulated by expert social administration. Today, **when** **democracy is gradually evolving into consumerist post-democracy, one should insist that democratic potentials are not exhausted** - "democracy as an unfinished project" could have been Stavrakakis' motto here. **The key to the resuscitation of this democratic potential is to re-mobilize enjoyment: "What is needed, in other words, is an enjoyable democratic ethics of the political.**"(269) The key question here is, of course, WHAT KIND OF enjoyment: Libidinal investment and **the mobilization of jouissance are the necessary prerequisite for any sustainable identification (from nationalism to consumerism).** This also applies to the radical democratic ethics of the political. But the type of investment involved has still to be decided. (282) Stavrakakis' solution is: neither the phallic enjoyment of Power nor the utopia of the incestuous full enjoyment, but a non-phallic (non-all) partial enjoyment. In the last pages of his book, trying to demonstrate how "democratic subjectivity is capable of inspiring high passions"(278), Stavrakakis refers to the Lacanian other jouissance, "a jouissance beyond accumulation, domination and fantasy, an enjoyment of the not-all or not-whole"(279). How do we achieve this jouissance? By way of accomplishing "the sacrifice of the fantasmatic objet petit a" which can only "make this other jouissance attainable" (279): The central task in psychoanalysis - and politics - is to detach the objet petit a from the signifier of the lack in the Other /.../, to detach (anti-democratic and post-democratic) fantasy from the democratic institutionalization of lack, making possible the access to a partial enjoyment beyond fantasy. /.../ Only thus shall we be able to really enjoy our partial enjoyment, without subordinating it to the cataclysmic desire of fantasy. Beyond its dialectics of disavowal, this is the concrete challenge the Lacanian Left addresses to us. (280-282) The underlying idea is breathtakingly simplistic: in total contradiction to Lacan, Stavrakakis reduces objet petit a to its role in fantasy - objet a is that excessive X which magically transforms the partial objects which occupy the place of the lack in the Other into the utopian promise of the impossible fullness of jouissance. What Stavrakakis proposes is thus the vision of a society in which desire functions without objet a, without the destabilizing excess which transforms it into a "cataclysmic desire of fantasy" - as Stavrakakis puts it in a symptomatically tautological way, we should learn to "really enjoy our partial enjoyment." For Lacan, on the contrary, objet a is a(nother) name for the Freudian "partial object," which is why it cannot be reduced to its role in fantasy which sustains desire; it is for this reason that, as Lacan emphasizes, one should distinguish its role in desire and in drive. Following Jacques-Alain Miller, a distinction has to be introduced here between two types of lack, the lack proper and hole: lack is spatial, designating a void WITHIN a space, while hole is more radical, it designates the point at which this spatial order itself breaks down (as in the "black hole" in physics). 2 Therein resides the difference between desire and drive: desire is grounded in its constitutive lack, while drive circulates around a hole, a gap in the order of being. In other words, the circular movement of drive obeys the weird logic of the curved space in which the shortest distance between the two points is not a straight line, but a curve: drive "knows" that the shortest way to attain its aim is to circulate around its goal-object. (One should bear in mind here Lacan's well-known distinction between the aim and the goal of drive: while the goal is the object around which drive circulates, its (true) aim is the endless continuation of this circulation as such.) Miller also proposed a Benjaminian distinction between "constituted anxiety" and "constituent anxiety," which is crucial with regard to the shift from desire to drive: while the first one designates the standard notion of the terrifying and fascinating abyss of anxiety which haunts us, its infernal circle which threatens to draws us in, the second one stands for the "pure" confrontation with objet petit a as constituted in its very loss. 3 Miller is right to emphasize here two features: the difference which separates constituted from constituent anxiety concerns the status of the object with regard to fantasy. In a case of constituted anxiety, the object dwells within the confines of a fantasy, while we only get the constituent anxiety when the subject "traverses the fantasy" and confronts the void, the gap, filled up by the fantasmatic object. However, clear and convincing as it is, this Miller's formula misses the true paradox or, rather, ambiguity of objet a: when he defines objet a as the object which overlaps with its loss, which emerges at the very moment of its loss (so that all its fantasmatic incarnations, from breasts to voice and gaze, are metonymic figurations of the void, of nothing), he remains within the horizon of desire - the true object-cause of desire is the void filled in by its fantasmatic incarnations. While, as Lacan emphasizes, objet a is also the object of drive, the relationship is here thoroughly different: although, in both cases, the link between object and loss is crucial, in the case of objet a as the object-cause of desire, we have an object which is originally lost, which coincides with its own loss, which emerges as lost, while, in the case of objet a as the object of drive, the "object" IS DIRECTLY THE LOSS ITSELF - in the shift from desire to drive, we pass from the lost object to loss itself as an object. That is to say, the weird movement called "drive" is not driven by the "impossible" quest for the lost object; it is a push to directly enact the "loss" - the gap, cut, distance - itself. There is thus a DOUBLE distinction to be drawn here: not only between objet a in its fantasmatic and post-fantasmatic status, but also, within this post-fantasmatic domain itself, between the lost object-cause of desire and the object-loss of drive. The weird thing is that Stavrakakis' idea of sustaining desire without objet a contradicts not only Lacan, but also Laclau, his notion of hegemony: Laclau is on the right track when he emphasizes the necessary role of objet a in rendering an ideological edifice operative. In hegemony, a particular empirical object is "elevated to the dignity of the Thing," it start to function as the stand-in for, the embodiment of, the impossible fullness of Society. Referring to Joan Copjec, Laclau compares hegemony to the "breast-value" attached to partial objects which stand-in for the incestuous maternal Thing (breast). Laclau should effectively be criticized here for confounding desire (sustained by fantasy) which drive (one of whose definitions is also "that what remains of desire after its subject traverses the fantasy"): for him, we are condemned to searching for the impossible Fullness. Drive - in which we directly enjoy lack itself - simply does not enter his horizon. However, this in no way entails that, in drive, we "really enjoy our partial enjoyment," without the disturbing excess: for Lacan, lack and excess are strictly correlative, the two sides of the same coin. Precisely insofar as it circulates around a hole, drive is the name of the excess that pertains to human being, it is the "too-much-ness" of striving which insists beyond life and death (this is why Lacan sometimes even directly identifies drive with objet a as surplus-jouissance.) Because he ignores this excess of drive, Stavrakakis also operates with a simplified notion of "traversing the fantasy" - as if fantasy is a kind of illusory screen blurring our relation to partial objects. This notion may seem to fit perfectly the commonsense idea of what psychoanalysis should do: of course it should liberate us from the hold of idiosyncratic fantasies and enable us to confront reality the way it effectively is... this, precisely, is what Lacan does NOT have in mind - what he aims at is almost the exact opposite. In our daily existence, we are immersed into "reality" (structured-supported by the fantasy), and this immersion is disturbed by symptoms which bear witness to the fact that another repressed level of our psyche resists this immersion. To "traverse the fantasy" therefore paradoxically means fully identifying oneself with the fantasy - namely with the fantasy which structures the excess resisting our immersion into daily reality, or, to quote a succinct formulation by Richard Boothby: Traversing the fantasy' thus does not mean that the subject somehow abandons its involvement with fanciful caprices and accommodates itself to a pragmatic 'reality,' but precisely the opposite: the subject is submitted to that effect of the symbolic lack that reveals the limit of everyday reality. To traverse the fantasy in the Lacanian sense is to be more profoundly claimed by the fantasy than ever, in the sense of being brought into an ever more intimate relation with that real core of the fantasy that transcends imaging. 4 Boothby is right to emphasize the Janus-like structure of a fantasy: a fantasy is simultaneously pacifying, disarming (providing an imaginary scenario which enables us to endure the abyss of the Other's desire) AND shattering, disturbing, inassimilable into our reality. The ideologico-political dimension of this notion of "traversing the fantasy" was rendered clear by the unique role the rock group Top lista nadrealista (The Top List of the Surrealists) played during the Bosnian war in the besieged Sarajevo: their ironic performances which, in the midst of the war and hunger, satiricized the predicament of the Sarajevo population, acquired a cult status not only in the counterculture, but also among the citizens of Sarajevo in general (the group's weekly TV show went on throughout the war and was extremely popular). Instead of bemoaning the tragic fate of the Bosnians, they daringly mobilized all the clichés about the "stupid Bosnians" which were a commonplace in Yugoslavia, fully identifying with them - the point thus made was that the path of true solidarity leads through direct confrontation with the obscene racist fantasies which circulated in the symbolic space of Bosnia, through the playful identification with them, not through the denial of this obscenities on behalf of "what people really are." No wonder, then, that, when Stavrakakis tries to provide some concrete examples of this new politics of partial jouissance, things go really "bizarre." He starts with Marshal Sahlins' thesis that the Paleolithic communities followed "a Zen road to affluence": although deeply marked by divisions, exchange, sexual difference, violence and war, they lack the "shrine of the Unattainable," of "infinite Needs," and thus the "desire for accumulation". In them, enjoyment (jouissance) seems to be had without the mediation of fantasies of accumulation, fullness and excess. /.../ they do show that another world may, in principle, be possible insofar as a detachment of (partial) enjoyment from dreams of completeness and fantasmatic desire is enacted. /.../ Doesn't something similar happen in the psychoanalytic clinic? And isn't this also the challenge for radical democratic ethics? (281) **The way the Paleolithic tribesmen avoided accumulation was to cancel the lack itself - it is the idea of such a society without the excess of "infinite Needs" which is properly utopian, the ultimate fantasy, the fantasy of a society before the Fall**. What then follows is a series of cases of how "political theorists and analysts, economists, and active citizens - some of them directly inspired by Lacanian theory - are currently trying to put this radical democratic orientation to work in a multitude of empirical contexts."(281)

**Links---Consumerism/Alt Key---2NC**

**Consumer society tells us to constantly “enjoy!” and we’ll be happy---this drive to enjoy is at the root of our unhappiness---a radical divestment from the politics of the squo is key**

Yannis **Stavrakakis 6** is a member of the Essex School of Discourse Analysis “Objects of Consumption, Causes of Desire: Consumerism and Advertising in Societies of Commanded Enjoyment” http://www.enl.auth.gr/gramma/gramma06/stavrakakis.pdf

Here, however, desire and enjoyment also emerge as political factors. In fact, it is Lacan himself who, in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, connects an “economic” analysis of the good(s) with power relations: “The good is at the level where a subject may have it at his disposal. The domain of the good is the birth of power . . . To exercise control over one’s goods, as everyone knows, entails a certain disorder, that reveals its true nature, i.e. to exercise control over one’s goods is to have the right to deprive others from them” (Seminar VII 229). In fact, Lacan even points to the political dimension of what governs consumerism and advertising, namely the metonymy of desire: “The morality of power, of the service of goods is as follows: ‘As far as desires are concerned come back later, Make them wait’” (315). In other words, as Mladen Dolar argues in his introduction to Grosrichard’s work, any administration of enjoyment “demands and presupposes a certain social organization, a hierarchy, which is in turn supported only by the belief in the supposed supreme enjoyment at the centre” (xvii). Thus we have a tripartite nexus connecting economy (capitalist market economy), inter-subjective desire (a particular socio-cultural administration of desire), and power (a particular power regime) - a nexus reminiscent of Lacan’s Bor romean knot. 17 And what about consumerism and advertising? Together they constitute the symptomatic element which holds together the three rings (economy, desire, power), the element - related to enjoyment - which knots together our present economic, cultural and political structures. Recent Lacanian theorizations of consumer society have highlighted these political implications of consumerism, and especially its central role in instituting and reproducing the social order in late capitalism. Todd McGowan’s recent book The End of Dissatisfaction? deserves much praise in this respect. McGowan starts by registering the enjoyment explosion surrounding us in consumer society and develops the hypothesis that it marks a significant shift in the structure of the social bond, in social organization (1). In particular, he speaks of a passage from a society of prohibition into a society of commanded enjoyment (2). While more traditional forms of social organization “required subjects to renounce their private enjoyment in the name of social duty, **today the only duty seems to consist in enjoying oneself as much as possible**” (2). This is the call that is addressed to us from all sides: the media, advertisements, even our own friends. Societies of prohibition were founded on an idealization of sacrifice, of sacrificing enjoyment for the sake of social duty; in our societies of commanded enjoyment “the private enjoyment that threatened the stability of the society of prohibition becomes a stabilizing force and even acquires the status of a duty” (3). This emerging society of commanded enjoyment is not concomitant with capitalism in general; it characterizes, in particular, late capitalism. In its initial phases, with its reliance on “work ethic” and Max Weber’s delayed gratification (Sennett 31), “capitalism sustained and necessitated its own form of prohibition” (McGowan 31). Simply put, early capitalism “thwarted enjoyment to the same extent that [many] traditional societies did” (31). Indeed, the classical bourgeois attitude - and bourgeois political economy was initially based on “postponement, the deferral of jouissances, patient retention with a view to the supplementary jouissance that is calculated. Accumulate in order to accumulate, produce in order to produce” (Goux 2034). It is the emergence of mass production and a consumer culture that signifies the beginning of “the turn to the command to enjoy,” but it is only with late capitalist globalization that the transformation is completed (McGowan 33). In The System of Objects, Baudrillard had also described this shift from an ascetic model of ethics organized around sacrifice to a new morality of enjoyment: “the status of a whole civilization changes along with the way in which its everyday objects make themselves present and the way in which they are enjoyed . . . The ascetic mode of accumulation, rooted in forethought, in sacrifice . . . was the foundation of a whole civilization of thrift which enjoyed its own heroic period” (172). In societies of commanded **enjoyment duty makes sense predominantly as a duty to enjoy**: “duty is transformed into a duty to enjoy, which is precisely the commandment of the superego” (McGowan 34). **The seemingly innocent and benevolent call to “enjoy!” - as in “Enjoy Coca-Cola!” - embodies the violent dimension of an irresistible commandment**. Lacan was perhaps the first to perceive the importance of this paradoxical hybrid when he linked the command “enjoy!” with the superego: “The superego is the imperative of jouissance - Enjoy!” (Seminar XX 3). He was the first to detect in this innocent call the unmistakable mark of power and authority. Thus Lacan is offering a revealing insight into what has been described as the “consuming paradox”: while consumerism seems to broaden our opportunities, choices and experiences as individuals, it also directs us towards predetermined channels of behavior and thus it “is ultimately as constraining as it is enabling” (Miles 147). The desire stimulated - and imposed - by advertising discourse is, in this sense, the desire of the Other par excellence. Already in 1968, Baudrillard had captured the moral dynamics of an “obligation to buy,” and recent consumption research is becoming increasingly more alert to this forced choice of consumerism: “It is now something of a duty to explore personal identity through consumption” (Daunton and Hilton 31). 18 In late capitalist consumer society this is the interpellating command that constructs us as social subjects: thus, apart from products and advertising fantasies, what is also manufactured is consumers (Fine 168). It is here that “the triumph of advertising” is located, as Adorno and Horkheimer already knew: “consumers feel compelled to buy and use its products even though they see through them” (167). 19 Let me make clear, however, that what we encounter here, albeit an important moral shift, is not some kind of radical historical break of cosmological proportions. From a psychoanalytic point of view, the administration of enjoyment and the structuration of desire are always implicated in the institution of the social bond. **Every society has to come to terms with the impossibility of attaining jouissance as fullness**; it is only the fantasies produced and circulated to mask or at least domesticate this trauma that can vary, and in fact do vary immensely. Prohibition and commanded enjoyment are two such distinct strategies designed to institute the social bond and legitimize authority and power in different ways. Nevertheless, in both cases, certain things remain unchanged. **What remains the same is, first of all, the impossibility of realizing the fantasy:** “The fundamental thing to recognize about the society of enjoyment is that in it the pursuit of enjoyment has misfired: **the society of enjoyment has not provided the enjoyment that it promises”** (McGowan 7). We have seen throughout this essay how **dissatisfaction and lack remain firmly inscribed within the dialectics of late capitalist consumerism**. But if this is the case, then the command to enjoy is only revealed as “a more nuanced form of prohibition”; it continues - with other means - the traditional function of symbolic Law and power (39). 20 This was something also observed by Baudrillard. In our consumer societies, authority and symbolic power are as operative as in “societies of prohibition”: “enforced happiness and enjoyment” are the equivalent of the traditional imperatives to work and produce (Consumer Society 80). Indeed, McGowan uses the word “obedience” to refer to our attachment to the enjoyment commandment. The command to enjoy is nothing but an advanced, much more nuanced - and much more difficult to resist - form of power. It is more effective than the traditional model not because it is less constraining or less binding but because its violent exclusionary aspect is masked by its vow to enhance enjoyment, by its productive, enabling facade: it does not oppose and prohibit but openly attempts to embrace and appropriate le sujet de la jouissance. 21 However, in opposition to what McGowan seems to imply, recognizing the extent of our “obedience” to this enjoyment commandment cannot be enough to “find a way out of this obedience” (194). Not only is this novel articulation of power and enjoyment hard to recognize and to thematize; it is even harder to de-legitimize in practice, to dis-invest consumption acts and dis-identify with consumerism. However, **without such a dis-investment and the cultivation of alternative (ethical) administrations of jouissance, no real change can be effected**. These two interrelated tasks comprise the very core of our ethico-political predicament in late modernity.

**Links---Marx---2NC**

**Even Marx didn’t go far enough---Marxian explanations subordinate the role of jouissance in explaining economic actions**

**Madra & Ozselcuk 10** Yahya Madra is an economics professor who holds a Ph.D. from University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Ceren Özselçuk is Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology of Bogaziçi University, Istanbul, “Enjoyment as an economic factor: Reading Marx with Lacan” http://www.communityeconomies.org/site/assets/media/yahyamadra/Subjectivityv2b.pdf

Second, while we welcome the analyses of “the society of enjoyment” precisely because they install the question of subjectivity and jouissance at the very core of political economy, we are concerned by the residual reproductionism that emerges when psychoanalytical categories such as jouissance, desire and drive are mobilized only to explain the resilience of capitalism. For instance, when Zizek argues that, “drive propels the entire capitalist machinery; it is the impersonal compulsion to engage in the endless circular movement of expanded self-reproduction” (2006, pp. 117-118), we are concerned that the psychoanalytical concept of drive is grafted unto an unreconstructed Marxian framework. Such articulations of Lacanian psychoanalysis with Marxian political economy **not only do injustice to Marx’s insight pertaining to the dependence of the reproduction of the circuit of capital** on the various contingent conditions of existence but also blunt the radical unruliness of psychoanalytical categories such as jouissance, desire, and drive **by subordinating them to the rationalism of theoretical humanism** that has come to 30 inform political economy for too long (see also, Özselçuk and Madra, 2007). To put it differently, we find Lacanian interventions into critical political economy wanting not because they go too far, but on the contrary, **because they do not go far enough**.

**Links---Chicago School---2NC**

**The Chicago school of economics is decidedly focused on greed---the problem they have identified with selectionist markets is when individuals become too greedy**

**Madra & Ozselcuk 10** Yahya Madra is an economics professor who holds a Ph.D. from University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Ceren Özselçuk is Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology of Bogaziçi University, Istanbul, “Enjoyment as an economic factor: Reading Marx with Lacan” http://www.communityeconomies.org/site/assets/media/yahyamadra/Subjectivityv2b.pdf

Foucault’s reading of American neoliberalism focuses exclusively on the Chicago approach. Despite the fact that Chicago economists mobilize “natural selection” as a metaphor for understanding the adjustment dynamics of competitive markets (Madra, 2007), their approach is, indeed, decidedly neoliberal. In particular, the Chicago approach insists that all government interventions (tax policies, commercial laws, financial regulations, trade laws, etc.) into markets, or any social institution, should model themselves on the “selectionist” logic of markets and should aim to facilitate competitive behavior, because competition creates economic efficiency and growth, and growth creates the condition for political freedom and social harmony (Friedman, 1962). Chicago-style solution to racial discrimination, letting competitive markets punish the discriminators, illustrates the reasoning behind this strong belief in the goodness of self-interested behavior: as long as competitive markets prevail, non-racist business owners will have a competitive (selective) advantage over racist ones because, unlike the latter, they have no reason not to hire or serve a certain subset of the population (e.g., African-Americans) and therefore they have access to a larger pool of talented laborers and to a larger quantity of customers (Becker, 1957). In short, non-discrimination will prevail because it is a better business strategy! **This fantasy frame demands continuous extension of the rule of markets to make use of selfinterested behavior and explains social problems by their absence**. Any intervention into markets that does not model itself on the “selectionist” logic of markets, such as entitlements, minimum wage laws, regulations, and public ownership of certain industries, would frustrate the realization of this market utopia. It is particularly remarkable that, for the proponents of the Chicago school, the celebrated homo economicus, when applied to the wellknown figure of “welfare mom” who “lives off” of unemployment benefits and child support, suddenly turns into a greedy agent that thwarts social harmony promised by the market society. In other words, for the Chicago school, the moment that the self-interested behavior falls outside of the domain of the selectionist logic of markets, **it turns into an excessive greed that needs to be governed by the invisible hand**. And to the extent that markets are bound to fall short of being universal, Chicago-trained experts can argue for (“desire”) more markets.

