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Reverse Spending Shell

Budget is constrained now – recent increases haven’t been enough.

Eaglen 10 (Mackenzie, Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, “U.S. Defense Spending: The Mismatch Between Plans and Resources” June 7, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/06/US-Defense-Spending-The-Mismatch-Between-Plans-and-Resources)KM

President Barack Obama’s fiscal year (FY) 2011 defense budget request[1] would increase the defense topline by between 1 percent and 2 percent in real terms. However, even with this modest increase, the budget is still insufficient to pay the Pentagon’s bills. In fact, the nation’s defense plans have become so chronically underfunded that most defense analysts dismiss the out-year projections in the Pentagon’s five-year budget plan as implausible. The news that the defense budget is inadequate to meet the nation’s security plans may come as a surprise to many Members of Congress who approved cuts in nearly 50 defense programs in FY 2010. Noting that the defense budget has been growing since 9/11, some observers argue that there should be no problem. However, despite the post-9/11 budget increases, defense spending is still tight, and core defense capabilities are being shortchanged.

Troop presence is the linchpin of the Defense Budget – Cuts = massive savings

Dancs 9 (Anita, writer for Foreign Policy in Focus, 7/2, http://www.fpif.org/reports/the\_cost\_of\_the\_global\_us\_military\_presence)

The United States spent $630 billion for national security in fiscal year 2008, not including international security assistance, space explorations, veterans’ benefits, or homeland security. The Department of Defense does not detail its budget, so it isn’t possible to compare costs of maintaining bases overseas and in the United States. It also does not provide enough information about transportation or other logistics that would clarify how much of those costs could be attributed to maintaining a global presence. Budget requests issued by the administration each February contain some information about global presence. For example, Obama’s budget for fiscal year 2010 requests $1.8 billion — the largest sum ever — for the global defense posture. As a budget item, this refers to changes in the forward (overseas) presence of the military. In other words, money is requested to rebase troops from one overseas location to another, or enhance presence in a new location. Most of the 2010 request is for construction in Guam so that Marines can relocate there from Japan.12 Other funds would be used to replace and upgrade facilities in the Middle East and Africa. This budget request reflects the changes in global presence from the traditional garrisons of Western Europe and Northeast Asia to the Middle East and Africa. The budget also describes European consolidation, where the posture is shifting to the south and the east of Europe, for closer proximity to regions requiring military operations. In the Western Hemisphere, the objective is to develop access arrangements in several countries. In Africa and the Middle East, the Pentagon seeks access arrangements and a network of Forward Operating Sites and Cooperative Security Locations. The 2010 budget request also includes $1.2 billion for the geographic unified combatant commands, though this money is only to fund specific activities; it doesn’t include funding for soldiers, sailors, Marines, airmen, ships, planes, and other equipment that are necessary to execute the geographic commands’ missions.13 The operations and management budget does specify line items as “base operations support,” but it is not possible to determine where the spending is intended. It is possible to dissect the military construction budget, but 47% of the dollar amount in the 2010 fiscal year budget request is labeled as “unspecified worldwide locations.” Military construction increased at more than three times the rate of Department of Defense increases, yet much of this is due to the Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC). With BRAC, the military attempts to identify long-term savings that can be achieved through consolidation and changes in basing structure, though this requires spending more money in the short term. The military is currently in the fifth round of BRAC, which is focused on reducing excess capacity within U.S. bases and territories of the United States. One-third of the budget for military construction and family housing is for BRAC in the fiscal year 2010 budget request. However, the 1993 fiscal year did indicate operating costs according to location. Overseas bases did have disproportionate operating costs. For the 17% of overseas bases indicated in the report, operating costs exceeded 20% of the $24.5 billion total.

Reverse Spending Shell

Cost savings are reinvested towards space programs which are struggling now

Garamone 10 (“Lynn Discusses Budget Priorities for Space” Jim American Forces Press Service, April 14, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=58751)KM

Even with a constrained environment, next year looks to be a remarkable one for military space, Lynn said. “We plan to launch the next block of GPS satellites, the first new protected [satellite communications] satellite, and the first space-based surveillance satellite,” he said. Acquisition reform plays a part. To ensure acquisition outcomes continue to be successful and continue to improve across the department, Lynn said, the Defense Department is taking several steps. “In many cases, we found the department wasn’t a smart buyer,” he acknowledged. Over the next five years, the department is increasing the acquisition work force by 20,000. This, Lynn said, will help the department nail down cost estimates in systems engineering and in program management. “We’re making sure we get the right people, not just the right number of them,” he said. Also, the department needs to exercise more discipline in setting requirements, the first part of the acquisition process, Lynn said, noting that acquisition reform requires the discipline to cancel programs that either are not working or aren’t needed. “In 2010 and 2011 budgets, [Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates] has cancelled programs that were performing poorly, providing redundant capabilities or simply funding capabilities that were not central to meet our security challenges,” Lynn said. The cancellations saved taxpayers more than $330 billion. “By exercising program discipline,” Lynn said, “we are able to direct resources to the highest-priority needs.” Industry, the deputy secretary told the group, obviously is critical to military space progress. The space industrial base must be robust enough to accomplish the national space strategy, he said. The economy has caused problems for suppliers, and some may go under, Lynn said. In past economic downturns, he added, the Defense Department and the government essentially invested more money to stabilize the nation’s defense industrial base. “But it would be irresponsible to pursue that approach across the board,” Lynn said. “So we have to find new ways to achieve stability in the industrial base, while at the same time meeting the needs of our warfighters and taxpayers.”

Space militarization programs result in human extinction.

Chomsky 1 (http://www.chomsky.info/interviews/200108--.htm, Noam Chomsky, American linguist, philosopher, cognitive scientist, and political activist)NAR

Take what's called the Missile Defense Program, which I think is mislabeled. It's actually a "militarization of space" program. The missile defense component is a minor feature that nobody takes very seriously. Nobody really believes that the US is trying to protect itself from North Korea. That's not serious. But the militarization of space is quite serious. Like a lot of Bush's policies, this one goes back to the Clinton period, but it's being enhanced. We are looking at the extension of military force from armies, to navies, to the air and now to outer space. You know, the development of space technology, including space warfare today, is similar in its technological-industrial significance to the development of navies a hundred years ago. If you look at say, England and Germany a century ago, which had the most advanced navies then, they were dealing with extremely tricky technological problems. Putting a huge gun on a moving platform and ensuring that it could hit another moving target was one of the hardest technical problems of the early twentieth century. In fact, Clinton-era publications of the US Space Command describe control over space as a parallel to control over the oceans a century ago. Then, countries built navies to protect and enhance their power in commercial and strategic interests. Today, the militarization of space is intended to protect US investments and commercial interest and US hegemony around the world. We're looking at the dawn of a new arms race. For example, Germany technically opposes the US space militarization program, but is bound to get involved. Otherwise it will be left behind in the development of advanced technology. Germany understands that very well. The US understands it too, and they fully expect that Germany and other countries that they want on board will go along with the program. The Bush Administration recognizes that US power is so overwhelming that it can't really be opposed, even if countries object to US actions. In fact, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 bans militarization. Potential adversaries of the US, and even its allies, are so far behind that these countries are very interested in maintaining the treaty. Europe and the rest of the world want a strong reaffirmation of the Treaty and the US is unilaterally trying to derail it. Termination of the treaty would mean that the US could develop satellite weapons, put offensive weapons in space. It would probably mean using nuclear power in space. All of this leads to some very dangerous scenarios, including destruction of the species.

\*\*\*UQ\*\*\*

Uq – Budget Tight

The DoD is facing budget cuts – Spending is tight

Hodge 10 (“Defense Industry Braces for Cuts” Nathan, June 12, WSJ, http://www.strongwatch.com/blogs/news/sedpellentesqueipsumatpurus.html)KM

WASHINGTON—A week after the Pentagon announced cost-saving measures, the defense industry is bracing for possible cuts to the Pentagon's weapons-buying programs. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has ordered an across-the-board review of business practices within the Pentagon, targeting total savings of $100 billion over the next five fiscal years. Facing a looming budget crunch, the department—which is now drawing up its budget for fiscal year 2012—hopes to free up funds to support troops in the field. Officials acknowledge, however, that efficiency measures alone will not be enough to reach that target and they will likely have to buy fewer weapons and services. Speaking Thursday morning at a Credit Suisse defense symposium, Frank Kendall, the Pentagon's deputy acquisition chief, said, "I think we're going to see possibly some gradual drawdowns in investment accounts." While Mr. Kendall said he didn't think the cuts to weaponry would be dramatic, he said the department had often started "far too many programs that were unrealistic in their requirements and simply not affordable," forcing costly terminations. "We need to make those decisions much earlier." The defense industry went through a wave of consolidations in the 1990s following the post-Cold War drawdown. Defense budgets effectively doubled over the past decade. Now companies are worried again. "This is real and immediate," said Alan Chvotkin, executive vice president and counsel for the Professional Services Council, a trade association that represents government contractors. "You're not going to solve the federal government's budget problems through operating efficiencies." Mr. Chvotkin said the secretary's initiative might also target underperforming programs, forcing contractors to take a pre-emptive look at their own performance. Pentagon leadership has not said what programs face the chopping block as part of this new austerity drive. But Mr. Gates has dropped very public hints about some capabilities he thinks the department simply cannot afford. A recent example: The Marine Corps Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, a high-speed landing craft being developed by General Dynamics Corp. The company has delivered four of the vehicles for testing, but the $13 billion program has been plagued by cost overruns and schedule delays. In a May 3 speech, Mr. Gates raised questions about whether the Marines could realistically expect to storm beaches in future wars. Another problematic program is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the costliest fighter program in history, with a total price tag in the hundreds of billions of dollars. The versatile stealth aircraft, which is being developed by Lockheed Martin Corp., is supposed to replace many of the fighters in the current inventory. Rep. Adam Smith (D., Wa), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee's air/land subcommittee, said the plane was "undeniably necessary." But he expressed concern about whether it could meet delivery goals. "If it meets the time frame, it's still very, very expensive and very, very difficult to get into a constrained budget," he said. "If it doesn't, we have to make some very hard decisions." Further complicating the picture, the military still has wars to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan. Those conflicts are likely to drive Pentagon investment in items like sophisticated surveillance equipment and counter-terrorism training. The new policy may also shift emphasis on delivering gear on shorter timelines to support deployed troops, rather than managing lengthy development programs that can take years to pay off. The Department of Defense "is not used to having to make any tradeoffs," said Howard Lance, the chairman, president and CEO of Harris Corp., a manufacturer of communications equipment for the government and the commercial market. "I think they are now dealing with the reality that budgets are not as robust."

Uq – Budget Tight

**DoD’s budget is taking heavy cuts – social spending is taking precedence.**

Coburn 5-27 (Senator Tom Coburn, member of Intelligence, Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Indian Affairs, Judiciary; and the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions., http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Sen-Tom-Coburn-Americas-Fiscal-Defense-Crisis-06412/) NAR

The need for serious deficit reduction and a loss of political support for high defense spending make cuts inevitable, says Gordon Adams, a defense expert at American University. If budget deficits aren't seriously tackled, US spending on interest on the national debt will exceed its defense budget by fiscal 2018, says Todd Harrison, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He predicts large defense cuts within three years. It won't be easy. With 2.25 million full-time civilian and military personnel (not including part-time Guard and Reserve members) and thousands of contracts with firms, the Defense Department is a major economic engine for hundreds of communities and enjoys huge political clout. Nonetheless, major defense cuts have happened before. Between 1989 and 1993, the active defense force shrank from 2.2 million to 1.5 million and civilian personnel slimmed down from 1.04 million to 700,000, Mr. Adams notes. With the end of the cold war, and by congressional budget cuts, defense spending fell 26 percent in constant dollars between 1985 and 1993 - presided over by none other than Dick Cheney, then Defense secretary, who prided himself on having ended more than 100 military acquisition programs. Today, defense expenditures amount to about 4.9 percent of US gross domestic product, the nation's total output of goods and services. That's well above the less than 2 percent of GDP spent by such allies as Canada, Germany, Britain, and France. The latest news suggests more cuts by allies are ahead. Add in what Homeland Security, Veterans Affairs, and the Energy departments spend on defense and total US military spending will reach $861 billion in fiscal 2011, Mr. Harrison calculates, exceeding that of all other nations combined. Already, defense outlays in Iraq are falling. The number of American military personnel in Iraq has fallen from a peak of 170,000 a couple of years ago to 86,000 now and perhaps 50,000 by Sept. 1. The number of bases and facilities there has been cut by nearly half since peaking at 370 in 2008. Military spending in Iraq has dropped by half - from $90.6 billion in 2009 to an expected $43.4 billion in fiscal 2011. By the end of next year, the US hopes to have only a training-size force there. By contrast, operations in Afghanistan are still growing, with some 94,000 US troops expected on the ground by late August or September. Costs are climbing rapidly - from $51 billion in 2009 to $110 billion projected for fiscal 2011. But Adams suspects that before Mr. Obama faces reelection in 2012 he will move toward ending the Afghanistan mission. "The politics are devastating," Adams says. Employment at the Defense Department probably won't shrink to the levels at Wal-Mart (1.4 million) or the post office (599,000). But a difficult switch from guns to butter - or guns to deficit reduction - is about to get under way.

DoD may obtain more money, but they would get far less than they need.

The Hill 6-8 (http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/102001-skelton-takes-gates-seriously-on-defense-spending-reforms) NAR

Lynn on Friday fleshed out Gates’s major initiative to reduce Pentagon bloat and scrutinize the defense budget. Gates unveiled his initiative in a major speech last month at the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kan. Pentagon leaders are eyeing 2 to 3 percent real growth in the Pentagon’s budget for the areas that need it most: force structure and modernization, Lynn indicated. The White House has told the Pentagon to expect growth of about 1 percent in the budget over the next several years. But Lynn said that based on past experience, about 2 to 3 percent real growth would be necessary to “give the troops what they need to do their very best.” Two-thirds of the $100 billion cost savings spread out over the next five years will come from trimming overhead on a department-wide basis. That money will be directly transferred into the force structure and modernization accounts, Lynn explained. The rest of the cost savings would come from “developing efficiencies within those force structure and modernization accounts,” he added. Lynn also warned that in order to redistribute $100 billion, the Pentagon leadership and the military services will have to identify “lower-priority programs” that are not going to be part of future budgets. The departments of the Army, Air Force and Navy, which also includes the Marine Corps, as well as the combatant commands are expected to report their proposals by July 31 as the Pentagon prepares its budget request for Congress. For example, the military departments are each expected to find $2 billion in non-essential costs for fiscal 2012. In turn, the services would be able to transfer those savings to their modernization efforts and their forces.

**Uq – Budget Tight**

Gates is planning to cut back on military spending – with the teaparty movement at his back it looks very likely it is going to happen.

True-Slant 6-7 (http://trueslant.com/scotthpayne/2010/06/07/tea-party-and-democrats-unite-over-defense-spending-cuts/)NAR

Robust defense spending is in many ways, integral to the modern American identity. A military superpower for decades now — and perhaps the sole true military superpower since the end of the Cold War — Americans have generally been loathe to look to defense budgets as a means of reining in spending (via Kevin Drum). But in addition to this, it is worth noting that while as a sector defense does not clock in substantial number relative to other sectors, its individual players are cornerstones of the American lobbying industry. Information provided by the CRP indicates that the biggest companies in the sector, including: Lockheed Martin, Boeing, General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon, happen to be on the CRP’s “heavey hitters” list. According to the CRP, “heavy hitters” are, “the 100 biggest givers in federal-level politics since 1989″. Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and General Electric (mentioned in the Politico article), rank among the top lobbying spenders from 1998-2010. Gates isn’t the first Secretary of Defense to seek cuts to military spending in order to bring the Pentagon’s budget under control, but previous attempts have been met with ardent and entrenched opposition. However, with the continuing precariousness of America’s economic situation unabated and the rhetorical firepower of the Tea Party movement at his back, Gates might just be the first Secretary to successfully achieve those cuts. What happens in the future vis-a-vis Gates, the Tea Party, and Democrats should such an effort bear fruit remains anyone’s guess.

Pentagon’s budget has been slashed.

Hartung 6-29 (http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128185955) NAR

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has made some attempts to tame the Pentagon beast, but so far his efforts have fallen far short of what is needed. Last year he succeeded in eliminating major weapons programs such as the F-22 combat aircraft and the Airborne Laser (ABL), a Star Wars–style missile defense system. Gates has been talking tough ever since, telling a crowd gathered in Abilene, Kansas (Dwight D. Eisenhower's hometown) that "the gusher has been turned off" on Pentagon spending. He has made some stark comparisons, noting, for example, that the United States spends almost as much on its military as the entire rest of the world combined; and that the US Navy is larger than the next thirteen navies combined, eleven of which are possessed by US allies. The logic of Gates' statements suggests that deep cuts in Pentagon spending are possible. But so far he has mostly moved money from one kind of weapons program to another. Getting real reductions in military spending will require more than just cutting unneeded weapons programs and eliminating waste, fraud and abuse at the Pentagon. It will mean cutting back on the missions the military is expected to carry out. Obama's National Security Strategy seems to acknowledge this point when it speaks of "the danger of overextending our power." The administration now needs to take this rhetoric seriously by adopting a strategy of restraint that could free up hundreds of billions of dollars for other purposes. This is where public pressure should come into play. If the deficit is to be reduced, it makes much more sense to cut Pentagon spending than it does to reduce investments in education, clean energy and mass transit. These other activities not only create more jobs but they address urgent national needs. The president and Congress need to hear this message loud and clear. So should the President's National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, which was appointed earlier this year to address long-term budgetary trends.

Top military officials agree that the DoD needs money

Dimascio 6-16 (Jen DiMascio is a writer who specializes in defense , http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0610/38622.html)NAR

“I am becoming increasingly concerned about the lack of progress on the supplemental, and I strongly urge Congress to complete its work on the request as soon as possible,” Gates said. During the hearing, senators peppered Gates and Adm. Michael Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with questions ranging from the nation’s policy toward Afghanistan, Iran and China to a variety of more parochial concerns regarding weapons systems from their home states. Gates and Mullen, as well as Gen. David Petraeus and Michele Flournoy, the undersecretary of defense for policy, who were also testifying on Capitol Hill on Wednesday, sought to impress upon lawmakers that despite bad news coming out of Afghanistan, progress is being made. Gates said senators should recognize the new Afghan strategy hatched last year has only been executed for a few months, adding that he has a “certain case of déjà vu,” comparing their questions with the kinds he heard during the darkest days of the Iraq war. This is not, he said, a production program, where particular objectives are met week to week. “We do ourselves no favors by tearing ourselves up by the roots every week to see how we’re doing,” Gates said.

Uq – Obama Bill

**Obama’s bill will severely cripple the defense industry.**

Nagle 6-28 (Chet Nagle, http://dailycaller.com/2010/06/28/debts-deficits-and-defense/, Naval Academy graduate and Cold War carrier pilot, June 28th 2010)NAR

The Obama administration intends to slash the defense budget in order to pay for its riotous spending on bailouts, “stimulus bills,” their signature healthcare program, and massive pork bribes for votes from congressmen who hopefully will not survive this November’s balloting. To continue the spending spree, the White House plans to eliminate over a trillion defense dollars in the next ten years. Details of those proposed cuts were laid out by Rep. Barney Frank’s (D-MA) Sustainable Defense Task Force in a 56 page report titled: Debt, Deficits, & Defense – A Way Forward. None of the service arms are spared. The Navy will be reduced to eight aircraft carriers (from twelve planned) and seven air wings. Eight ballistic missile submarines will be cut from the planned force of 14, leaving just six. Building of nuclear attack submarines will be cut in half, leaving a force of 40 by 2020. The four active guided missile submarines would be cut, too. Destroyer building would be frozen and the new DDG-1000 destroyer program cancelled. Among other huge cuts, the fleet is to be reduced to 230 combat ships, eliminating 57 vessels from a current force level of 287. The Air Force must retire six fighter air wings equivalents, and at the same time build 301 fewer F-35 fighters. The nuclear bomber force will be completely eliminated in the name of unilateral disarmament—the B-1 and B-2 and B-52 and other bombers will still be able to drop bombs, but their nuclear weapon wiring and controls will simply be removed. Procurement of the new refueling tanker and the C-17 cargo aircraft will be cancelled. Directed energy beam research and other advanced missile and space warfare defense projects will also be eliminated or curtailed. Active duty Army personnel will be slashed from 562,400 to 360,000. That includes elimination of about five active-component brigade combat teams (the report is not exactly). The Army will also suffer a myriad of other cuts, including closure of overseas bases. The Marine Corps would be cut by 30%, from 202,000 to 145,000, and the other funding cuts planned for the Corps mean the United States will not be able to mount a major amphibious landing on any hostile shore. Marine Corps programs to be killed include the V-22 Osprey tilt rotor aircraft and the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle.

The Budget is already shrunk, and Obama is planning on shrinking it more

Eaglen 6-7 (http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/06/US-Defense-Spending-The-Mismatch-Between-Plans-and-Resources, Mackenzie Eaglen, Research Fellow for National Security Studies)NAR

Most Americans believe the U.S. government spends far more on defense than it actually does. Defense spending is near historic lows, however, and the Administration’s proposed five-year budget plan would further reduce defense spending to levels unprecedented during wartime. Between 2010 and 2015, total defense spending is set to fall from 4.9 percent to 3.6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), even though the nation has assigned more missions to the military over the past two decades. This growing disparity between funding and requirements is the primary cause of the increasing strain on the defense budget, but numerous other external and internal factors also are contributing to the problem.

**Obama is planning on cutting modernization budgets for the DoD**

Talent 6-1 (http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/06/A-Constitutional-Basis-for-Defense, Jim Talent, Distinguished Fellow in Military Affairs at The Heritage Foundation and served as a U.S. Senator from 2002 to 2007)NAR

The American military is significantly weaker than it was at the end of the Cold War. The Army was cut from 18 divisions to 10 and is short on equipment. The Navy is smaller than it has been since 1916 and continues to shrink. The Air Force is smaller than it has been since Pearl Harbor, and the average age of the Air Force inventory is 23 years. Half of our bombers are considered antiques by FAA standards. There are no plans to replace them. Most of our tankers are equally as old; they will not be replaced, if at all, until the 2030s. The Department of Defense wants to close our most modern cargo aircraft production line and will close our most sophisticated fighter line. The missile defense budget has been cut, and according to most reports, the Obama Administration will cut modernization budgets even further.

Uq – Congress

Bipartisan support to cut defense spending

Army Times 7-3 (http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/07/army\_benefits\_070210w/)NAR

From the left, right and center of the political spectrum, talk about drastically cutting military personnel costs is on the rise. The $549 billion defense budget makes for a juicy target, and the $197 billion of that budget that goes to personnel costs is being attacked from all sides — even the Defense Department itself — as excessive in a time of economic malaise and belt-tightening. The list of programs under attack includes pay raises, retired pay, health care benefits, commissaries and exchanges, and even the size of the force. “We are very concerned about the outlook for the future,” said Joe Barnes of the Fleet Reserve Association, who is also a co-chairman the Military Coalition, a group of more than 30 military-related organizations. “We have had a lot of successes over the last 10 to 12 years, and we need to maintain them and to make further improvements.” But, he added, “There is some pain coming.” On the right, tea party activists and fiscal conservatives want the government to stop spending so much. In the past, they might have exempted defense spending from such calls for cuts, but those days are over for many who want everything to be on the table.

Plans dictate spending – budget priorities will drain cuts

Eaglen 6-7 (http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/06/US-Defense-Spending-The-Mismatch-Between-Plans-and-Resources, Mackenzie Eaglen, Research Fellow for National Security Studies)NAR

The biggest problem by far is the growing mismatch between defense resources and plans. One side of the political spectrum often argues that the Pentagon’s plans are too broad. The other side states that defense budgets are too low. From both perspectives, it should be obvious that there is a huge and growing disconnect. Dr. Michael O’Hanlon, a defense budget expert at the Brookings Institution, has observed that President Obama’s 2010 defense budget plans are “insufficient to support the national security establishment over the next five years.” O’Hanlon argues that by adopting a policy of zero real growth in the base budget, the Administration will leave the U.S. military with a cumulative requirement gap of about $150 billion between 2010 and 2014.[35] In explaining this, O’Hanlon identifies many of the pressures discussed above. Similarly, Travis Sharp of the Center for a New American Security has noted that Congress will need to “increase defense spending and to keep it elevated for most of the next two decades…to execute existing initiatives.”[37] Sharp elaborates that “the DoD base budget must average 567 billion dollars per year between 2011 and 2028 in order to carry out current plans.”[38] Taking unbudgeted costs into account, a recent CBO report estimated an even larger shortfall. It calculated that carrying out DOD plans for 2010 and beyond could require an annual base budget of $632 million (in 2010 dollars) through 2028— a figure 18 percent higher than current 2010 funding levels.[39] The persistent mismatch between defense plans and budgets translates into gaps in each of the military services’ capabilities. CSIS estimates that “today’s shortfalls in the Army alone may exceed the size of the entire Army budget pre-9/11.”[40] Congressional Research Service analyst Stephen Daggett estimates that the Army’s requirement gap is between $30 billion and $40 billion and has testified that the Navy’s shipbuilding plans and Air Force’s aviation plans are similarly underfunded.[41] The immediate consequence is that many high-priority defense programs are being cut or cancelled because of artificial budget constraints, not because of changing military requirements. On February 22, Representative Howard P. “Buck” McKeon (R–CA) released the services’ lists of unfunded priority programs. They totaled $548 million for the Air Force, $359 million for the Army, $532 million for the Navy, and $351 million for the Marine Corps.[42] The long-term consequence is that the Defense Department is failing to build the capabilities that it has long identified as necessary to defend America’s interests.

Uq – Congress

Obey’s anti-DoD rhetoric is being adopted by members of congress – DoD’s budget is on the chopping block.

Seattle Times 6-27 (http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/2012210146\_sirota28.html?prmid=op\_ed)NAR

Yes, just as Obey prepares to retire, there are signs that his crusade is winning converts. For instance, Oklahoma Republican Sen. Tom Coburn is using his position on President Obama's deficit commission to focus attention on Pentagon profligacy. Similarly, Politico reports that "key tea-party players (are) expressing a willingness to put the Pentagon budget on the chopping block." And rank-and-file congressional Democrats, once cowed by war proponents' saber rattling, are increasingly echoing Obey's rhetoric. Whether or not the cacophony stops the Pentagon's latest blank check is less important than Obey having finally rekindled an honest discussion about guns and butter. In a storied 41-year career of venerable accomplishments, that is the most profound achievement of all.

**Tea Party activists are against spending – the military makes up 40% of the fed budget**

**Register Citizen 6-23** (http://www.registercitizen.com/articles/2010/06/23/opinion/doc4c2186de6f830616097603.txt)

We’re spending about $750 billion on the military this year. That accounts for about 40 percent of the federal budget, if you include mandatory outlays like interest on the debt and Social Security. It accounts for over half of the so-called discretionary budget, the amount Congress divides up and spends annually. However you describe the Pentagon budget, it’s a lot of money. As budget analysts of all political persuasions will tell you, it’s replete with waste. Over $60 billion could be trimmed from the defense budget, according to the Unified Security Budget taskforce headed by Institute for Policy Studies research fellow Miriam Pemberton and Lawrence Korb, who served as President Ronald Reagan’s assistant secretary of defense. The savings, they say, would come from just cutting fighters, submarines, and other big weapons that don’t make sense given the threats faced by the U.S. today. Other military analysts have identified other ways to save even more money, and activists on the opposite end of the political spectrum from the tea party argue that the trillion dollars we’ve spent on wars in Iraq and Iran were squandered. If the Pentagon isn’t red meat for the ferocious tea bag express, what is? Yet, the issue is off the media radar screen for the most part. A Google News search for “tea party” and “Defense Department” yields about a dozen articles. Searching for “tea party” and “health care” produces more than 2,700. But one recent article in Politico, titled “Robert Gates May Get Lift from Tea Parties,” did tackle the issue. It provides an excellent example of the kind of Pentagon-related questions reporters across the country should ask tea party candidates. Politico, a Washington newspaper with a laser focus on politics, asked numerous tea party activists whether military spending should be on their budget-cut hit list. And all of them said it should be. The article quotes tea party leader Mike Pence (R-IN) saying “If we are going to get our fiscal house in order, everything has to be on the table.”

DoD is forced to fund unnecessary weapons by Congress – kills their budget.

Boston 6-11 (http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial\_opinion/editorials/articles/2010/06/11/dont\_exempt\_the\_pentagon/

In a strong letter to President Obama’s National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, three House members — Massachusetts Democrat Barney Frank and Republicans Ron Paul of Texas and Walter Jones of North Carolina — and Democratic Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon expressed surprise “at the apparent absence of discussion about the efficacy, the extent, and the cost of overseas US military commitments when debating how to deal with our extremely serious deficit problem.’’ If anything, the four lawmakers were understating the difficulty of returning to fiscal sanity without trimming a military budget of more than $650 billion. Frank and his colleagues, who will be presenting a report today on options for slashing Pentagon expenditures, are justified in calling attention to the nation’s “460 military installations in more than 38 countries.’’ And they are right to recall that the former defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, proposed “closing one-third of our overseas bases and moving 70,000 troops and 100,000 family members back to the United States.’’ However, the most significant savings in defense spending are to be found in the rejection of weapons systems that either don’t work or are not needed. The list of weapons declared unnecessary by the Defense Department, but nonetheless funded by Congress, is alarmingly long. A local example of such fiscal folly came last month when the House Armed Services Committee voted 59-0 to provide $485 million for an alternative engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The engine is made partly in Lynn, but Defense Secretary Robert Gates has called it “costly and unnecessary’’ and said he “strongly recommended’’ that Obama veto it. Gates is right.

Uq – Congress

Fear of Spending money is hitting the DoD Hard – Blue dogs reject all costly bills.

The Hill 6-24 (http://thehill.com/homenews/house/105195-liberals-battle-on-defense-budget-hits-turning-point?page=1)NAR

“No,” Blue Dog Rep. Jason Altmire (D-Pa.) responded when asked if he agreed with Hoyer’s stance on the defense budget. “A lot of the things he said I was not in agreement with,” Altmire said. “The first thing we need to look at are cuts to social programs.” The deficit appears to have put all Democrats on a path of mutually assured frustration for the foreseeable future. Blue Dogs, who were demanding a 2 percent cut to all non-defense discretionary spending for at least three years, blocked a budget blueprint that contained anything less. But while the one-year budget “enforcement resolution” that Blue Dogs and members of the Progressive Caucus finally agreed to will shave $7 billion off the president’s 2011 spending request, defense programs will not necessarily be exempt. After taking a stand against even spending freezes on everything not tied to national security, Minnick said more Blue Dogs were coming around to the notion that defense could not be considered a “sacred cow” by default. “We are talking about these issues with increasing seriousness,” he said. And Minnick said conservative Democrats have already had discussions about paying for the Afghanistan war beyond next year. “These aren’t emergencies anymore,” Minnick said. “There’s time to plan for them. These are predictable expenditures.”

Uq – No Supplemental

Disagreements over domestic spending means the supplemental bill won’t pass – sticks Gates with an incredibly tight budget.

CQ-Politics 7-2 (http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?parm1=1&docID=cqmidday-000003696828)NAR

Before adjourning late Thursday, the House adopted an amendment to the Senate-passed supplemental bill that would add some $21 billion in domestic spending to the $58.8 billion in appropriations for war and disaster relief that the Senate approved in May. The measure now goes back to the Senate, which reconvenes on July 12. But there is considerable Senate opposition to the non-war funding, and that chamber may not move quickly to the bill. If the Senate makes changes, as expected, the House would have to agree to the new Senate version. All of this could take more than a few days. Thad Cochran of Mississippi, ranking Republican on the Senate Appropriations Committee, wrote in a June 30 letter to his House counterpart, Jerry Lewis of California, that adding the domestic funding would delay the process of clearing the supplemental until “at least late July.” “If these changes are adopted in the House, in my view the Senate will not approve the bill for the president’s signature,” Cochran wrote. If Cochran is correct, the delay will increasingly pinch the military. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates cautioned last month that a failure to enact the supplemental $33 billion in fiscal 2010 war funds prior to the July Fourth recess, he said, would force the Pentagon to move money “beginning in July” from regular “operations and maintenance” accounts to units in Afghanistan, where the funds are needed to support a troop buildup. A Pentagon official who requested anonymity said Friday that cutbacks in base upkeep and unit training would be among the first activities to be curtailed this month whenever funding is needed for war zone operations. The official could not provide dollar amounts or say precisely when in July the shifts would begin to occur.

**War Supplemental bill won’t pass – constrains Gate’s budget.**

CQ-Politics 6-29 (http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?parm1=1&docID=cqmidday-000003693091) NAR

A divided majority caucus may not have the votes to pass a war supplemental without Republican help, because a sizable number of Democrats oppose further funding for conflicts. The Senate passed its $58.8 billion version of the supplemental on May 27, but it is unclear whether the Senate would accept any new domestic spending beyond money for disaster relief included in its version of the legislation. The leadership has not yet determined exactly how the votes will be structured — whether a bifurcated vote will send a single bill back to the Senate, or whether the House will vote on two separate pieces of legislation. Democratic leaders hope to clear the supplemental this week, before Congress departs for its weeklong July Fourth recess. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates says he needs the added funds quickly, a plea echoed Tuesday by Army Gen. David H. Petraeus during his Senate confirmation hearings to take command of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. “We need to get a supplemental passed as soon as possible,” House Minority Leader John A. Boehner , R-Ohio, said. “It should not be used as an excuse for tens of billions of dollars of additional social spending that will pile more debt on the backs of our children and grandchildren.” Privately, Republicans say they expect House Democratic leaders to realize this week that the votes simply aren’t there, certainly not in the Senate, for a supplemental that expands domestic spending, even if that spending is paid for with cuts elsewhere.

War Supplemental won’t pass – Republicans have a deadlock on it, will only pass clean.

Fire-Dog Lake 6-30 (http://news.firedoglake.com/2010/06/30/the-war-supplemental-will-social-spending-go-to-pick-up-republican-votes/)NAR

Enough Blue Dogs don’t want the social spending, and enough liberals don’t want the war funding, that the Republicans basically have a lock on the bill. So while Jim McGovern and Chellie Pingree’s protests are nice, and I hope they do get a vote on a timetable for withdrawal, ultimately they’re cut out of this deal. I’d expect the clean bill to pass with about 60 or so Democrats opposing. That’s because the priority of this government is to fund a chaotic and failing war effort halfway around the world in the name of denying 50-100 Al Qaeda members a “safe haven,” even though the Taliban controls significant swaths of the country right now and haven’t let Al Qaeda back in.

Uq – No Supplemental

Supplemental won’t pass – progressives and blue dogs oppose it.

Politico 6-30 (http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=863DD0FD-18FE-70B2-A84EC8B3393B57B6)NAR

 Since late last week, Democrats have been polling their members to gauge support for the estimated $37 billion in war-related funding requested by the president and what’s now a roughly equal package of spending including disaster aid, Haiti earthquake relief, veterans’ benefits and the teacher assistance. “We’re trying to put the pieces of a puzzle together that don’t quite fit together,” Rep. Robert Andrews (D-N.J.) said in an interview. “Our problem right now is a significant number of moderates don’t want to vote for the domestic spending and a significant number of progressives don’t want to vote for the war funding.” A House Democratic Caucus meeting Tuesday was devoted to the question of what steps the party should take to stimulate employment. But just as the war debate has shifted, so has the willingness of many in the party to embrace any new spending, even if it’s paid for with other revenues. “There are a number of moderates who feel that any pay-fors should be for deficit reduction, not to offset new spending,” Andrews said. “If you have $10 billion laying around for teachers, reduce the deficit by $10 billion.”

**Bill wont’ pass – McChrystal controversy ensures.**

CBS News 6-23 (http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544\_162-20008601-503544.html)NAR

Passing an emergency war funding bill to pay for President Obama's 17,000 troop increase and continued efforts in Afghanistan was never going to be easy in the House. Liberals are weary of war, fiscal hawks are concerned about deficits and Republicans are increasingly willing to vote against troop funding if Democrats lard up the bills with measure that have nothing to do with war. Democratic aides say that Gen. Stanley McChrystal made things a little more complicated. That funding is to pay for the execution of McChrystal's strategy. For his vision. One leadership aide said that the shocking profile of McChrystal in Rolling Stone raised serious questions about McChrystal's judgment and leadership at a time when they are struggling to get Democratic votes for the money. Now, the general has been relieved of duty and replaced by Gen. David Petraeus. One Democratic aide said that deciding on the best way forward is complicated by members' belief that Republicans will just say no to everything so Democrats have to find ways to pass things with just Democratic votes. The aide said "it's like putting together a puzzle without a picture." When asked what needs to happen for Republicans to support the bill, House minority leader John Boehner said this morning that he's "hopeful that the Democrat majority in Congress bring a clean supplemental to the floor of the House so that members can cast their votes."

Bill won’t pass – democrats hail anti-war efforts as being fiscally responsible

Politico 7-1 (http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0710/39278.html)NAR

Anti-war lawmakers have found a new angle on opposing Afghanistan war funding, saying their opposition is not only principled, it’s fiscally responsible. "We may come to you as fiscally conservative doves to oppose some of this incredible spending that's going on," said Rep. John Conyers (D-Mich.), who led a group of Congressional Progressive Caucus members Thursday in a rally against the $33 billion war funding bill. "We're forcing America to borrow more money, expand the deficit, increase wasteful government spending,” Conyers said. “We’re undermining our budgetary process. We’re risking Social Security.” Some of the 21 progressives who say they'll vote against the supplemental also slammed corruption in Afghanistan. A recent Wall Street Journal article showed that American funds were ending up in the pockets of Afghanistan warlords, prompting the chairwoman of the House Appropriations Committee’s subcommittee on foreign aid, Rep. Nita Lowey (D-N.Y.), to say she won’t spend “one more dime” until she determines the extent of the corruption. "We end up paying for both sides of the war," Rep. Judy Chu (D-Calif.) said.

Uq – No Supplemental

Passage doesn’t seem likely any time soon – education funding is a note vote in congress, and a go vote for Obama.

The Hill 7-1 (http://thehill.com/homenews/house/106907-house-approves-funding-for-war-in-afghanistan)NAR

But President Barack Obama will not be able to sign the war funding bill — which the Pentagon had wanted to see signed into law by July 4 — until later this month because the House amended the Senate's already approved version of the legislation. And further changes seem likely. Just as the House was preparing to vote on the rule for the supplemental, the Obama administration released a statement strongly supporting the underlying war funding but threatening a presidential veto of any bill that includes "provisions that would undermine [the president’s] ability as commander in chief to conduct military operations in Afghanistan." The administration statement also threatened a veto of any bill "that includes cuts to education reforms." The $15 billion in education aid added by the House would be partially offset by $800 million in cuts to new education programs. The Appropriations Committee said the cuts would not affect funding for any existing grant programs. "It seems only reasonable to defer some new activities and expansions in order to help address the urgent fiscal crisis facing our school systems," read a committee statement. "In addition, the rescissions in no way damage the future funding prospects in better economic times for these programs." Republicans decried the parliamentary maneuvers as "political chicanery" aimed at pushing through the Democrats’ domestic spending priorities, and complained that the votes were structured to make it impossible for the House to approve the military funds without first sending the legislation back to the Senate.

Additional items tacked onto the bill ensures a no pass – cuts back funding for Gates,

Politico 6-28 (http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0610/39133.html)NAR

House Republicans are warning that they may vote against the Afghanistan war funding bill if additional spending projects are added. California Republicans Jerry Lewis, the top Republican on the Appropriations committee, and Buck McKeon, the top Republican on Armed Services, sent a letter to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi Monday, urging her to act on the bill this week to avoid “compromising budget decisions due to the lack of adequate funding.” They are calling for a clean bill — one with no non-defense spending projects — saying they may oppose any legislative maneuvering that would split the bill into two parts: one part that deals with funding the war and another with unrelated spending. The purpose of such a bifurcation would allow Republicans to vote for funding, while allowing anti-war lawmakers to oppose it while maintaining a chance that the bill will pass. “We must either begin immediately to conduct a conference committee between the House and the Senate to bring a compromise version of the supplemental to the floor this week, or the House must take up and pass the supplemental that was passed by the Senate almost five weeks ago, without add-ons,” McKeon and Lewis wrote to Pelosi. “Any other legislative maneuver to consider this legislation would only serve to delay this troop funding even further, putting our national defense strategies at risk and likely costing the American people billions in additional, extraneous spending.”

Anti-War democrats spell the end for the war supplement bill – wants Obama to get all ‘dove like’.

Politico 6-25 (http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0610/39010.html) NAR

The bottom line: The president and congressional critics, long on a collision course over the war in Afghanistan, are hurtling ever faster toward each other since the ouster of Gen. Stanley McChrystal, and doves on Capitol Hill are feeling a little tougher right now. The anti-war coalition continues to be a thorn in the side of Democratic leaders, who are trying to find a way to move a war-funding bill over liberal objections and past a Republican Party unified in its opposition to using the must-pass $33 billion measure as a source of domestic spending. War critics say Obama is missing a golden opportunity to use the McChrystal flap as an excuse to reshape his policy in Afghanistan. Instead, he’s reaffirming a policy that was shaped in large measure by McChrystal and using acclaimed Gen. David Petraeus to execute it, leaving himself little room to cast blame should things go wrong.

Uq – No Supplemental

**There’s no Plan B for the supplement bill - now or never.**

Washington Post 6-7 (http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/06/how\_a\_bill\_becomes\_a\_part\_of\_a.html)NAR

I made some calls Monday afternoon to check on the status of Tom Harkin's effort to get $27 billion to help schools around the country avoid crippling layoffs. You'd think that would've been straightforward enough, but you (probably) don't report on Congress for a living. There's no standalone vehicle with the $27 billion. Instead, Harkin was going to offer it as an amendment to the war supplemental. But though he had more than 50 senators on his side, he didn't have the necessary 60, so he didn't force the vote. Rather, it seemed that Rep. David Obey, the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, was going to add the money into the House's version of the war supplemental. That hasn't happened yet, but if it does happen, and if that supplemental passes the House, then the hope is that the Senate will adopt Obey's education language when the two bills go to conference committee, and there will be 60 senators willing to vote "aye" on the final package. If it doesn't happen, well, there doesn't really seem to be a plan B for passing this bill. The baroque process happens to be a reminder, though, of the many high-cost war supplementals Congress has passed. These were pricey bills to fund the Iraq and Afghanistan wars (and other priorities that got attached). They weren't built into the budget. Nothing was done to offset their spending. And all of them passed. Now that we're dealing with an economic disaster at home, there's no similar willingness to bend the rules and spend what's needed to get the job done. And the irony is that supplemental measures make more sense in this context: You're supposed to increase deficits during a recession, and this money would do a lot more good for the country than, say, a senseless war in Iraq.

The bill would shove through billions in domestic spending – sparks harsh Republican backlash stopping Gates from getting his funding.

