# Race K

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## Notes

**1 – The 1NC is designed to be a (lengthy) 1 off strategy, but can be shortened by saving the last Wynter card for framework in the block. If you want to run a really short version, just read a specific link and then the Rodriguez and Kokontis cards**

**2 – For an explanation of the stance towards race that this K is designed to take, look at the Pak card under the Alternative section (Afro-Pessimism Ontology)**

**3 – The disability K in the TRI case neg will have links that should jive with the critique.**

**Max Hantel | Jishnu Guha-Majumdar**

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**Uday "Juggles" Kohli | Anna "Singalong" Griffin | Chris "Midnight City" O'Brien | Luke "Uptown Girl" Desobry | Christian “SpaceDs” AKA "I'll go to the library" Vences | Matthew “Cave Matt” AKA “Oop Me!” AKA “The Kid from the Ring” AKA “Solitaire” Cave**

## 1NC

### The Slave Ship 1NC

#### The history of transportation in the United States is the spatialization of white supremacy – to speak of transportation is to already speak of race. From the original transportation policy of the Middle Passage to “separate but equal” to the “white flight” of suburbanization, the condition of possibility for the freedom and mobility associated with transportation is the subjugation of raced bodies.

Brenman ‘7 [Marc, executive director of the Washington State Human Rights Commission and was formerly senior policy advisor for civil rights at the U.S. Department of Transportation, Transportation Inequality in the United States: A Historical Overview, Human Rights Magazine Vol. 34 No. 3, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/human\_rights\_magazine\_home/human\_rights\_vol34\_2007.html]

Three major kinds of infrastructure in the United States contribute to the separation of races: housing, education, and transportation. Of these, transportation receives the least attention by those interested in social justice. Yet people must get from place to place. Social mobility is an important part of the story we tell ourselves as Americans. But historically, it has not been available to all, or available only in a way that has channeled some people to specific places and inequitable opportunities, sometimes involuntarily and even in chains. Ideas and their implications also have to get from one place to another. The notion of progress, enshrined in liberal thinking, often has not served people of color when the progress was mechanical. This article sets the context for examining the inequality caused by, and supported by, transportation. In some cases, existing extreme inequality make forced transportation impossible to resist. In the first section, a new view is taken, seeing slave ships as bringing inequality to America, and the Underground Railroad as an important part of transportation, civil rights history, and the escape from inequality. The next section discusses the legal context as it relates to transportation inequity. The third joins education to transportation inequity. The fourth shows how the modern civil rights movement has a transportation base. The fifth ties together the joining of America by railroads and the civil rights movement. The sixth brings road building and shipping into the discussion. The last section brings us up to date by referencing Hurricane Katrina and gasoline prices. The Original Discriminatory Transport: Slave Ships Civil rights in transportation in the United States has a long history, beginning with the involuntary transportation of slaves to the American colonies. One of the major points about transportation in the United States is made early—it is not necessarily voluntary. The U.S. Constitution addressed this importation, banning its regulation until 1808. An organized system to assist runaway slaves seems to have begun toward the end of the eighteenth century. In 1786, George Washington complained about how one of his runaway slaves was helped by a “society of Quakers, formed for such purposes.” The system grew, and around 1831 it was dubbed the Underground Railroad, after the then emerging steam railroads. The system even used terms used in railroading: the homes and businesses where fugitives would rest and eat were called “stations” or “depots” and were run by “stationmasters,” those who contributed money or goods were “stockholders,” and the “conductor” was responsible for moving fugitives from one station to the next. It effectively moved hundreds of slaves northward each year; according to one estimate, slave states lost 100,000 slaves between 1810 and 1850. Legally Institutionalizing Transport Inequity In part to address this system, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (1850), legislated the return of runaway slaves to their owners. Thus we introduce a second point that runs counter to the American mythic story of social mobility—restrictions on travel. We will much later see echoes of such restrictions in the form of travel to Cuba, starting in 1962, with the U.S. embargo against Cuba. It was codified into law in 1992 with the purpose of bringing democracy to the Cuban people. A third point appears—restrictions on travel as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. The Fugitive Slave Act provides an extensive legal structure for enforcing the requirement of Article IV, Section 2, of the Constitution and lays out penalties for those impeding its enforcement. The necessity to do so reflects the growing conflict between opponents and proponents of slavery in the United States. The issue ultimately appeared before the Supreme Court, producing one of the most famous of the early race cases, Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), known to history as the Dred Scott decision. The U.S. Supreme Court declared that all blacks—slaves as well as free—were not and could never become citizens of the United States. The Court also declared the 1820 Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, thus permitting slavery in all of the country’s territories. Scott, a slave who had lived in the free state of Illinois and the free territory of Wisconsin before moving back to the slave state of Missouri, had appealed to the Supreme Court in hopes of being granted his freedom. The Court’s majority opinion stated that, because Scott was black, he was not a citizen and therefore had no right to sue. The framers of the Constitution, the opinion stated, believed that blacks “had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, whenever profit could be made by it.” Id. at 407. The Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335 (1875), required equal accommodations for blacks and whites in public facilities (other than schools). It represents the last congressional effort to protect the civil rights of African Americans for more than half a century. It stated that “all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water . . .” This legislation was effectively voided by the Supreme Court in 1883, through the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). These were a collection of cases involving the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Over a strong dissent by Justice John Marshall Harlan, the Supreme Court held the act unconstitutional as an exercise of Congress’s powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court ruled 8–1 that Congress had overstepped its authority, and therefore the act was invalid. In 1878, in Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878), the Supreme Court ruled that states cannot prohibit segregation on public transportation. A Louisiana Supreme Court had awarded damages to Josephine DeCuir, an African American woman denied access to a cabin set aside for white passengers during her voyage from New Orleans to Hermitage, Louisiana. The Court held that the Louisiana law on which the damages were based did not apply because the steamboat was a business involved in interstate commerce, which could only be regulated by the U.S. Congress. States could not require carriers engaged in interstate commerce to provide integrated facilities, even for trips that took place only within state borders. The Court’s opinion is said to have clearly indicated its interest in preserving existing racial customs and to have provided a rationale that was eventually used to support the “separate but equal” doctrine. In 1890, in Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Railway v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890), the Court permitted states to segregate public transportation facilities. In 1898, in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the Supreme Court upheld a Louisiana law compelling segregation of the races in rail coaches. To test the law’s constitutionality, Homer Plessy, a Louisianan of mixed race, made a point of exposing himself to arrest for sitting in the whites-only section of a train car. He was acting on the behalf of a Louisiana Citizen’s Committee formed to protest laws established to keep blacks and whites separate. When his case reached the Supreme Court, Plessy argued that enforced segregation in theoretically separate-but-equal accommodations compromised the principle of legal equality and marked blacks as inferior. The Court decided that the Louisiana law did not take away from the federal authority to regulate interstate commerce,

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nor did it violate the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery. Additionally, the law did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, which gave all blacks citizenship, and forbade states from passing any laws that would deprive blacks of their constitutional rights. The Court believed that separate but equal was the most reasonable approach, considering the social prejudices that prevailed at the time. The years 1900 to 1920 brought full extension of segregation to all southern public transportation. More than four hundred state laws, constitutional amendments, and city ordinances legalizing segregation and discrimination were passed in the United States between 1865 and 1967. Several states even prohibited hearses from carrying both races. Even the dead could not be transported equally. The Transportation-Education Nexus Transportation is closely intertwined with education. For example, in Clarendon County, South Carolina, residents filed a lawsuit in 1947 to provide bus transportation to black children. That suit was dismissed, but in 1950, 107 parents and children signed onto a second lawsuit seeking equal school buildings, equal teacher pay, equal textbooks, and equal transportation. This case, Briggs v. Elliott, 342 U.S. 350 (1952), was combined with lawsuits in Delaware, Virginia, Washington, D.C., and Kansas to become Brown v. the Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), ending segregation in public schools through holding the doctrine of separate but equal to be unconstitutional. Historian C. Vann Woodward has estimated that 106 new segregation laws were passed between the Brown decision and the end of 1956. By May 1964, the South had enacted 450 laws and resolutions to frustrate the Supreme Court’s decision. The Importance of Transport to Civil Rights The modern civil rights movement is tied up with transportation modes, including the Montgomery Bus Boycott, the Freedom Riders, and the desegregation of the interstate bus system. The Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 316(d), as early as 1887 had forbade any interstate common carrier by motor vehicle to subject any person to unjust discrimination. On December 1, 1955, Rosa Parks, a black seamstress and secretary of the local National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) chapter, was arrested for refusing to obey a Montgomery, Alabama, bus driver’s order to give her seat up for a boarding white passenger, as required by city ordinance. Outrage in Montgomery’s black community over her arrest sparked a boycott against the city’s bus line, the Montgomery Bus Boycott. Working closely with a long-active African American leadership in Montgomery, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. emerged as the president of the Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA), which organized the boycott. As the MIA’s demands expanded beyond more flexibility in bus seating to include more equal access to other municipal services, racial tensions increased. Preaching a course of nonviolence, Dr. King was convinced that the cause could be won through a combination of dignified behavior and economic pressure by the protesters. The boycott ended in December 1956, over a year after it began. That year, the MIA filed suit in federal district court to challenge the constitutionality of local bus segregation laws. The court ruled in favor of the MIA in June 1956, but the city challenged the ruling and the case went to the Supreme Court. This resulted in a ruling on November 13, 1956, that segregation on city buses was unconstitutional. The defendants were represented by Thurgood Marshall. In Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960), the Supreme Court stated, “When a bus carrier has volunteered to make terminal and restaurant facilities and services available to its interstate passengers as a regular part of their transportation, and the terminal and restaurant have acquiesced and cooperated in this undertaking, the terminal and restaurant must perform these services without discriminations . . .” The Freedom Rides occurred in 1961, when journalists reported on the bus rides of whites and blacks who set off from Washington in a heroic action to test compliance with the court’s ruling. Angry white mobs attacked the Freedom Riders as they got off the buses. The Freedom Rides, organized primarily by the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE), were one of the first times in which the civil rights movement consciously used the power of the media, in this case mostly print journalists, to win people over to its cause. At the same time as African Americans were being victimized and deprived of their rights through transportation, so, too, were Native Americans. By 1842, Presidents Jackson and Van Buren had forcibly removed most of the Seminoles and Cherokee to Oklahoma along the now infamous Trail of Tears. In one of the meaner ironies of American history, some Cherokees brought their own slaves along. Railroads benefited from displacing Indians from the land on which they lived and hunted. President Lincoln and succeeding presidents gave the Union Pacific more land than the combined area of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe received over 2,928,928 acres in Kansas. By 1872, the giveaway to the railroad owners of land taken by force from the Native Americans had amounted to 155,000,000 acres, an area almost equal to the New England states, New York, and Pennsylvania combined. Transportation is a tool of social policy, removal, and repression. Again, the issues reverberate in the present. Some tribes in the North Central states object to transportation of nuclear waste by railroad across their lands. This is a major environmental justice issue for Native Americans in that part of the country. During slavery, companies purchased slaves to work on the railroads. For example, it is documented that, as early as 1838, a southern railroad company purchased 140 slaves for $159,000 to work on constructing a railroad line in Mississippi. We see a similar use of people of color to build the nation’s transcontinental railways, by Chinese and Irish. We forget today that at that time the Irish were often considered colored. How Transport Spread Civil Rights From their beginning in 1868, plush Pullman train cars (named for George Pullman, owner of the Pullman Palace Car Company) were staffed mostly by black porters, many of them newly freed slaves. African Americans were concentrated in railroad work because they were excluded from many other occupations, while the Pullman Company and the railroad industry actively recruited them. By the 1920s, the Pullman Company, with 20,224 black employees, was the largest employer of black workers in the United States and Canada. The Pullman porters organized and spread the word of possible social mobility across the United States. The troubled relationship between African Americans and the labor move?ment is shown by the all-black Brother?hood of Sleeping Car Porters Union, because it was denied membership by the American Railway Union. Therefore, the porters did not join the famous 1894 strike against the Pullman Car Works in Chicago, led by Eugene Debs. Similarly, blacks were not permitted to join longshoremen’s and dockworker’s unions, and were used as scabs in the West Coast strikes in the 1930s until a deal was brokered, initiated by African Americans, to not be used as scabs if they were admitted to the unions. The Pullman Company had often used Asians to weaken the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters’ union recognition drive, and it is believed that this led to the opposition to Asian immigration to the United States by the leader of the sleeping car porters, A. Philip Randolph. This can be seen as one of the unfortunate antecedents to today’s tensions between Asian Americans and African Americans in inner cities, as the recently remembered fifteenth anniversary of the 1992 Los Angeles riots pointed out, which in part pitted African Americans against Korean American business owners. This is another theme of transportation equity in the United States—the setting of one group of people of color against another. There is a direct connection between the Sleeping Car Porters Union and the Montgomery Bus Boycott. E. D. Nixon was a leader in the union and a close associate of Randolph. He became president of the Voters League of Montgomery in 1944 and was also the leader of the NAACP in Alabama. He was a major organizer in building the bus boycott and became chairman of the MIA. Another veteran of the Sleeping Car Porters Union was Bayard Rustin, who worked with Randolph to open unions to black workers and set up apprentice training programs. Bayard became head of the A. Philip Randolph Institute in 1964, training black workers to move into decent union jobs. In Canada, the black porters’ struggle for unionization and equality is considered to be one of the great achievements of Canadian black history. Building—and Using—American Roads As the road net in the United States was improved, the chain gang was created. In several southern states, the criminal justice system was used to sentence blacks to chain gangs, where the mortality rate in some camps was over 40 percent. Many of these chain gangs worked on building roads. Chain gangs originated as a part of the mass organization at the turn of the twentieth century to create quality roads. In the 1890s, Good Roads Associations were developed in each of the southern states. They established a statutory labor system, in which every able-bodied road hand in the state was required to work for four or five days a year on public roads and highways. In one county in Florida in the 1920s, about 60 percent of those imprisoned and forced to work on chain gangs was black. Just as African Americans provided the free labor to build and maintain the economy of the pre–Civil War South, they did so again to build the South’s road net. In 1940, 74 percent of American blacks lived in the South. Approximately five million migrated north over the next twenty-five years. During the northern black migration, African American sleeping car porters who worked for railroads were an important link between North and South. Porters traveled the country, had connections in the black communities in the rural South and in northern cities, and facilitated the northern migration. Transportation has been an opportunity for advancement (for example, Pullman porter and teamster jobs), a way to obtain social mobility (the internal migration north of African Americans following the Civil War), a means of separation (“the wrong side of the tracks”), and a form of destruction of minority neighborhoods (Urban Renewal, also called Negro Removal). During World War II, many African Americans served in stevedore and transportation units in the segregated Army forces. The demands of the transportation industry helped fuel the migration of African Americans to the West Coast. During World War II, there was great demand for workers

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in shipyards and aircraft plants. Los Angeles, the San Francisco Bay Area, Portland, and Seattle all experienced large influxes of African Americans from the South and Texas to work in war industries. After World War II, the creation of the interstate highway system made white flight from cities possible and exacerbated social problems in inner cities. Lack of employment in African American communities was not addressed by this massive construction program because of a lack of local hiring preferences. Lack of economic opportunities for African Americans helped create the demand for affirmative action and disadvantaged business enterprise programs. Even today, the affirmative action programs of the U.S. Department of Transportation are controversial and subject to challenge. See, for example, the Adarand line of court decisions concerning preferences in contracts for road construction. There is also a close intersection between transportation and housing. Housing segregation contributed to the disconnect between workers and jobs. Many African American workers were confined to inner city neighborhoods, while jobs increasingly became located in outer suburban areas and around airports, requiring inordinately long and costly commutes. This disconnect has led to welfare-to-work programs, to try to join together those who use social welfare or benefits programs with work. Traveling to Where, Exactly? Transportation, education, and housing make up the three-legged stool that continues the vestiges of previous illegal (and legal) segregation. Today, we still see these vestiges. African American car ownership is the lowest of any racial or ethnic group in the United States. While some environmentalists may find this fact delightful, it has real negative implications when disaster strikes. In Hurricane Katrina in 2005, many African Americans could not evacuate using plans based on cars. At this writing, polls show that the rapidly rising price of gasoline in the United States is not yet a hardship for most of those polled. But African Americans, who have far less family wealth and discretionary income than whites, will inevitably feel the pinch of gasoline prices more than others. The travel of a group that already travels less than other groups will be restricted further. African Americans have made progress in the United States, but only from actual shackles on slave ships to the economic shackles of high gasoline prices, predatory lending, foreclosure, poor inner city schools, continuing job discrimination, and regressive taxes.

#### [INSERT APPROPRIATE 1NC LINK]

### The Slave Ship 1NC

#### White supremacy is a global modality of genocidal violence – Slavery may have ended in name, but its operational logic continues to fester. Reformist measures simply provide fuel for Whiteness

Rodriguez ’11 [Dylan, PhD in Ethnic Studies Program of the University of California Berkeley and Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies at University of California Riverside, “The Black Presidential Non-Slave: Genocide and the Present Tense of Racial Slavery”, Political Power and Social Theory Vol. 22, pp. 38-43]

To crystallize what I hope to be the potentially useful implications of this provocation toward a retelling of the slavery-abolition story: if we follow the narrative and theoretical trajectories initiated here, it should take little stretch of the historical imagination, nor a radical distension of analytical framing, to suggest that the singular institutionalization of racist and peculiarly antiblack social/state violence in our living era - the US imprisonment regime and its conjoined policing and criminalization apparatuses - elaborates the social logics of genocidal racial slavery within the American nation-building project, especially in the age of Obama. The formation and astronomical growth of the prison industrial complex has become a commonly identified institutional marker of massively scaled racist state mobilization, and the fundamental violence of this apparatus is in the prison's translation of the 13th Amendment's racist animus. By "reforming" slavery and anti-slave violence, and directly transcribing both into criminal justice rituals, proceedings, and punishments, the 13th Amendment permanently inscribes slavery on "post-emancipation" US statecraft. The state remains a "slave state" to the extent that it erects an array of institutional apparatuses that are specifically conceived to reproduce or enhance the state's capacity to "create" (i.e., criminalize and convict) prison chattel and politically legitimate the processes of enslavement/imprisonment therein. The crucial starting point for our narrative purposes is that the emergence of the criminalization and carceral apparatus over the last forty years has not, and in the foreseeable future will not build its institutional protocols around the imprisonment of an economically productive or profitmaking prison labor force (Gilmore, 1999).16 So, if not for use as labor under the 13th Amendment's juridical mandate of "involuntary servitude," what is the animating structural-historical logic behind the formation of an imprisonment regime unprecedented in human history in scale and complexity, and which locks up well over a million Black people, significantly advancing numbers of "nonwhite" Latinos as, and in which the white population is vastly underrepresented in terms of both numbers imprisoned and likelihood to be prosecuted (and thus incarcerated) for similar alleged criminal offenses?17 In excess of its political economic, geographic, and juridical registers, the contemporary US prison regime must be centrally understood as constituting an epoch-defining statecraft of race: a historically specific conceptualization, planning, and institutional mobilization of state institutional capacities and state-influenced cultural structures to reproduce and/or reassemble the social relations of power, dominance, and violence that constitute the ontology (epistemic and conceptual framings) of racial meaning itself (da Silva, 2007; Goldberg, 1993). In this case, the racial ontology of the postslavery and post-civil rights prison is anchored in the crisis of social meaning wrought on white civil society by the 13th Amendment's apparent juridical elimination of the Black chattel slave being. Across historical periods, the social inhabitation of the white civil subject - - its self-recognition, institutionally affirmed (racial) sovereignty, and everyday social intercourse with other racial beings - is made legible through its positioning as the administrative authority and consenting audience for the nation- and civilization-building processes of multiple racial genocides. It is the bare fact of the white subject's access and entitlement to the generalized position of administering and consenting to racial genocide that matters most centrally here. Importantly, this white civil subject thrives on the assumption that s/he is not, and will never be the target of racial genocide.18 (Williams, 2010) .Those things obtained and secured through genocidal processes - land, political and military hegemony/dominance, expropriated labor - are in this sense secondary to the raw relation of violence that the white subject inhabits in relation to the racial objects (including people, ecologies, cultural forms, sacred materials, and other modalities of life and being) subjected to the irreparable violations of genocidal processes. It is this raw relation, in which white social existence materially and narratively consolidates itself within the normalized systemic logics of racial genocides, that forms the condition of possibility for the US social formation, from "abolition" onward. To push the argument further: the distended systems of racial genocides are not the massively deadly means toward some other (rational) historical ends, but are ends within themselves. Here we can decisively depart from the hegemonic juridical framings of "genocide" as dictated by the United Nations, and examine instead the logics of genocide that dynamically structure the different historical-social forms that have emerged from the classically identifiable genocidal systems of racial colonial conquest, indigenous physical and cultural extermination, and racial chattel slavery. To recall Trask and Marable, the historical logics of genocide permeate institutional assemblages that variously operationalize the historical forces of planned obsolescence, social neutralization, and "ceasing to exist." Centering a conception of racial genocide as a dynamic set of sociohistorical logics (rather than as contained, isolatable historical episodes) allows the slavery-to-prison continuity to be more clearly marked: the continuity is not one that hinges on the creation of late-20th and early-list century "slave labor," but rather on a re-institutionalization of anti-slave social violence. Within this historical schema, the post-1970s prison

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[RODRIGUEZ CONTINUED]

regime institutionalizes the raw relation of violence essential to white social being while mediating it so it appears as non-genocidal, non-violent, peacekeeping, and justice-forming. This is where we can also narrate the contemporary racial criminalization, policing, and incarcerating apparatuses

as being historically tethered to the genocidal logics of the post-abolition, post-emancipation, and post-civil rights slave state. While it is necessary to continuously clarify and debate whether and how this statecraft of racial imprisonment is verifiably genocidal, there seems to be little reason to question that it is, at least, protogenocidal - displaying both the capacity and inclination for genocidal outcomes in its systemic logic and historical trajectory. This contextualization leads toward a somewhat different analytical framing of the "deadly symbiosis" that sociologist Loi'c Wacquant has outlined in his account of antiblack carceral-spatial systems. While it would be small-minded to suggest that the emergence of the late-20th century prison regime is an historical inevitability, we should at least understand that the structural bottom line of Black imprisonment over the last four decades - wherein the quantitative fact of a Black prison/jail majority has become taken-for-granted as a social fact - is a contemporary institutional manifestation of a genocidal racial substructure that has been reformed, and not fundamentally displaced, by the juridical and cultural implications of slavery's abolition. I have argued elsewhere for a conception of the US prison not as a selfcontained institution or isolated place, but rather as a material prototype of organized punishment and (social, civil, and biological) death (Rodriguez, 2006). To understand the US prison as a regime is to focus conceptually, theoretically, and politically on the prison as a pliable module or mobilized vessel through which technologies of racial domin8ance institutionalize their specific, localized practices of legitimated (state) violence. Emerging as the organic institutional continuity of racial slavery's genocidal violence, the US prison regime represents a form of human domination that extends beyond and outside the formal institutional and geographic domains of "the prison (the jail, etc.)." In this sense, the prison is the institutional signification of a larger regime of proto-genocidal violence that is politically legitimized by the state, generally valorized by the cultural common sense, and dynamically mobilized and institutionally consolidated across different historical moments: it is a form of social power that is indispensable to the contemporary (and postemancipation) social order and its changing structures of racial dominance, in a manner that elaborates the social logics of genocidal racial slavery. The binding presence of slavery within post-emancipation US state formation is precisely why the liberal multiculturalist narration of the Obama ascendancy finds itself compelled to posit an official rupture from the spectral and material presence of enslaved racial blackness. It is this symbolic rupturing - the presentation of a president who consummates the liberal dreams of Black citizenship. Black freedom, Black non-resentment, and Black patriotic subjectivity - that constructs the Black non-slave presidency as the flesh-and-blood severance of the US racial/racist state from its entanglement in the continuities of antiblack genocide. Against this multiculturalist narrative, our attention should be principally fixated on the bottom-line Blackness of the prison's genocidal logic, not the fungible Blackness of the presidency. CONCLUSION: FROM "POST-CIVIL RIGHTS" TO WHITE RECONSTRUCTION The Obama ascendancy is the signature moment of the post-1960s White Reconstruction, a period that has been characterized by the reformist elaboration of historically racist systems of social power to accommodate the political imperatives of American apartheid's downfall and the emergence of hegemonic (liberal-to-conservative) multiculturalisms. Byfocusing on how such reforms have neither eliminated nor fundamentally alleviated the social emergencies consistently produced by the historical logics of racial genocide, the notion of White Reconstruction departs from Marable's notion of the 1990s as the "twilight of the Second Reconstruction" (Marable. 2007. p. 216)19 and points toward another way of framing and narrating the period that has been more commonly referenced as the "post-civil rights" era. Rather than taking its primary point of historical departure to be the cresting of the Civil Rights Movement and its legacy of delimited (though no less significant) political-cultural achievements. White Reconstruction focuses on how this era is denned by an acute and sometimes aggressive reinvention and reorganization of the structural-institutional formations of racial dominance. Defined schematically, the recent half-century has encompassed a generalized reconstruction of "classically" white supremacist apparatuses of state-sanctioned and culturally legitimated racial violence. This general reconstruction has (1) strategically and unevenly dislodged various formal and de facto institutional white monopolies and diversified their personnel at various levels of access, from the entry-level to the administrative and executive levels (e.g., the sometimes aggressive diversity recruitment campaigns of research universities, urban police, and the military); while simultaneously (2) revamping, complicating, and enhancing the social relations of dominance, hierarchy, and violence mobilized by such institutions - relations that broadly reflect the long historical, substructural role of race in the production of the US national formation and socioeconomic order. In this sense, the notion of White Reconstruction brings central attention to how the historical logics of racial genocide may not only survive the apparent disruption of classical white monopolies on the administrative and institutional apparatuses that have long mobilized these violent social logics, but may indeed flourish through these reformist measures, as such logics are re-adapted into the protocols and discourses of these newly "diversified" racist and white supremacist apparatuses (e.g.. the apparatuses of the research university, police, and military have expanded their capacities to produce local and global relations of racial dominance, at the same time that they have constituted some of the central sites for diversity recruitment and struggles over equal access). It is, at the very least, a remarkable and dreadful moment in the historical time of White Reconstruction that a Black president has won office in an electoral landslide while well over a million Black people are incarcerated with the overwhelming consent of white/multiculturalist civil society.

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#### Vote negative to engage in an unflinching structural analysis of the ontological position of Blackness—the very possibility of ethics and freedom resides in a rejection of the affirmative’s ratification of democracy, the state and civil society. Resisting the lure of anti-blackness through a genealogy of history’s constitutive void is the starting point for imagining a new world.

Kokontis 2011 (Kate, PhD in Performance Studies from UC-Berkeley, “Performative Returns and the Rememory of History: genealogy and performativity in the American racial state,” Dissertation available on Proquest)

On one hand, she addresses the literal politics that the theological narratives espouse. There is a long tradition of deploying the Exodus narrative toward the pursuit of social reform. That is, instead of appealing to it in a way that focuses on the next world, “[t]hrough biblical typology, particularly uses of Exodus, African Americans elevated their common experiences to biblical drama and found resources to account for their circumstances and respond effectively to them. [...] Exodus history sustained hope and a sense of possibility in the face of insurmountable evil. The analogical uses of the story enabled a sense of agency and resistance in persistent moments of despair and disillusionment.”64 But even these efforts have – not exclusively, but often – relied on a particular iteration of the social gospel that presupposes a set of moral and institutional imperatives (for instance, the ideal of training racial, religious, sexual, social, or institutional “deviants” or outlyers to behave according to an ostensibly correct set of moral principles) that run counter to a radical critique of the underlying terms of the state and civil society which tend to ratify, naturalize, and invisibilize antiblackness and/or policies that adversely impact black people who are not part of the middle class, rather than to critique or subvert it. Hartman, on the other hand, does call for, and mount, a radical critique of the terms of the state and civil society: for her, they are inherently unethical rather than redeemable, having engendered centuries of black social death and historical unknowability, and thus any struggle toward freedom demands an unflinching critical analysis rather than an implicit or explicit ratification of these institutions and the terms on which they are predicated. But more fundamentally, she addresses the political implications of the assumptive logic of a theological teleology. I interpret Hartman to posit that there is a kind of freedom that can be predicated on not-knowing: if there is no predetermined future, there is no divine imperative that might encourage an investment in the moral prescriptions of a conservative social gospel: a toppled faith in the redemptive possibilities of the struggle has the potential to open the door to invention, speculation, refashioning, and cobbling together something from nothing, presence from absence. I interpret her to posit that a viable freedom dream necessitates the acknowledgment of loss and absence and the history of processes of dehumanizing antiblackness, the acknowledgement of the wound and its psychic, social, political, and ethical causes – as well as an acknowledgement of its persistence – rather than being deluded by tidy or optimistic but under-analyzed narratives of progress or redemption. Only then can any realistic stock be taken toward re-imagining the world and the possibilities and imperatives of a black freedom struggle. While Haley and Gates draw on narratives that say that the past, including its suffering, was meaningful, Hartman offers what might appear to be a much bleaker interpretation that insists that it is meaningless insofar as it is not folded into any sort of teleology. But in that is a kind of freedom/dream, because the subjects of her narrative are free from a predetermination of the terms on which liberation is possible, the structures around its enactment. What she calls for is a profound refashioning of the epistemology of the invisible, which is as fundamental a component of the black freedom struggle as is an epistemology of verifiable evidence of oppression. That is, she advocates the excavation of psychic structures and historical silences to replace an implicit or explicit faith in a divine logic in the (racial) order of things. Genealogy cannot connect with the unknown, so it becomes a ghost story, an excavation. The term might then be interpreted less as a means of accessing literal ancestors, and more as a process toward understanding. Hartman constructs, in her text, not a genealogy of anyone’s family, but a genealogy of the stranger, of the slave; a genealogy of loss, of the lost, of searching. Projects that make use of imaginative, performative, quasi-fictional or poetic devices can’t rest with not-knowing: the imaginative devices emerge, in fact, from attempts to piece together or construct/invent evidence from its lack. They all insist on the importance of knowing, whether because of some large-scale sense of collective responsibility, or because of personal yearning, or both. The imaginative devices don’t exist for the sake of being imaginative; they exist for the sake of survival. But in being imaginative, they allow for radical possibilities to emerge that literality forecloses. Part of what performance might offer the study of history is a) different keys to be able to fill in the gaps, that aren’t so heavily reliant upon explicit, legible empiricism, and b) not only permission for, but encouragement of what uncertainty can yield. Genealogy, broadly understood, is what furnishes

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evidence: it is the key to filling in blanks that are impossible to fill. One version of it is capable of being profoundly literal; of making reconstruction possible; it is used to fill in the blank that has been lost to us – whomever the ‘us’ is: the dispossessed, displaced, marginalized – providing an object to slip into a gaping negative space. This I would call genealogy as an object. A different version is used in order to understand the gaps, to underscore or illuminate the negative spaces and ask how they came to be, and filling in the context around the blank spaces, inheriting the loss, becomes the way to trace the relationship between the past, present, and future. This I would call genealogy as a process. What, then, is or could be critical or even radical in roots-seeking genealogy projects? There is something inherently conservative about nostalgia, according to most interpretations; but not if a notion of “radical nostalgia,” such as that offered by Peter Glazer, is pursued: such an enactment of notalgia engages in worldmaking and invention; the definition takes for granted that nostalgia is for worlds and times that never existed, and that therefore it is not conservative (i.e. about returning to an idealized past), but that it is creative and always seeking something new. Performative returns are inevitably projects of yearning, of wishing for a past that was imagined to be better than the present (which has devolved in some way) or a future that has promise and potential. The mythical Aztec homeland Aztlán that was made popular during the Chicano Movement is a very elegant example: it is a wished-for, utopian space, acknowledged as being impossible to realize, but always animating the spirit of the concrete efforts of its adherents toward social justice and structural change (see Anaya and Lomelí 1991). Hartman writes: “To believe, as I do, that the enslaved are our contemporaries is to understand that we share their aspirations and defeats, which isn’t to say that we are owed what they were due but rather to acknowledge that they accompany our every effort to fight against domination, to abolish the color line, and to imagine a free territory, a new commons. It is to take to heart their knowledge of freedom. The enslaved knew that freedom had to be taken; it wasn’t something that could ever be given to you. The kind of freedom that could be given to you could just as easily be taken back. [...] The demands of the slave on the present have everything to do with making good the promise of abolition, and this entails much more than the end of property in slaves. It requires the reconstruction of society, which is the only way to honor our debt to the dead. This is the intimacy of our age with theirs – an unfinished struggle. To what end does one conjure the ghost of slavery, if not to incite the hopes of transforming the present?” (Hartman 2007, 269-270). But performative return is not necessarily critical, and part of what I demonstrate throughout this dissertation is how such projects are always more complicated than they seem; they work to challenge and bolster the racial state; they are in some ways radical and in others extremely conservative. And this question of criticality has precisely to do with normativity: do genealogical practices, the conclusions they draw and the worldmaking they do, work to undo or to reinscribe oppressive patterns, habits, worldviews, available roles of and categories for historically marginalized groups of people? All three of these projects attempt to re-write the terms of America, such that the circumstances of African-Americans are configured as being integral instead of outside the dominant narrative; constitutive rather than an aberration. But they waver between trying to write that as a narrative of progress, in which we have left slavery behind and have ascended to a space of constitutive normativity; and trying to underline the fundamental and unending nature of slavery – a kind of rejoinder to uncritical narratives that not only attends to the subjective space of social death that it has yielded but the possibilities and necessities of invention that have flourished in its wake. What they have in common is that they present the necessity of grappling with the past instead of ignoring it, allowing African-Americans’ movements and reinscriptions of migration to trouble the waters of complacency, forging a broader awareness of the fraught position they have historically occupied. Each contains kernels of great possibility for an inclusive vision of the future as well as more or less significant red flags. Hartman’s vision, however, seems to espouse a particularly liberating articulation of freedom, because it does not try to deny or occlude the presence or significance of ongoing disparity and loss: while Gates’ and Haley’s subjects and implied audience have already succeeded, gained access to civil society, and have implicitly ratified the fundamental terms on which it is predicated, Hartman’s are still struggling to make something from nothing; they have an urgency in attending to disparities, and no investment in a status quo that excludes or violates their well-being. What she claims or advocates is not a victimized stance, but rather a staunch activist one that is inflected by a rigorous and unflinching structural analysis, and a sensitive and equally rigorous understanding of desire, yearning, and the possibilities for reinvention and reconstruction that emerge when faced with profound absence and loss.

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#### And, the cognitive space of debate is organized around the governing rules of whiteness—the alternative is necessary to provoke an epistemological break that can introduce generative chaos into the closed system of violent racialization. Unless we devise a radically new science of the human, ongoing colonialism, genocides, and nuclear extinction become inevitable.

Wynter ‘84 (Sylvia, Wynter was invited by the Department of Literature at the University of California at San Diego to be a visiting professor for 1974-75. She then became chairperson of African and Afro-American Studies, and professor of Spanish in the Department of Spanish and Portuguese at Stanford University in 1977. She is now Professor Emeritus at Stanford University, “"The Ceremony Must Be Found: After Humanism" Boundary II, 12:3 & 13:1, JSTOR)

The social behaviors that were to verify this topos of iconicity which yoked the Indo-European mode of being to human being in general, and the new middle class model of identity to the exemplary Norm of this new "empirico-transcendental doublet," man (Foucault, 1984) (imagined/experienced as if a "natural being"), would be carried out by the complementary non-discursive practices of a new wave of great internments of native labors in new plantations orders (native wage labor), and by the massacres of the colonial era—leading logically to their Summa in the Auchwitz/Belsen and in the Gulag/Cambodia archipelagoes. Through all this, different forms of segregating the Ultimate Chaos that was the Black—from the apartheid of the South to the lynchings in both North and South, to their deprivation of the vote, and confinement in an inferior secondary educational sphere, to the logic of the jobless/ghetto/drugs/crime/prison archipelagoes of today—ensured that, as Uspenskij et al note, the "active creation" of the type of Chaos, which the dominant model needs for the replication of its own system, would continue. It thus averted any effort to find the ceremonies which could wed the structural oppositions, liberating the Black from his Chaos function, since this function was the key to the dynamics of its own order of being. As Las Casas had argued against Sepulveda—when refuting the latter's humanist theory that human sacrifice carried out by the New World peoples was proof of the fact of their Lack of Natural Reason and, therefore, that it was just to make war against them to protect the innocents who were sacrificed and to take over their territory—"to sacrifice innocents for the good of the commonwealth is not opposed to natural reason, is not something abominable and contrary to nature, but is an error that has its origin in natural reason itself."" It is an error, then, not in the speaking/behaving subjects, but in the ratiomorphic apparatus generic to the human, the cognitive mechanism that is the "most recent superstructure in a continuum of cognitive processes as old as life on this planet," and, as such, "the least tested and refined against the real world" (Riedl/Kaspar, 1984). And it is only with science, as Riedl and Kaspar (quoting Roman Sexl) observe, that there is ever any true "victory over the ratiomorphic apparatus"—such as that of Galileo's and his telescope over the abductive logic of the if/then sequence of inference dictated behind the backs of their consciousness to the Aristotelian doctors of philosophy as the speaking subjects of the Christian-medieval system ensemble. II. Re-enacting Heresy: The New Studies and the Studia as a Science of Human Systems The main proposal here is that the calls made in the 1960s and 1970s for new areas/programs of studies, was, although non-consciously so at the time, calls which re-enacted in the context of our times a parallel counter-exertion, a parallel Jester's heresy to that of the Studia's. But because of our non-consciousness of the real dimensions of what we were about, we asked at first only to be incorporated into the normative order of the present organization of knowledge as add-ons, so to speak. We became entrapped, as a result, in Bantustan enclaves labelled "ethnic" and "gender" and/or "minority studies." These enclaves then functioned, as David Bradley notes, inter a/ia, to exempt English Departments from having to alter their existing definition of American literature. Even more, these enclaves functioned to exempt the callers for the new studies from taking cognizance of the anomaly that confronted us, with respect to a definition of American literature which lawlikely functioned to exclude not only Blacks, but all the other groups whose "diverse modalities of protest" (Detienne, 1979) in the 1960s and 1970s had fueled the call for new studies. Thomas Kuhn points out that the recognition of anomalies is the first step which leads to changes in the paradigms of the natural sciences.38 And in the same context the linguistic scholar Whatmough has argued that human observers are parts of the cosmos which they observe, that since all the knowledge that orders our behavior is gained from these human observers, such knowledge must either be solipsistic or reduce man to a part of his environment. This knowledge is, therefore, not to be trusted unless the observer in his role as knower finds the means to convert himself into an "external observer." Among the means which he proposes is the taking of the "all pervading regularity noted in language," rather than the speaking subject, as the object of investigation. And these regularities appear "all along the road through the heirarchy of language, from everyday chit chat through law, and religions, liturgy and homily, poetry, `literature,' science and philosophy to logic and mathematics."39 These regularities, he goes on, will enable the knower to make use of what he calls the mathematike techne, which enables her/him to treat languages like chemistry, for example, according to their grammars of regularities, as if man, i.e. the speaking/thinking/representing subject, "did not exist at all." One problem remained, however: that of the perception of these regularities. For, because the regularities are, so to speak, "built in" to the discourses, the users of these discourses cannot normally isolate the existence of these regularities (Whatmough, 1967). And, as Foucault reminds us, this problem is applicable not only for the boundary maintaining "true discourse" of the positivism inherited from the nineteenth-century episteme, but also for the eschatology of positivism's counter-discourse, Marxism, both generated from the same ground (Foucault, 1973) of a materialist metaphysics, and each dialectically the condition of the post-atomic dysfunctional sovereignty of the "grammar of regularities" of the other. The anthropologist, Legesse, has pointed to the extent to which we are trapped in the ordering "categories and prescriptions" of our epistemic orders. He notes, however, that the liminal groups of any order are the ones most able to "free us" from these prescriptions, since it is they who existentially experience the "injustice inherent in structure" (Legesse, 1973), that is, in the very ordering of the order which dictates the "grammar of regularities" through which the systemic subjects perceive their mode of reality as isomorphic with reality in general. The normative categories of any order—for example the aristocratic category of European feudalism—are normative precisely because the structure of their lived experience is isomorphic with the representation that the order gives itself of itself. The liminal categories like those of the bourgeoisie in the feudal order of things, on the other hand, experience a structural contradiction