**Impacts---Solvency Turn---2NC**

**And, our K takes out solvency---the attempt to regulate jouissance will inevitably fail---a psychoanalytical approach is key**

**Madra & Ozselcuk 10** Yahya Madra is an economics professor who holds a Ph.D. from University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Ceren Özselçuk is Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology of Bogaziçi University, Istanbul, “Enjoyment as an economic factor: Reading Marx with Lacan” http://www.communityeconomies.org/site/assets/media/yahyamadra/Subjectivityv2b.pdf

As we are writing this paper, the Obama Administration continues to articulate its calls for a more responsible society with the objective of designing the market incentives that would supposedly curb corporate greed, elicit the right economic behavior, discipline markets, and stabilize the economy. It is hard not to notice in the Obama Administration’s discourse the constitution of the New Keynesian version of neoliberal governmentality, a return to a prohibitive regime of enjoyment whose aim is to govern the “excesses” of human nature through “smart” regulation. **Nevertheless, this Democratic demand for “a return to regulation” is neither realistic nor desirable. It is not realistic because this prescription rests on the false premise that regulation could balance out and apportion a fair enjoyment to each through chipping off the excessive part**. In other words, **it perpetuates the impossible task of the theoretically humanist University Discourse that aims to domesticate the unruly “excess**” and reconsolidate American national unity and harmony. It is not politically desirable because it does not propose the possibility of a different kind of economy of enjoyment structuring a different kind of organization of surplus. By subscribing to the same framework of neoliberal governmentality as the “Chicago boys” did for the past three decades, the New Keynesian “designers” of the Obama Administration continue to keep the question of the appropriation and division of surplus as the untouchable limit of public debate and **place us under the masculine logic of desire to struggle over the bits of surplus where we are animated by the fantasy frames of entrepreneurship, growth, efficiency, upward mobility and so on.**

**Impacts---Environment---2NC**

**The growing consumer demand only drives warming---it’s real and causes extinction---err neg because we can’t psychologically understand the full magnitude of the impact**

Joseph **Dodds 11** is a chartered psychologist of the British Psychological Society Psychoanalysis and Society: At the Edge of Chaos <http://www.psypress.com/common/sample-chapters/9780415666121.pdf> p.3-6

**The ecological crisis is the greatest threat mankind collectively has ever faced** . . . [which] **with** **rapidly accelerating intensity threatens our whole planet**. If so staggering a problem is to be met, the efforts of scientists ofall clearly relevant disciplines will surely be required . . . psychoanalysts,with our interest in the unconscious processes which so powerfullyin¯uence man's behavior, should provide our fellow men with someenlightenment in this common struggle.(Searles 1972: 361)The planetary crisisThe Fourth Assessment Report of the International Panel on ClimateChange (IPCC 2007: 5) concluded that human activities are affecting theEarth on a planetary level, with `atmospheric concentrations of carbondioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide' now far exceeding anything `over thepast 650,000 years', including a rise in greenhouse gas emissions of `70%between 1970 and 2004'. Fourteen of the 15 warmest years on recordoccurred in the last 14 years (the other was 1990, which was warmer than1996) (Brohan et al. 2006, from the UK Met Offce, 2009), and the firstdecade of the twenty-first century, 2000±2009, was the warmest decade everrecorded (Voiland 2010), with the 2001±2010 period being even hotter(World Meteorological Organization 2011). **The scientific consensus is now overwhelming, with no major scientific body disputing the seriousness of the situation**.Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident fromobservations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures,widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level. . . evidence from all continents and most oceans shows that manynatural systems are being affected . . . Most of the observed increase in. . . temperatures since the mid 20th century is very likely due to theobserved increase in anthropogenic (human) greenhouse gas concen**-** trations . . . The probability that this is caused by natural climaticprocesses alone is less than 5% . . . temperatures could rise by between1.1 and 6.4 ¾C . . . during the 21st century . . . Sea levels will probablyrise by 18 to 59 cm . . . [P]ast and future anthropogenic carbon dioxideemissions will . . . contribute to warming and sea level rise for morethan a millennium . . . [but] the likely amount . . . varies greatlydepending on the intensity of human activity during the next century.(IPCC 2007: 2±5)We have so altered the physical processes of the Earth that futuregeologists, should they still exist, will be able to identify a clearly distinctperiod of the Earth's history for which a new term was introduced at thestart of this millennium, the `anthropocene' (Crutzen & Stoermer 2000;Zalasiewicz et al. 2008; Revkin 1992). Between 20,000 and 2 million speciesbecame extinct during the twentieth century, and the rate is now up to140,000 per year in what is labelled the sixth major extinction event to haveoccurred in the last 540 million years (Morell & Lanting 1999), the ®rst tobe caused by the activities of a single species. Harvard biologist E. O.Wilson, in The Future of Life (2003) warns that **half of all known species could be extinct by the end of the century**. The 2010 UN Convention onBiological Diversity (CBD), held in Japan, increased the number ofof®cially endangered species on the `Red List' to now include one ®fth of allanimal and plant species (including 41 per cent of amphibians). Major extinction events should also not be seen as linear processes, **as beyond certain critical thresholds entire ecosystems can be brought to a state of collapse, and can take ten million years to recover** (Science Daily 2011;Whiteside & Ward 2011). **We are taking part in a planetary pyramid scheme, getting into an ecological debt from which there can be no bail outs**. **Yet somehow this just doesn't hit home, our behaviour doesn't match our knowledge**. Why? Inwhat we might call a `deficit' account of our inactivity, George Marshall(2005, 2001) claims **we have a faulty `risk-thermostat' and so are unable to grasp the abstractness of the issue**. To try to get more of a handle on whatglobal temperature rises might do, George Monbiot (2005) makes it moreconcrete:We know what these ®gures mean . . . but it is very hard to make anysense of them. It just sounds like an alteration in your bath water . . . **The last time we had a six degree rise in temperature . . . around 251 million years ago in the Permian Era, it pretty well brought life on earth to an end.** **It wiped out 90% of all known species** . . . Virtuallyeverything in the sea from plankton to sharks simply died. Coral reefswere completely eliminated not to reappear on earth for ten millionyears . . . On land, the ground turned to rubble . . . vegetation died offvery quickly, and it no longer held the soil together . . . [which] washed. . . into the sea . . . creating anoxic environments at the bottom of theocean . . . [There was a] drop in total biological production of around95% . . . Only two quadrupeds survived . . . **We are facing the end of human existence . . . this is a very, very hard thing for people to face.** Here we are on more psychoanalytically interesting (if emotionally terri**-** fying) territory, suggesting an `anxiety-defence' understanding of inactivity.Monbiot (ibid.) continues, asking **why we can accept the threat of terrorism and the related changes to our lives, but not the far greater threat of climate change**. There has been a marked shift over the past decade. In publicstatements, politicians and major business groups are increasingly united onthe importance of the issue (if not its policy implications). Yet despitegrowing consensus, little is actually being done. Years of positive speechesby the UK government, for example, and claims of substantial ± even`world-leading' ± reductions disguise the fact that CO2 emissions fromoverall British economic activity have actually continued to rise, **due in part to growing consumer demand.** In addition, many of the claimed `reductions'have come more from structural changes in global economic production(including so-called `carbon outsourcing') than from actual ef®ciencysavings.This has been dramatically demonstrated by Baiocchi & Minx (2010:1177; see Figure 1), who applied structural decomposition analysis (SDA)to a global multiregional input-output model (MRIO) of changes in UKCO2 emissions between 1992 and 2004. They found that while `improve**-** ments from domestic changes in ef®ciency and production structure led to a148 Mt reduction in CO2emissions' this `only partially offsets emissionincreases of 217 Mt from changes in the global supply chain' including fromthe phenomenon of carbon outsourcing, and `from growing consumerdemand' (ibid.).The 2009 Copenhagen Summit, billed as the epoch-making turning pointwhen the world would come together to save the planet ± it was evendubbed `hopenhagen' (Brownsell 2009) ± was all but a complete failure(Vidal 2009). Even the Kyoto Protocol, seen as a more successful agree**-** ment, has not led to any actual reductions in global carbon emission rates,which grew by 24 per cent between the 1997 agreement and 2005 (WorldBank 2010: 233). In the context of climate change, the gap betweenknowledge and action does not seem to be narrowing, and **it is becoming increasingly clear that what is most needed is psychological research, for it is ultimately in human thinking, feeling and behaviour that the problem is generated, and can potentially be solved.**

**The root of the problem is our drive to consume---psychoanalysis is key to solve**

Joseph **Dodds 11** is a chartered psychologist of the British Psychological Society Psychoanalysis and Society: At the Edge of Chaos <http://www.psypress.com/common/sample-chapters/9780415666121.pdf> p.3-6

Psychological approaches to environmental problemsPsychology is now waking up to the fact that it **offers the `missing link' in climate change science** (Schmuck & Vlek 2003; Oppenheimer & Todorov2006; Reser 2007). This book offers primarily a psychoanalytic approach,which is particularly sensitive to dealing with issues around emotion,anxiety, and defences, as well as subtle psychological processes not easilycaptured on survey questions. In other words it emphasizes the unconsciouspsychological dimension of our individual, group, and social lives. However,it is important to emphasize that all areas of psychology have somethingimportant to offer towards this effort, and indeed the crisis is so acute thatno one approach will be enough in the face of the immensity of the task athand (Winter & Koger 2004). All need to participate in the wider ecology ofideas. Psychoanalysis, with its focus on the unconscious aspects of beha**-** viour, **needs to have a prominent place in this important work**.What are some of the non-psychoanalytic psychological approaches toclimate change and environmental problems? Schmuck and Vlek's (2003)review of the literature explores various areas where psychology can play animportant role. One approach is to study environment problems as dilemmas of the commons (Hardin 1968; Ostrom 1990; Vlek 1996), sometimesreferred to as social dilemmas (Dawes 1980; Dawes & Messick 2000;Osbaldiston & Sheldon 2002). These are situations involving a con¯ictbetween collective interests, or the aggregate interests of a large number ofpeople (including potentially future generations of people as yet not born),and short-term individual interests.This area is continuing to be developed in more focused work on theenvironment, for example Van Vugt's (2009) `Averting the Tragedy ofthe Commons: Using Social Psychological Science to Protect the Environ**-** ment'. Evolutionary psychology (Buss 2004, 2005; Barkow 2006; Tooby &Cosmides 2005) argues that in such situations while it may be in the interestof each individual for everyone else to follow the rules which bene®t thegroup as a whole, it is not necessarily in the individual's own interest to doso themselves (Ridley 1997; Axelrod 1984). In addition, while many indi**-** viduals may discount the importance of their own negative impact on thecommon physical or social environment, the cumulative effect of many suchsmall impacts leads to signi®cant environmental problems. **Given that over-consumption of the Earth's resources is a key root of the ecological crisis, consumer psychology also has much to offer**. Traditionally,consumer psychology has studied consumers wants and needs, and hasunderstandably been used to help businesses to better predict, satisfy and ±crucially ± produce consumer demand for their products. Clearly, this is anarea where psychology has been part of the problem, in that it has aided theeffort to encourage the over-consumption which is so threatening the planettoday. However, it has also developed a body of knowledge and techniqueswhich its exponents suggest can now be turned to the task of developing pro**-** environmental behaviour. In addition, consumer psychological research hasshown that increased consumption (beyond a minimum level) has no posi**-** tive correlation with increased happiness (Csikszentmihalyi 1999; Durning1995). On the contrary, according to Schmuck and Vlek (2003), evidencesuggests that `self-centered consumer values, life goals, and behaviors' havebeen `associated with detrimental effects for individual well-being' (Cohen &Cohen 2001; Schmuck & Sheldon 2001).Turning to cognitive psychology, studies of cognitive biases (Haselton,Nettle & Andrews 2005; Finucane et al. 2000) suggest that individuals tendnaturally to focus on short-term gains rather than long-term goals, espe**-** cially under situations of uncertainty (Kahneman, Slovic & Tver 1982), anarea where effective action in the face of climate change is obviouslyrelevant (Yudkow 2006; Pawlik 1991). Given these obstacles to action, howcan psychology engage with these biases and help towards individual andsocial change?Albert Bandura applied social learning theory and social cognitive theory(Bandura 1986, 2002) to an intervention designed to decrease populationgrowth, ultimately one of the key drivers of many of the environmentalproblems we face. Social learning theory suggests that our behaviour isaffected not only by direct reinforcers or punishments or behaviour shaping,as explored in classical and operative conditioning in the behaviouristtradition (Skinner 1969, 1981; Watson 1970; Baum 2005), but also indirectlyby observing others (modelling, observational learning) and the rewards orpunishments they receive (vicarious reinforcement). This is, after all, howadvertising works. We are often shown people who are beautiful, happy andsuccessful (in terms of love and wealth) following purchase of the itemconcerned.Based upon these concepts, Bandura arranged a series of broadcasts inseveral regions with high population growth rates which showed theadvantages of small families and the disadvantages of large families. Con**-** trolled studies demonstrated that these interventions led to an increasedpreference for small families, an increased use of contraception, and a cleardrop in birth rates. Discussing this successful psychological campaign,Bandura writes:One of the central themes . . . is aimed at raising the status of womenso they have equitable access to educational and social opportunities, avoice in family decisions and child bearing, and serve as active partnersin their familial and social lives. This involves raising men's under**-** standing of the legitimacy of women making decisions regarding theirreproductive health and family life.(Bandura 2002: 222)Environmental psychology (Gifford 2007) and the psychology of human±environment interactions have traditionally focused on the built environ**-** ment with less emphasis on the natural environment and ecology (Scull1999). However, this is now beginning to change. Stern (2000) suggests thatmany psychological theories have clear applications to the environmentalcrisis, some of which have already been applied. These include cognitivedissonance theory (e.g. Katzev & Johnson 1983, 1987), norm-activationtheory (e.g. Black, Stern & Elworth 1985; Stern et al. 1999; Kalof 1993;Widegren 1998), and the theory of reasoned action or the theory of plannedbehaviour (e.g. Bamberg & Schmidt 1999; Jones 1990).Stern (2000, 2004) has attempted to integrate much of this research into amore detailed understanding of pro-environmental behaviour. He suggeststhat given the urgency of the situation, psychological research and inter**-** ventions should be targeted on areas likely to have the biggest impact, forexample in decisions related to purchases of environmentally impactfulitems such as houses, domestic heating and cooling equipment, and cars.According to Stern (2000: 527) `one-time decisions can have environmentaleffects for decades because of the long life of the equipment (Gardner &Stern 1996; Stern & Gardner 1981).' One crucial area where psychological research can inform environmen**-** talists is research on the effects of traditional environmental campaignswhich use fear to frighten us into action. Stern (2005: 5) points out, how**-** ever, that much of the research into the effect of such appeals in general hasbeen far from supportive of this approach (Finckenauer 1982; Higbee 1969;Johnson & Tver 1983; Weinstein, Grubb & Vautier 1986), arguing that:The best evidence suggests that fear appeals may lead people either totake constructive action or to minimize or ignore a problem, dependingon various factors, such as whether they believe they are vulnerable tothe threat, their judgment of its severity, their awareness of positiveactions to take in response, and the belief that they can actually takethose actions at an acceptable cost.(Stern 2005: 5; see also Gardner & Stern 1996)In fact, generally, adaptive coping is most likely to occur when `threatsare perceived to be severe and personal and when cost-effective responsesare known and available', while high levels of threat `without the perceivedability to cope leads to maladaptive responses such as minimizing thedanger or unfocused emotionality' (Stern 2004: 4). This book shall arguethat the fear and anxiety elicited not only by environmental campaigns butalso by the actual existing threats to the environment plays an importantrole in our current psychological situation. Here, psychoanalysis has some-thing important to offer us through its deep theorization and clinicalexperience about the ways ± at times very strange ways ± that humansrespond to anxiety (Lertzman 2008).From a broader perspective, Oskamp (2000: 496) suggests that **psychology is crucial in the current ecological crisis, a crisis which threatens `to make Earth nearly uninhabitable for future generations' as a result of human behavioural patterns, particularly overpopulation and over-consumption'**.For Oskamp (ibid.), `**urgent changes to human lifestyles and cultural prac- tices are required for the world to escape ecological disaster'** and therefore`psychologists should lead the way in helping people adopt sustainablepatterns of living.' Oskamp goes on to describes some of the areas in which **psychology has already contributed towards developing a more sustainable future for** humanity and the Earth. These include energy conservationmethods (Katzev & Johnson 1987) and recycling and resource conservation(Oskamp 1995a, 1995b). However, faced with the task at hand, and the riskof a future uninhabitable Earth, **this is as yet nowhere near enough**. **The changes required in human behaviour are immense. Achieving a sustainable society will require basic changes in the beha- vior of most of the world's peoples**, and **aiding those changes is an important task for psychologists** . . . Social scientists need to work onchanging institutions and organizations in ways that will stronglyencourage pro-environmental options and behavior. Such changes insociety's organizational and institutional patterns will need to be moti**-** vated and supported through changes in some basic values.(Oskamp 2000: 506)The idea of the importance of changes to our overall value systems fromextrinsic to intrinsic values (Zimmerman 2007; Monbiot 2010; Crompton2010; Kluckholn & Strodtback 1961) is increasingly being discussed in the®eld and in recent psychoanalytic interventions (Weintrobe 2011a, 2011b).Oskamp (2000) suggests that as well as considering the level of individualchoice (Elgin 1993; Brower & Leon 1999) and group and social norms andactivities (Olson 1995), we need to focus on a `superordinate goal that allnations and peoples can share (Sherif et al. 1961)'. For this kind of world**-** wide shift in values he draws on William James's (1911) concept of a `moralequivalent of war', in this case involving `a war against the common enemyof an uninhabitable Earth.' This, he argues, is crucial `for mobilizing thewidespread public support needed to accomplish the huge changes neces**-** sary for a sustainable society . . . Environmentalists need nothing less thanthis level of fervor if they are to change worldwide patterns in time toforestall environmental disaster' (Oskamp 2000: 505).At his 2010 British Academy/British Psychological Society AnnualLecture on psychology and climate change, environmental psychologistDavid Uzzell (2010) supported this proposal. Uzzell (2010: 881) emphasizeshowever that the attitudes and values that drive environmentally harmful orsustainable behaviour `are not formed in a social and political vacuum' butare closely connected with our sense of identity, and are `embedded andnurtured in and emerge from a social context, such as class, gender, ethni**-** city and environmental settings, all of which lead to the development ofeveryday cultures and practices.' Uzzell (2010: 883) concludes that **psychol- ogists could help to reframe sustainable society so that we come to see it `not as a threat or a sacrifice but as an opportunity**.' There is therefore aneed for what Deborah Du Nann Winter (1996: 299) called a vision of asustainable world worth fighting for.An excellent overview of this topic, which tries to bring together thecontributions of different areas of psychology to the environmental crisis, isfound in Winter & Koger's (2004) book, The Psychology of EnvironmentalProblems, which includes crucial sections on psychoanalysis that will beexplored in more detail below. They argue that:In order to endure, we will need a robust psychology to help us makecrucial changes in our behaviours, thoughts, feeling, and values. **How to sustain human existence on the planet could become psychology's core question**, offering an intellectual coherence to a discipline frag**-** mented by diverse concerns.(Winter & Koger 2004: 211±212)

**Independently, environmental security rhetoric turns your warming adv**

Joseph **Dodds 11** is a chartered psychologist of the British Psychological Society Psychoanalysis and Society: At the Edge of Chaos <http://www.psypress.com/common/sample-chapters/9780415666121.pdf> p.3-6

One crucial area where psychological research can inform environmen**-** talists is research on the effects of traditional environmental campaigns **which use fear to frighten us into action**. Stern (2005: 5) points out, how**-** ever, that **much of the research into the effect of such appeals in general has been far from supportive of this approach** (Finckenauer 1982; Higbee 1969;Johnson & Tver 1983; Weinstein, Grubb & Vautier 1986), arguing that: **The best evidence suggests that fear appeals may lead people either to take constructive action or to minimize or ignore a problem**, dependingon various factors, such as whether they believe they are vulnerable tothe threat, their judgment of its severity, their awareness of positiveactions to take in response, and the belief that they can actually takethose actions at an acceptable cost.(Stern 2005: 5; see also Gardner & Stern 1996)In fact, generally, adaptive coping is most likely to occur when `threatsare perceived to be severe and personal and when cost-effective responsesare known and available', while **high levels of threat `without the perceived ability to cope leads to maladaptive responses such as minimizing the danger or unfocused emotionality'** (Stern 2004: 4). This book shall arguethat the fear and anxiety elicited not only by environmental campaigns butalso by the actual existing threats to the environment plays an importantrole in our current psychological situation. Here, psychoanalysis has some-thing important to offer us through its deep theorization and clinicalexperience about the ways ± at times very strange ways ± that humansrespond to anxiety (Lertzman 2008).

