# REPS TOOLBOX – 7WK SENIORS AHFM

**Organization – reps do/don’t shape reality is at the top then the rest is alphabetized. In each section the neg cards are usually before the aff cards.**

# \*\*\*REPS

# Reps Shape Reality/Policy

**Reality is a discursive construct – our understanding of the world is shaped by the way we describe it**

**Chia, 00** – Robert, University of Essex (“Discourse Analysis as Organizational Analysis,” Organization, Vol. 7, No. 3, 200, http://geocities.ws/visisto/Biblioteca/Chia\_Discourse.pdf)RK

The question of discourse, and the manner in which it shapes our epistemology and understanding of organization, are central to an expanded realm of organizational analysis. It is one which recognizes that the modern world we live in and the social artefacts we rely upon to successfully negotiate our way through life, are always already institutionalized effects of primary organizational impulses. Social objects and phenomena such as ‘the organization’, ‘the economy’, ‘the market’ or even ‘stakeholders’ or ‘the weather’, do not have a straightforward and unproblematic existence independent of our **discursively-shaped understandings**. Instead, they have to be forcibly carved out of the undifferentiated flux of raw experience and conceptually fixed and labelled so that they can become the common currency for communicational exchanges. Modern social reality, with its all-too-familiar features, has to be continually constructed and sustained through such aggregative discursive acts of reality-construction. The idea that **reality**, as we know it, **is socially constructed**, has become an accepted truth. What is less commonly understood is how this reality gets constructed in the first place and what sustains it. For the philosopher William James, our social reality is always already an abstraction. Our lifeworld is an undifferentiated flux of fleeting sense-impressions and it is out of this brute aboriginal flux of lived experience that attention carves out and conception names: . . . in the sky ‘constellations’, on earth ‘beach’, ‘sea’, ‘cliff’, ‘bushes’, ‘grass’. Out of time we cut ‘days’ and ‘nights’, ‘summers’ and ‘winters’. We say what each part of the sensible continuum is, and all these abstract whats are concepts. (James, 1948: 50, emphasis original) It is through this process of differentiating, fixing, naming, labelling, classifying and relating—all intrinsic processes of discursive organization—that social reality is systematically constructed. Discourse, as multitudinal and heterogeneous forms of material inscriptions or verbal utterances occurring in space–time, is what aggregatively produces a particular version of social reality to the **exclusion of other possible worlds.** It is therefore inappropriate to think of ‘organizational discourse’, for instance, as discourse about some pre-existing, thing-like social object called ‘the organization’. To do so is to commit what the mathematician-turned-philosopher Alfred North Whitehead (1926/1985) called the ‘Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness’ (p. 64) whereby our socially constructed conceptions of reality are unreflexively **mistaken for reality itself.** It is this fallacy which has led to either the rejection of the study of discourse as being inappropriate to organizational analysis, or the more popular formulation of ‘Organizational Discourse’ as discourse about organizations or about what goes on within organizations. Both claims miss the true significance of discourse analysis as a central feature of organizational analysis. Such formulations miss the essential point that discourse acts at a far more constitutive level to form social objects such as ‘organizations’ by circumscribing selected parts of the flux of phenomenal experiences and fixing their identity so that it becomes possible to talk about them as if they were naturally existing social entities. This ‘entitative’ form of thinking, which is widespread in organizational theorizing, conveniently forgets the fact that organizational action is first and foremost an ontological activity. Viewed from this perspective, the apparent solidity of social phenomena such as ‘the organization’ derives from the stabilizing effects of generic discursive processes rather than from the presence of independently existing concrete entities. In other words, phrases such as ‘the organization’ do not refer to an extra-linguistic reality. Instead they are conceptualized abstractions to which it has become habitual for us to refer as independently existing ‘things’. ‘Organizational Discourse’, therefore, must be understood, not in the narrow sense previously discussed, but in its wider ontological sense as the bringing into existence of an ‘organized’ or stabilized state. Discourse works to create some sense of stability, order and predictability and to thereby produce a sustainable, functioning and liveable world from what would otherwise be an amorphous, fluxing and undifferentiated reality indifferent to our causes. This it does through the material inscriptions and utterances that form the basis of language and representation. Through the regularizing and routinization of social exchanges, the formation and institutionalization of codes of behaviour, rules, procedures and practices and so on, the organizational world that we have come to inhabit acquires its apparent externality, objectivity and structure. The study of organizational discourse, and the way it shapes our habits of thought, by legitimizing particular objects of knowledge and influencing our epistemological preferences, is crucial for a deeper appreciation of the underlying motivational forces shaping the decisional priorities of both organizational theorists and practitioners alike. For, by organizing our preferred modes of thought, organizational discourse works as a relatively unconscious force to restrict vision and to thereby **inhibit the exploration of genuinely alternative modes** of conception and action. But since language itself, as a form of discourse, is quintessentially a modern method for organizing thought, we can only begin to fully appreciate the fundamental character of organization by first examining the workings of language itself. Thus, the formation of discursive modalities, the legitimating of objects of knowledge and the shaping of meanings and their attachment to social objects all form part of that wider organizational concern which we call ‘discourse analysis’, and which we argue here is a legitimate form of organizational analysis in the wider sense defined earlier. Since language is that prevailing means for codifying and hence rendering ‘articulable’ that realm of sense-experience which actively resists codification and representation, it must logically be our first port of call in our search for a deeper understanding of the meaning and effect of discourse as organization. But this poses a problem since we can only use language to express our understanding of the organizational character of language itself. As such, the study of discourse as organization needs to be approached elliptically rather than in the traditional direct and assertive manner. We need to begin by referral to that ‘pristine experience, unwarped by the sophistication of theory’ (Whitehead, 1929: 240) in order to rediscover the meaning and effect of organizational action. This, in turn, demands that we start off with a strategy of analysis which acknowledges the primacy of vagueness or undifferentiatedness as the aboriginal ‘stuff’ of reality. The long-held Aristotelian belief that language in general and linguistic categories in particular are fully adequate to the task of describing reality as it is in itself must be set aside if we are to begin to fully appreciate the workings of discourse as organization. By way of a kind of metaphorical explanation, Hans Holbein the Younger’s The Ambassadors, which was painted in 1533, provides a convenient leitmotif for the kind of oblique strategy required for approaching this ontological issue of organizational discourse. The painting depicts two finely clad gentlemen in traditional ambassadorial attire standing on either side of a display shelf containing books, scrolls, the globe, geometrical instruments, musical instruments and so forth. The two figures appear frozen, stiffened in their magnificent adornment. In front, cutting diagonally across the painting, as if put there as an afterthought, is a strange, oblique and unidentifiable object which interrupts and distracts our attention from the main contents of the painting. This painting has aroused endless controversies regarding its meaning and significance. One explanation which has been offered (Lacan, 1979: 92) and which suits our illustrative purpose here is that the ‘ambassadors’ are not ambassadors in the ordinary sense. Instead, the artefacts displayed suggests that the artist intended them to represent the triumph and vanity of formal, scientific knowledge. These are ambassadors of the Enlightenment. There is, however, the odd-shaped figure in the front which interrupts our visual field. The interesting thing about this particular unidentifiable object is that it can only be seen obliquely by positioning oneself at an angle of about twenty seven degrees from the surface of the painting. At this position, the object becomes immediately recognizable as a human skull. It is what, in art, is called an anamorphic figure. It cannot be seen frontally, but only from a side glance. The significance of the anamorphic skull cutting across the triumphal achievements of order, rationality and progress is a reminder that beneath all these achievements lie the murky depths of the unknown, the uncertain and the unpredictable. There is an intrinsic and essential vagueness which haunts our every achievement and which refuses to go away. This is the undifferentiated flux of our pre-linguistic experience. And it is out of this undifferentiated potentiality that discourse acts to produce the pattern of regularities that constitutes what we call organization. The claim that discourse is essentially performative is indisputable. We need discourse to order our world and to make it more predictable and hence more liveable. Yet, beneath this appearance of organizational orderliness lie material resistances which we have to constantly find ways of temporarily overcoming. These are areas of our pure experiences which language and discourse are not able to reach. It is this vague awareness which circumscribes our every attempt at organization. This awareness of the limitations and incompetence of discourse or utterance as the defining mode of being have been common tenets in philosophical thought and in the works of artists, poets and mystics in the West as well as ‘throughout Indian Brahaminism, Chinese Taoism and Japanese Shinto’ (Nishitani, 1982: 31). Bergson (1903/1955: 22–4) for one insists that all intellectual analysis reduces the phenomenon apprehended into pre-established symbols which necessarily place us ‘outside’ the phenomenon itself. Analysis thus leaves us with a relative kind of knowledge. On the other hand, absolute knowledge can only be given in an intuition which is necessarily ‘inexpressible’ in symbolic terms because of the uniqueness of that experience. Likewise, in the East, there is a long history of scepticism regarding the adequacy of language and discourse. Chuang Tzu, for instance, urges us to grasp that which lies beyond words when he says: Symbols are to express ideas. When ideas have been understood, symbols should be forgotten. Words are to interpret thought. When thoughts have been absorbed, words stop . . . Only those who can take the fish and forget the net are worthy to seek the truth. (Chuang Tzu, in Chang, 1963: 43) Whitehead (1933) also recognized the inadequacies of language in communicating deeper truths. He writes: Language delivers its evidence in three chapters, one on the meanings of words, another on the meanings enshrined in grammatical form, and the third on the meanings beyond individual words and beyond grammatical form, meanings miraculously revealed in great literature. (Whitehead, 1933: 263) In consequence the more intuitively and aesthetically minded have opted to privilege as more fundamental and profound that which lies beyond the ordinary grasp of language and logic and which they deemed to be only approachable through a complex, spiralling form of oblique utterances which merely point to or allude to an ultimate reality beyond the realms of intellection. There is a general antipathy to overly direct and assertive language in everyday discourse and in place of the insistence on straight-line clarity and distinctiveness in logical argumentation, there is a preference for circumnavigating an issue, tossing out subtle hints that permit only a careful listener or observer to surmise where the hidden or unspoken core of the question lies. Communication of thought is often indirect, suggestive, and symbolic rather than descriptive and precise. This cautious indirectness, as a deliberate intellectual strategy of communication, is exemplified by Holbein’s ‘ambassadors’. Yet, despite the basic inadequacies of discourse to communicate deeper truths, there is little doubt that it serves a purposeful role in our lives by transforming a difficult and infrangible reality into a resource at our disposal. Through its strategy of differentiation and simple-location, identification and classification, regularizing and routinization, discursive action works to translate the difficult and the intransigent, the remote or resistant, the intractable or obdurate into a form that is more amenable to functional deployment. This is the fundamental role of discourse as organization. Discourse is what constitutes our social world. The etymological meaning of the term ‘discourse’ is ‘to run, to enter, to and fro’. In other words, to discourse is to run to and fro and in that process create a path, a course, a pattern of regularities out of which human existence can be made more fixed, secure and workable. So discourse is first and fundamentally the organizing of social reality. From this perspective, the idea of a discourse about organizations is an oxymoron. Discourse itself is a form of organization and, therefore, organizational analysis is intrinsically discourse analysis. Organization should not be thought of as something performed by pre-existing ‘agents’. Instead the agents themselves, as legitimized objects of knowledge, must be understood as effects in themselves. The identity of the individual agent is constructed in the very act of organizing. The tendency to construe individuals as somehow prior to or free from organizational forces overlooks the ontological role of acts of organizing. From the point of view emphasized by this paper, we ourselves are organized as we engage in acts of organizing. My identity is established in the very act of differentiating and detaching myself (i.e. the process of individuation) from my surroundings through material inscriptions and verbal utterances. If we begin to think in these terms rather than the conventional preoccupations of organizational analysis, then instead of thinking about a theory of organizations, it might be more meaningful, with this post-representational understanding, to think about a social theory of organizing which would be actually practically useful and relevant to practising managers. It would help practitioners understand better how they have come to develop deeply entrenched habits of thought which unnecessarily circumscribed the possibilities for action. If discourse analysis helps us understand how societies construct their social worlds, how the flux and flow of the world is arrested and regularized and then translated into pragmatic use, how societal/global trends shift and so on, isn’t that eminently, instrumentally usable?

**Discourse determines policy outcomes**

**Detraz and Betsill, 08** - \*Nicole, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Colorado State University, and \*\*Michele M., Associate Professor of Political Science at Colorado State University (“Climate Change and Environmental Security: For Whom the Discourse Shifts,” Paper Presented At The 49th Annual Meeting Of The International Studies Association, 3/26/08, http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/2/5/2/5/9/pages252596/p252596-1.php)RK

A discourse-analytic approach is appropriate in that **discourses are powerful forces within policy debates**. Discourses can be thought of as “specific ensembles of ideas, concepts and categorization that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer 1995: 45). This definition suggests that discourses typically involve agency, meaning that individuals can actively shape discourses. It also suggests that discourses are constantly-evolving entities that can be shaped over time. Additionally, examining discourses can shed light on various **power relations** within an issue area. We can understand power relations as struggles “over interests, which are exercised, reflected, maintained and resisted through a variety of modalities, extents and degrees of explicitness” (Lazar 2005: 9). For example, dominant discourses are those that are most likely to be in line with the interests of powerful factions of society. It is unlikely that a discourse that is not in the interest of the powerful will actually be used in policy debates on salient issues. We can use discourse analysis to understand which discourses have made it to the level of policymaking for an issue like environmental change, and what this means for both the powerful and less-powerful in society. Litfin (1999) argues that discourses play an important role in shaping which policies are likely to emerge for a given issue area. According to Haas (2002: 1), Discourses **impart meaning to an ambiguous policy domain.** Discourses are important because **they institutionalize cognitive frames.** They identify issues as problems, set agendas, and define the salient aspects of issues as problems for decision-makers. Each discourse or perspective rests on different assumptions, goals and values… and suggests different policy solutions. They have the effect of defining provocations or crises. As this suggests, the use of one discourse over another has important implications, both theoretically and practically.

**Political processes are shaped by representational practices – interest based, input-output analysis fails to account for how policymaking actually works**

**Cambrosio et. al, 91** – Alberto, Associate Professor of Humanities and Social Studies in Medicine at McGill University, with Camille Limoges, Professor of History of Science and Social Assessment of Technology at the Universite du Quebec, and Denyse Pronovost, Research Assistant (“Analyzing Science Policy-Making: Political Ontology or Ethnography?: A Reply to Kleinman,” Social Studies of Science, Vol. 21, No. 4, November 1991, JSTOR)RK

We are very grateful to Daniel Lee Kleinman for providing us with an opportunity to clarify some key issues.' Like several of our colleagues, our critic seems to think that the 'new' sociology of science2 is either irrelevant to an understanding of the 'social' issues that matter, such as the issues about 'power', or that it ought to be redeemed by grafting its (social) constructionist approach on to the traditional analytic discourse dominated by such entities as social groups, social classes, vested interests, and the like. Not so. In his critique of our text,3 Kleinman displays a paradigmatic blindness to what we were up to. The opening sentence of his text appears in this regard exquisitely revealing: 'I read with interest the paper by Alberto Cambrosio and his colleagues on the politics of biotechnology policy-making in Quebec'.4 On the politics of biotechnology policy-making? But we never wrote such a piece! As its title made clear, we authored a paper on the ethnography of science policy-making. This is more than a mere terminological twist. Rather, it points to Kleinman's lack of interest in reading our text for what it is- and, more importantly, to his redefining, in his own terms, of the very object of our study.5 Having so redefined our endeavour, Kleinman can safely point to what he perceives as our basic failure, namely the failure to 'conceptualize the social struggle',6 and to explain 'why one side in a struggle... wins and another loses'.7 Kleinman's use of the notion of 'side' is enlightening. Borrowing from his own rhetoric, we might point out that he 'fails to ask' whether these 'sides' exist prior to the beginning of the processes under examination. This is a question he does not even consider because, from his point of view, 'sides' are a given.8 This is the point of view of political ontology. From an ethnographic viewpoint, however, 'sides' are as much a construction as any other - and, therefore, their positing and bounding are **consequences**, not causes, **of representational practices** in an agonistic field. But there is more: as shown by various passages in his text, Kleinman not only 'knows' beforehand that there are different 'sides', but he also 'knows' how those sides should behave. For instance, he asks 'why did they take different positions?',9 deploring that we do not provide any answer to this question. But how does he know that, in the case we studied, actors actually did take sides and enunciated correspondingly different positions? What about a situation in which a successful enrolment does not result in the construction of different 'sides' and conflicting positions?'? The evocation of our 'failure' here rests on nothing but Kleinman's programmatic revival of a political ontology which treats actual empirical findings as somewhat superfluous or at best confirmatory: 'social struggle' is an a priori notion, the central piece of a sort of watered-down Marxism, presumed apt to account for any 'social' or 'political' process." And the outcome of this shadow boxing is precisely what we aimed to avoid - that is, the blackboxing of the science policy-making process itself. This form of black-boxing is actually more pernicious than the traditional one. The latter, by looking only at the inputs and outputs of the policy process, simply ignored its constitutive dynamics. Kleinman's proposal, while also disregarding the actual public administration policy-making process, claims to have found the right tools for opening up the black box. In Kleinman's 'new agenda' the central analytical task is to explain why one side wins and another loses: this is what the opening of the science policy-making black box would amount to; if this approach succeeds in opening anything (and that is at best dubious) we suggest that it is the wrong box. That Kleinman's 'new agenda' would deflect analysis from the actual construction process of science policy is made clear again by his assertion that 'we cannot understand the nature of the representational practices. . . unless the scientific (policy) field is conceptualized as a complex configuration of institutions and power relations cross-cut by, and overlapping with, the economic, the academic, and the political'.'2 This again amounts to starting with already given, delineated and unquestioned macro-entities or domains structuring an explanatory grid. In our view, opening the black box and accounting for the policy-making process **starts with** the representational practices themselves, as they are being locally constructed. Our goal may be limited, as Kleinman rightly underlines, but in our opinion it accounts in a fuller way for agencies which need not be a priori accepted as explanatory resources. These agencies and domains are defined and bounded through representational practices. Kleinman is so involved in the prospect of displaying general causalities that he actually discovers one where we did not put any. What he unravels is a 'reason buried' in the paper,"3 apparently amounting to some sort of textual authority resulting in the creation of an intertextual web. He then goes on, rather predictably, to claim that we do not account for the sources of that authority and, therefore, that by not following the causality chain back to the prime mover we provide an incomplete explanation. Once again, his argument goes astray, since we are not in the business of providing explanations, especially not explanations grounded in political ontology. Such explanations become objects of interest to us only when they are spelled out by the actors under analysis, and, even then, as yet another piece of datum, not as an analytical resource. A more general point could be developed here concerning both the attempts at causal explanation and the use of a peculiar construct, 'interests', as the causal factor. Indeed, Kleinman invites us to understand the behaviour of actors by 'thinking about their interests'.'4 Since this approach has been repeatedly and in apposite manners criticized and found at fault, including in this journal,'5 we will not indulge in unnecessary repetitions. We suspect, however, that it is because we 'devote little attention to the interests of the actors' (indeed!) that Kleinman makes the curious critique that we 'seem to pay little attention to the actors themselves'.'6 This is a rather surprising assertion: it is precisely our taking the actors seriously that actually prompted us to produce detailed lists of their original formulations.'7 Would assigning interests to actors so that their behaviour becomes reducible to these interests be the only way to show interest in actors? We confess that we do not find the prospect very interesting. But maybe we are not speaking of the same actors. Our focus was on the actors as we encountered them during our fieldwork. These include, of course, not only individual human beings but also 'macro-actors', if and when they were constituted through the science policy process. Kleinman refers to a different kind of 'actors', such as 'sides', 'business', the 'chemical and biotechnology industry', 'academic scientists' - groups or entities the presence and effectiveness of which, on the basis of his ontology, ought, it seems, to be taken for granted. This may be why Kleinman overlooks one of the central points of our paper, namely the description of the dynamics, involving spokespersons, through which the relevant actors are constituted, as well as micro-actors transformed into macro-actors.'8 But, of course, as we have already mentioned, our critic shows little interest in understanding what goes on within the black box of policy-making. He is already satisfied that what matters unfolds elsewhere, through the endless repetition of processes whose basic principle - the primacy of 'social struggle', the lurking of powerful 'interests' behind social conflict, and so on -.we already ought to know.'9 If our critic were right, we would bear heavy responsibility in the demise of the constructivist research programme. Indeed, despite his acknowledging of a 'tremendous debt to recent work in the sociology of science', Kleinman declares that the 'shortcomings of such work make it clear that it is time to go beyond it'.20 Our tumbling will have opened the way for the rise of the 'new agenda'. It is somewhat ironic, however, that Kleinman marks out the work of Pierre Bourdieu as 'useful' in 'all these areas' of concern on the 'new agenda'.2' While some of Bourdieu's notions have, in a not so distant past, been deemed useful by some sociologist of science,22 most of the latter have since moved away from this brand of sociological reductionism.23 Could it be then that the 'new agenda' is in fact quite old? Much older than Bourdieu? As old as political ontology?

**Reps shape reality – this link turns their policy making arguments**

**Greenhalgh and Russell, 09** – \*Trisha, Professor of Primary Health Care at University College, London and \*\*Jill, senior lecturer in public policy at Queen Mary University, London (“Evidence-based policymaking: a critique,” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, vol. 52, no. 2, Spring 2009, Academic OneFile)RK

A critical reading of this debate suggests that setting priorities for health care is a discursive process (that is, it involves argument and debate). The policy-as-discourse perspective embraces a number of approaches that are centrally concerned with how policy problems are represented. Policymakers are not simply responding to "problems" that exist in the community, they are actively framing problems and thereby shaping what can be thought about and acted upon. According to Stone (1988): "The essence of policymaking in political communities [is] the struggle over ideas. Ideas are at the centre of all political conflict .... Each idea is an argument, or more accurately, a collection of arguments in favour of different ways of seeing the world" (p. 11). Within this conceptualization of policymaking, the understanding of "what evidence is" takes on a very different meaning. Evidence can no longer be considered as abstract, disembodied knowledge separate from its social context: There is no such entity as "the body of evidence." There are simply (more or less) competing (re)constructions of evidence **able to support almost any position.** Much of what is called evidence is, in fact, a contested domain, constituted in the debates and controversies of opposing viewpoints in search of ever more compelling arguments. (Wood, Ferlie, and Fitzgerald 1998, p. 1735) A number of empirical studies of health policy as discourse have been undertaken, though in general, these are not well understood or widely cited in mainstream health services research. Steve Maguire (2002), for example, describes a longitudinal case study of the development and introduction of drugs for the treatment of AIDS in the United States from 1981 to 1994. Detailed analysis of extensive field notes and narrative interviews with people with AIDS, activists, researchers, industry executives, and policymakers led his team to challenge three assumptions in the evidence-into-policy literature: (1) that there is a clear distinction between the "evidence producing" system and the "evidence adopting" system; (2) that the structure and operation of these systems are given, stable, and determinant of, rather than indeterminate and affected by, the adoption process; and (3) that the production of evidence precedes its adoption. Maguire's study found the opposite: that there was a fluid, dynamic, and reciprocal relationship between the different systems involved, and that activists "successfully opened up the black box of science" via a vibrant social movement which, over the course of the study, profoundly influenced the research agenda and the process and speed of gaining official approval for new drugs. For example, whereas the scientific community had traditionally set the gold standard as placebo controlled trials with hard outcome measures (such as death), the AIDS activists successfully persuaded them that placebo arms and "body count" trials were unethical in AIDS research, spurring a shift towards what is now standard practice in drug research--a new drug is compared with best conventional treatment, not placebo, and "surrogate outcomes" are generally preferred when researching potentially lethal conditions. The role of key individuals in reframing the issue ("hard outcomes" or "body counts") was crucial in determining what counted as best evidence and how this evidence was used in policymaking. Importantly, Maguire's fieldwork showed that AIDS activists did not simply "talk their way in" to key decision-making circles by some claim to an inherent version of what was true or right. Rather, they captured, and skillfully built upon, existing discourses within society, such as the emerging patients' rights movement and the epistemological debates already being held within the academic community that questioned the value of "clean" research trials (which only included "typical" and "compliant" patients without co-morbidity). They also collaborated strategically with a range of other stakeholders to achieve a common goal ("strange bedfellows ... pharmaceutical companies along with the libertarian, conservative right wing allied themselves with people with AIDS and gays" (p. 85). Once key individuals in the AIDS movement had established themselves as credible with press, public, and scientists, they could exploit this credibility powerfully: "their public comments on which trials made sense or which medications were promising could sink research projects" (p. 85). "Fair" Policymaking: A Process of Argumentation In summary, interpretivist and critical research on the nature of policymaking shows that it involves, in addition to the identification, evaluation, and use of research evidence, a complex process of framing, deliberation, negotiation, and collective judgment. Empirical research studies also suggest that this is a sophisticated and challenging process. In a qualitative research study of priority-setting committees in Ontario, for example, Singer and colleagues (2000) identified factors such as representation of multiple perspectives, opportunities for everyone to express views, transparency, and an explicit appeals process as key elements of fair decision making. An important dimension of this collective deliberation is the selection and presentation of evidence in a way that an audience will find credible and appealing. If we wish to better understand the deliberative processes involved in policymaking, and how evidence actually gets "talked into practice" (or not) at a micro level of social interaction, then we require a theoretical framework that places central focus on language, argumentation, and discourse. Philosophical work on argumentation can be traced back to Aristotle's classic Rhetoric. Aristotle classified rhetoric as a positive, scholarly activity and saw it as having three dimensions: logos (the argument itself--the "evidence" in modern parlance); ethos (the credibility of the speaker); and pathos (the appeal to emotions). Evidence-based perspectives on health-care policymaking tend to define the last two of these as undesirable "spin," to be systematically expunged so that the policymaking process can address "pure" evidence in an objective, dispassionate way. But an extensive literature from political science suggests that the "What should we do?" questions are addressed more effectively, not less, through processes of rhetorical argumentation (Fischer 2003; Majone 1989; Miller 2003; Stone 1988; Young 2000). Booth's (1974) definition of rhetoric as "the art of discovering warrantable beliefs and improving those beliefs in shared discourse," highlights the value of rhetoric in bringing to the fore the role of human judgment in policymaking. Rhetorical theory reminds us of the human agency involved in the use of evidence in policymaking, and indeed requires us to shift from equating rationality with EBM-type procedures to considering rationality as a situated, contingent human construction: "The constructive activity of rationality occurs through the discovery and articulation of good reasons for belief and action, activities that are fundamental to deliberation. Rationality concerns a process or activity (not a procedure) that guarantees criticism and change (not correctness)" (Miller 1990, p. 178). Sanderson (2004) suggests that this alternative conceptualization of rationality and focus on the deliberative processes of reason giving, argument, and judgment has much to offer to those around the policymaking table: we need to work within a broader conception of rationality to recognise the validity of the range of forms of intelligence that underpin "practical wisdom," to acknowledge the essential role of fallible processes of craft judgement in assembling what is to be accepted as "evidence," and to incorporate deliberation, debate and argumentation in relation to the ends of policy and the ethical and moral implications of alternative courses of action. From this perspective, the challenge faced by policy makers is seen not as a technical task of reducing uncertainty through the application of robust, objective evidence in the pursuit of more effective policies, but rather as a practical quest to resolve ambiguity through the application of what John Dewey calls "creative intelligence" in the pursuit of more appropriate policies and practice. (p. 376) A rhetorical perspective suggests that in allocating resources to publicly funded programs, for example, policymakers must first consider different framings of health problems (Schon and Rein 1990), then contextualize relevant evidence to particular local circumstances, and finally weigh this evidence-in-context against other evidence-in-context pertaining to competing policy issues. Is fertility a "medical need" or a "social expectation"? Is childhood obesity the result of "poor parenting" or of "obesogenic environments"? Is the withholding of an expensive drug for macular degeneration "denying sight-saving treatment to a defenseless pensioner" or "an attempt to allocate public resources equitably"? Once problems are framed, by what process might resources be fairly allocated between "infertility treatment," "parenting programs," "disincentivizing .junk food in schools," and "drugs for macular degeneration"?

**Reps shape how we analyze and form policies – their claims aren’t neutral and true but contestable**

**Van Efferink, 10** – Leonhardt, MSc in Financial Economics, MA in 'Geopolitics, Territory and Security,' working on a PhD at University of London, editor of ExploringGeopolitics (“Polar Partner or Poles Apart? How two US think tanks represent Russia,” PSA Graduate Network Conference, December 2010, http://www.psa.ac.uk/spgrp/51/2010/Ppr/PGC2\_Van%20EfferinkLeonhardt\_Polar\_Partners\_or\_Poles\_Apart\_PSA\_2010.pdf)RK

Methodology Informed by poststructuralism, we assume that “representations [of identity] and policy are mutually constitutive and discursively linked” (Hansen 2006, p. 28). Consequently, a think tank aims for consistency between its policy advice (“policy”) and its institutional context (proxy for “identity”) by using representations. this assumption is in line with the claim of Heritage (2010a) that its ideology forms the basis of its policy advice. Moreover, Brookings (Brookings, 2010b) has made it perfectly clear that its activities are meant to foster international cooperation. The second assumption is related to the first and concerns the position of the policy expert within a think tank: (Müller 2008, p. 326): “it is not the individual [i.e. policy expert] that structures and manipulates discourse but vice versa – discourses speak through the individual.” This assumption holds that the think tank’s institutional context (structure) conditions the autonomy of its policy expert to represent (agency). Alternatively, we could say that that “[i]n order to have their texts accepted as reasonable, geopoliticians [i.e. policy experts] have to draw upon discourses already granted hegemonic social acceptance [i.e. based on the think tank’s institutional context]” (Sharp 1993, p. 493). Our focus on institutional context is based on Dalby’s observation (1990a) that analysing geopolitical discourses requires an examination of the political circumstances, their sources and audiences and the process by which the discourse legitimises the authority of the source. In addition, Dodds (1994) suggests that texts about foreign policy are to be examined within several contexts such as the institutional setting. When interpreting text, we must consider the hermeneutics. According to Hans-Georg Gadamer (1989, p. 298), “the discovery of the true meaning of a text or a work of art is never finished; it is in fact an infinite process.” Gadamer was instrumental in the development of philosophical hermeneutics, which seeks to investigate the nature of human understanding. In his view, someone who analyses a text must be “aware of one’s own bias, so that the text can present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its own truth against one’s own [prejudices]” (ibid, p. 271-272). Our discourse analysis focuses on representations, informed by Dodds’ observation that (1994, p. 188) “[r]epresentational practices have increasingly been recognized as vital to the practices of foreign policy.” In addition, Agnew (2003, p. 7) argues that “**certain geopolitical representations underwrite specific policies**.” Next to representations (“what is being said about Russia?”), we assign meaning to lines of text by looking into representational practices (“how are things being said about Russia?”). These practices are relevant because “when something is recognized as a representational practice rather than an authoritative description, it can be treated as contentious” (Shapiro 1989, p. 20). We use a definition of discourse based on poststructuralism (Campbell 2007, p. 216): “a specific series of representations and practices through which meanings are produced, identities constituted, social relations established, and political... outcomes made more or less possible.” The usefulness of this definition also follows from its assumption that the think tanks’ representations are linked to both their institutional context (“identities”) and policy advice (“political outcomes”). Our study of discursive practices is informed by the work of three critical geopolitical scholars. First, we discuss analogies, labels and metaphors (Ó Tuathail 2002, 2006). Second, we search for cases of ‘geopolitical othering,’ identified by Dalby (1990a, p. 22/23) as “geopolitical processes of cultural dichotomizing, designating identity in distinction from Others.” This representational practice seeks to create a dualism in which a representation of one country means that the opposite is true for the other country. The practice implicitly suggests that the two countries have an entirely different set of values, one being “right” and the other “wrong”. Finally, we investigate the use of narrative closure which could take the form of referring to common truisms and presenting the complex reality “in easy to manage chunks” (Sharp 1993, p. 494). The practice leads to binary simplicity as the practice avoids complexity and problems that do not generate conclusions in terms of right or wrong. As a result, it dehistoricises, degeographicalises and depoliticises knowledge.

**Representations shape reality – they control communication and form identity**

**Sarrica and Contarello 4** (Muro Sarrica – Department of General Psychology at the University of Padova and Alberta Contarello – PhD, Department of Philosophy, Sociology, Education and Social Psychology, Section of Applied Psychology at the University of Padova “Peace, War and Conflict: Social Representations Shared by Peace Activists and Non-Activists,” September 2004, Vol. 41, No. 5 <http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/41/5/549>)//PC

The idea of social representations has its roots in Durkheim’s distinction between individual and collective representations, in structuralist anthropology and in Piaget’s distinction between childish operative thinking and adult formal thinking. Like collective representations, social represen- tations are shared within groups; just as in primitive cultures and in operative thinking, they are not based on logical rules. The underlying concept of the theory is that people refer to a reality that is socially con- structed, based on common agreement on what is real and what is not. Social represen- tations are thus defined, shared and used by groups and contribute to defining the environment in which the life of these groups and of their members takes place. Thus, they draw wider systems within which specific attitudes can develop (Doise, 1989). They may be defined as forms of common sense/knowledge, emotionally loaded, that allow members of a community to com- municate and understand each other (Moscovici, 1961/1976, 1998a,b). To highlight their social nature, the theory stresses the importance of the pro- cesses of communication within groups in the emergence of representations. When faced with an important but unfamiliar event, thoughts and discourse on the subject proliferate, and this set of interactions gives rise to a new social representation (Wagner, Valencia & Elejabarrieta, 1996). A social representation is, therefore, an explanation constructed by a group to cope with some- thing new. This first function, termed ‘symbolic coping’, is carried out through processes of anchoring and objectification. Anchoring consists of a series of responses that attempt to relate the content and struc- tures of the individual’s previous knowledge to the new event in order to make sense of it (Doise, 1992). Later, with objectification, ‘an icon, metaphor or trope [is constructed] which comes to stand for the new phenom- enon’ (Wagner et al., 1999: 99). Thanks to this process, even abstract or hazy concepts may be used by everyone and modified like real objects. Social representations have a twofold nature: they are stable concepts, since we do not redefine everything everyday, but they continue to evolve in relation to external, individual and group changes. To under- stand this twofold character, two zones – one central, the other peripheral – may be dis- tinguished in the representation. According to Flament (1987) and Flament & Moliner (1989), peripheral elements allow us to relate rapidly to the world around us. They also absorb the changes that concern the representation, by adapting to the changing situations. The central nucleus of the representation is, on the contrary, more stable and consists of ‘one or more elements, whose absence would end up destroying or giving a radically different meaning to the representation overall’ (Abric, 1989: 197; see also Abric, 1993). According to this approach, two social representations are different only if the central nuclei are different. People who share the same representation may differ, therefore, only in the peripheral elements to which they refer. It is also possible that, within the same cultural framework, different groups may take up distinct positions in the representa- tional field, by referring to different social representations. These differences are assumed to be systematic and organized on the basis of psycho-social variables (Doise, Clémence & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1992; Doise, Spini & Clémence, 1999), among which identity plays a crucial role. The question is whether identity is a function of the representation itself (Duveen, 2001) or if the contrary is equally true (Brewer, 2001), since the two themes are inextricably linked. From this viewpoint, sharing a social represen- tation is a consequence of belonging to a group, but it is also a way of defining oneself in opposition to outgroups with different representations. Social representations thus regulate intragroup and intergroup relations, create cohesion (Breakwell, 1993) and help form social identity (Moscovici & Hewstone, 1983) as well as its evolution and preservation (Breakwell, 2001; see also Chryssochoou, 2000, 2003).

# Reps Shape Reality – Environment Specific

**Discourse determines policy outcomes – specifically in the context of the environment**

**Detraz and Betsill, 08** - \*Nicole, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Colorado State University, and \*\*Michele M., Associate Professor of Political Science at Colorado State University (“Climate Change and Environmental Security: For Whom the Discourse Shifts,” Paper Presented At The 49th Annual Meeting Of The International Studies Association, 3/26/08, http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/2/5/2/5/9/pages252596/p252596-1.php)RK

A discourse-analytic approach is appropriate in that **discourses are powerful forces within policy debates**. Discourses can be thought of as “specific ensembles of ideas, concepts and categorization that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer 1995: 45). This definition suggests that discourses typically involve agency, meaning that individuals can actively shape discourses. It also suggests that discourses are constantly-evolving entities that can be shaped over time. Additionally, examining discourses can shed light on various **power relations** within an issue area. We can understand power relations as struggles “over interests, which are exercised, reflected, maintained and resisted through a variety of modalities, extents and degrees of explicitness” (Lazar 2005: 9). For example, dominant discourses are those that are most likely to be in line with the interests of powerful factions of society. It is unlikely that a discourse that is not in the interest of the powerful will actually be used in policy debates on salient issues. We can use discourse analysis to understand which discourses have made it to the level of policymaking for an issue like environmental change, and what this means for both the powerful and less-powerful in society. Litfin (1999) argues that discourses play an important role in shaping which policies are likely to emerge for a given issue area. According to Haas (2002: 1), Discourses **impart meaning to an ambiguous policy domain.** Discourses are important because **they institutionalize cognitive frames.** They identify issues as problems, set agendas, and define the salient aspects of issues as problems for decision-makers. Each discourse or perspective rests on different assumptions, goals and values… and suggests different policy solutions. They have the effect of defining provocations or crises. As this suggests, the use of one discourse over another has important implications, both theoretically and practically. Our analysis focuses on whether and how discourses linking environmental issues and security concerns have shaped international political debates on climate change. We begin by elaborating two general discourses on the relationship between environment and security, which we call environmental conflict and environmental security. This discussion highlights the various ways that global environmental problems and security issues can be connected and argues that each discourse has distinct implications for political debates and policy making. We then consider whether and how these discourses have shaped the historical international climate change debate as well as the latest Security Council debate in order to determine whether there has been a recent change. We demonstrate that the historical climate change debate has been informed by the environmental security discourse. While recent concern about climate-related conflict is new, we find that this new conflict dimension has been incorporated into the environmental security discourse and thus does not represent a wholesale discursive shift in the international climate change debate. Finally, we consider the possibility of a future discursive shift to the environmental conflict perspective and argue that such a shift would be counterproductive to the search for an effective global response to climate change.

**Discourse shapes environmental policies and discussions**

**Detraz and Betsill, 08** - \*Nicole, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Colorado State University, and \*\*Michele M., Associate Professor of Political Science at Colorado State University (“Climate Change and Environmental Security: For Whom the Discourse Shifts,” Paper Presented At The 49th Annual Meeting Of The International Studies Association, 3/26/08, http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/2/5/2/5/9/pages252596/p252596-1.php)RK

SECURITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE DEBATE The discursive framework used to discuss the relationship between security and the environment has direct implications for the policies likely to be developed in response to global environmental challenges such as climate change. It is therefore important to consider what discourses inform political debates on this issue and, in particular, to identify discursive shifts as these will have **implications for the future direction of policy** development. Our empirical analysis aims to determine what discourse(s) (if any) linking environment and security have informed the international climate change debate in the past and whether the recent Security Council discussions represent a discursive shift. In other words, we are interested in situating the April 2007 Security Council debate in a broader historical context.

**Reps are key to environmental policies – ignoring them makes policy failure inevitable**

**Litfin, 99** – Karen T., assistant professor of political science, University of Washington (“Constructing Environmental Security and Ecological Interdependence,” Global Governance, vol. 5, 1999, [http://faculty.washington.edu/litfin/research/litfin-constructing.pdf)RK](http://faculty.washington.edu/litfin/research/litfin-constructing.pdf%29RK)

A web of state and nonstate actors is involved not only in problem solving but also in problem definition or the social construction of problems. Although it would be reckless to deny that environmental problems have real physical referents and consequences, it is important to recognize that "problems" always presume a prior social process of recognition, prioritization, and some level of assent. The obvious material character of environmental problems often obscures their less obvious social character. Social constructivism does not deny the importance of material factors but insists that actors operate on the basis of the meaning that those factors have for them. Constructivism is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction **depends on** dynamic normative and epistemic **interpretations of the material world**.2 Environmental problems are simultaneously physical phenomena and social constructions. Ecologically speaking, for instance, the deaths of billions of microorganisms caused by each square foot of concrete pavement and the destruction of whale populations are both "problems." Yet only the latter has been defined as a global problem and subjected to international treaty restrictions. International **environmental problems, have been constructed** by some as new sources of conflict and by others as new opportunities for international cooperation. But regardless of whether environment is seen primarily as a source of conflict or as a source of cooperation, there is a disconcerting tendency among both practitioners and analysts to naturalize environmental problems. I maintain that an appreciation for the ways in which "environmental security" and "ecological interdependence" are socially constructed has important **theoretical and policy implications.** I first offer a critique of the environmental security literature, suggesting that constructivism offers a useful antidote to the troubling penchant for reification and false universalization. I then apply some of these insights to conceptions of ecological interdependence. Whether environmental problems are seen as a source of conflict or as an impetus to cooperation, naturalizing them not only obscures the extent to which problems are socially constructed through intersubjective understandings but also **predisposes** analysts and practitioners **to ignore** their deeper social, economic, and political roots. Since long-term solutions will require a willingness to grapple. with these deeper causes, this article aims to coax both the environmental security and the ecological interdependence literatures toward a more penetrating and reflective analysis. A range of possible scenarios for the future is explored, with some policy-relevant suggestions offered for how multilateral institutions and other international actors might move toward the more positive scenarios.

# Reps Shape Reality – Security Specific

**Security is discursive and a social construction – effective activism and policy require that it be analyzed** (this is specific to environmental security)

**Litfin, 99** – Karen T., assistant professor of political science, University of Washington (“Constructing Environmental Security and Ecological Interdependence,” Global Governance, vol. 5, 1999, [http://faculty.washington.edu/litfin/research/litfin-constructing.pdf)RK](http://faculty.washington.edu/litfin/research/litfin-constructing.pdf%29RK)

To claim that environmental problems are social constructions is not to deny their physical character; to believe otherwise would be ecologically and politically irresponsible. One of the pitfalls of security language is the presumption that security signifies some reality with a concrete external referent. As Ole Wrever argues, rather than being a sign for an objective referent, security is most aptly understood as a speech act: "**The utterance itself is the act**."19 Although his critique could provide the basis for a more reflective conception of security as a socially constructed set of concerns, Wrever opposes an expanded notion of security, including the "securitization of the environment," on the grounds that "security is articulated only from aspecific prace, in an institutional voice, by elites."20 In other words, only those concerned with classic state-centric threat-defense dynamics are entitled to perform security speech acts. This reading not only ignores the fact that security speech acts are performed on a daily basis by an increasingly diffuse group of scholars and practitioners, but it also abdicates too much terrain to the security traditionalists. The state is not the sole subject of security, nor is coercive power the sole means of seeking it. If Cold War hawks could seize on the ambiguous symbol of national security, then contemporary analysts may also deploy the ambiguous symbol of environmental security. But to do so reflectively, without falling prey to the sorts of ideological excess that characterized Cold War security discourse, they must be conscious of how they construct their speech acts. Security language has been characterized in terms of an objectivist epistemology. This concern is particularly relevant with respect to environmental security, which may require the authority of science to demonstrate the existence of "objective" threats.21 Although **scientific information** is clearly of great importance in international agenda setting for environmental issues, it **by no means provides an objective factual basis** on which rational policy can be formulated. Knowledge and information are framed and interpreted in light of specific interests and contending discourses.22 Even in the context of real material dangers, the invocation of environmental security threats is fundamentally about socially constructed risks.23 Wolfers observed long ago that the subjective dimension, the absence of fear, is at least as important to security language as the existence of material threats.24 Likewise, "environmt?ntal scarcities" are not purely objective phenomena but are also socially constructed and culturally dependent. For instance, a person requires 4 to 6 liters of water per day to survive. On this basis, potable water is abundant in most places. Yet social scientists routinely define scarcity as less than 2,740 liters per person per day, based on consumption rates in advanced industrialized countries.25 Likewise, invocations of environmental security tend to naturalize what are essentially social, political, and economic problems.26 If the threat-defense mechanism is mapped onto a naturalized understanding of environmental problems, then the quest for security may portray nature as enemy to be controlled and conquered, a stance that itself may be at the root of the mounting global environmental crisis. An associated pitfall is the tendency to paint environmental dangers in falsely universalizing terms. If security is a speech act, then its proponents need to become self-conscious of the specific interests and cultural biases from which they speak. Calls for environmental security have entirely different policy implications'depending on whether they come from Pacific islanders threatened with sea-level rise as a result of climate change, affluent urban dwellers suffocating from automotive emissions, or subsistence farmers without access to clean drinking water. Thus, if environmental security discourse is monopolized by those with an unreflective bias toward the advanced industrialized world, then it becomes an easy target for those in developing countries who are already wary of "environmental imperialism."27 A final cautionary note: unreflectively depicting environmental problems in security terms runs the risk of contributing to "a proliferating array of discourses of danger." As Michael Dillon maintains, security is neither a fact of nature nor a noun that names something, but a sociocultural aim. 28 Simon Dalby argues further that if "insecurity is not the problem, but rather the ontological condition of mortal human life, then the solution in terms of security, the assertion of control to ensure life, is ironically potentially a threat to life itself, that which is insecure in the first place."29 The Cold War quest for security, whose toxic and radioactive legacy will perpetuate insecurity for decades to come, should offer a sobering lesson. More generally, the driving force behind global environmental degradation is the unrestrained pursuit of material security, suggesting that the shortsighted pursuit of security may perpetuate environmental insecurity.

# Objectivity Bad – Patriarchy Turn

**Claims to objectively represent reality hide masculine power structures**

**Mackinnon, 00** – Catherine A., Long Professor of Law at the University of Michigan (“Points Against Postmodernism,” Chicago-Kent Law Review, vol. 75 [http://www.adelinotorres.com/filosofia/Against%20Postmodernism.pdf)RK](http://www.adelinotorres.com/filosofia/Against%20Postmodernism.pdf%29RK)

Feminism did call for rethinking everything. For one simple instance, the distinction drawn since the Enlightenment between the universal and the particular was revealed to be false, because what had been called universal was the particular from the point of view of power. For another, the subjective/objective division was revealed to be false, because the objective standpoint—or so I argued in Toward a Feminist Theory of the State—was specifically the view from the male position of power. That is, those who occupy what is called the objective standpoint socially, who also engage in the practice from that standpoint called objectification—the practice of making people into things to make them knowable—this standpoint and practice is an expression of the social position of dominance that is occupied by men. This standpoint is not positionless or point-of-viewless, as it purports to be; it does not simply own accuracy and fairness as many believe; **it embodies and asserts a specific form of power**, one that had been invisible to politics and theory but, by feminism, lay exposed as underlying them. This theory was not an affirmation of the feminine particularity as opposed to the masculine universal. It was not a claim to female subjectivity or a search for it. It saw that these concepts, and the purported divide between them, are products of **male power** that cannot see themselves or much else. Until exposed, these concepts looked general, empty of content, universally available to all, valid, mere tools, against which all else fell short. Feminism exposed how prior theory was tautologous to its own terms of validation, and could hardly be universal because it had left out at least half the universe. Neither did feminism precisely lay claim to the territory that women had been assigned under this system. More, it was its claim to us that we sought to disclaim. We were not looking for a plusher cell or a more dignified stereotype. We were not looking to elaborate the feminine particularity as if it was ours; we had been living inside its walls for centuries. We were not looking to claim the subjectivity or subject position to which we had been relegated any more than we sought to oppress others by gaining access to the power to objectify and dominate that we had revealed as such. All this would have left what we were trying to challenge squarely in place; by comparison with our agenda, it was playing with, or within, blocks. Identity as such was not our issue. Inside, we knew who we were to a considerable extent. Gender identity—the term introduced by Robert Stoller in 1964 to refer to the mental representation of the self as masculine or feminine—situates women’s problem in the wrong place.5 Our priority was gaining access to the reality of our collective experience in order to understand and change it for all of us in our own lifetimes.

# Reps Don’t Shape Reality

**Reps don’t shape reality – it’s objective**

**Kocher, 00** – Robert L., author, engineer working in the area of solid-state physics, and has done graduate study in clinical psychology (“Discourse on Reality and Sanity Part 1: What is Reality?” The Laissez Faire City Times, Vol. 4, No. 46, 11/13/00, http://web.archive.org/web/20040805084149/http://freedom.orlingrabbe.com/lfetimes/reality\_sanity1.htm)RK

The human senses seem remarkably able to discern a consistent and lawful reality. In the normal human being, mind and perception become so intimately connected as to produce a sense of unity with the world around us. This connection and sense of unity can be psychologically broken or regressed to primitive non-integrated levels through psychological trauma or regression, or through organic physical malfunction. For those who are in a normal functioning condition, behold, reality is all around you if you have courage to face it. Can I prove proof exists? No, I cannot. Not in the purely verbal world. Can I prove reality exists? No, not in the purely verbal world. Some things are too basic to be proven and must be accepted in day to day life. But in the purely verbal world, all things become philosophically doubtful when traced down to their primary premise, and that premise is then questioned. The World of Words While it is not possible to establish many proofs in the verbal world, and it is simultaneously possible to make many uninhibited assertions or word equations in the verbal world, it should be considered that reality is more rigid and does not abide by the artificial flexibility and latitude of the verbal world. The world of words and the world of human experience are very imperfectly correlated. That is, saying something doesn't make it true. A verbal statement in the world of words doesn't mean it will occur as such in the world of consistent human experience I call reality. In the event verbal statements or assertions disagree with consistent human experience, what proof is there that the concoctions created in the world of words should take precedence or be assumed a greater truth than the world of human physical experience that I define as reality? In the event following a verbal assertion in the verbal world produces pain or catastrophe in the world of human physical reality or experience, which of the two can and should be changed? Is it wiser to live with the pain and catastrophe, or to change the arbitrary collection of words whose direction produced that pain and catastrophe? Which do you want to live with? What proven reason is there to assume that when doubtfulness that can be constructed in verbal equations conflicts with human physical experience, human physical experience should be considered doubtful? It becomes a matter of choice and pride in intellectual argument. My personal advice is that when verbal contortions lead to chronic confusion and difficulty, better you should stop the verbal contortions rather than continuing to expect the difficulty to change. Again, it's a matter of choice. Philosophy is much like particle physics. Earlier in the 20th century the fundamental components of physical existence were considered to be the proton, the neutron, and the electron. As science developed atom smashers, and then more powerful atom smashers, these particles could be hit together and broken pieces of these components were found which might be assumed to be possible building blocks of the three primary particles. Well then, what are those building blocks made of? As more elaborate smashers are built and more discerning detection equipment is developed, perhaps still more kind of fragments or subparticles will be found. At some point in the process we will conclude that there is a material of some kind making up matter that just IS. It simply exists. Suppose the ultimate particle is found. The conclusion will be that it simply exists. There is no other conclusion possible or available. All systems of philosophy, of science, of religious theology, eventually can be traced down to one ultimate premise. There is something that exists. It exists, and that's all we know. Existence and reality exist. If an ultimate subparticulate material is found, in the world of chemistry, medicine, biology, engineering, and climbing stepladders; electrons, protons, and neutrons will still probably turn out to be the primary determining factors to be concerned about. That ignores some types of stuff like subparticle based propulsion system for future space ships or something similar in a highly specialized area. Philosophical questioning has long-since reached that parallel point of the ultimate particle or building material that just IS. There is something existent that just IS and will need to be accepted as being and following a consistent pattern of lawfulness. The fact is, the questions about proving whether reality exists, and proving proof exists are, or should be, meaningless to me beyond some degree of curiosity. I go on about my life without being able to prove proof or life exists. I can go on about my life without proving reality exists. The arguments asserted one way or another do not change how I need to live my life. Reality; A is A; what is, is; are equivalent to the protons, neutrons, and electrons of chemistry that must be accepted. Does the outcome of the philosophical question of whether reality or proof exists decide whether we should plant crops or wear clothes in cold weather to protect us from freezing? Har! Are you crazy? How many committed deconstructionist philosophers walk about naked in subzero temperatures or don't eat? Try creating and living in an alternative subjective reality where food is not needed and where you can sit naked on icebergs, and find out what happens. I emphatically encourage people to try it with the stipulation that they don't do it around me, that they don't force me to do it with them, or that they don't come to me complaining about the consequences and demanding to conscript me into paying for the cost of treating frostbite or other consequences. (sounds like there is a parallel to irresponsibility and socialism somewhere in here, doesn't it?). I encourage people to live subjective reality. I also ask them to go off far away from me to try it, where I won't be bothered by them or the consequences.

**Reps don’t shape policy – they have no causal link**

**Campbell, 02** – John L., Department of Sociology, Dartmouth College (“Ideas, Politics, and Public Policy,” Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 28, no. 1, 2002, JSTOR)RK

However provocative these notions about the relationships between ideas and institutions may be, critics charge that they are flawed (Yee 1996, Jacobsen 1995). To begin with, the path-dependenta rguments uffers because once ideas have become institutionalized in rules, procedures, agencies, and the like, it is no longer clear whether the ideas or the institutions within which they are embedded are more important for future policy-making episodes. Similarly, the actor-centered approach fails to differentiate the effects of ideas themselves from the effects of the actors who bear them. Researchers have found that the status of the actors bearing new ideas affects the odds that policy makers will adopt their ideas (Goldstein 1993:15). In other words, the persuasiveness of ideas is assumed rather than analytically partitioned and empirically demonstrated. In turn, some of these critics suggest that if we are concerned with understanding how ideas themselves affect policy making, then a more fruitful approach is to focus on the nature of political discourse.

# Reps Focus Bad – Engagement

**Focus on reps trades off with political engagement and problem solving – turns the alt**

**Solas, 02** – John, PhD in Humanities and Lecturer in Rural Social Welfare at the School of Behavioural and Social Sciences and Humanities (“The poverty of postmodern human services,” Australian Social Work, vol. 55, is. 2, June2002, Wiley)RK

Abstract Postmodernism cannot or will not tell the difference between truth and falsehood, **reality and simulacra**, principle and dogma, or right and wrong. As a corollary, it is unable or unwilling to make any ‘veritable’ difference to the nature or order of things. Indeed, there is no escape from, nor anything outside of, the ‘panopticon of language’. Accordingly, there is no significant probative difference between the practice and experience of genocide, and talking or writing about it. All one can do is be sceptical about discourses, even those concerned with ethnic cleansing and the like. As ludicrous as this sounds, it has not prevented postmodernism from monopolising discourses about significant aesthetic, cultural, economic, intellectual, political and social practices and sensibilities. Postmodernism manifests itself in a host of disciplines, and its presence is being increasingly felt in human services education and practice. If, as I shall argue, postmodernism is such a thoroughly baseless, reductive and inert doctrine, then why persist with it? The poverty of postmodernism prompts a timely return to the rich legacy of Marxism. The lure of postmodernism What is it about postmodernism that could attract the interest and support of erstwhile human service educators and practitioners, especially those on the political left? Judging from the literature on the subject there appear to be several main attractions. One of these is that there is no longer any need to be overly concerned about objective, material reality, or struggle with Realpolitik since neither exist in a definitive sense (Wood, 1997). Jean Baudrillard (1988) is cited as an ‘authority?’ on this exorbitant thesis. It is Baudrillard’s (1991) contention that we have arrived at an epoch of purely fictive or illusory appearances; that ‘reality’ is nowadays largely predefined by media-hype; and that henceforth we had better adjust to a life of virtual reality, rather than cling to the illusion that anything has veridical force. There are simply no ontological or epistemological grounds for distinguishing the difference between ‘simulacra’ or image and substance. Thus, Baudrillard (1991) was able to assure readers of The Guardian that the Gulf War would never happen because ‘talk’ of war had now become a substitute for the real event, and even if war broke out spectators would be unable to wrest fact from fiction since they would never have unmediated access to events. Thanks to Baudrillard, human services educators and practitioners will never again mistake the ‘hyperreality’ of immiseration for the real thing. Equally attractive is the notion of a ‘decentred subject.’ The thinking, feeling, willing, speaking and acting ‘liberal humanist’ self or ‘subject’ is now non-essential. This particular subject was the cause of so much depravity and violence that its departure is both expedient and a welcomed relief. Without it, human service workers need not contend with all the hard questions over which they had once agonised such as freedom, justice, equality, solidarity and the like. It is enough to theorise about how the subject is an effect of language or product of discourse, devoid of free will, agency and reflective grasp and fragmented by power, desire, convention or the dictates of various interpretative communities, than actually do anything about it. Another of the main attractions is postmodernism’s hostility towards the tyranny of ‘totality’ (Wood, 1997). All totalities, that is attempts to fashion and/or share something in common, be it a cause, culture, gender, language, race, ethnicity, humanity or whatever are, or have the potential to be, totalitarian. Thus, the disciples of postmodernism have acquired the virtues of being (absolutely?) sceptical towards universals and respectful of differences, except, that is, of different totalities. These are virtues which Jean François Lyotard (1988) has done much to establish and exemplify. When asked whether he condoned terrorism and war, Lyotard’s and Thébaud (1986) unqualified allegiance to these particular virtues obliged him to remain completely indiscriminate about the differences between the two. He was even unable to offer a reason for considering either of them just or unjust. As Lyotard (1985) blithely admitted: if you ask me why I am on that side, I think that I would answer that I do not have an answer to the question ‘why’? and that is in the order of transcendence. When I say ‘transcendence,’ it means: I do not know who is sending me the prescription in question. (p. 69). Lyotard claims that he is not in a position to know for sure the exact source of the discourse, he cannot judge its authority, intent or institutional warrant. True to his own postmodernist lights, Lyotard is content to remain in doubt rather than find out. The task for human services, then, is not to seek change, or even to articulate the political aspirations of a particular oppressed group, but to suspect all meta-narratives and preserve without judgement any difference, or differend in Lyotard’s (1988) terms. Finally, subscribers to postmodernism are not bound nor animated by a belief in ‘progress’ (Wood, 1997). This enables them to avoid the ‘naturalistic fallacy,’ which holds that it is possible to get from bad to better times. There is, therefore, absolutely nothing about the past, present or future that could be regarded as an advance – including, for instance, a capitalist-free Jurassic period, a 20th century devoid of dinosaurs, or more particularly, any notion of progressive human services. The age of enlightenment, according to postmodernists, has been a particularly egregious period. Belief in enlightenment has been the ultimate cause of peoples’ inhumanity to each other. Death camps, death squads, civil, cold and world wars, ethnic cleansing, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, the Cuban missile crisis and the persistent threat of nuclear annihilation, to mention only a few of the major events included in a large and growing inventory, attest to the brutal and oppressive logic of so-called ‘enlightened’ thought (Harvey, 1990). Postmodernists are adamant that serious doubt must be cast upon any appeal made to so-called enlightened ideals (reason, truth, knowledge, freedom and so on) in order to avoid more unmitigated disaster. The human services owe a large debt to Michel Foucault (1963, 1967, 1977) in particular for revealing the depth of their complicity in making things which they purport to remedy worse. Their knowledge has given them the power to help incriminate and incarcerate, pathologise and hospitalise, discipline and render docile individuals. Foucault annuls the difference between historical fact and ideological fiction, and hence, spares workers the arduous and risky task of exposing and challenging institutionalised lies and hypocrisies. A crucial question is what will become of the critical and progressive ethos of human services education and practice in the wake of postmodernism? Against postmodernism The retreat from frontline activism to the barricades of abstraction is, as Perry Anderson (1977) argued, a typical response to disillusionment. However, what is surprising is the failure of deserters to realise or acknowledge the extent to which they contribute to their own confinement in the backwaters of mainstream political life. The immodest and largely uncritical embrace of postmodernism must surely rank as one of the most **self defeating and untimely gestures that** could be made in response to the exigencies human service professions now face. It promotes a deep suspicion of anything that attempts to oppose fiction with facts, falsehood with truth and simulacrum with reality. According to postmodern luminaries, it is no longer possible –‘realistically’ possible – to believe in the value of reason, truth, freedom, progress and the emancipating power of enlightened critique. It would seem to be far better to abandon these values than be taken for a downright teleologically essentialistic universalist humanist fool for trusting in them. Of course, it is important to keep these values under close scrutiny. However, there is nothing to be gained by subscribing to total(ising) disbelief, unless of course one is willing to agree with Michel Foucault (1980) that ignorance is bliss. Nor is there any point engaging in iconoclasm of the postmodern variety if its denouement is to justify the claim to have reached the limits of what is ‘realistically’ possible, and closes off opportunities for **direct, far-reaching political action.**

**Reality is independent of discourse – focus on representation distracts from solving real problems**

**Cloud, 94** – Dana L., Assistant Professor in the Department of Speech Communication, University of Texas, Austin (“The materiality of discourse as oxymoron: A challenge to critical rhetoric,” Western Journal of Communication, vol. 58, is. 3, Summer 1994, ProQuest)

