# Kritik – in-lab mini-debate

## Background info

#### 1AC was high speed rail – Aff ran an economy advantage (with hegemony and “econ decline = war” impact) and the air pollution advantage

Exercise:

* The 2AC will make the 6 answers (below), but will add exactly four additional answers… you decide the four that you would add – they can be evidence or analytics. So, start the exercise by thinking which four answers you’d read.
* We’ll discuss everyone’s four extra answers – and their rationale(s) for adding those four args. Eventually, I’ll call on one person to give the 2AC. The 2AC will read the 10 args.
* The 2NC-1NR will be a student in the lab… it will be up to 5 minutes long.
* The 1AR will follow – 2 minutes long
* 2NR will follow – 5 minutes long.

## Section of Negative evidence

### 1NC Shell

#### Their security reps are inaccurate and cause action-reaction cycles. Such cycles are the root of violence and make extinction inevitable.

Der Derian 98 (James, Professor of Political Science – University of Massachusetts, On Security, Ed. Lipschutz, p. 24-25)

No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted. We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, an a priori  argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." Continues... [7](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0%3Dwww.ciaonet.org%3A80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note7) In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.' " [8](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0%3Dwww.ciaonet.org%3A80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note8) By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a "security crisis" in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control. What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that I am not in search of an "alternative security." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought." Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security: I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative. My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference. Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness.

#### Vote Neg to reject the dominant framing of security. A renewed focus on the epistemological and representational security lens is a prerequisite to effective policy solutions

Bruce ‘96

(Robert, Associate Professor in Social Science – Curtin University and Graeme Cheeseman, Senior Lecturer – University of New South Wales, Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9)

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable part of the problem to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific policies may follow. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

### 2NC-1NR Link – Hegemony

#### Pursuit of hegemony is a fantasy of control that relies upon construction of threatening Otherness --- this prompts resistance and create a permanent state of conflict

Chernus 6 (Ira, Professor of Religious Studies and Co-director of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program – University of Colorado-Boulder, Monsters to Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin, p. 53-54)

The end of the cold war spawned a tempting fantasy of imperial omnipotence on a global scale. The neocons want to turn that fantasy into reality. But reality will not conform to the fantasy; it won’t stand still or keep any semblance of permanent order. So the neocons’ efforts inevitably backfire. Political scientist Benjamin Barber explains that a nation with unprecedented power has “unprecedented vulnerability: for it must repeatedly extend the compass of its power to preserve what it already has, and so is almost by definition always overextended.” Gary Dorrien sees insecurity coming at the neoconservatives in another way, too: “For the empire, every conflict is a local concern that threatens its control. However secure it maybe, it never feels secure enough. The [neocon] unipolarists had an advanced case of this anxiety. . . . Just below the surface of the customary claim to toughness lurked persistent anxiety. This anxiety was inherent in the problem of empire and, in the case of the neocons, heightened by ideological ardor.”39 If the U.S. must control every event everywhere, as neocons assume, every act of resistance looks like a threat to the very existence of the nation. There is no good way to distinguish between nations or forces that genuinely oppose U.S. interests and those that don’t. Indeed, change of any kind, in any nation, becomes a potential threat. Everyone begins to look like a threatening monster that might have to be destroyed. It’s no surprise that a nation imagined as an implacable enemy often turns into a real enemy. When the U.S. intervenes to prevent change, it is likely to provoke resistance. Faced with an aggressive U.S. stance, any nation might get tough in return. Of course, the U.S. can say that it is selflessly trying to serve the world. But why would other nations believe that? It is more likely that others will resist, making hegemony harder to achieve. To the neocons, though, resistance only proves that the enemy really is a threat that must be destroyed. So the likelihood of conflict grows, making everyone less secure. Moreover, the neocons want to do it all in the public spotlight. In the past, any nation that set out to conquer others usually kept its plans largely secret. Indeed, the cold war neocons regularly blasted the Soviets for harboring a “secret plan” for world conquest. Now here they are calling on the U.S. to blare out its own domineering intentions for all the world to [end page 53] hear. That hardly seems well calculated to achieve the goal of hegemony. But it is calculated to foster the assertive, even swaggering, mood on the home front that the neocons long for. Journalist Ron Suskind has noted that neocons always offer “a statement of enveloping peril and no hypothesis for any real solution.” They have no hope of finding a real solution because they have no reason to look for one. Their story allows for success only as a fantasy. In reality, they expect to find nothing but an endless battle against an enemy that can never be defeated. At least two prominent neocons have said it quite bluntly. Kenneth Adelman: “We should not try to convince people that things are getting better.” Michael Ledeen: “The struggle against evil is going to go on forever.”40 This vision of endless conflict is not a conclusion drawn from observing reality. It is both the premise and the goal of the neocons’ fantasy. Ultimately, it seems, endless resistance is what they really want. Their call for a unipolar world ensures a permanent state of conflict, so that the U.S. can go on forever proving its military supremacy and promoting the “manly virtues” of militarism. They have to admit that the U.S., with its vastly incomparable power, already has unprecedented security against any foreign army. So they must sound the alarm about a shadowy new kind of enemy, one that can attack in novel, unexpected ways. They must make distant changes appear as huge imminent threats to America, make the implausible seem plausible, and thus find new monsters to destroy. The neocons’ story does not allow for a final triumph of order because it is not really about creating a politically calm, orderly world. It is about creating a society full of virtuous people who are willing and able to fight off the threatening forces of social chaos. Having superior power is less important than proving superior power. That always requires an enemy. Just as neocons need monsters abroad, they need a frightened society at home. Only insecurity can justify their shrill call for a stronger nation (and a higher military budget). The more dire their warnings of insecurity, the more they can demand greater military strength and moral resolve. Every foreign enemy is, above all, another occasion to prod the American people to overcome their anxiety, identify evil, fight resolutely against it, and stand strong in defense of their highest values. Hegemony will do no good unless there is challenge to be met, weakness to be conquered, evil to be overcome. The American people must actively seek hegemony and make sacrifices for it, to show that they are striving to overcome their own weakness. So the quest for strength still demands a public confession of weakness, just as the neocons had demanded two decades earlier when they warned of a Soviet nuclear attack through a “window of vulnerability.” The quest for strength through the structures of national security still demands a public declaration of national insecurity. Otherwise, there is nothing to overcome. The more frightened the public, the more likely it is to believe and enact the neocon story.

### 2NC-1NR Link – Economy

#### Tying economic growth to security produces a state-centric and positivist epistemology that disables critical approaches

Tooze 5 (Roger, Visiting Professor of International Relations – City University, “The Missing Link: Security, Critical International Political Economy, and Community, Critical Security Studies and World Politics, Ed. Booth, p. 146-148)

The Failure of Orthodox IPE

One would hope that the disciplinary knowledge of IPE could provide the required analysis. My sense is that it cannot yet do this. The reason for this is the failure of critical thinking: mainstream IPE is still locked into an ontology and epistemology that reproduces a very specific and partial inter­pretation of international political economy, based around the state and the shared commitment to a method of positivism.49 Mainstream IPE grounds its analysis in a world in which the state is the fundamental unit and legiti­mate knowledge is gained through the objective testing of propositions against an external and knowable reality. My negative conclusion is all the more disappointing given that the origins of modern IR-based international political economy lie in the very dissatisfaction felt with the limitations of a traditional military security-focused study of international relations, cou­pled with the inability and unwillingness of economics and international economics to handle questions of power.50 IPE as a distinct field of knowledge has been an academic growth industry since the early 1970s, particularly in the United States. Its growth has reflected events in the world political economy and the perceived needs of policymakers (again mainly in the United States). It is now a substantial field of knowledge, with all of the professional structures necessary to that success.5 As it has been primarily located within the larger field of interna­tional studies, the core theoretical frameworks of a U.S.-dominated IR, with its particular philosophical and political values and assumptions, have been transposed into IPE itself. Moreover, under the hegemony of econom­ics in the social sciences in general, the exponents of IPE have increasingly also transposed the assumptions and methodologies of economics, includ­ing rational choice theory, and a fixation with formal, quantifiable, model­ing, and microsystems explanations. All these elements constitute a deep commitment to positivist epistemology. As defined above, positivist episte­mology entails a claim that the only legitimate knowledge of IPE is gained through the objective testing of propositions against an external and know­able reality. The influence of this double and mutually supportive hegemo­ny52 has produced a distinct form of IPE, in which a contest between the competing perspectives of liberalism, nationalism, realism, and Marxism has veiled a basic orthodoxy constructed around an epistemological com­mitment to positivism, a theoretical commitment to methodological indi­vidualism, an ontological commitment to the state, and a domination by the agenda and interests of the United States.53 The commitment to positivism is a serious limitation on the ability of orthodox IPE to construct a knowledge sufficient to suggest adequate understandings of security and community under today's conditions and therefore appropriate to the complex, multilayered world we live in (as exemplified by some of the problems we have already identified). By deny­ing the social construction and reproduction of reality (and the social repro­duction of itself), orthodox IPE cannot take into account the intersubjective basis and realities of power in the world political economy. Moreover, in the context of the argument here, it places a fundamental epistemological barrier to the integration of political economy and (critical approaches to) security. A detailed epistemological critique of orthodox IPE has been artic­ulated elsewhere54; the following analysis will focus on the principal onto­logical questions and the core problem of the theorization of politics and economics. In terms of the basic structure of assumed entities and their relation­ships, IPE was initially constructed as "the politics of international eco­nomic relations."55 In other words, the focus was to be the politics of inter­state economic relations, with the unit of analysis being the territorial economy of the state, the politics being intergovernmental, and the realm of economics being given the generative role in the construction of the issues and concerns of governments. In this ontology, IPE draws upon classical political realism for its statism and liberal economic theory for its under­standing of economics. And although it is an attempt to bridge the gap between international relations and international economics, it also shares with IR a marked tendency to equate politics (i.e., the realm of the state), with force and economics (linked to civil society), with rule by consent. In this equation the politics of interstate economic relations was already demonstrating the power of the yet-to-be-articulated neoliberal ide­ology and neorealist IR theory.56 Even after the politics of international economics became international political economy (around the same time that mainstream IR moved to embrace neorealism) the academic main­stream of IPE continued to conceive the state as the ontological core entity. Statism remains the core ontological commitment for orthodox IPE. At the same time, there is a willingness to recognize that other entities are possi­bly significant and other forms of politics may occur, but all are subservient to state structures, processes, and purposes. Within IPE statism is more than putting the state at the center of analysis (state-centrism), as it involves the commitment to the state as the only legitimate framework for political economy.57 With regard to the argument of this chapter, the nature and limi­tations of this statism are best understood in relation to the way in which the joining together of economics and IR in the concept and issue of eco­nomic security has been theorized by orthodox IPE. Economic Security The consideration of the economic in the theory and practice of security, and security in the theory and practice of political economy, has taken place on the basis of prevailing discourses in economics, political science, politi­cal economy, and international political economy. As we have seen, these discourses not only embody deep commitments to specific (orthodox) methodology, epistemology, and ontology; they also construct both eco­nomics and politics, and the relationship between them, in very particular ways. This seems to have led to the possibility of a twin track for investiga­tions into security by political economy and into economics by security. One track starts with politics (the traditional concerns of security) but with economic added on as a new domain of threat to states. The other track starts with a (repoliticized) economics, leading to a whole literature on eco­nomic security, vulnerability, and systemic risk (with particular reference to the global financial system). But the way that the economic is then related to the political (and vice versa) seems to depend upon prior ideological commitments as to the nature of the relationship between economics and politics, normally expressed in paradigmatic terms of perspectives or con­testing approaches. For instance, a liberal interpretation of economic secu­rity is conditioned by the prior assumption of the link between economic prosperity and war based on the assumed beneficial rationality of markets. In this sense, economic security as a concept and as an issue has been clearly constructed as an extension of statist, positivist IPE, which brings together the twin tracks by grafting the agenda of economics onto the clas­sic concerns of state security via neorealism. Of course, the tradition of mercantilist thinking, or economic nationalism, as Robert Gilpin prefers to describe it, clearly locks economic security into physical security—but on, and only on, a state basis. In this tradition, power and wealth, and hence national security, are inseparable and complementary, particularly in what are regarded as strategic industries, that is, those industries whose healthy development is considered necessary for the maintenance of national mili­tary-political security.58 Notwithstanding the mercantilist imperative for both states and theorists, the post-1945 international economic structure emerged as a U.S. hegemony that was articulated and developed on the public basis of a liberal trade and investment order with a constituting, rationalizing, and legitimating ideology of liberal political economy. Hence, for twenty years after IR and economics were theoretically linked in mainstream academic practice, it was only to the extent that a strong, broad-based modern economy was regarded as necessary to maintain secu­rity.

