***1AC***

Contention 1: Terrorist Attack

Risk of a terrorist attack is high and the US hasn’t responded to the threat- we are still foot dragging

McCarter ’11 (Mickey McCarter, Journalist at Homeland Security Today, “TSA Calls for Increased Vigilance Due to Threat of Rail Plot”, http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/today-s-news-analysis/single-article/tsa-calls-for-increased-vigilance-due-to-threat-of-rail-plot/ee3a737e6470b70bf35d05bc696c3c82.html, May 9 ,2011, LEQ)

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continued to be on heightened alert over the weekend, following evidence that al Qaeda has been developing a potential plot to attack US rail systems on the tenth anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. TSA provided US rail companies with a security bulletin, continuing its practice of sharing information and intelligence about relevant threats to transportation industry partners. While TSA had no specific intelligence on an exact or imminent threat, the agency took the step of warning US transportation systems to increase vigilance for possible suspicious activity. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced Thursday that it sent an intelligence message to state and local governments about the al Qaeda plot, apparently hatched in February. The information was gathered from material that US forces retrieved earlier in the week when US Navy SEALs raided the compound of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, earlier in the week and killed the terrorist leader. However, DHS chose not to raise alert level in the National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) because no immediate threat was detected from examination of the available intelligence. "We want to stress that this alleged al Qaeda plotting is based on initial reporting, which is often misleading or inaccurate and subject to change," DHS Press Secretary Matt Chandler said in a statement. "We remain at a heightened state of vigilance, but do not intend to issue an NTAS alert at this time. We will issue alerts only when we have specific or credible information to convey to the American public. Our security posture, which always includes a number of measures both seen and unseen, will continue to respond appropriately to protect the American people from an evolving threat picture both in the coming days and beyond." Since the death of bin Laden, DHS generally continued to work with other agencies to take protective measures such as reviewing terrorist targets and critical infrastructure. The department sent officers and agents to boost security at various areas, including some US airports. Not everyone approved of the DHS decision to not issue an NTAS alert. Sen. Susan Collins (R-Maine), ranking member of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, questioned Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano about the decision in a hearing May 11. Friday, she reiterated her position that DHS should raise the alert level in light of intelligence concerning the plot against US rail systems. "Earlier this week, I urged the Secretary of Homeland Security to increase the threat level, at least for the next two weeks, while an intelligence assessment is conducted of the data seized from Osama bin Laden's compound and as a precautionary measure given the possibility of a retaliatory attack. I continue to question the secretary's decision not to increase the threat level," Collins said in a statement. William Millar, president of the American Public Transportation Association (APTA), stressed the history of terrorist attacks against rail lines and buses. Al Qaeda and other Islamist extremists have attacked rail transit systems in London, Madrid, and Moscow in recent years. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported in 2002 that one-third of terrorist attacks globally target transportation systems, Millar noted. "The threat to public transportation still clearly exists and the federal government needs to step up to the plate and adequately fund our nation's public transportation security needs. Transit security is national security and national security is the responsibility of the federal government," Millar said in a statement Friday. Federal funding for transit security has been too low, Millar argued. In fiscal 2011, DHS provides only $250 million in transit security funding outside of airport security. The White House has proposed $300 million in its fiscal 2012 budget. "Both of these levels of investment are inadequate," Millar said. "The 9/11 Commission Act [Public Law 110-53] called for the need for increased investment in transit security and authorized funding at the following levels: $650 million (fiscal 2008), $750 million (fiscal 2009), $900 million (fiscal 2010), and $1.1 billion (fiscal 2011) or $3.4 billion over four years. In fact, over the past four years, Congress has only appropriated less than half of the funding it authorized in the 9-11 Commission Act." Millar cited a recent survey that determined US public transportation systems require $6.4 billion over the next five years to adequately secure their infrastructure. He called upon Congress to enact legislation to "dramatically" increase federal transit security spending.

And Obama has de-regulated protection- increased the probability- high risk of an attack

Malkin ‘9 (Michelle Malkin, American conservative blogger, political commentator and author, “How Obama cronyism threatens rail security”, http://michellemalkin.com/2009/09/11/special-report-how-obama-cronyism-threatens-rail-security/, September 11, 2009, LEQ)

New Delhi. Mumbai. Chechnya. Madrid. London. The question isn’t whether America will suffer a jihadi attack on our passenger rail lines, but when. So, why has President Obama neutered the nation’s most highly-trained post-9/11 counterterrorism rail security team? All signs point to business-as-usual cronyism and pandering to power-grabbing union bosses. Amtrak’s Office of Security Strategy and Special Operations (OSSSO) grew out of a counterterrorism and intelligence unit developed by the Bush administration in the wake of global jihadi attacks on mass transit systems. The office was staffed with Special Forces veterans, law enforcement officers, railroad specialists, other military personnel, and experts who collectively possessed hundreds of years of experience fighting on the front lines against terrorism. Each member underwent at least 800 hours of rail security-related training, including advanced marksmanship, close quarters, and protective security exercises. OSSSO’s mobile prevention teams acted as “force multipliers” working with local, state, and federal authorities across the country to detect, deter, and defend against criminal and terrorist attacks on mass transit. They conducted hundreds of show-of-force, uniformed, and rail marshal rides. OSSSO also provided security services for President Bush, the Pope, the 2008 Democrat and Republican conventions, then-Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama’s campaign events, and then-Democratic vice presidential candidate Joe Biden’s Amtrak whistle stop tours. The counterterrorism unit’s push to conduct random passenger and baggage screening earned predictable criticism from civil liberties absolutists, but also garnered bipartisan praise on Capitol Hill. Even Democrat Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas hailed the rail security team’s work last year: “Let me congratulate them for being aware” of the threat to rail passengers, the chairman of a House Homeland Security subcommittee on transportation security, told USA Today in July 2008. “(But) this has to be the new standard for Amtrak.” How will Congress react to the news that this high standard has been obliterated? According to multiple government sources who declined to be identified for fear of retribution, OSSSO’s East Coast and West Coast teams have not worked in a counterterrorism capacity since the summer. Their long-arms were put under lock and key after the abrupt departures of Amtrak vice president for security strategy and special operations Bill Rooney and Amtrak Inspector General Fred Weiderhold. Weiderhold played an instrumental role in creating OSSSO’s predecessor at Amtrak, the Counter-Terrorism Unit (CTU). He tapped Rooney to oversee the office. But Rooney was quietly given the “thank you for your service” heave-ho in May and Weiderhold was unexpectedly “retired” a few weeks later — just as the government-subsidized rail service faced mounting complaints about its meddling in financial audits and probes. As I reported in June, Weiderhold had blown the whistle on intrusion of Amtrak’s Law Department into his financial audits and probes. A damning, 94-page report from an outside legal firm concluded that the “independence and effectiveness” of the Amtrak inspector general’s office were “being substantially impaired” by the Law Department – which happens to be headed by Eleanor Acheson, a close pal of Vice President Biden. Biden, in turn, is tight with the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), the powerful union that represents the Amtrak Police Department. According to OSSSO sources, the APD brass have been aggrieved over the non-unionized counterterrorism unit’s existence from its inception. A West Coast OSSSO team member told me that union leaders blocked police credentialing efforts by his office for more than a year. An East Coast OSSSO team member told me that the FOP recently filed a grievance against one of its counterterrorism officers for assisting a train conductor who asked for help in ejecting a ticketless passenger. Unlike the highly-specialized officers at OSSSO, APD officers possess minimal counterterrorism training. Past studies show alarmingly low pass rates among APD patrolmen who have attended undergone basic special operations classes, according to government sources. The Amtrak FOP continues to squabble over turf with the rival Teamsters Union; its leaders can’t even agree on minimal physical fitness standards for its members that have yet to be implemented. Nevertheless, OSSSO is now under the command and control of the APD — and federal stimulus funding specifically earmarked for the counterterrorism unit has now been absorbed by the police department. Amtrak did not respond to my questions about OSSSO by my column deadline Thursday afternoon. Al Qaeda operatives have repeatedly plotted to wreak havoc on our mass transit systems. And they will try, try again. American jihadi Bryant Neal Vinas recently gave the feds details about a plot blow up a Long Island Rail Road commuter train in New York’s Penn Station. As America marks the September 11 anniversary and the “Never forget” mantra echoes, an OSSSO team member told me: “There is no room for internal protectionism, vested interests of unions, or asset-manipulating bureaucracies where the safety of our national passenger railroad is concerned.” Does anyone else in Washington agree?

And they would use biological/chemical weapons when attacking railways- cause massive bioweapon devastation and destroy infrastructure

HITRAC ‘6 (Homeland Infrastructure Threat & Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC), Office of Intelligence and Analysis / Directorate for Preparedness, Strategic Sector Assessment, “(U//FOUO) The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Commercial Passenger and Freight Rail System”, Ohttp://www.nefafoundation.org/file/FeaturedDocs/HITRAC_PassengerFreightRail.pdf, May 24, 2006, LEQ)

Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks (U//FOUO) Terrorists show continuing interest in toxic chemical dispersion devices, given the relative ease with which toxic materials can be acquired or produced, the potential for large numbers of casualties, disruptions at the scene of the event, and psychological impact on the population. Improvised chemical attacks against the U.S. passenger rail systems pose a serious threat, as evidenced by the liquid sarin attack on the Tokyo subway system carried out by the Japanese religious cult Aum Shinrikyo in March 1995 that killed twelve passengers. (U//FOUO) Aum Shinrikyo also was responsible for an attempted biological attack in March 1995 in the Tokyo subway system involving three briefcases left in the Kasumigaseki train station. Although no injuries resulted, an Aum Shinrikyo member later confessed this was a failed biological attack involving the use of botulinum toxin. (U//FOUO) A radiological attack against a rail target could be conducted by exploding a radiological dispersal device close to unshielded individuals, rolling stock, and other rail equipment. (U) Hazardous Material Attacks (U//FOUO) U.S. freight trains carry more than 1 million tons of hazardous chemicals daily, 50 percent of the nation’s total. The vast majority of these chemicals, if released, will not cause mass casualties. A number of chemicals, however, can be fatal if inhaled. Nonetheless, an attack to release hazardous material (HAZMAT) as a weapon would be difficult for terrorists to execute and probably would not produce the desired effect, given the number of variables such as wind speed and direction, train timetables, and the capability of railroad HAZMAT teams to control and contain the effects of a release rapidly. (U) Toxic Inhalation Hazard Chemicals: A Rail Transportation Concern (U//FOUO) Of all toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) chemicals, chlorine is of greatest concern to the freight rail industry, because of the high number of chlorine-filled tank cars on the nation’s tracks each day, and due to the high demand and criticality of chlorine in water purification and other commercial uses. (U) Demolition or Sabotage of Rail Bridges and Tunnels (U//FOUO) The destruction or sabotage of rail bridges and tunnels is another possible method of terrorist attack against the U.S. rail system. Tens of thousands of rail bridges throughout the country vary widely in design, from reinforced wooden bridges to heavy steel trestle bridges. The simple sabotage of the rails on a bridge can cause a derailment, the momentum of which could force the engine and at least some of the cars to drop from the bridge. Demolition or sabotage of rail tunnels may increase casualties when they involve hazardous materials or are under water.

And railways are hyper-vulnerable to terrorist and hazardous catastrophes – err affirmative on risk- destroys the environment

Temple ‘7 (Bob Temple, Contributer to Group 7, think tank for Railroad Security, Quoting The GAO Report on Rail Security, The AAR Hearing on Rail Security, and The CRS Report for Congress - Passenger Rail Security: Overview of Issue, http://www.personal.psu.edu/staff/r/p/rpt117/sra211/vulnerabilities.htm, May 8, 2007, LEQ)

