### Security Critique

Security 1NC 3

\*\*\*\*Links\*\*\*\* 7

Economy Link 8

Links—terrorism 9

Links—hegemony 10

Link Environment 11

Link Warming 12

Highways Link 13

Highways Link 14

Waterways Link 15

Urban Transportation Link 16

\*\*\*\*BLOCK TRICKS\*\*\*\* 18

Bio-politics DA 20

Method first 22

Ontology first 23

Representations key 24

\*\*\*\*ALTERNATIVE\*\*\*\* 25

Alternative 26

A2 Realism 27

Knowledge production/turns the case 28

\*\*\*\*\*IMPACTS\*\*\*\* 29

Impacts—war/extinction 30

Impacts—value to life 31

Impacts—war/extinction 32

\*\*\*\*PERM ANSWERS\*\*\*\* 33

A2 perm 34

\*\*\*\*AFFIRMATIVE ANSWERS\*\*\* 37

Realism—the assassin 38

Realism 39

Realism 40

A2 Epistemology/method 41

Alternative turns 42

Alternative turns 43

A2 Self fulfilling prophecy 44

A2 Representations key 45

A2 Value to life 46

A2 Biopolitics 47

A2 Biopolitics 48

A2 Ontology first 49

Impact turns 50

Impact turns 51

Permutation 52

### Security 1NC

#### The Affirmative fits within a project of deeming certain infrastructure projects “vital” and thus essential to national security- this same logic is at the heart of the global military project

Stephen J. Collier The New School, New York and Andrew Lakoff University of California, San Diego Forthcoming in Myriam Dunn and Kristian Soby Kristensen (eds.), The Politics of Securing the Homeland: Critical Infrastructure, Risk and Securitisation (Routledge, 2008) “The Vulnerability of Vital Systems: How “Critical Infrastructure” Became a Security Problem” http://anthropos-lab.net/wp/publications/2008/01/collier-and-lakoff.pdf

In recent years “critical infrastructure protection” has emerged as an increasingly important framework for understanding and mitigating threats to security. Widespread discussion of critical infrastructure protection in the United States began in 1996, when President Clinton formed a Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. The Commission’s 1997 report, Critical Foundations, established the central premise of infrastructure protection efforts: that the economic prosperity, military strength, and political vitality of the United States all depend on the continuous functioning of the nation’s critical infrastructures. As the Report stated: “Reliable and secure infrastructures are … the foundation for creating the wealth of our nation and our quality of life as a people.” Moreover, the Report continued, “certain of our infrastructures are so vital that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on our defense and economic security” (United States. President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 1997: 3). In discussions such as these, we find a distinctive approach to identifying, assessing, and managing security threats. The characteristics of this approach include: (1) a concern with the critical systems upon which modern society, economy, and polity are seen to depend; (2) the identification of the vulnerabilities of these systems and the threats that might exploit these vulnerabilities as matters of national security; and (3) the effort to develop techniques to mitigate system vulnerabilities. In this chapter we ask: Where did this distinctive way of understanding and intervening in security threats come from? How did “critical infrastructure” come to be regarded as a national security problem? We argue that critical infrastructure protection is best understood as one response to a relatively new problematization of security. As Foucault writes, a new problematization occurs when something has “happened to introduce uncertainty, a loss of familiarity; that loss, that uncertainty is the result of difficulties in our previous way of understanding, acting, relating” (Foucault 1994: 598). As we will show, at pivotal moments in the twentieth century, technological and political developments rendered prior security frameworks inadequate, and forced experts to invent new ways of identifying and intervening in security threats. Specifically, what emerged was a way of understanding security threats as problems of system-vulnerability. The task of protecting national security came to include attention to the ongoing functioning of a number of vulnerable systems that were seen as vital to collective life. The paper follows a series of important moments in the twentieth century history of system-vulnerability thinking: the interwar articulation of strategic bombing theory in Europe and the United States, which focused on the “vital targets” of an enemy’s industrial system; the development of defense mobilization and emergency preparedness in the Cold War U.S. as a means to defend the industrial system against a targeted nuclear attack; the emergence of all-hazards planning and “total preparedness” as paradigms for response to disruptions of vital systems; and the widespread diffusion of formal models for assessing the vulnerability of vital systems (see figure 1). The culmination of the story takes place in the late 1970s and early 1980s, among a relatively peripheral group of experts who were thinking about new challenges to national security. These experts had turned their attention to emerging threats – such as energy crises, major technological accidents, and terrorist attacks – that did not fit within the strategic framework of the Cold War. These new threats, they theorized, could not be deterred, and their probability could not be calculated. In this context, they began to draw together techniques and organizational forms developed earlier in the century to define a broad approach to mitigating the perceived vulnerabilities of the nation’s critical systems.

