# \*\*\*Framework Cards

# Should

**Should means a policy recomendation**

**Carter, 02** (2/11/02, Rebecca S., “An Ordinance Concerning The Land Application Of Sewer Sludge In Buckingham County,” http://www.buckinghamcountyva.org/zoning/sewersludgeord.pdf)**Red**

**"Should" means a recommendation.**

**Should means obligation – only predictable meaning**

**Collins English Dictionary, 03** (theFreeDictionary.com, “Should,” http://www.thefreedictionary.com/should)**Red**

**should** [ʃʊd]

vb

(Linguistics / Grammar) the past tense of shall: **used** as an auxiliary verb **to indicate that an action is considered** by the speaker **to be obligatory** (you should go) or to form the subjunctive mood with I or we (I should like to see you; if I should be late, go without me)

[Old English sceold; see shall]

Usage: **Should has, as its** **most common meaning** in modern English, **the sense ought** as in I should go to the graduation, but I don't see how I can. However, **the older sense** of the subjunctive of shall is often used with I or we to indicate a more polite form than would: I should like to go, but I can't. In much speech and writing, should **has** **been replaced by would** in contexts of this kind, but it remains in formal English when a conditional subjunctive is used: should he choose to remain, he would be granted asylum

**Should implies obligation**

**American Heritage Dictionary, 09** (theFreeDictionary.com, “Should,” http://www.thefreedictionary.com/should)**Red**

**should** (shd)

aux.v. Past tense of shall

1. **Used to express obligation or duty**: You should send her a note.

# Resolved

**Resolved implies legislation**

**Robert, 15** – general (Henry M., *Roberts Rules of Order Revised,* “Part I. Rules of Order, Art. I. How Business Is Conducted in Deliberative Assemblies,” http://www.rulesonline.com/rror-01p.htm)**Red**

4. Motions and Resolutions. A motion is a proposal that the assembly take certain action, or that it express itself as holding certain views. It is made by a member's obtaining the floor as already described and saying, "I move that" (which is equivalent to saying, "I propose that"), and then stating the action he proposes to have taken. **Thus a member** "moves" (**proposes**) **that a resolution be adopted**, or amended, or referred to a committee, or that a vote of thanks be extended, etc.; or "That it is the sense of this meeting (or assembly) that industrial training," etc. **Every resolution should be in writing,** and the presiding officer has a right to require any main motion, amendment, or instructions to a committee to be in writing. **When a main motion is of** such **importance** or length as to be in writing **it is** usually **written in the form of a resolution, that is, beginning with** the words, "**Resolved**, That," the word "Resolved" being underscored (printed in italics) and followed by a comma, and the word "That" beginning with a capital "T." If the word "Resolved" were replaced by the words "I move," the resolution would become a motion. **A resolution is always a main motion.** In some sections of the country the word "resolve" is frequently used instead of "resolution." In assemblies with paid employees, instructions given to employees are called "orders" instead of "resolutions," and the enacting word, "Ordered" is used instead of "Resolved."

# \*\*\*Qritiq

# Notes

**You should probably refer to authors as ‘ze’ and use ‘per’ rather than his/her.**

# 1NC

**While the aff claims to transverse gender, they maintain the construct of sexual difference, which destroys agency and humyn freedom. The alternative is to embrace an ethic without sex and gender**

**Nicholas, 09** - research student in Humanities at Griffith University (Lucy, Thirdspace, “A Radical Queer Utopian Future: A Reciprocal Relation Beyond Sexual Difference,” vol. 8, is. 2, http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/lnicholas/248)**Red**

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**Removing, transcending, or otherwise rendering void** or absent **sex/gender as a central element of selfhood is an aim rarely pursued in theory or in activism concerned with deconstructing sex/gender.** **Even in queer and transgender theory that imagines alternative models or landscapes of identity or the self, sex/gender is usually merely adjusted, varied, and multiplied rather than rejected or transcended.** The few visions of future landscapes of identity and sexuality in Western contexts that dare to imagine a selfhood without sex /gender, or at least without sexual difference, appear to be limited to a strain of 1970s utopian feminist science fiction and more recently among the theory and prefigurative practices of contemporary anarchist-queer communities.

This article views **the current relationship between self and other** as one that, **in departing from the assumption of sex/gender, does not allow subjects to define themselves and others outside of it.** In its place **I propose an alternative way of being (ethics) derived from a social and intersubjective ontological basis that values reciprocal relations between subjects that are not reducible to antagonism or difference.**

I will first survey **some approaches** that also **deconstruct gender** and view the current gender order as limiting but **leave intact sex and, more specifically, sexual difference and wish to maintain some kind of gender as an aspect of identity.** This helps me to refine my approach to a deconstruction of both sex and gender as socially created and maintained aspects of selfhood. I then draw on the few approaches that do not simply rearrange sex and gender as elements of selfhood but attempt to envisage selfhood or ethos (ways of being) – as well as ways of being sexual – without sex and gender as elements of selfhood. Drawing from **science fiction and contemporary anarchist communities,** I will emphasize elements of these approaches that are useful while noting their limitations. Especially useful for my purpose are the normative, ethical evaluations and their application to sex/gender made in sci-fi texts and in anarchist queer communities that valorize autonomy and reject behaviour that restricts autonomy. However, these **approaches continue to rest on ontological foundations that rely on essential foundations, and they do not articulate a clear source of agency.**

To remedy these limitations, I look to ontological ethical theory from Simone **de Beauvoir’s** so-called moral period **and** JudithButler’s later, more ethically engaged, period – to **develop a foundation for an ethos beyond sexual difference.** **This work articulates an ethical basis of the valorization of freedom, understood as transcendence of imminence** (in Beauvoir’s terminology), **and a rejection of ways of being that prevent the transcendence of others. This** idea **can be usefully applied to sexual difference** – **understood as a socially and intersubjectively maintained phenomenon that prevents transcendence and renders subjects imminent.** Beauvoir’s and Butler’s emphasis on **the social and intersubjective in subject formation forms the basis for a humyn-**created and argued-for **ethics of reciprocity.**[1] **A situated ontology that perceives** self as always **self/other/situation** also **affects the ways that agency and resistance are possible**, thus **refining** the extent to which, and **how, subjects can act towards a chosen ethos.**

**This** discussion of agency, then, **leads to a discussion of how a reciprocal ethics of a subjecthood** **without sex/gender,** given this refined ontology and agency, **can be put into practice.** I will draw on anarchist approaches to education as paradigmatic, but not exhaustive, examples of a fostering of capacities that may offer a way to argue for this ethos and create a context conducive to a reciprocal ethos, while staying true to the principles of the ethos that it could be used to foster.

# Link: Sex/Gender

**The aff fails – their analysis of gender categories reproduces the notion of gender and prevent us from overcoming the binaries they qritiq**

**Nicholas, 09** - research student in Humanities at Griffith University (Lucy, Thirdspace, “A Radical Queer Utopian Future: A Reciprocal Relation Beyond Sexual Difference,” vol. 8, is. 2, http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/lnicholas/248)**Red**

**\*\*\*per replaces her/his, \*\*\*ze replaces she/he, \*\*\*humyn replaces human**

Many **queer theory and transgender texts** **focus on** **deconstructing gender, assuming that** while gender may be variable **sex, or more specifically sexual difference, is a given.** The sex/gender divide allowed feminists to argue that although sex was a biological category, gender was a separate and social, and therefore not essential, category. This divide gained salience after Ann Oakley used it in Sex, Gender and Society in 1972 and this way of thinking has undoubtedly helped feminists to further the notion that gender is social and, therefore, not fixed. However, critics have argued that **this analysis limits the diagnosis of the causal relationship between sex and gender,** **and many** theorists (Butler, Gender Trouble; Fausto-Sterling; Gatens; Hird; Hood-Williams; Hubbard) **theorize that it is gender that precedes sex:**

**There is no recourse to a body that has not always already been interpreted by cultural meanings;** hence, **sex could not qualify as a prediscursive anatomical facticity.** Indeed, **sex, by definition, will be shown to have been gender all along.** (Butler, Gender Trouble 12)

These theorists suggest that **the time has come to deconstruct the circular thinking that allows for the naturalization of sex by gender and of gender by sex,** **by deconstructing the** **socially constructed binary** difference **at the root of both categories** and perceiving them as co-constitutive.

Paradigmatic **models that rearrange the binary variables of feminine/masculine and male/female to deconstruct gender but fail to transcend the difference that underpins them are found in well-known queer and transgender texts** such as Judith Halberstam's Female Masculinity and Leslie Feinberg's Trans Liberation, which critique the current gender order and sketch out alternative visions or models. **Halberstam's project,** although a great deconstruction of the idea that masculinity is inherently linked to maleness and challenging "the permitted parameters of adult male and female gender" (5-6), is more limited in its brief imagining of alternatives and its **reliance on the idea of female and male as fixed sex categories as it seeks to multiply gender.** Halberstam asks, "Why do we not have multiple gender options, multiple gender categories?" and seems to build per ideal model for gender on a perceived actuality of gender as really a continuum from which to choose gender (20). **Feinberg's model is similarly articulated as "hues of the palette"** (1). Hausman has noted that reliance on an alternative essentialism and a voluntarism about gender's mechanism are both aspects of **many transgender texts,** which often contain the idea that the mind contains the "'true being' of that subject" (191) in the form of gender and "the idea that the subject has a voluntary or entirely self-willed identity" (196). Indeed, both models cited above **multiply the relationship and the area between the poles** **and, by focusing only on social gender, implicitly leave biological sex unscathed.** Through **these models,** they **tacitly reproduce the premise** not only **that identification to some kind of gender is imperative to selfhood** but also **that choosing is a simple subjective act. These formulations fail to transcend the binaries that are the focus of their critique because their modest aim is to rearrange the binary variables of male/female, masculine/feminine.**

The discontinuity between sex and gender that the above texts advocate is, however, still a disruption of traditional perceptions, and it has made life more liveable for large numbers of transgender people. Suzanne Kessler and Wendy McKenna identify the sex/gender distinction that allows for an incongruence between sex and gender as the second use of the word ‘transgender’ (after the first use, which they define as transition) and describe its valuable but limited challenge as “a previously unthinkable combination of male and female” (Kessler and McKenna, “Who Put the ‘Trans’” para. 2). **This approach, however, is limited for my purposes because it maintains binary understandings of both sex and gender.**[2]

Kessler and McKenna suggest that there is a third use of ‘transgender’ that represents not only a discontinuity between sex and gender but also perceives the ‘trans’ to be a transcendence, a description of a person “who has gotten through gender, beyond gender” (Kessler and McKenna, “Who Put the ‘Trans’” para. 2). This is one of the only examples in academia of a use of ‘gender’ that implicitly includes sex as social and that envisages the possibility of selfhood beyond or without these categories. This is a useful place to begin thinking about the possibility of selfhood and desire without sexual difference.

**Even in virtual worlds, where anything is potentially possible, users’ imaginations are restricted almost entirely by an attachment to gender, usually binary gender,** **but certainly to the compulsarity of having some kind of gender as a central marker of identity.** Additionally, gender is usually expected to be congruent with the real life biological sex of the participant. An illustrative example is the 2007 book Alter Ego: Avatars and Their Creators (Cooper), which presents a useful data set of sixty-six avatars – “computer generated visual representations of people or bots” (Nowak and Rauh para. 2) – alongside portraits and stories about their creators that demonstrates “the imaginative poverty of virtual reality” (Braidotti para. 49) in relation to gender. Within this varied and international collection of participants in virtual worlds, an overwhelming fifty-six are gender referential in that the apparent gender of the avatar is continuous with the gender of the creator. Additionally, although six avatars are entirely non-humyn, five of them are anthropomorphized and gendered, a fact that suggests that **having a clear gender is considered an integral part of self-representation.** Only one avatar is non-humyn and non-gendered. None of the avatars are gender ambiguous. Additionally, **research by** Kristine **Nowak and** Christian **Rauh** further **demonstrates the intersubjective imperative of gender. They discovered that the more androgynous and less humyn avatars are, the more difficult people find it to communicate with them:**

The responses to the images were consistent with what would be predicted by uncertainty reduction theory. The results show that the masculinity or femininity (lack of androgyny) of an avatar, as well as anthropomorphism, significantly influence perceptions of avatars. (para. 1)

**Uncertainty reduction theory demonstrates that the more familiar and understandable the other person is in an interaction, the more likely we are to trust and like them.** The above research demonstrates that this holds true for online interaction, and that placing **gender is an integral part of placing someone in familiar terms.** This research challenges early futurological predictions of the Internet as a space in which traditional identity would be challenged by demonstrating that the same rules of social interaction apply in virtual contexts as in real life, limiting the qualitative possibilities of self-presentation and of intersubjective understanding.[3]

Likewise, the **queer theory** I refer to **tends to negate the extent to which sex/gender, and indeed subjectivity itself, is intersubjective and social,** **and that its subversion cannot be an individual choice.** For example, by imagining an alternative gender system in which sex no longer dictates gender, Halberstam suggests that all one must do is to choose one’s gender from the selection and come out:

This project on female masculinity is designed to [...] argue for a concept of 'gender preference' as opposed to compulsory gender binarism [...] A system of gender preferences would allow for gender neutrality until such a time when the child or young adult announces his or her or its gender [...] people could come out as a gender in the way they come out as a sexuality. (27)

This **voluntarism belies the more complex analyses of subject formation that** I believe **are implicitly present in many of the illustrations and practices** that I will explore in the first section of this paper and explicitly present in the theories of subject formation of both Beauvoir and Butler that I will draw on in the second part.

**My project,** then, **departs from the premise that gender** alone **is an** incomplete **focus of critique for those whose aim is to eradicate the inequalities that it seemingly generates** and that **the aim of undermining it would be better served by shifting to the ontological premise of sexual difference that underpins both sex and gender.** In the following sections, I explore normative values that could justify this type of project, and I develop ontological premises that could underpin it.

# Link: Fem Sci-Fi

**Feminist science fiction reifies gender by valorizing femininity**

**Nicholas, 09** - research student in Humanities at Griffith University (Lucy, Thirdspace, “A Radical Queer Utopian Future: A Reciprocal Relation Beyond Sexual Difference,” vol. 8, is. 2, http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/lnicholas/248)**Red**

**\*\*\*per replaces her/his, \*\*\*ze replaces she/he, \*\*\*humyn replaces human**

**By maintaining that this non-exploitative, reciprocal ethic is a feminine ethic, however grounded in social or psycho-social conceptions of femininity/masculinity, the approaches of these feminist utopias still do not go far enough in fully transcending the sex/gender dualisms that are,** after all, **symptomatic of the very self/other dualism that such a reciprocal and nurturing ethic seeks to reject.** **Whitbeck claims that the feminine ethic is available to both men and women and that “people may become convinced of the superiority of a particular ontology and seek the relationships and practices consistent with that view.** (Theory may guide practice!)” (60). However, **ze maintains a special access to this ethic for women** by **stating** that **men’s “ways of acquisition are necessarily different from our’s”** (60). **The approaches of Le Guin, Whitbeck, and others who valorize the feminine ethic did, indeed, emerge out of their involvement in** 1970s **feminism and, thus, from a movement that, owing to its context, sought to strategically valorize the female sphere.**[4] It is my contention, however, that contemporary anarcho-queer ethics, along with a theoretical ontological ethics developed from the work of Simone de Beauvoir and Judith Butler, is able to reach similar ethical conclusions without recourse to sex/gender hierarchy inversion.

# Alt

**Sex can be transversed – only the alt creates value to life**

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The ideas of transcendence and project are also significant in Beauvoir’s account of the value of existence in that **Beauvoir defines existence as the projection of the self into the future, the transcendence of facticity.** By stating that “**~~man~~ is project**” (Beauvoir, “Pyrrhus and Cineas” 98), **Beauvoir states that doing is per definition of being and of freedom.** Indeed, in The Second Sex, **Beauvoir explicates that “every individual concerned to justify his existence feels** that **his existence involves an undefined need to transcend himself, to engage in freely chosen projects**” and, more strongly and normatively, that “**subjection to given conditions** […] **is an absolute evil**” (29). **Thus, we have a**n explicit normative **point of departure that can be applied to overcoming sexual difference** – that **subjection is to be avoided and transcendence is to be striven for to make existence worthwhile.**

Butler’s account of subject formation is similarly social and somewhat limiting in that in order to be, one must attach to pre-existing norms (Psychic Life of Power), the corollary of which is an opaque ontology (Giving an Account). This results in an “ambivalent scene of agency” (Butler, Psychic Life of Power 15) that is contingent on never being a self-contained self, but it is also, in Butler’s later work, the very condition of action or “the paradoxical condition for moral deliberation” (Butler, Giving an Account 10).[7]

These **ontological approaches can be points of departure for an ethics of responsibility** to the other **and** of **autonomy,** in a specific refined sense. If the purpose or fulfillment of existence is to be found in transcending facticity – and my ontological condition is that of opacity or of the ambiguity of my freedom being tied up in the freedom of others and vice versa, as well as being contingent on my situation – the modest corollary would seem to be that **freedom is not an individual state. Indeed, Beauvoir clarifies per particular notion of freedom as transcendence** in the following: “**To be free is not to have the power to do anything you like; it is to be able to surpass the given toward an open future; the existence of others as a freedom defines my situation and is even the condition of my own freedom**” (Ethics 91, my emphasis).

**The aff maintains hetero/homo binaries based on sexual difference – the alternative rejects these biological identities which solves case be erasing the differences upon which their hierarchies are built**

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I suggest that **the ontological ethics of Simone de Beauvoir, Judith Butler, and Michel Foucault offer utopian visions of a world without sexual difference useful ways to think about a subject formed with an alternative relationship to the other that is not premised on the opposition and struggle that underpins sexual difference and, thus, sex/gender.**

Additionally, I suggest that for those who wish to develop ways of being beyond sexual difference, the strategies of contemporary anarchist and radical queer practice may be of use and inspiration. These strategies offer a way forward from the point of departure of non-foundational social subjects because they operate from the premise that change must be a collective process and that a certain amount of explicit developmental power is necessary to foster the capacities of selves in the pursuit of autonomy over identity.

**The future of sexuality without sexual difference**, then, **is a future without notions of biological sex or gender or identities of binary hetero/homo/bi/trans sexuality.** Much **like Foucault’s notion of being agents of pleasure rather than subjects of desire** (Foucault, “Michel Foucault on ‘Pleasure vs. Desire’”) and the queer separation of acts from identity that built upon this notion, **sexuality without sexual difference would be about pleasure and acts rather than identity and essences. It would not be preoccupied with the “orientation of** […] **desire”** (Foucault, “Michel Foucault on ‘Pleasure vs. Desire’”) **because orientation would be meaningless without sexual difference to orient towards.**

**The alternative creates agency – it allows us to situate our resistance**

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**These different articulations of the limits to which we are autonomous** in the traditional sense **do not**, for Beauvoir and Butler, **preclude action. Their accounts offer refined understandings of autonomy** that have implications for the ways that the ideal of freely chosen transcendence can be achieved. Judith **Butler’s account of gendered subject formation is interesting** to bring in at this stage because per development of the idea of performativity was deeply influenced by a particular reading of Beauvoir’s notion of becoming a gendered subject and because per early work was so concerned with the type of autonomy or agency that Beauvoir’s account allowed for (see Butler, “Sex and Gender in Simone de Beauvoir’s Second Sex”). Indeed, Stoetzler emphasizes the similarities in thinking about structure and agency in Beauvoir and Butler, even after Butler rejected Beauvoir because ze perceived an adherence to the sex/gender divide and the assumption of a pre-discursive self in per work. These similarities suggest that both **draw out the contradictions or ambiguities of agency that must necessarily work from within its situation. The self as always self/other/situation severely delimits the possibility of agency and change but “not the impossibility of resistance”** (Stoetzler 360). Sonia Kruks, for instance, articulates Beauvoir’s formulation of agency as “living on rails” (67). Additionally, **Butler’s model of performativity, especially as it is distinguished** from performance, **articulates an ambiguous stance on situated agency and demonstrates what most voluntaristic queer theory negates in formulating methods of resistance.** Hausman suggests that queer and transgender theory and activism from the 1990s that was influenced by Butler’s seemingly agentic theory often worked within a popularized understanding of performativity that elided its important situational aspects and reduced the meaning of the concept to voluntaristic performance of a social gender that was perceived as separate from sex.

