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1NC

Russia is gearing toward expansionist policies in the status quo – but US presence globally prevents action

**Bugajski 10**(Janusz, holder of the Lavrentis Lavrentiadis Chair and director of the New European Democracies program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Russia’s Pragmatic Reimperialization” CRIA Vol. 4(1))AQB

Russia’s leaders believe that the world should be organized around a new global version of the 19th century “Concert of Europe” in which the great powers balance their interests, and smaller countries orbit around them as satellites and dependencies. From their point of view, in addition to having enduring interests, Russia also has enduring adversaries, particularly NATO and the U.S., in a competition to win over satellite states. For the Kremlin leadership there are only a handful of truly independent nations which must act as “poles of power” in a multipolar world order. Unipolarism, where the U.S. dominates world politics, must be replaced in order to establish checks and balances between the most important power centers. According to President Medvedev, the “continuing crisis of Euro-Atlantic policy is brought about by the “unipolar syndrome.”1 Russia’s regime does not favor working within multilateral institutions where its sovereignty and decision-making may be constrained, aside from privileged clubs such as G8 or the UN Security Council (UNSC).2 Hence, Moscow prefers multipolarity to multilateralism, where its power is enhanced rather than its involvement in cumbersome bodies where its power is diminished by the presence of several smaller countries. Russia is also more interested in regional organizations than global bodies, especially where it can play a leading role within them or act as a counterweight to Western leadership. Russia also favors participation in inter-institutional frameworks, in which it can assume an equal position to that of the EU, the U.S., or NATO, such as within the “Quartet” which deals with the Middle East peace process.

Military presence is key to block Russian expansionism

Klein 8(Brian, International Affairs Fellow in Japan, “What Goes Around Comes Around for Russia” Council on Foreign Relations)AQB

The West has a few potentially effective options in countering any further Russian forays into territorial adventurism. The flight of Western capital and a strong show of military support should raise the stakes high enough in the short term to discourage new Russian incursions. Russia’s access to the international economic system could be limited and its G8 membership suspended if it chose more aggressive action (most notably in Ukraine). Russian passports for the citizens of South Ossetia and Abkhazia won’t bring U.N. membership, trade, investment or international recognition. Sitting undeveloped on the edge of Russia like far-flung Soviet republics of the past, they will be reminded of the lost benefits of not integrating with the West. By contrast, U.S. support to Georgia to the tune of $1 billion (approximately 10 percent of the country’s 2007 GDP) will bring new development and jobs. The threat of energy-supply disruptions is probably Russia’s strongest leverage. It underscores that Europe must develop a broad energy policy that diversifies supply and reduces demand as a matter of national security. Russia’s coercive energy policy should put Japan on guard, especially with regard to possible codevelopment in Siberia. Ultimately a more productive relationship with Russia needs to be re-established. An appropriate incentive, after the defensive rhetorical dust has settled, would be to have serious negotiations on a new European security arrangement, codeveloped by the U.S., Europe and Russia as equal partners. The road to that end has just become longer and more tortuous. For now, a rich emboldened Russia thinks it no longer needs the West and can act against neighboring countries with minimal consequences. But commodity prices are already falling and Russia will eventually need more foreign investment and the rule of law to reach the desired economic heights and the subsequent respect that engenders in the industrialized world. For the West and Japan, this ambitious climb must be followed closely.

1NC

Russian expansionism escalates to nuclear exchange

Knight 8 (Alex, Master's Degree in PoliSci, http://endofcapitalism.com/2008/08/26/imperialism%E2%80%99s-chess-board-war-in-the-caucuses-and-the-fall-of-pax-americana/, AD: 7/4/10) jl

Poland: a Nuclear War Flashpoint

U.S. foreign policy strategists are bitter and enraged over losing their chess piece in Georgia, and that doesn’t bode well for rational thinking amongst imperialists. The State Department’s immediate response to Georgia’s routing was to sign a deal with Poland on which it had previously been stalling, to put in place a missile shield by 2012. The deal includes 10 interceptor missiles and a battery of long-range Patriot missiles, operated by 100 U.S. troops. While the State Department claims the measures are to defend against “future adversaries such as Iran,” this is a pretty preposterous scenario, given that all the missiles are pointed at Russia.

Russia is obviously not happy, and is firing back with words, and maybe eventually with missiles of its own. The Russian military deputy chief of staff, Anatoly Nogovitsyn, said that “by deploying, Poland is exposing itself to a strike – 100%” from Russia. In the form of nuclear warheads. No, this is not the ’60s, and yes, Russia is threatening nuclear war, while Poland and the U.S. seem perfectly willing to risk provoking one.

US-Russia war is the only existential risk – sheer magnitude of nuclear arsenals

Bostrom 2 (Nick, Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford University, http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html, AD: 7/4/10) jl

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[[4]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn4)  Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

UQ – Russia has the Ability to Expand

With the US distracted in the Middle East Russia has the ability to re-establish its spheres of influence.

Zeihan 6/15/10(Peter, Stratfor Global Intelligence “The Kyrgyzstan Crisis and the Russian Dilemma”)AQB

STRATFOR often discusses how Russia is on a bit of a roll. The U.S. distraction in the Middle East has offered Russia a golden opportunity to re-establish its spheres of influence in the region, steadily expanding the Russian zone of control into a shape that is eerily reminiscent of the old Soviet Union. Since 2005, when this process began, Russia has clearly reasserted itself as the dominant power in Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Ukraine, and has intimidated places like Georgia and Turkmenistan into a sort of silent acquiescence. But we have not spent a great amount of time explaining why this is the case. It is undeniable that Russia is a Great Power, but few things in geopolitics are immutable, and Russia is no exception.

Russia has potential to expand its influence to Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Shiliyang 10(Sheng Chief Researcher with the Center for Global Challenges Studies, “My vision of the BRICs” April 15)AQB

Outside the BRIC framework there is the “group of 11 emerging countries”, which includes Bangladesh, Vietnam, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Turkey and the Philippines. Most of these countries also have good relations with Russia. Russia’s ability to influence the situation across the former Soviet Union has increased since the Russian-Georgian war, but CIS countries have also become more suspicious, and one effect of the war was the deterioration of relations with the major Western countries. With the help of the BRICs Russia has the opportunity to expand its international influence, increase its presence areas across the expanse of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and to extend the use of the Russian model of international cooperation. One of the many informal international structures in the contemporary world, the G7 does not include Russia. Although the G8 includes Russia, it is treated somewhat differently from the other members. Within the G20 Russia joined the large group of developing countries. The BRIC group is the only structure where, unhindered by Western lectures, Russia as the country with the strongest potential can play the leading role.

UQ – Middle East

Russia is looking to expand its influence into the Middle East.

Lukyanov 6/10/10(Fyodor, Russia in Global Affairs Journal on foreign affairs and international relations, “Russia’s Middle East Policy: All Tactics, No Strategy”)AQB

The commercial considerations are quite obvious. Intense international competition means that in many markets Russia is losing out to other nations due to its lack of technological prowess or political clout. Russian manufacturers (the defense contractors or the atomic industry) find warmer welcome in those countries which, for one reason or another, are at odds with the West. In the Middle East than means primarily Iran and Syria. Libya used to be in the same group – until about five years ago. The approach has obvious limitations: if a nation falls out with the West, it either becomes victim of political or economic pressure, including sanctions – or sells out its loyalties, as was the case with Tripoli. Moscow has always walked a fine line here, trying to protect its trade without straying beyond the boundaries of international law (i.e. not breaking any sanctions), or allowing its Middle Eastern dealings to sour relations with the West too much. Of course, Russia is trying to expand its presence in the region beyond the “problem” nations. It is also working to break into new markets – either traditional Western turf (the Gulf monarchies) or the former Soviet sphere of influence (the North Africa).

Russia has stepped up its attempts at gaining influence in the Middle East.

Lukyanov 6/10/10(Fyodor, Russia in Global Affairs Journal on foreign affairs and international relations, “Russia’s Middle East Policy: All Tactics, No Strategy”)AQB

Finally, as part of its efforts to bolster its international standing, Russia is trying to step up its relations with all the key international players. Moscow is the only capital of the G8 that can sit down at talks with almost every single player in the Middle East – with the possible exception of the Taliban, but including Saudi Arabia, Syria, Israel, HAMAS, Hezbollah and Iran. Russia has repeatedly tried to cash in on its unique position to secure a greater say in world affairs – but with little success so far, it has to be said. In itself, the ability to engage various players in dialogue does not confer greater sway. From time to time, this ability actually causes some tensions: the other players begin to suspect Russia of double or triple dealing, while expectations of real progress remain unfulfilled. Russia’s problem in the Greater Middle East is fairly unique. Moscow has too many interests there and too much leverage to be simply one of several players. And yet this leverage isn’t strong enough to shift the course of events or achieve equal standing with America. Moscow continues to play a complex game in the region, with all three of its key priorities in mind - but there priorities can often clash. Commercial interest sometimes stands in the way of political gains, and vice versa. The need to participate in the global game (on the Iran issue, for example) jeopardizes constructive relations with Tehran on the regional level (in the Caspian and the Caucasus). Nevertheless, for the time being Russia is likely to stick to its tactical course of keeping all its options option, without committing to any definitive strategy.

UQ – War on Terror

Russia’s cooperation with the US in the war on terror is a disguise to pacify concerns about Russian expansionism.

Bhatty 8(Roy Sultan Khan M.Phil/Ph.D candidate at Area Study Centre for Europe “RUSSIA: THE TRADITIONAL HEGEMON IN CENTRAL ASIA”)AQB

Moreover, Putin’s policies from 1999 to 2001 became an instrument in strengthening Russia’s position and to avoid any clash. It adopted a defensive posture to reduce cost. It strengthened relations with China and tried to increase links with Pakistan and the Muslim world. Russia initiated a policy of appeasement towards the US and the West so that it might pay attention to internal threats to its security. In continuation of this policy, Russia cooperated with the US on its war on terrorism.32 The US war on terrorism has provided Russia an opportunity to appease the West and to send them a message that they are facing the same threat having the same interests in respect of the emergence of “Islamic extremism”. Militant groups active in Chechnya and Xinjiang were getting support from Taliban government of Afghanistan. The US attack on Afghanistan broke the supply line to Chechens and Xinjiang’s Uighurs. The Taliban’s defeat psychologically degraded extremist groups active in the entire region and shattered their morale, which was also advantageous for Russia and China. Russia’s cooperation with the US in the war on terrorism should not be considered as just Russia’s effort to appease the US. In fact, cooperation is also a form of competition. States cooperate with each other to enhance their capabilities to compete with other states. Russia also entered into a cooperation mechanism with the US in this regard. While supporting the US, Russia has avoided becoming a bandwagon or a junior partner of the US and has also criticized US polices.

UQ – AT: Russia Doesn’t Want to Expand

Russia is militarily aggressive and wants to expand.

Petrou 8 (Michael, foreign correspondent at Maclean's magazine with PhD modern history from the U of Oxford, Aug 25, *Maclean’s*, 121(33), EBSCO)JM

It is now clear that Russia wasn't bluffing, and is unlikely to do so in future standoffs. Less than two decades after losing its Soviet empire, Russia is ready to re-establish control over independent states in its backyard, regardless of who their allies are. "With regard to the former Soviet republics it means that the competition for influence between the West and Russia has revived," Jeffrey Mankoff, associate director of international security studies at Yale University, said in an interview with Maclean's. "It never really went away, but what this means is that Russia is making a more assertive claim to have a say in their affairs and to want to bring them over to its side." Georgia is the latest country to face a renewed fight for its autonomy. But other conflicts -- not necessarily military -- will likely follow in places such as Ukraine, eastern Europe, and the Baltic states. Moscow has emerged from this altercation victorious on all fronts. It has shown that it has the will to crush -- all too easily -- a small neighbour, and it has sent a collective shudder through the other countries along its borders, all in the face of hollow denunciations from the outside world -- and not much more. The West -- specifically the United States, the European Union, and NATO, the latter two having opened their doors to countries that are also in Moscow's sights -- needs to decide exactly what it is willing to do in the face of the growing Russian threat.

Russia is now an authoritarian regime with Putin leading its imperial expansion.

Llosa 8 (Alvaro, director of the Center on Global Prosperity, Aug 13, *Deseret News*, p. A.13, ProQuest)JM

Of course, one could reverse his argument: Soviet imperialism was a continuation, not an antecedent, of Russian nationalism. Vladimir Putin and his stooge, President Dmitry Medvedev, have revived a tradition of Russian expansionism that dates back to Ivan the Terrible. The invasion of Georgia echoes Russia's annexation of that country in 1801 and again in 1921, when the Soviets crushed a short-lived Georgian independence. This has little to do with protecting South Ossetians, who a few years ago were vying for independence from both Georgia and Russia. And it has little to do with Georgian President Mikheil Saakash- vili's obvious miscalculation in responding to South Ossetia's latest provocation by trying to assert military control of that region. Russia had been planning this for some time, as demonstrated by the awesome efficacy of the assault, targeting areas well beyond South Ossetia and Abkhazia, another rebellious region, and mobilizing its Black Sea fleet. It would also be a gross mistake to think that the casus belli can be traced to Western actions such as the recognition of Kosovo's independence to the detriment of Russia's Serbian allies or NATO's push for an anti-missile system in Central Europe. Those moves, however imprudent given the psychology of Moscow's leaders, did not precede the emergence of post-Soviet nationalism in Russia. Quite the opposite: Moscow's foreign expansion is the logical continuation of authoritarian rule at home, which Putin has been consolidating for some time with the help of abundant oil and natural gas money. First, Putin made sure his country's feeble democratic institutions were replaced with autocratic rule. Most checks and balances were neutered: the judiciary, political parties, local governments, the media, private corporations, separatist regions. The security forces, the Orthodox Church and the energy industry became the pillars of the new regime. The first two, already steeped in Russian nationalism, required little purging. The energy sector needed some work, which is why the giant Yukos firm was broken up and its oil subsidiary gobbled by the government, as was Gazprom, the world's largest producer of natural gas. Once the Kremlin's control was established, there was little anyone could do about Russian expansionism. Europe imports vast amounts of natural gas and oil from Russia. The threat to reduce or cut off supplies, for instance by ceasing shipments through Ukraine, a major transit route, served to blackmail the European Union.

UQ – AT: Russia Doesn’t Want to Expand

Russia’s military is aggressive now – they are violating sovereign air space.

Amies 4/4 (Nick, writer for Deutsche Welle, [http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5416016,00.html] AD: 7/4/10)JM

In the most recent reported incident, two Tu160 Blackjack bombers, capable of travelling at 2,220 kmph (1,379 mph) and carrying up to almost 40,000 kg (88,000 lb) of ordnance including either cruise or short-range nuclear missiles, infiltrated British airspace over Northern Scotland on March 10. In this case, the Tu160s were intercepted by two RAF Tornado F3 fighters and, after a four hour stand-off, the Russian long-range bombers eventually left the borders of UK airspace and the RAF planes returned to base. The incident over Stornaway was far from an isolated case. Defense analysts have been recording a steady increase in airspace violations by Russian military aircraft over the past five years after such incidents dropped off considerably at the end of the Cold War. The RAF admitted afterwards that air crews had been successfully scrambled to intercept Russian aircraft on more than 20 occasions since the start of 2009. Analysts say that the incursions - increases in which have been recorded over Scandinavia, Northern Britain and in most European countries along the Russian border - have become more aggressive and brazen in recent months and represent a definite change in Russian military behaviour patterns, a sign that the Kremlin is embracing a growing tendency to flex its military muscles in the post-Cold War era. It is believed that these incursions are part of a new strategy intended to test Western response times to increasingly aggressive incursions. Each time intercept aircraft are scrambled, the Russia pilots obtain valuable information on reaction times which are then complied for analysis by military planners and warplane designers. The concern is that, should Russia ever want to invade airspace for hostile reasons, its pilots will know exactly how European air forces operate.

Russia has the means for expansion – they are modernizing their military.

Amies 4/4 (Nick, writer for Deutsche Welle, [http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5416016,00.html] AD: 7/4/10)JM

A British Ministry of Defence official, in an interview with The Daily Telegraph newspaper, said that Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was suspected of being responsible for ordering the show of strength, a point of view Margaret Klein, a Russia expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, agrees with. "Prior to 2007, there were no regular patrol flights by Russia's strategic bombers," Klein told Deutsche Welle. "They were mostly grounded and only took part in military exercises. On Putin's order, regular patrol flights of Russia's Tu-160 und Tu-95 were resumed in August 2007. Since then, Russian strategic bombers have increased their patrols over the Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic Oceans and are sometimes intercepted by British, American or Canadian aircraft. Russian authorities, however, have denied accusations that Russian airplanes have violated the airspace of European, NATO or North American countries." Margaret Light, a Russia expert at the Department of International Relations & Centre for the Study of Global Governance at the London School of Economics, agrees that Russia is showing the West that it should still be taken seriously as a military power. "Part of the increased activity can simply be explained by the fact that Russian pilots, who had no real flying practice throughout the 90s, are now actively flying," she told Deutsche Welle. "As for the infiltration, it is one of the myriad ways the Russians try to prove that Russia is a great power that should be treated with the respect due to its great power."

UQ – AT: Russia Doesn’t Want to Expand

Russia is preparing to expand its regional influence.

Torbakov 9 (Igor, Senior Researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in Helsinki, [http://www.upi-fiia.fi/assets/publications/UPI\_Briefing\_Paper\_38\_torbakov-kononenko.pdf] AD: 7/4/10)JM

However, Russia’s conduct appears to be powerfully influenced by the Kremlin’s own subjective perception of how the recession is going to reshape the world’s geopolitical landscape. There seem to be two key elements in the Russian post-crisis strategic outlook. First, there is a strong belief among Moscow policymakers that although the crisis certainly hit Russia hard, the other global centres of power were seriously damaged as well. Thus, while globally Russia’s situation might not be any worse than that of its major geopolitical competitors, in post-Soviet Eurasia it seems to have weathered the financial storm much better than its neighbours, whose economies were literally ravaged by the crisis. Secondly, the Kremlin strategists appear to believe that the crisis is going to strengthen the trend towards greater multipolarity and regionalism. As Russia’s policy elite perceive their country to be one of the world’s several major centres of power, they seek to secure Russia’s position as a leader of a regional grouping which, ideally, would embrace all the CIS countries. Some of Russia’s latest moves seem to be influenced by this strategic outlook. First came Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s announcement that Russia is no longer interested in becoming a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on its own but would rather join as part of the customs union it has forged with Belarus and Kazakhstan. Second was the recent decision to give a significant boost to the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), including the creation of the bloc’s rapid reaction force. These moves suggest that Russia has indeed opted to play the role of a distinct regional power which is eager to offer its neighbours alternative non-Western economic and military institutions.

Russia is cooperating with the West now – but it wants to expand its sphere of influence.

Trenin 9 (Dmitri, director of the Moscow Center of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October, [http://www.twq.com/09october/docs/09oct\_Trenin.pdf] AD: 7/4/10)JM

Since its leadership abandoned the notion of integration first into the West (Boris Yeltsin following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991), and then with it (Vladimir Putin in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks), Russia has been defining itself as a self-standing great power with global reach. Its current ambition is to become a full-fledged world power, one of a handful of more or less equal key players in the twenty-first century global system. Seen from that perspective, the former imperial borderlands of Russia are deemed to be both elements of its power center and a cushion to protect Russia itself from undesirable encroachments by other great powers. This says a lot about Russia’s view of the world (Realpolitik/Realoekonomie: power competition and collaboration, under conditions of globalization), its self-image (a great power in a global oligarchy, holding primacy in its own neighborhood), and intentions (to advance to a high seat at the global governance table, where the Group of 8, Group of 20, United Nations Security Council, informal groupings such as BRIC [with Brazil, India, and China], and the proposed trilateral security structure for the Euro-Atlantic area are seated alongside the European Union and the United States). The aim is to bring about a less U.S./Western-centric system. Russia’s evolution in the next two decades and developments in the new states will decide whether this worldview bears relevance to contemporary international realities and trends, and whether the Kremlin’s ambitions can be fulfilled. For the purposes of this article, it will be important to see how Russia’s great power policies at the beginning of the twenty-first century differ from the traditional policies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. More specifically, is the current usage of the spheres of ‘‘privileged interests’’ instead of ‘‘spheres of influence’’ significant or is it a mere window dressing? Seen from a reverse perspective, how are the former Soviet republics/Warsaw Pact allies taking Russia’s new (old?) interests? Finally, what does it all portend for Russia’s relations with other power centers, such as China, the EU, and the United States, and with regional actors such as Iran and Turkey?

UQ – AT: Russia Has No Money

Expansionist policies will continue even in the midst of a failing world economy.

**Bugajski 10**(Janusz, holder of the Lavrentis Lavrentiadis Chair and director of the New European Democracies program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Russia’s Pragmatic Reimperialization” CRIA Vol. 4(1))AQB

Russia’s brewing domestic problems, precipitated by the global financial crisis and deepened by the drop in crude oil and natural gas prices, have not aborted its expansionist ambitions. On the contrary, Moscow uses the opportunities presented by the economic turmoil among its weaker neighbors to further impose its interests. It may seek to deflect attention from mounting social and regional disquiet inside the Russian Federation to cultivate the sense of besiegement by pressuring various neighbors in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia to abide by its foreign and security decisions. It is therefore important for the NATO allies to work more closely with a range of countries along Russia’s borders – from Ukraine to Kazakhstan – to ensure their independence and stability during a time of uncertainty and economic crisis. While President Barack Obama has symbolically pushed the “reset” button in relations with Moscow, some of Russia’s neighbors fear that instead of a “soft reset,” in which avenues of cooperation are pursued where there are genuine common interests, Washington may push a “hard reset” in which Russia’s imperial impulses are overlooked or accommodated. Indeed, the Putin-Medvedev tandem views reset buttons as the U.S.’s obligations to make compromises and as opportunities to expand and consolidate Russia’s influences. Moscow will therefore drive hard bargains to gain far-reaching advantages from Washington.

Links – Generic

US commitment to forward deployment is necessary to dissuade Russia from expansionism

Payne 9 (Keith, National institute for Public Policy President, Missouri State University Defense and Strategic Studies Professor, http://www.lanl.gov/conferences/sw/2009/docs/payne\_livermore-2.pdf, AD: 7/4/10) jl

Assurance involves allied perceptions of U.S. power and commitment,19 and the related questions of what and how U.S. strategic capabilities can address allies’ unique fears and circumstances. Useful insight regarding the requirements for assurance may be gained through an effort to understand allied fears and perceptions. The step of asking allies how the United States might best provide the assurance necessary to help them remain secure and confident in their non-nuclear status is an obvious first step. Some allies recently have been explicit that the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent is a key to their assurance and they link their own willingness to remain non-nuclear to the continuation of a credible U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. For example, senior Japanese officials have recently made and confirmed the following seven points: 20

• Some Japanese officials have become seriously concerned about the credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent;

• If the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent loses credibility, some in Japan believe that other security options will have to be examined;

• Some in Japan see specific characteristics of U.S. nuclear forces as particularly beneficial for extended deterrence; these force characteristics include a range of nuclear capabilities, flexibility, promptness, and precision to allow U.S. deterrence threats that are not made incredible by the prospect of excessive collateral damage;

• US “superiority” in nuclear weapons may be helpful for U.S. extended deterrence responsibilities;

• The overall quantity of U.S. nuclear weapons is important to the credibility of the extended deterrent and any further U.S. reductions should come only as part of a multilateral agreement for reductions among all nuclear weapons states;

• A global freeze in force nuclear numbers at this point would be useful because it would show which countries are intent on building up. Any future U.S. reductions must be structured to discourage any other nuclear power from expanding its nuclear capabilities;

• Japan supports the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, but this must be done in a careful, step by step manner that ensures Japanese security throughout the process; this mandates the maintenance of a credible U.S. nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future.

NATO allies often insist that U.S. nuclear weapons must remain deployed in Europe to provide the necessary assurance while Japanese officials are equally explicit that U.S. nuclear weapons must be “on-call” in a timely fashion, but not deployed on Japanese territory. The contemporary challenge in this regard is obvious: as WMD spread to regional rogue powers, U.S. allies in rough neighborhoods correspondingly become increasingly concerned about the details of the U.S. extended deterrence commitment and the forces intended to make it credible.

Their various and diverse views with regard to U.S. nuclear force necessary for extended deterrence will need to be integrated and prioritized.

There is a direct connection between allied perceptions of the assurance value of U.S. nuclear weapons for extended deterrence and nuclear non-proliferation: the U.S. withdrawal of its nuclear extended deterrent coverage would create new and powerful incentives for nuclear proliferation among U.S. friends and allies who, to date, have felt sufficiently secure under the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent to remain non-nuclear.21 As a 2007 report by the Department of State’s International Security Advisory Board concludes:

There is clear evidence in diplomatic channels that U.S. assurances to include the nuclear umbrella have been, and continue to be, the single most important reason many allies have foresworn nuclear weapons. This umbrella is too important to sacrifice on the basis of an unproven ideal that nuclear disarmament in the U.S. would lead to a more secure world....a lessening of the U.S. nuclear umbrella could very well trigger a cascade [of nuclear proliferation] in East Asia and the Middle East.22

The United States can decide what priority to place on the assurance of allies, and how it will proceed to support that goal, but only the allies can decide if they are assured. In the contemporary environment, available evidence suggests strongly that assurance is an important goal and that the particular characteristics for U.S. nuclear weapons described above are critical to the assurance of key allies.

3. Dissuasion and Inducements

Another national goal that should be included in the measure of U.S. strategic force adequacy is dissuasion. Dissuasion also is not new; it was articulated well as a national goal by Secretary McNamara in the 1960s,23 and the Clinton Administration’s “lead and hedge” strategy was intended to help dissuade a Russian return to arms racing.

Dissuasion is the “flip side” of the traditional recommendation that U.S. strategic force choices be guided by the expectation that U.S. restraint would induce opponents’ restraint. The expectation is that U.S. armament choices should be shaped by the goal of affecting opponents’ weapons acquisition policies. With dissuasion, the contention is that in some cases the manifest capability of standing U.S. forces or the U.S. potential for the acquisition of strategic capabilities can discourage opponents from competition; the goal is to undercut the opponent’s expected value from arms competition to such an extent that the opponent decides against competition.

Dissuasion adds a unique temporal dimension to the measures of merit for U.S. strategic forces and the definition of adequacy. The seeds of dissuasion must be sown in advance of the manifest appearance of a threat. To discourage opponents from taking the course of armaments competition, by definition, requires the dissuasive effect of U.S. strategic potential when opponents are making acquisition decisions, not after the threat emerges. If dissuasion works, the feared competition never materializes. There are several possible contemporary U.S. dissuasion goals, including:

• Rogue states from investing in WMD and missiles;

• The Chinese leadership from pursuing a significant buildup of strategic nuclear weapons; and,

• The Russian leadership from reverting to the former Soviet goal of building up its strategic forces in pursuit of counterforce capabilities against the United States.

Links – Generic

>CONTINUED<

Whether and how the character of U.S. strategic forces can contribute to dissuasion is not self-evident, and numerous uncertainties are unavoidable in attempting to dissuade. Nevertheless, the potential for dissuasion linkages may yield to examination, and considering how to dissuade opponents and potential opponents via the size and character of U.S. strategic forces is as coherent a goal as attempting to induce an opponent’s inaction via U.S. inaction—a related self-described element of U.S. strategic policy for decades.

For example, the continued unbeatable survivability of U.S. deterrent forces may be a key to discouraging any future incentives for Russia or China to see value in a Soviet-like bid to acquire extensive counterforce strategic capabilities. And, the U.S. potential to develop, deploy and reconstitute forces in a timely way may be a key to the U.S. capability to dissuade opponents from taking unwanted deployment initiatives.

**Links – Generic**

If the US pulls out of the East, Russia will roll in

Taylor 6/10 (Andrew Lewis, Foreign Affairs advisor, June 10, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2010/06/10/andrew-peek-eastern-europe-russian-influence-disinterest/)KFC

Unfortunately, when the 2008 war broke out, Vladimir Putin immediately flew home from the Beijing Olympics while President Bush stayed for the swimming. Nothing could have more vividly signaled the world that Russia was free to start the rollback of westernization in the communist world. And so, Russia surges forward. Autocratic Russia has never liked stasis. Its borders have always been in motion, expanding or contracting, depending on the resistance it meets. Most of this movement has no real impact on Russia’s relations with the outside world. If the West draws back, Russia pushes forward; but Russia will not view the Outside warmly in response, nor will it stop pushing on its new borders. Russia will not view such abdication as a concession, but as a right. If I were the Poles, I’d be worried. The line between liberal West and autocratic East is, with U.S. diplomatic acquiescence, creeping back across Europe, darkening the old Russian vassals one at a time. There’s not even much need for force. In part, the U.S. accedes because it desperately wants Kremlin support for UN sanctions on Iran. Fair enough. But in exchange, Russia gets – well, frankly, whatever Russia wants. It’s a smorgasbord of concession: slack on human rights, troops in Georgia, ships in Ukraine, cyber attacks on the Baltic States, no ground-based missile defenses in Poland or the Czech Republic, and a (more) friendly government in Kyrgyzstan. President Obama has taken America’s hands-off policy during the Georgia war and thrown it into overdrive. It is no surprise that he now wants to increase nuclear cooperation with the Kremlin, longtime supporter of Iran’s nuclear programs. He is keeping his eye on the ball.

**Links – Generic**

US presence prevents Russian expansion.

Beehner 5(Lionel Council on Foreign Relations, “ASIA: U.S. Military Bases in Central Asia” Jul. 26)AQB

Primarily to uproot the Taliban and other terrorists, administration officials say. But there are other issues of concern, including stemming the flow of drugs, illicit nuclear material, and small arms illicitly crossing borders. The region is also rich in energy resources, and the United States has supported a new oil pipeline from Baku, Azerbaijan, to Ceyhan, Turkey. This has led some to charge that the United States is really after the region's oil. "[Washington is] killing two birds with one stone," fighting terrorists while securing energy sources, says Lutz Kleveman, author of The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia. Others say the U.S. presence in Central Asia is aimed more at curbing the influence of Moscow in the region. "A fundamental objective of the U.S. government is to prevent any neo-imperial revival in Eurasia," says Stephen J. Blank, an expert on Central Asia at the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute. Central Asian leaders themselves increasingly accuse Washington of seeking a permanent presence in the region for reasons unrelated to its war on terrorism. At the SCO's July 5 summit, Uzbek President Islam Karimov, whose government is widely accused of corruption and human-rights abuses, said Washington has "far-reaching geopolitical plans, the final aim of which is to change the balance of power and dominate the Central Asian region." U.S. officials dispute this claim. "We have no territorial designs," General Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters July 14.

US commitment to NATO deters Russian expansion.