### Security 1NC

From their perspective, the ongoing functioning of such systems was a matter of national security. This approach to security problems was identified as central to post-Cold War national security in documents such as Critical Foundations, cited above.

#### Extinction is only possible through their conception of politics—the power to securitize authorizes the destruction of all life.

**Coviello, 2000** (Peter Coviello, PhD, Cornell, professor of English, Queer Frontiers, “Apocalypse from Now On”)

Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is nto to say that the world we inhabit is in any way post-apocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed—it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques Derrida’s suitably menacing phrase) “remainderles and a-symbolic destruction,” then in the postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an “other” people whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion, threatening the safety and prosperity of a cherished “general population.” This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag’s incisive observation, from 1989, that “Apocalypse is now a long-running serial: not Apocalypse Now but Apocalypse from now on. The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss) is that apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in the vast economy of power, it is ever useful. That is, through the perpetual threat of destruction---through the constant reproduction of the figure of apocalypse—agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first volume of The History of Sexuality addresses himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than productive, less life-threatening than, in his words, “life administering.” Power, he contends, “exerts a positive influence on life…and endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations.” In his brief comments on what he calls “the atomic situation,” however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means. For as “managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race,” agencies of modern power presume to act “on the behalf of the existence of everyone.” Whatsoever might be constructed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive or, indeed, potentially annihilating. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power,” Foucault writes, “this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.” For a state that would arm itself is not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patterns and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.

### Security 1NC

#### It also means there is ‘no value to life.’

**Dillon, 1999** (Michael Dillon, professor of IR at the University of Lancaster, Political Theory, "Another Justice" p. 164-5, EBSCO)

Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for mono, It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular invaluable and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism'. They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability.” Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of amount are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without deaf either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value—rights—may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, "we are dealing always with whatever exceeds whatever exceeds measure. But how do that necessity present itself? Another Justice answer: as the surplus of the duty to answer to One claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being. The event of this lack is not a negative experience. Rather, it is an encounter with a reserve charged with possibility. As possibility, it is that which enables life to be lived in excess without the overdose of actuality. What also means is that the human is not decided. lt is precisely undecidable. Undecidability means being in position of having so decide without having already been fully determined end without being capable et bringing an end to the requirement for decision.

### Security 1NC

#### C. The alternative is to reject the affirmative.Only a rejection of the aff’s security politics opens space for liberating political engagement.

**Neocleous, 2008** (Mark Neocleous, professor of the Critique of Political Economy, Head of Department of Politics & History, Brunel University, “Critique of Security” p. 185-6)

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that cannot be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'

## Links

### Economy Link

#### Economics expands security threats to markets—the desire to achieve economic security authorizes wars to protect ‘world systems’ of capital.

**Lipschutz, 1998** (Ronnie D, Professor, Department of Politics at UC Santa Cruz, "Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millennium's End" ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz18.html)

Today, a similar set of circumstances, brought on by economic globalization, seems to be developing and imposing costs and risks on the very people it is intended to benefit. In this context, talk of "economic security" becomes, once again, a speech act that seeks to legitimate a policy that promises very real insecurity for many. The market is a place full of risks, and only those who are willing to take risks in the market are likely to reap great benefits; given the logic of the market, these same individuals also risk bankruptcy and personal economic insecurity (an outcome only too evident in Orange County California's declaration of bankruptcy and Mexico's economic travails). Indeed, as Beverly Crawford's chapter seems to suggest, in a world of economic globalism, in which states must collaborate to foster global capitalism, and the processes of production, consumption, and accumulation become decoupled from individual states, it becomes more and more difficult to constitute an Other that might be transformed into a threatening enemy, thereby legitimating the differential degrees of personal and national security awarded by the market. We have seen some feeble efforts, based on notions of economic competitiveness and technological innovation, and given illustration in Michael Crichton's xenophobic and misogynistic Rising Sun , but these seem not to be very persuasive. A few argue that we (the United States) must become more like the Other (Japan) if we are to be made secure. [16](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz18.html#note16) How different this is from the world(s) of Morgenthau and Waltz! Business and capital are only too aware of this paradox, whereas the world of states and military power seems blissfully oblivious to it. For capital, there are no enemies, only competitors; indeed, the market, while competitive, is a realm of cooperation, not conflict, as is often assumed. [17](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz18.html#note17) Markets are rule-governed institutions and, to get along, you must go along. In the marketplace, nonexclusive identities are prized, not shunned, and multiple identities are encouraged in the name of consumer taste and "autonomy." This world is, as Kenichi Ohmae puts it, truly "borderless." [18](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz18.html#note18) Not only are there no borders between countries, there are no borders between market and consumer, either. What can security possibly mean in such a world? Not everyone is, of course, a participant in the market; indeed, there are billions of people and dozens of countries that are not. In spite of warnings about instability as the "enemy," these people and "states" are neither enemies nor threats to us in either an objective or intersubjective sense. Rather, the places in which many of them are found are more akin to realms constituted or consumed by chaos. The inhabitants of these zone participate in neither statist politics nor global markets as we understand them, not so much out of choice or desire as out of the logic of economic globalization driven by capitalism and the industrial coalition. But these zones of chaos are not just places "outside" of space or time; paradoxically, perhaps, they are sites of political experimentation, from which are emerging "world systems" that, if successful, could ultimately undermine the relative orderliness of the peaceful zones of the industrial coalition.