**That one cannot be without doing gender** (Butler, Psychic Life); **that one’s identity is in large part attributional and, thus, social; and that one’s autonomy is a situated autonomy has profound implications for modes of resistance.** **Beauvoir and Butler,** then, refuse to consider the possibility of some precultural autonomy and go beyond suggesting that there exists merely a delimited agency in some totality. Instead, they **assert that the condition of self/other/situation is agency,** that it is “the condition of my own freedom” (Beauvoir, Ethics 91). This line of argument means that **we are able to ignore as a false line of inquiry the issue of how to foster individual autonomy and, instead, focus on transcending imminence** in concert with others.

**Because** my **freedom is contingent on the freedom of others,** my own **existence can be fulfilled only through the freedom of others;** hence the ontological inevitability of reciprocity and responsibility. What Beauvoir’s ethics inherently valorize is, then, relations that maximize the autonomy of the self and of others so that freedom (as the fulfillment of existence) can be achieved. However, it is worth restating that these values are not derived from the assumption of inherently or essentially good or bad or co-operative or non-cooperative relations between people (as in the pessimistic assumptions of liberal theory or, conversely, the optimism of classical anarchism). **By stating that “there doesn’t exist any pre-established harmony between ~~men~~”** (Beauvoir, “Pyrrhus and Cineas” 108), Beauvoir suggests that **the foundation for per ethics should be derived from the facticity of humynity’s interrelated ontological situation, along with a humyn-created ethical ideal of transcendence** (similar to the normative ethical ideal in anarcho-queer communities) that takes this ontology as its starting point. Additionally, **transcendence, while ideal, is not an inherent capacity but rather contingent on others and situations.**

A similar value distinction can also be derived from Butler’s work on subject formation. While claiming that there is an ontological imperative to attach to pre-existing norms in order to be, it is possible to make a value distinction, as Amy Allen does, between subordinating and non-subordinating norms. And it is important to remember that it is individuals who uphold and perpetuate these norms. Thus, Allen suggests that **Butler can be used to “resist the idea that subjection is per se subordinating”** (Allen 210). **This value-based distinction of autonomy or ‘power to’ in contrast to domination or ‘power over,’ is also apparent in Foucault’s explicitly ethical work, in which ze defines ethics as “a way of being and of behaviour** […] a mode of being for the subject” (Foucault, Ethics 286). By seeing the self as something to be worked on, Foucault departs from a non-foundational ontology and inherently valorizes as ideal this ability, or freedom, to be able to work on the self. Like Beauvoir, Foucault emphasizes that sometimes these conditions for freedom, the ability to practice freedom, are not present: “One sometimes encounters what may be called situations or states of domination in which the power relations, instead of being mobile, allowing the various participants to adopt strategies modifying them, remain blocked, frozen” (Foucault, Ethics 283). By defining this situation as domination, Foucault valorizes its opposite, the practices of freedom (Foucault, Ethics 283).

# Role of the Ballot

**The role of the ballot is to foster a consciousness of the construction of sex as a category of identity – this lets us escape the enframing categories of the aff**

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What this demonstrates is that “there are, then, structural alternatives to the carceral school, classroom, and society, because there are power relationships and technologies that are not dominating” (Wain 358). In this sense, **Foucault’s, Beauvoir’s, and Butler’s conceptions of power, subject formation, and freedom as applied to education mesh nicely with aspects of anarchist ethos inherent in contemporary anarchist-queer theory,** practices, and communities: **that of autonomy in the sense of self-power rather than a simplistic ‘freedom from.’ In terms of education, this would result in “a pedagogical project that enables subjects to ‘give laws to themselves’”** (Wain 358). **This is an ideal approach for those who want to reconstruct identity for themselves** (understood within the refined definition of ‘selves,’ not as an atomized self but as situated, social selves developed in Part 2) **without the perceived restrictions of sex and gender and of a sexuality derived from these restrictions.**

**This focus on education** specifically **is analogous to the creation of cultural contexts more broadly by communities that foster the capacities for alternative ways of being.** Anarcho-queer communities also engage in the creation of zines and online communities that are able to foster shared culture in geographically diverse contexts, gatherings and spaces that enable physical space for fostering alternative culture and cultural creations such as music and art that **may also foster alternative consciousness** (see Nicholas for discussion of broader anarcho-queer cultural creation).

**These fundamentally collective approaches evade the individualistic voluntarism that plagues some early queer theory and are also ideal tactics for deconstructing the assumption that sex and sexual difference, alongside and as part of gender, are necessary elements of identity. They are also useful methods for fostering ways of relating according to explicit ethics of reciprocity and recognition rather than according to pre-existing identity categories.**

# \*\*\*Negative\*\*\*

# \*\*\*Fem Specific\*\*\*

**No Impact - Patriarchy is the just the product of people’s pursuit of happiness**

Goldberg, 1999 (Steven, Chairman of the Department of Sociology, City College, City University of New York, “The Inevitability of Patriarchy” http://lilt.ilstu.edu/gmklass/foi/readings/patriarchygoldberg.htm, EB)

But it is not only expectations that lead to the high-status roles in a society being designated masculine.  This arrangement also reflects a society's tendency to try to maximize individual happiness.  For consider what would happen if a society did *not* socialize women away from competing with men, from its *not* directing girls toward roles women are more capable of playing, or with status low enough that men will not strive for them.  No doubt some women would be aggressive enough to succeed in competitions with men and there would be considerably more women in high-status positions than there are now.  But most women would lose in such competitive struggles with men (because men have the aggression advantage), and so most adult women would be forced to live lives as failures in areas in which the society had *wanted them to succeed*.  It is women, far more than men, who would never allow a situation in which girls were socialized in such a way that the vast majority of them were doomed to adult lifetimes of failure to live up to their own expectations.  If women did not develop an alternative set of criteria for success, their sense of their own competence would suffer intolerably.  Our system of patriarchal sex roles is just this society's way of trying to maximize the individual

# Realism inevitable

**Realism is true and inevitable**

**Mearsheimer** **01** (John, Professor of political science at University of Chicago, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pg. 361)

The optimists' claim that security competition and war among the great powers has been burned out of the system is wrong. In fact, all of the major states around the globe still care deeply about the balance of power and are destined to compete for power among themselves for the foreseeable future. Consequently, realism will offer the most powerful explanations of international politics over the next century, and this will be true even if the debates among academic and policy elites are dominated by non-realist theories. In short, the real world remains a realist world. States still fear each other and seek to gain power at each other's expense, because international anarchy-the driving force behind greatpower behavior-did not change with the end of the Cold War, and there are few signs that such change is likely any time soon. States remain the principal actors in world politics and there is still no night watchman standing above them. For sure, the collapse of the Soviet Union caused a major shift in the global distribution of power. But it did not give rise to a change in the anarchic structure of the system, and without that kind of profound change, there is no reason to expect the great powers to behave much differently in the new century than they did in previous centuries.Indeed, considerable evidence from the 1990s indicates that power politics has not disappeared from Europe and Northeast Asia, the regions in which there are two or more great powers, as well as possible great powers such as Germany and Japan. There is no question, however, that the competition for power over the past decade has been low-key. Still, there is potential for intense security competion among the great powers that might lead to a major war. Probably the best evidence of that possibility is the fact that the United States maintains about one hundred thousand troops each in Europe and in Northeast Asia for the explicit purpose of keeping the major states in each region at peace.

# We turn the Aff

**War is the root cause of patriarchal domination and call for women’s rights is used by the right to justify military intervention – Prefer our impacts**

**AFP 04** (Agence France Presse, December 10, 2004, http://www.worldrevolution.org/news/article1702.htm)

Raped, treated as the sexual 'booty' of war or slain by indiscriminate bombings, women are too often the first victims of conflict, Amnesty International charged Wednesday in a report demanding legal redress. The London-based human rights group called for action by the International Criminal Court to halt oppressive violence against women. "Patterns of violence against women in conflict do not arise 'naturally' but are ordered, condoned or tolerated as a result of political calculations," its secretary general Irene Khan said in introducing the 120-page report on women in war. Not only are women "considered as the legitimate booty of victorious army," the report said, but "the use of rape as a weapon of war is perhaps the most notorious and brutal way in which conflicts impact on women." "Women's bodies, their sexuality and reproductive capacity are often used as a literal battleground," it said. Khan, the first women, the first Asian and the first Muslim to head Amnesty International, told AFP in an interview that "it's quite interesting to see that women rights have been used as justification for military intervention, in the cases of both Iraq (news - web sites) and Afghanistan (news - web sites)." But, she added, "on the ground the situation changes very little in favor of women ... In the case of Afghanistan we have seen no improvement. "Warlords are occupying parts of the territory and see women as commodities for trading, to settle land dispute. Abductions and forced marriages are about as bad, if not worse, than at any time in Afghan history. "Warlords are not being pulled out, they're not being prosecuted, they're not being investigated for the crimes that are openly committing." Even where women are not deliberately targetted, they are the main victims of so-called collatoral damage, whether caused by "precision" bombing or landmines, the report said. "In Iraq in 2003, US forces reportedly used more than 10,500 cluster munitions containing at least 1.8 million bomblets. An average failure rate of five percent would mean that about 90,000 unexploded munitions are now on Iraqi soil." The report urged the International Criminal Court to "pick up and prosecute one or two high-profile cases because that will send the message that violence against women cannot continue in such an impunity, which is the norm today." The court, headquartered in The Hague (news - web sites), began operating in July 2002 and is mandated to try genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Kahn acknowledged the way ahead would be tough, but said she hoped the report would generate pressure for change. Women and children make up 80 percent of the world's 40 million refugees, but they have no voice, and injustices go unpunished," she added. "If you take the example of the Korean women, the comfort women in Japan, who were used as sex slaves during the second world war, even now they're still battling for the recognition of their case," Khan said. The report detailed widespread rape in conflicts around the world, including the Darfur region of Sudan, Colombia, Nepal, Chechnya (news - web sites), India and, earlier this year, in the tiny Pacific territory of the Solomon Islands. Tens of thousands of women and young girls were raped during the conflicts sweeping the Democratic Republic of Congo (news - web sites). "Ten years on from the genocide in Rwanda, where violence against women was a central element of the strategy to eliminate a particular ethnic group, little or nothing seems to have been learned about how to prevent such horrors," the report said.

**War causes gender constructions not vice versa**

**Blanchard 03** [ Eric M. Blanchard is a PhD Candidate in the School of International. Relations at the University of Southern California, “ Gender, International Relations, and the Development of Feminist Security TheorySigns, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Summer, 2003), pp. 1289-1312]-JT

The war in Afghanistan demonstrated both gender’s power to legitimate national security goals and the easy acceptance of remasculinization during times of war (Tickner 2002). The vital, often gendered, negotiation of cultural relations between the West and Islam and the effects of state antiterror campaigns on civilians are problems that military campaigns in Afghanistan or Iraq are not designed to address and traditional nonfeminist theories of IR are not entirely equipped to handle. TheU.S.-led global war on terror seems to exemplify the type of gendered, multilevel insecurity that IR feminists have raised to our critical attention. Ironically, the policy world of nation-states has recently begun to outpace the academic discipline of IR in its acceptance of feminist issues, as evidenced by the rapid diffusion of “gender mainstreaming” bureaucracies and gendersensitive policies across states from a diverse range of cultures and levels of gender inequality (True and Mintrom 2001, 29). The adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in October of 2000 was a watershed that should provide those interested in gender and security with many new research opportunities to study the ways the incorporation of a gender perspective and female participation affect peacekeeping and the S I G N S Summer 2003. 1307 security of women and men.7 With its multileveled, ethical approach, feminist security theory offers the best hope that these challenges—technowar, the “war on terror,” and peacekeeping—can be met with an eye toward the reduction of gendered global insecurities in the difficult years ahead

# Alt Fails

**The criticism’s focus on identity creates a politics of exclusion that prevents meaningful critiques and turns the very superior identification they try to solve**

Jarvis – 2000[DSL, ‘International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism’, February, *University of South Carolina Publishing*, pg. 160-162]

Critical research agendas of this type, however, are not found easily in International Relations. Critics of feminist perspectives run the risk of denouncement as either a misogynist malcontent or an androcentric keeper of the gate. At work in much of this discourse is an unstated political correctness, where the historical marginalization of women bestows intellectual autonomy, excluding those outside the identity group from legitimate participation in its discourse. Only feminist women can do real, legitimate, feminist theory since, in the mantra of identity politics, discourse must emanate from a positional (personal) ontology. Those sensitive or sympathetic to the identity politics of par­ticular groups are, of course, welcome to lend support and encourage­ment, but only on terms delineated by the groups themselves. In this way, they enjoy an uncontested sovereign hegemony oyer their own self-identification, insuring the group discourse is self constituted and that its parameters, operative methodology, *,uu\* standards of argument, appraisal, and evidentiary provisions are self defined. Thus, for example, when Sylvester calls lor a "home.steading" does so "by [a] repetitive feminist insistence that *we be included on our terms"* (my emphasis). Rather than an invitation to engage in dialogue, this is an ultimatum that a sovereign intellectual space be provided and insulated from critics who question the merits of identity-based political discourse. Instead, Sylvester calls upon International Relations to "share space, respect, and trust in a re-formed endeavor," but one otherwise proscribed as committed to demonstrating not only "that the secure homes constructed by IR's many debaters are chimerical," but, as a con­sequence, to ending International Relations and remaking it along lines grounded in feminist postmodernism.93 Such stipulative provisions might be likened to a form of negotiated sovereign territoriality where, as part of the settlement for the historically aggrieved, border incursions are to be allowed but may not be met with resistance or reciprocity. Demands for entry to the discipline are thus predicated on conditions that insure two sets of rules, cocooning postmodern feminist spaces from systematic analyses while "respecting" this discourse as it hastens about the project of deconstructing International Relations as a "male space." Sylvester's impassioned plea for tolerance and "emphatic cooperation" is thus confined to like-minded individuals, those who do not challenge feminist epistemologies but accept them as a necessary means of rein­venting the discipline as a discourse between postmodern identities—the most important of which is gender.94 Intolerance or misogyny thus become the ironic epithets attached to those who question the wisdom of this reinvention or the merits of the return of identity in international theory.'"' Most strategic of all, however, demands for entry to the disci­pline and calls for intellectual spaces betray a self-imposed, politically motivated marginality. After all, where are such calls issued from other than the discipline and the intellectual—and well established—spaces of feminist International Relations? Much like the strategies employed by male dissidents, then, feminist postmodernists too deflect as illegitimate any criticism that derives from skeptics whose vantage points are labeled privileged. And privilege is vari­ously interpreted historically, especially along lines of race, color, and sex where the denotations white and male, to name but two, serve as generational mediums to assess the injustices of past histories. White males, for example, become generic signifiers for historical oppression, indicating anontologicallv privileged group by which the historical experiences of the "other" can then be reclaimed in the context of their related oppression, exploitation, and exclusion. Legitimacy, in this context, can then be claimed in terms of one's group identity and the extent to which the history of that particular group has been "silenced." In this same way, self-identification or "self-situation" establishes one's credentials, allowing admittance to the group and legitimating the "authoritative" vantage point from which one speaks and writes. Thus, for example, Jan Jindy Pettman includes among the introductory pages to her most recent book, *Worldinjj Women,* a section titled "A (personal) politics of location," in which her identity as a woman, a feminist, and an academic, makes appar­ent her particular (marginal) identities and group loyalties.96 Similarly, Christine Sylvester, in the introduction to her book, insists, "It is impor­tant to provide a context for one's work in the often-denied politics of the personal." Accordingly, self-declaration reveals to the reader that she is a feminist, went to a Catholic girls school where she was schooled to "develop your brains and confess something called 'sins' to always male forever priests," and that these provide some pieces to her dynamic objec­tivity.97 Like territorial markers, self-identification permits entry to intel­lectual spaces whose sovereign authority is "policed" as much by marginal subjectivities as they allege of the oppressors who "police" the discourse of realism, or who are said to walk the corridors of the discipline insuring the replication of patriarchy, hierarchical agendas, and "malestream" theory. If Sylvester's version of feminist postmodernism is projected as tolerant, per-spectivist, and encompassing of a multiplicity of approaches, in reality it is as selective, exclusionary, and dismissive of alternative perspectives as mainstream approaches are accused of being.

**The Alt can’t solve- examining science from a feminist perspective reinforces sterotypes of women- as incompetent**

**Fehr 04**(Carla is an Associate Professor in Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Iowa State University. She works in the philosophy of biology, feminist philosophy and feminist science studies. “Feminism and Science: Mechanism Without Reductionism” Spring <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/nwsa/summary/v016/16.1fehr.html>) AK

Although it has been said before by such leading philosophers as Sandra Harding (1987) and Helen Longino (1987), the point that feminist theorists do not and should not endorse a single feminist method, or of a single way that women do (or ought to do) science bears repeating for at least three reasons. First, Donna Haraway (1985) has pointed out that feminism and science need to be intertwined if we are to exercise our responsibility for the practices and products of science and technology. By drawing a line between women’s science and science itself, we lose our ability to address current problems within scientific practice, and we don’t investigate ways in which the traditional practice of science can be interrogated and improved. Second, presuppositions of a single feminist science reinforce the cultural stereotype that women can’t do science as it is traditionally construed. This further removes an already marginalized group from mainstream scientific discourse and fails to give credit to women who have fought to succeed as researchers in what continues to be a man’s game. Finally, we need to guard against essentializing women’s intellectual or cognitive characteristics. Advocating a single feminist science suggests that there is a single, feminine manner way in which women think or relate to other people or organize their experiments and their laboratories. This is not the case. Because of the latter two concerns, pluralism is an appropriate attitude to take toward feminism and science. Instead of endorsing a feminist method, I hope to create space for a variety of approaches.