Major Vulnerabilities to Railway Security Looking at the past, the United States has not had many major attacks on its railways. This could lead people to falsely believe that our railways are secure. Our railways do have some levels of security, but unfortunately, there is just not enough of it where it needs to be. The object of this section is to identify the major vulnerabilities to railway security. Large Area Covered by Railroads Possibly the largest, and probably most obvious, vulnerabilities to railways is the sheer amount of railroad tracks around the country. There are over 100,000 miles of rail in the United States . The extensiveness of the infrastructure creates an infinite number of targets for terrorists (GAO Report). Since the majority of these tracks are publicly owned, large sections go entirely unmonitored. One of the major problems with this vulnerability is that it is physically impossible to monitor every inch of railroad track at any given time. It just can’t be done. This leaves hundreds of miles of railroad open for terrorist attack. Points Where Cargo Is Transferred Intermodal Another vulnerability posed to railways is at points of which cargo is transferred from one mode of transportation to the other. The issue of port and border security extends far beyond the issue of rail security, although railroads, by virtue of the facts that they carry millions of containers unloaded from or loaded onto steamships each year and move hundreds of thousands of railcars and intermodal units across the Canadian and Mexican border each year, are certainly impacted (AAR Hearing). The sheer number of cargo loaded onto trains makes it physically impossible to actually examine each freight container. This makes it extremely hard to be positive no dangerous materials have made it onto trains they shouldn’t be on. An example of this vulnerability is when cargo is taken from a cargo ship at a port and then placed on a freight train for land transportation. Even if proper railway security is in place, vulnerabilities may still arise if the security at the port allowed for possibly harmful cargo to get through its own security measures. In this case, the security of the railway is directly affected by the security of other modes of transportation such as the cargo ship and port security. Train Schedule Databases Another huge security vulnerability that must be addressed is that of databases containing schedules for shipment of sensitive materials. Schedules of what shipments are going where, and what they contain are kept of trains so that they can get to where they are going efficiently. However, if access to these databases is gained by someone who is not supposed to have that information, a huge security breach could arise. If terrorists get access to schedules for hazardous material shipments, they would be able to coordinate a terrorist attack accordingly. Access to such information would allow them to know exactly where a train will be at exactly what time. This could allow for terrorists to set explosives on a track that they know a hazardous materials shipment is going to be using. This also provides terrorists with opportunities to hijack trains in areas where they know security is lax. Train Station Lack of Security Train Station A vulnerability unique to passenger trains is that they are constantly making highly predictable scheduled stops along the way to their destination. This makes it very easy for terrorist to know exactly where a train is going to be, and how to get to it. People are free to board and exit the train at each stop along the way. Unlike in airports, there are no secure areas in which all passengers must pass through designated security stations to get to. People are free to come and go as they please, and that poses a severe problem in terms of ease of access for terrorists. The nature of this vulnerability is inherent within the design of passenger trains themselves however. Train stations require that passengers be able to quickly board and exit trains. With extensive security measures in place, such as security checkpoints that passengers must go through, passenger train companies are likely to lose business. If boarding a train became too much of a hassle, passengers would be more likely to simply drive somewhere, or take other means of transportation like a bus or plane. Ambiguity in Who Is Responsible For Security The last major vulnerability with railway security is that the United States does not have one specific agency that deals with the security of its railways. In fact, it actually has over four separate agencies working on implementing security to difference aspects of the railway system. According to the GAO Report, the Transportation Security Administration, Federal Railroad Administration, Federal Transit Administration, and the Research and Special Programs Administration are all partially responsible for railway security. This poses a problem, because with the agencies working separate of one another, the possibility for gaps in security arises. If each agency thinks that the others have already thoroughly covered a particular vulnerability, it is possible that none of them will actually put in the time and work necessary to fully secure that vulnerability. Another costly problem with not having a specific agency responsible for railway security is that certain security aspects that are completely secure may be covered multiple times by multiple agencies. On the surface this seems like a good thing, because we are positive that that aspect is entirely covered. However, if you look at the financial costs of repeate dly covering the same security aspects multiple times, it becomes obvious that a large amount of funds are wasted that could be used on securing other vulnerabilities. Major Likely Forms of Attack Aimed at Railways The major forms of attack that are likely to be aimed at railways can be narrowed down to three subgroups. The purpose of this section is to identify what constitutes an attack in each of these subgroups, as well as elaborate on possible real world implementation of each subgroup. Destruction of Trains and/or Railways Themselves In this particular subgroup, the primary objective of an attack would be to cause as much destruction and damage as possible to anyone onboard, and within the immediate vicinity of a train. This can be accomplished by in many ways. The first way I will discuss is through the use of bombs on the actual trains themselves. A bomb could be placed on either a passenger train, or a freight train carrying a number of different cargos. Due to vulnerabilities in the security of actual train stations, a terrorist could place a bomb on a train and detonate it at any point while the train is in transit to its destination. Prime targets for this type of attack would be passenger trains containing a large number of passengers, as well as trains containing shipments of hazardous materials. The latter of which would most likely be detonated while the train is close to a highly populated area, such as a major city or town. Another way that terrorists could destroy a train is through making an attack with the intent to derail the targeted train. This type of attack could be orchestrated by destroying important sections of railway along a trains designated path. An example of this would be if a terrorist destroyed a bridge along a trains path before the train would have enough time to effectively stop, resulting in a derailment. An destroying a bridge like this over a waterway could be extremely destructive if the trains cargo is hazardous and ends up seeping into the water, which would result in a massive amount of pollution or contaminated water supply. An example of the contamination of a water supply by derailment is clearly illustrated below. The railroad tracks in this picture go right around this local water supply in Altoona, PA. A derailment of a train containing toxic chemicals would be catastrophic. Attacks with the aim of derailing and/or destroying a train can also come in the form of attacks made at railroad crossings. Examples of this could be by parking large vehicles filled with explosives on a railroad crossing, or even driving a an explosive filled or large vehicle into the side of a train as it passes over a railroad crossing. If orchestrated properly, the effects could be extremely damaging to any local cities or towns if chemicals or other hazardous materials are present on the train. An attack like this on a passenger train could also cause a sever loss of life. Hi-jacking of Trains In this type of attack a train’s contents is of some value to the terrorists or criminals. These contents could include chemicals which could be used as weapons, biological weapons, or in the case of a military shipment, military weapons and supplies. This type of attack sounds like something out of a movie, but it could in fact be orchestrated in a real life scenario. With information on when and where a train containing a shipment of interest, terrorist or criminals could use the resources available to them to infiltrate trains in transit and effectively hijack them. Hijackings could be particularly effective on trains that have little or no physical security on the trains themselves. An instance of this would be if a shipment of hazardous materials was only operated by a few conductors in the front car. Once on board, hijackers could easily eliminate the few conductors’ and then have full control of the train. With control of the train, and due to the vast amount of railroad tracks around the country, the hijackers could stop the train in a deserted area and make away with their cargo of interest. Breaching Railway Databases The last form of a possible attack on railways comes in the form of breaching confidential railway databases to obtain top secret information. This type of attack can be conducted either by hacking into an electronic database housing the sensitive information, or by physically obtaining the information from an onsite source. Once the information is obtained it would be more than likely sold to or used by terrorists to conduct either the first or second type of attack mentioned previously. Breaching railway databases in the previously mentioned way can actually be thought of as a preliminary step to the first two forms of attack. The reason for this is because obtaining information on hazardous material shipments allows for terrorists to better orchestrate an attack on a target, because they will know what it is carrying and where it will be. Another type of attack that could be used involving railway databases is data alteration. If someone were to access sensitive databases they could have the ability to alter the time tables of when certain trains will be on certain tracks. A variety of vulnerabilities could arise from this. A prevalent example of this would be if someone were to make it seem as though a particular track was clear, when it actually already has a train using it. This could cause anything from head on collisions to extreme confusion as to what trains are actually where they are supposed to be.

Environment collapse causes extinction

Young ‘10 (PhD coastal marine ecology, 10 [Ruth, “Biodiversity: what it is and why it’s important”, February 9th, http://www.talkingnature.com/2010/02/biodiversity/biodiversity-what-and-why/]

Different species within ecosystems fill particular roles, they all have a function, they all have a niche. They interact with each other and the physical environment to provide ecosystem services that are vital for our survival. For example plant species convert carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere and energy from the sun into useful things such as food, medicines and timber. Pollination carried out by insects such as bees enables the production of ⅓ of our food crops. Diverse mangrove and coral reef ecosystems provide a wide variety of habitats that are essential for many fishery species. To make it simpler for economists to comprehend the magnitude of services offered by biodiversity, a team of researchers estimated their value – it amounted to $US33 trillion per year. “By protecting biodiversity we maintain ecosystem services” Certain species play a “keystone” role in maintaining ecosystem services. Similar to the removal of a keystone from an arch, the removal of these species can result in the collapse of an ecosystem and the subsequent removal of ecosystem services. The most well known example of this occurred during the 19th century when sea otters were almost hunted to extinction by fur traders along the west coast of the USA. This led to a population explosion in the sea otters’ main source of prey, sea urchins. Because the urchins graze on kelp their booming population decimated the underwater kelp forests. This loss of habitat led to declines in local fish populations. Sea otters are a keystone species once hunted for their fur (Image: Mike Baird) Eventually a treaty protecting sea otters allowed the numbers of otters to increase which inturn controlled the urchin population, leading to the recovery of the kelp forests and fish stocks. In other cases, ecosystem services are maintained by entire functional groups, such as apex predators (See Jeremy Hance’s post at Mongabay). During the last 35 years, over fishing of large shark species along the US Atlantic coast has led to a population explosion of skates and rays. These skates and rays eat bay scallops and their out of control population has led to the closure of a century long scallop fishery. These are just two examples demonstrating how biodiversity can maintain the services that ecosystems provide for us, such as fisheries. One could argue that to maintain ecosystem services we don’t need to protect biodiversity but rather, we only need to protect the species and functional groups that fill the keystone roles. However, there are a couple of problems with this idea. First of all, for most ecosystems we don’t know which species are the keystones! Ecosystems are so complex that we are still discovering which species play vital roles in maintaining them. In some cases its groups of species not just one species that are vital for the ecosystem. Second, even if we did complete the enormous task of identifying and protecting all keystone species, what back-up plan would we have if an unforseen event (e.g. pollution or disease) led to the demise of these ‘keystone’ species? Would there be another species to save the day and take over this role? Classifying some species as ‘keystone’ implies that the others are not important. This may lead to the non-keystone species being considered ecologically worthless and subsequently over-exploited. Sometimes we may not even know which species are likely to fill the keystone roles. An example of this was discovered on Australia’s Great Barrier Reef. This research examined what would happen to a coral reef if it were over-fished. The “over-fishing” was simulated by fencing off coral bommies thereby excluding and removing fish from them for three years. By the end of the experiment, the reefs had changed from a coral to an algae dominated ecosystem – the coral became overgrown with algae. When the time came to remove the fences the researchers expected herbivorous species of fish like the parrot fish (Scarus spp.) to eat the algae and enable the reef to switch back to a coral dominated ecosystem. But, surprisingly, the shift back to coral was driven by a supposed ‘unimportant’ species – the bat fish (Platax pinnatus). The bat fish was previously thought to feed on invertebrates – small crabs and shrimp, but when offered a big patch of algae it turned into a hungry herbivore – a cow of the sea – grazing the algae in no time. So a fish previously thought to be ‘unimportant’ is actually a keystone species in the recovery of coral reefs overgrown by algae! Who knows how many other species are out there with unknown ecosystem roles! In some cases it’s easy to see who the keystone species are but in many ecosystems seemingly unimportant or redundant species are also capable of changing niches and maintaining ecosystems. The more biodiverse an ecosystem is, the more likely these species will be present and the more resilient an ecosystem is to future impacts. Presently we’re only scratching the surface of understanding the full importance of biodiversity and how it helps maintain ecosystem function. The scope of this task is immense. In the meantime, a wise insurance policy for maintaining ecosystem services would be to conserve biodiversity. In doing so, we increase the chance of maintaining our ecosystem services in the event of future impacts such as disease, invasive species and of course, climate change. This is the international year of biodiversity – a time to recognize that biodiversity makes our survival on this planet possible and that our protection of biodiversity maintains this service.

A terrorist attack would spill over into larger infrastructure damage- risk collapsing the entire economy and subsectors

PSD ‘3 (Protective Security Division, Department of Homeland Security, “CHARACTERISTICS AND COMMON VULNERABILITIES INFRASTRUCTURE CATEGORY: RAILROAD BRIDGES”, http://info.publicintelligence.net/DHS-RRBridges-CV.pdf, September 22, 2003, LEQ)

CONSEQUENCE OF EVENT Failure of a railroad bridge that supports the shipment of rail cars containing hazardous materials could result in a severe chemical release. A hazardous materials release in or around a railroad bridge will cause environmental damage, particularly for releases into the underlying water body. It could also cause injury or death to nearby residents or railroad employees. Some victims may experience persistent or long-term health effects or illnesses. The water supply may be contaminated, depending on the amount of chemical release into the waterway and/or the proximity of the receiving water treatment system. The physical circumstances of a railroad bridge failure would hamper response, rescue, and cleanup efforts. Specialized equipment would be necessary to effect any response (e.g., fire boats, dredging equipment). Failure of a railroad bridge that supports passenger transportation could result in injury or death to passengers and railroad employees. Failure of a railroad bridge due to a large explosion could impact neighboring residents and businesses due to the resulting explosive forces (e.g., fire and pressure). The worst-case scenario, as defined by the railroads, would be the interruption of service for any extended time. High-traffic corridors are especially critical. Railroad logistics are directly affected by the loss or damage of bridge assets for indefinite amounts of time. It is clear that many minor incidents created on a railroad system could interrupt traffic. The railroads haul sensitive military shipments on the STRACNET, 20% of chemicals, 40% of grain harvest, 64% of coal used for electric power, and 42% of intercity ton-miles essential to the viability of the nation’s day-to-day operations. Despite the availability of alternate transportation through added barge and truck travel, many industries would be forced to close if they could not receive the required materials for operation. Additionally, they would not be able to ship their products to market. This would cause a doubling effect of the disruption of rail traffic, along with a cascading effect on the federal, state, and local economy. Depending on how logistics are affected in a terrorist attack on major railroad bridge structures, the following impacts could potentially be realized: • The automotive industry could not operate for more than a week without rail services. • Paper industry segments would be shut down within a week of rail service cessation. • The coal mining industry would be halted in approximately two weeks. • Although power generation is less dependent on coal, most utility shipments occur via specialized unit coal trains from specific coal mines or areas directly to the generation plant. Depending on stockpiles, the ability to generate electricity could be affected at these plants. • Many lumber producers would shut down within weeks. • The plastics industry would shut down in three to four days with major rail stoppage. • Industrial inorganic chemicals and agricultural would be crippled by the loss of rail transportation. • There would be a significant impact on the food and agricultural industries if there were a loss of rail transportation. • Glass manufacturing would be seriously affected by an interruption of rail movements of raw materials. • A large fraction of aggregate shipment is by rail. While trucks can also move the products, there is not enough capacity in the trucking industry to pick up the additional logistical burden caused by a railroad shutdown. • Just-in-time intermodal services, including those bringing foreign goods to plants or to market, would be very difficult to maintain if there were no double-stack container services. In addition, rail bridges are commonly linked to highway bridges or traverse highways such that failure of the bridge will impact both rail and highway traffic. See Figures 1 and 2.

Collapse of agriculture would cause global wars

Winnail ’96 (Ph.D., M.P.H, FROM THE WORLD AHEAD, September-October 1996, http://www.kurtsaxon.com/foods004.htm)

As a result grain prices are the highest on record. Worldwatch Institute's president, Lester Brown, writes, "No other economic indicator is more politically sensitive that rising food prices.... Food prices spiraling out of control could trigger not only economic instability but widespread political upheavals"-- even wars. The chaotic weather conditions we have been experiencing appear to be related to global warming caused by the release of pollutants into the earth's atmosphere. A recent article entitled "Heading for Apocalypse?" suggests the effects of global warming--and its side effects of increasingly severe droughts, floods and storms--could be catastrophic, especially for agriculture. The unpredictable shifts in temperature and rainfall will pose an increased risk of hunger and famine for many of the world's poor. With world food stores dwindling, grain production leveling off and a string of bad harvests around the world, the next couple of years will be critical. Agricultural experts suggest it will take two bumper crops in a row to bring supplies back up to normal. However, poor harvests in 1996 and 1997 could create severe food shortages and push millions over the edge. Is it possible we are only one or two harvests away from a global disaster? Is there any significance to what is happening today? Where is it all leading? What does the future hold? The clear implication is that things will get worse before they get better. Wars, famine and disease will affect the lives of billions of people! Although famines have occurred at various times in the past, the new famines will happen during a time of unprecedented global stress--times that have no parallel in recorded history--at a time when the total destruction of humanity would be possible! Is it merely a coincidence that we are seeing a growing menace of famine on a global scale at a time when the world is facing the threat of a resurgence of new and old epidemic diseases, and the demands of an exploding population? These are pushing the world's resources to its limits! The world has never before faced such an ominous series of potential global crises at the same time! However, droughts and shrinking grain stores are not the only threats to world food supplies. According to the U.N.'s studies, all 17 major fishing areas in the world have either reached or exceeded their natural limits. In fact, nine of these areas are in serious decline. The realization that we may be facing a shortage of food from both oceanic and land-based sources is a troubling one . It's troubling because seafood--the world's leading source of animal protein--could be depleted quite rapidly. In the early 1970s, the Peruvian anchovy catch--the largest in the world--collapsed from 12 million tons to 2 million in just three years from overfishing. If this happens on a global scale, we will be in deep trouble. This precarious situation is also without historical precedent!