### Links—terrorism

#### Terrorism discourse masks state violence and represents the legitimation of the international security crisis.

**Der Derian, 1995** (James Der Derian, Director of the Global Security Program and Research Professor of International Studies at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, “Arms, Hostages, and the Importance of Shredding in Earnest: Reading the National Security Culture”)

Just as Nietzsche alleged the precession of meaning to facts, North-the factotum of terror and counter-terror-preceded the factoids of terrorism. To be sure, there are some commonly accepted "facts" about international terrorism. A selection of Rand corporation documents on international terrorism reveals the following: over the last ten years terrorists have seized over fifty embassies and consulates, held the oil ministers of eleven states hostage; kidnapped hundreds of diplomats, businessmen and journalists; made several hundred million dollars in ransom money; assassinated Lord Mountbatten and President Sadat and the former premier of Italy, attempted to assassinate the president of France, the Pope, and Alexander Haig (a near miss with a rocket launcher when he was supreme allied commander of NATO). Terrorist incidents and their severity have increased over the last ten years, but most terrorist actions involve few or no casualties: they are symbolic acts of violence. Compared to the ruthlessness and destructiveness of states, or even to natural disasters, terrorism is a mere nuisance. Yet it is cause for crises of state, media spasms on a seismic scale, and the hyper-production of institutes, conferences, and books on terrorism. Why is this? International terrorism does represent a crisis, but not in terms of body-counts or a revolutionary threat to the states-system. On a political level, the simulacrum of terrorism, that is, the production of a hyperreal threat of violence, anticipates a crisis of legitimation.9 What this means is that international terrorism is not a symptom or a cause or an effect of this systemic crisis: it has become a spectacular, micro-cosmic simulation. International terrorism simulates a legitimating crisis of the international order; conversely, counter-terrorism is a counter-simulation, an attempt to engender a new disciplinary order which can save the dominant legitimacy principle of international relations.10O n a representational level, the spectacle of terrorism displace-and distracts us from-the signs of a pervading international disorder. As a result, much of what is read and written of terrorism displays a superficiality of reasoning and a corruption of language which effects truths about terrorism without any sense of how these truths are produced by, and help to sustain official discourses of international relations. This was repeatedly evidenced by the proceedings and documents of the Iran-contra hearings, in which our reason of state was exposed as ideological expediency and redressed as principled policy. If the reader of terrorism is to break out of the dominant cultural economy, in which each of us acts as a factotum of factoids, that is, a transmitter of official truths, then some critical interpretive skills must be deployed. Along with an empirical study of the salient sources of disorder around us, we need a genealogy of our knowledge of international terrorism and legitimacy, of how consumers in this cultural economy arrive at some shared assumptions about the exchange-value of both. One goal, then, of a cultural reading is to reach a better under-standing of whether these assumptions or constructions of terrorism and legitimation serve to preserve principles and practices beneficial to the international order, or whether they forestall the knowledge necessary to deal effectively with an increasing fragmentation, a diffusion of power, and a sustained challenge to the sovereign state's once-natural monopoly of force: in short, the neo-medievalism alluded to earlier.

### Links—hegemony

#### Primacy discourse ascribes fear to potential challengers—militarized responses and war are inevitable with balance-of-power policies.

