Remote Sensing Neg

Terrorism Frontline

\*\*\*Nuclear Terrorism

1. Internal link gap – the Budge and Williamson card does not mention the nuclear attack their Ayson impact is predicated off – only attacks on transportation vehicles such as airplanes and railways

2. Terrorism is unlikely – you are more likely to be struck by lightning

Mueller 05 [John, Prof, OSU, “Terrorism and the Dynamics of Threat Exaggeration” Presentation @ 05 Annual Mtg of the American PoliSci Assoc. Washington DC, Sept 1-4, August, p 26]

"The chances of any of us dying in a terrorist incident is very, very, very small," filmmaker-provocateur Michael Moore happened to remark on 60 Minutes on February 16, 2003. His interviewer, Bob Simon, promptly admonished, "But no one sees the world like that." Both statements, remarkably, are true--the first only a bit more so than the second. This incongruity deserves investigating, as do the policy consequences that arise from what author Mark Bowden has characterized as "housewives in Iowa...watching TV afraid that al-Qaeda's going to charge in their front door,"43 or more generally from the fact that many people have developed what Leif Wenar of the University of Shefield has aptly labeled "a false sense of insecurity" about terrorism in the United States. For all the attention it evokes, terrorism, in reasonable context, actually causes rather little damage and, as Moore suggests, the likelihood that any individual will become a victim in most places is microscopic. Those adept at hyperbole like to proclaim that we live in "the age of terror" (Hoagland 2004). However, the number of people worldwide who die as a result of international terrorism is generally only a few hundred a year, tiny compared to the numbers who die in most civil wars or from automobile accidents. In fact, until 2001 far fewer Americans were killed in any grouping of years by all forms of international terrorism than were killed by lightning. And except for 2001, virtually none of these terrorist deaths occurred within the United States itself. Indeed, outside of 2001, fewer people have died in America from international terrorism than have drowned in toilet. Even with the September 11 attacks included in the count, however, the number of Americans killed by international terrorism since the late 1960s (which is when the State Department began its accounting) is about the same as the number killed over the same period by lightning--or by accident-causing deer or by severe allergic reaction to peanuts. In almost all years the total number of people worldwide who die at the hands of international terrorists is not much more than the number who drown in bathtubs in the United States.

3. Nuclear weapons are too hard to make

Mueller 05 [John, Prof, OSU, “Terrorism and the Dynamics of Threat Exaggeration” Presentation @ 05 Annual Mtg of the American PoliSci Assoc. Washington DC, Sept 1-4, August, p 28]

Nuclear weapons, most decidedly, can indeed inflict massive destruction, and it is certainly reasonable to point out that an atomic bomb in the hands of a terrorist or rogue state could kill tens of thousands of people. But it is also essential to note that making such a bomb is an extraordinarily difficult task. As the Gilmore Commission stresses, "Building a nuclear device capable of producing mass destruction presents Herculean challenges...A successful program hinges on obtaining enough fissile material;...arriving at a weapon design that will bring that mass together in a tiny fraction of a second, before the heat from early fission blows the material apart; and designing a working device small and light enough to be carried by a given delivery vehicle." It emphasizes that these are "the minimum requirementsIf each one is not met...one ends up not with a less powerful weapon, but with a device that cannot produce any significant nuclear yield at all or cannot be delivered" (1999, 31, emphasis in the original; see also Linzer 2004a).

4. Their only impact in their Budge and Williamson card is about hazard materials but terrorist attacks on railroads are overhyped – no risk

Moore 11

(Michael Scott Moore, Journalist at Miller-McCune, “Terrorist Attacks on Railroads Would Be Difficult”, http://www.psmag.com/politics/terrorist-threat-of-wrecking-the-railroad-really-hard-31033/, May 11, 2011, LEQ)

Past experiences suggest that terrorists who want to derail a train are facing a much more complex task than just leaving a penny on the rail. Since the discovery of notes confiscated after the Osama bin Laden raid that detailed ideas for derailing trains, concern has been raised about the vulnerability of America's rail system, never mind its high-speed rail aspirations. But derailing a train isn't as easy as it may seem, and the concern may be an overreaction. A Polish 14-year-old caused a lot of damage in downtown Lodz three years ago by rigging a TV remote control that let him switch track points on the city’s tram system. He derailed four trains and injured dozens of people. “He treated it like any other schoolboy might a giant train set,” Miroslaw Micor, a police spokesman in Lodz, said at the time. “But it was lucky nobody was killed.” Since the raid on Osama bin Laden’s house in Pakistan uncovered some notes about a future vision of derailed American trains, it’s worth remembering that the idea isn’t terribly new. America’s huge rail network — never mind the ambitious high-speed lines yet to be built — would be vulnerable for obvious reasons, and some critics have complained for months that Obama’s expensive high-speed rail dreams would be wide-open targets for al-Qaeda. But news outlets and politicians have overreacted, and a report from last year by the Mineta Transportation Institute gives a number of good reasons why derailment disasters are so rare. EUROPEAN DISPATCH Michael Scott Moore complements his standing feature in Miller-McCune magazine with frequent posts on the policy challenges and solutions popping up on the other side of the pond. The main reason is that blowing up a track is tougher than it sounds. “Getting a bomb to go off at the right time is difficult,” write the Mineta study authors. “Timers are unreliable if the trains do not run precisely on time, and pressure triggers do not always work.” Sabotaging the switching points — the Polish kid’s method — would be more reliable, but it takes more cleverness. Mechanical sabotage of all kinds (high- and low-tech) derailed trains with 76 percent success rate in the Mineta report’s samples — but it was much more rare than setting bombs. Only 25 out of the sample of 181 derailment attempts were acts of mechanical sabotage. In 1995, an Algerian terrorist group called the Groupe Islamique Armé tried to bomb a line of the TGV, France’s high-speed rail, near Lyon. It was an attack with al-Qaeda-like aspirations. “The psychological effect of an explosion on the train would have been enormous,” the Mineta study points out. “France’s TGV was the first high-speed rail system in Europe and today remains a source of national pride.” The bomb misfired, and the suspect eventually died in a shootout with police. French officials knew the GIA wanted to cause mayhem any way it could — including hijacking an airliner meant to smash into the Eiffel Tower a few months before. But officials resisted the urge to post metal detectors at all French train stations and force millions of passengers to take off belts and shoes. Instead, they doubled the number of inspectors sweeping the rails every morning for bombs. “French authorities … emphasize the importance of deploying limited resources in ways that terrorists cannot predict, persuading them that they face a high risk of being apprehended,” write the Mineta authors. “The French also place great importance on intelligence operations to monitor the activities of groups and individuals engaged in terrorist radicalization and recruiting.” The point is that airport-style security would ruin everything good about a high-speed train, so light security lines have remained the rule with European rail. Terrorism has been a steady risk in Europe for decades, but even where authorities screen baggage — on some French, Spanish, and British high-speed lines — the wait tends to be quick. Which doesn’t stop some American security experts, like Dr. Seyom Brown in the Texas news report linked here, from urging full screening of passengers even on light-rail systems like Dallas-Area Rapid Transit. “I don’t like it, but those are such vulnerable targets. I hope we don’t have to wait for an attack to occur before we start doing that,” Brown told WFAA News in Dallas last week. “… If it’s somebody getting on a train with a suicide vest, a bomb vest, right now, we don’t have very effective screening of people who are getting on trains.” The dirty secret, of course, is that full security on any train system is impossible. Intriguingly, the Mineta study looked at 181 derailing attempts around the world since 1920 and found a full third of them in “South Asia” — India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan. “The deadliest attacks have occurred in the developing countries,” says the report, probably because poor nations lack the budget to sweep and patrol their train systems. So the idea of an American train disaster didn’t have to dawn on bin Laden from headlines about Washington’s push for high-speed rail; in fact his imagination didn’t have to wander far at all.