And Chemical industry collapse causes extinction

Baum ’99 (Rudy M., C&EN Washington, Chemical and Engineering News, Millennium Special Report, 12-6, http://pubs.acs.org/hotartcl/cenear/991206/7749spintro2.html)

Here is the fundamental challenge we face: The world's growing and aging population must be fed and clothed and housed and transported in ways that do not perpetuate theenvironmental devastation wrought by the first waves of industrialization of the 19th and 20th centuries. As we increase our output of goods and services, as we increase our consumption of energy, as we meet the imperative of raising the standard of living for the poorest among us, we must learn to carry out our economic activities sustainably. There are optimists out there, C&EN readers among them, who believe that the history of civilization is a long string of technological triumphs of humans over the limits of nature. In this view, the idea of a "carrying capacity" for Earth—a limit to the number of humans Earth's resources can support—is a fiction because technological advances will continuously obviate previously perceived limits. This view has historical merit. Dire predictions made in the 1960s about the exhaustion of resources ranging from petroleum to chromium to fresh water by the end of the 1980s or 1990s have proven utterly wrong. While I do not count myself as one of the technological pessimists who see technology as a mixed blessing at best and an unmitigated evil at worst, I do not count myself among the technological optimists either. There are environmental challenges of transcendent complexity that I fear may overcome us and our Earth before technological progress can come to our rescue. Global climate change, the accelerating destruction of terrestrial and oceanic habitats, the catastrophic loss of species across the plant and animal kingdoms—these are problems that are not obviously amenable to straightforward technological solutions. But I know this, too: Science and technology have brought us to where we are, and only science and technology, coupled with innovative social and economic thinking, can take us to where we need to be in the coming millennium. Chemists, chemistry, and the chemical industry—what we at C&EN call the chemical enterprise—will play central roles in addressing these challenges. The first section of this Special Report is a series called "Millennial Musings" in which a wide variety of representatives from the chemical enterprise share their thoughts about the future of our science and industry. The five essays that follow explore the contributions the chemical enterprise is making right now to ensure that we will successfully meet the challenges of the 21st century. The essays do not attempt to predict the future. Taken as a whole, they do not pretend to be a comprehensive examination of the efforts of our science and our industry to tackle the challenges I've outlined above. Rather, they paint, in broad brush strokes, a portrait of scientists, engineers, and business managers struggling to make a vital contribution to humanity's future. The first essay, by Senior Editor Marc S. Reisch, is a case study of the chemical industry's ongoing transformation to sustainable production. Although it is not well known to the general public, the chemical industry is at the forefront of corporate efforts to reduce waste from production streams to zero. Industry giants DuPont and Dow Chemical are taking major strides worldwide to manufacture chemicals while minimizing the environmental "footprint" of their facilities. This is an ethic that starts at the top of corporate structure. Indeed, Reisch quotes Dow President and Chief Executive Officer William S. Stavropolous: "We must integrate elements that historically have been seen as at odds with one another: the triple bottom line of sustainability—economic and social and environmental needs." DuPont Chairman and CEO Charles (Chad) O. Holliday envisions a future in which "biological processes use renewable resources as feedstocks, use solar energy to drive growth, absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, use low-temperature and low-pressure processes, and produce waste that is less toxic." But sustainability is more than just a philosophy at these two chemical companies. Reisch describes ongoing Dow and DuPont initiatives that are making sustainability a reality at Dow facilities in Michigan and Germany and at DuPont's massive plant site near Richmond, Va. Another manifestation of the chemical industry's evolution is its embrace of life sciences. Genetic engineering is a revolutionary technology. In the 1970s, research advances fundamentally shifted our perception of DNA. While it had always been clear that deoxyribonucleic acid was a chemical, it was not a chemical that could be manipulated like other chemicals—clipped precisely, altered, stitched back together again into a functioning molecule. Recombinant DNA techniques began the transformation of DNA into just such a chemical, and the reverberations of that change are likely to be felt well into the next century. Genetic engineering has entered the fabric of modern science and technology. It is one of the basic tools chemists and biologists use to understand life at the molecular level. It provides new avenues to pharmaceuticals and new approaches to treat disease. It expands enormously agronomists' ability to introduce traits into crops, a capability seized on by numerous chemical companies. There is no doubt that this powerful new tool will play a major role in feeding the world's population in the coming century, but its adoption has hit some bumps in the road. In the second essay, Editor-at-Large Michael Heylin examines how the promise of agricultural biotechnology has gotten tangled up in real public fear of genetic manipulation and corporate control over food. The third essay, by Senior Editor Mairin B. Brennan, looks at chemists embarking on what is perhaps the greatest intellectual quest in the history of science—humans' attempt to understand the detailed chemistry of the human brain, and with it, human consciousness. While this quest is, at one level, basic research at its most pure, it also has enormous practical significance. Brennan focuses on one such practical aspect: the effort to understand neurodegenerative diseases like Alzheimer's disease and Parkinson's disease that predominantly plague older humans and are likely to become increasingly difficult public health problems among an aging population. Science and technology are always two-edged swords. They bestow the power to create and the power to destroy. In addition to its enormous potential for health and agriculture, genetic engineering conceivably could be used to create horrific biological warfare agents. In the fourth essay of this Millennium Special Report, Senior Correspondent Lois R. Ember examines the challenge of developing methods to counter the threat of such biological weapons. "Science and technology will eventually produce sensors able to detect the presence or release of biological agents, or devices that aid in forecasting, remediating, and ameliorating bioattacks," Ember writes. Finally, Contributing Editor Wil Lepkowski discusses the most mundane, the most marvelous, and the most essential molecule on Earth, H2O. Providing clean water to Earth's population is already difficult—and tragically, not always accomplished. Lepkowski looks in depth at the situation in Bangladesh—where a well-meaning UN program to deliver clean water from wells has poisoned millions with arsenic. Chemists are working to develop better ways to detect arsenic in drinking water at meaningful concentrations and ways to remove it that will work in a poor, developing country. And he explores the evolving water management philosophy, and the science that underpins it, that will be needed to provide adequate water for all its vital uses. In the past two centuries, our science has transformed the world. Chemistry is a wondrous tool that has allowed us to understand the structure of matter and gives us the ability to manipulate that structure to suit our own purposes. It allows us to dissect the molecules of life to see what makes them, and us, tick. It is providing a glimpse into workings of what may be the most complex structure in the universe, the human brain, and with it hints about what constitutes consciousness. In the coming decades, we will use chemistry to delve ever deeper into these mysteries and provide for humanity's basic and not-so-basic needs.

And an attack on infrastructure would force retaliation by the public- 9/11 proves

Mann ’11 (Simon Mann, “A wounded nation shifts its direction”, http://www.theage.com.au/world/a-wounded-nation-shifts-its-direction-20110909-1k1yh.html, September 10, 2011, LEQ)

Americans struggle to redefine their country a decade after the attacks, writes Simon Mann. Of all the tales of grief, of harrowing escape and heroism that coloured the September 11 attacks, one man's account of American Airlines Flight 77 slamming into the Pentagon captured neatly both the surreal nature of the moment as well as America's loss. It was like a trajectory … It never veered. Wings didn't tip … He had the throttles on full. The engines were so loud, I hit the ground. Just unbelievable. And all those people were down there. You know, you feel for everybody. Those people were just, one second were sittin', sittin' at work, and to have that happen, it's unreal. Things are gonna change. [Voice breaking] I guess we're not … um … we're not safe any more. Hands on ... then president George W. Bush at the scene of the attacks. Photo: Reuters Americans still look upon September 11, 2001, as the day that changed their nation. Ten years on, however, while the US and its citizens have undoubtedly been altered, these changes are more elusive than the initial impact. Things are different, but not necessarily in the ways people thought they would be, or in ways they would now even recognise. Nor is it easy to trace the complex web of cause and effect that stretches between the terrorist attacks and the sense of creeping malaise now engulfing the world's greatest power. Certainly, the attacks remain indelible, the statistics bleak: nearly 3000 people killed, including 403 emergency services personnel and all 658 employees of the bond trader Cantor Fitzgerald who turned up for work that fateful day and perished in the World Trade Centre's north tower or jumped to escape the flames and acrid smoke of that towering inferno. In the Lower Manhattan rubble, just 289 bodies were recovered intact: more than 19,000 body parts belonging to 1717 people were retrieved. And certainly, the costs - tangible and intangible - of America's retaliation, the "global war on terror" that was launched by George Bush and which came to define his presidency, are ongoing. Mired in two wars that have already cost more than $US4 trillion, America stands perpetually on a war footing, while the events of 10 years ago have led to the proliferation of a counter-terrorism and homeland security "enterprise" like no other, one that a Washington Post investigation revealed as involving 1271 different government institutions and generating 50,000 intelligence reports annually. Fifty-one groups alone, reported the Post, track terrorism financing. Meanwhile, that burgeoning bureaucracy is overseen by 100 different congressional committees. But for all the cost and inconvenience of its imposition - the cutting of civil liberties, delays at airports, the concrete barriers that greet visitors at every public institution, as well as a nation's general wariness - life for most Americans has resumed much as before, with the mundane usurping the extraordinary. "For a time,'' reflected Associated Press's national writer, Pauline Arrillaga, "we may have felt more patriotic and united, more vulnerable and wary, more appreciative of life, more concerned over the state of the world, but then we settled in to our 'new normal' and went back to routines modified for us - not by us." Still, some people did choose a different course in response to what they understood to be an epiphany, revamping goals and their lives, some of which are recorded in a book by Wendy Stark Healy and summarised by Arrillaga: the financial consultant who became chief executive of a September 11 support group; the Wall Street trader who, after losing 17 friends, moved his family to a small community in South Carolina in search of a simpler life; the fashion designer who became a disaster response expert; the aspiring actress who became a Buddhist and a spiritual healer. "People said here's the 'aha' moment. I don't even know if it happened that way for some of these folks, but they all had a little caveat," the author recounted to Arrillaga, recalling one person who told her: "I no longer take hellos and goodbyes for granted, because when I say goodbye to somebody I realise they may not come back." But those people were the exception, not the rule. As Americans picked up their lives they were confronted with a new century that was bringing new economic challenges, fiscal and monetary policies that created a housing bubble and bust, and a financial meltdown that threw millions out of work. Today, with the US on the brink of a double-dip recession, 85 per cent of Americans rank the economy, the federal budget deficit and rising healthcare costs as the most pressing issues facing the nation. Just 3 per cent nominate terrorism; 5 per cent, Iraq and Afghanistan. "Americans are eager to cut their losses after a wretched decade and turn from nation-building abroad to nation-building at home," suggested the Economist magazine in its anniversary editorial. The attacks on the US on September 11 may well have seared the notion of threat and terrorism deep in America's psyche (in their immediate aftermath, 1.4 million people switched their holiday travel plans from plane to train or car), but just 15 per cent of Americans these days fear a terrorist attack on home soil, while most respondents in recent polls now think the cost of fighting terrorism might be too high. That there has been no major attack in the US in the past decade - together with the assurances of authorities since Osama bin Laden's demise that the US is within striking distance of a "strategic defeat" of al-Qaeda - doubtless soothes nerves, despite the ample evidence of narrow misses and foiled plots, of the indictment of 120 suspects and the handful of serious incidents perpetrated by so-called "lone wolves". But any pending victory over al-Qaeda has not altered Americans' perception that the decade following September 11 has been one of decline. A poll commissioned for this year's Aspen Ideas Festival, held in the Colorado resort town, said seven out of 10 Americans thought the nation was worse off now than at the time of the attacks, while a majority (52 per cent) believed times would be tougher for the next generation. "I'd argue … that we may be experiencing a tipping point as a nation," Time magazine's managing director, Rick Stengel, told the conference. "Going from a people or nation that is preternaturally optimistic to one which is, I wouldn't say pessimistic, I'd say more realistic." There was a sense that a "depth of negativity" was feeding upon itself, noted Mark Penn, of the communications firm Burson-Marsteller, a co-sponsor with Time of the survey. "[Americans] see a mounting series of problems in front of them, almost traced to what they see as the most important event of the decade, which was 9/11, that then led to what they see as the debacle of the decade, which was the Iraq war, which they now see as having led to a lot of the problems that have mounted up and that weren't handled during that period." But now the focus was shifting to Washington, added Penn, and a political system proving inept at solving big issues (to wit, the debt-ceiling debacle). "Can it get back on track?" he asked. "Can it fix the things that are out of whack?" Whether September 11 was the catalyst for America's slide is contestable. But there is a chilling echo in bin Laden's stated ambition of "bleeding … to bankruptcy" the world's foremost power. The plot, according to bin Laden, cost less than $US500,000 to stage, but property damage alone was put at more than $US100 billion and ensuing economic losses beyond $US2 trillion. Then, the wars: 10 years on, the US still has more than 90,000 soldiers deployed in Afghanistan, while 45,000 remain in Iraq (though no longer in combat roles); the former reportedly costs $US10 billion a month. Overall, the cost of the two conflicts has been estimated by the Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz and fellow academic Linda Bilmes, of Harvard University, to be nearing $US5 trillion, including billions in development aid invested to win hearts and minds on the ground. Their study calculated future disability payments and healthcare costs of veterans alone could climb to $US900 billion, while the ''social costs, reflected in veteran suicides (which have topped 18 a day in recent years) and family break-ups, are incalculable". "Al-Qaeda, while not conquered, no longer appears to be the threat that loomed so large in the wake of the 9/11 attacks," argued Stiglitz and Bilmes in a report for Slate.com. "But the price paid in getting to this point, in the US and elsewhere, has been enormous - and mostly avoidable. The legacy will be with us for a long time." Of course, bin Laden didn't bankrupt America, but the terrorist attacks added strain to an economy that was already facing structural changes in the face of rising Asia, challenging at the same time what Americans, according to Stengel, "believe in our fibre: that you know that tomorrow is going to be better than today and the day after tomorrow is going to be better than tomorrow. And that has sustained American life." Regardless, American life - at least, American liberties - were to take a knock, ironically perhaps, in the aftermath of what world leaders were describing as an attack, not just on America, but "against freedom and democracy". But FBI director Bob Mueller recognised immediately how September 11 would change the role of his agency: "That's our new mission," he told Bush then, "preventing attacks." Congress rushed to give new powers to law enforcement: searches and wiretaps would not require court-approved warrants; people suspected of conspiring to commit terrorist acts could be detained or deported in secret; investigators would get greater powers to follow money trails. Offshore, America embarked on a mission that took it beyond historic legal bounds, employing "enhanced interrogation techniques" such as waterboarding, as well as sanctioning the ''rendition'' of detainees in countries known for using torture. And Guantanamo Bay became the holding pen for hundreds of prisoners detained indefinitely, absent of the usual legal protections. (Still, 150 remain there, including the September 11 mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.) "September 11 redefined sacrifice. It redefined duty," Bush wrote in his memoir, Decision Points. "And it redefined my job. The story of that week is the key to understanding my presidency. There were so many decisions that followed, many of them controversial and complex. "Yet after 9/11, I felt my responsibility was clear. For as long as I held office, I could never forget what happened to America that day. I would pour my heart and soul into protecting the country, whatever it took." Some of those harsher measures were wound back, though not to the complete satisfaction of civil libertarians, nor before a rising intolerance of Islam led to hundreds of attacks against American Muslims. Others, however, were ultimately embraced by the Obama administration, which jettisoned its promise to close Guantanamo within six months of assuming office. An attack-free America might present the case for the ends justifying the means, although a 10th anniversary assessment of how well recommendations of the 9/11 Commission have been implemented raises new alerts - at least nine of those 41 recommendations have been ignored, while airport screening still cannot reliably detect explosives. "We are still highly vulnerable to aviation security threats," the report concluded, while experts such as Daniel Byman, of the Brookings Institution, continue to urge authorities to focus on so-called "seam" areas - where the US is able to be attacked from outside its borders, such as on inbound airlines from foreign ports. While avenging the attacks instantly galvanised Americans into a broader fight against terrorism, the nature of that fight is evolving. Among the greatest threats cited in the anniversary report is the intensifying effort by terrorist groups to recruit US citizens and residents, as well as potential cyber attacks on critical infrastructure - neither the ambit only of al-Qaeda. A decade on, however, Americans are conscious more of a stuttering economic recovery and its threat to their livelihoods. Wary, too, that they have tired of Washington's bickering, Barack Obama recently urged them to mark this weekend's anniversary by summoning the spirit of unity that swelled in response to the attacks. These days, he told them in his weekly radio address, the US continues to fight al-Qaeda, is ending its war in Iraq and pulling back troops from Afghanistan, while "emerging from the worst economic crisis in our lifetimes". "None of this will be easy. And it can't be the work of government alone," he continued. "As we saw after 9/11, the strength of America has always been the character and compassion of our people. So as we mark this solemn anniversary, let's summon that spirit once more."

