Afghanistan Shared Neg – RRS

[\*\*\*Notes\*\*\* 3](#_Toc267414184)

[\*\*\*A2: Antiamericanism/terrorism\*\*\* 4](#_Toc267414185)

[\*\*\*A2: Heg\*\*\* 5](#_Toc267414186)

[Hegemony 1NC 5](#_Toc267414187)

[Hegemony 1NC 6](#_Toc267414188)

[Hegemony 1NC 7](#_Toc267414189)

[Withdrawal Bad – Heg 8](#_Toc267414190)

[Withdrawal Bad – Heg/Laundry List 9](#_Toc267414191)

[A2: Costs Internal Link 10](#_Toc267414192)

[A2: Costs Internal Link 11](#_Toc267414193)

[Ext - A2: Costs Internal Link 12](#_Toc267414194)

[Ext – Heg Alt Cause 13](#_Toc267414195)

[\*\*\*A2: Iran Coop Advantage\*\*\* 14](#_Toc267414196)

[Withdrawal Bad - Iran 14](#_Toc267414197)

[A2: US – Iran Coop 15](#_Toc267414198)

[A2: US – Iran Coop 16](#_Toc267414199)

[A2: US – Iran Coop 17](#_Toc267414200)

[A2: Drug Advantage 18](#_Toc267414201)

[A2: Drug Advantage 19](#_Toc267414202)

[A2: Iran Econ 20](#_Toc267414203)

[A2: Iran Econ 21](#_Toc267414204)

[A2: Iran Econ 22](#_Toc267414205)

[\*\*\*A2: Pakistan Coup\*\*\* 23](#_Toc267414206)

[Pakistan 1NC - Defense 23](#_Toc267414207)

[Pakistan 1NC - Defense 24](#_Toc267414208)

[Pakistan 1NC - Defense 25](#_Toc267414209)

[Ext – No Coup 26](#_Toc267414210)

[Ext – No Indo Pak War 27](#_Toc267414211)

[Pakistan 1NC - Offense 28](#_Toc267414212)

[Pakistan 1NC - Offense 29](#_Toc267414213)

[Pakistan 1NC - Offense 30](#_Toc267414214)

[Link Turn 2NC 31](#_Toc267414215)

[Instability Turn 2NC 32](#_Toc267414216)

[Instability Turn 2NC 33](#_Toc267414217)

[Instability Turn 2NC 34](#_Toc267414218)

[Instability Turn 2NC 35](#_Toc267414219)

[\*\*\*SCO Answers\*\*\* 36](#_Toc267414220)

[SCO-NATO 1NC 36](#_Toc267414221)

[SCO-NATO 1NC 37](#_Toc267414222)

[SCO-NATO 1NC 38](#_Toc267414223)

[Ext – Can’t Increase Co-op 39](#_Toc267414224)

[Ext – Co-op Fails 40](#_Toc267414225)

[Ext – Co-op Fails 41](#_Toc267414226)

[Ext – Arctic Takeout 42](#_Toc267414227)

[\*\*\*Solvency\*\*\* 43](#_Toc267414228)

[Troops Good – Afghan Stability 43](#_Toc267414229)

[Troops Good – Afghan Stability 44](#_Toc267414230)

[Troops Good – Afghan Stability 45](#_Toc267414231)

[A2: Reconciliation/Peace Deal 46](#_Toc267414232)

[A2: Reconciliation/Peace Deal 47](#_Toc267414233)

[Ext – Peace Deal Bad 48](#_Toc267414234)

[Afghan instability inevitable 49](#_Toc267414235)

[\*\*\*Disad Links\*\*\* 50](#_Toc267414236)

[CMR Link 50](#_Toc267414237)

[Obama Good Links – More 51](#_Toc267414238)

[\*\*\*Grabbag CP\*\*\* 52](#_Toc267414239)

[Overstretch CP 1NC 52](#_Toc267414240)

[Ext – CP Solves Troops/Avoids Politics 53](#_Toc267414241)

[Pakistan CP 1NC 54](#_Toc267414242)

[CP Solves Insurgency 55](#_Toc267414243)

[CP Solves Insurgency 56](#_Toc267414244)

[CP Solves Indo – Pak 57](#_Toc267414245)

[CP Solves Pakistan Econ 58](#_Toc267414246)

[A2: CP Links Politics 59](#_Toc267414247)

[SCO CP 1NC 60](#_Toc267414248)

[CP Solvency/A2: SCO Says No 61](#_Toc267414249)

[CP Solvency/A2: SCO Says No 62](#_Toc267414250)

[CP Solves Iran Coop Advantage 63](#_Toc267414251)

[A2: CP Links Politics 64](#_Toc267414252)

\*\*\*Notes\*\*\*

This file replaces the Afghanistan packet neg with the exception of the Karzai disad, which is probably currently unrunnable but could be updated in a future wave, and the civilian casualities CP.

You can run any of the grabbag cp planks together, depending what advantages they read. You could also combine it with the Afghanistan aid cp from the FMW lab’s shared neg if you would like…..and/or with the civilian casualities cp if you really wanted, though its not my highest recommendation.

Politics, Elections, CMR, and the case turns all can be net benefits to these CPs.

The defense and offense on the case is pretty solid in my opinion, so defending the status quo isn’t the worst option I’ve ever heard.

\*\*\*A2: Antiamericanism/terrorism\*\*\*

Alt Cause – Palestine outweighs

Global Post, 6/4/10 (lexis)

Israel feels it needs to maintain a reputation for frightfulness in the Middle East to cow Arabs. As New York Times columnist Tom Friedman once wrote, Israel keeps two sets of books ” one for the West, in which Israel is to be seen as a liberal democracy in the European tradition, the other for the Arabs in which Israel is brutal, taking two eyes and an ear for any one eye. Since Lebanon ended up looking like a win for Hezbollah, Israel worried about its prestige and used rough tactics in Gaza to restore the terror it hoped to instill. In Turkey, however, this backfired and the Turks began to slip away from the Israeli alliance. Now that America is fighting two wars against Muslim countries, the U.S. military recognizes that although they may be fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the power of the Palestinian problem, and Israels continued occupation, is what a British Foreign Minister called extremisms greatest recruiting sergeant." Already one can see Israels supporters in this country beginning to attack Turkey, whereas in the past the Israel lobby has been helpful to Turkey. That may change now that Turkey is denouncing Israel. Some American foreign policy gurus have written that with our main problem in Afghanistan and Pakistan, maybe the Palestinian problem isnt really so important. It is a short-sighted conception, for sooner or later the plight of the Palestinians comes back to kick us in the pants. Some Israelis, too, are saying that with their economy doing well and no recent suicide bombers, maybe the status quo is acceptable and maybe peace with the Palestinians isnt necessary. That will all come tumbling down with the next Palestinian uprising which is as sure to come as night follows day, unless the curse of occupation can be lifted from Israel and the Palestinians alike.

\*\*\*A2: Heg\*\*\*

Hegemony 1NC

Withdrawal signals weakness --- sparks regional conflict

Khalilzad ‘05

(Zalmay, Former US Ambassador, The National Interest, Summer, Lexis)

Regarding our efforts in Afghanistan, this means that we must bring each regional power to the point where its leaders accept the fact that their interests are better served by a stable, independent and prosperous Afghanistan, an outcome that opens the way to a wider economic transformation of the region. They also must come to see that the worst outcome is a return to proxy competition, a game that exacts an enormous cost in blood and treasure, and could result in a rival coming to dominate Afghanistan and using it as a base of operations to threaten its competitors. Moreover, all the major powers would benefit from the restoration of the historic Afghan land bridge connecting the markets of Central Asia, South Asia and southwest Asia--a region with a collective and growing GDP of $4 trillion. There is a strong case to be made that each country would benefit more from the prosperity derived from trade than from seeking to dominate its neighbors. Second, to effect this shift in the calculations of regional powers, we need to persuade their leaders that the United States is unalterably committed to success in Afghanistan. If the leaders of these countries are uncertain about the strength of our commitment to stay the course, they are likely to hedge against the possibility that we will pull out. In Afghanistan, this means that they will maintain relations with clients or factions that would give them an instrument for violent proxy competition after an American disengagement. Their support for these groups can hamper our effort to enable the Afghans to stabilize and rebuild their country. The challenge is finding ways to effectively signal our commitment, through both words and deeds, to leaders who are convinced of our short attention span.

Counterinsurgency strategy will boost leadership and democracy – US withdrawal crushes credibility, spurs counterbalancing and collapses global democracy

Twining, 9 (Dan, Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States

http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/30/the\_stakes\_of\_afghanistan\_go\_well\_beyond\_afghanistan)

And that is the point: the debate over whether to prevail in Afghanistan is about so much more. An American recommitment to a sustained counterinsurgency strategy that turned around the conflict would demonstrate that the United States and its democratic allies remain the principal providers of public goods -- in this case, the security and stability of a strategically vital region that threatens the global export of violent extremism -- in the international system. A new and sustained victory strategy for Afghanistan would show that Washington is singularly positioned to convene effective coalitions and deliver solutions to intractable international problems in ways that shore up the stability of an international economic and political order that has provided greater degrees of human freedom and prosperity than any other. By contrast, a U.S. decision to wash its hands of Afghanistan would send a different message to friends and competitors alike. It would hasten the emergence of a different kind of international order, one in which history no longer appeared to be on the side of the United States and its friends. Islamic extremism, rather than continuing to lose ground to the universal promise of democratic modernity, would gain new legs -- after all, Afghan Islamists would have defeated their second superpower in a generation. Rival states that contest Western leadership of the international order and reject the principles of open society would increase their influence at America's expense. Just as most Afghans are not prepared to live under a new Taliban regime, so most Americans are surely not prepared to live in a world in which the United States voluntarily cedes its influence, power, and moral example to others who share neither our interests nor our values.

Hegemony 1NC

Instability turns the advantage --- tanks credibility and leadership [Note: Instability Turn is in Pakistan 1NC]

Wisner ‘03

(Frank G. II, Co-Chair – Council on Foreign Relations Task Force, “Afghanistan: Are We Losing the Peace?”, June, http://www.asiasociety.org/policy\_business/afghanistan061703.pdf)

The Task Force concludes that to achieve the U.S. goal of a stable Afghan state that does not serve as a haven for terrorists, the United States should be providing greater support to the transitional government of President Hamid Karzai. More vigorous military, diplomatic, and economic measures are needed to bolster the central government’s hand and to prevent further deterioration in the security situation and the dimming of economic reconstruction prospects. Unless the present disturbing trends are arrested, the successes of Operation Enduring Freedom will be in jeopardy. Afghanistan could again slide back into near anarchy and the United States could suffer a serious defeat in the war on terrorism. This is a compelling report about what the United States should be doing next in Afghanistan. The Task Force warns that the world thinks of Afghanistan as America’s war. If the peace is lost there because of inadequate support for the government of Hamid Karzai, **America’s credibility around the globe will suffer a grave blow.** Washington needs to take corrective action before it is too late.

Heg doesn’t deter hostile global rivals

Layne ’96

(Chris,- Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute “Less is more” National Interest” http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m2751/is\_n43/ai\_18298481)

The strategy of preponderance is an impractical strategy because, over time, the United States cannot successfully perpetuate unipolarity by thwarting the emergence of new great powers. America's post-Cold War "unipolar moment" is an ephemeral geopolitical aberration. The emergence of these new powers is a recurring feature in international politics that reflects both the impact of differential growth rates among states and the logic of the system. The relative distribution of power among states is constantly, if slowly, changing; Japan's closing in on the United States in terms of GNP provides a concrete example. And the structural effects of anarchy compel states that possess the requisite capabilities to become great powers. States have virtually irresistible incentives to acquire the same kinds of capabilities that their rivals (actual or potential) possess, even in cases, such as Japan's, where historical memory militates against it. Another key structural effect is the tendency of states to balance against others who are too strong or threatening. The pressure to balance is especially strong in a unipolar system, as modern international history amply confirms. Maximal realists, however, assuming that their own belief in American exceptionalism is shared by the rest of the world, believe that this will not apply in the case of the United States. Instead of challenging America's hegemony, they argue, other states welcome it because they trust the United States to exercise its power fairly and wisely. This is an illusory view of how others perceive American hegemony. Hegemons may love themselves but others neither love nor trust them; other states are concerned more with a hegemon's fixed capabilities than its ephemeral intentions. Thus, any strategy aimed at suppressing the emergence of new great powers will instead stimulate the rise of challengers. It may be true, as Huntington argues, that a "state such as the United States that has achieved international primacy has every reason to attempt to maintain that primacy", but it is equally true that other states with the capabilities to do so will work to create counterweights to American overbearing power.

Hegemony 1NC

Heg is unsustainable --- other rising powers, U.S. economic weakness

Layne ’10

(Christopher,- Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute “Graceful Decline” <http://www.amconmag.com/article/2010/may/01/00030/>)

The epoch of American dominance is drawing to a close, and international politics is entering a period of transition: no longer unipolar but not yet fully multipolar. President Barack Obama’s November 2009 trip to China provided both substantive and emblematic evidence of the shift. As the Financial Times observed, “Coming at a moment when Chinese prestige is growing and the U.S. is facing enormous difficulties, Mr. Obama’s trip has symbolized the advent of a more multi-polar world where U.S. leadership has to co-exist with several rising powers, most notably China.” In the same Pew study, 44 percent of Americans polled said that China was the leading economic power; just 27 percent chose the United States. Much of America’s decline can be attributed to its own self-defeating policies, but as the U.S. stumbles, others—notably China, India, and Russia—are rising. This shift in the global balance of power will dramatically affect international politics: the likelihood of intense great-power security competitions—and even war—will increase; the current era of globalization will end; and the post-1945 Pax Americana will be replaced by an international order that reflects the interests, values, and norms of emerging powers. China’s economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States’ over the last two decades and continues to do so, maintaining audacious 8 percent growth projections in the midst of a global recession. Leading economic forecasters predict that it will overtake the U.S. as the world’s largest economy, measured by overall GDP, sometime around 2020. Already in 2008, China passed the U.S. as the world’s leading manufacturing nation—a title the United States had enjoyed for over a century—and this year China will displace Japan as the world’s second-largest economy. Everything we know about the trajectories of rising great powers tells us that China will use its increasing wealth to build formidable military power and that it will seek to become the dominant power in East Asia. Optimists contend that once the U.S. recovers from what historian Niall Ferguson calls the “Great Repression”—not quite a depression but more than a recession—we’ll be able to answer the Chinese challenge. The country, they remind us, faced a larger debt-GDP ratio after World War II yet embarked on an era of sustained growth. They forget that the postwar era was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and persistent high growth rates. Those days are gone. The United States of 2010 and the world in which it lives are far different from those of 1945. Weaknesses in the fundamentals of the American economy have been accumulating for more than three decades. In the 1980s, these problems were acutely diagnosed by a number of writers—notably David Calleo, Paul Kennedy, Robert Gilpin, Samuel Huntington, and James Chace—who predicted that these structural ills would ultimately erode the economic foundations of America’s global preeminence. A spirited late-1980s debate was cut short, when, in quick succession, the Soviet Union collapsed, Japan’s economic bubble burst, and the U.S. experienced an apparent economic revival during the Clinton administration. Now the delayed day of reckoning is fast approaching. Even in the best case, the United States will emerge from the current crisis with fundamental handicaps. The Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped massive amounts of dollars into circulation in hope of reviving the economy. Add to that the $1 trillion-plus budget deficits that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicts the United States will incur for at least a decade. When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U.S. current-account deficit, the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security), and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about the United States’ fiscal stability. As the CBO says, “Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly unsustainable and urgent fiscal problem.”

Withdrawal Bad – Heg

Admitting defeat in Afghanistan crushes heg – kills US credibility, collapses NATO and spurs isolationism

Twining, 9 (Dan, Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States

http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/30/the\_stakes\_of\_afghanistan\_go\_well\_beyond\_afghanistan)

Russia appears to be quietly reveling in the prospect that NATO, which appeared so threatening to Russian eyes during its multiple rounds of enlargement during the 1990s, could be defeated in its first real out-of-area operation. A NATO defeat in Afghanistan would call into question the future of the alliance and the credibility of American leadership with it, possibly creating a new and lasting transatlantic breach and intensifying concerns about the alliance's ability to protect weak European states against a resurgent Russia. China has no interest in Afghanistan's collapse into a sanctuary for Islamist extremists, including Uighers who militate against China's rule in Xinjiang. But a Western defeat in Afghanistan, which if historical precedent holds would be followed by a bout of U.S. isolationism, would only create more space for China to pursue its (for now) peaceful rise.

Withdrawal kills heg – control of key resources and credibility

Whitehouse, reviews editor of the International Socialist Review, 2010

David Whitehouse is reviews editor of the International Socialist Review

“Afghanistan Sinking deeper” ISR Issue 69, January–February 2010 http://www.isreview.org/issues/69/feat-afghanistan.shtml#top

Afghanistan is central to Washington’s regional plans. Central Asian states to Afghanistan’s north contain vast strategic reserves of gas and oil wealth. For this reason alone, the U.S. ruling class has an interest in building an Afghan client state. The location is also especially strategic, since it borders Iran and China, while Russia and India are near neighbors. This is why the U.S. intends to maintain a strong military presence, including permanent bases, in Afghanistan. In addition, there is the CIA station, set up in the western city of Herat with the permission of warlord Ismail Khan, to handle operations against Iran.

Finally, the war is also about preserving the credibility of the U.S. as the world’s hegemonic power—“Who is going to trust you again” if you leave without defeating the Taliban, complained Pakistan’s foreign minister.10 The U.S. cannot afford to let a diffuse rural insurgency force the withdrawal of the world’s most advanced military machine as long as the publicly-stated objective of the war is not won.

Withdrawal Bad – Heg/Laundry List

destroys US leadership and conflict mediation capabilities globally – collapses Pakistan and causes Iranian nuclearization

Kissinger, 10 (Henry, former Secretary of State, Washington Post, 6/24)

Yet America needs a strategy, not an alibi. We have a basic national interest to prevent jihadist Islam from gaining additional momentum, which it will surely do if it can claim to have defeated the United States and its allies after overcoming the Soviet Union. A precipitate withdrawal would weaken governments in many countries with significant Islamic minorities. It would be seen in India as an abdication of the U.S. role in stabilizing the Middle East and South Asia and spur radical drift in Pakistan. It would, almost everywhere, raise questions about America's ability to define or execute its proclaimed goals. A militant Iran building its nuclear capacity would assess its new opportunities as the United States withdraws from both Iraq and Afghanistan and is unable to break the diplomatic stalemate over Iran's nuclear program. But an obtrusive presence would, in time, isolate us in Afghanistan as well as internationally.

Withdrawal sends signal of overwhelming US weakness and causes conflict to spread throughout central asia

Rashid 9 (Ahmed, the National Interest, former Pakistani revolutionary and journalist, author of “Descent into Chaos”, 10/27/09, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22352)

SOUTHERN REGIONS of Muslim central Asia are now at risk. The situation will only get worse if the Taliban offensives continue. The regions bordering Afghanistan, including southern Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and eastern Turkmenistan, are facing pauperization of their populations, the collapse of Soviet-era services like health and education, and growing joblessness. Their regimes remain dictatorial, corrupt, and deny political or economic reforms. Vast numbers of poverty-stricken workers migrate to Russia looking for work. Uzbekistan is the largest of these states with some 27 million people and a history of Islamic revolt. Harsh policies and vicious crackdowns against anyone overzealously practicing Islam have led to a strong Islamist underground. After the massacre in Andijan in May 2005, when security forces killed up to eight hundred protesting citizens, hundreds of young dissidents have fled to join the two major Islamic groups operating from Pakistan’s tribal areas—the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU). Both these groups fight for and model themselves on the Taliban, work closely with al-Qaeda and help fund the extremist terrorist network by transporting drugs through central Asia to Europe. Both the IMU and the IJU recruit widely from central Asia, the Caucasus, Russia, and most recently from Turkey and Turks living in Germany. This summer, for the first time since 2001, allegedly under the auspices of al-Qaeda, the IMU and the IJU carried out suicide bombings and other small attacks against security forces in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Such attacks will certainly increase; both the Taliban and al-Qaeda would like to see central Asia in turmoil, perhaps eventually offering a safe haven to their leaders. Until recently, both Russia and the United States have ignored the impending crisis in the broader region. The United States thought of central Asia only in terms of the military bases the states there provided, while Russia put front and center maintaining a sphere of influence in its near abroad. However in the past few months, for the first time, Russia has started pressing the United States to cooperate with it more closely on Afghan policy, and Moscow has given the United States and NATO permission to transport supplies to Afghanistan by land. Moscow finally appears to understand the threat of Islamic militancy radiating from Afghanistan into central Asia and perhaps even into Russia itself. Any U.S. retreat from Afghanistan at this moment would certainly send an overwhelming message of U.S. weakness to Russia and the central Asian states. It would encourage extremism to grow and persuade the Afghan Taliban to step up support for its allies in central Asia.

