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# \*\*\*SPS Specific\*\*\*

## Defense of Space Development

### The affirmative is the best middle-ground for peaceful and ethical space development

-shouldn’t be responsible for all of globalization

-the alternative results in backlash to technology/globalization

Vedda 7 – PhD in Political Science @ Florida

James Vedda, The Role of Space Development in Globalization, in Societal Impact of Space Flight, Scholar

The challenge for space development is to continue its role as a key element of globalization without becoming associated with its negative consequences. The same entities that dominate space development—government institutions and transnational corporations—are seen by critics as orchestrating globalization to serve the wealthy at the expense of the poor. In this view, observations of Earth from space might be interpreted as security threats or as a way to spy on economic activities in other parts of the world, rather than being seen as an instrument of environmental protection and disaster relief. Satellite communications might be depicted as a tool tor extracting information and capital from unsuspecting regions of the world. rather than as a means of bringing information and capital to them. Even incoming information can be pejoratively portrayed as "'cultural contamination" or Western propaganda designed to influence national or regional policies and attitudes. Space technology could be seen by globalization critics as a tool of transnational corporations that exploit workers, of foreign investors who undermine local businesses or of wealthy (i.e. spacefaring) countries that economically take advantage of developing nations. The result could be neo-Luddite controls on technology and onerous trade protection schemes that suppress economic dynamism.21 Therefore, it is **critical that government-supported space development** be directed at—and perceived as—**seeking solutions for the planet** in areas such as disaster relief. environmental monitoring, **climate** research, medical research, and in the long term, the **use of extraterrestrial resources** and capabilities for the benefit of Earth. So tar, the government institutions criticized most often by globalization opponents are the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization.22 Multinational corporations typically are disparaged generically rather than by individual sectors,23 and mention of aerospace companies is notably absent so far. But there is still the possibility for an anti-technology backlash akin to the Vietnam-era experience.

### The affirmative refocuses globalization towards solving socioeconomic equality and societal need

Vedda 7 – PhD in Political Science @ Florida

James Vedda, The Role of Space Development in Globalization, in Societal Impact of Space Flight, Scholar

The OECD frames its recommendations in three "blocks" aimed at what governments can do to strengthen the contributions space can make to solving important socioeconomic challenges: Block I: Implement **sustainable space infrastructure** that is fully integrated with ground infrastructure and takes into account user needs, especially in the areas of Earth observation, navigation, communications, and access to space. Block II: Take advantage of productivity gains that space solutions may offer tor delivery of public services and development of new ones, particularly through international cooperation, data sharing, disaster and treaty monitoring, emergency management, and economic development. Block III: Encourage the private sector to contribute fully to the development of new, innovative applications and to the development and operation of space-based infrastructures by making national and international space laws business-friendly, and by encouraging entrepreneurship, open markets, and international standards.2 These recommendations align well with a belief that space development should continue to play a **significant role**—far beyond just communications—in shaping globalization's evolution and **keeping it focused on societal needs**. In its detailed recommendations, the OECD study suggests ideas on how we can get there from here. At least for the next three decades, the study sees great hope and promise for applied space research and development, relegates basic research to government space agencies, and seems to marginalize human spaceflight.

## Defense of Sustainable Development

### Representations of sustainable development / global cooperation are key to adoption

Woodell 2k – Analyst @ CMRC

Mary Woodell, analyst with Controversy Management and Risk Communication, 2000, “Power from space: the policy challenge,” Space Policy, May, Science Direct

It is in this context that questions of policy can and must come into play, and it is in this area that SSP may face its greatest challenge. There can be little argument that meeting the world's energy needs is a problem of global importance, affecting as it does every nation regardless of its level of development, the condition of its economy, or the extent of its political clout. The rapidly increasing interdependence of national economies — owing in no small part to technological advances — further underscores the global nature of the problem. Surely, then, it follows that any workable solution must be global in its reach — meaning in turn that devising such solutions requires global engagement and cooperation. Space solar power, by its very nature, is uniquely attractive as a focus for such engagement; it relies on resources that belong to everyone and no one. Perhaps for this reason, at the scientific level, SSP has a tradition of productive collaboration among a multinational community of experts that has evolved the SSP concept and its technologies without benefit of any recognized global authority or formal, unifying structure. Because it relies largely on proven technology, and is based on research conducted over the past 30 years, SSP is viewed by this expert community as a viable concept from a scientific point of view. If, as previously suggested, alternative energy sources must meet four key criteria, SSP can be argued to have cleared the first critical hurdle, meeting the primary criterion of technological feasibility. The next criterion is economic feasibility. As outlined above, such feasibility should be determined using broad, dynamic models that operate at the macro level and that take into account the interaction of multiple variables to produce a range of &if}then' scenarios. Obviously the outcome of such an analysis cannot be predicted; however, the nature of this macro approach directly reflects the fact that SSP must be considered in a global context. With technological feasibility largely established, it is clear that SSP is ready for such consideration. It is also clear that the scientific community cannot carry the discussion forward alone. For SSP to advance beyond the realm of theory, it must engage comparable collaboration at the international policy level — where issues of costs and benefits, sustainable development, international law, and geopolitical impact come together. Both precedent and infrastructure exist for such collaboration, in the form of the United Nations, and it is in this arena that SSP must find a voice. A significant advantage in this regard is that SSP can be viewed as transcending or sidestepping some of the thornier, more politically volatile aspects of the global energy debate, which is fraught with tension between industrialized nations and the developing world. By its very nature SSP renders moot a number of complicated political issues, among them the question of resource ownership. More significant are the environmental benefits of SSP relative to conventional alternatives, as these relate to highly charged international debate about global environmental impact and the tradeoff with industrial development. With its potential for delivering environmentally sound renewable energy, SSP may powerfully contribute to defusing these tensions, facilitating the policy debate and expediting real solutions. In addition to finding its voice, SSP must also find a home within the UN system. In some respects, the challenge is that there are too many options rather than too few, given the relevance of SSP to so many aspects of global debate. Consideration of energy alternatives such as SSP is clearly within the mandate of numerous organizations within the UN and is fully consistent with the goals of Agenda 21. Logical potential fora for such consideration include the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) and the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and its Office for Outer Space Affairs (OOSA), which, in particular, has a long tradition of multi-agency collaboration both within the UN system and with relevant affiliates. Such a tradition is important to the question of ‘housing' SSP, reaching as it does across multiple areas of influence. As a practical matter, however, the broad issue of sustainable development is one that has achieved **broad support and awareness**, among both policy makers and the general public. For this reason, the underlying logic of SSP is already “on the screen” in this sector of the policy arena, suggesting that greater momentum may be achieved **in this context**. For example, the CSD has been mandated by the UN General Assembly to consider energy issues at its ninth session [2], as part of its role in implementing Agenda 21. At its 19th Special Session in June, 1997, the General Assembly resolved, among other things, that `There is a need for: (a) A movement towards sustainable patterns of production, distribution and use of energy; 2(b) Evolving concrete measures to strengthen international cooperation in order to assist developing countries in their domestic efforts to provide adequate modern energy services, especially electricity, to all sections of their population, particularly in rural areas, in an environmentally sound manner; [and]2(e) Promoting efforts in research on and development and use of renewable energy technologies at the international and national levels2a [2]. Clearly, then, the CSD will play a central role in defining energy policy for UN member states, and may offer an effective forum for considering SSP. Regardless of its specific domicile, however, what matters is that SSP be considered in terms of its policy implications at a level appropriate to the global impact such alternatives may promise. In other words, just as space is recognized as common property, so, too, is power from the sun. No single nation or authority can claim it, nor can any single entity dictate policy on its use. For this reason the only possible policy arena for SSP is one that, in effect, **represents global interests**.

## AT: Reps K / Debate Key

### The 1ac representations are an activist’s call for SSP – excluding these reps makes all 1ac impacts inevitable

Collins 2k – PhD in Advanced Science and Tech

Patrick Collins, PhD, Visiting Research Fellow, Tokyo University, Research Center for Advanced Science & Technology, 2000, “SPS - time for a pilot plant,” Space Policy, 16, Science Direct

Active engagement also means taking an advocacy role with regard to SSP. While many scientists are deft politicians and passionate advocates in their own com munity, they generally do not apply these talents outside it, and the idea of doing so is largely alien \* if not out right distasteful. However, policy bodies cannot be expected to seek out new science, and if SSP is to `emerge as a serious candidate among the options for meeting the energy demands of the 21st century, as NASA's Fresh Look study suggests, it needs to be **brought before them**. The characterization of SSP as a “candidate” is an especially apt one in this context. In political terms, SSP is a dark horse with limited name recognition, running against a powerful incumbent (conventional fuels), an established contender (nuclear power), and an intriguing potential newcomer (cold fusion). For such a candidate to be considered, much less endorsed, it needs first to be known, **introduced to the people** and deliberative bodies who will determine its viability as an option. The multinational scientific community that has studied and evolved **SSP must now act as its advocate** in the policy arena \* specifically within the UN system as well as at the member state level. What is needed is a concerted effort and a collective strategy that builds and capitalizes on the initiatives undertaken by individual experts, many of whom have established valuable relationships with key government and commercial decision makers through their advocacy of SSP. Such an effort, to be successful, should reflect a campaign mentality and there is no doubt that this will require a significant shift in perspective for SSP scientists. For some, the transition may be awkward, and some may feel that the advocacy role is inappropriate. However, science has a proud tradition of activism on behalf of the common good, and aggressive advocacy of SSP is fully in keeping with this tradition. Moreover, those most knowledgeable about SSP science are by far the best equipped to make a case for it, in terms of both its underlying technology and its potential environmental and societal benefits. Finally, though, the most compelling case for concerted advocacy is the fact that SSP **cannot be realized without it**. No one is holding a place at the table for SSP in the policy arena, and if scientists themselves do not first make and then take that place, no one else will do it for them.

### A debate over the viability of SSP is vital to influencing policymakers for its adoption – greater public awareness is essential

Woodell 2k – Analyst @ CMRC

Mary Woodell, analyst with Controversy Management and Risk Communication, 2000, “Power from space: the policy challenge,” Space Policy, May, Science Direct

The scientific community has a unique — and potentially very powerful — role to play in the determination of energy policy. The importance of scientific and tech nical expertise in the debate about energy alternatives cannot be overstated; without this expertise, alternatives — and their consequences — cannot be properly evaluated, discussion cannot be adequately informed, and resulting policy decisions **cannot be considered sound.** Too often, however, scientists remain largely isolated from the policy-making process, whether by choice or by default. Policy is seen as the job of politicians, while science is for the scientists — and too seldom the twain do meet. The result is a dichotomy that, in the case of energy policy, has potentially very serious ramifications. Underlying this dichotomy are fundamental differences in perspective, methodology, training, and temperament. Policy development is by no means an exact science, and rarely does it produce exact results. Scientific methods do not apply. Policy decisions emerge from compromise based on recognition of common goals, and successful policy makers are skilled negotiators. The policy-making process, to an outsider, looks messy and imprecise, particularly when contrasted with the disciplines of scientific inquiry. By the same token, the rigorous process and methods of scientific research can appear plodding, tedious, and unimaginative to the untrained eye. Scientists inhabit a rarefied environment, and the bigger the science, the more rarefied it becomes. The same holds true of policy makers, who, at the global level, occupy a very exclusive domain. On a structural level, there is no real framework for routinized interaction between these two rarefied worlds; they operate independently of each other. Moreover, on a more human level, it is easy to see how pride of place can become a very real obstacle to productive interchange. Yet it is precisely in cases like SSP — which by any definition is big science with big policy implications — where such interchange is critical. And it cannot happen without the active engagement of the scientific community. Active engagement, in this instance, means expanding the traditional role of the scientific expert in policy development. This traditional role has usually been limited to providing input, rather than actively participating in deliberations. Science committees may provide subject-expert testimony, technical briefings or expert reviews, with the goal of educating policy makers on specific topics, but their focus is almost exclusively technical. Such committees more often than not function largely in isolation from broader policy bodies, with little overlap in membership or voting rights. In the case of SSP and the broad question of global energy alternatives, this approach seems limited if not profoundly flawed. Sound science must be the foundation of any energy policy, not a sidebar to the debate. This means that scientists should be engaging in, rather than simply supporting or informing, the policy-making process. Fully integrating scientific expertise into the policy development process would yield several important, related benefits: for the public, greater assurance of sound science; for policy makers, improved appreciation of science's role and contributions; for scientists, better understanding of the context and impact of their work. Most important, such improved integration would almost certainly produce sounder policy — a goal that surely all would endorse. Active engagement also means taking an advocacy role with regard to SSP. While many scientists are deft politicians and passionate advocates in their own community, they generally do not apply these talents outside it, and the idea of doing so is largely alien — if not outright distasteful. However, policy bodies cannot be expected to seek out new science, and if SSP is to emerge as a serious candidate among the options for meeting the energy demands of the 21st century, as NASA's Fresh Look study suggests, it needs to be brought before them. The characterization of SSP as a ‘candidate’ is an especially apt one in this context. In political terms, SSP is a dark horse with limited name recognition, running against a powerful incumbent (conventional fuels), an established contender (nuclear power), and an intriguing potential newcomer (cold fusion). For such a candidate to be considered, much less endorsed, it needs first **to be known** — introduced to the people and deliberative bodies who will determine its viability as an option. The multinational scientific community that has studied and evolved SSP must now act as its advocate in the policy arena — specifically within the UN system as well as at the member state level. What is needed is a concerted effort and a collective strategy that builds and capitalizes on the initiatives undertaken by individual experts, many of whom have established valuable relationships with key government and commercial decision makers through their advocacy of SSP. Such an effort, to be successful, should reflect a campaign mentality and there is no doubt that this will require a significant shift in perspective for SSP scientists. For some, the transition may be awkward, and some may feel that the advocacy role is inappropriate. However, science has a proud tradition of activism on behalf of the common good, and aggressive advocacy of SSP is fully in keeping with this tradition. Moreover, those most knowledgeable about SSP science are by far the best equipped to make a case for it, in terms of both its underlying technology and its potential environmental and societal benefits. 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### Public education about the viability of SPS is key – otherwise it’ll never get off the ground

Shiner 8

Linda Shiner, 2008, “Where the Sun Does Shine,” Air Space Magazine, http://www.airspacemag.com/space-exploration/Sun\_Does\_Shine.html?c=y&page=1

Perhaps the biggest hurdle facing space solar power is public concern about how low-level microwave beams will affect animals and humans. Never mind that the fear remains unfounded. Because of the widespread use of microwaves for communication, the Federal Communications Commission has established a safety standard for human exposure. In all proposed space power systems, the expected power density at the edges of the receiving antenna, where people are most likely to be affected, meets the standard. But explaining this to the public, which hears “microwave” and thinks “oven,” might require a large and costly education campaign. Another worry, that microwave beams could scramble a passing airliner’s avionics or harm passengers, could be addressed by restricting the airspace around the beams, just as the Federal Aviation Administration restricts the airspace over nuclear power plants. Space power advocates may find it instructive to study the political struggles of the nuclear power industry.

## AT: Space Security K

### The plan solves the impact – the affirmative forges cooperation on key areas of mutual energy interest – this leads to space peace

Hays and Lutes 7 - \*PhD in Strategic Studies, \*\*Colonel, Senior Military Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University

Peter Hays and Charles Lutes, 2007, “Towards a theory of spacepower,” Space Policy, Science Direct

Spacepower both influences and is influenced by an actor’s economic power. Space applications have facilitated globalization, created opportunities for development, and enhanced the global nature of the economy. In its current state, spacepower enables other economic enterprises. However, the potential for creating wealth from space suggests the likelihood of expanding development and economic competition at some point in the future. The point at which that potential is realized is greatly dependent on the factors that shape spacepower. Spacepower has been a major, if often underappreciated, factor in enabling the globalization trend of the past 20 years. The explosion in communication and information technology was made possible through the global view space provides. For developing areas of the world space assets offer ways to manage natural resources better and extend services to remote populations. Additionally, space applications have played a major role in economic development through activities such as telecommunications, navigation, Earth observation and remote sensing, and meteorology. The current economic paradigm is to use satellite technology to create wealth from space. The future economic paradigm will be to create wealth in space. Further, economic enterprises will not be limited to Earth’s orbital plane. Eventually, wealth creation will occur on other planets and celestial bodies as well as in deep space. The timing of such activity is dependent on a set of interrelated shaping factors. However, some applications likely to create wealth in space over the next 50 years include space tourism and adventure; in-orbit servicing; space manufacturing; energy from space; and extra- terrestrial mining. Developing these markets will require significantly reduced access costs, favorable economic conditions and legal regimes, and safety and security of space assets and humans in space. 4.1. Economic prospects A robust and vibrant space economy is highly dependent on a number of factors. A review of those factors yields the following insights: 􏰅 technology is the most significant factor shaping the commercial space industry; 􏰅 the high costs of current space activity require heavy research and development efforts and assumption of risks beyond the scope of most space entrepreneurs; 􏰅 from an economic perspective, space should be a domain free to the pursuit of economic goals; 􏰅 stability of the space-enabled information infrastructure is essential to continued global economic growth and vitality. 5. Security and spacepower Notions of security in space (and through space) vary markedly based on the perspectives of diverse actors, on a broad range of challenges and threats, and on the nature of various space activities themselves. Space activities enable economic security by enhancing the value of global economic interdependence while reducing the vulnerabil- ities of singular actors. Human security **can be advanced** **through such activities** as space-based telemedicine, infectious disease control as well as enabling expansion of economic development in rural areas or those areas previously inaccessible to basic services. Environmental security can be enhanced through global monitoring of the Earth and Solar System. Energy security may be achieved by those who are able to tap into a potentially unlimited source of solar and other forms of power in space. 5.1. National security and spacepower While space has a role in each of these security areas, spacepower is often thought of in the context of national security, as it enhances the ability of spacefaring nations to compete and thrive in an anarchic international security environment. The use of the terms ‘‘power’’ and ‘‘space- power’’ are most closely associated with the notion of power as accorded to the nation-state. Although there clearly are many other forms of power wielded by many different types of actors in and through space, this project assumes that the nation-state will remain the dominant form of power broker for the foreseeable future. Thus it is important to consider how spacepower relates to national security. Depending upon how it perceives its national interests, there are several basic ways a space power may seek security, including maintaining a favorable status quo; expanding its power to increase or close a perceived gap relative to other space powers; or limiting or constraining the power of other space actors. Spacefaring states are likely to have two overarching concerns with regard to security and space capabilities. First, how to use space capabilities to provide for, support, and enhance the overall security of the nation state or related actors (security through space). Second, how to maintain the security of space capabilities themselves—both military and non-military (security in space). 5.2. Security challenges and dilemmas A number of security challenges and dilemmas arise as actors pursue individual interests in space: space assets are fragile and vulnerable; the lines between civilian and military space assets have become blurred; capabilities designed to enhance security through space may reduce security in space, and vice versa; and achieving the economic and sociocultural potential of space requires enduring stability in the domain. 6. Spacepower and the international system Spacepower has an emerging role in the international political system, and at the same time the nature of that system influences how actors might perceive and use spacepower. Spacepower to date has been shaped primarily by the Cold War context in which it matured. As the international system exhibits changes over the next 50 years, the nature of spacepower can be expected to change with it. 6.1. The current paradigm of spacepower in the international system The 1967 Outer Space Treaty defined the initial principles for space activity and these principles describe the dominant paradigm of the international community regarding spacepower: space is the province of all mankind—a ‘‘global commons;’’ space is to be used for peaceful purposes; all states have an equal right to explore and use space; international cooperation and consultation are essential; and signatories retain ownership of their space objects and bear responsibility for their space activities, including any damage inflicted on another state’s space objects [3]. Although most, if not all, spacefaring actors subscribe to the principles of the Outer Space Treaty, a number of issues have arisen to challenge the dominant paradigm. They include definitional problems, concerns about sovereignty and property rights, prospects of weapons in space, and pursuit of self-interests. 6.2. International security in space The space political environment is still in its infancy, and it is unclear how the balance between purely national and global interests will be managed. A reframing of the current paradigm may be required to accommodate the changing nature of space activity. Nation–states will probably seek alternative arrangements in space as they perceive increased vulnerabilities or greater security. Some alternative ways that nations may choose to enhance security, either individually or collectively, are: pursuing unilateral strategies; applying balance of power ap- proaches, developing alliance-based security arrangements; establishing ‘‘rules of the road;’’ enhancing frameworks for cooperation and interdependence in space; and/or nego- tiating arms control or other legal restraints. From the standpoint of international security, one can identify an optimal condition of enduring stability in the space domain. Its attributes would include: a norm of unfettered access to space as a feature of amicable interstate relations; a solid measure of protection, through individual or collective measures, against the aggressive or capricious acts of spoilers; and a situation in which the real or perceived vulnerabilities among space actors are minimized. Ultimately, creating a condition of enduring stability in outer space will hinge upon how tensions between national interests are addressed and whether there emerges over time a convergent perception of what actions tend, on balance, to strengthen or undermine stability. The prospects for military competition and conflict will increase if enduring stability is not a primary goal of major space powers. 6.3. Enhancing the international system In a stable environment, space can enhance and strengthen the international system. The economic and sociocultural imperatives discussed earlier suggest the importance of maintaining space as a domain for wealth creation and for solving the problems of humankind. Spacefaring actors should consider adopting cooperative approaches in space to address issues of global concern such as energy scarcity, climate change, space situational awareness, space debris, defense against earth colliding objects, material resource scarcity, and extra-terrestrial property regimes. Forging collective action on these and other issues will enhance understanding, confidence building, and sharing of knowledge that will contribute to the stability of space as a regime and to its effectiveness in enhancing human prosperity.

## AT: Frontier K

### Representations of sustainability and space-environmentalism offer a sharp break from Cold War frontierism – creates a locus of support that encourages peaceful space policy

Delgado 11 – Fellow @ Space Policy Institute

Laura, 2011, “When inspiration fails to inspire: A change of strategy for the US space program,” Space Policy, Science Direct

The “narrow nationalistic scope of the frontier analogy”, for example, masks the fact that such a conception can have surprisingly little bearing on the younger public [2]. For a generation that is both witness to and active participant in the advances of glob- alization, it speaks more of conquest and violence, of a hardship that is not a feature of everyday life. For them (for us), the notions of interdependence, cooperation coexisting with competition, and multiculturalism are **more powerful and meaningful**. This clash of conceptions, when not understood and addressed, can spell doom for efforts to draw younger members of the public to space because these can have the opposite effect.3 Space can easily be disregarded as foreign and unimportant or, worse, as part of the problem.4 Lacking a debate about what science and space mean today to the younger generations also leads to a situation where the inspi- ration argument bypasses whole groups of people who do not find its tenets compelling, but are instead driven by other concerns, interests, and emotions. Consider for instance the growing interest in climate sciences, renewable energy, and sustainable living. The number of people that feel compelled and drawn by their growing awareness of the frailty of the environment and the interdependence between human actions and quality of life **is growing**. Some say these feelings were first propagated with the Earthrise picture, of the Earth coming up from the curvature of the lunar surface but, while directly linked to space, it was not discovery, competition, or a drive to be the best, that this evoked. It was something else.

## AT: Science K

### The affirmative is not responsible for the entire scientific project – rather, the educational benefits of the scientific method are the only way to prevent conservative takeover of science

Fraknoi 7 – Professor of Astronomy

Andrew Fraknoi, Chair of the Astronomy Department at Foothill College, Societal Impact of Space Flight, p. 414

In a way, those of us concerned with education should be grateful for the growth of tabloid-level interest in alien life-forms or completely misinterpreted "faces" on Mars. Although some students or adults may become interested in space science through such nonsense, they can sometimes go on to learn or read about the real world of space and astronomy once their interest is piqued. Still, without better information about the **scientific method** in our schools, our media, and in our public consciousness, too few people have the tools to go beyond a fascination with pseudoscience to the real science that would await them. Still more disturbing, a 2004 Gallup poll said that 45 percent of Americans believe that God created humans in their present form at some time in the last 10,000 years. When asked about the origin of humanity and being given several choices, only 13 percent of Americans chose an answer that did not include something about God's role. A December 2004 Newsweek poll asked whether respondents favored teaching creation science in addition to evolution: 60 percent favored it, 12 percent were undecided, and only 28 percent were opposed. For many people, this seems to be only fair, in a loose, democratic sort of sense. Many of these people are the ones who have a **problem understanding the scientific method** and ways of deciding on evidence in science. This ambiguity about (or ignorance of) the scientific method spills over into public views of the teaching of astronomy as well. The legislatures of a number of states (including Kansas) have begun to pass laws, at the behest of fundamentalist religious groups, to include anything that contradicts a young Earth and young universe in the subjects that should be taught "only as a theory" or caught with "alternative theories" or de-emphasized. This includes radioactive dating and Big Dang cosmology—ideas essential to understanding the longevity and formation of the universe. (The key issue is that the time scales of our modern understanding are too long to satisfy those who seek to promulgate a very literal interpretation of the Bible as science.)2"

## AT: Resource K / Util Good

### Utilitarianism is the only way to sustain durable space policy – representing pragmatic benefits is necessary to inspire public support

Delgado 11 – Fellow @ Space Policy Institute

Laura, 2011, “When inspiration fails to inspire: A change of strategy for the US space program,” Space Policy, Science Direct

The unspoken desire is to speak of space as something the USA chooses to do because it can, not because it needs to. But is that true anymore? Not really. Concerns over the increasing vulnerability of US space systems are tied to the fact of its increasing dependence on these assets. The good news at least for those who advocate interdependence to advance space security is that other countries are also beginning to depend on space. For developing and devel- oped countries alike, space is no longer just an option. But even that is not clearly understood by the public. Many still see the budget of the space program as an expensive luxury. And fashioning the case for space as something that only really speaks to US identity and leadership does not help. A lucky few, when asked about the importance of space activities, may be able to mention a couple of spinoffs by chance but, for most, its important role in society remains a complete mystery. Because of this, it is precisely this angle – the **utilitarian vision** which asks “how activities in space can best **serve the demands of Earth-bound society** by delivering a variety of direct and tangible benefits” [11] – that I believe should be strengthened from now on. We should harvest the **very real impact** of space capabilities, not just as spinoffs or as something else the space program produces, but as the core reason why it must be supported and grown. For attracting the younger generations that are no longer driven by concerns over demonstrated US leadership, or an identity defined through ideological competition, the key may be putting the **pragmatic aspect of space** on an equal footing to the popular - yet sorely limiting - inspiration argument.

## AT: Images of Suffering K

### The alternative justifies mass atrocity – representation of suffering bears witness and ends public silence

Kleinman and Kleinman 96 – Professors of Anthropology

Arthur, Maude and Lillian Presley Professor of Medical Anthropology and Professor of Anthropology at Harvard, Joan, Research Association at Medical Anthropology Program at Harvard, “The appeal of experience; the dismay of images: cultural appropriations of suffering in our times,” *Daedalus* v125.n1 (Wntr 1996): pp1(23)

It is necessary to balance the account of the globalization of commercial and professional images with a vastly different and even more dangerous cultural process of appropriation: the totalitarian state's erasure of social experiences of suffering through the suppression of images. Here the possibility of moral appeal through images of human misery is prevented, and it is their absence that is the source of existential dismay. Such is the case with the massive starvation in China from 1959 to 1961. This story was not reported at the time even though more than thirty million Chinese died in the aftermath of the ruinous policies of the Great Leap Forward, the perverse effect of Mao's impossible dream of forcing immediate industrialization on peasants. Accounts of this, the world's most devastating famine, were totally suppressed; no stories or pictures of the starving or the dead were published. An internal report on the famine was made by an investigating team for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It was based on a detailed survey of an extremely poor region of Anwei Province that was particularly brutally affected. The report includes this numbing statement by Wei Wu-ji, a local peasant leader from Anwei: Originally there were 5,000 people in our commune, now only 3,200 remain. When the Japanese invaded we did not lose this many: we at least could save ourselves by running away! This year there's no escape. We die shut up in our own houses. Of my 6 family members, 5 are already dead, and I am left to starve, and I'll not be able to stave off death for long.(30) Wei Wu-ji continued: Wang Jia-feng from West Springs County reported that cases of eating human meat were discovered. Zhang Sheng-jiu said, "Only an evil man could do such a thing!" Wang Jia-feng said, "In 1960, there were 20 in our household, ten of them died last year. My son told his mother 'I'll die of hunger in a few days.'" And indeed he did.(31) The report also includes a graphic image by Li Qin-ming, from Wudian County, Shanwang Brigade: In 1959, we were prescheduled to deliver 58,000 jin of grain to the State, but only 35,000 jin were harvested, hence we only turned over 33,000 jin, which left 2,000 jin for the commune. We really have nothing to eat. The peasants eat hemp leaves, anything they can possibly eat. In my last report after I wrote, "We have nothing to eat," the Party told me they wanted to remove my name from the Party Roster. Out of a population of 280, 170 died. In our family of five, four of us have died leaving only myself. Should I say that I'm not broken hearted?(32) Chen Zhang-yu, from Guanyu County, offered the investigators this terrible image: Last spring the phenomenon of cannibalism appeared. Since Comrade Chao Wu-chu could not come up with any good ways of prohibiting it, he put out the order to secretly imprison those who seemed to be at death's door to combat the rumors. He secretly imprisoned 63 people from the entire country. Thirty-three died in prison.(33) The official report is thorough and detailed. It is classified neibu, restricted use only. To distribute it is to reveal state secrets. Presented publicly it would have been, especially if it had been published in the 1960s, a fundamental critique of the Great Leap, and a moral and political delegitimation of the Chinese Communist Party's claim to have improved the life of poor peasants. Even today the authorities regard it as dangerous. The official silence is another form of appropriation. It prevents public witnessing. It forges a secret history, an act of political resistance through keeping alive the memory of things denied.34 The totalitarian state rules by collective forgetting, by denying the collective experience of suffering, and thus creates a culture of terror. The absent image is also a form of political appropriation; public silence is perhaps more terrifying than being overwhelmed by public images of atrocity. Taken together the two modes of appropriation delimit the extremes in this cultural process.(35)

### The imagination of the aff is a necessary first step toward solidarity with those starving

Hastrup, ‘93

[Kirsten Hastrup, *Man*, New Series, 28(4), 1993, 727-739]

When Drhze and Sen, in their recent major work on hunger and public action, claim that people are not mere victims of a particular history but also its agents whose actions can transform society (1989: 279), this is an echo of the antl~ropologicailn sight that people are both defined by the social space and are its defining consciousness (Ardener 1987: 40). It is this power to define the world that we must now seize to the benefit of the starving. We cannot leave the hard facts of hunger for the hard sciences to measure; solidarity sets the standard for rationality, not the other way round. In short, there is no such thing as immanently hard and soft facts, let alone inherently hard and soft sciences. Softness is an expression of failure to convince other people about the truth of certain statements, be they about pain or pleasure. This failure should be remedied by anthropology in the interest of human solidarity. Solidarity is not achieved by inquiry but by imagination, the imaginative ability to see strange people as fellow sufferers; that is, to incorporate others' suffering into a shared concern (Rorty 1989: ~ v i )It is this imaginative ability which has always been the hallmark of anthropology, and which still **compels us to action**.