Terrorism retaliation causes nuclear war with Russia/ China

Ayson 10 – Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington (Robert, July. “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, Issue 7. InformaWorld.)

But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it [is] detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.

CBW attacks ensure multiple scenarios for extinction

Kellman ‘8 (Barry Kellman is the director of the International Weapons Control Center, “Bioviolence: A Growing Threat”, The Futurist, May-June 2008, http://www.wfs.org/March-April09/MJ2008_Kellman.pdf)

A looming danger confronts the world—the threat of bioviolence. It is a danger that will only grow in the future, yet we are increasingly failing to confront it. With every passing day, committing a biocatastrophe becomes a bit easier, and this condition will perpetuate for as long as science progresses. Biological warfare is as old as conflict, of course, but in terms of the objectives of traditional warfare— gaining territory or resources, compelling the surrender of an opposing army—biological weapons weren’t very effective. If the objective is to inflict mass death and panic on a mixed population, however, emerging bioweapons offer remarkable potential. We would be irresponsible to presume that radical jihadists like al Qaeda have ignored said potential. What’s New in Bioviolence? Bioviolence refers to the many ways to inflict disease as well as the many people who might choose to do so, whether heads of states, criminals, or fanatics. Fortunately, doing bioviolence is technically far more difficult than using conventional explosives. Natural pathogens like anthrax are difficult to weaponize. Smallpox remains unavailable (presumably); plague is readily treatable; Ebola k i l l s t o o q u i c k l y t o i g n i t e a p a ndemic. But emerging scientific disciplines—notably genomics, nanotechnology, and other microsciences— could alter these pathogens for use as weapons. These scientific disciplines offer profound benefits for humanity, yet there is an ominous security challenge in minimizing the danger of their hostile application. For exampl e , highly dangerous agents can be made resistant to vaccines or antibiotics. In Australia, scientists introduced a gene into mousepox (a cousin of smallpox) to reduce pest populations—it worked so well that it wiped out 100% of affected mice, even those that had immunity against the disease. Various bacterial agents, such as plague or tularemia (rabbit fever), could be altered to increase their lethality or to evade antibiotic treatment. Diseases once thought to be eradicated can now be resynthesized, enabling them to spread in reg ions where there is no natural immunity. The polio virus has been synthesized from scratch; its creators called it an “animate chemical.” Soon, it may be resynthesized into a form that is contagious even among vaccinated popu l a t i o n s . Recreation of long eradicated livestock diseases could ravage herds severely lacking in genetic diversity, damage food supplies , and cause devastating economic losses. Perhaps the greatest biothreat is the manipulation of the flu and other highly contagious viruses, such as Ebola. Today, scientists can change parts of a virus’s genetic material so that it can perform specific functions. The genomic sequence of the Spanish flu virus that killed upwards of 40 million people nearly a century ago has been widely published; any savvy scientist could reconstruct it. The avian flu is even more lethal, albeit not readily contagious via casual aerosol delivery. A malevolent bioscientist might augment its contagiousness. The Ebola virus might be manipulat ed so that i t ki l l s more slowly, allowing it to be spread farther before its debilitating effects altogether consume its carrier. A bit further off is genetic manipulation of the measles virus—one of the great killers in human history—rendering useless the immunizations that most of us receive in early childhood. Soon , laboratory resynthesis of smallpox may be possible. Advanced drug delivery systems can be used to disseminate lethal agent s to broad populations . Bioregulators — small organic compounds that modify body systems— could enhance targeted delivery technologies. Some experts are concerned that new weapons could be aimed at the immune, neurological, and neuroendocrine systems. Nanotechnology that lends itself to mechanisms for advanced disease detection and drug delivery—such as gold nanotubes that can administer drugs directly into a tumor—could also deliver weaponized agents deep into the body, substantially raising the weapon’s effectiveness. Altogether, techniques that were on the frontiers of science only a decade or two ago are rapidly mutating as progress in the biological sciences enables new ways to produce lethal catastrophe. Today, they are on the horizon. Within a decade, they will be pedestrian. According to the National Academies of Science, “The threat spectrum is broad and evolving—in some ways predictably, in other ways unexpectedly. In the future, genetic engineering and other technologies may lead to the development of pathogenic organisms with unique, unpredictable characteristics.” For as far into the future as we can possibly see, every passing day it becomes slightly easier to commit a violent catastrophe than it was the day before. Indeed, the rapid pace of advancing science helps explain why policies to prevent such a catastrophe are so complicated. Bioviolence Jihad? Some experts argue that terrorists and fanatics are not interested in bioviolence and that the danger might therefore be overblown. Since there have been no catastrophic bioviolence attacks, these experts argue, terrorists lack the intention to make bioweapons. Hopefully, they are correct. But an enormous amount of evidence suggests they are wrong. From the dawn of biology’s ability to isolate pathogens, people have pursued hostile applications of biological agents. It is perilous to ignore this extensive history by presuming that today’s villains are not fervent about weaponizing disease. Not a single state admits to having a bioweapons program, but U.S. int e l l i g e n c e o f f i c i a l s a s s e r t t h a t a s many as 10 states might have active programs, including North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Moreover, many terrorist organizations have expressed interest in acquiring biological weapons. Whatever weight the taboo against inflicting disease might have for nation-states, it is obviously irrelevant to terrorists, criminals, and lunatics. Deterrence by threat of retaliation is essentially meaningless for groups with suicidal inclinations who are likely to intermingle with innocent civilians. Al -Qaeda and aff i l iat ed I s lami c fundamentalist organizations have overtly proclaimed their intention to develop and use bioweapons. The 11th volume of al-Qaeda’s Encyclopedia of Jihad is devoted to chemical and biological weapons. Indeed, alQaeda has acknowledged that “biological weapons are considered the least complicated and easiest to manufacture of all weapons of mass destruction.” Al-Qaeda is widely reported to have acquired legal pathogens via publicly available scientific sources. Before 9/11, al-Qaeda operatives reportedly purchased anthrax and plague from arms dealers in Kazakhstan, and the group has repeatedly urged followers to recruit microbiology and biotechnology experts. Follow ing th e Ta l iban ’ s fa l l , f iv e a l Qaeda biologi cal weapons labs in Afghanistan tested positive for anthrax. Documents calculating aerial dispersal methods of anthrax via balloon were discovered in Kabul, along with anthrax spore concentrate at a nearby vaccine laboratory. According to a lengthy fatwa commissioned by Osama bin Laden, jihadists are entitled to use weapons of mass destruction against the infidels, even if it means killing innocent women, children, and Muslims. No matter that these weapons cannot be specifically targeted. “[N]othing is a greater duty, after faith itself, than repelling an enemy attacker who sows corruption to religion and the world.” According to the fatwa, “No conditions limit this: one repels the enemy however one can.” The sentiment might be reprehen sible, but it is certainly not irrational. Even the most passionate terrorists must realize that conventional attacks are not bringing the West to its knees. The 9/11 strikes, the bombing of the Madrid and London subways, and numerous smaller attacks have all put civilization on edge, but history marches inexorably forward. A few thousand people can be killed, yet Western armies still traverse the world, and Western economies still determine winners and losers. From this perspective, the stakes must be raised. Bioviolence is perhaps the most dire, easiest means to execute existential danger. What Might Bioviolence Accomplish? Envision a series of attacks against capitals of developing states that have close diplomatic linkages with the United States. The attacks would carry a well-publicized yet simple warning: “If you are a friend of the United States, receive its officials, or suppo r t i t s po l i c i e s , thou sand s o f y o u r p e o p l e wi l l g e t s i c k . ” How many a t ta ck s in how many c i t i e s would it take before international diplomacy, to say nothing of international transit, comes to a crashing halt? In comparison to use of conventional or chemical weapons, the potential death toll of a bioattack could be huge . Al though the numbe r of victims would depend on where an attack takes place, the type of pathogen, and the sophistication of the weapons maker, there is widespread consensus among experts that a heightened attack would inflict casualties exceedable only by nuclear weapons. In comparison to nuclear weapons, bioweapons are far easier and cheaper to make and transport, and they can be made in facilities that are far more difficult to detect. The truly unique characteristic of c e r t a i n bioweapons t h a t d i s t i nguishes them from every other type of weapon is contagion. No other type of weapon can replicate itself and spread. Any other type of attack, no matter how severe, occurs at a certain moment in time at an identifiable place. If you aren’t there, you are angry and upset but not physically injured by the attack. An attack with a contagious agent can uniquely spread, potentially imperiling target populations far from where the agents are released. A b i o - o ff e n d e r c o u l d i n f e c t h i s minions with a disease and send them across borders before symptoms are obvious. Carriers will then spread it to other unsuspecting victims who would themselves become extended bioweapons, carrying the disease indiscriminately. There are challenges in executing such an attack, but fanatical terrorist organizations seem to have an endless supply of willing suicide attackers. All this leads to the most important characteristic of bioviolence: It raises incomparable levels of panic. Contagious bioviolence means that planes fly empty or perhaps don’t fly at all. People cancel vacation and travel plans and refuse to interact with each other for fear of unseen affliction. Public entertainment events are canceled; even going to a movie becomes too dangerous. Ultimately, bioviolence is about hiding our children as everyone becomes vulnerable to our most fundamental terror: the fear of disease. For people who seek to rattle the pillars of modern civilization and perhaps cause it to collapse, effective use of disease would set in motion political, economic, and health consequences so severe as to call into question the ability of existing governments to maintain their citizens’ security. In an attack’s wake, no one would know when it is over, and no government could credibly tell an anxious population where and when it is safe to resume normal life. While it is difficult to specify when this danger will strike, there should be no doubt that we are vulnerable to a rupture. Just as planes flying into the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001, instantly became a historical marker dividing strategic perspectives before from after, the day that disease is effectively used as an instrument of hate will profoundly change everything. If you want to stop modern civilization in its tracks, bioviolence is the way to go. The notion that no one will ever commit catastrophic bioviolence is simply untenable. What Can We Do? How can we confront these growing dangers? First, we must appreciate the global nature of the problem. Perpetrators from anywhere can get p a t h o g e n s f ro m v i r t u a l l y e v e r ywhe re . Biore s earch labs that onc e were concentrated in about two dozen developed states are proliferating, expanding the risk that lethal agents could be diverted and misused. The knowledge needed to weaponize pathogens is available on the Internet. An attack can be prep a r e d t h ro u g h e a s y n e tw o r k s o f transnational communication. Once a bioweapon is prepared, terrorists or other perpetrators from anywhere can slide across national boundaries and release disease anonymously. Once released, a contagious agent would spread without regard for boundaries, race, religion, or nationality. Public health responses would have to be internationally coordinated. New modes of international l egal coope rat ion would immediately be needed to investigate the crime. Thus, bioviolence dangers shrink the planet into an interdependent neighborhood. It makes no sense for any particular country to try to insulate its homeland from these dangers. No missile defense system will p ro t e c t u s f rom b i o v i o l e n c e . Improved border security will not keep disease at bay. National efforts to enhan c e m ed i ca l p repa redn e s s hav e virtues, but these defenses can be readily circumvented. To prevent bioviolence requires policies that focus on humanity as a species and that are implemented everywhere with centralized governance. Antibioviolence policies must be global. Ye t , advanc ing ant i -bioviol enc e policies is what the international community does worst. Bioviolence dangers are unnecessarily high because national and international antibioviolence strategies are gap-ridden, often incoherent, and not globally observed. As a result, we are all virtually naked in the face of unacceptable dangers. No ot her t hreat pre s ent s such a s tark cont ras t between severity of harm and a failure of leadership to reduce risks. Most important, existing institutional arrangements are inadequate. In sharp contrast to most other global security challenges, there is no responsible international authority that defines relevant prohibitions and responsibilities, implements policies over time, or evaluates whether obligations are being fulfilled. With regard to global bioviolence prevent i o n p o l i c i e s , t h e r e ’ s n o b o d y i n charge. No one is responsible; no one is accountable. The absence of authority is profoundly dangerous. Bioviolence prevention and preparedness requires a sizable orchestra, made up of various instruments, to play complicated music in harmony. Today, there is not a bad “conductor”, there is no conductor at all. The result is cacophony. Simply stated, bioviolence is the dark s ide of global izat ion, ye t int e rna tional alarms of bioviolence ring nowhere! We need a comprehensive national and international strategy for bioviol enc e prevent ion . [Se e box: “Five S t r a t e g i e s f o r P r e v e n t i n g B i oviolence,” page 30.] Policies should be pursued within an integrated approach that enables each policy to gain strength from all the others. Such policies are potentially available and effective, but they demand progressive changes in our global order. The Security Mission Global bioviolence prevention and preparedness policies are imperative, but also imperative is recognition that the world faces natural disease horrors. Where mass public health challenges are daily phenomena, the risks of terrorists using pathogens must be weighed against more tangible natural threats. Simply stated, it is illegitimate to insist that every nation adopt policies for preventing human-inflicted disease without acknowledging the silent genocide of natural disease that is responsible for millions of deaths. But neither is it legitimate to view bioviolence dangers as distractions from efforts to combat natural disease and therefore to put off beneficial measures until those afflictions are defeated. To do so frustrates forward movement on cost-effective initiatives that could help build an international security architecture for advancing science and health. Thus, bioviolence prevention must be a facet of a broad international commitment to: 1. Prevent the spread of disease ( e .g. , through publ i c -heal th measures). 2. Enhance protection against and cures for disease (e.g., through vaccination and drug therapies). 3. Supervise the conduct of biological science. 4. Criminalize unauthorized or improper use of pathogens. From this foundation should flow a policy commitment to the growth of bioscience as a global public good. Policies to encourage its worldwide spread deserve vigorous support. This governance mission should, therefore, be conceived as a global covenant . As bios c i enc e goe s forward as a fundamental pillar of human progress, all nations must undertake common responsibilities to prevent bioviolence even as the burdens associated with those responsibilities are differentiated according to wealth and capability. From everyone according to their abilities—to all for the benefit of all. The United Nations’ Importance The United Nations represents the b e s t venu e fo r a new gove rnanc e platform that can accommodate the need for an integrated global strategy agains t bioviol enc e . Only the United Nations has the necessary in ternational legitimacy, and only the Uni t ed Nat ions can int egrat e the many sectors—health, law enforcement, science, military, emergency preparedness—that must devote expertise and resources. A primary consideration here is to minimize any bureaucratic reshuffling. There is certainly no need to modify or replicate existing capabilities. Many relevant governance tasks are already addressed by one or more international organizations. For example, the World Health Organization should continue to be responsible for addressing the health implications of a pandemic, whether natural or malevolent. Interpol should continue to be responsible for a d d re s s i n g b i o v i o l e n c e ’ s l aw e nforcement implications. Indeed, the UN’s role should be only to coordinate the performance of these tasks. Broadly viewed, the United Nations should be able to undertake three functions: First, a specific UN agency should stimulate bioscience development by incorporating security concerns into the fabric of scientific undertakings and by assisting countries in using bioscience in ways that are consistent with policies for preventing bioviolence. Because science, development, and security can and must be mutually reinforcing, this agency’s primary responsibilities would be to promote and distribute knowledge and build capacity to fulfill obligations, especially in developing nations. Second, a UN office should coordinate activities among the relevant international/regional organizations, professional networks, and expert bodies. For example, three major international organizations focus on health (World Health Organization, Animal Health Organization, and the Food and Agriculture Organization); Interpol and Europol both focus on law enforcement; a large array of organizations focus on conveyance of dangerous items (e.g., International Maritime Organization, International Civil Aviation Organization). This UN office should be a steering mechanism to engage each of these orga nizations’ specialized expertise and to identify synergies. Third, a Security Council Committee should be authorized to investigate bioviolence preparations as well as respond and coordinate assistance to a bioviolence attack. Situations that call for investigation or response arise rarely, but they carry disproportionate significance for international peace and security. The Security Council Committee should not advance programmatic agendas, but it should be able to wield expertise and political muscle in volatile situations. Its primary mission would be to enable the international community to sustain global order in the face of a bioviolence challenge. Ever since someone harnessed a new technology to create a weapon with more devastating effects, there has been a link—a double helix—between the progress of science and the pursuit of security. This is inevitable. These dangers of bioviolence do not a rg u e f o r re l i n q u i s h i n g s c i e n t i f i c progress, but they disprove notions tha t n ew cha l l eng e s can b e e ff e ct ive ly addre s s ed wi th ye s t e rday’ s policies. At bottom is a condition unique to this historical era: Scientific progress is intertwined with escalating malevolence threatening human security. Progressing capabilities improve our l ive s and ye t , inext r i cably, enable truly harmful weapons against humanity. Here are the challenges to international peace and security at the beginning of the third millennium. Failing to do the right thing in response to these challenges could have dire consequences for all humanity.