A2: Costs Internal Link

Alt cause - Comparative ev proves entitlement crisis swamps their costs internal links

Carafano 7 (James, 4-10-7, “Maintaining Robust National Security

Spending”, Heritage Foundation,

http://www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/em1023.cfm) LE

Despite intense military activity since 9/11, defense spending is at a historical low and has been for too long. Current and future Administrations and Congress should commit now to spending 4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on national defense even after any drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan or Iraq, both to pre¬vent a recurrence of the "hollow force" and to meet the military's immediate modernization needs. Although defense spending has been relatively restrained, expenditures on Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid have been exploding. Meeting the resource needs for winning the war on terrorism includes maintaining overall defense budgets at 4 percent of GDP while simultaneously recognizing that projected growth in entitlement expenditures will jeopardize the nation's ability to wage war over the long term. This harsh fact makes entitlement reform a national security issue. Avoiding a "Hollow Force." The term "hollow force" was coined in the post–Vietnam War era to describe a military force that lacks the resources to field trained and ready forces, to support ongoing operations, and to modernize. In the past, when America's military has begun to become hollow, the strain has showed first in the National Guard. The same warning signs are evident today, including an austere lack of equipment, heavy reliance on cross-leveling to fill out units preparing to deploy, and a reduction in the levels of unit readiness. However, this problem is not exclusive to the National Guard. The Army and Air Force are already showing signs of funding shortfalls for equipment modernization. Although today's military is not yet hollow, it could become so in less than a decade if funding for military modernization is not adequate over a sustained period of time. Moreover, underfunding defense will actually cost the U.S. more in the long run, including reducing the defense industrial base to a dangerously low level. This leads to an undercapitalized base that is not competitive, driving up costs for the U.S. government and taxpayer. Not spending enough on defense also creates the reality and perception of American weakness, which will increase risk, hinder economic growth, and lower stability in the world. Indeed, robust defense spending saves money. President Ronald Reagan's defense buildup and steady defense funding throughout the 1980s helped to win the Cold War and enabled the U.S. to quickly defeat Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. Regrettably, the Administration's defense budget request and emergency supplemental spending bill come at a time when political pressure to reduce defense expenditures is growing. The perception is that the battle in Iraq constitutes the entirety of the war effort and that as this operation winds down, the American people are entitled to a new peace dividend. This notion, coupled with the imminent retirement of 78 million baby boomers, means that the danger of a hollow force is very real. Mandatory spending in the U.S. budget is projected to increase significantly in the coming years. The Congressional Budget Office projects that the share of the U.S. economy devoted to defense spending will actually decrease as a result. Entitlement Reform as National Security Issue. The U.S. government is running a large budget deficit, and the principal reason is the growth in entitlement costs, not increased defense funding since 9/11. Since 1970, the historical ratio between defense spending and entitlement spending on Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security has flipped. In 1970, military spending totaled 7.8 percent of GDP—almost twice the 4.1 percent of GDP spent on the big three entitlement programs. Today, defense spending has fallen to 3.9 percent of GDP while entitlement spending has more than doubled to 8.8 percent of GDP. By 2030, the big three entitlements will absorb roughly 84 percent of all federal revenues, crowding out defense and homeland security and threatening the historically low-tax, high-growth U.S. economy. Congress needs to find a solution to the entitlement spending problem quickly. Consequently, defense is not the problem with the budget, and cutting defense is not the solution. As a nation at war, the U.S. is spending remarkably little on defense. Devoting 4 percent of GDP to defense imposes a reasonable burden on the U.S. economy and is significantly below the mean of roughly 7.5 percent of GDP that the U.S. spent on defense during the Cold War. Spending 4 percent of GDP will not risk losing the war because of economic collapse brought on by excessive defense spending. Further, Congress needs to keep in mind the economic costs of military failure. Military power trumps economic power in the short term. Even a single successful attack on U.S. territory using an electromagnetic pulse generated by a nuclear weapon would have devastating economic consequences.

A2: Costs Internal Link

Deficits are sustainable and self correcting

Wray, 7/20/10 (Randall, Prof Economics @ UMKC, http://www.newdeal20.org/2010/07/20/deficits-do-matter-but-not-the-way-you-think-15355/)

In recent months, a form of mass hysteria has swept the country as fear of “unsustainable” budget deficits replaced the earlier concern about the financial crisis, job loss, and collapsing home prices. What is most troubling is that this shift in focus comes even as the government’s stimulus package winds down and as its temporary hires for the census are let go. Worse, the economy is still — likely — years away from a full recovery. To be sure, at least some of the hysteria has been manufactured by Pete Peterson’s well-funded public relations campaign, fronted by President Obama’s National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform — a group that supposedly draws members from across the political spectrum, yet are all committed to the belief that the current fiscal stance puts the nation on a path to ruinous indebtedness. But even deficit doves like Paul Krugman, who favor more stimulus now, are fretting about “structural deficits” in the future. They insist that even if we do not need to balance the budget today, we will have to get the “fiscal house” in order when the economy recovers. There is an alternative view propounded by economists following what has been called “Modern Money Theory”, which emphasizes the difference between a currency-issuing sovereign government and currency users (households, firms, and nonsovereign governments) (See here and here). They insist that the notion of “fiscal sustainability” or “solvency” is not applicable to a sovereign government — which cannot be forced into involuntary default on debts denominated in its own currency. Such a government spends by crediting bank accounts or issuing paper currency. It can never run out of the “keystrokes” it uses to credit bank accounts, and so long as it can find paper and ink, it can issue paper currency. These, we believe, are simple statements that should be completely noncontroversial. And this is not a policy proposal — it is an accurate description of the spending process used by all currency-issuing sovereign governments. And, yet, there are a number of misconceptions circulating that need to be addressed. Many (often of the Austrian persuasion) interpret this simple statement as a Leninist plot to destroy the nation’s currency by flying black helicopters dumping an infinite supply of bags of money all over the planet. This is usually accompanied by a diatribe on the evils of fiat money, with a call to return to “sound money” based on shiny yellow metal. Others suggest that we are instead proposing to ramp up the size of government, until it completes Obama’s plan to gobble up the whole economy. Almost all critiques eventually produce a lecture on the lessons to be learned from Weimar Germany and from Zimbabwe. Cont….Our response is two pronged. First, OK, let us accept your premise. Will the government be able to make all payments (including interest paid on debt) as they come due? The answer is, of course, “yes — by crediting bank accounts”. Insolvency is not possible when one spends by a simple keystroke. The critic then quickly changes the subject: Weimar! Zimbabwe! You are a destroyer of the currency! Yes, but it was your scenario, not mine. And even in your worst case scenario, the government cannot be forced to default. Instead, Krugman argues “the government would decide that default was a better option than hyperinflation”. In other words, Krugman veers off into politics — government “decides” to default — because the economics does not give him the result he wants. Second. Your scenario is highly implausible. As budget deficits rise, this increases income (government spending exceeds tax revenue, thus adds net income to the nongovernment sector) and wealth (nongovernment savings accumulated in the form of government debt) of the nongovernment sector. Eventually, this causes private spending and production to grow. As the economy heats up, tax revenue begins to grow faster than government spending or GDP. (In the US over the past two cycles, in the expansion phase federal tax revenue grew two to three times faster than GDP and government spending.) This reduces the government deficit (remember the Clinton boom and budget surpluses?). Even if the government spending is on interest (in Krugman’s model, the deficit is due to interest payments) that generates nongovernment income and spending. In other words, the cyclical upswing will automatically reduce the budget deficit. The scenario ignores the “automatic stabilizers” that cause the budget deficit to swing counter-cyclically. Cont….Uemployment is a chronic problem, even at business cycle peaks. Aging does raise serious questions about allocation of resources, especially medical care. Poverty and homelessness exist in the midst of relative abundance. Simply recognizing that our sovereign government cannot go bankrupt does not solve those problems, but it does make them easier to resolve. We may well need more government spending, and, yes, even budget deficits to tackle some of those problems.

Ext - A2: Costs Internal Link

War not root cause – massive entitlement spending swamps

Reidl, 6/21/10 (Brian, Senior Fellow @ heritage, http://www.economicnoise.com/2010/06/22/myths-about-what-caused-deficits/)

Putting the federal budget on a sustainable path will require drastic reforms. Balancing the budget by 2020 would require either eliminating one-third of all spending, raising taxes by 50 percent, or a combination of the two. This enormous budget constraint will set the framework for all budgeting decisions—from taxes to health care, from education to Social Security. Finding a solution to growing deficits requires first correctly diagnosing their cause. Both recent and future budget deficits have been blamed largely on the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, and to a lesser extent on the war on terrorism, but the data contradict these myths. In reality, spending is almost exclusively the problem: \* The 2001 and 2003 tax cuts were responsible for just 14 percent of the swing from the projected cumulative $5.6 trillion surplus for 2002–2011 to an actual $6.1 trillion deficit. The vast majority of the shift was due to higher spending and slower-than-projected economic growth. \* President Barack Obama’s assertion that most future deficits will result from the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Medicare drug entitlement is based on faulty methodology, but is still wrong even using that methodology. \* Above-average spending, not below-average revenues, accounts for 92 percent of rising budget deficits by 2014 and 100 percent by 2017. \* Nearly all rising spending will occur in Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and net interest payments. Deficit reduction efforts should focus on the source of the problem: rising entitlement spending. Any attempt to split the difference between broad-based tax hikes and spending cuts should be rejected outright as a false solution.

Ext – Hege Alt Cause

Heg will collapse --- dollar weakness and spending will force withdrawal

Layne ’10

(Christopher,- Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute “Graceful Decline” <http://www.amconmag.com/article/2010/may/01/00030/>)

The dollar’s vulnerability is the United States’ geopolitical Achilles’ heel. Its role as the international economy’s reserve currency ensures American preeminence, and if it loses that status, hegemony will be literally unaffordable. As Cornell professor Jonathan Kirshner observes, the dollar’s vulnerability “presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance.” Fears for the dollar’s long-term health predated the current financial and economic crisis. The meltdown has amplified them and highlighted two new factors that bode ill for continuing reserve-currency status. First, the other big financial players in the international economy are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous allies (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U.S. protection from the Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Indeed, China, which has holdings estimated at nearly $2 trillion, is worried that America will leave it with huge piles of depreciated dollars. China’s vote of no confidence is reflected in its recent calls to create a new reserve currency. In coming years, the U.S. will be under increasing pressure to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. This will require it to impose fiscal self-discipline through some combination of budget cuts, tax increases, and interest-rate hikes. Given that the last two options could choke off renewed growth, there is likely to be strong pressure to slash the federal budget. But it will be almost impossible to make meaningful cuts in federal spending without deep reductions in defense expenditures. Discretionary non-defense domestic spending accounts for only about 20 percent of annual federal outlays. So the United States will face obvious “guns or butter” choices. As Kirshner puts it, the absolute size of U.S. defense expenditures are “more likely to be decisive in the future when the U.S. is under pressure to make real choices about taxes and spending. When borrowing becomes more difficult, and adjustment more difficult to postpone, choices must be made between raising taxes, cutting non-defense spending, and cutting defense spending.” Faced with these hard decisions, Americans will find themselves afflicted with hegemony fatigue. The United States will be compelled to overhaul its strategy dramatically, and rather than having this adjustment forced upon it suddenly by a major crisis, the U.S. should get ahead of the curve by shifting its position in a gradual, orderly fashion. A new American global posture would involve strategic retrenchment, burden-shifting, and abandonment of the so-called “global counterinsurgency” being waged in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a first step, the U.S. will need to pull back from its current security commitments to NATO, Japan, and South Korea. This is not isolationism. The United States undertook the defense of these regions under conditions very different from those prevailing today. In the late 1940s, all were threatened by the Soviet Union—in the case of South Korea and Japan, by China as well—and were too weak to defend themselves. The U.S. did the right thing by extending its security umbrella and “drawing a line in the sand” to contain the Soviet Union. But these commitments were never intended to be permanent. They were meant as a temporary shield to enable Western Europe, Japan, and South Korea to build up their own economic and military strength and assume responsibility for defending themselves.

\*\*\*A2: Iran Coop Advantage\*\*\*

Withdrawal Bad - Iran

Admitting defeat in Afghanistan prevents coming Iran democracy and emboldens Iranian nuclearization and aggression

Twining, 9 (Dan, Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States

http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/30/the\_stakes\_of\_afghanistan\_go\_well\_beyond\_afghanistan)

The strategic implications of a Western defeat in Afghanistan for American relations with other major powers are similarly troubling. The biggest game-changer in the nuclear standoff with Iran is not new sanctions or military action but a popular uprising by the Iranian people that changes the character of the radical regime in Tehran -- a prospect one would expect to be meaningfully diminished by the usurpation through violence of the Afghan government, against the will of a majority of Afghans, by the religious extremists of the Taliban. And despite welcome new unity in the West on a tougher approach to Iran's development of nuclear weapons following revelations of a new nuclear complex in Qum, how can Washington, London, Paris, and Berlin stare down the leaders of Iran -- a potentially hegemonic Middle Eastern state with an advanced conventional and near-nuclear arsenal and a vast national resource base -- if they can't even hold their own against the cave-dwelling, Kalashnikov-wielding despots of the Taliban?

A2: US – Iran Coop

Incremental approaches can’t solve US Iran Relations

Leverett, Senior Fellow at the New American Foundation, ’06

(Flynt, “Dealing with Tehran: Assessing US Diplomatic Options Toward Iran,” American Century Foundation Report, http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/leverett\_diplomatic.pdf)

This paper lays out a comprehensive strategy for diplomatic engagement with Iran. The paper’s core argument is that successful resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue requires a “grand bargain” between the United States and Iran—that is, an overarching framework in which outstanding bilateral differences are resolved as a package. Any incremental, issue-by-issue or step-by step approach to engagement with Iran will fail. Moreover, while some would wish otherwise, at the heart of a U.S.-Iranian grand bargain there will need to be an American security guarantee to the Islamic Republic. However, under the rubric of a grand bargain, the United States would gain—among other benefits— strategically meaningful limits on Iran’s nuclear activities, termination of its support for terrorism, and Iranian cooperation in stabilizing post-Saddam Iraq. U.S.-Iranian rapprochement also could provide the foundation for establishing a regional security framework in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East more broadly.

Incremental Approaches have no shot – this card rules

Leverett, Senior Fellow at the New American Foundation, ’06

(Flynt, “Dealing with Tehran: Assessing US Diplomatic Options Toward Iran,” American Century Foundation Report, http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/leverett\_diplomatic.pdf)

Taken together, these considerations argue for a serious diplomatic effort by the United States to resolve the current controversy over Iran’s nuclear activities. However, such an effort cannot be serious if it is not comprehensive. Diplomatic resolution of the nuclear issue inevitably will require a broad-based restructuring of U.S.-Iranian relations, amounting to an effective rapprochement between Washington and Tehran. As Iranian officials have repeatedly made clear in diplomatic exchanges and private conversations, Iran will not agree to strategically meaningful restraints on the development of its nuclear infrastructure without having its core security concerns addressed. This means that Tehran will require, among other things, a security guarantee from Washington—effectively a commitment that the United States will not use force to change the borders or form of government of the Islamic Republic of Iran—bolstered by the prospect of a lifting of U.S. unilateral sanctions and normalization of bilateral relations. But, no American administration would be able to provide a security guarantee unless U.S. concerns about Iran’s support for terrorist organizations and its attitude toward Israel were also addressed. And, the Iranian leadership would not be willing or able to address those concerns absent a strategic understanding with Washington about Iran’s place in the region. At this juncture, resolving any of the significant bilateral differences between the Islamic Republic and the United States inevitably means resolving all of them. This is particularly the case with regard to the nuclear issue. That is why proposals to resolve the diplomatic impasse over Iran’s nuclear activities solely by assuring Iranian access to nuclear fuel and various types of civil nuclear technologies in exchange for Tehran’s commitment not to develop fuel cycle capabilities cannot provide the basis for a stable settlement.9 That is also why Western offers of economic and trade incentives, without corollary measures addressing core Iranian security concerns, will not induce Tehran to freeze its nuclear development.10 Moreover, that is why the predictable recommendation of eminent persons’ groups on how to improve U.S.-Iranian relations—an incremental, issue-by-issue or step-by-step approach—entirely misses the point.11 Tactical cooperation with Iran on specific issues where American and Iranian interests converge has been tried by successive U.S. administrations: by the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations in Lebanon, the Clinton administration in Bosnia, and the current Bush administration in Afghanistan. In all cases, such cooperation could not be leveraged into a broader strategic opening; usually this was because U.S. policymakers allowed domestic political considerations or other foreign policy interests to undermine diplomatic initiatives toward Iran.12 To assume that an incremental approach somehow can resolve the current standoff between Iran and the West over Tehran’s nuclear activities ignores the lessons of this history.

A2: US – Iran Coop

Incrementalism is doomed

a) disputes over terrorism and nuclear issue always undermine progress

Goldfield, Vice Chairman of Stonebridge International, LLC, an international strategic advisory firm based in Washington DC, 2004

(HP, Iran: Time for a new Approach, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Iran\_TF.pdf, p.50)

The Task Force report offers sound and insightful analysis of the evolution of the Islamic Republic’s internal politics, its foreign policy, and the range of U.S. interests at stake in America’s relationship with Iran. However, I must take exception with the report’s conclusion that a “grand bargain” between the United States and Iran is not a realistic goal. Indeed, I believe that a grand bargain may be the only realistic option for breaking out of the current impasse in U.S.-Iranian relations, which is increasingly dysfunctional for U.S. interests. We have had considerable experience, over the years, with incremental or issue-specific approaches to seeking an improved U.S.-Iranian relationship. In Lebanon, Bosnia, and, most recently, in Afghanistan, U.S.-Iranian cooperation has been important to the achievement of U.S. policy goals in challenging environments. Yet, this cooperation has never been able to serve as the catalyst for more fundamental and strategic improvement in the U.S.-Iranian relationship. Disagreements over other critical issues—especially terrorism and nonproliferation—have always undermined the strategic potential of U.S.-Iranian tactical cooperation. I see no reason, in the current climate, to believe that the kind of approach recommended in the report is more likely to succeed in improving the overall nature of the U.S.-Iranian relationship than earlier exercises in incremental, issue-specific cooperation. I have assumed for some years that the biggest problem the United States faces in trying to get the Iranian government to change its approach toward proliferation and support for terrorism is that most Iranian citizens have heretofore had no clear reason to “connect the dots” between their government’s ending its support both for Hezbollah and for nuclear weapons development and having U.S. economic sanctions lifted as a result. If such a connection were made, you might find the majority of Iranians demanding good behavior by their government on these issues because the vast majority wants a better relationship with the United States, as they believe that a normalized relationship with the United States is in their own economic and social self-interest.

Alt Cause – multiple other US troop deployments ensure iran threat perception

Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, 2006

(Ted Galen, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: America’s Policy Options,” 9/20, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa578.pdf)

So what are Iran’s possible motives for going nuclear? Prestige is certainly one consideration— that was a factor even when the shah was in power. But prestige does not appear to be the dominant reason in Iran’s case today. Deterrence, both regional and extraregional, seems to be a more important consideration. Iran is located in a volatile region, surrounded by hostile neighbors. Russia, Israel, Pakistan, and India all have nuclear weapons already, so regional deterrence issues probably loom large for Tehran.69 Iran very likely is also reacting to U.S. actions. President Bush’s “axis of evil” speech, linking Iran to Iraq and North Korea, came as a prelude to an invasion and occupation of Iraq. A policymaker in Tehran (or Pyongyang) seeing his country linked to Iraq in that fashion might well assume that his country will also be on the U.S. hit list at some point. In addition to President Bush’s hostile rhetoric, the United States has deployed its forces in ways that many Iranians find menacing. U.S. troops are already in several Persian Gulf states, and have been in the region since the first Persian Gulf war. Additional forces have now been deployed to some of the Central Asian republics, to Afghanistan, and, of course, most recently to Iraq. To leaders in Tehran, those moves look suspiciously like an encirclement strategy with Iran as the next target for U. S. military action. Iran’s apparent response in wanting to build nuclear weapons is not irrational; it is quite logical. A grand bargain is the one offer that might induce Iran to abandon the quest for a nuclear arsenal, despite the various powerful incentives to pursue that goal. Normalized relations, an end to economic sanctions, the removal of any threat of a campaign of forcible regime change, and a settlement of Tehran’s multi-billion-dollar financial claims are very appealing carrots that Washington can offer. But it is hard to imagine Iran giving up its long-standing effort to build a nuclear arsenal for much less than that package of incentives.

one issue doesn’t create spill over.

Wisner, Vice Chairman for External Affairs at the American International Group, 06

(Frank, “Iran’s Political/Nuclear Ambitions and US Policy Options,” Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, May 17 and 18, p.86)

But I argue most carefully that trying only to engage Iran on one issue is bound to fail. There is a record of American diplomacy with Iran where we have directed ourselves at one question, only to find that unlinked to other questions, and complicated by the political dynamics in our respective societies those initiatives have achieved a short-term benefit in some cases, but have always ended in not producing a spreading agreement to others.

A2: US – Iran Coop

Incrementalism fails – empirically proven.

Wisner, Vice Chairman for External Affairs at the American International Group, 06

(Frank, “Iran’s Political/Nuclear Ambitions and US Policy Options,” Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, May 17 and 18, p.119)

Ambassador WISNER. Senator, there is a long history of American attempts to engage Iran and a respectable history of Iranian attempts to engage the United States. It’s my conclusion that these attempts have failed in the past. Obviously, over sharp differences of points of view, but, principally, because they were not linked coherently within a political objective, they were individual initiatives. Senator OBAMA. Can you explain what you mean by that? Ambassador WISNER. An individual initiative, for example, we and the Iranians talked about the American hostages in Lebanon, we found a basis to solve that particular problem, but it had no spillover effect on the range of disagreements. And as soon as it clashed with our electoral cycles—we were going into an election— the initiative dried up. We opened a multilateral channel of dialog with the Iranians, inside—over the issue of our hostages in Iran. And the Iranians took a number of steps that were, frankly, helpful to the United States over Afghanistan. That didn’t lead anywhere, because it was in isolation. I would argue that solely a discussion of Iraq, in Baghdad, with our Ambassador in Baghdad, may reveal some interesting outcomes, but ultimately it’s not going to effect the totality of the relationship, unless there’s a political decision at the top on both sides, to aim for a different construct, to aim for a normalization between the two sides, and then—as we did with China—once we link at the top, between our President, the Iranian leadership, a desire, a determination to live in peace with one another, than you can address the subordinate portions of the puzzle: Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Israel—but if you try to go at the bottom up, you will fail. You will be frustrated. That was the core of my contention. Now, do I believe that the letter should be answered? No and yes. The letter is very complicated for an American mind to get around—it’s a strange formulation is about the nicest thing you can say. But I believe it offers the United States an opportunity to state our case.

