## Security K – 1NC

### The Aff promotes a securitizing view of space exploration by justifying the plan through a politics of fear --- this is an intentional narrative that conceals ideological bias and serves as a pretext for militarization

Mellor 7 (Felicity, Lecturer in Science Communication – Imperial College (UK), “Colliding Worlds: Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space”, Social Studies of Science, 37(4), August, p. 499-502)

Since the late 1980s, a small group of astronomers and planetary scientists has repeatedly warned of the threat of an asteroid impacting with Earth and causing global destruction. They foretell a large impact causing global fires, the failure of the world’s agriculture and the end of human civilization. But, these scientists assure us, we live at a unique moment in history when we have the technological means to avert disaster. They call for support for dedicated astronomical surveys of near-Earth objects to provide early warning of an impactor and they have regularly met with defence scientists to discuss new technologies to deflect any incoming asteroids. The scientists who have promoted the asteroid impact threat have done so by invoking narratives of technological salvation – stories which, like the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), promise security through a superweapon in space. The asteroid impact threat can therefore be located within the broader cultural history of fantasies about security and power, which, Bruce Franklin (1988) has argued, is inextricably linked to the century-old idea that a new superweapon could deliver world peace. Howard McCurdy (1997 78–82), in his study of the ways in which the US space programme was shaped by popular culture, has suggested that the promotion of the impact threat can be seen as the completion of Cold War fantasies, which had used a politics of fear to justify space exploration. McCurdy highlights the alignment between the promotion of the impact threat and works of fiction. In this paper, I consider the reconceptualization of asteroid science that this alignment entailed. It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a complete history of the science of planetary impacts. My focus is on how a group of scientists moved from seeing impacts as significant events in Earth history to seeing them as threatening events in the human future – a move from historical to futurological narratives. Nor is there space to give a full account of the empirical developments that were used to support the construal of asteroids as a threat. Rather, I wish to make the case that these empirical developments were given meaning within a specific narrative context which drew civilian astronomers into contact with defence scientists, especially those working on SDI. A number of studies (for example, McDougall, 1985; Forman, 1987; Kevles, 1990; DeVorkin, 1992; Leslie, 1993; Dennis, 1994) have revealed the ways in which US research programmes and nominally-civilian scientific institutions originated in military programmes. One aim of this paper is to demonstrate how the boundary between civilian and military science is blurred not just institutionally, but also at a fundamental conceptual level. The civilian scientists discussed here followed different working practices and traded in different forms of expertise than did the defence scientists. They were typically astronomers or planetary scientists who worked for NASA or on NASA-funded research programmes at universities and private institutes. They saw themselves as distinct from the defence scientists who were typically physicists and engineers working on new weapons systems or other technologies of national security at the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories or at armed services institutions. Yet the two groups came to share an interest in asteroids and with that a set of assumptions about the nature of human society, the role of technology and our place in outer space. As they came into contact, their differing backgrounds meant they disagreed over a number of issues, yet both sides pursued the collaboration despite the tensions. Many studies of the interaction between military and civilian science have focused on sources of funding and shared technologies. Important as these are, they fail to capture fully the dynamic between the two communities. In particular, a cynical picture of scientists simply pursuing sources of funding on any terms cannot reveal the far-reaching ways in which civilian research can become entrenched in particular patterns of thinking which are supportive of militaristic programmes. For military/civilian collaborations to be sustained, civilian scientists need to share with their counterparts in the defence sector an understanding of the overall trajectory of their research. For shared technologies to be developed, they need first to be imagined. Military/civilian interactions are therefore predicated on, and mediated through, a shared technoscientific imaginary. Despite expressing concerns about the motives and methods of the weapons scientists, the civilian scientists who promoted the asteroid impact threat drew on narratives that configured a human role in space in a similar way to SDI. These narratives helped make asteroids conceivable as a threat, yet they also served to make acceptable, and even necessary, the idea of space-based weaponry. Despite their disagreements, at the level of their shared narratives the discourses of the civilian and defence scientists were mutually supportive. Several studies of the role of narrative in the production of scientific knowledge have identified it as a means of generating coherence in science that both enables and constrains further research (Haraway, 1989; O’Hara, 1992; Rouse, 1996; Brown, 1998). Richard Harvey Brown is the most explicit about what constitutes a narrative, defining it as ‘an accounting of events or actions temporally that explains them causally or motivationally’ (Brown, 1998: 98). Brown’s definition of narrative fits with that of narrative theorists such as Mieke Bal (1997) who have stressed that narrative entails not a random unfolding of events but a sequenced ordering involving a transition from one state to another brought about or experienced by actors. One implication of this is the fundamental role of causality and agency. Another is that a narrative beginning always anticipates an ending – a resolution or closure to the events that have been set in motion. Historian Hayden White (1981: 23) has argued that the tendency to present history as narrative ‘arises out of a desire to have real events display the coherence, integrity, fullness, and closure of an image or life that is and can only be imaginary’. He finds that narrative closure involves a passage from one moral order to another. ‘Where, in any account of reality, narrativity is present, we can be sure that morality or a moralizing impulse is present too’ (White, 1981: 22). In this sense, narrative is inherently teleological and ideological. The inexorable movement of a narrative towards a predetermined end ensures that its many assumptions go unchallenged. An analytical approach to the interaction between military and civilian science that recognizes the ideological function of narrative can help sidestep some of the difficulties associated with the distortionist thesis often attributed to Paul Forman’s (1987) landmark paper on the military basis of US post-war physics. Forman has been criticized for implying that without military patronage, physics would have followed an ideal direction unaffected by outside interests (for example, Kevles, 1990). By looking at what sorts of narratives scientists draw on, we can avoid Forman’s supposed idealism. The question is not so much whether science has been distorted, but through which of many possible stories a research programme has been articulated. To ask which stories have been invoked is to ask which ideologies have implicitly been accepted. And to ask that is to allow that, on ideological grounds, some stories are preferable to others. Because narratives are shared within a research community, they are not always explicitly articulated in texts. Technical papers are most likely to hide the fundamental assumptions that underpin a research area. However, literature addressed to wider audiences is often more explicit. Grey literature, such as policy reports or review papers, and popularizations written by scientists are therefore useful sources for identifying the narrative context in which a science is framed, traces of which may also be found in technical papers. While always remembering that such accounts are written with particular persuasive or marketing goals in mind, these texts nonetheless reveal what, to the scientist-author, is both thinkable and compelling. In what follows, I draw on this full range of texts, from technical papers to popularizations, to show that the scientists promoting the impact threat have repeatedly turned to narratives of technological salvation that imagined the ultimate superweapon – a space-based planetary defence system that would protect the Earth from the cosmic enemy. I begin with a brief overview of earlier conceptions of asteroids before outlining the events through which asteroids were promoted as a threat and examining the narrative context in which this occurred. I finish by arguing that the narration of the impact threat entailed a reconceptualization of asteroids, space and astronomy and invoked a ‘narrative imperative’ that helped legitimize the militarization of space.

## Security K – 1NC

### Disorder and insecurity are inevitable. Attempting to control danger is the impetus for global destruction

Der Derian 98 (James, Professor of Political Science – University of Massachusetts, On Security, Ed. Lipschutz, p. 24-25)

No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted. We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, an a priori  argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." Continues... [7](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0%3Dwww.ciaonet.org%3A80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note7) In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.' " [8](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0%3Dwww.ciaonet.org%3A80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note8) By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a "security crisis" in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control. What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that I am not in search of an "alternative security." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought." Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security: I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative. My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference. Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness.

## Security K – 1NC

### Vote Neg to reject the dominant framing of security. This critical praxis is a prerequisite to effective policy solutions

Bruce 96 (Robert, Associate Professor in Social Science – Curtin University and Graeme Cheeseman, Senior Lecturer – University of New South Wales, Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9)

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable part of the problem to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific policies may follow. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

## Block Tricks – Apocalyptic Rhetoric

### Fear of apocalypse causes endless violence in the name of security

Coviello 00 (Peter, Professor of English and Acting Program Director of Africana Studies – Bowdoin College, Queer Frontiers, p. 40-41)

Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is in any way postapocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed-it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques Derrida's suitably menacing phrase) `remainderless and a-symbolic destruction,"6 then in the postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an "other" people whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion, threatening the safety and prosperity of a cherished "general population:' This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag's incisive observation, from 1989, that, "Apocalypse is now a long-running serial: not `Apocalypse Now' but 'Apocalypse from Now On."" The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss) is that apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it is ever useful. That is, through the perpetual threat of destruction-through the constant reproduction of the figure of apocalypse-agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first volume of The History of Sexuality addresses himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than productive, less life-threatening than, in his words, "life-administering:' Power, he contends, "exerts a positive influence on life . . . [and] endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations:' In his brief comments on what he calls "the atomic situation;' however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means. For as "managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race," agencies of modern power presume to act "on the behalf of the existence of everyone:' Whatsoever might be construed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive or, indeed, potentially annihilating. "If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power;' Foucault writes, "this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population:'8 For a state that would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patterns and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.

## Block Tricks – Serial Policy Failure

### Both their harm and solvency claims are false. Advantages are random factoids politically constructed to make the plan appear to be a good idea. Solvency is a rigged game.

Dillon and Reid 00 (Michael, Professor of Politics – University of Lancaster, and Julian, Lecturer in International Relations – King’s College, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, January / March, 25(1))

More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptionsthat go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the controlthatthey want. Yet serial policy failure--the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it.

## Block Tricks – Value to Life

### Security imposes a calculative logic that destroys the value to life

Dillon 96 (Michael, Professor of Politics – University of Lancaster, Politics of Security, p. 26)

Everything, for example, has now become possible. But what human being seems most impelled to do with the power of its actions is to turn itself into a species; not merely an animal species, nor even a species of currency or consumption (which amount to the same thing), but a mere species of calculation. For only by reducing itself to an index of calculation does it seem capable of constructing that oplitical arithmetic by which it can secure the security globalised Western thought insists upon, and which a world made uncreasingly unpredictable by the very way human being acts into it now seem to require. Yet, the very rage for calculability which securing security incites is precisely also what reduces human freedom, inducing either despair or the surrender of what is human to the dehumanising calculative logic of what seems to be necessary to secure security. I think, then, that Hannah Arendt was right when she saw late modern humankind caught in a dangerous world-destroying cleft between a belief that everything is possible and a willingness to surender itself to so-called laws of necessity (calculability itself) which would make everything possible. That it was, in short, characterized by a combination of reckless omnipotence and reckless despair. But I also think that things have gone one stage further – the surrender to the necessity of realising everything that is possible- and that this found its paradigmatic expression for example in the deterrent security policies of the Cold War; where everything up to and including self-immolation not only became possible but actually necessary in the interests of (inter)national security. The logic persists in the metaphysical core of modern politics- the axiom of Inter-state security relations, popularized for example, through strategic discourse- even if the details have changed.

### Calculability devalues life and make extermination possible

Dillon 99 (Michael, Professor of Politics and International Relations – University of Lancaster, “Another Justice”, Political Theory, 27(2), April, p. 164-165)

Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism. They trade in it still to devastatingglobal effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability. Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zeropoint of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, “we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure.” But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being.

## Block Tricks – Threat Epistemology

### The Aff is epistemologically bankrupt. Their evidence is manufactured and distorted by the threat industry.

Pieterse 7 (Jan, Professor of Sociology – University of Illinois (Urbana), “Political and Economic Brinkmanship”, Review of International Political Economy, 14(3), p. 473)

Brinkmanship and producing instability carry several meanings. The American military spends 48% of world military spending (2005) and represents a vast, virtually continuously growing establishment that is a world in itself with its own lingo, its own reasons, internecine battles and projects. That this large security establishment is a bipartisan project makes it politically relatively immune. That for security reasons it is an insular world shelters it from scrutiny. For reasons of ‘deniability’ the president is insulated from certain operations (Risen, 2006). That it is a completely hierarchical world onto itself makes it relatively unaccountable. Hence, to quote Rumsfeld, ‘stuff happens’. In part this is the familiar theme of the Praetorian Guard and the shadow state (Stockwell, 1991). It includes a military on the go, a military that seeks career advancement through role expansion, seeks expansion through threat inflation, and in inflated threats finds rationales for ruthless action and is thus subject to feedback from its own echo chambers. Misinformation broadcast by part of the intelligence apparatus blows back to other security circles where it may be taken for real (Johnson, 2000). Inhabiting a hall of mirrors this apparatus operates in a perpetual state of self hypnosis with, since it concerns classified information and covert ops, limited checks on its functioning.

## Link – Space

### Space exploration is a pretext for imperial control of orbital territory --- fuels force projection and global violence

Duvall 8 (Raymond, Professor of Political Science – University of Minnesota, and Jonathan Havercroft, Professor of Political Science – University of Oklahoma, “Taking Sovereignty Out of this World: Space Weapons and Empire of the Future”, Review of International Studies, p. 774-775)

The strategy of the empire of the future undermines the binary logic of a states-system predicated either on territorially bounded sovereign states or a globally diﬀused, decentralised and deterritorialised biopolitical Empire as proposed by Hardt and Negri. Our analysis reveals a third possibility: in the empire of the future space power combines a set of otherwise heterogeneous processes. Space based missiledefence strips all states – except the possessor of the system – of their hard shells by eroding nuclear deterrence capabilities, while providing the possessor of missile defence with a territory more secure from nuclear attack. Space control denies all states with the exception of the controlling power unfettered access to space. Furthermore it annexes orbital space as a territory of the space power. Finally, force application from orbital space makes any point on earth a potential target for the military force of empire of the future. This makes the traditional imperial imperative to project force through controlling territory no longer necessary. Empire of the future combines strategies of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation to simultaneously undermine some features of state sovereignty and reinforce others. Therefore the current assumption that many IR theorists make that international society must be based on either a collection of sovereign territorial states or deterritorialised biopolitical apparatuses ignores the possibility that these two processes can be co-constitutive. In the empire of the future the locus of authority is centralised but this authority governs a deterritorialised political entity. While this new constellation of political power will present new possibilities for resistance, we should not underestimate how this empire’s new modes of killing will constitute structures of domination potentially more terrifying than anything humanity has yet encountered.

## Link – Asteroids

### Doomsday asteroids are a cultural production that fit within an apocalyptic ideology of U.S.-as-savior --- justifies imperial expansion and militarization

Mellor 7 (Felicity, Lecturer in Science Communication – Imperial College (UK), “Colliding Worlds: Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space”, Social Studies of Science, 37(4), August, p. 511)

*Narratives of Technological Salvation*

Despite their disagreements over technical details and funding priorities, both civilian and defence scientists appealed to narratives of technological salvation. In his study of the superweapon in the American imagination, Bruce Franklin (1988) has shown how a century-long tradition of futurewar fiction shaped an apocalyptic ideology in which American technological genius was to put an end to all war and fulfil America’s manifest destiny. Franklin argues that this cultural fantasizing has been materially significant in producing actual superweapons and developing defence policy. As David Seed (1999) has also shown, SDI was made imaginable, and was explicitly defended, by science fiction writers. The impact-threat scientists took this cultural fantasizing a step further as they attempted to establish the reality of that threat. It was now nature, rather than any human foe, which was configured as the warring enemy whose technological defeat would bring Earthly harmony. Until the 1970s, most science fiction stories about asteroids imagined them as objects to be exploited for their mineral wealth. Scientists’ writings would occasionally reflect this interest. Indeed, the only paper in the 1979 volume Asteroids to allude to a future impact of an asteroid with Earth was framed in terms of the exploitation of asteroids. In a bizarre paper, which had been rejected for an earlier publication after being judged ‘outrageously innovative’ and ‘premature’, Samuel Herrick (1979) proposed that portions of the asteroid Geographos could be targeted at specific points on the Earth to produce ‘constructive’ effects, such as the excavation of a new Central American canal to join the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

### The link is *more* than just “identification of asteroids” --- the plan as a response implies a narrative structure and human-centered perspective that *fuels* technologized approaches to space and *inevitably* ends in securitized politics

Mellor 7 (Felicity, Lecturer in Science Communication – Imperial College (UK), “Colliding Worlds: Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space”, Social Studies of Science, 37(4), August, p. 515)

The asteroid impact threat was thus articulated within a narrative context that was closely aligned to science fiction and was shared by both civilian scientists and defence experts. As Veronica Hollinger (2000: 216–17) has noted, traditional science fiction is driven by an Aristotelian plot characterized by ‘a valorisation of the logic of cause and effect’. Impact narratives conformed to this traditional narrative logic: asteroids and scientists act by causing a series of events to unfold, from the approach of an asteroid and recognition of the threat through attempts at technological mitigation to resolution in salvation. These narratives configured asteroids as acting agents in human affairs and brought to asteroid science a structure in which human agents (and their technological proxies) solve the problem posed in the narrative and in so doing achieve closure. Allusions to impact narratives implied a direction and human-centredness to events that, once the narratives had been evoked, could not easily be suppressed. Despite their attempts to distance themselves from the weapons scientists, the civilian scientists experienced a ‘narrative imperative’ that drew them towards the same technologized ends as those promoting SDI.