Contention 2: Solvency

Plan: The Department of Defense should increase railroad transportation security through developing an integrated National Transportation Strategy.

A National transportation strategy would undergo all necessary actions

Capra ‘6 (Gregory S. Capra, Gregory S. Capra serves as the Chief of the Program Management Office, Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence, Andrews AFB, Maryland. He earned a bachelor’s degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Colorado and a master’s degree in Strategic Studies from the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He is licensed as a Professional Engineer in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Since entering Federal Civilian Service in 1987, he has supported the men and women of the United States Army and Air Force by serving in various positions at the installation, major command, and headquarters. Prior to attending Air War College in 2006, he served as a Base Closure and Realignment Analyst for the Office of the Air Force Civil Engineer, Headquarters Air Force, Washington, DC, “Protecting Critical Rail Infrastructure”, http://cpc.au.af.mil/PDF/monograph/criticalrailinfrastructure.pdf, December 2006, LEQ)

Actions required to protect these assets are: (1) accelerated development of high-volume, walk-through chemical, biological, and radiation sensors to screen passengers and bags at transit stations; (2) rerouting hazardous cargo railroad shipments around cities with high densities of population; and (3) developing an integrated National Transportation Strategy. Abstract Terrorist attacks and accidents involving rail systems have resulted in death and destruction. The attacks in Madrid and London are good indications of the potential effects of a terrorist attack on the United States rail systems. Three years after the Madrid bombings, the United States has made little progress in securing its rail systems. This paper advocates that the United States develop a long-range, comprehensive, integrated National Transportation Strategy to address security of the systems and the demand to move more people and cargo. A background on foreign terrorist attacks in the United States and an overview of rail systems are included, as well as an examination of: • terrorist threats to the United States and its rail systems; • vulnerabilities and critical elements of freight railroads and passenger rail systems; • Department of Defense’s role in protecting critical rail infrastructure; and • specific recommendations on what to protect first and how to protect it. Priorities for protecting rail systems are: (1) transit rail stations in the biggest, most densely populated cities with a history of terrorist attacks; (2) railroad shipment of hazardous materials through large metropolitan areas; and (3) passenger trains and other rail stations.

And this solves national infrastructure security concerns – the federal government is key- the plan would secure sights from terrorism, increase re-construction efforts, and increase security interoperability

Increase funding for dilapidated infrastructure that could risk being a terrorist target

Train security response teams to act as an emergency military team to secure trains

Increase security systems at railroad stations

Capra ‘6 (Gregory S. Capra, Gregory S. Capra serves as the Chief of the Program Management Office, Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence, Andrews AFB, Maryland. He earned a bachelor’s degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Colorado and a master’s degree in Strategic Studies from the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He is licensed as a Professional Engineer in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Since entering Federal Civilian Service in 1987, he has supported the men and women of the United States Army and Air Force by serving in various positions at the installation, major command, and headquarters. Prior to attending Air War College in 2006, he served as a Base Closure and Realignment Analyst for the Office of the Air Force Civil Engineer, Headquarters Air Force, Washington, DC, “Protecting Critical Rail Infrastructure”, http://cpc.au.af.mil/PDF/monograph/criticalrailinfrastructure.pdf, December 2006, LEQ)

First, the U.S. Government must invest in automated security technology to ensure a 24/7 security blanket is in place at transit stations. Technology such as surveillance cameras and sensors can reduce the financial burden of personnel costs during times of elevated security across the country. Under the current system, every time there is a threat of a possible terrorist attack, increased surveillance costs millions of dollars in personnel overtime. The U.S. Government must take the lead to accelerate development, testing, and implementation of high capacity scanners for conventional explosives, chemical agents, and biological agents. Much research and development work and acquisition funding will be required before a practical security system is feasible. Second, the U.S. Government needs to address the transportation of hazardous materials through densely populated areas. State and local governments do not have the authority to restrict passage since this involves interstate transportation of goods. Therefore, the U.S. Government needs to provide funding or incentives for the freight railroads to relocate rail lines carrying hazardous materials away from densely populated areas with critical choke points like the Howard Street Tunnel in Baltimore. In addition, shipment of hazardous materials either should never be routed through major population centers or should at least be restricted in densely populated areas or through critical nodes during high threat levels. As a minimum, the U.S. Government needs to require freight railroads to notify local governments when transporting hazardous materials to allow these communities the opportunity to provide additional security. Third, federal and state governments need to develop and publish standards for prioritizing what is defended and then should oversee the vulnerability assessments of critical assets to ensure consistency. Lack of sufficient funding is the number one issue preventing transit organizations from implementing security enhancements and they are looking to the federal government for that funding.87 Before the federal government invests tax dollars or provides tax incentives to make security improvements, standards for risk assessments and levels of security need to be established. Several standard and risk assessment models exist that can be used to ensure comparable results. For example, the Federal Highway Administration’s Recommendations for Bridge and Tunnel Security provides an assessment guide that could be applied across all transportation systems.88 The Federal Transit Agency’s Transit Security Design Considerations provides guidance on incorporating security measures into transit projects.89 The GAO recommends systematic planning to optimize resources. For example, they found that the Transportation Security Agency acted promptly to meet the Congressional mandate to screen 100 percent of the luggage on commercial airlines for explosives, but they did not always use a risk assessment process to determine priorities and requirements. This led to 7,000 explosive scanners being installed in airport lobbies rather than being incorporated into the airport baggage conveyor system. Since these systems were not engineered into the screening process, the net result was an operational inefficiency and a requirement for additional screeners. The Transportation Security Agency is now working with nine airports to correct the oversight. Once implemented, this initiative will reduce the number of screeners and supervisors by 78 percent and save the government $1.3 billion over 7 years.90 Procedures need to be developed for screening passengers and luggage boarding trains and similar approaches to this would avoid many future problems if things are done systematically. The rail industry should learn from the airline industry’s experiences with security screening and avoid making the same costly mistakes. Fourth, the top priority for freight railroads is the physical security of transfer and maintenance yards. This can be accomplished by securing the perimeter and controlling entry. The U.S. military uses a layered approach in force protection, which could easily be followed by the freight railroads. The ultimate goal is to minimize mass casualties. Securing the perimeter of the installation defends against threats like car and truck bombs. Controlling the access at a limited number of manned gates could help ensure that authorized personnel and visitors are allowed in terminals and trains. The second layer of protection inside the perimeter is to ensure a proper standoff distance is maintained by not allowing vehicles to park within 25 meters of a rail facility or train. The freight railroads and Association of American Railroads, like U.S. military installations, set the standard for taking decisive action to secure their sector after the attacks of 9/11. However, a GAO visit to several stations showed that the rail companies need to secure the perimeter of the rail and in-route storage yards and control access to them. It is the same for railroad companies as for U.S. military installations; they need to be vigilant and provide security to their critical assets. Finally, United States Congress needs to establish and approve a long-range strategy addressing all modes of transportation. At a strategic level, it is easy to argue rail systems should be viewed as national assets in the same manner as the airports, airport security, and federal highways. The federal and state governments need to develop a near-term transportation plan for 2007 and a long-range National Transportation Strategy to provide a vision for the year 2030. This strategy needs to address transportation security issues; protection of intercity passenger rail service; defending freight transportation; providing security of air, rail, and highway systems; and increasing railroad capacity to handle the projected 57 percent increase in freight by 2020.91 There are two supporting reasons why a National Transportation Strategy is needed: • The first reason is discussed in Mr. Jenkins paper, Improving Public Surface Transportation Security: What Do We Do Now? He recommends the government develop a transportation system security strategy that focuses on: “preventing the loss of life; minimizing long-term risks to heath; and limiting social upheaval, . . . environmental catastrophe and economic disruption.”92 He suggests: “Vulnerable bridges can be upgraded and protected at a cost, or, if they are near obsolescence, they can be replaced with new physically stronger structures. The system could also be augmented with additional bridges to make it less vulnerable overall. Rather than merely becoming a continuing operational expense, security could be the basis for the reconstruction of the U.S. national transportation infrastructure.”93 • The second reason is the amount of money the federal government has spent to keep Amtrak in business that could have been used to fund transportation security. The federal government has spent $21.3 billion for Amtrak from fiscal years 1976 to 2003.94 GAO recently reported that it has cost the federal government $1 billion annually over the last five years to keep Amtrak operating. Plus, Amtrak says it will need $2 billion annually for operations and deferred maintenance, plus an estimated $70 billion over the next 20 years to expand the high speed passenger rail network.95 GAO recommended Congress consider developing a system-wide approach to transportation, as opposed to a focusing on one mode or type of travel. This type of approach may significantly change funding for Amtrak.