**Impacts---Death Drive---2NC**

**All desire is a desire of the Other---our endless desire to consume is no more than an unfulfillable fantasy---we always constantly desire more, to the point where death becomes the only cure to our desires**

Jeanne L. **Schroeder 98** Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, COMMENTARY: THE END OF THE MARKET: A PSYCHOANALYSIS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 112 Harv. L. Rev. 483

According to Hegel, **we seek property and engage in market transactions out of unfulfillable desire**. But this desire is not, as economists pretend, a desire for material things, utility, or wealth. To Hegel, each abstract person (that is, the individual in the state of nature posited by Enlightenment political philosophy) seeks to actualize his potential freedom through recognition by others. n30 Although Hegel does not use [\*496] the express vocabulary of eroticism, in Lacanian psychoanalysis this longing to understand oneself through recognition is desire (specifically Eros). **We desire things derivatively as a means of achieving our true desire - the desire of the Other**. n31 When we repress this derivative aspect of our desire for objects, we treat them as substitutes for our true object of desire. n32

Hegel agreed with classical liberal philosophy that freedom is the essence of human nature, n33 but thought that freedom was merely potential in the "state of nature" of autonomous individuality. To Hegel, freedom can become actualized only through the type of relationship that Lacan would call "love." n34 Hegel adopted the liberal Kantian conception of freedom as radical negativity n35 - the total absence of constraints. This abstract concept becomes concrete through social relations. n36 By this I mean that Hegel posited that the abstract person can achieve legal subjectivity n37 (and, therefore, more complex stages of [\*497] personality) only by being recognized as a subject by a person whom one in turn recognizes as a subject. n38 We are, therefore, driven to help others fulfill and exceed their highest potential in the hope that, once they do so, they will then turn around and recognize us as their equals. Such a relationship of mutual recognition in which each party helps the other become more than they were originally is "love." n39 **Man's desire is "the desire of the Other" in both senses of the expression - we want to have the other, but, more importantly, we want the other to desire (recognize) us.**

In our search for recognition, we create legal and other rights not to claim them for ourselves, but in order to bestow them on others in order to increase their dignity. **The regime of abstract right - property, contract, and market relations - is the simplest and most primitive manifestation of this dialectic of desire**. n40

The desire of the Hegelian (Symbolic) marketplace is the Lacanian concept of Eros. Eros is an attempt to achieve perfection through an immediate relation with another - the perfect complementary soulmate who will serve as the yin to our yang. n41 As the myth of Orpheus shows us, **Eros is creative, but only insofar as desire remains unfulfilled**. **To achieve one's desire is death; Eros always threatens to become Thanatos, the death wish**. n42

Hegel understands that the paradox of desire is that to be true to one's desire, one must prolong it, by at least temporarily postponing its [\*498] consummation. Indeed, it is precisely its postponement that creates desire.

When I say that Hegel postpones the consummation of desire, I mean that in order to ensure that both parties to the dialectic of recognition remain free and that neither party subsumes the other, Hegel insists that relationships be mediated - that the lovers be kept apart. In the regime of abstract right, this mediator is property. n43 In abstract right, abstract persons seek subjectivity through mutual recognition through possession, enjoyment, and exchange of external objects. n44

Similarly, Lacan insists that psychic subjectivity can be achieved only through recognition by others. n45 In the symbolic relation he called sexuality, abstract persons seek subjectivity through mutual recognition in a regime of possession, enjoyment, and exchange of a mysterious object of desire, which Lacan called the "Phallus." n46 This necessity for mediation is one of the meanings of Lacan's famous slogan: "There is no [direct and unmediated] sexual relationship." n47

 [\*499] In other words, although Hegel and Lacan might at first blush seem like radically different thinkers, closer examination reveals that their theories are linked by the recognition that subjectivity is intersubjectivity mediated by objectivity. n48 They also both agree that the freedom at the center of human subjectivity is radical negativity. n49

Hegel emphasized what might be called the comic side of this dialectic. n50 In comedy, conflicts are resolved in a happy ending (traditionally including the marriage of two or more of the protagonists). The Hegelian dialectic shows how the contradictions within the abstract person in the state of nature are resolved through social relations, including the market and the family. Moreover, the negativity in the center of the human soul is optimistically seen as the absence of constraints that makes freedom possible, and as the space that permits growth and creativity.

In contrast, Lacan emphasized the tragic side of this dialectic. In tragedy, conflicts prove to be irresolvable, and result in the death of one or more of the protagonists. The negativity or "split" that lies at the center of our psyche is seen pessimistically. If Hegel emphasizes that relationships occur, Lacan emphasizes that these relationships are always imperfect and mediated, desire is always postponed, and man is in a constant state of yearning. Love is always, to some extent, unrequited - there are no perfect soulmates. We can bear this pain only by adopting one of a number of delusions that Lacan identified with sexual identity. The contradictions of personality cannot be permanently resolved. **The dialectic of desire ultimately can be solved only by death.** **Eros can be postponed only so long. Postponement eventually turns into procrastination. And so we must eventually give way to Thanatos.** n51

**Impacts---Jouissance = Root Cause---2NC**

**Jouissance is the root cause of our drives to endless consume**

**Glynos & Stavrakkakis 10** Jason Glynos is Senior Lecturer in Political Theory at the Department of Government, University of Essex, Yannis Stavrakakis studied political science at Panteion University (Athens) and discourse analysis at Essex, “Politics and the unconscious” Subjectivity (2010) 3, 225–230. doi:10.1057/sub.2010.17 ebsco

Given the above analysis, we can ask whether the particular moves recently in the United States to reform the financial regulatory regime and the health-care system will help rebuild, and re-establish trust in, the collective containers that will make such mourning possible. Maybe. O¨ zselc¸uk and Madra suggest, however, that **neo-Keynesian New Deal solutions have their limits**. O¨ zselc¸uk and Madra do so by relying on a mix of Lacanian theory and a non-structuralist, nonhumanist Marxism that seeks to repoliticize the conditions under which surplus is produced, appropriated, distributed and consumed. They thereby continue in a tradition that links psychoanalyis and the economy, starting with Freud, and reinforced by Lacan in the link explicitly made by him between ‘surplus enjoyment’ and Marx’s ‘surplus value’. While consumption processes have been animated by an enjoyment (**jouissance) that gorges on credit because it ‘knows nothing about rational moderation’**, processes of appropriation and distribution have been subject to different principles of governance. In particular O¨ zselc¸uk and Madra argue that ‘[e]ven though New Keynesian “designers” differ from the “Chicago boys” in the way they parse out the question of when greed becomes a problem and how to govern it [with proper institutional incentives], they share the foundational figure of homo economicus as the working assumption regarding the behaviour of individuals’. By according foundational status to economic incentives and processes of market exchange both approaches are understood by O¨ zselc¸uk and Madra as variants of neo-liberal governmentality, thereby keeping questions about the appropriation and distribution of surplus as ‘the untouchable limit of public debate’. Instead **such a regime continues to encourage individuals to fight for scarce surpluses ‘animated by fantasy frames** of entrepreneurship, growth, efficiency, upward mobility, and so on’.

**Alternative---Psycho Key---2NC**

**Psychoanalysis is key---all other strategies will fail**

Yannis **Stavrakakis 6** is a member of the Essex School of Discourse Analysis “Objects of Consumption, Causes of Desire: Consumerism and Advertising in Societies of Commanded Enjoyment” http://www.enl.auth.gr/gramma/gramma06/stavrakakis.pdf

In this sense, psychoanalysis may be able to illuminate and overcome the limitations of more traditional approaches. Outside the advertising industry, **these limitations are also being revealed by the inability of radical critiques of advertising to displace consumerist identifications and to lessen the ideological grip of advertising fantasies**, to reintroduce the importance of the political act alongside the ubiquitous act of consumption. It is more than revealing that even people who question the status of both market economy and advertising seem unable to organize their desire in an alternative way; thus advertising discourse enjoys a passive legitimization that adds to its hegemonic hold. Despite the revival of the culture of constraint in the 1960s and 1970s - partly in the work of figures associated with the Freudian Left - no effective defence “from the power and appeal of an everadvancing consumerism” has been established (Cross 140). Furthermore, **as a result of the difficulties in effectively dealing with the status of desire in a consumer culture, no really appealing alternatives have been created** (130). And the situation today is not markedly different. The typical jeremiad form of critique has proved unable to seriously reflect on these failures. And the problem persists. A good case in point is Lodziak’s recent book where consumerism is castigated as a substitute for autonomy, able to satisfy “only the most fickle” (158). Lodziak concludes: “It is for the majority an inadequate compensation for the denial of a more meaningful life, but a compensation that has been tolerated in the absence of alternatives” (158). The obvious question here is that if consumerism is so inadequate, how does it manage to resist the unmasking operations of its critics, how does it retain its hegemonic grip? As I shall be arguing in this essay, “the jeremiad,” **the dominant type of radical critique, could never imagine the dynamics of jouissance underlying consumer culture, and was thus trapped within a “false consciousness” paradigm, reducing what was a question of desire and enjoyment to a question of knowledge and rationality, unable to offer any realistic alternatives**. **The result has been the defeat of the ultimately impotent culture of constraint.** There is nothing to gain in denying that advertising is capable of enchanting us in a variety of ways. This is how it has managed to become a major force in structuring everyday life, our identifications, aspirations and imaginations; it is for the same reason that demystifying the normalizing tendencies of advertising and consumerism presupposes that we learn to appreciate the affective mobilization entailed in the presence or the promise of commodity consumption (Bennett 113-14). 6 All this is not to say that there have been no economists aware of the constitutive antinomies of satisfaction which destabilize the ideal type of rational choice theories - consider, in this respect Scitovsky’s lacanesque observation that “the most pleasant is on the borderline with the unpleasant” (34). Albert Hirschman has also highlighted the limitations of the rationalchoice model, and attempted to construct an enriched version of it drawing on a variety of sources, including Baudrillard (36). Obviously, there have also been critics of advertising and consumerism, especially from a sociological perspective, that tried to move away from the naturalist/essentialist paradigm in order to take into account the plasticity, the metonymic character of desire. Already from Baudrillard’s 1970 book The Consumer Society and up to more recent texts the problematic of desire is becoming more and more central. With this trend, however, a new problem appeared, one associated with the increasing dominance of social constructionism: what was stressed was the symbolic, culturally conditioned aspect of human desire, sometimes at the expense of affect and real enjoyment. In what follows, I will be providing an overview of the limitations of both the naturalist/essentialist camp and the constructionist/culturalist camp, mapping, at the same time, the radical implications of a Lacanian approach. If consumerism has been victorious, it is because it has managed - through the fantasmatic effects of advertising and experiences of partial jouissance - to register and re-shape the logic of desire and **no critique will ever be effective without acknowledging this fact and formulating an alternative administration of enjoyment.**

**Alternative---AT No Alt---2NC**

**If we win a link we win---the very questioning of their scholarship leads to new alternatives**

Jeanne L. **Schroeder 98** Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, COMMENTARY: THE END OF THE MARKET: A PSYCHOANALYSIS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 112 Harv. L. Rev. 483

Although I end this Commentary with some practical advice, I do not attempt here to develop a new paradigm. As a Hegelian, I believe that logical analysis (that is, philosophy) is important as a means of self-understanding and as a tool for critiquing theories. It cannot, however, dictate specific policy recommendations. To Hegel, the implications for policy can be decided only by pragmatism, not logic. n16 The policy question, which can be phrased as, "If law and economics analysis is flawed, then **what do you propose as an alternative?",** **is inapt if it suggests that the legal scholar should engage in "business as usual" until an alternative is proposed.** This approach is a vulgar oversimplification of Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific paradigms, which is reflected in the banal cliche that "it takes a theory to beat a theory." n17 Even if Kuhn is correct that, as an empirical matter, a given discipline will not reject an existing paradigm until an alternative is developed, one can often perceive that an existing paradigm is ripe to be replaced before one develops the revolutionary paradigm (or research program) that will replace it. Indeed, I would suggest that **it is often this dissatisfaction with the status quo that leads the creative scholar to seek out the new alternative.**

**AT Permutation---2NC**

**The permutation fails**

**Madra & Ozselcuk 10** Yahya Madra is an economics professor who holds a Ph.D. from University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Ceren Özselçuk is Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology of Bogaziçi University, Istanbul, “Enjoyment as an economic factor: Reading Marx with Lacan” http://www.communityeconomies.org/site/assets/media/yahyamadra/Subjectivityv2b.pdf

**These fantasy narratives administer desire such that social cohesion and economic conflicts are codified in reference to a human essence fixed around greed**. **They negate the unconscious precisely because they naturalize the economy by grounding it in and unifying around the positivity of a self-transparent self-consciousness**. In contrast, Lacanian psychoanalysis, starting with a diametrically opposite view of the subject, one that contaminates being with the permanent negativity of the unconscious, solders economy to the libidinal and simultaneously de-naturalizes and opens it to the constitutive opaqueness of identifications and fantasies, the ambiguous, excessive, and unstable nature of jouissance, and the prohibitions and injunctions of the super-ego. **Precisely for this reason, an encounter between Lacanian psychoanalysis and the dominant theoretical humanist tradition within political economy cannot occur.**

**AT Rational Markets---2NC**

**Individuals don’t act rationally in the market**

Jeanne L. **Schroeder 98** Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, COMMENTARY: THE END OF THE MARKET: A PSYCHOANALYSIS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 112 Harv. L. Rev. 483

3. Irrationality. -

A perfect market requires that all participants be economically rational. Irrationality in market transactions is, therefore, a market imperfection, or transaction cost. n189 One should not caricature the rationality requirement as the simplistic proposition that people act like the radically autonomous individuals of classical liberalism who care about nothing but their own narrow self-interest. n190 Indeed, many proponents of classical economics claim that their concept of economic rationality assumes only "that individuals maximize welfare as they conceive it, whether they be selfish, altruistic, loyal, spiteful, or masochistic." This expansive concept of "self-interest" is so highly stylized that it can encompass any conceivable behavior and, therefore, is arguably of little (or no) predictive value, let alone normative purchase. Economic rationality is, therefore, not necessarily characterized by selfishness narrowly defined, but rather by the ability to know what one wants and how to get it. Economically rational persons "are supposed to " know what they want' and to seek it " intelligently.' ... They are supposed to know absolutely the consequence of their acts when they are performed, and to perform them in the light of the consequences." n191

 [\*538] Stigler explains the three characteristics of an economically rational person: "1. His tastes are consistent, 2. His cost calculations are correct, 3. He makes those decisions that maximize utility." n192 Consistency does not require that the participant have any principled criteria for making choices. n193 In this limited sense, economics believes that there is no accounting for tastes. Consistency merely means preferences are well-ordered and transitive - if one prefers A to B and B to C, then one will also prefer A over C. n194 Critics of classical economics question the empirical accuracy of this assumption. n195

 [\*539] The combination of the rationality requirement with the perfect information requirement means that in a perfect market there is no "false consciousness." In the perfect market, one can never say that a participant should prefer A over B, or that she would if she only knew better, because the perfect information requirement means that she always already knows her preferences and their consequences.

In Stigler's words, the requirement of correct cost calculations is equivalent to a stipulation that consumers can do "proper arithmetic," and "is so obvious as to be vulgar." n196 Stigler notes, however, that despite this, **it is a well known empirical fact that people are poor at comparing costs that are not monetarized**. n197

Stigler's final requirement of "utility maximization" merely proposes that when given the choice of two "market baskets," the consumer will choose the one he prefers. n198 People will choose to act in such a way that is calculated to produce what they believe would be good results, and to avoid actions which they believe would produce bad results. Once again, **there are reasons to doubt the empirical validity of this assumption**. **We observe people (including ourselves) doing stupid and self-destructive things all the time**. n199

 [\*540] Because rationality is required for the perfect market, irrationality is a market imperfection, or a Coasean transaction cost, by definition. Coleman argues that the Coase Theorem should be seen as a definition of rational action. n200 "To act rationally, then, is to promote allocative efficiency [by, in the cases discussed by Coase,] ... putting resources to their profit-maximizing use." n201

In other words, the rationality requirement is equivalent to extending the perfect information requirement to include perfect knowledge of one's own psyche. There is, therefore, no unconscious and no repressed desire in the perfect market. As we shall see, according to psychoanalytic theory, the lack of an unconscious also means that there [\*541] is no consciousness or subjectivity either. n202 **Perfect rationality is the Lacanian Real.** n203

**AT Falsifiability---2NC**

**No impact to falsifiability in the context of psychoanalysis**

Colin **Dean 5** Bsc, Ba, B.Litt(Hon),Ma, B.Litt(Hon), Ma, Ma(Psychoanalytic Studies) Gamahucher Press, West Geelong, Victoria, Australia, 2005 “The Irrational And Illogical Nature Of Science And Psychoanalysis: The Demarcation Of Science And Non-Science Is A Pseudo Problem” Http://Gamahucherpress.Yellowgum.Com/Books/Psychoanalysis/The\_Irrational\_And\_Illogical\_Nature\_Of\_Science\_And\_Psychoana.Pdf

There is an on going debate in psychoanalysis as to whether psychoanalysis is a scientific or hermeneutic discipline. The positivist critique of psychoanalysis argue that psychoanalysis is “…an ideological closed belief system lacking falsifiable postulates or a sound empirical basis.” 1 Zaretsky notes “… some came to believe that psychoanalysis was not a science.” The reason for this was because psychoanalysis excluded “… critique and speculation, [refused] to ask when empirical verification was necessary and when it was impossible to obtain … “ 2 These attacks were not new for during the inter war period psychoanalysis was critiqued by “… liberal defenders of scientific orthodoxy.” 3 Nevertheless there was disagreement on the scientific status of psychoanalysis such that some Logical positivists, such as Richard Von Mises argued that psychoanalysis was grounded on “ incontestable observations”. 4 Here we see that a major criticism of psychoanalysis was its lack of empirical support. In other words a major criticism of psychoanalysis was that it did not verify its ideas by experience or reality. Now no less a figure than Freud himself claimed that psychoanalysis was in fact empirically non-falsifiable. Freud when confronted with the unscientific status of psychoanalysis, “responded that analysis did not lend itself to experimental testing ..” 5 Grunbaum, in 1984, published a book which took issue with the positivist attack upon the un-falsifiablity of psychoanalysis Grunbaum “ argues that, although perhaps more difficult to study than in the physical sciences, cause-effect principles apply just as strongly in psychology as in physics. He also shows that many psychoanalytical postulates are falsifiable …” 6 A, Bateman, & J, Holmes claim that repression, unconscious awareness, identification and internalization are scientifically proven. 7 Now despite Grunbaum’s apparent demonstration of the falsifablity of psychoanalysis some theorists claim that the external validation of psychoanalysis is doomed to fail. These theorists follow Ricoeur in claiming a hermeneutic understanding of psychoanalysis. They claim that instead of a correspondence with reality, as being the criteria upon which to assess psychoanalysis, they claim that “… internal coherence and narrative plausibility as the basis for settling disputes.” 8 Thus we see there are those, like Grunbaum, who argue that psychoanalysis can be tested against the facts of reality and potentially its postulates can be falsified by reality. On the other hand there are those, like Ricoeur, who advocate a hermenutical approach where it is not a correspondence with reality that matters but whether the psychoanalytic theory is internally consistent and its interpretations or narratives satisfying or not. A theory is falsifiable, in the correspondence theory of ‘truth’ if it does not agree with reality. In the coherence theory of ‘truth’ a theory is falsifiable if it is inconsistent in terms of the system. I will argue that both criteria are flawed and lack epistemological support. In this regard we see that the debate on the falsifiablity of psychoanalysis is a debate between correspondence and coherence theorists. Now the correspondence and coherence theories of ‘truth’ are philosophically flawed. I will show how they are flawed and lack epistemological support. What I will draw from this is my claim that it does not matter whether psychoanalysis is falsifiable or not either in terms of the correspondence or coherence theories of ‘truth’ because both lack epistemological support. A way of looking at a theory is to see at as a set of statements which say something about a state of affair about reality. Under this viewpoint the issue is what is the relation between the statement and reality that makes it ‘true’ or ‘false’. O’Hear notes ‘true’ statements correspond or picture reality 9 . **But the problem with this is that “ how can a statement- something linguistic – correspond to a fact or state of affairs**. Certainly it cannot be a replica of a state of affairs , nor does it fit with it in the way a nut might be said to correspond with a nut. Further, even if we could make some sense of a simple affirmative factual statement …. There are considerable problems with knowing just what it is other statements are supposed to correspond to.” 10 What about negative statements that say something is not or does not exist? What about counterfactural statements? Do mathematical and moral statements correspond to something in reality? Are there universal statements that correspond to reality? The correspondence theory of ‘truth’ that sees statements as corresponding to reality is thus problematic. The problems are such that, as O’Hear notes “ the correspondence relation are simply shadowy reflections of statements we regard as true for other reasons rather than as generally mind-independent realities.” 11 **When we realize that** **there is no non-conceptual view about reality we realize that even ‘reality’ is a value-laden conceptual laden term**. As some argue all theory is value laden there are no facts uncontaminated by epistemological, metaphysical, other theories, and ontological views. The result of all this is to undermine the claims of the correspondence theory such that “… there is something futile in thinking that what we know is achieved by direct access to a mind-independent reality, which would suggest that a naïve correspondence view of truth, at least, is likely to be able to give us little guidance in our actual inquiries and researches.” 12 We shall see that the coherence theory of ‘truth’ fares no better in guiding our research or acessing our actual statements about ‘truth’ or falsidity. In the coherence theory of ‘truth’ the criterai of ‘truth’ is that a statement does not contradict other statements O’Hear notes that “systems here are regarded as being governed by nothing more mysterious than normal relations of implication and 11 ibid., . p90. 12 Ibid., p.96. 9 contradiction.” 13 But as has been pointed out it is quite easy to avoid contradiction by dropping inconsistent statements 14 . If a statement is inconsistent with theory or observation we can just drop either the theory or observational statement. Also many scientific theory suffer from empirical counter-evidence which we nevertheless still accept. 15 What happens when two or more theories i.e. Kleinian, Lacanian, Freudian, ego-psychology etc, are lets say coherent but contain mutually contradictory statements in regard to each other. In other words what about the situation when theories are coherent but contradict each other. O’Hear points out “ that many would regard this as a conclusive objection to the coherence theory of truth, for surely whether a statement is true or not depends on the facts and not on the systems we are using to interpret the facts.” 16 But here is the big problem. We showed above that facts are themselves value conceptual laden. The correspondence theory of ‘truth’ in fact is not epistemologically or metaphysically etc neutral- we see the facts through other theories. But we have just seen that in seeing the facts through other theories assumes that the theories are coherence, but coherence theories of ‘truth’ as we have seen are epistemologically flawed. Thus we see that epistemologically both the correspondence and coherence theories of ‘truth’ are flawed. **This to my mind say that it does not matter whether psychoanalysis is falsifiable**. Whether it is, or is not is based upon a particular theory of ‘truth’ that has no epistemological support. Now regardless of these philosophical investigations I will show that in terms of each theory there is evidence that even though their criteria are not met for some theories these theories are still used with ongoing validity. This 13 ibid., p.92. 14 ibid., p.93. 15 ibid., p.93. 16 ibid., p.84. 10 evidence wil also lend weight to my claim that it dose not matter whether psychoanalysis is falsifiable or not, it can still have validity.