### This is true, even if the asteroid threat is scientifically valid. It serves as a projection of fear that legitimizes a *broader politics* of security, militarization, and permanent war

Mellor 7 (Felicity, Lecturer in Science Communication – Imperial College (UK), “Colliding Worlds: Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space”, Social Studies of Science, 37(4), August, p. 512)

The asteroid impact threat offered a scientifically validated enemy onto which could be projected the fears on which a militaristic culture depends. Far from providing a replacement outlet for weapons technologies, the promotion of the asteroid impact threat helped make the idea of war in space more acceptable and helped justify the continued development of spacebased weaponry. Arguably, with the Clementine and Deep Impact missions, the asteroid impact threat even facilitated the testing of SDI-style systems. The asteroid impact threat legitimized a way of talking, and thinking, that was founded on fear of the unknown and the assumption that advanced technology could usher in a safer era. In so doing, it resonated with the politics of fear and the technologies of permanent war that are now at the centre of US defence policy

## Link – China Threat

### Their description of China is a normative process that legitimates power politics and makes the “China threat” self-fulfilling

Pan 4 (Chengxin, Department of Political Science and International Relations – Australian National University, “The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 29(3), June/July, p. 305-306)

While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is," their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means. For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world."2 Like many other China scholars, Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment."3 Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" [end page 305] and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt. I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "observation" of "where China is today," nor to join the "containment" versus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the "China threat" literature. More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature—themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions.

## Link – Russia Threat

### Depicting Russia as a threat turns the world into an item that must be defended --- fueling a global drive to eliminate danger

Jæger 00 (Øyvind, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, “Securitizing Russia: Discurisve Practices of the Baltic States”, http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.pdf)

The Russian war on Chechnya is one event that was widely interpreted in the Baltic as a ominous sign of what Russia has in store for the Baltic states (see Rebas 1996: 27; Nekrasas 1996: 58; Tarand 1996: 24; cf. Haab 1997). The constitutional ban in all three states on any kind of association with post-Soviet political structures is indicative of a threat perception that confuses Soviet and post-Soviet, conflating Russia with the USSR and casting everything Russian as a threat through what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) call a discursive "chain of equivalence". In this the value of one side in a binary opposition is reiterated in other denotations of the same binary opposition. Thus, the value "Russia" in a Russia/Europe-opposition is also denoted by "instability", "Asia", "invasion", "chaos", "incitement of ethnic minorities", "unpredictability", "imperialism", "slander campaign", "migration", and so forth. The opposite value of these markers ("stability", "Europe", "defence", "order", and so on) would then denote the Self and thus conjure up an identity. When identity is precarious, this discursive practice intensifies by shifting onto a security mode, treating the oppositions as if they were questions of political existence, sovereignty, and survival. Identity is (re)produced more effectively when the oppositions are employed in a discourse of in security and danger, that is, made into questions of national security and thus securitised in the Wæverian sense. In the Baltic cases, especially the Lithuanian National Security Concept is knitting a chain of equivalence in a ferocious discourse of danger. Not only does it establish "[t]hat the defence of Lithuania is total and unconditional," and that "[s]hould there be no higher command, self-controlled combat actions of armed units and citizens shall be considered legal." (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 1, 2) It also posits that [t]he power of civic resistance is constituted of the Nation’s Will and self-determination to fight for own freedom, of everyone citizen’s resolution to resist to [an] assailant or invader by all possible ways, despite citizen’s age and [or] profession, of taking part in Lithuania’s defence (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 4).  When this is added to the identifying of the objects of national security as "human and citizen rights, fundamental freedoms and personal security; state sovereignty; rights of the nation, prerequisites for a free development; the state independence; the constitutional order; state territory and its integrity, and; cultural heritage," and the subjectsas "the state, the armed forces and other institutions thereof; the citizens and their associations, and; non governmental organisations,"(National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 2, Sc. 1, 2) one approaches a conception of security in which the distinction between state and nation has disappeared in all-encompassing securitisation. Everyone is expected to defend everything with every possible means. And when the list of identified threats to national security that follows range from "overt (military) aggression", via "personal insecurity", to "ignoring of national values,"(National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 10) the National Security Concept of Lithuania has become a totalising one taking everything to be a question of national security. The chain of equivalence is established when the very introduction of the National Security Concept is devoted to a denotation of Lithuania’s century-old sameness to "Europe" and resistance to "occupation and subjugation" (see quotation below), whereby Russia is depicted and installed as the first link in the discursive chain that follows. In much the same way the "enemy within" came about in Estonia and Latvia. As the independence-memory was ritualised and added to the sense of insecurity – already fed by confusion in state administration, legislation and government policy grappling not only with what to do but also how to do it given the inexperience of state institutions or their absence – unity behind the overarching objective of independence receded for partial politics and the construction of the enemy within. This is what David Campbell (1992) points out when he sees the practices of security as being about securing a precarious state identity. One way of going about it is to cast elements on the state inside resisting the privileged identity as the subversive errand boys of the prime external enemy.

## Link – Hegemony

### Pursuit of hegemony is a fantasy of control that relies upon construction of threatening Otherness --- this prompts resistance and create a permanent state of conflict

Chernus 6 (Ira, Professor of Religious Studies and Co-director of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program – University of Colorado-Boulder, Monsters to Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin, p. 53-54)

The end of the cold war spawned a tempting fantasy of imperial omnipotence on a global scale. The neocons want to turn that fantasy into reality. But reality will not conform to the fantasy; it won’t stand still or keep any semblance of permanent order. So the neocons’ efforts inevitably backfire. Political scientist Benjamin Barber explains that a nation with unprecedented power has “unprecedented vulnerability: for it must repeatedly extend the compass of its power to preserve what it already has, and so is almost by definition always overextended.” Gary Dorrien sees insecurity coming at the neoconservatives in another way, too: “For the empire, every conflict is a local concern that threatens its control. However secure it maybe, it never feels secure enough. The [neocon] unipolarists had an advanced case of this anxiety. . . . Just below the surface of the customary claim to toughness lurked persistent anxiety. This anxiety was inherent in the problem of empire and, in the case of the neocons, heightened by ideological ardor.”39 If the U.S. must control every event everywhere, as neocons assume, every act of resistance looks like a threat to the very existence of the nation. There is no good way to distinguish between nations or forces that genuinely oppose U.S. interests and those that don’t. Indeed, change of any kind, in any nation, becomes a potential threat. Everyone begins to look like a threatening monster that might have to be destroyed. It’s no surprise that a nation imagined as an implacable enemy often turns into a real enemy. When the U.S. intervenes to prevent change, it is likely to provoke resistance. Faced with an aggressive U.S. stance, any nation might get tough in return. Of course, the U.S. can say that it is selflessly trying to serve the world. But why would other nations believe that? It is more likely that others will resist, making hegemony harder to achieve. To the neocons, though, resistance only proves that the enemy really is a threat that must be destroyed. So the likelihood of conflict grows, making everyone less secure. Moreover, the neocons want to do it all in the public spotlight. In the past, any nation that set out to conquer others usually kept its plans largely secret. Indeed, the cold war neocons regularly blasted the Soviets for harboring a “secret plan” for world conquest. Now here they are calling on the U.S. to blare out its own domineering intentions for all the world to [end page 53] hear. That hardly seems well calculated to achieve the goal of hegemony. But it is calculated to foster the assertive, even swaggering, mood on the home front that the neocons long for. Journalist Ron Suskind has noted that neocons always offer “a statement of enveloping peril and no hypothesis for any real solution.” They have no hope of finding a real solution because they have no reason to look for one. Their story allows for success only as a fantasy. In reality, they expect to find nothing but an endless battle against an enemy that can never be defeated. At least two prominent neocons have said it quite bluntly. Kenneth Adelman: “We should not try to convince people that things are getting better.” Michael Ledeen: “The struggle against evil is going to go on forever.”40 This vision of endless conflict is not a conclusion drawn from observing reality. It is both the premise and the goal of the neocons’ fantasy. Ultimately, it seems, endless resistance is what they really want. Their call for a unipolar world ensures a permanent state of conflict, so that the U.S. can go on forever proving its military supremacy and promoting the “manly virtues” of militarism. They have to admit that the U.S., with its vastly incomparable power, already has unprecedented security against any foreign army. So they must sound the alarm about a shadowy new kind of enemy, one that can attack in novel, unexpected ways. They must make distant changes appear as huge imminent threats to America, make the implausible seem plausible, and thus find new monsters to destroy. The neocons’ story does not allow for a final triumph of order because it is not really about creating a politically calm, orderly world. It is about creating a society full of virtuous people who are willing and able to fight off the threatening forces of social chaos. Having superior power is less important than proving superior power. That always requires an enemy. Just as neocons need monsters abroad, they need a frightened society at home. Only insecurity can justify their shrill call for a stronger nation (and a higher military budget). The more dire their warnings of insecurity, the more they can demand greater military strength and moral resolve. Every foreign enemy is, above all, another occasion to prod the American people to overcome their anxiety, identify evil, fight resolutely against it, and stand strong in defense of their highest values. Hegemony will do no good unless there is challenge to be met, weakness to be conquered, evil to be overcome. The American people must actively seek hegemony and make sacrifices for it, to show that they are striving to overcome their own weakness. So the quest for strength still demands a public confession of weakness, just as the neocons had demanded two decades earlier when they warned of a Soviet nuclear attack through a “window of vulnerability.” The quest for strength through the structures of national security still demands a public declaration of national insecurity. Otherwise, there is nothing to overcome. The more frightened the public, the more likely it is to believe and enact the neocon story.

## Link – Economy

### Tying economic growth to security produces a state-centric and positivist epistemology that disables critical approaches

Tooze 5 (Roger, Visiting Professor of International Relations – City University, “The Missing Link: Security, Critical International Political Economy, and Community, Critical Security Studies and World Politics, Ed. Booth, p. 146-148)

The Failure of Orthodox IPE

One would hope that the disciplinary knowledge of IPE could provide the required analysis. My sense is that it cannot yet do this. The reason for this is the failure of critical thinking: mainstream IPE is still locked into an ontology and epistemology that reproduces a very specific and partial inter­pretation of international political economy, based around the state and the shared commitment to a method of positivism.49 Mainstream IPE grounds its analysis in a world in which the state is the fundamental unit and legiti­mate knowledge is gained through the objective testing of propositions against an external and knowable reality. My negative conclusion is all the more disappointing given that the origins of modern IR-based international political economy lie in the very dissatisfaction felt with the limitations of a traditional military security-focused study of international relations, cou­pled with the inability and unwillingness of economics and international economics to handle questions of power.50 IPE as a distinct field of knowledge has been an academic growth industry since the early 1970s, particularly in the United States. Its growth has reflected events in the world political economy and the perceived needs of policymakers (again mainly in the United States). It is now a substantial field of knowledge, with all of the professional structures necessary to that success.5 As it has been primarily located within the larger field of interna­tional studies, the core theoretical frameworks of a U.S.-dominated IR, with its particular philosophical and political values and assumptions, have been transposed into IPE itself. Moreover, under the hegemony of econom­ics in the social sciences in general, the exponents of IPE have increasingly also transposed the assumptions and methodologies of economics, includ­ing rational choice theory, and a fixation with formal, quantifiable, model­ing, and microsystems explanations. All these elements constitute a deep commitment to positivist epistemology. As defined above, positivist episte­mology entails a claim that the only legitimate knowledge of IPE is gained through the objective testing of propositions against an external and know­able reality. The influence of this double and mutually supportive hegemo­ny52 has produced a distinct form of IPE, in which a contest between the competing perspectives of liberalism, nationalism, realism, and Marxism has veiled a basic orthodoxy constructed around an epistemological com­mitment to positivism, a theoretical commitment to methodological indi­vidualism, an ontological commitment to the state, and a domination by the agenda and interests of the United States.53 The commitment to positivism is a serious limitation on the ability of orthodox IPE to construct a knowledge sufficient to suggest adequate understandings of security and community under today's conditions and therefore appropriate to the complex, multilayered world we live in (as exemplified by some of the problems we have already identified). By deny­ing the social construction and reproduction of reality (and the social repro­duction of itself), orthodox IPE cannot take into account the intersubjective basis and realities of power in the world political economy. Moreover, in the context of the argument here, it places a fundamental epistemological barrier to the integration of political economy and (critical approaches to) security. A detailed epistemological critique of orthodox IPE has been artic­ulated elsewhere54; the following analysis will focus on the principal onto­logical questions and the core problem of the theorization of politics and economics. In terms of the basic structure of assumed entities and their relation­ships, IPE was initially constructed as "the politics of international eco­nomic relations."55 In other words, the focus was to be the politics of inter­state economic relations, with the unit of analysis being the territorial economy of the state, the politics being intergovernmental, and the realm of economics being given the generative role in the construction of the issues and concerns of governments. In this ontology, IPE draws upon classical political realism for its statism and liberal economic theory for its under­standing of economics. And although it is an attempt to bridge the gap between international relations and international economics, it also shares with IR a marked tendency to equate politics (i.e., the realm of the state), with force and economics (linked to civil society), with rule by consent. In this equation the politics of interstate economic relations was already demonstrating the power of the yet-to-be-articulated neoliberal ide­ology and neorealist IR theory.56 Even after the politics of international economics became international political economy (around the same time that mainstream IR moved to embrace neorealism) the academic main­stream of IPE continued to conceive the state as the ontological core entity. Statism remains the core ontological commitment for orthodox IPE. At the same time, there is a willingness to recognize that other entities are possi­bly significant and other forms of politics may occur, but all are subservient to state structures, processes, and purposes. Within IPE statism is more than putting the state at the center of analysis (state-centrism), as it involves the commitment to the state as the only legitimate framework for political economy.57 With regard to the argument of this chapter, the nature and limi­tations of this statism are best understood in relation to the way in which the joining together of economics and IR in the concept and issue of eco­nomic security has been theorized by orthodox IPE. Economic Security The consideration of the economic in the theory and practice of security, and security in the theory and practice of political economy, has taken place on the basis of prevailing discourses in economics, political science, politi­cal economy, and international political economy. As we have seen, these discourses not only embody deep commitments to specific (orthodox) methodology, epistemology, and ontology; they also construct both eco­nomics and politics, and the relationship between them, in very particular ways. This seems to have led to the possibility of a twin track for investiga­tions into security by political economy and into economics by security. One track starts with politics (the traditional concerns of security) but with economic added on as a new domain of threat to states. The other track starts with a (repoliticized) economics, leading to a whole literature on eco­nomic security, vulnerability, and systemic risk (with particular reference to the global financial system). But the way that the economic is then related to the political (and vice versa) seems to depend upon prior ideological commitments as to the nature of the relationship between economics and politics, normally expressed in paradigmatic terms of perspectives or con­testing approaches. For instance, a liberal interpretation of economic secu­rity is conditioned by the prior assumption of the link between economic prosperity and war based on the assumed beneficial rationality of markets. In this sense, economic security as a concept and as an issue has been clearly constructed as an extension of statist, positivist IPE, which brings together the twin tracks by grafting the agenda of economics onto the clas­sic concerns of state security via neorealism. Of course, the tradition of mercantilist thinking, or economic nationalism, as Robert Gilpin prefers to describe it, clearly locks economic security into physical security—but on, and only on, a state basis. In this tradition, power and wealth, and hence national security, are inseparable and complementary, particularly in what are regarded as strategic industries, that is, those industries whose healthy development is considered necessary for the maintenance of national mili­tary-political security.58 Notwithstanding the mercantilist imperative for both states and theorists, the post-1945 international economic structure emerged as a U.S. hegemony that was articulated and developed on the public basis of a liberal trade and investment order with a constituting, rationalizing, and legitimating ideology of liberal political economy. Hence, for twenty years after IR and economics were theoretically linked in mainstream academic practice, it was only to the extent that a strong, broad-based modern economy was regarded as necessary to maintain secu­rity.