A2: Drug Advantage

causes production to shift to other countries

Washington Times 07 [“Poppies in Taliban fields,” Sept 9, http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2007/september/sep92007.html]

Even if they succeed, they cannot reasonably hope to have a lasting impact on heroin availability. If cracking down on opium production in some Afghan provinces simply shifts it to others, cracking down on opium production throughout Afghanistan will simply shift it to other countries. That has been the general pattern during the last century of opium "eradication," which might more accurately be called opium relocation.

other states would quickly fill in – necessary climate, trafficking routes and terrorists are already established in corrupt neighboring states

Osmonaliev 05 [Kairat, Chief of the Legal and International Cooperation Section at Kyrgyzstan’s Drug Control Agency, “Developing Counter-Narcotics Policy In Central Asia,” Silk Road Paper, Jan 05, www.silkroadstudies.org/Silkroadpapers/Osmonaliev.pdf]

The struggle against drug trafficking in Afghanistan is closely associated with the settlement of a range of social and economic problems. Political stability is foremost. Nearly all Central Asian states are interested in establishment of strong governmental authority in Afghanistan, which would be able to put an end to drug trafficking. If the “Golden Triangle” scenario of offering alternative agriculture is duplicated in Afghanistan, then the drug situation can definitely stabilize, but only if there is strong democratic power in the Central Asian republics and a coherent, restrictive counter-narcotics policy is implemented. As one expert notes: Even if opium production in Afghanistan were to cease tomorrow and traffickers’ stockpiles run dry, the flow of heroin into Europe would diminish only briefly, if at all. Prices would rise, stimulating production in other states, mainly in Central Asia, where networks for growing, processing, and trafficking are already well-established. 51 Such a development cannot be dismissed out of hand. As mentioned earlier, Kyrgyzstan used to be the largest producer of legal opium in the Soviet Union and climatic conditions for poppy cultivation are favorable in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Today, there are already functioning drug trafficking and distribution networks in these countries. Huge drug markets in Russia and in China have developed into stable consumption countries, stimulating supply. Tajikistan, lacking stability and the poorest country in Central Asia, is exceedingly vulnerable to international drug trafficking. In the long term and under the right circumstances, the Golden Crescent could spill over into Central Asian territory. As in Myanmar, continuing economic decline, growing inflation and increasing poverty and malnutrition, as well as widespread corruption and repression of human rights, have contributed to illicit drug trafficking.52

Specifically, they can traffic drugs through Tajikistan

Cornell 02 [Dr. Svante E., the Executive Director of Cornell Caspian Consulting, “THE NEXUS OF NARCOTICS, CONFLICT AND RADICAL ISLAMISM IN CENTRAL ASIA,” Caspian Brief No. 24, June, www.cornellcaspian.com/briefs/24\_0206CA\_Islamism.pdf]

The fact that both the IMU’s incursions into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan were launched from the territory of Tajikistan, not Afghanistan, bears repeating. Although the group keeps training camps in Afghanistan, it has also on several occasions freely moved across the Tajik-Afghan border, despite the fact that this border is patrolled by over 12,000 Russian troops in accordance with aww formal agreement reached by the Foreign and Defense Ministries of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The ease with which the IMU operates shows at the very least that it has contacts in the highest echelons of power in Tajikistan. In any case, the weakness of the Tajik government makes it incapable of controlling its territory effectively, enabling the IMU to operate with relative freedom. Hence, the IMU’s ability to wreak havoc would not necessarily end even should members of the group be interdicted from Afghanistan, as seems to be happening presently. It relies on both Afghanistan and Tajikistan for its operations.

A2: Drug Advantage

Supply-side strategies will never work

Jenkins 07 [Sir Simon, received a knighthood for services to journalism, “Britain stoned at home, sold out in Afghanistan,” Sept 2, http://www.kuwaittimes.net/read\_news.php?newsid=NjY5OTg=]

The British regard excluding both the Taleban and any tribal leaders dependent on drugs from the new state as their sacred post- imperial duty. As long as that is the case, and the Americans keep bombing, Taleban leaders will be able to recruit jihadists from across the world. They can arm and pay them from drugs profits as long as the British keep consuming heroin. Since Britain says it wants to stop this by equating the price of poppies with that of wheat (meaning the price of poppies must fall by 90 per cent), the foreign secretary, David Miliband, was right to say this month that Britain is in Afghanistan "for the long haul". I assume he meant forever. Every schoolchild economist knows demand will always attract supply. If the government wants to restrict demand for heroin in Britain, it could do so by making it more expensive. This was the covert rationale for the spectacularly failed poppy eradication policy of 2001. But impoverishing local Afghan farmers, processors and traders, who receive a tiny proportion of the eventual street price, will not achieve this any more than it has done already. The only way, repeat the only way, of curbing the heroin trade is by curbing demand. London's policy, shared with Washington, of trying to stop its people from consuming heroin and cocaine by disrupting the supply chain, was never going to work. It has merely made supply more profitable. It has been pursued for the cynical reason that politicians find it easier to blame some poor foreign country for a British social problem than to tackle that problem domestically. While Britons and Afghans are dying in Helmand, the budget for drug rehabilitation at home is pitiful even by European standards.

Afghan opium production down

Reuters, 5/17/10 (www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64G1DN20100517)

Afghan and United Nations officials say a natural pest has hit the key narcotics producing region of southern Afghanistan, which could result in a major reduction of poppy output, the raw material for heroin, this year. Controlling the opium trade in Afghanistan, the world's leading producer of the drug, is part of the fight by the West and the Afghan government against Taliban militants, overthrown in a U.S.-led invasion in 2001.

A2: Iran Econ

Multiple alt causes swamp Iran Econ

Amuzegar, Jahangir, 2010, Carnegie Endowment International Peace, March, has taught at UCLA, University of Michigan, Michigan State University, University of Maryland, the American University and SAIS. He served the pre-revolution government of Iran as Minister of Commerce, Minister of Finance, and Ambassador-at-Large. He has been on the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund, representing Iran and several other member countries. He has written more than 50 journal articles and is the author of seven books on Iran, oil and economic development, the latest of which is Managing the Oil Wealth. Dr. Amuzegar has a Ph.D. in economics from the University of California at Los Angeles.

The Iranian economy is facing its bleakest prospects in nearly two decades, with an almost unanimous forecast of low growth, high inflation, and continued double-digit unemployment. These worsening economic conditions, in turn, are likely to place considerable stress on internal politics, leading to strikes, protests, and business bankruptcies, and encouraging further emigration and capital flight. Persistent structural weaknesses and the Ahmadinejad administration’s gross mismanagement of the economy are largely at fault for the economy’s dysfunction, but recent external developments—including Western banks and industrial companies’ reduced exposure to Iran, possible new sanctions, and increasing transaction costs—are also damaging the economic climate.

Multiple structural weaknesses outweigh

Amuzegar, Jahangir, 2010, Carnegie Endowment International Peace, March, has taught at UCLA, University of Michigan, Michigan State University, University of Maryland, the American University and SAIS. He served the pre-revolution government of Iran as Minister of Commerce, Minister of Finance, and Ambassador-at-Large. He has been on the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund, representing Iran and several other member countries. He has written more than 50 journal articles and is the author of seven books on Iran, oil and economic development, the latest of which is Managing the Oil Wealth. Dr. Amuzegar has a Ph.D. in economics from the University of California at Los Angeles.

The dim outlook reflects both a number of structural weaknesses that developed since the 1979 revolution and the Ahmadinejad government’s avowed “anti-liberalist” and “anti-capitalist” economic mismanagement and bellicose anti-Western posture. Structurally, Iran’s economy remains largely state-owned and controlled, poorly taxed, highly subsidized, and hazardously reliant on crude oil export. In addition, the economy continues to follow a lopsided economic model reminiscent of the former Soviet Union’s. Despite the leadership’s repeated emphasis on the need for privatization and a favorable reinterpretation of the Constitution, the government and state-affiliated entities continue to own, manage, or control some 70 percent of the economy, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) making increasing inroads into such strategic areas as oil and gas, infrastructure, telecommunications, missile development, nuclear energy, and even some unsavory operations. Taxes constitute at best only 7 percent of GDP, with more than 50 percent of the economy legally tax-exempt, and the rest engaging in tax evasion. Subsidies to both consumers and producers amount to nearly 25 percent of the national product. Receipts from oil and gas exports—the economy’s lifeblood—constitute more than 80 percent of total annual foreign exchange earnings, and 70 percent of the government’s fiscal budget. The presence of oil resources raises the cost of labor, housing, and various services. Non-oil exports are stifled by their sectors’ competitive disadvantage and economic diversification becomes even more arduous. Public investment prioritizes nuclear energy, space exploration, defense gear, and exotic nanotechnology over agriculture, industry, public transportation, and environmental protection. As a result, while the Islamic Republic now ranks high among a handful of nations in some high-tech endeavors—and in Ahmadinejad’s boastful description, is a “nuclear state”—its traditional economic activities continue to rely on nineteenth century technologies. By various estimates, a hidden underground economy also accounts for some 20 percent of formal GDP.

A2: Iran Econ

Economic Mismanagement

Amuzegar, Jahangir, 2010, Carnegie Endowment International Peace, March, has taught at UCLA, University of Michigan, Michigan State University, University of Maryland, the American University and SAIS. He served the pre-revolution government of Iran as Minister of Commerce, Minister of Finance, and Ambassador-at-Large. He has been on the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund, representing Iran and several other member countries. He has written more than 50 journal articles and is the author of seven books on Iran, oil and economic development, the latest of which is Managing the Oil Wealth. Dr. Amuzegar has a Ph.D. in economics from the University of California at Los Angeles.

In addition to suffering from these growth-impeding structural weaknesses, the economy is also grossly mismanaged. The Ahmadinejad administration’s blatant and boastful disregard of economic realities, misguided populism, crony capitalism, and growing militarization, on top of biting external sanctions, have established a dysfunctional economic environment and are worsening the business climate. The public sector, plagued by nepotism and widely-publicized corruption, lacks competent managers. Periodic reports by the Heritage Foundation, Freedom House, and Transparency International paint a highly unfavorable picture of Iran’s strait-jacketed economy.

Exchange rate problems and stagflation

Amuzegar, Jahangir, 2010, Carnegie Endowment International Peace, March, has taught at UCLA, University of Michigan, Michigan State University, University of Maryland, the American University and SAIS. He served the pre-revolution government of Iran as Minister of Commerce, Minister of Finance, and Ambassador-at-Large. He has been on the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund, representing Iran and several other member countries. He has written more than 50 journal articles and is the author of seven books on Iran, oil and economic development, the latest of which is Managing the Oil Wealth. Dr. Amuzegar has a Ph.D. in economics from the University of California at Los Angeles.

On top of all of this, the exchange rate for the rial has been kept relatively stable even as inflation has continued to register double digits every year. The overvalued currency has increased imports to unprecedented levels, bankrupting thousands of domestic producers. This combination of structural weaknesses and glaring mismanagement has exposed the economy to “stagflation,” a simultaneous combination of inflation and recession. Real GDP growth has been declining every year since 2005/2006—when Ahmadinejad first took office—falling to less than 1.5 percent in 2009/2010. Official data also show an all around decline in capital, labor, and total factor productivity, with some 20 percent of the population now below the national poverty line.

Inflation and budget deficits

Amuzegar, Jahangir, 2010, Carnegie Endowment International Peace, March, has taught at UCLA, University of Michigan, Michigan State University, University of Maryland, the American University and SAIS. He served the pre-revolution government of Iran as Minister of Commerce, Minister of Finance, and Ambassador-at-Large. He has been on the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund, representing Iran and several other member countries. He has written more than 50 journal articles and is the author of seven books on Iran, oil and economic development, the latest of which is Managing the Oil Wealth. Dr. Amuzegar has a Ph.D. in economics from the University of California at Los Angeles.

Inflation has been an endemic feature since the revolution. Except for a few years of strict wage and price controls during the Iran–Iraq war, it has steadily registered double-digits. Iran’s current inflation rate is the highest in the region, and arguably third highest in the world. The latest official inflation rate is 12.2 percent, but private estimates place it at more than 20 percent due to differences in consumption baskets and methods of calculation, gaps between official and free-market prices, and data manipulation by officials. With the Iranian New Year—and the associated end-of-the-year bonuses and rising consumer expenditures—approaching, prices are expected to rise further. Increasing injection of record oil export receipts into the low-capacity national economy, public investment in low-return but politically popular development projects, mandated loans to so-called “quick-return” projects for job creation, and generous bank lending for home purchases, marriages, and other consumer needs are all responsible for the inflation. However, the government’s perennial budget deficit, which is financed by the state banking system and has been a prominent feature of all but four post-revolution years, tops the list. In the last four years, total liquidity has more than doubled. The government’s debt to the banking system (state banks and the Central Bank) and the banking system’s debt to the Central Bank have both increased substantially. At the same time, non-performing assets of the state banks have reached record levels, and nearly 7000 businesses have failed to service their debts.

A2: Iran Econ

Drug Use not root cause of unemployment – multiple factors outweigh

Amuzegar, Jahangir, 2010, Carnegie Endowment International Peace, March, has taught at UCLA, University of Michigan, Michigan State University, University of Maryland, the American University and SAIS. He served the pre-revolution government of Iran as Minister of Commerce, Minister of Finance, and Ambassador-at-Large. He has been on the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund, representing Iran and several other member countries. He has written more than 50 journal articles and is the author of seven books on Iran, oil and economic development, the latest of which is Managing the Oil Wealth. Dr. Amuzegar has a Ph.D. in economics from the University of California at Los Angeles.

Unemployment Protracted unemployment is an important symptom of the weak business climate. Official jobless data are highly unreliable, as numbers published by different agencies differ considerably. Official figures are always on the low side, while pro-labor quarters give higher numbers. The current official rate is 12 percent; private estimates go twice as high. The Statistical Center’s claims of declining unemployment in recent months, which are frequently disputed, rely on the innovative assumptions that even one hour of work per week constitutes employment and that students and housewives are “employed”—thus equating occupation with employment. Reasons for the high unemployment range from the disastrous pro-natal policy of the 1980s wartime administration to the mismatch between the skills provided by education and those needed for employment to a defective pro-labor code that discourages long-term employment contracts. However, Ahmadinejad’s bewildering policy of reducing lending interest rates below inflation while adjusting minimum wage rates to the annual increase in consumer prices—thus encouraging investment in capital-intensive projects over those in labor—is a major culprit. The worsening economic conditions are likely to place considerable stress on internal politics: energizing the “greens” movement, provoking strikes by disgruntled and unpaid workers; giving rise to massive protests by university campus activists; and leading to further exodus of talent and capital, as well as a spate of business bankruptcies. While the somber trend line and the economy’s poor prospects may still fail to fulfill the wishes of democracy advocates at home (and their supporters abroad), hoping for a “regime change,” such factors as reduced foreign exchange reserves, uncertain oil prices, an overvalued exchange rate, looming external pressures, and internal political exigencies are bound to drastically affect President Ahmadinejad’s major economic policies, if not his bombastic rhetoric, in the coming year.

\*\*\*A2: Pakistan Coup\*\*\*

Pakistan 1NC - Defense

Pakistan stable now – multiple reasons

Fair, 10 (Christine, assistant prof @ Georgetown, 6/24,

http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/24/is\_pakistan\_a\_failed\_state\_no

So, Pakistan faces severe challenges. But Pakistan has also made important strides which are not captured by this index. First, Pakistan has taken the challenge of defeating the Pakistani Taliban seriously. The excesses of the militants in Swat, their refusal to honor a controversial peace deal, a video revealing their beating a young woman and their subsequent public rejections of the Constitution and democracy hardened public opinion toward them. The public's resistance to military operations decreased, and support for the various peace deals declined. Pakistan's Army and Frontier Corps are taking up the fight and appear to have their citizenry with them. Unfortunately, the media tends to conflate all militants under the unhelpful rubric of "the Taliban": the "Afghan Taliban," "Pakistani Taliban," or the misnamed "Punjabi Taliban." Given the propensity to call these and other groups "extremists" or "insurgents," media reports deride the efforts of the Pakistan Army to defeat the TTP. This is unfair. The Pakistan Army and the Frontier Corps face a formidable foe. The Frontier Corps lacks basic equipment and training, including battlefield first aid. If they are injured, they often bleed out before they can get to a medical facility. Their lack of battlefield medical evacuation, smart artillery, and close air support makes their battle against the militants all the more sobering. Previous reports about Frontier Corps defection and even collaboration with the Afghan Taliban appear to be increasingly less relevant. Second, though it has a long way to go, Pakistan has made enormous investments in its internal security apparatus. The Pakistani Army now understands the need for competent police forces as well as an increasingly competent Frontier Corps as key elements in the "holding" phase after clearing militants of an area. The Army knows it can't sit in places like Swat indefinitely. Third, Pakistan continues to make strides with decreasing fertility and expanding educational opportunities. Although state-run institutions such as the public schools are a disaster, affordable private schools are spreading throughout Pakistan. Fourth, Pakistan continues to build its infrastructure. Pakistan is increasingly connected with improved roads. That said, Pakistan does face enormous electricity shortages due to Musharraf's failure to make a single investment in this sector during his 10-year tenure. Fifth, while the specter of A.Q. Khan's nuclear black market -- and his ties to the state -- haunt Pakistan, and while Pakistan has long conducted asymmetric warfare under its nuclear umbrella, Pakistan has made significant strides in securing its nuclear arsenal through the establishment of the National Command Authority and the Strategic Plans Directorate. It should be remembered that the U.S. Air Force "lost" several nuclear warheads for some 36 hours in August 2007. (The air chief was among some 70 people who were punished.) If the United States can have such a lapse after decades of investing in nuclear-security protocols, Pakistan's relatively nascent institutions may not be foolproof. Finally, throughout the 1990s, no democratically elected government served out its term, with the opposition colluding the military to prorogue the parliament and call fresh elections. In fact, the first parliament to serve out its complete term was that elected in the problematic 2002 elections. The election of 2008, despite a difficult start with voter registration and manipulation of electoral rules, was reasonably fair and peaceful, despite Taliban threats to disrupt the process. That election saw the peaceful and democratic transfer of power which brought President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani into office. Despite the problems with President Zardari, who is widely viewed as corrupt, an important shift has taken place politically. Perhaps under Army pressure, Zardari began relinquishing the sweeping presidential powers he inherited from Musharraf. In April 2010, Zardari signed the 18th Amendment which returned Pakistan to a parliamentary democracy more in line with its 1973 Constitution, which remains the lodestone of democratic legitimacy in Pakistan. This is the first time in recent history when a president "willingly" ceded power to a prime minister. In short, the Failed States Index is clearly only one side of the die. While sitting at a computer crunching numbers, even with expert input as the index apparently uses, the larger story is missed. Pakistan has its problems and enormous challenges lay ahead, but it is far from a failed or even failing state.

Pakistan 1NC - Defense

India won’t militarily respond --- terrorist threat doesn’t outweigh risk of nuclear retaliation

Kumar ’10

(Radha,- Program Director, Peace and Conflict, Delhi Policy Group @ Council on Foreign Relations May 13th “Summer Thaw in India-Pakistan Freeze?”)

Many people have argued that the Mumbai attacks of 2008 created a sense of such frustration and helplessness within India, that if there is another Mumbai, India will have no option but to respond militarily. Within India, however, those who would argue that point would argue for a conventional military response, not for a nuclear response. When they say a conventional military response, they are not factoring in that Pakistan then might push it to the nuclear stage. But I feel fairly convinced that as far as the prime minister of India is concerned, or the leading decision-makers are concerned, that's one of the fears that would restrain even a military response. My own preference would be for Pakistanis not to say, "What would you do the next time this happens?" and to add, as they often do, "and we know it will happen," but for them to say, "What can we do to see that it doesn't happen again?" And how real are fears of a nuclear confrontation in such an event? When it comes to the question of nuclear confrontation, it's an interesting but little-mentioned fact that the Indian government has tended traditionally, right from the days of testing its first nuclear weapons in 1974, to see nuclear weapons as symbolic deterrents--not as actual offensive weapons. And there was a huge complacency within the Indian establishment that Pakistan's nuclearization would not lead to a real military confrontation. Some of that complacency was exploded in 2002, when India massed its troops on the Pakistani border in response to an attack on the Indian Parliament, and Pakistan responded in fact by arming some of its tanks with nuclear weapons and moving them to its border. But even then, the point didn't sink home in India, that the level of Pakistani alarm at Indian muscle-flexing is one that can go very rapidly from rhetoric to nuclear. Even today, there is possibly not a sufficient recognition in India of that will. That makes for a very dangerous situation.

Claims of Pakistan coup or loose nukes are media hype – several reasons

Korb, ’09 (Lawrence, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, Korb served as assistant secretary of defense during the Reagan administration, Bulletin Atomic Scientists, 5/19, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-security-of-pakistans-nuclear-arsenal)

Media reports of Pakistan's imminent demise are overstated. The same holds true for the supposed lack of security of Islamabad's nuclear arsenal. The weapons are safe for a variety of reasons--the army's ability to better control the typically renegade ISI chief among them. During the last week of April, I visited four cities in Pakistan (Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore, and Karachi). The purpose of the trip was to discuss a December 2008 Center for American Progress report that I coauthored, Partnership for Progress: Advancing a New Strategy for Prosperity and Stability in Pakistan and the Region. Although this was my first trip to Pakistan, one of the two other colleagues who accompanied me had visited the country on three previous occasions. For two reasons, we had exceptional access to some 60 current and former civilian and military government officials (including a two-hour visit to the ISI headquarters), members of the media and academia, and heads of nongovernmental organizations. First, one of the members of the working group who helped us formulate the report is now the Pakistani ambassador to the United States. Second, several of our colleagues from the Center for American Progress have moved into key positions in the Obama administration. Moreover, since we aren't in government, it was easier for us to challenge the bromides that some officials peddle. Before the visit, I knew Pakistan was facing several critical political, economic, and security problems. Still, there were some hopeful signs: Pakistan held free and fair elections in February 2008; the country has an independent judiciary and a vibrant civil society and media; and the Obama administration and Congress were finally making U.S. relations with Pakistan a priority. That said, the day we arrived, the U.S. media gave the impression that Pakistan was in dire straits. Some were going so far as to compare the current condition of Pakistan to that of contemporary Somalia, a failed state already in or about to be engulfed in chaos. Similarly, some high-level officials in the Obama administration contend Pakistan resembles Iran in 1979, a Muslim country about to be taken over by a group of radical Islamists. Others see Islamabad as Saigon in 1975, a capital city about to fall to an advancing enemy. Finally, some analysts compare today's Pakistan to that of Afghanistan in the 1990s, when the Taliban stepped into a chaotic situation and restored order. After my trip, though, I believe that all of these comparisons are inaccurate and overstated. Pakistan isn't about to descend into chaos, nor will it be taken over by the Taliban any time soon.

