# Russia Relations Updates

# U/x

## Rels Low

**Relations low---Syria**

**CFR 7/17** 2012, \*Council on Foreign Relations: Interviewer: Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor, CFR.org and Interviewee: Dimitri Simes, President and CEO, Center for the National Interest, “Why Russia Won't Yield on Syria,” http://www.cfr.org/russian-fed/why-russia-wont-yield-syria/p28712, AJ

UN Special Envoy to Syria Kofi Annan is in Moscow for talks with President Vladimir Putin aimed at intensifying pressure on the Syrian regime through UN Security Council sanctions, but Russia expert Dimitri Simes says that while Russia might at some point get fed up with Bashar al-Assad and see that his government is losing ground, it isn't "as opposed to the Damascus regime as the Obama administration and many other governments." Putin is generally committed to "maintaining the sovereignty of existing states," especially since "most of the regimes that were changed after the Cold War were the regimes that were friendly to Russia," says Simes. Additionally, says Simes, **Putin "is more skeptical of U.S. and Western intentions**, particularly U.S. intentions," than former president [Dmitry] Medvedev, who had forged a good relationship with President Obama. Despite the "reset" under President Obama and President Medvedev, many people around Putin **were not persuaded there was a qualitative change in the U.S.-Russian relationship.** The bottom line is that Putin is more hard-nosed; he is more skeptical of U.S. and Western intentions, particularly U.S. intentions, and he's not personally mesmerized by President Obama the way Medvedev was.

# A2: Alt Causes

## JV Solves

**JV repeal overcomes alt causes and makes relations sustainable---reverse casual evidence**

**Burns 6/20** 2012, \*William J. Burns: Deputy Secretary, “Russia's Accession to the World Trade Organization and Granting Russia Permanent Normal Trade Relations,” http://www.state.gov/s/d/2012/193453.htm, AJ

This hearing comes at an opportune moment. This summer, Russia will become a member of the World Trade Organization. Before this happens, Congress has a choice: it can extend Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) to Russia, giving American exporters and workers a level the playing field in one of the fastest growing markets in the world; or it can keep Jackson-Vanik in place, **preventing American companies from reaping the benefits of an unprecedented opportunity to boost trade in a large and growing market**. Terminating the Jackson-Vanik Amendment’s application is not a favor to Russia. It is a step to help create American jobs. And, as Russia’s aspiring democrats have made clear, it is a smart, strategic investment in the kind of country Russia’s emerging middle class is striving for -- a Russia that promotes a strong rule of law. This step is in the Russian people’s own self-interest and to the practical benefit of American companies and workers. At a time when the economic needs of the American people are great, U.S. foreign policy must help American workers and businesses connect to markets abroad to drive our economic recovery at home. The upside of opening Russian markets to American exporters is clear. From 2009 to 2011, U.S. exports to Russia rose 57 percent, and total U.S.-Russia trade rose over 80 percent. However, U.S. trade with Russia still totals less than one percent of our global trade. Russia may be the world’s seventh-largest economy, but it is our 20th largest trading partner. Lifting Jackson-Vanik and extending PNTR does not require the United States to change any of its tariffs, services, market access, or other World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments. It simply makes permanent the treatment we have already extended to imports from Russia every year since 1992 and ensures that the WTO Agreement will apply between us. If the WTO Agreement does not apply between us American companies will be at a disadvantage. While America’s competitors will enjoy more liberal treatment for exports of goods and services and stronger commitments on protection of intellectual property rights, American companies will not. Russia will not have an obligation to apply science-based food safety standards to U.S. exports of meat and poultry or WTO rules on antidumping, leaving American companies vulnerable. Worse still, when our economic competitors from Brazil, Europe and China have grievances in Russia, their governments will be able to turn to a binding WTO dispute mechanism. The United States will not. Beyond the benefits to immediate U.S. economic interests, extending PNTR to Russia is a **strategic investment in our long-term relationship**. Our strategic interests around the world demand that we cooperate with Russia in a number of areas. Russia is a permanent member of the Security Council and a member of the P5+1. Together Russia and the United States hold 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons. Russia is the single largest source of the world’s hydrocarbons. Russia sits astride Europe, Asia, and the broader Middle East, three regions whose geostrategic importance will continue to shape American interests for years to come. By working together with Russia over the last three and a half years, we have shown that we can achieve tangible results that matter to our own self-interest and national security. We are implementing the New START Treaty. Together, we are disposing of enough weapons-grade plutonium for 17,000 nuclear warheads. Russia joined with other members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council in supporting Security Council Resolution 1929 and voluntarily cancelled the sale of a sophisticated air defense system to Iran, a contract worth over a billion dollars. This week, Moscow hosted international talks to press Iran to comply with its international obligations regarding its nuclear program. Russia also provides critical logistical support to international forces in Afghanistan: many of the supplies that transit the Northern Distribution Network go through Russia and a majority of our troops traveling to Afghanistan transit through Russian airspace -- over 370,000 military personnel in all. The United States and Russia have achieved gains that extend beyond security and global politics to touch the daily lives of Americans and Russians. Last July, Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov signed an agreement to build trust and transparency on the sensitive issue of inter-country adoption. They also approved a reciprocal visa agreement to makes it easier for business people and tourists to travel between our countries. And through the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission and its 20 working groups, we have built new partnerships and engaged our citizens, businesses and non-governmental organizations in areas such as health care and energy efficiency. Even as we seek progress on areas of mutual interest, there are also areas of real difference between our countries on issues ranging from missile defense and Georgia to Syria and human rights. We continue to believe that cooperation with Russia on missile defense can enhance the security of the United States, our allies in Europe, and Russia. In pursuing cooperation on missile defense, the United States will not agree to constrain or limit our missile defenses. U.S. support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders will not change. On Syria, our message to our Russian colleagues has been clear and consistent. Assad’s campaign of terror against his own people is unconscionable. It is past time for action to meet our obligations as UN Security Council members to protect peace and security and allow the Syrian people to pull their country back from the brink and embark on a political transition. Today, a deeper economic partnership represents one of our **greatest opportunities to work to build trust and pursue common interests** with Russia. The removal of Jackson-Vanik would give ballast to our overall relationship with Russia and strengthen the case of those who argue that greater cooperation with America is good for the Russian people. Keeping Jackson-Vanik in place for Russia also provides political ammunition for those in Russia who argue that the United States is stuck in a Cold War mentality. It puts our companies at a competitive disadvantage and diminishes our ability to hold Russia to its commitments to transparency and increased market access. Our goal is to be supportive of efforts made by Russians themselves to modernize their economic and political systems. Russian civil society activists argue that increased trade with the United States would help strengthen this new middle class. They argue that greater transparency and accountability in rules will help attract the investment needed to move Russia’s economy away from its dependence on hydrocarbons and generate new sources of economic growth. They argue that a level playing field, including better legal protections and transparent, predictable rules applied uniformly across Russia’s territory, will help provide a hedge against corruption and monopolistic control. **Refusing to lift Jackson-Vanik and extend PNTR gives America no leverage over Russia in the areas where we differ**. This is why leaders of Russia’s political opposition have called on the U.S. to terminate Jackson-Vanik, notwithstanding their concerns about human rights and the Magnitskiy case -- concerns which we share. Similarly, Georgia recognized the benefits of increased trade and, notwithstanding its disagreements with Russia, joined a consensus agreement to support Russia’s WTO accession. Over time, extending PNTR can help Russians achieve their goal of building a modern, successful and prosperous nation. Upon accession to the WTO, Russia will join the United States and others in taking on obligations to increase transparency and predictability in laws and regulations. WTO membership and PNTR alone will not cut the Russian economy free from what Russia’s own leadership recognizes are the crippling effects of corruption and weak rule of law. Other complementary measures such as beginning negotiations on a new Bilateral Investment Treaty and Russia’s progress toward OECD accession are also important to continue to support Russia’s modernization and openness to free trade. While challenges will remain for a long time to come, this long-term strategy of greater economic engagement, grounded in a rules-based system, can help to open up Russia’s economy and society and to reinforce rule of law. Ultimately, the Russian people themselves will have to choose their country’s direction. In the meantime, we will support Russians’ own efforts to create the kind of country they strive for: an open society that protects fundamental freedoms, property rights, transparency, competition and free trade; and a modern Russia that partners with the United States to promote global security and prosperity. Navigating relations with Russia in the months and years ahead will not be easy. It will involve a complicated mix of managing cooperation and differences. However, as Russia prepares to join the World Trade Organization, the economic needs of the American people and the Russian people’s vision for their own future both point us in the same direction: toward an end to the application of the decades-old Jackson-Vanik Amendment and the **beginning of a new chapter in our economic and trade relationship with Russia**.

## A2: Missile Defense

**START solves missile defense cooperation**

**Lodge 6/20** 2012, \*Terri Lodge is the director of nuclear security at the nonpartisan American Security Project, “New START is working to enhance US national security,” http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/233801-new-start-is-working-to-enhance-us-national-security, AJ

Fourth, the Treaty does not limit U.S. missile defense programs. Claims of a secret missile defense deal in the treaty are the stuff of fantasy, not reality. There is no secret missile defense deal as part of New START. U.S. negotiators understood that no treaty can limit U.S. missile defense programs. Since the ratification of New START the **U.S. has advanced its missile defense plans while pursuing a missile defense cooperation agreement with Russia**. A possible cooperation agreement would **allay Russian concerns about U.S. missile defense initiatives** but not limit U.S. plans.

## A2: Syria

**Doesn’t affect relations**

**CFR 7/17** 2012, \*Council on Foreign Relations: Interviewer: Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor, CFR.org and Interviewee: Dimitri Simes, President and CEO, Center for the National Interest, “Why Russia Won't Yield on Syria,” http://www.cfr.org/russian-fed/why-russia-wont-yield-syria/p28712, AJ

At a certain point, Russians may say to themselves that the game is all over in Syria, or at least almost over. They would not want to be the last ones to be committed to this man who is not viewed in Moscow as the same kind of villain he's viewed as in Washington, but he's not quite a hero either. At some point they may decide to give up on him and to start looking for bringing about regime change. They're not quite there yet. Movement in that direction is driven by opposition successes on the ground, not by public pressure from the Obama administration. Also, Russians think the Obama administration is a little hypocritical, because as they have told Washington, [if] it is so committed to removing Assad, they certainly can do it the way it was done in Iraq, the way it was done during the liberation of Kosovo from Serbia, without Security Council blessing. The Russians are saying it would be a mistake, they would criticize it, but they would not resist it militarily, and it would **not be a defining issue in the Russian-American relationship**. Russian officials believe the Obama administration really does not want to intervene in Syria, but they're using Russia as a whipping boy, to blame on Russia what the Obama administration does not quite want to do itself. The administration acts under the assumption that they can have their cake and eat it too in relations with anyone in the world, including proud powers such as China and Russia. Secretary Clinton, for instance, while she's trying to persuade the Russians to support a tough Syrian resolution, at the same time went to St. Petersburg and organized a meeting with opposition activists and promised that the United States would **find some creative way to support Russian opposition groups despite new legislation** passed by the Russian Duma, which requires such groups, if they accept foreign money and engage in political activity, to be registered as foreign agents. Do I like this legislation passed by the Russian Duma? Absolutely not. This legislation is counterproductive for Russia and will be a problem in the U.S.-Russian relationship. But at the same time, if Syria is such a central problem for the United States, wouldn't it be wise for the secretary of state on this particular trip to Russia not to meet with opposition activists? Because it creates an impression in Moscow that the only reason the United States is not calling for an end to the Putin government is because Russia is a major nuclear power. That impression certainly does not make Russia more forthcoming on issues of concern to the United States.