United Press International 7-2 (http://www.istockanalyst.com/article/viewiStockNews/articleid/4273202)NAR

The bill, which contains billions of dollars in additional domestic spending sought by House Democrats, passed 239-182 Thursday, with 15 Democrats and 167 Republicans voting against it, The Hill reported. Because the House amended the Senate version of the bill, the measure must return to the upper chamber for consideration. House members defeated several amendments offered by liberal Democrats that would have forced the Obama administration to withdraw troops from Afghanistan sooner than officials want, the Washington publication said. As the House debated the bill, the Obama administration issued a statement strongly supporting the war funding but threatening a presidential veto of any bill that included "provisions that would undermine (the president's) ability as commander in chief to conduct military operations in Afghanistan." The statement also threatened a veto of any bill "that includes cuts to education reforms." The supplemental appropriation includes $15 billion in education aid that would be offset partially by $800 million in cuts to new education programs, the House Appropriations Committee said. "It seems only reasonable to defer some new activities and expansions in order to help address the urgent fiscal crisis facing our school systems," a committee statement read. "In addition, the rescissions in no way damage the future funding prospects in better economic times for these programs." Republicans cried foul, calling the parliamentary maneuvers "political chicanery" designed to push through Democrats' domestic spending priorities. The Hill reported Republicans also complained that the votes were structured in such a way that made it impossible for the House to approve military spending without returning the legislation to the Senate.

Uq – No Supplemental

Domestic spending means the death of the bill – democratic unity is broken.

Politico 7-3 (http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=98EF4119-18FE-70B2-A8EC8766712179BB)NAR

House Appropriations Chairman Dave Obey (D-Wisc.) labored for weeks to craft a package of domestic spending -- $10 billion for teacher salaries, $5 billion for college scholarships, $701 million for border security and $142 million in money to help the Gulf Coast -- to ride alongside the $33 billion emergency supplemental funding the war in Afghanistan. He looked for cuts to existing programs so that centrist Democrats could tell constituents that the new spending was "paid for." But 15 House Democrats, mostly conservatives, voted against the bill anyway, suggesting that -- "paid for" or not -- there's not much upside in voting for new spending. Just as Obey prepared to bring his amendment to the floor for a vote, the White House released a statement of administration policy with a threat to veto the measure over $800 million in rescissions Obey had proposed to help offset the cost of the education spending -- a paltry amount compared with the new windfall for the Education Department. Obey targeted charter school grants and the new "Race to the Top" reform program -- both top priorities for the president and his Education Secretary, Arne Duncan. The veto threat gave cover to Democrats, liberal and conservative, who would vote against the measure but also may have backfired a bit by infuriating House Democrats.

Political climate in the senate has changed – won’t appreciate the new spending the House bill has.

Fire-Dog Lake 7-2 (http://news.firedoglake.com/2010/07/02/the-war-supplemental-a-rundown/)NAR

What they actually wanted was the same bill the Senate passed so they could easily get their precious war money. And they wanted the maximum amount of shock-doctrine funds to force untested “reforms” on public schools nationwide. Well, they didn’t get it. The amendment passed, and pretty easily, with only 15 Democratic defections and 3 Republican supporters (Castle, Tim Johnson, Kirk). So that’s in the bill. The other three votes were test votes on the level of opposition to the Afghan war. An amendment pushed by Blue Dogs to embarrass the antiwar crowd by calling for an elimination of military funding got 25 votes. But Barbara Lee’s amendment calling for money to only go toward a withdrawal garnered 100 votes. And the McGovern amendment, which would have required a timetable for withdrawal, received a whopping 162 votes, including the majority of the Democratic caucus and 9 Republicans. This shows a real crumbling of the Afghanistan policy. So where do we go from here? The House bill differed from the Senate bill significantly, with all kinds of additional spending. It’s unclear whether the Senate can pass a now-$80 billion dollar supplemental. They certainly won’t even try until mid-July when they return from recess. And despite the pay-fors to the education spending (the House bill is actually cheaper in deficit terms, and it doesn’t have that $3.9 billion for Afghan reconstruction to boot), it’s likely that the Senate will balk. Who will blink?

Gates is pushing for supplement bill, but multiple ‘veto’ objects may keep it away.

Fox News 6-20 (http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/06/20/gates-afghanistan-progress-slower-planned-plugging/)NAR

But the budget fight has already taken on a challenging tone. Gates has requested that Congress pass an emergency supplemental by July 4, a delay of his original Memorial Day goal. Fighting over additional unpaid spending attached to the emergency bill has delayed a vote in the House. "We will have to start doing stupid things after the Fourth of July recess in terms of planning for major disruptions if we don't have the supplemental by the Fourth of July recess," Gates warned. "We actually begin to have to take really serious negative actions that impact our troops, as well as our civilians, in mid to -- in early to mid-August."  As for the longer term, Gates said he believes the president would veto a bill passed by Congress that includes continued funding for the C17 cargo plane or an alternative engine for the Joint Strike Fighter even if that legislation also included repeal of "don't ask, don't tell." Those two non-combat spending items are on the defense secretary's chopping block but could survive cuts if attached to a repeal of the military's policy on gays serving in the military, a priority for President Obama. "Well, as I told the Senate Appropriations Committee and the defense subcommittee this week, it would be a very serious mistake to believe that the president would not veto a bill that has the C17 or the alternative engine in it just because it had other provisions that the president and the administration want," Gates said.

Uq – Supplemental-Budget Cut

Money is tight for Gates – a no-vote by now for the bill means budget cuts.

Wall Street Journal 6-20 (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704638504575319011750369950.html?mod=WSJ\_hpp\_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsForth) NAR

Defense Secretary Robert Gates on Sunday urged Congress to pass legislation to allocate more funding for the war in Afghanistan by the beginning of July. Mr. Gates, speaking on "Fox News Sunday," suggested that otherwise, the Pentagon would have to start doing "stupid things," in an apparent reference to potential budget cuts. The Senate approved legislation in May to allocate roughly $60 billion in additional taxpayer money to pay for the conflict in Afghanistan through the remainder of fiscal year 2010 ending Sept. 30, but the House of Representatives has yet to act on the measure. It wasn't immediately clear how House lawmakers might respond to Mr. Gates's call for speedy action on a supplemental spending bill. President Barack Obama pledged to end mid-year war-funding bills when he took office and to instead include the necessary resources to pay for the war as part of the regular budget process. But his decision last year to increase the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan by about 30,000 troops meant that the government would need more money immediately. That brings the total U.S. presence in that country to just under 100,000. White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel, appearing on ABC's "This Week," said a July 2011 deadline set by Mr. Obama to start withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan still stood. "Everyone know there's a firm date," Mr. Emanuel said. He said the level of drawdown would be determined at that time, depending on the conditions in the country.

Uq – A2**: ‘Gates cuts spending’**

**Gates doesn’t save money – he will reinvest it into new tech.**

Politico 6-17 (http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0610/38643.html)NAR

Gates has directed the military to find billions of dollars in overhead savings for the Pentagon’s fiscal year 2012 budget as part of a grand bargain — one that promises DoD leaders that if they save money, they will be able to reinvest those dollars without sacrificing the size of their forces

Uq – A2: “Pullout Inev”

Even if pullout is inevitable, only a sudden shockwave like the plan would jump start the DoD’s budget.

Washington Post 6-29 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/28/AR2010062805053.html)NAR

Over the past few decades, the number of government employees overseeing contracting has shrunk as defense budgets have rapidly grown. That led to little oversight on the costs of weapons systems, industry experts say. The Obama administration has pushed for hiring more contracting experts to help improve the acquisition process. Gates dropped plans for a new long-range bomber and fired the head of the F-35 fighter jet program after the costs skyrocketed. "The savings we are seeking will not be found overnight," Carter said. "It has taken years for excessive costs and unproductive overhead to creep into our business processes, and it will take years to work them out."

**\*\*\*Links & Internals\*\*\***

Link – Troop Reductions Save Money

Troop withdrawal saves $1 trillion

Maze 9 (Rick, staff writer for the Army Times, 9/5, http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/09/military\_troopwithdrawals\_cost\_090309w/) PJ

A speedier withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq and Afghanistan would shave $1.1 trillion off the budget in the next decade, a new congressional budget projection says. That would be a sizeable cut in defense-related spending from 2010 through 2019, which the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimates at $7.4 trillion. The budget forecast, issued as Congress is about to return from a summer break and confront questions about budget priorities and deficit spending, says defense costs are uncertain because budget analysts cannot predict the number of deployed troops and the pace of operations. The $7.4 trillion price tag is based on the number of deployed troops remaining at about 210,000, but looks at two scenarios for reductions: A sharp reduction in troops over three years, resulting in $1.1 trillion in savings. Under this projection, the number of deployed troops falls to 160,000 in 2010; to 100,000 in 2011; to 35,000 in 2012 and to 30,000 from 2013 to 2019. A more gradual decline that shaves $700 billion off the $7.4 trillion defense spending estimate. It assumes 210,000 deployed troops in 2010; 190,000 in 2011; 150,000 in 2012; 100,000 in 2013 and 75,000 in 2014 and beyond. The report does not suggest what the money saved from the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan should be used for, but the Defense Department surely would make a bid to keep at least some of it to pay for unfunded weapons modernization programs. The budget and economic update notes that Congress has allocated $944 billion so far for Iraq and Afghanistan operations — $849 billion in direct spending by the Defense Department, $51 billion for diplomatic efforts, $42 billion to aid Iraq and Afghanistan police and military forces and $2 billion to cover costs such as increases in veterans benefits and services.

Troop presence costs billions – withdrawing saves billions

Blumer 9 (Tom, president of Monetary Matters, a training and development company in Mason, Ohio, 11/20, http://newsbusters.org/blogs/tom-blumer/2009/11/20/nyt-discovers-wars-cost-money) PJ

While President Obama’s decision about sending more troops to Afghanistan is primarily a military one, it also has substantial budget implications that are adding pressure to limit the commitment, senior administration officials say. The latest internal government estimates place the cost of adding 40,000 American troops and sharply expanding the Afghan security forces, as favored by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top American and allied commander in Afghanistan, at $40 billion to $54 billion a year, the officials said. Even if fewer troops are sent, or their mission is modified, the rough formula used by the White House, of about $1 million per soldier a year, appears almost constant. So even if Mr. Obama opts for a lower troop commitment, Afghanistan’s new costs could wash out the projected $26 billion expected to be saved in 2010 from withdrawing troops from Iraq. And the overall military budget could rise to as much as $734 billion, or 10 percent more than the peak of $667 billion under the Bush administration.

Major decreases in troops save money

Simpson 9 (Stan, talk show commentator, 2/27, http://blogs.courant.com/stan\_simpson/2009/02/its-3-months-later-than.html)

It is three months later than he promised, but the bottom line is we should soon see a major decrease  in American troops fighting this $12 billion- a-month misguided war in Iraq. President Obama says he wants only 50,000 of the 142,000 U.S. soldiers to remain in Iraq in 2010. Now, some might say that's 50,000 too many. But with a projected defict of $1.75 TRILLION, this will be one way for America to save money. The $12 billion squandered each month is only a snapshot to other wasteful spending in Iraq.

Withdrawal saves billions that can be reinvested anywhere.

Lewis 6(James, Analyst@American Thinker, December 11, “The US Cannot Leave Iraq”, http://www.americanthinker.com/2006/12/the\_us\_cannot\_leave\_iraq.html, accessd 7/6/10)jn

It will free up billions of dollars in funds that can be used for education, social security, renewable energy research, etc. Hundreds of billions of our tax dollars have already been spent on this war, and the pace of spending is not likely to slow down. If lawmakers cut funding or make it conditional, it will likely be seen by the American public as not supporting the troops. Imagine what we could do with all that extra money. We could shore up education and infrastructure, ensuring high future productivity and job opportunities. We could shore up a social security system heading for bankruptcy. We could develop renewable energy sources, possibly alleviating our dependence on Middle Eastern oil.

Link – Troop Reductions Save Money

Defense budgets are entirely dependent on savings from military withdrawals

Tiron 10 (Roxana, writer for The Hill, 6/28, http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/106055-levin-troop-

reductions-would-net-defense-savings)

As Pentagon leaders seek to free up about $100 billion in the defense budget, the leading Senate Democrat on military matters said on Monday that any savings will depend on U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan. Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said the “success of any reductions in the Pentagon budget” would depend on savings from the significant troop reductions in Iraq this year and the pace of reducing the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan starting next July. “More than any other thing, this is going to affect the budget,” Levin said at a breakfast with defense reporters. If the pace of the troop reduction in Afghanistan is “significant” next July, Levin said, the Pentagon could have “major savings.” The wars are currently funded through the so-called overseas contingency funds. President Barack Obama has requested $130 billion in war funds for 2011 and an additional $33 billion for the remainder of the fiscal year. Congress has not yet approved that war emergency-spending bill, though Defense Secretary Robert Gates has stressed that that legislation should be passed by the end of this week. The Pentagon leadership has launched a major push to free up about $100 bilion over the next five years to maintain current fighting forces and modernize weapons systems. The goal is to find more savings within the defense budget without cutting the top-line number. Pentagon leaders are eyeing 2 to 3 percent real growth in budget areas that need it most: force structure and modernization. Pentagon acquisition chief Ashton Carter on Monday met with defense industry executives and Pentagon acquisition corps to discuss ways to cut waste in military contracts and restore affordability in defense contracts. “It’s about eliminating unnecessary costs,” Carter said on Monday. The Pentagon’s acquisition chief described the effort as “doing more without more.”

Removing troops allows congress to make defense cuts - a peace time environment does not need such a standing army.

Government Executive 6-21 (http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0610/062110cdam2.htm?oref=rellink)NAR

But when it comes to ensuring that defense bears some of the burden of federal deficit reduction, $100 billion over the next five years would hardly make a dent. The deficit for this fiscal year will top $1 trillion, and is expected to grow exponentially over the next decade because of a sharp rise in entitlement costs. The defense budget, which accounts for more than half of all federal discretionary spending, must play a role if the government has any hope at reining in the burgeoning deficit, said Gordon Adams, OMB's former associate director of national security programs during the Clinton administration. "A double tsunami is about to hit defense," said Adams, now a professor at American University. The first wave is a growing appetite for deficit reduction and spending control. The second wave, Adams said, is an anticipated reduction in troops deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, making it both easier and more politically feasible to cut the defense budget. With tens of thousands of troops still deployed in both countries, most lawmakers -- particularly key members of the Armed Services committees from both parties -- would not tolerate cuts to the defense budget. In fact, many Republicans complain that the Obama administration isn't spending enough to acquire fighter aircraft and ships. But a peacetime environment would pave the way for significant defense cuts, as it has after most major military operations. Gates' $100 billion cost-saving plan does not qualify for a "serious rethink" of the Pentagon budget, Adams said. Berteau, meanwhile, likened it to a "test program" in deficit reduction efforts. But Adams predicts that external pressures from the White House, as well as a growing deficit-reduction pressures from Blue Dogs and fiscally conservative Republicans, will lead the charge in cutting the Pentagon's top line.

Link – Troop Reductions Save Money

Troop presence costs billions

Johnson No Date (Chalmers, staff writer, http://current.com/16pv64c)

The U.S. Empire of Bases -- at $102 billion a year already the world's costliest military enterprise -- just got a good deal more expensive. As a start, on May 27th, we learned that the State Department will build a new "embassy" in Islamabad, Pakistan, which at $736 million will be the second priciest ever constructed, only $4 million less, if cost overruns don't occur, than the Vatican-City-sized one the Bush administration put up in Baghdad. The State Department was also reportedly planning to buy the five-star Pearl Continental Hotel (complete with pool) in Peshawar, near the border with Afghanistan, to use as a consulate and living quarters for its staff there. Unfortunately for such plans, on June 9th Pakistani militants rammed a truck filled with explosives into the hotel, killing 18 occupants, wounding at least 55, and collapsing one entire wing of the structure. There has been no news since about whether the State Department is still going ahead with the purchase. Whatever the costs turn out to be, they will not be included in our already bloated military budget, even though none of these structures is designed to be a true embassy -- a place, that is, where local people come for visas and American officials represent the commercial and diplomatic interests of their country. Instead these so-called embassies will actually be walled compounds, akin to medieval fortresses, where American spies, soldiers, intelligence officials, and diplomats try to keep an eye on hostile populations in a region at war. One can predict with certainty that they will house a large contingent of Marines and include roof-top helicopter pads for quick get-aways. While it may be comforting for State Department employees working in dangerous places to know that they have some physical protection, it must also be obvious to them, as well as the people in the countries where they serve, that they will now be visibly part of an in-your-face American imperial presence. We shouldn't be surprised when militants attacking the U.S. find one of our base-like embassies, however heavily guarded, an easier target than a large military base. And what is being done about those military bases anyway -- now close to 800 of them dotted across the globe in other people's countries? Even as Congress and the Obama administration wrangle over the cost of bank bailouts, a new health plan, pollution controls, and other much needed domestic expenditures, no one suggests that closing some of these unpopular, expensive imperial enclaves might be a good way to save some money. Instead, they are evidently about to become even more expensive. On June 23rd, we learned that Kyrgyzstan, the former Central Asian Soviet Republic which, back in February 2009, announced that it was going to kick the U.S. military out of Manas Air Base (used since 2001 as a staging area for the Afghan War), has been persuaded to let us stay. But here's the catch: In return for doing us that favor, the annual rent Washington pays for use of the base will more than triple from $17.4 million to $60 million, with millions more to go into promised improvements in airport facilities and other financial sweeteners. All this because the Obama administration, having committed itself to a widening war in the region, is convinced it needs this base to store and trans-ship supplies to Afghanistan.

Troop withdrawal sets up political stage for hard defense spending cuts for specific weapons programs.

Francis 10 (David R. weekly columnist, March 29, “Defense budget: After Afghanistan and Iraq withdrawal, a peace dividend?”, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/David-R.-Francis/2010/0329/Defense-budget-After-Afghanistan-and-Iraq-withdrawal-a-peace-dividend)KM

Nevertheless, the election in Iraq has raised hopes that the US can shrink its military presence there to 50,000 noncombat troops by September. On March 10, Defense Secretary Robert Gates reportedly also raised the possibility that some of the 33,000 troops involved in the recent buildup in Afghanistan could leave before July 2011, the date set by President Obama for beginning withdrawal. If and when these wars wind down, the US may receive an even bigger peace dividend in the form of overall defense cuts. Huge federal budget deficits will force them. Right now, neither Republicans nor Democrats in Congress are inclined to make serious cuts for fear of being called weak on defense. Without a war, however, members of Congress, particularly Democrats, may begin asking hard questions about weapons programs. There's much to cut, says Christopher Hellman of the National Priorities Project in Northampton, Mass. He calls the defense budget "bloated."

Link – PMCs Are Expensive

PMCs are expensive

Swanson 8 (James A, former senior fellow in constitutional studies and former editor-in-chief of the Cato Supreme Court Review, “The Bush League of Nations”, p. 154) PJ

America’s private mercenary companies in Iraq perfectly match the Bush regime’s worldview and unconstitutional governance. They are music to a dictator’s ears. These armies function above and outside the law, doing Bush’s bidding in the dark, without appropriate accountability and oversight. Beholden to him and the GOP, they protect America’s corporate empire and serve as the emperor’s praetorian guard, much like Saddam’s Republican Guard, only less competent at their core mission and much more expensive.

Blackwater alone costs 6 times as much as regular soldiers do

Pitzke 7 (Marc, writer for Spiegel Online, 10/3, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,509264,00.html) PJ

The probe has found out that Blackwater, which is the exclusive contractor of the US State Department in Iraq, is extremely expensive: The cost of a Blackwater guard is "over six times more than the cost of an equivalent soldier," according to the report. Even Secretary of Defense Robert Gates himself had complained about that fact before Congress last week, saying that Blackwater's high wages are luring more and more good men away from the US forces.

PMCs cost billions

Robberson 7 (Tod, writer for Dallas News, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/world/stories/122406dnintldyncorp.32c4b08.html) PJ

DynCorp International runs its operational hub from a dark glass building bearing another firm's logo. The office complex, on the outskirts of Irving, gives no indication of the huge footprint the military services company is leaving around the world. Using billions of taxpayer dollars, DynCorp is quietly doing the U.S. government's work in Iraq, Afghanistan and other world hot spots. Its paramilitary forces can kill or be killed in combat, but there's little public accounting of what DynCorp does or whether tax dollars are being well spent.

PMCs are expensive

Svoboda 7 (Sandra, professor at Wayne State University, 5/9, http://www.privateforces.com/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=1761)

Using private contractors isn't anything new for the federal government — including the Department of Defense. Brooks, from the industry association, says about 80,000 privately contracted employees did logistics work during the Vietnam War. But there's no doubt it's a growing industry. A Congressional Research Service report released in January called "Defense Contracting in Iraq: Issues and Options for Congress" found an 88 percent increase between 2000 and 2005 in the dollar amount of U.S. defense department contracts for goods and services overall. What's different now is how the money is being spent. "There has been a substantial shift in the types of contracts for troop support services, the size of the contracts, and the lack of effective management control over the administration of the contracts, and the oversight of the contractors," the report stated. "These new contracts have characteristics that make oversight difficult." According to the report, the majority of troop support services contracts in Iraq have not been competitively bid. It cites congressional concern that the contracts are "expensive and difficult to manage"; public agencies and private organizations have cited instances of waste and fraud.

And, we spend almost 300 million dollars a year on one security firm alone

Scahill 7 (Jeremy, Puffin Foundation Writing Fellow at The Nation Institute, is the author of the bestselling Blackwater, *The Independent,* Aug 10, http://www.uruknet.info/?p=35239 ) ET

The single largest U.S. contract for private security in Iraq was a $293 million payment to the British firm Aegis Defence Services, headed by retired British Lt. Col. Tim Spicer, who has been dogged by accusations that he is a mercenary because of his private involvement in African conflicts. The Texas-based DynCorp International has been another big winner, with more than $1 billion in contracts to provide personnel to train Iraqi police forces, while Blackwater USA has won $750 million in State Department contracts alone for "diplomatic security."

Link – PMCs Are Expensive

And, securitization costs more than 90% of the taxes of the US

Scahill 7 (Jeremy, Puffin Foundation Writing Fellow at The Nation Institute, is the author of the bestselling Blackwater, *The Independent,* Aug 10, http://www.uruknet.info/?p=35239 ) ET

While Iraq currently dominates the headlines, private war and intelligence companies are expanding their already sizable footprint. The U.S. government in particular is now in the midst of the most radical privatization agenda in its history. According to a recent report in Vanity Fair, the government pays contractors as much as the combined taxes paid by everyone in the United States with incomes under $100,000, meaning "more than 90 percent of all taxpayers might as well remit everything they owe directly to [contractors] Some of this outsourcing is happening in sensitive sectors, including the intelligence community. "This is the magnet now. Everything is being attracted to these private companies in terms of individuals and expertise and functions that were normally done by the intelligence community," says former CIA division chief and senior analyst Melvin Goodman. "My major concern is the lack of accountability, the lack of responsibility. The entire industry is essentially out of control. It’s outrageous."

PMCs are 70% of the US intelligence budget

Scahill 7 (Jeremy, Puffin Foundation Writing Fellow at The Nation Institute, is the author of the bestselling Blackwater, *The Independent,* Aug 10, http://www.uruknet.info/?p=35239 ) ET

RJ Hillhouse, a blogger who investigates the clandestine world of private contractors and U.S. intelligence, recently obtained documents from the Office of the Directorate of National Intelligence (DNI) showing that Washington spends some $42 billion annually on private intelligence contractors, up from $17.54 billion in 2000. Currently that spending represents 70 percent of the U.S. intelligence budget going to private companies.

Link – TNWs Are Expensive

Tactical nuclear weapons are expensive to maintain

Landler 10 (Mark, writer for the New York Times, 4/22, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/23/world/europe/23diplo.html)

TALLINN, Estonia — Fresh from signing a strategic nuclear arms agreement with Russia, the United States is parrying a push by several NATO allies to withdraw its aging stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. Speaking Thursday at a meeting of NATO foreign ministers here, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said the Obama administration was not opposed to cuts in these battlefield weapons, mostly bombs and short-range missiles locked in underground vaults on air bases in five NATO countries. But Mrs. Clinton ruled out removing these weapons unless Russia agreed to cuts in its arsenal, which is at least 10 times the size of the American one. And she also appeared to make reductions in the American stockpile contingent on Russia’s being more transparent about its weapons and willing to move them away from the borders of NATO countries. “We should recognize that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance,” Mrs. Clinton said. “As a nuclear alliance, sharing nuclear risks and responsibilities widely is fundamental.” The push to withdraw tactical weapons from Europe has gained momentum in recent weeks, with Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Norway jointly petitioning NATO to take up the issue. Many analysts consider these weapons a dangerous relic of the cold war, expensive to safeguard and deadly if they fell into the wrong hands.

Revamps for TNWs will incur huge costs

Associated Press 10 (5/9, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/05/09/outdated-unwanted-possibly-insecure-nukes-hang-europe-nato-debate-builds/)

"They are political, not military," the ex-Marine officer said in an interview at NATO headquarters, referring to the aura of "alliance resolve" the bombs represent. As for Baltic nervousness, Ambassador Rogozin said "deterring" the new Russia in the vastly changed post-Cold War world is "senseless, idiotic." To Rogozin, the American bombs are a "toy," of use not to Europe or the U.S., but only to NATO's bureaucracy. In the end, whatever the strategic argument, an economic one may prevail. The U.S. allies must all replace their aging warplanes in the coming years, and making the new jets nuclear-capable would incur huge additional costs. Germany, whose Tornados must be replaced earliest, will have to decide soon whether to spend an estimated 300 million euros (US $400 million) to extend this questionable nuclear operation. Berlin's Bundestag is unlikely to vote those funds, NATO insiders said.

TNWs are ridiculously expensive

Margolis 10 (Eric, contributing foreign editor for Sun National Media Canada, 3/9, http://www.lewrockwell.com/margolis/margolis182.html)

Thousands more tactical nuclear warheads will remain, though Washington hints it might remove some from Western Europe and Asia. Tactical nuclear weapons would play a key role in halting a North Korean attack on South Korea. Nuclear weapons are widely accepted in the West as a legitimate defense against nuclear attack. But since the Bush administration, the hard right has been pushing for using small nuclear weapons against deeply buried targets – like Iranian nuclear plants – or guerilla groups. A new, small tactical nuclear warhead, aka "Muslim-buster" – was evaluated and almost went into production before it was stopped by the US Congress. Republicans are again beating the war drums over the supposed nuclear threat from North Korea and Iran. They accuse Obama of near treason for having even considered scrapping part or all of America's huge nuclear arsenal, as he once promised to do. These low-IQ Republican scaremongers don't know, or don't care that North Korea has no long-ranged nuclear capability, or wants nukes for defense against possible US nuclear attack – and as a way of extorting funds from the US, Japan and South Korea. Or that Iran has no nuclear weapons as of now, and poses no threat to the distant US. Retired US generals and admirals have repeatedly advocated junking all nuclear weapons, calling them ruinously expensive and of no military value.

Link – TNWs Are Expensive

Nuclear weapons are expensive to maintain

Byrne et al 10 (Lt. Col. Michael, CDR Douglas Edson, Lt. Col. Andrea Hlosek, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2010/0406/comm/byrneetal\_natonuke.html)

From an economic standpoint, maintaining nuclear proficiency is costly; it requires specialized security, personnel training, logistics, and infrastructure.  If the operational environment has made the employment of European tactical nuclear weapons highly unlikely, then it is contrary to good stewardship of limited national resources to retain these programs.  As European nations are faced with the expense of modernizing their aging air forces, some are opting out of the nuclear weapons sharing arrangement by default, with acquisition of less expensive non dual-capable aircraft.  For example, Germany is considering replacing its Tornado fighter jets with the Euro-fighter, which is not capable of employing tactical nuclear weapons.14 The nuclear sharing European countries continue to give low priority to this mission, contributing to the degradation of this capability.  A change in NATO policy would lend coherence to this issue and prevent a haphazard deterioration of the nuclear force posture.    At this rate, the diplomatic window for using the removal of these weapons as leverage for arms control negotiations with Russia is rapidly closing.

Withdrawal of TNWs increases economic cooperation with Russia

Millar and Alexander 1 (Alistair, director of the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, and Brian, director of the Cuba Policy Foundation, http://www.fourthfreedom.org/Applications/cms.php?page\_id=27#bio20)

The U.S. should withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from Europe to address longstanding Russian security concerns, particularly as NATO continues to expand eastward, in exchange for a pledge from Moscow that it will share data on the status and location of its TNW arsenal, and download and significantly reduce its forward deployed tactical nuclear weapons in the area between Russia’s western border and the Ural Mountains. It is sometimes argued that a withdrawal of U.S. TNWs from Europe would leave the United States with few bargaining chips. This quarrel does not take into account that other incentives, particularly economic stimulus and debt relief packages, are carrots that can continue to be offered to Russia. Furthermore, important benefits could result from U.S. withdrawal, providing an opportunity for progress. For example, if an accounting process for Russian weapons could be developed—along with other acceptable transparency measures—as a condition for withdrawal of U.S. weapons, a framework could begin for future reductions of Russian TNWS. The gain for both sides would offer a pathway for ending the current stalemate on this issue. Support for Russian reliance on TNWs varies from sector to sector of the Russian nonstrategic weapons infrastructure. It is therefore important in the initial phases of the incentive-based framework to posit attractive inducements that are likely to appeal to wider, collective Russian interests. Specified proposals could then be sought with individual agencies such as MINATOM (the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy, roughly the equivalent of the U.S. Department of Energy) or the Twelfth Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. One example of this appeal to collective interests could revolve around the notion of a withdrawal of 150 U.S. TNWs in Europe. This would ameliorate Russian concerns about military inferiority, particularly conventional inferiority. The United States has expressed willingness to remove these weapons from Europe in the past. Despite resistance from German, Dutch, and other NATO allies, it is increasingly difficult to justify the need for these weapons on European soil. As previously addressed, the removal of U.S. TNWs in Europe could have a positive effect on Russia’s efforts to deal with its nuclear legacy and nonproliferation initiatives.61 It will not affect NATO deterrence capability. Although the case is still made by some European policy analysts that TNWs remain an integral part of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and NATO’s commitment to Euorpe, economic and political ties have supplanted any reasonable argument for keeping an arsenal of European nuclear weapons as a “vital transatlantic link.” Ivo Daalder notes that “[B]y removing American nuclear weapons from Europe and pledging to include them as part of a Russian-U.S. negotiation regarding tactical nuclear weapons, NATO would enhance the prospect of a possible agreement that would increase effective control over and secure the dismantlement of the large Russian tactical nuclear stockpile.”62 Russian security advisors are concerned that NATO “tactical” nuclear weapons could play a strategic role.

Link – TNWs Are Expensive

TNW deployment is a budgetary waste – funds could be redirected towards other measures.

Lamond and Ingram 9 (“Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states” 15 January 2009 Claudine Paul – BASIC, http://www.basicint.org/gtz/gtz11.htm)KM

While exact figures of US tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) in Europe are classified (NATO does not publish figures on its nuclear arsenals); it is believed there are approximately 200-350 US TNWs in Europe.[2] In Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands there are said to be 10-20 TNW B-61s based at each of the following airbases: Kliene Brogel, Buchel and Volkel. In Italy around 50 TNWs are thought to be based on the Aviano airbase and 20-40 on the Ghedi Torre airbase. The United States is believed to hold around 50-90 TNWs at the Incirlik airbase in Turkey. In a multi-polar, post-Cold War strategic context, there are several reasons why NATO members would want to reconsider the forward deployment of TNWs, three of which are: Nuclear weapons are irrelevant to the majority of security threats considered within NATO, particularly now that it is universally recognized that the Soviet/Russian threat from a supposedly superior conventional capability is manifestly absent today. Even if European states still feel the need for an explicit US nuclear umbrella, TNWs would not be the method of choice for US military planners. Funds allocated to storing, maintaining and protecting nuclear weapon facilities could be better spent focusing on current non-traditional threats.

Link – Generic Bases

Military presence is expensive - $250 billion annually

Dancs 9 (Anita, writer for Foreign Policy in Focus, 7/2, http://www.fpif.org/reports/the\_cost\_of\_the\_global\_us\_military\_presence)

The U.S. military's global presence is vast and costly. More than one-third of U.S. troops are currently based abroad or afloat in international waters, and hundreds of bases and access agreements exist throughout the world. At the beginning of the 21st century, the government pushed to expand this presence through a variety of mechanisms. Yet the Department of Defense's budget presentations lack enough detail to make it possible to know the precise cost. The budgets don't break down the numbers, for example, on maintaining bases at home and overseas. Nevertheless, from data on personnel, bases, and the Pentagon's budgets, it's possible to make an estimate. This number comes from the proportion of each branch's budget devoted to military personnel stationed overseas, excluding troops based in and around Iraq and Afghanistan. Since one-fourth of these military personnel are stationed overseas, the overall figure includes one-fourth of the defense-wide budget. Finally, it includes the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the amount of military assistance to other countries. The report does not include subsidies from governments that host bases, three-quarters of which come from Japan alone. The final bill: The United States spends approximately $250 billion annually to maintain troops, equipment, fleets, and bases overseas.

Link – South Korea/Iraq Bases

South Korea and Iraq bases are expensive

Francis 6 (David R, writer for the Christian Science Monitor, 4/3, http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0403/p16s02-cogn.html)

United States taxpayers have spent an inflation-adjusted $1 trillion to keep military bases in South Korea since the war ended there in 1953. Those bases remain in place, though they are shrinking. Some military analysts wonder if 20 or so years from now the US will still have costly "enduring" bases in Iraq. ("Permanent" is a term the Pentagon generally avoids in referring to the hundreds of bases it has around the globe.) Alternatively, should the US decide to leave Iraq - perhaps because a full-fledged civil war puts American armed forces in a too-perilous position - the personnel and their equipment could be flown out quickly. "They could come home in a month," calculates John Pike, director of Globalsecurity.com, a website specializing in military affairs. Maybe three months, figures Gordon Adams, head of Security Policy Studies at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. Hiring Ukraine's huge Antonov cargo planes might speed the process. So far, though, it seems clear that the Pentagon would prefer to keep its bases in Iraq. It has already spent $1 billion or more on them, outfitting some with underground bunkers and other characteristics of long-term bases. The $67.6 billion emergency bill to cover Iraq and Afghanistan military costs includes $348 million for further base construction. That supplemental appropriation was passed last month by the House and will soon come before the Senate. With the midterm congressional elections eight months away, there is a widespread assumption the Pentagon will withdraw goodly numbers of US troops from Iraq before then. But no top American or British authority has ruled out keeping permanent bases in Iraq.

Link – Iraq Presence Expensive

Iraq bases are expensive

Zeese 6 (Kevin, attorney and executive director of Democracy Rising, http://www.antiwar.com/orig/zeese.php?articleid=8885)

Long lasting military bases in Iraq will be an expensive budget item even if the US decides to reduce its forces to 50,000, less than half the current troop level. The annual cost would run between $5 billion to $7 billion a year, estimates Gordon Adams, director of Security Policy Studies at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. Recently, the House voted, by a voice vote, to oppose a permanent military presence in Iraq. Future on the record votes for appropriations will show whether this was a symbolic election-year vote, or something the House is serious about.

Iraq bases cost billions

Engelhardt 8 (Tom, author and co-founder of the American Empire Project, 6/18, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/JF18Ak04.html)

It's just a US$5,812,353 contract - chump change for the Pentagon and not even one of those notorious "no-bid" contracts either. Ninety-eight bids were solicited by the Army Corps of Engineers and 12 were received before the contract was awarded this May 28 to Wintara, Inc of Fort Washington, Maryland, for "replacement facilities for Forward Operating Base Speicher, Iraq". According to a Department of Defense press release, the work on those "facilities" to be replaced at the base near Saddam Hussein's hometown, Tikrit, is expected to be completed by January 31, 2009, a mere 11 days after a new president enters the Oval Office. It is but one modest reminder that, when the next administration hits Washington, American bases in Iraq, large and small, will still be undergoing the sort of repair and upgrading that has been ongoing for years. In fact, in the past five-plus years, untold billions of taxpayer dollars have been spent on the construction and upgrading of those bases. When asked in the autumn of 2003, only months after Baghdad fell to US troops, Lieutenant Colonel David Holt, the army engineer then "tasked with facilities development" in Iraq, proudly indicated that "several billion dollars" had already been invested in those fast-rising bases. Even then, he was suitably amazed, commenting that "the numbers are staggering". Imagine what he might have said, barely two and a half years later, when the US reportedly had 106 bases, mega to micro, all across the country. By now, billions have evidently gone into single massive mega-bases like the US air base at Balad, about 85 kilometers north of Baghdad. It's a "16-square-mile fortress" (41 square kilometers) housing perhaps 40,000 US troops, contractors, special-ops types and Defense Department employees. As the Washington Post's Tom Ricks, who visited Balad in 2006, pointed out - in a rare piece on one of the US's mega-bases - it's essentially "a small American town smack in the middle of the most hostile part of Iraq". Then, air traffic at the base was already being compared to Chicago's O'Hare International or London's Heathrow - and keep in mind that Balad has been steadily upgraded ever since to support an "air surge" that, unlike the President George W Bush's 2007 "surge" of 30,000 ground troops, has yet to end.

Link – Iraq Presence Expensive

Cost for presence in Iraq and Afghanistan has totaled $1 trillion

Common Dreams 10 (political news source, 5/25, http://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2010/05/25-6)

WASHINGTON - May 25 - Today, U.S. Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI) announced that he intends to offer legislation requiring the president to develop a flexible timetable to draw down U.S. troops from Afghanistan as an amendment to the supplemental spending bill, which will soon come before the Senate.  The amendment is based on legislation Feingold, along with U.S. Representatives Jim McGovern (D-MA) and Walter Jones (R-NC), introduced last month to enhance our national security and reduce the burden on our Armed Forces and on taxpayers.  It was recently reported that the 1,000th American service member was killed in connection with operations in Afghanistan.  “A large, open-ended, expensive military presence in Afghanistan is not the way to defeat al Qaeda,” Feingold said.  “Rather than pouring so much of our money and resources into one country that isn’t even al Qaeda’s base, we should develop a timetable to redeploy our troops from Afghanistan so we can focus on going after al Qaeda’s global network.”  The amendment mirrors the Feingold-McGovern-Jones legislation and would require the president to provide a plan and timetable for drawing down our forces in Afghanistan and identify any variables that could require changes to that timetable.  The amendment would not require the president to redeploy troops.  Congress has appropriated $299.6 billion for the war in Afghanistan and related operations to date (FY01-FY10).  This supplemental bill includes another $30 billion for Afghanistan.  The total cost to date of both Afghanistan and Iraq is over $1trillion.

Troop withdrawal from Iraq would save billions

Lightman 8 (David, writer for McClatchy Newspapers, 9/19, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2008/09/19/52810/federal-billions-for-wall-street.html)

WASHINGTON — The next president will take office in January with little hope of getting his pet programs enacted quickly, if at all, because of already-massive budget deficits likely to balloon even further from the hundreds of billions expected to be used to bail out Wall Street. "The next president is just not going to have the money to meet his promises," said Maya MacGuineas, the president of the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, a nonpartisan budget-research group. Democratic nominee Barack Obama and Republican rival John McCain have big plans that would add substantially to the deficit. By 2013, when his changes would be fully implemented, Obama would boost the deficit by $360 billion with his tax cuts and by another $65 billion with his health-care plan while partially offsetting that with $139 billion saved through winding down the Iraq war and making other spending cuts, according to US Budget Watch, a nonpartisan research group. McCain's tax cut plan would add $417 billion to $485 billion to the deficit, while his health-care policies would cost another $54 billion to $65 billion. Iraq troop reductions and "unspecified cuts to balance the budget" could save $291 billion to $304 billion, however.

Iraq presence costs billions annually

Xinhua 7 (Chinese news source, 10/9, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/6279164.html)

A long-term U.S. troop presence in Iraq will cost between 4 billion U.S. dollars to 8 billion dollars up front, with an annual tab ranging from 10 billion dollars to 25 billion dollars, according to a new study. The forecasts were made in a report released by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Monday. The report prepared two scenarios envisioning a long-term U.S. military presence in Iraq at the request of Sen. Kent Conrad, (D-N. D.), and both employed a baseline estimate of 55,000 troops in Iraq at any given time. Under the first "combat" scenario, U.S. troops will be in Iraq for specific periods of time before returning to their home bases and will operate at roughly the same tempo and perform the same missions as troops now on the ground. That requires one-time costs of 4 billion dollars to 8 billion dollars and an annual cost of 25 billion dollars.

Link – Japan Presence Expensive

Military presence in Japan is expensive

Meyer 9 (Carlton, former US Marine, http://www.g2mil.com/Japan-bases.htm)

Maintaining 50,000 U.S. troops in Japan requires millions of dollars each year to rotate GIs for three-year tours, which includes shipping their children, pets, and household goods. In addition, mainland Japan is an unpopular duty station because of cold weather, high costs, and polite yet unfriendly locals. Since housing costs for military families and American civilian employees are twice that of the USA, the U.S. military also spends millions of dollars for additional housing costs and "locality" pay. Keeping military families, aircraft, and ships permanently based in Japan is not only extremely expensive, it is strategically unwise. The USA maintained dozens of aircraft at Clark Field in the Philippines in 1941 to deter a Japanese attack. They provided an easy target for a surprise attack and all aircraft were destroyed on the ground. The defense of the Philippines was poorly organized as a key concern for American officers was the evacuation of military families.

Japan bases are expensive

Norberg 7 (Agneta, vice chair of the Swedish Peace Council, 5/9, http://www.ipb.org/old/NewsLetter/NO%20BASES%20NETWORK.doc)

Military bases are expensive and divert funding from addressing urgent human needs at home and abroad. The Pentagon squanders tens of billions of dollars on foreign military bases.Expenses include housing families of US soldiers, commissaries where US troops and their families gets special discounts and pristine golf courses. Meanwhile, human needs of both US and host nations go unmet.In Japan and other host nations, anger is growing as their tax dollars are used to pay for an intrusive military force and their luxury accommodations, while local people go without adequate housing and social services.

Link – Japan Presence Expensive: A2: Guam

**Still saves money – Japan is already offering to pay 6 billion to move the U.S., they will also pay for the bases.**

AP 7-4 (July 4th 2010, http://www.mediacomtoday.com/news/read.php?id=17985572&ps=923&srce=news\_class&action=4&lang=en&\_LT=UNLC\_NKNWU00L4\_UNEWS) NAR

The United States has asked Japan to help shoulder hundreds of millions of dollars in additional fees to transfer Marines from a controversial base on Okinawa island to Guam, Kyodo news agency reported. The extra money — needed to help pay for electricity, water and sewage facilities at the new site — could add further uncertainty to the future of the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station, which has strained the security alliance that Japan and the U.S. sealed 50 years ago. Debate over a relocation plan for the base, which currently sits in the middle of a city in Okinawa, led to repeated mass protests and was a major factor in Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's resignation last month. Under the existing deal, 8,000 Marines and their dependents will move to the U.S. territory of Guam and some facilities will shift to a less populated part of the Japanese island. Japan agreed in 2006 to pay more than $6 billion of the $10 billion the move was expected to cost. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates asked Tokyo last month to help pick up the tab for the higher-than-expected infrastructure costs at the new base, Kyodo news said, citing unnamed diplomatic sources. Kyodo said that would likely cost Japan an additional tens of billions of yen (hundreds of millions of dollars). The country's massive debt and struggling economy are a major issue in national elections set for this month, and any additional financial burden for the already sensitive Okinawa base issue would draw strong criticism at home.