Pakistan 1NC - Defense

Army Dominated by Punjabis – will never allow pashtun takeover

Korb, ’09 (Lawrence, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, Korb served as assistant secretary of defense during the Reagan administration, Bulletin Atomic Scientists, 5/19, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-security-of-pakistans-nuclear-arsenal)

It's also important to note that Islamabad's intelligence service, or ISI, which has been a renegade operation for nearly two decades, has been brought under the army's control. In fact, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the current Pakistani Army Chief of Staff, once headed the ISI, and the high-level officials in that agency are all his appointees and thus, very loyal to him. Lastly, the Pakistani Army is composed mostly of Punjabis, and the Taliban insurgents are entirely Pashtun. Therefore, the army won't let these insurgents, who they see as outsiders, take control of the heart of Pakistan (as opposed to the frontier areas) or the nuclear weapons. Given the strategic location of Pakistan and the fact that it has nuclear weapons, it's easy to see why some might embrace a worst-case scenario. But based on my visit, I don't buy it at this time.

No Popular Support

Korb, ’09 (Lawrence, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, Korb served as assistant secretary of defense during the Reagan administration, Bulletin Atomic Scientists, 5/19, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-security-of-pakistans-nuclear-arsenal)

The trip reinforced my belief that Pakistan has a great many political, economic, and social problems that prevent it from achieving its full potential. But the majority of the population wants the duly constituted government to fulfill its responsibilities to promote the general welfare and provide for the common defense. They aren't looking to some outside force such as the Taliban to assume control of the country and solve these problems. Unlike Afghanistan in the 1990s, the Taliban in Pakistan isn't seen as a group capable of imposing order on a chaotic situation. Rather, the Taliban is seen as an organization trying to upset the existing order. For instance, the majority of the Pakistani population urged the government to take forceful action against the Taliban when it reneged on its agreement in the Swat District.

Ext – No Coup

Pakistan imposion is a myth – no coup and weapons are secure

Innocent, Foreign Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute, 2009

“Myth v. Fact: Afghanistan” September 4, 2009

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/malou-innocent/myth-v-fact-afghanistan\_b\_277411.html

The "Pakistan-is-imploding" theme that coursed through the Beltway like wildfire last spring was excessively alarmist.

First, the danger of militants seizing Pakistan's nuclear weapons remains highly unlikely. Pakistan has an elaborate command and control system in place that complies with strict Western standards, and the country's warheads, detonators, and missiles are not stored fully-assembled, but are scattered and physically separated throughout the country.

Second, average militants have no viable means of taking over a country of 172 million people. The dominant political force within Pakistan is not radical fundamentalist Islam, but a desire for a sound economy and basic security. In fact, if the country were to be taken over by al Qaeda sympathizers, it would likely be because U.S. policies in both Pakistan and neighboring Afghanistan are being exploited by militants to undermine public support for the government in Islamabad.

Army Checks

Korb, ’09 (Lawrence, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, Korb served as assistant secretary of defense during the Reagan administration, Bulletin Atomic Scientists, 5/19, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-security-of-pakistans-nuclear-arsenal)

Moreover, at this time, the Pakistani Army has no desire to seize political power, nor will it let the Taliban take control of Pakistan proper or seize Pakistan's nuclear weapons. The Pakistani Army jealously guards its reputation. In fact, it places a higher priority on its reputation and its interest than that of the country. The army knows that if it staged a coup at this time, it would become responsible for all of the country's economic and social problems. Likewise, the Pakistani military, which numbers about 1 million soldiers, has enough brute force to prevent the Taliban from breaking out of the rural areas of the frontier provinces and into the heart of Pakistan, even if it keeps a large contingent on the border with India. Since the army knows that the collateral damage--including creating refugees--would be significant if it uses force, it won't take action until ordered to do so by the prime minister and the Parliament.

No Loose nukes or radical takeover

Korb, ’09 (Lawrence, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, Korb served as assistant secretary of defense during the Reagan administration, Bulletin Atomic Scientists, 5/19, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-security-of-pakistans-nuclear-arsenal)

I'm also convinced that Pakistan's nuclear weapons won't be allowed to fall into the hands of the insurgents. This sentiment is shared by Gen. David Petraeus, the CENTCOM commander, and Adm. Michael Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the president himself. In a recent interview with Newsweek, Obama said, "We have confidence that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is safe; that the Pakistani military is equipped to prevent extremists from taking over those arsenals." Why? Because even though the program originally was started by a civilian, President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in the 1970s, the weapons now are firmly under the control of the Pakistani Army; the army sees them as its main counterweight to India's large conventional forces and nuclear capabilities, which it views as the real existential threat to Pakistan. That's exactly why it's currently increasing its nuclear arsenal. In addition, over the past three years, Washington has made a $100-million investment to improve Pakistan's nuclear weapon safeguards. (The Pakistanis won't let us see how this money was spent because they fear that we will use this information to disable the nukes.)

Ext – No Indo Pak War

Proximately makes nuclear use an impossible option for either country

Chandra and Ganguly, India’s Ambassador to the U.S. and professor of poli sci @ Hunter College, 1999

Naresh Chandra is India's Ambassador to the United States

Sumit Ganguly:\*\*Dr. Ganguly is Professor of Political Science at Hunter College of the City University of New York. He is the author of The Origins of War in South Asia (Second Edition, 1994) and Between War and Peace: The Crisis in Kashmir (forthcoming).

CDI Show Transcript: Nuclear War Between India and Pakistan? December 13, 1999

<http://www.cdi.org/adm/1214/transcript.html>

NARRATOR: Professor Ganguly does not imply that India or Pakistan would behave any more or less responsibly than other nuclear powers. Rather, his focus on the potential for accidents is precisely because a conscious decision by India or Pakistan to start a nuclear war simply does not make sense. To begin with, the countries are so close together, that neither could attack from a safe distance. CHANDRA: I think the nuclear devices cannot possibly be used in Kashmir or nearabout, because people talk a lot of proximity of India and Pakistan. That also is insurance that nobody would attack each other with nuclear devices. NARRATOR: India and Pakistan share important natural resources, including water resources, which could be destroyed if either side uses a nuclear weapon against the other. There is also a familial connection between the two countries. In fact, there are nearly as many Muslims in India as there are in Pakistan. NARRATOR: A rational decision on either side to use nuclear weapons is also highly unlikely given their history. Even when India and Pakistan have been at war, they have both followed unwritten rules against inflicting high levels of irrevocable destruction on each other. GANGULY: .... These were real gentlemen's wars, if one may use that term. India could have very easily bombed water resources in the Pakistani Punjab and wreaked havoc. And the Pakistanis could have done the same thing, but they chose not to do that.

Pakistan 1NC - Offense

Smaller footprint increases anti-Americanism and recruitment outside of Afghanistan

Hegghammer ‘09

(Thomas,- senior research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) and an associate of the Initiative on Religion in International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs “The big impact of small footprints”11-11 http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/11/11/the\_big\_impact\_of\_small\_footprints)

Why, then, would a small footprint approach in Afghanistan create more visual symbols of Muslim suffering? For a start, a troop reduction would not take away the occupation, at least not in the eyes of non-Afghan Islamists. Al Qaeda has a very wide definition of occupation and would frame any U.S. military presence in the region as such. Moreover, the surgical strikes would not be that surgical. A significantly smaller U.S. ground presence is likely to produce less good human intelligence, because it will be harder to protect informants. This will increase the risk of hitting, for example, wedding parties. In addition, fewer strikes means that each individual operation is more visible. This mitigates the problem of information saturation which currently frustrates jihadi propagandists. In war, many bad things happen, but individual incidents drown in the noise of the conflict. This may explain why interest in the Iraqi insurgency on jihadi forums has decreased steadily since 2005; there was so much going on that even jihadis were desensitized. A related dynamic may be behind the paradox that in Pakistan, public outrage over CIA drone strikes seems to have decreased in 2008 and 2009 as the frequency of strikes has gone up. For al Qaeda's propagandists, less can be more. Last but not least, the Taliban will be better placed to exploit the attacks politically. Surgical strikes can work, provided the government on whose territory they occur is a relatively friendly one. The killing of al Qaeda operative Abu Ali al-Harithi by a CIA drone in Yemen in 2002 was certainly controversial, but it did not become a major symbol of Muslim suffering, because there was no civilian collateral damage and no images of the incident. Likewise, drone strikes in Pakistan have been unpopular, but Islamabad's complicity gives Pakistani officials an incentive to keep photographers away from the aftermath. By contrast, a future Taliban-dominated government would do everything in its power to amplify the visual impact and exaggerate the collateral damage of American operations. It would use diplomatic and other channels to build international political pressure on the U.S. stop its attacks. There would be calls on Washington to offer concrete evidence and justification for each major attack, which would be hard to do without sharing sensitive intelligence. Meanwhile, al Qaeda would hide among civilians. For the Taliban, plausible deniability would be easy to establish: after all, Kabul cannot prevent Arab tourists, charity workers and preachers from entering the country. With the small footprint approach, al Qaeda will have a safe haven in Afghanistan, albeit a somewhat less open one than in the late 1990s.

Withdrawal increases dependence on UAV strikes --- inflames resentment

Hegghammer ‘09

(Thomas,- senior research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) and an associate of the Initiative on Religion in International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs “The big impact of small footprints”11-11 http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/11/11/the\_big\_impact\_of\_small\_footprints)

It is ironic that many proponents of troop reduction in Afghanistan are also critical of drone strikes in Pakistan. What they do not seem to realize is that the small footprint approach will increase our reliance on drone strikes in Afghanistan. Without a major ground presence, airstrikes will be our principal tool for keeping al Qaeda on the run and deterring the Taliban from hosting them. Such intermittent strikes may well create more anti-Americanism outside Afghanistan than the current occupation.

Pakistan 1NC - Offense

**Instability Turn:**

**US withdraw de-stabilizes Pakistan – it only encourages extremism**

Lisa Curtis is Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center and James Phillips is Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. “Shortsighted U.S. Policies on Afghanistan to Bring Long-Term Problems” – Heritage Foundation Reports – Published on October 5, 2009 – http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/shortsighted-us-policies-on-afghanistan-to-bring-long-term-problems

There have been several positive developments in Pakistan over the last six months, such as the Pakistan military's thrust into the Swat Valley to evict pro-Taliban elements and significant improvement in U.S.-Pakistani joint operations along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border that led to the elimination of Baitullah Mehsud in August. Moreover, the Pakistani military is reportedly preparing for an offensive in South Waziristan, where al-Qaeda and other extremists have been deeply entrenched for the last few years. But this recent success in Pakistan should not mislead U.S. policymakers into thinking that the U.S. can turn its attention away from Afghanistan. In fact, now is the time to demonstrate military resolve in Afghanistan so that al-Qaeda and its affiliates will be squeezed on both sides of the border. If the U.S. scales back the mission in Afghanistan at a time when the Taliban views itself as winning the war there, it is possible that the recent gains in Pakistan will be squandered. Anti-extremist constituencies in Pakistan that are fighting for their lives and the future of Pakistan are begging the U.S. to "stay the course" in Afghanistan, with full knowledge that a U.S. retreat would embolden extremists region-wide. Washington should listen to these voices.

US Withdraw cause Al Qaeda to re-enter. This forces US re-entry – turning the case.

John Nagl is the president of the Center for a New American Security. The National Interest. March/April 2010 – http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22916

This is not to mention the regional consequences of an American withdrawal from Afghanistan, the costs of which would be severe. The dominant regional narrative—that the United States will abandon its friends without compunction—would be reinforced. NATO, having made a more extensive commitment to Afghanistan than to any post–Cold War conflict, would be severely weakened. Pakistan would be forced to recalculate its recent decisions to fight against the Taliban inside its own borders because the balance of power in the region would shift in favor of the Taliban upon our departure. Al-Qaeda would likely again decide that Afghanistan presents a more favorable home under those circumstances than do the tribal regions of Pakistan, which are subject to at least some degree of state control. America would again have to invade and occupy Afghanistan to drive out the terrorists.

Pakistan 1NC - Offense

US Withdrawal causes Pakistan to preemptively tilt towards Taliban - collapses Pakistan and causes nuclear war with india – multiple reasons

Kagan and Kagan, 9 (Fred and Kim, former prof of military history @ West Point and military historian, 10/12, http://www.aei.org/article/101110)

Within Pakistan, the U.S. reversion to a counterterrorism strategy (from the counterinsurgency strategy for which Obama reaffirmed his support as recently as August) would disrupt the delicate balance that has made possible recent Pakistani progress against internal foes and al Qaeda. Pakistani president Asif Ali Zardari, army chief of staff General Ashfaq Kayani, and others who have supported Pakistani operations against the Taliban are facing an entrenched resistance within the military and among retired officers. This resistance stems from the decades-long relationships nurtured between the Taliban and Pakistan, which started during the war to expel the Soviet Army. Advocates within Pakistan of continuing to support the Taliban argue that the United States will abandon Afghanistan as it did in 1989, creating chaos that only the Taliban will be able to fill in a manner that suits Pakistan. Zardari and Kayani have been able to overcome this internal resistance sufficiently to mount major operations against Pakistani Taliban groups, in part because the rhetoric and actions of the Obama administration to date have seemed to prove the Taliban advocates wrong. The announcement of the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces would prove them right. Pakistani operations against their own insurgents--as well as against al Qaeda, which lives among those insurgents--would probably grind to a halt as Pakistan worked to reposition itself in support of a revived Taliban government in Afghanistan. And a renewed stream of Afghan refugees would likely overwhelm the Pakistani government and military, rendering coherent operations against insurgents and terrorists difficult or impossible. The collapse of Pakistan, or even the revival of an aggressive and successful Islamist movement there, would be a calamity for the region and for the United States. It would significantly increase the risk that al Qaeda might obtain nuclear weapons from Pakistan's stockpile, as well as the risk that an Indo-Pakistani war might break out involving the use of nuclear weapons.

Link Turn 2NC

The plan increases the visibility of each attack and prevents desensitizing potential recruits to the conflict --- history proves these symbols affect recruitment more than an escalated conflict

Hegghammer ‘09

(Thomas,- senior research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) and an associate of the Initiative on Religion in International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs “The big impact of small footprints”11-11 http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/11/11/the\_big\_impact\_of\_small\_footprints)

A growing number of people, led by Vice President Joe Biden, are advocating a so-called "small footprint" approach to the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan. They propose a significantly reduced military presence that focuses more on destroying al Qaeda than on building Afghanistan, and relies more on airstrikes and special forces than on conventional tactics. America will get about as much security as before, the argument goes, but at a much lower price. A return of the Taliban to power is not necessarily a problem, small footprint proponents argue, because the regime can be deterred from hosting al Qaeda by the threat of U.S. airstrikes or another invasion. One of the many assumptions behind this tempting argument is that there is a certain level of proportionality between the amount of force we use and the level of resistance we encounter. If we stop occupying Afghanistan and limit violence to the really bad guys, al Qaeda will be unable, and other radicalized Muslims unwilling, to attack the United States. This may be true for local insurgencies such as the Taliban, but not for small transnational movements such as al Qaeda. In fact, a significantly smaller U.S. presence in Afghanistan may paradoxically generate more anti-Americanism outside Afghanistan and ultimately more anti-Western terrorism than a more conventional military approach. This is because jihadi propaganda today relies on visually powerful symbols to mobilize people, and intermittent "surgical" strikes, and the casualties they cause, may create more such symbols than continuous conventional warfare. The history of jihadism is full of examples of seemingly small incidents having a major effect on mobilization. In August 1998, the U.S. launched missiles on Afghanistan and Sudan in retaliation for al Qaeda attacks on U.S. embassies in East Africa. The strikes made Mullah Omar work more closely with Osama Bin Laden and were followed by an increase in recruitment to al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. In April 2002, the Israeli military's incursion into Jenin caused a veritable political earthquake in the Muslim world, and demonstrably helped recruitment to al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. This was despite the relatively few casualties (a U.N. report concluded 52 Palestinian were killed, half of them civilians). In Pakistan, a few failed U.S. airstrikes in the Tribal Areas in 2006 and 2007 caused public outrage.and dramatically increased anti-Americanism across the country. The power of small incidents has increased in the past decade thanks to the Internet. Increasing bandwidth, cheaper digital cameras and fast-learning activists have turned the world wide web into a giant propaganda tool which can generate powerful visual messages and project them instantly to a global audience. The smallest detail can be dramatically enlarged and turned into a symbol of "Muslim suffering at the hands of non-Muslims." On jihadi discussion forums such as Faloja (named after the Iraqi city whose 2004 battles between jihadis and U.S. forces made it an icon of Muslim suffering), high-quality video productions appear on a daily basis. The relationship between objective physical destruction and jihadi mobilization has never been less linear. (Of course, the non-linearity works both ways; more conventional power does not necessarily generate less powerful propaganda.)

Instability Turn 2NC

Extend our Pakistan Instability Turn:

Our 1NC Curtis & Phillips ev proves that US presence currently helps the Pakistani government defeat terror cells that pose a threat to Pakistan.

This turns the Aff because *their* argument is that terrorism in Pakistan freaks-out India.

Here’s more proof that US withdraw de-stabilizes Pakistan – more suicide bombings and hurts Pakistan’s economy

Wall Street Journal, editorial staff, “U.S. Credibility and Pakistan” – OCTOBER 1, 2009 – http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704471504574443352072071822.html

As for the consequences to Pakistan of an American withdrawal, the foreign minister noted that "we will be the *immediate* effectees of your policy." Among the effects he predicts are "more misery," "more suicide bombings," and a dramatic loss of confidence in the economy, presumably as investors fear that an emboldened Taliban, no longer pressed by coalition forces in Afghanistan, would soon turn its sights again on Islamabad. Mr. Qureshi's arguments carry all the more weight now that Pakistan's army is waging an often bloody struggle to clear areas previously held by the Taliban and their allies. Pakistan has also furnished much of the crucial intelligence needed to kill top Taliban and al Qaeda leaders in U.S. drone strikes. But that kind of cooperation will be harder to come by if the U.S. withdraws from Afghanistan and Islamabad feels obliged to protect itself in the near term by striking deals with various jihadist groups, as it has in the past. Pakistanis have long viewed the U.S. through the lens of a relationship that has oscillated between periods of close cooperation—as during the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s—and periods of tension and even sanctions—as after Pakistan's test of a nuclear device in 1998. Pakistan's democratic government has taken major risks to increase its assistance to the U.S. against al Qaeda and the Taliban. Mr. Qureshi is warning, in so many words, that a U.S. retreat from Afghanistan would make it far more difficult for Pakistan to help against al Qaeda.

Withdrawal collapses Afghanistan – spills over into Pakistan and iran

Kagan and Kagan, 9 (Fred and Kim, former prof of military history @ West Point and military historian, 10/12, http://www.aei.org/article/101110)

It is very likely that the insurgency will grow in size and strength in 2010 faster than Afghan security forces can be developed without the addition of significant numbers of American combat troops.

If the United States should adopt a small-footprint counterterrorism strategy, Afghanistan would descend again into civil war. The Taliban group headed by Mullah Omar and operating in southern Afghanistan (including especially Helmand, Kandahar, and Oruzgan Provinces) is well positioned to take control of that area upon the withdrawal of American and allied combat forces. The remaining Afghan security forces would be unable to resist a Taliban offensive. They would be defeated and would disintegrate. The fear of renewed Taliban assaults would mobilize the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras in northern and central Afghanistan. The Taliban itself would certainly drive on Herat and Kabul, leading to war with northern militias. This conflict would collapse the Afghan state, mobilize the Afghan population, and cause many Afghans to flee into Pakistan and Iran.

Troop withdrawal from Afghanistan is bad – increases the risk that Pakistan’s weapons will fall into the wrong hands.

The Times (London) – May 3, 2010 – lexis

Afghanistan remains a necessary war. To abandon it would risk Western security. Not only would al-Qaeda return to use the country as a haven but such a failing state could destabilise neighbouring Pakistan and its weak Government. An Islamist takeover of Pakistan and its nuclear weapons would be a disaster for the region and for efforts to counter nuclear proliferation.

Instability Turn 2NC

perception of US withdrawal will solve ethnic recruitment issues – vital internal link to Taliban victory

Dorronsoro, scholar at the Carnegie Endowment expert on Afghanistan, 2009

Gilles Dorronsoro, a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment, is an expert on Afghanistan, Turkey, and South Asia. His research focuses on security and political development in Afghanistan, particularly the role of the International Security Assistance Force, the necessary steps for a viable government in Kabul, and the conditions necessary for withdrawal scenarios.

Previously, Dorronsoro was a professor of political science at the Sorbonne, Paris and the Institute of Political Studies of Rennes. He also served as the scientific coordinator at the French Institute of Anatolian Studies in Istanbul, Turkey.

“The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan” <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/taliban_winning_strategy.pdf>

The alienation of the Pashtuns is a major factor in the insurgency’s success in the South. However, this could seriously impair the insurgency’s progress in the North, where the Pashtuns are a minority. The Taliban cannot hope to “win” Afghanistan ultimately without generalizing the conflict throughout the state. Therefore, the Taliban are trying to avoid being seen as Pashtun and at the same time do not want the Pashtun communities in the North to be stigmatized. The “ethnic question,” then, is key for the insurgency: How can a de facto Pashtun- based movement call for the unity of all Muslims and hope to gain ground outside its initial base? In other words, how can the Taliban use the Pashtun resentment in the South and simultaneously broaden the insurgency and include other ethnic groups in the North? To address this dilemma, the Taliban have been using those members who are drawn from non-Pashtun communities but are affiliated with the Taliban because of an ideological commitment. This strategy seems to work to a certain extent: In Samangan Province, for instance, the Taliban have found support in the Tatar community. Uzbek or Turkmen militants (and some militants from Uzbekistan) give the Taliban movement in the North a local face. In the longer term, the Taliban could rally more non-Pashtun groups on nonideological grounds if they appear to be winning in the war against the IC. In addition, the second component of the insurgency, the Hezb-i islami, historically has a fairly solid following in the North, for example in Badakhshan Antonio Guitozzi and Dominique Orsini, “Center-Periphery Relations in Afghanistan: Bada- khshan Between Patrimonialism and Institution-Building,” Central Asian Survey, 2009, p. 13. and Kunduz. As Guitozzi writes, “Although it is not clear to what extent Taliban preachers and agents had by spring 2008 been successful in raising support inside Badakhshan, the insurgent leadership of Hezb-i islami seems to have been successful in reactivating its old networks.”8 The actions of the two parties (the Hezb-i islami and the Taliban) in different parts of the North are complementary, since they do not try to recruit in the same networks.