Carey 9(John, Canadian Military Journal, “SHOULD NATO SEEK FURTHER EXPANSION?”)AQB

Third, expansion furthers freedom, democracy, and free enterprise in Eastern Europe. Relying largely upon Woodrow Wilson’s democratic peace theory, NATO seeks to spread democracy and free markets because liberal democracies evidently do not declare war on one another. Furthermore, in the shadow of the past, supporters believe NATO represents a commitment by western nations, primarily the United States, to deter future Russian belligerence.12 George W. Bush, in his 2005 Inaugural Address, declared: “America’s vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one...it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.’13Generally, countries with a policy of democracy share similar values and beliefs. Free-market economic ties provide, to Western nations especially, access to financial opportunity. Moreover, there is less likelihood of human rights abuses within a democratic state.14 Critics of NATO expansion argue that the alliance must remain a European-Atlantic military pact that maintains traditional values, safeguards, and missions. NATO must not abandon its traditional transatlantic charter. Bringing in new members damages NATO’s credibility as ‘...fundamentally a defensive organization... NATO must focus on what it knows and does best.’15 Moreover, there is concern that the Article 5 Security Guarantee could be undermined as further countries join NATO.16 Because of uncertainty regarding Russia, new member states – particularly those from the former Soviet Union – could become entangled either militarily or politically with Russia and, consequently, lessen security for all of NATO’s membership.

**Links – Generic**

US troop commitment to NATO deters Russian expansion.

Rozoff 9(Rick, Center for Research on Globalization “Encircling Russia: US NATO Military Bases in Eastern Europe” Oct 24)AQB

As though a war of such monumental proportions was not enough for self-styled 21st Century NATO to manage, its chief Rasmussen delivered an inventory of additional missions while addressing the bloc's new Strategic Concept, including "nuclear matters," "cyber defence," "the difficult economic climate," "the effects of disruption in energy supply" and "perhaps the most global of challenges - climate change." [4] But his main focus was on two related subjects, both with Russia as prime antagonist. On the first topic Rasmussen asserted: "Energy security is [an] emerging challenge. Indeed, many countries...have already felt the effects of disruption in energy supply, and in the next few years, the competition for energy will only get more intense. This means that we need to think about how to protect our supply lines, our transit routes, and our critical infrastructure." His allusion was to collective NATO-U.S.-EU efforts to "lessen Europe's energy dependency" on Russia and to continue developing alternative routes for Caspian Sea and Middle East oil to enter Europe by circumventing Russia (and Iran). What, if the situation were reversed, would be condemned in Western capitals as an energy war. In mentioning "the meaning of Article 5," Rasmussen affirmed that "NATO’s core task was, is, and will remain, the defence of our territory and our populations. For our Alliance to endure, all members must feel that they are safe and secure. NATO has never failed in this respect." There is only one nation on earth against whom NATO can "defend its territory": Russia. His comments concerning "the challenge of cyber-attacks - which, as we saw in Estonia two years ago, can seriously destabilise a country" made the point even more indisputable. Rasmussen's address, finally, rehashed the 1989 George H.W. Bush speech A Europe Whole and Free [5] with the pledge that "our new Strategic Concept must reaffirm a long-standing NATO objective: to help complete the consolidation of Europe as a continent that is whole, free and at peace. NATO’s open door policy will continue. It will continue because it contributes to Euro-Atlantic security, and it provides a strong incentive, for aspirants, to get their house in order." The small and diminishing handful of nations in Europe not already in NATO supplying troops and military equipment for the war in Afghanistan and the three countries in the South Caucasus - Armenia's defense minister was at the NATO meeting to offer troops - are to be dragged into the Alliance, Russian apprehensions and objections notwithstanding.

Links – Containment

Military Presence contains Russia expansion

Talbott 9 (Strobe, President of Brookings Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0223\_russia\_talbott.aspx, AD: 7/5/10) jl

So in a very real sense, the political (as opposed to the geographic) “west” has Russia surrounded. That is a fact – and a formulation – that makes many Russians nervous, or worse, since “encirclement” is the English version of the word that they use for “containment”. But what is called for is emphatically not the cold war strategy based on a global chain of military alliances aimed at deterring or, if necessary, defeating Soviet expansionism. Of those pacts, only NATO survives precisely because it has – whatever the Russians may fear and say – taken on a post-cold war identity and mission.

Revitalising the NATO-Russia Council should, over the longer term, ease Russia’s neuralgia about the alliance. In the near term, the council could provide a forum for dealing with troublesome issues such as the Bush administration’s plans to base anti-missile defences in Poland and the Czech Republic and the Russian threat to counter those deployments with offensive rockets in Kaliningrad.

The Russians have provided an opening for renewed diplomacy. Since last summer, President Dmitry Medvedev has been calling for a “new Euro-Atlantic security architecture”. So far, except for rehashing old complaints and the unacceptable claim that other former Soviet republics fall within Russia’s “sphere of privileged interests”, Mr Medvedev and Mr Lavrov have been vague about what they have in mind.

That creates a vacuum that the United States and its European partners can fill with their own proposals. The theme of those should be accelerating the emergence of an international system (of which NATO is a part) that is prepared to include Russia rather than exclude or contain it, and to encourage positive forces in Russia that want to see their nation integrated in a globalised world organised around the search for common solutions to common problems.

Military presences deters Russian aggression

Klein 8 (Brian P, International Affairs Fellow for Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/17281/what\_goes\_around\_comes\_around\_for\_russia.html, AD: 7/5/10) jl

The West has a few potentially effective options in countering any further Russian forays into territorial adventurism. The flight of Western capital and a strong show of military support should raise the stakes high enough in the short term to discourage new Russian incursions. Russia’s access to the international economic system could be limited and its G8 membership suspended if it chose more aggressive action (most notably in Ukraine).

Links - Presence

Abandoning our military presence within allied countries sacrifices them to Russian expansion.

Johnson 8 (Daniel, journalist for the Sun, Feb 7, [http://www.nysun.com/opinion/putins-new-cold-war/70910/] AD: 7/5/10)JM

But "The New Cold War" is extremely — indeed, overwhelmingly — persuasive about the fate that has yet again befallen the unfortunate region of Europe that lies on the borderlands of East and West. For Mr. Putin's Russia, "repression at home is matched by aggression abroad." Whether it is targeting missiles at NATO countries or actually firing them at Georgia, Moscow has no compunction about using brute force to achieve its aims. The most worrying factor in the situation is not, however, the attitudes of the most part fiercely independent states in the Baltic, Caucasus, or Central Europe. It is the tendency of the wealthy countries at one remove from Russian power, but dependent on Russian energy supplies, that really gives cause for concern. Knowing how to play what Mr. Lucas calls "pipeline politics" is really the only contribution that Mr. Putin has made to Russian foreign policy during his eight years in office. But it has yielded political as well as economic dividends, despite the notorious inefficiency of Russia's state-run energy monopoly, Gazprom, whose chief executive, Dmitri Medvedev, is Mr. Putin's anointed successor. During the period after September 11, when America was preoccupied with the Islamofascist threat to the virtual exclusion of others, West European leaders mostly cozied up to Mr. Putin: notably Jacques Chirac of France, Gerhard Schröder of Germany, and Silvio Berlusconi of Italy. Mr. Schröder even stooped so low as to accept a job from Gazprom immediately after leaving office. During the past year or two, there has been a change of leadership and a notable hardening of tone: Chancellor Merkel of Germany and President Sarkozy of France have both talked tough to the Russians. But the energy dependency of Europe has increased if anything, while Russia's successful attempts to diversify its customer base in the far east has strengthened its bargaining in position. Russia may call the shots in its acrimonious relationship with NATO, but the real economic power still lies with the West. "The free market cannot be decoupled from the free society," Mr. Lucas states. As long as Europe and America do not abandon the small, weak states in Russia's sphere of influence, they can prevent the new Cold War from spiralling out of control. The Cold War was all about beating the Soviet Union at its own game, while keeping a clear sense of the ideological and moral gulf that separated the two systems. The Lucas thesis is in essence a plea for "a renewal of both that moral competition and moral distance." In the War on Terror, the West's greatest enemy is itself, as in the Cold War. "Until we make it clear that we believe in our own values," Mr. Lucas argues, "we cannot defend ourselves against the subversion and corruption that are leaking into our citadels of economic and political power." That's the point: we must believe in our own values. If we who have lived by this Judaeo-Christian moral code — including freedom, democracy, and the rule of law — do not proclaim it and fight to preserve it, why should the Russians, who have lived under one form of despotism or another since time immemorial, suddenly adopt it as their own? Whether it is defending itself against Islamofascism or Putinism, the Atlantic alliance must believe in its own mission before it can win the war of ideas.

Links – Weapons Systems

The US’s removal of weapon systems flues Russian expansionism

Reid 9 (Tim, Times, September 18, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article6839192.ece)KFC

The call the Polish Prime Minister had been dreading came from President Obama yesterday morning exactly 70 years after the Soviet invasion of Poland. It was to deliver news that appalled America’s new allies in Eastern Europe while triggering declarations of victory in Moscow. Mr Obama, who had earlier called the Czech Prime Minister, told Donald Tusk, of Poland, that he was scrapping plans for a US missile defence system based in their two countries. The move, one of the sharpest breaks yet with the policies of George W. Bush, signalled a huge diplomatic gamble by Mr Obama and a major concession to Russia, whose co-operation he desperately needs to achieve much of his foreign agenda. The $14 billion Bush-era programme — ten permanent interceptor missiles in Poland and a radar site in the Czech Republic — had infuriated the Kremlin. Moscow claimed that it would have been a direct threat to Russia’s nuclear arsenal, despite US insistence that it was solely aimed at defending Europe from Iranian weapons. The plan had thus become a major impediment to Mr Obama negotiating a new nuclear arms-reduction treaty with Moscow, and of persuading Russia to back tough new sanctions against Iran. Yet the system had been looked to by Eastern European governments as a US bulwark against the increasingly aggressive and expansionist behaviour of Russia, their former Cold War master. The decision to scrap it bought immediate expressions of dismay in the region, where governments are already unnerved by Washington’s recent efforts to “reset” relations with Moscow. A spokesman for the Polish Foreign Ministry described it as “a catastrophe”. Lech Walesa, the former Polish and Solidarity leader, said that the move was “not good”. Alexandr Vondra, the former Czech Deputy Prime Minister intimately involved in negotiations with the Bush administration over the system, said: “We expect the US to honour its commitments. If they don’t, they may have problems generating support for Afghanistan and other things.”

Links – Middle East

Russia now challenges the US for power in the Middle East

Sharashenidze 10 (Tornike, World Politics Analyst, 8 February 2010, http://eng.girs.org.ge/index.php?newsid=37)KFC

As a prelude, we will cover Russia’s relations with other major actors of the global system in advance of this discussion. Russia in the Global System Part 1 generally related to Russia’s recent history, its traditional foreign policy outlook and its security concerns. Here focus shall be upon concrete examples, which can help to further interpret Russian behaviour, especially, vis-à-vis other Great Powers. The relations with the US and Europe (or, as would be referred to in Russia, with the West) still hold a pivotal place in Russian foreign policy. The US was considered to be a “principal adversary” in the Cold War. Naturally, the expansion of American influence has been alarming Moscow since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The inertia of the Cold War has influenced not only the identity of its principal adversary but also the geography of the rivalry with the adversary; that is, Europe. Splitting up the Euro-American alliance was one of the major goals for Russia during the Cold War and this stratagem has recently been widely applied. In late 2007, Putin bluntly called for abandoning “the stupid Atlantic solidarity.” Otherwise, he said, it would be impossible for the West to improve its relations with Russia. Moscow wants NATO, as an alliance forging the so-called “stupid solidarity,” to be rendered obsolete as a “remnant of the Cold War.” In this case, the world will become more “multi-polar” with Russia enjoying more influence and power and the US becoming just another Great Power with its power dramatically decreased. Russian officials often stress that the US and Russia should build their relations as equal partners. This kind of rhetoric has recently emerged as Russia has somehow become able to challenge the US influence in the former Soviet Union with the American image having suffered due to the war in Iraq. Russian foreign policymakers believe that the US only understands the language of force and does not recognise the interests of other Great Powers (this belief stems from the experience of the 1990s). In order to preserve Russia’s interests, therefore, the US should not only be confronted but should be treated (at least verbally) as a peer to make it more co-operative. At the same time, Russia should find comfort in confronting the strongest international actor in that it raises its self-esteem and allows it to view itself as formidable as it was during the Cold War. The time for goodwill gestures has gone and Russia now has to show its willingness and ability to protect its interests by all available means (including military ones as happened in August 2008). Moscow is aware that in some areas (such as non-proliferation and fighting terrorism) its interests overlap with those of the US but these interests are clearly overridden by security concerns (and the US is considered the biggest threat to the Russian security). As for common concerns (proliferation, terrorism), herein Russia resorts to “passing the buck” and letting the US deal with problems such as Iran's nuclear problem (and creating obstacles in this question by vetoing relevant resolutions in the UN Security Council) thereby further increasing America’s burden. The more problems the US will have to deal with, the easier it will be for Russia to neutralise US influence in Europe and in the former Soviet Union.

Links – Afghanistan

Power is zero-sum – US withdrawal from Afghanistan causes Russian expansionism

Izzadeen 6/18 (Ameen, World Watch Staff Writer, http://www.dailymirror.lk/print/index.php/opinion1/13366.html, AD: 7/3/10) jl

The US knows it has lost the "Great Game" in Central Asia. Both Russia and China have virtually brought Central Asian countries into their sphere of influence. The only hold the US has in the region is in Afghanistan, a withdrawal from which will allow both China and Russia to establish a geographically contiguous zone of influence that may extend all the way to West Asia via Iran and Iraq.

This is why the US probably feels that checking Russia and China is strategically important. With China being the tougher target, the US focus is largely on Russia, which is not unaware of the US moves.

US influence in Afghanistan is necessary to contain Russia

Izzadeen 6/18 (Ameen, World Watch Staff Writer, http://www.dailymirror.lk/print/index.php/opinion1/13366.html, AD: 7/3/10) jl

The underlying message in the New York Times story is that the Americans are set to stay on in Afghanistan. Defeating the Taliban is not their sole objective. On the pretext of helping the Afghans to exploit their "new-found" mineral deposits, the Americans will stay on in Afghanistan to achieve three strategic objectives — to check China's growing influence in the region, to weaken Russia and to keep a close tab on developments in nuclear Pakistan.

Military presence in Afghanistan checks Russia’s influence

Stratfor 5 (Global Intelligence Think Tank, http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/156167/analysis/20100305\_russias\_expanding\_influence\_part\_3\_extras, AD: 7/3/10) jl

Ultimately, however, the logic behind a lasting U.S. presence in Afghanistan is not driven by domestic concerns, although the stability of the country itself is important to the United States. Now that Afghanistan is relatively stable politically, with a U.S.-backed candidate elected president, the United States can consider reversing the flow of its influence from projecting it into Afghanistan to projecting it from Afghanistan. A permanent presence would mean such a reversal, and a view of the surrounding region provides many reasons for the United States to make such a shift.

To the west sits Iran, with whom the United States is locked in a battle of wills over the Iranian nuclear program and the future of Iraq. Having the capability to project force into Iran from both the west via Iraq and the east via Afghanistan — not to mention from the Persian Gulf — would be a nice bargaining chip for the United States should the situation become more tenuous.

To the north are the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. The United States already has bases in two of them — Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan — that are supporting troops in Afghanistan. With the United States now competing with Russia and China for influence in the region, permanent bases in Afghanistan certainly would enhance Washington’s regional influence.

US deployment in Afghanistan checks aggressive Russian expansion

Konurov 9 (Andrei, Russian Analyst for Strategic Culture Foundation, http://en.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=2439, AD: 7/3/10) jl

The US has deployed 19 military bases in Afghanistan and Central Asian countries since the war began in October, 2001. These bases function autonomously from the surrounding space, are networked by airlifts, and get supplies from outside of Afghanistan, also mostly by air. The system of bases makes it possible for the US to exert military pressure on Russia, China, and Iran. As for Russia, this is a manifestation of the long-term US geopolitical strategy aimed at separating Russia from seas and locking it up in the Eurasian inland. More advanced phases of the strategy envision the US advancement deep into Eurasia, the gaining of positions in it that would weaken Russia's control over its territory, and – eventually – the elimination of the Russian statehood in Siberia and the Far East. Considering that in any war the US mainly relies on its air force, the above strategy can be implemented with the help of a network of isolated bases and does not require control over the entire territory of Afghanistan.

Links – Afghanistan

Troops in Afghanistan check expansion of Russia

Haleem and Jing 9 (Abdul and Lin - Staff Writers for China View, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/28/content\_11087266.htm, AD: 7/5/10) jl

The driving force for toppling Taliban regime and deploying troops in Afghanistan is to safeguard the interests of U.S. and its western allies in the war-torn Asian state, he said.

The observer said that the strategically important location of Afghanistan that links south Asia to central Asia has prompted Washington and its allies to snatch a foothold in this part of the world.

"Deploying troops in Afghanistan has enabled the U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to reach closer to Iran and Russian borders," Akhgar said, adding that "to safeguard its national interest, the United States has to keep its presence in Afghanistan."

US presence in Afghanistan prevents coalition of regional powers from expanding

Bhadrakumar 8 (M.K, Career Diplomat in Indian Foreign Service, http://www.japanfocus.org/-M\_K-Bhadrakumar/2996, AD: 7/5/10) jl

The US has succeeded in establishing its long-term military presence in Afghanistan. Ironically, with the deterioration of the war, a case is now being built for establishing new US military bases in Central Asia. While the US's close partnership with the Pakistani military continues intact, the search for new supply routes becomes the perfect backdrop for expanding its influence into the Russian and Chinese (and Iranian) backyards in Central Asia.

The veiled threat of reopening the "Kashmir file", which is patently aimed at keeping India at bay, also serves a useful purpose. Plainly put, the US faces a real geopolitical challenge in Afghanistan if only a coalition of like-minded regional powers like Russia, China, Iran and India takes shape and these powers seriously begin exchanging notes about what the Afghan war has been about so far and where it is heading and what the US strategy aims at. So far, the US has succeeded in stalling such a process by sorting out these regional powers individually. Indeed, Washington has been a net beneficiary from the contradictions in the mutual relations between these regional powers.

On the whole, the US holds several trump cards, given the contradictions in Sino-Indian relations, Sino-Russian relations, the situation around Iran, India-Pakistan relations and Iran-Pakistan and, of course, Russia-Pakistan relations. The US's number one diplomatic challenge at this juncture will be to pre-empt and scatter any sort of incipient coordination that may take place between the regional powers surrounding Afghanistan in the nature of a regionally initiated peace process. The US has done its utmost to see that the SCO proposal for holding an international conference on Afghanistan doesn't materialize.

Russia wishes to expand its influence in Afghanistan

Newsweek 10 (MSNBC News Organization, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/04/02/russia-invades-afghanistan-again.html, AD: 7/3/10) jl

Still, Russia's ambitions in Afghanistan go far beyond the drug war, and include building a pro-Russian constituency among the country's elite, dominating Afghanistan's multibillion-dollar infrastructure-development industry, and exploiting its underground wealth. "It is not too late. We are determined to activate our business cooperation with Afghanistan. Russia is first of all interested in exploiting Afghan gas and mineral resources," says Avetisyan, the Russian ambassador.

Links – Afghanistan

Russia is currently trying to expand in to Central Asia

Djuraev 5 (Ulugbek, AIA Central Asian section, 18.05.2005, http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=97)KFC

During the past months there has been much gossip in Moscow about the actions that the West undertakes to expel Russia from the post-Soviet space. After the change of power in Georgia and particularly in Ukraine, due to the plot of official Kremlin representatives, a real hysteria commenced in the local mass media. At the beginning of this year, following the growing confrontation- of the regime with the opposition in Kyrgyzstan, journalists and politicians in Moscow began to urge the expulsion-of Russia from Central Asia. Previously, the same concerns had been strengthened when the antiterrorist operation began in Afghanistan and the American military bases appeared in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Now, the Russians say that as a consequence of the "Velvet revolutions," the Kremlin will soon lose all its allies in the region, and satellites of the West will occupy their place. However, facts indicate the contrary. The hysteria displayed in Russia regarding the Western intrusion into Central Asia is no more than a propagandist cover for Moscow's expansion in the region. Means of Russian Expansion From the beginning of last year, the Kremlin has strengthened considerably its positions in Central Asia. Putting aside its former tactics of political blackmail - and pressure on the leaders of the region, Russia now places its emphasis on the promotion of its economic interests. Primary importance is attached to the strategic spheres in the economies of the Central-Asian states, such as oil and gas extraction, development of electrical infrastructure, and aluminum mining. Russia guarantied itself a monopoly in these spheres, leaving the other major players in the region (China, Iran, Turkey, USA) far behind. Along with this, since 2003 Moscow has in fact controlled the shipments of Turkmen and Uzbek gas to Europe. At the same time, Russia tries to bind the states of Central Asia in military and security spheres. This is done by supplying military equipment, signing bilateral agreements of military partnership (as in case of Uzbekistan, in July, 2004), performing joint training, and exchanging information in the framework of regional organizations (Collective Security Treaty Organization - CSTO, Shanghai Cooperation Organization - SCO). This year, the conduct of joint military training for the states of CSTO in Tajikistan, in the presence of Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov, was a clear affirmation of this tactic.. Under the excuse of opposition to the West, Moscow effectively uses the processes taking place in the states of the region in order to preserve and strengthen its influence there. Unlike their practice in former years, official Kremlin representatives prefer not to openly exert pressure on the ruling elites of Central Asia. In a clandestine manner, Moscow convinces them that the West inspires the "democratic" movements and secretly continues to support local Islamic radicals. In this way, according to the Russians, the West allegedly creates a real threat to the regional leaders, aiming to replace them with its own satellites.

Links – Afghanistan/Central Asia

Russia takes any opportunity to project power into Central Asia

Djuraev 5 (Ulugbek, AIA Central Asian section, 18.05.2005, http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=97)KFC

The recent Russian advance in Central Asia demonstrates that Moscow's policy in this region has become significantly more sophisticated than it was in the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. Using large national companies, the Kremlin strives to foster dependence in the strategic economic spheres of the economy in the Central-Asian states. This extends its abilities to influence political elites of the region, and strengthens the energy dependence of Central and Western Europe on Moscow. At the same time, exploiting the inner political problems of Central Asia, Russia rapidly increases its influence over the leaders of this region. March events in Kyrgyzstan were a powerful detonator for this process. Russia also attempts to use the recent destabilization in Uzbekistan to sabotage the relations of Tashkent with the West and to strengthen Russian positions in Uzbekistan. Moscow's successful advances in Central Asia, and the strengthening of its relations with Ankara and Tehran, have led to the formation in the region of a triple strategic alliance, including Russia, Turkey and Iran. This alliance obviously is of an anti-Western character, and it creates extremely favorable conditions for Russian economic and, eventually, military and political, expansion to the South. At the same time, during the past years, in the direction of the Southeast, Moscow has sharply increased its cooperation with India. In the Southwestern direction, Moscow has intensively reconstructed the strategic outposts of the Soviet epoch, resuscitating ties with Syria, Lebanese Druzes, and the new leadership of the Palestinian Authority. Hence, Russia has returned to its traditional expansionist policy of Tsarist and Soviet epochs, aspiring to embrace with its influence Central and South Asia and the Middle East. The only difference is in the fact that Putin does this in a much more veiled and sophisticated form than did the last Tsars of the Russian Empire and the Secretaries General of the USSR. However, the essence of the matter is the same as in the past: the Russian expansion is directed first of all against the West…

Links – Afghanistan/Central Asia

Russia is seeking to remove US influence in Central Asia to secure gas and oil interests.

Bhatty 8(Roy Sultan Khan M.Phil/Ph.D candidate at Area Study Centre for Europe “RUSSIA: THE TRADITIONAL HEGEMON IN CENTRAL ASIA”)AQB

Russia’s long-term interests in Central Asia are very clear and unambiguous. Russia wants to maintain stability in Central Asia to avoid any spill over effects. Conflicts in Central Asia would create a power vacuum that could develop security challenges for Russia. Stability in Central Asia is also a prerequisite for the smooth import of oil and gas from Central Asia. Russia desires to keep the CARs in its sphere of influence to ensure their cooperation, not only in energy supply, but also in other areas of strategic importance. The CARs’ oil and gas pipelines links with other regional states like Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and China and will integrate the CARs with these regional states which will hurt Russia’s long term strategic and economic interests. For instance, if the CARs succeed in transporting their energy resources through Turkey, Pakistan or Iran excluding Russia, it will result in large revenues in the CARs which they will use in establishing their independent forces and stable economies. Then, their dependence on Russia will decrease and Russia will always discourage such kind of developments. As a part of long-term strategy, Russia wants to counter any penetration by the US, US dominated institutions like NATO and regional powers.

Links – Afghanistan/Central Asia

US presence in central Asia mitigates Russian power and influence – excludes them from a major role.

Bhatty 8(Roy Sultan Khan M.Phil/Ph.D candidate at Area Study Centre for Europe “RUSSIA: THE TRADITIONAL HEGEMON IN CENTRAL ASIA”)AQB

Some liberals in Russia are of the view that Russia should not oppose the American presence in Central Asia as the US has capabilities to protect the region from danger of terrorism and an American presence will work as a buffer between volatile Central Asia and Russia. But these liberal thoughts do not match with ground realities and psychological impact that US presence can have on Russians. The US presence in the region mitigates Russia’s image as a great power. Expansion of NATO is a part of the strategy to increase US influence. The US and NATO’s emergence in Afghanistan was acceptable for Russia because the rising danger of Islamic extremism was threatening the CARs’ stability and ultimately Russia. But NATO’s success in maintaining stability in Afghanistan will set an example for world in peace making outside Europe. If in the future any security threat emerges in the CARs, NATO may be used in maintaining peace and stability excluding any key role for Russia. Russia has been unable to check burgeoning influence of NATO and the EU. NATO is not giving Russia any role in its decision making. In the words of Putin, the ‘US treats Russia like the uninvited guest at a party’.37 In the EU, Russia is not acceptable as its full member due to its large size. Psychologically the West has been afraid of Russia’s potential of expanding its power and influence on the European continent. Its huge size mismatch with the main European contenders can disturb the balance of power in Europe. Due to Russia’s status as an autonomous great power, it has also been reluctant to join different institutions where it does not have a decisive role in decision making. Moscow perceives the EU as backing the ambitions of US to achieve its regional and global interests. While economic compulsions will bring the EU and Russia close together, it is unlikely that Russia will integrate with the EU. Russian history, distinctive goals and Eurasian identity are some important factors that force Russia to pursue its own agenda instead of integrating with the EU.

Links – Central Asia

The US would not intervene if Russia started to expand into the Central Asia

Bhadrakumar 6/26 (Ambassador M.K., diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service, June 26, 2010, Mainstream 48(27), http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article2157.html

“We know that not only criminal but also extremist groups and Islamic fundamentalists have stepped up their activity in Kyrgyzstan itself and are making efforts to gain certain power,” CSTO Secretary-General Nikolai Bordyuzha said on May 12. When Islamic militants first burst into post-Soviet Central Asia in 1999, southern Kyrgyzstan figured in their sights. Last year they returned to the scene. The possibility of a radical group such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which was based in the Afghan-Pakistan region and active in Ferghana, stirring up the Uzbek-Kyrgyz ethnic cauldron cannot entirely be ruled out. The underground radical group Hizb ut-Tahrir is also known to be active in Osh. Conceivably, therefore, Moscow can expect a high level of understanding from Beijing for taking initiatives to try to stabilise the Kyrgyz situation. As far as Western powers are concerned, they lack any desire to intervene in faraway Kyrgyzstan. The US and European Union have their hands full with problems. The US’ passion for spreading democratic ideals has also significantly cooled. As Obama pointed out in his recent speech at the West Point Military Academy—and amply reflected in the latest National Security Strategy —the prevailing thinking in Washington is that the US should lead globally by setting its own example rather than resorting to adventurist, wasteful interventions. In sum, the main political obstacle, if any, to Russia’s historic decision in the upcoming days will come not from the great powers rivalling Moscow for influence in Central Asia, but from the complex, inter-weaving interests of Kyrgyzstan’s neighbours—especially Uzbekistan—and the accelerating meltdown of statehood in Bishkek.

Links – Turkey

Turkey can’t stop Russia on its own – an alliance is key.

Speldova, Sotola, and Trejbalova 9 (Aneta, Martin, and Tereza, researchers for the Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, a peer review journal, [http://cejiss.org/online/turkey/] AD: 7/3/10)JM

Preventing Russia from tightening its grip on the region is a second level challenge, one closely related to the challenge posed by Iran as these are mutually reinforcing. Without Russian support, Iran is vulnerable, and Russia is hampered if Iran were successfully ‘kept down.' An alliance policy (as noted above) could help increase Turkey's relevance, and reduce Russia's manoeuvrability, though Turkey is not powerful enough to ‘keep Russia out' on its own.

Russia has a vested interest in Turkey and the Caucuses – Georgia proves.