Japan will pay even more for the move.

Kyodo News 7-4 (July 4th 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100704a1.html) NAR

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has asked Tokyo to shoulder additional costs to transfer about 8,000 U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam, diplomatic sources from the two countries said Saturday.

The increased amount is estimated to be at least tens of billions of yen, with the U.S. side claiming that expenses to develop infrastructure, such as facilities for electricity as well as water and sewerage, will cost more than expected, according to the sources. Japan is planning to respond to the request, which Gates made in a letter sent in mid-June, after the July 11 House of Councilors election, according to the sources. The transfer of the marines to Guam, together with the relocation of the Futenma air station in Okinawa Prefecture, was agreed on in 2006 to be completed in 2014. While a delay in relocating the Futenma base is expected, infrastructure development in Guam is already under way. The 2006 agreement said total costs for the transfer to Guam will be $10.27 billion, or around ¥900 billion, of which Japan will shoulder some $6.09 billion. It will be a headache for Prime Minister Naoto Kan as it will inevitably draw criticism from opposition lawmakers and other quarters if the government accepts the increase in the cost burden. Before submitting the letter, Gates made the request during talks with Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa in Singapore on June 5. But Kitazawa declined to respond directly at that time as it was shortly after the abrupt resignation of Yukio Hatoyama as prime minister. The U.S. is apparently seeking Japan to shoulder more costs not only because of its tight budget situation, but "it may be linked to former Prime Minister Hatoyama's flip-flops over the relocation of the Futenma base that damaged the Japan-U.S. alliance," a diplomatic source said. Hatoyama, who made a campaign promise during last year's general election to move the Futenma base out of the prefecture, ended up signing a deal with Washington to relocate it to the Henoko coastal area in Nago, northern Okinawa, in line with an existing plan.

Link – South Korea Presence Expensive

South Korean base revamps are expensive

Rowland 9 (Ashley, writer for Stars and Stripes, 9/17, http://www.stripes.com/news/south-korea-base-in-midst-of-1-billion-makeover-1.94777)

KUNSAN AIR BASE, South Korea — Come back to this tiny base on the edge of the Yellow Sea in 10 years, and you might not recognize it. Construction is under way on 44 projects, from new high-rise dorms to a renovated Patriot missile battery site. Another 266 projects have been planned or are awaiting funding. In total, the overhaul to a base that houses 2,600 troops and suffered from neglect for years will cost a whopping $1 billion. To put it in perspective, that’s one-thirteenth of the cost of expanding Camp Humphreys, the U.S. military base that is tripling in size and will eventually house 17,000 troops, the bulk of the 28,500-strong U.S. military presence here. Kunsan airmen and base officials have said for years that routine repairs were not made to the base because it was once scheduled for closure, though 7th Air Force historian David Schepp said there is no record of such a plan. What is certain is that many of Kunsan’s buildings and infrastructure — from its dorms with malfunctioning air conditioning to its corroded water pipes — were not updated. "We probably went through five or 10 years of neglect," said Col. Jerry Harris, former commander of Kunsan’s 8th Fighter Wing, who was replaced in a change of command ceremony on Tuesday. "We probably treated [the base] as a renter instead of an owner." Harris said the base has to revamp its infrastructure just to be livable. Because the improvements are so expensive — and because there’s not much vacant land that could be used to expand the base and build family housing — Kunsan is unlikely to have command-sponsored billets anytime soon, he said. "If we bring families here now, they might not be happy with the rustic conditions," he said. "I think [command sponsorship] will happen. It’s just going to take time." USFK will eventually allow half of its troops to bring their families with them to South Korea. Maj. Denise Kerr, spokeswoman for the 7th Air Force, said in an e-mail that Kunsan is unlikely to get command-sponsored billets before 2020. One of the biggest construction projects under way is the $28 million, 200-room Wolfpack Lodge, scheduled to open in December. The new billeting will replace the 104-room Seaside Inn, an aging collection of two-story buildings, including one that has been condemned and will be torn down this fall.

Reducing presence in South Korea saves money

Congressional Budget Office 4 (http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=5415&type=0&sequence=4)

Shrinking the Army's forward presence by moving personnel and forces back to the United States would address several concerns about current overseas basing. It would reduce the annual costs of maintaining those forces, the amount of family separation that soldiers experienced, and the extent of turnover in CONUS units. To illustrate the effect of large changes in overseas force structure, the alternatives in this report include two different size cuts in Army presence overseas--to about half of the current level and to just 5 percent to 10 percent of the current level. The United States could realize significant savings--approaching $1 billion per year, CBO estimates--if 95 percent of the Army forces now stationed in Germany were moved back to CONUS. The reason is that costs for base operations, military housing, schools for Army children, and pay and allowances for personnel are lower in the United States than in Germany. If 95 percent of the Army forces stationed in South Korea were returned to the United States, smaller savings would result--more than $200 million annually.

Link – Afghan Opium Eradication

Opium eradication is expensive

Associated Press 9 (9/2, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32653272/ns/world\_news-south\_and\_central\_asia/)

While the Obama White House has all but abandoned the Bush administration's program of destroying poppy crops, the Afghan government continues to support poppy crop eradication efforts. A U.S. Senate report called eradication "an expensive failure," and U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke called the practice "a waste of money." Critics said razing poppy fields angered and impoverished rural Afghans without making a significant dent in harvests. In his statement, Costa agreed, saying that "eradication continues to be a failure." Less than 4 percent of the crop planted was destroyed in the past two years, he pointed out. But some Western counter-narcotics officials say eradication discourages cultivation by raising the risk to farmers of planting the crop.

Eradication is expensive

Bigwood and Coffin 5 (Jeremy and Phillip, writers for Foreign Policy in Focus, 10/6, http://www.fpif.org/reports/coca\_eradication)

As early as 1925, the U.S. government advocated the destruction of crops used in drug production, including coca, opium poppy, and cannabis. U.S.-sponsored drug crop eradication started in Mexico after President Nixon’s war on drugs was launched in 1968. When a 1995 National Security Council report recommended that international drug control priorities shift from drug interdiction to crop eradication, the United States reinvigorated its eradication programs, much of them aimed at coca cultivation in the South American Andes, the source of most cocaine in the United States. In 1999, Congress passed the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act authorizing $2.3 billion for international counternarcotics operations—including over $246 million for eradication programs and equipment in Mexico, Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru—with the aim of reducing illegal drug flows by 80% by 2001. This clearly has not achieved the intended effect: today, more cocaine at cheaper prices is entering the U.S. In August 2000, the U.S. Congress passed Plan Colombia, a $1.3-billion counterdrug effort to operate mainly in Colombia. Plan Colombia is largely a military offensive, using the Colombian army and police as U.S. proxies not only against drug crops but also against insurgents.

Link – Afghan Opium Eradication

Opium eradication has cost millions

Constable 6 (Pamela, Washington Post, 9-19, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/18/AR2006091801282.html)

Over the past two years, the Bush administration has poured several hundred million dollars into combating drugs here. The money has funded programs to develop alternative crops, eradicate poppy fields, build prisons and train special anti-narcotics police officers, prosecutors and judges. But still production rises. Thomas A. Schweich, a senior anti-drug official at the State Department, visited Kabul last week for consultations. He told a group of journalists there was no more room for excuses, such as that Afghan farmers are too poor to survive without poppy cultivation or that bureaucrats linked to drugs can be dealt with by rotating them into other jobs. "We are looking for the government of Afghanistan to start prosecuting corrupt officials," Schweich said. "They must get out the message that if you grow poppy, you will be eradicated, and if you traffic, you will be prosecuted. "There are a lot of rumors and finger-pointing, but they need to start building cases that will stand up in court."

Eradication costs $1 billion a year

Dilanian 9 (Ken, writer for USA Today, 3/31, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-03-30-poppy-fields\_N.htm)

"Eradication has been a disaster," said another expert, Vanda Felbab-Brown of Georgetown University. "It has really antagonized the population." Barnett Rubin, a New York University professor and Holbrooke adviser, told Congress last year that eradication usually fuels the Taliban-led insurgency. However, the white paper on Afghanistan released Friday by the White House says the new strategy will spend more on "crop substitution and alternative livelihood programs" while continuing the practice of "targeting those who grow the poppy." Holbrooke said after the release of the Afghanistan strategy that "you can't eliminate the whole eradication program. But you've got to put more emphasis on agricultural job creation." The dilemma of Afghanistan's poppy production has long bedeviled civilian and military strategists. The crop makes up 90% of the world's opium, which is used to make heroin, and a third of the nation's gross domestic product, according to the United Nations. Opium profits fuel the insurgency, but so does destroying the poppy crops of poor farmers, says Lt. Col. John Glaze, whose 2007 report for the Army War College argued against eradication. Poppy production has skyrocketed since the 2001 U.S. invasion. President Bush proposed chemical spraying to kill poppy fields, but the Afghan government and European countries resisted that step as too harsh. In the past two years, the Bush administration pursued a strategy that combined limited poppy-plant eradication by hand and relatively modest programs to help farmers grow alternative crops. The military also began targeting opium traffickers, as opposed to growers. Former Afghanistan counternarcotics coordinator Thomas Schweich says that formula succeeded in driving down opium production by 6% last year, and the number of acres under cultivation dropped 19%. Other experts, including Felbab-Brown, attribute that decline to market saturation and drought. Holbrooke criticized the Bush strategy in a column in *TheWashington Post* last year. "Even without aerial eradication," he wrote, "the program, which costs around $1 billion a year, may be the single most ineffective program in the history of American foreign policy. It's not just a waste of money. It actually strengthens the Taliban and al-Qaeda."

Link - Offshore Balancing

Offshore balancing is the alternative to forward deployments

Art and Waltz 9 (Robert J, Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University, and Kenneth Neal, International Relations Scholar, “The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics, p. 320)

An alternative to the strategy of preponderance is offshore balancing. In this sec­tion I describe a U.S. grand strategy of offshore balancing, delineate the realist premises on which the strategy rests, and demonstrate how the strategy is deduced from these premises. Offshore balancing is a strategy for the multipolar world that already is emerging. Its underlying premise is that it will become increasingly more diffi­cult, dangerous, and costly for the United States to maintain order in, and control over, the international political system as called for by the strategy of preponder­ance. Offshore balancing would define U.S. interests narrowly in terms of defend­ing the United States's territorial integrity and preventing the rise of a Eurasian hegemon. As an offshore balancer, the United States would disengage from its military commitments in Europe, Japan, and South Korea. The overriding objec­tives of an offshore balancing strategy would be to insulate the United States from future great-power wars and maximize its relative power position in the interna­tional system. Offshore balancing would reject the strategy of preponderance's commitment to economic interdependence because interdependence has negative strategic consequences. Offshore balancing also would eschew any ambition of perpetuating U.S. hegemony and would abandon the ideological pretensions embedded in the strategy of preponderance. As an offshore balancer, the United States would not assertively export democracy, engage directly in peace-enforce­ment operations, attempt to save "failed states" (like Somalia and Haiti), or use military power for the purpose of humanitarian intervention.

Offshore balancing is less costly that forward deployment

Art 3 (Robert J, Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University, “A grand strategy for America”, p. 86)

The costs of the strategies turn mainly on deployment requirements. Con­tainment and dominion require the United States to deploy forces overseas in peacetime. Global and regional collective security and cooperative secu­rity may or may not, but would be more politically effective if they did. Iso­lationism definitely does not. Offshore balancing deploys forces forward only when a Eurasian hegemon threatens. Selective engagement requires forward deployment of American troops in Eurasia and the Persian Gulf. Dominion is prohibitively expensive. Isolationism is cheap but there is no fallback position should it fail Offshore balancing is moderate in its cost if the United States has its forces only at home, but it could be expensive if those forces must be deployed to Eurasia, especially to fight a major war. Containment and the three forms of collective security are moderate to expensive strategies, depending upon the contributions of other states and upon the number and size of the states to be contained and the wars to be deterred or fought if deterrence fails. Selective engagement is not cheap, but it does not have to be exorbitant.

Link Helpers – **Will Reinvest**

The Pentagon is looking for savings in its budget to reinvest elsewhere.

Scully 10 (“Tough choices confront defense budget cutters” Megan CongressDaily June 21, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0610/062110cdam2.htm)KM

After a decade of unprecedented growth, efforts to cut waste in the defense budget are coming from every corner -- from the high levels of the Pentagon to fiscal conservatives and liberals alike on Capitol Hill. The proposals on the table vary, as do the appetites for making actual reductions to the size of the Pentagon's budget. But the discussion inside the Beltway has shifted within the past year from shielding the military's accounts from the type of fiscal belt-tightening that is now a reality for most other federal agencies to making the Pentagon an active participant in cost-cutting exercises.For its part, the Pentagon recently announced a five-year effort to find more than $100 billion in savings within the Defense Department's budget and reinvest that money into higher-priority force structure and modernization accounts.

The plan causes reinvestment – Gates has ordered the military to find savings and move them to higher priorities.

Kreisher 10 (“McHugh: Cuts will help Army priorities” Otto CongressDaily June 10, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0610/061010cdpm1.htm)KM

Army Secretary John McHugh Thursday said the Army is "excited" about Defense Secretary Robert Gates' order for the services to find $2 billion in savings in their fiscal 2012 budget request. While McHugh said "we have not been ordered to cut anything," he said Gates' plan requires the Army to "focus on what is generically called overhead," and would allow it to keep the savings and "apply it to other, greater needs." That ability to reapply the money saved to higher priorities "is what makes the secretary's plan unique and makes it far more likely to succeed" than past efforts to cut defense spending, he said in response to a question. Gates has instructed each of the three military departments to cut $2 billion and the other defense agencies $1 billion in low-priority programs from their next budgets in an effort to achieve a total of $100 billion in savings over five years. Explaining the proposal last week, Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn said the idea was not to cut the total defense budget, but to allow spending on the operating forces and essential modernization to go up faster than the 1 percent real growth expected in future budgets.

Link Helpers – Will Reinvest

Savings from a tighter budget cause reinvestment in prioritized technology. Sustainable budgets solve.

Rogers 10 (Diane Lim, Brookings Institution, “Why a tightened defense budget would improve national security” June 22, http://www.csmonitor.com/Money/Economist-Mom/2010/0622/Why-a-tightened-defense-budget-would-improve-national-security)KM

First, I think most Americans (regardless of what they think of our wars and military activity more generally) assume that cuts in the defense/national security budget would weaken our defense capabilities–that a tradeoff exists between deficit reduction and a strong defense. But what surprised me the most at the Naval War College conference was my learning that most of these national security officials and experts, who all advocate for a strong defense, believed that if the defense budget were tightened (and all seemed to recognize that given our fiscal situation, such tightening is inevitable), the quality of defense spending would actually improve. There was a clear message–from even those in uniform(!)at this conference–that more binding budget constraints would force national security policymakers to better prioritize. Instead of just trying everything, they would need to put scarce dollars where they would have the most benefit. They would find it worthwhile to eliminate wasteful spending, and improved strategic planning would become more a necessity rather than just an option. (I realize it is troubling that the human lives at stake are not a good enough reason for better strategic planning–but even there, financial incentives at the margin matter.) Thus, there is not a tradeoff between adequately financing the military and reducing the budget deficit. You don’t have to be either in favor of a strong defense OR in favor of fiscal responsibility–there is no “bright line” that separates those camps. Just like there is no “bright line” between those who are concerned about adequately stimulating the recovering-but-still-weak economy, and those who want to improve the longer-term fiscal outlook. In fact, in both cases, the seemingly opposing goals turn out to be more symbiotic (and even synergistic) than opposing. I’ve made the point many times regarding stimulus versus deficit reduction, but here’s a new video by the Brookings Institution’s Bill Gale that explains this very clearly. And on defense spending, one of the experts I met at the Naval War College conference, Carl Conetta of the Project on Defense Alternatives, served on the “Sustainable Defense Task Force” which recently issued this report–which emphasizes “a set of criteria to identify savings that could be achieved without compromising the essential security of the United States.” Coincidentally, the report opens with these two quotes from two other experts I met at the conference, the Hoover Institution’s Kori Schake and the Center for American Progress’ Michael Ettlinger: “Conservatives need to hearken back to our Eisenhower heritage, and develop a defense leadership that understands military power is fundamentally premised on the solvency of the American government and the vibrancy of the U.S. economy.” –Kori Schake, Hoover Institution Fellow and former McCain-Palin Foreign Policy Advisor “A country that becomes economically weakened because it has shortchanged necessary domestic investments and carries excessive levels of debt will also eventually be a weaker country across the board. An overall defense strategy that is fiscally unsustainable will fail every bit as much as a strategy that shortchanges the military.” –John Podesta and Michael Ettlinger, Center for American Progress

**Link Helpers – Trade-Off**

Internal budget reform will determine how to pay for new bills.

Eaglen 6-3 (http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/06/US-Defense-Spending-The-Mismatch-Between-Plans-and-Resources, Mackenzie Eaglen, Research Fellow for National Security Studies)NAR

Ultimately, severe modernization cuts could increase the likelihood that U.S. military capabilities will fall short of the nation’s wide-ranging security commitments. Current budget plans indicate the U.S. may relinquish its military superpower status — not to another nation per se, but by reverting to a position where the country lacks the capacity to engage and maintain a forward presence globally. While many in the audience were shocked at the secretary’s intentions for the future of our maritime services, they shouldn’t have been. This defense secretary often broadcasts what he plans to do and always executes according to public plan. There are very few surprises. Gates is correct that the status quo (putting more expensive technologies on fewer platforms) is unacceptable. The logical conclusion is to rebuild and modernize the aging and stressed military frames in sufficient number to keep robust build rates and a cheaper work force. Since the Obama administration is proposing flat or declining defense budget top lines — excluding war funds — for the next 10 years, internal defense budget reforms are necessary to pay the procurement bills. That requires the uncomfortable but necessary evaluation of how better to pay America’s all-volunteer force — the fastest growing and unsustainable portion of the defense budget.

Trade off is true: The DoD is being forced to cut funding on Iraq

Christian Science Monitor 6-28 (http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/David-R.-Francis/2010/0628/Cuts-to-US-defense-budget-look-inevitable) NAR

Today, defense expenditures amount to about 4.9 percent of US gross domestic product, the nation's total output of goods and services. That's well above the less than 2 percent of GDP spent by such allies as Canada, Germany, Britain, and France. The latest news suggests more cuts by allies are ahead. Add in what Homeland Security, Veterans Affairs, and the Energy departments spend on defense and total US military spending will reach $861 billion in fiscal 2011, Mr. Harrison calculates, exceeding that of all other nations combined. Already, defense outlays in Iraq are falling. The number of American military personnel in Iraq has fallen from a peak of 170,000 a couple of years ago to 86,000 now and perhaps 50,000 by Sept. 1. The number of bases and facilities there has been cut by nearly half since peaking at 370 in 2008. Military spending in Iraq has dropped by half – from $90.6 billion in 2009 to an expected $43.4 billion in fiscal 2011. By the end of next year, the US hopes to have only a training-size force there. By contrast, operations in Afghanistan are still growing, with some 94,000 US troops expected on the ground by late August or September. Costs are climbing rapidly – from $51 billion in 2009 to $110 billion projected for fiscal 2011. But Adams suspects that before Mr. Obama faces reelection in 2012 he will move toward ending the Afghanistan mission. "The politics are devastating," Adams says.

I/L – Modernization

Budget constraints destroy military modernization efforts for planes, ships, and other weapons systems.

Eaglen 10 (Mackenzie, Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, “U.S. Defense Spending: The Mismatch Between Plans and Resources” June 7, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/06/US-Defense-Spending-The-Mismatch-Between-Plans-and-Resources)KM

Most Americans believe the U.S. government spends far more on defense than it actually does. Defense spending is near historic lows, however, and the Administration’s proposed five-year budget plan would further reduce defense spending to levels unprecedented during wartime. Between 2010 and 2015, total defense spending is set to fall from 4.9 percent to 3.6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), even though the nation has assigned more missions to the military over the past two decades. This growing disparity between funding and requirements is the primary cause of the increasing strain on the defense budget, but numerous other external and internal factors also are contributing to the problem. External sources of strain outside the Pentagon’s control include: Historical hangovers. Years of underinvestment in defense, especially during the 1990s, have had lasting effects on the defense program. Efforts to remedy the problem and play catch-up have been insufficient to rebuild the military. Crowding out by entitlements. The exploding costs of domestic entitlements and health care are placing severe pressure on the defense budget. If their growth is left unchecked, they could soon consume every dollar of federal revenue, completely crowding out defense spending. Internal strains include: Defense entitlements. Paralleling trends in the larger federal budget, key defense spending priorities are being overtaken by escalating personnel compensation costs, including numerous deferred and in-kind benefits. Modernization funds for new planes, ships, aircraft, vehicles, and other weapons systems are being hit the hardest. Shrinking economies of scale and defense inflation. Military modernization accounts are under further duress because the cost of military equipment is rising faster than the overall defense budget and outpacing inflation in the wider economy. The problem is caused largely by declining build rates and lost economies of scale. Other factors include the rising costs of fuel, input materials, labor, and increasingly complex systems. Unless Congress addresses these unsustainable trends in the larger federal budget and within the defense budget itself, these problems could reinforce one another, devastating military modernization by forcing another procurement holiday. This would severely reduce the military’s fighting capability for decades to come. America’s defense investment crisis may have already begun. Modernization funding (the procurement account plus the research, development, test, and evaluation account) is projected to stagnate in FY 2011 and then decline in subsequent years. Planned defense cuts over the next five years will exacerbate the problem, further reducing build rates, overall efficiency and possibly shrinking competition further. However, before addressing defense spending imbalances, Congress should first ensure that it has correctly identified and defined the problem.

I/L – End Strength

Savings would be redirected to military end strength

McMichael 10 (“DoD sets priorities with 2011 budget, QDR”, William H. - Staff writer, Army Times Feb 2, http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/02/military\_2011\_budget\_QDR\_020110w/)KM

The Pentagon’s double-barreled preview of spending plans unveiled Monday asks Congress for an additional $15 billion over current fiscal year spending — an increase of 2.2 percent — for baseline spending and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. As the White House announced last week, the Pentagon is proposing a 1.4 percent pay raise, equal to the most recent increase in the Employment Cost Index. The raise, if approved, would be the lowest in the history of the all-volunteer military. Overall, the Pentagon wants to spend $138 billion, an increase of 2.6 percent, on military personnel — a category that also includes allowances for food and housing, and expenditures to fully fund end strength growth in the Army and Marine Corps — keys to increasing post-deployment time back home, officials say.

Budget savings would be reallocated to support military end strength.

Kruzel 9 (“Gates Says People Are His Top Budget Priority” John J. April 13, *American Forces Press Service,* http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=53915)KM

Supplemental budgets accounted for the funding required to remedy problems at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, D.C.; fielding more mine-resistant vehicles, or MRAPs; providing more intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets to warfighters; and countering threats from makeshift bombs. These additional, ad hoc, budgets also supported family programs, research and medical care for post-traumatic stress and traumatic brain injury, and other quality-of-life programs, Gates said. “I couldn’t understand why the building was so consumed with preparing for wars in the future and was so incapable of fighting the wars we were in,” he said. “They were being funded in supplementals -- they weren’t a part of the permanent budget of the Department of Defense. And so when supplementals went away, they would all be at risk.” Accordingly, Gates recommended the fiscal 2010 budget include $11 billion to increase the Army and Marine Corps end strength and to allow the Navy and Air Force to stop reducing the size of their ranks. The other thrust of his proposed budget was institutionalizing the warfighters’ needs by putting more funding in the baseline budgets of the individual services, Gates said. The secretary recommended increasing funding for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance for each service branch, a 5 percent increase in special operations forces, a $500 million increase for helicopter crews, maintenance, and other programs.

The military is shifting budget priorities to personnel costs and end strength.

AFP 10 (February 01, “Military Spared Belt-Tightening Budget” Agence France-Presse http://www.military.com/news/article/military-spared-belt-tightening-budget.html)KM

Both the strategy document and budget appeared heavily influenced by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, noting the stress placed on troops' families from repeated deployments and calling for enshrining counter-insurgency doctrine. Amid reports of U.S. special forces working closely with Yemeni troops to target al-Qaida operatives, the strategy review was unclear if the administration anticipated more,costly wars against insurgents requiring large numbers of ground troops --- or if it would instead rely on arming proxies. "I don't see us in these big involvements again," said Lawrence Korb, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a former assistant secretary of defense. "That's a question I'd like to see answered," Korb told AFP. "Is Yemen the model or Iraq the model from now on?" The cost of maintaining the all-volunteer force, which has expanded under the demands of the Iraq and Afghan conflicts, are steadily rising, with large sums spent on salaries, medical care and other compensation for troops and their families. "Personnel costs in the Pentagon are rising so fast that they are beginning to crowd out technology in the defense budget," said Loren Thompson, a defense analyst and consultant with the Lexington Institute. "There's just not enough money left to buy all the weapons they want."

I/L – End Strength

Savings would be redirected to personnel strength – Gates perceives current spending as inadequate.

UPI 6-17 (http://www.upi.com/Business\_News/Security-Industry/2010/06/17/Defense-spending-skewed-Gates-says/UPI-88091276778760/) NAR

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates told the Senate Appropriations Committee's defense subcommittee that he was frustrated with the level of support given to soldiers in combat, the Pentagon said. "One (problem) that I have not yet found the answer to (is) to get urgent action in an area supporting men and women in combat today that ranges across the entirety of the department, both uniformed and civilian and all the different defense agencies," Gates said. Only 10 percent of the budget at the Defense Department, he said, was designated for programs such as irregular or asymmetric warfare. Nearly 40 percent is spent on dual-purpose items, leaving the bulk of military spending left to things other than combat. "If you took a broad look at our budget, about 50 percent of our procurement budget is for what I would call long-term modernization programs to deal with near-peer countries," Gates said.

End strength is a priority for the military – budget will be focused there.

Air Force News 10 (“Air Force fiscal 2011 budget: Today’s fight, Future challenges”, February 2, 2010, BY AIR FORCE NEWS AGENCY, http://www.defencetalk.com/air-force-fiscal-2011-budget-23965/)KM

In FY11, the Air Force's baseline budget totals $119.6 billion which provides resources across several appropriations that provide pay and allowances for people, readiness and infrastructure and modernization. An additional $20.8 billion was requested for overseas contingency operations, or OCO, to support ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In keeping with the Air Force's tradition of taking care of its Airmen and their families, General Flowers explained that Air Force officials will invest about $1 billion for quality of life programs such as child development centers, spouse counseling and employment programs, school liaison officers and childcare programs. The general also said the submission will support a basic pay increase of 1.4 percent for both Airmen and civilians. In addition, Airmen can receive increases of up to 4.2 percent for basic allowance for housing and 3.4 percent for rations. Personnel funding continues to be a priority for the service, with $29.3 billion devoted to active duty, Guard, and Reserve end-strength preservation. The budget also provides for increases in critical-skills recruiting and retention bonuses, and personnel plus-ups in stressed career fields.

Military personnel benefits are top priority.

Daniel 10 (Feb. 23, Lisa, American Forces Press Service, “Soldiers, families top Army priorities, leaders say”, http://www.army.mil/-news/2010/02/24/34879-soldiers-families-top-army-priorities-leaders-say/)KM

Funding programs to support Soldiers and their families is the Army's top priority in the new fiscal year, the service's secretary and chief of staff told a Senate panel today. Army Secretary John M. McHugh, a former Congress member who served on the House Armed Services Committee, returned to Capitol Hill today to give his assessment of where the Army stands and where it needs to go. "I found an Army clearly fatigued by nearly nine years of combat," McHugh told the Senate Armed Service Committee. "But through it all, they are more resilient." To sustain and improve that resilience, McHugh and Army Chief of Staff Gen. George W. Casey Jr. spoke for the need to improve Soldiers' "dwell time" at home between deployments, as well as Army family support and mental health programs. "We remain out of balance," McHugh said. "Our all-volunteer force is a national treasure. If we wish to sustain it, Soldiers and their families must be our top priority. For those of us in the Army family, it is the top priority." The Defense Department's fiscal 2011 budget request includes $1.7 billion to fund what McHugh called "vital" family programs such as those to provide respite care and spousal employment, and to open some 50 child-care centers and seven youth centers. "We sign up the Soldier, we re-sign up the family," McHugh said.

I/L – End Strength

Budget savings get redirected to increasing end strength capabilities.

AFP 10 (“US military aims to save 100 billion dollars over five years” 04/06 WASHINGTON, http://mobygroup.com/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=1114&Itemid=66)KM

The Pentagon announced a major cost-cutting initiative Friday, which it hopes will slash 100 billion dollars from its tight operating costs over the next five years, a senior US defense official said. But with the world's most advanced military waging wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Defense Department said there was no intention of reducing force numbers in the US Army, Navy, or Air Force, and that the Pentagon's most expensive acquisition project ever -- the F-35 fighter jet -- would not be cut. "Most of the savings are intended to be achieved by shaving overhead and tightening efficiency, with the billions saved there shifted to operational costs and force modernization," Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn told reporters. "The total over five years will be just over 100 billion dollars" shared across the department, Lynn said. The military is being told to save seven billion dollars in fiscal year 2012, 11 billion in 2013, 18.9 billion in 2014, 28 billion in 2015, and 37 billion dollars in fiscal year 2016, the Pentagon said. In February, US President Barack Obama unveiled his defense budget proposal for fiscal year 2011, which includes 549 billion dollars as the base budget plus 159 billion dollars for "overseas contingency operations," mainly the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lynn said the Pentagon was hoping to cut overhead in order to keep pace with the costs of maintaining military competence, which he said historically rise between two to three percent per year. Over the next five years, the base budget is planned to increase by about one percent per year, he said. "This is not about reducing the top line, this is about operating within a constrained top line and trying to get enough resources into that war-fighting in addition to developing that operating agility," Lynn said. The savings would not come at the expense of troop numbers, he stressed. "Our assessment is that we need the force structure that we have, and we have increased, particularly the ground forces, to meet the increases of the army end strength," Lynn said.

End strength is being pushed now but lacks funds – savings in military spending will be redirected here.

Scully 7 (“Industry counts on Democrats to support Defense spending” Megan CongressDaily January 17, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0107/011707cdam2.htm)KM

But the one thing that might put a strain on defense spending -- or, at least, the military's procurement accounts -- is the White House's plan to boost the size of the Army and Marine Corps by 92,000 troops over the next five years, bringing the Marines to an "end strength" of 202,000 and the Army to 547,000 soldiers. The plan has widespread congressional support, but increasing end-strength levels comes with a hefty price tag -- one that might surpass $10 billion. Another defense industry lobbyist, who is not as optimistic about a procurement boon, said he expects the Pentagon to pay for about half of that new personnel bill through increases in the department's budgetary so-called topline. The other half, the lobbyist said, might get paid for out of procurement accounts, often considered the low-hanging fruit in the Pentagon budget. "I think it's a little bit shortsighted just to come to the conclusion that even if the topline holds or even goes up, that any particular program will ... be supported across the board," the lobbyist said. Perhaps the biggest unknown is Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who has been on the job less than a month. Unlike former Defense Secretary Don Rumsfeld, Gates does not have strong ties to -- or even much knowledge of -- the services' technology transformation efforts. Indeed, his focus is Iraq -- not future programs. "He's the boss and right now his center of focus is solely Iraq," the lobbyist said. "They haven't gotten to the point of being able to look into the future and look at these programs, I don't think."

**I/L – Space**

Budget constraints will force cuts in military space weapons programs before they’re ready.

Garamone 10 (“Lynn Discusses Budget Priorities for Space” Jim American Forces Press Service, April 14, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=58751)KM

COLORADO SPRINGS, Colo., April 14, 2010 – Military space operators and their private-sector partners are going to have to find ways to grow capabilities while operating in a fiscally-constrained environment, Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Lynn III said here today. Speaking at the National Space Symposium, Lynn said President Barack Obama’s decision to allow some growth in national security agencies was the right move. The president froze spending for domestic agencies. National security agencies – including the Defense Department – are fighting two wars and working to ensure defense of the homeland. “Even with the increases, some of the costs embedded in our budget are growing faster than the budget as a whole,” Lynn said. Programs such as military health care, wages and benefits, and some of the most advanced weapon systems are likely to continue growing faster than the overall budget, he added. “This presents a dilemma,” he told the audience. “Either the department, and the industrial base that supports us, can become more efficient, or else we will eventually be forced to reduce programs and ultimately to diminish capabilities.” The changing fiscal environment also means large amounts of money will not materialize to solve problems magically, the deputy secretary said. “Our space industry will have to overcome the operational challenges,” he added, “while operating in a cost-constrained environment.”

I/L – Space

The military and Obama have space dominance programs at the top of the shopping list.

Burghardt 10 (“The Militarization of Outer Space: The Pentagon’s “Space Warriors”” Tom Global Research May 10, http://www.infowars.com/the-militarization-of-outer-space-the-pentagons-space-warriors/)KM

It’s not as if things aren’t bad enough right here on planet earth. What with multiple wars and occupations, an accelerating economic meltdown, corporate malfeasance and environmental catastrophes such as the petroleum-fueled apocalypse in the Gulf of Mexico, I’d say we have a full plate already. Now the Defense Department wants to up the stakes with new, destabilizing weapons systems that will transform low- and high-earth orbit into another “battlespace,” pouring billions into programs to achieve what Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) has long dreamed of: “space dominance.” Indeed, Pentagon space warriors fully intend to field a robust anti-satellite (ASAT) capability that can disable, damage or destroy the satellites of other nations, all for “defensive” purposes, mind you. Back in 2005, The New York Times reported that General Lance W. Lord, then commander of AFSPC, told an Air Force conference that “space superiority is not our birthright, but it is our destiny. … Space superiority is our day-to-day mission. Space supremacy is our vision for the future.” Five years on, that “mission” is still a top priority for the Obama administration. While some might call it “net-centric warfare” on steroids, I’d choose another word: madness.

**\*\*\*Impact – Space\*\*\***

Impact – Space Bad: Nuclear War

Space militarization causes space nuclear war.

Chin 5 (Larry, reporter for Global Research, July 16, “Deep Impact and the Militarization of Space” http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=645)KM

Space is not only the ultimate military "high ground"; it is the frontier for pillage and colonization, and the battleground for coming superpower conflicts with China and other rivals. "The prospects for eventual profit and control of the new space frontier are too high to be left to chance", observed Gagnon. "Clearly, since the end of World War II, the US military has been planning and is now vigorously developing space technologies that will give them control of the pathways on an off the planet Earth. Just as the Spanish Armada and the British Navy were created to protect their ‘interests and investments’ in the new world, space is viewed today as open territory to be seized for eventual corporate profit." Did any of these nightmarish realities cross the minds of the NASA scientists as they wildly celebrated the successful Deep Impact blast of July 3, 2005, or those who watched the event unfold on television screens and through their telescopes? The acceleration of space militarization, pushed by Bush adminstration, has raised appropriate alarm, among those who know. In addition to the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space, the Union of Concerned Scientists is opposing the Bush space agenda, and taking its case for treaties prohibiting space weapons to Congress and the United Nations. To again quote Gagnon, "the United Nations, to their credit, created the Moon Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty as ways to circumvent the war-like tendencies of humankind as we step out into the cosmos…but the US appears to be heading in the opposite direction by creating enormous danger and conflict with the current Nuclear Systems Initiative that will expand nuclear power and weapons into space---all disguised as the noble effort to hunt for the ‘origins of life’ in space. [ Similarly, the Deep Impact project is also being lauded for "origins of life" research breakthroughs.—LC] Only a lively and growing global debate about the ethics and morality of current space policy will save us from igniting the harsh fires of Prometheus in the heavens above us."

Impact – Space Bad: Nuclear War

Space militarization causes tensions that escalate to US first strikes and preventative nuclear war from adversaries.

Krepon and Clary 3 (“Space Assurance or Space Dominance? THE CASE AGAINST WEAPONIZING SPACE” Michael , president and CEO of the Henry L. Stimson Center, Christopher , Research Assistant for the Weaponization of Space Project at the Stimson Center, http://www.stimson.org/wos/pdf/space3.pdf)KM

In space, as with terrestrial missile defenses, it is far more challenging to mount a successful defense than to penetrate a soft target. Because of their threatening nature and their vulnerability, weapons designed for space warfare, whether on the ground or in orbit, would become extremely high-value targets. To prevent a precarious and dangerous mix of satellites interspersed with ASATs, the United States would seek to prevent space mines and other attacking devices either from being launched or from being parked in orbit. Alternatively, if the United States does not prevent the deployment of foreign ASATs in space, it must be prepared to wage war by shooting first and asking questions later. Military operations in space would thus be placed on continual hair-trigger alert because successful dominance in space would not be possible without the capacity for preemptive strikes or preventive measures. Having first crossed key thresholds relating to the flight-testing and deployment of space weaponry, would the United States arrogate to itself the right during peace time to carry out preemptive strikes to prevent others from following suit? And having rejected arms control arrangements prohibiting the flight-testing and deployment of space weaponry, would the United States seek to impose or dictate these constraints solely on others, and by force of arms? It is inconceivable that a quest by the United States to enforce dominion or appropriation of space in this manner could be politically sustainable or successful against varied means of retaliation. And even if a future government of the United States attempted to destroy threats to unimpeded U.S. satellite operations, how would U.S. satellites and the space shuttle cope with the debris resulting from space warfare? The technical challenges of launching successful preemptive or preventive attacks against deployed space mines would be daunting. Attacks against some space mines would doubtless trigger hostile responses, so preemptive or preventive attacks would need to be launched against as many targets as can be identified. Would warfare of this kind be confined to space? Would the United States also attack the space launch facilities and key communication nodes of the state or states that have orbited space mines? If not, would the United States shoot down space launch vehicles or aircraft that might be carrying space mines? These questions, and others that flow logically from them, clarify the adverse military and diplomatic ramifications that would accompany U.S. initiatives to weaponize space. Considerable skepticism is warranted that preemption or preventive war strategies can be confined to space, since satellite warfare is so intimately related to military operations on Earth. Attacks on satellites could severely damage prospects for escalation control and, in the worst case, could trigger the use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. expeditionary forces, allies, or the U.S. homeland. Since space warfare would not be perceived as a trivial pursuit, those nations that could be gravely disadvantaged by the flight-testing and deployment of space weaponry are likely to consider equally grave countermeasures.

Impact – Space Bad: Prolif Shell (1/2)

Space militarization destroys anti-proliferation efforts, escalates conflicts and puts the world on the brink of multiple nuclear first strikes.

Krepon and Clary 3 (“Space Assurance or Space Dominance? THE CASE AGAINST WEAPONIZING SPACE” Michael , president and CEO of the Henry L. Stimson Center, Christopher , Research Assistant for the Weaponization of Space Project at the Stimson Center, http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=81)KM

While space has long been utilized to assist military operations, it has not been weaponized. A new report by the Henry L. Stimson Center--Space Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space--argues that the surest way for the United States to lose the military advantages now enjoyed in space is to turn the heavens into a shooting gallery. The Stimson report concludes that U.S. military and economic security is best served by avoiding the flight-testing and deployment of space weaponry. The pursuit of space dominance could impair global commerce, produce long-lasting, environmental debris in space, and harm alliance ties as well as relations between the United States and Russia and China, the two countries whose help is most needed to stop and reverse proliferation. The quest to dominate space could prompt low-cost, low-tech countermeasures in the form of space mines and other anti-satellite devices. Potential adversaries in space would be faced with the dilemma of shooting first or risk being shot. The quest to secure dominion over space would therefore elevate into the heavens the hair-trigger postures that plagued U.S. and Soviet officials during the Cold War.

Space weaponization causes prolif on the ground to counter prolif in the skies, destroying global stability and forcing multiple scenarios of preemptive wars.

Krepon and Clary 3 (“Space Assurance or Space Dominance? THE CASE AGAINST WEAPONIZING SPACE” Michael , president and CEO of the Henry L. Stimson Center, Christopher , Research Assistant for the Weaponization of Space Project at the Stimson Center, http://www.stimson.org/wos/pdf/space3.pdf)KM

The argument presented here is that terrestrial U.S. military dominance would be impaired, rather than enhanced, by American initiatives to weaponize space. While the United States clearly has the ability to outspend competitors, and to produce more advanced types of space weaponry, weaker adversaries will have affordable, asymmetric means to counter U.S. initiatives in space, as well as on earth. The net result of an uneven competition to weaponize space would be that prudent U.S. defense planners could not count on protecting space assets, and that weaker adversaries could not count on the negation of U.S. advantages. Neither could be certain of the outcome of space warfare, but both adversaries would have to fear the worst. Because of the vulnerability of space assets to ASATs, both would need to assume a dangerous “hair-trigger” posture in space—unless the United States employed preemptive military means to prevent the launch or deployment of presumably hostile space assets belonging to other states. The likely consequences of a dynamic, but uneven, space warfare competition are not hard to envision. Potential adversaries are likely to perceive American initiatives to weaponize space as adjuncts to a U.S. military doctrine of preemption and preventive war. Depending on the scope and nature of U.S. space warfare preparations, they could also add to Chinese and Russian concerns over the viability of their nuclear deterrents. U.S. initiatives to extend military dominance into space are therefore likely to raise tensions and impact negatively on U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia relations at a time when bilateral relations have some promising, but tenuous, elements. Cooperative relations with both countries will be needed to successfully combat proliferation, but Moscow and Beijing are unlikely to tender such cooperation if they perceive that U.S. strategic objectives include the negation of their deterrents. Under these circumstances, proliferation of weapons in space would be accompanied by terrestrial proliferation.

Impact – Space Bad: Prolif Shell (2/2)

Prolif is the most probably scenario for extinction – we should do everything possible to prevent it.