Withdrawal pre-stabilization will result in a bloodier civil war destabilizing the entire region

Right Vision News 2010 Bangladesh: Obama's Af-Pak Idealism: Myths and Realities January 8, 2010 l/n

However, the new policy is a continuation of the Af-Pak doctrine announced on 27th March 2009 by President Obama and repeats the old rhetoric with one major change: it gives a time frame of 18 months for US military withdrawal from Afghanistan after handing over security responsibilities to Afghan forces. The memories of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan after the Soviet collapse in 1989 leaving the country in chaos are still vivid in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A repeat of that scenario, before stabilizing the security situation in Afghanistan, would be catastrophic as the Afghan government may collapse resulting in even a bloodier civil war, renewed humanitarian crisis and mass refugees exodus putting regional stability at risk of unseen dangers. No better arrangement could have been designed to facilitate the return to power of the Taliban, and its dreaded guests, the Al Qaeda. It is paradoxical that a force as large as approximately 2,50,000 US-NATO-ANA soldiers is going to fight with a force of fewer than 100 Al-Qaeda members and around 15,000 to 20,000 Taliban according to CIA's own estimates.

Instability Turn 2NC

Withdrawal bad – India/Pakistan

Twining 2009 Daniel Twining is senior fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. During the Bush administration, he served as a member of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's policy planning staff, with responsibility for South Asia and regional issues in East Asia. “The stakes in Afghanistan go well beyond Afghanistan” September 30, 2009 http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/30/the\_stakes\_of\_afghanistan\_go\_well\_beyond\_afghanistan The problem with the current debate over Afghanistan is that it is too focused on Afghanistan. There is no question that the intrinsic importance of winning wars our country chooses to fight -- to secure objectives that remain as compelling today as they were on September 12, 2001 -- is itself reason for President Obama to put in place a strategy for victory in Afghanistan. But the larger frame has been lost in the din of debate over General McChrystal's leaked assessment, President Obama's intention to ramp up or draw down in Afghanistan, and the legitimacy of the Afghan election. In fact, it is vital for the United States and its allies to recommit to building an Afghan state that can accountably govern its people and defeat the Taliban insurgency -- for reasons that have to do not only with Afghanistan's specific pathologies but with the implications of failure for the wider region and America's place in the international system. The surreal belief in some quarters that abandoning Afghanistan -- described as a "graveyard of empires" with its complicated tribes, forbidding terrain, and peripheral strategic importance -- would not have direct and bloody consequences for the United States, never mind the Afghan people, can be answered with three numbers: 9-11. It is troubling that our political and foreign policy elites even need to engage this debate (including its more sophisticated but equally illusory variants like moving to an "over-the-horizon" strike-and-retreat strategy). At the same time, the experts (correctly) advocating a counterinsurgency strategy make the same mistake of framing their arguments purely with reference to Afghanistan's internal dynamics. As important as they are, they constitute only part of a wider strategic landscape that would be upended by a U.S. decision to reduce its political and military commitment to Afghanistan. A recent trip to Islamabad and Lahore revealed to me that most Pakistani elites -- including the small minority that could credibly be described as sympathetic to Western goals in Afghanistan -- already believe that the game is up: the will of the transatlantic allies is broken, Obama doesn't have the courage or vision to see America's mission in Afghanistan through to victory, and the U.S. is well along the road to walking away from Afghanistan as it did after 1989. This widespread Pakistani belief has encouraged behavior deeply inimical to Washington's regional aims, with the effect that the American debate over whether Afghanistan is worth it is inspiring Pakistani actions that will make success all the harder to achieve. After all, why shouldn't the Pakistani security services continue to invest in their friendly relations with the Taliban if Mullah Omar and company soon will take power in Afghanistan's Pashtun heartland? Why should the Pakistani military take on the militant groups that regularly launch cross-border attacks into Afghanistan when the NATO targets of those attacks will soon slink away in defeat? Why should the Pakistani government get serious about wrapping up the Quetta Shura when the Afghan Taliban appears to be ascendant in the face of Western weakness? Why should Pakistan's intelligence service break its ties to Lashkar-e-Taiba, one of the world's most potent terrorist groups, when it forms such a useful instrument with which to bleed U.S. ally India? And why should Pakistani civilian and military leaders overtly cooperate with the United States when it appears such a weak and unreliable ally of the Afghan people -- incapable, despite its singular wealth and resources, of defeating a 25,000-man insurgency in one of the poorest countries on Earth? As Chris Brose and I recently argued, it is vital for the West to prevail in Afghanistan because of its effect in shaping Pakistan's strategic future. Proponents of drawing down in Afghanistan on the grounds that Pakistan is the more important strategic prize have it only half right: if Pakistan is the strategic prize, it should be unthinkable not to press for victory in Afghanistan given the spillover effects of a Western defeat there. All of Pakistan's pathologies -- from terrorist sanctuary in ungoverned spaces, to radicalized public opinion that creates an enabling environment for violent extremism, to lack of economic opportunity that incentivizes militancy, to the (in)security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, to the military's oversized role in political life in ways that stunt the development of civilian institutions -- all of this will intensify should Afghanistan succumb to the Taliban as the West withdraws. These dynamics, in turn, will destabilize India in ways that could torpedo the country's rise to world power -- and the strategic dividends America would reap from India's success. New Delhi is now a truer proponent of Washington's original objectives in Afghanistan -- the Taliban's decisive defeat by military force rather than reconciliation and the construction of a capable Afghan democracy -- than some American leaders are now. Afghanistan is in India's backyard -- they shared a border until 1947 -- and the collapse of its government would destabilize Pakistan in ways that would quickly cost Indian dearly. Indian strategists fear that the spillover from a Taliban victory in Afghanistan would induce Pakistan's "Lebanonization," with the Pakistani Taliban becoming a kind of South Asian Hezbollah that would launch waves of crippling attacks against India. India cannot rise to be an Asian balancer, global security provider, and engine of the world economy if it is mired in interminable proxy conflict with terrorists emanating from a weak or collapsing state armed with nuclear weapons on its border.

Instability Turn 2NC

Withdrawal Emboldens extremists globally

Traub 2010 Foreign Policy, “COIN Toss: Is Hamid Karzai worth the fight in Afghanistan? We'd better learn the answer soon -- or give up the counterinsurgency game”

James Traub is a contributing writer for The New York Times Magazine, where he has worked since 1998. From 1994 to 1997, he was a staff writer for The New Yorker.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/29/coin\_toss

Still, at the bottom of each list I had written the great equalizer: On one side, "We can afford to lose," and on the other, "We can't afford to lose." If U.S. and NATO troops really are facing kids who can't see beyond their neighborhood, or even fundamentalists who will be satisfied by stripping away all vestiges of modernity from Afghanistan, then the war is simply unnecessary for Americans. Americans lived with Taliban control of Afghanistan in 1997, and ashamed though they might feel for having raised the hopes of the Afghan people only to abandon them, Americans would probably live with it again. Perhaps they would pay no graver cost in leaving Afghanistan than they did in pulling out of Vietnam in 1975. But I doubt it. While communism was rapidly discrediting itself as a fighting faith in the 1970s, jihadism is a vibrant cause that would experience profound validation from a forced U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. As Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies recently wrote, the Afghan Taliban is "far better linked to Al Qa'ida and other international extremist groups" than it was only a few years ago; should they gain real power, "they are likely to become such a sanctuary and a symbol of victory that will empower similar extremists all over the world." This is not to say that a monolithic jihadism will spread outward from Afghanistan in a contemporary version of the domino theory, but rather that a Taliban victory there is likely to attract and inspire Islamist radicals everywhere.

\*\*\*SCO Answers\*\*\*

SCO-NATO 1NC

SCO-NATO Cooperation high now --- in Afghanistan and across the board

RIA Novosti ‘09 “SCO summit expected to vote for global cooperation” 6-11 <http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20090611/155224628.html> Accessed 7.20.10

At the same time, no organization is willing to abandon cooperation with the United States or the European Union, provided it is based on the principles of equality and respect for each other. There is a dire need for such cooperation. The NATO and SCO conferences in March showed that the two organizations are prepared to cooperate in Afghanistan. The six SCO states welcome the policy of U.S. President Barack Obama, who has declared Afghanistan and Pakistan a number one priority. Therefore, the SCO summit in Yekaterinburg may vote for cooperation with the U.S. and NATO. This will be evidence of the organization’s willingness to cooperate with non-regional forces, and not only in Afghanistan.

SCO can’t increase cooperation --- too many internal disputes

Robert Matthews is an associate researcher at FRIDE, a security studies thinktank in Madrid and Fionnuala Ní Eigeartaigh is a writer and editor working in the field of international relations and conference rappprteur for FRIDE, March, 2009 http://www.fride.org/descarga/CR10\_Afghanistan\_Crisis\_Regional\_Eng\_sep09.pdf Accessed 7.20.10

There are many shoals on the way to success for a regionally-based international effort. The challenges in promoting it are indeed great for an international community that has yet to find an effective way to coordinate its own role in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is at the crossroads for several regional groupings, and forming a coherent regional group may prove difficult. Moreover, there is no consensus on what kind of Afghanistan is acceptable to all countries having a stake. Complex bilateral rivalries, including – but not limited to – Pakistan-India, Iran-Saudi Arabia, and Russia-United States, characterise the region and could derail a regional solution to Afghanistan. An approach that relies on regional states may encounter weaknesses inherent in the states themselves. Afghanistan and its neighbourhood are fragmented and complex; the countries are often impoverished, competing for resources and displaying mutual distrust and resentment. These weaknesses also compound the difficulty of dealing with multiple war zones within Afghanistan. Finally, globalisation has weakened state actors, and existing regional organisations such as the SCO, while potentially strong players currently have their own agendas and, in any case, may not wield real influence. Russia and Central Asia are indispensable elements in any regional effort, but there is no strong evidence that Central Asian countries wish to be directly involved in Afghanistan security strategies. Central Asian development issues, particularly water and energy, are gaining growing importance and are a further source of regional tension. Russia, as well as China, may be more interested in bilateral relations with Pakistan and Afghanistan than in any regional grouping inspired and led by the US. Iran is a key actor in any regional dialogue, but it views the role of Saudi Arabia with considerable wariness and, of course, is still hostile to the intentions of the main international actor there: the United States. Another risk is that Iran, Pakistan, Russia and China, all wary of the US military build-up, will respond tepidly to US-led regional diplomacy.

SCO-NATO 1NC

SCO can’t solve resource conflict

Alexander Cooley is Associate Professor of Political Science at Barnard, Columbia University in New York and an Open Society Global Fellow researching the rise of the SCO in Central Asia, March 11th, 2010 <http://www.globeurope.com/standpoint/think-strategic> Accessed 7.20.10

Internal problems continue to plague the organization. Chief among them is the growing economic competition between its two largest members, Russia and China. The financial crisis has severely eroded Russia’s economic influence in Central Asia, while it has allowed China to accumulate energy assets in exchange for providing loans and investments to the Central Asian countries. Fearing Beijing’s growing economic ambition, Moscow has refused to support Beijing’s SCO economic initiatives, such as co-founding a $10 billion anti-crisis fund last year or creating a free economic area. Instead, Moscow has aggressively pushed the Central Asian states to work within the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) or, in the case of Astana, the recently formed Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, both of which exclude Beijing. Not surprisingly, China has grown increasingly frustrated with Russia’s competitive posture and reluctance to support its SCO agenda. Moreover, the Central Asian states themselves simply refuse to implement Beijing’s proposed regional public goods initiatives. Despite regular Ministerial and Presidential level cooperative declarations on issues such as integrating regional infrastructure, telecommunications and power grids, the Central Asian states are hesitant to subject any sector in which domestic companies have ties to their ruling families to external competition. The SCO has also failed to address pressing common resource management issues, including the disputes over water rights that are now escalating tensions between Uzbekistan and its neighbors. In such an institutional and regional climate, it is difficult to imagine any meaningful Central Asian economic integration across Central Asia along the lines witnessed in the EU, in ASEAN or NAFTA.

No Baltic Conflict ---- NATO and the SCO will cooperate anyways

Collins and Wohlforth ’04

(Kathleen,- Assistant Prof of Poly Sci at Notre Dame William,- Associate Prof of Government at Dartmouth “DEFYING “GREAT GAME” EXPECTATIONS”)

The popular great game lens for analyzing Central Asia fails to capture the declared interests of the great powers as well as the best reading of their objective interests in security and economic growth. Perhaps more importantly, it fails to explain their actual behavior on the ground, as well the specific reactions of the Central Asian states themselves. Naturally, there are competitive elements in great power relations. Each country’s policymaking community has slightly different preferences for tackling the challenges presented in the region, and the more influence they have the more able they are to shape events in concordance with those preferences. But these clashing preferences concern the means to serve ends that all the great powers share. To be sure, policy-makers in each capital would prefer that their own national firms or their own government’s budget be the beneficiaries of any economic rents that emerge from the exploitation and transshipment of the region’s natural resources. But the scale of these rents is marginal even for Russia’s oil-fueled budget. And for taxable profits to be created, the projects must make sense economically—something that is determined more by markets and firms than governments. Does it matter? The great game is an arresting metaphor that serves to draw people’s attention to an oft-neglected region. The problem is that the great-game lens can distort realities on the ground, and therefore bias analysis and policy. For when great powers are locked in a competitive fight, the issues at hand matter less than their implication for the relative power of contending states. Power itself becomes the issue—one that tends to be nonnegotiable. Viewing an essential positive-sum relationship through zero sum conceptual lenses will result in missed opportunities for cooperation that leaves all players—not least the people who live in the region—poorer and more insecure. While cautious realism must remain the watchword concerning an impoverished and potentially unstable region comprised of fragile and authoritarian states, our analysis yields at least conditional and relative optimism. Given the confluence of their chief strategic interests, the major powers are in a better position to serve as a stabilizing force than analogies to the Great Game or the Cold War would suggest. It is important to stress that the region’s response to the profoundly destabilizing shock of coordinated terror attacks was increased cooperation between local governments and China and Russia, and—multipolar rhetoric notwithstanding—between both of them and the United States. If this trend is nurtured and if the initial signals about potential SCO-CSTO-NATO cooperation are pursued, another destabilizing shock might generate more rather than less cooperation among the major powers. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan are clearly on a trajectory that portends longer-term cooperation with each of the great powers. As military and economic security interests become more entwined, there are sound reasons to conclude that “great game” politics will not shape Central Asia’s future in the same competitive and destabilizing way as they have controlled its past. To the contrary, mutual interests in Central Asia may reinforce the broader positive developments in the great powers’ relations that have taken place since September 11, as well as reinforce regional and domestic stability in Central Asia.

SCO-NATO 1NC

Their hegemony impact takes itself out --- proves multi-polar solutions like NATO-SCO cooperation will fail

No risk of Arctic conflict --- institutions, treaties and negotiation check

Byers ’09

(Michael,- 12-16 “Cold Peace: International Cooperation Takes Hold in the Arctic” <http://www.cceia.org/resources/articles_papers_reports/0040.html> Accessed 7.20.10)

One occasionally hears talk of the need for an Arctic treaty modeled on the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, or for an Arctic-wide nuclear-weapons-free zone. Achieving multilateral agreement on such matters will not be easy, given the continued strategic importance of the Arctic for the United States and Russia; the significant populations that live there, especially in Alaska and Russia; and the considerable jurisdiction already vested in the Arctic Ocean coastal states under the law of the sea. Fortunately, a great deal of cooperation and international law already exists in the Arctic, beginning with UNCLOS and extending through the Arctic Council, the International Maritime Organization, and the very many ad hoc meetings between different governments. Treaties exist—and are complied with—on icebreaker transits, the protection of species at risk, the prevention and cleanup of pollution, and many other subjects. The few remaining boundary disputes are relatively minor and susceptible to negotiated solutions. Much of the cooperation is based on the sovereign rights that Arctic countries hold over their territories, adjoining waters, and continental shelf. This should come as no surprise, for the international legal system is the result of centuries of cooperation between sovereigns, as countries defined the boundaries between their respective jurisdictions and worked together in pursuit of common goals. In the Arctic, sovereign rights can facilitate cooperation by providing clear jurisdiction for regulating shipping and the extraction of natural resources, and for guarding against nonstate security threats. Thanks to international law, there is no race for Arctic resources. Nor is there any appetite for military confrontation. The Arctic, instead, has become a zone of quiet cooperation, as countries work together to map the seabed, protect the environment, and guard against new, non-state security threats.

Ext – Can’t Increase Co-op

SCO won’t increase cooperation --- suspicious of NATO and other controversies block

Marcel de Haas is a senior researcher at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2009 <http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2009/01/sco_central_asias_waking_giant.html> Accessed 7.20.10

Perhaps inevitably, the SCO – and Russia and China as its leading members – regards Nato's increased presence in the region with some distrust. As long as Nato remains reluctant to enter into a dialogue with the SCO, such a cautious attitude looks set to linger, and may even intensify. Consideration also needs to be given, therefore, to the establishment of a Nato-China Council, along the lines of the Nato-Russia Council, and to the creation of arrangements that would facilitate greater cooperation with the SCO as a whole. Such cooperation would not bridge the main differences between SCO members and the west over issues like democratisation and human rights. Cooperation would also need to comprise much more than mere joint policy development, and should involve the practical pursuit of mutually beneficial, smaller-scale ad hoc projects. Nato and the SCO could work together on neutralising anti-personnel mines in Afghanistan, as well as other possible types of confidence-building measures, such as joint police training and counter-narcotics operations.

Ext – Co-op Fails

SCO-NATO Co-operation doesn’t spillover and won’t blunt Russian aggression

Stephen Blank is Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College March 11th, 2009

“NATO CONFRONTS ITS EURASIAN RIVALS” <http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5057> Accessed 7.20.10

But many questions surround the CSTO and call into doubt its utility for genuine combat missions. Its supreme command remains quite undefined. Indeed, we are told that it will be a secretariat, not a true military command organization. Second, its missions, at least formally, also remain undefined. Sources tell us it will not be used to quell domestic unrest among members and that it will be used against foreign or terrorist threats. But it is clear that the Russian army, not to mention other member armies, is in no condition to fight insurgents. They certainly are not going into Afghanistan, and Belarus has already exempted its forces from foreign missions. So again it remains unclear exactly what those forces will do when deployed. While the CSTO leadership wants to cooperate with NATO against the drug trade, and this is certainly a worthy endeavor in principle, there is no public elaboration of how this cooperation would be accomplished and under what organizational formula. Absent any details, these calls for cooperation amount to mere propaganda, not serious military-political policy. Meanwhile, as the CSTO clearly is controlled and directed by Russia, it is likely to be used largely as an instrument of Russian policy. Moreover, Russia’s motives vis-à-vis NATO are quite transparent. Russia wants NATO to recognize this institution as a legitimate security provider because it is not ready to fully accept that Central Asian states can relate independently to NATO, and it wants to forestall and/or curtail their participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace or their bilateral military relations with the United States. It is a cardinal and fundamental point of Russian policy that no other foreign military be present in any form whatsoever in Central Asia or the Caucasus, whether it be naval, air, or land forces and, as the recent episode involving the U.S. air base at Manas confirms, Moscow is determined to oust America from the region even at the risk of obstructing effective military prosecution of the war against the Taliban. IMPLICATIONS: Abundant evidence – such as Moscow’s official statements that Central Asian states are not allowed to organize regionally without Russian participation - testifies to Moscow’s belief that the Central Asian states are not fully sovereign, and thus are incapable of effectively making their own defense decisions. Therefore, they will inevitably fall under the sway of one or another great power or bloc, and would be either pro-Russian or pro-Western but not independent if left to their own devices. Since Moscow defines pro-Western states as intrinsically hostile to it, clearly there is no alternative but to subsume these “independent” states under its leadership in a large military-political bloc of Russia’s own. Consequently, Moscow wants the CSTO to be the intermediary between them and NATO so that NATO must go through Moscow for any substantive security discussions with Central Asia. The idea that East and West are competing blocs that must be divided along lines of regional bipolarity is Moscow’s real foreign policy objective, and that it is what it means by multipolarity. This idea is a fixture in Russian foreign policy thinking. This author first heard it in Moscow in 1996 when participants at the biennial conference of European security institutions postulated that the U.S. should head the West and interact with Russia who led the former Soviet union, a posture that was properly and bitterly rejected by both Western and Eastern analysts there. Again in 2006, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov publicly advocated delimiting Eurasia between NATO and the Russian-sponsored Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). At the December 1, 2006, meeting of the CIS and Baltic States Media Forum, Ivanov argued that “the next logical step on the path of reinforcing international security may be to develop a cooperation mechanism between NATO and the CSTO, followed by a clear division of spheres of responsibility. This approach offers the prospect of enabling us to possess a sufficiently reliable and effective leverage for taking joint action in crisis situations in various regions of the world.” Not only is this a frank call for spheres of influence and for Russia to create a security system akin to a solar system in which smaller states revolve around Russia, it also returns us to the strategic bipolarity of the Cold War. Russian efforts to have NATO bless the SCO are also contrary to NATO’s interests and values, as well as the interests of Central Asian states. Although the SCO has conducted large-scale anti-terrorist exercises for several years, it is Russia, rather than other members, who is most intent on converting it into a primarily defense-oriented organization. It also has tried to use the SCO to gain support for such insupportable initiatives like the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Although Central Asian Governments value the SCO for its benefits allowing them to collaborate to impress their views upon Russia and China and for the benefits they receive from those two larger states, they have shown no inclination to convert the SCO into a fundamentally military organization as Russia apparently wants.