**Alt can’t solve- altering masculine and feminine roles won’t change anything- ideas, especially IR, can’t be gendered**

**Lind 05** (Michael Lind is Policy Director of the Economic Growth Program at the New America Foundation. He is executive editor of The National Interest. “**The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War” January 20** <http://feminism.eserver.org/of-arms-and-the-woman.txt>**) AK**

This recurrent focus on little sisterhoods, mobilizing against "gendered" nation-states, multinational capitalism and racial and religious prejudice, owes a lot to the Marxist dream of a transnational fraternity of workers (in a new form, as a transnational sorority of feminists) and even more to the hope of early twentieth-century peace crusaders such as Jane Addams that the women of the world can unite and put an end to war and exploitation. Enloe tries to justify the attention paid to quite different groups of women in various countries with the claim that "no national movement can be militarized"--or demilitarized?--"without changing the ways in which femininity and masculinity infuse daily life." Even if "militarization," however defined, does result in certain kinds of gender relations, it does not follow that altering masculine and feminine roles will, in itself, do much to reverse the process. Something may, after all, be an effect without being a cause. Rejecting the feminist approach to international relations does not mean rejecting the subjects or the political values of feminist scholars. Differing notions of masculinity and femininity in different societies, the treatment of women and homosexuals of both sexes in the armed forces, the exploitation of prostitutes by American soldiers deployed abroad, the sexual division of labor both in advanced and developing countries: all of these are important topics that deserve the attention that Enloe awards them. She shows journalistic flair as well as scholarly insight in detailing what abstractions like the Caribbean Basin Initiative mean in the lives of women in particular Third World countries. Still, such case studies, however interesting, do not support the claim of feminist international relations theorists that theirs is a new and superior approach. One thing should be clear: commitment to a feminist political agenda need not entail commitment to a radical epistemological agenda. Ideas do not have genders, just as they do not have races or classes. In a century in which physics has been denounced as "Jewish" and biology denounced as "bourgeois," it should be embarrassing to denounce the study of international relations as "masculinist." Such a denunciation, of course, will not have serious consequences in politics, but it does violence to the life of the mind. The feminist enemies of empiricism would be well-advised to heed their own counsel and study war no more.

**Alt can’t solve- viewing things from a feminist perspective is Marxist**

**Hekman 97** (Susan is a Professor of Political Science and Director of Graduate Humanities at The University of Texas at Arlington. “Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited” Winter Jstor.com) AK

In the succeeding decade, feminist standpoint theory has become a staple of feminist theory. Nancy Hartsock's essay in Sandra Harding and Merrill Hintikka's pathbreaking book Discovering Reality (1983) brought the concept to a philosophical audience. In a number of influential publications, Dorothy Smith developed a sociological method from the "standpoint of women." Harding featured feminist standpoint theory in her two important books on science and feminism. Patricia Hill Collins articulated a specifically black feminist standpoint. But in the late 1980s and early 1990s criticisms of the position mounted, and fewer discussions of it were published. Today the concept occupies a much less prominent position. Particularly among younger feminist theorists, feminist standpoint theory is frequently regarded as a quaint relic of feminism's less sophisticated past. Several developments in the late 1980s have led to this declining influence. First, the inspiration for feminist standpoint theory, Marxism, has been discredited in both theory and practice. Second, feminist standpoint theory appears to be at odds with the issue that has dominated feminist debate in the past decade: difference. Third, feminist standpoint theory appears to be opposed to two of the most significant influences in recent feminist theory: postmodernism and poststructuralism. The Marxist roots of the theory seem to contradict what many define as the antimaterialism of postmodernism. For all of these reasons, the conclusion that feminist standpoint theory should be discarded seems obvious.

Turn and alt doesn’t solve: feminist thought just reproduces gender stereotypes

**Witworth, 94** prof of political science and female studies @ York U, (Feminism and International Relations, pg 20,

Even when not concerned with mothering as such, much of the politics that emerge from radical feminism within IR depend on a ‘re-thinking’ from the perspective of women. What is left unexplained is how simply thinking differently will alter the material realities of relations of domination between men and women. Structural (patriarchal) relations are acknowledged, but not analysed in radical feminism’s reliance on the experiences, behaviours and perceptions of ‘women’. As Sandra Harding notes, the essential and universal ‘man’, long the focus of feminist critiques, has merely been replaced here with the essential and universal ‘woman’. And indeed, that notion of ‘woman’ not only ignores important differences amongst women, but it also reproduces exactly the stereotypical vision of women and men, masculine and feminine, that has been produced under patriarchy. Those women who do not fit the mould – who, for example, take up arms in military struggle – are quickly dismissed as expressing ‘negative’ or ‘inauthentic’ feminine value**s** (the same accusation is more rarely made against men). In this way, it comes as no surprise when mainstream IR theorists such as Robert Reohane happily embrace the tenets of radical feminism. It requires little in the way of re-thinking or movement from accepted and comfortable assumptions about stereotypes. Radical feminists find themselves defending the same account of women as nurturing, pacifist, submissive mothers as men do under patriarchy, anti-feminists and the New Right. As some writers suggest, this in itself should give feminists pause to reconsider this position.

Turn - The rhetoric of the negative reinforces patriarchy through comfortable stereotype assumptions.

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**Turn and alt doesn’t solve: feminism silences voices of non-Western, non-white women**

**Goetz, 91** research fellow in Development studies at U of Sussex, (Anne Goetz, “Gender and International Relations,” Harper and Row, 1991, J)

Third world women have accused first world and western-trained feminists of exercising a certain cultural colonialism, of misrepresenting different women by homogenizing the experiences and conditions of western women across time and culture. Chakravorty Spivak has shown that western women are “complicitous” in contributing to the continued ‘degredation’ of third world women whose micrology they interpret without having access to it. Monica Lazreg, exploring the ‘perils of writing as a woman on women in Algeria’ suggests that third world women have been produced as a field of knowledge, essentializing their difference in a process that represents a ‘caricature of the feminist project’. Black feminists have accused white feminists of adding on difference at the margin ‘without leaving the comforts of home’ so as to support ‘the seeming homogeneity, stability, and self-evidence of its experience based epistemology’. Trinh T. Minh-ha identifies this neutralized difference as ‘the very kind of colonized anthropologised difference the master has always granted his subordinates’. Audre Lorde’s response to the universalized picture of oppression in Mary Dali’s Gym/Ecology reproaches her for failing: “to recognize that, as women… differences expose all women to various forms and degrees of patriarchal oppression, some of which we share, some of which we do not… The oppression of women knows no ethnic nor racial boundaries, true, but that does not mean that it is identical within those boundaries… to imply… that all women suffer the same oppression simply because we are women is to lose sight of the many varied tools of patriarchy. It is to ignore how these tools are used by women without awareness against each other.” These statements amount to descriptions of an epistemologically totalizing and culturally disruptive feminist. And to the extent that feminist theory’s claim to relevance is based upon its claim to represent the meaning of women’s social experience in all its heterogeneity, these critiques point to some fundamental problems. The original consciousness raising approach of traditional feminist – what Catherine MacKinnon has called its critical method – involved a project of theorizing the collective expression of the social constitution of sexed identities. This was informed by a political understanding that gender was not an inalienable description of human reality; an understanding derived from the insights of a traditional feminist ideology whose analysis of the political meaning of experience was concerned with deconstructing the legitimating surface of women’s oppression. Theorizing the social construction of subjectivity produced an understanding of the mechanisms of sexist oppression. In practice, and as seen above, particularly in the context of WID practice, that collective critical reconstitution of women’s experiences in traditional feminist movements has tended to reproduce the situational consciousness of the white, bourgeois, heterosexual feminist, developing a set of certainties structured around that specific subjectivity. Such certainties in liberal or Marxist feminist ideologies tended to inform the cross-cultural investigations of sexual subordination, producing a certain myopia with respect to the details of sexual subordination in different societies. The failure to guide practice with reference to the processes that shape human perceptions and norms promoted the disintegration of feminist pronouncements on women in development into a norm setting activity by a counter-elite.

# Epistemology Fails

**Feminist epistemology contradicts itself – creates a bias paradox**

**Rolin 06** (Kristina is an Academy of Finland Research Fellow at Helsinki School of Economics. Her main areas of research are philosophy of science and epistemology, with emphasis on social epistemology and feminist epistemology. She has published articles in *Philosophy of Science*, *Social Epistemology*, *Perspectives on Science*, and *Hypatia*. “The Bias Paradox in Feminist Standpoint Epistemology” *Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology* 3.1 (2006) <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/episteme/v003/3.1rolin.html>) AK

Sandra Harding's feminist standpoint epistemology is an ambitious and controversial attempt to argue that diversity among inquirers is an epistemic advantage to a community of inquirers. According to Harding, epistemic advantage accrues not to just any kind of diversity but to diversity with respect to the social positions of inquirers and participants in their studies. Harding's feminist standpoint epistemology advances the claim that those who are unprivileged with respect to their social positions are likely to be privileged with respect to gaining knowledge of social reality. According to Harding, unprivileged social positions are likely to generate perspectives that are "less partial and less distorted" than perspectives generated by other social positions (Harding 1991, 121; see also pages 138 and 141). I call this claim the thesis of epistemic privilege. The thesis of epistemic privilege is connected to a particular conception of objectivity, "strong objectivity," which is the view that objective research starts from the lives of unprivileged groups (Harding 1991, 150; see also page 142). Diversity with respect to social positions is beneficial for knowledge-seeking communities because there are many ways of being unprivileged. As Harding explains, "the subject of feminist knowledge – the agent of these less partial and distorted descriptions and explanations – must be multiple and even contradictory" (1991, 284). The thesis of epistemic privilege has been criticized on two grounds. One objection is that Harding's feminist standpoint epistemology does not provide any standards of epistemic justification that enable one to judge some socially grounded perspectives as better than others. Another objection is that there is no evidence in support of the thesis of epistemic privilege. These two objections are connected. As long as it is not [End Page 125] clear what standards of epistemic justification allow one to judge some socially grounded perspectives as better than others, it is not clear either what kind of evidence we should expect in support of the thesis of epistemic privilege. Let me explain each objection. The first objection is raised by Louise Antony (1993) and Helen Longino (1999). They argue that the thesis of epistemic privilege is undermined by another thesis in Harding's feminist standpoint epistemology, the thesis that all scientific knowledge is socially situated (Harding 1991, 11; see also pages 119 and 142). I call this the situated knowledge thesis (see also Wylie 2003, 31). The thesis of epistemic privilege relies on the assumption that there is a standard of impartiality that enables one to judge some socially grounded perspectives as "less partial and distorted" than others. The situated knowledge thesis seems to undermine this assumption by suggesting that all knowledge claims are partial in virtue of being grounded on a particular perspective on social reality. As Helen Longino explains, in order to argue that some socially grounded perspectives are better than others, a standpoint epistemologist would have to be able to identify privileged perspectives from a non-interested position, but according to standpoint epistemology, there is no such position (1999, 338; see also Hekman 2000, 24). Louise Antony calls the tension between the thesis of epistemic privilege and the situated knowledge thesis a "bias paradox" (1993, 188-189). In claiming that all knowledge is partial, feminist standpoint epistemology challenges the very notion of impartiality. But by undermining the notion of impartiality, feminist standpoint epistemology is in danger of losing its critical edge (Antony 1993, 189).

**Feminist epistemology creates more problems than it solves- it makes us want to view things from nowhere**

**Rolin 06** (Kristina is an Academy of Finland Research Fellow at Helsinki School of Economics. Her main areas of research are philosophy of science and epistemology, with emphasis on social epistemology and feminist epistemology. She has published articles in *Philosophy of Science*, *Social Epistemology*, *Perspectives on Science*, and *Hypatia*. “The Bias Paradox in Feminist Standpoint Epistemology” *Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology* 3.1 (2006) <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/episteme/v003/3.1rolin.html>) AK

For a long time feminist standpoint epistemology has relied on the power of visual and spatial images such as "perspectives" and "standpoints." The very term "standpoint" evokes an image of a position where one stands and views the object of inquiry from a particular "perspective" (Pohlhaus 2002, 288). Even though this image has been fruitful in feminist epistemology, it is time to acknowledge that it creates more problems than it solves. One problem is that it imports a foundationalist theory of epistemic justification into feminist epistemology. The visual and spatial image of a "standpoint" easily leads us into thinking that we need a "view from nowhere" in order to be able to compare different perspectives. I have argued that a contextualist theory of epistemic justification offers an alternative to a "view from nowhere." A context of default entitlements provides a "situated" standard of impartiality that enables us to assess the relative merits of two or more socially grounded perspectives. Another problem generated by visual and spatial images is that it is not clear what we assess when we assess socially grounded perspectives. I have argued that it is possible to identify and evaluate an assumption that manifests [End Page 134] a socially grounded perspective. This requires that we specify a context of epistemic justification.

**Individual promotion of feminist standpoint epistemology fails—only a community reevaluation can solve**

Rolin 07**—**Professor at the Academy of Finland Research Fellow at Helsinki School of Economics (Kristina,Episteme, “The Bias Paradox in Feminist Standpoint Epistemology”, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/episteme/v003/3.1rolin.html, JB)

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# Queer Theory Fails

**Queer theory cedes the political—it replaces personal poltics for engagement with real reform.**

Kirsch, 2000 (Max, Associate Professor at Florida Atlantic University, “Queer Theory and Social Change”, p. 97-98)

Queerness as a deviant form of heterosexuality results in oppression. When this fact is not confronted, it can lead to maladaptive responses that include the markings of internalized homophobia: depression, psychosis, resignation, and apathy. These are very much reactions to the ways in which we view ourselves, which in turn are, at least in part, due to the ways in which we are constantly told to view ourselves. Here, the production of consciousness takes a very concrete form. Those enduring this form of violence cannot, even in the academy, simply decide to disengage. We cannot simply refuse to acknowledge these facts of social life in our present society, and hope that our circumstances will change. Although the lack of definition is what has inspired the use of "queer," it cannot, as Butler herself asserts, "overcome its constituent history of injury" (1993b: 223). Be that as it may, "queer," as put forward by Queer theorists, has no inherent historical or social context. We continually return to the following question: to whom does it belong and what does it represent? These advocates of "queer" do not acknowledge that *queer* is produced by social relations, and therefore contains the attributes of existing social relations. As I have shown, Queer theory, particularly as it is expressed in Butler's writings on performativity, dichotomizes the political as personal and the political as social action into a binary that positions political action in impossible terms. The nature of the "political" is never clearly discussed, and remains a chasm (cf. Kaufman and Martin, 1994). However appealing the notion of positioning the self through a reinterpretation of the "I" may be, it is misguided as political action: it cannot generate the collective energy and organization necessary to challenge existing structures of power. As Michael Aglietta observes, "There is no magical road where the most abstract concepts magically command the movement of society" (1979: 43). The question of polities, then, brings us back to where we began: what is the nature of the political and how do we address it? Is it beneficial to maintain alliances with established political parties? Can we adopt the dominant values of our culture and still hope to change the dynamics of those values? How do we form alliances with other oppressed groups? Is there a structural economic basis for such an alliance, or should we look elsewhere? Perhaps most importantly: is it possible, given the tremendous resources represented by the dominant and coercive ideology of our present social relations, to maintain the energy necessary to develop and continue modes of resistance that counter it? In the last question, as I will show, lies an answer to the issue of alliances and structural identification. But first, we need to refocus the discussion.

**Queer theory assumes a male identity—rendering lesbians invisible.**

Jeffreys 94(Sheila, Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Melbourne, Women’s Studies International Forum, “The Queer Disappearance of Lesbians: Sexuality In the Academy, Volume 17, Issue 5, p. 459-472)

The appearance of queer theory and queer studies threatens to mean the disappearance of lesbians. The developing field of lesbian and gay studies is dominated now by the queer impulse. Lesbian feminism is conspicuous by its absence. Lesbian feminism starts from the understanding that the interests of lesbians and gay men are in many respects very different because lesbians are members of the political class of women. Lesbian liberation requires, according to this analysis, the destruction of men's power over women. In queer theory and queer studies, lesbians seem to appear only where they can assimilate seamlessly into gay male culture and politics. No difference is generally recognised in interests, culture, history between lesbians and gay men. The new field of the study of 'sexuality' seems similarly to be dominated by gay male sexual politics and interests. Both areas are remarkably free of feminist influence. As I discuss here, there is seldom any mention in queer theorising of sexuality of issues which are of concern to feminists and lesbian feminists, such as sexual violence and pornography or any politics of sexual desire or practice, and there is no recognition of the specificity of lesbian experience. Within traditional Women's Studies, lesbian students and teachers have long been angry at the 'lesbian-free' nature of courses and textbooks. A good example is Rosemarie Tong's Women's Studies reader Feminist Thought (1989). Although many of the feminist theorists covered in the book are lesbians, lesbian feminism is not one of the varieties of feminist thought included here. The index directs the reader to find lesbian feminist thought in three pages under the heading of 'Radical feminism and sexuality' (Tong, 1989). Lesbians might well have expected to find the new lesbian and gay studies more sympathetic to their interests, but that is only true in practice if they see themselves as a variety of gay men rather than as women. The new lesbian and gay studies is 'feminismfree.' By not recognising the different interests, history, culture, experience of lesbians, lesbian and gay studies homogenises the interests of women into those of men. It was precisely this disappearance of women's interests and experience in the malestream academic world which caused the development of Women's Studies in the first place. It cannot therefore be an unalloyed cause for celebration in the 1990s that lesbian and gay studies are becoming sufficiently well recognised to have a whole new journal GLQ and a first reader, The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader (Abelove, Barale, & Halperin, 1993). Both are American in origin and content. Even a casual glance at these publications suggests that lesbians and feminists have considerable cause for concern. It is not simply an abstract desire to right the injustice of lesbian disappearance which motivates my concern at the way that lesbian and gay studies are going. The work of this new field does and will increasingly influence the ideas and practices of lesbian and gay culture. Academia is not hermetically sealed but reflects and influences the world outside the academy. The disappearance of lesbians into an economically powerful commercial gay culture in the streets and the clubs will be exacerbated by what is happening in queer theory. The editorial of the first issue of GLQ celebrates its commitment to 'queer' politics. The queer perspective is not a gender-neutral one. Many lesbians, perhaps the vast majority of lesbian feminists, feel nothing but hostility toward and alienation from the word queer and see queer politics as very specifically masculine. The editorial tells us that the journal will approach all topics through a queer lens. "We seek to publish a journal that will bring a queer perspective to bear on any and all topics touching on sex and sexuality" (Dinshaw & Halperin, GLQ, 1993; p. iii). We are told that the Q in the title of the journal GLQ has two meanings, quarterly and also "the fractious, the disruptive, the irritable, the impatient, the unapologetic, the bitchy, the camp, the queer" (p. iii). This definition of the word 'queer' should alert readers to its masculine bias. The adjectives accompanying it here refer to male gay culture. They arise from traditional notions of what is camp. Camp, as we shall see, lies at the very foundation of queer theory and politics and is inimical to women's and lesbian interests. But before looking at the problems with camp in detail, it is worth considering another way in which this list of adjectives might not sit well with lesbian feminism. Although gay men's rebellion against oppression might well have been so mild that it could be expressed in terms like irritability, this has not been the way that lesbians have traditionally phrased their rebellion. Perhaps because lesbians have a great deal more to fight, that is, the whole system of male supremacy, rage has been a more prevalent emotion than irritability. The early womanifesto of lesbian feminism, the Woman- Identified-Woman paper, expressed it thus: "A Lesbian is the rage of all women condensed to the point of explosion" (Radicalesbians, 1988, p. 17). Irritable is how one might feel about not having garbage collected, not about ending the rape, murder, and torture of women, including lesbians. Some queer studies writers are currently seeking to establish that 'camp' is a fundamental part of 'queer.' There is still a controversy about what constitutes camp, with gay male critics opposing their own notions to that expressed in the famous Susan Sontag piece and pointing out that her version is heterosexist (Miller, 1993; Sontag, 1986). Sontag saw camp as a sensibility and one that was not necessarily queer or gay. Moe Meyer, in the volume the POLITICS and POETICS of CAMP, which is said on the blurb inside the cover to contain essays by "some of the foremost critics working in queer theory" says that camp is "solely a queer discourse" and certainly not just a "sensibility" but "a suppressed and denied oppositional critique embodied in the signifying practices that processually constitute queer identities" (Meyer, 1994b; p. 1). Rather, the function of camp is the "production of queer social visibility" and the "total body of performative practices and strategies used to enact a queer identity" (Meyer, 1994b; p. 5). So camp is defined here not just as one aspect of what it is to be queer, but as absolutely fundamental to queer identity. Camp appears, on examination, to be based largely on a male gay notion of the feminine. As his example of camp political tactics, Meyer uses the Black drag queen, Joan Jett Blakk, who ran as a mayoral candidate in Chicago in 1991. This man ran as a 'Queer Nation' candidate. He is referred to by female pronouns throughout this piece, which raises some difficulties in itself for women who wish to recognize themselves in the text. Meyer tells us that there were some objections from what he calls "assimilationist gays" who saw the drag queen political tactic as "flippant and demeaning." The implication is that men who objected did so for conservative motives, whereas in fact they might have been expressing profeminist sympathies. For women and lesbians who have rejected femininity, the celebration of it by a gay man is likely to be seen as insulting rather than as something with which to identify in 'queer' solidarity. Actually, women might well want more women in parliament rather than men wearing the clothing that has been culturally assigned to women.