Railroads are the key internal link into security – overwhelm other infrastructure sectors

Capra ‘6 (Gregory S. Capra, Gregory S. Capra serves as the Chief of the Program Management Office, Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence, Andrews AFB, Maryland. He earned a bachelor’s degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Colorado and a master’s degree in Strategic Studies from the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He is licensed as a Professional Engineer in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Since entering Federal Civilian Service in 1987, he has supported the men and women of the United States Army and Air Force by serving in various positions at the installation, major command, and headquarters. Prior to attending Air War College in 2006, he served as a Base Closure and Realignment Analyst for the Office of the Air Force Civil Engineer, Headquarters Air Force, Washington, DC, “Protecting Critical Rail Infrastructure”, http://cpc.au.af.mil/PDF/monograph/criticalrailinfrastructure.pdf, December 2006, LEQ)

One critical infrastructure is the U.S. transportation system.6 The focus of this paper will be on the security issues surrounding only the rail portion of transportation. The national objectives for protecting critical infrastructure are: (1) to identify and assure the protection of those assets, systems, and functions that we deem most “critical” in nature, particularly in a national or major regional context; (2) to assure the protection of infrastructures and assets that face a specific, imminent threat; and (3) to pursue collaborative measures and initiatives to assure the protection of other potential targets that may become attractive over time.7 Rail Background Rail systems are classified into two categories. The first is the freight rail system which includes the DoD Strategic Rail Network. Freight systems are privately owned. Seven major railroads own 80 percent of the rail lines and the remaining 20 percent is owned by more than 500 short line railroads. The amount of Class I rail lines has steadily decreased since the height of railroad use in the early 1900s. There are approximately 100,000 miles of Class I rail lines crossing the country.8 Of this amount, DoD classifies 30,000 miles of Class I rail lines as critical to mobility for national defense. The freight railroads are the workhorse for moving large quantities of raw materials long distances. Freight railroads carry 42 percent of intercity freight, including 65 percent of coal shipments, 70 percent of automobile shipments, and 30 percent of grain shipments when compared on a ton/mile basis.9 The freight network has some redundancy, providing resiliency against critical failure. The second is the passenger rail system that includes intercity passenger rail (Amtrak) and transit rail which includes commuter rail, heavy-rail (metro, subway, rapid transit, or rapid rail) and light-rail (streetcar, tramway, or trolley).10 According to The National Strategy for The Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, about 20 million intercity passengers ride trains annually that travel on the surface and 45 million passengers ride subways each year.11 Amtrak operates intercity passenger service on 22,000 miles of rail track but only owns 650 miles of rail track in the profitable northeast commuter corridor.12 “Amtrak serves over 500 train stations, the majority of which are owned by cities, states, and freight railroads. However, about 135 stations are owned by Amtrak, including Penn Station in New York, which is used by 400,000 [local] commuters and intercity rail customers daily. Amtrak also owns and operates the Northeast Corridor, the most heavily traveled passenger rail corridor in the country, [running] over 1,200 trains per day, including over 1,000 trains operated by commuter authorities.”13 Transit rail systems have 6,800 miles of commuter rail, 1,600 miles of heavy-rail and 1,000 miles of light-rail.14 Each year public transit serves 9.5 billion passengers (including buses), approximately onethird of these passengers use transit rail systems. On a daily basis, this is greater than the total number of passengers served by air or intercity rail.15

And federal action is key- incremental actions fail and the government is key to motivating the market to act

Rosenbloom and Wachs ’12 (Sandra Rosenbloom, Martin Wachs, Dr. Sandra Rosenbloom is Director of the Drachman Institute at the University of Arizona and a Professor of Planning at the Institute for Land and Regional Development Studies, Martin Wachs is a senior principal researcher at RAND and a professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. He formerly served as director of the RAND Transportation, Space, and Technology Program. Prior to joining RAND in 2005, he was professor of civil and environmental engineering and professor of city and regional planning at the University of California, Berkeley, where was also director of the Institute of Transportation Studies. Prior to this, he spent 25 years at UCLA, where he served three terms as chairman of the Department of Urban Planning, “A Federal Role in Freight Planning and Finance”, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1137.pdf, 2012, LEQ)

Demands for Federal Action Most analysts and stakeholder groups have concluded that there is a role for the federal government in addressing problems in the U.S. freight system. At the core of major debates, however, are questions about how often, how much, how, and with what sources of funds the federal government should respond. Many industry groups and analysts have argued that the federal government should make substantial efforts to address freight issues. The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (undated) asserted that, Unless America takes direct action soon to develop [a] New Interstate Highway System, the nation’s freight highway network will experience greater unreliability, delay, and congestion. Incremental changes will fall far short of the necessary investment needed to reverse these trends. (p. 21) Many freight stakeholders, particularly in the private sector, argue that the federal government must intervene aggressively to maintain national productivity and increase American competitiveness. Michael Lind, writing in the December 2009 issue of McKinsey Quarterly, commented, . . . the low cost and reliability of freight transportation in the United States have been critical to the country’s economic success. But America’s failure to modernize its overloaded freight transportation infrastructure—chiefly the railroad network and highways used by trucks, but also inland waterways, ports, and airports—is imposing costs on American efficiency. As a result of congestion (highway delays, for instance), the penalty on American growth exacted by logistics costs rose from 8.6 percent of GDP in 2003 to 10.1 percent in 2007, even before the crisis [the current downturn in the economy]. Robert Poole and Adrian Moore of the Reason Foundation, which has called for reduced federal funding of a variety of transportationrelated activities, find that freight activities are worthy of federal assistance (Poole and Moore, 2010). Calling the urban interstates “the lifeblood of goods movement” (p. i) Poole and Moore conclude that commerce and international trade are clear federal responsibilities and should “be at the core of a rethought federal role” in transportation. But these are not consensus views. RAND studies (Ortiz et al., 2007; Hillestad, van Roo, and Yoho, 2009) and a 2009 Transportation Research Board study (2009) have concluded that since most freight problems are local or regional in nature, their solutions should largely be fashioned and paid for by state and local governments.

And specifically the DOD is best to resolve security issues with trains- expertise and inter-connection with other states which only the DOD has access to

Capra ‘6 (Gregory S. Capra, Gregory S. Capra serves as the Chief of the Program Management Office, Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence, Andrews AFB, Maryland. He earned a bachelor’s degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Colorado and a master’s degree in Strategic Studies from the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He is licensed as a Professional Engineer in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Since entering Federal Civilian Service in 1987, he has supported the men and women of the United States Army and Air Force by serving in various positions at the installation, major command, and headquarters. Prior to attending Air War College in 2006, he served as a Base Closure and Realignment Analyst for the Office of the Air Force Civil Engineer, Headquarters Air Force, Washington, DC, “Protecting Critical Rail Infrastructure”, http://cpc.au.af.mil/PDF/monograph/criticalrailinfrastructure.pdf, December 2006, LEQ)

Protecting Critical Rail Infrastructure . . . 29 IV. DoD’s Role in Protecting Critical Rail Infrastructure DoD’s involvement in Homeland Security is identified through the: • National Security Strategy; • National Strategy for Homeland Security; • National Defense Strategy; • National Military Strategy; • Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support; • The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets; and • Joint Publication, 3-26, Homeland Security. DoD’s role in protecting rail systems is part of their overall mission to protect defense critical infrastructure and national critical infrastructure. The purpose of the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program is to ensure availability of critical defense assets through risk management. DoD agencies have two roles in Defense Critical Infrastructure Program. The first is to conduct risk management assessments of the rail infrastructure on the installation and to identify, remediate, or mitigate the risks. This program complements other programs that protect the installation assets like the antiterrorism, force protection, continuity assessment, and installation preparedness programs.79 Risk management evaluates and prioritizes assets based on the potential threats, vulnerabilities and critical value. To remediate or mitigate the risks, DoD can change the operation of the systems, change physical security, or both. The Department of Defense’s second role is to identify and communicate defense mobility requirements to the appropriate federal, state, and local agencies and the local railroad providers. The Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command Transportation Engineering Agency is responsible for the Railroads for National Defense Program and serves as DoD’s liaison for civil rail carriers and state rail authorities.80 They communicate the requirements for the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program for rail systems through the Railroads for National Defense Program on behalf of the Commander of the U.S. Transportation Command to the Federal Railroad Administration. The local installation is responsible for working with the state and local governments and the railroads. They typically do this with a memorandum of agreement for mutual support during a crisis. DoD’s role in protecting national critical rail infrastructure is limited since the primary responsibility belongs to other federal, state, and local agencies and private rail companies. However, the Association of American Railroads testified before the U.S. Senate that the National Guard would be needed to secure critical assets during heightened states of alert.81 The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the National Guard in Title 10 status under the control of the President from performing law enforcement duties.82 Therefore, this support would be best provided by the National Guard in Title 32 status under the control of state governors so they can perform law enforcement duties. The Department of Defense also has the role of providing civil support to other federal agencies and private sectors when directed by the President of the United States or Secretary of Defense. The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support describes DoD’s roles and responsibilities in protecting critical infrastructure: • U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) are designated the lead DoD agencies for protecting defense critical infrastructure and national critical infrastructure in the continental U.S. and Hawaii respectively. • Installation commanders are responsible for protecting the defense critical infrastructure on military installations. • Joint Force Headquarters - National Capital Region has a key role in the National Capital Region. Their role is to work with the state, local governments, and the owners of the private rail systems to prevent and prepare an attack. • Joint Task Force - Civil Support will provide integrated DoD support to the designated lead federal agencies for domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) consequence management. When required, the Secretary of Defense directs deployment of the Joint Task Force - Civil Support to CBRNE incident sites through NORTHCOM’s commander. The Joint Task Force - Civil Support role is to establish command and control for DoD forces and provide civilian support. • The National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction - Civil Support Teams operating under state status will likely be the first military responder to a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or highyield explosives (CBRNE) incident site.83 The Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command Transportation Engineering Agency developed and manages a key rail information asset for DoD, the Intelligent Road/Railroad Information Server web-based tool. According to the Intelligent Road/Railroad Information Server White Paper, Intelligent Road/Railroad Information Server (IRRIS) “technology integrates transportation logistics, real-time tracking, and infrastructure data into a single, secure application [computer program] accessible through the Internet. With real-time and relevant information about road conditions, construction [sites], incidents [accidents, attack or system failure], and weather [conditions] from more than 150 worldwide data sets, IRRIS technology enables SDDCTEA [Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command Transportation Engineering Agency] to visualize assets and perform spatial queries and analysis, such as plume modeling to depict the effects of hazardous materials and/or explosives on any geographic area. . . . It uses the latest Web[-based] geographic information systems (GIS), intelligent transportation systems, location-based services, wireless technologies, and global positioning systems to provide support for effective logistics, emergency response, and management.”84 Figure 7. Intelligent Road/Railroad Information Server Plume Modeling85 32 . . . Protecting Critical Rail Infrastructure Figure 7 shows an example of the Intelligent Road/Railroad Information Server plume modeling. For example, Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command Transportation Engineering Agency used the Intelligent Road/Railroad Information Server to assist the U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Northern Command, and Federal Emergency Management Agency during the Hurricane Ivan evacuation in

2004.86

***Addons***

Economy Addon

Collapse of the railroad industry would kill the economy

Dovell ’12 (Elizabeth Dovell, Contributor at Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Rail Infrastructure”, http://www.cfr.org/united-states/us-rail-infrastructure/p27585, March 7, 2012, LEQ)

Rail is an essential component of a balanced national transportation (PDF) system and a globally competitive economy. The American Society of Civil Engineers, which graded U.S. rail infrastructure with a C-, notes that the rail industry requires $200 billion in investment by 2035 to meet projected future demand. In the United States, modern freight and passenger rail systems share the same corridors and infrastructure. But while privately owned U.S. freight has succeeded in remaining competitive with other transportation modes, federally run passenger rail has struggled. Experts say the continued success of freight rail will require billions in new funding to avoid congestion, particularly if plans for expanding passenger rail proceed. Funding for the upkeep and expansion of passenger rail--which receives significantly less in federal subsidies than other transportation modes--has remained a controversial issue in Washington. The Obama administration's plan to expand high-speed rail (sustained speeds of more than 125 miles per hour) faces fierce opposition. Supporters cite the unique benefits of high-speed rail, including energy savings, more efficient mobility, and greater manufacturing opportunities for U.S. companies. Moreover, many U.S. economic competitors in Asia and Europe are making significant investments in HSR (WashPost). Opponents argue the economic benefits of HSR rarely surpass the costs, and point out that most systems do not turn a profit and rely heavily on government subsidies. The Shakeup of U.S. Rail The mid-to-late nineteenth century saw thousands of miles of track laid across the United States, and by the turn of the twentieth century, rail companies--which offered both passenger and freight rail services at the time--provided one of the cheapest and most efficient modes of transport. In the 1930s, rail transportation began to struggle in competition with commercial aviation and the increasingly popular automobile. Meanwhile, freight regulations put in place by the Interstate Commerce Commission, along with labor union restrictions, stifled the industry further. By 1968, the Pullman Palace Car Company, a major manufacturer of passenger railroad cars, had gone bankrupt. In an effort to give the industry a much-needed boost, the Penn Central Transportation Company was formed that same year, only to declare shortly thereafter the largest corporate bankruptcy in history (Time). Freight railroad is maintained with little taxpayer money, unlike alternate forms of freight transport such as trucks and barges, for which the government maintains the highway infrastructure. The 1970s and 1980s were a turning point for U.S. rail. Amtrak was established by law in 1971 and ushered in a new era of publicly owned and subsidized passenger rail. The modern freight rail industry was created by the Staggers Act of 1980, which partially deregulated the industry and contributed to mass consolidation and increased investment. As part of the Staggers process, the U.S. government allowed freight carriers to exit the passenger business in exchange for donating equipment to Amtrak and pouring $200 million into the new system. Most of the approximately 22,000 miles of track over which Amtrak runs are still owned by freight railroads. Amtrak pays freight carriers for the right to operate on their tracks and for priority over other customers. The Staggers law also granted railroads the freedom to change prices and negotiate private contracts with shipping companies. Following enactment, the number of large railroad carriers shrank from twenty-six to seven, and the amount of track owned by these companies declined from nearly 165,000 miles in 1980 to about 94,000 in 2008. The Success of Freight Rail The U.S. freight rail industry continues to thrive today. "America's freight railways are one of the unsung transport successes of the past thirty years," says the Economist. "They are universally recognized in the industry as the best in the world." Freight railroad is maintained with little taxpayer money, unlike alternative forms of freight transport such as trucks and barges, for which the government maintains the infrastructure. Over the last several decades, U.S. freight companies have made billion-dollar investments in the national rail network. Warren Buffett highlighted this trend in 2009, increasing Berkshire Hathaway's holdings of BNSF (USA Today)--the nation's second largest railroad--by $26 billion. Remarking on the historic investment, which was the largest in the history of Berkshire, Buffett said, "Our country's prosperity depends on its having an efficient and well-maintained rail system." Compared to other modes of freight transport, rail also has a smaller environmental impact, better fuel efficiency, and lower costs over large distances. Steel wheel technology makes rail far more efficient than truck freight due to limited rolling resistance: railcars become more efficient as more weight is added. Trains can now move one ton of cargo approximately 484 miles on just one gallon of fuel, according to the American Association of Railroads. Lower freight rail costs save consumers money and help keep U.S. manufacturers globally competitive. According to Dr. Pasi Lautala, director of the Rail Transport Program at Michigan Technological University, "If you talk to industry experts, everyone has a positive outlook on the future of the freight rail industry, because it makes sense if you look at the world right now. You look at the economic advances, especially in fuel consumption compared to truck traffic and the limitations of marine transportation." But challenges remain. Freight rail will need substantial investment in the future, despite its current success. Congestion is on the rise, and capacity must increase by approximately 90 percent to meet estimated demands by 2035, according to the U.S. Transportation Department. Re-regulation and the potential for track sharing with high-speed and express intercity rail could also put the freight industry under strain. President Obama has proposed a 110 mile-per-hour intercity passenger speed limit, which could create congestion problems for slower-running freight trains.