5. Status quo solves trucking hazards – Operation Steel Box

DOT 12

(Fast Lane, Official DOT Blog, : Operation Steel Box keeps hazardous materials where they belong: inside safe trucks”, April 19, 2012, DOT, <http://fastlane.dot.gov/2012/04/operation-steel-box-keeps-hazardous-materials-where-they-belong-inside-safe-trucks.html#.UBdvjTFST-M>) aw

Every day, our roadways carry billions of dollars of raw materials and finished goods from coast to coast. And every day, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) works hard to make sure that cargo is protected inside safe commercial vehicles operated by safe drivers. Ensuring that commercial vehicles and their drivers are safe also means that FMCSA protects other users of America's roadways. And when our nation's commercial vehicles transport the hazardous materials our economy needs, that safety mission becomes even more critical. That's why this week, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's Southern Service Center put Operation Steel Box into action with inspection strike forces at key ports where hazardous materials carriers load their contents. From Houston to New Orleans, Mobile, Tampa, Jacksonville, Savannah, Mt. Pleasant (SC), and Wilmington, inspectors were on the ground checking commercial motor vehicles, tractor-trailer combinations, equipment, and freight boxes as loads came off ships bound for motor carriers. We even had a team at the intermodal center in Memphis to check as freight was moved from railway to roadway. Crews were also checking hazardous materials (hazmat) package markings, package labels, and package specifications to ensure that hazmat shipments were in appropriate containers. In addition to the hazardous materials and packaging inspections, FMCSA and state police and highway patrol officers also checked vehicle placards, carriers and drivers, with a special eye out for vehicles carrying undeclared hazardous materials. The three days of Operation Steel Box this week represent the first time FMCSA's Southern region has conducted a hazmat strike force of this magnitude. It will help us stay foused on hazardous materials transportation in the south and help strengthen our important safety partnerships with local and state law enforcement agencies.\*\*\*Bioterrorism

1. Large-scale bioterrorism impossible – can’t manufacture

HSC 2005

(Henry Stimson Center, 2005, “Frequently Asked Questions: Likelihood of Terrorists Acquiring and Using Chemical or Biological Weapons”, ACCEM, <http://www.accem.org/pdf/terrorfaq.pdf>) aw

However, two factors stand in the way of manufacturing chemical agents for the purpose of mass casualty. First, the chemical reactions involved with the production of agents are dangerous: precursor chemicals can be volatile and corrosive, and minor misjudgments or mistakes in processing could easily result in the deaths of would-be weaponeers. Second, this danger grows when the amount of agent that would be needed to successfully mount a mass casualty attack is considered. Attempting to make sufficient quantities would require either a large, well-financed operation that would increase the likelihood of discovery or, alternatively, a long, drawn-out process of making small amounts incrementally. These small quantities would then need to be stored safely in a manner that would not weaken the agent’s toxicity before being released. It would take 18 years for a basement-sized operation to produce the more than two tons of sarin gas that the Pentagon estimates would be necessary to kill 10,000 people, assuming the sarin was manufactured correctly at its top lethality.

2. Bioweapons impossible – even renowned scientists cannot isolate bioterror strains

HSC 2005

(Henry Stimson Center, 2005, “Frequently Asked Questions: Likelihood of Terrorists Acquiring and Using Chemical or Biological Weapons”, ACCEM, <http://www.accem.org/pdf/terrorfaq.pdf>) aw

Oftentimes, obtaining biological agents is portrayed as being as easy as taking a trip to the country. The experience of the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo proves that this is not the case. Isolating a particularly virulent strain in nature---out of, for example, the roughly 675 strains of botulinum toxin that have been identified---is no easy task. Despite having skilled scientists among its members, Aum was unable to do so. Terrorists could also approach one of the five hundred culture collections worldwide, some of which carry lethal strains. Within the United States, however, much tighter controls have been placed on the shipment of dangerous pathogens from these collections in recent years.