[Note – “IPE” = International Political Economy]

### Block Tricks – Serial Policy Failure

#### Both their harm and solvency claims are false. Advantages are random factoids politically constructed to make the plan appear to be a good idea. Solvency is a rigged game.

Dillon and Reid 00 (Michael, Professor of Politics – University of Lancaster, and Julian, Lecturer in International Relations – King’s College, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, January / March, 25(1))

More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure--the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it.

### Block Tricks – Value to Life

#### Security imposes a calculative logic that destroys the value to life

Dillon 96 (Michael, Professor of Politics – University of Lancaster, Politics of Security, p. 26)

Everything, for example, has now become possible. But what human being seems most impelled to do with the power of its actions is to turn itself into a species; not merely an animal species, nor even a species of currency or consumption (which amount to the same thing), but a mere species of calculation. For only by reducing itself to an index of calculation does it seem capable of constructing that oplitical arithmetic by which it can secure the security globalised Western thought insists upon, and which a world made uncreasingly unpredictable by the very way human being acts into it now seem to require. Yet, the very rage for calculability which securing security incites is precisely also what reduces human freedom, inducing either despair or the surrender of what is human to the dehumanising calculative logic of what seems to be necessary to secure security. I think, then, that Hannah Arendt was right when she saw late modern humankind caught in a dangerous world-destroying cleft between a belief that everything is possible and a willingness to surender itself to so-called laws of necessity (calculability itself) which would make everything possible. That it was, in short, characterized by a combination of reckless omnipotence and reckless despair. But I also think that things have gone one stage further – the surrender to the necessity of realising everything that is possible- and that this found its paradigmatic expression for example in the deterrent security policies of the Cold War; where everything up to and including self-immolation not only became possible but actually necessary in the interests of (inter)national security. The logic persists in the metaphysical core of modern politics- the axiom of Inter-state security relations, popularized for example, through strategic discourse- even if the details have changed.

#### Calculability devalues life and make extermination possible

Dillon 99 (Michael, Professor of Politics and International Relations – University of Lancaster, “Another Justice”, Political Theory, 27(2), April, p. 164-165)

Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism. They trade in it still to devastatingglobal effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability. Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zeropoint of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, “we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure.” But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being.

### Block Tricks – Threat Epistemology

#### The Aff is epistemologically bankrupt. Their evidence is manufactured and distorted by the threat industry.

Pieterse 7 (Jan, Professor of Sociology – University of Illinois (Urbana), “Political and Economic Brinkmanship”, Review of International Political Economy, 14(3), p. 473)

Brinkmanship and producing instability carry several meanings. The American military spends 48% of world military spending (2005) and represents a vast, virtually continuously growing establishment that is a world in itself with its own lingo, its own reasons, internecine battles and projects. That this large security establishment is a bipartisan project makes it politically relatively immune. That for security reasons it is an insular world shelters it from scrutiny. For reasons of ‘deniability’ the president is insulated from certain operations (Risen, 2006). That it is a completely hierarchical world onto itself makes it relatively unaccountable. Hence, to quote Rumsfeld, ‘stuff happens’. In part this is the familiar theme of the Praetorian Guard and the shadow state (Stockwell, 1991). It includes a military on the go, a military that seeks career advancement through role expansion, seeks expansion through threat inflation, and in inflated threats finds rationales for ruthless action and is thus subject to feedback from its own echo chambers. Misinformation broadcast by part of the intelligence apparatus blows back to other security circles where it may be taken for real (Johnson, 2000). Inhabiting a hall of mirrors this apparatus operates in a perpetual state of self hypnosis with, since it concerns classified information and covert ops, limited checks on its functioning.

### Alternative Solvency

#### Critical reflection is an end in itself --- demanding simple answers crowds out vital ethical questions about IR

Biswas 7 (Shampa, Professor of Politics – Whitman College, “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist”, Millennium, 36(1), p. 117-125)

It has been 30 years since Stanley Hoffman accused IR of being an ‘American social science’ and noted its too close connections to US foreign policy elites and US preoccupations of the Cold War to be able to make any universal claims,7 yet there seems to be a curious amnesia and lack of curiosity about the political history of the discipline, and in particular its own complicities in the production of empire.8 Through what discourses the imperial gets reproduced, resurrected and re-energised is a question that should be very much at the heart of a discipline whose task it is to examine the contours of global power. Thinking this failure of IR through some of Edward Said’s critical scholarly work from his long distinguished career as an intellectual and activist, this article is an attempt to politicise and hence **render questionable** the **disciplinary traps** that have, ironically, circumscribed the ability of scholars whose very business it is to think about global politics to actually think *globally* and *politically*. What Edward Said has to offer IR scholars, I believe, is a certain kind of global sensibility, a critical but sympathetic and felt awareness of an inhabited and cohabited world. Furthermore, it is a profoundly political sensibility whose globalism is predicated on a cognisance of the imperial and a firm non-imperial ethic in its formulation. I make this argument by travelling through a couple of Said’s thematic foci in his enormous corpus of writing. Using a lot of Said’s reflections on the role of public intellectuals, I argue in this article that IR scholars need to develop what I call a ‘global intellectual posture’. In the 1993 Reith Lectures delivered on BBC channels, Said outlines three positions for public intellectuals to assume – as an outsider/exile/marginal, as an ‘amateur’, and as a disturber of the status quo speaking ‘truth to power’ and self-consciously siding with those who are underrepresented and disadvantaged.9 Beginning with a discussion of Said’s critique of ‘professionalism’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ as it applies to International Relations, I first argue the importance, for scholars of global politics, of taking *politics* seriously. Second, I turn to Said’s comments on the posture of exile and his critique of identity politics, particularly in its nationalist formulations, to ask what it means for students of global politics to take the *global* seriously. Finally, I attend to some of Said’s comments on humanism and contrapuntality to examine what IR scholars can learn from Said about *feeling and thinking globally* concretely, thoroughly and carefully. IR Professionals in an Age of Empire: From ‘International Experts’ to ‘Global Public Intellectuals’ One of the profound effects of the war on terror initiated by the Bush administration has been a significant constriction of a democratic public sphere, which has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent and a sharp delineation of national boundaries along with concentration of state power. The academy in this context has become a particularly embattled site with some highly disturbing onslaughts on academic freedom. At the most obvious level, this has involved fairly well-calibrated neoconservative attacks on US higher education that have invoked the mantra of ‘liberal bias’ and demanded legislative regulation and reform10, an onslaught supported by a well-funded network of conservative think tanks, centres, institutes and ‘concerned citizen groups’ within and outside the higher education establishment11 and with considerable reach among sitting legislators, jurists and policy-makers as well as the media. But what has in part made possible the encroachment of such nationalist and statist agendas has been a larger history of the corporatisation of the university and the accompanying ‘professionalisation’ that goes with it. Expressing concern with ‘academic acquiescence in the decline of public discourse in the United States’, Herbert Reid has examined the ways in which the university is beginning to operate as another transnational corporation12, and critiqued the consolidation of a ‘culture of professionalism’ where **academic bureaucrats** **engage in bureaucratic role-playing,** minor academic **turf battles mask the larger managerial power play** on campuses and the increasing influence of a relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular ‘expert cultures’ have led to academics relinquishing their claims to public space and authority.13 While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, there is much reason for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward Said has written extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces, ‘the one public space available to real alternative intellectual practices: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today’15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains that ‘the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)’16. The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be **seduced by power**.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of **intellectual orientation**. It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds **of ethical questions irreducible to formulaic ‘for or against’ and ‘costs and benefits’ analysis** can simply **not be raised**. In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of ‘intellectual relevance’ that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical and perhaps unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, that is about *politics* (rather than techno-expertise) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.21

### Alternative Solvency – A2: Security Inevitable

#### False ideology. Security *appears* inevitable because we allow it to constitute our world.

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer – School of Politics and Professor of International Relations – University of New South Wales, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 68-69)

This chapter is thus an exercise in thinking, which challenges the continuing power of political ontologies (forms of truth and being) that connect security, sovereignty, belonging, otherness and violence in ways that for many **appear like enduring political facts**, inevitable and irrefutable. Conflict, violence and alienation then arise not merely from individual or collective acts whose conditions might be understood and policed; they **condition politics** as such, forming a permanent ground, a dark substrata underpinning the very **possibility of the present**. Conflict and alienation seem inevitable because of the way in which the modem political imagination **has conceived and thought securit**y, sovereignty and ethics. Israel/ Palestine is chosen here as a particularly urgent and complex example of this problem, but it is a problem with much wider significance. While I hold out the hope that security can be re-visioned away from a permanent dependence on insecurity, exclusion and violence, and I believe it retains normative promise, this analysis takes a deliberate step backward to examine the very real barriers faced by such a project. Security cannot properly be rethought without a deeper understanding of, and challenge to, the political forms and structures it claims to enable and protect. If Ken Booth argues that the state should be a means rather than an end of security, my objective here is to place the continuing power and depth of its status as an end of security, and a fundamental source for political identity, under critical interrogation.' If the state is to become a means of security (one among many) it will have to be fundamentally transformed. The chapter pursues this inquiry in two stages. The first outlines the historic strength and effective redundancy of such an exciusivist vision of security in Israel, wherein Israel not only confronts military and political antagonists with an 'iron wall' of armed force but maps this onto a profound clash of existential narratives, a problem with resonances in the West's confrontation with radical Islamism in the war on terror. The second, taking up the remainder of the chapter, then explores a series of potential resources in continental philosophy and political theory that might help us to think our way out of a security grounded in violence and alienation. Through a critical engagement with this thought, I aim to construct a political ethics based not in relations between insecure and separated identities mapped solely onto nation-states, but in relations of responsibility and interconnection that can negotiate and recognise both distinct and intertwined histories, identities and needs; an ethics that might underpin a vision of interdependent (national and non-national) existence proper to an integrated world traversed by endless flows of people, commerce, ideas, violence and future potential.

### A2: Threats are Real

#### Begs the question. Threats become real because of psycho-social dynamics.

Mack 90 (John E., Professor of Psychiatry – Harvard University Medical School, The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, Ed. Volkan, 1, p. 58-59)

Attempts to explore the psychological roots of enmity are frequently met with an argument that, reduced to its essentials, goes something like this: “It’s very well to psychologize but my enemy is real. The Russians (or germans, Arabs, Israelis, Americans) are armed, threaten us, and intend us harm. Furthermore, there are real struggles between us and them and differing national interests: competition over oil, land or scarce resources and genuine conflicts of values between our two nations (or political systems) It is essential that we be strong and maintain a balance of superiority of (military and political) power, lest the other side take advantage of our weakness.” This argument is netiher wrong nor right, but instead simply limited. It fails to grapple with a critical distinction that informs the entire subject. Is the threat really generated by the enemy as it appears to be at any given moment, or is it based on one’s own contribution to the threat, derived from distortion of perception by provocative words and actions in a cycle of enmity and externalization of responsibility? In sum, the enemy IS real, but we have not learned to identify our own role in creating that enemy or in elaborating the threatening image we hold of the other group or country and its actual intentions or purposes. “We never see our enemy’s motives and we never labor to asses his will with anything approaching objectivity” (Bunting 1986).

#### Most recent psychological evidence confirms. Enemy creation is not objective, but a paranoid need for certainty. Reject their media doomsaying.