Hill and Taspinar 6 (Fiona, senior fellow at the Brookings Institute and Omer, prof of National Security Strategy at the U.S. National War College, January, [http://www.setav.org/ups/dosya/23841.pdf] AD: 7/3/10)JM

Russia’s current foreign policy outlook––overall, as well as in the Caucasus––is quite negative. This is in spite of the fact that Russia’s relationships with all of its historic enemies, including Turkey, China, Japan, Germany, France, Iran, and even the U.S., are arguably better than ever; and that Russia remains a major international player in a host of prestigious institutions including the G8 (which it chairs in 2006) and the UN Security Council. However, the rapid decline of Russia’s conventional military prowess after 1991; the entry of former satellites into NATO and the EU; the generally poor image, which Russia enjoys abroad, and the seeming absence of any close ally apart from Belarus, have compounded a deep sense of humiliation. The idea that Russia is friendless, or generally viewed, as an “Upper Volta with missiles” or “Upper Volta with a lot of oil and gas” does not sit well with the Russian political and foreign policy elite and the Kremlin. As a result, Russia has become a paranoid power in the international arena—increasingly concerned about preventing the erosion of its regional and global position; and about heading off the further expansion of the European Union, and the penetration of U.S. and other Western companies and interests into Eurasian markets. Moscow has pursued the creation of its own single economic space in Eurasia focused on major regional trading partners like Ukraine and Kazakhstan. And Moscow has also taken steps to counter “Western-sponsored” regional alliances with perceived anti-Russian tendencies—from NATO to GUAM and the OSCE—by insisting on special arrangements (like the NATO-Russian Council), by promoting its own alternative structures, or by deliberately undermining institutions (through, for example, its efforts to block the budget of the OSCE in 2005). Against this backdrop, a particularly old-style, “zero-sum” approach tends to dominate Moscow’s thinking about relations with its Eurasian neighbors––especially the Caucasus, the Baltic States, and Ukraine. Moscow wants the decisive say in its neighbors’ foreign policy decisions as well as in their economic investment decisions (a new form of Soviet-era “Finlandization”), and has heavily invested in maintaining the status quo. Russia is not quite so keen on, for example, taking the lead in resolving regional problems, like territorial conflicts in the Caucasus in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh––especially if a long-term settlement might forfeit a current Russian interest. Relations with Georgia, in particular, and the resolution of the secessionist conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are seen through this prism in Moscow. Indeed, the bilateral relationship with Georgia is perhaps the most contentious of Russia’s relations with its neighbours today. A serious clash between Russia and Georgia, provoked by Russia’s pursuit of the war in Chechnya, for example, was barely avoided in 2002. In this period, refugees and fighters from Chechnya moved into Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge, an isolated area with an indigenous Chechen population. Georgia initially did little to address the problem in spite of considerable pressure from Russia. The Georgian government was consumed with internal squabbles, the increasing unpopularity of (now former) President Eduard Shevardnadze, social unrest, entrenched corruption, widespread criminality, and the challenges of dealing with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. External observers, especially in Moscow, began to refer to Georgia as a “failed state.” After a tense period of mutual recriminations, covert Russian bombing raids inside the Gorge, Russian threats to send troops into Georgian territory, and the introduction of a U.S. program to train the Georgian military, the Georgian government finally launched its own counter-terrorism operation. This operation and a Russo-Georgian agreement to carry out joint border patrols provided a temporary solution to the problem, but Russian politicians, including President Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, make it clear that they still view Georgia as a failed state. And the confrontation between Russia and Georgia is as acute under new President Mikheil Saakashvili as it was under President Shevardnadze because of Moscow’s suspicions that the United States orchestrated the November 2003 “Rose Revolution” that brought him to power to bolster American interests in the Black Sea and the Caucasus.

Links - Turkey

Turkey fears Russian expansionism – Russians will exploit their dependency on the U.S.

Hill and Taspinar 6 (Fiona, senior fellow at the Brookings Institute and Omer, prof of National Security Strategy at the U.S. National War College, January, [http://www.setav.org/ups/dosya/23841.pdf] AD: 7/3/10)JM

The new Russian-Turkish relationship is certainly a development to be watched carefully in Europe––especially in the context of the EU’s attempt to forge a new Neighborhood Policy toward the Caucasus, in which Turkey, as a candidate country and the region’s closest neighbor, ought to be a playing a leading role. Turkish-Russian rapprochement is certainly better for Europe than having these two long-standing, and often bitter, geopolitical rivals engaged in territorial competition in the region. It is even plausible that a democratic and prosperous Turkey within the EU will influence Russia positively. But, it is also important at this juncture for the EU to realize that beyond some (albeit significant) common economic, political and security interests, the main driving factor in this Turkish-Russian rapprochement is a shared desire to maintain the status quo. While Turkey fears destabilization on its borders and the ramifications of this for its own territorial integrity, Russia is more concerned about American and European infiltration in its traditional sphere of imperial influence, and is trying to see what political and economic advantage it can exploit from Turkish fears and dissatisfaction with the U.S. and the EU. This is, therefore, a partnership that, for now, is more rooted in prevailing anxieties than in future hopes.

Turkey is vulnerable to Russian expansionism – the Russians will use force.

Torbakov 8 (Igor, Senior Researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in Helsinki, [http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/GeorgiaCrisisTorbakov.pdf] AD: 7/3/10)JM

All the frictions between Ankara and Washington notwithstanding, Turkey, a NATO member and U.S. ally, held that its ultimate geopolitical interest lay in the preservation of the “geopolitical pluralism” in post-Soviet Eurasia in general and in the South Caucasus in particular. Politically, maintaining “pluralism” meant the strengthening of regional countries’ political sovereignty, countering the growth of Russian influence in the Caucasus (which has been done largely in a covert rather than overt way), and fostering the development of closer ties between nations in the South Caucasus and Euro-Atlantic organizations. Naturally, Ankara’s understanding of “pluralism” included the growth of Turkey’s own influence in the region (like post-Soviet Russia, the post-Ottoman Republic of Turkey is a nation with a pronounced imperial outlook, which, depending on the context, readily regards itself as a Balkan, Middle East, or Caucasus power). It was within the context of the “geopolitical pluralism” policy that Ankara signed a limited defense cooperation agreement with Georgia and Azerbaijan.5 In 2006, Ankara offered Tbilisi $1.8 million in military aid. The agreement also provided an opportunity for Georgian officers to receive military training in Turkey.6 Economically, “pluralism” largely meant the construction of multiple oil and gas pipelines traversing the “Caucasus transit corridor” (and Turkey’s territory) and bringing Caspian hydrocarbons to the world markets while bypassing Russia. Turkey’s strategic goal has been to maximally exploit the economic dimension of the “pluralism” policy in order to turn the country into a major energy transit hub, through which Caspian fuel would be transported to Europe and other markets. It would appear that this goal so much cherished by Turkish elites was almost within reach before the Georgia war broke out: two major projects – the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the parallel Baku- Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline – had been recently realized, and several new ambitious projects, such as the Trans-Caspian pipeline and Nabucco pipeline, were being actively discussed. Clearly, these aspects of Ankara’s policies in the Caucasus have been not to Moscow’s liking: Turkey has effectively sought to rival Russia, both as an assertive geopolitical player in the Caucasus and as an alternative energy conduit. But on the other hand, over the last five to seven years, Russia has become Turkey’s major trading partner, and energy cooperation (particularly the supply of Russian natural gas) plays an extremely important role in the overall context of economic relations between the two countries. For example, Turkey depends on Russia for 29 percent of its oil and 63 percent of its natural gas. “The trade volume between Turkey and Russia is expected to reach $38 billion this year, up from $27 billion the previous year, according to Turkish estimates,” reported the Turkish Daily News.7 Turkish investments into the Russian economy amount to $5 billion, and the overall volume of Russian contracts signed by Turkish construction firms is in excess of $25 billion.8 Furthermore, Ankara’s sophisticated diplomacy has always been inclined to look for suitable compromises with Moscow and is ready, if need be, to accommodate Russia’s strategic interests in the Caucasus. Since the preservation of the status quo in the South Caucasus – and thus the ability to pursue an ambivalent policy – by and large suited Ankara’s purposes just fine, the key foreign policy mantras reiterated by the Turkish elite have until very recently been “maintaining regional stability” and “keeping intact the existing balance of power and interests.” The Georgia war disrupted the pre-August 7 status quo as Turkey’s two main pillars of regional policy were effectively destroyed: two of the Caucasus “frozen” conflicts became “defrosted”, and Russia chose to forgo restraint, displaying instead the willingness and resolve to resort to force. A new kind of game ushered in by the Russian invasion of Georgia made it abundantly clear that Turkey’s political and economic interests in the region are vulnerable. That’s why Ankara wasted no time embarking on an urgent “damage control” operation, having advanced a grand scheme to (re)stabilize the region – the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP). Remarkably, the Turkish leadership chose Moscow as the venue where the regional pact’s blueprint was first unveiled.9 The decision reflects Ankara’s awareness of an increasingly complex reality: Russia is potentially both a threat and the main partner in the challenging business of stabilizing the volatile Caucasus.

Links - Turkey

Russia has geopolitical interests in the Caucuses.

Mead 2/8 (Walter Russell, Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, [http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2010/02/08/lessons-from-ukraine-mostly-about-russia/] AD: 7/3/10)JM

The eclipse of the US project (based on NATO expansion that is no longer realistic) and the EU project (based on expansion) leaves the Russian project of re-integrating the Soviet space looking better, and there is hope in Moscow and fear elsewhere that the Empire of the Czars is once more on the march. It’s more of a lurch than a march; even with its oil and gas wealth, Russia isn’t rich enough to build a new empire where the czars and the commissars ruled. Russia’s influence in Ukraine will surely grow now, more because of commercial relations and deals as because of geopolitical power. But even if EU membership is a long way away, Europe is a much more attractive market than Russia and Ukraine’s new government is not going to give up the hope that trade with Europe can promote Ukraine’s recovery and growth.

Links – Turkey

Russia has dibs on Turkey – U.S withdrawal will spur Russian expansionism in the region.

Torbakov 8 (Igor, Senior Researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in Helsinki, [http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/GeorgiaCrisisTorbakov.pdf] AD: 7/3/10)JM

The warming of Russian-Turkish relations that has been progressing since the beginning of this decade and the resulting boom in bilateral cooperation in the economic and political spheres were based on the two countries’ tacit understanding that they would refrain from pursuing overly assertive policies in the regions where their strategic interests overlap. But with the invasion of Georgia, Turkish analysts now say that “it seems that Russia has now moved to an assertive policy in the [Caucasus] region, claiming a zone of influence.”72 Such Russian conduct is seen by Turkish planners as muscular if not outright aggressive and is not in Ankara’s interests. Furthermore, some Turkish strategic thinkers believe that the Caucasus crisis is likely to have broader negative geopolitical implications for Turkey. It will be difficult for Ankara, they say, to engage with both Iran and Syria as these countries move closer to Russia in response to recent developments.73 Russia’s efforts to undermine the East-West energy corridor add to Ankara’s rising concerns about Moscow’s role in the region. At an international conference sponsored by Turkey’s Ari Movement that took place in Istanbul in mid-September, Sergei Markov, a Russian lawmaker and the Kremlin-connected political analyst, spelled out Moscow’s credo in the energy transportation sphere with an unusual frankness. “Of course it is ideal for us that oil and gas pipelines pass from Russian soil,” Markov said, clearly reflecting Russia’s new confidence and assertiveness. “If the pipeline passes from our territory we support it, if it does not, we don’t support it.” When he was reminded of economic reciprocity and interdependence Markov said bluntly, “I want you to depend on me, rather than me depending on you.”74 Moscow’s resurgence sets the limits for Russian-Turkish rapprochement. Russia’s abrasive international conduct has already revived within the Turkish analytic community an image of a growling Russian bear threatening its neighbors.75 One of the consequences of the Georgia war, notes the prominent Turkish commentator Semih Idiz, is that it has increased “the fear of the Russian bear, which will no doubt drive many countries to ensure that they reinforce their protection against Moscow and its military might.”76 A number of Turkish analysts and policymakers argue that Ankara, together with its Western allies, must find ways to urgently put Russia’s strategic ambitions in check. “In the long run, an increasing Russian assertiveness in the region runs contrary to Turkish interests,” asserts a commentary in the Turkish Daily News under the poignant title “The Need to Check Russia.”77 Remarkably, Russian strategists, for their part, appear to be equally wary of Turkey’s desire to enhance its posture in the South Caucasus. Some Russian foreign policy commentators point out that Turkey’s efforts to shift gears in the region and distance its policies from those of the U.S. does not in any way signal Ankara’s willingness to forge something resembling an alliance-type relationship with Russia. Turkey, they argue, is pursuing its own economic and geopolitical interests in the Caucasus, seeking “to play an independent role” there.78 While noting certain positive aspects of the Ankara-sponsored Caucasus Pact (first of all, the scheme’s intent to exclude “outside powers” from taking part in the resolution of the region’s problems), a number of Russian pundits question Turkey’s and Russia’s ability to “amicably co-exist” in the strategically important and conflict-torn South Caucasus. First, it is not clear whether Ankara’s and Moscow’s visions of their respective roles within the new regional equation are fully compatible. Second, both countries are very ambitious in their geopolitical aspirations and, historically, do not have much experience in protracted cooperation.79 Some Russian planners are uneasy about Turkey’s diplomatic activism – in particular, Ankara’s efforts to improve relations with Armenia, Russia’s strategic ally in the Caucasus, and mediate a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Russians understand Turkey’s intentions, saying that the Karabakh settlement will create additional possibilities for the diversification of the energy supply routes to Europe. The necessity to secure this transportation network will foster the “militarization of the region” – through possible deployments of the military contingents from EU and NATO countries. Such a development, Russian analysts argue, will affect their country’s security.80 Overall, Ankara’s claims to an enhanced role in the Caucasus affairs are perceived with a certain apprehension in Moscow. “There is no doubt,” one Russian commentary asserts, “that the strengthening of Turkey’s influence in the [Caucasus] region will threaten Russia’s geopolitical interests.”81 So far, the official rhetoric in both countries stresses the commonality of interests and exalts the values of cooperation. Judging by the pronouncements of Russian and Turkish leaders, Ankara and Moscow have emerged from the Georgia war as the best of friends. “Our relations with the Russian Federation have actually gone beyond the special,” Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan told reporters at the Victory Day reception in Ankara.82 For his part, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev highly praised the Russian-Turkish “multifaceted partnership.” Speaking on September 18 at the Kremlin ceremony at which the new Turkish Ambassador to Moscow Halil Akinci presented his credentials to him, Medvedev said that “the cooperation between our countries is a significant factor in ensuring peace, security and stability in the Black Sea and the Caucasus.”83 But the geopolitical tussle in the volatile Caucasus is far from over. Some Russian and Turkish analysts appear to be anticipating a less than altruistic scenario: first, Ankara and Moscow will succeed in dramatically reducing U.S. influence in the region; then, they will lock horns in the scramble over the “American succession.”

Links – Turkey

Russia will expand into Turkey for resources and geopolitical interests.

Torbakov 8 (Igor, Senior Researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in Helsinki, [http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/GeorgiaCrisisTorbakov.pdf] AD: 7/3/10)JM

The Kremlin, naturally, has sought to counter what it believed was the U.S.-sponsored Caucasus scenario. Russia’s strategic objective has been to restore its geopolitical dominance in the Caucasus and tighten its grip on the region’s energy resources. By invading Georgia, Moscow, in one move, has arguably achieved just that: it “has reestablished a hold over the narrow strategic corridor of the South Caucasus” and “reasserted its influence over energy supply routes and suppliers from the Caspian basin and Central Asia.”36 After Georgia, Turkey appears to be facing some hard choices as it is being challenged by a resurgent Moscow and by threatened by the prospect of energy transport routes being reoriented toward Russia.37

Russia’s geostrategic posture indicates it has the will and ability for military expansion in the region.

Uslu 3 (Nasuh, Lecturer, the U of Kırıkkale, Department of International Relations, Fall and Winter, *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, 2(3&4), p. 168-169)JM

It is too early for Turkish policy-makers to say that Russia is no longer a potential threat for Turkey. There is even tendency to perceive that the Russian Federation has replaced its predecessor as a new threat to Turkish interests.17 Russia is the strongest force in the region and through its actions it gives the impression that it still pursues power politics to expand its spheres of influence. Russia’s heavy-handed approach toward the future membership of the Eastern European countries in NATO, its direct interventions in conflicts and disagreements in the former Soviet republics and its coercive actions to establish spheres of influence in the region are bound to irritate Turkey as the country which will be influenced by these developments in the most serious way. Russia launches initiatives to remind the regional countries that it is still a great power and this impairs to some extent Turkey’s initiatives of establishing close links with the regional countries, with which it has historical, racial, cultural and religious ties.18 The United States, too, seems to share increasingly more concerns with Turkey on the assertion of the Russian influence in the Central Asia and the Caucasus. The American administration has also some doubts on the possibility of Russia’s gaining control of the energy resources in the region and on Russia’s co-operation with anti-Western states such as Iran.19 The agreement on Ukraine’s vital importance for the European security and on maintaining Ukraine’s independence to check the Russian expansionism is another example of the convergence of U.S. and Turkish interests. Turkey’s position seems now more secure in the region. The United States gives increasingly more support to Turkish initiatives and the Russian influence is less effective. Russia’s heavy-handed approach toward some former Soviet republics has led these states to try to balance the Russian force by expanding their ties with other countries including Turkey and the USA. Russia’s economic crisis and ethnic problems, too, has reduced the Russian ability to control the region.20

Links - Turkey

Russia has every reason to attack Turkey

Uslu 3 (Nasuh, Lecturer, the U of Kırıkkale, Department of International Relations, Fall and Winter, *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, 2(3&4), p. 169-170)JM

Turkey’s sense of relief depends on the Russian behaviour and the future of Russia. The ultimate nature and direction of Russia’s new order still remains unresolved and the future of the relationship between Russia and its ethnic nations is still uncertain. The relative stability and calmness of the Soviet era has been replaced by regional conflicts and tensions stemmed from ethnic national challenges to the integrity of the Russian Federation. Since it is certain that Russia will continue to respond to these uprisings with an unrestricted use of force, this constitutes a major risk to Turkey’s security. Moreover, Russia is a historic rival of Turkey and it has numerous clashing interests with those of Turkey extending from the Central Asia to the eastern Mediterranean. Russia’s vision clashes with Turkey’s intention of becoming the principal link between Asia and Europe because Russian leaders see Russia as the centre of the Euro-Asian landmass and want to control developments in this region.21 The story of Turkish-Russian relations in the post-Cold War period is a mixed one. The two countries are important economic and trade partners of each other whereas they also suspect of evil intentions of each other together with the mutual fear of the expansion of the other’s influence. Particularly, Turkey feels anxiety about the possible renewal of the competition between the West and Russia. Ankara is highly suspicious that Moscow might prefer to initiate actions of influence in the southern parts of the Eurasian landmass rather than in Europe, creating a new cold war. Turkish rulers naturally fear that Turkey can be left alone by its Western allies in countering such threats, which may emerge in the wings.22 They also concern that Russia may use its conflict in Chechnya as a pretext to establish and expand its influence in the Caucasus and may gain the control of Azerbaijan and Georgia to a great extent. Of course, there will be serious repercussions of instabilities in the region, created by Russia, for Turkish interests. Such developments will exacerbate Turkish security fears, will close the important land corridor between Turkey and Central Asia and will threaten to prevent the construction of oil and gas pipelines, which will connect the Caspian region with Turkey and Europe.23

The U.S will stop the ever present threat of Russian expansionism.

Uslu 3 (Nasuh, Lecturer, the U of Kırıkkale, Department of International Relations, Fall and Winter, *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, 2(3&4), p. 169-170)JM

There are other reasons for Turkish authorities to fear evil Russian designs. The Russian support for the separatist PKK and the Armenian occupation of the Azeri territory and the Russian initiative of selling S-300 missiles to the Greek Cypriot administration are still in their minds. They also suspiciously watch the Russian initiatives of violating the regional balance of power to the disadvantage of Turkey and Azerbaijan. Russia deployed a squadron of MiG 29 fighters to Armenia in December 1998 and began to station S-300 Zenith air defence systems in its base in Armenia, causing tensions in Turkish-Armenian relations.24 The Russian actions against Georgia, including giving support to the Abhazian rebels and launching attacks against the Chechens inside the Georgian borders, are another sign of violating the regional balance. Turkish authorities admit that Russia and Turkey will always compete with each other and that Russia opposes Turkish interests regarding regional oil pipelines, but they want this competition kept within peaceful limits.25 Turkey and the West need to form a common strategy toward Russia to deal with its expansionist actions and to improve economic and political relations with this state, as an important economic partner, which seems willing to make reforms and to offer co-operation to the West. Thus, establishing normal relations with Russia and containing this state to prevent its expansionist policies are two issues, in which Turkey seeks the help of the Western countries. It is an undeniable fact that Russia and Turkey are commercial partners as well as being political and economic rivals. There is a strong economic factor behind the Turkish desire of improving relations with Moscow. Russia is one of the most important trade partners of Turkey, coming second after Germany and the biggest gas provider of Turkey. Turkish business companies see Russia as a large and potentially lucrative market. In short, the mutual Turkish and Russian interests, concerns and perception of security are interwoven with each other with the possibility of clashes and confrontation. The two states need to manage these sensitive relations by being aware of mutual interests and fears.

Links - Turkey

Russia is vying for resources in Southeast Europe to reestablish influence there.

Whitmore 7 (Brian, Senior Correspondent in RFE/RL's Central Newsroom, June 27, [http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1077355.html] AD: 7/3/10)JM

Two summits in two Southeast European cities. One loud and clear message from Russian President Vladimir Putin: We're back. Addressing a Balkan energy summit in Zagreb, Croatia on June 24, Putin was as poker-faced as ever as he trumpeted a landmark deal that could secure Moscow's continued dominance of Europe's energy market. "As you know, yesterday [June 23] Gazprom and the Italian [energy] company Eni signed a memorandum on the possible construction of a gas pipeline under the Black Sea," Putin told 10 heads of state from the Balkan region. Putin also said Russia wants to build "underground storage facilities in several Balkan states, which will not only improve energy supplies to the region, but will make it more attractive and more important from the perspective of solving energy problems in Europe as a whole."A day later at a meeting of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) in Istanbul, Turkey, Putin urged member states to foster stability in the region's energy markets by signing long-term contracts -- presumably with Russia. Putin later told reporters that "the Balkans and the Black Sea [region] has always been a sphere of our special interests," adding that it is "natural that a resurgent Russia is returning there." Analysts say Putin's energy diplomacy in the Balkans and Turkey was partially aimed at frustrating the European Union's efforts to diversify the continents energy supply to lessen dependence on Moscow. But Putin also had a larger agenda: reestablishing a Russian sphere of influence in Southeastern Europe. The highlight of Putin's energy diplomacy this week was Gazprom's deal with Eni to build the South Stream pipeline, which would pump 30 billion cubic meters of Russian gas a year under the Black Sea to Bulgaria. The pipeline, which is slated to be finished by 2011, would then branch off in two directions: north to Austria and south to Italy. Energy analysts say South Stream severely hampers the European Union's efforts to diversify the continent's energy supplies to reduce dependency on Russia. Federico Bordonaro, a Rome-based energy analyst for the "Power and Interest News Report," says it's another big move in the chess game. "I don't think this kills other possible projects, but what it kills is the possibility that these other projects will be as decisive as they were actually thought to be," Bordonaro says. A key component of the EU strategy is the proposed Nabucco pipeline, which would transport gas from Central Asia and the Caspian Sea region to Western Europe via Turkey and the Balkans -- without going through Russia. To block this strategy and maintain its dominance, Moscow is seeking to gain control over energy routes in Southern Europe so Caspian and Central Asian gas is exported to international markets via Russia. In May, Russia moved closer toward that goal when Putin, Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev agreed to build a pipeline along the Caspian Sea coast to transport natural gas from Turkmenistan to Europe via Kazakhstan and Russia. And the South Stream project is another giant step in that direction. "I think it makes it much more complicated to find the backing for projects like the Nabucco pipeline. Particularly if South Stream seems to be looking at two onshore routes once it gets to Bulgaria -- one, perhaps, going across to Italy and one going to Austria. And that second one would be in competition with Nabucco," says Julian Lee, a senior analyst with the London-based Center for Global Energy Studies

Links – South Korea

Russia has a vested interest in the Korean peninsula.

Kwon 6/4 (Yong, staff writer for the Asia times, [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/LF04Dg01.html] AD: 7/4/10)JM

Russia has three key policy objectives when it comes to the two Koreas: firstly, to use the Korean Peninsula as a bridgehead into the Pacific Ocean for greater interaction with economic organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, and the United Nations' Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific; secondly, to develop a market for arms and energy; and third, to establish a partnership for the development of Siberia. [1] These objectives are subsumed under a wider Russian foreign policy objective of counterbalancing the unilateral influence of the United States in the world. Russia has given up on military and nuclear parity with the United States since the end of the Cold War. However, this does not mean that Russia has given up on upholding its status as a "great power".

Russia needs the Korean peninsula for Siberian development.

Kwon 6/4 (Yong, staff writer for the Asia times, [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/LF04Dg01.html] AD: 7/4/10)JM

Moscow has proven itself consistent and balanced in seeking its own self-interest abroad. It would not make sense to ignore North Korea's richer southern neighbor when seeking foreign investment for development in Siberia or a more intimate economic relationship with the other Asian tigers. The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation from June 2002 outlined Moscow's need to maintain a balanced position in Northeast Asia. This was evident in Russia's outreach to both countries with the New Russia-North Korea Friendship Treaty and increased economic cooperation with South Korea. Russia's posture towards the Koreas has not changed since.

Russia is militarily aggressive – its doctrines prove.

McDermott 2/23 (Roger, honorary senior research associate, department of politics and international relations, U of Kent at Canterbury, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\_cache=1&tx\_ttnews[tt\_news]=36076] AD: 7/4/10)JM

Recognizing this distinction, compared with the previous military doctrine in 2000, a number of obvious novelties are evident. These include: “attempts to destabilize the situation in individual states and regions and to undermine strategic stability;” the “creation and deployment of strategic missile defense systems undermining global stability and violating the established correlation of forces in the nuclear-missile sphere, and also the militarization of outer space and the deployment of strategic non-nuclear precision weapon systems.” Despite these dangers being “new,” they are unsurprising. Other innovations involve the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missile technology and the growth in the number of nuclear states, as well as the violation of international agreements and non-compliance with previously existing treaties. The former seems linked to Iran and North Korea, while the latter reflects the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and the difficulty in concluding a revised Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. The doctrine also notes the danger posed by centers of inter-ethnic tension, international armed groupings close to the Russian border, which may indicate its authors had Afghanistan in mind (www.kremlin.ru, February 5). Nonetheless, a military “threat,” according to the doctrine, may lead to a “real possibility of military conflict.” It then notes a deterioration in inter-state relations, which was not mentioned in the previous doctrine. The fourth and fifth threats, in contrast to other themes contained in the doctrine, are rooted in the observation of worrying trends close to the Russian border. These involve a “show of military force with provocative objectives in the course of exercises on the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation or its allies;” and “stepping up of the activity of the armed forces of individual states (groups of states) involving partial or complete mobilization and the transitioning of these states’ organs of state and military command and control to wartime operating conditions.” The underlying security thinking is less clear, yet there was evidently a weighty issue on the minds of the authors of the doctrine (www.kremlin.ru, February 5).

Links – South Korea

Korea is wanted by Russia, and the US is her protector

Colonel Parker 3 (Richard H., US Army, Lawrence Blotzer, Project Adviser, 07-04-2003, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA414532)KFC

Throughout her history, Korea has been a bridge between mainland Asia (China and Russia) and island empire (Japan). Considering Korea’s geo-strategic position, it is easy to understand that many have sought to control this bridge through diplomatic, cultural, economic, and military methods.4 When Korea was opened to diplomatic and commercial relations with Western powers, she almost immediately became embroiled in disputes involving interests in East Asia.5 Neither China, nor Japan, nor Russia, dared ignore Korea—at the risk of losing to the others. In modern times we have witnessed three Korean wars, involving many foreign powers.6 During the last Korean War, the newly created Republic of Korea faced imminent collapse many times, before the United Nations combined forces halted the communist armies of China and North Korea. The quick and determined commitment of U.S. military, with over 26,000 Americans killed, played a decisive role in securing South Korea and cementing a partnership for future defense.7

The US is in Korea to keep stability from Russia take over

Colonel Parker 3 (Richard H., US Army, Lawrence Blotzer, Project Adviser, 07-04-2003, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA414532)KFC

Despite the current administration’s focus on the WOT and Iraq—the issues of North Korean nuclear weapons and conventional capabilities, the geo-strategic critical position of Korea, and the tremendous stake of China (and Taiwan), Japan, Russia, and South Korea in the global economy (see chart 1) require that the region remains of great concern. Increasing national pride and world-wide importance of these competing regional powers (two of which— China and Russia—sit on the United Nations Security Council) cause a growing interest in each to influence events in Northeast Asia. Also, the historical rivalry between Korea, China, Japan, and Russia is a dominant theme throughout U.S. attempts to act in its national interest and maintain regional stability. Engagement with China, in particular, will be critical to protecting United States interests in the region.

Russia still wants to be a playa in Korea and the withdrawal of US troops with allow for Russian take over

Colonel Parker 3 (Richard H., US Army, Lawrence Blotzer, Project Adviser, 07-04-2003, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA414532)KFC

The first approach by the Russian Empire toward Korea was in 1654, along the northern border on the Amur River. Conflict was constant between China, Japan, Russia, and Korea for several centuries, leading to Soviet occupation of Manchuria and Northern Korea at the end of World War 2.24 From the Korean War onward, Soviet influence in North Korea was increasingly replaced by China. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russian influence on the peninsula all but vanished. A major concern for all the regional powers, if not the world, continues to be the situation in Russia. As it manages conflict between central and individual republics, economic turmoil, and a declining position in world events—Russia still maintains a large nuclear weapons arsenal, great national resources, and a seat on the United Nations Security Council. It will want to be seen as an important player, to be included in the resolution of key regional issues.25 In particular, Russia’s major levers on events in Asia are arms sales and resource exports. While most countries produce about 80-90 percent of their arms for domestic use, Russia exported three times as much as they kept for their own military, with China as one of the primary buyers.26 How the United States engages Russia and the other regional powers concerning unification and the future of Korea will play an important part in maintaining Northeast Asia regional stability.

Links – South Korea

The US troop presence is keeping nukes away from Korea and stopping Russia arm sales

Colonel Parker 3 (Richard H., US Army, Lawrence Blotzer, Project Adviser, 07-04-2003, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA414532)KFC

Northeast Asia is home to several of the largest armed forces in the world, including four nuclear powers (U.S., China, Russia, and North Korea). After the United States ($331 billion), the next largest defense budgets are in Russia and Japan. All states in the region have increased defense spending and acquired more modern arms in the last ten years, with no indication that this trend will reverse. Russia, with yearly sales averaging $3.2 billion from 1995 to 2001, and other former Soviet states will continue to look for markets to sell modern weapons as a way to invigorate their sagging economies.32 Even South Korea now has T-80 tanks and BMP infantry carriers, as payment from Russia for part of their debt. China, in particular, will take advantage of this opportunity to gain a generational leap in military technology—with a focus on building a military force capable of enforcing its demands on Taiwan. There have been substantial increases in capability of the military forces opposite Taiwan. Also, Chinese military experts are developing strategies and forces, applied to concepts such as “anti-access” and “area denial”, aimed at potential U.S. intervention.33 In moving the Republic of Korea’s border north to the Yalu River, China may view a U.S.-Korea alliance as an escalation of containment and respond with further arms build-up. The potential for a conventional arms race, however, is not as dangerous as nuclear arms proliferation. The potential for nuclear proliferation is one of the greatest challenges to U.S. interests in Northeast Asia. China is expanding its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SSBN) capabilities. Russia exports (primarily to Asian markets) about $2.2 billion worth of nuclear material and technology annually.34 The policies of Korea, Japan, and Taiwan are to have no nuclear weapon capability, relying instead on the protective umbrella provided by the United States arsenal. If the U.S. military presence in Korea and Japan disappears, however, these three governments may believe that the U.S. nuclear umbrella is not guaranteed—perhaps, causing nuclear weapon proliferation. Also, each is interested in developing and/or obtaining a credible theater missile defense (TMD) system, which China may see as a danger. Japanese and South Korean leaders in the 1990’s began seeking a TMD capability to counter the North Korean missile threat.35 Since similar technologies exist in both types missile systems, TMD affords an opportunity to quickly obtain an offensive capability. If handled properly, U.S. engagement with China, Japan, and Korea, can diminish this risk and allow further peaceful globalization of the Northeast Asian economies.