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between their lived experience and the grammar of representations which generate the mode of reality by prescribing the parameters of collective behaviors that dynamically bring that "reality" into being. The liminal frame of reference, therefore, unlike the normative, can provide what Uspesnkij et al call the "outer view," from which perspective the grammars of regularities of boundary and structure-maintaining discourses are perceivable, and Whatmough's "external observer's position" made possible. What the calls for New Studies at first overlooked, however, was precisely the regularities which emerged into view in the wake of the "diverse modalities of protest" whose non-coordinated yet spontaneous eruption now brought into unconcealedness—not only the lawlike rule-governed nature of the exclusion of the diverse protesting groups/categories as group-subjects from any access to the means of representation, but also the regularities of the exclusion of their frames of reference and historical/cultural past from the normative curriculum, an exclusion so consistent as to be clearly also rule-governed. This consistency was reinforced by the emergence of the equation between the group/categories excluded from the means of representation and the ratios of their degrees of socio-economic empowerment/disempowerment in the world outside. The dynamic presence of rule-governed correlations which determined rules of in/exclusion, was, however, only perceivable by the non-orchestrated calls for New Studies, calls like "the diverse modalities of protest" in the Greek city states analysed by Detienne, which, by breaching parallel dietary and other rules, not only called the ontology of the religio-political order of the city-state into question, but made perceivable, through what they protested against, the founding Order/Chaos oppositional categories which underpinned the boundary/structure maintaining dynamics of the polis (Detienne, 1979). These regularities pointed to a fundamental question which, at the time, remained unasked. It had to do with the anomalous implication that they were determined by rules which transcended the conscious intention of the academics who enacted the decision-making processes as to what to in/exclude, just as the rules of inference of Galileo's doctors of philosophy were dictated by the ratiomorphic apparatus or rational world view based on the a priori of an order of value between the imperfect terrestrial and the crystalline perfection of the lunar realm: the Order/Chaos opposition of the autopoetic dynamics of the Christian medieval-system ensemble. What, in this case, then, determined the rules which determined the decisionmaking processes by which individual scholars, working with integrity and according to the criteria of objective standards, in/excluded? What determined what should and should not be defined as American Fiction, and the mode of measure of the "objective" standards of individual scholars? The question was not to be asked, however, until the after side of the experience of disillusion which the callers all underwent and which David Bradley traces in his article, "Black and American in 1982." For it was to be a recognition, made by us all on the other side of that experience, of the existence of objective limits to the incorporation of Blacks into the normative order of being/knowing of the present order, that would lead to our further recognition of the need for an epistemological break. Bradley was one of a group of Blacks for whom Affirmative Action, by countering the "inbuilt distribution bias" of the dynamics of the order, had worked. The interference of Affirmative Action with the normative functioning of the order with respect to the distribution—at the group category level—of unequal ratios of access to educational empowerment, had enabled Bradley, together with a group of young Blacks like himself, to breach the rule-governed nature of the proscription which confined Blacks-as-a-group to a secondary educational orbit, relative to their White peers-as-a-group. Bradley at the time, observing his father's great joy, had determined to do everything to prove his father's and his own private hope true. His father's hope was that at long last Blacks were to be allowed to break out of the secondary orbit to which their lives and dreams had been confined, and if this hope would not be realized in time for his own life to be graced by the change, it would in time at least be realized for his son's. Bradley's own hope had been that once Blacks were included in vast numbers in the highest levels of higher education, and had worked hard and proved themselves, they would be so numerous, so no longer the token exception, that they would eventually have to be distinguished by criteria other than by "the uniform of skin." However, he experienced on the campus both the overt and covert forms of anathematization which met the breaching of the interdiction that the black presence-as-a-group implied (since what Hofstadter calls the category structure of the "representational system" "America"° is based on the dynamics of the contradiction between individual equality and group heirarchy). These experiences slowly stripped away the illusion of any fundamental change in the ordering of group relations. The shouts of "Nigger! Nigger!" in the citadel of reason in the heart of the non-redneck campus, the phoned bomb threats, the fragile defenselessness of the Black students in the face of a mindless hostility, the ineffective wringing of hands of concerned Liberal Whites, were paralleled by the more discreet acts of partition (Detienne, 1979) by university administrators, whose proscription of the financially starved Black Culture Center, always a whitewashed rotting house to be reached by a scramble up a muddy bank, mainly always on the nether edge of campus, once again gave the rule-governed regularity of the game away. Blacks would be allowed on the campus as a group, admitted to have even a culture, as long as this "culture" and its related enclave studies could be made to function as the extra-cultural space, in relation, no longer to a Wasp, but now more inclusively to a White American, normatively Euroamerican intra-cultural space; as the mode of Chaos imperative to the latter's new self-ordering. (The readapted Western culture Core Curriculum is the non-conscious expression of this more "democratizing" shift from Wasp to Euro.) Indeed once this marginalization had been effected, the order of value recycled in different terms, with the category homeostasis returning to its "built in normalcy," the abuse and the bomb threats ceased. Order and Chaos were once more in their relational interdefining places, stably expressing the bio-ontological principle of Sameness and Difference of the present order, as the rule-governed discourse of Galileo's doctors of philosophy functioned to verify

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the physicoontological mode of Sameness and Difference on which the Christian medieval order rested before the Studia and Copernicus, before the Jester's heresy of the figures of rogue/clown/fool, had pulled the "high seriousness" of its self-justifying self-representation down to earth. Bradley now recognized that he had been wrong to hope that Black lives, from his father's to his own, had to "run along the same line ... one that rises and falls like a sine wave," one that is "a graphed function not of a mathematical relation between sides and angles but of a social relationship between Blacks and American society itself." Sometimes the line could be "on the positive side of the base line," at other times on the negative side. If the effects were different, the function had always to remain the same. Thus his hope for the next generation of Blacks, in this case for his young godson, would have to be cut down to realistic size. His hope could only now be that by the time his godson came of age, the "graph of black will once again be on the upswing," giving him, as Bradley himself had had, "a little time to gain some strength, some knowledge, some color to hold inside himself." For that would/could be, "all the hope there is. 11 Yet the beginning of hope also lay here. The recognition of the regularities pointed outside the "functional rhetoric" of the Liberal creed to the existence of objective limits and, therefore, of laws of functioning which, beyond the conscious intentionalities of their subjects—White or Black—determined the limits to the order's normative incorporation of those whose lives in a "free" country had to be made to serve as the "graphed function" of the boundary maintaining system, as its markers of Chaos, the Not-Us. The Spanish historian Americo Castro had noted the existence of this systemic function of Blacks in the comparison he made between their function and that of Jew and Moor in sixteenth-century Spain. Although converted Christians and, therefore, "according to the gospel and the sacraments of the Church," forming a part of the "mystical Body of Christ and His Church," these categories had been stigmatized as being of unclean blood and heretical descent (i.e., not Spanish-Christian). Their proscribed lives—they were excluded from jobs; many were burnt at the stake by the Inquisition for "heresy"—enabled them to function as the mode of Difference from which the new secularizing bonding principle of limpieza, which came to constitute the "boundary maintaining system" of the Statal Group Subject of monarchical Spain, could be generated as an ontologized principle of Sameness. Here Americo Castro pointed to the regularity of the parallel by which the subordination of the lives of the category-bearers of difference to their "grasped function" is repeated in the lives of present day American Blacks, who are today re-enacting and "living a drama similar to that of the Spanish moriscos and Jews," even though according to the Constitution they form part of the American We (Americo Castro, 1977) or group-Subject. Only with their complete strategic marginalization did the by now bantustanized enclave studies begin to rethink their function: to grasp a connection with that of the Liminal outsider Jester's role of the original Studia, a role to which they were heir. This became clear as they began to take as their parallel objects of inquiry the representations which had been made of their groups by the order of discourse of mainstream scholarship; as they began to find that these representations, too, functioned according to across the board, objective rules. What was here revealed, when taken all together, were the regularities of the "figuring" of an Other excluded series, with the discourse functioning to constitute them as a "human species" totemic operator which paralleled that of the "animal species" totemic operator of traditional Neolithic societies as well as the planetary grid of the Christian medieval order. This discourse, then, operated to serve the same extra-cognitive function of Ptolemaic astronomy in the Middle Ages. It re-enacted the celestial/terrestrial physico-ontological principle of Difference in new terms: this time in terms of a bioontological principle of Sameness/Difference, expressed, not in the Spirit/Flesh order of value of the Christian-medieval order, but in the rational/irrational mode of Order/Chaos of our own. Whatever the group—women, natives, niggers—whatever the category—the Orient, Africa, the tropics—the ordering principle of the discourse was the same: the figuration of an ontological order of value between the groups who were markers of "rationality" and those who were the markers of its Lack-State. And the analyses which had begun to perceive the lawlike regularities of these ordering discourses went from Virginia Woolf's observation of the compulsive insistence by "angry male professors" on the mental inferiority of women, through Carter G. Woodson's diagnosis (1935) of the lawlike manner in which the curriculum in American schools distorted history so as to represent the Whites as everything and the Blacks as nothing, to Aime Cesaire's Discourse on Colonialism, which again diagnosed the regularities with which the colonizers rewrote the past to show themselves as having done everything and the colonized nothing, and, more recently Abdel Malek's/Edward Said's dissection of the phenomenon of Orientalism.4' What began to come clear was the reality of the reflex automatic functioning of rules of figuration, parallel to those of Galileo's doctors of philosophy, which went beyond the intentionality of the objectively rational scholar, rules which then revealed that the objectivity was that of the ratiomorphic apparatus or cognitive mechanism of our present organization of knowledge, one by which we are all, including the liminal Others, non-consciously governed. A parallel suspicion of something automatic functioning beyond the conscious control of the human had impelled the exchange of letters between Einstein and Freud, which was to be published under the title, Why War?. In the early decades of the century Einstein had written Freud, asking if his new discipline could provide some hope with respect to, and in the context of, the acceleration of the phenomenon of inter-human wars. Freud had responded that there was his theory of the instincts but that as yet he had no overall answer. Psychology as a discipline, however, was to confront the question by focussing on the connection between the phenomenon of nationalism and the processes of socialization which exacerbated nationalist allegiances as a primary causal factor. And in his History of Sexuality, Michel Foucault suggested that with the shift from the monarchical order of things to the bourgeois order in its pure state—the transposition from a governing figurative "symbolic of blood" to what might be called a "metaphorics of naturality" in which the bourgeoisie comes to image its boundary-maintaining Group-Subject system on the analogy of a living organism—the imperative of the self-preservation of the "natural community" (nation-Volk, race, culture) metaphorically ontologized as a "biological" Body, had led to the acceleration of wars between men who were now led to imagine themselves, for the first time in human history, as "natural beings."42 Recently Lewis Thomas, the biologist, has again focussed on the connection between nationalism—which he sees as an evolutionary blind alley for the human as a species—and the threat of nuclear extinction. Like Einstein earlier, Thomas has glimpsed that hope, if it is to exist, would have to be found in a new order of knowledge. And he suggests that the disciplines that were concerned with the problems of human behavior, although still in a groping uncertain stage, are the only ones capable of providing an answer to mankind's quest for social hope; that one day there would emerge from these uncertain attempts, a "solid" discipline as "hard" as physics, plagued "as physics still is with ambiguities" yet with new rules "and new ways of getting things done, such as for instance getting rid of patriotic rhetoric and thermonuclear warfare all at once."" The proposal I am making is that such a discipline can only emerge with an overall rewriting of knowledge, as the re-enacting of the original heresy of a Studia, reinvented as a science of human systems, from the liminal perspective of the "base" (Dewey, 1950) new Studies, whose revelatory heresy lies in their definition of themselves away from the Chaos roles in which they had been defined—Black from Negro, Chicano from Mexican-American, Feminists from Women, etc. For these have revealed the connection between the way we identify ourselves and the way we act upon/know the world. They have made clear that we are governed in the way we know the world by the templates of identity or modes of self-troping speciation, about which each human system auto-institutes itself, effecting the dynamics of an autopoetics, whose imperative of stable reproduction has hitherto transcended the imperatives of the human subjects who collectively put it into dynamic play. The proposed science of human systems, therefore, decenters the systemic subject. Instead, it takes as the object of its inquiry the modes of symbolic self-representation (Creutzfeld, 1979), about which each human system auto-institutes itself, the modes of self-troping rhetoricity through which the Subject (individual/collective) actualizes its mode of being as a living entity. In addition, it takes the ratiomorphic apparatus or episteme, which exists as the enabling rational world view of the self-troping mode of being as an object of inquiry in the comparative context in which it is definable as one of the cognitive mechanisms determined by the "psychogeny" of the human rather than by the phylogeny of purely biological organisms. Taking the connection that

### The Slave Ship 1NC

[WYNTER CONTINUED]

Thomas makes between "patriotic rhetoric" and "thermo-nuclear warfare" as a key linkage, a science of human systems will take most crucially as an object of its inquiry the modes of cultural imagination of human systems—Jerison's "imagery systems"—together with the laws of functioning of the rhetorically coded mode of figuration, which, with its internal mediation of the mimesis of Desire (Girard, 1965) and of Aversion (Fanon, 1967), orients the normative seeking/avoiding/knowing behaviors of the systemic subjects. For it is this governing system of figuration generated from the mode of self-definition which integrates with the neurophysiological machinery of the brain, that functions as the shared integrative mechanism, determining not only the mode of consciousness or "world of mind" of the order, but serving also, at the aesthetico-affective level of the order, to stabilize the response to the target-stimuli of Desire for all that is the Self/Order and of Aversion to all that is the Chaos of the Self, the Death of its Life. It is by thereby securing shared and predictably functioning endogenous waveshapes in the brain (Thatcher/John, 1977), of the normative Subject of the order, that the system of figuration sets limits to that Subject's mode of imagining its Self/Group-Self and, therefore, to the knowledge that it can have of its world. A science of human systems which takes the laws of figuration of human systems as its objects of inquiry must, therefore, adopt a synthetic rather than categorized approach to its subject. In order to study their rhetor-neurophysiological laws of functioning, it must above all breach the distinction between brain/minds, the natural and the human sciences. For one of its major hypotheses is that systems of figuration and their group-speciating Figuration-Work essentially constitute the shared governing rhetor-neurophysiological programs or abduction schemas through which human Group Subjects realize themselves as boundary maintaining systems. These governing rhetor-neurophysiological programs--which can often function as regressive defects of social fantasy (Thatcher/John 1977), as in the case of limpieza de sangre and of Aryaness, as well as of an ontologized whiteness--are the mechanisms which determine the limit of the figuratively coded "boundary-maintaing" systems. They then function, as in the case of the American order, to set objective limits (such as those to Bradley's hopes) to the definition of its fiction; and to the possible non-proscription of Black Culture Center at the nether edge of the campus, as the physical expression of the rhetorical configuration of the mode of chaos to the order's self-troping definition of itself. Hence the paradox of the major proposal that we make: that it is the literary humanities which should be the umbrella site for the transdisciplinary realization of a science of human systems.

## Camp Aff 1NC Links

### 1NC Link – Policy Aff (Non Public Transit)

#### Modern transportation investment and planning are fundamentally beset by racial inequality – their focus on transportation as a tool of development is sustained by vast networks of systemic discrimination that leave the marginalized behind

Bullard et al. 2000 [Robert D, Ware Professor of Sociology and Director, Environmental Justice Resource Center at Clark Atlanta University, Glenn Johnson, research associate in the Environmental Justice Resource Center and Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at Clark Atlanta, and Angel Torres, GIS specialist with the Environmental Justice Resource Center , Dismantling Transportation Apartheid: The Quest for Equality, in Sprawl City, pp. 42-47]

Federal tax dollars help build and subsidize many of the roads, freeways, and public transit systems in our nation. Building highways to the suburbs and subsidizing the construction of suburban homes were considered two of government's primary responsibilities." Many of these transportation activities had unintended consequences of dividing, isolating, disrupting, and imposing different economic, environmental, and health burdens on some communities. According to longtime civil rights activist and Georgia congressman John Lewis, Even in a city like Atlanta, Georgia a vibrant city with a modern rail and public transit system—thousands of people have been left out and left behind because of discrimination. Like most other major American cities, Atlanta's urban center is worlds apart from its suburbs. The gulf between rich and poor, minorities and whites, the "haves" and "have-nots" continues to widen.'' Some communities accrue benefits from transportation development projects, while other communities bear a disproportionate burden and pay the costs in diminished health. Generally, benefits are more dispersed, while costs or burdens are more localized. For example, having a seven-lane freeway next door may not be a benefit to someone who does not even own a car. Low-income and people of color communities are severely impacted by road construction and other transportation projects that result in the inci- deuce of tailpipe pollutants in urban areas. This constitutes evidence that suburban-serving freeways have significant negative impacts on inner-city neighborhoods, yet offer little benefit in return." Transportation decision making whether at the federal, regional, state, or local level—often mirrors the power arrangements of the dominant society and its institutions. Some transportation policies distribute the costs in a regressive pattern while providing disproportionate benefits for individuals who fall at the upper end of the education and income scale. All transportation modes are not created equal. Federal transportation policies, taxing structure, and funding schemes have contributed to the inequity between the various transportation modes (e.g., private automobile, rail, buses, air). Most state departments of transportation (DOTs) have become de facto road building programs that buttress the asphalt and construction industries. On the other hand, funding for efficient, clean, regional mass transportation systems has been spotty at best. The Quest for Environmental Justice Environmental justice means different things to different people. Environmental justice is defined as the fair treatment and meaningful involvement tice advocates (i.e., child care, health providers, housing, educators, environmentalists, organized labor, etc.) have reintroduced transportation equity on the political radar screens. The issues have been couched in social and economic justice contexts\_ Many poor people and people of color, who are concentrated in central cities, are demanding better transportation that will take them to the job-rich suburbs.21 Ideally, it would be better if jobs were closer to inner-city residents' homes. However, few urban-core neighborhoods have experienced an economic revitalization that can rival the current jobs in the suburbs. Transportation equity concerns extend to disparate outcomes in planning, operation and maintenance, and infrastructure development. Transportation is a key component in addressing poverty, unemployment, equal opportunity goals, and ensuring equal access to education, employment, and other public services. In the real world, all transportation decisions do not have the same impact on all groups. Costs and benefits associated with transportation developments are not randomly distributed. Transportation equity is concerned with factors that may create or exacerbate inequities. Environmental justice focuses on measures to prevent or correct disparities in benefits and costs. Disparate transportation outcomes can be subsumed under three broad categories of inequity: procedural, geographic, and social? Procedural Inequity Attention is directed to the process by which transportation decisions may or may not be carried out in a uniform, fair, and consistent manner with involvement of diverse public stakeholders. The question here is, do the rules apply equally to everyone? Geographic Inequity. Transportation decisions may have distributive impacts (positive and negative) that are geographic and spatial, such as rural vs. urban vs. central city. Some communities are physically located on the "wrong side of the tracks" and often receive substandard services. Environmental justice concerns revolve around the extent to which transportation systems address outcomes (diversity and quality of services, resources and investments, facilities and infrastructure, access to primary employment centers, etc.) that disproportionately favor one geographic area or spatial location over another. Social Inequity. Transportation benefits and burdens are not randomly distributed across population groups. Generally, transportation amenities (benefits) accrue to the wealthier and more educated segment of society, while transportation disamenities (burdens) fall disproportionately on people of color and individuals at the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum. Intergenerational equity issues are also subsumed under this category. For example, the impacts and consequences of some transportation decisions may reach into several generations. Such negative impacts or disamenities include transportation infrastructure that physically isolates communities; inequitable distribution of environmental "nuisances" such as maintenance and refueling facilities (air quality), airports (noise); lack of sufficient mitigation measures to correct inequitable distribution of negative impacts such as noise or displacement of homes, parks, and cultural landmarks; diversity of modal choices available to access key economic activity and employment locations; the transit head-ways and age and condition of the transit fleet; the availability and condition of facilities and services at transit stations such as information kiosks, seating, cleanliness, rest rooms; condition of the roadways that service lower-income and people of color communities; and major transportation investment projects and community economic development "spillover" effect. Central cities and suburbs are not equal. They often compete for scarce resources. it is not difficult to predict the outcome between affluent suburbs and their less affluent central city competitors. Freeways are the lifeline for suburban commuters, while millions of central-city residents are dependent on public transportation as their primary mode of travel. But recent cuts in mass transit subsidies and fare hikes have reduced access to essential social services and economic activities. Nevertheless, road construction programs are booming—even in areas choked by air pollution.

### 1NC Link – High Speed Rail (Policy)

#### High Speed Rail is only the latest manifestation of a long history of railway fueled imperialism – HSR is designed to annihilate space and time so Empire may run more efficiently

Minn ’11 [Michael, PhD student in Geography at [The University of Illinois](http://www.geog.illinois.edu/), The Political Economy of High Speed Rail in the United States, 19 August 2011]

The role of railroads in the geographic development of the United States is undeniable. It is no historical accident that the advent of commercial steam locomotive rail service around 1830 and the development of its communications technology twin, the telegraph, in 1837 occurred between the statement of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 and the coining of the term Manifest Destiny" in 1839. The technological advantage provided by railroads and telegraphs both enabled and made inevitable Euro American expansion over the continent and capitalist industrial exploitation of its material resources. World railways were a primary tool of imperialism, shrinking time and space to permit the global movement of goods and capital as well as helping to consolidate smaller states (Robinson 1991). The accumulation of capital made possible by American railroads helped usher in the American Century" (Luce 1941) and the American-dominated capitalist global empire. Mention of capitalism within contemporary human geography ultimately leads to Karl Marx, generally altered through the lens of David Harvey. While Harvey, acknowledges that Marx's writings on the spatial dimension of his theory of accumulation are, \fragmentary and often only sketchily developed," scrutiny of Marx's writing can reveal a novel location theory whose focus on dynamics can offer a perspective unavailable within the framework of comparatively static neoclassical economics" (Harvey 1975, 9). Accumulation of capital is the driver of the capitalist system. This creates a imperative for growth, expansion, and dynamism in order for capitalism to survive. Growth inevitably encounters barriers (often produced by contradictions within capitalism itself), leading to periods of crisis that must be overcome. These crises often bear heavy social costs, but eventually result in a rationalization of the economic system, and generally have the effect of expanding productive capacity that renews conditions for continued accumulation. Increased production requires increased demand, which can be obtained in new spheres of activity, new social wants, population expansion and/or geographic expansion. (Harvey 1975, 9{10) 9Marx addresses transportation and communication explicitly in regards to circulation of both goods and labor as capitalism inherently drives beyond spatial barriers. Transportation and communication are the means for \annihilation of space by time" as \spatial distance reduces itself to time" (Marx 1857{1858 / 1973, 538{539). Cheaper and / or faster transportation facilitates growth in surplus capital and accumulation by reducing existing circulation / production costs, expanding markets, and expanding spheres for realization of labor Widespread suburbanization emerged as a spatial fix to the potential crisis of overaccumulation facing post-WWII America (Harvey 2001, 86). Produc- tive capacity expanded to meet the socially produced demand for housing, cars and a wide variety of associated commodities. With war-torn Europe and Asia in a state of recovery, American capitalism stood astride the world, accumulating massive amounts of capital. While globalization radically al- tered the American economy after the 1970s, the suburban model retained its hegemony in American culture and spatial form. However, in many urban areas the physical and economic limitations of sub- urban growth have begun to reach another barrier as congestion on highways and runways threatens another crisis of capitalism, something that even pro- highway Libertarians acknowledge (Staley and Moore, 2009). A rational Keynesian response has been the suggestion of high-speed passenger rail transportation that would annihilate of space by time and render a spatial or mobility fix to the crisis. The rapid interconnection of population and labor centers within productive megaregions would facilitate circulation of labor and consumers. HSR would be a medium for the production of space to meet the needs of capitalism. HSR would aid in overcoming spatial limits of current American suburban form within a handful large megaregions in which congestion is rapidly reach- ing the limits of the dominant air / auto paradigm. HSR could aid in con- verting exurbs into suburbs and megaregions into virtual megalopoli. Indeed, auto congestion relief is one of the arguments commonly made in debates be- tween spending on rail vs. roads (CHSRA 2008, 12), and has been a dominant element of the HSR discourse since the 1960s (CACI, 1967). By siting HSR stations in the more lightly developed areas between dense urban centers, the suburban / exurban progression can presumably continue, absorbing popu- lation growth and facilitating further capital accumulation. HSR as, effectively, an expansion of commuter rail might also have the effect of increasing the productivity of workers using that service. In their rolling of- ces, creative class workers would transform the comparatively unproductive time of driving and/or ying into meaningful labor time, increasing produc- tivity that, in turn, creates more surplus capital for their employers. While New York's Metro North commuter railroad has been marketed with the slo- gan, \Train time is your own time" (Cameron 2010), even if travelers simply 11use the time for sleep or satisfaction of other biological and psychological needs, that is presumably time that is displaced from the worker's personal time rather than the employers production time. HSR might serve as partial solution to the range limitations of battery- powered electric cars that may be needed to compensate for increased cost and decreased availability of petroleum-based fuels. Price and technology limitations of battery technology limit the range of purely electric cars. For example, the pure electric Nissan (2010) LEAF has a rated range of only 100 miles on a single charge and that range can be reduced signi cantly by envi- ronmental or driving conditions. Unless and until battery and / or charging technology are signi cantly improved, broad transition to electric vehicles would signi cantly reduce the ease of making long-distance automobile trips that is currently available with gasoline-powered automobiles. Electric cars in conjunction with electric- or hydrogen-powered HSR could conceivably permit some measure of long-range mobility while continuing the viability of suburban development forms and permitting expanded use of industrially-generated renewable or nuclear power. This would preserve the existing housing business model while permitting continued spatio-economic growth and capitalist exploitation of a market for private automobiles

### 1NC Link – High Speed Rail (Critical)

#### The cosmopolitanism at the heart of democratic speed is not new—it is the same ideological justification for war and humanitarian violence in the service of the global exportation of whiteness

Ruggiero 2007 (Vincenzo, Crime and Conflict Research Centre, Middlesex University, “War, crime, empire and cosmopolitanism,” Critical Criminology, June)

Cosmopolitan intervention in warring countries is said to assume the traits shared by military and police action, with some tasks falling within traditional tasks (for example, separating belligerents and maintaining ceasefires), and other new tasks including the protection of safety zones or relief corridors. Yet other tasks would consist of ensuring freedom of movement, guaranteeing the safety of individuals, helping refugees and displaced persons, and capturing war criminals. In brief, a cosmopolitan management of international tensions transcends politically defined territorial entities, and is inspired by a type of universalistic humanism that supersedes the distinction between the local and the global. Cosmopolitanism is characterised by a partnership between ‘islands of civility’ and trans-national institutions. If we accept that the state intervenes in family affairs in order to prevent domestic violence, we also have to accept that cosmopolitan mobilisation intervenes on a global scale. One could object that a type of cosmopolitan politics is already in the international agenda, and that respect for human rights, the rejection of ethnic cleansing and genocide have long been part of the rhetoric used by official political representatives. It would appear, in sum, that cosmopolitan mobilisation is exclusively addressed to ‘disintegrating states’ and that ‘new wars’ merely describe those waged by war barons. Such a cosmopolitan policy would be disastrous. It involves picking those who are the bearers of ‘civility’ and favouring them politically and economically, backing this up with external force. Who will judge who are the cosmopolitans? We need to evolve a doctrine that a large part of the world’s states can accept, that draws on a wider set of national traditions of civility and tolerable standards of international conduct. This will not be easy, but international standards that come in a box marked ‘made in America’ will not be well received. This is particularly so since the history of American interventions in the last fifty years hardly shows them to be disinterested or exercised on behalf of liberty in most cases (Hirst 2001, p. 86–87). In other words, it might be considered that the designation ‘new wars’ also applies to the aggressions on the part of those who, taking their own cosmopolitanism as a given, attempt to impose it on others by bombing them. How can claims of cosmopolitanism be associated with firepower? There is the risk, in sum, that through cosmopolitan mobilisation the ideology of ‘just wars’ is re-launched by those who regard their own principles as more noble than those of the enemy (Feldman 1994). Coupled with a notion of humanitarian violence, cosmopolitan mobilisation paves the way to re-colonisation by the powerful states, and while invoking humanitarianism it implicitly labels the other as inhuman, therefore deserving of persecution (Deriu 2005; Fine 2006; Zolo 2000). Did the knocking down of the twin towers not trigger a process of condemnation, along with a judgement of incivility and backwardness, addressed towards entire populations? And does this judgement not legitimate the destructive desire of those who express it?

### 1NC Link – Transit Apartheid/Reformism

#### Their reformism is anti-revolutionary – historically, public social investments like the aff are used to create a narrative of national redemption from racism. The use of expansive taxation and market mechanisms is used to incorporate and defuse anti-racist struggles around issues like public transportation

Baca ‘8 [George, assistant professor of anthropology at Goucher College, “Neoliberalism and stories of racial redemption”, Dialectical Anthropology, 2008, Volume 32, Number 3, Pages 219-241, Springer]

In the vacuum left by federal government cutbacks, city governments like Fayetteville assumed greater responsibility for providing basic urban services and physical infrastructure. Yet this only intensified trends already put in place over the previous decades. Rising responsibilities and decreased contributions of the federal government encouraged city managers throughout the South to reach out to the business interests to promote economic development as an alternative to Federal support, and through this rhetoric, to build a dominant coalition of civil leaders and business interests. Changes under way earlier culminated in the move by Fayetteville’s business leaders and public officials to envision local government as an economic development tool whose provisioning responsibilities lay primarily with service to the business community. Eschewing long held skepticism about governmental interference and taxes, business leaders and governmental officials began to see Federal programs and local revenue streams as means to further the objectives of a narrow segment of Fayetteville’s population. Their first major attempt at merging government and business resulted in an industrial recruitment project, which netted several industrial plants, including Rohm Haas, Kelly Springfield Tire Co, and Black and Decker. These companies added nearly 6,000 industrial jobs to the local tax base. And success led to further expansion. By the early 1970 s, business leaders, city officials, and economic boosters sought to broaden their appeal by remaking the city’s image, seeking to erase the notoriety of the town’s label “Fayettenam,” which made the city difficult to “sell” to outside businesses. This effort to sanitize the city’s reputation targeted what leaders believed to be the epicenter of the problem: the 400 and 500 blocks of Hay Street. Downtown revitalization came to the forefront of city politics in 1977 when a group of private citizens, comprised largely of local architects, sought to demolish this area, and several others, in the name of “urban renewal.” In 1981 the mayor ran on a program of “Destroying” the old image of Fayetteville by closing “adult businesses” downtown, which he described as “a cancer in this city.”19 By the fall of 1983, city council began its own attack against Fayettenam by banning strip bars and condemning downtown buildings as, together with the mayor, they staged media events by bulldozing all the buildings on the 500 block of Hay Street. Mayoral supporters heralded this as “the day the 500 Block took a tumble.”20 These city-backed projects represented both the transformation in the local elite as well as the culmination of processes underway for several decades, as business and political leaders began connecting the city’s reputation with projects designed to attract investment and grow the economy. They designed public projects around the needs of land developers and the merchant coalition in ways that connected such things as education and crime prevention in black neighborhoods. City management opened the city’s administration to the needs and interests of the business community and sought a close relationship with ostensibly private business groups like the Chamber of Commerce, the downtown revitalization group, and the Fayetteville Economic Development Corporation. Increasingly, civic leaders associated the use of public money with cleaning up the city’s image and economic development, aimed at “growing” the tax base, improving the quality of life, and expanding urban services. Fayetteville’s political leaders also expanded the city’s authority at the time—increasing its use of outside resources and access to state and federal aid—by connecting city government with the needs of various community groups and the business community, advocating “public-private partnerships” as a means of meeting what had formerly been primarily city government responsibilities. Throughout this period, Federal agencies and local governments like that in Fayetteville quickly found that civil rights groups like the NAACP could be configured to promote economic development and technocratic models of service provision through careful inclusion in processes like those above. Well before the Reagan Revolution and popular talk of globalization, mainstream black officials were being absorbed into a “developing apparatus of race relations management as either public officials or quasi public functionaries” (Reed 1999, p. 1). So successful were these programs that now, nearly half a century later, expansion of the black political sphere and the rise of significant black middle-classes have cloaked fiscal policies that actually decreased federal spending on public schools, healthcare, and public transport (Prashad 2006). And ironically, celebration of these and other civil rights victories as the benchmark of black progress helps legitimize economic policies that increase inequality. Indeed, rhetoric about racial progress and reform amid increasingly difficult economic times parallel rhetoric used by white leaders in the transformation of cities like Fayetteville, and have emerged as a great myth of national redemption that preserves the racial cleavages forged during the white supremacy campaigns of the 1890s.21 Federal agencies, like their local counterparts, have found that racial reforms could not only defuse anti-racist struggles but recuperate these energies to uphold an economic policy agenda aimed mainly at the growth of business at the expense of public provisioning. The “cunning of recognition,” as anthropologist Elizabeth Povinelli describes this use of political reforms, recognizes the injustices of previous forms of racism. However, such recognition of the horrors of slavery is cast in ways that reinvigorate the future of the nation and its economic system (Povinelli 2002, p. 29; also see Williams 1991). Building on the racial institutions designed to manage blacks during segregation, racial reforms have come to embody economic policies that curtail public goods in line with organizations like the World Bank, WTO, and IMF, expanding a brokerage-style politics that has narrowed black politics within the emerging system of neoliberal capitalism.

[CONTINUED LATER]

Relations between Civil Rights and Neoliberal reforms challenge anthropologists to dispense with ideas that simultaneously glorify the civil rights movement and demonize conservative reforms, and treat them as if they represent opposite trends or stand on two sides of a historical rupture. Rather, much is to be gained by viewing racial reforms as part of a machinery of governance that has characterized bureaucratic inclusion and development of southern cities like Fayetteville for much of the twentieth century, and which have as their backdrop and precedent segregation and violent racial militarism. Rather than treating racial reforms in the abstract, they must be examined in terms of their implementation. As we can see, political leaders in Fayetteville have used Federal authorities and race reforms to readjust the city’s racial system to the changing needs of its political and business system. Nostalgic glorification of the bygone days of Fordism and Civil Rights has muddied analysis of civil rights reforms. By the 1960s, federal agencies and local governments like Fayetteville had already started reorienting civil rights groups like the NAACP to “economic development” and technocratic models of service provision. Well before the rise of Reagan-style neoliberalism, a mainstream black political class had been absorbed into a “developing apparatus of race relations management as either public officials or quasi-public functionaries” (Reed 1999, p. 1). The critical failures of anthropology and other social sciences is unfortunate as the federal government’s adjustment to the protest of the 1960s served as a catalyst in universalizing economic development and growth, a topic of much concern in today’s world, yet which is often dealt with in ahistorical terms. Civil rights reforms in the U.S. fortified a new pattern of social management which has incorporated opposition movements. Political and economic elites legitimate their programs by integrating potentially antagonistic forces into the logic of centralized administration. With the rise of civil rights’ management, these forces have regulated domination and militated against disruptive political strategies while steadily redirecting limited public resources. For nearly half a century federal agencies and their local counterparts have incorporated small numbers of African Americans in ways that have cloaked the very fiscal policies that have decreased spending on public schools, healthcare, and public transport. And while black economic success is novel and commendable, the stories of redemption meant to explain their undoing have unwittingly legitimized conservative politics by drawing attention away from fiscal policies that have increased racial inequality and constricted black politics to ever more narrow channels of business development. The careful combining of racial reform and conservative fiscal policies have defused struggles against racism and recuperated the energy of these struggles to uphold liberal forms of power in Fayetteville and elsewhere in the U.S. South (Baca 2006).

### 1NC Link – Disability Justice

#### The affirmative positions freedom as a question of reclaiming humanity and participation – this view cannot take into account the gratuitous violence enacted on the slave. Expanding the inclusionary circle of civil society can never include Blackness because it is founded in contradistinction to it – their humanism is birthed from the murder of the slave.

Wilderson ’10 [Frank, Associate Professor at UC Irvine’s Department of Drama and African American Studies, Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms, pp. 21-23]

Again, what is important for us to glean from these historians is that the preColumbian period, the Late Middle Ages, reveals no archive of debate on these three questions as they might be related to that massive group of Black-skinned people south of the Sahara. Eltis suggests that there was indeed massive debate which ultimately led to Britain taking the lead in the abolition of slavery, but he reminds us that that debate did not have its roots in the late Middle Ages, the post-Columbian period of the 1500s or the Virginia Colony period of the 1600s. It was, he asserts, an outgrowth of the mid- to late-18th century emancipatory thrust—intra-Human disputes such as the French and American Revolutions—that swept through Europe. But Eltis does not take his analysis further than this. Therefore, it is important that we not be swayed by his optimism of the Enlightenment and its subsequent abolitionist discourses. It is highly conceivable that the discourse that elaborates the justification for freeing the slave is not the product of the Human being’s having suddenly and miraculously recognized the slave. Rather, as Saidiya Hartman argues, emancipatory discourses present themselves to us as further evidence of the Slave’s fungibility: “[T]he figurative capacities of blackness enable white flights of fancy while increasing the likelihood of the captive’s disappearance…” (Scenes…22). First, the questions of Humanism were elaborated in contradistinction to the human void, to the African-quachattel (the 1200s to the end of the 17th century). Then, as the presence of Black chattel in the midst of exploited and un-exploited Humans (workers and bosses, respectively) became a fact of the world, exploited Humans (in the throes of class conflict with un-exploited Humans) seized the image of the slave as an enabling vehicle that animated the evolving discourses of their emancipation, just as un-exploited Humans had seized the flesh of the Slave to increase their profits. Without this gratuitous violence, a violence that marks everyone experientially until the late Middle Ages when it starts to mark the Black ontologically, the so-called great emancipatory discourses of modernity—marxism, feminism, postcolonialism, sexual liberation, and the ecology movement—political discourses predicated on grammars of suffering and whose constituent elements are exploitation and alienation, might not have developed.vi Chattel slavery did not simply reterritorialize the ontology of the African. It also created the Human out of culturally disparate entities from Europe to the East. I am not suggesting that across the globe Humanism developed in the same way regardless of region or culture; what I am saying is that the late Middle Ages gave rise to an ontological category—an ensemble of common existential concerns—which made and continues to make possible both war and peace, conflict and resolution, between the disparate members of the human race, east and west. Senator Thomas Hart Benton intuited this notion of the existential commons when he wrote that though the “Yellow race” and its culture had been “torpid and stationary for thousands of years… [Whites and Asians] must talk together, and trade together, and marry together. Commerce is a great civilizer—social intercourse as great—and marriage greater” (The Congressional Globe. May 28, 1846). David Eltis points out that as late as the 17th century, “[p]risoners taken in the course of European military action…could expect death if they were leaders, or banishment if they were deemed followers, but never enslavement…Detention followed by prisoner exchanges or ransoming was common” (1413). “By the seventeenth century, enslavement of fellow Europeans was beyond the limits” (1423) of Humanism’s existential commons, even in times of war. Slave status “was reserved for non-Christians. Even the latter group however…had some prospect of release in exchange for Christians held by rulers of Algiers, Tunis, and other Mediterranean Muslim powers” (emphasis mine 1413). But though the practice of enslaving the vanquished was beyond the limit of intra-West wars and only practiced provisionally in East-West conflicts, the baseness of the option was not debated when it came to the African. The race of Humanism (White, Asian, South Asian, and Arab) could not have produced itself without the simultaneous production of that walking destruction which became known as the Black. Put another way, through chattel slavery the world gave birth and coherence to both its joys of domesticity and to its struggles of political discontent; and with these joys and struggles, the Human was born, but not before it murdered the Black, forging a symbiosis between the political ontology of Humanity and the social death of Blacks. In his essay “To ‘Corroborate Our Claims’: Public Positioning and the Slavery Metaphor in Revolutionary America,” Peter Dorsey (in his concurrence with cultural historians F. Nwabueze Okoye and Patricia Bradley) suggests that, in mid- to late-18th century America, Blackness was such a fungible commodity that it was traded as freely between the exploited (workers who did not “own” slaves) as it was between the unexploited (planters who did). This was due to the effective uses to which Whites could put the Slave as both flesh and metaphor. For the Revolutionaries, “slavery represented a ‘nightmare’ that white Americans were trying to avoid” (359). Dorsey’s claim is provocative, but not unsupported: he maintains that had Blacks-as-Slaves not been in the White field of vision on a daily basis that it would have been virtually impossible for Whites to transform themselves from colonial subjects into Revolutionaries: Especially prominent in the rhetoric and reality of the [Revolutionary] era, the concepts of freedom and slavery were applied to a wide variety of events and values and were constantly being defined and redefined…[E]arly understandings of American freedom were in many ways dependent on the existence of chattel slavery…[We should] see slavery in revolutionary discourse, not merely as a hyperbolic rhetorical device but as a crucial and fluid [fungible] concept that had a major impact on the way early Americans thought about their political future…The slavery metaphor destabilized previously accepted categories of thought about politics, race, and the early republic. (355) Though the idea of “taxation without representation” may have spoken concretely to the idiom of power that marked the British/American relation as being structurally unethical, it did not provide metaphors powerful and fungible enough for Whites to meditate and move on when resisting the structure of their own subordination at the hands of “unchecked political power” (354). The most salient feature of Dorsey’s findings is not his understanding of the way Blackness, as a crucial and fungible conceptual possession of civil society, impacts and destabilizes previously accepted categories of intra-White thought, but rather his contribution to the evidence that, even when Blackness is deployed to stretch the elasticity of civil society to the point of civil war, that expansion is never elastic enough to embrace the very Black who catalyzed the expansion. In fact, Dorsey, building on Patricia Bradley’s historical research, asserts that just the opposite is true. The more the political imagination of civil society is enabled by the fungibility of the slave metaphor, the less legible the condition of the slave becomes: “Focusing primarily on colonial newspapers…Bradley finds that the slavery metaphor ‘served to distance the patriot agenda from the antislavery movement.’ If anything, Bradley states, widespread use of the metaphor ‘gave first evidence that the issue of real slavery was not to have a part in the revolutionary messages’” (359). And David Eltis believes that this philosophical incongruity between the image of the Slave and freedom for the Slave begins in Europe and pre-dates the American Revolution by at least one hundred years: The [European] countries least likely to enslave their own had the harshest and most sophisticated system of exploiting enslaved non-Europeans. Overall, the English and Dutch conception of the role of the individual in metropolitan society ensured the accelerated development of African chattel slavery in the Americas…because their own subjects could not become chattel slaves or even convicts for life…There may be something to be said for expanding a variation of Edmund Morgan’s argument to cover the whole of the British Atlantic, in the sense that the celebration of British liberties—more specifically, liberties of Englishmen—depended on African slavery. (Emphasis mine 1423) The circulation of Blackness as metaphor and image at the most politically volatile and progressive moments in history (e.g. the French, English, and American Revolutions), produces dreams of liberation which are more inessential to and more parasitic on the Black, and more emphatic in their guarantee of Black suffering, than any dream of human liberation in any era heretofore. Black Slavery is foundational to modern Humanism’s ontics because “freedom” is the hub of Humanism’s infinite conceptual trajectories. But these trajectories only appear to be infinite. They are finite in the sense that they are predicated on the idea of freedom from… some contingency that can be named, or at least conceptualized. The contingent rider could be freedom from patriarchy, freedom from economic exploitation, freedom from political tyranny (for example, taxation without representation), freedom from heteronormativity, and so on. What I am suggesting is that first, political discourse recognizes freedom as a structuring ontologic and then it works to disavow this recognition by imagining freedom not through political ontology—where it rightfully began—but through political experience (and practice); whereupon it immediately loses its ontological foundations. Why would anyone do this? Why would anyone start off with, quite literally, an earth-shattering ontologic and, in the process of meditating on it and acting through it, reduce it to an earth reforming experience? Why do Humans take such pride in self-adjustment, in diminishing, rather than intensifying, the project of liberation (how did we get from ’68 to the present)? Because, I contend, in allowing the notion of freedom to attain the ethical purity of its ontological status, one would have to lose one’s Human coordinates and become Black. Which is to say one would have to die. For the Black, freedom is an ontological, rather than experiential, question. There is no philosophically credible way to attach an experiential, a contingent, rider onto the notion of freedom when one considers the Black—such as freedom from gender or economic oppression. The kind of contingent riders rightfully placed on the non-Black when thinking freedom. Rather, the riders that one could place on Black freedom would be hyperbolic— though no less true—and ultimately untenable: i.e., freedom from the world, freedom from humanity, freedom from everyone (including one’s Black self). Given the reigning episteme, what are the chances of elaborating a comprehensive, much less translatable and communicable, political project out of the necessity of freedom as an absolute? Gratuitous freedom has never been a trajectory of Humanist thought, which is why the infinite trajectories of freedom that emanate from Humanism’s hub are anything but infinite—for they have no line of flight leading to the Slave.