Economic decline causes extinction

Royal ‘10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. “Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention. This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

Warming Addon

Railroads are key to solving energy and warming

BA Future ‘9 (Building America’s Future Educational Fund, “Advocates for Environment, Freight and Passenger Rail and Transportation Reform Unite to Promote Rail Investment”, http://www.bafuture.org/news/press-release/advocates-environment-freight-and-passenger-rail-and-transportation-reform-unite-, January 15, 2009, LEQ)

WASHINGTON - January 15, 2009 – Two days before President-elect Barack Obama and Vice President-elect Joe Biden arrive here by train for their inauguration, environmental, freight and passenger rail groups have come together with reform-minded transportation experts to form a coalition that will advance rail programs. The coalition will encourage public policies recognizing rail as a critical element of the national transportation system and an essential part of the future economic growth and environmental well-being of the nation. The group, called the OneRail Coalition, brings passenger and freight rail stakeholders together for the first time. Members include American Public Transportation Association, Amtrak, American Short Line & Regional Railroad Association, Association of American Railroads, Building America’s Future, National Association of Railroad Passengers, Natural Resources Defense Council, Railway Supply Institute, States for Passenger Rail Coalition, and Surface Transportation Policy Partnership. According to the group, public policies that support both freight and passenger rail objectives are needed to maximize transportation options that enhance mobility, achieve energy efficiency, address climate change, boost economic growth and improve quality of life for all Americans. “Rail must be an essential component of any national infrastructure investment initiative,” said Anne Canby, President, Surface Transportation Policy Partnership. “Rail provides a solution for many of our most urgent transportation, energy and environmental problems.” “As we look to increase recovery and sustain economic growth, we ask that Congress and the administration focus investment on our U.S. rail system. That focus can help de-congest choke points, put more freight and passengers on fuel-efficient trains, and lower our nation’s greenhouse gas emissions,” said Frank Busalacchi, Secretary, Wisconsin Department of Transportation and Chairman, States for Passenger Rail Coalition and a member of the 2008 National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission. The energy and environmental benefits of rail are significant. Expanding passenger train options between and into U.S. urban centers would substantially reduce highway congestion, fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. Increasing intermodal freight shipments on rail also can reduce greenhouse gas emissions; every ton mile of freight that moves by rail instead of long-haul truck reduces greenhouse gas emissions by at least two-thirds. A coordinated approach of rail and truck shipping is already showing substantial efficiencies and net reductions in potential carbon emissions. “Our nation’s surface transportation infrastructure should strive to provide interconnectivity and be environmentally sound,” said Amtrak President Joseph Boardman. “Increasing investment in rail – both passenger and freight – is a critical step toward achieving this goal.”

Warming is the most likely scenario for extinction - outweighs nulcear war

Deibel, Professor of IR @ National War College, 7 (Terry L, Professor of IR @ National War College, “Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft”, Conclusion: American Foreign Affairs Strategy Today)

Finally, there is one major existential threat to American security (as well as prosperity) of a nonviolent nature, which, though far in the future, demands urgent action. It is the threat of global warming to the stability of the climate upon which all earthly life depends. Scientists worldwide have been observing the gathering of this threat for three decades now, and what was once a mere possibility has passed through probability to near certainty. Indeed not one of more than 900 articles on climate change published in refereed scientific journals from 1993 to 2003 doubted that anthropogenic warming is occurring. “In legitimate scientific circles,” writes Elizabeth Kolbert, “it is virtually impossible to find evidence of disagreement over the fundamentals of global warming.” Evidence from a vast international scientific monitoring effort accumulates almost weekly, as this sample of newspaper reports shows: an international panel predicts “brutal droughts, floods and violent storms across the planet over the next century”; climate change could “literally alter ocean currents, wipe away huge portions of Alpine Snowcaps and aid the spread of cholera and malaria”; “glaciers in the Antarctic and in Greenland are melting much faster than expected, and…worldwide, plants are blooming several days earlier than a decade ago”; “rising sea temperatures have been accompanied by a significant global increase in the most destructive hurricanes”; “ NASA scientists have concluded from direct temperature measurements that 2005 was the hottest year on record, with 1998 a close second”; “Earth’s warming climate is estimated to contribute to more than 150,000 deaths and 5 million illnesses each year” as disease spreads; “widespread bleaching from Texas to Trinidad…killed broad swaths of corals” due to a 2-degree rise in sea temperatures. “The world is slowly disintegrating,” concluded Inuit hunter Noah Metuq, who lives 30 miles from the Arctic Circle. “They call it climate change…but we just call it breaking up.” From the founding of the first cities some 6,000 years ago until the beginning of the industrial revolution, carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere remained relatively constant at about 280 parts per million (ppm). At present they are accelerating toward 400 ppm, and by 2050 they will reach 500 ppm, about double pre-industrial levels. Unfortunately, atmospheric CO2 lasts about a century, so there is no way immediately to reduce levels, only to slow their increase, we are thus in for significant global warming; the only debate is how much and how serious the effects will be. As the newspaper stories quoted above show, we are already experiencing the effects of 1-2 degree warming in more violent storms, spread of disease, mass die offs of plants and animals, species extinction, and threatened inundation of low-lying countries like the Pacific nation of Kiribati and the Netherlands at a warming of 5 degrees or less the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets could disintegrate, leading to a sea level of rise of 20 feet that would cover North Carolina’s outer banks, swamp the southern third of Florida, and inundate Manhattan up to the middle of Greenwich Village. Another catastrophic effect would be the collapse of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation that keeps the winter weather in Europe far warmer than its latitude would otherwise allow. Economist William Cline once estimated the damage to the United States alone from moderate levels of warming at 1-6 percent of GDP annually; severe warming could cost 13-26 percent of GDP. But the most frightening scenario is runaway greenhouse warming, based on positive feedback from the buildup of water vapor in the atmosphere that is both caused by and causes hotter surface temperatures. Past ice age transitions, associated with only 5-10 degree changes in average global temperatures, took place in just decades, even though no one was then pouring ever-increasing amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Faced with this specter, the best one can conclude is that “humankind’s continuing enhancement of the natural greenhouse effect is akin to playing Russian roulette with the earth’s climate and humanity’s life support system. At worst, says physics professor Marty Hoffert of New York University, “we’re just going to burn everything up; we’re going to heat the atmosphere to the temperature it was in the Cretaceous when there were crocodiles at the poles, and then everything will collapse.” During the Cold War, astronomer Carl Sagan popularized a theory of nuclear winter to describe how a thermonuclear war between the Untied States and the Soviet Union would not only destroy both countries but possibly end life on this planet. Global warming is the post-Cold War era’s equivalent of nuclear winter at least as serious and considerably better supported scientifically. Over the long run it puts dangers from terrorism and traditional military challenges to shame. It is a threat not only to the security and prosperity to the United States, but potentially to the continued existence of life on this planet.

Independently, CO2 emissions will destroy the ocean - causes extinction

Sify, Citing Professors @ University of Queensland and North Carolina, 10 (Sify News, Citing Ove Hoegh-Gulberg, Professor @ University of Queensland and Director of the Global Change Institute AND Citing John Bruno, Associate Professor of Marine Science @ UNC, “Could unbridled climate changes lead to human extinction?,” June 19th, http://www.sify.com/news/could-unbridled-climate-changes-lead-to-human-extinction-news-international-kgtrOhdaahc.html)

Sydney: Scientists have sounded alarm bells about how growing concentrations of greenhouse gases are driving irreversible and dramatic changes in the way the oceans function, providing evidence that humankind could well be on the way to the next great extinction. The findings of the comprehensive report: 'The impact of climate change on the world's marine ecosystems' emerged from a synthesis of recent research on the world's oceans, carried out by two of the world's leading marine scientists. One of the authors of the report is Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, professor at The University of Queensland and the director of its Global Change Institute (GCI). 'We may see sudden, unexpected changes that have serious ramifications for the overall well-being of humans, including the capacity of the planet to support people. This is further evidence that we are well on the way to the next great extinction event,' says Hoegh-Guldberg. 'The findings have enormous implications for mankind, particularly if the trend continues. The earth's ocean, which produces half of the oxygen we breathe and absorbs 30 per cent of human-generated carbon dioxide, is equivalent to its heart and lungs. This study shows worrying signs of ill-health. It's as if the earth has been smoking two packs of cigarettes a day!,' he added. 'We are entering a period in which the ocean services upon which humanity depends are undergoing massive change and in some cases beginning to fail', he added.

XT: Solves Warming

Railroad investment is key to prevent GHG emissions.

Heintz et al 9 (James Heintz Associate Research Professor & Associate Director, Robert Pollin Professor of Economics & Co-Director, Heidi Garrett-Peltier Research Assistant. Political Economy Research Institute. Alliance for American Manufacturing. “How Infrastructure Investments Support the U.S. Economy: Employment, Productivity and Growth” http://americanmanufacturing.org/files/peri_aam_finaljan16_new.pdf, January 2009, JGR)

By 2035, demand for freight rail transportation is expected to double (AAR, 2007). Maintaining adequate infrastructure is essential if freight rail is to continue to provide a more environmentally benign alternative to long-distance trucking. Intercity passenger rail, mostly on trains operated by Amtrak, currently links over 500 cities nationwide and provides a viable alternative to air and road transport (Department of Transportation, 2007). Insufficient capital investment in freight and intercity rail would compromise the future contributions of railroads to the U.S. economy. In turn, these investment gaps would slow down the transition to a clean-energy economy. Unlike road transportation, rail infrastructure is largely financed by private companies. Since the railroads were deregulated in the late 1970s, securing the funds for ongoing capital improvements has been a challenge. It is unclear to what extent railroad companies will be able to finance future fixed capital requirements from ongoing revenues (ASCE, 2005). If railroads cannot finance sufficient capital improvements, the growth in demand for rail services would shift onto the road system—increasing congestion, road maintenance costs, as well as increasing greenhouse gas emissions.

***Case***

Err on Caution

Err on caution- rail systems are vulnerable- especially HAZMAT materials

Capra ‘6 (Gregory S. Capra, Gregory S. Capra serves as the Chief of the Program Management Office, Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence, Andrews AFB, Maryland. He earned a bachelor’s degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Colorado and a master’s degree in Strategic Studies from the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He is licensed as a Professional Engineer in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Since entering Federal Civilian Service in 1987, he has supported the men and women of the United States Army and Air Force by serving in various positions at the installation, major command, and headquarters. Prior to attending Air War College in 2006, he served as a Base Closure and Realignment Analyst for the Office of the Air Force Civil Engineer, Headquarters Air Force, Washington, DC, “Protecting Critical Rail Infrastructure”, http://cpc.au.af.mil/PDF/monograph/criticalrailinfrastructure.pdf, December 2006, LEQ)

III. Rail Infrastructure Assessments What was demonstrated on September 11 is that transportation systems and assets can be misused by terrorists in ways that can be difficult to anticipate and overlooked in day-to-day efforts to ensure transportation security. . . . Given the size, scope, and ubiquity of the transportation sector, coupled with its myriad owners, operators, and users, many opportunities exist for terrorists to exploit components of transportation systems in novel ways unanticipated by those traditionally responsible for transportation security. . . . Yet terrorists are actively seeking to exploit new threat vectors that lie beyond such conventional perceptions of order.37 –Panel on Transportation, Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism, 2002 When considering the vulnerabilities of critical rail systems, the United States must imagine the unthinkable. Terrorists will look for unconventional ways to exploit rail system vulnerabilities similar to the way they exploited the airline industry in the 9/11 attacks. It is important to understand and remember the mind set of Al Qaeda and jihadist supporters. They are willing to sacrifice their lives in the acts to achieve “martyrdom” for their cause. They do not differentiate between military and civilian targets, or between men, women, and children when killing Americans. According to Bin Ladin’s fatwas, the more Americans they can kill, the greater their perceived glory. All rail systems share many of the same vulnerabilities: they are open to hijackings, and there are myriad unsecured rail cars, rail corridors, tunnels, bridges, switch gear, maintenance and storage yards, buildings, parking areas, and power, communication and surveillance systems. Freight systems can operate in a closed network where the railroads have control over the cargo as opposed to passenger systems that rely on an open system. A closed system, similar to the screening process of the airport security, is easier to protect. Once freight is screened by rail security, it remains protected by the railroads until it reaches its destination. Decisions on how much protection to provide to freight rail should be a reflection of the type and quantity of hazardous materials (HAZMAT) involved. HAZMAT loads should get priority protection. Passenger trains are harder to protect because they require an open system to allow a large number of passengers’ quick entry and exit from trains and stations. All rail systems are vulnerable to failures of other critical infrastructures like the electrical, communications, and water systems. For example, during the August 2003 blackout across the northeast, New York City’s 413 subway trains lost power and communication and stranded over 400,000 passengers.38 It took nearly three hours to evacuate all passengers.39 In addition, loss of power to over 10,000 traffic signals resulted in instant gridlock on the streets of Manhattan.40 The resulting pedestrian and vehicular traffic jam in Figure 1 shows the disruption caused by loss of rail service in a major city. On 9/11, a broken water main flooded two major transit tunnels. The pump system used to drain the tunnels was not operational due to the loss of electricity. Loss of power was also an issue for the railroads after hurricane Katrina struck. The railroad workers had to bring in generators to provide power for the signals and switches before they could restart operations. Figure 1. 59th Street Bridge Crowded with Pedestrians and Vehicles41