Caught between the Scylla of idealism and the Charybdis of "vulgar" economism or simpleminded orthodoxies, critical scholars are trying to navigate safe passage by way of a particular theoretical hypothesis: the materiality of discourse, or the idea that discourse itself is influential in or even constitutive of social and material reality (including the lived experience of work, pleasure, pain, and hunger). In the wake of the ideological turn in rhetorical studies (Wander, 1983; McGee, 1984), a generation of scholars (Crowley, 1992; McGuire, 1990; Ono & Sloop, 1992) has crafted a "critical rhetoric" (McKerrow, 1989) with the goal of claiming and analyzing discourses as sites of struggle over power. The attempt to redefine discourse as a constitutive element of material relations--in other words, to argue for the materiality of discourse is part and parcel of the poststructuralist shift toward discourse theory. With the materiality of discourse at their center, poststructuralist theories of discourse and power are to varying degrees anti-realist (relativist) and anti-materialist (idealist). In recent rhetorical theory, there are two versions of the "materiality of discourse hypothesis," tending respectively toward idealism, on the one hand, and political relativism on the other. In my view, each version of this theory warrants caution on the part of political critics. Criticisms of idealism and relativism in poststructuralist discourse theory have been articulated in other disciplines, from Marxist and feminist perspectives (Alcoff, in press; Callinicos, 1989; J. Clarke, 1991; Eagleton, 1991; Geras, 1987, 1988; Hennessy, 1993; Modleski, 1991; Norris, 1990; Wood, 1986). The purpose of this essay is to situate that critique within the field of rhetorical studies and to warn critical rhetoricians who would wear the materialist mantle about the potential political consequences of accepting the idea of the materiality of discourse. This article defends the tradition of materialist, realist ideology criticism as the version of the materiality of discourse hypothesis most consonant with the project of political critique. The essay paints a synecdochal picture of our field, taking two theorists in particular, McGee and McKerrow, as representative and symptomatic of the shift toward the materiality of discourse in rhetorical studies. Their work reveals two prevailing versions of this idea: On the one hand, we find the limited claim that discourse is material because it has material effects and serves material interests in the world. This view, while tending toward idealism, does not equate reality with discourse. On the other hand, a more radical shift is evident, away from structuralist and realist ways of thinking. On this view, discourse not only influences material reality, it is that reality. All relations, economic, political, or ideological, are symbolic in nature. This view tends toward relativism. DISCURSIVE AND IDEOLOGICAL TURNS The discursive turn is emblematically represented by Foucault (1980), who argues that power is a matter of shifting discursive formations rather than economic relations. Poststructuralist theories in this light seem a natural outgrowth of Althusser's (1960/1984) structuralism, which argued that ideology and its apparatuses were determining forces in social relations, warranting a reclassification of ideological outlets such as the church and the schools as "state apparatuses." This theory marked a distinct, and unfortunate, idealist shift in Marxist thinking. Clegg (1991) argues that as Althusserian (and poststructuralist) Marxists shifted attention away from economic factors and toward ideology, all previous Marxisms were erroneously discarded as crudely empiricist and economistic. As a result, materialist historical analysis fell by the way in favor of a theoretical and critical practice increasingly disconnected from the material practices of exploitation and oppression that originally motivated Marxist critiques of society and culture. With postmodernists and post-Marxists (see Baudrillard, 1975; Foucault, 1980; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Lyotard, 1984; Mouffe, 1988) this turn is taken to its logical conclusion, in arguments that **reject the economic and political realms as sites of struggle**, in favor of a politics of textuality. Baudrillard (1975) takes this position to its extreme, arguing that people can be "oppressed by the code" that establishes relations of consumption, which Baudrillard views as more foundational to late capitalism (Jameson, 1991) than the relations of production. Idealism and materialism as philosophical stances are more often matters of emphasis than discrete critical categories. Yet, since the late 1960s, critical scholars have foregrounded the political inflections of historical materialism, the Marxist historical method emphasizing the role of economic forces in structuring social change and arguing that consciousness is the product of social forces. Philosophical materialism is thus aligned with a progressive or Marxist critique of existing social relations. In rhetorical studies, that tradition of critique was inaugurated by Burke's (1935/1984) analysis of the ways in which language mystifies and legitimizes capitalism (see also Schiappa & Keehner, 1991). The ideological turn was later systematically defined and defended in the field by Wander (1983, 1984) and McGee (1982, 1984; see also McKerrow, 1983). Wander and McGee argued that it would be productive for rhetoricians to view discourse as an agency of economic and political power, and to bring rhetoric's considerable repertoire of textual analysis skills to bear on understanding how political and economic power is mediated, reinforced, perpetuated, and challenged in the texts we study. Since Wander's and McGee's initial forays, the ideological turn has persevered through variations and challenges (Crowley, 1992). Contributors to a recent special issue on ideology of Western Journal of Communication (Wander, 1993) argue various points of view within and against the ideological turn. While some authors argue that we must get past the language and logic of "oppressor and oppressee" ways of seeing (Condit, 1993, p. 186), others defend materialist critique and articulate a new (for our field) call for scholars to attend to and act on the consequences of discourses in the world outside of the academy (Andersen, 1993; Owen & Ehrenhaus, 1993; Rigsby, 1993; Wood & Cox, 1993). This latest installment in the ideology debates reveals that the ideological turn is not complete. One argument that remains to be made in our journals is that materialist ideology criticism differs substantively from more recent postmodernist approaches to discourse. While many rhetoricians argue that postmodernist "neo" or "post" Marxisms are politically and philosophically aligned with the ideological turn (Crowley, 1992), the newer theories diverge in their basic assumptions from a materialist theory of language in ways that are disabling to critique. Thus, I would reject Crowley's (1992) broad definition of ideological criticism as "an umbrella term for any criticism that is primarily motivated by ethical or political concerns" (p. 452). Crowley adds, "This definition equates ideological criticism with rhetorical criticism, and, at the same time, frees it from necessary implication with Marxism" (p. 452). Crowley's definition leaves behind a materialist theory of communication that recognizes the importance of material forces (economic and physical) in relation to rhetorical action. Only in the "implication with Marxism" can we adequately acknowledge the legacy of materialism as the foundation of ideology criticism. DEFINING MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM, REALISM AND RELATIVISM In classical Marxist texts on language and culture one can discover two meanings of the word "materialist," the first suggesting that social relations and concrete, sensuous human activity are the source of human consciousness, and that human beings derive identity and purpose from their social contexts. Marx (1888/1978a) wrote, as "men" [sic] are products of their circumstances and upbringing, "changed men are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing" even as human activity produces changes in circumstances (p. 143). This dialectical model suggests that people must be understood as historically located and socially constituted. This idea is the starting point of materialist language theory's emphasis on the subject as a historically-situated product of discourses and relations (an idea that has been given renewed vigor by postmodernists, but which did not originate with them). The second and broader definition of materialism consists in the idea that the mode of production, or the way in which goods are made and distributed in society, determines the social relations and forms of consciousness of any given epoch. Engels (1880/1978) summarized this position: The materialist conception of history starts from the proposition that the production of the means to support human life and, next to production, the exchange of thing produced, is the basis of all social structure; that in every society that has appeared in history, the manner in which wealth is distributed and society divided in classes or orders is dependent on what is produced, how it is produced, and how the products are exchanged. From this point of view the final cause of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in men's brains, not in men's better insight into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange. (p. 701) On this view, the task of a critique of culture is to unmask the shared illusions of a society as ideas promulgated by and serving the interests of the ruling class, or those who control the production and distribution of material goods.(1) In Marx's (1978b) words, "Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life" (p. 155). Idealism, when defined in opposition to historical materialism, refers not to the commonsense notions of wishful thinking or hopefulness about the possibility of social change, but rather to the tendency to overemphasize consciousness, speech, and text as the determinants of such change. A materialist theory of language and ideology suited to a materialist view of history (Williams, 1973, 1977) suggests that economic forces and relations of power motivate discourses that justify, obscure, or mystify the workings of powerful interests and structures of power. Following Marx's insight that ideologies are instrumental in legitimating capitalism, Gramsci's (1971) theory of hegemony, developed in his prison writings, gives ruling-class rhetoric a great deal of credit in maintaining social order in the face of conflict and challenge. To Marxist theorists and their elaborators, ideas--or ideologies--have material consequences. This simple claim is not in itself idealist, but rather is congruent with historical materialism, which seeks to uncover the historically specific, interest-rooted motives of human consciousness rather than credit ideas as the motor of history. Historical materialism is one version of realism, or a philosophy that insists that there is a truth independent of the individual knower or perceiver of reality (Hikins, 1990). But in contrast with a naive realism that assumes a universal reality independent of perspective, Alcoff (in press) defends what she calls "imminent realism," which insists that truths are perspectival, and that we should privilege the truths of subordinate groups in society. For historical materialists, specifically, truth lies in relations of economic and political power (rather than in spiritual or moral principles), often obscured or selectively voiced in popular and political discourse. Realism is often understood in opposition to relativism, or a stance that asserts the reality-building function of discourse.(2) Sometimes called social constructionism (Berger Luckmann, 1967), unmitigated rhetorical relativism is at odds with both materialist and idealist realisms because in principle, relativism affords the critic no privileged perspectives by which to judge economic or political realities. On the other hand, social constructionism usefully challenges the idea that a given economic or political reality is natural, permanent, and transparent and argues that representations of that reality are persuasive constructs that obscure the real interests at stake and the possibilities of change. Social constructionism also challenges idealist humanism, or the idea that individual humans are agents in charge of their destiny, without regard to their place in relations of class, race, or gender or to the ways in which human action is constrained as well as enabled in ideology. These emphases provide constructionism with a productive materialist edge. THE RHETORICIANS, PART ONE: IDEALIST MATERIALISTS In our field, McGee has been a prominent advocate of ideology criticism, and of a particular formulation of the materiality of discourse hypothesis. For example, McGee (1982) argues for a conception of rhetoric as material and as ideological. Rhetoric is material simply by virtue of its pragmatic effects in the world; it is ideological: "a distorted structure of facts and inferences" serving "intersubjective desires" (p. 43). In another essay, McGee (1975) takes the study of ideology in a particularly rhetorical direction, focusing on how a "people" can be constituted in persuasive discourse: "From a rhetorical perspective, the entire socialization process is nothing but intensive and continual exercises in persuasion: Individuals must be seduced into abandoning their individuality, convinced of their sociality" (p. 240). McGee is making the materialist point here that social cohesion and control depend on the persuasive work of ideology, as people are socialized into participating in their social system (or, could it be argued that people are seduced by ideology into seeing themselves as individuals and giving up their sociality?). Similarly, McGee (1980, 1986) insists that rhetoric ought to be studied in the context of relations of material power, arguing that to describe mass consciousness as a formal vision or a voluntary fantasy (Bormann, 1972) obscures significant aspects of ideology, domination, and power. A critic of Persian Gulf War news coverage, working from the assumptions of the early McGee, would notice how a people was constructed in the discourse of yellow ribbons, slogans of support, news stories about families coping with the anxiety and risks of war, and the flow of news from stories on danger and violence in the Saudi sands to stories on unity and coping on the home front. One would notice how particular ideographs, such as (liberty) were invoked and redefined in support of the war effort. One would explore the contradiction between the phrase "liberate Kuwait" and the reality of the Kuwaiti aristocratic power structure and oppressive social relations to which the U.S. was reinstating the Emir and his royal family. Or one might explore the use of such formulations as "collateral damage" as they justified real civilian casualties. During the Persian Gulf War, the Pentagon, the Bush administration, and popular news media outlets successfully crafted a pro-war hegemony in both complex and simply propagandistic ways, despite the fifty-fifty division of opinion about the war on its eve, and despite ruptures in, contradictions in, and challenges to pro-war perspectives (Cloud, in press; Kellner, 1992). Kellner's (1992) research documents the myriad ways in which lies were successfully deployed in answer to those challenges. In addition, mythic narratives of oversimplified good and evil (for example, television introductions framing the war as a "showdown" in the Gulf), an embedded cultural anti-Arab racism (ubiquitous representations of Arabs as terrorists), revised histories of the Vietnam War (blaming protests and the media for loss of American lives and credibility), and other strategic discourses worked to obscure the costs of the war in terms of damage and death, to delegitimize diplomatic alternatives to warfare, and to marginalize and discredit protests. Particularly persuasive was the dislocation of conversation about the war from political spaces to emotional ones (Cloud, in press). Support group and military family news was a constant feature of Persian Gulf War coverage, surpassing in terms of minutes hard news about military strategy, hardware, casualties, and protests in a ratio of two to one on national networks, including CNN. These stories, occurring a the end of newscasts, served to "wrap up" the day's news on a note of reassurance. This reassurance depended on a particularly gendered mapping of the home front, as the role of woman as silent keeper of family unity became a trope for a coping rather than protesting national community. A typical story exemplifying this strategy ("War of Emotions," 1991) opens with anchorperson Lynn Russell. Over her left shoulder to the viewer's right, a map of New Hampshire is framed in a box. Below it, in blocked capitals, appears the word "SUPPORT," itself both a label and an implicit command. The segment cuts to a scene in Concord, where, as Russell says, people are "coping with the war." The story moves from street scenes to interviews with women in a mall, back to houses bedecked with yellow ribbons and U.S. flags against a background of sparkling snow and azure sky, back to more interviews at the mall followed by a cutaway to a rural woman alone at home and then with a group of supporters, then finally to Norma Quarrels, the correspondent, who wraps the whole thing up: "On the home front, the Persian Gulf conflict is a war of emotions [italics added]--as evidenced in small towns like Concord, New Hampshire." The war of emotions is one-sided in Concord, which, as the town's name suggests, is a place of unity and mutual support, not division, critique, or conflict. Images of a white, spacious two-story house, crusty with glistening snow, yellow ribbons adorning the house and a flag waving in the breeze construct an idealized patriotism. The segment cuts to a closer view of the ribbons, yellow on white, then to a bumper sticker on a pickup truck: "I SUPPORT OUR TROOPS IN OPERATION DESERT SHIELD." When the scene shifts from the quiet outdoor scene to the bustling shopping mall where families gather for a photo session and letter writing stint, viewers are asked to connect the positive images of patriotic domesticity with the support group effort. Dissent speaks here in a lonely voice. The segment includes the voice of a token protester, a well-dressed, young white woman, walking alone in a shopping mall, in the illusion of journalistic balance: "I think we should get the hell out of there." She is shown alone, in contrast to framing scenes that show large numbers of community members engaged in a letter writing campaign to the troops for Valentine's Day. The report does not tell us her name or provide any information about her identity in or attachments to this community. In this mythic opposition of characters, protest is defined as the willful abnegation of community spirit and belongingness. One mother comments, "They really do need our support. I don't want them to be unsupported like the men in Vietnam felt that they were unsupported." This statement precedes the brief cutaway to the unidentified woman who speaks out against the war, as if to chastise her for potentially creating another Vietnam War with her words. From the perspective of ideology criticism, it is clear that this kind of "yellow-ribbon" news served a hegemonic function: to frame the war in terms of family unity and emotional support, to imply that protest is inappropriate in a space of such unity and emotional support, and thus to domesticate the home front. This observation is not to deny that despite the force of nationalism during the Gulf War, many people protested against the war, deploying rhetorical resources (within the available ideological frame) of their own, reconfiguring the elements of the discourse in phrases like "Support Our Troops--Bring Them Home." But we must also acknowledge that the persuasiveness of protest was limited severely by the dominant discourse's hold on the popular imagination and on public opinion, as popular opinion polls showed increasing support for the war (near ninety percent) as the pro-war propaganda campaign wore on. In this way, materialist ideology criticism notices that the images of the Persian Gulf War and other wars and the characterizations of war protesters are not accurate to a reality that exists outside of the text. It calls our attention to the fact that the domestication of the home front was part and parcel of a massive, real slaughter of Iraqi troops and civilians. It notices that the construction of discourse happens in strategic ways that serve powerful interests, both political and economic. While access to alternative media reports (for example, the BBC and a range of left periodicals) helped activists discover the real consequences and motives of the war, dominant media outlets rarely provided counter-ideological information or analysis (Andersen & Carpignano, 1991). Even when direct knowledge of a counter-ideological reality is unavailable, a materialist perspective holds out the possibility of extratextual reality in theory. In other words, if a bomb falls on civilians in Baghdad, and a critic is not present to see it, the bomb still did, in reality, fall. While materialists "debunked" the nationalism of the Gulf War as the rhetorical inducement to unity and support, idealists affirmed the yellow ribbon campaign as a voluntary and positive enactment of national community, or held up some other "ideal" vision as an alternative, instead of exposing the oppressive "reality" behind the discourse. For example, popular media pundits condemned CNN reporter Peter Arnett for reporting widespread civilian casualties, accusing Arnett of attempting to destroy the unified U.S. national community (Leo, 1991). Rhetorical idealism, or the attention to how communication enacted and sustained national community, underpinned the ubiquitous appeals of the mainstream media to the flag and to the slogan "support our troops." The idea and ideal of the community and nation become more important than its motivations or consequences for people living and dying with the war--questions requiring a materialist conception of rhetoric (McGee, 1982) for answers. Rhetorical scholars have yet to produce an idealist reading of Persian Gulf War rhetoric. However, we can get a sense of what rhetoricians, materialist and idealist, do with war rhetoric by reviewing rhetorical analyses of Nixon's November 3, 1969 "Vietnamization" speech (Campbell, 1972 a & b; Hill, 1972 a & b; Newman, 1970, Stelzner, 1971; Wander & Jenkins, 1972). Critics of this address (which was designed to discredit the anti-war movement and advocate continuing U.S. military involvement in Vietnam) did not explicitly label themselves materialist or idealist. However, Campbell (1972a) clearly represents a materialist view, contrasting the "mythical America" of peace and freedom constructed by Nixon with "nonmythical America": Nonmythical America supports totalitarian governments all over the world. Nonmythical America is engaged in a war in South Vietnam in which it is systematically destroying the civilian population and agricultural capacity of the country it is ostensibly defending. Nonmythical America practices a racism which makes a mockery of its mythic principles. (p.56) Earlier in the essay, Campbell takes issue with Nixon's account of the beginning of the war, calling readers' attention to omissions and lies. Campbell's approach depends on the materialist claim that there is a reality outside of its prevailing mythic constructions, one to which a rhetor might be called accountable. On the other hand, both Stelzner's (1971) analysis of the speech as "mythic quest story" and Hill's (1972a) neo-Aristotelian approach reveal the limits of idealist, exclusively text-centered approaches regarding discourse so clearly motivated by powerful interests and designed to obscure or deceive. While not unmindful of Nixon's deception, Stelzner is reduced to describing Nixon's speech as a mythic quest narrative with Nixon and the American "silent majority" cast as heroes, concluding only that the speech "accomplishes some objectives" and "gains an audience and time" (p. 172). And Hill's mandate to describe the text based on Aristotle's categories and evaluate its success in terms of its effectiveness in reaching its target audience provides an even starker contrast with Campbell. While admitting that Nixon concealed his intent to keep U.S. forces in Vietnam and isolated anti-war constituents of his audience, Hill encourages critics to avoid locating the rhetorical act in its material contexts, in favor of appreciating the artistry of the speech in reaching its target audience. Hill (1972a) writes, "[N]eo-Aristotelian criticism does not warrant us to estimate the truth of Nixon's statements or the reality of the values he assumes as aspects of American life" (p. 385). Campbell (1972b; see also Black, 1965/1978), in turn, condemns Hill's method as producing "analyses that are at least covert advocacy of the point of view taken in the rhetorical act" (Campbell, 1972b, p. 453). The debate over Nixon's speech constituted a premonition of the ideological turn, which, as Crowley (1992) has noted, cut against the affirmative idealism of the rhetorical tradition. McGee's (1975, 1980, 1982) essays are clearly a fulfillment of that turn, concerned with the way in which power is wielded and freedom constrained in discourse. He maintains a strong sense that there are material consequences to representation. In the ideological turn, the critic is figured as an engaged participant in social discourse, taking political and ethical stances, resisting oppression, and condemning rhetorical practices that maintain unequal relations of power. While postmodernists may claim continuity with the engaged political-critical stance, the assumptions of the postmodern turn are inimical to materialist ideology criticism. With postmodernism, the pendulum shifts back toward the idealist assumption that rhetoric, now conceived as a mosaic of cultural fragments in flux (Brummett, 1993), is all that "matters." On first reading, McGee's (1990) most recent essay seems to extend a materialist perspective. The rhetor, he maintains, is an interpreter of culture, drawing from the heteroglossic, fragmented social space of CNN and MTV an articulation of the people that is neither permanent, stable, nor his or her own. The critic's job is, then, the task of rhetorical construction--the temporary fixing and stabilizing of discourse to reveal its location in social space and relations of power, "All of culture is implicated in every instance of discourse," he writes (McGee, 1990, p. 281), suggesting the materialist's emphasis on ideological patterns in formations of texts rather than in discrete instances (if such a thing can be said to exist) of rhetoric. Here McGee (1990) argues (much as Campbell argued against Hill) against Leff and Sachs' (1990) He then suggests that the stance of the rhetorical critic should be that of rhetor, taking texts that are, on their own, fragmentary expressions of culture and supplying additional premises as necessary in order to make a "text worthy of criticism" (McGee, 1990, pp. 281-283). While the task and the responsibility of the ideology critic have always been to expose ideological texts as such and to produce critical texts as acts of opposition or advocacy, McGee (1990) goes one step further to argue that culture itself is fragmentary, and that audiences are the true authors of rhetorical texts in that they assemble a meaningful whole from the fragments offered them in discourse: "In short, text construction is now something done more by the consumers than by the producers of discourse" (p. 288). At this point, McGee's (1990) text risks embracing the flaws (from a materialist perspective) of an idealist critical stance. While acknowledging that texts cannot be understood except in relation to their contexts (a materialist argument), he defines those contexts as themselves intertextual, rather than material. So instead of discovering the economic or political interests motivating ideological discourses, the critic reduced to describing patterns across cultural texts. Moreover, this description is likely to be uncritical of a commodified discursive space: Rather than bemoaning that "the public's business is now being done more often via direct mail, television spots, documentaries, mass entertainment" (p. 286), McGee advises us to hold our noses and dive into the swirl. A second idealist theme in the "fragments" hypothesis has to do with the tendency to "overplay the audience" (Condit, 1990, p. 339). McGee potentially overestimates the capacity of audiences to make texts of their own from the fragments that bombard them, when, indeed, the fragments of culture often come together in stable ideological patterns and preferred meanings, as during the Persian Gulf War. In the rejection of any notion of "totalization" (McGee, 1990, p. 284), McGee argues that culture is actually fragmented and unstable: "We stand now in the middle...of a seventy-year movement which has fractured and fragmented American culture. Contemporary discourse practices reflect this fragmentation" (p. 286). This assumption does not bear scrutiny in a world in which "postmodern" texts that, while aesthetically fragmented and reflexive, actually encode a stable hierarchical social order in a totality that incorporates moments of resistance and fragmentation (Harvey, 1989). From Nixon's "Vietnamization" speech to Bush's declaration of war against Iraq, from television coverage of the 1960s counterculture to the coverage of the Persian Gulf War, the range of popular fragments available to most people does not allow for infinite critical possibility. Further, even if we cheerfully concede that audiences can and do perform critical readings, their moments of critical consciousness in and of themselves do nothing to challenge structures of power. Radical textual readings of romance novels or Star Trek, of game shows or Madonna, of biker culture or Oprah Winfrey or war do not undermine social relations unless those readings lead to some kind of concrete oppositional action--a successful strike, a demonstration that builds a mass movement, or other collective and effective refusal of the prevailing social order. And, the project of ideology and hegemony has been and still is the management of that conflict in the service of the dominant order (Cloud, 1992). The "cultural fragments" model cannot fathom the interest-governed systematicity of ideological texts. If one were to follow McGee's (1990) critical model into the texts of the Persian Gulf War, it would be possible to affirm or ignore the totalizing nationalistic hype, the euphemisms ("collateral damage," "surgical strike") obscuring the impact of weaponry and the Iraqi death toll, and the almost seamless ideological narrative that convinced us that the Persian Gulf War was just and its consequences benign. Perhaps a follower of the later McGee would focus instead on the tiny cracks in the discourse, for example, rare moments in "support group" narratives in which family members acknowledged their anger and fear that their loved ones were fighting, proclaiming the discourse fragmented, and the audiences free to construct their own rhetoric of compliance or resistance. This critical perspective detaches texts from their material (rather than intertextual) contexts. It so potentially overestimates the degree to which people can achieve emancipation through discursive work on the fragments of the popular. Like neo-Aristotelian criticism, the cultural fragments hypothesis entails advocacy, implicit or explicit, of discourses that dominate and deceive. As cultural critic Ebert (1992-93) puts it, the critical emphasis on the audience tends to "substitute affirmation for critique" (pp. 7, 43).(3) The affirmative tone of cultural studies also characterizes the second group of critical rhetoricians under consideration here, the relativists.

**Even if they’re right, practical political considerations are more important**

**Cloud, 94** – Dana L., Assistant Professor in the Department of Speech Communication, University of Texas, Austin (“The materiality of discourse as oxymoron: A challenge to critical rhetoric,” Western Journal of Communication, vol. 58, is. 3, Summer 1994, ProQuest)

But in a relativist's world, reality is malleable and subject to interpretation. The critic is not in a credible position to adjudicate the truth or falsity of a discourse, or to speculate about whose interests are served by a particular set of texts. To commit oneself to any reality claim is to be open to the charges of dogma and intolerance. The critic is implicated in the structures of power under investigation, and must be reflexive about her or his own interests in pursuing a particular critical goal. Further, power on this view can no longer be thought of as negative or repressive, and in fact to speak of **oppression** within this framework **can no longer make sense.** Instead, power is fluid, unfitable, existing in shifting networks of discursive control (Foucault, 1980, pp. 92-97). In poststructuralist social theory, power exists in discursive form, or rather in discursive formations, that constitute reality itself. In this view there is no distinction between the real or material and the discursive. For this reason, the theory of discourse here is more properly called the discursivity of the material rather than the materiality of discourse. The oppositions material-ideal and real-ideological are completely collapsed into one another, so that the distinction between ideology and reality, superstructure and base, no longer have meaning. The materialist project of demystification is abandoned in the process, as examination of postmodern critical rhetorics reveals. Although they are not, strictly speaking, rhetoricians, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) put forward a commonly cited theory of rhetoric for socialists that hinges on the discursivity of the material (Eagleton, 1991; Geras, 1987). Laclau and Mouffe argue that hegemony is the ability of groups to formulate antagonisms to the system based on articulations of "the people" in unified, counter-hegemonic coalitions, (in contrast, Marxists before the "posts" have understood cultural hegemony to mean the tendency of culture to appropriate and contain oppositional moments and discourses in the ultimate service of the stability of capitalist relations; see Williams, 1977, pp. 108-114). Laclau and Mouffe explicitly reject any distinction between the discursive and the real or material. They consider themselves post-Marxists because they locate revolutionary agency in discourse rather than in the insurrectionary activity of classes with particular economic positions and interests. They define discourse very broadly, as the whole ensemble of social relations, of which linguistic actions are only a part (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987). Later they explain, "Human beings socially construct their world, and it is through this construction--always precarious and incomplete--that they give to a thing its being" (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987, p. 89). They define their project as "anti-realist" rather than anti-materialist (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987, pp. 86-87), meaning that what they reject is the usefulness of the notion of ontological, pre-discursive reality, not the imbrication of discourse with power. Like McGee (1986), they reject the idea that the world falls into line according to some set of a priori idealized forms or concepts. Unlike McGee, however, Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 1987) completely collapse the distinction between discourse and the real. McGee (1986) is quite clear in his refusal of this conflation: Action is doing-to the world, the chopping of trees....There is a tremendous gulf between action and discourse, the distance between murder, for example, and the 'symbolic killing' of name-calling....In truth, the only actions that consist in discourse are performed on discourse itself. Speech will not fell a tree, and one cannot write a house to dwell in. One can act through discourse on discourse to guide or control the meaning people see in selected representation of the world. Discursive action, however, always stands in anticipation of its consequences, an act that requires additional acts before one is clear that it ever was more than "mere talk." (p. 122) When one lets go of the distinction between material reality and the ideal or ideological, the social structure ceases to be recognized as a set of material power relations but becomes instead a set of competing reality definitions that are unfixed, free-floating, and malleable regardless of the material circumstances in which one finds oneself. In the competition among rhetorically produced realities, there are few resources for privileging one construct over another. Further, when discourse counts as material, emancipation is seemingly possible in "mere talk," the construction of counter-hegemonic articulations of "the people." The risks of such a view are idealism (as described above), political relativism, and the endorsement of a merely descriptive critical project. The realist critique of discourse theory has been argued by feminists (Alcoff, in press; Ebert, 1992-93; Hennessy, 1993) and Marxists (Norris, 1990, 1992). Specifically, poststructuralist and postmodernist approaches to discourse have come under fire for their abdication of critical judgment. This critique bears directly on our own field. For as Wood and Cox (1993) put it, "From the Frankfurt School to post-Marxists to other players in postmodern theory, materiality is out and discourse, as a constituting agency of consciousness, is in....Scholars in our own field have paralleled this move" (p. 278). Among rhetoricians, the relativist views on power and discourse characteristic of poststructuralism are most clearly manifest in McKerrow's (1989, 1991b) "critical rhetoric" project. McKerrow (1989, 1991b) argues for a critical practice that can encompass both a critique of domination, or the unmasking of realities obscured by ideological discourses, and a critique of freedom, or a description of what discourses accomplish without reference to an extra-textual reality. By this he means that we ought to attend to Foucault's definition of power as positive/creative as well as oppressive, power as discursively deployed, resistance as plural and localized, texts as open, and discourse as autonomous from or inclusive of economic and political structures. McKerrow's eight principles of critical rhetoric (one of which is that discourse is material, in the relativist sense) encompass both the critique of domination (of negative power, oppression) and the critique of freedom. We need both, says McKerrow (1989): It is the case that state power exists, is repressive, and is accessible to critique. It is equally the case that power is not only repressive but potentially productive, that its effects are pervasive throughout the social world and that these effects are accessible to analysis. (p. 101) Like Marx (1932/1978b), McKerrow acknowledges that despite the pervasiveness and persuaviveness of ideologies, and despite the existence of exploitation and oppression, the working class and dominated groups are not powerless, but rather possess tremendous potential power against their rulers. However, what McKerrow's (1989) language obscures is the possibility that the critique of domination and the critique of freedom are mutually contradictory in the task of ideology criticism. We cannot talk about unmasking repressive, dominating power without some understanding of reality and oppression. Yet following Foucault (1980), McKerrow (1989) suggests that one cannot identify categories of oppressor and oppressed, nor can one take a stance on the truth and falsity of discourses. He states, "[a] critical rhetoric examines the dimensions of domination and freedom as these are exercised in relativized world," (McKerrow, 1989, p. 91). Accordingly, McKerrow wants to argue for a view of rhetoric as "doxastic," concerned with the creation and maintenance of social consensus about what is real, true, and good, rather than with reality, truth and goodness per se. He maintains that the rhetor is not a free agent, as Aristotelian theory would have it, but "speaks the culture," in ways that empower and constrain her/him at the same time. The critic, then, must take up what Foucault would call a genealogical task--to describe the shifting articulations of the discourse, to situate rhetoric within the discursive formation and the relations of power inscribed there, performing an act of textual construction that is itself rhetorical. The project of describing rhetoric as doxa finds itself at odds with a project that seeks to expose the naturalized common sense of a people as an ideology obscuring certain features of material reality. A critical performance based on the critical rhetoric model could analyze the competing constructed "truths" of the Persian Gulf War from multiple perspectives, from Colin Powell to Iraqi civilians in the rubble after the devastation, from George Bush to anti-war protesters. But after one has sought out the voices of the war-mongers and the voices of the Iraqis and the voices of the Palestinians and the voices of the mothers waiting for their sons and daughters to return from battle, what then? Does the critique of freedom negate the possibility of privileging some of these voices over others in an act of judgment? If the discourse is the reality, would a critic of the "freedom" inherent in the discourse around the war be forced to grant the nationalistic 1991 Superbowl half-time an ontological status equal to the suffering of thousands of Iraqis as they were buried in the sand? Most advocates of the critical rhetoric project would probably be loath to take the materiality of discourse thesis so far as to make critique impossible. For example, McKerrow (1991a) defends the project of Marxist ideology critique in other contexts, suggesting that to leave open the question of political commitment in theory does not preclude taking a political stand (albeit open to future critique) in practice. Yet, the potentially relativist consequences of the "critique of freedom" in a rhetoric conceived as doxastic are revealed in two articles, "Reality Gulf" and "The Gulf War Never Took Place," by postmodernist Baudrillard. Baudrillard (as summarized by Norris, 1992, pp. 11-31, 192-196) makes the argument that the war was not a "real" event, but rather was a hyperreal product of media construction. Norris (1992) condemns Baudrillard and other postmodernist intellectuals who adopted a relativist philosophical and textualist stance, arguing that they abdicated grounds on which to evaluate the war. The problem with the various poststructuralist intellectual movements, Norris argues, is their treatment of language and texts as entities without reference to a world we might designate as "real." We need not deny that the war seemed to television news audiences to be an "unreal" product of textual construction to suggest that the fabrication of a sense of unreality was a persuasive ideological strategy that diminished our capacity to respond critically and politically to the consequences of the war. While Baudrillard cannot be read as speaking for all postmodernists, his stance serves as a warning buoy marking the existence of a dangerous idealist and relativist undertow in the postmodern sea. Within rhetorical studies, Ono and Sloop (1992) have noted these dangers. They accept McKerrow's call for reflexivity on the part of the critic, but warn critical rhetoricians that without a telos or guiding political project or purpose, criticism becomes a relativist, insular endeavor (see also Charland, 1991). Yet, Ono and Sloop reject the commitment of Wander's (1983) ideological turn as a dogmatic modernist project, arguing for a postmodern reformulation of telos that recognizes that truths are contingent, and scholars sometimes mistaken in their projects and commitments. While amending the relativism of poststructuralist theory, Ono and Sloop (1992) adhere uncritically to its idealism, lauding criticism as in and of itself "discursive struggle" (p. 52) that will achieve liberation from dominating discourses. Similarly, Brummett (1991), McGee (1990), and McGuire (1990) have argued for a conception of criticism itself as the transformative act rather than theorizing the action of groups to change material structures in their own discourse. Thus, Ono and Sloop advocate as one example of a transformative critical act the rethinking of the meaning of "homosexual." Ono and Sloop's suggestion is an example of identity politics, which consists of the heralding of the constitution and expression of oppositional identities as political action, in a social space presumed to be fragmented, combined with the denial that oppression has a material base in social class (i.e., that racism is not simply about identity, but is about the denial of material benefits like money and physical safety based on identity). Identity politics pervades not only contemporary critical practice but also contemporary social movements, which have often been undermined by a personalized focus on the self rather than a political focus on social transformation (Adams, 1989; S. Clarke, 1991; Kauffman, 1990; Smith, 1994). What a defense of the ideological turn offers, in contrast, is the insistence that it is not only discourses and codes from which many people need liberation. A politics of discourse, even where the project is grounded in the critic's commitments, assumes that those who are oppressed or exploited need discursive redefinition of their identities, rather than a transformation of their material conditions as a primary task. The project of ideology critique, modernist as it may be,(4) is the only critical stance that suggests discourse may justify oppression and exploitation, but texts do not themselves constitute the oppression. In other words, when one assumes either that historical agency lies with texts (idealism) or that textuality is all there is (relativism), one risks leaving behind the project of critique. There is a difference between the 150 thousand Iraqi casualties of the Persian Gulf War and their discursive construction as "collateral damage," "terrorists," or "human shields." No doubt, the constructions have persuasive force, but cannot be regarded as being as real as the dead and wounded people. This acknowledgment is necessary if we are to be able to privilege politically the voices and realities of people who are, in some real way, oppressed. Hartsock (1983) argues for crediting the voices and standpoints of those who are exploited and oppressed with more ontological significance and political truth than those of the dominant culture. In other words, it is important for the critical rhetorician, as for any critical person, to seek out counter-ideological information and perspectives whose contradictions with the prevailing constructions of "reality" expose those constructions as mystification. The alternative is the aestheticization and depoliticization of political struggle. Farrell (1993), in the recent Western symposium on ideology; writes, The site of struggle in the academy has been relocated to a realm entirely interior to texts....Rhetoric, that practically conscientious discourse of struggle and conflict, has been aestheticized....The cult of textuality has had the effect of blinding many of us to and also insulating many of us from the places where real material grievances are stored and sometime lost. (p. 149) With the poststructuralist turn as it is represented by McGee (1990) and McKerrow (1989, 1991b), we may no longer have a stance from which to perform the still-relevant task of rhetorical-ideological criticism. In the acceptance of a relativist world view, a critical rhetoric that loses sight of the material realm threatens to render critical judgment inconsequential. THEORIES HAVE CONSEQUENCES This article has argued that there are two problematic versions of the "materiality of discourse" hypothesis: one represented by McGee (1990), McGuire (1990), and Ono and Sloop (1992) stating that rhetoric, language, and culture transcend and determine material relations of power (idealism), and another represented by Laclau and Mouffe (1985), McKerrow (1989, 1991b), Baudrillard (1975), and Foucault (1980) suggesting that rhetoric, language, and culture constitute reality and that therefore there are no ontological or epistemological grounds for moral or political critique (relativism). A third way, the way of the ideology critic, avoids relativism and idealism while acknowledging the persuasive force of rhetoric in history. Those who will label the call for a return to pre-poststructuralist frameworks impossible, given that we live in a "post-poststructuralist" historical moment, assume (in idealist fashion) that poststructuralist and postmodern theories are historical determinants rather than being ideological expressions of late capitalism, as in Jameson's (1991) formulation. German (1991) argues that behind the influence of poststructuralist and postmodern theories "is the [wrong] idea that the society in which the ideas of socialism and communism flourished is itself dead or dying: consumption is the key, the working class is disappearing, collective action is a thing of the past" (p. 40). Harvey (1989; see also Schiller, 1991) provides much evidence that capitalist and neoimperialist power relations, far from being dispersed, disabled, or otherwise fragmented, have extended and deepened their reach and strength, and that therefore the task of ideology criticism on the classical model is still vital. This is not to say that ideology criticism should remain uninformed by its encounter with recent rhetorical theory and criticism. McKerrow (1983) calls for a "rhetorical conception of ideology" that can account not only for economic determination of ideas but also for "the possibility of human intervention in the progress of history" (p. 200). However, an emphasis on the individual human agent should not obscure the ideological power of dominant economic and political interests in **structuring, framing, and setting the limits** for rhetorical action. One way for the materialist to acknowledge human action is to conceive of rhetorical acts as strategic deployments of symbolic resources within an ideological frame. To mitigate against dogmatic and simplistic approaches to texts, ideology critics might also accept the poststructuralist impulse to acknowledge complexity where it exists, in addition to the insights that collectivity and meaning are rhetorical processes, and that much of human experience is textual, strategic, and rhetorical. In particular, attention to the ways in which some truths (e.g., about sexuality, drug addiction, mental illness, and other formations) are constructs that function persuasively and even coercively is an important extension of the task of ideology criticism. Yet, we ought not sacrifice the notions of practical truth, bodily reality, and material oppression to the tendency to render all of experience discursive, as if no one went hungry or died in war. To say that hunger and war are rhetorical is to state the obvious; to suggest that rhetoric is all they are is to leave critique behind. Critical rhetorical theory's easy **adoption of poststructuralist ideas entails the evacuation of the critical project** as elaborated by Wander (1983) more than a decade ago: An ideological turn in modern criticism reflects the existence of crisis, acknowledges the influence of established interests and the reality of alternative world views, and commends rhetorical analyses not only of the actions implied but also of the interests represented. More than 'informed talk about matters of importance,' criticism carries us to the point of recognizing good reason and engaging in right action. (p. 18) In light of a critical project geared toward the emancipation of real people engaged in struggle, we would do well to herald the activist turn (Andersen, 1993) and in our critical practice, to retain notions of the real; of the material; and of the structured, stable, and dominating. For without these, any claims as to the "materiality of discourse" will be **oxymoronic** indeed.

# Policy Focus Good

**Even if they’re right, our framework’s better – learning to speak in the language of traditional policymaking is key to creating policy change**

**Campbell, 02** – John L., Department of Sociology, Dartmouth College (“Ideas, Politics, and Public Policy,” Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 28, no. 1, 2002, JSTOR)RK

As noted above, one of the most important problems with the literature on ideas and policy making is that the causal mechanisms whereby different types of ideas affect policy making are often **poorly specified** (Yee 1996). However, scholars have made some progress. Actors and Epistemic Communities One way to explain how ideas affect policy making is to show through careful process tracing how specific actors carried certain ideas into the policy-making fray and used them effectively. These actors are often academics and other intellectuals whose claim to knowledge and expertise enables their voice to be heard above others (Brint 1994a). For example, Skowronek (1982) argued that an intellectual vanguard of university-trained professionals, economists, and other progressive thinkers were among America's most valuable state-building resources during the early twentieth century. They played key roles in the development of a more professional, bureaucratic U.S. state by providing all sorts of new ideas about how to better organize the state and exercise state power. Intellectuals were also important in advancing various programmatic ideas about how to build welfare states in Europe and North America (Rueschemeyer & Skocpol 1996). Similarly, think tanks, research institutes, and university academics-notably economists have affected industrial and macroeconomic policy making (Domhoff 1998:ch. 4; Ricci 1993; Stone 1996; Smith 1991, 1989). At the international level "epistemic communities" are responsible for generating new ideas and disseminating them among national policy makers as well as others in the international community. Epistemic communities are networks of professionals and experts with an **authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge**, who share a set of normative beliefs, causal models, notions of empirical validity, and a common policy enterprise (Haas 1992). Keck & Sikkink (1998) argued that these networks are especially important because their members are often responsible for generating the very ideas that constitute the world culture, discussed earlier, to which sociologists attribute isomorphic effects at the national level. Moreover, Keck & Sikkink specified more carefully than most world culture researchers how these transnational networks mobilize and frame information, and how they convince powerful international actors, such as the World Bank and U.S. government, to press nation states that are reluctant to adopt internationally accepted human rights, environmental, and other policies (see also Risse et al. 1999). As such, their contribution is threefold. First, they delineated several causal mechanisms through which world culture affects national policy makers, thereby injecting a degree of agency into the otherwise structuralist world culture literature. Second, they addressed the important debate over whether a few centralized hegemonic organizations (e.g., McNamara1 998, Pauly 1997) or decentralized networks of organizations and individuals, each of which is rather weak on its own (e.g., Boli & Thomas 1999), are responsible for the diffusion of world culture. For Keck & Sikkink, both matter. Third, they showed that the diffusion of world culture often involves much struggle, conflict, and even repression. Indeed, diffusion is a much more uneven and contested process than much of the literature suggests (see also Mittelman 2000). Institutional Filters and Embeddedness Of course, actors do not operate in a vacuum. Many researchers have argued that the formal rules and procedures governing policy making affect which ideas penetrate the policy-making process and are adopted and implemented as policy. In other words, institutions influence the degree to which academics, other intellectuals, and thus new policy ideas can access policy-making arenas. This sort of institutional filtering has affected economic policy (P. Hall 1989a,b), welfare policy (Weir & Skocpol 1985), energy policy (Campbell 1988, Jasper 1990), and national security policy (Risse-Kappan 1994). Studies have paid less attention to the informal channels through which this occurs, but insofar as intellectuals and policy makers travel in the same social circles, social as well as political institutions can act as filters in this sense (Domhoff 1974, Rueschemeyer & Skocpol 1996). For instance, one reason why national unemployment insurance was passed in Britain was that liberal social scientists from Oxford University, who favored such a program, mingled in the same clubs, associations, and other social venues as London's political elite and urged them to adopt this idea. As a result, when the Liberal Party came to power in the early twentieth century, many of these intellectuals were appointed to key administrative posts where they helped formulate the program, which was passed in 1911 (Schwebber 1996). Indeed, the ways in which idea-producing institutions, such as the professions and universities, are linked to the state helps determine which ideas affect policy making (Ziegler 1997).

**Forming political identities is pre-requisite to the kritik – only learning to navigate political engagement solves**

**Bertsch, 95** – Charlie, graduate student in the English Ph.D. program at UC-Berkeley (“Useful Fictions,” Bad Subjects, is. 19, March 1995, http://bad.eserver.org/issues/1995/19/bertsch.html)RK

The third model of identity in circulation today — usually called constructivism — provides us with a way to avoid such dilemmas. Inspired by psychoanalytic and Marxist traditions, proponents of this model argue that nothing is necessarily constant to an individual's make-up. They try to show that what seems most integral to an individual's being is actually put-together in a social realm that both precedes and exceeds her or his bodily boundaries. Another way of putting this is to say that this model of identity insists on the social-constructedness of all subjects. In a sense, this is not so much a model of identity in its own right as a countermodel whose purpose is to refute other models of identity. Obviously, if we agree that an individual's will is constructed by social forces, then it becomes impossible to say that individuals are in complete control of their actions. Likewise, if we agree that qualities like race, gender, and sexual-preference are imposed on an individual by those forces, then it becomes impossible to state that a given individual is essentially anything. More generally, if we agree with this model, we are forced to acknowledge that the notion that individuals possess identity-in-the-singular is itself a construct. That is, we must acquiesce to the superficially radical idea that all identity is a fiction. We get a very different picture of transformational identities when we consider them in the light of this model. It suggests that transformational identities are not a special case, but the norm: if there can be no fixed identities, then what we have been calling 'transformations' are the only identities we have, plain and simple. Although this model suggests that all identities are fictional, its more extreme proponents — usually called 'post-structuralists' — reserve special animosity for the idea that the different identities an individual performs can somehow add up to a coherent 'self,' an identity-in-the-singular. They imply that the more time an identity must span and the greater the number of individual actions it must therefore encompass, the more dangerous it becomes. In a way, this is to argue that the problem is not which identities are made or how they are made, but that they sustain themselves at all. Unfortunately, if we draw this sort of conclusion from the constructivist model of identity, **it is nearly impossible to imagine substantive political action.** Almost all political action requires concerted effort towards a **definite goal** over time. And such effort, in turn, requires a reasonably **stable identity**. After all, it is impossible for individuals to strategize unless they know that they will have the same general goals tomorrow that they have today. In radically critiquing the idea of identity-in-the-singular, the post-structuralists who draw this conclusion ultimately promote passivity. Hegemony, Ideology, and Identity Of course, it is one thing to realize that all identity is a fiction, but quite another to decide what to do with that insight. We can draw other conclusions to from the constructivist model of identity, ones which can enable political action rather than inhibit it. In order to get a better sense of what they might look like, we need to take a detour through theory more directly concerned with the workings of society as a whole. When Marxist social theorist Antonio Gramsci looked at the Western world of the 1930s, he saw that vast numbers of people appeared strangely content to live within a power structure that runs counter to their own best interests. In trying to account for this phenomenon, Gramsci realized that the ruling class in modern societies does not rule by threat of force alone. He theorized that the majority of people in such societies behave themselves, not only because they fear punishment, but also because they consent to the power structure that maintains the status quo. Indeed, since most people do not break the law or seek to overthrow this power structure, it can be said that their consent plays a bigger role in perpetuating the dominance of the ruling class than does their fear of punishment. Gramsci called the achievement and maintenance of this consent 'hegemony.' Two aspects of Gramsci's theory of hegemony are particularly significant for our thinking about identity. The first is that he describes hegemony as a kind of cultural 'glue' able to bind and hold together very different sectors of modern societies, even ones which have little or nothing in common. As Stuart Hall phrases it in an article entitled 'Gramsci and Us,' hegemony 'does not reflect, it constructs a 'unity' out of difference.' The second aspect relates to the way hegemony manages to accomplish this. Because it resolves real differences into a semblance of unity, hegemony requires the creation and sustenance of an illusion. To put this another way, hegemony depends upon a collective fantasy in which conflicting sectors are perceived to be somehow alike, a fantasy that these sectors share a common identity. Hegemony is, in other words, a fiction of collective identity. But how does this relate to the issues surrounding individual identity that we have been discussing? Gramsci doesn't talk about individuals much, except to discuss the ways in which they bond together in organizations. As I will explain later, I think it might be good to start thinking about individuals in terms of collective identity. For now, however, we can turn to another Marxist social theorist who tried to build on both Gramsci's insights into collective identity and Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic insights about individual identity. In the essay 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes Towards an Investigation' from which Bad Subjects derives its name, Louis Althusser revises the traditional Marxist definition of ideology. Instead of contrasting the illusions of ideology to the 'truth' of reality as Marx had implicitly done, Althusser argues that there is no escape from ideology. 'Ideology,' he writes, 'represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.' Because our minds always 'mediate' (or filter) our relation to reality, it is not possible for us to have direct access to it. Instead, we only have indirect access to reality through the socially constructed fictions with which we define ourselves and our place in the world. To rephrase this insight in terms of our topic, because identity takes shape when we distinguish between what and where we are, and because it is socially constructed, it derives from our imaginary relationship to our real conditions of existence. We could say that, if ideology represents, then identity is a principal effect of that representation. If all identity is a fiction, then it must be ideology that creates and sustains that fiction. As we can see, Althusser clearly argues for a constructivist model of identity. Where he differs from the post-structuralist proponents of this model whom we discussed earlier, however, is in his distinction between ideology-in-general and ideologies in the plural. 'Ideology-in-general' refers to the inescapable fact that we can never access reality directly: we always perceive it through what Lacan called the 'imaginary,' through fictions. Ideologies, on the other hand, are the historically specific fictions with which people of a given place and time make sense of themselves and their relation to the world. Making this distinction allows us to conclude that, while we cannot escape ideology-in-general, there is a lot at stake in determining which specific ideologies dominate our lives. This returns us to Gramsci's notion of hegemony. Since hegemony really depends on the creation and sustenance of a collective fiction of identity, it is really just a specific ideology that holds sway over the majority of people in a society. As Althusser's argument suggests, hegemony is therefore not eternal, but something that can be challenged by other specific ideologies. From a leftist perspective, challenging hegemony requires the creation of an alternative fiction of collective identity. That is, if we wish to disassemble a particular power structure, it is **not enough to say that it is bad**. And it certainly isn't enough to show that it is glued together by a fiction that resolves real differences into a semblance of unity. Rather, we need to provide a different logic with which to make society cohere, one in keeping with our political goals. Clearly, the idea that all identity is a fiction need not induce passivity. If, as Althusser argues, there is no political action, no 'practice except by and in an ideology,' then we must construct fictions of identity adequate to our political project. Those adherents to the constructivist model of identity who are so suspicious of identities that can be sustained over time seem to forget that, as Karl Marx puts it in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 'men make their own history,' though 'not of their own free will; not under circumstances they themselves have chosen but under the given and inherited circumstances with which they are directly confronted.' They forget, in other words, that the social forces that construct identity result from the collective activity of human beings. Indeed, from Bad Subjects' leftist perspective, the strength of this model comes from its recognition that identities are made, not found. That its proponents would forget that the social forces that construct identity are themselves made, not found, seems remarkable. Useful Fictions As we mentioned earlier, we live in a society that, for all of its modernity, still reserves a prominent place for fantasies of transformation. The majority of these fantasies, however, narrate metamorphoses in which individuals change more or less independently of the society around them. When we do get narratives in which individual transformation is more closely linked to collective transformation, such as in science-fiction tales of the 1950s or Star Trek: The Next Generation's stories about the Borg, they tend to be extremely pessimistic. While becoming a vampire or murderer can give a character personality and even glamour, becoming a standardized cog in an impersonal machine cannot. What all this suggests is that, although we need to imagine transformation, we are encouraged to imagine it only as individual transformation. This is a phenomenon leftists would do well to consider. Certainly, there are times when it is useful to imagine individual transformations. As several articles in Bad Subjects have attested, autobiographical 'conversion' narratives can be a powerful way of communicating with people who might ignore an explicitly political message. In the long run, however, our goal is not just to 'reach' people, but to organize them into a new and better society. The left needs to turn the idea of transformation on its head. We do not need narratives of individual transformation within a society that does not change. Instead, **we need to construct fictions of identity that inspire individuals to work for social change**; fictions of identity that are predicated not on the individual's opposition to society, but on her or his **integration into it**; fictions of identity in which individuals act, not as autonomous individuals, but as part of a collective movement; fictions, finally, that are worth believing in.

# Post-Modernism Bad – Shouldn’t Be In IR

**Postmodernism has no place in IR**

**Debrix, 02** François Debrix is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Florida International University. “Language as Criticism: Assessing the Merits of Speech Acts and Discursive Formations in International Relations,” New Political Science, 24:2, 201-219 [http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/07393140220145216 Accessed 7/17/12](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/07393140220145216%20Accessed%207/17/12) BJM

Unfortunately, by embracing postmodern methods, the discipline of international relations also tends to simplify and confuse these analytical tools. IR scholars, including some constructivists and poststructuralists, are starting to lose track of the motivations that first compelled postmodern scholars to turn to language and to ask questions about knowledge. The relation between the need to look at language differently and the epistemological challenge is fading away. It is becoming fashionable to use language strategies of all sorts without questioning why such instruments may be needed at all, to what extent, and toward which objective. 6 As the attraction to the critical method takes precedence over the epistemological justification for such a method, the role and place of language in postmodern IR is rarely a reason for concern anymore. 7 In this essay, I want to place the focus back on the linguistic strategies of postmodern inquiry and on their link to epistemology. Not all postmodern linguistic strategies are equivalent or complementary. Not all of them serve similar epistemological and political purposes. It is important for postmodern scholars to know which strategies of language do what. By the same token, it is crucial to keep in mind the distinctions that exist between constructivism and poststructuralism.

# Post-Modernism Bad – Patriarchy

**Post-modern denial of material reality entrenches patriarchy and makes feminist critique impossible**

**Mackinnon, 00** – Catherine A., Long Professor of Law at the University of Michigan (“Points Against Postmodernism,” Chicago-Kent Law Review, vol. 75 [http://www.adelinotorres.com/filosofia/Against%20Postmodernism.pdf)RK](http://www.adelinotorres.com/filosofia/Against%20Postmodernism.pdf%29RK)

Just these few examples of the practice of this theory show a twopronged transformation taking place. By including what violates women under civil and human rights law, the meaning of “citizen” and “human” begins to have a woman’s face. As women’s actual conditions are recognized as inhuman, those conditions are being changed by requiring that they meet a standard of citizenship and humanity that previously did not apply because they were women. In other words, women both change the standard as we come under it and change the reality it governs by having it applied to us. This democratic process describes not only the common law when it works but also a cardinal tenet of feminist analysis: women are entitled to access to things as they are and also to change them into something worth us having. Thus women are transforming the definition of equality not by making ourselves the same as men, entitled to violate and silence, or by reifying women’s so-called differences, but by insisting that equal citizenship must include what women need to be human, including a right not to be sexually violated and silenced. This was done in the Bosnian case by recognizing ethnic particularity, not by denying it. Adapting the words of the philosopher Richard Rorty, we are making the word woman a “name of a way of being human.”10 We are challenging and changing the process of knowing and the practice of power at the same time. In other words, it works. Feminism made a bold claim in Western philosophy: women can access our own reality because we live it; slightly more broadly, that living a subordinated status can give one access to its reality. Not reality with a capital R—this particular social reality. Since women were not playing power games or trying to win academic debates, we did not claim privilege. We simply claimed the reality of women’s experience as a ground to stand on and move from, as a basis for conscious political action. As it turned out, once rescued from flagrant invisibility, women’s realities could often be documented in other ways and nearly **anyone proved able to understand them** with a little sympathetic application. Women turned the realities of powerlessness into a form of power: credibility. And **reality supported us.** What we said was credible because it was real. Few people claimed that women were not violated in the ways we had found or did not occupy a second class status in society. Not many openly disputed that what we had uncovered did, in fact, exist. What was said instead was that in society, nothing really exists. II. During the same twenty-five year period that this theory and practice have been ongoing, a trend in theory called postmodernism has been working on undoing it. Its main target is, precisely, reality. Postmodernism, I will argue—or more narrowly, the central epistemic tendency in it that I am focusing on—derealizes social reality by **ignoring it**, by refusing to be accountable to it, and, in a somewhat new move, by openly repudiating any connection with an “it” by claiming “it” is not there. Postmodernism is a flag flown by a diverse congeries, motley because lack of unity is their credo and they feel no need to be consistent. Part of the problem in coming to grips with postmodernism is that, pretending to be profound while being merely obscure (many are fooled), slathering subjects with words, its selfproclaimed practitioners fairly often don’t say much of anything.11 A third part of the problem is that some commentators credit postmodernism with ideas that serious critical traditions originated and have long practiced. For example: “Balkin has been one of the few legal writers willing to explore postmodern issues such as the social construction of reality, the role of ideology, and the problem of social critique.”12 Jack Balkin does explore these themes, calling that work postmodern, but legal feminists have been exploring them in depth for about thirty years, as have Marxists and some legal realists, beginning long before, to name only some. Another part of the problem is that postmodernism steals from feminism—claiming for example that the critique of objectivity is a postmodern insight—and covering its larceny by subsuming feminism as a subprovince of postmodernism.13

# Post-Modernism Bad – Agency

**Focus on discourse makes real agency impossible – ignores reality**

**Mackinnon, 00** – Catherine A., Long Professor of Law at the University of Michigan (“Points Against Postmodernism,” Chicago-Kent Law Review, vol. 75 [http://www.adelinotorres.com/filosofia/Against%20Postmodernism.pdf)RK](http://www.adelinotorres.com/filosofia/Against%20Postmodernism.pdf%29RK)

Postmodernism as practiced often comes across as style— petulant, joyriding, more posture than position. But it has a method, making metaphysics far from dead. Its approach and its position, its posture toward the world and its view of what is real, is that it’s all mental. Postmodernism imagines that society happens in your head. Back in the modern period, this position was called idealism. In its continuity with this method, to offer a few examples, postmodernism has made the penis into “the phallus” and it is mostly observed to signify.32 Women have become “an ongoing discursive practice,”33 or, ubiquitously, “the female body,”34 which is written on and signified but seldom, if ever, raped, beaten, or otherwise violated. Racism and homophobia are elided “differences” in disguise. Abuse has become “agency”—or rather challenges to sexual abuse have been replaced by invocations of “agency,” women’s violation become the sneering wound of a “victim” pinned in arch quotation marks.35 Instead of facing what was done to women when we were violated, we are told how much freedom we had at the time. (For this we need feminism?) Agency in the postmodern lexicon is a stand-in for the powerless exercising power; sometimes it means freedom, sometimes self-action, sometimes resistance, sometimes desire. We are not told which of these is meant, precisely, or how any or all of these things are possible under the circumstances. It would be good to know. Oddly missing in this usage is what an agent legally is: someone who acts for someone else, the principal, who is pulling their strings. Domination, postmodernists know exists, but they don’t tell us how or where or why. It is something that no one does or has done to them but somehow winds up in “gendered lopsidedness.”36 What we used to call “what happened to her,” has become, at its most credible, “narrative.” **But real harm has ceased to exist.** So whole chapters of books with “pornography” in their titles can be written without ever once talking about what the pornography industry concretely does, who they are, or what is done to whom in and with the materials.37 There is no discussion of how pornography exploits and mass-produces sexual abuse. There is not even an extension of the early work on the scopic drive by Foucault, Lacan, and Irigaray (who are even French)—an analysis that is readily extendable to describe the aggressive appropriation and trafficking of women in pornography.38 Nor have I noticed the multiculturalists out there opposing the spread of pornography from Scandinavia, Germany, and the United States on grounds of cultural imperialism, and it’s taking over the world. The point of postmodernism is to get as far away from anything real as possible. Postmodern feminists seldom build on or refer to the real lives of real women directly; mostly, they build on the work of French men, if selectively and often not very well.39 Foucault, for instance, studied some real practices, though he mostly missed gender, which from the standpoint of feminism is a rather big thing to miss. Foucault’s elision of gender, feminist postmodernists try endlessly to fix, but his actual engagement with reality—“I’m an empiricist”40—they have totally abandoned. Feminist postmodernism is far, far away from the realities of the subordination of women. All women should be so fortunate.

# Post Modernism Bad – Action/Turns the Alt

**Reality exists – even if it is constructed, focus on discourse makes action impossible and destroys the alternative**

**Mackinnon, 00** – Catherine A., Long Professor of Law at the University of Michigan (“Points Against Postmodernism,” Chicago-Kent Law Review, vol. 75 [http://www.adelinotorres.com/filosofia/Against%20Postmodernism.pdf)RK](http://www.adelinotorres.com/filosofia/Against%20Postmodernism.pdf%29RK)

C. Reality It is my view that it is the relation of theory to reality that feminism changed, and it is in part a reversion to a prefeminist relation of theory to reality that postmodernism is reimposing. This is not about truth. Truth is a generality, an abstraction of a certain shape and quality. **Social realities are something else again.** Postmodernism has decided that because truth died with God, there are no social facts. The fact that reality is a social construction does not mean that it is not there; **it means that it is there**, in society, where we live. According to postmodernism, there are no facts; everything is a reading, so there can be no lies. Apparently it cannot be known whether the Holocaust is a hoax, whether women love to be raped, whether Black people are genetically intellectually inferior to white people, whether homosexuals are child molesters. To postmodernists, these factish things are indeterminate, contingent, in play, all a matter of interpretation. Similarly, whether or not acts of incest happened or are traumatic to children become fogged over in “epistemological quandaries” as beyond thinking, beyond narrative, beyond intelligibility, as “this event that is no event”—as if survivors have not often reported, in intelligible narratives, that such events did happen and did harm them.41 That violation often damages speech and memory does not mean that, if one has speech and memory, one was not violated. Recall when Bill Clinton, asked about his sexual relationship with a young woman intern, said that it all depended on what “is” means. The country jeered his epistemic dodge as a transparent and slimy subterfuge to evade accountability: get real. The postmodernists were strangely silent. But you can’t commit perjury if there are no facts. Where are these people when you need them? What postmodernists want, I have come to think, apart from to live in their heads instead of in the world (that old dodge), is to vault themselves out of power methodologically. They want to beat dominance at its own game, which is usually called dominating. They want to win every argument in advance. Also, if everything is interpretation, you can never be wrong. Feminism has faced that you don’t know what is real by getting outside your determinants (which you can’t do anyway) but by getting deep inside them with a lot of other people with the same foot (even feet) on their necks. Abdicating this, feminism’s source of power, postmodernism has swallowed the objective standpoint while claiming to be off on a whole new methodological departure. Then they sigh and admit they might have to concede partiality,42 meaning admitting only knowing part. What, again, was the alternative? Totality? What’s wrong with partiality—except from the objective standpoint, which thinks it means you can’t be right? Who said there is either the whole or a part? Postmodernism keeps becoming what it claims to supersede.43 If feminism is modernist—which is highly problematic, as it is as much a critique of modernism44—and postmodernists want to be postfeminist, they have to take feminism with them and go further. They often claim to. To be postmodern in this sense, the insights of modernism and its critics into the inequalities of sex, race, and class must, it seems to me, be taken on board before they can be gone beyond.45 Instead of superceding these insights, postmodernists routinely elaborately deny them, ignore them, act like they are not there. This is premodern, as if feminism never existed. On the question of continuity, whether postmodernism has much if anything to say that modernism didn’t, is also worth asking. The great modern, Gertrude Stein, wrote in 1946: “[T]here aint any answer, there aint going to be any answer, there never has been an answer, that’s the answer.”46 How is postmodernism “post” that? What I mean to say on the question of reality in theory is this: When something happens to women, it happens in social reality. The perspective from women’s point of view does not mean that women’s reality can only be seen from there, hence is inaccessible to anyone else and can’t be talked about and does not exist. Rather, what can be seen from the point of view of the subordination of women has been there all along—too long. We wish it didn’t exist but it can’t be wished out of existence. Anyone can see it. It can be found. It can be ascertained. It can even be measured sometimes. It can be discussed. Before us, it has been missed, overlooked, made invisible. In other words, the harm of second class human status does not pose an abstract reality question. In social life, there is little that is subtle about most rapes; there is nothing complex about a fist in your face; there is nothing nuanced about genocide—although many nuanced questions no doubt can be raised about them. These social realities, central to feminism, do not raise difficult first-order reality questions, not any more. It is the denial of their social reality that is complicated and raises difficult philosophical questions. Understand that the denial of the reality of such events has been a philosophical position about reality itself. Unless and until effectively challenged, only what power wants to see as real is granted reality status. Reality is a social status. Power’s reality does not have to establish itself as real in order to exist, because it has the status as real that power gives it; only the reality of the powerless has to establish itself as real. Power can also establish unreality—like the harmlessness of pornography or smoking—as reality. That doesn’t make it harmless. But until power is effectively challenged on these lies, and they are lies, only those harmed (and those harming them, who have every incentive to conceal) have access to knowing that that is what they are. So it has taken us all this time, and a movement that has challenged male power, to figure out that women’s reality is also a philosophical position: that women’s reality exists, including women’s denied violation, therefore social reality exists separate from its constitution by male power or its validation by male knowledge. This analysis raises some questions about postmodernism that are not simply a report on my current mental state. They are: Can postmodernism stop the rape of children when everyone has their story, and everyone is presumably exercising sexual agency all the time? Can postmodernism identify fascism if power only exists in microcenters and never in systematic, fixed, and determinate hierarchical arrangements? How can you oppose something that is always only in play? How do you organize against something that isn’t even really there except when you are thinking about it? Can postmodernism hold the perpetrators of genocide accountable? If the subject is dead, and we are dealing with deeds without doers,47 how do we hold perpetrators accountable for what they perpetrate? Can the Serbian cultural defense for the extermination of Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and Kosovar Albanians be far behind? If we can have a multicultural defense for the current genocide, because that’s how the Serbs see it, why not a German cultural defense for the earlier one? Anti-Semitism was part of German culture. Finally, for another old question, if you only exist in opposition, if you are only full in opposition to the modern,48 it has determined you. Don’t you need an account of how you are not merely reiterating your determinations? From postmodernists, one is not yet forthcoming. **The postmodernist reality corrosion,** thus, **not only makes it incoherent and useless**—the pragmatists’ valid criticism49—**but also regressive, disempowering, and collaborationist.**

# \*\*\*ARCTIC

# Arctic Conflict Reps Bad

**Representations of a chaotic Arctic are not neutral. They are used to expand securitizing measures.**

**Dodds, 10** – Klaus, Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London (“Flag planting and finger pointing: The Law of the Sea, the Arctic and the political geographies of the outer continental shelf,” Political Geography, vol. 29, is. 2, February 2010, Wiley)RK

This episode formed the backdrop to this paper, which was originally a wide-ranging lecture on the Polar Regions presented to the 2009 Nordic Geographers Meeting, held in Finland. My concern here is to use this moment in 2007 as an exemplar of Arctic territorialities, which is then informed by recent discussions on calculable territory, sovereignty and territorial legibility (for example, Agnew, 2005; [Blomley, 1994] and [Blomley, 2003]; [Clark et al., 2008] and [Crampton, 2006]; [Elden, 2007] and [Elden, 2009]; Hannah, 2009). This flagging incident seemed to me to present an opportunity to reflect on how Arctic territories are being made legible and re-legible for the purpose of intervention and/or management. Legibility, as such, allows for all sorts of textual and visual interventions (see Fig. 1). As a widely cited Foreign Affairs journal article noted in the aftermath of the 2007 Russian flagging, “The situation is especially dangerous because there are currently no overarching political and legal structures that can provide for the orderly development of the region or mediate political disagreements over Arctic resources or sea-lanes” (Borgerson, 2008: 71). Accordingly, a nightmarish neo-realist vision of international politics with the central Arctic Ocean as an anarchic space, at the apparent mercy of the competing geopolitical imperatives of coastal states and other interested parties, is brought to the fore (see also Baev, 2007). As a consequence of such a scenario, the management of the Arctic emerges as a latter day Sisyphean challenge ( [Heininen, 2005] and [Heininen and Nicol, 2007]; Dodds, 2008; [Dalby, 2009] and [Rothwell, 2009]). Given the enduring legacies of Arctic militarization alongside the tangled contours of the military–industrial–academic complex (Barnes, 2008), this framing of the Arctic, as a poorly regulated space invested with considerable resource potential, is not inconsequential (for other analyses, [Chaturvedi, 1996], [Chaturvedi, 2000] and [Lackenbauer and Farish, 2007]). Growing evidence of material changes such as sea ice thinning (and with consequences for seaborne accessibility via the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route) and new resource assessments by state agencies such as the US Geological Survey (Bird et al., 2008) have added gist to the neo-realist mill. Maps of biophysical changes, polar sea-lanes, actual and possible maritime claims and resource potential have also enriched a particular sense of the Arctic as a site of intensifying geopolitical competition, and what Didier Bigo has termed, the ‘circulation of security unease’ (Bigo, 2002). As the Canadian scholar, Michael Byers informed his readers, “An ice-free Northwest Passage could also serve as an entry point for drugs, guns and illegal immigrants”. In Canada and elsewhere including the United States, there is evidence of a kind of domopolitics, which as Walters (2004: 241) has noted involves, “[a] rationalization of series of security measures in the name of a particular conception of home” against a backdrop of anxiety about heightened mobility.

**Their securitizing framing of the arctic turns case – makes competition and conflict inevitable**

**Dodds, 10** – Klaus, Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London (“Flag planting and finger pointing: The Law of the Sea, the Arctic and the political geographies of the outer continental shelf,” Political Geography, vol. 29, is. 2, February 2010, Wiley)RK

Conclusion The ongoing claims to OCS and maritime resources, alongside with debates about the trans-continental accessibility of the Arctic, has attracted considerable popular and formal geopolitical speculation. According to some commentators, the Arctic is on the threshold of a political and environmental state-change (e.g. Berkman & Young, 2009). Sea ice thinning in particular is held to be primarily responsible for stimulating renewed interest in the Arctic as a resource rich space awaiting further development and exploitation. Moreover, as a consequence of these potential shifts, it is claimed that we are witnessing the prospect of further schisms emerging over maritime claims to the Arctic Ocean. As Berkman and Young (2009: 339) warn, “The Arctic could slide into a new era featuring jurisdictional conflicts, increasingly severe clashes over the extraction of natural resources, and the emergence of a new ‘great game’ among the global powers”. Claims to OCS are only one element, therefore, **in a wider discursive reconfiguration of the Arctic.** Repeated warnings concerning the thinning of Arctic sea ice have contributed to increasingly strategic debate concerning the region's accessibility not only in the form of shipping lanes (e.g. the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route) but also as an energy/resource frontier. What is at stake here, I believe, is a competing sense of territorial legibility, most notably over the maritime Arctic. The ongoing attempt of the coastal states to map and survey their continental shelves is one powerful manifestation of that desire, in the words of the US led Extended Continental Shelf Project, **for ‘certainty’ and ‘recognition’.** Informing, and indeed enhancing, that desire for those aforementioned qualities is a whole series of ‘bordering practices’ ranging from demarcating the outer continental shelf to speculating about new fears of illegal trans-shipment and illicit flows through an ice-free Arctic. What, however, is clear is that those Arctic coastal states seeking ‘certainty’ and ‘recognition’ will have to do so in a world much changed form the Cold War era when extra-territorial actors and indigenous communities were either marginal or marginalised, respectively (cf. Osherenko & Young, 1989).

**Attempts to control and understand the arctic function to securitize and make knowable the region in preparation for war**

**Dodds, 10** – Klaus, Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London (“Flag planting and finger pointing: The Law of the Sea, the Arctic and the political geographies of the outer continental shelf,” Political Geography, vol. 29, is. 2, February 2010, Wiley)RK

Calculable territory: making the Arctic legible In his highly suggestive book, Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, James Scott poses the question of what kinds of conditions need to exist for the state to intervene in an attempt to engineer particular outcomes for its population (Scott, 1999). As Scott (1999: 2) expatiates, “How did the state gradually get a handle on its population and their environments?” While he is excoriating subsequent attempts of states to engage in social engineering, attention is drawn to a series of modernist conceits such as confidence in the progress of science and mastery over nature, which have animated many state-sponsored interventions such as Soviet collectivization (Scott, 1999: 89). Whether examining Soviet Russia or post-colonial Tanzania, his analytical framework is informed by a concern for how populations and territories were made ‘legible’ via cadastral surveys, statistics and mapping. The capacities a state possesses to make its population and territory legible are thus shown to be inevitably double-edged – there is usually a high price to be paid for grand plans designed at a distance and implemented with little appreciation for local communities and environments. Scott's arguments seem highly pertinent for a region such as the seabed beneath the central Arctic Ocean, which after all few will ever actually see let alone experience. During the Cold War, however, the crews contained within American and Soviet submarines came as close to anyone to the subterranean world of the Arctic Basin. Rapidly appreciating that the Arctic barely separated the two superpowers, both the United States and the Soviet Union invested billions of dollars and roubles in an attempt to understand better the surface and sub-surface properties of the Arctic Ocean. The challenges posed by ice depth and spread, changeable water temperature and inclement weather were sizeable. In the post-war period, for example, civilian and military based institutions such as the Office of Naval Research funded Arctic Research Laboratory (ARL) occupied the vanguard of scientific research ( [Doel et al., 2005] and [Farish, 2006]). The ARL's Committee on Oceanography, alongside the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, and the US Navy Hydrographic Office were eager to map and survey the seabed north of Port Barrow in Alaska all the way to the North Pole (Leary & LeSchack, 1996: 44). Making the seabed of the Arctic Ocean legible was critical to US maritime strategy throughout the Cold War. Military planners, as with their Soviet counterparts, wanted to know more about this particular theatre for two fundamental reasons. First, the US Navy wanted to be able to track and monitor the movements of their Soviet counterparts, especially if ice cover made aerial surveillance problematic. Second, armed with superior oceanographic and bathymetric knowledge of the Arctic, it was hoped that the US would have a decisive military advantage in the event of war breaking out between the two superpowers and their allies. The collection of such information was aided and abetted by a series of drifting ice stations, which used echo-sounding techniques to collect under ice acoustic data. Soviet and US drifting ice stations, operating during the International Geophysical Year of 1957–1958, contributed further to this task even if data collected was not shared in the same manner as was experienced in the Antarctic. Both states were determined to make the Arctic Ocean legible for geopolitical reasons. A major turning point was the voyage of the nuclear powered US submarine Nautilus in 1958 and its sub-surface voyage to the North Pole followed in March 1959 by the surfacing of the Skate at the same geographical point. These voyages gave fresh impetus to the Office of Naval Research and both voyages demonstrated that nuclear submarines could operate in all seasons, and with greater understanding of the Arctic Ocean Basin, it became increasingly feasible to detect and avoid icebergs and judge when and how to break surface ice. This expanding corpus of geographical knowledge about the Arctic and North Atlantic coincided with civilian mapping projects, funded by the Defense Research Development Board, designed to enhance understanding of the seabed floor and temperature profile of the oceans. As Hamblin (2005) has noted, “Reliable data would allow the US Navy to colonize this environment i.e. **control or master it in order to best navigate it in the next war**”. While the Cold War had subsided, this desire to make Arctic territory legible has taken a different kind of turn in the last decade informed as much by changing sea ice patterns, seaborne mobility, and resource speculation as they are by military-strategic rationales ( [Lopez, 1988] and [Bravo and Rees, 2006]). What emerges is a sense of the Arctic as a palimpsest – quite literally ‘again scraped’. As colonial, Cold War and now War on Terror era rationales and representations intermingle with one another. Adriana Craciun is right in part to remind us that, “They have come by airship, plane, balloon, nuclear submarine, and most recently by Russian mini-sub… Scientists predict an ice-free Arctic Ocean in a few decades, at which point one might think that the ‘Northwest Passage’ will cease to mean anything”. Where I disagree is the notion that meaning somehow disappears rather than enriching multiple legibilities of the Arctic. Geographers such as Matthew [Hannah, 2000] and [Hannah, 2009] have turned to Michel Foucault's suggestive writings on governmentality and calculable territory to re-configure what made the modern governance of populations possible. Drawing on Scott's arguments pertaining to legibility, Hannah (2009: 68) shows clearly how there are a series of important moments including **inscribing territory with “basic systems of geographical reference that allow knowledge about populations, resources and activities to be indexed to specific locations, and hence make territory readable**”. The 2007 Russian expedition to the bottom of the central Arctic Ocean was preoccupied with the collection of bathymetric and oceanographic data (see Fig. 3). The mapping and subsequent public display of that knowledge of the Arctic seabed is an essential element of what we will subsequently be considering – extending sovereign rights over outer continental shelf regions. In so doing, this analysis addresses a series of themes. First, the actual process of making Arctic territories is considered with specific reference to the Law of the Sea, a body of international law associated with the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) occupies center-stage ( [Steinberg, 2001] and [Vogler, 2000]). It is, under UNCLOS, that a large number of states (excluding the United States) agreed to divide the seas and oceans into discreet territorial zones including exclusive economic zones and outer continental shelf. Second, the establishment and recognition of those boundaries and zones are not inconsequential. The role of the UN-based body, the CLCS, is pertinent because it acts as a center of territorial calculation and through its ‘recommendations’ plays a critical role in legitimising effective rule at a considerable distance from political centres such as Copenhagen, Moscow, Oslo, Ottawa and Washington, DC. Finally, these ‘recommendations’ help to conjure up and constitute the Arctic as an object of governance. The inscription of Arctic territory including remote areas of the seabed by coastal states and international bodies such as the CLCS makes it both more legible and accessible – although in this case accessibility is unusual in the sense that it is likely to only apply to scientists and their logistical sponsors including civilian and military agencies such as the US Coast Guard. Access to these territories will, because of their remoteness, inevitably be conditioned by variable sea ice/weather. The CLCS requested that the Russian authorities conduct further oceanographic research in the central Arctic Ocean following their 2001 submission to this UN body. What has changed in the intervening period, however, was this attempt to calculate subterranean territory was further heightened by a growing awareness of an Arctic being changed by ice melting and debates over accessibility involving a range of parties including coastal and non-coastal states. The establishment of calculable territory depends on underwater interventions and the travails of mini-submarines and survey vessels are helping to create the conditions for further sovereign interventions. The map and the survey are one element of this intervention but so are other kinds of activities and practices. In a speech to an audience in the Canadian Arctic, the Canadian Prime Minister noted that: But you can't defend Arctic sovereignty with words alone…It takes a Canadian presence on the ground, in the air and on the sea and a Government that is internationally recognized for delivering on its commitments. And I am here today to make it absolutely clear there is no question about Canada's Arctic border…All along the border, our jurisdiction extends outward 200 miles into the surrounding sea, just as it does along our Atlantic and Pacific coastlines…Some in the opposition dismiss our focus on northern sovereignty as expensive and unnecessary…Some have actually come to the North and suggested our plans here are a waste of money. To that I say, government's first obligation is to defend the territorial integrity of its borders…This is Nunavut – “Our Land” – just as Yukon and the Northwest Territories and the entire Arctic Archipelago are “Our Land” (Harper, 2006). Notwithstanding the Prime Minister's extraordinary appropriation of the Inuit term ‘Nunavut’, it does give an indication of the apparent stakes. Making territory legible, especially in the absence of the protective covering of ice, **raises the spectre of intrusion and transgression even in areas where citizens will never see let alone walk over.** And as one commentator has recently noted, the legibility of the Arctic carries with not just contemporary anxieties but longer colonial trajectories, “…the Northwest Passage has long been regarded not as a distinct place, but as a threshold to a desired place elsewhere, be it the commercial riches of China, natural resources in the High Arctic, or the paradise imagined to exist at the ice-free North Pole…” (Craciun, 2009: 14). The spectre of an ice-free North Pole is unquestionably one of the most powerful incentives to make those subterranean territories legible. It also helps to explain and legitimate a special kind of icy geopolitics (Dodds, 2008). Mobilising terms such as ‘borders’, ‘our land’ and ‘presence’, Prime Minister Harper helped to conjure up the exceptional – the Arctic as an exceptional space, which demands extraordinary measures to make sure that Canadians care as much as the Arctic as they might about the Bay of Fundy. In Canada's case, new investment in icebreakers, military bases, scientific mapping and enhanced homeland security measures were initiated ( [Heubert, 2009] and [Byers, 2009]). As we shall see, however, those **attempts to intervene and to enhance legibility are rarely straightforward in a remote environment** strongly shaped by ocean currents, sea ice formation and extreme weather. The Arctic, notwithstanding the desires and demands of coastal states and their political representatives, is a lively space.