3. Bioterror attacks grossly overestimated – empirically proven

HSC 2005

(Henry Stimson Center, 2005, “Frequently Asked Questions: Likelihood of Terrorists Acquiring and Using Chemical or Biological Weapons”, ACCEM, <http://www.accem.org/pdf/terrorfaq.pdf>) aw

The Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo was brimming with highly educated scientists, yet the cult’s biological weapons program turned out to be a lemon. While its poison gas program certainly made more headway, it was rife with life-threatening production and dissemination accidents. After all of Aum’s extensive financial and intellectual investment, the Tokyo subway attack, while injuring over 1,000, killed only 12 individuals. In 96 percent of the cases worldwide where chemical or biological substances have been used since 1975, three or fewer people were injured or killed.

4. Remote sensing for bioterrorism inadequate – multiple warrants – their solvency evidence

Yang 02

(2002 Chaowei Phil Yang Professor of GIScience, George Mason University “UTILIZING REMOTE SENSED DATA IN A QUICK RESPONSE SYSTEM” Menas Kafatos, Ruixin Yang, Chaowei Yang, Richard Gomez, & Zafer Boybeyi)

However, for this capability to be exploitable, it is essential that a well-populated spectral library information system exists and be accessible in a user-friendly way by the user of this technology. This will also require the development of faster processing algorithms, better search methods, improved spectral matching techniques, data fusion, availability of digital elevation data, and cost-effective data handling and management structures, all of which need to be addressed

5. Remote sensing must solve all 7 bio-response categories to effectively contain a large-scale attack

WMD Center 11

(THE BIPARTISAN WMD TERRORISM RESEARCH CENTER, eleven of the nation’s leading biodefense experts, October 11, “Bio-Response Report Card”, <http://www.wmdcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/bio-response-report-card-2011.pdf>) aw

Some might interpret the seven different bio-response categories identified by our experts as independent needs. That would be a mistake. The complexity of the biodefense enterprise demands that they all be regarded as essential parts in a single enterprise. The WMD Commission used the analogy of links in a chain—if one link is broken, the chain fails (see page 62). Each of the defined response categories is integral to ensuring the nation’s resilience to biological threats. And each category requires the orchestration of a varied set of stakeholders, providers, and resources to achieve its objectives and meet fundamental expectations.

**6. No environment remediation means US bio-response capabilities still fail**

WMD Center 11

(THE BIPARTISAN WMD TERRORISM RESEARCH CENTER, eleven of the nation’s leading biodefense experts, October 11, “Bio-Response Report Card”, <http://www.wmdcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/bio-response-report-card-2011.pdf>) aw

An integrated, tested environmental remediation plan for wide-area anthrax cleanup does not currently exist. The federal government has recently released interim guidance addressing federal, state, and local roles in environmental remediation following a widearea anthrax attack, but the document does not address all outstanding questions—such as evacuation and long-term health issues. No remediation plans have yet been tested in a national level exercise. There is currently no consensus-based outdoor or indoor clearance policy to establish safety standards. There is no policy defining responsibility for the cleanup costs of privately owned facilities. Without the ability to clean up after an anthrax event, even an unsophisticated attack could produce an effective area-denial weapon with enormous economic consequences.

7. Remote sensing must address the stressed health care system to achieve solvency

WMD Center 11

(THE BIPARTISAN WMD TERRORISM RESEARCH CENTER, eleven of the nation’s leading biodefense experts, October 11, “Bio-Response Report Card”, <http://www.wmdcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/bio-response-report-card-2011.pdf>) aw

A catastrophic biological event in the United States would quickly overwhelm the capacity of an already-stressed health care system. Although there has been progress over the past decade, there is not yet a comprehensive approach to emergency medical response—from the individual citizen, through the first responder emergency medical system (EMS), to emergency departments, hospitals, and alternate sites of medical care. Although evidence suggests that a better-prepared, informed citizenry can reduce demand on hospital-based services during a crisis, currently there is minimal public investment in demand-reduction strategies. There has been incremental, but to date, insufficient progress in developing crisis standards of care. Federal medical resources and capabilities, including those residing in the Veteran’s Administration (VA), Department of Defense (DoD), and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), have not been fully coordinated and exercised to support response to a large-scale biological disaster.

2NC Terrorism

\*\*\*Bioterrorism Impact Defense

Technical hurdles to bioterrorism will force conventional means

HSC 2005

(Henry Stimson Center, 2005, “Frequently Asked Questions: Likelihood of Terrorists Acquiring and Using Chemical or Biological Weapons”, ACCEM, <http://www.accem.org/pdf/terrorfaq.pdf>) aw

There have been reports in the media that a handful of terrorist organizations have been exploring chemical and biological weapons. However, for the reasons discussed above, the technical hurdles to actually developing an effective large-scale chemical or biological weapons program---as opposed to investigating or experimenting with them---may well turn out to be so sizeable that terrorists would choose to remain reliant on more conventional means.

Water bioterrorism is a myth

HSC 2005

(Henry Stimson Center, 2005, “Frequently Asked Questions: Likelihood of Terrorists Acquiring and Using Chemical or Biological Weapons”, ACCEM, <http://www.accem.org/pdf/terrorfaq.pdf>) aw

The “pill in the water supply” is a myth about chemical terrorism that is not true. All metropolitan water supplies have certain safeguards in place between their citizens and the reservoir. Everyday, water goes through various purification processes and is tested repeatedly. If terrorists were to attempt to poison a reservoir, they would need to disperse tons of agent into the water---smaller amounts would be diluted--- and the vessels required for such a feat would be difficult to miss. Many cities have implemented heightened security around their reservoirs in order to further monitor any questionable activities.