[Note – “IPE” = International Political Economy]

## Impact – Global Violence

### Western construction of security guarantees unending genocide and war

Batur 7 (Pinar, Professor of Sociology – Vassar College and Ph.D. – University of Texas, Austin, “The Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide”, Handbook of the The Sociology of Racial and Ethnic Relations, Eds. Vera and Feagin, p. 446-447)

At the turn of the 20th century, the “Terrible Turk” was the image that summarized the enemy of Europe and the antagonism toward the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire, stretching from Europe to the Middle East, and across North Africa. Perpetuation of this imagery in American foreign policy exhibited how capitalism met with orientalist constructs in the white racial frame of the western mind (VanderLippe 1999). Orientalism is based on the conceptualization of the “Oriental” other—Eastern, Islamic societies as static, irrational, savage, fanatical, and inferior to the peaceful, rational, scientific “Occidental” Europe and the West (Said 1978). This is as an elastic construct, proving useful to describe whatever is considered as the latest threat to Western economic expansion, political and cultural hegemony, and global domination for exploitation and absorption. Post-Enlightenment Europe and later America used this iconography to define basic racist assumptions regarding their uncontestable right to impose political and economic dominance globally. When the Soviet Union existed as an opposing power, the orientalist vision of the 20th century shifted from the image of the “Terrible Turk” to that of the “Barbaric Russian Bear.” In this context, orientalist thought then, as now, set the terms of exclusion. It racialized exclusion to define the terms of racial privilege and superiority. By focusing on ideology, orientalism recreated the superior race, even though there was no “race.” It equated the hegemony of Western civilization with the “right ideological and cultural framework.” It segued into **war** and **annihilation** and **genocide** and continued to foster and aid the recreation of racial hatred of others with the collapse of the Soviet “other.” Orientalism’s global racist ideology reformed in the 1990s with Muslims and Islamic culture as to the “inferior other.” Seeing Muslims as opponents of Christian civilization is not new, going back to the Crusades, but the elasticity and reframing of this exclusion is evident in recent debates regarding Islam in the West, one raised by the Pope and the other by the President of the United States. Against the background of the latest Iraq war, attacks in the name of Islam, racist attacks on Muslims in Europe and in the United States, and detention of Muslims without trial in secret prisons, Pope Benedict XVI gave a speech in September 2006 at Regensburg University in Germany. He quoted a 14th-century Byzantine emperor who said, “show me just what Muhammad brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.” In addition, the Pope discussed the concept of Jihad, which he defined as Islamic “holy war,” and said, “violence in the name of religion was contrary to God’s nature and to reason.” He also called for dialogue between cultures and religions (Fisher 2006b). While some Muslims found the Pope’s speech “regrettable,” it also caused a spark of angry protests against the Pope’s “ill informed and bigoted” comments, and voices raised to demand an apology (Fisher 2006a). Some argue that the Pope was ordering a new crusade, for Christian civilization to conquer terrible and savage Islam. When Benedict apologized, organizations and parliaments demanded a retraction and apology from the Pope and the Vatican (Lee 2006). Yet, when the Pope apologized, it came as a second insult, because in his apology he said, “I’m deeply sorry for the reaction in some countries to a few passages of my address at the University of Regensburg, which were considered offensive to the sensibilities of Muslims” (Reuters 2006). In other words, he is sorry that Muslims are intolerant to the point of fanaticism. In the racialized world, the Pope’s apology came as an effort to show justification for his speech—he was not apologizing for being insulting, but rather saying that he was sorry that “Muslim” violence had proved his point. Through orientalist and the white racial frame, those who are subject to racial hatred and exclusion themselves become agents of racist legitimization. Like Huntington, Bernard Lewis was looking for Armageddon in his Wall Street Journal article warning that August 22, 2006, was the 27th day of the month of Rajab in the Islamic calendar and is considered a holy day, when Muhammad was taken to heaven and returned. For Muslims this day is a day of rejoicing and celebration. But for Lewis, Professor Emeritus at Princeton, “this might well be deemed an appropriate date for the apocalyptic ending of Israel and, if necessary, of the world” (Lewis 2006). He cautions that “it is far from certain that [the President of Iran] Mr. Ahmadinejad plans any such cataclysmic events for August 22, but it would be wise to bear the possibility in mind.” Lewis argues that Muslims, unlike others, seek self-destruction in order to reach heaven faster. For Lewis, Muslims in this mindset don’t see the idea of Mutually Assured Destruction as a constraint but rather as “an inducement” (Lewis 2006). In 1993, Huntington pleaded that “in a world of different civilizations, each . . .will have to learn to coexist with the others” (Huntington 1993:49). Lewis, like Pope Benedict, views Islam as the apocalyptic destroyer of civilization and claims that reactions against orientalist, racist visions such as his actually prove the validity of his position. Lewis’s assertions run parallel with George Bush’s claims. In response to the alleged plot to blow up British airliners, Bush claimed, “This nation is at war with Islamic fascists who will use any means to destroy those of us who love freedom, to hurt our nation” (TurkishPress.com. 2006; Beck 2006). Bush argued that “the fight against terrorism is the ideological struggle of the 21st century” and he compared it to the 20th century’s fight against fascism, Nazism, and communism. Even though “Islamo-fascist” has for some time been a buzzword for Bill O’Reilly, Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity on the talk-show circuit, for the president of the United States it drew reactions worldwide. Muslim Americans found this phrase “contributing to the rising level of hostility to Islam and the American Muslim community” (Raum 2006). Considering that since 2001, Bush has had a tendency to equate “war on terrorism” with “crusade,” this new rhetoric equates ideology with religion and reinforces the worldview of a war of civilizations. As Bush said, “ . . .we still aren’t completely safe, because there are people that still plot and people who want to harm us for what we believe in” (CNN 2006). Exclusion in physical space is only matched by exclusion in the imagination, and racialized exclusion has an internal logic leading to the **annihilation** of the excluded. Annihilation, in this sense, is not only designed to maintain the terms of racial inequality, both ideologically and physically, but is institutionalized with the vocabulary of self-protection. Even though the terms of exclusion are never complete, genocide is the definitive **point** in the exclusionary racial ideology, and such is the logic of the outcome of the exclusionary process, that it can conclude only in ultimate domination. War and genocide take place with compliant efficiency to serve the **global racist ideology** with **dizzying** **frequency**. The 21st century opened up with genocide, in Darfur.

## Impact – Genocide

### Securitization is a precondition for genocide. Their advantage descriptions will be used to justify massive violence

Friis 00 (Karseten, UN Sector – Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, “From Liminars to Others: Securitization Through Myths”, Peace and Conflict Studies, 7(2), [http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.p df#page=2](http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.p%20df#page=2))

The problem with societal securitization is one of representation. It is rarely clear in advance who it is that speaks for a community. There is no system of representation as in a state. Since literately anyone can stand up as representatives, there is room for entrepreneurs. It is not surprising if we experience a struggle between different representatives and also their different representations of the society. What they do share, however, is a conviction that they are best at providing (a new) order. If they can do this convincingly, they gain legitimacy. What must be done is to make the uncertain certain and make the unknown an object of knowledge. To present a discernable Other is a way of doing this. The Other is represented as an Other -- as an unified single actor with a similar unquestionable set of core values (i.e. the capital “O”). They are objectified, made into an object of knowledge, by re-presentation of their identity and values. In other words, the representation of the Other is depoliticized in the sense that its inner qualities are treated as given and non-negotiable. In Jef Huysmans (1998:241) words, there is both a need for a mediation of chaos as well as of threat. A mediation of chaos is more basic than a mediation of threat, as it implies making chaos into a meaningful order by a convincing representation of the Self and its surroundings. It is a mediation of “ontological security”, which means “...a strategy of managing the limits of reflexivity ... by fixing social relations into a symbolic and institutional order” (Huysmans 1998:242). As he and others (like Hansen 1998:240) have pointed out, the importance of a threat construction for political identification, is often overstated. The mediation of chaos, of being the provider of order in general, is just as important. This may imply naming an Other but not necessarily as a threat. Such a dichotomization implies a necessity to get rid of all the liminars (what Huysmans calls “strangers”). This is because they “...connote a challenge to categorizing practices through the impossibility of being categorized”, and does not threaten the community, “...but the possibility of ordering itself” (Huysmans 1998:241). They are a challenge to the entrepreneur by their very existence. They confuse the dichotomy of Self and Other and thereby the entrepreneur’s mediation of chaos. As mentioned, a liminar can for instance be people of mixed ethnical ancestry but also representations of competing world-pictures. As Eide (1998:76) notes: “Over and over again we see that the “liberals” within a group undergoing a mobilisation process for group conflict are the first ones to go”. The liminars threaten the ontological order of the entrepreneur by challenging his representation of Self and Other and his mediation of chaos, which ultimately undermines the legitimacy of his policy. The liminars may be securitized by some sort of disciplination, from suppression of cultural symbols to ethnic cleansing and expatriation. This is a threat to the ontological order of the entrepreneur, stemming from inside and thus repoliticizing the inside/outside dichotomy. Therefore the liminar must disappear. It must be made into a Self, as several minority groups throughout the world have experienced, or it must be forced out of the territory. A liminar may also become an Other, as its connection to the Self is cut and their former common culture is renounced and made insignificant. In Anne Norton’s (1988:55) words, “The presence of difference in the ambiguous other leads to its classification as wholly unlike and identifies it unqualifiedly with the archetypal other, denying the resemblance to the self.” Then the liminar is no longer an ontological danger (chaos), but what Huysmans (1998:242) calls a mediation of “daily security”. This is not challenging the order or the system as such but has become a visible, clear-cut Other. In places like Bosnia, this naming and replacement of an Other, has been regarded by the securitizing actors as the solution to the ontological problem they have posed. Securitization was not considered a political move, in the sense that there were any choices. It was a necessity: Securitization was a solution based on a depoliticized ontology.10 This way the world-picture of the securitizing actor is not only a representation but also made into reality. The mythical second-order language is made into first-order language, and its “innocent” reality is forced upon the world. To the entrepreneurs and other actors involved it has become a “natural” necessity with a need to make order, even if it implies making the world match the map. Maybe that is why war against liminars are so often total; it attempts a total expatriation or a total “solution” (like the Holocaust) and not only a victory on the battlefield. If the enemy is not even considered a legitimate Other, the door may be more open to a kind of violence that is way beyond any war conventions, any jus in bello. This way, securitizing is legitimized: The entrepreneur has succeeded both in launching his world-view and in prescribing the necessary measures taken against it. This is possible by using the myths, by speaking on behalf of the natural and eternal, where truth is never questioned.

## Alternative Solvency

### Critical reflection is an end in itself --- demanding simple answers crowds out vital ethical questions about IR

Biswas 7 (Shampa, Professor of Politics – Whitman College, “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist”, Millennium, 36(1), p. 117-125)

It has been 30 years since Stanley Hoffman accused IR of being an ‘American social science’ and noted its too close connections to US foreign policy elites and US preoccupations of the Cold War to be able to make any universal claims,7 yet there seems to be a curious amnesia and lack of curiosity about the political history of the discipline, and in particular its own complicities in the production of empire.8 Through what discourses the imperial gets reproduced, resurrected and re-energised is a question that should be very much at the heart of a discipline whose task it is to examine the contours of global power. Thinking this failure of IR through some of Edward Said’s critical scholarly work from his long distinguished career as an intellectual and activist, this article is an attempt to politicise and hence **render questionable** the **disciplinary traps** that have, ironically, circumscribed the ability of scholars whose very business it is to think about global politics to actually think *globally* and *politically*. What Edward Said has to offer IR scholars, I believe, is a certain kind of global sensibility, a critical but sympathetic and felt awareness of an inhabited and cohabited world. Furthermore, it is a profoundly political sensibility whose globalism is predicated on a cognisance of the imperial and a firm non-imperial ethic in its formulation. I make this argument by travelling through a couple of Said’s thematic foci in his enormous corpus of writing. Using a lot of Said’s reflections on the role of public intellectuals, I argue in this article that IR scholars need to develop what I call a ‘global intellectual posture’. In the 1993 Reith Lectures delivered on BBC channels, Said outlines three positions for public intellectuals to assume – as an outsider/exile/marginal, as an ‘amateur’, and as a disturber of the status quo speaking ‘truth to power’ and self-consciously siding with those who are underrepresented and disadvantaged.9 Beginning with a discussion of Said’s critique of ‘professionalism’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ as it applies to International Relations, I first argue the importance, for scholars of global politics, of taking *politics* seriously. Second, I turn to Said’s comments on the posture of exile and his critique of identity politics, particularly in its nationalist formulations, to ask what it means for students of global politics to take the *global* seriously. Finally, I attend to some of Said’s comments on humanism and contrapuntality to examine what IR scholars can learn from Said about *feeling and thinking globally* concretely, thoroughly and carefully. IR Professionals in an Age of Empire: From ‘International Experts’ to ‘Global Public Intellectuals’ One of the profound effects of the war on terror initiated by the Bush administration has been a significant constriction of a democratic public sphere, which has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent and a sharp delineation of national boundaries along with concentration of state power. The academy in this context has become a particularly embattled site with some highly disturbing onslaughts on academic freedom. At the most obvious level, this has involved fairly well-calibrated neoconservative attacks on US higher education that have invoked the mantra of ‘liberal bias’ and demanded legislative regulation and reform10, an onslaught supported by a well-funded network of conservative think tanks, centres, institutes and ‘concerned citizen groups’ within and outside the higher education establishment11 and with considerable reach among sitting legislators, jurists and policy-makers as well as the media. But what has in part made possible the encroachment of such nationalist and statist agendas has been a larger history of the corporatisation of the university and the accompanying ‘professionalisation’ that goes with it. Expressing concern with ‘academic acquiescence in the decline of public discourse in the United States’, Herbert Reid has examined the ways in which the university is beginning to operate as another transnational corporation12, and critiqued the consolidation of a ‘culture of professionalism’ where **academic bureaucrats** **engage in bureaucratic role-playing,** minor academic **turf battles mask the larger managerial power play** on campuses and the increasing influence of a relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular ‘expert cultures’ have led to academics relinquishing their claims to public space and authority.13 While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, there is much reason for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward Said has written extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces, ‘the one public space available to real alternative intellectual practices: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today’15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains that ‘the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)’16. The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be **seduced by power**.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of **intellectual orientation**. It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds **of ethical questions irreducible to formulaic ‘for or against’ and ‘costs and benefits’ analysis** can simply **not be raised**. In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of ‘intellectual relevance’ that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical and perhaps unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, that is about *politics* (rather than techno-expertise) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.21

## Alternative Solvency – A2: Security Inevitable

### False ideology. Security *appears* inevitable because we allow it to constitute our world.

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer – School of Politics and Professor of International Relations – University of New South Wales, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 68-69)

This chapter is thus an exercise in thinking, which challenges the continuing power of political ontologies (forms of truth and being) that connect security, sovereignty, belonging, otherness and violence in ways that for many **appear like enduring political facts**, inevitable and irrefutable. Conflict, violence and alienation then arise not merely from individual or collective acts whose conditions might be understood and policed; they **condition politics** as such, forming a permanent ground, a dark substrata underpinning the very **possibility of the present**. Conflict and alienation seem inevitable because of the way in which the modem political imagination **has conceived and thought securit**y, sovereignty and ethics. Israel/ Palestine is chosen here as a particularly urgent and complex example of this problem, but it is a problem with much wider significance. While I hold out the hope that security can be re-visioned away from a permanent dependence on insecurity, exclusion and violence, and I believe it retains normative promise, this analysis takes a deliberate step backward to examine the very real barriers faced by such a project. Security cannot properly be rethought without a deeper understanding of, and challenge to, the political forms and structures it claims to enable and protect. If Ken Booth argues that the state should be a means rather than an end of security, my objective here is to place the continuing power and depth of its status as an end of security, and a fundamental source for political identity, under critical interrogation.' If the state is to become a means of security (one among many) it will have to be fundamentally transformed. The chapter pursues this inquiry in two stages. The first outlines the historic strength and effective redundancy of such an exciusivist vision of security in Israel, wherein Israel not only confronts military and political antagonists with an 'iron wall' of armed force but maps this onto a profound clash of existential narratives, a problem with resonances in the West's confrontation with radical Islamism in the war on terror. The second, taking up the remainder of the chapter, then explores a series of potential resources in continental philosophy and political theory that might help us to think our way out of a security grounded in violence and alienation. Through a critical engagement with this thought, I aim to construct a political ethics based not in relations between insecure and separated identities mapped solely onto nation-states, but in relations of responsibility and interconnection that can negotiate and recognise both distinct and intertwined histories, identities and needs; an ethics that might underpin a vision of interdependent (national and non-national) existence proper to an integrated world traversed by endless flows of people, commerce, ideas, violence and future potential.