**Their representations of the arctic as a zero-sum, competitive zone constructs threats and undermines stability in the region. The alternative is to accept inherent uncertainty in the region to allow for less narrow constructions of the region**

**Van Efferink, 11** – Leonard A. S., Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London (“Polar Partners or Poles Apart? On the discourses of two US think tanks on Russia's presence in the ‘High North’,” The Geographical Journal, vol. 178, is. 1, March 2012, first published 8/30/11, Wiley)RK

The impact of climate change in the Arctic region has been frequently noted (ACIA 2004; Pharand 2007). Melting sea ice combined with permafrost change is transforming the region's continental and maritime geography, and highlighting an uncertain future. Consequently, representations of the region are rapidly changing. Steinberg (2010, 82–3) gives examples of conflicting representations that portray the Arctic as both ‘near and far, territorializable and beyond territorialisation, dynamic and static, two-dimensional and three-dimensional, normal and aberrant’. He notes that these contradictory images in turn support preferences for contradictory forms of regional governance frameworks (e.g. state sovereignty versus multilateral regime). Among policymakers and their external policy advisors, representations of the Arctic differ substantially as well. A telling example is the way in which two US think tanks portray the Arctic in general and Russia in particular. The following comparison highlights the need for a prominent position of geographers in the debate on Arctic governance. US think tanks and geographical knowledge The most common definition of a think tank is an ‘independent, non-profit, tax-exempt, and non-partisan [organisation] engaged in the study of public policy’ (Abelson 2006, xv). Particularly two characteristics of the national political system explain their relatively strong position in the USA. First, the Republican Party and Democratic Party have not been founded on ideological principles. Second, both parties do not have their own research agencies, providing members of Congress with an incentive to consult think tanks. The exact impact of a think tank on public policy, either direct or indirect, is usually hard to measure. It depends on a number of domestic and foreign factors that are beyond the control of think tanks (Abelson 2006). Nonetheless, these institutions are influential in geopolitical terms (Ó Tuathail and Luke 1994), where geopolitics is commonly understood as ‘discourse about world politics’ (Ó Tuathail 2006a, 1). Discourses can be seen as a collection of rules used to give meaning to communication (Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992). The think tanks are part of a process that naturalises authoritative interpretations and their representations help to constitute meanings and values in US society. At times, they are key providers of geographical knowledge to the President (Abelson 2006), who plays a central role in the national process of giving meaning to world politics (Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992). The importance of how geographical knowledge is (re)presented in US politics is further underlined by its rather underdeveloped level in this country (Sharp 1993). The Brookings Institution Brookings is one of the oldest think tanks in the USA. The Institute of Government Research (IGR), the predecessor of Brookings, was founded in 1916 (Abelson 2006). Its board was deliberately a mix of liberals and conservatives. In 1927, the IGR was merged with another institute and a graduate school to form the Brookings Institution. Brookings (2010a) seeks to make the world safer and more prosperous through promoting international cooperation. Despite its self-proclaimed non-ideological position, the think tank can be considered liberal, reflected by the fact that multilateralism has always been its hallmark. Brookings does not support the idea of US exceptionalism and puts the USA on a par with Russia and some other countries: ‘[e]stablished powers – the United States, Europe, Japan, Russia – must build common approaches to [global developments] . . . ’ (Brookings 2010b). It sees world politics not as a zero-sum game and feels that military strength is insufficient to protect the USA against foreign threats: ‘[o]ur challenge is to influence the dynamics of change to avoid zero-sum solutions to problems that require today's powers to commit to collective security, recognizing that no state alone can make itself invulnerable’ (Brookings 2010b). The publication ‘The geopolitics of Arctic melt’ (Ebinger and Zambetakis 2009) in a British journal tallies with Brookings' strategy of providing in-depth analysis. It targets an international audience, in contrast to the Heritage publication we analyse below. Another difference is that the former article focuses on the Arctic region in general, while the latter concentrates on Russia's activities in the region. Indirectly referring to Heritage, the authors emphasise that cooperation abounds in the region (Ebinger and Zambetakis 2009, 1228): ‘[i]n contrast to alarmist rhetoric by some conservative think-tanks, relations among the Arctic powers have thus far been characterized by a spirit of cooperation, with outstanding disputes managed peacefully’. The Arctic Council, consisting of the eight Arctic countries and indigenous peoples' organisations, is a key example of regional cooperation. The organisation was founded in 1996 and aims to protect the regional environment and promote sustainable development (Heininen and Nicol 2007). Partly due to reluctance of the USA to strengthen the position of the Arctic Council, the body has limited powers (Numminen 2010). Koivurova (2008, 26) argues that if the Arctic Council does not obtain a legal mandate, it could become ‘a façade under which unilateral and uncoordinated development-oriented policies of the States in the region can proceed’. Ebinger and Zambetakis further stress the constructive relationship between the USA and Russia (2009, 1228–9): ‘[i]n May 2009 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for cooperation between their two countries in the region’. Furthermore, Ebinger and Zambetakis (2009, 1229) consider ‘talk of any potential “heating up” or “Arctic scramble” inappropriate’. Their representations of the Arctic actors do not single out one country in a negative way. The authors consider resource exploration a possible motive of all circumpolar polar countries for claiming territory (2009, 1221): ‘[t]he perception of strategic finds, however, can be enough to motivate territorial claims’. The melting of the Arctic ice cap may ease the exploration and exploitation of mineral resources in the region's subsoil, also in the light of recent technological progress (Howard 2009). The US Geological Survey published new estimates of Arctic hydrocarbon reserves in 2008, suggesting that the region holds 13% of the world's undiscovered oil and 30% of the world's undiscovered natural gas (USGS 2008). Despite these positive estimates, massive new exploration and exploitation activity is very unlikely in off-shore areas in the coming decades. As Powell (2008) stresses, these estimations concern undiscovered reserves which indicates a very high level of uncertainty. Moreover, we should be very critical in terms of the adequacy of available technology for their exploration and exploitation and the potential profitability of such activities (Anderson 2009; Howard 2009). Nonetheless, the Arctic is increasingly represented as being essential for the energy security of Europe and North America (Powell 2008). Moreover, Ebinger and Zambetakis mention that all circumpolar countries are involved in territorial disputes in the Arctic. As Gerhardt et al. (2010) highlighted, sovereignty has always been a contentious issue in the Arctic due to the permanent presence of ice. An important reason is that most sovereignty concepts presume the existence of only land and (fluid) water, leaving the legal status of ice undetermined. Pharand (2007, 19) argues for example that in Canada's Arctic Archipelago, the selection of the baselines' position should take into account ‘the quasi-permanency of the ice over the enclosed waters [as it] bolsters the physical unity between land and sea’. Ebinger and Zambetakis further note that the seabed below the North Pole may eventually be claimed by three countries, mentioning the ‘conflicting claims by Russia, Denmark and Canada over the Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges’ (2009, 1228). Their description of the claims does not differentiate between involved actors: ‘[e]ach country claims that the ridges are natural geological extensions of its territory, and each is collecting geological data to support its claims’ (2009, 1228). Regarding the flag planting ceremony in August 2007, Ebinger and Zambetakis argue that Russia had performed it ‘mainly for domestic political consumption but also to send a message about their perceptions of sovereignty to the other Arctic states’ (2009, 1228). The ceremony was conducted by a Russian scientific expedition that managed to plant a titanium flag on the seabed under the North Pole at a depth of 4000 m (BBC 2007; Dodds 2008). The official aim of the expedition was to search for geologic evidence to support Russia's territorial claim. The flag planting ritual has been a practice for claiming territory for centuries and has already been conducted several times in the Arctic (Dodds 2008). Ebinger and Zambetakis downplay the likelihood of a substantial increase in the Russian military presence in the region: ‘While some of Russia's actions may be perceived as aggressive, fears about the potential militarization of the Arctic at this stage are unwarranted’ (2009, 1228). Russia's willingness to cooperate with other countries is stressed by the observation that ‘Russia . . . called for increased cooperation with Canada in Arctic management’ (2009, 1229). In addition, it is argued that ‘Russia apparently believes it has more to gain by following international law . . . than by aggressively asserting its sovereignty’ (2009, 1228). The country has shown respect for international law and a willingness to settle border disputes peacefully. In 2001, Russia submitted a case to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) to claim a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the territorial sea baselines in some parts of the Arctic Ocean (Dodds 2008). The claim was based on United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The commission refused to make a decision and requested additional geological evidence to support the claim. In September 2010, Russia signed an agreement with Norway to settle their border dispute in the Barents Sea (IBRU 2011). Earlier that year, the countries had held their first joint military exercise in the Arctic since 1994 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway 2010). Nonetheless, Ebinger and Zambetakis point at some military activities in the Arctic that indicate a less than cooperative attitude: ‘[n]aval manoeuvres by Russia have disrupted Norwegian air traffic in offshore areas, and there [is] often aerial harassment between Russian fighter jets and Norwegian jets trying to intercept them at the border’ (2009, 1227). This illustrates that Russia at times uses military means and strong language to bolster territorial claims and achieve its foreign policy goals. In recent years, Russia's navy and air forces have become more active in the Arctic Ocean, also beyond the country's exclusive economic zone (Borgerson 2008; Howard 2009). In all, Brookings stresses that Russia's foreign policy focuses on international law and diplomacy. Representing Russia as a cooperative country, the think tank recommends multilateral initiatives to address and prevent regional tensions. In addition, the authors do not distinguish between Arctic countries when claiming that the USA should be ‘cooperating with Canada and other Arctic states’ (2009, 1232). The Heritage Foundation Heritage is a relatively young think tank (established in 1973) that has managed to become very influential. Its aims are ‘[t]o formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values and a strong national defense’ (Heritage 2010). Heritage is actually a neo-conservative think tank. The term ‘neo-conservatism’ emerged in the USA during the 1970s to describe groups who opposed to an improvement of the relationship with Russia and the related disarmament in the 1970s (Ó Tuathail 2006b). They also advocated higher defence spending, stressed the need to spread ‘freedom’ around the world and expressed strong doubts about international institutions. The American military–industrial complex considers Heritage as a key tool to influence foreign policy and is a large funding source (Abelson 2006). US exceptionalism is a key theme of Heritage as shown by the statement that ‘. . . America holds a special claim to be a world leader’ (Heritage 2010, 18). This idea is based on the claim that America's large territory, its wealth and its power are considered God-given (Sharp 1993). Therefore, the USA is destined to be the world's most influential country with a legitimate and moral duty to intervene outside its own territory. The two-page article ‘Russia's race for the Arctic’ appeared briefly after Russia planted its flag on the Arctic seabed in August 2007 (Cohen 2007). It highlights a characteristic strategy of Heritage: providing timely and concise publications that are easy to digest. Implicitly providing a representation of the region, Cohen argues that the US government should take action because ‘[t]here is too much at stake to leave the Arctic to [Russia]’ (Cohen 2007, 2). This line seems to depict the Arctic as the reward of a zero-sum game by speaking of ‘leave the Arctic to’, assuming there is no room for shared sovereignty or joint resource exploration. Alternatively, the Arctic is assumed to be one indivisible space where a **co-existence** of different countries **is impossible.** This is in line with the observation by Dodds (2010) that some neo-realist representations of the region speak of an anarchic Arctic Ocean where competing geopolitical actors seek dominance. Cohen uses numerous representational practices to **depict Russia as a threat.** As Dodds (1994, 188) observed, ‘[such] practices have increasingly been recognized as vital to the practices of foreign policy’. First, Cohen claims that ‘[t]he U.S. and its allies are not interested in the new Cold War in the Arctic’ (2007, 2). He suggests that Russia singlehandedly started a Cold War in the region, without explaining what he exactly means by this. Using the analogy with a period when Russia (actually the Soviet Union) was considered a danger gives the impression that contemporary Russia is a threat to the USA as well. The notion of a dangerous Russia is reinforced when Cohen (2007, 1–2) attempts to put the current government of Russia on a par with past governments of the Soviet Union: ‘[t]oday's Russian rhetoric is reminiscent of the triumphant totalitarianism of the 1930s and the mindset of the Cold War’. The Arctic was already high on the political agenda of the Soviet Union by 1930 due to its large share in the country's landmass, its strategic location and its large resources reserves (McCannon 1998). Regarding the flag planting ceremony in August 2007, Cohen contends that with this act and its claims in the Arctic, ‘[Russia] has created a new source of international tension, seemingly out of the blue’ (2007, 1). He forgets to mention that the Arctic has known territorial disputes between all circumpolar countries for decades. Moreover, Cohen argues that ‘[g]eopolitics and geo-economics are driving Moscow's latest moves’ (2007, 1). The presence of natural resources explains why the Russian government indeed considers the Arctic a top priority, with Russia's ruling elite considering oil and gas the country's most effective foreign policy tool (Trenin 2009). However, the last sentence of Cohen is a clear example of narrative closure as the geopolitical and geo-economical agendas of the USA and the other Arctic countries are **left unmentioned.** Furthermore, the article emphasises Russia's willingness to use military force and strong language when dealing with Arctic matters. Accordingly, Cohen (2007, 1) recommends that the US government formulate ‘a strong response’ to Russia's policies. In his view, the planting of the flag reflected a little civilised and rather uncooperative attitude (2007, 2): ‘[a] crisis over Russian claims in the Arctic is avoidable if Russia is prepared to behave in a more civilized manner [and explore] the Arctic's wealth in a cooperative fashion’. Finally, Cohen implicitly depicts Russia as an ‘unfriendly’ and ‘un-Western’ country, and stresses the importance of alliances: ‘[Russia] has left the U.S., Canada, and the Nordic countries little choice but to forge a cooperative High North strategy and invite other friendly countries, such as Great Britain, to help build a Western presence in the Arctic’ (2007, 2). This seems what Dalby (1990, 22) calls ‘the essential geopolitical moment’, referring to ‘[t]he **exclusion of the Other** and the inclusion, incorporation and administration of the Same’. Conclusion The comparison of the discourses of two US think tanks shows how **different representations of the region and its actors could make the difference between either an inclusionary or exclusionary Arctic regime.** This finding is in line with Campbell's (2007, 216) definition of discourse that demonstrates well how representations can affect policy: ‘a specific series of representations and practises through which meanings are produced, identities constituted, social relations established, and political and ethical outcomes made more or less possible’. Furthermore, the comparison lends support to Powell's (2010) view that geographers should participate in the debate on a regional governance framework. One constructive way to do so is by stressing and explaining the complexity and uncertainty that the region characterises, in order to limit the (re)construction in policy circles of degeographicalised representations of the Arctic. After all, **leaving the production of geographical knowledge to those with narrow interests could be detrimental to Arctic stability.**

# Arctic Conflict Reps Bad – Russia Specific Link

**Their framing of the Arctic presents Russia as uncivilized and aggressive other that must be treated only as a threat**

**Van Efferink, 10** – Leonhardt, MSc in Financial Economics, MA in 'Geopolitics, Territory and Security,' working on a PhD at University of London, editor of ExploringGeopolitics (“Polar Partner or Poles Apart? How two US think tanks represent Russia,” PSA Graduate Network Conference, December 2010, http://www.psa.ac.uk/spgrp/51/2010/Ppr/PGC2\_Van%20EfferinkLeonhardt\_Polar\_Partners\_or\_Poles\_Apart\_PSA\_2010.pdf)RK

Cohen (2007, p. 2) is not specific about the rationale behind his advice to the US government to take action. He simply states that “[t]here is too much at stake to leave the Arctic to [Russia].” This line seems to depict the Arctic as the reward of a zero-sum game by speaking of “leave the Arctic to”, assuming there is no room for shared sovereignty or joint resource exploration. Alternatively, the Arctic is assumed to be one indivisible space where a co-existence of different countries is impossible. It also suggests that without a US response, Russia would “conquer” the Arctic completely. Finally, the line seems to suggest that the US and Russia are **struggling** **for** territorial **control** of particular areas to support their military potential and secure natural resources. Such a struggle was a popular theme during the Cold War, when many in the US foreign policy establishment held the view that more territory would bring more power (Dalby 1990b). To act in the Arctic, Cohen (2007, p. 1) recommends that the US government formulate “a strong response” to Russia’s policies. This advice is in line with the claim of the US government in the late 1970s that the Soviet Union would only understand force (Dalby 1990a). Despite his representation of Russia as threat to regional security, if left unchecked, Cohen does not suggest a military response. Instead, he recommends that the US and its “allies” use diplomacy and international law to address Russia’s territorial claim. He also mentions the possibility of cooperating with Russia. In doing so, Cohen (2007, p. 2) implicitly states that the US and its “allies” are civilised countries for which cooperation with other countries is “natural”: “[a] crisis over Russian claims in the Arctic is avoidable if Russia is prepared to behave in a more civilized manner. If Moscow suggests exploring the Arctic’s wealth in a cooperative fashion…” Cohen implicitly states that the planting of the flag is not “civilized”. Moreover, he says that only Russia can reduce the tensions in the Arctic by changing its policies in the Arctic. Interestingly, Cohen suggests that Russia may be interested in changing its Arctic policies, acknowledging that the current government does not hold exactly the same foreign policies as those held in the years of totalitarianism and the Cold War. Alliances play a role in another recommendation (ibid, p. 2) and requires our attention as well: ”[Russia] has left has left the U.S., Canada, and the Nordic countries little choice but to forge a cooperative High North strategy and invite other friendly countries, such as Great Britain, to help build a Western presence in the Arctic.” This line constitutes the identity of Russia implicitly as an ‘unfriendly’ and ‘uncooperative’ country. Heritage’s representations of Russia To start with a depiction of the Arctic region, Cohen (2007, p. 2) claims that “[t]he U.S. and its allies are not interested in the new Cold War in the Arctic.” He suggests that Russia singlehandedly started a Cold War in the region. Cohen also implicitly states that Russia is indeed interested in “the new Cold War”, but he does not explain what he means exactly by this. Using the analogy of a period when Russia (actually the Soviet Union) was considered a danger gives the **impression** that contemporary Russia is a threat to the US as well. Regarding the flag planting ceremony in August 2007, Cohen (2007, p. 1) contends that with this statement and its territorial claims in the Arctic, “[Russia] has created a new source of international tension, seemingly out of the blue.” He forgets to mention that the Arctic has known territorial disputes between all circumpolar countries for decades (see chapter 3). Moreover, Cohen (2007, p. 1) argues that “[g]eopolitics and geo-economics are driving Moscow’s latest moves.” He does not speak of the US and the other Arctic countries having a geopolitical and geo-economical agenda as well. This line is an example of **narrative closure**. In addition, Cohen (2007, p. 1) calls the ceremony “a chilling throwback to the attempts during the 1930s to conquer the Arctic.” Paraphrasing Campbell (1998, p. 22), he seems to grant “Russian imperialism” almost an ontological status. Cohen attempts to put the current government of Russia on par with past governments of the Soviet Union by stating that “[t]oday’s Russian rhetoric is reminiscent of the triumphant totalitarianism of the 1930s and the mindset of the Cold War.” He applies the same representational practice when writing that “[t]o the regime’s critics, today’s expedition is a chilling reminder of the brutal era when millions of Gulag prisoners were sent to [the Arctic] to build senseless mega-projects for the power-mad dictator.” Cohen seeks to create a dualism in which a representation of Russia (totalitarianism) means that the opposite is true for the US (democracy). He implicitly suggests that the two countries have an entirely different set of values, with one being positive (US) and the other negative (Russia). This representational practice has earlier been used by the neo-conservative think tank Committee on the Present Danger (Dalby 1990a) and the magazine Reader’s Digest (Sharp 1993). This claim also contains representational practices (Cohen 2007, p. 2): “However, Moscow’s current rush to dominate the Arctic Ocean and everything under it indicates that greed and aggression motivate the new Russian polar bear.” Cohen exaggerates by claiming that Russia wants to control the Arctic Ocean completely. He suggests that other Arctic countries are not motivated by greed, in contrast to Russia. The country’s aggression is mentioned in another line of this two-page document as well (Cohen 2007, p. 2) where he writes “Russia’s decision to take an aggressive stand…” ‘Aggressiveness’ was a label that was frequently assigned to the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1992). Finally, this line also contains the metaphor “bear” which was used in US discourse on the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This representation of Russia is reminiscent of the Soviet Union in official US discourse in the late 1970s: “The USSR was...portrayed as an **implacable foe, an untrustworthy rival**…” (Dalby, 1990, p. ix). Conclusion So how do think tanks use representations of Russia to justify their policy advice on the Arctic? Table 1 shows the key findings of this study. [Table 1 omitted] As we had assumed, Brookings recommends that the US government supports international cooperation in the Arctic, in line with its liberal background. Conditioned by its neoconservative ideology, Heritage argues that cooperation is only possible if Russia changes its attitude. If this does not happen, the think tank favours a strong response against Russia from the US and its “allies”. The representations of Russia’s territorial claim in the Arctic link the institutional context of both think tanks to their policy recommendations. Brookings’ emphasis on international cooperation as the best foreign policy approach for the US manifested through a representation of Russia as a “normal” Arctic country (i.e. non-exotic). The think tank downplays the risk of Russian militarization of the region. Heritage however represents Russia as a threat owing to its perceived aggressiveness and greed, depicting the country as ‘non-Western’. Regarding its emphasis on Russia’s motives, Heritage upholds an American foreign policy tradition (Kissinger 1994, p. 813): “[w]ith respect to no other country [than the USSR/Russia] has American policy been geared as consistently to an assessment of its intentions rather than to its potential or even its policies.” Regarding representational practices, Heritage uses many representational practices to depict Russia as a threat, including analogies (references to the Cold War and the totalitarian regime of Stalin), labels (“aggressive”) and metaphors (“Russian bear”). Its discourse further contains ‘geopolitical othering,’ which implies that Russia is a **non-Western, semi-civilised and unfriendly country**. Moreover, the authors employ the practice of narrative closure. For example, only Russia’s interest in the natural resources of the Arctic is mentioned, and in a disapproving way. Nonetheless, the other circumpolar countries would also like to benefit, if possible, from resource exploration in the Arctic. The use of all these representational practices tends to depict Russia as a threat to the US.

# \*\*\*CHINA

# China Threat Reps Bad – Pan

**Their depiction of China reduces Chinese society to something to be observed with clinical detachment – this only creates a self-fulfilling prophecy and justifies warfare**

**Pan 4** (Chengxin, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University, “The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,” June/July 2004, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 305-331, JSTOR)//PC

While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China pre- cisely is," their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means. For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often con- flicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, sug- gests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world."2 Like many other China scholars, Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment."3 Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt. I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "obser- vation" of "where China is today," nor to join the "containment" ver- sus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the "China threat" literature. More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are bet- ter understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other con- structions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature - themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions. These themes are of course nothing new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. They have been identified elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies, political science, and international relations.4 Yet, so far, the China field in the West in general and the U.S. "China threat" literature in particular have shown remarkable resistance to systematic critical reflection on both their normative status as discursive practice and their enormous practical implica- tions for international politics.5 It is in this context that this article seeks to make a contribution. I begin with a brief survey of the "China threat" argument in contemporary U.S. international relations literature, followed by an investigation of how this particular argument about China is a discursive construction of other, which is predicated on the predominant way in which the United States imagines itself as the uni- versal, indispensable nation-state in constant need of absolute cer- tainty and security. Finally, this article will illustrate some of the dan- gerous practical consequences of the "China threat" discourse for contemporary U.S.-China relations, particularly with regard to the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident

**Constructing China as a threat creates a self-fulfilling prophecy, arms race, and increases the risks of escalation and warfare**

**Pan 4** (Chengxin, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University, “The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,” June/July 2004, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 305-331, JSTOR)//PC

I have argued above that the "China threat" argument in main- stream U.S. IR literature is derived, primarily, from a discursive construction of otherness. This construction is predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the U.S. self and on a posi- tivist-based realism, concerned with absolute certainty and security, a concern central to the dominant U.S. self-imaginary. Within these frameworks, it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening, absolute other since it is unable to fit neatly into the U.S.-led evolutionary scheme or guarantee absolute security for the United States, so that U.S. power preponderance in the post-Cold War world can still be legitimated. Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding China as a dynamic, multifaceted coun- try but it leads inevitably to a policy of containment that, in turn, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist extremism, and hard-line stance in today's China. Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations, as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident have vividly attested. In this respect, Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "a policy of con- tainment toward China implies the possibility of war, just as it did during the Cold War vis-à-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of China."93 For instance, as the United States presses ahead with a missile- defence shield to "guarantee" its invulnerability from rather unlikely sources of missile attacks, it would be almost certain to intensify China's sense of vulnerability and compel it to expand its current small nuclear arsenal so as to maintain the efficiency of its limited deterrence. In consequence, it is not impossible that the two countries, and possibly the whole region, might be dragged into an escalating arms race that would eventually make war more likely. Neither the United States nor China is likely to be keen on fighting the other. But as has been demonstrated, the "China threat" argument, for all its alleged desire for peace and security, tends to make war preparedness the most "realistic" option for both sides. At this juncture, worthy of note is an interesting com- ment made by Charlie Neuhauser, a leading CIA China specialist, on the Vietnam War, a war fought by the United States to contain the then-Communist "other." Neuhauser says, "Nobody wants it. We don't want it, Ho Chi Minh doesn't want it; it's simply a question of annoying the other side."94 And, as we know, in an unwanted war some fifty-eight thousand young people from the United States and an estimated two million Vietnamese men, women, and children lost their lives. Therefore, to call for a halt to the vicious circle of theory as practice associated with the "China threat" literature, tinkering with the current positivist-dominated U.S. IR scholarship on China is no longer adequate. Rather, what is needed is to question this un-self-reflective scholarship itself, particularly its connections with the dominant way in which the United States and the West in gen- eral represent themselves and others via their positivist epistemol- ogy, so that alternative, more nuanced, and less dangerous ways of interpreting and debating China might become possible.

**Representations of China as an economic threat are only rooted in us-them dichotomies to justify US hegemonic domination**

**Pan 4** (Chengxin, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University, “The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,” June/July 2004, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 305-331, JSTOR)//PC

 That China constitutes a growing "threat" to the United States is arguably one of the most important "discoveries" by U.S. IR schol- ars in the post-Cold War era. For many, this "threat" is obvious for a variety of reasons concerning economic, military, cultural, and political dimensions. First and foremost, much of today's alarm about the "rise of China" resolves around the phenomenal devel- opment of the Chinese economy during the past twenty-five years: Its overall size has more than quadrupled since 1978. China expert Nicholas Lardy of the Brookings Institution suggested that "the pace of China's industrial development and trade expansion is unparalleled in modern economic history." He went on: "While this has led to unprecedented improvements in Chinese incomes and living standards, it also poses challenges for other countries."6 One such challenge is thought to be job losses in the United States. A recent study done for a U.S. congressional panel found that at least 760,000 U.S. manufacturing jobs have migrated to China since 1992. 7 Associated with this economic boom is China's growing trade surplus with the United States, which, according to Time magazine journalists Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, increased nearly tenfold from $3.5 billion in 1988 to roughly $33.8 billion in 1995. This trade imbalance, as they put it, is a function of a Chinese strategy to target certain industries and to undersell American competition via a system of subsidies and high tariffs. And that is why the deficit is harmful to the Ameri- can economy and likely to become an area of ever greater con- flict in bilateral relations in the future.8 For many, also frightening is a prospect of the emergence of so- called "Greater China" (a vast economic zone consisting of main- land China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan). As Harry Harding points out, "Although [Greater China] was originally intended in [a] benign economic sense, ... in some quarters it evokes much more aggressive analogies, such as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere or Greater Germany."9 In this context, some believe that China's economic challenge inevitably gives rise to a simultaneous military threat. As Denny Roy argues: "A stronger, wealthier China would have greater where- withal to increase its arsenal of nuclear-armed ICBMs and to increase their lethality through improvements in range, accuracy, and survivability. If China continues its rate of economic expan- sion, absolute growth in Chinese nuclear capabilities should be expected to increase."10 Furthermore, U.S. Congressman Bob Schaf- fer claimed that China's military buildup, already under way at an alarming rate, was aimed at the United States.11 In addition to what they see as a worrying economic and mili- tary expansion, many U.S. China scholars believe that there exist still other dimensions to the "China threat" problem, such as China's "Middle Kingdom" mentality, unresolved historical griev- ances, and an undemocratic government.12 Warren I. Cohen argues that "probably the most ethnocentric people in the world, the Chinese considered their realm the center of the universe, the Middle Kingdom, and regarded all cultural differences as signs of inferiority."13 As a result, it is argued, the outside world has good reason to be concerned that "China will seek to reestablish in some form the political and cultural hegemony that it enjoyed in Asia during the Ming and early Qing dynasties."14 At another level, from a "democratic peace" standpoint, a China under the rule of an authoritarian regime is predisposed to behave irresponsibly. As Bernstein and Munro put it: If the history of the last two hundred years is any guide, the more democratic countries become, the less likely they are to fight wars against each other. The more dictatorial they are, the more war prone they become. Indeed, if the current Beijing regime con- tinues to engage in military adventurism - as it did in the Taiwan Strait in 1996- there will be a real chance of at least limited naval or air clashes with the United States.15 Subscribing to the same logic, Denny Roy asserts that "the estab- lishment of a liberal democracy in China is extremely unlikely in the foreseeable future. . . . Without democratization within, there is no basis for expecting more pacific behavior without."16 However, for other observers, even if China does become democ- ratized, the threat may still remain. Postulating what he calls the "democratic paradox" phenomenon, Samuel Huntington suggests that democratization is as likely to encourage international conflict as it is to promote peace.17 Indeed, many China watchers believe that an increase in market freedom has already led to an upsurge in Chinese nationalism, the only thing that allegedly provides the glue to hold contemporary China together.18 It is argued that such nationalist sentiment, coupled with memories of its past humilia- tion and thwarted grandeur, will make China an increasingly dis- satisfied, revisionist power - hence, a threat to the international status quo. Furthermore, some point out that what is also troublesome is an entrenched realpolitik strategic culture in traditional Chinese thought. Harvard China expert Alastair Iain Johnston, for exam- ple, argues that Chinese strategic culture is dominated by the para- bellum (prepare for war) paradigm. This paradigm believes that warfare is a relatively constant feature in international relations, that stakes in conflicts with the adversary are zero-sum in nature, and that the use of force is the most efficacious means of dealing with threat.19 From this, Warren Cohen concludes that if Johnston's analysis of China's strategic culture is correct - and I believe that it is - generational change will not guarantee a kinder, gentler China. Nor will the ultimate disappearance of communism in Beijing. The powerful China we have every reason to expect in the twenty-first century is likely to be as aggressive and expansionist as China has been whenever it has been the dominant power in Asia.20 Apart from these so-called "domestic" reasons for the "China threat," some commentators arrive at a similar conclusion based on the historical experience of power realignment as a result of the rise and fall of great powers. China, from this perspective, is regarded as the most likely candidate to fill the power vacuum cre- ated by the end of U.S.-Soviet rivalry in East Asia. This, according to Kenneth Lieberthal at the University of Michigan (and formerly of the U.S. State Department), "will inevitably present major chal- lenges to the United States and the rest of the international system since the perennial question has been how the international com- munity can accommodate the ambitions of newly powerful states, which have always forced realignment of the international system and have more often than not led to war."21 For this reason, the rise of China has often been likened to that of Nazi Germany and militarist Japan on the eve of the two world wars. For example, Richard K. Betts and Thomas J. Christen- sen argue: Like Germany a century ago, China is a late-blooming great power emerging into a world already ordered strategically by ear- lier arrivals; a continental power surrounded by other powers who are collectively stronger but individually weaker (with the exception of the United States and, perhaps, Japan); a bustling country with great expectations, dissatisfied with its place in the international pecking order, if only with regard to international prestige and respect. The quest for a rightful "place in the sun" will, it is argued, inevitably foster growing friction with Japan, Russia, India or the United States.22 At this point, it seems there has been enough reason and em- pirical evidence for the United States to be vigilant about China's future ambition. While there are debates over the extent to which the threat is imminent or to which approaches might best explain it, the "objective" quality of such a threat has been taken for granted. In the words of Walter McDougall, the Pulitzer Prize- winning historian and strategic thinker at the University of Penn- sylvania, recognizing the "China threat" is "commonsense geopoli- tics."23 For Huntington, the challenge of "Greater China" to the West is simply a rapidly growing cultural, economic, and political "reality."24 Similarly, when they claim that "China can pose a grave problem," Betts and Christensen are convinced that they are merely referring to "the truth."25 In the following sections, I want to question this "truth," and, more generally, question the objective, self-evidentiary attitudes that underpin it. In my view, the "China threat" literature is best understood as a particular kind of discursive practice that dichotomizes the West and China as self and other. In this sense, the "truism" that China presents a growing threat is not so much an objective reflection of contemporary global reality, per se, as it is a discursive construction of otherness that acts to bolster the hegemonic leadership of the United States in the post-Cold War world. Therefore, to have a better understanding of how the dis- cursive construction of China as a "threat" takes place, it is now necessary to turn attention to a particularly dominant way of U.S. self-imagination.

**Warnings of China rise are rooted in false us-them dichotomies used to justify US hegemonic power**

**Pan 4** (Chengxin, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University, “The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,” June/July 2004, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 305-331, JSTOR)//PC

In addition to what they see as a worrying economic and mili- tary expansion, many U.S. China scholars believe that there exist still other dimensions to the "China threat" problem, such as China's "Middle Kingdom" mentality, unresolved historical griev- ances, and an undemocratic government.12 Warren I. Cohen argues that "probably the most ethnocentric people in the world, the Chinese considered their realm the center of the universe, the Middle Kingdom, and regarded all cultural differences as signs of inferiority."13 As a result, it is argued, the outside world has good reason to be concerned that "China will seek to reestablish in some form the political and cultural hegemony that it enjoyed in Asia during the Ming and early Qing dynasties."14 At another level, from a "democratic peace" standpoint, a China under the rule of an authoritarian regime is predisposed to behave irresponsibly. 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China, from this perspective, is regarded as the most likely candidate to fill the power vacuum cre- ated by the end of U.S.-Soviet rivalry in East Asia. This, according to Kenneth Lieberthal at the University of Michigan (and formerly of the U.S. State Department), "will inevitably present major chal- lenges to the United States and the rest of the international system since the perennial question has been how the international com- munity can accommodate the ambitions of newly powerful states, which have always forced realignment of the international system and have more often than not led to war."21 For this reason, the rise of China has often been likened to that of Nazi Germany and militarist Japan on the eve of the two world wars. For example, Richard K. Betts and Thomas J. Christen- sen argue: Like Germany a century ago, China is a late-blooming great power emerging into a world already ordered strategically by ear- lier arrivals; a continental power surrounded by other powers who are collectively stronger but individually weaker (with the exception of the United States and, perhaps, Japan); a bustling country with great expectations, dissatisfied with its place in the international pecking order, if only with regard to international prestige and respect. The quest for a rightful "place in the sun" will, it is argued, inevitably foster growing friction with Japan, Russia, India or the United States.22 At this point, it seems there has been enough reason and em- pirical evidence for the United States to be vigilant about China's future ambition. While there are debates over the extent to which the threat is imminent or to which approaches might best explain it, the "objective" quality of such a threat has been taken for granted. 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In this sense, the "truism" that China presents a growing threat is not so much an objective reflection of contemporary global reality, per se, as it is a discursive construction of otherness that acts to bolster the hegemonic leadership of the United States in the post-Cold War world. Therefore, to have a better understanding of how the dis- cursive construction of China as a "threat" takes place, it is now necessary to turn attention to a particularly dominant way of U.S. self-imagination.

**Representations of China as a threat are not grounded in reality and are merely a construction of a foil to the American system to legitimize US power**

**Pan 4** (Chengxin, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University, “The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,” June/July 2004, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 305-331, JSTOR)//PC

At first glance, as the "China threat" literature has told us, China seems to fall perfectly into the "threat" category, particularly given its growing power. However, China's power as such does not speak for itself in terms of an emerging threat. By any reasonable measure, China remains a largely poor country edged with only a sliver of affluence along its coastal areas. Nor is China's sheer size a self-evident confirmation of the "China threat" thesis, as other countries like India, Brazil, and Australia are almost as big as China. Instead, China as a "threat" has much to do with the partic- ular mode of U.S. self-imagination. As Steve Chan notes: China is an object of attention not only because of its huge size, ancient legacy, or current or projected relative national power. . . . The importance of China has to do with perceptions, espe- cially those regarding the potential that Beijing will become an example, source, or model that contradicts Western liberalism as the reigning paradigm. In an era of supposed universalizing cos- mopolitanism, China demonstrates the potency and persistence of nationalism, and embodies an alternative to Western and espe- cially U.S. conceptions of democracy and capitalism. China is a reminder that history is not close to an end.39 Certainly, I do not deny China's potential for strategic misbe- havior in the global context, nor do I claim the "essential peace- fulness" of Chinese culture.40 Having said that, my main point here is that there is no such thing as "Chinese reality" that can auto- matically speak for itself, for example, as a "threat." Rather, the "China threat" is essentially a specifically social meaning given to China by its U.S. observers, a meaning that cannot be discon- nected from the dominant U.S. self-construction. Thus, to fully understand the U.S. "China threat" argument, it is essential to rec- ognize its autobiographical nature. Indeed, the construction of other is not only a product of U.S. self-imagination, but often a necessary foil to it. For example, by taking this particular representation of China as Chinese reality per se, those scholars are able to assert their self-identity as "mature," "rational" realists capable of knowing the "hard facts" of inter- national politics, in distinction from those "idealists" whose views are said to be grounded more in "an article of faith" than in "his- torical experience."41 On the other hand, given that history is apparently not "progressively" linear, the invocation of a certain other not only helps explain away such historical uncertainties or "anomalies" and maintain the credibility of the allegedly universal path trodden by the United States, but also serves to highlight U.S. "indispensability." As Samuel Huntington puts it, "If being an American means being committed to the principles of liberty, democracy, individualism, and private property, and if there is no evil empire out there threatening those principles, what indeed does it mean to be an American, and what becomes of American national interests?"42 In this way, it seems that the constructions of the particular U.S. self and its other are always intertwined and mutually reinforcing. Some may suggest that there is nothing particularly wrong with this since psychologists generally agree that "individuals and groups define their identity by differentiating themselves from and placing themselves in opposition to others."43 This is perhaps true. As the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure tells us, meaning itself depends on difference and differentiation.44 Yet, to understand the U.S. dichotomized constructions of self/other in this light is to normalize them and render them unproblematic, because it is also apparent that not all identity-defining practices necessarily per- ceive others in terms of either universal sameness or absolute oth- erness and that difference need not equate to threat.

**Representations of China as a threat creates an Orientalist us-them dichotomy and a self-fulfilling prophecy**

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In the same way, a multitude of other unpredictable factors (such as ethnic rivalry, local insurgencies, overpopulation, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, rogue states, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorism) have also been labeled as "threats" to U.S. security. Yet, it seems that in the post-Cold War environment, China represents a kind of uncer- tainty par excellence. "Whatever the prospects for a more peaceful, more democratic, and more just world order, nothing seems more uncertain today than the future of post-Deng China,"55 argues Samuel Kim. And such an archetypical uncertainty is crucial to the enterprise of U.S. self-construction, because it seems that only an uncertainty with potentially global consequences such as China could justify U.S. indispensability or its continued world domi- nance. In this sense, Bruce Cumings aptly suggested in 1996 that China (as a threat) was basically "a metaphor for an enormously expensive Pentagon that has lost its bearings and that requires a formidable 'renegade state' to define its mission (Islam is rather vague, and Iran lacks necessary weights)."56 It is mainly on the basis of this self-fashioning that many U.S. scholars have for long claimed their "expertise" on China. For example, from his observation (presumably on Western TV net- works) of the Chinese protest against the U.S. bombing of their embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, Robert Kagan is confident enough to speak on behalf of the whole Chinese people, claiming that he knows "the fact" of "what [China] really thinks about the United States." That is, "they consider the United States an enemy - or, more precisely, the enemy. . . . How else can one interpret the Chinese government's response to the bombing?" he asks, rhetori- cally.57 For Kagan, because the Chinese "have no other informa- tion" than their government's propaganda, the protesters cannot rationally "know" the whole event as "we" do. Thus, their anger must have been orchestrated, unreal, and hence need not be taken seriously.58 Given that Kagan heads the U.S. Leadership Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is very much at the heart of redefining the United States as the benevolent global hegemon, his confidence in speaking for the Chinese "other" is perhaps not surprising. In a similar vein, without producing in-depth analysis, Bern- stein and Munro invoke with great ease such all-encompassing notions as "the Chinese tradition" and its "entire three-thousand- year history."59 In particular, they repeatedly speak of what China's "real" goal is: "China is an unsatisfied and ambitious power whose goal is to dominate Asia. . . . China aims at achieving a kind of hegemony. . . . China is so big and so naturally powerful that [we know] it will tend to dominate its region even if it does not intend to do so as a matter of national policy "m Likewise, with the goal of ab- solute security for the United States in mind, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen argue: The truth is that China can pose a grave problem even if it does not become a military power on the American model, does not intend to commit aggression, integrates into a global economy, and liberalizes politically. Similarly, the United States could face a dangerous conflict over Taiwan even if it turns out that Beijing lacks the capacity to conquer the island. . . . This is true because of geography; because of America's reliance on alliances to pro- ject power; and because of China's capacity to harm U.S. forces, U.S. regional allies, and the American homeland, even while los- ing a war in the technical, military sense.61 By now, it seems clear that neither China's capabilities nor intentions really matter. Rather, almost by its mere geographical existence, China has been qualified as an absolute strategic "other," a discursive construct from which it cannot escape. Because of this, "China" in U.S. IR discourse has been objectified and deprived of its own subjectivity and exists mainly in and for the U.S. self. Little wonder that for many U.S. China specialists, China becomes merely a "national security concern" for the United States, with the "severe disproportion between the keen attention to China as a security concern and the intractable neglect of China's [own] security con- cerns in the current debate."62 At this point, at issue here is no longer whether the "China threat" argument is true or false, but is rather its reflection of a shared positivist mentality among mainstream China experts that they know China better than do the Chinese themselves.63 "We" alone can know for sure that they consider "us" their enemy and thus pose a menace to "us." Such an account of China, in many ways, strongly seems to resemble Orientalists' problematic distinc- tion between the West and the Orient. Like orientalism, the U.S. construction of the Chinese "other" does not require that China acknowledge the validity of that dichotomous construction. Indeed, as Edward Said point out, "It is enough for 'us' to set up these distinctions in our own minds; [and] 'they' become 'they' accordingly."64 It may be the case that there is nothing inherently wrong with perceiving others through one's own subjective lens. Yet, what is problematic with mainstream U.S. China watchers is that they refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of the inherent fluidity of Chinese identity and subjectivity and try instead to fix its ambiguity as absolute difference from "us," a kind of certainty that denotes nothing but otherness and threats. As a result, it becomes difficult to find a legitimate space for alternative ways of understanding an inherently volatile, amorphous China65 or to recognize that China's future trajectory in global politics is contingent essentially on how "we" in the United States and the West in general want to see it as well as on how the Chinese choose to shape it.66 Indeed, discourses of "us" and "them" are always closely linked to how "we" as "what we are" deal with "them" as "what they are" in the practical realm. This is exactly how the discursive strategy of perceiving China as a threatening other should be understood, a point addressed in the following section, which explores some of the practical dimension of this discursive strategy in the containment perspectives and hegemonic ambitions of U.S. foreign policy.

**Depictions of China as a threat and crisis-mangement strategies shape policy-making strategies**

**Pan 4** (Chengxin, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University, “The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,” June/July 2004, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 305-331, JSTOR)//PC

This "neocontainment" policy has been echoed in the "China threat" literature. In a short yet decisive article titled "Why We Must Contain China," Washington Post columnist Charles Krautham- mer insists that "containing China" and "undermining its ruthless dictatorship" constitute two essential components of "any rational policy toward a rising, threatening China." Not only is a policy other than containment considered irrational, but even a delay to implement it would be undesirable, as he urges that "containment of such a bully must begin early in its career." To this end, Kraut- hammer offers such "practical" options as strengthening regional alliances (with Vietnam, India, and Russia, as well as Japan) to box in China; standing by Chinese dissidents; denying Beijing the right to host the Olympics; and keeping China from joining the World Trade Organization on the terms it desires.68 Containing China is of course not the only option arising from the "China threat" literature. More often than not, there is a sub- tle, business-style "crisis management" policy. For example, Bern- stein and Munro shy away from the word containment, preferring to call their China policy management.69 Yet, what remains unchanged in the management formula is a continued promotion of control- ling China. For instance, a perusal of Bernstein and Munro's texts reveals that what they mean by management is no different than Krauthammer's explicit containment stance.70 By framing U.S.- China relations as an issue of "crisis management," they leave little doubt of who is the "manager" and who is to be "managed." In a more straightforward manner, Betts and Christensen state that coercion and war must be part and parcel of the China manage- ment policy: In addressing the China challenge, the United States needs to think hard about three related questions: first, how to avoid crises and war through prudent, coercive diplomacy; second, how to manage crises and fight a war if the avoidance effort fails; third, how to end crises and terminate war at costs acceptable to the United States and its allies.71 This is not to imply that the kind of perspectives outlined above will automatically be translated into actual China policy, but one does not have to be exceedingly perceptive to note that the "China threat" perspective does exert enormous influence on U.S. policy making on China. To illustrate this point, I want now to examine some specific implications of U.S. representations of the "China threat" for U.S.-China relations in relation to the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis and the "spy plane" incident of 2001.

**The affirmatives representations of China as a threat only create a self-fulfilling prophecy – 2001 spy plane incident proves**

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Theory as Practice 2: The 2001 Spy-Plane Incident Following the 1995-1996 missile crisis, mainstream China observers have continued to take the Taiwan question as a purely geopolitical or security issue, which accordingly should be understood and dealt with simply from the time-honored balance-of-power, zero-sum game perspectives. For example, Bernstein and Munro insist that Taiwan's reunification with the mainland Vili leave China in possession of yet another immense economic prize. . . . Complete Chinese reunifica- tion, in other words, would further upset the balance of power and vastly enhance China's economic and strategic strength."79 Com- menting on this typical way of representing the Taiwan question, the Taiwan-based scholar Chih-yu Shih suggests that the national security analysis may seem to be a more tangible approach to dissecting the rationale behind Beijing's "policy of coercion" and, because it appears sensible to us, can alleviate our need to pursue Beijing's motivations more deeply. Not only can we thus camouflage our embarrassment at not really knowing China, but also Beijing's discomforting behavioural patterns be- come comfortably familiar.80 Clearly, the practical implications of this kind of representation go far beyond that. After perceiving a power imbalance in the Tai- wan Strait in favor of China, James Lilley (former U.S. ambassador to China) and Carl Ford proposed: "The name of the game for Tai- wan, then, is deterrence," which means that the United States must help Taiwan's military maintain "a qualitative edge over the PRC."81 The 2002 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Security Review Commission reached similar conclusions, recommending, among other things, "deterring China attacking Taiwan" and "supporting Taiwan's ability to defend itself without outside assistance." In its formal conclusion, the review commission, made up of well-known U.S. China experts as well as influential policymakers, vows to con- tinue monitoring China in every aspect relating to "our national security concerns."82 In fact, U.S. monitoring activity, such as conducting reconnais- sance flights along Chinese borders, had always been part of its China policy. So went the rationale: The Chinese say they have the right to use force to reclaim Tai- wan because it belongs to them, and they regularly practice for an invasion. This threat of force is why on April 1st [2001], the U.S. Navy's EP-3 surveillance plane was in the area to monitor China 's military preparations. ss Yet it turned out that the EP-3 spy plane collided with a Chinese navy fighter jet that was tailing it over the South China Sea, some fifty miles from the coast of China's Hainan Province. The Chinese jet crashed into the waters below, while the crippled spy plane landed on Hainan island. Washington demanded immediate return of its crew and plane, while Beijing insisted that the United States bear the responsibility for the midair collision and apologize for the incident. Rather than reflecting on how their new containment policy might have contributed to this incident in the first place, many U.S. realist analysts hastily interpreted it as further objective proof of the long-suspected "China threat." As Allen S. Whiting put it, the collision "focused attention anew on Beijing's willingness to risk the use of force in pursuit of political objectives."84 It was as if the whole incident had little to do with U.S. spying, which was seen as "routine" and "normal." Instead, it was the Chinese who were said to be "playing a dangerous game," without regard to the old spy etiquette formulated during the Cold War.85 For other observers, China's otherness was embodied also in its demand for a U.S. apology. For example, Merle Goldman, a history professor at Boston University, said that the Chinese emphasis on apologies was rooted in the Confucian value system: "This kind of internalized consensus was the way China was ruled for thousands of years."86 From this perspective, China's request for an apology was preordained by a fixed Chinese tradition and national psyche and had nothing whatsoever to do with the specific context of this incident in which China was spied on, its sovereignty violated, and one of its pilots lost. Thus, even in the face of such a potentially explosive incident, the self-fulfilling effect of the "China threat" discourse has not been acknowledged by mainstream U.S. China analysts. To the con- trary, deterring and containing China has gained new urgency. For example, in the aftermath of this standoff, neoconservative colum- nists Robert Kagan and William Kristol (chairman of the Project for the New American Century) wrote that "not only is the sale of Aegis [to Taiwan] . . . the only appropriate response to Chinese behav- ior; We have been calling for the active containment of China for the past six years precisely because we think it is the only way to keep the peace."87 Although the sale of the Aegis destroyers was deferred, President George W. Bush approved an arms package for Taiwan that included so-called "defensive" weapons such as four Kidd class destroyers, eight diesel submarines, and twelve P-3C sub- marine-hunting aircraft, as well as minesweeping helicopters, tor- pedoes, and amphibious assault vehicles. On this arms sale, David Shambaugh, a Washington-based China specialist, had this to say: "Given the tangible threats that the Chinese military can present to Taiwan - particularly a naval blockade or quarantine and missile threats - this is a sensible and timely package."88 Given the danger and high stakes involved, some may wonder why China did not simply cooperate so that there would be no need for U.S. "containment." To some extent, China has been cooperative. For example, Beijing was at pains to calm a disgrun- tled Chinese public by explaining that the U.S. "sorry" letter issued at the end of the spy-plane incident was a genuine "apology," with U.S. officials openly rejecting that interpretation. On the Taiwan question, China has dropped many of its previous demands (such as "one China" being defined as the People's Republic). As to the South China Sea, China has allowed the ASEAN Regional Forum to seek a negotiated solution to the Spratly Islands dispute and also agreed to join the Philippines as cochairs of the working group on confidence-building measures.89 In January 2002, China chose to play down an incident that a presidential jet outfitted in the United States had been crammed with sophisticated satellite-operated bugs, a decision that, as the New York Times puts it, "illustrates the depth of China's current com- mitment to cultivating better relations with the United States."90 Also, over the years, China has ratified a number of key nonprolif- eration treaties and pledged not to assist countries in developing missiles with ranges that exceed the limits established under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). More recently, China has collaborated with the United States in the war on terrorism, including issuing new regulations to restrict the export of missile technology to countries usually accused by the United States of aid- ing terrorists. Indeed, as some have argued, by any reasonable mea- sure China is now more responsible in international affairs than at any time since 1949.91 And yet, the real problem is that, so long as the United States continues to stake its self-identity on the realization of absolute security, no amount of Chinese cooperation would be enough. For instance, Iain Johnston views the constructive development of China's arms-control policy as a kind of "realpolitik adaptation," rather than "genuine learning."92 From this perspective, however China has changed, it would remain a fundamentally threatening other, which the United States cannot live with but has to take full control of.

# China Threat Reps Good

**China threat theory discourse is essential for a peaceful Chinese rise**

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 A closer look shows that the discourse of China threat goes beyond a debate between hawks and doves within the American intelligentsia or between China and the West. When the Chinese texts transform ‘China threat’ from a description of specific events into a theory that has general implications – ‘China threat theory’ (Zhongguo weixielun) – something else is going on. People in Washington and Beijing are using the same terms to talk about different things. It is necessary therefore to analyse the Chinese discourse of ‘China threat theory’ to see how it moves from ‘refuting foreign fallacies’ to producing national identity in China. While there have been a number of articles in the West warning of a rising China each year since 1992, the volume of the alarmist articles published outside China is far outnumbered by articles published inside China. From 1994 to early 2004, there have been almost 200 articles published in Chinese academic and professional journals. (For comparison, there are only five articles on ‘Islamic threat’ even though China is a participant in the ‘war on terrorism’ and has a restive Muslim majority population in its own Northwestern province of Xinjiang.) The timing of the Chinese articles is noteworthy: the first ‘China threat theory’ article appeared in 1992, and the discourse was predictably strong at the nadir of Sino-American relations in the mid-1990s. But surprisingly, ‘China threat theory’ discourse made a comeback in China just as it was losing influence in the US after 2001: the largest number of scholarly articles about ‘China threat theory’ were published in China during 2002 and 2003. The disproportionate response in Chinese texts – 190 academic articles responding to a dozen foreign articles and books – suggests that the problem is not just the tenor of official US and Japanese reports, but broader issues of identity politics in China. Instead of assuming that ‘China’ and ‘America’ or ‘Japan’ are pre-existing things, we need to see how this exchange of criticisms serves to construct such national identities. Rather than being a problem that needs to be refuted, dismissed, and thus excised from the official record and popular memory, ‘China threat theory’ is actually quite useful in China as a category for identity construction: otherwise, why do official Chinese publications keep reproducing and circulating such negative images of the PRC? Certainly, a simple explanation is that some Chinese elites enjoy being dangerous, as it reaffirms China’s status as a great power. Actually, one of the curious upshots of being recognized as a great power is that it makes one’s country a rhetorical target in the court of world opinion. As Irish writer Oscar Wilde quipped, the only thing worse than being talked about – is not being talked about. But the discursive workings of ‘China threat theory’ are more complex than that. A qualitative examination of the articles also suggests that rather than simply being directed at a foreign audience to correct a Western misunderstanding, the texts are directed at China’s domestic audience to construct identity – but in a curious way. While the arguments of Western pessimists can be summarised easily (economic growth leads to military expansion), what is interesting about the Chinese discourse is not its coherence, but its lack of clarity. ‘China threat theory’ consolidates contradictory arguments, and opposing conclusions under one conceptual roof. Indeed, one could argue that conceptual category ‘China threat theory’ found in Chinese texts actually precedes Western assessments of China as a threat: the arguments that would guide the debate at its height in the mid-1990s were presented in striking detail in the first ‘China threat theory’ article, which appeared in 1992.28 Once ‘China threat theory’ was formed as a category it guided Chinese understandings of foreign criticisms of the PRC – often regardless of the specific criticisms contained in specific articles. For example, in a Foreign Affairs article that actually criticised the interpretations of Western alarmists as excessive, Segal argues that China is not the next superpower. Rather, he concludes that China is ‘overrated as a market, a power, and a source of ideas’, and thus is a ‘second-rank middle power’.29 One might expect Chinese elites to welcome Segal’s article since it shares many of the same economic and military assessments that Chinese articles use to refute China threat theory. But the Chinese reaction in the official media was harsh, denouncing Segal’s article as part of ‘anti-China’ propaganda that is analogous to China threat theory.30 To be antiChina then, is not just to paint China as a threat, but to say that China is irrelevant. In this way, ‘China threat theory’ discourse is not involved in explaining world politics, so much as asserting ‘China’ as a victim of a foreign conspiracy, and thus ‘Chinese’ as the main category of identity in the PRC. In other words, by adding ‘theory’ to ‘China threat’ Chinese texts do not constitute the discourse according to similarities. Rather, ‘China threat theory’ is produced as a category according to difference: anything judged as hostile to China becomes part of ‘China threat theory’, including what the texts call ‘Clash of civilisations theory’, ‘China collapse theory’, ‘Greater China theory’, ‘Yellow Peril theory’, ‘Contain China theory’, and so on. Likewise, China threat theory is used to house a range of political, economic and cultural criticisms coming from a variety of locations including Japan, India, Russia, Southeast Asia, and the US. Thus while ‘China threat theory’ articles insist that it is a peculiarly American problem, the offending articles also emanate from various vectors on China’s periphery. It is common to assume that identity is generated through a search for core values that are shared within a population.31 China (and Chinese foreign policy) thus gain coherence through references to the peace-loving tradition of five thousand years of Chinese civilisation. But ‘China threat theory’ discourse suggests that identity is generated in China not just according to shared norms, but by excluding difference.32 In other words, Chinese identity production involves spreading anti-China discourse within the PRC in order to draw the symbolic boundaries that clearly distinguish Chinese from foreigners. The Chinese texts show that rather than being a singular and coherent ‘thing’, ‘China threat’ takes shape as a theory through a series of distinctions. This is similar to Foucault’s analysis of how the grand principle of ‘rationality’ is not a universal value, but actually takes shape against the various historical practices designated as ‘madness’.33 Likewise, as Der Derian argues, diplomacy is not a process of mutual understanding, so much as a practice of mutual estrangement.34 When ‘China threat theory’ excludes all the ways of how not to understand China as foreign, the only thing left is the proper way of how to understand China’s ‘peaceful rise’. The texts produce Chinese identity in this curious dynamic of positive and negative images: the positive ideal of ‘peaceful rising’ only makes sense when contrasted with its opposite: China as a revisionist power that threatens the peace and order of the international environment. Indeed, the article written by the President of China’s National Defence University, ‘To Hell with ‘‘China threat theory’’ ’, actually spends the bulk of its space praising the achievements of reform China.35 Likewise, ‘The Great Renaissance of the Chinese Nation’ actually instructs Chinese citizens on how to respond correctly to ‘China threat theory’.36 Hence by turning China threat into a theory, the discourse moves from merely responding to criticism in a negative way, actively producing positive meaning. Rather than simply ‘putting an end to ‘‘China threat theory’’ ’ as the first article on the topic advised in 1992,37 the discourse continually reproduces and circulates this set of images of a peacefully rising China that is the victim of criticism that only comes from abroad. Although Taiwan is a site of much discussion of a ‘China threat’, Taiwanese people are rarely criticised in the mainland’s ‘China threat theory’ texts. This underlines how the category ‘China threat theory’ is used to sort out the domestic from the foreign: Taiwanese are seen by Beijing as Chinese compatriots. Because Beijing frames ‘China threat theory’ as a ‘foreign fallacy’ and Cross-Straits relations as an issue of domestic politics, the large and vociferous cache of ‘China threat’ texts from Taiwan are erased by ‘China threat theory’ discourse. Although Chinese premier Zhu Rongji sought to change the subject from China threat to China opportunity, many ‘China threat theory’ articles engage in a proliferation of foreign threats. As a former Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA reasons: ‘If we follow the logic of ‘‘China threat theory’’, who benefits from it, and who thus can be a threat to other countries’ security?’38 The common response to China threat theory thus is that America is the real threat.39

# China Threat Real

**A laundry list of empirics prove that China is internally unstable and risks aggression**

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 On March 1, I emceed a press conference that featured several groups of the China pro-democracy movement. Notably, D.J. McGuire, the author of Dragon In The Dark , warned at the conference that the ruling regime, China's Communist Party, has "anti-American objectives and plans." He warned that China has overseas expansion plans "to avoid disturbing questions," domestically. It is a classic maneuver of tyrants to stir up foreign trouble when they need more allegiance or patriotism at home, or to distract from domestic troubles. (China indeed has domestic turmoil, including a new trend in which 300,000 people have quit the Communist Party. An entire separate discussion could be made about the troubled state of the Chinese regime.) McGuire warned that China wants three things: to conquer Taiwan; to become Asia's leading power; and then, world domination. And, what stands in the way is the United States. Perhaps McGuire should not be singled out as the source- his is only the most articulate rendition, among many, that basically say the same thing. On March 6, the foreign minister of China responded by trying to say that the "China threat theory" is hogwash. Some people take it that the foreign minister referred to our event in Washington, but my information says only that a People's Daily reporter asked about "the new wave in Washington, 'the Chinese threat theory'." The lack of specifics makes me unable to say whether my group is in a shouting match with Beijing's foreign ministry- however, we have confronted Beijing in another sense, by taking the side of Tiananmen Square dissidents for 15 years. One can say that my group was born into a collision with Beijing. (CSN's founding was roughly at the same time as one man stopped a line of tanks, in that famous, classic image from June 5, 1989.) At any rate, Beijing would like to debunk the China threat "theory." I decided to write this article under my own byline, because the China Support Network has already said that China poses a threat. Under my own byline, I can represent Practical Idealism, a brand of politics that began under my byline, prior to the Tiananmen Square uprising of 1989. It is a brand that has America's best interests at heart, as well as believing that people are important- the clarion theme of a 1984 political campaign that introduced Practical Idealism. This is a different angle, but I still would not trust Beijing as far as I can throw it. I can only affirm that by looking into this angle, that concerns about "China-as-dangerous" are reinforced. I've noted elsewhere that business interests are always going to want to cool down, minimize, and deny political tensions. They are motivated to do so- they want the trade with this nation of (potentially) 1.3 billion customers. That leads to wishful and rose colored assessments, and even discussions of geopolitical military strategy may be driven by the wishful line, "China? They're not expansionist." Where do the wishers get this idea? Ask any Tibetan. How do they feel? Colonized! Ask anyone in East Turkestan. How do they feel? Colonized! Ask anyone in Taiwan. How do they feel?- In the case of Taiwan, they are staring down the barrel of a gun, but they are more fortunate than the Tibetans and East Turkestanis, in that the gun has not fired yet. The key word is "yet." China has been very explicit- loud and clear- in naming Taiwan as an objective. This point is not even a stretch of debate. The statements about Taiwan issue regularly from China's foreign ministry, and they are as explicit as they are chilling. The only way that business interests, or poor strategists, can arrive at their wishful, rose colored assessments is by averting their eyes, shrugging off Tibet, Taiwan, East Turkestan, and even prior occasions like the Korean War, where Americans faced Chinese troops. In relation to Taiwan, China is not just making statements-it's moving hardware. Over 700 ballistic missiles have now been arrayed against Taiwan. In addition to its new manned space program (also cloned from Russia), and nuclear weapons (with nuclear secrets stolen from America under Bill Clinton), China has a new long-range air force. China has a new deep-water navy. Even nuclear submarines, to have a "second strike capability" against America in a nuclear war. (One might ask, where did this nuclear-armed communist superpower get its wherewithal?- And the answer is that they are enriched by America trade, by the exact amount of the U.S. trade deficit with China. If someone gave you $160 billion a year, you too could have your own army, navy, air force, and space program!) Another counterargument is in the nature of the Chinese Communist Party itself. How did it start?- It started as a branch of the Soviet Communist Party. The Soviet system was taken as a model, and the CCP is born of the same paradigm, as a clone or a carbon copy. In this way, we can also note that the CCP is a "foreign influence," not indigenously Chinese. Any sane person who remembers the Soviet Union as a threat will already see a "China threat" in the preceding part of this article. But, there is more, and I have reasons why even Li Zhaoxing (the Chinese foreign minister) cannot definitively offer us assurance of a "peaceful rise" on the part of China, even if he means what he is saying. My argument here is also why China has instability, even when it claims to have, or to value, stability. They key word is "claims." Claims from the Chinese government are chiefly excuses to stay in power for one more day, and for that government, lying is a way of life. However, I promise that the following argument can hold true even if Li Zhaoxing is sincere. Even when Chinese leaders have a rare day of sincerity (if ever they do), they are within "the CCP system." The CCP system includes diabolical treatment of people, double standards galore, profound corruption, trickery, treachery, and no respect for China's own constitution. On any given day, the Chinese are already in violation of prior international agreements and their own constitution (which, oddly, says freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the right to criticize the government exist). (This raises the question, "Who, in their right mind, would sign a contract with an opposite party of that little reliability?" An entire separate discussion could be made about China's business practices, which have actually come to turn off some foreign investors.) China's is a system that is not systematic, and while it's reputed to be a dictatorship, even the dictator can be rudely surprised by matters blowing up in his face. It might be fair to say that no one man is truly in charge of China. (China contains many fiefdoms, reporting cooked statistics to the other fiefdoms. For more reliable statistics, Chinese turn to the CIA's web site, just to figure out what's the case in China.) In other words, China is an interplay of forces, and due to inevitable frictions as forces collide, China is unpredictable, perhaps deadly so. For those in Tibet, in East Turkestan, and for all domestic dissenters, China is already deadly. Now, it is threatening to become deadly in a military sense, especially where the United States has a role to defend Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act. Let me note, for anyone who thinks that China is "gradually building up" to "someday" be a military challenger, that a current of opinion says that they should conquer Taiwan before the 2008 Olympics. If those become intentions that are followed through, then the war would begin by the end of 2006. Also, if anyone thinks that it would be a regional, limited war, a related current of opinion says that they must flatten the U.S., because that is what stands in the way. A war over Taiwan could find China to be striking hard at the American homeland. But, let's return to my argument, where I am applying systemic issues to show that no one man, nor even the CCP, can make assurances for China. What is the CCP, and what is its history? Remember that their system is officially atheist, and requires unswerving loyalty and adherence to the CCP, which in their system is placed above all else- the state, the military, and the constitution are all malleable toys which bend to the will of the CCP. Above all, "the party" answers to no one, and to no international conventions- not even to standards of civilization within China's borders. The party takes itself to be god, not constrained by any law of anybody- not of man, not of heaven. This system effectively installs the CCP as a deity. But, look at its history- how does this deity behave? Nothing is predictable or orderly about China's history under the CCP. In fact, this has been the deadliest episode in Chinese history, with twists and turns that no one could predict. Setbacks? Reversals? Contradictions? Retractions? Corrections? Doubling back? Inconsistencies? Or, as a lawyer might say, violations of estoppel?- These are prominent in CCP history. Even if a gullible person starts by thinking, "the party is always right," and tries to comprehend the official line, that person would be rudely surprised, and could not read very far through CCP history before asking the question, "How can this be right?" As a deity, the CCP has been capricious and whimsical. The word of the party (even if we suppose it to be infallible) has changed dramatically, simply based on who wins the power struggle in the periodic shifts of Chinese politics. It has changed so dramatically as to make a mockery of any pretensions to intellectual consistency, credibility, or an upright, mature nature. Thinking people simply can't believe in the CCP any more, and that may be why there is a growing wave of resignations from the Chinese Communist Party. If this were a deity, we would have to describe it as a criminally insane deity, or perhaps with words such as adolescent, anti-social, and deranged. This amounts to another reason why China should be considered dangerous, no matter what is said by current President Hu Jintao or Li Zhaoxing. Their job is chiefly to keep face, in the midst of the train wreck of Chinese government. They can speak of a "peaceful rise" for China, and they can cross their fingers and hope for the best, but what is over their shoulders? Over their shoulders are two different forces: Jiang Zemin, and the Chinese democracy movement. These may also be known as the "leftist" and "rightist" forces in Chinese politics. The rightists are down, but not out- upon his recent death, it was learned that Zhao Ziyang (the reform minded former party leader) still has many friends, even deep inside the CCP itself. The rightist element exists, and may yet find its champion for leadership. Surely, it has leaders in exile, with names like Wei Jingsheng, Xu Wenli, Yan Jiaqi, Fang Lizhi and Fang Jue. The rightist element also has Wang Bingzhang as the most prominent dissident who is now rotting in a Chinese jail cell, much like Nelson Mandela. Good leaders inside China include Jiang Yanyong, Ding Zilin, and He Depu, all of whom have been roughed up periodically by goons of the regime. For potential opposition, the Chinese regime also has Li Hongzhi, perched atop the Falun Gong movement, and Zhang Hongbao, perched atop the Zhong Gong movement, not to mention the Tiananmen movement, which would be more powerful if it were not hobbled by disunity. (There, headlines are stolen on alternate days by Wang Dan, Lian Shengde, and Zhou Yongjun.) The bigger problem is over the left shoulder of Hu Jintao, because former President Jiang Zemin could provoke or start a war, while the rightists are a peaceful, unarmed movement. We do not know that Hu Jintao is a leader committed to peace. We know that in late 2004, Hu approved a massacre of villagers in Hanyuan County, and by some reports, more people were killed than in the Tiananmen massacre. But suppose, for the sake of argument, that Hu wants peace, and Jiang wants war. My press conference statement said, "We have concern about the military ambitions of Jiang Zemin, whom we believe can still provoke a war, even from retirement. We may learn today that he's really not retired, remaining active while he is titularly out of power for public relations purposes. Many, many things can happen without full play in the press." On March 1, Zhou Yongjun relayed word that "before Jiang Zemin retired, he had quietly changed the Party-Administration-Military power structure of China into a new structure of 5 'leaders groups,' with himself as the heads of them all. They are: the central policy group; central diplomacy group; national war preparation group; anti-Taiwan-independence and anti-foreign military interference headquarters; and, the first political commissar of Zhongnanhai guarding troop." That last group is akin to the Secret Service in the USA, meaning that they have guns trained on the national leaders and their families. The dissidents were warning us that Jiang Zemin has undertaken maneuvers behind the scenes to quietly consolidate power. If true, then Jiang Zemin becomes an invisible hand behind the throne of the puppet emperor. Observers of China will remember that in a recent transition, Jiang Zemin "packed" the Politburo Standing Committee with cronies from his "Shanghai faction," so that Jiang's men surround Hu Jintao in any case. Is Hu Jintao really at leave to govern? Dissidents assert that the presence of Jiang Zemin on the scene increases the mortal danger to Taiwan (and, by extension, the United States). According to Chinese dissidents, "Jiang asked all provinces/municipalities/counties to set up 'Wartime leaders groups' before 2005. These groups, which are at the core of all levels of power, are under direct control of Jiang Zemin. This way, there formed another set of power systems from the local governments to the central government. And at the top of this pyramid is Jiang Zemin." Dissidents also note that Jiang wants to change China to embrace a hereditary system of national leadership, so that his son can succeed him. If Jiang's family were to lose "head of state" status, then there would be no more immunity for the crimes, of which Jiang stands accused (genocide, crimes against humanity, etc.) Danger of war is also seen in three aspects. One, China won't renounce the use of force with Taiwan. Two, China won't curb or reverse its deployment of missiles opposite Taiwan. And three, its National People's Congress is expected to pass a new "anti-secession" law this month, to provide the legal pretext or cover as enabling legislation for a Taiwan war. The law being passed is, itself, dangerously close to a declaration of war. In the light of this, only the most gullible child would believe Li Zhaoxing's assurances of "no China threat." I can simply ask my readers, from this one paragraph alone, are matters moving in a more peaceful direction? Or, are matters moving in a direction to be more on a war time footing? That there is a "China threat" was never more timely advice.