Trains Underfunded

And we have underfunded security for railways- the plan is necessary

Capra ‘6 (Gregory S. Capra, Gregory S. Capra serves as the Chief of the Program Management Office, Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence, Andrews AFB, Maryland. He earned a bachelor’s degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Colorado and a master’s degree in Strategic Studies from the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He is licensed as a Professional Engineer in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Since entering Federal Civilian Service in 1987, he has supported the men and women of the United States Army and Air Force by serving in various positions at the installation, major command, and headquarters. Prior to attending Air War College in 2006, he served as a Base Closure and Realignment Analyst for the Office of the Air Force Civil Engineer, Headquarters Air Force, Washington, DC, “Protecting Critical Rail Infrastructure”, http://cpc.au.af.mil/PDF/monograph/criticalrailinfrastructure.pdf, December 2006, LEQ)

Part of the concern is the U.S. Government’s lack of emphasis on and funding for the security of rail systems. Essentially, protection of U.S. rail systems have been given a much lower priority than protection of the U.S. airline industry as a result of the impact of the terrorists’ acts on the commercial aviation industry. This is reflected in the funding provided by the U.S. Government for security through the Transportation Security Agency. During the Secretary of Homeland Security’s testimony before the Homeland Security Committee, Representative Bennie Thompson (D-MS) pointed out the fact that the Transportation Security Agency focused too much on aviation and had allocated a mere 7 percent of its budget to inspect and patrol rail lines. Representative Thompson felt this was unacceptable and that, if necessary, the Transportation Security Agency should be reorganized to make rail security a higher priority.30 In addition, the GAO recently reported that funding for aviation security for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 was 87 percent of the Transportation Security Agency’s budget.31 The president of the American Public Transportation Association testified that since 9/11 the industry identified a $6 billion requirement for security enhancements of all systems, they invested $2 billion, and only received $250 million from the Transportation Security Agency over three years.32 Finally, the Federal Transit Administration assessed transit national critical infrastructure as “. . . designed and operated as an open environment—it is by its very nature a high risk, high consequence target for terrorists. More than 9.5 billion passengers a year ride our transit systems. Some of the largest transit systems report that more than 1,000 people a minute enters their largest intermodal facilities during rush hour. Transit subways travel under key government buildings, business centers, and harbors. Worldwide, transit has been a frequent terrorist target, including bombings in the London and Paris subways [and bus lines], the sarin gas attack in Tokyo, and bus bombings in Israel.”33 Approximately 3 percent of the total gross domestic product, $319 billion, is attributed to freight for-hire transportation services. Of this, rail systems account for approximately $26 billion.34 The gross domestic product attributed to transportation-related final demand is over $1.1 trillion, about 10.5 percent.35 In addition, the annual operation expenses for the transit sector exceed $30 billion annually.36 With such a high potential to affect the economy, it is possible the next terrorist attack in the United States could be on the rail systems.

Probability High of Terrorist Attacks

A risk of a terrorist attack is high on railroad- they are highly vulnerable- Osama Bin Laden documents prove motivation

Bennett ’11 (Brian Bennett, Washington Bureau, LA Times, “Al Qaeda had U.S. trains in its sights, U.S. officials say”, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/05/nation/la-na-bin-laden-rail-threat-20110506, May 5, 2011, LEQ)

Evidence collected in the Osama bin Laden killing in Pakistan indicates that the Al Qaeda terrorist network considered attacking America's rail system. Officials note that train and subway systems are difficult to secure, given the millions of people who get on and off every day. Reporting from Washington — Evidence collected from Osama bin Laden's compound in Pakistan indicates that Al Qaeda considered launching a terrorist strike against America's rail system, U.S. officials said Thursday, though there was no sign of concrete plans to carry out an attack. The plot was "aspirational," said a U.S. official who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of the information. The apparent plot was discovered amid the documents, computers, hard drives, flash drives, DVDs and other material that U.S. commandos recovered after they killed Bin Laden in his hide-out Monday. It is the first information made public from the vast haul. In response to the new intelligence, the Department of Homeland Security sent a bulletin to state and local police officials Thursday urging them to remain at a "heightened state of vigilance," said Matt Chandler, a spokesman for the department. "We have no information of any imminent terrorist threat to the U.S. rail sector, but wanted to make sure our partners were aware of the alleged plotting," Chandler said. Officials said Al Qaeda members discussed the plot in February 2010 and planned to execute it later this year, on the 10th anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks, the Associated Press reported. Terrorists aligned with or inspired by Al Qaeda have targeted trains with deadly effect in the past. In March 2004, coordinated bombings of commuter trains in Madrid killed 191 people and injured about 1,800. In July 2005, four suicide bombers blew up three subway trains and a double-decker bus in London, killing 52 people and injuring about 700. U.S. authorities have added airport security personnel and tightened screening for passengers and cargo coming into the country since the raid on Bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Trains and subway systems are more difficult to secure, given the millions of people who get on and off every day. Rather than using checkpoints to screen each passenger, police and bomb-sniffing dogs conduct random checks on platforms, stations and aboard some trains. Mass-transit systems and passenger trains "unfortunately remain a target," John Pistole, the Transportation Security Administration administrator, told a congressional hearing on rail security Wednesday. He said they had been "the focus of numerous plots here in the U.S. — unsuccessful, fortunately." Mass transit is "the most vulnerable," agreed Rep. Peter T. King (R-N.Y.), chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, which held the hearing. "And having been to London and to Madrid and seen the terrible damage that was done there by Al Qaeda, you realize, one, in some ways how much easier it is for terrorists to attack mass transit, and also how horrific the tragedy is when it occurs."

***AT: Off Case***

Plan Popular

Plan has bipartisan support

Malkin ‘9 (Michelle Malkin, American conservative blogger, political commentator and author, “How Obama cronyism threatens rail security”, http://michellemalkin.com/2009/09/11/special-report-how-obama-cronyism-threatens-rail-security/, September 11, 2009, LEQ)

New Delhi. Mumbai. Chechnya. Madrid. London. The question isn’t whether America will suffer a jihadi attack on our passenger rail lines, but when. So, why has President Obama neutered the nation’s most highly-trained post-9/11 counterterrorism rail security team? All signs point to business-as-usual cronyism and pandering to power-grabbing union bosses. Amtrak’s Office of Security Strategy and Special Operations (OSSSO) grew out of a counterterrorism and intelligence unit developed by the Bush administration in the wake of global jihadi attacks on mass transit systems. The office was staffed with Special Forces veterans, law enforcement officers, railroad specialists, other military personnel, and experts who collectively possessed hundreds of years of experience fighting on the front lines against terrorism. Each member underwent at least 800 hours of rail security-related training, including advanced marksmanship, close quarters, and protective security exercises. OSSSO’s mobile prevention teams acted as “force multipliers” working with local, state, and federal authorities across the country to detect, deter, and defend against criminal and terrorist attacks on mass transit. They conducted hundreds of show-of-force, uniformed, and rail marshal rides. OSSSO also provided security services for President Bush, the Pope, the 2008 Democrat and Republican conventions, then-Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama’s campaign events, and then-Democratic vice presidential candidate Joe Biden’s Amtrak whistle stop tours. The counterterrorism unit’s push to conduct random passenger and baggage screening earned predictable criticism from civil liberties absolutists, but also garnered bipartisan praise on Capitol Hill. Even Democrat Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas hailed the rail security team’s work last year: “Let me congratulate them for being aware” of the threat to rail passengers, the chairman of a House Homeland Security subcommittee on transportation security, told USA Today in July 2008. “(But) this has to be the new standard for Amtrak

And empirics prove- transportation security is bipartisan

PHO ‘7 (Palm Harbor Office, “Rep. Gus Bilirakis Lauds Passage of Bi-Partisan Rail Security Legislation”, http://bilirakis.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=33&Itemid=115, March 28, 2007, LEQ)

Washington, D.C. - Rep. Gus Bilirakis (R-Palm Harbor), a Member of the Homeland Security Committee, lauded the bi-partisan passage of H.R. 1401, the Rail and Public Transportation Security Act, which included two security provisions he authored. The legislation passed 299 to 124. Among other things, this important homeland security legislation would: Enhance the security of our nation's rail, public transportation and over-the-road bus carriers. Require high and medium risk transportation systems to assess their vulnerabilities and develop and implement security plans. Authorize security grant programs, of 6.2 billion over the next four years, to be distributed on the basis of risk, for rail, public transportation and over-the-road bus systems, to make needed security improvements. The bill the House approved yesterday includes two provisions Rep. Bilirakis successfully inserted during the consideration of the bill by the Homeland Security Committee. The provisions would: Require the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to conduct physical testing of rail cars to determine the most likely successful means of attack against them. Currently, no real-world vulnerability testing has been done on the safety of tank cars carrying dangerous toxic-by-inhalation hazardous materials. Require the security coordinator positions required under the legislation to be filled by U.S. citizens. This is the same as the requirement for individuals seeking security clearances for access to classified information and materials. "I applaud my colleagues in the House for joining together to pass this bi-partisan homeland security legislation." Rep. Bilirakis said. "Our country lives under the constant threat of terrorism by people who despise freedom. It is important that this Congress continues to work together to pass common sense legislation that completely and accurately assesses and addresses security threats to this country's transportation infrastructure."

XT: Popular

Political support is high for high speed rail.

Clubb 10 (Oliver Clubb is a retired Syracuse University political science professor and long-time peace and environmental activist. Global Warming Solutions. “on high-speed trains” http://globalwarmingsolutionsbook.org/read/highspeedtrains.html, 2010, JGR)

Their rapid growth around the world attests to the fact that investment in high-speed rail systems has been bringing very great transportation, economic and environmental benefits to countries that have built them. In these promising circumstances, the time had surely come for Congress and the President to focus seriously on the question of how to get a US network of world-class high-speed rail systems up and running. How to bring this political shift about? If you look at a map of US federally-designated high-speed rail corridors (See Appendix One), you will see that high-speed trains along those corridors would serve many states and congressional districts. Why not form a congressional high-speed rail caucus, like the Congressional Bike Caucus in the present case committed to bringing high-speed rail to all those federally-designated corridors? Recall that Chicago and eight Midwestern governors have already announced their support for construction of a network of high-speed rail lines serving their region. Can it be doubted that almost every legislator whose state or congressional district stands to gain from high speed rail, if asked, would line up in support of the project? What if this large bloc of legislators, supported by their governors and local constituencies, were to call for a substantial investment of stimulus funds? This could come from still uncommitted portions of the $80 billion in stimulus funds assigned to the renewable energy sector since a large reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is as characteristic of rail travel as it is of solar and wind-power generation. And why couldn't federal funding for high-speed rail also come from billions in bail-out funds being paid back by investment banks and such corporations as General Motors?

AT: States/ Private CP

The plan creates a central coordination agency which is key to solve- states or private counterplans won’t solve

Temple ‘7 (Bob Temple, Contributer to Group 7, think tank for Railroad Security, Quoting The GAO Report on Rail Security, The AAR Hearing on Rail Security, and The CRS Report for Congress - Passenger Rail Security: Overview of Issue, http://www.personal.psu.edu/staff/r/p/rpt117/sra211/vulnerabilities.htm, May 8, 2007, LEQ)

Ambiguity in Who Is Responsible For Security The last major vulnerability with railway security is that the United States does not have one specific agency that deals with the security of its railways. In fact, it actually has over four separate agencies working on implementing security to difference aspects of the railway system. According to the GAO Report, the Transportation Security Administration, Federal Railroad Administration, Federal Transit Administration, and the Research and Special Programs Administration are all partially responsible for railway security. This poses a problem, because with the agencies working separate of one another, the possibility for gaps in security arises. If each agency thinks that the others have already thoroughly covered a particular vulnerability, it is possible that none of them will actually put in the time and work necessary to fully secure that vulnerability. Another costly problem with not having a specific agency responsible for railway security is that certain security aspects that are completely secure may be covered multiple times by multiple agencies. On the surface this seems like a good thing, because we are positive that that aspect is entirely covered. However, if you look at the financial costs of repeate dly covering the same security aspects multiple times, it becomes obvious that a large amount of funds are wasted that could be used on securing other vulnerabilities.

AT: Spending Disad

Plan saves money by removing redundancies in the system- turns the disad

Temple ‘7 (Bob Temple, Contributer to Group 7, think tank for Railroad Security, Quoting The GAO Report on Rail Security, The AAR Hearing on Rail Security, and The CRS Report for Congress - Passenger Rail Security: Overview of Issue, http://www.personal.psu.edu/staff/r/p/rpt117/sra211/vulnerabilities.htm, May 8, 2007, LEQ)

Ambiguity in Who Is Responsible For Security The last major vulnerability with railway security is that the United States does not have one specific agency that deals with the security of its railways. In fact, it actually has over four separate agencies working on implementing security to difference aspects of the railway system. According to the GAO Report, the Transportation Security Administration, Federal Railroad Administration, Federal Transit Administration, and the Research and Special Programs Administration are all partially responsible for railway security. This poses a problem, because with the agencies working separate of one another, the possibility for gaps in security arises. If each agency thinks that the others have already thoroughly covered a particular vulnerability, it is possible that none of them will actually put in the time and work necessary to fully secure that vulnerability. Another costly problem with not having a specific agency responsible for railway security is that certain security aspects that are completely secure may be covered multiple times by multiple agencies. On the surface this seems like a good thing, because we are positive that that aspect is entirely covered. However, if you look at the financial costs of repeatedly covering the same security aspects multiple times, it becomes obvious that a large amount of funds are wasted that could be used on securing other vulnerabilities.