## A2: Unsustainable

**Sustainable relations are possible---transparency is critical**

**Collins et al 12** 4/19, \*James F. Collins, Lilia Shevtsova, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Ben Cardin, Angela Stent, Dorothy Dwoskin: Carnegie Endowment, “The Next Phase of U.S.-Russia Relations,” http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/19/next-phase-of-u.s.-russia-relations, AJ

Sustainable U.S.-Russia Relations: A “**basic commitment to transparency” should form the foundation of U.S. relations** with other countries, including Russia, Cardin said. However, he added that Russia suffers from “gross corruption” and weak protection of human rights, especially for journalists and opposition figures. While Russia is an important strategic partner, the United States must “stand up and point out the problems that they [Russians] have today” in order to maintain a normal relationship, he concluded.

# A2: Impact turns

## A2: Afghanistan Stability

**US-Russia relations solve Afghanistan stability—Post 9/11**

**CFR, 06** (Council on Foreign Relations, “Russia’s Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do – Report of an Independent Task Force”, Task Force Chairs: John Edwards, Jack Kemp. Project Director: Stephen Sestanovich, pdf.)//JL

U.S.-Russian relations did enjoy a vigorous resurgence in this period.¶ Agreement on how to deal with terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and global energy needs seemed particularly strong. The American campaign in Afghanistan benefited from the sharing of Russian intelligence information as well as from access to Central Asian military airfields, which Russia did not seek to block. Russian officials welcomed the United States as a new recruit to an effort—fighting Islamist terrorism—that they had long championed. For his part, President George W. Bush referred to Russia as an‘ ‘ally’’ in the struggle. The United States led the effort at the 2002 summit of the G8 in Canada to create the $20 billion Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction to improve the security of dangerous, especially fissionable, materials. Russia also became part of the U.S.-proposed Proliferation Security Initiative, a multinational network to interdict such materials.

**US-Russia relations provide Afghanistan and Iran stability**

**CFR, 06** (Council on Foreign Relations, “Russia’s Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do – Report of an Independent Task Force”, Task Force Chairs: John Edwards, Jack Kemp. Project Director: Stephen Sestanovich, pdf.)//JL

In 2005, Russian officials sought to curtail access by the United States and NATO to Central Asian air bases—even though these were still being used to support military and humanitarian operations in Afghanistan, an effort that Russia ostensibly supported. For the first time since 2001, Moscow prepared to throw up obstacles to Western policy, not because it now disagreed with the goal of fighting terrorism, but because it subordinated this goal to a different, geopolitical concern. Acting in the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization¶ (the other members of which are Central Asian states), Russia and China saw an opportunity to reverse the growing American presence in the region. American hopes for expanded energy cooperation also encountered a series of disappointments: the revocation of long-standing ExxonMobil licenses for Sakhalin natural gas fields; the destruction of Russia’s largest and best-managed oil company, Yukos, as part of the reassertion of state control over the oil sector; the enunciation of new policies to limit Western investment in Russian energy development; the delay and near-collapse of the Murmansk pipeline project; and the cutoff of gas to Ukraine and, beyond it, to the rest of Europe, as part of a counterattack against Kiev’s pro-Western orientation. Under the cumulative impact of these developments, the ‘‘strategic energy dialogue’’ came to a standstill. Of the three issues that gave the post–September 11 relationship real meaning—counterterrorism, energy security, and nonproliferation— only the last remains an example of truly robust cooperation. In the past six months, Russia has had to balance two competing interests: on the one hand, good relations with Tehran (which include sharply increased military sales and the goal of further sales of nuclear power reactors), and on the other, maintaining solidarity with Western states in an effort to keep Iran from becoming a nuclear-weapons state. Facing this choice, Russia’s coordination of policy with the West has actually grown stronger. Moscow has dismissed suggestions that political, economic, or other sanctions might have to be imposed on Tehran, but it has supported efforts to refer the issue of Iran’s nuclear activities to the UN Security Council. It has also pursued a parallel proposal, with U.S. and European encouragement, to provide nuclear-enrichment services so as to head off the further development of Iran’s own capabilities in this area.

**US-Russia relations vital to Afghanistan stability**

**Krickus, 11**— Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the University of Mary Washington and has held the Oppenheimer Chair for Warfighting Strategy at the U.S. Marine Corps University. Previously he cofounded The National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs in Washington, DC, and began conducting research on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’ “nationalities question. Sajudis invited him to serve as an international monitor for the first democratic election conducted in Soviet Lithuania. Dr. Krickus has offered testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and has lectured at the U.S. Foreign Service Institute, the Polish Foreign Ministry, the European Commission, and other domestic and foreign venues on the Soviet Union/Russia, the Baltic countries, NATO, and Kaliningrad. Dr. Krickus holds a B.A. in government from the College of William and Mary, an M.A. in international affairs from the University of Massachusetts, and a Ph.D. in comparative politics from Georgetown University. (Richard J., “The Afghanistan Question And The Reset In U.S.-Russian Relations”, The Letort Papers, October 2011, PDF.)//JL

U.S.-Russian security cooperation in Afghanistan has been limited but successful. By the end of 2011, more than 50 percent of the cargo to be delivered to coalition forces will travel by way of the NDN.20 It will become an even more critical logistical asset as coalition forces begin to exit Afghanistan, and agreements with Central Asian and Russian authorities permit cargo heretofore prohibited—such as lethal equipment—to traverse their land and air space. In addition, help in the way of arms, intelligence, and training from the Russian side has facilitated the coalition’s mission in Afghanistan. Looking forward, expanding commercial relations between Russia and Afghanistan are on the upswing. On January 21, 2011, Karzai was the first Afghan president to visit Moscow since Najibullah did so in the late 1980s. He, along with a number of prominent Afghans, met with Medvedev and Putin to discuss wider economic cooperation. Yevgeny Primakov, the head of Russia’s Chamber of Commerce, pointed to upgrading the Afghan infrastructure projects that were initially built during the Soviet era, such as a pre-fabricated housing factory, and one that produces cement in Jabal Siraj. Both would be funded by the Moscow Industrial Bank. Karzai, in turn, cited a $500 million rise in bilateral trade and Afghanistan’s interest in Russia’s hydrocarbon assets. He also welcomed access to the technical expertise that his northern neighbor could provide, as well as military assistance such as the 20,000 AK-47 rifles Russia donated to his forces and its help in training 250 members of the Afghan police force.21 Since opening a trade office in Kabul in 2002, the Afghans have eagerly accommodated Russian commercial efforts that are associated with Soviet-era development programs like the Naglu hydroelectric station and “the Salang tunnel that links Kabul to the Northern provinces and was constructed by the Soviets.” 22 Simultaneously, Russia is intent on connecting its pipelines and rail transit systems running through Central Asia to those in Afghanistan. As funding associated with extensive American military operations declines, Kabul will look to Russia as an eager economic partner. On the diplomatic front, Russia through the UN can encourage stakeholders to fund economic and humanitarian programs that ease Afghanistan’s economic challenges. Russia is in a position likewise to advance progress of the international effort to make Bonn II a success. It also enjoys close relations with China and India and can help encourage both of these emerging powers to endorse a diplomatic campaign to stabilize the entire region. In event of partition, Russia’s assistance to the Northern Alliance’s success would be critical—most specifically in maintaining air and land corridors to it and providing arms, ammunition, and supplies required to sustain the non-Taliban entity. Simultaneously, were the worst-case scenario to materialize, the Tajik and Uzbek insurgents affiliated with the Taliban would become more aggressive throughout Central Asia. Under these circumstances, Russia might take active military measures to meet the jihadist threat. Fearful of their security, those Central Asian leaders that were wary of Russian soldiers operating on their territory might actually welcome them. In the face of a range of plausible scenarios, the American defense community must assess the feasibility of joint U.S.-Russian military operations. But a broad range of concomitant questions must also be addressed. What are the prospects of joint military cooperation in meeting a resumed jihadist threat in Afghanistan or Central Asia? What would be the character of this military cooperation? Are joint combat operations even plausible, given existing reservations in both Washington and Moscow about the good will of the other side? And if they are plausible, what about the command structure and from which venue would they operate? Finally, what are the prospects of China joining Russia and the United States in a range of efforts to develop and stabilize Afghanistan, or, barring that, at least Beijing standing aside and not interfering in those efforts?23 Critics of the reset in both Washington and Moscow, however, have been unrelenting in derogating the reset campaign. But in addition to the sanguine prospects engendered by the New START, U.S. critics of the reset overlook the fact that Russia joined the Americans and Europeans in sanctioning Tehran for failing to comply with UN resolutions regarding its drive for nukes. Likewise, Moscow withheld an arms sale that amounted to close to a billion dollars. True, the Kremlin often uses harsh language in criticizing Western foreign policy initiatives, but in the final analysis, it rarely backs its caustic words with punishing actions. Russia needs the reset, and this conviction encouraged Medvedev in the May 2011 G-8 gathering in France to call for Quaddafi’s expulsion from office. This was a significant setback for the Libyan dictator since he had cited his “close” relationship with Moscow as evidence that he was not a pariah in the eyes of the international community. Of course, Russian critics assert that, aside from the American pledge to provide a $5 million reward for information leading to the arrest of the North Caucasus terrorist, Umarov, Russia has not gotten much in return for the reset. That is categorically untrue, since coalition troops have suffered the loss of considerable blood and treasure in Afghanistan—in the case of the United States, about 1,600 deaths—in order to crush the very same jihadists that deem Russia an enemy of Islam.