**Campbell, 1998** (David, Campbell, professor International Politics at University of New Castle, "Writing Security; United States Foreign Policy the Politics of Identity" p. 31-33)

Most important just as the source of danger has never been fixed, neither has the identity that it was said to threaten. The contours of this identity have been the subject of constant (re)writing; no rewriting in the sense of changing the meaning, but rewriting in the sense of inscribing something so that which is contingent and subject to flux is rendered more permanent. While one might have expected few if any references to national values or purposes in confidential prepared for the inner sanctum of national security policy (after all, don't they know who they are or what they represent?) the texts of foreign policy are replete with statements about the fulfillment of the republic, the fundamental purpose of the nation, God given rights, moral codes, the principles of European civilization, the fear of cultural and spiritual loss, and the responsibilities and duties thrust upon the gleaming example of America. In this sense, the texts that guided national security policy did more than simply offer strategic analysis of the "reality" they confronted: they actively concerned themselves with the scripting of a particular American identity. Stamped "Top Secret" and read by only the select and power few, the texts effaced the boundary between inside and outside with their quasi-Puritan figurations. In employing this mode of representation, the foreign policy texts of the postwar period recalled the seventeenth-century literary genre of the jeremiad, or political sermon, in which Puritan preachers combined searing critiques with appeals for spiritual renewal. Later to establish the interpretive framework for national identity, these exhortations drew on a European tradition of preaching the omnipresence of sin so as to instill the desire for order but they added a distinctly affirmative moment: The American Puritan jeremiad was the ritual of a culture on an errand - which is to say, a culture based on a faith in process. Substituting teleology for hierarchy, it discarded the Old War ideal of stasis for a New World vision of the future. Its function was to create a climate of anxiety that helped release the restless "progressivist" energies required for the success of the venture. The European jeremiad thrived on anxiety, of course. Like all "Traditionalist" forms of ritual, it used fear and trembling to teach acceptance of fixed social norms. But the American jeremiad went much further. It made anxiety its end as well as its means. Crisis was the social norm it sought to inculcate. The very concept of errand after all, implied a state of unfulfillment. The future, though divinely assured, was never quite there, and New England's Jeremiahs set out to provide the sense of insecurity that would ensure the outcome. Whereas the Puritan jeremiads were preached b y religious figures in public, the national security planners entreated in private the urgency of the manifold dangers confronting the republic. But the refrains of their political sermons have occupied a prominent place in postwar political discourse. On two separate occasions (first in 1950, and t hen in 196), private citizens with close ties to the foreign policy bureaucracy established a "Committee on the Present Danger" to alert a public they perceived as lacking resolve and will to necessity of confronting the political and military threat of communism and the Society Union. More recently, with Pentagon planners concerned about the "guerillas, assassins, terrorists, and subversives" said to be "nibbling away" at the United States, proclamations that the fundamental values of the country are under threat have been no less insistent. As Oliver North announced to the U.S. Congress: "It is very important for the American people to know that this is a dangerous world; that we live at risk and that this nation is at risk in a dangerous world." And in a State Department report, the 1990s were foreshadowed as an era in which divergent political critiques nonetheless would seek equally to overcome the "corruption" and "profligacy" induced by the "loss" of "American purpose" in Vietnam the "moral renewal." To this end, the rendering of Operation Desert Shield-turn-Storm as an overwhelming exhibition of America's rediscovered mission stands as testament. The cold war, then , was both a struggle that exceeded the military threat of the Soviet Union and a struggle into which any number of potential candidates, regardless of their strategic capacity, were slotted as a threat. In this sense, the collapse, overcoming, or surrender of one of the protagonists at this historical junction does not mean "it" is over. The cold war's meaning will undoubtedly change, but if we recall that the phrase cold war was coined by a fourteenth century Spanish writer to represent the persistent rivalry between Christians and Arabs, we come to recognize that the sort of struggle the phrase demotes is a struggle over identity: a struggle that is no context-specific and thus not rooted in the existence of a particular kind of Soviet Union. Besides, the United States-led war against Iraq should caution us to the fact that the Western (and particularly American) interpretive dispositions that predominated in the post-World War II international environment - with their zero-sum analyses of international action, the sense of endangerment ascribed to all the activities of the other, the fear of internal challenge and subversion, the tendency to militarize all response, and the willingness to draw the lines of superiority/inferiority between us and them - were not specific to one state or ideology. As a consequence, we need to rethink the convention understanding of foreign policy, and the historicity of the cold war in particular.