Links – Japan

US and NATO presence in Japan is meant to encircle Russia and prevent its encroaching influence in the pacific.

Nazemroaya 7(Mahdi, Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization, “Global Military Alliance: Encircling Russia and China”)AQB

North Korea, China, and Russia are being demonized to justify the deepening military integration of Australia, Japan and several other Asia-Pacific nations with the United States and NATO. Isabel Reynolds an international correspondent in Japan reveals in an article for Reuters that the tightening security and military atmosphere in Japan and Australia is aimed at China and Russia; “Whether or not there is an overt threat, Japan and the so-called ‘littoral allies’ [meaning countries such as the Philippines, Taiwan, and Singapore] in the region have got to address that,” he [military analyst Alex Neil] added. North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests last year are a source of worry, and China’s shooting down of one of its own satellites with a ballistic missile in January [2007] aroused concern in many capitals. “We are no longer in an age when either Japan or Australia can rely solely on the United States as an ally,” said military analyst Tetsuya Ozeki, who says both China and Russia are set to become equally influential in the region.” [10] Australian Prime Minister John Howard, dismissed concerns that the depending alliance between Australia and Japan would harm ties with China. [11] There are aggressive steps being undertaken by NATO and the U.S. to encircle Russia and China. What the agreement between Australia and Japan (along with the move by the Tokyo government to amend the Japanese Constitution) amounts to, is the formation of an Eastern flank against Russia and China and a parallel sister-alliance to NATO.

Links – Japan/Asia

To prevent Russian expansion into the Far East the US must maintain its predominance in Asia starting with Japan.

Cohen 9(Ariel, Senior Research Fellow for The Heritage Foundation, “Russia and Eurasia: A Realistic Policy Agenda for the Obama Administration”)AQB

Russian elites and leaders insist that Russia is and should be recognized as an important actor in Northeast Asia. In examining Russia in the Far East and U.S. policy, Dr. Stephen Blank observes that Washington should take these aspirations into account when framing future policies for Russia and Asia. Russia hopes to use its location, vast natural resources in eastern Siberia and Russian Asia, and reviving defense forces to create partnerships with key Asian states and then to leverage those assets into an enduring Russian role in the region. Commodities and proceeds from their sale are to provide the key to unlocking the development of the region's economy and infrastructure, thus enabling Russia to play a great-power role in Asia. For the U.S., the paramount need is to forestall a full-fledged Russo-Chinese alliance and to avoid a blowup between China and Japan. To achieve a dynamic stability amid a fast-changing Asia, the U.S. needs to: Preserve American leadership and military predominance in Asia. Continued American leadership provides an umbrella that allows other powers to contribute to regional prosperity without permitting regional rivalries to spin out of control. Globalize the strategic nuclear arms control process after ratification of a new treaty with Russia. This should permit the U.S. to gain some measure of regulation over China's strategic nuclear and missile modernization. Explore opportunities for enhancing energy cooperation with all of Asia's major energy consumers.

Russia is looking to make itself a regional power in Asia – Japan is the only way for the US to directly counter that growth.

Brookes 8(Peter, Senior fellow at The Heritage Foundation, “America's Perils in the Orient”)AQB

And don't forget Russia, which deems itself an Asian power. Moscow can't hold a candle to Beijing's new regional clout - but Russia was the Cold War heavy hitter, especially militarily, in that part of the world. The Kremlin will use its plentiful Siberian natural resources and vast oil and gas wealth to throw its weight around with energy-starved Asian powers. Nor is a Russian-Chinese "condominium" in Asia out of the question: Moscow's done much to aid China's military build-up, selling Beijing the lion's share of its advanced weaponry in recent years - though that's changing now, as the PRC's indigenous arms industry takes off. Bright spots in the region include America's strong alliance with Japan. Tokyo is making increasing contributions to international security, including a cooperative missile-defense program with Washington. The plucky Aussies have also been a stalwart ally, not only in their own neck of the woods, but in Iraq and Afghanistan as well, punching above their weight - once again. And while Singapore isn't a US formal ally, our ties are solid. Many have dubbed this "the Asian century." Considering the region's economic, political and military heft, that may be true - meaning the next White House must keep its sights on East Asia to protect and advance American interests.

**Links - Japan**

Continued security alliance with Japan helps deter Russia.

Garthoff 6/3/10(Raymond a specialist on arms control and former ambassador to Bulgaria, “Relations With the Great Powers: Russia, Japan, China” The Brookings Institute)AQB

The centrality of the U.S.-Japan alliance for the regional security environment makes it much more than a bilateral issue. While greater Japanese military support for U.S. forces may strengthen deterrence and the ability to respond to regional crises, it may aggravate Asian concerns about Japan's remilitarization, possibly even fueling a new regional arms race. Some Asian states might also interpret this move as the precursor to American military disengagement. Any attempt to restructure the alliance must therefore be sensitive to its possible impact on the rest of the region. Japanese leaders must deal more forthrightly with the historical issues concerning Japan's militarist past to reassure Asians about Japan playing a more prominent regional security role. And U.S. leaders must convince the region that changes in U.S. force structure in Japan do not weaken America's capacity to deter aggression and respond effectively when aggression occurs, but rather make U.S. forward deployments in Japan politically more sustainable. Finally, as critical as deterrence and crisis management are, they are by no means sufficient to promote regional security. The United States and Japan must move beyond a strategy of military presence to develop an effective regional strategy to reduce tensions and prevent crisis. Keeping 100,000 troops in the East Asia-Pacific region is a poor surrogate for a comprehensive Asia policy. More realism is necessary in claims about what this military presence accomplishes. The "regional cooperation" section of the April 1996 U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security did nothing more than list in general terms common regional security goals regarding Korea, China, Russia, and Southeast Asia.

Links - Japan

Minus US presence Russia would gain dominance through aggressive energy policy.

Tsuneo 10(Watanabe, DIRECTOR, POLICY RESEARCH DIVISION and SENIOR FELLOW at the Tokyo Foundation, “The Need for Japan-US Cooperation in Dealing with Russia”)AQB

The third panel discussed the topic “Russia and Energy Security,” addressing the question of whether Russia will become a major supplier of fossil fuels to Asia in the future or merely continue to be a supplier to Europe, as well as the future prospects for nuclear energy in Russia. More detailed information may be found in the report by Eurasia Information Network Research Fellow Taisuke Abiru. The panelists noted that, in light of interruptions in the supply of natural gas to Europe by Russia and other such factors, it would be risky for Japan and the rest of Asia to become more dependent on Russia. Citing the latent demand in Japan and Japanese needs for greater diversification of energy suppliers, the panelists discussed the issue of whether such diversification is a realistic option. It was also pointed out that Russia has the potential to be a powerful partner to Japan and the United States in cooperating on nuclear energy.

Links - Japan

“Americanization” on Japan due to overwhelming presence, Russia cannot form a lasting relationship.

Churgov 5(Sergei Moscow State Institute of International Relations, “Russia and Japan: A Failed Breakthrough” Russia in Global Affairs № 3, July - September 2005)AQB

Now Russia and Japan have two options: they can either halt their talks, or they can continue their negotiations on a territorial demarcation, despite the previous setbacks. When two states really seek to settle their differences, they can surely achieve this goal. At the present stage, however, there is an impression that Russia is more interested in a compromise than Japan, as Tokyo keeps turning down Moscow’s proposals. Nevertheless, changes are already taking place in the foreign-policy mentality of Japanese and Russian societies. More and more Japanese want to see their homeland not as a great military and political power, but as a cozy “Asian Switzerland” – an ecologically clean country providing social guarantees for its citizens. This means that they may moderate their political ambitions. Furthermore, the Japanese are growing more and more discontent with the role assumed by the United States in the world and in Japan, in particular. According to some Japanese political scientists, the term ‘globalization’ is now often used to mean ‘Americanization,’ because “the United States, as the only superpower, is advancing only its own interests under the guise of globalization.” All these factors give grounds to believe that Russian-Japanese relations may soon develop in a somewhat different context and according to scenarios that now seem unlikely

Links – Iraq

Presence in Iraq prevents Russia from gaining a geostrategic advantage

Jon 8 (Bi, Writer on Iran, http://www.bibijon.org/iranimage/articles/iran-brief.htm, AD: 6/7/10) jl

For centuries the West has been the guarantor of Iran’s territorial integrity against Russian expansionism.  Long before oil was discovered, Western powers regarded Tsarist Russia’s access to the Persian Gulf’s “warm waters” as an intolerable checkmate situation. If an Iran-US collision  is not averted,  Iran will have no choice, existentially, but to swallow its pride and independence and sign on as a Russian client.

Presence in Iraq checks Russian expansionism

Friedman 8 (George, Stratfor Intelligence Writer, www.stratfor.com/weekly/rotating\_focus, AD: 6/7/10) jl

Bush’s decision to go to Ukraine indicates that he feels safe in opening a new front — at least diplomatically — while an existing military front remains active. That move makes no sense, particularly in the face of some European opposition, unless he believes the Russians are weaker than they appear and that the American position in Iraq is resolving itself. Bush undoubtedly would have liked to have waited for greater clarity in Iraq, but time is almost up. The Russians are moving now, and the United States can either confront them now or concede the game until the United States is in a military position to resume Russian containment. Plus, Bush doesn’t have any years left in office to wait.

The global system is making a major shift now, as we have been discussing. Having gotten off balance and bogged down in the Islamic world, the only global power is trying to extricate itself while rebalancing its foreign policy and confronting a longer-term Russian threat to its interests. That is a delicate maneuver, and one that requires deftness and luck. As mentioned, it is also a long shot. The Russians have a lot of cards to play, but perhaps they are not yet ready to play them. Bush is risking Russia disrupting the Middle East as well as increasing pressure in its own region. He either thinks it is worth the risk or he thinks the risk is smaller than it appears. Either way, this is an important moment.

If the US pulls out its Iraqi troops, Russia will feel threatened and increase military on its boarders

Zevelev 7 (Igor, Doctor of Political Science, 17-11-2007, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/21/1150.html)KFC

Finally, if one assumes that America’s ability to reach its objectives in global politics is really losing strength, Russia will not stand to benefit from such a scenario. In such an event, the U.S. would be forced to loosen its geopolitical grip in neighboring regions and the issue of admitting the post-Soviet countries into NATO will be put aside. But whether or not Russia will get any extra dividends from America’s weakening and isolationism is not immediately clear. The medal has the other side, too, as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the spread of extremist movements in the Middle East – and possibly Central Asia – would increase. Russia will run especially high risks if the situation in Afghanistan gets out of hand. The pullout of U.S. troops from Iraq will call into question the rationality of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, and Moscow’s vital interests in maintaining stability in Central Asia will become jeopardized. Given such a scenario, Japan will stop relying on U.S. protection as in the past and start increasing its military potential, prompting China to act correspondingly. These factors will negatively affect security along the entire perimeter of Russia’s borders and will compel it to increase its own military spending.

Links – Iraq

Russia is angered at the US troop presence in Iraq, Russia wants to have control as well

Miles 7 (Tom, Reuters, Jan 27, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL2790402920070127)KFC

Russia expects the United States to explain its growing military presence in the Middle East when the countries next meet to discuss the region, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told Russian news agencies on Saturday. "I have seen no change in Washington's fairly aggressive rhetoric," Lavrov said. "It continues, just like its actions to increase the military presence in the region. It will be one of the questions which we want to clarify in Washington. What's it all about?" Lavrov is expected to attend a meeting of the so-called Quartet of international mediators in Washington on February 2 to try to revive Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. Russia, the United States, EU and United Nations make up the Quartet. The United States is in the process of sending an additional 21,500 troops to Iraq, which it invaded in 2003, in an effort to quell an insurgency. It already has 134,000 troops in Iraq. Washington has said it is deploying a second aircraft carrier group in the Gulf as well as Patriot missile defense systems -- steps widely seen as a warning to Iran and Syria. The United States, which has accused Iran and Syria of being destabilizing influences in the region, maintains a significant military presence in Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain, base for the U.S. Navy's Fifth fleet. Lavrov said unilateral U.S. sanctions against Iran would be counterproductive to efforts to resolve the problem of the country's nuclear ambitions and would force Tehran out of the negotiating process. The United States has accused Iran of having a secret program to build nuclear weapons. Tehran says its nuclear program is solely for power generation. TALKS Russia's number two diplomat, Security Council Secretary Igor Ivanov, is due to hold talks in Iran on Sunday. Colonel Oleg Kulakov, an Iran expert at Moscow Military University, said Lavrov saw obvious links between the Middle East peace process, violence in Iraq and U.S. suspicions of Iraq and Syria. "(Lavrov) thinks the involvement of Syria and Iran -- Iran in particular -- could bring some fresh air to the (Middle East) talks," he said. "Russia wants some kind of movement in this direction because the situation in the region is not developing according to the scenario written in Washington." But Kulakov said it would be a mistake to expect much from the Washington meeting. "One meeting can't solve it," he said. Moscow has repeatedly angered Washington with its willingness to deal with Iran, which sits just across the Caspian Sea from Russia's southern border. It regards Iran as a legitimate business partner. Russia has sold Iran anti-aircraft missiles and helped it build a nuclear reactor at the port of Bushehr. It also watered down a U.N. resolution to impose sanctions on Iran that aimed to stop Tehran enriching nuclear material for use in bombs. Washington has hit back with sanctions on Russian defense industry firms it says were cooperating with Iran and Syria. Russia called the measures "illegal" and "vicious". Lavrov said Iran and Syria should not be isolated but should understand they were expected to play a positive role and in return they would receive an appropriate position in the regional dialogue. "We are deeply convinced that Iran and Syria should not be isolated but brought into the peace process," he said, speaking on return from a visit to India with President Vladimir Putin. "In general, the problems that exist in the Middle East and in the surrounding region are linked to muddle-headed ideas about prestige. Someone says something once and from then on he can't break with this principle. This is an inflexible policy, and it's short-sighted." Kulakov said the U.S. policy of isolating Iran was an error. "If you isolate Iran there are some forces that may gain strength within the country, such as the religious clerics. If you involve Iran, you will strengthen the less religious, less extremist forces."

Links – Kuwait

Russia is building heavy ties with Kuwait

Itar Tass 6/30 (30.06.2010, http://www.itar-tass.com/eng/level2.html?NewsID=15277579&PageNum=0)KFC

Promising projects in trade, economic and other spheres will be vital topics for discussion. “Despite the world financial crisis, the indicators of the Russian-Egyptian ties haven’t decreased. Egypt continues to be Russia’s leading partners in the region in terms of trade and tourism,” Russian Foreign Ministry’s spokesman Andrei Nesterenko stressed. Sergei Lavrov and Amr Musa will discuss practical launch of the mechanism of the Russian-Arab cooperation forum. Its task is to expand the range of multi-dimensional interaction between Russia and the Arab world. In the meantime, the president of the Russian Autonomous Republic of Tatarstan, Rustam Minnikhanov, believes that Russia, and Tatarstan in particular, have good prospects for developing ties with the Arab Muslim world. “Everything that we do today to develop contacts with the Islamic world has a big future. The Russian leadership understands this, and gives support to these undertakings in every possible way,” Minnikhanov said at a reception in the Kazan Kremlin, which was given on Tuesday in honor of the ambassadors of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Russia. They had attended the 11th International forum of Islamic business and finance in Kazan. Tatarstan cooperates with 42 members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The republic’s annual trade turnover with the Islamic world has increased from 93 million to three billion dollars in recent years. That accounts for 23% of the republic’s foreign trade volumes. At the same time, President Minnikhanov said that Tatarstan should upgrade its relations with Muslim countries and bring them to a qualitatively new level. “ I agree that it’s necessary to develop trade and economic relations, make investments in Russia’s economy, develop cultural and scientific ties and find points of contact in developing tourism,” said Kuwait’s Ambassador to Russia, Nasser Hadji Ibrahim Al-Muzayan.

Russia is concerned about the US presence in Kuwait and wishes to assert power in Kuwait

Rozoff 9 (Rick, Global Research, September 10, 2009, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=15144)KFC

An Afghanistan that was at peace and stabilized would then be a decided disadvantage for plans to maintain and widen Western military positioning at the crossroads where Russian, Chinese, Iranian, Pakistani and Indian interests meet. The Russian writer mentions that Washington and its NATO allies have employed the putative campaign against al-Qaeda – and now Taliban as well as the drug trade – to secure, seize and upgrade 19 military bases in Afghanistan and Central Asia, including what can become strategic air bases like former Soviet ones in Bagram, Shindand, Herat, Farah, Kandahar and Jalalabad in Afghanistan. The analyst pointed out that “The system of bases makes it possible for the US to exert military pressure on Russia, China, and Iran.” It suffices to recall that during the 1980s current U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates was the CIA official in charge of the agency’s largest-ever covert campaign, Operation Cyclone, to arm and train Afghan extremists in military camps in Pakistan for attacks inside Afghanistan. A “porous border” was not his concern at the time. Konurov ended his article with an admonition: “There is permanent consensus in the ranks of the US establishment that the US presence in Afghanistan must continue. “Russia should not and evidently will not watch idly the developments at the southern periphery of post-Soviet space.” [4] Iran’s top military commander, Yahya Rahim-Safavi, was quoted in his nation’s media on September 7 offering a comparable analysis and issuing a similar warning. Saying that “The recent security pact between US and NATO and Afghanistan showed the United States has no plan to leave the region,” he observed that “Russia worries about the US presence in Central Asia and China has concerns about US interference in its two main Muslim provinces bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan.” [5] To indicate that the range of the Western military threat extended beyond Central Asia and its borders with Russia and China, he also said the “presence of more than 200,000 foreign forces in the region particularly in South-West Asia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Middle East, the expansion of their bases, the sale of billions of dollars of military equipments to Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and looting their oil resources are the root cause of insecurity in South-West Asia, the Persian Gulf region and Iran,” and noted that “US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf had been a cause for concern for Russia, China and Iran.” [6] The Iranian concern is hardly unwarranted. The August 31 edition of the Jerusalem Post revealed that “NATO’s interest in Iran has dramatically increased in recent months” and “In December 2006, Israeli Military Intelligence hosted the first of its kind international conference on global terrorism and intelligence, after which Israel and NATO established an intelligence-sharing mechanism.”

Impact Helper – Extinction

US-Russia war is the only existential risk – sheer magnitude of nuclear arsenals

Bostrom 2 (Nick, Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford University, http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html, AD: 7/4/10) jl

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[[4]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html" \l "_ftn4" \o ")  Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

I/L – Central Asia K/

Central Asia is the lynch pin to Russian expansion – US presence is key to containment

Center for Contemporary Conflict 4 (Think Tank on Emerging Security Issues, http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/conferences/recent/dissOct04\_rpt.pdf, AD: 7/4/10) jl

Dr. James Goldgeier from George Washington University discussed the case of Russia, and looked at the range of deterrence and dissuasion policies the United States has applied to the Soviet Union and Russia since the end of the Second World War. Today, U.S. policy toward Russia is not so much about trying to dissuade it from becoming a peer competitor—that is not going to happen—but dissuading it from reconstituting empire in Central Asia and also facilitating the military ambitions of others. So far, the United States has a mixed report card: Russian democratization appears to have stalled, if not gone into remission; Russia repeatedly has defied U.S. wishes in providing dual-use technologies to states of proliferation concern; but Russia has not been able to reconstitute its past empire in Central Asia, largely because of its own limited capabilities.

Impact Helper – Extinction

That conflict is the only extinction scenario

Rozzoff 9 (Rick, Manager of STOP NATO International, http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/08/27/baltic-sea-flash-point-for-nato-russia-conflict, AD: 7/5/10) jl

The world has been on edge for a decade now and a form of numbing has set in with many of its inhabitants; a permanent condition of war apprehension and alert has settled over others, particularly those in areas likely to be directly affected. Over the past six years the worst and most immediate fears have centered on the prospects of three major regional conflicts, all of which are fraught with the danger of eventual escalation into nuclear exchanges.

The three are a renewed and intensified Indian-Pakistani conflict, an outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula and an attack by the U.S., Israel or both in unison against Iran.

The first would affect neighbors both in possession of nuclear weapons and a combined population of 1,320,000,000.

The second could set Northeast Asia afire with China and Russia, both having borders with North Korea, inevitably being pulled into the vortex.

The last could lead to an explosion in the Persian Gulf and throughout the Middle East, with the potential of spilling over into the Caspian Sea Basin, Central and South Asia, the Caucasus and even the Balkans, as the U.S. and NATO have strategic air bases in Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan and, at least for the time being, Kyrgyzstan that would be employed in any major assault on Iran, and the latter would retaliate against both land- and sea-based threats as best it could.

In the event that any of the three scenarios reached the level of what in a humane and sensible world would be considered the unthinkable – the use of nuclear weapons – the cataclysmic consequences both for the respective regions involved and for the world would be incalculable.

Theoretically, though, all three nightmare models could be geographically contained.

There is a fourth spot on the map, however, where most any spark could ignite a powder keg that would draw in and pit against each other the world’s two major nuclear powers and immediately and ipso facto develop into a world conflict. That area is the Baltic Sea region.

In 2003, months before NATO would grant full membership to the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the Russian Defense Minister at the time, Sergei Ivanov, warned that such a development would entail the deployment of NATO, including American, warplanes “a three-minute flight away from St. Petersburg,” Russia’s second largest city.

And just that occurred. NATO air patrols began in 2004 on a three month rotational basis and U.S. warplanes just completed their second deployment on January 4 of this year.

Had history occurred otherwise and Soviet warplanes alternated with those of fellow Warsaw Pact nations in patrolling over, say, the St. Lawrence Seaway or the Atlantic Coast off Nova Scotia, official Washington’s response wouldn’t be hard to imagine or long in coming.

A 2005 report by the Natural Resources Defense Council confirmed that the U.S. maintained 480 nuclear bombs in Europe, hosted by six NATO allies, Belgium, Britain, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Turkey.

More recent estimates indicate that over 350 American nuclear weapons remain in Europe to the present time.

If the six above-mentioned nations continue to host nuclear arms, what would new NATO members Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – the first and third currently governed by former U.S. citizens, president Toomas Hendrik Ilves and Valdas Adamkus, respectively – deny the Pentagon?

In the interim between the accession of the three Baltic states and former Soviet republics into NATO and now, the Alliance as a whole and the U.S. in particular have expanded their permanent military presence within all three nations: Estonia and Latvia which both border the main body of Russia and Lithuania which abuts the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad.

Expansion Bad – Nuclear War

Russian expansion into Turkey provokes a NATO response triggering a Russian nuclear strike.

Blank 99 (Stephen, prof of Russian National Security Studies @ Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, *Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region*, p. 263-264)JM

The regional structure of political forces does little to encourage optimism concerning a positive strategic outcome for anyone in the Caspian basin. Recently, Armenia has allied itself to Moscow, and Azerbaijan to Ankara. 73 Under these circumstances, and given the uncertain domestic political outcomes among oil and gas producers, our ambivalence about committing forces and the dangerous regional situation of rival alliances create the potential for wider and more protracted regional conflicts that could become proxy wars for the great powers like the Third World conflicts of the 1980s. Azerbaijan and Georgia's growing efforts to secure NATO's lasting involvement in the region coupled with Russia's determination to exclude the West foster a polarization along traditional lines. 74 Moreover, U.S. efforts to tie energy supplies through and to Armenia if it makes peace with Baku encounter strong opposition in Yerevan and Nagorno-Karabakh, both of whose forces could easily undermine a pipeline to Turkey through Armenia or the other Transcaucasian states. Regardless, Baku will not build a pipeline through Armenia, even after peace. 75 Peace will therefore not bring pipelines to Armenia, nor will there be an oil-based incentive to make peace. So, too, could the Kurds destroy pipelines in Turkey. We must also remember that this is a territory with a high incidence of powerful earthquakes. Clearly, there are already high odds against completion of the United States' favored project regardless of Russian policy, which will only abet Armenian-Kurdish obstacles to energy pipelines. Yeltsin's warnings about U.S. efforts to obtain military-political-economic leverage in the Transcaspian and the Russian elite's extreme sensitivity regarding this region show that Moscow, too, will resolutely contest the United States' expanded presence. Shevardnadze and Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev believe that assassination attempts against them in February 1998—neither of which was the first such effort—were orchestrated by elements in Moscow. 76 The concurrent Armenian coup that brought hard liners to power in Yerevan appears to have had Russian support as well. 77 Past experience suggests Moscow will even threaten a Third World War if there is Turkish intervention in the Transcaucasus, 78 and the 1997 Russo-Armenian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance and the 1994 Turkish-Azerbaijani Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation suggest just such a possibility. 79 Conceivably, the two larger states could then be dragged in to rescue their allies from defeat. The Russo-Armenian treaty is a virtual bilateral military alliance against Baku, in that it reaffirms Russia's lasting military presence in Armenia, commits Armenia not to join NATO, and could justify further fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh or further military pressure against Azerbaijan that will impede energy exploration and marketing. 80 It also reconfirms Russia's determination to resist an expanded U.S. presence and remain the exclusive regional hegemon. Thus, many structural conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict where third parties intervene now exist in the Transcaucasus. Many Third World conflicts generated by local structural factors have a great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often feel obliged to rescue their proxies and proteges. One or another big power may fail to grasp the stakes for the other side since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence, commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons or perhaps even conventional war to prevent defeat of a client are not well established or clear, as in Europe. For instance, in 1993 Turkish noises about intervening in the Karabakh War on behalf of Azerbaijan induced Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in such a case. 81 This confirms the observations of Jim Hoagland, the international correspondent of The Washington Post, that “future wars involving Europe and America as allies will be fought either over resources in chaotic Third World locations or in ethnic upheavals on the southern fringe of Europe and Russia.” 82 Unfortunately, many such causes for conflict prevail across the Transcaspian. Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally but probably could not prevail in a long war against Russia or if it could, would conceivably trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia's declared nuclear strategies), the danger of major war is higher here than almost anywhere else in the CIS or the so-called arc of crisis from the Balkans to China. As Richard Betts has observed, The greatest danger lies in areas where (1) the potential for serious instability is high; (2) both superpowers perceive vital interests; (3) neither recognizes that the other's perceived interest or commitment is as great as its own; (4) both have the capability to inject conventional forces and; (5) neither has willing proxies capable of settling the situation. 83

Expansion Bad – Conflict Escalation (1/2)

Russian expansionism causes conflict escalation – none of their takeouts will account for increased nationalism post the Georgia conflict

Umlanda 9 (Andreas, Former Fellow at Stanford, Harvard, and Oxford, http://www.globalpolitician.com/25610-crimea-russia, AD: 7/4/10) jl

The August 2008 war in the Caucasus was a shock to Russian-Western relations. The West’s timid reaction to the five-day conflict and to the de facto annexation of two Georgian provinces, by Russia, do not bode well for the future of European security. While the recent renewal of friendly relations between Moscow and Washington as well as current rapprochement between President Dmitry Medvedev and the liberal Russian intelligentsia give reason for hope, the major source for instability in northern Eurasia remains in place. A radically anti-Western and decidedly neo-imperialist faction of Moscow’s elite has gained a foothold in the Russian governmental apparatus, Putin’s United Russia party, electronic as well as print media, (un)civil society, and academia. An array of more or less influential and, often, relatively young ultra-nationalists ranging from newly appointed presidential administration officer Ivan Demidov to popular political commentator Mikhail Leontyev as well as recently elected Moscow State University professor Alexander Dugin have become part and parcel of everyday political, journalistic and intellectual discourse, in the post-Soviet world. These and similarly oriented figures were among the government’s whips during the Russian army’s intervention in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, last year. In the reports of Kremlin-controlled TV channels, the summer 2008 armed confrontation in the Southern Caucasus was as a proxy-war that the Georgians were fighting for, and with the support of, the US against Russia. The media campaign during and after the August war provided official approbation for the bizarre conspiracy theories that Leontyev, Dugin and Co. have been propagating in both prime-time television shows and high-brow analytic journals, for a long time. The years of unfettered xenophobic agitation by Moscow’s revanchist intellectuals in Russian mass media since Vladimir Putin’s rise are showing effects. As recent opinion polling data suggests, anti-Western – especially anti-American and anti-NATO – feelings have become widespread among ordinary Russians. According to Russia’s leading opinion polling agency, the Levada Center, already before the Russian-Georgian War, Russians’ positive feelings towards the US had deteriorated from over 65% in 2000, when Putin became President, to 43% in July 2008, by when Putin had left the Kremlin (http://www.levada.ru/russia.html ). Since the war in August, pro-American feelings have declined further, in all sectors of Russian society. State-controlled Russian polling agency VTsIOM which had earlier downplayed Russian anti-Westernism admitted recently that Russians’ views of, for instance, NATO “have changed fundamentally.” In 2006, 26% of Russians had regarded NATO an organization pushing, in the first instance, interests of the US. By now, 41% have come to hold this opinion. Whereas in 2006, 21% of the Russian population had regarded NATO as an organization the mission of which was “conducting aggressive military acts against other countries,” in late March 2009, 31% agreed to that statement (http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/, Press Release no. 1191). Whatever “Obama-effect” there currently is in Russia, one suspect that it may soon be over there. The recent sea-change in the political outlook of the world’s largest country and remaining nuclear superpower gains relevance against the background of several unresolved issues in Moscow’s former empire, among them the future of the Black Sea section of Russia’s naval forces. Currently, the port hosting the Russian Black Sea fleet is the city of Sevastopol, an independent municipality of Ukraine, and, with a population of 379,000, the largest city of the Crimean peninsula. Sevastopol gained world fame in the 19th century. Already then the major port of the Black Sea fleet, its almost one year long siege became the major episode of the 1853-56 Oriental or Crimean War between the Tsarist Empire, on the one side, and France, the UK and the Ottoman Empire, on the other. Many of the Tsarist army soldiers who fought and fell at Sevastopol were, in fact, Ukrainians and not Russians. Nevertheless, the Crimean War of the 1850s created, in Russia, a historical imagery of the Russians tenacious defense of Sevastopol against Western invaders, and Moscow's rightful claim to that city. In spite of thousands of Ukrainians' direct contribution to this war, the powerful military mythology around the Tsarist army’ heroic defense of the empire’s Southern border may, by Moscow's political technologists, be exploited also in a contemporary conflict. The Crimean War is also relevant to an understanding of generic security risks prevalent in the post-Soviet world and elsewhere. Being the first modern armed conflict, the mid-19th century stand-off between Russia and the West, in the Black Sea, is an example of how international wars have often come about. Today’s public perception of the reasons for war are dominated by Nazi Germany’s military adventures – a topic dealt with in hundreds of documentaries and movies shown on TV, on an almost daily basis, in Europe and elsewhere. Yet, World War II remains an altogether untypical instance. It was caused by one side’s, the "Berlin-Rom-Tokyo-Axis's," long-planned attempt to destroy the states it invaded, annex their territories, and subjugate or kill their populations. That has, however, not always been the cause for armed confrontations in world history, as the prehistory of the Crimean War illustrates. Frequently, wars have broken out not as a result of a long-planned and well-prepared military expansion. Often, they were outcomes of an escalation of tensions between states which, originally, had not been intending or not been interested to fight each other, on the battle-field, at all costs. In the 1850s, it needed a long chain of events to cause France, the United Kingdom and Turkey (as well as Sardinia) to form a coalition and enter a fight with the Tsarist army in the Black and other seas around the Russian Empire. To be sure, the aggressive factions among Moscow’s post-Soviet imperialists would like to annex Crimea – if not all of south-eastern Ukraine – to Russia sooner rather than later. Many of these ultra-nationalists would be also prepared to, right away, wage war for reaching this aim. However, they do not dominate Russian foreign policy. For an escalation of tensions, at the Black Sea, explicitly expansionist policies by the Kremlin would not be necessary. A mere stirring up of emotions around the future of the Sevastopol naval base, the position of Crimea’s ethnic Russian majority vis-à-vis the Ukrainian state, or the rights of the Tatar