## Alternative Solvency – A2: Jarvis

### Jarvis is trash --- he misreads and essentializes critical scholarship --- making his claims worthless

Shapiro 1 (Michael J., Professor of Political Science – University of Hawaii, International Studies Association Review of Books, p. 126-128)

D. S. L. Jarvis's International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodern­ism: Defending the Discipline constitutes a radical alternative to Cochran's practice of critique. Manifesting a serious allergy to critique and especially to what he calls "postmodernism," Jarvis presumes that he must defend tradi­tional, neopositivist IR against (in the words of the book jacket) "the various postmodern and poststructuralist theories currently sweeping the discipline of International Relations."To put the matter simply at the outset, Jarvis appears to be almost entirely ignorant of the philosophical predicates of the critical IR literature he attacks. He invents a model of thought that he finds vulnerable and then proceeds with his method of argumentation, mostly to scoff at the enemy he has invented. But Jarvis's scoffing amounts to whistling in the dark. He has entered a field of critique with predicates that are mysterious to him, and he shows signs of being genuinely anxious about the consequences of critical work.The monster Jarvis creates is a work of fiction, for he begins with the pre­sumption that postmodern orientations are "sweeping" and therefore threaten­ing the discipline. (I estimate that roughly one percent of the papers at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association reference postructural­ist philosophy.) Returning to the Victorian genre of Gothic fiction in which the constitutive practice involves two primary roles—the monster and the victim—Jarvis portrays Richard Ashley as the Frankenstein monster and the victim as the entire IR discipline. Moreover, Jarvis's overwrought style of characteriza­tion of the dangers of postmodern IR fits Gothic fiction's motivational profile as well. As is noted in Fred Botting's treatment of the genre: "The terrors and horrors of transgression in Gothic writing become powerful means to reassert the values of society, virtue and propriety. . . . They warn of dangers by putting them in their darkest and most threatening form" (p. 5).Why fiction? Jarvis' makes "the postmodern" (which he seems to know primarily on the basis of rumor, for most of his citations are not to postructur­alist texts but to thinkers hostile to them) an elastic category that applies to everything that he perceives to be antagonistic to his pre-Kantian empiricism. It encompasses most of feminist IR and anything that uses interpretive method. Although the use of a deconstructive mode of critique is extremely rare in international studies (the major practitioner is David Campbell), Jarvis fre­quently uses the term "deconstruction" as a synonym for postmodernist method. He assumes, without showing any evidence that he has read a word of Jacques Derrida's writings, that deconstruction is hostile to theory building and is opposed to all forms of affirmation. This characterization is belied by Derrida's state‑ments and demonstrations and by Campbell's deconstruction-inspired writing on war, security, and the ethics of responsibility. Symptomatic of his woeful ignorance of critical work in general, Jarvis refers at one point to the expression "structure of feeling" as a "postmodern phrase" (p. 32). Structure of feeling is initiated in the work of Raymond Williams, the late (and famous—though not sufficiently to alert Jarvis) Marxist literary critic whose work cannot be remotely related to poststructuralist critique and has inspired such prominent postmod­ernism bashers as Terry Eagleton.Jarvis's ignorance is not confined to contemporary critical interpretive theory (postmodern or otherwise); it even extends to the neoempiricist philosophy of science. For example, he chides postmodernists for holding the outrageous view that theorizing constitutes fact (p. 27), while he wants to uphold a model in which the integrity of theory—in international studies or elsewhere—requires that the domains of theory and fact be understood as radically separate. One need not resort to a Foucauldian treatment of discourse as event or a Deleuzian critique of representational thinking to challenge Jarvis's approach to theory. Jarvis's view of the theory–data relationship was seriously impeached by enough neoempiricist philosophers by the 1960s to field a softball team (among the heavy hitters in the starting lineup would be Willard V. Quine, Patrick Suppes, and Norwood Russell Hanson).The critical work for which Jarvis has contempt is not the threat he imag­ines to "the discipline," unless we construct the IR discipline as a trained inat­tention to the problematics, within which the work of theory proceeds. The writings of Michel Foucault (some of whose work Jarvis seems to have read) have implications for a critical and affirmative perspective that does not com­promise the kind of theory building that IR empiricists do. It extends the arena—in which to theorize while encouraging a historical sensitivity—to regimes of discourse and suggests an ethico-politics of freedom from the impo­sitions of identity. Although Foucault's conception of the problematic points to how concepts and the modes of fact assigned to them are historically contin­gent, explicable in contexts of value, and complicit with modes of power and authority, this does not thereby invalidate theory. Rather, it opens the way to work on the ethico-political context of theory and, among other things, to theo­rize with a sensitivity to theory's constituencies (beyond the policymakers that seem to be prized by Jarvis). As Molly Cochran, whose work is based on knowl­edge and critique rather than rumor and contempt, implies, an important legacy of contemporary critical work is the expansion of political and moral inclusion. Finally, there is one other genre that is (regrettably) embedded in Jarvis's fable of the dangers of postmodernism, a biographical speculation about a five-year hiatus in Richard Ashley's publishing life. Obsessed with the dangers of postmodernism, Jarvis attributes these years of silence to the "deep resigna­tion" (p. 183) that he thinks Ashley's version of postmodern theorizing invites. Without insisting on a counterspeculation, I want to point out that Ashley's publishing hiatus coincides with the period shortly after an automobile accident claimed the life of his wife and seriously maimed his two sons. At a minimum, the information renders Jarvis's biographical fable crass and uninformed—like the rest of the book.

## Alternative Solvency – A2: Mechanism Key

### Focus on feasibility destroys our critical project. Jones agrees.

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer – School of Politics and Professor of International Relations – University of New South Wales, Beyond Security: Ethics and Violence, p. 21-22)

A further argument of the CSS thinkers, one that adds a sharply conservative note to their normative discourse, needs comment. This states that proposals for political transformation must be based on an identification of 'immanent possibilities' for change in the present order. Indeed, Richard Wyn Jones is quite, militant about this: [D]escriptions of a more emancipated order must focus on realizable utopias ... If [critical theorists] succumb to the temptation of suggesting a blueprint for an emancipated order that is unrelated to the possibilities inherent in the present ... [they] have no way of justifying their arguments epistemologically. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that a vision of an emancipated order that is not based on immanent potential will be politically efficacious. 47 Certainly it is helpful to try to identify such potentials; but whatever the common sense about the practicalities of political struggle this contains, I strongly reject the way Jones frames it so dogmatically. Even putting aside the analytical ambiguities in identifying where immanent possibilities exist, such arguments are ultimately disabling and risk denying the entire purpose of the critical project. It is precisely at times of the greatest pessimism, when new potentials are being shut down or normative change is distinctly negative arguably true of the period in which I am writing - that the critical project is most important. To take just one example from this book, any reader would recognise that my arguments about the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be extremely difficult to 'realise' (even though they endorse a negotiated two-state solution). This only makes it more important to make them because the available contours of the present, confined as they are within the masculinist ontology of the insecure nation-state, fail to provide a stable platform either for peace or a meaningful security. In the face of such obstacles the critical project must think and conceive the unthought, and its limiting test ought not to be realism but responsibility**.** The realism underlying the idea of immanent possibility sets up an important tension between the arguments of this book and the normative project of cosmopolitanism which was most famously set out by Kant in his Perpetual Peace as the establishment of a 'federation of peoples' based on Republication constitutions and principles of universal hospitality, that might result in the definitive abolition of the need to resort to war. 41 However, Kant's image of universal human community and the elimination of war exists in fundamental tension with its foundation on a 'pacific federation' of national democracies. With two terrible centuries' hindsight we know that republics have not turned out to be pacifistic vehicles of cosmopolitan feeling; instead, in a malign convergence of the social contract with Clausewitzian strategy, they have too often formed into exciusivist communities whoseultimate survival is premised upon violence. Is the nation-state the reality claim upon which cosmopolitanism always founders? Could a critique of security, sovereignty and violence, along the lines I set out here, help us to form a badly needed buttress for its structure?

## Framing Key

### Questions of framing are a meta-argument that must precede policy discussion

Crawford 2 (Neta, Ph.D. and MA – MIT, Professor of Political Science – Boston University, Argument and Change in World Policy, p. 19-21)

Coherent arguments are unlikely to take place unless and until actors, at least on some level, agree on what they are arguing about. The at least temporary resolution of meta-arguments- regarding the nature of the good (the content of prescriptive norms); what is out there, the way we know the world, how we decide between competing beliefs (ontology and epistemology); and the nature of the situation at hand (the proper frame or representation)- must occur before specific arguments that could lead to decision and action may take place. Meta-arguments over epistemology and ontology, relatively rare, occur in instances where there is a fundamental clash between belief systems and not simply a debate within a belief system. Such arguments over the nature of the world and how we come to know it are particularly rare in politics though they are more frequent in religion and science. Meta-arguments over the “good” are contests over what it is good and right to do, and even how we know the good and the right. They are about the nature of the good, specifically, defining the qualities of “good” so that we know good when we see it and do it. Ethical arguments are about how to do good in a particular situation. More common are meta-arguments over representations or frames- about how we out to understand a particular situation. Sometimes actors agree on how they see a situation. More often there are different possible interpretations. Thomas Homer-Dixon and Roger karapin suggest, “Argument and debate occur when people try to gain acceptance for their interpretation of the world”. For example, “is the war defensive or aggressive?”. Defining and controlling representations and images, or the frame, affects whether one thinks there is an issue at stake and whether a particular argument applies to the case. An actor fighting a defensive war is within international law; an aggressor may legitimately be subject to sanctions. Framing and reframing involve mimesis or putting forward representations of what is going on. In mimetic meta-arguments, actors who are struggling to characterize or frame the situation accomplish their ends by drawing vivid pictures of the “reality” through exaggeration, analogy, or differentiation. Representations of a situation do not re-produce accurately so much as they creatively re-present situations in a way that makes sense. “mimesis is a metaphoric or ‘iconic argumentation of the real.’ Imitating not the effectivity of events but their logical structure and meaning.” Certain features are emphasized and others de-emphasized or completely ignored as their situation is recharacterized or reframed. Representation thus becomes a “constraint on reasoning in that it limits understanding to a specific organization of conceptual knowledge.” The dominant representation delimits which arguments will be considered legitimate, framing how actors see possibities. As Roxanne Doty argues, “the possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place.” If, as Donald Sylvan and Stuart Thorson argue, “politics involves the selective privileging of representations, “it may not matter whether one representation or another is true or not. Emphasizing whether frames articulate accurate or inaccurate perceptions misses the rhetorical import of representation- how frames affect what is seen or not seen, and subsequent choices. Meta-arguments over representation are thus crucial elements of political argument because an actor’s arguments about what to do will be more persuasive if their characterization or framing of the situation holds sway. But, as Rodger Payne suggests, “No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded by norm entrepreneurs without serious political wrangling.” Hence framing is a meta-argument.

## A2: Threats are Real

### Begs the question. Threats become real because of psycho-social dynamics.

Mack 90 (John E., Professor of Psychiatry – Harvard University Medical School, The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, Ed. Volkan, 1, p. 58-59)

Attempts to explore the psychological roots of enmity are frequently met with an argument that, reduced to its essentials, goes something like this: “It’s very well to psychologize but my enemy is real. The Russians (or germans, Arabs, Israelis, Americans) are armed, threaten us, and intend us harm. Furthermore, there are real struggles between us and them and differing national interests: competition over oil, land or scarce resources and genuine conflicts of values between our two nations (or political systems) It is essential that we be strong and maintain a balance of superiority of (military and political) power, lest the other side take advantage of our weakness.” This argument is netiher wrong nor right, but instead simply limited. It fails to grapple with a critical distinction that informs the entire subject. Is the threat really generated by the enemy as it appears to be at any given moment, or is it based on one’s own contribution to the threat, derived from distortion of perception by provocative words and actions in a cycle of enmity and externalization of responsibility? In sum, the enemy IS real, but we have not learned to identify our own role in creating that enemy or in elaborating the threatening image we hold of the other group or country and its actual intentions or purposes. “We never see our enemy’s motives and we never labor to asses his will with anything approaching objectivity” (Bunting 1986).

### Most recent psychological evidence confirms. Enemy creation is not objective, but a paranoid need for certainty. Reject their media doomsaying.

Jacons 10 (Tom, Professional Journalist for 20 Years, “The Comforting Notion of an All-Powerful Enemy”, Miller-McCune, 3-8, http://www.miller-mccune.com/politics/the-comforting-notion-of-an-all-powerful-enemy-10429/)

We have seen the enemy, and he is powerful. That’s a recurring motif of contemporary political discourse, as generalized fear mutates for many into a fixation on a ferocious foe. Partisan rhetoric has turned increasingly alarmist. President Obama has difficulty getting even watered-down legislation passed, yet he is supposedly establishing a socialist state. The Tea Party is viewed as a terrifying new phenomenon, rather than the latest embodiment of a recurring paranoid streak in American politics. Osama bin Laden is likely confined to a cave, but he’s perceived as a threat large enough to justify engaging in torture. According to one school of thought, this tendency to exaggerate the strength of our adversaries serves a specific psychological function. It is less scary to place all our fears on a single, strong enemy than to accept the fact our well-being is largely based on factors beyond our control. An enemy, after all, can be defined, analyzed and perhaps even defeated. The notion that focusing our anger on a purportedly powerful foe helps mitigate our fears was first articulated by cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker in his 1969 book Angel in Armor. It has now been confirmed in a timely paper titled “An Existential Function of Enemyship,” just published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. A research team led by social psychologist Daniel Sullivan of the University of Kansas reports on four studies that suggest people are “motivated to create and/or perpetually maintain clear enemies to avoid psychological confrontations with an even more threatening chaotic environment.” When you place their findings in the context of the many threats (economic and otherwise) people face in today’s world, the propensity to turn ideological opponents into mighty monsters starts to make sense. In one of Sullivan’s studies, conducted during the 2008 presidential campaign, a group of University of Kansas undergraduates were asked whether they believed enemies of their favored candidate (Obama or John McCain) were manipulating voting machines in an attempt to steal the election. Prior to considering such conspiracy theories, half were asked to consider the truth of statements such as “I have control over whether I am exposed to a disease,” and “I have control over how my job prospects fare in the economy.” The other half were asked to assess similar statements on relatively unimportant subjects, such as “I have control over how much TV I watch.” Those who were forced to contemplate their lack of control over significant life events “reported a stronger belief in opponent-led conspiracies,” the researchers report. In another study, the student participants were randomly assigned to read one of two essays. The first stated that the U.S. government is well-equipped to handle the economic downturn, and that crime rates are declining due to improved law enforcement. The second reported the government is not at all competent to cope with the recession, and crime rates are going up in spite of the authorities’ best efforts. They were then presented with a list of hypothetical events and asked to pick the most likely cause of each: A friend, an enemy, or neither (that is, the event happened randomly). Those “informed” that the government was not in control were more likely to view a personal enemy as responsible for negative events in their lives. In contrast, those told things are running smoothly “seemed to defensively downplay the extent to which enemies negatively influence their lives,” the researchers report. These studies suggest it’s oddly comforting to have someone, or something, you can point to as the source of your sorrows. This helps explain why Americans inevitably find an outside enemy to focus on, be it the Soviets, the Muslims or the Chinese. Given that society pays an obvious price for such illusions, how might we go about reducing the need for “enemyship?” “If you can somehow raise people’s sense that they have control over their lives and negative hazards in the world, their need to ‘enemize’ others should be reduced,” Sullivan said in an e-mail interview. “In our first study, for instance, we showed that people who feel dispositionally high levels of control over their lives did not respond to a reminder of external hazards by attributing more influence to an enemy. Any social structure or implementation that makes people feel more control over their lives should thus generally reduce (though perhaps not completely eliminate) the ‘need’ or tendency to create or attribute more influence to enemy figures. “In our third study, we showed that if people perceived the broader social system as ordered, they were more likely to respond to a threat to personal control by boosting their faith in the government, rather than by attributing more influence to an enemy. So, again, we see that the need to perceive enemies is reduced when people are made to feel that they are in control of their lives, or that there is a reliable, efficient social order that protects them from the threat of random hazards. “One could imagine, then, that circumstances which allow all citizens to be medically insured, or to have a clear sense of police protection, could reduce the tendency to seek out enemy figures to distill or focalize concerns with random, imminent threats.” Sullivan also offers two more personal potential solutions. “If people have such inherent needs for control and certainty in their lives, they should try to channel those needs as best they can into socially beneficial pursuits,” he says. “Lots of people pursue science, art and religion — just to give a few examples — as means of boiling down uncertainty about the world into clear systems of rules and engagement with reality, creating small domains for themselves in which they can exert a sense of mastery. Insofar as these pursuits don’t harm anyone, but still provide a sense of control, they can reduce the need for enemyship. “A final solution would be to encourage people to simply accept uncertainty and lack of control in their lives,” he adds. “Some meaning systems — Taoism for example — are rooted in this idea, that people can eventually accept a certain lack of control and eventually become resigned to this idea to the extent that they no longer react defensively against it.” So there, at least, is a practical place to begin: Less MSNBC and more meditation.