## Links

### Link – Highways

#### Investment in Highways widens the socioeconomic gap between majority and minorities – benefits only accrue to the privileged

Bullard ‘3[Robert, Ware Professor of Sociology and Director, Environmental Justice Resource Center, Clark Atlanta University, Fall/Winter 2003]

Transportation spending programs do not benefit all populations equally.27 Follow the transportation dollars and one can tell who is important and who is not. The lion's share of transportation dollars is spent on roads, while urban transit systems are often left in disrepair.28 Nationally, 80% of all surface transportation funds is earmarked for highways and 20% is earmarked for public transportation. 9 Public transit has received roughly $50 billion since the creation of the Urban Mass Transit Administration over thirty years ago,30 while roadway projects have received over $205 billion since 1956.31 On average, states spend just $0.55 per person of their federal transportation funds on pedestrian projects, less than 1% of their total federal transportation dollars.32 Average spending on highways came to $72 per person.33 Generally, states spend less than 20% of federal transportation funding on transit.34 The current federal funding scheme is bias against metropolitan areas. The federal government allocated the bulk of transportation dollars directly to state departments of transportation. 36 Many of the road-building fiefdoms are no friend to urban transit. Just under 6% of all federal highway dollars are sub-allocated directly to the metropolitan regions.37 Moreover, thirty states restrict use of the gasoline tax revenue to fund highway programs only.38 Although local governments within metropolitan areas own and maintain the vast majority of the transportation infrastructure, they receive only about 10% of every dollar they generate.39 From 1998-2003, TEA-2141 transportation spending amounted to $217 billion.41 This was the "largest public works bill enacted in the nation's history. '42 Transportation spending has always been about opportunity and equity. In the real world, costs and benefits associated with transportation developments are not randomly distributed. 43 Transportation justice is concerned with factors that may create and/or exacerbate inequities and measures to prevent or correct disparities in benefits and costs."a Disparate transportation outcomes can be subsumed under three broad categories of inequity: procedural, geographic, and social.45 Procedural Inequity: Attention is directed to the process by which transportation decisions may or may not be carried out in a uniform, fair, and consistent manner with involvement of diverse public stakeholders.46 Do the rules apply equally to everyone? Geographic Inequity: Transportation decisions may have distributive impacts (positive and negative) that are geographic and spatial, such as rural versus urban versus central city.47 Some communities are physically located on the "wrong side of the tracks" and often receive substandard transportation services. 48 Social Inequity: Transportation benefits and burdens are not randomly distributed across population groups.49 Generally, transportation amenities (benefits) accrue to the wealthier and more educated segment of society, while transportation disamenities (burdens) fall disproportionately on people of color and individuals at the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum.50 Intergenerational equity issues are also subsumed under this category. 51 The impacts and consequences of some transportation decisions may reach into several generations. 2 Heavy government investment in road infrastructure may be contributing to an increase in household transportation costs. 53 Lest anyone dismiss transportation as a tangential issue, consider that Americans spend more on transportation than any other household expense except housing.54 On average, Americans spend $0.19 out of every dollar earned on transportation expenses. 55 Transportation costs ranged from 17.1% in the Northeast to 20.8% in the South 6 -where some 54% of African Americans reside. Americans spend more on transportation than they do on food, education, and health care. 58 The nation's poorest families spend more than 40% of their take home pay on transportation. 9 This is not a small point since African American households tend to earn less money than white households.60 Nationally, African Americans earn only $649 per $1000 earned by whites. 61 This means that the typical black household in the United States earned 35% less than the typical white household.

#### The highway system is historically bound up with racialized suburbanization that creates de facto segregation

Kuswa ‘2 [ Kevin, PhD in communication studies, Suburbification, Segregation, and the Consolidation of the Highway Machine, J.L. Soc’y]

The rhetoric of blame--creating a status of victim by arguing that certain people deserve their immobility-is complemented by a highway machine that allows an extreme differentiation between living conditions within a limited region. It becomes natural to blame people for inadequate living conditions in order to justify inaction. Fotsch concentrates on Los Angeles and urban California, but the same process marks the history of Houston, Chicago, St. Louis, Detroit and many other east coast cities. Charting the way interstate throughways divided Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, D.C., Richmond, and Atlanta is but one string of examples. During the 1950s the "auto freeway transportation system.. .helped to create the ghettos, and now those same highways have joined a technological narrative that helps to legitimate the ghettos. The state continues to invade the formation of the suburb and the urban fringe by allocating resources in selective ways. State policies attempt to capture transportation and residential planning, simultaneously entrenching certain racist practices. Urban highways after 1956, in particular, were constructed according to fairly uniform standards -set up by the Bureau of Public Roads in the *Yellow Book.* The urban highway is, simply, a wide path of limited access roadway, usually raised with at least two lanes available in each direction. The effects of these highways are severe and physical, especially their "connection to the suburban goal of escaping urban populations."49 More pernicious than the urge to escape, the connection to suburbia made it easy to label urban populations as "poor" and "radical" and constitutive of a culture of new immigrants.5" The logic of the suburbs implied that the run-down areas of a city were regions occupied by minorities. In instances where the actual suburb was not predominantly inhabited by whites, those places still tended to be racially homogenous and the suburb was always a means of separating economic classes. The city polarized into a few high rent districts and a number of highly populated low rent districts. The highway generated an explicitly racist boundary ,by isolating large numbers of people from one another. Certainly buses and consumer spots at highway exits -offered locations for human contact, but not the same type of human interchange that previously occurred on trains.

#### Despite the rhetoric of freedom and mobility, the flipside of highway expansion is the destruction and segregation of marginalized communities

Kuswa ‘2 [ Kevin, PhD in communication studies, Suburbification, Segregation, and the Consolidation of the Highway Machine, J.L. Soc’y]

Detailing the suburb as a primary mechanism for the segregation of people, Lewis Mumford targets the metropolis and its co-option by the military and the state. Citing overvalued land, increasing congestion, a lack of space for recreation, a perpetual cycle of growth and decay, and an elitist distribution of social services, Mumford contends: "The metropolitan regime opposes these domestic and civic functions: it subordinates life to organized destruction, and it must therefore regiment, limit, and constrict every exhibition of real life and culture. 37 Mumford's articulation of a regimented urban reality was compounded by the massive expansion of road building following World War II and the 1956 solidification of the highway machine. The rise of the suburb-a place partially produced by (and fueling) the highway's ability to connect the pristine periphery to the central business district-temporarily resolved Mumford's concerns of density and congestion, only to displace those problems with more severe environmental and human costs. Regardless of the organization of the suburb, the construction of highways in urban areas was a traumatic and oppressive event for the people uprooted by the highway's swath. The suburb also exacerbated the human displacement wrought by the highway because the resources necessary to soften the blow of urban construction were being consumed by suburban areas. The suburbs were typically beyond the reach of the poorest residents of the city, a barrier to entry that widened the gap between the rich and the poor, particularly when the poor neighborhoods were often the same neighborhoods torn up by the highway. The paradox was that the highways and the vehicles that traversed them were being promoted under the banners of maximum choice, individual access, and personal mobility. 38 These ideals were used to build more highways, increasing the demand for automobiles, and removing choice from the inhabitants of the city. Personal and individual choice could not exist on a large scale when part of the process necessitated a destructive dissection of urban areas.

### Link – High Speed Rail – Implementation

#### Even at the level of implementation, High Speed Rail is shot through with racist ideologies

Molina, ’10 [Alejandra, Register staff writer, December 9th, 2010, 11:39 am, Orange County Register]

Civil rights advocates are asking the federal government to cease funding for California’s planned high-speed rail line because they say minority-owned businesses are being excluded from the project. The Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights in San Francisco and the Associated Professionals and Contractors filed an administrative complaint Wednesday against the California High Speed Rail Authority, charging it with unfair contracting practices that violate federal civil rights laws. “We are frankly appalled at the fact that the high-speed rail is totally excluding minority businesses,” said Diana LaCome, president of APAC and National Concilio of California, on Wednesday. “The Latino Hispanic community is completely left out, yet we happen to be the largest minority group in California.” The complaint asks the U.S. Department of Transportation to open a formal investigation into the authority’s contracting practices under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The non-profit groups want federal funding to be withheld until the investigation is completed. “With billions of dollars of future contracting dollars still at stake, immediate federal intervention is critical,” the complaint reads. Valerie Martinez, the rail authority’s small-business liaison, said the project has been in full compliance with the law. “Our contracts are awarded in a very public and transparent manner by our Board, in public meetings,” Martinez said via e-mail. “We are committed to further ensuring that every Californian and every community has an equal opportunity to access the economic benefits of the project.” The federal government has committed $3 billion to the project, which would whisk travelers from Anaheim to San Francisco in less than three hours. The overall cost is projected at $43 billion. Construction on the first $4.15 billion segment, in the Central Valley, is supposed to being in 2012. In analyzing the ten largest design and project management contracts awarded, the non-profit groups found that out of the 134 prime contractors and subcontractors participating, about 12 are minority-owned firms. “The minority firms represent those minority communities in various areas of the state,” said Frederick Jordan, president of the San Francisco African American Chamber of Commerce. “We cannot have a recovery unless we get some of those recovery dollars down into the communities.” According to the complaint, less than 4 percent of contracting dollars have gone to small or micro-businesses. The authority is supposed to take steps to meet or exceed a statewide small business goal of 25 percent, the complaint says. “We’re talking about family-owned businesses,” LaCome said. “We’re talking about businesses that may hire some of the folks that traditional businesses do not.”

### Link – High Speed Rail – Sprawl

#### High Speed Rail causes massive urban sprawl

Kambitsis ’10 [Jason, Wired.com, March 16, 2010, <http://www.wired.com/autopia/2010/03/high-speed-rail-and-sprawl/>]

It’s fast, it’s efficient and it is the future of transportation, but will high-speed rail cause sprawl? Yes, it could, warn some urban planners. Despite the promise of creating more densely populated urban centers, high-speed rail could do quite the opposite by making it easier for people to live far from urban centers. Let’s use California as an example, since high-speed rail has made the most progress there. The Golden State, long known as a trendsetter for transportation and environmental policy, has received more than $2.3 billion in stimulus funds toward a proposed line linking San Francisco and Los Angeles by way of the Central Valley. The money is earmarked for construction, land acquisition and engineering and it follows the $9.95 billion allocated by a state ballot initiative. If and when the line is completed by 2030, riders will zip between the two cities in 2 hours and 38 minutes and pay less than half what it would cost to fly. But that convenience could increase emigration from California’s urban centers to the exurbs and beyond. In other words, it could lead to more sprawl. An example of this can be seen in cities like Palmdale, which is 58 miles north of Los Angeles. By cutting the commute time between those two cities from 1 hour and 25 minutes, to 27 minutes, outward growth of the Los Angeles area will undoubtedly continue. It’s easy to see why — home prices in Palmdale are more than half of those in L.A., and high-speed rail could make getting downtown as quick and easy as living downtown. Pushing people further into the exurbs runs counter to a major goal of high-speed rail, namely cutting our carbon output while creating denser, more sustainable communities. Before this conversation goes any farther it should be said adopting high-speed rail is fundamental to the country’s economic vitality because it provides cost-effective transportation options that link major commerce centers. It is in many ways more beneficial than the continued use of automobiles as the primary means of moving people around. The time is now and the technology is here. That said, there are some potential flaws regarding where stations are built and how the rail infrastructure is integrated with communities that could lead to sprawl. The goal for high-speed rail in the United States, as in Europe — which, like Japan, is held as a model for HSR — is linking large cities. But the big difference between the European and American approach is Europeans have made a large investment in rail and the accompanying infrastructure that links it with stations and communities. The United States, on the other hand, has invested heavily in a highway system. The result is our land use patterns are quite different. In addition to making rail a priority, Europe has long supported public transit and multi-modal transportation infrastructure that supports bicycling, walking and other ways of getting around. It has all but taken the car out of the equation and solved the so-called “last mile” problem — addressing how people get from the transit stop to their final destination. Public transit options, along with dense, compact communities built around transit hubs (an approach called transit oriented development, or TOD) has created inherent convenience and in many cases eliminated dependence on cars. In the United States it is a completely different story. We rarely embrace TOD. This could be a problem with high-speed rail. Without a rapid transformation of our building patterns and a push to make existing communities denser, high-speed rail could be a conduit of sprawl, not a deterrent. If stations include vast parking lots, or they’re built in remote areas away from urban cores instead of being made a part of the community, it will all but guarantee people drive to the stations and create a system that is only accessible by car. Drivers already comfortable with a commute of an hour or more could move further away from urban centers, drive to a station and ride to work and still enjoy a shorter overall commute time. “HIgh-speed rail will simply add another layer of access to the far-flung suburbs/exurbs and Central Valley, resulting in more mass-produced subdivisions,” warns Robert Cervero, director of the University of California Transportation Center and author of Development Around Transit. We can avoid this. Proactive land use policies focused on increasing urban density coupled with incentives for transit-oriented development and suburban infill must be embraced by communities along high-speed rail lines — especially those with planned stops. This will help create a market for transportation and the subsequent development tied to it. Regional and local transportation planning initiatives that create infrastructure connecting pedestrians, bicycles and mass transit and place it on a level playing field with automobiles will reduce dependence on cars for commuting. Parking should be provided in garages, not lots, and it must be integrated into the development. And, finally, stations must be landmark, not utilitarian, structures that compliment their communities and welcome riders. Grand Central Station in New York is an excellent example. Focusing on these ideals will reduce the risk of sprawl and make high-speed rail — and the communities it connects — a guidepost to the future of transportation.

#### Sprawl is inherently racialized – it creates de facto segregation and prevents social justice organizing

Powell ’99 [John, founding member of PRRAC's Board, is executive director of the Institute on Race and Poverty and was recently named the Marvin J. Sonosky professor of law and public policy at the University of Minnesota Law School, “Achieving Racial Justice: What's Sprawl Got to Do With It?”, Online]

While the Supreme Court supported desegregation within cities by ending de jure segregation, it simultaneously supported segregation of the region along jurisdictional lines through the constitutionalization of "local control." Federal courts constitutionalized the concept of "local control" despite pre-existing federal law that said cities were not entities unto themselves, thereby setting the stage for the re-establishment of a racial hierarchy that reconfigured, but maintained, white supremacy and black subordination. "Local control" has been used to justify the segregated and fragmented jurisdictional structure of sprawl; it is the primary enforcement mechanism for racially exclusionary practices; and it appears to be a perfectly legal method of ensuring racial subordination under current federal law. Two areas of particular significance in the "local control" movement are land use practices or exclusionary zoning and protection of local control over education. School desegregation litigation provides an example of how white suburbanization under the concept of "local control" has undermined the civil rights movement. Despite almost 50 years of litigation since Brown, most black, and an increasing number of Latino, children attend racially and economically segregated schools in areas that have supposedly been desegregated under federal law. The Supreme Court fostered this arrangement by striking down explicit segregation at the intrajurisdictional level while upholding it at the inter-jurisdictional level. One of the most important cases that supported this arrangement was the Milliken case. The Supreme Court, basing its decision on the importance of local control, would not allow the lower court to order a desegregation remedy for Detroit's discriminatory school district that included Detroit's suburbs. The Court held that the suburban districts could not be incorporated into the desegregation remedy because they had not been found to intentionally segregate their districts. This was their conclusion, despite the fact that Detroit's school district was overwhelmingly comprised of students of color and the suburban districts were overwhelmingly white. The Court ignored the claim that a segregated housing market on a jurisdictional level was causing inter-district school segregation. Instead, the Court suggested that these segregative housing patterns were unexplainable and beyond the purview of the court. Milliken sent a message to whites that neighborhood-level segregation within the city would not be acceptable, but the suburbs would be a safe haven from desegregation. And the message to blacks was that there were limits to how far the Court would go to achieve racial justice, and those limits very closely matched the city limits. This white suburban wall began to crack for middle-income blacks after passage of the Fair Housing Act of 1968. As a result, middle-income blacks have begun to move to the suburbs in record numbers. However, they are often resegregated in the suburbs and remain isolated from the more powerful white suburbs that still capture most of the opportunities and resources. During this same period, low-income people of color have been consigned to resource-depleted cities; isolated from the opportunities that brought blacks to the North 50 years ago. This isolation has caused an explosion of racialized concentrated poverty at the urban core. Growth in black and brown concentrated poverty at the urban core is almost always associated with white, upper middle-class, fragmented sprawl at the edge of the region. Racial subordination has taken on a different form: through the mechanisms of metropolitan fragmentation and sprawl, blacks have again been subordinated socially, politically and economically. By racializing space through the spatial isolation of blacks and other minorities, we have achieved many of the negative racial conditions formally held in place with Jim Crow laws, thus frustrating the civil rights goals of the 50s and 60s. Weighing In On the Issue Fragmentation and sprawl may be the most important impediments to racial justice as we approach the millennium. The fact that it has become a national concern for environmentalists as well as land use planners provides a wonderful opportunity to weigh in on this national discussion. New lines are being drawn on this issue by federal and state government, both figuratively and literally, and suburban voters demonstrated a growing hostility toward sprawl in the last election.

### Link – Transportation

#### Transportation isn’t neutral but is embedded in discursive and ideological systems – the fetishism of economically productive modes of mobility reflects dominant power structures

Konrad ’09 [Miriam, PhD in sociology from Georgia State University, “Transporting Atlanta”, State Universty of New York Press, Albany, 2009, p. 1-2]

It is astonishing how many of the worldís great struggles may be framed in terms of mobility issues, from forty years in the desert, to the middle passage, the Trail of Tears, diaspora, dislocation, expatriation, repatriation, immigration, emigration, access to work, school, play, home and so much more. Transportation options serve as both a barrier and a bridge, literally and figuratively and may truncate or elongate both time and space for all denizens of the planet. The wherewithal to move about is increasingly packaged as an item that may be bought and sold whose exchange value buys more than simple arrival at destinations. The cultural cachet of being able to traverse a great deal of space and consume time at a rapid rate affords one a favored position in society, smoothing the road for a successful life. This commodification of movement and the consequent privileging and punishing, mobilizing and miring, conferring and crippling, produced and reproduced by the systematized transportation complex, evident globally, fine-tuned in the United States, and well illustrated in the Atlanta case, is what I refer to as the mode of mobility. Both preference for and access to transportation options are created through overt and subtle processes that include: creating spaces that only lend themselves to certain forms of mobility (namely, the automobile) and preclude in many instances any alternatives; fetishizing high-speed, privatized forms of mobility; and privileging those forms that have been accommodated and fetishized, and also those persons who advocate them. The built environment both proscribes and describes where and how we are going and the discourse that both reflects and creates that environment too often goesunexamined. This reflexivity is manifest in all aspects of our movement as well as in our immobility. We learn what we "need" in part from reading the landscape that we are given (which was created by people's choices or lack thereof at some point), which in turn gives those very needs life. Ever more roads call for ever more cars and we become increasingly less able to distinguish what we created from what is a "natural" and "obvious" trajec­tory of progress. The human hand becomes invisible as creator and director of trans­portation options, in such a way as to allow us to believe, often, that we are merely following the road as it stretches before us, rather than shaping its twists and turns as we go. In this vein, then, the modeof mobility not only determines where we go and how we get there, (as if that were not enough) but further confers value added to (or subtracted from) the means that we choose or are forced to employ, and simultaneously obscures from us our power in the production of those means. Deciphering the hieroglyph of the mode of mobility and its ability to conflate physical movement and social position is the aim of this book. Mine is fundamentally a neo-Marxian perspective: "Marxian" in that I take relations of power as central to all social processes, and "neo" in that I conceive these relations as situated not only in the economic sphere. Production is not purely an economic notion, but also applies to the pro­duction of knowledge, culture, and space. I see the concepts of ideology (the legitimization of the status quo via a predominant system of signs, symbols, and discourse); hegemony (the cultural domination of ideology by the elite); multiple oppressions, operating sometimes simultaneously and sometimes at odds with each other; and spatiality (how space is created, negotiated, manipulated, and dominated) as salient issues in reading the mobility landscape. My central concept of the mode of mobility is fashioned after and extended out from Karl Marx's conception of the mode of production in which the mode indicates the method of producing the necessities of life. This method is a complex and recursive exchange between external condi­tions and internal conceptions determining what we as a society need, want, and do. Marx ([1859] 1978) asserts, "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that deter­mines their consciousness" (4). I extend on and transform this assertion by removing the "not" and transforming the "but" to an "and." In so doing, this supposition discloses its deeply reflexive character, revealing the dialectical nature of the process, becoming: "It is the consciousness of men [humans] that determines their being, and their social being that determines their consciousness." Thus, I seek to investigate the interplay between discourse and the built environment, mindful that each recursively affects the other, culminating in transportation policies and practices that both mirror and manufacture the mode of mobility.

### Link – Keynesian Economics/Reformism

#### The promise of economic growth for all and democracy to come is the most pernicious lie of whiteness—the affirmative defuses revolutionary energy into an always unrequited hope, justifying violence, warfare and racism through the dream of inclusion.

Hoescht 2008 (Heidi, PhD in Literature from UCSD, “Refusable Pasts: Speculative Democracy, Spectator Citizens, and the Dislocation of Freedom in the United States,” Proquest Dissertations)

This dissertation examines the intimate connections between emancipatory democracy and speculative economics. It studies cultural texts that reflect and express national ideals of U.S. democracy that emereged in three periods of heightened captialist speculation the Jacksonian period of the 1830s, the 1930s Popular Front period, and the rise of liberal multiculturalism between 1980 to the present. The project engages two kinds of cultural texts. The project derives its proximate objects of the study--folklore, literature, literary criticism, stage performances, community festivals and public parks—from a range of critical and cultural texts produced by Constance Rourke, F.O. Matthiessen, Nathaniel Hawthorne, George Catlin, Frederick Law Olmsted, and the neighborhood of Powderhorn Park. Yet, the disseration also explores a second text that connects these seemingly disparate objects and authors. The social text that binds the chapters of this dissertaion is a broader text of U.S. culture and social practice that is conditioned and inflated by the logic of speculation. This second text reveals culture as a central link in the economic project of U.S. nationalism. Culture in this text, is a key technology by which U.S. inequality is reproduced, reiterated, and translated across contexts. I argue that the cultural logic of specualiton disables possibilities for participatory democracy and racial, gendered, and class justice and equality. This logic aligns the emancipatory aspirations of aggreived groups to the market and property interests of elites. I show that culture has been instrumental for expanding social inequality through the promises of U.S. nationalism. The speculative logic of U.S. democracy relies on the category of "not yet freedom" to hide economic and racial inequalities. It preserves the idea of democracy only by deferring actual justice to a perpetually pushed back future. The pursuit of democracy in the United States has been haunted by histories of refusal and deferral. When aggrieved groups ask for emancipation, elites often respond with promises of freedom without doing the hard work of creating justice. Refusable Pasts explores how the national culture of the United States portrays the deferral of freedom to some unspecified "not yet" time in the future as evidence of real democratic inclusion in the present. Promises of future freedom evidence the power and pervasiveness of popular aspirations for democracy. Yet because national culture offers aggrieved groups democratic promises rather than democratic practices, it also demonstrates the power of elites to suppress popular democracy and preserve their own privileges. Speculative logic and market subjectivity permeate U.S. national culture. Speculative practices originate in economic relations, but their logic structures national culture as well. Speculative logics promising future growth have connected the expressive cultures of U.S nationalism to the economic life of the nation's elites. Just as investors anticipate that economic returns in the future will reward their work in the present, citizens are encouraged to defer their desires for empowerment, autonomy, dignity and community to some perpetually promised but never quite realized time of "not yet" freedom in the future. Hope functions as a fundamental mechanism for deferring freedom to the future and refusing radical change in the present. Under these conditions, culture serves as a cover story promoting economic expansion and empire, slavery and racial subordination, plunder and perpetual warfare. The national culture of the nation works to instantiate, legitimate, and perpetuate economic inequality and social stratification. It is also one forum that elites use to manage the emancipatory aspirations of popular struggles. Culture counts because stories centered on the logic of speculation promise symbolic reconciliations as the salve to the wounds caused by the perpetuation of inequalities in society. The speculative logics that inform national culture portray inexcusable injustices in the present as mere preludes to a promised prosperity and freedom in the future. Thus, the democratic promises inscribed inside national culture actually function as powerful mechanisms for the perpetuation of decidedly undemocratic practices and policies.

### Link – Economics

#### Economics is infiltrated with racist politics. A rising tide doesn’t raise all ships – economic growth differentially affects racial populations and leaves marginalized groups in the dust

Gabriel and Todorova ’02 [Satyananda J., Evgenia O., “Racism and Capitalist Accumulation: An Overdetermined Nexus,” Journal of Critical Sociology, 2002]

The pervasiveness of racial consciousness cannot help but shape the economic relationships in contemporary capitalist social formations. The interaction of racialized agents shapes the parameters of a wide range of economic processes such as market exchange transactions, employment contracts, pricing, capital budgeting decisions, and so on. The fact that one can observe patterns of differential economic success and failure based on racial ca tegories is evidence of the impact of racism upon agents. Economic theories, both Marxian and neoclassical, have attempted to explain rational behavior of agents in the context of the market for labor-power. The Marxian approach has been to make sense of this market in the context of capitalist exploitation, for which the market in labor-power is a precondition. Capitalism presupposes the existence of free wage laborers. In the Marxian tradition, direct producers become "free" to sell their labor-power as a result of determinate social and natural processes. It is in this process of gaining capitalist freedom that the rationality of wage laboring is formed. Capitalist freedom came to exist in contrast to serfdom and slavery. In this sense, it was born of a complex association of ideas. In some instances, this would have included, from the earliest stages of capitalist development, ideas produced within racist paradigms. The wage laboring consciousness necessary for an agent to be willing and able to sell her labor power would have been influenced, in the Western Europe and Great Britain of early capitalist development, by aristocratic racism and then later by white supremacist racism. The perception of capitalist freedom, in contrast to serfdom or slavery, would certainly have made it easier to create, reproduce and expand the wage laboring consciousness. Thus, the creation of labor markets would, necessarily, be very different in an environment where direct producers view themselves as already free. There are countless stories of the difficulties of creating labor markets in African colonies, for instance. The classic case is that of Tanganyika, under German colonial rule, where resistance to working as wage laborers was so strong that entire villages would move rather than submit to the labor market in order to meet the imposed hut taxes. These villagers had lived as communal producers, collectively performing and appropriating surplus labor. Their history was one of collective decision-making, communal freedom, and the absence of racialized consciousness. Capitalist freedom did not appear to be an attractive alternative. This was not the case in Britain, Western Europe, or the United States, where the perceived alternative was, in many but not all cases, serfdom or slavery. Under those conditions, the legitimacy of capitalist freedom was less likely to be challenged. We have already mentioned the importance of dissociation to creating a wage laboring consciousness, one in which the individual can sell her labor power like so many bushels of tomatoes. The various forms of racialized consciousness that were prevalent in most capitalist social formations, having already produced forms of dissociation and alienation in the consciousness of direct producers and others, may have been critical to the rapidity with which labor markets were established and expanded.

### Link – Global Warming

#### Global Warming is not caused by humans writ large—it is caused by the uneven development engendered by Whiteness. The affirmative naturalizes the coercive racial politics at the heart of warming by universalizing its source and projecting its impacts far into the future. The imperial West started the process of warming, and the American racial state perpetuated it in the quest to export Whiteness. The affirmative only notices warming when it might destroy white bodies, invisibilizing millions of non-whites already killed.

Wynter 2007 (Sylvia, Professor Emeritus in Spanish and Romance Languages at Stanford Univeristy, “The Human being as noun? Or being human as praxis? Towards the Autopoietic turn/overturn: A Manifesto,” otl2.wikispaces.com/file/view/The+Autopoetic+Turn.pdf)

For if, as Time magazine reported in January 2007 (Epigraph 2), a U.N. Intergovernmental panel of Natural Scientists, were soon to release "a smoking-gun report which confirms that human activities are to blame for global warming" (and thereby for climate change), and had therefore predicted "catastrophic disruptions by 2100," by April, the issued Report not only confirmed the above, but also repeated the major contradiction which the Time account had re-echoed. This contradiction, however, has nothing to do in any way with the rigor, and precision of their natural scientific findings, but rather with the contradiction referred to by Derrida's question in Epigraph 3—i.e., But who, we? That is, their attribution of the non-natural factors driving global warming and climate change to, generic human activities, and/or to "anthropocentric forcings"; with what is, in effect, this mis-attribution then determining the nature of their policy recommendations to deal with the already ongoing reality of global warming and climate change, to be ones couched largely in economic terms. That is, in the terms of our present mode of knowledge production, and its "perceptual categorization system" as elaborated by the disciplines of the Humanities and Social Sciences (or "human sciences") and which are reciprocally enacting of our present sociogenic genre of being human, as that of the West's Man in its second Liberal or bio-humanist reinvented form, as homo oeconomicus; as optimally "virtuous Breadwinner, taxpayer, consumer, and as systemically over-represented as if it, and its behavioral activities were isomorphic with the being of being human, and thereby with activities that would be definable as the human-as-a-species ones. Consequently, the Report's authors because logically taking such an over-representation as an empirical fact, given that, as highly trained natural scientists whose domains of inquiry are the physical and (purely) biological levels of reality, although their own natural-scientific order of cognition with respect to their appropriate non-human domains of inquiry, is an imperatively self-correcting and therefore, necessarily, a cognitively open/open-ended one, nevertheless, because in order to be natural scientists, they are therefore necessarily, at the same time, middle class Western or westernized subjects, initiated 15 as such, by means of our present overall education system and its mode of knowledge production to be the optimal symbolically encoded embodiment of the West's Man, it its second reinvented bio-humanist homo oeconomicus, and therefore bourgeois self-conception, over-represented as if it were isomorphic with the being of being human, they also fall into the trap identified by Derrida in the case of his fellow French philosophers. The trap, that is, of conflating their own existentially experienced (Western-bourgeois or ethno-class) referent "we," with the "we" of "the horizon of humanity." This then leading them to attribute the reality of behavioral activities that are genre-specific to the West's Man in its second reinvented concept/self-conception as homo oeconomicus, ones that are therefore as such, as a historically originated ensemble of behavioral activitiesas being ostensibly human activities-in-general. This, in spite of the fact that they do historicize the origin of the processes that were to lead to their recent natural scientific findings with respect to the reality of the non-naturally caused ongoing acceleration of global warming and climate change, identifying this process as having begun with the [West's] Industrial Revolution from about 1750 onwards. That is, therefore, as a process that can be seen to have been correlatedly concomitant in Great Britain, both with the growing expansion of the largely bourgeois enterprise of factory manufacturing, as well with the first stages of the political and intellectual struggles the British bourgeoisie who were to spearhead the Industrial Revolution, to displace the then ruling group hegemony of the landed aristocracy cum gentry, and to do so, by inter alia, the autopoetic reinvention of the earlier homo politicus/virtuous citizen civic humanist concept of Man, which had served to legitimate the latter's traditionally landed, political, social and economic dominance, in new terms. This beginning with Adam Smith and the Scottish School of the Enlightenment in the generation before the American, French, and Haitian (slave) revolutions, as a reinvention tat was to be effected in now specifically bourgeois terms as homo oeconomicus/and virtuous Breadwinner. 116 That is as the now purely secular genre of being human, which although not to be fully (i.e., politically, intellectually, and economically) institutionalized until the mid-nineteenth century, onwards, when its optimal incarnation came to be actualized in the British and Western bourgeoisie as the new ruling class, was, from then on, to generate its prototype specific ensemble of new behavioral activities, that were to impel both the Industrial Revolution, as well as the West's second wave of imperial expansion, this based on the colonized incorporation of a large majority of the world's peoples, all coercively homogenized to serve its own redemptive material telos, the telos initiating of global warming and climate change. Consequently, if the Report's authors note that about 1950, a steady process of increasing acceleration of the processes of global warming and climate change, had begun to take place, this was not only to be due to the Soviet Revolution's (from 1917 onwards) forced march towards industrialization (if in its still homo oeconomicus conception, since a march spearheaded by the 116 See the already cited essay by J.G.A. Pocock "symbolic capital," education credentials owning and technically skilled Eastern European bourgeoisie)—as a state-directed form of capitalism, nor indeed by that of Mao's then China, but was to be also due to the fact that in the wake of the range of successful anti-colonial struggles for political independence, which had accelerated in the wake of the Second World War, because the new entrepreneurial and academic elites had already been initiated by the Western educational system in Western terms as homo oeconomicus, they too would see political independence as calling for industrialized development on the "collective bovarysme "117 model of the Western bourgeoisie. Therefore, with the acceleration of global warming and climate change gaining even more momentum as all began to industrialize on the model of homo oeconomicus, with the result that by the time of the Panel's issued April 2007 Report the process was now being driven by a now planetarily homogenized/standardized transnational "system of material provisioning or mode of techno-industrial economic production based on the accumulation of capital; as the means of production of ever-increasing economic growth, defined as "development"; with this calling for a single model of normative behavioral activities, all driven by the now globally (post-colonially and post-the-1989-collapse-of-the-Soviet Union), homogenized desire of "all men (and women) to," realize themselves/ourselves, in the terms of homo oeconomicus. In the terms, therefore, of "its single (Western-bourgeois or ethno-class) understanding" of "man's humanity," over-represented as that of the human; with the well-being and common good of its referent "we"—that, not only of the transnational middle classes but even more optimally, of the corporate multinational business industries and their financial networks, both indispensable to the securing of the Western-bourgeois conception of the common good, within the overall terms of the behavior-regulatory redemptive material telos of ever-increasing economic growth, put forward as the Girardot-type "cure" for the projected Malthusian-Ricardo transumed postulate of a "significant ill" as that, now, ostensibly, of mankind's threatened subordination to [the trope] of Natural Scarcity, this in the reoccupied place of Christianity of its postulate of that "ill" as that of enslavement to Original Sin."' With the result that the very ensemble of behavioral activities indispensable, on the one hand, to the continued hegemony of the bourgeoisie as a Western and westernized transnational ruling class, is the same ensemble of behaviors that is directly causal of global worming and climate change, as they are, on the other, to the continued dynamic enactment and stable replication of the West's second reinvented concept of Man; this latter in response to the latter's existential imperative of guarding against the entropic disintegration of its genre of being human and fictive nation-state mode of kind. Thereby against the possible bringing to an end, therefore, of the societal order, and autopoetic living Western and westernized macro world system in it bourgeois configuration, which is reciprocally the former's (i.e., its genre of being human, and fictive modes of kind's condition of realization, at a now global level. This, therefore, is the cognitive dilemma, one arising directly from the West's hitherto unresolvable aporia of the secular, that has been precisely captured by Sven Lutticken in a recent essay. Despite, he writes, "the consensus that global warming cannot be ascribed to normal fluctuations in the earth's temperature... [the] social and political components of this process have been minimized; man-made nature is re-naturalized, the new (un)natural history presented as fate." And with this continuing to be so because (within the terms, I shall add, of our present "single understanding of man's humanity" and the unresolvable aporia which it continues to enact), "[t]he truly terrifying notion is not that [global warming and climate change] is irreversible, but that it actually might be reversible—at the cost of radically changing the economic and social order..."119 The changing, thereby, of the now globally hegemonic biologically absolute answer that we at present give to the question to who we are, and of whose biohumanist homo oeconomicus symbolic life/death (i.e., naturally selected/dysselected) code's intentionality of dynamic enactment and stable replication, our present "economic and social order" is itself the empirical actualization.

### Link – Hegemony

#### US hegemony is just the racial violence of America gone global –aff claims to benevolence are symptoms of white privilege

Rodriguez ‘07 [Dylan, PhD in Ethnic Studies Program of the University of California Berkeley and Associate Proffessor of Ethnic Studies at University of California Riverside, “American Globality And the US Prison regime: State Violence And White Supremacy from Abu Ghraib to Stockton to bagong diwa”, Ateneo de Manila University, 2007, Kritika Kultura 9 (2007): 022-048]

In fact, the notion of American globality I have begun discussing here already exceeds negri and Hardt’s formulation to the extent that it is a global racial formation, and more pointedly a global mobilization of a white supremacist social formation (read: a united States of America formed by the social-economic geographies of racial chattel slavery and their recodification through the post-13th Amendment innovation of other technologies of criminalization and imprisonment). The US prison regime’s production of human immobilization and death composes some of the fundamental modalities of American national coherence. It inscribes two forms of domination that tend to slip from the attention of political theorists, including Negri and Hardt: first, the prison regime strategically institutionalizes the biopolitical structures of white racial/nationalist ascendancy—it quite concretely provides a definition for white American personhood, citizenship, freedom, and racialized patriotism. Second, the prison regime reflects the moral, spiritual, and cultural inscription of Manifest Destiny (and its descendant material cultural and state-building articulations of racist and white supremacist conquest, genocide, and population control) across different historical moments. to invoke and critically rearticulate negri and Hardt’s formulation, the focal question becomes: How does the right of the uS-as-global police to kill, detain, obliterate become voiced, juridically coded, and culturally recoded? the structure of presumption—and therefore relative political silence—enmeshing the prison’s centrality to the logic of American globality is precisely evidence of the fundamental power of the uS prison regime within the larger schema of American hegemony. In this sense the uS prison regime is ultimately really not an “institution.” rather it is a formulation of world order (hence, a dynamic and perpetual labor of institutionalization rather than a definitive modernist institution) in which massively scaled, endlessly strategized technologies of human immobilization address (while never fully resolving) the socio-political crises of globalization. The US prison regime defines a global logic of social organization that constitutes, mobilizes, and prototypes across various localities. What would it mean, then, to consider state-crafted, white supremacist modalities of imprisonment as the perpetual end rather than the self-contained means of American globality? I am suggesting a conception of the prison regime that focuses on what cultural and political theorist Allen Feldman calls a “formation of violence,” which anchors the contemporary articulation of white supremacy as a global technology of coercion and hegemony. Feldman writes, the growing autonomy of violence as a self-legitimating sphere of social discourse and transaction points to the inability of any sphere of social practice to totalize society. Violence itself both reflects and accelerates the experience of society as an incomplete project, as something to be made. As a formation of violence that self-perpetuates a peculiar social project through the discursive structures of warfare, the US prison regime composes an acute formation of racial and white supremacist violence, and thus houses the capacity for mobilization of an epochal (and peculiar) white supremacist global logic. This contention should not be confused with the sometimes parochial (if not politically chauvinistic) proposition that American state and state-sanctioned regimes of bodily violence and human immobilization are somehow self-contained “domestic” productions that are exceptional to the united States of America, and that other “global” sites simply “import,” imitate, or reenact these institutionalizations of power. In fact, I am suggesting the opposite: the US prison regime exceeds as it enmeshes the ensemble of social relations that cohere uS civil society, and is fundamental to the geographic transformations, institutional vicissitudes, and militarized/economic mobilizations of “globalization” generally. to assert this, however, is to also argue that the constituting violence of the US prison regime has remained somewhat undertheorized and objectified in the overlapping realms of public discourse, activist mobilization, and (grassroots as well as professional) scholarly praxis.

Here I am arguing that it is not possible to conceptualize and critically address the emergence and global proliferation of the (uS/global) prison industrial complex outside a fundamental understanding of what are literally its technical and technological premises: namely, its complex organization and creative production of racist and white supremacist bodily violence. It is only in this context, I would say, that we can examine the problem of how “the Prison” is a modality (and not just a reified product or outcome) of American statecraft in the current political moment. It is only a theoretical foregrounding of the white supremacist state and social formation of the united States that will allow us to understand the uS prison regime as an American globality that materializes as it prototypes state violence and for that matter, “state power” itself through a specific institutional site.

### Link – Nuclear War

#### Representations of future nuclear war rest on racist fears of irrational non-whites—the bomb is the epitome of the destructive capacity of Whiteness, naturalizing structural violence through the projection of a spectacular extinction.