### The 1AC is an imagination that gives recognition to the suffering of Afghan peoples

Hastrup, ‘93

[Kirsten Hastrup, *Man*, New Series, 28(4), 1993, 727-739]

Particular phenomena warrant attribution of feeling not because there is a scientifically established chain between experience and behaviour, but because all of us have learned what it means to 'be in pain', or to 'be hungry'. Thus 'the connection between subjective states and overt manifestation is to be found in one's own experience' (Vendler 1984: 201). With such invisible facts as suffering in particular, there is no way of understanding people except through one's own experience and power of imagination. Sufferings, evidently, vary not only in kind, but also in degree, and it would be absurd to claim that anthropologists actually share the experiences of hardship with the people they study. This is why experience must be stretched by powers of imagination. Imagination in this sense is not a question of fantasy and creative writing, but of extending the logic of recognition to the unprecedented. In other words, with imagination we are not only in the realm of the restricted Romantic view of a capacity for novelty, but in the general capacity of organizing new experience into meaningful units (cf. Johnson 1987: 140 sqq.).

### Turn – the imagination of the 1AC enables us to begin to respond to the pain of starvation

Hastrup 93

[Kirsten Hastrup, Man, New Series, 28(4), 1993, 727-739]

Suffering, then, is embodied and is in some ways beyond cognitive understanding. As such it is 'lost' to both gaze and speech. Yet implicitly we 'recognize' it, even when we have not felt exactly the same way or been exposed to similar disasters. Certain experiences are not literally shared at all, but we are, nevertheless, able to imagine their implications. This is the point I want to make: it is not distance, or lack of personal experience by itself which makes us feel impartial to hunger and other forms of suffering. As we know from theatre performances, 'audience involvement' can be total, even if the spectators are physically separate from the object of attention (Tuan 1990: 244). Irrespective of the fact that people organize their lives so differently that they appear to be living in different worlds, there is unity at one point; it is that unity which makes us imaginablz to one another (Shweder 1991: 18). This power of mutual imaginability also allows us to **acknowledge that pain is one and can be generalized about** (cf. Davis 1992: 155). The problem remains, of course, of how anthropology can codifj sensations that are so **brutally nonlinguistic as hunger and starvation**. If realities are not independent of our representations of them and our involvement with them, then our raising of scientific questions can be no innocent act (Shweder 1991: 107).

### Total rejection of images of suffering leads to paralysis

Kleinman and Kleinman 96 – Professors of Anthropology

Arthur, Maude and Lillian Presley Professor of Medical Anthropology and Professor of Anthropology at Harvard, Joan, Research Association at Medical Anthropology Program at Harvard, “The appeal of experience; the dismay of images: cultural appropriations of suffering in our times,” *Daedalus* v125.n1 (Wntr 1996): pp1(23)

Our critique of appropriations of suffering that do harm does not mean that no appropriations are valid. To conclude that would be to undermine any attempt to respond to human misery. It would be much more destructive than the problem we have identified; **it would paralyze social action**. We must draw upon the images of human suffering in order to identify human needs and to craft humane responses.

## Futurism Good / Obligation to Future Societies

### Access to space resources are the first priority – creates economic sustainability, supports future generations and significantly expand quality of life

-this card supports future thinking

-supports the ethical use of space

-supports transculturalism (as opposed to national pride)

Fisk 8 – Professor of Atmospheric, Oceanic and Space Sciences @ U of M

Len Fisk, 2008, “The impact of space on society: Past, present and future,” Space Policy, Science Direct

We live in a global, highly interdependent world. This is no longer a time to pursue space strictly for national pride. We need to bring to bear all our capabilities in space to determine the future of our planet and to **increase** the economic **opportunities** that are **available for all of our societies**. There are compelling tasks that need to be undertaken in specific scientific disciplines. If we extend the human presence into space, we no longer have the luxury of treating the conditions and the hazards of space as an interesting scientific problem, to be solved at our leisure. We need instead to be set loose and supported to develop a true predictive capability of the space environment through which humans will fly. And to do so as soon as possible. Perhaps we will decide that the future of fundamental physics is in understanding dark energy, which is not understood, but appears to be accelerating the expansion of the universe. We should be set loose and supported to mount a worldwide effort to use our capabilities in space to understand this fundamental force of nature. As with all previous discoveries in fundamental physics, we can expect that future societies will depend upon and profit from the discoveries we make. It cannot be that we occupy this vast universe alone. Where does everybody else live? What are they like? We need to be set loose and supported to determine how common life is, even within our own Solar System. We need to find life elsewhere in the universe, and if possible to communicate with it. Such an event would alter the course of human history as no other. Asteroids can hit Earth and destroy us. An unlikely event, but not an impossible one. We need to be set loose and supported to fully understand our risks, and to be prepared to defend ourselves. There is a worldwide need for technically competent workforces, to solve the many problems facing our societies, and to ensure our economic future. Space has a proven record of creating technically competent work- forces. The Apollo program in America inspired a generation to pursue careers in math, science, and engineering. **We can all do this again**. There is a worldwide need to believe that the future can be better than the present, and to collectively work to secure that brighter future. Space is all about the future. We envision a time when our planet is safe from ourselves. When our economies grow without bound; when our knowledge of the wonders of the universe has become true understanding; when we are a true spacefaring civilization. We need to be set loose and supported to pursue that brighter future for all of us. During the past 50 years, space has had a profound impact on our societies. It has facilitated the globally interdependent world in which we live. It has altered our sense of our place in the universe. It has created technically competent workforces, stimulated our economies, enhanced our lives, and vastly increased our knowledge of Earth, our Solar System and the universe beyond. It is my fervent hope that in the years ahead we will be called upon to do so much more. We can make it a much better world for all of our societies, if only we are **set loose and supported to do so**.

## AT: Space Exploitation K

### Space resource use is ethical and sustainable – limiting consumption to terrestrial sources is the worst of all choices because it denigrates the bottom billion and leads to societal repression

Collins and Autino, 10 - \* Life & Environmental Science, Azabu University AND \*\* Andromeda Inc., Italy

Patrick and Adriano, “What the growth of a space tourism industry could contribute to employment, economic growth, environmental protection, education, culture and world peace,” Acta Astronautica 66 (2010) 1553–1562, science direct

The continuation of human civilisation requires a growing world economy, with access to increasing resources. This is because competing groups in society can all improve their situation and reasonable fairness can be achieved, enabling social ethics to survive, only if the overall ‘‘economic pie’’ is growing. Unfortunately, societies are much less robust if the ‘‘pie’’ is shrinking, when ethical growth becomes nearly impossible, as competing groups try to improve their own situation at the expense of other groups. Continued growth of civilisation requires continual ethical evolution, but this will probably be possible only if resources are sufﬁcient to assure **health, comfort, education and fair employment** for all members of society. The world economy is under great stress recently for a number of reasons, a fundamental one being the lack of opportunities for proﬁtable investment—as exempliﬁed by Japan’s unprecedented decade of zero interest-rates. This lack of productive investment opportunities has led a large amount of funds in the rich countries to ‘‘churn’’ around in the world economy in such forms as risky ‘‘hedge funds’’, causing ever greater ﬁnancial instability, thereby further weakening economic growth, and widening the gap between rich and poor. Increasing the opportunities for proﬁtable, stable investment requires continual creation of new industries [16]. Governments today typically express expectations for employment growth in such ﬁelds as information technology, energy, robotics, medical services, tourism and leisure. However, there are also sceptical voices pointing out that many of these activities too are already being outsourced to low-cost countries which are catching up technologically in many ﬁelds [20]. Most of the new jobs created in the USA during the 21st century so far have been low-paid service work, while the number of US manufacturing jobs has shrunk rapidly [21]. It is thus highly relevant that aerospace engineering is a ﬁeld in which the most technically advanced countries still have a substantial competitive advantage over later developing countries. Hence, if a commercial space travel industry had already been booming in the 1980s, the shrinkage in aerospace employment after the end of the ‘‘cold war’’ would have been far less. Consequently it seems fair to conclude that the decades-long delay in developing space travel has contributed to the lack of new industries in the richer countries, which is constraining economic growth and causing the highest levels of unemployment for decades. The rapid economic development of China and India offers great promise but creates a serious challenge for the already rich countries, which need to accelerate the growth of new industries if they are to beneﬁt from these countries’ lower costs without creating an impoverished under-class in their own societies. The long-term cost of such a socially divisive policy would greatly outweigh the short-term beneﬁts of low-cost imports. The development of India and China also creates dangers because the demands of 6 billion people are now approaching the limits of the resources of planet Earth. As these limits are approached, governments become **increasingly repressive**, thereby adding **major social costs to** the direct costs of environmental damage [22]. Consequently, as discussed further below, it seems that the decades-long delay in starting to use the **resources of the solar system** has already caused heavy, selfinﬂicted damage to humans’ economic development, and must be **urgently overcome**, for which a range of policies have been proposed in [23,24].

## AT: Space Exploitation K

### Environmental concerns should not extend to space – it’s a desolate wasteland and it’s infinite

Huebert and Block 8 - \*Professor of Law, \*\*Professor of Economics

Jacob and Walter, 2008, “Environmentalists in Outer Space,” J H Huebert, http://jhhuebert.com/articles/environmentalists-in-outer-space/

Save the earth! That’s been the mantra of environmentalists for decades. But now they want more. They not only want to tell us what we can do on the earth, but also what we can do off the earth, in outer space. Yes, statist environmentalists are already concerned about the alleged threat to the outer-space environment posed by humanity. Humans have already defiled the earth, they say, so why should we be allowed to do it to the rest of the universe? We find their proposed environmental programs for outer space wholly unjustified. In their place, we propose pure private property rights. Almost no one would say he’s an enemy of the environment. Everyone wants clean air to breathe and clean water to drink, and no one wants anyone to invade his person or property with harmful substances. People (like us) who go this far—and only this far—with their environmentalism probably comprise the majority of humanity. In the second half of the twentieth century another type of environmentalism arose: ecocentric (rather than anthropocentric) environmentalism, or “deep ecology.” According to ecocentrism, Mikael Stenmark writes, only “ecological wholes (such as species, ecosystems, the land or the biotic community) . . . have a value in themselves . . . and . . . the value of the ecological parts . . . is determined by how far they contribute to the survival and well-being of the ecological whole.” The ecocentric view extends its concern to the entire earth, dirt and rocks included. Everything (except humans, apparently) is seen as possessing “intrinsic value” (value somehow derived from itself, not from man), which is destroyed or threatened by any human tampering. Holmes Rolston III writes, “Earth does not belong to us; rather we belong to it. . . . Earth is really the relevant survival unit.” This philosophy’s real-world implications can be seen in the activities of the Earth First! organization, which is known for putting spikes in trees so lumberjacks or mill workers who cut them may be injured or killed. Earth First! leader Richard Foreman states the ends of ecocentric environmentalism: “We advocate bio-diversity for bio-diversity’s sake. That says man is no more important than any other species . . . . It may well take our extinction to set things straight.” Considering the focus on the earth and “biodiversity,” one might expect that we would be spared the down-with-humans-up-with-dirt-and-rocks rhetoric with respect to man’s activity beyond the earth. Unfortunately, this has not been so. As Howard A. Baker writes in the law journal Annals of Air and Space, “With an environmental approach, protection of the outer space environment and its sub-systems is the priority, [not] ensuring that outer space can be used for [human] space activities.” In Law, Values, and the Environment, Robert N. Wells Jr. adds, “Outer space, a source of wonder and inspiration for centuries, deserves to be preserved in its original pristine state, for its own sake and for future generations to enjoy.” And April Greene Apking, writing in the Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, writes, “[W]e must ensure that our presence [in space] does not defile what remains one of the few accessible pristine areas.” These radical views even have found their way into the work of relatively moderate writers. Glenn H. Reynolds and Robert P. Merges, for example, generally favor private property rights, but make an exception for “environmental research and conservation preserves,” which would place “10 to 15 percent of the area capable of being developed” off limits. To speak of a “pristine” outer-space environment is a rather strange thing to do, given how utterly unpleasant the rest of the universe appears to be. Mercury, for example, has no atmosphere, and portions of its surface become hot enough to melt tin, while others remain cold enough to keep ice from crashed comets perpetually frozen—with little remotely pleasant in between. Venus is even worse. Its atmosphere is almost pure carbon dioxide, complemented by thick clouds of something like battery acid. Its atmospheric pressure is 92 times greater than earth’s, so any visiting astronaut in a normal spacesuit would be crushed instantly. The mean surface temperature is 480 degrees Celsius. Earth’s moon is relatively less hateful, but it has no atmosphere, of course, and has never supported liquid water, let alone life. Mars is dead, too. There is no conclusive evidence for life there, either now or in the past. Its atmosphere consists mostly of deadly carbon dioxide, and its mean surface temperature is negative 23 degrees Celsius. Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, and Neptune are covered in extremely large, cold, and stormy mixes of toxic liquids and gasses. Some of these distant planets’ moons might be of some use, but are nonetheless wholly inhospitable. For example, one of Jupiter’s moons, Europa, is covered in water ice and may have liquid water and possibly some sort of microscopic life beneath its frozen surface. And Saturn’s moon Titan has, like earth, a mostly nitrogen atmosphere—at negative 180 degrees. Where there is no atmosphere, as on the moon, the environment is far from healthy. Spaceships and spacesuits must be well shielded to protect against the sun’s radiation. Bad to Worse All of that may sound bad, but in fact the space environment is only going to become much worse. That’s because our sun will eventually change to a “subgiant” star, then a Red Giant, then a nebula, then a White Dwarf, then a Black Dwarf. In the end, all the planets, including earth, will lose their atmospheres and exist at a temperature just a few degrees above absolute zero. In sum, the space environment is so bad right now that, from anything other than a human-hating perspective, it **could not get much worse**—except that billions of years from now, it will get worse, and there is nothing anyone can do about that. Considering the solar system’s present and future environmental state, the idea of space pollution **becomes absurd**. Air pollution? As we’ve seen, there is no air on the moon—and to the extent that our neighboring planets have an atmosphere at all, it’s almost entirely carbon dioxide, which is toxic and the bane of environmentalists when produced by humans here on earth. Thus nothing we could do to other celestial bodies could make the “air” more toxic than it already is. Water pollution? There is no surface liquid water anywhere but on earth. Radiological pollution? There’s already dangerous radiation in space against which humans must shield themselves. The Mars atmosphere may limit the amount of radiation on its surface—but given its poison-gas environment, not to mention its already highly toxic soil, how much worse would some radiation here and there make the planet? To speak of pollution or contamination of space in the abstract—apart from human beings’ property rights—**makes no sense**.

### Space exploitation is most ethical – solves terrestrial devastation – no risk of alien exposure

Huebert and Block 8 - \*Professor of Law, \*\*Professor of Economics

Jacob and Walter, 2008, “Environmentalists in Outer Space,” J H Huebert, http://jhhuebert.com/articles/environmentalists-in-outer-space/

One of the most promising uses for space is, of course, as a waste dump. This should be cause for environmentalist celebration, not alarm. For example, nuclear electric power is far better for the environment than fossil fuels, which pollute the air and cause countless health problems. But what to do with the small amount of toxic waste it creates? Once space flight becomes sufficiently affordable, the answer becomes simple: send it on a long, long trip. Who but the most fanatical “cosmo-centrist” could be disturbed by sending our waste to Venus, an already hellish place where no living creature will likely ever go? The only colorable objection to this is that the waste might pose a risk to people on earth as it leaves the atmosphere (say, if the ship carrying it explodes or crashes, as NASA vehicles are wont to do). But presumably that risk would shrink as the private sector moves further into space transportation and space technology advances. For example, a space elevator would not entail the high risks or costs of ordinary space flight. And, of course, carriers of hazardous waste would be liable for harm they cause—which, along with their financial investment, would encourage them to take extreme care. Another potential benefit would be to move **polluting industrial operations off-planet**. Again, environmentalists who really care about the well-being of humans or life generally (as opposed to rocks and dirt per se) **should delight** in this prospect. As we’ve mentioned, some have called for part or all of outer space to be declared an untouchable “wilderness.” We find this to be a rather strange preoccupation. Right now space is a de facto 100 percent wilderness preserve and will remain so even if humans go there in large numbers. If environmentalists wanted to preserve specific areas, they could buy or simply homestead land, which some of them have done on earth. Governments, though, have little incentive or ability to determine which parts of any celestial body are best used as wilderness preserves and which are best put to other purposes. Such determinations would surely be corrupted by the influence of special interests, just as special interests have influenced terrestrial environmental laws to the benefit of polluters. Indeed, the U.S. government’s management of its national parks has been dismal, as have governments’ overall environmental records. So if optimal preservation of that which is valuable to scientists and other admirers of pristine lunar wilderness is the goal, the answer again is strictly enforced private property rights. It is entirely unjust for “wilderness” advocates to use government to prevent others from developing their property in space. They may speak in terms of intrinsic value, but they really seek to use the law to forcibly place their personal aesthetic preferences above those of others, and above the welfare of the human race. Terraforming What about “terraforming”? This would involve transforming an alien environment to give it a climate more like earth’s. Fantastic though it sounds, this may be technologically feasible on Mars. Essentially, it would involve initiating “global warming” through the release of CF4 into the now very sparse Martian atmosphere, raising its temperature by ten degrees Celsius within several decades, which would cause an increase of water vapor in the atmosphere, further warming the planet. Next, humans could release “methanogenic and ammonia-creating bacteria into the now-livable environment,” quoting Robert Zubrin, creating even more greenhouse gases. “The net result of such a program could be the creation of a Mars with acceptable atmospheric pressure and temperature, and liquid water on its surface within fifty years of the start of the program.” (Zubrin is quoted in Glenn H. Reynolds, “Space Law in the 21st Century: Some Thoughts in Response to the Bush Administration’s Space Initiative,” Journal of Air Law and Commerce.) Mars would not then have a breathable atmosphere, writes Glenn Reynolds, “but would support crops and allow people to move around without spacesuits.” Those who want a “pristine” outer-space environment hate this idea, but we see no problem with it. If no one owned property on Mars before terraforming apart from the terraformers, property rights wouldn’t be an issue—the terraformers would have a right to do as they please. They would not own the whole planet, though, but only the parts with which they actually “mixed their labor.” If other property owners were present, they would likely welcome terraforming because it would make their own property more useful to them. Some, though—especially scientists researching the planet’s history—might not welcome the radical changes to the planet. But the right to be protected against weather one finds undesirable has never been recognized, to our knowledge. No Legal Standing Of course, non-property-owning environmental activists on earth—those most likely to challenge terraforming—would have no standing to challenge this process of development. Again, their aesthetic tastes **should not be given priority** over the preferences of those with an actual stake in the matter (property owners) and over the good of the human race generally. Some have suggested that space settlers should be restricted because extraterrestrial life is possible. We disagree. There is no evidence that life exists or has ever existed anywhere except earth. And even if it does exist, there is no reason to think government is necessary to protect it. Human beings are fascinated by the idea of extraterrestrial life. Anyone who goes to space for any purpose is likely to be interested in checking for signs of past or present life on his property before acting in a way that might destroy those signs. For the intellectually uncurious, there would still be financial incentives. For example, scientific or environmental organizations could offer prize money for discovery of evidence of extraterrestrial life; a property owner who discovers such evidence could sell scientists, journalists, and others rights to access, study, and publicize it. Only governmental intervention (say, stripping individuals of property rights when something of scientific interest is found on their property) is likely to cause incentives to run in any other direction. Space environmentalism **lacks any justification**, and its only philosophical foundation is a most extreme form of environmentalism to which very few people seriously subscribe. For the good of the human race, and because it is just, private parties should be free to use space for whatever human purposes they see fit within the limits of private property rights.

## Citizen Challenging Conservative Space Policy Key

### Citizen debate about space dominance is key – challenges elites

Moore 8 – Former Editor of BAS

Mike, research fellow at the Independent Institute and former editor of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Twilight War, pg. xv

The public's concept of America’s future in space includes returning to the Moon and establishing a permanent presence there, as well as thinking seriously about one day sending astronauts to Mars. Meanwhile, in the name of national security, the United States is pursuing a research and development program aimed at achieving the military capability to control orbital space and—possibly—to place weapons in space, once a sitting president gives the go ahead and Congress agrees. Are we talking eyes-glaze-over rocket science here? Questions fit only for "experts"? **No**. We're talking about the meaning of America, and you and I are all expert enough to tackle that one. Americas founders shared a very big idea—that the people, not a monarch, were sovereign. They also believed that for such a republic to work, citizens **must be well informed** and **deeply involved** in important public-policy questions. That's Civics 101. If the United States chooses to go the space-control and space-weapons route—and that choice has not yet been definitively made—that decision will become a central feature of American foreign policy, a policy that since 2001 has had a decidedly unilateralist and triumphalist cast. A policy of space dominance would set the tone for decades to come. It would be a lulu of a mistake for which America's children and grandchildren would pay the price. We the people can no longer afford to let the question of unilateral space dominance remain in a hazy **leave-it-to-the-experts twilight**. There's a policy war going on regarding space that, in the end, comes down to a conflict over fundamental American values. That policy struggle has largely gone unnoticed. We **need to examine these issues in the clarifying light of** **day**; we must become more involved in shaping this vital facet of our nations future. Twilight War gives you the background needed to come to grips with that issue.

## Appeal to Transnational Values Good

### The affirmative’s appeal to transnational concerns is the only way to motivate space policy among the public

Billings 7 – Professor @ Georgetown

Linda, PhD in Mass Communication, Professor of Media @ Georgetown, Societal Impact of Space Flight, p. 498

In order to survive as a cultural institution, spaceflight needs an ideology. It needs to have some connection to widely held beliefs. It needs a role in a cultural narrative. But as Pyne has noted, "Locating exploration in the human gene or in the human spirit" and not in specific cultures is not viable. Continued reliance on this narrative "only absolves us from making those vital, deliberate choices" we inevitably have to make—about how we should proceed into space, and what values space exploration should embody. "These choices,Pyne has said, "are not intuitive." As a cultural institution, space exploration "has to speak to deeper longings and fears and folk identities:' It "is not merely an expression of curiosity but involves the encounter with a world beyond our ken that challenges our sense of who we are. It is a moral act ... more than adventuring, more than entertainment, more than inquisitiveness." It has to explain "who a people are and how they should behave." And in the current cultural environment, as Pyne has observed, space exploration "will have to base its claim to legitimacy on **transnational or ecumenical values**."

### The narrative of peaceful coexistence and progress is key

Billings 7 – Professor @ Georgetown

Linda, PhD in Mass Communication, Professor of Media @ Georgetown, Societal Impact of Space Flight, p. 499

This historical review of the rhetoric of space advocacy reveals competing American cultural narratives, then. The dominant narrative—advancing the values of the dominant culture—upon which the narrative of U.S. spaceflight piggybacks, is a story of American exceptionalism that justifies unilateral action and the globalization of American capitalist democracy and material progress. The story of spaceflight is embedded in this broader narrative. That story is also woven into a competing narrative, a vision of "Utopian ideas of **collective progress"** and “a spiritual humbling of self .” This competing narrative may be a site within which the ideology' of spaceflight might **rejuvenate itself**—where the vision of a human future in space becomes a vision of humanity's collective peaceful existence on Spaceship Earth and the need to work together to preserve life here and look for life out there.

### Transnational motivations are the most effective way to pursue an ethical approach to space

Avdeyev 11 – Holds the most cumulative time in space

Sergey Avdeyev, et. al., 2011, “Human space exploration e A global trans-cultural quest,” Vol. 27, Space Policy, Science Direct

Decision makers are called upon to regard the support of human space exploration as a task which goes much further than supporting technology development. It is no utilitarian means, but rather a quest. The fact that the different cultures around the globe share in this quest should make it clear to decision makers that in supporting space exploration they must not and cannot compete with other actors but should **take this trans-cultural quest as a global endeavour**. This knowledge should be **translated into further public support** in our societies for human space exploration. This Statement provides the rationale and the substance for bold steps into the future and encourages and supports decision makers in driving the cause of human space exploration further by high- lighting its trans-cultural dimension.

# \*\*\*REALISM\*\*\*

We, the United States of America, can be first. If we do not expend the thought, the effort, and the money required, then another and more progressive nation will. It will dominate space, and it will dominate the world.

-James H. Doolittle (1959)

## 2AC U.S. Domination of Space Good

**Threat construction good – U.S. domination of space solves benign hegemony, status quo risks conflict and it’s morally justified**

**Dolman 5 – PhD, Professor**

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Just as the Athenians could argue that Melian neutrality was more damaging to their interests than outright hostility, Astropolitik declares that the lack of a hostile space power at the present is **more damaging to US** space interests than having aggressive, competing military space programs with which to cope (an argument specifically constructed in Chapter 4). In a parallel line of reasoning, the Athenians believed the toleration of a weak neutral close to the borders of its empire was a sign of weakness in themselves. It could induce current allies to switch to neutrality, depriving them of needed revenues (via tribute). The lack of an enemy in space is most assuredly causing complacency in the United States, stunting the expansion of its space capabilities, and further causing our allies (in Europe and Japan specifically, but in Israel most notoriously) to develop their own **potentially conflicting military space capacities** because they cannot be sure of US commitments in the future. The United States does have one significant edge over the Athenians in that it can advance a broad moral argument for space domination. Athens was fashioning a coercive empire of dependent states, the United States is not. The US form of liberal democracy, unlike Athenian mob democracy, is conducted within the rule of law. It is admirable and socially encompassing. If any one state should dominate space, it ought be one with a constitutive political principle that government should be **responsible** and responsive to its people, **tolerant** and accepting of their views, and willing to extend legal and **political equality** to all. In other words, the United States should **seize control** of outer space and become the shepherd (or perhaps watchdog) for all who would venture there, for if any one state must do so, it is the most likely to establish a **benign hegemony**.

## 2AC Mearsheimer ‘01

**Realism is true and inevitable – a shift away collapses into chaos.**

**Mearsheimer** **1**

(professor of political science at University of Chicago, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, pg. 361)

The optimists' claim that security competition and war among the great powers has been burned out of the system is wrong. In fact, all of the major states around the globe still care deeply about the balance of power and are destined to compete for power among themselves for the foreseeable future. Consequently, realism will offer the most powerful explanations of international politics over the next century, and this will be true even if the debates among academic and policy elites are dominated by non-realist theories. In short, the real world remains a realist world. States still fear each other and seek to gain power at each other's expense, because international anarchy-the driving force behind greatpower behavior-did not change with the end of the Cold War, and there are few signs that such change is likely any time soon. States remain the principal actors in world politics and there is still no night watchman standing above them. For sure, the collapse of the Soviet Union caused a major shift in the global distribution of power. But it did not give rise to a change in the anarchic structure of the system, and without that kind of profound change, there is no reason to expect the great powers to behave much differently in the new century than they did in previous centuries.Indeed, considerable evidence from the 1990s indicates that power politics has not disappeared from Europe and Northeast Asia, the regions in which there are two or more great powers, as well as possible great powers such as Germany and Japan. There is no question, however, that the competition for power over the past decade has been low-key. Still, there is potential for intense security competion among the great powers that might lead to a major war. Probably the best evidence of that possibility is the fact that the United States maintains about one hundred thousand troops each in Europe and in Northeast Asia for the explicit purpose of keeping the major states in each region at peace.

## Realism True in Space

**States are always attempting to maximize their power, even in space—genuine cooperation will never prevail**

**Dolman 5 – PhD, Professor**

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Thus I propose corralling the elements of space and politics recognized as realist into their proper places in grand strategy. Colin Gray, in his penetrating analysis of the meaning and place of modern strategy, makes an almost unassailable case that the elements of strategy are unchanging, and applicable across all levels of analysis—that is, across system, across level, and across time. 3 His argument is wholly compatible with the tenets of astropolitics and Astropolitik: ‘there is an essential unity to all strategic experience in all periods of history because nothing vital to the nature and function of war and strategy changes’. 4 In his rigorous definition, Gray asserts that strategy is ‘the use that is made of force and the threats of force for the ends of policy’. 5 Threats may be implicit or explicit, but the connection between violence and policy is vital to an understanding of grand strategy. While it may seem barbaric in this modern era to continue to assert the primacy of war and violence—‘high politics’ in the realist vernacular—in formulations of state strategy, it would be **disingenuous** and even **reckless** to try to deny the continued preeminence of the terrestrial state and the place of military action in the short history and near future of space operations. Even as states publicly denounce the use of violence and force in space operations, **all spacefaring states today have military missions**, goals, and contingency space-operations plans. A case will be made here that the reality of confrontation in space politics pervades the reality of the ideal of true cooperation and political unity in space which has never been genuine, and in the near term seems **unlikely.**

**Space competition is inevitable and cooperation is futile**

**Dolman 5 – PhD, Professor**

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At this juncture it is probably necessary to set down a defense of the selection of an admittedly contentious term for the title. Astropolitics is innocuous enough. It conjures a sense of commingled realms of politics and space-age technology. It is narrower and more powerful than that, as will be shown, but as an appellation it should not rankle. Astropolitik, as the saying goes, is another kettle of fish. Yet it is chosen carefully and with much thoughtful deliberation. The text nowhere concludes that a harsh realist outlook is the only one for the future of space exploration and exploitation. It simply avers that this has been the pattern, and that policymakers should be prepared to deal with a competitive, state-dominated future in space. Nor is there any intimation that such an environment is inevitable or even probable. In the author’s view, in the long term, such a sustained policy is counterproductive and detrimental. The colossal effort to conquer space will be done much more efficiently by a united world, if for no other reason than that the enormous expense of a truly large-scale conquest and colonization effort may require the enthusiasm and support of all Earth’s people. Simply put, in a world of modern territorial nation-states (whose demise has been prematurely announced 6 ), collective action dilemmas will prevent those political entities from cooperatively exploiting the realm, and **efforts to enjoin states to do so will have negative if not countervailing results**. These views are discussed in greater detail in Chapters 4–6. In the short term, despite our best intentions, **we may be relegated to a harsh, discordan**t, entirely realist paradigm in space.