# China Threat Real – Defense of Methodology

**Our methodology employs a 4 tier system that overcomes Pan’s criticism**

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This article is not about the rise of China and the decline of the West per se, but about the number of ways to see the future of China depending on the perspective of how one sees the functions of the world system. Seeing the future of China through the lens of International Relations (IR) theorists is problematic in that the theorists offer certain ‘truths’ about the future intentions of China; and the level of debate can be argued to be shallow, suffering from “motivated belief” and unable to provide deeper understandings on how to understand China’s futures. With this in mind this article intends to deepen and widen the discussion on questions about the future of China by mapping the three most widely discussed futures of China as seen through IR theories. I will examine the discourse on the “China threat” theory as used by both Western and Chinese realists and its mirror image of “Peaceful rise” (peaceful development) used by liberalists using a futures methodology causal layered analysis (CLA) to problematise their claims and examine their underlying beliefs and drivers. Broadly speaking these debates can arguably be described as simplistic, but since they are the most frequently occurring, I hope to offer a more nuanced understanding of the differing political perspectives. It is not possible or the intention of this article to map all IR or other types of scenarios for the futures of China due to the amount of space provided, only those that are considered to be, “colonising the future and closing off options by projecting currently dominant ideas and values into the future and assuming they will continue to dominate” (May, 1999, p.126). Theoretical Framework CLA, developed by Sohail Inayatullah (2004), was chosen as the methodology to map the most common images of the rise of China because it allows an opening of the present and past to create alternative futures rather than simply predicting a particular future based on a narrow empiricist viewpoint. In CLA, the way in which a problem is framed ultimately provides its solution, thus framings are not neutral, but part of the analysis. CLA does not claim or argue for any particular ‘truth’, but to explore how a discourse becomes privileged - that is who gains and who loses when a particular discourse becomes dominant. For this reason it is useful in examining the conclusions made by popular images of the future of China and test whether or not they have enough depth to support their conclusions. As such CLA requires the user to travel through a number of layers which ultimately question or ‘undefine’ the future and make the units of analysis problematic. This unique layered approach allows the user to deepen the future and unpack the unconscious stories used to 2make sense of the way reality is formed. Importantly CLA explores not just the noise of litany and systems, but the deeper worldviews and myths to support these underlying layers of data. The following is a brief summation of his concept and how it applies within this analysis across four overlapping layers: Litany, Systemic Causes, Discourse/ Worldview and Myth/Metaphor. The litany level identifies facts often presented by news or other media for political purposes and often exaggerated. These facts are not value free, and they are hard to challenge because they are presented as the ‘truth’ on which the system, worldview or myth rests. The next level, systemic causes and their effects, is concerned with exploring the interrelated social, technological, economic, environmental, political and historical factors of an issue and the underlying data. The data can be questioned, but not the paradigm within which the question is framed. At this level, the government, experts from academia or someone else are expected to solve the problem. These two levels are considered ‘shallow’ and short term in their focus. In order to move into deeper and more complex analysis, the next two levels are necessary to uncover. The third level concerns discourse or worldview. The key here is to recognise what deeper positions are shaping the assumptions behind the systemic and the litany views. Who are the stakeholders? How do their worldviews and nested beliefs about themselves, others, the future, time and space provide the deeper discourses which ultimately constitute the issue? This level is critical in determining how the first two levels are legitimised. Whether to include or exclude a particular discourse can ultimately privilege the issue and the scenarios which emerge. This level allows other perspectives or epistemologies to place claims on how the scenarios are framed, so whether one has a realist versus idealist worldview, a Chinese versus a macro-historical worldview or even a Chinese versus a Western worldview; will have consequences for how scenarios are constituted (Inayatullah, 2010). The fourth level is that of unconscious myths and metaphors. Myths create a sacred image of the future which, an unconscious archetype which structures the perceptions and worldviews and hence a persons experience of the world. This level is reliant on specific cultural and civilisational assumptions about the nature of time, rationality and agency. Most importantly the ability to open up or transform the future can require unlearning particular myths or worldviews held dear so as to learn new ways of thinking about the future. If what Polak (1973) says is correct that the future must not only be perceived, it must also be shaped, it is therefore critical to explore and deconstruct the underlying assumptions, narratives, worldviews and myths being told about the rise of China. Table 1 below outlines the three stories for the rise of China.

**And, it concludes our discourse is productive**

**Hoffman, 12** Jeanne Hoffman is the Deputy Director of Academic Programs at the Institute for Humane Studies. She has a law degree from Ave Maria School of Law and received her BA in Political Science from Villanova University. “Unpacking Images of China Using Causal Layered Analysis,” Journal of Futures Studies, March 2012, 16(3): 1-24 [http://www.jfs.tku.edu.tw/16-3/A01.pdf Accessed 7/17/12](http://www.jfs.tku.edu.tw/16-3/A01.pdf%20Accessed%207/17/12) BJM

Systemic causes level “China now wants a seat at the head of the table” and “its leaders expect to be among the key architects of global institutions” according to Cheng Li, director of research at the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institute (Foroohar and Liu, 2010, p.36). The “China threat” theory is seen as a way to deny China’s rightful place at the table. Ultimately Chinese realists are pessimistic about China’s external environment, cross-strait relationships, and especially the United States. Concepts such as transnational challenges, globalization and global governance are rejected (Shambaugh, 2010). The “China threat” theory is then seen as threatening to Chinese “core interests” and related “national security” issues including challenging the need for U.S. military activity near China, arms sales to Taiwan, disputed territories in the South China Seas and other incidents. Yan holds that realists in China “actively participate in international affairs, open itself up to the greater world, and enlarge international cooperation; however, all of these should be in favour of China’s national interests” (2001, p.35). Worldview/discourse level The dominant discourse is not to “put an end to the China threat theory”, but to use it to reshape the international environment. Official Chinese publications often refer to the “China threat” theory and so can be seen to be a useful tool for identity construction whereby anything considered hostile to the interests of China is lumped in with the “China threat” theory. A common response then becomes that America is the real threat, or Taiwan, or Japan, or India or whomever depending on the needs of the security matter at hand (Callahan, 2005, p.709, 711). This discourse is politically useful to the ears of a domestic audience who have historical sensitivities to foreign invasion and other external threats and the ensuing internal uprisings. No doubt a strategy that aims to keep China weak, contain its rise by militarily encircling the Chinese mainland and slow economic growth through currency and trade wars for no other reason than preventing it from emerging as a peer competitor is open to moral criticism (Wang, 2011). Carlson (2011) sees the Chinese worldview as evolving into two contrasting, contested and more fluid shapes. On the one hand, China accepts the bedrock of the international system, tempered by a realistic acceptance of US hegemony and a degree of the diminution of states rights and questions of multilateral intervention. On the other hand, there is a renewed interest in a version of the vision of Tianxia (“all under Heaven” this will be developed further in the “Peaceful rise” construct) argued by Zhao Tingyang with particular interpretations about Chinese history and the normative principles underlying the current international order. Zhao cautions that we are currently facing the prospect of a ‘failed’ world in which the “American empire as “winner takes all” will not lead to something of a cheerful “end of history” but rather to the death of the world” (Zhao as cited in Carlson, p.97). Zhao (2006) argues that the only way to prevent such an outcome is to create a grand narrative of three elements: a view of the world as a global geographical entity or ‘Oneness of the world’, a commonly agreed institutionally ordered world/society as the highest political order rather than one of nation/states and somehow legitimised by most of the people (but not democratic).

# \*\*\*DEATH

# AT: Death Doesn’t Exist

**No, this is stupid**

**Meyers, 09** – Paul Zachary, biologist and associate professor at the University of Minnesota (“The dead are dead,” Pharyngula, 12/10/09, http://scienceblogs.com/pharyngula/2009/12/10/the-dead-are-dead/)RK

One of the most important tools for promulgating religion is fear, and one of the biggest sources of fear is the inescapable fact of personal mortality: we’re all going to die someday, and we all know people we’ve loved who have died. Religion steps up to the challenge of death in its usual glib and dishonest way, and promises a mysterious “afterlife,” in which you’ll get to go on being you despite the inconvenience of your flesh rotting away. None of the proponents of this belief have the slightest scrap of evidence for their claims, other than an appeal to emotion and desire, and sometimes some really bad experiments and sloppy observations of phenomena that vanish when a little rigor is applied. Usually, the defense of belief in an afterlife falls along a couple of lines. One is the absence of a defense; you really want to live forever, so go ahead, simply believe this claim of immortality. It’s easy! Most religions simply do that, assert with no evidence but a hefty demand that you take the story on faith…which the believers have no difficulty providing. The other strategy is to claim evidence while 9not having any. Without exception, this approach is appallingly stupid; I have never read anyone claiming to have solid evidence of life after death who fails to provide a **train of fallacies and distortions.** And if you want appallingly stupid fallacies, there is one man you can always turn to to provide: Dinesh D’Souza. He recently took part in an interview in which he defended the notion of a Christian afterlife. Kengor: If there is life after death, how do we know that the Christian view of the afterlife is the correct one? D’Souza: One way is to test a uniquely Christian claim: Remember that while all the religions of the world say there is life after death, only one religion says that it has actually happened. Jews and Muslims, for example, believe that there is a resurrection at the end of the world. But Christianity asserts that its founder, Jesus Christ, died and came back to life. No other religion claims that its founder–say Moses or Muhammad–physically returned from the dead. In one of the later chapters of my book, I examine the resurrection as a historical event. I take the facts that the vast majority of historians would accept–the fact that Christ lived and preached, that he made enemies, that his enemies killed him, that he was buried in a tomb, that his disciples claim to have found the tomb empty, that they said Jesus appeared before them several times after his crucifixion, and that this event filled them with conviction and propelled a movement of conversion that was sustained even in the face of Roman persecution and resistance. So these are the facts, and how do we account for them? If the resurrection stands up to historical scrutiny, if it is an historical event by the standards of historical verification, then the Christian view of the afterlife rises above the pack. It is the one to take seriously. Wow. He’s making a historical argument while clearly utterly ignorant of the history. Resurrections and visits to the afterlife are practically staples of just about every religion. Osiris was killed, chopped into pieces, and resurrected, yet this is not evidence that the Egyptian pantheon existed. Gilgamesh made a visit to the underworld and returned to report on its existence and conditions, but we aren’t worshipping a mob of Mesopotamian deities now. How can anyone claim that Christianity is unique in having a dead god returning to life when it’s a standard feature of many old pagan religions? The resurrection of Jesus is not a reasonable historical event. There are no primary, contemporary accounts of his existence. The books of the Bible that describe him were written decades after the purported event, and most of the biblical accounts are second-, third-, or distant-hand hearsay written by people with a vested interest in promoting a religion. The accounts we do have are inconsistent or contradictory, or inconsistent and contradictory. By the standards of historical verification, Jesus and his miraculous resurrection are myths. Nothing more. Maybe something less. This is the kind of idiocy we’ve all come to expect from D’Souza. Another tactic that believers resort to, other than pseudohistory, is pseudoscience. This is remarkably popular, especially among the New Agey set, and the usual science that gets mangled is physics. The quantum is usually involved, too. I’m sure he wouldn’t want to be an exception, so when Robert Lanza asks in the Huffington Post (you already know what kind of fluff you’re going to get from the information given just this far), “Does Death Exist? New Theory Says ‘No’“, you can count on yet more nonsense. Lanza has respectable credentials as a stem cell biologist, but he’s also the author of one of those all-encompassing, total-explanation-of-the-universe, crackpot theories, which is his, and which belongs entirely to him, called “biocentrism.” We know this because his tag line in the article is “Robert Lanza, MD is considered one of the leading scientists in the world. He is the author of “Biocentrism,” a book that lays out his theory of everything.” I’ve noticed that leading scientists tend not to have to introduce themselves by declaring that they are a leading scientist, but that’s another issue. Lanza recently lost a sister in an accident, and most of his article seems to be a kind of emotional denial, that this tragedy cannot have happened and his sister really is alive and well somewhere. I feel for him — I’ve also lost a sister, and wish I could see her again — but this is not a reason to believe death doesn’t happen. I’ve stubbed my toe and wished with some urgency that it hadn’t happened, but the universe is never obliging about erasing my mistakes. But then Lanza goes on to babble about quantum physics and many-worlds theory. Although individual bodies are destined to self-destruct, the alive feeling – the ‘Who am I?’- is just a 20-watt fountain of energy operating in the brain. But this energy doesn’t go away at death. One of the surest axioms of science is that energy never dies; it can neither be created nor destroyed. But does this energy transcend from one world to the other? Consider an experiment that was recently published in the journal Science showing that scientists could retroactively change something that had happened in the past. Particles had to decide how to behave when they hit a beam splitter. Later on, the experimenter could turn a second switch on or off. It turns out that what the observer decided at that point, determined what the particle did in the past. Regardless of the choice you, the observer, make, it is you who will experience the outcomes that will result. The linkages between these various histories and universes transcend our ordinary classical ideas of space and time. Think of the 20-watts of energy as simply holo-projecting either this or that result onto a screen. Whether you turn the second beam splitter on or off, it’s still the same battery or agent responsible for the projection. I have heard that first argument so many times, and it is facile and dishonest. We are not just “energy”. We are a pattern of energy and matter, a very **specific and precise arrangement** of molecules in movement. **That can be destroyed.** When you’ve built a pretty sand castle and the tide comes in and washes it away, the grains of sand are still all there, but what you’ve lost is the arrangement that you worked to generate, and which you appreciated. Reducing a complex functional order to nothing but the constituent parts is an insult to the work. If I were to walk into the Louvre and set fire to the Mona Lisa, and afterwards take a drive down to Chartres and blow up the cathedral, would anyone defend my actions by saying, “well, science says matter and energy cannot be created or destroyed, therefore, Rabid Myers did no harm, and we’ll all just enjoy viewing the ashes and rubble from now on”? No. **That’s crazy** talk. We also wouldn’t be arguing that the painting and the architecture have transcended this universe to enter another, nor would such a pointless claim ameliorate our loss in this universe. The rest of **his argument is quantum gobbledy-gook.** The behavior of subatomic particles is not a good guide to what to expect of the behavior of large bodies. A photon may have no rest mass, but I can’t use this fact to justify my grand new weight loss plan; quantum tunnelling does not imply that I can ignore doors when I amble about my house. People are not particles! We are the product of the aggregate behavior of the many particles that constitute our bodies, and you **cannot ignore** the importance of these higher-order relationships when talking about our fate. The rational atheist view is simpler, clearer, and I think, more true. Lanza’s sister is dead, and so is mine; that means the features of their independent existence that were so precious to us, that made them interesting, thinking, behaving human beings, have ceased to exist. The 20-watts of energy are dissipating as heat, and can’t be brought back. They are lost to us, and someday we will end, too. We should feel grief. Pretending that they have ‘transcended’ into some novel quantum mechanical state in which their consciousness persists, or that they are shaking hands with some anthropomorphic spiritual myth in never-never land, does a disservice to ourselves. The pain is real. Don’t deny it. Use it to look at the ones you love who still live and see what you can do to make our existence now a little better, and perhaps a little more conducive to keeping our energies patterned usefully a little longer.

# \*\*\*GENDERED LANGUAGE BAD

# Gendered Language

**The \_\_\_ team’s use of gendered language is grounded in the desire for a patriarchal society**

**Eckert and McConnel-Ginet 92** (Penelope institute for Research on learning, Sally department of modern languages and linguistics at Cornell University “Think Practically and Look Locally: Language and Gender as Community- Based Practice” <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2155996>) JC

Power is not all that connects gender identities to gender relations (consider, for example, intimacy and desire). Differences between and within gender groups can support collaborative efforts in community endeavors, dividing labor and drawing on multiple talents (72), and can function in structuring desire (and not only heterosexual desire; see 61). But interest in power has been the engine driving most research on language and gender, motivated partly by the desire to understand male dominance and partly by the desire to dismantle it (sometimes along with other social inequalities). Janus-like, power in language wears two faces. First, it is situated in and fed by individual agency; situated power resides primarily in face-to-face interac- tions but also in other concrete activities like reading or going to the movies. Second, it is historically constituted and responsive to the community's coor- dinated endeavors; social historical power resides in the relation of situated interaction to other situations, social activities, and institutionalized social and linguistic practices. This duality of power in language derives directly from the duality of social practice: Individual agents plan and interpret situated actions and activities, but their planning and interpretation rely on a social history of negotiating coordinated interpretations and normative expectations (and in turn feed into that history). And the duality of social practice is directly linked to the duality of meaning. What speakers "mean" in their situated utterances and how their interlocutors interpret them is the situated face of meaning; its historical community face involves the linguistic system(s) with conventional- ized meanings and usage norms to which utterance meanings are oriented. The real power of language, its social and intellectual value, is found in the inter- play between these two aspects of meaning and in the room for development afforded by the adaptability of conventions (e.g. indirection, irony, metaphor, pervasive vagueness, and ambiguity). The overwhelming tendency in language and gender research has been to emphasize either speakers and their social relations (e.g. women's disadvan- tages in conversation) or the meanings and norms encoded in the linguistic systems and practices historically available to them (such sexist patterns as conflating generic human with masculine in forms like "he" or "man"). But linguistic forms have no power except as given in people's mouths and ears (or via other media); talk about meaning that leaves out the people who mean is at best limited. We begin by looking at power in situated interactions, then expand the discussion to include more explicit considerations of the commu- nity's attempted coordination of symbolic practices (and control of their po- tential power). We emphasize the existence of alternatives to androcentric.

Patriarchy lead to war, prolif, environmental destruction, and eventually extinction

**Warren and Cady 94**—Warren is the Chair of the Philosophy Department at Macalester College and Cady is Professor of Philosophy at Hamline University (Karen and Duane, “Feminism and Peace: Seeing Connections”, p. 16, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3810167.pdf, JB)

Operationalized, the evidence of patriarchy as a dysfunctional system is found in the behaviors to which it gives rise, (c), and the unmanageability, (d), which results. For example, in the United States, current estimates are that one out of every three or four women will be raped by someone she knows; globally, rape, sexual harassment, spouse-beating, and sado-masochistic pornography are examples of behaviors practiced, sanctioned, or tolerated within patriarchy. In the realm of environmentally destructive behaviors, strip-mining, factory farming, and pollution of the air, water, and soil are instances of behaviors maintained and sanctioned within patriarchy. They, too, rest on the faulty beliefs that it is okay to "rape the earth," that it is "man's God-given right" to have dominion (that is, domination) over the earth, that nature has only instrumental value, that environmental destruction is the acceptable price we pay for "progress."And the presumption of warism, that war is a natural, righteous, and ordinary way to impose dominion on a people or nation, goes hand in hand with patriarchy and leads to dysfunctional behaviors of nations and ultimately to international unmanageability. Much of the current" unmanageability" of contemporary life in patriarchal societies, (d), is then viewed as a consequence of a patriarchal preoccupation with activities, events, and experiences that reflect historically male-gender identified beliefs, values, attitudes, and assumptions. Included among these real-life consequences are precisely those concerns with **nuclear proliferation, war, environmental destruction, and violence toward women**, which many feminists see as the logical outgrowth of patriarchal thinking. In fact, it is often only through observing these dysfunctional behaviors-the symptoms of dysfunctionality that one can truly see that and how patriarchy serves to maintain and perpetuate them. When patriarchy is understood as a dysfunctional system, this "unmanageability" can be seen for what it is-as a predictable and thus logical consequence of patriarchy.'1 The theme that global environmental crises, war, and violence generally are predictable and logical consequences of sexism and patriarchal culture is pervasive in ecofeminist literature (see Russell 1989, 2). Ecofeminist Charlene Spretnak, for instance, argues that "militarism and warfare are continual features of a patriarchal society because they reflect and instill patriarchal values and fulfill needs of such a system. Acknowledging the context of patriarchal conceptualizations that feed militarism is a first step toward reducing their impact and preserving life on Earth" (Spretnak 1989, 54). Stated in terms of the foregoing model of patriarchy as a dysfunctional social system, the claims by Spretnak and other feminists take on a clearer meaning: Patriarchal conceptual frameworks legitimate impaired thinking (about women, national and regional conflict, the environment) which is manifested in behaviors which, if continued, **will make life on earth difficult, if not impossible**. It is a stark message, but it is plausible. Its plausibility lies in understanding the conceptual roots of various woman-nature-peace connections in regional, national, and global contexts.

Patriarchy is the root cause of war and will lead to nuclear holocaust

Reardon, 93- [Betty, Women and peace: feminist visions of global security, p.31]

A clearly visible element in the escalating tensions among militarized nations is the macho posturing and the patriarchal ideal of *dominance*, not parity, which motivates defense ministers and government leaders to “strut their stuff” as we watch with increasing horror. Most men in our patriarchal culture are still acting out old patterns that are radically inappropriate for the nuclear age. To prove dominance and control, to distance one’s character from that of women, to survive the toughest violent initiation, to shed the sacred blood of the hero, to collaborate with death in order to hold it at bay—all of these patriarchal pressures on men have traditionally reached resolution in ritual fashion on the battlefield. But there is no longer any battlefield. Does anyone seriously believe that if a nuclear power were losing a crucial, large-scale conventional war it would refrain from using its multiple-warhead nuclear missiles because of some diplomatic agreement? The military theater of a nuclear exchange today would extend, instantly or eventually, to all living things, all the air, all the soil, all the water. If we believe that war is a “necessary evil,” that patriarchal assumptions are simply “human nature,” then we are locked into a lie, paralyzed. The ultimate result of unchecked terminal patriarchy will be nuclear holocaust. The causes of recurrent warfare are not biological. Neither are they solely economic. They are also a result of patriarchal ways of thinking, which historically have generated considerable pressure for standing armies to be used.

**Discussing gendered language in the debate community is important--- provides deeper understanding of how gender and language interact**

**Eckert and McConnel-Ginet 92** (Penelope institute for Research on learning, Sally department of modern languages and linguistics at Cornell University “Think Practically and Look Locally: Language and Gender as Community- Based Practice” <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2155996>) JC

Language enters into the social practices that gender people and their activi- ties and ideas in many different ways, developing and using category labels like "woman" and "man" being only a small part of the story. To understand precisely how language interacts with gender (and with other symbolic and social phenomena) requires that we look locally, closely observing linguistic and gender practices in the context of a particular community's social prac- tices. Gumperz (42) defines a speech community as a group of speakers who share rules and norms for the use of a language. This definition suggests the importance of practice in delineating sociolinguistically significant groupings, but it does not directly address social relations and differentiation among members of a single community (though implicitly treating differentiation as revealing '"sub-" communities). Nor does it make fully explicit the role of practice in mediating the relation between language and society. To explore in detail how social practice and individual "place" in the community interconnect, sociolinguists need a conception of a community that articulates place with practice. We therefore adopt Lave & Wenger's notion of the "community of practice" (69, 116). A community of practice is an aggre- gate of people who come together around mutual engagement in an endeavor. Ways of doing things, ways of talking, beliefs, values, power relations-in short, practices-emerge in the course of this mutual endeavor. As a social construct, a community of practice is different from the traditional community, primarily because it is defined simultaneously by its membership and by the practice in which that membership engages. (This does not mean that commu- nities of practice are necessarily egalitarian or consensual-simply that their membership and practices grow out of mutual engagement.) In addition, rela- tions between and among communities of practice, and relations between communities of practice and institutions, are important: Individuals typically negotiate multiple memberships (in families, on teams, in workplaces, etc), many of them important for understanding the gender-language interaction. A focus on language and gender as practice within communities of practice can, we think, provide a deeper understanding of how gender and language may interact and how those interactions may matter.

#  ‘F-Word’ Bad

**Their use of the ‘f’ word is an independent reason to vote \_\_\_**

**Schwyzer, 09**  Hugo Schqyzer, community college history and gender studies professor, Berkley “Penetrate” v. “Engulf” and the multiple meanings of the “f” word: a note on feminist language, 4 November 2009, http://hugoschwyzer.net/2009/11/04/penetrate-v-engulf-and-the-multiple-meanings-of-the-f-word-a-note-on-feminist-language/

There’s a pause at this point. Here’s the problem: long before most kids in our culture become sexually active, the most common slang word in the American idiom has knit together two things in their consciousness: sex and rage. If “fucking” is the most common slang term for intercourse, and “fuck you” or “fuck off” the most common terms to express contempt or rage, what’s the end result? A culture that has difficulty distinguishing sex from violence. In a world where a heartbreakingly high percentage of women will be victims of rape, it’s not implausible to suggest that at least in part, the language itself normalizes sexual violence. I challenge my students. I don’t ask them to give up all the satisfactions of profanity; rather I challenge them to think about words like “fuck” or “screw” and then make a commitment to confine the use of those words to either a description of sex (“We fucked last night”) or to express anger or extreme exasperation (“I’m so fucking furious with you right now!”) but not, not, not, both. Rage and lust are both normal human experiences; we will get angry and we will be sexual (or want to be) over and over again over the course of our lives. But we have a responsibility, I think, to make a clear and bright line between the language of sexual desire and the language of contempt and indignation. Pick one arena of human experience where that most flexible term in the English vernacular will be used, and confine it there. Words matter, I tell my students. We’re told over and over again that “a picture is worth a thousand words” — but we forget that words have the power to paint pictures in our minds of how the world is and how it ought to be. The language we use for sexuality, the words we use for rage and longing — these words construct images in our heads, in our culture, and in our lives. We have an obligation to rethink how we speak as part of building a more pleasurable, safe, just and egalitarian world.

# ‘History’ Bad

**In the context of women’s liberation, we advocate the use of the word herstory as it recognizes that women have been written out of regular history**

**Wallechinsky and Wallace 1981** (David; and Irving; “Feminism Ideas and Sexism in Language Part 3” http://www.trivia-library.com/a/feminism-ideas-and-sexism-in-language-part-3.htm)

 The Women's Liberation Movement has attempted to alter the English language as it touches women. Ms. (pronounced "miz") existed before the women's movement in secretarial handbooks as the solution to the sticky problem of unknown marital status, but its use was not ensured until the publication of the most widely circulated magazine associated with the women's movement, Ms. The U.S. Government Printing Office, official stylemaster for government and civil-service publications has condoned the use of Ms. However, a 1973 Gallup poll found that disapproval of its use among women who knew of the term outweighed approval, 5-3. Some women say that "miz" sounds a little too much like "massa," or that the abbreviation already stands for the word "manuscript." The term's acceptance has been primarily as a written and not a verbal form of address. While "Ms." has been the most successful attempt to alter language, other attempts have included using "he/she" or a newer form "s/he" to replace "he." Replacing "men" with "people" or "persons" has become popular (almost a game or joke for some). "Jurymen" becomes "jurypeople," "postmen" becomes "postpeople," and so on. History now has an adjunct "herstory," not because the etymology of history is history (it isn't), but because "herstory" emphasizes that women have been written out of regular history. And the "Madam Chairmen" of the world (a linguistic contradiction to begin with) have been deposed by hundreds of "chairpersons."

**Vote Negative to challenge oppression**

**Zainzinger 2010** (Vanessa; “His-/herstory of Gender-Based Language Reform” October 28th. <http://vanessazainzinger.wordpress.com/2010/10/28/his-herstory-of-gender-based-language-reform/>)

 While language and gender research has progressed dramatically and attempts at eliminating gender biased language have been ubiquitous in recent years, their relative success is dependent on the social context in which the language reform occurs. The introduction of unbiased language has only been persistent where it was within a larger sociopolitical initiative, formal speech or language forums sensitive to attitudinal changes. So have attempts at popularising new terms in everyday, informal language been widely unsuccessful, while changes in media language and formal contexts have been consistent. However, even if gender-based language reform has not been completely successful, it continues to sensitise individuals to ways in which language is discriminatory. This makes consciousness-raising an ongoing step in the progress against the oppression and marginalisation of women in language.

# ‘You Guys’ Bad

**Changing language is a pre-requisite to shaping gender equality—phrases like “you guys” reinforce patriarchal system.**

**Kleinman 07** Sherryl Kleinman, Professor in Department of Sociology at the University of North Carolina, “Why Sexist Language Matters.” March 12, 2007. <http://www.alternet.org/story/48856/>

 Gendered words and phrases like "you guys" may seem small compared to issues like violence against women, but changing our language is an easy way to begin overcoming gender inequality. or years I've been teaching a sociology course at the University of North Carolina on gender inequality. I cover such topics as the wage gap, the "second shift" (of housework and childcare) that heterosexual women often do in the home, the "third shift" (women's responsibility for intimate relationships with men), compulsory heterosexuality, the equation of women's worth with physical attractiveness, the sexualizing of women in the media, lack of reproductive rights for women (especially poor women), sexual harassment and men's violence against women. My course makes links among items on that list. For example, if women are expected to take care of housework and children, then they cannot compete as equals with men in the workplace; if men see women largely as sex objects and servers, then it is hard for men to see women as serious workers outside the home; if women are taught that it is their job to take care of relationships with men, they may be blamed for breakups; if women are economically dependent on men, they may stay with abusive male partners; if women prefer intimacy with women, men may harass or violate them. What I've left off the list is the issue that both women and men in my classes have the most trouble understanding -- or, as I see it, share a strong unwillingness to understand -- sexist language. I'm not referring to such words as "bitch," "whore" and "slut." What I focus on instead are words that students consider just fine: male (so-called) generics. Some of these words refer to persons occupying a position: postman, chairman, freshman, congressman, fireman. Other words refer to the entire universe of human beings: "mankind" or "he." Then we've got manpower, manmade lakes and "Oh, man, where did I leave my keys?" There's "manning" the tables in a country where children learn that "all men are created equal." The most insidious, from my observations, is the popular expression "you guys." Please don't tell me it's a regional term. I've heard it in the Triangle, New York, Chicago, San Francisco and Montreal. I've seen it in print in national magazines, newsletters and books. And even if it were regional, that doesn't make it right. I'll bet we can all think of a lot of practices in our home regions that we'd like to get rid of. I sound defensive. I know. But that's because I've so often heard (and not only from students) ... What's the big deal? Why does all this "man-ning" and "guys-ing" deserve a place in my list of items of gender inequality and justify taking up inches of space in the newsletter of a rape crisis center? Because male-based generics are another indicator -- and more importantly, a reinforcer -- of a system in which "man" in the abstract and men in the flesh are privileged over women. Some say that language merely reflects reality and so we should ignore our words and work on changing the unequal gender arrangements that are reflected in our language. Well, yes, in part. It's no accident that "man" is the anchor in our language and "woman" is not. And of course we should make social change all over the place. But the words we use can also reinforce current realities when they are sexist (or racist or heterosexist). Words are tools of thought. We can use words to maintain the status quo or to think in new ways -- which in turn creates the possibility of a new reality. It makes a difference if I think of myself as a "girl" or a "woman"; it makes a difference if we talk about "Negroes" or "African-Americans." Do we want a truly inclusive language or one that just pretends? Before I discuss how benign-sounding words like "freshman" and "you guys" reinforce the gender inequalities on my list, above, let me tell you about an article that made a difference in my own understanding of sexist language. In 1986 Douglas Hofstadter, a philosopher, wrote a parody of sexist language by making an analogy with race. His article ("A Person Paper on Purity in Language") creates an imaginary world in which generics are based on race rather than gender. In that world, people would use "freshwhite," "chairwhite" and yes, "you whiteys." People of color would hear "all whites are created equal" -- and be expected to feel included. Substituting "white" for "man" makes it easy to see why using "man" for all human beings is wrong. Yet, women are expected to feel flattered by "freshman," "chairman" and "you guys." And can you think of one, just one, example of a female-based generic? Try using "freshwoman" with a group of male students or calling your male boss "chairwoman." Then again, don't. There could be serious consequences for referring to a man as a "woman" -- a term that still means "lesser" in our society. If not, why do men get so upset at the idea of being called women? And why do so many women cling to "freshman," "chairman" and "you guys?" I think I know why, though it doesn't make me feel any better. "Man" is a high-status term, and women want to be included in the "better" group. But while being labeled "one of the guys" might make us feel included, it's only a guise of inclusion, not the reality. If we were really included, we wouldn't have to disappear into the word "guys." I'm not saying that people who use "you guys" have bad intentions, but think of the consequences. All those "man" words -- said many times a day by millions of people every day -- cumulatively reinforce the message that men are the standard and that women should be subsumed by the male category. We know from history that making a group invisible makes it easier for the powerful to do what they want with members of that group. And we know, from too many past and current studies, that far too many men are doing "what they want" with women. Most of us can see a link between calling women "sluts" and "whores" and men's sexual violence against women. We need to recognize that making women linguistically a subset of man/men through terms like "mankind" and "guys" also makes women into objects. If we, as women, aren't worthy of such true generics as "first-year," "chair" or "you all," then how can we expect to be paid a "man's wage," be respected as people rather than objects (sexual or otherwise) on the job and at home, be treated as equals rather than servers or caretakers of others, be considered responsible enough to make our own decisions about reproduction, define who and what we want as sexual beings? If we aren't even deserving of our place in humanity in language, why should we expect to be treated as decent human beings otherwise? Now and then someone tells me that I should work on more important issues -- like men's violence against women -- rather than on "trivial" issues like language. Well, I work on lots of issues. But that's not the point. What I want to say (and do say, if I think they'll give me the time to explain) is that working against sexist language is working against men's violence against women. It's one step. If we cringe at "freshwhite" and "you whiteys" and would protest such terms with loud voices, then why don't we work as hard at changing "freshman" and "you guys?" Don't women deserve it? If women primarily exist in language as "girls" (children), "sluts" and "guys," it does not surprise me that we still have a long list of gendered inequalities to fix. We've got to work on every item on the list. Language is one we can work on right now, if we're willing. It's easier to start saying "you all" instead of "you guys" than to change the wage gap tomorrow.

# AT: gendeded language

**Your author concludes \_\_\_\_**

**Eckert and McConnel-Ginet 92** (Penelope institute for Research on learning, Sally department of modern languages and linguistics at Cornell University “Think Practically and Look Locally: Language and Gender as Community- Based Practice” <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2155996>) JC

Despite the studies of language and gender discussed above we do not yet have a coherent view of the interaction of gender and language. Existing theories have tended to draw on popular conceptions of gender-e.g. as a set of sex-determined attributes of individuals (a kind of "femininity" or "masculin- ity," often associated with a particular division of social activities such as childcare or making war), or as a relation of oppression of females by males. As we have emphasized, gender cannot be understood simply as a matter of individual attributes: Femininity connects to masculinity, femininities and masculinities connect to one another, and all connect to other dimensions of social categorization. Nor is gender reducible to a relation between "women" and "men" as undifferentiated groups. Rather, gender is constructed in a com- plex array of social practices within communities, practices that in many cases connect to personal attributes and to power relations but that do so in varied, subtle, and changing ways. Although a number of scholars have attempted to understand language as rooted in social practice, relatively little progress has been made in explaining how social practices relate to linguistic structures and systems. With only a few exceptions (e.g. 7, 32), linguists have ignored recent work in social theory that might eventually deepen our understanding of the social dimensions of cognition (and of the cognitive dimensions of social practice). Even less atten- tion has been paid to the social (including the linguistic) construction of gender categories: The notions of "women" and "men" are typically taken for granted in sociolinguistics. Nor has much attention been given to the variety of ways gender relations and privilege are constructed. Dominance is often seen as either a matter of deference and/or coercion; other aspects of gender rela- tions-e.g. sexual attraction-are typically ignored. Theoretical work in gen- der studies (e.g. 6, 22, 96, 107) is still not well known among theorists of society and culture (but see 37 as an interesting contribution), and sociolin- guistic studies have only rarely taken advantage of recent developments in understanding gender (but see e.g. 39).

# AT: ‘You Guys’

**“Guys” in the plural sense refers to both sexes- their criticism applies to the singular useage**

**Dictionary.com ’11** [http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/guy]

guy1   [gahy] Show IPA noun, verb, guyed, guy•ing.

noun

1.

Informal. a man or boy; fellow: He's a nice guy.

2.

Usually, guys. Informal. persons of either sex; people: Could one of you guys help me with this?

# \*\*\*HEG

# Heg Reps Good

**Heg solves global problems and is net beneficial for the majority of people**

**Kagan 98 (**Robert senior associate at the Carnegie endowment for international peace “The Benevolent Empire” http://people.cas.sc.edu/rosati/a.kaplan.benevolentempire.fp.sum98.pdf)JC

The irony of these pleas for vigorous American leadership did not escape notice, even in Paris, the intellectual and spiritual capital of anti- hegemony and "multipolarity." As one pundit (Jacques Amalric) noted wickedly in the left-leaning L/berat/on, "Those who accused the United States of being overbearing are today praying for a quick end to the storm." Indeed, they were and with good reason. As Aldo Rizzo observed, part in lament and part in tribute, in Italy's powerful La Stam- pa: "It is in times like these that we feel the absence of a power, certainly not [an] altemative, but at least complementary, to America, something which Europe could be. Could be, but is not. Therefore, good luck to Clinton and, most of all, to America." This brief moment of international concern passed, of course, as did the flash of candor about the true state of world affairs and America's essential role in preserving a semblance of global order. The president appeared to regain his balance, the drivewheel kept spinning, and in the world's great capitals talk resumed of American arrogance and bullying and the need for a more genuinely multipolar system to manage inter- national affairs. But the almost universally expressed fear of a weakened U.S. presidency provides a useful antidote to the pervasive handwringing, in Washington as well as in foreign capitals, over the "problem" of Amer- ican hegemony. There is much less to this problem than meets the eye. The commingled feelings of reliance on and resentment toward America's international dominance these days are neither strange nor new. The resentment of power, even when it is in the hands of one's friends, is a normal, indeed, timeless human emotion--no less so than the arrogance of power. And perhaps only Americans, with their rather short memory, could imagine that the current resentment is the unique product of the expansion of American dominance in the post-Cold War era. During the confrontation with the Soviet Union, now recalled in the United States as a time of Edenic harmony among the Western allies, not iust French but also British leaders chafed under the leadership of a sometimes overbearing America. As political scientist A.W. DePorte noted some 20 years ago, the schemes of European unity advanced by French financial planner Jean Monnet and French foreign SUMMER 1 9 9 8 25 U.S. Hegemony minister Robert Schuman in 1950 aimed "not only to strengthen Western Europe in the face of the Russian threat but also--though this was less talked about--to strengthen it vis-a-vis its indispensable but overpowering American ally." Today's call for "multipolarity" in inter- national affairs, in short, has a history, as do European yearnings for unity as a counterweight to American power. Neither of these pro- In truth, the benevolent hegemony exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world's population. fessed desires is a new response to the particular American hegemony of the last nine years. And neither of them, one sus- pects, is very seriously intended. For the tnlth about America's dominant role in the world is known to most clear-eyed international observers. And the truth is that the benevolent hegemony exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world's population. It is certainly a better international arrangement than all realistic alternatives. To under- mine it would cost many others around the world far more than it would cost Americans--and far sooner. As Samuel Huntington wrote five years ago, before he joined the plethora of scholars disturbed by the "arrogance" of American hegemony: "A world without U.S. primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country shaping global affairs.

**Our heg discourse is good**

**Kagan 98 (**Robert senior associate at the Carnegie endowment for international peace “The Benevolent Empire” http://people.cas.sc.edu/rosati/a.kaplan.benevolentempire.fp.sum98.pdf)

Those contributing to the growing chorus of antihegemony and multipolarity may know they are playing a dangerous game, one that needs to be conducted with the utmost care, as French leaders did dur- ing the Cold War, lest the entire intemational system come crashing down around them. What they may not have adequately calculated, however, is the possibility that Americans will not respond as wisely as they generally did during the Cold War. U.S. Hegemony Americans and their leaders should not take all this sophisticated whining about U.S. hegemony too seriously. They certainly should not take it more seriously than the whiners themselves do. But, of course, Americans are taking it seriously. In the United States these days, the lugubrious guilt trip of post-Vietnam liberalism is echoed even by con- servatives, with William Buckley, Samuel Huntington, and James Schlesinger all decrying American "hubris," "arrogance," and "imperial- ism." Clinton administration officials, in between speeches exalting America as the "indispensable" nation, increasingly behave as if what is truly indispensable is the prior approval of China, France, and Russia for every military action. Moreover, at another level, there is a stirring of neo-isolationism in America today, a mood that nicely complements the view among many Europeans that America is meddling too much in everyone else's business and taking too little time to mind its own. The existence of the Soviet Union disciplined Americans and made them see that their enlightened self-interest lay in a relatively generous foreign policy. Today, that discipline is no longer present. In other words, foreign grumbling about American hegemony would be merely amusing, were it not for the very real possibility that too many Americans will forget--even if most of the rest of the world does not-- just how important continued American dominance is to the preserva- tion of a reasonable level of international security and prosperity. World leaders may want to keep this in mind when they pop the champagne corks in celebration of the next American humbling.

# Heg Reps Framework

**Discussing hegemony in academic settings is key to create social changes and prevent corruption**

**Walsh 8** (John staff at the University of Rhode Island “The critical role of discourse in Education for Democracy” http://www.jceps.com/PDFs/6-2-04.pdf)JC

As students learn to become active and engaged democratic citizens they are continually faced with contradictions inherent in early 21 st century democracy including: the advantages of wealth in running for office, the conflict between the ideal of the government deriving its powers from the people and the reality of the people being subjected to the power of the government, just to name two. Rather than educate for democracy, the ideology of democracy may function in such a way as to preserve the current political system through hegemony in order to achieve the consent of present and future generations for the maintenance and reproduction of the current relations of domination. Throughout this project I refer to dominant ideologies not a dominant ideology. This is intended to emphasize that ideology is not a unified and cohesive phenomenon. What is known is the dominant ideology consists of many oppressive and exploitative ideologies. Sometimes these ideologies work in tandem to sustain existing relations of domination and at other times they contradict one another and provide opportunities for dialectical analysis. In their discussions, the students sometimes challenge one ideology while sustaining another. Hegemony refers to the manner in which consent is garnered from the masses so that social relations based on domination appear to be normal and natural (Gramsci, 2000). Antonio Gramsci (2000) theorized that the dominant social system is imposed on the general population through hegemony and direct domination. According to Gramsci, the dominant group exercises hegemony to extract consent from the portion of the population which is not part of the dominant group. Those who are not persuaded through hegemony are subject to direct domination through the legal state apparatuses used for enforcing discipline. Of course, their legality is a result of the dominant group‟s control of the political / legal system. In this sense, Gramsci‟s conception of hegemony is consistent with Althusser‟s (2001) representation of the relationship between repressive State apparatuses and ideological State apparatuses and Marx‟s (1978) contention that the ruling class produces ideology. Leadership, according to Gramsci, is a prerequisite for gaining political power and the leadership responsible for hegemonic domination rests with those who act as intellectuals for the dominant group. Here, Gramsci is approaching Marx‟s contention that ideology begins with the division of labor into mental and material production. Gramsci‟s solution to the problem of the ruling class controlling mental production is the development of organic intellectuals from within non-ruling classes (Gramsci, 2000). Every social group has its “own stratum of intellectuals” (Gramsci, 2000, p. 251). This is not to say that some people are intellectuals and some are not; Gramsci is careful to explain that all people are intellectuals but the social function of some is purely intellectual. Said another way, some people‟s relation to society is to produce material goods or services, and others provide “intellectual and moral leadership” (Gramsci, 2000, p. 249). The intellectuals of the dominant group play a significant role in hegemonic dominance, especially when social, political, and economic crises arise. If hegemony were not able to garner consent then direct domination would be required, or at least its use would be more visible (Gramsci, 2000). When such crises reach a climax it is the role of the intellectuals within oppositional groups to exercise “intellectual and moral leadership” (p. 249) in order to gain political power (Gramsci, 2000). Organic intellectuals, developed from within non-ruling classes, have the potential to provide leadership roles within these movements as they can help other members of their class build class consciousness of the hegemonic representations used to justify existing social relations (Gramsci, 2000). The United States may just be at such a critical juncture in the early part of the 21 st century. The contradictions of the crisis of the conservative restoration and the expansion of the global neoliberal project are beginning to become clear as the United States is engaged in a perpetual global war, the gap between the haves and the have-nots increases, inequality based on race and gender persists, and the environment continues to be destroyed. During this time the political forces of the dominant group struggle to conserve and defend the existing social structure for their own benefit (Gramsci, 2000). Meanwhile the intellectuals of the dominant group construct discourse which normalizes government support of corporate hegemony and abolishes the role of the government in achieving social justice (Harvey, 2005). It is in this historical epoch that the social groups opposed to domination must rely on their own organic intellectuals to provide intellectual and moral leadership for the transformation of society. While these intellectuals may operate in many sites, the primary site for challenging hegemony and for the development of organic intellectuals may exist within schools.

**We are the agents of change**

**Stoddart 7** (Mark phD candidate at the department of sociology at the University of British Colombia “Ideology, Hegemony, Discourse: A critical Review of Theories of Knowledge and Power” http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/bitstream/1808/5226/1/STARV28A9.pdf)JC

Gramsci also asserts that hegemony has a material dimension. It is not only a system of ideas, floating above economic structures. Rather, the **social action of everyday life produces hegemonic effects**. Writing about the emergence of Fordist production in the United States, for example, Gramsci (1992) describes an American hegemony that is “born in the factory” (p. 169). Gramsci (1996) describes how the interplay of our cultural and material surroundings constructs hegemony as follows: The press is the most dynamic part of the ideological structure, but not the only one. Everything that directly or indirectly influences or could influence public opinion belongs to it: libraries, **schools**, associations and **clubs** of various kinds, even architecture, the layout of streets and their names (p. 53). Furthermore, hegemony often lies beneath the surface, unarticulated. As Williams (1977) writes, “A lived hegemony is always a process. It is not, except analytically, a system or a structure. It is a realized complex of experiences, relationships, and activities, with specific and changing pressures and limits” (p. 112). This illustrates how hegemony works as a sort of common sense, rather than as a coherent body of thought, such as we would associate with ideology. Gramsci gives us an image of society in which the cultural realm is a central location for the exercise of social power. By comparison with the Frankfurt School theorists, however, hegemonic power is something that is always contested, always historically contingent and always unfinished. He ascribes a high level of importance to the subaltern classes, **intellectuals**, and revolutionary political parties as agents for social change. For Gramsci, a revolutionary seizure of the means of production is not a viable tactic for creating radical social change in modern capitalist societies. Where a society is characterized primarily by the exercise of hegemonic power instead of coercion, a prolonged cultural “war of position” is more important, where the hegemony of the ruling classes is dissembled and a new hegemony is crystallized (Femia 1975: 34). This occurs as subaltern groups realize their own capacity to become philosophers of their daily experience; they come to understand the hegemonic common sense that they otherwise take for granted. The Gramscian model of hegemony departs significantly from the Marxist notion of ideology, while retaining Marxist foundational categories of class, the capitalist mode of production, and the dis- tinction between the economic base and the cultural superstructure. Among the advances made by Gramscian theory is the attention to hegemonic power as an often-implicit “common sense” rather than a coherent body of thought, which is inherently unfinished and historically contingent. It is the embodiment of hegemony in everyday common sense, through the mundane activities connected with work, school, the family and the church, that secures the consent of capital’s subaltern classes.

**Discussing hegemony spills over to the political agenda**

**Tang 11** (Harry member of the Comimittes of Correspondence for Democracy and Socialism, the Northwest Central Labor Council “More on Ideological Hegemony: The Education system” http://heartlandradical.blogspot.com/2011/05/more-on-ideological-hegemonythe.html)JC

I have been thinking a lot about “ideological hegemony;” how and why we think about the political world in the ways we do. I do so not to add another layer of theory to an already complex set of arguments about economics and politics. Nor am I interested in immobilizing political activists. Rather, I think progressives need to think about how to challenge the ideas that most of us are supposed to accept and believe. Of course, the primary public institutions that transmit ideas and ways of thinking to people, from the start to the end of their educational careers, are schools. Our friends on the Right know how important it is to shape schools at all levels. Early in this century I remember hearing Rush Limbaugh say on one of his radio programs that “the only institutions we do not yet control are the schools” With this as a goal, just the other day we read stories about Koch brothers’ money financing faculty positions at Florida State University in economics (presumably Marxist or structural economists need not apply). Just a week earlier a story broke about rightwing efforts to cut and splice public recordings of lectures in a labor studies class at the University of Missouri to leave the impression that the instructors are advocates for labor violence. Using the methods of vilification and distortions that worked successfully against green jobs advocate Van Jones, community action group ACORN, and Shirley Sherrod, an African American employee of the Department of Agriculture, attacks on education are growing. The use of more sophisticated technologies than in the days of McCarthy or David Horowitz’s print crusades against “dangerous professors” are becoming common. In addition to smear campaigns and using money to shape hiring practices at universities, access to varieties of knowledge remains very much constrained by institutional and political pressures, from kindergarten through high school and college. For example, we can talk about two subject areas, militarism and economic orthodoxy. Both subjects were prominently featured at an elementary school, Mayflower Mill Elementary School in Lafayette, Indiana. As the local newspaper, the Journal & Courier reported approvingly on May 12, 2011: “When Mayflower Mill Elementary students were told they would be able to hear the approaching helicopter that would land behind the school before they saw it, their ears perked up.” Although the noise they first heard was only a delivery truck, soon a Bell UH-1H Huey helicopter which was used in Vietnam, and piloted by a group of veterans, arrived. The pilots were part of an organization committed to maintaining a positive public image of the helicopter. The helicopter and its veteran pilots spent the day at the elementary school, called by the school “Operation American Pride,” “After Wednesday’s landing, students broke into groups…..including lessons on flag etiquette and the life of the soldier.” Kids got to go in the helicopter, sit behind a Humvee, and a military truck. The whole day was a celebration of the military, military values, super-patriotism. One student referred to experiencing the helicopter as “cool” and “exhilarating.” Organizing the day’s activities took combined efforts of members of military families, community donations, support from the Army National Guard and members of Purdue University’s ROTC. Of course, the activities required the full cooperation of teachers, the principal, and members of the school board. I wonder what would have happened if a parent or brave teacher had proposed that “Operation American Pride” include an historical discussion of the millions of Vietnamese people who died in the U.S. war in that country; or perhaps, if course material include reference to the 57,000 American soldiers who died in the war or the lingering effects of Agent Orange on subsequent generations of Vietnamese and U.S. veterans. In addition the J & C reported on May 16, that fourth and fifth graders at the same school recently completed a class project simulating commerce and manufacturing. Students designed and sold products to their school mates (and the money earned went to recognized charities such as the American Heart Association and the local fire department). Kids produced “slime,” decorated pencils, and chocolate coated plastic spoons. Students designed their products, shopped for supplies, and produced and sold them. The teacher, it was reported, has done a similar project every year because she said about students that “they need to understand finance.” The newspaper reported that the project was supported by long-time economics education lobbyist and think tank, the Indiana Center for Economic Education. An ICEE spokesperson, who offered a program that the teacher had taken years ago, spoke about the lessons kids learned: “The basics of operating their own business, the fact you’ve got to produce a product customers want and counter the cost of resources you need.” The spokesperson claimed the exercises such as at Mayflower Mill highlight real issues which sometimes get lost in teaching more dominant subjects. I wonder if students learned anything about the historic role of organized labor in the state, high unemployment in Indiana, growing economic inequality, the forty year deindustrialization of the state economy, and the differences in economic opportunity between African Americans, other minorities, and whites, and between men and women. Almost accidentally, I accessed stories about political struggles from 2004 until today at my old high school, Senn High School, in Chicago. It seems that the high school which over forty years ago was white and middle class was now populated by young people from working class and poor African American, Latino, and immigrant families. By the new century it was experiencing problems in reference to academics and social order. The authorities, the City alderwoman, the head of the Chicago Public Schools, Arne Duncan, Mayor Daley, and the military came up with a “great” idea. They created in 2005, over the objections of students, teachers, and community activists, the Hyman Rickover Naval Academy which occupies a large physical space in the high school and has enrolled at least 25 per cent of the student population. Meanwhile programs to teach English as a second language and advanced placement courses for college preparation were reduced. The teaching staff in the non-military portion of Senn High School was cut by 33 per cent. CORE (Caucus of Rank and File Educators) continues to challenge the militarization of the Chicago school system. In our communities we need to work in solidarity with those immediately involved in educational institutions. Where issues of militarism and economic orthodoxy shape school curricula our voices need to be heard. Our political agenda, in sum, needs to address as best our resources allow what we learn, how we learn it, and who controls the institutions that shape our thinking and the thinking of young people.

# Imperialism Good

**Turn American imperialism prevents genocides and wars**

**Boot 3** (senior fellow for the national security studies “U.S. Imperialism: A force for Good” http://www.cfr.org/iraq/us-imperialism-force-good/p5959)JC

What is the greatest danger facing America as it tries to rebuild Iraq: Shiite fundamentalism? Kurdish separatism? Sunni intransigence? Turkish, Syrian, Iranian or Saudi Arabian meddling? All of those are real problems, but none is so severe that it can't readily behandled. More than 125,000 U.S. troops occupy Mesopotamia. They are backed up by the resources of the world's richest economy. In a contest for control of Iraq, America can outspend and outmuscle any competing faction. The greatest danger is that America won't use all of its power for fear of the "I" word -- imperialism. When asked on April 28 on al-Jazeera whether the United States was "empire building," Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld reacted as if he'd been asked whether he wears women's underwear. "We don't seek empires," he replied huffily. "We're not imperialistic. We never have been." That's a fine answer for public consumption. The problem is that it isn't true. The United States has been an empire since at least 1803, when Thomas Jefferson purchased the Louisiana Territory. Throughout the 19th century, what Jefferson called the "empire of liberty" expanded across the continent. When U.S. power stretched from "sea to shining sea," the American empire moved abroad, acquiring colonies ranging from Puerto Rico and the Philippines to Hawaii and Alaska. While the formal empire mostly disappeared after the Second World War, the United States set out on another bout of imperialism in Germany and Japan. Oh, sorry -- that wasn't imperialism; it was "occupation." But when Americans are running foreign governments, it's a distinction without a difference. Likewise, recent "nation-building" experiments in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan are imperialism under another name. Mind you, this is not meant as a condemnation. The history of American imperialism is hardly one of unadorned good doing; there have been plenty of shameful episodes, such as the mistreatment of the Indians. But, on the whole, U.S. imperialism has been the greatest force for good in the world during the past century. It has defeated the monstrous evils of communism and Nazism and lesser evils such as the Taliban and Serbian ethnic cleansing. Along the way, it has helped spread liberal institutions to countries as diverse as South Korea and Panama. Yet, while generally successful as imperialists, Americans have been loath to confirm that's what they were doing. That's OK. Given the historical baggage that "imperialism" carries, there's no need for the U.S. government to embrace the term. But it should definitely embrace the practice. That doesn't mean looting Iraq of its natural resources; nothing could be more destructive of the goal of building a stable government in Baghdad. It means imposing the rule of law, property rights, free speech and other guarantees, at gunpoint if need be. This will require selecting a new ruler who is committed to pluralism and then backing him or her to the hilt. Iran and other neighbouring states won't hesitate to impose their despotic views on Iraq; we shouldn't hesitate to impose our democratic views.

# \*\*\*HOLOCAUST TRIVIALIZATION

# Holocaust Reps Bad

**Using the word Holocaust allows the actual genocide to occur**

**Freeman 91** ( Michael professor at the university of essex “Holocaust and Genocide studies” http://dl2af5jf3e.scholar.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?sid=google&auinit=M&aulast=Freeman&atitle=The+theory+and+prevention+of+genocide&id=doi:10.1093/hgs/6.2.185&title=Holocaust+and+genocide+studies&volume=6&issue=2&date=1991&spage=185&issn=8756-6583)JC

Wiesel's critique of scholarship deserves careful evaluation. Academics and scientists can be arrogant, but are not necessarily so and some academics share Wiesel's view that the Holocaust overwhelms understanding:2 Understanding the Holocaust does not require an appeal to 'laws', which play hardly any role in social science nowadays.13 Complete identification with victims and executioners is certainly impossible, but a degree of empathy is not." Further, empathy is necessary but not sufficient for understanding genocide. We need to know how victims and executioners became such. No social agents fully understand the origins of their predicaments. Understanding genocide, therefore. requires us to look beyond the understandings of victims and executioners to the causes of their situations:5 Wiesel has declared his constant goal to have been 'to invoke the past as a shield for the future'. If this is possible, there must be some similarity between past and future. Wiesel concedes that the theories that have been proposed to understand the Holocaust may contain 'a fraction of the truth\*:6 Our obligation, then, surely is to collect, criticise, and improve rather than to dismiss these fractions. It is true that no language can adequately represent the Holocaust. But this is in part a general problem of getting language to represent experience. The problem is exceptionally difficult when language seeks to grasp the Holocaust, because of the extraordinary and overwhelming character of the event. There is certainly a danger that academic and scientific discourses may dehumanise the human.' 7 And yet, with all its horror, genocide is social behaviour, and it would surely be a greater moral error for social science to evade than to confront it.

# Holocaust Reps Good

**Comparing the Holocaust to other genocides is key to prevent future genocides**

**Freeman 91** ( Michael professor at the university of essex “Holocaust and Genocide studies” http://dl2af5jf3e.scholar.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?sid=google&auinit=M&aulast=Freeman&atitle=The+theory+and+prevention+of+genocide&id=doi:10.1093/hgs/6.2.185&title=Holocaust+and+genocide+studies&volume=6&issue=2&date=1991&spage=185&issn=8756-6583)JC

Much has been written about the claim that the Holocaust was unique and therefore cannot be compared with other genocides." I shall confine myself to the following points. First, every event is unique: unique events may, however, be similar and comparable. Second, important events are unique in important respects, but may also be similar in important respects. Third, the Hitlerite intent to destroy the Jews was uniquely thorough-going. Fourth, the uniqueness of the Holocaust does not preclude the usefulness of comparing it with other genocides. Robert Jay Litton has, for example. proposed that the concept of national or racial therapy may be common to the Holocaust and other genocides. This hypothesis must be tested empirically: it cannot be dismissed a priori.19 Finally, we repeat the point we made about Wiesel: if knowledge of the past can be a shield for the future, past and future must have important elements in common. Comparison therefore may contribute to prevention. We need a comparative theory of genocide, therefore, which respects the uniqueness of the Holocaust.

**Concealing the holocaust causes more genocides to occur**

**Stannard 96** (David E. Professor at the University of Hawaii “The dangers of calling the Holocaust unique” http://www.codoh.com/library/document/530)JC

Surely no one other than a rabid Holocaust denier would claim that those "indirect" killings were not a part of the Holocaust. In the same way, the massive number of deaths from disease, starvation, exposure, and exhaustion that characteristically are suffered by other victims of genocidal assault cannot morally be separated from the rest. None of these challenges to the "uniqueness" argument minimizes or denies in any way the horrendous suffering of Jews in the Holocaust. But they do suggest why those who insist on the uniqueness of the Holocaust, when faced with the growing body of information that refutes their claim, increasingly have had to turn to the manipulation, fabrication, and misstatement of fact to advance their argument. Under scrutiny, a revealing pattern emerges in much of the recent literature that denies the comparability of the Holocaust and other examples of genocide: The advocates of Holocaust uniqueness resort to many of the same assertions used by those who deny that the Holocaust ever occurred. Over and over again, dubious massaging of the data leads one author after another to minimize drastically the death toll in other genocides; to claim that the deaths that did occur during those other "tragedies" were routine wartime casualties or the result of "natural causes" such as disease; to deny evidence of official intent to commit genocide. But whereas Holocaust deniers are rightly seen as anti-Semitic crackpots, those who say the Holocaust was unique are regarded by many people as the bearers of truth. There are obvious political reasons why. Contemporary scholarship on the case of Armenian genocide provides a glimpse of these reasons. From 1915 through 1923, between one-half and three-quarters of the Armenians in the collapsing Ottoman Empire-roughly one million to 1.5 million innocent people-were slaughtered by a government that had been taken over by xenophobic nationalists who considered the Armenians a dangerous religious minority. Although debate continues as to the precise number of Armenians killed, no serious historian today questions the existence of the Armenian genocide. But the Republic of Turkey, which came into being in 1923 as the successor to the Ottoman Empire, officially denies that any such mass killing ever took place. While it is not unusual for countries to deny the truth about their violent pasts, it might seem odd that Israel enthusiastically supports the Turkish government's position. Just last year, for example, the government of Israel banned from Israeli television a documentary on the Armenian genocide and quashed an effort by the Israeli Education Ministry to introduce the slaughter of the Armenians into highschool curricula. Moreover, on at least two occasions recently, Israeli government officials and Jewish lobbyists in the United States have joined forces with Turkey in blocking U. S. proposals to commemorate the Armenian genocide. Why would the descendants of those who died in one of the most monstrous genocides in human history be motivated to join in a genocide-denying propaganda effort on behalf of a country that is demonstrably guilty of genocide? The answer is what the essayist Phillip Lopate calls "extermination pride . . a sort of privileged nation status in the moral honor roll." The Holocaust historian Zygmunt Bauman has noted that Israel uses the Holocaust "as the certificate of its political legitimacy, a safe-conduct pass for its past and future policies, and, above all, as the advance payment for the injustices it might itself commit." Doing so creates the need to play down other genocides. As one proponent of the uniqueness of the Holocaust, Edward Alexander, has put it, to describe as genocidal the ghastly agonies suffered by others-the Armenians, for instance-is "to plunder the moral capital" of the Jewish people. It is to "steal the Holocaust. " In a classic case of quid pro quo, the Turkish government has demonstrated its gratitude for Israel's support in denying the Armenian genocide by declaring its agreement with Israel's claim of the uniqueness of the Holocaust. And in the middle of this cynical and dehumanizing reciprocation stand the pro-uniqueness writers, who have provided Turkey and Israel with their contrived intellectual support. T o be sure, those who maintain that the Holocaust was unique do not by any means represent the entirety of Jewish scholarship on the subject. On the contrary, dogmatic proponents of uniqueness are something of a cult within the world of genuine scholarship. Israel W. Charny, executive director of the Institute on the Holocaust and Genocide in Jerusalem, describes them as self-appointed "high priests." He strongly objects to what he calls their "fetishistic" efforts to "establish the exclusive 'superiority' or unique form of any one genocide." Yet in the public realm, Jewish suffering has attained what the religion scholar Richard L. Rubenstein calls "religio-mythic" status. Consider what the international outcry would be today, if reports surfaced of a massive deportation of thousands of Jews from Germany to Romania, where they were met with a nationwide campaign of terrorism, violence, and murder. But that is precisely what did happen recently-except the victims were Gypsies. No one has ever bestowed religio-mythic status upon their torment, and they have no political chips to play in the games of international power politics. Thus, no outcry has been heard over the brutality and persecution they continue to face throughout Europe. Proponents of the uniqueness of the Holocaust not only do damage to historical truth, but in their determination to belittle all genocides other than the Holocaust, they are, in fact, accomplices in the efforts of numerous governments to conceal and deny their own pasts or to obscure current campaigns of mass violence, such as those in Guatemala (where more than 100,000 people have been slaughtered by the government in recent years) and in East Timor (where one-third of the indigenous population has been wiped out). What is true for the Jews is true for others, as well: Genocide concealed is genocide likely to recur. This is not an academic game. Real people's lives are at stake. Horrendous as Jewish suffering in the Holocaust was, it is essential that false claims for its uniqueness not be permitted to denigrate the memory of other genocides-or to impede the desperately needed expansion of human-rights protections to other threatened peoples throughout the world today

# \*\*\*INDIA-PAKISTAN

# Indo-Pak War Reps Bad

**Construction of threats is the root cause of their war scenarios**

**Nizamani 2k** (Haider K., Institute of International Relations at the University of British Columbia, Visiting Fellow at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute “Describing the Nuclear Elephant: Nuclear Policy and Politics in India and Pakistan,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2000, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 141-151, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/29/1/141.citation)//PC

Nuclear Weapons: An Immoral and Unscientific Option The opponents of the nuclear option in the subcontinent vigorously contest ‘the logic of deterrence’ on moral and scientific grounds.15 Ahmed and Cortright’s Pakistan and the Bomb is the key text of voices of dissent in Pakistan’s nuclear discourse. Dissenting voices are cognisant of the popularity of nuclear programs in India and Pakistan. Surveys of elite opinion in both countries show more than 80 per cent of respondents’ support for their country’s nuclear option. This popularity is sustained by a select group of vocal opinion-shapers that holds sway over the nature and direction of the debate on the nuclear issue in the subcontinent. Dissidents maintain that the nuclear establishments in both countries are not accountable to the public and remain shrouded in secrecy. In this milieu, the internal debate resembles more of a monologue of nuclear hawks where dissent risks being categorised as treasonous. Most dissidents in the nuclear debate unwittingly accept the point made by mainstream Western analysts about the greater possibility of an accidental nuclear war between India and Pakistan. Zia Mian, an avowed unilateralist, for example, maintains in this collection that ‘keeping the nuclear option means...willingness to kill millions of innocent civilians. This is a fundamentally immoral position which should be rejected out of hand’.16 Mian sees a direct connection between underdevelopment and spending on the nuclear program in Pakistan. His solution entails drastic cuts in military expenditure. This assertion overlooks the power of nationalist rhetoric in which the nuclear issue is wrapped and enjoys a popularity that cuts across classes. Secondly, the argument that funds diverted from the nuclear program would be spent on education and health sector needs to be critically examined rather than accepted at face value. Dissidents do realise that a meaningful reduction in military spending by Pakistan is only possible if India is not perceived as a threat. Yet again, the responsibility of this mindset is squarely placed with Pakistanis, whereas, more appropriately it is both Indian and Pakistani dominant security discourses that are sustained by portraying the ‘other’ as an enemy.