Williams 11 [Paul, lecturer in English at the University of Exeter, “Race, Ethnicity, and Nuclear War”, Liverpool Science Fiction Texts and Studies, 2011, p.1-3]

In this study, nuclear representations are defined as depictions of the following subjects: (1) the invention and use of the first atomic bombs; (2) nuclear weapons testing stockpiling of the Cold War superpowers; and (3) nuclear war (often referred to as World War Three) and life after such a cataclysm. Nuclear technology has been the subject of narratives of racial and national belonging and exclusion undoubtedly because its emergence (and deployment against Japan) was read by some commentators as an act of genocidal racist violence, and by some as the apex of Western civilization’s scientific achievement. These opposing perspectives are interpretative poles that have been central to nuclear representations. By posing white moral and technological superiority against the destructive technology it supposedly invented, cultural producers have cited nuclear weapons as evidence against white Anglo-Saxon supremacism. From this point of view, the scientific achievement of splitting the atom does not reveal white superiority; instead, the enormity of nuclear weapons reminds one that the technology first created by the white world imperils the whole Earth. Through a range of media, from novels to poetry, short stories to film, comics to oratory, the terms that modern European imperialism depended upon – ‘civilization, ‘race’, and ‘nation’, in particular – often recur in nuclear representations. Some of these representations, emerging when Europe’s empires were relinquishing direct control of their colonies, share the uncertainty that beset the colonial powers following the uneven and often violent decolonizing preocess. The historical congruence of nuclear representations and decolonization intimates the importance of this context to future visions of World war Three: tropes of genocide, technological and and scientific modernity, and the (re)population of the planet are relevant to this apocalyptic subgenre of SF as well as being recurrent elements in colonial history. Several of the nuclear representations discussed reproduce the justifications of the modern imperial project. But an alternative tradition makes these justifications visible and demonstrates their corrosive, lingering presence in contemporary culture through the depiction of nuclear technology and its possible consequences. Significantly, the idea that nuclear weapons are used to buttress a racial order that privileges whiteness – an idea that prohibits non-white peoples from accessing such technology – remains a potent current running from 1945 until the present day. Having raised this point to emphasize the importance of the themes in this study, I am mindful to repeat that my focus is literary, cultural and filmic texts. I am not seeking to explain how race and ethnicity have structured Cold War history. If I may be excused a brief aside, I do think such moments have occurred. Civil rights and Cold War historians have long understood that US foreign policy had to negotiate the American government’s response to domestic systems of racial discrimination, and vice versa. Recently decolonized nations whose populations had been excluded along similar lines by European imperialism followed the narrrative of American desegregation closely, and the allegiances of these nations played and important role in the Cold War. When the black student James Meredith was not permitted to join the University of Mississippi in 1962, President Kennedy ordered federal marshals to force his registration through. This took place on 1 October 1962, after a night of fighting between demonstrators and troops. While not universally praised, Kennedy’s actions were widely perceived in the international press as evidence to resolve to oppose racial discrimination. When the Cuban Missile Crisis took place three weeks later, the presidents of Guinea and Ghaa denied refuelling facilities to Soviet planes flying to the Caribbean. Kennedy aside Arthur Schlesinger directly attributed the African presidents’ actions to the intervention in Mississippi. The subject of this book is not the mechanisms of history. The subject of this book is the way that representations of nuclear weapons and the world after nuclear war postulate meanings that are not only fully activated when considered through a lens of race, ethnicity, nationhood and civilization. In many of the texts discussed, a primary consideration is whether the vestigial master narrative of white supremacy, the narrative of racial superiority that underpinned modern European colonization, is being resuscitated. I have in mind Fredric Jameson’s expression, ‘if interpretation in terms of […] allegorical master narratives remains a constant temptation, this is because such master narratives have inscribed themselves in the texts as well as in our thinking about them. For Jameson the interpretative act runs the risk of being an act of hermeneutic bad faith – the risk that the critic finds what they are looking for all along because they gathered up a series of texts whose selection is far from arbitrary, and consequently the reading of said texts confirms the ubiquity of the historical essence with which they were initially ascribed. Yet, as Jameson writes, one should not be too cynical about the act of interpretation. If the critical analysis of a text finds evidence of the historical trends it set out to discover the success of the interpretation is not in itself a reason to reject the idea that texts allow one to think closely and critically about historical attitudes. The act of interpretation can sometimes be the imposition of a preconvieved set of ideas onto a series of texts chosen precisely because they corroborate the hypothesis being tested, but it can also be credible because texts are inscribed by history and by master naratives. As a way of referring to an explanation of the movement of history and its future direction, Jameson’s sense of master narratives is worth retaining. My usage here designates the explanation itself, specifically the master narrative of white supremacism that proved so useful to European colonialism and the settlement of North America. How do texts come to be inscribed by master narratives? What justification do I have in reading the master narrative o white supremacism and related narratives of settlement through the literary, cultural and filmic texts analysed here?

### Link – Terrorism

#### Their terrorism advantage is based on the exportation of a violent anxiety and fear of raced bodies

Rodriguez ‘07 [Dylan, PhD in Ethnic Studies Program of the University of California Berkeley and Associate Proffessor of Ethnic Studies at University of California Riverside, “American Globality And the US Prison regime: State Violence And White Supremacy from Abu Ghraib to Stockton to bagong diwa”, Ateneo de Manila University, 2007, Kritika Kultura 9 (2007): 022-048]

To consider the US prison as a global practice of dominance, we might begin with the now-indelible photo exhibition of captive brown men manipulated, expired, and rendered bare in the tombs of the uS-commandeered Abu Ghraib prison: here, I am concerned less with the idiosyncrasies of the carceral spectacle (who did what, administrative responsibilities, tedium of military corruption and incompetence, etc.) than I am with its inscription of the where in which the worst of uS prison/state violence incurs. As the bodies of tortured prisoners in this somewhere else, that is, beyond and outside the formal national domain of the United States, have become the hyper-visible and accessible raw material for a global critique of the US state—with Abu Ghraib often serving as the signifier for a generalized mobilization of sentiment against the American occupation—the **intimate** and proximate bodies of those locally and intimately imprisoned within the localities of the United States constantly threaten to disappear from the political and moral registers of US civil society, its resident uS establishment left, and perhaps most if not all elements of the global establishment left, which includes NGOs, political parties, and sectarian organizations. I contend in this essay that a new theoretical framing is required to critically address (and correct) the artificial delineation of the statecraft of Abu Ghraib prison, and other US formed and/or mediated carceral sites across the global landscape, as somehow unique and exceptional to places outside the US proper. In other words, a genealogy and social theory of US state violence specific to the regime of the prison needs to be delicately situated within the ensemble of institutional relations, political intercourses, and historical conjunctures that precede, produce, and sustain places like the Abu Ghraib prison, and can therefore only be adequately articulated as a genealogy and theory of the allegedly “domestic” US prison regime’s “globality” (I will clarify my use of this concept in the next part of this introduction). Further, in offering this initial attempt at such a framing, I am suggesting a genealogy of US state violence that can more sufficiently conceptualize the logical continuities and material articulations between a) the ongoing projects of domestic warfare organic to the white supremacist US racial state, and b) the array of “global” (or extra-domestic) technologies of violence that form the premises of possibility for those social formations and hegemonies integral to the contemporary moment of US global dominance. In this sense, I am amplifying the capacity of the US prison to inaugurate technologies of power that exceed its nominal relegation to the domain of the criminal- juridical. Consider imprisonment, then, as a practice of social ordering and geopolitical power, rather than as a self-contained or foreclosed jurisprudential practice: therein, it is possible to reconceptualize the significance of the Abu Ghraib spectacle as only one signification of a regime of dominance that is neither (simply) local nor (erratically) exceptional, but is simultaneously mobilized, proliferating, and global. The overarching concern animating this essay revolves around the peculiarity of US global dominance in the historical present: that is, given the geopolitical dispersals, and dislocations, as well as the differently formed social relations generated by US hegemonies across sites and historical contexts, what modalities of “rule” and statecraft give form and coherence to the (sapatial-temporal) transitions, (institutional-discursive) rearticulations, and (apparent) novelties of “War on Terror” neoliberalism? Put differently, what technologies and institutionalities thread between forms of state and state-sanctioned dominance that are nominally autonomous of the US state, but are no less implicated in the global reach of US state formation?

#### The War on Terror is fueled by American hegemony as an outlet to export the violence of Whiteness, culminating in racial dehumanization

Gordon ’06 [Avery, professor in sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, “Abu Ghraib: Imprisonment and the War on Terror” Race & Class, Copyright 2006 Institute of Race Relations Vol. 48(1): 42–59]

The ongoing news of torture and abuse of prisoners of war and socalled enemy combatants, notably at Abu Ghraib and Guanta´namo Bay (where prisoners have been on a hunger/death strike), has given the US military prison unprecedented public attention. Rarely do any prisons, much less the especially secretive military prisons, emerge from the edge of geo-social consciousness where they reside. Thus our ability today to name some of their locations – Abu Ghraib, Guanta´namo Bay, Diego Garcia, Kandahar, Peshawar – is significant, even if these are only a fraction of the estimated 1,000 US military and intelligence (CIA) installations worldwide. It’s worth pausing over this number a moment. At last count, in 2001, the US officially reported a total of eighty-nine military prisons, fifty-nine in the US and thirty outside, including recent prison acquisitions in Iraq (officially counted at sixteen) and Afghanistan (officially counted at one), omitting the unknown number of secret prisons.1 Chalmers Johnson argues that the official figures from the Department of Defense for 2003, of 702 overseas military bases in about 130 countries and 6,000 bases in the US and its territories, significantly undercount the actual number of bases the US occupies globally because the 2003 report omits bases in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Qatar and Uzbekistan. It lists only one Marine base at Okinawa, Japan, failing to capture the size and scope of the American military colony there. According to Johnson, an ‘honest count’ (including Royal Air Force bases in Britain which he claims are more properly US military and espionage installations) of ‘our military empire would probably top 1000 different bases in other people’s countries’.2 If we make the reasonable presumption that every military base has at least one prison or detention facility, a brig in popular parlance, then the scope of military imprisonment is staggering. Indeed, the expansion of the reach of the US military into countries not its own, often with coerced or blackmailed permission, and the expansion of its corollary carceral complex add up to an extremely important and dangerous phenomenon. Secretive and closed, with expulsion and discredit the penalty for whistle-blowing, this vast military machine is little known. Some people are closer to its direct touch than others, but the shape and skein of how the war on terror, an ongoing security war, is changing the landscape slowly emerges. The attention lavished on Abu Ghraib prison and more recently directed to the discovery of US secret military and intelligence detention facilities in other countries, particularly in eastern Europe, is thus significant and laudable. However, it has, in the main, obscured and sometimes denied the continuum between US military prisons abroad and territorial US civilian prisons. It is that connection that I address briefly here. I begin with Walter Benjamin’s famous statement that ‘the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the state of emergency in which we live is not the exception but the rule’ and with two presumptions or starting points, which follow. First presumption. While there is abundant cause for moral outrage and disgust, there is no warrant for being surprised or shocked that citizens of the US tortured, abused and ritually humiliated other human beings and that the country’s political and military leaders covered up their authorisation of it. There is no cause whatsoever for either angry or startled or presidential assertions that abuse and torture are not ‘American’, not things that American citizens do or condone.3 American exceptionalism – the assertion that the US is an inherently more democratic, egalitarian and just society than all others – has always been a lie.4 The current Bush government has indeed formulated a policy of exceptionalism, claiming the right of the US, as a sovereign God-given Christian nation, to exempt itself from the same laws that govern the conduct of other nations, but this policy is closer to the government’s own definition of a rogue state than it is to a model democracy. You do not even need to believe in ‘the evidence of things not seen’, as I do, to acknowledge the truth of this lie.5 Certainly since the invention of photography, the visual evidence is usually available; often, it is itself an artefact or a souvenir of the presumed normalcy and legitimacy of the actions it shows. In this, the amateur photographs of Abu Ghraib that we have seen or whose release are still in dispute (those of army specialist Joseph Darby) most closely resemble the photographs taken of lynchings in the US between the 1880s and the 1930s; resemble them not only in their images of white women and men smiling and grinning at the mutilated bodies of Black women and men hanging from trees and posts, but also in the extent to which they were openly distributed and sold as keepsakes of an afternoon well-spent.6 I note, as an important aside, that though they have been demanded, there has been no state acknowledgement or press interest in the official videotapes and photographs, those from the CCTV surveillance cameras ubiquitous in all prisons. As Shafiq Rasul and Asif Iqbal, two British citizens recently released from Guanta´namo Bay, stated: We should point out that there were – and no doubt still are – cameras everywhere in the interrogation areas. We are aware that evidence that could contradict what is being said officially is in existence. We know that CCTV cameras, videotapes, and photographs exist since we were regularly filmed and photographed during interrogations and at other times, as well.7

### Link – Public Sphere

#### Public deliberation structurally cannot include the position of the slave because they are denied personhood by definition – the structural violence of slavery cannot be articulated in the political

Hartman ‘9 [Saidiya, professor of English and comparative literature and women's and gender studies at Columbia University, “Redressing the Pained Body: Toward a Theory of Practice”, in American Studies: An Anthology, pp.343-344]

In order to illuminate the significance of performance and the articulation of social struggle in seemingly innocuous events, everyday forms of practice must be contextualized within the virtually unbounded powers of the slave-owning class, and whites in general, to use all means necessary to ensure submission. Thus it is no surprise that these everyday forms of practice are usually subterranean. I am reluctant to simply describe these practices as a "kind of politics," not because I question whether the practices considered here are small-scale forms of struggle or dismiss them as cathartic and contained.' Rather, it is the concern about the possibilities of practice as they are related to the particular object constitution and subject formation of the enslaved outside the "political proper" that leads me both to question the appropriateness of the political to this realm of practice and to reimagine the political in this context. (As well, f take seriously Jean Comaroff's observations that "the real politick of oppression dictates that resistance be expressed in domains seemingly apolitical.")" The historical and social limits of the political must he recognized in order to evaluate the articulation of needs and the forwarding of claims in domains relegated to the privatized or nonpolitical. If the public sphere is reserved for the white bourgeois subject and the public/private divide replicates that between the political and the nonpolitical, then the agency of the enslaved, whose relation to the state is mediated by way of another's rights, is invariably relegated to the nonpolitical side of this divide. This gives us some sense of the full weight and meaning of the slaveholder's dominion. In effect, those subjects removed from the public sphere are formally outside the space of politics. The everyday practices of the enslaved generally fall outside direct forms of confrontation; they are not systemic in their ideology, analysis, or intent, and, most important, the slave is neither civic man nor free worker but excluded from the narrative of "we the people" that effects the linkage of the modern individual and the state. The enslaved were neither envisioned nor afforded the privilege of envisioning themselves as part of the "imaginary sovereignty of the state" or as "infused with unreal universality."" Even the Gramscian model, with its reformulation of the relation of state and civil society in the concept of the historical bloc and its expanded definition of the political, maintains a notion of the political inseparable from the effort and the ability of a class to effect hegemony? By questioning the use of the term "political," I hope to illuminate the possibilities of practice and the stakes of these dispersed resistances. All of this is not a preamble to an argument about the "prepolitical" consciousness of the enslaved but an attempt to point to the limits of the political and the difficulty of translating or interpreting the practices of the enslaved within that framework. The everyday practices of the enslaved occur in the default of the political, in the absence of the rights of man or the assurances of the self-possessed individual, and perhaps even without a "person," in the usual meaning of the term.

### Link – AT: Omission

#### Their choice of transportation investment is not neutral – they are conscious attempts at increasing racial subordination

Bullard, Johnson, Torres ‘4[Robert, Glenn, Angel, , Ph.D., (Environmental Sociology) Highway Robbery Transportation Racism & New Routes to Equity, Cambridge, MA]

Transportation systems do not spring up out of thin air. They are planned·~and, in many cases, planned poorly when it comes to people of color. Conscious decisions determine the location of freeways, bus stops, fueling stations, and train stations. Decisions to build highways, expressways, and beltways have far-reaching effects on land use, energy policies, and the environment. Decisions by county commissioners to bar the extension of public transit to job- rich economic activity centers in suburban counties and instead spend their transportation dollars on repairing and expanding the nation’s roads have serious mobility implications for central city residents. Together, all these transportation decisions shape United States metropolitan areas, growth patterns, physical mobility, and economic opportunities} These same transportation policies have also aided, and in some cases subsidized, racial, economic, and environmental inequities as evidenced by the segregated housing and spatial layout of our central cities and suburbs. It is not by chance that millions of Americans have been socially isolated and relegated to economically depressed and deteriorating central cities and that transportation apartheid has been created.

### Link – AT: Link Turn

#### The attempt to increase mobility of the black body is already calculated into the policing power of whiteness—the car, the train and the plane are just mobile extensions of the prison in which every black body is suspect, criminalized, and open to gratuitous violence.

Wilderson 2010 (Frank, Revolutionary, Interviewed by Percy Howard, <http://percy3.wordpress.com/2010/07/14/frank-wilderson-wallowing-in-the-contradictions-part-2/>)

Well, I think that the question of civil society, not all the questions but the truth of civil society, not the totality of it, but one of the concerns of civil society is how to contain “the Black”, and the answer to that question is like a hundred different splices of light going out in all directions. The professor uh, Desmond, I can’t remember his last name(A UCD prof that attended the lecture that afternoon), the older Black man who was speaking in the middle you know, he used to teach Economics here….he, talked about Jamestown and one of the things that I came across in the research for this book was a dissertation, a pro-slavery dissertation written by a White intellectual in 19-something in Virginia, and he was writing about the grain of sand, the germ, that creates the modern police force. And he locates this germ in the question of Black mobility. He charts how throughout the colonies all the way through the Civil War this thing that will become the modern police force, starts off as small collections of people just coming together to monitor the movement of Blacks. And that was really fascinating to me, you know. Obviously the police do a lot of other things today, they do the border patrol, and they do white collar crime…. but what his dissertation is saying is that the constituent element of policing is the maintenance of surveillance of Black bodies. I see the prison industrial complex as an extension of a kind of need, based upon what I would say is a fundamental anxiety concerning where is the Black and what is he or she doing. PH There’s, a high degree of sensitivity to that. My father and I were just talking about this once, in the context of Rodney King, The LA riots, etc. My father made this beautiful analogy, he says you know, if you train a horse, if you train a horse, you know, and you tether him to a little peg and he gets used to it, then you can take it away, you can take the leash off of him and he’ll stand by the peg and he won’t run. FW Yeah. PH He said that’s how Blacks have learned to function in Los Angeles, they would not cross the line. They would come right up to the line, but not cross with violent intent, because we’re not supposed to be there and we know that deadly force will definitely ensue. FW Yeah, yeah. There is a guy named Loïc Wacquant who also talks about the Black life being a life from birth to death of existing in what he calls a carcereal continuum (Editorial notes: original attribution of the term is to Foucault) and that different Black people live different modes of incarceration, but that imprisoning Black bodies is a project of civil society and for some people from the ghetto, their bodies take in this project full force, and others like you and I, meet the project when our car is pulled over by the police for being in the wrong neighborhood.

Without challenging broader structures of Black abjection, increased mobility only envelops Black bodies in circuits of exchange and commodification

Dubey 2003 (Madhu, Department of English at UIC, Signs and Cities: Black Literary Postmodernism, 116)

Using Eadweard Muybridge as the nodal point for its investigation into several interrelated epistemological issues pertaining to the modern industrial city, Reuben contributes to broad critiques of the episteme of modern visuality. More importantly, the novel clarifies the continuing relevance of this critique to contemporary urban conditions, and specifically, to the ways in which the bodies of urban African-Americans are objectified by postmodern visual regimes of surveillance and representation. Media images of unruly black bodies help legitimize the spatial confinement of the black urban poor as well as the incarceration of unprecedented numbers of black men. The "liaisons between [urban] architecture and the American police state," to borrow Mike Davis's phrase, are evoked by Wideman's recurring metaphorical references to the city of Philadelphia as a "jail sentence" (114). According to Reuben, "All black men have a Philadelphia"; even if any particular black man manages to escape his Philadelphia, he always leaves behind his double, a "brother trapped there forever" (93). As I argued earlier, the criminalized black body is inseparable from the fetishized black body in postmodern visual culture. Reuben clarifies this link between containment and commodification by employing the trope of the double to render both of these dimensions of black urban visibility and by suggesting that commodified sexual desires wreaks as much violence on black urban bodies as does public fear. Wideman's two conspicuous examples of commodified black male bodies are, predictably enough, of basketball players and musicians. Wally's job as a recruiter of promising high-school basketball players brings him into contact with coaches who appraise potential recruits as "prize studs" (100). When Wally signs the deal and converts the recruits into "merchandise" (103), he becomes "the cutter of cords" (107), dislodging them from their small-town homes and inserting them into metropolitan circuits of exchange value.  Their entry into the comedy exchange system violently splits and doubles their bodies, condemning them to perpetual mobility and homelessness: "Sever this boy and release a ghost that will spend its days floating back and forth between two places, two bodies, never able to call either one home" (107).

## Impacts

### Impact – Genocide

#### Racism inevitably leads to Genocide.

Steuter & Wills ’08 [Erin and Deborah, Writers at Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., At War With Metaphor: Media, Propaganda, and Racism in the War on Terror, pg. 41 to 45, 2008]

[Google Books Starts Here]

…

every genocide is followed by denial. The mass graves are dug up and hidden. The historical records are burned, or closed to historians. Even during the genocide, those committing the crimes dismiss reports as propaganda. Afterwards such deniers arc called "revisionists." Others deny through more subtle means: by characterizing the reports as "unconfirmed" or "alleged" because they do not come from officially approved sources; by minimizing the number killed; by quarreling about whether the killing fits the legal definition of genocide ("definitionalism"); by claiming that the deaths of the perpetrating group exceeded that of the victim group, or that the deaths were the result of civil war, not genocide.` Before there can be an act of genocide to deny, however, there must he a number of conditions in place to allow genocidal violence to occur. Stanton argues that classification, the first condition or stage, is fundamental and deeply encoded in human language. All languages require classification, a "division of the natural and social world into categories."9 All cultures have categories to distinguish between "us" and "them," between members of our group and others. While all language may make this distinction, it is when we add symbolization to "name and signify" our classifications that what Keen calls the "paranoid culture" begins to assert itself, making certain physical characteristics (such as skin color or facial features) symbols for racial or ethnic classifications. In the later stage of the genocidal process, these markers may become abstract and externalized, as with the yellow star forced on the Jews of Nazi Germany or the blue-checked scarf used by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia to identify, marginalize, and deport people from the Eastern Zone. Classification and symbolization are widespread human practices that are part of our national identity and cultural self-awareness. When joined by dehumanization, these qualities move a society significantly further down the grim road to genocide. Dehumanization relegates the classified group to a category of sub-humanity, making it easier to overcome an aversion to killing. Instead, killing becomes something to be celebrated; thus, in a notorious tape recording of an interview with members of the elite Canadian Airborne Unit in Somalia, a soldier is heard telling the interviewer that their "peacekeeping" mission "sucks, man. We ain't killed enough n yet."'' In the later stages of the genocidal process, polarization intensifies difference, as moderates are silenced or killed. Often, the first casualties of genocide are moderates within the killing groups, voices raised in objection over the escalating violence. Extremists target moderates so that only the extremes will be left in conflict, with no milder middle to slow the cycle of descent into genocide. Once moderate voices have been suppressed, individual deaths escalate into mass killings, in which the rhetoric of extermination is

[Continued Later]

trouble, natives were always wild animals that had to be rooted out of their dens, swamps, jungles."24 Until the conquest of the natives was complete, the message was always the same and almost always voiced through metaphors of natural animality. The most fitting end for "the animals vulgarly called Indians," as Hugh Brackenridge, an eighteenth century jurist and novelist wrote, was extermination.-' Within this animal metaphor, the "injuns inability to be civilized confirmed the idea of their bestiality, which could thus be seen as fundamental, pernicious, and stubbornly resistant to improvement. In this way, they were blamed for their extermination: by being beyond the reach of the civilizing impulse, they brought their end upon themselves. Because of their resistance to absorption, acculturation, and conformity to European models of civilization, natives were constructed as wild, a threat to culture, and an obstacle to western progress. Their removal therefore was not only necessary, it was also inevitable, natural and morally desirable. The efficacy of the American Indian genocide garnered some international notice; according to his biographer John Toland, Adolf Hitler was impressed with its scope. Toland writes that the Nazi leader "Often praised to his inner circle the efficiency of America's extermination—by starvation and uneven combat—of red savages who could not be tamed by captivity."26

### Impact – Global Violence

#### White supremacy is a global system of oppression that normalizes genocidal modalities of violence and domination

Rodriguez ‘07 [Dylan, PhD in Ethnic Studies Program of the University of California Berkeley and Associate Proffessor of Ethnic Studies at University of California Riverside, “American Globality And the US Prison regime: State Violence And White Supremacy from Abu Ghraib to Stockton to bagong diwa”, Ateneo de Manila University, 2007, Kritika Kultura 9 (2007): 022-048]

For the theoretical purposes of this essay, white supremacy may be understood as a logic of social organization that produces regimented, institutionalized, and militarized conceptions of hierarchized “human” difference, enforced through coercions and violences that are structured by genocidal possibility (including physical extermination and curtailment of people’s collective capacities to socially, culturally, or biologically reproduce). As a historical vernacular and philosophical apparatus of domination, white supremacy is simultaneously premised on and consistently innovating universalized conceptions of the white (european and euroamerican) “human” vis-à-vis the rigorous production, penal discipline, and frequent social, political, and biological neutralization or extermination of the (non-white) sub- or non-human. to consider white supremacy as essential to American social **formation** (rather than a freakish or extremist deviation from it) facilitates a discussion of the modalities through which this material logic of violence overdetermines the social, political, economic, and cultural structures that compose American globality and constitute the common sense that is organic to its ordering. While the US prison industrial complex constitutes a statecraft of perpetual domestic crisis that emerges from this social logic of white supremacy, the US prison regime is becoming profoundly undomesticated in a twofold sense: the technologies of carceral racial domination have distended into localities beyond the US proper (they are extra-domestic), while the focused and mundane (though no less severe) bodily violence of the prison’s operative functions have constituted a microwarfare apparatus, accessing and penetrating captive bodies with an unprecedented depth and complexity (the regime is in this sense defined by an unhinged, undomesticated violence). In this context, the (racial) formations of punishment and death inscribed on the various surfaces of the US prison regime—from the nearby to the far away—are in fact generally unremarkable. It cannot be overemphasized that this carceral formation produces a normal and trite violence, a naturalized facet of American social intercourse across scales and geographies, forming the underside of a civil society that is historically unimaginable outside its modalities of formal exclusion and civil/ social neutralization. Yet, it is precisely as this prison regime rearranges, remobilizes, and redeploys its normalized structure of white supremacist bodily violence into geographies beyond the American everyday that it momentarily surfaces as a spectacle of public consumption and even a critical public discourse, in such moments as the photographic revelation of the uS military’s torture of prisoners at Abu Ghraib. While the “national” scope of the US prison industrial complex constitutes a profound social and political crisis of epochal scale, it also composes an institutional symbiosis that has yielded an authentic conjunctural articulation of state violence that is both organic to the domestic US carceral and capable of rearticulation, appropriation, and mobilization across global geographies. Thus, to understand the prison as a regime is to focus conceptually, theoretically, and politically on the prison as a pliable module or mobilized vessel through which the state generates particular practices of legitimated violence and bodily immobilization. “Prison regime” is a conceptual and theoretical (not a discretely “institutional”) phrase that refers to a modality through which the state organizes, rationalizes, and deploys specific technologies of violence, domination, and subjection—technologies that are otherwise reserved for deployment in sites of declared war or martial law: in this usage, “prison regime” differentiates both the scale and object of analysis from the more typical macro- scale institutional categories of “the prison,” “the prison system,” and, for that matter, “the prison industrial complex.” the conceptual scope of this term similarly exceeds the analytical scope of prison management, prison policy, and “the prison (or prisoner’s) experience,” categories that most often take textual form through discrete case studies, institutional reform initiatives, prison ethnographies, and empirical criminological surveys.Rather, the notion of a prison regime invokes a “meso” (middle, or mediating) dimension of processes, structures, and vernaculars that compose the state’s modalities of self-articulation and self-conceptualization, institutional crafting, and “rule” across the macro and micro scales. It is within this meso range of fluctuating articulations of power that the prison is inscribed as both a localization and constitutive logic of the state’s production of juridical, spatial, and militarized dominion. A genealogy of the prison regime foregrounds the essential instability—the unnaturalness—of its object of discussion, suggesting a process of historical analysis and theorization that methodologically extends beyond 1.) the particular and mystified institutionality of the discrete and narrowly bounded entity we know as the Prison; and 2.) the juridical and institutional formalities of the state’s supposed “ownership” of and orderly proctorship over the Prison as it is conventionally conceived.

### Impact – Ableism

#### Whiteness is the root cause of ableism – technologies of violence and surveillance used against people with disabilities originated in Eurocentric thought

Smith ‘4 [Phil, Executive Director, Vermont Developmental Disabilities Council, “Whiteness, Normal Theory, and Disability Studies”, Disability Studies Quarterly Spring 2004, Volume 24, No. 2, http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/491/668]

This point, that ableism is created by those who define themselves as able-bodied, as normal, and that it is a master status invisible to themselves, calls out for the need to develop what might be called normal theory and normal studies, similar to the development of whiteness theory and whiteness studies, that can unpack more fully the ideology of ableism and expose normality as a scopic site for the subjugation of people labeled as having disabilities. It is also likely, given the normative universalization of whiteness in modernist Western culture, that the construction of whiteness is at the complex, multiple roots of both racisms and ableisms. This is especially true given that eugenic science is at the heart of current special education, psychology, and the system of services and supports for people with disabilities (Kliewer and Drake 1998). Clearly, whiteness is intimately tied to modernist constructions of science (Kincheloe 1999). It would seem, then, that the projects of developing multiple, postmodern, normal studies may have as their subjects, at least in part, the complex ways in which whiteness ideology creates ableisms. Kincheloe (1999) argues cogently, when discussing the normative landscape of whiteness, that: This norm has traditionally involved a rejection of those who did not meet whiteness' notion of reason emerging from the European Enlightenment. Whiteness deployed reason – narrowly defined Eurocentric reason as a form of disciplinary power that excludes those who do not meet its criteria for inclusion into the community of the socio-politically enfranchised. Understanding such dynamics, those interested in the reconstruction of white identity can engage in the post formal (a theoretical effort to redefine the Eurocentric notions of intelligence and reason by examining such concepts in light of socio-psychological insights from a variety of non-western cultures [see Kincheloe and Steinberg 1993; Kincheloe 1995]) search for diverse expressions of reason. Such a project empowers white students seeking progressive identities to produce knowledge about the process of White identity reconstruction, the redefinition of reason, the expansion of what is counted as a manifestation of intelligence, and the phenomenological experience of challenging the boundaries of whiteness. (Paragraph 56) This analysis seems critical in understanding the relationship of whiteness studies and disability studies. The normative disciplinary power of whiteness undergirding the rationality of Eurocentric culture and thought segregates not only those defined as not-white from the terrains of equality, equity, and justice, but also those defined as not-Able (body or mind). A project of inclusion that reinvents whiteness by calculating freshly an ideology of diverse reasons, intelligences, and experiences will, of necessity, involve an exploration of the cartography of abled Normality. A broad whiteness studies approach must shake hands with a broad disability studies approach if either whiteness or ability is to be reconceptualized.

### Impact – Environment

#### Environmental destruction is caused by systemic racism

Bullard ’04[Robert, Bachelor's degree in Government at Alabama A&M University, in 1968. His M.A. in Sociology was earned at Atlanta University, in 1972. Bullard obtained his Ph.D. in Sociology at Iowa State University, in 1976, under the supervision of urban sociologist Robert ("Bob") O. Richards and Dean of the Barbara Jordan-Mickey Leland School of Public Affairs at Texas Southern University, “Environment and Morality: Confronting Environmental Racism in the United States”, Geneva, October 1, 2004, p.8]

Environmental racism refers to any policy, practice or directive that differentially affects or disadvantages (whether intended or unintended) individuals, groups or communities based on race or colour. It combines with public policies and industry practices to provide benefits for corporations while shifting costs to people of colour. Government, legal, economic, political and military institutions reinforce environmental racism, and it influences local land use, enforce-ment of environmental regulations, industrial facility siting and the locations where people of colour live, work and play. The roots of environmental racism are deep and have been difficult to eliminate. Environmental decision making often mirrors the power arrangements of the dominant society and its institutions. It disadvantages people of colour while providing advantages or privileges for corporations and individuals in the upper echelons of society. The question of who pays and who benefits from environmental and industrial policies is central to this analysis of environmental racism. Environmental racism reinforces the stratification of people (by race, ethnicity, status and power), place (in central cities, suburbs, rural areas, unincorporated areas or Native American reservations) and work (in that office workers, for example, are afforded greater protections than farm workers). It institutionalizes unequal enforcement, trades human health for profit, places the burden of proof on the “victims” rather than the polluters, legitimizes human exposure to harmful chemicals, pesticides and hazardous substances, promotes “risky” technologies, exploits the vulnerability of economically and politically disenfranchised communities, subsidizes ecological destruction, creates an industry around risk assessment, delays cleanup actions and fails to develop pollution prevention and precaution processes as the overarching and dominant strategy. Environmental decision making and local land-use planning operate at the intersection of science, economics, politics and special interests in a way that places communities of colour at risk. This is especially true in America’s Deep South, which, by default, has become a “sacrifice zone”, a sump for the rest of the nation’s toxic waste, and is tarnished with the legacy of slavery, Jim Crow and white resistance to equal justice… There is a direct correlation between exploitation of land and exploitation of people. Native Americans have to contend with some of the worst pollution in the United States, and the places where they live are prime targets for landfills, incinerators, garbage dumps and risky mining operations. Pollution from industries is showing up in the Akwesasne mothers’ milk in New York. Native American reservations are under siege from “radioactive colonialism”. The legacy of institutional racism has left many sovereign Indian nations without an economic infrastructure to address poverty, unemployment, inadequate education and health care, and a host of other social problems. Environmental racism is also evident at the global level. Shipping hazardous wastes from rich to poor communities is not a solution to the growing global waste problem. (Transboundary shipment of banned pesticides, hazardous wastes and toxic products, and export of “risky technologies” from the United States, where regulations and laws are more stringent, to nations with weaker infrastructure, regulations and laws, smacks of a double standard). Unequal interests and power arrangements have allowed poisons of the rich to be offered as short-term remedies for poverty of the poor. This scenario plays out domestically (in the United States, where low-income and people of colour communities are disproportionately impacted by waste facilities and “dirty” industries) and internationally (where hazardous wastes move from countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/OECD to non-OECD states). Endangered people of colour in the industrialized countries of the North have much in common with populations in developing countries that are also threatened by industrial polluters. For example, grassroots groups from Norco, Louisiana, to Ogoni, Nigeria, identified Shell Oil as a common threat. Environmental justice activists have mobilized in central city ghettos, barrios and villages from Atlanta to the Arctic Circle, Alaska to South Central Los Angeles, South Africa to rural Native American reservations and rainforests in Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador and Brazil. These groups have organized, educated and empowered themselves to challenge government and industrial polluters. Environmental racism manifests itself in the substandard treatment of workers. Thousands of farm workers and their families are exposed to dangerous pesticides on the job and in the labour camps. These workers also have to endure substandard wages and work conditions. Environmental racism also extends to the exploitative work environment of garment district sweatshops, the microelectronic industry and extraction industries. A disproportionately large share of the workers who suffer under substandard occupational and safety conditions are immigrants, women and people of colour.

### Impact – Ethics

#### The totalizing dominance of whiteness makes ethical relationality impossible

Yancy ‘5 [George, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University and Coordinator of the Critical Race Theory Speaker Series, “Whiteness and the Return of the Black Body”, The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 19.4 (2005) 215-241, Muse]

The reader will note that the question regarding how it feels to be a problem does not apply to people who have at some point in their lives felt themselves to be a problem. In such cases, feeling like a problem is a contingent disposition that is relatively finite and transitory. When Black people are asked the same question by white America, the relationship between being Black and being a problem is non-contingent. It is a necessary relation. Outgrowing this ontological state of being a problem is believed impossible. Hence, when regarding one's "existence as problematic," temporality is frozen. One is a problem forever. However, it is important to note that it is from within the white imaginary that the question "How does it feel to be a problem?" is given birth. To be human is to be thrown-in-the-world. To be human not only means to be thrown within a context of facticity, but it also means to be in the mode of the subjunctive. It is interesting to note that the etymology of the word "problem" suggests the sense of being "thrown forward," as if being thrown in front of something, as an obstacle. Within the white imaginary, to be Black means to be born an obstacle at the very core of one's being. To ex-ist as Black is not "to stand out" facing an ontological horizon filled with future possibilities of being other than what one is. Rather, being Black negates the "ex" of existence. Being Black is reduced to facticity. For example, it is not as if it is only within the light of my freely chosen projects that things are experienced as obstacles, as Sartre might say; as Black, by definition, I am an obstacle. As Black, I am the very obstacle to my own meta-stability and trans-phenomenal being. As Black, I am not a project at all. Hence, within the framework of the white imaginary, to be Black and to be human are contradictory terms. [End Page 237] Substituting the historical constructivity of whiteness for "manifest destiny," whites remain imprisoned within a space of white ethical solipsism (only whites possess needs and desires that are truly worthy of being respected [Sullivan 2001, 100]). It would seem that many whites would rather remain imprisoned within the ontology of sameness, refusing to reject the ideological structure of their identities as "superior." The call of the Other qua Other remains unheard within the space of whiteness's sameness. Locked within their self-enthralled structure of whiteness, whites occlude the possibility of developing new forms of ethical relationality to themselves and to non-whites. It is partly through the process of abandoning their hegemonic, monologistic discourse (functioning as the "oracle voice") that whites might reach across the chasm of (nonhierarchical) difference and embrace the non-white Other in his or her Otherness. "A true and worthy ideal," as Du Bois writes, "frees and uplifts a people" (1995b, 456). He adds, "But say to a people: 'The one virtue is to be white,' and people rush to the inevitable conclusion, "Kill the 'nigger'!" Of course, the idea that "the one virtue is white" is a false ideal, for it "imprisons and lowers" (456). Whiteness is a "particular social and historical [formation] that [is] reproduced through specific discursive and material processes and circuits of desire and power" (McLaren 1998, 66). On this score, reproduced through circuits of desire and power, whiteness strives for totalization; it desires to claim the entire world for itself and has the misanthropic effrontery to territorialize the very meaning of the "human."

### Impact – Global Warming

#### Only the K solves Global Warming – environmental destruction is a direct result of racial hierarchies that incentivize increased consumption – their use of market mechanisms will inevitably fail

Mandell ’08[Bekah, \* A.B., Vassar College; J.D., Boston College Law School, “RACIAL REIFICATION AND GLOBAL WARMING: A TRULY INCONVENIENT TRUTH”, Boston Thrid World Law Journal, Spring 2008, p. 3-5]

The unsustainable land-use and consumption that define the American dream--an inherently white ideal--create cultural and racial hierarchies by setting up two classes of citizens in American society: those who can consume space and those who cannot. Representative Nydia M. Velazquez, who represents in Congress a predominantly poor urban district of New York, points out, [\*296] the simple fact is that our current unsustainable "more-is-better" culture undermines any hope of achieving justice--at home or abroad. We often hear about how the United States consumes a vastly disproportionate amount of resources relative to the rest of the world. Americans are building bigger houses, driving bigger cars, consuming more and more of everything than just about anyone else anywhere. This is certainly true, and the long-term environmental effects of this overconsumption may well prove disastrous . . . . . . . [A]nd one thing is for sure--Americans are not doing all this overconsuming in congressional districts like the one I represent.... In my district, crime is high, test scores are low, schools are crumbling, and the "American Dream"--however you choose to define it--is very, very difficult to attain. Those who currently enjoy the privileges of consumption fear losing the bigger houses, bigger cars, and the economic power to consume, not only because they provide material comforts, but because they have become the signifiers of wealth, power, and whiteness in American society. As Professor Farley stated, "The system of property [and all of its trappings] is white-over-black." Those material comforts that identify whiteness do so in dialectic opposition to the high crime, low test scores, and crumbling schools that mark blackness in American society. [\*297] Fear of eroding the hierarchies that define race explains why politicians and other elites have consistently championed ineffectual "market-based approaches" to global warming. By focusing public and private energy on relatively insignificant individual behavior changes, the Bush administration and other privileged elites are able to maintain the racial hierarchy that consolidates their economic and social power. Politicians know that "[w]ithout white-over-black the state withers away." Therefore, they have a profound incentive to maintain the racial hierarchy. Unsurprisingly, "because these elites accrue social and economic benefits by maintaining the status quo, they inevitably do." This white consensus to maintain the spatial and mobility hierarchies that reify race is possible because, "[w]hite privilege thrives in highly racialized societies that espouse racial equality, but in which whites will not tolerate being either inconvenienced in order to achieve racial equality . . . or being denied the full benefits of their whiteness . . . ." With so much white privilege to lose, it becomes clear why even most passionate environmental advocates are far more willing to call for, and make, small non-structural changes in their behavior to ameliorate [\*298] global warming, but are unwilling to embrace significant or meaningful actions to address the crisis. Even as global warming is starting to become the subject of increasing media coverage and as more environmental groups call for action to halt the crisis, most activism is limited to changes that maintain the existing spatial, social, economic and legal framework that defines American society. Despite knowing for decades that we have been living unsustainable lifestyles, and "hav[ing] had some intuition that it was a binge and the earth couldn't support it, . . . aside from the easy things (biodegradable detergent, slightly smaller cars) we didn't do much. We didn't turn our lives around to prevent it." Greenhouse emissions reduction challenges have cropped up on websites across the country, encouraging Americans to change their light bulbs, inflate their tires to the proper tire pressure to ensure optimal gas mileage, switch to hybrid cars, run dishwashers only when full, telecommute, or buy more efficient washers and dryers. However, popular emissions challenge web sites are not suggesting that Americans give up their cars, move into smaller homes in more densely populated urban neighborhoods near public transportation, or take other substantive actions to mitigate the global climate crisis. Even Al Gore, [\*299] the most famous voice in the climate change movement, reminds his fellow Americans that "[l]ittle things matter . . . buy a hybrid if you can, buy a flex-fuel car if you can. Get a higher mileage car that's comfortable for your needs." "[M]any yuppie progressive 'greens' are the [\*300] ones who drove their SUVs to environmental rallies and, even worse, made their homes at the far exurban fringe, requiring massive car dependence in their daily lives," taking residential segregation and racial and spacial hierarchies to previously unimagined dimensions. This focus on maintaining one's privileged lifestyle while making minimal changes reflects the power of the underlying structural impediments blocking a comprehensive response to global climate change in the United States. It is not just political inaction that prevents a meaningful response. Millions of Americans do not demand a change in environmental policy because, just as with political elites, it is against the interests of those enjoying white privilege to take genuine steps to combat climate change. Real climate action would ultimately require relinquishing the spatial, social, and economic markers that have created and protected whiteness and the privilege it confers. Although "we too often fail to appreciate how important race remains as a system for amassing and defending wealth and privilege," the painfully slow reaction of the American public to the growing dangers of global warming highlights just how important racial privilege remains and how reluctant its beneficiaries are to give it up. Elite reformists make meaningful change even more remote as they push for behaviors to tweak, but not to change the existing social, economic, and legal hierarchy in the face of [\*301] "problems, [like global warming] that arise to threaten the predominance of the traditionalist, capitalist ruling class.