## Realism Inevitable - Generic

**Egotism and Domination are inevitable in the international system**

**Thayer 2k**

(Bradley, political scientist and an associate professor in Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, the MIT Press, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2(Autumn 2000), pp. 124-151, "Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics”)

The second ultimate cause of egoistic and dominating behavior is given by Morgenthau: Humans behave as they do because they possess an animus dominandi.24 They seek power because human nature is fundamentally egoistic and malignant. Thus conflict and war occur because human nature is bad.25 Thomas Hobbes provided the foundation for this second, secular, pillar of real- ist thought: Humans are ruled by an insatiable desire for power.26 This lust for power has created a state of war in which humans live in reciprocal and per- manent fear of violent death, and in which peace is always precarious. According to Morgenthau, the "desire for power ... concerns itself not with the individual's survival but with his position among his fellows once his sur- vival has been secured.... His lust for power would be satisfied only if the last became an object of his domination, there being nobody above or beside him, that is, if he became like God."27 So encompassing is this desire for power that the tendency to dominate "is an element of all human associations, from the family through fraternal and professional associations and local political orga- nizations, to the state."28 Two types of behavior are the proximate causes of the realist argument: ego- ism and domination.29 Egoism will cause an individual to place his interests before those of others, the interests of himself and his family before those of more distant relatives, and the interests of relatives before those of his commu- nity, state, and so on.30 The desire to dominate, realists believe, is inherent and often leads to physical aggression against those who oppose n of the primitive cell into ever larger components, organs, and so on to create what Dawkins calls "sur- vival machines." He explainsone's objectives. State leaders are expected to mirror this ordering by putting the interests of their state before those of others or of the world community, and by striving to dominate other states. Realists argue that only by possessing power can indi- viduals attack and conquer others as well as deter and defend themselves from attack. The principal result of this process is that balances of power will form and reform cyclically, producing both periods of stability and intense security competition in international politics

## Realism Inevitable – Human Nature

**Realism and the self-help theory are rooted in human nature – anarchic worlds from the dawn of time to today created an impetus for realist thought.**

**Thayer 2004**

Thayer has been a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and has taught at Dartmouth College and the University of Minnesota [*Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict*, University of Kentucky Press, 2004, pg. 75-76 //adi]

The central issue here is what causes states to behave as offensive realists predict. Mearsheimer advances a powerful argument that anarchy is the fundamental cause of such behavior. The fact that there is no world government compels the leaders of states to take steps to ensure their security, such as striving to have a powerful military, aggressing when forced to do so, and forging and maintaining alliances. This is what neorealists call a self-help system: leaders of states arc forced to take these steps because nothing else can guarantee their security in the anarchic world of international relations. I argue that evolutionary theory also offers a fundamental cause for offensive realist behavior. Evolutionary theory explains why individuals are motivated to act as offensive realism expects, whether an individual is a captain of industry or a conquistador. My argument is that anarchy is even more important than most scholars of international relations recognize. The human environment of evolutionary adaptation was anarchic; our ancestors lived in a state of nature in which resources were poor and dangers from other humans and the environment were great—so great that it is truly remarkable that a mammal standing three feet high—without claws or strong teeth, not particularly strong or swift—survived and evolved to become what we consider human. Humans endured because natural selection gave them the right behaviors to last in those conditions. This environment produced the behaviors examined here: egoism, domination, and the in-group/out-group distinction. These specific traits arc sufficient to explain why leaders will behave, in the proper circumstances, as offensive realists expect them to behave. That is, **even if they must hurt other humans** or risk injury to themselves, they will strive to **maximize their power**, defined as either control over others (for example, through wealth or leadership) or control over ecological circumstances (such as meeting their own and their family's or tribes need for food, shelter, or other resources).

**Denying human nature results in totalitarianism and devalues life**

**Pinker 2**

(Steven, Harvard College Professor and Johnstone Family Professor in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University, professor emiritus Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences at MIT, "The Blank Slate: the Modern Denial of Human Nature", Chapter 20)

Finally, I’ve argued that grounding values in a blank slate is a mistake. It’s a mistake because it makes our values hostages to fortune, implying that some day, discoveries from the field or lab could make them obsolete. And it’s a mistake because it conceals the downsides of denying human nature, including persecution of the successful, totalitarian social engineering, an exaggeration of the effects of the environment (such as in parenting and the criminal justice system), a mystification of the rationale behind responsibility, democracy, and morality, and the devaluing of human life on Earth.

**The drive for power is the very essence of human existence**

**Donnelly ‘00**

(Jack, Ph. D University of California – Berkley in Political Science, Professor of IR at Korbel School, “Realism and International Relations”, Cambridge England, p.47)

Most states are indeed strongly inclined to seek power. Pursuing goals other than the national interest defined in terms of power often is dangerous, even counterproductive. But even Morgenthau's case for these lesser (although still important) claims is undermined by an exaggerated emphasis on a one-sided account of human nature. The pursuit of power, Morgenthau argues, is an inescapable consequence of the “elemental bio-psychological drives … to live, to propagate, and to dominate [that] are common to all men” (1948: 16–17). “All men lust for power” (1962a: 42). “Man's aspiration for power is not an accident of history; it is not a temporary deviation from a normal state of freedom; it is an all-permeating fact which is of the very essence of human existence” (1948: 312). This appeal to a natural will to power – “the animus dominandi, the desire for power” (1946: 192) – puts a particularly stark face on Morgenthau's realism. “It is this ubiquity of the desire for power which, besides and beyond any particular selfishness or other evil purpose, constitutes the ubiquity of evilness in human action” (1946: 194). Even if we could overcome the Hobbesian drives of competition, diffidence, and glory, we would still lust after power.

## U.S. Space Dominance K2 Stability

**The U.S. will inevitably have to assert space dominance to maintain dominance and stability– GPS proves**

**Dolman 5 – PhD, Professor**

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 Today, with the demise of the Cold War, the United States has the luxury of reducing its land, sea, and air forces, and channeling monies and efforts saved into its space activities. Whether it will do so voluntarily remains to be seen, and in the current political climate increased funding to space is not only dubious, but it must compete with perceived domestic spending priorities. For activists in either camp, the budget is seen as a zero-sum game; more money for me looks like less money for you. Still, while the ideological battle continues, the funding commitment issue may be spiraling out of the control of domestic preferences. The United States may find itself unable to avoid its newfound international space responsibilities and global commitments, many of which may not have been foreseen. For example, the United States military’s Navstar/GPS navigational satellites were deployed to enhance its military power, as a force-multiplier, in the jargon of the military. The subsequent utility of these assets to global commercial navigation, communication, and above all commerce, has made them an indispensable world asset. The United States military now finds itself in the curious position of having to maintain a network of satellites that contributes billions of dollars to the world economy, and should it fail to be maintained, would have global civilian negative ramifications. 53 The creation and maintenance of global space-based communications and navigation systems, clearly a modern parallel to artificial technological chokepoints as the world becomes increasingly reliant on these assets, has brought the interests of other states ‘close along’ our (astropolitical) shores. **The United States must be ready and prepared, in Mahanian scrutiny, to commit to the defense and maintenance of these assets, or relinquish its power to a state willing and able to do so**.

**The U.S. is most suited for space domination – comparatively better than any alternative**

**Dolman 5 – PhD, Professor**

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 As the great liberal democracy of its time, the United States is preferentially endowed to guide the whole of humanity into space, to police any misuse of that realm, and to ensure an equitable division of its spoils. But if the United States were to abandon its egalitarian values, corrupted by its own power, and follow a path of aggressive expansion into the cosmos using the riches gained to dominate the peoples of the Earth, what then? Does the benign era of Pax Americana end? Perhaps, but the likelihood of that outcome depends on one’s current view of the benevolence of US hegemony and the future role of ongoing globalism. The argument here is that the checks and balances of liberal democracy make it the **least likely of all potential candidates to misuse its power**, and history for the most part backs the assertion. If one state is to seize control of space, as the astropolitical model suggests, there seems to be little evidence that any other nation is more suitable. If no state does, as is the current situation, then exploration and commerce will remain moribund. The argument—better no ruler of space than even an enlightened one—is fallacious. If no wealth comes from space then it matters little how it is divided. The dynamic, self-interested pursuit of wealth will maximize space exploration and exploitation, and ultimately all Earth’s people will gain. The astropolitical model shows how competition and cooperation can be maximized.

## AT: Backlash Against U.S. Space Domination

**The United States is extremely powerful—it can implement harsh realist policies in space with little opposition**

**Dolman 5 – PhD, Professor**

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 Astropolitik gets its moniker from the old, now completely discredited German school of Geopolitik. It is meant to be a constant reminder of the inherent flaws of letting the cultural dimension (specifically hypernationalism) drive grand strategy. One should also be struck by the affinity with the doctrine of Realpolitik. This most extreme of the political realist theories makes no attempt to hide its ruthless concentration on the national interest and the cold, calculating central role of raw power in politics. It is widely criticized by those who do not have power, widely employed by those who do. Such is the case today that in space, at the very least, the United States can adopt any policy it wishes and the attitudes and reactions of the domestic public and of other states can do little to challenge it. So powerful is the United States that should it accept the harsh Realpolitik doctrine in space that the military services appear to be proposing, and given a proper explanation for employing it, there may in fact be little if any opposition to a fait accompli of total US domination in space.

## Key to Policymaking

**Realism is true and key to effective policy formation.**

**Mearsheimer** **1**

(Professor of political science at University of Chicago, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, pg. 2)

There are no status quo powers in the international system, save for the occasional hegemon that wants to maintain its dominating position over potential rivals. Great powers are rarely content with the current distribution of power; on the contrary, they face a constant incentive to change it in their favor. They almost always have revisionist intentions, and they will use force to alter the balance of power if they think it can be done at a reasonable price. At times, the costs and risks of trying to shift the balance of power are too great, forcing great powers to wait for more favorable circumstances. But the desire for more power does not go away, unless a state achieves the ultimate goal of hegemony. Since no state is likely to achieve global hegemony, however, **the world is condemned to perpetual great-power competition**. This unrelenting pursuit of power means that great powers are inclined to look for opportunities to alter the distribution of world power in their favor. They will seize their opportunities if they have the necessary capability. Simply put, great powers are primed for offense. But not only does a great power seek to gain power at the expense of other states, it also tries to thwart rivals bent on gaining power at its expense. Thus, a great power will defend the balance of power when looming change favors another state, and it will try to undermine the balance when the direction of change is in its own favor. Why do great powers behave this way? My answer is that the structure of the international system forces states which seek only to be secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other. Three features of the international system combine to cause states to fear one another: 1) the absence of a central authority that sits above states and can protect them from each other, 2) the fact that states always have some offensive military capability, and 3) the fact that states can never be certain about other states’ intentions. Given this fear—which can never be wholly eliminated—states recognize that the more powerful they are relative to their rivals, the better their chances of survival. Indeed, the best guarantee of survival is to be a hegemon, because no other state can seriously threaten such a mighty power. This situation, which no one consciously designed or intended, is genuinely tragic. Great powers that have no reason to fight each other—that are merely concerned with their own survival—nevertheless have little choice but to pursue power and to seek to dominate the other states in the system. This dilemma is captured in brutally frank comments that Prussian statesman Otto von Bismarck made during the early 1860s, when it appeared that Poland, which was not an independent state at the time, might regain its sovereignty. “Restoring the Kingdom of Poland in any shape or form is tantamount to creating an ally for any enemy that chooses to attack us,” he believed, and therefore he advocated that Prussia should “smash those Poles till, losing all hope, they lie down and die; I have every sympathy for their situation, but if we wish to survive we have no choice but to wipe them out.” Although it is depressing to realize that great powers might think and act this way, **it behooves us to see the world as it is, not as we would like it to be**. For example, one of the key foreign policy issues facing the United States is the question of how China will behave if its rapid economic growth continues and effectively turns China into a giant Hong Kong. Many Americans believe that if China is democratic and enmeshed in the global capitalist system, it will not act aggressively; instead it will be content with the status quo in Northeast Asia. According to this logic, the United States should engage China in order to promote the latter’s integration into the world economy, a policy that also seeks to encourage China’s transition to democracy. If engagement succeeds, the United States can work with a wealthy and democratic China to promote peace around the globe. Unfortunately, **a policy of engagement is doomed to fail.** If China becomes an economic powerhouse it will almost certainly translate its economic might into military might and make a run at dominating Northeast Asia. Whether China is democratic and deeply enmeshed in the global economy or autocratic and autarkic will have little effect on its behavior, because democracies care about security as much as non-democracies do, and hegemony is the best way for any state to guarantee its own survival. Of course, neither its neighbors nor the United States would stand idly by while China gained increasing increments of power. Instead, they would seek to contain China, probably by trying to form a balancing coalition. The result would be an intense security of great-power war hanging over them. In short, China and the United States are destined to be adversaries as China’s power grows.

## Prevents Atrocities

**Rejecting Realism results in the worst atrocities**

**Thayer 2k**

(Bradley, political scientist and an associate professor in Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, the MIT Press, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2(Autumn 2000), pp. 124-151, "Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics”)

Irrespective of the ultimate causes of ethnic conflict, both the international system and individual states can work to suppress it. The bipolar international system of the Cold War helped to control ethnic conflict; and the deleterious ef- fect of systemic change (i.e., the end of the Cold War) in promoting ethnic conflict has been well analyzed.125 State policies may also help prevent or ame- liorate ethnic conflict. Michael Brown summarizes the principal finding of his and Sumit Ganguly's survey of ethnic relations in sixteen Asian and Pacific states by noting that government policies "are often decisive in determining whether ethnic problems, which are inherent in multiethnic societies, are re- solved peacefully and equitably."126 Nonetheless, given the contribution of xe- nophobia and ethnocentrism to fitness during human evolution, ethnic conflict is likely to be a recurring social phenomenon. Therefore ethnic conflict, like war and peace, is part of the fabric of international politics

## Transition = Violent

**The transition away from realism will cause violence**

**Murray** **97 – Professor Politics at the University of Wales**

(Alastair J.H., Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, p. 185-6)

Yet Linklater concedes that ‘it is not at all clear that any strand of social and political thought provides a compelling account of “strategies of transition”’. Indeed, where he has attempted to engage with this issue himself, he as proved manifestly unable to provide such an account. Although he has put forward some ideas of what is needed – a fundamental recognition of political relations, establishing a global legal order to replace the sovereign state, and a fundamental rearrangement of economic relations, establishing an order in which all individuals have the means as well as the formal rights of freedom – his only suggestion as to how such objectives should be achieved seems to be that ‘[s]ocial development entails individuals placing themselves at odds with their societies as they begin to question conventional means of characterizing outsiders and to criticize customary prohibitions upon individual relations with them’. His critical theoretical “transitional strategies amount to little more than the suggestion that individuals must demand recognition for themselves as men as well as citizens, must demand the right to enter into complex interstate relations themselves, and must act in these relations as beings with fundamental obligations to all other members of the species”. More recently, he has proposed a vision in which ‘substantial and transnational citizenships are strengthened and in which mediating between the different loyalties and identities present within modern societies is one central purpose of the post-Westphalian state’. Such an objective is to be reached by a discourse ethics along the lines of that proposed by Habermas. Yet such an ethics amounts to little more than the suggestions that human beings need to be reflective about the ways in which they include and exclude outsiders from dialogue, scarcely going beyond Linklater’s earlier emphasis on individuals acting as men as well as citizens. Realism does at least propose tangible objectives which, whilst perhaps the visionary appeal of Linklater’s proposals, ultimately offer us a path to follow, and it does at least suggest a strategy of realization, emphasising the necessity of a restrained, moderate diplomacy, which, if less daring than Linklater might wish, provides us with some guidance. It is this inability to articulate practical strategies which suggests the central difficulty with such critical theoretical approaches. The progressive urge moves a stage further here, leading them to abandon almost entirely the problems of establishing some form of stable international order at this level in favour of a continuing revolution in search of a genuine cosmopolis. It generates such an emphasis on the pursuit of distant, ultimate objectives that they prove incapable of furnishing us with anything but the most vague and elusive of strategies, such an emphasis on moving towards a post-Westphalian boundary-less world that they are incapable of telling us anything about the problems facing us today. If, for theorists such as Linklater, such a difficulty does not constitue a failure for critical theory within its own terms of reference, this position cannot be accepted uncritically. Without an ability to address contemporary problems, it is unable to provide strategies to overcome even the immediate obstacles in the way of its objective of a genuinely cosmopolitan society. And, without a guarantee that such cosmopolitan society is even feasible, such a critical theoretical perspective simply offers us the perpetual redefinition of old problems in a new context and the persistent creation of new problems to replace old ones, without even the luxury of attempting to address them.

## Us/Them Dichotomy Inevitable

**In-Group/Out-Group distinctions are human nature – two reasons.**

**1. Resource conflicts**

**Thayer 2004**

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Humans make in-group/out-group distinctions for three reasons. First, **humans seek resources**—food, water, and shelter—to care for themselves and relatives, and they seek mates to reproduce their genotype; in sum, they are egoistic for the reasons advanced by Darwin, William Hamilton, and other evolutionary theorists, as I described in chapter 1 and in the discussion above. They are unlikely to assist those who are not related, but may do so occasionally, expecting reciprocal behavior. Humans behave in these ways because resources were scarce in the late-Pliocene, Pleistocene, and Holoccne environments in which we evolved. In that environment, it is easy to understand why **humans would prefer more resources to fewer**: more strength is preferable to less strength, more wealth to less wealth, domination to being dominated. Most people do indeed prefer more resources to fewer; the rich want even more wealth, and seldom say they are too wealthy. Rather, they seem to worry about protecting their wealth from those who may take it from them, such as revolutionaries or the government. In essence, in prehistoric times when there was too little to go around, humans discriminated between self and others, family and others, tribe and others, in-groups and out-groups. This behavior remains today. We humans are likely to perceive out-groups as **threats to our resources**, the resources we need to maintain ourselves and our families and extended in-groups such as the tribe or state.

**2. Threat assessment**

**Thayer 2004**

Thayer has been a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and has taught at Dartmouth College and the University of Minnesota [*Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict*, University of Kentucky Press, 2004, pg. 78 //adi]

Second, living and evolving in dangerous environments, humans, like other animals, **need the ability to assess threats** rapidly and react quickly. The in-group/out-group distinction may be thought of as the human minds immediate threat assessment. It is a mechanism for determining whether or not nonrelated conspecifics presented a threat. In sum, **our mind rapidly debates: no threat/threat**. Is the outsider a threat to oneself or to ones family? As a result, over the course of human evolution, strangers were first likely to fear one another, at least until they became familiar.

## Gov’t Manipulation Inevitable

**Governments will manipulate national interest to justify space domination**

**Dolman 5 – PhD, Professor**

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Such advantageous physical features alone would not ensure the seafaring state had the tools necessary for naval dominance, however. The character of a nation’s people must also be specially endowed. They must, at the very least, be appreciative of the value of sea-based activity, if not wholly immersed in it. They must be commercially aggressive, rational profit-seekers who recognize the potential bounty of sea trade, and who through hard work and persistence will achieve wealth from it. 51 This maritime citizenry will form the peacetime commercial fleet, gaining the skills and experience necessary to make a vast national reserve for mobilization in conflict, and at all times supporting through their taxes and other contributions the vibrancy of the sea-based national enterprise. The government, too, must be outfitted with appropriate institutions and political officeholders ready and able to recognize and take advantage of the state’s position and attributes. Such a national character is evident in the potential for success in space endeavors as well. All spacefaring nations have attempted to tap into a national fascination with space exploration, if not directly manipulate their populations with promises of vast profit and adventure. The citizenry of the spacefaring state must be willing to sacrifice earthly comforts for unspecified gains in the exploration of the unknown, be committed to scientific endeavors and willing to hand over a large share of their income to the taxes necessary to support expensive long-term space projects, have a great interest (bordering on fetish or worship) in space developments and advances, and be tolerant of unavoidable failures, mishaps, and setbacks. With an energized and psychologically prepared populace, the inevitable tribulations necessary to enter into and then dominate space are bearable.

**States aren’t moral – no room to be ethical**

**Hersberger 04 – Financial representative with Northwestern Mutual**

(10/8/04 “Realism” <http://users.manchester.edu/Student/EJHersberger/MyPage2/Realism.pdf>)

Power optimization is essential to the theory of realism. It is the mode of realism by which international relations should be managed. This idea of power politics leads a nation to focus primarily upon its own interests. Thus, national interest takes precedence over interdependence among nations. As a result of this, morality is either set aside as a hindrance to obtaining power or used as a guise to obtain the national interest. As Burchill states in the second edition of Theories of International Relations, “There is no room for moral or ethical concerns, prejudice, political philosophy or individual preference in the determination of foreign policy because actions are constrained by the relative power of the state. Thus, the national interest ought to be the sole pursuit of statesmen” (Burchill, 79). This struggle for power and pursuit of the national interest is brought to equilibrium through a balance of power among nations.

## Violence inevitable

**Violence inevitable**

**Mearsheimer 09**

(Professor of Political Science and the co-director of International Security Policy at the University of Chicago (John J. Mearsheimer, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics xi-xii)

This cycle of violence will continue far into the new millennium. Hopes for peace will probably not be realized, because the great powers that shape the [international](http://inieniaiion.il) system fear each other and compete for power as a result. Indeed, their ultimate aim is to gain a position of dominant power over others, because having dominant power is the best means to ensure one's own survival. Strength ensures safety, and the greatest strength is the greatest insurance of safety. States facing this incentive are fated to clash as each competes for advantage over the others. This is a tragic situation in that there is no escaping it unless the stales that make up the system agree to form a world government. Such a vast transformation is hardly a realistic prospect, however, so conflict and war are bound to continue as large and enduring features of world politics.

## Expansionism/Violence Inevitable – Alt Fails

**States are inherently expansionist; the alt creates an incentive for other countries to expand through violence**

**Synder 2**

(Glenn H.“Mearsheimer's World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay” MIT Press International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Summer, 2002), pp. 149-173; JSTOR)

It is only fair to point out that Mearsheimer's vision seems less radical when one takes into account various qualifiers. Great powers try to expand only when opportunities arise. They will do so only when the benefits clearly exceed the risks and costs. They will desist from expansion when blocked and wait for a "more propitious moment" (p. 37). In a 1990 article, Mearsheimer stated that one reason hegemony was rare was that "costs of expansion usually outrun the benefits before domination is achieved."1l The term "expansion" appears to mean, although it is never explicitly stated, increased power through increased control of territory. Mearsheimer devotes considerable space to arguing, and demonstrating with historical data, that offensive action often succeeds and that conquest does or can "pay" economically and strategically. He does not emphasize that expansion may contribute (positively or negatively) to values other than power and security. Mearsheimer's offensive realism seems to predict much more conflict and war than does Waltz's defensive realism. States are never satisfied; they keep reaching for more power, and these power urges seem bound to collide. Mearsheimer's states seem perilously close to Arnold Wolfers's "hysterical Caesars"-states that, "haunted by fear," pursue "the will-of-the-wisp of absolute security."" Waltz's states are less fearful, more accepting of risks, more oriented toward particular nonsecurity interests, and more willing to live with only a modest amount of security. Sensible statesmen seek only an "appropriate" amount of realismpower, given their security needs, says Waltz.'2

## No Alternative to Realism

**No Alternative to Realism**

**Solomon 96**

(Hussein, Senior Researcher, Human Security Project, Institute for Defence Policy, African Security Review Vol 5 No 2, 1996, "In Defence of Realism: Confessions of a Fallen Idealist", http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/5No2/5No2/InDefence.html)

We have seen a great many criticisms levelled against the state-centric bias of realists, but what would be an alternative form of political community? In answer to this question Booth makes the following observation: "Modern states are too large to satisfy some human needs, and too small to cope with the requirements of guidance for an increasingly interdependent planet. The logical conclusion of this argument is that power should be more diffuse. It is desirable to take it away from states to more local communities (to cater for cultural diversity, for example), while wider problems such as economic and environmental issues, could be more effectively dealt with by designated regional or global function organisations."104 If this is an alternative to the State, then it is indeed a poor substitute. Consider the idea that power should be more diffuse. Whether one talks of a strongly centralised unitary state or a federal state with the devolution of power (thereby empowering local communities), it is still a state. Thus, it is not an argument against the State, it is an argument against a specific type of state (unitary) in favour of another type of state (federal). If Booth is talking about even greater autonomy to cater for cultural diversity, how might this apply to the South African scenario? Apartheid South Africa justified its bantustan policies following a similar type of logic. More recently, Inkatha has been using a similar kind of logic in order to entrench itself in the KwaZulu-Natal Legislature; and the possibility of another Biafra or Katanga developing in that troubled region is becoming increasingly real. Booth’s other idea that ‘wider problems such as economic and environmental issues could be more effectively dealt with by regional or global function organisations’ should also be questioned. In the first instance, economic regimes like the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Trade And Tariffs (GATT) which led to the formation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) have failed to achieve its stated objective of ‘tariff disarmament’ as trade relations between the US and Japan indicate. Neither is this an isolated incident, if the ‘chicken wars’ between South Africa and the US are anything to go by. On the question of environmental regimes one may simply point out how global environmental concerns floundered in the high seas of national self-interest at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992.105 To emphasise the point, both brutally and simply, there is no practical alternative to the State. Walker says that "[t]he state is a political category in a way that the world, or the globe, or the planet, or humanity is not."106 Also stressing the centrality of the State, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali observes: "The foundation-stone of this work [ie. peace and economic development] is and must remain the State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress."107 But, the most powerful argument for the State comes not from its many and varied successes, but rather from its failure. State collapse, as in Somalia, has not been met by cries of jubilation from its ‘emancipated’ inhabitants as Booth would have us believe.108 Rather, tragedy and misery has greeted Somalians with its collapse. This is why the State must and should remain the primary referent in domestic and international affairs. The principle of state sovereignty is the most plausible way of reconciling claims about the universal and the particular, society and the individual. Without the apparatus of a strong state, the way becomes clear for the Mohammed Farah Aideeds of the world to appear. Without the apparatus of a strong state, the world will be plunged into Somali-style warlordism of the Dark Age variety.

## AT: Reps K’s – Realism Inevitable/No Alt

**Representations of state action cannot change realism, and even if they could, we have no way of knowing if they new system would be any better.**

**Mearsheimer, 95**

(Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago – 1995 (John, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, p. 91-2)

The most revealing aspect of Wendt’s discussion is that he did not respond to the two main charge leveled against critical theory in “False Promise.” The first problem with critical theory is that although the theory is deeply concerned with radically changing state behavior, it says little about how change comes about. The theory does not tell us why particular discourses become dominant and other fall by the wayside. Specifically, Wendt does not explain why realism has been the dominant discourse in world politics for well over a thousand years, although I explicitly raised the question in “False Promise” (p. 42). Moreover, he shed no light on why the time is ripe for unseating realism, nor on why realism is likely to be replaced by a more peaceful, communitarian discourse, although I explicitly raised both questions. Wendt’s failure to answer these questions has important ramifications for his own arguments. For example, he maintains that if it is possible to change international political discourse and alter state behavior, “then it is irresponsible to pursue policies that perpetuate destructive old orders [i.e., realism], especially if we care about the well-being of future generation.” The clear implication here is that realists like me are irresponsible and do not care much about the welfare of future generations. However, even if we change discourses and move beyond realism, a fundamental problem with Wendt’s argument remains: because his theory cannot predict the future, he cannot know whether the discourse that ultimately replaces realism will be more benign than realism. He has no way of knowing whether a fascistic discourse more violent than realism will emerge as the hegemonic discourse. For example, he obviously would like another Gorbachev to come to power in Russia, but a critical theory perspective, defending realism might very well be the more responsible policy choice.