**Even math and science are unfalsifiable---don’t throw the whole theory out**

Colin **Dean 5** Bsc, Ba, B.Litt(Hon),Ma, B.Litt(Hon), Ma, Ma(Psychoanalytic Studies) Gamahucher Press, West Geelong, Victoria, Australia, 2005 “The Irrational And Illogical Nature Of Science And Psychoanalysis: The Demarcation Of Science And Non-Science Is A Pseudo Problem” Http://Gamahucherpress.Yellowgum.Com/Books/Psychoanalysis/The\_Irrational\_And\_Illogical\_Nature\_Of\_Science\_And\_Psychoana.Pdf

There are examples from physics where correspondence with reality has not resulted in the abandonment of the theory. A theory has been falsified yet nevertheless it is still used. A classic example is that of Newtonian physics Newtonian prediction of black-body radiation failed –this was left to quantum physics to do. Also Newtonian physic failled to predict the motion of three bodies in combined gravitational motion i.e. planets 17 . Kuhn points out that no one denied that Newtonian physic was not as science because it could not predict the speed of sound, or Newton’s laws of gravitation failed to predict and account for the perigee of the moon or the motion of the moon; as he states “ no one seriously questioned Newtonian theory because of the long recognized discrepancies between predictions from the theory and both the speed the speed of sound and the motion of Mercury.” 18 Thus we see that even if psychoanalysis is falsified in terms of the correspondence theory of ‘truth ,the case of Newtonian physics shows us that it need not matter in the least. In this regard there is truth in Freud’s provocative idea, when he states, “ even if psychoanalysis showed itself as unsuccessful in every other form of nervous and psychical disease as it does in delusions, it would still remain completely justified as an irreplacable instrument of scientific research. It is true that in that case we should not be in a position to practice it.” 19 Now even in science and mathematics there are un-falsifiable entities but this does not stop them being used in those disciplines. At the very core of science and mathematics there are un-falsifiable entities Such things as matter, the mathematical point, anti-matter force etc. are unfalsifiable. Freud notes the presence of un-falsiable objects in psychoanalysis when he states “ too it will be entirely in accord with our expectations if the basic concepts and principles of the new science (instincts, nervous energy, etc) remain for a considerable time no less indeterminate than those of the older sciences (force, mass, attraction, etc).” 20 Thus we see that even if psychoanalysis is not falsifiable, in terms of the correspondence theory of ‘truth’. just like in mathematics and science, it does not matter for a theories validity. The coherence theory of ‘truth’s says that if a theory or statement is inconsistent then it is false. But there are examples where this is the state of affairs but nevertheless the theories are still used. Freud acknowledges the inconsistency of psychoanalysis, thus in terms of the coherence theory falsifiable, but nevertheless says it does not matter. As he states “ [a] person of an epistemological bent might find it tempting to follow the paths –the sophists – by which the anarchists succeed in enticing such conclusions from science [i.e. its self-abrogation]. All I can say is the anarchist theory sounds wonderfully superior so long as it relates to opinions about abstract things: but it breaks down with its first step into practical life” 21 Nevertheless Freud states “Indeed it seems to us so much a matter of course to equate them in this way that any contradiction of the idea [the unconscious] strikes us as obvious non-sense. Yet psychoanalysis cannot avoid raising this contradiction; it cannot accept the identity of the conscious and the mental.” 22 In mathematics inconsistency goes right to the heart of it, but this does not stop it from still being valid. As Bunch states: “None of them [paradoxes] has been resolved by thinking the way mathematicians thought until the end of the nineteenth century. To get around them requires some reformulation of mathematics. Most reformulations except for axiomatic set theory, results in the loss of mathematical ideas and results that have proven to be extremely useful. Axiomatic set theory explicitly eliminates the known paradoxes, but cannot be shown to be consistent. Therefore, other paradoxes can occur at any time.” 23 With all these paradoxes and inconsistencies Bunch notes that it is “… amazing that mathematics works so well.” 24 Since the mathematical way of looking at the world generates contradictory results from that of science, 25 such as the mathematical notion of the continuum, and quantum mechanical concept of quanta. As Bunch notes “… the discoveries of quantum theory or the special theory of relativity were all made through extensive use of mathematics that was built on the concept of the continuum…that mathematical way of looking at the world and the scientific way of looking at the world produced contradictory results.” 26 Here we see the very foundation of science and mathematics is falsifiable but this dose not bring about the abandonment of those things that are falsifiable. The same is true in quantum mechanics inconsistencies or falsifiablty does not bring about the abandonment of the statements or theory. In regard to quantum mechanics Heisenberg notes that “ the strangest experience of those years was that the paradoxes of quantum theory did not disappear during this process of clarification; on the contrary they have become even more marked and exciting.” 27 Now even though no experiment has contradicted quantum theory predictions and quantum theory is the most successful that has ever existed nevertheless one paradox namely the Einstien-Prodolsky-Rosen paradox may require for its resolution declaring the existing quantum theory, with all its successes wrong. 28 Eberhard notes the solving of some quantum paradoxes is not decided by a method or epistemology but “ [the] ideas [relating] to one’s philosophical view of the world.” 29 Thus we see that it does not matter if psychoanalysis is falsifiable or not. There are statements and theories in mathematics and science which are falsifiable both by a correspondence theory of ‘truth’ criteria or coherence theory of ‘truth’ criteria. Nevertheless even though they are falsifiable the statements are still used and the theories still regarded as valid. We saw that there are un-falsiable statements mathematics and science but nevertheless these statements are not abandoned. We saw that philosophically the correspondence and coherence theories of ‘truth’ are epistemologically flawed. These flaws thus take away the epistemological support for their truth criteria . All these examples thus to my mind leads to the conclusion that psychoanalysis while it in theory can be falsified, and in practice if we accept Grunbaunm’s arguments, it does not matter. As Freud said so long ago “ even if psychoanalysis showed itself as unsuccessful in every other form of nervous and psychical disease as it does in delusion it would still remain completely justified as an instrument of scientific research it is true that in that case we should not be in a position to practice it.” 30

**And, it is falsifiable---their indicts are old**

Drew **Westen 98** Department of Psychiatry Harvard Medical School, “The Scientific Legacy of Sigmund Freud Toward a Psychodynamically Informed Psychological Science,” Psychological Bulletin November 1998 Vol. 124, No. 3, 333-371s

Although commentators periodically declare that Freud is dead, his repeated burials lie on shaky grounds. Critics typically attack an archaic version of psychodynamic theory that most clinicians similarly consider obsolete. Central to contemporary psychodynamic theory is a series of propositions about (a) unconscious cognitive, affective, and motivational processes; (b) ambivalence and the tendency for affective and motivational dynamics to operate in parallel and produce compromise solutions; (c) the origins of many personality and social dispositions in childhood; (d) mental representations of the self, others, and relationships; and (e) developmental dynamics. **An enormous body of research in cognitive, social, developmental, and personality psychology now supports many of these propositions**. Freud's scientific legacy has implications for a wide range of domains in psychology, such as integration of affective and motivational constraints into connectionist models in cognitive science.

Freud, like Elvis, has been dead for a number of years but continues to be cited with some regularity. Although the majority of clinicians report that they rely to some degree upon psychodynamic 1 principles in their work ( Pope, Tabachnick, & Keith-Spiegel, 1987 ), most researchers consider psychodynamic ideas to be at worst absurd and obsolete and at best irrelevant or of little scientific interest. In the lead article of a recent edition of Psychological Science, Crews (1996) arrived at a conclusion shared by many: "[T]here is literally nothing to be said, scientifically or therapeutically, to the advantage of the entire Freudian system or any of its component dogmas" (p. 63).

**Despite the explosion of empirical studies of unconscious cognitive processes** (see, e.g., Greenwald, 1992 ; Kihlstrom, 1987 ; Schacter, 1992 ), few reference Freud; none cite any contemporary psychodynamic work; and in general, psychodynamic concepts are decreasingly represented in the major psychology journals ( Robins & Craik, 1994 ). The situation is similar in the popular media and in broader intellectual discourse. Publications ranging from Time to the New York Review of Books periodically publish Freud's intellectual obituary, with critics charging that Freud's ideas–such as his dual-instinct theory or his hypotheses about female personality development–are seriously out of date and without scientific merit (e.g., Crews, 1993 ).

Many aspects of Freudian theory are indeed out of date, and they should be: Freud died in 1939, and he has been slow to undertake further revisions. **His critics, however, are equally behind the times, attacking Freudian views of the 1920s as if they continue to have some currency in their original form.**

**Psychodynamic theory and therapy have evolved considerably since 1939 when Freud's bearded countenance was last sighted in earnest**. Contemporary psychoanalysts and psychodynamic therapists no longer write much about ids and egos, nor do they conceive of treatment for psychological disorders as an archaeological expedition in search of lost memories ( Aron, 1996 ; Gabbard, 1994 ; Horowitz, 1988 ; Kolb, Cooper, & Fishman, 1995 ; Mitchell, 1988 ; Wachtel, 1993 ). People do sometimes describe feelings or behaviors in therapy that conform remarkably to aspects of Freud's psychosexual theories (such as a patient of mine with erectile problems whose associations to a sexual encounter led to an image of having sex with his mother, followed by some unpleasant anal imagery). Nevertheless, psychotherapists who rely on theories derived from Freud do not typically spend their time lying in wait for phallic symbols. They pay attention to sexuality, because it is an important part of human life and intimate relationships and one that is often filled with conflict. Today, however, most psychodynamic theorists and therapists spend much of their time helping people with problematic interpersonal patterns, such as difficulty getting emotionally intimate or repeatedly getting intimate with the wrong kind of person (see Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983 ).

**AT Robinson---2NC**

**Lacan is not inherently conservative---opposing utopianism is liberating if it creates a more radically democratic politics**

**Thomassen 4** Lasse Department of Gvt @ the Univ of Essex, “Lacanian Political Theory: A Reply to Robinson,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 6.4, EbscoHost

 (3) According to Robinson, Lacanian political theory is inherently conservative. ‘Lacanians’, Robinson writes, ‘urge that one reconcile oneself to the inevitability of lack. Lacanian politics is therefore about coming to terms with violence, exclusion and antagonism, not about resolving or removing these’ (p. 260). And, about Mouffe, he writes that, ‘as a Lacanian, Mouffe cannot reject exclusion; it is, on a certain level, necessary according to such a theory’ (p. 263). Such assertions are only possible if we believe in the possibility of opposing exclusion to a situation of non-exclusion, which is exactly what post-structuralists have challenged. Moreover, the post-structuralist (and Lacanian) view does not necessarily preclude the removal of any concrete exclusion. On the contrary, the acknowledgement of the constitutivity of exclusion shifts the focus from exclusion versus non-exclusion to the question of which exclusions we can and want to live with. Nothing in the poststructuralist (and Lacanian) view thus precludes a progressive politics. Of course, this is not to say that a progressive politics is guaranteed—if one wants guarantees, post-structuralist political theory is not the place to look. There are similar problems with Robinson’s characterisation of Zizek’s ‘nihilistic variety of Lacanianism’: ‘the basic structure of existence is unchangeable ... [Zizek’s] Lacanian revolutionism must stop short of the claim that a better world can be constructed’ (p. 267). This, according to Robinson, ‘reﬂects an underlying conservatism apparent in even the most radical-seeming versions of Lacanianism’ (p. 268). Again, the constitutivity of exclusion and violence does not necessarily mean that ‘the new world cannot be better than the old’ (p. 268). The alternative to guaranteed progress is not necessarily conservatism or nihilism, and the impossibility of a perfect society does not exclude attempts at improvement—with the proviso that what counts as improvement cannot be established according to some transcendental yardstick. Thus, while Robinson raises many interesting points, there are also some problems with his position. Here, I have focused on some misunderstandings of the status of the claims made by post-structuralist political theorists, but there are also some simple misreadings of the texts under review. For instance, when dealing with Mouffe’s view that antagonism is ineradicable, Robinson links this to a Hobbesian statism: ‘the exclusionary and violent operations of coercive state apparatuses must be accepted as an absolute necessity for any kind of social life. This is Hobbesian statism updated for a post-modern era’ (p. 261). How Robinson is able to move from the ineradicability of antagonism and exclusion to ‘the exclusionary and violent operations of coercive state apparatuses ... as an absolute necessity’ and ‘Hobbesian statism’ is beyond comprehension. There is certainly nothing to suggest such an interpretation in the pages referred to by Robinson (Mouffe 2000, 43, 105, 129–132).

**\*\*\*Aff Answers\*\*\***

**Consumerism Ethical/Inev---2AC**

**Consumerism is inevitable and ethical**

Patricia **Cohen 2** is a writer for the New York Times, citing James B. Twitchell, prof of English at the University of Florida, “In Defense Of Our Wicked, Wicked Way” The New York Times July 7, 2002, http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/jtwitche/nytimesarticle.pdf

"I CAN stand here and look at this for hours," said James B. Twitchell as he parked himself in front of the bottled water section in City Market, just past the jars of $30-per-pound teas and behind the eight-foot display of imported olive oils. Mr. Twitchell, a professor of English at the University of Florida in Gainesville, specializes in the Romantic poets, but his real obsession is shopping. Given the choice of reading literary theorists like Foucault or gazing at shelves stacked with artfully shaped bottles of water piled up like Jay Gatsby's beautifully tailored shirts, he would quickly choose the latter. "There is more that I can sustain myself with at the water aisle than in all of modern criticism," he said. In a series of books, the latest of which is "Living It Up: Our Love Affair With Luxury" (Columbia University Press), Mr. Twitchell has detailed the consumption habits of Americans with all the scholarly delight of a field anthropologist who has discovered the secret courting rituals of a remote tribe. He is exquisitely attuned to the subtle gradations of status conferred by the labels on what people wear, eat, drink, drive and freeze ice cubes in. And he is not alone. Whether prompted by the 90's spendathon or the endless fascination not only with shopping, but with reading about shopping, a new title by an academic or journalist on the subject appears practically every week. Burlington, where Mr. Twitchell grew up and where he now spends summers, was singled out by David Brooks in his wickedly funny "Bobos in Paradise" as a model Latte Town, a city that has perfectly reconciled the mercenary instincts of the bourgeoisie with the artistic spirit of the bohemians to create an upscale consumer culture. What distinguishes Mr. Twitchell's study of excessive consumerism, though, is that he applauds it. To him, Evian and Pellegrino, Vermont Pure and Dasani are evidence of what could be called his trickledown theory of luxury: that the defining characteristic of today's society is the average person's embrace of unnecessary consumption, superficial indulgence, wretched excess and endless status-seeking. Oh, earthly paradise! Once defined by exclusiveness, luxury is now available -- whether in the form of limited-edition coffee at Starbucks or Michael Graves tea kettles at Target -- to all. And that, Mr. Twitchell maintains, is a good thing. Sure, he argues in his book, buying essentially useless luxury items "is one-dimensional, shallow, ahistorical, without memory and expendable. **But it is also strangely democratic and unifying. If what you want is peace on earth, a unifying system that transcends religious, cultural and caste differences, well, whoops!, here it is**. The Global Village is not the City on the Hill, not quite the Emerald City, and certainly not quite what millennial utopians had in mind, but it is closer to equitable distribution of rank than what other systems have provided." That is, to say the least, a minority report. For centuries, philosophers, artists and clerics railed against luxury. Ecclesiastical courts forbade most people from eating chocolate, drinking coffee or wearing colors like Prussian blue and royal purple -- "luxuria" that signaled living above one's God-ordered place. Thorstein Veblen offered the first modern critique of "conspicuous consumption" in his 1899 treatise "The Theory of the Leisure Class." Post-World War II social critics and economists extended Veblen's critique to the expanding middle class. John Kenneth Galbraith warned in "The Affluent Society" of the binge afflicting the postwar generation. Unwitting consumers, he said, were essentially suckered by admen and salesmen into spending money on things they didn't need. In his 1970 study "The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism" Daniel Bell argued that "the culture was no longer concerned with how to work and achieve, but with how to spend and enjoy." This trend, he warned, could end up undermining the very work ethic that made capitalism function. That, obviously, did not happen. If anything people worked more so they could spend more. In "The Overspent American," Juliet B. Schor noted that people no longer compared themselves with others in the same income bracket, but with the richer and more famous they saw on television, propelling them to spend more than they could afford. To Mr. Twitchell, the naysayers are scolds and spoilsports. Indoor plumbing, sewing machines, dishwashers, college educations, microwaves, coronary bypasses, birth control and air travel all began as luxury items for the wealthy. Nor are buyers mindlessly duped by canny advertisers into buying items they don't really want, he said. Quite the opposite. They enjoy the sensual feel of an Hermes silk tie, the briny delicacy of Petrossian caviar or simply the sensation of indulging themselves. These things may not bring happiness, but neither does their absence from the lives of people too poor to afford them. It may seem an odd moment to champion luxury. The spectacular boom of the 90's now looks as if it was partly built on spectacular sleight of hand, with Enron, Global Crossing, Adelphia and WorldCom all recently admitting that billions in reported profits were nonexistent. The moment seems ripe for a chastened culture to repent its indulgences. Reassessing the get-and-spend ethic -- not defending consumerism -- might well be the defining current of the next few years. The problem with Mr. Twitchell's view, said Robert H. Frank, author of "Luxury Fever," is that our sense of what we need to live comfortably keeps spiraling upward. It is not that luxury spending isn't good for particular individuals, but that it is bad for society overall. "It's like when everybody stands up for a better view, you don't see better than before," Mr. Frank said from his home in Ithaca. There's a lot of waste in luxury spending. Instead of building safer roads or providing better health care, we are spending that money on bigger diamonds and faster cars. Mr. Twitchell is unpersuaded, however. Walking down Church Street, Burlington's busy pedestrian mall, he pointed out the transformation that the consumer culture has wrought in his hometown. Lean and tanned, with cropped gray hair and rounded tortoise-shell glasses, Mr. Twitchell looks a bit like Dennis the Menace's father after Dennis has grown up, moved across the country and given his old man a few years to recover. "Church Street once serviced needs, now it services desires," Mr. Twitchell said. The optician's shop is gone, and so is Sears and JCPenney. He pointed out the Ann Taylor store, where the Masonic temple used to be. A chic French children's store sits in the old bank. "The key to modern luxe is that most of us can have a bit of it on the plate," Mr. Twitchell said. "I can't own a Lexus, but I can rent one. I can't go to Bermuda for a winter, but I can have a time share for a weekend. I don't own a yacht but I'm taking a Princess cruise." The process of democratization is mirrored in Mr. Twitchell's family history. His great-grandfatherAndrew A. Buell made his fortune building wooden boxes from Adirondack lumber. Driving up Lodge Road to "the hill," where Mr. Buell built a red stone Romanesque mansion with a copper-topped tower, Mr. Twitchell passed the Burlington Country Club, which his grandfather Marshall Coleman Twitchell helped found. The family's sprawling former home is now a women's dormitory, and the surrounding 66-acre estate serves as the University of Vermont's Redstone campus. A couple of blocks from the hilltop, both in location and status, is the relatively modest white wooden house that Mr. Twitchell, thes son of Marshall Coleman Twitchell Jr., an ophthalmologist, and his sisters grew up in. At that time, said Mr. Twitchell, now 59, one's social place was determined by birth, or "what I call the lucky sperm culture." Today, birth-ordained status has been supplanted by store-bought status. Mr. Twitchell has no regrets about this lost world. "Though I was a beneficiary of it, I'm glad it's over," he said. "There is something refreshing about the material world that downtown Burlington opened up." Compared to the traditional ways of marking status -- race, parentage, accent, private schools -- one's purchases are a preferable way of telling who's up and who's down, he said. On that point, Mr. Twitchell is not alone. Gary Cross, a historian at Penn State University, said that **consumer culture in one sense is "democracy's highest achievement, giving meaning and dignity to people when workplace participation, ethnic solidarity and even representative democracy have failed."** Still, as Mr. Cross argued in 2000 in "An All-Consuming Century: Why Commercialism Won in Modern America," "most of us, no matter our politics, are repulsed by the absolute identity of society with the market and individual choice with shopping." True enough, Mr. Twitchell readily conceded. But he maintains the critics are missing the essential characteristic of luxury spending. "Luxury has very little to do with money or things," he said. "Luxury is a story we tell about things," and it's ultimately the story we are after. That is, our purchases are imbued with elaborate narratives about the life we want to live. It is advertisers and manufacturers who give objects meaning by constructing the stories about them, Mr. Twitchell said, and that meaning is as much a source of desire as the object itself. Think of the elaborate fantasies spun by marketers like Ralph Lauren and Martha Stewart. It goes for whatever you're buying, whether it's Jimmy Choo, Birkenstock or Payless shoes. When Mr. Twitchell, a dedicated factory outlet shopper, flashes his member's card at Sam's Club, "the allure is not just that I'm saving money," he said, "but that I'm smarter and savvier, that I'm duping the duper." Or consider an experiment he performed on his colleagues. He told some English professors that he was going to spend $6,000 to buy an 1850 copy of Wordsworth's "Prelude." Brilliant idea, everyone said. A few days later, Mr. Twitchell told the same colleagues that he had changed his mind and was going to use the $6,000 to buy a used BMW. "I could have said that I was investing in a collection of Beanie Babies comics or a diamond pinkie ring for the shocked response that I got," he wrote. Critics of consumption will say they are making a moral argument, Mr. Twitchell said, but "often what is condemned as luxury is really just a matter of taste." To Mr. Twitchell, as long as human beings crave sensation, they will desire material goods and luxurious ones at that, Wall Street scandals notwithstanding. "If this year it's Enron and WorldCom, then another year it was Long-Term Capital Management," he said. **Recessions may come and go, but consumption is eternal. The ad slogan is right: Diamonds are forever.**