#### Only addressing racial and spatial inequality can solve global warming – the aff leads to serial policy failure

Mandell ’08[Bekah, \* A.B., Vassar College; J.D., Boston College Law School, “RACIAL REIFICATION AND GLOBAL WARMING: A TRULY INCONVENIENT TRUTH”, Boston Thrid World Law Journal, Spring 2008, p. 3-5]

Lawmakers and politicians have not taken action to combat climate change because effectively arresting climate change will challenge the foundational values of American society. Meaningful action would require changes in the way we live, which would undermine the foundation of our hierarchical political and social structure. The behaviors and lifestyles in the United States that emit the lion's share of CO[2] into the atmosphere are the very same as those that have actualized the idea of race and maintained the "white-over-black" hierarchy that is the essence of our social, economic, and legal structure. These environmentally destructive behaviors and lifestyles have created and protected white privilege in American society. Thus, meaningful action to combat [\*294] climate change will require a dismantling of the systemic policies and norms that have both caused global warming and protected the racial hierarchy that underlies contemporary America. This reality explains why meaningful action on the issue of climate change has eluded policy-makers for decades. The structures, practices, and ideologies of the suburban American dream--with its detached single-family homes in spread-out neighborhoods, far from commercial and urban areas--have been some of the strongest forces in creating and perpetuating white privilege in American society. Henry Holmes explains the role of the suburbs in that process: Suburbia, as we know it today, became the preferred middle-class lifestyle. With it came patterns of economic development, land use, real estate investment, transportation and infrastructure development that reflected race, class and cultural wounds deeply embedded in the psyche and history of the United States. Jim Crow--institutionalized segregation and apartheid against African Americans and other nonwhites--was reflected in urban and suburban zoning codes, restrictive racial covenants in real estate investment and lending practices, redlining by financial institutions, discriminatory private business practices, and the distribution of public investments. All these served the interests of the policy-makers, usually the corporate elite who were typically European-American and middle class or wealthy. In addition to concretizing the abstract concept of race in American society, the growth of the suburbs has become a major factor in [\*295] changing the earth's climate. Transportation, electricity generation, and deforestation represent the most harmful human activities because they release large amounts of carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas, into the atmosphere. Suburbanization and private car-centered transportation policies require that more energy be spent on transportation, demand far more electricity, and cause more deforestation than any other lifestyle. Global warming is an unforeseen side effect of the policies and behaviors that have been used to "race" our society. Therefore, a meaningful response to the global climate crisis requires a dismantling, or at the very least a reordering, of the spatial systems we have created to construct and perpetuate the concept of race in the United States.

### Impact – Suburbanization

#### Racist land policies originally caused suburbanization

Mandell ’08[Bekah, \* A.B., Vassar College; J.D., Boston College Law School, “RACIAL REIFICATION AND GLOBAL WARMING: A TRULY INCONVENIENT TRUTH”, Boston Thrid World Law Journal, Spring 2008, p. 3-5]

Climate change is a result of a concentration of greenhouse gases in the earth's atmosphere. The concentration of greenhouse gases in the earth's atmosphere has risen significantly since industrialization in the 1800s, but has spiked precipitously in the decades after World War II, a rise that tracks the increasing suburbanization of the United States. Despite rhetoric from political leaders about the unchecked CO[2] emissions of developing nations, the United States remains the most significant producer of greenhouse gases in the world, responsible for nearly a quarter of the world's total emissions. It is significant [\*336] then that the increasing concentration of CO[2] in the earth's atmosphere correlates temporally with the rise of suburbanization and personal transportation in the United States. Suburban land use, and the racist policies that created and support such land use, have led to a spike in the United States's CO[2] emissions. Large, inefficient, single-family homes on large lots, located far from commercial centers, accessible only by personal vehicles, consume energy and land in correlation with the three most significant sources of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere: electricity production, transportation, and deforestation. The suburbanization of whiteness has created endless acres of suburbs in the United States. Between 1982 and 2003, the growth in developed land in the United States far outpaced population growth, increasing by nearly half, as more and more of the population moved out to the suburbs. In 1982, 72.9 million acres of the land in the United States were developed; twenty-one years later, by 2003, 108.1 million acres had been developed. This new development transforms fields, farms, and forest into inefficient housing, featuring large footprints on large lots. As whites have had to move farther and farther [\*337] from cities and inner-ring suburbs to preserve their privilege, the lots on which they have built their new homes have grown in size, eating up more land that was once forest or grassland. This increased distance from basic needs and larger home sizes require increasing amounts of fossil fuels for transportation and for heating, cooling, and power.

## Alternative

### Alt – Genealogy

#### Genealogy is key in the struggle against the racial state and imperial warfare—the affirmative’s dream of redeeming America through urban renewal and Urban transport takes part in racist disaster capitalism and the privilege of Whiteness.

Kokontis 2011 (Kate, PhD in Performance Studies from UC-Berkeley, “Performative Returns and the Rememory of History: genealogy and performativity in the American racial state,” Dissertation available on Proquest)

There are clear reasons why this project is timely – indeed, urgent. At a glance, genealogy projects proliferate: all of my objects of analysis came out in the last few decades, and indeed, in the time since I first conceived of and started working on this project as a graduate student in 2005, more and more fodder has emerged in a range of contexts. It is everywhere. These emergences in the last half-decade or so have included Gates’s miniseries, Hartman’s Lose Your Mother, Roots thirtieth anniversary republication, a play about Italian American performative returns staged in New York, the Tenement Museum’s acquisition of a new building that would enable it to include the stories of (African-descended) immigrants from the Caribbean in their site-specific tours – just to name a few. My hunch is that this is not coincidental: rather, these emergences speak to a widespread and urgent reflection on America’s history and present. It has been approximately forty years since the formative moment of 1968-1969. Today’s moment in time compels a look back at the spirit, efforts, improvements, and setbacks since that revolutionary moment in the past when the reinvention of society seemed not only possible, but inevitable. It compels looking back at Vietnam from the vantage point of yet another seemingly endless imperialist war (on Terror, manifested in the ostensibly finished War in Iraq, the ongoing War in Afghanistan, and the new War in Pakistan) that has now lasted longer than that of Vietnam, but which has been met with considerably more complacency not least because of who is and isn’t doing the fighting. This vantage point is from a time where we have elected the first Black president and claim to be not only post-civil rights and post-Black Power but even post- racial – but from where hateful white reactionaries are forming “Tea Parties,” where the Southern Poverty Law Center has documented that participation in white supremacist “patriotic” hate groups who threaten and enact particular violence on brown and black people, presumed to be criminals and aliens, has risen 54% since 2000,21 where the prison industrial complex is booming, and where the Border and now entire Southwest are increasingly militarized in concert with Draconian new immigration policies on the part of many states that follow Arizona’s infamous SB1070 (it is not shocking that one of the groups that worked on this bill and others like it was ALEC (American Legislative Exchange Council), “a powerful front group that helps corporate representatives craft template legislation for state lawmakers, funded partially by the private prison industry”).22 This is a vantage point from where, in contrast to Third World Liberation Front protests in favor of African American and Ethnic Studies programs in universities, now education in the humanities and many social sciences (not to mention actual science, as opposed to faith), critical thinking, and “identity politics” seem quaint and passé, if not downright embarrassing, and we favor underfunding, instrumentalizing, and privatizing “education,” if not functionally eradicating it altogether. And this moment provides a vantage point that is in the wake of two extremely crucial, formative, catastrophic disasters that took place in major US cities (New York and New Orleans, which also happen to be the diasporic hotspots in which my project is situated) – 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, ten and six years ago respectively – whose consequences are dire not only on account of the loss of lives but on account of what they engendered – jingoism, xenophobia, religious intolerance, open and unabashed racism, and state violence (imperialism, war, torture, racial profiling, police brutality, and “urban renewal”/forcible displacement, among other things) – and the questions they revealed as urgent: What are the consequences of our contemporary international engagements – our foreign policy and image of ourselves and ways we conduct ourselves at home and abroad (politically, economically, ethically, etc), and ways in which we incorporate others from elsewhere into the fabric of our society, our relationship to power and influence and imperialist practices – and how do they fit into a centuries-long tradition of racial-(nation-)state- building? Who are our others, our constitutive margins? To whom are American freedom, democracy, and civil liberties guaranteed and from whom are they stripped, if ever they were granted in the first place? To whom does the safety net extend, and whom does it allow to slip through the cracks and drown? This historical consciousness provides the backdrop of the performative returns that have been enacted of late. This project cannot solve the structural or psychic problems that these returns speak to, although it is certainly undertaken with the above questions at its heart. And it does, I hope, illuminate the network of historical events and resurfacings that connect individual acts of performative return, the grievances they cite and the grief they express; I hope that it weaves together the disparate and opposing genealogies into a fabric – rough perhaps, but not easily riven - that portrays the inextricability of those italicized questions from these performative undertakings, and ofthese undertakings from each other.

### Alt – Historical/Discursive Analysis

#### Whiteness Supremacy is affectively and discursively produced – it circulates through an assumed grammar that produces Blackness as ontologically abject. The alternative disrupts the attempt to ahistorically pass off the violence of the White Gaze.

Yancy ‘5 [George, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University and Coordinator of the Critical Race Theory Speaker Series, “Whiteness and the Return of the Black Body”, The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 19.4 (2005) 215-241, Muse]

The burden of the white gaze disrupts my first-person knowledge, causing "difficulties in the development of [my] bodily schema" (110). The white gaze constructs the Black body into "an object in the midst of other objects" (109). The nonthreatening "I" of my normal, everyday body schema becomes the threatening "him" of the Negro kind/type. Under pressure, the corporeal schema collapses. It gives way to a racial epidermal schema.6 "Below the corporeal schema," writes Fanon, "I had sketched a historico-racial schema. The elements that I used had been provided for me not by 'residual sensations and perceptions of a primarily tactile, vestibular, kinesthetic, and visual character,' but by the other, the white man [woman]" (111). In other words, Fanon began to "see" himself through the lens of a historico-racial schema. Note that there was nothing intrinsic to his physiology that forced his corporeal schema to collapse; it was the "Black body" as always already named and made sense of within the context of a larger semiotics of privileged white bodies that provided him with the tools for self-hatred. His "darkness," a naturally occurring phenomenon,7 became historicized, residing within the purview of the white gaze, a phenomenal space created and sustained by socioepistemic and semiotic communal constitutionality. On this score, the Black body is placed within the space of constitutionality vis-à-vis the racist white same, the One. Against the backdrop of the sketched historico-racial (racist) scheme, Fanon's "darkness" returns to him, signifying a new genus, a new category of man: A Negro! (116). He inhabits a space of anonymity (he is every Negro), and yet he feels a strange personal responsibility for his body. He writes: I was responsible at the same time for my body, for my race, for my ancestors. I subjected myself to an objective examination, I discovered my blackness, my ethnic characteristics; and I was battered down by tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetishism, racial defects, slave-ships, and above all else, above all: "sho' good eaten'." (112)8 [End Page 222] Fanon writes about the Black body and how it can be changed, deformed, and made into an ontological problem vis-à-vis the white gaze. Describing an encounter with a white woman and her son, Fanon narrates that the young boy screams, "Look at the nigger! . . . Mama, a Negro!" (113).9 Fanon: My body was given back to me sprawled out, distorted, recolored, clad in mourning in that white winter day. The Negro is an animal, the Negro is bad, the Negro is mean, the Negro is ugly; look, a Negro, it's cold, the Negro is shivering because he is cold, the little boy is trembling because he is afraid of the nigger, the nigger is shivering with cold, that cold that goes through your bones, the handsome boy is trembling because he thinks that the nigger is quivering with rage, the little white boy throws himself into his mother's arms: Mama, the nigger's going to eat me up.. (113–14) The white imagery of the Black as a savage beast, a primitive and uncivilized animal, is clearly expressed in the boy's fear that he is to be eaten by the "cannibalistic" Negro. "The more that Europeans dominated Africans, the more 'savage' Africans came to seem; cannibalism represented the nadir of savagery" (Brantlinger 1985, 203). Presumably, the young boy does not know that his words will (or how they will) negatively affect Fanon. However, for Fanon, the young white boy represents the broader framework of white society's perception of the Black. The boy turns to his white mother for protection from the impending Black doom. The young white boy, however, is not simply operating at the affective level, he is not simply being haunted, semi-consciously, by a vague feeling of anxiety. Rather, he is operating both at the affective and the discursive level. He says, "Mama, the nigger's going to eat me up." This locutionary act carries a perlocutionary force of effecting a phenomenological return of Fanon to himself as a cannibalistic threat, as an object to be feared. Fanon, of course, does not "want this revision, this thematization."10 African-American philosopher Robert Gooding-Williams notes: For Fanon, the boy's view of the Negro (of Fanon himself in this case) as an object of fear is significant, as it suggests (1) that the image (racial epidermal schema) of the Negro posited by the boy's verbal performance has a narrative significance and (2) that such images are available to the boy as elements of a socially shared stock of images that qualify the historicity (the historical situatedness) both of the boy and of the Negro he sees. (1993, 165) One is tempted to say that the young white boy sees Fanon's Black body "as if " it was cannibal-like. The "seeing as if," however, is collapsed into a "seeing as is." In Fanon's example, within the lived phenomenological transversal context of white racist behavior, the "as if " reads too much like a process of "conscious effort." On my reading, "youngwhiteboyexperiencesniggerdark-bodycannibalevokestrepidation" [End Page 223] is what appears in the uninterrupted lived or phenomenological flow of the young white boy's racist experience. There is no experience of the "as if." Indeed, the young white boy's linguistic and nonlinguistic performance is indicative of a definitive structuring of his own self-invisibility as: "whiteinnocentselfinrelationshiptothedarkniggerself." This definitive structuring is not so much remembered or recollected as it is always present as the constitutive imaginary background within which the white boy is both the effect and the vehicle of white racism; indeed, he is the orientation of white epistemic practices, ways of "knowing" about one's (white) identity vis-à-vis the Black Other. The "cultural white orientation" is not an "entity" whose origin the white boy needs to grasp or recollect before he performs whiteness. He is not a tabula rasa, one who sees the Black body for the first time and instinctively says, "Mama, the nigger's going to eat me up." On this score, the boy does indeed undergo an experience of the dark body as frightening, but there is no concealed meaning, as it were, inherent in the experience qua experience of Fanon's body as such. Rather, the fright that he experiences vis-à-vis Fanon's dark body is always already "constructed out of . . . social narratives and ideologies" (Henze 2000, 238). The boy is already discursively and affectively acculturated through micro-processes of "racialized" learning (short stories, lullabies, children's games,11 prelinguistic experiences, and so forth) to respond "appropriately" in the presence of a Black body. The gap that opens up within the young white boy's perceptual field as he "sees" Fanon's Black body has already been created while innocently sitting on his mother's lap.12 His mother's lap constitutes a "raced" zone of security. This point acknowledges the fundamental "ways the transactions between a raced world and those who live in it racially constitute the very being of those beings" (Sullivan 2001, 89). The association of Blackness with "nigger" and cannibalism is no mean feat. Hence, on my view, he is already attending to the world in a particular fashion; his affective and discursive performances bespeak the (ready-to-hand) inherited white racist background according to which he is able to make "sense" of the world. Like moving my body in the direction of home, or only slightly looking as I reach my hand to retrieve my cup of hot tea that is to the left of my computer screen, the young white boy dwells within/experiences/engages the world of white racist practices in such a way that the practices qua racist practices have become invisible. The young boy's response is part and parcel of an implicit knowledge of how he gets around in a Manichean world. Being-in a racist world, a lived context of historicity, the young boy does not "see" the dark body as "dark" and then thematically proceed to apply negative value predicates to it, where conceivably the young boy would say, "Yes, I 'see' the dark body as existing in space, and I recognize the fact that it is through my own actions and intentions that I predicate evil of it." "In order even to act deliberately," as philosopher Hubert L. Dreyfus maintains, "we must orient ourselves in a familiar world" (1991, 85). [End Page 224] My point here is that the young white boy is situated within a familiar white racist world of intelligibility, one that has already "conceded" whiteness as "superior" and Blackness as "inferior" and "savage." Involved within the white racist Manichean world, the young boy has found his orientation, he has already become part and parcel of a constituted and constituting force within a constellation of modes of being that are deemed natural. However, he is oblivious to the historicity and cultural conditionedness of these modes of being. Despite the fact that "race" neither exists as a naturally occurring kind within the world nor cuts at the joints of reality, notice the evocative power of "being Black," which actually points to the evocative power of being white. The dark body, after all, would not have evoked the response that it did from the young white boy were it not for the historical mythos of the white body and the power of white normativity through which the white body has been pre-reflectively structured, resulting in forms of action that are as familiar and as quotidian as my reaching for my cup of tea. His white racist performance is a form of everyday coping within the larger unthematized world of white social coping. On this score, one might say that the socio-ontological structure that gives intelligibility to the young white boy's racist performance is prior to a set of beliefs of which he is reflectively aware. Notice that Fanon undergoes the experience of having his body "given back to him." Thus Fanon undergoes a profound phenomenological experience of being disconnected from his body schema. Fanon experiences his body as flattened out or sprawled out before him. And, yet, Fanon's "body," its corporeality, is forever with him. It never leaves. So, how can it be "given back"? The physical body that Fanon has/is remains in space and time. It does not somehow disappear and make a return. And, yet, there is a profound sense in which his "corporeality" is interwoven with particular discursive practices. Under the white gaze, Fanon's body is not simply the res extensa of Cartesian dualism. Within the context of white racist practices vis-à-vis the "Black" body, there is a blurring of boundaries between what is "there" as opposed to what has been "placed there." Hence, the body's "corporeality," within the context of lived history, is shaped through powerful cultural schemata. This does not mean that somehow the "body" does not exist. After all, it is my body that forms the site of white oppression. To jettison all discourse regarding the body as "real," being subject to material forces, and such, in the name of the "postmodern body," is an idealism that would belie my own philosophical move to theorize from the position of my real lived embodiment. The point here is that the "body" is never given as such, but always "appears there" within the context of some set of conditions of emergence (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 108). The conditions of emergence for the phenomenological return of Fanon's body qua inferior or bestial are grounded in the white social imaginary, its discursive and nondiscursive manifestations. Having undergone a gestalt-switch in his body image, his knowledge/consciousness of his body has become "solely a negating activity. It is a third-person [End Page 225] consciousness. The body is surrounded by an atmosphere of certain uncertainty" (1967, 110–11). Linda Alcoff discusses this phenomenological sense of being disjointed as a form of "near-incommensurability between first-person experience and historico-racial schema that disenables equilibrium" (1999, 20). What this points to is the "sociogenic" basis of the "corporeal malediction"experienced by Blacks (Fanon 1967, 111). On this score, "the black man's [woman's] alienation is not an individual question" (11). In other words, the distorted historico-racial schema that occludes equilibrium takes place within the realm of sociality, a larger complex space of white social intersubjective constitutionality "of phenomena that human beings have come to regard as 'natural' in the physicalist sense of depending on physical nature" (Gordon 1997, 38). Of course, within the context of colonial or neocolonial white power, the objective is to pass off what is historically contingent as that which is ahistorically given.

### Alt – Afro-Pessimism Ontology

#### Anti-Blackness structurally underpins all violence—while racialized violence is still a daily reality for people caught in the position of the slave, the rhetoric of “oppression” or “exploitation” alone asks only how we might redeem this failed American experiment. There is no analogy for the structural suffering of the slave, meaning authentic engagement with social violence must begin with the anti-human void known as Blackness

Pak 2012 (Yumi, PhD in literature from UC-San Diego, “Outside Relationality: Autobiographical Deformations and the Literary Lineage of Afro-pessimism in 20th and 21st Century African American Literature,” Dissertation through Proquest)

Because the four authors I examine focus intensively on untangling and retangling the nexus of race, gender, and sexuality in autobiographical narratives, this project originally relied most heavily on the frameworks provided by queer theory and performance studies, as the structural organization and methodology behind both disciplines offered the characteristic of being “‘inter’ – in between... intergenric [sic], interdisciplinary, intercultural – and therefore inherently unstable” (“What is Performance Studies Anyway?” 360). My abstract ideation of the dissertation was one which conceptualized the unloosening of the authors’ respective texts from the ways in which they have been read in particular genres. Yet the investigative progression of my research redirected me to question the despondency I found within Toomer, Himes, Baldwin and Jones’ novels, a despondency and sorrow that seemed to reach beyond the individual and collective purportedly represented in these works. What does it mean, they seem to speculate, to suffer beyond the individual, beyond the collective, and into the far reaches of paradigmatic structure? What does it mean to exist beyond “social oppression” and veer instead into what Frank B. Wilderson, III calls “structural suffering” (Red, White & Black 36)? Briefly, Wilderson utilizes what he calls Frantz Fanon’s splitting of “the hair[s] between social oppression and structural suffering”; in other words, Wilderson refutes the possibility of analogizing blackness with any other positionality in the world. Others may be oppressed, indeed, may suffer experientially, but only the black, the paradigmatic slave, suffers structurally. Afro-pessimism, the theoretical means by which I attempt to answer this query, provides the integral term and parameters with which I bind together queer theory, performance studies, and autobiography studies in order to propose a re-examination of these authors and their texts. The structural suffering of blackness seeps into all elements of American history, culture, and life, and thus I begin my discussion with an analysis of Hortense Spillers’ concept of an American grammar in “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book.” To theorize blackness is to begin with the slave ship, in a space that is in actuality no place.7 In discussing the transportation of human cargo across the Middle Passage, Spillers writes that this physical theft of bodies was “a willful and violent (and unimaginable from this distance) severing of the captive body from its motive will, its active desire” (Spillers 67). She contends here that in this mass gathering and transportation, what becomes illuminated is not only the complete and total deracination of native from soil, but rather the evisceration of subjectivity from blackness, the evacuation of will and desire from the body; in other words, we see that even before the black body there is flesh, “that zero degree of social conceptualization that does not escape concealment under the brush of discourse, or the reflexes of iconography” (67). Black flesh, which arrives in the United States to be manipulated and utilized as slave bodies, is “a primary narrative” with its “seared, divided, ripped-apartness, riveted to the ship’s hole, fallen, or ‘escaped’ overboard” (67). These markings – “lacerations, woundings, fissures, tears, scars, openings, ruptures, lesions, rendings, punctures of the flesh” – are indicative of the sheer scale of the structural violence amassed against blackness, and from this beginning Spillers culls an “American grammar” that grounds itself in the “rupture and a radically different kind of cultural continuation,” a grammar that is the fabric of blackness in the United States (67, 68). As Wilderson observes, “Africans went into the ships and came out as Blacks” (Red, White & Black 38). In other words, in the same moment they are (re)born as blacks, they are doomed to death as slaves. This rupture, I argue, is evident in the definitions of slavery set forth by Orlando Patterson in his seminal volume, Slavery and Social Death: natal alienation, general dishonor and openness to gratuitous violence. The captive body, which is constructed with torn flesh, is laid bare to any and all, and it is critical to note here that Patterson, in line with Afro-pessimists, does not align slavery with labor. The slave can – and did – work, but what defines him/her as such is that as a dishonored and violated object, the master’s whims for him/her to work, or not work, can be carried out without ramifications. Rather, the slave’s powerlessness is heightened to the greatest possible capacity, wherein s/he is marked by social death and the “permanent, violent domination” of their selves (Patterson 13). Spillers’ “radically different kind of cultural continuation” finds an articulation of the object status of blackness in the United States, one which impugns the separation of “slave” and “black.” As Jared Sexton and Huey Copeland inquire, “[h]ow might it feel to be... a scandal to ontology, an outrage to every marker of the human? What, in the final analysis, does it mean to suffer?” (Sexton and Copeland 53). Blackness functions as a scandal to ontology because, as Wilderson states, black suffering forms the ethical backbone of civil society. He writes, [c]hattel slavery did not simply reterritorialize the ontology of the African. It also created the Human out of cultural disparate identities from Europe to the East... Put another way, through chattel slavery the world gave birth and coherence to both its joys of domesticity and to its struggles of political discontent, and with these joys and struggles, the Human was born, but not before it murdered the Black, forging a symbiosis between the political ontology of Humanity and the social death of Blacks. (Red, White & Black 20 – 21) Again, the African is made black, and in this murder both ontological and physical, humanity gains its coherence. It is not my intention (nor of other Afro-pessimists) to argue that violence has only ever been committed against black individuals and communities in the United States, or in the world, but rather that the structural suffering that defines blackness, the violence enacted against blackness to maintain its positioning outside of civil society, that demarcates the black as slave, has no horizontal equivalent and, indeed, provides the logical ethos of existence for all othered subjectivities; by this I mean that all other subjects (and I use this word quite intentionally) retain a body and not the zero degree of flesh. As Sexton writes, “we might say of the colonized: you may lose your motherland, but you will not ‘lose your mother’ (Hartman 2007)” (“The Curtain of the Sky” 14). This is precisely why Sexton offers the succinct definition of Afro-pessimism as “a political ontology dividing the Slave from the world of the Human in a constitutive way” (“The Social Life of Social Death” 23). Furthermore, Afro-pessimists contest the idea that the modern world is one wherein the price of labor determines the price of being equally for all people. In this capitalistic reading of the world, we summon blacks back into civil society by utilizing Marxism to assume “a subaltern structured by capital, not by white supremacy” (“Gramsci’s Black Marx” 1). While it is undeniable, of course, that black bodies and labor were used to aid in the economic growth of the United States, we return again to the point that what defines enslavement is accumulation and fungibility, alongside natal alienation, general dishonor, and openness to gratuitous violence; the slave, then, is not constituted as part of the class struggle.8 While it is true “that labor power is exploited and that the worker is alienated in it,” it is also true that “workers labor on the commodity, they are not the commodity itself is, their labor power is” (Red, White & Black 50). The slave is, then, invisible within this matrix, and, to a more detrimental effect, invisible within the ontology of lived subjects entirely. The slave cannot be defined as loss – as can the postcolonial subject, the woman, or the immigrant – but can only be configured as lack, as there is no potential for synthesis within a rubric of antagonism. Wilderson sets up the phrase “rubric of antagonism” in opposition to “rubric of conflict” to clarify the positionality of blacks outside relationality. The former is “an irreconcilable struggle between entities, or positions, the resolution of which is not dialectical but entails the obliteration of one of the positions,” whereas the latter is “a rubric of problems that can be posed and conceptually solved” (Red, White & Black 5). He continues, “[i]f a Black is the very antithesis of a Human subject... then his or her paradigmatic exile is not simply a function of repressive practices on the part of institutions” (9). Integrating Hegel and Marx, and returning to Spillers, Wilderson argues that within this grammar of suffering, the slave is not a laborer but what he calls “anti- Human, against which Humanity establishes, maintains, and renews its coherence, its corporeal integrity” (11). In contrast to imagining the black other in opposition to whiteness, Wilderson and other Afro-pessimists theorize blackness as being absent in the dialectic, as “anti-Human.”

## Answers to Answers

### AT: Perm

#### The perm’s coalitional strategy takes out its solvency – white civil society is founded on the decimation of Black bodies. In opposition to the assimiliationist move of Masters making common cause with Slaves, vote negative for a radical act of refusal

Hartman and Wilderson ‘3 [Saidiya, professor of English and comparative literature and women's and gender studies at Columbia University, and Frank, Associate Professor of African American Studies, Drama at UC Irvine, “THE POSITION OF THE UNTHOUGHT”, Qui Parle, Vol. 13, No. 2 Spring/Summer 2003, JSTOR]

S.V.H. — Once again, trying to fit into the other's shoes becomes the very possibility of narration. In the chapter "A Perilous Passage in the Slave Girl's Life," the question for Jacobs is how she can tell her story in a way that's going to solicit her white readership when she has to efface her very condition in order to make that story intelligible to them. I look at this messy moment as kind of a vor-tex in Jacobs' narrative, where in order to fashion herself as a desir ing subject, she has to deny the very violence, which elsewhere she said defines her position as a slave: her status as a thing and the negation of her will. In one sense, she has to bracket that so she can tell a story about sexuality that's meaningful in a white dominant frame. And I think this is why someone like Hortense Spillers raises the question of whether gender and sexuality are at all applicable to the condition of the captive community.8 That's what I was working with there, that impossibility or ten-sion between Jacobs as an agent versus the objective conditions in which she finds herself. This is something you talk about in your work as well, this existence in the space of death, where negation is the captive's central possibility for action, whether we think of that as a radical refusal of the terms of the social order or these acts that are sometimes called suicide or self-destruction, but which are really an embrace of death. Ultimately it's about the paradox of agency for those who are in these extreme circumstances. And basically, there are very few political narratives that can account for that. F. W. —And we have to ask why. In my own work, obviously I'm not saying that in this space of negation, which is blackness, there is no life. We have tremendous life. But this life is not analogous to those touchstones of cohesion that hold civil society together. In fact, the trajectory of our life (within our terrain of civil death) is bound up in claiming — sometimes individually, sometimes collectively — the violence which Fanon writes about in The Wretched of the Earth, that trajectory which, as he says, is "a splinter to the heart of the world"9 and "puts the settler out of the picture."1° So, it doesn't help us politically or psychologically to try to find ways in which how we live is analogous to how white positionality lives, because, as I think your book suggests, whites gain their coherence by knowing what they are not. There is tremendous diversity on the side of whiteness and tremendous conflict between white men and white women, between Jews and gentiles, and between classes, but that conflict, even in its articulation, has a certain solidarity. And I think that solidarity comes from a near or far relation to the black body or bodies. We give the nation its coherence because we're its underbelly." S.V.H. — That's what's so interesting for me about Achille Mbembe's work, the way he thinks about the position of the for-merly colonized subject along the lines of the slave as an essential way of defining the predicament. Essentially, he says, the slave is the object to whom anything can be done, whose life can be squandered with impunity.12 F.W. — And he's suggesting that what it means to be a slave is to be subject to a kind of complete appropriation, what you call "property of enjoyment." Your book illustrates the "myriad and nefarious uses of slave property" and then demonstrates how "there was no relation to blackness outside the terms of this use of, entitlement to, and occupation of the captive body, for even the status of free blacks was shaped and compromised by the existence of slavery" (S, 24). So. Not only are formally enslaved blacks property, but so are formally free blacks. One could say that the possibility of becoming property is one of the essential elements that draws the line between blackness and whiteness. But what's most intriguing about your argument is the way in which you demonstrate how not only is the slave's performance (dance, music, etc.) the property of white enjoyment, but so is — and this is really key — the slave's own enjoyment of his/her performance: that too belongs to white people." S.V.H. — Right. You know, as I was writing Scenes of Subjection, there was a whole spate of books on nineteenth-century culture and on minstrelsy in particular. And there was a certain sense in which the ability to occupy blackness was considered transgressive or as a way of refashioning whiteness, and there were all these radical claims that were being made for it." And I thought, "Oh, no, this is just an extension of the master's prerogative." It doesn't matter whether you do good or you do bad, the crux is that you can choose to do what you wish with the black body. That's why thinking about the dynamics of enjoyment in terms of the material relations of slavery was so key for me. E W. —Yes, that's clarifying. A body that you can do what you want with. In your discussion of the body as the property of enjoyment, what I really like is when you talk about Rankin. Here's a guy —like the prototypical twentieth-century white progressive — who's anti-slavery and uses his powers of observation to write for its abolition, even to his slave-owning brother. He's in the South, he's looking at a slave coffle, and he imagines that these slaves being beaten could be himself and his family. Through this process it makes sense to him, it becomes meaningful. His body and his family members' white bodies become proxies for real enslaved black bodies and, as you point out, the actual object of identification, the slave, disappears. S.V.H. — I think that gets at one of the fundamental ethical ques-tions/problems/crises for the West: the status of difference and the status of the other. It's as though in order to come to any recognition of common humanity, the other must be assimilated, meaning in this case, utterly displaced and effaced: "Only if I can see myself in that position can I understand the crisis of that position." That is the logic of the moral and political discourses we see everyday —the need for the innocent black subject to be victimized by a racist state in order to see the racism of the racist state. You have to be exemplary in your goodness, as opposed to . . . F. W. — [laughter] A nigga on the warpath! S.V.H.— Exactly! For me it was those moments that were the most telling — the moments of the sympathetic ally, who in some ways is actually no more able to see the slave than the person who is exploiting him or her as their property. That is the work Rankin does and I think it suggests just how ubiquitous that kind of vio-lence, in fact, is. F.W. — You've just thrown something into crisis, which is very much on the table today: the notion of allies. What you've said (and I'm so happy that someone has come along to say it!) is that the ally is not a stable category. There's a structural prohibition (rather than merely a willful refusal) against whites being the allies of blacks, due to this — to borrow from Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth again — "species" division between what it means to be a subject and what it means to be an object: a structural antagonism. But everything in the academy on race works off of the question, "How do we help white allies?" Black academics assume that there is enough of a structural commonality between the black and the white (working class) position — their mantra being: "We are both exploited subjects" — for one to embark upon a political ped-agogy that will somehow help whites become aware of this "com-monality." White writers posit the presence of something they call "white skin privilege," and the possibility of "giving that up," as their gesture of being in solidarity with blacks. But what both ges-tures disavow is that subjects just can't make common cause with objects. They can only become objects, say in the case of John Brown or Marilyn Buck, or further instantiate their subjectivity through modalities of violence (lynching and the prison industrial complex), or through modalities of empathy. In other words, the essential essence of the white/black relation is that of the master/slave — regardless of its historical or geographic specificity. And masters and slaves, even today, are never allies.

#### The permutation works through the fungibility of the slave body and the ruse of analogy—there is no way of incorporating Blackness into a civil society or state founded on its constitutive negation.

Pak 2012 (Yumi, PhD in literature from UC-San Diego, “Outside Relationality: Autobiographical Deformations and the Literary Lineage of Afro-pessimism in 20th and 21st Century African American Literature,” Dissertation through Proquest)

I turn here to Hartman’s work in African American cultural studies, wherein she problematizes the notion of empathy as a useful or neutral structure of feeling. In Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America, Hartman recounts John Rankin’s letter to his brother, where he describes how deeply moved he was after witnessing a slave coffle. He writes that his imagination forces him to believe, “‘for the moment, that I myself was a slave, and with my wife and children placed under the reign of terror. I began in reality to feel for myself, my wife, and my children’” (Scenes of Subjection 18, emphasis mine). This notation of beginning to “feel,” where the feeling supplants “reality,” is the point of Hartman’s contention and my intervention. As she writes, “in making the slave’s suffering his own, Rankin begins to feel for himself rather than for those whom this exercise in imagination presumably is designed to read.” Or, in other words, “the ease of Rankin’s empathic identification is as much due to his good intentions and heartfelt opposition to slavery as to the fungibility of the captive body” (19). Rankin can feel black because blackness is fungible: blackness is simultaneously tradable and replaceable. This is precisely what Wilderson critiques as the “ruse of analogy.” He writes that this ruse “erroneously locates Blacks in the world – a place where they have not been since the dawning of Blackness,” and continues that this attempt at “analogy is not only a mystification, and often erasure, of Blackness’s grammar of suffering” (Red, White & Black 37). In other words, Rankin is able to feel for himself, his wife and his children precisely because the slave is erased in that feeling. He reads himself as analogous to the slave as a means of understanding his subject status when that analogy misreads and misplaces blackness. I contend Himes is making the same argument: by creating a figure that critically displaces the idea of a “shared humanity,” by making Jimmy white, he negates an identificatory practice which grounds itself on an eventual recognition of subjectivity, or an insertion into civil society. Hence, Himes voids the novel of blackness (except for the most periphery figures) precisely because blackness is constituted through the absence of relationality itself. Furthermore, I posit that Jimmy’s whiteness is symptomatic of Afro-pessimism via the quandary David Marriott poses in his scholarship, where he challenges us to question “how we can understand black identity when, through an act of mimetic desire, this identity already gets constructed as white” (Haunted Life 208). Marriott re-reads Fanon’s seminal encounter with a young white boy in Black Skin, White Masks, and an anecdote of a little black girl attempting to scrub herself clean of racial markings, not as encounters of interpellation, but as intensely fraught moments of violent phobic recognition of the self as something hateful and hated. Marriott states, “[i]n these two scenes a suppressed but noticeable anger and confusion arises in response to the intruding other” (the other being the little white child for Fanon, and her own image for the little girl) and that this response has “to do with the realization that the other, as racial imago, has already occupied and split the subject’s ego” (210).49 It is not that blackness is set in Hegelian opposition to whiteness as the O/other, but rather that blackness is dependent on whiteness always already having been present. In other words, blackness is not “something missing,” but rather “the addition of something undesirable and dirty that fragments the body by destroying all positive semblances of the self.” This “addition” of blackness results in “the self’s desire to hurt the imago of the body in a passionate bid to escape it” (210). In this reading of Fanon, Marriott offers his contribution to the field of Afro-pessimism: even on a psychic level, within the discourse of self and ontology, blackness is null and void. The black body is occupied by a white unconscious, one that loves his/herself as white, and hates his/herself as black.50 As Marriott writes in the introduction to On Black Men, “[t]he black man is, in other words, everything that the wishful-shameful fantasies of culture want him to be, an enigma of inversion and of hate – and this is our existence as men, as black men” (On Black Men x). themselves,” that indeed, “this prototypical identification with whiteness” is “a foundational culture and tradition which can be neither avoided nor eluded” (55 – 56). The absence of a black interiority is also addressed by Kevin Bell as he examines the 1953 meeting between Himes, Richard Wright and James Baldwin at Les Deux Magots in Paris. Bell writes that many of Himes’s literary contemporaries, including Wright and Baldwin, are mostly invested in “sonorities, colors, and movements that... constitute little more than added flavorings, punctuations and accents by which to augment an already- established, normative ‘white’ interiority” (“Assuming” 853). This is in contrast to Himes, who waylays coherence and a structured black subjectivity for the “suffocating thickness of a crazy, wild-eyed feeling” which is the discord always present in the black unconscious, or the realization that one has always been, and will always be, at war with oneself (856). Jimmy thinks that “he could see his mind standing just beyond his reach, like a white, weightless skeleton” (Yesterday 52). His mind is not his to grasp, always “just beyond his reach,” and is imagined as a white figure of death. It is impossible to incorporate Jimmy and his mind in much the same way as it is impossible to bring blackness into relationality, or to enfold him within civil society. To do so would lead to the logical unfolding present in Wilderson’s work, and one which Himes’ articulates forty years earlier during an interview: “[t]he black man can destroy America completely, destroy it as a nation of any consequence. It can just fritter away in the world. It can be destroyed completely” (“My Man Himes” 46). In other words, to make blackness relational is to lead to the incoherence and dismantling of civil society as it currently stands.

#### The affirmative neatly packages black resistance through various logics of Whiteness, like political participation and market rights, ensuring co-option and closing off the radical ethical possibilities of authentic abolitionism.