## AT: Int’l Cooperation Disproves

**Turn – International cooperation in space empirically fails, causing less competition and inaction**

**Dolman 5 – PhD, Professor**

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**The core problem in international space law is that the practical effect of collectivizing space has been counter to its intended purpose of encouraging the development of outer space**. Indeed, it would seem to have had precisely the **opposite** effect. The reason is that the treaty solved an entirely speculative collective action problem, a ‘tragedy of the commons’ in outer space, in the belief that common pool resources were wasted in the competitive scramble of states to claim sovereignty over the new frontier. The treaty may actually have resulted in a collective inaction problem as states failed to invest in the development of space because an important incentive for its development had been eliminated. The argument here is that in rendering space and all celestial bodies res communis rather than res nullius, and thus eliminating them as proper objects for which states may compete, the treaty dramatically reduced the impetus for the development of outer space. Some celestial bodies, the Moon, Mars, and larger asteroids in particular, represent potential new national territory for states, and in the realist/Astropolitik paradigm, states are hard wired to acquire and hold territory. According to Hendrik Spruyt, the sovereign nation-state emerged as the dominant state form, first in Europe and then across the planet, because it was superior to the three alternative state forms; the individual city-state (Genoa, Florence, and Venice), the city league (Hansa), and the multinational borderless empire (Holy Roman Empire and Roman Catholic Church). 73 The advantages of the sovereign nation-state in this competition lay not only in the exclusive economic exploitation of a national population and territory but also in its interaction with other sovereign nation-states in the new state system. Control over territory, even territory with little or no population, was then and remains today an essential criterion for statehood. That the modern nation-state continues to be motivated to acquire and hold territory is evident in their willingness to use military force to resist the loss of existing territory to separatist movements and in disputes over territories such as the former Spanish Sahara, West Bank, Spratley Islands, and AksaiChin Plateau. The point is driven home by considering the hypothetical permanent loss of all national territory by a state that retains possession of its bureaucratic organizations and non-territorial assets. Would it continue to be deemed a state? Clearly, having lost its res, the former nation-state would cease to be a state and become a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), and in consequence, a creature of lesser status in international affairs. Having been deprived of the possibility of assuming sovereign possession of new territory discovered and claimable on celestial bodies and in space, states did the same thing that individuals and firms do when domestic law deprives them of the possibility of assuming legal possession of real estate. They rationally choose not to make investments that would lead to its development. In the absence of some immediate political return in the form of new national territory, the attractions of political, economic, and social returns in the near term from investment in or consumption by states are likely to be underwhelming. The perverse consequence of the OST was the inducement of individually rational behavior by decisionmakers in the few spacefaring states with the technology and fiscal resources to undertake the development of outer space to not do so. **This deprives all of humanity much less all states of the long-term benefits of the development of outer space**. By collectivizing outer space, the OST vested legal rights in all states that they would not or could not exercise. That spacefaring states would not is the result of disincentives. The actual tragedy of the commons is that **the effort to achieve collective action resulted in collective inaction.**

**Collective security in space discourages space development—free market forces allow benefits of space for all states**

**Dolman 5 – PhD, Professor**

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Application of the Coase theorem makes the insight more explicit. 74 In its most straightforward form, the Coase theorem asserts that if individual property rights exist and transaction costs are low or zero, then resource allocation will be optimal regardless of how property rights were initially assigned. This theory of market exchange is simply an argument that the assignment of property rights will result in the efficient allocation of resources because individuals with the ability to use property more efficiently will purchase it from the existing owners. One important implication is that distributive justice is irrelevant to the efficient allocation of resources. Thus any assignment of property rights is preferable to no assignment of property rights. If the recognition of national sovereignty over territory under international law is substituted for protection of individual property rights under domestic law, and the motivation of states to acquire territory is substituted for the motivation of individuals to acquire wealth, then the logic of the Coase theorem would dictate that any assignment of sovereignty over territory would be preferable to no assignment. Therefore, if the **policy goal** is to encourage the development of outer space, then any assignment of sovereignty over territory in space and on celestial bodies would be preferable to the **existing structure** of vesting collective rights in all states. If the assignment of sovereignty achieves some measure of distributive justice, then so much the better. The preferred solution is to let **market-style forces** determine relative values of assigned sovereignty for all states (see below, p. 178). Without doubt, however, without the investment in space development by the spacefaring states and/or their national firms, the non-spacefaring states cannot possibly receive any economic benefits from the collective ownership of space. With investment in space development by the spacefaring states and/or their national firms, non-spacefaring states could reap some economic benefit from space.

**Cooperation over space imitative is motivated by self-interest**

**Peter 6 – Research Fellow - European Space Policy Institute**

(Nicolas, Analyst on future space exploration, Research Assistant - Lockheed Martin Fellow - Space Policy Institute - Center for International Science and Technology Policy - Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University (GWU); “The changing geopolitics of space activities”; Available online 24 April 2006; accessed 7/6/11; JN)

Cooperation has a long established tradition in space activities. It has become an integral part of the space policy of the different agencies around the world and states now rarely initiate and carry out a significant space program without some element of foreign participation. **The reasons for cooperation are multiple, but states cooperate principally when it benefits their self-interests**. Therefore, partners may be pursuing common programmatic goals, but for different reasons, as each partner’s space program exists within its own political environment [2,3]. Furthermore, it is generally admitted that international cooperation expands the scope of programs beyond the individual participants’ capabilities by tapping into the resources of multiple countries. This expansion of resources available through cooperation is not just financial, but also scientific and technological [1]. The benefits of cooperation are numerous and well documented: among others, they include improving capability, sharing costs and building common interests. Cooperation also gives states the opportunity to rationalize and optimize their planning and resources by coordinating the development of their respective missions and allowing them to enlarge their spectrum of mission possibilities [1]. It is recognized that, if the partners contribute capability, the sum can be greater that the parts alone, and the cost can be shared among the partners, thereby potentially making the implementation of a space project more affordable to each individual partner involved, while enriching the pool of scientific and technological expertize brought to bear.

**Self-preference is inevitable even in seemingly cooperative actions**

**Solomon 96**

(Hussein, Senior Researcher, Human Security Project, Institute for Defence Policy, African Security Review Vol 5 No 2, 1996, "In Defence of Realism: Confessions of a Fallen Idealist", http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/5No2/5No2/InDefence.html)

Those who are still unconvinced of the predominance of national self-interest in global politics should simply ponder the following question: can they provide an example of one country which conducts it foreign policy without considering its national interest? What the above demonstrates is that interdependence and integration are not some forerunner of the emergence of a global polity heralding the disappearance of the State. It must rather be viewed simply as the workings of the national interest. Concomitant to this there can be no talk of a ‘waning state’.

## AT: Realism Justifies Violence

**Militarism of space is just a means to an end, not the goal—it’s key to maximize wealth**

**Dolman 5 – PhD, Professor**

(Dr. Everett Carl Dolman is Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS). His focus is on international relations and theory, and he has been identified as Air University’s first space theorist. Dr. Dolman began his career as an intelligence analyst for the National Security Agency, and moved to the United States Space Command in 1986. In 1991, he received the Director of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst award; Astropolitik, originally published in 2002, pg 176)

Astropolitics and Astropolitik provide a military strategy and a legal-institutional blueprint that should ignite a new space race almost at once. It is not the only possibility, but it follows long-established political traditions and taps into the most dynamic capacities of people and states. The changes promoted are simple, inexpensive, and should prove remarkably effective. There will be complaints, numerous no doubt, that it advocates dooming the future of humanity to a state-centric model that has produced an historically abysmal war record on Earth. Why spread this paradigm out to infect everything we touch in space? The objections are valid, but generally at odds with the wishes of those who would make them. The ultimate goal of astropolitics and Astropolitik is not the militarization of space. Rather, the militarization of space is a means to an end, part of a longer-term strategy. The goal is to reverse the current international malaise in regard to space exploration, and to do so in a way that is efficient and that harnesses the positive motivations of individuals and states striving to better their conditions. It is a neoclassical, market-driven approach intended to maximize efficiency and wealth.

**Alternative is worse – rejecting Realism results in the worst atrocities**

**Thayer 2k**

(Bradley, political scientist and an associate professor in Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, the MIT Press, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2(Autumn 2000), pp. 124-151, "Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics”)

Irrespective of the ultimate causes of ethnic conflict, both the international system and individual states can work to suppress it. The bipolar international system of the Cold War helped to control ethnic conflict; and the deleterious ef- fect of systemic change (i.e., the end of the Cold War) in promoting ethnic conflict has been well analyzed.125 State policies may also help prevent or ame- liorate ethnic conflict. Michael Brown summarizes the principal finding of his and Sumit Ganguly's survey of ethnic relations in sixteen Asian and Pacific states by noting that government policies "are often decisive in determining whether ethnic problems, which are inherent in multiethnic societies, are re- solved peacefully and equitably."126 Nonetheless, given the contribution of xe- nophobia and ethnocentrism to fitness during human evolution, ethnic conflict is likely to be a recurring social phenomenon. Therefore ethnic conflict, like war and peace, is part of the fabric of international politics

## AT: Kritik Incorporates Realism

**The k domesticates realism- ruins the theory**

**Gow 5 – Prof of IR, Director of International Peace and Security Program**

James, Professor of International Peace and Security, and Director of the International Peace and Security Programme. Gow is a permanent non-resident scholar with the Liechtenstein Institute, Princeton University. He has held visiting positions at the University of Sheffield, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington D.C., the Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, and the Centre of International Studies, Princeton University. Professor Gow is currently Chair of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism Advisory Council, a member of the British Film Institute In-View Advisory Board and a member of the ESRC/AHRC ‘Global Uncertainties’ Development Panel, Book: Defending the West, Polity Press, (pg. 28)

The majority of students of international relations using a Constructivist approach have been opposed to Realism - and indeed to Idealism and other traditions and schools of thought. Constructivist Realism, therefore, represents, I believe, a radical step in the appreciation of international politics. The term is unique and meaningful,25 but it is not necessarily the first attempt to deploy Constructivism while acknowledging merit in Realism. By referring to 'interactions' Wendt, in popularizing the notion of Social Constructivism in the study of international relations and seeking avowedly to present a normative-driven, Idealist challenge to Realism, nonetheless acknowledges that he is a 'realist' to the extent that his focus is on the state.26 This is a deeply qualified nod to Realism – one that is considerably outweighed by the overall aim of undoing and revising the dominant Realist position. A more notable example is that of the 'Copenhagen' Constructivists Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde, who go some way towards taking a similar position to Constructivist Realism, but fall short of doing so. Although their purpose and primary focus is the broadening of the security agenda, while also setting boundaries to its expansion, the approach they take is both avowedly Constructivist and openly Realist. It is Constructivist to the extent that they view 'securitization' as 'an essentially inter-subjective process', which means that in all but the most immediate and extreme cases, threats could not be objectively identified.27 It is Realist to the extent that they seek to identify their position as 'post-sovereign realism'.28 However, their attention to the social processes that determine security seems ultimately driven by the same desire to temper the Realist predicament. By taking a partly Constructivist approach, they maintain, 'it will sometimes be possible to maneuver the interaction among actors and thereby curb security dilemmas'.29 The reflexively engaged use of Constructivism, even with a foothold in Realism, makes clear that their ultimate agenda is a similar desire to use the power of knowledge and understanding to tame and change the Realist beast to that expressed by Wendt. In the end, their mission is to change Realism, if not eventually to transform security relations and remove that concept's dominance. It is not to situate Realism in an inter-subjective context, where the soundness of their analysis on the constituted and changeable character of Realism makes clear that Realism is not necessarily an inherent or 'natural position, whatever its strengths and merits. S

## AT: Democratic Peace Theory Disproves

**Democratic peace theory is utopian in space—it’s already militarized and weaponized**

**Dolman 5 – PhD, Professor**

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Needless to say, a contradictory thesis is prevalent. For many traditional peace theorists, who concentrate on eliminating war by reducing and eliminating the military capacity to engage in combat, democratic peace theory appears fully complementary to their views. Since war is the problem democracy is held to correct, they presume that the tools of war are, by association, ‘anti-democratic’. 10 The widely held belief that disarmament promotes peace has long been acknowledged, and then quickly dismissed, by such eminent theorists as Friedrich Schumann and Hedley Bull. 11 Still, the notion hangs on and is the prescriptive cornerstone of the World Peace Movement. 12 Reducing or eliminating arms promotes peace and decreases external threats, so the argument goes, which in turn fosters domestic development of individual liberty. William Thompson makes precisely this point as he argues that peace causes democracy, not the reverse. 13 Moreover, say the peace theorists, when all states are democratic there will be no need to maintain the military forces necessary to prosecute war, and all states will be able, if not compelled by socio-economic necessity, to complete any remaining process of disarmament. For these advocates, astropolitics and Astropolitik will be considered politically and socially reprehensible, if not dangerous. The preferred prescription is that humanity begins its entry into the cosmos without weapons, warriors, or Clauswitzian theorists. If the non-weaponized model is pursued, peaceful coexistence is inevitable. Unfortunately for their utopian position, the short history of space exploration already belies that hope. The militarization and weaponization of space is not only an historical fact, it is an **ongoing** process.

**Even if democratic peace theory is true, ALL states must be democratic to prevent space conflict**

**Dolman 5 – PhD, Professor**

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There is some hope for this view. Mounting empirical evidence points to the proliferation of modern liberal democracy as a pacifying force in international relations. Liberal-democratic states have not gone to war with each other, and, although they have had considerable conflicts of interest, appear content to resolve common disputes with rare resort even to the threat of military violence. Such is the enormous drain on national economies that advanced liberal-democratic states are the most likely to undertake and sustain a dominating space program. As more states democratize, these observations lead to the promise of an ever-widening democratic zone of peace, ultimately encompassing the globe then spreading out to the cosmos and ushering in an era of true cooperation and stability. Although David Singer and Melvin Small first empirically described the phenomenon, it was Michael Doyle who provoked a storm of activity with his attempt to tie the observation to Kant’s claim that liberal-democratic states would be naturally less prone to engage in war as any alternative politically organized state. What remained intriguing, and promising, was the empirical evidence and rationale that democratic states do not go to war **with each other**. 8 Causal explanations tend to cluster around structural and normative factors of government capacities and leadership qualities, and represent some of the most sophisticated international analyses in ongoing political science debates. 9 If mutual liberal democracy is in fact a sufficient precondition for inter-state peace, then democratic peace theory provides both the means and end for a stable and pacific world (and presumably space) order. Any policy that efficiently enhances the process of democratization in authoritarian and developing states will have positive inter-state results, and should be thoughtfully considered. **When all states are democratic, war will be a social relic**. Astropolitics and Astropolitik encompass the social and cultural effects of new technologies, in this case space technologies, on the subsequent evolution of political institutions (Chapters 2 and 5). The direction of influence on democratization of astropolitical variables is introduced here, though it is not definitively announced. If, however, primarily democratic states enter and exploit space, and these states are best equipped to sustain robust space programs, then the tenets of Astropolitik are **structurally less malicious**—since these states are **unlikely** to pursue violent confrontation with each other—and so can be used for commercial and system stability (policing) and productive economic advantages.

**Democratic peace theory is wrong—democracies must still militarize to avoid war**

**Dolman 5 – PhD, Professor**

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Democratic states have too short a history, and in that brief time they have always been allied against ideological positions that sought the end of liberalism—first monarchy, then fascism, then communism. It is only recently that liberal-democratic states have shared borders, the realists will point out, as their numbers have risen to important minority status in the community of states only since 1945. They argue it is not weapons or armed force that destabilizes, it is the attitudes and perceptions of the potential wielders of weapons that matter. States must anticipate increasing resource and market competition in the future, and should expect democratic states to act as any other power-optimizing state, regardless of domestic governing arrangements. Stable peace, wholly desirable but fragile, can be obtained only via balancing strategies based on mutual positions of strength. 15 Democratic states may be especially vulnerable in a less militarized world, since their societies tend to be more open, mobilization is public and difficult, and they are thus susceptible to first strike attacks. 16 Under these conditions, all states should avoid eliminating or unduly weakening their armed forces. To do so would be an invitation to war.

**If democratic peace theory is correct, then militarization shouldn’t be an issue**

**Dolman 5 – PhD, Professor**

(Dr. Everett Carl Dolman is Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS). His focus is on international relations and theory, and he has been identified as Air University’s first space theorist. Dr. Dolman began his career as an intelligence analyst for the National Security Agency, and moved to the United States Space Command in 1986. In 1991, he received the Director of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst award; Astropolitik, originally published in 2002, pg5)

The concerns of the realists are well argued, and cast a wary doubt on the abundance of empirical evidence cited by the democratic peace proponents. If one accepts for the moment, as an analytical assumption only, the proposition that liberal-democratic states do not go to war with each other, then an alternate and exceptionally cooperative future can be projected. Indeed, if such states do not go to war with each other, then the level of armaments they possess or the **military attitudes they project should not be a serious threat**. Calls for disarmament may be economically efficient, but they should **not be necessary**. Liberal-democratic states have nothing to fear from other such states, and the size and strength of their armed forces need not be of concern. If one further accepts that a stable inter-state peace is the goal of both liberal and realist theory—a reasonable one in that a stable peace has been the holy grail of international theorists since the possibility of global destruction via nuclear devastation has been hypothesized—then a compatible path is opened. The means of one school (realist military preparedness) are reconciled with the means (liberal democratization) and ends (global then interstellar peace derived from the condition of full democracy) of the other. The point of harmonization is democracy itself.

**Even if democratic peace theory is true, it’s always better to be prepared for war**

**Dolman 5 – PhD, Professor**

(Dr. Everett Carl Dolman is Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS). His focus is on international relations and theory, and he has been identified as Air University’s first space theorist. Dr. Dolman began his career as an intelligence analyst for the National Security Agency, and moved to the United States Space Command in 1986. In 1991, he received the Director of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst award; Astropolitik, originally published in 2002, pg 5-6)

If war never occurs, then all attempts to prepare for it are (in the liberal view) wasted. On the other hand, if the democratic peace is not so robust, and in the future democratic states may indeed go to war, then the realists have not sacrificed their defensive postures. Vigilance and force of arms will be ready to assure the peace in a breakdown of theory. Astropolitics and Astropolitik constitute but one view of the future, which cannot accurately foretell real world events. It can only provide predictions of what the model will output if certain expressed assumptions are accepted. Readers will find evidence both for and against a prognosis of peace, but by itself it is neither a threat to that peace nor a guarantee of hostile military action.

## AT: Critical Theory

**Critical discourse doesn’t cause change – empirically proven**

**Mearshheimer 09**

Professor of Political Science and the co-director of International Security Policy at the University of Chicago (John J. Mearsheimer, “Reckless States and Realism” 2009, <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0048.pdf>)

Second, a close look at the international politics of the feudal era reveals scant support for the claims of critical theorists. Markus Fischer has done a detailed study of that period, and he finds "that feudal discourse was indeed distinct, prescribing unity, functional cooperation, sharing, and lawfulness."166 More importantly, however, he also finds "that while feudal actors observed these norms for the most part on the level of form, they in essence behaved like modern states." Specifically, they "strove for exclu­sive territorial control, protected themselves by military means, subjugated each other, balanced against power, formed alliances and spheres of influence, and resolved their conflicts by the use and threat of force."167 Realism, not critical theory, appears best to explain international politics in the five centuries of the feudal era.

**Genuine peace and stability can never be reached on the international level**

**Donnelly 2k**

[Jack, Ph. D University of California – Berkley in Political Science, Professor of IR at Korbel School, “Realism and International Relations”, Cambridge England, p. 53]

Mearsheimer, however, also poses a quite unreasonable test, reformulating the issue as “whether institutions cause peace” (1994/95: 15). And he defines “peace” in such a way that this test becomes absurd. “Genuine peace, or a world where states do not compete for power, is not likely” (1994/95: 9). “Peace, if one defines that concept as a state of tranquility or mutual concord, is not likely to break out in this world” (Mearsheimer 1994/95: 12). Many hierarchical political orders also lack tranquility and mutual concord. This does not imply that domestic political institutions have no effects. Likewise, the absence of “genuine peace” tells us nothing about the effects of international institutions on stability and security relations. Security competition, even war, can persist in a world in which institutions have extensive and important effects on international stability. To have an effect is to produce some change or result; as the Oxford English Dictionary puts it, to have an “operative influence. ” In a somewhat stronger sense of the term, we often speak of an actor being effective only if the result produced was intended (or at least desirable even if unintended). “Genuine peace, ” however, requires not merely that international institutions be effective but that they completely transform the character of international relations. This is an absurd stipulation - as is underscored by the fact that by this criterion balance of power politics has no effect on international peace or stability.

## AT: Neoliberalism

**Liberalism ignores the realm of security**

**Mearsheimer 09**

Professor of Political Science and the co-director of International Security Policy at the University of Chicago (John J. Mearsheimer, “Reckless States and Realism” 2009, <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0048.pdf>)

Liberal institutionalism does not directly address the question of whether institutions cause peace, but instead focuses on the less ambitious goal of explaining cooperation in cases where state interests are not fundamentally opposed.36 Specifically, the theory looks at cases where states are having difficulty cooperating because they have "mixed" interests; in other words, each side has incentives both to cooperate and not to cooper­ate.37 Each side can benefit from cooperation, however, which liberal institutionalists define as "goal-directed behavior that entails mutual policy adjustments so that all sides end up better off than they would otherwise be."38 The theory is of little relevance in situations where states' interests are fundamentally conflictual and neither side thinks it has much to gain from cooperation. In these circumstances, states aim to gain advantage over each other. They think in terms of winning and losing, and this invariably leads to intense security competition, and sometimes war. But liberal insti-tutionalism does not deal directly with these situations, and thus says little about how to resolve or even ameliorate them. Therefore, the theory largely ignores security issues and concentrates instead on economic and, to a lesser extent, environmental issues.39 In fact, the theory is built on the assumption that international politics can be divided into two realms—security and political economy—and that liberal institutionalism mainly applies to the latter, but not the former. This theme is clearly articulated by Charles Lipson, who writes that "sig­nificantly different institutional arrangements are associated with international eco­nomic and security issues.'"10 Moreover, the likelihood of cooperation is markedly different within these two realms: when economic relations are at stake, "cooperation can be sustained among several self-interested states," whereas the prospects for coop­eration are "more impoverished ... in security affairs."41 Thus, the theory's proponents pay little attention to the security realm, where questions about war and peace are of central importance.

## AT: Postmodernism

**Postmodernism destroys the vision of political order and progress in international relations**

**Williams ‘05**

[Michael C., Professor International Relations University of Ottawa, “The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations”, Cambridge University, p.159-160]

Debates surrounding ‘postmodernism’ have been subject to even more intense forms of the same divisive dichotomisation as other aspects of theoretical debate in International Relations. Most commonly, ‘postmodernism’ has become the bogey-man of the field, the subject of a set of (largely undefined and inadequately articulated and argued) charges about how in challenging the canons of science and destroying the value of Truth (and the truth of Values), it disavows the entire Western rationalist tradition, and risks destroying the vision of political order, progress, and responsibility with which that tradition is associated. Yet despite clear attempts to distance themselves from questions raised by the relationship between modernity and postmodernity – part of the general tendency in rationalist International Relations to sideline the question of the dilemmas of modernity and politics more generally – the analysis above suggests that no aspect of contemporary International Relations theory can remain immune from their consideration via cosy self-assurances of social scientific legitimacy, or analytic and political responsibility.70 Moreover, if an ironic conclusion of this reassessment of the Realist tradition is that the liberal–realist and rationalist–constructivist divides are fundamentally misleading, then an even more ironic conclusion is that the wilful Realist tradition has much in common with certain aspects of postmodern thinking.

## Competition Inevitable – Russia

**Realist perspective comes first—countries will always act in their own interests, especially when it comes to space policies—Russia proves.**

**Pravada 10**

(“International Cooperation in Space is Impossible”, Pravada, Russian Newspaper Online, 5/20/10, http://english.pravda.ru/science/tech/20-05-2010/113443-space\_cooperation-0/)//AW

According to the official space exploration program of the Russian Federation, the nation’s space agency, Roskosmos, does not see activities outside Earth’s orbit without cooperation with other countries. In the past, space exploration programs were based on national ambitions of the states which conducted those programs. The ambition to show the power of its science and technology made the Kremlin launch the world’s first-ever satellite and then first man in space. The White House stunned the world with its Apollo program. The defeat of the USSR in the lunar race made Soviet scientists develop orbital stations Salyut and Mir. The success of the Soviet Union at this point was so impressive that it made the United States proceed in the same direction. In 1984, Ronald Reagan announced the start of works to develop Space Station Freedom with the participation of America’s friends and allies. Tom Moser, the director of the program, clearly stated in 1987, when he tried to convince the Congress to fund the orbital complex, that Space Station Freedom would be developed to leave the Russians behind. The construction of the station with the participation of international partners was supposed to show that “free nations” could cooperate in space as successfully as communist ones (the Soviet Union was working on the Interkosmos program in cooperation with its political allies during those years). The end of the cold war and the space race deprived the USA of its goals. Moreover, it turned out that coordinating efforts of different countries in one space project was a very complicated objective. Space Station Freedom was supposed to enter orbit at the end of the 1980s. However, the designers of the complex, who had already spent $8 billion on engineering works, could only present a pile of documents to the president and the Congress. The program was eventually scrapped in the beginning of the 1990s. However, NASA suggested the White House should invite Russia in the project to celebrate the start of the new era in US-Russian relations and to build the complex faster, better and cheaper. NASA believed that Russia’s participation in the construction of the station, which was called the ISS, marked an obvious achievement both from the political, technological and economic point of view. US specialists thought that Russia would help save one year and $2 billion. In total, the construction of the ISS was evaluated at $17.4 billion. Russia helped in the solution of two vital problems in the program. It provided the service module (SM) known as Zvezda (Star) and Soyuz spaceships. The module, which provided some of the station’s life support systems, was launched to the station four years later that planned. US congressmen calculated that the delay resulted in the losses of $5 billion. Russia was primarily responsible for the delay in the start of the exploitation of the complex, not to mention the increased spending. US congressmen repeatedly offered to either exclude Russia from the ISS program or simply purchase its service module. Now it is obvious that if Russia had been deprived of its membership in the program, the space station would have stopped operating after the crash of Shuttle Columbia in 2003. Russia’s Soyuz and Progress booster rockets remained the only option to deliver cargoes and astronauts to the space station before NASA resumed shuttle launches. The fate of the ISS will solely depend on the Russian rockets after 2010, when the shuttle program is shut down completely. If Columbia had not crashed, astronauts would have continued flying to the ISS and back on board NASA’s shuttles, whereas Russia’s role would have been much less important. The problems connected with international cooperation between the members of the ISS project and their dependence on Russia and the USA made NASA’s John Logsdon come to conclusion that the ISS program experience was negative for its members. As for the international cooperation in post-ISS projects, Barack Obama traditionally sees his major objective at this point in preserving America’s leadership in the organization of international efforts to explore the Moon, Mars, etc. Unlike Russia, the USA has no official document related to the space exploration program that would stipulate the nation’s future dependence on cooperation with other countries. The possible consequences of such dependence can be seen in the canceled program of another manned flight to the moon. If the USA had accepted Roskosmos’s request to include Russia in the project, the results would have led to lamentable consequences for Russia. Michael Griffin, a former head of NASA, said in 2006 that cooperation works best only if it is based on you-pay-for-yourself principle. Russia would have ended up with nothing if it had been accepted. A look back at the history of space exploration clearly shows that most significant and technological progress was achieved at the time when it was connected with the solution of strictly national, not international problems of space exploration. Superpowers used space technologies to demonstrate their scientific and technological strength. This competition gave a powerful incentive to the development of space industries in Russia and the United States. International cooperation in space nowadays is impossible.

## Competition Inevitable – China

**Competition is inevitable—China proves.**

**Foster 09**—Daily Telegraph's South Asia Correspondent

(Peter, “Space Arms Race Inevitable Says Chinese Commander”, The Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/6486030/Space-arms-race-inevitable-says-Chinese-commander.html)//AW

China, which hopes to put a man on the moon by 2020, has long stated that it supported the peaceful uses of outer space and opposed the introduction of weapons there. However Xu Qiliang, a senior Chinese air force commander, said it was imperative for the PLA air force to develop offensive and defensive operations in outer space. "As far as the revolution in military affairs is concerned, the competition between military forces is moving towards outer space," he told the*People's Liberation Army Daily* in an interview to mark last month's 60th Anniversary of Communist China, "this is a historical inevitability and a development that cannot be turned back." Although Beijing has also sought to establish an international treaty to control the deployment of weapons in space, China surprised the world in 2007 when it shot down one of its own weather satellites in a test seen by many, including the United States, as a possible trigger of an arms race in space. "The PLA air force must establish in a timely manner the concepts of space security, space interests and space development," Mr Xu added, "We must build an outer space force that conforms with the needs of our nation's development (and) the demands of the development of the space age." Superiority in outer space can give a nation control over war zones both on land and at sea, while also offering a strategic advantage, Xu said, noting that such dominance was necessary to safeguard the nation. "Only power can protect peace," the 59-year-old commander added. China is currently in the process of rapidly modernising its armed forces, investigating the construction hardware such as aircraft carriers as well as cyber warfare techniques that could paralyse enemy's command and control systems. Last year's annual Pentagon report to the US Congress warned that Chinese militarisation was changing the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region.

**Competition inevitable—China satellites and new DoD national security space strategy proves.**

**The Economist 11**

(“The Cluttered Frontier: America Updates Its Space Security Policy”, Security in Space, The Economist, February 10, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18111774)//AW

At least, they used to be. Unfortunately, it has not quite worked out like that. A strategy document[\*](http://www.economist.com/node/18111774#footnote1) published on February 4th by the country’s Department of Defense (DOD) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence reveals interlopers. Around 60 countries now have satellites orbiting the Earth. Along with those satellites—which number more than 1,000—there are 22,000 man-made objects large enough to track by radar and hundreds of thousands of bits of debris too small to detect. Space is a congested, contested and competitive place, and one in which America is merely first among equals**. America’s new national security space strategy—the first the DOD has felt the need to publish—is an attempt to adapt to this reality.** Satellites, vital for both military and economic security, face a range of threats, including accidental collisions, anti-satellite missiles, lasers, electronic jamming and even the hacking of their software. On top of that, America has a lot more competition than it used to in the markets for making and launching satellites. A decade ago its share of these industries was double what it is today. Such competition is inevitable, as space technology spreads and other countries are no longer forced to rely on America’s good offices for things like satellite-based global positioning systems. But a more direct threat to America’s position comes from the testing of anti-satellite weapons. In 2007 the Chinese used one of their ageing weather satellites as target practice for a ground-based missile. The test was successful, in that the satellite was destroyed, and America had a minor “*Sputnik* moment” of realization of the true capabilities of its rival. But the test also had the consequence of creating thousands of pieces of debris that now pose a hazard for other satellites, including Chinese ones. The new strategy document suggests that, rather than trying to negotiate treaties that outlaw such behavior, America should lead by example. To an extent, it already has. A year after the Chinese test, America followed suit. It destroyed an errant spy satellite that still had a full load of a toxic propellant called hydrazine, and was in danger of spilling it over an inhabited area when it re-entered the atmosphere. Unlike the Chinese test, though, the American target was in such a low orbit that any debris would quickly have fallen into the air and burned up. There were claims at the time that this test was intended mainly as a demonstration to the Chinese. If it was, they may have learned a lesson in good neighborliness, at least. According to Brian Weeden, of a think-tank called the Secure World Foundation, China conducted another anti-satellite test in 2010, and that passed without criticism. The crucial difference was that, like America’s test, the second Chinese one did not create any mess.