Bioterror dispersal cannot be achieved

HSC 2005

(Henry Stimson Center, 2005, “Frequently Asked Questions: Likelihood of Terrorists Acquiring and Using Chemical or Biological Weapons”, ACCEM, <http://www.accem.org/pdf/terrorfaq.pdf>) aw

The options for delivering poison gas range from high to low tech. Theoretically, super toxic chemicals could be employed to foul food or water supplies, put into munitions, or distributed by an aerosol or spray method. Because of safeguards on both our food and water supplies as well as the difficulty of covertly disbursing sufficient quantities of agent, this method is unlikely to be an effective means to achieving terrorist aims. Chemical agents could also be the payload of any number of specially designed or modified conventional munitions, from bombs and grenades to artillery shells and mines. However designing munitions that reliably produce vapor and liquid droplets requires a certain amount of engineering skill. Finally, commercial sprayers could be mounted on planes or other vehicles. In an outdoor attack such as this, however, 90 percent of the agent is likely to dissipate before ever reaching its target. Effective delivery, which entails getting the right concentration of agent and maintaining it long enough for inhalation to occur, is quite difficult to achieve because chemical agents are highly susceptible to weather conditions.

Effective bio-response requires a nonexistent attribution capability

WMD Center 11

(THE BIPARTISAN WMD TERRORISM RESEARCH CENTER, eleven of the nation’s leading biodefense experts, October 11, “Bio-Response Report Card”, <http://www.wmdcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/bio-response-report-card-2011.pdf>) aw

Despite extensive research, a scientifically and legally validated attribution capability does not yet exist for anthrax or virtually any other pathogen or toxin. There is not yet a networked system of national and international repositories to support microbial forensics, and existing mechanisms to facilitate collaboration among stakeholders worldwide are insufficient. However, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have made considerable progress in building partnerships between public health and law enforcement organizations at the federal, state, and local levels that will significantly improve cooperation during an investigation

Lack of medical countermeasures impede response capabilities

WMD Center 11

(THE BIPARTISAN WMD TERRORISM RESEARCH CENTER, eleven of the nation’s leading biodefense experts, October 11, “Bio-Response Report Card”, <http://www.wmdcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/bio-response-report-card-2011.pdf>) aw

Current stockpiles of medical countermeasures could limit the impact of small-scale attacks using anthrax and several other likely pathogens, but may not be adequate for largescale attacks. Medical countermeasures are not currently available for resistant or novel pathogens. Adequate supplies of medical countermeasures have removed smallpox as a large-scale threat. The process for developing and producing medical countermeasures still lacks clearly defined requirements, a common set of prioritized research and development goals, coordinated budget requests, and sufficient, sustained funding.

\*\*\*Hazmat Impact Defense

Railroad hazard material delivery is overwhelmingly safe – 99.998%

Spraggins 09

(Barry, Journal of Management and Marketing Research, University of Nevada, “The case for rail transportation of hazardous materials”, AABRI, <http://www.aabri.com/manuscripts/09224.pdf>) aw

Railroads have an outstanding track record in safely delivering hazardous materials -- 99.998 percent of all rail cars containing hazardous materials arrived at destination safely, without any release due to an accident. In fact, the rail hazmat accident rate has declined by 88 percent from 1980 to 2007 and 39 percent since 1990. Railroads and trucks carry roughly equal hazmat ton-mileage, but trucks have 16 times more hazmat releases than railroads (Hazmat, nd). Statistically, railroads are the safer form of transportation for hazardous materials.

Status quo solves railroad hazmat safety

Association of American Railroads 11

(March, “Hazmat Transportation by Rail: An Unfair Liability,” <http://www.aar.org/~/media/aar/Background-Papers/Haznat-by-Rail.ashx>)

Safety is the top priority for railroads no matter what they are transporting. Steps railroads are taking to help keep TIH and other hazmat transport safe include: • Transporting TIH materials on routes that pose the least overall safety and security risk. Railroads conduct ongoing, comprehensive risk analyses of their primary TIH routes and any practical alternative routes over which they have authority to operate. These analyses must consider 27 different factors, including hazmat volume, trip length, population density of nearby communities, and emergency response capability along the route. The safest routes based on these analyses are the routes railroads must use. • Developing and implementing technological innovations such as improved track and freight car defect detection systems and stronger, more durable steel for tank cars. • Training emergency responders to help ensure that, if an accident occurs, emergency personnel will know what to do to minimize damage to people and property. • Working with local authorities to help ensure effective safety planning, including by providing local authorities upon request with lists of hazardous materials transported through their communiti

FEMA Frontline

1. FEMA and the Federal Government solves disasters now – lessons learned from Katrina – Iowa flood response proves

1AC Author Walters 10 (Jonathan Walters is the Executive Editor of GOVERNING. He has been covering state and local public policy and administration for more than 30 years. August 2010. “FEMA: Making a Comeback” http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/homeland-security-disasters/fema-making-comeback.html) //CL

While state, local and federal governments work out various response and recovery protocols, one fact remains: Every serious disaster presents different challenges. "There's a saying among emergency management experts: When you've been to one disaster, you've been to one disaster," says David Miller, Iowa's head of emergency management. That's another way of saying that every disaster has its own special quirks that may require different intergovernmental responsibilities and relationships. Miller says his state was painfully and powerfully reminded of this in spring 2008 when Iowa experienced the range of natural disasters that can befall one place. The weekend before Memorial Day, an EF5 tornado -- the highest intensity on the rating scale -- ripped a 43-mile path of devastation across three counties, killing eight people and nearly wiping out the small town of Parkersburg. Unfortunately the EF5 was just one in a record-setting rampage of tornadoes in Iowa that year. But that wasn't all: The next weekend it started to rain across eastern Iowa. The rain was almost continuous throughout the middle of the summer and caused severe flooding that didn't subside until August. "So you have a fast-moving disaster where rescue and recovery happen fairly quickly," Miller says. "And then a slow-moving disaster where you're doing both for a long time." In the case of the flooding, Miller saw the side of FEMA that represents some institutional progress, namely mechanisms created in the wake of Katrina aimed at longer-range recovery issues. FEMA officials helped communities develop and pursue "long-range recovery goals," Miller says, which included helping communities track down resources outside of FEMA's direct control. "Those mechanisms were used effectively in Iowa," says Miller, a 20-year veteran of emergency management. "We gained some real benefit from those." In Iowa City, for example, the agency identified specific federal, non-FEMA funding sources for very specific projects. FEMA personnel then worked with city officials on preparing grant applications, which led to a $25 million U.S. Department of Commerce grant for the city's top two recovery priorities: relocating its wastewater treatment facility and elevating Dubuque Street, one of the city's key thoroughfares. FEMA's shift to focus more on long-term recovery is one of the encouraging signs related to the agency's comeback, but even in that capacity, the agency can still sometimes be maddeningly bureaucratic, Holdeman says.