**And, prefer our evidence---Mr. Twitchell knows style**

Patricia **Cohen 2** is a writer for the New York Times, citing James B. Twitchell, prof of English at the University of Florida, “In Defense Of Our Wicked, Wicked Way” The New York Times July 7, 2002, http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/jtwitche/nytimesarticle.pdf

Mr. Twitchell is unpersuaded, however. Walking down Church Street, Burlington's busy pedestrian mall, he pointed out the transformation that the consumer culture has wrought in his hometown. **Lean and tanned, with cropped gray hair and rounded tortoise-shell glasses**, Mr. Twitchell looks a bit like **Dennis the Menace's father after Dennis has grown up**, moved across the country and given his old man a few years to recover. "Church Street once serviced needs, now it services desires," Mr. Twitchell said. The optician's shop is gone, and so is Sears and JCPenney. He pointed out the Ann Taylor store, where the Masonic temple used to be. A chic French children's store sits in the old bank.

**Consumerism Good---2AC**

**Consumerism is key to happiness…**

Will **Wilkinson 8** is a research fellow at the Cato Institute, “Too Much Consumption? Let Me Decide” http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/too-much-consumption-let-me-decide

Critics often say capitalism produces, and we mindlessly consume, all sorts of junk we don't really need. We could live a lot more simply, more in tune with nature, with more time for one another. Some thinkers say that individualistic consumerism distracts us from more satisfying collective pursuits. Others urge us to pare down our consumption. They want us to minimize our "carbon footprints," as if catastrophe draws closer with each trip to the store, with each exhale. The Greek philosopher Diogenes, who extolled the unencumbered life of the lowly dog, would have agreed. One day, Diogenes smashed his only possession, a wooden bowl, after seeing a peasant boy drink from his cupped hands. Today, there are Jainist monks in India who walk around naked. Who can commune with the transcendent when bogged down in grubby material things, like pants? Sure, most critics of consumption don't take it as far as Diogenes. But if you're going to take it anywhere, you've got to draw a line and say why pants and bowls go on one side of it, and iPhones and a 20-ounce soy milk mochaccino go on another. But why suppose there's one line? Different people have different aspirations and plans. They have different frames of reference for adequacy and excess. What each of us needs depends on what we are trying to make of our lives. Of course, moralizers of all stripes, from officious environmentalists to religious fundamentalists, have strong ideas about what we really need. But the fact that you think you know what's best for me doesn't mean I don't really need my nose hair trimmer or my stuffed armadillo. I have my reasons. If this wild assortment of stuff was really crushing our souls, then maybe we ought to smash our flatscreens like Diogenes smashed his bowl. But the evidence is clear: People are most likely to be happy, healthy, well-educated and long-lived in places where people consume the most. Maybe we don't need to be happy, or to live 80 years. But if we want to, then we've got a good thing going. **Just don't trip over your Roomba**.

**Falsifiability---2AC**

**The K isn’t falsifiable**

Francis J. **Mootz 2k** II, Visiting Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law; Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law, Yale Journal of the Law & Humanities, 12 Yale J.L. & Human. 299, p. 319-320

Freudian psychoanalysis increasingly is the target of blistering criticism from a wide variety of commentators. 54 In a recent review, Frederick Crews reports that   independent studies have begun to converge toward a verdict... that **there is literally nothing to be said, scientifically or therapeutically, to the advantage of the entire Freudian system** or any of its component dogmas Analysis as a whole remains powerless... and understandably so, because **a thorough going epistemological critique, based on commonly acknowledged standards of evidence and logic decertifies every distinctively psychoanalytic proposition**. 55   The most telling criticism of Freud's psychoanalytic theory is that it has proven no more effective in producing therapeutic benefits than have other forms of psychotherapy. 56 Critics draw the obvious conclusion that the benefits (if any) of psychotherapy are neither explained nor facilitated by psychoanalytic theories. Although Freudian psychoanalytic theory purports to provide a truthful account of the operations of the psyche and the causes for mental disturbances, critics argue that psychoanalytic theory may prove in the end to be **nothing more than fancy verbiage** that tends to obscure whatever healing effects psychotherapeutic dialogue may have. 57

Freudian psychoanalysis failed because **it could not make good on its claim to be a rigorous and empirical science**. Although Freud's mystique is premised on a widespread belief that psychoanalysis was a profound innovation made possible by his genius, Freud claimed only that he was extending the scientific research of his day within the organizing context of a biological model of the human mind. 58  [\*320]  Freud's adherents created the embarrassing cult of personality and the myth of a self-validating psychoanalytic method only after Freud's empirical claims could not withstand critical scrutiny in accordance with the scientific methodology demanded by his metapsychology. 59 The record is clear that Freud believed that psychoanalysis would take its place among the sciences and that his clinical work provided empirical confirmation of his theories. **This belief now appears to be completely unfounded and indefensible.**

Freud's quest for a scientifically grounded psychotherapy was not amateurish or naive. Although Freud viewed his "metapsychology as a set of directives for constructing a scientific psychology," n60 Patricia Kitcher makes a persuasive case that he was not a blind dogmatist who refused to adjust his metapsychology in the face of contradictory evidence. n61 Freud's commitment to the scientific method, coupled with his creative vision, led him to construct a comprehensive and integrative metapsychology that drew from a number of scientific disciplines in an impressive and persuasive manner. n62 However, **the natural and social sciences upon which he built his derivative and interdisciplinary approach developed too rapidly and unpredictably for him to respond.** n63 As developments in biology quickly undermined Freud's theory, he "began to look to linguistics and especially to anthropology as more hopeful sources of support," n64 but this strategy later in his career proved equally [\*321] unsuccessful. n65 **The scientific justification claimed by Freud literally eroded when the knowledge base underlying his theory collapsed**, **leaving his disciples with the impossible task of defending a theory whose presuppositions no longer were plausible according to their own criteria of validation**. n66

**Falsifiability 1st**

**Lett 91** Professor of Anthropology, Department of Social Sciences, 1991 “A field Guide to Critical Thinking” p.32

It may sound paradoxical, but in order for any claim to be true, it must be falsifiable. The rule of falsifiability is a guarantee thai if the claim is false, the evidence will prove it false; and if the claim is true, the evidence will not disprove it (in which case the claim can be tentatively accepted as true until such time as evidence is brought forth that does disprove it). The rule of falsifiability, in short, says that the evidence must matter, and as such it is the first and most important and most fundamental rule of evidential reasoning.The rule of falsifiability is essential for this reason: If nothing conceivable could ever disprove the claim, thenthe evidence that does exist would not matter, it would be pointless to even examine the evidence, because the conclusion is already known—the claim is invulnerable to any possible evidence. This would not mean**,** however, that the claim is true; instead it would mean that the claim is meaningless. This is so because it is impossible—logically impossible—for any claim to be true no matter what. For every true claim, you can always conceive of evidence that would make the claim untrue— in other words, again, every true claim is falsifiable. […] For example, the true claim that the life span of human beings is less than 200 years is falsifiable; it would be falsified if a single human being were to live to be 200 years old. Similarly, the true claim that water freezes at 32° F is falsifiable; it would be falsified if water were to freeze at, say, 34° F. Each of these claims is firmly established as scientific "fact," and we do not expect either claim ever to be falsified; however, the point is that either could be. Any claim that could not be falsified would be devoid of any propositional content; that is, it would not be making a factual assertion— it would instead be making an emotive statement, a declaration of the way the claimant feels about the world. Nonfalsifiable claims do communicate information, but what they describe is the claimant's value orientation. They communicate nothing whatsoever of a factual nature, and hence are neither true nor false. Nonfalsifiable statements are propositionally vacuous.

**Alt Fails---2AC**

**Alternative can’t solve---psychoanalysis can’t change anything**

**Hutchens 4** Assistant Professor at James Madison University “The Senselessness of a Curable World: Jean-Luc Nancy on Freudian Massenpsychologie,” theory @ Buffalo 9, http://wings.buffalo.edu/theory/archive/archive.html, 115-116

Yet Nancy does have a viable objection that the very distinction between curable and incurable already implies the linkages that enable socialization amongst narcissistic egos. In other words, this vacillation of commitment is the result of indebtedness to biological and metaphysical presumptions concerning the ego. Insofar as the egos of this scheme neither compose nor have access to social reality, they lack the very ‘world’ which singular beings, someones, must compose. There is thus a lacuna of sense in the play of signifyingness around narcissistic egos. Psychoanalytic theory offers only a “severe punctuation of truth, that is, a pure privation of sense” that might ultimately demand an excessive sense. The inaugural thought of psychoanalysis merely “dissolves all sense”, renders it “destitute” by reducing it to a “mere demand of sense” and by “exposing truth as the disappointment of that demand” (The Sense of the World 46). It lacks world and access to the sense with which the world is coextensive. It therefore offers only a description of an unrequited demand for sense that is confused with sense itself. It is precisely this “disappointment” of the psycho-analytics of culture that provides it with the mission to cure a world; yet, paradoxically, the analyst would never settle for such a disappointment if it were not already striving to endow itself with authority over a “curable” world it feared might prove incurable. I concur with Nancy that psychoanalysis endeavors to lead politics to its truth, yet achieves only the annihilation of the political truth it needs for the purpose of resolving the difficulties engendered by the espousal of the metaphysical egology. Scanning political truth in a lapidary fashion, without arche, possessing no end or ground by which its success could be determined, psychoanalysis fails either to resolve the political deficiencies it identifies or to offer a purview of its own conceptual capacity to do so. In more general terms, one might propose that the effort to appropriate political truth into a tenable psychoanalysis of culture serves only to depropriate the very subject of culture. Perhaps there is a sickness, a collective neurosis that leaves all non-relating narcissistic egos in a state of panic. Yet, psychoanalysis has neither devolved its actual sense nor provided therapeutic means by which to address it. Sense, anterior to sanity and insanity, is not indicative of the sickness that psychoanalysis construes. In its infinite reticulations of singularity, sense is ‘mad’ and thus cannot be produced by any theory whose intended praxis is therapy (The Sense of the World 49) Psychoanalysis composes its own neurotic fantasy of social illusion. It does not confront the manner in which there might be ‘sickness’ in the very groundless insubstantiality of social relations, or perhaps no such sickness of that kind at all.

**Robinson---2AC**

**Traversing the fantasy reifies existing domination and condones violence**

**Robinson 5** Andrew, recently completed his PhD in political theory at the University of Nottingham, Theory and Event, 8/1, “The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique”, projectmuse

Žižek's anti-capitalism has won him friends in leftist circles, but the capitalism to which he objects is not the capitalism of classical Marxist critique. One could, indeed, question whether Žižek is attacking capitalism (as opposed to liberalism) at all. His "capitalism" is a stultifying world of suffocating Good which is unbearable precisely because it lacks the dimension of violence and antagonism. It is, he says, 'boring', 'repetitive' and 'perverse' because it lacks the 'properly political' attitude of 'Us against Them'20. It therefore eliminates the element of unconditional attachment to an unattainable Thing or Real, an element which is the core of humanity21. It delivers what Žižek fears most: a 'pallid and anaemic, self-satisfied, tolerant peaceful daily life'. To rectify this situation, there is a need for suffocating Good to be destroyed by diabolical Evil22. 'Why not violence?' he rhetorically asks. 'Horrible as it may sound, I think it's a useful antidote to all the aseptic, frustrating, politically correct pacifism'23. There must always be social exclusion, and 'enemies of the people'24. The resulting politics involves an 'ethical duty' to accomplish an Act which shatters the social edifice by undermining the fantasies which sustain it25. As with Mouffe, this is both a duty and an acceptance of necessity. 'By traversing the fantasy the subject accepts the void of his nonexistence'26. On a political level, this kind of stance leads to an acceptance of social exclusion which negates compassion for its victims.  The resultant inhumanity finds its most extreme expression in Žižek's work, where 'today's "mad dance", the dynamic proliferation of multiple shifting identities... awaits its resolution in a new form of Terror'.  It is also present, however, in the toned-down exclusionism of authors such as Mouffe.  Hence, democracy depends on 'the possibility of drawing a frontier between "us" and "them"', and 'always entails relations of inclusion-exclusion'[28](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html#_edn28).  'No state or political order... can exist without some form of exclusion' experienced by its victims as coercion and violence[29](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html#_edn29), and, since Mouffe assumes a state to be necessary, this means that one must endorse exclusion and violence.  (The supposed necessity of the state is derived from the supposed need for a master-signifier or nodal point to stabilize identity and avoid psychosis, either for individuals or for societies).  What is at stake in the division between these two trends in Lacanian political theory is akin to the distinction Vaneigem draws between "active" and "passive" nihilism[30](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html#_edn30).  The Laclauian trend involves an implied ironic distance from any specific project, which maintains awareness of its contingency; overall, however, it reinforces conformity by insisting on an institutional mediation which overcodes all the "articulations".  The Žižekian version is committed to a more violent and passionate affirmation of negativity, but one which ultimately changes very little.  The function of the Žižekian "Act" is to dissolve the self, producing a historical event.  "After the revolution", however, everything stays much the same.  For all its radical pretensions, Žižek's politics can be summed up in his attitude to neo-liberalism: 'If it works, why not try a dose of it?'[31](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html#_edn31).  The phenomena which are denounced in Lacanian theory are invariably readmitted in its "small print", and this leads to a theory which renounces both effectiveness and political radicalism. It is in this pragmatism that the ambiguity of Lacanian political theory resides, for, while on a theoretical level it is based on an almost sectarian "radicalism", denouncing everything that exists for its complicity in illusions and guilt for the present, its "alternative" is little different from what it condemns (the assumption apparently being that the "symbolic" change in the psychological coordinates of attachments in reality is directly effective, a claim assumed—wrongly—to follow from the claim that social reality is constructed discursively).  Just like in the process of psychoanalytic cure, nothing actually changes on the level of specific characteristics.  The only change is in how one relates to the characteristics, a process Žižek terms '*dotting the "i's*"' in reality, recognizing and thereby installing necessity[32](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html#_edn32).  All that changes, in other words, is the interpretation: as long as they are reconceived as expressions of constitutive lack, the old politics are acceptable.  Thus, Žižek claims that de Gaulle's "Act" succeeded by allowing him 'effectively to realize the necessary pragmatic measures' which others pursued unsuccessfully[33](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html#_edn33).  More recent examples of Žižek's pragmatism include that his alternative to the U.S. war in Afghanistan is only that 'the punishment of those responsible' should be done in a spirit of 'sad duty', not 'exhilarating retaliation'[34](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html#_edn34), and his "solution" to the Palestine-Israel crisis, which is NATO control of the occupied territories[35](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html#_edn35).  If this is the case for Žižek, the ultra-"radical" "Marxist-Leninist" Lacanian, it is so much the more so for his more moderate adversaries.  Jason Glynos, for instance, offers an uncompromizing critique of the construction of guilt and innocence in anti-"crime" rhetoric, demanding that demonization of deviants be abandoned, only to insist as an afterthought that, 'of course, this... does not mean that their offences should go unpunished'[36](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html#_edn36).  Lacanian theory tends, therefore, to produce an "anything goes" attitude to state action: because everything else is contingent, nothing is to limit the practical consideration of tactics by dominant elites.

**Growth Good---2AC**

See the dedev file/cap good file for more

**Trends are reversing – Kuznets curve theory means growth helps the environment**

**Sari and Soytas 9** Ramazan and Ugur, Dept. of Business Administration, Middle East Technical University, “Are global warming and economic growth compatible? Evidence from ﬁve OPEC countries?,” Applied Energy, Volume 86, pg. 1887-1893, ScienceDirect, Tashma, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306261908003267>, 2009

The recent studies on the other hand improved our understanding in at least two ways. Firstly, the empirical studies may be suffering from omitted variables bias that may yield spurious causality test results. Hence, a multivariate approach should be preferred over bi-variate approaches. Secondly, the temporal relationship between energy use and income may be depending on country speciﬁc factors. Furthermore, depending on the nature of the link in concern, alternative policy options may be available to policy makers in different countries. Therefore, studying countries individually may be necessary. There is an abundance of studies that test the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis (see [6,45] for a review) which relate environmental degradation to economic growth. The hypothesis states that as economies grow pollution also grows, but **after an income level is reached economic growth is associated with a decline in pollution**. As Rothman and de Bruyn [35] suggest if the hypothesis holds economic growth can gradually become a solution to environmental problems and no policy action is necessary.

**Growth improves the environment**

**Bhagwati 4** Jagdish N., Columbia University, Economics Department, “In Defense of Globalization,” Oxford University Press, pg. 144-145, Tashma, <http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/transcripts/5046.html/_res/id%3Dsa_File1/In_Defense_of_Globalization.pdf>, 2004

In fact, as development occurs, economies typically shift from primary production, which is often pollution intensive, to manufactures, which are often less so, and then to traded services, which are currently even less pollution-intensive. This natural evolution itself could then reduce the pollution-intensity of income as development proceeds. Then again, the available technology used, and technology newly invented, may become more environment-friendly over time. Both phenomena constitute an ongoing, observed process. The shift to environment-friendly technology can occur naturally as households, for example, become less poor and shift away from indoor cooking with smoke-causing coal-based fires to stoves using fuels that cause little smoke.19 But this shift is often a result also of environment-friendly technological innovation prompted by regulation. Thus, restrictions on allowable fuel efficiency have promoted research by the car firms to produce engines that yield more miles per gallon. But these regulations are created by increased environmental consciousness, for which the environmental groups can take credit. And the rise of these environmental groups is, in turn, associated with increased incomes. Also, revelations about the astonishing environmental degradation in the Soviet Union and its satellites underline how the absence of democratic feedback and controls is a surefire recipe for environmental neglect. The fact that economic growth generally promotes democracy, as discussed in Chapter 8, is yet another way in which rising income creates a better environment. In all these ways, then, increasing incomes can reduce rather than increase pollution. In fact, for several pollutants, empirical studies have found a bell-shaped curve: pollution levels first rise with income but then fall with it.20 The economists Gene Grossman and Alan Krueger, who estimated the levels of different pollutants such as sulfur dioxide in several cities worldwide, were among the first to show this, estimating that for sulfur dioxide levels, the peak occurred in their sample at per capita incomes of $5,000–6,000.21 Several historical examples can also be adduced: the reduction in smog today compared to what the industrial revolution produced in European cities in the nineteenth century, and the reduced deforestation of United States compared to a century ago.22 The only value of these examples is in their refutation of the simplistic notions that pollution will rise with income. They should not be used to argue that growth will automatically take care of pollution regardless of environmental policy. Grossman and Krueger told me that their finding of the bell-shaped curve had led to a huge demand for offprints of their article from anti-environmentalists who wanted to say that “natural forces” would take care of environmental degradation and that environmental regulation was unnecessary; the economists were somewhat aghast at this erroneous, ideological interpretation of their research findings.