Ext – Co-op Fails

Cooperation over Afghanistan will break down --- other issues derail it

Eric Walberg writes for Al-Ahram Weekly, 2009, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s Special Conference on Afghanistan” <http://news.kontentkonsult.com/2009/04/shanghai-cooperation-organisations.html> Accessed 7.20.10

But Obama will be unlikely to capture this moment, given his timidity so far in dealing with the mess he was bequeathed. He needs to build a new coalition and endgame strategy that would avoid the humiliation the US suffered in Vietnam, and fast. There are many adjustments to be made — nixing the Bush-Brzezinski strategy of surrounding Russia with NATO members for starters. And winding down the campaign against Iran, which will include reining in Israel. US policymakers who want to reverse the reckless sabre-rattling of the Bush years can actually take solace in the rise of the SCO, which was founded in 2001 and whose growing prominence is a direct result of the Bush years. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and NATO’s self-proclaimed status as world policeman in the past two decades, Russia and China were more or less forced to form their own “NATO”. After all, nature abhors a vacuum. Ironically, as the attempt to surround Russia sputters, it is Afghanistan that is now surrounded by SCO members and observers, notably Iran, anxious to contain drug trafficking. In this context, US-Israel threats to attack Iran are more and more like the boy who cried “Wolf!” The Bush Afghanistan/Iran policies in shambles and there is little indication so far that much is being done to improve the situation. Can NATO and the SCO become allies in Afghanistan, or are they fated to be enemies? Council for Foreign Relations analyst Evan Feigenbaum, until recently the State Department’s deputy assistant secretary for South and Central Asia, says the SCO conference “offers an opportunity for the US to try to turn what are ostensibly common interests into complementary polices,” but he’s not optimistic. He pointed to the SCO call in 2005 for a timeline for a US withdrawal from military bases in Central Asia, which “attracted a lot of notoriety,” and asks just what the SCO could actually do in Afghanistan. Good question. How can Chinese and Russian support save the totally discredited Karzai regime? How would their “help” be greeted by Afghans? Clearly some accommodation with, if not total surrender to the Taliban is the deadend the US has reached, and SCO involvement can change this. Feigenbaum makes another telling observation: “We really don’t understand what the SCO is ... Is it a security group? Is it a trade bloc? Is it a group of non-democratic countries that have created a kind of safe zone where the US and Europeans don’t talk to them about human rights and democracy?” Indeed, there is little uniting the suspicious and uneasy SCO members other than fear and perhaps loathing of the US and Taliban, and a desire to staunch the drug smuggling which the US is failing so spectacularly to deal with. If NATO were to disband or at least retract its claws, the SCO might well collapse. Expanding it to include, say, Iran, let alone Pakistan and India, would paralyse it. The most likely cooperation would be in containing the drug flow, if the US is indeed serious about this and not part of the problem, as some analysts — in the first place Russian — contend. The prospects of establishing a stable, popular political regime opposed to the Taliban is a fantasy apparently shared by both NATO and the SCO. But Russia and China are hardly going to have more success in destroying the Taliban than the US. Any attempt by either Russia or China to contribute to the slaughter now taking place will only backfire among their own restive Muslim minorities, which all SCO members have. It appears that Russia genuinely wants the US to succeed in bringing Afghanistan to heel. Russia’s Ambassador to NATO Dmitri Rogozin said recently, “We want to prevent the virus of extremism from crossing the borders of Afghanistan and take over other states in the region such as Pakistan. If NATO failed, it would be Russia and her partners that would have to fight against the extremists in Afghanistan.” Rogozin proposes using the NATO-Russia Council to establish a security order stretching “from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Perhaps NATO could develop into PATO, a Pacific-Atlantic alliance.” Whether this is merely Rogozin being flippant is not clear. Surely such an organisation belongs as part of the UN, which is perhaps what he meant. In any case, Rogozin is back on the warpath, or rather the peacepath, calling NATO’s month-long war games in Georgia scheduled for 7 May a “provocation” and calling for them to be cancelled. If they go ahead, Russia will “take appropriate measures”, one of which already has been taken with the cancellation of a meeting of Russian and NATO general staff commanders this week. There are lots more aces up the Russian sleeve, including SCO and Afghan ones. If Obama persists in Bush-era belligerence, it will only make resolving the many problems he faces all the more difficult.

Ext – Arctic Takeout

No Arctic impact --- not economically important and cooperation is more likely than competition

Economist ‘07

(8-18, Lexis)

An oft-quoted figure—that the region contains 25% of the world's undiscovered oil and gas—is generally attributed to America's Geological Survey. Don Gautier, who works for that agency, retorts that it has never done a systematic study of the Arctic, or put a figure on its energy riches. But the United States and other Arctic nations are doing a survey now, and a clearer picture may soon emerge. At least in the short term, Mr Gautier says, government activity in the Arctic has more to do with transport routes than with under-sea riches. But for shippers no less than for oilmen and miners, expectations of quick gains may be overdone. Take the Northwest Passage, to which the newly proclaimed Canadian port of Nanisivik marks the eastern entrance. At the moment, this route through the Canadian archipelago is navigable at best for a brief summer spell. (Sovereignty over the passage is one of the Arctic's many unresolved issues: Canada claims it, but the United States says the waters are international.) In theory, a complete opening of the Northwest Passage can shave 2,500 miles off a journey from Europe to Asia. But Lawson Brigham of the United States Arctic Research Commission, based in Alaska, is not convinced the financial gains will be dramatic. "Has anybody done the economics?" the former coastguard captain asks. In fact, he and fellow researchers from the Arctic Council are doing some sums at the moment; they will complete their assessment of global warming's impact on shipping next year. Despite the appearance of a free-for-all, governments and scientists still co-operate over the Arctic; often there is no choice. In the Danish expedition that set sail this week, the Swedish ice-breaker is being led northwards by a larger Russian one, the 50 Years of Victory. And, despite a Canadian-Danish tiff over tiny Hans Island, the Canadians will help the Danes by providing some data on the ridge. Having dropped (back in 1990) a plan to build the world's biggest ice-breaker, the Canadians may also have to seek Russian help next time they need to carve out a path to the North Pole: even the patrol boats ordered up by Mr Harper this month won't match Russia's leviathans. And despite the general surge of Slavic pride, Moscow's recent Arctic foray was far from being an all-Russian affair. One member of the crew was a Swede, Fredrik Paulsen, who paid $3m for his ticket; another an Australian businessman, Michael McDowell. "Russia's role in the expedition was to provide transport for rich foreign tourists," grumbles Lev Savatyugin of the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute. He is also sceptical of the expedition's scientific value, saying that gathering gravel from the surface of the seabed proved little about long-term geological movements; you need to dig deeper, and other Russians have already been doing that. For the time being, the fact that no nation can conquer the Arctic on its own is probably a source of relief. At a moment when nationalistic claims and counter-claims are resounding over the ice-floes, the region's intractability still forces its would-be conquerors to rub along.

\*\*\*Solvency\*\*\*

Troops Good – Afghan Stability

Surge is successful – multiple indicators

Charney, President of Research Institute, 2010

Craig Charney, president of Charney Research, took Afghanistan's first scientific opinion poll in 2004 and has taken seven others since.

Newsweek,The Surge Is Working; All the signs point America's way, March 8, 2010

Even as the Marines' battle for Marja grabs headlines, it's diverting attention from a bigger story. Though the Taliban is entrenched in Helmand province, where Marja is situated, its grip is slipping in the rest of Afghanistan as President Barack Obama's 30,000-troop surge unfolds. These developments undercut the common belief that America is doomed to fail in a land of fiercely tribal, pro-Taliban Pashtuns who hate infidel invaders. In fact, Afghanistan's demography, sociology, military situation, and politics all favor Obama's counterinsurgency strategy. That's why it's working. The strategy, devised by U.S. and NATO commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal, aims to win over Afghans by protecting them from the Taliban, restraining firepower to limit civilian casualties, and speeding up development, along with seizing Taliban sanctuaries like Marja. It has six things going for it. Most Afghans aren't Pashtuns --and most Pashtuns oppose the Taliban. Three fifths of Afghans are Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara, and other ethnicities who suffered under Taliban rule and dread its return. What's more, while most Taliban fighters are Pashtun, 70 percent of Pashtuns dislike the Taliban. Only one Pashtun in four favors the insurgents. Most Pashtuns desire closer ties with the West. Why? Polls say they, like other Afghans, mainly want jobs, electricity, and reconstruction--none of which the Taliban offers. Civilian casualties are down. Despite tragedies like last week's errant airstrike that killed 27 noncombatants, McChrystal's strategy cut civilian deaths from U.S. and NATO action by 30 percent, to 596 last year. The Taliban killed many more civilians in 2009: 1,630, a 60 percent jump from 2008. Afghans noticed. Over the course of 2009, polls show, they started blaming Afghanistan's violence on the Taliban instead of the Americans. Afghans feel more secure when U.S. troops are around. As U.S. forces have surged in Afghanistan, so has their popularity. Support for the U.S. military presence climbed 5 points in 2009 to 68 percent, reversing three years of decline. Polls show that Afghans have confidence in U.S. forces when they think the American presence is strong in their area. Civilian casualties worry them, but Afghans' chief gripe about our forces is their absence, not their presence. Afghan forces are gaining on-the-ground presence and popularity. Afghanistan's Army and police are surging, too, doubling in size since 2008. As they've fanned out, the proportion of Afghans reporting a weak government presence where they live has fallen by half, to just 19 percent. Greater presence has raised the forces' standing with their people. Despite often-justified criticism of both forces for ineptitude and corruption, December's ABC News poll found 70 percent of Afghans are positive about the Army and 62 percent about the police, significantly up from a year before. Though government forces have failings, most Afghans prefer them to the Taliban for security. The Taliban is stuck in thinly populated rural areas. ABC's poll showed that the Taliban gained little ground in 2009, even as it killed more. Only 14 percent of Afghans said it was strong in their areas, the same as the year before. The Taliban had infiltrated most Pashtun areas by 2008, leaving few other easy targets--and those big swaths of the map under Taliban influence have few people. So McChrystal's focus on protecting towns and other populated areas from Taliban attack makes sense. The antigovernment alliance is showing cracks. Osama bin Laden is disliked by over half of Afghans, especially influential male elders in the Pashtun south. Polls also show Taliban supporters detest the Hezb-i-Islami movement of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Taliban ally, while Hekmatyar supporters return the disfavor. Moreover, one third to one half of Afghans mention poor local security or compulsion as the reason people in their areas support the insurgents, just as many as cite religion. Many Taliban supporters aren't religious fanatics; offer what they want or play on their divisions and they can be peeled away. The fight for Marja is the climax of the struggle for Helmand, home of the majority of the Taliban's full-time fighters and lucrative opium revenues. It's the Anbar province of Afghanistan: like its Iraqi equivalent, it must be taken to remove an insurgent heartland. But Afghanistan's main battle is elsewhere. If the Taliban can't gain popular support or silence, it can't win. Obama's gamble recognizes this--and it's started to pay off.

Troops Good – Afghan Stability

Surge efforts are already securing provinces held by insurgents, more troops mean more stability

Boot, senior fellow @ the Council on Foreign Relations, 2009

Max Boot, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution: “Is Obama's troop surge the right policy in Afghanistan? Yes.

U.S. needs more troops to secure population centers, oust Taliban.” December 8, 2009 l/n

President Barack Obama's Afghanistan policy raises some serious questions, but to see why it has a decent chance of working, it helps to visit the town of Nawa in southern Afghanistan. I was there in October and found that 1,000 Marines who had arrived during the summer already had made substantial strides. When the Marines got there, Nawa was a ghost town. "It was strangled by the Taliban," Lt. Col. William McCollough, the boyish commander of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, told me. "Anyone who was here was beaten, taxed, intimidated." The Marines provided security, and the town sprang back to life, with schools opening, shops doing a bustling business and trucks bringing in goods. The residents of Nawa, like most Afghans, were happy to be free of the Taliban and their theocratic decrees. But McCollough cautioned that the progress was as fragile as an eggshell. In particular, he worried about the dark pull exerted by Marjah, less than 10 miles away. A city of 50,000 people, Marjah has long been a haven of opium smugglers and insurgents who terrorize the surrounding area. Commanders at Camp Leatherneck, the headquarters of 10,000 Marines operating in Helmand province, realize that it is essential to take Marjah, just as it was essential to take Fallujah and Ramadi in Iraq. But they also know --- or rather they knew when I visited --- that they didn't have enough infantry to achieve that objective. They were spread thin just trying to consolidate gains in towns such as Nawa. Obama's decision to send 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan changes the equation. The first reinforcements will be Marines headed for Helmand --- and a likely showdown in Marjah. There will be hard fighting ahead, just as there was last summer when Marines entered Nawa and other Taliban strongholds. But with enough resources and enough patience, there is little doubt that American troops and their Afghan allies will be able to secure key areas of southern Afghanistan that have slipped out of the government's grasp. The questions that remain unanswered after the president's West Point address: Will the troops have the time and resources needed to win? "Win" is a word that Obama avoided. He cited his long-standing goal of "disrupting, dismantling and defeating al-Qaida and its extremist allies," but he spoke merely of his desire to "break the Taliban's momentum" rather than defeat it altogether.

Marjah proves the surge is working – commanders are optimistic

BBC 2010 BBC Monitoring South Asia – Political Pakistan author says "flawed" US policies turned Afghan victory into lost battle, Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, May 25, 2010 l/n

With two troop surges and easy victory in Marjah, military commanders of ISAF are feeling more optimistic about next battle in Kandahar. They are confident that they will be able to hand over charge of Helmand and Kandahar to Afghan National Army (ANA) by end of this year and thus not only break the back of Taleban but force them to come to negotiating table and impose a political solution of their choice. By mid 2011, the US hopes to hand over bulk of provinces to ANA and be in a position to commence graduated troop withdrawal. In other words, the US desires the game it started in Afghanistan in October 2001 to end in its favor. It wants the exit to be on its terms, that is, it should give an impression that the US has not lost the war but has decided to voluntarily abdicate. It also wishes to leave behind US friendly regime willing to serve US interests in the region. For this reason the US continues to back up unpopular Karzai even after he won controversial election through massive fraud and presides over corrupt and inefficient regime.

Troops Solve al-Qaeda threat

Zakaria, PhD Harvard and editor of Newsweek International, 2009

Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International, a Newsweek and Washington Post columnist, weekly host for CNN, and a New York Times bestselling author. He was described in 1999 by Esquire Magazine as “the most influential foreign policy adviser of his generation” and in 2007, Foreign Policy and Prospect magazines named him one of the 100 leading public intellectuals in the world. B.A. from Yale College and a Ph.D. from Harvard University. He has received honorary degrees from numerous universities including Brown, the University of Miami, and Oberlin College. He currently serves as a Trustee of Yale University.

Newsweek: The Case Against a Surge; More troops won't solve Afghanistan, October 19, 2009 l/n

At the heart of Gen. Stanley McChrystal's request for a major surge in troops is the assumption that we are failing in Afghanistan. But are we really? The United States has had one central objective: to deny Al Qaeda the means to reconstitute, train, and plan major terror attacks. This mission has been largely successful for the past eight years. Al Qaeda is dispersed, on the run, and unable to direct attacks of the kind it planned and executed routinely in the 1990s. Fourteen of the top 20 leaders of the group have been killed by drone attacks. Its funding sources are drying up, and its political appeal is at an all-time low. All this is not an accident but rather a product of the U.S. presence in the region and efforts to disrupt terrorists, track funds, gain intelligence, aid development, help allies, and kill enemies.

Troops Good – Afghan Stability

Counterinsurgency in the north is vital to prevent Taliban take over and terrorist sanctuary

Dorronsoro, scholar at the Carnegie Endowment expert on Afghanistan, 2009

Gilles Dorronsoro, a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment, is an expert on Afghanistan, Turkey, and South Asia. His research focuses on security and political development in Afghanistan, particularly the role of the International Security Assistance Force, the necessary steps for a viable government in Kabul, and the conditions necessary for withdrawal scenarios.

Previously, Dorronsoro was a professor of political science at the Sorbonne, Paris and the Institute of Political Studies of Rennes. He also served as the scientific coordinator at the French Institute of Anatolian Studies in Istanbul, Turkey.

FIXING A FAILED STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/dorronsoro_fixing_failed_strategy2.pdf>

Instead, the International Coalition, with its limited resources and diminishing popular support, should focus on its core interests: preventing the Taliban from retaking Afghan cities, avoiding the risk that al-Qaeda would try to reestablish sanctuaries there, pursue a more aggressive counterinsurgency strategy in the North, and reallocate its civilian aid resources to places where the insurgency is still weak. That way, they can make a difference.

A2: Reconciliation/Peace Deal

Peace Deal increases terrorism and ensures instability and conflict in Afghanistan Pakistan and india

Chellaney, professor of strategic studies at Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, 2010

Brahma Chellaney is a professor of strategic studies at the privately funded Center for Policy Research in New Delhi. The Washington Times (Washington, DC) Surge, bribe and run; Washington has learned nothing from past policies; February 16, 2010

In a land with a long tradition of humbling foreign armies, payoffs are unlikely to buy peace. All the Pakistan-backed Taliban has to do is simply wait out the Americans. After all, popular support for the Afghan war has markedly ebbed in the U.S. even as the other countries with troops in Afghanistan exhibit war fatigue. If a resurgent Taliban is on the offensive, with 2008 and 2009 proving to have been the deadliest years for U.S. forces since the 2001 American intervention, it is primarily because of two reasons: the sustenance the Taliban still draws from Pakistan, and a growing Pashtun backlash against foreign intervention. The Taliban leadership – with an elaborate command-and-control structure oiled by petrodollars from Arab sheikdoms and proceeds from the opium trade - operates from the comfort of sanctuaries in Pakistan. Fathered by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency and midwifed by the CIA in 1994, the Taliban rapidly emerged as a Frankenstein's monster. Yet President Clinton's administration acquiesced in the Taliban's ascension to power in Kabul in 1996 and turned a blind eye as that thuggish militia, in league with the ISI, fostered narcoterrorism and swelled the ranks of the Afghan war alumni waging transnational terrorism. With Sept. 11, 2001, however, the chickens camehome to roost. In declaring war on the Taliban in October 2001, U.S.policy came full circle. Now, desperate to save a faltering military campaign, U.S. policy is coming another full circle as Washington advertises its readiness to strike deals with moderate Taliban (as if there can be moderates in an Islamist militia that enforces medieval practices). In the past year, U.S. military and intelligence have carried out a series of air and drone strikes and ground commando attacks from Afghanistan in Pakistan's tribal Waziristan region against the Pakistani Taliban, the nemesis of the Pakistani military. The CIA alone has admitted carrying out a dozen drone strikes in Waziristan to avenge the bombing of its base in Khost, Afghanistan. The Khost bombing was carried out by a Jordanian double agent at Pakistan's insistence. The agent said in a prerecorded video that he was going to take revenge for the U.S. attack that killed the Pakistani Taliban chief Baitullah Mehsud. But, tellingly, the U.S. military and intelligence have not carried out a single air, drone or ground attack against the Afghan Taliban leadership in Baluchistan, south of Waziristan. The CIA and the ISI are again working together, including in shielding the Afghan Taliban shura members so as to facilitate a possible deal. Mr. Obama's Afghan strategy should be viewed as a shortsighted strategy that unwittingly has repeated the very mistakes of American policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan over the past three decades that have come to haunt U.S. security and the rest of the free world. Washington is showing it has learned no lesson from its past policies that gave rise to monsters like Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar and to the state within the Pakistani state, the ISI, which was made powerful during Ronald Reagan's presidency as a conduit of covert U.S. aid for anti-Soviet Afghan guerrillas. To justify the planned Faustian bargain with the Taliban, the Obama team is drawing a specious distinction between al Qaeda and the Taliban and illusorily seeking to differentiate between moderate Taliban(the good terrorists) and those who rebuff deal-making (the bad terrorists). The scourge of transnational terrorism cannot be stemmed if such specious distinctions are drawn. India, which is on the front line of the global fight against international terrorism, is likely to bear the brunt of the blowback of Mr. Obama's AfPak strategy, just as it came under terrorist siege as a consequence of the Reagan-era U.S. policies in that belt. The Taliban, al Qaeda and groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba are a difficult-to-separate mix of soul mates who together constitute the global jihad syndicate. The only difference is that al Qaeda operates out of mountain caves in Pakistan while the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taibaoperate openly across Pakistan's western and eastern borders. To cut a deal with any constituent of this syndicate will only bring more international terrorism. A stable Afghanistan cannot emerge without dismantling the Pakistani military's sanctuaries and sustenance infrastructure for the Afghan Taliban and militarily decapitating the latter's command center in Baluchistan. As U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry put it in his leaked November cables to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, [M]ore troops won't end the insurgency as long as Pakistan sanctuaries remain. Instead of seeking to cut off the Taliban's support, the U.S. is actually partnering with the Pakistani military to win over the Taliban. And, as an inducement, it has upped the annual aid for Pakistan for next fiscal year to $3.2 billion - a historic high. Even if the Obama administration managed to bring down violence in Afghanistan by making a deal with the Taliban, that would only strengthen the militia's cause, besides keeping the Taliban intact as a fighting force with active ties to the Pakistani military. Such a tactical gain would exact serious costs on regional and international security by keeping the AfPak region as the epicenter of a growing transnational terrorism scourge and upsetting civilian reconstruction in Afghanistan, where India has emerged as one of the largest bilateral aid donors. Regrettably, the Obama administration is falling prey to a long-standing U.S. policy weakness: the pursuit of narrow objectives without much regard for the interests of friends. It seems determined to save face even if the United States ultimately loses the Afghan war.