2. Plan Can’t Solve – The affirmative only implements remote sensing. Their NASA and US DOT evidence says that in order to run and make accurate disaster models you need geospatial information technology, which the plan doesn’t fund development for.

3. Soft power low now – financial crisis

Beinart 10

(Peter, Writer for Time Magazine, Jun 12, 2010 ,TIME” How the Financial Crisis Has Undermined U.S. Power”) aw

Obama's efforts to change America's image have been constrained by his inability to change certain U.S. policies at home. The best way for America to promote its values is "by living them," declares the National Security Strategy, but when it comes to closing Guantánamo Bay or dramatically reducing U.S. carbon emissions, Congress has shown little interest in making Washington a shining city on a hill. These problems, however, pale before the overarching one: despite Obama's personal popularity, American soft power isn't going up; it's going down. The reason is the financial crisis. America's international allure has always been based less on the appeal of the man in the Oval Office than on the appeal of the American political and economic model. Regardless of what foreigners thought of Bill Clinton, in the 1990s America's brand of deregulated democracy seemed the only true path to prosperity. American economists, investment bankers and political consultants fanned out across the globe to preach the gospel of free elections and free markets. America represented, in Francis Fukuyama's famous words, "The End of History." (See pictures of Obama in Russia.) Now it is much less clear that history is marching our way. The financial crisis has undermined the prestige of America's economic model at the very moment that China's authoritarian capitalism is rising. A decade ago, poor governments hungry for trade and aid had no choice but to show up in Washington, where they received lectures about how to make their economies resemble America's. Now they can get twice the money and half the moralizing in Beijing. From Iran to Burma to Sudan, the Obama Administration's charm offensive has been undermined by China's cash offensive. The result is that 18 months after it took over a foreign policy in the red, there are growing signs that Team Obama understands that no raise is on its way. The White House is starting to confront the "hard choices" that come from trying to pare down America's commitments overseas

4. No brink – past destructive hurricanes have not triggered the link

Coastal Living 11

(“The Decade's Worst Hurricanes”, <http://www.coastalliving.com/lifestyle/worst-us-hurricanes-00414000072121/>) aw

This week, New York City and parts of the East Coast get their first hurricane warning since Gloria in 1985. If we’ve learned anything over the past decade, it’s that low-level storms can wreak just as much havoc as a high-level one. Remember Katrina? That was a category 3. Here, the most damaging hurricanes of the past 10 years: Ike (September 2008) Although it was classified as a category 2 storm, Ike remains the third costliest hurricane in U.S. history after Katrina and 1992’s Andrew. Total damage: $25 billion, mostly in Florida, Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas. Katrina (August 2005) This category 3 hurricane is the costliest in U.S. history, with damages estimated at $81 billion. It’s also one of the deadliest, with deaths exceeding 1,800 in Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. Winds reached a maximum of 175 miles per hour, but most of the storm’s devastation resulted from levy failure in the low-lying city of New Orleans. Even now, six years later, the city is still recovering. Rita (September 2005) Hitting less than a month after Katrina, this category 3 storm prompted a massive evacuation effort of more than 3 million to prevent the tragedy Katrina effected. Still, Rita managed to cause $10 billion in damage in Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. Hurricane Wilma (October 2005) Wilma’s arrival in Florida was measured at a category 3 level, with winds reaching speeds of 185 miles per hour. The hurricane caused 5 deaths in the U.S., and more than $20 billion in damages.

5. Even if failed Katrina response killed US credibility, public spirit and the reconstruction of New Orleans restored confidence

1AC Author Hartford Courant 6 (Hartford Courant, Tribune Newspaper website for the Connecticut area. 8/27/6 “In New Orleans, Yes They Can” <http://articles.courant.com/2006-08-27/news/0608270084_1_disaster-response-natural-disaster-victims>) //CL

How the reconstruction of the Gulf region is handled will be key to restoring public confidence. Devastating loss should be viewed as an opportunity to learn from past mistakes and begin anew. What went wrong a year ago this week has been well documented. There was chaos, anger and death following Katrina, much of which should have been prevented. There was mind boggling miscommunication and bureaucratic bungling that kept much-needed housing from displaced disaster victims and holes in the system that allowed taxpayer dollars to be squandered. But stories of faith, charity and the resilience of the human spirit are equally legion. The public response to the hurricane victims was heartfelt and generous. Rescuers, particularly the U.S. Coast Guard, performed courageously to pluck survivors from rooftops and perilous perches. The entertainment world used its talent to raise money for the city's resurrection. So far, 30,000 homes are being repaired or rebuilt in New Orleans. Songbirds, worms and frogs not seen since the storm are returning. Although it's hard to measure, perhaps half the human population counted in 2000 has returned to New Orleans, a sign that should be viewed as hopeful, considering that many who fled the storm have settled in other locales where opportunity may keep them away. The convention center is back in business and the Superdome, symbol of shame in the days following the flood, has been rebuilt and will open when the New Orleans Saints take the field next month. Preservation Hall is filled with music again, and the beignets are cooking at Cafe Du Monde. Billions have been paid in flood insurance claims. Federal housing aid, key to helping many families rebuild, is finally ready to be disseminated to those in need. Damaged levees have been shored up to what authorities say are pre-Katrina levels.