**Competition between countries for space power is inevitable—China and US prove.**

**Ritter 08**—Times Correspondent specializing in international affairs

(Peter, “The New Space Race: China v. US”, Time Magazine, February 13, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1712812,00.html)//AW

Both the U.S. and China have announced intentions of returning humans to the moon by 2020 at the earliest. And the two countries are already in the early stages of a new space race that appears to have some of the heat and skullduggery of the one between Washington and Moscow during the Cold War, when space was a proxy battleground for geopolitical dominance. On Monday, the U.S. Department of Justice announced the indictment of a former Boeing engineer for passing sensitive information about the U.S. space program to the Chinese government. According to the indictment, Dongfan Chung, a 72-year-old California man who worked for Boeing until September 2006, gave China documents relating to military aircraft and rocket technology, as well as technical information about the U.S. Space Shuttle. U.S. officials say the Chung case is part of a pattern of escalating espionage by China. "We're seeing this on all fronts," says Dean Boyd, a spokesman for the Justice Department's National Security Division. Since October 2006, the Justice Department has prosecuted more than a dozen high-profile cases involving China, including industrial espionage and the illegal export of military technology. In an unrelated case also announced Monday, a Defense Department employee was arrested in Virginia for passing classified information about the sale of U.S. military technology to Taiwan to alleged Chinese agents. The scale of Chung's alleged espionage is startling. According to the Justice Department, Chung may have been providing trade secrets to Chinese aerospace companies and government agents since 1979, when he was an engineer at Rockwell International, a company acquired by Boeing in 1996. He worked for Boeing until his retirement in March 2003, and continued to work as a contractor for the company until September 2006. The indictment alleges that Chung gave China documents relating to the B-1 bomber and the Delta IV rocket, which is used to lift heavy payloads into space, as well as information on an advanced antenna array intended for the Space Shuttle. According to the indictment, Chinese officials gave Chung a shopping list of information to acquire for them. In one instance, Chung said that he would send documents through an official in China's San Francisco consulate. In another, a Chinese contact suggested he route information through a man named Chi Mak, a naturalized U.S. citizen who also worked as an engineer in California and who was convicted last year of attempting to provide China with information on an advanced naval propulsion system. The indictment charges that Chung was a willing participant. "Having been a Chinese compatriot for over 30 years and being proud of the achievements by the people's efforts for the motherland, I am regretful for not contributing anything," Chung allegedly wrote in an undated letter to one of his mainland contacts. (Chung's lawyer has maintained his client's innocence.) China's manned space program, codenamed Project 921, is indeed a matter of considerable national pride for a country that sees space exploration as confirmation of superpower status. China is pouring substantial resources into space research, according to Dean Cheng, an Asian affairs specialist at the U.S.-based Center for Naval Analysis. With a budget estimated at up to $2 billion a year, China's space program is roughly comparable to Japan's. Later this year, China plans to launch its third manned space mission — a prelude to a possible lunar foray by 2024. With President George W. Bush vowing to return American astronauts to the moon by 2020, **some competition is perhaps inevitable.** China's space program lags far behind that of the U.S., of course. "They're basically recreating the Apollo missions 50 years on," says Joan Johnson-Freese, chair of the National Security Studies Department at the U.S. Naval War College and an expert on China's space development. "It's a tortoise-and-hare race. They're happy plodding along slowly and creating this perception of a space race." But there may be more at stake than national honor. Some analysts say that China's attempts to access American space technology are less about boosting its space program than upgrading its military. China is already focusing on space as a potential battlefield. A recent Pentagon estimate of China's military capabilities said that China is investing heavily in anti-satellite weaponry. In January 2007, China demonstrated that it was able to destroy orbiting satellites when it brought down one of its own weather satellites with a missile. China clearly recognizes the significance of this capability. In 2005, a Chinese military officer wrote in the book *Joint Space War Campaigns,* put out by the National Defense University, that a "shock and awe strike" on satellites "will shake the structure of the opponent's operations system of organization and will create huge psychological impact on the opponent's policymakers." Such a strike could hypothetically allow China to counterbalance technologically superior U.S. forces, which rely heavily on satellites for battlefield data. China is still decades away from challenging the U.S. in space. But U.S. officials worry espionage may be bringing China a little closer to doing so here on Earth.

**China is militarizing space against Japan and its allies – risks great power war.**

**Nautilus Institute 7**

(“The Abuses of Realism and Australian Security Interests : the 2007 Defence Update”,2007, http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/apsnet/policy-forum/2007/0714a-tanter.html/)

The core of the China problem for Australia has been well-canvassed for several years in the image of the Australian government’s nightmare of having to choose between its economic partner and its military ally. The trilateral security institutionalization now underway between the United States, Japan and Australia is certainly meant to exclude China. The Australian expression of concern about Chinese military development was itself an echo, just days apart, of Japan’s Defence Ministry statement: “Tokyo's Defense Ministry said Beijing's military expansion plans include outer space, citing its successful missile test in January that destroyed a satellite. ‘It is highly possible that (China) is considering attacks against satellites as part of its military actions,’ the report went on, stressing that the rapid modernization of China's military forces ‘raises concerns’ and the effects on Japan ‘must be assessed carefully.’" [6] The East Asian echo is a symptom of the deeper problem. Australia and Japan are effectively coordinating their statements on China as a threat, in the absence of any genuine security threat. The deepening of security relations between these two countries and India is not coincidental, and is well understood by China as such. Not surprisingly, the Chinese have called Australia’s bluff on the matter, resulting, as the Chinese government no doubt foretold to itself, in a humiliating backdown by the Australian Minister for Defence highly satisfactory to Middle Kingdom thinkers. The tightening of security ties with Japan is being pursued enthusiastically without a realistic assessment of either the domestic problems that will inevitably arise from remilitarization in a country with deep and abiding democratic deficits, or the almost reckless embrace of “great power-like” security thinking and defence policies that are bringing Japan into unnecessary conflict with China, such as missile defence. [7]

**China’s actions contradict their plans—we must prepare for worst case scenarios**

**Everett, 2008**

(Rep. Terry Everett, Alabama Republican, is ranking member on the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces Needed: strategy for space protection Washington Times; Lexis, Date Acessed: June 21 words January 11)

Second, we have long viewed the use of space as a privilege for all nations so long as that access is peaceful. This policy has existed since the Eisenhower administration and has been reinforced through subsequent international agreements. It is therefore unacceptable for any nation or non-state actor to have the power to "hold at risk" American satellite systems or any other nation's systems, thereby placing all of the commercial, civil and military uses of space at risk. China's anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon test was a stark reminder of a growing threat that we do not fully understand. The debris created from the test will have to be monitored in the future (the Air Force currently watches over 8,000 objects in space) and Chinese intent is unknown. Their actions are at odds with their assertion that the test was "peaceful." China continues to increase its ASAT inventory and expand its counterspace capabilities beyond ballistic missiles, according to the Pentagon's annual China military report. We can't assume satellites would be attacked only in times of war or only for military gains. Both Libya and Iran have disrupted satellite operations because they did not agree with TV broadcasts carried over communications satellites. Less than four percent of our nation's budget for national security space capabilities goes toward protection. This did not change after the ASAT test. Congress called for the secretary of defense and director of national intelligence to develop a comprehensive space protection strategy. It's purpose would be to guide what investments the nation should make to better understand the space environment and take specific actions to defend our satellites and our national security interests in space. I hope the president's budget for fiscal 2009 will request increased investment and a coherent strategy for space protection. Beyond the necessary budget increases**, the Department of Defense must prepare for future challenges to our use of space and our available strategic options if China**, or another nation, threatens our space capabilities. We need to understand the consequences of our space capabilities being destroyed or debilitated, and how we would adapt. Have we communicated our possible responses should the Chinese threaten our space systems? More importantly, do we know our own procedures should there be an attack in space? Our national space policy was written before this ASAT test occurred and it needs revision. Like other issues of the day, space protection demands international cooperation. The best pressure we can apply to China, and any others who might threaten our space capabilities, is multilateral pressure. We should be engaging the international community - our NATO allies are a good start - to put more pressure on China to explain its test and its intentions. This is an opportunity for the United States and our allies to lay claim to the peaceful use of space and put pressure on those who might have different intentions. It is frankly unacceptable that a year after this test, we still do not have a coherent explanation from China on why they destroyed the satellite in space. Given our reliance on space, **we have no choice but to prepare for the worst-case scenario,** particularly if China continues to refuse to engage and disclose its intentions.

# \*\*\*Generic Space K Answers/FW\*\*\*

## Science Education Good

### Science education is a vital tool – creates skills job-portable skills

Fraknoi 7 – Professor of Astronomy

Andrew Fraknoi, Chair of the Astronomy Department at Foothill College, Societal Impact of Space Flight, p. 411

The results of the lack of good science education in this country is that adult Americans know very little about science. Jon Miller of Northwestern University, the foremost science pollster in the United States, has come to the conclusion that fewer than 20 percent of adult Americans know enough science for minimal civic literacy. For example, 50 percent of adult Americans believe that humans lived at the same rime as dinosaurs. Only 22 percent of adults in the United States can correctly define a molecule. -' At the same time that American science literacy is declining, the U.S. Department of Labor reports that in the next decade jobs requiring science, engineering, or technical training will increase by 51 percent—four times higher than general job growth. Where will all the trained people to hold those jobs come from? Clearly, the reports warning that the competitiveness of our country may be undercut by the lack of adequate education in science and engineering are worthy of far greater political attention than they have so far received.

### Scientific literacy is an important educational asset – key to testing national policy and critical thinking

Druger et al 11 – Professor of Biology @ Syracuse

Marvin Druger, Professor of Biology @ Syracuse, With 2 other Professors @ Syracuse, “Scientific literacy and attitudes towards American space exploration among college undergraduates,” Space Policy, Vol. 27, Science Direct

Advancements and discoveries in science and technology have earned the USA a reputation for being a powerful and prosperous nation. This is especially true when it comes to space exploration and NASA where the USA has been at the forefront and continues to lead the world. National support for space exploration is integral to continuing and expanding our nation's commitment of public funding to achieve space exploration goals [1]. According to a 2008 Gallup Poll, 71% of the American public were supportive of the space program and felt the USA was doing a good job maintaining its leadership in space exploration [2J. While the American public generally like space science and say they are interested, many people are unaware of basic scientific facts and concepts [3,4]. Scientific literacy is the capacity to use scientific knowledge, identify questions and to draw evidence-based conclusions in order to understand and help make decisions about the natural world and the changes made to it through human activity [5]. An adequate understanding of basic scientific terms, concepts and facts, coupled with the **ability to reason well** about issues involving science and technology, are indicators of scientific literacy [6]. Low scientific literacy could result in the **inability to formulate educated opinions about national public policy issues** [7].

### Space education is a pre-requisite to informed citizenry and participation in public discourse

Druger et al 11 – Professor of Biology @ Syracuse

Marvin Druger, Professor of Biology @ Syracuse, With 2 other Professors @ Syracuse, “Scientific literacy and attitudes towards American space exploration among college undergraduates,” Space Policy, Vol. 27, Science Direct

In summary, the present study found that, while college undergraduates claim to know little about US space exploration, they tend to have positive attitudes regarding NASA. Their scientific literacy levels and public support for space exploration are related and this is most evident in political science and health science majors. It may be that the better educated one is about space science, the more likely he or she is to become an **informed citizen** who participates in **public discourse** and is therefore more optimistic and supportive of space science [3J. This could be evaluated in future studies using surveys specific to knowledge of space exploration and NASA. More research should be conducted regarding support for US space exploration and scientific literacy among this generation as they are the future taxpayers, voters and decision makers on space policy.

### Space education is the only way to create a sustainable support for space-faring

-this card defends public discussion of space information

Brown 7 – Editor of Space Policy

Frances, 2007, “Space agencies and public outreach—must try harder,” Space Policy, Science Direct

A not dissimilar feeling is also evident in the Space Generation Congress Youth Declaration produced at the IAC in autumn 2006.3 Support for a human Moon mission and establishment of a base is clear, but this is preceded by calls for greater attention to space debris and to the possibility of an NEO impact, a continuing commitment to space for peaceful purposes and support for more public involvement in space via private space tourism. There is also a call to foster space capacity building in developing countries and to encourage their greater participation in space programmes. Tellingly, the Declaration recognizes that ‘there is a lack of space education in schools’ and that ‘the fundamental justifications supporting the human aspect of space exploration have not yet been properly articulated to the people of the world by the spacefaring nations’. The space community, and the Apollo generation in particular, needs to wake up, and to wake up fast. The public may think space is nice, even exciting at times, but they also think it is expendable when set against other priorities, they are largely indifferent to human missions and their knowledge of what goes on up there is scant at best, when not actually wrong. A major problem, in my view, is the tendency for space experts by and large to talk only to each other, often only to others in their own speciality (or clique), be that engineering, law or remote sensing. Yet, if it is to have any chance of building the kind of support that will see important Earth-orientated missions like GMES through to completion, let alone the less obviously useful Vision for Space Exploration, the space community must do more to **get its message across**. It must take more account of what the public is concerned about and of the media the latter uses to access information on those concerns. Finarelli and Pryke make a number of recommendations of ways of engaging and informing the public. Let us hope that they will be heeded.

## AT: Space Ks – AT: Ethics

### Space industrialization is a moral approach to sustaining humanity

Johnson et al 9 – NASA Physicist

Les Johnson, NASA Physicist, 2009, Matloff, PhD in Applied Science @ NYU, C Bangs, Artist, Paradise Regained: The Regreening of the Earth, pg. xiv

Chapter 1: Space Utilization: A Moral Imperative: It is in this chapter that we will put forth a moral concept on which this book is based. It is a concept that should have nearly niversal appeal and should guide much of our decision making regarding both space and environmental policies. Simply stated, life is good. The converse is also a moral assertion: that which leads to non-life is evil. Those who seek to preserve life, human and nonhuman, are acting in a morally superior manner compared to those who seek to diminish or harm life. We believe the moral decision that life on Earth is good drives those in the modern environmental movement to their activism. It is this same moral decision that motivates many space enthusiasts, activists, and professionals. We discuss why space industrialization and utilization is a **viable, long-term, moral solution to our environmental problems**.

### Human expansion and use of space is a moral requirement

Johnson et al 9 – NASA Physicist

Les Johnson, NASA Physicist, 2009, Matloff, PhD in Applied Science @ NYU, C Bangs, Artist, Paradise Regained: The Regreening of the Earth, pg. 8

In fact, the argument can be made that by expanding the realm of human activity to space, including all the processes and products that on Earth would be called pollution and pollutants, we will be creating new places for life to exist and thrive. Such expansion would be a **thoroughly positive moral choice**. Our industrial plants will have to have breathable air and drinkable water, they will have to have artificial protection from solar radiation in all its forms, and they will have to regulate the temperature so that human life can survive and thrive. We will be creating "green" ecosystems from desert, and the inevitable by-products of our civilization, the pollutants, will not harm any ecosystem in any way. We should not be profligate and wasteful by any means. Our explorers and industrialists will not want to waste anything that has potential use, because it simply will be too expensive to do so. Recycling should be the norm and only after all other options are exhausted should we discard our waste into the space environment. We have a moral obligation to develop space resources and to foster space industrialization. To not do so is **ultimately anti-life** and an **immoral act of omission**.

### Space development encourages positive treatment of Earth – no risk of degradation

Johnson et al 9 – NASA Physicist

Les Johnson, NASA Physicist, 2009, Matloff, PhD in Applied Science @ NYU, C Bangs, Artist, Paradise Regained: The Regreening of the Earth, pg. 166

Space settlers must also contend with another form of radiation: galactic cosmic rays. These electrically charged particles are accelerated to near-light-speed velocities by cosmic electromagnetic fields. Because only about two dozen humans have thus far voyaged beyond the protective confines of Earth's magnetic field, we have little data regarding the safe threshold for human exposure to these particles. The best methods of protecting against galactic cosmic rays are either to equip the space settlement with a massive, thick shield of rock or soil gathered from celestial bodies, or to generate an artificial magnetic field. As humans travel once again to the moon (and other solar-system bodies), space mission planners will learn a great deal more about this radiation source. As we learn how to explore space, we will learn more about how to improve life on Earth. From taking the technologies developed to purify water on the International Space Station and adapting them for use in terrestrial water purification systems to the new technologies for capturing and sequestering carbon dioxide, the tools we will need for space development are increasingly becoming the **same tools we need here on Earth.**

## AT: Frontier K

### Alt doesn’t solve – SSP is space frontiering

Martin et al 11 – Lt. Col. in the USAF

Harold Martin, et al, “Space Based Solar Power” Industry and Technology Assessment, Scholar

Large, urban infrastructure is built on an abundance of (relatively) cheap energy. If SBSP is successful, it has the potential to be part of the **new frontier of space**, which is currently opening up. There is significant and large potential in this market, especially as our analysis shows that current sources of energy are not enough to meet growing demands within the next 30 years.

## AT: “Leadership” Link

### They’ve got it backwards – the international community is demanding US leadership in space

Newton 11 – PhD @ UA-Huntsville

Elizabeth, PhD @ UA-Huntsville, Leader @ Center for System Studies, And Griffin, Also PhD and VP @ Center for System Studies, 2011, “United States space policy and international partnership,” Space Policy, Vol. 27, Science Direct

The president’s request and congressional authorization for continued funding of the ISS’s operations delivers on commitments made to international partners beginning in the mid-1980s when the program was conceived. However, without a successor system to the Shuttle, the USA has abrogated intergovernmental agree- ments to provide crew and cargo transportation, and crew rescue, as partial compensation for partner investments in the ISS’s infra- structure and operations. Reliance on the Russian Soyuz for limited down-mass cargo transport seriously inhibits the value that can be realized from ISS utilization until a commercial solution is available. In addition, the USA’s unilateral abandonment of the Moon as a near-term destination shakes partners’ political support for their exploration plans, some of which were **carefully premised on US intentions**, and more than five years of collaborative development of lunar base plans. 3.3. Leadership The USA is a majority funder for many space programs and is a technology leader, two features which have provided sufficient motivation for partners to **accept US leadership**, even when unfortunately high-handed. It is a stunning failure of political will to lack a successor system to the retiring Space Shuttle, and so the US cedes leadership in human spaceflight with its inability to access the ISS independently, for itself or for its partners, until a new commercial capability has been demonstrated. The USA further relinquishes leadership when abandoning years of work on strategic planning and guidance, the evaluation of alternatives, and orchestration of diverse but important contributions that were manifested in the Global Exploration Strategy. Sudden redirections without consultation are not hallmarks of leadership and will no doubt motivate partners to do more unilateral planning and execution, at least for a while. Finally, leadership in the future is at risk: how can the USA hope to influence outcomes and protect interests e strategic, commercial, and cultural e on the Moon if it is not present? 4. Conclusion Is the USA better off with the new (emerging) space policy? In some areas, yes, in some, no; and in some, it is too early to tell. In human spaceflight chronic under-funding and a political failure to persist toward goals have engendered a repetitive and distasteful cycle of churn that in the long haul is more expensive than if a plan had been committed to and executed. Policy changes on some fronts will be celebrated by international partners and rued on other fronts, where continued interdependence will be approached cautiously. We should be diligent in monitoring whether the risks and time-delays created by policy change are proven to be worth the benefits, that is, we need to create a ‘closed loop’ on the system, to gauge regularly and systematically whether we are achieving what we want. A vision of American excellence and leadership in security, political economy, and influence provides a **framework for** this **evaluation** and for the goals that we set for ourselves. While accountability and data are not beloved in the political process, we will not be able to move beyond debates that the majority of Americans view as arcane, unless we zero in on data-driven eval- uations of policy’s performance. Magical thinking might make for good politics, but it makes poor policy.

## AT: Frontier K – Cooperation Likely

### US space leadership places a premium on cooperation and consultation – only a passive US approach leads to competition in space

Fukushima 11 – Fellow @ NIDS in Japan

Yasuhito Fukushima, Fellow @ the National Institute for Defense Studies, 2011, “An Asian perspective on the new US space policy: The emphasis on international cooperation and its relevance to Asia,” Vol. 27, Space Policy, Science Direct

Leveraging the increasing opportunities to work together with other countries is not the only aim of the NSP. The changing environment of space activities has pressured the USA into undertaking a more intensified policy of international cooperation. One reason the USA needs cooperation is closely connected to the fear of weakening US primacy in space. Along with the USSR (Russia), the USA has been the leading space power and, especially after the Soviet breakup, it has enjoyed a huge advantage in this field. In 2009 it is estimated that the US government space budget ($64.42 billion) accounted for a quarter of the global space economy ($261.61 billion) and about three-quarters of aggregate world government space budgets ($86.17 billion).5 The current US primacy in space is, however, no longer secure and is challenged by budget pressures and growing competition. The push for more budget cuts is especially apparent in the national security space sector. In June 2010 Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates announced his intention to save over $100 billion of the defense budget over a five-year period starting from fiscal year 2012 and this is where the space-related budget is expected to suffer.6 In addition, the proliferation of space activities has inten- sified heated competition in space. For example, the US Global Positioning System (GPS) has been widely used as the “gold stan- dard” for space-based positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) and generated huge positive economic effects.7 Nevertheless, other countries have recently been preparing their own global navigation satellite systems (GNSS). Russia is rebuilding its Glonass constel- lation, which aims to be fully operational by the end of 2010.8 European countries are funding the Galileo system, which is scheduled to be partially operational in 2014.9 China is also con- structing the Beidou/Compass system, which is intended to achieve global coverage by around 2020.10 These systems are designed to be dual-use and are sure to have great impact on related markets. Under these circumstances the USA is attempting to maintain its primacy in space by utilizing increased international cooperation and collaboration. Michael Nacht, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Affairs, stated in May 2010 that expectations of flat to declining military space budgets in the next couple of years is the motivation for enhancing international cooperation.11 Furthermore, while space is becoming a more competitive domain where other nations are increasing their presence, the USA seems to be aiming to shape the direction of global space activities in its favor and to expand its market opportunities **through cooperation with other nations**. In the case of space-based PNT, the new NSP stipulates that, for the purpose of maintaining US leadership in this area, the country shall “engage with foreign GNSS providers to encourage compatibility and interoperability, promote transparency in civil service provision, and enable market access for US industry.” Another reason the USA is in need of cooperation has something to do with the fact that outer space is a highly interdependent domain. Just as the maritime domain has several major routes for transportation called the sea lines of communication, highways for satellites (e.g. LEO and GEO) exist in outer space.12 These are shared by all spacefaring nations and non-state actors, and are becoming increasingly congested as satellites and space debris increase. In this context, the NSP states “the now-ubiquitous and inter- connected nature of space capabilities and the world’s growing dependence on them mean that irresponsible acts in space can have damaging consequences for all of us.” The NSP also names the increase in the amount of space debris and the risks of satellite collisions as examples of challenges for the sustainable use of space. These descriptions are no doubt influenced by the results of two incidents e China’s 2007 ASAT test and the 2009 USeRussia satellite collision e which have occurred since the last NSP was released in 2006. These two incidents have made the challenges to the sustainability of the space environment more imminent, multiplying the number of catalogued LEO space objects by more than 60%.13 The Obama NSP clearly recognizes that **international cooperation** is vital in addressing these challenges. It states that not only the USA but other countries also share the responsibility and “calls on all nations to work together to adopt approaches for responsible activity in space.” Also, the section on international cooperation in the inter-sectoral guidelines specifies that the USA will pursue bilateral and multilateral TCBMs “to encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, space.” Now it is increasingly important for the USA to go beyond its traditional cooperation with allies and partners, and to expand cooperation with virtually all nations. Thus, the Obama administration sees international cooperation as a “key cornerstone” of its NSP not only to take advantage of growing opportunities, but also to maintain both US primacy in space, and the safety and security of space. For the USA now, international cooperation has been evolving from “nice to do” to “**must do” status**.

## AT: Frontier K – Space Frontier Peaceful

### Space won’t replicate historical Frontier mentality

-the permutation provides an example of an ethical approach to the space frontier

Gray 99

D.M., “Space as a frontier - the role of human motivation,” Space Policy, Science Direct

Frontiers have the reputation for generating a ‘Frontier Mentality’. This is generally thought of in terms of the American frontier mythos. The sturdy pioneer is seen as independent, self-sufficient, and highly motivated to provide a better life for his family. He is also portrayed as having little regard for any environmental devastation or for any indigenous society he might encounter. While there were no doubt pioneers with these qualities, these values reflect the unique mixing of the historic society and the realities of the resources being utilized on the frontier at that time. Further, our perception of the past is distorted by the ethics of our society and the historic, social and entertainment mediums by which the picture of the past is presented. If historic frontiers are studied in some detail, it soon becomes apparent that **each has a unique set of values, ideals and mind-sets**.

### Turn – space channels frontier ideology into peace-seeking

Gray 99

D.M., “Space as a frontier - the role of human motivation,” Space Policy, Science Direct

The motivation of nations to expand their spheres of influence has historically been expressed in terms of imperialism, colonialism, hegemony and outright military conquest. In America in the 19th century it was most often expressed in terms of Manifest Destiny - the belief that the United States of America should extend across the continent from the Atlantic to Pacific. The movement was personified by folk heroes such a Daniel Boone, Kit Carson and Davy Crockett. However, on a larger scale it was expressed in a generationally driven agrarian and mining expansion from east to west until the Civil War and then a rebound back to the east into the interior from the Pacific in the post-War eras. In the 19th century and first half of the 20th century, the idea of a steadystate society was anathema to national prestige. Nations competed in a global land-rush with little regard for the indigenous societies. The American frontiersmen perceived the land to be empty and brushed away the native populations who could not compete with the technology, organizational structures and aggressive ideologies of the EuroAmerican society. Indeed, national ambition expressed in the expansion of physical borders continues to produce war and the threat of war. However, nationalistic expansion is given a more constructive venue when it is presented with a true wilderness in which it can grow. In the 20th century, physical frontiers were replaced by technological frontiers that provided arenas of expansionist opportunity with no native populations. The Wright Brothers, Henry Ford, Einstein, Yager, Glenn, Jobs and Gates became the new American folk heroes. They personified the expansion of the frontiers of technology and science. **Instead of subjugating or pushing peoples aside**, these technological frontiers tended to **empower and provide new freedoms**. The common man learned to put aside old ways of doing things and embrace new technologies. In 20th century America, the ideology of `Manifest Destiny’ came to be replaced with &You can't stand in the way of progress!'. Nationalistic goals motivated President Kennedy to declare during a speech at Rice University on September 12, 1962, &I believe this nation should commit itself, before this decade is out, to landing a man on the moon and return him safely to the earth'. The speech resulted in the spear thrust of Apollo that proved the USA's superiority over the Soviet technological machine. On Sunday, 20 July 1969, America's sphere of influence extended to the lunar surface as Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin planted the American flag on the Sea of Tranquillity. Having proved its superiority, America could be magnanimous in victory with the symbolic handshake of Apollo}Soyuz. Since America's retreat from the successes of Apollo, nationalistic interests in space have become less clear. The USA began to quietly concentrate on orbiting satellites. Military and security organizations in the government viewed space as the most practical means of providing information they deemed necessary to maintain national security. The USA's new symbol of superiority in space became the Space Shuttle which could take larger crews to space in airline-like comfort. The USA's expansionist policies had once again moved from the **physical to the technological**. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the USA had little reason to compete in space. Instead, it found more prestige in allowing other countries to participate in Shuttle missions and most recently in the International Space Station. For America's partners, participation in the station provided access to space without having to develop the means to travel there. For these nations, their space programs have become a focus of national pride. For example when SPAR of Canada recently sold its space robotics unit that manufactured the Shuttle's robot arm to a subsidiary of the American company Orbital Sciences, the SPAR stock holders arose to remove the board of directors that had made the decision [2].