**\*\*\*Random\*\*\***

**Sick Warming Card**

**Warming is real and causes extinction---err aff/neg---the very magnitude of the warming makes it impossible to fully psychologically grasp**

Joseph **Dodds 11** is a chartered psychologist of the British Psychological Society Psychoanalysis and Society: At the Edge of Chaos <http://www.psypress.com/common/sample-chapters/9780415666121.pdf> p.3-6

**The ecological crisis is the greatest threat mankind collectively has ever faced** . . . [which] **with** **rapidly accelerating intensity threatens our whole planet**. If so staggering a problem is to be met, the efforts of scientists ofall clearly relevant disciplines will surely be required . . . psychoanalysts,with our interest in the unconscious processes which so powerfullyin¯uence man's behavior, should provide our fellow men with someenlightenment in this common struggle.(Searles 1972: 361)The planetary crisisThe Fourth Assessment Report of the International Panel on ClimateChange (IPCC 2007: 5) concluded that human activities are affecting theEarth on a planetary level, with `atmospheric concentrations of carbondioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide' now far exceeding anything `over thepast 650,000 years', including a rise in greenhouse gas emissions of `70%between 1970 and 2004'. Fourteen of the 15 warmest years on recordoccurred in the last 14 years (the other was 1990, which was warmer than1996) (Brohan et al. 2006, from the UK Met Offce, 2009), and the firstdecade of the twenty-first century, 2000±2009, was the warmest decade everrecorded (Voiland 2010), with the 2001±2010 period being even hotter(World Meteorological Organization 2011). **The scientific consensus is now overwhelming, with no major scientific body disputing the seriousness of the situation**.Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident fromobservations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures,widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level. . . evidence from all continents and most oceans shows that manynatural systems are being affected . . . Most of the observed increase in. . . temperatures since the mid 20th century is very likely due to theobserved increase in anthropogenic (human) greenhouse gas concen**-** trations . . . The probability that this is caused by natural climaticprocesses alone is less than 5% . . . temperatures could rise by between1.1 and 6.4 ¾C . . . during the 21st century . . . Sea levels will probablyrise by 18 to 59 cm . . . [P]ast and future anthropogenic carbon dioxideemissions will . . . contribute to warming and sea level rise for morethan a millennium . . . [but] the likely amount . . . varies greatlydepending on the intensity of human activity during the next century.(IPCC 2007: 2±5)We have so altered the physical processes of the Earth that futuregeologists, should they still exist, will be able to identify a clearly distinctperiod of the Earth's history for which a new term was introduced at thestart of this millennium, the `anthropocene' (Crutzen & Stoermer 2000;Zalasiewicz et al. 2008; Revkin 1992). Between 20,000 and 2 million speciesbecame extinct during the twentieth century, and the rate is now up to140,000 per year in what is labelled the sixth major extinction event to haveoccurred in the last 540 million years (Morell & Lanting 1999), the ®rst tobe caused by the activities of a single species. Harvard biologist E. O.Wilson, in The Future of Life (2003) warns that **half of all known species could be extinct by the end of the century**. The 2010 UN Convention onBiological Diversity (CBD), held in Japan, increased the number ofof®cially endangered species on the `Red List' to now include one ®fth of allanimal and plant species (including 41 per cent of amphibians). Major extinction events should also not be seen as linear processes, **as beyond certain critical thresholds entire ecosystems can be brought to a state of collapse, and can take ten million years to recover** (Science Daily 2011;Whiteside & Ward 2011). **We are taking part in a planetary pyramid scheme, getting into an ecological debt from which there can be no bail outs**. **Yet somehow this just doesn't hit home, our behaviour doesn't match our knowledge**. Why? Inwhat we might call a `deficit' account of our inactivity, George Marshall(2005, 2001) claims **we have a faulty `risk-thermostat' and so are unable to grasp the abstractness of the issue**. To try to get more of a handle on whatglobal temperature rises might do, George Monbiot (2005) makes it moreconcrete:We know what these ®gures mean . . . but it is very hard to make anysense of them. It just sounds like an alteration in your bath water . . . **The last time we had a six degree rise in temperature . . . around 251 million years ago in the Permian Era, it pretty well brought life on earth to an end.** **It wiped out 90% of all known species** . . . Virtuallyeverything in the sea from plankton to sharks simply died. Coral reefswere completely eliminated not to reappear on earth for ten millionyears . . . On land, the ground turned to rubble . . . vegetation died offvery quickly, and it no longer held the soil together . . . [which] washed. . . into the sea . . . creating anoxic environments at the bottom of theocean . . . [There was a] drop in total biological production of around95% . . . Only two quadrupeds survived . . . **We are facing the end of human existence . . . this is a very, very hard thing for people to face.** Here we are on more psychoanalytically interesting (if emotionally terri**-** fying) territory, suggesting an `anxiety-defence' understanding of inactivity.Monbiot (ibid.) continues, asking **why we can accept the threat of terrorism and the related changes to our lives, but not the far greater threat of climate change**. There has been a marked shift over the past decade. In publicstatements, politicians and major business groups are increasingly united onthe importance of the issue (if not its policy implications). Yet despitegrowing consensus, little is actually being done. Years of positive speechesby the UK government, for example, and claims of substantial ± even`world-leading' ± reductions disguise the fact that CO2 emissions fromoverall British economic activity have actually continued to rise, **due in part to growing consumer demand.** In addition, many of the claimed `reductions'have come more from structural changes in global economic production(including so-called `carbon outsourcing') than from actual ef®ciencysavings.This has been dramatically demonstrated by Baiocchi & Minx (2010:1177; see Figure 1), who applied structural decomposition analysis (SDA)to a global multiregional input-output model (MRIO) of changes in UKCO2 emissions between 1992 and 2004. They found that while `improve**-** ments from domestic changes in ef®ciency and production structure led to a148 Mt reduction in CO2emissions' this `only partially offsets emissionincreases of 217 Mt from changes in the global supply chain' including fromthe phenomenon of carbon outsourcing, and `from growing consumerdemand' (ibid.).The 2009 Copenhagen Summit, billed as the epoch-making turning pointwhen the world would come together to save the planet ± it was evendubbed `hopenhagen' (Brownsell 2009) ± was all but a complete failure(Vidal 2009). Even the Kyoto Protocol, seen as a more successful agree**-** ment, has not led to any actual reductions in global carbon emission rates,which grew by 24 per cent between the 1997 agreement and 2005 (WorldBank 2010: 233). In the context of climate change, the gap betweenknowledge and action does not seem to be narrowing, and **it is becoming increasingly clear that what is most needed is psychological research, for it is ultimately in human thinking, feeling and behaviour that the problem is generated, and can potentially be solved.**

**Grab Bag**

**The perfect market isn’t achievable**

Jeanne L. **Schroeder 98** Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University,COMMENTARY: THE END OF THE MARKET: A PSYCHOANALYSIS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 112 Harv. L. Rev. 483

First and foremost, I agree that one should not necessarily give up an ideal one has adopted for logical, religious, or other grounds - such as freedom, justice, grace, or whatever - just because it is empirically impossible. Rather, such ideals serve as one's inspiration even if they are not reasonable aspirations. My complaint about this strain of law and economics is not the empirical impossibility of the ideal, **but the failure of economists to consider the implications of having a theoretically impossible ideal**. This failure can lead to the **incorrect conclusions that the goal has already been reached or is within sight, or that one's policy recommendations will result in the achievement of something close to the ideal, which can in turn result in complacency.**

[\*517] Let me clarify the nature of the impossibility of the perfect market (and of the Lacanian Real) that lies at the heart of my critique. It is common to compare the ideal of the perfect market to the impossible ideals of science. n111 This reveals a grave misunderstanding. **The Real of the perfect market is not merely impossible to achieve as an empirical matter; it is also theoretically impossible**. To understand this, it is useful to compare the impossibility of the Real to the empirical impossibility of scientific models. For example, the laws of motion posited by physics describe a perfectly frictionless world. This frictionless world is probably empirically impossible to replicate perfectly. The laws of motion are theoretically possible, however, in that they are internally consistent. We can predict how objects would behave in such a world. We can use this idealized model to predict how objects should behave in the actual world, in which friction exists. We can develop empirical experiments in an attempt to falsify the hypothesis of the laws of motion. n112 That is, the laws of motion are an attempt to give an affirmative description of actual motion in the empirical world through abstraction and simplification.

In contrast, the Lacanian Real is not just empirically, but also theoretically, impossible. Unlike the hypothetically perfect conditions of physics, the ideals of the Real are not an abstracted, simplified version of the Symbolic order they explain. Rather, the Real is the negative of the Symbolic and serves as its border, its limit. Each is defined in terms of what the other is not. Consequently, the Symbolic concept cannot exist in the Real ideal and vice versa - the two are mutually inconsistent. To achieve the Real would, therefore, be to obliterate the Symbolic.

This distinction between empirical and theoretical impossibility can be put in another way. In the case of an empirically impossible ideal (such as the laws of motion), the actual phenomenon that is to be explained (that is, motion) would continue to exist if the ideal could be achieved: motion would exist in a frictionless world in which the laws of motion operated. In contrast, as I shall discuss, if a theoretically [\*518] impossible Real (such as the perfect market) could be achieved, the actual phenomena that the ideal is designed to explain (that is, actual markets) would cease.

Lacanian theory goes further, however. The Real is defined as impossibility per se, in the sense that it is grounded in fundamental logical paradoxes that cannot be resolved. The Real is beyond our rational understanding (which is located in the Symbolic and the Imaginary). It is a fundamental impasse that is hypothesized to lie at the heart of not only human nature, but the structure of the universe itself. For example, **the Real of the perfect market - a concept that by definition requires market transactions - is simultaneously the destruction of all market transactions**. n113

The branch of law and economics that I am critiquing in this Commentary also attempts to use the ideal of the perfect market for a purpose beyond that for which the ideals of science are used. Scientific models are a means of explaining and predicting actual phenomena. In this Commentary, I am not critiquing economics for developing models - such as the perfect market - for such an explanatory or predictive purpose. However, even though engineers do make practical application of scientific models, their goal is not to make actual phenomena more like the model, but to achieve some other goal. For example, if an engineer were to try to reduce friction on a railroad track, it would not be because a world without friction is her ideal, but because she wished to build a train that will travel faster or cheaper. There may be other circumstances in which she would actually wish to find a way to move away from the ideal and increase friction (perhaps to develop better brakes on the train). Moreover, I do not believe that scientists and engineers would, as some law and economics scholars do, try to imagine what would happen under the ideal circumstances of their model in order to develop actual systems that would mimic the results of such a hypothetical universe.

Those law and economics advocates who seek to formulate legal rules that will mimic the results that would be achieved in a perfect market must first describe the contours of the perfect market they wish to emulate. I show, however, that this task is not merely impracticable, it is also logically impossible. To pretend to describe what would happen in the perfect market is a fantasy in the Lacanian sense of the term: it is an attempt to erect a seemingly attainable Imaginary substitute for the unattainable, indescribable, and unimaginable Real.

**?**

**Madra & Ozselcuk 10** Yahya Madra is an economics professor who holds a Ph.D. from University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Ceren Özselçuk is Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology of Bogaziçi University, Istanbul, “Enjoyment as an economic factor: Reading Marx with Lacan” http://www.communityeconomies.org/site/assets/media/yahyamadra/Subjectivityv2b.pdf

In our Lacanian inflected reading of class antagonism, our entry point follows Zizek’s statement (1989, p. 126, 1990, p. 251, 1998, p. 81) that “there is no class relation” (echoing Lacan’s famous formula “there is no sexual relationship”). Accordingly, we read concrete class formations of the production and division of surplus labor as institutionally materialized attempts to constitute a semblance of relationship. Just as Lacan reads particular gendered constructions (e.g., “courtly love”) as attempts at “making up for the absence [the constitutive impossibility] of sexual relationship” (Lacan, 1998 [1975], p. 69), one can read particular class formations and identifications as defense formations that aim at stabilizing 19 and resolving the problem of subject’s desire, in this case, as it pertains to the question of how to produce, appropriate and distribute the social surplus. Nevertheless, **such stabilization can never be accomplished**. And this is not only due to the structure of fantasy which perpetuates desire by providing rationalizations that put off the (impossible) completion of the social and the settling of class antagonism: substituting one failed fantasy formation (qua class identifications) for another, subjects can continue to sustain their desire for the best class arrangement **at the cost of remaining trapped within a circuit of dissatisfaction**. What is really unsettling, however, is not this unquenchable desire but rather the jouissance experienced by the subject. In fact, **the desire for the unattainable completion can be regarded as the vain attempt to domesticate and regulate subject’s relation to jouissance.** Jouissance, as “the bit of non-being at the subject’s core,” (Copjec, 2002, p. 7) as the enjoyment of drives, satisfies itself only too well and in complete defiance to any notion of the subject that can remotely be associated with consciousness, control and mastery. **Because the subject is a relation to jouissance, and not the bedrock of rational calculation or conscious being, it cannot be unified and unifiable around some intentional interest or reason.** To return to our original question regarding the nature of the limit of the social, we can say that jouissance stands for this limit. It is the ineradicable ambiguity that suffuses the social: while jouissance accounts for the ways in which institutions are preserved and class identifications take hold of subjectivity and “stick,” at the same time, the psychoanalytical experience strongly indicates jouissance itself does not “stick.” That is, **while economic institutions and discourses try to administer and domesticate enjoyment, they always fail since it is impossible to balance out, apportion, or stitch together enjoyment**. This emphasis on the excessive and unstable nature of jouissance negates any form of reproductionism in which the practices of **consumption, production and distribution are glued snugly together in a systemic cycle of social equilibrium and crisis.** A series of articles have unpacked this particular understanding of class antagonism as the very impossibility of maintaining a stable and unambiguous class relationship, and argued that class relations fail in two different ways (Özselçuk and Madra, 2005, 2007). The masculine logic of exception fails to be complete since it constitutes a whole within a field de-limited by an exception. The feminine logic, in contrast, fails to constitute a consistent whole because it refuses to posit an exception (Lacan, 1998 [1975], Copjec, 1994). Another way to approach this division is through Jason Glynos’ useful differentiation between the ideological mode of being, which is associated with closure, and the ethical mode of being, which is associated with openness: While the former has a ‘logic’, more specifically a fantasmatic logic, which grips through transgression and guilt, the latter escapes attempts at capture—indeed, it appears to entail the dissolution of such a logic. Instead, it is characterized by an alternative ethos which signals a commitment to recognizing and exploring the possibilities of the new in contingent encounters. (2008, p. 291) In what ways can we substantiate the libidinal dimension of this fantasmatic and masculine logic of failing to institute class? Turning once again to Marx provides us with some clues. When Marx wrote about different exploitative class formations, he always constructed a chain of equivalence among wage-labor, slave-labor, and serf-labor. For instance, he always used the loaded term “wage-slavery” to indicate a formal similarity among different exploitative class formations. What is this formal similarity? Each exploitative class structure constitutes an unstable and dynamic social field delimited by an exceptional X, an entity 21 (whether it be filled by the figure of a Lord, a Slave Master, or the Board of Directors) that has the exclusive right to appropriate the surplus of its immediate performers. In order to explicate the exceptional status of the X, let us consider the case of capitalist exploitation. For Marx, the capitalist corporation constitutes an all around an exceptional X, a legal fiction that gets “something for nothing.” This exception to the rule of the exchange of equivalents that supposedly governs the capitalist market economy is very much akin to the masculine fantasy of the primordial father who had access to another kind of jouissance, a non-castrated jouissance. To appreciate this point about “something for nothing,” it is necessary to recall that, according to the Marxian account of class payments, the Board of Directors is paid twice: first when Board members appropriate the entire surplus value, and then second, when they (handsomely) remunerate themselves from the surplus value that they just appropriated for doing the job of appropriating surplus value! While the second class payment does indeed constitute “something for something,” and therefore could be conceived to fall under the rule of the exchange of equivalents, the first class payment, the moment of appropriation, constitutes “something for nothing” (Resnick and Wolff, 1987). Therefore, the Board of Directors of a corporation as the appropriator of the surplus value is a legal fiction necessary for the constitution of the capitalist corporation as an all: “all individuals really active in the production from the manager down to the lowest daylabourer” (Marx, 1991, p. 568, emphasis added) have to perform “something” to receive “something”—except for the Board of Directors. We should perhaps stress that the exception that constitutes the capitalist-all is a position that can be maintained through the conjuring up of various ideological semblances, including, but certainly not exclusive to, the legal fiction of the Board of Directors. **The ideology of** 22 **economic growth**, for instance, **as the unchanging answer of classical political economy, neoclassical economics, and late neoclassical economics to their constitutive and shared problematic of how to reconcile rational choice and social harmony, seems to be a prominent example**. Another example is the classical figure of Entrepreneur as an innovator who can take risks like no other, who can be creative and imaginative, who creates jobs by undertaking investment under uncertainty, and who will be the engine of economic growth and efficiency, but who also would know when it is “necessary” to downsize and take away the benefits that s/he has bestowed upon the public. To once again paraphrase Lacan, **the Entrepreneur as such does not exist**. Nevertheless, the Entrepreneur is a fiction with material effects in that it provides a fantasy frame for economic subjects through which the booms and busts of the circuit of capital are explained as the outcome of his/her decisions to invest or not. From a Marxian perspective, it is not difficult to identify that the unquestionable status of this exception is a mere imposture for the classical entrepreneur has long become a marginal figure within the capitalist system. Under contemporary capitalism, innovation, risk management, and investment are all thoroughly socialized processes undertaken by complex institutional dispositifs. Nonetheless, the myth of the Entrepreneur is hardly displaced. If anything, under neoliberalism, the super-egoic injunction to strive under the ideal of the Entrepreneur has become even more pernicious: it has taken a new shape that announces everyone is at this point an entrepreneur! From women’s labor allocation between the household and the market to their participation in micro-credit schemes, from skill update training to search for self-employment, every decision is submitted to the demand of entrepreneurial individuation. 7 **The amplified guilt of not being able to measure up under the** 23 **pervasive influence of the entrepreneurial injunction constitutes a central aspect of the masculine libidinal economy of neoliberal capitalism.** Yet what is more interesting is the particular ways in which jouissance can be organized under the entrepreneurial injunction. On the one hand, Entrepreneur as an exception can serve as a threshold that sets off a movement of identification with the Other, more precisely, with the desire of the Other. On the other hand, in so far as the desire of the Other is affixed to an impossible, an “absolute jouissance” to which all attempts at accessing is bound to remain deficient, **this desire economy gives way to a masochistic enjoyment**. It is also in this light that we can perhaps uncover a previously unnoticed psychic dimension to the way in which pleas for market regulation start to be heard and find resonance in public. Could this be because regulation through expert knowledge, and the delegation of some part of the entrepreneurial decision thereof, offers some respite from the unbearable suffering under guilt? In the next section, we further illustrate such vicissitudes of jouissance by way of an exemplary analysis of the latest crisis of US capitalism.