## A2: Aids

**U.S Russia Relations is key to counter AIDs**

**U.S Embassy No date**-[“Embassy of the United States in Russia” 200 years of U.S-Russia Diplomatic Relations; <http://us-russia200.moscow.usembassy.gov/200th/anniversary.php?record_id=health>]

Bicentennial Partnerships: Health and Science Bicentennial Partnerships reflect American and Russian cooperation in a range of areas as part of the U.S. Embassy Moscow's commemoration of the 200th Anniversary of U.S. - Russia Diplomatic Relations. Cooperation In Health The United States and Russia have had a long history of health cooperation. Russian and American government and private partners are working together on many levels, helping to build a foundation for thorough reform of the health care system as well as making significant strides in health care research. For the past decade and a half, the United States and the Russia Federation have worked together on Russia peer-to-peer health partnership programs in areas such as as hospital care and administration, primary health care, reproductive health, women’s health, neonatal resuscitation, emergency medical services, and child welfare. From 1993 to 2006 more than 3,500 U.S. and Russian experts -- doctors, nurses, policy-makers, health administrators, lab technicians, NGO representatives, educators, and social workers -- participated in exchange visits. In all, there were 32 health partnerships between US and Russian health institutions in 24 regions of Russia and 24 US states. HIV/AIDs Initiatives The United States and the Russian Federation have intensified efforts to combat the HIV/AIDS threat. Leaders of both nations have agreed to emphasize joint research, program implementation, and public-private cooperation. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs have contributed to increasing HIV/AIDS prevention activities focusing on high-risk groups, especially among youth. Other Russian-American efforts underway, by the U.S. Civilian Research and Development Foundation and others, include expanding joint HIV/AIDS biomedical research and disease surveillance to harness the considerable scientific resources of both the U.S. and Russia, and to prevent the spread of the closely linked multi-drug resistant (MDR) tuberculosis (TB) epidemic, as well as contain Avian Influenza. Presidential Initiatives: At the Bratislava Summit, President Bush and President Putin agreed to cooperate internationally on a number of fronts in the fight against the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Last year, for instance, U.S. and Russian laboratory specialists worked side by side in Ethiopia and in Namibia to train local specialists on HIV testing and diagnostics. In addition, the two countries conduct joint research on cancer through the American Russian Cancer Alliance, a unique partnership of leading U.S. and Russian cancer research institutes. The Environment, Science and Technology Section of the U.S. Embassy Moscow coordinates bilateral US-Russian relations in health and science areas, including science policy, public health, and biotechnology.

## A2: Anti-Americanism

**No Anti-Americanism**

**Brown 06**-[Post-Communist Russia and anti-Americanism: Has the West lost Russian public opinion? Dr. Stephen Brown; School of History and Politics; University of Newcastle - 25-27 September 2006 <University of Wollongong http://www.newcastle.edu.au/Resources/Schools/Newcastle%20Business%20School/APSA/INTLREL/Brown-Stephen.pdf>]

Abstract. Post-Communist Russia’s place in the international system has constituted a matter of intense academic interest since the end of the Cold War. In 2006, the relationship between the West and Russia cooled markedly in response to changing political alliances among the successor states of the former Soviet Union and Russia’s alleged use of its oil and gas resources for political purposes. Richard Pipes has warned that the West should not trust Russia because both its political elites and public opinion are hostile to Western values. This paper will argue that public opinion in Russia has been, and remains, mostly favourable towards the United States, Europe and the liberal democratic political system associated with the ‘West’ and that anti-Americanism, a discourse considered to be widespread in Europe, remains relatively weak in Russia. While many Russian politicians and ideologues have urged Russians to view the West as both foreign and hostile, a majority of the general public has steadfastly resisted. Sympathetic to Europe and unenthusiastic about new wars, Russia’s general public has proved a surprisingly resilient ally both for a pragmatic Russian foreign policy and for the West. Break¶ Like other European publics, Russians claim that they are critics of American foreign policy, and not hostile to the American public. As the Pew Global Attitudes Project (2005) has found, Russians believe that they are able to discern positive and negative features among Americans: 61% of Russians have a positive impression of Americans. Majorities in Russia associate Americans with the positive characteristics “hard-working” (72%), and “inventive” (56%); yet just 32% say the term “honest” applies to Americans. Majorities of Russians also describe Americans as “greedy” (60%) and “violent” (54%), and a relatively large minority calls Americans “immoral” (42%). It is true that at the end of the 1990s, the Russian public’s love of the United States had reached its nadir. In 1999/2000, only 37% of Russians expressed a ‘favourable opinion about the United States’, according to Pew. This polling was conducted in the wake of the 1998 financial crisis and after the NATO bombing of Serbia, which was opposed by Russia, and when anti-Western rhetoric had received more legitimacy under Prime Minister Primakov, known for his criticisms of the United States. This outcome can be compared to Pew’s finding that 78% of Germans held a favourable opinion about the United States in 1999/2000. Since then, Russian public opinion has followed a trajectory common to much of the world. After the attacks of 11 September 2001, Russians expressed their sympathy for the United States and tended to support the American-led crusade against Islamic extremism (O’Loughlin 2002, 19). In 2002, favourable opinion about the United States in Russia climbed to 61%, the same level as in Germany. As the invasion of Iraq loomed in 2003, favourable opinions about the United States, as measured by the Pew surveys, plummeted in Russia and in many other countries. In Russia, favourable opinion about the United States in 2003 fell to 36% and in Germany to 45%. Thereafter, Russian opinion about the United States has risen much faster than in Germany, France and Spain. Favourable opinion of the United States in Russia was 52% in 2005, a figure that almost matched that of Britain (55%) and was higher than that recorded in France (41%), Germany (43%) and Spain (38%). According to Pew, in 2006 Russia (43%) maintained its lead over France (39%), Germany (37%) and Spain (30%).

## A2: China War

**Russian relations solve Chinese belligerence-no lashout**

Graham 09**,** Thomas, senior director at Kissinger Associates, Inc. He served as special assistant to the president and senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff “ Resurgent Russia and U.S. Purprposes” The Century Foundation, foreign policy and economic think tank, <http://tcf.org/events/pdfs/ev257/Graham.pdf> NEH )

 The rise of China already is having a major impact on the global economy, including increasing the scarcity of critical commodities, such as oil, gas, and metals. China’s geopolitical weight will only grow as its economy expands, reshaping in particular the balance of power in Northeast and Central Asia. The U.S. interest is in integrating China as a responsible stakeholder into global economic and security structures. Russia’s massive territorial presence in Northeast Asia and its continu• ing political, economic, and security presence in Central Asia make it a major player in the construction of new security structures in both those regions, along with China, the United States, and other powers. Its treasure trove of natural resources in Siberia and its Far Eastern region could play a central role in fueling Chinese economic growth. A continued strong Russian presence increases the possibilities for building stable security structures; a weak Russia would make those tasks harder. The United States, of course, could work with others, minus Russia, to build these structures, but cooperation with Russia would ease the task.

## A2: Central Asian Instability

**U.S Russia Cooperation is key to Central Asian instability**

Asia Times 11-[Russia frets over Eurasian domino theory By Yong Kwon; Central Asia Jun 3, 2011b ;http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central\_Asia/MF03Ag01.html]

Since the early 2000s, Moscow has been singularly concerned with the influx of drugs flooding across the porous borders of Central Asia into Russia. The consumption of these drugs by the Russian people contributes to Russia's rapidly declining population and strains its already exhausted healthcare system. Widespread use of intravenous drugs combined with other strains on the welfare of the Russian people could reduce the Russian population, which stood at 150 million in 1991, to a figure as low as 100 or 80 million by 2050. [1] While political scientists continue to dispute over whether demographic decline affects the overall status of a state a great power, Russia's rapidly declining population stands as a serious liability for the country's ability to develop socially and economically. The best way to decrease the trans-Eurasian drug trade is to bolster the economic stability and security of the Central Asian states. However, development of this economic periphery remains predicated on several factors; primarily, the ability of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to protect their investments and secondly, Russia's capacity to ensure stability in the global energy market. Both tasks require a degree of cooperation from other great powers, specifically the United States. Facilitating Russia's key objectives, Central Asia is slowly emerging from the economic periphery and moving towards greater integration with the global market. In addition to pre-existing Russian energy corporations and the rapidly expanding Chinese natural resource extraction projects, foreign investments are slowly trickling into the region to bolster development. South Korean corporations have shown great interest in limestone and shell deposits in Kyrgyzstan while Australia considers investments in Kazakh copper mines. Last week, Osh province in Kyrgyzstan received commitments for foreign investment worth $24 million during an investment forum. [2] Kyrgyzstan also plans to attract investments for the construction of hydroelectric plants that will place the second poorest Central Asian state at the forefront of the region's energy export market. Kazakhstan can also expect greater capital investment as it has reaffirmed its commitment to enter the expanding Islamic bond market and by July 1 is preparing to remove all customs borders between itself, Russia and Belarus. On top of this, Kazakhstan is looking forward to developing the Kashgan super-oil field, raising its status among oil exporting states. These are remarkable developments considering last year's ethnic and political upheaval in Kyrgyzstan and the global economic downturn. However, the stability of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan remains on thin ice. The presence of Islamic fundamentalism, a massive drug trade and instability in the global energy market all threaten to shatter the initial successes of these economies. While the Osh investment forum was taking place, Bishkek announced that it will deploy more troops to the Kyrgyz-Tajik border south of Osh province to guard against incursion by fundamentalist militants and narco-traffickers. On the same day, Astana announced the deployment of an unspecified number of its troops as peacekeepers to Afghanistan. These actions show how serious both states are in securing a stable region for continued growth and development. Russia is naturally interested in supporting these efforts because they are in line with its national interests, but its capacity to aid is limited due to the sheer scale of the problem. Russia's Federal Service for Drug Control reported seizing around 6.9 tons of hashish in 2008, but remained far from scratching the surface of the estimated 3,858 tons produced annually in Afghanistan. [3] Moscow genuinely wants a strong American presence in Central Asia to secure the borders and create a more stable Afghanistan. Russia's desires for US engagement in the region can be seen in its silence over American military presence in Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan (see Clawing back credibility in Kyrgyzstan , Asia Times Online, Sep 3, 2010 ), which is in stark contrast to Moscow's vociferous opposition to the Pentagon project to place a land-based SM-3 (Standard Missile 3) interceptor missile system in Romania. Russia had proposed to make the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) more focused on combating international crime. Although shot down by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the proposed changes intended to increase the presence of the United States in Russia's traditional "near-abroad". All of Russia's recent approaches to US foreign policy in Central Asia points to Moscow's doctrine of resolving key regional issues at a multilateral level.

## A2: Central Asian War

**Won’t escalate.**

Weitz 6-[Richard, Senior Fellow and Associate Director of the Center for Future Security Strategies at Hudson Institute, Summer, “Averting a New Great Game in Central Asia,” Washington Quarterly 29:3]

Concerns about a renewed great game are thus exaggerated. The contest for influence in the region does not directly challenge the vital national interests of China, Russia, or the United States, the most important extraregional countries in Central Asian security affairs. Unless restrained, however, competitive pressures risk impeding opportunities for beneficial cooperation among these countries. The three external great powers have incentives to compete for local allies, energy resources, and military advantage, but they also share substantial interests, especially in reducing terrorism and drug trafficking. If properly aligned, the major multilateral security organizations active in Central Asia could provide opportunities for cooperative diplomacy in a region where bilateral ties traditionally have predominated.