Jacons 10 (Tom, Professional Journalist for 20 Years, “The Comforting Notion of an All-Powerful Enemy”, Miller-McCune, 3-8, http://www.miller-mccune.com/politics/the-comforting-notion-of-an-all-powerful-enemy-10429/)

We have seen the enemy, and he is powerful. That’s a recurring motif of contemporary political discourse, as generalized fear mutates for many into a fixation on a ferocious foe. Partisan rhetoric has turned increasingly alarmist. President Obama has difficulty getting even watered-down legislation passed, yet he is supposedly establishing a socialist state. The Tea Party is viewed as a terrifying new phenomenon, rather than the latest embodiment of a recurring paranoid streak in American politics. Osama bin Laden is likely confined to a cave, but he’s perceived as a threat large enough to justify engaging in torture. According to one school of thought, this tendency to exaggerate the strength of our adversaries serves a specific psychological function. It is less scary to place all our fears on a single, strong enemy than to accept the fact our well-being is largely based on factors beyond our control. An enemy, after all, can be defined, analyzed and perhaps even defeated. The notion that focusing our anger on a purportedly powerful foe helps mitigate our fears was first articulated by cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker in his 1969 book Angel in Armor. It has now been confirmed in a timely paper titled “An Existential Function of Enemyship,” just published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. A research team led by social psychologist Daniel Sullivan of the University of Kansas reports on four studies that suggest people are “motivated to create and/or perpetually maintain clear enemies to avoid psychological confrontations with an even more threatening chaotic environment.” When you place their findings in the context of the many threats (economic and otherwise) people face in today’s world, the propensity to turn ideological opponents into mighty monsters starts to make sense. In one of Sullivan’s studies, conducted during the 2008 presidential campaign, a group of University of Kansas undergraduates were asked whether they believed enemies of their favored candidate (Obama or John McCain) were manipulating voting machines in an attempt to steal the election. Prior to considering such conspiracy theories, half were asked to consider the truth of statements such as “I have control over whether I am exposed to a disease,” and “I have control over how my job prospects fare in the economy.” The other half were asked to assess similar statements on relatively unimportant subjects, such as “I have control over how much TV I watch.” Those who were forced to contemplate their lack of control over significant life events “reported a stronger belief in opponent-led conspiracies,” the researchers report. In another study, the student participants were randomly assigned to read one of two essays. The first stated that the U.S. government is well-equipped to handle the economic downturn, and that crime rates are declining due to improved law enforcement. The second reported the government is not at all competent to cope with the recession, and crime rates are going up in spite of the authorities’ best efforts. They were then presented with a list of hypothetical events and asked to pick the most likely cause of each: A friend, an enemy, or neither (that is, the event happened randomly). Those “informed” that the government was not in control were more likely to view a personal enemy as responsible for negative events in their lives. In contrast, those told things are running smoothly “seemed to defensively downplay the extent to which enemies negatively influence their lives,” the researchers report. These studies suggest it’s oddly comforting to have someone, or something, you can point to as the source of your sorrows. This helps explain why Americans inevitably find an outside enemy to focus on, be it the Soviets, the Muslims or the Chinese. Given that society pays an obvious price for such illusions, how might we go about reducing the need for “enemyship?” “If you can somehow raise people’s sense that they have control over their lives and negative hazards in the world, their need to ‘enemize’ others should be reduced,” Sullivan said in an e-mail interview. “In our first study, for instance, we showed that people who feel dispositionally high levels of control over their lives did not respond to a reminder of external hazards by attributing more influence to an enemy. Any social structure or implementation that makes people feel more control over their lives should thus generally reduce (though perhaps not completely eliminate) the ‘need’ or tendency to create or attribute more influence to enemy figures. “In our third study, we showed that if people perceived the broader social system as ordered, they were more likely to respond to a threat to personal control by boosting their faith in the government, rather than by attributing more influence to an enemy. So, again, we see that the need to perceive enemies is reduced when people are made to feel that they are in control of their lives, or that there is a reliable, efficient social order that protects them from the threat of random hazards. “One could imagine, then, that circumstances which allow all citizens to be medically insured, or to have a clear sense of police protection, could reduce the tendency to seek out enemy figures to distill or focalize concerns with random, imminent threats.” Sullivan also offers two more personal potential solutions. “If people have such inherent needs for control and certainty in their lives, they should try to channel those needs as best they can into socially beneficial pursuits,” he says. “Lots of people pursue science, art and religion — just to give a few examples — as means of boiling down uncertainty about the world into clear systems of rules and engagement with reality, creating small domains for themselves in which they can exert a sense of mastery. Insofar as these pursuits don’t harm anyone, but still provide a sense of control, they can reduce the need for enemyship. “A final solution would be to encourage people to simply accept uncertainty and lack of control in their lives,” he adds. “Some meaning systems — Taoism for example — are rooted in this idea, that people can eventually accept a certain lack of control and eventually become resigned to this idea to the extent that they no longer react defensively against it.” So there, at least, is a practical place to begin: Less MSNBC and more meditation.

### A2: Realism Good

#### Realism escalates all problems into global disaster --- their worldview is structurally incapable of responding to global problems

Der Derian 6 (James, Professor of International Studies – Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, “An Accident Waiting to Happen”, Harvard International Review, 27(3), Fall, http://hir.harvard.edu/ predicting-the-present/national-security)

However, the discourse of the second Bush term has increasingly returned to the dominant worldview of national security, realism. And if language is, as Nietzsche claimed, a prisonhouse, realism is its supermax penitentiary. Based on linear notions of causality, a correspondence theory of truth, and the materiality of power, how can realism possibly account—let alone prepare or provide remedies—for complex catastrophes, like the toppling of the World Trade Center and attack on the Pentagon by a handful of jihadists armed with box-cutters and a few months of flight-training? A force-five hurricane that might well have begun with the flapping of a butterfly’s wings? A northeast electrical blackout that started with a falling tree limb in Ohio? A possible pandemic triggered by the mutation of an avian virus? How, for instance, are we to measure the immaterial power of the CNN-effect on the first Gulf War, the Al-Jazeera-effect on the Iraq War, or the Nokia-effect on the London terrorist bombings? For events of such complex, non-linear origins and with such tightly-coupled, quantum effects, the national security discourse of realism is simply not up to the task. Worse, what if the “failure of imagination” identified by the 9/11 Commission is built into our national and homeland security systems? What if the reliance on planning for the catastrophe that never came reduced our capability to flexibly respond and improvise for the “ultra-catastrophe” that did? What if worse-case scenarios, simulation training, and disaster exercises—as well as border guards, concrete barriers and earthen levees—not only prove inadequate but might well act as force-multipliers—what organizational theorists identify as “negative synergy” and “cascading effects” —that produce the automated bungling (think Federal Emergency Management Agency) that transform isolated events and singular attacks into global disasters? Just as “normal accidents” are built into new technologies—from the Titanic sinking to the Chernobyl meltdown to the Challenger explosion—we must ask whether “ultra-catastrophes” are no longer the exception but now part and parcel of densely networked systems that defy national management; in other words, “planned disasters.” What, then, is to be done? A first step is to move beyond the wheel-spinning debates that perennially keep security discourse always one step behind the global event. It might well be uni-, bi-, or multi-polar, but it is time to recognize that the power configuration of the states-system is rapidly being subsumed by a heteropolar matrix, in which a wide range of different actors and technological drivers are producing profound global effects through interconnectivity. Varying in identity, interests, and strength, these new actors and drivers gain advantage through the broad bandwidth of information technology, for networked communication systems provide the means to traverse political, economic, religious, and cultural boundaries, changing not only how we interpret events, but making it ever more difficult to maintain the very distinction of intended from accidental events.

### A2: Permutation

#### Their *initial framing* precludes change. Forgetting the 1AC is necessary.

Bleiker 1 (Roland, Senior Lecturer and Co-Director – Rotary Centre of International Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution, The Zen of International Relations, Ed. Chan, Mandeville, and Blieker, p. 38-39)

The power to tell stories is the power to define common sense. Prevalent IR stories have been told for so long that they no longer appear as stories. They are accepted as fact for their metaphorical dimensions have vanished from our collective memories. We have become accustomed to our distorting IR metaphors until we come to lie, as Nietzsche would say “herd-like in a style obligatory for all. As a result dominant ir stories have successfully transformed one specific interpretation of world political realities, the realist one, into reality per se. Realist perceptions of the international have gradually become accepted as common sense, to the point that any critique against them has to be evaluated in terms of an already existing and objectified world view. There are powerful mechanisms of control precisely in this ability to determine meaning and rationality. 'Defining common sense', Steve Smith argues, 'is the ultimate act of political power.’8 It separates the possible from the impossible and directs the theory and practice of international relations on a particular path. The prime objective of this essay is to challenge prevalent IR stories. The most effective way of doing so, the chapter argues, is not to critique but to forget them, to tell new stories that are not constrained by the boundaries of established and objectified IR narratives. Such an approach diverges from many critical engagements with world politics. Most challenges against dominant IR stories have been advanced in the form of critiques. While critiquing orthodox IR stories remains an important task, it is not sufficient. Exploring the origins of problems, in this case discourse of power politics and their positivist framing of the political practice, cannot overcome all the existing theoretical and practical dilemmas. By articulating critique in relation to arguments advanced by orthodox IR theory, the impact of critical voices remains confined within the larger discursive boundaries that have been established through the initial framing of debates. A successful challenge to orthodox IR stories must do more than merely critique their narrow and problematic nature. To be effective, critique must be supplemented with a process of forgetting the object of critique, of theorizing world politics beyond the agendas, issues and terminologies that are prest by orthodox debates. Indeed the most powerful potential of critical scholarship may well lie in the attempt to tell different stories about IR, for once theres stories have become validated , they may well open up spaces for a more inclusive and less violence prone practice of real world politics.

#### Perm footnotes criticism --- destroys its benefits

Der Derian 95 (James, Professor of Political Science – University of Massachusetts, International Theory: Critical Investigations, p. 374)

But what happens - as seems to be the case to this observer - when the 'we' fragments, 'realism' takes on prefixes and goes plural, the meaning of meaning itself is up for grabs? A stop-gap solution is to supplement the definitional gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist, mindful of a creeping pluralism, will note the 'essentially contested' nature of realism - duly backed up with a footnote to W. B. Gallie or W E. Connolly - and then get down to business as usual, that is, using realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon. This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere: in exchange for not contesting the charge that the meaning of realism is contestable, the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to then turn around and commit worse epistemological crimes. In honor of the most notorious benefactor of nolo-contendere in recent American legal history, we might call this the 'Spiro-ette effect' in International Relations.

## Aff section

### The 2AC has read these six answers:

#### ( ) Perm – do plan and all non-competitive parts of their worldview

#### ( ) Policy Framework before Reps – coalitions, anti-politics, and zero impact

Churchill ‘96

Ward Churchill, Professor of American Indian Studies at the University of Colorado, 1996 (“Semantic Masturbation on the Left: A Barrier to Unity and Action,” From A Native Son: Selected Essays in Indigenism, 1985-1995, Published by South End Press, ISBN 0896085538, p. 460)

There can be little doubt that matters of linguistic appropriateness and precision are of serious and legitimate concern. By the same token, however, it must be conceded that such preoccupations arrive at a point of diminishing return. After that, they degenerate rapidly into liabilities rather than benefits to comprehension**.** By now, it should be evident that much of what is mentioned in this article falls under the latter category; it is, by and large, inept, esoteric, and semantically silly, bearing no more relevance in the real world than the question of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. Ultimately, it is a means to stultify and divide people rather than stimulate and unite them. Nonetheless, such “issues” of word choice have come to dominate dialogue in a significant and apparently growing segment of the Left. Speakers, writers, and organizers of all persuasions are drawn, with increasing vociferousness and persistence, into heated confrontations, not about what they’ve said, but about how they’ve said it. Decisions on whether to enter into alliances, or even to work with other parties, seem more and more contingent not upon the prospect of a common agenda, but upon mutual adherence to certain elements of a prescribed vernacular. Mounting quantities of progressive time, energy, and attention are squandered in perversions of Mao’s principle of criticism/self-criticism – now variously called “process,” “line sharpening,” or even “struggle” – in which there occurs a virtually endless stream of talk about how to talk about “the issues.” All of this happens at the direct expense ofactually understanding the issues themselves, much less doing something about them. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that the dynamic at hand adds up to a pronounced avoidance syndrome, a masturbatory ritual through which an opposition nearly paralyzed by its own deeply felt sense of impotence pretends to be engaged in something “meaningful.” In the end, it reduces to a tragic delusion at best, cynical game playing or intentional disruption at worst. With this said, it is only fair to observe that it’s high time to get off this nonsense, and on with the real work of effecting positive social change.