**?????**

Jeanne L. **Schroeder 2k** Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University,THE ECONOMICS OF RACE AND GENDER: Rationality in Law and Economics Scholarship 79 Or. L. Rev. 147

5. The objet petit a Perhaps Lacan's greatest insight, and the one most relevant to economics, is that intersubjective relations get played out through object relations. n321 Indeed, Lacan considered the objet petit a to be his most important contribution to psychoanalytic theory. Unfortunately, the term usually appears in French because this is one of the few cases in which the connotations of the French term can not be translated into our closely related language. n322 [\*244] What is the objet petit a, and what does it mean to say that it functions as a little other? According to psychoanalysis, human desire is the desire for completion, wholeness, the cure of castration, either through the attainment of the lost object of desire or merger back into the real - the destruction of our own subjectivity in the ecstasy of oblivion. Our love that creates our desire, and the desire that inflames our love, is intersubjective recognition in the symbolic order. It is impossible to achieve our desire within the symbolic order - castration and desire are necessary for subjectivity. We can never know the answer to the question Che Voui? (How can I make you love me?) because love can never be demanded from, but only given to, others. The subject is, therefore, in a constant state of frustration. Hence, the subject resorts to fantasy in the vain hope of finding a means to achieve satisfaction. Because the subject desires, she retroactively hypothesizes that there must be a cause of her desire - there must be some "thing" or "object" that she wants. If she obtained this "thing," she would no longer desire. Therefore, she searches for this mysterious object that can serve as the cause of her desire. This object, the objet petit a, will serve as the specific other - the little other - that will answer her questions of desire. Note why this is a fantasy. What we really desire is impossible - wholeness. In fact, wholeness is not a lost something that we once had. Wholeness is, instead, an ideal that we retroactively reconstruct to serve as a contrast to the fact of our incompleteness. The phallus is not just lost, it never existed and never will exist. We create the fantasy of the objet petit a because we desire, but we tell ourselves we desire because of the objet petit a. Consequently, the objet petit a is the "object cause of desire." n323 This is not because it actually causes our desire, rather, we act as though it must be the cause of our desire. The objet petit a is an abduction of the "just so" story - a retroactive attempt to explain what has gone before. The object cause of desire follows, rather than precedes, our desire. Anything perceived as external to our subjectivity can serve as [\*245] an objet petit a. An objet petit a can be a specific other person, but it can also be an attribute - such as a breast, or a foot, to give common examples. But it does not have to be a conventionally "sexual" object, or even an object of pleasure. It must merely serve as a retroactive explanation of our emotion; it is whatever seems to set the chain of desire into motion. Proust's madelaine, supposedly producing the chain of memories that became The Memory of Times Past, is an excellent example of a little other at work. The object does not even have to be a physical object at all. Two common little others identified by Lacan are the voice and the gaze. n324 The fact that the objet petit a is a substitute for our true desire means, of course, that it is, once again, in a constant state of flux. The objet petit a only functions if it is kept at a distance. The moment a subject obtains a specific object identified as her petit a, it becomes obvious that her desire is not satisfied - she is still, by definition, a split subject. She must then immediately find another object to fill this role. A wonderful, if extreme example, is the behavior of Don Juan, as described in Leporello's Catalogue aria from Don Giovanni. The Don had thousands of lovers. n325 He truly loved each woman as the object cause of her desire, until he possessed her, at which moment his desire immediately turned to another woman. His true desire was, of course, for Woman - the abstract concept of the Feminine as lost object of desire; wholeness understood as union with the maternal. Each actual woman was only a petit a, a temporary substitute for this impossible ideal. The concept of the objet petit a holds out a possible explanation for a number of economic conundrums we have encountered. First, it is, once again, a fuller account of the Becker-Stigler assertion that tastes are indeed stable and universal despite the overwhelming evidence of fickle and idiosyncratic tastes evidenced in specific market decisions. To recap, Becker and Stigler posit that actual objects purchased in the market are mere commodities, or things that contingently serve as means to satisfy [\*246] the more abstract taste for universal recognitions. This may explain why changes in fashion are consistent with stable tastes, but does not explain why fashions change. That is, consistency of fashion is equally consistent with their notion of stable tastes. In contrast, the Lacanian account is an explanation of change itself. The true desire of normal neurotic subjects is indeed stable and universal. Indeed, desire is so universal that it can never be satisfied. Nevertheless, the subject who seeks to satisfy her desire constantly identifies objets petit a to serve as what Becker and Stigler call "commodities" or means to achieve her true desire. But, psychoanalysis goes further and explains why every commodity - every petit a - while always serving the function of explaining desire, always also fails in its function of satisfying desire. As soon as a petit a is attained - as soon as a commodity is acquired in the market place - it becomes inadequate to its task precisely because the objet petit a is only a proxy for our true object of desire (wholeness). n326 The Lacanian account also explains the apparent paradox of the economic notion of utility. If economic subjects are rational utility maximizers who seek to increase their utility with each exchange, why aren't we constantly ratcheting up and becoming happier over time? Lacan agrees with economists that subjects do in fact frequently seek to satisfy their desires, and even has an account for why this is true. But he also explains why they do not, in fact, ever get closer to their desire through acquisitive behavior. Utility maximization is necessarily a run on a hamster wheel - a frenetic race that ends where it begins.

**…???????**

Jeanne L. **Schroeder 98** Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University,COMMENTARY: THE END OF THE MARKET: A PSYCHOANALYSIS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 112 Harv. L. Rev. 483

I suggest that this embarrassed reticence relates to the essentially erotic nature of markets. Confronting what I have called the erotic origins of market theory causes us to blush with the same shame we feel when forced to consider our own erotic origins in the parental marriage bed. In both cases, we fear to gaze into the abyss. Why?

I believe the answer lies in the psychoanalytic nature of the perfect market. **The ideal of the perfect market is located in the Real, while actual markets are located in the intersubjective order of the "Symbolic**." **The perfect market is therefore the death of the actual market.** [\*516] The perfect market is an extraordinary world with no differentiation, no time, no space, no desire, no exchange, no objects - no subjectivity. Consequently, we cannot bear to contemplate the ideal of the perfect market directly, even as we cannot resist our desire for it. Instead, **we erect in the "Imaginary" unthreatening fantasy images of the market that seem more satisfying than actual markets, yet less terrifying than perfect markets**. Indeed, **being Real and neither Imaginary nor Symbolic, the perfect market is not merely impossible, it is literally unimaginable and unspeakable**.

In order to continue to create, we must follow our desire. Yet we will lose the object of desire if we try to confront the fantasies we erect to stand in its place, as Orpheus found out when he tried to embrace Eurydice. Moreover, if we were actually to achieve our desire, we would lose not only our desire, but also our very existence as free subjects, as Orpheus and Lot's wife learned when they achieved jouissance.

Consequently, for the ideal of the perfect market to function, two things are necessary. First, its contours must be repressed and replaced with a fantasy image. Second, desire must always be postponed. The ideal of the perfect market can never be achieved because to do so would destroy the actual market and our freedom. We dare not give way to our desire. What I am suggesting is that scholars may resist confronting their own ideal of the perfect market because they unconsciously fear that if they do so, they will have to abandon their fantasy structure. I argue that a close examination of the "perfect market" reveals that it is not merely empirically, but also theoretically, impossible. As such, it is not merely a poor tool for the study of actual markets - it may also impede that study.

**?????????????????**

Jeanne L. **Schroeder 98** Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University,COMMENTARY: THE END OF THE MARKET: A PSYCHOANALYSIS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 112 Harv. L. Rev. 483

2. The Abyss. -

Let us now dare to gaze into the abyss of the perfect market that we would create if we could eliminate transaction costs; let us confront the Real we desire to achieve by curing Castration. It turns out that each seemingly distinct transaction cost is merely a different aspect of a single category of cost. This cost is the mediation and separation that permit the creation of subjectivity. Cas [\*551] tration creates the space, the radical negativity, that enables freedom to function. This radical freedom is, in Hegelian-Lacanian theory, the Feminine. By trying to identify and eliminate transaction costs, therefore, we are like Orpheus and Lot's wife - we seek to capture the moment of feminine jouissance. As their stories show, the fundamental human condition is ironic. Paradoxically, according to Lacan, it is Castration that creates the Feminine - it is only the realization that we are not whole, that all relationships are mediated and that we are constrained by the Symbolic order that enables humans to create the ideal of perfection, wholeness, immediate relationship, and absolute freedom. The moment we achieve our desire and join with the Feminine, we destroy ourselves. If we were to capture the Feminine moment by eliminating transaction costs (understood as the mediation that allows desire) and achieve the immediate relation of the perfect market, we would destroy not only actual markets, but also our subjectivity and freedom. To be true to our desire is to postpone it. To give way to our desire is to end it. If the perfect market is the end (ideal) of actual markets, then the perfect market must be the end (death) of actual markets.

In the perfect market, there is no distinction among subjects. Information is not merely perfect, but also complete - "free, complete, instantaneous, and universally available." n237 If the ability to use strategic behavior impedes reallocations, then strategic behavior is a transaction cost that by definition cannot exist in the perfect market. Consequently, there can be no secrets in the perfect market; there can be no differences in position. Each individual has perfect understanding not only of her own thoughts, dreams, desires, and intentions, but also of those of every other person in the market. It is as though there were only one mind, one individual, in the universe. As Cooter points out, the type of disclosure and certification of intent required by the perfect market destroys a player's freedom. n238 Without individuality, freedom, and the unconscious, there is no subjectivity. There is no reason to speak because everything has already been said. But more importantly, there is no one left to speak.

Intersubjective relations require a fundamental separation from, and even ignorance of, the Other. According to both Hegel and Lacan, the intersubjective recognition that creates subjectivity always requires a mediating object of desire. n239 In the words of Slavoj <brev Z>i<brev z>ek:

We can recognize the other, acknowledge him as person, only in so far as, in a radical sense, he remains unknown to us - recognition implies the absence of cognition. A neighbour totally transparent and disclosed is no more a "person", we no longer relate to him as to another person: intersub [\*552] jectivity is founded upon the fact that the other is phenomenologically experienced as an "unknown quantity", as a bottomless abyss which we can never fathom. n240

But it is precisely this separation and ignorance that cannot exist in the perfect market. Consequently, no one can recognize anyone else as a person in the perfect market. If, as Hegel and Lacan insist, subjectivity and interrelationship require mutual recognition, there can be no individual subjectivity in the perfect market.

The perfect market is perfectly unfree. Because all legal rights must be clear and unambiguous, there is no room for the creation of legal rights. Because every member of the market polices and monitors every other member, the market is perfectly coercive. All information is public. Consequently, not only the public-private distinction essential to classical liberalism, but also the private individuality necessary for differentiation among, and recognition by, other persons disappears. If everyone has perfect information about everyone else, then there can be no surprises in the perfect market. In the perfect market, all participants are perfectly rational. Each participant must singlemindedly seek her own self-interest, however she conceives it. She must use any and all means to achieve her ends and therefore come to her end. In order not to give ground with respect to her desire, she must eventually stop procrastinating, give way to her desire, and achieve jouissance. Thus, all action must be preordained. Similarly, the rigid definition of rationality adopted by the Coase Theorem requires that human behavior be as "rigorously deterministic as a multiplication table." n241 Without freedom, there can be no individuality, no subjectivity.

In the perfect market, there can be no distinctions among objects. Product differentiation is an imperfection by definition. n242 At the efficient price, all objects are perfect substitutes for all other objects. The fact that there are no differentiated mediating objects for persons to use to individuate themselves implies that there can be no subjectivity in the perfect market.

 [\*553] In a perfect market, there are no transactions, no movement, no market intercourse. According to Coasean analysis, the initial legal regime is irrelevant only if all misallocations (that is, inefficient allocations) of entitlements can be costlessly corrected. In other words, mistakes must be corrected instantaneously. Consequently, in the perfect market, there are no actual market transactions, because all resources will have always already flowed to the highest valuing user. Moreover, actual markets depend on information being imperfect - "costly, partial, and deliberately restricted in its availability." n243 If, by definition, all entitlements have always already flowed to the highest valuing user in the perfect market, then the exchange price of all entitlements equals the use value to all users. The economic theory of marginalism holds that, in the perfect market, exchange will continue until all subjects become perfectly indifferent to all objects. There is, therefore, no desire. Without desire, there is no exchange.

Once the perfect market is achieved, all markets stop. This was one of Coase's insights. Markets exist only as a means of eliminating transaction costs. n244 When transaction costs are eliminated, markets are also necessarily eliminated. n245 "In such a world the institutions which make up the economic system have neither substance nor purpose." n246

Moreover, from a Hegelian viewpoint, the elimination of markets results in the destruction of the legal subjectivity that is necessary for the actualization of our freedom in the modern liberal representative democratic state. As I have written extensively elsewhere, and briefly described above, n247 according to Hegelian philosophy, personality is created through erotic interrelationships of mutual recognition by means of the exchange of a mediating object. The most basic of such erotic interrelationships is that of the abstract right - property, contract, and the market. These cannot exist without differentiation, separation, and mediation - without transaction costs. Personality is created through desire, but in the perfect market, all desires are always already fulfilled. Once again, Coase intuited this result:

I showed in "The Nature of the Firm" that, in the absence of transaction costs, there is no economic basis for the existence of the firm... It does not matter what the law is... In such a world the institutions which make up the economic system have neither substance nor purpose... If transaction costs are zero, "the assumption of private property rights can be dropped ...." n248

 [\*554] Finally, in the perfect market there is no time or space: the universe collapses back to the primordial unity that existed before the big bang. Kant teaches us that this fact means that once the perfect market is achieved, there can be no thought, no consciousness. According to Kant's science of the transcendental aesthetic, the most basic mental function underlying thought is sensuous intuition. n249 The two pure forms of sensuous intuitions are space and time. n250 Space is not a conception that we derive from experience. n251 Nor is time an empirical conception. n252 Rather, space and time are a priori intuitions that conscious beings need to presuppose in order to understand external objects (space), n253 change, and motion (time). n254 As Kant notes, "space does not represent any property of objects as things in themselves." n255 Similarly, time does not "subsist[] of itself, or ... inhere[] in things as an objective determination ... Time is ... merely a subjective condition of our (human) intuition ... and in itself, independently of the mind or subject, is nothing." n256 In other words, time and space are the ways humans organize their understanding of the world. They are the "two sources of knowledge" that "make synthetical propositions a priori possible." n257 They are the "conditions of our sensibility." n258

It follows from the propositions that sensible intuition is the most basic element of thought and that time and space are the pure forms of sensible intuition, that to do away with time and space is equivalent to doing away with the possibility of thought. This finding is, of course, Lacan's conclusion. The Real - the elimination of all distinctions in [\*555] cluding time and space - is the destruction of subjectivity and consciousness.

And so, just as Lacan theorized that subjectivity is created through Castration, subjectivity also requires the existence of transaction costs. Subjectivity requires that desire be repressed, that the psyche be divided between the conscious and subconscious - conditions inconsistent with the requirements of perfect information and economic rationality. Subjectivity requires distinction and separation - conditions inconsistent with the requirements of indifference. Subjectivity requires time and space.

Consequently, the perfect market is not merely the destruction of actual markets. It is the destruction of freedom, subjectivity, and consciousness. There is no exchange in the perfect market not merely because there is nothing left to exchange, but also because no one exists who can exchange.

The perfect market is pure, immediate relationship where all distinctions of time and space, and between subject and subject, subject and object, and desire and fulfillment, are merged and obliterated. It is therefore Real, not Imaginary or Symbolic. It is not merely impossible; it is by definition unimaginable and unspeakable. n259

Thus, we cannot bear to confront the perfect market or describe it in law and language. And yet, paradoxically, law and economics scholars cannot escape this fixation. They are driven by this desire. Coase, perhaps intuiting that it is fantasy that drives Eros, warns us not to look too closely at the model. He declares that "it would not seem worthwhile to spend much time investigating the properties of such a world." n260 He is particularly upset because his fame lies almost entirely on his formulation of the Coase Theorem, a "world of zero transaction costs ... remote from the real world." n261 Economists are seduced by the beauty of the perfect market. n262

 [\*556] This lapse is, perhaps, inevitable. It is precisely the feeling of Castration that makes us imagine and desire the perfect wholeness of the Real. Similarly, the recognition of the concept of transaction costs causes us to speculate about and desire the perfect market.

**!??!?!?!?!?!?!?**

Jeanne L. **Schroeder 98** Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University,COMMENTARY: THE END OF THE MARKET: A PSYCHOANALYSIS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 112 Harv. L. Rev. 483

B. Making the Impossible Possible

The postmodernist subject must learn the artifice of surviving the experience of a radical Limit, of circulating around the lethal abyss without being swallowed up by it ... Is not Lacan's entire theoretical edifice torn between these two options: between the ethics of desire/Law, of maintaining the gap, and the lethal/suicidal immersion in the Thing? Slavoj <brev Z>i<brev z>ek n263 We have seen that despite the obsession with the perfect market, few other than Coase have been able fully to internalize the logical implications of its assumptions. They cannot bear to gaze into the Real. To achieve the perfect market is jouissance, the transgression of the market, law, and language. To achieve the perfect market would be to regress back to the state before the birth of subjectivity. **The perfect market is death**. David Gray Carlson has come to a similar conclusion by deconstructing price theory. Markets require imperfection. The perfect market, therefore: spells the death of price theory qua theory, a death foretold in the etymology of the word "economy," derived as it is from oikos (household), which is akin to oikesis (tomb). The real economy in microeconomics, then, is an economy of death... a tomb, incidentally, that is memorialized on the back of every dollar bill turned out by the United States Treasury Department. n264 Carlson sees price theory as logocentric - a philosophy of presence "whose will to power works to exclude the trace of its origin in death." n265 But Carlson's analysis, based on Derridean philosophy, is only partial.

We do not exclude the trace merely because it stands for death. Lacanian psychoanalysis reveals that the perfect market is not merely [\*557] the death of economics, it is its desire - its Thanatos. It is only desire that makes us human, enables us to love and to create, and that drives the economy on. Consequently, we repress the object of desire and postpone the moment of consummation of our desire in jouissance not because we desire but just so we may desire. Psychoanalysis teaches us that repression does not exclude the object it expels. It preserves it. What is repressed in the Symbolic always returns in the Real. n266 By repressing the perfect market, we make it serve as the object of desire. n267

Lacanian psychoanalysis holds that the entire Symbolic order, including language, law, and the market, is a fiction - a human creation. Being a fiction, it only works if the fiction is maintained. n268 **If we give in to the Masculine desire of Eros and confront the fantasy image we have made, we will destroy the fantasy**. **If we give in to the Feminine desire of Thanatos, we confront death face to face**. And the only way to achieve the Feminine desire of Thanatos is by dying. Consequently, in order for desire to function, it must be prohibited.

Prohibition, however, is alchemy. The Real, and the Feminine, are the impossible. Indeed, they do not exist. Once we forbid them, however, we create the sense of their possibility. n269 Why forbid what can't be done? What had been mourned as the always already lost is now anticipated as the not yet found. **We live our lives not merely in the hope but in the confidence that the Real, the Feminine, radical freedom, and perfect immediate sexual relationships can yet be attained. In this way, we make our own freedom**. n270

Similarly, it is necessary in order for the market economy to function that it be a means to an end. The means will end if and when it achieves its ends. Accordingly, **if we dream the ideal end of the perfect market, we must repress and postpone the end of that dream**. We must never give ground relative to our desire, but **we are lost as soon as we give way to our desire.**

What does my analysis mean for law and economics? Although the Real (the perfect market) might be an ideal necessary to the function of the Symbolic (the actual market), the Symbolic, by definition, can never be the same as the Real. Moreover, because the perfect market, [\*558] being Real, literally cannot be described in the Symbolic or pictured in the Imaginary, attempts to develop models based on what would happen in a hypothetical perfect market can only be fantasies in the technical sense of the term (that is, Imaginary substitutes for one's true desire). Insofar as law and economics scholars wish to formulate policy recommendations for actual Symbolic markets, they should heed Coase's call not to give way to their desire for the Real and not to formulate Imaginary substitutions for this ideal.

Transaction costs can no more be eliminated than any other costs; they are the limits of our mortality. The Real is impossible to achieve. The theory of the second best tells us that one will not necessarily get any closer to the ideal by eliminating or reducing any one transaction cost. **Castration cannot be cured bit by bit**. Moreover, the Real cannot be captured in the Symbolic of language or the Imaginary of picture thinking. The Real is not merely impossible to achieve as a practical matter. It is logically impossible in the sense that it is the order of intractable paradoxes. The perfect market is an unimaginable and unspeakable world of the living dead without time, space, or subjectivity. **Any attempt to create legal rules that mimic the perfect market are doomed because we can never know the true contours of the ideal to be mimicked.** Attempts by law and economics scholars to describe what would occur if transaction costs could be eliminated can only be fantasies in the technical sense of that term. They are not descriptions of the Real of the perfect market but comforting Imaginary substitutes erected to stand in its place.

What we can do, as Coase pleads, is study actual costs and actual behavior in actual markets on their own terms. n271 Even if one continues to retain the impossible ideal of the perfect market as an explanatory or predictive model of economic activity, when legal economists attempt to make policy recommendations we must set realistic goals based on contingent, empirical judgments regarding the relative efficiency of possible actual market choices.

**What in the world???**

Jeanne L. **Schroeder 98** Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University,COMMENTARY: THE END OF THE MARKET: A PSYCHOANALYSIS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 112 Harv. L. Rev. 483

This brief explanation helps us to understand why we simultaneously desire, but cannot bear to confront, the Real. The Masculine desire of Eros is built on a fantasy - the lie that our desire is caused by an obtainable Imaginary object. **It is the delusion that we can remain located in the Symbolic order without being Castrated**. Because that which is lost in Castration - the Feminine - is that which, by definition, is in the Real, the Feminine cannot, in fact, be captured in words or images. Any and all positive conceptions of "the feminine" must, by necessity, be fantasy images which stand in for the Feminine. n89 (I refer to such fantasy images as "femininity.")

Similarly, in market relations we erect actual, seemingly Real objects to stand in for the object lost through Castration. Such substitutions constitute a fantasy that, if we can just obtain that desired object, then we will be complete. n90 And so we act as though it were [\*510] really that wedding ring, big new house, fancy sports car, or whatever that will make us happy. **Because this is a fantasy, it cannot bear close scrutiny**. If we were to examine our fantasy, **we would realize that we have been chasing only a phantasm, and not our true desire**. If we were to turn around to look directly at our fantasy, as Orpheus turned to look at Eurydice, we would lose sight of it, and the fantasy would come to an end. We can see the Real only if "eyed awry." n91 Eros can function only insofar as we keep up pretenses.