## A2: Realism Good

### Realism escalates all problems into global disaster --- their worldview is structurally incapable of responding to global problems

Der Derian 6 (James, Professor of International Studies – Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, “An Accident Waiting to Happen”, Harvard International Review, 27(3), Fall, http://hir.harvard.edu/ predicting-the-present/national-security)

However, the discourse of the second Bush term has increasingly returned to the dominant worldview of national security, realism. And if language is, as Nietzsche claimed, a prisonhouse, realism is its supermax penitentiary. Based on linear notions of causality, a correspondence theory of truth, and the materiality of power, how can realism possibly account—let alone prepare or provide remedies—for complex catastrophes, like the toppling of the World Trade Center and attack on the Pentagon by a handful of jihadists armed with box-cutters and a few months of flight-training? A force-five hurricane that might well have begun with the flapping of a butterfly’s wings? A northeast electrical blackout that started with a falling tree limb in Ohio? A possible pandemic triggered by the mutation of an avian virus? How, for instance, are we to measure the immaterial power of the CNN-effect on the first Gulf War, the Al-Jazeera-effect on the Iraq War, or the Nokia-effect on the London terrorist bombings? For events of such complex, non-linear origins and with such tightly-coupled, quantum effects, the national security discourse of realism is simply not up to the task. Worse, what if the “failure of imagination” identified by the 9/11 Commission is built into our national and homeland security systems? What if the reliance on planning for the catastrophe that never came reduced our capability to flexibly respond and improvise for the “ultra-catastrophe” that did? What if worse-case scenarios, simulation training, and disaster exercises—as well as border guards, concrete barriers and earthen levees—not only prove inadequate but might well act as force-multipliers—what organizational theorists identify as “negative synergy” and “cascading effects” —that produce the automated bungling (think Federal Emergency Management Agency) that transform isolated events and singular attacks into global disasters? Just as “normal accidents” are built into new technologies—from the Titanic sinking to the Chernobyl meltdown to the Challenger explosion—we must ask whether “ultra-catastrophes” are no longer the exception but now part and parcel of densely networked systems that defy national management; in other words, “planned disasters.” What, then, is to be done? A first step is to move beyond the wheel-spinning debates that perennially keep security discourse always one step behind the global event. It might well be uni-, bi-, or multi-polar, but it is time to recognize that the power configuration of the states-system is rapidly being subsumed by a heteropolar matrix, in which a wide range of different actors and technological drivers are producing profound global effects through interconnectivity. Varying in identity, interests, and strength, these new actors and drivers gain advantage through the broad bandwidth of information technology, for networked communication systems provide the means to traverse political, economic, religious, and cultural boundaries, changing not only how we interpret events, but making it ever more difficult to maintain the very distinction of intended from accidental events.

## A2: Realism Good

### Realism has blind spots that destroys is explanatory ability --- recognizing social influences enriches and sustains the theory

Niarguinen 1 (Dmitri, Professor of International Relations and European Studies – Central European University, Rubikon, December, http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubikon/forum/dmitri.htm)

Morgenthau’s state-centric theory is clearly set, but it is not to say he envisages it as being pre-destined and unchangeable. The political, cultural and strategic environment will largely determine the forms of power a state chooses to exercise, just as the types of power which feature in human relationships change over time. In addition, Realists should not be wedded to a perennial connection between interest and the nation-state which is 'a product of history, and therefore bound to disappear'[19]. Later (in 1970) Morgenthau anticipated that the forces of globalization would render the nation-state no longer valid: “the sovereign nation-state is in the process of becoming obsolete”[20]. He stresses that a final task that a theory of international relations can and must perform is to prepare the ground for a new international order radically different from that which preceded it[21]. Kenneth Waltz's neo-realism is both a critique of traditional realism and a substantial intellectual extension of a theoretical tradition which was in danger of being outflanked by rapid changes in the contours of global politics[22]. The international system (anarchy) is treated as a separate domain which conditions the behavior of all states within it. Paradoxically, with the advent of neo-realism, the scope and flexibility of Realism have significantly diminished. The theory has become deterministic, linear, and culturally poor. For neo-realists, culture and identity are (at best) derivative of the distribution of capabilities and have no independent explanatory power. Actors deploy culture and identity strategically, to further their own self-interests[23]. Nevertheless, it is wrong to assert that neo-realist perspectives do not acknowledge the importance of social facts. Gilpin has developed a compelling argument about war and change[24]. While his book is built on (micro)economic premises, he does not neglect sociological insights as necessary for understanding the context of rational behavior. "Specific interests or objectives that individuals pursue and the appropriateness of the means they employ are dependent on prevailing social norms and material environment…In short, the economic and sociological approaches must be integrated to explain political change"[25]. Waltz was implicitly talking about identity when he argued that anarchic structures tend to produce “like units”[26]. He allows for what he calls ‘socialization’ and ‘imitation’ processes. Stephen Krasner suggested that regimes could change state interests[27]. Regimes are an area where knowledge should be taken seriously. If regimes matter, then cognitive understanding can matter as well[28]. Realism is not necessarily about conflict; material forces may as well lead to cooperation. However, the minimalist treatment of culture and social phenomena increasingly proved neo-realism as losing ground empirically and theoretically. It was the suspicion that the international system is transforming itself culturally faster than would have been predictable from changes in military and economic capabilities that triggered the interest in problems of identity[29]. Reconstruction of the theory was vital in order to save Realism from becoming obsolete. The realization of this fact has triggered a shift in Realist thinking and gave way to the emergence of a 'constructivist' re-incarnation of Realism. Friedrich Kratochwil has once observed that no theory of culture can substitute for a theory of politics[30]. At least, nobody has ventured to accomplish such an enterprise so far. To disregard culture in politics, it seems obvious today, is inappropriate, not to say foolish. There remain opportunity costs incurred by Realism in its asymmetric engagement with cultural phenomena. Thus, Realism, notwithstanding its concern with parsimony, should make a serious commitment to building analytical bridges which link identity- and culture-related phenomena to its explanatory apparatus (like anarchy, sovereignty, the security dilemma, self-help, and balancing)[31]. Alexander Wendt in his seminal article “Anarchy Is What States Make of It” has masterfully shown how power politics is socially constructed[32]. Salus populi supreme lex. This classical metalegal doctrine of necessity is associated with raison d’etat, the right of preservation, and self-help. Wendt is convinced that the self-help corollary to anarchy does enormous work in Realism, generating the inherently competitive dynamics of the security dilemma and collective action problem[33]. What misses the point, however, is that self-help and power politics follow either logically or causally from anarchy. They do not; rather, they are just among other institutions (albeit significant ones) possible under anarchy. Consequently, provided there is relatively stable practice, international institutions can transform state identities and interests. Let me focus on two concrete security issues - the security dilemma and nuclear deterrence - to illustrate the point. A central tenet of Realism, the security dilemma[34], arises for the situation when “one actor’s quest for security through power accumulation ... exacerbates the feelings of insecurity of another actor, who in turn will respond by accumulating power”[35]. As a result of this behavior, a vicious circle or spiral of security develops, with fear and misperception exacerbating the situation[36]. Nevertheless, security dilemmas, as Wendt stresses, are not given by anarchy or nature[37]. Security dilemmas are constructed because identities and interests are constituted by collective meanings which are always in process. This is why concepts of security may differ in the extent to which and the manner in which the self is identified cognitively with the other. Because deterrence is based on ideas about threat systems and conditional commitments to carry out punishment, it has proved particularly congenial to the strategic studies scholarship within the Realist tradition[38]. Deterrence is a conditional commitment to retaliate, or to exact retribution if another party fails to behave in a desired, compliant manner. Thus defined, deterrence has been invoked as the primary explanation for the non-use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear case, in contrast to chemical weapons, for example, is definitely problematic for challenging traditional deterrence theory because it is widely felt that the tremendous destructive power of thermonuclear weapons does render them qualitatively different from other weapons. Yet, the patterns of the non-use of nuclear weapons cannot be fully understood without taking into account the development of norms that shaped these weapons as unacceptable. By applying social constructivist approach, it is possible to emphasize the relationship between norms, identities, and interests and try to provide a causal explanation of how the norms affect outcomes[39]. Norms shape conceptualizations of interests through the social construction of identities. In other words, a constructivist account is necessary to get at 'what deters,' and how and why deterrence 'works' [40]. International relations theory cannot afford to ignore norms. Demonstrating the impact of norms on the interests, beliefs, and behavior of actors in international politics does not and must not invalidate Realism. Rather, it points to analytical blind spots and gaps in traditional accounts. In so doing, it not only casts light into the shadows of existing theory but raises new questions as well.[41] However, with all the 'constructivist' adjustments made (which are absolutely credible), it is important to keep in mind 'pure rationalist' tools as well. Krasner points out that whenever the cost-benefit ratio indicates that breaking its rules will bring a net benefit that is what states will do[42]. Wendt introduces a correction that instrumentalism may be the attitude when states first settle on norms, and "continue(s) to be for poorly organized states down the road"[43]. States obey the law initially because they are forced to or calculate that it is in their self-interest. Some states never get beyond this point. Some do, and then obey the law because they accept its claims on them as legitimate[44]. This is truly an excellent observation. The problem here, however, could be that even when states remove the option of breaking the law from their agenda, this already implies that benefits overweight costs. And even if this is not the case, how can we know where exactly this point is, beyond which states respect law for law’s sake? Furthermore, states that supposedly have stepped over this point might break the law, when it has become least expected, if they consider this of their prime interest. Powerful illustration of this is France, which resumed its nuclear testing to the great surprise of the world[45]. Another interesting example is the case of NATO. Traditional alliance theories based on Realist thinking provide insufficient explanations of the origins, the interaction patterns, and the persistence of NATO. The 'brand new' interpretation is that the Alliance represents an institutionalized pluralistic community of liberal democracies. Democracies not only do not fight each other, they are likely to develop a collective identity facilitating the emergence of cooperative institutions for specific purposes[46]. Thus presented, old questions get revitalized. Why is NATO the strongest among the other post-Cold War security institutions – as compared to, the WEU, not even to mention the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy? Why is not the OSCE given a chance to turn into a truly pluralistic European 'Security Architecture'? Why was NATO so eager to bomb Kosovo, which was a clear breach of international law? Because it is ‘an institutionalized pluralistic community of liberal democracies’? Or yet because it is a predominantly military organization? Why do public opinion polls in Russia[47] repeatedly show that NATO is an aggressive organization (and which can also be observed in official rhetoric, as in the national security conception and the military doctrine[48])? All these questions suggest that to claim that Realist explanation of NATO existence can be thrown into a dustbin is at minimum inappropriate. Social sciences do not evolve via scientific revolutions, as Thomas Kuhn argues is the case for the natural sciences. Not paradigm shifts but rather style and fashion changes are what characterize social science[49]. Thus posed, paradigm development promises Realism a bright future. In this respect, recent success of constructivism has, metaphorically speaking, **breathed in a new life** into Realism. Realism is in much debt to constructivism for being revitalized. Yet, paying full credit to the contribution of constructivism, it should be noted that to a large extent constructivists take off from the Realist positions.

## A2: Realism Inevitable

### Inevitability of realism is false. This argument erases ethics and sanctions mass violence.

Kraig 2 (Robert Alexander, Instructor in Communication – University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and State Political Director – Service Employees International Union, “The Tragic Science: The Uses of Jimmy Carter in Foreign Policy Realism”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 5(1), Spring)

Given the claimed inevitability of realism's description of international politics, one might think that nations need not look to expert guidance because power interests will inevitably determine governmental policy. But the realists, while embracing determinism, simultaneously argue that human nature is repeatedly violated. One traditional claim has been that America, because of its unique history, has been ever in danger of ignoring the dictates of the foreign policy scene. This argument is offered by Henry Kissinger in his avowedly Morgenthauian work Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. 21 Realists also argue that there are idealists in all human societies who refuse to see the reality of power. As Richard W. Cottam, a trenchant critic of orthodox realism, explained the argument: "Every era has its incorrigible idealists who persist in seeing evil man as good. When they somehow gain power and seek to put their ideas into effect, Machiavellians who understand man's true nature appear and are more than willing and more than capable of exploiting this eternal naivete." 22 Cottam was referring to one of the central ideological constructs of international relations theory—the realist/idealist dichotomy. First explicated in detail by Morgenthau in his Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, 23 this dichotomy is used to discredit leaders who dare to consider transcending or transforming established patterns of global competition. This construct is enriched by the narratives of failed idealists—most prominently Tsar Alexander the First, Woodrow Wilson, Neville Chamberlain, and Jimmy Carter—men who, despite and in fact because of their good intentions, caused untold human suffering. After World War II, realists built their conception of leadership on a negative caricature of Woodrow Wilson. 24 As George Kennan, one of the primary architects of Cold War policy, warned in 1945: "If we insist at this moment in our history in wandering about with our heads in the clouds of Wilsonean idealism . . . we run the risk of losing even that bare minimum of security which would be assured to us by the maintenance of humane, stable, and cooperative forms of society on the immediate European shores of the Atlantic." 25 Wilson's supposed idealism was said by the emerging realist scholars to have led to the unstable international political structure that caused World War II [End Page 6] and now threatened the postwar balance of forces. Despite convincing refutations by the leading historians of Wilson's presidency, most recently John Milton Cooper Jr. in his definitive study of the League of Nations controversy, realists continue to caricature Wilson as a fuzzy-headed idealist. 26 Idealists, in realist writings, all share a fatal flaw: an inability to comprehend the realities of power. They live in a world of unreality, responding to nonexistent scenes. As Riker put it, "Unquestionably, there are guilt-ridden and shame-conscious men who do not desire to win, who in fact desire to lose. These are irrational ones in politics." 27 It is here that the realist expert comes in. It is assumed that strategic doctrine can be rationally and objectively established. According to Kissinger, a theorist who later became a leading practitioner, "it is the task of strategic doctrine to translate power into policy." The science of international relations claims the capacity to chart the foreign policy scene and then establish the ends and means of national policy. This objective order can only be revealed by rational and dispassionate investigators who are well-schooled in the constraints and possibilities of power politics. Realism's scenic character makes it a radically empirical science. As Morgenthau put it, the political realist "believes in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion—between what is true objectively and rationally supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only subjective judgement." Avowedly modernist in orientation, realism claims to be rooted not in a theory of how international relations ought to work, but in a privileged reading of a necessary and predetermined foreign policy environment. 28 In its orthodox form political realism assumes that international politics are and must be dominated by the will to power. Moral aspirations in the international arena are merely protective coloration and propaganda or the illusions that move hopeless idealists. What is most revealing about this assessment of human nature is not its negativity but its fatalism. There is little if any place for human moral evolution or perfectibility. Like environmental determinism—most notably the social darwinism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—political realism presumes that human social nature, even if ethically deplorable, cannot be significantly improved upon. From the stationary perspective of social scientific realism in its pure form, the fatal environment of human social interaction can be navigated but not conquered. Description, in other words, is fate. All who dare to challenge the order—Carter's transgression—will do much more damage than good. The idealist makes a bad situation much worse by imagining a better world in the face of immutable realities. As one popular saying among foreign policy practitioners goes: "Without vision, men die. With it, more men die." 70 (continued) The implications of this social philosophy are stark. Tremendous human suffering can be rationalized away as the inevitable product of the impersonal international system of power relations. World leaders are actively encouraged by the realists to put aside moral pangs of doubt and play the game of international politics according to the established rules of political engagement. This deliberate limitation of interest excuses leaders from making hard moral choices. While a moralist Protestant like Jimmy Carter sees history as a progressive moral struggle to realize abstract ideals in the world, the realist believes that it is dangerous to struggle against the inexorable. The moral ambiguities of political and social ethics that have dogged philosophy and statesmanship time out of mind are simply written out of the equation. Since ideals cannot be valid in a social scientific sense, they cannot be objectively true. The greatest barrier to engaging the realists in serious dialogue about their premises is that they deny that these questions can be seriously debated. First, realists teach a moral philosophy that denies itself. There is exceedingly narrow ground, particularly in the technical vocabulary of the social sciences, for discussing the moral potential of humanity or the limitations of human action. Yet, as we have seen in the tragedy of Jimmy Carter, a philosophical perspective on these very questions is imparted through the back door. It is very hard to argue with prescription under the guise of description. The purveyors of this philosophical outlook will not admit this to themselves, let alone to potential interlocutors. [End Page 21] Second, and most importantly, alternative perspectives are not admitted as possibilities—realism is a perspective that as a matter of first principles denies all others. There is, as we have seen in the Carter narrative, alleged to be an immutable reality that we must accept to avoid disastrous consequences. Those who do not see this underlying order of things are idealists or amateurs. Such people have no standing in debate because they do not see the intractable scene that dominates human action. Dialogue is permissible within the parameters of the presumed order, but those who question the existence or universality of this controlling scene are beyond debate. Third, the environmental determinism of political realism, even though it is grounded in human social nature, is antihumanist. Much of the democratic thought of the last 200 years is grounded on the idea that humanity is in some sense socially self-determining. Society as social contract is a joint project which, over time, is subject to dialectical improvement. Foreign policy realism, as we have seen, presupposes that there is an order to human relations that is beyond the power of humans to mediate. 71 When you add to this the moral imperative to be faithful to the order (the moral of the Carter narrative), then democratic forms lose a great deal of their value. Indeed, there has been a great deal of hand wringing in international relations literature about how the masses are inexorably drawn to idealists like Carter and Wilson. Morgenthau states this much more frankly than most of his intellectual descendants: [the] thinking required for the successful conduct of foreign policy can be diametrically opposed to the rhetoric and action by which the masses and their representatives are likely to be moved. . . . The statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived as power among other powers. The popular mind, unaware of the fine distinctions of the statesman's thinking, reasons more often than not in the simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil. 72 Some realists, based on this empirical observation, openly propose that a realist foreign policy be cloaked in a moral facade so that it will be publicly palatable. Kissinger's mistake, they say, was that he was too honest. Morgenthau concludes that "the simple philosophy and techniques of the moral crusade are useful and even indispensable for the domestic task of marshaling public opinion behind a given policy; they are but blunt weapons in the struggle of nations for dominance over the minds of men." If one believes that social scientists have unique access to an inexorable social reality which is beyond the control of humanity—and which it is social suicide to ignore—it is easy to see how democratic notions of consent and self-determination can give way to the reign of manipulative propaganda. 73 There is another lesson that can be drawn from the savaging of Carter in international relations scholarship for those who seek to broaden the terms of American foreign policy thought and practice. Those who would challenge the realist orthodoxy [End Page 22] face a powerful rhetorical arsenal that will be used to deflect any serious dialogue on the fundamental ethical and strategic assumptions of realism. Careful and balanced academic critiques, although indispensable, are unlikely to be a match for such formidable symbolic ammunition. Post-realism, if it is to make any advance against the realist battlements, must marshal equally powerful symbolic resources. What is needed, in addition to academic critiques aimed at other scholars, is a full-blooded antirealist rhetoric. It must be said, in the strongest possible terms, that realism engenders an attitude of cynicism and fatalism in those who would otherwise engage the great moral and political questions of our age. 74 History is replete with ideals that, after much time and effort, matured into new social realities. In the not-so-distant past, republican governance on a mass scale and socially active government were empirical impossibilities. However halting and imperfect these historical innovations may be, they suggest the power of ideals and the possibility of human social transformation. On the other hand, fatalism fulfills itself. The surest way to make a situation impossible is to imagine it so. This is a tragic irony we should strive to avoid, no matter how aesthetically fitting it may be.