### Link Environment

#### Threat depiction of the environment halts mobilization efforts and ignites backlash – that turns and outweighs the case – any solvency they may claim only exists in a bottle – large comparative analysis takes out their answers

Trennel, 06 [Paul – Ph.D University of Wales, “The (Im)possibility of Environmental Security”] PDF

The entire rationale behind the move to link the environment to security is a belief that by so doing it is possible to utilise the capacity of security to engineer a greater degree of social mobilization in the quest to meet environmental challenges. As Deudney points out “the aim of these new links is not primarily descriptive, but polemical. It is not a concern about fact but a rhetorical device designed to stimulate action” (1990: 465). In other words, the notion of ‘environmental security’ represents a “motivational strategy” (1991: 195). Therefore, the attempt to conjoin the environment and security can be understood with reference to the Copenhagen School’s conception of security as a performative speech act (Waever, 1995; Buzan ***et al.***, 1998). Under this model when an issue is cast in security terms, or ‘securitized’, social relations are reordered along security lines and a response which transcends normal politics is initiated. The status of attempts to link the environment and security as rhetorical moves undertaken with the desire to alter reality means that the conception of security as a speech act represents the best framework for analysing the environment-security literaturen. It will, therefore, be employed throughout this thesis. From this perspective this I contend that there is a fundamental, and erroneous, assumption underlying ongoing attempts to conceive of the environment as a security issue. I argue that this project is guilty of assuming that the mere linguistic conjunction of ‘environment’ and ‘security’ will produce the mobilization effect which forms the fundamental purpose of the environment-security linkage. This is not necessarily the case. Not every issue referred to in security terms generates an extraordinary response, and thus far the connection of the environment to security has roundly failed to generate large-scale environmental mobilization. A deeper analysis of the dynamics of securitization reveals that ‘security’ only attains the performative capacity to mobilize through a complex political process. I argue, following Thierry Balzaqc (2005) that successful securitization is intersubjective, meaning that in order for mobilization to occur an audience must accept a securitizing actor’s claims and the necessity for an extraordinary response to a problem. As such, securitizing moves must be backed with external evidence of an imminent existential threat to affirm the urgent need for action. Whether or not the environment provides this external dimension is a point of contention. It is my claim that the spatially and temporally distant nature of environmental threats leads to a lack of evidence of environmental destruction in the everyday experience of the target audience of securitizing moves[[1]](#footnote-1). This may prevent the environment from being seen as a pressing existential threat which merits immediate and extraordinary corrective action. I attempt to validate this claim by comparing environmental hazards to other examples of distant suffering such as famine and genocide in order to highlight how suffering which is not immediately proximate and observable to individuals frequently fails to motivate remedial action. The environment too could fall foul of the tendency to ignore suffering which is not accompanied by a proximate physical stimulus and therefore fail to generate mobilization. If it can be shown that the environment is unlikely to sustain large-scale mobilization on security grounds due to the very nature of the threat it poses, then the incentive for linking the environment to security is removed. This would serve to break the academic deadlock over whether and how to connect the environment and security and provide the basis for the project to overcome environmental vulnerability to move beyond security.

### Link Warming

#### Warming rhetoric gets co-opted by the military furthering militarism - that turns the case

Marntinot, 07 [Steve – Instructor at the Center for Interdisciplinary Programs at San Francisco State University, “Militarism and Global Warming”] <http://www.greens.org/s-r/42/42-06.html>