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Expansion Bad – Conflict Escalation (2/2)

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minority within the Crimean Autonomous Republic could be sufficient to spill first blood. The following sequence of political reactions, social mobilization and mutual accusations, by Kiev and Moscow, would bring Europe’s two largest countries quickly to the brink of an armed confrontation. Inter-ethnic violence would put power-holders, on both sides, under pressure to militarily intervene. As the Russian-Georgian war illustrated, Russia has no qualms to use swiftly and on a large scale regular army units beyond its borders. Furthermore, Moscow was prepared to provide "help" to South Caucasian peoples who, in the ethnic Russian heartland of the Russian Federation (RF), frequently suffer from racist prejudices and are classified as "persons of Caucasian nationality" – the term "Caucasian" referring here to "black" rather than "white" people. In the case of Abkhazia, Moscow, moreover, "helped" a population that was under no immediate threat from Georgian troops. The case is remarkable even more so as, in August 2008, the Abkhaz republic was finally excised from the Georgian state territory although, when the Soviet Union fell apart, its titular nationality had, like in many other autonomous republics of the USSR, not constituted a majority of the population of the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR). As a result of the peculiar migration policies of the CPSU, during the last census of the USSR in 1989, 45,7% of the inhabitants of the Abkhaz ASSR were classified as "Georgians" whereas only 17,8% called themselves "Abkhaz" – the percentage of Abkhazians being thus only slightly higher than that of the share of Russians and Armenians in the population of Abkhazia. With its "recognition of the independence" of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as through the stationing of troops on their territories, the Russian political elite has demonstrated that it is interested in a partial revision of the results of the Russian empire's fall. Most of Crimea’s inhabitants are, unlike South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia's populations, ethnic Russians who seem to be actively acquiring RF passports. Should the Russian Federation's public come to believe that the hundreds of thousands of ethnically Russian inhabitants of Crimea are under some sort of threat, the Kremlin may feel forced to “protect the compatriots" – whatever the larger implications and geopolitical costs. The Kremlin’s decision-makers may even understand that the chances, on the Black Sea peninsula, of a full military victory are, unlike in South Ossetia, slim. Yet, a public opinion whipped up by apocalyptic visions and hate-speech from the likes of Leontyev or Dugin would force even moderate Russian politicians to prove their "patriotism," and "take a principled position." The West’s two foremost specialists on Crimea, Gwendolyn Sasse of the Oxford University, and Taras Kuzio of Carleton University, explain why existing ethnic tensions have, so far, not led to large-scale violence, on Crimea. Sasse found in mid-2008 that, “in recent years, Russian leaders have understood the benefits of a cooperative relationship with Ukraine, but have also taken advantage of close ties to Crimea as a means of influencing Kiev.” Kuzio is more skeptical towards Russian intentions, in Crimea. But, in early 2009, he too noted that there is a “low level of animosity between ethnic Russians and Ukrainians in Crimea.” Kuzio pointed to, among other aspects, “the ability of the Ukrainian security services to undermine Crimean separatism.” These and other factors listed by Sasse and Kuzio recently are still valid, and will remain so. Yet, it is not clear whether they take into full account recent changes in Russian public opinion on the outside world, in general, and the political mood of Moscow’s elite regarding its conduct of foreign affairs, in particular. In a confrontation between relatively pro- and radically anti-Western political factions within the Kremlin, Russia’s new frame of mind could easily be utilized by Moscow’s ultra-nationalists. An encouragement of anti-Ukrainian and separatist forces, on Crimea, could be seen by the extreme right as a strategy to undermine Russian-Western rapprochement. A resulting Russian-Ukrainian war would be devastating for the relations of the two closely related nations, and disastrous for European security. In the worst case, it could, as was the case during Russia's two Chechnia wars, mean the death of thousands of Crimeans (including many ethnic Russians), and lastingly isolate Russia internationally. However, it would also discipline President Dmitry Medvedev in the way in which the Russian-Georgian War withheld – at least, for some time – the new President’s domestic and foreign initiatives. Another irredentist war would transform Russia into something like a fortress with an even more rigid internal regime and less international cooperation than today. It would again postpone, or even put an end to the Medvedev circle's attempts to re-democratize Russia. Moscow’s revanchists may calculate that the political repercussions of an escalation of tensions on Crimea will strengthen their position in Russia. Should they get a chance to manipulate the politics of the Black Sea peninsula, a second Crimean War could become reality.

Expansion Bad – Extinction

Russian expansionism causes extinction

Engdahl 7 (F. William, has written on issues of energy, politics and economics for more than 30 years, http://www.engdahl.oilgeopolitics.net/Geopolitics\_\_\_Eurasia/Putin/putin.html, AD: 7/5/10) jl

Putin also did not have North Korea, China, Pakistan or India in mind, nor Great Britain with its ageing nuclear capacity, not even Israel. The only power surrounding Russia with weapons of mass destruction was its old Cold War foe--the United States.

The Commander of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces, General Nikolai Solovtsov, was more explicit. Commenting on the successful test of the K65M-R at Russia’s Kapustin Yar missile test site last April, he declared that US plans for a missile defense system, ‘could upset strategic stability. The planned scale of the United States’ deployment of a…missile defense system is so considerable that the fear that it could have a negative effect on the parameters of Russia’s nuclear deterrence potential is quite justified.’ Put simply, he referred to the now open US quest for Full Spectrum Dominance—Nuclear Primacy.

A new Armageddon is in the making. The unilateral military agenda of Washington has predictably provoked a major effort by Russia to defend herself. The prospects of a global nuclear conflagration, by miscalculation, increase by the day. At what point might an American President, God forbid, decide to order a pre-emptive full-scale nuclear attack on Russia to prevent Russia from rebuilding a state of mutual deterrence?

The new Armageddon is not exactly the Armageddon which George Bush’s Christian fanatics pray for as they dream of their Rapture. It is an Armageddon in which Russia and the United States would irradiate the planet and, perhaps, end human civilization in the process.

Expansion Bad – Nukes

Expansion increases the chances for the use of nuclear weapons as Russia has promised to “protect” interests outside its borders.

Peters 10(Andrea International Committee of the Fourth International “Russia announces expansion of nuclear capabilities, sanctions pre-emptive nuclear strikes” January 7)AQB

While Medvedev claims that the new weapons Russia is planning to develop will be in accord with whatever arms control agreement is ultimately reached with the US, the Kremlin’s announcement makes it clear that it has no intention of taking the threat of nuclear war off the table. Indeed, the Russian president’s announcement comes on the heels of a revision of the country’s military doctrine to allow for pre-emptive nuclear strikes. As reported in Russia Today, the Kremlin-sponsored English-language news agency, in mid-December the Russian Security Council approved the draft of a new policy that will permit not only nuclear attacks to “prevent any military threat,” but also the “use of nukes in small-scale conflicts.” This change to the country’s nuclear policy, which is similar to revisions made by the US to its military doctrine under the Bush administration, is part of a broader effort by Russia to both strengthen its armed forces and increase their profile in the international arena. Also in December, the upper house of the Russian Duma, the Federation Council, passed a resolution giving the president broad powers to authorize the use of force outside the country’s borders without recourse to parliament. According to a December 10 article in the Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor, President Medvedev can now “send troops into action abroad anywhere, anytime; decide on the size of force, specify the enemy, with no legal restraints or limitations, ‘to defend the interests of the Russian Federation and its citizens.’”

Russian expansion creates multiple scenarios for nuclear escalation - They will use nukes to accomplish political goals.  
Blank 9(Stephen, Strategic Studies Institute, “RUSSIA AND ARMS CONTROL: ARE THERE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION?” March)AQB

Proliferators or nuclear states like China and Russia can then deter regional or intercontinental attacks either by denial or by threat of retaliation.168 Given a multipolar world structure with little ideological rivalry among major powers, it is unlikely that they will go to war with each other. Rather, like Russia, they will strive for exclusive hegemony in their own “sphere of influence” and use nuclear instruments towards that end. However, wars may well break out between major powers and weaker “peripheral” states or between peripheral and semiperipheral states given their lack of domestic legitimacy, the absence of the means of crisis prevention, the visible absence of crisis management mechanisms, and their strategic calculation that asymmetric wars might give them the victory or respite they need.169 Simultaneously, The states of periphery and semiperiphery have far more opportunities for political maneuvering. Since war remains a political option, these states may find it convenient to exercise their military power as a means for achieving political objectives. Thus international crises may increase in number. This has two important implications for the use of WMD. First, they may be used deliberately to offer a decisive victory (or in Russia’s case, to achieve “intra-war escalation control”—author170) to the striker, or for defensive purposes when imbalances in military capabilities are significant; and second, crises increase the possibilities of inadvertent or accidental wars involving WMD.171 Obviously nuclear proliferators or states that are expanding their nuclear arsenals like Russia can exercise a great influence upon world politics if they chose to defy the prevailing consensus and use their weapons not as defensive weapons, as has been commonly thought, but as offensive weapons to threaten other states and deter nuclear powers. Their decision to go either for cooperative security and strengthened international military-political norms of action, or for individual national “egotism” will critically affect world politics. For, as Roberts observes, But if they drift away from those efforts [to bring about more cooperative security], the consequences could be profound. At the very least, the effective functioning of inherited mechanisms of world order, such as the special responsibility of the “great powers” in the management of the interstate system, especially problems of armed aggression, under the aegis of collective security, could be significantly impaired. Armed with the ability to defeat an intervention, or impose substantial costs in blood or money on an intervening force or the populaces of the nations marshaling that force, the newly empowered tier could bring an end to collective security operations, undermine the credibility of alliance commitments by the great powers, [undermine guarantees of extended deterrence by them to threatened nations and states] extend alliances of their own, and perhaps make wars of aggression on their neighbors or their own people.172

Expansion Bad – Laundry List

Russian adventurism causes nuclear conflict, accidental launch and collapses Russian democracy

Cohen 96 (Ariel – senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/1996/01/BG1065nbsp-The-New-Great-Game, AD: 7/5/10) jl

The U.S. Role in the Great Game

Much is at stake in Eurasia for the U.S. and its allies. Attempts to restore its empire will doom Russia's transition to a democracy and free-market economy. The ongoing war in Chechnya alone has cost Russia $6 billion to date (equal to Russia's IMF and World Bank loans for 1995). Moreover, it has extracted a tremendous price from Russian society. The wars which would be required to restore the Russian empire would prove much more costly not just for Russia and the region, but for peace, world stability, and security.

As the former Soviet arsenals are spread throughout the NIS, these conflicts may escalate to include the use of weapons of mass destruction. Scenarios including unauthorized missile launches are especially threatening. Moreover, if successful, a reconstituted Russian empire would become a major destabilizing influence both in Eurasia and throughout the world. It would endanger not only Russia's neighbors, but also the U.S. and its allies in Europe and the Middle East. And, of course, a neo-imperialist Russia could imperil the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf.15

Domination of the Caucasus would bring Russia closer to the Balkans, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Middle East. Russian imperialists, such as radical nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, have resurrected the old dream of obtaining a warm port on the Indian Ocean. If Russia succeeds in establishing its domination in the south, the threat to Ukraine, Turkey, Iran, and Afganistan will increase. The independence of pro-Western Georgia and Azerbaijan already has been undermined by pressures from the Russian armed forces and covert actions by the intelligence and security services, in addition to which Russian hegemony would make Western political and economic efforts to stave off Islamic militancy more difficult.

Russian expansionism escalates to nuclear exchange

Knight 8 (Alex, Master's Degree in PoliSci, http://endofcapitalism.com/2008/08/26/imperialism%E2%80%99s-chess-board-war-in-the-caucuses-and-the-fall-of-pax-americana/, AD: 7/4/10) jl

Poland: a Nuclear War Flashpoint

U.S. foreign policy strategists are bitter and enraged over losing their chess piece in Georgia, and that doesn’t bode well for rational thinking amongst imperialists. The State Department’s immediate response to Georgia’s routing was to sign a deal with Poland on which it had previously been stalling, to put in place a missile shield by 2012. The deal includes 10 interceptor missiles and a battery of long-range Patriot missiles, operated by 100 U.S. troops. While the State Department claims the measures are to defend against “future adversaries such as Iran,” this is a pretty preposterous scenario, given that all the missiles are pointed at Russia.

Russia is obviously not happy, and is firing back with words, and maybe eventually with missiles of its own. The Russian military deputy chief of staff, Anatoly Nogovitsyn, said that “by deploying, Poland is exposing itself to a strike – 100%” from Russia. In the form of nuclear warheads. No, this is not the ’60s, and yes, Russia is threatening nuclear war, while Poland and the U.S. seem perfectly willing to risk provoking one.

Expansion Bad – Hegemony

The ultimate goal of Russia’s expansion is to collapse America’s unipolarity.

**Bugajski 10**(Janusz, holder of the Lavrentis Lavrentiadis Chair and director of the New European Democracies program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Russia’s Pragmatic Reimperialization” CRIA Vol. 4(1))AQB

The word “pragmatic” has been loosely applied in describing Russia’s foreign policy by implying partnership, moderation, and cooperation, as well as by counterposing it to an ideologized and expansive imperial policy characteristic of the Cold War. Paradoxically, pragmatic imperialism is a useful way to describe Putinist Russia’s foreign policy, which has been continued under the Medvedev presidency, particularly in the strategies employed to realize specific national ambitions.7 The primary goal of Putinism is to restore Russia as a neo-imperial state – if not as a global superpower then as a regional superpower. Moscow’s overarching goal toward the West is to reverse the global predominance of the United States by transforming the current unipolarity into multipolarity in which Russia exerts increasing international leverage. To achieve these long-range objectives, the Kremlin is intent on expanding the “Eurasian space” in which Russia is the dominant political player, and thus the Western, or Euro-Atlantic, zone of security would become increasingly fractured and neutralized. In this strategic struggle, “Eurasianism” for Moscow involves two interconnected approaches: transforming Europe into an appendage of the Russian sphere of influence and debilitating Euro-Atlanticism by undercutting Europe’s connections with the United States. The two strategic objectives were succinctly highlighted by Russia’s newly installed president Dmitry Medvedev during his visit to Berlin in June 2008 when he proposed the creation of a pan-European security pact that would sideline or absorb NATO and steadily enfeeble U.S. influence. In Medvedev’s words: “Atlanticism as a sole historical principle has already had its day. NATO has failed to give new purpose to its existence.”8 Medvedev followed up his initial proposal for a new European security framework during the World Policy Conference in Evian, France, on October 8, 2008.9 In elaborating on the initial plan, he posited the notion of “equal security” in which Russia would maintain a veto on any further NATO enlargement and where no state or international organization would possess “exclusive rights” in providing peace and stability in Europe. In effect, Moscow would be in a position to block any moves by the Central-East European (CEE) countries to enhance their own security and obstruct any changes in NATO’s military infrastructure in Europe.

Expansion Bad – Destabilization

Russia uses tactics that destabilize regions and governments to expand it’s influence – empirically proven with the invasion of Georgia.

**Bugajski 10**(Janusz, holder of the Lavrentis Lavrentiadis Chair and director of the New European Democracies program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Russia’s Pragmatic Reimperialization” CRIA Vol. 4(1))AQB

Russia under Putin’s guidance has evolved into an imperial project for two core reasons. First, it has clearly articulated ambitions to restore its global status, primarily in competition with the United States, and to undermine international institutions that hinder these aspirations. Second, Moscow's drive to dominate its former satellites, curtail the expansion of Western structures, and neutralize Europe as a security player is accomplished through a mixture of threat, subterfuge, disinformation, pressure, and economic incentives. Russia's national interests are viewed as predominating over those of its smaller neighbors and European partners. However, Russia's neo-imperialism no longer relies primarily on traditional instruments such as military might, the implanting of political proxies in subject states, or the control of territory. Instead, Moscow employs an assortment of diplomatic, political, informational, economic, and security tools to encourage the evolution of pliant governments that either remain neutral or actively promote Moscow’s strategic agenda. Nonetheless, military force may also be employed to destabilize a neighboring government and fracture its territory as the invasion of Georgia in August 2008 poignantly illustrated. In contrast with the Cold War, Russia has deployed novel tools for subversion, disinformation, and domination. In particular, Moscow’s growing monopolization of energy supplies from within Russia and the Caspian Basin to Europe buttresses its power projection. Europe’s growing energy dependence and Russia's accumulative purchases of energy infrastructure and other assets in targeted states reinforce the latter’s political influence.

Expansion Bad – Resource Wars

Russia’s expansionist goal to become an economic powerhouse will lead to energy and resource wars that escalate to armed conflicts.

**Bugajski 10**(Janusz, holder of the Lavrentis Lavrentiadis Chair and director of the New European Democracies program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Russia’s Pragmatic Reimperialization” CRIA Vol. 4(1))AQB

Russia’s ambitions are to fundamentally alter the existing European security structure, to marginalize or sideline NATO, and to diminish the U.S. role in European security. In all these areas, Russia’s national interests fundamentally diverge from those of the U.S.; or, more precisely, the Russian leadership does not share Western interests or threat perceptions.4 To affirm its national interests, the Medvedev administration has released three major policy documents: the Foreign Policy Concept in July 2008, the Foreign and Security Policy Principles in August 2008, and the National Security Strategy in May 2009.5 The Foreign Policy Concept claims that Russia is a resurgent great power, exerting substantial influence over international affairs and determined to defend the interests of Russian citizens wherever they reside. According to the Foreign and Security Policy Principles, Moscow follows five key principles: the primacy of international law, multipolarity to replace U.S.-dominated unipolarity, the avoidance of Russian isolationism, the protection of Russians wherever they reside, and Russia’s privileged interests in regions adjacent to Russia. Russia’s National Security Strategy, which replaced the previous National Security Concepts, repeats some of the formulations in the other two documents and depicts NATO expansion and its expanded global role as a major threat to Russia’s national interests and to international security. The document asserts that Russia seeks to overcome its domestic problems and emerge as an economic powerhouse. Much attention was also devoted to the potential risk of future energy wars over regions such as the Arctic, where Russia would obviously defend its access to hydrocarbon resources. The document also envisages mounting competition over energy sources escalating into armed conflicts near Russia’s borders. Among the customary list of threats to Russia’s security, the National Security Strategy includes alleged falsifications of Russian history.6 The Kremlin is engaged in an extensive historical revisionist campaign in which it seeks to depict Russia’s Tsarist and Soviet empires as benevolent and civilizing missions pursued in neighboring countries. Systematized state-sponsored historical distortions have profound contemporary repercussions. Interpretations of the past are important for legitimizing the current government, which is committed to demonstrating Russia’s alleged greatness and re-establishing its privileged interests over former satellites.

Expansion Bad – Resource Wars

Energy wars go north causing the battle for the Arctic to go nuclear.

Matthews 9(Owen, writer for The Mail news service, “The coldest war: Russia and U.S. face off over Arctic resources”)AQB

The year is 2020, and, from the Middle East to Nigeria, the world is convulsed by a series of conflicts over dwindling energy supplies. The last untapped reserves of oil and gas lie in the most extreme environment on the planet - the North Pole - where an estimated bonanza of 100 billion barrels are buried deep beneath the Arctic seabed. The ownership of this hostile no-man's-land is contested by Russia, Denmark, Norway, the U.S and Canada. And, in an increasingly desperate battle for resources, each begins to back up its claim with force. Soon, the iceberg-strewn waters of the Arctic are patrolled by fleets of warships, jostling for position in a game of brinkmanship. Russia's Northern Fleet, headed by the colossal but ageing guided missile cruiser Pyotr Velikiy (Peter The Great), and the U.S. Second Fleet, sailing out of Norfolk, Virginia, are armed with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles - and controlled by leaders who are increasingly willing to use them. For now, such a scenario is pure fiction. But it may not be for long. Only recently, respected British think-tank Jane's Review warned that a polar war could be a reality within 12 years. And the Russians are already taking the race for the North Pole's oil wealth deadly seriously. Indeed, the Kremlin will spend tens of millions upgrading Russia's Northern Fleet over the next eight years. And its Atomic Energy Agency has already begun building a fleet of floating nuclear power stations to power undersea drilling for the Arctic's vast oil and gas reserves. A prototype is under construction at the SevMash shipyard in Severodvinsk. The prospect of an undersea Klondike near the North Pole, powered by floating nuclear plants, has environmentalists deeply worried - not least because Russia has such a dismal record on nuclear safety and the disposal of radioactive waste.

Russia’s goal to become an economic powerhouse will involve the use of nuclear missile equipped submarines.

Matthews 9(Owen, writer for The Mail news service, “The coldest war: Russia and U.S. face off over Arctic resources”)AQB

Soviet and U.S Cold Warriors spent decades fantasising about how to militarise the Arctic. Joseph Stalin sent millions of gulag prisoners to their deaths building an insane railway between the Arctic towns of Salekhard and Igarka. Leonid Brezhnev built fleets of monster, nuclear-powered icebreakers in an attempt to keep a passage around northern Siberia open year-round. Today, Russia, Canada and the U.S. keep isolated military posts dotted across the Arctic Circle, supplied by helicopters and, in Russia's case, manned by shifts of shivering conscripts in tall felt boots and sheepskin coats. But above all, any confrontation over the Arctic would be a naval one, with Russia's Northern Fleet, based at Murmansk, confronting the U.S. Second Fleet. Fully two-thirds of Russia's naval power is allocated to its Northern Fleet. The fleet also boasts Russia's newly-revamped nuclear missile submarines. The fleet is also armed with new, sea-launched Bulava intercontinental ballistic nuclear missiles, which are designed to evade U.S. missile defence shields and destroy entire cities. Clearly, Moscow sees the north as its most vulnerable, and easily expanded, frontier and seems willing to stake its claim with devastating force.

Expansion Bad – Resource Wars

After the conflict in Georgia, an arctic exchange is likely.

Matthews 9(Owen, writer for The Mail news service, “The coldest war: Russia and U.S. face off over Arctic resources”)AQB

War over the North Pole was, until Russia's invasion of Georgia in August, an unlikely scenario. Now, though, as Russia becomes ever more aggressive (President Medvedev has just signed off on the latest round of a massive upgrade of the country's armed forces), it has come a step closer to the realms of the possible. The Kremlin has made it clear that it has set its sights on domination of the last great wilderness on Earth. At stake is the massive mineral wealth hidden deep under the Arctic seabed - much of it made more accessible as the ice cap retreats. Vladimir Putin, Russia's Prime Minister, long vowed to build an 'energy empire' and dreamed of reversing the collapse of Russian power after the fall of the Soviet Union, an event he once called 'the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century'. And now Putin's hand-picked successor, President Dmitry Medvedev, has set his sights on the Arctic, a chunk of territory with massive mineral wealth. In a startling attempt to re-draw the map of the world, Moscow has signalled its intentions to annex a huge swathe of the continental shelf, which runs from Northern Siberia, to include the entire North Pole. Medvedev set out his assertive strategy to expand Russia's borders northward at a meeting of Russia's national security council in the Kremlin almost immediately after coming to power last year. 'Our biggest task is to turn the Arctic into Russia's resource base for the 21st century,' he told his top security lieutenants. The top of the world currently lies under international waters, supervised by a United Nations Commission. The five countries with Arctic coastlines - Russia, Canada, the U.S, Denmark (which owns Greenland) and Norway - control only a 200-mile economic zone extending north from their northern coasts. Beyond that, it is a no-man's-land.

Expansion Bad – Terrorism

As Russia attempts to expand, they use Muslim sentiments toward the US as weapons – Encourages terrorism.

Bhatty 8(Roy Sultan Khan M.Phil/Ph.D candidate at Area Study Centre for Europe “RUSSIA: THE TRADITIONAL HEGEMON IN CENTRAL ASIA”)AQB

Though the emergence of extremism is also a threat for Russia, Russia has the opportunity to direct the Muslim’s sentiments against the US and to get their sympathies. In 2003, ultranationalist leader of Russia Vladimir Zhirinovsky openly supported US war against Iraq, arguing that Russia would benefit from it, as US would be weakened and while feeling hated for the US, the world community would look toward Russia for help.33 Since 2001, and especially after 2003, the US is quite involved in Afghanistan and Iraq that has given much time to Russia to revive its power that it lost in the Cold War.34 Russia wants to keep the US and NATO preoccupied. In fact Russia is following the old saying of the famous and earliest known writer on military strategy, Sun Tzu, who said ‘the best way to win is to let your enemy defeat himself’. In the CARs, by encouraging extremist groups clandestinely, Russia can force their authoritarian rulers to look towards Russia for help. Russia has shown no keen interest in providing assistance to crush extremist groups active in Central Asia. This gives a strong appearance that Russia is involved in encouraging these groups for its own vested interests in the region. For instance, Russia did not support Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan properly at the time of the infiltration made by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in 1999 and 2000. An article reproduced in the June 2001 issue of a Russian journal Russia and the Muslim World (Moscow), revealed that the IMU had its bases in Tajikistan which was ally of Russia. The IMU was patronized by high Tajik officials including special services, whereas wounded Islamic fighters were treated in hospital in Dushanbe.35 In an interview with “Abdullah” the son of a man identified as Shaikh Ibrahim (the IMU leader Tahir Yuldoshev’s second in command) said, Tahir rejected a proposal from an unknown Russian who offered him a deal to finance him and supply of arms and ammunition to fight against the US in Afghanistan.36 By exploiting the threat of extremism in Central Asia, Russia has compelled the CARs to look for Russia’s help. Russia’s alleged hand in support of militants fighting against US provides Russia an opportunity to make the US engaged in a volatile Afghanistan and to take a revenge of the USSR’s defeat in Afghanistan which was made possible with US weapons and dollars. So Russia is using its cards to maintain its influence in the region.

**Expansion Bad – First Strike**

Russia perceives signs of weakness – they will launch a first strike attack.

Skousen 9 (Joel, political commentator and writer for World Affairs Brief, September 25, [http://centurean2.wordpress.com/2010/02/17/canceled-european-missile-defense-signals-new-disarmament-race-to-war/] AD: 7/5/10)JM

The UK Guardian reported that, “Barack Obama has demanded the Pentagon conduct a radical review of US nuclear weapons doctrine to prepare the way for deep cuts in the country’s arsenal, the Guardian can reveal.” This is exactly the same thing President Bill Clinton ordered in 1996 that led to the secret issuance of PDD-60 completely changing the Reagan era nuclear doctrine designed to win a nuclear war with Russia. PDD-60 is still secret, but a few public statements issued in late 1997 by Clinton disarmament advisor Robert Bell and Craig Cerniello of Arms Control Today (who was part of the drafting and review process) [ http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997\_11-12/pdd ] indicated that the Presidential Decision Directive instructed US missile commanders “not to depend on launch-on-warning” (a tactic of launching all fixed silo missiles at the enemy before opponents first strike missiles landed and destroyed ours), –in essence, this PDD directed our country to absorb a first strike and retaliate later. A frustrated Marine General is said to have exclaimed, “Retaliate with WHAT?” He knew, as did other commanders of our Trident nuclear submarines that Clinton had unilaterally agreed to keep half of all our SLBM submarines in port at any one time “to assure our Russian friends that we are not a threat.” When you telegraph a subtle message to the Russians that we are going to absorb a first strike, you induce them to make sure they hit us with everything necessary to make sure we cannot respond after a first strike. PDD-60 also removes all alternate submarine launch codes so that our subs cannot fire without direct communications with the President. Those vital communications links will assuredly not survive a massive first strike. Even if they did, it is probable given what we know that the President would simply not issue the orders to launch until a first strike had landed. This is not deterrence. This is suicide, or a very carefully planned agenda to make the US vulnerable. Why would US leaders do this? It is designed to drive Americans into a New World Order that has military power over member nations–something no amount of public manipulation in past decades has been able to do. When our leaders come out of their bunkers they will declare the “Russians and Chinese deceived us” and now (that our military forces are mostly destroyed) we have no choice but to enter into a military alliance with the UN to save us.

U.S. foreign policy strategists are bitter and enraged over losing their chess piece in Georgia, and that doesn’t bode well for rational thinking amongst imperialists. The State Department’s immediate response to Georgia’s routing was to sign a deal with Poland on which it had previously been stalling, to put in place a missile shield by 2012. The deal includes 10 interceptor missiles and a battery of long-range Patriot missiles, operated by 100 U.S. troops. While the State Department claims the measures are to defend against “future adversaries such as Iran,” this is a pretty preposterous scenario, given that all the missiles are pointed at Russia. Russia is obviously not happy, and is firing back with words, and maybe eventually with missiles of its own. The Russian military deputy chief of staff, Anatoly Nogovitsyn, said that “by deploying, Poland is exposing itself to a strike – 100%” from Russia. In the form of nuclear warheads. No, this is not the ’60s, and yes, Russia is threatening nuclear war, while Poland and the U.S. seem perfectly willing to risk provoking one.

**AT: Russia’s A Democracy**

Despite hopes of a transition to a democratic nation Russia has transitioned to an authoritarian type government.