## AT: Frontier K – Frontier Reps Good

### Only our representations solve the case—frontier imagery is key to motivate space exploration

Gray 99

D.M., “Space as a frontier - the role of human motivation,” Space Policy, Science Direct

Whether in the striking of a new vein of gold, the invention of a new process or the “Imagineering” of a new space-based communication industry, the threshold for primary frontier ignition is usually quite high. The sturdy prospector/inventor must parlay sweat equity and knowledge of the new discovery into a debt-financed second generation of development. The products of this effort, if successful, can then be used as collateral for further investment. This process continues until the energy applied to the resource is of such a scale that the frontier wave becomes self-sustaining and the wealth generated is harvested by the controlling investors. With each successive successful generation of development, the scale of investment becomes larger. At each step, the developing frontier resource that cannot justify additional financing joins the ranks of failed investments. Any developed assets are either abandoned or absorbed into the holdings of more viable enterprises. The feedback driving an active frontier is economic in nature. Outside investing, more commonly known as speculation, serves to amplify this feedback. As the scale of outside investment expands, the development of the frontier resource becomes increasingly directed by the economic needs of the adjacent civilization. However, the efficiency of the speculative capital when applied to the frontier is affected by the unique nature of the frontier resource and several non-economic conditions derived from the contact civilization. Each frontier is a unique blend of wilderness resources and the contact society. Anthropologists have long known that societies expand and contract thanks to changes in technology, social systems and ideology. There is no evidence that mankind's expansion into space will be an exception. These factors affect both the threshold for the sparking of frontier and the speed with which, once sparked, the frontier advances. Within the realm of the today's society interfacing with the present space frontier these three environmental conditions can be labeled technology, legislation and charisma (TLC). Technology is the means by which undeveloped wilderness resources are transformed into a viable frontier industry. Machines and systems enable human economic activity in hostile wilderness environments. Both mainstream and seemingly trivial technological developments have been adapted for use in historical frontiers. These frontier enabling technologies can be a new way to chip stone on the African Plains, a windmill to pump water on the American Plains or ultra-light composite materials to wrap strap-on boosters for expendable rockets. Many wilderness settings with known resources have had to await technological advances before frontier development could occur. Many oil fields below the ability of historic drilling technology have had to await the development of new methods of drilling before they could be tapped. Many played-out frontiers have been rejuvenated by the influx of a new technology. In the American West, many a gold mine was reopened when the new cyanide process was introduced around the turn of the 20th century. Legislation is the means by which human endeavor in a wilderness is legitimized and trade to and from the frontier is safeguarded. Since frontiers are areas of economic speculation, frontier participants are vitally interested in official recognition and protection of their investment. Debt financing, the life-blood of frontier, is simply not possible until a set of rules is hammered out on all levels of frontier activity. Historic miner courts were nearly always set up as soon as prospectors realized they had a viable strike. By "ling his claim at one of these miner courts, the prospector protected his investment of capital and sweat equity from any who would &jump' his claim. Further, the legitimate holding of the claim allowed the miner to approach financial institutions - whether formal or informal - and use the claim as collateral for the funds for further speculative development. Charisma, often overlooked in frontier histories and economic plans, is the motivation that pulls men and women forward into the wilderness to seek their fortunes. Reasons to participate in frontiers can be as numerous as participants - ranging from personal desire for wealth to larger ideologies that shape the course of nations. Among the most common reasons to participate in a frontier is the belief that frontiers offer opportunities no longer available in civilization. It is this belief that sustains participants through unimaginable hardships and failures. In the 1840s, families struggling to make a living on too small farms packed their possessions and crossed the North American continent on the Oregon Trail. Businesses utilize the charisma of frontier to increase profits. From the 1870s through 1890s railroads promoted rail travel to the American West in crowded cities in the American east and in Europe by advertising the cheap and fertile western lands. Nations also utilize frontier issues and ideologies to advance their own agendas. Manifest Destiny which was a belief that the United States should stretch from sea to sea, was a rallying cry for those promoting the settlement of Oregon. Without human motivations, there would be little reason for a frontier participant to work the long hours, face the dangers and assume the risk of a frontier when economic security can be more easily obtained in the comforts of civilization.

### Frontier imagery inspires support for space projects

Gray 99

D.M., “Space as a frontier - the role of human motivation,” Space Policy, Science Direct

Frontiers have an intrinsic appeal not only to nations and investors, but to individuals as well. Daniel Boone sought the solace of solitude of the wilderness. The Pilgrims were only the first of many groups to escape religious constraints by moving to the American frontier to set up utopian communities. Talented young men eager to prove their worth, tended to enter into frontiers to make a name for themselves. Others, with dubious pasts, escaped to the frontier so that they could start life anew with a clean slate. The reasons for individuals to participate in frontiers are many, but in their basic forms they can be listed as: freedom, opportunity and adventure. The call of the frontier brings meaning and challenge to personal lives. It inspires. The chance to live and work in space is a motivator that has inspired students for four decades. Homer Hickam in the autobiographical movie October Sky found a way out of a dying West Virginia coal town by following his rocketry interests. Ultimately, he was able to attend college and work for NASA as an engineer. The motivator is not exclusively American, Franklin ChangDiaz who grew up in Costa Rica followed his dreams to the USA to graduate from MIT and become an astronaut. He has to date flown on six Shuttle missions.

## AT: Frontier K – Mars Impact Turn

### Space frontier is key to expansionism – the alternative ensures human extinction

Zubrin 94 – PhD in Nuclear Engineering

Robert Zubrin, former senior engineer with the Martin Marietta Astronautics company, working as one of its leaders in development of advanced concepts for interplanetary missions, 1994, “The Significance of the Martian Frontier,” Ad Astra, Science Direct

Without a frontier from which to breathe life, the spirit that gave rise to the progressive humanistic culture that America has offered to the world for the past several centuries is fading. The issue is not just one of national loss — human progress needs a vanguard, and no replacement is in sight. The creation of a new frontier thus presents itself as America's and **humanity's greatest social need**. Nothing is more important: Apply what palliatives you will, without a frontier to grow in, not only American society, but the **entire global civilization** based upon Western enlightenment values of humanism, reason, science and progress **will die**. I believe that humanity's new frontier can only be on Mars. MARS HAS WHAT IT TAKES Why Mars? Why not on Earth, under the oceans or in such remote region as Antarctica? And if it must be in space, why on Mars? Why not on the Moon or in artificial satellites in orbit about the Earth? It is true that settlements on or under the sea or in Antarctica are entirely possible, and their establishment and access would be much easier than that of Martian colonies. Nevertheless, the fact of the matter is that at this point in history such terrestrial developments cannot meet an essential requirement for a frontier — to wit, they are insufficiently remote to allow for the free development of a new society. In this day and age, with modern terrestrial communication and transportation systems, no matter how remote or hostile the spot on Earth, the cops are too close. If people are to have the dignity that comes with making their own world, they must be free of the old. Why then not the Moon? The answer is because there's not enough there. True, the Moon has a copious supply of most metals and oxygen, in the form of oxidized rock, and a fair supply of solar energy, but that's about it. For all intents and purposes, the Moon has no hydrogen, nitrogen or carbon — three of the four elements most necessary for life. (They are present in the Lunar soil, but only in parts per million quantities, somewhat like gold in sea water. If there were concrete on the Moon, Lunar colonists would mine it to get its water out.) You could bring seeds to the Moon and grow plants in enclosed greenhouses there, but nearly every atom of carbon, nitrogen and hydrogen that goes into making those plants would have to be imported from another planet. While sustaining a Lunar scientific base under such conditions is relatively straightforward, growing a civilization there would be impossible. The difficulties involved in supporting significant populations in artificial orbiting space colonies would be even greater. Mars has what it takes. It's far enough away to free its colonists from intellectual, legal, or cultural domination by the old world, and rich enough in resources to give birth to a new. The Red Planet may appear at first glance to be a desert, but beneath its sands are oceans of water in the form of permafrost, enough in fact (if it were melted and Mars' terrain were smoothed out) to cover the entire planet with an ocean several hundred meters deep. Mars' atmosphere is mostly carbon-dioxide, providing enormous supplies of the two most important biological elements in a chemical form from which they can be directly taken up and incorporated into plant life. Mars has nitrogen too, both as a minority constituent in its atmosphere (three percent) and probably as nitrate beds in its soil as well. For the rest, all the metals, silicon, sulfur, phosphorus, inert gases and other raw materials needed to create not only life but an advanced technological civilization can readily be found on Mars. The United States has, today, all the technology needed to send humans to Mars. If a "travel light and live off the land" strategy such as the Mars Direct plan were adopted, then the first human exploration mission could be launched within 10 years at a cost per year less than 20 percent of NASA's existing budget. Once humans have reached Mars, bases could rapidly be established to support not only exploration, but experimentation to develop the broad range of civil, agricultural, chemical and industrial engineering techniques required to turn the raw materials of Mars into food, propellant, ceramics, plastics, metals, wires, structures, habitats, etc. As these techniques are mastered, Mars will become capable of supporting an ever-increasing population, with an expanding division of labor, capable of mounting engineering efforts on an exponentially increasing scale. Once the production infrastructure is in place, populating Mars will not be a problem — under current medical conditions an immigration rate of 100 people per year would produce population growth on Mars in the 21st century comparable to that which occured in Colonial America in the 17th. Within a century, an engineering capability could be created on Mars with the capability to literally transform the planet, if not to a fully Earth-like environment, at least to the warm, wet conditions of Mars'primitive past, making a desert world into a home for a new spectrum of descendants of terrestrial life. Mars is remote and can be settled. The fact that Mars can be settled and altered defines it as the New World that can create the basis for a positive future for terrestrial humanity for the next several centuries. WHY HUMANITY NEEDS MARS "Everything has tended to regenerate them; new laws, a new mode of living, a new social system; here they are become men." — Jean de Crevecoeur, Letters from an American Farmer, 1782 To see best why 21st century humanity will desperately need an open frontier on Mars, we need to look at modern Western humanist culture and see what makes it so much more desirable a mode of society than anything that has ever existed before. Then we need to see how everything we hold dear will **be wiped out** if the frontier remains closed.

### Key to human diversity – impact is extinction

-significantly advances terrestrial quality of life

-no risk of endless wars or destruction – ensures terrestrial democracy

Zubrin 94 – PhD in Nuclear Engineering

Robert Zubrin, former senior engineer with the Martin Marietta Astronautics company, working as one of its leaders in development of advanced concepts for interplanetary missions, 1994, “The Significance of the Martian Frontier,” Ad Astra, Science Direct

In the 21st Century, without a Martian frontier, there is no question that human diversity will decline severely. Already, in the late 20th century, advanced communication and transportation technologies have eroded the healthy diversity of human cultures on Earth, and this tendency can only accelerate in the 21st. On the other hand, if the Martian frontier is opened, then this same process of technological advance will also enable us to establish a new branch of human culture on Mars and eventually worlds beyond. The precious diversity of humanity can thus be preserved on a broader field, but only on a broader field. One world will be just too small a domain to allow the preservation of the diversity needed not just to keep life interesting, but to assure the survival of the human race. Without the opening of a new frontier on Mars, continued Western civilization faces the risk of technological stagnation. To some this may appear to be an outrageous statement, as the present age is frequently cited as one of technological wonders. In fact, however, the rate of progress within our society has been decreasing and at an alarming rate. To see this, it is only necessary to step back and compare the changes that have occurred in the past 30 years with those that occurred in the preceding 30 years and the 30 years before that. Between 1903 and 1933 the world was revolutionized: Cities were electrified; telephones and broadcast radio became common; talking motion pictures appeared; automobiles became practical; and aviation progressed from the Wright Flyer to the DC-3 and Hawker Hurricane. Between 1933 and 1963 the world changed again, with the introduction of color television, communication satellites and interplanetary spacecraft, computers, antibiotics, scuba gear, nuclear power, Atlas, Titan, and Saturn rockets, Boeing 727's and SR-71's. Compared to these changes, the technological innovations from 1963 to the present are insignificant. Immense changes should have occurred during this period, but did not. Had we been following the previous 60 years' technological trajectory, we today would have videotelephones, solar powered cars, maglev trains, fusion reactors, hypersonic intercontinental travel, regular passenger transportation to orbit, undersea cities, open-sea mariculture and human settlements on the Moon and Mars. Instead, today we see important technological developments, such as nuclear power and biotechnology, being blocked or enmeshed in political controversy — we are slowing down. Now, consider a nascent Martian civilization: Its future will depend critically upon the progress of science and technology. Just as the inventions produced by the "Yankee Ingenuity" of frontier America were a powerful driving force on worldwide human progress in the 19th century, so the "Martian Ingenuity" born in a culture that puts the utmost premium on intelligence, practical education and the determination required to make real contributions will make much more than its fair share of the scientific and technological breakthroughs that will **dramatically advance the human condition** in the 21st. A prime example of the Martian frontier driving new technology will undoubtedly be found in the arena of energy production. As on Earth, an ample supply of energy will be crucial to the success of Mars settlements. The Red Planet does have one major energy resource that we currently know about: deuterium, which can be used as the fuel in nearly waste-free thermonuclear fusion reactors. Earth has large amounts of deuterium too, but with all of the existing investments in other, more polluting forms of energy production, the research that would make possible practical fusion power reactors has been allowed to stagnate. The Martian colonists are certain to be much more determined to get fusion on-line, and in doing so will **massively benefit the** mother **planet as well**. The parallel between the Martian frontier and that of 19th century America as technology drivers is, if anything, vastly understated. America drove technological progress in the last century because its western frontier created a perpetual labor shortage back East, thus forcing the development of labor saving machinery and providing a strong incentive for improvement of public education so that the skills of the limited labor force available could be maximized. This condition no longer holds true in America. In fact, far from prizing each additional citizen, immigrants are no longer welcome here, and a vast "service sector" of bureaucrats and menials has been created to absorb the energies of the majority of the population which is excluded from the productive parts of the economy. Thus in the late 20th century, and increasingly in the 21st, each additional citizen is and will be regarded as a burden. On 21st century Mars, on the other hand, conditions of labor shortage will apply with a vengeance. Indeed, it can be safely said that no commodity on 21st century Mars will be more precious, more highly valued and more dearly paid for than human labor time. Workers on Mars will be paid more and treated better than their counterparts on Earth. Just as the example of 19th century America changed the way the common man was regarded and treated in Europe, so the impact of progressive Martian social conditions will be felt on Earth as well as on Mars. A new standard will be set for a higher form of humanist civilization on Mars, and, viewing it from afar, the citizens of Earth will rightly demand nothing less for themselves. The frontier drove the development of democracy in America by creating a self-reliant population which insisted on the right to self-government. It is doubtful that democracy can persist without such people. True, the trappings of democracy exist in abundance in America today, but meaningful public participation in the process has all but disappeared. Consider that no representative of a new political party has been elected president of the United States since 1860. Likewise, neighborhood political clubs and ward structures that once allowed citizen participation in party deliberations have vanished. And with a re-election rate of 95 percent, the U.S. Congress is hardly susceptible to the people's will. Regardless of the will of Congress, the real laws, covering ever broader areas of economic and social life, are increasingly being made by a plethora of regulatory agencies whose officials do not even pretend to have been elected by anyone. Democracy in America and elsewhere in western civilization needs a shot in the arm. That boost can only come from the example of a frontier people whose civilization incorporates the ethos that breathed the spirit into democracy in America in the first place. As Americans showed Europe in the last century, so in the next the Martians can show us the path away from oligarchy.

## AT: Frontier K – Inescapable

### Frontier reps are inescapable – they are intrinsically tied to public discourse about space policy

Billings 7 – Professor @ Georgetown

Linda, PhD in Mass Communication, Professor of Media @ Georgetown, Societal Impact of Space Flight, Frontier Days in Space: Are They Over?” Space Policy, August

Patricia Nelson Limerick has recommended that the space community abandon the frontier metaphor. But at the same time she acknowledges that it is 'an enormously persistent and determining pattern of thought'. Ultimately, it may not be feasible to expunge the frontier metaphor from the public discourse about space exploration. But it certainly is possible, and practical, to re-examine it as a motivating force for space exploration. What is the space frontier? It might be useful to think of the space frontier as a vast and distant sort of Brazilian rainforest, Atacama Desert, Antarctic continent a great unknown that challenges humans to think creatively and expansively, to push their capabilities to the limits, a wild and beautiful place to be studied and enjoyed but left unsullied. Curiosity is what brought humans out of caves, took them across oceans and continents, compelled them to invent aeroplanes and now draws them towards the stars. The broad, deep public value of exploring the universe is the value of discovery, learning and understanding; thus the space frontier could be a school for social research, a place where new societies could grow and thrive. This is the space frontier: the vast, perhaps endless frontier of intellectual and spiritual potential. Consider the popularity of director Ron Howard's film Apollo 13. What appealed to audiences about this story was that it was about danger, risk, challenges, hard work, human ingenuity, turning failure to success, life triumphing over death. In his turn of the century essay, 'The moral equivalent of war', American philosopher William James wrote that 'without risks or prizes for the darer, history would be insipid indeed'. Space exploration offers tremendous opportunities to take extraordinary risks and thus it promises great challenges to the human mind and spirit. Intellectual and spiritual growth are more than worthy goals of future space exploration efforts.

### Their evidence describes status quo frontierism – that proves the alt doesn’t solve

Gray 99

D.M., “Space as a frontier - the role of human motivation,” Space Policy, Science Direct

Once a frontier has successfully sparked, it is extremely difficult to extinguish its flame. Rapid development from internal and external sources will modify technology, legislation and charisma in the adjacent society into forms more favorable to the frontier. The more dynamic the frontier, the more widespread and profound will be the modifications to society. As long as frontier resources hold up, **there is little that can stop development**. By the time the wealth-generating resources have become con- trolled and opportunities diminished, the frontier has moved on leaving a modified civilization to follow in its wake

## AT: Security K – Intervention Turn

### Rejection of securitization leads to instability and international intervention – doesn’t enable radical democracy – turns their impact

McCormack 10 – Lecturer in International Politics

Tara McCormack, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, pg. 127-129

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of problematising weak or unstable states and allowing international institutions or major states a **more interventionary role**, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have **any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation**. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework there were at least formal and clear demarcations. This has the consequence of entrenching international power inequalities and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means the condemnation of millions to a **barbarous life of inhuman bare survival**. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to create self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks **cannot** **be empowering,** and ultimately lead to **more power for powerful states,** we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

## AT: Security K – Alt Fails

### The alternative’s focus on individual resistance denies the accountability necessary to actuate collective global change – leaves power in the hands of the elites

Chandler 4
David, Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, Building Global Civil Society `From Below'?, Millennium - Journal of International Studies 2004; 33; 313

The celebration of global civil society ‘from the bottom up’ would appear to be based less on any emergence of new political forces at the global level than the desire of Western activists and commentators to **justify their avoidance of accountability** to any collective source of political community or elected authority. The focus on the shared interests with those ‘excluded’, or the ‘imagined’ global community of radical activists, is a way of **legitimising the avoidance** of any accountability to those still ‘trapped inside’—the electorate. 113 The struggle for individual ethical and political autonomy, the claim for the recognition of separate ‘political spaces’ and for the ‘incommunicability’ of political causes, demonstrates the limits of the radical claims for the normative project of global civil society ‘from below’. The **rejection** of the formal political sphere, as a way of mediating between the individual and the social, **leaves political struggles isolated** from any shared framework of meaning or from any formal processes of democratic accountability. This article should not be read as a defence of some nostalgic vision of the past, neither does it assert that the key problem with radical global civil society approaches is their rejection of formal engagement in existing political institutions and practices. The point being made here is that the rejection of state-based processes, which force the individual to engage with and account for the views of other members of society, is a reflection of a broader problem—an unwillingness to engage in political contestation. Advocates of global civil society ‘from below’ would rather hide behind the views of someone else, legitimising their views as the prior moral claims of others—the courtly advocates—or putting themselves in harm’s way and leading by inarticulate example, rather than engaging in a public debate. The unwillingness of radical activists to engage with their own society reflects the attenuation of political community rather than its expansion. Regardless of the effectiveness of radical lobbying and calls for recognition, this rejection of social engagement can only further legitimise the narrowing of the political sphere to a **small circle of unaccountable elites**. If the only alternative to the political ‘game’ is to threaten to ‘take our ball home’—the anti-politics of rejectionism—the powers that be can **sleep peacefully in their beds.**

## AT: Security K – Alt Fails

### Refusal to engage the with existing power structures dooms the alternative

McCormack 10 – PhD in IR

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In chapter 7 I engaged with the human security framework and some of the problematic implications of ‘emancipatory’ security policy frameworks. In this chapter I argued that the shift away from the pluralist security framework and the elevation of cosmopolitan and emancipatory goals has served to **enforce international power inequalities** rather than lessen them. Weak or unstable states are subjected to greater international scrutiny and international institutions and other states have greater freedom to intervene, but the citizens of these states have no way of controlling or influencing these international institutions or powerful states. This shift away from the pluralist security framework has **not challenged the status quo**, which may help to explain why major international institutions and states can easily adopt a more cosmopolitan rhetoric in their security policies. As we have seen, the shift away from the pluralist security framework has entailed a shift towards a more openly hierarchical international system, in which states are differentiated according to, for example, their ability to provide human security for their citizens or their supposed democratic commitments. In this shift, the old pluralist international norms of (formal) international sovereign equality, non-intervention and ‘blindness’ to the content of a state are overturned. Instead, international institutions and states have more freedom to intervene in weak or unstable states in order to ‘protect’ and emancipate individuals globally. Critical and emancipatory security theorists argue that the goal of the emancipation of the individual means that security must be reconceptualised away from the state. As the domestic sphere is understood to be the sphere of insecurity and disorder, the international sphere represents greater emancipatory possibilities, as Tickner argues, ‘if security is to start with the individual, its ties to state sovereignty must be severed’ (1995: 189). For critical and emancipatory theorists there must be a shift towards a ‘cosmopolitan’ legal framework, for example Mary Kaldor (2001: 10), Martin Shaw (2003: 104) and Andrew Linklater (2005). For critical theorists, one of the fundamental problems with Realism is that it is unrealistic. Because it prioritises order and the existing status quo, Realism attempts to impose a particular security framework onto a complex world, ignoring the myriad threats to people emerging from their own governments and societies. Moreover, traditional international theory serves to obscure power relations and omits a study of why the system is as it is: [O]mitting myriad strands of power amounts to exaggerating the simplicity of the entire political system. Today’s conventional portrait of international politics thus too often ends up looking like a Superman comic strip, whereas it probably should resemble a Jackson Pollock. (Enloe, 2002 [1996]: 189) Yet as I have argued, contemporary critical security theorists seem to show a marked lack of engagement with their problematic (whether the international security context, or the Yugoslav break-up and wars). Without concrete engagement and analysis, however, the **critical project is undermined** and critical theory becomes nothing more than a request that people behave in a nicer way to each other. Furthermore, whilst contemporary critical security theorists argue that they present a more realistic image of the world, through exposing power relations, for example, their lack of concrete analysis of the problematic considered renders them **actually unable to engage with existing power structures** and the way in which power is being exercised in the contemporary international system. For critical and emancipatory theorists the central place of the values of the theorist mean that it cannot fulfil its promise to critically engage with contemporary power relations and emancipatory possibilities. Values must be joined with engagement with the material circumstances of the time

## AT: Security K – Alt Fails

### Can’t overcome existing power structures

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This book is an argument about the political limits to critical and emancipatory approaches to contemporary international relations. In particular I focus upon critical and emancipatory approaches to security and conflict although the argument is applicable more broadly. For critical and emancipatory theorists, the Cold War state-based security framework is both archaic and immoral. It is archaic because sovereign states can no longer resolve contemporary security problems which spread across state borders (new types of conflict for example) and it is immoral because under the cover of sovereignty governments have been permitted to treat their populations as badly as they wish to. Critical and emancipatory theorists argue that security needs to be reconceptualised in terms of human freedom and well being, and that more cosmopolitan forms of international organisation should be constructed, in which human rights and dignity should not be a matter of chance depending upon which state a person happens to be born in, but universal rights. By challenging the key tenets of the tra- ditional security framework, critical and emancipatory theorists argue that they pose a challenge to contemporary global power structures. Critical approaches to international relations have become increasingly influential, yet whilst critical international relations theorists often represent themselves as critical voices from the margins challenging contemporary power relations in the world, the contemporary context is one in which international and national security policy and discourse is often framed in similar terms to the prescriptions advocated by critical theorists. For critical theorists the limitations of contemporary security policies show that underneath the ‘critical talk’ powerful states and institutions are still in control of the security agenda, and that the promises of critical and emanci- patory theorists are still to be fulfilled. Meanwhile, radical critics of universal human rights and post-Cold War security policies argue that powerful Western states are implementing new forms of imperial control over the developing world. In this read- ing, so-called emancipatory theorists are the theoretical handmaids of Empire. This book will argue that current critical and emancipatory approaches **cannot fulfil their promises** and pose a challenge to contemporary power relations. However, the argument will be neither that critical prescriptions need to be more faithfully applied, nor that critical theorists are simply justifying Western power. Rather, the book will seek to draw out the problematic political assumptions of critical and emancipatory theorists and similarities with contemporary security policies and rhetoric, and argue that whatever the intent of contemporary critical theorists they **cannot pose a challenge** to **contemporary power structures or discourses**.

## AT: Security K - Outdated

### Their link evidence misrepresents power structures – the Cold War frameworks have disappeared – prefer recency of our evidence

-proves there won’t be a self-fulfilling increase in violence because states are rejecting realism

-the alternative is idealistic

-demands a specific link argument – not merely “state” or “sovereign politics”

McCormack 10 – PhD in IR

Tara McCormack, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, pg. 39-40

Critical theorist Andrew Linklater elaborates the problem with sovereignty: The nature of the social bond which has bound the members of each modern European state together and separated them from the other states and the rest of humankind is being challenged by subnational groups and eroded by the advance of regionalism and globalization. These pressures pose a combined challenge to the exclusionary nature of sovereignty and to traditional ideas about citizenship. (1996: 78) We would be hard pressed to find a statement from a major international security policy report that would be in disagreement with this critical statement. Mainstream security policy and international security policy discourse have **clearly shifted** in the last two decades to a form that is much similar than otherwise to critical and emancipatory security theory. Critical and emancipatory security theorists are critiquing an **increasingly anachronistic and irrelevant** model of security theory and practices. The contemporary international context and security problematic is clearly very different from that of 20 years ago, yet reading critical and emancipatory theorists one could be oblivious to the fact that a major feature of post-Cold War security policy discourse has been a reorientation around human rights, empowerment and a critique of the old framework of sovereign equality and non-intervention. I do not suggest here that major international institutions and powers have become forces battling for the good of all mankind, nor that statements about human rights mean that America, for example, is pursuing human rights for all. However, an engage- ment with this major shift in the way in which power is being articulated and justi- fied must be a first step towards any critical engagement with contemporary power relations and any potential for a more emancipatory politics. This makes the critical task more complicated for critical approaches as the old certainties of the Cold War security framework are disappearing and in its place there is a new world in which major powers and international institutions are **disowning that very framework**. In fact, an engagement with the problematic aspects of contemporary security policies would illuminate much about the limitations to abstract declarations of rights and freedom without political content (as we will see in some of the follow- ing chapters). This suggests that contrary to the claims of contemporary critical and emancipa- tory theorists they are not engaging in the ‘here and now’, yet engaging with struc- tures and discourses of contemporary power must be fundamental to the task of posing a challenge to those power relations and structures. This points to a serious theoretical limit to contemporary critical and emancipatory approaches. Critical and emancipatory theorists are engaging in an exercise in idealism, this is shown because their critique is not rooted in an engagement with and critique of contem- porary structures and discourses of power. Whilst the moral impulses of critical and emancipatory theorists may well be altruistic, without an engagement in the material circumstances of the **contemporary period their critique** becomes little more than a statement of the moral values of the theorist. In chapter 3 I explore a differ- ent aspect of this theoretical problem.

## AT: Security K – State-Centrism Good

### State-centrism is the only way to produce human security and limit everyday injustice – material change should be preferred

-alternatives to the state will not be democratically accountable – can’t give content to rights claims

-key to value to life

McCormack 10 – PhD in IR

Tara McCormack, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, pg. 140-142

Critical and emancipatory theorists fail to understand that there must be a **political content** to emancipation and new forms of social organisation. Critical theorists seek emancipation and argue for new forms of political community above and beyond the state, yet there is nothing at the moment **beyond the state that can give real content** to those wishes. There is no democratic world government and it is simply nonsensical to argue that the UN, for example, is a step towards global democ- racy. Major international institutions are essentially controlled by powerful states. To welcome challenges to sovereignty in the present political context **cannot hasten** any kind of more just world order in which **people really matter** (to para- phrase Lynch). Whatever the limitations of the state, and there are many, at the moment the state represents the only framework in which people might have a chance to have some meaningful control over their lives. Critical theorists who argue for more cosmopolitan international frameworks of universal human rights or more global democratic organisations in order to emancipate the oppressed fail to understand that in the current political context they are arguing for **fictional rights and communities**. In this context, these rights can only be given at the behest of a more powerful state or international organisation. This, however, leads to a relationship between the rights recipient and the rights giver which is not a political relationship of control and accountability, but one closer, as Emma Rothschild has perceptively argued, to charity (Rothschild, 1995). In order to illustrate this problem from another angle, let us consider briefly the concept of Children’s Rights (this example is taken from Norman Lewis, 1998) or gender inequality. Without a doubt in many parts of the world children and women suffer greatly and have many unfair burdens upon them. It may seem therefore that the UN Convention on Children’s Rights, for example, or a framework of universal human rights codified in international law might be seen as a good and progressive thing in order to decrease inequality and empower women and children. Certainly for many critical and emancipatory theorists, as we have seen, the emerging rights regime is part of a potentially more just world order. However, as James Heartfield (1996) has argued, this is to understand that rights are a purely legal matter, rather than a product of prior social and political struggle which is then given legal form. Rights derive from subjects who are capable of exercising them and giving content to them (Heartfield, 1996; Lewis, 1998). Without the social and political struggle and the development of the rights-bearing individual who gives the legal rights their content, rights are fictions. Of course in reality a person in Britain (for example) does not directly exercise his or her rights, rather they are enforced by the existing state. If, for example, a women is denied employment because of her gender this infringes her rights. These rights are codi- fied in state law. She may then go to court in order to force the company to abide by the law and her rights will be upheld. This is not, however, simply an esoteric point for political theorists but one with major implications for people. If we return to the example of the UN Convention on Children’s Rights we can begin to see what the problematic implications of rights without content are. Children’s rights cannot be exercised by children, they do not have the capacity, they are dependent upon other people in order to survive. Their rights are fictions which must be exercised on behalf of them (Lewis, 1998: 93). In reality this means that the state, for example, is empowered here, not the child. In the broader context of contemporary international relations it tends to mean that the developing coun- try in which children’s rights are seen to be lacking (for example a country in which child labour is common) is subject to greater intervention and regulation from a more ‘enlightened’ international community. This also has the effect of turning what are essentially consequences of serious poverty and a low level of development into problems of law and morality. Again, more powerful ‘enlightened’ states are empowered to intervene and regulate developing states in the name of interna- tional law and human rights (Lewis, 1998: 95–98). As the problems, however, are not matters of law but of development they cannot be resolved through law. Not only is state sovereignty eroded but the idea of law also. We could also consider the problem of gender inequality in a developing state. A woman in Afghanistan, for example, clearly does not have the civil rights that a woman in another state might have. Yet of course, these are rights that she cannot claim against the government of her state, or rather the government cannot give content to these rights as the government’s control in the case of Afghanistan does not go much further than Kabul. Rather, the only way in which there may be a way for her to have these rights would be through the intervention of another state (indeed women’s rights formed part of the rationale for the military intervention in Afghanistan) whether military or tied to aid. Here, there will be no political relationship between the Afghan woman and, for example, NATO. There will be no mechanism of control and accountability for the woman, her rights are in the gift of power external forces and therefore not rights that can empower as they are not con- trolled by her. Friedrich Kratochwil argues that critical theory has to address ‘what types of constitutive understanding authorise particular practices and this creates specific types of authority’ (2007: 36). I argue that critical and emancipatory approaches have a certain unrealised constitutive understanding which is **abstract and idealised**, leading ultimately to forms of power and political practice that are disempowering. Critical theorists separate the rights bearer from the rights claimant. In the absence of any constitutive body that can give content to those rights or even agreed norms that can derive from that political body, these rights are at best meaningless and at worst empower precisely those practices which critical theorists wish to resolve. It is in this respect that in contemporary context critical and emancipatory approaches reproduce and authorise the constitutive particular practices of contemporary powers.