# Indo-Pak War Reps Good

**Even if they win that discourse comes first, our Indo-Pak war scenario is true – security discourse in India and Pakistan view the other as evil, ensures the use of nuclear weapons and escalation**

**Nizamani 98** (Haider K., Institute of International Relations at the University of British Columbia, “Limits of dissent: A comparative study of dissident voices in the nuclear discourse of Pakistan and India,” 1998, Contemporary South Asia, pg. 317-337, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09584939808719847)//PC

The dominant nuclear discourse, as well as dissent, in the subcontinent has its general politics of truth (which certain types of statements are made to function as true and thus serve as informal rules by which some statements are designated as accurate reflections of national interests and others as anti-national viewpoints. In other words, this general politics of truth sanctifies certain means and topics of inquiry and dismisses others. This in turn, creates the Pundits and Dalits (Untouchables) in the 'nukespeak' hierarchy of the subcontinent. The question of truth is not isolated from issues of power and rights. In the triangle of truth, power and right, Foucault observed a close relationship where 'there can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of association'. 18 To put it simply, 'we are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth'. 19 Therefore, the discourse of truth is not a mere linguistic construction but an engine of power whose effects can be felt at different levels. As such, it is through discourses of truth that 'We are judged, condemned, classified, determined in our undertakings, destined to a certain mode of living or dying, as a function of the true discourse which are the bearers of the specific effects of power'. 20 By analysing the discourse of the counter-narratives in the nuclear debate, I would be able to understand the prevalent forms of thinking, writing and policy-making alternatives put forward by dissenters as well as their limitations. However, the limits of dissent can be understood by juxtaposing it against the features of the dominant nuclear discourse in Pakistan and India. Needless to say, the dominant discourse has become even more extreme in the wake of the May 1998 nuclear blasts conducted by the governments in New Delhi and Islamabad. What dissent is up against In order to appreciate what the counter-narratives are up against, I will delineate the main tenets of the contemporary dominant discourses in Pakistan and India with special reference to the salience of the nuclear issue in them. A functional model to summarise the discussion looks at the dominant discourse's notion of threats and the threatened, reasons behind that situation, security objectives in such context, means to attain those objectives and, finally, costs involved in pursuing the suggested tneans. The dominant security discourse in post-colonial India and Pakistan is based upon the portrayal of the Other as an inferior. An expression of this in the case of Pakistan's dominant discourse is equating all Indians with Hinduism, a religion which they consider inferior to Islam. On the other hand, for the state-managers of India, Pakistan is seen in contrast to their democracy as the outcome of a parochial idea based on religion which serves as a fertile ground for dictatorships. In Pakistan and India, the difference within their territorial limits is suppressed in the name of Islam and secularism, respectively, and the external Other is considered as dangerous and inferior. The dominant nuclear discourse in Pakistan is made possible by a regime of truth that derives sustenance from a particular imagery about the country: a Pakistan which is only conceivable in terms of its incompatibility with India. This scheme is based on binary dichotomies in which Pakistan is a good, superior and peace-loving country, whereas India is the embodiment of an evil and expansionist power. The methodology of discourse analysis enables us to better understand the dynamics and the elements that turn the nuclear programmes of both countries into symbols of national sovereignty. It is through discourse analysis that we can demystify the myths about the nuclear issue, as well as become aware of the limits of the perspectives that seek to alter the nature and direction of the nuclear policies of New Delhi and Islamabad by pointing out the strategic undesirability and economic non-viability of retaining the nuclear option. Nuclear discourse is an integral part of this gamut of the dominant discourse in Pakistan and India. However, the task of turning the dominant episteme into a normal and unquestioned world-view of the constituent populations is seldom accomplished smoothly. For proponents of the dominant discourse in Pakistan, the Self implies an identity based upon Islam as a unifying religion and Urdu as the national language of the country. Heterogeneous societal reality asserts itself to defy such a national identity. Dynamics of these contradictions enmesh internal and external in two ways. By portraying India as a danger to the Pakistani identity—read Urdu and Islam—India is projected as a monolithic Hindu entity primarily interested in destroying Pakistan. Therefore, any internal resistance to the national identity based upon Urdu or Islam as the sole defining factors is interpreted as the doings of India. This scheme denies the fact that where there is a use of power (which is often coercive) to forge an identity, resistance to it is immanent in the process. This denial results in marginalising, isolating, and in some cases violently suppressing movements or voices which do not fall within the orbit of the dominant lore about national identity. In this process, internal dissent is invariably tied to the external enemy. A Pathan secessionist becomes an Afghan agent, and a Sindhi separatist an Indian agent. In sum, according to the dominant security discourse, the primary threat to Pakistan emanates from external sources. India is the nearest and the most potent of them, followed by Israel and the West. The threatened community is that of a Muslim Pakistan whose Islamic identity is endangered by external enemies and their local collaborators. The image of the threatened community is a monolith and any evidence to suggest otherwise is seen as a manifestation of the foreign hand. Explanations of threats are located in so-called objective incompatibility of Islam against the Hindu psyche and other forms of expansionism: i.e. Zionism and Western civilisation. This objective conflict facilitates a tripartite alliance of Western-Jewish-Hindu forces against the Muslim world (of which Pakistan is a fortress). Faced with this situation, the key objectives of Pakistan's security policy are strengthening an independent Islamic identity, bringing Kashmir into the fold of Pakistan to complete the unfinished agenda of the 1947 Partition and, finally, building the solid foundations of an Islamic Ummah (community) in world politics. Indian identity is also a work in progress. 'Midnight's children' started their 'tryst with destiny' in the name of democracy, secularism and non-alignment. 21 Although officially still wedded to those ideas, the present-day reality of India leaves much to be desired on the above fronts. Distrusted by neighbours as a regional hegemon, plagued by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and feared by various identity-based movements as an oppressive centre, contemporary India is more guided by assumptions of political realism than the visionary dreams of Gandhi or Nehru. Nuclear weapons once dubbed as 'evil' by the political leadership of independent India have become a viable strategic option in the eyes of the present-day Indian leadership and strategic experts. The proponents of dominant discourse in India have embraced nuclear weapons capability as an integral aspect of asserting the national sovereignty. The discourse in India is guided by a mix of factors ranging from an aspiration to great power status to allocating blame to the adversaries (Pakistan being the major one) for the nuclear imbroglio in South Asia. The Indian security discourse also exhibits traits of dichtomising the world, both external and internal, in binary opposites to privilege the dominant discourse of the security of the country. The dominant Indian nuclear discourse strives to use the official policy on the issue as a sign of the country's assertion as a regional power capable of resisting the global power structure and a symbol of sovereignty of Atal Bihari Vajpayee's India. As a result of this, those sections of intelligentsia who do not subscribe to the dominant discourse within both countries are portrayed as either actual or potential agents of external powers or as novices who do not comprehend what is in the national interests. Dualisms like Self and Other, internal and external, defence and danger permeate the dominant security discourse in India, of which the nuclear factor is an integral part. What dangers does India face and why? How should it ward off these dangers? Where does the nuclear factor fit in this matrix? The answers provided by the dominant security discourse in India help us to understand the political value of the nuclear factor in the country. The dominant discourse defines Indian identity in negative terms; namely, what it is not by referring to the Others (both internal and external) of India. These Others by implication become threats to the Indian identity. The methodology of discourse analysis enables us to situate the value of the discussion of threats in the dominant discourse as an integral aspect of the identity formation on a particular line in post-colonial India. The dominant security discourse maintains that India is threatened by external enemies. These enemies foment troubles within India to achieve their objectives. Therefore, internal dissent is no more than an extension of some 'foreign hand'. Pakistan emerges as the most dangerous of all threats because it strives to Balkanise India. The Chinese threat is also significant but is gradually receding into the background. The West also tries to undermine India through coercive diplomacy and other means. Since the list of threats to India as outlined by the proponents of the dominant security discourse is based upon binary opposites, the enemies of New Delhi are invariably blamed for problems that afflict the nation. This becomes obvious when we ask: what makes India the target of the above threats? Two themes emerge as answers to this question. First, regional adversaries are out to harm India because it is a secular, democratic state amid theocratic, obscurantist and totalitarian regimes. The innocence of India is patent and its secular and democratic credentials beyond doubt, whereas the adversaries are marred by a variety of the negative characteristics. Pakistan is relegated to a theocracy and China to a totalitarian state. Historical amnesia comes into play by turning a blind eye to counter-evidence that might undermine the claims that Indian secularism may be lacking in substance or New Delhi is at least partly responsible for infusing fear in its neighbours. Second, the West, especially the US, pressures India because of the latter's leadership of third world causes. That is why pressure on India in the wake of nuclear explosions is portrayed as a form of neo-colonialism. It is in the context of how to deal with the above threats that the nuclear issue crops up. In present-day India, the dominant security discourse equates keeping the nuclear option with an effective deterrent and a symbol of exercising sovereignty despite international pressures. Here it should be made clear that the present views on the nuclear weapons option are in marked contrast with Nehru-era policy on the nuclear issue. Nehru was firmly against this option and vowed that under no circumstances would India opt for nuclear weapons. The dominant security discourse is based upon the dictum of assigning an evil nature to the Other and considering the Self as a custodian of goodness. The lines between the external and internal become blurred in this narrative when domestic troubles are reduced to external intervention. In the name of secularism and democracy, an effort is made to create an India which suppresses, often violently, claims to other forms of identity. Externally, India is promoted as a genuine great power. If such an India instils fear among its smaller neighbours, especially Pakistan, the standard line is to dismiss such fears as the figments of imagination of paranoid neighbours.

**Our threats are real – regardless of our discourse, dominant Indian discourse portrays conflict as likely – even dissenters agree war is probable**

**Nizamani 98** (Haider K., Institute of International Relations at the University of British Columbia, “Limits of dissent: A comparative study of dissident voices in the nuclear discourse of Pakistan and India,” 1998, Contemporary South Asia, pg. 317-337, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09584939808719847)//PC

Counter-narratives in the Indian nuclear discourse do not read the scope and intent of nuclear programmes of India's adversaries in the same manner as the exponents of nukespeak. Consequently, their answers to the alleged adversaries' proposals to deal with the nuclear issue are also different from those offered by the custodians of the dominant discourse. Different perceptions viz-d-viz the nature of the Pakistani nuclear programme are a case in point where counter- narratives proceed from different conceptual grounds. The Pakistani programme is variously dubbed as part of the broader Islamic or Western designs to undermine India in the discourse of the Indian nukespeak, whereas dissidents see it primarily as an India-centred project guided solely by the notion of safeguarding Pakistan's national interests. Therefore, Pakistani nuclear policy is not independent of India. According to Praful Bidwai and Vanaik, 'Pakistan's programme has essentially been "dedicated", that is to say having a clear military purpose as its principal raison d'etre. It is reactive and indicative of obsession with the Indian threat'.45 This is diametrically opposed to Indian nukespeak with regard to the nature and direction of the Pakistani programme. Once Pakistan's programme is described primarily as a response to the Indian threat, it is all too obvious that the counter-narratives will question what is considered axiomatic about the Indian nuclear programme; namely, the peaceful nature of India's programme and the suggestion that Pakistan's nuclear ambi- tions developed independently of the Indian nuclear programme. Bidwai and Vanaik maintain that those in India who argue that Pakistan's nuclear ambitions are not conditioned by the Indian posture are making an implausible and unconvincing argument. For them, 'these arguments are also somewhat self- serving in that they tend to obscure India's responsibility as the key referent or pole in the South Asian nuclear arms race'.46 One may debate whether the nuclear situation in South Asia can technically be termed an arms race or not, but what is more important in the above characterisation is holding India responsible for the existing nature and direction of the nuclear interaction in the region. Demonising Pakistan is at the heart of the contemporary dominant security discourse in India and the counter-narratives seem to be cognisant of that feature. Examining this aspect in the writings of security analysts in India, Gautam Navlakha, a relatively less familiar name among nuclear dissidents, observes that 'portraying Pakistan as the main threat encourages chauvinistic groups to dictate policy by stopping sports and cultural exchanges because it is an enemy nation and anyone having link with it becomes suspect'.47 Such utterances invite the wrath of the likes of Subrahmanyam who sees most of India's domestic troubles as Pakistan's doings. Navlakha responds to that view by arguing that 'in India acceptance of the right of self-determination has been taken to mean the end of the Indian state rather than a way to rest it on democratic foundation'.48 The dominant discourse dismisses the demands for separate identities and decentra- lisation as the handiwork of few insurgents acting upon external instructions by asserting India is a genuinely democratic, secular and federal society. The counter-narratives call into question that whole edifice by casting a sympathetic look at the demands of various identity-based movements. Here the buck is not passed to alleged external enemies for instigating troubles in India, but New Delhi is held responsible for mishandling the contending demands of various groups.49 When the opponents' evil is not taken for granted, then one's goodness does not remain a given either. The dissidents do not see the Indian nuclear programme as peaceful as claimed by mandarins of the dominant discourse. Most dissenters agree that India's nuclear programme was entirely peaceful during the Nehru era but the same cannot be said of the post-Nehru period. And that is amply proved by fears that Vanaik and Bidwai expressed almost seven years ago; namely, 'the threshold country that is perhaps closest to crossing the threshold is India'.50 The reasons that propel India's nuclear ambitions are both internal and external politico-strategic considerations. Vanaik and Bidwai go to the extent of suggesting that the Pokhran test was aimed at deflecting attention away from the domestic troubles besetting the Indira Gandhi regime in 1974.51 Deshingkar also questions the peaceful nature of that test in light of the secrecy surrounding the event and the almost total absence of a governmental account of the reasons to opt for a nuclear explosion.52

# \*\*\*KOREA

# Korea War Reps Bad

**The construction of a distinction between north and South Korea only creates the pre-conditions for war and is the root cause of conflict**

**Bleiker 1** (Roland Bleiker, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, Australia, “Identity and security in Korea,” The Pacific Review, 2001, Volume 14, No. 1, pg. 121-148, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09512740010018589)//PC

In recent times, however, Korea has witnessed a series of historic diplo- matic breakthroughs. The inauguration of Kim Dae-jung as South Korea’s president in early 1998 has led to a new, more conciliatory and engaging Nordpolitik. In late 1999, the so-called Perry Report called for a funda- mental review of US policy towards Pyongyang, advocating a position that rests not only on military deterrence, but also on a ‘new, comprehensive and integrated approach’ to negotiations with North Korea (Perry 1999: 8). Pyongyang too has softened some of its policies, opening itself up to more business interactions with the outside world and revealing more flex- ibility in diplomatic negotiations – such that by June 1999 a historic summit meeting between the two heads of state – Kim Jong-il and Kim Dae-jung – became possible. The significance of this meeting cannot be overesti- mated. It was accompanied by a series of less spectacular but equally important cultural and economic events. Whether or not the planned results of the meeting – which include large-scale family reunions – can be fully implemented remains to be seen. The task of this essay is to place the recent breakthroughs in the context of the larger political patterns that have dominated the peninsula in the post-war period. Many deeply entrenched difficulties and security risks remain intact. While outright war no longer seems an imminent threat, a sudden escalation of tensions cannot be excluded. A more fundamental rethinking of security and ethics is thus necessary to overcome the current violent-prone political order. The essay argues that to recognize the existing problems and to iden- tify the tasks that lie ahead, it is necessary to scrutinize the security situ- ation on the Korean Peninsula not only in conventional ideological and geopolitical terms, but also, and primarily, as a question of identity. Much like Gregory Henderson’s classic Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (1968: 3) described the essence of Korean politics as revolving around a ‘physics of centralisation’, one could view identity as the key to understanding security on the peninsula. To be more precise, the present security dilemmas can be seen as emerging from a fundamental but largely ignored tension between the idea of Korean identity and its rather different prac- tical application. A strong, almost mythical vision of homogeneity perme- ates both parts of Korea. It portrays the division of the peninsula as a temporary disruption of Korean identity and assumes that unification will eventually recover the lost national unity (see Grinker 1998: 8–9). It is in this spirit that the official joint-press communiqué of the June 2000 summit declared unification a key priority (New York Times, 14 June 2000). Enforcing such trends is a strong cultural fear of the notion of outside- ness, of absolute otherness. This is why the other side of the divided penin- sula must be seen as part of a whole. Anything else would be too terrible, too evil a notion to contemplate. This is why North Korea ‘is quite liter- ally still family’ (see Alford 1999: 103–6). In contrast to this mythical homogeneity we find the reality of half a century of political division, during which the two Koreas have developed identities that are not only distinct, but also articulated in direct and stark opposition against each other. Over the years these antagonistic forms of identity have become so deeply entrenched in societal consciousness that the current politics of insecurity appears virtually inevitable. It is the tension between these two contradictory aspects of Korea politics – the strong myth of homogeneity and the actual reality of opposional iden- tity practices – that contains the key to understanding both the sources of the existing conflict and the potential for a more peaceful peninsula. To foreground identity is not to deny that security policies in divided Korea have been dominated by strategic and ideological motives. The point, rather, is to acknowledge that the ensuing dilemmas were, and still are, also part of a much deeper entrenched practice of defining security through a stark opposition between self and other. This mind-set, which defines security as a protection of the inside from the threat of a hostile outside, turns into a collective mind-set that greatly increases the risk of instability and violent encounters. The essay begins by illustrating how the construction of self and other has affected the security of Korean people – security as defined not only in terms of militarily perceived national defence, but also in the wider sense of guaranteeing stability, subsistence, dignity, basic human rights and freedom from fear. The main part of the essay then consists of exploring possibilities for the establishment of a more peaceful political climate on the peninsula. Despite recent progress in negotiations between North and South, the likelihood of a humanitarian catastrophe remains high as long as current North and South Korean notions of identity prevail. An alter- native to present insecurity politics would need to be based on a concept of justice that subsumes, at its core, a fundamentally different conception of the relationship between self and other. An articulation of an adequate security policy must revolve around combining the ongoing and encour- aging search for dialogue with a new and more radical willingness to accept that the other’s sense of identity and politics may be inherently incom- mensurable with one’s own.

**Identity between North and South Korea are based on arbitrary differences – this discourse only creates a self-fulfilling prophecy – US intervention empirically fails**

**Bleiker 1** (Roland Bleiker, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, Australia, “Identity and security in Korea,” The Pacific Review, 2001, Volume 14, No. 1, pg. 121-148, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09512740010018589)//PCIdentity and (in)security in Cold War Korea: a condensed history To explore the possibilities of translating recent breakthroughs into a sustained peace in Korea one must first engage the political discourses that have given rise to the existing conflict. As a result of Soviet–American rivalry at the end of the Second World War the Korean Peninsula was tentatively divided along the 38th parallel. With the creation of two polit- ically and ideologically separate Korean states in 1948, and their subse- quent confrontation during the Korean War, this supposedly provisional division became a permanent feature of Northeast Asia. Much of the ensuing conflict is based on identity constructs that portray the political system at the opposite side of the divided peninsula as threatening, perhaps even inherently evil. This phenomenon is all the more astonishing since the boundaries of identity in Korea are drawn not along ‘natural’ lines, such as race, ethnicity, language or religion. They are based above all on two artificially created and diametrically opposed ideological images of the world. Korea may have been particularly receptive to the external imposition of stark identity constructs. Embedded in an unusually homo- geneous cultural tradition, Korea opened relatively late to the world – in the second half of the nineteenth century – only to be absorbed into the Japanese Colonial empire, whose ruthless occupation strategy sought to eradicate Korean identity and assimilate the peninsula. Ideology, identity and inter-state violence The political vacuum that had existed after half a century of Japanese occupation may have provided an environment that facilitated the impo- sition of dualistic and antagonistic Cold War identity patterns. This does, of course, not mean that there had been no differences in Korea, or that ideology has eradicated all other sources of identity. Regional identities have always played a key role in politics on the peninsula, both before and after the Korean War. Moreover, Koreans derive their identity from a variety of sources. Depending on the situation, a person may, for instance, be identified primarily as a man or a woman, an elder or a youth, a manager or a peasant.1 These and many other forms of identification are carefully grammaticized in the Korean language, which possesses verb and noun suffixes that structurally force a speaker to identify specific hier- archy relationships in all verbal interactions. The Cold War has not erad- icated these aspects of Korean culture and politics. Rather, it has created a situation where one very specific, and largely externally imposed form of identification – an ideological one – has come to prevail over all others. Whereas gender, age, education or regional affiliation continue to be key factors in determining a person’s social status and possibilities, his/her ideological identification has literally turned into a matter of life and death, or at least freedom and imprisonment. It is in this context that the rivalry between the two Koreas has given rise to a highly volatile conflict zone. The Korean War claimed the lives of more than a million people and, almost half a century after the events, an estimated 10 million individuals are still separated from their families. Perhaps even more tragic, as Bruce Cumings (1997: 298) notes, is not even the war itself, for it could have solved – as many civil wars do – some of the political tensions that existed in Korea during the 1940s and early 1950s – tensions that were unusually high and linked to such issues as colonial legacies, foreign intervention and national division. The true tragedy, Cumings stresses, was ‘that the war solved nothing’, for all it did was to restore the status quo ante.2 The stage was now set for a volatile future. Each of the subsequent attempts to repress the Korean conflict through the conventional logic of military deterrence has turned out to be disas- trous. They have, in Moon Chung-in’s words (1996: 9), ‘driven North and South Korea into the trapping structure of a **vicious cycle of actions and reactions’**. The peninsula, as a result, was sucked into a very costly arms race that elevated levels of tensions to the point that the two divided sides have almost constantly been exposed to the spectre of violence. Examples abound: North Korea has committed what are said to be a dozen major terrorist attacks, from bombings of civilian airliners to tunnel and subma- rine infiltrations across the DMZ. South Korea stands accused of having violated the Armistice Agreement roughly 500,000 times (Moon 1996: 53). Its yearly joint military exercises with the US Army, entitled Team Spirit, have traditionally revolved around an unnecessarily aggressive northbound military scenario (Moon 1996: 68). The identity patterns that formed with the division of the peninsula and the subsequent Korean War are important for understanding the chal- lenges that lie ahead. Antagonistic identity constructs, born out of death, fear and longing for revenge, are continuously used to fuel and legitimize aggressive foreign and repressive domestic policies. Identity in Korea is essentially constructed in negative terms; that is, in direct opposition to the other side of the divided nation. What Cumings (1997: 140) wrote of the immediate post-war period remained valid for all of the post-war period, at least until very recently: not one good thing could be said about the leader on the other side of the dividing line. ‘To do so was to get a jail sentence.’ Look at a few examples of what Moon (1996: 71–2) calls ‘demonising images’. The North Korean press is full of derogative terms that describe the South Korean political system and its leaders. The concepts have changed over the years, but the dynamic remains the same. In the mid-1980s, for instance, the terminology used to describe South Korean presidents included honorific attributes such as ‘human butcher’, ‘rare human rubbish’, ‘chieftain of irregularities and corruption and human scum’ (KCNA, Jan./Feb. 1988). In more recent times, the preferred vocabulary has shifted towards terms like ‘warhawks’, ‘warmongers’, ‘fascists’, ‘imperialists’ and ‘reactionaries’ (KCNA, April/ May 2000). In South Korea too, negative identity constructs became entrenched in societal consciousness to the point that ‘for more than two decades after national partition, South Korean schoolchildren visually depicted North Koreans literally to be red-bodied demons with horns and long fingernails on their hairy, grabbing hands, as represented in anti- Communist posters’ (Choi 1993: 81). One does not need to be a trained psychologist to realize that children who grow up with such images and educational leitmotifs contribute to the dissemination of a societal self- awareness that is articulated through a stark opposition between inside and outside. Efforts have recently been made to dismantle at least some of these antagonistic images. Officers of the South Korean Armed Forces, for instance, are encouraged to introduce and employ military jargon that allows soldiers to distinguish between the evil North Korean system (the ‘main enemy’) and their innocent brothers and sisters in the north (the ‘anti-enemy’) (Defence White Paper 1998: 83). But deeply entrenched antagonistic identity constructs cannot be changed overnight. They persist in virtually all aspects of life. ‘In front of them all’ proclaims the much- heralded motto of the US and South Korean troops stationed in the Joint Security Area (Eighth US Army 2000). Perhaps even more telling is the fact that President Kim Dae-jung created a major political storm when he described Kim Jong-il, the North Korean leader, not in the usual nega- tive terms (as a brutal, insane, licentious and impetuous drunk and playboy), but as ‘a pragmatic leader with good judgement and knowledge’ (see Korea Herald, 8 May 2000). The vehemence of the public reaction demonstrates that the construction of an antagonistic ‘other’ is so pronounced and deeply embedded in the collective consciousness that, as several Korean commentators now admit, it is virtually impossible to advance objective assessments of the security situation on the peninsula (Choi 1998: 26).

**Constructions of North Korea as a threat is rooted in Cold War logic, are the root cause of military conflict, and justifies human rights violations**

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Ideology, identity and domestic repression While one can easily recognize how Korea’s politics of insecurity has trig- gered high military tensions in Northeast Asia, it is important to note that antagonistic identity constructs have also shaped the course of domestic politics. As in many other parts of the world, a perceived external threat is used to consolidate domestic power structures. It is not by accident that North and South Korea have one of the world’s worst human rights records. Various analysts do, indeed, detect a direct relationship between the creation of enemy images and efforts to suppress domestic dissent. Stephen Noerper (1998: 167–74), for instance, demonstrates how the production of military tension has been an essential component of Pyongyang’s ability to sustain itself externally and internally. In the South too, various military regimes have used the perception of a hostile North as a strategy to repress dissent and consolidate domestic power structures. The situation has improved with South Korea’s gradual transition to democracy, but the government still employs the notorious National Security Law to crack down on dissidents who show sympathy for the arch enemy in the North. Little does it matter, of course, that in the almost total absence of inter- actions between North and South, the construction of enemy images is based far more on fiction than on facts. Indeed, the practice of constructing a threatening other is greatly facilitated by the unusually hermetic demil- itarized zone that separates the two Koreas. There is no communication across the 38th parallel and neither North nor South Korean people have a realistic idea of how everyday life looks in the vilified other half. For decades the two regimes have shielded their populations from ‘subver- sive’ influences stemming from the other side. The consequences are mani- fold. The absence of cross-national knowledge and interaction, for instance, makes it possible for South Koreans to hate an abstract notion of an evil communist state without having to specify how they feel about the actual people who live on the other side of the 38th parallel (Grinker 1998: x). Cultures of insecurity, and the dualistic and antagonistic thinking patterns that sustain them, are, of course, not unique to Korea. They are part of a much deeper embedded practice of defining security in repres- sive ways. The Cold War was only one manifestation of such practices. A variety of theorists have drawn attention to what R. B. J. Walker (1986: 497) has identified as a key component of contemporary thinking about international politics: namely, a sharply dichotomized account of the relationship between the principle of identity and unity and the principle of difference or pluralism. Questions of identity, these scholars stress, are crucial to understand this dualistic construction of security, for ‘security cannot be severed from the claims of group and collective structures within which individuals find their identity and through which they undertake collective projects’.3

**Reunification still links – it is still entrenched in an underlying cold war logic and constructs the identity of North Korea**

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The conceptual and political limits of the soft-landing scenario Highly desirable as it may be, and successful as it has been in its initial phases, the soft-landing scenario is not without difficulties. Two particular challenges stand out. First, the policy of rapprochement has not addressed – yet alone overcome – the antagonistic identity constructs that have given rise to the conflict in the first place. Despite openings at various fronts, the underlying assumption, especially among South Korean and American policy-makers, remains that the North will gradually move towards a market-oriented economy, which will then facilitate a peaceful reintegra- tion of the peninsula. It is a scenario of a ‘contained collapse’, whose prime objective remains winning the war; that is, a way of conquering the North by means other than weapons. The tactical elements may seem more tolerant than that of the hard-line approach, but the fundamental strategic goal remains strikingly similar: to annihilate the arch enemy and its sense of identity (see Grinker 1998). Given the spectacular success of the recent summit meeting such an assessment seems harsh, perhaps even polemic. And yet, underneath the new politics of engagement linger more deeply entrenched residues of Cold War thinking patterns. The subsequent sections of this essay will substantiate in more detail how these patterns persist and why an engagement with them is necessary for the promotion of long-term peace and reconciliation on the peninsula.

**Their security discourse is the root cause of the problems they try to solve – the alternative solves proliferation and makes unification peaceful**

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Rethinking identity and difference To take recent progressive initiatives a step further and to deal adequately with present and future security threats in Korea, including a possible collapse of the North, a fundamental rethinking of identity and difference is required. This, in turn, precipitates an equally fundamental reassess- ment of what is and is not essential to understand the conflict on the Korean Peninsula. A focus on identity will de-emphasize some political issues hitherto perceived as central while moving other, more marginal, concerns to a prominent position. Among the issues that move to the background are diplomatic negotiations or debates about the ‘bomb’, which have so far preoccupied analysts of Korean security. This is not to say that they are not important, or that a possible military escalation should not be of the utmost concern. The point, rather, is that these dangers must be seen as symptoms, rather than causes. The nuclear threat, for instance, does not exist primarily because of proliferating weapons potential. It has emerged and persists only because the underlying polit- ical discourse has led the two Korean states into a situation in which conflict has become the modus operandi of political interactions. A rethinking of security must tap into and challenge this more funda- mental domain of politics. It must address issues of perception and iden- tity. It must confront the political discourses that have objectivized and legitimized the current culture of violence. From such a perspective, the principal ethical challenge in divided Korea consists of how to deal with the other and, once national unification has occurred, with the residues of deeply embedded identity constructs that are based on an antagonistic interaction between inside and outside. The ability to meet this challenge determines to a great extent the level of violence that will accompany intra-national relations and a possible unification process. By foregrounding issues of identity and difference, the essay now draws attention to two aspects that are crucial for the establishment of a more peaceful security situation in Korea. One has to do with the search for dialogue, with the need to develop commonalities across difference. The other revolves around accepting the incompatibilities that will always remain. Expressed in other words, the search for a proper solution to the problem of divided Korea must be based on a process that not only promotes dialogical interactions, but also recognizes the inevitable exis- tence of difference and alterity as an essential aspect of preventing violent encounters.

**Ethics are key to solve tensions and unification on the Korean peninsula – dialogue isn’t sufficient**

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Towards an ethics of difference Dialogue alone cannot solve the problem of divided nations. No matter how successful dialogical interactions between the opposing sides are, they will always have to deal with the remainder, with positions that cannot be subsumed into compromise or, perhaps, not even be apprehended from the vantage point of those who do not live and represent them. If current dialogical breakthroughs are not followed up by a more tolerant approach towards the fundamental values espoused by the other side, then progress will either stall or be accompanied by the constant spectre of a possible relapse into violence. Another form of ethics is necessary to deal with this problematic remainder – not an ethics of dialogue, but an ethics of accepting the other as other, of not subsuming her/him/it into one’s own positionality. The writings of Emmanuel Levinas can provide some guidance here. Much of the ethics of responsibility that he developed revolves around a refusal to encompass difference into the same. Responsibility is then a question of accepting alterity as that which it is, a position that may, by virtue of its unique underlying values, be incompatible with one’s own. Ethics becomes a matter of engaging the other in a way that avoids reliance on a totalizing view of the world. A central element of this strategy thus consists of developing a relationship to alterity that displays understanding of and respect for the other’s different identity performances.7 Even an eventual redrawing of political boundaries cannot simply erase the antagonistic identity constructs that have emerged and evolved during the five decades of Korean division. Differences between the two Koreas are too deeply rooted to be merged into one common form of identity, at least in the near future. One of the most symbolic manifestations of this factor is the fact that most North Korean defectors, despite being offered generous financial aid, job training and other assistance in the South, find it extremely hard to adapt to life in an environment that espouses very different values from the one in which they grew up. Many commentators now recognize that hostile identity practices are so deeply entrenched that Korea is simply not ready for unification. ‘We are not prepared to receive [our northern brethren], and they are not prepared for what they will find on the other side’ (Lee Sang Man, cited in Korea Herald, 24 April 2000). The consequences of this phenomenon are far- reaching, and can be seen in virtually all aspects of Korean security politics.

**Even if the aff wins solvency it's merely a band-aid fix, only the alternative can de-construct identities, that’s key to stability, unification, and solves the affirmative**

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In lieu of conclusion: security as a non-violent and disorderly relationship with difference? Korea defies conclusions. It is an open book, whose storyline has yet to be written to the end. Whether peace or conflict will prevail is to a great extent dependent on the mind-sets that will guide not only future deci- sion-makers, but also the respective societies at large. Despite deeply entrenched Cold War patterns, recent events have given rise for hope. More tolerant South Korean and US approaches, coupled with signs of opening emanating from Pyongyang, have led to a more dialogical environment and to what is the most significant symbolic break- through since the Korean War: a summit meeting between the two Korean heads of state. While some progress has been achieved, the tasks that lie ahead are gargantuan. Past events have shown that a sudden increase in tension, and a possible military confrontation on the peninsula, cannot be entirely excluded. More importantly, perhaps, is the spectre of a possible collapse of the North Korean regime. Although the soft-landing scenario is geared towards pre-empting such a destabilizing event, a collapse scenario remains a possibility and should thus be a central concern for both scholars and policy-makers. Indeed, the chances of a collapse may well increase if the summit meeting of June 2000 is, as expected, leading towards more daily interactions between the divided sides. The conse- quences are potentially disastrous: a German-style unification resulting from a rapid disintegration of the North could easily trigger a civil war or a refugee crisis – in short, a complex emergency that may engender a ‘humanitarian intervention’ which could destabilize far more than just the Northeast Asian region.9 The responsibility to restore order would then most likely lie with the US and South Korean armed forces – insti- tutions that have the power to deal with such a crisis, but are in many ways ill-equipped to take on humanitarian tasks. Of course, conducting humanitarian and wartime operations simultaneously is, as Scott Snyder (1998a: 43) stresses, always a highly problematic endeavour. The US and South Korean armed forces are institutions that have been built and trained to fight and destroy, rather than to help and heal. Indeed, they are the very phenomena that institutionally epitomize the antagonistic identity constructs which have given rise to the conflict in the first place. The security situation on the Korean Peninsula will remain volatile as long as current identity constructs continue to guide policy formation. A soft-landing approach may well be the most reasonable and desirable scenario, but it can only unfold and develop to its fullest potential once it incorporates, in a central manner, issues of identity and difference. This process starts with recognizing that identities are constructed, and that these constructs constitute key elements of the security situation on the peninsula. Needed, then, is a move away from the widespread essentialist tendency to ground policy in an understanding of North Korea ‘as it is’ (see, for instance, Choi 1999: 2). The Perry Report is a case in point: it recommends that the US should deal with North Korea ‘as it is, not as we might wish it to be’. It advocates a ‘realist view [of North Korea], a hard-headed understanding of military realities’ (Perry 1999: 5, 12). But, of course, there is no such thing as a ‘reality’ on the Korean Peninsula. There has been far too much destruction and antagonistic rhetoric to allow for judgements that are even remotely objective. Earlier sections of this essay have pointed out how decades of media representations have consti- tuted North Korea as a ‘rogue state’. As a result, signs of compromise and dialogue that diverged from the expected pattern of hostility and aggression were – with notable exceptions – often neither reported in the press nor appreciated by policy-makers.

# \*\*\*OCULARCENTRISM

# Ocularcentrism Bad

**Visual metaphors alter our epistemological orientation to be violent and exclusionary to others**

**Hibbits 94** (Bernard professor at the university of Pittsburgh school of law “Making sense of metaphors” <http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/meta_int.htm>)

A string of recent articles and books has stressed that metaphors are commonplace in law.33 The multiple visual and aural metaphors with which I began this Article help to create and sustain what has imaginatively been described as "a magical world . . . where liens float, corporations reside, minds hold meetings, and promises run with the land."34 To say that jurisprudential metaphors exist and even flourish is not, however, to say that they have been uniformly welcomed, even by the most creative lawyers and jurists. In the eighteenth century, England's Lord Mansfield commented that "nothing in law is so apt to mislead than a metaphor."35 In the early years of this century, Yale legal theorist Wesley Hohfeld agreed.36 In 1926, Benjamin Cardozo was willing to tolerate metaphors in law, but held that they had "to be narrowly watched, for starting out as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it."37 [1.4] As we have come to appreciate that metaphor is omnipresent, we have come to take it very seriously.38 Today, few would dismiss it as mere semantic decoration, ornament, or rhetorical device. Some scholars have indeed gone so far in the other direction as to suggest that metaphors are fundamental tools of thought and reasoning-so much a part of the deep structure of our mentality that "our ordinary conceptual system . . . is . . . metaphorical in nature."39 [1.5] As an aspect of our mentality's deep structure, our metaphors can reveal a great deal about us, both as individuals and as members of a broader culture. I may use a certain metaphor because I am, or at least my culture is, familiar with the metaphor's subject matter. Coming readily to my mind as a pole of comparison, the metaphor will be meaningful to others sharing similar life experiences or backgrounds. For example, using the metaphoric expression "I struck out" to communicate failure suggests a personal and/ or cultural familiarity with baseball. Alternatively, I may use a particular metaphor because I and/or my society value or devalue its subject; using the metaphor can therefore accentuate positive or negative reaction to the metaphor's referent. For instance, were I a libertarian, or were I living in a libertarian culture, I might label government a "parasite." My choice of metaphor would not only communicate my dislike of government, but, by association, my dislike of parasites as well. [1.6] "Modal" metaphors of the sort examined in this Article can be particularly revealing of our circumstances and values. Modal metaphors directly or indirectly evoke specific modes or forms of human sensory experience: sight, sound, touch, smell, or taste. For example, if I call an attitude an "outlook," I am using a modal metaphor evoking visual experience. Alternatively, if I speak of the "texture" of an argument, I am using a modal metaphor evoking tactile experience. Over time, individuals may develop or demonstrate a penchant for modal metaphors favoring a particular sense. Far from being arbitrary, such a penchant may (as we shall see) reflect a broad cultural bias for that sense, an association with a group which in a specific historical or social context has indulged or has been forced to privilege that sense, and/or an inclination towards values which that sense has been deemed to phenomenologically support or promote. [1.7] Ironically, we may reveal more of ourselves by our general and our modal metaphors than by statements and sayings that are the products of more calculated deliberation. Insofar as metaphors are privy to our most profound thoughts and experiences, they may tap into cultural or personal truths of which we are not at first aware, and into notions of which we may not even approve. Calling a mental crisis a nervous "breakdown" may unwittingly manifest a modern tendency to regard the mind as a machine;40 calling an African American football player "a little monkey" may unwittingly manifest racism.41 In this context, metaphors operate as the "sonar" of our minds, revealing deeply submerged-but nonetheless fundamental-realities that we cannot or will not consciously acknowledge. [1.8] As an integral part of our mentality, metaphors can also shape our thoughts and even our actions.42 Calling chess a battle (or hearing someone else call it a battle) certainly encourages me to conceive of it, however inaccurately, as a harsh, even potentially violent confrontation between grim-faced opponents. The psychological impact of the metaphor may be all the more powerful if I have had little or no previous experience with the game. The way I think about chess may in turn affect my behavior. In light of the metaphor, maybe I will decide to play, or maybe I will choose to do something less aggressive. If I do choose to play, the metaphor I used or heard might well influence how I play. For instance, if chess is a battle, an intimidating, combative strategy may seem appropriate. If the "battle" metaphor becomes popular, an entire culture may be led to the same conclusion, and play chess accordingly. [1.9] Modal metaphors can have an especially strong impact on how we think and what we do. If, for example, I call "thought" itself "reflection," I am figuratively characterizing thought as a visual enterprise. Insofar as reflection literally presumes a visual subject, the metaphor may subtly encourage thinkers to believe that they should look for intellectual stimulation, rather than listen for it; in other words, the metaphor may affect their epistemological orientation. The same visual metaphor may alternatively imply that only individuals from visually biased backgrounds can properly engage in thought, prompting individuals from other traditions that prize other senses to be dismissed (or not to regard themselves) as legitimate or competent participants in intellectual inquiry. In this context, the "casual" choice of a "simple" metaphor may have profoundly divisive social implications. Describing thought as "reflection" may even induce thinkers to behave in a manner considered appropriate to a visual process: for example, the metaphor may suggest that thinkers should passively watch the world, rather than become actively engaged with it.

**That makes exclusion inevitable**

**Bagenstos 2k** (Samuel, professor of law at the university of Michigan “Subordination, Stigma, and Disability” <http://tinyurl.com/bsjqxqj>)

The historic exclusion of people with disabilities from “normal” society has interacted in complex and reciprocal ways with broader ideological currents. Lennard Davis has argued that the notion of “norms” dates only to the development of a science of statistics in the early nineteenth century. 175 Until then, Davis contends, the place now occupied by the “norm” was held by the notion of an “ideal,” which was understood to be unattainable by any human. 176 But the newfound “concept of a norm, unlike that of an ideal, implie[d] that the majority of the population must or should somehow be part of the norm.” 177 Early statisticians made this point expressly: They argued that social institutions should be built around the broad middle group of persons who fit the social norm. 178 As Davis demonstrates, their arguments both provided justification for, and drew strength from, an ideology that accorded a morally privileged position to the middle class. 179 More darkly, they fed the eugenic ideology that led to the institutionalization and sterilization of many people whom we now label “disabled.” 180 The nineteenth-century notion that institutions should be designed for the “norm” persists. But our vision of “normal” human attributes has become increasingly idealized, as the eugenics movement (which sought “to norm the nonstandard” 181 ) may have been the first to demonstrate. Rob Imrie’s account of modernist architecture points out the effect that such an ideology of the “norm” has had on our built environment. In seeking to make form follow function, and to “tie buildings back to the scale of the human being,” modernists harbored a particularly able-bodied vision of who “the human being” was. 182 Imrie illustrates this vision by pointing to Le Corbusier’s “Modular,” which “utilized the proportions of the (able) body to enable the architect to create the built spaces.” 183 The “Modular,” a diagram of a muscular six-foot tall man, was “the person for whom functionality in building design and form was being defined.” 184 Many inaccessible features of today’s buildings, Imrie argues, trace directly to modernism’s exclusion of people with disabilities from its idealized version of the “norm.” 18 As we move to a new millennium, we seem to believe as strongly as ever that everyone should fit an “ideal” body type. Although there are surely a variety of reasons for this development, the most notable are a consumer/advertising culture that idealizes beauty and a widespread belief in the ability of modern medicine to enhance our mental and physical lives. 186 As a result, the ideological currents that exclude people with disabilities from our notion of the “norm” stubbornly remain with us. The stigma attached to “disability” thus both represents the legacy of a history of exclusion and reflects a series of broader ideological developments. Whatever the underlying reason for its persistence, however, that stigma can help us to understand the means by which disability-based subordination is transmitted. More importantly, stigma can serve an evidentiary function: It can help us identify cases where impairments are likely to be associated with systematic deprivation of opportunities. Seen in this light, the “disability” category embraces those people who experience impairment-based stigma—that is, those people who, because of present, past, or perceived impairments, are considered by society to be outside of the “norm.” As Carol Gill puts it, “disability is a marginalized status that society assigns to people who are different enough from majority cultural standards to be judged abnormal or defective in mind or body.” 187 Although I would argue that stigma identifies and explains—but does not necessarily define—disabilitybased subordination, Gill’s analysis substantially overlaps my own. In this view, “disability” is a group status, but it is not one defined by anything inherent in the members of the group. Rather, the attitudes and practices that exclude people with “disabilities” from many opportunities to participate in society are the very ones that create the “disability” category. Although individuals em- braced by the category have vastly different impairments and limitations (indeed, some have no impairment or limitation at all), what is crucial is that society treats them as essentially similar. 188 In Wendell’s words, “[w]idespread perceptions that people with disabilities are similar in very significant ways create the category, ‘people with disabilities.’” 189 The widespread acts of “discrimination, segregation, and denial of equal opportunity” directed at people with disabilities have effectively marked that group as a “dependent caste.” 190

# Ocularcentrism Bad – Gender Impact

**Overly rationalized understandings of sight reinforce gender binaries**

**Urano, 10** Dr Kaoru Urano. PhD from Durham University. “Virginia Woolf ’s Refutation of Ocularcentrism: The Eyelessness in the Moment of Being” Journal of the Ochanomizu University English Society. [http://teapot.lib.ocha.ac.jp/ocha/bitstream/10083/49639/1/02\_5-15.pdf Accessed 7/17/12](http://teapot.lib.ocha.ac.jp/ocha/bitstream/10083/49639/1/02_5-15.pdf%20Accessed%207/17/12) BJM

 Western culture has a long tradition of privileging sight as the noblest sense since as early as the writing of Plato, but it is particularly with Cartesian dualism that the closest association of sight and the mind emerged. 4 Broadly speaking, Descartes needed to emphasize the mind’s superiority over the body in order to establish a system of objective knowledge, and it is under this impulse that he advanced his peculiar model of the eye under the perfect control of the mind. In Optics (1637) he proposes an experiment to see how vision works, and it lucidly shows his effort to eliminate physical factors from human sight (Descartes 166-67). According to Descartes, first, one takes the eye of a newly dead person, or failing that, of an ox or some other large animal, and replaces the membranes with some white material thin enough to let light pass through such as a piece of paper or an egg-shell. If one puts this eye in the hole of a specially made board facing various objects and looks at the white material, one finds there a picture of those objects. Descartes claims that this is quite the same as what actually happens in the eye of a living person, but it should be admitted, the eye here is “a disembodied cyclopean eye detached from the observer, possibly not even a human eye” (Crary 47). 5 Furthermore, it is not the physical eye but the mind of the viewer that sees the objects: “it is the soul which sees, and not the eye; and it does not see directly, but only by the means of the brain” (Descartes 172). The brain and the nerves are thought to be impediments thrust between the world and the rational mind. They sometimes deceive the latter with physical disorders, for if there were just the mind and the eye as a lens, we might always arrive at objective knowledge of the world. Jonathan Crary finds an analogy between this Cartesian eye and camera obscura, a major optical device of the period, which is “a precarious figurative resolution” (41) of the problem of the seventeenth century philosophy—how to establish the objective knowledge of the world. The mechanism of a camera obscura, to cut off the subject from the object and to turn visual experience into a disembodied act in control of the mind, fully corresponds with what Descartes tried to do with his optical model (25-66). Elizabeth Ermarth also sees the Cartesian eye as an expression of the age’s impulse to rationalize sight, rather than a unique idea of his own: Renaissance laws of perspective as a cultural consensus finds “its philosophical analogues in Cartesian epistemology” (5). 6 The last century saw a gradual erosion of the dominance of Cartesian dualism, and feminist critics began to attack the erasure of the body from his philosophy as the sign of a flight from the feminine and towards a masculinized, objectivist system of knowledge. 7 Cartesian ocularcentrism—a mode of seeing in order to offer a rational understanding of the world—was also exposed to criticism in this feminist context. As Laura Mulvey’s classic essay “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” stands as an exemplary argument, from the mid-1970s to mid-80s feminists defined the act of seeing as an area of male dominance. 8 Mulvey’s view of society is essentially Freudian: it requires a constant renewal of the castrated woman in order to stabilize patriarchal orders and meanings. Hence the “male gaze” is ubiquitous, turning the female body into an object of gaze to serve the male subject (Amelia Jones 44-53). What is not entirely satisfactory about this theorization of the gaze in this period is that, by emphasizing the power of the masculine gaze and the sacrifice that women pay to sustain it, it carries a danger of strengthening the same gender dichotomy that it attacks. 9 In other words, as long as one thinks about the eye as an organ in the service of the mind, one cannot be freed from the almost obsessive notion that the subject is formed by the Other’s gaze. This negative conception of vision is not only a specialty of feminism, but prevalent in the twentieth century philosophy—from Jean-Paul Sartre’s violent disgust for the illusions of sight (which seems to be assimilated by Simone de Beauvoir, too) to Michael Foucault’s theory of panoptic gaze as the locus of power, for example. Rethinking sight as a physical act has a possibility to grow out of this wholesale denigration of vision in the twentieth century. 10 In my view, the eyeless sensation in Virginia Woolf can be regarded as one innovative attempt to break through the mindeye connection whose origin can be traced back to Descartes’s optical model. She describes vision not as a location of the mind’s work but as a physical perception, merging it with other bodily sensations to the extent that they become inseparable from one another, and by doing so, tries to register the knowledge and experience which would slip through the net of a masculinized language.

# Ocularcentrism Good

**Turn- focusing on visual metaphors causes us to be more exclusionary**

**Hibbits 94** (Bernard professor at the university of Pittsburgh school of law “Making sense of metaphors” http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/meta\_int.htm)

Apart from what is likely to happen, one might argue that a complete shift from visual to aural figures of legal speech in American legal discourse would be inadvisable, even for those persons who have thus far gained or been empowered by the increased popularity of aural legal metaphors. In the guise of liberating and validating the relatively more aural experiences of individuals from traditionally marginalized American gender, racial, ethnic, and religious groups, such a transformation might ironically do much to legitimate and validate the circumstances of their marginalization. For instance, when feminist legal scholars embrace aural metaphors such as "dialogue" and "conversation," are they not coining a legal language in large part born of the very conditions of subordination and oppression that they seek to challenge and change? Do not their words-for all their obvious appeal-at some level accept and endorse the sensory limitations that others (in this instance, men) have traditionally imposed on them?716 In this context, the true liberation of individuals from marginalized backgrounds arguably requires that they not arbitrarily limit themselves to-or preemptively define themselves by-aural metaphors that others have in some sense chosen for them.717 [c.5] Undue reliance on aural metaphors might even distance outsider legal theorists from other important aspects of their own cultural histories and experiences. No human culture-however constituted-is ever completely visual or aural, and we all run the risk of misunderstanding and distorting ourselves if we try to redefine the world-or law-along a single sensory line. Here, the historical experience of male, white, Anglo, and Protestant Americans may serve as both a lesson and a warning: in allowing themselves to have been drawn so strongly to visuality, many individuals from these backgrounds have largely forgotten or failed to appreciate the not-insignificant degrees of aurality inherent in their own traditions-an aurality which they are only now rediscovering in an increasingly aural age. Their extreme indulgence of the visual has thus come at a critical cost not only to others, but to themselves.

# \*\*\*POVERTY

# Poverty Reps Bad

**Media representations of poverty are gross oversimplifications that turn any possibility of combating those conditions**

**Tester, 01** Keith Tester is Professor of Sociology at the University of Hull in England and Professor of Sociology at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, Korea. He is the author of numerous books, including the prize-winning Animals and Society: The Humanity of Animal Rights (1991), Civil Society (1992), Media, Culture, and Morality (1994), Moral Culture (1997), and Compassion, Morality, and the Media (2001). “Compassion, Morality, and the Media,” [http://ftp.mcgraw-hill.co.uk/openup/chapters/0335205135.pdf Accessed 7/8/12](http://ftp.mcgraw-hill.co.uk/openup/chapters/0335205135.pdf%20Accessed%207/8/12) BJM

For Finkielkraut, ‘public indifference can no longer be attributed to ignorance as it once could’ (Finkielkraut 1998: 141). This means that it is impossible to uphold ideals about the essential moral goodness of humanity and of individual people. After all, if we were good and kindly as some Enlightenment moral narratives suggest, we would not be able to know about the famines with such equanimity. But we do know and we do not feel ourselves to be overly stirred into action. Consequently, Finkielkraut felt that it was appropriate to make the general statement that, ‘The more suffering that people see on their TV screens, the less concerned they feel. Current events demobilize them; images kill the feeling of obligation within them’. He went on to claim that, ‘The public is blasé: news reports fail to take their audience beyond the realm of everyday experience, and they insinuate the most monstrous realities into the everyday by marking them with the stamp of dejavu’ (Finkielkraut 1998: 141). In all, Finkielkraut believes that, ‘public indifference is now the result of habit’ and that, ‘In order to break public opinion of this habit, one is almost naturally led to up the ante. Famine attains the status of genocide, and the West’s responsibility for the Third World’s delayed development becomes the West’s extermination of Third World peoples’ (Finkielkraut 1998: 141, original emphasis. Finkielkraut’s book was originally published in France in 1982. It is therefore worth reading alongside some of the points that are made in Baudrillard 1994. Baudrillard’s book was ﬁrst published in France in 1992). A comparable position has been hinted at by Zygmunt Bauman in a couple of sentences that are not really developed in his book Postmodern Ethics (Bauman 1993). There, he mentions an idea of the telecity which draws on the Simmelian theme of the status of the stranger in the modern metropolis (see the essay on ‘The Stranger’ in Simmel 1950). According to Simmel, of course, the stranger who is perpetually encountered in the spaces and places of the metropolis tends to be dealt with through strategies of avoidance and disengagement. For Simmel, precisely because the stranger is unknown, the individual attempts to make sense of this mysterious presence by a turning away from social relationships. Bauman follows this lead when he says that strangers are now also represented by television and that yet, in that representation, they lose their embodied presence and in so doing they lose their moral integrity. They become something other than fully and experientially properly human. He says that, ‘The strangers (the surfaces of strangers) whom the televiewer confronts are “telemediated”. There is, comfortingly, a glass screen to which their lives are conﬁned’. Bauman goes on: ‘the reduction of their existential mode to pure surface is now, at long last, tangibly obvious, indubitable, technologically guaranteed’ (Bauman 1993: 177–8). Television thus achieves what the city could not. Whereas the stranger in the city retains and remains a physical and material presence, according to Bauman the stranger in the telecity is ﬂattened out so that her or his presence to the viewer is without any great substance. It is clear from the tone of the passages from Bauman that, for him, the telecity (the television as the agent of the imagination of a universal city of strangers) is of enormous consequence for moral relationships and ties between the viewers and the people on the screen. This is obvious from his comment about strangers become surfaces. The inhabitants of his telecity are disembodied and disindividuated; instead they are aestheticized (they are represented as surfaces) that are denied a moral compulsion precisely because they lack any deep integrity or objectivity. For Bauman then, the telecity symbolizes the replacement of the moral by the aesthetic to such an extent that it becomes reasonable to question whether it remains valid to talk about morality in this particular ﬁeld. But when he reaches that kind of conclusion, Bauman turns the debate about the compulsion of television for moral relationships to the discourse of pleasure. As he puts it: ‘In the telecity, the others appear solely as objects of enjoyment, no strings attached . . . Offering amusement is their only right to exist – and a right which it is up to them to conﬁrm ever anew, with each successive “switching on” ’ (Bauman 1993: 178). As such, even though Bauman gestures towards crucially important themes and concerns, his own treatment of the relationship between television and morality ultimately turns away from the problem of moral relationships. Of course, for Bauman, that is exactly the issue at hand; the seemingly decisive conquest of the moral by the aesthetic, of responsibility by fun. What is clear, however, is the point of connection between Bauman and Alain Finkielkraut. They both assume that the suffering other will be overwhelmingly morally compelling to any and every audience only insofar as that other is possessed of a material solidity. When that solidity is absent – as it necessarily must be when the other is present only through representation – moral status is thrown into doubt and there emerges for the audience the pressing problem of what this means. Doubt and uncertainty replace the certainty and conﬁdence which would presumably prevail when and where the other is possessed of a material dimension and integrity. For Finkielkraut the result is that the audience is thrown back into its habitual modes of viewing when it is confronted with uncertainty, while for Bauman the result is that the audience demands to be entertained and amused if the others are going to be able to command anything approaching a second glance or thought (and even then, that ability is dependent upon there being nothing more entertaining on another channel or on the next page). Yet in subsequent comments, Bauman has put a question mark against the ability of representations and reports of suffering and misery to be entertaining even on their own limited terms. He has done this by emphasizing the problem of global poverty (and therefore the comparison and connection of Bauman with Finkielkraut is given more validity) and by drawing on some comments by the Polish commentator Ryszard Kapuscinski. He points to three areas of concern. First, Bauman says that it is no coincidence that reports of famines come from those parts of the world which we also tend to associate with the once rapidly growing economies of the ‘Asian tigers’. According to Bauman, the audience is left to reach the conclusion that starvation and misery are not inevitable in any part of the world and, therefore, that the suffering must be the fault of the victims in some mysterious yet no doubt decisive manner. The success stories of some Asian economies ‘are assumed to demonstrate what was to be proved – that the sorry plight of the hungry and indolent is their sui generis choice: alternatives are available, and within reach – but not taken for the lack of industry or resolve’. He concludes that, ‘the underlying message is that the poor themselves bear responsibility for their fate’ (Bauman 1998a: 73). What this comment seems to miss, however, is the fact that many reports of famine come from Africa. But the general thrust of Bauman’s comment remains valid. Africa is invariably presented as a place of endemic and persistent pain and suffering. Therefore, instead of poverty being the fault of the victims, the message is that it is simply the way that things are. It becomes their unalterable fate. Second, ‘the news is so scripted and edited as to reduce the problem of poverty and deprivation to the question of hunger alone’ (Bauman 1998a: 73). The point here is that, for Bauman and Kapuscinski alike, the reduction of poverty to hunger represents a gross oversimpliﬁcation of a complex and multidimensional condition. For them both, poverty is about much more than hunger and starvation and to pretend otherwise is to reduce the issue of global poverty to a straightforward issue which needs to be addressed only when the problem arises. In other words, Western audiences are able to forget about whole swathes of the world so long as they are not seen or known to be experiencing famine. This is because the equation of poverty with hunger means that where there is not hunger neither can there be poverty. Third, Bauman uses Kapuscinski to suggest that the media coverage of famine, misery and suffering serves to isolate the world of the audience from the world in which it seems that violence and brutality run amok. He says that the media create the world ‘out there’ as a problem from which the world ‘in here’ has to be isolated and kept apart. Consequently, ‘A synthetic image of the self-inﬂicted brutality sediments in public consciousness – an image of . . . an alien, subhuman world beyond ethics and beyond salvation’. Bauman says that this ‘synthetic image’ allows audiences to believe that, ‘Attempts to save that world from the worst consequences of its own brutality may bring only momentary effects and are bound in the long run to fail’. The reports and representations teach that the world ‘out there’ is literally and metaphorically hopeless. Indeed, Bauman says that for the audience, the major problem becomes one of how to make sure that the prosecutors of brutality are kept ﬁrmly in the ‘out there’ that is marked by violence and want, in contradistinction to the ‘in here’ which is purportedly marked by ethics and hope (Bauman 1998: 75–6). From Finkielkraut and Bauman the conclusion seems to be obvious. There might not be anything which will be able to snap the audience out of its deep and well-learned torpor and boredom, and some of the scenes might be so commonplace that they are scarcely noticed. The implication seems to be that nothing terribly much matters, and nothing matters of its own account, on its own terms.

# \*\*\*RUSSIA

# Russia Threat Reps Good

**Constructing Russia as a threat is necessary – censoring Russia threat discourse leaves us unprepared to respond**

**Nyquist, 12** – Jeffrey, President of the Strategic Crisis Center and Distinguished Senior Fellow in Political Science at the Inter-American Institute (“Enemies in the East: An Interview with Anca-Maria Cernea,” The Inter-American Institute, 3/29/12, http://www.theinteramerican.org/commentary/358-enemies-in-the-east-an-interview-with-anca-maria-cernea.html)RK

**\*\*\*cites Anca-Maria Cernea, Romanian analyst and writer**

But how could this be? The 1989 Revolution supposedly brought down the Communist system. How could the Communist elite continue to keep control of the country’s key assets? Cernea explained that there was a genuine anti-Communist revolution: “But there was also a coup d’état organized by people of the regime who were taking their orders from Moscow. The Soviets had their agents in the Romanian Communist Party and in Securitate [the secret police]; Ceausescu was aware of their existence, he was keeping them under control, but his position towards the USSR didn’t allow him to eliminate those people.” Cernea believes the Soviets helped prepare some of the changes in Eastern Europe in 1989, with the following stipulation: “When I say ‘the Soviets were preparing’ I don’t mean that all of the changes that took place in 1989 were 100 percent KGB manipulation. I mean that the Soviets were aware of the failure of their system long before 1989, and were working on projects that would allow them to keep, or even increase their power by changing their appearance through glasnost/perestroika and by giving up certain less important aspects of their control over the region – like Marxist ideology and centralized economy. I think their plans succeeded in great part, but not completely.” The national security implications of Cernea’s analysis should not be passed over, especially considering the present rulers of Russia, the ongoing modernization of the Russian armed forces, and Russia’s alliance with Iran. One might be tempted to ask if Romania is a reliable NATO partner. According to Cernea, “As long as Băsescu is president of Romania, I am sure there is no doubt about our commitment to the alliance with the U.S. and Israel. On the contrary, as I see the situation now, it’s rather a problem for us and for Băsescu that the United States are less and less interested in Eastern Europe and that we can’t count on our American allies to protect us against the Russians. It’s rather you Americans that will decide if Romania will stay in the Free World or will be taken back under Russian domination – if let’s say Băsescu has an accident, or is removed from power by some other means.” Is Cernea suggesting that Russia could retake Romania? “Romanian people are traditionally hostile to Russians,” she explained. “This is a thing deeply rooted in our culture and mentalities and it's much older than Communism. The Communist experience has only strengthened this hostility to an unprecedented degree. Iliescu himself had to disguise his attachment to Russia, however difficult it was for him to do so.” It is not a question of the Romanian people going over to Russia. It is a question of whether the Romanian people can retain their freedom under an oligarchy that doesn’t believe in rule of law, and secretly supports Moscow. “In my opinion,” Cernea concluded, “NATO is indeed undermined, by many things. The fact that former Communist countries, with their former Communist armies and secret services are now members of NATO is just one of the risks; it’s a real risk, but it’s not the most important, and it can be dealt with – and should be, of course. But the Western armies and secret services are probably infiltrated too. The most serious problem is not even that; it’s the fact that **NATO seems to have no real political will, no realistic plan, no effective decision-making, no leadership.** NATO looks more and more like OSCE, or the UN; it is just another place for debate, similar to so many other international organizations. It doesn’t act like a military alliance, committed to defend its values against **real, clearly defined enemies**.” Cernea is correct, and there is more that could be said. The West has lost its way. **We no longer properly identify our enemies. We no longer prepare for war with Russia – our main enemy.** It seems that America’s armaments exist only to deal with weak threats – like the Taliban, Iran or North Korea. A large and powerful foe, like Russia, cannot be spoken of as a threat. Such an admission would be a scandal. We seek amelioration and peace at every turn. America’s policy is a strange combination of appeasement and presumption. Sad to say, everything may be lost if we ignore words of warning from those who are fighting against Russian tyranny – in Romania, Poland, Ukraine, and other countries. **Communism is not dead.** We only have to look at American politics to see this.

**That destroys NATO and cedes Europe to Russian control**

**Nyquist, 11** – Jeffrey, President of the Strategic Crisis Center and Distinguished Senior Fellow in Political Science at the Inter-American Institute(“Russia’s Disruptive Role,” Financial Sense Online, 8/1/11, http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/jr-nyquist/2011/08/01/russia-disruptive-role)RK

On Sunday I spoke with Polish journalist Tomasz Pompowski, who wanted to give me an update on events in Europe. The picture he painted was not entirely pleasant. Russia, he said, was promoting economic and political instability. Russia’s role is not generally understood, he explained, but “whenever you look behind a little, you see the Russians. You see former KGB people.” The game appears to involve businesses, including media businesses – but especially the energy business. The Russians make a great deal of money by exporting gas and oil. It also appears they have a special strategy for dealing with their competition. “The peaceful siesta after the collapse of the Berlin Wall was deceptive,” said Pompowski. The Russians, he explained, made use of the Arab world in order to cause problems and play games with future energy prices. “If you talk to KGB dissidents,” he said, “they will tell you that the most important research department in the KGB was that devoted to Arabic language, culture and Islam, going back since before the invasion of Afghanistan.” The Arabs and the Iranian Muslims control a very considerable part of global energy production. If trouble can be stirred up within these countries, or between countries, then Russia will get more money for its energy exports. For example, the political destabilization of Saudi Arabia could be very profitable for Russia. At present, encouraging Iranian nuclear ambitions, with the attending sanctions on Iran, may also lead to higher Russian profits. Russia is also making economic moves into Europe and Israel. “Russian tycoons are buying up the Israeli media,” he said. “Meanwhile, Rupert Murdoch is under attack just as he was starting to invest in Eastern Europe.” Pompowski pointed to the fact that Murdoch’s rival in the United Kingdom is “former” Soviet KGB officer Alexander Lebedev, who owns the Evening Standard and is buying Murdoch’s News of the World which was closed down three weeks ago in the wake of a scandal in which News of the World was found by British police to have hacked the phone calls of nearly 4,000 people, including members of the Royal family. “Look at that,” said Pompowski. When I asked Pompowski why the Russian operatives would block Murdoch in Eastern Europe while taking over his outlets in Britain, he explained: “I believe Moscow has to put down the alternative voices.” Why would this be necessary? Moscow is trying to split off Europe from America through the agency of anti-American active measures. Murdoch’s media outlets represent an obstacle to such an effort. “The late Gen. Odom believed that the Soviet Union transformed itself into these different entities,” noted Pompowski. “Now the NATO states have to understand this new complex of power, and they must take notice.” The danger, said Pompowski, is that Russia may “damage and destabilize the structures established after the Second World War, which were part of the Western security system.” The official Russian policy is to create a new “security architecture for Europe.” This translates as Europe without NATO – that is to say, Europe dominated by Russia.

**Collapse of NATO causes immediate instability that escalates to superpower nuclear war**

John **O'Sullivan**, editor of the National Review and founder of the New Atlantic, 6-19**98** [American Spectator]

Some of those ideas--notably, dissolution and "standing pat"--were never likely to be implemented. Quite apart from the sociological law that says organizations never go out of business even if their main aim has been achieved (the only exception being a slightly ominous one, the Committee for the Free World, which Midge Decter closed down after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact), NATO's essential aim has not been permanently achieved. True, the Soviet threat is gone; but a nuclear-armed and potentially unstable Russia is still in the game; a major conflict has just been fought in the very Balkans which sparked the First World War; and there are a number of potential wars and civil wars lurking in such regions as the Tyrol, the Basque country, Northern Ireland (not yet finally settled), Corsica, Belgium, Kosovo, and Eastern Europe and the Balkans generally where, it is said, " every England has its Ireland, and every Ireland its Ulster." If none of these seems to threaten the European peace very urgently at present, that is in part because the existence of NATO makes any such threat futile and even counter-productive. No nation or would-be nation wants to take NATO on. And if not NATO, what? There are international bodies which could mediate some of the lesser conflicts: the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe is explicitly given that responsibility, and the European Union is always itching to show it can play a Big Power role. But neither body has the military heft or the prestige to deter or repress serious strife. The OSCE is a collective security organization, and as Henry Kissinger said of a similar body: "When all participants agree, there is no need for it; when they split, it is useless." And the EU only made itself look ridiculous when it attempted to halt the Bosnian conflict in its relatively early stages when a decisive intervention might have succeeded. As for dealing with a revived Russian threat, there is no military alliance in sight other than NATO that could do the job. In a sense, NATO today is Europe's defense. Except for the American forces, Western armies can no longer play an independent military role. They are wedded to NATO structures and dependent on NATO, especially American, technology. (As a French general admitted in the Gulf War: "The Americans are our eyes and ears.") If NATO were to dissolve--even if it were to be replaced by some European collective defense organization such as a beefed-up Western European Union--it would invite chaos as every irredentist faction sought to profit from the sudden absence of the main guarantor of European stability.