Hoescht 2008 (Heidi, PhD in Literature from UCSD, “Refusable Pasts: Speculative Democracy, Spectator Citizens, and the Dislocation of Freedom in the United States,” Proquest Dissertations)

Slavery is the other side of this coin. As with negotiations with indigenous people, the fundamental dependence by the oppressors on the oppressed conditioned the severe inequality in the south. Speculative exchange and exploitation of human chattel also created openings for rebellion and resistance. Interregional connections created by the domestic U.S. slave trade enabled unpredictable circuits of rumor through which enslaved African Americans imagined and communicated. The violence and indignity of slavery made it necessary for enslaved people to communicate inventively. Rebellions by Nat Turner and others put pressure on slave owners, investors, bankers, and complicit governments to justify the dehumanizing practice of marking people with a price. Black abolitionists like David Walker, Sojourner Truth, Martin Delany, Frederick Douglass and many others, staged powerful struggles against Southern Slavery. In their related efforts to desegregate the Jim Crow North, they also imagined and created black networks of freedom to escape from pervasive white violence. This freedom was built from black institutions, and was committed to black survival, subsistence, resistance, affirmation, and education. It did not necessarily depend on liberal precepts about law or market participation. Black people's efforts to design and demand self-determination and freedom, however, also produced a class of speakers, organizers, and writers who fit the needs of the white abolitionist movement. The promises of freedom white abolitionists offered were also committed to "restoring" democratic ideals, but by preserving the property interests of white nationalists."' The sentimental cultures of abolitionists emphasized the humanity of slaves in a way that actually upheld plantation fantasies and protected white privilege even while advocating the end of slavery. The struggles over freedom that speculative networks enabled also produced struggles over personhood that white nationalists endeavored to manage. The freedoms African Americans and Native Americans dreamed and struggled to retain during the Jacksonian period are not necessarily reflected in the promises they secured." Liberal translation from human rights to property rights is the recurring pattern in the emancipatory movements that speculative climates make possible. The broad social movements for labor unionization and against fascism and lynching during the 1930s cultural front period brought plebian artists and intellectuals together to imagine U.S. culture across ethnic divisions. As Michael Denning has shown in his deservedly influential text, the egalitarian social movements at the center of The Cultural Front drew on popular cultural history to create multi-ethnic alliances and renewed calls for democratic pluralism. The international movement of the Popular Front provided a social foundation for imagining democracy as a joint project waged through labor solidarities. The emphasis on culture as a force that brought different groups together also gave rise to the American Studies movement, restoring intellectual faith in promises many had imagined had been irreparably corrupted by the market. Yet as I argue at length in the opening chapters of this project, the conditions of inclusion through cultural conformity to liberal ideals in the democratic project of the cultural front reproduced the terms of exclusion that refuse alternative imaginaries for freedom. The national project that emerged during the cultural front period elucidates how speculative logics extend beyond economic practices in the United States. Scholarship in this period obscured the social, political, and cultural mechanisms of speculation by refusing to recognize the actual economic conditions of the past in their reflections about the Jacksonian period for the "Lincoln Republic."

### AT: Intersectionality

#### Foregrounding interlocking oppressions in a chain of equivalence denies the structuring force of anti-blackness – that dooms solvency of the aff and perm

Sexton ’10 [Jared, associate professor of African American studies and film and media studies at the University of California, Irvine, “People-of-Color-Blindness”, Social Text 2010 Volume 28, Number 2 103: 31-56]

If the oppression of nonblack people of color in, and perhaps beyond, the United States seems conditional to the historic instance and functions at a more restricted empirical scope, antiblackness seems invariant and limitless (which does not mean that the former is somehow negligible and short-lived or that the latter is exhaustive and unchanging). If pursued with some consistency, the sort of comparative analysis outlined above would likely impact the formulation of political strategy and modify the demeanor of our political culture. In fact, it might denature the comparative instinct altogether in favor of a relational analysis more adequate to the task. Yet all of this is obviated by the silencing mechanism par excellence in Left political and intellectual circles today: “Don’t play Oppression Olympics!” The Oppression Olympics dogma levels a charge amounting to little more than a leftist version of “playing the race card.” To fuss with details of comparative (or relational) analysis is to play into the hands of divide-and-conquer tactics and to promote a callous immorality. 72 However, as in its conservative complement, one notes in this catchphrase the unwarranted translation of an inquiring position of comparison into an insidious posture of competition, the translation of ethical critique into unethical attack. This point allows us to understand better the intimate relationship between the censure of black inquiry and the recurrent analogizing to black suffering mentioned above: they bear a common refusal to admit to significant dif ferences of structural position born of discrepant histories between blacks and their political allies, actual or potential. We might, finally, name this refusal people-of-color-blindness, a form of colorblindness inherent to the concept of “people of color” to the precise extent that it misunderstands the specificity of antiblackness and presumes or insists upon the monolithic character of victimization under white supremacy 73 —thinking (the afterlife of) slavery as a form of exploitation or colonization or a species of racial oppression among others. 74 The upshot of this predicament is that obscuring the structural position of the category of blackness will inevitably undermine multiracial coalition building as a politics of radical opposition and, to that extent, force the question of black liberation back to the center of discussion. Every analysis that attempts to understand the complexities of racial rule and the machinations of the racial state without accounting for black existence within its framework—which does not mean simply listing it among a chain of equivalents or returning to it as an afterthought—is doomed to miss what is essential about the situation. Black existence does not represent the total reality of the racial formation—it is not the beginning and the end of the story—but it does relate to the totality; it indicates the (repressed) truth of the political and economic system. That is to say, the whole range of positions within the racial formation is most fully understood from this vantage point, not unlike the way in which the range of gender and sexual variance under patriarchal and heteronormative regimes is most fully understood through lenses that are feminist and queer. 75 What is lost for the study of black existence in the proposal for a decentered, “postblack” paradigm is a proper analysis of the true scale and nature of black suffering and of the struggles—political, aesthetic, intellectual, and so on—that have sought to transform and undo it. What is lost for the study of nonblack nonwhite existence is a proper analysis of the true scale and nature of its material and symbolic power relative to the category of blackness. 76 This is why every attempt to defend the rights and liberties of the latest victims of state repression will fail to make substantial gains insofar as it forfeits or sidelines the fate of blacks, the prototypical targets of the panoply of police practices and the juridical infrastructure built up around them. Without blacks on board, the only viable political option and the only effective defense against the intensifying cross fire will involve greater alliance with an antiblack civil society and further capitulation to the magnification of state power. At the apex of the midcentury social movements, Kwame Ture and Charles Hamilton wrote in their 1968 classic, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation, that black freedom entails “the necessarily total revamping of the society.” 77 For Hartman, thinking of the entanglements of the African diaspora in this context, the necessarily total revamping of the society is more appropriately envisioned as the creation of an entirely new world: I knew that no matter how far from home I traveled, I would never be able to leave my past behind. I would never be able to imagine being the kind of person who had not been made and marked by slavery. I was black and a history of terror had produced that identity. Terror was “captivity without the possibility of flight,” inescapable violence, precarious life. There was no going back to a time or place before slavery, and going beyond it no doubt would entail nothing less momentous than yet another revolution. 78

### AT: Framework – Fairness

#### Standards of fairness and objectivity are smokescreens for the powerful to maintain their privilege and the moral high ground

Delgado 1992 (Richard, Professor at Seattle University School of Law, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power,” 77 CNLLR 813)

We have cleverly built power's view of the appropriate standard of conduct into the very term fair. [FN41] Thus, the stronger party is able to have his way and see himself as principled at the same time. [FN42] Imagine, for example, a man's likely reaction to the suggestion that subjective considerations-a woman's mood, her sense of pressure or intimidation, how she felt about the man, her unexpressed fear of reprisals if she did not go ahead [FN43]-ought to play a part in determining whether the man is guilty of rape. Most men find this suggestion offensive; it requires them to do something they are not accustomed to doing. “Why,” they say, “I'd have to be a mind reader before I could have sex with anybody!” [FN44] “Who knows, anyway, what internal inhibitions the woman might have been harboring?” And “what if the woman simply changed her mind later and charged me with rape?” [FN45] What we never notice is that women can “read” men's minds perfectly well. The male perspective is right out there in the world, plain as day, inscribed in culture, song, and myth-in all the prevailing narratives. [FN46] These narratives tell us that men want and are entitled\*820 to sex, that it is a prime function of women to give it to them, [FN47] and that unless something unusual happens, the act of sex is ordinary and blameless. [FN48] We believe these things because that is the way we have constructed women, men, and “normal” sexual intercourse. [FN49] Notice what the objective standard renders irrelevant: a downcast look; [FN50] ambivalence; [FN51] the question, “Do you really think we should?”; slowness in following the man's lead; [FN52] a reputation for sexual selectivity; [FN53] virginity; youth; and innocence. [FN54] Indeed, only a loud firm “no” counts, and probably only if it is repeated several times, overheard by others, and accompanied by forceful body language such as pushing the man and walking away briskly. [FN55] Yet society and law accept only this latter message (or something like it), and not the former, more nuanced ones, to mean refusal. Why? The “objective” approach is not inherently better or more fair. Rather, it is accepted because it embodies the sense of the stronger party, who centuries ago found himself in a position to dictate what permission meant. [FN56] Allowing ourselves to be drawn into reflexive, predictable arguments about administrability, fairness, stability, and ease of determination points us away from what \*821 really counts: the way in which stronger parties have managed to inscribe their views and interests into “external” culture, so that we are now enamored with that way of judging action. [FN57] First, we read our values and preferences into the culture; [FN58] then we pretend to consult that culture meekly and humbly in order to judge our own acts. [FN59] A nice trick if you can get away with it.

### AT: Framework/Cede the Political

#### Framework aspires to the management of blackness through seemingly neutral and objective transportation planning

Fonza 2010 (Annalise, PhD in Regional Planning from UMass-Amherst, “TROUBLING CITY PLANNING DISCOURSES: A WOMANIST ANALYSIS OF URBAN RENEWAL AND SOCIAL PLANNING IN SPRINGFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS, 1960-1980,” Proquest dissertation)

Various scholars assert that whiteness thrives as an ideological construct via the creation of a buffer class of middle stratum agents who will do what is necessary to gain and keep the socio-economic benefits or privileges that they gain from those situated at the top of the social hierarchy (Allen 1994; Allen 1997; Stokes 2001; Buck, Pem Davidson 2001). This assertion is critical to understanding how whiteness, as an epistemological framework, is reasserted or reinvented by an invisible, white homosocial or homopolitical network (Stokes 2001). In The Color of Sex: Whiteness, Heterosexuality, and the Fictions of White Supremacy, Mason Stokes describes a white homosocial network as an invisible network of white men that has the power to organize and control others, including men and women, as intermediaries to act on behalf of the network (Stokes 2001).9 In volume one of The Invention of the White Race: Racial Oppression and Social Control, Theodore W. Allen illustrates how, from the thirteenth to the nineteenth century, the British used an intermediate class strata-system to dominate and control those who lived on the Irish plantation of Ulster (Allen 1994). The intermediate class of agents acts as a buffer between the white homosocial network and the so-called lower classes of persons, who are not a part of the middle stratum of society due to a number of systemic or structural factors such as capitalism, sexism, classism, racism, etc. As long as the homosocial network is not structurally challenged, disrupted or exposed, those within the buffer class are eligible to gain the privileges or benefits that are granted by those at top of the social hierarchy. It is imperative that planning scholars become conscious of how whiteness is perpetuated by the creation of a middle stratum or middle class of intermediaries because the professional planner is often in the intermediary position where she or he must articulate the interests of someone who is part of a white homosocial network. As agents of these white homosocial or homopolitical networks, it is essential that planners realize the extent to which they and all westernized professionals can be agents of whiteness.

#### Transportation policy can’t be evaluated in a vacuum – only broader ideological analysis can overcome transportation inequity

Konrad ’09 [Miriam, PhD in sociology from Georgia State University, “Transporting Atlanta”, State Universty of New York Press, Albany, 2009, p. 4-5]

Efforts to rectify the myriad problems associated with this impasse have for too long focused on individual pieces of the puzzle and behavior modification with little attention to the ideological framework that undergirds the entire system. For example, growth-oriented policies (and the political actors associated with them) look to ever more roads to alleviate the traffic congestion. Those with a "greener" orientation seek greater walkability, bik­ability, and more public transit options to address the needs of both those who must move about and the space in which they move. Citizens concerned primarily with issues of equity organize their efforts around policies that will increase the mobility of marginalized members of society, reminding us that, "solutions guided by a tendency which ignores that fact of inequality will inevitably place the greatest burdens of adjustment on those least able to carry them" (Irrante 1980:516). While all of these actors are in pursuit of relief for pains arising from the same source, their proposed solutions can at best be palliative and never curative because they attend to symptoms rather than the disease. To further complicate matters, groups of people with the above-men­tioned primary interests often find themselves at loggerheads with one another, either in overt conflict (as with the growth and equity groups); in an uneasy and volatile game of concessions and compromises (as with the green and growth groups); or in a strange and often confoundingly strained relation­ship in which ostensibly compatible goals clash despite the best intentions of the parties involved (as with the equity and green groups). The tensions arising from the open enmity in some instances, the veiled friction between interests in others, and the unsettled alliances created in still others could perhaps be eased if all parties had a more profound understanding of the foundations on which their assumptions about mobility are predicated. Getting at what lies beneath the asphalt, as it were, will shed light on its seemingly unstoppable space, energy, and money consumption and perhaps allow for future decision making that includes a more nuanced reading of the landscape. This exploration will therefore include, but not be limited to, a cataloguing of the components of policy formulation as commonly understood: the agenda-setting process, the actors invited to the table, and the outcomes. It will further be an examination of what precedes all of this; the taken for granted assumptions about the meanings and possibilities of mobility. For example, all researchers are aware that what questions we bring to a study in part determine the answers. This is no less true with how transportation policy is created. In terms of equity issues, for instance: How transportation is defined and measured can often determine how equity is evaluated. The use of vehicle mileage, as a measure of travel and traffic congestion, tends to favor more spending on infrastructure improvements and less on other transportation alternatives. Also, transportation planners use other variables in their transportation modeling such as vehicle miles traveled, which favors people who drive their automobile more miles than average, or passenger miles traveled, which favors people who travel more than average (Bullard et al 2000:68). If mobility is defined and hierarchically structured in such a way as to marginalize some modes, and even preclude others, we would do well to identify how that construction came into being. As with any social problem, seeking a way out must begin with understanding how we arrived there in the first place.

### AT: Framework

#### Their framework enacts and comes from a view from nowhere that obscures embodiment and makes Whiteness invisible

Yancy ‘5 [George, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University and Coordinator of the Critical Race Theory Speaker Series, “Whiteness and the Return of the Black Body”, The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 19.4 (2005) 215-241, Muse]

I write out of a personal existential context. This context is a profound source of knowledge connected to my "raced" body. Hence, I write from a place of lived embodied experience, a site of exposure. In philosophy, the only thing that we are taught to "expose" is a weak argument, a fallacy, or someone's "inferior" reasoning power. The embodied self is bracketed and deemed irrelevant to theory, superfluous and cumbersome in one's search for truth. It is best, or so we are told, to reason from nowhere. Hence, the white philosopher/author presumes to speak for all of "us" without the slightest mention of his or her "raced" identity. Self-consciously writing as a white male philosopher, Crispin Sartwell observes: Left to my own devices, I disappear as an author. That is the "whiteness" of my authorship. This whiteness of authorship is, for us, a form of authority; to speak (apparently) from nowhere, for everyone, is empowering, though one wields power here only by becoming lost to oneself. But such an authorship and authority is also pleasurable: it yields the pleasure of self-forgetting or [End Page 215] apparent transcendence of the mundane and the particular, and the pleasure of power expressed in the "comprehension" of a range of materials. (1998, 6) To theorize the Black body one must "turn to the [Black] body as the radix for interpreting racial experience" (Johnson [1993, 600]).1 It is important to note that this particular strategy also functions as a lens through which to theorize and critique whiteness; for the Black body's "racial" experience is fundamentally linked to the oppressive modalities of the "raced" white body. However, there is no denying that my own "racial" experiences or the social performances of whiteness can become objects of critical reflection. In this paper, my objective is to describe and theorize situations where the Black body's subjectivity, its lived reality, is reduced to instantiations of the white imaginary, resulting in what I refer to as "the phenomenological return of the Black body."2 These instantiations are embedded within and evolve out of the complex social and historical interstices of whites' efforts at self-construction through complex acts of erasure vis-à-vis Black people. These acts of self-construction, however, are myths/ideological constructions predicated upon maintaining white power. As James Snead has noted, "Mythification is the replacement of history with a surrogate ideology of [white] elevation or [Black] demotion along a scale of human value" (Snead 1994, 4). How I understand and theorize the body relates to the fact that the body—in this case, the Black body—is capable of undergoing a sociohistorical process of "phenomenological return" vis-à-vis white embodiment. The body's meaning—whether phenotypically white or black—its ontology, its modalities of aesthetic performance, its comportment, its "raciated" reproduction, is in constant contestation. The hermeneutics of the body, how it is understood, how it is "seen," its "truth," is partly the result of a profound historical, ideological construction. "The body" is positioned by historical practices and discourses. The body is codified as this or that in terms of meanings that are sanctioned, scripted, and constituted through processes of negotiation that are embedded within and serve various ideological interests that are grounded within further power-laden social processes. The historical plasticity of the body, the fact that it is a site of contested meanings, speaks to the historicity of its "being" as lived and meant within the interstices of social semiotics. Hence: a) the body is less of a thing/being than a shifting/changing historical meaning that is subject to cultural configuration/reconfiguration. The point here is to interrogate the "Black body" as a "fixed and material truth" that preexists "its relations with the world and with others"3 ; b) the body's meaning is fundamentally symbolic (McDowell 2001, 301), and its meaning is congealed through symbolic repetition and iteration that emits certain signs and presupposes certain norms; and, c) the body is a battlefield, one that is fought over again and again across particular historical moments and within particular social spaces. "In other words, the concept of the body provides only the illusion of self-evidence, facticity, 'thereness' for something [End Page 216] fundamentally ephemeral, imaginary, something made in the image of particular social groups" (301). On this score, it is not only the "Black body" that defies the ontic fixity projected upon it through the white gaze, and, hence, through the episteme of whiteness, but the white body is also fundamentally symbolic, requiring demystification of its status as norm, the paragon of beauty, order, innocence, purity, restraint, and nobility. In other words, given the three suppositions above, both the "Black body" and the "white body" lend themselves to processes of interpretive fracture and to strategies of interrogating and removing the veneer of their alleged objectivity. To have one's dark body invaded by the white gaze and then to have that body returned as distorted is a powerful experience of violation. The experience presupposes an anti-Black lived context, a context within which whiteness gets reproduced and the white body as norm is reinscribed.The late writer, actor, and activist Ossie Davis recalls that at the age of six or seven two white police officers told him to get into their car. They took him down to the precinct. They kept him there for an hour, laughing at him and eventually pouring cane syrup over his head. This only created the opportunity for more laughter, as they looked upon the "silly" little Black boy. If he was able to articulate his feelings at that moment, think of how the young Davis was returned to himself: "I am an object of white laughter, a buffoon." The young Davis no doubt appeared to the white police officers in ways that they had approved. They set the stage, created a site of Black buffoonery, and enjoyed their sadistic pleasure without blinking an eye. Sartwell notes that "the [white] oppressor seeks to constrain the oppressed [Blacks] to certain approved modes of visibility (those set out in the template of stereotype) and then gazes obsessively on the spectacle he has created" (1998, 11). Davis notes that he "went along with the game of black emasculation, it seemed to come naturally" (Marable 2000, 9). After that, "the ritual was complete" (9). He was then sent home with some peanut brittle to eat. Davis knew at that early age, even without the words to articulate what he felt, that he had been violated. He refers to the entire ritual as the process of "niggerization." He notes: The culture had already told me what this was and what my reaction to this should be: not to be surprised; to expect it; to accommodate it; to live with it. I didn't know how deeply I was scarred or affected by that, but it was a part of who I was. (9) Davis, in other words, was made to feel that he had to accept who he was, that "niggerized" little Black boy, an insignificant plaything within a system of ontological racial differences. This, however, is the trick of white ideology; it is to give the appearance of fixity, where the "look of the white subject interpellates the black subject as inferior, which, in turn, bars the black subject from seeing him/herself without the internalization of the white gaze" (Weheliye 2005, 42). On this score, it is white bodies that are deemed agential. They configure "passive" [End Page 217] Black bodies according to their will. But it is no mystery; for "the Negro is interpreted in the terms of the white man. White-man psychology is applied and it is no wonder that the result often shows the Negro in a ludicrous light" (Braithwaite 1992, 36). While walking across the street, I have endured the sounds of car doors locking as whites secure themselves from the "outside world," a trope rendering my Black body ostracized, different, unbelonging. This outside world constitutes a space, a field, where certain Black bodies are relegated. They are rejected, because they are deemed suspicious, vile infestations of the (white) social body. The locks on the doors resound: Click. Click. Click. Click. Click. Click. ClickClickClickClickClickClickClick! Of course, the clicking sounds are always already accompanied by nervous gestures, and eyes that want to look, but are hesitant to do so. The cumulative impact of the sounds is deafening, maddening in their distorted repetition. The clicks begin to function as coded sounds, reminding me that I am dangerous; the sounds create boundaries, separating the white civilized from the dark savage, even as I comport myself to the contrary. The clicking sounds mark me, they inscribe me, they materialize my presence in ways that belie my intentions. Unable to stop the clicking, unable to establish a form of recognition that creates a space of trust and liminality, there are times when one wants to become their fantasy, to become their Black monster, their bogeyman, to pull open the car door: "Surprise. You've just been carjacked by a ghost, a fantasy of your own creation. Now, get the fuck out of the car." I have endured white women clutching their purses or walking across the street as they catch a glimpse of my approaching Black body. It is during such moments that my body is given back to me in a ludicrous light, where I live the meaning of my body as confiscated. Davis too had the meaning of his young Black body stolen. The surpluses being gained by the whites in each case are not economic. Rather, it is through existential exploitation that the surpluses extracted can be said to be ontological—"semblances of determined presence, of full positivity, to provide a sense of secure being" (Henry 1997, 33). When I was about seventeen or eighteen, my white math teacher initiated such an invasion, pulling it off with complete calm and presumably self-transparency. Given the historical construction of whiteness as the norm, his own "raced" subject position was rendered invisible. After all, he lived in the real world, the world of the serious man, where values are believed anterior to their existential founding. As I recall, we were discussing my plans for the future. I told him that I wanted to be a pilot. I was earnest about this choice, spending a great deal of time reading about the requirements involved in becoming a pilot, how one would have to accumulate a certain number of flying hours. I also read about the dynamics of lift and drag that affect a plane in flight. After no doubt taking note of my firm commitment, he looked at me and implied that I should be realistic (a code word for realize that I am Black) about my goals. He said that I should become a carpenter or a bricklayer. I was exposing myself, telling a trusted teacher what I wanted to be, and he returned me to myself as something [End Page 218] that I did not recognize. I had no intentions of being a carpenter or a bricklayer (or a janitor or elevator operator for that matter). The situation, though, is more complex. It is not that he simply returned me to myself as a carpenter or a bricklayer when all along I had this image of myself as a pilot. Rather, he returned me to myself as a fixed entity, a "niggerized" Black body whose epidermal logic had already foreclosed the possibility of being anything other than what was befitting its lowly station. He was the voice of a larger anti-Black racist society that "whispers mixed messages in our ears" (Marable 2000, 9), the ears of Black people who struggle to think of themselves as a possibility. He mentioned that there were only a few Black pilots and that I should be more realistic. (One can only imagine what his response would have been had I said that I wanted to be a philosopher, particularly given the statistic that Black philosophers constitute about 1.1% of philosophers in the United States). Keep in mind that this event did not occur in the 1930s or 1940s, but around 1979. The message was clear. Because I was Black, I had to settle for an occupation suitable for my Black body,4 unlike the white body that would no doubt have been encouraged to become a pilot. As with Davis, having one's Black body returned as a source of impossibility, one begins to think, to feel, to emote: "Am I a nigger?" The internalization of the white gaze creates a doubleness within the psyche of the Black, leading to a destructive process of superfluous self-surveillance and self-interrogation. This was indeed a time when I felt ontologically locked into my body. My body was indelibly marked with this stain of darkness. After all, he was the white mind, the mathematical mind, calculating my future by factoring in my Blackness. He did not "see" me, though. Like Ellison's invisible man, I occupied that paradoxical status of "visible invisibility." Within this dyadic space, my Black body phenomenologically returned to me as inferior. To describe the phenomenological return of the Black body is to disclose how it is returned as an appearance to consciousness, my consciousness. The (negatively) "raced" manner in which my body underwent a phenomenological return, however, presupposes a thick social reality that has always already been structured by the ideology and history of whiteness. More specifically, when my body is returned to me, the white body has already been constituted over centuries as the norm, both in European and Anglo-American culture, and at several discursive levels from science to philosophy to religion. In the case of my math teacher, his whiteness was invisible to him as my Blackness was hyper-visible to both of us. Of course, his invisibility to his own normative here is a function of my hyper-visibility. It is important to keep in mind that white Americans, more generally, define themselves around the "gravitational pull," as it were, of the Black.5 The not of white America is the Black of white America. This not is essential, as is the invisibility of the negative relation through which whites are constituted. All of embodied beings have their own "here." My white math teacher's racist social performances (for example, his "advice" to me), within the context of a [End Page 219] white racist historical imaginary and asymmetric power relations, suspends and effectively disqualifies my embodied here. What was the message communicated? Expressing my desire to be, to take advantage of the opportunities for which Black bodies had died in order to secure, my ambition "was flung back in my face like a slap" (Fanon 1967, 114). Fanon writes: The white world, the only honorable one, barred me from all participation. A man was expected to behave like a man. I was expected to behave like a black man—or at least like a nigger. I shouted a greeting to the world and the world slashed away my joy. I was told to stay within bounds, to go back where I belonged. (114–15) According to philosopher Bettina Bergo, drawing from the thought of Emmanuel Levinas, "perception and discourse—what we see and the symbols and meanings of our social imaginaries—prove inextricably the one from the other" (2005, 131). Hence, the white math teacher's perception, what he "saw," was inextricably linked to social meanings and semiotic constructions and constrictions that opened up a "field of appearances" regarding my dark body. There is nothing passive about the white gaze. There are racist sociohistorical and epistemic conditions of emergence that construct not only the Black body, but the white body as well. So, what is "seen" when the white gaze "sees" "my body" and it becomes something alien to me?

### AT: Totalization/Essentialism

#### Only an unflinching and paradigmatic analysis of Blackness can overturn the American paradigm – it’s their burden to prove that Blackness is anything but an ontological void

Wilderson 2010 (Frank, Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the Structure of US Antagonisms, 10-11)

Regarding the Black position, some might ask why, after claims successfully made on the state by the Civil Rights Movement, do I insist on posting an operational analytic for cinema, film studies, and political theory that appears to be a dichotomous and essentialist pairing of Masters and Slaves? In other words, why should we think of today’s Blacks in the US as Slaves and everyone else (with the exception of Indians) as Masters? One could answer these questions by demonstrating how nothing remotely approaching “claims successfully made on the State” have come to pass. But that would lead us in the wrong direction; we would find ourselves on “solid” ground, which would only mystify, rather than clarify, the question. We would be forced to appeal to “facts,” the “historical record,” and empirical markers of stasis and change, all of which could be turned on their head with more of the same. Underlying such a downward spiral into sociology, political science, history, and/or public policy debates would be the very rubric that I am calling into question: the grammar of suffering known as exploitation and alienation, the assumptive logic whereby subjective dispossession is arrived at in the calculations between those who sell labor power and those who acquire it. The Black qua the worker. Orlando Patterson has already dispelled this faulty ontological grammar in Slavery and Social Death, where he demonstrates how and why work, or forced labor, is not a constituent element of slavery. Once the “solid” plank of “work” is removed from slavery, then the conceptually coherent notion of “claims against the state”—the proposition that the state and civil society are elastic enough to even contemplate the possibility of an emancipatory project for the Black position—disintegrates into thin air. The imaginary of the state and civil society is parasitic on the Middle Passage. Put another way: no slave, no world. And, in addition, as Patterson argues, no slave is in the world. If, as an ontological position, that is, as a grammar of suffering, the Slave is not a laborer but an anti-Human, a positionality against which Humanity establishes, maintains, and renews it coherence, its corporeal integrity; if the Slave is, to borrow from Patterson, generally dishonored, perpetually open to gratuitous violence, and void of kinship structure, that is, having no relations that need be recognized, a being outside of relationality, then our analysis cannot be approached through the rubric of gains or reversals in struggles with the state and civil society, not unless and until the interlocutor first explains how the Slave is of the world. The onus is not on one who posits the Master/Slave dichotomy, but on one who argues there is a distinction between Slaveness and Blackness. How, when, and where did such a split occur? The woman at the gates of Columbia University awaits an answer.

### AT: Prag/Need Blueprint

#### The demand for political coherence and reformism obliterates the position of the slave – their integrationist optimism cannot take into account the gratuitous violence directed towards Blackness

Hartman and Wilderson ‘3 [Saidiya, professor of English and comparative literature and women's and gender studies at Columbia University, Frank, Associate Professor of African American Studies, Drama at UC Irvine, “THE POSITION OF THE UNTHOUGHT”, Qui Parle, Vol. 13, No. 2 Spring/Summer 2003, JSTOR]

What I mean, is that so often in black scholarship, people consciously or unconsciously peel away from the strength and the terror of their evidence in order to propose some kind of coherent, hopeful solution to things. Your book, in moving through these scenes of subjection as they take place in slavery, refuses to do that. And just as importantly, it does not allow the reader to think that there was a radical enough break to reposition the black body after Jubilee.' That is a tremendous and courageous move. And I think what's important about it, is that it corroborates the experience of ordinary black people today, and of strange black people like you and me in the academy [laughter]. But there's something else that the book does, and I want to talk about this at the level of methodology and analysis. If we think about the registers of subjectivity as being preconscious interest, unconscious identity or identifications, and positionality, then a lot of the work in the social sciences organizes itself around precon-scious interest; it assumes a subject of consent, and as you have said, a subject of exploitation, which you reposition as the subject of accumulation.2 Now when this sort of social science engages the issue of positionality — if and when it does — it assumes that it can do so in an un-raced manner. That's the best of the work. The worst of the work is a kind of multiculturalism that assumes we all have analogous identities that can be put into a basket of stories, and then that basket of stories can lead to similar interests. For me, what you've done in this book is to split the hair here. In other words, this is not a book that celebrates an essential Afrocentrism that could be captured by the multicultural discourse. And yet it's not a book that remains on the surface of preconscious interest, which so much history and social science does. Instead, it demands a radical racialization of any analysis of positionality. So. Why don't we talk about that? Saidiya V Hartman — Well! That's a lot, and a number of things come to mind. I think for me the book is about the problem of crafting a narrative for the slave as subject, and in terms of positionality, asking, "Who does that narrative enable?" That's where the whole issue of empathic identification is central for me. Because it just seems that every attempt to employ the slave in a narrative ultimately resulted in his or her obliteration, regardless of whether it was a leftist narrative of political agency — the slave stepping into someone else's shoes and then becoming a political agent — or whether it was about being able to unveil the slave's humanity by actually finding oneself in that position. In many ways, what I was trying to do as a cultural historian was to narrate a certain impossibility, to illuminate those practices that speak to the limits of most available narratives to explain the position of the enslaved. On one hand, the slave is the foundation of the national order, and, on the other, the slave occupies the position of the unthought. So what does it mean to try to bring that position into view without making it a locus of positive value, or without trying to fill in the void? So much of our political vocabu-lary/imaginary/desires have been implicitly integrationist even when we imagine our claims are more radical. This goes to the second part of the book — that ultimately the metanarrative thrust is always towards an integration into the national project, and partic-ularly when that project is in crisis, black people are called upon to affirm it. So certainly it's about more than the desire for inclusion with-in the limited set of possibilities that the national project provides. What then does this language — the given language of freedom —enable? And once you realize its limits and begin to see its inex-orable investment in certain notions of the subject and subjection, then that language of freedom no longer becomes that which res-cues the slave from his or her former condition, but the site of the re-elaboration of that condition, rather than its transformation. F. W. — This is one of the reasons why your book has been called "pessimistic" by Anita Patterson.' But it's interesting that she does-n't say what I said when we first started talking, that it's enabling. I'm assuming that she's white — I don't know, but it certainly sounds like it. S.V.H. — But I think there's a certain integrationist rights agenda that subjects who are variously positioned on the color line can take up. And that project is something I consider obscene: the attempt to make the narrative of defeat into an opportunity for cel-ebration, the desire to look at the ravages and the brutality of the last few centuries, but to still find a way to feel good about our-selves. That's not my project at all, though I think it's actually the project of a number of people. Unfortunately, the kind of social revisionist history undertaken by many leftists in the 1970s, who were trying to locate the agency of dominated groups, resulted in celebratory narratives of the oppressed.4 Ultimately, it bled into this celebration, as if there was a space you could carve out of the ter-rorizing state apparatus in order to exist outside its clutches and forge some autonomy. My project is a different one. And in partic-ular, one of my hidden polemics in the book was an argument against the notion of hegemony, and how that notion has been taken up in the context of looking at the status of the slave. F.W. — That's very interesting, because it's something I've been thinking about also in respect to Gramsci. Because Anne Showstack Sassoon suggests that Gramsci breaks down hegemony into three categories: influence, leadership, and consent.' Maybe we could bring the discussion back to your text then, using the examples of Harriet Jacobs,6 a slave, and John Rankin,' a white anti-slavery Northerner, as ways in which to talk about this. Now, what's really interesting is that in your chapter "Seduction and the Ruses of Power," you not only explain how the positionality of black women and white women differs, but you also suggest how blackness disarticulates the notion of consent, if we are to think of that notion as universal. You write: "[B]eing forced to submit to the will of the master in all things defines the predicament of slavery" (S, 110). In other words, the female slave is a possessed, accumulated, and fungible object, which is to say that she is ontologically different than a white woman who may, as a house servant or indentured laborer, be a subordinated subject. You go on to say, "The opportunity for nonconsent [as regards, in this case, sex] is required to establish consent, for consent is meaningless if refusal is not an option. . . . Consent is unseemly in a context in which the very notion of subjectivity is predicated upon the negation of will" (S, 111).

### AT: Class First

#### Racism is historically separate from capitalism but is crucial to its very operation and existence

Miles and Brown ‘3 [Robert and Malcolm, Robert Miles is the Director of Study Abroad and Professor of Sociology and International Studies at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Malcolm Brown is Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Exeter., “Racism (Key Ideas)”, British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data, pg. 117-118]

We regard racialisation and racism as historically specific and necessarily contradictory phenomena. Racism has appeared in a number of different forms, but it has a varying interaction with economic and political relations in capitalist and non-capitalist social formations. Racialisation and racism are not exclusive ‘products’ of capitalism but have origins in European societies prior to the development of the capitalist mode of production and have a history of expression within social formations dominated by non-capitalist modes of production in interaction with the capitalist mode. In other words, racism is an ideology with conditions of existence that are, at least in part, independent of the interests of the ruling class and the bourgeoisie within capitalist societies. To define racism as functional to capitalism is to presuppose the nature and outcome of its interaction with economic and political relations, and with other ideologies. Such a definition mistakenly assumes that a homogeneous ruling class inevitably and necessarily derives economic and/or political advantages from its expression. The use of racism to limit the size of the labour market is not necessarily in the interests of those employers experiencing a labour shortage, nor of those who require skilled labour, while racism and exclusionary practices that result in civil disturbance will not necessarily be welcomed by capitalists whose business activity has been disrupted as a result, or by the state that may need to increase expenditure to maintain social order. Hence, we analyse racism as a necessarily contradictory phenomenon. The expression of racism, and the subsequent structuring of political and economic relations, has a variety of temporally specific consequences for all those implicated in the process, and whether or not they are advantageous will depend upon class position and conjuncture. Racism is therefore a contradictory phenomenon because what is ‘functional’ for one set of interests may be ‘dysfunctional’ for another, and because the conditions that sustain its advantageous expression are rarely permanent, and changed circumstances may clash with the continued expression of racism. The effectivity of racism is therefore historically specific and hence knowable only as a result of historical analysis rather than abstract theorising. The objective of this chapter is to illustrate and elaborate these claims. Part of the explanation for this exclusionary practice lies in the fact that the majority of migrants, including those who considered themselves skilled in the context of relations of production in the Caribbean and the Asian subcontinent, had few skills relevant to an industrial capitalist economy (Wright 1968: 30–40). On this criterion, they were likely to be excluded from any form of skilled manual or non-manual employment. Additionally, racism was a determining factor. Some employers explained their exclusionary practices by reference to the anticipated or real opposition of their existing workforce to working with ‘coloureds’, opposition that they endorsed by acting in this manner. Others negatively stereotyped Asians as ‘slow to learn’, or African Caribbean people as lazy, unresponsive to discipline and truculent, or ‘coloured people’ generally as prone to accidents or requiring more supervision than ‘white’ workers (Wright 1968: 89–144). In all these instances, migrants were signified by skin colour and attributed collectively with negatively evaluated characteristics. Not all employers in Wright’s survey articulated such racist views, so unanimity should not be assumed. Nevertheless, the interrelationship between the racialisation of migrants, racism and exclusionary practice limited the parameters of the labour market open to migrants from the Caribbean and Asian subcontinent. Thus, while there existed a demand for an increase in the size of the British working class – which thereby stimulated migration – racism and associated exclusionary practices placed those migrants in, and largely restricted them to, semi- and unskilled manual working-class positions.

### AT: Whiteness(es) Turns/Too Radical

#### The rush to declare Whiteness as a positive and heterogeneous identity beyond structural oppression is the height of narcissism and the privileged reassertion of privilege—fragmenting whiteness as an ontological position absolves everyone for racialized violence

Ahmed 2004 (Sara, “Declarations of Whiteness: The Non-Performativity of Anti-Racism,” e-borderlands, 3.2)

Another risk is that in centering on whiteness, whiteness studies might become a discourse of love, which would sustain the narcissism that elevates whiteness into a social and bodily ideal. The reading of whiteness as a form of narcissism is of course well established. The ‘whiteness’ of academic disciplines, including philosophy and anthropology has been subject to devastating critiques (see, for examples, Mills 1998; Asad 1973). For example, a postcolonial critique of anthropology would argue that the anthropological desire to know the other functioned as a form of narcissism: the other functioned as a mirror, a device to reflect the anthropological gaze back to itself, showing the white face of anthropology in the very display of the colour of difference. So if disciplines are in a way already about whiteness, showing the face of the white subject, then it follows that whiteness studies sustains the direction or orientation of this gaze, whilst removing the ‘detour’ provided by the reflection of the other. Whiteness studies could even become a spectacle of pure self-reflection, augmented by an insistence that whiteness ‘is an identity too’. Does whiteness studies function as a narcissism in which the loved object returns us to the subject as the origin of love? We do after all get attached to our objects of study, which might mean that whiteness studies could ‘get stuck’ on whiteness, as that which ‘gives itself’ to itself. Dyer talks about this risk when he admits to another fear: ‘I dread to think that paying attention to whiteness might lead to white people saying they need to get in touch with their whiteness’ (1997, 10). Whiteness studies would here be about white people learning to love their own whiteness, by transforming it into an object that could be loved. 6. Dyer is right, I think, to feel such dread. Whiteness studies is potentially dreadful, and scholarship within the field is full of admissions of anxiety about what whiteness studies ‘could be’ if was allowed to become invested in itself, and its own reproduction. We should I think, pay attention to such critical anxieties, and ask what the enunciation of such anxieties is doing. In terms of the constitution of the field, for example, the anxiety is not so much that the borders will be invaded by inappropriate others (as with traditional disciplines), but that the borders will themselves be inappropriate. But at the same time, and somewhat paradoxically, the anxiety about borders works to install borders: whiteness becomes an object through the expression of anxiety about becoming an object. The repetition of the anxious gesture, that is, gestures toward a field. Fields can be understood, after all, as the forgetting of gestures that are repeated over time. Is there a relationship between the emergence of a field through the enunciation of anxiety and the emergence of a new form of whiteness, an anxious whiteness? Is a whiteness that is anxious about itself – its narcissism, its egoism, its privilege, its self-centeredness – better? What kind of whiteness is a whiteness that is anxious about itself? What does such an anxious whiteness do? 7. Such an anxious whiteness would be different to the ‘worrying’ whiteness that Ghassan Hage critiques in White Nation (1998) and Against Paranoid Nationalism (2003). This worrying whiteness is one that worries that ‘others’ may threaten its existence. An anxious whiteness would be one that is anxious about such worrying: this white subject would come into existence in its very anxiety about the effects it has on others, or even in fear that it is taking something away from others. This white subject might even be anxious about its own tendency to worry about the proximity of others. So let’s repeat my question: is an anxious whiteness that declares its own anxiety about its worry better, where better might even evoke the promise of "non-racism" or "anti-racism? 8. Before posing this question through an analysis of the effects of how whiteness becomes declared, we could first point to the placing of ‘critical’ before ‘whiteness studies’, as a sign of this anxiety. I am myself very attached to being critical, which is after all what all forms of transformative politics will be doing, if they are to be transformative. But I think the ‘critical’ often functions as a place where we deposit our anxieties. We might assume that if we are doing critical whiteness studies, rather than whiteness studies, that we can protect ourselves from doing – or even being seen to do – the wrong kind of whiteness studies. But the word ‘critical’ does not mean the elimination of risk, and nor should it become just a description of what we are doing over here, as opposed to them, over there. 9. I felt my desire to be critical as the site of anxiety when I was involved in writing a race equality policy for the university at which I work in the UK, where I tried to bring what I thought was a fairly critical language of anti-racism into a neo-liberal technique of governance, which we can inadequately describe as diversity management, or the ‘business case’ for diversity. All public organisations in the UK are now required by law to have and implement a race equality policy and action plan, as a result of the Race Relations Amendment Act (2000). My current research is tracking the significance of this policy, in terms of the relationship between the documentation it has generated and social action. Suffice to say here, my own experience of writing a race equality policy, taught me a good lesson, which of course means a hard lesson: the language we think of as critical can easily ‘lend itself’ to the very techniques of governance we critique. So we wrote the document, and the university, along with many others, was praised for its policy, and the Vice-Chancellor was able to congratulate the university on its performance: we did well. A document that documented the racism of the university became usable as a measure of good performance. 10. This story is not simply about assimilation or the risks of the critical being co-opted, which would be a way of framing the story that assumes ‘we’ were innocent and critical until we got misused (in other words, this would

maintain the illusion of our own criticalness). Rather, it reminds us that the transformation of ‘the critical’ into a property, as something we have or do, allows ‘the critical’ to become a performance indicator, or a measure of value. The ‘critical’ in ‘critical whiteness studies’ cannot guarantee that it will have effects that are critical, in the sense of challenging relations of power that remain concealed as institutional norms or givens. Indeed, if the critical was used to describe the field, then we would become complicit with the transformation of education into an audit culture, into a culture that measures value through performance. 11. My commentary on the risks of whiteness studies will involve an analysis of how whiteness gets reproduced through being declared, within academic texts, as well public culture. I will hence be reading Whiteness Studies as part of a broader shift towards what we could call a politics of declaration, in which institutions as well as individuals ‘admit’ to forms of bad practice, and in which the ‘admission’ itself becomes seen as good practice. By reading Whiteness Studies in this way, I am not suggesting that it is a symptom of bad practice: rather, I think it is useful to consider ‘turns’ within the academy as having something to do with other cultural turns. The examples are drawn from the UK and Australia, as the two places in which my own anti-racist politics have taken shape. My argument is simple: anti-racism is not performative. I use performative in Austin’s (1975) sense as referring to a particular class of speech. An utterance is performative when it does what it says: ‘the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action’ (1975, 6). 12. I will suggest that declaring whiteness, or even ‘admitting’ to one’s own racism, when the declaration is assumed to be ‘evidence’ of an anti-racist commitment, does not do what it says. In other words, putting whiteness into speech, as an object to be spoken about, however critically, is not an anti-racist action, and nor does it necessarily commit a state, institution or person to a form of action that we could describe as anti-racist. To put this more strongly, I will show how declaring one’s whiteness, even as part of a project of social critique, can reproduce white privilege in ways that are ‘unforeseen’. Of course, this is not to reduce whiteness studies to the reproduction of whiteness, even if that is what it can do. As Mike Hill suggests: ‘I cannot know in advance whether white critique will prove politically worthwhile, whether in the end it will be a friendlier ghost than before or will display the same stealth narcissism that feminists of color labeled a white problem in the late 1970s’ (1997, 10).