6. Soft power solves nothing – can’t substitute for hard power

Kroenig, Government at Georgetown, et al. 10 [Matthew, Department of Government, Georgetown University Melissa McAdam, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley Steven Weber, Information School, University of California, Berkeley, Taking Soft Power Seriously, Comparative Strategy, Volume 29, Issue 5 November 2010 , pages 412 – 431]

Foreign policy actors have many reasons to experiment with soft power, not merely because its use can be less costly than hard power. But, soft power comes with its own quite striking limitations. Our research suggests that soft power strategies will be unlikely to succeed except under fairly restrictive conditions. It may very well be, then, that the U.S. foreign policy elite is at risk of exaggerating the effectiveness of soft power (rather than underutilizing it) as a tool of foreign policy. After all, international communication is fraught with difficulties, persuading people to change firmly held political views is hard, and individual attitudes are often thought to have an insignificant role in determining international political outcomes. Soft power, therefore, will probably be considered a niche foreign policy option useful for addressing a small fraction of the problems on Washington's foreign policy agenda. Analysts who suggest that soft power can easily be substituted for hard power or who maintain that soft power should provide an overarching guide to the formulation of U.S. foreign policy are badly mistaken. It is not conducive to good policy to employ the idea of soft power as a way of arguing against the use of military force, for example.

2NC FEMA

\*\*\*FEMA Fails

Evacuation facilitation and first response capabilities irrelevant – strained FEMA resources

Mayer and DeBosier 10

(Matt Mayer, former U.S. Department of Homeland Security official and Mark, writer for heritage, april 13th, “Federalizing disasters weakens FEMA Hurts Americans Hit by catastrophes, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/04/Federalizing-Disasters-Weakens-FEMA-and-Hurts-Americans-Hit-by-Catastrophes>)

The Federal Emergency Management Agency has been responding to almost any natural disaster around the country, be it a contained three-county flood, or a catastrophe of near-epic proportions like Hurricane Katrina. As a result, many states and localities have trimmed their own emergency-response budgets, often leaving them ill prepared to handle even rain- or snowstorms without federal assistance. This leaves FEMA stretched far too thin and ill prepared to respond to grand-scale catastrophes. The "federalization of disasters" misdirects vital resources, leaving localities, states, and the federal government in a lose-lose situation. FEMA policies must be overhauled to let localities handle smaller, localized disasters, and to allow FEMA to respond fully and effectively when it is truly needed. If the status quo continues, it will be a disaster for everyone. Since 1993, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has been federalizing "routine" natural disasters--such as floods, fires, and storms--that had historically been dealt with entirely by state and local governments.[[1]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/04/Federalizing-Disasters-Weakens-FEMA-and-Hurts-Americans-Hit-by-Catastrophes#_ftn1) Because of this federalization of routine disasters, two consequences emerged. First, many state and local governments cut funding to their own emergency management, thereby rendering themselves less prepared to handle natural disasters. Second, FEMA spends too much time responding to routine natural disasters and not enough time preparing for catastrophic natural disasters--such as hurricanes, earthquakes, or volcanic eruptions, which could have a national impact--thereby increasing the likelihood that the federal response for the next catastrophic event will be insufficient. Examining the recovery efforts in Louisiana in the five years since Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans and many Gulf Coast communities, a third consequence of FEMA's federalization of natural disasters has become evident: Vital resources are increasingly diverted to responses to routine natural disasters. Congress should establish clear requirements that limit the situations in which federal emergency declarations can be issued, while eliminating certain types of disasters from FEMA's portfolio altogether. These actions, coupled with changes in the public assistance program that reflect the on-the-ground fiscal challenges of the affected areas, would help states and localities to better recover when catastrophe strikes. **Sizing Up the Problem** Unless one has personally experienced a catastrophe, one cannot fathom the depth and breadth of the devastation that can occur. Hurricane Katrina, by any measurable standard, was a catastrophe. Based on FEMA's top ten list of costliest disasters since 1954, Hurricane Katrina is by far the most expensive.[[2]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/04/Federalizing-Disasters-Weakens-FEMA-and-Hurts-Americans-Hit-by-Catastrophes#_ftn2) In fact, the recovery cost for Hurricane Katrina will be more than the cumulative costs for the other nine disasters on the list combined. Hurricane Rita, which struck 30 days after Katrina, is fourth on the top ten list. Hurricanes Gustav and Ike (which only barely missed the top ten list), struck Louisiana three years later. This means that Louisiana is now recovering from the collective damages of four of the worst natural disasters in recorded history. The recovery efforts have overwhelmed the local communities, the state of Louisiana, and the federal government. Funding from FEMA's Public Assistance Grant Program (in operation since 1988) for Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita is estimated to be over $12 billion. The average total Public Assistance Obligation funding per major disaster is only $58 million.[[3]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/04/Federalizing-Disasters-Weakens-FEMA-and-Hurts-Americans-Hit-by-Catastrophes#_ftn3) Louisiana has 16 individual government agencies that each receive more than $58 million in funding, and at least three entities that each receive more than $500 million in funding. More than 22,000 projects rely on funding from the Public Assistance Grant Program for repairs of damaged property. Of these, 10,994 projects are categorized as "large projects," requiring at least $55,600 each. All 120 public school campuses in the city of New Orleans were damaged or destroyed during Hurricane Katrina and will require an estimated $2.6 billion to restore. The Louisiana Office of Facility Planning and Control is responsible for the repairs or replacement of more than 1,700 damaged facilities. More than 25,000 homes and business were destroyed in a five-parish area. Only one building remained standing in Cameron Parish in the wake of Hurricane Rita. Roughly 80 percent of New Orleans was inundated by toxic waters for several weeks. Nearly every fire station and police station in the parishes surrounding New Orleans was destroyed or rendered functionally impaired. In the aftermath of a disaster, the focus is normally on response--saving lives and property. But recovery, which follows thereafter, can be a much more difficult process--restoring services and attempting to make the community operate again-- and it is bewildering to even know where to begin. Local staff has been decimated, operating revenues are dramatically reduced, rumors and confusion abound, andeverything is a political priority. A period of chaos and frustration is inevitable as food and water are scarce, there is no electricity to operate air conditioners in 98 degree heat, fuel and pharmaceuticals are difficult or impossible to locate, and shelters are overcrowded and looting threatens to spiral out of control. Eventually, order is restored, the local workforce begins to return, and state and federal support arrives. Next, the daunting task ahead begins to materialize and the really hard work starts: Community by community, damage assessments proceed and recovery strategies and priorities begin to take shape. Sooner, rather than later, the stark reality sets in that such a large-scale recovery program is heavily reliant on the federal government through the Public Assistance Grant Program as a primary source of funding.