Miller`2(James D. Miller**,** professor of economics, Smith College, NATIONAL REVIEW, January 23, 2002, p. http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-miller012302.shtml)KM

The U.S. should use whatever means necessary to stop our enemies from gaining the ability to kill millions of us. We should demand that countries like Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea make no attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction. We should further insist on the right to make surprise inspections of these countries to insure that they are complying with our proliferation policy. What if these nations refuse our demands? If they refuse we should destroy their industrial capacity and capture their leaders. True, the world's cultural elites would be shocked and appalled if we took preventive military action against countries that are currently doing us no harm. What is truly shocking, however, is that America is doing almost nothing while countries that have expressed hatred for us are building weapons of mass destruction. France and Britain allowed Nazi Germany's military power to grow until Hitler was strong enough to take Paris. America seems to be doing little while many of our foes acquire the strength to destroy U.S. cities. We can't rely upon deterrence to prevent an atomic powered dictator from striking at us. Remember, the Nazi's killed millions of Jews even though the Holocaust took resources away from their war effort. As September 11th also shows, there exist evil men in the world who would gladly sacrifice all other goals for the opportunity to commit mass murder. The U.S. should take not even the slightest unnecessary chance that some dictator, perhaps a dying Saddam Hussein, would be willing to give up his life for the opportunity to hit America with nuclear missiles. Once a dictator has the ability to hit a U.S., or perhaps even a European city, with atomic weapons it will be too late for America to pressure him to give up his weapons. His ability to hurt us will effectively put him beyond our military reach. Our conventional forces might even be made impotent by a nuclear-armed foe. Had Iraq possessed atomic weapons, for example, we would probably have been unwilling to expel them from Kuwait. What about the rights of those countries I have proposed threatening? America should not even pretend to care about the rights of dictators. In the 21st century the only leaders whom we should recognize as legitimate are those who were democratically elected. The U.S. should reinterpret international law to give no rights to tyrants, not even the right to exist. We should have an ethically based foreign policy towards democratic countries. With dictatorships, however, we should be entirely Machiavellian; we should deal with them based upon what is in our own best interests. It's obviously in our self-interest to prevent as many dictators as possible from acquiring the means to destroy us. We shouldn't demand that China abandon her nuclear weapons. This is not because China has proved herself worthy to have the means of mass annihilation, but rather because her existing stockpile of atomic missiles would make it too costly for us to threaten China. It's too late to stop the Chinese from gaining the ability to decimate us, but for the next ten years or so it is not too late to stop some of our other rivals. If it's politically impossible for America to use military force against currently non-hostile dictators then we should use trade sanctions to punish nations who don't agree to our proliferation policy. Normal trade sanctions, however, do not provide the punishing power necessary to induce dictators to abandon their arms. If we simply don't trade with a nation other countries will sell them the goods that we used to provide. To make trade sanctions an effective weapon the U.S. needs to deploy secondary boycotts. America should create a treaty, the signatories of which would agree to: · only trade with countries which have signed the treaty, and · not trade with any country which violates our policy on weapons proliferation. I believe that if only the U.S. and, say, Germany initially signed this treaty then nearly every other country would be forced to do so. For example, if France did not sign, they would be unable to trade with the U.S. or Germany. This would obviously be intolerable to France. Once the U.S., Germany and France adopted the treaty every European nation would have to sign or face a total economic collapse. The more countries which sign the treaty, the greater the pressure on other countries to sign. Once most every country has signed, any country which violated America's policy on weapons proliferation would face almost a complete economic boycott. Under this approach, the U.S. and Germany alone could use our economic power to dictate the enforcement mechanism of a treaty designed to protect against Armageddon. Even the short-term survival of humanity is in doubt. The greatest threat of extinction surely comes from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. America should refocus her foreign policy to prioritize protecting us all from atomic, biological, and chemical weapons.

Impact – Space Bad: Perpetual Wars

Space militarization destroys our international standing, creating a world of perpetual war without any backing.

Krepon and Clary 3 (“Space Assurance or Space Dominance? THE CASE AGAINST WEAPONIZING SPACE” Michael , president and CEO of the Henry L. Stimson Center, Christopher , Research Assistant for the Weaponization of Space Project at the Stimson Center, http://www.stimson.org/wos/pdf/space3.pdf)KM

U.S. initiatives to “seize” the high ground of space are likely to be countered by asymmetric and unconventional warfare strategies carried out by far weaker states—in space and to a greater extent on Earth. In addition, U.S. initiatives associated with space dominance would likely alienate longstanding allies, as well as China and Russia, whose assistance is required to effectively counter terrorism and proliferation, the two most pressing national security concerns of this decade. No U.S. ally has expressed support for space warfare initiatives. To the contrary, U.S. initiatives to weaponize space would likely corrode bilateral relations and coalition-building efforts. Instead, the initiation of preemptive or preventive warfare in space by the United States based on assertions of an imminent threat—or a threat that cannot be ameliorated in other ways—is likely to be met with deep and widespread skepticism abroad. The international community has long been aware of latent threats to satellites residing in military capabilities designed for other purposes. Common knowledge of such military capabilities designed for other means has not generated additional instability in crisis or escalation in wartime. The flight-testing and deployment of dedicated space weaponry would add new instability in crisis and new impulses toward escalation. It would be folly to invite these consequences unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. Space warfare, far more than terrestrial combat, does not lend itself to the formation of “coalitions of the willing.” U.S. initiatives to weaponize space could therefore result in a lonely journey that leads to war without end and to war without friends. The burdens and risks placed upon the shoulders of U.S. expeditionary forces would be exceedingly great. In addition, the quest for space dominance would undoubtedly accentuate domestic political divisions on national security issues, which results in diminished U.S. security.

Impact – Space Bad: Wars

Space militarization ensures war – accidents are perceived as attacks

David 82 (Ritchie, David. Spacewar. New York, NY: Antheneum, 1982, p.191-92)NAR

Perhaps the greatest danger posed by the militarization of space is that of war by accident. At any given time, several thousand satellites and other pieces of equipment -- spent booster stages and the like -- are circling the earth, most of them in low orbit. The space immediately above the atmosphere has begun to resemble an expressway at rush hour. It is not uncommon for satellites to miss each other by only a kilometer or two, and satellites crashing into each other may explain some of the mysterious incidents in which space vehicles simply vanish from the skies. One civillian TV satellite has been lost in space; it never entered its intended orbit, and no signals were heard from it to indicate where it might have gone. Collision with something else in space seems a reasonable explanation of this disappearance. Even a tiny fragment of metal striking a satellite at a relative velocity of a few kilometers per second would wreck the satellite, ripping through it like a Magnum slug through a tin can. Now suppose that kind of mishap befell a military satellite -- in the worst possible situation, during a time of international tension with all players in the spacewar game braced for attacks on their spacecraft. The culpable fragment might be invisible from the ground; even something as small and light as a paper clip could inflict massive damage on a satellite at high velocity. Unaware of the accident, a less than cautious leader might interpret it as a preconceived attack. Wars have begun over smaller incidents

Space weaponizaton necessitates pre-emptive strikes, creating great-power conflicts in a moments notice.

Krepon 4 (Michael Kreponis the author of Space Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space, November 2004, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004\_11/Krepon#kreponbio)NAR

To prevent adversaries from shooting back, the United States would need to know exactly where all threatening space objects are located, to neutralize them without producing debris that can damage U.S. or allied space objects, and to target and defeat all ground-based military activities that could join the fight in space. In other words, successful space warfare mandates pre-emptive strikes and a preventive war in space as well as on the ground. War plans and execution often go awry here on Earth. It takes enormous hubris to believe that space warfare would be any different. If ASAT and space-based, ground-attack weapons are flight-tested and deployed, space warriors will have succeeded in the dubious achievement of replicating the hair-trigger nuclear postures that plagued humankind during the Cold War. Armageddon nuclear postures continue to this day, with thousands of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons ready to be launched in minutes to incinerate opposing forces, command and control nodes, and other targets, some of which happen to be located within large metropolitan areas. If the heavens were weaponized, these nuclear postures would be reinforced and elevated into space. U.S. space warriors now have a doctrine and plans for counterspace operations, but they do not have a credible plan to stop inadvertent or uncontrolled escalation once the shooting starts. Like U.S. war-fighting scenarios, there is a huge chasm between plans and consequences, in which requirements for escalation dominance make uncontrolled escalation far more likely. A pre-emptive strike in space on a nation that possesses nuclear weapons would invite the gravest possible consequences. Attacks on satellites that provide early warning and other critical military support functions would most likely be viewed either as a surrogate or as a prelude to attacks on nuclear forces. Even if space weapons are not used, their flight-testing or presence overhead, capable of impairing a country’s ability to see, hear, navigate, detect impending danger, and fight, would have profound implications for international relations. The medium of space is not country-specific. The placement of space weapons in low-Earth orbit will be of concern to any country over which the space weapon passes or could pass with orbital adjustments. Washington policymakers do not talk often or publicly about space warfare, and China and Russia continue to seek improved ties to the United States. There is, however, considerable awareness in Moscow and Beijing about the Pentagon’s plans and deep skepticism that the Pentagon’s interest in space warfare is directed solely at states such as North Korea and Iran. Instead, the Air Force’s new counterspace doctrine is widely viewed in the broader context of the Bush administration’s endorsement of pre-emptive strikes and preventive wars, open-ended national missile defense deployments, and the integration of improved broad-area surveillance and conventional deep-strike capabilities alongside U.S. nuclear forces, which remain on high states of alert. If U.S. counterspace programs proceed, Russia and China can be expected to forge closer ties, pursuing joint diplomatic initiatives to prevent the weaponization of space, alongside military research and development programs to counter U.S. military options. Instead of engaging in a Cold War-like nuclear arms race with Washington, Moscow and Beijing will compete asymmetrically, using less elaborate and expensive techniques, such as by trailing expensive U.S. space weapons and satellites with cheap space mines

Impact – Space Bad: US-China Nuclear War Shell (1/2)

Space militarization creates a hair-trigger posture by the US military to defend space assets from anti-satellite missiles from China, creating a first strike that escalates to nuclear war.

Lewis 4 (Jeffrey Center for Defense Information “What if Space Were Weaponized?” July, http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf)KM

There are, however, dangers to placing such important assets in space. Satellites are inherently vulnerable. They travel in predictable, fixed orbits — this is the reason that some in the Air Force call intercepting a satellite “scheduling.” Because of the high velocities of objects in orbit, even a small object can destroy the most durable military satellite. For example, engineers cannot shield satellites against orbital debris larger than one centimeter in diameter – anything larger than an M&M.20 Moreover, the space environment is harsh and subject to human manipulation. During a high-altitude nuclear test in the early 1960s, the United States discovered that a nuclear weapon detonated in space could create a lethal electromagnetic pulse that would deaden virtually all of the satellites in its line-of-sight, and leave a long-term radiation hazard that would disable large numbers of satellites over the next several months.21 Not surprisingly, the Pentagon is extremely worried about possible Chinese ASATs, and the threat that such weapons would pose to U.S. military superiority. The most recent Pentagon report on Chinese military power warns that “China is said to be acquiring a variety of foreign technologies which could be used to develop an active Chinese ASAT capability.”22 The report also warns that, at the outset of a conflict, “the PLA would attempt to weaken U.S. or other third party’s resolve by demonstrating the capability to hold at risk – or actually striking – high-value assets. The PLA would seek to leverage emerging asymmetric capabilities to counter or negate an adversary’s superiorities.”23 These weapons could be used to blind the missile warning and radar satellites that allow the United States to target Chinese ballistic missiles on the ground or in flight, as well as the communications satellites that would direct systems such as the Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) to their targets. If the United States were to deploy space-based missile defenses, or place a large number of CAVs in orbit (aboard a space maneuver vehicle like NASA’s X-37), China might target those weapons with anti-satellite weapons as well. This situation would essentially put the United States on “hair trigger” alert in space. A Chinese military exercise, for example, involving the movement of large numbers of troops and mobilization of ballistic missile units might be mistaken in the United States as a prelude to a surprise attack. With a military strategy that absolutely depends on vulnerable space assets to protect the homeland, an American president would face the unenviable task of choosing between launching a surprise attack on China or risking the loss of space-based intelligence, strike and missile defense assets that protect against nuclear attack. Such an attack could be very large or very small. The United States might attempt to use CAVs, aided by guidance from space-based radar systems, to attack Chinese command and control systems, disable the arsenal of Chinese ballistic missiles or merely attack the sites of suspected Chinese anti-satellite weapons. Missile defense, using space-based sensors and perhaps interceptors, would be used to discourage the Chinese from attempting any retaliation. It is not clear whether even a very large American first strike would completely neutralize the 75 to 100 Chinese nuclear weapons that the CIA anticipates will be capable of reaching the United States in the next 10 to 15 years.24 Controlling escalation, however, appears dicey – if the United States succeeded in severely degrading the Chinese command and control system, Chinese leaders might not even know that the original attack had been confined to conventional weapons. Those who say this scenario is far fetched may be surprised to learn that it happened – in a war game sponsored by the Naval War College.25 In that game, which was held August 14-25, 2000, a large Asian nation with over a billion people called Red (China) was conducting large-scale military exercises that the Blue Team (the United States) believed were a prelude to an attack on a U.S. ally located in region, designated Brown. During these exercises, the commander of Blue Forces became concerned that Red might use ground-based lasers against U.S. satellites. Fearing the loss of such important assets, he ordered a limited preemptive strike – using a fleet of CAVs that he had deployed in space – against suspected ground-based laser sites deep inside Red’s country. At the same time, he refrained from striking other targets “rationalizing that the preemptive strike was only protecting high-value space assets, not initiating hostilities.”26 The Blue Team was stunned when Red viewed the strike on targets deep inside its territory as an act of war and retaliated – causing a general war. One flabbergasted participant, sounding not completely convinced of what had just happened, reportedly explained: “We thought these preemptive strikes might very well have stopped the crisis situation. But there were some who had a different point of view – that the strikes may have been provocative.”27 It is important to note that the Chinese don’t even have to actually acquire ASATs for this nightmare scenario to happen. The Pentagon’s assessments of Chinese ASATs are based largely on circumstantial evidence – a Hong Kong newspaper report here; a commercial purchase by a Chinese company there. In fact, the Pentagon admits that “specific Chinese programs for a laser ASAT system have not been identified” and that press reports of a so-called “parasitic” microsatellite “cannot be confirmed.”28 Such gaps in U.S. knowledge are dangerous, given the natural tendency of defense planners to assume the worst. Although Blue claimed that it had acted on “unambiguous warning” of a threat to space assets, the mere fact that the Chinese might already have such system – or could improvise a crude ASAT in a pinch – would create a strong incentive to use U.S. space systems before they were lost. It is not too far fetched to imagine the president, faced with a crisis over Taiwan, deciding – as he did with Iraq – that “we cannot wait for the final proof – the smoking gun – that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.”29

Impact – Space Bad: US-China Nuclear War Shell (2/2)

First strike from US towards China would be the biggest impact equivalent to 100 holocausts.

Ellsberg 9 (“U.S. Nuclear War Planning for a Hundred Holocausts” DANIEL Former United States military analystSEPTEMBER 13, 2009 http://www.ellsberg.net/archive/us-nuclear-war-planning-for-a-hundred-holocausts)KM

The question to the JCS was: “If your plans for general [nuclear] war are carried out as planned, how many people will be killed in the Soviet Union and China?” Their answer was in the form of a graph (see representation below). The vertical axis was the number of deaths, in millions. The horizontal axis was time, indicated in months. The graph was a straight line, starting at time zero on the horizontal—on the vertical axis, the number of immediate deaths expected within hours of our attack—and slanting upward to a maximum at six months, an arbitrary cutoff for the deaths that would accumulate over time from initial injuries and from fallout radiation. The lowest number, at the left of the graph, was 275 million deaths. The number at the right-hand side, at six months, was 325 million. That same morning, with Komer’s approval, I drafted another question to be sent to the Joint Chiefs over the president’s signature, asking for a total breakdown of global deaths from our own attacks, to include not only the whole Sino-Soviet bloc but all other countries that would be affected by fallout. Again their answer was prompt. Komer showed it to me about a week later, this time in the form of a table with explanatory footnotes. In sum, 100 million more deaths, roughly, were predicted in East Europe. There might be an additional 100 million from fallout in West Europe, depending on which way the wind blew (a matter, largely, of the season). Regardless of season, still another 100 million deaths, at least, were predicted from fallout in the mostly neutral countries adjacent to the Soviet bloc or China: Finland, Austria, Afghanistan, India, Japan and others. Finland, for example, would be wiped out by fallout from U.S. ground-burst explosions on the Soviet submarine pens at Leningrad. (The total number of “casualties”—injured as well as killed—had not been requested and was not estimated; nor were casualties from any Soviet retaliatory strikes.) The total death toll as calculated by the Joint Chiefs, from a U.S. first strike aimed primarily at the Soviet Union and China, would be roughly 600 million dead. A hundred Holocausts.

Impact – Space Bad: US-Russia Nuclear War Shell (1/2)

Space weaponization puts Russia on the edge, making any accident in space a reason to resort to nuclear war with the US.

Lewis 4 (Jeffrey Center for Defense Information “What if Space Were Weaponized?” July, http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf)KM

In both cases, Russian observers were confident that what appeared to be a “small” attack was not a fragmentary picture of a much larger one. In the case of the Norwegian sounding rocket, space-based sensors played a crucial role in assuring the Russian leadership that it was not under attack. The Russian command system, however, is no longer able to provide such reliable, early warning. The dissolution of the Soviet Union cost Moscow several radar stations in newly independent states, creating “attack corridors” through which Moscow could not see an attack launched by U.S. nuclear submarines.47 Further, Russia’s constellation of early-warning satellites has been allowed to decline – only one or two of the six satellites remain operational, leaving Russia with early warning for only six hours a day. Russia is attempting to reconstitute its constellation of early-warning satellites, with several launches planned in the next few years. But Russia will still have limited warning and will depend heavily on its space-based systems to provide warning of an American attack.48 As the previous section explained, the Pentagon is contemplating military missions in space that will improve U.S. ability to cripple Russian nuclear forces in a crisis before they can execute an attack on the United States. Anti-satellite weapons, in this scenario, would blind Russian reconnaissance and warning satellites and knock out communications satellites. Such strikes might be the prelude to a full-scale attack, or a limited effort, as attempted in a war game at Schriever Air Force Base, to conduct “early deterrence strikes” to signal U.S. resolve and control escalation.49 By 2010, the United States may, in fact, have an arsenal of ASATs (perhaps even on orbit 24/7) ready to conduct these kinds of missions – to coerce opponents and, if necessary, support preemptive attacks. Moscow would certainly have to worry that these ASATs could be used in conjunction with other space-enabled systems – for example, long-range strike systems that could attack targets in less than 90 minutes – to disable Russia’s nuclear deterrent before the Russian leadership understood what was going on. What would happen if a piece of space debris were to disable a Russian early-warning satellite under these conditions? Could the Russian military distinguish between an accident in space and the first phase of a U.S. attack? Most Russian early-warning satellites are in elliptical Molniya orbits (a few are in GEO) and thus difficult to attack from the ground or air. At a minimum, Moscow would probably have some tactical warning of such a suspicious launch, but given the sorry state of Russia’s warning, optical imaging and signals intelligence satellites there is reason to ask the question. Further, the advent of U.S. on-orbit ASATs, as now envisioned50 could make both the more difficult orbital plane and any warning systems moot. The unpleasant truth is that the Russians likely would have to make a judgment call. No state has the ability to definitively determine the cause of the satellite’s failure. Even the United States does not maintain (nor is it likely to have in place by 2010) a sophisticated space surveillance system that would allow it to distinguish between a satellite malfunction, a debris strike or a deliberate attack – and Russian space surveillance capabilities are much more limited by comparison. Even the risk assessments for collision with debris are speculative, particularly for the unique orbits in which Russian early-warning satellites operate. During peacetime, it is easy to imagine that the Russians would conclude that the loss of a satellite was either a malfunction or a debris strike. But how confident could U.S. planners be that the Russians would be so calm if the accident in space occurred in tandem with a second false alarm, or occurred during the middle of a crisis? What might happen if the debris strike occurred shortly after a false alarm showing a missile launch? False alarms are appallingly common – according to information obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) experienced 1,172 “moderately serious” false alarms between 1977 and 1983 – an average of almost three false alarms per week. Comparable information is not available about the Russian system, but there is no reason to believe that it is any more reliable.51 Assessing the likelihood of these sorts of coincidences is difficult because Russia has never provided data about the frequency or duration of false alarms; nor indicated how seriously earlywarning data is taken by Russian leaders. Moreover, there is no reliable estimate of the debris risk for Russian satellites in highly elliptical orbits.52 The important point, however, is that such a coincidence would only appear suspicious if the United States were in the business of disabling satellites – in other words, there is much less risk if Washington does not develop ASATs. The loss of an early-warning satellite could look rather ominous if it occurred during a period of major tension in the relationship. While NATO no longer sees Russia as much of a threat, the same cannot be said of the converse. Despite the warm talk, Russian leaders remain wary of NATO expansion, particularly the effect expansion may have on the Baltic port of Kaliningrad. Although part of Russia, Kaliningrad is separated from the rest of Russia by Lithuania and Poland. Russia has already complained about its decreasing lack of access to the port, particularly the uncooperative attitude of the Lithuanian government. 53 News reports suggest that an edgy Russia may have moved tactical nuclear weapons into the enclave.54 If the Lithuanian government were to close access to Kaliningrad in a fit of pique, this would trigger a major crisis between NATO and <CONTINUED>

Impact – Space Bad: US-Russia Nuclear War Shell (2/2)

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Russia. Under these circumstances, the loss of an early-warning satellite would be extremely suspicious. It is any military’s nature during a crisis to interpret events in their worst-case light. For example, consider the coincidences that occurred in early September 1956, during the extraordinarily tense period in international relations marked by the Suez Crisis and Hungarian uprising.55 On one evening the White House received messages indicating: 1. the Turkish Air Force had gone on alert in response to unidentified aircraft penetrating its airspace; 2. one hundred Soviet MiG-15s were flying over Syria; 3. a British Canberra bomber had been shot down over Syria, most likely by a MiG; and 4. The Russian fleet was moving through the Dardanelles. Gen. Andrew 28 What if Space Were Weaponized? Goodpaster was reported to have worried that the confluence of events “might trigger off … the NATO operations plan” that called for a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union. Yet, all of these reports were false. The “jets” over Turkey were a flock of swans; the Soviet MiGs over Syria were a smaller, routine escort returning the president from a state visit to Moscow; the bomber crashed due to mechanical difficulties; and the Soviet fleet was beginning long-scheduled exercises. In an important sense, these were not “coincidences” but rather different manifestations of a common failure – human error resulting from extreme tension of an international crisis. As one author noted, “The detection and misinterpretation of these events, against the context of world tensions from Hungary and Suez, was the first major example of how the size and complexity of worldwide electronic warning systems could, at certain critical times, create momentum of its own.” Perhaps most worrisome, the United States might be blithely unaware of the degree to which the Russians were concerned about its actions and inadvertently escalate a crisis. During the early 1980s, the Soviet Union suffered a major “war scare” during which time its leadership concluded that bilateral relations were rapidly declining. This war scare was driven in part by the rhetoric of the Reagan administration, fortified by the selective reading of intelligence. During this period, NATO conducted a major command post exercise, Able Archer, that caused some elements of the Soviet military to raise their alert status. American officials were stunned to learn, after the fact, that the Kremlin had been acutely nervous about an American first strike during this period.56 All of these incidents have a common theme – that confidence is often the difference between war and peace. In times of crisis, false alarms can have a momentum of their own. As in the second scenario in this monograph, the lesson is that commanders rely on the steady flow of reliable information. When that information flow is disrupted – whether by a deliberate attack or an accident – confidence collapses and the result is panic and escalation. Introducing ASAT weapons into this mix is all the more dangerous, because such weapons target the elements of the command system that keep leaders aware, informed and in control. As a result, the mere presence of such weapons is corrosive to the confidence that allows national nuclear forces to operate safely.

US-Russia war is the only existential risk – sheer magnitude of nuclear arsenals

Bostrom 2 (Nick, Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford University, http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html, AD: 7/4/10) jl

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[[4]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn4%22%20%5Co%20%22)  Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

Impact – Space Bad: Russia/China Nuclear War

Space militarization forces China and Russia to heighten defense postures, increasing the risk of nuclear war from terrorism, accidents, or miscalculation.

Lewis 4 (Jeffrey Center for Defense Information “What if Space Were Weaponized?” July, http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf)KM

The Russians already continue to maintain their forces on high rates of alert – something that the United States has apparently been encouraging to reduce Russian fears about U.S. missile defenses. The follow-on Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) agreement contained provisions for eliminating missiles with multiple warheads (which are usually kept on higher rates of alert), but the administration of President George W. Bush abandoned that restriction in the Moscow Treaty and Russia may resort to multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) to maintain a larger nuclear force.36 Alert Rate Scenarios 23 Russian President Vladimir Putin has called the prospects of space weapons “particularly alarming,” while the commander of Russian Space Forces implied that Russia would respond to U.S. deployments of space weapons.37 While China currently maintains its forces on a “no alert” status, Beijing has indicated considerable concern about how a U.S. spacebased missile defense system might undercut its nuclear deterrent. The Chinese ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament warned that the deployment of space weapons would “jeopardize the global strategic balance and stability” and “trigger off … another round of arms race.”38 China currently does not appear to keep nuclear warheads mated to its ballistic missiles, nor aboard its single ballistic missile submarine (which stays in port). All Chinese nuclear weapons appear to be under lock and key in storage facilities that are physically separate from their launch pads. The deployment of space weapons could create strong incentives to reverse this restraint, and increase the alert rates of Chinese forces.39 Raising the alert rates of Russian and Chinese nuclear forces would undermine U.S. security on a day-to-day basis, because forces on alert are inherently more vulnerable to the inherent risks of accident or unauthorized use. Accidents happen, including accidents with U.S. nuclear weapons. In some cases, the warheads were lost – the United States lost at least two nuclear weapons during aircraft crashes in 1958 off the coast of Savannah, Georgia, and in 1966 off the coast of Spain.40 In other cases, warheads have been recovered: In 1996, an Energy Department tractor trailer overturned in a Nebraska blizzard carrying “classified cargo” – later confirmed to be several nuclear warheads. Fortunately, the weapons were recovered undamaged after several hours.41 These kinds of accidents are more likely to happen when forces are kept on alert and moved around. There is also the risk that nuclear warheads might be stolen by terrorists or sold by military units. Although Russian soldiers are now paid regularly, obviating concerns that they might sell nuclear weapons on the black market, both Russia and China have indigenous terrorist groups with ties to al Qaeda. These groups would have strong incentives to attempt to steal one or more nuclear weapons – and mobile missiles patrolling in remote areas, for example, might be an inviting target. Forces on high rates of alert are also vulnerable to the nightmare scenario of an unauthorized launch by a field commander. Although the United States has instituted extensive human reliability programs to ensure that U.S. military personnel are psychologically stable, there is little evidence of comparable programs in Russia or China. Even in a perfect program, mistakes are made. As one U.S. officer recalled: “I used to worry about Gen. [Thomas] Power. I used to worry that Gen. Power was not stable. I used to worry about the fact that he had control over so many weapons and weapon systems and could, under certain conditions, launch the force. Back in the days before we had real positive control, [Stratgeic Air Command] had the power to do a lot of things, and it was in his hands, and he knew it.”42 These problems are a feature of what some call the “always/never” dilemma: “nuclear weapons must always detonate when those authorized direct and never detonate when those authorized do not.” These are cross purposes – finding the right balance between the two requires making intelligent judgments about which risks one chooses to run. Given the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons and important economic and political interests that the United States shares with both Russia and China, all sides should be more interested in the “never” part of the equation. Yet space weapons, by threatening the nuclear forces of both countries, could well create incentives for Russia and China to do the opposite.

Impact – Space Bad: Indo-Pak War Shell (1/2)

Space militarization causes India to follow suit, forcing Pakistan into preemptive strikes and nuclear war.

Lewis 4 (Jeffrey Center for Defense Information “What if Space Were Weaponized?” July, http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf)KM

Previous scenarios outlined the relationship between U.S. pursuit of space weapons and their possible spread to other countries. Perhaps the most straightforward possibility for this phenomenon lies in the relationship between India and Pakistan. India is a state that may pursue ASAT capabilities, if other states do so first. The chief of the Indian Air Force, S. Krishnaswamy, recently remarked that: “Any country on the fringe of space technology like India has to work towards such a command as advanced countries are already moving towards laser weapons platforms in space and killer satellites.”57 Pakistan has a much smaller industrial base, but has long attempted to match Indian deployments – particularly in military matters. Pakistan is likely to emulate Indian ASAT efforts, given the enmity between the two countries and the relative advantage that India derives from the use of space for military operations. Developing states like India and Pakistan could develop two types of ASATs by 2010. First, both states could create modified missile defense systems to intercept satellites. All missile defense interceptors have an inherent capability to intercept satellites in LEO. India already has an active program to develop its own indigenous missile defenses and has expressed interest in purchasing the U.S. Patriot PAC-3 and Russian S-300 short-range missile defense systems.58 Second, both states might develop so-called “killer satellites” based on civilian microsatellite technology. The Indian Space Research Organization is already supporting the development of a 60 kg technology demonstration microsatellite, called ANUSAT, to be launched in 2005.59 India may also be interested in directed energy weapons, although New Delhi probably lacks the technical expertise to develop such weapons. Nevertheless, India’s Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) reportedly commissioned a study on directed energy weapons and the Indian Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) funds research on laser weapons.60 There are also reports that the Indian military has conducted studies on space-based lasers, as well as a “kinetic attack loitering interceptor.” Although Pakistan has a smaller technological base than does India, Pakistan is also investing in space systems. Pakistan has created an indigenous space agency, the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO), to build and launch indigenous satellites. Pakistan has also signed an agreement to increase cooperation with the Chinese space program.61 The role that space systems will play in Indian and Pakistan military operations in the future remains unclear, and the nuclear arsenals of both countries remain inchoate. India has positioned itself to exploit space technologies. New Delhi has launched several remote-sensing satellites under the Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) Satellite System, including the Technology Experimental Satellite with one-meter resolution.62 Already New Delhi is sophisticated enough to eliminate any coverage of its military operations areas when selling the IRS data commercially. Pakistan is more likely to focus on strategies that deny India the use of space, rather than exploiting these advantages itself. Pakistan does, however, lease a U.S.-built communications satellite in geostationary orbit. Space-based capabilities would provide India with a real advantage over Pakistan. When the U.S.-based Federation of American Scientists (FAS) purchased one-meter resolution images from a commercial satellite company, FAS analysts expressed surprise at the amount of detail available about the Pakistani nuclear force. Looking at one image, an FAS analyst said the image “shows the Pakistanis have all their eggs in one basket. These Pakistani missiles are vulnerable to an Indian first strike.”63 The Indian military is also reportedly interested in acquiring military GPS receivers from the United States and has launched a national communications satellite constellation, INSAT, that will carry military traffic.64 India may also be interested in supplementing national capabilities with commercial systems. By 2010, these capabilities could provide India with a substantial advantage in a crisis. Both countries rely on offensively oriented conventional military doctrines. India reportedly considered limited conventional strikes on Pakistani targets in response to alleged Pakistani support for terrorists. Indian officials apparently believe that nuclear weapons would discourage the escalation of a low-intensity conflict into a full-scale conventional war. The Pakistani Army, in contrast, emphasizes launching counter-offensives to respond to limited strikes.65 Perhaps mindful of Pakistan’s strategy, India considered a round of air strikes during a recent conflict that would have been limited to the <CONTINUED>

Impact – Space Bad: Indo-Pak War Shell (2/2)

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monsoon season, when heavy rains impede large-scale conventional armor operations.66 In war games conducting by the United States Navy, very similar scenarios were played out.67 In each of these scenarios, Pakistan used limited nuclear weapon attacks to attempt to disrupt Indian conventional operations. During a conflict in 2010, Pakistan may have a strong incentive to launch preemptive strikes against satellites used by the Indian military for reconnaissance and communications. Such strikes would pose substantial challenges to U.S. security policy. First, even limited strikes against Indian satellites could very well endanger U.S. space assets, including imaging satellites and civil space missions. A 1985 ASAT test conducted by the United States created hundreds of pieces of debris, many of which remained in orbit for a decade. In 1999, one of these pieces of debris came within about one kilometer from the International Space Station. 68 Although unlikely, the National Academy of Sciences has warned of the possibility of “collisional cascading” from debris impacts at crowded altitudes.69 High altitude nuclear detonations could also create substantial collateral damage, through electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and radiation effects. Second, Pakistan might target third-party satellites used by the Indian Army. Potential targets would include commercial imaging and communications satellites, as well as the GPS or Third Party Escalation Scenario 31 European Galileo system if Indian forces were allowed to utilize those services during an offensive. Such attacks would have unanticipated affects on the United States. In one war game, the United States faced what one participant called “ugly choices” about commercial satellites being used by potential opponents. Participants discovered that they were unable to determine who might be affected by a decision to shoot down a commercial satellite. This, according to one participant, “vastly complicates the national security landscape.”70 The United States has made clear that it would regard a deliberate attack on U.S. space assets, including commercial satellites, as an act of war. The U.S. National Space Policy states: “Pur-poseful interference with U.S. space systems will be viewed as an infringement on our sovereign rights. The United States may take all appropriate self-defense measures, including if directed by the National Command Authorities, the use of force to respond to such an infringement on U.S. rights.”71 In practice, of course, the U.S. threat to treat attacks on satellites as an act of war may not be credible for commercial satellites supporting foreign military operations. Moreover, the lack of casualties in an attack on U.S. space assets also raises questions about the credibility of this commitment. Perhaps more importantly, the risk of Pakistani ASAT attacks would create the same escalatory incentives for India that the United States faces in the second scenario. U.S. war games suggest that future conflicts in South Asia may not be very stable.72 A contractor who has conduct more than two dozen war games for the Pentagon and other military-planning centers told the Wall Street Journal that the India-Pakistan scenarios usually escalate to the use of nuclear weapons “within the first 12 ‘days’ of the war game.” “It’s a scary scenario,” said one participant. Anti-satellite weapons would reinforce the strong escalatory dynamic that many war games have revealed. For example, war games that quickly escalate to nuclear use are often restarted to allow the Indian side to reconsider some of the moves that lead to Pakistani escalation. The Indian side, however, generally learns the opposite lesson and attempts a “lighting strike” to destroy the Pakistani nuclear stockpile. When asked if the Indian Armed Force could really execute a preemptive strategy, one participant noted, “Probably not, but they believe they could.” According to U.S. intelligence estimates, a limited nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan could kill as many as 12 million people.73 The scale of the humanitarian catastrophe has led the military to war game possible scenarios for peacekeeping missions to prevent escalation. Participants learned that such interventions, as often as not, escalated into a crisis. In at least one game, the United States was compelled to send a rescue team to forcibly enter Pakistan and relieve a besieged division of U.S. peacekeepers – this force was attacked with nuclear weapons. Yet, will the United States really be able to keep out of a conflict if vital military and commercial assets in space are threatened, either deliberately or collaterally, by South Asian ASATs?

That causes extinction.

Fai 1 (Ghulam Nabi, Executive Director of the Kashmiri American Council., 7/8/01, “India-Pakistan Summit and the Issue of Kashmir”)KM

The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crowned with a unilateral veto power) to aggressive involvement at the vortex. The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary.

Impact – Space Bad: Arms Race Shell

**Even a perception of U.S. space militarization causes instability akin to a nuclear arms race**

Hitchens 2 (Theresa Hitchens, CDI Vice President, Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette?, The Policy Implications of US Pursuit of Space-Based Weapons, Center for Defense Information, April 18, 2002, April 18, 2002, http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm)NAR

China and Russia long have been worried about possible U.S. breakout on space-based weaponry. Officials from both countries have expressed concern that the U.S. missile defense program is aimed not at what Moscow and Beijing see as a non-credible threat from rogue-nation ballistic missiles, but rather at launching a long-term U.S. effort to dominate space. Both Russia and China also are key proponents of negotiations at the UN Conference on Disarmament to expand the 1967 Outer Space Treaty to ban all types of weapons. The effort to start talks known as PAROS, for "prevention of an arms race in outer space," has been stalled due in large part to the objection of the United States. For example, in November 2000, the United States was one of three countries (the others were Israel and Micronesia) to refuse to vote for a UN resolution citing the need for steps to prevent the arming of space. It is inconceivable that either Russia or China would allow the United States to become the sole nation with space-based weapons. "Once a nation embarks down the road to gain a huge asymmetric advantage, the natural tendency of others is to close that gap. An arms race tends to develop an inertia of its own," writes Air Force Lt. Col. Bruce M. DeBlois, in a 1998 article in Airpower Journal. Chinese moves to put weapons in space would trigger regional rival India to consider the same, in turn, spurring Pakistan to strive for parity with India. Even U.S. allies in Europe might feel pressure to "keep up with the Joneses." It is quite easy to imagine the course of a new arms race in space that would be nearly as destabilizing as the atomic weapons race proved to be.

Arms race escalates to nuclear war – militarized nations will first strike.

Cox 7 (Global Research, November 19, 2007, “Real-Life Star Wars: The Militarization of Space”, Stan http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=7373)KM

Why should we citizens even care what goes on outside the planet and its atmosphere? The prospect of space war seems a lot less ominous than did, say, the threat of a US-Soviet nuclear holocaust. Nobody lives in space; no civilians will be maimed or killed by a robotic shoot-em-up in orbit. Helen Caldicott and Craig Eisendrath answered such arguments in their book War in Heaven: The Arms Race in Outer Space, published earlier this year. In the wake of the Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957, they wrote, humans across the globe began asking, "Would [outer space] be the venue for wars and synchronized killings, or the common space for a complex of cooperative peaceful efforts benefiting our species? The two uses of space could not exist side by side." They stress that the first deployment of weapons will set off a multi-trillion-dollar arms race, risk littering orbital space with enough debris to make it unusable for any civilian purpose, and possibly trigger a nuclear war. The central problem is the vulnerability of orbiting spacecraft. They have the great advantage of "seeing"vast regions of the Earth's surface, but that leaves them hanging out there fully exposed. Space objects not only have nowhere to hide; they also move in fully predictable ways, making them vulnerable to attack at an adversary's convenience. USSTRATCOM's Gen. Kehler -- who, ironically, bears a slight resemblance to the late actor Peter Sellers (but only as he played the amiable President Muffley, not the crazed Dr. Strangelove) -- emphasized that dilemma with an old war axiom: "If the enemy's within range, so are you." That places space weapons in a classic "use 'em or lose 'em" position, pushing their owner to launch a preemptive strike at the first sign of danger. In the words of one analyst, "The hair trigger that characterized nuclear deterrence during the Cold War would be elevated to the heavens."

Impact – Space Bad: Arms Race

Space militarization creates an arms race and short-circuits our alliances on the rock.

Power 5 (Jonathan, reporter for arab news, Mon. May 30, 2005 “Militarizing Space is Quite Unnecessary”, http://archive.arabnews.com/?page=7&section=0&article=64570&d=30&m=5&y=2005&pix=opinion.jpg&category=Opinion%22)KM

Space war has been a recurrent political theme since the fright America got when the Soviet Union launched its Sputnik in 1957. President Lyndon Johnson, not long after, said, “Out in space, there is the ultimate position — from which total control of the earth may be exercised”. President Ronald Reagan launched his Strategic Defense Initiative, the so-called “star wars”, meant to deploy space-based weapons to shoot down incoming missiles. He found his way blocked by a Democratic Congress. But Reagan’s notion pales besides that of Rumsfeld’s. Rumsfeld has always talked of the need for America’s total domination of space. It must be large enough and so all encompassing, argued his report, that any counter measures by other countries would be quickly nullified. This is the ultimate in American unilateralism. It will not only make enemies where they don’t exist, it will make friends in NATO wonder if they will be pressed to make up the alliance’s inevitable shortfall in more run-of-the-mill programs whilst American indulges itself in its space fantasies.

Space militarization collapses US dominance – it triggers an arms race that the US has the most to lose from.

Pena and Hudgins 2 (Charles V. and Edward L., sen. defense policy analyst/form. director at Cato Institute,

March 18, “Should the United States "Weaponize" Space? Military and Commercial Implicatons”,

http://www.cato.org/pub display.php?pub id=1286&print=Y)KM

Advocates of a more aggressive U.S. military policy for space argue that the United States is more reliant on the use of space than is any other nation, that space systems are vulnerable to attack, and that U.S. space systems are thus an attractive candidate for a “space Pearl Harbor.” But as important and potentially vulnerable as current U.S. space-based assets may be, deploying actual weapons (whether defensive or offensive) will likely be perceived by the rest of the world as more threatening than the status quo. Any move by the United States to introduce weapons into space will surely lead to the development and deployment of anti-satellite weapons by potentially hostile nations. As the dominant user of space for military and civilian functions, the United States would have the most to lose from such an arms race. Although there are legitimate (and unique) military requirements for space assets, virtually all are “dual use.” Military requirements should not necessarily dictate those other uses. In fact, commercial efforts in space often lead those of the government and the Department of Defense and usually have lower costs, due to market influences and competition. National security must be one component of total U.S. space policy, but it must certainly not be the primary component. In the post–Cold War environment—with no immediate threat from a rival great power and none on the horizon— the United States must not establish overstated and costly military requirements for space-based resources. The military must make greater use of commercial space assets. Also, the United States should strive to foster an environment that allows commercial space activity to grow and flourish rather than use it to create a new area for costly military competition.

Space weaponization creates an arms race with Russia and China.

Shachtman 4 (Noah, Wired.com Reporter. Febuary 20, “Pentagon Preps for War in Space” http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0.1282.62358.00.html)KM

Space has become an increasingly important part of U.S. military efforts. Satellites are used more and more to talk to troops, keep tabs on foes and guide smart bombs. There's also long been recognition that satellites may need some sort of protection against attack. But the Air Force report goes far beyond these defensive capabilities, calling for weapons that can cripple other countries' orbiters. That prospect worries some analysts that the U.S. may spark a worldwide arms race in orbit. "I don't think other countries will be taking this lying down," said Theresa Hitchens, vice president of the Center for Defense Information. The space weapons programs listed in the Air Force report went largely unnoticed until Hitchens circulated them in an e-mail Thursday. "This will certainly prompt China into actually moving forward" on space weapon plans of its own, she added. "The Russians are likely to respond with something as well."

Impact – Space Bad: Arms Race

Space militarization fosters a self-fulfilling prophecy, culminating in a return to a cold war.

Saperstein 2 (http://www.aps.org/units/fps/newsletters/2002/july/saperstein.pdf, July 2002, Alvin M. Saperstein, Physics Professor)NAR

It should be abundantly clear by now that U.S. civil life and prosperity is bound up with the smooth functioning and predictability of commercial satellite systems (ground and launching stations, satellites, command and control communication links), internationally and American owned and operated. Also increasingly evident (e.g., Gulf War, Balkan Wars, Afghanistan) is the dependence of the U.S. military, and the resultant discomfort of its opponents, upon space systems– its own, and civil ones. For example, many of the aerial munitions used in Afghanistan were guided to their targets by GPS. America’s opponents in any future conflict would like to obstruct its use of space. Hence the U.S. would like to protect its space assets while simultaneously hindering access to space by its opponents. One possible U.S. policy is the development and deployment of active defense and offense in space – the ability to conduct war in space. Terrestrial and satellite based ASATs would be intended to target enemy ASATs as well as the opponent’s militarily relevant satellites. If the opponents are not technologically advanced nations (or nonnational groups), they will not have their own space assets – just rely upon commercial space systems. Then the U.S. would have no space targets against which to deploy unless it wished to threaten civil space assets. It would then be creating a space-arms-race against itself as well as hindering the development of space commerce – insurance and investment capital does not freely flow to war zones. Such a policy would also antagonize other nations – technically backward or advanced, perhaps creating opponents where none previously existed; no one likes a hegemon. If, on the other hand, the opponent is technologically able to wage war in space (Europe, Russia, China, India, ?), they may respond to a U.S. run in space by competing. In addition to harming civil space commerce, such an expensive race would obstruct the U.S.’s present free ability to use space in furtherance of its terrestrial military objectives. Opponents in such a race would be able to threaten the U.S. with nuclear weapon carrying ICBMs while also endangering its early warning satellites. We would be returned to the terror of the Cold War - without its stabilizing contribution of certain knowledge of the opponent’s pre-attack actions.

Impact – Space Bad: Laundry List

U.S. space weaponization leads to global economic collapse, nuclear proliferation, and instability.