**Bugajski 10**(Janusz, holder of the Lavrentis Lavrentiadis Chair and director of the New European Democracies program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Russia’s Pragmatic Reimperialization” CRIA Vol. 4(1))AQB

Despite initial expectations that a prosperous Russia will evolve into a democracy with a more benign foreign policy, the exact opposite occurred. With Putin as president from 1999 and the subsequent decade-long oil bonanza, Russia became more authoritarian in its domestic politics and increasingly imperialistic toward its neighbors. This trend has been largely supported by the Russian public, as the state media inculcated the myth that during the 1990s, Russia was in a chaotic state of affairs precipitated by international meddling, and that a strong centralized state was the most effective alternative. Western analysts often assume that Russia is acting in accordance with its national interests rather than its state ambitions. It is useful to distinguish between the two rather than simply accepting official Russian assertions at face value. For instance, is it in Russia’s legitimate interest to prevent the accession of neighboring states into NATO or to oppose the positioning of NATO infrastructure among new Alliance members? Accepting such positions would indicate that NATO is a threat to Russia’s security and territorial integrity rather than being primarily a pretext used by Moscow to deny the sovereignty of neighboring countries.3

AT: NATO Contains

NATO wouldn’t stop an expanding Russia

Larison 7/5 (Daniel, July 5th, 2010, http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2010/07/05/russian-aggression/)KFC

Was Russian recognition of the independence of the separatist republics illegal? Of course. So was the recognition of Kosovo independence by the U.S. and much of Europe. It is pretty widely accepted now that it was recognition of Kosovo independence that led to Russia’s recognition of the separatist republics. Western governments wanted to make Kosovo a “special” case, and Russia was going to make sure that it became a precedent that had unhappy consequences for a U.S. ally. Georgian escalation made it very easy for Moscow to do just that. The main difference between the conflicts prior to recognition is that the U.S. and NATO launched the attack on Serbia that later led to this partition, while Russia was repelling an attack from Georgia against the statelets that had effectively broken away decades ago. It was the U.S. and NATO that launched an unprovoked war against a traditional Russian ally eleven years ago after assuring Russia that it had no reason to worry about eastward NATO expansion. It was also the U.S. and many of our NATO allies that arbitrarily partitioned that country’s territory two years ago with those recognitions of Kosovo independence. Perhaps it isn’t exactly paranoia to see an expanding NATO as some sort of threat to Russia and its allies. Then again, maybe Moscow is mistaken to see NATO expansion as a major threat. As NATO has expanded, it has steadily gone from being what some of us used to call the greatest alliance in history to something more like a club for the politically correct. Belonging to it has had far less to do with collective defense against a foreign threat, which has steadily receded for the last twenty years, and more to do with burnishing the credentials of one’s country as a truly Western one. Certainly, many new and aspiring NATO members have contributed to the war in Afghanistan, and many have also inexplicably contributed to the war in Iraq, but for the most part these have been symbolic commitments that underscore just how militarily useless most of the new allies are. To the extent that NATO continues to have any real military function at all, it has been to serve as America’s posse in military campaigns that have nothing to do with the alliance’s reason for existing. What continues to amaze is not the limited support NATO allies are giving to the war in Afghanistan, but that they continue to provide any support when they no longer really have any obligation to do so. Meanwhile, it is exactly those countries where Western security guarantees are truly risky and dangerous that stood no chance of gaining entry, because Ukraine or Georgia in NATO might have eventually required NATO to fulfill its pledge to defend against an attack on any member, and no current member of NATO had any intention of doing that.

NATO won’t deter Russia – they aren’t rational.

Valasek 9 (Tomas, director of foreign policy & defence @ CER, November, [http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/wp\_929\_nato\_nov09.pdf] AD: 7/7/10)JM

Second, countries in Europe’s north and east also warn against assuming that the Kremlin will always act rationally. While the threat of collective retaliation should deter Russia from confronting a NATO country, the Central Europeans point out that Moscow’s attitude to its neighbours is driven as much by emotions as by reason. They worry this could lead Moscow to escalate future disputes into a war, no matter how disastrous for Russia. They point to the 2009 Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute as an example. This crisis started as a commercial dispute over unresolved debt, gas prices and transit fees. When Ukraine refused to pay, Russia cut gas supplies for two weeks, leaving a number of Central European countries without gas in the middle of winter (Ukraine transports 80 per cent of Russian gas exports to Europe). Kyiv was hardly blameless in the crisis – it had failed to pay bills on time and was reluctant to remove murky gas trading companies – but Russia, in turning off gas supplies entirely, turned a bilateral dispute over payments into a gas war affecting all of Central Europe. One senior Central European official closely involved in brokering the agreement which ended the crisis blamed “Putin’s rage at Ukraine” for the escalation. Gazprom, Russia’s state-controlled gas mammoth, lost $1-2 billion in revenue during the crisis. Since the shutoff, the EU has intensified efforts to build new pipelines to connect Europe to non-Russian sources of gas, such as the Nabucco pipeline through Turkey and the Balkans. From a commercial point of view and from the standpoint of relations with the EU, the crisis did predictable damage to Russia – yet it did take place, despite solid rational arguments against it.

\*\*AFF ANSWERS\*\*

UQ – Containment Fails

Russia is expanding now – even attempts at containment are failing

Klein 8 (Brian P, International Affairs Fellow for Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/17281/what\_goes\_around\_comes\_around\_for\_russia.html, AD: 7/5/10) jl

Russia invades an eastern European republic, sends its navy to Latin America for military exercises in America’s backyard, and threatens to cut off energy supplies to western Europe. This reads like a chapter out of Cold War history.

Yet 2008 has marked the re-emergence of Russia after a two-decade hiatus. Flush with cash from oil and gas revenue and a hefty grudge against perceived Western insults to its great power status, Russia has launched the opening salvo in a more muscular foreign policy.

While the United States and Europe hoped that Russia would become more integrated into the world system, talk of NATO expansion, support for nascent eastern European democracies, and plans for basing missiles in Poland have heightened Russia’s sense of alienation and its perception that it must not bend to the will of Western powers.

UQ – Afghanistan Influence Now

Drug war makes Russia’s influence in Afghanistan high

Newsweek 10 (MSNBC News Organization, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/04/02/russia-invades-afghanistan-again.html, AD: 7/3/10) jl

For Viktor Ivanov, the road back to Kabul has taken two decades. He first arrived in Afghanistan in 1987 as a young KGB officer, back when the country was the southernmost outpost of the Soviet empire. When he returned last month, Kabul was the outpost of a very different empire—one run by reluctant imperialists in Washington keen to get out as soon as possible. Though the official reason for Ivanov's return was to aid U.S. antinarcotics efforts—he's now Russia's drug czar—his real goal in Afghanistan was clear: to help recover some of Russia's lost influence there. As his Russian Air Force plane began its descent into the Kabul airport, Ivanov raised a glass of champagne with his aides and boasted, "Russia is back."

Influence now is crowding out the US

Newsweek 10 (MSNBC News Organization, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/04/02/russia-invades-afghanistan-again.html, AD: 7/3/10) jl

A lot of history stands in the way of Russia's new campaign. Local memories of the destruction wrought by the Soviets in their decade-long occupation remain fresh. But both the Afghans and the Americans have reasons to welcome Russia's reengagement. No one has a silver bullet for Afghanistan's rampaging drug trade, but with its vast intelligence assets across Central Asia and an operational group of Russian troops on the Afghan-Tajik border, Moscow could make a real difference. To win over the locals, the Russians have also offered to ramp up their involvement in the Afghan reconstruction, energy, and mineral sectors. Russian companies are currently negotiating to rebuild 142 Soviet-built installations across the country, including a $500 million deal to reconstruct hydroelectric plants in Naglu, Surobi, and Makhipar and a $500 million program to build wells and irrigation systems nationwide. Rosneft, the Russian state-owned oil and gas giant, has commissioned a study of gas fields in Djarkuduk and Shebarghan that could lead to contracts yielding $350 million a year. Russian air-transport contractors are already working for NATO and the Afghan government. But all this cooperation comes with a price: increased Russian influence in Kabul. Moscow makes no bones about this: it seeks nothing less than to "reclaim its geopolitical share of Afghanistan," says its ambassador, Andrey Avetisyan.

US-Russia cooperation in Afghanistan on drugs now

Newsweek 10 (MSNBC News Organization, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/04/02/russia-invades-afghanistan-again.html, AD: 7/3/10) jl

It might seem surprising, given Afghanistan's history as a Cold War battleground, that it's the Americans who invited the Russians back in. But sure enough, last year U.S. President Barack Obama and his Russian counterpart, Dmitry Medvedev, set up a series of contact groups on mutual security interests in the region. Ivanov and his U.S. counterpart, Gil Kerlikowske, have since sat down on many occasions to figure out ways Russia can help NATO choke off the Taliban's drug businesses.

Link Turn – General

U.S military presence is used to justify Russian aggression.

Young 9 (Cathy, Russian American journalist and writer, April, [http://reason.com/archives/2009/03/13/unclenching-the-fist/1] AD: 7/6/10) JM

It could even be argued that the Bush administration’s aggressive unilateralism on the war in Iraq, its often cavalier attitude toward human rights in the War on Terror, and its executive power grab on the home front emboldened Putin to behave similarly. While most of the alleged Bush-Putin parallels are specious, the actions of the Bush White House easily lent themselves to a self-serving interpretation by the Putin clique, validating its cynical conviction that democracy is just a cover for “might makes right.” The war in Iraq also made it far too easy to equate all efforts at “democracy promotion,” even peaceful activities such as assisting civil rights groups, with naked imperialism. This helped the Putin propaganda machine stoke Russian unease about the U.S. role in the “color revolutions” in Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004, which replaced those nations’ governments with ones less devoted to Moscow. Many Russians certainly experienced the collapse of the USSR and the weakening of Russia’s influence abroad as a blow to their national pride. But the notion that the United States rubbed Russia’s face in its humiliation is a myth. (If the West rejoiced in Communism’s Cold War defeat, so did most of the Russian media and political elites at the time.) Yes, NATO expansion into Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics ranks high on the list of Russian grievances. But when NATO first began seriously considering admitting former Eastern Bloc states in the early 1990s, most supporters of expansion assumed that it could eventually include Russia—and Russia seemed receptive. These prospects were undercut by pressures from neo-Communists and nationalists in the Russian parliament, who wanted a less pro-Western stance, and by mixed signals and suspicions on both the Russian and the U.S. sides. It could be that the conflict is more contrived than real on Russia’s end. The belief that Kremlin rhetoric about the American threat is a faux paranoia, calculated to enable bullying at home and abroad, is shared by numerous commentators inside Russia, from the Carnegie Endowment’s Lilia Shevtsova to former top-level Soviet arms negotiator Gen. Vladimir Dvorkin. Writing in the independent online journal EJ.ru in April 2008, Dvorkin pointed out the obvious: Given Russia’s nuclear potential, a military attack by NATO troops on Russia is unthinkable, no matter how many of its neighbors join the alliance. The real danger to Russia, in Dvorkin’s view, is “civilizational isolation” if the country continues to resist democratization and modernization and finds itself surrounded by neighbors integrated into the West.

U.S presence diverts attention from Russia enabling expansionism.

Friedman 8 (George, Ph.D. in government at Cornell U, September 2, [http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/medvedev\_doctrine\_and\_american\_strategy] AD: 7/6/10)JM

In short, the United States remained heavily committed to a region stretching from Iraq to Pakistan, with main force committed to Iraq and Afghanistan, and the possibility of commitments to Pakistan (and above all to Iran) on the table. U.S. ground forces were stretched to the limit, and U.S. airpower, naval and land-based forces had to stand by for the possibility of an air campaign in Iran — regardless of whether the U.S. planned an attack, since the credibility of a bluff depended on the availability of force. The situation in this region actually was improving, but the United States had to remain committed there. It was therefore no accident that the Russians invaded Georgia on Aug. 8 following a Georgian attack on South Ossetia. Forgetting the details of who did what to whom, the United States had created a massive window of opportunity for the Russians: For the foreseeable future, the United States had no significant forces to spare to deploy elsewhere in the world, nor the ability to sustain them in extended combat. Moreover, the United States was relying on Russian cooperation both against Iran and potentially in Afghanistan, where Moscow’s influence with some factions remains substantial. The United States needed the Russians and couldn’t block the Russians. Therefore, the Russians inevitably chose this moment to strike.

Withdrawal is key to stop Russia.

Friedman 8 (George, Ph.D. in government at Cornell U, September 2, [http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/medvedev\_doctrine\_and\_american\_strategy] AD: 7/6/10)JM

Rapidly disengage from Iraq, leaving a residual force there and in Afghanistan. The upside is that this creates a reserve force to reinforce the Baltics and Ukraine that might restrain Russia in the former Soviet Union. The downside is that it would create chaos in the Islamic world, threatening regimes that have sided with the United States and potentially reviving effective intercontinental terrorism. The trade-off is between a hegemonic threat from Eurasia and instability and a terror threat from the Islamic world.

Link Turn – General

Overseas bases give an incentive for Russia to engage in military adventurism.

Vine 9 (David, prof of Anthropology at American U, February 25, [http://www.fpif.org/articles/too\_many\_overseas\_bases] AD: 7/7/10)JM

Proponents of maintaining the overseas base status quo will argue, however, that our foreign bases are critical to national and global security. A closer examination shows that overseas bases have often heightened military tensions and discouraged diplomatic solutions to international conflicts. Rather than stabilizing dangerous regions, our overseas bases have often increased global militarization, enlarging security threats faced by other nations who respond by boosting military spending (and in cases like China and Russia, foreign base acquisition) in an escalating spiral. Overseas bases actually make war more likely, not less.

Link Turn – Afghanistan

We can’t deter Russia while still in Afghanistan.

Evans, Charter, and Philp 8 (Evans, award-winning syndicated journalist, David, journalist and Catherine, foreign correspondent for The Times, September 9, [http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4709981.ece] AD: 7/7/10)JM

Those near neighbours already in Nato are the ones leading the charge to put the Russian threat back on the map. “Now, because of Georgia, there are Nato members such as Poland, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states who are saying the alliance should stop thinking about expeditionary warfare and concentrate once again on old-style military structures to deter Russia,” a senior alliance source told The Times. “Their plea is 'Nato come home', but we can't ditch Afghanistan to shore up Poland or the Baltic states to deter an assertive Russia.” The division between those who still want to focus the main effort on Afghanistan and others who believe that resources should be switched back to confronting Russia's rediscovered imperialist ambitions has created turmoil within the alliance. Key to this conflict are the tough decisions to be made over who gets to join the alliance, and when.

Link Defense – Afghanistan – No Containment

Russia isn’t threatened by US presence in Afghanistan

Aljazeera 9 (http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2009/03/200932752829665993.html, AD: 7/3/10) jl

But while Moscow appears opposed to the US foothold in Central Asia, it wants the US presence in Afghanistan to prevent the expansion of terrorism and drug-trafficking to Russian borders.

Impact Turn – Afghanistan – Expansion Good

Withdrawal is inevitable – Russian influence stabilizes the region and prevents conflict

Newsweek 10 (MSNBC News Organization, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/04/02/russia-invades-afghanistan-again.html, AD: 7/3/10) jl

So far, such moves seem to elicit more relief than concern in Washington. The Obama administration has taken a big gamble with its surge, and everything is being done with an eye to July 2011, when the administration has promised to begin its withdrawal. For that to happen, Afghanistan's neighbors must shoulder more and more of the burden of helping fix its drug and infrastructure problems. If that means Afghanistan moving closer to Russia's orbit, then Washington, at least for now, seems to deem that a price worth paying. "The United States is not concerned about Russia coming back," says Anthony Cordesman, a respected analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. If history is any guide, having Afghanistan in Russia's sphere of influence would be far from ideal—but it would also be preferable to having it go it alone and spread violent mayhem across the region and the world.

Impact Defense – NATO Contains Russia

NATO contains Russian expansion

Wilkinson 97 (Paul, Prof of IR at U of St Andrews, http://www.fas.org/man/nato/hrpc\_nato\_xpn.htm, AD: 7/6/10) jl

The fundamental geopolitical reality in Central and Eastern Europe is the inherent imbalance of power between Russia and its immediate and near neighbors, either individually or in combination.  This age-old reality is reflected in Russian dominion over Poland, the Baltic nations, Finland, Belarus, and Ukraine in the 18th and 19th centuries, and over the vast imperium of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact in the 20th century. The current eclipse of Russian military and economic power should not blind us to centuries-old realities of geography and economics.  An expanded NATO remains an essential shield against a resurgence of Russian power.  Even today, there is clear evidence of a revival of Russian expansionism:   
Russia has achieved a "reunion" with Belarus, a nation of 10.5 million the size of Romania.   On April 2, 1997, Russian President Yeltsin and Belarussian President Lukashenka signed a treaty creating a union of the two countries with joint armed forces and common citizenship and currency, as well as a binational ruling body.  The union will again bring Russian power, after an absence of only six years, to the eastern borders of Poland and the Baltic states--700 miles farther west.  Russian commentators stressed that the "union" was a riposte to NATO expansion, and that it is open to other members.  As a result, Russia will have achieved an expanded union before NATO does. Russia has serious border disputes with Ukraine, and has refused to define its thousand-mile border.  Russia continues to claim the strategic Crimean Peninsula, as well as significant units of the former Soviet Black Sea fleet. Russia has repeatedly and brutally threatened the three Baltic Republics. TASS reported on January 9, 1997 that Russian Foreign Minister Y.M. Primakov stated at a cabinet meeting that "Russia should not be afraid to use economic sanctions" to in disputes with former Soviet republics over the status of their Russian minorities. A February 12, 1997 statement by the Russian Embassy in Washington warned that "entry of Baltic nations into NATO would... have an extremely negative impact on the prospects of formation of a long-term model of constructive cooperation in the region." That statement's insistence on "creating favorable transport conditions for the Kaliningrad region," prompted one analyst to observe: "If Poland becomes a member of NATO, Lithuania will be the only landbridge between the two.  And Moscow is thus making it very clear it will demand a transit accord with Lithuania, something Vilnius is unlikely to agree to willingly." Russia maintains significant military forces in the Kaliningrad enclave bordering Lithuania and Poland--forces not restricted by the CFE Flank Agreement limitations. Russia's armed forces have seized control of portions of Moldava, a small state physically separated from Russia by 325 miles of Ukrainian territory, but contiguous to NATO candidate Romania. Russia  has repeatedly intervened to destabilize and subvert the strategic Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus Mountains--the latter of which has newly-found, exceptionally important gas and oil reserves whose transit routes westward Moscow seeks to control. Russia has stationed its armed forces in Ukraine, Armenia and Tajikistan. And while tolerating dramatic deterioration in its Soviet-era force structure, the bankrupt Russian state still commits vast resources to military research and procurement that will bear fruit in the intermediate future--like the defeated German Reichswehr of the 1920's.  Russia’s revised military doctrine in essence neglects current military assets to concentrate on leapfrogging potential foes by developing next-generation technologies.  Since Russia observed the performance of U.S. high-tech assets in Operation Desert Storm, its doctrine "places new emphasis on the need for military technology advancements in C4I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence), long-range smart weapons, and increased mobility, especially in air and space."    Russian spending for research and development of high-technology weapons has increased nearly sixfold over the past three years, rising from $2.1 billion in 1994 to almost $13 billion today--versus other defense spending of $19 billion.  Current high-priority projects include production of an upgraded mobile ICBM, tactical nuclear weapons, miniature nuclear warheads, and a new Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile--all already in development or production.   And Jane’s of Britain reports that Russia has developed several new chemical and bacteriological weapons, including a new strain of anthrax which antibiotics cannot counteract.   
Russia’s entire negotiating posture on NATO expansion reveals not a fear of aggression--which Russia’s leaders from Boris Yeltsin on down have disclaimed--but a conscious desire to dominate both the former Soviet Union and the former Warsaw Pact.  Why else would the current Russian Foreign Minister (and former Soviet KGB head) Y.M. Primakov have opened negotiations with the following demands: That NATO accept a 10-year moratorium on the accession of any other Central European nation after the entry of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999. That NATO forswear ever placing troops, nuclear or other heavy weapons, or even military infrastructure on the soil of those new members Moscow is prepared to countenance. That no former Soviet Union republic--including the Baltic states forcibly annexed by the USSR as part of the infamous 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact--ever be considered for NATO membership. These negotiating positions made sense only if Russia seeks the ability to blackmail or actually occupy the whole former Warsaw Pact, and direct military dominance over the mis-named "Commonwealth of Independent States."  Indeed, given the unfolding sequence of events, NATO expansion might fairly be characterized as a Western response to accelerating Russian efforts to revive the Soviet imperium. Promoting Democracy and Stability in the Former Warsaw Pact Beyond defending Western Europe from Soviet imperialism during the Cold War, NATO proved essential to fostering democracy and the rule of law in Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Turkey.  So too will NATO membership today lend stability to states still trying to revive or create capitalism and democracy after generations of Communist autocracy.  NATO membership will in particular help inculcate the norm of civilian control of the military.  And just as membership in NATO helped abate the historic rivalry between Germany and France and contain disputes between Greece and Turkey, so too will NATO membership help diminish longstanding animosities between Central European nations.  Already, the mere prospect of NATO membership has helped promote settlement of outstanding issues predating the Second World War between Germany and the Czech Republic, and led Hungary and Romania to resolve their centuries-old territorial disputes.

Impact Defense – NATO Contains Russia

Russia won’t start a war – it knows NATO will smack it down.

Valasek 9 (Tomas, director of foreign policy & defence @ CER, November, [http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/wp\_929\_nato\_nov09.pdf] AD: 7/7/10)JM

Are allies right to worry about a war? Some new NATO countries hold fears of Russia dating back to the Cold War; and it is not obvious that these can be “exorcised through contingency planning”, as one NATO insider put it.1 Equally, the Central Europeans have suffered real harassment and occasional ‘soft’ attacks (like cyber-strikes) from Russia in recent years. And their worries about Moscow’s intentions are shared by the Nordic countries. So can all fears of Russia be put down to historical animosities? And what precisely do the North and Central Europeans worry about? Does NATO have adequate measures in place to deter a potential conflict with Russia or defend against it? In principle NATO’s ‘all for one, one for all’ clause, known as Article V, should deter Russia from attacking any of the allies.2 And so should NATO’s military superiority. But could Russia have reasons to doubt that NATO would respond collectively to an attack on a Central European ally? And what is the state of NATO’s preparations for the defence of a member-state in Central or Northern Europe?

NATO is enough of a threat to contain Russia.

Ivashov 7 (Leonid, President of the Academy of Geopolitical, July, *Defense and Security*, 78, “Will America Fight Russia?”)JM

Ivashov: Numerous scenarios and options are possible. Everything may begin as a local conflict that will rapidly deteriorate into a total confrontation. An ultimatum will be sent to Russia: say, change the domestic policy because human rights are allegedly encroached on, or give Western businesses access to oil and gas fields. Russia will refuse and its objects (radars, air defense components, command posts, infrastructure) will be wiped out by guided missiles with conventional warheads and by aviation. Once this phase is over, an even stiffer ultimatum will be presented - demanding something up to the deployment of NATO "peacekeepers" on the territory of Russia. Refusal to bow to the demands will be met with a mass aviation and missile strike at Army and Navy assets, infrastructure, and objects of defense industry. NATO armies will invade Belarus and western Russia. Two turns of events may follow that. Moscow may accept the ultimatum through the use of some device that will help it save face. The acceptance will be followed by talks over the estrangement of the Kaliningrad enclave, parts of the Caucasus and Caspian region, international control over the Russian gas and oil complex, and NATO control over Russian nuclear forces. The second scenario involves a warning from the Kremlin to the United States that continuation of the aggression will trigger retaliation with the use of all weapons in nuclear arsenals. It will stop the war and put negotiations into motion.

NATO deters Russia and stops escalation.

Freeman 8 (Colin, journalist for the Telegraph, August 23, [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/2609100/Troop-surge-strategist-Fred-Kagan-calls-for-beefed-up-Baltic-defences-against-Russia.html] AD: 7/7/10)JM

Although any Russian action against a full Nato member would be a far greater act of aggression than its recent incursion into Georgia, Moscow might be tempted to try it in the Baltics as a way of testing Nato's resolve, knowing that the alliance might dither about deploying even conventional forces straightaway. Turning each country into a defensive "porcupine", he argues, would make such a move almost unthinkable in the first place. "I think that Russia does have designs on the Baltic states, and they have established a precedent in Georgia where they think they can use force to defend Russian minorities in other countries," he said. "The whole purpose of Nato is to deter war, and only secondly to fight if war breaks out. The Russians knew that Georgia would be easy, but I would like them to know that somewhere like Estonia would be very hard."

Impact Defense – NATO Contains Russia

NATO is deterring Russia now.

Blank 97 (Stephen, Ph.D. in History from the U of Chicago., November, [http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=146] AD: 7/7/10)JM

As in the past, European security organizations must deter and reassure Russia while enhancing the security of the littoral states.11 These organizations must also jointly share in any Baltic security plan so that no state or organization obtains a free ride. Free riding occurs when one or more states, or organizations, knowing or believing that some other state or organization can or will formulate solutions for major issues like Baltic security, effectively abstains from serious participation in the solution. Instead that state/s or organization/s then lets other states act alone, gaining a free ride at their expense. If free riding pervades an entire alliance as in the 1930s, security guarantees are devalued and could even become worthless.12 Accordingly, to stabilize the Baltic region, states cannot keep looking, as they are now tempted to do, for others to ensure regional security. Free riding undermines Baltic integration in Europe by dissolving the cohesion of the new NATO-led security system. It also fosters renationalized and unilateral security policies. Germany could incline further to make a bilateral deal with Russia over Central and Eastern Europe. As it is, Baltic cohesion, too, is already eroding. Lithuania poses, not as a Baltic state, but as a Central European one that seeks unilateral entry to European organizations, while forsaking Latvia and Estonia. Estonia follows suit regarding its future entry into the EU and supports admitting at least one Baltic state into NATO so that others might later gain a hearing. 13 Free riding and allied divisions regarding the Baltic could create new and unforeseen regional problems and clearly are due to the EU's and NATO's hesitations over Baltic issues.14 Regional cooperation, which is already weakened due to NATO and the EU's reluctance to expand, will further decrease where free riding and renationalized agendas prevail.15 Russia could then be tempted to extend an unwelcome protectorate over the Baltic states. To prevent such outcomes and protect the Baltic states, NATO must continue to provide security, deter Russia, reassure, and lead the non-NATO littoral states and Europe's other security organizations, the EU and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), toward regional as well as European military-political integration. Failure to do so will have grave consequences. Ex-Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt wrote that Russia's Baltic policy is a litmus test of its European and security policies.16 Volker Ruhe, Germany's Minister of Defense, wrote that the Baltic states are the practical testing ground for meeting the challenges of reshaping NATO's missions, territorial scope, the relations between the United States and its European allies, the hoped for partnership with Russia, and, in general, for building the Europe we want to see.17 German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel also stressed these states' importance for future European security.18

Impact Defense – No US-Russia Conflict

No chance of U.S-Russian war.

Perkovich 3 (George, dir of the nonproliferation program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March/April, Foreign Affairs, 82(2), p. 2)JM

As for Russia, a full-scale war between it and the United States now seems inconceivable. Given the desires for larger cuts in nuclear forces that Russia displayed in negotiating the 2002 Moscow Treaty, Russia hardly seems enough of a threat to justify the size and forward-leaning posture of America's present arsenal.

No Russia-U.S. conflict.

Manning 2K (Robert, Research Fellow at the FILENE Institute, March 10, *The Washington Times*, "Abbott and Costello nuclear policy," p. A18)JM

We don't want to go any lower because we need these weapons for nuclear deterrence, according to State Department spokesman James Rubin. But how many nukes do we need for deterrence to be credible? China, which President Clinton has talked of as a "strategic partner," has a grand total of 20 - count them - strategic warheads that could hit the United States. Nuclear wannabes like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq would have only a handful if they did manage to succeed in joining the nuclear club. Russia, which has 6,000 strategic warheads, is no longer an adversary. During the Cold War, it was not hard to envision a conventional war in Europe escalating into nuclear conflict. But today it is difficult to spin a plausible scenario in which the United States and Russia escalate hostilities into a nuclear exchange. Russia has no Warsaw Pact, and not much of a conventional force to speak of. Yet U.S. nuclear planners still base their targeting plans on prospective Russian targets, though no one will say so.

No Russian threat – their military and economy is in ruin.

Friedman and Logan 9 (Benjamin, PhD in econ from Harvard, and Justin, M.A in international relations from the U of Chicago, Spring, [http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/friedman\_logan\_hittingstopbuttononnatoexpansion.pdf] AD: 7/6/10)JM

This narrative is devoid of strategic logic. Leaving aside nuclear weapons, which deterrence renders unusable, Russia is not a great power, and is incapable of threatening Western Europe, let alone the United States. The World Bank predicts that Russia’s economy will shrink by 4.5 percent this year, and its unemployment will hit 12 percent. Even close to the height of oil prices, Russia possessed a gdp only roughly at 60 equivalent to that of Italy and Portugal combined. Its stock market is down by more than half since this time last year. Its defense spending totals about $70 billion annually (less than what the U.S. spends on defense research and investment alone), for what remains a second-rate military. This is a country strong enough to pummel weak neighbors like Georgia, but one that shouldn’t worry Europe, which spends roughly four times more. Balance of power theory tells us that if Russia grows more threatening, the members of the European Union—now collectively richer than the U.S.—will respond by investing more on defense than their current average of 2 percent of gdp, and by further integrating their military capacity. No longer driven by a revolutionary ideology, Russia also lacks the Soviet Union’s ambitions. True, Russia does not like the democratic governments on its flanks in Ukraine and Georgia. But that is because these governments are pursuing policies that anger Russia, not because they are democratic per se. What Russia wants are pliant neighbors. That desire is typical of relatively powerful states: The long U.S. history of violent interventions in Latin America undermines whatever lectures we might direct at Moscow.

Impact Defense – Expansion Fails

Russian influence expansion ventures fail – Georgia proves.

Klitsounova 9(Elena, Centre for European Policy Studies “Russia’s Response: Sovereign Democracy Strikes Back” Oct. 30)AQB

Yet, while Russian soft power instruments may predominate on paper in a wide variety of policy areas, they seem to lack power in practice. The Georgian crisis of August 2008 clearly showed Russia’s limited ability to expand influence over its immediate neighbours by pulling only on the levers of soft power. And the situation is likely to become even more complicated in the near future. As a result of the crisis, the Russian cabinet has already announced budget cuts, so establishing and expanding new areas of external aid on a shrinking budget will be extremely difficult. At the moment, some institutional features of Russia’s political model seem to be attractive to quite a number of regimes in the post-Soviet region. Moscow’s impetuous rebellion against the “intervention of democracy promoters” seems to be viewed with some sympathy in many post-Soviet capitals. Nevertheless, it is important not to overestimate Russia’s political attractiveness. With a younger generation of politicians soon to come to power, Russia’s leadership is likely to lose a large part of its capital of personalised relationships with post-Soviet political elites. The ongoing world economic crisis may dramatically change the structures of interest and power in the region and thus undermine the effectiveness and attractiveness of non-competitive political regimes. And last but not least, the EU’s serious attempts at projecting its own political influence far beyond its borders may also change the expectations of political actors populating the EU-Russia common neighbourhood.

Impact Defense – Russia ≠ Expansionist

Russia has no expansionist goals – even if it could expand, its main goal is stability.