#### ( ) Avoiding anti-politics is key to check the worst violence

Small ‘6

(Jonathan, former Americorps VISTA for the Human Services Coalition,“Moving Forward,” *The Journal for Civic Commitment*, Spring, http://www.mc.maricopa.edu/other/engagement/Journal/Issue7/Small.jsp)

What will be the challenges of the new millennium? And how should we equip young people to face these challenges? While we cannot be sure of the exact nature of the challenges, we can say unequivocally that humankind will face them together. If the end of the twentieth century marked the triumph of the capitalists, individualism, and personal responsibility, the new century will present challenges that require collective action, unity, and enlightened self-interest. Confronting global warming, depleted natural resources, global super viruses, global crime syndicates, and multinational corporations with no conscience and no accountability will require cooperation, openness, honesty, compromise, and most of all solidarity – ideals not exactly cultivated in the twentieth century. We can no longer suffer to see life through the tiny lens of our own existence. Never in the history of the world has our collective fate been so intricately interwoven. Our very existence depends upon our ability to adapt to this new paradigm, to envision a more cohesive society. With humankind’s next great challenge comes also great opportunity. Ironically, modern individualism backed us into a corner. We have two choices, work together in solidarity or perish together in alienation. Unlike any other crisis before, the noose is truly around the neck of the whole world at once. Global super viruses will ravage rich and poor alike, developed and developing nations, white and black, woman, man, and child. Global warming and damage to the environment will affect climate change and destroy ecosystems across the globe. Air pollution will force gas masks on our faces, our depleted atmosphere will make a predator of the sun, and chemicals will invade and corrupt our water supplies. Every single day we are presented the opportunity to change our current course, to survive modernity in a manner befitting our better nature. Through zealous cooperation and radical solidarity we can alter the course of human events. Regarding the practical matter of equipping young people to face the challenges of a global, interconnected world, we need to teach cooperation, community, solidarity, balance and tolerance in schools. We need to take a holistic approach to education. Standardized test scores alone will not begin to prepare young people for the world they will inherit. The three staples of traditional education (reading, writing, and arithmetic) need to be supplemented by three cornerstones of a modern education, exposure, exposure, and more exposure. How can we teach solidarity? How can we teach community in the age of rugged individualism? How can we counterbalance crass commercialism and materialism? How can we impart the true meaning of power? These are the educational challenges we face in the new century. It will require a radical transformation of our conception of education. We’ll need to trust a bit more, control a bit less, and put our faith in the potential of youth to make sense of their world. In addition to a declaration of the gauntlet set before educators in the twenty-first century, this paper is a proposal and a case study of sorts toward a new paradigm of social justice and civic engagement education. Unfortunately, the current pedagogical climate of public K-12 education does not lend itself well to an exploratory study and trial of holistic education. Consequently, this proposal and case study targets a higher education model. Specifically, we will look at some possibilities for a large community college in an urban setting with a diverse student body. Our guides through this process are specifically identified by the journal Equity and Excellence in Education. The dynamic interplay between ideas of social justice, civic engagement, and service learning in education will be the lantern in the dark cave of uncertainty. As such, a simple and straightforward explanation of the three terms is helpful to direct this inquiry. Before we look at a proposal and case study and the possible consequences contained therein, this paper will draw out a clear understanding of how we should characterize these ubiquitous terms and how their relationship to each other affects our study. Social Justice, Civic Engagement, Service Learning and Other Commie Crap Social justice is often ascribed long, complicated, and convoluted definitions. In fact, one could fill a good-sized library with treatises on this subject alone. Here we do not wish to belabor the issue or argue over fine points. For our purposes, it will suffice to have a general characterization of the term, focusing instead on the dynamics of its interaction with civic engagement and service learning. Social justice refers quite simply to a community vision and a community conscience that values inclusion, fairness, tolerance, and equality. The idea of social justice in America has been around since the Revolution and is intimately linked to the idea of a social contract. The Declaration of Independence is the best example of the prominence of social contract theory in the US. It states quite emphatically that the government has a contract with its citizens, from which we get the famous lines about life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Social contract theory and specifically the Declaration of Independence are concrete expressions of the spirit of social justice. Similar clamor has been made over the appropriate definitions of civic engagement and service learning, respectively. Once again, let’s not get bogged down on subtleties. Civic engagement is a measure or degree of the interest and/or involvement an individual and a community demonstrate around community issues. There is a longstanding dispute over how to properly quantify civic engagement. Some will say that today’s youth are less involved politically and hence demonstrate a lower degree of civic engagement. Others cite high volunteer rates among the youth and claim it demonstrates a high exhibition of civic engagement. And there are about a hundred other theories put forward on the subject of civic engagement and today’s youth. But one thing is for sure; today’s youth no longer see government and politics as an effective or valuable tool for affecting positive change in the world. Instead of criticizing this judgment, perhaps we should come to sympathize and even admire it. Author Kurt Vonnegut said, “There is a tragic flaw in our precious Constitution, and I don’t know what can be done to fix it. This is it: only nut cases want to be president.” Maybe the youth’s rejection of American politics isn’t a shortcoming but rather a rational and appropriate response to their experience. Consequently, the term civic engagement takes on new meaning for us today. In order to foster fundamental change on the systemic level, which we have already said is necessary for our survival in the twenty-first century, we need to fundamentally change our systems. Therefore, part of our challenge becomes convincing the youth that these systems, and by systems we mean government and commerce,have the potential for positive change.Civic engagement consequently takes on a more specific and political meaning in this context. Service learning is a methodology and a tool for teaching social justice, encouraging civic engagement, and deepening practical understanding of a subject. Since it is a relatively new field, at least in the structured sense, service learning is only beginning to define itself. Through service learning students learn by experiencing things firsthand and by exposing themselves to new points of view. Instead of merely reading about government, for instance, a student might experience it by working in a legislative office. Rather than just studying global warming out of a textbook, a student might volunteer time at an environmental group. If service learning develops and evolves into a discipline with the honest goal of making better citizens, teaching social justice, encouraging civic engagement, and most importantly, exposing students to different and alternative experiences, it could be a major feature of a modern education. Service learning is the natural counterbalance to our current overemphasis on standardized testing. Social justice, civic engagement, and service learning are caught in a symbiotic cycle. The more we have of one of them; the more we have of all of them. However, until we get momentum behind them, we are stalled. Service learning may be our best chance to jumpstart our democracy. In the rest of this paper, we will look at the beginning stages of a project that seeks to do just that.

#### ( ) Our *specific* reps – even if doomsday – are good. Spur needed movements

#### Joppke '91

(Christian - professor of political and social sciences at the European University Institute — The British Journal of Sociology - March - via J-Store)

Since the ecology and anti-nuclear movements lack a well-defined group basis, they all the more depend on the public attention to the issues they address. The new risks must be drawn as imminent and global, otherwise Olson's mobilization barrier could not be overcome. No looming threat of disaster or prospect of immediate 'collective bads', no collective action.12 As a result, doomsday visions, Angst, and a sense of utmost urgency prosper in these movements." After all, they emerge in reaction to policies on the brink of implementation, large-scale technologies in the process of realization, or air and water already polluted. Considering their temporal position, there is no time to lose because too much time has already been lost.

#### ( ) Judge Choice – reject the rep, not the team. The Aff has given the judge and discussion several options to affirm – we’re not “wed” to them in the same manner as plan text. Better for selectivity skills and logic.

#### ( ) Realism’s entrenched and alts aren’t better.

John Mearsheimer, Political Science—University of Chicago, 1995 International Security, p. 91-2

The most revealing aspect of Wendt’s discussion is that he did not respond to the two main charge leveled against critical theory in “False Promise.” The first problem with critical theory is that although the theory is deeply concerned with radically changing state behavior, it says little about how change comes about. The theory does not tell us why particular discourses become dominant and other fall by the wayside. Specifically, Wendt does not explain why realism has been the dominant discourse in world politics for well over a thousand years, although I explicitly raised the question in “False Promise” (p. 42). Moreover, he shed no light on why the time is ripe for unseating realism, nor on why realism is likely to be replaced by a more peaceful, communitarian discourse, although I explicitly raised both questions. Wendt’s failure to answer these questions has important ramifications for his own arguments. For example, he maintains that if it is possible to change international political discourse and alter state behavior, “then it is irresponsible to pursue policies that perpetuate destructive old orders [i.e., realism], especially if we care about the well-being of future generation.” The clear implication here is that realists like me are irresponsible and do not care much about the welfare of future generations. However, even if we change discourses and move beyond realism, a fundamental problem with Wendt’s argument remains: because his theory cannot predict the future, he cannot know whether the discourse that ultimately replaces realism will be more benign than realism. He has no way of knowing whether a fascistic discourse more violent than realism will emerge as the hegemonic discourse. For example, he obviously would like another Gorbachev to come to power in Russia, but a critical theory perspective, defending realism might very well be the more responsible policy choice.

## Aff backline cards

### A-to “Fiat not Real”

#### Pre-fiat breeds apathy

Eliasoph ‘97

Nina Eliasoph is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Southern California –Theory and Society, Vol. 26, No. 5 (Oct., 1997), pp. 605-647 – Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/658024

If it's not something that[pause**]** effects **[pause]** my[pause]family, I don't see[pause] me [pause]doing it. **[**Speeds up] And-I-mean-of-course-nuclear-war- could-affect-my[chuckles] family. ButI still don't -if it's not local**,** I mean, I'm more - maybe it's small-minded**. (**Sherry, a schools volunteer, in an interview) Was she really as small-minded as she claimed to be? "I care about issues that are close to home," **"**I care if it affects me personally,**" "I care if it's for my children": these** are **the** familiar phrases that many Americans use to explain political involvement and apathy**.** Journalists, activists, and theorists often take these phrases at face value; politicians base social policies on them, trying to play to voters whom they imagine to be self-interested and short-sighted, cutting funds for projects that do not seem "close to home." The phrases are usually interpreted as transparently obvious indications of citizens' self-interest and lack of broad political concern - their "small-mindedness." But these insist- ant, extravagant expressions of self-interest do not simply indicate clear, straightforward self-interest or parochial thinking. The phrases work hard. Activists, intellectuals, and other concerned citizens often assume that someone like Sherry just doesn't care or is self-interested or ignorant; we try to draw people like her into political participation by impressing upon them that they should care (perhaps by telling them how nuclear war might affect their kids), or telling them not to be so self-interested. This article shows just how hard someone such as Sherry has to work to avoid expressing political concern. Penetrating this pervasive culture of political avoidance requires a new way of understandingthis thing that sounds like apathy and self-interest. Using examples from a two- year fieldwork and interview study among volunteers, activists, and recreation groups in a sprawling West Coast suburb, this article shows how much emotional and interactional weight these common phrases bear; expanding from the case of "close to home" to everyday political speech in general, the article outlines questions about culture, power, and emotions, in order to explore a way of thinking about political engagement, disengagement, and grassroots social change. If we recognize that producing apathy takes a great deal of work, then we may find an unnoticed reserve of hope;we may begin to draw out the contradictory, tangled, democratic impetus embedded in citizens' everyday interactions - and also the impetus toward self-enclosed, narrowness embedded in these same interactions. In other words, by paying attention to the ways people actually talk in these groups, we can begin to understand the politics of civil society - sometimes par- ticipating in civic groups expands citizens' horizons, sometimes it shrinks them, sometimes it does both at once.