## AT: Environmental Security K

### Engaging in environmental security discourse is vital to catalyze resistance against the security state – even in the worst case it’s net better than allowing neoconservatives to control governmental discourse

Barnett 1

Jon, Research Council Fellow In The School Of Social And Environmental Enquiry @ The University Of Melbourne, The Meaning Of Environmental Security: Ecological Politics And Policy In The New Security Era, Chapter 9, 137-41

The question of whether it is valid to understand environmental problems as security problems recurs throughout any thoughtful discussion of environmental security. The dilemma should by now be apparent; securitising environmental issues runs the risk that the strategic/realist approach will coopt and colonise the, environmental agenda rather than respond positively to environmental problems (as discussed in Chapter 6). For this reason critics of environmental security, such as Deudney (1991) and-Brock (1991), Suggest that it is dangerous to understand environmental problems as security issues: This book's position on the matter has been emerging in previous chapters. It contends that the problem turns not on the presentation of environmental problems as security issues, but on-the meaning and practice of security in present times. Environmental security, wittingly or not, contests the legitimacy of the realist conception of security by pointing to the contradictions of security as the defence of territory and resistance to change. It seeks to work from within the prevailing conception of security, but to be successful it must do so with a strong sense of purpose and a solid theoretical base. Understanding environmental problems as security problems is thus a form of conceptual speculation. It is one manifestation of the pressure the Green movement has exerted on states since the late 1960s. This pressure has pushed state legitimacy nearer to collapse, for if the state cannot control a problem as elemental as environmental degradation, then what is its purpose? This legitimacy problem suggests that environmental degradation cannot further intensify without fundamental change or the collapse of the state. This in turn implies that state-sanctioned environmentally degrading practices such as those undertaken in the name of national security cannot extend their power further if it means further exacerbation of environmental insecurity. While the system may resist environmental security's challenge for change, it must also resist changes for the worse. In terms of the conceptual venture, therefore, appropriation by the security apparatus of the concept of environmental security is unlikely to result in an increase in environmental insecurity (although the concept itself may continue to be corrupted). On the other hand, succeeding in the conceptual venture may mean a positive modification of the theory and practice of national security. It may also mean that national governments will take environmental problems more seriously, reduce defence budgets, and generally implement policies for a more peaceful and environmentally secure world. This dual goal of demilitarisation and upgrading policy may well be a case of wanting to have one's cake and eat it — but either the having or the eating is sufficient justification for the concept (Brock 1996). The **worst outcome** would be if the state ceased to use the concept of environmental security, heralding the end of the contest and requiring that the interests of peace and the environment be advocated through alternative discourses. This is perhaps the only real failure that is likely to ensue from the project of environmental security.

## Institutional Focus Key

### Political engagement is key – only by acting within existing structures can we initiate the movement to save the environment – theorizing alone can’t solve

De-Shalit 2K

Avner, Professor of Political Theory at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Associate Fellow at the Oxford Centre for Environment, Ethics, and Society, Mansfield College, Oxford University, “The Environment: Between Theory and Practice,” pg 4-6

However, it would be wrong, if not dangerous, to blame the 'other'. From the prophets in biblical times to the French revolutionaries and the early Fabians, history is full of examples of theorists and philosophers who abandoned all hope of persuading others through deliberation, and became impatient and hence more radical in their ideas. This explains why the shift from humanistic to misanthropic attitudes has been rapid. Perhaps the 'easiest' way to solve a problem is to lose faith in a form of gradual change that can still remain respectful of humans. Such an attitude, I believe, only brings about a new series of problems encompassing dictatorship, totalitarianism, and lack of personal freedom. In this book I seek to maintain the philosophical impetus, not to point the finger at the politicians or the activists. Rather, I wish to examine ourselves—the philosophers who engage in discussing the environment—to discover how we might construct a theory that is much more accessible to the activists and the general public (without relinquishing any of our goals), and which can be harnessed to the aims of political philosophy. Here, the counter-argument would go something like this: 'OK, so the argumentation supplied by environmental philosophers is so removed from that used by activists and governments. So what? The only outcome of this is that more arguments, or, if you like, a pluralistic set of arguments, will emerge. Some arguments are relevant to academia alone; others can be used in politics. Thus, for example, in the university we could maintain an ecocentric environmental philosophy, 7 whereas in politics anthropocentric 8 arguments would dominate.' In response to this, it could be argued that plurality of argument is indeed welcome. Moreover, as we saw earlier, the divergence between, say, ecocentric environmental philosophy and anthropocentric environmental philosophy is not so vast in terms of the policies they recommend. In fact, as John Barry argues, 'reformed naturalistic humanism' is capable of supporting a stewardship ethics just as well (J. Barry 1999 : ch. 3). But my point is that saving the environment is not just a matter of theory: it is an urgent political mission. In a democratic system, however, one cannot expect policies to be decided without giving any thought to how these policies should be explained to the public, and thereby gain legitimacy. In other words, the rationale of a policy is an increasingly important, if not inseparable, part of the policy; in particular, the openness and transparency of the democratic regime makes the rationale a crucial aspect of the policy. A policy whose rationale is not open to the public, or one that is believed to be arrived at through a process not open to the public, is considered a-democratic (cf. Ezrahi 1990). Consequently, a policy's legitimacy is owed not only to its effectiveness, but also to the degree of moral persuasion and conviction it generates within the public arena. So, when constructing environmental policies in democratic regimes, there is a need for a theory that can be used not only by academics, but also by politicians and activists. Hence the first question in this book is, Why has the major part of environmental philosophy failed to penetrate environmental policy and serve as its rationale? The first part of this book, then, discusses this question and offers two explanations in response. These explanations are based on the premiss that environmental ethics and political theory should be differentiated and well defined so that later on they may join hands, rather than that they should be united in a single theory. It is assumed that they answer two questions. Environmental ethics is about the moral grounds for an environment-friendly attitude. Political theory with regard to the environment relates to the institutions needed to implement and support environmental policies. Thus, the failure to distinguish properly between environmental ethics and political theory underlies the failure of the major part of environmental philosophy to penetrate environmental policy and provide its rationale. In Chapter 1 it is claimed that in a way environmental philosophers have moved too rapidly away from anthropocentrism—mainstream ethical discourses—towards biocentrism and ecocentrism. 9 My argument is that the public on the whole is not ready for this, and therefore many activists and potential supporters of the environmental movement become alienated from the philosophical discourse on the environment. In addition, I suggest that the reason for the gap between on the one hand environmental philosophers and on the other activists and politicians is that environmental philosophers have applied the wrong approach to political philosophy. I claim that all moral reasoning involves a process of reflective equilibrium between intuitions and theory. I distinguish between 'private', 'contextual', and 'public' modes of reflective equilibrium, arguing that environmental philosophers use either the first or second mode of reasoning, whereas political philosophy requires the third: the public mode of reflective equilibrium. The latter differs from the other two models in that it weighs both the intuitions and the theories put forward by activists and the general public (and not just those of professional philosophers). The argument for this being so is that reasoning about the environment needs to include political and democratic philosophy. And yet, most of environmental philosophers' efforts so far have focused on such questions of meta-ethics as 'intrinsic value theories' and 'biocentrism'. Environmental philosophers have been pushed in this direction out of a genuine desire to seek out the 'good' and the truth, in an effort to ascertain the moral grounds for an environment-friendly attitude. I suggest that environmental philosophers should not limit themselves to discussing the moral grounds for attitudes, or to trying to reveal the good and the truth, although these are important and fascinating questions. At least some of them should instead go beyond this and address the matter of the necessary institutions for implementing policies, and finally, and of no less importance, find a way to persuade others to act on behalf of the environment. In other words, while there is a place for meta-ethics, it should not be the only approach to philosophizing about the environment; it should not replace political philosophy.

# \*\*Bataille\*\*

## AT: Sacrifice

**Sacrificial politics recreate power relations – only those who have things to sacrifice can do so
Wolin 4** Richard Wolin, Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center, 2004 (The Seduction of Unreason pp 102-103)

But problems exist with Bataille's use of ethnographic literature on sacrifice and the gift. For in certain respects his naïve employment of Mauss's findings risks regressing behind his mentor's account. For Bataille, the glory of ritual lies in its gratuitousness: qua social practice, ritual is totally removed from utilitarian ends. And as such, it engenders privileged moments when society embraces loss qua loss. Sacrifice in particular involves a transfiguration of everyday life that verges on apotheosis: both victim and community temporarily cross the line separating the sacred from the profane. The victim becomes a demigod momentarily permitted to dwell among the gods and the community stands in enhanced proximity to the sacred. For Bataille, profane existence is a "thing world," a sphere of life beholden to mundane considerations of use. Its denizens grapple fecklessly with the cycle of production and reproduction that constitutes "mere life." "Sacrifice," Bataille observes, "restores to the sacred world that which servile use has degraded, rendered profane." Religion is purely "a matter of detaching from the real order, from the poverty of things, and of restoring the divine order" When viewed from the Bataillesque standpoint of "nonproductive expenditure," acts of destruction sacrifice, potlatch, war, and violence ennoble. Destruction emancipates both objects and persons from the profane considerations of use. As Bataifie contends, "Destruction is the best means of negating a utilitarian relation."53 The grandeur of sacrifice or gift giving lies in their restoration of "intimacy": a proximity to the sacred reminiscent of Heideggerian "nearness to Being" (Nahe). As Bataille explains: The victim is a surplus taken from the mass of useful wealth. And he can only be withdrawn from it in order to be consumed profidessly, and therefore utterly destroyed. Once chosen, he is the accursed share, destined for violent consumption. But the curse tears him away from the order of things; it gives him a recognizable figure, which now radiates intimacy, anguish, the profundity of living beings .... This was the price men paid to escape their downfall and remove the weight introduced in them by the avarice and cold calculation of the real order. 54 **Yet insofar as they misconstrue the historical parameters of ritual practice, these celebratory descriptions risk becoming glib**. Ultimately, Bataille's appreciation of these phenomena succumbs to a type of "primitivism" He decontextualizes the cult practices he analyzes the better to incorporate them within his own theoretical agenda: "an anthropology that will itself provide a living and orgiastic myth to overturn, through its experience on a collective level, 'modern' sterile bourgeois society"55 Bataille understands sacrifice as gratuitous and nonutilitarian. Acts of sacrifice, he claims, have "no ends beyond themselves." **But this contention is misleading**. Although Bataille is correct in describing such practices as unrelated to the production of wealth, **they are very much oriented toward the reproduction of existing power relations**. As practiced among the Aztecs, human sacrifice redounded to the credit of the ruling caste (priests and aristocracy), providing them with a quasi divine power to preside over life and death. For these reasons, it is deceptive to claim, as Bataille repeatedly does, that sacrifice has no end beyond itself. One could raise an analogous criticism of Bataille's treatment of potlatch the public, demonstrative destruction of wealth as well as gift giving. **In truth, only those who possess great wealth can afford to destroy it**. Consequently, the option to engage in potlatch does not exist for society's lower classes." **Like sacrifice, potlatch is implicated in the reproduction of social hierarchy. Such acts reinforce the status and prestige of those who destroy their wealth.** In nearly every case, the practitioners of potlatch belong to the upper strata of society. **Those who are forced to passively endure the potlatch are in effect humiliated. Through such acts, their lowly social rank is reaffirmed.** The same is true of gift giving. Gifts are not freely bestowed, shorn of ulterior ends. Bataille seizes on the aspect of gift giving that serves his purposes. Gift giving is not an economic transaction; it is neither an act of barter, nor does it aim at the enhancement of social wealth. Instead**, in the first instance with gift giving, social relations among persons are at issue. As with both sacrifice and potlatch, what is at stake with the gift are relations of power.** When given in accordance with social ritual, gifts always come with strings attached: unless the gift can be returned in kind, its social function is to intimidate the recipient. **The object of gift giving as a social ritual is to derogate and shame the recipient by virtue of his or her inability to return a gift of equal value.** Gift giving, too, then must he classified as a ritual practice that is in no sense gratuitous or free. **Far from being an end in itself, as Bataille claims, it is fully implicated in the production and reproduction of social power.**

## Internal link turn – Levinas

**Turn – transgression creates an obligation to the Other – not freedom**

**Hudek 7** (Antony,  Research Fellow at Camberwell College of Arts, London, “The Sensive Image: De-Thinking the Figure with Bataille and Levinas,” Image and Narrative Issue 18, September 2007, dml)

For Levinas the image, like the event of the other's summons, exerts passivity, so to speak, but a passivity which falls short of being radical, for it signals a 'free' liberty in appearance only, allowing the subject to enjoy the spectacle of itself as if from the outside, as if an object. (Levinas 1987: 3, 4) Like physical suffering, the image is ambiguous: a putting off, a deferral, and therefore an assertion of subjectivity's agency in the face of pressure from without; at the same time the image is subjectivity's violent submission into a presentness before death, an extenuation of the ego before any action has taken place. (Lannoy 42-44; Levinas 1987: 13) This fundamental ambiguity common to suffering and image is erotic, and laughable, bringing to light a passivity which only resembles its more radical twin. As Levinas argues, however, this trivial semblance is enough to prepare for the face's approach, for a radical passivity to come. (Levinas 1961: 92, 127, 267, 295) After all, assigning a negative role to the image is 'negative' only in relation to the 'positive' that would be ethical agency. (Levinas 1984: 108; Hayat 23). Levinas' impure "aesthetics and ethics of the amourous gesture," crystallised in the image, is interesting/interested not for what it represents but for its representational drive, for its resemblance to the inimitable experience of alterity. (Irigaray 235; Levinas 1987: 6) No represented object is representational enough to quell this lust for the unrepresentable face sparked in the subject by the image.

## Universal Ethics Good

**We have an obligation to help others even in the face of absolute negativity – solves value to life**

**Jovanovic and Wood 4** (Spoma and Roy, Communications/Rhetoric Professors at Denver University and U North Carolina, “Speaking from the Bedrock of Ethics,” Philosophy and Rhetoric Vol 37 no 4, 2004, 317-334, dml)

On September 11, 2001, terrorism touched down in the United States. While millions of us were immobilized and left speechless by what we witnessed live on television, thousands of others in the World Trade Center towers, at the Pentagon, and on three airplanes had no such luxury. They were confronted with a reality few could have ever imagined. One man inside World Trade Center One demonstrates that ethics is a lived response of the type Levinas describes. He was not alone, however. Without advance preparation or rules of conduct to follow, the men and women trapped by evil deeds remind us that ethics is a response to the call of the other. Harry Ramos, forty-six, had just returned to work at his office on the eighty-seventh floor after a week’s absence. Within minutes, the building was shaking violently; he braced himself in a doorway for stability. As light fixtures plummeted to the floor and smoke filled the office, Harry had no idea that a jetliner had just crashed into his building, floors above him. However, he knew enough to know that the survival of his office staff was at stake. Harry, the head trader for a small investment bank, the May Davis Group, was in the throes of pandemonium. Yet, he had to act. With the company.s chief financial officer, Harry marshaled the twelve employees in the office to the stairwell to begin the descent down eighty-seven floors, one step at a time. Harry stationed himself at the end of the line, making sure no one was left behind. .Nine floors down, the stairwell ended. Emerging into a hallway to look for the next flight of stairs, the group saw wires dangling from the cracked ceilings. Sparks popped. Small fires burned everywhere. Office workers were milling in confusion. The smoke was thickening . (Walsh 2001, 1). The scene was not promising. As the group continued down, Harry convinced the stragglers to keep moving. Along the way, Harry also stopped to help strangers make their way into the stairwell. At the fifty-third floor, Harry found Victor who, because of his large size or perhaps his profound fear, found it difficult to move. Together with another May Davis employee, they made it to the thirty-ninth floor by way of stairs and a short elevator ride. At one point, Harry let go of Victor, to walk ahead and survey the situation. .Victor cried out in fear. "Harry, please help," he begged. "Don't worry, we.re not leaving you," Mr. Ramos said. (Walsh 2001, 1). Stopping to rest, the building sadistically shook again, and so the trio picked themselves up and walked down further, to the thirty-sixth floor. There, an exhausted Victor proclaimed his energy was spent, that his legs could not carry his frame another step. A firefighter rushing by yelled at Harry to leave Victor behind and run. But Harry did not move, assuring the large stranger, "Victor, don’t worry. I'm with you." Moments later, on television sets tuned in to the scene from all over the world, we saw the avalanche of cement and glass crush to the ground as the World Trade Center towers came tumbling down. As the buildings col lapsed, so did thousands of lives. What the ordinary men and women like Harry Ramos left behind was not only a memory of good deeds, but also a glimpse into ethics and communication that compels us to answer the call of the other. Harry Ramos demonstrates for us the detectable evidence of the saying in everyday discourse. In Harry's response, we begin to recognize something compelling that makes possible the saying, what Levinas refers to as .the trace.. The trace signifies presence in absence, like how we feel someone's company even after they have left the room or when the amputee continues to experience the ache of a phantom limb. And, there is the trace of God who has "walked the earth" though is no longer directly visible. For Levinas, the trace is the vestige of the infinite. The Levinasian trace is nonphenomenological, signifying without manifesting anything (Peperzak 1997). As such, it resists our attempts to analyze it or identify it conclusively. Yet we continue to search for it in the saying, in the human face, and in responsibility. This quest, says Levinas, is a worthy one, indicative of an ethical life. The trace itself challenges logic and rationality; the trace resists comprehension as it .disturbs the order of the world. (1996b, 62). The difficulty of talking about the trace arises from its "enigmatic, equivocal" features that elude our attempts to name it. Levinas explains, "The infinite then cannot be tracked down like game by a hunter. The trace left by the infinite is not the residue of a presence; its very glow is ambiguous. (1998, 12). The trace, then, is not a sign or a concrete feature but a paradoxical function of sociality (Bergo 1999). The trace is palpable yet not tangible, within our reach yet out of our grasp. David Michael Levin describes Levinas's phenomenology as *tracework,* an obsession-sustained meditation on an admittedly hopeless search for the traces .of primordial responsiveness. . The project is hopeless, but not futile; Levin offers, .since the effort, the attempt itself, carries enormous moral merit. (1998, 349). These are powerful ideas.an ethical subject whose ethics are lodged in a place otherwise than being; an ethic that can be conceived as the condition for dialogue in the saying to another; and the possibility of that saying, overwritten in ontology by the said, coming through still as a trace in discourse .like an unheard question. (Bergo 1999, 155). "Harry, please help me," is surely the call of conscience from one terrified and helpless man to a stranger who befriended him. "Don't worry, we're not leaving you," is just as surely the .here I am.. But the repeat at the end, "Don't worry, I'm with you," turns the "here I am" into a deeply exposed and singular commitment. It is no longer "we" but "I" who will be *with* the man who is not going anywhere in the heart of an inferno.

## Perm

**Perm do both – You take Bataille’s theories too far – the perm is the best option – we have to avoid indiscriminate violence**

Kenneth **ITZKOWITZ**, 19**99**, Associate Professor of Philosophy – Marietta College, “To witness spectacles of pain: The hypermorality of Georges Bataille” College Literature, Winter

Yet in our lives there are also limits. It is unlikely that Bataille would applaud Manson for the same reason he ultimately rejects Sade. They are both indiscriminate; they both go too far. "Continuity is what we are after," Bataille confirms, but generally only if that continuity which the death of discontinuous beings can alone establish is not the victor in the long run. What we desire is to bring into a world founded on discontinuity all the continuity such a world can sustain. De Sade's aberration exceeds that limit. (Bataille 1962, 13) In other words, our wasteful consumption must also have limits. To actually approve of our own self-destruction goes too far. Later on in Death and Sensuality, Bataille continues, Short of a paradoxical capacity to defend the indefensible, no one would suggest that the cruelty of the heroes of Justine and Juliette should not be wholeheartedly abominated. It is a denial of the principles on which humanity is founded. We are bound to reject something that would end in the ruin of all our works. If instinct urges us to destroy the very thing we are building we must condemn those instincts and defend ourselves from them. (Bataille 1962, 179-80) This passage is crucial for understanding Bataille's ethics. Usually Bataille writes on behalf of the violence that remains unaffected by absolute prohibitions. Prohibitions cannot obviate this transformative violence. There is always ample motive to produce the experiences of sacred transformation, i.e., to transgress the prohibitions. Yet self-preservation is also a fundamental value for Bataille; there is also ample motive to resist the violence that denies the value of the well being of life itself. As he says in the second of the above passages, we must condemn what threatens to destroy us; our sovereign aspirations can be taken too far. In another passage he speaks of our need "to become aware of . . . [ourselves] and to know clearly what . . . [our] sovereign aspirations are in order to limit their possibly disastrous consequences" (1962, 181). It is when we are ignorant of these aspirations that we are most vulnerable to them, enacting them anyway, albeit inattentively.

## Perm/AT: Energy Expenditure

**Expenditure fails and destroys the environment – only a less radical approach solves**

Allan **Stoekl**, 200**7**, Professor of French and Comparative Literature – Penn State University, “Excess and Depletion: Bataille’s Surprisingly Ethical Model of Expenditure” in Reading Bataille Now edited by Shannon Winnubst, p. 253-4

Humans waste not only the energy accumulated by other species, but, just as important, their own energy, because humans themselves soon hit the limits to growth. Human society cannot indefinitely reproduce: soon enough what today is called the “carrying capacity” of an environment is reached.3 Only so many babies can be born, homes built, colonies founded. Then limits are reached. Some excess can be used in the energy and population required for military expansion (the case, according to Bataille, with Islam {1976a, 83-92; 1988, 81-91}), but soon that too screeches to a halt. A steady state can be attained by devoting large numbers of people and huge quantities of wealth and labor to useless activity: thus the large numbers of unproductive Tibetan monks, nuns, and their lavish temples (1976a, 93-108; 1988, 93-110). Or, most notably, one can waste wealth in military buildup and constant warfare. No doubt this solution kept populations stable in the past (one thinks of constant battles between South American Indian tribes), but in the present (i.e., 1949) the huge amounts of wealth devoted to military armament, worldwide, can only lead to nuclear holocaust (1976a, 159-60; 1988, 169-71). This final point leads to Bataille’s version of a Hegelian “Absolute Knowing,” one based not so much on the certainty of a higher knowledge as on the certainty of a higher expenditure, improperly conceived, can threaten the very existence of society. Bataille’s theory, then, is a profoundly ethical one: we must somehow distinguish between versions of excess that are “on the scale of the universe,” and whose recognition-implementation guarantees the survival of society (and human expenditure), and other versions that entail blindness to the real role of expenditure and thereby threaten man’s, not to mention the planet’s, survival. This, in very rough outline, is the main thrust of Bataille’s book. By viewing man as waster rather than conserver, Bataille manages to invert the usual order of economics: the moral imperative, so to speak, is the furthering of a “good” expenditure, which we might lose sight of if we stress an inevitably selfish model of conservation or utility. For if conservation is put first, inevitably the bottled-up forces will break loose, but in unforeseen and in, so to speak, untheorized ways. We should focus our attention, not on conservation, maintenance, and the steady state – which can lead only to mass destruction and the ultimate wasting of the world – but instead on the modes of waste in which we, as human animals, should engage. But how does one go about privileging waste in an era in which waste seems to be the root of all evil? Over fifty years after the publication of The Accursed Share, we live in an era in which nuclear holocaust no longer seems the main threat. But other dangers lurk, ones just as terrifying and definitive: global warming, deforestation, and the depletion of resources – above all, energy resources: oil, coal, even uranium. How can we possibly talk about valorizing waste, when waste seems to be the principle evil threatening the continued existence of the biosphere on which we depend? Wouldn’t it make more sense to stress conservation, sustainability, downsizing, rather than glorious excess?

## BATAILLE SLAYER STAR THIS CARD

**\*\*note I can’t actually tell what this card says, I think it’s just nonsense, but it might be decent**

**Bataille’s alternative forces an openness that necessitates the acceptance of evil and endless violence**

**Mansfield 6 –** Associate Professor in Critical and Cultural Studies at Macquarie University in Sydney

(Nick, “War and Its Other: Between Bataille and Derrida,” Theory & Event 9:4, dml)

The commonality between this argument and Bataille is clear. Both thinkers argue for a war that reconfirms peace as prior to it, and that is thus a necessary part of its logic. In Bataille, the presentation of the operation of war as an opening of and onto the general economy connects the loosening of identities with danger, destruction and violence. In Derrida, this idea recurs in the proposition that deconstruction is necessary and ineluctable but also always threatening and dangerous. The relationship between pre-originary peace and the war that bears a trace of it is in parallel with the relationship between the unconditional incalculable and the conditional calculable. Incalculability and its avatars seem to announce a pre-openness that allows for the loosening of strictures and our exposure to the optimistic unsettling of any deconstruction. Yet, Derrida acknowledges that the opening on the unconditional can be dangerous. In a discussion of perhaps deconstructive open-ness's most compelling figure, the messianic, he writes: The coming of the other can only emerge as a singular event when no anticipation sees it coming, when the other and death -- and radical evil -- can come as a surprise at any moment. . . The messianic exposes itself to absolute surprise and, even if it always takes the phenomenal form of peace or of justice, it ought, exposing itself so abstractly, be prepared (waiting without awaiting*itself*) for the best as for the worst, the one never coming without opening the possibility of the other.[20](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezp1.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v009/9.4mansfield.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn20%22%20%5Co%20%22) The same phrasing and idea have appeared elsewhere. An unconditional justice "is always very close to the bad, even to the worst."[21](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezp1.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v009/9.4mansfield.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn21%22%20%5Co%20%22)In the figure of Lot, an unconditional hospitality is staged by way of the patriarch's preparedness to offer his daughters up to be raped.[22](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezp1.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v009/9.4mansfield.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn22%22%20%5Co%20%22)The open "divine violence" which allows for the possibility of justice involves killing. Analogically, in Bataille, the inevitable open-ness to consumption and excess may be part of war. The unconditional incalculable then also involves the risk of danger, even when it is called peace, and the danger in peace may indeed be war, and vice versa. The language Derrida uses to describe the mirror-image of the Levinasian position in Kant captures the complexity here, when he detects in the promise "the trace of a threat, of what threatens it and threatens in it, thus contaminating the promise by a threat."[23](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezp1.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v009/9.4mansfield.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn23%22%20%5Co%20%22)There is thus no simple benign peace unaffected by the war that infiltrates it and with which it might operate, even as it is wrecked by it and with which it might even become confused. We cannot rely on the simple opposition between war, on the one hand, and, on the other, peace and all its relatives: innocence, sociality, meaning and so on. Nor can we rely on its simple overcoming in identity. Peace induces a war that murders it but in which in turn its trace is preserved. Each threatens the other it allows, makes and is determined to ruin.