Rivera 3 (David, assistant prof of government @ Hamilton College, Spring, *Political Science Quarterly*, 118(1), p. 84-85)JM

Other observers, however, painted a very different picture of post-Soviet Russia and defended the Kremlin against the imperialist charge. Explicitly taking issue with many of the aforementioned authors, Stephen Sestanovich argued in 1994 that “the dominant interest now guiding Russian policy is [not intimidation or destabilization but] stability. For now, the picture of an expansionist juggernaut is — at the very least — far ahead of the facts.”[ 6] U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Thomas Pickering similarly maintained that “charges of resurgent Russian imperialism have been overstated…. After the Soviet Union collapsed, Moscow pursued policies — such as drastically cutting military spending — that severely limited its ability to rebuild the empire, even if it had wanted to.”[ 7] In an overview of points of agreement and contention in U.S.-Russian relations given just prior to Bill Clinton's participation in the Moscow summit of May 1995, Pickering went even further by describing Russia's relations with its CIS neighbors as containing “some positive trends which we strongly support.” In particular, the Ambassador praised Russia for its policies toward Ukraine, the Baltics, Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh.[ 8] Most dramatically, Leon Aron put the “Yeltsin revolution” in historical perspective by asserting that “not since the middle of the sixteenth century when the Russian expansion began, has there been a Russia less aggressive, less belligerent, less threatening to neighbors and the world than the Russia we see today.”[ 9] This debate over the nature of Russian policy also served as the backdrop for a parallel debate over Western policy. Given the prevalence of Clinton administration officials mentioned in the previous paragraph, it should come as no surprise that those analyses were frequently marshaled in defense of partnership and engagement with Russia.[ 10] In contrast, analysts who viewed Russian policy as imperialist generally argued that the primary restraints on even greater bellicosity were Russian weakness and efforts by outside powers to deter Russian encroachments. Hence, they were critical of the Clinton administration's approach to the region and advocated instead that Washington bolster the non-Russian states' tenuous independence and contain Russian expansion. For example, Zbigniew Brzezinski writes, “Russia is more likely to make a break with its imperial past if the newly independent post-Soviet states are vital and stable…. Political and economic support for the new states must be an integral part of a broader strategy for integrating Russia into a cooperative transcontinental system.”[ 11] Some also opposed Ukrainian nuclear disarmament, predicting that “without nuclear weapons, Ukraine … will be vulnerable to an expansionist Russian power. Once the nuclear weapons are gone Russia will interpret the economic grievances of ethnic Russians in Eastern Ukraine as violations of human rights.”[ 12]

Russian expansionist predictions are all hype – stability is Russia’s goal, not conquest.

Rivera 3 (David, assistant prof of government @ Hamilton College, Spring, *Political Science Quarterly*, 118(1), p. 101-102)JM

Nevertheless, the weight of evidence more strongly supports those who defended Moscow against the imperialist charge. For every former republic that fell victim to Russian intervention, an equal number successfully rid themselves of a Russian military presence without falling victim to such intervention. The military interventions that did occur were all small-scale operations. Discontented ethnic Russians received military protection in only one of the fourteen non-Russian states, and the Yeltsin administration did not pursue territorial aggrandizement at the expense of any former Soviet republics. In addition, the second half of the 1990s witnessed heightened Russian conciliation and peacemaking as well as the consolidation of the tenuous independence of several of Eurasia's previously “failed states.” Why Russia's neighbors so strongly supported Yeltsin during his campaign for reelection in 1996 and throughout his presidency is now apparent.[ 100] Consideration of the policies that Moscow did and did not pursue makes clear that Russia was, at most, selectively imperialist and that charges of Russian imperialism are exaggerated. The predominance of a nonimperialist orientation of Russian foreign policy is further shown by the fact that a central prediction made by analysts who viewed Russian policy as imperialist did not come to pass. The Yeltsin administration continued to ignore Crimea's ethnic Russian insurgents even after Ukraine denuclearized. Zbigniew Brzezinski similarly had warned that “Ukraine is on the brink of disaster: the economy is in a free-fall, while Crimea is on the verge of a Russia-abetted ethnic explosion. Either crisis might be exploited to promote the breakup or the reintegration of Ukraine in a larger Moscow-dominated framework.”[ 101] Now that the decade has closed it is evident that Russia under Yeltsin was not interested in exploiting such opportunities. The Kremlin thereby passed what was widely regarded as “the test case of whether Russia will remain a nation-state or seek to become again a multinational empire.”[ 102]

Impact Defense – Russia ≠ Expansionist

Russian foreign policy has no imperial ambition.

Rivera 3 (David, assistant prof of government @ Hamilton College, Spring, *Political Science Quarterly*, 118(1), p. 104-105)JM

However, there are grounds for optimism that a pacific, nonimperialist orientation will continue during Putin's reign. In response to Brzezinski, Sestanovich points out that when Putin speaks of “strengthening the Russian state,” the language he uses indicates that he primarily has the domestic, not international, dimensions of state power in mind.[ 115] More generally, Boris Yeltsin resigned the presidency in December 1999 in the expectation that his prime minister and favored successor would continue his international policies.[ 116] This expectation has so far been fulfilled as Putin's Kremlin has retained Foreign Minister Ivanov and, most important, has not undertaken the use of military force against any of the NIS. In fact, Putin's policies have been sufficiently moderate that even Brzezinski has begun to conclude that “the Russian elite is gradually shedding its imperial nostalgia.”[ 117] This moderation and restraint might be merely a function of preoccupation with the war in Chechnya, but it might also be more fundamentally rooted in lessons Putin has drawn from history. For instance, when asked whether the introduction of Warsaw Pact forces into Hungary and Czechoslovakia were mistakes, Putin replied, “In my opinion, those were huge mistakes. And the Russophobia which confronts us in Eastern Europe today stems precisely from those mistakes.”[ 118] He has also appealed to his compatriots to “abandon imperial ambitions.”[ 119] Hence, Washington should continue to give more weight to engagement over containment until the optimistic assumptions underlying such an approach are convincingly disproved by Russian actions.

There will be no red spread – economics and population issues will stop it.

Mearsheimer 6 (John, prof of international relations @ the U of Chicago, *International Relations*, 20(1), p. 119-120)JM

IR What about the prospect of another ambitious and powerful Russia, moving westwards and increasingly dominating a Europe which has been deserted by the United States? JM That is definitely not going to happen. Russia has roughly half the population of the former Soviet Union and it has a struggling economy, which is nowhere near as dynamic as the Chinese or German economies. IR But we are talking 20 or 30 years down the line, and your book importantly stresses the sweep of history. JM Most experts think that Russia’s population will shrink markedly over the next 20 to 30 years and that its economy will continue to face serious problems. I don’t think we have to worry about a second coming of the Soviet Union in the decades ahead.

Even if Russia is anti-west, they are not a revisionist power.

Aron 6 (Leon, dir of Russian Studies @ American Enterprise Institute, December, *Commentary,* 122(5), p.22)JM

This is not to suggest that Putin has sought to re-create Soviet foreign policy outright. Despite the muscular rhetoric emanating from the Kremlin, Russia is not a "revisionist" power like the Soviet Union or present-day China. It is not intent on reshaping in its favor the regional or global balance of forces. In the geopolitical competition, Moscow may complain about the score, but it is unlikely to take the risks associated with changing the rules of the game. Nor is Russia willing to commit the resources needed to sustain any such endeavor — unlike China, for instance, whose defense appropriations have grown annually by double-digit percentages over the past twenty years. Even in today's Russia, flush with petrodollars, the share of the GDP devoted to defense — just 2.9 percent in 2005 — is at least ten times smaller than during the days of the Soviet Union.

Impact Defense – Russia ≠ Expansionist

Russia is all talk – its military isn’t prepared for expansionism.

Braithwaite 8 (Rodric, former British Ambassador to Russia, August-September, *Survival*, 50(40), p.174)JM

So what about Russia as a global military threat? Putin has gone some way towards reviving the demoralised remnants of the Soviet armed forces. But Russia still spends less than one-twenty-fifth of what America spends on defence. Russian published figures for defence expenditure are opaque,4 but the Russian government has repeatedly stated that it will not allow defence expenditure to drag down the economy as it did in the Soviet period. This is one lesson Russia’s leaders really do seem to have learned from the past.5 Lucas reluctantly recognises this. ‘On the face of it’, he says, ‘Russia is still an intimidating military power. It has one of the world’s largest armies, excellent special forces and some remarkable modern weapons’ (p. 0\*$). But he admits that Russia is still too poor and weak to do more than posture. ‘Russia [is not] a global adversary, despite its increasingly assertive presence on the international stage. Indeed, it often looks like a partner’ (p. #&). In a striking and apt phrase, he goes on: ‘[Russia] is too weak to have a truly effective independent foreign policy, but it is too disgruntled to have a sensible and constructive one’ (p. 0+$). But if this is so, what is all the fuss about?

The narrow-minded scholarship of the negative’s disadvantage is akin to a fairy tale – view it as suspect.

Mullerson 8 (Rein, prof of International Law @ King's College, July 1, *Chinese Journal of International Law*, p.585-586)JM

7. I understand why many Russian leaders in the rich tapestry of Russian history, where there is indeed too much red, want to emphasize only glorious victories and see only wrongs done against Russia and not by her. For politicians, Book Reviews 585 and even more for military men, an attempt to see problems from all possible angles may indeed lead to a political or strategic paralysis. Hence, a black and white picture of the world and a vision based on the principle: those who are not with us are against us. However, I cannot comprehend how somebody educated at the London School of Economics and Political Science cannot be more sophisticated and open-minded. Why a writer, journalist and academic, whose task should be to come as close to the truth as possible, never hoping of course to reach it, has to straighten one’s narrative, makes it so monodimensional. I am afraid that it may be caused by a combination of three d’s: dislike, disappointment and dread. Dislike, because Russia has indeed too often behaved like a big bully; disappointment since notwithstanding ‘‘the 1990s promises’’ she still refuses to become a ‘‘normal’’ country; dread because suddenly this ‘‘abnormal’’ entity is once again, like Phoenix, rising from the ashes. There is no doubt that Edward Lucas knows a lot and the book is informative. However, this book also proves that knowing does not mean understanding and that prejudice does not derive only from ignorance, especially if knowledge is mixed with fear and loathing. Of course, fans of Tchaikovsky, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, Chekhov or Russian ballet may also extrapolate their admiration to all things Russian, closing eyes on negative aspects of Russia’s domestic and international politics. That is why any serious researcher needs to follow a recipe of Professor Karl Popper, who for many years taught at Edward Lucas’ alma mater: the surest test of any theory, vision or worldview is not trying to collect as many proofs of the point one holds dear (usually one can find a loads of them), but on the contrary, it is necessary to look for facts that would contradict your predilections, preconceived ideas and fears (often there are too many of those as well). Working with Russia as she is, not trying to isolate her or forcing her to become a ‘‘normal’’ State is the best way to not only avoid a new Cold War but also give democracy a better chance in Russia. One would be advised to approach Edward Lucas’ informative book as a shard of a broken mirror that shows Russia from a specific angle while other shards—other writings—contribute to a fuller picture; the search for the unbroken mirror be better left for those who believe in fairy tales.

Impact Defense – Russia ≠ Expansionist

Russia isn’t prepared for imperial conquest.

Savodnik 8 (Peter, author and journalist, May 19, *Time International*, 171(20), EBSCO) JM

It's premature to call the still-unfolding rivalry a cold war. No doubt, Russia and the West have divergent interests. According to the Russian worldview, everything good that happens in the West is bad for Russia. Worse yet, Moscow seems willing to do almost anything to achieve great-power (if not superpower) status. Still, we're far from a Manichaean showdown. Russia is too weak to wage a cold war. Outside Moscow, St. Petersburg and a handful of other cities, most Russians live in Khrushchev- and Brezhnev-era hovels. The economy is diversifying but not diversified; for now, the oil and gas markets largely decide how much money flows into the Kremlin coffers. And the military is a wreck; Lucas points out, for instance, that the navy now has just 20 seaworthy surface ships. Most importantly, Russia lacks a clear political identity. Beyond its economic and strategic concerns, Russia doesn't know what it wants to be. This is an ideological, even ontological lassitude. The reason the postcommunist world is so unstable is not that Russia is on the verge of repatriating old turf. It's that Russia is navigating between two ideas of Russia: its former Soviet self and its current shadow of that former self--a cartoonish, hopelessly upside-down mythology versus a dispiriting reality. Russia will not transcend this dichotomy until it begins building a truly original future instead of trying to cobble together a distant past. Lucas is right that the West should set aside its differences and resist Russian aggression. But we should be clear about the nature of this aggression. The new cold war, thankfully, has yet to break out.

Impact Defense – Russia ≠ Expansionist

The Georgian conflict didn’t prove Russia is an expansionist power– it proved the opposite.

Bush 8 (Jason, chief of BusinessWeek 's Moscow bureau, August 22, [http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/blog/europeinsight/archives/2008/08/the\_new\_cold\_war.html] AD: 7/6/10)JM

The Georgian crisis has been an interesting example of how Cold War stereotypes mould western perceptions about Russia, including those in the media. Reading western newspapers or listening to western politicians, and you are obviously supposed to think that Russia is Nazi Germany, Putin is Hitler, and Georgia is Czechoslovakia in 1938. The parallel has been drawn explicitly by a number of western pundits. See, for instance, this opinion piece by former state department official Robert Kagan, which begins with the extraordinary sentence: “The details of who did what to precipitate Russia’s war against Georgia are not very important.” Supposedly, this is all about a Russian master-plan to restore the Soviet empire, with Georgia as the first domino to fall while the West stands idly by. It is a false and misleading analogy, for the simple reason that the whole bloody mess was begun by the Georgians—an uncomfortable fact now publicly admitted by US diplomats. There is nothing at all mysterious about Russian policy. They have been in control of South Ossetia since the early 1990s and have had troops deployed there all that time. On 7 August, the Georgians launched a massive and well-prepared attack on the region, using multiple rocket launchers to attack residential areas of the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali, and killing several of the Russian soldiers after targeting their barracks. You only have to imagine what the US reaction would be if Fidel Castro decided one day to launch an all-out attack on Guantanamo Bay, in the process killing hundreds of US citizens and US military personnel. The Russian military reaction was inevitable in the circumstances. The real mystery of the whole affair is what President Saakashvili was hoping to achieve with his extraordinary gamble, and why he chose to strike when he did. Tension has been rising in the region for some time, partly because of recent events in Kosovo, which declared independence in February, with western backing. That sets a precedent for the break-away states in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to do the same (as they have long wanted to do), which may have panicked the Georgians. The Russians have been warning for years that independence for Kosovo would start a chain-reaction in the Caucasus. The crisis is certainly bad for East-West business ties and the investment climate. The investment climate in Russia is already reeling from one business scandal after another. As well as the TNK-BP affair, there have also been recent controversies connected with Mechel, Hermitage and Telenor. The biggest loser from a prolonged cool-off will be Russia though. One interesting angle of the Georgian crisis is the negative impact on the Russian economy. In the days after the outbreak of war, the stock market and even the rouble plunged, and Russian banks found it harder to get credit lines abroad. This shows how far the new globalized Russia depends economically on the outside world. This economic dependence increases the West's options, but also means that the West doesn’t necessarily need to take strong-arm measures to restrain the Russians. The danger is that the West will now over-react, punishing Russia unnecessarily because of the overblown fears and simplistic analysis of the numerous Cold Warriors back home. Amid the jumpy hysteria of recent days, many people in the West have assumed that quiet diplomacy is powerless. This isn't true, however, as the French-brokered peace plan showed. For diplomacy to be effective, though, the West has to be seen as an honest broker. Instead of that, we have typically seen knee-jerk support for Georgia, and the usual anti-Russian stereotypes. Unfortunately, there appear to be plenty of people in the West who are now arguing for a new Cold War. They have fallen into the trap of believing that Putin is the new Hitler and Georgia the new Czechoslovakia, so “the West must make a stand”. In effect, these people are arguing for a cure that is actually a lot worse than the disease.

Expansionism Good – Oil

Russian expansionism is necessary to access arctic oil reserves – the impact is Russian economic collapse and global oil shocks

Weir 8 (Fred, Correspondent for the CSM, May 28, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2008/0528/p01s04-wosc.html>, AD: 7/6/10) jl

The Kremlin often touts Russia's image as an "energy superpower," but now the country's oil production is declining. Some say Russia may have already reached peak oil output. Underscoring the urgency of the issue, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's new cabinet made its first order of business on Monday the approval of a package of measures to relieve the oil-production crisis. "It's a good first step," says Natalia Milchakova, an oil and gas analyst for Otkritiye, a Moscow-based brokerage firm. But she adds that "rapidly slowing" oil production, which was growing by more than 10 percent five years ago, isn't "something that can be quickly fixed with political declarations." As the world's second-largest oil exporter, Russia joins a growing number of top oil suppliers wrestling with how to address declining or peaking production. Like Venezuela and Mexico, Russia is heavily dependent on oil, which accounts for more than two-thirds of government revenue and 30 percent of the country's gross domestic product. Now, Moscow is trying to remedy a situation caused in part by outdated technology, heavy taxation of oil profits, and lack of investment in oil infrastructure. The Presidium of the Cabinet, as it is officially known, in its inaugural meeting Monday approved tax holidays of up to 15 years for Russian companies that open new oil fields and proposed raising the threshold at which taxation begins from the current $9 per barrel to $15. Oil companies welcomed the measures, but experts say that after almost two decades of post-Soviet neglect, which have seen little new exploration, it may be too little, too late. After rising steadily for several years to a post-Soviet high of 9.9 million barrels per day (bpd) in October, Russian oil production fell by 0.3 percent in the first four months of this year, while exports fell 3.3 percent – the first Putin-era drop. Russia's proven oil reserves are a state secret, but the Oil & Gas Journal, a US-based industry publication, estimates it has about 60 billion barrels – the world's eighth largest – which would last for 17 years at current production rates. Energy Minister Viktor Khristenko recently admitted the decline, but suggested it might be overcome by fresh discoveries in underexplored eastern Siberia or in new Arctic territories recently claimed by Russia. "The output level we have today is a plateau, or stagnation," he said. But Leonid Fedun, vice president of Russia's largest private oil company LUKoil, went one step further in an interview with the Financial Times last month. "Russian oil production has peaked and may never return to current levels," he said. That poses problems for Russia, which has talked of expanding beyond its main oil market – Europe – to China, Japan, and the US. In 2006, then-President Putin approved construction of an $11 billion pipeline across Siberia to the Pacific Ocean to carry eastward exports. Putin and his successor, Dmitri Medvedev, have insisted Russia can meet demand by increasing output but oil analysts around the globe are pessimistic that oil supplies can meet rising consumption in the coming decade.

Arctic oil reserves are key to the Russian economy

Wiedemann 6(Erich, author for Spiegel Online, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,405320,00.html>, AD: 7/6/10) jl

Global warming isn't necessarily the catastrophe it's made out to be -- at least not for multinational oil companies. Shrinking ice caps would reveal the Arctic's massive energy sources and shorten tanker routes by thousands of miles. Ice-cap melting may be [bad news for the polar bears in Manitoba](http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,395014,00.html), Canada, but it is great news for Pat Broe of Denver. When the ice melts in the Arctic, the polar predators have to search for new hunting grounds or starve -- but Broe doesn't mind. He figures global warming will make him around $100 million a year. His friends laughed at him when he bought the run-down port in Churchill -- a tiny outpost of a thousand souls on the Hudson Bay. What could he possibly want with a harbor in one of the most deserted places on the planet that's frozen over a big chunk of the year? Wait and see, said Broe. He only paid a symbolic price of seven dollars -- not a bad price for a port. He knew that time was on his side. Temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere are rising twice as fast as in the southern half. The summers are getting longer and the pack ice is getting thinner. By 2015 the North Pole is expected to be navigable for normal ships six months out of the year. It's then that a golden age will dawn upon Churchill. Via Arctic waterways, an oil tanker only needs a week to make it from the Russian port city Murmansk on the Barents Sea to the east coast of Canada. That's only half the time it takes from Abu Dhabi on the Persian Gulf to Galveston, Texas. And from Churchill to Chicago on the Hudson Bay Railway, it's not much further than from Texas to the Windy City. Tankers from Venezuela to Japan can even save some 12,000 kilometers (7,500 miles) by traveling over the pole. Of course, with rising ocean temperatures comes an increased danger of icebergs, but at least the Arctic oil fields aren't in a region plagued by political instability. No suicide bombers, no kidnappings, no explosions. What risk there is up north, is nothing big oil companies aren't happy to take on. The first cargo likely to be transported via the Northwest Passage is Russian oil from Siberia destined for North America. The melting ice will also make it easier to get to oil and natural gas fields that are still blocked by pack ice. The Arctic is a giant treasure trove for energy multinationals. A quarter of the world's oil and gas reserves are estimated to be hidden underneath its rapidly shrinking ice. At current market values they would be worth $1.5 to $2 trillion. There are even proven oil deposits at the North Pole itself.

Expansionism Good – Oil

Independently, Russian economic collapse causes nuclear war

David 99 (Steven, Professor of Political Sciences at John Hopkins University, Foreign Affairs, Proquest, AD: 7/6/10) jl

AT NO TIME since the civil war of 1918-Zo has Russia been closer to bloody conflict than it is today. The fledgling government confronts a vast array of problems without the power to take effective action. For 70 years, the Soviet Union operated a strong state apparatus, anchored by the KGB and the Communist Party. Now its disintegration has created a power vacuum that has yet to be filled. Unable to rely on popular ideology or coercion to establish control, the government must prove itself to the people and establish its authority on the basis of its performance. But the Yeltsin administration has abjectly failed to do so, and it cannot meet the most basic needs of the Russian people. Russians know they can no longer look to the state for personal security, law enforcement, education, sanitation, health care, or even electrical power. In the place of government authority, criminal groups-the Russian Mafia-increasingly hold sway. Expectations raised by the collapse of communism have been bitterly disappointed, and Moscow's inability to govern coherently raises the specter of civil unrest. If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 5o percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience. A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation-personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support. Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely. Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia-even though in decline-does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,ooo nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much materiel. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war.

Expansionism Good – Oil

Oil shocks crush the US economy

Setser 4 (Brad, Research Associate, Global Economic Governance Programme at Oxford [http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~nroubini/papers/OilShockRoubiniSetser.pdf](http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/%7Enroubini/papers/OilShockRoubiniSetser.pdf) , AD: 7/6/10) jl

These effects are not trivial: oil shocks have caused and/or contributed to each one of the US and global recessions of the last thirty years. Yet while recent recessions have all been linked to an increase in the price of oil, not all oil price spikes lead to a recession. The 2003 spike associated with the invasion of Iraq is a good example. Private sector estimates generally suggest that a persistent 10% increase in the price of oil – say an increase from $30 to an average of $35 over the course of 2004 -- would reduce the US and the G7 growth rate by about 0.3%-0.4% within a year. Some (Goldman Sachs) are more pessimistic, and calculate that if oil prices were to increase further to levels closer to $45, the reduction in the G7 growth rate may be closer to 1% of GDP. Thus, private estimates of the negative effects of an oil shock currently range between 0.3% to 1% of US and G7 GDP growth. This means that the US economy, which was growing in Q4:2003 and Q1:2004 at about a 4.3% average rate could be expected to see a slowdown of its growth to a level between 4.0% and 3.3%. Global growth would also de-accelerate from its current very strong pace. And, indeed, the first estimate for Q2:2004 U.S. GDP growth was 3.0%, confirming that high oil prices in the first half of 2004 put a dent on real consumer demand. Looking ahead, persistence of oil prices at recent high levels of $43-44 per barrel (or even higher prices) could further slow down the U.S. economy below a 3% growth rate.

Extinction

Friedberg and Schoenfield 8 (Friedberg, professor of politics and international relations at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School, Schoenfeld, senior editor of Commentary, is a visiting scholar at the Witherspoon Institute in Princeton, N.J., “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, WSJ, <http://online.wsj.vom/articles/SB122455074012352571.html>, AD: 6/19/10) jl

Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum**.** The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability.

\*\*\*RELATIONS\*\*\*

1NC Shell

US-Russia Relations are high now – START and lifting sanctions

Fisher 10 (Max, The Atlantic Wire, http://www.theatlanticwire.com/opinions/view/opinion/Why-US-Russia-Nuke-Deal-Matters-2978, AD: 7/5/10) jl

The United States and Russia appear to be moving forward on the latest iteration of START, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which guides a reduction in the nuclear arsenal of both nations. First signed in 1991 at the end of the Cold War, START expired in December. Diplomats from the two countries have agreed on the pact, but it now must be ratified by their respective legislatures and signed by Presidents Medvedev and Obama. Here's what was accomplished, what wasn't, and what remains to be done.

Furthers Obama's Nuke-Free Goal  The Washington Post's [Mary Beth Sheridan writes](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/24/AR2010032401535_pf.html), "The pact appeared to represent President Obama's first victory in his ambitious agenda to move toward a nuclear-free world. [...] Perhaps more important for Obama, the accord comes shortly before a crucial meeting of signers of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the global pact that contained the spread of nuclear weapons for decades. The administration is hoping to persuade treaty members to impose stiffer punishments on nations that are accused of violating the pact."

Obama's Greatest Foreign Policy Triumph?  The New York Times' [Peter Baker thinks so](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/25/world/europe/25start.html?ref=world). "The new treaty represents perhaps the most concrete foreign policy achievement for Mr. Obama since he took office 14 months ago and the most significant result of his effort to 'reset' the troubled relationship with Russia. The administration wants to use it to build momentum for an international nuclear summit meeting in Washington just days after the signing ceremony and a more ambitious round of arms cuts later in his term."

Improving U.S.-Russia Ties  Global Security's [Nikolas Gvosdev says](http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/100324562-good-news-on-start-1.htm) the moves "suggest that both sides saw the U.S. -Russia relationship deteriorating even further without some concrete measure of success." He writes, "For its part, the lifting of U.S. sanctions that had been imposed against the Russian aerospace firm Glavkosmos (initially imposed in 1998 for its previous dealings with Iran) was also a symbolic gesture on Washington's part of wanting to improve ties."

Continued US presence boosts cooperation – pull out would end ties

AP 6/24 (June 24, 2010, http://politics.usnews.com/news/articles/2010/06/24/obama-medvedev-say-reset-us-russia-relations.html)KFC

President Barack Obama declared Thursday that he and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev have "succeeded in resetting" the relationship between the former Cold War adversaries that had dipped to a dangerous low in recent years. Obama directly acknowledged differences in some areas, such as Moscow's tensions with neighboring Georgia, but said "we addressed those differences candidly." And he announced that the U.S. and Russia had agreed to expand cooperation on intelligence and the counterterror fight and worked on strengthening economic ties between the nations. Obama gave Russia perhaps the biggest gift it could have wanted from the meetings: an unqualified, hearty plug for Moscow's ascension to the World Trade Organization. Russia has long wanted membership but U.S. support in the past has come with conditions. "Russia belongs in the WTO," Obama said as the two leaders stood side-by-side in the East Room after several hours of meetings — including an impromptu trip to a nearby burger joint for lunch. The leaders faced questions about the U.S.-led Afghanistan war, and Obama promised that the U.S. will "not miss a beat" because of the change in military command that he ordered on Wednesday. Obama accepted Gen. Stanley McChrystal's resignation and replaced him with his direct boss, Gen. David Petraeus. Petraeus "understands the strategy because he helped shape it," Obama said. Medvedev seemed reluctant to wade into the topic, recalling the ultimately disastrous Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. "I try not to give pieces of advice that cannot be fulfilled," Medvedev said. "This is a very hard topic, a very difficult one." Yet he said that Russia supports the U.S. effort if it can result in Afghanistan emerging from extreme poverty and dysfunction to have "an effective state and a modern economy." "This is the path to guarantee that the gravest scenarios of the last time will not repeat," he said.

1NC Shell

US-Russia relations are critical to solving WMD terrorism

Hart 7 (Gary, Wirth Chair professor at the University of Colorado, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gary-hart/letter-to-democrats-on-us\_b\_45075.html, AD: 7/3/10) jl

Second, we have a mutual interest in defeating terrorism. Those interests have caused the Russians to conduct prolonged military actions in Chechnya and the United States to conduct equally prolonged military occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. Clearly, there are differences in methodology, with the Russians using much more brutal means, but the residents of Grosny and of Falluja may not see that much difference. Though opposing our invasion of Iraq, the Russians fully endorsed our invasion of Afghanistan (where they themselves had a rather unpleasant experience). If we are not fully exploiting Russian intelligence networks in pursuit of this common interest, it is to our detriment. Third, there is the matter of oil. The Russians have it and we need it. During the first Clinton term, I urged our government to negotiate long-term oil purchase agreements with the Russians to help reduce our dependence on dangerously unstable Persian Gulf sources. It is not too late to pursue that idea. The Russians need massive Western investment in oil production facilities and the United States and its European allies need predictable oil supplies. High level diplomatic and commercial engagement with the Russians can prevent destructive Russian tendencies to nationalize their oil production facilities. There is no reason that arrangements such as we have had with the Saudis for decades cannot be replicated in Russia. But this will only occur in the context of stable, friendly relations between our two nations. Fourth, we have high technology and the Russians need high technology, particularly in the fields of telecommunications, health care, and industrial modernization. A decade of experience in modernization of Russia's telecommunication system convinces me of two things: 21st century communications technology is key to Russia's emerging economy, and Russian science, though inadequately equipped, has much to offer the West and global markets. Russia represents a huge potential market for U.S. technology companies--its health care system is still abysmal for most Russians--and U.S. companies require encouragement to explore those markets. Fifth, Russia is neighbor to several Islamic states, former Soviet republics, and whether one subscribes to a Huntingtonian thesis of civilization clashes or merely civilization frictions, Russia occupies an unrivaled strategic position on the margins of a cultural divide. Further, it occupies a strategic position in Northeast Asia, particularly with regard to North Korea and China. Russia allied with the West and sharing a common international agenda can only be in our interest. As the noted Russian expert Dimitri Simes has repeatedly pointed out, its geo-strategic location places Russia in a unique position to exert influence on critical matters such as Iran's nuclear ambitions. According to Professor Simes, "exactly like the United States, Russians wonder what will be the immediate purpose of the Iranian nuclear enrichment program." The list above is merely illustrative of the common interests the U.S. and Russia share. Several principles might be evoked to produce a constructive bi-lateral relationship. Our relationship should be based upon mutual self-interest, not altruism. We do not develop a working relationship as a favor to the Russians but as an advantage to ourselves. Russia is by history and culture a Western nation and should be integrated into the West. The U.S. and Russia share security interests and concerns. We are a market for Russia's natural resources and Russia is a market for our technology. An isolated, anti-democratic Russia increases our insecurity. Russia's development as a market democracy will best be achieved by engagement not rejection. Except in recent years when American foreign policy assumed a theological aura, we have consistently sought self-interested relations with nations with whom we did not always agree. The late Jean Kirkpatrick is notable for having distinguished between authoritarian states, with whom we could collaborate regardless of their undemocratic natures, and totalitarian states with whom we could have nothing to do. Even today, in the era of a foreign policy based on good and evil, we maintain productive relations with highly authoritarian states (including former Soviet republic) that are guilty of no more undemocratic behavior than Russia.