#### That cedes the political in a dangerous way

Eliasoph ‘97

Nina Eliasoph is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Southern California –Theory and Society, Vol. 26, No. 5 (Oct., 1997), pp. 605-647 – Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/658024

If the key to the mystery of "close to home" is not deformed "beliefs," or absent "languages," perhaps ignorance explains it. Americans are astoundingly ignorant of the most basic historical and political facts - who the vice-president is, which sides we are arming in various wars, and more.43 Given this dismal state of affairs, many researchers con- clude that a large portion of the American electorate is just too un- educated, stupid, or apathetic to participate. But, again, as Habermas, Mill, and other democratic theorists would argue, memorized lists of facts do not reveal or create political competence; what could begin to create competence is unobstructed communication that broadens citi- zens' political imaginations, inspires curiosity and analysis. Ignorance is not just a cause, or precondition, of other kinds of political compe- tence; it is also an effect of this incompetence-inducing cultural work. In Simonds's model,44 the three levels of competence - understanding of "what is," "what ought to be," and "what would be possible" - stack up, each presupposing the one below it. But here, volunteers' "incom- petence" in the second and third level drowned out competence in the first; volunteers' desire to appear optimistic about the future silenced their ability to analyze the present - a thin optimism of the will drowned out a pessimism of the intellect (to paraphrase Gramsci). This becomes especially clear if we listen to changes in speech from one context to the next. Displays of ignorance were not equally urgent in all contexts. For example, in one interview with a wife and husband, the husband, Ron, eagerly displayed scary knowledge to his wife, Clara. But when he turned to me, his knowledge and critique vanished; instead he sounded gullible and ignorant. The interchange began when I asked Clara about the nuclear issue. She responded that a nuclear battleship was different from a nuclear plant, and safer. Ron interrupted, "A nuclear battleship is a nuclear plant." She said she heard there were differences and again Ron interrupted, "If one of those babies melts down out there in the Sound, there won't be any difference to you!" To her, he detailed how a meltdown could happen, drawing on the large store of unspoken fearful knowledge many people in town shared. Clara then said that they may already have been exposed to radioactivity and would not even know it, since the govern- ment would not tell residents. Their twelve year old son, also in the room, silently listening to the interview, mumbled, "They wouldn't?"45 Then I turned to Ron himself, to ask him about the nuclear issue. Suddenly, he sounded very different. He knew "some sharp people who work on the battleships" and trusted them not to make mistakes. So I know accidents happen. They's why there're accidents. But you know, I could stay in my bed, and not cross the street and never get run over by a car, but never do anything.... I don't worry about it. I don't worry about it.... If the people out there were a bunch of Bozos and they worried me, maybe I'd be over there protesting.... I think it's run pretty right, so it's not an issue. So I don't do anything about it. But a moment later Clara said again that she had heard that they cannot melt down, and again, Ron interrupted, "They told you Three Mile Island wouldn't melt down either, but it did." Addressing his wife, Ron wanted to display his knowledge and scare her, but when standing on ceremony, addressing a researcher, he wanted to avoid appearing worried about something he could not change, so he roped his knowl- edge in, with a happy summary. Here was another setting - in addition to volunteer group meetings - in which a volunteer could let his or her competence roam in one speech context but not another. In volunteer group meetings, "close to home" cheered volunteers up, but made them less able publicly to formulate a moral ideal (of "what ought to be") and less able publicly to imagine a better world (of "what could be"); less able to learn about the wider world together: in short, rendered them less politically competent than they might have been in some other context where hope was less crucial, where displaying and acquiring knowledge would not risk undermining hope. Cultivating these infi- nite, acutely context-sensitive varieties of apparent "incompetence" took great skill.Some recent discussions of the broader cultural milieu defend privatism by saying that official definitions of "public" debate make the public arena too dry, abstract, and stuffy for the average person. One argu- ment contends that prosperous, post-World War II Americans have typically been content just to be left alone, sit in their backyards, play with their kids, and mind their own business, trying to carve out a small space for themselves where they feel free, equal, and comfort- able. Richard Flacks, for example,46 contends that much political activism in this century, such as the struggle for the two-day weekend, has been aimed at maintaining and enlarging that nice little walled garden, and that intellectuals are fooling themselves if they imagine that the majority of people will ever want to leave that privacy to "make history" instead of "making life": making history is just too hard. But this privatism takes its own toll, it has not just been the unob- structed will of the people, and it is not just human nature; corporate and government policies chased Americans into that little private space, encouraging a trade-off, offering long work hours for high pay if they refrained from mounting big challenges to that system - com- manding them, "Don't ever leave that tiny little private space!"47 Vol- unteers show how hard it is to stay inside the garden wall; they were very aware that their private lives were interlaced with social problems, and they knew there was no wall strong or high enough to keep social ills out. Trying to relax in that green yard meant, among other things, devoting themselves constantly to patching and rebuilding the wall. The wall was the major focus of active inattention. Since engagement with the wider world was inevitable, inattention inevitably had a shape. Protecting what is "close to home" is fine in itself; the problem arises if citizens can never publicly acknowledge that they take anything else seriously, or acknowledge that close and far are inseparable

### A-to Serial policy failure

#### Serial policy failure wrong. That starting point shatters agency and trades fatalism for progress

Kurasawa ‘4

(Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004).

Moreover, keeping in mind the sobering lessons of the past century cannot but make us wary about humankind’s supposedly unlimited ability for problemsolving or discovering solutions in time to avert calamities. In fact, the historical track-record of last-minute, technical ‘quick-fixes’ is hardly reassuring. What’s more, most of the serious perils that we face today (e.g., nuclear waste, climate change, global terrorism, genocide and civil war) demand complex, sustained, long-term strategies of planning, coordination, and execution. On the other hand, an examination of **fatalism** makes it readily apparent that the idea that humankind is doomed from the outset puts off any attempt to minimize risks for our successors, essentially condemning them to face cataclysms unprepared. An **a priori pessimism** is also unsustainable given the fact that long-term preventive action **has** **had** (and will continue to have) appreciable **beneficial effects**; the examples of *medical research*, the welfare state, international humanitarian law, as well as strict *environmental reg*ulation*s* in some countries stand out among many others. The evaluative framework proposed above should not be restricted to the critique of misappropriations of farsightedness, since it can equally support public deliberation with a reconstructive intent, that is, democratic discussion and debate about a future that human beings would freely self-determine. Inverting Foucault’s Nietzschean metaphor, we can think of genealogies of the future that could perform a farsighted mapping out of the possible ways of organizing social life. They are, in other words, interventions into the present intended to facilitate global civil society’s participation in shaping the field of possibilities of what is to come. Once competing dystopian visions are filtered out on the basis of their analytical credibility, ethical commitments, and political underpinnings and consequences, groups and individuals can assess the remaining legitimate catastrophic scenarios through the lens of genealogical mappings of the future. Hence, our first duty consists in addressing the present-day causes of eventual perils, ensuring that the paths we decide upon do not contract the range of options available for our posterity.42 Just as importantly, the practice of genealogically inspired farsightedness nurtures the project of an autonomous future, one that is socially self-instituting. In so doing, we can acknowledge that the future is a human creation instead of the product of metaphysical and extra-social forces (god, nature, destiny, etc.), and begin to reflect upon and deliberate about the kind of legacy we want to leave for those who will follow us. Participants in global civil society can then take – and in many instances have already taken – a further step by committing themselves to socio-political struggles forging a world order that, aside from not jeopardizing human and environmental survival, is designed to rectify the sources of transnational injustice that will continue to inflict needless suffering upon future generations if left unchallenged.

### Cochran

#### ( ) Reps and Epistemology can’t be fully settled – can and should act with some uncertainty.

**Cochran ‘99**

Molly Cochran Assistant Professor of International Affairs @ Georgia Institute for Technology, Normative Theory in International Relations. 1999, Page 272

To conclude this chapter, while modernist and postmodernist debates continue, while we are still unsure as to what we can legitimately identify as a feminist ethical/political concern, while we still are unclear about the relationship between discourse and experience, **it is** particularly **important** for feminists **that we proceed with analysis of both the material (**institutional and **structural) as well as the discursive**. **This holds not only for feminists, but for all theorists oriented towards the goal of extending further moral inclusion in the present** social sciences climate of epistemological uncertainty**. Important ethical/political concerns hang in the balance. We cannot afford to wait for the meta-theoretical questions to be conclusively answered**. Those answers may be unavailable. **Nor can we wait for a credible vision of an alternative institutional order to appear before an emancipatory agenda can be kicked into gear. Nor do we have before us a chicken and egg question of which comes first: sorting out the metatheoretical issues or working out which practices contribute to a credible institutional vision**. **The two questions can and should be pursued together, and can be via moral imagination. Imagination can help us think beyond discursive and material conditions which limit us, by pushing the boundaries of those limitations in thought and examining what yields.** In this respect, I believe international ethics as pragmatic critique can be a useful ally to feminist and normative theorists generally.

### Yes, value to Life

#### Yes, value to life

Coontz’1

Phyllis D. Coontz, PhD Graduate School of Public and International Affairs University of Pittsburgh, et al, JOURNAL OF COMMUNITY HEALTH NURSING, 2001, 18(4), 235-246 – J-Stor

In the 1950s, psychiatrist and theorist Viktor Frankl (1963) described an existential theory of purpose and meaning in life. Frankl, a long-time prisoner in a concentration camp, re- lated several instances of transcendent states that he experienced in the midst of that terri- ble suffering using his own experiences and observations. He believed that these experi- ences allowed him and others to maintain their sense of dignity and self-worth. Frankl (1969) claimed that transcendence occurs by giving to others, being open to others and the environment, and coming to accept the reality that some situations are un- changeable. He hypothesized that life always has meaning for the individual; a person can always decide how to face adversity. Therefore, self-transcendence provides mean- ing and enables the discovery of meaning for a person (Frankl, 1963). Expanding Frankl's work, Reed (1991b) linked self-transcendence with mental health. Through a developmental process individuals gain an increasing understanding of who they are and are able to move out beyond themselves despite the fact that they are ex- periencing physical and mental pain. This expansion beyond the self occurs through in- trospection, concern about others and their well-being, and integration of the past and fu- ture to strengthen one's present life (Reed, 1991b).

### Reps backlines

#### ( ) Your cards describe what *COULD* be, but social science shows reps don’t create reality

Newsom ‘96

David Newsom, former ambassador and under secretary of state, is the Cumming professor of international studies at the University of Virginia and is currently interim Dean of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Foreign Policy and Academia – Source: Foreign Policy, No. 101 (Winter, 1995-1996), pp. 52-67

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149406 .

American foreign policy is influenced by Congress, the media, advocacy organizations, lobbies, think tanks, and academia. Of those listed, the free realm of academia--the 3,638 institutions of higher education and the persons associated with them--*should* have the most knowledge and insight to offer to policymakers. Challenges to conventional wisdom and provocative explorations of international issues are part of the domain of the scholar and teacher and are precisely what is often missing in the official policy world. Yet the practices and approaches that are part of the culture of the professorial world *limit* its direct influence on the formation of policy. The worlds of the professor and the policymaker meet on many occasions, yet they remain fundamentally different. Over the years, the differences between the two outlooks have been complicated by academic suspicion of government and opposition to official policies and have been made more contentious by the attitude of many in government that academia represents an irrelevant ivory tower.

#### ( ) And, Reception-theory proves reps don’t “create reality”. Audiences are smart and reach their own conclusions.

Kraus ‘89

(et al – Sidney Kraus is a professor in the Department of Communication at Cleveland State University and Dennis Giles is also in the Department of Communication at Cleveland State University. Reviewed work(s):

Constructing the Political Spectacle by Murray Edelman Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Sep., 1989), pp. 517-525 Published by: International Society of Political Psychology Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791366)

Edelman assumes (like the early Frankfurt School) that viewers/audi- tors of the spectacle (here, the political spectacle) have only two choices- they can accept the terms (rules) of the game or reject them. There is no room for a negotiated reading of political discourse or the appropriation of politi- cal "problems" by individuals to serve their interests-their legitimate well- being as they define it. In this theory, spectators/participants are presented with a crude dualism: accept it all, reject it all. Ignored in the discussion are the so-called "cultural" studies published during the past decade [e.g., Hall (1980), Morely (1980, 1981), Radway (1984, 1986), Fiske (1986), Giles (1986); cf. two recent studies not available to Edel- man: Steiner (1988), and Giles (1989)], which have extended "reception the- ory"[e.g., Iser (1978), Suleiman and Crosma (1980), Jauss (1982) with an introduction by Paul de Man)]. This major theoretical perspective of cul- ture, literary, film and television studies in the United States and Britain re- jects the notion of a universally passive appropriation of a text on its own terms (political or otherwise) to explore the actual pragmatics of the act of viewing/reading a "spectacle." These studies present alternatives to the either/or stance of Edelman. While assuming that any practice of discourse constructs its own illusionary "world" (in Nelson's terms) and is potentially mystifying, these critics stress the ability and freedom of viewers/auditors and spectators/participants to construct their "own" meanings (like Edel- man's). This developing body of theory and analysis posits and describes the ability of viewers of the "spectacle" to negotiate the meaning of texts-to read and realize (Iser's term) meanings which often diverge from the "dominant" readings preferred by the political and media institutions.