**The affirmative fails to mobilize grass roots movements because it fails to use empiricism**

Edwards 98 (Tim, Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Leicester, Sexualities, “Queer Fears: Against the Cultural Turn”, Vol 1, p471-484, November, <http://sex.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cgi/reprint/1/4/471.pdf>)

A second, and linked, question about queer theory concerns its academic and political context. Early lesbian and gay studies tended to stress the importance of social history and particularly long-term grass roots activism in explaining the rise and fall of varying forms of gay liberation (Altman, 1971; D’Emilio, 1983; Gay Left Collective, 1980; Katz, 1976; Weeks, 1977). Early second-wave feminism similarly often provided strong critiques of gender oppression rooted in the importance of historical transformations in patriarchy, the development of specifically western of capitalist forms of institutions such as the family or state, or alternatively ground its assertions in personal or political experience or convictions (Barrett, 1980; Firestone, 1970; Greer, 1971; Millett, 1971; Mitchell, 1971). What is perhaps surprising, then, is the enormity of the shift that has taken place within what is now commonly called the lesbian and gay studies. This shift has primarily taken two directions or forms: firstly, towards poststructural theory that often has little foundation in any kind of empirical work and is focused more primarily in the form of journalism that sometimes makes similar claims. I am thinking here of the work of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and her followers, Judith Butler’s highly influential analyses, similar often French feminist psychoanalytic studies, plus some important collections (see Bristow and Wilson, 1993; Butler 1990, 1993; Dollimore, 1991; Fuss, 1992; Harwood et al., 1993; Nicholson and Seidman, 1995; Sedgwick, 1985, 1990). Populist examples are numerous and include Cassell’s Sexual Politics series, which covers everything from queer film interpretations to studies of cross-dressing, and writers for magazines such as ‘Attitude’ and ‘Genre’ including Mark Simpson (Simpson, 1994, 1996). Initially, I wish to consider the context of this shift in direction. The current lesbian and gay studies have primarily come out of three developments. The first of these is the formation of careers of many gay men and lesbians, including founding members of gay liberation movements, in academia. Their research activity and publications have had a fundamental impact in forming gay and lesbian studies. Secondly, the expansion and adoption of a particular type of theory, a mostly North American form of poststructuralism often tied up with the wider development of European literary and cultural studies, has secured many old and gained many new academic positions. Thirdly, the AIDS crisis and other sociopolitical developments, ranging from Section 28 in the UK to the rise of fundamentalism in the US, have provided much of the means, as well as the ammunition for, empirical and political support for a lesbian and gay studies. Two immediate and important concerns are raised here. The first is the increasing extent to which lesbian and gay studies, and the queer theory and politics attendant with it, is divorced from wider politics or connections with grass roots activism. The development of queer theory alongside such campaigns as ACT-UP and OutRage, while significant, is still not evidence of links with lesbian and gay communities across the full spectrum of many societies and is often focused on the specialist activities of very small groups. Secondly, it is important to clarify here that we are also considering a major mutation in theoretical standpoint and, on top of this, a shift in emphasis across differing disciplines. While the first wave of lesbian and gay studies was strongly located within the fields of social history, sociology or politics, the current expansion of lesbian and gay studies has developed primarily out of literary criticism, cultural studies and psychoanalysis. At the risk of stating the obvious, this *does* make a difference. For while the social sciences were directly founded upon a strong and sometimes overtly political engagement with the social world, cultural, literary and psychoanalytic studies – while not necessarily excluding such considerations – are clearly more strongly founded upon more individual or textual questions. In addition, while one may easily sing the praises of interdisciplinary study, the foundations of such differing academic perspectives are not so easily reconciled.

**Critiques of heteronormativity re-entrench existing subject identity roles and manifest the harmful aspects of capitalism**

McNamara in 2000 (Liam, “Review: The Political economy of Sex”, <http://culturemachine.tees.ac.uk/Reviews/rev11.htm>)

In Chapter Three, Hennessey attacks the current reigning ideology of neoliberalism, which involves an increasing drive for profits, globalization, and a general cultural turn in theory, leading to the assimilation of critical theory by the academy. This has lead to the abandonment of Marxism and its substitution by cultural materialism. Hennessey tries to turn the argument back to theories of exploitation, ultimately rejecting overdetermination in favour of commodity fetishism. She explicitly links heteronormativity to the emergence of the commodity form, since it is the division of labour that has allowed the formation of new sexual subjectivities in the consumer society. This liberation of productive forces has enabled the emergence of new desiring subjects that escape the heterosexual norm, but this development is underpinned by a new patriarchal hierarchy ushering in a renascent form of heteronormativity. Hennessey points out how in the nineteenth century sexology and psychoanalytic discourses allowed for new divergent sexual identities that were swiftly reterritorialized under the ‘perversions’. Heteronormative paradigms have gone on to manage desire by restricting queer desire to the perversions. Basically Hennessey is trying to historicize Cixous’ ideas of a ‘patriarchal binary logic’ and the persistence of gendered active/passive roles of sexuality.**6** Hennessey links sexual liberation to economic imperatives and the division of labour in addition to the conventional cultural explanations, and suggests that desire has been managed and moved away from procreative norms due to the demands of the new productive forces found in mass consumption. Hennessey’s stance shows a critical understanding of sexual liberation, by the introduction of the theory of class. Hennessey points out: ‘capitalism does not require heteronormative families or even a gendered division of labour. What it does require is an unequal division of labour’ (P&P, 105). Some gay men have adopted the ideology of the family, but this ideology is generally compulsory for the disadvantaged. At bottom, what is needed is commodity exchange and surplus value for the few not many. Capitalism still relies on heterosexuality for the poor, and the new non-normative forms of sexuality are generally reserved for the affluent consumer subjectivities. These emergent ‘postmodern sexualities’ are compatible with the new liquescent forms of the commodity, possessing a fluidity that has an affinity with the new consumer ethos**.**

# \*\*\*Sci-Fi Specific\*\*\*

# FRAMEWORK/SOLVENCY

**Sci-fi empirically can’t understand or affect policy**

**Berger 1976** – award winning science fiction author (July, Albert I., “ The Triumph of Prophecy: Science Fiction and Nuclear Power in the Post-Hiroshima Period” Science Fiction Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, JSTOR)

This naivete about politics and preoccupation with technological solutions was the obverse of the prevailing SF distaste for politics. Politics had always had a bad press in the science-fiction magazines, being portrayed as the captive of technologically, if not socially reactionary special interests. The appalling scientific ignorance and prejudice displayed by Congress after Hiroshima, and its general unwillingness to be educated, merely compounded the problem in the eyes of science-fiction writers and readers. This distaste for politics was testified to not only by letters-to-the-editor in Astounding and the fan magazines but also by an article by W.B. de Graeff, "Congress is too Busy" (Sept 1946), detailing with a gleeful contempt the most mundane and ridiculous chores of a member of Congress. By 1950 even an old stalwart like E.E. Smith could take up nearly a third of a novel-First Lensman (not serialized; Fantasy Press 1950)-with a detailed account of an election in which military heroes act both as police forces and as candidates arrayed against a corrupt political machine. The use of conspicuously armed poll watchers and what amounts to a military coup are justified by the criminal tactics of the opposition. Smith's villains are supposed to be the pawns of a sinister conspiracy of aliens, but their methods are described as normal American practice.

**SF alone isn’t enough – new socio-literary techniques are needed for public engagement**

**Miller and Bennett 2008**  - Associate Director of the Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes, Associate Director and CoPI of the Center for Nanotechnology in Society, and Chair of the PhD Program in Human and Social Dimensions of Science and Technology at Arizona State University. He is also a Senior Fellow in the Center for World Affairs and the Global Economy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He holds a PhD in electrical engineering from Cornell University AND PhD in biochemistry from Arizona State University in 2003 and today is an Assistant Research Professor in the Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes and the Center for Nanotechnology in Society at Arizona State University (October, Clark A. and Ira, “ Thinking longer term about technology: is there value in science fiction-inspired approaches to constructing futures? ” Science and Public Policy, 35(8), Ebsco)

Even if science fiction offers an alternative approach to fostering thinking about longer-term developments in technology — one that focuses as much or more on the social dimensions of technological change than the technological — new kinds of socio-literary techniques would still be needed in order to exploit this approach in public engagement or technology assessment exercises. In the past two years, we have undertaken or participated in several exercises that have explored how aspects of science fiction might be used in interesting ways that we describe in brief here. We do not mean these to rise to the standard of proof of concept, by any stretch of the imagination. Nevertheless, we offer them as illustrations of a couple of possible approaches we have taken, early on in our explorations of how we might use science fiction-inspired techniques to advance the objectives of societal reflection on technological futures.

**Predictions about the future of space must be rigorous and realistic—their science fiction stories don’t qualify**

**HUNTLEY et al 2010** (Wade L. Huntley, US Naval Postgraduate School; Joseph G. Bock, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies; Miranda Weingartner, Weingartner Consulting; “Planning the unplannable: Scenarios on the future of space,” Space Policy 26)

Few space security analysts have focused on the possibilities for cooperation to function more organically as an element of the evolution of human space activities, rather than simply as a structure applied to that evolution. The more organic possibility reflects the potential over time for cooperative agreements and institutions to change state interests themselves. Processes facilitating such evolution include strategic interest convergence, information creation and sharing, ‘‘spillover’’ and ‘‘feedback’’ effects, issue scope expansion and integration, and the facilitation of transnational linkages. Interacting synergistically with the interests they are influencing, such cooperation evolves dynamically as well. As such cooperation deepens its roots among all parties, it can begin to endure self-sustainably.21 The potential for more organic principles and cooperative institutions to shape the nature of political relations themselves suggests a more expansive concept of the underlying nature of interstate relations e one that need not always resemble the realist image of a Hobbesian ‘‘war of all against all’’. Hedley Bull’s ‘‘anarchical society’’ and Daniel Deudney’s ‘‘negarchy,’’ for example, capture the past and present existence of international political orders that, despite the absence of hierarchical government, have functioned as qualitatively distinct governance systems.22 Application of concepts of qualitatively distinct political ordering principles to developing governance conditions of the future human presence in space is as yet largely unexplored.23 The fluidity of interests and capabilities with respect to space activities suggests a relatively large potential for organized cooperation to influence their evolution. Such cooperative principles and institutions would then become intrinsic to the dynamic political forces shaping the expanding human presence in space, growing and evolving with them, rather than acting as exogenous static structures seeking to constrain those forces.24 The rate and uncertainty of change in both the technological and political dimensions of expanding human space activities complicates this task. Herein lies the value of ‘‘realistic visions’’. Rigorous articulations of the interplay of the wide variety of constraints, tradeoffs, uncertainties, and values entailed in human expansion into space can facilitate evaluation of the applicability of alternative governance concepts to human space activities in the context of dynamic change. Among other things, such visions can explore how alternative futures in space are intimately linked to terrestrial conditions. As the human presence in space develops into an integral aspect of global life, it will increasingly reflect the prevailing conditions of global life. Anticipation of space weaponization premises continued earthly insecurity and conflict, while ambitions for growing commercial and exploratory development of space presume increasing international integration and collaboration. A future in which space becomes a domain of conflict and arms race competition may be irreconcilable with visions for increasing peaceful human presence embodied in today’s growing commercial and exploratory activities. Choices among alternative futures for the human presence in space may depend upon choices among alternative futures for life on Earth as well. The following section reviews the potential for scenariobuilding techniques to inform these choices by providing rigorous detailed visions of future worlds that account for a wide range of current realities and span the spectra of the most important uncertainties. The resulting plausible, integrated visions can yield feasible policy-relevant insights that demonstrably enable current policy making to be more farsighted. Beyond the fruits of the exercises themselves, the longer time-frames entailed in scenario building also facilitate dialogue among diverse parties divided on nearer-term questions. The collaboration enabled can inspire innovation and integrated analysis among diverse experts, leading to the development of a productive ‘‘epistemic community’’25 addressing the full scope of future human space activities. Vision development is only one aspect of long-term planning. Comprehensive knowledge generation and strategies for policy making are also required. But vision development is currently the least well advanced. All global policy debate, including US national security policy making, can benefit from having a fuller range of rigorous and credible assessments of long-term prospects from which to draw.

**We should build plausible and specific scenarios—that’s key to improve space policy and avoid nuclear war**

**HUNTLEY et al 2010** (Wade L. Huntley, US Naval Postgraduate School; Joseph G. Bock, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies; Miranda Weingartner, Weingartner Consulting; “Planning the unplannable: Scenarios on the future of space,” Space Policy 26)

On 16 March 1966 Neil Armstrong deftly piloted the Gemini VIII within 0.9 meters of the pre-launched Agena Target Vehicle, then slowly accomplished the world’s first orbital docking. Armstrong and co-pilot David Scott were still in a celebratory mood, when Scott noticed the Gemini beginning to roll. Armstrong used the Orbit Attitude and Maneuvering System thrusters, but the moment he throttled down, they started to roll again. Turning off the Agena seemed to stop the problem for a few minutes. But when it began again, the roll was accelerating. They undocked and with a long burst of translation thrusters moved away from the Agena. But the roll continued to accelerate. Tumbling now at one revolution per second, the astronauts were in danger of impaired vision and loss of consciousness. But Armstrong was able to bring the wild oscillations under control thanks in part to preparation by a flight simulation training exercise that many pilots disliked, believing the simulation was too unlikely to waste their scarce training time and energy on.26 Fortunately, NASA did not plan the astronauts’ training based on the most likely scenarios. Instead, they planned on the basis of plausible and important scenarios. Developing plausible scenarios helps us take the long view in a world of great uncertainty.27 Scenarios are narratives of the future defined around a set of unpredictable drivers, intended to expand insight by identifying unexpected but important possible directions and outcomes. Scenarios have a timeline over which meaningful change is possible. They are a useful tool for examining a number of different possible futures. They provide a means to stimulate new thinking, challenge assumptions, and provide an effective framework for dialogue among a diverse group of stakeholders. They can inspire new ideas and innovations by helping identify common goals and interests that transcend current political divides. Scenarios thus help to develop the means to work towards preferred futures.28 Scenarios are stories about the way the world might turn out tomorrow; they do not need to be likely, but they ought to be plausible, internally consistent, and relevant. It is precisely by considering possible, even if not necessarily likely, scenarios that we are best prepared for the unpredictability of the future. By encouraging creative thinking beyond the future we anticipate, scenarios help us become more resilient to unexpected events. With respect to their utility in guiding policy development, three features distinguish good scenarios from simple speculations, linear predictions or fanciful musings of the future: Scenarios are decision focused. Successful scenarios begin and end by clarifying the decisions and actions the participants must make if they are to deal successfully with an uncertain future. One common misconception of scenarios is that they are prescient, path dependent predictions of the future. On the contrary, scenarios are used to order our thoughts amid uncertainty, build common ground among differing perspectives, and think rationally about our options. The value of a set of scenarios accrues not from their accuracy or likelihood, but from their plausibility and the insights they generate. Scenarios are imaginative. In examining a decision within the context of a number of different futures, scenarios require us to look behind fixed assumptions. They encourage participants to challenge conventional wisdom, create new contexts for existing decisions, and think creatively about options for surmounting obstacles. At their core, then, scenarios are about learning.29 Scenarios are logical. The scenario process is formal and disciplined in its use of information and analysis. The creativity and imagination inspired by scenarios can only be as effective as it is based in realistic assessments. In requiring participants to challenge each others’ thoughts, perceptions, and mind-sets, the process helps clarify that reality. Scenarios first emerged following World War II as a method of military planning. This approach was reflected in Herman Kahn’s assertion of the need to ‘‘think the unthinkable’’ concerning the possibilities and implications of war in the atomic age. ‘‘In our times’’, Kahn wrote in 1966, ‘‘thermonuclear war may seem unthinkable, immoral, insane, hideous, or highly unlikely, but it is not impossible’’. 30 Kahn’s motivation was, in part, recognition of the counter-intuitive notion that planning could be a necessary means of avoidance. Analyzing scenarios reached greater methodological sophistication with the work of Pierre Wack, a planner at the London offices of Royal Dutch/Shell. Wack and his colleagues refined the application of scenario thinking to private enterprise. This work helped Shell anticipate the consequences of the emergence of a cartel among oil exporting countries, and to develop various plans to cushion the blow that would (and did) result from formation of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960. Shell was also able to anticipate massive economic and political change in the then USSR in the late 1980s.31 Scenario analysis came to be used in the political arena when associates of Wack assisted stakeholders in South Africa in the peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy. Many doubted the country’s prospects; in 1987, the Guardian Weekly quoted Margaret Thatcher’s former spokesman Bernard Ingham as saying that anyone who believed the African National Congress (ANC) would one day rule South Africa was ‘‘living in cloud cuckoo land.’’32 But with operations in South Africa and an interest in preventing anarchy following the downfall of apartheid, Shell sent some of Wack’s prote´ge´s, including Adam Kahane, to convene meetings of top governmental, religious, civic and business leaders at a conference site there called Mont Fleur. From February 1990, when Nelson Mandela was released from prison, to April 1994, when the first all-race elections were held, participants identified relatively certain and uncertain but plausible factors, and then formed into teams to research various alternative futures. In the midst of deep conflict and uncertainty, ‘‘Mont Fleur’’ brought people together from across ideological and political divides to think creatively about the future of their country. The collaboratively drafted scenarios were not a panacea, but did contribute to establishing a common vocabulary and enough mutual understanding for participants to find common ground on complex decisions. In particular, the consensus on the undesirability of three particular scenarios contributed to developing the perception of shared interests that was an important element in the success of the governmental transition.33 Scenario-building and analysis has become a distinct tool of US government policy making, and has been applied directly to future space security issues. For example, one major US Air Force scenario-based study evaluated 25 emerging technologies and 40 separate potential weapons systems through the lens of six ‘‘alternative futures’’ in an effort to guide future Air Force policy choices.34 This exercise (and others like it) exemplifies the potential for applying nonlinear future planning methodologies to large-scale public policy topics, including the future of space. The principal deficiency of such government-sponsored efforts is simply the narrowness of their focus e they are, by design, only concerned about a single government’s decision points and are shaped by the goals, dilemmas and uncertainties most relevant to that single party. Lacking is a parallel process to achieve the same kind of expansive thinking while also incorporating a full range of stakeholders. Such exercises can hardly be generated by governments.