Krepon 4 (Michael Kreponis the author of Space Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space, November 2004, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004\_11/Krepon#kreponbio)NAR

If the United States leads the way in flight-testing and deploying new anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, other states will surely follow suit because they have too much to lose by allowing the Pentagon sole rights to space warfare. U.S. programs will cost more and be far more sophisticated than the ASAT weapons of potential adversaries, who will opt to kill satellites cheaply and crudely. The resulting competition would endanger U.S. troops that depend on satellites to an unprecedented degree for battlefield intelligence, communication, and targeting to win quickly and with a minimum of casualties. Space warfare would have far-reaching adverse effects for global commerce, especially commercial transactions and telecommunication services that use satellites. Worldwide space industry revenues now total almost $110 billion a year, $40 billion of which go to U.S. companies.[4] These numbers do not begin to illuminate how much disruption would occur in the event of space warfare. For a glimpse of what could transpire, the failure of a Galaxy IV satellite in May 1998 is instructive. Eighty-nine percent of all U.S. pagers used by 45 million customers became inoperative, and direct broadcast transmissions, financial transactions, and gas station pumps were also affected.[5] Weaponizing space would poison relations with China and Russia, whose help is essential to stop and reverse proliferation. ASAT weapon tests and deployments would surely reinforce Russia’s hair-trigger nuclear posture, and China would likely feel compelled to alter its relaxed nuclear posture, which would then have negative repercussions on India and Pakistan. The Bush administration’s plans would also further alienate America’s friends and allies, which, with the possible exception of Israel, strongly oppose the weaponization of space. The fabric of international controls over weapons of mass destruction, which is being severely challenged by Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, could rip apart if the Bush administration’s interest in testing space and nuclear weapons is realized. This highly destabilizing and dangerous scenario can be avoided, as there is no pressing need to weaponize space and many compelling reasons to avoid doing so. If space becomes another realm for the flight-testing and deployment of weapons, there will be no sanctuary in space and no assurance that essential satellites will be available when needed for military missions and global commerce. Acting on worst-case assumptions often can increase this likelihood. Crafting a space assurance[6] posture, including a hedging strategy in the event that others cheat, offers more potential benefits and lower risks than turning the heavens into a shooting gallery.

Impact – Space Bad: Space Debris Shell

Militarization causes an increase in space debris which kills space exploration efforts.

Katz-Hyman and Krepon 3 (Michael and Michael “Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space” Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April p120, http://spacedebate.org/evidence/1302/)km

Orbital debris mitigation and space traffic management require multilateral solutions. Earth is surrounded by litter -- perhaps 9,000 objects larger than ten centimeters in diameter, and an estimated 100,000 pieces of orbital debris larger than a marble. As Joel Primack has written, "[S]pace does not clear after an explosion near our planet. The fragments continue circling the Earth, their orbits crossing those of other objects. Paint chips, lost bolts, pieces of exploded rockets -- all have already become tiny satellites, traveling at about 27,000 kilometers per hour, 10 times faster than a high-powered rifle bullet. A marble traveling at such speed would hit with the energy of a one-ton safe dropped from a three-story building. Anything it strikes will be destroyed and only increase the debris." The weaponization of space is an environmental as well as a national security issue. The environmental degradation of space created by space-faring nations constitutes a danger to space exploration, the space shuttle, and other peaceful uses of space. Space litter also poses difficulties for the military uses of space.

You have an obligation to vote here – extinction is inevitable unless we colonize.

Falconi 1, (Oscar: BS degree in Physics from M.I.T. “THE CASE FOR SPACE COLONIZATION - NOW!” http://www.nutri.com/space/]KM

What expenditure should have first priority in American budgetary considerations? Defense? Pollution? Education? Inflation? Unemployment? Crime? Welfare? Integration? Bussing? Bureaucratic over-regulation? What we present here is felt to be an extremely convincing argument for an adventure in space that a billion years from now might well be considered by far the best investment ever made at any time by any society. The adventure is the colonization of space. The argument is that man may soon destroy himself on earth before he can set up a backup civilization elsewhere. Now man may or may not be the only life in the universe capable of abstract thought, but we surely must agree that much would be lost if man's existence were to cease right now. Trillions of trillions of potentially happy and productive man-years would never come to pass. We are obligated to do all we can, now, to protect this future! In the last generation or two, man has clearly reached some sort of milestone or turning point. The present is unprecedented, and so the future is completely unpredictable. For the first time in man's history, many things seem to be doubling every decade or two, such as population, research, energy usage, pollution, nuclear capability, total knowledge, and more. In addition, man has achieved the ability to destroy himself and all his future generations. The probability of man's self-destruction is clearly increasing at a rate much greater than, for instance, population growth. An in-depth study could well uncover some alarming statistics here. It behooves us to immediately begin work toward getting a self-sufficient colony away from earth. We just may be the only life in the universe with the foresight to have "moved out" before it destroyed itself. So, should America go all-out for space colonization? What follows can only touch the surface of this question. The points that are made, however, are felt to be convincing enough to warrant immediate and forceful action. Many of the ideas in this book are very new and very important. Read them with a receptive mind and criticize them fairly and logically, remembering all the while the importance of what's at stake. "What can happen, will happen." - Anon CAUSES OF MAN'S EXTINCTION Unfortunately, mankind reproduces itself in series. One generation begets the next. When one generation ceases to exist all future generations are lost. In the past, the human race was well dispersed, with little possibility for self-destruction. There was no reason to think that the existent generation might be the last. But times have changed. With weaponry and research advancing furiously, it could well be that our chance for self-destruction is doubling every year or two. Carl Sagan, in a recent episode of his very fine TV series, "Cosmos", has reasoned that the chance of human life continuing to exist on earth is less than 1% per century. This is equivalent to less than a 50-50 chance of lasting the next 15 years! As it stands now, it appears that most Americans (half are less than 30) will die a violent death. When the odds against us are bad, and rapidly getting worse, it's time to search for a solution.

Impact – Space Bad: Space Debris

Space weapons exponentially increases space debris.

Katz-Hyman and Krepon 3 (Michael and Michael “Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space” Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April p122-3, http://spacedebate.org/evidence/1303/)km

The weaponization of space, particularly with respect to the flight-testing of antisatellite weapons, would greatly compound existing concerns over safe passage. In the event of a resumption of ASAT tests, the Pentagon would attempt to mitigate space debris, as it does with respect to missile defense tests, but the effectiveness of such efforts is questionable. Moreover, other states that test ASATs may not be as conscientious about debris creation. The actual use of ASATs would compound these dangers exponentially. Space warfare would not only constitute a threat to targeted satellites, it would also create debris fields that would threaten satellites operating in low earth orbit, including NTM, space transportation systems such as the U.S. space shuttle, and the International Space Station. The damage resulting from warfare that includes ASAT use could be more long lasting in space than on Earth.

Space weapon usage increases debris – it’s the single greatest threat to colonization.

Krepon 5 (Michael. "Seven Questions: Space Weapons." Foreign Policy. July, http://spacedebate.org/evidence/1443/)KM

Once you blow something up in space, the debris lingers. It isn't like a sea battle where the remains of two warships sink to the bottom. The last anti-satellite weapons test was carried out in 1985 by the United States. We took aim at an old, dying Air Force satellite -- just as a test -- and it created 200 pieces of debris that were large enough to track. The last piece of debris finally left low Earth orbit 17 years later, and one of the pieces came within 1 mile of the International Space Station and could have done significant damage. Debris is the single greatest threat to the space shuttle. This is why the Air Force prefers to jam or dazzle satellites rather than blowing them up. But once we go down this road, there are no guarantees that other countries will play by our rules. It is a lose-lose situation if space warfare happens. The United States will still win wars, but we will win with more casualties and more destruction.

Debris is forever – weaponization will destroy all chances of using space.

Scheetz 6 (Lori. "Infusing Environmental Ethics into the Space Weapons Dialogue." Georgetown International Environmental Law Review. Vol. 19, No. 1 Fall p 69 http://spacedebate.org/argument/2213)

It is important to note that debris orbiting approximately 800 kilometers above Earth resulting from testing, deployment, and use of space weapons will reside there for decades. After debris settles into orbit at more than 1,500 kilometers above Earth's surface, it will remain there indefinitely. Collisions involving debris exceeding just one centimeter can be disastrous. In LEO, a marble-sized debris fragment can collide with satellites "with about the same energy as a one ton safe dropped from the top of a five story building." When these fragments collide, the quantity of debris increases. This prospect is compounded if each nation, in the long-term future, rationally takes advantage of the space commons and introduces its own weapons systems.

Impact – Space Bad: A2: Space Inevitable

Inevitability claims are a self fulfilling prophecy.

Park 6 (Andrew T. "Incremental Steps for Achieving Space Security: The Need for a New Way of Thinking to Enhance the Legal Regime for Space." *Houston Journal of International Law* Vol. 28, No. 3 p 887 http://spacedebate.org/argument/1271/)KM

The simplest argument for space weaponization (inevitability) may also be the most reckless because of its self-fulfilling nature. Proponents of the inevitability of space weaponization have proffered multiple theories as to why the realm of space will eventually become weaponized. According to the logic of these inevitability proponents, the United States should lead the way rather than be left in the dust as military technology continues to rapidly develop. However, while the inevitability argument may have some merit, its true danger lies in its unverifiable nature until weaponization actually occurs. Moreover, it is important to note that this premise is driven not only by American insecurities, but also by the need for the United States to control its own future. Since the ideological divide between “space doves” and those who believe space weaponization is inevitable is not likely to be bridged soon, the international community must recognize the need for a legal regime for space with teeth—or, put another way, a legal regime that goes beyond simply establishing a set of norms that have little to no consequences.

Only the US has the ability to deploy space weapons – we control the inevitability claim.

Park 6 (Andrew T. "Incremental Steps for Achieving Space Security: The Need for a New Way of Thinking to Enhance the Legal Regime for Space." *Houston Journal of International Law* Vol. 28, No. 3 p 887 http://spacedebate.org/argument/1271/)KM

The fallacy of the inevitability argument is that, in the short run at least, the United States is the only country that possesses the resources and capabilities necessary to deploy space weapons. This has never been the case in American history. As one historian notes, from the "development of ironclad warships in the 1860s, Dreadnought battleships after 1900, or atomic weapons in the 1940s," different nations were simultaneously developing the same technology. This left a choice to the different governments to either take the lead in the arms race or get passed by. In the space weapons debate, in contrast, "the United States can unilaterally [for the time being] choose whether space will be weaponized." Consequently, the United States controls the inevitability of space weaponization. This conviction is dangerously close to evolving into a self-fulfilling prophecy that simply cannot be refuted.

Space militarization is not inevitable – economic claims are based in outdated mercantilism.

Moltz 7 (James Clay. "Protecting Safe Access to Space: Lessons from the First 50 Years of Space Security." Space Policy. Vol. 23 November p204 http://spacedebate.org/argument/1295)KM

On the other hand, there are those who argue the converse, specifically, that commerce will drive weapons into space as countries seek to defend their assets. As Franz Gayl argues: "... as with aviation, access and technology will drive forward to exploit any and all warfighting relevance, application, and advantage from space, quite independent of a nation's will to prevent it." However, such prospects hold true only if commercial actors remained as tied to individual nations as they were in the 19th century model of mercantilism. Such conditions are unlikely to govern in space, given the rapidly growing internationalization of space commerce, where companies may use technology from several countries, be based in another, and receive funding or contracts from customers in still other parts of the world. Such factors are likely to mitigate the purported commercial "demand" for defenses. For these reasons, predictions regarding the future of space security based on the experience of other past environments and periods should be viewed with at least some skepticism. Thus far, arguments and predictions about "inevitable" outcomes in space have held up surprisingly poorly.

\*\*\*Impacts – End Strength\*\*\*

Impact – End Strength – Terrorism Shell

Large boots-on-ground presence spurs increased terror activity

Rosenbleeth & Cole 8 (Rocky T. Cole, Robert Rosenbleeth, International Affairs and Economics

University of Georgia, 2011, , http://www.uga.edu/juro/2008/2008papers/Cole2008.pdf) NAR

While a large presence of boots on the ground deters insurgents, it also frustrates the local population, who might perceive the troops as unfriendly occupiers violating their sovereignty. Policies that increase this negative perception also increase locals’ willingness to cooperate with the insurgents.26 This problem is clearly evident in the United States’ attempts to restore order in Iraq after toppling Saddam Hussein. By targeting the soft underbelly of American operations— the aid workers and contractors tasked with rebuilding Iraqi infrastructure, the insurgency was able to prevent the United States from delivering on its promise to improve the lives of Iraqis. As the United States went on the offensive against the insurgency, they further angered the Iraqi population with aggressive military action.27 Therefore, the Army must strike a balance between achieving a strong presence on the ground and winning the support of the local population. The best way to achieve this balance is not to pour money into more troops. The Army must develop more capable, flexible, and dynamic units to successfully and efficiently win counterinsurgency wars.

Terrorism risks extinction

Kirkus Reviews, 99 (Book Review “The New Terrorism: Fanatiscism and the Arms of Mass Destruction”, http://www.amazon.com/New–Terrorism–Fanaticism–Arms–Destruction/dp/product–description/0195118162)

Today two things have changed that together transform terrorism from a ``nuisance'' to ``one of the gravest dangers facing mankind.'' First terroristsbe they Islamic extremists in the Middle East, ultranationalists in the US, or any number of other possible permutationsseem to have changed from organized groups with clear ideological motives to small clusters of the paranoid and hateful bent on vengeance and destruction for their own sake. There are no longer any moral limitations on what terrorists are willing to do, who and how many they are willing to kill. Second, these unhinged collectivities now have ready access to weapons of mass destruction. The technological skills are not that complex and the resources needed not too rare for terrorists to employ nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons where and when they wish. The consequences of such weapons in the hands of ruthless, rootless fanatics are not difficult to imagine. In addition to the destruction of countless lives, panic can grip any targeted society, unleashing retaliatory action which in turn can lead to conflagrations perhaps on a world scale. To combat such terrorist activities, states may come to rely more and more on dictatorial and authoritarian measures. In short, terrorism in the future may threaten the very foundations of modern civilizations.

Impact – End Strength – Terrorism

**End-Strength can’t stop terrorists – unable to gather support of local populations**

Rosenbleeth & Cole 8 (Rocky T. Cole, Robert Rosenbleeth, International Affairs and Economics

University of Georgia, 2011, , http://www.uga.edu/juro/2008/2008papers/Cole2008.pdf) NAR

Strategic reactions to ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Iraq indicate that boots on the ground are not a panacea for virulent insurgencies. Defeating insurgents is much more than a numbers game. Few insurgencies in recent history have been defeated by the sheer military force of a major power. The French defeat in Algeria, Russian defeat in Afghanistan, and American stalemate in Vietnam all show the limited effectiveness of large armies in distant, asymmetric conflicts.20 When military might has defeated insurgencies, combat operations “annihilate[d] the insurgency and its supporters through bombings, massive raids, heavy shelling, and even torture and executions.”21 Such tactics would only intensify modern insurgencies, as the Internet ensures that the occupied population would quickly learn about their occupier’s brutality.22 That is not to say that boots on the ground are unnecessary. As Williamson Murray, the former Army War College Professor of Military History, states: In almost every situation envisioned, boots on the ground will determine the outcome of the wars that America fights, because for most of the world’s peoples, it is control of the ground that matters. Only control of the ground, not air superiority, will translate into political success—the only reason to embark on war.23 Yet, control of the ground does not come from the brute force of large troop deployments; rather, it comes from mastering the political environment of the occupied state to bring about stability and ultimately a self-sustaining government. The chief advantage of successful insurgencies is their ability to control the political sphere in the area of operation. Gaining influence with the local population lets insurgents operate freely and openly. Without some degree of confidence that locals will not report them to authorities, insurgents cannot successfully engage the occupying power and then escape by receding into the local population. Because insurgents require this local support, locals are often capable of identifying the insurgents as well as their bases of operation. However, the locals must be persuaded to support the occupying power in its fight against the insurgents. Without such local support, any military superiority is unsustainable.24 In order to gain the support of the population and defeat the insurgency, the occupying power must prevent the insurgents from creating a constant level of violence. By exerting the will power to effectively prevent violence and foster economic growth, the occupying power gains legitimacy with the local population, causing them to turn away from the insurgents.25 However, the counterinsurgency force faces a conundrum when using only military might to prevent violence

Impact – End Strength – Readiness Shell

Long-term increases in end strength hurt readiness – hurt budget allocations.

Bruner 5 (http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/42484.pdf, Edward F. Bruner, January 3rd 2005, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division)KM

Administration End Strength Initiative. Before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) on January 28, 2004, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker, testified that he had been authorized by the Secretary of Defense to increase end strength of the Army by 30,000 personnel on a temporary, emergency basis.9 He argued that a permanent, legislated increase would be unwise and unnecessary. He asserted that a permanent increase would create a burden on planned defense budgets in the out years, citing $1.2 billion annually for each increase of 10,000 troops. Some ongoing programs were presented as, over time, providing a more efficient and usable force structure within current Army end strength.

Readiness is key to prevent war.

Spencer 00 (Jack, Policy Analyst – Heritage Foundation, The Facts About Military Readiness, 9–15, http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/ BG1394.cfm)KM

The evidence indicates that the U.S. armed forces are not ready to support America's national security requirements. Moreover, regarding the broader capability to defeat groups of enemies, military readiness has been declining. The National Security Strategy, the U.S. official statement of national security objectives,3 concludes that the United States "must have the capability to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames."4 According to some of the military's highest–ranking officials, however, the United States cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan have all expressed serious concerns about their respective services' ability to carry out a two major theater war strategy.5 Recently retired Generals Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps and George Joulwan of the U.S. Army have even questioned America's ability to conduct one major theater war the size of the 1991 Gulf War.6 Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace.

Lack of readiness causes North Korean conflict.

Carpenter 8 (1/9/08 Ted Galen, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=16622)

At the same time, U.S. officials must stop letting hope triumph over experience when it comes to dealing with North Korea on the nuclear issue. Those officials also need to consider a fall-back plan if the six-party talks fail to produce an effective and worthwhile solution. Relying on deterrence supplemented by a regional missile defense program may be the most feasible option. Another possibility is to induce China to remove the current ruling elite in its troublesome client state and replace it with a more pliable regime, in exchange for a U.S. promise to end its military presence on the peninsula.

That escalates to nuclear war

Ogura and Oh 97 Professor of Economics at Toyama University, Professor of Innovation Management at the Middle East Technical University in Northern Cyprus[Toshimaru and Oh, “Nuclear Clouds Over the Korean Peninsula and Japan” Monthly Review, April]

North Korea, South Korea, and Japan have achieved quasi- or virtual nuclear armament Although these countries do not produce or possess actual bombs, they posses sufficient technological know-how to possess one or several nuclear arsenals. Thus, virtual armament creates a new nightmare in this region – nuclear annihilation. Given the concentration of economic affluence and military power in this region and its growing importance to the world system, any hot conflict among these countries would threaten to escalate into a global conflagaration.

Impact – End Strength – Readiness

End Strength cost, will destroy military readiness for the future.

Defense Tech 7 (March 12th 2007, http://defensetech.org/2007/12/03/the-downside-of-end-strength-increases/) NAR

But increasingly critics of the buildup point out that in the next few years, possibly before the additional troops are added by 2010–2012, the United States will have withdrawn combat troops and possible all military forces from Iraq and Afghanistan. Even today, they note, the U.S. commitment of ground troops in the two wars is just over ten percent of the total active Army-ARNG-USAR and Marine Corps strength. Frank Hoffman, a retired Marine officer and leading defense analyst, has observed that the global war on terrorism and the Iraq conflict are being used as “lame rationales” for enlarging the military. Hoffman, a senior researcher at the Marine Corps Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities in Quantico, Virginia, continued, “Unless you think we will have more than six brigades in Iraq in 2012, I don’t see how this is relevant.” Other analysts and some congressional staffers have privately echoed Hoffman’s views, as have a few military officers in off-the-record conversations. The troop buildup has an estimated initial cost of nearly $100 billion with a subsequent cost of $15 billion per year to maintain the additional forces. These costs are being incurred at a time that several new aircraft and ship programs are far above predicted costs, virtually all U.S. Army and Marine Corps ground vehicles except for M1 tanks are in need of replacement, military health costs are skyrocketing, and the increased costs of fuel are playing havoc with operating budgets. While some troop increases transcend the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, especially increases in special operations forces and, to some extent, in Marine units. After withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq — as after the Vietnam War — U.S. national leaders will be very reluctant to commit ground forces to sustained combat situations. Rather, special operations and forward-deployed Marine units afloat will be the more likely to be used in future crises and conflicts. Along with forward-deployed Navy ships, they will be the “forces of preference” for the foreseeable future. The current crises in Africa that have led to the recent establishment of the U.S. Africa Command, the confrontations with the leaders of Venezuela and Iran, competition with China and India for resources in several parts of the world, and other problem areas will demand that the United States maintain flexible and rapidly deployable presence and combat forces. It is unlikely that those will be large Army or Marine Corps ground combat formations.

Impact – End Strength – Readiness

End strength increases are only temporary and cause trade-offs with more substantial reforms that are key to future military success.

Blackwell and Dunn 3(“Meeting the Operational Tempo Challenge: Increasing End Strength is only Part of the Solution” Lt. Gen. Paul E., Richard J. III, USA Ret., 12/01 http://www3.ausa.org/webpub/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/CCRN-6CCSB7)KM

The Army is in the midst of a major operational tempo challenge with no end in sight. Worldwide operational commitments in support of the global war on terrorism have the Army stretched thin -- too few soldiers are trying to do too much. Some are advocating a significant increase in Army end strength to reduce the strain on the force by providing an additional two infantry divisions to meet near-term critical needs. While an increase in end strength may be warranted, it is only one of the full sets of actions that deserve consideration. We must not underestimate either the severity of the operational tempo strain the Army is under right now or the importance of reducing the load quickly. Those of us old enough to remember Vietnam recall the impact on soldiers and their families of having to serve a combat tour of duty every other year -- a situation today’s Army may be facing in the immediate future. The rapid exodus of senior noncommissioned officers and company grade officers almost broke the force during Vietnam -- and should be a warning to us today. With the evolving world security environment and expanding global war on terrorism, it appears to be a safe assumption that we will be unable to significantly reduce the number and scope of missions the Army is required to perform. Therefore, to reduce the operational tempo strain on units, we need more units capable of performing today’s missions to expand the pool from which we can draw. We can create these additional units in several ways. We can: Form more (smaller but equally capable) units out of existing units by rapidly fielding technological enablers. Convert soldiers and units with less relevant missions to soldiers and units with more relevant missions. Free soldiers from non-tactical missions to fill new tactical units. Add end strength to fill new units. Most probably, the optimal solution lies in some mix of the above options. However, the Army must recognize that the last solution, adding end strength, is both the most expensive and most time-consuming. To convince DoD to add end strength, the Army must first show that it has done everything it can to help itself through the first three options. Make no mistake, executing any and all of the first three options will be difficult and painful and will call for making very hard choices. All the easy savings have long since been taken. However, given the alternative of breaking the force, it is clear that half measures will not suffice. We need to structure the Army now for the long haul. The longer we delay, the greater the damage to the force and the more difficult the fix. The Army should take a hard look at the benefits -- and costs -- of executing each of the following actions. This analysis must be done with a clear-eyed understanding that the severity of the operational tempo challenge is more likely to increase than decline in the immediate future.

End strength increases are bad – they’re the most inefficient way to boost military readiness and hurt it in the long term.

Blackwell and Dunn 3(“Meeting the Operational Tempo Challenge: Increasing End Strength is only Part of the Solution” Lt. Gen. Paul E., Richard J. III, USA Ret., 12/01 http://www3.ausa.org/webpub/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/CCRN-6CCSB7)KM

Add end strength to fill new units. This most expensive and more controversial option may still be required if the previous options do not generate enough units to provide sufficient operational tempo relief. Personnel are enormously expensive when all the different cost elements from salaries and benefits, to support structure, to retirement are added in. Given the size of federal deficits and other pressures on discretionary spending, increases in defense spending beyond those required to support ongoing operations will be hard to come by. Unless an exceptionally strong case can be made for increasing Army end strength because all other options have truly been exhausted, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is unlikely to be able or willing to help the Army. Given the other major claimants on defense dollars (particularly future procurement programs) and the fact that the overall defense budget tends to be a zero-sum game, additional personnel costs are likely to come mostly -- if not all -- from within the Army budget. This could have a major impact on worthwhile efforts like Army Transformation and quality of life improvements.

Impact – End Strength – Turns Case

End strength increases signal permanent presence – turns the case.

Conetta 7 (“No good reason to boost Army, Marine Corps end strength” Carl Conetta Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Report #20 31 January http://www.comw.org/pda/0701br20.html)km

As we show below, there is no manifest need for such a capability unless: US national leadership seeks to maintain a large contingent of troops inside Iraq indefinitely -- a presence on the order of 70,000 troops; or, US leadership hopes to otherwise routinely and continuously involve 100,000 or more US ground troops in regime change, foreign occupation, "nation-building", counter-insurgency, and/or stability operations. The prospect of large numbers of US troops remaining in Iraq for many years to come is not an idle one, despite the present unpopularity of the war. Although proposals for beginning a process of withdrawal from Iraq have now become commonplace in Congress, few advocates talk about total withdrawal anytime soon -- if at all. Complete withdrawal has significant traction in public opinion polls, but much less in the executive or legislative branches. Put simply: the proposals to increase Army and Marine Corps end strength would enable the United States to "stay the course" charted by the Bush administration in Iraq and elsewhere -- indefinitely. Much as the proposed Iraq "troop surge" serves as a riposte to seeking a diplomatic solution to the Iraqi impasse, the proposal to add to Army and Marine Corps end strength serves as an alternative to setting a new course at the level of national security strategy.

Impact – End Strength – Shifts to PMC’s

End strength increases force the military to employ private contractors to make up for the cost.

GAO 5 (“FORCE STRUCTURE Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and Oversight of Costs for Transforming Army to a Modular Force” September http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05926.pdf)KM

The Army’s Campaign Plan calls for a decision by fiscal year 2006 on whether to create five additional modular brigade combat teams—a decision that could affect the size and composition of the modular force as well as its cost. Adding five brigades would provide additional capability to execute the defense strategy but would require additional restructuring of people and equipment. If the Secretary of Defense decides to add five brigade combat teams to the current plan, the cost for modularity will increase significantly. For example, each modular brigade combat team under the current design would require 3,300 to 3,700 soldiers, for a potential total of up to 18,500 soldiers. It is not clear whether the Army would have to add this entire amount to its end strength, however. The Army has begun initiatives to rebalance the force by converting military positions to civilian positions, thus allowing soldiers currently in the institutional force to be moved to the operational force, and by rebalancing the active and reserve components in the force. To the extent the Army is successful in reallocating positions under these initiatives, it may be able to offset some of these requirements of the additional brigades. In addition to personnel requirements, adding these brigades to the force structure would add costs for equipment, facilities, and training.

PMC’s make every conflict escalate faster – they prompt first strikes and free market arms races

Singer 2 (P.W. Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution. Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security International Security 26.3 186-220 TBC 6/26/10)

The privatized military industry lies beyond any one state's control. Further, the layering of market uncertainties atop the already-thorny issue of net assessment creates a variety of complications for determining the balance of power, particularly in regional conflicts. Calculating a rival's capabilities or force posture has always been difficult. In an open market, where the range of options is even more variable, likely outcomes become increasingly hard to discern. As the Serbs, Eritreans, Rwandans, and Ugandans (whose opponents hired PMFs prior to successful offensives) all learned, not only can once-predictable deterrence relationships rapidly collapse, but the involvement of PMFs can quickly and perhaps unexpectedly tilt local balances of power. In addition, arms races could move onto the open market and begin to resemble instant bidding wars. (In the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, a new spin on the traditional arms race emerged when both countries competed first on the global military leasing market before taking to the battlefield.) The result is that the pace of the race is accelerated, and "first-mover" advantages are heightened. Indeed such changes could well influence the likelihood of war initiation. 57 Conventional arms control is also made more difficult with the existence of this market, because actual force capacities can be lowered without reducing the overall threat potential.

Impact – End Strength – 2NC: Turn Shield – Doesn’t Solve

End strength doesn’t solve – capabilities key.

Rumsfeld 4 (December 02, Secretary of Defense Donald H. “Force Management Risk” http://www.dod.gov/execsec/adr2004/pdf\_files/0002\_force\_management\_bobbi\_sept20.pdf)KM

We recognize the traditional measure of “end strength” – that is, how many men and women are on active or reserve component duty– is not a leading performance indicator of force capability. Thus, to match the right skills to each mission, we need to understand and specifically manage the factors that shape capabilities. One effect of the global war on terror has been a significant increase in operational tempo, which is likely a “spike” driven by the de-ployment of nearly 125,000 troops in Iraq as of Summer 2004. Con-gress provided the emergency authorities to manage this increased operating tempo in the short term. We are operating with nearly 33,000 additional people in the active duty force than authorized by Congress. Congress also supported the mobilization of National Guard and Reserve forces and provided the supplemental funding needed to support our expanded, wartime missions. However, increasing end strength and funding is not a permanent solution to continuing operational pressures. Instead, we must use other force management tools to manage future risk, such as im-proved operational jointness, rebalancing the mix of active and re-serve components of the overall force, and adjusting our recruiting and retention programs to re-direct resources from under-utilized to highly-demanded skill areas. Maintain Manning Levels of Military Forces Each year, Congress authorizes funds to maintain specific numbers of skilled service members, called “end strength.” Services are com-pelled to budget and recruit, retain, or release members to match those authorized end strength numbers by the end of the fiscal year. By law, the secretaries of the military departments may authorize operating up to 2 percent above the authorized end strength. If he determines it to be in the national interest, the Secretary of Defense may authorize the Services to operate above their authorized end strength by 3 percent for the fiscal year. In the past, the military departments reported on whether they met their authorized end strength only once a year, on September 30. Therefore, it was possible that at other times during the year, force levels were higher or lower than authorized. A higher end strength means funds intended for other activities, like training, might be used instead for personnel expenses. Too few people could mean that some military units may not have enough skilled personnel for their missions, or must draw personnel from other sources, nega-tively affecting other unit’s missions.

End strength doesn’t solve – hurts modernization and incentivizes war – it’s politically unpopular to increase capacity without using it.

Hillison 4 (“CALL OUT THE MINUTEMEN” Lieutenant Colonel Joel R. United States Army, 28 February www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ksil/files/000128.doc)KM

Therefore, the Army needs to increase its overall capability. Various alternatives to increasing the capability of the force have been proposed recently. These proposals center around two basic approaches: increasing active duty end strength, or restructuring the active and reserve components to increase the forces available for deployment and lessen our reliance on the reserves. Both of these options are currently being explored. In fact, Congress recently authorized a 2,400 soldier increase in end strength for FY 2004 and Secretary Rumsfeld has used emergency powers to allow the Army to temporarily exceed its authorized end strength by 30,000. Some organizations, such as the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), have called for a permanent increase in end strength. In a report from the Institute of Land Warfare, AUSA called for an increase of 60,000 soldiers. Even if there was agreement that increased end strength would address the requirement-capability imbalance, increasing end strength takes time. The recruiting and training base can only produce a finite number of additional soldiers per year. It is estimated that the Army can only increase end strength by 5,000 to 10,000 soldiers per year. Therefore, increasing Active Duty end strength would not be a quick solution. The other problem with this solution is that the Army must act under financial constraints. With increasing deficits and growing non-discretionary spending, there is little hope for a sustained increase in defense dollars. Therefore, money spent on increased end strength would have to come from other existing programs, such as modernization. A recent study by the Congressional Budget Office estimates that two new divisions worth of end strength would cost up to an estimated $19.4 billion to create. In addition, increasing end strength is not a good mechanism to fulfill temporary requirements. Once force structure is added, both political and military leaders feel pressure to utilize the military in order to justify the existing force structure. These same leaders are hesitant to cut these forces once they are no longer required, especially during election years. Finally, increasing permanent end strength without a commensurate increase in appropriations could leave the army “bloated and ill-prepared” according to the Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker. If, as Secretary Rumsfeld has stated publicly, the increased demand on the Army represents only a temporary spike, then it would make more sense to temporarily utilize the Reserve Components to meet this surge in requirements in addition to other measures already being used such as Stop Loss.

\*\*\*Aff Answers\*\*\*

\*\*\*N/UQ\*\*\*

Non-Uq – Budget Not Tight

**Terminally NU: The administration is slated to increase the DoD’s budget in the coming years, which has nearly doubled since 1998. Gate’s “budget cuts” are anything but.**

Preble 6-30 (Christopher Preble is director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and a member of the Sustainable Defense Task Force, http://dailycaller.com/2010/06/30/toward-a-responsible-defense-budget/) NAR

In a recent article in The Daily Caller, Chet Nagle claims that the Obama administration “plans to eliminate over a trillion defense dollars in the next ten years.” Unfortunately, he has no basis for saying so. The Department of Defense is one of the only government agencies slated to receive real increases in spending over the next few years, according to the administration’s budget submissions. Nagle pretends that the cuts proposed in a recent report by the Sustainable Defense Task Force have the administration’s support. This is not the case. As a member of the task force, I actually wish Nagle were right. Even modest cuts to military spending — which has grown by 86 percent since 1998 — would show that the administration had reconsidered the approach to U.S. military power that has prevailed in Washington since the end of the Cold War. But like the last one, this administration seems to believe that U.S. troops should answer every 911 call, with American taxpayers footing the bill. Perhaps Nagle was misled by a series of speeches by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, in which Gates questioned the need for expeditionary fighting vehicles when we haven’t landed Marines on a hostile shore since the Inchon landing in September 1950. Perhaps Nagle confused Gates’ pledge to eliminate waste and inefficiency within the Pentagon’s budget as a sign that the secretary was serious about cutting military spending. Far from it; Gates is mainly shifting spending within the Pentagon’s budget. T he bottom-line figure continues to grow. Equally misguided is Nagle’s claim that eliminating the bomber leg of the nuclear triad is a step toward unilateral disarmament. This proposal finds support in a report published by the Air Force Association’s Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies, not the province of peaceniks and anti-nuclear activists. A separate article published by the chief of the Air Force Strategic Plans and Policy Division and two Air Force War College professors concluded that as few as 311 nuclear warheads would constitute an effective and credible deterrent. The U.S. simply does not need the same nuclear force structure — bombers, missiles, and submarines — that it had during the height of the Cold War. The key shortcoming of Nagle’s article is his failure to confront the logic underlying our proposed cuts. Most of what Americans think of as “defense” spending isn’t really intended to defend the U.S. Rather, our military is structured toward defending other countries that can and should defend themselves. Sheltered under the American security umbrella, our allies have allowed their own military capabilities to atrophy.

The DoD is already pushing for modernization – DA is NU

Government Executive 6-21 (http://www.govexec.com/story\_page.cfm?articleid=45529&oref=todaysnews)NAR

For its part, the Pentagon recently announced a five-year effort to find more than $100 billion in savings within the Defense Department's budget and reinvest that money into higher-priority force structure and modernization accounts. Two-thirds of the savings are expected to come from unnecessary overhead costs, which make up roughly 40 percent of the Pentagon's budget. The rest will come from cuts to weapons systems and other investment accounts that the military deems it no longer needs -- a painful prospect for the armed services and lawmakers on Capitol Hill, who are reluctant to cut programs they've championed for years. The cost-cutting effort is designed to make the Pentagon able to live within a base budget that is expected to have only 1 percent real growth annually -- a relatively modest raise for a department whose base budget has nearly doubled in size since 2001. At the same time, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Rep. Ike Skelton, D-Mo., has announced that his panel will launch a review to find cost savings, presumably starting with the fscal 2012 budget. "It's not just a matter of dollars; it's how you spend them," Skelton said recently. "You spend [it] all on bows and arrows in a bigger budget, you don't have much."

Non-Uq – Budget Not Tight

Budget is fairing fine – recent military stimuli proves

Xinhua News 7-2 (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-07/02/c\_13380724.htm)NAR

The U.S. House of Representatives on Thursday approved the additional war funding bill that President Barack Obama requested for the military buildup in Afghanistan. The new measure, once approved by both chambers, would raise the total funding for U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade to one trillion dollars. But the bill is believed unlikely to be signed into law by the president before the July 4 recess as it had hoped, because the bill will need to go to the Senate, which has gone into recess for a week and a half. The House and the Senate must approve the bill with exactly the same language before it can go to the president for signature. And the House has made changes to some provisions by adding billions of non-military spending, so the bill must return to the Senate for another vote. The changes that House Democratic leaders made to the bill made it harder to gain support from Republicans, who have been advocating for a "clean bill" with no unrelated domestic spending. So it is unclear whether the Senate Democrats can garner enough votes for the bill's passage. Obama asked Congress in February for 33 billion dollars to pay for his troop surge in Afghanistan. That was on top of about 130 billion dollars that Congress already approved for the Afghanistan and Iraq wars through Sept. 30 of this year.

DoD already engaging in cost-saving program – means they are obtaining excess money at no cost to their effectiveness.

The Wall Street Journal 6-28 (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703964104575335180991820498.html)NAR

The Department of Defense on Monday unveiled a new series of measures to wring more cost savings out of the roughly $400 billion it spends annually on weapons, equipment and services. Ashton Carter, the Pentagon's acquisition chief, held closed-door sessions Monday with top defense industry executives and defense procurement officials to explain the new initiative, which is part of a larger austerity drive within the department. Over the past decade, U.S. defense budgets have seen consistent, double-digit growth, but Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned in May that the post-9/11 defense spending boom was coming to an end. In an interview, Mr. Carter said the department wanted to "do more without more" by realizing 2% to 3% in annual savings through productivity enhancements and greater efficiencies. "If we can achieve that, we can avoid the alternative, which is instability, uncertainty, broken programs, and broken faith and confidence with the taxpayer that we're capable of delivering value for the defense dollar," he said.

Gates already doing trade-offs to get excess cash.

The Wall Street Journal 6-28 (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703964104575335180991820498.html)NAR

Sen. Carl Levin (D., Mich.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, told reporters on Monday he was confident that Mr. Gates could make the right tradeoffs to preserve military capabilities without commensurate budget increases. "If anybody can do it, Gates can," Mr. Levin said. Andrew Krepinevich, president of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, said Mr. Gates had already been "dropping hints" about significant weapons program cuts. "You are seeing three pressure points," Mr. Krepinevich said. "One is a budget that's being squeezed from the top down; second, a budget that is being eaten from the inside out by manpower costs; and the third is cost overruns."

**Gates is committed to opening space for the DoD’s budget.**

Statesman 6-28 (http://www.statesman.com/news/nation/nation-digest-mcchrystal-tells-army-hell-retire-study-775186.html)NAR

Pentagon looks to save $100 billion Defense Secretary Robert Gates said he wants to trim some of the billions of dollars the Pentagon spends on weapon systems and contractor services, part of a Pentagonwide effort to find $100 billion in savings in the next five years. Gates said the Defense Department will focus on unnecessary spending by defense contractors that provide the military with everything from fighter jets to janitors.

Non-Uq – Budget Not Tight

Gates is committed to freeing money and avoiding unnecessary costs – F35 engines prove

Washington Post 6-8 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/07/AR2010060704832.html?hpid=topnews)NAR

"The American people deserve a government that spends every taxpayer dollar with as much care as taxpayers spend their own dollars -- where money is spent not out of inertia, but only when it contributes to achieving a clear national priority," Emanuel and Orszag write in the memo, according to an early draft. The approach is modeled on a Defense Department program, announced in early May by Secretary Robert M. Gates, aimed at encouraging the military and civilian bureaucracy to find $7 billion to help cover the cost of combat operations. Emanuel said similar programs have also been used successfully by state and local governments. Gates seems to be something of a budget-cutting inspiration for Obama. Less than two weeks ago, the president threatened to veto a defense authorization bill now working its way through Congress unless lawmakers canceled funding to develop an alternative engine for the F-35 warplane, which Gates has deemed unnecessary.

Gates is making every dollar count – he will free up room for needed operations

UPI 6-18 (http://www.upi.com/Business\_News/Security-Industry/2010/06/18/Lockheed-backs-Gates-on-budget/UPI-88271276875930/)NAR

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates is on track with his calls to redefine defense spending to meet the 21st century threat environment, Lockheed Martin said. Gates complained to lawmakers this week that the Defense Department budget was focused on non-combat operations. "If you took a broad look at our budget, about 50 percent of our procurement budget is for what I would call long-term modernization programs to deal with near-peer countries," he said. Bob Stevens, chairman and chief executive officer at Lockheed Martin, said the defense secretary was right to refocus military spending. "(Gates) has been relentless and eloquent in demanding a new kind of focus -- from the Department of Defense, the Congress and the defense industry as well, to be extremely rigorous in determining what our requirements really are ... to align our priorities with real world needs ... and to ensure we do everything possible to make every dollar count," he said. Stevens added his company was "disciplined" in setting its priorities to meet its customers need and fulfill its obligation to support national security.

Major weapon programs have already been cut by Gates – the main focus is our combat troops.

Star Telegram 6-28 (http://www.star-telegram.com/2010/06/28/2299559/defense-official-meets-with-defense.html)NAR

Carter said the Pentagon "has concluded that we cannot support our troops with the capabilities they need" without dramatic cost savings from the $400 billion spent annually on weapons, supplies and services. He said he was looking for what the private sector calls productivity growth, 2 to 3 percent annual cost savings without buying fewer weapons or supplies. The goal is to achieve $100 billion in savings between 2012 and 2016. "In effect, doing more without more," Carter said. "In the real economy, we expect that every year. But in the defense economy, more has been costing more." Defense Secretary Robert Gates, in remarks to the news media, said major weapons programs have been cut and more would probably be cut, but other ways must be found to reduce defense expenditures so the military services can pay salaries, benefits and support troops serving around the world. Defense industry officials said they welcomed Carter's invitation to discuss changes to contracting policies and government requirements that would help lower costs. In a statement issued after the Pentagon meetings, Lockheed Martin Corp. Chief Executive Robert Stevens praised Carter's initiative and promised cooperation. "We see the world through exactly the same lens as Secretary Gates and Dr. Carter, and we intend to be relentless in focusing on program execution, on continuously improving our quality, and on driving affordability into every process and every program," Stevens' statement said. "We've already made changes with the Secretary's goals in mind -- and those changes have resulted in reduced costs in several areas -- but we've just started."

Non-Uq – Budget Not Tight

The DoD is planning on making cost-effective reforms to several factors of its industry

Weinberger 6-4 (Sharon Contributor http://www.aolnews.com/nation/article/where-could-pentagon-make-cuts-to-save-100-billion/19504233) NAR

It's not the first time the Defense Department has attempted far-reaching cost-saving measures. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld announced a similar business overhaul on Sept. 10, 2001, but that plan was quickly overtaken by the 9/11 attacks. This time around, the Pentagon is promising to look across the board, from personnel to health care. Here are a few of the areas likely to be targeted:

A.)Health Care reform

Weinberger 6-4 (Sharon Contributor http://www.aolnews.com/nation/article/where-could-pentagon-make-cuts-to-save-100-billion/19504233) NAR

At around $50 billion annually and growing, health care is one of the top drivers of the Pentagon's budget. But cutting it will also be the most contentious. Congress has repeatedly resisted any attempts to cut Tricare, the military health care plan, and in recent years lawmakers have moved to expand the program.

B.)Equipment reformatting

Weinberger 6-4 (Sharon Contributor http://www.aolnews.com/nation/article/where-could-pentagon-make-cuts-to-save-100-billion/19504233) NAR

Though the Pentagon has said it would like to see more cuts from its weapons-buying accounts, that's easier said than done. Even when it tries to cut weapons the military says it doesn't want, it has to contend with Congress. For example, the administration is in a standoff with Congress over an alternate engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The cost of the engine, which the Pentagon insists it doesn't need? $3 billion.