#### ( ) Reception theory double-bind – either reps don’t cause reality or critics can’t explain *their* non-dominant reading

Kraus ‘89

(et al – Sidney Kraus is a professor in the Department of Communication at Cleveland State University and Dennis Giles is also in the Department of Communication at Cleveland State University. Reviewed work(s):

Constructing the Political Spectacle by Murray Edelman Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Sep., 1989), pp. 517-525 Published by: International Society of Political Psychology Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791366)

Edelman's practice in this book is ambivalent in that he invokes a world outside the mystifying practice of political discourse which seems intended as a correction of political spectacle, or an expose of its falsities. Are state- ments like the Reagan statement, then, intended as "proof" of his theory, or as brief illustrations of the kind of analysis that could be carried out utiliz- ing his theory? At times, he cites analytical or historical studies (in footnotes) as sup- port of his statements, but more often he seems to present such statements as though they were self-evident "facts." If all political reality is indeed a construction of language, how can one regard Edelman's statements of ap- parently self-evident facts as anything other than a further instance of self- interested linguistic construction? Statements like the description of the "real- ity" behind the mystifications of Reagan's political discourse can only be regarded, then, as mere opinions of the author, since they are unsupported by an extensive analysis. Edelman says that "the notion of reality construc- tion implies that some are valid and others not.... It can be done well or badly and be right or wrong" (pp. 6, 121). But how can the reader judge the validity of statements such as the one about Reagan? Why is Edelman's statement "right" whereas other such statements may be "wrong"? Although Edelman here does not claim to be writing a book of extended analysis, but rather elaborates theory, many of the statements he makes about "reality" remain unpersuasive since they are not accompanied by analytical work which could show why this "opinion" is more valid than any other. If, according to his own theory, Edelman's statements about reality are themselves con- structed according to the social/political position and the "interests" of the speaker/observer, there is no reason why a critical reader should regard them as demystifications or deconstructions of political discourse.

#### ( ) Reps-focus links to anti-politics

Dewsbury ‘3

(John-David Dewsbury -- School of Geographical Studies, University of Bristol -- Environment and Planning A 2003, volume 35, pages 1907-1932 -- http://www.sages.unimelb.edu.au/news/mhgr/dewsbury.pdf)

That someone includes us -- the social scientists, the researchers, and the writers. In some way we are all false witnesses to what is there.(2) So, even though the philosophi- cal drive moves against the apparently sterile setup of totalizing representations, the presentation of ideas is trapped within the structure it is trying to critique. In my opinion, this sterility is only apparent. Significantly, this appearance is valid from both sides: from the side of representational theory because of the belief in the representational structure as being able to give an account of everything; and from the side of nonrepresentational theory because of the danger of getting carried away with an absolute critique of representations. The apparent sterility comes from this last point: that in getting carried away with critique you fail to appreciate that the building blocks of representation are not sterile in themselves -- **only when they are used as part of a system.** **The representational system**, its structure and regulation of meaning, **is not complete** -- it needs constant maintenance, loyalty, and faith from those who practice it. In this regard, **its power is in its pragmatic functions**: easy communication of ideas (that restricts their potential extension), and sustainable, defensible, and consensual agreement on understanding (a certain kind of understanding, and hence a certain type of knowledge). The nonrepresentational argument comes into its own in asking us to revisit the performative space of representation in a manner that is more attuned to its fragile constitution. The point being that **representation** left critically unattended **only allows for conceptual difference and not for a concept of difference** as such. The former maintains existing ideological markers whilst the latter challenges us to invent new ones. For me, the project of nonrepresentational theory then, is to excavate the empty space between the lines of representational meaning in order to see what is also possible. The representational system is not wrong: rather,it is **the belief that it offers complete understanding -- and that *only* it offers any sensible understanding at all --** that **is critically flawed.**

### Epistemology should not be top Priority

( ) We’ll stay stuck in epistemological-debates forever – that’s \*the point\* of their epistemology framework

Wendt, ‘98

(professor of international security – Ohio State University, Alexander, “On Constitution and Causation in International Relations,” British International Studies Association)

As a community, we in the academic study of international politics spend too much time worrying about the kind of issues addressed in this essay. The **central point** of IR scholarship is to increase our knowledge of how the world works, not to worry about how (or whether) we can know how the world works. What matters for IR is ontology, not epistemology. This doesn’t mean that there are no interesting epistemological questions in IR, and even less does it mean that there are no important political or sociological aspects to those questions. Indeed there are, as I have suggested above, and as a discipline IR should have more awareness of these aspects. At the same time, however, these are questions best addressed by philosophers and sociologists of knowledge, not political scientists. Let’s face it: most IR scholars, including this one, have little or no proper training in epistemology, and as such the attempt to solve epistemological problems anyway will inevitably lead to confusion (after all, **after 2000 years, even** the **specialists are still having a hard time**). Moreover, as long as we let our research be driven in an open-minded fashion by substantive questions and problems rather than by epistemologies and methods, there is little need to answer epistemological questions either. It is simply not the case that we have to undertake an epistemological analysis of how we can know something before we can know it, a fact amply attested to by the success of the natural sciences, whose practitioners are only rarely forced by the results of their inquiries to consider epistemological questions. In important respects we do know how international politics works, and it doesn’t much matter how we came to that knowledge. In that light, going into the epistemology business will distract us from the real business of IR, which is international politics. Our **great** debates should be about first-order issues of substance, like the ‘first debate’ between Realists and Idealists, not second-order issues of method. Unfortunately, it is no longer a simple matter for IR scholars to ‘just say no’ to epistemological discourse. The problem is that this discourse has already contamin- ated our thinking about international politics, helping to polarize the discipline into ‘**paradigm wars’**. Although the resurgence of these wars in the 1980s and 90s is due in large part to the rise of post-positivism, its roots lie in the epistemological anxiety of positivists, who since the 1950s have been very concerned to establish the authority of their work as Science. This is an important goal, one that I share, but its implementation has been marred by an overly narrow conception of science as being concerned only with causal questions that can be answered using the methods of natural science. The effect has been to marginalize historical and interpretive work that does not fit this mould, and to encourage scholars interested in that kind of work to see themselves as somehow not engaged in science. One has to wonder whether the two sides should be happy with the result. Do positivists really mean to suggest that it is not part of science to ask questions about how things are constituted, questions which if those things happen to be made of ideas might only be answerable by interpretive methods? If so, then they seem to be saying that the double-helix model of DNA, and perhaps much of rational choice theory, is not science. And do post-positivists really mean to suggest that students of social life should not ask causal questions or attempt to test their claims against empirical evidence? If so, then it is **not clear by what criteria their work should be judged**, **or how it differs from art or revelation**. On both sides, in other words, the result of the Third Debate’s **sparring over epistemology is often one-sided, intolerant caricatures** of science.

#### ( ) Epistemology or Ontology 1st” is wrong and links to anti-politics

Jarvis 2K

(D.S.L., Lecturer n Government - U of Sydney, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE CHALLENGE OF POSTMODERNISM, p. 128-9)

Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge. But to suppose that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggles as actors in international politics. What does Ashley's project his deconstructive efforts, or valiant tight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed and destitute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the emigres of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rarionality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to suppose that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary—or is in some, way bad—is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and these theories tne ultimate question, “So what?” to what purpose do they deconstruct problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this "debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics" be judged pertinent relevant helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate.

### Root cause/Turns Case Section

#### ( ) Turns case and root cause wrong – not a unique turn, prefer specificity. And, root cause args wrong – their claim’s offense for us.

**Swanson ‘5**

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**It is** thus **misleading to suggest that social relations are ever solely** economic, political or cultural, **or that the causes of** **and remedies for unjust social arrangements are singular** (see also Butler, 1997c: 273, 276; Young, 1997: 154–6; Sayer, 1999). Although Fraser insists on the thorough imbrication of culture and economics, her **emphasis on** the two categories of redistribution and recognition and on **root causes undermine**s the **more complex understanding** she articulates elsewhere.6 Moreover, despite her commitment to perspectival dualism – and thus her rejection of substantive dualism and economism – in several instances Fraser describes the economy and capitalism in economically reductionist and determinist terms (2003: 53, 58, 214–18). **For instance**, although she correctly insists that capitalism and culture interact, **she often appears to conceptualize capitalism** and other economic activities **as** in themselves fundamentally economic **practices that function independently of political and cultural processes**, and, related, appears to conceive economic behavior/phenomena as devoid of values. To cite just a few examples, Fraser provides the following conceptualizations: ‘In this marketized zone, interaction is not directly regulated by patterns of cultural value. It is governed, rather by the functional interlacing of strategic imperatives, as individuals act to maximize self-interest’ (2003: 58); ‘system integration, in which interaction is coordinated by the functional interlacing of the unintended consequences of a myriad of individual strategies’; and ‘a quasi-objective, anonymous, impersonal market order that follows a logic of its own. This market order is culturally embedded, to be sure. But it is not directly governed by cultural schemas of evaluation’ (2003: 214). **As the concept of overdetermination shows,** ‘economic’ **practices** themselves **depend on specific** (cultural) **knowledge**s, values and discourses, as well as specific (political) rules and regulations (and vice versa). Values are therefore not confined to the cultural status order.7 In addition to discourses and knowledges, values, for example, constitute ideas and behavior related to business enterprise success and purposes, rational considerations and calculations, individual self-interest, appropriate and desirable objects of economic production and exchange, etc. (Amariglio and Ruccio, 1994; Watkins, 1998). The theoretical perspective I am advocating here thus urges both the multiplication of analytical categories and concrete empirical investigations of the numerous conditions of existence (located throughout society) of any unjust practice (see also Smith, 2001: 121). It consequently suggests that overcoming any given form of oppression most likely will require transforming a wide range of cultural, economic and political practices.

### Threats Real

#### Objective dangers exist --- the alt is complicit with mass violence

Lora 94 (Ronald, Professor of History, Emeritus – University of Toledo, American Historical Review, 99(1), February, p. 330)

Campbell’s work is useful because it reminds us of the need to reconsider the process by which states define themselves; yet problems remain. Radical skepticism of the sort expressed in this book based too much on international relations theory and too little on primary documents, at times takes on the tone of one who has never faced a gunman in a dark parking lot. Nowhere is it seriously considered that Soviet control over Eastern Europe and the Baltic states was an oppressive objective reality**,** or that the conduct of Joseph Stalin was so abnormal as to preclude some traditional ways in which nations conduct business with each other. What the United States should have done in Cold War foreign policy—and what now it should do with drugs, terrorism, and Japanese competition—is not the explicit concern of this book. Campbell displays great zeal in drawing analogies, but it is a dubious undertaking to insist that the modern state’s concern with security replicates the church’s concern with salvation, that the church, like the state, employs an evangelism of fear to ward off threats to its legitimacy. To argue thus necessitates a tortuous reading of Thomas Hobbes’s *Leviathan*. Moreover, from the angle of the church and of the state, Campbell’s reading of the texts is insensitive to genuine religious concern with salvation on the one hand, and to the democratic state’s wish to respond to citizens needs on the other.