### AT: Alt Leads to Violence

#### Fear of violence is a conservative political maneuver –the question is not whether or not there will be violence but whether it will be directed at an unjust social order

Wilderson 2011[Frank B., University of California Irvine – African American Studies/Drama Department, The Vengeance of Vertigo: Aphasia and Abjection in the Political Trials of Black Insurgents, InTensions Journal, Issue 5, Fall/Winter 2011]

Many pacifist scholars and activists consider the strategies and tactics of armed revolutionaries in First World countries to be short-sighted bursts of narcissism.xvii What pacifist detractors forget, however, is that for Gramsci, the strategy of a War of Position is one of commandeering civic and political spaces one trench at a time in order to turn those spaces into pedagogic locales for the dispossessed; and this process is one which combines peaceful as well as violent tactics as it moves the struggle closer to an all-out violent assault on the state. The BLA and their White revolutionary co-defendants may have been better Gramscians than those who critique them through the lens of Gramsci. Their tactics (and by tactics I mean armed struggle as well as courtroom performances) were no less effective at winning hearts and minds than candle light vigils and “orderly” protests. If the end-game of Gramscian struggle is the isolation and emasculation of the ruling classes’ ensemble of questions, as a way to alter the structure of feeling of the dispossessed so that the next step, the violent overthrow of the state, doesn’t *feel l*ike such a monumental undertaking, then I would argue the pedagogic value of retaliating against police by killing one of them each time they kill a Black person, the expropriating of bank funds from armored cars in order to further finance armed struggle as well as community projects such as acupuncture clinics in the Bronx where drug addicts could get clean, and the bombing of major centers of U.S. commerce and governance, followed by trials in which the defendants used the majority of the trial to critique the government rather than plead their case, have as much if not more pedagogic value than peaceful protest. In other words, if not for the“pathological pacifism” (Churchill) which clouds political debate and scholarly analysis there would be no question that the BLA, having not even read Gramsci,xviii were among the best Gramscian theorists the U.S. has ever known. But though the BLA were great Gramscian theorists, they could not become Gramscian subjects. The political character of one’s actions is inextricably bound to the political status of one’s subjectivity; and while this status goes without saying for Gilbert and Clark, it is always in question for Balagoon and Bukhari. [34] How does one calibrate the gap between objective vertigo and the need to be productive as a Black revolutionary? What is the political significance of restoring balance to the inner ear? Is tyranny of closure the only outcome of such interventions or could restoration of the Black subject’s inner ear, while failing at the level of conceptual framework, provide something necessary, though intangible, at the level of blood and sweat political activism? These unanswered questions haunt this article. Though I have erred in this article on the side of paradigm as opposed to praxis, and cautioned against assuming that we know or can know what the harvest of their sacrifice was, I believe we are better political thinkers—if not actors—as a result of what they did with their bodies, even if we still don’t know what to do with ours. \*

## Aff Answers

### Aff – Perm/Reformism

#### The alternative gives white people one option alone, repudiation. The politics of repudiation causes backlash and inevitably fails. Accounting for the heterogeneous meaning of whiteness makes possible convivial relations. Reformism and revolution are ultimately the same strategy.

Winant 1997 (Howard, Director, UC Center for New Racial Studies. Institute for Social, Behavioral, and Economic. Research. University of California Santa Barbara, CA, Behind Blue Eyes: Contemporary White Racial Politics, http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/winant/whitness.html)

Drawing their inspiration from W.E.B. Du Bois and James Baldwin, the social historians who have provided the core insights of the abolitionist project stress the "invention of whiteness" as a pivotal development in the rise of US capitalism. They have begun a process of historical reinterpretation which aims to set race -- or more properly, the gestation and evolution of white supremacy -- at the center of US politics and culture. Thus far, they have focused attention on a series of formative events and processes: the precedent of British colonial treatment of the Irish (Allen 1994, Ignatiev 1995); the early, multiracial resistance to indentured servitude and quasi-slavery, which culminated in the defeat of Bacon's Rebellion in late 17th century Virginia; the self-identification of "free" workers as white in the antebellum North (Roediger 1991); and the construction of a "white republic" in the late 19th century (Saxton 1990). These studies, in some cases quite prodigious intellectual efforts, have had a significant impact on how we understand not only racial formation, but also class formation and the developing forms of popular culture in US history. What they reveal above all is how crucial the construction of whiteness was, and remains, for the development and maintenance of capitalist class rule in the US. Furthermore, these studies also show how the meaning of whiteness, like that of race in general, has time and again proved flexible enough to adapt to shifts in the capitalist division of labor, to reform initiatives which extended democratic rights, and to changes in ideology and cultural representation. The core message of the abolitionist project is the imperative of repudiation of white identity and white privilege, the requirement that "the lie of whiteness" be exposed. This rejection of whiteness on the part of those who benefit from it, this "new abolitionism," it is argued, is a precondition for the establishment of substantive racial equality and social justice -- or more properly, socialism -- in the US. Whites must become "race traitors," as the new journal of the abolitionist project calls itself. Its motto: "Treason to whiteness is loyalty to humanity." How is this rejection of whiteness to be accomplished? Both analytical and practical measures are envisioned. On the intellectual level, the abolitionist project invites us to contemplate the emptiness, indeed vacuity, of the white category: It is not merely that whiteness is oppressive and false; it is that whiteness is nothing but oppressive and false.... It is the empty and terrifying attempt to build an identity based on what one isn't and on whom one can hold back (Roediger 1994, 13; emphasis original). In short, there is no white culture, no white politics, no whiteness, except in the sense of distancing and rejection of racially-defined "otherness." On the practical level, the argument goes, whites can become "race traitors" by rejecting their privilege, by refusing to collude with white supremacy. When you hear that racist joke, confront its teller. When you see the police harassing a nonwhite youth, try to intervene or at least bear witness. In short, recognize that white supremacy depends on the thousands of minute acts that reproduce it from moment to moment; it must "deliver" to whites a sense of their own security and superiority; it must make them feel that "I am different from those "others." Single gestures of this sort, Race Traitor's editors say, ...would [not] in all likelihood be of much consequence. But if enough of those who looked white broke the rules of the club to make the cops doubt their ability to recognize a white person merely by looking at him or her, how would it affect the cops' behavior (Editorial 1993, 4-5)? Thus the point is not that all whites recognize the lie of their privilege, but that enough whites do so, and act out their rejection of that lie, to disrupt the "white club's" ability to enforce its supremacy. It is easy to sympathize with this analysis, at least up to a point. The postwar black movement, which in the US context at least served as the point of origin for all the "new social movements" and the much-reviled "politics of identity," taught the valuable lesson that politics went "all the way down." That is, meaningful efforts to achieve greater social justice could not tolerate a public/private, or a collective/individual distinction. Trying to change society meant trying to change one's own life. The formula "the personal is political," commonly associated with feminism, had its early origins among the militants of the civil rights movement (Evans 1980). The problems come when deeper theoretical and practical problems are raised. Despite their explicit adherence to a "social construction" model of race (one which bears a significant resemblance to my own work), theorists of the abolitionist project do not take that insight as seriously as they should. They employ it chiefly to argue against biologistic conceptions of race, which is fine; but they fail to consider the complexities and rootedness of social construction, or as we would term it, racial formation. Is the social construction of whiteness so flimsy that it can be repudiated by a mere act of political will, or even by widespread and repeated acts aimed at rejecting white privilege? I think not; whiteness may not be a legitimate cultural identity in the sense of having a discrete, "positive" content, but it is certainly an overdetermined political and cultural category, having to do with socioeconomic status, religious affiliation, ideologies of individualism, opportunity, and citizenship, nationalism, etc. Like any other complex of beliefs and practices, "whiteness" is imbedded in a highly articulated social structure and system of significations; rather than trying to repudiate it, we shall have to rearticulate it. That sounds like a daunting task, and of course it is, but it is not nearly as impossible as erasing whiteness altogether, as the abolitionist project seeks to do. Furthermore, because whiteness is a relational concept, unintelligible without reference to nonwhiteness -- note how this is true even of Roediger's formulation about "build[ing] an identity based on what one isn't" -- that rearticulation (or reinterpretation, or deconstruction) of whiteness can begin relatively easily, in the messy present, with the recognition that whiteness already contains substantial nonwhite elements. Of course, that recognition is only the beginning of a large and arduous process of political labor, which I shall address in the concluding section of this paper. Notwithstanding these criticisms of the abolitionist project, we consider many of its insights to be vital components in the process of reformulating, or synthesizing, a progressive approach to whiteness. Its attention is directed toward prescisely the place where the neo-liberal racial project is weak: the point at which white identity constitutes a crucial support to white supremacy, and a central obstacle to the achievement of substantive social equality and racial justice. CONCLUDING NOTES: WHITENESS AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICS In a situation of racial dualism, as Du Bois observed more than 90 years ago, race operates both to assign us and to deny us our identity. It both makes the social world intelligible, and simultaneously renders it opaque and mysterious. Not only does it allocate resources, power, and privilege; it also provides means for challenging that allocation. The contradictory character of race provides the context in which racial dualism -or the "color-line," as Du Bois designated it, has developed as "the problem of the 20th century." So what's new? Only that, as a result of incalculable human effort, suffering, and sacrifice, we now realize that these truths apply across the board. Whites and whiteness can no longer be exempted from the comprehensive racialization process that is the hallmark of US history and social structure. This is the present-day context for racial conflict and thus for US politics in general, since race continues to play its designated role of crystallizing all the fundamental issues in US society. As always, we articulate our anxieties in racial terms: wealth and poverty, crime and punishment, gender and sexuality, nationality and citizenship, culture and power, are all articulated in the US primarily through race. So what's new? It's the problematic of whiteness that has emerged as the principal source of anxiety and conflict in the postwar US. Although this situation was anticipated or prefigured at earlier moments in the nation's past -- for example, in the "hour of eugenics" (Stepan 1991, Kevles 1985, Gould 1981) -- it is far more complicated now than ever before, largely due to the present unavailability of biologistic forms of racism as a convenient rationale for white supremacy.[7] Whiteness -- visible whiteness, resurgent whiteness, whiteness as a color, whiteness as difference -- this is what's new, and newly problematic, in contemporary US politics. The reasons for this have already emerged in my discussion of the spectrum of racial projects and the particular representations these projects assign to whiteness. Most centrally, the problem of the meaning of whiteness appears as a direct consequence of the movement challenge posed in the 1960s to white supremacy. The battles of that period have not been resolved; they have not been won or lost; however battered and bruised, the demand for substantive racial equality and general social justice still lives. And while it lives, the strength of white supremacy is in doubt. The racial projects of the right are clear efforts to resist the challenge to white supremacy posed by the movements of the 1960s and their contemporary inheritors. Each of these projects has a particular relationship to the white supremacist legacy, ranging from the far right's efforts to justify and solidify white entitlements, through the new right's attempts to utilize the white supremacist tradition for more immediate and expedient political ends, to the neoconservative project's quixotic quest to surgically separate the liberal democratic tradition from the racism that traditionally underwrote it. The biologistic racism of the far right, the expedient and subtextual racism of the new right, and the bad-faith anti-racism of the neoconservatives have many differences from each other, but they have at least one thing in common. They all seek to maintain the long-standing association between whiteness and US political traditions, between whiteness and US nationalism, between whiteness and universalism. They all seek in different ways to preserve white identity from the particularity, the difference, which the 1960s movement challenge assigned to it. The racial projects of the left are the movements' successors (as is neoconservatism, in a somewhat perverse sense). Both the neoliberal racial project and the abolitionist project seek to fulfill the movement's thwarted dreams of a genuinely (i.e., substantively) egalitarian society, one in which significant redistribution of wealth and power has taken place, and race no longer serves as the most significant marker between winners and losers, haves and have nots, powerful and powerless. Although they diverge significantly -- since the neoliberals seek to accomplish their ends through a conscious diminution of the significance of race, and the abolitionists hope to achieve similar ends through a conscious reemphasizing of the importance of race -- they also have one very important thing in common. They both seek to rupture the barrier between whites and racially-defined minorities, the obstacle which prevents joint political action. They both seek to associate whites and nonwhites, to reinterpret the meaning of whiteness in such a way that it no longer has the power to impede class alliances. Although the differences and indeed the hostility -- between the neoliberal and abolitionist projects, between the reform-oriented and radical conceptions of whiteness -- are quite severe, we consider it vital that adherents of each project recognize that they hold part of the key to challenging white supremacy in the contemporary US, and that their counterpart project holds the other part of the key. Neoliberals rightfully argue that a pragmatic approach to transracial politics is vital if the momentum of racial reaction is to be halted or reversed. Abolitionists properly emphasize challenging the ongoing commitment to white supremacy on the part of many whites. Both of these positions need to draw on each other, not only in strategic terms, but in theoretical ones as well. The recognition that racial identities -- all racial identities, including whiteness -- have become implacably dualistic, could be far more liberating on the left than it has thus far been. For neoliberals, it could permit and indeed justify an acceptance of race-consciousness and even nationalism among racially-defined minorities as a necessary but partial response to disenfranchisement, disempowerment, and superexploitation. There is no inherent reason why such a political position could not coexist with a strategic awareness of the need for strong, class-conscious, transracial coalitions. We have seen many such examples in the past: in the anti-slavery movement, the communist movement of the 1930s (Kelley 1994), and in the 1988 presidential bid of Jesse Jackson, to name but a few. This is not to say that all would be peace and harmony if such alliances could come more permanently into being. But there is no excuse for not attempting to find the pragmatic "common ground" necessary to create them. Abolitionists could also benefit from a recognition that on a pragmatic basis, whites can ally with racially-defined minorities without renouncing their whiteness. If they truly agree that race is a socially constructed concept, as they claim, abolitionists should also be able to recognize that racial identities are not either-or matters, not closed concepts that must be upheld in a reactionary fashion or disavowed in a comprehensive act of renunciation. To use a postmodern language I dislike: racial identities are deeply "hybridized"; they are not "sutured," but remain open to rearticulation. "To be white in America is to be very black. If you don't know how black you are, you don't know how American you are" (Thompson 1995, 429).

### Aff – AT: Ontological Blackness

#### The theory of ontological blackness enforces a rigid and suffocating identity on the heterogeneity of black experiences, leading to political paralysis and re-entrenching white power.

Pinn 2004 (Anthony, Anthony B. Pinn is an American professor and writer whose work focuses on liberation theology, Black religion, and Black humanism. Pinn is the Agnes Cullen Arnold Professor of Humanities and Professor of Religious Studies at Rice University, “‘‘Black Is, Black Ain’t’’: Victor Anderson, African American Theological Thought, and Identity,” Dialog: A Journal of Theology, Volume 43, Number 1 . Spring 2004)

This connection between ontological blackness and religion is natural because: ‘‘ontological blackness signifies the totality of black existence, a binding together of black life and experience. In its root, religio, religion denotes tying together, fastening behind, and binding together. Ontological blackness renders black life and experience a totality.’’13 According to Anderson, Black theological discussions are entangled in ontological blackness. And accordingly, discussions of black life revolve around a theological understanding of Black experience limited to suffering and survival in a racist system. The goal of this theology is to find the ‘‘meaning of black faith’’ in the merger of black cultural consciousness, icons of genius, and post-World War II Black defiance. An admirable goal to be sure, but here is the rub: Black theologians speak, according to Anderson, in opposition to ontological whiteness when they are actually dependent upon whiteness for the legitimacy of their agenda. Furthermore, ontological blackness’s strong ties to suffering and survival result in blackness being dependent on suffering, and as a result social transformation brings into question what it means to be black and religious. Liberative outcomes ultimately force an identity crisis, a crisis of legitimation and utility. In Anderson’s words: Talk about liberation becomes hard to justify where freedom appears as nothing more than defiant self-assertion of a revolutionary racial consciousness that requires for its legitimacy the opposition of white racism. Where there exists no possibility of transcending the blackness that whiteness created, African American theologies of liberation must be seen not only as crisis theologies; they remain theologies in a crisis of legitimation.14 This conversation becomes more ‘‘refined’’ as new cultural resources are unpacked and various religious alternatives acknowledged. Yet the bottom line remains racialization of issues and agendas, life and love. Falsehood is perpetuated through the ‘‘hermeneutic of return,’’ by which ontological blackness is the paradigm of Black existence and thereby sets the agenda of Black liberation within the ‘‘postrevolutionary context’’ of present day USA. One ever finds the traces of the Black aesthetic which pushes for a dwarfed understanding of Black life and a sacrifice of individuality for the sake of a unified Black ‘faith’. Yet differing experiences of racial oppression (the stuff of ontological blackness) combined with varying experiences of class, gender and sexual oppression call into question the value of their racialized formulations. Implicit in all of this is a crisis of faith, an unwillingness to address both the glory and guts of Black existence—nihilistic tendencies that, unless held in tension with claims of transcendence, have the potential to overwhelm and to suffocate. At the heart of this dilemma is friction between ontological blackness and ‘‘contemporary postmodern black life’’—issues, for example related to ‘‘selecting marriage partners, exercising freedom of movement, acting on gay and lesbian preferences, or choosing political parties.’’15 How does one foster balance while embracing difference as positive? Anderson looks to Nietzsche. European genius, complete with its heroic epic, met its match in the aesthetic categories of tragedy and the grotesque genius revived and espoused by Friedreich Nietzsche. The grotesque genius served as an effective counter-discourse by embracing both the ‘light’ and ‘dark’ aspects of life, and holding in tension oppositional sensations—pleasure and pain, freedom and oppression.16 Utilizing Nietzsche’s work, Anderson ask: ‘‘what should African American cultural and religious criticism look like when they are no longer romantic in inspiration and the cult of heroic genius is displaced by the grotesquery—full range of expression, actions, attitudes, behaviors everything found in African American life—of contemporary black expressive culture and public life?’’17 Applied to African Americans, the grotesque embodies the full range of African American life—all expressions, actions, attitudes, and behavior. With a hermeneutic of the grotesque as the foci, religio-cultural criticism is free from the totalizing nature of racial apologetics and the classical Black aesthetic. By extension, Black theology is able to address both issues of survival (Anderson sees their importance.) and the larger goal of cultural fulfillment, Anderson’s version of liberation. That is to say, placing ‘‘blackness’’ along side other indicators of identity allows African Americans to define themselves in a plethora of ways while maintaining their community status. This encourages African Americans to see themselves as they are— complex and diversified—no longer needing to surrender personal interests for the sake of monolithic collective status.

### Aff – AT: Social Death

#### Social death theory of slavery is wrong and outdated—attending to historical difference is crucial to moving beyond the essentializing and demeaning black pathology theory espoused by Wilderson

Brown 2009 (Vincent, Professor of History and of African and African American Studies at Harvard University, Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery, December)

Although the deaths of slaves could inspire such active and dynamic practices of social reconnection, scholars in recent years have made too little of events like the funeral aboard the Hudibras and have too often followed Orlando Patterson’s mon- umental Slavery and Social Death (1982) in positing a metaphorical “social death” as the basic condition of slavery. In a comparative study of sixty-six slaveholding societies ranging from ancient Greece and Rome to medieval Europe, precolonial Africa, and Asia, Patterson combined statistical analysis and voluminous research with brilliant theoretical insights drawn from Marxian theory, symbolic anthropology, law, philosophy, and literature in order to offer what he called a “preliminary definition of slavery on the level of personal relations.” Recognizing violence, violations of personhood, dishonor, and namelessness as the fundamental constituent elements of slavery, Patterson distilled a transhistorical characterization of slavery as “the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored persons.” In this way the institution of slavery was and is a “relation of domination,” in which slaveholders annihilated people socially by first extracting them from meaningful relationships that defined personal status and belonging, communal memory, and collective aspiration and then incorporating these socially dead persons into the masters’ world. As a work of historical sociology concerned primarily with the comparative analysis of institutions, the book illuminated the dynamics of a process whereby the “desocialized new slave” was subsumed within slave society.5 Slavery and Social Death was widely reviewed and lavishly praised for its erudition and conceptual rigor. As a result of its success, social death has become a handy general definition of slavery, for many historians and non-historians alike. But it is often forgotten that the concept of social death is a distillation from Patterson’s breathtaking survey—a theoretical abstraction that is meant not to describe the lived experiences of the enslaved so much as to reduce them to a least common denominator that could reveal the essence of slavery in an ideal-type slave, shorn of meaningful heritage.6 As a concept, it is what Frederick Cooper has called an “agentless abstraction” that provides a neat cultural logic but ultimately does little to illuminate the social and political experience of enslavement and the struggles that produce historic transformations.7 Indeed, it is difficult to use such a distillation to explain the actual behavior of slaves, and yet in much of the scholarship that followed in the wake of Slavery and Social Death, Patterson’s abstract distillates have been used to explain the existential condition of the enslaved. Having emerged from the discipline of sociology, “social death” fit comfortably within a scholarly tradition that had generally been more alert to deviations in pat- terns of black life from prevailing social norms than to the worldviews, strategies, and social tactics of people in black communities. Together with Patterson’s work on the distortions wrought by slavery on black families, “social death” reflected sociology’s abiding concern with “social pathology”; the “pathological condition” of twentieth-century black life could be seen as an outcome of the damage that black people had suffered during slavery. University of Chicago professor Robert Park, the grand-p`ere of the social pathologists, set the terms in 1919: “the Negro, when he landed in the United States, left behind almost everything but his dark complexion and his tropical temperament.”8 Patterson’s distillation also conformed to the nomothetic imperative of social science, which has traditionally aimed to discover universal laws of operation that would be true regardless of time and place, making the synchronic study of social phenomena more tempting than more descriptive studies of historical transformation. Slavery and Social Death took shape during a period when largely synchronic studies of antebellum slavery in the United States domi- nated the scholarship on human bondage, and Patterson’s expansive view was meant to situate U.S. slavery in a broad context rather than to discuss changes as the in- stitution developed through time. Thus one might see “social death” as an obsolete product of its time and tradition, an academic artifact with limited purchase for contemporary scholarship, were it not for the concept’s reemergence in some im- portant new studies of slavery.9

### Aff – Totalization Turn

#### Turn: viewing Whiteness monolithically circumscribes political possibility and undermines coherent analysis. Default to the specificity of empirical analyses.

Kolchin 2 (Peter, Professor of History at Delaware University, “ Whiteness Studies: The New History of Race in America,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 89, No. 1 (Jun., 2002), pp. 154-173, JSTOR)

The central question one must confront in evaluating whiteness studies is the salience of whiteness as an explanation for exploitation, injustice and, more generally, the American past. In addressing that question, the matter of context becomes crucial. Simply put, in making whiteness omnipresent, whiteness studies authors risk losing sight of contextual variations and thereby undermining the very understanding of race and whiteness as socially constructed. Nonhistorians are particularly prone to deprive whiteness of historical context. As Roediger notes in pointing to "tensions" within the field of whiteness studies, "much cultural studies work in the area lacks historical grounding and ignores or misconceives the emphasis on class relations common among historians of whiteness." In Scenes of Subjection, for example, the literary scholar Saidiya V. Hartman portrays white racism as a constant unaffected by any change in the social order, including "the nonevent of emancipation," and sees virtually everything done to or for African Americans as an expression of that racism. A similar inattention to context underlies Brodkin's attribution of American prejudice against Jews (their "temporary darkening") to the desire to exploit them as industrial laborers, without bothering to place that prejudice in the framework of the long European history of anti-Semitism—an anti-Semitism that was not always rooted in economic interest and did not always require that Jews be seen as nonwhite. Writing as if racism were a uniquely American illness, the American studies scholar George Lipsitz muses that "it must be the content of our character."" But inattention to context bedevils many of the historians as well. In White Women's Rights, for example, one of the few historical works to examine the way whiteness shaped the experiences and behavior of women, Louise Michele Newman too often strays from her intriguing exploration of the impact on feminism of a particular form of evolutionary racism and generalizes about the views of "white women," who resisted patriarchy for themselves but sought to impose it on "inferior" races. Pushing far beyond the sensible observation that most white feminists shared the racial prejudices common among whites in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, she understates the range and complexity of feminist thought and argues that racism was "an integral, constitutive element" of feminism itself, or as she puts it, "feminism developed . . . as a racialized theory of gender oppression."20 Such overgeneralization is especially prevalent among historians who rely heavily on image, representation, and literary depiction. Grace Elizabeth Hale's densely written but fascinating book, Making Whiteness, has the rare advantage among whiteness studies works of dealing with that part of the country where race has most pervasively shaped social relations: the South. But Hale loses much of that advantage by paying virtually no attention to social relations and confusing what is southern with what is more generally American until the reader is unsure whether she is describing southern whiteness or American whiteness, or whether she thinks that it does not make any difference. The South, she concludes, "lies not south of anywhere but inside us." Never really explaining what she means by "whiteness" (which at times she equates with segregation) or whose interests it served, she is on equally slippery ground in confronting chronological context. "Whites [all? most? some?] created the culture of segregation," she proclaims, "in large part to counter black success." This thesis is perfectly plausible, if undemonstrated. But in arguing that the myths of the happy slave and of criminal Reconstruction were products of the late-nineteenth-century imagination, Hale largely ignores earlier versions of those myths propounded by protagonists in the struggles over slavery and Reconstruction; the arguments that she treats as new were appropriations and modifications of arguments previously forged in real social relations. Indiscriminately mixing fiction and nonfiction as documentation, she confuses description (at which she is very good) with explanation and almost totally ignores interest and politics in her delineation of the "making" of whiteness.2' Although Jacobson pays more attention to contextual variation, he too can paint with a very broad brush, in the process placing a heavy explanatory burden—I believe too heavy—on whiteness. His focus on image and representation makes it difficult to judge the prevalence of particular ideas, because in quoting extensively from racist stereotypes, he makes no effort to give equal time to the opponents of such views. Brilliantly exploring racial depictions of diverse immigrant groups that Americans would later consider ethnic rather than racial and thereby showing the subjective character of race, he too often blurs a crucial distinction between "race" on the one hand and "nation," "nationality," and "ethnicity" on the other. For if both race and nation are constructed (imagined) communities, they are differently constructed: whereas race implies inherent, immutable characteristics, national and ethnic identity can be conceived of as inherent but need not be. Throughout much of American history, Americans have promiscuously combined racial and nonracial thinking in differentiating among groups; sometimes they assumed that differences were inherent, sometimes not, and often they failed to articulate clear positions on the question (no doubt because they had not formulated such positions). Jacobson himself notes in passing that discrimination was not always based on color or race—"The loudest voices in the organized nativism of the 1840s and 1850s harped upon matters of Catholicism and economics, not race"—but he tends to assume the biological nature of arguments that could as easily be interpreted as cultural. (See, for example, his citation of the assertion in the 1911 publication A Dictionary of Races or Peoples that "'the savage manners of the last century are still met with amongst some Serbo-Croatians of to-day'" as evidence for emphasis on the "physical properties" of race.) remains murky. On one hand, Jacobson portrays the 1840s-1920s as a period of "variegated whiteness" in which white Americans saw some whites as whiter than others, warns us not to "reify a monolithic whiteness," and speaks of a "system of `difference' by which one might be both white and racially distinct from other whites." On the other, he speaks of the "process by which Celts or Slays became Caucasians." The unresolved issue here is the extent to which Americans conceived of whiteness (rather than other criteria such as religion, culture, ethnicity, and class) as the main ingredient separating the civilized from the uncivilized.23 There can be no doubt, for example, that many antebellum Americans viewed the Irish as a degraded and savage people, but whether they saw lack of whiteness as the key source of this inferior status is dubious; to most Americans, for whom Protestantism went hand in hand with both republicanism and Americanism, the Irish immigrants' Catholicism was far more alarming than their color. Indeed, some abolitionists managed to combine a passionate belief in the goodness and intellectual potential of black people with an equally passionate conviction of the unworthiness of the Irish, and in the 1850s many nativists saw little difficulty in moving from the anti-Irish Know-Nothing party into the antislavery Republican party, a trajectory that would have been truly remarkable had their dominant perception of the Irish been that they were nonwhite. And as Jacobson points out, the 1790 law that limited naturalization to "free white persons" "allowed Irish immigrants entrance as `white persons'"; in what sense, then, should one speak of their subsequently "becoming" white? This can make sense if whiteness is to be understood metaphorically, meaning "acceptable," but Jacobson and other whiteness studies authors clearly intend the term to serve as more than a metaphor; indeed, if it is understood only metaphorically, much of their analysis collapses.24 The overworking of whiteness is especially noteworthy in the work of David Roediger, for he professes greater interest in specific social relations than many whiteness studies authors. Nevertheless, his argument too often depends on blurring important distinctions among whites, thereby belying the commonality of the "wages of whiteness" he outlines. His starting point is promising: living in a slaveholding republic, white workers in the (northern) United States increasingly defined themselves by what they were not—blacks, slaves. But defining oneself as not-black and as not-slave are not at all the same, and Roediger's fudging on that crucial point is especially striking coming from someone who usually pays such careful attention to language. The "not-slave" formulation led to the elaboration of a "free-labor" ideology that combined an emphasis on the dignity of labor with a condemnation of chattel slavery as the antithesis of free, republican (that is, American) values; the "not-black" variation led to a racist denigration of nonwhites and the insistence that the United States was a "white man's country." The two views could go together, but often they did not, and Roediger's argument that whiteness was an essential element of free-labor ideology is unpersuasive. If some labor radicals took what amounted to the proslavery position that slaves in the South were better off than "free" white workers in the North, others did not, and the argument in any case rested less on the degree of whiteness than on the degree of exploitation. Similarly, Roediger's thesis that in rejecting the term "servant" in favor of "hired hand" and "help," workingmen were "becoming" white conflates two very different forms of resistance to dependence that could be, but were not always, combined. The uppity domestics who tormented Frances Trollope in Cincinnati expressed little or no concern for whiteness as they asserted their American equality, and they contrasted their rights, not with black dependence, but with that stemming from English hierarchy. Responding disdainfully to Trollope's expectation that she would eat in the kitchen, one servant typically "turned up her pretty lip, and said, 'I guess that's 'cause you don't think I'm good enough to eat with you. You'll find that won't do here.'"25 The question is not whether white racism was pervasive in antebellum America—it was—but whether it explains as much as Roediger and others maintain. In an argument further developed by Ignatiev, Roediger asserts that "it was by no means clear that the Irish were white." They present little evidence, however, that most Americans viewed the Irish as nonwhite. (To establish this point one would have to analyze the "racial" thought of Americans about the Irish, a task that neither Roediger nor Ignatiev undertakes.) Indeed, the whiteness studies authors often display a notable lack of precision in asserting the nonwhite status of despised groups. Roediger suggests that Irish whiteness was "by no means clear"; Ignatiev speaks of "strong tendencies . . . to consign the Irish, if not to the black race, then to an intermediate race located between white and black"; Neil Foley, in discussing prejudice against poor whites in central Texas, proclaims that "not all whites . . . were equally white" and suggests that landlords felt that their tenants "lacked certain qualities of whiteness"; Brodkin states that "for almost half a century, [Jews] were treated as racially notquite-white." What is at issue is not the widespread hostility to and discrimination against the Irish, Jews, poor whites, and multiple other groups, but the salience of whiteness in either explaining or describing such hostility and discrimination. The status of southern poor whites is especially telling, for despite persistent "racial" stereotypes of them as shiftless, slovenly, and degraded, such stereotypes did not usually include denials of their whiteness. Americans have had many ways of looking down on people without questioning their whiteness.26 A brief consideration of the ideology of four prominent nineteenth-century Americans—the Confederate vice president Alexander H. Stephens, Illinois's Democratic senator Stephen A. Douglas, Abraham Lincoln, and Ohio's Republican senator Benjamin F. Wade—illustrates the risk of overemphasizing whiteness. Like most white Americans, all four were in some sense committed to whiteness. In his famous speech hailing the secession of the southern states, Stephens boldly identified as the "cornerstone" of the new government "the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery, subordination to the superior race, is his natural and moral condition." In the Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858, Douglas mercilessly denounced his Republican challenger as a supporter of black equality and boasted that "this government was made on the white basis. . . . It was made by white men, for the benefit of white men and their posterity for ever, and I am in favor of confining citizenship to white men." Lincoln responded that he did not favor "political and social equality between the white and black races"; noting the "physical difference" between the races, he proclaimed that "inasmuch as it becomes a necessity that there must be a difference, I, as well as Judge Douglas, am in favor of the race to which I belong, having the superior position." Upon his arrival in Washington, D.C., in 1851, Wade complained that "the Nigger smell I cannot bear," adding that the food was "all cooked by Niggers until I can smell and taste the Nigger."27 Yet any treatment of those four men that stopped at their common commitment to whiteness would be so incomplete as to be totally misleading. Stephens was an ardent Confederate whereas the other three were committed Unionists. Their differences on slavery and black rights were even more notable. Stephens was a defender of slavery and black racial subordination. Douglas saw slavery as a minor issue whose fate should be left to local (white) control. Lincoln believed that slavery was morally wrong as well as socially degrading, eschewed the race-baiting that Douglas and many other white Americans took for granted, and in his debate with Douglas immediately qualified his support for white supremacy with the ringing assertion that whether or not "the negro" was equal in all respects, "in the right to eat the bread, without leave of anybody else, which his own hand earns, he is my equal and the equal of Judge Douglas, and the equal of every living man." Wade was an ardent opponent of slavery, who became one of the most enthusiastic proponents of a radical Reconstruction policy designed to remake the South and provide equal rights for the former slaves, as well as a sturdy champion of the rights of women and of labor. In short, what is most significant about the careers of the four men lies, not in their shared expressions of whiteness, but in the sharply divergent positions they took on the major issues of their era. Whiteness turns out to be a blunt instrument for dissecting the nuances—or even the major outlines—of their political ideology and behavior.

### Aff – Totalization Turn

#### Whiteness is not monolithic and not uniformly experienced by black subjects—focus on empirical analyses and the possibility of democratic deliberation is key to avoid meaningless dogma

Shelby 05 (Tommie, Professor of African and African American Studies and Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University) 2005 “We Who Are Dark” P. 147-8)

Others might challenge the distinction between ideological and structural causes of black disadvantage, on the grounds that we are rarely if ever able to so neatly separate these factors, an epistemic situation that is only made worse by the fact that these cause interact in complex ways with behavioral factors. These distinctions, while perhaps straightforward in the abstract, are difficult to employ in practice. For example, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the members of a poor black community to determine with any accuracy whether their impoverished condition is due primarily to institutional racism, the impact of past racial injustice, the increasing technological basis of the economy, shrinking state budgets, the vicissitudes of world trade, the ascendancy of conservative ideology, poorly funded schools, lack of personal initiative, a violent drug trade that deters business investment, some combination of these factors, or some other explanation altogether. Moreover, it is notoriously difficult to determine when the formulation of putatively race-neutral policies has been motivated by racism or when such policies are unfairly applied by racially biased public officials. There are very real empirical difficulties in determining the specific causal significance of the factors that create and perpetuate black disadvantage; nonetheless, it is clear that these factors exist and that justice will demand different practical remedies according to each factor's relative impact on black's life chances. We must acknowledge that our social world is complicated and not immediately transparent to common sense, and thus that systematic empirical inquiry, historical studies, and rigorous social analysis are required to reveal its systemic structure and sociocultural dynamics. There is, moreover, no mechanical or infallible procedure for determining which analyses are the soundest ones. In addition, given the inevitable bias that attends social inquiry, legislators and those they represent cannot simply defer to social-scientific experts. We must instead rely on open public debate--among politicians, scholars, policy makers, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens--with the aim of garnering rationally motivated and informed consensus. And even if our practical decision procedures rest on critical deliberative discourse and thus live up to our highest democratic ideals, some trial and error through actual practice is unavoidable. These difficulties and complications notwithstanding, a general recognition of the distinctions among the ideological and structural causes of black disadvantage could help blacks refocus their political energies and self-help strategies. Attention to these distinctions might help expose the superficiality of theories that seek to reduce all the social obstacles that blacks face to contemporary forms of racism or white supremacy. A more penetrating subtle and empirically grounded analysis is needed to comprehend the causes of racial inequality and black disadvantage. Indeed, these distinctions highlight the necessity to probe deeper to find the causes of contemporary forms of racism, as some racial conflict may be a symptom of broader problems or recent social developments (such as immigration policy or reduced federal funding for higher education).

### Aff – Whiteness not Root Cause

#### Positing whiteness as the source of all violence obscures the historical process of racial reification and dooms any attempt at intersectional analyses of oppression

Niemonen, 2010 (Jack Niemonen, American Sociologist, 41(1), 48-81, “Public Sociology or Partisan Sociology? The Curious Case of Whiteness Studies” EBSCOhost)

Despite recognition that racial classification systems are not constant, proponents of whiteness studies treat whites as if they were an immutable, bounded, and cohesive category (Bonnett 2003; Eichstedt 2001; Gabriel 2000; Giroux 1997; Hartigan 1997; Keating 1995; Kincheloe 1999; Kolchin 2002; Levine-Rasky 2000; McCarthy 2003; Pugliese 2002; Sidorkin 1999; Yans 2006). They posit a generic white subject, both privileged and unaware of the extent of that privilege. However, even if whites coalesce at certain historical junctures, we cannot conclude that the category “white” is an entity that will continue indefinitely in the absence of antiracist initiatives (McDermott and Sampson 2005; Yans 2006; cf. Niemonen 2007). Reification has the unintended consequence of neglecting how the construction of racial identities is a negotiated, indeed manipulative, process (Bonnett 1998; Rockquemore 2002). In doing so, proponents of whiteness studies understate the contradictions, inconsistencies, and ambivalences within white and nonwhite identities. They assume before the fact that whites regard whiteness rather than nationality, ethnicity, religion, or class as the main factor that separates the civilized from the uncivilized. And, they oversimplify the challenges that nonwhites face by implying that their problems are largely race-related and hence attributable to racism (Croteau et al. 2002; Hartigan 2002; Kolchin 2002; Mansfield and Kehoe 1994; Warren and Twine 1997). Emphasizing the unifying interest in, and reproduction of, dominance minimizes how the boundaries of racial categories are negotiated, reinforced, or challenged in daily life (Alcoff 1998; Bash 2006; Perera 1999). Largely ignored are the complicated interactions between race, class, and sex, and the struggles of many whites to acquire privileges in a class-stratified society, especially economic security and some degree of self-autonomy (Bonnett 1997; Eichstedt 2001; Hartigan 1997, 2000b; Hubbard 2005; Kolchin 2002; Lee 1999; Winders 2003). Reifying the concept of race fails to capture the processes through which it acquires meaning, confers status, or exerts a “structuring effect” (Bash 2006; Lewis 2004). By suppressing intra-group divisions and contradictions, whiteness studies ignore how multiple statuses work together in people’s lives (cf. Brekhus 1998; Merton 1972) and perpetuate an “us-them” view of difference—the binary perspective that is at the core of racist discourses. The reification of racial categories endows them with causal potential and predictive ability, implying that all persons classified as white will exhibit the undesirable traits associated with whiteness, since being white is a condition with distinct, identifiable, but largely negative attributes that are in need of corrective attention (Alcoff 1998; Bash 2006; Hartigan 2000b; Keating 1995; Santas 2000; Scott 2000). In a reversal of the historical equation, “white” has become reprehensible whereas “nonwhite” has become virtuous (Gillborn 1996; Keating 1995). Whiteness studies posit racism as a mono-causal explanation for almost everything. All other forces, including the class struggle, are relegated to the margins. William Julius Wilson’s work is dismissed out-of-hand as a defense of the culture of poverty thesis (e.g., Harrison 1998; Ladson-Billings 1996; Welcome 2004). Racism is the problem. Therefore, whites either actively resist its reproduction or they perpetuate existing inequalities (Hartigan 2000b; Kolchin 2002; Moon and Flores 2000; Troyna 1994). This premise allows for the subsequent argument that whiteness is the source of oppression. If it is eradicated, then social justice will emerge (Moon and Flores 2000; Trainor 2002). Once whiteness is demonized, whites have no choice but to view their selves—ironically—in the context of a deficit model that identifies their failings, after which they may redeem themselves by becoming race traitors. Whites are required to renounce their whiteness but at the same time celebrate the alternatives. Such arguments inevitably result in anger and bafflement (Gillborn 1996; Kolchin 2002).