In other words, war is the factor that renders the military a self-generating cyclic producer of global warming. Wars add untold and inestimable damage to the ecology on all levels, while fulfilling their major function of producing mass murder. War is the essential logic of a military machine, and of an ethic and a politics of militarism. Its fundamental purpose is to guarantee access to resources, and in particular petroleum, for its constituency. Its constituency is the US economy, and US industry. As the largest single consumer of petroleum in the world, its role is to guarantee the continued consumption of petroleum by the US economy, the largest national consumer of petroleum in the world. In addition, the military has become a major industrial factor in the US itself, as part of a greater economic cycle. This is a result of an ancillary economic process, the movement of runaway shops and of whole industries relocating to lower wage areas. Some industries moved south, others to Latin America, others to Asia or wherever on the globe they could be more exploitative. The US government, from the Reagan administration on, has provided subsidies to major industries to move to low-wage areas, and produced agreements in many countries for establishing export production zones — that is, zones in which production is only for export; they add little to the local host economies, and create international assembly lines whose only coherence is the multinational corporate structure that controls it. The effect of this process has been to gut the industrial base of the US economy. The subsidiary internal effect was that the military, the one industry that could not run away because it was strategic, gained economic hegemony by default. The US economy fell into the hands of the military-industrial complex. This brings us to the third dimension of militarist self-generation as a global warming factor. In the face of runaway industries, the US economy has become dominated by military production. The military is now connected and conjoined to roughly 50% of all economic activity in the US. This doesn’t mean that 50% of all production is military production; it means that 50% of all economic activity is associated with the military, either in the production of military hardware, the running of bases, or in ancillary industries whose major customer is the military, and who thus owe their existence and functions to that major customer. Military appropriations by Congress may be 25% of the budget, but there are ripple and multiplier effects that expand the economic involvement of the military to far beyond that 25%.  … the citizens of that structure, the corporations themselves, have no ethical concerns toward the planet nor toward life. Here is how corporate control of the economy, a history of militarism, and corporate globalization all come together. The US military is what facilitated the acquisition of exploitation rights in other countries by US corporations, leaving the US economy essentially a military-oriented economy. That is, militarism has engendered a military economy. Second, it fosters a situation in which a transnational corporate structure becomes the predominant political force in the world; and the citizens of that structure, the corporations themselves, have no ethical concerns toward the planet nor toward life. Its ethics are governed by the maintenance of its stock value on the stock markets of the world. Thus, resource exploitation is its food, and resource consumption is its metabolism. Militarism is the way corporations maintain their access to their food supply — the planet. Because the military economy is by nature a monopoly, owing to government control, security clearances, national security considerations, etc., all military industries fall into a culture of corruption that is far beyond that of ordinary industries. This corruption is a cultural phenomenon that makes health and longevity an ancillary concern. In the interests of that corruption, beyond profit or stock price levels, the military drives the political processes and thinking of this society to ideologically ignore or deny the problem of global warming. The profit picture is important, of course, and it leads the oil and coal interests to buy prostituted scientists to help them promulgate that denial. But the real opposition to recognition of global warming is more immediately the corruption that exudes from the military and its militarism. In order to seriously address the problem, the movements (ecology, environmentalist, anti-consumption, alternative energy) will have to be anti-militarist. The military is key to the cycle of self-generation of global warming at the human (initiatory) end of the spectrum of factors. The military may not be the worst offender in producing greenhouse gases in the pragmatic sense, but it is the worst offender as an entity and an ideology in the world. It has to be seen as lying at the heart of the offense itself.  The military may not be the worst offender in producing greenhouse gases in the pragmatic sense, but it is the worst offender as an entity and an ideology …It is not possible for the environmental movement to take a step toward preserving the environment unless two things are brought to an end — the existence of the US military machine and the existence of the corporate structure.

### Highways Link

#### The aff’s expansion of the highway system serves to expand the disciplinary power of the automobile- this automobility is a means by which capital and the state inundate their norms- this extends the myth of American exceptionalism

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In a democracy, Seiler argues, freedom, specifically freedom of individual movement, is imperative to the definition of the citizen. He writes, "The legitimacy of modern liberal societies depends to a large degree on their capacity not merely to tolerate but to enable performances of self-determination in all those individuals identified as citizens" (130). Thus automobility, seen as a fusion of self-directed mobility and consumerist self-expression, becomes a synecdoche for normative citizenship in the United States. Drawing heavily on the work of Foucault, Seiler charts the rise of automobility at the turn of the twentieth century as a technology of the self, as a disciplinary technology, and as a form of capital deeply inscribed by state and commercial systems of surveillance and control. He explores "how mobility itself informs and structures modern liberal subjectivity, the contested 'prize' that its disparate groups seek to realize through the practices of automobility" (11). Seiler understands driving as an "apparatus" similar to the way that Foucault understood sexuality, simultaneously liberating as it disciplines: Like sex, driving is imbued with emancipatory pleasures and destructive potential "called for the construction of an apparatus, consisting of legal, technical, medical, cultural, economic, political, ethical, and architectural/spatial elements, that would simultaneously enable and constrain, cultivate and regulate, govern and license it" (62–63). In the early days of the automobile, shifts in the capitalist mode of production, coupled with the emergence of discourses exhibiting anxieties over modernization and a perceived loss of subjectivity, created a crisis to which automobility was able to respond. The implementation of Taylorist forms of scientifically managed manufacturing were key, as alienation in the workplace created a space to generate a new "expressive" ideal of individualism, à la Herbert Hoover. Workers were not only likened to a mass by figures such as Frederick Taylor, but these laborers, typically white men, were subjected to a mode of surveillance previously associated with women and people of color. This alienation and perceived emasculation in the workplace created a desire not only for self-expression but also for mobility and individual freedom of choice. The new brand of individualism was meant to restore agency (often read as masculinity) to the individual. As commodities became the primary mode of self-expression, the automobile was positioned as the quintessential product to meet these ends. Seiler argues that ultimately the automobile was championed as "both the instrument for the performative recuperation of the 'sovereign self' of the republican past and the facilitator of the blithely masterful new subjectivity of the consumer-citizen" (13). Driving came to be seen as a performance of freedom, and thus analogous to citizenship. [End Page 176] The cold war era presented yet another crisis regarding individualism. Recoiling from a collectivism that permeated the years of the Great Depression and faced with ostensible threats of Soviet communalism, U.S. rhetoricians, thinkers, and pop cultural producers, from Jack Kerouac to R. W. Lewis, became newly obsessed with the propagation of individualism and a fear of conformity. Challenging the "utility thesis"—that cars became the primary mode of modern transportation due to military and civilian imperatives during the postwar economic boom—Seiler sees automobility as part of the cold "war of ideology,"