\*\*\*Credibility Defense

Even if the US lost credibility from Katrina, credibility is regenerative

1AC Author Gaines-Ross (Doctorate in political strategy, chief reputation strategist) 2012

(Dr. Leslie Gaines-Ross, “Reputation Matters,” 2012, <http://www.europeanbusinessreview.com/?p=356>) //CL

As Hurricane Katrina tragically demonstrated, losing reputation is a defining moment for a company, country, institution, or individual. Benjamin Franklin once advised that ”glass, china, and reputation are easily cracked, and never well mended.” Franklin was only partially correct. Yes, reputations are inherently fragile and can tumble without warning overnight. However, the repair process has greatly improved since the eighteenth century. Today, companies can expect to do more than merely patch a tattered reputation back together. Rebuilding a strong reputation is well within the realm of possibility. If the right steps are taken, reputation restoration is likely.

\*\*\*Soft Power Defense

Single issues not key to soft power – perceptions change slowly

Gray, International Politics at Reading, 11 [COLIN S. GRAY is Professor of International Poli- tics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England. He worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London), and at Hudson Institute (Croton-on-Hudson, NY) before founding the Na- tional Institute for Public Policy, a defense-oriented think tank in the Washington, DC, area. Dr. Gray served for 5 years in the Reagan administration on the President’s General Advisory Committee on Arms SSI Monograph HARD POWER AND SOFT POWER: THE UTILITY OF MILITARY FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY Colin S. Gray April 2011]

The error lies in the search for, and inevitable finding of, “golden keys” and “silver bullets” to resolve current versions of en- during problems**.** Soft-power salesmen have a potent product-mix to sell, but they fail to appreciate the real- ity that American soft power is a product essentially unalterable over a short span of years. As a country with a cultural or civilizational brand that is unique and mainly rooted in deep historical, geographical, and ideational roots, America is not at liberty to emu- late a major car manufacturer and advertise an exten- sive and varied model range of persuasive soft-power profiles. Of course, some elements of soft power can be emphasized purposefully in tailored word and deed. However, foreign perceptions of the United States are no more developed from a blank page than the American past can be retooled and fine-tuned for contemporary advantage. Frustrating though it may be, a country cannot easily escape legacies from its past.

Solvency Frontline

Status quo geospatial data is insufficient – improving interoperability will not solve the impacts

FCC 05

(State CIO IT Council IT Strategic Plan Committee, “CALIFORNIA GIS STRATEGIC PLAN”, April 1, 2005, http://gio.ca.gov/docs/State\_GIS\_Strategic\_Plan\_v2a.pdf

Unfortunately, quality geospatial data to support effective state government is lacking in California. Quality data—data that is up-to-date, consistent, accurate, complete and accessible—is expensive to develop and maintain, especially for large and diverse landscapes as in California. Because of fragmentation in management and absence of coordination, the state has no program or process to coordinate the access, capture, and maintenance of quality geospatial data.

#### **Interoperability risks**

Jon Collins (author @ Freeform Dynamics) 5/10/10

(“Standards and interoperability: Are you backing the right horse?”, <http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/05/10/standards_and_interoperability/>) chip

Inefficiency is the result of poor interoperability, as costs of keeping things up and running, or indeed, adapting systems to meet new requirements, can quickly escalate should the necessary interfaces or standards be absent. It’s worth pointing out that interoperability can easily be broken with a few bad decisions at the design stage.¶ For example, I remember working with a company that had problems with a certain open source application server, due to a contractor taking it upon himself to extend the code in order to add a few custom enhancements. You can imagine the wasted effort that went into retrofitting the ‘enhancements’ into subsequent releases, particularly once he no longer worked for the organisation.¶ Interoperability is desirable but it is not an absolute, just as it is not possible to design a single device that can meet every need. There will always be a place for proprietary solutions, particularly if they work extremely well, and the value derived from them is significantly greater than any ‘interoperable’ equivalent. Equally, commercial vendors answerable to their shareholders (that’s just about all of them) will always be looking after number one – interoperability and standards are a means to a largely financial end.¶ On this note, it is important for end-user organisations to be discerning, not to mention a little suspicious when it comes to matters of interoperability. Vendors across the board will claim their own products work ‘better together’ (with the implication that running a multi-vendor, best-of-breed environment will never be as good) but you should keep an eye on both the short-and long-term costs of any lock-in this implies. This is the case from traditional application stacks (“our app works better on our database”), and newer online models, many of which still pay scant regard to matters of data accessibility or portability.¶ Due diligence is key when buying and deploying IT systems and services, in terms of both what you need a system to do now, and what you might need it to do in the future. A few questions asked early on around interoperability can go a long way; otherwise, by the time you find you have backed the wrong horse, it may be too late to do much about it

Inherency

Status quo solves the plan – substantial efforts and regulation

ERIC 10

(Emergency Response Interoperability Center, “Emergency Response Interoperability Center (ERIC) Information Sheet”, 2010, <http://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/docs/ERIC_Info_Sheet_09072010.pdf>) aw

The Emergency Response Interoperability Center (ERIC) is a division within the Public Safety Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB), in the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). ERIC is responsible for implementing interoperability standards and developing technical and operational procedures for the 700 MHz nationwide interoperable public safety broadband wireless network. Recommended by the National Broadband Plan, ERIC’s mission is to ensure nationwide operability and interoperability by developing, recommending and administering policy goals, objectives, rules, regulations, programs and plans with assistance from several stakeholders. ERIC fulfills its mission by working within the PSHSB and the FCC to enable the adoption of rules and regulations that governs the technical interoperability of the nationwide interoperable public safety broadband network.