**The collapse of the soviet union was a hoax. Integration into the international system allows for Soviet expansionism and global power**

**Nyquist, 11** – JR, President of the Strategic Crisis Center and Distinguished Senior Fellow in Political Science at the Inter-American Institute(“The New Russian Threat Out of the Old Soviet Collapse,” Financial Sense Online, 1/29/11, http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/jr-nyquist/the-new-russian-threat-out-of-the-old-soviet-collapse)RK

This week I continue my conversation with former KGB Lt. Col. Victor Kalashnikov, who was kind enough to outline the untold story of the Soviet Union's collapse. Kalashnikov was a KGB analyst who worked in Austria during the events of 1989-1991. The fall of the Soviet Union, he says, was an event that has been widely misrepresented and misunderstood. "We are going to mark the 20th anniversary of that event this year," he noted. "I happened to be a witness, and I will comment, from memory, what I experienced; how the authorities acted, and how they reacted. There is a widespread opinion that economic problems were the main cause of the USSR breakdown, that economic problems led to Gorbachev's reforms. My counter-arguments are: (1) the USSR was a society run by people with particular interests and motives; (2) these people were perfectly happy with the economic arrangement of the Soviet Union." Kalashnikov pointed to the southern Russian city of Tagonrog, where his uncle Alexei was the head of the city's KGB. "I have visited him and his family various times in the sixties and seventies," said Kalashnikov. "My uncle, who was a KGB general, occupied the best flat in this nice southern city. He had two Volga cars, and one from the KGB with a driver, for traveling. I remember at the time how people brought huge quantities of delicacies into my uncle's flat. He had a huge villa on the Black Sea shore. Moreoever, he together with his Party colleagues, had an airplane at their disposal, an old lend lease plane, so they could fly to Moscow for shopping. They also made European tours through the Mediterranean. Summarizing all that, my uncle had no economic problem in the old Soviet Union. Most sections of the Soviet nomenklatura [ruling class], lived an upper middle class average existence. Today many of them live much higher, of course. But in the 1980s they were not motivated to change anything radically at all. That is my point." While the ruling elite lived comfortably, the people of the Soviet Union lived miserably. According to Kalashnikov, "Marina and myself made very expensive trips through the USSR as researchers, together with other researchers and students from our university. In 1980 or 81 we visited the Urals. Let me tell you, frankly, I visited hundreds of industrial enterprises and farms, city governments and hotels, and villages, and there was practically no food in the stores because everything was distributed through a sophisticated system by the population. The shelves in the stores were empty. There was one type of canned beans, a few staples, and nothing else. Now, in summer time, the water was hardly drinkable at all. The smell was horrible. The living condition of the vast majority of people was absolutely miserable. The nomenklatura lived well, but up to 90 percent of the people lived in squalor. The housing for normal citizens was desperate to catastrophic. Yes, indeed, the Russian people were facing very severe problems, it is true. But so what? The economic situation of the people had no impact on the stability of the regime. Was there any danger of a revolt? Absolutely not. After Stalin's terror, the rulers knew how to block dissent, how to put people in jail. They had the gulag [prison camp system]. There was, of course, no labor movement. It was absolutely quiet, and this was normal. There was a sort of joke told at the time: 'What is the Polish Solidarity [union]? When there is no food in Sverdlovsk they go on strike in Gdansk.' The situation was absolutely horrible in Russia, but they strike in Poland. This is the Russian sarcastic form of humor. To evaluate this development in point of view of general economic problems, if you look at social groups, we easily may discover that there was no political or social unrest from the population. In the Urals, for example, everything was okay. Gorbachev could have governed in the same way for another 20 years. So why did everything change? I do not believe the economic problems were the major cause of the Gorbachev changes." Kalashnikov makes an excellent point. Furthermore, we know from the writings of Soviet Bloc defectors (like Jan Sejna and Anatoliy Golitsyn) that a change in the Communist system was contemplated long before the 1980s. This change was envisioned as part of a long-range strategy. The immediate occasion for reverting to this strategy, according to Kalashnikov, was Ronald Reagan. "Not only him personally," explained Kalashnikov, "but his administration, his policy, his strategy and that of NATO. In the early and mid 80s I was in the Analytic Department of the KGB, and there was concern about military-political pressure from the West, from the Americans especially. There was competition in space, the oceans and in the military area. To assess all this properly, you have to look at events in the early 70s. What I mean is, of course, the war in Vietnam. Moscow drew a simple conclusion from that war. The conclusion of the Soviet General Staff was that the Americans could be defeated on the battlefield without recourse to nuclear arms. For that we only needed a Third World country, armed and trained by ourselves, and a good proletarian party with a strong leader. To gain such countries, the Soviet Union embarked on a worldwide expansion under the policy of détente [or разрядка]. The Soviets intervened in Africa, taking over Angola and Mozambique, and they involved themselves in Nicaragua. There was a successful global offensive, with some setbacks. This occurred at a time of general American weakness, due to the support we had from leftists and pacifists. I had access to General Staff reports from 1984, with operational military assessments. These included the effects of mass demonstrations on American military and rocket bases. The Soviets continued in this way until something changed quite unexpectedly for us." As Kalashnikov explained, President Ronald Reagan had begun putting military pressure on the Soviet Union during his first term. Reagan proposed the construction of anti-ballistic missile defenses for America (the Strategic Defense Initiative). He oversaw an increase in the size of the U.S. Army and Navy. There were qualitative and technological improvements to American forces as well. Were the Americans bluffing? Was the period of U.S. weakness at an end? Then, in 1986, Arab terrorists struck a discotheque in Germany. "This was carried out by Libyans with help from the East German Stasi," said Kalashnikov. "Three people were killed, including American servicemen, and 200 wounded. Some days after that, American aircraft bombed Libya. It was a massive military response, which was serious. My superiors evaluated the situation carefully, and I was at several meetings. Just one attack on a disco, and the Americans sent in bombers. There would be no joking with Ronald Reagan or his people. This episode showed that the Soviet strategy of applying pressure on the West had reached its limit. We must now think things over. My bosses were upset and concerned about the American behavior. It was one of those crucial events, along with other indications of growing will on the Western side to contain the Soviet offensive, and to launch strategic counter-attacks wherever possible, with no serious compromises." Since the Soviet Union had begun pushing into Africa, into Afghanistan, and into Central America, the American's felt obliged to firm up their defenses. From the Soviet strategic vantage-point, there was nothing further to be gotten from direct expansion. A reversion to another strategic model, long held in reserve, was to begin. The new strategy would employ diplomacy. "It's about the idea of launching the common European house," said Kalashnikov, "allowing the Germans to unify so that they would ask the Americans to go home, and they would pay off Moscow and transfer technologies to the USSR, etc. I know that the German unification was a scheme to produce a favorable outcome for the Kremlin, because pro-Soviet forces would come to power in Germany, mainly from the Left. We were confident of this. The main goal was to drive the Americans from Europe. If we succeeded, in that case, with destabilizing NATO, we would have more options from our fellow Europeans. In the first stage of this so-called German-Soviet condominium, the fate of Czechoslovakia and Poland was unimportant because the framework was ours. We were working with the Germans directly. It was all in the spirit of the Rapallo Treaty [1922], or the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. The slogan was, 'The Americans out, the Soviets in, the Germans up.' What happened next, however, was not expected. The unification of Germany was carried out very rapidly, in a few months. Nobody expected this. In the course of 1990 the Soviet armed forces, which were intended to occupy Western Europe, found themselves sitting on NATO territory. There was no option for keeping this force in Germany. So the Russians were placed in an impossible situation. The Soviet forces had to leave. The process of that massive retreat had a huge impact on the Soviet Union. The Soviet machine was a massive military industrial monster. So the withdrawal of Soviet armies from Europe meant that the system was largely destabilized. It meant that a ripple effect was felt throughout the Urals [i.e., military industry]. The entire enforcement apparatus went out of balance. The situation dictated an abrupt change of domestic policy. In August 91 conservative forces supposedly took over in a coup. **Gorbachev arranged this himself** because he felt cheated in Europe. At the same time they engaged Saddam Hussein to occupy Kuwait, and Saddam started to threaten Saudi Arabia. Bush senior was clever enough not to engage too deep in Iraq at that time, while Moscow became an indispensible partner for the West in the United Nations Security Council. Later, the 9/11 catastrophe was necessary to lure America's military might into Afghanistan and Iraq. That made Washington even more dependent on Moscow, and that is the strategic situation of today. What happened in 1991, with the collapse of the USSR, was due to the escalation of a political crisis in Ukraine. This was a huge and important part of the Soviet Union, and the Ukrainians continued to offer resistance, leading to serious discontent and opposition. And I know from Ukrainian KGB people that they worried all the time that something was going on; and if they lost control, there would be serious trouble for Moscow itself. That's why the Ukrainian KGB was even more cruel and stubborn than it was in Russia. In our conversations, when they came to Lubyanka to various meetings, we expressed our criticism of their harshness, and their various scandals. They would reply, 'You have no idea how dangerous and difficult the situation is in Ukraine.' So when the Soviet military and Soviet forces suffered the shock of withdrawal from Europe, the activists in Ukraine organized a revolt. The Ukrainians were ready for armed resistance. They also had units within the Soviet armed forces. We were warned of this, that it was serious and reality-based. The leadership in Kiev kept calling Moscow for help, for any kind of support. But Moscow was unable to help, because it was engaged with Germany and NATO. So it was absolutely impossible to mobilize units to suppress the Ukrainian resistance. That was the real problem. As Ukraine got its independence, the national democrats came to power there, and the Soviet Union was done. This was clear to everyone. Without Ukraine, the USSR was a fiction. The political influence of Ukraine spread in all directions. It spread to Russia, infected the Russian democrats. Ukraine became a major stumbling block for the Soviet elite." But all was not lost for the KGB or the Communist elite. Decades earlier, Soviet planners had looked ahead to a time when a reform of the Soviet system would be necessary. In a book published in 1984, KGB defector Anatoliy Golitsyn wrote about a secret Soviet plan to do away with Communist Party dominance. **This**, he said, **would be a deception.** The Communist Party would still exist underneath the surface. It would merely go underground, or break into various new parties that would control the Russian political process according to a script. In facing the crisis, Kalashnikov noted the Kremlin's agility: "Moscow managed to regroup itself, to recuperate, by launching Islamist forces. In this way they kept Soviet legitimacy. This is extremely important to understand. In diplomatic terms, the Russian Federation is the Soviet Union of today. It has all the prerequisites, with the Security Council, central structures, etc. And it retains the status of nuclear superpower. Back in 1991 we were told, 'Listen comrade, it is a defeat for us. But it is a temporary setback.' **The Soviet Union never accepted defeat in the Cold War, not for a minute.** There was not even a temporary break in the policy from Gorbachev to Yeltsin to Putin. We have been reorganizing and will be back on track. You may remember the removal of the Dzerzhinsky monument from in front of KGB headquarters. Now let me describe the reaction in our ranks, in our residencies. When we saw what happened in Moscow, there was a general sigh of relief. We knew that someone had masterfully distracted the crowd in front of our headquarters to that poor Dzerzhinsky monument, so our premises remained untouched. That was a huge difference from what happened in East Berlin. We immediately realized that the leaders and organizers of that crowd were KGB assets, our agents. The fall of Dzerzhinsky's statue was arranged by the KGB. It was ultimately a fake event." And what was the attitude of the KGB's top leadership at the time? "In October of 91 I went to Moscow to meet with Gen. Victor Ivanenko, who was the person commanding the security of the KGB. He wanted to see me to discuss the situation of the money of the Communist Party and KGB. Austria, where I worked for the KGB, was central to the international business of the Soviet Communist Party. In Austria we had several banks under our control, and the general directors were KGB officers; that is, in capitalist Austria. The Russian presence in Austria was overwhelming. My point in telling about my visit with Gen. Ivanenko was that the KGB elite showed no nervousness or bad feelings about what happened. They were just rearranging their business according to a new situation. In Vienna itself, the Communist Party boss changed his suit and became a capitalist." The turn to capitalism in Russia was not an honest turn to freedom. The privatization of the Soviet Union merely signified the transfer of state property into the hands of the nomenklatura. According to Kalashnikov, "In plain words, they started a process of transferring national wealth, factories, resources, etc., for nothing, into the hands of the Soviet elite, and trusted persons. In Russia, the nomenklatura took everything for themselves. They were not preoccupied with limiting themselves with laws, norms, or institutions of any kind." This was the formula for controlled capitalism in Russia. In this manner, explained Kalashnikov, the Russian Communists used the process of "privatization" to make themselves into a business class that could make deals with the West. "The Russians," he said, "needed to gain legal status for their companies in the West. So again, the Russians are putting the West in a dire strategic position, because of al Qaeda, because of a new dependence on Russian gas and oil, because sections of the Western business community are collaborating with Russia in commercial ventures; and this will **allow Moscow to expand its military-political endeavors across the globe.** Russia today has resources it could only dream of during the Cold War. They need not spy on British Petroleum, since they are helping British Petroleum. The same is true of the Western media, finance, etc., etc. The field of intelligence has changed, and different tactics are being used. So the nature of spying has changed. It is not less than before, but even more intense." This is how a new threat emerges from the old threat. To quote KGB Major Anatoliy Golitsyn, it is a case of "new lies for old."

**Causes WMD use and regional collapse**

Ariel **Cohen**, Heritage, Heritage Foundation, THE NEW "GREAT GAME": OIL POLITICS IN THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA, January 25, 20**06**, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1065.cfm>

Much is at stake in Eurasia for the U.S. and its allies. Attempts to restore its empire will doom Russia's transition to a democracy and free-market economy. The ongoing war in Chechnya alone has cost Russia $6 billion to date (equal to Russia's IMF and World Bank loans for 1995). Moreover, it has extracted a tremendous price from Russian society. The wars which would be required to restore the Russian empire would prove much more costly not just for Russia and the region, but for peace, world stability, and security. As the former Soviet arsenals are spread throughout the NIS, these conflicts may escalate to include the use of weapons of mass destruction. Scenarios including unauthorized missile launches are especially threatening. Moreover, if successful, a reconstituted Russian empire would become a major destabilizing influence both in Eurasia and throughout the world. It would endanger not only Russia's neighbors, but also the U.S. and its allies in Europe and the Middle East. And, of course, a neo-imperialist Russia could imperil the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf.15 Domination of the Caucasus would bring Russia closer to the Balkans, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Middle East. Russian imperialists, such as radical nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, have resurrected the old dream of obtaining a warm port on the Indian Ocean. If Russia succeeds in establishing its domination in the south, the threat to Ukraine, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan will increase.

**Democratizing Russia is impossible – it is controlled by hidden autocrats**

**Nyquist, 11** – JR, President of the Strategic Crisis Center and Distinguished Senior Fellow in Political Science at the Inter-American Institute (“Is Russia Ruled by a Secret Politburo?” Financial Sense Online, 10/3/11, http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/jr-nyquist/2011/10/03/is-russia-ruled-by-a-secret-politburo)RK

It has recently come to light that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is going to run for the presidency of Russia next year. Last March, while visiting Russia, U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden advised Putin not to run. After all, it is beginning to look as if Putin is a dictator. First, Putin is the President of Russia for two terms. Next, Putin becomes prime minister while an apparent stand-in (President Dmitri Medvedev) openly admits that his authority is less than that of Putin. Recently Putin announced his intention to serve another presidential term. We ought to ask if Putin is a dictator? Does he decide everything on his own? The answer to this question was recently given by a retired East European politician. During a broadcast of Shuster Live, former Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk publicly stated that the real rulers of Russia are “one step above” Prime Minister Putin and President Dmitri Medvedev. “The situation in Russia became such that not one or two people run the country,” Kravchuk explained, “Putin and Medvedev do not determine the future of Russia and the world. Another group determines the policy.” The other television guests, along with the host (Mr. Shuster), listened attentively to Kravchuk’s explanation. Nobody jumped up to contradict him. He spoke carefully, in a calm voice, sometimes smiling as he spoke. Kravchuk’s manner had the authority of one who knows. The live audience applauded Kravchuk’s statement, which warned that the thinking of the Ukrainian government was mistaken. The Ukrainian government thinks it can build a relationship of friendship with Russia, he said, but there is no friendship. “Russia is ruled not by one or two individuals but by a group of people,” Kravchuk explained. “Russia has not yet identified the names, but this is a real fact.” The former Ukrainian president noted that his country’s politics had been based upon an illusion for the entire period of Ukraine’s independence. “It doesn’t matter if we call Russia good or bad. It is what it is,” said Kravchuk. “Russia will not change her approach. And it is hardly a democratic approach. One group has been in charge for a long time, there is no real competition between political parties [in Russia], and there are no competing views within civil society. This is the way to totalitarianism.” Kravchuk said that “Russia exploits our weaknesses any way they like.” He added that “Russia will always be what it is….” It is therefore irrelevant whether Putin runs for another term of office, or whether Putin retires. According to Kravchuk, “If one of those heads [Putin or Medvedev] is taken from the Russian eagle – Russia will still follow the same policy.” We might ask whether former President Kravchuk is a “conspiracy theorist.” No, he is one of the best-informed East European politicians alive. Kravchuk understood Moscow’s politics so well in times past that he advanced under that system. He became head of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and was the man who declared Ukraine’s independence, after all. He knows for a “fact” that Putin and Medvedev are part of a larger façade. Russia is still dangerous, he warned his Ukrainian listeners. The personal dictatorship of Putin is a deception. Do not believe what you see. **There is not going to be positive change in Russia next year.** Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Gryshchenko was also a guest on the same program. When Kravchuk was finished, the host of the show, Mr. Shuster, asked the Ukrainian Foreign Minister whether another presidential term for Putin would make any difference. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Gryshchenko answered that “It doesn’t matter who runs the country [Russia]. We were told [under the Soviet Union] that ‘who is who’ doesn’t matter because Communism will win anyway. But now they understand that they were wrong. Personality matters, specifically when the personality has a mandate from the voters….” As for personalities “selected” by neighboring countries, explained Gryshchenko, “we will have to develop a relationship with such personalities.” Besides this, he added, the Russian people will vote for these personalities. This cryptic exchange was extraordinary in what it revealed. Sensitive information was being discussed publicly, and discretion was in play. No history lesson was given, no detailed explanation was offered. Now that Putin is running for the presidency, Kravchuk wanted Ukraine to realize that Putin doesn’t matter. Russia’s policy is not going to change. Elections don’t matter in Russia because the real rulers of the country are not the elected rulers. A Politburo-like structure exists at the top, and all decisions are made by it. **Ukraine should not put its hopes in Russian democracy.** There are elections, of course, but the nominal personalities put forward are the servants of unnamed others. In the West, policy-makers should heed Kravchuk’s warning about the Russian system. Moscow is not on a democratic path. Moscow is on a totalitarian path. And furthermore, Putin himself is a placeholder for others.

# Russia Threat Reps Good – Engagement Author Indict

**Advocates of engagement are biased – they are coopted by the Russian system**

**Nyquist, 10** – JR, President of the Strategic Crisis Center and Distinguished Senior Fellow in Political Science at the Inter-American Institute(“Will Russia Keep the Treaty?,” Financial Sense Online, 12/30/10, http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/jr-nyquist/will-russia-keep-the-treaty)RK

There is another side of this blackmail which Kalashnikov didn't mention. When Western politicians and businessmen get tangled up with Russia's mafia elite, they enter into a partnership from which they cannot easily extricate themselves. Western bankers who have laundered Russian money are now part of the Russian mafia's scheme. They have purchased the infamous one-way ticket. They cannot go back. **They cannot get out.** It is too late. Now they must follow along, and the Russian criminal machine colonizes the unsuspecting Western capitalist. The ultimate exploitation of this process may not be far to find. As the criminal system advances, **the leaders of the West must keep silent**; for they were the first to advocate "engagement" with the Russians. How can they publicly admit that they have been drawn in, swindled, and tainted? Kalashnikov mentioned the diplomatic cables published by WikiLeaks, where NATO documents outlined strong measures for protecting the Baltic States from Russia. He acknowledged that Russia's overall position was weakened by these leaks, and NATO's position was strengthened. "The leaks," he said, "make absolutely clear that NATO is NATO, with no second-rate membership [for the threatened Baltic countries]. The Estonian people, when I was there, expressed concern regarding the American position. Of course, officially, everything was okay. But what about the ultimate will-power of the Americans? Now the Estonian concerns will be mitigated. They reacted very positively to the WikiLeaks, thanks to Julian Assange." I asked Kalashnikov what he thought of Assange, the Australian-born publisher of WikiLeaks. "My feeling," he answered, "is that Assange is not fully aware of what he is doing. He is not aware of the substance and meaning of the information he is spreading. They represent him as a proponent of certain information, but if you are trying to make some revelations, you should yourself be aware of what you are doing, and what sort of facts you are bringing out. My impression is that Julian Assange and the people around him don't really know what it is about." According to Kalashnikov, many experts on Russia also don't "really know what it is about." Certainly, the subject is a labyrinth in which an explorer can easily become lost. However we characterize Russia, none of the familiar categories apply. This is because a confusion of terms and names took hold in Russia immediately following the Bolshevik Revolution. The Communist system initiated a corruption of language on a scale hitherto unknown, so that common meanings became confused. Basic words, used to describe commonly observed objects, **were corrupted to the point that such words acquired a nonsensical association in the popular mind**. It should be remembered that what used to be called the Communist system was always a criminal system, devoted to the overthrow of private property. The nomenklatura were the administrators of this process after 1917, and they continue administering this theft, as an ongoing project, up to the present day. Will such people keep an arms reduction agreement with America? Not a chance.

# Assertive Russia Policy Good

**Assertive policy towards Russia is key to effective relations**

**Cohen, 11** – Ariel, Ph.D., Senior Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation (“Reset Regret: U.S. Should Rethink Relations with Russian Leaders,” The Heritage Foundation, 6/15/11, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/reset-regret-us-should-rethink-relations-with-russian-leaders)RK

For the past two years, the Obama Administration has touted its Russia “reset policy” as one of its great diplomatic achievements. The President spent an inordinate amount of time cultivating Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and making him his principal diplomatic interlocutor—despite the fact that Medvedev is Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s appointed protégé with no political base of his own. To uphold the “reset,” the Administration agreed to cut U.S. strategic nuclear forces under New START, abandoned missile defense deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic, engaged Russia in missile defense talks, pursued a policy of geopolitical neglect in the former Soviet Union, and toned down criticism of political freedom violations in Russia. However, Putin remains Russia’s “national leader” and the real power behind—and on—the throne. Top White House and State Department officials now privately recognize that they bet on the wrong horse, as it is unlikely that Medvedev will wield any real power beyond the spring of 2012. However, the Administration cannot publicly admit that this bet failed, as it would undermine the very notion of this over-personalized “reset.” Yet the reality that Medvedev has a limited capacity to deliver and is unlikely to continue in office means that the U.S. should rethink its strategy for engaging with Russia’s leadership. Putin: No Friend of America U.S.–Russian relations include issues such as human rights and Islamist extremism in Russia, the energy and sovereignty concerns of U.S. friends and allies, Iran, and nuclear nonproliferation. The Obama Administration cannot address these issues by pretending that Medvedev and his narrow circle of supporters wield the real power. In fact, it is the Putin group—which includes the key energy, military and security services officials, businessmen, and the leadership of the United Russia ruling party—that exercises the ultimate power. Now Putin, no great friend of America, is likely to move back from the Prime Minister’s office to the Kremlin in the spring of 2012, raising tough questions about Obama’s Russian policy. Putin publicly disagreed with Medvedev, his handpicked successor, on a number of key policy issues, many of them vital to U.S. interests. These included the role of freedom in the country, the legacy of Joseph Stalin (Putin called him “an effective manager”), and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The two also argued on modernization, Libya, and persecution of the former oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Putin also supports “friendship” with China and Venezuela and good relations with Iran. At various points Putin accused the U.S. of supporting Islamist terrorists in North Caucasus in order to dismantle Russia, illegally intervening in Iraq, being responsible for the global economic recession, and toppling regimes in the Middle East through promotion of social media. Putin views modernization as primarily boosting military technology, pays lip service to the fight against corruption, and directly intervenes in prominent court cases. Putin formed his worldview in the KGB and by reading Russian nationalist philosophers. He famously considers the collapse of the Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.” He also does not like or trust the United States. Ideological Chasm Beyond the two men’s competition for power lies a deep ideological chasm, which reflects a 150-year confrontation between the “Westernizers” and the authoritarian “Slavophiles”/Eurasianists, who want to make Russia a linchpin of a global confrontation with the Euro-Atlantic world. Without recognizing this schism, it is practically impossible for Western decision makers to understand the two Russian leaders, their worldviews, and their ambitions. Pro-Putin elites include the top officers of security services and the armed forces, the military-industrial complex, state company bosses, and a part of the business class. They are a mix of statists, imperialists, and nationalists. They support a future for Russia that is rooted in the imperial past and Christian Orthodoxy. Last month, worried about his own and his party’s declining popularity and anxious to outmaneuver Medvedev, Putin launched Popular Front, a political contraption that would consist of United Russia, women’s and environmental organizations, sympathetic businessmen, and trade unions. Determined to control the next Duma, Putin may allow communists and possibly Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s ultra-nationalists in the next Parliament. This may spell the end of the feeble multi-party system in Russia. Too Late for Damage Control While the White House has yet to publicly realize its errors regarding policy toward Russia, any damage control may be too little, too late: This April, while on a trip to Moscow, Vice President Joseph Biden invited Putin to visit Washington. As of this writing, Putin has not committed to a visit. Furthermore, naming Michael McFaul—an openly pro-Medvedev Putin critic and architect of the “reset” policy—as the next U.S. Ambassador to Moscow may not improve the relations with the Putin circle. Even before Putin returns to his Kremlin office, Russia is likely to demand U.S. concessions: joint controls and technology transfer for European missile defenses, the withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, refusing to abide by Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and sabotaging sanctions on Syria and Iran. Its relentless pressure on Ukraine continues. In the near future, the clampdown on political expression and the media are likely to exacerbate, while corruption and trampling of the rule of law will continue unabated. Reset the “Reset” The Obama Administration and Congress need to recognize that the “reset” with Russia, which requires huge payoffs for small results, is in dire need of a reassessment. **The U.S. should pursue its national interests in relations with Moscow** instead of chasing a mirage. The U.S. and Russia have mutual interests in opposing Islamic radicalism and terrorism, nonproliferation, counter-narcotics, boosting trade and investment, and expanding tourism, business, and exchanges. Russia can benefit from access to U.S. science—especially health sciences, technology, and investment—if Moscow improves its foreign and domestic policies. However, **Congress and the Administration should not tolerate Russian mischief**, either domestic or geopolitical. The U.S. should not shy away from articulating its priorities and values to its Russian partners—and play hardball when necessary.

**Strong policy towards Russia is key to supporting human rights and democratization**

**Cohen and Jensen, 11** – \*Ariel, Ph.D., Senior Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation and \*\*Donald N., Ph.D., Senior Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations in the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University (“Reset Regret: Moral Leadership Needed to Fix U.S.–Russian Relations,”The Heritage Foundation, 6/30/11, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/reset-regret-moral-leadership-needed-to-fix-us-russian-relations)RK

The discussion about democracy, human rights, and the rule of law has careened through at least three phases in U.S. relations with Russia, each one resulting in sometimes jarring shifts in Washington’s approach to Moscow. In order to reaffirm America’s interests, when dealing with Russia, the U.S. should concentrate on the values of freedom and justice. The Administration needs to stop its policy of “pleasing Moscow” and instead add pressure on Russia to start a “reset” of its own policies that currently disregard human rights, democracy, and good governance. The U.S. should deny visas to corrupt Russian businessmen, examine their banking practices and acquisitions, and target Russian police and prosecutors who fabricate evidence, and judges who rubber stamp convictions, which is what the bipartisan S. 1039 “Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act” aims to do. Three Phases of U.S.–Russian Relations When the Soviet Union fell in December 1991, Washington rushed to Boris Yeltsin’s assistance. The world expected that Russia would eventually grow to be more like the United States or Western Europe. By the late 1990s, however, Russia was rapidly regressing from Western political models. Beginning around 2000, the two sides returned to a relationship based on strategic security concerns resembling the old Cold War paradigm. Moscow and Washington quickly exhausted this security agenda for U.S.–Russian rapprochement, however, and the pendulum swung back. During the rest of the decade, while Russia rejected American efforts to promote democracy in Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Iraq, Washington grew alarmed at the increasing authoritarianism of Vladimir Putin. George W. Bush’s proclamation of America’s duty to press for democratic values around the globe further alienated the Kremlin. Obama’s “Reset” The “reset policy” toward Russia, announced by the Obama Administration in February 2009, saw yet another shift. This rebalancing was part of the White House’s broader “new realism” in U.S. foreign policy, a bizarre hybrid that combined a reluctance to defend human rights in Russia, China, and Iran with apologies for alleged “crimes” caused by American exceptionalism. This pseudo-realism has adulterated fundamental American interests and abhors the use of force to protect them. One could argue that that brand of “realism” had already shown its shortcomings in the 1980s, when it ignored the moral revolutions that ended the Cold War. The Obama Administration failed to realize that there is no escape from moral reasoning in politics, even in world politics. The Cold War proved that the prudent use of the entire toolbox of American power was not only necessary but also vital, since it aimed at securing the morally worthy goal of peace through strength. Underlying the Obama Administration’s “reset” of relations with Russia was its promotion of democracy and human rights even as it sought engagement on the two countries’ common interests. The state of democracy inside Russia is, in fact, being addressed by Washington and Moscow: Michael McFaul, the President’s Senior Director for Russia on the National Security Council, is the U.S. leader of a bilateral working group on civil society in partnership with Vladislav Surkov, Putin’s and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s political architect. The High Costs of the “Reset.” While the gains from the “reset” relationship have been exaggerated, the cost in terms of the U.S. moral authority has been high. The Obama Administration has explicitly disavowed linkages within its Russia policy components, such as punishing Russian misbehavior in one area by withholding concessions in another. There is good reason to believe, moreover, that Russian leaders do not take White House efforts at promoting human rights seriously. They know that the U.S. Administration is chained to the “reset” and will do little more than verbally object to the Kremlin’s abuses of human rights and the rule of law. The talk of democracy is “for domestic [U.S.] consumption,” said one official Russian visitor to Washington last fall. Such American softness is one reason why Medvedev told the Financial Times on June 18, “Let me tell you that no one wishes the re-election of Barack Obama as U.S. president as I do.” Free from concern about a serious U.S. response, corruption and abuse of power in Russia continue to rise. In June, the Russian Justice Ministry denied registration to the Party of People’s Freedom, a new party created by prominent opposition leaders, an early indication that December’s parliamentary elections will be neither free nor fair. In May, prosecutors opened a criminal investigation into anti-corruption whistleblower Aleksey Navalny for what he said was revenge for exposing alleged fraud at Russian state companies. In December 2010, former oligarchs Mikhail Khodorkhovsky and Platon Lebedev were sentenced, in their second trial, to additional lengthy terms in Siberian prisons on charges of embezzlement and money laundering. On May 31, the European Court of Justice ruled that officials had seriously violated Khodorkovsky’s rights during his arrest and trial detention. A Moral Black Hole. The roots of the Russian elite’s discontent lie in imperial nostalgia, phantom pains of autocracy, and questionable morality. The end of communism resulted in a moral black hole—a deep spiritual and identity crisis among the elites. Corruption, alcoholism, and blurred lines between organized crime and authority reflect general alienation, recklessness, and fatalism. Nations fail, St. Augustine argued, because peoples fail. A healthy society can correct a deficient state, but even the best-designed states will founder if they are based upon a deficient civil society. This degradation bears directly on Russia’s conduct of its foreign policy. Those who keep calling for an engagement that will eventually transform Russia cannot see that it is the West, not Russia, that is being transformed by this contact. What Is to Be Done? It is, thus, in the American national interest to attend to broader international concerns such as freedom and justice when dealing with Russia. The current regime stands squarely against these objectives and, therefore, against U.S. interests. In order for the U.S. to be in a stronger position than it is today, the White House needs to shift from seeking to “please the Russians” to a more vigorous promotion of its values that pressures Moscow to “reset” its policies concerning human rights, democratization, and good governance and to distance itself from rogue states. Key levers in this effort include denying visas to corrupt Russian businessmen and examining their banking practices and acquisitions. The U.S. should also target police and prosecutors who fabricate evidence and judges who rubber stamp convictions. This is what the bipartisan S. 1039 “Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act,” co-sponsored by Senators John McCain (R–AZ), Mark Kirk (R–IL), Joseph Lieberman (I–CT), and Ben Cardin (D–MD), aims to achieve. Initially, Russian reaction to such a shift in U.S. policy would cause heartburn. Nevertheless, America already has many allies within the country. As the Institute of Contemporary Development, a prominent Russian think tank chaired by Medvedev, stated earlier this year, “The challenge of our times is an overhaul of the system of values, the forging of new consciousness… The best investment [the state can make in man] is Liberty and the Rule of Law, and respect for man’s dignity.” If Washington persists and stays strong, the Kremlin is likely to relent and eventually acquiesce. Russia’s current rulers recognize and respect power and policies based on strength, not weakness.

**Holding the line on Russia policy is key to Russian democracy and relations**

**Kagan, 04** – Robert, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (“Stand Up to Putin,” The Washington Post, 9/15/04, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21853-2004Sep14.html)RK

In fact, it will hurt. Failure to take sides with democratic forces in Russia will cast doubt on Bush's commitment to worldwide democracy. A White House official commented to the New York Times that Putin's actions are "a domestic matter for the Russian people." Really? If so, then the same holds for all other peoples whose rights are taken away by tyrants. If the Bush administration holds to that line, then those hostile to democracy in the Middle East will point to the glaring U.S. double standard; those who favor democracy in the Middle East will be discredited. That will be a severe blow to what Bush regards as a central element of his war on terrorism. Nor should the president and his advisers doubt that vital U.S. interests are at stake in the Russian struggle. Fighting the war on terrorism should not and cannot mean relegating other elements of U.S. strategy and interests to the sidelines. A dictatorial Russia is at least as dangerous to U.S. interests as a dictatorial Iraq. If hopes for democratic reform in Russia are snuffed out, Russia's neighbors in Eastern and Central Europe will be rightly alarmed and will look to the United States for defense. And there is an even more fundamental reality that the president must face: **A Russian dictatorship can never be a reliable ally** of the United States. A Russian dictator will always regard the United States with suspicion, because America's very existence, its power, its global influence, its democratic example will threaten his hold on power.

# AT: Red Dawn

**Even if they didn’t collapse in the 90s, Soviets are collapsing now**

**Nyquist, your author, 11** JR, President of the Strategic Crisis Center and Distinguished Senior Fellow in Political Science at the Inter-American Institute(“Russia Transformed,” Financial Sense Online, 12/12/11, http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/jr-nquist/2011/12/12/russia-transformed)RK

Tens of thousands of Russians took to the streets last Saturday, protesting the previous Saturday’s fraudulent parliamentary elections. Speaking on the Caucasus International TV Channel (broadcast from Georgia), Russian economist and dissident Andrei Illarionov said, “A lot of things have drastically changed since the Dec. 4 elections. The scale of [election] falsification is unprecedented, even for Russian history.” Instead of a free and fair election on Dec. 4, Illarionov said it was a “special operation” intended to strengthen Russia’s ruling party. This special operation, however, has backfired. The whole country knows that the elections were a sham. There have been irregularities in previous Russian elections. But this time is different. As Illarionov explained, “there were a lot of independent observers at the election stations, who actually managed to block falsification and secured a more or less fair count of the vote.” Where falsification was forestalled, Putin’s party won a rough quarter of the popular vote. Where falsification went forward, Putin’s party was given more than half. “Also,” Illarionov noted, “there are specialists in Russia who can apply mathematical modeling who can figure out how people actually voted. At minimum, we are talking about 17 million stolen votes.” Public statements by the Russian president and prime minister, claiming a fair vote, have only served to discredit the government. “Now people have proof that these leaders are liars,” said Illarionov. “They lie to people, and there is going to be no trust for these two. This is a new situation.” What we are seeing in Russia is a mass reaction, involving hundreds of thousands of Russians. In Moscow somewhere between 50,000 and 100,000 people came out into the streets and joined the protest. Security police were standing by, and some arrests were made. But overall, the Kremlin didn’t want a showdown. A reader in Moscow, known to me through a friend, reported that Saturdays’ protest “went well beyond expectations….” The authorities had originally agreed to allow 300 people to gather on Ploschad Revolutsii (which literally means “Riot Square”). But those who followed Facebook in Russian knew that the number might be a hundred times larger. “It became clear that [the authorities] should expect dozens of thousands,” he wrote, “so they changed the meeting place to Bolotnaya Ploschad [literally meaning “Swamp Square”] and now permission [was extended] to 30,000 people [when] in fact, there came at least 60,000, some say 80,000 or even 100,000.” Our Moscow correspondent’s first impression was, “Lots … of really nice people everywhere – peaceful, intelligent, all cheered up and having fun, yet, remembering the goal, which is: Honest elections in honest government.” During the protest events, a number of opposition figures addressed the crowds: Leonid Parfynov, the Russian news anchor; Grigori Yavlinsky, Russian politician and free market advocate; and Dmitri Bykov, a poet. As if to acknowledge the decisive role played by Internet social media, Russian President Medvedev responded to several thousand negative comments on his Facebook page by promising an investigation into election fraud. Russian protestors interviewed by Western media said that Medvedev had no choice. Something would have to be done. All shades of opinion were in agreement throughout Russia. As my correspondent in Moscow explained, “[This] is something new for us: left wing, right wing, liberals, nationalists, communists – all stopped arguing and fighting to stand side by side. This actually happened, and, ironically, we should thank our hated government for that.” The Kremlin’s old “divide-and-conquer” strategy has no traction for the moment. “I was standing there with my mom,” he wrote, “we haven’t seen any violence…. We haven’t seen anyone looking drunk or drugged. There were a lot of troops on the perimeter of course, a real lot. They were ready to suppress a riot, but it was no riot….” “Tens of millions of Russians were offended, and believe the leadership lied to them. This has shaken Russian society to its foundations,” noted Andrei Illarionov during his interview with Caucasus International TV. “This is a massive reaction of millions of people…. We are approaching a turning point at which it becomes publicly indecent to support the regime. It will not be tolerable in society to support them. And people who make public statements in support of the regime will be outcasts.” The criminality and indecency of the Russian government is comprehended and acknowledged by the Russian people. The **moral force** behind this awakening cannot be measured, though it is widely felt. An inward transformation of the country has occurred. The old Soviet structures represented by the FSB/KGB have been rebuked. The method of the lie is no longer acceptable. **Here is the promise of positive change.** Here is **a moral current at work within a society, threatening otherwise powerful and secure rulers.** Predictably, the Russian government will retreat and temporize for the moment. Those who understand crowd psychology know that mass protests typically run out of steam. Public outrage cannot last forever. Yet something has changed in Russia. The totalitarian structures that remained after 1991 have suffered a blow. **Perhaps even a fatal blow.** The year 2011 has been remarkable in terms of revolutionary changes affecting a number of countries within the old totalitarian bloc, especially Libya and Syria. The most important country within the bloc has always been Russia. And now Russia’s people have begun to mass in the streets. Perhaps there is room for optimism.

**No red-dawn – KGB is dead**

**Nyquist, 12** – JR, President of the Strategic Crisis Center and Distinguished Senior Fellow in Political Science at the Inter-American Institute(“The Battle for Russia,” Financial Sense Online, 1/9/12, http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/jr-nyquist/2012/01/09/the-battle-for-russia)RK

The year 2012 is going to be an exciting one. There will be a presidential election in the United States. There may be a military clash in the Strait of Hormuz. But the most important changes may occur in Russia, where the Russian people are preparing to challenge the government of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. During the street protests in Moscow and other cities last month, a new feeling swept the country. This feeling has its roots in the development of an authentic Russian middle class. It is not a wealthy middle class by Western standards, but it nonetheless bears the mark of self-sufficiency and decency. Either this decency will prevail, or it will be checked. Either Putin will be swept from power or the Russian middle class will be smashed. On one side of the struggle is the surviving machinery of old Soviet state: the secret police, the Interior Ministry, the large corporations, and Putin’s controlled media. On the other side we see millions of people who are fed up with arbitrary government power, gangster methods, and who want to see the rule of law. Each side has its own rhetoric, its own philosophy. Exemplifying the rhetoric of the Russian state, consider a recent Pravda.ru opinion piece titled Nuclear War on the horizon. Here is a view sometimes expressed by operatives of the Kremlin. In fact, something akin to this view was put forward by Vladimir Putin when he spoke to the Russian nation following the Beslan massacre of September 2004. At that time he blamed America for conspiring to murder Russian children, claiming that “someone” wanted to break up Russia and finish off what remained of the Soviet state because Moscow still had nuclear weapons. In the Pravda.ru column, America is depicted as threatening the entire world with nuclear annihilation. The United States is accused of leading a bloody “genocidal campaign against Libya” and of threatening the same against Iran. No credit is given to U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta for publicly speaking out against a preemptive attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. In fact, the United States is embarking upon a program of spontaneous disarmament. As Congress has been unable to pass the necessary deficit reduction package, the U.S. Defense Department will face what Panetta says are “devastating, automatic, across-the-board cuts that will tear a seam in the nation’s defense.” The real policy of the United States and the real objectives of the U.S. military are never acknowledged by Putin’s spokesmen. In the Pravda.ru column we read: “The forces of demonic evil now have come nose to nose with the forces of reason.” This was a reference to the Russian fleet stationed near Syria, and the potential for a confrontation with NATO warships. Here the old rhetoric of the Soviet Union appears once more. The war drums are thundering, and the “imperialist aggressor” is called to account. But we cannot take it seriously. For something else has appeared on the horizon, which Putin says was inspired by the CIA: a popular opposition movement against his KGB regime. Exemplifying this opposition we find Danila Galperovich’s interview with Russian dissident Vladimir Bukovsky, translated for Frontpagemag.com by Yelena Glazova. Here we find a frank discussion of Moscow’s police state methods. Here we learn that the KGB has “lost much of their qualitative acumen and sharpness in the last twenty years.” And why wouldn’t they? According to KGB defector Anatoliy Golitsyn, **the post-Soviet regime of pretended democracy was not supposed to last twenty years.** It was designed to overpower the West in ten years. So the plan didn’t work. So Russia’s hidden **totalitarian structures have begun to decay**. They have remained under fake bourgeois auspices too long; and besides, there is no Stalin to lead them. In this matter we should remember what Stalin said to his henchmen during his last days: “You are like blind kittens; what will happen without me? The country will perish because you do not know how to recognize enemies.” What Bukovsky goes on to describe is the fate of these blind kittens, caught up in the crisis of Russia’s false democracy. One might say it is the crisis of a deception gone too long, carried too far by structures that can no longer bear the load. A world war might have once saved the current Russian regime, granting it renewed legitimacy in the midst of crisis. But **now it is too late.** According to Bukovsky, the incompetence of the regime is such that if Stalin were alive today he would have them all shot. “They cannot even blow up the buildings in their capital city without exposing themselves and leaving traces,” Bukovsky added, referring to the 1999 apartment bombings that were used to justify the KGB’s return to power. “Nothing [in the KGB/FSB] works as it should,” says Bukovsky. So how will this Kremlin, with its third generation blind kittens, survive the growing groundswell of popular opposition? Bukovsky says that the KGB understands how to manipulate mass movements with its network of double agents. But in the end, this method will not work. “The social atmosphere in due course becomes ever more politicized, radicalized,” Bukovsky explained. In the end, the KGB cannot join the protests against itself without damaging its own position. And so, Russia faces a serious political crisis in March or April. This crisis will likely grow, and spiral out of control.

# \*\*\*SUFFERING

# Suffering Good

**Attempts to prevent suffering miss the boat – instead we should embrace it and give it meaning, only then will suffering cease to be suffering, but sacrifice**. **And, the permutation fails – any attempt to avoid suffering fails to acknowledge its necessary role.**

**Wrisley, 10** George Wrisley, Professor @ University of Iowa, “Nietzsche and Suffering—a Choice of Attitudes and Ideals,” <http://georgewrisley.com/Nietzsche%20and%20Suffering--A%20Choice%20of%20Attitudes%20and%20Ideals.pdf> Accessed 7/7/12 BJM

II Suffering as a Constituent of Life

 “To live is to suffer”: this is only contentious if we thereby mean that to live is only to suffer. If we say that suffering pervades life, that need not mean that there are no pleasures in life. Even still, is it true that for every individual, life will involve suffering? Other than those who are born and die a quick, painless death shortly thereafter, the answer is surely going to be yes. However, before we rightfully answer whether life automatically means suffering, we should say what is meant by suffering. If we look at suffering as a genus, we can say that psychological suffering and physical suffering are its species. It is easy to think of examples of both kinds. Under mental suffering we find depression, anxiety, fear, unsatisfied desires (perhaps even desire itself before it is satisfied), loneliness, loss, anguish, grief, separation, lamentation, distress, dissatisfaction, rejection, failure, hopelessness, stress, boredom, ennui, angst, weltschmerz, existential malaise, and so on. While all of the above admit to degrees, one could argue that any degree of any of them constitutes suffering. Physical suffering presents more of a variety of clear and unclear cases of suffering due to degrees. There is pain—really the paradigm of physical suffering —in its various degrees (passing a kidney stone to a mild, dull, almost unnoticed ache), hunger, which can range from mild discomfort to actual pain, itching in its various degrees (most of one’s body covered in a rash to the itch one offhandedly scratches), degrees of being too hot or too cold, being tickled until one cannot stand it, and so on. One becomes acquainted with more kinds of suffering the longer one lives. But even a very young sheltered child has experienced many of the above kinds of suffering. At the very least, any child will experience hunger and unsatisfied desires; in all likelihood, however, a child will experience much more suffering. When we consider the full range of possible human suffering, it is hard to deny that to live is to suffer, as long as we do not mean that to live is only to suffer. However, it is not so clear that we can say that to live is to experience joy. For it seems quite clear from my experience, and that related to me by others, that it is far easier to suffer than to find joy, peace, or happiness. III An Important Complication to Suffering In section II, I listed many kinds of psychological and physical suffering; to those kinds of suffering we can add another: the suffering we experience due to our suffering. In its simplest form this might just be the lamentation of not being able to walk around as one would because of the pain from a sprained ankle. Such complications and additional suffering are important; however, a more pressing problem is the way we feel when we cannot find a purpose or meaning for our suffering. Nietzsche writes that man’s problem, “was not suffering itself, but that there was no answer to the crying question, ‘why do I suffer?’…The meaninglessness of suffering, not suffering itself, was the curse that lay over mankind so far—” Lack of such meaning creates a suffocating void, opening the door to suicidal nihilism. In Man’s Search For Meaning, Viktor E. Frankl writes, “In some way, suffering ceases to be suffering at the moment it finds a meaning, such as the meaning of a sacrifice….That is why man is even ready to suffer, on the condition, to be sure, that his suffering has a meaning.” So, in addressing what our attitude toward suffering should be, we need to take into consideration the problem of meaning for our suffering. As we will see, Nietzsche thinks that until he arrived the ascetic ideal was the only means whereby suffering could be given meaning. As Leiter does, I will argue that Nietzsche provides an alternative to the ascetic ideal. What the ascetic ideal and its Nietzschean alternative are will be the focus of our inquiry into what our attitude toward suffering should be. IV What Should Our Attitude Toward Suffering Be? How should we comport ourselves to the suffering we find in our lives? When touching a hot stove or confronted with danger, our natural reactions are to pull back, to flee, to find safety. In general it seems that we naturally shy away from discomfort and pain—suffering of all types. The child laments his boring afternoon and the adult fears the impending death of a parent and the subsequent anguish the loss will bring, hoping and wishing they will never come. Suffering, it seems, is quite rightly seen as undesirable. However: When a misfortune strikes us, we can overcome it either by removing its cause or else by changing the effect it has on our feelings, that is, by reinterpreting the misfortune as a good, whose benefit may only later become clear. So, should we seek to abolish suffering as far as we can by removing its cause, or should we attempt to change our attitude toward suffering such that it is no longer seen as (always) undesirable? Taking Nietzsche seriously when he says that it is the meaning of our suffering that has been the problem, I will attempt to indirectly answer this question by looking at two possibilities found in Nietzsche for giving meaning to our suffering. The first possibility concerns a religious ethic that, according to Nietzsche, views suffering as undesirable, but which ultimately uses mendacious and deleterious means to provide a meaning for human suffering. The second possibility concerns the extent to which we can say Nietzsche endorsed the idea of giving meaning to suffering through acknowledging its necessary role in human enhancement and greatness. Since the religious ethic sees suffering as undesirable and thus something ultimately to be avoided (being itself the paradigmatic means for easing suffering), and the means it uses to give suffering meaning are ultimately mendacious, I will argue that if Nietzsche is significantly correct in both his attack on religious morality and his alternative ideal, we can take this as evidence that the avoidance of suffering is not the proper attitude. Unfortunately, I will not be able to address the question of whether Nietzsche is significantly correct in this paper. Secondly, given Nietzsche’s positive alternative—one that embraces the necessary role suffering has for the enhancement of human life—I will argue that we can take this as evidence that it is our attitude toward suffering that needs to be modified, i.e., we should modify so that we no longer see suffering as something to be avoided. Because of this, the middle position of avoiding suffering when possible and then seeing its positive attributes when it does occur does not recommend itself. That is, since it will be argued that suffering has a positive and necessary role to play, to seek to avoid it as far as possible and then to acknowledge its positive aspects when it does occur, is not really to acknowledge and accept suffering’s positive and necessary role. However, as we will see, all of this is complicated by the issue of the order of rank as found in Nietzsche’s writings.

**Pain and suffering are meaningless without the other – reject attempts to eliminate suffering**

**Wrisley, 10** George Wrisley, Professor @ University of Iowa, “Nietzsche and Suffering—a Choice of Attitudes and Ideals,” <http://georgewrisley.com/Nietzsche%20and%20Suffering--A%20Choice%20of%20Attitudes%20and%20Ideals.pdf> Accessed 7/7/12 BJM

Nietzschean Justification of Suffering If we are not to try to abolish all suffering, which ultimately amounts to merely avoiding suffering some of the time, then how can we view suffering in a way that is fecund and best for the enhancement of life? Perhaps one way to change our view of suffering is through the sincere acknowledgment that suffering has positive aspects, some of which might be necessary for human greatness. Nietzsche addresses the positive aspects of suffering from many different directions. Unfortunately, I will only look at two of them in turn. First, there is the idea that suffering and joy (happiness) are inseparable; further, to enjoy great joy requires submitting oneself to (at least the possibility of) great suffering. Second, suffering makes one strong. Suffering and Joy as Inseparable Commenting on what he calls the religion of pity, Nietzsche writes the following about suffering and happiness: If you, who adhere to this religion, have the same attitude toward yourselves that you have toward your fellow men; if you refuse to let your own suffering lie upon you for an hour and if you constantly try to prevent and forestall all possible stress way ahead of time; if you experience suffering and displeasure as evil, hateful, worthy of annihilation, and as a defect of existence, then it is clear that besides your religion of pity you also harbor another religion in your heart that is perhaps the mother of the religion of pity: the religion of comfortableness. How little you know of human happiness, you comfortable and benevolent people, for happiness and unhappiness are sisters and even twins that either grow up together or, as in your case, remain small together. Here Nietzsche plainly disparages the preference for comfortableness over pain: those who “worship” comfort know so little of happiness, for since happiness and unhappiness are twins, when you avoid unhappiness in your pursuit of comfort you avoid happiness as well. The obvious question is why should we believe that happiness is so tied to unhappiness? In “Nietzsche And Dostoevsky On The Meaning Of Suffering,” George F. Sefler offers a possible answer. Unfortunately without citing his quotations, Sefler writes that for Nietzsche it is a “philosophical prejudice” of the metaphysician to postulate “antithetical absolutes”; for every good or pleasurable concept there exists an opposite concept: pleasure and pain are paired but antithetical. Further, according to Sefler, the metaphysician has claimed the impossibility “of the generation of one absolute from its respective opposite.” Nietzsche, according to Sefler, thinks these prejudices need to be reexamined, the implication being that the metaphysician is wrong to postulate such absolute opposites and that pleasure and pain really are not opposites in this sense. But so presented the case for great pleasures requiring great suffering remains unconvincing. James W. Hillesheim, discussing Nietzsche and self-overcoming, writes that we must get rid of the “dualistic view of pleasure and pain.” Appealing to Ryle’s notion of a category mistake, he calls this dualistic view of pleasure and pain a misclassification. In making the case on Nietzsche’s behalf that pleasure and pain really are connected, in particular for one engaged in self-overcoming, he cites a strange passage from Nietzsche’s The Will to Power: Nietzsche cites examples of pleasures in which a number of painful stimuli are necessary: This is the case, e.g., in tickling, also the sexual tickling in the act of coitus: here we see displeasure at work as an ingredient of pleasure. It seems, a little hindrance that is overcome and immediately followed by another little hindrance that is again overcome – this game of resistance and victory arouses most strongly that general feeling of superabundant, excessive power that constitutes the essence of pleasure. The opposite, an increase in the sensation of pain through the introduction of little pleasurable stimuli, is lacking; for pleasure and pain are not opposites. Citing tickling and sexual tickling as examples of the combination of pleasure and pain hardly proves the case that great pleasure requires great pain. However, the idea we find here, that the constant overcoming of hindrances gives rise to feelings of excessive power, which in turn is the essence of pleasure, is important. It is at least plausible to view hindrances as, in some sense, displeasurable in themselves, and their overcoming as giving rise to feelings of power, which are, according to Nietzsche, the very essence of pleasure. If they are the essence of pleasure, or at least give rise to pleasure, it further seems plausible to say that the greater the hindrance, i.e., the greater the displeasure, the greater the feeling of power, and therefore, pleasure that will result. Further, we do find here some reason to disregard the idea that pleasure and pain are strict opposites. That is, Nietzsche points out that while certain kinds of pain will give rise to pleasure, certain types of pleasure will not give rise to pain in the same way. If we accept the idea that overcoming certain hindrances can lead to pleasure, and that the greater the hindrance the greater the pleasure, we do not thereby have to accept that this is the only way to bring about great pleasure. That is, we do not have to accept it as the only means to pleasure unless we really take Nietzsche’s assertion that the essence of pleasure is the feeling of superabundant, excessive power; and it is not obvious that Nietzsche is right about this. It is easy to imagine great pleasures that do not require feelings of excessive power. For example, I can love my job, earn money by it, and then go on a wonderful vacation where everything runs smoothly: I relax, play, perhaps on a deeper level I commune with nature, and thereby experience great, non-shallow pleasure. Nietzsche could argue that such pleasures are not really pleasures after all, much like Socrates does in Plato’s Republic, when he argues that physical pleasures are really illusions and therefore not real pleasures at all. But without serious argumentation, such a move would be a cheap trick. Nevertheless, there is something to the idea of great pleasure being cultivated by the overcoming of great hindrances, even if it does not turn out to be the only means for experiencing great pleasure. Sefler tries to tie pleasure and pain together in another way. Life, he writes, is “situational”; it is made up of interrelated elements whose configurations determine the meaning of the overall whole: Elements of experience are such because of their relationality to their co-elements. Pain has no meaning “in-itself”; it is meaningful only in reference to pleasure….And…happiness has no meaning “in-itself,” it is meaningful only in reference to suffering. If suffering were to disappear from the world, happiness would likewise disappear; that is, the happiness-suffering into dimensions of life would combine a constant, unchangeable state which would be indifferentiable. We might agree that what pain means to us is dependent upon how it fits into the rest of our lives, including its relation to the pleasure we experience. If we feel our pleasures are mediocre and our pains significant, this may be a result of their relation. That is, the pleasure feels particularly mediocre in light of the great pain we experience, and the pain we experience is particularly significant in light of the meager pleasures we experience. Or it might be the case that after suffering a great pain, what would otherwise be a mediocre pleasure is experienced as something truly great. For example, our experience of a hot bath will surely be different depending on whether we have been doing manual labor all day or whether we are just bathing upon awakening. However, it is not entirely clear that if suffering were to disappear, so would happiness. True, happiness may mean something different with the disappearance of suffering and thereby what was happiness strictly speaking disappears, but this does not seem to imply that we would not experience any kind of happiness or pleasure. If we live somewhere where the summers are around 100 degrees Fahrenheit and the winters around 15 degrees Fahrenheit, the great difference will surely color our experiences of hot and cold temperatures; nevertheless, if we lived somewhere where the temperature never got below 85 degrees Fahrenheit, we would surely still sweat and feel the heat, even if its “meaning” in some sense were to be different without the contrasting experience of the cold temperature. So, while it does not speak against their being opposites, we can accept that pleasure and pain, happiness and suffering are so connected that the qualitative experience of one colors our qualitative experience of the other in a reciprocal fashion. In summary, it seems reasonable to say that pleasure and pain, happiness and suffering, are so related that they are in some sense “twins,” or at least not complete opposites, in the following ways. First, there are some cases where pleasure results from pain in the form of hindrances overcome: the greater the hindrance the greater the feeling of power and therefore pleasure. Second, while pain may give rise to pleasure in some cases, it does not seem that the opposite holds, i.e., pleasure overcome does not give rise to pain. Third, and this does not necessarily speak against their being opposites, pain and pleasure have a reciprocal relationship in which the experience of the one colors our experience of the other. This coloring of experience could go either way: the greatness of suffering may either increase or decrease our feeling of pleasure, and vice versa. The question then is whether we have found reason to think we should not try to avoid suffering as far as possible. In the first case, unless superabundant, excessive feelings of power really are the essence of pleasure, it doesn’t seem that the overcoming of hindrances is going to be the only way of achieving pleasure. And even if the essence of pleasure is as Nietzsche claims, it is not obvious that the overcoming of hindrances is the only way to achieve such levels of feeling. However, it does perhaps give reason to believe that there are instances of suffering that can bring about great feelings of pleasure. In the case of the reciprocal coloring of pleasure and pain, it gives reason to think that, at least in some cases, the experience of great suffering may be conducive to the experience of great pleasure. However, this reciprocal coloring does not seem to imply that we cannot experience great pleasure without great suffering. Therefore, we have been given reason to think that joy and suffering are connected in a way that implies they are not strict opposites, but not in a way that makes them wholly inseparable. Concerning the giving of meaning to our suffering, we might say that in those cases where suffering gives rise to great joy, insofar as we find a life of joy and happiness meaningful, we ought to find the suffering that allows for further joy to be meaningful as well. However, this is not altogether satisfying since it would not seem to be enough to stave off suicidal nihilism. So, let us now turn to other ways in which suffering is conducive to the enhancement of human life.

# Suffering Bad

**Pain undermines the autonomy of the subject and should be rejected**

**Edelglass 6** William Edelglass is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Marlboro College, “LEVINAS ON SUFFERING AND COMPASSION” Sophia, Vol. 45, No. 2, October 2006

Because suffering is a pure passivity, lived as the breach of the totality we constitute through intending acts, Levinas argues, even suffering that is chosen cannot be meaningfully systematized within a coherent whole. Suffering is a rupture and disturbance of meaning because it suffocates the subject and destroys the capacity for systematically assimilating the world. 9 Pain isolates itself in consciousness, overwhelming consciousness with its insistence. Suffering, then, is an absurdity, 'an absurdity breaking out on the ground of signification.'1~ This absurdity is the eidetic character of suffering Levinas seeks to draw out in his phenomenology. Suffering often appears justified, from the biological need for sensibility to pain, to the various ways in which suffering is employed in character formation, the concerns of practical life, a community's desire for justice, and the needs of the state. Implicit in Levinas's texts is the insistence that the analysis of these sufferings calls for a distinction between the use of pain as a tool, a practice performed on the Other's body for a particular end, and the acknowledgement of the Other's lived pain. A consequence of Levinas's phenomenology is the idea that instrumental justifications of extreme suffering necessarily are insensible to the unbearable pain they seek to legitimize. Strictly speaking, then, suffering is meaningless and cannot be comprehended or justified by rational argument. Meaningless, and therefore unjustifiable, Levinas insists, suffering is evil. Suffering, according to Levinas's phenomenology, is an exception to the subject's mastery of being; in suffering the subject endures the overwhelming of freedom by alterity. The will that revels in the autonomous grasping of the world, in suffering finds itself grasped by the world. The in-itself of the will loses its capacity to exert itself and submits to the will of what is beyond its grasp. Contrary to Heidegger, it is not the anxiety before my own death which threatens the will and the self. For, Levinas argues, death, announced in suffering, is in a future always beyond the present. Instead of death, it is the pure passivity of suffering that menaces the freedom of the will. The will endures pain 'as a tyranny,' the work of a 'You,' a malicious other who perpetrates violence (TI239). This tyranny, Levinas argues, 'is more radical than sin, for it threatens the will in its very structure as a will, in its dignity as origin and identity' (TI237). Because suffering is unjustifiable, it is a tyranny breaking open my world of totality and meaning 'for nothing.' The gratuitous and extreme suffering that destroys the capacity for flourishing human activity is generally addressed by thinkers in European traditions in the context of metaphysical questions of evil (is evil a positive substance or deviation from the Good?), or problems of philosophical anthropology (is evil chosen or is it a result of ignorance?). For these traditions it is evil, not suffering, that is the great scandal, for they consider suffering to be evil only when it is both severe and unjustified. II But for Levinas suffering is essentially without meaning and thus cannot be legitimized; all suffering is evil. As he subsumes the question of death into the problem of pain, 12 so also Levinas understands evil in the context of the unassumability and meaninglessness of suffering. 13 The suffering of singular beings is not incidental to an evil characterized primarily by the subordination of the categorical imperative to self-interest, or by neglect of the commands of a Divine Being. Indeed, for Levinas, evil is understood through suffering: 'All evil relates back to suffering' (US92). No explanation can redeem the suffering of the other and thereby ~emove its evil while leaving the tyranny of a pain that overwhelms subjectivity.

# Suffering Reps Bad

**Representations of suffering are essentializing and used as a commodity for market gain – reject their appeals**

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Suffering is one of the existential grounds of human experi ence; it is a defining quality, a limiting experience in human conditions.1 It is also a master subject of our mediatized times. Images of victims of natural disasters, political conflict, forced migration, famine, substance abuse, the HIV pandemic, chronic illnesses of dozens of kinds, crime, domestic abuse, and the deep privations of destitution are everywhere. Video cameras take us into the intimate details of pain and misfortune. Images of suffering are appropriated to appeal emotionally and morally both to global audiences and to local populations. Indeed, those images have become an important part of the media. As "infotainment" on the nightly news, images of victims are com mercialized; they are taken up into processes of global marketing and business competition. The existential appeal of human experi ences, their potential to mobilize popular sentiment and collective action, and even their capability to witness or offer testimony are now available for gaining market share. Suffering, "though at a distance," as the French sociologist Luc Boltanski tellingly ex presses it, is routinely appropriated in American popular culture, which is a leading edge of global popular culture.2 This globalization of suffering is one of the more troubling signs of the cultural transformations of the current era: troubling because experience is being used as a commodity, and through this cultural represen tation of suffering, experience is being remade, thinned out, and distorted. It is important to avoid essentializing, naturalizing, or sentimen talizing suffering. There is no single way to suffer; there is no timeless or spaceless universal shape to suffering. There are com munities in which suffering is devalued and others in which it is endowed with the utmost significance. The meanings and modes of the experience of suffering have been shown by historians and anthropologists alike to be greatly diverse.3 Individuals do not suffer in the same way, any more than they live, talk about what is at stake, or respond to serious problems in the same ways. Pain is perceived and expressed differently, even in the same commu nity.4 Extreme forms of suffering?survival from the Nazi death camps or the Cambodian catastrophe?are not the same as the "ordinary" experiences of poverty and illness.5 We can speak of suffering as a social experience in at least two ways that are relevant to this essay: 1) Collective modes of expe rience shape individual perceptions and expressions. Those collec tive modes are visible patterns of how to undergo troubles, and they are taught and learned, sometimes openly, often indirectly. 2) Social interactions enter into an illness experience (for example, a family dealing with the dementia of a member with Alzheimer's disease or a close network grieving for a member with terminal cancer). As these examples suggest, relationships and interactions take part, sometimes a central part, in the experience of suffering.6 Both aspects of social experience?its collective mode and intersubjective processes?can be shown to be reshaped by the distinctive cultural meanings of time and place. Cultural represen tations, authorized by a moral community and its institutions, elaborate different modes of suffering. Yet, local differences?in gender, age group, class, ethnicity, and, of course, subjectivity?as well as the penetration of global processes into local worlds make this social influence partial and complex.

**Representations of suffering cause policy paralysis and justify colonial expansion**

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This may seem too thoroughgoing a critique. Clearly, witnessing and mobilization can do good, but they work best when they take seriously the complexity of local situations and work through local institutions. Moral witnessing also must involve a sensitivity to other, unspoken moral and political assumptions. Watching and reading about suffering, especially suffering that exists some where else, has, as we have already noted, become a form of entertainment. Images of trauma are part of our political economy. Papers are sold, television programs gain audience share, careers are advanced, jobs are created, and prizes are awarded through the appropriation of images of suffering. Kevin Carter won the Pulitzer Prize, but his victory, substantial as it was, was won because of the misery (and probable death) of a nameless little girl. That more dubious side of the appropriation of human misery in the globalization of cultural processes is what must be addressed. One message that comes across from viewing suffering from a distance is that for all the havoc in Western society, we are some how better than this African society. We gain in moral status and some of our organizations gain financially and politically, while those whom we represent, or appropriate, remain where they are, moribund, surrounded by vultures. This "consumption" of suffer ing in an era of so-called "disordered capitalism" is not so very different from the late nineteenth-century view that the savage barbarism in pagan lands justified the valuing of our own civiliza tion at a higher level of development?a view that authorized colonial exploitation. Both are forms of cultural representation in which the moral, the commercial, and the political are deeply involved in each other. The point is that the image of the vulture and the child carries cultural entailments, including the brutal historical genealogy of colonialism as well as the dubious cultural baggage of the more recent programs of "modernization" and globalization (of markets and financing), that have too often wors ened human problems in sub-Saharan Africa.21 Another effect of the postmodern world's political and eco nomic appropriation of images of such serious forms of suffering at a distance is that it has desensitized the viewer. Viewers are overwhelmed by the sheer number of atrocities. There is too much to see, and there appears to be too much to do anything about. Thus, our epoch's dominating sense that complex problems can be neither understood nor fixed works with the massive globalization of images of suffering to produce moral fatigue, exhaustion of empathy, and political despair. The appeal of experience is when we see on television a wounded Haitian, surrounded by a threatening crowd, protesting accusa tions that he is a member of a murderous paramilitary organiza tion. The dismay of images is when we are shown that the man and the crowd are themselves surrounded by photographers, whose participation helps determine the direction the event will take.22 The appeal of experience and the dismay of images fuse together in Kevin Carter's photograph, and in the story of his suicide. The photograph is a professional transformation of social life, a politi cally relevant rhetoric, a constructed form that ironically natural izes experience. As Michael Shapiro puts it, .. .representation is the absence of presence, but because the real is never wholly present to us?how it is real for us is always mediated through some representational practice?we lose something when we think of representation as mimetic. What we lose, in general, is insight into the institutions and actions and episodes through which the real has been fashioned, a fashioning that has not been so much a matter of immediate acts of consciousness by persons in everyday life as it has been a historically developing kind of imposition, now largely institutionalized in the prevailing kinds of meanings deeply inscribed on things, persons, and structures.23 This cultural process of professional and political transformation is crucial to the way we come to appreciate human problems and to prepare policy responses. That appreciation and preparation far too often are part of the problem; they become iatrogenic.