## A2: Predictions Good

### Aff “worst case” predictions validate security logic --- causes violent escalation and destroys policymaking

Schneier 10 (Bruce, Security Technologist, Author, MA in Computer Science – American University, “Worst-Case Thinking”, 3-13, http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/05/worst-case\_thin.html)

At a security conference recently, the moderator asked the panel of distinguished cybersecurity leaders what their nightmare scenario was. The answers were the predictable array of large-scale attacks: against our communications infrastructure, against the power grid, against the financial system, in combination with a physical attack. I didn't get to give my answer until the afternoon, which was: "My nightmare scenario is that people keep talking about their nightmare scenarios." There's a certain blindness that comes from worst-case thinking. An extension of the precautionary principle, it involves imagining the worst possible outcome and then acting as if it were a certainty. It substitutes imagination for thinking, speculation for risk analysis, and fear for reason. It fosters powerlessness and vulnerability and magnifies social paralysis. And it makes us more vulnerable to the effects of terrorism. Worst-case thinking means generally bad decision making for several reasons. First, it's only half of the cost-benefit equation. Every decision has costs and benefits, risks and rewards. By speculating about what can possibly go wrong, and then acting as if that is likely to happen, worst-case thinking focuses only on theextreme but improbable risksand does a poor job at assessing outcomes.Second, it's based on flawed logic. It begs the question by assuming that a proponent of an action must prove that the nightmare scenario is impossible. Third, it can be used to support any position or its opposite. If we build a nuclear power plant, it could melt down. If we don't build it, we will run short of power and society will collapse into anarchy. If we allow flights near Iceland's volcanic ash, planes will crash and people will die. If we don't, organs won’t arrive in time for transplant operations and people will die. If we don't invade Iraq, Saddam Hussein might use the nuclear weapons he might have. If we do, we might destabilize the Middle East, leading to widespread violence and death. Of course, not all fears are equal. Those that we tend to exaggerate are more easily justified by worst-case thinking. So terrorism fears trump privacy fears, and almost everything else; technology is hard to understand and therefore scary; nuclear weapons are worse than conventional weapons; our children need to be protected at all costs; and annihilating the planet is bad. Basically, any fear that would make a good movie plot is amenable to worst-case thinking. Fourth and finally, worst-case thinking validates ignorance. Instead of focusing on what we know, it focuses on what we don't know -- and what we can imagine. Remember Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's quote? "Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns -- the ones we don't know we don't know." And this: "the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence." Ignorance isn't a cause for doubt; when you can fill that ignorance with imagination, it can be a call to action. Even worse, it can lead to hasty and dangerous acts. You can't wait for a smoking gun, so you act as if the gun is about to go off. Rather than making us safer, worst-case thinking has the potential to cause dangerous escalation. The new undercurrent in this is that our society no longer has the ability to calculate probabilities**.** Risk assessment is devalued. Probabilistic thinking is repudiated in favor of "possibilistic thinking": Since we can't know what's likely to go wrong, let's speculate about what can possibly go wrong. Worst-case thinking leads to bad decisions, bad systems design, and bad security. And we all have direct experience with its effects: airline security and the TSA, which we make fun of when we're not appalled that they're harassing 93-year-old women or keeping first graders off airplanes. You can't be too careful! Actually, you can. You can refuse to fly because of the possibility of plane crashes. You can lock your children in the house because of the possibility of child predators. You can eschew all contact with people because of the possibility of hurt. Steven Hawking wants to avoid trying to communicate with aliens because they might be hostile; does he want to turn off all the planet's television broadcasts because they're radiating into space? It isn't hard to parody worst-case thinking, and at its extreme it's a psychological condition. Frank Furedi, a sociology professor at the University of Kent, writes: "Worst-case thinking encourages society to adopt fear as one of the dominant principles around which the public, the government and institutions should organize their life. It institutionalizes insecurity and fosters a mood of confusion and powerlessness.Through popularizing the belief that worst cases are normal, it incites people to feel defenseless and vulnerable to a wide range of future threats." Even worse, it plays directly into the hands of terrorists, creating a population that is easily terrorized -- even by failed terrorist attacks like the Christmas Day underwear bomber and the Times Square SUV bomber. When someone is proposing a change, the onus should be on them to justify it over the status quo. But worst-case thinking is a way of looking at the world that exaggerates the rare and unusual and gives the rare much more credence than it deserves. It isn't really a principle; it's a cheap trick to justify what you already believe. It lets lazy or biased people make what seem to be cogent arguments without understanding the whole issue. And when people don't need to refute counterarguments, there's no point in listening to them.

## A2: Permutation

### -- Including their liberal option *wards off* critique

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer – School of Politics and Professor of International Relations – University of New South Wales, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 3-4)

These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation inspecific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on tei-ror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1 It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, but also theirmainstream critiques - whether they take the form ofliberal policy approaches in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique.

## A2: Permutation

### Their *initial framing* precludes change. Forgetting the 1AC is necessary.

Bleiker 1 (Roland, Senior Lecturer and Co-Director – Rotary Centre of International Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution, The Zen of International Relations, Ed. Chan, Mandeville, and Blieker, p. 38-39)

The power to tell stories is the power to define common sense. Prevalent IR stories have been told for so long that they no longer appear as stories. They are accepted as fact for their metaphorical dimensions have vanished from our collective memories. We have become accustomed to our distorting IR metaphors until we come to lie, as Nietzsche would say “herd-like in a style obligatory for all. As a result dominant ir stories have successfully transformed one specific interpretation of world political realities, the realist one, into reality per se. Realist perceptions of the international have gradually become accepted as common sense, to the point that any critique against them has to be evaluated in terms of an already existing and objectified world view. There are powerful mechanisms of control precisely in this ability to determine meaning and rationality. 'Defining common sense', Steve Smith argues, 'is the ultimate act of political power.’8 It separates the possible from the impossible and directs the theory and practice of international relations on a particular path. The prime objective of this essay is to challenge prevalent IR stories. The most effective way of doing so, the chapter argues, is not to critique but to forget them, to tell new stories that are not constrained by the boundaries of established and objectified IR narratives. Such an approach diverges from many critical engagements with world politics. Most challenges against dominant IR stories have been advanced in the form of critiques. While critiquing orthodox IR stories remains an important task, it is not sufficient. Exploring the origins of problems, in this case discourse of power politics and their positivist framing of the political practice, cannot overcome all the existing theoretical and practical dilemmas. By articulating critique in relation to arguments advanced by orthodox IR theory, the impact of critical voices remains confined within the larger discursive boundaries that have been established through the initial framing of debates. A successful challenge to orthodox IR stories must do more than merely critique their narrow and problematic nature. To be effective, critique must be supplemented with a process of forgetting the object of critique, of theorizing world politics beyond the agendas, issues and terminologies that are prest by orthodox debates. Indeed the most powerful potential of critical scholarship may well lie in the attempt to tell different stories about IR, for once theres stories have become validated , they may well open up spaces for a more inclusive and less violence prone practice of real world politics.

### Perm footnotes criticism --- destroys its benefits

Der Derian 95 (James, Professor of Political Science – University of Massachusetts, International Theory: Critical Investigations, p. 374)

But what happens - as seems to be the case to this observer - when the 'we' fragments, 'realism' takes on prefixes and goes plural, the meaning of meaning itself is up for grabs? A stop-gap solution is to supplement the definitional gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist, mindful of a creeping pluralism, will note the 'essentially contested' nature of realism - duly backed up with a footnote to W. B. Gallie or W E. Connolly - and then get down to business as usual, that is, using realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon. This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere: in exchange for not contesting the charge that the meaning of realism is contestable, the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to then turn around and commit worse epistemological crimes. In honor of the most notorious benefactor of nolo-contendere in recent American legal history, we might call this the 'Spiro-ette effect' in International Relations.

## A2: Framework

### Plan focus makes violence inevitable --- mental deputy politics absolve individual complicity

Kappeler 95 (Susanne, Associate Professor – Al-Akhawayn University, The Will to Violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior, p. 10-11)

‘We are the war’ does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society—which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of collective irresponsibility1, where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyze the specific and differential responsibilities of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective ‘assumption’ of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility—leading to the –well-known illusion of our apparent ‘powerlessness’ and its accompanying phenomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens- even more so those of other nations – have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia – since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the respons­ibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls ‘organized irresponsibility’, upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually or­ganized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers. For we tend to think that we cannot ‘do’ anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of ‘What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?’ Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as ‘virtually no possibilities’: what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN — finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war’, ‘I want military intervention’, ‘I want to stop this backlash’, or ‘I want a moral revolution.’7 ‘We are this war’, however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so—called peace talks, namely as Drakuli~ says, in our non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we ‘are’ the war in our ‘unconscious cruelty towards you’, our tolerance of the ‘fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don’t’ — our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the ‘others’. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape ‘our feelings, our relationships, our values’ according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

# \*\*\* AFF ANSWERS

## Specificity First (Space-Specific)

### Theoretical criticism doesn’t disprove our specific claims --- factual statements about space require technical expertise to disprove

Yudkowsky 6 (Eliezer, Research Fellow and Director – Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, “Cognitive Biases Potentially Affecting Judgment of Global Risks”, Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, ed. Bostrum, 8-31, http://www.singinst.org/ourresearch/publications/cognitive-biases.pdf)

Every true idea which discomforts you will seem to match the pattern of at least one psychological error. Robert Pirsig said: "The world's biggest fool can say the sun is shining, but that doesn't make it dark out." If you believe someone is guilty of a psychological error, then demonstrate your competence by first demolishing their consequential factual errors. If there are no factual errors, then what matters the psychology? The temptation of psychology is that, knowing a little psychology, we can meddle in arguments where we have no technical expertise - instead sagely analyzing the psychology of the disputants. If someone wrote a novel about an asteroid strike destroying modern civilization, then someone might criticize that novel as extreme, dystopian, apocalyptic; symptomatic of the author's naive inability to deal with a complex technological society. We should recognize this as a literary criticism, not a scientific one; it is about good or bad novels, not good or bad hypotheses. To quantify the annual probability of an asteroid strike in real life, one must study astronomy and the historical record: no amount of literary criticism can put a number on it. Garreau (2005) seems to hold that a scenario of a mind slowly increasing in capability, is more mature and sophisticated than a scenario of extremely rapid intelligence increase. But that's a technical question, not a matter of taste; no amount of psychologizing can tell you the exact slope of that curve. It's harder to abuse heuristics and biases than psychoanalysis. Accusing someone of conjunction fallacy leads naturally into listing the specific details that you think are burdensome and drive down the joint probability. Even so, do not lose track of the real-world facts of primary interest; do not let the argument become about psychology. Despite all dangers and temptations, it is better to know about psychological biases than to not know. Otherwise we will walk directly into the whirling helicopter blades of life. But be very careful not to have too much fun accusing others of biases. That is the road that leads to becoming a sophisticated arguer - someone who, faced with any discomforting argument, finds at once a bias in it. The one whom you must watch above all is yourself. Jerry Cleaver said: "What does you in is not failure to apply some high-level, intricate, complicated technique. It's overlooking the basics. Not keeping your eye on the ball." Analyses should finally center on testable real-world assertions. Do not take your eye off the ball.

## Case = Prerequisite to Alt

### Case turns the critique --- violent conflict blocks transition to their alternative

Linklater 90 (Andrew, Senior Lecturer in Politics – Monash University, Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations, p. 32)

These theoretical disagreements with Marxism generate major differences at the practical level. It is necessary to conclude that a post-Marxist critical theory of international relations must concede that technical and practical orientations to foreign policy are inescapable at least at this juncture. Such an approach must appreciate the need for classical realist methods of protecting the state under conditions of insecurity and distrust, and recognise the importance of the rationalist defence of order and legitimacy in the context of anarchy. It is important to take account of the rationalist claim that order is unlikely to survive if the major powers cannot reconcile their different national security interests. In a similar vein, a critical approach to international relations is obliged to conclude that the project of emancipation will not make significant progress if international order is in decline. One of its principal tasks would then be to understand how the community of states can be expanded so that it approximates a condition which maximises the importance of freedom and universality. In this case, a critical theory of international relations which recognises the strengths of realism and Marxism must aim for a political practice which deals concurrently with the problem of power, the need for order and the possibility of emancipation through the extension of human community.

## Threats Real

### Objective dangers exist --- the alt is complicit with mass violence

Lora 94 (Ronald, Professor of History, Emeritus – University of Toledo, American Historical Review, 99(1), February, p. 330)

Campbell’s work is useful because it reminds us of the need to reconsider the process by which states define themselves; yet problems remain. Radical skepticism of the sort expressed in this book based too much on international relations theory and too little on primary documents, at times takes on the tone of one who has never faced a gunman in a dark parking lot. Nowhere is it seriously considered that Soviet control over Eastern Europe and the Baltic states was an oppressive objective reality**,** or that the conduct of Joseph Stalin was so abnormal as to preclude some traditional ways in which nations conduct business with each other. What the United States should have done in Cold War foreign policy—and what now it should do with drugs, terrorism, and Japanese competition—is not the explicit concern of this book. Campbell displays great zeal in drawing analogies, but it is a dubious undertaking to insist that the modern state’s concern with security replicates the church’s concern with salvation, that the church, like the state, employs an evangelism of fear to ward off threats to its legitimacy. To argue thus necessitates a tortuous reading of Thomas Hobbes’s *Leviathan*. Moreover, from the angle of the church and of the state, Campbell’s reading of the texts is insensitive to genuine religious concern with salvation on the one hand, and to the democratic state’s wish to respond to citizens needs on the other.