#### The discourse of monolithic, unchanging whiteness obscures the complexity of race in America. It posits whiteness as only a massive and negative force without contours or lived experience, making transformation impossible

Winant 1997 (Howard, Director, UC Center for New Racial Studies. Institute for Social, Behavioral, and Economic. Research. University of California Santa Barbara, CA, Behind Blue Eyes: Contemporary White Racial Politics, <http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/winant/whitness.html>)

In a quiet office at a Washington think tank, a balding white man with a Ph.D composes a tract on the biologically-determined intellectual inferiority of blacks. Out on a Brooklyn street, as black demonstrators march through a segregated white enclave, white residents yell racist epithets. In a suburban Virginia church, an evangelical Protestant minister preaches to a largely white, overwhelmingly middle-class audience. At an urban college campus in California, whites and blacks, Latinos and Asians, sit side-by-side in the overcrowded classroom, and in their own separate groups in the cafeteria. As they drive home to their segregated neighborhoods, they pump the same high-volume hip-hop sounds through their car speakers. A few miles up the interstate, neo-Nazis train at a private ranch. A few miles the other way, a multiracial garment workers' union is being organized; a majority of the workers in the bargaining unit are Asians and Latinos, but there are some whites. Among the organizers, one of the most effective is a young white woman who speaks good Spanish. How can we make sense of the highly variable "whiteness" of these rather emblematic characters? How does the contemporary US racial order locate white identities? Indeed, how viable is white identity? Is whiteness merely the absence of "color," the sign of "privilege"? Is it, in other words, a purely negative signifier? Or is it possible to view white identities more positively, to see whiteness in terms of "difference" perhaps, but not in terms of racial domination, supremacy, or hierarchy? In this essay I look at US racial politics and culture as they shape the status of whites. In other words, I begin from the premise that it is no longer possible to assume a "normalized" whiteness, whose invisibility and relatively monolithic character signify immunity from political or cultural challenge. An alternative perspective is demanded, one which begins from a recognition of white racial dualism. My discussion of this theme, in the next section of this essay, is an extension to whites of the Duboisian idea that in a racist society the "color line" fractures the self, that it imposes a sort of schizophrenia on the bearers of racialized identities, which forces them to see themselves simultaneously from within and without. Du Bois of course intended this analysis to explain problems of black politics and culture at the turn of the 20th century; it was a time when few publically questioned the normalization of whiteness. I extrapolate his idea to whites at the end of the 20th century; today, I suggest, whiteness has been deeply fissured by the racial conflicts of the post-civil rights period. Since the 1960s contemporary racial discourse has been unable to function as a logic of racial superiority and justified exclusion. Therefore it has been forced into rearticulations, representations, reinterpretations of the meaning of race and, perforce, of whiteness. In the following section of this paper I analyze the new politicization of whiteness which has taken shape particularly in the post-civil rights era -- the period since the ambiguous victory of the civil rights movement in the mid-1960s. Here we discuss the reasons why, contrary to the racially egalitarian thrust of the civil rights "revolution," the significance of white identity was reinterpreted and repoliticized -- largely in a reactionary direction -- in the wake of the 1960s. I identify several factors contributing to this shift: the erosion of traditional ethnicities, the decline of class-based politics, and the elaboration of right-wing racial ideologies able to rearticulate some of the 1960s movement demands in a discourse of conservatism and "color-blindness." Next, I analyze the range of white racial projects that the contemporary politics of racial dualism generates. My account of racial projects, as developed in earlier work, focuses on the relationship between representation and structure. Therefore in this investigation I look for distinct views on the meaning of whiteness. How do these interpretations link to political positions, policies, and programs? I discuss a series of racial projects that span the political continuum, and develop some critical perspectives on the "left" or "progressive" projects. In the final section, I focus on the future of whiteness in the US, and sketch out some elements of what a potential anti-racist politics for whites might look like. Whiteness as Racial Dualism Once, US society was a nearly monolithic racial hierarchy, in which everyone knew "his" place. Today, nobody knows where he or she fits in the US racial order. Thirty years after the enactment of civil rights legislation, agreement about the continuing existence of racial subordination has vanished. The meaning of race has been deeply problematized. Why? Because the legacy of centuries of white supremacy lives on in the present, despite the partial victories of the 1960s. Because the idea of "equality," it turned out, could be reinterpreted, rearticulated, reinserted in the business-as-usual framework of US politics and culture. Because that framework is extremely resilient and able to absorb political challenges, even fundamental and radical ones. Because the outlawing of formal discrimination, which was a crucial and immediate objective of the 1960s movements, did not mean that informal racist practices would be eradicated, or indeed even that anti-discrimination laws would be seriously enforced. And yet it would be inaccurate to say that the movement failed. In virtually every area of social life, the impact of the postwar racial mobilizations is plain to see (Jaynes and Williams 1989). Although in some sectors, like housing desegregation, massive efforts to transform an entrenched and complex pattern of racial discrimination were largely (though not entirely) defeated (Massey and Denton 1993), in other areas -- for example the desegregation of the armed forces (Moskos 1988, Butler 1980) -- really remarkable change occurred. More relevant to this article, white racial attitudes shifted dramatically in the postwar period. As the definitive work on the subject put it: [S]egregation of and discrimination against black people were supported as principles by a majority of white Americans in the early 1940s, and no doubt in the preceding decades. By the early 1970s, however, support for overt discrimination in employment had nearly vanished..., and in most other public spheres of life -- public accommodations, public transportation, and even public schools -- the proportion of the white population insisting on segregation in principle was both small and shrinking (Schuman et al 1985, 193; emphasis original). "In principle." In practice, however, research demonstrates a continuing [W]hite reluctance to accept the implementation of policies intended to change race relations; reluctance on the part of whites to enter social settings (e.g., schools) in which blacks are the majority; continuing discriminatory behavior by whites, especially in areas involving close personal contact; conflicting beliefs of whites with regard to the values of equality and individualism...(Jaynes and Williams, eds. 1989, 116). So, monolithic white supremacy is over, yet in a more concealed way, white power and privilege live on. The overt politics of racial subordination has been destroyed, yet it is still very possible to "play the racial card" in the political arena. Racially-defined minorities are no longer subject to legal segregation, but they have not been relieved of the burdens of discrimination, even by laws supposedly intended to do so. Whites are no longer the official "ruling race," yet they still enjoy many of the privileges descended from the time when they were. In this situation the old recipes for racial equality, which involved creation of a "color-blind" society, have been transformed into formulas for the maintenance of racial inequality. The old programs for eliminating white racial privilege are now suspected of creating nonwhite racial privilege. The welfare state, once seen as the instrument for overcoming poverty and social injustice, is now accused of fomenting these very ills. Therefore, not only blacks (and other racially-identified minorities), but also whites, now experience a division in their racial identities. On the one hand, whites inherit the legacy of white supremacy, from which they continue to benefit. But on the other hand, they are subject to the moral and political challenges posed to that inheritance by the partial but real successes of the black movement (and affiliated movements). These movements advanced a countertradition to white supremacy, one which envisioned a radicalized, inclusive, participatory democracy, a substantively egalitarian economy, and a nonracial state. They deeply affected whites as well as blacks, exposing and denouncing often unconscious beliefs in white supremacy, and demanding new and more respectful forms of behavior in relation to nonwhites. Just as the movements partially reformed white supremacist institutions, so they partially transformed white racial consciousness. Obviously, they did not destroy the deep structures of white privilege, but they did make counterclaims on behalf of the racially excluded and subordinated. As a result, white identities have been displaced and refigured: they are now contradictory, as well as confused and anxiety ridden, to an unprecedented extent. It is this situation which can be described as white racial dualism.[1]

### Aff – Intersectionality

#### Spatial analysis is necessary intersectional – gender and class must be considered alongside racial formations

Razac 2007 (Sherene, professor of Sociology and Equity Studies in Education, the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto. "When Place becomes Race," Race and Racialization Essential Readings, 76)

It must be said at the outset that our focus on racial formations is automatically a focus on class and gender hierarchies as well.  Racial hierarchies come into existence through patriarchy and capitalism, each system of domination mutually constituting the other.  The lure of a spatial approach is precisely the possibility of charting the simultaneous operation of multiple systems of domination.  As Edward Soja explains in Postmodern Geographies, "the spatiality of social life is stubbornly simultaneous, but what we write down is successive because language is successive."  To consider, for example, the multiple systems that constitute spaces of prostitution, we must talk about the economic status of women in prostitution, the way in which areas of prostitution are marked as degenerate space that confirms the existence of white, respectable space, the sexual violence that brings so many young girls to prostitution, and so on.  Yet, beginning with any one practice privileges a particular system and leaves the impression that it is that system that is pre-eminent.  A spatial analysis can help us to see the operation of all the system as they mutually constitute each other.

### Aff – Cede the Political

#### Turn: They cede the politics of whiteness to white supremacists, destroying anti-racist movements

Sullivan 8  [Shannon Sullivan, Head of Philosophy and Professor of Philosophy, Women's Studies, and African and African American Studies at Pennsylvania State University, Spring 2008, “Whiteness as Wise Provincialism: Royce and the Rehabilitation of a Racial Category,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy, Vol. 44, No. 2]

In a similar fashion, when white people who care about racial justice have virtually no conscious or deliberate affiliation with their whiteness, the meaning and effect of whiteness is left to happenstance or, more likely, is determined by white supremacist groups. Royce’s primary concern is the dissolution of communities through neglect, and if well-intentioned white people do not care about, invest in, or acknowledge a significant history with their whiteness, then whiteness will be neglected. But unlike provincial communities, whiteness does not necessarily unravel or wither away because of simple neglect by anti-racist white people. Its neglect by anti-racists whites instead leaves it wide open for racist white groups to develop. Like a garden, whiteness can easily grow tough weeds of white supremacy if it is not wisely cultivated. The evil of abandoning whiteness, allowing white supremacists to make of it whatever they will, can be mitigated by a wise form of whiteness.

In practice, this means that white people who care about racial justice need to educate newcomers to whiteness—namely, white children—to be loyal to and care about their race. While Royce’s comments about the problem of newcomers due to increased geographical mobility do not apply directly to whiteness,16 white children can be thought of as newcomers to the community of whiteness who do not (yet) have an intimate connection to their race or know how to cultivate and care for it. Here again is an instance in which white supremacists have been allowed to corner the market on whiteness: almost all explicit reflection and writing on how to raise white children as white has been undertaken by groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, World Church of the Creator, and Stormfront.17 The association is so tight that the mere suggestion of educating white children in their whiteness is alarming to many people. But educating white children about their whiteness need and should not mean educating them to be white supremacists. A wise form of whiteness would help train the developing racial habits of white children in anti-racist ways.18

#### Attending to the specificity of whitenesses in the context of different racial projects is necessary for political engagement—a focus on the interplay between institutions and discourse, between policy and ontology is key

Winant 1997 (Howard, Director, UC Center for New Racial Studies. Institute for Social, Behavioral, and Economic. Research. University of California Santa Barbara, CA, Behind Blue Eyes: Contemporary White Racial Politics, <http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/winant/whitness.html>)

Yet it would be inaccurate to describe the racial reaction of the post-civil rights era as merely a new form of "coded" white supremacy. A crucial aspect of its success was its ability to reinterpret some of the 1960s movements' most cherished demands in a conservative and individualistic discourse focused on formal equality. This was in fact a legitimate rendition of certain movement positions, which were selected, to be sure, from a generally more radical movement discourse, but not invented out of whole cloth. The frequent reference made on the right to Dr. King's phrase about "the content of their character, not the color of their skin" (Steele 1990), for example, demonstrates the possibility of rearticulating movement claims in a more pacific direction, and not coincidentally, in a direction far more palatable to whites. The neoconservative rearticulation of 1960s movement demands in the form of the "color-blind" ideal of what a racially egalitarian society would look like thus served several purposes: it did in fact embody a certain current in movement thinking; it described the limited but real accomplishments of integration, accommodation, and tolerance that were achieved in the post-1960s period; it offered a concrete vision of how US society might get "beyond race"; it allowed society's inevitable failure to do this on a large scale to be blamed on "race radicals" and "separatists," who insisted on cultivating a "victim mentality"; and, as I have mentioned, it provided a fig leaf with which to cover over the unpleasant fact that widespread discrimination, and indeed unreconstructed white supremacist attitudes, remained. \*\*\* Thus from the late 1960s on, white identity has been reinterpreted, rearticulated in a dualistic fashion: on the one hand egalitarian, on the other hand privileged; on the one hand individualistic and "color-blind," on the other hand "normalized" and white. Nowhere is this new framework of the white "politics of difference" more clearly on display than in the reaction to affirmative action policies of all sorts (in hiring, university admissions, federal contracting, etc.). Assaults on these policies, which have been developing since their introduction as tentative and quite limited efforts at racial redistribution (Johnson 1967, but see also Steinberg 1994), are currently at hysterical levels. These attacks are clearly designed to effect ideological shifts, rather than to shift resources in any meaningful way. They represent whiteness as disadvantage, something which has few precedents in US racial history (Gallagher 1995). This imaginary white disadvantage -- for which there is almost no evidence at the empirical level -- has achieved widespread popular credence, and provides the cultural and political "glue" that holds together a wide variety of reactionary racial politics. White Racial Projects Both the onset of white racial dualism and the new politicization of whiteness in the post-civil rights era reflect the fragmentation of earlier concepts of white racial identity and of white supremacy more generally. In their place, a variety of concepts of the meaning of whiteness have emerged. How can we analyze and evaluate in systematic fashion this range of white racial projects? As I have argued elsewhere (Winant 1994, Omi and Winant 1994), the concept of racial projects is crucial to understanding the dynamics of racial formation in contemporary society. In this approach, the key element in racial formation is the link between signification and structure, between what race means in a particular discursive practice and how, based upon such interpretations, social structures are racially organized. The link between meaning and structure, discourse and institution, signification and organization, is concretized in the notion of the racial project. To interpret the meaning of race in a particular way at a given time is at least implicitly, but more often explicitly, to propose or defend a certain social policy, a particular racialized social structure, a racial order. The reverse is also true: in a highly racialized society, to put in place a particular social policy, or to mobilize for social or political action, is at least implicitly, but more often explicitly, to articulate a particular set of racial meanings, to signify race in certain ways. Existing racial projects can be classified along a political spectrum, according to explicit criteria drawn from the meaning each project attaches to "whiteness." Such a classification will necessarily be somewhat schematic, since in the real world of politics and culture ideas and meanings, as well as social practices, tend to overlap in unpredictable ways. Nevertheless, I think it would be beneficial to attempt to sort out alternative conceptions of whiteness, along with the politics that both flow from and inform these conceptions. This is what I attempt here, focusing on five key racial projects, which I term far right, new right, neoconservative, neoliberal, and new abolitionist.

### Aff – Commodification

#### The alt doesn’t solve – Oppositional Black discourse gets commodified by the market

Wright ‘4 [Kristine, teaches at the University of California-Irvine, Rise Up Hip Hop Nation: From Deconstructing Racial Politics to Building Positive Solutions, Socialism and Democracy online, http://sdonline.org/36/rise-up-hip-hop-nation-from-deconstructing-racial-politics-to-building-positive-solutions/]

The themes in rap songs are homogeneous because certain formulas have proven to be profitable, and are therefore imitated exhaustively. While rap images of black rage were controversial at one time, after twenty years, they are now normalized, validating mainstream stereotypes of young African Americans. In truth, hip-hop culture’s transition into mainstream America offers important insights on popular culture as mass culture, and popular culture as site of ideology construction and negotiation. Because they are socially constructed, popular culture and media representations are not independent of the power dynamics that inform popular culture’s production. We must not only examine the content of popular culture and media representations, we must also examine the media industry’s role in the creation process to better understand its influence.¶ The commodification of hip hop culture leaves the revolutionary aspect of the culture to be witnessed by only its most ardent supporters, once again, creating a “preaching to the choir” situation. As Gray asserts, cultural matters are, in fact, matters of power and politics. Through its commodification, hip hop culture’s political representative becomes the corporate controlled, almighty dollar.¶ While mainstream media and record companies promote hip hop that’s violent, misogynistic, materialistic, and individualistic, this depiction is really more of hip hop as commodity, a product of corporate America, and a reflection of mainstream America’s appetite for reified black images. Black rage is now entertainment. Unfortunately, the cost is more than the $17.99 price tag on a CD. The real cost is an innovative and multi-dimensional culture that becomes essentialized, a revolutionary culture that’s too often under-valued within its own community, and a collective identity that’s too easily prejudged and misrepresented… while the whole world watches.1¶

### Aff – Identity Politics Bad

#### Identity politics cedes the political – their appeal to racial experience ironically dehistoricizes oppression

Ireland ‘2 [Craig, is a SSHRCC (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada) postdoctoral fellow at the Université de Sherbrooke, The Appeal to Experience and Its Consequences Variations on a Persistent Thompsonian Theme, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/cultural\_critique/v052/52.1ireland.html]

Once an arcane philosophical term, experience over the last three decades has become a general buzzword. By the 1970s, experience spilled over into the streets, so to speak, and it has since then become the stuff of programmatic manifestos and has been enlisted as the ground from which microstrategies of resistance and subaltern counterhistories can be erected. But for all the blows and counterblows that have carried on for over three decades between those who appeal to the counterhegemonic potential of experience and those who see such appeals as naive voluntarism, such debates show no signs of abating. On the contrary, they have become yet more strident, as can be seen by Michael Pickering's recent attempt to rehabilitate the viability of the term "experience" for subaltern historiography by turning to E. P. Thompson and Dilthey and, more recently still, by Sonia Kruks's polemical defense of experience for subaltern inquiry by way of a reminder that poststructuralist critics of experience owe much to those very thinkers, from Sartre to Merleau-Ponty, whom they have debunked as if in oedipal rebellion against their begetters.¶ Such debates over experience have so far gravitated around issues of epistemology and agency, pitting those who debunk experience as the stuff of an antiquated philosophy of consciousness against those who argue that subaltern experience provides an enclave against strong structural determination. Lost in such debates, however, have been the potential consequences of appeals to immediate experience as a ground for subaltern agency and specificity. And it is just such potential consequences that will be examined here.¶ These indeed demand our attention, for more is at stake in the appeal to experience than some epistemological faux pas. By so wagering on the perceived immediacy of experience as the evidence for subaltern specificity and counterhegemonic action, appeals to immediate experience, however laudable their goal, end up unwittingly naturalizing what is in fact historical, and, in so doing, they leave the door as wide-open to a progressive politics of identity as to a retreat to neoethnic tribalism. Most alarming about such appeals to [End Page 87] experience is not some failure of epistemological nerve—it is instead their ambiguous political and social ramifications. And these have reverberated beyond academia and found an echo in para-academia— so much so that experience has increasingly become the core concept or key word of subaltern groups and the rallying call for what Craig Calhoun calls the "new social movements" in which "experience is made the pure ground of knowledge, the basis of an essentialized standpoint of critical awareness" (468 n.64).¶ The consequences of such appeals to experience can best be addressed not by individually considering disparate currents, but by seeking their common denominator. And in this regard, E. P. Thompson will occupy the foreground. It is safe to say that what started as an altercation between Thompson and Althusser has since spawned academic and para-academic "histories from below" and subaltern cultural inquiries that, for all their differences, share the idea that the identities and counterhistories of the disenfranchised can be buttressed by the specificity of a group's concrete experiences. Much theorizing on experience by certain cultural and historiographical trends, as many have already pointed out, has been but a variation on a persistent Thompsonian theme in which Thompson's "kind of use of experience has the same foundational status if we substitute 'women's' or 'black' or 'lesbian' or 'homosexual' for 'working class'" (Scott, 786).

### Aff – Genealogy Bad

#### Turn—the invocation of genealogy is itself a disciplinary norm complicit with whiteness

Stevens 2003 (Jacqueline, Professor of Political Science at Northwestern, Political Theory, 31.4, JSTOR)

As a consequence of Foucault’s influence, one can now list hundreds of books and articles whose authors pursue a “genealogy” and not a “history” of this or that.2 So, we might now ask: What does a genealogy mean to us? What is the value of a genealogy? How ought we to pursue questions about geneal- ogies? The quick answer first. We value genealogies for political resistance, aesthetic criticism, and rote professionalization. No serious student of cul- tural studies today would do a “history of X” and not its genealogy for her dis- sertation. The fad indicates nothing especially insidious about cultural stud- ies or the linguistic turn in parts of the academy, but amounts to one more disciplining convention. Far less insistent or hegemonic than, say, the requirement of rational choice theory or behavioral studies in the social sci- ences, the prevalence of a Foucauldian lexicon in the humanities calls atten- tion to itself precisely because of its advocates’ general reluctance to impose orthodoxies. The problem with the success of Foucault’s method is not its opacity or relativism, as conservative critics of Foucault carp, but rather that it holds forth its own specialized jargon that turns out to be belied by its own intellectual history, leading to strained readings and analyses that at times mirror the pointless, obsessive methodism in other fields. Foucault ([1971] 1977a) claims to derive his devotion to genealogy from Nietzsche, yet Nietzsche himself mocked genealogists and their enterprise. Approaching Nietzsche through Deleuze ([1962] 1983), Foucault misreads the single text in which Nietzsche discusses the concept of genealogy (Nietz- sche [1887] 1967b), and seems thereby to have led a herd of academics away from Nietzsche’s own meaning of ‘Genealogie’ and into what by now may have become a revaluation of the word. For an elite circle of students, “gene- alogy” has come to mean something quite different from its ordinary use and etymology. After offering an old-fashioned intellectual history of Nietz- sche’s mocking use of ‘Genealogie’, I turn to how the term has come to be misused and perhaps even abused by Foucault and his disciples.

### Aff – Disability – AT: Root Cause

#### Disability can’t be fully explained by whiteness

Smith ‘4 [Phil, Executive Director, Vermont Developmental Disabilities Council, “Whiteness, Normal Theory, and Disability Studies”, Disability Studies Quarterly Spring 2004, Volume 24, No. 2, http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/491/668]

In ways similar to those in which marginalized racial groupings have been forced to live outside the boundaries of normalized white landscapes, segregation into literal and virtual disability ghettos has been the norm in modernist Western culture (Groch 1998; Smith 1999b). People with disabilities are denied even basic health care, so that those labeled as having so-called mental retardation have a life expectancy that is as little as two-thirds – or less – that of the total population (Horwitz, Kerker, Owens, and Zigler 2000). And people with disabilities are at significant risk for violence in the form of sexual, physical, mental, emotional, and verbal abuse in their lives (Horwitz, Kerker, Owens, and Zigler 2000; Sobsey and Doe 1991; Smith 2001c; Sullivan and Knutson 2000). Some have suggested that the creation of the institutional framework of special education itself has served "...to provide an education for 'normal' students unimpeded by students who are troublesome, in the widest possible sense" (Tomlinson 1995, p. 127). Groch (1998) has pointedly noted that both racism and ableism are ideologies, "with most Americans seldom questioning their legitimacy" (p. 202). By "most Americans," I understand her to mean "most white, able-bodied Americans." The clarification is significant, I believe, because it begins to explore the invisibility of ability, what some see as "normal," for those who define others as disabled. Doing so denies the normality of disability, the ways in which what is portrayed as outside boundaries of normative landscapes by the ideology of eugenicist ableism is, from critical theory and disability studies perspectives, in fact normative. Others have also pointed out the invisibility of ability, of being able-bodied. For example, "there are few names that refer to that status except those in currency within the disabled community such as 'able-bodied', 'nondisabled,' and 'abled" (Gordon and Rosenblum 2001, p.13). In the same way that people of "color" may see whiteness better than Whites, so people labeled as having a disability may be able to see normality better than those who are only, at best, temporarily able-bodied. There is one difference between the status of whiteness (or, for that matter, masculinity) and the status of able-bodiedness: "Whites do not worry about becoming black; men don't worry about becoming women. Disability, however, is always a potential status..." (Gordon and Rosenblum 2001, p.16). It is probable, therefore, that significantly greater anxiety – perhaps terror is a better word – attends what is thought to be the dark specter of disability, and why eugenicism – again, perhaps genocide is a better word – remains a real possibility in the lives of people with disabilities.

### Aff – Disability – Perm

#### The perm solves best – theories of white supremacy need to take ableism into account

Smith ‘4 [Phil, Executive Director, Vermont Developmental Disabilities Council, “Whiteness, Normal Theory, and Disability Studies”, Disability Studies Quarterly Spring 2004, Volume 24, No. 2, http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/491/668]

I propose an intellectual alliance between whiteness studies and disability studies in order to accentuate the underlying invisibility of normative whiteness and able-ness ideologies. These structures are at the core of Western culture, and yet remain unnoticed, un-observed. Without turning our cultural gaze on them – without scrutinizing and inspecting their borders – these ideologies will continue to oppress and obfuscate, exclude and excise, human communities that have been placed not just outside the margins, but off the page. In calling for this kind of intellectual alliance, I do not want to place it in opposition to a creative, articulate, cross-disciplinary collaboration between race studies and disability studies. Besides creating a problematic and difficult binary, I want to acknowledge the importance of the work of anti-racist scholars like Derrick Bell (1987), W.E.B. DuBois (1971), Frantz Fanon (1968), bell hooks (1994), Toni Morrison (1992), and Cornel West (1999) in creating the possibility for and development of a robust whiteness studies. Race studies has functioned in the same way that disability studies has in creating the development of normal theories, as a kind of essential breeding ground for ideas and thought. The work of those within the Black American civil rights movement has done much to make it possible for people with disabilities to end their own segregation and discrimination (Robinson 2002). And the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa enabled some disability activists to begin thinking and arguing about the oppression of people with disabilities (Campbell & Oliver 1996). What implications does this intersection have for both whiteness studies and disability studies? It will be essential for both scholarly fields to see themselves as inherently interdisciplinary. I use the term field, and think of the meadow out behind my old Vermont farmhouse, filled with an amazing diversity of plant, animal, and, as I walk through it on a late summer evening to swim naked in the dark at the pond by its edge, even spiritual, life. To explore that meadow, to understand it in totally new and increasingly holistic ways, I need to be not just a biologist, zoologist, or botanist, but a poet, a farmer, a philosopher, a sociologist. So, too, will those seeking to explore the meadows of whiteness and disability need to stretch far beyond what has traditionally been thought of as the processes of exploration used to outline cultural processes – they will need to use a synergistic tool belt worn by an overtly Renaissance craftsperson. What does it mean for whiteness to recognize disability within its own ranks? An exploration of the way ableism fits in with all the other "isms" will be an important expansion of the work of whiteness studies scholarship. Too often left out of such cultural exploration, an understanding of the impact of disability on whiteness in Western culture will be an area worth exploring. For example, what is the intersection of whiteness and disability in novels like Moby Dick, The Color Purple, or Heart of Darkness, in films like Taxi Driver, or in works by photographers such as Diane Arbus?

### Aff – AT: Heg/Empire Bad

#### A totalizing rejection of hegemony is politically disabling – the alternative is reactionary, ineffective, and ignores the very real contributions western political thought has made to combat oppression

Thompson ‘3 [Michael J., Founder and Editor of Logos and teaches Political Theory at Hunter College CUNY., “Iraq, Hegemony, and the Question of American Empire”, Logos Vol. 2 Issue 4, [www.logosjournal.com/thompson\_iraq.htm](http://www.logosjournal.com/thompson_iraq.htm)]

Hegemony in international terms without some kind of competing force, such as the Soviets, can clearly lead to the abuse of power and a unilateralist flaunting of international institutions that do not serve at the imperium's whim. But this should not mean that hegemony itself is a negative concept. Although empire is something rightfully reviled, hegemony may not be as bad as everyone thinks. We need to consider what is progressive and transformative in the ideas and values of the western republican and liberal traditions. We need to advocate not an anti-hegemonic stance in form, but an anti-hegemonic and anti-imperialist stance in content, one that advocates the particular interests of capital of the market in more broad terms rather than the universal political interests of others. Rather than choose between western hegemony on the one hand and political and cultural relativism on the other, we need to approach this problem with an eye toward cosmopolitanism and what the political theorist Stephen Eric Bronner has called "planetary life." Simple resistance to American "imperial" tendencies is no longer enough for a responsible, critical and rational left. Not only does it smack of tiers-mondisme but at the same time it rejects the realities of globalization which are inexorable and require a more sophisticated political response. The real question I am putting forth is simply this: is it the case that hegemony is in itself inherently bad? Or, is it possible to consider that, because it can, at least in theory, consist of the diffusion of western political ideas, values and institutions, it could be used as a progressive force in transforming those nations and regions that have been unable to deal politically with the problems of economic development, political disintegration and ethnic strife? It is time that we begin to consider the reality that western political thought provides us with unique answers to the political, economic and social problems of the world and this includes reversing the perverse legacies of western imperialism itself. And it is time that the left begins to embrace the ideas of the Enlightenment and its ethical impulse for freedom, democracy, social progress and human dignity on an international scale. This is rhetorically embraced by neoconservatives, but it turns out to be more of a mask for narrower economic motives and international realpolitik, and hence their policies and values run counter to the radical impulses of Enlightenment thought. Western ideas and institutions can find affinities in the rational strains of thought in almost every culture in the world, from 12th century rationalist Islamic philosophers like Alfarabi, Avicenna (Ibn Sinna) and Averroes (Ibn Rushd) to India's King Akbar and China's Mencius. The key is to find these intellectual affinities and push them to their concrete, political conclusions. Clearly, the left's problem with the idea of the spread of western political ideas and institutions is not entirely wrong. There was a racist and violent precedent set by the French and English imperial projects lasting well into the 20th century. The problem is in separating the form from the content of western hegemonic motives and intentions. And it is even more incorrect to see the occupation of Iraq as a symptom of western ideas and Enlightenment rationalism. Nothing could be further from the case and the sooner this is realized, the more the left will be able to carve out new paths of critique and resistance to a hegemony that is turning into empire. And it is precisely for this reason why, in institutional terms, the UN needs to be brought back in. Although there are clearly larger political and symbolic reasons for this, such as the erosion of a unilateralist framework for the transition from Hussein's regime, there is also the so-called "effect of empire" where Iraq is being transformed into an instrument of ideological economics. The current U.S. plan for Iraq, one strongly supported by Bremer as well as the Bush administration, will remake its economy into one of the most open to trade, capital flows and foreign investment in the world as well as being the lowest taxed. Iraq is being transformed into an neo-liberal utopia where American industries hooked up to the infamous "military-industrial complex" will be able to gorge themselves on contracts for the development of everything from infrastructure to urban police forces. As time moves on, we are seeing that Iraq provides us with a stunning example of how hegemony becomes empire. It is an example of how the naïve intention of "nation building" is unmasked and laid bare, seen for what it truly is: the forceful transformation of a sovereign state into a new form suited to narrow western (specifically American) interests. Attempts to build a constitution have failed not from the lack of will, but from the lack of any political discourse about what form the state should take and about what values should be enshrined in law. Ruling bodies have become illegitimate almost immediately upon their appointment because there exists almost complete social fragmentation, and the costs of knitting it together are too great for America to assume. In the end, America has become, with its occupation of Iraq and its unilateralist and militaristic posture, an empire in the most modern sense of the term. But we should be careful about distinguishing empire from a hegemon and the implications of each. And since, as Hegel put it, we are defined by what we oppose, the knee-jerk and ineffectual response from the modern left has been to produce almost no alternative at all to the imperatives that drive American empire as seen in places such as Iraq. To neglect the military, economic and cultural aspects of American power is to ignore the extent to which it provokes violent reaction and counter-reaction. But at the same time, to ignore the important contributions of western political ideas and institutions and their power and efficacy in achieving peace and mutual cooperation, whether it be between ethnic communities or whole nations themselves, is to ignore the very source of political solutions for places where poverty, oppression and dictatorships are the norm and remain stubbornly intact.

#### The alt won’t solve – Hegemony is sustainable, stable and creates relative world peace

Lieber and Alexander 2005 (Keir and Gerard “Waiting for Balancing: Why the World is not Pushing Back” International Security 30.1, projectmuse)

The major powers are not balancing against the United States because of the nature of U.S. grand strategy in the post–September 11 world. There is no doubt that this strategy is ambitious, assertive, and backed by tremendous offensive military capability. But it is also highly selective and not broadly threatening. Specifically, the United States is focusing these means on the greatest threats to its interests—that is, the threats emanating from nuclear proliferator states and global terrorist organizations. Other major powers are not balancing U.S. power because they want the United States to succeed in defeating these shared threats or are ambivalent yet understand they are not in its crosshairs. In many cases, the diplomatic friction identiªed by proponents of the concept of soft balancing instead reflects disagreement about tactics, not goals, which is nothing new in history. To be sure, our analysis cannot claim to rule out other theories of great power behavior that also do not expect balancing against the United States. Whether the United States is not seen as a threat worth balancing because of shared interests in nonproliferation and the war on terror (as we argue), because of geography and capability limitations that render U.S. global hegemony impossible (as some offensive realists argue), or because transnational democratic values, binding international institutions, and economic interdependence obviate the need to balance (as many liberals argue) is a task for further theorizing and empirical analysis. Nor are we claiming that balancing against the United States will never happen. Rather, there is no persuasive evidence that U.S. policy is provoking the kind of balancing behavior that the Bush administration’s critics suggest. In the meantime, analysts should continue to use credible indicators of balancing behavior in their search for signs that U.S. strategy is having a counterproductive effect on U.S. security. Below we discuss why the United States is not seen by other major powers as a threat worth balancing. Next we argue that the impact of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq on international relations has been exaggerated and needs to be seen in a broader context that reveals far more cooperation with the United States than many analysts acknowledge. Finally, we note that something akin to balancing is taking place among would-be nuclear proliferators and Islamist extremists, which makes sense given that these are the threats targeted by the United States. the united states’ focused enmity Great powers seek to organize the world according to their own preferences, looking for opportunities to expand and consolidate their economic and military power positions. Our analysis does not assume that the United States is an exception. It can fairly be seen to be pursuing a hegemonic grand strategy and has repeatedly acted in ways that undermine notions of deeply rooted shared values and interests. U.S. objectives and the current world order, however, are unusual in several respects. First, unlike previous states with preponderant power, the United States has little incentive to seek to physically control foreign territory. It is secure from foreign invasion and apparently sees little benefit in launching costly wars to obtain additional material resources. Moreover, the bulk of the current international order suits the United States well. Democracy is ascendant, foreign markets continue to liberalize, and no major revisionist powers seem poised to challenge U.S. primacy. This does not mean that the United States is a status quo power, as typically defined. The United States seeks to further expand and consolidate its power position even if not through territorial conquest. Rather, U.S. leaders aim to bolster their power by promoting economic growth, spending lavishly on military forces and research and development, and dissuading the rise of any peer competitor on the international stage. Just as important, the confluence of the proliferation of WMD and the rise of Islamist radicalism poses an acute danger to U.S. interests. This means that U.S. grand strategy targets its assertive enmity only at circumscribed quarters, ones that do not include other great powers. The great powers, as well as most other states, either share the U.S. interest in eliminating the threats from terrorism and WMD or do not feel that they have a significant direct stake in the matter. Regardless, they understand that the United States does not have offensive designs on them. Consistent with this proposition, the United States has improved its relations with almost all of the major powers in the post–September 11 world. This is in no small part because these governments—not to mention those in key countries in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, such as Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia— are willing partners in the war on terror because they see Islamist radicalism as a genuine threat to them as well. U.S. relations with China, India, and Russia, in particular, are better than ever in large part because these countries similarly have acute reasons to fear transnational Islamist terrorist groups. The EU’s official grand strategy echoes that of the United States. The 2003 European security strategy document, which appeared months after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, identifies terrorism by religious extremists and the proliferation of WMD as the two greatest threats to European security. In language familiar to students of the Bush administration, it declares that Europe’s “most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction.” 60 It is thus not surprising that the major European states, including France and Germany, are partners of the United States in the Proliferation Security Initiative. Certain EU members are not engaged in as wide an array of policies toward these threats as the United States and other of its allies. European criticism of the Iraq war is the preeminent example. But sharp differences over tactics should not be confused with disagreement over broad goals. After all, comparable disagreements, as well as incentives to free ride on U.S. efforts, were common among several West European states during the Cold War when they nonetheless shared with their allies the goal of containing the Soviet Union.61

### Aff – AT: State Bad

#### Their critique of the state ignores worse forms of imperialism and the catastrophic effects of collapse of the state system for oppressed groups

Pasha ’96 [Mustapha Kamal, Professor and Chair of the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Aberdeen, “Security as Hegemony”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 21, No. 3 (July-Sept. 1996), pp. 283-302, JSTOR]

An attack on the postcolonial state as the author of violence73 and its drive to produce a modern citizenry may seem cathartic, without producing the semblance of an alternative vision of a new political community or fresh forms of life among existing political communi- ties. Central to this critique is an assault on the state and other modern institutions said to disrupt some putatively natural flow of history. Tradition, on this logic, is uprooted to make room for grafted social forms; modernity gives birth to an intolerant and insolent Leviathan, a repository of violence and instrumental rationality's finest speci- men. Civil society - a realm of humaneness, vitality, creativity, and harmony - is superseded, then torn asunder through the tyranny of state-building. The attack on the institution of the state appears to substitute teleology for ontology. In the Third World context, especially, the rise of the modern state has been coterminous with the negation of past histories, cultures, identities, and above all with violence. The stubborn quest to construct the state as the fount of modernity has subverted extant communities and alternative forms of social orga- nization. The more durable consequence of this project is in the realm of the political imaginary: the constrictions it has afforded; the denials of alternative futures. The postcolonial state, however, has also grown to become more heterodox - to become more than simply modernity's reckless agent against hapless nativism. The state is also seen as an expression of greater capacities against want, hunger, and injustice; as an escape from the arbitrariness of communities established on narrower rules of inclusion/exclusion; as identity removed somewhat from capri- cious attachments. No doubt, the modern state has undermined tra- ditional values of tolerance and pluralism, subjecting indigenous so- ciety to Western-centered rationality. But tradition can also conceal particularism and oppression of another kind. Even the most elastic interpretation of universality cannot find virtue in attachments re- furbished by hatred, exclusivity, or religious bigotry. A negation of the state is no guarantee that a bridge to universality can be built. Perhaps the task is to rethink modernity, not to seek refuge in a blind celebration of tradition. Outside, the state continues to inflict a self-producing "security dilemma"; inside, it has stunted the emergence of more humane forms of political expres- sion. But there are always sites of resistance that can be recovered and sustained. A rejection of the state as a superfluous leftover of modernity that continues to straitjacket the South Asian imagination must be linked to the project of creating an ethical and humane order based on a restructuring of the state system that privileges the mighty and the rich over the weak and the poor.74 Recognizing the constrictions of the modern Third World state, a reconstruction of state-society re- lations inside the state appears to be a more fruitful avenue than wishing the state away, only to be swallowed by Western-centered globalization and its powerful institutions. A recognition of the patent failure of other institutions either to deliver the social good or to procure more just distributional rewards in the global political economy may provide a sobering reassessment of the role of the state. An appreciation of the scale of human tragedy accompanying the collapse of the state in many local contexts may also provide im- portant points of entry into rethinking the one-sided onslaught on the state. Nowhere are these costs borne more heavily than in the postcolonial, so-called Third World, where time-space compression has rendered societal processes more savage and less capable of ad- justing to rhythms dictated by globalization

### Aff – Queer Theory Perm

#### Queer theory destabilizes whiteness and makes collective action in the face ontological antagonism possible

Pak 2012 (Yumi, PhD in literature from UC-San Diego, “Outside Relationality: Autobiographical Deformations and the Literary Lineage of Afro-pessimism in 20th and 21st Century African American Literature,” Dissertation through Proquest)

The fruitfulness of queer theory, however, is that the discipline is founded on the idea of resisting definition and stability around the concept of subjectivity, while at the same time maintaining a political urgency around the situating of that same subject within spheres of lived experience. In other words, queer theory precisely encapsulates the borderland that Gloria Anzaldúa defines as a “vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural boundary. It is in a constant state of transition” (Anzaldúa 25). It is, in its best incarnation, the epitome of what she calls a mestiza consciousness: a consciousness born out of the recognition of multiple and sometimes warring positionalities that exist as a “source of intense pain” and in order to keep “breaking down the unitary aspect of each new paradigm” (102). Utilizing this definition and purpose of queer theory, I argue that Himes’ utilization of queer kinships works to undo the conditions of natal alienation through the formation of familial bonds. Although these gestures toward kinship ultimately (and inevitably) fail, I maintain that Himes seems to directly address E. Patrick Johnson’s question, “what is the utility of queer theory on the front lines, in the trenches, on the street, or anyplace where the racialized and sexualized body is beaten, starved, fired, cursed – indeed, when the body is the site of trauma?” (“‘Quare’ Studies” 129). Here, on the front lines, I read Himes as staking a claim in queerness-as-function as opposed to queerness-as-representation; in other words, he utilizes queerness to point to the condition of social death that defines Jimmy, and not as a means of expressing either the acts or the orientation of same-sex desire.