### Highways Link

and in fact as a major piece of propaganda, espousing the American ideals of motion, speed, and autonomy, all of which were circumscribed by the state and the highway patrol. In this light the freeway became a stage of nearly 43,000 miles of road where citizens could perform freedom while assuaging the "crisis of the individual." Seiler continues, "The figure of the driver, moreover, embodied the ideological gulf separating the United States from its communist antagonists, and proved … the continuing vitality of the essential individual freedom enjoyed under liberalism and capitalism" (72). Such performances of freedom were fundamental to the development of a new brand of American individualism: autonomous yet cooperative and responsible. These acts of automotive freedom, however, are of an uneven and precarious nature. Here Seiler furthers the discussion of Kevin Borg, who reminds his readers that automotive breakdowns strip a driver of such freedoms, and that their restoration lay in the hands of a class of the highly skilled, yet hardly esteemed, mechanics. On a more political note, Seiler highlights the undemocratic nature of such freedoms, and shows that automobility, like U.S. citizenship, has not been made equally available to all in this country. Interested in the normative power of "American character," Seiler explores the question "Who is served by automobility?" He writes that "assigning the honorific 'American' … has been bound up with legitimating particular regimes of accumulation and policies of exclusion, assimilation, and conquest throughout the nation's history" (7). This ideology of freedom is defined by a periphery of unfreedom and restriction, as the notion of the authentic American renders some as "inauthentic." For women, driving has continually been framed as a kind of test for the fitness of citizenship (which gives new light to the sexist jokes about dangerous women behind the wheel). But Seiler tells a much more complicated narrative of gender and early automobility, one in which women are key actors. In the early days of automobility, women raced cars and published narrative stories of their cross-country adventures on the road. Also, at this time the automobile [End Page 177] was a curious commodity available only to an elite few, too fashionable and trendy, not to mention expensive, for the masses. These associations painted the car as a kind of luxury plaything, susceptible to the capriciousness of a feminine subject. Further, due to the unreliability of early automobiles and roads and drivers' inability to deal with breakdowns or other emergencies on the road, the subjectivity of the driver seemed to be characterized by feminized vulnerability. Thus, for the first few decades of automobility, well before the masculinized sports car or the SUV, the automobile was decidedly "indeterminately gendered" (54). Yet, this era was brief, and before long women became primarily associated with the serving and consuming aspects of driving: chauffeuring children around and running errands for the family—thus paralleling their more general position within the public sphere. The liberal ideal of the "open road" has been further troubled by the ubiquity of racialized violence and discrimination. Through an analysis of midcentury guidebooks written for black drivers—Travelguide (bearing the telling subtitle Vacation and Recreation Without Humiliation) and the Negro Motorist Green Book, which directed African American drivers toward safe, nondiscriminatory hotels, restaurants, and car repair shops—Seiler explores the "high stakes, pleasures, and perils of African Americans' driving and car ownership, claims to the public space of the road, and general participation in an expanding culture of automobility" (106). Such publications exhibited an immense desire among blacks to participate as equal citizens in the U.S. automotive and democratic processes, though often in the contradictory terms of "communal racial uplift and liberal individualism" (106). In this sense the guidebooks, published from 1936 to 1957, facilitated a type of cultural citizenship for African Americans, who were in the proto-stage of the civil rights movement. "It was in this historical context that African Americans' desire and fitness for citizenship were tethered to and divined in their participation in automobility, a practice that fused self-determination and self-representation, mobility, consumption, and social encounter" (106). Here Seiler examines how some persons are granted personhood, while others are not, and similarly shows that the corollary to mobility is immobility—that the former of each pair actually relies on the latter. Since the onslaught of mass automobility, mobility has been at the crux of American personhood. Yet, paradoxically, it can also make the subject disappear. Seiler asserts that while the highway is not outside racial and gender dynamics, for nonwhites and women it can provide fleeting moments of respite from identity and its hindrances. The aesthetics of speed are often blurry, and [End Page 178] the decorporealizing powers of speed and the isolation of the automobile offer the possibility of erasing the markers of identity, if only ephemerally. For Seiler, "the self-obscuring speed and procedural regulation of highway driving provides a metaphor for the abstraction of the subject in the liberal public sphere" (126). The "liquidation of the subject," through the blur of the speeding car or other means, is similarly the effect of modern consumer society and life in the age of governmentality. Individuals in consumer society have a propensity toward withdrawal and privatization that is only reinforced by a weak social contract. And yet, the effacement of the individual's particularities actually pushes one in the direction of the Habermasian ideal type: the blank liberal subject who is supposed to check his or her identity "at the door." Automobility gives a sense of variety and mobility, but the choices are prescribed and mass-produced, the routes already mapped. The paradox of automobility is that it disciplines as it liberates.