**Risks are too high – great power war theories false in Central Asia.**

Smith 96 [Diane, Military Net, Jun 17, “Central Asia: A New Great Game?” http://www.milnet.com/pentagon/centasia/cenasap1.htm]

Is there a new "Great Game" being played out in Central Asia? Boris Rumer argues that the successor states to the Russian and British empires have renewed the struggle for hegemony in the center of the Asian continent. As the world shifts from a bipolar to a multipolar focus, the nations of Asia search for new trans-regional security arrangements. More specifically, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the creation of five Central Asian republics2 (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan), have complicated the security relations of the Asian states. (See Figure 1.) But, this new struggle is not a repeat of the 19th century "Great Game," by which the Central Asian states are but pawns of great powers as *they* jockey for power and position. Instead, the Central Asian states themselves are active players in this struggle for power, in a unique geo-strategic position to influence immediate neighbors Russia, China, and Iran, and even beyond into the Indian subcontinent. Once considered a backwater of little importance during the Soviet era, Central Asia could play a pivotal role in Asian politics in the next decade. Enlargement and Engagement set domestic political stability, regional peace, and the maturation of market economies in the five Central Asian states as policy goals of the United States. The key to Asian, especially Central Asian, regional security is economic. A strong, vibrant market economy is a prerequisite for political stability and the growth of democracy. Political stability, however, is itself a key element to economic development; peace in the region, especially in Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir, must be gained before that economic takeoff can occur. Serious political, economic, ethnic, religious, and social challenges confront the five new Central Asian states in this quest for regional security. How each state is able to confront and resolve these problems will determine its ability to emerge as a viable force in this struggle for influence, in this new "Great Game." Instability might seem to provide opportunities for states such as Iran or China to expand their influence, but the risks that such instability would ricochet back on them are too great. Thus, Iran, Pakistan, India, Russia and China each seek, in their own way, to promote stability within Central Asia while expanding their own regional influence.

## A2: Hegemony

**US -Russian relations are critical to US hegemony, US involvement in conflicts all over the world**

The Nixon Center 3[“Advancing American Interests and the U.S.-Russian Relationship Interim Report” THE COMMISSION ON AMERICA’S NATIONAL INTERESTS AND RUSSIA. The Nixon Center. Sept. 2003. <http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monographs/FR.htm>]

At the same time, U.S. leaders increasingly recognized the emerging, inter-related threats of terrorism and proliferation.  Though policy makers and experts had devoted some attention to these issues earlier, the tragic events of September 11 rapidly crystallized American thinking about these threats and transformed the struggle to contain them into the principal aim of American foreign policy.  Notwithstanding its diminished status and curtailed ambition, Russia has considerable influence in its neighborhood and a significant voice elsewhere as well.  Moscow can contribute importantly to U.S. interests if it chooses to do so.  Accordingly Russia can markedly decrease, or increase, the costs of exercising American leadership both directly (by assisting the United States, or not) and indirectly (by abetting those determined to resist, or not). For this Commission’s purposes it is American interests, not the U.S.-Russian relationship per se, that are paramount.  The relationship should serve U.S. interests—not vice versa.  This does not mean that Russian interests are unimportant.  Russian cooperation on specific issues will reflect Russian judgment of how these actions affect its interests.  Fortunately, Russia’s national interests converge with our own interests much more than they diverge.  The real interests Russia and America share—including Russia’s successful integration into the West as a market-oriented democracy—greatly outweigh the interests that divide us.  But since short term interests and narrower political advantage can cloud perceptions, U.S. policy must have a more ambitious objective than simply demonstrating to Moscow how its cooperation with the U.S. advances Russian interests.  Wise policy will also seek to create significant equities in Russian society and among leading political forces in cooperative action, which provides the context for managing unavoidable differences on other issues. The proper starting point in thinking about American national interests and Russia—or any other country—is the candid question: why does Russia matter?  How can Russia affect vital American interests and how much should the United States care about Russia?  Where does it rank in the hierarchy of American national interests?  As the Report of the Commission on American National Interests (2000) concluded, Russia ranks among the few countries whose actions powerfully affect American vital interests.  Why? First, Russia is a very large country linking several strategically important regions.  By virtue of its size and location, Russia is a key player in Europe as well as the Middle East and Central, South and East Asia.  Accordingly, Moscow can substantially contribute to, or detract from, U.S. efforts to deal with such urgent challenges as North Korea and Iran, as well as important longer term problems like Iraq and Afghanistan.  In addition, Russia shares the world’s longest land border with China, an emerging great power that can have a major impact on both U.S. and Russian interests.  The bottom line is that notwithstanding its significant loss of power after the end of the Cold War, Moscow’s geopolitical weight still exceeds that of London or Paris. Second, as a result of its Soviet legacy, Russia has relationships with and information about countries that remain comparatively inaccessible to the American government, in the Middle East, Central Asia and elsewhere.  Russian intelligence and/or leverage in these areas could significantly aid the United States in its efforts to deal with current, emerging and still unforeseen strategic challenges, including in the war on terrorism. Third, today and for the foreseeable future Russia’s nuclear arsenal will be capable of inflicting vast damage on the United States.  Fortunately, the likelihood of such scenarios has declined dramatically since the Cold War.  But today and as far as any eye can see the U.S. will have an enduring vital interest in these weapons not being used against America or our allies. Fourth, reliable Russian stewardship and control of the largest arsenal of nuclear warheads and stockpile of nuclear materials from which nuclear weapons could be made is essential in combating the threat of “loose nukes.”  The United States has a vital interest in effective Russian programs to prevent weapons being stolen by criminals, sold to terrorists and used to kill Americans. Fifth, Russian stockpiles, technologies and knowledge for creating biological and chemical weapons make cooperation with Moscow very important to U.S. efforts to prevent proliferation of these weapons.  Working with Russia may similarly help to prevent states hostile to the United States from obtaining sophisticated conventional weapons systems, such as missiles and submarines. Sixth, as the world’s largest producer and exporter of hydrocarbons (oil and gas), Russia offers America an opportunity to diversify and increase supplies of non-OPEC, non-Mid-Eastern energy. Seventh, as a veto-wielding permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, Russia can substantially ease, or complicate, American attempts to work through the UN and other international institutions to advance other vital and extremely important U.S. interests.  In a world in which many are already concerned about the use of U.S. power, this can have a real impact on America’s success at providing global leadership.  More broadly, a close U.S.-Russian relationship can limit other states’ behavior by effectively eliminating Moscow as a potential source of political support.

**Collapsing US-Russian cooperation will increase global missile sales and the risk of conflict—it will destroy U.S. leadership**

Simes ‘07 (Dimitri, President of the Nixon Center and Publisher of The National Interest, Foreign Affairs, “Losing Russia; The Costs of Renewed Confrontation,” Nov/Dec – lexis]

But if the current U.S.-Russian relationship deteriorates further, it will not bode well for the United States and would be even worse for Russia. The Russian general staff is lobbying to add a military dimension to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and some top officials are beginning to champion the idea of a foreign policy realignment directed against the West. There are also quite a few countries, such as Iran and Venezuela, urging Russia to work with China to play a leading role in balancing the United States economically, politically, and militarily. And post-Soviet states such as Georgia, which are adept at playing the United States and Russia off against each other, could act in ways that escalate tensions. Putin's stage management of Moscow's succession in order to maintain a dominant role for himself makes a major foreign policy shift in Russia unlikely. But new Russian leaders could have their own ideas -- and their own ambitions -- and political uncertainty or economic problems could tempt them to exploit nationalist sentiments to build legitimacy. If relations worsen, the UN Security Council may no longer be available -- due to a Russian veto -- even occasionally, to provide legitimacy for U.S. military actions or to impose meaningful sanctions on rogue states. Enemies of the United States could be emboldened by new sources of military hardware in Russia, and political and security protection from Moscow. International terrorists could find new sanctuaries in Russia or the states it protects. And the collapse of U.S.-Russian relations could give China much greater flexibility in dealing with the United States. It would not be a new Cold War, because Russia will not be a global rival and is unlikely to be the prime mover in confronting the United States. But it would provide incentives and cover for others to confront Washington, with potentially catastrophic results.

## A2: Iran Prolif

**Stabilizing relations is key to stop Iranian proliferation**

**Blank 10** -[Non-Proliferation, Russian Style <http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2010/19/blank.php> Research Professor of National Security affairs]

In turn, taking Russia seriously means acknowledging that Russia’s robust economic interests in Iran and the nuclear, energy, and defense industry lobbies that benefit from those interests greatly influence Moscow’s policies. And beyond those lobbies, Russia’s fundamental strategic interests lie in promoting Iranian-U.S. hostility, rather than cooperation. Official Russian statements advocate strengthening Iran’s role as a legitimate actor in a Middle East security system, even as Iranian leaders threaten to destroy Israel and promote state-sponsored terrorism. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has even gone so far as to insist that Iran be invited to participate in any security system for the Black Sea region.[24](http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2010/19/blank.php#footnotes) Russia, meanwhile, is reaping the dividends. Since Iran’s nuclear program kicked into high gear over the past half-decade, Moscow has offered nuclear reactors to no fewer than 13 Arab states as part of its efforts to advance its economic, political, and strategic interests in the Middle East–hardly a contribution to non-proliferation. The lesson is clear. For over a decade, Russian pundits and officials have openly stated that they want Iran to be a partner of Russia, lest the U.S. consolidate its position as the leading foreign power in the Middle East.[25](http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2010/19/blank.php#footnotes) Iranian-American hostility precludes such a consolidation and permits Russia to exercise influence by supporting the maintenance of a system of controlled tension there.

**US-Russia relations key to prevent Iran prolif**

Katz 9-[Mark N. Katz. Middle East Papers: Obama’s approach to Russia and Iran December, 2009. Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University. He writes on Russian foreign policy, the international relations of the Middle East, and transnational revolutionary movements. <http://digilib.gmu.edu:8080/xmlui/bitstream/1920/5666/1/russia_iran_obama_katz.pdf>]

From this perspective, it is clear why the United States and Russia should cooperate on the Iranian nuclear issue. Both, after all, do not want to see Iran acquire nuclear weapons. Russia could help pressure Iran to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by working with the United States to impose meaningful UN Security Council sanctions against Iran. And if Tehran were to see this cooperation materialize, it might back down before sanctions actually had to be imposed. In that light, canceling the Bush administration’s plan to deploy ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems in Poland and the Czech Republic (which the Obama administration didn’t like anyway) was a sacrifice that was well worth making to lift an obstacle to Russian-American cooperation on Iran.