**Our framework arguments turn their technological democracy impact—credible and specific scenarios are critical to manage technological change**

**HUNTLEY et al 2010** (Wade L. Huntley, US Naval Postgraduate School; Joseph G. Bock, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies; Miranda Weingartner, Weingartner Consulting; “Planning the unplannable: Scenarios on the future of space,” Space Policy 26)

It is this last type of scenario-building and analysis that is most appropriate for initiating and continuing dialogue around the future use of space. Generative scenarios are particularly well suited to addressing three core challenges: anticipating the technological changes relevant to the full range of the growing human utilization of space that will inevitably unfold over the coming decades; guiding and planning integration across the full range of human space activities in conjunction with evolving terrestrial political conditions; identifying and responding to the critical uncertainties over the directions and implications of long-term developments in both the previous dimensions. Scenario building can address these challenges by providing rigorous, detailed visions of future worlds accounting for a wide range of variables, inevitable change and uncertainty. The collaboration entailed in scenario building can also inspire the creativity and imagination of an expert community representing diverse viewpoints on immediate issues. The resulting plausible, integrated visions, responsive to current realities and robust against future uncertainties, can yield feasible policy-relevant ideas for promoting peaceful development of the future human presence in space despite the wide range of possible future developments both in space and on Earth. As noted earlier, vision development is only one aspect of long-term planning. A comprehensive knowledge base and strategies for policy-making are also required. By integrating expertise in these other areas into vision development, scenario-building exercises can contribute valuable long-term insights to policy debates. The following section reports the results of one such exercise.

# DEBATE NOT KEY

**SF education available in public domain and in schools**

**Reynolds 77** – Associate Professor of Education in the Profes- sional Laboratory Experiences Department of the University of Georgia. (John C., “Science Fiction in the 7-12 Curriculum” *The Clearing House,* Vol. 51, No. 3, Nov., 1977, JSTOR)

A survey of 300 teachers in four Southeastern states\* during the past two academic years has revealed that 59 percent of 7-12 grade instructors utilize some form of science fiction in their class- room instruction. Science fiction as an educa- tional tool appears to be gaining favor with teach- ers. What accounts for this interest in science fic- tion and science fantasy? The popularity of numerous science fiction movies and television shows such as Star Trek and Space: 1999 provides a partial answer. As a form of vicarious escapism and adventure, science fiction has definitely established a large and enthusiastic following since its inception. From Jules Verne and H.G. Wells to Arthur C. Clarke and Ray Bradbury, the imagina- tion of both science fiction fans and the general public have been stimulated by science fiction novels, short stories, paperbacks, pulp magazines, films, and television programs. The phenomena of science fiction in its various media forms has edu- cational implications for teachers, supervisors, and administrators.

**Wrong forum – SF wildly popular now – means they can access their education outside**

**Colatrella 1999 –** Professor of Literature and Cultural Studies in the School of Literature, Communication, and Culture, and Co-Director of the Georgia Tech Center for the Study of Women, Science, and Technology; PhD Rutgers University, 1997 (Carol, “Science Fiction in the Information Age.” American Literary History Vol. 11, No. 3, Autumn, 1999, JSTOR)

In our own time, science fiction's possibilities have encour- aged us to think globally and even universally. The current popu- larity of galactic spectacles, whether comic or serious (think also of the movies Independence Day [1996], Men in Black [1997], Contact [1997], Gattaca [1997], Deep Impact [1998], etc.), compli- cates our notions of high and low art, of distinct and rigid generic boundaries, as the beauty and power of science and technology impress audiences moved by the magnitude and insidious po- tential of ideas and innovations to damage individuals, social groups, and whole civilizations. Many SF fictions, films, videos, and games have crossed over into mainstream venues that mix politics and entertainment, which are no longer considered sepa- rate as television news executives seek to expand their audiences, attracting readers, computer users, and television watchers. Con- sider the phrase "Star Wars," which has multiple referents-it signifies a film indebted to the television series (also now a book series) Star Trek, strategic defense plans of the Reagan adminis- tration, computer games available to children and adults alike via the Internet or commercial purchase, and the documentary television coverage of the Gulf War. Politics, commerce, and en- tertainment converge, as news from Wall Street reminds us

# CAPITALISM LINKS

**Science fiction is a commodity – it’s packaged and manipulated by profit-driven publishers**

**Elkins and Suvin 1979** – former editor of Science Fiction Studies AND Professor Emeritus at McGill University (November, Charles and Darko, “ Preliminary Reflections on Teaching Science Fiction Critically ” Science Fiction Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3, JSTOR)

SF shares with other paraliterary some aspects very important, indeed crucial, for the teacher and student. First, a large number of people actually read it regardless of the official educational requirements. Therefore, assigned texts will usually be presented to a group of students heterogeneous in respect of their previous familiarity with that kind of text: some will be familiar with whatever books are chosen, some will not. More importantly, some will have notions (sometimes strong opinions) about what kind of writing- what characteristic genre or category - these books belong to. Second, the economically and indeed anthropologically (philosophically) crucial aspect SF shares with other paraliterature is that it is primarily a commodity. (Every book published under capitalism is a commodity; but remnants of pre-capitalist notions of prestige, glory, etc., qualify the commodity status of much "high lit.") This means that the book publishers and the TV and movie producers have to enforce certain strongly constricting lower-common-denominator cliches in strict proportion to the capital invested and profits expected (rather than to a mythical audience-taste); the constricted narrative patterns, plots, characters, language, etc., in turn prevent paraliterature from giving a full and lasting satisfaction to its consumer. However, this also means that the book-as-commodity acquires a certain financial independence of its ideological content: it will be subject to promotion, hypes, etc., and conversely it will often be excused anything as long as it brings in the profits. Third, this makes for its twofold dominant societal function: financially, that of selling well (to many readers); ideologically, that of momentarily entertaining and pacifying its readers. This helps the social status quo both economically and politically, by addicting the reader and/or viewer to further reading/viewing for further momentary compensation (see Joanna Russ's "SF and Technology as Mystification," SFS No. 16 [Nov. 1978]) and by defusing active or at least radical civic discontent, in favor of mass social mythologies of an anti-rational kind (see Roland Barthes' Mythologies).

**SF is dominated by publishers interested in profit – results in censorship**

**Zebrowski 2006** – award winning SF author (July 6, George, “ We Are Not Alone A Talk by George Zebrowski ” <http://www2.ku.edu/~sfcenter/Zebrowski.htm>)

The position of writers much more resembles that of "Bambi Meets Godzilla," than that of partners in an industry. Adapt or get squashed; usually get squashed, and contribute to the larger tally of a company's earnings even when your work is individually accounted a loss, or further enslaved when the publisher refuses to revert rights through the subterfuge of a token "in print" claim, to beef up the assets column, which includes losses. "Publishers kill authors by creative bookkeeping," wrote Richard Curtis in his pioneering study of the 1990s. "By depriving authors of vital information about book sales, delaying disbursements interminably, obscuring the meaning of figures, manipulating collection dates of subsidiary income, and withholding excessive royalties as a cushion against returns, many publishers figuratively strangle writers and literally poison their good will." Royalty statements are fictional because, as more than one accountant has noticed, the information provided tells you nothing beyond the fact that someone wrote it down and forces you to take his word for it. I refer mostly to big publishing, which today is better at hiding its ways, not to the often brave small and midsized venture whose failings arise from having to share breath with T-Rex distributors who make and keep a dishonest environment encouraged by the big houses. The smaller houses are slowly taking publishing back to its roots, especially in science fiction, even as the big houses are seeking to sell off divisions and bury the records of a diseased past before it can be excavated. The most surprising thing is how well known and uncontested the facts are and how little has been done to change them. Writers grow used to things and have to choose what to do first. Even if I could pay the legal costs, I cannot sacrifice the time needed to find out what happened to the "bragged about" last 300 copies of Brute Orbits, my 1999 Campbell Prize winner, or try to discover the why of the ever-receding earnout figures for my Star Trek novels, where the records probably no longer exist. Publishing contracts are inherently one-sided, and illegal to one degree or another, because they fail to perform what is promised while saying that they will, by claiming in too many pages of non-English that they are not responsible for anything even when they are. Publishers get defensive toward protesting authors who point out this and other failings, even threatening them with "junk publication"--a minimal edition, for show, which only claims to fulfill the contract, by putting them on an economic blacklist that amounts to censorship. These threats are well known even among authors who earn good money, so called in the allowed accounting, and is carried out in other contexts, as when a publisher wishes to downsize books from planned hardcovers to a smaller printing in mass paperback. This happened to a novel of mine, which subsequently made the New York Times Notable Books of the Year, which infuriated the editor, whose judgment and ulterior motives were suddenly exposed. The small printing, on the cheapest paper stock, was in fact the uncorrected proof, with some fifty errors, all corrected on time by me, left unfixed. The editors at Easton Press, a book club, made all the corrections for their signed, leatherbound hardcover first edition--of a mass paperback, which further irritated my editor, who had reverted the book club rights to me, thinking it a worthless concession that would shut me up. The downsizing was later admitted, with no sense of irony, to have been useless. The justice that comes to authors is much smaller than the original injustice. The good faith clause was violated, since my novel was to have been a hardcover, but this provision is always violated in one way or another. It's not that more is done for one author's book over another, but that nothing or next to nothing is done for most, even as bookstores are paid to display certain titles prominently. Laws governing the conduct of contracts, rather than the contracts themselves, are routinely ignored. Take it or leave it. Don't bite the hand that feeds you crumbs--sometimes big ones, but not what is owed. An editor can mislead a writer, even tell him in good faith how many copies were printed or how few remain in the warehouse, but this has no accountability because of the merely insisted upon whole-contract-and-nothing-but-the-contract wording of that illegal contract clause. An editor may promise you a contract, even tell your agent, then retract and say that his word is without contractual meaning, and claim to be the sole arbiter of that claim. The full law of contracts and the laws governing contracts disagrees, but they count on your being unable to fight the case, even with words on paper.

# QUEER THEORY LINKS

**The aff’s traditional SF understands the future as a heterosexual future – alt creates a far more radical vision of SF that solves the case**

**Pearson 99** -- PhD student in English Studies at the University of Wollongong in Australia. She has an MA in English from McGill University in Canada and taught for fifteen years in Cultural Studies and English at Trent University before returning to doctoral studies (Wendy, “Alien Cryptographies: The View from Queer.” Science Fiction Studies, Volume 26, Part 1 http://www.depauw.edu/sfs/backissues/77/pearson77.htm)

I have argued in this essay that a queer reading is performative in itself and that it is, in the long run, less about content—we have already considered the lack of queerness of gay and lesbian content within mimetic representations—than about worldview. Queer readings are informed by a desire to understand the text both in terms of its potential for representing dissident sexual subjectivities outside of a Cartesian understanding of the subject and in terms of the text’s engagement with a specific historico-cultural understanding of dissident sexualities and of the place of such sexualities within the sex/gender system that regulates and constructs normative—and thus also non-normative—ways of being-in-the-world as a sexed and sexual subject. When the questions raised by the formulations "queer reading" and "queer text" are brought to bear on sf, what is revealed is a complex and contradictory fictional arena. On the one hand, there is the particular aptness of sf, as a non-mimetic form of writing, to produce stories in which sexuality does not need to be understood in ways "vouched for by human senses and common sense" and to interrogate the ways in which sexual subjectivities are created as effects of the system that sustains them. On the other hand, **there are also the variety of ways in which most sf texts, regardless of their identification as "estranged fictions," are completely unselfconscious in their reproduction of the heteronormative environment in which they were written.** A queer reading may then work through a range of different strategies— from decoding the outlaw cryptographies that have hidden—and may still hide—issues of sexual difference (often in plain sight) to delineating the specifics that may make a particular text queer, to disinterring the many and peculiar ways through which the dominant twentieth-century Western conception of sexuality underlies, is implicated in, and sometimes collides with sf’s attempt to envision alternative ways of being-in-the-world, ways which are always, no matter how deeply their signs are hidden, already about being-in-the-world as a person with a sex, a gender, and a sexuality. The subversive potential of sf as a mode through which non-Cartesian subjectivities can be represented is a function precisely of sf’s ability to create a "radically or significantly different formal framework" (Suvin 18), of its very estrangement from the mimetic attempt of naturalistic—or mundane—fiction to reiterate faithfully a teleological understanding of humanity’s being-in-the-world, to represent the subject as the cause rather than the effect of the system. Thus, sf’s "foundational infidelity" (Jackson 125) to the world "vouched for by human senses and common sense" at one and the same time makes it possible—although obviously not inevitable—for sf to tell alternative stories—other stories, alien stories—of both sexual ontologies and the systems that sustain and create them. Sf narratives may, seen from a queer viewpoint(s), provide a map or chart of those alien spaces—whether inner or outer—in which queers do, have, and will exist. Queer sf provides spaces to go beyond simply writing gay men and lesbians into uninterrogated hetero-normative visions of both present and future and may, at its best, answer Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s call to bypass the old familiar routes "across the misleadingly symmetrical map ... fractured in a particular historical situation by the profound asymmetries of gender oppression and heterosexist oppression" and, instead, to engage in the more promising project [which] would seem to be a study of the incoherent dispensation itself, the indisseverable girdle of incongruities under whose discomfiting span, for most of a century, have unfolded both the most generative and the most murderous plots of our culture. (90)

# STARSHIP Bad

**Heinlein was a hack and Starship Troopers is an outdated celebration of war**

**PANSHIN 1968** (Alexei, Award-winning Science Fiction Author and Critic, Heinlein in Dimension, http://www.enter.net/~torve/critics/Dimension/hd04-1.html)

The last appearance of the idea comes in Starship Troopers, the first novel written in Heinlein's third period. Heinlein has his narrator "prove" as a class assignment that war and moral perfection derive from the instinct to survive, thereby putting a stamp of approval on war. Rico, the narrator, concludes: Man is what he is, a wild animal with the will to survive, and (so far) the ability, against all competition. Unless one accepts that, anything one says about morals, war, politics -- you name it -- is nonsense. Correct morals arise from knowing what Man is --not what do-gooders and well-meaning old Aunt Nellies would like him to be. The universe will let us know -- later -- whether or not Man has any "right" to expand through it. Though it may not seem to be, this is really the old argument that might makes right. It is hard to say whether it is in character for Heinlein's narrator to deliver this argument because the narrator is never defined closely enough for us to tell his attitudes and capabilities. The story itself only partly offers evidence for the argument given: that is, we only know that Heinlein's men are willing to fight. Most important, the argument does not belong of necessity to the story -- it is tossed in solely as an off-the-cuff remark. In other words, the presence of this opinion in this story as it is given is of a different order than its presence in either The Puppet Masters or Tunnel in the Sky and is a digression in a way that it is not in Starman Jones. It is frequent extended editorials of this sort that have damaged Heinlein's recent stories beyond any repair. The impression Heinlein has given by this change in emphasis is of a man standing in a pulpit delivering sermons against an enemy that no one but he can see clearly. Since these opinions he has delivered are obviously of primary importance to him, negative reactions to these stories of his have seemed only to cause him to state his opinions all the more strongly. The novelists of the last century, particularly the bad ones, are difficult and dated reading because they continually moralized and their moralizations have not aged well. My own belief is that Heinlein's moralizations will look just as odd to our descendants and read as poorly.

**Starship Troopers is sanitized propaganda for war**

**PANSHIN 1968** (Alexei, Award-winning Science Fiction Author and Critic, Heinlein in Dimension, http://www.enter.net/~torve/critics/Dimension/hd04-1.html)

Starship Troopers (F&SF, October, November as Starship Soldier), Heinlein's 1959 Hugo award-winning novel, has been widely taken as a militaristic polemic. I don't see that any other reading is really possible. Not only does the story-line actively put the military life in the most glamorous terms possible (note, for instance, the emotional difference between the magazine title, the editor's choice, and the book title, Heinlein's choice), but there are numerous classroom interludes and asides by the narrator that attempt to give a direct philosophical justification for government by veterans, and militarism as a way of life. The book's nearest cousin is the sort of recruiting film that purports to show the life of a typical soldier, with a soundtrack commentary by earnest sincere Private Jones who interprets what we see for us. The outstanding characteristic of a film of this sort, and of Heinlein's book, is slick patness. The story line of this book is actually quite simple: the training of a "Mobile Infantryman" of the future and his participation in a future war. However, Heinlein disguises the simplicity of his story by employing a very involved order of narration that, clarified, goes as follows: One -- Mobile Infantrymen are dropped from a starship during a future war. There is a quick strike, given in detail, ending with the death of one of the armored, heavily-armed soldiers as they are picked up from the raid. This, of course, is just what a recruiting film would do, use a large slab of action as a narrative hook to arouse interest and sympathy, with some death-and-glory to tickle those young adventurers susceptible to its appeal. Two -- Just as the recruiting film would do, cut back to pick up the eager young narrator on the day he enlists (instead of going to Harvard, as his rich father would have him). The next five chapters give an account of basic training: the tough sergeant, the rigorous training, the hero fouling up and being straightened out, and then graduation from basic. Three -- Neatly eased into the above is a flashback to the hero's high school class in History and Moral Philosophy, a course that the society's rulers have decreed must be taken by all (though it need not be passed). There is also a ruling that this course must be taught by an ex-service man, and this class and the hero's teacher, Colonel Dubois, are brought up again and again. Four -- The early career of a raw young soldier. This is where the raid that opens the book naturally fits. Following it is an account of leave and the narrator's application for Officer Candidates School. Five -- A very long chapter showing Rico, the narrator, as an officer-in-training, and then as a student officer in an important combat situation. Six -- Close with the narrator as a seasoned officer in a reprise of the situation that opens the book. Starship Troopers is in no way an account of human problems or character development. There is no sustained human conflict. The story is the account of the making of a soldier -- or, rather, a marine -- and nothing more. The narrator goes in as a boot and emerges a lieutenant, and that is all. Heinlein's "soldiers" are really marines, by the way, based on today's Marines, not on regular infantry. They are a small, highly disciplined elite corps with a strong esprit who are carried on board ships run by the Navy, and used on planetary raids. Heinlein's officers are called "mister" and his basic training is called "boot camp," both true of Marines, but not of the Army. For all that the book is told in the first person, Heinlein's narrator remains curiously anonymous. At the end you know nothing of his tastes, his likes and dislikes, his personal life. The course of the book changes him in no way because there is nothing to change -- Rico remains first and last a voice reading lines about how nice it is to be a soldier. The other characters are even more sketchy, or are simple expositions of an attitude. Rico's father, for instance, is used at the beginning of the book to oppose his son's decision to join the service, and then resurrected as the corporal who replaces Rico when he goes off to OCS (I said the story was pat). The slickness of the story is quite bothersome to me. War in the story involves death and glory and that is all; disease, dirt, and doubt are missing. All the soldiers we see are tough, smart, competent, cleancut, clean shaven, and noble.