**Media appropriations of pitiful events misconstrue the facts which precludes possibility of effective response – the alternative is to interrogate compassion fatigue in order to establish a true understanding of these events**

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In 1992 relief officials warned that a famine loomed in the Republic of the Sudan, but the American press showed little interest in covering it. There were many reasons to ignore the story. Sudan's civil war continued and an unfriendly government made access into the country difficult. There was little American interest in Sudan (Sudan had supported Iraq during the Gulf War), and the internal politics of Sudan made any resolution seem improbable. Besides, there was already a famine in nearby Somalia with easy access, great images, and, eventually, American troops. The press had its famine. International news stories vie for the public's attention: starving children in Ethiopia, epidemics in Zaire, assassinations in the Middle East, and genocide in Eastern Europe. The gaunt child or refugee may provoke pity, but the sheer number of crises and the violent imagery that accompanies them dull the senses. The pictures from the old famine begin to run together with the pictures from the new one. Soon, the public's eyes have glazed over. Compassion Fatigue is a critical assessment of the American press' failure to adequately cover international news. Susan D. Moeller conducts a comparative study of how the mainstream media (CNN and network news plus the major newsweeklies and dailies) cover disease, famine, death, and war: the four horsemen of the apocalypse. In each of the four sections she explores the dynamics of crisis coverage: why each story relies on certain formulas (length of time, stereotypical characters and situations), why each story must have an American connection (culturally, economically), and why each story must have provocative imagery and language. In March 1996, the press began to report on the possible connection between Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or mad cow disease). With a novel disease, possible epidemic, and British connection, the press believed they had a story that would "surmount the compassion fatigue hurdle." They tried to bring an American element into the story by interviewing the wife and daughter of a Florida man who had died of CJD; they also reported when McDonald's restaurants in England discontinued the use of British beef. Still, no one was dying and the story fizzled out. Moeller writes: "It's probable that if CJD had been tied to the eating of Asian or African water buffaloes it would never have come to the public's attention at all." Clearly the possible connection of CJD to BSE needed to be explored, but the media's attempt to turn CJD into the next Ebola fell flat. On October 6, 1981, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was assassinated. The press began their coverage by questioning what the crisis meant for the United States. Would amenable relations with Egypt continue? Video footage of the assassination and surrounding events emphasized the violence. Instead of attempting to describe disaffected Muslim sects in Egypt, the press boiled everything down to terrorism. Moeller writes: "Acts of terror are lethal and there is a presumption of future risk. Political assassinations, as narrowly defined, while lethal, do not typically pose a continued risk." Sadat's assassination received heavy coverage, but the story lacked context. The press even downplayed negative aspects of Sadat's past. When coverage was discontinued after the funeral, the public was left with a simple story about a saintly man cut down by fundamentalist terrorists. Moeller offers several practical solutions for overcoming compassion fatigue. Instead of formula coverage, the media should take the time required to add depth to the context. Without foreknowledge of potential problems--as in the humanitarian mission to Somalia--no one is prepared when unexpected things happen. Moeller also warns against simplifying a story by using American connections. By comparing involvement in Yugoslavia to involvement in Vietnam, the situation is reduced to whether or not to get involved in a "quagmire." Finally, Moeller warns against graphic imagery and sensationalized news. Everyday crises like measles are important, too, and it is the media's job to make them interesting. Despite its lively writing, Compassion Fatigue is an exhausting book. The number of crises analyzed leaves the reader acutely aware of the human need that exists in the world around us. It also makes us aware of just how important it is to take the necessary steps to avoid compassion fatigue. The media must choose stories where human need--not sensational images or an American connection--is paramount. They must take the time to explain why these stories are important and why the public should care. Only then will the public begin to pay attention and properly address the human need.

# Quantifying Suffering Bad

**Attempts to quantify suffering debase the experience to an economic index that alienates us from this suffering**

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We now turn to explore a different form of the transformation of social suffering. In recent years, experts in international health and social development, for very appropriate reasons, have sought to develop new ways of configuring the human misery that results from chronic disease and disability. Faced with the problem of increasing numbers of cases of chronic illness?diabetes, heart disease, cancer, asthma, depression, schizophrenia?as populations live long enough to experience degenerative diseases and other health conditions of later life, health professionals have realized that mortality rates are unable to represent the distress, disable ment, and especially the cost of these conditions. Therefore, they have sought to construct new metrics to measure the suffering from chronic illness, which in medical and public health argot is called "morbidity." These metrics can be applied, the experts claim, to measure the burden of suffering in "objective" terms that can enable the just allocation of resources to those most in need.26 One metric of suffering recently developed by the World Bank has gained wide attention and considerable support.27 Image II describes what the World Bank's health economists mean by the term Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs). Table 1 shows the result of the application of DALYs to measure the cost of suffering from illnesses globally. It emphasizes the significant percentage of loss in DALYs due to mental health problems. This finding, one would suppose, should help make the case for giving mental health problems?suicide, mental illnesses, trauma due to violence, sub stance abuse?higher priority so that greater resources can be applied to them. In fact, the cost of mental health problems are placed by the World Bank in the discretionary category so that the state is not held responsible for that burden. This is a serious problem that requires fundamental change in the way suffering from mental health problems is prioritized by the World Bank. But here we ask a different question: What kind of cultural represen tation and professional appropriation of suffering is this? This metric of suffering was constructed by assigning degrees of suffering to years of life and types of disability. The assumption is that values will be universal. They will not vary across worlds as greatly different as China, India, sub-Saharan Africa, and North America. They will also be reducible to measures of economic cost. That expert panels rate blindness with a severity of 0.6, while female reproductive system disorders are evaluated at one third the severity is surely a cause for questioning whether gender bias is present, but more generally it should make one uneasy with the means by which evaluations of severity and its cost can be validly standardized across different societies, social classes, age cohorts, genders, ethnicities, and occupational groups. The effort to develop an objective indicator may be important for rational choice concerning allocation of scarce resources among different policies and programs. (It certainly should support the importance of funding mental health programs, even though as it is presently used in the World Bank's World Development Report it does not lead to this conclusion.) But it is equally important to question what are the limits and the potential dangers of configur ing social suffering as an economic indicator. The moral and political issues we have raised in this essay cannot be made to fit into this econometric index. Likewise, the index is unable to map cultural, ethnic, and gender differences. Indeed, it assumes homo geneity in the evaluation and response to illness experiences, which belies an enormous amount of anthropological, historical, and clinical evidence of substantial differences in each of these do mains.28 Professional categories are privileged over lay categories, yet the experience of illness is expressed in lay terms. Furthermore, the index focuses on the individual sufferer, deny ing that suffering is a social experience. This terribly thin represen tation of a thickly human condition may in time also thin out the social experience of suffering. It can do this by becoming part of the apparatus of cultural representation that creates societal norms, which in turn shapes the social role and social behavior of the ill, and what should be the practices of families and health-care pro viders. The American cultural rhetoric, for example, is changing from the language of caring to the language of efficiency and cost; it is not surprising to hear patients themselves use this rhetoric to describe their problems. Thereby, the illness experience, for some, may be transformed from a consequential moral experience into a merely technical inexpediency.

# Suffering Reps Good

**Your author concludes the other way – your criticism risks silence which is infinitely worse, some appropriations are productive**

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 It is necessary to balance the account of the globalization of commercial and professional images with a vastly different and even more dangerous cultural process of appropriation: the totali tarian state's erasure of social experiences of suffering through the suppression of images. Here the possibility of moral appeal through images of human misery is prevented, and it is their absence that is the source of existential dismay. Such is the case with the massive starvation in China from 1959 to 1961. This story was not reported at the time even though more than thirty million Chinese died in the aftermath of the ruinous policies of the Great Leap Forward, the perverse effect of Mao's impossible dream of forcing immediate industrialization on peas ants. Accounts of this, the world's most devastating famine, were totally suppressed; no stories or pictures of the starving or the dead were published. An internal report on the famine was made by an investigating team for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It was based on a detailed survey of an extremely poor region of Anwei Province that was particularly brutally affected. The report includes this numbing statement by Wei Wu-ji, a local peasant leader from Anwei: Originally there were 5,000 people in our commune, now only 3,200 remain. When the Japanese invaded we did not lose this many: we at least could save ourselves by running away! This year there's no escape. We die shut up in our own houses. Of my 6 family members, 5 are already dead, and I am left to starve, and I'll not be able to stave off death for long.30 Wei Wu-ji continued: Wang Jia-feng from West Springs County reported that cases of eating human meat were discovered. Zhang Sheng-jiu said, "Only an evil man could do such a thing!" Wang Jia-feng said, "In 1960, there were 20 in our household, ten of them died last year. My son told his mother Til die of hunger in a few days.'" And indeed he did.31 The report also includes a graphic image by Li Qin-ming, from Wudian County, Shanwang Brigade: In 1959, we were prescheduled to deliver 58,000 jin of grain to the State, but only 35,000 jin were harvested, hence we only turned over 33,000 jin, which left 2,000 jin for the commune. We really have nothing to eat. The peasants eat hemp leaves, anything they can possibly eat. In my last report after I wrote, "We have nothing to eat," the Party told me they wanted to remove my name from the Party Roster. Out of a population of 280, 170 died. In our family of five, four of us have died leaving only myself. Should I say that I'm not broken hearted?32 Chen Zhang-yu, from Guanyu County, offered the investigators this terrible image: Last spring the phenomenon of cannibalism appeared. Since Com rade Chao Wu-chu could not come up with any good ways of prohibiting it, he put out the order to secretly imprison those who seemed to be at death's door to combat the rumors. He secretly imprisoned 63 people from the entire country. Thirty-three died in prison.33 The official report is thorough and detailed. It is classified neibu, restricted use only. To distribute it is to reveal state secrets. Pre sented publicly it would have been, especially if it had been pub lished in the 1960s, a fundamental critique of the Great Leap, and a moral and political delegitimation of the Chinese Communist Party's claim to have improved the life of poor peasants. Even today the authorities regard it as dangerous. The official silence is another form of appropriation. It prevents public witnessing. It forges a secret history, an act of political resistance through keep ing alive the memory of things denied.34 The totalitarian state rules by collective forgetting, by denying the collective experience of suffering, and thus creates a culture of terror. The absent image is also a form of political appropriation; public silence is perhaps more terrifying than being overwhelmed by public images of atrocity. Taken together the two modes of appropriation delimit the extremes in this cultural process.35 CODA Our critique of appropriations of suffering that do harm does not mean that no appropriations are valid. To conclude that would be to undermine any attempt to respond to human misery. It would be much more destructive than the problem we have identified; it would paralyze social action. We must draw upon the images of human suffering in order to identify human needs and to craft humane responses.

# Compassion Fatigue – Generic Link

**Everything they have said is suspect – the media undertakes a formulaic mode of reporting “reality” which eschews the truth**

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 A simple redactiveness in the images of a crisis can be the most powerful way of calling attention to an issue. The best pictures, said the great 19th-century British historian Thomas Macaulay, “exhibit such parts of the truth as most nearly produce the effect of the whole.” But the selection of those parts is a task rife with problems. Commonly, crisis images do not describe epiphanies, but formula. Crisis images feed into formula coverage. Dave Marash, a correspondent for ABC News Nightline, has noted how much television relies on “familiar pictures and familiar texts.” He observed, for instance, the TV code for “hurricane”: “Palm trees bending to the gale, surf splashing over the humbled shore, missing roofs, homeless people showing up in local gyms. You see it once or twice most years.” 112 (On occasion not only is the same code used by various media, but the exact same images are repeated— a consequence of the fact that most of the media subscribes to or has access to the same photo agencies, wire services and/or satellite news services.) Especially when a crisis is a “foreign” event, there is a tendency to fall back on hackneyed images, often revealing more about what the crisis is thought to be than what the crisis actually is. Formulaic images “label” a crisis so that it is identifiable. “Wars,” said photojournalist Eugene Richards, “have to look the same way from picture to picture….” And “when they do,” noted Susan Meiselas, “it can be hard to tell them apart— especially when the people and places look the same, too, as in the conflicts in Nicaragua and El Salvador or Rwanda and Burundi.” 113 “War” is signaled by photographs of men with guns, not, for example, by images of a barren landscape— even if that landscape is seeded with mines, and is, in effect, as much a war zone as that street filled with guerrilla fighters. Other varieties of crises have their own “look,” too. For instance, photography can give a disease the imprimatur of an epidemic by cueing an audience to formulaic elements, say, doctors in “space suits,” signaling that the disease is highly contagious or, say, the microscopic appearance of a virus, signaling that the disease is aberrant. Images, by design, cannot help but simplify the world. What matters is the quality of their simplicity. Images of crisis and their accompanying metaphors rely on a repertoire of stereotypes: the heroic doctor, the brutal tyrant, the sympathetic aid worker, the barbaric mercenaries, the innocent orphans, the conniving politicians, and so on. The images induce the public to fit these models into the current crisis. Each stereotype employed implies or presupposes a story line which in turn implies or presupposes an appropriate political response. If the images that document a crisis are of starving orphans, the remedy is humanitarian assistance. If the images are of the brutal tyrant, the remedy is military force. There is a built-in inertia that perpetuates familiar images. Without them “reality” becomes more complex, less immediately understandable, more “real”—and perhaps more interesting. But because, other than choosing to watch or not to watch or to read or not to read, the media’s audience has little direct control over the news they receive, the audience can’t easily vote for a more individual style of coverage. The public’s most direct response to coverage that it doesn’t like is to lapse into ennui. In an oft-cited passage in Jonathan Kozol’s book on poverty in urban America, Amazing Grace, a mother with AIDS is told about compassion fatigue among the well-to-do. She says to Kozol, “I don’t understand what they have done to get so tired.” 114 They haven’t done anything. But as they sit passively in front of their TV sets, they’ve been barraged with redundant images. Since we are not typically conscious that news images are being repeated, they have an insidious and usually imperceptible effect. 115 Yet this compassion fatigue is a problematic response to read. It may be perfectly evident that readers are not interested in a news event— for example, they may not buy the magazine with Bosnia on the cover— but it is less clear whether the low sales of that issue are due to the public’s lack of interest in Bosnia or just to the style of coverage. So the media’s reaction is often both to pull Bosnia from the cover of all future issues and to change their news style to include more “reader-friendly,” humaninterest content.

# Compassion Fatigue – Disease Link

**Coverage of disease falls prey to sensationalism, causes compassion fatigue and turns the case**

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Sensationalism, formulaic coverage, reference to metaphors familiar to an American audience. These are the hallmarks of the media’s coverage of outbreaks of disease. Usually the outbreaks don’t last long enough for Americans to lapse into compassion fatigue. A couple of weeks of terrifying coverage and the media is on to the next crisis. But the method of coverage sets the bar higher for the next incident, the method trains Americans to want ever more sensational details, the method prompts the media to consider covering only the most threatening, most aberrant, most contagious epidemics. A new outbreak of disease will have to meet the flesh-eating standard or the “Ebola Standard.” Those illnesses which merely kill in some pedestrian fashion— like diarrhea or measles— will garner no attention at all, and become, ultimately, the casualties of compassion fatigue syndrome. Disease, especially epidemic disease, is not only a biological phenomenon but a social, cultural and political one. 5 How societies respond to catastrophic outbreaks of disease is measured by their level of emotion and fear, their trust in science and medicine, their experience of pain and illness and their reaction to disability and death. 6 The public which generally lacks knowledge about international affairs is at an even greater disadvantage when trying to follow the story of an outbreak of disease abroad, because it often lacks basic knowledge about the functioning of science and medicine as well. Therefore, in these instances, media audiences are especially dependent on the media as information sources and for guidelines about how to feel and how to react. Somewhat surprisingly, despite the potential sensationalist appeal of stories about a disease run amuck abroad, not many of these events make the evening news and the front pages of the newspapers. In 1992– 93, for example, an extremely lethal epidemic of Kala-Azar (visceral leishmaniasis) broke out in southern Sudan afflicting tens of thousands of people. Because the region was held by the rebel forces in a country wracked by civil war, little information was available and few outsiders could get in to confirm the little that had leaked out. The logistics of news gathering, but also the chilling effect of compassion fatigue when considering whether to budget news from a country such as the Sudan, kept the epidemic all but invisible to the world. 7 As William Ahearn, a vice president and executive editor at Associated Press, observed: “I haven’t been at too many newspapers where I’ve heard people in charge ask, Well, what did we leave out today?’” 8 The “epidemics” that have received attention have not always posed the most obvious medical danger, either to the region in which the outbreak has occurred or to the global environment. Why is there little or no coverage of the World Health Organization estimates that 3.2 million children die every year of diarrheal diseases before reaching their fifth birthday? Or of the approximately 2 million people who die every year of tuberculosis? Or of the more than 27,000 American children, half of them under 4 years old, who contracted measles during 1990? One hundred died. Or of the thousands of Americans who die every year of influenza? The answer is compassion fatigue. Body counts alone, even from the United States, do not make the news nor determine the extent of coverage. So whose lives count? How do the media select which epidemics to cover? Preventable tragedies, illnesses which have cures or vaccines, and cause their harm less because of their innate virulence than because of want of money or public will, rarely make splashy headlines. The best predictor of coverage is an indication that some horrible disease is spreading and posing a global— or at least widespread— risk to people of the same demographic profile as the media’s audience (white, middle-class Americans). 9 Joseph McCormick, chief of the Special Pathogens Branch of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), noted: “Again and again, the viruses that emerge from the remote parts of the earth and assail the indigenous population only gain attention when they move out of a small area to affect larger numbers— or when they kill off wealthy people or foreigners, especially Americans. Diseased white Westerners are always a sure bet when it comes to attracting attention. If the right people aren’t infected or dying, outbreaks that occur all the time…go unnoticed.” 10

**Plague discourse attaches historical baggage to policy responses, causing compassion fatigue**

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 But sometimes the most compelling metaphors in the media’s coverage of disease outbreaks are analogies to other diseases. 27 When a medical story breaks out of the back pages of the professional journals and goes on the wires there is a need to develop the scientific context. By reference to more familiar elements of medical experience, expectations are created. Analogous illnesses offer cues as to how a new threat should be viewed; the media suggest how one disease is like and unlike others. Is this new disease invasive like cancer or insidious like AIDS? Is it like the Black Death? There is power in naming— the reason why many doctors don’t tell their patients they’ve contracted AIDS or cancer. As one French physician explained, “When you tell them they have the [AIDS] virus, you kill them.” 28 Analogy and metaphor turn into analogue. A disease is not only like the plague, it shares all the characteristics of the plague. A disease is not only like the Black Death, it is the Black Death. Few epidemic diseases are spread by casual contact; Ebola, CJD, yellow fever and cholera, for example, are transmitted by bodily fluids or an exchange of tissue, not by shaking hands. But Americans, who don’t know much about science and medicine, 29 imagine that all epidemics are like the mythic epidemic— highly infectious and usually fatal. That description describes the collective memory of the plague. Historically, of all diseases, the plague, which felled millions and repeatedly changed the course of history, reverberates most dolefully: the plagues of the Old Testament, the plague of Thucydides, the plagues of medieval Europe. Today, even though plague outbreaks in lesser-developed nations, such as the one in India in 1994, can be controlled with antibiotics— even the airborne pneumonic plague is not invariably fatal— the historic meaning survives. The plague continues to be mentioned in the same breath as AIDS and the trendy “emerging viruses” of Ebola, dengue and Lassa fevers. As Robert Preston, the best-selling author of The Hot Zone wrote in an op-ed in The New York Times during the Indian plague crisis, “Even with all of the advances of the last 100 years in medical technology, the world may be closer to the Middle Ages than policy makers realize.” 30 “Plague” as a late-20th-century disease is upon examination no more threatening than many others and much less threatening than some. Thus the reality of the disease is less scary than the history of it; the Black Death is a more terrifying image than the modern-day plague. “Plague” has come to have a generic meaning, according to The American Heritage Dictionary: “a pestilence, affliction, or calamity, originally one of divine retribution.” All feared diseases have come to be plagues— and once labeled as such they assume the features of the plague. Calling a new disease a “plague” adds context to a media story on its outbreak and signals to readers and viewers the gravity of the situation. But it also infuses the new disease with overtones of godforsaken inevitability. Susan Sontag noted in her work Illness as Metaphor and AIDS and its Metaphors that “disease occurs in the Iliad and the Odyssey as supernatural punishment, as demonic possession, and as the result of natural causes.” Most of us, at the end of the 20th century, think that those first two characterizations are quaint ways of looking at illness. But if at some level we didn’t believe in part in those causalities, there would be no stigma attached to certain diseases. Media stories on epidemics would not satisfactorily report that certain victims are promiscuous or touchingly linger on pathetic images of victims who are children or nuns. Our instinctive response to such reports is that promiscuity reaps what it sows but that the felling of the young or the clergy is not fair. But, of course, in a world completely dominated by the viral or bacteriological origin of disease, fairness does not enter into the picture. Even diseases on an epidemic scale are natural phenomena, not events “with a moral meaning,” as Harvard historian of science Steven Jay Gould has said. There is— or at least there should be—“no message” in their spread.

# Compassion Fatigue – Famine Link

**Status quo media coverage of famines causes compassion fatigue and prevents future public response**

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Henry Grunwald, the former editor-in-chief of Time magazine and a former U.S. ambassador to Austria, cites images as a key way for the media to “stir emotions.” Images, he said, “now have even greater impact than they did during the Vietnam War. It is the heartrending television pictures of starvation…that helped persuade Americans to police the tribal wars and banditry in Somalia.” 37 The media know that the ultimate heart-tugger is a story or photograph of a child in distress. When the victims are children, compassion fatigue is kept at bay longer than it might be if adults were the only casualties represented. Adults can be seen as complicit in their own demise; it’s difficult to justify the death of a child. A recent study that investigated relief groups’ use of photographs in their fund-raising efforts noted that children were the most credible “message sources,” that close-ups generated reader interest and that a child staring straight into the camera increased the personal appeal for donations. The study, published in the prestigious academic journal Journalism Quarterly, also confirmed previous studies that found that “the most influential campaigns are those reinforcing predispositions.” 38 Using this logic, the media in their coverage of each new famine just tweaks the famine image a little; the coverage is geared to remind the public of previous debacles. If the previous famine garnered attention, so the argument goes, mimicking its coverage will garner attention for the newest crisis. But this conduct encourages compassion fatigue. The conflating of famine stories encourages audiences to believe that a new famine is but a continuation of the past one…only worse. The fundamental continuation of the famine saga tempts an audience into questioning whether caring is futile, whether— if the starving, like the poor, are always with us— it is not debilitating to little effect to care about those threatened. If the intent of the media’s stories is action (as their lack of objectivity would argue), and past action seems incontestably to have accomplished little (otherwise, why would there be another famine?), an audience can’t help but feel that any response on its part is meaningless. This is a recipe for compassion fatigue. Walter Lippmann wrote, in 1922, that the press was “like the beam of a searchlight that moves restlessly about, bringing one episode and then another out of darkness into vision.” From blackness into blinding glare. And then back into blackness. It’s a problematic way of covering the world. But as distorting as the media’s representation of famine might be, those disasters which manage to cut through the compassion fatigue night to have their moment in the bright lights may be the fortunate ones. “Lucky are the people in Yugoslavia and Somalia, for the world is with them,” wrote a missionary in a letter smuggled out of southern Sudan. “It may be a blessing to die or get killed in front of the camera because the world will know.”

**Famine discourse is surrounded by formulaic media coverage, causes compassion fatigue**

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Famines that kill make for good stories. Journalists can come away with compelling pictures and tales of drama and conflict, complete with heroes, villains and innocent victims. A “‘good famine story,’” observed Alexander de Waal, somewhat caustically, “is that of a family who have [sic] been forced to abandon their home, have lived off nuts and berries, whose children are starving or already dead, and whose only hope lies in the charity of a (preferably foreign) aid programme. This is not to say that journalists deliberately exaggerate the scale of the suffering that is going on (though sometimes they do); merely that their professional priorities lead them to characterize a famine situation in a certain manner.” 20 When covering disasters there is a standard formula to follow. Stereotyped images, stock phrases and common abstractions reinforce an established way of interpreting the news. “Reporters can ‘tell it like it is’ within 60 seconds, rapidly sorting key events from surrounding trivia, by drawing on reservoirs of familiar stories to cue readers,” observed one Harvard academic. Once established, it’s hard for the stereotypes to disappear. Despite the Ethiopians’ success at averting a famine in 1994, for example, they are still often represented as the helpless victims they had been in 1984. The stereotypes even persist in periodicals that make an effort to report on positive stories. In May 1994, for example, the British publication The Economist illustrated an article on the country’s firstever multiparty parliamentary elections with a photograph of a small malnourished child. 21 Numerous observers have noted that there is a “template” for famine reporting. To fit the formula, first, people must be starving to death. Take the Somalia story. For months the media ignored the war in which hundreds of civilians were being injured and killed everyday by the “war lords” and local “thugs.” “The Western media,” said Edward Girardet, a documentary television journalist, “couldn’t care less about Africans killing Africans. There were enough places in Africa with people killing each other. So what? Anything else new? What editors really wanted was a famine. A solid, Ethiopian-style hunger story.” Only when the media “finally had its famine story…was the situation considered news-worthy….” 22 Second, the causes of and solutions for the famine must be simplified. There is a tendency for the media to view a famine as if it was a natural disaster, beyond the control of people. That allows the media to avoid a serious assessment of the factors that created the famine. Instead the media typically distills a famine’s multiple causes into single problems: for example, drought, as during the 1984– 85 famine in Ethiopia, or general chaos, as during the 1991– 92 famine in Somalia. Simplistic causes suggest and make plausible simplistic solutions— such as the giving of money— and tend to exaggerate the agency of Western aid and to minimize the involvement and efficacy of indigenous efforts. The stories rarely challenge the notion that Western money and technology are the key missing factors in the famine equation; instead they focus on the threats to the correct usage of the foreign aid. 23 Third, the story of the famine must be told in the language of a morality play, with good and evil fighting for ascendancy, and characters fit into the parts of victim, rescuer and villain. Victims must be sympathetic— usually women and children— and credible for the American public— not aligned with known terrorist or “extremist” political groups. Intermediaries— such as humanitarian workers— who are perceived as being above partisan politics or self-interest must be available to “interpret” the ongoing scenario. And four, there must be images— ideally available on a continuous basis. Any cutoff of pictures, whether caused by problems of access or censorship, shortfalls in the media’s budget or glitches in the communication technology, risks severing the entire story. Generally this stereotyped reporting occurs once a famine has become a big story. But there are earlier stages in coverage. Famine stories commonly follow a four-step chronological pattern. 24 1. The first time news of a famine appears is when the famine is “imminent.” This “early predictor story,” as Michael Maren, a journalist and former aid worker has identified, is typically a news brief, a very few column inches of story, buried deep in the elite print press under a catchall “World Wrap-Up” section. Usually a wire service story— often from the British service Reuters when the famine is African— the dateline is commonly Geneva, Rome, Paris or Brussels, sites of the headquarters of various U.N. agencies and relief organizations, the originating source or sources for the news of the famine. The thrust of these news briefs is that huge populations are at risk of starvation. But because that can be said of many peoples in many regions of Africa at any given time these news briefs do not make much of a stir. The story remains an international organization story (“The World Food Program of the United Nations today announced that…”) rather than an African story (“Hundreds of members of the Dinka tribe…”). 2. If the “starvation” continues to progress, it is likely that some correspondent covering Africa for the elite press— occasionally a freelancer with impeccable credentials in the region— will, on a sweep through the territory, do a lengthy “trend” story featuring the famine. Coverage of the famine will be one part of a larger article on government corruption, civil war, international aid and/or ecological conditions in the affected region. The story will heavily cite official sources of information. During the next weeks or months, this initial trend story will inspire several more scattered features, all concluding that famine in Africa is periodically endemic, that there is too much to do, that little’s changed. However, in order to justify the writing of the articles at this time, comparisons will be drawn between this new confluence of problems and recognized crises in the past— saying, for example, that Mogadishu, Somalia, is “Africa’s Beirut” 25 — or between this new famine and catastrophic past famines, such as the Ethiopian famine of 1984– 85. Numbers in the millions will be cited for people at risk of starvation and death. Photographs will often appear with the stories, but not all of them will be of the starving— some will be of soldiers or aid transports, and so forth. As a result the images will cause little more than a ripple of attention. 3. If the coverage is to continue and grow, it does so because of some precipitating event, usually involving Americans— for example, a tour of the area by a highprofile Congressional delegation or a moral call-to-action by some major international player or celebrity. Almost over night, the famine will become a front-page, top-of-the-news story. Print and television reporters, photographers and camerapeople flood the area. At this point, the story is grossly simplified: clear victims, villains and heroes are created; language such as “harrowing,” “hellish,” “unprecedented,” “single worst crisis in the world,” “famine of the century” is employed; huge numbers are tossed off frequently and casually, with few references to sources. As one disaster reporter noted, there is “a common peril in disaster reporting— exaggerating the immediate and long-term impact. We will always gravitate toward the largest kill count…. We will always speculate (and sometimes predict) the cosmic consequence.” 26 And grim and graphic photographs, especially of dying children, become ubiquitous. 4. Partly through happenstance— the climaxing of step-three coverage at a time when there is no other major international event, no wars with Americans engaged, no dramatic terrorist action, no devastating natural disaster— the famine becomes an American crusade. The famine dominates the media’s coverage of international news, and for a while even domestic events. It becomes the focus of presidential and congressional debate and action. It becomes a cultural and moral bellwether for the nation. The blanket attention drives a massive outpouring of charitable donations; newspaper articles and television programs— even the elite ones— list the addresses and toll-free numbers of the involved humanitarian agencies. By this stage, the story has become a runaway engine. As Michael Maren argues, it is now “impervious to facts that do not fit the popular story line.”

# Compassion Fatigue – Impacts

**Focus on guilt-based pancea politics precludes effective public response to structural conditions and turns the case**

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It all started with an advertising campaign. We have all been cued by that famous series of ads by Save the Children. You can help this child or you can turn the page. The first time a reader sees the advertisement he is arrested by guilt. He may come close to actually sending money to the organization. The second time the reader sees the ad he may linger over the photograph, read the short paragraphs of copy and only then turn the page. The third time the reader sees the ad he typically turns the page without hesitation. The fourth time the reader sees the ad he may pause again over the photo and text, not to wallow in guilt, but to acknowledge with cynicism how the advertisement is crafted to manipulate readers like him— even if it is in a “good” cause. As the Chicago Tribunes 1998 series investigating four international charities bluntly stated, “Child sponsorship is one of the most powerful and seductive philanthropic devices ever conceived.” 7 Most media consumers eventually get to the point where they turn the page. Because most of us do pass the advertisement by, its curse is on our heads. “Either you help or you turn away,” stated one ad. “Whether she lives or dies, depends on what you do next.” Turning away kills this child. We are responsible. “Because without your help, death will be this child’s only relief.” 8 In turning away we become culpable. But we can’t respond to every appeal. And so we’ve come to believe that we don’t care. If we turn the page originally because we don’t want to respond to what is in actuality a fund-raising appeal, although in the guise of a direct humanitarian plea, it becomes routine to thumb past the pages of news images showing wide-eyed children in distress. We’ve got compassion fatigue, we say, as if we have involuntarily contracted some kind of disease that we’re stuck with no matter what we might do. But it’s not just the tactics of the advocacy industry which are at fault in our succumbing to this affliction. After all, how often do we see one of their ads, anyway?…unless it’s Christmastime and we’re opening all our unsolicited mail. It’s the media that are at fault. How they typically cover crises helps us to feel overstimulated and bored all at once. Conventional wisdom says Americans have a short attention span. A parent would not accept that pronouncement on a child; she would step in to try to teach patience and the rewards of sticktoitiveness. But the media are not parents. In this case they are more like the neighborhood kid who is the bad influence on the block. Is your attention span short? Well then, let the media give you even more staccato bursts of news, hyped and wired to feed your addiction. It is not that there’s not good, comprehensive, responsible reporting out there. There is. “Sometimes,” said the late Jim Yuenger, former foreign editor with the Chicago Tribune, “you put the news in and people just aren’t going to read it and you have to say the hell with it.” 9 But that type of coverage is expensive as well as spaceand time-consuming. It rarely shows enough bang for the buck. So only a few elite media outlets emphasize such coverage, and even they frequently lapse into quick once-over reporting. “We give you the world,” yes, but in 15-second news briefs. The print and broadcast media are part of the entertainment industry— an industry that knows how to capture and hold the attention of its audience. “The more bizarre the story,” admitted UPI foreign editor Bob Martin, “the more it’s going to get played.” 10 With but a few exceptions, the media pay their way through selling advertising, not selling the news. So the operating principle behind much of the news business is to appeal to an audience— especially a large audience— with attractive demographics for advertisers. Those relatively few news outlets that consider international news to be of even remote interest to their target audiences try to make the world accessible. The point in covering international affairs is to make the world fascinating— or at least acceptably convenient: “News you can use.” “When we do the readership surveys, foreign news always scores high,” said Robert Kaiser, former managing editor of The Washington Post. “People say they’re interested and appreciate it, and I know they’re lying but I don’t mind. It’s fine. But I think it’s an opportunity for people to claim to be somewhat better citizens than they are.” 11 But in reality, they’re bored. When problems in the news can’t be easily or quickly solved— famine in Somalia, war in Bosnia, mass murder of the Kurds— attention wanders off to the next news fashion. “What’s hardest,” said Yuenger, “is to sustain interest in a story like Bosnia, which a lot of people just don’t want to hear about.” The media are alert to the first signs in their audience of the compassion fatigue “signal,” that sign that the short attention span of the public is up. “If we’ve just been in Africa for three months,” said CBS News foreign editor Allen Alter, “and somebody says, ‘You think that’s bad? You should see what’s down in Niger,’ well, it’s going to be hard for me to go back. Everybody’s Africa’d out for the moment.” As Milan Kundera wrote in The Book of Laughter and Forgetting, “The bloody massacre in Bangladesh quickly covered over the memory of the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia, the assassination of Allende drowned out the groans of Bangladesh, the war in the Sinai Desert made people forget Allende, the Cambodian massacre made people forget Sinai and so on and so forth, until ultimately everyone lets everything be forgotten.” 12 The causes of compassion fatigue are multiple. Sometimes there are just too many catastrophes happening at once. “I think it was the editor Harold Evans,” said Bill Small, former president of NBC News and UPI, “who noted that a single copy of the [London] Sunday Times covers more happenings than an Englishman just a few hundred years ago could be expected to be exposed to in his entire lifetime.” 13 In 1991, for instance, it was hard not to be overwhelmed by the plethora of disasters. So compassion fatigue may simply work to pre-empt attention of “competing” events. Americans seem to have an appetite for only one crisis at a time. The phenomenon is so well-known that even political cartoonists make jokes about it, such as the frame drawn by Jeff Danziger of a newsroom with one old hack saying to someone on the phone: “Tajikistan? Sorry, we’ve already got an ethnic war story,” and another old warhorse saying on another phone: “Sudan? Sorry we’ve already got a famine story.” 14 Even during “slower” disaster seasons, there is always a long laundry list of countries and peoples in upheaval. Many and perhaps most of the problems are not of the quick-fix variety— the send-in-the-blankets-and-vaccination-suppliesand-all-will-be-well emergencies. Most global problems are entrenched and longlasting, rarely yielding to easy solutions available to individuals or even NGO and governmental authorities. “The same theme just dulls the psyche. For the reader, for the reporter writing it, for the editor reading it,” said Bernard Gwertzman, former foreign editor at The New York Times. 15 Tom Kent, international editor at the Associated Press, noted the same problem in covering ongoing crises. “Basically, in our coverage we cover things until there’s not much new to say. And then we back off daily coverage and come back a week or a month later, but not day-to-day.” He could tell, he said, when the sameness of the situation was drugging an audience into somnolence. We can certainly get a sense for the degree that people care about a story in the public. For example, when Bosnia started, people were calling up all the time for addresses of relief organizations and how we can help and all that. We did lists, and then requests dropped off. And in the first part of the Somalia story we heard “How can we help?” “How can we get money to these people?” We sent out the lists, then those calls dropped off Either the people who wanted to contribute had all the information they needed, or there just wasn’t anybody else who was interested. In Rwanda, we got practically no inquiries about how to help, although our stories certainly suggested there’s as much misery in Rwanda as anywhere else. 16 Sometimes to Americans, international problems just seem too permanent to yield to resolution. Sometimes even when problems flare out into crisis— by which point it is too late for the patch-’em-up response— the public is justified in believing that outside intervention will do little good…so what’s the use in caring? It’s difficult for the media and their audience to sustain concern about individual crises over a period of months and maybe even years. Other more decisive— and short-term— events intervene, usurping attention, and meanwhile, little seems to change in the original scenario. There is a reciprocal circularity in the treatment of low-intensity crises: the droning “same-as-it-ever-was” coverage in the media causes the public to lose interest, and the media’s perception that their audience has lost interest causes them to downscale their coverage, which causes the public to believe that the crisis is either over or is a lesser emergency and so on and so on. Another, especially pernicious form of compassion fatigue can set in when a crisis seems too remote, not sufficiently connected to Americans’ lives. Unless Americans are involved, unless a crisis comes close to home— either literally or figuratively— unless compelling images are available, preferably on TV, crises don’t get attention, either from the media or their audience. Some of the public may turn the television off when they see sad reports from around the world, but unless the news is covered by the media, no one has an opportunity to decide whether to watch or not. “Thanks to the news media,” noted Newsweek, “the face of grieving Kurdish refugees replaced the beaming smiles of victorious GIs.” Publicity, Newsweek argued, “galvanized the public and forced the president’s hand.” In just two weeks, the Bush administration sent $188 million in relief to the Kurds. 17 It’s a bit like that tree falling in the middle of the forest. If it falls and no one hears, it’s like it never happened. The tree may lie on the forest floor for years, finally to rot away, without anyone ever realizing it once stood tall.

**Media reports miscommunicate the implications of conflict – causes serial policy failure**

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 But much of journalism is repetitious— or at least seems that way. Turn on the news and you see crime stories, scandals, budget reports and even full-blown crises that all sound alike. Ironically, even though the uncertain outcome of a catastrophe is what makes it so compelling— both to report on and to consume as news— once the parameters of a news story have been established, the coverage lapses into formula. Mythic elements— the fearless doctor, the unwitting victim— will be emphasized, but they will fall into a pattern. Myths, after all, are stories. Some are heroic, some are tragic, most are predictable. Formulaic coverage of similar types of crises make us feel that we really have seen this story before. We’ve seen the same pictures, heard about the same victims, heroes and villains, read the same morality play. Even the chronology of events is repeated: A potential crisis is on the horizon, the crisis erupts, the good guys rush in to save the victims but the villains remain to threaten the denouement. Only the unresolved ending makes the crisis narrative different from a Disney script where the protagonists live happily ever after. The dashing French doctors and American Marines rescued the starving brown child-victims in Somalia, for example, but the evil warlords stole away the chance for peace and prosperity. “Especially in America, we like to think of things in terms of good guys and bad guys,” said Malcolm Browne, former foreign correspondent for AP, ABC and The New York Times. “If one of the partners in a conflict is one that most people can identify with as a good guy, then you’ve got a situation in which it’s possible to root for the home team. That’s what a lot of news is about. We love to see everything in terms of black and white, right and wrong, truths versus lies.” 20 By power of suggestion, the media so fix a conception in our minds that we cannot imagine the one thing without the other. “We do mislead,” said Browne. “We have to use symbolism. Symbolism is a useful psychological tool, but it can be terribly misused. It can be misleading. It can lead to great cruelty and injustice, but all of those things are components of entertainment.” 21 Once a story commands the attention of the media— or once the media deems a story worthy of attention— reporting styles, use of sources, choice of language and metaphor, selection of images and even the chronology of coverage all follow a similar agenda. Other distortions occur. Sensationalized treatment of crises makes us feel that only the most extreme situations merit attention (although the media still selfcensors the worst of the stories and images from crises— such as the most graphic pictures of those Kurds killed by Iraqi chemical weapons in Halabja or the photos of trophy bits of flesh and body parts flaunted by Somalis allied with Mohammed Farah Aidid). Dire portraits are painted through relentless images and emotional language. A crisis is represented as posing a grave risk, not only to humanity at large, but to Americans specifically. Unless a disease appears to be out of a Stephen King horror movie— unless it devours your body like the flesh-eating strep bacteria, consumes your brain like mad cow disease, or turns your insides to bloody slush like Ebola— it’s hardly worth mentioning in print or on air. It takes more and more dramatic coverage to elicit the same level of sympathy as the last catastrophe. “Can shocking pictures of suffering, which elicited so much charity in 1984, save those at risk in Africa and the Subcontinent this time?” asked Newsweek about the famine in 1991. “Images are stopgap measures, at best; and their repetition breeds indifference.” 22 What is strong today may be weak tomorrow. Journalists want their coverage of crises to be a “page-turner,” but frequently the public’s response is to just “turn the page.” Voilà. Compassion fatigue. The Americanization of crises also plays into this proclivity. Americans are terribly preoccupied with themselves. The Americanization of events makes the public feel that the world subscribes, and must subscribe, to American cultural icons— and if it doesn’t or can’t it is not worth the bother, because clearly the natives are unworthy or the issue or event is. Media consumers are tied to a tether of cultural images. This is a fact well-known yet rarely acknowledged. Peoples in other countries know that when they use Western icons to help define their struggles the West pays greater attention. So the student democracy movement in Tiananmen Square made sure to carry their Statue of Liberty in front of the cameras and protesters outside an Indonesian courtroom sang the civil rights anthem “We Shall Overcome” while facing the microphones. Would our interest in those events have been as great without those signifiers? We draw historical parallels and make cultural connections between our world and that of the “other.” The lone man defying the Chinese authorities by standing in front of the line of tanks was for us another Patrick Henry shouting, “Give me liberty or give me death.” We take for granted the placards quoting Thomas Jefferson and Martin Luther King, Jr., which are written in English— but are carried by citizens of China or Croatia or Chechnya. And when the natives of other countries haven’t drawn our parallels for us, the American media suggests similarities. “I’m big on comparisons,” said Karen Elliot House, president of Dow Jones International, the parent company of The Wall Street Journal. “I think most people want to know are we better or worse than Poland and why.” The American filter, the notion of relevance to the United States, is very important. Since our knowledge about the lands outside our borders is minimal, even the abbreviated version of events which makes it into the news has to be translated for us. “Remember all these countries in Eastern Europe have been lost to American consciousness for 50 years,” said Wall Street Journal former foreign correspondent Walter Mossberg. “In order to get people to understand why they should care about this, you do have to resort to historical analogies.”

# Compassion Fatigue – Framework

**Critical interrogation into the images used by the media is essential for policymaking and historical education**

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Once the pictures are “in the can,” the editing of images to emphasize one aspect of a situation can equally skew perception. The taking and the publishing of images is inherently undemocratic. Even if one discounts the limitations of technology and access, there is still an astonishing range of images from which the single one is selected. We, the audience, are seduced into believing in the freedom of the press, because rarely, at least in the United States, is the viewing of certain images prohibited. But the viewing is just the last act in the series of image production and dissemination. There is an ideological construct (or constructs) behind every image. There are moral, cultural, social and political assumptions in the taking and the publishing and the viewing of images. Images serve a myriad of functions within a culture: They can be taken to offer aesthetic repose, to fulfill a breaking-news function, to keep an historical event in memory, to confront authorities with evidence, to serve as mute testimony. Like contemporary affairs, the historical past can be co-opted by seductive imagery (as Oliver Stone’s JFK film demonstrated). Images taken or appropriated to represent the past determine how we view history. They are not passive illustrations; they are ideological constructions designed to justify national ideals resonant today. The endless arguments about what should be included in school textbooks reminds us that history is shaped by the selective presentation of images, people and events. Who we believe we are and how we perceive the world to be have a powerful effect on world events. Photographs cannot initiate a moral or political stance, but they can reinforce one. In Bosnia, said Johanna Neuman, “the pictures may have moved the leadership to threaten or cajole or implement sanctions or even, finally, to strike from the air. The pictures produced a policy of humanitarian assistance…. But never did the pictures prompt the West to enter the war on the ground…. The bottom line never changed.” 139 Neither the taking nor the viewing of images impels great action. An understanding of imagery and metaphors— and the initiating ideology— provides no constant guide to the behavior of a culture. It does, however, help to delineate the structure within which policymakers deal with specific issues and within which the attentive public understands and responds to those issues. 140 Despite the fact that CNN, the three television networks and some of the world’s best photo journalists— James Nachtwey, David and Peter Turnley, Luc Delahaye, Jon Jones, Christopher Morris, Anthony Suau, Gilles Peress, Corinne Dufka, Tom Stoddart, Roger Hutchings and even portraitist Annie Liebovitz— have all camped out in Bosnia, despite the fact that there were more photographers and cameramen killed there in three years of fighting than in ten years of war in Vietnam, there was little political will to intervene. Would more images of the caliber of the raped Moslem women or the emaciated POWs staring bleakly out from behind Serb barbed wire have made a difference in the U.S. commitment there? Or would more iconic photos just have left us with more guilt? As the American response to Bosnia proved, images’ power to provoke action has not only dimmed, but it never operated at all unless the appropriate response was immediately apparent and relatively simple. It makes sense that when the public— via the American government— is effectively prohibited from action— if a crisis is too complex or entrenched for amelioration— compassion fatigue results. Compassion fatigue is a result of inaction and itself causes inaction. “Our experience is that over the last couple of years our appeals for Bosnia have seen declining returns,” said John McGrath of Oxfam in 1995. “I think people feel it’s a situation with no end. They feel that if the politicians can’t sort it out or don’t have the will to sort it out then what can the public do?”

# No Compassion Fatigue

**The thesis of compassion fatigue is wrong – multiple studies prove**

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There are very few studies that have analysed audience consumpTion of and reacTion to news in terms of claims about compassion faTigue. The ﬁrst and best known is a 1996 paper by Kinnick, Krugman and Cameron which used a telephone survey of 316 Atlanta residents to 17measure amtudes towards AIDS, homelessness, violent crime and child abuse and the media coverage of these issues. 58 The authors found considerable variaTion between individuals, argued responses were issue dependent and observed that there was no such thing as a totally faTigued individual. They did conclude that there was a compassion faTigue phenomenon but that it was a situaTional variable rather than a personality trait. Equally, they did note that the mass media played a primary role through both negative coverage and content that allowed avoidance, and that respondents readily blamed the media for their personal desensitisaTion and avoidance strategies. 59 However, Kinnick, Krugman and Cameron qualiﬁed the media’s role by pointing out how prior disposiTions intersected with media coverage: “results of the study suggest that for those who are initially disinterested or biased against vicRms of a social problem, pervasive media coverage likely serves to entrench negative feelings towards victims and foster densensitizaTion.” 60 And, in a statement that reduced the primacy of the media’s role, the authors concluded that “level of media consumpTion…does not appear to be as inﬂuenBal in the development of compassion faTigue as individual tolerances for exposure to disturbing media content and perceptions of the victims’ ‘deservingness’ of compassion.” 61 In pointing towards the disposiTion and state of individuals as causal factors in how they directed and expressed compassion, Kinnick, Krugman and Cameron provide a link to how social psychology claims to oﬀer an account of how some people secure empathy from an audience. In the relevant literature much of this debate is conducted in terms of the “identiﬁable victim eﬀect,” which, through its emphasis on how people continue to respond to appeals (part of the OED deﬁniTion), stands in contradistincTion to any claims about the contemporary prevalence of compassion faTigue. Stemming from the work of Thomas Schelling in the 1960s, the identiﬁable victim eﬀect describes the way “people react diﬀerently toward identiﬁable victims than to statistical victims who have not yet been identiﬁed.” 62 It recalls the quote attributed to Joseph Stalin that “one death is a tragedy; one million is a staTistic” as well as the statement from Mother Theresa that “if I look at the mass I will never act. If I look at the one, I will.” These claims seem to be based on the psychological intuiTion that an identiﬁable victim is ipso facto a more powerful emoTional stimulus than a staTistical victim – that, for example, the photograph of an individual person in distress in any given disaster is more eﬀective than accounts of the millions at risk or dying from that situaTion. 63 For Paul Slovic, this incapacity to translate sympathy for the one into concern for the many, as evidenced in the way mass murder and genocide in places like Rwanda and Darfur are largely ignored, testiﬁes to “a fundamental deﬁciency in human psychology.” 64 Although the literature on what motivates charitable giving (the home of much of these arguments) is relatively sparse, a series of recent studies in decision psychology have produced some interesting ﬁndings. Small and Lowenstein conducted a ﬁeld experiment that demonstrated when asked to contribute to a housing charity that had identiﬁed the recipient family versus one that would ﬁnd a family after the donation, people’s contribuTions were higher to the family already identiﬁed. 65 Kogut and Ritov asked participants to donate towards treatment for one sick child or a group of eight sick children, with both the individual and the group represented in photographs. Although the total amount needed was the same in both cases, donaTions were higher for the individual child than for the group of children. 66 Small, Lowenstein and Slovic asked givers to respond to a staTistical descripTion of food shortages in southern African aﬀecting three million children versus a personal appeal with a picture on behalf of Rokia, a seven-year-old Malawian girl, and the identiﬁed victim triggered a much higher level of sympathy and greater donaTions. 67 In a similar study, when potential donors were faced with the opTion of helping just two children (the girl Rokia and a boy, Moussa) rather than a single individual, the response for the individual child was far greater than for the pair. 68 In analysing the form of the image that best elicits a response, Small and Verrochi found that sad facial expressions in the pictures of victims produced a much greater response than happy or neutral images, and that this was achieved through “emoTional contagion,” whereby viewers “caught” vicariously the emoTion on a victims face. 69 As a more detailed moment in the producTion of the identiﬁable victim, sad pictures generated greater sympathy and increased charitable giving. These studies conﬁrm the intuiTion that images are central to the transmission of aﬀect, and that while some are more powerful than others, “when it comes to eliciting compassion, the identified individual victim, with a [sad] face and a name, has no peer.” 70 This establishes the phenomenon, how it operates, but not why. Some of the reasons, at least in terms of the psychologists conducting these studies, could include the following: 19(1) That a single individual is viewed as a psychologically coherent unity, whereas a group is not; 71 (2) That identiﬁable victims are more “vivid” and hence more compelling than colourless representaTions; (3) That identiﬁable victms are actual rather than likely victims; (4) That as an identiﬁed, actual victim, blame is more easily attached, whereas for people who are not yet victims responsibility is harder to assign; (5) Identiﬁable victims generate concern when they are a signiﬁcant proporTion of their group. This is “the reference group eﬀect” which suggests, for example, that those infected with a disease that kills 90% of a small populaTion attract more sympathy than, say, one million victims in a country of 20 million people. 72 As much as the social scientiﬁc methodologies of these studies suggest they have produced deﬁnitive reasons for the ‘identiﬁable victim eﬀect’, they generate “no evidence that these are the actual mechanisms that produce the eﬀect.” 73 They reiterate, nonetheless, ﬁndings from related studies to suggest what is happening. Small and Lowenstein argue that “people use disBnct processes to make judgements about speciﬁc as opposed to general targets, ” with the processing of informaTion about speciﬁc individuals being more emoTionally engaging than deliberaTion about abstract cases. 74 Small and Verrochi maintain that there is a diﬀerence between empathic feeling and deliberative thinking, with the emoTional contagion produced by particular pictures of speciﬁc individuals happening outside of awareness. 75 Although they are distinct, these two processes can intersect. Indeed, if emoTional engagement is signiﬁcant enough, it can lead individuals to explore deliberatively contextual informaTion about the identﬁable victim they originally responded to. Here, though, some studies identify a potentially paradoxical outcome – the greater the deliberative thinking that takes place, the more the emoTional engagement is overridden, sympathy diminishes, and charitable donaTions decline. 76 Having detailed the “identiﬁable victim eﬀect” and the images that contribute to it, these psychological studies have set out an interesting problematc even if they have not identiﬁed the causes for this eﬀect. They also leave us with a number of challenging quesTions: is our capacity to feel limited such that anything beyond the speciﬁc individual leads to a decline in emoTional concern for others? 77 How might other emoTions, such as anger, disgust and fear aﬀect sympathy? Would the role of pictured expressions on the faces of adults diﬀer from those found with children? 78 Many of these issues and quesTions become more complex when we move beyond small ﬁeld experiments about charitable giving to large-scale social and political phenomena. Although, in a manner not dissimilar from Moeller’s political critique, Slovic wants to maintain that the repeated American failure to respond to mass murder and genocide globally represents a fundamental psychological ﬂaw – stemming from the inability to make an emoTional connecTion to the vicBms of the violence – he concedes that in cases such as the South Asian tsunami of 2004 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005 there was a signiﬁcant cultural response to the plight of millions of individuals who formed a collective and sometimes distant community of suﬀering. These moments were diﬀerent, claims Slovic, because of what he calls the dramatic, intimate, exhaustive and vivid media coverage of these events for spectators beyond the danger zone. This stands in direct opposiTion to the compassion faTigue thesis, whereby the deluge of imagery is said to inevitably dull feeling. As a result, Slovic maintains - this time in opposiTion to Moeller’s thesis - that the reporting of on-going genocides is sparse and sporadic. 79 Beyond the work cited above, there are very studies examining the compassion faTigue thesis. Stanley Cohen and Bruna Seu report on a 1998 pilot study at Brunel University in England where three focus groups of ﬁfteen people were shown Amnesty InternaTional appeals about Afghanistan and Bosnia. 80 Although the sample was small, Cohen and Seu conﬁdently report that the emoTional response of the subjects meant that “the strong compassionate faTigue thesis...cannot be sustained.” Those in the focus groups recognised an accumulaTion of atrocity images but that did not produce indiﬀerence, even if they resented how charities played on their guilt for circumstances beyond their control. What the accumulaTion of images did produce was a sense of demand overload, meaning that there were too many demands on their compassion and insuﬃcient means to determine which of the demands could be most eﬀectively met. 81 Birgitta Hoijer’s research during the 1999 Kosovo crisis, in which detailed telephone interviews and focus groups with more than 500 people in Sweden and Norway explored their reacTion to images of suﬀering in news coverage, conﬁrms much of Cohen and Seu’s argument. 82 Hoijer found that 51% of respondents said they often or quite often reacted to atrocity images, 14% said sometimes or not at all, with only 23% saying they never reacted. Gender and age were important with women reacting more than men, and older people reacting more than the young. In an important statement, Hoijer says that “women especially said that they sometimes cried, had to close their eyes or look away, because the pictures touched them emoTionally,” thereby demonstrating that averting one’s gaze can itself be an aﬀective response rather than a sign of indiﬀerence. It is also a response that recalls the idea from the medical literature that ‘caring too much can hurt’. 83 Hoijer’s research intersects with the literature on the “identiﬁable victim eﬀect” when she reports that the audience for the Kosovo images accepted the media’s code of victimhood in which women and children were seen as innocent and helpless, and it was this vicBmhood which made them deserving of compassion. 84 Hoijer does note that when the Kosovo crisis ran on into a 78 day war feelings of powerlessness overcame the audience such that time did undermine compassion. Even if this was expressed in terms of distanciaTion or numbness it is not evidence of compassion faTigue. Rather, it conﬁrms that compassion has to be connected to a ﬁnite outcome otherwise it could be directed towards a diﬀerent issue. As a result, Hoijer says her research “opposes, or strongly modulates, the thesis about a pronounced compassion faTigue among people in general.” 85 The ﬁnal source of evidence that can cast concrete light on the compassion faTigue thesis concerns charity appeals. The OED deﬁniTion of compassion faTigue at the outset cited the “diminishing public response” to such appeals as evidence. But is the public response diminishing? While answering that would require a detailed longitudinal study, a few observaTions suggest the public still respond quite eagerly to calls for charity. In Britain there are 166,000 charities that received donaTions totalling £10 billion in 2009. In the United States, there are more than 800,000 charitable organisaTions, and Americans gave them more than $300 billion in 2007. 86 The British public’s response to disasters like the 2010 Haiti earthquake (for which the Disasters Emergency Committee raised £106 million) shows that the willingness to act on empathy for the victims of natural disasters is still considerable even when they are distant. 87 The DEC conducts consolidated appeals for the fourteen leading aid NGOs in the UK, and a look at their various appeals over the last few years shows that there is a constant willingness to donate, albeit at variable rates, from the 2009 Gaza appeals’s £8.3 million to the 22massive £392 million given for the 2004 Tsunami appeal. 88 There are clearly diﬀerential responses, but these do not add up to a generally diminished response.

# No Compassion Fatigue – AT: Sontag

**Compassion fatigue isn’t a thing – Sontag concludes aff**

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It is worth undertaking a closer examination of Sontag’s reasoning in order to understand what the concept of compassion fatigue assumes. Sontag claims that familiarity with images is what determines the emotions people summon in response to photographs of suﬀering: Don McCullin’s photographs of emaciated Biafrans in the early 1970s [sic] had less impact for some people than Werner Bishchof’s photographs of Indian famine victims in the early 1950s because those images had become banal, and the photographs of Tuareg families dying of starvation in the sub-Sahara that appeared in magazines everywhere in 1973 must have seemed to many like an unbearable replay of a now familiar atrocity exhibition. 20 There is no supporting evidence for the vague claims that McCullin’s photographs “had less impact for some people” or that the images of dying Tuareg “must have seemed to many like an unbearable replay...”. While it would be wrong to insist on social scientiﬁc protocols for an interpretive essay, the insubstantial foundations on which this idea of repetition and familiarity leading to a failure of response has been built are revealed in these sentences. Sontag’s analysis was written between 1973 and 1977, and the grounds for this argument seem even weaker when we consider that no more than seven years later the world was moved to the largest charitable event ever by both still and moving pictures of mass famine in Ethiopia. So where does Sontag’s conviction that “the shock of photographed atrocities wears oﬀ with repeated viewings” comes from? 21 Because she maintains that photographs of atrocity jolt viewers only because they oﬀer them something novel, her conviction is founded on the “negative epiphany” arrived at in a “ﬁrst encounter” with horriﬁc pictures: For me, it was photographs of Bergen-Belsen and Dachau which I came across by chance in a bookstore in Santa Monica in July 1945. Nothing I have seen - in photographs or in real life - ever cut me as sharply, deeply, instantaneously. Indeed, it seems plausible to divide my life into two parts, before I saw those photographs (I was twelve) and afer, though it was several years before I fully understood what they were about. 22 Encountering photographs of the Nazi’s concentration camps for the ﬁrst time is surely something that many of us can recall. However, a personal epiphany seems a weak basis on which to make absolute and universal claims about the power of photography, not least because each of us will experience our epiphanies on a timescale at variance with Sontag’s. What is repetitive for her will be novel for others. Who is to say that the millions moved to charitable action by Live Aid in 1984 were or were not familiar with either Bischof’s or McCullin’s famine photographs? Although Sontag’s articulation of the relationship between photography and compassion fatigue from the 1970s has been pivotal to the concept’s enduring power, thirty years later, in Regarding the Pain of Others, Sontag heavily qualiﬁed and largely retracted her earlier claims: As much as they create sympathy, I wrote [in On Photography], photographs shrivel sympathy. Is this true? I thought it was when I wrote it. I’m not so sure now. What is the evidence that photographs have a diminishing impact, that our culture of spectatorship neturalizes the moral force of photographs of atrocities? Not everything posited in On Photography is abandoned in Regarding the Pain of Others. Sontag still operates in terms of assumptions about the scope and scale of our “incessant exposure to images, and overexposure to a handful of images seen again and again.” 23 Equally, she persists with the proposition that “as one can become habituated to horror in real life, one can become habituated to the horror of certain images.” What changes is the fact that this condition is no longer a given: “there are cases where repeated exposure to what shocks, saddens, appalls does not use up a full-hearted response. Habituation is not automatic, for images…obey diﬀerent rules than real life.” 24 Sontag’s increased attentiveness to contingency carries over into an appreciation of the diﬀerent motivations of individuals and the diﬀerent capacities of images. People, she writes, “can turn oﬀ not just because a steady diet of images of violence has made them indiﬀerent but because they are afraid.” 25 Pictures of the atrocious, she concedes, “can answer to several diﬀerent needs. To steel oneself against weakness. To make oneself more numb. to acknowledge the existence of the incorrigible.” 26 But in her clearest reversal, Sontag concludes “harrowing photographs do not inevitably lose their power to shock.” 27

# No Compassion Fatigue – AT: Moeller

**Moeller deploys compassion fatigue as an empty signifier, and multiple studies disprove her thesis**

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In these moments, Moeller regards compassion fatigue not as a thing that acts, but the condiTion which results from acTion elsewhere: it is the unavoidable, inevitable consequence the public lapses into as a result of someone or something else’s fault. The many and varied ways in which Moeller articulates the idea of compassion fatigue and the causal relaTions associated with it demonstrate that the term is an empty signiﬁer - it has no agreed meaning and lacks stable referents, instead funcTioning something like a cultural meme around which a host of concerns and criticisms swirl. This can be demonstrated further by considering those few moments in which Moeller oﬀers some substantive evidence for her multiple posiTions. The informaTion in Moeller’s book is derived from interviews with, or quotes from, important ﬁgures in America’s mainstream press speaking about the intersecTion of poliBcs, media and internaTional events. Small anecdotes - such as the case of the Newsweek issue with a Luc Delahaye photo of an injured Bosnian child on the cover being one of the poorest selling weeks of all time - bear the weight of general arguments. 43 There are also limited references to newspaper stories on compassion fatigue, which oﬀer up interviews from both citizens and sources like Neil Postman, who was quoted in a 1991 New York Times story proclaiming; the sheer abundance of images of suﬀering will tend to make people turn away...People respond when a little girl falls down a well. But if 70,000 people in Bangladesh are killed, of course people will say, 'Isn't that terrible' but I think the capacity for feeling is if not deadened, at least drugged. 44 13 The best way to consider the supports for Moeller’s argument is to examine her discussion of the US coverage and response to the Rwanda genocide. As with other chapters, the thorough analysis of the crisis in Rwanda is linked to a media critique via the occasional remarks of broadcasters, print journalists and editors, and buttressed by the odd quote from members of the public. 45 Citizens are cited for their complaints about the publicaTion of graphic pictures from photographers like Gilles Peress, Tom Stoddart and others, while reporters remark on the challenges of covering a story as large as the mass killings in 1994. Moeller’s central point is that when a naTion fails to act decisively in the face of incontrovertible evidence of genocide despite extensive media coverage it is evidence of compassion fatigue either on the part of media or the public or both. But part of her own narrative shows the problematic nature of compassion fatigue as a concept for the dynamics she wishes to examine. Using a Boston Globe report on the charitable response to Rwanda, Moeller makes much of the fact that during the weeks of the mass killings Oxfam America received no more than the normal number of phone calls from people oﬀering donaTions. Her conclusion is that “the images of the genocide spurred few to donate money.” 46 However, after the killing ended and Rwanda became a refugee crisis, with hundreds of thousands ﬂeeing to Goma and suﬀering from cholera as a result, Oxfam received more than 1,000 calls in 24 hours with people willing to donate vast sums of money. According to the Boston Globe reporter, all attribute the sudden interest to news coverage of the cholera epidemic that in the past four days has killed 7,000 Rwandans who have ﬂed to refugee camps in Zaire. The link is so direct, they say, that phone calls peak immediately after graphic reports of dying Rwandan refugees are broadcast on news reports...Many callers are crying on the phone. Some ask if they can adopt orphaned children, others want to ﬂy to Rwanda to volunteer. 47 It is curious, to say the least, that an outpouring of compassion is mobilised as evidence for an argument about the pervasiveness of compassion fatigue. Furthermore, this report on the rise of compassion came just six weeks after the views in another American newspaper report are cited by Moeller as evidence for the claim that “the symptoms of compassion fatigue are getting worse”: ‘It wasn’t too long ago,’ wrote Richard O’Mara in The Baltimore Sun, ‘that the face of an African child, frightened and hungry, could draw out the sympathies of people in the richer countries and, more importantly, stimulate a reﬂex towards rescue. That face became emblematic of the 1980s. But with all symbols it soon list its human dimension, its link to the actual ﬂesh-and-blood child. Now that face stirs few people. The child has fallen victim, this time to a syndrome described as “compassion fatigue”.’ 48 Considering these points together demonstrates Moeller’s rampant lack of clarity about what is or is not compassion fatigue. The compassionate response towards Rwandan refugees is taken as evidence of the absence of caring during the genocide. For Moeller, photography is indicted in the process: she contends that “in the case of Rwanda, clearly, the famine images [sic] touched people. The genocide pictures did not.” 49 Then, compassion fatigue is said to be getting 15worse and this is supported by an opinion which declares that the face of the child in distress no longer stirs people, when just six weeks later the graphic accounts of dying Rwandans are cited as the principal reason behind the massive jump in charitable giving for those refugees. The fact that ‘compassion fatigue’ can be mobilised as a concept when a surge in charitable compassion is being discussed demonstrates how empty it is as a signiﬁer. Nonetheless, Moeller identiﬁes something important with her general if unfocused concerns concerning the Rwanda case. While compassion was not diminished, let alone exhausted, in the cases she considers, it is certainly diﬀerential. That is, while compassion as a reservoir of public empathy remains in plentiful supply, it is clearly directed towards some issues and not others at some times and not others. What Moeller has seized upon is the way in which humanitarian emergencies solicit both public and policy responses more readily than political crises. Moeller works hard to indict either the media or the public or imagery (or some combinaTion of the three) as culpable for a response that was clearly inadequate to the Rwandan genocide when it was underway. That the internaTional response to the Rwandan genocide was, to put it mildly, insuﬃcient, is by now well documented - as the Sarkozy photograph in the introducTion reminds us. 50 In the case of the United States government, the lack of acTion was the continuaTion of a century’s avoidance and indiﬀerence to some of humanity’s greatest crimes. 51 Moeller is thus undoubtedly correct to argue that “one diﬃculty in moving Americans toward engagement is that they consider few political themes or few internaTional conﬂicts compelling enough to galvanize a concerted response.” 52 However, the “Americans” who are most responsible in this formulaTion are the successive administraTions and policy makers who have regularly declined to support internaTional acTion on the grounds of the United States’ naTional interest. This is not to deny that the media and the public also bear some responsibility for America’s repeated failure to act, but it is clear that when the political leadership frames internaTional crises in ways that lessen the chance for a timely and robust response, this provides others with a powerful lead that further diminishes the likelihood of a timely and robust response. We saw this in the context of the Bosnian War, when both American and European leaders represented the conﬂict as a civil war leading to humanitarian emergency rather than a political concern. 53 And we have seen it in the context of the violence in Darfur, where a humanitarian script trumped the genocide narrative, and then only afer a United NaTions oﬃcial declared that it was ‘‘the world’s worst humanitarian crisis’’ which diﬀered from the genocide in Rwanda only in terms of the numbers aﬀected. 54 Moeller’s critique of American public and policy attitudes towards internaTional crises is persuasive in many respects, but it is not a critique that beneﬁts from being conducted in terms of ‘compassion fatigue’. Indeed, the overriding problem with Moeller’s approach is the way ‘compassion fatigue’ becomes the alibi for a range of issues which, while related at some levels, demand speciﬁc investigaTions. In addiTion to the political critique, Moeller wants to argue that compassion fatigue is responsible for “much of the failure of internaTional reporting today,” “the media’s peripatetic journalism,” and “the media’s preoccupaTion with crisis coverage.” Moeller is correct that there are many areas of concern when it comes to internaTional journalism, but ‘compassion fatigue’ as a general concept oﬀers little purchase on problems that include everything from news narraBves and television scheduling to the political economy of broadcasting, not least because the ecology of internaTional news has been radically transformed in the decade since her argument was published. 55 Finally, on top of the political and media critiques, Moeller deploys compassion fatigue as both a descripTion and explanaTion of the public’s allegedly “short attenTion span” and “boredom with internaTional news.” 56 Here, too, there are many quesTions to raise. We could point to the way these claims necessarily invoke a past golden age in which attenTion spans were supposedly long and nobody was bored. Or we could argue that these commonly repeated assumpTions about audience behaviour are contradicted by Pew Research Centre evidence which shows that “people are spending more time with news than ever before.” 57 Either way, these thoughts require us to ask: what, actually, is the evidence for the existence of compassion fatigue, where that term refers to popular desensitisaTion?