## Problem-Solving Good

### Policy change is necessary to alleviate real and on-going suffering. Abstract claims of “epistemology” and “ontology” and non-impacts like “technological rationality” are ivory-tower constructions that condemn millions to death

Jarvis 00 (Darryl, Senior Lecturer in International Relations – University of Sydney, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism, p. 128-130)

Questions of Relevance, Rhetoric, Fiction, and Irrationalism While Ashley's rhetoric serves to effect a number of political moves, it also helps conceal a series of blatant weaknesses implicit in his poststructural theory. The first of these we might identify as the rhetorical invention and reification of fictitious enemies, a mechanism that not only validates Ash­ley's project but gives it meaning. Frequently, for example, what Ashley purports to be attacking turns out to be a fictitious, or at best grossly exaggerated, entity. In his adoption of the "megahistorical unit, moder­nity," for example, Ashley presupposes an homogeneous, coherent phe­nomenon able to be studied—a suggestion most would find outrageous. As Tony Porter notes, "giving coherence to such a phenomenon requires doing violence to its diversity." Enlightenment thought can no more be reduced to a symmetric intellectual tradition or historical moment than can postmodernism." Indeed, emasculating such an intellectual potpourri of ideas whose only similarity is dissonance seems peculiar considering Ashley's persistent commitment to venerate difference and discursive practices. To suppose that liberalism, Marxism, conservatism, fascism, leninism, or assorted other -isms that fall under the modernist rubric are contiguous is as preposterous as conflating Derrida with Foucault, Lyotard, and Baudrillard. Yet the hubris of Ashley's entire poststructural theory rests on such simplification and not only with the concept of modernity. Positivism, realism, or technical rationality, for instance, are all reduced to overly simplistic caricatures, assumed ubiquitous, and dis­tilled into three or four rudimentary propositions that Ashley then sets about deconstructing. Technical rationality simply becomes nonreflexive problem-solving; positivism, a system of thought that divides subject from object and fact from value; while realism is reduced to the ontolog­ical presumption of the state-as-actor. While simplicity has unquestion­able heuristic value, crude reductionism for the sake of political opportunism is plainly defamatory. Rather than parsimonious theory, what Ashley delivers is a series of fictitious straw men, theoretically fabri­cated along with crude ontological and epistemological presumptions that render them congenitally deformed and thus susceptible to Ashley's poststructural interpretivism. In reality, of course, no such caricatures exist. Positivists, realists, and modernists alike are considerably more complex, divergent, and reflexive than Ashley would have us believe. In the case of realism, for example, Ashley conflates the writings of Kenneth Waltz, Robert Keohane, Stephen Krasner, Robert W. Tucker, George Modelski, Charles Kindleberger, and Robert Gilpin, disregarding the disparate set of professional and political perspectives that makes each one distinctive and debate among them fero­cious." However, it is on the basis of these exaggerated caricatures that Ashley's raison d'être for poststructural theory and political transformation ultimately rests. Perhaps more alarming though is the outright violence Ashley recom­mends in response to what at best seem trite, if not imagined, injustices. Inculpating modernity, positivism, technical rationality, or realism with violence, racism, war, and countless other crimes not only smacks of anthropomorphism but, as demonstrated by Ashley's torturous prose and reasoning, requires a dubious logic to make such connections in the first place. Are we really to believe that ethereal entities like positivism, mod­ernism, or realism emanate a "violence" that marginalizes dissidents? Indeed, where is this violence, repression, and marginalization? As self- professed dissidents supposedly exiled from the discipline, Ashley and Walker appear remarkably well integrated into the academy—vocal, pub­lished, and at the center of the Third Debate and the forefront of theo­retical research. Likewise, is Ashley seriously suggesting that, on the basis of this largely imagined violence, global transformation (perhaps even rev­olutionary violence) is a necessary, let alone desirable, response? Has the rationale for emancipation or the fight for justice been reduced to such vacuous revolutionary slogans as "Down with positivism and rationality"? The point is surely trite. Apart from members of the academy, who has heard of positivism and who for a moment imagines that they need to be emancipated from it, or from modernity, rationality, or realism for that matter? In an era of unprecedented change and turmoil, of new political and military configurations, of war in the Balkans and ethnic cleansing, is Ashley really suggesting that some of the greatest threats facing humankind or some of the great moments of history rest on such innocu­ous and largely unknown nonrealities like positivism and realism? These are imagined and fictitious enemies, theoretical fabrications that represent arcane, self-serving debates superfluous to the lives of most people and, arguably, to most issues of importance in international relations. More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflects our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating the­ory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorists have to the real world. Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge." But to suppose that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggles as actors in international politics. What does Ashley's project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and des­titute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the emigres of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to suppose that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary—or is in some way bad—is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. As Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, "So what?" To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this "debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics" be judged pertinent, relevant, help­ful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholasti­cally excited by abstract and recondite debate." Contrary to Ashley's assertions, then, a poststructural approach fails to empower the marginalized and, in fact, abandons them. Rather than ana­lyze the political economy of power, wealth, oppression, production, or international relations and render an intelligible understanding of these processes, Ashley succeeds in ostracizing those he portends to represent by delivering an obscure and highly convoluted discourse. If Ashley wishes to chastise structural realism for its abstractness and detachment, he must be prepared also to face similar criticism, especially when he so adamantly intends his work to address the real life plight of those who struggle at marginal places. If the relevance of Ashley's project is questionable, so too is its logic and cogency. First, we might ask to what extent the postmodern "empha­sis on the textual, constructed nature of the world" represents "an unwar­ranted extension of approaches appropriate for literature to other areas of human practice that are more constrained by an objective reality."" All theory is socially constructed and realities like the nation-state, domestic and international politics, regimes, or transnational agencies are obviously social fabrications. But to what extent is this observation of any real use? Just because we acknowledge that the state is a socially fabricated entity, or that the division between domestic and international society is arbitrar­ily inscribed does not make the reality of the state disappear or render invisible international politics. Whether socially constructed or objectively given, the argument over the ontological status of the state is of no par­ticular moment. Does this change our experience of the state or somehow diminish the political-economic-juridical-military functions of the state? To recognize that states are not naturally inscribed but dynamic entities continually in the process of being made and reimposed and are therefore culturally dissimilar, economically different, and politically atypical, while perspicacious to our historical and theoretical understanding of the state, in no way detracts from its reality, practices, and consequences. Similarly, few would object to Ashley's hermeneutic interpretivist understanding of the international sphere as an artificially inscribed demarcation. But, to paraphrase Holsti again, so what? This does not make its effects any less real, diminish its importance in our lives, or excuse us from paying serious attention to it. That international politics and states would not exist with­out subjectivities is a banal tautology. The point, surely, is to move beyond this and study these processes. Thus, while intellectually interesting, con­structivist theory is not an end point as Ashley seems to think, where we all throw up our hands and announce there are no foundations and all real­ity is an arbitrary social construction. Rather, it should be a means of rec­ognizing the structurated nature of our being and the reciprocity between subjects and structures through history. Ashley, however, seems not to want to do this, but only to deconstruct the state, international politics, and international theory on the basis that none of these is objectively given but fictitious entities that arise out of modernist practices of representa­tion. While an interesting theoretical enterprise, it is of no great conse­quence to the study of international politics. Indeed, structuration theory has long taken care of these ontological dilemmas that otherwise seem to preoccupy Ashley."

## Political Vacuum

### Turn --- without alternative security policy options the security sector will be dominated by the most conservative policymakers

Olav. F. Knudsen, Prof @ Södertörn Univ College, ‘1 [*Security Dialogue* 32.3, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization,” p. 366]

A final danger in focusing on the state is that of building the illusion that states have impenetrable walls, that they have an inside and an outside, and that nothing ever passes through. Wolfers’s billiard balls have contributed to this misconception. But the state concepts we should use **are in no need of** such an illusion. Whoever criticizes the field for such sins in the past needs to **go back to the literature**. Of course, we must continue to be open to a frank and unbiased assessment of the transnational politics which significantly in- fluence almost every issue on the domestic political agenda. The first decade of my own research was spent studying these phenomena – and I disavow none of my conclusions about the state’s limitations. Yet I am not ashamed to talk of a domestic political agenda. Anyone with a little knowledge of Euro- pean politics knows that Danish politics is not Swedish politics is not German politics is not British politics. Nor would I hesitate for a moment to talk of the role of the state in transnational politics, where it is an important actor, though only one among many other competing ones. In the world of transnational relations, the exploitation of states by interest groups – by their assumption of roles as representatives of states or by convincing state representatives to argue their case and defend their narrow interests – is a significant class of phenomena, today as much as yesterday. Towards a Renewal of the Empirical Foundation for Security Studies Fundamentally, the sum of the foregoing list of sins blamed on the Copen- hagen school amounts to a lack of attention paid to just that ‘reality’ of security which Ole Wæver consciously chose to leave aside a decade ago in order to pursue the politics of securitization instead. I cannot claim that he is void of interest in the empirical aspects of security because much of the 1997 book is devoted to empirical concerns. However, the attention to agenda-setting – confirmed in his most recent work – draws attention away from the important issues we need to work on more closely if we want to contribute to a better understanding of European **security as it is** currently developing**.** That inevitably requires a more **consistent** interest in security policy in the making – not just in the development of alternative security policies. The dan- ger here is that, as alternative policies are likely to fail grandly on the political arena, crucial decisions may be made in the ‘**traditional’ sector of security** policymaking, **unheeded by any but the most uncritical minds.**

### The alt creates a political void filled by elites – locking in oppression

Cook 92 (Anthony, Associate Professor – Georgetown Law, New England Law Review, Spring, 26 New Eng.L. Rev. 751, Lexis)

The effect of deconstructing the power of the author to impose a fixed meaning on the text or offer a continuous narrative is both debilitating and liberating. It is debilitating in that any attempt to say what should be done within even our insular Foucaultian preoccupations may be oppositionalized and deconstructed as an illegitimate privileging of one term, value, perspective or narrative over another. The struggle over meaning might continue ad infinitum. That is, if a deconstructionist is theoretically consistent and sees deconstruction not as a political tool but as a philosophical orientation, political action is impossible, because such action requires a degree of closure that deconstruction, as a theoretical matter, does not permit. Moreover, the approach is debilitating because deconstruction without material rootedness, without goals and vision, **creates a political** and spiritual **void** into which the socially real power we theoretically deconstruct steps and **steps on** the disempowered and dispossessed.  [\*762]  To those dying from AIDS, stifled by poverty, dehumanized by sexism and racism, crippled by drugs and brutalized by the many forms of physical, political and economic violence that characterizes our narcissistic culture, power hardly seems a matter of illegitimate theoretical privileging. When vision, social theory and political struggle do not accompany critique, the **void will be filled** by the rich, the powerful and the charismatic, those who influence us through their eloquence, prestige, wealth and power.

## Political Vacuum

### The impact is extinction

Rorty 98 (Richard, Professor of Comparative Literature – Stanford University, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America, p. 89-94)

At that point, something will crack. The nonsuburban electorate will decide that the system has failed and start looking around for a strongman to vote for someone willing to assure them that, once he is elected, the smug bureaucrats, tricky lawyers, overpaid bond salesmen, and postmodernist professors will no longer be calling the shots. A scenario like that of Sinclair Lewis’ novel It Can’t Happen Here may then be played out. For once such a strongman takes office, nobody can predict what will happen. In 1932, most of the predictions made about what would happen if Hindenburg named Hitler chancellor were **wildly overoptimistic**. One thing that is very likely to happen is that **the gains made in the past forty years** by black and brown Americans, and by homosexuals, **will be wiped out**. Jocular contempt for women will come back into fashion. The words "nigger" and "kike" will once again be heard in the workplace. **All the sadism** which the academic Left has tried to make unaccept­able to its students will come flooding back. All the resent­ment which badly educated Americans feel about having their manners dictated to them by college graduates will find an outlet. But such a renewal of sadism will not alter the effects of selfishness. For after my imagined strongman takes charge, he will quickly make his peace with the international super­rich, just as Hitler made his with the German industrialists. He will invoke the glorious memory of the Gulf War to **pro­voke military adventures which will** generate short-term prosperity. He will be a disaster for the country and the world. People will wonder why there was so little resistance to his evitable rise. Where, they will ask, was the American Left? Why was it only rightists like Buchanan who spoke to the workers about the consequences of globalization? Why could not the Left channel the mounting rage of the newly dispossessed? It is often said that we Americans, at the end of the twenti­eth century, no longer have a Left. Since nobody denies the existence of what I have called the cultural Left, this amounts to an admission that that Left is unable to engage in national politics. It is not the sort of Left which can be asked to deal with the consequences of globalization. To get the country to deal with those consequences, the present cultural Left would have to transform itself by opening relations with the residue of the old reformist Left, and in particular with the labor unions. It would have to talk much more about money, even at the cost of talking less about stigma. I have two suggestions about how to effect this transition. The first is that the Left should put a moratorium on theory. It should try to kick its philosophy habit. The second is that the Left should try to mobilize what remains of our pride in being Americans. It should ask the public to consider how the country of Lincoln and Whitman might be achieved. In support of my first suggestion, let me cite a passage from Dewey's Reconstruction in Philosophy in which he ex­presses his exasperation with the sort of sterile debate now going on under the rubric of "individualism versus commu­nitarianism." Dewey thought that all discussions which took this dichotomy seriously suffer from a common defect. They are all committed to the logic of general notions under which specific situa­tions are to be brought. What we want is light upon this or that group of individuals, this or that concrete human being, this or that special institution or social arrangement. For such a logic of inquiry, the tradition­ally accepted logic substitutes discussion of the mean­ing of concepts and their dialectical relationships with one another. Dewey was right to be exasperated by sociopolitical theory conducted at this level of abstraction. He was wrong when he went on to say that ascending to this level is typically a right­ist maneuver, one which supplies "the apparatus for intellec­tual justifications of the established order. "9 For such ascents are now more common on the Left than on the Right. The contemporary academic Left seems to think that the higher your level of abstraction, the more subversive of the estab­lished order you can be. The more sweeping and novel your conceptual apparatus, the more radical your critique. When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been "inadequately theorized," you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of lan­guage, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist ver­sion of economic determinism. Theorists of the Left think that dissolving political agents into plays of differential sub­jectivity, or political initiatives into pursuits of Lacan's im­possible object of desire, helps to subvert the established order. Such subversion, they say, is accomplished by "problematizing familiar concepts." Recent attempts to subvert social institutions by prob­lematizing concepts have produced a few very good books. They have also produced many thousands of books which represent scholastic philosophizing at its worst. The authors of these purportedly "subversive" books honestly believe that they are serving human liberty. But it is almost impossi­ble to clamber back down from their books to a level of ab­straction on which one might discuss the merits of a law, a treaty, a candidate, or a political strategy. Even though what these authors "theorize" is often something very concrete and near at hand-a current TV show, a media celebrity, a re­cent scandal-they offer the most abstract and barren expla­nations imaginable. These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into polit­ical relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left re­treats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice pro­duces **theoretical hallucinations**. These result in an intellec­tual environment which is, as Mark Edmundson says in his book Nightmare on Main Street, Gothic. The cultural Left is haunted by ubiquitous specters, the most frightening of which is called "power." This is the name of what Edmund­son calls Foucault's "haunting agency, which is everywhere and nowhere, as evanescent and insistent as a resourceful spook."10

## Alternative Fails

### Alternative fails --- critical theory has no mechanism to translate theory into practice

Jones 99 (Richard Wyn, Lecturer in the Department of International Politics – University of Wales, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, CIAO, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/wynjones/wynjones06.html)

Because emancipatory political practice is central to the claims of critical theory, one might expect that proponents of a critical approach to the study of international relations would be reflexive about the relationship between theory and practice. Yet their thinking on this issue thus far does not seem to have progressed much beyond grandiose statements of intent. There have been no systematic considerations of how critical international theory can help generate, support, or sustain emancipatory politics beyond the seminar room or conference hotel. Robert Cox, for example, has described the task of critical theorists as providing “a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order” (R. Cox 1981: 130). Although he has also gone on to identify possible agents for change and has outlined the nature and structure of some feasible alternative orders, he has not explicitly indicated whom he regards as the addressee of critical theory (i.e., who is being guided) and thus how the theory can hope to become a part of the political process (see R. Cox 1981, 1983, 1996). Similarly, Andrew Linklater has argued that “a critical theory of international relations must regard the practical project of extending community beyond the nation–state as its most important problem” (Linklater 1990b: 171). However, he has little to say about the role of theory in the realization of this “practical project.” Indeed, his main point is to suggest that the role of critical theory “is not to offer instructions on how to act but to reveal the existence of unrealised possibilities” (Linklater 1990b: 172). But the question still remains, reveal to whom? Is the audience enlightened politicians? Particular social classes? Particular social movements? Or particular (and presumably particularized) communities? In light of Linklater’s primary concern with emancipation, one might expect more guidance as to whom he believes might do the emancipating and how critical theory can impinge upon the emancipatory process. There is, likewise, little enlightenment to be gleaned from Mark Hoffman’s otherwise important contribution. He argues that critical international theory seeks not simply to reproduce society via description, but to understand society and change it. It is both descriptive and constructive in its theoretical intent: it is both an intellectual and a social act. It is not merely an expression of the concrete realities of the historical situation, but also a force for change within those conditions. (M. Hoffman 1987: 233) Despite this very ambitious declaration, once again, Hoffman gives no suggestion as to how this “force for change” should be operationalized and what concrete role critical theorizing might play in changing society. Thus, although the critical international theorists’ critique of the role that more conventional approaches to the study of world politics play in reproducing the contemporary world order may be persuasive, their account of the relationship between their own work and emancipatory political practice is unconvincing. Given the centrality of practice to the claims of critical theory, this is a very significant weakness. Without some plausible account of the mechanisms by which they hope to aid in the achievement of their emancipatory goals, proponents of critical international theory are hardly in a position to justify the assertion that “it represents the next stage in the development of International Relations theory” (M. Hoffman 1987: 244). Indeed, without a more convincing conceptualization of the theory–practice nexus, one can argue that critical international theory, by its own terms, has no way of redeeming some of its central epistemological and methodological claims and thus that it is a fatally flawed enterprise.