**Starship Troopers glorifies war—it also doesn’t solve their arguments because the system is simply presented as correct, which undermines debate**

**PANSHIN 1968** (Alexei, Award-winning Science Fiction Author and Critic, Heinlein in Dimension, http://www.enter.net/~torve/critics/Dimension/hd04-1.html)

It is, of course, Heinlein's intention to make war glorious. He wishes to exalt the military and the common soldier. He says explicitly: A soldier accepts personal responsibility for the safety of the body politic of which he is a member, defending it, if need be, with his life. The civilian does not. In the society of Heinlein's book only ex-servicemen have the right to hold office, to vote, and to teach History and Moral Philosophy, a subject that presumably only they understand. The society is defined as right. Heinlein bulwarks his position by making it the supposed result of "a scientifically verifiable theory of morals," a stacking of the deck that seems an attempt to **cut off all debate**. I have no final answers myself and I find disturbing the ease with which Heinlein churns out his "right" answers, dismissing all other possibilities. As an example, Colonel Dubois, who teaches the scientific theory of morals and hence should know what is what, says flatly that value is not an absolute ("Wrong," he says, when Rico guesses it is). Value, according to Colonel Dubois, is only in relation to living persons -- value is cost and use; if you value freedom highly you must be willing to give your life for it. A lot of other thinkers, including Plato, have held the opinion that value is an absolute, but Dubois is able to dismiss them out of hand. He is right, you see, and hence doesn't have to explain, refute, or argue, but simply expound his correct opinions. This, I am all too afraid, is how rigid a government such as Heinlein propounds would actually be. "Our system works better than any used by our ancestors," says another teacher of History and Moral Philosophy, and no doubt his definition of "better," like that of any contented man, is "things as they are," in effect, saying, "Our system is more comfortable and home-like than any used by our ancestors." In one class in History and Moral Philosophy, the reason is given why this "perfect" government has never been overthrown: "If you separate out the aggressive ones and make them the sheep dogs, the sheep will never give you any trouble." This, to my mind, is the justification of a sheep-shearer. Luckily, of course, Heinlein defines his government as altruistic, and since everything is done by definition in this story, there is nothing to worry about. I can't help but wonder what the story (recruiting film) would be without a war. The war of the story begins after Rico enters basic and no clear reason is ever given for its start. It is simply needed for illustrative material. Starship troopers are not half so glorious sitting on their butts polishing their weapons for the tenth time for lack of anything else to do.

# A2: SCIENCE EDUCATION

**Science fiction conflates fantasy with fact—this undermines civic engagement and scientific literacy**

**Kluger 7/11/11** - senior writer for TIME (Jeffery, “ Scientific Illiteracy After the Shuttle: Are America's Smartest Days Behind Her?” [http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,2082213,00.html](http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0%2C8599%2C2082213%2C00.html))

The problem is, the land of the free and home of the brave is in danger of becoming — not to put too fine a point on it — the land of the dunderhead, and my trip to Cape Canaveral, Fla., drove that point home. It's no secret that as a people, we're rapidly losing the basic fund of knowledge we need if we're going to function well in a complex world. Just last week, another dispiriting poll was released revealing how little some of us know about our national history. Only 58% of Americans can say with certainty what happened on July 4, 1776 — a figure that falls to a jaw-dropping 31% in the under-30 cohort. Fully 25% of Americans who do know that we seceded from some country or another to become a nation don't know what that former parent country was. This follows on the heels of other polls showing similar numbers of folks believing that we fought the Russians in World War II and beat them with the help of our stalwart German allies. Being historically illiterate is bad. Being scientifically illiterate, however, is even worse — if only because having a working knowledge of how the world operates is essential to understanding critical areas of national policy. Type the words "global warming" and "hoax" into Google and you get an appalling 10.1 million hits. The polls are all over the map on this one, but they show that rising numbers of Americans think climate science is fraudulent or exaggerated — up to 41% in one survey. It's not merely opinion to say that those people are simply wrong. There may be raging debates among scientists about the precise severity, mechanisms and trajectory of global warming, but the basic science is established and accepted, whether you want to admit it or not. Then of course there are the 18% of Americans who believe the sun revolves around Earth and the 28% who think the moon landings were faked. Google that last one and you're taken to sites that profess to be forums for political debate. Political debate? About faking the moon landings? This isn't the Roman Senate, folks, it's fantasyland. What got me thinking about all this was a stop I made after the launch at the Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex — a combination museum and theme park on the Cape Canaveral grounds. The center's special feature this season is called Sci-Fi Summer 2011 — and it delivers just what it promises. Adjacent to the rocket garden, with its full-size mock-ups of the U.S.'s most legendary boosters, is a massive maplike display comparing the sizes of the Saturn 1B, the Saturn 5, the Mercury Redstone, the space shuttle and the International Space Station to the Starship Enterprise. Which is fine, except that all the other spacecraft actually existed and the Enterprise, um, didn't. The spacesuits worn by Neil Armstrong, Gordon Cooper and other astronauts are similarly commingled throughout the exhibit with uniforms worn by the Klingons and Romulons. There is also an entire pavilion set aside for a Star Trek display. O.K., it's cranky to begrudge people a little fun and Star Trek is undeniably cool. But do we really not get enough fun and cool elsewhere? Is there anyone alive who thinks that what Americans need right now are more ways to divert and amuse ourselves? Mix Cooper with the Klingons or the shuttle Enterprise with the Starship Enterprise long enough and the kids who consume all this stuff will no longer be able to tell them apart. Scientific literacy is part of good citizenship. And when it comes to space science, you don't need a lick of fiction to make it fun. An engineer at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory who works in the interplanetary program once explained why he loves his job by saying, "If you can't have a good time coming to work and building robots to send to Mars, give it up, man." The same used to be true of merely learning about such things. It must become true again if the U.S. is going to keep its edge.

# \*\*\*Science is Good\*\*\*

# Falsifiability Good

**The affirmative refuses to accept the same falsifiable review our evidence goes through – disproves their methodology, destroys academic debate, and causes extinction.**

**Coyne, 06** – Author and Writer for the Times (Jerry A., “A plea for empiricism”, FOLLIES OF THE WISE, Dissenting essays, 405pp. Emeryville, CA: Shoemaker and Hoard, 1 59376 101 5)

Supernatural forces and events, essential aspects of most religions, play no role in science, not because we exclude them deliberately, but because they have never been a useful way to understand nature. Scientific “truths” are empirically supported observations agreed on by different observers. Religious “truths,” on the other hand, are personal, unverifiable and contested by those of different faiths. Science is nonsectarian: those who disagree on scientific issues do not blow each other up. Science encourages doubt; most religions quash it. But religion is not completely separable from science. Virtually all religions make improbable claims that are in principle empirically testable, and thus within the domain of science: Mary, in Catholic teaching, was bodily taken to heaven, while Muhammad rode up on a white horse; and Jesus (born of a virgin) came back from the dead. None of these claims has been corroborated, and while science would never accept them as true without evidence, religion does. A mind that accepts both science and religion is thus a mind in conflict. Yet scientists, especially beleaguered American evolutionists, need the support of the many faithful who respect science. It is not politically or tactically useful to point out the fundamental and unbreachable gaps between science and theology. Indeed, scientists and philosophers have written many books (equivalents of Leibnizian theodicy) desperately trying to show how these areas can happily cohabit. In his essay, “Darwin goes to Sunday School”, Crews reviews several of these works, pointing out with brio the intellectual contortions and dishonesties involved in harmonizing religion and science. Assessing work by the evolutionist Stephen Jay Gould, the philosopher Michael Ruse, the theologian John Haught and others, Crews concludes, “When coldly examined . . . these productions invariably prove to have adulterated scientific doctrine or to have emptied religious dogma of its commonly accepted meaning”. Rather than suggesting any solution (indeed, there is none save adopting a form of “religion” that makes no untenable empirical claims), Crews points out the dangers to the survival of our planet arising from a rejection of Darwinism. Such rejection promotes apathy towards overpopulation, pollution, deforestation and other environmental crimes: “So long as we regard ourselves as creatures apart who need only repent of our personal sins to retain heaven’s blessing, we won’t take the full measure of our species-wise responsibility for these calamities”. Crews includes three final essays on deconstruction and other misguided movements in literary theory. These also show “follies of the wise” in that they involve interpretations of texts that are unanchored by evidence. Fortunately, the harm inflicted by Lacan and his epigones is limited to the good judgement of professors of literature. Follies of the Wise is one of the most refreshing and edifying collections of essays in recent years. Much like Christopher Hitchens in the UK, Crews serves a vital function as National Sceptic. He ends on a ringing note: “The human race has produced only one successfully validated epistemology, characterizing all scrupulous inquiry into the real world, from quarks to poems. It is, simply, empiricism, or the submitting of propositions to the arbitration of evidence that is acknowledged to be such by all of the contending parties. Ideas that claim immunity from such review, whether because of mystical faith or privileged “clinical insight” or the say-so of eminent authorities, are not to be countenanced until they can pass the same skeptical ordeal to which all other contenders are subjected.” As science in America becomes ever more harried and debased by politics and religion, we desperately need to heed Crews’s plea for empiricism.

# Falsifiability Good

**The ONLY objective approach to knowledge accumulation is to engage in empirical falsification through the scientific method and historical decision-making.**

**Fischer, 98** – Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University (Frank, “BEYOND EMPIRICISM: POLICY INQUIRY IN POSTPOSITIVIST PERSPECTIVE”, Published in Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 26. No.1 (Spring, 1998): 129-146)

Neopositivism (or logical empiricism) has supplied the epistemological ideals of the contemporary social and policy sciences (Hawkesworth 1988; A theory of knowledge put forth to explain the concepts and methods of the physical and natural sciences, neopositivism has given shape as well to a social science in pursuit quantitatively replicable causal generalizations (Fay 1975). Most easily recognized as the stuff of the research methodology textbook, neopositivist principles emphasize empirical research designs, the use of sampling techniques and data gathering procedures, the measurement of outcomes, and the development of causal models with predictive power (Miller 1993; Bobrow and Dryzek 1987). In the field of policy analysis, such an orientation is manifested in quasi-experimental research designs, multiple regression analysis, survey research, input-output studies, cost-benefit analysis, operations research, mathematical simulation models, and systems analysis (Putt and Springer, 1989; Sylvia, et al. 1991). **The only reliable approach to knowledge accumulation**, according to this epistemology**, is empirical falsification through objective hypothesis-testing of rigorously formulated causal generalizations** (Popper, 1959: Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1992:231; Hofferbert 1990). **The goal is to generate a body of empirical generalizations capable of explaining behavior across social and historical contexts, whether communities, societies, or cultures, independently of specific times, places, or circumstances**. **Not only are such propositions essential to social and political explanation, they are seen to make possible effective solutions to societal problems**. **Such propositions are** said to **supply the cornerstones of theoretical progress.** Underlying this effort is a fundamental positivist principle mandating a rigorous separation of facts and values, the principle of the "fact-value dichotomy" (Bernstein 1976; Proctor 1991). According to this principle, empirical research is to proceed independently of normative context or implications. Because only empirically based causal knowledge can qualify social science as a genuine "scientific" endeavor, social scientists are instructed to assume a "value-neutral" orientation and to limit their research investigations to empirical or "factual" phenomena. Even though adherence to this "fact-value dichotomy" varies in the conduct of actual research, especially at the methodological level, the separation still reigns in the social sciences. To be judged as methodologically valid, research must at least officially pay its respects to the principle (Fischer 1980). In the policy sciences the attempt to separate facts and values has facilitated a technocratic form of policy analysis that emphasizes the efficiency and effectiveness of means to achieve politically established goals. Much of policy analysis, in this respect, has sought to translate inherently normative political and social issues into technically defined ends to be pursued through administrative means. In an effort to sidestep goal-value conflicts typically associated with policy issues, economic and social problems are interpreted as issues in need of improved management and program design; their solutions are to be found in the technical applications of the policy sciences (Amy 1987). Often associated **with this orientation has been a belief in the superiority of scientific decision-making**. Reflecting a subtle antipathy toward democratic processes, terms such as "pressures" and "expedient adjustments" are used to denigrate pluralistic policymaking. If politics doesn't fit into the methodological scheme, then politics is the problem. Some have even argued that the political system itself must be changed to better accommodate policy analysis (Heineman et al. 1990). In the face of limited empirical successes, neopositivists have had to give some ground. Although they continue to stress rigorous empirical research as the long-run solution to their failures, they have retreated from their more ambitious efforts. Today their goal is to aim for propositions that are at least theoretically proveable at some future point in time. An argument propped up by the promise of computer advances, it serves to keep the original epistemology in tack. But the modification misses the point, as postpositivists are quick to point out. The problem is more fundamentally rooted in the empirical social scientists's misunderstanding of the nature of the social. As we shall see, it is a misunderstanding lodged in the very concept of a generalizable, value-free objectivity that neopositivists seek to reaffirm and more intensively apply.

**Only claims that survive the test of falsifiability can be the basis of sound policy decision – they are the only basis of emancipatory action**

**Benson and Stangroom 06**

Ophelia and Jeremy, authors of many philosophy books, Why truth matters, 63-64

Science and other forms of empirical enquiry such as history and forensic investigation do have legitimate authority because the truth-claims they make are based on evidence (and are subject to change if new evidence is discovered). Other systems of ideas that make truth-claims that are not based on evidence, that rely instead on revelation, sacred books, dreams, visions, myths, subjective inner experience, and the like, lack legitimate authority because over many centuries it has gradually become understood that those are not reliable sources. They can be useful starting-points for theory-formation, as has often been pointed out. Theories can begin anywhere, even in dreams. But when it comes to justification, more reliable evidence is required. This is quite a large difference between science and pseudoscience, genuine enquiry and fake enquiry, but it is one that Ross does not take into account. The implication seems to be that for the sake of a 'more democratic culture' it is worth deciding that the wrong answer ought to have as much authority as the right one. And yet of course it is unlikely that Ross really believes that. Surely if he did, he would not have written this book - he would not be able to claim that a more democratic culture is preferable to a less democratic one, or anything else that he claims in his work. However playful or quasi-ironic Strange Weather may be, it does lapse into seriousness at times, it does make claims that Ross clearly wants us to accept - because he thinks they are right as opposed to wrong. The intention of Strange Weather is to correct mistaken views of science and pseudoscience, to replace them with other, truer views. Ross cannot very well argue that his views are wrong and therefore we should believe them. He is in fact claiming authority for his own views, he is attempting to seek the higher part of a truth-hierarchy. The self-refuting problem we always see in epistemic relativism is here in its most obvious form. And Ross ought to realize that if such claims could succeed they would eliminate all possibility for making the kinds of claims that the Left needs to make just as much as anyone else does. Truth-claims, evidence, reason, logic, warrant, are not some fiefdom or gated community or exclusive club. On the contrary. They are the property of everyone, and the only way to refute lies and mistakes. The Left has no more reason to want to live by lies and mistakes than anyone else has.

**Only empiricism allows for the advancement of knowledge – rationalist based theory dissolves into an infinitely regressive battle over technique**

**Richardson 99**

Jeff, Center for Health Program Evaluation, Director Health Economic Unit, Monash University, “Rationalism, Theoretical Orthodoxy and their legacy in Cost Utility Analysis” Working Paper 93, August ISBN 1325 0663 p. i)

The theme of this paper is that there is a malaise in a significant part of theoretical economics which has adversely affected its character and growth and which has spilled over into applied economics in a particular way; viz by reducing the scope of hypotheses that have been the subject of empirical enquiry and by promoting policies on the basis of their conformity with an established orthodoxy, in preference to policies supported by evidence. The approach to this topic is both historical and epistemological. It is argued that the history of science has been characterised by a struggle between the conflicting paradigms of Rationalism and Empiricism with intellectual progress being broadly determined by the extent to which the latter and not the former has been ascendant. It is argued that the reason for this arises from the epistemological structure of the competing paradigms. While Empiricism leads to a method which encourages the growth of knowledge, Rationalism encourages an ultimately sterile focus upon analytical techniques per se. It is suggested that economic orthodoxy and, more specifically, health economic theory has adopted the form and increasingly the substance of Rationalist paradigm and that the inhibiting influence of this can explain the neglect of a series of issues which arise in Cost Utility Analysis and, more broadly, in economic evaluation; issues which, for a non-economist, would have prima facie candidacy for investigation and for possible inclusion in economic theory. Ten examples are given. It is concluded that the opportunity cost of our adoption of methodological Rationalism in terms of intellectual progress elsewhere and policy prescriptions may have been very high.

**Empiricism is the most useful form of knowledge for policymakers—useful in making theories to shape policy**

**Walt, ‘5** – Prof, Kennedy School of Government @ Harvard (Stephen M., Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2005. 8:23–48, pg. 25-26, “The Relationship Between Theory and Policy in International Relations,” http://www.iheid.ch/webdav/site/political\_science/shared/political\_science/3452/walt.pdf) MH

Policy decisions can be influenced by several types of knowledge. First, policy makers invariably rely on purely factual knowledge (e.g., how large are the opponent’s forces? What is the current balance of payments?). Second, decision makers sometimes employ “rules of thumb”: simple decision rules acquired through experience rather than via systematic study (Mearsheimer 1989).3 A third type of knowledge consists of typologies, which classify phenomena based on sets of specific traits. Policy makers can also rely on empirical laws. An empirical law is an observed correspondence between two or more phenomena that systematic inquiry has shown to be reliable. Such laws (e.g., “democracies do not fight each other” or “human beings are more risk averse with respect to losses than to gains”) can be useful guides even if we do not know why they occur, **or if our explanations for them are incorrect**. Finally, policy makers can also use theories. A theory is a causal explanation— it identifies recurring relations between two or more phenomena and explains why that relationship obtains. By providing us with a picture of the central forces that determine real-world behavior, theories invariably simplify reality in order to render it comprehensible.

**Empiricism is the only way to prevent false science from existing**

**Pigliucci 10** chair of the Department of Philosophy at CUNY-Lehman College, PhDs in botany and philosophy of science, doctorate in genetics (Massimo, 5/10/2010, “Conclusion: So, What Is Science after All?”, Nonsense on Stilts: How to Tell Science from Bunk, p.303-4) MH

The presence of coherent conceptual constructs in the form of theories and hypotheses is also a necessary component of science. Science is not just a collection of facts about the world, nor do scientific theories emerge from the accumulation of facts, as Francis Bacon thought. Theories are creative productions of the human mind and reflect our best attempts at making sense of the world as it is. But theories are not enough, otherwise science would be no different from philosophy. It is the crucial role of em­ pirical information that completes the trinity that underlies all scientific research. Empirical evidence, as we have seen in this book, does not nec­ essarily mean experiment, but more broadly refers to any combination of experimentation and systematic observation that produces not just facts, but data. Empirical testability, then, is one major characteristic distinguishing science from nonscience. Although something might sound “scientific,” such as in the case of string theory in physics or the borderline examples of evolutionary psychology and the search for extraterrestrial intelligence, a field does not belong to science unless there are reasonable ways to test its theories against data. Plenty of human activities, of course, are not sci­ entific in this sense. Personal taste in, say, art may be subject to empirical surveys (we can ask people what they like and dislike), and taste clearly is an aspect of nature, since human culture is as natural as anything else. But unless our research on taste is informed by an overall conceptual structure (a theory) that can be used to generate specific testable hypotheses, it is not science.

People’s intuitive psychology contradicts science – always a risk people will abandon it

Bloom and Weisberg, 2007

Paul, psychologist at Yale University, Deena Skolnick, doctoral candidate in psychology at Yale University, modified version of P. Bloom & D. S. Weisberg, "Childhood origins of adult resistance to science", published in Science, May 18, 2007

The main source of resistance to scientific ideas concerns what children know prior to their exposure to science. The last several decades of developmental psychology has made it abundantly clear that humans do not start off as "blank slates." Rather, even one year-olds possess a rich understanding of both the physical world (a "naïve physics") and the social world (a "naïve psychology"). Babies know that objects are solid, that they persist over time even when they are out of sight, that they fall to the ground if unsupported, and that they do not move unless acted upon. They also understand that people move autonomously in response to social and physical events, that they act and react in accord with their goals, and that they respond with appropriate emotions to different situations. These intuitions give children a head start when it comes to understanding and learning about objects and people. But these intuitions also sometimes clash with scientific discoveriesabout the nature of the world, making certain scientific facts difficult to learn. As Susan Carey once put it, the problem with teaching science to children is "not what the student lacks, but what the student has, namely alternative conceptual frameworks for understanding the phenomena covered by the theories we are trying to teach." Children's belief that unsupported objects fall downwards, for instance, makes it difficult for them to see the world as a sphere — if it were a sphere, the people and things on the other side should fall off. It is not until about eight or nine years of age that children demonstrate a coherent understanding of a spherical Earth, and younger children often distort the scientific understanding in systematic ways. Some deny that people can live all over the Earth's surface, and, when asked to draw the Earth or model it with clay, some children depict it as a sphere with a flattened top or as a hollow sphere that people live inside. In some cases, there is such resistance to science education that it never entirely sticks, and foundational biases persist into adulthood. A classic study by Michael McCloskey and his colleagues tested college undergraduates' intuitions about basic physical motions, such as the path that a ball will take when released from a curved tube. Many of the undergraduates retained a common-sense Aristotelian theory of object motion; they predicted that the ball would continue to move in a curved motion, choosing B over A below.