### Security /War on Terror not root cause or “driving desire”

#### ( ) They’re wrong about underlying desire – the inability of “Security” and the War on Terror to become mantras confirm

Chandler ‘4

(David Chandler is Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster – International Politics, 2004, 41, (354–374) – available at: http://www.davidchandler.org/pdf/journal\_articles/International%20Politics%20-%20Culture%20Wars.pdf)

It appeared as if the horrific events of 9/11 would rewrite the norms and practices of international society and provide the ‘defining paradigm’ missing from ‘the global order’ since the end of the Cold War (see for example, Booth and Dunne, 2002, ix). The doctrine of humanitarian intervention had exposed the US to accusations of double standards and given the moral highground to aid agencies rather than military forces. In the wake of 9/11, the US government had the opportunity to regain the moral mantle. In a world of victim politics, the US could at last claim to be a victim itself. In the words of Martin Shaw, the US and Britain now had the ‘moral capital’ they needed to overcome the legacy of Empire and tackle the Culture Wars at home and abroad (Shaw, 2001). Initially, Bush and Blair were upbeat about the possibilities for developing a new vision of the future. For the hawks in the US establishment, 9/11 provided the legitimacy to project US power in a more confident way and long-term plans for war on Iraq were already considered on that day (Goldenberg and Borger, 2003). US Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, recognized from the beginning that the ‘war against terrorism’ was an opportunity to restore what America had lost in Vietnam. As Maureen Dowd noted in the New York Times: The administration isn’t targeting Iraq because of 9/11. It’s exploiting 9/11 to target Iraq. This new fight isn’t logical — it’s cultural. It is the latest chapter in the culture wars, the conservative dream of restoring America’s sense of Manifest Destinyy Extirpating Saddam is about proving how tough we are to a world that thinks we got soft when that last helicopter left the roof of the American embassy in Saigon in 1975. (Dowd, 2002). This confidence was most manifest in Tony Blair’s triumphant speech to the Labour Party conference in October 2001: The starving, the wretched, the dispossessed, the ignorant, those living in want and squalor from the deserts of Northern Africa to the slums of Gaza, to the mountain ranges of Afghanistan: they too are our cause. This is a moment to seize. The kaleidoscope has been shaken. The pieces are in flux. Soon they will settle again. Before they do, let us re-order this world around usy’. (Blair, 2001b) While the US and British establishments talked a good deal about the ‘war against terrorism’, they found it much more difficult to fight one. The war in Afghanistan illustrated the problem. Since the ‘war against terrorism’ was driven largely by a desire to reap domestic rewards through a show of strength, there was a lack of political and military strategy on the ground. The aims of the war were not clear, and like the Kosovo war, appeared to shift with every new media deadline. Initially, the aim was to capture bin Laden, then to remove the Taliban regime, but despite the fire power, the daisy-cutters and the clusterbombs there was little sense of achievement. It soon appeared that 9/11 had not established a new paradigm for the projection of power. There was no problem in bringing US firepower to bear, but the ‘war against terrorism’ in Afghanistan provided little new context of meaning or purpose. The conflict was shaped by the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, with the dropping of food parcels along with missiles and an emphasis on the humanitarian and human rights cause. Again, the critics argued that a humanitarian war could not be fought from 35,000 feet and the sight of the most powerful military power on earth carpet bombing one of the poorest did little to reassert a sense of moral mission. The biggest problem was that the war in Afghanistan was not framed in a context that linked it with any positive vision of the future. The ‘war against terrorism’, like ‘humanitarian intervention’, was a policing operation, not the beginning of a revived sense of purpose. The artificial nature of the project and the lack of commitment it could inspire meant that rather than asserting its power, the US risked further being discredited. The use of local Afghan warlords to hunt down bin Laden in the mountains of Tora Bora, widely blamed for allowing him to escape, was a humiliating failure for the US. The lack of willingness to commit US troops in a situation where casualties were feared possible undermined the projection of US power and US success in imposing ‘regime change’. In the aftermath of Tora Bora, the US government was even keener to shift the emphasis to Iraq and ‘wipe the slate clean’. There has been little focus on post-war Afghanistan and the Western-sponsored Karzai government has been hamstrung by the US lack of willingness to enforce his rule outside of the capital Kabul. Policy reports contrast the ‘light footprint’ of international control in the state in comparison to the resources put into the more high-profile protectorates of Bosnia and Kosovo (see for example, Chesterman, 2002). The victory/defeat for the US in Afghanistan appears emblematic of the failure of the ‘war against terrorism’. Every attempt to use the international sphere to regain a sense of domestic mission seemed only to make the problems worse. In this sense, it would appear that whatever happens over Iraq, the US government is unlikely to reap any long-term political gain. It appears that the American establishment cannot even convince itself of a sense of Manifest Destiny, let alone the rest of the world. As London Times columnist Mick Hume asserts ‘the fall-out from the Culture Wars is not only felt on campuses and in high cultural circles. The calling into question of America’s traditional values has a corrosive effect on every institution including the US military (Hume, 2002). Rick Perlstein notes that the opposition to the war is not coming mainly from the public but the establishment itself: the foreign policy establishment seems distinctly uneasy about war in Iraq. The military establishment is not necessarily any more enthusiastic; Gen. Anthony Zinni, President Bush’s own sometime Mideast envoy, has spoken repeatedly against invasion and in favour of containment. The Central Intelligence Agency has let its coolness to the invasion idea become known. (Perlstein, 2002) The messy war in Afghanistan and the divisions within the US establishment over Iraq illustrate the difficulties of policy-making in the absence of a political or ideological framework. In relation to the ‘war against terrorism’, this was highlighted again by the shifting responses of Washington to North Korea. In January 2002, in his State of the Union address President Bush named North Korea as part of the ‘axis of evil’ and a ‘threat to world peace’ alongside Iran and Iraq (Bush, 2002). The US cut fuel aid that had been promised to ease the North’s energy needs and, in response, North Korea defended its right to restart its nuclear weapons programme, making the focus on Iraq as the main danger of supplying weapons of mass destruction appear increasingly irrational. Washington could not sustain its hard line and in January 2003 was forced to publicly back down, offering food and energy aid to North Korea as an incentive to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme (Goldenberg and Watts, 2003).

### Problem-Solving Good

#### Policy change is necessary to alleviate real and on-going suffering. Abstract claims of “epistemology” and “ontology” and non-impacts like “technological rationality” are ivory-tower constructions that condemn millions to death

Jarvis 00 (Darryl, Senior Lecturer in International Relations – University of Sydney, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism, p. 128-130)

Questions of Relevance, Rhetoric, Fiction, and Irrationalism While Ashley's rhetoric serves to effect a number of political moves, it also helps conceal a series of blatant weaknesses implicit in his poststructural theory. The first of these we might identify as the rhetorical invention and reification of fictitious enemies, a mechanism that not only validates Ash­ley's project but gives it meaning. Frequently, for example, what Ashley purports to be attacking turns out to be a fictitious, or at best grossly exaggerated, entity. In his adoption of the "megahistorical unit, moder­nity," for example, Ashley presupposes an homogeneous, coherent phe­nomenon able to be studied—a suggestion most would find outrageous. As Tony Porter notes, "giving coherence to such a phenomenon requires doing violence to its diversity." Enlightenment thought can no more be reduced to a symmetric intellectual tradition or historical moment than can postmodernism." Indeed, emasculating such an intellectual potpourri of ideas whose only similarity is dissonance seems peculiar considering Ashley's persistent commitment to venerate difference and discursive practices. To suppose that liberalism, Marxism, conservatism, fascism, leninism, or assorted other -isms that fall under the modernist rubric are contiguous is as preposterous as conflating Derrida with Foucault, Lyotard, and Baudrillard. Yet the hubris of Ashley's entire poststructural theory rests on such simplification and not only with the concept of modernity. Positivism, realism, or technical rationality, for instance, are all reduced to overly simplistic caricatures, assumed ubiquitous, and dis­tilled into three or four rudimentary propositions that Ashley then sets about deconstructing. Technical rationality simply becomes nonreflexive problem-solving; positivism, a system of thought that divides subject from object and fact from value; while realism is reduced to the ontolog­ical presumption of the state-as-actor. While simplicity has unquestion­able heuristic value, crude reductionism for the sake of political opportunism is plainly defamatory. Rather than parsimonious theory, what Ashley delivers is a series of fictitious straw men, theoretically fabri­cated along with crude ontological and epistemological presumptions that render them congenitally deformed and thus susceptible to Ashley's poststructural interpretivism. In reality, of course, no such caricatures exist. Positivists, realists, and modernists alike are considerably more complex, divergent, and reflexive than Ashley would have us believe. In the case of realism, for example, Ashley conflates the writings of Kenneth Waltz, Robert Keohane, Stephen Krasner, Robert W. Tucker, George Modelski, Charles Kindleberger, and Robert Gilpin, disregarding the disparate set of professional and political perspectives that makes each one distinctive and debate among them fero­cious." However, it is on the basis of these exaggerated caricatures that Ashley's raison d'être for poststructural theory and political transformation ultimately rests. Perhaps more alarming though is the outright violence Ashley recom­mends in response to what at best seem trite, if not imagined, injustices. Inculpating modernity, positivism, technical rationality, or realism with violence, racism, war, and countless other crimes not only smacks of anthropomorphism but, as demonstrated by Ashley's torturous prose and reasoning, requires a dubious logic to make such connections in the first place. Are we really to believe that ethereal entities like positivism, mod­ernism, or realism emanate a "violence" that marginalizes dissidents? Indeed, where is this violence, repression, and marginalization? As self- professed dissidents supposedly exiled from the discipline, Ashley and Walker appear remarkably well integrated into the academy—vocal, pub­lished, and at the center of the Third Debate and the forefront of theo­retical research. Likewise, is Ashley seriously suggesting that, on the basis of this largely imagined violence, global transformation (perhaps even rev­olutionary violence) is a necessary, let alone desirable, response? Has the rationale for emancipation or the fight for justice been reduced to such vacuous revolutionary slogans as "Down with positivism and rationality"? The point is surely trite. Apart from members of the academy, who has heard of positivism and who for a moment imagines that they need to be emancipated from it, or from modernity, rationality, or realism for that matter? In an era of unprecedented change and turmoil, of new political and military configurations, of war in the Balkans and ethnic cleansing, is Ashley really suggesting that some of the greatest threats facing humankind or some of the great moments of history rest on such innocu­ous and largely unknown nonrealities like positivism and realism? These are imagined and fictitious enemies, theoretical fabrications that represent arcane, self-serving debates superfluous to the lives of most people and, arguably, to most issues of importance in international relations. More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflects our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating the­ory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorists have to the real world. Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge." But to suppose that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggles as actors in international politics. What does Ashley's project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and des­titute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the emigres of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to suppose that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary—or is in some way bad—is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. As Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, "So what?" To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this "debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics" be judged pertinent, relevant, help­ful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholasti­cally excited by abstract and recondite debate." Contrary to Ashley's assertions, then, a poststructural approach fails to empower the marginalized and, in fact, abandons them. Rather than ana­lyze the political economy of power, wealth, oppression, production, or international relations and render an intelligible understanding of these processes, Ashley succeeds in ostracizing those he portends to represent by delivering an obscure and highly convoluted discourse. If Ashley wishes to chastise structural realism for its abstractness and detachment, he must be prepared also to face similar criticism, especially when he so adamantly intends his work to address the real life plight of those who struggle at marginal places. If the relevance of Ashley's project is questionable, so too is its logic and cogency. First, we might ask to what extent the postmodern "empha­sis on the textual, constructed nature of the world" represents "an unwar­ranted extension of approaches appropriate for literature to other areas of human practice that are more constrained by an objective reality."" All theory is socially constructed and realities like the nation-state, domestic and international politics, regimes, or transnational agencies are obviously social fabrications. But to what extent is this observation of any real use? Just because we acknowledge that the state is a socially fabricated entity, or that the division between domestic and international society is arbitrar­ily inscribed does not make the reality of the state disappear or render invisible international politics. Whether socially constructed or objectively given, the argument over the ontological status of the state is of no par­ticular moment. Does this change our experience of the state or somehow diminish the political-economic-juridical-military functions of the state? To recognize that states are not naturally inscribed but dynamic entities continually in the process of being made and reimposed and are therefore culturally dissimilar, economically different, and politically atypical, while perspicacious to our historical and theoretical understanding of the state, in no way detracts from its reality, practices, and consequences. Similarly, few would object to Ashley's hermeneutic interpretivist understanding of the international sphere as an artificially inscribed demarcation. But, to paraphrase Holsti again, so what? This does not make its effects any less real, diminish its importance in our lives, or excuse us from paying serious attention to it. That international politics and states would not exist with­out subjectivities is a banal tautology. The point, surely, is to move beyond this and study these processes. Thus, while intellectually interesting, con­structivist theory is not an end point as Ashley seems to think, where we all throw up our hands and announce there are no foundations and all real­ity is an arbitrary social construction. Rather, it should be a means of rec­ognizing the structurated nature of our being and the reciprocity between subjects and structures through history. Ashley, however, seems not to want to do this, but only to deconstruct the state, international politics, and international theory on the basis that none of these is objectively given but fictitious entities that arise out of modernist practices of representa­tion. While an interesting theoretical enterprise, it is of no great conse­quence to the study of international politics. Indeed, structuration theory has long taken care of these ontological dilemmas that otherwise seem to preoccupy Ashley."