## Fascism

**Unconditional expenditure leads to fascism – even though Bataille opposed it, the concentration camp is the result of their alternative**

**Bell**, M.A. Thesis in the Theory, Culture and Politics Program at Trent University, 20**08** [Jeremy, “Bataille, the Economic, and the Sacred: Working through the accursed share,” January, proquest, 91-96]

At the same time however, we need not apologize for the irrefutable problems with Bataille's vision, problems better recognized by those sympathetic to this vision than by its overt detractors. For although Sartre's critique of Bataille as a "nouveau mystique" or Breton's critique that "Bataille professes to wish only to consider in the world that which is vilest, most discouraging, and most corrupted"24 are not without their grain of truth, it is Caillois, Kojêve, and Walter Benjamin that properly identify the most problematic points of Bataille's vision. Caillois' criticism is the most obvious, the least surprising: simply put, Bataille's preoccupation with "mysticism, tragedy, madness, and death" borders on a pathological obsession that compromises the establishment of "a moral community... as accessible as the community of established science".25 Kojêve's criticism is subtler, but equally valid: in wanting to revitalize the sacred within contemporary existence the College generally but Bataille particularly were "wanting to play at being sorcerer's apprentices... [and that] a miracleworker, for his part, could no more be carried away by a sacred knowingly activated by himself, than could a conjuror be persuaded of the existence of magic while marveling at his own sleight of hand".26 Even if one does recognize a value in the sacred, in this time of its fragmentation, its internalization, how possibly could one knowingly revitalize it? Although Kojêve's critique may, ultimately, be wrong, the puzzles set forth within it move it toward Benjamin's criticism, by far the most grave and persistently pertinent. "According to Klossowski," Michel Surya writes, "recent German exiles (Walter Benjamin first and foremost, but also Hans Meyer...) grew worried that the College was toying with explosive ideas without realistically weighing up the consequences."27 These explosive ideas, as we know, concerned fascism. For although, as Michel Surya's biography of Bataille conveys in the most unequivocal terms, in the most immediate sense Bataille was passionately opposed to fascism, which is illustrated, for example, in "Nietzsche and the Fascists", his single- handed effort to rescue and differentiate Nietzsche's philosophy from its cooptation by the fascists, as well as the journal of Acephale generally, one of the central purposes of which was the refutation of fascist ideology, one cannot help but feel that, nonetheless, there is an unsettling truth to Benjamin's worries. Was it not fascism, more than any other ideology within the last century, which toyed with idea of the sacred, while at the same time expressing an uprootedness no longer binding it to explicit religious formations? Bataille was well aware of this, as he expresses in no uncertain terms in "The Psychological Structure of Fascism". Not only this, but even if Acephale was oriented around a headlessness antithetical to the "head" of a fascist state, is there not, nonetheless, an insidious character to the secret society which evokes for us the most disturbing occult configurations of the Nazis? Although, on the one hand, it is wrong and false to accuse Bataille of being a fascist, are we really surprised that he has elicited this criticism, continually, from his detractors? One way in which we can acknowledge these dangers while nonetheless retaining Bataille's essential lessons without exhaustively rehashing Bataille's biography is by returning to our earlier observations regarding negative entropy, and how this is counterbalanced by an interest in "remaining a child" in the face of "mere survival", particularly as these terms are configured in "The Survivor", Lyotard's essay on Hannah Arendt and the dangers of totalitarianism. For as Lyotard explains it here, echoing Bataille's observations in "The Psychological Structure of Fascism", the shortcoming of Arendt's analysis of totalitarianism rests in her failure to recognize the proper "origins of totalitarianism" in our relation to the heterogeneous, repressed, or sacred. Although her analysis elegantly illustrates the particular historical conditions responsible for its development, it fails to observe the manner in which totalitarian ideology makes use of the forces of attraction and repulsion by simultaneously drawing from the anxiety brought about by our relation to these forces and by presenting it as a tremendously threatening force disseminated across the political sphere It is for this reason that we cannot view the defeat of particular regimes as properly sufficient in exhausting the presence of these dangers within contemporary political structures or forms. What totalitarianism earlier accomplished through extermination camps and military ventures he argues, now occurs through what Lyotard describes as the administration of daily life, and — more generally — the processes of negative entropy wherein the human is no more meaningful than any other term within the system, the dangerous culmination of the concept of utility. For as Lyotard writes, Crude propaganda is discreet in democratic forms: it gives way to the inoffensive rhetoric of the media. And worldwide expansion occurs not through war, but through technological, scientific, and economic competition. The historical names for this Mr. Nice Guy totalitarianism are no longer Stalingrad or Normandy (much less Auschwitz), but Wall Street's Dow Jones Average and the Tokyo's Nikkei Index.28 Where efficiency and productivity are granted primacy, and the human is no more important than any other term within the system, what we have called the heterogeneous, the sacred, and the repressed, which Lyotard describes as our enigmatic relation to birth and death, is threatened with the possibility of permanent and absolute foreclosure, which he calls "mere survival" in a manner similar to his scenario regarding the death of the sun and our exit from planet earth. For Lyotard, our recognition of this danger, the dangers present within both totalitarianism and contemporary capitalism, of foreclosing our relation to the heterogeneous and the sacred while simultaneously disseminating it across the political sphere, can occur in "neither a remission nor a challenge" — both of which fall within the parallel systems of totalitarianism and capitalism — but rather, can only occur in "the scruple of an as if," which is what he calls childhood.29 Childhood, what Bataille might call sovereignty, I would like to argue, is our mode of relation to and recognition of what I have described as the epistemological or psychological dimension of the accursed share. For as Lyotard writes, The effect is childhood that knows all about as 0; all about the pain of impotence and the complaint of being too small, of being there late (compared to others) and (as to its strength) of having arrived early, prematurely—childhood that knows all about broken promises, bitter disappointments, failings, and abandonment, but which also knows all about dreaming, memory, question, invention, obstinacy, listening to the heart, love, and real openness to stories. Childhood is a state of the soul inhabited by something to which no answer is ever given. It is led in its undertakings by an arrogant loyalty to this unknown guest to which it feels itself a hostage. Antigone's childhood. I understand childhood here as obedience to a debt (which we call a debt of life, of time, of event; a debt of being there in spite of everything), a debt for which only the persistent feeling of respect can save the adult from bein no more than a survivor, a creature living on reprieve from annihilation. 0 Of course, our obedience to this debt, our arrogant loyalty to this unknown guest, our accursed share, is not simply accomplished and completed, but rather perpetually worked through in our effort — which we should not hesitate to call painful — to bear witness to that inaccessible point, wholly heterogeneous, where, in intimate immanence, a sacred animality is — momentarily — attained. Only by transgressing the boundaries and limits of negative entropy, the systematic peak of utility and use- value, can we overcome the horrible burden of time and rejoin in that sacred totality, where — acephalic — we can attain that "sovereign self-consciousness that, precisely, no longer turns away from itself."31 What I mean to suggest by this is that, in a certain sense, Bataille's thought does in fact hold a dangerous proximity to fascism, a danger moreover that is only heightened in our failure to recognize this proximity. This is not to say that his thought is fascist. Nonetheless, it is extremely important that we recognize how Bataille's fascination with mysticism, tragedy, madness, and death does, like the sorcerer's apprentice, enter into a dangerous game, a game that for this reason is to be played neither as a remission nor a challenge to the accursed share, this unknown guest to which the soul feels itself a hostage, but only with the scruple of an as if, a game that is only to be played with humility. For if we acknowledge, for example, that the human sacrifices offered by the Aztecs to satiate the thirst of the sun does approach a general economy founded upon consumption and expenditure, **it is not difficult to see how, similarly, concentration camps could also facilitate an economy of expenditure and consumption where nothing is left in reserve**. However, it is difficult to see how an economy of listening to the heart, love, and real openness to stories, as well as abandonment and dispossession, ultimately a childish economy of play, could lapse into the bloodshed of primitive war.

## Violence

**You cause it!**

**Evangelou 10 –** Assistant Lecturer in Comparative Literature

(Angelos, “Georges Bataille’s “Ethics of Violence,” Skepsi vol 3(2) 2010, available at <http://dl.dropbox.com/u/8274824/v03i02/pdfs/Skepsi-0302-2010-%20Georges%20Bataille%E2%80%99s%20%E2%80%98Ethics%20of%20Violence%E2%80%99-Angelos%20Evangelou.pdf>, dml)

An understanding of Georges Bataille’s ‘ethics of violence’ requires that violence be read in the general context of his theory of the heterogeneous, 2 as well as from an amoral perspective. This element of amorality, which I will shortly discuss briefly, is tightly connected to the heterogeneous, which is what is denied and rejected on the very ground of what has generally been considered moral. Bataille therefore calls for a return to what has so far been excluded and rejected as dangerous, monstrous, destructive, sick, mad and perverse on these grounds. The expression of violence is just one of the manifestations of the heterogeneous which is met with most resistance in this project of revaluation, because of its complex web of psychological, ethical and political implications. At this early stage, a clarification is of the essence: the term ‘ethics’ is to be distinguished from ‘morality’. 3 For this distinction, I am drawing on the analysis of the two terms by Bernard Williams, who himself draws on the Socratic question, ‘how should one live?’, contrasting it with questions such as ‘what is our duty?’ or ‘how may we be good?’. Williams explains that Socrates’ question may be interpreted as one about ‘a good life’ or ‘a life worth living’ but that it does not in itself ‘bring in any distinctive moral claims’ (Williams 1993: 5). He therefore argues that ‘morality should be understood as a particular development of the ethical, one that has a special significance in modern Western culture. [Morality] emphasizes certain ethical notions rather than others, developing in particular a special notion of obligation [...] In view of these features it is also, I believe, something we should treat with a special skepticism’ (6; emphasis added).

**You necessitate ontological violence**

**Evangelou 10 –** Assistant Lecturer in Comparative Literature

(Angelos, “Georges Bataille’s “Ethics of Violence,” Skepsi vol 3(2) 2010, available at <http://dl.dropbox.com/u/8274824/v03i02/pdfs/Skepsi-0302-2010-%20Georges%20Bataille%E2%80%99s%20%E2%80%98Ethics%20of%20Violence%E2%80%99-Angelos%20Evangelou.pdf>, dml)

I claim that an understanding of Bataille’s ‘ethics of violence’, implies an understanding of the concept of anguish, which is both the generator and the result of the suffering. Anguish does not have an end and does not lead anywhere other than anguish: If the will to anguish can only ask questions, the answer, if it comes, wills that anguish be maintained. The answer is, anguish is your fate’ (75). It is pain that maintains the wound open and, quite predictably, experiences of shock and suffering are of particular interest for Bataille.

**Alt cannot renounce its violent components**

**Evangelou 10 –** Assistant Lecturer in Comparative Literature

(Angelos, “Georges Bataille’s “Ethics of Violence,” Skepsi vol 3(2) 2010, available at <http://dl.dropbox.com/u/8274824/v03i02/pdfs/Skepsi-0302-2010-%20Georges%20Bataille%E2%80%99s%20%E2%80%98Ethics%20of%20Violence%E2%80%99-Angelos%20Evangelou.pdf>, dml)

The problem which arises, however, is that if we accept that the whole realm of heterogeneity is primarily violent, then by renouncing the component of violence for its potential ethical risks, the whole edifice of heterogeneity collapses too. Despite the frightening implications of hypermorality, such a renunciation for Bataille would not be legitimate. In my opinion, the ethical and political ambiguity to which Bataille’s thought may give rise is consciously left unresolved by Bataille, who never felt the need to provide any serious response to politically oriented accusations. For this reason there has never been any clearly articulated self-defence, unlike the monumental defence he made on behalf of Nietzsche.

**War is an integral part of Bataille’s alt**

**Mansfield 6 –** Associate Professor in Critical and Cultural Studies at Macquarie University in Sydney

(Nick, “War and Its Other: Between Bataille and Derrida,” Theory & Event 9:4, dml)

An example Bataille gives of this is Aztec human sacrifice. The Aztecs, according to Bataille, captured and then feted a particular human individual, on whom they lavished the greatest wealth and luxury, art and adornment. At the end of a specified period of time, this individual would be brutally and ostentatiously slaughtered. The aim of this festival was to open a channel through the otherwise sealed world of logical order, and allow humans to connect with the flows of continuity that represented the truth of being, and from which in daily life, people needed to struggle to exempt themselves. This process was what Bataille understood as transgression. Because they involved a wilful destruction of all that had been painstakingly accrued through disciplined practices of husbandry and production, Bataille named these transgressive practices "consumption." War is one of these transgressive rituals. Rather than seeing war as an emotional explosion of primitivism, or the result of calculating strategy, Bataille saw war as one of the processes whereby human societies broke out of the constraint of purpose and order to encounter the truth they could not always live. Several things need to be said about this process. Firstly, to summarise the complex logic here. Transgression expresses a society's engagement with the irrational and excessive flows of energy that have made all its systems and logics possible, but which also exceed and threaten them. Engagement with these flows is a fulfilment of our nature, but it must be felt as a contradiction of our normal, rational, life, that it simultaneously confirms. War opens up possibilities of ecstasy, intensity and violence, while retrospectively constructing before and to endure beside and beyond them, an imagined culture of reason, innocence and meaning. Dissociation and excess require this zone as the antecedent of transgression, in fact, what is to be transgressed. Reason, morality and purpose then are constructed as the necessary counterpart and context of excessive violence and disarray. Following this logic, war then cannot be simply something executed by "the social" nor can it be a simple version of it. It defines the social as the locus of an innocence that violence is to transgress, a rightness that needs to be defied by a brutality that confirms and consolidates it. Innocence thus needs war as that which both confirms and justifies it as innocence.

## Environment Disad

**\*\*note: I can’t find quals for her for some reason**

**Boldt-Irons 95**

(Leslie, “On Bataille: Critical Essays,” pg 24)

Arkady Plotnitsky takes as his point of departure Bataille's notion of expenditure when he asks whether or not Bataille avoids idealizing waste which he opposes to consumption for productive purposes. While Plotnitsky points to Bataille's tendency at times to "subordinate the effect of exchange and consumption" (to a somewhat idealized insistence on the primordiality of waste), he also underlines Bataille's awareness that to privilege expenditure unconditionally is just as untenable as to not account for its loss. Plotnitsky argues that Bataille's "insistence on waste is saved by his labyrinthine complexity of inscription of these theories." In writing of an exchange of expenditures, Bataille avoids reducing his view of economy to either an exchange economy or to one that is entirely free of exchange, the exuberance of the sovereign operations which he describes always involve more than mere waste or expenditure.

## Patriarchy

**Bataille’s alt reifies patriarchal structures**

**Itzkowitz 96 –** Professor of Philosophy at Marietta College

(Ken, “Feminism and the problem of Georges Bataille,” from *Her voices: hermeneutics of the feminine* pg 176, dml)

The central issue of this paper is control: proper and improper control, abandonment and control. Both Georges Bataille and Andrea Dworkin are compelled by the issue of control. With Bataille, this leads to a fundamental distinction between what he calls the restricted and the general economies. With Dworkin, this leads to a determined focus on the improper control by men of women. Moreover, Dworkin has an interest in Bataille himself. The main thing for her is that he is an exemplar of the system that improperly controls women. Dworkin sees Bataille as a mainstay of the patriarchy that values the domination and victimization of women. As an implication of this, she would have us see him as deﬁnitely supportive of what she calls the "male-supremacist ideology" (Pornography, p. 13). Those holding this ideology believe in the intrinsically valued and authoritative self which "men [are said to] have . . . and that women must, by definition, lack . . ." (p. I3). As such this self, as Dworkin puts it, is seen as entitled to take what it wants to sustain or improve itself, to have anything, to require any need at any cost... : the nature of the male self is that it takes, so that, by deﬁnition, the absolute self is expressed in the absolute right to take what at needs to sustain itself. (p. 1:)

## Expenditure Fails

**Expenditure is not transgressive- limitless consumption is useless theory**

Paul **Mann**, 19**99,** “The Exquisite Corpse of Georges Bataille” in Masocriticism, p. 67-9

I would like at one and the same time to affirm this model and to dismiss it as the most desperate alibi of all. For “sacrificial consumption” can never become an explicit critical motive.13 At the moment it presents itself as a proper element of some critical method, it degenerates into another useful trope, another bit of intellectual currency, another paper-thin abyss, another proxy transgression; and the force of transgression moves elsewhere, beneath a blinder spot in the critical eye.14 Questions of motive or understanding, the fact that one might be self-critical or at least aware of recuperation, are immaterial: what is at stake here is not self-consciousness but economics, material relations of appropriation and exclusion, assimilation and positive loss. Whatever transgression occurs in writing on Bataille does so only through the stupid recuperation and hence evacuation of the whole rhetoric and dream of transgression, only insofar as the false profundity of philosophy or theory evacuates the false profundities it apes. To justify this as the sublime loss of loss is merely to indulge a paradoxical figure. Excess is not a project but a by-product of any discourse; the interest of Bataillean discourse lies chiefly in the compulsive and symptomatic way it plays with its feces. The spectacle of critics making fools of themselves does not reveal the sovereign truth of death: it is only masocritical humiliation, a pathological attempt to disavow the specter of death. As for the present essay, it makes no claims to any redeeming sacrifice. Far from presenting you with a truer Bataille, far from speaking in his voice more clearly than his other readers, this essay pleads guilty to the indictment against every appropriation. Until philosophy and theory squeal like a pig before Bataille’s work, as he claims to have done before Dali’s canvases, there will be no knowledge of Bataille. In the end, one might have to take and even stricter view: there is no discourse of transgression, either on or by Bataille. None at all. It would be necessary to write a “Postscript to Transgression” were it not for the fact that Foucault already wrote it in his “Preface,” were it not for the fact that Bataille himself wrote it the moment before he first picked up his pen. It makes no difference whether one betrays Bataille, because one lip syncs Bataille’s rhetoric or drones on in the most tedious exposition. All of these satellite texts are not heliotropic in relation to the solar anus of Bataille’s writing, of the executioners he hoped (really?) would meet him in the Bois de Boulogne, or depensives in spite of themselves. It would be sentimental to assign them such privileges. They merely fail to fail. They are symptoms of a discourse in which everyone is happily transgressing everyone else and nothing ever happens, traces of a certain narcissistic pathos that never achieves the magnificent loss Bataille’s text conveniently claims to desire, and under whose cover it can continue to account for itself, hoarding its precious debits in a masocriticism that is anything but sovereign and gloriously indifferent. What is given to us, what is ruinously and profitably exchanged, is a lie. Heterology gives the lie to meaning and discourse gives the lie to transgression, in a potlatch that reveals both in their most essential and constitutive relation. Nothing is gained by this communication except profit-taking from lies. We must indict Bataille as the alibi that allows all of this writing to go on and on, pretending it is nothing it is not, and then turn away from Bataille as from a sun long since gone nova, in order to witness the slow freezing to death of every satellite text. The sacrificial consumption of Bataille has played itself out; the rotten carcass has been consumed: no more alibis. What is at stake is no longer ecstatic sexuality or violent upheavals or bloody sacrifices under the unblinking eye of the sun; nor was it ever, from the very beginning of Bataille’s career. These are merely figures in the melodramatic theater of what is after all a “soft expenditure” (Hollier 1989, xv), a much more modest death, a death much closer to home. It has never been more than a question of the death of the theory and of theory itself as death. Of theory-death. A double fatality.

## Capitalism

**Bataille’s idea of expenditure reifies consumerism that makes capitalism inevitable – turns the alt**

**Shaviro 8 –** Professor of English at Wayne State

(Steven, “Capitalism, Consumerism, and Waste,” <http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=651>, dml)

Finally, this crazed consumerism is the way that the capitalist mode of production manages a loss that it incessantly disavows, but that it cannot actually escape. Unproductive expenditure may well be the very point of the conjunctive synthesis of consumption. For this synthesis continually exempts or extracts something from the otherwise infinite processes of production and circulation. It provides a terminus for the otherwise aimless and limitless movement of the valorization of capital. For the conjunctive synthesis marks the point at which the circuits of money and commodities (C-M-C and M-C-M’) are broken, so that exchange comes to a momentary end. In the residual subject’s *jouissance*, the commodity is withdrawn from circulation, in order to be used up or destroyed. The conjunctive synthesis thereby deducts something from capital accumulation. And yet, without this synthesis and its deductions, the capitalist economy could not function at all. As Marx and Engels tell us, even in the ‘normal’ situation of bourgeois society, “a great part not only of the existing products, but also of the previously created productive forces, are periodically destroyed.” Or, as David Harvey puts it, since capital is always in danger of being choked by overproduction and overaccumulation, it must continually resort to “violent paroxysms” of “the devaluation, depreciation, and destruction of capital.” Specifically, this is what happens on a major scale in moments of economic crisis. But on a minor or “molecular” level, the conjunctive subject or consumer is itself always in crisis — and it can only alleviate this situation by indulging in another round of shopping, purchasing, and consuming.

## Epistemology

**Bataille’s materialist dialectics have no practical use and produce an empty epistemology.**

Asger **Sørensen 2007** [Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy, Copenhagen Business School): “The inner experience of living matter: Bataille and dialectics” *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, vol. 33 no. 5, pp. 597-615]

Instead, inspired by the dialectics of Bataille, one could understand the basic contradiction in and of human life as just a conflict, a tension inherent in humn and social eing as such, and as such an ontological condition that is dealt with – and thus solved – practically every day. The point to discuss politically is therefore not whether we can dissolve what the dialectical tradition would call the contradictions of the existing solution and reach the truth of the social being in question. The contradictions are always already solved practically, and the question is only how to make these practical solutions better. No society is completely homogeneous, since any human being takes part in more than one social being, e.g. families, classes, subcultures, associations, etc. /…/ Bataille’s materialist dialectics /…/ risk becoming a mystifying ideology for a world organized only by the market, since no long-term political action, no persistent use of force, seems legitimate in Bataille’s perspective. /…/ Bataille describe the processes of nature and human culture dialectically, without comforting himself with dreams and hopes of ideals of a harmony that history or experience will realize in the end. /…/ In short, with an epistemology and an ontology like Bataille’s, it is very difficult to believe in anything worth dying for. And that is a shame.

## Transgression impossible

**The alternative is impossible: the transgression ethic of pure shock is unsustainable and destroys any public ethics.**

Richard **Wolin**, Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center, 200**4** (The Seduction of Unreason pp 103-104)

At times Bataille's longing for community and his glorification of "transgression"-acts of excess that would disrupt the status quo seemed to **argue for mutually contradictory values**. For the rituals of premodern communities aimed at ensuring stability, tradition, and the maintenance of social "norms"-above all, the norm separating the sacred and profane. Yet Bataille, the self-proclaimed apostle of "excess" and black sheep of the twentieth-century avant-garde, professed a credo mandating profanation for profanation's sake-an "ethos" or "anti-ethos" obsessed with violating taboos, disrupting norms, and transcending limits. While this orientation was certainly well-represented in his theoretical writings, it came through even more vividly in his Sadean novellas of the 1920s and 1930s, The Story of the Eye and The Blue of Noon. Both novels represent explorations of (as Bataille puts it in "The Notion of Expenditure") "perverse sexual activity i.e., deflected from genital finality." Taboos are violated on virtually every page. The missionary position is the only sexual posture that remains unexplored.40 **In reexamining the religion of transgression propagated by Bataille, however, one encounters significant ethical gaps**. Echoing Tony Judt's findings in Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944-1956, one senses that aspects of Bataille's thought are redolent of a more general and longstanding vacuum at the heart of public ethics in France"-"**the marked absence of a concern with public ethics or political morality.""** In France during the 1930s this ethical void reached crisis proportions when antirepublican sentiment proliferated on both the left and right sides of the political spectrum, foreshadowing the nation's "strange defeat" of 1940. Yet this is also the context in which Bataille's role as a precursor of poststructuralism becomes critical. For in the manner of Heidegger, who famously forswore "ethics" in favor of "Fundamental Ontology" poststructuralism, too, has had a notoriously difficult time articulating an ethics. Thus, following the iconoclastic lineage established by Bataille and Nietzsche, Foucault later equated "norms" with "normalization," the production of pliable minds and "docile bodies." He perceived norms as little more than cogs in the mechanism of modern society qua disciplinary regime. As a result, in his diagnosis of the age, the dimension of "principle" evaporated, becoming mere grist for the mill of modernity qua "carceral society." Like Bataille and Nietzsche, Foucault sought to stand traditional morality on its head. Following Nietzsche's summons in The Genealogy of Morals, he heralded a "transvaluation of values." Norms retained value only insofar as they served as objects of "transgression" or "self-overcoming."" In recent years denizens of the poststructuralist camp have begun meditating on how one might constitute a community immune to totalitarian temptation. Unsurprisingly Bataille's meditations on the sacred, sacrifice, and transgression have served as an indispensable point of reference. 4' Following Bataille's lead, this "unavowable" (Blanchot) or "inoperative" community (J. L. Nancy) would be predicated on the values of "heterogeneity" and "difference" instead of those of "totality." This community would be subtended not by the values of social transparency but by the anticonventional mores of transgression. Bernard-Henri Levy has rightly sounded an alarm concerning the anti-moral implications of this new, avowedly illiberal "communitarian" spirit. Organicism. Naturalism. Refusal of universal values. Denial of values purely and simply... It is on these bases, on this mute foundation, that one deploys a cover of horror that is more somber and infinitely more clamorous .... I will have attained my objective when I have succeeded in convincing that fascism is not in the first instance barbarism; that it is not essentially and to begin with the apocalypse; that it does not always and of necessity mean storms of iron and blood. Instead, it is in the first instance a type of society, a model of community, a manner of thinking and of organizing the social bond." Bataille's "ecstatic" model of community, the manner of "thinking and of organizing the social bond" he seeks to privilege, merits critical scrutiny, for it is a model that embraces an aesthetics of transgression as the norm for social action. Bataille's ecstatic community would also be an aesthetic community: a community in which the favored mode of social practice would be action that yielded no return"; action that, in a manner reminiscent of art for art's sake, had no end beyond itself. **At times, Bataille's celebration of transgression for its own sake seems woefully simplistic.** In lieu of a conceptual framework that would permit one to distinguish between constructive and retrograde instances of transgression, we are left with an ethos of shock, rupture, and disruption simpliciter. Bataille seeks to ground postmodern ethics in the attitudes of a cultural avant-garde (Acéphale and the College of Sociology) oriented toward precapitalist life forms that modernity has scorned. Yet **the very idea of achieving a conceptual reckoning with Bataille-generated ideals such as "transgression," "heterogeneity," and "expenditure" would seem inimical to their very spirit.** In his idiom, to rely on procedures of principled legitimation or a rational accountability would be to succumb to the logic and rhetoric of "productive consumption"-the values of a society predicated on instrumental reason and commodity exchange.

## Alt doesn’t solve

**Alt doesn’t solve – they call for embracing the violent conflict in the 1AC – but bataille just wants us to imagine conflict – means perm to do the plan and imagine violence solves**

**Evangelou 10 –** Assistant Lecturer in Comparative Literature

(Angelos, “Georges Bataille’s “Ethics of Violence,” Skepsi vol 3(2) 2010, available at <http://dl.dropbox.com/u/8274824/v03i02/pdfs/Skepsi-0302-2010-%20Georges%20Bataille%E2%80%99s%20%E2%80%98Ethics%20of%20Violence%E2%80%99-Angelos%20Evangelou.pdf>, dml)

Bataille does take this distant view; as Surya observes: ‘[He] abstained from pronouncing himself morally on any particular fact (the events of 1934, the rise of fascism, for example), from judging as a moralist; which is to say judging […] from the perspective of what had to be and what must be’ (Surya 2002: 428). Such a distance and abstention of course can be challenged for their ethical implications. How can one experience war ahistorically while war is taking place? How legitimate is it for Bataille, who otherwise says that he would indeed be willing to fight if the conditions demanded or permitted it, 9 to read Hervie and Proust while a battle is unfolding (Bataille 1992: 162) or to write at the bar and drink during an air raid (124)? Yet Bataille writes in the opening pages of Guilty that ‘no one relates to the war madness, I’m the only one who can do this’ (Bataille 1988a: 12). And if it is neither the combat aspect of war he finds fascinating, 10 nor the political aspect of it, 11 then what is it? What kind of relation with the war does Bataille claim to have?

**Bataille doesn’t want actual conflict**

**Evangelou 10 –** Assistant Lecturer in Comparative Literature

(Angelos, “Georges Bataille’s “Ethics of Violence,” Skepsi vol 3(2) 2010, available at <http://dl.dropbox.com/u/8274824/v03i02/pdfs/Skepsi-0302-2010-%20Georges%20Bataille%E2%80%99s%20%E2%80%98Ethics%20of%20Violence%E2%80%99-Angelos%20Evangelou.pdf>, dml)

It is important to clarify that even if Bataille is fascinated by war, he nevertheless does not call for a revolution of absolute violence. He does not suggest that everybody be killed and annihilated, or that a constant state of massacre be established. ‘It is not that evil would be the contrary of justice’ (Bataille in Surya 2002: 430). This would imply the dissolution of limits, and transgression. an important concept for Bataille, would no longer be possible. Let us remember that Bataille does not call for an eradication of morality but for its transgression. However, even if it is only the acknowledgement of death to which Bataille wants people to commit through violence, horror or the death of the other, he does not exclude real death from being there, available always as a possibility, as a threat, keeping the wound of anguish open. ‘For the individual, partial loss is a means of dying while surviving. It’s foolish to try to avoid the horror of loss. [...] You have to come as close as possible to death. Without flinching. And even, if necessary, flinching. ...and even, if necessary, dying’ (Bataille 1988a: 93; ellipsis and emphasis in the original).

## No link – humanity isn’t that bad

**Humanity isn’t that bad**

**Land 92** – Continental Philosophy Lecturer at the University of Warwick

(Nick, *The Thirst for Annihilation: Georges Bataille and Virulent Nihilism (An Essay in Atheistic Religion*) pg 13, dml)

In the end—one no longer denies it—there is death, but for the moment one has…other ends? There must surely be other ends. Man as an end in himself? We have that of course, some would say we have considerably too much of it. Since zoology has matured enough to adopt its most aberrant specimen—the perverse animal—it is difficult for us not to see preposterous claims to a unique human dignity as a slander against nature. Nevertheless, is it not possible to precipitate the principle of our humanism, distill it down to goodness? Who could be so impudent as to seek something other than goodness? This is surely the very essence of the end, the absolute end, gleaming magnificently in its Platonic rendition: *The Good.* How touchingly naïve this word sounds today. The Good is the object of rationalized desire, of what had become, by the end of the eighteenth century, *Wille,* will. The word our economists eventually settled for is *preference,* those with more of an ideological bent tend to prefer *choice.* Even after being winkled by psychology from its Platonic niche in the celestial order, the good is still indispensable to concrete reason, as its end and orientation. The good is exactly what—upon reflection—we want. At least, it is what we should want; the intelligibility of educated desire. Our civilization has deluged us with ‘goods’, at least in its metropolitan heights. Yet, as Freud suggests, we remain discontented by civilization, gnawed by *Unbehagen.* The problem with goodness is less its maldistribution than the fact it is so depressingly tedious. We applaud Mother Theresa without reservation, before succumbing to our yawns (longing for her to be arraigned for a sex-crime, or for a war to break out). Perhaps all righteousness is on the side of the good, but as to the ‘good life’, wouldn’t it be somewhat better to be dead?

## Nihilism

**Their negativity regresses into nihilism**

**Land 92** – Continental Philosophy Lecturer at the University of Warwick

(Nick, *The Thirst for Annihilation: Georges Bataille and Virulent Nihilism (An Essay in Atheistic Religion*) pg 13, dml)

To say ‘there is no God’ is not to express a proposition in a preestablished logical syntax, but to begin thinking again, in a way that is radically new, and therefore utterly experimental. Zero is fatally discovered beneath the scabrous crust of logical negativity. It is obscurantism of the most tediously familiar kind to suggest that the ‘nothing’ of nihilism is an indissolubly theological concept. The *nihil* is not a concept at all, but rather immensity and fate. Nietzsche describes atheism as an open horizon, as a loss of inhibition. The ‘a-’ of atheism is privative only in the sense of a collapsing dam. Deconstruction is the systematic closure of the negative within its logico-structural sense. All uses, references, connotations of the negative are referred back to a bilateral opposition as if to an inescapable destination, so that every ‘de-’, ‘un-’, ‘dis-’, or ‘and-’ is speculatively imprisoned within the mirror space of the concept. If we were to follow deconstruction to the letter here it would follow that atheism, antihumanism, and antilogic, far from being virulent pestilential swamps, had no force except through their determinate relations to their enemies, which had thus always already bilateralized them into docility. As for deconstruction ‘itself’, ah, it likes to suffer!