# Science = Truth

**Only science can create an absolute truth**

**Gleiser 11** Marcello, Appleton Professor of Natural Philosophy and Professor of Physics and Astronomy at Dartmouth “Speaking in Defense of Science” http://www.npr.org/blogs/13.7/2011/02/09/133591874/speaking-in-defense-of-science

Although it may seem like old news, science and the teaching of science remains under attack in many parts of the country. This "anti-scientifism" is costing the United States dearly. A country that distrusts science is condemned to move straight back to medieval obscurantism. While many countries are working hard to educate their young about the values of science and of scientific research, in the U.S. countless people are teaching them to mistrust science and scientists, taking every opportunity to politicize and theologize the scientific discourse in ways completely incompatible with the goals and modus operandi of the scientific enterprise. Now, many will say that they are not anti-science per se, just against the science that clashes with their religious beliefs. So, antibiotics are fine, but the theory of evolution is not. If only they'd take the time to learn about how antibiotics work and about how over-prescribing can result in germ mutations that render some antibiotics ineffective. It's is a real-time illustration of the theory of evolution at work. Or take the statement made by Bill O'Reilly, that my co-blogger Adam Frank posted here yesterday, concerning the tides and the existence of the moon. Can a man living in the 21st century, and with enormous media clout, actually state that God put the moon around the Earth to promote the tides? Apparently, yes. And worse, O'Reilly called the people that pointed out to him that there are well-understood natural mechanisms that explain the origin of the moon and the solar system, and why there is life here and not on Mars or Venus, as "desperate." He continued: "It takes more faith to not believe, and to think that this was all luck ... than it does to believe in a deity." No, it takes an enormous amount of intellectual blindness to actually deny the well-established advances of science in the name of a faith based on an antiquated God of the Gaps theology. Unfortunately, many believe that what O'Reilly says with a straight face is true. What are scientists and educators to do? First, we must speak out. We cannot let such absurdities go unchallenged. Here is an example on teaching evolution. Fortunately, there are many others. (Go to the National Center for Science Education for more.) The old position that engaging is beneath our dignity will not help us advance the cause for a scientifically literate population. Second, we should be honest about what science can and cannot do. We should celebrate and publicize all the wonderful achievements of science, but also be frank about the challenges we still face. Scientists should not use science as a weapon against belief by making it into a belief system. That, too, is a road to nowhere. The danger of taking science too far, as in stating to the world that science has all the answers and can understand it all, is to lose its credibility when findings are doubted, or when "established" theories are supplanted by new ones. Much better is to explain how science goes about creating knowledge through a process of trial and error and constant verification by independent experimental groups. Our scientific knowledge of nature grows through a self-correcting accretion process. New theories emerge through the cracks in old ones. There is drama and beauty in this endeavor, as we struggle to make sense of the world around us. To deny what we've learned is to deny one of the greatest accomplishments of humanity. Our children deserve better than that. To not know is fine. To not want to know is disastrous.

**Science is moving to be increasingly objective now- the only problem is a lack of public trust**

**Slayton, 2007,** Rebecca, SAGE, Social Studies of Science, “Discursive Choices: Boycotting Star Wars between Science and Politics,” JSTOR, KHaze

The case examined here - a nationwide boycott of 'Star Wars' research funds - is particularly interesting because it transgressed discursive bound aries between science and politics. Science has traditionally been trusted as a resource for legitimizing decisions with profound social consequences, because it represents politically neutral knowledge. Thus, constructivist studies of expertise note that boundary-work, with its rhetorical distinc tions between 'science' and 'polities', is crucial to the legitimation of sci ence advice.22 Harry Collins and Robert Evans recently suggested that a 'third wave' of science studies would move beyond this focus on legitima tion to identify 'academic' criteria for distinguishing between experts and laypersons, or 'reasons for using the advice of scientists and technologists, rather than as individuals or as members of certain institutions' (Collins & Evans, 2002: 236-37, emphasis added). In separate critiques, Brian Wynne, Sheila Jasanoff, and Arie Rip each countered that expert knowl edge is inseparable from the institutions which lend it legitimacy.23 My account builds upon those critiques by examining how discursive choices help maintain and reconfigure forms of expertise deemed legitimate by a society. Constructivist studies often take interest in science policy organizations because they play a central role in legitimizing expertise, specifically by insti tutionalizing practices that claim to clearly separate science from politics. Sheila Jasanoff (1992, 2003) has emphasized that such practices reflect the values of their political culture. For example, in the adversarial politics of the USA, policymakers often find scientific experts to back conflicting positions, leading to a loss of public confidence in science's ability to 'speak truth to power'.24 Furthermore, in a nation with a strong suspicion of technocracy, this loss of faith can lead to endless suspicion and cross-examination of tech nical experts.25 **Organizations in the USA respond to such demands for transparency by extensively elaborating institutional practices that aim to eliminate political 'bias' and ensure objectivity**.26 While these studies have examined how organizations maintain expert ise within established organizations, Kelly Moore (1993, 1996a, 1996b) and Gary Downey (1988) have each examined the institutionalization of new forms of expertise. In his analysis of the formation of the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), Downey (1988) suggests that Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) professors 'reproduced' their cultural iden tities as objective scientists, at the same time that they 'reconstituted' those identities as political actors. Similarly, Moore (1993) argues that new organizations representing 'science in the public interest' emerged as sci entists attempted to reconcile their professional and political identities dur ing a cycle of political protest. Both argue that **organizations such as the UCS helped institutionalize new ways for scientists to intervene in poli tics, without threatening cherished notions of 'democracy' or 'objective science'**.

# Truth = Liberating

**Truth provides us reassurance and peace in the mind- obeying facts given to us by authority is the most liberating action**

**Benson, 2006,** Ophelia, editor of the website Butterflies and Wheels and deputy editor of The Philosophers' Magazine “Why Truth Matters,” p. 3-4, KHaze

This role of Authority- to tell people what to believe and think, or at least what to appear to believe and think- can be seen in two ways, or from two directions. It was coercive and authoritarian, but **it was** also in a sense **liberating: it liberated people from responsibility and the hard work of thinking**. It was external, imposed, top-down, but that very imposed top-down externality made it a source of inner security and comfort. It’s a familiar thought, even to defiant rebellious types (or perhaps especially to them) that I can be very restful just to give up and take orders- the despairing emptied-out rest of Winston at the end of Nineteen Eighty-Four, but all the rest the sane. The social world has always lavishly provided this comfort, and still does for many. Holy books, tradition, fiats, laws, priests, judges, monarchs, inquisitions, prisons, chains, axes, fires, manacles, expulsions. The advantage of all these is the clarity, the lack of ambiguity (unless one notices the places where holy books contradict themselves, but people seem not to).

# AT: Right Wing Takeover

**Debating science is key to check back the right**

**Nature 10** international weekly science journal (Nature, 9/9/2010, “Science Scorned”, http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v467/n7312/full/467133a.html) MH

There is a growing anti-science streak on the American right that could have tangible societal and political impacts on many fronts — including regulation of environmental and other issues and stem-cell research. Take the surprise ousting last week of Lisa Murkowski, the incumbent Republican senator for Alaska, by political unknown Joe Miller in the Republican primary for the 2 November midterm congressional elections. Miller, who is backed by the conservative 'Tea Party movement', called his opponent's acknowledgement of the reality of global warming “exhibit 'A' for why she needs to go”. “The country's future crucially depends on education, science and technology.” The right-wing populism that is flourishing in the current climate of economic insecurity echoes many traditional conservative themes, such as opposition to taxes, regulation and immigration. But the Tea Party and its cheerleaders, who include Limbaugh, Fox News television host Glenn Beck and Sarah Palin (who famously decried fruitfly research as a waste of public money), are also tapping an age-old US political impulse — a suspicion of elites and expertise. Denialism over global warming has become a scientific cause célèbre within the movement. Limbaugh, for instance, who has told his listeners that “science has become a home for displaced socialists and communists”, has called climate-change science “the biggest scam in the history of the world”. The Tea Party's leanings encompass religious opposition to Darwinian evolution and to stem-cell and embryo research — which Beck has equated with eugenics. The movement is also averse to science-based regulation, which it sees as an excuse for intrusive government. Under the administration of George W. Bush, science in policy had already taken knocks from both neglect and ideology. Yet President Barack Obama's promise to “restore science to its rightful place” seems to have linked science to liberal politics, making it even more of a target of the right. US citizens face economic problems that are all too real, and the country's future crucially depends on education, science and technology as it faces increasing competition from China and other emerging science powers. Last month's recall of hundreds of millions of US eggs because of the risk of salmonella poisoning, and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, are timely reminders of why the US government needs to serve the people better by developing and enforcing improved science-based regulations. Yet the public often buys into anti-science, anti-regulation agendas that are orchestrated by business interests and their sponsored think tanks and front groups. In the current poisoned political atmosphere, the defenders of science have few easy remedies. Reassuringly, polls continue to show that the overwhelming majority of the US public sees science as a force for good, and the anti-science rumblings may be ephemeral. As educators, scientists should redouble their efforts to promote rationalism, scholarship and critical thought among the young, and engage with both the media and politicians to help illuminate the pressing science-based issues of our time.

**The right wing rejects science- climate debate proves**

**Winship 6/12** senior writing fellow at Demos, former senior writer at "Bill Moyers Journal" on PBS and current president of the Writers Guild of America (Michael, 6/12/2011, “The Perils of Ignoring Ignorance”, http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war\_room/2011/06/10/winship\_climate\_change) MH

A local NPR reporter was talking with Joseph Nicholson, CEO of Red Jacket Orchards in Geneva, New York, up in the neck of the upstate woods where I was born and raised. There’s been a lot more rain than usual, he said. Produce hasn’t been exposed to sufficient "heat units" -- in other words, the sun. "We're going to be at least two weeks behind in harvest or ripening," he said, and if the skies don’t brighten up soon, yields could be down 30 to 35 percent. That’s a lot of lost apples -- and cherries, peaches and plums (although the rhubarb is doing just fine, thanks for asking). As upstate kids we were told -- apocryphally -- that the only part of the world more overcast than us was Poland, so the idea that all these years later it’s cloudier than ever is startling. Is this part of manmade climate change? Republican presidential candidate Rick Santorum sure doesn’t think so. The other day he told Rush Limbaugh "the idea that man… is somehow responsible for climate change is, I think, just patently absurd." He went on to call it a left-wing conspiracy, "just an excuse for more government control of your life… I’ve never been for any scheme or even accepted the junk science behind the whole narrative." Better you should listen to Ram Khatri Yadav, a rice farmer in northeastern India, who recently complained to The New York Times, "It will not rain in the rainy season, but it will rain in the nonrainy season. The cold season is also shrinking." He’s experiencing climate change as a life or death reality. In a June 4 article headlined "A Warming Planet Struggles to Feed Itself," the Times reported, “The great agricultural system that feeds the human race is in trouble… Many of the failed harvests of the past decade were a consequence of weather disasters, like floods in the United States, drought in Australia and blistering heat waves in Europe and Russia. Scientists believe some, though not all, of those events were caused or worsened by human-induced global warming.” For years, scientists believed that the carbon dioxide produced by greenhouse emissions were at least in part beneficial for crops, acting as a fertilizer that helped counterbalance the deleterious effects of climate change. But according to the Times, new research indicates "extra carbon dioxide does act as plant fertilizer, but that the benefits are less than previously believed -- and probably less than needed to avert food shortages." The World Bank estimates that there may be as many 940 million hungry people this year. The international relief agency Oxfam projects already high food prices more than doubling by 2030 with perhaps half of that spike due to climate change. With those increases could come hoarding, gouging, panic buying and food riots like those that led to the overthrow of the Haitian government in 2008. Nor is it just our food supply that has climate change breathing hot and heavy down our collective necks. City and state planners also are examining its impact on urban centers and preparing for the worst. A May 22 Times article notes, "Climate scientists have told city planners that based on current trends, Chicago will feel more like Baton Rouge than a Northern metropolis before the end of this century... New York City, which is doing its own adaptation planning, is worried about flooding from the rising ocean." In Chicago’s case, scientists project that if global carbon emissions continue at their current pace, the Second City would have summers "like the Deep South, with as many as 72 days over 90 degrees before the end of the century. For most of the 20th century, the city averaged fewer than 15… "The city could see heat-related deaths reaching 1,200 a year. The increasing occurrences of freezes and thaws (the root of potholes) would cause billions of dollars’ worth of deterioration to building facades, bridges and roads. Termites, never previously able to withstand Chicago’s winters, would start gorging on wooden frames." Conservatives like Santorum may scoff but the insurance industry is telling cities and states they had better adapt to reality or face ever higher premiums: "The reinsurance giant Swiss Re, for example, has said that if the shore communities of four Gulf Coast states choose not to implement adaptation strategies, they could see annual climate-change related damages jump 65 percent a year to $23 billion by 2030." Of course, it’s the science that right-wingers dismiss as "junk" that could help save us, not that they want to hear that. Researchers are developing strains of rice and wheat more resistant to heat, drought, flood and rising levels of carbon dioxide. That takes cash, another notion to which conservatives are especially adverse. Over the last five years, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has spent $1.7 billion to feed the world but private philanthropy isn’t enough. A year ago, the State Department and the US Agency for International Development began Feed the Future, a global hunger and food security initiative to boost agriculture in 20 desperately poor countries. President Obama has pledged $3.5 billion; so far, Congress has come up with a little more than half of it. We live on a planet where, New York Times reporter Justin Gillis wrote, "Little new land is available for farming, where water supplies are tightening, where the temperature is rising, where the weather has become erratic and where the food system is already showing serious signs of instability." But last month, the House appropriations subcommittee on agriculture, headed by Georgia Republican Jack "I Came from God, Not from a Monkey" Kingston, cut Feed the Future’s budget by thirty percent. How do you like them apples?

# AT: Risk Analysis Bad

Science is critical to accurately assess risk

Tuathail 00 Gearoid O., Associate Professor of Political Geography – Virginia Tech University, Geopolitics @ Millennium, Paranoid Fantasies and Technological Fundamentalism Amidst the Contradictions of Contemporary Modernity, http://www.nvc.vt.edu/toalg/Website/Publish/Papers/GeographicaSlovenica2001.pdf

History indicates that the everyday practice of geopolitics is often motivated and given meaning by paranoid fantasies of various sorts. In the twentieth century the paranoid fantasies that informed geopolitics were state-centric and nationalist territorial visions of world domination and control. There is no shortage of paranoid visions of the future at the opening of the twenty first century. Rather than dismiss all paranoid fantasies as irrational, it is may be worthwhile in the coming century to distinguish between counter-modern ones (usually based on religious and/or nationalist romantic visions) that attempt to impose certitude upon modernity, classic modern fantasies about limitless progress and growth that recycle already bankrupt myths to serve particularistic interests, and reflexively modern visions that sometimes throw the contradictions of the contemporary geopolitical condition into stark relief. The paranoid visions of environmentalists and peace activists today are part of the struggle to imagine and transform the future of modernity. Though these visions sometimes appear fantastic they are far from being crazy. Unlike the paranoid power fantasies and conspiracies that gave meaning to international politics for much of the twentieth century, visions of increasing planetary temperatures and rising ocean levels, unfolding global pandemics and irreversible technoscientific manipulations, proliferating weapons of destruction and deepening vulnerability to potentially catastrophic accidents**,** can beempirically documentedandsupportedin great scientific detail. As Athansiou remarks about those studying the rising levels toxicity in the environment, ‘the paranoids, it happens, do not have a bad record at all**.31**

# AT: Socially Constructed

**Social constructivism confuses fact with opinion and fails to change our standpoint of education- it only legitimizes elites monopolizing information to serve their own needs, causing extinction**

**Sokal, 2008,** Alan, Department of Physics New York University and Department of Mathematics University College London, “What is science and why should we care?” http://www.physics.nyu.edu/sokal/sense\_about\_science\_PUBL.pdf, KHaze

Statements as clear-cut as these are, however, rare in the academic postmodernist literature. More often one finds assertions that are ambiguous but can nevertheless be interpreted (and quite often are interpreted) as implying what the foregoing quotations make explicit: that science as I have defined it is an illusion, and that the purported objective knowledge provided by science is largely or entirely a social construction. For example, Katherine Hayles, professor of English at UCLA and former president of the Society for Literature and Science, writes the following as part of her feminist analysis of uid mechanics: Despite their names, conservation laws are not inevitable facts of nature but constructions that foreground some experiences and marginalize others. . . . Almost without exception, conservation laws were formulated, developed, and experimentally tested by men. If conservation laws represent particular emphases and not inevitable facts, then people living in di erent kinds of bodies and identifying with different gender constructions might well have arrived at di erent models for [fluid] flow. (What an interesting idea: perhaps: people living in different kinds of bodies" will learn to see beyond those masculinist laws of conservation of energy and momentum.) And Andrew Pickering, a prominent sociologist of science, asserts the following in his otherwise-excellent history of modern elementary-particle physics: [G]iven their extensive training in sophisticated mathematical techniques, the preponderance of mathematics in particle physicists' accounts of reality is no more hard to explain than the fondness of ethnic groups for their native language. On the view advocated in this chapter, there is no obligation upon anyone framing a view of the world to take account of what twentieth-century science has to say. But let me not spend time beating a dead horse, as the arguments against postmodernist relativism are by now fairly well known - rather than plugging own writings, let me suggest the superb book by Canadian philosopher of science James Robert Brown, Who Rules in Science?: An Opinionated Guide to the Wars. Suffice it to say that **postmodernist writings systematically confuse truth with claims of truth, fact with assertions of fact, and knowledge with pretensions to knowledge** - and then sometimes go so far as to deny that these distinctions have any meaning. Now, it's worth noting that the postmodernist writings I have just quoted all come from the 1980s and early 1990s. In fact, over the past decade, academic postmodernists and social constructivists seem to have backed off the most extreme views that they previously espoused. Perhaps I and like-minded critics of postmodernism can take some small credit for this, by initiating a public debate that shed a harsh light of criticism on these views and forced some strategic retreats. But most of the credit, I think, has to be awarded to George W. Bush and his friends, **who have shown just where science-bashing can lead in the real world**. Nowadays, even sociologist of science Bruno Latour, who spent several decades stressing the so-called “social construction of scientific facts", **laments the ammunition he fears he and his colleagues have given to the Republican right-wing, helping them to deny or obscure the scientific consensus on global warming, biological evolution and a host of other issues.** 14 He writes: While we spent years trying to detect the real prejudices hidden behind the appearance of objective statements, do we now have to reveal the real objective and incontrovertible facts hidden behind the illusion of prejudices? And yet entire Ph.D. programs are still running to make sure that good American kids are learning the hard way that facts are made up, that there is no such thing as natural, unmediated, unbiased access to truth, that **we are always prisoners of language, that we always speak from a particular standpoint**, and so on, **while dangerous extremists are using the very same argument of social construction to destroy hard-won evidence that could save our lives.** That, of course, is exactly the point I was trying to make back in 1996 about socialconstruction talk taken to subjectivist extremes. I hate to say I told you so, but I did. As did, several years before me, Noam Chomsky, who recalled that in a not-so-distant past, Left intellectuals took an active part in the lively working class culture. Some sought to compensate for the class character of the cultural institutions through programs of workers' education, or by writing best-selling books on mathematics, science, and other topics for the general public. Remarkably, their left counterparts today often seek to deprive working people of these tools of emancipation, informing us that the “project of the Enlightenment" is dead, that we must abandon the “illusions" of science and rationality **- a message that will gladden the hearts of the powerful, delighted to monopolize these instruments for their own use.**