Nevertheless, Lacan posits that when we take on the Feminine sexuated position, we are sometimes able to glimpse the Real in an experience Lacan called Feminine jouissance - enjoyment, orgasm, ecstasy. n92 Despite the name, however, "enjoyment" is not enjoyable in the conventional sense of the word. To achieve the Real is to leave the Symbolic and, therefore, to lose one's own personality. Jouissance is the hope of wholeness in the sense of ecstatic union with the Feminine as the Phallic Mother (that is, becoming one with the universe). But when we actually confront the Real, we see that it results in the obliteration of self. Consequently, jouissance is also the gut-wrenching horror of staring into the abyss. n93 The abyss is uniquely horrifying because jouissance is also the realization that this nothingness is the very center of our soul.

Like the Masculine desire of Eros, the Feminine desire of Thanatos must always be postponed, but for a different reason. To achieve the Real is to be torn limb from limb by the ecstatic Feminine personified in the Orpheus myth as the Maenads. As with Eros, we must avoid looking too closely at Thanatos, but for a different reason. We are afraid to look at Eros because he is Imaginary, he is not real enough. We are terrified to look at Thanatos because she is all too Real. **The ultimate reality is death**.

And yet, we are like children at a scary movie. **Although we cover our eyes, we can never resist the guilty pleasure of peeking through our fingers in order to confront our fears and gaze into the abyss**. As Lacanian philosopher Slavoj Zizek says, "the trouble with jouissance is not that it is unattainable, that it always eludes our grasp, but, rather, **that one can never get rid of it**." n94

 [\*511] In a series of articles and a book, I have illustrated how these fantasy images play out in property law theory and doctrine. n95 Because we are unsatisfied with the artificiality and necessary incompleteness of the Symbolic order of law and because we wish to attain the wholeness of the Real, in the order of the legal Imaginary we try to substitute seemingly Real (but actually Imaginary) concepts for Symbolic ones. Because property, like sexuality, is Phallic in nature, we have a strong tendency to use the same anatomic metaphors in both. The Masculine position of having the Phallus is conflated with the anatomical fact that men have penises, and the Feminine position of being the Phallus is conflated with anatomical femaleness. Correspondingly, we have a strong tendency to describe property in terms of implicit imagery of the male organ and the female body. When we use the former metaphor, property is seen as that which is physically held and shown, possessed and exchanged. Loss of property is thought of in terms of anatomic castration in the sense of a physical taking. We concentrate on the rights of possession and of alienation through exchange (contract), while repressing that of enjoyment. When we use the Feminine metaphor for property, property is seen as that which one identifies with, enters and enjoys, and protects. Loss of property is conflated with rape, violation, pollution, and loss of self.

Similarly, I suggest that the law and economics movement, which neither bases its policy suggestions on actual markets nor adequately comes to grips with its own ideal of the perfect market, is located in the Imaginary. **It is the weaving of a series of fantasy images in a vain attempt to reconcile the Symbolic with the Real.**

**Terms/FYI**

Jeanne L. **Schroeder 98** Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University,COMMENTARY: THE END OF THE MARKET: A PSYCHOANALYSIS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 112 Harv. L. Rev. 483

According to Lacan, there are three orders of the psyche, which he called the Real, the Imaginary, and the Symbolic. n52 The Imaginary is the realm of imagery, fantasy, meaning, and complementarity. The Symbolic is the cultural order of law and language, of signification and sexuality. The Real is our intuition that there is something beyond or prior to the other two. The Real is not the same as the natural world, n53 yet for many purposes the Real functions as though it were the natural world. This is because the Real includes our sense that there is a natural world external to our thoughts and dreams, something more permanent than our fleeting human lives. It is sometimes convenient to oversimplify and use the word "Real" as though it meant the natural or anatomical. The Real, however, also includes such concepts as death, the thing-in-itself, God (in the sense of Geist or the Absolute), and everything else that is beyond ourselves. n54 The Real is, therefore, the impossible - not just in the sense that it is impossible for us to have direct access to the Real in our conscious minds, but also because it necessarily includes logical paradoxes that [\*501] are beyond our ordinary intuitions of what is possible. n55 We experience the Real as though it were something we have lost. It functions as though it were the "hard kernel" n56 of reality that was left behind when we entered the orders of imagery and speech. This experience of the Real as "prior" to the other orders is not literally true, however. The Real is created simultaneously with the Imaginary and the Symbolic through the operation called "castration." n57 2. Castration. Lacan declares that the subject is split. n58 He, like Hegel, believes that subjectivity - the abilities to be a legal actor ca [\*502] pable of bearing rights and engaging in legal relations and to be a speaking, sexed person capable of engaging in social relations - can be created only by the social. Classical liberal philosophy and jurisprudence are, from a Hegelian perspective, internally inconsistent with respect to the concepts of individuality and rights. n59 All liberal philosophies start with some conception of the free autonomous individual in some mythical or hypothesized state of nature. Hegel agrees with the liberal proposition that freedom and the capacity for bearing rights are the most basic essences of human nature. n60 He thinks, however, that the autonomous individual posited by liberalism is too empty and frail a creature to engage in legal relations. As Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld n61 and Ronald Coase n62 would later understand, Hegel asserted that legal rights can be understood only as relationships between and among people. Similarly, language can be understood only in terms of society. Consequently, contrary to the claims of liberalism, the autonomous individual in the state of nature could neither speak nor bear legal rights. The freedom that is human potential can be actualized only through social relationships. n63 Hegel argues that because the abstract person posited by liberalism is driven to make his potential freedom actual, the person passionately desires to enter into social relations in order to achieve first, subjectiv [\*503] ity and then, higher states of human consciousness. n64 As I have already stated, one attains subjectivity when another free subject recognizes one as a subject. The abstract person in the state of nature has only his (or, more accurately, because the person is abstract, "its") potential freedom - its negativity. It, therefore, has no distinguishing characteristics that would make it recognizable. n65 To be recognized by other subjects and have relationships with others, therefore, the abstract person must form object relations (that is, take on specific recognizable characteristics). To Hegel, the regime of abstract right - property, contract, and the capitalist market - is the most primitive form of interrelationship from a logical perspective. n66 Note that I did not say this is so from a historical or biographical perspective - modern property rights and capitalistic markets are relatively modern inventions. n67 Although the market is the logically simplest and most primitive form of erotic relationship, it was one of the last of these relationships to develop as a historical matter. [\*504] The proposition that subjectivity can be achieved only through the social (that is, through law and language) creates a paradox. That which is most ourselves - our subjectivity, our freedom, our speech, our sexuality - is simultaneously that which is not ourselves, in the sense that it comes to us from the outside. n68 As we mature and are initiated into language and law, thereby acquiring sexuality, we first experience the sense that we have lost something that we can no longer explain in words or images. This sense that our wholeness is lost, and that this loss has been imposed upon us by something outside of us, is what Lacan calls "Castration." n69 That is, we can achieve subjectivity - be a speaking person or legal actor - only through others. We feel (incorrectly) that we must once have been whole and inviolate; we intuit that there was once an object that is now lost because "someone" has taken it away. Lacan calls this hypothesized object, which we feel must have been lost in Castration, the Phallus. This intentionally confusing and apparently masculinist terminology is designed to reflect the conflations of anatomy and the psyche made in our society. n70 This terminology can be troublesome to feminists. I believe that Lacan's insistence that there are two different sexuated positions the subject can take with respect to the Phallus necessarily implies that the masculine metaphor of Castration used to describe the "universal" sense of loss felt by all subjects is appropriate to the subject when he stands in the Masculine position. I have suggested that more appropriate metaphors for wholeness and loss, when experienced in the Feminine position, might be virginity and defloration, integrity and violation. n71 One of the guises of the Phallus is the Feminine. That is, the Masculine position is entirely circumscribed within the Symbolic order of [\*505] law, language, and sexuality. Lacan describes the formula of the Masculine: "All are subject to the symbolic order (the Phallus)." n72 The Feminine is, in contrast, exiled at least partially into the Real. The formula for the Feminine as the negation or denial of the Masculine can be stated as: "Not all are subject to the symbolic order." n73 A full account of the Masculine and Feminine positions is beyond the scope of this Commentary. It is sufficient for current purposes to emphasize that because adult subjects located in the regime of the Symbolic have a sense of loss (that is, Castration), we also feel that we must have once been whole. The Real is conceptualized as that which is beyond the Symbolic and Imaginary. We feel, wrongly, that whatever once made us whole must now be located in the Real. This theoretical account is reflected in our personal histories. Newborns do not seem to have an awareness of the distinction between their bodies and the external world. That is, they have little or no sense of "otherness." At some point in the first few months of life, infants start experiencing separation, in the sense that they become aware that they are not physically one with the world. n74 The first "other" that the baby recognizes is the primary caretaker - the person who fills the role that our society calls "mother." n75 This awareness of separation is the first step in the creation of the Imaginary and Symbolic orders (that is, the ability to envision and speak). From the fact that we were not aware of our separation from our mothers until we had entered the Imaginary and the Symbolic, we retroduce the false hypothesis that we must have in fact [\*506] been one with our mothers prior to that time. As a result, we feel that the Phallus (the wholeness that was lost through Castration) must have been unity with the ideal of the Feminine. n76 In other words, the purely neutral concepts of wholeness and loss become conflated with anatomical sexuality, as reflected in Lacan's intentionally confusing terminology. This conflation is why the ideal of the Feminine is sometimes known as the all-powerful Phallic Mother. n77 The Feminine as the Phallic Mother is, therefore, that which is located in the Real. 3. Fantasy and Sexuality. Although subjectivity (which can be created only through recognition in intersubjective relations) is created in the Symbolic, human beings are not satisfied with the Symbolic. The Symbolic is, by definition, not only artificial, but also incomplete. We long for the impossible wholeness of the Real. In an attempt to achieve that which cannot be achieved in the Symbolic, we turn to the Imaginary. In the Imaginary we erect seemingly attainable fantasy images to stand in as substitutes for our true object of desire. n78 These fantasy objects of desire are invented to serve retroactively as though they were the cause of our desire. In fact, we desire because we are not, and can never be, whole, because desire is the longing to be whole. Because we can never become whole in the Symbolic order, we sublimate our true desire. We try to pretend that the reason we desire is because there is some "thing" that we want - that some attainable "desirable" object is causing our desire. This seems comforting because each person can then say to him or herself, "If I could just possess that beautiful woman's body; have a man's organ or, lacking that, his child; make partner; get tenure; get a job at a more prestigious law firm; or whatever; then my desire would be fulfilled and I would finally be happy." Among other things, this leads to the conflation of the psychic desire for recognition (Eros) with the biological urge to mate. These fantasy identifications create sexuality and enable markets to operate. According to Hegel, we take on object relations in property and contract as a means of achieving our true desire - actualization of our freedom through recognition as subjects by others. n79 The market is a [\*507] means to the end of intersubjectivity. However, Lacan would argue that this process can never be satisfying because our desire must always be postponed and relationships must always be mediated. n80 Consequently, when we engage in actual market relations, we often repress our true desire for market relations and act as though we desire the objects of market relations. We imagine that our intersubjective relations are the means to the ends of object relations, rather than the other way around. n81 How does this abstract process of achieving subjectivity through recognition relate to sexuality? Psychoanalytic sexuality consists of various strategies that subjects can employ with respect to Castration. For reasons that are beyond the scope of this Commentary, the Masculine is the position of having and exchanging the Phallus, whereas the Feminine is that of being and enjoying the Phallus. n82 These two sexual positions are, of course, not literally true. Castration is universal. No one, Masculine or Feminine, has the Phallus and no one, Masculine or Feminine, can actually be it because it doesn't exist. Consequently, masculinity is not superior to femininity. Rather, the Masculine position can be seen as the cowardly position of denial and fantasy - it is the false claim or pretense that the Masculine subject has "it" when he doesn't. n83 The Masculine position corresponds to desire in the form of Eros - the fantasy that one can remain a subject in the Symbolic order yet attain wholeness by acquiring a perfect soul mate who will take the place of the lost Phallus. In the order of the Imaginary, we erect fantasy substitutes to stand in the place of the actual Real object of desire (the Phallus, the Feminine, wholeness, a perfect sexual relationship). In the Imaginary, we try to find natural (seemingly Real) analogues to stand in the place of the Symbolic concepts of sexuality. n84 In other words, in the Imaginary, we conflate sexuality with anatomy. n85 Con [\*508] sequently, we look for things that anatomic males have or can attain, and that anatomic females can be, to serve as metaphors for the Phallus. Specifically, the Phallus is conflated with the male organ (hence Lacan's terminology) and the female body. By wielding penises, and subordinating women, those who are in the Masculine position vainly pretend not to be Castrated. The subordination of women has often taken a literal form in traditional societies in which women are exchanged among men in marriage. n86 It also takes a more subtle form of the Imaginary ideal of an affirmative "femininity," which can be tamed and captured, as a substitute for the radical negativity of the Real Feminine, which cannot. n87 [\*509] The Feminine sexuated position, in contradistinction, is the acceptance of Castration - the understanding that a loss has occurred that cannot be cured, only mourned. The Feminine, therefore, is identified with Castration, with lack. n88 She is identified with that which is lost in the Real. The feminine position with respect to Castration corresponds to desire in the form of Thanatos. Thanatos can be thought of as the understanding that no external object of desire can heal the wound of Castration. Thanatos is based on the realization that wholeness can be achieved only if one can somehow retreat back to the pre-castrated state - to become one with the universe. To do so would be to lose individuality and subjectivity. It would be as though one had never been born; it would be as though one were dead. 4. Jouissance, Desire, and the Horror of the Real. This brief explanation helps us to understand why we simultaneously desire, but cannot bear to confront, the Real. The Masculine desire of Eros is built on a fantasy - the lie that our desire is caused by an obtainable Imaginary object. It is the delusion that we can remain located in the Symbolic order without being Castrated. Because that which is lost in Castration - the Feminine - is that which, by definition, is in the Real, the Feminine cannot, in fact, be captured in words or images. Any and all positive conceptions of "the feminine" must, by necessity, be fantasy images which stand in for the Feminine. n89 (I refer to such fantasy images as "femininity.") Similarly, in market relations we erect actual, seemingly Real objects to stand in for the object lost through Castration. Such substitutions constitute a fantasy that, if we can just obtain that desired object, then we will be complete. n90 And so we act as though it were [\*510] really that wedding ring, big new house, fancy sports car, or whatever that will make us happy. Because this is a fantasy, it cannot bear close scrutiny. If we were to examine our fantasy, we would realize that we have been chasing only a phantasm, and not our true desire. If we were to turn around to look directly at our fantasy, as Orpheus turned to look at Eurydice, we would lose sight of it, and the fantasy would come to an end. We can see the Real only if "eyed awry." n91 Eros can function only insofar as we keep up pretenses. Nevertheless, Lacan posits that when we take on the Feminine sexuated position, we are sometimes able to glimpse the Real in an experience Lacan called Feminine jouissance - enjoyment, orgasm, ecstasy. n92 Despite the name, however, "enjoyment" is not enjoyable in the conventional sense of the word. To achieve the Real is to leave the Symbolic and, therefore, to lose one's own personality. Jouissance is the hope of wholeness in the sense of ecstatic union with the Feminine as the Phallic Mother (that is, becoming one with the universe). But when we actually confront the Real, we see that it results in the obliteration of self. Consequently, jouissance is also the gut-wrenching horror of staring into the abyss. n93 The abyss is uniquely horrifying because jouissance is also the realization that this nothingness is the very center of our soul. Like the Masculine desire of Eros, the Feminine desire of Thanatos must always be postponed, but for a different reason. To achieve the Real is to be torn limb from limb by the ecstatic Feminine personified in the Orpheus myth as the Maenads. As with Eros, we must avoid looking too closely at Thanatos, but for a different reason. We are afraid to look at Eros because he is Imaginary, he is not real enough. We are terrified to look at Thanatos because she is all too Real. The ultimate reality is death. And yet, we are like children at a scary movie. Although we cover our eyes, we can never resist the guilty pleasure of peeking through our fingers in order to confront our fears and gaze into the abyss. As Lacanian philosopher Slavoj <brev Z>i<brev z>ek says, "the trouble with jouissance is not that it is unattainable, that it always eludes our grasp, but, rather, that one can never get rid of it." n94 [\*511] In a series of articles and a book, I have illustrated how these fantasy images play out in property law theory and doctrine. n95 Because we are unsatisfied with the artificiality and necessary incompleteness of the Symbolic order of law and because we wish to attain the wholeness of the Real, in the order of the legal Imaginary we try to substitute seemingly Real (but actually Imaginary) concepts for Symbolic ones. Because property, like sexuality, is Phallic in nature, we have a strong tendency to use the same anatomic metaphors in both. The Masculine position of having the Phallus is conflated with the anatomical fact that men have penises, and the Feminine position of being the Phallus is conflated with anatomical femaleness. Correspondingly, we have a strong tendency to describe property in terms of implicit imagery of the male organ and the female body. When we use the former metaphor, property is seen as that which is physically held and shown, possessed and exchanged. Loss of property is thought of in terms of anatomic castration in the sense of a physical taking. We concentrate on the rights of possession and of alienation through exchange (contract), while repressing that of enjoyment. When we use the Feminine metaphor for property, property is seen as that which one identifies with, enters and enjoys, and protects. Loss of property is conflated with rape, violation, pollution, and loss of self. Similarly, I suggest that the law and economics movement, which neither bases its policy suggestions on actual markets nor adequately comes to grips with its own ideal of the perfect market, is located in the Imaginary. It is the weaving of a series of fantasy images in a vain attempt to reconcile the Symbolic with the Real. 5. The Contours of the Real. What are the contours of the Real? By definition, we cannot explain the Real in words (the Symbolic) or depict it in pictures (the Imaginary). Rather, we must describe the Real in terms of what it is not. In this section, I shall discuss only one aspect of this highly complex and paradoxical - indeed impossible - concept. We, as subjects, now feel separate from other persons. We imagine that at one time we must have been complete in ourselves and one with the Other. The Real is the universe before the "big bang" that created subjectivity (that is, before Castration). It is the ideal of perfect union with no mediation or alienating distinctions of any type that could separate us from the ideal Mother. There is, therefore, no time in the Real because time separates yesterday from today and today from tomorrow. As was the case with the physical universe, time began only with the big bang of Castration. The Real is, therefore, an event that is simultaneously an instant and eternity. There can be no space in the Real because space separates [\*512] here from there. n96 There are no objects in the Real. Objects can be understood only in terms of that which is other than - different from - a subject. n97 But this requires that subject and object be separated. There can be no desire in the Real. Desire is the longing for wholeness. Because the Real is that which is already perfect and whole, there is nothing left to desire. In the Real, we are totally indifferent to everything because nothing is different from anything else. In other words, in the Symbolic, we are Castrated and violated. In the Real, we are intact, yet impotent; virgin, yet sterile. Most importantly, there is no subjectivity, no personality, no individuality in the Real. n98 To be a subject, I must be recognized by others. To be recognized, I must have at least one distinguishing characteristic. But a distinguishing characteristic, by definition, distinguishes and thereby separates me from others. This separation necessary for subjectivity is precisely that which does not exist in the Real. Another way of saying this is that, in order to claim to be a subject, I must understand myself as being at least minimally different from someone or something else. This requirement of differentiation requires me to withdraw from and expel the Other. In Lacan's terms, there are no sexual relations in the sense that all intersubjective relations are mediated. I must put space between me and the Other. As discussed, subjectivity requires such mediated intersubjective relations. To have perfect union - to achieve the Real - I must give up all distinctions. I must give up myself. I must lose my subjectivity. Without individuality and without desire, speech is not only unnecessary, but it is also impossible: there is no one to speak, no one to speak to, and nothing to speak about. As the Bible tells us: "In the beginning ... The earth was without form and void." n99 We can now understand that the Real - the jouissance of Thanatos - is not merely death (which might hold out the possibility of an afterlife, transmigration, or rebirth), but death beyond death, obliteration, Nirvana. We can achieve subjectivity only in the social realm of law, in the Symbolic. To Lacan, subjectivity includes the ability to speak and to have sexuality and consciousness. To leave the [\*513] Symbolic and (re)enter the Real would be to lose one's subjectivity, one's individual personality. Myth once again reflects psychoanalysis. The Bible tells us that when God decided to destroy Sodom and Gomorrah, He told Lot and his family to leave but warned them not to turn around and look back at their homes and loved ones. Lot's wife heard the sounds of destruction behind her and gave way to her desire. In her jouissance, she doubly turned - around and into a pillar of salt. n100 When Orpheus turned, he was driven by Eros. He sought to embrace the perfect wife of his dreams. When he faced the image he had constructed to serve as the object of desire, he merely lost this specific fantasy. His desire and his subjectivity remained. When Lot's wife turned, however, she was driven by Thanatos. She yearned to confront and return to her origins; she wanted to go home. By fulfilling her desire, she lost not merely her life, but also her self. She literally lost her subjectivity and became an inanimate object. Her very name, her individuality, was lost forever. n101 All we know about her is that she had been married to Lot. n102