C.) Base closing

Weinberger 6-4 (Sharon Contributor http://www.aolnews.com/nation/article/where-could-pentagon-make-cuts-to-save-100-billion/19504233) NAR

When the Pentagon wants to shed real estate, it's not as easy as just closing up shop. To close a base in the United States, the administration has go through the Base Realignment and Closure Act, a formal process that can take several years. The last BRAC recommendations were finalized in 2005. The next round hasn't even been scheduled yet and might not happen until 2013.

D.) Personnel cuts

Weinberger 6-4 (Sharon Contributor http://www.aolnews.com/nation/article/where-could-pentagon-make-cuts-to-save-100-billion/19504233) NAR

Specifically singled for cuts are personnel, particularly headquarters staff. Of course, some people are already pointing out that the desire to cut staff seems to go directly against the Pentagon's stated goal of "in-sourcing" jobs, meaning hiring government workers to perform jobs that over the past decade have gone to private contractors.

E.) Logistics improvements

Weinberger 6-4 (Sharon Contributor http://www.aolnews.com/nation/article/where-could-pentagon-make-cuts-to-save-100-billion/19504233) NAR

Gone is the day of the $600 hammer, at least from congressional hearings. Instead, the military is facing sticker shock for basic supplies, such as water. Although estimates vary, one study pegs the cost of delivering drinking water to soldiers in theater at as high as $11.81 a gallon. No easy solution exists to cut the cost of logistics, but the Pentagon could explore different basing options or supply routes.

Non-Uq – Congress

They got it the wrong way – Congress supports giving 33 billion to the DoD, budget is fine.

NY-Times 7-2 (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/03/us/politics/03cong.html) NAR

The debate in Congress over an $82 billion war spending bill has opened up a war of a different sort — a fierce clash between House Democrats and the Obama White House over two highly sensitive issues: the nation’s huge budget deficit and the lingering wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. To help entice liberal Democrats to approve $33 billion for military operations overseas that they do not support, House leaders added more than $20 billion in new domestic spending to the bill, including $10 billion to save teachers’ jobs. In the process, the House also voted to cut $800 million from President Obama’s marquee education initiatives. House Democrats, led by Representative David R. Obey of Wisconsin, the departing chairman of the Appropriations Committee, said redirecting the education money, including about $500 million from the competitive grant program called Race to the Top, was a small price to pay to avert as many as 140,000 teacher layoffs this year.

Budget Cuts won’t lead to modernization – only 20% of the budget is spent on combat.

Foreign Policy 7-2 (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/07/02/this\_week\_at\_war\_the\_pentagons\_own\_private\_welfare\_state)NAR

A recent report from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) explained the dismal trends that are bogging down the Pentagon's budget. Over the past decade, the budget, after subtracting out inflation, has almost doubled. Yet during that time, the number of aircraft and warships has declined and those that remain have gotten older. Funding has expanded at Reagan-like levels. But compared to the Reagan years, there has been relatively little modernization resulting from all of that spending. The operational costs of fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are a large part of the problem. According to the CSBA, 20 percent of defense spending (including supplemental budgets) between 2001 and 2010 went to operational costs of those two wars. But the remaining 80 percent of the spending doesn't seem to have produced much new capability. The rapid escalation in the cost of new weapons -- partly caused by frustrating mismanagement in research and procurement practices -- has resulted in a bleak return on investment for taxpayers. In 1985, during the peak of the Reagan defense buildup, the Pentagon bought 338 new tactical fighter aircraft and 23 new warships, among other items. In 2008, procurement spending was 33 percent higher after adjusting for inflation, yet the department could afford only 56 new airplanes and 7 new warships. One wonders whether the increases in weapons quality have been worth the inflation in unit costs. But it is the Department's personnel costs that will pose the biggest headache in the future. Just like entitlement spending in the domestic budget, salaries, health care, and family services benefits granted today compound into the future and are politically impossible to retract. In order to reduce stress on ground troops making repeated deployments to the war zones, Defense Secretary Robert Gates expanded Army and Marine Corps headcounts by 92,100 immediately after taking office in late 2006. Meanwhile, Congress has consistently upped the ante on the Pentagon's salary requests. Just like everywhere else in the economy, the Pentagon's health care bill has run wild, tripling the rate of inflation in the rest of the economy since 2001 -- it now consumes nearly a tenth of the Pentagon's base budget. And in order to retain experienced personnel constantly separated from their families, Congress has expanded a variety of family benefits. The result has been a growth in inflation-adjusted personnel costs from $73,300 per head in 2000 to $126,800 in the 2011 budget. When it comes time for Congress to roll back defense spending, this compensation will be untouchable. Training, maintenance, and equipment modernization will suffer the cuts.

Non-Uq – No Obama Bill

**There is a desire to get defense cuts to free up money – but it isn’t going to pass through congress.**

Raw-Story 6-11 (http://rawstory.com/rs/2010/0611/commission-outlines-1-trillion-defense-budget-cuts/)NAR

A bipartisan commission of defense experts has released a plan that would reduce the US's defense spending by nearly $1 trillion over 10 years -- a plan sure to gather support from progressives and libertarians, but unlikely to pass through Congress. The commission's report comes at a time when public concern about the US's national debt has hit a fever pitch, and the claim that nearly $1 trillion can be saved from defense spending will certainly color future debates about what government services to cut. The Sustainable Defense Task Force, put together at the behest of Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA) to "explore options for reducing the defense budget’s contribution to the federal deficit without compromising the essential security of the US," recommends saving $200 billion by reducing the presence of US troops in Western Europe and the Far East, and reducing total troop strength to 1.3 million. The report (PDF) also recommends eliminating "costly and unworkable weapons systems," for a savings of $130 billion, and reducing the US's nuclear arsenal to 1,050 warheads, for a savings of $113 billion.

Non-Uq – Supplemental Now

Bill will be passed by August – besides, plan would pay for military salaries and cover civilian furloughs, not experimental research. Prefer our evidence, it is future predictive.

Marine Times 7-1 (http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/06/military\_warsupplemental\_congress\_063010w/)NAR

Congress won’t make Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ July 4 deadline for passing a war supplemental funding bill, but there is now a glimmer of hope that lawmakers might get the measure passed before August, when the military would begin to face severe cash-flow problems. The holdup on the bill has been in the House of Representatives, but Rep. David Obey, D-Wis., the House Appropriations Committee chairman, announced Wednesday that a $93.5 billion supplemental appropriations bill would be considered by the House this week that includes $37 billion for troops in Iraq. The bill also includes $13 billion to cover a planned expansion of Agent Orange disability benefits to more Vietnam veterans. Gates warned lawmakers that the Navy and Marine Corps would have to start dipping into peacetime budgets to cover war-related expenses as early as next week if Congress did not pass a final supplemental war funding bill before leaving town for its Fourth of July recess. He also warned the Army would face severe budget pressure in August, including the potential for civilian furloughs and insufficient funds to cover military pay.

Non-Uq – SDTF

The SDTF will free up 960 billion for the DoD.

Taxpayers for Common Sense 6-11 (http://www.taxpayer.net/resources.php?category=&type=Project&proj\_id=3550&action=Headlines%20By%20TCS)NAR

A new report identifies $960 billion in Pentagon budget savings that can be generated over the next ten years from realistic reductions in defense spending. The report was produced by the Sustainable Defense Task Force, a group convened in response to a request from Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA) to explore options for reducing the defense budget’s contribution to the federal deficit without compromising the essential security of the United States. The report comes at a time when the federal deficit is drawing increasing attention from policymakers in Washington. President Obama has appointed a National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform to look at long-term budgetary trends; the administration’s new National Security Strategy has argued that we need to “grow our economy and reduce our deficit” if we are to ensure continued U.S. strength and influence abroad; Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has spoken of eliminating unnecessary weapons systems and reducing overhead costs at the Pentagon; and key Congressional leaders are speaking of a bottom-up review of defense spending to look for potential cuts.

SDTF proposition may reach 1.1 trillion in excess funds

Virtue Online 6-30 (http://www.virtueonline.org/portal/modules/news/article.php?storyid=12831)NAR

Last month a "Sustainable Defense Task Force" proposed cutting $1.1 trillion of a projected $7 trillion cost over a decade. How? Reduce the number of nuclear weapons in half to 1,000, saving $113 billion. Reduce conventional forces by 200,000 saving $395 billion and pare the number of ships from 287 to 230, saving $177 billion. Only a quarter favored an income tax hike of 10% to 20% to raise up to $381 billion in 2025. Half supported a 20% jump for the rich, yielding $174 billion, and two-thirds back an extra 5% for those earning over $1 million. That would pull in $34 billion with another $20 billion by raising capital gains - if these folk don't move to the Bahamas. Nearly half supported limiting itemized deductions to 28% of income, though couples earning over $210,000 deduct 33% to 35%. Half support reforming the entire tax code, to reduce rates and earmark 10% to 30% for deficit reduction. To summarize, half of participants agreed on how to cut $1.2 trillion; another 18% agreed on paring $1 trillion. "You have restored my confidence in the ability of citizens to challenge the politicians," said Alice Rivlin, Co-Chair of a Bi-partisan Debt Reduction Task Force.

Non-Uq – **Savings Inevitable**

**Congressional backlash to funding benefits mounting, future cuts to this are likely**

Maze 7-3 (http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/07/army\_benefits\_070210w/)NAR

A task force formed at the urging of Frank, Jones, Paul and Wyden is proposing a $1.1 trillion reduction in defense spending over 10 years, including $628.5 billion in personnel programs. Frank, who is leading the bipartisan effort, said he isn’t singling out the military for cuts, but he doesn’t want it singled out for special protection, either. “We need to bring focus on a long-term reduction in the deficit. We believe that one item has not gotten enough attention: military spending,” he said. “Everything has got to be on the table.” The report of the Sustainable Defense Task Force was sent to the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, an 18-member panel that is supposed to report to the White House and Congress in December with recommendations on how to reduce the federal deficit. Because the 2011 defense budget could be completed before the commission completes its report, cuts in personnel programs are not likely this year, according to congressional aides who asked not to be identified. But talk about cutting future benefits could discourage efforts to increase benefits now. A House Armed Services Committee aide said most lawmakers on both sides of the aisle wouldn’t support major cuts in the number of military personnel, nor in pay and benefits — but this could change after the November elections. If a freshman class of lawmakers arrives in Congress next year believing that cutting spending is their top priority, support for the military and its personnel could erode, congressional aides warned.

Cost savings inevitable – overhead cost reductions

Wheeler 6-10 (Winslow Wheeler, Director, Straus Military Reform Project, Center for Defense Information , http://www.huffingtonpost.com/winslow-t-wheeler/nightmare-budget-scenario\_b\_607421.html) NAR

While Gates and Obama won that Titanic F-22 fight last year, they waffled on the C-17 and let 18 more be produced. This year, Gates says he means it on the C-17, but the C-17 porkers are laying in wait for him in the Senate where they have the votes, and the House C-17 porkers lust to tag along. More problematic is Gates' selection of the second F-35 engine to take a stand on. In 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) repeated a previous internal DOD study saying the second engine, bought competitively, could save money. Nonetheless, Gates -- now with Obama belatedly backing him -- says he'll get the bill vetoed if it endorses any competition between F-35 engines. Gates' $102 billion reduction in overhead is a cumulative goal for five years, not one, and the bigger savings don't arrive until the elusive (may-never-happen) out-years. This will be after Gates, maybe even Obama, is long gone. The first year savings ($7 billion) is a puny 1.2 percent of the 2012 Pentagon spending plan. The public schedule includes no savings in the next fiscal year, the one for 2011 that doesn't even start until next October. According to an internal Defense Business Board study, DOD spends 40 percent of its funds on overhead. If the whole $102 billion is saved, and if it all comes out of overhead (which is not the plan), DOD spending for bureaucratic fat will be reduced only 8.5 percent. The administrative bloat would go down, but only from 40 percent to 37 percent of total DOD spending. Similar timidity and procrastination is recommended by the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Congressman Ike Skelton, D-MO. Having finished shepherding the 2011 DOD authorization bill through the House of Representatives last month, Skelton now announces that next year will he look at saving money. The only sum he would identify is "X amount." Expect little to nothing from this diffidence, and you will not be disappointed. Others are less timid. Congressman Barney Frank, D-MA, has put together an alternative DOD budget plan to reduce spending there by $1 trillion over ten years. He has logic on his side: since 2000, the Pentagon's "base" budget has gone up by the same amount ($1 trillion), in addition to the $1 Trillion also spent on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Non-Uq – Savings Inevitable

**US military already obtaining savings via their ‘Lean Six Sigma’ programs – savings reaches billions**

Minitab 8 (http://www.minitab.com/en-US/company/news/news-basic.aspx?id=364&langType=1033, July 1st 2008) NAR

The U.S. military is saving billions of dollars by implementing quality improvement methods such as Lean Six Sigma, and these savings could grow even faster as the Department of Defense takes steps to expand these initiatives throughout the armed services. For example, the Department of Defense recently selected Minitab Inc., the leading provider of software and services for quality improvement, for a General Services Administration Blanket Purchase Agreement. The agreement makes Minitab’s solutions for quality improvement, data analysis, Lean, and Six Sigma more easily accessible at a time when all branches of the military are implementing such initiatives. Since the U.S. Army deployed Lean Six Sigma in 2005, nearly 2,000 personnel have been trained, more than 1,000 projects have been completed, and more than 1,600 remain active. The Army credits these projects with achieving nearly $2 billion in savings so far. The Department of the Navy has trained more than 5,000 sailors and Marines as Six Sigma green or black belts since 2006. The Navy estimates savings from its projects for 2006 and 2007 to be $450 million, a 4-to-1 return on investment. The U.S. Air Force has trained more than 500 Six Sigma belts, and its Air Logistics Centers received two Shingo Prizes for quality improvement last year. The Air Force has committed to a 40,000-manpower reduction without impairing its operational capabilities due in part to efficiencies gained from its initiatives. As more military personnel begin applying the tools of Six Sigma, they are likely to encounter Minitab’s products, including Minitab Statistical Software, Quality Companion by Minitab, and Quality Trainer by Minitab. “Minitab’s software is used by the most successful Six Sigma companies, and this agreement gives the military easy access to the same tools and solutions,” says Paul Engle, commercial sales leader for Minitab Inc. Many DoD agencies already use Minitab’s products, Engle notes, including the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. “Our hope is that this blanket purchase agreement will make it easier for the armed services to implement their quality improvement initiatives at home and abroad.”

Gates has a commitment to saving money – Will find $100 billion in the next 5-years

Washington Post 6-28 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/28/AR2010062803269.html?nav=rss\_business/industries)NAR

Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Monday he wants to trim some of the billions of dollars the Pentagon spends on weapons systems and contractor services, part of a Pentagon-wide effort to find $100 billion in savings in the next five years Gates, who already plans to pare down the Pentagon's huge bureaucracy to save money, said that the Defense Department will focus on unnecessary spending by defense contractors that provide the military with everything from fighter jets to janitors. Gates said it is "a matter of principle and political reality to make sure every taxpayer dollar counts." His goal is to shift money from overhead expenses to supporting U.S. troops spread around the globe. The Pentagon will spend about $400 billion of its $700 billion budget on weapons and services from defense contractors. The new plan calls for annual savings of about 2 percent to 3 percent through measures like contracts that require the defense companies to shoulder cost overruns and encouraging competition between contractors.

Non-Uq – Savings Inevitable

Gates already saved roughly $65 billion in the F-35 fiasco

Washington Post 6-28 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/28/AR2010062803269.html?nav=rss\_business/industries)NAR

For example, Gates fired the head of the F-35 fighter program in February after the cost per plane nearly doubled to $113 million from 2001. Lockheed Martin, which is the lead contractor on the $323 billion project to build 2,450 aircraft, said earlier this month that it plans to cut the cost of the jet by nearly 20 percent.

**Over $400 billion will be saved by Carter and Gates**

**Wall Street Journal 6-28** (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703964104575335180991820498.html)NAR

WASHINGTON—The Department of Defense on Monday unveiled a new series of measures to wring more cost savings out of the roughly $400 billion it spends annually on weapons, equipment and services. Ashton Carter, the Pentagon's acquisition chief, held closed-door sessions Monday with top defense industry executives and defense procurement officials to explain the new initiative, which is part of a larger austerity drive within the department. Over the past decade, U.S. defense budgets have seen consistent, double-digit growth, but Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned in May that the post-9/11 defense spending boom was coming to an end.

Non-unique – Afghanistan costs will be slashed in the status quo – it’s the most expensive military occupation right now.

The Christian Science Monitor 10 (“Will Petraeus cut costs in Afghanistan as he did in Iraq?” June 24, lexis)KM

One military medal Gen. David Petraeus did not receive from President Bush for his success in Iraq - even though he deserves it - was for reducing US costs. Now, under President Obama, he has replaced Gen. Stanley McChrystal in Afghanistan and may yet be rewarded if he can rein in that war's expenses. As an officer astute about politics, Petraeus knows the new politics of austerity in Washington. Congress is in little mood to add to the debt. Afghanistan now costs more than Iraq, or some $70 billion this year, even as a troop surge goes on. Mr. Obama warns he has a budget limit for Afghanistan. "We simply cannot afford to ignore the price of these wars," he says. He seeks a balance between domestic priorities, especially the economy, and the threat of violence from Al Qaeda or its affiliates in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan. The president also promises to address the war costs "openly and honestly." A strategy review is planned for December with a drawdown of forces set to begin mid-2010 - depending on local conditions, as Defense Secretary Robert Gates puts it. "We are in this thing to win," he says. Defining victory, however, remains illusive and divisive among Obama's security team, one reason for McChrystal's ill-spoken words to a reporter. Rather than wait until December, Obama should use this change of command to give a clear explanation of the current trade-offs between the war's costs and the evolving security threats. Is he still set on denying a haven for Al Qaeda, as promised - even if, for instance, the coming offensive in the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar fails and drags the war into 2012 and beyond? The president dislikes an open-ended commitment to the war. And he uses the threat of withdrawal to pressure Kabul to quickly boost its forces and the economy. But squaring his goal of securing that country enough to prevent another 9/11 with the budget pressures back home will require Obama to keep a running dialogue with the American people. Since last year, they have largely found the war not worth fighting. It takes more than one good general to win a war. The home front is a battleground, too.

Non-Uq – Reinvestment Inevitable

Gates is already making programs to save money – will invest that money into new weapon systems.

Government Executive 7-4 (http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0610/060410cdpm1.htm?oref=rellink)NAR

Defense Secretary Robert Gates is ordering a department wide, five-year effort to find more than $100 billion in cost savings in the Pentagon's budget and redirect that money to pay for military weapons systems and force structure. In the next several days, Pentagon leaders will direct the military services and defense agencies to scrub their budgets to find $7 billion in savings for the fiscal 2012 budget, Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn said Friday. Each of the three services will be responsible for coming up with $2 billion in savings for the fiscal 2012 budget request. But as a strong incentive, the services will keep within their budgets whatever costs they cut over the next five years to pay their force structure and modernization bills. The initial cost-savings plans are due by July 31, Lynn said. After the $7 billion savings in fiscal 2012, the annual cost savings appear to increase significantly to reach a total of $100 billion by fiscal 2012.

\*\*\*Link & Internal Link Answers\*\*\*

No I/L – Cuts Redirected Elsewhere

Budget cuts will be used to pay for the war and soldier salaries.

FireDog Lake 6-17(http://news.firedoglake.com/2010/06/17/congress-presses-pentagon-on-afghanistan-funding-withdrawal-date/) NAR

Defense Secretary Robert Gates told senators Wednesday that the Pentagon will have to do “stupid things” if Congress doesn’t approve a $33 billion supplemental spending request by July 4. The military sought passage of the wartime spending bill before Memorial Day, but that slipped by, making the July 4 recess the next must-pass deadline. Funding for the Navy and Marine Corps will begin to run out in July, forcing the Pentagon to disrupt other programs. And by early to mid-August, the military may have to start furloughing civilians and might not be able to pay members of the active-duty military.

Cost savings cover inflation, not specific weapons programs

Washington Post 6-10 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/09/AR2009060902647.html) NAR

For the Defense Department to merely tread water, a good rule of thumb is that its inflation-adjusted budget must grow about 2 percent a year (roughly $10 billion annually, each and every year). Simply put, the costs of holding on to good people, providing them with health care and other benefits, keeping equipment functional, maintaining training regimes, and buying increasingly complex equipment tend to grow faster than inflation. This is, of course, no more an absolute rule than is Moore's law about changes in computing capacity. But like Moore's law, it tends to hold up remarkably well with time, especially when downsizing the Defense Department's force structure is not really an option, and it is not today. It is easiest to understand this by examining the four main categories of Pentagon spending: military personnel, operations and maintenance, procurement, and research and development. Regarding the first, there were times in the 1970s when we starved personnel accounts, but the result was a dispirited and "hollow" force. At a time of war, when we are asking so few troops to do so much for so long, this is not a viable option. In fact, over the years of the Bush presidency, personnel spending increased 100 percent. About 25 percent of that was due to the cumulative effects of inflation and another quarter to mobilizing reservists and enlarging the force. But the remaining half was real cost growth averaging 5 percent a year. Even if we slow the trend, we can't realistically end it. Operations and maintenance costs are always what budgeteers want to cut -- and always the area where they overestimate the potential for savings. This was the case in the 1990s; almost every year the Clinton administration hoped to economize on such expenses through new types of efficiencies, but almost every year it wound up needing to add to those accounts retroactively. Among defense budget specialists, the real debate is whether inflation-adjusted operations and maintenance costs per person grow at 2 percent annually or 3 percent or somewhere in between. Procurement and research and development are the chief areas in which Defense Secretary Robert Gates has sought savings in the proposals he announced in April. He has proposed cuts to programs including the F-22 fighter, the DDG-1000 destroyer, the Army's Future Combat System, the presidential helicopter fleet, the transformational communications satellite, aircraft carrier production runs, the airborne laser missile defense program and the next-generation bomber. These are solid proposals; he could make additional cuts to the V-22 Osprey and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter programs, as well as existing nuclear weapons platforms.

**Excess military money is used to by antiquated weaponry.**

The Atlantic 6-16 (http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/06/cut-the-military-budget/58282/)NAR

The other reason is that Congress tends to think about boondoggle weapons systems in the context of jobs, not deficits. Killing a turkey is viewed as eliminating a major employer. (Last month, Frank voted over the objections of the defense secretary to fund a duplicate F-35 engine built in Lynn, but says he'd kill the fighter altogether if it came to a vote.) So we still buy useless weapons, over the protests of reformers and defense officials. That kind of backward thinking could start to change. Bringing the deficit under control is a zero-sum game. Eventually, we'll have to raise taxes and cut spending. As budget pressure grows, the nearly $1 trillion in military cuts proposed by the task force could look appealing. One way of getting this done is through the president's Deficit Reduction Commission, which will recommend a package of cuts to Congress in December for an up-or-down vote. The Sustainable Defense Task Force is lobbying the commission to do what Obama wouldn't: consider military cuts, and in the context of the entire federal budget. Members like Frank and Paul say they'll vote against any package that doesn't, and encourage congressional colleagues to do likewise.

Link Turn – PMC’s Save Money

Using PMCs extensively saves the military money

DCAF 4 (Geneva Centre of Democratic Control of Armed Forces, http://www.dcaf.ch/pfpc/proj\_privmilitary.pdf)

Contracting out to private companies, agencies, or other intermediate types of administration has a place in efficient government. And there are functions that PMFs perform better than governments. According to US SecDef Donald Rumsfeld, using contractors saves money and frees up the military to concentrate on its core mission.

PMCs save the military money

Lendman 10 (Steve, Centre for Research on Globalization, 1/19, http://sjlendman.blogspot.com/2010/01/outsourcing-war-rise-of-private.html)

Singer noted how PMCs have been involved in some of the most controversial aspects of war - from over-billing to ritual slaughter of unarmed civilians. Yet none of them have ever been prosecuted, convicted or imprisoned, an issue Singer cites in listing five "dilemmas:" 1. Contractual ones - hiring PMCs for their skills, to save money, or do jobs nations prefer to avoid. Yet unaccountability injects a "worrisome layer of uncertainty" into military operations, opening the door to unchecked abuses. 2. PMCs constitute an unregulated global business operating for profit, not peace and security when skilled killers are hired - former Green Berets, Delta Force soldiers, Navy Seals, and foreign ones like the British SAS.

PMCs save money

Brownfield 4 (Peter, writer for FOXNews, 4/18, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,117239,00.html)

These hired guns, who number more than 15,000, generally prefer the term "private military contractors." They are a mixture of ex-military, mostly from Great Britain and the United States, but also from Australia, South Africa and elsewhere, including Fiji, Nepal and even Iraq. They serve many roles that are traditionally seen as the responsibility of soldiers, including guarding supply convoys for military contractors, training Iraqi soldiers and even supplying guards for Coalition Provisional Authority (search) Administrator L. Paul Bremer. With the military having shrunk by one-third since the Cold War, the Pentagon has had to rely increasingly on contractors. Some industry insiders say well-run operations can boost military effectiveness and save money. But, company executives and industry analysts say that the private military business, which has ballooned since the Iraq war, is in need of better regulation. At the same time, after recent murders and kidnappings of security contractors, including an Italian who was executed on Wednesday, Democratic lawmakers are calling on the Pentagon to review the use of contractors.

PMCs save money – companies take fatality responsibiliy

Scahill 9 (Jeremy, Puffin Foundation Writing Fellow at the Nation Institute, http://www.voltairenet.org/article159859.html)

Hiring private guards is less expensive than hiring new officers. Oakland — facing a record $80 million budget shortfall — spends about 65% of its budget for police and fire services, including about $250,000 annually, including benefits and salary, on each police officer. In contrast, for about $200,000 a year the city can contract to hire four private guards to patrol the troubled East Oakland district where four on-duty police officers were killed in March. And the company, not the city, is responsible for insurance for the guards. As in many cities, this is a contentious issue in Oakland, which has struggled to deal with substantial violence on the one hand and police brutality on the other. According to the San Francisco Chronicle: The areas where the armed guards were supposed to have been deployed have a disproportionate share of homicides, assaults with deadly weapons and robberies… The crime rate in the area, according to a 2003 blight study, is between 225 and 150 percent higher than the city as a whole.

PMCs save billions

People’s Geography 7 (news site, 5/14, http://peoplesgeography.com/2007/05/14/going-blackwater-profiteering-and-private-armies/)

3. Civilian contractors doing the military support, reconstruction, and security in Iraq are overwhelmingly Iraqis, the people who should be leading such efforts in Iraq. Americans make up only 17 % of Department of Defense contractors, something critics prefer to overlook. 4. Good oversight and accountability are good for good companies. While oversight has improved since 2003, overwhelmed contract officers have had a detrimental effect on the private sector’s ability to fulfill their contracts. In terms of accountability, companies can and are frequently held accountable through standard contractual methods. For individuals, there are a number of laws on the books, including the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), which can be used to try contractors in Federal courts. As a trade association, we believe these laws could be more energetically enforced by the Department of Justice. 5. The U.S. military is designed to be the most capable organization in the world, it is not designed or expected to be particularly cost effective. Outsourcing needs to the private sector brings huge economies of scale and efficiencies that save billions of dollars while reducing burdens and enhancing services to the soldiers in the field.

Link Turn – South Korea Withdrawal Expensive

South Korea withdrawal is expensive – would make billions spent in vain

Ahn 9 (writer for the Korea Policy Institute, 1/31, http://www.kpolicy.org/documents/policy/090131christineahnexpensivedivision.html)

The United States has committed to spending $10 billion on base construction in South Korea, and South Korea has begun to increase its military budget annually by 10 percent under its $665 billion Defense Reform 2020 Initiative. John Feffer, editor of *Foreign Policy In Focus*, estimates that spending will go towards purchasing "expensive, high-tech systems, such as new F-15k fighters from Boeing, SM-6 ship to air missiles, and rapid response teams with 2,000 advanced armored vehicles to handle a possible North Korean collapse." South Korea is also preparing for 2012, when it will assume control of the U.S. Forces in Korea and bear the primary responsibility of the defense against North Korea. Although the 27,000 American troops now in South Korea will be reduced, thousands of American troops and a couple of U.S. military bases, in Pyongtaek and Osan, will remain to secure U.S. interests in the region. The two huge bases in Pyongtaek and Osan are now major listening posts for the U.S. military. Investigative journalist and longtime contributor to *The Nation* Tim Shorrock, while conducting exhaustive research for his book *Spies for Hire* on the privatization of U.S. intelligence, uncovered unsavory evidence that the U.S. military bases are eavesdropping on Korean civilian activities. According to Shorrock, Pyongtaek has become a key overseas intelligence outpost for the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). Although the primary target is the DPRK, U.S. intelligence activities at Pyongtaek and Osan also monitor China, Vietnam, and other countries in Asia. "Scariest of all is their potential power to monitor South Korean communications," states Shorrock. Shorrock asserts that while the NSA must follow certain legal procedures to spy on Americans inside the United States, there are no restrictions on the NSA's monitoring of overseas communications. Since 9/11, what is considered a threat has widened to include almost any activity that questions or challenges U.S. dominance. According to Shorrock, "That means that political activity aimed at curbing the buildup at Pyongtaek is very closely monitored. There may be certain restrictions on ROK authorities spying on Korean citizens; but the gloves would be off for U.S. authorities doing that." In the course of his investigation, Shorrock discovered an article by a U.S. Forces in Korea official on U.S. cooperation with ROK police in monitoring U.S. bases: "It's an amazingly frank assessment that tells me that the anti-bases movement is being as closely monitored, and probably more so, than Al Qaeda - and basically puts the movement in the same camp as global terrorists." According to Jae-Jung Suh, professor at Johns Hopkins University, the U.S. military aims to transform into a 21st century global fighting machine, which includes realigning bases and further enmeshing South Korea and Japan into the U.S. military alliance. Not only does increasing the militarization of South Korea intensify military pressure against North Korea, Suh predicts that in the long run, it will exert pressure on Asian allies to fortify their militaries. This new arms race will further punctuate a deepening fault line between the U.S.-Asia alliance. But there are more than economic costs associated with increasing the militarization of Korea. According to Selig Harrison of the Center for International Policy, "The subsidy provided by the U.S. presence enables South Koreans to postpone hard choices concerning how fast and how far to move toward reunification." In other words, the U.S. military presence enables South Korea to provide a high level of defense against North Korea at a reduced cost. "The withdrawal of U.S. forces would force Seoul to decide whether it should seek the same level of security now provided by the U.S. presence by upgrading defense expenditures," writes Harrison, "Or whether instead, the goal of accommodation and reunification with the north would be better served by negotiating a mutual reduction of forces with the north."

Link Turn – South Korea Withdrawal Expensive

Removing troops from South Korea results in enormous at-home basing expenses

Congressional Budget Office 4 (http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=5415&type=0&sequence=4)

Following the approach that the Army uses in South Korea, this option would make 90 percent of tours in Europe unaccompanied to reduce the size and cost of the Army's infrastructure in the region. Thus, most of the approximately 60,000 soldiers assigned to Europe would serve one-year tours without their dependents. As a result, the Army would need to provide housing, schools, and other support for only a small fraction of the roughly 80,000 dependents of active-duty personnel stationed in Europe. However, because the Army would need to provide additional housing suitable for unaccompanied soldiers and would have to pay to move personnel every year rather than every three years, this alternative would cost $825 million up front to implement and about $75 million per year thereafter, CBO estimates (see Table 3-3). The largest expense associated with this option would be a one-time investment of $1.7 billion for construction--primarily to build barracks in Europe for soldiers on unaccompanied tours (who, like single soldiers, typically live together in barracks). The Army could convert housing units that are now used by soldiers with families into housing for unaccompanied personnel, which would be less expensive than constructing new barracks. But doing so would result in higher annual costs thereafter, because barracks are cheaper to operate and maintain than family housing units. Nearly half of the $1.7 billion in new construction costs would be offset by money that the Army would save by cancelling construction projects that would otherwise be needed to replace facilities for soldiers' families in Europe on the schedule that DoD has set as its goal. CBO estimates that over the 10-year implementation period assumed in this analysis, those one-time construction savings would total $875 million, bringing the net cost of carrying out this option to $825 million. On an ongoing basis, this approach would significantly reduce the size of the student body at DoD-supported schools in Europe. Currently, more than 20,000 dependent children of Army personnel in Europe attend DoD schools. If demand for those schools was reduced to a level commensurate with that experienced in South Korea, the number of students would fall to around 3,500, producing annual savings of about $125 million.(12) Another $50 million in annual savings would result from reduced construction costs for family housing. Conversely, some annual costs would rise after this alternative was implemented. An additional $100 million per year would be needed to maintain quarters for soldiers in Europe and to pay housing allowances for families left in the United States. Moreover, the annual cost of moving soldiers and their belongings for a permanent change of station would rise by $225 million as a result of making PCS moves to Europe more frequent. Because those recurring costs would exceed the recurring savings described above, CBO estimates that converting three-year accompanied tours in Europe to one-year unaccompanied tours would end up raising annual costs by $75 million.

Link Turn – Opium Eradication

Ending opium eradication shifts focus to spending on finding traffickers

Drug War Chronicle 9 (International organization working for policy reform in US drug laws and criminal justice system, 7/3, http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/592/afghanistan\_US\_stops\_opium\_poppy\_eradication)

Thousands of US Marines poured into Afghanistan's southern Helmand province this week to take the battle against the Taliban to the foe's stronghold. But in a startling departure from decades of US anti-drug policy, eradicating Helmand's massive opium poppy crop will not be part of their larger mission. US envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke told members of the G-8 group of industrialized nations Saturday that attempting to quash the opium and heroin trade through eradication was counterproductive and bad policy. Instead, the US would concentrate on alternative development, security, and targeting drug labs and traffickers. "Eradication is a waste of money," Holbrooke told the Associated Press during a break in the G-8 foreign ministers meeting on Afghanistan. "The Western policies against the opium crop, the poppy crop, have been a failure. It might destroy some acreage, but it didn't reduce the amount of money the Taliban got by one dollar. It just helped the Taliban, so we're going to phase out eradication," he said. "The farmers are not our enemy; they're just growing a crop to make a living. It's the drug system," Holbrooke continued. "So the US policy was driving people into the hands of the Taliban." The Taliban insurgents are estimated to earn tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars a year from the opium and heroin trade, which generates multiple streams of income for them. Taliban commanders tax poppy farmers in areas under their control, provide security for drug convoys, and sell opium and heroin through sm1quggling networks that reach around the globe. As late as last year, US policymakers supported intensifying eradication efforts, with some even arguing for the aerial spraying of herbicides, as has been done with limited success, but severe political and environmental consequences in Colombia. That notion was opposed by the Afghan government of President Hamid Karzai, as well as by the US's NATO partners, particularly Britain, which supports expanded manual eradication of the poppy fields.

These drug investigations cost billions

Francis 9 (Diane, writer for the Huffington Post, 4/19, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/diane-francis/americas-war-on-drugs-a-f\_b\_188269.html)

As the western hemisphere's leaders begin their Summit of the Americas today in Tobago, the issue that dare not speak its name should be front and center but won't be. The issue involves America's foolish and expensive War on Drugs which has not worked and threatens to ruin Mexico, Bolivia, Ecuador as it has ruined Colombia. The issue was articulated this week at the World Economic Forum confab in Rio de Janeiro when Columbia's former president made an impassioned appeal for leaders in Latin America to condemn the U.S. War on Drugs because it threatens the stability of many countries in the hemisphere. Canada is also increasingly harmed by America's vast appetite for drugs, with cartels infesting the country which is a transshipment nation for narcotics. There are increasing numbers of gangland slayings in Vancouver, for instance, and the proliferation of "grow ops" across the country which are producing high-grade marijuana for export. While worrisome in Canada, the American prohibition against drugs, and failure to address the underlying causes, are devastating to the Caribbean and Latin America. "Drug usage is unstoppable and the cartels have coyotes [people smugglers] planting on the streets hundreds of thousands of illegals selling drugs.," said Cesar Gavaria, president of Colombia between 1990 and 1994. "The U.S. consumption has stayed level despite huge costs and the jailing of millions of people." Colombia was the first casualty in the drug wars. It's economy collapsed, unemployment reached 20%, 200 municipalities in the rural areas were "destroyed" and four million residents fled, along with jobs. American military help to Colombia for the past several years has stopped mass kidnappings, political and police assassinations and helped curb "paramilitaries." But the growing of cocaine, opium and marijuana is unabated, said Gavaria. His passionate plea mentioned the fact that Europe and Canada realizes is that drug usage is a health issue, not a police matter. He said the Americans must recant, and abandon, their drug Prohibition policies and adopt European-style health care to deal with the problem. Because they have not, Mexico now has the drug interdiction problem that has resulted in 10,000 drug-related murders in 2008. Mexico is engaged in a huge military battle with narcotics traffickers who have taken over the gigantic business from Colombia's cartels. Drugs used to go from Colombia to the U.S. and now flow via the Caribbean and Mexico and Canada. Mexico the next casualty "Mexico is now fighting this battle and must do that, but cannot win," he said, meaning that it may restore security but won't stop the flow of drugs anymore than Colombia has been able to do. Mexico's second most powerful politician, President Felipe Calderone's successor, is believed by many skeptics to have been assassinated by the cartels, along with the former head of drug interdiction, on the U.S Presidential Election Day as a result of a fiery crash of their private jet into downtown Mexico City during rush hour. In the past year, some 4,000 police chiefs, judges, mayors and politicians have been assassinated in Mexico, of the 10,000 drug-related murders, as the country is now gripped in an all-out war against the drug gangsters. This is the type of "war" that ruined Colombia's economy, democracy and society which is, after years of trouble, slowly rebuilding. Likewise, the U.S. is badly damaged by this unneeded "war", said Gavaria. "The U.S. has half a million people in jail for drug trafficking," said the former president. "Another 100,000 people who are in jail are there for offenses related to drugs. This is more people in American prisons than are in all the prisons in Europe." The U.S. is spending US$40-billion a year on this plus its drug interdiction system and courts -- all to "keep drug consumption where it has been for years," he said.

Link Turn – Opium Eradication

Eradication is the most cost-effective option

Perl 3 (Raphael, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 10/16, http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/IB88093.pdf)

Proponents of vastly expanded supply reduction options, and specifically of herbicidal crop eradication, argue that this method is the most cost-effective and efficient means of eliminating narcotic crops. They maintain that, coupled with intensified law enforcement, such programs will succeed since it is easier to locate and destroy crops in the field than to locate subsequently processed drugs on smuggling routes or on the streets of U.S. cities. Put differently, a kilogram of cocaine hydrochloride is far more difficult to detect than the 300 to 500 kilograms of coca leaf that are required to make that same kilogram. Also, because crops constitute the cheapest link in the narcotics chain, producers will devote fewer economic resources to prevent their detection than to concealing more expensive and refined forms of the product. In addition, eradication successes have been recorded in individual countries. According to INL’s *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report* of 2002, for example, Pakistan has reduced opium cultivation by more than 95% since 1995 and Taliban-controlled Afghanistan accomplished a similar feat in a single year, eliminating more than 62,000 hectares or 97% of the opium crop between 2000 and 2001. However, INL reports that cultivation surged again to 31,000 hectares in 2002 under the relatively weak Afghan political authority that succeeded the Taliban, suggesting that an effective central government presence in drug crop areas is critical to the success of eradication projects.

Shift from eradication leads to interdiction

Ward and Byrd 4 (Christopher and William, consultant and advisor for the World Bank, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/01/06/000012009\_20050106091108/Rendered/PDF/311490PAPER0AF100SASPR0no051Dec0171.pdf)

The Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND) was created in October 2002 to coordinate Afghanistan’s counter narcotics struggle. The Directorate has prepared a national strategy, signed by the President, which targets a 70% reduction in opium production by 2008, and its elimination by 2013. The mechanisms are an alternative livelihoods approach coupled with progressive enforcement of a cultivation ban, interdiction and prosecution of trafficking and processing, and forfeiture of drug-related assets. The strategy provides a sound framework for action. It acknowledges the difficulties faced and proposes many sound and necessary actions. It has a provision for action plans, coordination, monitoring etc. The proposals link to existing activities and programs rather than proposing yet more initiatives for an already overloaded system. Broad consultations are needed to get ownership of the strategy and to develop a sequenced action plan and investment program. The overall targets are ambitious, prompting the question whether the measures proposed are sufficient to achieve them. A “paradigm shift” may be needed to cope with such an unprecedented problem. Institutional capacity is another question, particularly the capacity of CND to do all that is expected of it. Strengthening of counter-narcotics institutions is under consideration, including the possibility of establishing a ministry responsible for counter-narcotics efforts. The International Counter Narcotics Conference in February, 2004 demonstrated the Government’s determination and top-level commitment, created some ownership, and put on the table a number of the more difficult issues. Key points from the strategy are now being worked out in implementation plans, although some implementation proposals appear at variance with the strategy, particularly the balance between eradication and interdiction, and the sequencing of alternative livelihoods programs and eradication.

Interdiction is expensive

Ward and Byrd 4 (Christopher and William, consultant and advisor for the World Bank, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/01/06/000012009\_20050106091108/Rendered/PDF/311490PAPER0AF100SASPR0no051Dec0171.pdf)

Extensive regional and international cooperation around Afghanistan contributes to substantial seizures of opiates. International concern and action has intensified with concerns over the explosive growth of the Afghan heroin trade and its possible links to terrorism. International experience is that interdiction beyond the frontier increases risk premia but is expensive and can stop only a small proportion of the trade. Effectively, interdiction needs to begin within Afghanistan – evidence suggests that demand reduction or interdiction beyond the frontiers will do little to reduce the drug problem in major producing countries like Afghanistan. Without strong domestic interdiction, Afghanistan will continue to export increasing quantities of opiates. Export routes out of the country are many and shift quickly in response to attempts to suppress them. Trade and processing are even more “footloose” than production in terms of how quickly they can shift. Demand for heroin in Western Europe is not growing, but Afghan opiates are supplying expanding markets in Eastern Europe and Asia, and even the best organized states cannot really control trafficking or local demand. HIV/AIDS is growing fast in these new territories. Prospects for a reduction in aggregate demand or producer price through increased risk premia beyond Afghanistan’s frontiers are poor.

Link Turn – Incirlik

We would redeploy

Bolme 7 (Selin M, SETA Ankara & Ankara University, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_7057/is\_3\_9/ai\_n28498510/pg\_7/)

Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the Bush Administration will be able to convince the House. In 1975, despite the opposition of President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger plus two vetoes, Congress passed the arms embargo against Turkey. (29) Hence, it can be said that the Armenian Genocide Resolution may still pass despite Turkey's Incirlik card. On the other hand, is there any plan as to what happens after closing the Incirlik Air base as a response to possible passage of the Armenian Resolution or inadequate American support in the fight against PKK? During crises of embargo in 1975, the bases were opened again to the US use after the lifting of the embargo. But the Armenian Genocide Resolution is a different matter in that there would be no reversal of the process once Congress passes the resolution. So, if Incirlik is vital for the U.S., they may play other cards against Turkey, like a new arms embargo. Such a card is likely to cause difficulties for Turkey in her fight against PKK. Turkey needs to consider all scenarios before taking any action. Furthermore, Incirlik is not the only base or facility that is used by the US. According to US Department of Defense Base Structure Report in 2004, air bases in Batman, Cigli and Mus are active bases of US Air Force without permanent personnel. There is an administration office with 43 personnel in Ankara. Izmir Air Station is another active facility with 117 military members. Izmir Storage Annex No 2 and Yumurtalik Petroleum Products Storage Annex are other installations that are mentioned on the report. The name of the twelve other installations are not mentioned as they are too small (less than 10 acres in area or their plant replacement value are under $10 million) According to the report, total military members of those facilities is 14.