## A2: Middle East Instability

**Russian cooperation k/t Afghan Stability**

**Hart and Hagel 9**. [Gary, former Democratic Senator, Chuck, Distinguished Professor at Georgetown University , former US Republican Senator, Commission on US Policy Towards Russia, March, “The Right Direction for U.S. Policy Toward Russia ,” Belfer Center for Science and Int’l Affairs, www.nixoncenter.org/RussiaReport09.pdf, 12/23]

The September 11 attacks starkly demonstrated the common threat of terrorism to America and Russia. Moscow has since provided important assistance to the United States and its NATO allies in Afghanistan; however, this help may be at risk if U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia relations weaken further. After initially acquiescing to a U.S. military presence in the region, Russia has complicated U.S. efforts to maintain air bases in central Asia to support operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, including Kyrgyzstan’s recent decision that the United States should close its Manas base. This in part reflects U.S.-Russian differences over both Afghanistan and the wider central Asian region. It also starkly illustrates the potential costs of treating the former Soviet Union as a competitive battleground rather than a zone of cooperation. Though the Russian government has an interest in preventing the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, Moscow might revoke its permission for transit of NATO cargoes to Afghanistan via Russia if NATO-Russia relations deteriorate further. Greater cooperation in Afghanistan is far more desirable and could build on past collaboration to develop deeper intelligence sharing and improved coordination with Russia’s long-standing allies in the country. However, it will require greater willingness to consider Russian perspectives.

## A2: Nato

**No Alienation-Russia can cooperate with the U.S and Nato**

**CFR 10**-[Kinder, Gentler U.S.-Russia Mood at NATO Summit Interviewee: Stephen Sestanovich, CFR George F. Kennan Senior Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies Interviewer: Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor, CFR.org November 19, 2010 <http://www.cfr.org/international-peace-and-security/kinder-gentler-us-russia-mood-nato-summit/p23473>]

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's presence at the NATO summit in Lisbon this weekend is part of a warming of U.S.-Russian relations during the Obama administration, says CFR Russia expert Stephen Sestanovich. Russia wants to show it's expanding cooperation with NATO on Afghanistan, Sestanovich says, from facilitating transport of NATO equipment to working with the alliance on counternarcotics - and wants to explore cooperation on missile defense. Sestanovich thinks ratification of the new START treaty, signed in April, would demonstrate a crucial element of the reset in relations pushed by the Obama administration, but points out Russia isn't concerned about the timing. Sestanovich says Russia has worked with the U.S. and NATO on counternarcotics efforts in Russia, and that Russian officials privately say "it would be a disaster" for Russia if the U.S. and NATO were defeated in Afghanistan. He also notes that on the domestic front, the polls numbers of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin -- "the ultimate decider" are still high, but that Medvedev is "pulling even." Still, says Sestanovich, nothing will stop Putin from running for office again if that's what he chooses to do.

**NATO is resilient—encouraging dialogue and cooperation**

**Blachford, 7/6** (Kevin Blachford, PhD student at the University of Winchester specializing in global politics and security studies, World Policy, "NATO Looks Forward", www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2012/07/06/nato-looks-forward)

 At London’s prestigious think tank, Chatham House, former Danish Prime Minister and current Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen outlined his vision for NATO’s future in the twenty-first century. In an age of austerity, when military budgets are being cut, Rasmussen offered his optimistic view of the future of the transatlantic alliance. With many security issues likely to arise in the decades ahead there could be a “perfect storm” of interconnected problems. The twenty-first century is likely to face resource scarcity, instability of energy supplies, a population boom, and the resurgence of great power rivalries and nationalism. Despite all this, Rasmussen’s position was surprisingly upbeat and in order to face these challenges he called for NATO to take on a more global outlook. Admitting that “it’s not easy to be an optimist,” Rasmussen recognized that, “undoubtedly we live in a time of momentous shifts, in a world that is increasingly unpredictable, complex and interlinked.” But he argued his case for optimism by declaring, “Europe and North America still have tremendous resources, resolve, and ideas. And when we work together, there is no greater force for positive change.” Since the end of the Cold War NATO’s primary rationale—to protect the transatlantic alliance in the face of the Soviet threat—has been obviated. However, despite the end of the Cold War, NATO has been surprisingly resilient and has proven its ability to adapt to new challenges. The ability of NATO forces to deploy during emergencies such as the recent Libya campaign also shows the continuing relevance of the need for Western nations to work together in facing security challenges. It was the prospect of cooperation, which Rasmussen continually stressed, which would be the way forward for the Atlantic alliance in the twenty-first century. Making the case for cooperation he argued that, “in almost all areas, we need effective partnerships to be successful— to manage crises, defend against emerging security challenges, and promote stability.” But the Secretary General also made the case for cooperation and dialogue with India, Russia, and China. In the case of China he stated, “NATO needs to better understand China and define areas where we can work together to guarantee peace and stability.” The difficulty for NATO however, will be maintaining a united front as it continues the dialogue. It will be incredibly easy for European and American allies to squabble amongst themselves if presented with a pressing security challenge, particularly if that challenge is dealing with is China-related. The hard task for NATO will be trying to strengthen the alliance while continuing to talk with one voice when addressing new security challenges. NATO must also continue to be ready for future challenges when diplomacy breaks down. With nations cutting their military budgets it is more important than ever that NATO members continue to maintain the interoperability of their forces. While the Secretary General continued to stress the importance of the Atlantic alliance and the need for NATO to build its ability to offer stability in Europe, the key part of his speech was his argument for NATO’s role in addressing global issues. Downplaying the recent American pivot to Asia, he instead made the case for NATO’s ability to forge new strategic partnerships and opportunities for cooperation on a global scale. In particular he noted how NATO can work with countries like Australia and other nations that share similar goals and values. But there are also other security challenges, which NATO may be hard pressed to address. Cybersecurity will undoubtedly be an increasingly pressing security issue in the twenty-first century. The rise of cybersecurity and the role of non-state actors involved in cybercrime and espionage makes it difficult for a nation state alliance to solve this challenge. Both state and non-state actors dominate the security challenges of the cyberdomain and yet, there is no clear consensus on how cybersecurity can be tackled without infringing on personal freedoms and increasing intrusive surveillance. If NATO is to continue to show its relevance in this century, it will have to vastly increase its ability to defend cyberspace while also cooperating with other powers to ensure a free and fair internet for all. There are many security challenges that are likely to arise in the twenty-first century. While NATO may not be able to address all of these challenges, it is still the most effective and enduring alliance for Western nations. As long as NATO can speak with one voice and encourage cooperation in order to reduce suspicion and mistrust then it will continue to be relevant for the foreseeable future. It is NATO’s successful history and its proven ability to provide stability that gives Anders Rasmussen every right to be optimistic.

**Russia-NATO relations check Central Asian war**

 **Vajdic 7/18/12** (Daniel Vajdic, The Diplomat, "Russia's 'shrewd' Central Asia play", www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/europe/russias-shrewd-central-asia-play/)

Late last month, Moscow granted NATO access to a supply transit facility in the Russian city of Ulyanovsk. Although the move may seem ironic, given that Russia still identifies NATO as a major threat, Moscow’s readiness to help the alliance ship supplies from Afghanistan back to Europe is part of a shrewd strategy to maintain its grip on Central Asia and to check U.S. influence in a region that has an important role to play in the stability of Afghanistan. Central Asia’s strategic value came to prominence after the September 11 terrorist attacks and the start of the Afghan war. Before then, the region was known for its considerable natural resources but otherwise rarely mentioned. Today, however, these countries are relevant beyond their oil and natural gas reserves. Both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have hosted—and the latter still does—U.S. military installations in support of Afghan combat operations. Moreover, the region has been a vital component of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which is used by NATO to transport almost all non-lethal and some lethal supplies to Afghanistan. "Central Asia’s strategic value came to prominence after the September 11 terrorist attacks and the start of the Afghan war." -Daniel Vajdic In this context, Russia’s sway over Central Asia matters and the Kremlin stands to benefit in a number of ways from the Ulyanovsk transit facility. First, cooperation with NATO in Ulyanovsk will be financially lucrative. Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s former ambassador to NATO, was candid about this in a recent radio interview when he said, “We are opening the gates and earning money by doing this.” He also noted that, while Russia previously supported an international military presence in Afghanistan, Moscow now favors the speedy withdrawal of Western troops. Second, if Rogozin’s claim that Russia wants to see Western forces leave Afghanistan is indeed true, then Moscow expedites this process by giving NATO access to Ulyanovsk. Whether Russia truly wants NATO out of Afghanistan is difficult to say. Although Rogozin was unequivocal, other Russian officials have expressed the opposite view. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said as recently as April that, “As long as Afghanistan is not able to ensure by itself the security in the country, artificial timelines of withdrawal are not correct and they should not be set.” Of the two, Lavrov’s statement is far more logical. Russia remains deeply concerned about the continued spread of Islamic fundamentalism from Afghanistan to Central Asia, which will accelerate after the bulk of coalition troops are withdrawn in 2014. Moreover, even at the peak presence of international forces in Afghanistan, Moscow was highly critical of NATO for its inability to curb opium output—a significant portion of which flows across Central Asia’s porous borders into Russia. This, too, is bound to accelerate after 2014. Therefore, Rogozin’s insistence that NATO depart Afghanistan clearly runs counter to Russian interests. In recent weeks, Moscow has most likely begun to shift its position in order to make the best out of a bad situation. If a substantial drawdown in coalition forces is inevitable, and the Kremlin seems to believe this no matter who wins the White House in November, then why not adopt a stance that conforms to reality and make some money in the process? Finally, the Ulyanovsk facility may very well be a clever attempt to reduce U.S. interaction with Central Asian countries and to reverse a recent downward trend in the Kremlin’s regional influence. On June 25, a few days before Moscow formally made the Ulyanovsk announcement, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev amended the decree that outlines Russia’s cooperation with NATO over Afghan supply routes. Notably, the new version replaces “ground transit” with “ground and combined transit.” The latter would involve the initial delivery of supplies to Ulyanovsk by air and then transfer to either rail or truck. This provision has significance beyond its face value. If the Kremlin insists on the “combined transit” approach, then it will force NATO to bypass Central Asian countries in order to use Ulyanovsk, which will diminish their role in the withdrawal of supplies from Afghanistan and, more broadly, their level of cooperation with NATO. At its June summit in Chicago, NATO revealed bilateral ground transit agreements with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. Russia hasn’t criticized the deals publicly—which would be too hypocritical even for the Kremlin—but Moscow’s broader resistance to U.S. involvement in Central Asia would suggest that Russia isn’t exactly enthusiastic about an arrangement that could result in closer ties between the West and a region that Moscow considers to be in its “sphere of privileged interests.” Where Russia has expressed concern, however, is in the transfer of U.S. and NATO military equipment to Central Asian countries after the end of combat operations in Afghanistan. From NATO’s perspective, the rationale to hand over surplus arms would be twofold: shipping them back to the U.S. or Europe is expensive; and Central Asian governments will need these weapons to protect their borders if, as many anticipate, Afghanistan is engulfed in turmoil after 2014. Given its fear that Islamic fundamentalism will proliferate in Central Asia, Russia shouldn’t be opposed to the fortification of regional defenses. But this isn’t necessarily the case. Moscow does want these countries to have the capacity to safeguard themselves—and Russia—from such threats. At the same time, the Kremlin wants them to remain dependent on Russia for their security and to ensure that Russia will continue to play the role of Central Asia’s dominant power. Russia is particularly sensitive to its regional status after a series of setbacks this year. In February, Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev, while on an official visit to Moscow, said that a Russian airbase in his country exists only to “flatter the vanity of Russian generals” and complained about Moscow’s “measly” rent payment. Kyrgyzstan’s defense minister confirmed earlier this month that Bishkek plans to raise the fees on three of Russia’s four bases. Moreover, even though the country’s parliament ordered that the U.S.-operated Manas transit center in Kyrgyzstan be closed in 2014, Atambayev now seems prepared to retain the facility and its U.S. presence as a “civilian transport hub,” despite Russian objections. Similar issues plague relations between Russia and Tajikistan. In September 2011, the two sides established in principle that they would extend Russia’s use of Tajik bases—where it deploys at least 6,000 troops—by forty nine years. That treaty, however, has yet to be signed. Tajikistan reportedly demanded an exorbitant $300 million in annual rent payments and a reduction in the duration of the treaty, which has stalled negotiations. Russia blames NATO for the deadlock. In Uzbekistan, the Kremlin’s decline in clout is even more apparent. Although Moscow’s relationship with Tashkent has a history of turbulence, ties between the two countries today are as strained as ever. For the second time since 1999, and less than a month after Vladimir Putin’s June 4 visit to Tashkent, Uzbekistan formally suspended its membership in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which is a military alliance composed of most Central Asian countries, Russia, Belarus, and Armenia. Uzbekistan’s traditionally capricious leadership was vague about the reasons for its sudden withdrawal. But Tashkent is evidently unhappy about two Russian initiatives: plans to deploy a CSTO rapid reaction force; and a recent stipulation that foreign military bases on the territory of any member state must be approved by the remainder of the alliance. This has raised speculation that Uzbekistan’s departure may foreshadow its intention to invite the U.S. to—once again—open a military base in the country. In short, Russia’s decision to give NATO access to a transit facility in Ulyanovsk is founded on both financial and geopolitical factors. Much like NDN as a whole, the Ulyanovsk supply hub will be extremely lucrative for the Russian companies involved. And, whether Russia truly wants to accelerate NATO’s departure from Afghanistan or to simply exhibit a position that conforms to NATO’s inevitable withdrawal, the Ulyanovsk initiative is consistent with Moscow’s broader objectives. Finally, typical of its zero-sum modus operandi, the Kremlin’s cooperation with NATO in Ulyanovsk may, above all, be an attempt to limit NATO’s interaction with Central Asian countries and to prevent a further deterioration in Russia’s regional influence.