Off-Case

\*\*\*Privates Solvency

The private sector should advance remote sensing satellites

Hudgins 97

(Edward L., Director of Regulatory Studies, Cato Institute, “NASA and Mission to Planet Earth”,Testimony before the House Committee on Science, 3-19,http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=12406) aw

A second reason for not reauthorizing Mission to Planet Earth is that this program continues to cement NASA and the government in exactly the mode of operation that discourages private sector development of space infrastructure, and that in part accounts for the fact that we do not have space stations and Moon bases at this time. If a government agency, say, EPA, needs data, it should purchase the data, not the hardware, from the private sector. Government agencies should not be in the business of launching remote sensing satellites into space nor owning those satellites. There are private sector providers that could collect the data, based on bids submitted to the agency wishing the information. This approach would help in the development of for profit, private sector alternatives to government functions. Again, consider NASA's history of protecting its budgets by freezing out true private sector alternatives. In the 1970s and early 1980s, has private launch companies were developing and offering creative and innovative services, federal agencies were prohibited from contracting with these enterprises. If in those years NASA had begun to contract out for services, to get out of the freight hauling business and back to science, we likely would have a vibrant private launch sector offering services for much less than NASA's cost for such efforts. In the 1980s Space Industries of Houston offered to launch a mini-station for $750 million that could take government and other payloads a decade before the planned NASA station. The government would not contract with this private supplier.

\*\*\*Politics Link

Space operations unpopular - budget and debt

Schmitt (Former US Senator New Mexico, former Apollo Astronaut, aerospace and private enterprise consultant, member of the new Committee of Correspondence) 5/24/11

(Harrison, “Former Senator Schmitt Proposes Dismantling of NASA and Creation of a New, Deep Space Exploration Agency,” 2011, <http://aerospaceblog.wordpress.com/2011/05/24/former-senator-schmitt-proposes-dismantling-of-nasa-and-creation-of-a-new-deep-space-exploration-agency>) //CL

How notions of leadership have changed since Eisenhower and Kennedy! Immense difficulties now have been imposed on the Nation and NASA by the budgetary actions and inactions of the Bush and Obama Administrations between 2004 and 2012. Space policy gains relevance today comparable to 50 years ago as the dangers created by the absence of a coherent national space policy have been exacerbated by subsequent adverse events. Foremost among these events have been the Obama Administration’s and the Congress’s spending and debt spree, the continued aggressive rise of China, and, with the exception of operations of the Space Shuttle and International Space Station, the loss of focus and leadership within NASA headquarters.

#### Political strife over geospacial orbit

Anthony Kimery (Online Editor and Manager of KMD Media's Online Media Division, respected award-winning editor and journalist who has covered national and global security, intelligence and defense issues for three decades, received the National Imagery and Mapping Agency Director’s Award for Excellence, and was a Fund for Investigative Journalism grant recipient, served as managing editor of SOURCES, a San Francisco-based security intelligence news service, a founding contributing writer for Homeland Defense Journal and a contributing writer for Insight, a weekly current affairs magazine that was published by The Washington Times Co. He's also written for The Washington Post, Wired, Vietnam, Common Cause, SAGA, and the Investigative Reporters & Editors Journal) 5/3/12

(“Congress Fails To Resolve Geospatial Info-Sharing Issues”, <http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/daily-news-briefings/single-article/congress-fails-to-resolve-geospatial-info-sharing-issues/26758fecd31bc091147e63c94ca8ffbf.html>) chip

Congress has recognized the challenge of coordinating and sharing geospatial data from the local, county, and state level with the national level, and vice versa, but “challenges to coordinating how geospatial data are acquired and used -- collecting duplicative data sets, for example -- at the local, state and federal levels, in collaboration with the private sector, are not yet resolved,” concluded a new Congressional Research Service (CRS) report.¶ ¶ Geospatial data can be vitally important to first responders and emergency managers, for example, during times of crisis – including a catastrophic terrorist attack or major natural disaster.¶ ¶ The report, Issues and Challenges for Federal Geospatial Information, written by Peter Folger, a CRS specialist in energy and natural resources policy, stated that, “The cost to the federal government of gathering and coordinating geospatial information has ... been an ongoing concern. As much as 80 percent of government information has a geospatial component, according to various sources,” and “the federal government’s role has changed from being a primary provider of authoritative geospatial information to coordinating and managing geospatial data and facilitating partnerships.”¶ ¶ While “Congress explored issues of cost, duplication of effort and coordination of geospatial information in hearings” during the 108th Congress, Folger noted that lawmakers still face considerable challenges with regard to coordinating how geospatial data are acquired and used by local, state and federal entities in collaboration with the private sector.¶ ¶ The report stated that “two bills introduced in the 112th Congress, HR 1620 and HR 4322, would address aspects of duplication and coordination of geospatial information.”¶ ¶ Folger wrote, “The federal government has recognized the need to organize and coordinate the collection and management of geospatial data since at least 1990, when the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) revised Circular A-16 to establish the Federal Geographic Data Committee (FGDC) and to promote the coordinated use, sharing and dissemination of geospatial data nationwide.