## Alternative Fails

### \*Their alternative is fake radicalism --- does nothing to improve the material conditions of the insecure

Booth 5 (Kenneth, Professor of International Politics – University of Wales-Aberystwyth, Critical Security Studies and World Politics, p. 270-271, footnote on 277)

Postmodern/poststructural engagement with the subject of security in international relations has been characterized by some of the general problems of the genre, notably obscurantism, relativism, and **faux radicalism**.26 What has particularly troubled critics of the postmodern sensibility has been the latter's underlying conception of politics.27 Terry Eagleton, for one, has praised the "rich body of work" by postmodern writers in some areas but at the same time has contested the genre's "cultural relativism and moral conventionalism, its scepticism, pragmatism and localism, its distaste for ideas of solidarity and disciplined organization, [and] its lack of any adequate theory of political agency."28 Eagleton made these comments as part of a general critique of the postmodern sensibility, but I would argue that specific writing on security in international relations from postmodern and poststructuralist perspectives has generally done nothing to ease such concerns. Eagleton's fundamental worry was how postmodernism would "shape up" to the test of fascism as a serious political challenge. Other writers, studying particular political contexts, such as postapartheid South Africa, have shown similar worries; they have questioned the **lack of concrete or specific resources** that such theories can add to the repertoire of reconstruction strategies.29 Richard A. Wilson, an anthropologist interested in human rights, has generalized exactly the same concern, namely, that the postmodernist rejection of metanarratives and universal solidarities does not deliver a helpful politics to people in trouble. As he puts it, "Rights without a metanarrative are like a car without seat-belts; on hitting the first moral bump with ontological implications, the passenger's safety is jeopardised."30 The struggle within South Africa to bring down the institutionalized racism of apartheid benefited greatly from the growing strength of universal human rights values (which delegitimized racism and legitimized equality) and their advocacy by groups in different countries and cultures showing their political solidarity in material and other ways. Anxiety about the politics of postmodernism and poststructuralism is provoked, in part, by the negative conceptualization of security projected by their exponents. The poststructuralist approach seems to assume that security cannot be common or positive-sum but must always be zero-sum, with somebody's security always being at the cost of the insecurity of others. At the same time, security itself is questioned as a desirable goal for societies because of the assumption of poststructuralist writers that the search for security is necessarily conservative and will result in negative consequences for somebody. They tend also to celebrate insecurity, which I regard as a **middle-class affront to the truly insecure**.31

*Cut to footnote on page 277—*

31. Examples of the approach are **Dillon**, *The Politics of Security*; **and Der Derian**, “The Value of Security,” in Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security*.

In the shadow of such views, it is not surprising that the postmodern/poststructuralist genre is sometimes seen as having affinities with realism. Political realists and poststructuralists seem to share a fatalistic view that humans are doomed to insecurity; regard the search for emancipation as both futile and dangerous; believe in a notion of the human condition; and relativize norms. Both leave power where it is in the world: deconstruction and deterrence are equally static theories.

## Alternative Fails

### Mere declaration of an alternative does nothing --- they have no mechanism to enact their worldview

Murray 97 (Alastair J.H., Professor of Political Theory – University of Edinburgh, Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, p. 188-189)

Realists, however, would be unlikely to be troubled by such charges. Ashley needs to do rather more than merely assert that the development of global threats will produce some universal consensus, or that any number of less exclusionary world orders are possible, to convince them. A universal threat does not imply a universal consensus, merely the existence of a universal threat faced by particularistic actors. And the assertion that indeterminate numbers of potentially less exclusionary orders exist carries little weight unless we can specify exactly what these alternatives are and just how they might be achieved. As such, realists would seem to be justified in regarding such potentialities as **currently unrealisable ideals** and in seeking a more proximate good in the fostering of mutual understanding and, in particular, of a stable balance of power. Despite the adverse side-effects that such a balance of power implies, it at least offers us something **tangible** rather than **ephemeral promises lacking a shred of support**. Ultimately, Ashley's demand that a new, critical approach be adopted in order to free us from the grip of such 'false' conceptions depends upon ideas about the prospects for the development of a universal consensus which are little more than **wishful thinking**, and ideas about the existence of potentially less exclusionary orders which are little more than mere assertion. 50 Hence his attempts, in 'Political realism and human interests', to conceal these ideas from view by claiming that the technical base of realism serves only to identify, and yet not to reform, the practical, and then, in 'The poverty of neorealism', by removing the technical from investigation altogether by an exclusive reliance on a problem of hermeneutic circularity.

### Rethinking thinking is a recipe for disaster --- the black hole of philosophy will indefinitely delay needed action to confront immediate crises

Booth 95 (Kenneth, Professor of International Politics – University of Wales, Aberystwyth, International Relations Theory Today, Ed. Booth & Smith, p. 330)

The implications of saying ‘Dare not to know’ in international relations are profound. They entail a revolution in the ontology, epistemology and agenda of the discipline. Dare not to know means: re-examining basic concepts; opening up to what has been closed out; rehumanizing what has been dehumanized; de-gendering what has been gendered; celebrating confusion rather than certainty; dethroning the logic of anarchy with the logics of anarchy; denaturalizing established common sense; populating the frontier zones between international relations and other academic disciplines; ideologizing the supposedly ‘objective’; re-imagining the humanly constituted; contextualizing the tradition; making normativity a norm; and listening carefully to the subject’s ‘screaming silences’. To accept such a programme obviously entails the risk of academic international relations being **sucked into the black hole** of philosophy. **Thinking about thinking** always threatens to undermine any confidence we may have in what we know and how we act. This is particularly disturbing for a subject such as international relations, which has always been thought about as a policy science, intimately concerned with decisions and their consequences. Implicitly, international relations has operated on the old principle that ‘there is nothing so practical as a good theory’. A reinvented future for the subject requires consideration of the interplay of practice and theory. Dreams that are not operationalized **leave the world as it is**. Putting all this together, politically speaking, means that we **cannot wait** for philosophy to deliver final judgements about beauty and truth. The world is confronted by numerous **immediate** and long-term **problems**, so we have to demonstrate the ‘courage of our confusions’ if we hope to get from here to the future in good shape. For several reasons, the year 2045 can be taken as the symbolic marker of the future.

## China Threat K Answers

### Only the permutation solves --- rigid rejection of “China threat” gets warped into a new orthodoxy and fuels extremism. Recognizing plural interpretations and linkages is more productive.

Callahan 5 (William A., Professor of Politics – University of Manchester, “How to Understand China: The Dangers and Opportunities of Being a Rising Power”, Review of International Studies, 31)

Although ‘China threat theory’ is ascribed to the Cold War thinking of foreigners who suffer from an enemy deprivation syndrome, the use of containment as a response to threats in Chinese texts suggests that Chinese strategists are also seeking to fill the symbolic gap left by the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was the key threat to the PRC after 1960. Refutations of ‘China threat theory’ do not seek to deconstruct the discourse of ‘threat’ as part of critical security studies. Rather they are expressions of a geopolitical identity politics because they refute ‘Chinese’ threats as a way of facilitating the production of an America threat, a Japan threat, an India threat, and so on. Uniting to fight these foreign threats affirms China’s national identity. Unfortunately, by refuting China threat in this bellicose way – that is by generating a new series of threats – the China threat theory texts end up confirming the threat that they seek to deny: Japan, India and Southeast Asia are increasingly threatened by China’s protests of peace.43 Moreover, the estrangement produced and circulated in China threat theory is not just among nation-states. The recent shift in the focus of the discourse from security issues to more economic and cultural issues suggests that China is estranged from the ‘international standards’ of the ‘international community’. After a long process of difficult negotiations, China entered the WTO in December 2001. Joining the WTO was not just an economic or a political event; it was an issue of Chinese identity.44 As Breslin, Shih and Zha describe in their articles in this Forum, this process was painful for China as WTO membership subjects the PRC to binding rules that are not the product of Chinese diplomacy or culture. Thus although China enters international organisations like the WTO based on shared values and rules, China also needs to distinguish itself from the undifferentiated mass of the globalised world. Since 2002, a large proportion of the China threat theory articles have been published in economics, trade, investment, and general business journals – rather than in international politics, area studies and ideological journals as in the 1990s. Hence China threat theory is one way to differentiate China from these international standards, which critics see as neo-colonial.45 Another way is for China to assert ownership over international standards to affirm its national identity through participation in globalisation.46 Lastly, some China threat theory articles go beyond criticising the ignorance and bad intentions of the offending texts to conclude that those who promote China threat must be crazy: ‘There is a consensus within mainland academic circles that there is hardly any reasonable logic to explain the views and practices of the United States toward China in the past few years. It can only be summed up in a word: ‘‘Madness’’ ’.47 Indians likewise are said to suffer from a ‘China threat theory syndrome’.48 This brings us back to Foucault’s logic of ‘rationality’ being constructed through the exclusion of a range of activities that are labelled as ‘madness’. The rationality of the rise of China depends upon distinguishing it from the madness of those who question it. Like Joseph Nye’s concern that warnings of a China threat could become a self-fulfilling prophesy, China threat theory texts vigorously reproduce the dangers of the very threat they seek to deny. Rather than adding to the debate, they end up policing what Chinese and foreigners can rationally say. Conclusion The argument of this essay is not that China is a threat. Rather, it has examined the productive linkages that knit together the image of China as a peacefully rising power and the discourse of China as a threat to the economic and military stability of East Asia. It would be easy to join the chorus of those who denounce ‘China threat theory’ as the misguided product of the Blue Team, as do many in China and the West. But that would be a mistake, because depending on circumstances anything – from rising powers to civilian aircraft – can be interpreted as a threat. The purpose is not to argue that interpretations are false in relation to some reality (such as that China is fundamentally peaceful rather than war-like), but that it is necessary to unpack the political and historical context of each perception of threat. Indeed, ‘China threat’ has never described a unified American understanding of the PRC: it has always been one position among many in debates among academics, public intellectuals and policymakers. Rather than inflate extremist positions (in both the West and China) into irrefutable truth, it is more interesting to examine the debates that produced the threat/opportunity dynamic.

## China Threat K Answers

### No self-fulfilling prophecy

Rachman 96 (Gideon, Asia Editor – Economist, “Containing China”, The Washington Quarterly, 19(1), Winter, Lexis)

Let us start with the self-fulfilling prophecy. This argument, often advanced by Sinologists, stresses Chinese paranoia. For historical reasons, the Chinese leadership is said to be deeply suspicious of the outside world. It assumes that outsiders will inevitably try to frustrate growing Chinese prosperity and power, however that power is used. Objecting to Chinese threats, protesting about human rights abuses, meeting the Taiwanese, attempting to leave Hong Kong with workable, democratic institutions, using words like containment: any and all of this will simply be interpreted by China as a plot to undermine Chinese stability. It may well be that the Chinese think like this. So what? The point is to respond to Chinese actions, not to try to fathom Chinese thought processes. If policymakers insist on playing the psychologist, perhaps they should model themselves on B. F. Skinner, rather than Freud. In other words rather than trying to divine the sources of Chinese behavior by analyzing old traumas, they should concentrate on behavior modification. A basic tenet of behavior therapy is not to reward behavior that you wish to discourage: giving in to threats is not generally regarded as sound practice. Ah, reply some Sinologists, but the Chinese are different. China, in the words of Henry Kissinger, "tends to react with neuralgia to any perceived slight to its dignity." n7 Well, perhaps. But it is a myth that the Chinese never back down when put under pressure. There are recent examples that suggest the opposite. In February 1995, the Chinese gave considerable ground over intellectual property rights when threatened with sanctions by the United States. The Chinese released Harry Wu, the Chinese-American human rights activist, when it became clear that imprisoning him would gravely damage U.S.-Chinese relations. After its display of public fury over the Lee Teng-hui visit, China quietly returned its ambassador to Washington and moved to patch up relations with the United States, despite failing to extract a public promise that Lee would never again be granted a U.S. visa. China also seems likely to give substantial ground in negotiations over accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Believers in the self-fulfilling prophecy have got the argument the wrong way around. It is certainly true that American, and indeed Asian, policies toward China could be a lot better thought out. But the West is not the source of friction: the real sources of the current tensions are Chinese actions, particularly Chinese threats to use force to assert claims over Taiwan and the South China Sea. The Chinese insist that they have never been an expansionist power. But China has very expansive ideas of where its legitimate borders lie. Because weak Chinese governments have always been especially prickly on issues of sovereignty, instability after the death of Deng Xiaoping may only heighten Chinese assertiveness.

## Hegemony K Answers

### Blanket kritik of hegemonic (economic) power is ethically unjustifiable. Reigning in worst aspect of bush administrations’ use of military threats solves their offense, but preserves ethical good of avoiding conflict.

Christian REUS-SMIT IR @ Australian Nat’l ‘4*American Power and World Order* p. 109-115

The final ethical position — the polar opposite of the first — holds that the exercise of hegemonic power is never ethically justifiable. One source of such a position might be pacifist thought, which abhors the use of violence even in unambiguous cases of self-defence. This would not, however, provide a comprehensive critique of the exercise of hegemonic power, which takes forms other than overt violence, such as economic diplomacy or the manipulation of international institutions. A more likely source of such critique would be the multifarious literature that equates all power with domination. Postmodernists (and anarch­ists, for that matter) might argue that behind all power lies self-interest and a will to control, both of which are antithetical to genuine human freedom and diversity. Rad­ical liberals might contend that the exercise of power by one human over another transforms the latter from a moral agent into a moral subject, thus violating their in­tegrity as self-governing individuals. Whatever the source, these ideas lead to radical scepticism about all institutions of power, of which hegemony is one form. The idea that the state is a source of individual security is replaced here with the idea of the state as a tyranny; the idea of hegem­ony as essential to the provision of global public goods is A framework for judgement Which of the above ideas help us to evaluate the ethics of the Bush Administration's revisionist hegemonic project? There is a strong temptation in international relations scholarship to mount trenchant defences of favoured para­digms, to show that the core assumptions of one's pre­ferred theory can be adapted to answer an ever widening set of big and important questions. There is a certain discipline of mind that this cultivates, and it certainly brings some order to theoretical debates, but it can lead to the 'Cinderella syndrome', the squeezing of an un­gainly, over-complicated world into an undersized theor­etical glass slipper. The study of international ethics is not immune this syndrome, with a long line of scholars seeking master normative principles of universal applic­ability. My approach here is a less ambitious, more prag­matic one. With the exceptions of the first and last positions, each of the above ethical perspectives contains kernels of wisdom. The challenge is to identify those of value for evaluating the ethics of Bush's revisionist grand strategy, and to consider how they might stand in order of priority. The following discussion takes up this challenge and arrives at a position that I tentatively term 'procedural solidarism'. The first and last of our five ethical positions can be dismissed as unhelpful to our task. The idea that might is right resonates with the cynical attitude we often feel to­wards the darker aspects of international relations, but it does not constitute an ethical standpoint from which to judge the exercise of hegemonic power. First of all, it places the right of moral judgement in the hands of the hegemon, and leaves all of those subject to its actions with no grounds for ethical critique. What the hegemon dictates as ethical is ethical. More than this, though, the principle that might is right is undiscriminating. It gives us no resources to determine ethical from unethical hegemonic conduct. The idea that might is never right is **equally unsatisfying**. It is a principle implied in many critiques of imperial power, including of American power. But like its polar opposite, it is **utterly undiscriminating**. No matter what the hegemon does we are left with one blanket assessment. No procedure, no selfless goal is worthy of ethical endorsement. This is a **deeply impoverished ethical posture**, as it **raises the critique of power above all other human values**. It is also completely counter-intuitive. Had the United States intervened militarily to prevent the Rwandan genocide, would this not have been ethically justifiable? If one answers no, then one faces the difficult task of explaining why the exercise of hegemonic power would have been a greater evil than allowing almost a million people to be massacred. If one answers yes, then one is admitting that a more discriminating set of ethical principles is needed than the simple yet enticing propos­ition that might is never right.