A2: Reconciliation/Peace Deal

Reconciliation impossible

Cole, professor of modern Middle Eastern and South Asian history at the University of Michigan, 2010

Salon.com via l/n: “How to tell what's what in Afghanistan” February 22, 2010 Monday

4. Can the Afghan public, which includes many groups (Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks) deeply harmed by Taliban rule, accept reconciliation, as well? Unlikely. Former Northern Alliance leader popular among Tajiks, Abdullah Abdullah, warned Karzai against reconciling with the Taliban this weekend. Abdullah dropped out of last fall's presidential contest in protest against alleged ballot fraud in Karzai's favor. There is general hostility toward reconciliation with the Taliban among the parties representing northern, non-Pashtun ethnic groups.

Ext – Peace Deal Bad

Peace deal causes increased instability and terrorism

Grono and Rondeaux, deputy president at the International Crisis Group and Group’s senior analyst in Kabul, 2010

Nick Grono is the deputy president at the International Crisis Group in Brussels. Candace

Rondeaux is Crisis Group's senior analyst in Kabul.

The Boston Globe: Dealing with brutal Afghan warlords is a mistake, January 17, 2010

AS WASHINGTON rolls out its latest troop surge in Afghanistan, all eyes are on the violent south and east of the country to see whether the additional military muscle will bring stability. But outside observers are looking in the wrong place: They ought to focus on the backroom deals the United States is preparing to make with some notorious warlords, as these will determine the long-term effectiveness of President Obama's strategy. While the White House has paid lip service to the importance of good governance in Afghanistan, the reality is that co-opting violent warlords is at the heart of a plan that will likely result in further instability. One of the warlords who may soon star in the new US efforts to rebrand fundamentalists as potential government partners is Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a brutal Afghan insurgent commander responsible for dozens of deadly attacks on coalition troops. As a mujahedeen commander during the civil war in the 1990s, Hekmatyar turned his guns on Kabul, slaughtering many thousands of Afghans, with his militias raping and maiming thousands more. Three decades of warfare in Afghanistan have produced a multitude of warlords and commanders. Institutions have been supplanted by abusive powerholders, who maintain their control through violence, patronage, corruption, and external backing. There was a real opportunity to fundamentally change this dynamic after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, but it was squandered. Instead of rebuilding institutions, and focusing on the rule of law, the United States tried to build peace on the cheap, subcontracting power to many of those abusive warlords who had been marginalized by the Taliban. These same warlords have now seized on their reprieve with a vengeance. A list of power brokers in Afghanistan today reads a bit like a who's who of commanders responsible for atrocities during the civil war. While warlords like Afghanistan's current co-vice presidents Mohammad Qasim Fahim and Karim Khalili have reinvented themselves as powerful officials, Hekmatyar chose a different path. After a brief stint as prime minister before the Taliban charged into Kabul, Hekmatyar, founder of the powerful Hizb-e Islami political party, retreated to Iran in the mid-nineties, only to resurface in 2001 when he declared his opposition to the US military engagement in Afghanistan. Although once backed by the CIA with scores of millions of dollars in arms, and a favored client of both the Saudi and Pakistani intelligence services during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s, Hekmatyar's anti-U.S. stance made him the target of a CIA drone attack in 2002, and earned himself a place on a list of designated global terrorists in 2003. He is now believed to shuttle between hideouts in Pakistan's mountainous tribal areas and in northeast Afghanistan. In the past year or so Hekmatyar, a charismatic Pashtun Islamic fundamentalist, has begun to raise his profile, granting several interviews with major news outlets and stepping up the tempo of his political propaganda. He has put a lot of effort into restyling himself in a more acceptable guise - as a strong moderate fundamentalist with Afghanistan's best Islamic interest at heart. This despite his own claims that he plotted with the Taliban to foment a deadly attack that killed 10 French soldiers in August 2008, just one of several violent assaults on coalition troops and Afghan government that he has claimed responsibility for in recent years. And there are increasing signals that Karzai and the United States are willing to cut a deal with him. Karzai has been the most explicit. He has publicly stated that he would be willing to talk to Hekmatyar and even offer him a position in government if that would help end the fighting in Afghanistan. Washington has been more circumspect, but the signs are there: Senior US officials have indicated that they might be open to a political deal with the insurgent commander. Some interpreted the US release last summer of Hekmatyar's son-in-law and former Hizb-e Islami spokesman, Ghairat Baheer, who spent years in captivity at the prison in Bagram, as a sign that an agreement might, indeed, be in the works. Doing deals with Hekmatyar, or others like him, is a mistake. Similar accords across the border in Pakistan have repeatedly failed. Such appeasement deals give vulnerable Afghan populations little incentive to stand up to the insurgents, especially if they believe that those insurgents have the upper hand. They would send a message that terror pays dividends. And for Kabul and Washington to negotiate from a position of apparent weakness would make long-term political solutions all the more elusive. Instead of entering into alliances of convenience with the most undesirable of local powerholders, the international community, and the Afghan government, would gain by holding warlords like Hekmatyar accountable for past abuses, and ending the climate of impunity that has allowed so many of them to flourish within and outside government.

Afghan instability inevitable

Alt Causes to Instability -- Pakistan’s regional strategic interest in maintaining it, Pashtun cross-border kinship, ISI Islamic influences

Simon and Stevenson, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Professor of Strategic Studies at the US Naval War College, 2009

“Afghanistan: How Much is Enough?”, Survival, 51: 5, 47 — 67

Accessed via University of Kansas June 24, 2010

It was clear even before the 11 September attacks that among Islamist groups, al-Qaeda posed the most dangerous strategic threat to the United States. Thus, after 11 September, the American priority was to unseat a regime – the Taliban – that was providing sanctuary and operational support to al-Qaeda, in order to prevent further attacks. Afghanistan was therefore the prime target. US officials knew that Pakistan had discreetly supported the Taliban for reasons largely unrelated to al-Qaeda’s anti-Western and anti-American designs, and Washington’s objective vis-à-vis Pakistan, subsidiary to that of eliminating Afghanistan as al-Qaeda’s sanctuary and the Taliban as its patron, was to enlist Pakistan in ensuring the incapacity of al-Qaeda once coalition forces had succeeded in dislodging it. For a variety of familiar and well-documented reasons – American military commanders’ tactical misjudgments at Tora Bora, the intensity of Pashtuns’ cross- border kinship, Pakistan’s regional strategic interest in maintaining a degree of instability in Afghanistan, and Islamist influences in Pakistan’s Inter- Services Intelligence directorate – this effort to harness Pakistan as a robust counter-terrorism partner has not succeeded. Thus, eight years after the 11September attacks, the core al-Qaeda infrastructure has re-materialised in Pakistan.

\*\*\*Disad Links\*\*\*

CMR Link

Military officials aggressively oppose the plan

Abramowitz, senior fellow at the Century Foundation, 2010

The Century Foundation, founded in 1919 by the progressive businessman Edward A. Filene, is a nonprofit public policy research institution committed to the belief that a mix of effective government, open democracy, and free markets is the most effective solution to the major challenges facing the United States. Our staff, fellows, and contract authors produce publications and participate in events that (1) explain and analyze public issues in plain language, (2) provide facts and opinions about the strengths and weaknesses of different policy strategies, and (3) develop and call attention to distinctive ideas that can work.

The Century Foundation’s long history of providing reliable and insightful analysis, as well as our decades of experience in convening bipartisan, diverse task forces and working groups, particularly distinguishes us from other think tanks. Political forces have swung dramatically during the passing decades and surely will again in the future. But our commitment to offering reason and facts in the pursuit of national progress endures.

Morton, The National Interest: Salvaging Afghanistan, June 23, 2010 http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23610

Military views, of course, count for a lot. Indeed, they appear now to be decisive with the president, no matter how hard he pushes them, and they color the politics of the issue. The national-security apparatus is no easy foe. Quite understandably, most senior military officials want combat forces to remain in Afghanistan until the task of building a working Afghan state has significantly advanced. They will be finding every reason for staying. They won much respect with the surge in Iraq, although there are other ways of explaining the improvement there than the surge. Nor does that success mean that the surge in Afghanistan led by the same military men in Iraq will work. The sad fact is that we don’t know what it will take, how long it will take, and what it will cost “to win” in Afghanistan, no matter what our government or military say. That the promised end of the year will bring a conclusive judgment of our prospects is illusory. The Taliban can always decide to fight another day in places and times of their choosing.

Obama Good Links – More

Obama will “stay the course” to preserve his capital

Abramowitz, senior fellow at the Century Foundation, 2010

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Public support for the war will continue – the right would spin withdrawal under Obama’s watch and dominate the debate

Abramowitz, senior fellow at the Century Foundation, 2010

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Morton, The National Interest: Salvaging Afghanistan, June 23, 2010 http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23610

In the end, one has to make some assessment about our prospects in Afghanistan. Judgments will wildly differ. The basic issues for decision, are how long our ground forces stay and what they can accomplish. The longer we stay, the more likely we will stay longer in the hopes that something good will happen. The administration thus also avoids a fight with the Right, whose hold on the public discourse cannot be believed given their record this past decade. Nor will the American public necessarily tune out on Afghanistan, although polls show them increasingly uncertain about what the administration is doing. Colin Powell was clearly wrong in asserting that the American public could not fight a long war and needed an exit strategy for any future wars. The United States has now fought two bloody wars for over five years with monumental damage to the U.S. economy. And the fighting may well continue with public support or acquiescence.

Enhanced engagement enjoys widespread bipartisan support

Manfredi, specialist on Afghanistan insurgencies and advisor to the Belgian foreign affairs committee on Middle East policy, 2009

Federico Manfredi is a specialist on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. He was an advisor to the Belgian foreign affairs committee on policy in the Middle East and Central Asia.

World Policy Journal, “Rethinking U.S. Policy in Afghanistan” Winter 2008/2009

A new U.S. president is about to inherit the deepening crisis in Afghanistan. As the war enters its eighth year, the United States is striving to regain momentum, increasing troop levels, and stepping up military operations to subdue a resurgent Taliban movement and stabilize the floundering Afghan government. These efforts enjoy solid bipartisan support. Indeed, the general consensus in Washington is that the war in Afghanistan remains a legitimate cause that is crucial to the U.S. national interest—a “good war” well worth a reinvigorated commitment. However, President Barack Obama should rethink the conventional wisdom. While the invasion of Afghanistan made sense in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the current nation-building-cum-counterinsurgency enterprise is an unnecessary burden that the United States can and should abandon.

\*\*\*Grabbag CP\*\*\*

Overstretch CP 1NC

The United States Federal Government should provide substantially higher financial and educational incentives for recruitment and retention in the Armed Forces as per Becker.

Increased incentives quickly solves personnel shortages while actually saving money

Gary Becker, Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, “Yes, Raise Military Pay. Just Do It Cleverly” Business Week, 1-7-2001

In the past two decades, both the civilian sector and the military have come to rely more on computer and other high-tech skills. However, the military-civilian pay gap for highly skilled persons widened greatly as the booming American economy increased civilian pay much more rapidly than military pay. As a result, it has become much harder for the armed forces to retain skilled men and women: In the 1990s, retention rates fell in all categories. This skills gap seriously undermines U.S. defense capabilities. That's why the incoming Bush Administration's commitment to raise military pay should be directed mainly toward overcoming the shortage of technically trained personnel. By making a few key changes in pay and recruitment policies, the U.S. armed forces would be better prepared for modern warfare. High turnover of skilled employees creates problems for all organizations, but it is especially costly to the military because the armed forces offer free training to attract good quality recruits. Each of the services provides training in hundreds of categories, investing hundreds of thousands of dollars in training their most highly skilled men and women. Yet, many of those trainees leave the services after a single term, or about five years, and some leave for special reasons even before the first term is completed. In particular, reenlistment rates have plummeted for better-educated and extensively trained recruits, who have skills that are highly valued by private companies. While a little over half of all first-termers reenlist, this drops to just 30% for Navy and Air Force pilots, and it is even lower for some other highly skilled personnel. Military pilots and technicians are snapped up by commercial airlines and other civilian companies immediately after they leave the service. Obviously, one possible solution is to increase the financial compensation for people with the most desirable skills. Unfortunately, it is difficult for the armed forces to pay different salaries and benefits to personnel of the same rank and years of service. But bonuses can and do differ, and most recruits, who tend to be in their early years of setting up households, greatly value lump-sum payments, since they can be large enough to bring houses and cars within reach. The Army, Navy, and Air Force already try to cut turnover of their well-trained personnel by offering bonuses when they reenlist after first or second terms. Some of these bonuses amount to more than $100,000, usually spread over several years. However, in order to raise reenlistment to decent levels, given the huge gap with civilian pay, bonuses need to be increased further to pilots, computer specialists, and other highly skilled personnel who are in strong demand by private companies. It also should be pointed out that it is easier for the military than for civilian companies to provide up-front bonuses. In civilian life, companies may have little legal recourse if new employees with large signing bonuses decide to quit after a short time on the job. Military personnel who receive bonuses, by contrast, cannot leave until their term is over. PRETRAINED. Similarly, the military should take greater advantage of its unique ability to pay for education and training without fear that recipients will take a better offer as soon as they've acquired new skills. Already, the armed forces attract officers by supporting their college education through ROTC and other programs if students commit to serving afterwards on active duty. This policy could be expanded to noncommissioned officers by paying the cost of learning computer and other technical skills in the civilian sector, again contingent on an obligation to serve after completing training. But these steps alone will probably not be enough to close the military skills gaps. The armed forces should consider taking a more novel approach by offering bonuses to attract first-term enlistees who already possess desirable high-tech skills. These bonuses, too, would depend on the length of the enlistment and the pay gap between the military and private companies. Recruitment of trained personnel would help reduce the military expenditure on training and also help the armed forces absorb the latest civilian technological developments. This approach lowers the burden to the military when skilled persons fail to reenlist, since trained replacements could be recruited. Of course, nonmonetary incentives also matter. Military surveys indicate that family concerns and low morale are important reasons for low reenlistment rates. Military life, with its frequent relocations, can prove to be a strain on marriages, but poor morale should improve with the Bush Administration's commitment to upgrading weapons and pay. Changing the military pay system won't be easy. But without skilled personnel trained in electronics and other technical skills essential to modern warfare, the U.S. armed forces will be less prepared for future global confrontations.

Ext – CP Solves Troops/Avoids Politics

INCENTIVES ARE THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION – CONGRESS LOVES IT

Franklin Hagenbeck, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel for the US Army, “Policy, Compensation, and Benefits Overview” Federal Document Clearing House, April 6, 2006

The Army continues to face and meet challenges in the Human Resources Environment. In recent years, Congressional support for benefits, compensation and incentive packages has ensured the recruitment and retention of a quality force. Today, I would like to provide you with an overview of our current military personnel policy and the status of our benefits and compensation packages as they relate to maintaining a quality force. Recruiting Recruiting Soldiers who will fight and win on the battlefield is critical to the success of our mission. These Soldiers must be confident, adaptive, and competent; able to handle the full complexity of 21St century warfare in our current combined, joint, expeditionary environment. They are the warriors of the 21St century. However, recruiting these qualified young men and women is extremely challenging in the highly competitive environment. The head to head competition with industry, an improving economy, lower unemployment, decreased support from key influencers, the media and the continuing Global War on Terror present significant challenges. Currently we are meeting our year-to-date recruiting missions. The active component finished February 2006 at 102% accomplished with a year to date achievement of 103%. The United States Army Reserve accessions were 97% for February 2006 and 99% year to date. The National Guard finished February 2006 at 101 % accomplished with a year to date achievement of 107%. All components are projecting successful annual missions for FY06. However, there is still two-thirds of the mission remaining. With Congressional help, the Army is aggressively adjusting its resources to meet the recruiting challenge. It is a challenge that we must meet. Incentives & Enlistment Bonuses The Army must maintain a competitive advantage to remain successful in attracting high quality applicants. Bonuses are the primary and most effective competitive advantage for the Army. These incentives are instrumental in filling critical Military Occupation Specialties. Enacted legislation last year has assisted the Army in this effort by increasing the cap on bonuses from $20,000 to $40,000. ( $10,000 to $20,000 for Reserves) These bonuses are designed to attract the special needs of the Army and our applicants. These bonuses help us to compete against current market conditions now and in the future. The bonuses enable us to target critical skills in an increasingly college oriented market and meet seasonal ("quick-ship") priorities. The Army's recruiting program is most effective when equipped with the right mix of incentives and bonuses. The Army College Fund is a proven expander of the high-quality market. College attendance rates are at an all-time high and continue to grow, with 66 percent of the high school market attending college within one year of graduation. The Army College Fund allows recruits to both serve their country and earn additional money for college.

Pakistan CP 1NC

Text: The United States Departments of State and Treasury should convene international working groups through Friends of Pakistan to fund and implement an economic rescue package for Pakistan. This economic rescue package should include employment creation, humanitarian assistance and technical support for nuclear confidence-building measures between Pakistan and India, including ground based sensors.

The counterplan solves

Stewart, South Asia Program, a task force of experts in South Asia, -09 (South Asia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Mr. Rory Stewart, Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard University, Pg. 40, Back From the Brink? A Strategy for Stabilizing Afghanistan-Pakistan, April 2009, http://www.asiasociety.org/files/pdf/Afghanistan-PakistanTaskForce.pdf)

President Obama should direct the U.S. Departments of State and Treasury to convene international working groups, through the Friends of Pakistan and existing coordination mechanisms for Afghanistan, to urgently design, fund, and implement economic rescue packages for both Afghanistan and Pakistan. These packages should include immediate employment creation, humanitarian assistance, and measures to ensure the supply and availability of food and energy. Either direct budget support with a clear road map of conditions, and/or a World Bank–administered trust fund, should be the instrument of disbursement.

That solves perception of US goodwill and alleviates backlash to US military policies

Pervez ’08

(Fouad,- writer, actor, policy analyst, and contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus July 11th “The Real Crisis in Pakistan” http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5360.)

The greatest threat Pakistan faces is perhaps economic. The rather miniscule – and shrinking – Pakistani middle class makes perhaps 20-30% of its counterpart in the United States. Most Pakistanis live on much less – the annual GDP per capita is under $3,000. In spite of this, over the past few months, prices for seemingly everything except pirated DVDs have risen sharply. I paid the exact same for meat and vegetables in Karachi as I do in Washington, DC. Consumer products, clothing, apartment rental fees, cars – everything costs virtually the same as it does in the United States. On their substantially lower salaries, Pakistanis are therefore struggling to make ends meet. Every person I spoke to agreed that this was the worst economic crunch they could recall. Fuel, wheat, and sugar prices keep rising, while the Pakistani rupee has hit record lows. The government recently withdrew subsidies, so food prices rose over 30% for the month of June – a new high. Overall inflation has climbed to over 20%, another record high. Foreign investment is staying away, making an economic recovery even more challenging. The plummeting stock market seems to be on the verge of collapse, even though government-imposed regulations have artificially limited its fall. Simply put, the economic downfall is causing substantial suffering for all Pakistanis, and there seems to be no end in sight. On top of the economic woes, there is a shortage of both electricity and water. While always an issue in Pakistan, these shortages are substantially worse now. Usually, electricity would be out for an hour or two in some areas, at most once a day. This time, however, power goes out several times a day for anywhere between 5-12 hours, as part of nationwide power load sharing. In Islamabad, the load sharing was on a precise schedule, so people could prepare for it. The shortages were more frequent, but shorter in length – 6 outages a day, all for about an hour. Karachi was far less predictable, and power would usually go out for at least 2-3 hours at a time. As an increasingly industrial country, Pakistan will need more and more power. This point, however, has been lost on the government, which has conducted little research into power generation. Maintenance of current power plants has been delinquent, resulting in many plants running well under 100%. And new power plants were not built at a pace to accommodate the increasing electricity usage. In addition, water shortages are quite severe right now. Numerous sections of Karachi are getting by with no water at all. Residents of these water-less areas go to nearby neighborhoods in the early morning to steal water. The electricity and the water shortages have combined to cause great health hazards to Pakistanis. They have also made everyday functioning exponentially harder. Additionally, the scale of these problems and the lack of any long-term solutions and short-term relief have greatly increased the population’s frustration with the government. [Continues –Text Removed] Not only would all these steps help alleviate significant suffering within Pakistan, they would also go a long way toward repairing America’s image in the country. As it stands, Pakistanis have constructed the United States as a threat. They have responded to that threat by balancing against it whenever and however possible, often through violent means. No matter how many militants the United States strikes down, more will rise up until and unless Pakistanis see the United States as something other than a cruel neo-colonial or neo-imperial power. America’s current Pakistan policy, focusing on military action in the northwest region while neglecting the real crises ravaging the country, will only strengthen this perception. If nobody steps in to help soon, Pakistan could collapse. The consequences of that would be grim for everyone.

CP Solves Insurgency

Pakistan Aid Key to Democracy and Prevents Terrorism

Curtis, Senior Research Fellow in South Asian Studies, Heritage Foundation, ’07 [Lisa, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 4]

Carefully targeted U.S. aid programs can help to counter anti-American sentiment in Pakistan and limit the influence of radicals who use hatred of the U.S. to mobilize political support. A visible U.S. aid presence in the country will reassure the Pakistani population that Washington is committed to average Pakistanis, not just to the military leadership. U.S. assistance programs that focus on building institutions and promoting human rights and democracy and that target the health and education sectors would show that the U.S. is committed to Pakistan's success as a stable and prosperous country and deflate extremists' arguments that Washington is interested only in exploiting Pakistan for its own purposes. Washington must work to overcome the suspicions of Pakistanis who remember when the U.S. abruptly cut off its large-scale aid program because of Pakistan's nuclear program in the early 1990s.

multiyear economic rescue package solves conflict.

South Asia Program, a task force of experts in South Asia, -09 (South Asia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Mr. Rory Stewart, Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard University, Pg. 40, Back From the Brink? A Strategy for Stabilizing Afghanistan-Pakistan, April 2009, http://www.asiasociety.org/files/pdf/Afghanistan-PakistanTaskForce.pdf)

To signal support for the needs of the Pakistani people, the United States should lead the international community in developing a multiyear economic rescue package for the country. President Obama could start by asking Richard Holbrooke, his special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, to convene a joint task force of the U.S. State and Treasury departments. This would also be an appropriate subject for the work of the Friends of Pakistan. The United States should open its markets to Pakistani textiles, a longstanding demand that might prove more beneficial than foreign aid. The deeper engagement created by such a program will provide opportunities to strengthen civilian institutions and promote regional economic cooperation as an antidote to confrontation.