**Science is a comparatively better system of authority than any alternative- their effort to prioritize their alternative, relativistic worldview reinforces bad instances of domination**

**Benson, 2006,** Ophelia, editor of the website Butterflies and Wheels and deputy editor of The Philosophers' Magazine “Why Truth Matters,” p 63-64, KHaze

The basic claim of Strange Weather is that science’s authority, status, prestige, and position at the top of the knowledge hierarchy, and the political-cultural-rhetorical hierarchy as well, are both arbitrary and anti-democratic. ‘How can metaphysical life theories and explanations taken seriously by millions be ignored or excluded by a small group of powerful people called “scientists”? This claim is not actually argued, as we have seen; it is merely asserted and reiterated throughout via rhetoric: science and rationality, realism and truth are associated with the police, border-patrols, authority, and other such categories. But Ross ignores the obvious crucial facts **that (1) some authority is better justified than others as are some forms of expertise**, some exercises of control or power, and so on, **and (2) there is a reason for the authority and prestige of science,** a reason that goes beyond mere habits of deference. To put it bluntly, the reason is that ***the right answer has more authority than the wrong*** one. Ross neglects to address this rather important aspect of the question. Science and other forms of empirical enquiry such a history and forensic investigation do have legitimate authority because the truth-claims they make are based on evidence and are subject to change if new evidence is discovered. Other systems of ideas that make truth-claims that are not based on evidence, that rely instead on revelation, sacred books, dreams, visions, myths, subjective inner experience, and the like, lack legitimate authority because over many centuries it has gradually become understood that those are not reliable sources. They can be useful starting-points for theory formation, as has often been pointed out. Theories can begin anywhere, even in dreams. But **when it comes to justification, more reliable evidence is required**. This is quite a large difference between science and pseudoscience, genuine enquiry and fake enquiry, but it is one that Ross does not take into account. The implication seems to be that for the sake of a ‘more democratic culture’ it is worth deciding that the wrong answer ought to have as much authority as the right one. And yet of course it is unlikely that Ross really believes that. Surely, if he did, he would not have written this book- he would not be able to claim that a more democratic culture is preferable to a less democratic one, or anything else that he claims in his work. However playful or quasi-ironic Strange Weather may be, it does lapse into seriousness at times, it does make claims that Ross clearly wants us to accept- because he think they are right as opposed to wrong. The intention of Strange Weather is to correct mistaken views of science and pseudoscience, to replace them with other, truer views. Ross cannot very well argue that his views are wrong and therefore we should believe them. **He is in fact claiming authority for his own views, he is attempting to seek the higher part of a truth-hierarchy. The self-refuting problem we always see in epistemic relativism is here in its most obvious form.**

**Only science is rooted in empirical evidence based off of reality – other modes of knowledge are subject to personal bias which destroys objectivity**

**Benson 8** Ophelia editor of the website Butterflies and Wheels and deputy editor of The Philosophers' Magazine “Ways of knowing” http://www.butterfliesandwheels.org/2008/ways-of-knowing/ RB

That comes much too close to saying explicitly that religion has a way of knowing, but that’s the very thing religion doesn’t have. It has lots of ways of claiming to know, of pretending to know, of performing an imitation of knowing; but it has no way of actually legitimately knowing. (Tom says exactly that in the paragraph following the quoted passages. I just felt like saying it too.) By implying non-empiricism might have some epistemic merit as a route to objectivity in certain realms, the NAS and other science-promoting organizations miss the biggest selling point for science, or more broadly, intersubjective empiricism: it has no rival when it comes to modeling reality in *any* domain that’s claimed to exist. The reason is simple but needs to be made explicit: religious and other non-empirical ways of knowing don’t sufficiently respect the distinction between appearance and reality, between subjectivity and objectivity. They are not sufficiently on guard against the possibility that one’s model of the world is biased by perceptual limitations, wishful thinking, uncorroborated intuition, conventional wisdom, cultural tradition, and other influences that may not be responsive to the way the world actually is. Just so – along with the rest of what Tom says about it; it’s hard to excerpt because it’s all so admirably clear and compelling. At any rate – all this is obvious enough and yet it’s kept tactfully veiled in much public discourse simply in order to appease people who are not sufficiently on guard against the possibility that one’s model of the world is biased by wishful thinking among other things. It’s all very unfortunate. The very people who most need to learn to guard against cognitive bias are the ones who are being appeased lest they get ‘offended’ at discovering that. It’s an endless circle of epistemic disability. Faith-based religions and other non-empirically based worldviews routinely make factual assertions about the existence of god, paranormal abilities, astrological influences, the power of prayer, etc. So they are inevitably in the business of representing reality, of describing what they purport to be objective truths, some of which concern the supernatural. But having signed on to the cognitive project of supplying an accurate model of the world, they routinely violate basic epistemic standards of reliable cognition. There’s consequently no reason to grant them any domain of cognitive competence. Although this might sound arrogant, it’s a judgment reached from the standpoint of epistemic *humility*. The real arrogance is the routine violation of epistemic standards of reliable cognition. There’s something so vain, so self-centered, about doing that – as if it’s appropriate to think that our hopes and wishes get to decide what reality is. It’s just decent humility to realize that reality is what it is and that we are not so important or powerful that we can create it or change it with the power of thought.

**Constructivist viewpoints are just as arbitrary and self-serving as science- it fails to bring us closer to reality.**

**Benson, 2006,** Ophelia, editor of the website Butterflies and Wheels and deputy editor of The Philosophers' Magazine “Why Truth Matters,” p 76-77, KHaze

Here we come back to the skeptical impasse we saw in Chapter 2. The radically skeptical position may be true; the evil demon may be tricking us; there is no way to disprove the possibility. **But then that possibility applies across the board**. It’s no good saying ‘You’re a brain in a vat and I’m not,’ because **it could just as well be the other way around.** By the same token it’s no good saying ‘You’re delusional about evidence and the truth-claims you think your evidence warrants, but I’m right about my evidence and the truth-claims I think it warrants.’ Why would that be the case? Why is your view privileged? Philip Kitcher puts it in this way: If the invitation is to throw away all our beliefs, start from scratch, and justify the claim that the objects about which we form perceptual beliefs are as we represent them, then we could not offer our contemporary blend of physics, physiology, and psychology to advance the kind of picture of perception I have sketched. **But neither can champions of Science Studies offer any rival picture**, even one that uses screens, veils, or cave walls. Descartes launched philosophy on a quest for fundamental justification, and despite the many insight uncovered by him and his brilliant successors, we now know that the problem he posed is insoluble… **If the constructivist reminds us that we haven’t shown on the basis of a set of principles that precede the deliverance of empirical science that our scientific opinions are reliable, the right response is to confess that we haven’t**. There is no such set of principles that will do that job, but by the same token, no set of principles will establish a constructivist picture.

**Science is the best means to create an objective description of reality and break down institutional hierarchies- its critics surrender “truth” to state control and replace logic with incoherent psycho-babble in order to gain support**

**Benson, 2006,** Ophelia, editor of the website Butterflies and Wheels and deputy editor of The Philosophers' Magazine “Why Truth Matters,” p.46-48, KHaze

This penchant for the defiant gesture, for proudly or ‘playfully’ denying reality, is a characteristic move of constructionist, post-modernist, standpoint and other radical theories. The translation of epistemic questions into political ones, and hence of errors and legless theories into political stances, is the rhetorical ploy that makes it work- ‘work,’ that is, in the sense of persuading others. **This ‘working’ might seem counterproductive for the Left**, given science’s historical role as, in Daniel Dennett’s phrase, the universal acid, the great solvent of tradition (since tradition so often boils down to traditions of who gets to oppress which groups). But there is a kind of logic to it, however flawed. This translation is, in the view of its practitioners, the logical outcome of projects to rethink everything. ‘Everything’ really does mean everything, the thinking goes, so **positivists and conventional epistemologists who call a halt**, who try to build walls and patrol borders around science, **are selling out and giving up, surrendering to the most pervasive and oppressive power of all**. **Their skepticism of skepticism is not a cognitive or warranted or logical view but a regressive political failure: cowardice or venality or lack of imagination**. Again, the matter is posed in moral and political terms rather than epistemic ones; translated, in short. Critics of standpoint epistemology are called conservative and reactionary, conventional and traditional, thus shifting the terms of the discussion from one of evidence, methodology, logic and accuracy, to one of basic morality. It is assumed (and sometimes explicitly said) that there is a moral imperative to press the interrogation of received wisdom all the way into science itself. It is possible to tease out a kind of explanation for this view- an explanation of why it might make sense in moral and political terms even though it makes no sense in epistemic terms. Two concerns have always loomed large for the New or postmodern Left: liberation and egalitarianism. The rethinking projects have always had a goal increasing liberation and doing away with hierarchies. Science cuts both ways in each endeavor. It is immensely liberating but it is also confining: **one is not free to choose the results one desires, or to change or conceal evidence**. And it is both egalitarian and hierarchal: **it is the career open to talents, so it is the very opposite of hierarchies based on birth, class, race, or gender**, but it is also the very essence of meritocracy, in that talent and hard work are required in order to do well, and there is such a thing as doing well. So because science does cut both ways, it is understandable that the Left is divided over these issues. Some of the Left adheres to Enlightenment ideas of rationality and empiricism, and some of it opts for what one might call paradigm-shift egalitarianism and liberation that goes past boundaries and stopping-points which used to be taken for granted. This brand of egalitarianism extends its reach into areas of life where it had not occurred to people to think it was relevant, Until Now. The Until Now note is another that is struck often in postmodernist writing, a self-congratulatory ‘only we have been bold and perceptive enough to see this’ note. This aspect itself does a good deal to explain the roots and motivation of epistemic relativism. In that sense, **the counter-intuitiveness, the perversity, the nonsensicality of many of the claims is in fact the point.** The idea is that people simply failed to think of Startling Claim X before out of timidity or conformity, or awe of science and authority, or lack of imagination, or simply not being as shrewd and clever as the current generation; therefore the fact that the claim appears outlandish can be taken as merely more of the same timidity and failure of imagination. To the extent that this idea is in effect, it operates as an incentive to make outrageous claims, as opposed to a more usual scholarly incentive to temper such claims. **Under the influence of this idea, the more outrageous the claim, the better.**

**Science can correct social constructions- skepticism grounded in research is key**

**Krebs 10** Principal of Jesus College, Oxford (John, 2/8/2011, “We might err, but science is self-correcting”, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest\_contributors/article7018438.ece) MH

This philosophy of science was formally instituted 350 years ago in London by the small band of men, including Christopher Wren and Robert Boyle, who founded the Royal Society, the world’s oldest national academy of science. Their motto, Nullius in verba (“Take nobody’s word for it”) embodies the Royal Society’s founding principle of basing conclusions on observation and experiment rather than the voice of authority. Scientists don’t have all the answers, but they do have a way of finding out, and the fact that our lights come on, our computers compute and our mobile phones phone are among the myriad daily reminders that the scientific way works. You might retort that science and scientists often don’t live up to this ideal. And you would be right. **Scientists, like everyone else, have human frailties** and are susceptible to fashion and orthodoxy. Nevertheless, over time, science is self-correcting because **someone will have the courage to challenge the prevailing view and win the argument, provided he or she has sufficient evidence.** There is, of course, no excuse for scientists who over-egg or massage their results, or who underplay the uncertainties in their conclusions. The prevailing view in many areas of science will include significant uncertainties (as with climate change), so challenge is central to the progress of understanding. The claim that Himalayan glaciers would melt in the next 30 years is an example of this self-correction. It was debunked from within the scientific community and not by outside commentators, it does not undermine the core conclusions about man-made global warming, and the mistake that the Chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change made was to dismiss this challenge without studying the evidence. Scepticism is fine but science is not a free-for-all. Whether or not you accept the sceptics’ view should depend on careful weighing of the evidence. Dr Wakefield had no good evidence to support his claim of a link between the MMR vaccine and autism. Equally, the Department of Health’s claim that the “MMR vaccine is perfectly safe” is wrong. No vaccine is perfectly safe, but not vaccinating your children exposes them to a far bigger risk than the tiny risk associated with the vaccine. Given what I have said, it is not surprising that the interaction between science and government can be edgy. Ministers look to their expert advisers for clear-cut answers, a unanimous view, and preferably one that is politically convenient. Scientific advisers are prone to disappoint on all fronts. “I am sorry minister, but science is not clear-cut, what is more, different experts take a different view, and our best advice is to do X” (where X is not a vote winner). When I was asked to advise, in 1996, on whether or not to kill badgers as a way of controlling bovine tuberculosis, I said that without a proper experiment it is not possible to tell whether or not the policy would work. To its credit, the Ministry of Agriculture set up what was perhaps the largest ecological experiment ever carried out in this country. The result showed that killing is not a cost-effective policy, and disappointed farmers. Last year David Nutt, Chairman of the Advisory Committee on the Misuse of Drugs, was sacked by the Home Secretary for being too outspoken about the Government’s rejection of his committee’s advice on the classification of cannabis and Ecstasy. If ministers are going to reject expert advice, they should explain why. What they should definitely not do, as both the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary did in this case, is to announce, before they have received the expert advice, that they have made up their mind. Equally, independent experts should not be gagged by ministers, even if their views are inconvenient. Science, warts and all, is still the best way of finding out, and is absolutely **vital in informing government policy.** That is why the Government must strongly reaffirm its commitment to freedom of expression for independent scientific advisers. At the same time, if scientists have a right to be heard, they have a responsibility to be scrupulously honest and not to claim more than is justified by the evidence.

**Reality isn’t socially constructed- the mind finds the most objective reality**

**Bohghossian 1** PhD in philosophy from Princeton, Silver Professor of Philosophy at NYU (Paul, “WHAT IS SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION?”, as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/1153/socialconstruction.pdf) MH

Money, citizenship and newspapers are transparent social constructions because they obviously could not have existed without societies. Just as obviously, it would seem, anything that could have – or that did – exist independently of societies could not have been socially constructed: dinosaurs, for example, or giraffes, or the elementary particles that are supposed to be the building blocks of all matter and that physicists call “quarks.” How could they have been socially constructed if they existed before societies did? Yet when we turn to some of the most prominent texts in the social construction literature, we find an avalanche of claims to the effect that it is precisely such seemingly mind- and society-independent items that are socially constructed. Take Andrew Pickering’s book, Constructing Quarks (1984) . As his title suggests, Pickering’s view seems to be that quarks were socially constructed by scientists in the 1970s when the so-called “Standard Model” was first developed. And the language of the text itself does not disappoint: …the reality of quarks was the upshot of particle physicists’ practice…. But how can this be? If quarks exist – and we are assuming for present purposes that they do – they would have had to have existed before there were any societies. So how could they have been constructed by societies? Perhaps Pickering does not mean what he says; perhaps he intends only to be making a claim about our belief in quarks rather than about the quarks themselves, a thesis we shall also want to examine in due course. Whether or not Pickering intended the worldly claim, however, claims like that seem to be all around us. Here, just for another example, are Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar on the subject of the facts studied by natural science (Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts, 1979, pp.180-182): We do not wish to say that facts do not exist nor that there is no such thing as reality….Our point is that “out there ness” is a consequence of scientific work rather than its cause. But it is not easy to make sense of the thought that facts about elementary particles or dinosaurs are a consequence of scientific theorizing. How could scientific theorizing have caused it to be true that there were dinosaurs or that there are quarks? Of course, 4 science made it true that we came to believe that dinosaurs and quarks exist. Since we believe it, we act as though dinosaurs and quarks exist. If we allow ourselves some slightly florid language, we could say that in our world dinosaurs and quarks exist, in much the way as we could say that in the world of Shakespeare’s Hamlet, Ophelia drowns. So, still speaking in this vein, we could say that science made it true that in our world there are dinosaurs and quarks. But all we could coherently mean by this is that science made it true that we came to believe that dinosaurs and quarks exist. And that no one disputes. Despite all the evidence in their favor, these beliefs may still be false and the only thing that will make them true is whether, out there, there really were dinosaurs and there really are quarks. Surely, science cannot construct those things; at best, it can discover them.

# AT: Unethical

**Scientific empiricism is the only way to create a coherent system of ethics**

Torbjörn **Tännsjö** **8** Professor and Chair, Practical Philosophy, Stockholm University, Sweden “Truth in Ethics, Truth in Science - Different?” http://www.asianhhm.com/medical\_sciences/truth\_ethics\_science.htm

Typical ethical theories state which actions are right and which actions are wrong and also why they are right and wrong respectively. Two examples of such theories are explained in this article, utilitarianism and the sanctity of life doctrine. According to utilitarianism, an action is right if and only if it maximises the sum-total of well-being in the universe; if it is not right, then it is wrong. And the fact that an action maximises the sum-total of well-being in the universe, if it does, is what makes it right. The sanctity-of-life doctrine (as I here conceive of it) concurs in the idea that one should maximise the sum-total of well-being in the universe, but claims that the end doesn’t justify the means. It is wrong actively and intentionally to kill an innocent human being, even if killing this innocent human being means that the sum-total of well-being in the universe is maximised. The fact that an act is an act of intentional and active killing of an innocent human being (murder), if it is, makes it wrong, irrespective of its consequences. How should we go about if we want to test these and other ethical theories? Some philosophers, of a rationalist bent, have thought that morality can be derived from reason itself, i.e. they have believed that, once we understand each moral theory thoroughly and clearly, we can simply grasp which one is true. Few stick to this belief now-a-days, however, and, I think, wisely so. When we assess putative moral theories, we must proceed in a manner, which is similar to how we assess scientific theories. We have to put our moral hypotheses to test. We test our scientific theories against our observations. In a similar vein, we have to test our moral hypotheses against not observations, but our considered moral intuitions. A moral intuition is an immediate reaction to an action with which one is presented, to the effect that the action is right or wrong. It is ‘immediate’ in the sense that it is not the result of any conscious process of reasoning. I will return to the requirement that our moral intuitions should be considered. A scientific theory that is at variance with (the content of) our observations is rejected. A scientific theory must be empirically adequate. In a similar vein, an ethical theory must give the right answer to moral questions; it must conform to our considered moral intuitions. However, empirical adequacy or conformity with our considered moral intuitions respectively, is just a necessary requirement, it is not a sufficient one. The theory must also, in order to gain support from the observation (intuition), give the best explanation of (the content of) our observations and considered intuitions. This means that it must be general, simple, theoretically fruitful and so forth. Once again, I see no difference here between ethics and science. On a structural level, what goes on in the testing of both moral and scientific theories is the same. And yet, if we look closer to the ethical case, an important difference surfaces: in science we normally rely on real experiments. In ethics we must rest satisfied with thought experiments.