UQ – Reset Button

Obama and Medvedev have hit “reset” button on Russian Relations.

Klein 6/24/10(Kent, VA News Source, “Obama, Medvedev Say They Have Reset US-Russia Relations”)AQB

U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev say they have succeeded in resetting their countries' relationship, which had drifted in recent years. The two leaders discussed trade and security at the White House Thursday, after going out for hamburgers. Presidents Obama and Medvedev say the United States and Russia will broaden their cooperation on intelligence and counterterrorism, and have improved their economic ties. Mr. Obama told reporters he and Mr. Medvedev have put their countries' relationship on a firmer footing, despite disagreeing about Russia's tensions with Georgia. "Our two countries continue to disagree on certain issues, such as Georgia, and we addressed those differences candidly," he said. "But by moving forward in areas where we do agree, we have succeeded in resetting our relationship, which benefits regional and global security." The president said he and his counterpart have moved beyond only discussing the issues covered in most previous U.S.-Russian meetings.

Despite a dip Medvedev and Obama have re-built relations on common issues.

Butler 6/24/10(Desmond, The Associated Press, “Obama, Medvedev Say 'Reset' US-Russia Relations”)AQB

Washington (AP) - President Barack Obama declared Thursday that he and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev have "succeeded in resetting" the relationship between the former Cold War adversaries that had dipped to a dangerous low in recent years. Obama directly acknowledged differences in some areas, such as Moscow's tensions with neighboring Georgia, but said "we addressed those differences candidly." And he announced that the U.S. and Russia had agreed to expand cooperation on intelligence and the counterterror fight and worked on strengthening economic ties between the nations. Obama gave Russia perhaps the biggest gift it could have wanted from the meetings: an unqualified, hearty plug for Moscow's ascension to the World Trade Organization. Russia has long wanted membership but U.S. support in the past has come with conditions. "Russia belongs in the WTO," Obama said as the two leaders stood side-by-side in the East Room after several hours of meetings - including an impromptu trip to a nearby burger joint for lunch. The leaders faced questions about the U.S.-led Afghanistan war, and Obama promised that the U.S. will "not miss a beat" because of the change in military command that he ordered on Wednesday. Obama accepted Gen. Stanley McChrystal's resignation and replaced him with his direct boss, Gen. David Petraeus.

UQ – WTO

Russia US relations are high – Obama is helping them get into the WTO.

Klein 6/24/10(Kent, VA News Source, “Obama, Medvedev Say They Have Reset US-Russia Relations”)AQB

"Because 20 years after the end of the Cold War, the U.S.-Russian relationship has to be about more than just security and arms control," he said. "It has to be about our shared prosperity, and what we can build together." President Obama said he will speed discussions on Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization. U.S. support for Moscow's joining the WTO has come with conditions in the past. But Mr. Obama says most of the differences have been resolved, and he believed the rest will be soon. "Russia belongs in the WTO," he said. "That is good for Russia, it is good for America, and it is good for the world economy." Mr. Obama said a major hurdle was cleared when Moscow agreed to lift a six-month ban on the sale of U.S. poultry in Russia. Mr. Medvedev said he believes the obstacles to his country joining the WTO can be removed in the next few months. "There are some remaining technical minor problems, and our teams have been instructed to work as fast as possible," he said. "We hope, and we have stated this, that their work will be finalized by the end of September this year."

UQ – Pol Cap

Obama and Medvedev have invested large amounts of pol cap to make improve relations.

Stanage 7/4/10(Niall, The Post news, “Spy games will not affect US-Russian relations”)AQB

For all the James Bond like drama of the alleged Russian spy ring story, the diplomatic fallout from the episode appears likely to be limited. The reason is, ultimately, straightforward: both the Obama administration and Russian power-brokers have invested a considerable amount of political capital in a push for improved relations. They are not going to want their efforts to be blown off course. There is another important factor, too. Despite the surprise engendered by the peculiar nature of the alleged plot, there has long been a mutual assumption in Washington and Moscow that each side continues to spy on the other. Professor Robert Legvold, a Russian expert at New York’s Columbia University, told The Sunday Business Post that efforts like those apparently uncovered last week were peripheral compared with ‘‘the high-level spying that they [Russia] appear to be engaged in, as we are’’. The modest political impact of the story was underlined by the muted reactions from Barack Obama’s White House administration. White House press secretary Robert Gibbs told reporters at a briefing that he did ‘‘not believe that this will affect the reset of our relationship with Russia’’. Philip Gordon, assistant secretary of state with responsibility for Russia, struck a similarly pragmatic note, asserting that the US ‘‘would like to get to the point’’ where covert agents were not deployed by either side, but added that ‘‘we’re apparently not there yet.

UQ – AT: Russian Spy Ring

The arrested Russian spy ring will not have any affect on relations.

Xinhua News Agency 6/30/10(“Arrests of alleged Russian spies will not affect U.S.-Russian relations: White House”)AQB

WASHINGTON, June 29 (Xinhua) -- The White House said on Tuesday that the arrests of the alleged Russian spies will not affect the recently improved U.S.-Russian relations. "I think we have made a new start to working together on things like in the United Nations dealing with North Korea and Iran. I do not think that this will affect those relations." White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said. U.S. Justice Department announced on Monday that authorities had busted a spy ring suspected of conducting long-term, "deep- cover" espionage for Moscow. Court documents said that the 11 suspects had tried to penetrate decision-making circles of the U.S. government. Gibbs said U.S. President Barack Obama was "fully and appropriately" informed of the arrests, describing the act of law enforcement as appropriate. The arrests came just days after Russian President Dmitry Medvedev visited the U.S., which Obama said has succeeded in " resetting" the bilateral ties. U.S.-Russian ties had hit a Cold-War-era low after conflicts broke out between Russia and Georgia in 2008. Obama decided, since he took office in Jan. 2009, to improve the marred bilateral relations. The recent signing of a new nuclear arms treaty by the two countries and their cooperation on the issue of Iran indicated that Obama's effort has somewhat paid off. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin told former U.S. President Bill Clinton Tuesday that hopefully the latest Russian spy row in the United States would not jeopardize bilateral ties. "I hope very much that the positive that was collected recently in our interstate relations will not experience any harm because of the recent events," said Putin as quoted by the Interfax news agency.

Links – Afghanistan

Cooperation now in Afghanistan – pullout wrecks relations

Zibel 9 (Eve, FOX News, July 06, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/07/06/russia-cooperation-afghanistan-shows-degree-turn/)KFC

A deal between the United States and Russia to increase assistance and training in Afghanistan is being hailed by Obama administration officials as "historic" and demonstrative of two nations no longer fighting a Cold War. A joint statement issued Monday before a press conference in Moscow with President Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev pledges a commitment to the nation of Afghanistan as it struggles to overcome various political and social challenges. "We reaffirm our commitment to the goals of the common fight against the threats of terrorism, armed extremism, and illegal drug trafficking in Afghanistan," the statement reads. "We shall continue and develop our cooperation in the interest of enhancing the capabilities of the government of Afghanistan to accomplish key socioeconomic objectives, to raise living standards, and to ensure the security of its people." The statement was a bit lost in the news in a series of agreements, including on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, and senior administration officials chided reporters for focusing on a Cold War type of relationship between the two nations. "This is not the Cold War. This is not just a relationship about competition, confrontation and the things we disagree about," said Michael McFaul, a senior adviser on Russia. "This discussion makes me feel a little bit like some of us want to fight what is not a real war. It is not real. The threat that we pose to Russia from our missile defense systems is not real. The president couldn't have been more clear about that." Obama, Medvedev "Reset" Relations With Nuclear Reduction Plans McFaul highlighted the Russians allowing 4,500 flights of American soldiers and equipment going through Russia, a country he admitted, used to be an adversary. "We're talking about 4,500 flights of American soldiers and equipment going through what used to be our enemy. And they're paying for it. This is something that's very concrete. This is a real war we're fighting."

Links – Afghanistan

Pullout of Afghanistan signals loss of cooperation on War on Drugs

BBC 9 (21 October 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8319585.stm)KFC

Russia is highlighted as the country that bears the brunt of the ill-effects of the Afghan drug trade by a UN Office on Drugs and Crime report. The BBC's Stephen Eke reports on Moscow's growing concern about the problem. The head of Russia's federal drug control service has recently blamed lack of effective border controls, and accused coalition forces in Afghanistan of doing "next to nothing" to tackle drug production. The result, he said, is an estimated 2.5 million heroin addicts in Russia alone, creating what he called a lost generation of young people. President Medvedev calls Afghan heroin a threat to Russia's national security. And it has led to serious tensions between Moscow and Washington - Russia accuses Nato, and more often the US, of failing to make enough effort to tackle heroin production in Afghanistan. Since the collapse of communism, Russia's southern borders have been much more vulnerable. Poor border controls The greater part of Afghan heroin enters the territory of the former Soviet Union through Afghanistan's borders with Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. It then travels westwards across Kazakhstan, before entering the central and Ural regions of Russia, where there are intense focal spots of heroin addiction. Seizures of heroin by police and border guards remain very low. The Russian medical authorities say overdoses are now killing more than 80 people every day. In addition, Russia has seen hundreds of thousands of HIV and hepatitis infections, as a result of intravenous drug abuse. Precise figures are not available, but it is estimated that there are somewhere between 1.5 million and six million heroin addicts in Russia. Moscow co-operates with the UN and with Western experts in its efforts to tackle heroin addiction, but relations have sometimes been tense. Many European specialists consider Russian approaches to preventing and treating heroin addiction as confused. Methadone substitution therapy, for example, is illegal in Russia, a country where alternative, scientifically unproven treatments are often preferred.

Failure to cooperate with Russia in Afghanistan hurts relations

Weir 10 (Fred, Correspondent, May 19, 2010, http://therearenosunglasses.wordpress.com/2010/05/20/moscow-furious-says-us-not-pushing-drug-war-in-afghanistan/)KFC

Russia’s new drug czar, Viktor Ivanov, is spitting mad at NATO. A gruff and graying veteran of the Soviet Union’s disastrous military intervention in Afghanistan, he recently made his first return visit to that country. When he came back to Moscow, he had harsh words for the Western alliance, charging that it is enabling a drug-fueled hurricane of destabilization that is now sweeping across former Soviet Central Asia and Russia. He wants the war in Afghanistan to be a proper drug war. Why? Mr. Ivanov says the flow of narcotics from the fields of Afghanistan into Russia has increased by 16 percent in the past three years alone, spiking urban drug addiction. He alleged in a March press conference that drug barons are uniting with Islamist militants to seize power in vulnerable Central Asian states – and that the North Atlan tic Treaty Org ani zation’s (NATO) failure to deal with Afghan istan’s burgeoning drug production threatens to create a security nightmare for Russia and its regional allies. “We do not believe the principal aims of the NATO security operation in Afghanistan have been achieved,” Ivanov said at a press conference. “Of course the struggle against terrorism should take precedence, but what about liquidating drug production? How does it happen that almost 10 years after NATO occupied this country, Afghanistan is not only the world’s largest producer of opium, but also of hashish, surpassing the traditional global leader, Morocco?” In recent years, Russia and NATO have run a school for Afghan antidrug police in the Moscow-region town of Domodedovo, turning out hundreds of graduates. But despite that cooperation, experts say Moscow is increasingly dubious about NATO’s ability to impose order in Afghanistan, and may be seeking ways to expand its influence in Central Asia against the day the United States decides to leave. Some analysts suggest that the Kremlin’s recent backing of a coup in Kyrgyzstancould be a sign of more assertive behavior to come. “The former Soviet states of central Asia are our own backyard,” says Tatiana Parkhalina, director of the independent Center for European Security in Moscow. “Moscow doesn’t want to stand by while the Taliban and terrorist networks convert the financial resources from drug trafficking into arms and political influence… There is a practical alliance taking shape between drug traffickers and terrorists, and it is a very big threat.”

Links – Iraq/ME

The US and Russia are fighting the war on terror in the Middle East together – Plan is abandonment

Kuchins 2 (Andrew, director of Russian and Eurasian Program @ Carnegie, Dec 25, 2002, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1153)KFC

Q: How much does the US foreign policy depend on the wishes of its allies. How are US President's choices affected by the wishes of the UK, Turkey, Jordan, Russia? That's a very complex question. In short, I'll say this: America is the world's only superpower. Does this mean that we can do whatever we want, without taking into account the interests of the world community? Absolutely not. Each situation is different, and we must take the interests of others into account. I could not say, for instance, that a decision is 30% based on the President's rating, 15% on the President's advisors, 50% on the views of other countries and so on. Each political situation is absolutely unique, and its resolution depends on many factors. I understand that my answer my not be totally satisfying, but there is no way to answer otherwise. Q: What is happening in Afghanistan? There are news of more al-Qaeda bases, and before the Northern Alliance came to power, which was formerly known as a large drug manufacturer. The situation in Afghanistan is very difficult, and people in the former Soviet republics probably know what's really happening better than anyone else in the world. It's difficult to say how long the American troops will continue their actions. But I think that the Bush Administration understands that our actions in Afghanistan are important from many points of view. The whole world is closely paying attention to what the US is doing there, because this is the first experience of a war on terrorism. When the military presence will end is difficult to say. But whatever happens, if we cannot demonstrate to other countries that we are able to finish what we started, than the other countries will think that the US is lacking in diligence and resolve. Q: What can you expect from Central Asia? What effect are the military bases having? The presence of international anti-terrorist forces will increase regional stability. But the biggest influence on the region will be the development of the states, especially Uzbekistan. If President Islam Karimov will not seriously attend to economic reforms, than what sort of long-term stability could be attained? American armed forces can lend a hand in resolving security issues, but the countries' internal development is the most important thing. It seems there is good opportunity here for cooperation between American and Russian forces, especially in Tadjikistan. And this can play a major role in the field of drug trafficking.

Russian Relations Good – Nationalism

Relations are critical to prevent Russian nationalism

Simes 7 (Dimitri, President of the Nixon Center and Publisher of The National Interest, http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=CDI+Russia+Profile+List&articleid=a1193837742, AD: 7/5/10) jl

But if the current U.S.-Russian relationship deteriorates further, it will not bode well for the United States and would be even worse for Russia. The Russian general staª is lobbying to add a military dimension to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and some top officials are beginning to champion the idea of a foreign policy realignment directed against the West. There are also quite a few countries, such as Iran and Venezuela, urging Russia to work with China to play a leading role in balancing the United States economically, politically, and militarily. And post-Soviet states such as Georgia, which are adept at playing the United States and Russia oª against each other, could act in ways that escalate tensions. Putin’s stage management of Moscow’s succession in order to maintain a dominant role for himself makes a major foreign policy shift in Russia unlikely. But new Russian leaders could have their own ideas—and their own ambitions—and political uncertainty or economic problems could tempt them to exploit nationalist sentiments to build legitimacy. If relations worsen, the un Security Council may no longer be available—due to a Russian veto—even occasionally, to provide legitimacy for U.S. military actions or to impose meaningful sanctions on rogue states. Enemies of the United States could be emboldened by new sources of military hardware in Russia, and political and security protection from Moscow. International terrorists could find new sanctuaries in Russia or the states it protects.And the collapse of U.S.- Russian relations could give China much greater flexibility in dealing with the United States. It would not be a new Cold War, because Russia will not be a global rival and is unlikely to be the prime mover in confronting the United States. But it would provide incentives and cover for others to confront Washington, with potentially catastrophic results.

Nationalist revival causes US-Russian nuclear war.

Israelyan 98 (Victor, Former Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist, Winter, Washington Quarterly) jl

The first and by far most dangerous possibility is what I call the power scenario. Supporters of this option would, in the name of a "united and undivided Russia," radically change domestic and foreign policies. Many would seek to revive a dictatorship and take urgent military steps to mobilize the people against the outside "enemy." Such steps would include Russia's denunciation of the commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons; suspension of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I and refusal to ratify both START II and the Chemical Weapons Convention; denunciation of the Biological Weapons Convention; and reinstatement of a full-scale armed force, including the acquisition of additional intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, as well as medium- and short-range missiles such as the SS-20. Some of these measures will demand substantial financing, whereas others, such as the denunciation and refusal to ratify arms control treaties, would, according to proponents, save money by alleviating the obligations of those agreements. In this scenario, Russia's military planners would shift Western countries from the category of strategic partners to the category of countries representing a threat to national security. This will revive the strategy of nuclear deterrence -- and indeed, realizing its unfavorable odds against the expanded NATO, Russia will place new emphasis on the first-use of nuclear weapons, a trend that is underway already. The power scenario envisages a hard-line policy toward the CIS countries, and in such circumstances the problem of the Russian diaspora in those countries would be greatly magnified. Moscow would use all the means at its disposal, including economic sanctions and political ultimatums, to ensure the rights of ethnic Russians in CIS countries as well as to have an influence on other issues. Of those means, even the use of direct military force in places like the Baltics cannot be ruled out. Some will object that this scenario is implausible because no potential dictator exists in Russia who could carry out this strategy. I am not so sure. Some Duma members -- such as Victor Antipov, Sergei Baburin, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and Albert Makashov, who are leading politicians in ultranationalistic parties and fractions in the parliament -- are ready to follow this path to save a "united Russia." Baburin's "Anti-NATO" deputy group boasts a membership of more than 240 Duma members. One cannot help but remember that when Weimar Germany was isolated, exhausted, and humiliated as a result of World War I and the Versailles Treaty, Adolf Hitler took it upon himself to "save" his country. It took the former corporal only a few years to plunge the world into a second world war that cost humanity more than 50 million lives. I do not believe that Russia has the economic strength to implement such a scenario successfully, but then again, Germany's economic situation in the 1920s was hardly that strong either. Thus, I am afraid that economics will not deter the power scenario's would-be authors from attempting it. Baburin, for example, warned that any political leader who would "dare to encroach upon Russia" would be decisively repulsed by the Russian Federation "by all measures on heaven and earth up to the use of nuclear weapons." n10 In autumn 1996 Oleg Grynevsky, Russian ambassador to Sweden and former Soviet arms control negotiator, while saying that NATO expansion increases the risk of nuclear war, reminded his Western listeners that Russia has enough missiles to destroy both the United States and Europe. n11 Former Russian minister of defense Igor Rodionov warned several times that Russia's vast nuclear arsenal could become uncontrollable. In this context, one should keep in mind that, despite dramatically reduced nuclear arsenals -- and tensions -- Russia and the United States remain poised to launch their missiles in minutes. I cannot but agree with Anatol Lieven, who wrote, "It may be, therefore, that with all the new Russian order's many problems and weaknesses, it will for a long time be able to stumble on, until we all fall down together."

Russian Relations Good – Terrorism and Proliferation

U.S.-Russian relations key to prevent terrorism and proliferation

Rumer and Sokolsky 2 (Eugene and Nikolai, Institute for National Strategic Studies senior research fellows, https://www.ciaonet.org/wps/rue02/rue02.pdf, AD: 7/5/10) jl

Even a cursory examination of the alternatives should make clear why investing in a stable and positive relationship with Russia is in the national interest. We must not take Russia’s pragmatism and ability to act in its self-interest for granted. We need to look no further than the record of Russia adrift throughout the 1990s for proof. Russia may have achieved a substantial degree of stability since the nadir of 1998 when its currency collapsed and its leadership became mired in a succession of crises and corruption scandals. However, this achievement and Russia’s constructive stance in the international arena should not be considered irreversible. Russia’s ability to act in its self-interest will not always translate into compliance with U.S. interests. But dealing with a responsible and coherent leadership presiding over a stable and secure Russia is preferable to coping with an erratic Russia. In the short and medium term, U.S. efforts to combat proliferation and terrorism would face much tougher odds without Russian cooperation. Despite Russia’s diminished stature in the international arena, its cooperative approach to U.S.-Russian relations since September 11 has had a positive, soothing impact on trans-Atlantic relations, making it possible for the United States in turn to focus its diplomatic and political energies where they have been needed most. The record of the 1990s offers an important lesson: a weak Russia is in the interest of no one. The ability of Russia to put its own house in order—from securing its nuclear weapons to pumping oil and gas to global markets—is an important element of U.S. national and international security. The danger to U.S. interests is not from a potential challenger to President Putin, who might shy away from a good personal relationship with his American counterpart, but from Russia failing to consolidate its political and economic accomplishments of the last few years. In the long run, U.S. interests would be well served by a cooperative relationship with Russia, as envisioned by President Bush. Russia is by no measure likely to regain its global superpower status. However, as a regional power, it could be a useful collaborator with the United States—from helping to balance China to supplying energy to key markets to exercising restraint in critical areas of conventional and WMD proliferation. Thus, shaping positive and collaborative long-term Russian attitudes is an important U.S. objective.

Proliferation causes extinction

Utgoff 2 (Victor A., Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis, Survival Vol 44 No 2 Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions, p. 87-90)

In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

Russian Relations Good – Terrorism and Proliferation

Terrorist acquisition of Russian loose nuclear weapons causes attack on the US, US nuclear lash-out and entanglement wars

Speice 6 (Patrick Speice, JD candidate. William and Mary Law Review, Lexis) jl

Organizations such as the Russian military and Minatom are now operating in circumstances of great stress. Money is in short supply, paychecks are irregular, living conditions unpleasant ... [D]isorder within Russia and the resulting strains within the military could easily cause a lapse or a breakdown in the Russian military's guardianship of nuclear weapons. 38 Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or fissile material from Russia as a result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of stringent Soviet-era nuclear security measures. 39 Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods, including " steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways. " 40 Equally threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on their own. Very little material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon. 41 Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not significant. 42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear device into the United States makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it was built. 43 Accordingly, supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first place are the most effective means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44 Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. 46 Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there [\*1439] are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young to retire, 47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. Moreover, there would b e immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. 50 In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. 51 This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States [\*1440] or its allies by hostile states, 52 as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. 53

\*\*\*AFF ANSWERS\*\*\*

UQ – Relations Low – General

Spy scandal has derailed US-Russian relations

Engelstad 7/3 (Ryan, Newark Conflict Resolution Examiner, http://www.examiner.com/x-56495-Newark-Conflict-Resolution-Examiner~y2010m7d3-Spying-is-bad-With-Video, AD: 7/6/10) jl

The United States and Russia's relationship may again be on the rocks in light of recent espionage accusations against a ring of over 10 individuals, two of which were from Montclair, NJ. It was only last week when President Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev of Russia were seen eating lunch together in Washington D.C. Now, President Obama's efforts to repair U.S.-Russia relations will surely be sidetracked. This is a conflict of a global nature, but these recent events can be compared to just about any relationship, and there are important lessons to be learned.  (For more information about this conflict, check this artice from the Newark Star Ledger.)

UQ – Relations Low – Missile Shield

Missile shield eroding relations now

Landay 10 (Jonathan S, McClatchy Staff Writer, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/03/01/89641/us-russia-treaty-stalls-over-obama.html, AD: 7/5/10) jl

WASHINGTON — Negotiations to complete a new U.S.-Russia nuclear arms treaty have stalled over a Russian demand for the option to withdraw unilaterally if Moscow determines that U.S. missile defenses would threaten its intercontinental nuclear missile force, a senior U.S. official said Monday.

Similar "unilateral statements" have been included in previous arms control treaties, and the former Bush administration used one in 2002 to abrogate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with the former Soviet Union.

The Obama administration, however, has rejected the Russian demand, fearing that it could make it harder to win the Republican votes needed for Senate ratification of the new nuclear arms pact.

Biden is pissing Russia off – Missile Shield

Cooper and Kulish 9 (Helene and Nicholas - NYT Staff Writers, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/07/world/europe/07iht-07munich.20001384.html, AD: 7/6/10) jl

MUNICH — Vice President Joseph Biden of the United States rejected the notion of a Russian sphere of influence Saturday, promising that the new government under President Barack Obama would continue to press NATO to seek "deeper cooperation" with like-minded countries.

Biden, in a much-anticipated speech at an international security conference, also said the Obama administration would continue to pursue a planned missile defense system that has angered the Kremlin, provided the technology works and is not too expensive. The missile defense shield, Biden said, is needed to "counter a growing Iranian capability."

UQ – Obama Hit the “reset” button

Non-Unique: All the “reset” button has done is return the US to Cold war sentiments.

Trotman 7/6/10(Ricky member of the Young Leaders Program at the Heritage Foundation, “The Only Thing We Are Re-Setting is the Cold War” The Heritage Foundation)AQB

Peter Brookes presents an op-ed in the Boston Herald demonstrating this administration’s repeated failure to live up to its promise of transparency and open government. The administration’s reticence to give Senators the negotiating record for the new START treaty is yet another flagrant example. The reasons provided in the START hearings not to release the negotiating record are either false, or simply fly in the face of reason. The first, that negotiating records have not been released to the Senate in the past, is patently false given that they have for both the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The second, that releasing such documents to the Senate would compromise the position of future negotiators, is appalling. There is no call for full, public disclosure, but rather release of the information to the Senate, who is responsible for fully vetting any treaty signed between the United States and a foreign nation. By not releasing the record, this administration is making it seem more and more likely that there is something in there that they don’t want the Senate to see. At stake here is nothing less than our national security. While this administration is seeking to reset US-Russian relations, the only thing that is being reset is a Cold War environment. The New START Treaty codifies strategic parity, threatens our ability to build upon our missile defense system, and keeps the mentality of Mutually Assured Destruction alive and well. Combine this with the revelation that ten people have been arrested for allegedly being undercover Russian spies and you have an environment bearing striking similarities to pre-1989 US-Russian relations. Fortunately, with the constitutional role afforded to the Senate, there is still hope for preventing this major step backwards. All this administration has to do is provide the full range of materials necessary to thoroughly vet this treaty and its implications for U.S. security policy.

UQ – Talks Failed

Recent talks have failed to replace old sentiments.

Keating 6/16/10(Joshua, Foreign Policy Magazine “A Short History of a Bad Metaphor”)AQB

As policy initiatives go, the "reset button" didn't exactly have the smoothest of rollouts. On March 6, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton presented her Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov with a literal button meant to symbolize the Obama administration's intention to repair frayed ties with Russia. Unfortunately, one misplaced syllable on the Cyrillic label meant that the button actually said "overcharge," not "reset," and Clinton was subjected to a few days of media mockery in both capitals. But despite (or perhaps because of) the initial gaffe, the phrase caught on. More than a year later, and just ahead of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's visit to Washington next week, "reset button" has become shorthand for the administration's entire Russia policy. Virtually every big-think article or op-ed written on U.S.-Russia relations since that day has referred to the reset button either admiringly or disparagingly. What's more, the phrase has gone viral. Commentators have invoked the reset button in discussions of U.S. policy on Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, Israel, Islam, Britain, Latin America, BP, climate change, Africa, health care, the economy, the war on drugs, and even the Obama presidency itself. Now, when hostile leaders like Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chávez talk about reaching out to the United States, they say they're "willing to press the reset button." When Obama makes a major policy address on a controversial topic like the Gulf oil spill, the question pundits ask is whether he will be able to "hit the reset button." One might almost get the impression that the U.S. political and media establishment has become one giant tech-support line, where the first response to any problem is, "Have you tried restarting the machine?" "It definitely became a much bigger metaphor than was originally intended," said one senior administration official who spoke on condition of anonymity. "It was not a conscious thing that we were going to go out and create this image. It's since been codified. Not by us, by the way." The phrase, in verb form, actually dates back to the presidential transition period when then President-elect Obama told NBC's Tom Brokaw that "it's going to be important for us to reset U.S.-Russian relations." But it entered the popular lexicon when Vice President Joe Biden used it during a widely touted foreign-policy address at a security summit in Munich in February 2009. "The last few years have seen a dangerous drift in relations between Russia and the members of our alliance," Biden said, referring to NATO. "It is time -- to paraphrase President Obama -- it's time to press the reset button and to revisit the many areas where we can and should be working together with Russia." The basic premise of the strategy is that on the major priorities of U.S. foreign policy -- containing Iran, fighting international terrorism, and reducing the risk of nuclear weapons -- there's no reason for the United States and Russia to be at odds. By focusing on these areas, there's potential for "win-win" outcomes rather than "zero-sum" competition. "This was a fairly radical notion in U.S.-Russia relations," says the administration official.

Link Turn – Iraq – Improves Relations

Pullout from Iraq resolves tensions with Russia

Wishnick 4 (Elizabeth, Research Associate at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub383.pdf, AD: 7/6/10) jl

The U.S.-led war in Iraq has introduced new complications into security cooperation between the United States and Central Asia and revealed inconsistencies in the U.S. approach to regional security. The increased U.S. security focus on the region has led other regional powers--especially Russia, China, and India--to compete for influence there more overtly, and a continued American military presence is likely to create tensions in Russian-American relations in particular. Central Asian leaders concerned about the implications of the U.S. interest in “regime change” for their own rule, now have an added incentive to overstate terrorist threats facing their countries, while justifying the persecution of any political opposition and peaceful religious activity.

Link Turn – Generic – Improves Relations

Only the risk of a turn – expansion is inevitable, it’s just a question of aggressiveness – attempts at containment make lashout worse

Tymoshenko 7 (Yuliya, leader of Ukraine's parliamentary opposition, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62613/yuliya-tymoshenko/containing-russia, AD: 7/5/10) jl

In the name of peacekeeping in places such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Trans-Dniestria (restive regions within former Soviet republics), Russia has sought to reestablish its tutelage, and the West has largely not objected. The West has done little to enable the Soviet Union's successor states -- with the exception of the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania -- to achieve viable international standing. The activities of Russian troops in Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and the former Soviet states of Central Asia are rarely questioned, let alone challenged. Moscow is treated as the de facto imperial center -- which is also how it conceives of itself.

What can the West do to dissuade the Kremlin from pursuing Russia's age-old imperial designs? In the 1990s, an enfeebled Russia needed help from abroad. Unless oil prices unexpectedly collapse, no such leverage will be available in the near future. On the contrary, political pressure from outside is likely to aggravate rather than change Russian behavior. With the Kremlin once again firmly in control, Russia will change from within -- or not at all.

Link Defense – Afghanistan – No Impact

Russia isn’t threatened by US presence in Afghanistan

Aljazeera 9 (http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2009/03/200932752829665993.html, AD: 7/3/10) jl

But while Moscow appears opposed to the US foothold in Central Asia, it wants the US presence in Afghanistan to prevent the expansion of terrorism and drug-trafficking to Russian borders.