Redeployment costs billions

Abercrombie 5 (Neil, hairs the House Armed Services subcommittee on air and land forces, http://www.armytimes.com/community/opinion/army\_backtalk\_redeploy\_071105/)

There is broad agreement that thoughtful planning is needed for the eventual redeployment of our troops. Yet most people are unclear about the feasibility of redeploying more than 160,000 troops, support personnel and equipment out of a hostile country. Some argue that strategic redeployment is too slow. Others want to “stay the course,” and claim that such redeployment plans are pointless. But redeployment is a complex military operation demanding serious thought and planning, especially if we have forces under fire or caught between factions in a civil war. One hundred and eighty-one House Republicans have joined 169 Democrats to pass legislation that would require the Bush administration to report to Congress on its planning for redeployment from Iraq. The companion measure was quickly introduced in the Senate by Ken Salazar, D-Colo., and Lamar Alexander, R-Tenn., and also has solid bipartisan support. Our legislation requires that redeployment planning addresses: Protecting U.S. forces in Iraq. Protecting U.S. civilians, contractors, third-party forces and Iraqi nationals who have assisted the U.S. Maintaining and enhancing the ability of the U.S. to eliminate and disrupt al-Qaida and other terrorists. Preserving military equipment necessary to defend U.S. national security interests. It also specifies that missions for the troops remaining in Iraq should be limited to: Protecting U.S. national security interests. Conducting counterterrorism operations against al-Qaida and other terrorist groups. Protecting U.S. civilians and U.S. diplomatic and military facilities. Supporting and equipping Iraqi forces to take responsibility for their own security. One of the first issues is deciding which military units will be redeployed, in what order, from which geographic areas and over what time period. This includes the possibility of consolidating bases and relocating some units within Iraq during redeployment, deciding which forces might have to stay in Iraq and Kuwait and for how long. We’ll need detailed cost figures. Some experts estimate as much as $10 billion will be needed to get our forces and most of their equipment home from Iraq. By comparison, we’re spending about $10 billion every month to stay there.

Link Turn – Missile Defense Alternative to TNWs

Spending will trade off from TNWs to missile defense systems

Young 10 (Thomas, writer for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 5/1, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/missile-defense-the-future-of-nato-burden-sharing)

"If you are a NATO member, you have to work for collective security," Bulgarian Prime Minister Boiko Borisov recently [remarked](http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61B24K20100212?type=politicsNews) in response to reports that his country is positioning itself as a potential host for components of the reconfigured European missile defense system. Borisov's statement encapsulates the spirit of NATO burden sharing: allies collectively shouldering the costs, risks, and responsibilities of maintaining adequate defenses. Those who argue for keeping forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe (maintained under the auspices of NATO defense commitments) frequently cite the need for burden sharing. And despite claims that nuclear sharing undermines the spirit of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), many see the arrangement as a source of NATO cohesion that has helped prevent a two-tier alliance of nuclear haves and have-nots. Such a divide is further avoided by allies' conventional contributions toward an effective nuclear strike package, including the provision of combat air support, reconnaissance, surveillance, and midair refueling. Moreover, the stationing of nuclear weapons on the continent symbolically affirms the U.S. commitment to defend Europe. Although the perceived value of these weapons for Western European allies has waned considerably since the end of the Cold War, the security assurances that they embody continue to be important to countries on NATO's eastern periphery (e.g., Poland, Estonia, and Turkey). Historically, Washington has viewed deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe as a contribution to nonproliferation, arguing that it prevented allies such as Germany from seeking their own nuclear weapon capability. Although this role is less relevant today, it continues to be applicable to Turkey--an alliance member that attaches particular value to NATO security assurances. In particular, NATO can influence Ankara's threat calculations (especially vis-à-vis Iran) by reassuring it of the alliance's commitment to defend its territory--something that is currently achieved, in large part, by the forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons hosted at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. And yet, there's a growing consensus on both sides of the Atlantic that the weapons should be withdrawn. A decision will have to be made soon: The dual-capable aircraft tasked with carrying out NATO's nuclear mission are unlikely to remain in service beyond 2020. If the weapons are removed, then it's preferable that there be some form of replacement that makes withdrawal more palatable to NATO countries that face regional security challenges (i.e., Turkey). Exactly what would constitute a suitable replacement for nonstrategic nuclear weapons? One suggestion is that the alliance simply rely on the extended deterrence offered to non-nuclear weapon allies by the strategic nuclear forces of the United States, Britain, and France. But this would contribute to perceptions of a two-tier alliance and could be seen as a weakening of Washington's commitment to Europe's defense. Another option is to reassure allies in Eastern Europe that there are conventional plans in place to protect them in the event of a crisis. Yet force planning of this type is likely to require military exercises--something that Moscow will vociferously oppose on the pretext that they're aimed at Russia. An alternative solution: missile defense. If countries agree to station interceptors on their territory or contribute missile defense assets such as Aegis ships, they would, in effect, be sharing the burdens and risks of collective defense in much the same way Germany, Turkey, and Italy do by hosting nonstrategic nuclear weapons. This option also has the added benefit of shifting the burden east toward those countries that are more skeptical of any symbolic weakening of the U.S. commitment to defend Europe. Further, the ability for mobile missile defense capabilities to be surged into regions at times of crisis creates the need for regular consultations within the Nuclear Planning Group or a similar NATO forum, thereby providing allies with continued influence over U.S. defense policy.

Missile defense systems cost billions

Coyle 6 (Philip E, Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs, 1/24, http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=ask\_this.view&askthisid=163)

Under the administration of President George W. Bush, the Department of Defense has been spending about $10 billion per year on missile defense. The President's goal is to be able to shoot down enemy missiles of all types - short range, medium range, and intercontinental ballistic missiles - with interceptors launched from land, from sea, from aircraft and from space. It's called a layered defense. The idea is that if one layer misses the next one won't. Pentagon briefings picture the United States covered by a series of overlapping glass domes, and we are meant to imagine that enemy missiles will bounce off those domes like hail off a windshield. In a recent report the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office estimates that missile defense spending could double by 2013 to about $19 billion per year. The CBO also proposes an evolutionary approach that would reduce missile defense spending to only $3 billion per year by focusing on research and development, rather than continuing to deploy unproven hardware.

Link Turn – TNWs

Removal of TNW’s would still incur the same costs as keeping them.

Kelleher and Warren 9 (Catherine M., Public Policy at the University of Maryland, and Scott L. executive director of the nonprofit Generation Citizen “Getting to Zero Starts Here: Tactical Nuclear Weapons” http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009\_10/Kelleher)KM

The possibility exists in the near future for a reduction to a new symbolic level, for example, to 100 tactical weapons on the U.S. side, although the costs for infrastructure and security will remain near present levels. Because it is generally agreed that the present numbers are already purely symbolic, further reductions would be a signal and a commitment to the future, rather than a concrete measure such as elimination. A specific attempt should be made now to identify and eventually destroy any remaining British and French systems now in storage.

The process of dismantling nuclear weapons totals in the billions

Alger and Findlay 9 (Justin, a research assistant for the Nuclear Energy Futures Project, and Trevor, CIGI Senior Fellow, http://www.icnnd.org/research/Alger\_Findlay\_Cost\_of\_Disarmament.pdf)

A study by Stephen Schwartz et al published in 1998 deserves an honourable mention for opening the discussion on how much nuclear weapons cost—both to keep and to get rid of. The authors delve into the costs of nuclear weapons, including building, deploying and dismantling them.7 The study approaches the question of disarmament from the angle of reducing nuclear weapons expenditures in the aftermath of the Cold War rather than that of complete nuclear disarmament, so some of the challenging questions about how to dismantle the nuclear weapons complex writ large (along with the costs of verification) are not addressed directly. However, the study does reveal how challenging it is to account for nuclear weapons costs, especially on the disarmament side, particularly with respect to the difficult question of the disposition of excess fissile material. Schwartz et al estimate the cost of dismantling American nuclear weapons between 1940 and 1990 at $40.6 billion.8 Of this total, 47.2 percent ($19.2 billion) was for plutonium disposition—making it one of the most expensive parts of the process.9 The authors also caution that these numbers reflect dismantlement costs in an era when warheads were being replaced rather than retired, which limited the amount of surplus material that needed to be permanently disposed of.10 In these instances the material taken out of a warhead to be retired was often held for future use in a replacement weapon. Complete nuclear disarmament would, in contrast, entail the additional cost of disposal of weapons grade material to render it unusable for a nuclear weapon. The options for such material disposition are numerous and include ‘burning’ it in fast reactors, using plutonium in mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel for civilian power reactors, blending high-enriched uranium (HEU) down also for civilian power reactor use, or vitrification with other fission products as waste. These options vary wildly in their potential cost.11 Disposing of all of the fissile material from large nuclear programs will be costly. Most of such states will already have facilities for handling, storage and long-term if not permanent disposal of such material, not just from their military programs but from their civilian nuclear power programs. In such cases the additional expense may not be as great as might be expected.

TNW’s are expensive even in relocation – soldiers must be stationed and on stand-by for any potential changes.

Meier 6 (“News Analysis: An End to U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe?” Oliver, *Arms Control Association* July/August http://www.armscontrol.org/print/2088)KM

From NATO’s perspective, such an arrangement of “virtual” nuclear sharing might have a number of technical and political disadvantages. NATO member states may be reluctant to redeploy nuclear weapons in times of crisis for fear of sending a wrong, escalatory signal. The United States currently deploys specially trained Munitions Support Squadrons of approximately 125-150 soldiers each at every base where U.S. nuclear weapons are stored. These units would either have to remain stationed at bases where nuclear weapons could be redeployed or kept on standby in the United States for possible relocation in Europe. Both are expensive options and may be difficult to justify, given how unlikely it is that NATO nuclear weapons would ever actually be used. There is also a fear at NATO headquarters in Brussels and national defense ministries that NATO’s nuclear policy may over time fade into irrelevance if the real weapons are withdrawn.

Link Turn – Japan – 2AC Guam

**Turn: Guam Relocation**

**A. Withdrawal means redeployment to Guam**

Straits Times 9 (Feb 17, Asian News Source, http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/Asia/Story/STIStory\_339485.html)JFS

HOPING to give new momentum to a plan to rework the deployment of US troops in the Pacific, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton signed an agreement Tuesday with Japan that will move 8,000 Marines off the southern Japanese island of Okinawa to the US territory of Guam. The framework of the transfer had already been agreed on in 2006, but several major points remain to be worked out, including the location of a base to replace Okinawa's Futenma air station, a major hub for the Marines there. Officials on both sides have agreed to relocate the operations of the base to another, less crowded part of Okinawa, but local opposition has stalled progress.

B. Redeployment to Guam costs $10 billion

Fujita 10 (Akiko, writer for Public Radio International’s “The World”, 1/4, http://www.pri.org/world/asia/us-military-buildup-guam1816.html)

The population of Guam is expected to increase by 50 percent in the next four years. That's because the U.S. military plans to redeploy thousands of Marines and their families from the Japanese island of Okinawa. The move could bring an economic boom to the Pacific island but it threatens to strain Guam's infrastructure. The US and Japan agreed to the troop transfer three years ago, to reduce US troop presence in Okinawa. Joe Arnett with the Guam Chamber of Commerce says the move will transform the island. "This investment into Guam in unprecedented. Guam has never seen this level of investment into the island ever before." Arnett expects the military buildup to create 30,000 new jobs on the island. Many will be temporary construction jobs filled by foreign workers. But Arnett says high paying; permanent jobs will stay in the community. It sounds like a good opportunity for an island struggling with eight percent unemployment. But Senator Judi Guthertz says Guam isn't ready to shoulder the load. "We're not going to be ready unless resources are made available to the civilian community," said Guthertz. Guthertz oversees the legislative committee for the military buildup. She supports the Marine transfer, but says the American government isn't doing enough to support Guam. While the US and Japan has pledged 10 billion dollars for the buildup itself, they haven't guaranteed large investments in the civilian communality. Guthertz says that's a concern in light of a recent environmental impact statement. It said the buildup will attract tens of thousands to the island, perhaps as much as a 50 percent jump in a few years.

Link Turn – Japan – Move to Guam

Military withdrawal from Japan results in troop going to other islands

Brown 10 (Peter J, writer for the Asian Times, 2/20, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LB20Dh01.html)

Webb is mindful that the presence of US forces on Okinawa has been a political hot potato for years. Former governor Keiichi Inamine, for example, proposed a complete withdrawal of US military personnel from Okinawa in 2003. Webb even wrote an article in early 2001 for Parade magazine entitled "Should We Leave Okinawa?" in which he mentioned that former Japanese prime minister Ryutaro Hashimoto "speaks often of 'the suffering of the Okinawan people' as a result of the American bases, implicitly supporting their removal". "Okinawa - 350 miles [563 kilometers] from Taipei, 700 from Seoul, 800 from Manila and about 1,500 from Singapore - is ideally situated not only for the defense of Japan but also for rapid deployment to a wide array of potential crises," Webb wrote. "Ironically, some US defense planners believe that the limits American forces have placed on themselves in order to satisfy the Okinawan people are too restrictive, leading them to recommend a substantial withdrawal from the island." Webb also highlighted a US National Defense University study in 2000 which recommended a "diversification throughout the Asia-Pacific region" of US forces on Okinawa.

Japan stationed troops get redeployed to Guam

**Yoshida 6/28** (Kensei, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, http://japanfocus.org/-Yoshida-Kensei/3378)JFS

Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, located in the middle of a residential area of the city of Ginowan (population 91,000) north of the capital Naha, reportedly stations 2000 to 4000 personnel of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing of the III Marine Expeditionary Force. Helicopters and fixed/wing aircraft are constantly flying low in circles over the residences, schools and hospitals for embarkation and touch-and-go exercises, creating roaring noise and the danger of crashes. People are so concerned that they have long been demanding its closure and return, with particular urgency since 2004 when one of Futenma’s heavy helicopters spiraled into the wall of the administration building of a university right across the fence and splattered its broken pieces all over during the summer break. In 2006, the Japanese and U.S. governments agreed to relocate many Okinawa-based Marines to Guam by 2014 to lessen the Okinawan people’s burdens or to accommodate “the pressing need to reduce friction on Okinawa.” MCAS Futenma would be returned, but only after being replaced by a new facility that Japan would construct within Okinawa.

Troops get redeployed to Guam

Shuster 6/21 (Mike, National Public Radio, Morning Edition, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127932447)JFS

"The U.S. government [has] repeatedly said that [it wants] to relocate to a place where [it] will be welcome. That welcome is simply not there in Okinawa at the moment," Nakano says. The U.S. says it will transfer 8,000 Marines to Guam and move a portion of the base to another part of Okinawa.

Link Turn – Japan – Guam Move Expensive

Redeployment costs billions

McCurry 6 (Justin, writer for the Guardian, 4/25, http://www.military-quotes.com/forum/japan-pay-60-costs-moving-t20834.html)

After weeks of stalled negotiations, Japan has agreed to pay almost 60% of the cost of transferring thousands of US marines from Okinawa to Guam in a move designed to reduce the US's military burden on one of its closest allies. Japan's defence minister, Fukushiro Nukaga, announced the deal after more than three hours of talks in Washington on Sunday with the US defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld. "I had not expected that such an agreement was possible," Mr Nukaga told reporters. "Japan and the United States were still wide apart on the issue and I thought 'It won't go anywhere unless I directly meet Mr Rumsfeld for talks aimed at a breakthrough.'" Under the agreement, which is part of Washington's plans to realign its forces around the world, Japan will pay $6.1bn (£3.4bn) towards the $10bn it is expected to cost to move 8,000 marines and their families to Guam, a US territory located roughly midway between Japan and Australia. Japan will pay $2.8bn in grants, with the remainder coming in various loans. Japan had refused US demands to pay 75% of the total while it struggles to rein in its huge public debt. Many Japanese also blame the bases for causing pollution, accidents and crime. Mr Rumsfeld said he and Mr Nukaga "have come to an understanding that we both feel is in the best interests of our two countries". Okinawa comprises a fraction of Japan's total area, but is home to around half of the 50,000 US troops stationed in the country. "One big goal of this realignment was to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa, and our thought is to carry this out as quickly as possible," Shinzo Abe, a Japanese government spokesman, told reporters. "Our burden was unavoidable in order to speed up the process."

Redeployment costs billions

Associated Press 9 (2/17, http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/Asia/Story/STIStory\_339485.html)

TOKYO - HOPING to give new momentum to a plan to rework the deployment of US troops in the Pacific, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton signed an agreement Tuesday with Japan that will move 8,000 Marines off the southern Japanese island of Okinawa to the US territory of Guam. The framework of the transfer had already been agreed on in 2006, but several major points remain to be worked out, including the location of a base to replace Okinawa's Futenma air station, a major hub for the Marines there. Officials on both sides have agreed to relocate the operations of the base to another, less crowded part of Okinawa, but local opposition has stalled progress. 'This agreement reflects the commitment we have to modernise our military posture in the Pacific,' Mrs Clinton said. 'It reinforces the core of our alliance - the mission to defend Japan against attack and to deter any attack by all necessary means.' Japan's Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone also hailed the agreement. 'We believe this Guam agreement shows the strength of our alliance,' he said. 'We agreed to work toward the implementation of the 2006 pact in a manner that does not compromise readiness or capability.' There are currently about 13,000 Marines stationed on Okinawa, and 23,000 US troops there overall. They are part of about 50,000 US troops deployed in Japan under a post-World War II mutual security pact. The cost of the realignment plan has generated intense debate in Japan. Guam's transformation is expected to cost at least US$15 billion (S$23 billion) and put some of the US military's highest-profile assets within the fences of a vastly improved network of bases. In the pact signed on Tuesday, Japan agreed to give Washington $2.8 billion for the transfer costs, though its contribution is expected to go higher.

No Link – Japan Bases are Inexpensive

Comparatively – keeping troops in Japan is cheaper than having them in the US

Onishsi No Date (Kenichi, writer for the Newsletter for a Multicultural Japan, http://www.tabunka.org/newsletter/canjapan.html)

Let me give you some information on U.S. bases in Japan. U.S. bases in Japan number 94, when only those bases for U.S. use are counted, and their aggregate size is over 316 square kilometers. Besides these, there are 42 bases of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces which are designated for common use with the U.S. forces as needed. This means that a total of 136 bases are available for the U.S. forces in Japan. The bases for the U.S. use have somewhat decreased, but common use bases have substantially increased so that the aggregate size is 1.9 times greater than that of 20 years ago. The U.S. Department of Defense's East Asia Strategy Report, published in February 1995, regards Japan as supplying "by far the most generous host nation support of any of our allies." As U.S. administration officials point out, "it is actually less expensive to the American taxpayer to maintain our forces forward deployed than in the United States."

No Link – Troop Reductions are Expensive

Short term costs of troop withdrawals are expensive

Eaglen 9 (Mackenzie, Heritage Foundation's Research Fellow for National Security Studies, 4/30, http://www.speroforum.com/a/19140/Obamas-military-budget-to-decrease-over-10-years)

Congress must also consider several other billpayers knocking at the Pentagon's door that are certain to consume any potential real growth in the Obama defense budget--even before the details are available in May. In the same floor speech earlier this week, Senator Inhofe highlighted the difference in war funding requests for 2009 by Presidents Bush and Obama. Congress approved $65.9 billion in emergency supplemental funds for the first part of FY 2009, yet President Obama's supplemental request of $75.5 billion for defense needs is supposed to pay for invoices that actually run much higher. This six-month supplemental for the second half of FY 2009 is supposed to fund ongoing operations, a significant 21,000-troop increase in Afghanistan, and the expensive beginning of a withdrawal from Iraq. While it may appear to be cheaper to take troops out of Iraq, in the short-term it actually costs much more to get military servicemembers and their gear out. Senator Inhofe also discussed a recent General Accountability Office report that characterizes the cost to redeploy significant force levels from Iraq as a "massive and expensive effort" with rising near-term costs.[2] The report states the cost of equipment repairs and replacements--along with closing and turning over 283 military installations in Iraq--and finally moving troops and equipment home "will likely be significant." Senator Inhofe and others are rightly sounding an alarm bell that defense spending on current warfighting operations is decreasing in FY 2009 by $10.7 billion.

Withdrawal is a long, expensive process

Scahill 9 (Jeremy, Puffin Foundation Writing Fellow at the Nation Institute, 3/30, http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168/35899.html)

First, there's the money. "Although reducing troops would appear to lower costs, GAO has seen from previous operations â€¦ that costs could rise in the near term," according to the 56-page report, which is titled "Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight." In addition to the massive funds required to move tens of thousands of troops, the GAO points out that the Army estimates "it would cost $12 billion to $13 billion a year for at least two years after the operation ends to repair, replace and rebuild the equipment used in Iraq." The cost of closing U.S. bases will also "likely be significant;" even after military units leave Iraq, the Pentagon will need to invest in training and equipment to return these units to levels capable of performing "full spectrum operations." (The GAO report does not even mention the costs of providing much-needed medical and mental health services to veterans.) The Obama administration is likely to portray the costs of "withdrawing" from Iraq as a painful necessity made inevitable by the Bush administration. But there are already calls for Obama to not allocate any new funds for such an operation. Retired Army Col. Ann Wright, a veteran diplomat who reopened the U.S. embassy in Kabul after Sept. 11 (and, while in the military, worked on plans for an Iraq invasion), says, "Everyone in the Department of Defense -- military and civilian -- knows well the expense of going to war and the expense of bringing troops back to the United States.

No Link – Troop Reductions are Expensive

Withdrawing is expensive business

Carpenter 8 (Ted Galen, Council on Foreign Relations, 2/28, http://www.cfr.org/publication/15586/when\_should\_the\_us\_withdraw\_from\_iraq.html)

It is important to clarify the real strategic choice in Iraq. It is not between a U.S. withdrawal in the next 6 to 12 months or a withdrawal sometime in the next 5 years or so. It is a choice between a prompt withdrawal and trying to stay in Iraq for decades—or in Senator McCain’s flippant formulation, a century. The creation of numerous “enduring” military bases and the building of an embassy nearly as large as Vatican City confirms that the U.S. intends to stay a very long time. A long-term occupation would be an extremely costly proposition, both in lives and dollars. The mission currently costs more than $10 billion per month. Even if the level of violence remains relatively low, and Washington ultimately achieves its long-delayed objective of reducing troop levels below 100,000 (neither of which is certain), the monthly cost would still run $7 billion to $8 billion. And that is merely the direct financial drain. It does not take into account such indirect costs as the care of thousands of additional wounded veterans over the coming decades—an obligation that will add tens of billions more to the tab. A long-term mission in Iraq is a multi-trillion-dollar commitment.

Removal of equipment alone is expensive

Fishel 10 (Justin, writer for FOXNews, 4/12, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/04/02/military-embarks-costly-complicated-removal-iraq-equipment/)

The U.S. Army plans to spend tens of billions of dollars over the next year and a half to refurbish and move equipment out of Iraq as the military focus shifts to a build-up in Afghanistan.  Third Army Commander Lt. Gen. William Webster told Pentagon reporters Friday there are 2.8 million pieces of equipment in 88,000 containers that need to be moved out of Iraq, calling it the largest operation "since the build-up for World War II."  The equipment drawdown coincides with the troop drawdown President Obama outlined in 2009. The president wants 50,000 troops left in Iraq by the end of the summer while surging 30,000 forces into Afghanistan in that same period. The rest of the U.S. presence in Iraq is supposed to be gone by the end of 2011.  Webster said the military will salvage whatever it can during that time, taking items to Kuwait to be rebuilt and shipped directly to the battlefield in Afghanistan. Items that are not fit for battle will make their way back to the United States for training purposes.  The toughest part of the job, Webster said, is determining what to keep and what to leave behind for the Iraqis -- decisions based in part on whichever option is cheaper. The Army Material Command and Defense Logistics Agency has thousands employees making those decisions.  For example, humvees and mine-resistant vehicles are considered to be worth refurbishing and bringing to Afghanistan. The mine-resistant truck, better known as the M-RAP, is taking over as the new workhorse of the military. The reinforced V-shaped hull beneath them shields its passengers from roadsides bombs, protection that's desperately needed in Afghanistan.  However, the thousands of SUVs used by military and civilian officials in and around Baghdad aren't worth taking anywhere. A truck bought for $30,000 in 2004 is worth only $5,000-$8,000 dollars today, and the cost of shipping one of the SUVs exceeds that value.  In addition, many of these trucks were not built to U.S. emission standards and would face the added cost of upgrading the exhaust system. "So in some cases, it's cheaper for us to turn that over to the government of Iraq through the -- the right programs and let them keep it," Webster said.  Another example of equipment that the U.S. plans to leave behind is the common jersey barrier, or T-wall as it's known in Iraq. The walls, shaped like an upside-down "T," lined the roads throughout Baghdad at the height of the war and served to protect government and commercial buildings from bombs and other attacks.  Webster said depending on their size it costs between $800 and $5,000 to pour a T-wall, but it would also cost $5,000 to ship it.  "And so it doesn't make any sense," Webster told reporters Friday. "It's cheaper, more beneficial to our government to buy them in Afghanistan or adjacent countries. And that, of course, then contributes to businesses in Afghanistan."  Despite the enormous cost of the undertaking, Webster said decisions like this have saved the Army and the taxpayer lots of cash.  "We saved about $3.8 billion last year by finding those redundancies and efficiencies in our processes and either cost avoidance or cost savings, and we were able to apply that $3.8 billion towards last year's build-up in Afghanistan," he said.  But moving equipment is one of the most costly undertakings in a foreign war. Webster acknowledged that at the height of the Iraq surge, about $20 billion dollars was spent repairing equipment and supplying

No Link – Iraq Withdrawal

With over 200 bases and thousands of troops, Iraq withdrawal will be expensive

DeYoung 9 (Karen, staff writer for the Washington Post, 3/25, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032402741.html)

The removal of about 140,000 U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2011 will be a "massive and expensive effort" that is likely to increase rather than lower Iraq-related expenditures during the withdrawal and for several years after its completion, government investigators said in a report released yesterday. "Although reducing troops would appear to lower costs," the Government Accountability Office said, withdrawals from previous conflicts have shown that costs more often rise in the near term. The price of equipment repairs and replacements, along with closing or turning over 283 U.S. military installations in Iraq, "will likely be significant," the GAO reported. Even the smallest facilities, with 16 to 200 combat troops, will take up to two months to close, the report said. Several dozen large installations -- such as Balad Air Base, with 24,000 inhabitants -- are likely to take 18 months or more. The report, "Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight," lists other challenges for the withdrawal and post-withdrawal periods, including uncertainties about security for civilian officials, the enormous size of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and the Iraqi government's ability to sustain basic services and infrastructure.

No Link – Afghanistan Opium

The government doesn’t spend a lot on opium interdiction

Mercille 10 (Julien, writer for Counterpunch a prominent political newsletter, 6/30, http://counterpunch.org/mercile06302010.html)

All this said, there is one way in which Afghanistan does have a drug problem, namely, its increasing number of addicts. A recent UNODC report estimated that drug use had increased dramatically over the last few years and that around one million Afghans now suffer from drug addiction, or 8% of the population—twice the global average. Since 2005, the number of regular opium users in Afghanistan has grown from 150,000 to 230,000 (a 53% increase) and for heroin, from 50,000 to 120,000 (a 140% increase). This spreads HIV/AIDS because most injecting drug users share needles. But treatment resources are very deficient. Only about 10% of addicts have ever received treatment, meaning that about 700,000 are left without it, which prompted UNODC chief Antonio Maria Costa to call for much greater resources for drug prevention and treatment in the country. But the problem is that the Obama and Bush administrations could not care less: since 2005, they have allocated less than $18 million to “demand reduction” activities in Afghanistan—an amount less than 1% of the $2 billion they spent on eradication and interdiction. [10] Clearly, US priorities have nothing to do with fighting a war on drugs.

No I/L – Space Militarization

**U.S. avoiding space militarization now – doesn’t have the budget and no programs developed yet.**

Hitchens, Hyman & Lewis 6 (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No 1, March 2006, Theresa Hitchens, Michael Katz-Hyman and Jeffrey Lewis, Hitchens- Center for Defense Information Vice President, Hyman - holds a BS in Physics with a Minor in Technology and Policy from Carnegie Mellon University., Lewis - Director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative at the New America Foundation, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/131hitchens.pdf) NAR

From analyzing current Pentagon budget documentation, we conclude that, for the moment, support for ‘‘space superiority’’ and ‘‘space control’’ systems remains largely rhetorical\*with little actual budgetary support. The Bush administration has expressed interest in these new military missions in outer space. That interest has been reflected in statements by Pentagon officials about space dominance, as well as official military documents, especially those emanating from the Air Force. However, this interest has not yet been reflected in budget requests. Unclassified technology development programs included in the six-year Future Years Defense Plan are a decade or more away from deployment. Programs related to offensive counterspace, space-based missile defense interceptors, and space-based strike total slightly less than $300 million in FY 2006 funding. Based on current levels of technological development and anticipated levels of budgetary support, we conclude significantly higher expenditures in research and development would be required to develop and deploy killer microsatellites, space-based missile defense interceptors, and military space planes. The Pentagon is not\*at least in the unclassified budget\*actively developing capabilities, such as new ground- or airlaunched ASATs, that might be seen in a relatively short time.

U.S. won’t be developing space weapons, at a minimum, until 2015.

Space Review 5 (http://www.thespacereview.com/article/394/1, June 20th 2005) NAR

Since then, there has been almost no work done on space-based missile defense systems and, according to recent reports, the MDA does not plan to ask for any money before 2008. Under current plans, the Pentagon will not even think about deploying any sort of “son of Brilliant Pebbles” until around 2015. Instead, they are working on a ground-based system, called the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI): a missile that would only be launched after an enemy missile has left its silo or launch pad, and would then chase until hopefully hitting and destroying it; that is, being “down” and shooting “up.” Not only that, but the KEI’s would have to be based in nations near the sites from which enemy missiles might be launched. This gives those nations where these interceptors would be based an effective veto over whether the US could or could not defend itself.

\*\*\*Impact Turn – Space\*\*\*

Impact Turn – Space Good: Deters Arms Race

US space dominance checks arms races – stops anyone from escalating conflicts and capabilities.

Dolman 6 (Everett C. "U.S. Military Transformation and Weapons in Space." *SAIS Review*. XXVI, No. 1 Winter-Spring p171, http://spacedebate.org/evidence/2311/)KM

Seizing the initiative and securing low-Earth orbit now, while the United States is unchallenged in space, would do much to stabilize the international system and prevent an arms race in space. The enhanced ability to deny any attempt by another nation to place military assets in space and to readily engage and destroy terrestrial anti-satellite capacity would make the possibility of large-scale space war or military space races less likely, not more. Why would a state expend the effort to compete in space with a superpower that has the extraordinary advantage of holding securely the highest ground at the top of the gravity well? So long as the controlling state demonstrates a capacity and a will to use force to defend its position, in effect expending a small amount of violence as needed to prevent a greater conflagration in the future, the likelihood of a future war in space is remote.

US militarization now prevents arms races in the future – entry costs into space are too much and conventional balancing would be minimal.

Dolman 5 (Everett C. Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 14 September, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space”, http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20%26%20Space.pdf)KM

Indeed, it is concern for the unanticipated arrival of technology X that initially motivates my own preference for a policy advocating immediate deployment of space weapons. So long as America is the state most likely to acquire a breakthrough technology in this area, my concern is limited to the problem of letting technology take us where it will. But what if an enemy of democratic liberalism should suddenly acquire the means to place quickly and cheaply multiple weapons into orbit? The advantages gained from controlling the high ground of space would accrue to it as surely as to any liberal state, and the concomitant loss of military power from the denial of space to our already-dependent military force could cause the immediate demise of the extant international system. The longer the US dithers on its responsibilities, the more likely a potential opponent could seize low-earth orbit before America could respond. And America would respond … finally. But would another state? If America were to weaponize space today, it is unlikely that any other state or group of states would find it rational to counter in kind. The entry cost to provide the infrastructure necessary is too high; hundreds of billions of dollars, at minimum. The years of investment it would take to achieve a minimal counter-force capability—essentially from scratch—would provide more than ample time for the US to entrench itself in space, and readily counter preliminary efforts to displace it. The tremendous effort in time and resources would be worse than wasted. Most states, if not all, would opt not to counter US deployments in kind. They might oppose US interests with asymmetric balancing, depending on how aggressively America uses its new power, but the likelihood of a hemorrhaging arms race in space should the US deploy weapons there—at least for the next few years—is extremely remote.

Impact Turn – Space Good: Global Stability

US space dominance wouldn’t create a anarchic world of first strikes and arms races, the US wants to pursue stable space development.

Lambakis 2 (Steven. “"Putting Military Uses of Space in Context." Future Security in Space: Commercial, Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, http://spacedebate.org/evidence/1632/)KM

Second, enhanced military power in the hands of states that uphold the rule of international law can work to improve peace and stability in the world. Treaties dealing with the space environment are written to establish stability and order on the space frontier. And this is good. Washington has never considered space to be a domain of anarchy. Indeed, it is in the U.S. interest to develop proper laws and exercise force in a restrained and responsible manner to prevent space from devolving into a lawless, disorderly realm.

Impact Turn – Space Good: Diplomacy

Space capabilities solve diplomacy – gives the US more options when dealing diplomatically with threats.

Lambakis 2 (Steven. “"Putting Military Uses of Space in Context." Future Security in Space: Commercial, Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, http://spacedebate.org/argument/1466)KM

There are sound political and strategic justifications for looking to space. First, a weapon that exploits Earth's orbit may increase the number of foreign policy and military options available to our leaders and commanders. More options mean that a leader may not be forced to take a more destructive or weaker course of action, that he has choices on how his country should act in a dynamic, complex, and often dangerous world. Effective military options, in other words, can work to improve deterrence and stability and help leaders deal more intelligently, even more diplomatically, with surprises.

Space control is key to diplomatic power – a globalized economy depends on communications tech in space.

Whiting 2 (“Policy, Influence, And Diplomacy: Space As A National Power Element” Lieutenant Colonel Stephen N., School Of Advanced Airpower Studies Air University, June, https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2002/saas/whiting.pdf)KM

From its initial emphasis in the late 1950s as a means of superpower competition, through today’s use of space assets to enable terrestrial military forces, space power has conferred diplomatic advantages to those nations able to employ it. Even so, its potential remains underdeveloped. Since space is the newest medium in which military forces operate, it is to be expected that policy makers have not used space assets as tools of diplomacy to the same degree they have used other, more traditional means. Yet, their lack of focus on this particular tool or means is perplexing. Such esteemed space theorists as James Oberg have misunderstood the power of space assets to affect diplomatic objectives. He states, “Space power, alone, is insufficient to...ensure the attainment of terrestrial political objectives.”159 As affirmed in Colin Gray’s statement above, space professionals have given insufficient thought to (among other strategic implications of space assets) codifying precisely how, when, and where to use space assets for diplomatic purposes short of combat. The analysis that follows seeks to fill part of this void by classifying the diplomatic uses of space assets.160 While the model presented is holistic in its applicability across the spectrum of conflict, its rudimentary nature is evidence that future theorists and strategists still need to accomplish much work. Exploiting space systems to directly achieve diplomatic objectives is a capacity available now, and this opportunity is due to a confluence of trends. First, an increasingly important characteristic of the post-Cold War world is the escalating impact of globalization and interdependency among states. Particularly among the most developed states, those participating heavily in the information age, the development and distribution of knowledge is replacing the manufacturing and distribution of goods as society’s central source of wealth, prestige, and power.161 The linkages connecting these states to the outside world and to elements within their own societies are becoming indispensable, as these are the conduits for information exchange. Especially for states with global trade and military interests, and despite the enormous growth of fiber optics technology for data transmission and communications, space assets are a critical component for these information transactions. The same holds for lesser-developed states, particularly if their internal communications infrastructures are rudimentary or fragmented. For the United States, DoD Directive 3100.10, Space Policy, states the case flatly: “The globally interdependent information- and knowledge-based economy as well as information-based military operations make the information lines of communication to, in, through, and from space essential to the exercise of United States power.”162

Impact Turn – Space Good: Diplomacy

Space allows for diplomatic power through tech partnerships.

Whiting 2 (“Policy, Influence, And Diplomacy: Space As A National Power Element” Lieutenant Colonel Stephen N., School Of Advanced Airpower Studies Air University, June, https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2002/saas/whiting.pdf)KM

The second component of space assets’ diplomatic power is the ability to induce international actors toward desired behaviors, or away from undesirable behaviors, through the granting or termination of technology partnerships. Although this power is fundamentally coercive in nature, it is generally perceived as a relatively benevolent form relying on the promise of benefits to the target state rather than threatening punishment. Called “persuasive influence” by Lt Col Gregory M. Billman, he defines it as “action taken…to benefit another side in some way. Noteworthy is the lack of threatening force to effect a change in an entity’s behavior.”181 Interestingly, “Cooperative uses of the armed forces have occurred far less frequently than have coercive uses.”182 As such, this is an area ripe for investigation. Since, by its very nature, the ability to negotiate and carry out technology partnerships occurs over long time periods (measured in years and decades rather than weeks and months), this facet of space assets’ diplomatic power is normally only effective during peacetime. Further, since the nature of a partnership implies an ability by both parties to contribute to their mutual goals (although the contributions may not be equal), space technology partnerships are most effective among first and second world countries with some industrial or scientific capacity capable of being oriented toward space technologies.

Space-based tech partnerships are effective tools to shape the behaviors of other states.

Whiting 2 (“Policy, Influence, And Diplomacy: Space As A National Power Element” Lieutenant Colonel Stephen N., School Of Advanced Airpower Studies Air University, June, https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2002/saas/whiting.pdf)KM

While the ISS offers a useful case study in understanding how technology partnerships have been used to influence Russian behavior, the ISS and Space Shuttle have also been used to shape the behavior of American allies such as Canada, Japan, and the European Space Agency. Canada’s contribution of its Robotic Arm to both projects, the Japanese Experimental Module, and the European Space Lab flown on Shuttle missions are all efforts at lowering the cost of space exploration for the American taxpayer while supporting the space ambitions of American allies. Through such partnerships, trade, technological, and military relationships are strengthened, while also increasing the interdependency of these states on the American space effort. Space technology partnerships offer a powerful inducement to promote or dissuade nations from specific behaviors. By offering other states the opportunity to more easily access space, and thereby receive the concomitant prestige associated with space programs, or to partner with other spacefaring states to lower the cost of a specific space function, the United States can achieve both economic savings in its space programs and shape the behavior of other states.

Space dominance provides the opportunity to provide space services as a new form of foreign aid diplomacy.

Whiting 2 (“Policy, Influence, And Diplomacy: Space As A National Power Element” Lieutenant Colonel Stephen N., School Of Advanced Airpower Studies Air University, June, https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2002/saas/whiting.pdf)KM

The third aspect of space assets’ inherent diplomatic power is the ability to provide no-cost, or low-cost, access to space services to states who do not otherwise have access to such services. Similar to technology partnerships in that access to space services is a form of constructive coercion through persuasive influence, three factors make this component distinct. First, rather than collaborate with another state toward some common goal, access to space services resembles traditional foreign aid in that the country granting the access to its space services does not expect a significant monetary or technological payback for the services it provides. Second, providing access to space services does not require the state receiving the services to be industrially or technologically advanced. In fact, some of the best opportunities for achieving diplomatic leverage in this area may very well be among third world states. The third unique factor of access to space services is that it offers the opportunity to achieve diplomatic advantage in a quicker timeframe than technology partnerships. Since providing access to space services can theoretically occur very quickly, depending on the training and hardware that must be provided to the target state, diplomatic effects can be readily realized.

Impact Turn – Space Good: Diplomacy

That diplomatic power is key to deterring conflicts before they start- Persian Gulf War proves.

Whiting 2 (“Policy, Influence, And Diplomacy: Space As A National Power Element” Lieutenant Colonel Stephen N., School Of Advanced Airpower Studies Air University, June, https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2002/saas/whiting.pdf)KM

The second category of access to space services concerns high-end services such as high-resolution imagery, missile warning data, advanced communications, and launch services. Focused more toward technologically sophisticated states, those with advanced elements within their economies, providing high-end space services can be an inducement as it allows access to services that are currently beyond their means. For example, providing missile warning data (along with Patriot missile batteries and crews, and an intense air interdiction effort) to Israel during the Persian Gulf War led directly to achieving the United States’ diplomatic objective of persuading Israel not to retaliate militarily against Iraq. Israeli retaliation could have severely fractured the American-led coalition, and the use of military assets (space, air, and ground) in this diplomatic capacity was one of the most important strategic operations of the entire conflict.

Space diplomacy power prevents conflict escalation and maintains US dominance globally.

Whiting 2 (“Policy, Influence, And Diplomacy: Space As A National Power Element” Lieutenant Colonel Stephen N., School Of Advanced Airpower Studies Air University, June, https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2002/saas/whiting.pdf)KM

The Space-Diplomacy model argues that access to space services is an effective diplomatic tool throughout the spectrum of conflict. In peacetime, the United States can provide access to space services to encourage desired behaviors from other states. In addition, providing access to space services maintains the United States’ leadership position in space by dissuading other states from building competing systems to those operated by the United States and provided for their access. An interesting example is the fact that no viable system has arisen to compete with the United States’ Global Positioning System (GPS). Although European allies have expressed reservations that the GPS system cannot be relied on for their civil purposes since the American military controls it, and hence could degrade or deny the signal in some future crisis, they have been unable to bring together the political and financial resources to field their own systems. According to René Oosterlinck, head of the navigation department at the European Space Agency, "Europe cannot accept reliance on a military system which has the possibility of being cut off."189 While the latest indications are that the Europeans will go forward with their Galileo navigation constellation, there is doubt whether they will actually see the project through to fruition since the United States provides its GPS signal free to the entire planet.190 During periods of crisis response, the United States can provide access to space services (such as imagery) that would stabilize a situation, reassure an ally, or prevent escalation. Finally, during war, the United States can achieve diplomatic objectives by providing vital space services (such as missile warning) to coalition partners to take, or avoid taking, actions that directly bear on the war’s outcome.

Impact Turn – Space Good: World Peace

Empirically proven, world peace and growth directly coincides with unilateral dominance.

Dolman 6 (Everett C. "U.S. Military Transformation and Weapons in Space." SAIS Review. XXVI, No. 1 (Winter-Spring) page 172, http://spacedebate.org/evidence/2310/)KM

There is reasonable historic support for the notion that the most peaceful and prosperous periods in modern history coincide with the appearance of a strong, liberal hegemon. America has been essentially unchallenged in its naval dominance over the last 60 years, and in global air supremacy for the last 15 or more. Today, there is more international commerce on the oceans and in the air than ever. Ships and aircraft of all nations worry more about running into bad weather than about being commandeered by a military vessel or set upon by pirates. Search and rescue is a far more common task than forced embargo, and the transfer of humanitarian aid is a regular mission. Lest one think this era of cooperation is predicated on intentions rather than military stability, recall that the policy of open skies advocated by every president since Eisenhower did not take effect until after the fall of the Soviet Union and the singular rise of American power to the fore of international politics. The legacy of American military domination of the sea and air has been positive, and the same should be expected for space.