## A2: Nyquist

**Russia wants to cooperate with the U.S**

Ria Novosti 11-[Russia wants better cooperation with U.S. – Putin; Topic: Putin's annual Q&A session (2011)-<http://en.rian.ru/russia/20111215/170277377.html>]

Russia will continue cooperation with the United States despite the perception Washington needs to do more to achieve real consensus with its friends and allies, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said on Thursday. “Sometimes I think that America does not need allies, it needs vassals. But we want and we will develop cooperation with the United States, because I see that a transformation is taking place inside the United States itself,” Putin said during a four-hour Q&A session on Thursday. Russia, which opposes a monopolar world, is not going “to live as a country surrounded by enemies,” Putin said. The premier accused the United States of imposing its political will on its allies. He referred to the U.S. military campaign in Iraq in 2003 when the United States attacked the country and then compelled its allies to join the operation. “Is that alliance? Is that mutual decision-making? Alliance means discussion, making a joint decision, outlining an agenda concerning common threats and ways to tackle them,” Putin said.

**Cooperation key to check Russian nationalism**

Cohen 2010 (Stephen F Cohen, “, Professor of Russian and Slavic Studies, History Ph.D. 1969 (Government and Russian Studies), Columbia; M.A. 1962 (Government and Russian Studies), B.S. (Economics and Public Policy), 1960, Indiana University”, Rethinking Russia : U.S.-Russian Relations in an Age of American Triumphalism - An Interview with Stephen F. Cohen “Journal of International Affairs” Vol. 63, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2010 page 191-205

Journal: Keeping in mind the crucial debate over modernization going on in Moscow today, what would be the impact of a new American policy toward Russia along the lines you propose? Cohen: We can affect the ongoing debates and struggles in Russia by our approach. If we approach Russia as an equal nation, in a cooperative manner, in a non-military way, we will help the forces there arguing for a democratic, or at least non-Stalinist modernization. If we, on the other hand, keep approaching Moscow as though it’s a defeated power, with closed fists in the form of NATO, as though Russia has no legitimate security concerns in its neighborhood, U.S. policy will give credence to the alarms and prognoses of the authoritarian modernizers. By the way, the same issue existed in American policy circles in the 1970s and 1980s. U.S. cold warriors said we (the pro-détente advocates) were wrong in insisting that their policy hurt would-be Soviet reformers. Gorbachev proved us right. He made it clear that he couldn’t carry out fundamental reform at home unless Reagan met him halfway. Reagan’s greatness was that he did so. As early as 1986, less than a year after Gorbachev came to power, Reagan met him in Reykjavik, where they almost agreed to abolish all nuclear weapons. They didn’t, but Gorbachev was able to return home and tell his powerful opponents, “You see, Reagan is a man we can work with.” The linkage became abundantly clear. While Gorbachev was introducing democracy at home, he and Reagan for the first time abolished an entire category of nuclear weapons. That’s how a new, wiser U.S. policy can really enhance our national security—and the world’s.

**Strong relations key to our economic interests-prevents lashout**

Hamilton, 3-[Lee, Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Former Chairman of the House Committee on International Relations, The International Economy, June 22]

While it has proven premature to speak of a positive transformation in U.S.-Russian relations, the breadth of our common interests suggests that partnership is preferable to confrontation. The United States and Russia each have an interest in strengthening Russia’s economy. The United States should forgive some Soviet-era Russian debt, repeal the outdated Jackson-Vanik amendment, and support Russian ac- cession into the World Trade Organization, in return for greater transparency and market reform within Russia. A Russian economy tied more to the West would strengthen the global economic recovery, reduce Russia’s interest in dealing in nuclear technology with countries like Iran, and enable the full development of Russia’s oil and gas reserves. The United States and Russia also have overlapping security concerns. While we should speak out vigorously against Russian human rights violations in Chechnya, the United States must continue working with Russia in the war on terror and the stabilization of Central Asia. We should also bring Russia closer to NATO, as cooperation reduces the likelihood of a return to Russian expansionism.

## A2: Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

**Negotiations and partnership will solve Nagorno-Karabakh conflict**

**America Intelligence Wire, 11** (“Russia diplomat: Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution – period of hope” 8 June 2011 http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-258435334/russian-diplomat-nagorno-karabakh.html)

JUNE 8 / , Azerbaijan, Baku -- Russia, as one of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs, is making every effort at mediation and believes in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Russian Ambassador to Azerbaijan Vladimir Dorokhin said on Wednesday.¶ "I beg you to believe us when we say that we are doing our best to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict," Dorokhin said at a news conference, marking the Day of Russia on June 12. "Today, we as negotiators are in a period of hope," he said.¶ He said Moscow is making efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by doing everything in its power so that the parties to the conflict come to serious agreements. He believes that such a chance exists.¶ The conflict between the two South Caucasus countries began in 1988 when Armenia made territorial claims against Azerbaijan. Armenian armed forces have occupied 20 percent of Azerbaijan since 1992, including the Nagorno-Karabakh region and seven surrounding districts.¶ Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a ceasefire agreement in 1994. The co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group -- Russia, France, and the U.S. -- are currently holding peace negotiations.¶ Armenia has not yet implemented the U.N. Security Council's four resolutions on the liberation of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding regions.¶ The Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev and Serzh Sargsyan, have held periodic meetings since June 2008 to concede on ways to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Despite this, the basic principles have not yet been agreed on.¶ "Russia stands for the supremacy of international law at the international arena and is willing to contribute to resolving world problems", Dorokhin stressed.¶ Dorokhin named Russia's relations with Azerbaijan a strategic partnership, noting important events in the past year, including Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's visit and the Russian-Azerbaijani humanitarian forum.¶ "Russia remains an important economic partner to Baku," he said. "Russia wants to see a strong and prosperous neighbor.

## A2: Russian Democracy

**U.S cooperation promotes Russian Democracy**

McFaul 04-[“Russia’s Transition to Democracy and U.S.-Russia Relations: Unfinished Business” January 2004 Michael McFaul is the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is also an associate professor of political science at Stanford University and a nonresident Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. <http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/russia_mcfaul.pdf>]

The Relationship between Russian Democracy and U.S. National Security At the most general level of analysis, there should be no question that the United States has a strategic interest in fostering democratic regimes abroad, and especially in large, powerful countries like Russia. History shows that democracies do not attack each other. In the first half of the last century, imperial Japan and fascist Germany constituted the greatest threats to American national security. The destruction of these tyrannical regimes followed by the imposition of democratic regimes in Germany and Japan helped make these two countries American allies. In the second half of the last century, Soviet communism and its supporters represented the greatest threat to American national security. Regime change inside Russia was not the sole cause of the sea change in Russian behavior internationally. Russia today is much weaker, militarily and economically, than the Soviet Union was at the time of its collapse. Even if Russia wanted to underwrite anti-American movements in third countries or construct anti-NATO alliances, it probably does not have the means to do so. Still, it is important to remember that Russia has thousands of nuclear weapons. A new fascist regime would make this arsenal threatening once again. 7 The chances of Putin or his successor restoring full-blown autocracy in Russia are remote. Yet, well before the reinstallation of Russian dictatorship, the negative effects on American national interests of partial democratic reform in Russia can already be observed. The United States should encourage democracy to reduce the growing influence of Putin’s former KGB colleagues; to help ensure economic growth; and to ally ourselves with the Russian people. Today Putin enjoys high approval ratings, giving him the capacity to rule without the support of anti-democratic elements and unreformed units of the Russian state if he chose to do so. Nonetheless, Putin appears at times to be beholden to these forces. Many Kremlin watchers already ascribe incredible power to the former FSB officers now serving in Putin’s government both in the ministries and in the presidential administration. If Putin’s popularity were to decline, he would be forced to rely even more heavily on these FSB officers. In the worst case scenario, if democracy were suspended completely, Putin or his successor would become completely dependent on this faction. Russia’s economic transformation is also threatened by democracy in decline. In contemporary dictatorships, capitalism rarely thrives. After a decade of post-communist transition, one of the striking outcomes across the board is the correlation between democracy and economic growth.1 Recent studies of transitional economies suggest that an independent media and a strong party system are more important for fighting corruption than a bloated police force. The best watchdogs for bad policy and corrupt government are hungry politicians who want to get back into power through the ballot box or investigative journalists who want to make their name by exposing company and government fraud. Finally, the United States should want to see the consolidation of democracy in Russia because the people of Russian want democracy. In poll after poll, Russians report that they value democratic ideals and practices, even if they are not ready at this time to fight for the protection or promotion of these practices.2 Steps to Help the Cause of Russian Democracy The battle for democracy within Russia will largely be won or lost by internal forces. In the margins, however, the United States can help to tilt the balance in favor of those who support freedom. The U.S. Congress has an important, independent role to play, especially today when the Bush administration is distracted with other foreign policy issues. While many issues in U.S.-Russian relations should be tackled principally and primarily by the executive branch, democracy promotion is one issue in which the Congress should take an active role.