### Political Vacuum

#### Turn --- without alternative security policy options the security sector will be dominated by the most conservative policymakers

Olav. F. Knudsen, Prof @ Södertörn Univ College, ‘1 [*Security Dialogue* 32.3, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization,” p. 366]

A final danger in focusing on the state is that of building the illusion that states have impenetrable walls, that they have an inside and an outside, and that nothing ever passes through. Wolfers’s billiard balls have contributed to this misconception. But the state concepts we should use **are in no need of** such an illusion. Whoever criticizes the field for such sins in the past needs to **go back to the literature**. Of course, we must continue to be open to a frank and unbiased assessment of the transnational politics which significantly in- fluence almost every issue on the domestic political agenda. The first decade of my own research was spent studying these phenomena – and I disavow none of my conclusions about the state’s limitations. Yet I am not ashamed to talk of a domestic political agenda. Anyone with a little knowledge of Euro- pean politics knows that Danish politics is not Swedish politics is not German politics is not British politics. Nor would I hesitate for a moment to talk of the role of the state in transnational politics, where it is an important actor, though only one among many other competing ones. In the world of transnational relations, the exploitation of states by interest groups – by their assumption of roles as representatives of states or by convincing state representatives to argue their case and defend their narrow interests – is a significant class of phenomena, today as much as yesterday. Towards a Renewal of the Empirical Foundation for Security Studies Fundamentally, the sum of the foregoing list of sins blamed on the Copen- hagen school amounts to a lack of attention paid to just that ‘reality’ of security which Ole Wæver consciously chose to leave aside a decade ago in order to pursue the politics of securitization instead. I cannot claim that he is void of interest in the empirical aspects of security because much of the 1997 book is devoted to empirical concerns. However, the attention to agenda-setting – confirmed in his most recent work – draws attention away from the important issues we need to work on more closely if we want to contribute to a better understanding of European **security as it is** currently developing**.** That inevitably requires a more **consistent** interest in security policy in the making – not just in the development of alternative security policies. The dan- ger here is that, as alternative policies are likely to fail grandly on the political arena, crucial decisions may be made in the ‘**traditional’ sector of security** policymaking, **unheeded by any but the most uncritical minds.**

#### The alt creates a political void filled by elites – locking in oppression

Cook 92 (Anthony, Associate Professor – Georgetown Law, New England Law Review, Spring, 26 New Eng.L. Rev. 751, Lexis)

The effect of deconstructing the power of the author to impose a fixed meaning on the text or offer a continuous narrative is both debilitating and liberating. It is debilitating in that any attempt to say what should be done within even our insular Foucaultian preoccupations may be oppositionalized and deconstructed as an illegitimate privileging of one term, value, perspective or narrative over another. The struggle over meaning might continue ad infinitum. That is, if a deconstructionist is theoretically consistent and sees deconstruction not as a political tool but as a philosophical orientation, political action is impossible, because such action requires a degree of closure that deconstruction, as a theoretical matter, does not permit. Moreover, the approach is debilitating because deconstruction without material rootedness, without goals and vision, **creates a political** and spiritual **void** into which the socially real power we theoretically deconstruct steps and **steps on** the disempowered and dispossessed.  [\*762]  To those dying from AIDS, stifled by poverty, dehumanized by sexism and racism, crippled by drugs and brutalized by the many forms of physical, political and economic violence that characterizes our narcissistic culture, power hardly seems a matter of illegitimate theoretical privileging. When vision, social theory and political struggle do not accompany critique, the **void will be filled** by the rich, the powerful and the charismatic, those who influence us through their eloquence, prestige, wealth and power.

### Political Vacuum

#### The impact is extinction

Rorty 98 (Richard, Professor of Comparative Literature – Stanford University, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America, p. 89-94)

At that point, something will crack. The nonsuburban electorate will decide that the system has failed and start looking around for a strongman to vote for someone willing to assure them that, once he is elected, the smug bureaucrats, tricky lawyers, overpaid bond salesmen, and postmodernist professors will no longer be calling the shots. A scenario like that of Sinclair Lewis’ novel It Can’t Happen Here may then be played out. For once such a strongman takes office, nobody can predict what will happen. In 1932, most of the predictions made about what would happen if Hindenburg named Hitler chancellor were **wildly overoptimistic**. One thing that is very likely to happen is that **the gains made in the past forty years** by black and brown Americans, and by homosexuals, **will be wiped out**. Jocular contempt for women will come back into fashion. The words "nigger" and "kike" will once again be heard in the workplace. **All the sadism** which the academic Left has tried to make unaccept­able to its students will come flooding back. All the resent­ment which badly educated Americans feel about having their manners dictated to them by college graduates will find an outlet. But such a renewal of sadism will not alter the effects of selfishness. For after my imagined strongman takes charge, he will quickly make his peace with the international super­rich, just as Hitler made his with the German industrialists. He will invoke the glorious memory of the Gulf War to **pro­voke military adventures which will** generate short-term prosperity. He will be a disaster for the country and the world. People will wonder why there was so little resistance to his evitable rise. Where, they will ask, was the American Left? Why was it only rightists like Buchanan who spoke to the workers about the consequences of globalization? Why could not the Left channel the mounting rage of the newly dispossessed? It is often said that we Americans, at the end of the twenti­eth century, no longer have a Left. Since nobody denies the existence of what I have called the cultural Left, this amounts to an admission that that Left is unable to engage in national politics. It is not the sort of Left which can be asked to deal with the consequences of globalization. To get the country to deal with those consequences, the present cultural Left would have to transform itself by opening relations with the residue of the old reformist Left, and in particular with the labor unions. It would have to talk much more about money, even at the cost of talking less about stigma. I have two suggestions about how to effect this transition. The first is that the Left should put a moratorium on theory. It should try to kick its philosophy habit. The second is that the Left should try to mobilize what remains of our pride in being Americans. It should ask the public to consider how the country of Lincoln and Whitman might be achieved. In support of my first suggestion, let me cite a passage from Dewey's Reconstruction in Philosophy in which he ex­presses his exasperation with the sort of sterile debate now going on under the rubric of "individualism versus commu­nitarianism." Dewey thought that all discussions which took this dichotomy seriously suffer from a common defect. They are all committed to the logic of general notions under which specific situa­tions are to be brought. What we want is light upon this or that group of individuals, this or that concrete human being, this or that special institution or social arrangement. For such a logic of inquiry, the tradition­ally accepted logic substitutes discussion of the mean­ing of concepts and their dialectical relationships with one another. Dewey was right to be exasperated by sociopolitical theory conducted at this level of abstraction. He was wrong when he went on to say that ascending to this level is typically a right­ist maneuver, one which supplies "the apparatus for intellec­tual justifications of the established order. "9 For such ascents are now more common on the Left than on the Right. The contemporary academic Left seems to think that the higher your level of abstraction, the more subversive of the estab­lished order you can be. The more sweeping and novel your conceptual apparatus, the more radical your critique. When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been "inadequately theorized," you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of lan­guage, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist ver­sion of economic determinism. Theorists of the Left think that dissolving political agents into plays of differential sub­jectivity, or political initiatives into pursuits of Lacan's im­possible object of desire, helps to subvert the established order. Such subversion, they say, is accomplished by "problematizing familiar concepts." Recent attempts to subvert social institutions by prob­lematizing concepts have produced a few very good books. They have also produced many thousands of books which represent scholastic philosophizing at its worst. The authors of these purportedly "subversive" books honestly believe that they are serving human liberty. But it is almost impossi­ble to clamber back down from their books to a level of ab­straction on which one might discuss the merits of a law, a treaty, a candidate, or a political strategy. Even though what these authors "theorize" is often something very concrete and near at hand-a current TV show, a media celebrity, a re­cent scandal-they offer the most abstract and barren expla­nations imaginable. These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into polit­ical relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left re­treats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice pro­duces **theoretical hallucinations**. These result in an intellec­tual environment which is, as Mark Edmundson says in his book Nightmare on Main Street, Gothic. The cultural Left is haunted by ubiquitous specters, the most frightening of which is called "power." This is the name of what Edmund­son calls Foucault's "haunting agency, which is everywhere and nowhere, as evanescent and insistent as a resourceful spook."10

### A-to Heg Link

#### Blanket kritik of hegemonic (economic) power is ethically unjustifiable. Reigning in worst aspect of bush administrations’ use of military threats solves their offense, but preserves ethical good of avoiding conflict.

Christian REUS-SMIT IR @ Australian Nat’l ‘4*American Power and World Order* p. 109-115

The final ethical position — the polar opposite of the first — holds that the exercise of hegemonic power is never ethically justifiable. One source of such a position might be pacifist thought, which abhors the use of violence even in unambiguous cases of self-defence. This would not, however, provide a comprehensive critique of the exercise of hegemonic power, which takes forms other than overt violence, such as economic diplomacy or the manipulation of international institutions. A more likely source of such critique would be the multifarious literature that equates all power with domination. Postmodernists (and anarch­ists, for that matter) might argue that behind all power lies self-interest and a will to control, both of which are antithetical to genuine human freedom and diversity. Rad­ical liberals might contend that the exercise of power by one human over another transforms the latter from a moral agent into a moral subject, thus violating their in­tegrity as self-governing individuals. Whatever the source, these ideas lead to radical scepticism about all institutions of power, of which hegemony is one form. The idea that the state is a source of individual security is replaced here with the idea of the state as a tyranny; the idea of hegem­ony as essential to the provision of global public goods is A framework for judgement Which of the above ideas help us to evaluate the ethics of the Bush Administration's revisionist hegemonic project? There is a strong temptation in international relations scholarship to mount trenchant defences of favoured para­digms, to show that the core assumptions of one's pre­ferred theory can be adapted to answer an ever widening set of big and important questions. There is a certain discipline of mind that this cultivates, and it certainly brings some order to theoretical debates, but it can lead to the 'Cinderella syndrome', the squeezing of an un­gainly, over-complicated world into an undersized theor­etical glass slipper. The study of international ethics is not immune this syndrome, with a long line of scholars seeking master normative principles of universal applic­ability. My approach here is a less ambitious, more prag­matic one. With the exceptions of the first and last positions, each of the above ethical perspectives contains kernels of wisdom. The challenge is to identify those of value for evaluating the ethics of Bush's revisionist grand strategy, and to consider how they might stand in order of priority. The following discussion takes up this challenge and arrives at a position that I tentatively term 'procedural solidarism'. The first and last of our five ethical positions can be dismissed as unhelpful to our task. The idea that might is right resonates with the cynical attitude we often feel to­wards the darker aspects of international relations, but it does not constitute an ethical standpoint from which to judge the exercise of hegemonic power. First of all, it places the right of moral judgement in the hands of the hegemon, and leaves all of those subject to its actions with no grounds for ethical critique. What the hegemon dictates as ethical is ethical. More than this, though, the principle that might is right is undiscriminating. It gives us no resources to determine ethical from unethical hegemonic conduct. The idea that might is never right is **equally unsatisfying**. It is a principle implied in many critiques of imperial power, including of American power. But like its polar opposite, it is **utterly undiscriminating**. No matter what the hegemon does we are left with one blanket assessment. No procedure, no selfless goal is worthy of ethical endorsement. This is a **deeply impoverished ethical posture**, as it **raises the critique of power above all other human values**. It is also completely counter-intuitive. Had the United States intervened militarily to prevent the Rwandan genocide, would this not have been ethically justifiable? If one answers no, then one faces the difficult task of explaining why the exercise of hegemonic power would have been a greater evil than allowing almost a million people to be massacred. If one answers yes, then one is admitting that a more discriminating set of ethical principles is needed than the simple yet enticing propos­ition that might is never right.