Increased assistance to pakistan signals US goodwill

US-Pakistan Business Council -09 (April 2009, Strengthening the U.S.-Pakistan Economic Partnership: Policy Recommendations to the Obama Administration and to Members of Congress, http://www.uschamber.com/NR/rdonlyres/eyhho4hsycm24jnny5ifqkivaj7q45amqwjcybw5vujsm36mh6cnzdymgttypkxl74sz2sklwixj3ujcp44rlwwww7h/0903uspbc\_report.pdf)

The U.S. private sector applauds the administration’s plan to increase development assistance to Pakistan. Our members support the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, introduced in the previous Congress by then-Sen. Joe Biden (D-DE) and Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN), which would triple nonmilitary aid to Pakistan. We are encouraged that Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry (D-MA) and Ranking Member Richard Lugar (R-IN) have introduced the bill in this Congress. The U.S. private sector believes that sustained assistance allocating resources to education, health care, infrastructure development, and poverty alleviation would demonstrate that the United States is committed to ensuring Pakistan’s long-term prosperity. The business community welcomes the creation of public-private capacity-building initiatives to help Pakistan’s population and provide opportunities for U.S. private sector involvement.

Empirically that solves backlash and terrorism

Pakistan Policy Working Group, an independent, bipartisan group of American experts on U.S.–Pakistan relations, -08 (pg. 30, The Next Chapter: The United States and Pakistan, September 2008, Pakistan Policy Working Group, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2008/09\_pakistan\_cohen/09\_pakistan\_cohen.pdf)

The premise for this plan relies on a successful experience born in disaster. Following the 2005 Kashmir earthquake, the U.S. devoted nearly $1 billion to relief efforts and reaped a greater reward in popular support than at any point in recent history. U.S. Chinook helicopters delivering lifesaving support became the symbol of charity, humanity, and friendship. One senior official described the U.S. earthquake response as the most successful strategic confrontation to date in the battle with the terrorists in South Asia. The question is: Can the United States recreate this demonstration of commitment without the tragedy of a disaster?

CP Solves Insurgency

Has the largest possible effect of any US action

Boucher -07 (Richard A. Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, Disam Journal, excerpts of the statement presented to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, July 17, 2007, The United States and Pakistan relations and cooperation: key to regional stability, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi\_0199-7508079/The-United-States-and-Pakistan.html)

We continue to actively pursue our public diplomacy efforts inside Pakistan to ensure that we reach out to Pakistani citizens to share our own message, and help others understand American policies, views and values. Americans continue to be generous in their willingness to help and reach out to Pakistanis as demonstrated after the devastating 2005 earthquake in Kashmir, where the immediate and overwhelming support of the U.S. military and the donations of private Americans saved many lives and garnered the goodwill of the Pakistani people. Nothing could have been more effective in demonstrating American values and disseminating a message of friendship between our peoples.

CP Solves Indo – Pak

The United States needs to provide technological assistance to maintain CBMs.

Pandey and Schaffer -02 (Swati Pandey and Teresita C. Schaffer, August 1, 2002, The South Asia Monitor, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Building Confidence in India and Pakistan*, http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/csis/sam/sam49/index.html)

The recent events in South Asia suggest that the United States needs to move beyond its traditional policy of short-run crisis management to a long-term relationship of cooperation and engagement with India and Pakistan. The United States has a chance to play an important role and build a lasting relationship with both countries, thereby keeping tensions low and gaining strategic advantages in the region, including in the War on Terror. Instead of directly engaging in monitoring or mediating, the United States could provide technological support as necessary, offering advice on maintaining CBMs and overseeing the long-term reduction of militancy and the advancement of economic development.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld offered India ground-based sensors in June. The sensors would survey the LoC and be locally managed and maintained. Such proposals, particularly if offered to Pakistan as well, would give both countries the technology necessary to begin immediate monitoring. Although the technologies may not be particularly esoteric, this offer and others like it save the two countries time in development and distribution. Its provisions would of course need to be tailored to the Indo-Pakistan border’s unique infrastructure, climate, and terrain. In addition to technology the United States can assist with the establishment of dispute-resolution forums, helping with initial dialogue attempts and providing necessary capital.

CBMs solve India/Pakistan war.

Hilali, Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar, -05 (A.Z. Hilali, Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar, Confidence- and Security-Building Measures for India and Pakistan, Alteratives 30 (2005), pg 191-222, http://www.atypon-link.com/LRP/doi/pdf/10.5555/alte.2005.30.2.191?cookieSet=1)

India and Pakistan both need confidence and security-building measures to safeguard the interest of their peoples and to enhance economic growth. The wider potential of CSBMs has been recognized, especially in terms of their ability to contribute to the creation of an atmosphere more conducive to the attainment of farther reaching goals. Some scholars have argued that India and Pakistan primarily need cooperation and understanding in the field of military and defense to reduce the pressure of tension and hostility. For this to happen, both sides need security dialogues and cooperation. To defuse tension, certain principles are required. There must be

• Participation on an equal footing • Unanimity through consultation • A search for common ground while reserving differences

US assistance on confidence-building measures solves.

Bajpai, is an experienced Indian diplomat and expert in security issues, -03 (K. Shankar Bajpai, former Indian ambassador to Pakistan, China and United States, professor at the University of California, May/June 2003, *Untangling India and Pakistan*, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58979/k-shankar-bajpai/untangling-india-and-pakistan?page=6)

Washington must make long-term stability the focus of its South Asia policy, and talks on Kashmir are a natural starting place. But Washington's approach can work only if it bears in mind exactly what talks are meant to facilitate: a new approach between the two sides. India and Pakistan are currently in a dead end, and the only way out of a dead end is to backtrack. But if India is to back away from its present refusal to talk until terrorism ends completely, it needs some credible assurance that it will not be trapped again by impossible demands regarding Kashmir. Pakistan is correct to expect that Kashmir will be the prime focus of discussions. But the least India and outside players can expect from Pakistan is a genuine attempt to ease the other difficulties in the relationship. Washington's potential to help lies not in trying to invent, much less enforce, a Kashmir solution, but in nudging the two sides into a joint search for positive relations. If U.S. encouragement can stimulate bilateral progress in improving ties, a solution to Kashmir will eventually become possible. The ultimate responsibility, however, lies with the two neighbors themselves. India and Pakistan both face a common enemy in the form of terrorism; only a new effort at cooperation will rid the region of this scourge.

The nuclear issue of course needs fuller attention. But despite its enormous importance, to deal with it here would double the length of this essay. Let us merely note that India has always accepted Pakistan's right to develop its own nuclear capabilities. In fact, to the extent that tensions in the subcontinent are linked to Pakistan's genuine (as opposed to propagandist) fears of India, anything that gives it greater confidence for its security should act as a stabilizing factor. Unfortunately, recent tensions have cast severe doubts about such a view. The two sides should therefore begin serious discussions on basic confidence-building and nuclear transparency to avoid catastrophic accidents, mistakes, or miscalculations. Here, too, the United States could be a most effective catalyst.

CP Solves Pakistan Econ

US assistance solves the economy and causes good governance.

Boucher -07 (Richard A. Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, Disam Journal, excerpts of the statement presented to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, July 17, 2007, The United States and Pakistan relations and cooperation: key to regional stability, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi\_0199-7508079/The-United-States-and-Pakistan.html)

U.S. development assistance in Pakistan is tailored to help build sustainable growth and improve living standards that will promote the conditions for good governance, responsible citizenship, and foreign investment. In 2006, the U.S. provided Pakistan $69.3 million to improve primary and higher education along with other funds that support education through the national budget. The U.S. government has also provided $200 million in budget support starting in fiscal year 2005, which has opened budget space for the government of Pakistan to spend additional resources on education, improving macroeconomic performance, and the quality and access to health care and education. This budget support is guided by the shared objectives, which are negotiated every year with the Government of Pakistan to identify those sectors where U.S. budget support will be spent. In 2007, Pakistan agreed to spend $56.25 million of the budget support toward education.

US Aid key to Pakistani Economy

U.S. Bureau of Intelligence and Research ’07 [Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Electronic Affairs Publication Office, May 1, US Federal News, lexis]

U.S. assistance has played a key role in moving Pakistan's economy from the brink of collapse to setting record high levels of foreign reserves and exports, dramatically lowering levels of solid debt. Also, despite the earthquake in 2005, GDP growth remained strong at 6.6% in fiscal year 2005/2006. In 2002, the United States led Paris Club efforts to reschedule Pakistan's debt on generous terms, and in April 2003 the United States reduced Pakistan's bilateral official debt by $1 billion. In 2004, approximately $500 million more in bilateral debt was granted. Consumer price inflation eased slightly to an average of 8% in 2005/2006 from 9.3% in 2004/2005.

A2: CP Links Politics

Congress supports the counterplan – doesn’t drain capital

Korb, ’08 (Lawrence, Center for American Progress, 11/17, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/11/pakistan\_report.html)

An engaged U.S. Congress. In the past year, Congress has taken important strides in moving U.S. policy in Pakistan in a new direction, and the new Congress that takes office in January will likely build on these actions. In the House of Representatives, the Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs have conducted regular hearings into U.S. aid programs and policy toward Pakistan. In the Senate, former Chairman Joseph Biden (D-DE) (now vice- president elect) and Ranking Member Richard Lugar (R-IN) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee introduced the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2008, legislation that aims to broaden the U.S.- Pakistan relationship beyond military relations and to authorize $7.5 billion to Pakistan over five years for projects "intended to benefit the people of Pakistan," including "just and democratic governance, economic freedom, and investments in people, particularly women and children." This legislation lays the groundwork for a new strategy in which the United States seeks a partnership with the people of the Pakistan and not just a military expected to cooperate on American security aims.

Congress won’t backlash – times have changed

Herrling and Radelet ‘08

(Sheila Herrling, Senior Policy Analyst and Manger of the Center for Global Development’s Foreign Assistance Initiative, Steve Radelet, Senior Fellow at the CGD, “U.S. Foreign Assistance for the Twenty-first Century,” 8-22-2008 http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/16559)

For the U.S. to achieve its foreign policy goals in developing countries, additional funding for foreign assistance will be required. More money alone is not the solution. But more money better spent is an important part of the answer. Although the increases in funding in recent years are welcome, they were on top of a very low base, and are inadequate for the United States to fight poverty, state failure, and instability in low-income countries around the world— objectives that are crucial to Americans’ own well-being. In 2008, the defense budget accounted for 21.5 percent of the administration’s fiscal year budget request, while funding for development-related assistance was just 0.4 percent.5 A ratio of 50:1 is clearly out of balance at a time when foreign policy experts agree that stronger and more diversified foreign policy tools are required to achieve today’s objectives. Conclusion By implementing the reforms outlined above, the United States can fight poverty, address the root causes of state failure, and support democracies around the world.6 Taking on these challenges will not be easy. Modernizing foreign assistance into an effective instrument for smart and strong U.S. global leadership will require major organizational and legislative changes. Several attempts at modest reorganization or rewriting the Foreign Assistance Act have been made in the last two decades; all fell short because of lack of support in either the administration or on Capitol Hill. But today there is strong bipartisan backing for elevating the importance of development, with growing consensus around missions, mandates, and strategies. It is time to take advantage of this rare opportunity to modernize and strengthen U.S. foreign assistance to more effectively combat poverty, widen the circle of development and prosperity, fight terrorism, and further other U.S. strategic interests abroad.

True despite weak economic environment

Nita Lowey, US Representative (D-NY), Speech before the Council on Foreign Relations, 1-22-2009

(http://www.cfr.org/publication/18384/future\_of\_foreign\_assistance\_amid\_global\_economic\_and\_financial\_crisis.html)

Now, in the inaugural address, despite the fiscal crisis and troubles both here and abroad, America will uphold our responsibility to lead the world community, to address the security threats and moral imperatives of our day. And there is a growing consensus in Washington and in the new administration that effective foreign assistance is one of the most important ways to confront the complex challenges of our increasingly dangerous world. President Obama has selected economic and national security teams that inspire confidence. As you know, our new secretary of State was official today. And, indeed, we are confident that he can deliver the new direction he has promised Americans. I'm not as confident that he'll be doubling the foreign aid budget but I'm confident that he will lead us in a new direction.

SCO CP 1NC

Text – The United States Federal Government should propose joint North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Shanghai Cooperation Organization anti-narcotics efforts on Afghanistan

Their own 1ac ev concedes US military presence doesn’t block cooperation – SCO will say yes and the counterplan spills over

Afrasiabi ’09

(Kaveh,- former political science professor at Tehran University “Unlikely bedfellows in Afghanistan” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\_Asia/KC18Df02.html)

Due to their geographical proximity to Afghanistan and the threats of conflict spillover, the SCO members are naturally concerned about the security meltdown in Afghanistan. As a result, it is not far-fetched to anticipate a near-term breakthrough over SCO-NATO cooperation on Afghanistan. This would be despite lingering SCO suspicions of NATO's "out of area" operations in their backyard. NATO's decision to put on hold the accession of Georgia and Ukraine dampens these suspicions. The key issue is the nature of any possible SCO-NATO cooperation. In 2005, the SCO and Afghanistan set up a liaison group based in Beijing to deal with drug trafficking, cross-border crime and intelligence-sharing. But not much has happened and then-president Vladimir Putin's 2004 call for a SCO "security belt" around Afghanistan to stop the drug trade has not materialized This is partly because the SCO is still in the process of self-definition, and unlike NATO, or for that matter the Moscow-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), it lacks the identity of a military bloc. In a recent interview, the SCO secretary general, Bolat Nurgaliev, stated that "any physical involvement by the SCO in Afghanistan has not been contemplated so far". But with NATO admittedly failing to secure Afghanistan, the NATO leadership may now be amenable to the idea of a co-security partnership with SCO. This could begin with the low-security issues of drug trafficking and arms smuggling. This would parcel out a slice of the Afghan security pie to the SCO, traditionally viewed with suspicion in the US and European capitals as a potential rival to NATO. In a separate development, according to a source at the UN, China is leaning in favor of a UN peacekeeping force for Afghanistan to which it would contribute, this in contrast to Russia's cool reception of this option. At the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which is a major organizer of The Hague Afghan conference, the idea of sending blue helmets to guard Afghanistan's porous borders is under serious consideration. Whether or not the SCO and NATO can cooperate on low-security issues depends on each organization's sober "threat analysis" and NATO's firm conclusion that it cannot handle Afghanistan alone. But, perhaps more important than any decision by the SCO and NATO leaders is whether India and Pakistan can stop competing and begin to cooperate on Afghanistan.

CP Solvency/A2: SCO Says No

Extend Afrasiabi – SCO says yes – prefer our ev

1. Its comparative – assumes their warrant and says SCO concern over afghan instability swamps fears of NATO presence
2. Has warrants their ev doesn’t answer – NATO decision to delay accession has eased SCO fears
3. Its their 1ac card – they shouldn’t be allowed to indict it
4. Their say no ev doesn’t assume the counterplan – it assumes immediate full scale SCO involvement – not limited coop on antinarcotics – they have no specific say no card and zero ev to answer that the counterplans limited coop spills over

Mutual interests, focus on antinarcotics and Moscow meeting momentum ensures SCO says yes – coop spills over and also solves their iran coop advantage

Afrasiabi ’09

(Kaveh,- former political science professor at Tehran University “Unlikely bedfellows in Afghanistan” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\_Asia/KC18Df02.html)

But those who continue to view SCO-NATO relations primarily through the prism of a new cold war miss the point that there is a convergence of interests between the two sides on such issues as Afghanistan's security and the threat of Islamist radicalism and terrorism. These dictate the necessity of incremental cooperation between them, perhaps within the familiar framework of simultaneous cooperation and competition. Such selective cooperation between the SCO and NATO would most likely strengthen the hands of those voices within the SCO which have been pushing for a US and European Union-inclusive "SCO + 3", the third potential member being Japan. This is an unlikely scenario, yet worth repeating for purely confidence-building purposes. Moscow and Beijing have divergent perspectives on the purpose of the SCO in the geopolitical realm, with Beijing favoring a more circumspect security and military role for the organization than envisioned by Moscow. Nonetheless, the Moscow meeting has the potential to cement the bond between the SCO's twin pillars at a critical moment in international affairs. Simultaneously, in light of the SCO-Afghan contact group's primacy of the counter-narcotics agenda, the Moscow meeting could improve information-sharing and security coordination between NATO and SCO on this particular issue. It could also lead to an enhanced role for Iran, which is a frontline state in the war against the Afghan drug trade.

CP Solvency/A2: SCO Says No

SCO member states have called for the counterplan

Weitz 07 [Richard, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, “Inside Track: Afghan Drug Deals,” Sept 4, National Interest Online, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=15428]

At its August 16 summit in Bishkek, several member governments of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) identified narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan as a major regional security problem. NATO should use this possible opening to explore potential collaboration in Afghan security issues with Russia and China. Since the alliance mission in Afghanistan continues to suffer from major problems, assistance from these two countries—to supplement the support already provided by the SCO’s Central Asian members as well as SCO observer Pakistan—should be encouraged. In their Bishkek Declaration on international security, the summit participants expressed alarm about "the threat of narcotics coming from Afghanistan and its negative effect on Central Asia" and called for "combining international efforts on the creation of anti-narcotics belts around Afghanistan." The heads of state also affirmed their readiness "to participate in the efforts to normalize the political situation in Afghanistan" and "to develop economic cooperation with the country." In addition, the communiqué issued by the heads of state called for greater use of "the SCO Afghanistan Contact Group mechanism as well as other mutually acceptable formats" to manage Afghan-related security threats. Shortly before the summit, the Russian Foreign Ministry circulated a draft proposal for an international conference on Afghanistan that, while occurring under SCO auspices, would nevertheless include countries both from the region and other interested parties. In his speech to the summit attendees, Russian President Vladimir Putin urged the foreign ministries of the SCO members to take charge of organizing such a gathering. He also called on the SCO to create a counter-narcotics security zone around Afghanistan that would help monitor money laundering and other sources of terrorist financing associated with Afghan narcotics trafficking. Although China is not situated along the "Northern Route" through which Afghan narcotics have traditionally entered Central Asia and Europe, new narcotics trafficking networks have developed since 2005 that transport illicit drugs from Afghanistan throuwgh Pakistan and Central Asia into China. In addition, Chinese officials remain concerned about the Taliban’s ties to Islamic extremist groups advocating independence for China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. A June 2007 People’s Daily commentary warned that The ‘Taliban phenomenon’ has produced grave concern. . . . [I]ts resurgence has severely challenged the authority of the Afghan government. . . . [T]he Taliban have grown more robust . . . taking full advantage of local feelings of dissatisfaction over living conditions and anti-US sentiments. . . . [T]he Taliban have galvanized their link-up with al-Qaeda remnants. . . . Afghanistan is at risk of becoming the second Iraq. An official at the Chinese Foreign Ministry subsequently said that, since maintaining stability in the larger Central Asian region represented a "primary focus" of the SCO, China and other member governments want to cooperate on fighting drugs smuggling and terrorism emanating from Afghanistan.

Current SCO invitation proves they say yes

Afrasiabi ’09

(Kaveh,- former political science professor at Tehran University “Unlikely bedfellows in Afghanistan” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\_Asia/KC18Df02.html)

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is scheduled to hold a conference on Afghanistan in Moscow on March 27, a few days ahead of a similar United Nations meeting in The Hague in the Netherlands. Russia, which holds the current SCO presidency, has sent out invitations to India, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, the Group of Eight nations, the UN, as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to what is increasingly shaping up as a landmark event. NATO secretary general Japp de Hoop Scheffer is reportedly planning to attend the SCO meeting, which will focus on the "situation in Afghanistan and its influence on neighboring states, boosting joint efforts by the international community to counteract terrorism, the illegal drug trade and trans-border organized crime from Afghan territory", according to an official SCO statement. The SCO is an inter-governmental regional organization that comprises Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Iran, India, Mongolia and Pakistan have observer status. According to the US envoy to Moscow, John Beryle, the US will send a high-level delegation led by a senior diplomat. This is a positive gesture by US President Barack Obama that is bound to smooth the groundwork for his much-anticipated summit with his Russian counterpart, Dmitry Medvedev, who announced the Moscow conference in January.

CP Solves Iran Coop Advantage

Counterplan spills over – solves Iran drug coop advantage

Afrasiabi ’09

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NATO-SCO cooperation over the narcotics trade will likely pave the way to a NATO-Iran dialogue, given Iran's observer role in the SCO and the current public discussions of the possibility of an Iranian corridor for NATO supplies to Afghanistan. Possibly, Iran could serve as a transmission belt between the SCO and NATO. It could do this by providing a cooperation mechanism between them by participating in the NATO-SCO dialogue on narcotics and arms traffic and in any (hitherto improbable) NATO-SCO cooperation on Afghan security. China, which has just bolstered its ties with Iran by signing yet another major gas deal worth US$3.2 billion, may actually be more amenable than Moscow to allowing an enhanced Iranian role on Afghanistan via the SCO. This could be as a twin of China's Central Asia policy that seeks a more independent role for Central Asian states on regional issues.

A2: CP Links Politics

Counterplan doesn’t drain congress – congress supports counternarcotics cooperation

Carpenter 04 [Ted Galen, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, “How the Drug War in Afghanistan Undermines America’s War on Terror,” Nov 10, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=2607]

There are **several reasons** why Washington is now making the anti-drug campaign a high priority. Congressional pressure is mounting on the Bush administration to make counternarcotics goals a significant part of the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan. Influential members of Congress, such as Rep. Henry Hyde (R-IL), chairman of the House International Relations Committee, have made it clear that they want action on the drug front. Although not specifically advocating crop eradication measures, Hyde has urged the Pentagon to treat all opium labs and storage areas in Afghanistan as “legitimate military targets and utilize narcotics-related intelligence to locate other such targets.”10

Prefer our ev – its specific to anti-narcotics – their cards assume far broader coop with the SCO – not our limited mechanism – which would mute opposition

Even if the counterplan is a little controversial – its OBVIOUSLY far less high profile than total withdrawal from Afghanistan – magnitude of the link is key – it determines link probability – at minimum the counterplan links far less