## A2: Russian Expansion

**Russia not looking to expand its influence**

Matthews and Nemtsova 7/5 [7/5/10 Owen, studies modern history at Oxford, Anna, “Finding a Friendly Face in Russia” <http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdweb?index=0&did=2064617061&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1277748512&clientId=17822>

What has come over Vladimir Putin? Not so long ago the Russian leader was raging against the United States for trying to become "the one single master" of the world, blasting NATO for "creeping up to Russia's borders," and commissioning a rewrite of his country's history textbooks to glorify the murderous dictatorship of Joseph Stalin. But lately the prime minister is sounding downright temperate. Instead of excoriating the West, he's pushing U.S. business deals and drawing up a new partnership with the European Union on trade and visa-free travel. In April he publicly denounced the brutality of Stalin's "totalitarian regime." And initially, instead of flexing Russia's regional muscle by sending troops to quell ethnic violence in neighboring Kyrgyzstan, he pushed for a regionwide aid effort. Putin's new, softer tone doesn't mean he has given up his longstanding ambition to restore Russia's status as a great power. On the contrary, the difference now is that for the first time in a decade, the world is finally going his way, and he can afford to relax a bit. During his eight years as president, Putin fought constantly to defend what he regarded as Russia's rightful sphere of influence along its borders. During the Bush years, relations soured over Russian suspicions that America was instigating "color revolutions" that toppled pro-Putin regimes in Georgia, Ukraine, Serbia, and Kyrgyzstan. But Obama offered to "reset" relations and backed off plans to plant anti-missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic. Thanks to the victory of a pro-Moscow president in Ukraine, NATO membership is off the table in that country. And no one was able to stop Russia from effectively annexing Georgia's northern territories in 2008. Putin may be playing it cool in Kyrgyzstan, but at the same time, he's strengthening Moscow's leadership of a Central Asian security bloc that spans the region.

**US checks Russia’s sphere of influence**

Cooper and Kulish 09 –[2/7/09, Helene Cooper and Nicholas Kulish, New York Times, “U.S. rejects 'sphere of influence' for Russia,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/07/world/europe/07iht-07munich.20001384.html>]

But for all the talk of a new era in relations between the United States and the world, old sores remained, and with no sign of healing soon. For instance, while Biden's wording virtually echoed the stance on missile defense that Obama took during the presidential campaign, it was notable because Biden did not announce a strategic review of the issue, which administration officials had considered as a way to reduce tensions between Washington and Moscow. Instead, Biden hewed to a line long expressed by the Bush administration and said the Obama administration would pursue it "in consultation with our NATO allies and Russia**."** "We will not agree with Russia on everything," Biden said. "For example, the United States will not recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. We will not recognize a sphere of influence. It will remain our view that sovereign states have the right to make their own decisions and choose their own alliances." Biden said that the United States and Russia can disagree but should still look for ways to "work together where our interests coincide."

## A2: Soft Power

**U.S. will remain at the top of the soft power ladder**

**Wallin, 6/22/12** (Matthew Wallin, American Security Project Policy Analyst, masters in Public Diplomacy at USC, B.A. in Political Science with international relations from California State University, former intern in the Office of Press Relations at the U.S. Department of State as a Press Officer, USC Center on Public Diplomacy, "China and Russia: Competitors to American Public Diplomacy?", americansecurityproject.org/blog/2012/china-and-russia-competitors-to-american-public-diplomacy/)

This morning, The Heritage Foundation held an event titled “Challenging America: How Russia, China, and Other Countries Use Public Diplomacy to Compete with the U.S.” The event explored the expanding soft power and public diplomacy efforts of China and Russia in relation to the dwindling efforts seen in the United States since the end of the Cold War. Speakers included Dean Cheng, Ariel Cohen, and Helle Dale. Cheng explored the great attention that has given to China’s recent efforts at significantly expanding its soft power base. Those efforts recently have included the Beijing Olympics, CCTV, the 2012 Shanghai Expo, and of course the massive number of Confucius Institutes which teach Chinese language throughout the world. China’s efforts, as Cheng notes, are a result of China’s belief that information has strategic importance. At the same time, China is also seriously concerned about its own cultural security, and is cautious about allowing foreign cultural influence beyond its borders. In contrast to the U.S., Chinese international broadcasting is also aimed directly at the Chinese public. Interestingly, Cheng also stressed the attention that China paid to American efforts to gather support for the 2003 Iraq war, including the military’s journalist embedding system. The Heritage Panel However, despite China’s recent soft-power attention, I contend that there are still many issues problematic for the Chinese to overcome. To read about some of the challenges the Chinese face in their efforts to attract the world, take a look at my previous post in May. Cohen spoke regarding Russia’s efforts at strategic communication, highlighting their use of Russia Today, which appears to have found a big enough audience amongst English speakers worldwide to justify its existence. It holds particular following amongst those already critical of the United States and its allies. While RT is more propagandistic in nature, there are also other media organizations in Russia still doing respectable work. Cohen also made several references to Al Jazeera, pointing out the strength of its brand for Sunni Arabs, and noting the impressiveness of its English programming (while at the same time its anti-Israeli viewpoint), which is comprised mostly of former BBC journalists. Dale focused her comments on the state of American public diplomacy, noting that it may take the increased spending by Russia and China to shake up lawmakers in Washington to take PD more seriously. Since the end of the Cold War, she noted, U.S. public diplomacy has not been impressive and suffers from a lack of focus. Despite the promise of a new strategic communication plan for the United States, Dale also argued that President Obama has mainly used strategic communication as a platform for himself. Dale also explored the State Department’s internet strategy—of which I have been a vocal critic. Though State has enthusiastically but belatedly embraced use of the internet for diplomatic purposes, the internet remains a vulnerable medium. As Dale explained, the internet is vulnerable to blocking and hacking, making it sometimes difficult to get the message through subversion efforts. I would stipulate, however, that both TV and radio have also been historically subject to blocking or jamming (though not hacking). The event could have used a little more discussion of the effectiveness of the Chinese and Russian PD efforts. While there was general consensus by the panel that both Russia and China’s outreach has been generally well received by sympathetic audiences, there was little discussion of whether or not it is helping them achieve their foreign policy goals. One example, brought up by Cohen, is that during the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, the Georgians were significantly more effective than the Russians at rousing international opinion in a way that had immediate foreign policy benefits. The panelists also engaged in a discussion about the role of soft and hard power, with Cheng noting that soft power is best conducted under the umbrella of hard power. I’m not so sure that’s entirely the case, as some countries have a relatively strong soft power base, like Sweden, without expending significant hard power resources. Cohen stipulated that there is sometimes a narrow transition between soft and hard power, explaining that soft power can be used to draw people to take violent action. While both hard and soft power can only operate on their own to limited extents, the combination of the two, known as smart power, can often be used more advantageously. I believe this is what the panel was trying to explain. Helle Dale made the best argument for this when she explained that the military’s own reviews of its efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have noted that it did not adequately (or necessarily correctly) employ soft power resources to consolidate its battlefield successes. Yet in the end, I found the most interesting point made by the panel is that Russia and China have analyzed what the U.S. did in public diplomacy during the Cold War, and are making their own attempts to replicate its successes. While both countries are focusing on the traditional forms of media that the U.S. used so successfully, the U.S. is relying more on the internet. Personally, I’m not so worried about these countries making efforts to promote their image as I neither find it surprising nor alarming. I’d be more shocked if they weren’t, and wondering what was going on behind closed doors. Certainly, the U.S. has had its disagreements with the Russians and Chinese, particularly on the floor of the U.N. Security Council, creating a perception that the U.S. needs to “compete” with these countries in public diplomacy. This may be true, but there are also under-explored opportunities to tap the listening potential of public diplomacy to better understand the perception of these countries’ citizenry. That understanding can be used to find areas of agreement and challenges where we can work together for a common purpose—and ultimately find ways to better resolve our differences.

**It’s reverse causal—soft power helps Russia relations**

**Mendelson, 9** (Sarah E. Mendelson, senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program, Director of the Human Rights and Security Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, former program officer with the National Democratic Institute in Moscow, B.A. in history from Yale University, Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University, fellowships at Stanford University and Princeton University, editorial board of International Security, member of the advisory committee for the Europe and Central Asia Division of Human Rights Watch, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, "U.S.-Russian Relations and the Democracy and Rule of Law Defecit", A Century Foundation Report)

In fact, coping with authoritarian trends in Russia (and elsewhere) will involve changes in U.S. policies that have, on the surface, nothing to do with Russia. Bush administration counterterrorism policies that authorized torture, indefinite detention of terrorist suspects, and the rendering of detainees to secret prisons and Guantánamo have had numerous negative unintended consequences for U.S. national security, including serving as a recruitment tool for al Qaeda and insurgents in Iraq.4 Less often recognized, these policies also have undercut whatever leverage the United States had, as well as limited the effectiveness of American decision-makers, to push back on authoritarian policies adopted by, among others, the Putin administration. At its worst, American departures from the rule of law may have enabled abuse inside Russia. These departures certainly left human rights defenders isolated. Repairing the damage to U.S. soft power and reversing the departure from human rights norms that characterized the Bush administration’s counterterrorism policies will provide the Obama administration strategic and moral authority and improve the ability of the United States to work with allies. It also can have positive consequences for Obama’s Russia policy.