Space is key in the nuclear age to transcend nuclear nihilism and create a global golden age of peace in the revolution of conflict.

Dolman 5 (Everett C. Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 14 September, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space”, http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20%26%20Space.pdf)KM

As leader of the international community, the United States finds itself in the unenviable position that it must make decisions for the good of all. On the issue of space weaponization, there appears no one best option. No matter the choice selected, there are those who will benefit and those who will suffer. The tragedy of American power is that it must make a choice, and the worst choice is to do nothing. And yet, in the process of choosing, it has a great advantage—the moral ambiguity of its people regarding the use of power. There is no question that corrupted power is a dangerous thing, but perhaps only Americans are so concerned with the possibility that they themselves will be corrupted. They fear what they could become. No other state has such potential for selfrestraint. It is this introspection, this self-angst that makes America the best choice to lead the world today and tomorrow. It is not perfect, but perhaps it is perfectible. Perhaps the most important insight to come from a discussion of transformation in war is the notion that space weapons, along with the parallel development of information, precision, and stealth capabilities, presents in our era a true revolution in military affairs. As such, these technologies and capabilities will propel the world into an uncertain New Age. For better or worse, the future can be denied only by a spasm of nuclear nihilism. The states that move forward against the fears of the many, and harness these new technologies to a forward-looking strategy of cooperative advantage for all, have the potential to initiate humanities’ first global golden age. The very nature of space requires that the ultimate use of it must be both encompassing and incorporating, but the nature of international relations and the lessons of history dictate that it begin with the vision and will of a few acting in the benefit of all.

Impact Turn – Space Good: Heg

The US has already crossed the line – space is key to all military function, only further development creates a peaceful transition into space-enabled hegemony.

Dolman 5 (Everett C. Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 14 September, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space”, http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20%26%20Space.pdf)KM

The United States has embarked on a revolutionary military transformation designed to extend its dominance in military engagements. Space capabilities are the lynchpin of this transformation, enabling a level of precision, stealth, command and control, intelligence gathering, speed, maneuverability, flexibility, and lethality heretofore unknown. This twenty-first century way of war promises to give the United States a capacity to use force to influence events around the world in a timely, effective, and sustainable manner. And this is a good thing, a true transformation from conflicts past. That the process of transformation was well underway became evident in 1991, when the world’s fourth largest military was defeated in just ten days of ground combat. Unfathomably complicated battle equipment, sleek new aircraft, and promising new missile interceptors publicly debuted. Arthur C. Clarke went so far as to dub Operation DESERT STORM (ODS) the world’s first space war, as none of the accomplishments of America’s new look military would have been possible without support from space. Twelve years later, in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), assertions as to the central role of space power could no longer be denied. America’s military had transitioned from space supported to a fully space enabled force, with astonishingly positive results. Indeed, most of the nation’s current space power functions were successfully exercised in OIF, including space lift, command and control, intelligence including rapid battle damage assessment, timing and navigation, and meteorological support. The tremendous growth in space reliance from OSD to OIF is evident in the raw numbers. Despite engaging with a 60 percent smaller force (fewer than 200,000 personnel v. over 500,000), satellite communications usage increased four-fold, from 200 to 800 Mbps (Megabits per second) capacity. Newly possible operational concepts such as reach back (intelligence analysts in the United States sending information directly to frontline units) and reach forward (rear-deployed commanders able to direct battlefield operations in real time) reconfigured the tactical concept of war. The value of Predator and Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), completely reliant on satellite communications and navigation for their operation, was confirmed. Special Forces units, paradoxically tethered to satellite support and yet practically unfettered in their silent movements because of them, ranged throughout Iraq in independent operations that were extremely disruptive. But the paramount effect of space-enabled warfare was in the area of combat efficiency. Space assets allowed all weather, day-night precision munitions to provide the bulk of America’s striking power. Strikes from standoff platforms, including Vietnam-Era B-52s, allowed maximum target devastation with extraordinarily low death and collateral devastation. In ODS, 90 percent of munitions used were unguided. Of the ten percent that were guided, none was GPS capable. By OIF, 70 percent were precision guided, more than half of those from GPS satellites. In ODS, fewer than five percent of aircraft were GPS-equipped. By OIF, all were. During ODS, GPS proved so valuable to the army that it procured and rushed into theater over 4,500 commercial receivers to augment the meager 800 military-band ones it could deploy from stockpiles, an average of one per company (about 200 personnel). By OIF, each army squad (6-10 soldiers) had at least one military GPS receiver. With such demonstrated utility and reliance, there is no question the US must guarantee space access if it is to be successful in future conflicts. Its military has stepped well over the threshold of a new way of war. It is simply not possible to go back to the violently spasmodic mode of combat typical of pre-space intervention. The United States is now highly discriminating in the projection of violence, parsimonious in the intended breadth of its destruction. For the positive process of transformation to continue, however, space weapons must enter the combat inventory of the United States.

Space is key to maintaining precision technologies – the alternative is to revert back to indiscriminant killing in war.

Dolman 5 (Everett C. Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 14 September, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space”, http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20%26%20Space.pdf)KM

Space weaponization is a critical and necessary component in the process of transformation well under way, a process that cannot be reversed. Once America demonstrated the capacity to strike precisely, it could only go back to the kind of indiscriminant targeting and heavy collateral damage that characterized pre-space warfare if it were engaged in a war of national survival. And if there are future technological, economic, and perhaps social benefits to be derived from developing and deploying weapons, they will certainly not come from increasing the stock of current systems. They will only come, if at all, from the development of new, highly complex and scientifically heuristic space, stealth, precision, and information systems.

Impact Turn – Space Good: Heg

US militarization is better than any alternative – it continues the status quo status of American hegemony rather than challenge it, causing arms races and military engagement.

Dolman 5 (Everett C. Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 14 September, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space”, http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20%26%20Space.pdf)KM

This rationality does not dispute the fact that US deployment of weapons in outer space would represent the addition of a potent new military capacity, one that would assist in extending the current period of American hegemony well into the future. This would clearly be threatening, and America must expect severe condemnation and increased competition in peripheral areas. But such an outcome is less threatening than any other state doing so. Placement of weapons in space by the United States would be perceived correctly as an attempt at continuing American hegemony. Although there is obvious opposition to the current international balance of power, the status quo, there is also a sense that it is at least tolerable to the majority of states. A continuation of it is thus minimally acceptable, even to states working towards its demise. So long as the US does not employ its power arbitrarily, the situation would be bearable initially and grudgingly accepted over time. On the other hand, an attempt by any other state to dominate space would be part of an effort to break the land-sea-air dominance of the United States in preparation for a new international order, with the weaponizing state at the top. The action would be a challenge to the status quo, not a perpetuation of it. Such an event would be disconcerting to nations that accept the current international order (including the venerable institutions of trade, finance, and law that operate within it) and intolerable to the US. As leader of the current system, the US could do no less than engage in a perhaps ruinous space arms race, save graciously decide to step aside.

Space prevents hegemonic power struggles.

Dolman 5 (Everett C. Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 14 September, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space”, http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20%26%20Space.pdf)KM

Seizing the initiative and securing low-Earth orbit now, while the US is unchallenged in space, would do much to stabilize the international system and prevent an arms race is space. From low-Earth orbit (LEO), the enhanced ability to deny any attempt by another nation to place military assets in space, or to readily engage and destroy terrestrial ASAT capacity, makes the possibility of large scale space war and or military space races less likely, not more. Why would a state expend the effort to compete in space with a superpower that has the extraordinary advantage of holding securely the highest ground at the top of the gravity well? So long as the controlling state demonstrates a capacity and a will to use force to defend its position, in effect expending a small amount of violence as needed to prevent a greater conflagration in the future, the likelihood of a future war in space is remote. Moreover, if the US were willing to deploy and use a military space force that maintained effective control of space, and did so in a way that was perceived as tough, non-arbitrary, and efficient, such an action would serve to discourage competing states from fielding opposing systems. Should the US use its advantage to police the heavens (assuming the entire cost on its own), and allow unhindered peaceful use of space by any and all nations for economic and scientific development, over time its control of LEO could be viewed as a global asset and a public good. Much in the manner that the British maintained control of the high seas, enforcing international norms of innocent passage and property rights , the US could prepare outer space for a long-overdue burst of economic expansion.

Impact Turn – Space Good: Benign Heg

Space is the only way to a benign hegemon – budget tradeoffs force a reduction of ground forces that threaten state sovereignty while funding space tech as limited force projection.

Dolman 5 (Everett C. Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 14 September, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space”, http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20%26%20Space.pdf)KM

It is an even more difficult dilemma for those who oppose weapons in general, and space weapons in particular. Ramifications for the most critical current function of the army, navy, and marines are profound—pacification, occupation, and control of foreign territory. With the downsizing of traditional weapons to accommodate heightened space expenditures, the ability of the US to do all three will wane significantly. At a time when many are calling for increased capability to pacify and police foreign lands, in light of the no-end-in-sight occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, space weapons proponents must advocate reduction of these capabilities in favor of a system that will have no direct potential to do so. Hence, the argument that the unilateral deployment of space weapons will precipitate a disastrous arms race is misplaced. To be sure, space weapons are offensive by their very nature. They deter violence by the omnipresent threat of precise, measured, and unstoppable retaliation. They offer no advantage if the target set considered is not global. But they also offer no advantage in the mission of territorial occupation. As such, they are far less threatening to the international environment than any combination of weapons employed in their stead. A state employing offensive deterrence through space-weapons can punish a transgressor state, but is in a poor position to challenge its sovereignty. The transgressor state is less likely to succumb to the security dilemma if it perceives its national survival is not at risk. Moreover, the tremendous expense of space weapons inhibits their indiscriminate use. Over time, the world of sovereign states will recognize that the US does not threaten self-determination internally, though it challenges any attempts to intervene militarily in the politics of others, and has severely restricted its own capacity to do so. America will maintain the capacity to influence decisions and events beyond its borders, with military force if necessary. The operational deployment of space weapons would increase that capacity by providing for nearly instantaneous force projection worldwide. This force would be precise, unstoppable, and deadly. At the same time, the US must forego some of its ability to intervene directly in other states because its capacity to do so will have been diminished in the budgetary trade-offs required. Transformation of the American military assures that the intentions of current and future leaders will have but a minor role to play in international affairs. The limited requirement for collateral damage, need for precision to allay the low volume of fire, and tremendous cost of space weapons will guarantee they are used only for high value, time sensitive targets. Whether or not the United States desires to be a good neighbor is not necessary to an opposing state’s calculation of survival. Without sovereignty at risk, fear of a spacedominant American military will subside. The US will maintain its position of hegemony as well as its security, and the world will not be threatened by the specter of a future American empire.

Impact Turn – Space Good: Inevitable

Space weapons are inevitable – US deployment is key to preventing competition and arms races in the future.

Dolman 5 (Everett "Strategy Lost: Taking the Middle Road to Nowhere." *High Frontier Journal* Vol. 3, No. 1 Winter p33, http://spacedebate.org/evidence/1848/)KM

Common to all hedging strategy proponents is the fear that placing weapons in space will spur a new arms race. Unfortunately, such a strategy increases the likelihood of a space arms race if and when space weapons are ultimately deployed, as the only plausible response by the US would be to at least match the opposing capabilities. This dithering approach blatantly ignores the current real world situation. At present, the US has no peer competitors in space. For the US to refrain from weaponizing until another state proves the capacity to challenge it allows for potential enemies to catch up to American capabilities. At a minimum, there is no risk for potential peer competitors to try. On the other hand, should the US reject the hedging strategy and unilaterally deploy weapons in space, other states may rationally decide not to compete. The cost of entry will simply be too great; the probability of failure palpable. In other words, the fear of an arms race in space, the most powerful argument in favor of the hedging plan, is most likely if the US follows its counsel.

Weaponization is inevitable – capabilities have existed for 60 years.

Lambakis 2 (Steven “"Putting Military Uses of Space in Context." Future Security in Space: Commercial, Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2002 p23 http://spacedebate.org/evidence/1630/)KM

Second, there is historical context to consider. Critics of expanding the military uses of space are wont to make a clean-cut distinction between 'militarizing' space, on the one hand, which they say already has happened, and 'weaponizing' space on the other, which they say has yet to occur. But this is a distinction without a meaningful difference, because the combat or force function, which naturally involves the use of arms, is a potential part of any military activity. Even some peacekeepers carry arms. Viewed in this light, the term 'weaponization' may be used, in a general way, to characterize activities that countries have undertaken for nearly 60 years. In other words, the so-called weaponization of space is happening under our very noses.

Space militarization is inevitable – China has already pushed the world past the point of no return.

Kueter 7 (Jeff. "Crossing the Rubicon in Space Again: Iacta Alea est." . January 23, http://spacedebate.org/argument/1143)KM

"The die is cast," Suetonius reports Julius Caesar said as he exhorted his men to cross the river Rubicon and created the popular idiom for a point of no return. The long-held Rubicon in space, the deployment and use of so-called space weapons, was crossed long ago by both the former Soviet Union and the United States. Still, many have claimed that it is possible to turn back history’s pages and preserve space as a sanctuary. If there were ever serious doubts about the impossibility of that dream, they are dispelled now. Last fall, when reports that China had used lasers to "blind" a U.S. satellite were made public, the Rubicon of space was crossed (again) and now we learn that China has demonstrated successful anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities launched from earth.1 In destroying their own satellite, China has signaled to the world its capability to threaten essential satellites directly, by physically destroying them, and indirectly, by using lasers and other jamming techniques to deny free use of them.

Impact Turn – Space Good: A2: Space Bad – Accidents

Their impact turns rely on unrealistic apocalyptic rhetoric – states would prioritize accidents on Earth over space.

Lambakis 1 (Steven. On the Edge of Earth: The Future of American Space Power. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky. p 259 http://spacedebate.org/evidence/1210/)KM

Even if a spacecraft were shot down by accident, the implications would not be so grave when compared, for example, to an accidental launch of a nuclear tipped missile. So, asked Walter McDougall, "why is it more important to protect pristine space, where nothing lives, than the crowded earth?" This is a good question. It is a question that has never been addressed fully by the space sanctuary enthusiasts (apart from making the apolitical, astrategic point that attacking unmanned targets in space makes wars "more likely" or is escalatory), who tend to use only one "strategic" framework for assessing the implications of space weapons: the framework of apocalypse. Any use of weapons in or from space will bring doom to "our planet." Arms races will drain the life blood out of that national budget. Interception of nuclear-tipped ICBMs in space is a precursor to a treacherous instability, that kind that could lead to nuclear holocaust. A decision by the United States to use the space environment for protection will bring the acrimony of the entire world against Washington, asphyxiating U.S. national and economic security. This is not strategic though -- this is the worst case, even unimaginable-case scenario played to the hilt.

Their impact turns would be solved by existing international law and protocol.

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 9 (“Missile Defense, the Space Relationship and the Twenty-First Century” 2009. p 91, http://spacedebate.org/argument/1427)KM

Further, even if a [Brilliant Pebble] “got away” to “run wild,” it would quickly burn up in the atmosphere. And in the case of an accidental shoot-down involving the mistaken identity of someone’s “innocent” missile (such as one carrying a communications satellite), Brilliant Pebbles and other SBIs would fall under the same protocols and international notification procedures that have long governed an unwarranted response by offensive nuclear weapons against another nation: when a country plans to launch a nonthreatening rocket – such as for a weather or communications satellite or to ferry astronauts and supplies to the international space station or the moon or to send robots to Mars or to orbit telescopes – those powers possessing offensive nuclear weapons are notified well in advance, so as to avoid a terrible misunderstanding that could trigger a massive retaliatory nuclear strike against the country of origin. Brilliant Pebbles and other SBIs would fall under the same protocol of advance notification and, of course, their automated systems would be switched off, even as offensive nuclear weapons would be taken off hair-trigger alert and ordered to “stand down.”

Impact Turn – Space Good: A2: Space Bad – US-Russia War

War would not break out in satellite miscommunication – US and Russia have multiple communication outlets.

Lambakis 1 (Steven. "Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics." Policy Review. February, http://spacedebate.org/argument/1851)KM

In other words, it is not at all self-evident that a sudden loss of a communications satellite, for example, would precipitate a wider-scale war or make warfare termination impossible. In the context of U.S.-Russian relations, communications systems to command authorities and forces are redundant. Urgent communications may be routed through land lines or the airwaves. Other means are also available to perform special reconnaissance missions for monitoring a crisis or compliance with an armistice. While improvements are needed, our ability to know what transpires in space is growing -- so we are not always in the dark.

Impact Turn – Space Good: A2: Space Bad – Indo-Pak War

India has no capabilities to develop space technology. No risk of escalation.

Chellaney 7 (Brahma. "India's Vulnerability Bared." Japan Times. February 9, http://spacedebate.org/argument/1358)KM

Before it can think of developing a counter-capability to shield itself from an ASAT menace, it will have to deal with two obtrusive mismatches that hobble its deterrence promise. The first mismatch is between its satellite and launch capabilities. Greater operational capability necessitates large satellites. While India has first-rate satellite-manufacturing expertise, it still needs a foreign commercial launcher like the Ariane 5 of the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company to place its INSAT-4 series satellites in geostationary orbit. The second mismatch is in the military realm -- between the technical sophistication to build nuclear warheads and the extent to which they can be delivered reliably by missiles. Nearly a decade after it went overtly nuclear and almost a quarter-century after the missile program launch, India still lacks the full reach against China. The thermonuclear warhead India tested with a controlled yield in 1998 still awaits a delivery vehicle of the right payload range.

India lacks infrastructure, funding, and planning to implement any space programs.

Asia Times 8 ("India goes to war in space.". June 18, http://spacedebate.org/argument/1358)KM

India's expression of its intentions to set up an aerospace command and its announcement of the Integrated Space Cell has raised concern in some quarters that India is entering the arms race in space. Such fears might be premature, given that the Integrated Space Cell is at a very rudimentary stage. "India is just putting in place a very minimal budget initiative that will take several years to develop," argued Prabhakar. "Besides satellites in space, India's space architecture of offensive and defensive systems are yet to be conceived, built and deployed," said Prabhakar, pointing to the different kinds of satellites, space-based laser systems, space stations and ground-based laser stations for offensive space operations that the "space superpowers" - the United States, Russia and China - have.

India doesn’t have rudimentary defense capabilities – space is a long way away.

Asia Times 8 ("India goes to war in space.". June 18, http://spacedebate.org/argument/1358)KM

In the event of their satellites being knocked out by enemy action during a crisis, the US, Russia and China have the capability to launch substitute satellites into space at short notice. The US can move its satellites from one orbit level to another, higher level to escape being taken out by an enemy anti-satellite system (ASAT). India can program a satellite launch only on a programmed sequence basis and not on short notice for rapid launches to replenish lost satellites, Prabhakar said. "India doesn't have even preliminary capability to defend its satellites," he said, adding "it will take another 15 to 20 years or more before India can put these systems in place." For all its impressive achievements in building and launching satellites, India is decades away from establishing a fully-operational aerospace command. It has formidable capability in building satellites. It is now trying to find a way to defend them.

Impact Turn – Space Good: A2: Space Bad – Counterbalancing

No one could counterbalance the US if it established space dominance.

Hyten 00 (John E. A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War: Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in Space. Urbana-Champaign, IL: Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security, April http://spacedebate.org/evidence/1766/)KM

[Samuel] Huntington implies that other nations would only enter an arms race to preserve the balance of power. But what if that balance of power was already overwhelming in favor of one side to begin with? Currently the United States has no peer in the world either economically or militarily. The United States has become the world's sole remaining superpower. If the United States added space weapons to its already massive arsenal of weapons, would this change the balance of power sufficiently to require other nations to respond? This is doubtful. Any other nation -- China, Russia, France, and others -- would have to simultaneously develop a robust terrestrial military capability while at the same time engaging in an arms race in space. Having the ability to control space without at least a minimally effective force on the ground would be impractical. The Russians and the Chinese currently are the closest competitors to the United States when it comes to military power. The collapse in 1989 of the Soviet Union demonstrated to the world that entering an enormously expensive arms race (which space weapons would certainly be) would have catastrophic results for a nation. No nation today has the combined military or economic wherewithal to enter an arms race in space with the United States.

Militarizing space puts us so far ahead of the rest of the world that no one could hope to compete with us.

Dolman 6 (Everett C., Karl P. Mueller et al. "Toward a U.S. Grand Strategy in Space." Washington Roundtable on Science & Public Policy. Washington, D.C.: George C. Marshall Institute, March 10, 2006 page 24 http://spacedebate.org/argument/2132)KM

DOLMAN: Nonetheless, we have a different system today and, as Karl has pointed out, it may be that if the United States were to unilaterally militarize space – and I am not advocating that necessarily, but it is an option – that it could in fact prevent an arms race. The trillions of dollars that would have to be spent to dislodge the United States from space, if it were to quickly seize control of the low-earth orbit, might be seen as not worthwhile to another state. However, if we wait fifteen or twenty years until a state is able to challenge the United States in space, then we will have a space race. By putting weapons in space to enhance its military capabilities the United States today is saying to the world that in this period of American hegemony, it is not going to wait for problems to develop overseas until they bubble over into its area of interest, and then massively and forcefully fix that problem. No. The American way of war today, based on precision and on space capabilities, is to engage early using less force, using more precise force and more deadly force in a specific area, but with far less collateral damage. That is the new American way of war and we really cannot get out of it.

Impact Turn – Space Good: A2: Space Bad – Debris

Debris is inevitable and has no impact.

Dinerman 7 (Taylor. "Sticky airbags and grapples: kinetic ASATs without the debris." The Space Review. January 22, 2007, http://spacedebate.org/argument/2597)KM

Dangerous space debris is both man-made and natural, in the latter case in the form of micrometeoroids. Confusing the two is a great way to make the issue into more of a problem than it already is. The environment around Earth is certainly filled with space junk, but if this was as dangerous as has been claimed, spacecraft would be breaking up on an almost weekly basis. Space junk is a problem and always will be. The international agreements designed to mitigate the dangers have been useful, but cannot halt the creation of more debris any more than recycling laws halt the production of garbage. The trend has been moving in the right direction, at least until our Chinese friends decided to make a statement.

Debris doesn’t outweigh military objectives – prefer our impacts.

Dinerman 7 (Taylor. "Sticky airbags and grapples: kinetic ASATs without the debris." The Space Review. January 22, 2007, http://spacedebate.org/argument/2597)KM

Whatever happens the US should be wary of making too big a deal out of the orbital debris issue. All man-made activity in space produces debris. If the US or its allies worry too much about this question instead of simply deciding to live with it, the enemy will find ways of using this concern against the US, like in the case of the “collateral damage” question, where Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and others learned the lesson that when they kill civilians, they win, and when the US kills civilians, they win. If America’s space warriors concentrate on their primary mission, which is to defeat the enemy, destroy his space assets, and protect our own, all will be well. If, on the other hand, we end up concentrating on limiting the creation of space debris while avoiding the primary mission, we will hand the enemy a tool they will use to frustrate our goals. War is a dirty, messy business and cannot be waged cleanly, not in Baghdad nor in outer space.

Tech solves the impact – weapons can be developed with anti-debris capabilities.

Dinerman 7 (Taylor. "Sticky airbags and grapples: kinetic ASATs without the debris." The Space Review. January 22, 2007, http://spacedebate.org/argument/2597)KM

Fortunately, a few years ago a proposal was floated for as class of weapons that would destroy target spacecraft without directly creating any debris. This type of "co-orbital" ASAT would approach its target and envelop it with an airbag covered in a type of sticky substance. It would then fire a thruster so that the conjoined satellites would burn up in the atmosphere. If it worked as designed, no debris would be created. In practice it would be no easy task to design, test, and operate such a weapon, but it is not beyond the state of the art and would not create any debris. Figuring out what kind of sticky material is right for such a system would, by itself, be a fascinating project. The substance might have applications in other military and perhaps civil space systems. If the sticky airbag solution proves too difficult, the same goals might be reached using an ASAT equipped with grappling arms that would grasp the target before pushing down towards the atmosphere. The challenges of such a system are evident, not the least of which would be the need for some sort of decision-making software that would choose the best places to seize the enemy satellite during the final moments before contact.

\*\*\*Impact Turn – End Strength\*\*\*

Impact Turn – End Strength Good – Readiness

A strong ground force is necessary – technological strength simply is not enough, Iraq proves.

O’Hanlon & Kagan 7 (http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/other/Kagan\_OHanlon\_07.pdf, Frederick W. Kagan is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, specializing in defense transformation, Michael O’Hanlon is senior fellow and Sydney Stein Jr. Chair in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U S defense strategy, the use of military force, and homeland security, April 2007) NAR

Moreover, if there was any doubt, Iraq proves technology will not let us cut back on people. Other recent operations in Afghanistan (as well as Bosnia, Kosovo, Panama, and so on) also revealed the ineffectiveness of attempting to replace people with machines on a large scale. In most of the post-conflict stabilization (or counterinsurgency) operations we have seen or can foresee, there can be no substitute for large numbers of trained and capable ground forces, deployed for a long time. It is unacceptable, therefore, simply to demand a zero-sum soldiers-versus-systems trade-off in the defense budget. Prioritizing systems at the expense of soldiers has had dreadful consequences. If we overcompensate by now doing the reverse, it would store up enormous danger for the future. The truth is that the nation is at war now, the strategic horizon is very dark, and armed forces that were seized in the strategic pause of the 1990s are inadequate today. Transformation must proceed, possibly with a change in its intellectual basis and its precise course, and the ground forces must be expanded significantly. Meeting both requirements will demand increased defense expenditures for many years into the future, although there are some approaches we could pursue to mitigate that increase. But whatever the cost, a nation at war and in a dangerous world must maintain military forces adequate to protect its vital interests, or else face an intolerable degree of national insecurity.

End-Strength is key to military strength – it isn’t all about GIs.

Creators 6 (http://www.creators.com/opinion/austin-bay/how-many-ground-troops-does-the-united-states-need.html, December 2006)NAR

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Pete Schoomaker told Congress that the active duty Army needed more soldiers. The Army would grow to 547,000 by 2012, adding 65,000 new soldiers over a five-year period. However, the current Army chief of staff, Gen. George Casey, said last week that the Army needs 547,000 active troops within the next three years. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates supports Casey's boost. Gates also advocates expanding the Marine Corps' active force 27,000, from 175,000 to 202,000 Marines. I know it takes time to recruit and train soldiers, making a very rapid build-up unwieldy if not unrealistic, but in my opinion Casey's request is short by 100,000 troops. Last week, the Los Angeles Times featured a discussion between Phil Carter, a Los Angeles attorney who served with the 101st Airborne in Iraq, and me on military-related issues. Carter and I agreed that a 650,000-soldier U.S. Army is a more realistic figure given personnel demands and expected commitments. Carter argued that "America can no longer afford to run its steak-and-lobster national security strategy on a McDonald's budget." I agreed with his assessment, but pointed out that the personnel issue has another subtle dimension that stretches U.S. military personnel. America expects its military to win its wars, which means having war-fighters proficient with weaponry running from bayonets to smart bombs. But America also expects its military to competently use a trowel, auditing software and a doctor's bag, and occasionally provide legal, political and investment advice. That's been the military's burden since 1992, when the Era of Peacekeeping replaced the Cold War. Sept. 11 replaced the Era of Peacekeeping with a global war over the conditions of modernity, where the trowels and investment advice are often as important as combat skills. We need more troops. That will mean spending tax dollars — but with 300 million people, we have the recruiting pool to support a 650,000 soldier Army. We also need to get the skills of U.S. government civilian agencies into the field. That will take tax dollars and focused political leadership.

Impact Turn – End Strength Good – Readiness

Ground forces key – they’re critical to deterrence in multiple scenarios and need expansion now.

Kagan and O’Hanlon, 2007 (Frederick and Michael \*P.h.d from Yale, professor at Westpoint\*\* Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution, April 2007 “The Case for Larger Ground Forces” Stanley Foundation, Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide)KM

Sound US grand strategy must proceed from the recognition that, over the next few years and decades, the world is going to be a very unsettled and quite dangerous place, with Al Qaeda and its associated groups as a subset of a much larger set of worries. The only serious response to this international environment is to develop armed forces capable of protecting America’s vital interests throughout this dangerous time. Doing so requires a military capable of a wide range of missions—including not only deterrence of great power conflict in dealing with potential hotspots in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Persian Gulf but also associated with a variety of Special Forces activities and stabilization operations. For today’s US military, which already excels at high technology and is increasingly focused on re–learning the lost art of counterinsurgency, this is first and foremost a question of finding the resources to field a large-enough standing Army and Marine Corps to handle personnel intensive missions such as the ones now under way in Iraq and Afghanistan. Let us hope there will be no such large–scale missions for a while. But preparing for the possibility, while doing whatever we can at this late hour to relieve the pressure on our soldiers and Marines in ongoing operations, is prudent. At worst, the only potential downside to a major program to strengthen the military is the possibility of spending a bit too much money. Recent history shows no link between having a larger military and its overuse; indeed, Ronald Reagan’s time in office was characterized by higher defense budgets and yet much less use of the military, an outcome for which we can hope in the coming years, but hardly guarantee. While the authors disagree between ourselves about proper increases in the size and cost of the military (with O’Hanlon preferring to hold defense to roughly 4 percent of GDP and seeing ground forces increase by a total of perhaps 100,000, and Kagan willing to devote at least 5 percent of GDP to defense as in the Reagan years and increase the Army by at least 250,000), we agree on the need to start expanding ground force capabilities by at least 25,000 a year immediately. Such a measure is not only prudent, it is also badly overdue.

Impact Turn – End Strength Good – Readiness

Increasing end strength immediately boosts morale—the perception of a force capable of reducing operational tempos is enough to enhance readiness and boost recruitment

Reed and Hagel, 04 (Jack and Chuck, US Senators, Federal News Service, “NEWS CONFERENCE WITH SENATOR JACK REED (D-RI) AND SENATOR CHARLES HAGEL (R-NE) RE: LEGISLATION TO EXPAND THE SIZE OF THE ARMY”, 3/4, lexis)KM

Q Could I ask you to elaborate some on the manifestations of the stress that the force is under? How do you see the stress? What are the consequences, and particularly as it affects the Guard? SEN. REED: I'll just start. I have two Military Police companies and a Military Police battalion in Iraq from the Rhode Island National Guard. They've done a magnificent job. And no one knows for sure what their reaction is going to be when they come back in about a month. But having deployed previously, about two years ago, to the Balkans, and now this second deployment, a very long, about 16-month, deployment, there is a feeling, at least, or an anticipation that some, if not many, of these soldiers will decide that they can't continue to serve. I think that feeling will be accelerated if we don't increase the size of the end strength of the Army because they can do the math, too. If the Army stays this size they're going again and they're going very quickly. I think we'll also -- and General Abizaid was asked today about the impact on force retention and recruitment, and he expressed some concern. He was confident that we could weather this storm -- he is more confident than I -- but he expressed concern about retention of young officers, which is a key factor in any military force, and younger NCOs. So these are beginning to show some stress, and the -- Q Will increasing the size of the Army relieve the pressure on the -- SEN. REED: It will certainly relieve the pressure on the National Guard, both I think initially in terms of perception -- perception as being there's a bigger active force, I'm not going to be called in six months to go -- but also reality. Eventually the active force will be doing more. Another point that we're looking at -- we're trying to find data. It's hard sometimes to do this. One of the major sources of recruitment for the National Guard and reserves are regular soldiers who are leaving and will go into the Reserve/National Guard. I wonder now, if regular soldiers are leaving the active force right now, whether they'll go into the Reserve/National Guard simply because my presumption is they're leaving because they don't want to go back again into Iraq or Afghanistan or someplace else, and they won't join the Guard because they know they'll be headed that way. SEN. HAGEL: The only thing I would say in addition to that, the recruitment/retention issue is an issue and it's going to become more of an issue, and not because I say it or Senator Reed says it, but we hear from people who we represent. We hear from their families. We hear from their employers. We hear from their communities. And we hear from them personally, and some are willing to go on the record with the press. When I was back in Nebraska over Christmas, I had two Reserve officers, captains, talk to the press about this. But also one additional point: morale, morale of the troops. And morale is a very significant factor because morale directs everything. Morale directs not just the feeling of the nobleness of the purpose and the cause, but there's an alertness factor. You drift into a dullness that is very dangerous in combat or in what we're doing in nation building and peacekeeping around the world. And if you lose the morale of the troops, then you've lost something that's irreplaceable and is very difficult to get back. And there's no question in my mind that this increase of force structure helps address this.

Impact Turn – End Strength Good – Terrorism

**Intense ground-force presence is critical to providing stability to Iraq and Afghanistan.**

Bruner 5 (http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/42484.pdf, Edward F. Bruner, January 3rd 2005, Specialist in National Defense

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division) NAR

Specific types of forces needed will be defined by perceptions of future requirements, recent experiences, and response to current stresses. Congress influences the type of forces to be acquired by allocating end strength among the four Services. Further refinements occur as specific weapons systems and materiel are developed and procured, and through the oversight process. Whether or not to create dedicated “constabulary” forces remains an issue. Substantial ground combat forces will likely be needed as “stabilization” efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq have no defined end point20 and other nations of concern, such as Iran, Syria, and North Korea, retain a potential for future armed confrontation. Combat campaigns in both Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated the value of U.S. Special Operations Forces. SOF strength is being increased and is particularly important to the War on Terrorism, but that strength is accounted for within the Services that contribute their personnel to SOF units. In Iraq, the ability of U.S. mechanized infantry and armored forces to survive and prevail against both regular and nonconventional enemy forces, even in urban areas, was striking. To reinforce success, some advocate maintaining and increasing units armed with Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles.21

End strength is key to solving terrorism – war is ground troop intensive.

Kagan 6 (Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute August Frederick, Foreign Affairs, “The U.S. Military Manpower Crisis, July/August, www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.24584/pub\_detail.asp)KM

Three hundred forty-five million dollars can, roughly speaking, buy one F-22 Raptor--the U.S. military's new stealth fighter plane--or pay the average annual cost of 3,000 soldiers (although it would cost far more to equip, maintain, and deploy either the fighter or the troops). The soldiers are a better investment. Yet U.S. military personnel, pundits, and policymakers have been downplaying the importance of ground forces since 1991. Even today, in the face of ongoing, manpower-intensive counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Bush administration is emphasizing long-range strike capabilities over land forces. The recently released 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and the president's budget proposal for fiscal year 2007 both reaffirm this priority. The administration has maintained this emphasis despite the fact that the long-term neglect of U.S. ground forces has caused serious problems in the Iraqi and Afghan campaigns. If not corrected, moreover, this neglect will cause even worse problems in the future. War is fundamentally a human activity, and attempts to remove humans from its center--as recent trends and current programs do--are likely to lead to disaster.

Impact Turn – End Strength Good – Inevitable

End strength changes are inevitable – empirically, they are temporary fluctuations in force size.

Bruner 5 (http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/42484.pdf, Edward F. Bruner, January 3rd 2005, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division)KM

Administration End Strength Initiative. Before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) on January 28, 2004, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker, testified that he had been authorized by the Secretary of Defense to increase end strength of the Army by 30,000 personnel on a temporary, emergency basis.9 He argued that a permanent, legislated increase would be unwise and unnecessary. He asserted that a permanent increase would create a burden on planned defense budgets in the out years, citing $1.2 billion annually for each increase of 10,000 troops. Some ongoing programs were presented as, over time, providing a more efficient and usable force structure within current Army end strength.

Debates about end strength are ongoing – changes are inevitable.

Bruner 5 (http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/42484.pdf, Edward F. Bruner, January 3rd 2005, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division)KM

Considerations for Congress. Congress debated the Administration’s end strength initiative in the FY2005 defense authorization bill. The Senate version, S. 2400, endorsed the Administration’s proposal to increase the Army by 30,000 temporarily over three years. The House version, H.R. 4200, boosted the Army by 30,000, added 9,000 Marines, and designated $1.2 billion of Iraq War funding towards associated costs. The result (P.L. 108-375) was to increase the Army by 20,000 and the Marine Corps by 6,000 in FY2005, allowing for a further increase in FY2006.11 Various considerations could influence the future debate. The “right” size for the military addresses military requirements now and in the future. The Administration acknowledges current stresses on the force, but interprets the situation as a “spike” in requirements that will return to a lower, more manageable “plateau.” Critics counter that the war on terrorism and occupation of Iraq could endure for many years and that the continuing potential for sudden, major crises, such as in Korea, requires a robust U.S. military force.12 One’s view of the future determines one’s idea of acceptable risk.

Impact Turn – End Strength Good – A2: Modernization

Tech isn’t enough – a large ground force is key to solving all threats.

Peters 6 (Ralph, former Army officer, “The Counterrevolution in Military Affairs,” The Weekly Standard, 2/6,

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/649qrsob.asp)KM

From Iraq's Sunni Triangle to China's military high command, the counterrevolution in military affairs is well underway. We are seduced by what we can do; our enemies focus on what they must do. We have fallen so deeply in love with the means we have devised for waging conceptual wars that we are blind to their marginal relevance in actual wars. Terrorists, for one lethal example, do not fear "network–centric warfare" because they have already mastered it for a tiny fraction of one cent on the dollar, achieving greater relative effects with the Internet, cell phones, and cheap airline tickets than all of our military technologies have delivered. Our prime weapon in our struggles with terrorists, insurgents, and warriors of every patchwork sort remains the soldier or Marine; yet, confronted with reality's bloody evidence, we simply pretend that other, future, hypothetical wars will justify the systems we adore––purchased at the expense of the assets we need. Stubbornly, we continue to fantasize that a wondrous enemy will appear who will fight us on our own terms, as a masked knight might have materialized at a stately tournament in a novel by Sir Walter Scott. Yet, not even China--the threat beloved of major defense contractors and their advocates--would play by our rules if folly ignited war. Against terrorists, we have found technology alone incompetent to master men of soaring will--our own flesh and blood provide the only effective counter. At the other extreme, a war with China, which our war gamers blithely assume would be brief, would reveal the quantitative incompetence of our forces. An assault on a continent-spanning power would swiftly drain our stocks of precision weapons, ready pilots, and aircraft. Quality, no matter how great, is not a reliable substitute for a robust force in being and deep reserves that can be mobilized rapidly.

End strength key – no tech can substitute a large stabilizing force.

Kagan and O’Hanlon, 2007 (Frederick and Michael \*P.h.d from Yale, professor at Westpoint\*\* Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution, April 2007 “The Case for Larger Ground Forces” Stanley Foundation, Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide)km

Moreover, if there was any doubt, Iraq proves technology will not let us cut back on people. Other recent operations in Afghanistan (as well as Bosnia, Kosovo, Panama, and so on) also revealed the ineffectiveness of attempting to replace people with machines on a large scale. In most of the post–conflict stabilization (or counterinsurgency) operations we have seen or can foresee, there can be no substitute for large numbers of trained and capable ground forces, deployed for a long time. It is unacceptable, therefore, simply to demand a zero-sum soldiers-versus-systems trade-off in the defense budget. Prioritizing systems at the expense of soldiers has had dreadful consequences. If we overcompensate by now doing the reverse, it would store up enormous danger for the future. The truth is that the nation is at war now, the strategic horizon is very dark, and armed forces that were seized in the strategic pause of the 1990s are inadequate today. Transformation must proceed, possibly with a change in its intellectual basis and its precise course, and the ground forces must be expanded significantly. Meeting both requirements will demand increased defense expenditures for many years into the future, although there are some approaches we could pursue to mitigate that increase. But whatever the cost, a nation at war and in a dangerous world must maintain military forces adequate to protect its vital interests, or else face an intolerable degree of national insecurity.

Impact Turn – End Strength Good – A2: Costs

Personnel spending is lower in priority – it doesn’t have an effect.

Conetta 10 (“An Undisciplined Defense Understanding the $2 Trillion Surge in US Defense Spending” Carl COMMONWEALTH INSTITUTE 18 January, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/~/media/Fiscal-Times/Research-Center/Budget-Impact/Think-Tanks/2010/01/18/An-Undisciplined-Defense.ashx?pid={8C2801AD-D4B2-47A4-B581-D5BC72F117FE}0)KM

Shifts in spending priorities: Looking at how the four main “accounts” have fared relative to each other shows O&M spending to have advanced most significantly. Its relative importance began to increase in the early 1990s. Research & Development funding followed a similar trajectory. Procurement, by contrast, has become more important relative only to military personnel spending, which has slipped in importance. The greater emphasis on modernization spending relative to personnel spending does not mean that US military power has become much more capital intensive than it was in 1989, however. This is because the principle budget shift, which has been toward a greater emphasis on O&M spending, actually involves a significant expansion of DoD’s workforce – by means of contract labor. 3.

Personnel costs are sustainable – reductions from the aff check back costs.

(“Toward a sustainable US defense posture: an option to save $60+ billion over the next five years” Carl Conetta Commonwealth Institute *Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Memo #42* 2 August 2007)KM

Third, reductions in force structure are associated with direct savings in personnel, procurement, and operations and maintenance. They also make additional savings possible in central support structures and functions – such as basic training, central logistics, and the military base infrastructure. The estimate given above for savings from the proposed cuts only marginally takes the latter type of potential savings into account because these are likely to be realized only in the case of a more comprehensive program of retrenchment and restructuring.

High end strength retention makes costs sustainable.

National Journal ‘2 (‘High retention rates in military save Pentagon money’, Nov. 22, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1102/112202nj2.htm)KM

There is no disagreement at the top of the Pentagon that the higher retention rates mean fewer civilians have to be enticed to serve in the military, and that saves big bucks. The Pentagon pegs the cost of recruiting each new civilian at $12,300.

Impact Turn – A2: End Strength – Shifts to PMC’s

Lowered end strength causes dependency on PMC’s, not the other way around.

Gallup 8 (Heather L, 01-Mar “Blending the Battlefield: An Analysis of Using Private Military Companies To Support Military Operations In Iraq; AIR FORCE INST OF TECH WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING, http://www.stormingmedia.us/77/7714/A771484.html)KM

Over the past fifteen years, the Department of Defense has experienced an increasing trend in the outsourcing and privatization of military operations. Key factors contributing to the growth include declines in military budgets, reductions in active duty end-strength, increases in operational deployments, advancements in weapon system technology, and evolutions in the nature of warfare. However, the continued escalation of incorporating Private Military Companies (PMC’s) on the battlefield creates unique challenges. The purpose of this exploratory and descriptive research is to identify utilization rates, describe the types of roles being fulfilled, and synthesize the challenges of augmenting military manpower with civilian contractors. For this effort, the research scope is primarily focused on exploring the use of PMC’s to support battlefield operations in Iraq. The research strategy involves the collection, reduction, and analysis of existing census data and secondary archival data from multiple sources. To add flexibility to the study, interactive data analysis techniques are employed using a combination of several qualitative methodologies. The conclusions drawn from the resulting data analysis framework are intended to facilitate a better understanding of the complexities of using civilian contractors in a war zone as well as outline key focus areas for improving the planning, management, and oversight of PMC operations. In addition, this research expands the existing body of knowledge on this dynamic topic.