# Compassion Good

**Affirming an ethic of compassion is an ethical necessity – only by privileging compassion can we stop otherization which causes violence**

**Porter, 06** Elisabeth Porter, head of the School of International Studies at the University of South Australia, “Can Politics Practice Compassion?” hypatia 21:4 project muse Accessed 7/8/12

I am defending the position that it is possible to be politically compassionate and just and that such a claim should be disentangled from notions of gender.12 I dispute the essentialist claim that women are naturally compassionate. However, because of women's traditional association with caring and their role as primary parent, many women are experienced in caring and tend to respond readily with compassion. As others also argue (Philips 1993, 70; Sevenhuijsen 1998, 13), I am emphasizing the interplay between the particularity of compassion and the universality of justice. Undoubtedly, the dichotomy of public justice associated with masculinity and private care associated with femininity narrowed moral parameters, harmfully cementing restrictive gendered stereotypes. Rather, the relationship between compassion and justice is rich. Compassion “helps us recognize our justice obligations to those distant from us” (Clement 1996, 85). Examples of justice obligations include welfare programs; foreign aid; famine and disaster relief; humane immigration policies; and relieving the suffering of families who are affected by terrorism in Bali, Iraq, Israel, London, Morocco, Northern Ireland, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, the United States, and elsewhere. A choice between justice and compassion is false; considerations of justice “arise in and about the practice of care” (Bubeck 1995a, 189). Thus, a defense of the need for compassion is as much a defense for the rights of justice. Anticipating this defense was Elizabeth Bartlett's (1992) interpretation of Albert Camus' concept of rebellion in the novel The Plague. She made three points that resonate with my argument on the relationship between justice and care. First, justice originates from care. In Camus' ethic of rebellion, the passionate demand for justice and rights comes from compassionately witnessing and being outraged by such aggressive acts as battering, abuse, or police brutality, such incomprehensible injustices as innocent children suffering from malnutrition, and various forms of others' oppression. As Bartlett remarked, “It is these moments of compassionate recognition of human dignity, not a dispassionate calculation of rights, which give rise to the demand for justice” (1992, 84). Second, both justice and care imply community. In The Plague, rebellion is a rejection of all forms of oppression. Acts of compassion are choices to “suffer with” others in order to build solidarity.13 Third, care defines justice. For Camus, “only those actions which retain the impulse and commitment to care serve justice” through compassionate responses (Bartlett 1992, 86). This strong notion of compassionate justice in politics is necessary if we are to respond meaningfully to peoples' pain. The defense of compassionate justice is prominent in feminist literature because of women's historical experience of injustice and because of women's traditional association of caring. It is also prominent in postcolonial and development discourse where there are attempts to redress political injustice with the practical, compassionate development of human well-being. The third potential barrier to realizing political compassion lies in the controversy as to who and what we are responsible for. I have argued elsewhere that responsibilities are based on the principles of connection (1991, 159). We carry out responsibilities through moral engagement with others. The question, “how can I (we) best meet my (our) caring responsibilities?” (Tronto 1993, 137) is central to, but not exclusive to feminist ethics. Jean-Marc Coicaud and Daniel Warner, in expanding the relational dimension of ethics, argue that “somehow, we owe something to others and that our ability to handle what we owe to others decides in some sense who we are” (2001, 2). Yet this is not easy in practice. In our socially embodied moral world, our identities, relationships, and values differentially define our responsibilities. Practices of responsibility are situated culturally and many need changing. For example, in a materialist, technocratic age dominated by self-interest, compassionate impulses toward those who are suffering are dismissed readily as time-consuming, or consciences are salved by a quick donation to charity while complaining of “compassion fatigue.” Yet after the anguish of 9/11, people in many nations reassessed their priorities and lifestyles, reaching out to loved ones and strangers in affirming ways.14 Some feminists see the particularity of responsibility as an obstacle to realizing political compassion. For example, Susan Mendus argues that “identity and morality are constituted by actual relationships of care between particular people,” thus the concept of care does not translate readily to the wider political problems of hunger, poverty, refugee status, and war that require solutions for people we do not know (2000, 106). As I am arguing, it is not care alone or a particular relationship of care that enables compassionate responsibility, but a merging of a compassionate drive with a search for justice, equality, and rights. Caring for someone necessarily encompasses a concern for his or her equality and rights. I am supporting a strong notion of compassionate justice that accepts responsibilities toward “particular others” who can include “actual starving children in Africa with whom one feels empathy” (Held 1987, 118). If we take seriously the idea of global interdependence, then regardless of our specific nationalities and races, we have “duties” to people who are distant from us and belong to other communities (Midgley 1999, 161). Amartya Sen also believes we have a “multiplicity of loyalties” (1996, 113) to humanity, our nation, city, community, family, and friends. Simone Weil's notion of “justice as compassion” also is one in which mutual respect for all humans grounds our obligations to prevent suffering and harm. She believes that we have an unconditional obligation not to let a single human suffer “when one has the chance of coming to his assistance” (quoted in R. Bell 1998, 114).15 This qualifier is important. We cannot assume responsibility for all suffering, to do so is naïve. We can assume, however, some responsibility to try to alleviate suffering whenever we can. Yet, as intimated earlier, in order to move beyond empathy, we must also address claims for justice and equality. Again, I suggest that without the compassionate drive that is prompted by visualizing the pain of injustice, we will not feel peoples' anguish, or bother to consider what they need. As individuals, we have responsibilities beyond our personal connections to assist whenever it is within our capacities and resources to do so. I do not want to give the impression that our entire lives should be devoted to attending to others' needs. To do so would return women to exclusive nurturance at the expense of self-development and public citizenship. It is, rather, a matter of acting with compassion when it is possible to do so, and the possibility of course is debatable and requires priorities, which differ with us all. Politically, this means that politicians, nations, and international organizations have a similar responsibility to alleviate the suffering that results when peoples' basic needs are not met. There is a heavy responsibility on wealthy nations where the extent of poverty and misery is not as conspicuous as elsewhere to assist less wealthy nations.16 State responsibility is acute when suffering is caused by harsh economic policies, careless sales of arms and military weapons, severe immigration rules, and obscene responses to terrorism by further acts of violence. With the majority of these massive global issues, most of us can only demonstrate the first stage of co-suffering, and perhaps move to the second and debate the merit of options that might meet peoples' needs, and alleviate suffering. This vocal civic debate can provoke the third process of political responses that actually lead to political compassion. Given nations' moral failures of compassion and such conspicuous evidence of oppression, exploitation, brutality, and indifference, we need to be observant, and understand the implications of a failure to practice compassion. To summarize this section, the conceptual barriers that prevent the practice of political compassion are significant but surmountable. Compassion is not too personal for politics. Rather, it can be the emotion that helps prompt a critical scrutiny of institutional structures; it is the driving force toward the practice of compassionate justice; and, as an emotion and response, it broadens political responsibilities. I now argue that political compassion is linked to the political goals of a good society and is achievable politically.17 This argument contrasts with that of Hannah Arendt, who wrote that compassion abolishes the distance between citizens and thus is “politically speaking, irrelevant and without consequence” (1973, 86). Arendt's belief is that whereas the public arena is a site for deliberation, dissent, and argument, compassion requires a direct response that talking distorts. Certainly, too much abstract discussion on poverty, asylum seekers, detention camps, or the effects of war delays actual decisions for change. However, later, I argue that dialogue is a crucial way for all concerned groups to ascertain the best way to respond to peoples' feelings of vulnerability. Particularly in the current global climate of heightened vulnerability to terrorist attacks, the need for protection is powerful. Within liberal democracies, we are more accustomed to emphases on autonomy and self-sufficiency than the need for protection. While care ethics recognizes that we all are vulnerable in the sense that fortune and fate are “morally arbitrary” (Porter 1995, 181) and this is why it is important that we care about each other, most care ethics literature refers to the vulnerable either as children or as those requiring welfare, disability rights, or health care. In the present international context, we often lose sight of personal powerlessness and politically equate vulnerability with minimizing the possibility of terrorist threats. Considerations of national security thus dominate over human security. Certainly, terrorist threats must be dealt with appropriately, but the means of national protection should not be at the expense of the emotional safety of such vulnerable groups as asylum seekers. States need to maximize security, but “there are broader understandings of human security that encompass social well-being and the security of political, civil, social, cultural, and economic rights” (Porter 2003b, 9). The defense of human security can adopt an attitude toward the vulnerable of protective “holding,” which minimizes harmful risk and reconciles differences (Ruddick 1990, 78–79). How democratic nations deal with the vilification or reconciliation of cultural and religious differences is central to the practice of political compassion. For example, asylum seekers rightfully seek refuge, safety, and security, under United Nations conventions. These rights include the right to seek asylum and the right to request assistance to secure safety in their own countries. Those seeking such rights increasingly are facing governments with tightened borders. In multicultural states, tolerance, trust, and openness are essential for positive civic relationships. Since 9/11, there has been a movement away from open tolerance to closed dichotomies based on an “othering,” a stereotyping of groups considered different from “us.” These dichotomies are not harmless opposites; they “mask the power of one side of the binary to control the other” (D. Bell 2002, 433), like us/them, citizen/foreigner, friends/enemies, and good/evil. Absolutist dichotomies are blind to nuances, middle-ground positions, particular contexts, and connections, all the considerations of judgment needed for wise, compassionate decisions. Importantly, absolutist dichotomies are oblivious to the pain of those who are excluded, those most in need of protection. They make people feel “at risk” simply for looking different or having a different faith. Those with absolutist views see “illegal immigrants” and “queue jumpers” rather than desperate, fearful people seeking legitimate asylum. A classic example of this binary control is President George W. Bush's ultimatum, “If you're not with us, you're against us.” A simplistic with us/against us, free world/axis of evil analysis cements an inclusion/exclusion that fails to comprehend the pain of those who are excluded.

# \*\*\*WAR (GENERAL)

# War Reps Bad

**Representing war as exclusively negative and violent only constructs threats, only the alternative can solve wars through nonviolent methods**

**Sarrica and Contarello 4** (Muro Sarrica – Department of General Psychology at the University of Padova and Alberta Contarello – PhD, Department of Philosophy, Sociology, Education and Social Psychology, Section of Applied Psychology at the University of Padova “Peace, War and Conflict: Social Representations Shared by Peace Activists and Non-Activists,” September 2004, Vol. 41, No. 5 <http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/41/5/549>)//PC

The present research had two main aims: to study groups of activists and the creation of specific social representations; and to gain a better understanding of peace activism by investigating the meanings that underlie the phenomenon. Given the exploratory nature of the enquiry, our findings provide support for our expectations but also raise many points to be taken up and further investigated. Overall, the hypotheses on social representations of war and peace find support. As regards war, at least two main representations may be observed, with a common intersection. Non-activists repre- sent war as a tragic event, which endangers life and against which there is nothing to be done; it gives rise to feelings of impotence and desperation. Activists, on the other hand, develop a more concrete approach to what can be done. This confirms the results of many previous studies (see Schatz & Fiske, 1992). As regards peace, a clear social representation would appear to emerge only in the case of the activist group, as expected, whereas the representation supplied by non- activists does not appear to be sharply defined. War-zone experience and identifi- cation with one’s own association also account for the different contents of representations. Lastly, as regards represen- tations of both war and peace, women make greater reference than men to interpersonal and emotional aspects. The social represen- tation of conflict proves to be of major importance. The representation of conflict is the item that distinguishes peace activists from non-activists to the greatest extent. The former regard conflict as normal and ambiva- lent, whereas for the latter, it differs from war only because it is more local and inter- personal, but it is still exclusively negative. In addition, the more activists identify with their own association, the more they regard conflict as normal. A lower level of identifi- cation correlates with a more problematic representation of conflict. This set of results fits in well with the theoretical perspective we proposed. In studies on social representations, reference is frequently made to macro-social analysis, attempting to compare representations shared by entire populations (Doise, Spini & Clémence, 1999; Orr, Sagi & Bar-On, 2000; Wagner, Valencia & Elejabarrieta, 1996). By focussing on small real groups, the present study stresses the importance they have in the creation of specific representations within society at large, as well as emphasiz- ing the active role they play in defining the context in which they operate. The results obtained show the importance that practical activity (in this case, peace activism) has in giving rise and maintenance to social representations. Activists construct specific social representations of the issues they fight for, and these representations give meaning to their activity. At the same time, sharing these representations is a basic element in the social identity of the activist, as shown by the differences encountered among activists: those who identify less with their own group are also those who hold less prototypical views on peace and conflict, which sharply distinguish them from the outgroup, thus confirming the role of social representations in defining group boundaries. Identification with one’s own group may be viewed not so much as a variable affecting the extent to which each individual submits to normative influence (‘to espouse that same value system’, as suggested by Hinkle et al., 1996: 44), but rather as a variable linked to the sharing of specific social representations. Using a social representations approach has enabled us to study peace as a positive concept and peace activism as an active social proposal, overcoming the strange distortion where peace psychology concentrates mainly on the effects of war and the resolution of conflicts. In addition, as regards peace psy- chology’s contribution, we may at this point hypothesize a general interpretative key, which is not so much an ultimate goal as an initial research hypothesis. The study of the social representations of war, peace and conflict supports the hypothesis that peace activism may be interpreted as a form of coping, not only in the face of a nuclear threat but also as a reaction to the threat of war in general. The non-activist group, in fact, tends to refer to specific social represen- tations with conflict seen always in negative terms (war evoking scenarios of impotence) and peace, in the superficial nature of external signs and abstract principles, as only a vague utopia. Not committing oneself actively against war may be interpreted as a form of emotional coping in the face of a ter- rifying threat. For peace activists, on the other hand, war is a concrete fact and can therefore be tackled. Peace, by contrast, is a dynamic confrontation characterized by, among other things, contrasts. Finally, conflict is perceived as something natural that may be resolved positively. Activism emerges decisively as a form of coping that focuses on the problem. It is not a question of an individual approach based on one’s own effectiveness and one’s own resources, but a form of com- munity coping. In their theoretical elabora- tion of this concept, Lyons et al. (1998) emphasized the great importance of com- munication processes within a close com- munity – processes that were described in the present study in the form of social represen- tations. In support of the idea that efficacy arises from the group, we find the free associ- ations prompted by myself in relation to my association. The doubts and weariness that portray the single individual, combined with trust, become a representation of the group characterized by efficacy, friendship and mutual support. Since this preliminary enquiry is of a highly explorative nature, many questions remain unanswered and would benefit from further research. More specifically, based on these findings, subsequent studies with different, specific methods should clarify what is the central nucleus and what are the peripheral elements of the various represen- tations, as well as which specific elements distinguish them. Since the number of subjects investigated was relatively small, it would be interesting to develop future research to include larger numbers to produce a clearer picture of the national panorama and better balance the proportions of men and women interviewed. Collection of data from a larger and more representative sample, especially if obtained using a random procedure, would, in addition, prevent dis- tortions due to the personal characteristics of participants who choose to join the research. The set of practices that effectively involve activists should be investigated in greater depth, to gain a better understanding of the links between the origins and assertions of the social representations. To this end, it could also be interesting to investigate the possible differences arising between people involved in different groups actively involved in peace actions (e.g. professional mediators, volunteers). If we do not take practices to be just synonyms of behaviours but as units of action and social meaning, then we also need a deeper investigation of the whole specific culture in which they are embedded, to better understand their underlying sense. Practical Considerations and Possible Developments for the Associations Since the present work is also intended as an applied study, we might conclude with some brief practical considerations for peace movements. The representation of conflict that non-activists appear to hold should not be allowed to hold sway during meetings dealing with methods for finding nonviolent solutions to conflict. The preconception that conflict is something negative, to be avoided, and from which one party will necessarily emerge defeated should be rebutted. **Only when this problem has been tackled can non- violent methods of solving conflicts be fully understood**. Likewise, people must be made more aware of their potential to act against war. Rather than present an apolitical and abstract scenario, it should be stressed that even the most serious decisions are taken by men and women, on whom it is possible to exert pressure. In conclusion, it is essential to allow activists, especially new recruits, to take part actively in meetings and collective experiences. This might develop a greater sense of belonging to the group, greater adhesion to the culture of the group and more consistent behaviour – all aspects of fundamental importance for affirming the ideas that this admirable minority put forward.

**Nuclear war rhetoric only encourages risk-taking, belligerency, and irrationality – it ignores the victims view of nuclear war**

**Helwich 11** (David, Bachelor of Arts/Bachelor of Science from the University of Wyoming, Master of Arts from the University of Wyoming, Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of College of Liberal Arts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the University of Pittsburgh, Approved by William Keller, PhD, Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, John Lyne, PhD, Professor, Communication, John Poulakos, PhD, Associate Professor, Comunication, Dissertation Advisor: Gordon Mitchell, PhD, Associate Professor, Communication, “Nuclear Weapons After The Cold War: Change And Continuity In Public Discourses,” 2011, University of Pittsburg, Proquest, <http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdlink?vinst=PROD&fmt=6&startpage=-1&vname=PQD&RQT=309&did=2482201131&scaling=FULL&vtype=PQD&rqt=309&cfc=1&TS=1341791964&clientId=17822>)//PC

In writing about her study detailing her experiences observing “inside” the nuclear force and strategy planning establishment, sociologist Carol Cohn argues that the discourse utilized in nuclear planning has dangerous consequences, both for individuals within the nuclear establishment and for persons debating and deliberating about the role of nuclear weapons. Cohn develops this point in a 1987 article published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Technostrategic language articulates only the perspective of the users of nuclear weapons, not the victims. Speaking the expert language not only offers distance, a feeling of control, and an alternative focus for one’s energies; it also offers escape from thinking of oneself as a victim of nuclear war. No matter what one deeply knows or believes about the likelihood of nuclear war, and no matter what sort of terror or despair the knowledge of nuclear war’s reality might inspire, the speakers of technostrategic language are allowed, even forced, to escape that awareness, to escape viewing nuclear war from the position of the victim, by virtue of their linguistic stance. I suspect that much of the reduced anxiety about nuclear war commonly experienced by both new speakers of the language and longtime experts comes from characteristics of the language itself: the distance afforded by its abstraction, the sense of control afforded by mastering it, and the fact that its content and concerns are those of the users rather than the victims. In learning the language, one goes from being the passive, powerless victim to being the competent, wily, powerful purveyor of nuclear threats and nuclear explosive power. The enormous destructive effects of nuclear weapons systems become extensions of the self, rather than threats to it. 68 The discourse of nuclear strategy, which Cohn identifies as an example of technostrategic discourse, distances its users from the consequences of using nuclear weapons while creating a powerful feeling of control over their use. In a later passage Cohn argues that this sense of mastery of “nuclearist” language encourages risk-taking and belligerent political stances concerning the potential use of nuclear weapons. Likewise, she claims that the abstract nature of nuclear language eases public opposition to nuclear weapons by deflating the threat of mass destruction. 69 The discourse of nuclear weapons thus anesthetizes its practitioners from the consequences of nuclear war while deflecting public opposition to what Cohn describes as the “masculine world of nuclear planning.” 70 From a rhetorical perspective, her work highlights the powerful effects that what Goodnight describes as “the discourse of the technical sphere” can have upon political deliberations about the role of nuclear weapons. 71

**Nuclear deterrence discourse eliminates public deliberation on nuclear policy and leads to nuclear numbing and re-creates the conditions for their impacts**

**Helwich 11** (David, Bachelor of Arts/Bachelor of Science from the University of Wyoming, Master of Arts from the University of Wyoming, Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of College of Liberal Arts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the University of Pittsburgh, Approved by William Keller, PhD, Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, John Lyne, PhD, Professor, Communication, John Poulakos, PhD, Associate Professor, Comunication, Dissertation Advisor: Gordon Mitchell, PhD, Associate Professor, Communication, “Nuclear Weapons After The Cold War: Change And Continuity In Public Discourses,” 2011, University of Pittsburg, Proquest, http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdlink?vinst=PROD&fmt=6&startpage=-1&vname=PQD&RQT=309&did=2482201131&scaling=FULL&vtype=PQD&rqt=309&cfc=1&TS=1341791964&clientId=17822)//PC

Drawing from a wide range of both rhetorical criticism and other critiques of the effects of nuclear discourse, rhetorical scholar Edward Schiappa provides a detailed overview of many of the problems associated with nuclear language. He equates “nukespeak,” a term coined by a group of British linguists 72 with “terministic screens,” extending Burke’s analysis that “terminologies direct our attention by selecting some aspects of reality to focus on and deflecting others.” 73 Schiappa applies this concept to participants and audiences in nuclear deliberations, observing that: the likely consequence of nukespeak is that its users will tend to understand nuclear weapons, strategy, and war as benign or beneficial rather than repulsive and horrifying. This hypothesized result is supported by reports of the military establishment and by an observer of military ‘culture.’ 74 Nuclear rhetoric thus structures both the ability of speakers to understand the consequences of nuclear weapons and distances practitioners of nukespeak from the realities of nuclear war. Schiappa is also concerned with the effects of an uncritical spread of the use of nukespeak upon both the audiences of nuclear policy debates and the general public. He argues that the highly technical nature of nuclear discourse limits the agency of participants and audiences within nuclear debates because those in power define the terms through which the debate can occur. Members of the public are denied access to nuclear weapons decision-making because its technical aspects are structured in ways that rig dialogue to support the perspectives of the nuclear establishment. 75 Schiappa identifies two mechanisms of nuclear discourse that potentially debilitate meaningful debate about the role of nuclear weapons. The first, which he identifies as “domestication,” involves translating nuclear discourse into so-called “everyday language.” Phrases such as “nuclear exchange,” “nuclear umbrella,” “bargaining chips,” and “richer options” have the effect of making nuclear war more palatable to the public. Similarly, the domestication of nuclear weapons weakens public deliberation about nuclear weapons because it removes those weapons from the slate of items to be debated. 76 The second process Schiappa identifies is “bureaucratization,” which includes both a proliferation of acronyms and technical jargon relating to nuclear weapons and planning for a nuclear war. Acronyms such as MIRV, ICBM, LOW, EMP, and START, and phrases like “radiological emergency,” “survivability,” and “anticipatory counterattack,” he argues, serve to distance the practitioners of nuclear discourse from the consequences of their imagined actions, both lending a false sense of mastery and rendering nuclear war less horrifying. 77 Domestication thus sanitizes nuclear discourse while bureaucratization technologizes it. Schiappa describes the impact of this as “render[ing] nuclear policy irrelevant or inaccessible to public deliberation and investigation.” 78 Nuclear language thus insulates the nuclear establishment from public criticism and limits the horizons of potential debate about nuclear weapons. British ‘nukespeak’ analysts develop a slightly different treatment of metaphor and euphemism. In the introduction to the 1982 volume Nukespeak, Stephen Hilgartner, Richard C. Bell, and Rory O’Connor observe that misuses of language “have consistently distorted the debate over nuclear weapons and nuclear power.” 79 This argument is developed as a critique of the ‘nuclear lexicon,’ which they describe as “a world of doublethink” **that takes traditional notions of peace and security and wraps them in the warped logic of nuclear deterrence,** deploying savvy euphemisms and a “highly specialized vocabulary” in an effort to gloss over the horrific consequences of nuclear conflict. 80 In a similar vein, linguist Paul Chilton argues that the use of euphemism and metaphor by practitioners of nuclear discourse functions to obscure and sanitize discussions about nuclear weapons. 81 He also claims that “discourse producers concentrate linguistic effects at … critical discourse moments,” and “mobilize meaning” by legitimizing, reifying, and dissimulating nuclear weapons and the realities of nuclear war. 82 Metaphors, which equate nuclear weapons with everyday items and concepts, and euphemisms, which deflect attention from the intended purposes and uses of nuclear weapons and strategies, Chilton maintains, suppress public opposition to nuclear weapons. In describing the effects of euphemisms, he claims that they are “thus always a potentially ideological tool of language,” and thus are a powerful tool of the nuclear establishment. The replacement of plain language with vague euphemisms in public debates about nuclear weapons removes the horrors of such weapons from the public eye. 1.2.4 Other Disciplines In their influential and controversial work Indefensible Weapons, psychologist Robert Jay Lifton and political scientist Richard Falk describe the political and psychological effects of nuclear weapons, detailing what they call “nuclear numbing,” a process through which the public and policy makers become increasingly desensitized to the consequences of nuclear deterrence doctrines and the potential use of nuclear weapons. Lifton writes that nuclear numbing is perpetuated by a series of experts who work as “hired anesthetists” that both ignore the effects of nuclear war upon its victims while “conveying the sense that nuclear matters are completely under control” because the knowledgeable professionals have a firm grasp of the situation.88 Nuclear numbing is a psychological process that is perpetuated by an increasing technicization of nuclear weapons and nuclear discourse. Lifton’s argument differs from the work of nukespeak and nuclear rhetorical critics in its emphasis on the role of psychological health in political debates. Although Lifton and Falk have been justifiably criticized for having an overlydeterministic view of the effects of language and for providing relatively scant evidence for their broader claims, they still raise the important point that nuclear discourse does tend to remove nuclear weapons from public debate, both through bolstering public faith in ‘nuclear priests’ and by sanitizing the potential consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.89 Lifton, writing with psychologist Eric Markusen, has also explored the desensitizing psychological effects of a willingness to use nuclear weapons upon politicians and members of the nuclear establishment, arguing that the “otherization” and “demonization” used to justify the use of nuclear weapons **increases the possibility of their use**.90 Lifton and Falk make another important contribution to the study of public deliberations about nuclear weapons with their discussion of the argumentative strategies used to mask the inherent dangers of nuclear weaponry and deterrence doctrines from the attention of both nuclear experts and the public. Lifton describes a series of “nuclear illusions” that obfuscate the purported irrationality of nuclear weapons policy. The central illusion is one of ‘limit and control,” tied to the concept that nuclear war is both survivable and winnable, perpetuated by, among many others, military analysts Keith B. Payne and Colin Gray in their famous 1980 essay

**The affirmatives nuclear discourse ignores the view of the victims and only justifies hegemonic stances and upholds the ability to wage war**

**Allan 89** (Stuart, Carleton University “Talking our extinction to death: Nuclear Discourse And The News Media,” CANADIAN JOURNALOF COMMUNICATION,VOL. 14, NO. 1, 1989)//PC

In tracing further the more pronounced implications of Orwell's Newspeak program for recent efforts to theorize nuclear discourse, the most pertinent research to be drawn upon revolves around the questions of the 'nuclearization of language' or, similarly, 'nukespeak'. A close reading of that (English-language) literature suggests that while efforts to provide an analytically precise definition of nukespeak are sig- nificant in number (see Aubrey, 1982; Beedham, 1983; Chilton, 1985b, 1982; Faw- cett, 1985; Fowler and Marshall, 1985; Hilgartner et a1 1982; Hodge, 1985; Hodge and Mansfield, 1985; Hook, 1985,1984a, 1984b; Kress, 1985; Moss, 1985a, 1985b; O ' T o o l e , 1 9 8 5 ; V an B e l l e a n d C l a e s , 1 9 8 5 ) , t h e y h a v e c o n s i s t e n t l y p r o v e n t h a t t h e n o – tion is an elusive one. Generally, most formulations appear to be organized around a number of common linguistic elements or themes, the most prominent of which in- clude the use of euphemism, jargon, modality, negativity, the non-realization of agen- cy, syntax and vocabulary to construct and reinforce a 'neutralizing language' which servestofacilitatethelegitimizationofcertainmilitarizationprocesses. One question which then arises concerns the applicability of such a construct for analyzing the Soviet equivalent f nukespeak. Certainly this type of research would provide a fascinating point of comparison, as well as underscoring the complexity of what is often a rela- tional series of utter ances vis-à-vis the 'enemy'. An extensive search of the literature, however, has yet to produce a systematic study of this nature (see Keen, 1986, for an examination of visual metaphors and the mechanism of enmity in Soviet propagan- da); its import for future research must therefore be accentuated. For Chilton, who has been recognized as the originator of the term itself (see Beed- ham, 1983; Fawcett, 1985), to employ the notion of nukespeak is essentially to make three claims. First, that there is currently in use a specialized vocabulary for speak- ing about nuclear issues which relies on habitual metaphors and preferred grammati- cal construction; second, that this variety of English is 'ideologically loaded' to the extent that it works to justify 'nuclear culture'; lastly, that this is of importance to the extent that language affects how people think and therefore act on related issues (Chil- ton,1982:95). Hook makes an important addition in terms of the notion of perspec- tive. He suggests that the term nukespeak implies a fundamental choice between a view of nuclear 'reality' from the 'top down'; that is, from the 'official' definition, or 'bottom up', which signifies the 'victims' position (Hook. 1985: 67). Further, Hook contends that "the perspective of the victims has been consistently excluded from the hegemonic nuclear discourse...[as they] ...are most commonly viewed from the perspective of the executioners"(1985:67). Such a configuration allows for the con- sideration of the choice itself, precisely as it is reproduced through the social framing of the predominant ways of speaking nuclear issues, as an explicit manifestation of particular relations of domination and resistance. Characteristic of much of the work completed on this problem to date is the view of nukespeak functioning as a conscious attempt on the part of the nation-state to facilitate the continued production and deployment of nuclear weapons. Often the primary focal point for this type of analysis is that nukespeak is designed to ensure that the nation-state's policy on defence and security issues is perceived by the public as constituting the only sensible, rational and correct approach. The terminology and grammatical constructions attributed to those individuals and institutions positioned within the dominant nuclear discourse are therefore defined as controlled responses directed at potential threats to the nation-state's legitimacy (for a general discussion of the 'maleness' of related scientific discourses, see Easlea, 1983). Some evidence for this line of inquiry is provided through studies of 'official' rhetoric (see Franck and Weisband, 1971; Glasgow University Media Group, 1985; Halverson, 1971; Hook, 1984b; Kress, 1985; Lapp, 1956; Luostarinen, 1986; Moss, 1985a; Nash, 1980; Rapopart, 1980; Richardson, 1985; Smith, D., 1987; Wander, 1984; Weart, 1985). as they illustrate certain advantages for the nation-state in propagating national 'self- defence', as opposed to propagating war, to maintain its continuous 'arms race'. In this way a world poised on the brink of a 'nuclear exchange' is both necessary and desirable if 'global stability' is to be maintained. The declaration of a 'winnable' or 'limited' 'conflict' becomes euphemized as 'pushing the button', 'pulling the nuclear trigger' or making 'the ultimate decision'. Moreover, only after 'thinking the unthinkable' can a 'general nuclear response' be 'set into motion' (where the 'three Rs of winning' are 'reload'. 're-constitution' and 'refire'). 'Their' cities and towns then become 'soft targets' to be 'removed' with 'clean', 'surgical strikes'. Precisely what size the 'nuclear footprint' will be when a 'target of opportunity' is 'neutralized', however, depends upon the 'success radius'. As a result, while expressly denying their intention to sustain the 'arms build up', the 'superpowers' simply demonstrate their 'need to uphold their ability to wage war'. Clearly, the term 'defence' is central here, since as an ideonym for the term 'war' it would indeed appear to allow the nation- state's military activity to be made synonymous with a perceived right to defend it- self.

**The discourse of deterrence fails and inherently only creates the pre-conditions for wars**

**Allan 89** (Stuart, Carleton University “Talking our extinction to death: Nuclear Discourse And The News Media,” CANADIAN JOURNALOF COMMUNICATION,VOL. 14, NO. 1, 1989)//PC

In sharp contrast to Vigor's position are the views of Chilton who considers this type of linguistic reasoning to be both absurd and dangerous, arguing that it rests on two fundamental misconceptions: first, the notion that the absence of a lexical item in a language implies an inability to comprehend the corresponding concept; and the second, the notion that the concept of deterrence is an objectively given category to be independently named in several languages (Chilton, 1985b: 103-04). Chilton as- sumes an alternative stance by insisting that conceptual limitation can not be inferred, particularly given that different cultures have formed in their military strategy various stable concepts and lexical items; examples include the Russian 'otpugivat' ('to frighten off'), the German 'abschrecken' ('ffighten off') and the French 'dissuader' ('dissuade') (1985b: 104). To further substantiate this claim, Chilton moves to ques- tion the role of language in conceptualizing the domain of strategy. Findings from a rigorous linguistic analysis of the 'ideologically conditioned knowledge' which 'deter', 'deterrent' and 'deterrence' signify suggests that, despite common claims to the contrary, nuclear weapons do not imply 'deter', but rather 'use' (1985b: 127). One brief example from his study is a quotation attributed to British Prime Minister Thatcher suggesting that 'deterrence has deterred'. Chilton points out that as it is pos- sible to state both that 'the (nuclear) deterrent deters the Russians' and that 'the (nuclear) deterrent does not deter the Russians\*(a prerequisite for continuing nuclear armament production), a precise distinction between semantic and pragmatic factors cannot be made; that is, the notion of deterrence is ideologically determined in specific ways by the user (1985b: 125-127). Further attempts to dismantle the 'theory of deterrence' as an ideological construct include the work of Van Belle and Claes (1985) who offer an examination of 'NA TO' defence policy where 'words play as big a part as arms'. The 'official doctrine of NATO policy' is based on 'mutual deterrence', the logic of which they contend rests on a confusion between "the most spiritual power-belief-with the most material power destruction by nuclear arms"(VanBelleandClaes,1985:99). By assuming a perspective on deterrence which defines it as a semiotic behavior, the authors are able to analyze the 'psycho-logic 'of the notion: firstly, in terms of closed systems of inference; secondly, in terms of culturally entrenched stereotypes and stories, and; finally, in terms of 'psych+pathological relations' between persons (1985: 95-101). NATO's 'deterrence discourse', they conclude, con notes that the 'enemy' or the 'other' is not seen asa 'real' other; rather it is always compared with an 'ideal image' of self (e.g. 'democracy' or 'freedom'), thus the dominant notion of deterrence is itself based upon a 'fundamental mistrust' (1985: 101). If the 'spiral of armament\*is to be stopped, this mistrust must be eliminated through the development of an international dialogue : that has as its subject the politics of deterrence itself(1985: 101). Kress (1985) offers a complementary approach to the 'politics of deterrence' for- mulation by placing a new emphasis on the capacity of language to function as a form of 'social action'. A basic anti-Soviet attitude, he contends, is present in all pro-nuclear deterrent texts (or constructed by its absence). Therefore, to devise strategies to alter the present ideological determinations of these texts, the social determination of lin- guistic practice must be theorized without precluding individual differences vis-a-vis the reader's role (Kress, 1985: 66-67,81-84). Strictly defined efforts to explicate lin- guistic action can not, he insists, account for how such arguments are embedded in those discourses which constitute the social life of most individuals, including discour- ses of work, the family, morality, nationalism, sexism and patriarchy (1985: 84). Kress's conclusion is thus similar to that of Van Belle and Claes to the extent that the very basis of the motivating ideology of pro-nuclear texts must be analytically privileged if the long-term ideological-political realignments articulated through strategic texts are to be brought about (1985: 84-86). It is clear that the degree to which the word 'deterrent' has been transformed into a synonym for nuclear weapons delimits the terrain for alternative efforts to (re)articu- late the need for eliminating their production. Moreover, this 'security rationale' and its privileged claim on 'reality' even appears to further mystify oppositional ways of formulating counter-definitions of what is 'at issue', thereby posing a significant dif- ficulty for any organized political intervention. This partial review of the literature would suggest that the deterrence construct appears to act as a dominant principle of pro-nuclear arguments, and when it is transferred to the deterrent 'value' of nuclear missiles (that is, the assumed value in the implicit claim that these weapons are actual- ly 'working' to deter the Soviet Union from aggressive action), then the concept itself is reified in relation to the missile's explosive capacity. If calls for disarmament are met with calls not for rearmament but for deterrence (Beedham, 1983: 22), and if 'deterrence strategy' is based on 'preserving the balance of MAD (mutual assured destruction)', then the continuation of the race to build evermore powerful weapons will have been effectively secured by the nation-state.

**Their nuclear discourse only re-creates the same threats they try to solve, leads to apocalypse and environmental degradation**

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"The atom" is mysterious, and mystified, in its associations with the primordial, the fundamental, and the sacred. Atoms are invisible abstractions, idealized and perfect in their mathematical representations; they are Platonic ideals or Husserlian essences. But at the same time, atoms are capable of direct and dramatic material effects as symbolized by the penultimate and sublime nuclear image—the mushroom cloud (Boyer, 1985; Caputi, 1993; Ferguson, 1984; Hales, 1991; Rosenthal, 1991; Ruthven, 1993; Weart, 1989; Winkler, 1993). In this merging of spirit and matter, abstractness and consequentiality, atoms are godlike entities. In striving to control and deploy atomic forces, humans, in turn, appropriate the sta- tus of gods. Caputi (1993), Chernus (1986), and Rhodes (1986) have noted the prevalence of religious imagery—and personal identification—in the discourse of scientists (Robert Oppenheimer), mihtary officers (Thomas Farrell), politicians (Harry Truman), and journalists (William Laurence) who participated in the drama ofthe first nuclear blast. As Chernus (1986) commented, "[Atomic] weap- ons are special in that they rely... on the basic principle that underlies our entire conception of material reality in the twentieth century—the structure ofthe atom. The mystery embodied in the Bomb is the mystery of reality itself, and it is the nu- clear scientists who have unlocked or harnessed it" (p. 15). In the preceding quote, Chernus called attention to the deification of "the Bomb" with an ironic use of capitalization. David Lilienthal (1963), the first chair- person ofthe Atomic Energy Commission and an early nuclear rhetor, apparently had no such ironic intention when he capitalized "the Atom" throughout a series of essays on its political and social meaning. Meanwhile, prominent nuclear scien- tists were contributing to the elevation of their own discipline with essays such as Erwin Schrodinger's What Is Life? (1945) and Niels Bohr's Afomic Physics and Hu- man Knowledge (1958), laying claim to the most fundamental questions of ontol- ogy and epistemology. Thus, the physical forces of the atom have acquired a theological status, and the "nuclear priesthood" that (ad)ministers these forces has become mysterious as well.' Mystery extends, further, to the weapons that embody and deliver these forces, and to the strategic "doctrines" that govern their place in a system of global relations based on the constant nuclear presence. In the doctrine of "deterrence," that presence itself replaces war (Baudrillard, 1983), whereas in the alternative doctrine of "nuclear war fighting," the simulacra of deterrence edge closer to a literal apocalypse in which the mysterious nuclear forces would be re- vealed and manifested materially. As Burke (1969) observed, mystery begets hierarchy: "The very word 'hierar- chy,' with its original meaning of 'priest-rule' (while in English one also hears 'higher') has connotations of celestial mystery" (p. 306). As we have seen, hierar- chical structures that emerge under the nuclear sign privilege closed communi- ties of technical, military, and government insiders. Meanwhile, geopolitical hierarchies are driven by a competition for nuclear superiority, or at least by a striving for membership in the "nuclear club" (symbolized by tbe possession of a nuclear "club" of another kind). These modes of hierarchy are mutually reinforc- ing: Geopolitical nuclear threats legitimate domestic nuclear institutions, which in turn provoke the expansion and intensification of those same threats (Kurtz, 1988; Nadel, 1995). In this context, environmental protection is subordinated to the overriding motive of weapons production, with both material and discursive consequences. Within the weapons production system, extraordinary material hazards are produced, while discourse about those hazards is constrained and contained (Kinsella, 2001). More broadly, environmental concerns in general are viewed as being less urgent than national security priorities, narrowly defined. Although one response to mystery is deification, another response is the urge to control or domesticate that mystery. These two responses exist in tension within the nuclear discursive formation. Thus another, related form of hierarchy—the most far-reaching and the one that most fundamentally links nuclear discourse to environmental communication—emerges as an increasingly alienated and ma- nipulative relationship between humanity and nature, understood as binary oppo- sites. Tbe "scientists who have 'unlocked' or 'harnessed'" (Chernus, 1986, p. 15) nuclear forces have taken the modernist project of subjugating the natural world to its ultimate end. Even the nuclear domain, one ofthe most inaccessible and myste- rious aspects ofnature, has become a "standing reserve" (Heidegger, 1977) for hu- man use; by implication, there are no limits to nature's potential for human colonization and exploitation. Rogers (1998) examined the implications ofthis bi- nary, hierarchical opposition between humanity and nature, tracing its Platonic origins and showing how it grounds both representational and constitutive theo- ries of communication. Drawing from feminist theory and from Neitzsche's re- flections on truth and power, he pointed out the association of "nature" or "matter" with the feminine and how a masculinized "will to truth" orders and con- trols that feminine principle. In such a discursive formation, possibilities for hu- man dialogue with nature are forfeited in exchange for a regime of separation and domination. Thus, the "domination" (Leiss, 1972), "death" (Merchant, 1979), or "end" (McKibben, 1989) of nature are driven in an especially potent way by nuclear discourse. I turn now to an examination of that discursive potency and its relationship to potent nuclear materialities.

**Nuclear power engages in the same discourse that assumes humans can control technology and leads to environmental destruction, only the alternative of reflecting can solve**

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Ten months after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Einstein (1946) wrote that "[t]he unleashed power ofthe atom has changed everything save our modes ofthinking, and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe." It is clear that the catastrophe envisioned by Einstein would entail the end ofhuman civiliza- tion, if not the human species, for he concluded that "a new type ofthinking is es- sential if mankind is to survive and move toward higher levels" (p. 11)."\* Einstein's statement called attention to the potency of nuclear energy and to the urgency of our situation, and has become a commonplace ofthe nuclear age. However, any new thinking adequate to this situation must recognize that "the unleashed power ofthe atom" is both a material and a discursive phenomenon. The statements of many nuclear rhetors presume that nuclear potency is en- tirely a property of the external, material world. Eor example, Mechling and Mechling (1995) showed how the image ofthe "nuclear genie" gained ascendancy in popular portrayals of atomic energy during the 1950s. In those narratives, hu- manity has encountered a pre-existing force, like a fisherman who, while walking on a beach, spies a bottle containing a mysterious and powerful genie. Human re- sponsibility for the genie's power begins only at this moment of encounter, and humans can choose to use that power for good or for evil. The nuclear narratives of the 1950s express confidence that humans can domesticate this external power, appropriating it for positive ends. Indeed, 3 decades later, in the face of a nuclear arms race that challenged this confidence in human control, one could still find physicist Edward Teller appealing to the "genie of technology" (Teller, 1987, p. 22) in his advocacy for a missile defense program. Eor Teller, the dangers ofnuclear en- ergy camefi-omwithout—from nature or from hostile foreign powers—and could be contained and controlled tbrough the use of ever-more sophisticated technolo- gies. Continuing U.S. commitments to an expensive and potentially destabilizing missile defense system maintained this same view toward containing the nuclear genie, and toward technology as the control of potent external forces. Thus, little evidence of new thinking has emerged during the half-century since Einstein's observation. In later elaborations of what he meant by "a new type of thinking," even Einstein, himself, returned to themes he had advocated decades before the advent of nuclear weapons, such as a rejection of nationalism and mili- tarism and a call for world government (Clark, 1971). Goals such as these, however important or necessary, have remained elusive while the potency and availability of nuclear weapons have increased enormously. Although the catastrophe envi- sioned by Einstein now appears even more threatening, our responses have been constrained by the same deep structure of meanings that produced the nuclear sit- uation. This structure of meanings limits our understandings of nuclear potency and our responses to that potency. As the preceding discussion ofthe theme ofmystery showed, contemporary nu- clear discourse has very deep roots. "The unleashed power ofthe atom" is not an external phenomenon we have recently discovered, which our discourse must now address; instead, it is a product of centuries of discourse about nature and about the relationship between humans and nature. As Mickunas and Pilotta (1998) ob- served, a tension between atomistic and wbolistic views, present in Western philo- sophical thought since Aristotle, was resolved in favor of atomism by the Enlightenment philosophers. A number of consequences followed: Nature was viewed as being infinitely manipulable by human agents, quantitative analysis took priority over qualitative approaches, and a fundamentally technological and instrumental rationality was establisbed. Human intervention in nuclear pro- cesses is a capstone ofthe subsequent modernist project and its conceptions ofsci- ence, technology, progress, and control—a dramatic demonstration of the Baconian vision of knowledge as power. The modernist constellation of meanings and practices, articulated over the course of 3 centuries, has culminated in contem- porary nuclear discourse and its potent material products such as nuclear weap- ons, nuclear power plants, and nuclear wastes. As I have demonstrated in the case of nuclear fusion research (Kinsella, 1996, 1999,2004a), nuclear power is not simply the liberated energy of subatomic parti- cles; it is also a formation of power/knowledge constituted through technical, or- ganizational, institutional, political, and cultural discourses. Nuclear materialities and nuclear discourse are inextricably linked, and tbeir potency is a product of how they operate together. As Beck (1992) suggested, we live in a condition of "re- fiexive modernity," subject to hazards of our own creation; only by reflecting on the discourses and practices that led to these hazards, and reconstructing them de- liberately, can we interrupt that refiexive loop (Kinsella, 2002). Examining the roots of nuclear discourse is an essential part of that refiective process.

**Their nuclear discourse and catastrophes only creates a self-fulfilling prophecy, destroys public participation in the political sphere, and destroys the environment – only the alternative can solve**

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Although the material catastrophe envisioned by Einstein has not (yet) occurred, arguably it bas been replaced by a social and political catastrophe, a catastrophe of public discourse. In an influential essay that helped inaugurate the "nuclear criti- cism" project ofthe mid-1980s (cf. Norris, 1994), Derrida (1984) suggested that the prospect of nuclear annihilation "through all the techno-scientific inventive- ness that it motivates, structures not only the army, diplomacy, politics, but the whole ofthe human socius" (p. 23). In a Burkean reading of Derrida, consistent with the preceding discussion of nuclear mystery, Williams (1989) suggested that the nuclear threat has acquired the status of a transcendental signified, a value or meaning that stands outside language. As an overarching presence beyond the hm- its of linguistic representation, **that threat appears mysterious and self-generating.** Such an ontological or theological absolute can neither be changed nor ignored; it appears as if our only available response is to submit to its potent disciplinary effects. Examining a wide range of popular cultural texts from tbe Cold War era, Nadel (1995) demonstrated how these disciplinary effects extended well beyond tbe (ex- plicitly) nuclear domain. Although the U.S. geopolitical strategy of "containment" through nuclear threat was directed at the Soviet Union, it motivated a parallel do- mestic containment of individual identities, social roles, cultural expression, and political discourse. Under the nuclear sign, operationalized as a binary opposition between the superpowers, the general population internalized behavioral and dis- cursive boundaries modeled in countless mass media messages and in everyday so- cial interaction. Thus, writing almost 4 decades after Einstein at an advanced stage ofthe Cold War, Baudrillard (1983) displayed an optimism regarding our basic survival but a pessimism regarding tbe conditions of tbat survival. Although his comment was directed at the Cold War deterrence regime, it now seems eerily rele- vant to emerging concerns about social control in an era marked by new fears of nuclear proliferation and terrorism: It isn't that the direct menace of atomic destruction paralyzes our lives....Deterrence excludes war—the antiquated violence of exploding systems. Deterrence is the neu- tral, implosive violence ofmetastable or involving systems. The risk ofnuclear atom- ization only serves as a pretext... to the installation of a universal system of security, linkup, and control whose deterrent effect does not aim for atomic clash at all... but really the much larger probability of any real event, of anything which could disturb the general system and upset the balance. The balance of terror is the terror of bal- ance, (pp. 59-60) Ironically appropriating a term from nuclear weapons design, Baudrillard (1994) described an "implosion" of culture and politics around a narrow range of possibilities. The threat of material annihilation is transformed into a potent dis- cursive annihilation encompassing public speech, cultural expression, and politi- cal process, as society's efforts are focused on sustaining the precarious nuclear order. Environmental communication is among the many domains impoverished by this arrangement. Most directly, the legitimacy of social commitments to nu- clear activities with dangerous environmental consequences appears unquestion- able, and public discussion of these activities is discouraged. Less directly but nevertheless pervasively, environmental concerns of all types are devalued and de- ferred, and public discourse provides few opportunities for considering more harmonious ways of living on and with the Earth. Although alternative voices are certainly not absent in this discursive regime, their potency is strongly attenuated. These poststructuralist readings of nuclear discourse are disturbing: they sug- gest that not only environmental communication, but virtually all public dis- course, is dampened by the effects of nuclearism. However, they also point to a potential way out of the closures that have prevailed to date. These closures are products ofthe meanings we have attached to nuclear phenomena, and by examin- ing those meanings more closely we can recognize their constructedness and con- tingency. An analysis ofthe nuclear discursive formation is a first step toward its reconstruction, opening up new possibilities for how we view nuclear materialities and our relationship to those materialities. Indeed, environmental communica- tion can play a special role in that process of reconstruction. If fundamental atti- tudes toward nature—the assumed binary opposition between nature and humanity, the privileging ofthe human pole in this opposition, the prevalence of atomistic rather than wholistic thinking, and the resulting modernist project of control—are among the sources of nuclearism, then environmental communica- tion provides a wide range of opportunities for interrogating those attitudes. When McKibben (1989) examined the social practices that lead to global climate change, or Merchant (1979) critiqued the masculinist bias in discourses ofnature, they also implicitly questioned the discursive premises of nuclearism. More di- rectly, environmental communication provides some ofthe most accessible sites for public engagement with nuclear institutions, policies, and practices; typically, individuals and communities can voice environmental concerns with greater au- thority and perceived legitimacy than they would bring to more arcane debates on strategic military policy or nuclear energy policy. Thus, environmental communi- cation provides both direct and indirect opportunities to challenge the nuclear discursive order.

**Even if our argument is rooted in cold-war ideology, it is uniquely applicable to contemporary problems**

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Although the observations of Baudrillard, Derrida, Nadel, and Williams were situ- ated in tbe historical context ofthe Cold War, they remain relevant to the contem- porary situation. The discursive constraints, communicative patterns, and systems of meaning established over nearly half a century are still influential; as Taylor and Hartnett (2000) remarked, their residues "contaminate" the ambiguous new dis- cursive environment. Thus, Taylor and Davis (2001, p. 286) observed that "the ways in which [Cold War] events are interpreted and enforced as 'lessons' may profoundly effect the institutions, policies, and technologies" that are now emerg- ing. Public discourse surrounding many urgent contemporary issues—nuclear weapons proliferation, international nuclear rivalries, missile defense technolo- gies, and terrorism threats—remains structured, in part, by the material and discursive "legacies" ofthe Cold War (Taylor, Kinsella, Depoe, & Metzler, 2005). It now appears that two distinct eras have followed the collapse ofthe binary op- position between the superpowers. Eor a decade, public perceptions ofthe threat of nuclear war diminished, leading to a broader recognition ofthe other nuclear threats it had masked: massive contamination at weapons production sites, vast accumulations of dangerous wastes from the production process, and the poison- ous social and political effects of the Cold War discursive order. That decade brougbt increased challenges to the legitimacy of nuclear institutions, with many of those challenges emerging from environmental concerns (Dalton et al., 1999; Depoe, 2004; Dycus, 1996; Hamilton, 2004; Kinsella, 2001; Masco, 1999; Metzler, 1998; Ratliff, 1997; Taylor & Davis, 2001; Taylor et al., 2005). However, the post-Cold War decade has now been succeeded by an era marked by new percep- tions of vulnerability to a multitude of threats, viewed or portrayed as external in origin. Although the sources and forms of these threats are more varied than were those ofthe Cold War, nuclear threats still retain a special symbolic potency.^ Di- rected outward, concerns about nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism are used to legitimate continued, and even expanded, commitments to defense pro- duction and military operations (Cordesman, 2002; Klare, 1995). Directed in- ward, they provide rhetorical resources for advocates ofthe "universal system of security, linkup, and control" that Baudrillard (1983, p. 60) identified. Thus, envi- ronmental concerns are again being displaced, and public discourse is again being constrained, as attention is focused on external threats and a new version of the Cold War "citadel culture" (Werkmeister, 1989) emerges. In this new context, another characteristic theme of nuclear discourse—secrecy—demands renewed critical attention.

# War Reps Bad – Pos Peace

**Their representation of war only recreates the conditions for war, justifies militarization, and exacerbates insecurity**

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The language in which modern weapons deploy- ments are portrayed requires particularly careful exa- mination. As noted earlier, the term "arms race" is especially misleading. Similarly, the term 'deterrence' brings with it meanings and implications that both elucidate and obscure what is going on. Consider, for example, the way deterrence theory incorporates the term 'balance', as in balance of power, which can mean both preponderance (as with a bank balance) or equilibrium. This difference is crucial to the debate between deterrence and war fighting schools of nu- clear strategy. In conventional military terms, the more and bigger, the better. For classical minimum deterrence, enough is enough.15 Similar ambiguities arise from the use of terms like "modernization", or the depiction of strategic deployments quantitatively rather than qualitatively. The prevalence of "nukespeak", as such usages have come to be called, does not exhaust the impor- tance of language in this context. Indeed, as some of the terms already mentioned may suggest, what is important here is less the linguistic characteristics of particular words or the propagandists intentions of specific usages than the discourses about military affairs in which particular words and intentions parti- cipate. Two terms with very deep historical and cul- tural roots are particularly suggestive here: the 'ene- my' and 'peace'. The concept of the 'enemy' invokes a very complex theme within Western culture concerning 'the Other'. This theme comes in many forms, from the dialectical logic of master and slave to the projections of psychoa- nalysis. In its crudest forms, a manicheism prevails; we have truth, reason and God, they have supersti- tion, barbarism and the devil. This theme is familiar enough in many of our categorizations of the so-called insane, in the social construction of gender, and in relations between the West and the rest whether this has been the Ottoman Empire, the Soviet Union, or the Third World.16 It has been particularly pro- nounced in the recent rhetoric of the Cold War. The wider implications invoked by references to an enemy are closely related to the highly problematic nature of the concept of peace. Here problems arise from false distinctions between war and peace in an era in which preparations for war are an increasingly important aspect of peace-time activity. Problems also arise from definitions of peace as the mere absence of war, or from attempts to reconcile peace with other cherished values like 'justice'. But perhaps most significantly, our commonest understandings of the meaning of peace in Western societies embody conceptions of universalism that reflect a culturally specific philosophical tradition. Most obviously, peace has been associated with claims to unity, with universalist claims about the priority of order over conflict. The philosophy of Immanuel Kant is sym- bolic in this respect. With Kant, the possibility of peace is explicitly linked to the realization of uni- versal reason. This connection in turn grows out of a commonly perceived philosophical tradition that goes back to classical Greece. In fact, the conceptual opposition between war and peace reflects a wider philosophical discourse in which the moment of unity or identity is linked with the good, the true and the beautiful. Diversity and difference are then treated as the inferior negations of these privileged values. And, of course, whether one understands this cultural tradition in terms of the rise of secular rationalism, or of the convergence of rationalism with religious monotheism, the postulation of a single moment of unity, identity and truth allows for a sharp distinction between those who can and those who cannot claim to have access to it. A concept of peace that is firmly attached to extreme universalism easily permits a rapid slide into a manichean world of friend and foe. In short, to examine terms like enemy or peace is to recognize the depth and complexity of the broader discourses in which specific linguistic meanings are constituted. Manipulative rhetoric and propaganda become less important than the capacity of such dis- courses to generate and limit our understanding of the way the world is, and even to specify the options avail- able for the world to become. Something like Michel Foucault's (1979, 1978) analysis of the discourses through which our understanding of madness and sexuality have been constituted, is therefore called for here. The examples of the terms "enemy" and "peace" also suggest that the starting point for any such analy- sis must be the way our understanding of modern military affairs is caught up in a culturally and histori- cally specific discourse dominated by a sharply dicho- tomized account of the relationship between the prin- ciple of identity or unity and the principle of differ- ence or pluralism. I have argued elsewhere that it is precisely this account that informs the most influ- ential modern theories of international politics (Walk- er (forthcoming), Walker 1984a, 1984b. See also Ash- ley). More specifically, it underlies both the contrast between political realists and political idealists, and between forms of political realism informed by a sense of history and change (Machiavelli) and those informed by a structuralist account of inter-state rela- tions (Hobbes). This account has predisposed ana- lyses of change in international politics to pose possi- bilities for the future as either a tragic continuation of the same old game of power and war or a historic leap towards a universalist global community. It is not immediately obvious that this either/or choice is war- ranted by the historical evidence or by the indicators of current trends available to us. Nevertheless, this formulation continues to have a powerful grip on con- temporary thinking about international politics. It informs both textbooks and policy prescriptions. And it is clearly visible in public debate between "hawks" and "doves" on military issues, at least in the North American context. A critical assessment of these pre- dispositions is essential. These discourses constitute one of the most power- ful expressions of the connection between culture, broadly conceived, and emerging processes of milita- rization. On one level, they can be understood as par- ticipating in the processes of cultural production. They generate popular images and meanings as well as inform the interpretive codes of specific research communities. On another level, they reflect, and ob- scure, deep tensions within the dominant cultural tra- ditions of Western modernity. Our thinking about the nature of war and the possibilities of peace, for example, is frequently structured by an underlying tension between the philosophical principles of iden- tity and difference. It is not difficult to show that the limits to our understanding of reason, democracy, and security are implicated in similar tension. On a third level, they reproduce assumptions about the location of human identity and political action. Where modern forms of militarization demand great- er and greater attention to their impact on both global structures and the local activities of everyday life, these discourses reproduce a vision of politics as either the presence or absence of the state. Unfortu- nately, while the state has long been the form of politi- cal community that has been able to claim legitimacy and obligation precisely because of this capacity to provide security for its citizens, contemporary forms of militarization have begun to turn the state into a primary source of insecurity. It is in terms of the theory of the modern state, therefore, that the connec- tion between culture and insecurity must be estab- lished most clearly.

**The affirmatives depiction of war only re-creates conflict, destroys human identity, and wrongly legitimizes the state**

**Walker 87** (R.B.J., Tampere Peace Research Institute at the University of Tampere, Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Victoria, Canada, editor of the journal International Political Sociology, “CULTURE, DISCOURSE, INSECURITY,” 1987, Current Research on Peace and Violence, Vol. 10, No. 1, WAR, PEACE & CULTURE (1987), pp. 50-64, JSTOR)//PC

At a second level, militarization can be linked both to the tensions within the cultural traditions of West- ern modernity and to the sophisticated discursive structures about war and peace that have arisen within these cultural traditions. On the one hand, this suggests the need for a cultural politics aimed at unco- vering these tensions. That we live in a society that claims Enlightenment but advances barbarism, that claims democracy but enhances the secret state, that claims security but accumulates the power of mutual suicide, are fundamental points that demand constant exposure. On the other hand, there is the need for a cultural politics aimed at defusing the dominant dis- courses about war and peace. In the Western context these discourses reflect a heritage of Western rational- ism. Consequently, the critique of militarization ine- vitably becomes trapped in the familiar logic of iden- tity versus difference, order versus conflict, universa- list community versus pluralist conflict. This logic issues in the co-optation of dissent and the continued legitimation of present practices. Hence the crucial importance of refusing any simple dichotomization of the claims of identity and difference.17 Where militari- zation is often justified by the claim that human socie- ties are different, and therefore inevitably in conflict, and where opposition to militarization coalesces on propositions about the essential unity of human existence, it now seems necessary to stress the claims of both unity and diversity as a starting point for any formulation of more peaceful possibilities. Both levels lead on to the third, and it is here that the most important issues arise. In this context, the relation between culture and militarization appears as a reconstruction of the horizons of human identity. On the one hand this is felt as an expansion, a recogni- tion of the global structures in which we all partici- pate, whether we wish it or not. On the other it is felt as a contraction, a fusion of the most global structures with the minutest activities of everyday life. Yet this occurs at precisely the same time that the currently most powerful focus of human identity - the state - is becoming ever more powerful. In the more prosper- ous societies, processes of militarization seem to be enhancing the power of the state at the same time that the state is less and less able to justify its claims on human identity. In less prosperous societies, the state retains legitimacy in part because of its role in resist- ing more powerful states. It does so by entering fur- ther and further into the structures of militarization that render human security in general increasingly problematic. Perhaps the sharpest way of posing these connec- tions between culture, insecurity and the state is in terms of the broad problematic announced by the term "bureaucracy". It is here that many of the themes raised so far begin to come together. In the context of cultural production, questions of war and peace now engage very large bureaucratic institutions. Where it is tempting to analyse modern weapons deployments through general theories about the logic of deterrence or the determinations of technological innovation, it is often much more ins- tructive to enquire into the detailed analysis of the bureaucratic routines and rivalries that mediate spe- cific decisions.18 One of the most interesting issues here concerns the way modern military-bureaucratic structures reach out into a very broad sector of the intelligentsia. In the American case, for example, we can point to the symbolic early case of the Rand Corporation, the development of deterrence theory by ex-economists, and the proliferation of research institutions and uni- versity research projects dependent on defense fund- ing. Conversely, modern American social theory con- tinues to reflect an understanding of social life through metaphors and models stimulated by mili- tary research, as with cybernetics, game theory, opera- tions research and systems analysis. Here it is possible to analyse the relationship between particular bureaucratic institutions and the more general pro- cesses of cultural production and reproduction. It is also possible to examine the specific way in which policy is constituted through particular discursive structures.

# Nuclear War Reps Good

**Representations of nuclear war are key to understand and prevent nuclear war**

**Martin 2** (Brian, Professor of Social Sciences at the University of Wollongong, Australia, “Activism after nuclear war?,” 9/3/02, Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/02tff.html)//PC

In the event of nuclear war, as well as death and destruction there will be serious political consequences. Social activists should be prepared. The confrontation between Indian and Pakistani governments earlier this year showed that military use of nuclear weapons is quite possible. There are other plausible scenarios. A US military attack against Iraq could lead Saddam Hussein to release chemical or biological weapons, providing a trigger for a US nuclear strike. Israeli nuclear weapons might also be unleashed. Another possibility is accidental nuclear war. Paul Rogers in his book Losing Control says that the risk of nuclear war has increased due to proliferation, increased emphasis on nuclear war-fighting, reduced commitment to arms control (especially by the US government) and Russian reliance on nuclear arms as its conventional forces disintegrate. A major nuclear war could kill hundreds of millions of people. But less catastrophic outcomes are possible. A limited exchange might kill "only" tens or hundreds of thousands of people. Use of nuclear "bunker-busters" might lead to an immediate death toll in the thousands or less. Nuclear war would also lead to increased political repression. Martial law might be declared. Activists would be targeted for surveillance or arrest. Dissent would become even riskier. War always brings restraints on civil liberties. The political aftermath of September 11 - increased powers for police forces and spy agencies, increased intolerance of and controls over political dissent - is just a taste of what would be in store in the aftermath of nuclear war. Being prepared for nuclear war is not defeatism but realism. Indeed, being prepared may make nuclear war less likely, as I argued 20 years ago in an article titled "How the peace movement should be preparing for nuclear war". Many of the points I made then are just as relevant today. Groups should have contingency plans in case of emergency. It is worth asking, for example, "What should we do if key members are arrested?" Planning for such possibilities can be useful even if there is no nuclear crisis, since the group could come under attack for other reasons. Various scenarios should be considered, such as intensive surveillance, disruption, infiltration and public discrediting. Brian Glick's book War at Home is a valuable manual on this topic. Resources could come under attack: offices destroyed, computers stolen, websites removed. This points to the value of having back-up copies of key information. The same applies to skills: if a knowledgeable person, such as a web designer, is not around, can someone else do the job? Communiation networks are absolutely essential in a crisis. Being able to obtain reliable information and consult with others is vital for taking action. Activists should have plans for maintaining communication links in the face of interruption and disruption. If the phones are taken out, for example, what other system can be used? Schweik Action Wollongong developed some exercises for strengthening communication in groups. In a crisis, individuals and groups may need to act on their own. This could be due to arrest of movement leaders or to interruption of communication. When local groups have autonomy and many people have leadership skills, then it is easier to act effectively in a crisis. Generally speaking, decentralisation and self-reliance are an advantage. If worst comes to worst and nuclear weapons cause physical effects close to home, then survival becomes a priority. It makes sense to know the basics about the effects of nuclear war - blast, heat, radiation - and how to protect. Knowing basic first aid is important too. There is plenty of information on what to do in the event of nuclear war, but most social activists have avoided even thinking about it on the grounds that preparation makes nuclear war more likely. I disagree. If activists are seen to be ready, this makes nuclear war less likely. Nuclear weapons are severely stigmatised largely due to the efforts of peace activists. Governments have been reluctant to use nuclear weapons because they realise there will be an enormous political backlash. From the 1940s on, US leaders have considered using nuclear weapons on quite a number of occasions - such as during the Vietnam war - but always refrained, largely due to the fear of a backlash. If, despite this, nuclear weapons are used, it is vital that social activists capitalise on the widespread revulsion that will occur. To do this, activists need to be prepared. Otherwise, the next nuclear war will be only the beginning of a series of nuclear wars. A further implication is that activists need to be psychologically prepared for nuclear war. For decades, many people have thought of nuclear war as "the end": as extinction or the end of civilisation. But limited nuclear war has always been possible and even a major nuclear war could leave billions of people alive. Therefore it makes sense to think through the implications and make suitable preparations. Nuclear war is almost bound to be a disaster, not only in human and environmental terms but as well in terms of political prospects for achieving a better world. Activists are doing what they can to prevent nuclear war, but they are not the ones who design and produce the weapons and prepare to use them. Given that nuclear weapons may be used despite the best efforts of peace activists, it makes sense to be prepared for the aftermath. That means preparing organisationally and psychologically.

**The alternative fails – it can’t create real institutional change or solve nuclear war**

**Martin 82** (Brian, Professor of Social Sciences at the University of Wollongong, Australia, “How the Peace Movement Should be Preparing for Nuclear War,” Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 1982, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 149-159. http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/peace.html)//PC

The risk of nuclear war Unless nuclear weapons are totally eliminated, it is a virtual certainty that nuclear war will occur eventually. The likelihood of war in any given year may be small, but the cumulative effect of small probabilities can approach certainty. The likelihood is definitely not zero. For example, it is known that US policy-makers have seriously considered using nuclear weapons unilaterally on a number of occasions. Two developments have increased the risk of nuclear war in recent years. First is the deployment of highly accurate strategic missile systems in the US and the Soviet Union, plus developments in anti-submarine warfare and communications and control systems. This is increasing the chance that one of the superpowers will launch a 'first strike' in an attempt to destroy the opponent's nuclear inventory. Second is the spread of the capability to make nuclear weapons to more and more countries, fostered by the expansion of the nuclear power industry. It seems likely that this nuclear proliferation will be aided at some stage by laser enrichment of uranium, a technique which will dramatically reduce the obstacles to obtaining nuclear weapons. The question in such circumstances is not if nuclear war will occur, but when, what kind, and on what scale. The risk of nuclear war could be removed if all nuclear weapons were eliminated- total nuclear disarmament. How could this happen? I have argued elsewhere that convincing decision-makers or mobilising public opinion to influence decision-makers is insufficient, and that what is required is grassroots initiatives mobilising large numbers of people in activities that challenge or transform warlinked institutions and which create new institutions.[1] The chance that the people struggling for fundamental institutional change will succeed worldwide in 20, 50 or 100 years is much less than certainty. Indeed, any realistic assessment of the strength of the present peace movement, in terms of its ability to fundamentally affect arms races and their institutional bases, would have to admit its extreme weakness. The peace movement seems highly unlikely to bring about nuclear disarmament within the next few years, and hence it should be prepared for the possibility of nuclear war. Whether a nuclear war is limited or global, available evidence suggests that a large fraction of the world's population may be unaffected physically.[2] A long term strategy for peace must provide the basis for transforming the war system both before and after nuclear war or nuclear wars, and at the same time minimise the chance of nuclear war occurring in the first place. In addition to the important physical effects of nuclear war there would be important indirect political effects. It seems very likely that there would be strong moves to maintain or establish authoritarian rule as a response to crises preceding or following nuclear war. Ever since Hiroshima, the threat of nuclear destruction has been used to prop up repressive institutions, under the pretext of defending against the 'enemy'.[3] The actuality of nuclear war could easily result in the culmination of this trend. Large segments of the population could be manipulated to support a repressive regime under the necessity to defend against further threats or to obtain revenge. A limited nuclear war might kill some hundreds of thousands or tens of millions of people, surely a major tragedy. But another tragedy could also result: the establishment, possibly for decades, of repressive civilian or military rule in countries such as Italy, Australia and the US, even if they were not directly involved in the war. The possibility of grassroots mobilisation for disarmament and peace would be greatly reduced even from its present levels. For such developments the people and the peace movements of the world are largely unprepared.

# Nuke War Reps Good – AT: Root Cause

**Nuclear discourse is not the root cause of our impacts – prefer specific scenarios**

**Kinsella 5** (William J., Associate Professor at North Carolina State University, bachelor's degree in physics from Manhattan College, graduate studies in astronomy and physics from New Mexico State University, master's and doctoral degrees in Communication at Rutgers University, Director of the University of North Carolina States interdisciplinary program in Science, Technology & Society and as a faculty member in the interdisciplinary programs in Communication, Rhetoric & Digital Media and Environmental Sciences, “One Hundred Years of Nuclear Discourse: Four Master Themes and Their Implications for Environmental Communication,” 2005, The Environmental Communication Yearbook, Volume 2, Chapter 3)//PC

Together, these four themes provide useful tools for explicating the nuclear dis- cursive formation and its relationship to environmental communication. How- ever, in using them for these purposes, I agree with Ruthven (1993), who stressed the need for "more than a thematics of nuclearism" (p. 17). Ruthven argued that although many critics have discussed the influences of nuclear discourse on soci- ety, politics, and culture (e.g., Chaloupka, 1992; Gerry, 1987; Norris, 1992,1994), they have been less successful in examining how nuclear discourse is, simulta- neously, a product of those same systems. This observation provides an important reminder that nuclear discourse is not necessarily the root cause ofthe many prob- lems associated with it; instead, it might be understood more usefully as a product of underlying systems of meaning, and a vehicle for flows of power/knowledge as- sociated with those meaning systems. Thus, in the discussion that follows, I wish to emphasize that nuclear discourse and environmental communication have a relationship of mutual infiuence. For example, nuclear discourse influences environmental communication when commitments to weapons production pro- duce environmental consequences that become topics for public deliberation (Dalton, Garb, Lovrich, Pierce, & Whiteiey, 1999; Dycus, 1996; Makhijani, Hu, & Yih, 1995), or when the claimed successes of nuclear science and technology ap- pear to legitimate the modernist project ofthe mastery of nature (Kinsella, 2004a). However, influences flow in the opposite direction as well, when discourses por- traying the American desert as an unproductive wasteland foster its colonization by nuclear enterprises (Kuletz, 1998; Limerick, 1998) or, more broadly, whenever "our perceived relationship with nature influences nuclear decision making" (Taylor & Davis, 2001, p. 288).