**Alt cause to collapse of soft power**

**Mendelson, 9** (Sarah E. Mendelson, senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program, Director of the Human Rights and Security Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, former program officer with the National Democratic Institute in Moscow, B.A. in history from Yale University, Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University, fellowships at Stanford University and Princeton University, editorial board of International Security, member of the advisory committee for the Europe and Central Asia Division of Human Rights Watch, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, "U.S.-Russian Relations and the Democracy and Rule of Law Defecit", A Century Foundation Report)

The ability of any U.S. administration to shape what happens inside Russia has long been exaggerated and misunderstood. The impact of foreign assistance clearly matters to those individuals who receive funds and technical training, but recent evidence suggests that how the United States conducts itself in the world has far more weight in terms of its ability to bolster or undermine democracy, human rights and the rule of law in other countries.41 For example, U.S. noncompliance with human rights norms and laws has enabled, although not caused, Russia’s authoritarian drift. Therefore, a robust and comprehensive effort to opt back in to international legal frameworks will have important knock-on effects for our relations with Russia, in addition to bolstering our ability to work with allies. The United States needs to shape the larger policy context in a positive, rather than a negative, way. 42 An array of new U.S. policies unrelated to Russia (such as closing Guantánamo, ending detention without charge, and halting unlawful interrogation of terror suspects) can help restore U.S. soft power, as well as repair the international architecture that Russia (correctly) views as weak and that it (regrettably) seeks to replace. If the United States once again is associated with justice instead of injustice, it will do much to shore up human rights activists inside Russia. It will also challenge core assumptions that have taken hold within the Russian elite about the hypocrisy and weakness of democracy and human rights norms within the international system.

**No impact - Soft power is useless**

Fan 7 (Ying, Senior Lecturer in Marketing at Brunel Business School, Brunel University in London, “Soft power: Power of attraction or confusion?”, November 14)

Despite its popularity, the concept soft power remains a power of confusion. The definition is at best loose and vague. Because of such confusion it is not surprising that the concept has been misunderstood, misused and trivialised ( Joffe, 2006a ). Criticisms of soft power centre mainly around three aspects: defi nition, sources and limitations. There may be little or no relationship between the ubiquity of American culture and its actual influence. Hundreds of millions of people around the world wear, listen, eat, drink, watch and dance American, but they do not identify these accoutrements of their daily lives with America ( Joffe, 2006b ). To Purdy (2001) soft power is not a new reality, but rather a new word for the most effi cient form of power. There are limits to what soft power could achieve. In a context dominated by hard power considerations, soft power is meaningless ( Blechman, 2004 ). The dark side of soft power is largely ignored by Nye. Excessive power, either hard or soft, may not be a good thing. In the affairs of nations, too much hard power ends up breeding not submission but resistance. Likewise, big soft power does not bend hearts; it twists minds in resentment and rage ( Joffe, 2006b ).¶ Nye’s version of soft power that rests on affection and desire is too simplistic and unrealistic. Human feelings are complicated and quite often ambivalent, that is, love and hate co-exist at the same time. Even within the same group, people may like some aspects of American values, but hate others. By the same token, soft power can also rest on fear ( Cheow, 2002 ) or on both affection and fear, depending on the context. Much of China ’ soft power in south-east Asia testifi es to this. Another example is provided by the mixed perception of the United States in China: people generally admire American technological superiority and super brands but detest its policies on Taiwan.

# Impacts

## Laundry List

**US-Russia relations struggling now and are key to solve terrorism, prolif, stability, energy and more**

**C**ouncil on **F**oreign **R**elations**, 06** (“Russia’s Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do”, cfr.org, March 2006, http://www.cfr.org/iran/russias-wrong-direction/p9997)//JL

Fifteen years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, "U.S.-Russia relations are clearly headed in the wrong direction," finds an Independent Task Force on U.S. policy toward Russia sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. "Contention is crowding out consensus. The very idea of a 'strategic partnership' no longer seems realistic," it concludes. The bipartisan Task Force was chaired by former Senator John Edwards and former Congressman and Housing and Urban Development Secretary Jack Kemp and directed by Council Senior Fellow Stephen Sestanovich. The Task Force notes significant recent economic progress in Russia. "Between 2000 and 2004 the number of Russians living below the government's poverty line dropped from forty-two million to twenty-six million. The national unemployment rate—over 10 percent in 2000—is now about 7 percent ... [and] a middle class appears to be emerging." At the same time, when President Bush has made democracy a goal of American foreign policy, Russia's political system is becoming steadily more authoritarian, the Task Force charges. "The political balance sheet of the past five years is extremely negative. The practices and institutions that have developed over this period have become far less open, pluralistic, subject to the rule of law, and vulnerable to the criticism and counterbalancing of a vigorous opposition or independent media."¶ As Russia prepares to host the G8 summit this summer, the report, *Russia's Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do*, affirms that Russia's cooperation is central to achieving American interests. "On a whole host of issues—Iran, energy, HIV/AIDS, and preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction—it's vital to have Russia on our side," said Kemp. "The G8 summit may be a watershed on many of these issues—Iran and energy in particular. It's a real opportunity to lock in more helpful Russian policies. But if we don't see progress, people are going to ask what Russia is doing in the G8 in the first place." "U.S.-Russia cooperation can help the United States handle some of the most difficult issues we face," said Edwards. "Yet regrettably, cooperation is becoming the exception, not the norm. This report is a wake-up call that we need to get U.S.-Russia relations back on track to meet the challenges that face both of our countries." Consistent with this, the report argues, "Although President Putin is presiding over the rollback of Russian democracy, the United States should work with him to keep Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and to keep terrorists from attacking either his country or ours." The Task Force is comprised of many of the nation's preeminent Russia scholars and policy practitioners. It applauds recent Russian support for containing Iran's nuclear program and cooperative initiatives to secure nuclear materials, but cautions that "U.S.-Russia relations are now marked by a growing number of disagreements. The partnership is not living up to its potential."

**US-Russia relations solve democracy, energy, disease, terrorism and more**

**C**ouncil on **F**oreign **R**elations**, 06** (“Russia’s Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do”, cfr.org, March 2006, http://www.cfr.org/iran/russias-wrong-direction/p9997)//JL

De-democratization: The report finds that Russian political institutions are becoming "corrupt and brittle." As a result, "Russia's capacity to address security concerns of fundamental importance to the United States and its allies is reduced. And many kinds of cooperation—from securing nuclear materials to intelligence sharing—are undermined." Energy supplies: "Russia has used energy exports as a foreign policy weapon: intervening in Ukraine's politics, putting pressure on its foreign policy choices, and curtailing supplies to the rest of Europe. The reassertion of government control over the Russian energy sector increases the risk this weapon will be used again." The war on terror: The Task Force finds "a seeming Russian effort to curtail U.S. and NATO military access to Central Asian bases," a sign that Russia is retreating from the idea that "success in Afghanistan serves a common interest." Russia hosting the G8: "A country that has in the space of a single year supported massive fraud in the elections of its largest European neighbor and then punished it for voting wrong by turning off its gas supply has to be at least on informal probation at a meeting of the world's industrial democracies."

**US-Russia relations key to trade, democracy, energy and more**

**C**ouncil on **F**oreign **R**elations**, 06** (“Russia’s Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do”, cfr.org, March 2006, http://www.cfr.org/iran/russias-wrong-direction/p9997)//JL

Democratization: "To go beyond mere expressions about the rollback of Russian democracy, the United States should increase—not cut—Freedom Support Act funds, focusing in particular on organizations committed to free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections in 2007–2008." G8: "To protect the credibility of the G8 at a time when many are questioning Russia's chairmanship, the United States should make clear that this role does not exempt Russian policies and actions from critical scrutiny. Keeping the G8 a viable international forum will require a de facto revival of the Group of Seven (G7). Without creating a completely new forum, the United States and its democratic allies have to assume a stronger coordinating role within the old one." Energy policy: "The United States cannot expect Russian energy policy to substitute for its own. If America and its allies lack a comprehensive strategy to increase supplies of energy, diversify the number of suppliers and transport routes, and promote energy efficiency, they will only increase Russia's ability to exploit its market position for political purposes." The report adds, "To limit the use of oil and gas exports as an instrument of coercion—and as a prop for authoritarianism—the United States needs to agree with other governments, especially our European allies, on measures to assure that state-controlled Russian energy companies act like true commercial entities." Trade and the WTO: "We strongly favor accession, but on this condition: It must not be a political present," says the Task Force. "Accession will promote further liberalization of the Russian economy and should signify full Russian acceptance of a rules-based international trading system.... American negotiators should not, however, attempt to resolve important remaining issues under the pressure of an artificial deadline, least of all the deadline of this year's G8 summit.... It would be far better for the G8 meeting to come and go without Russia in the WTO, than to bring Russia into the organization on preferential terms." Iran: "A Russian policy that limits nuclear cooperation with Iran to nonsensitive technologies would justify dropping our historic objections to the Bushehr reactor." For its part, Russia needs to accept that "the international community may soon face an Iran so determined to produce fissile material that all nuclear cooperation between Moscow and Tehran, including the Bushehr reactor, should cease." Russia's neighbors: "The United States should cede no veto or undue deference to Russia over American relations with the states of the Russian periphery.... There is nothing legitimate about limiting the opportunity of its neighbors to deepen their integration into the international economy, to choose security allies and partners, or to pursue democratic political transformation." The report further recommends, "Post-Soviet states that share America's approach to major international problems and can contribute to resolving them should be able to count on greater support."

**US-Russia relations are vital to ALL global issues**

**Wei, 12**—PhD at the Russian Research Center of Shanghai International Studies University (JinShen, “US-Russia Relations Aren’t Going To ‘Cool Down’”, WatchingAmerica.com, May 23, 2012, http://watchingamerica.com/News/160385/us-russia-relations-arent-going-to-cool-down/)//JL

As for G-8, it also seems reasonable for the Prime Minister, Dmitri Medvedev, to attend on behalf of Putin. As the former Russian president, his appearance again symbolizes the continuation of Russia’s pragmatic foreign policy. Furthermore, Putin has never believed that Russia is a follower of the other seven G-8 members; he always fights for equal status. He places great emphasis on Russia’s stake in international matters and never makes compromises on issues involving Russia’s national interests. It is worth noting that the biggest differences between Russia’s foreign policy through its role in international organizations and that of the Soviet Union’s are that Russia has abandoned the traditional tactic of using ideology as a policy standard. Instead, Russia focuses on real issues, like Russia’s national interests and the establishment of Russia’s image as a major world power. Regardless of the differences, the U.S. is still the major decisive factor in global politics, and the U.S.-Russia relationship remains one of the most important international bilateral relationships. In the words of Russia’s former Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, “Today, there are no important global issues that can be solved without the involvement of Moscow and Washington, D.C.” So, Putin’s strategies for G-8 are only small episodes rather than “Cold War” signals of U.S.-Russia relations.