### Waterways Link

#### The affirmatives attempt to rebuild waterways and damns is the newest method of attempts to control the environment for “productive” purposes

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"Biopolitical landscape" here is intended to mean an architectural rationalization of ecological and human resources calculated to foster the efficient integration, management, and mobility of both human and animal populations.6 The biopolitical turn in landscape preservation, particularly as it figures in the work of Nobbs, signals a movement to accommodate competing uses of the environment (conservation as well as commercial and industrial exploitation) by facilitating the circulation and transit of a multiplicity of human population groups and nonhuman species that results in a reconfiguration of ecological systems as multipurpose traffic corridors.7 This biopolitical redefinition of demography and landscape depends on, and draws its legitimacy from, a new confluence of institutions (public and private) and techniques (legal, legis lative, and scientific) which claim the posthuman "species body" as their common subject.8

### Urban Transportation Link

#### Previous increases of urban transportation have never had their intended effect because they engage in a top down security approach

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\*\*\*MUTP= Mega Urban Transport Project

The preceding discussion has identified a number of problems for mega projects, cost underestimation, benefit over estimation, selection of the ‘wrong’ projects, lack of strategic positioning of projects, and the dilemma of gaining community acceptance and approval. The solutions to these problems, greater community consultation, technical improvements to CBA, risk allocation in PPPs have failed to have a statistical impact on the problems. They exhibit a circular relationship between problem identification and proposed solution. Problems with MUTPs are in part ‘real’ and are in part socially constructed. For example, contested information is clearly a socially constructed issue [73], while problems with cost benefit, indicate a technical problem in coming to grips with actualised changes in the price of things over long periods of time [74]. Although it is clear that price is a product of social interaction, the argument here is that the project, by virtue of not being in a position to affect the price of materials directly, is at the effect of the price as though it was a real object in the environment. There are a number of other such objects, for example the political party in power, environmental groups etc, as well as more solid matters such as soil or rock profiles on which the project is built. Clearly there is an element of real world effect of MUTPs, they place large physical objects in the environment, and just as clearly the meaning of those objects, their appraisal and their evaluation are social constructs. This would suggest that the application of a frame of analysis which deals with both the ‘real’ and the constructed at the same time could provide insight to the problems which present themselves in these projects. Michel Foucault’s theory of governmentality is one such frame.

### Urban Transportation Link

#### Urban transportation projects often arise out of the need to “do something”-this is the logic of security being applied to transportation

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\*\*\*MUTP= Mega Urban Transport Project

The first problem identified above related to project selection. The point was made that the selection of projects is in general not a result of normative needs analysis. The discussion on the development of the art of government showed that in Foucault’s understanding of the world, problems and their solutions arise in a dynamic relationship, and that problem definition is determined by the art of government available in which to solve it. In this sense art of government is being used as a particular type of Heidiggerian episisteme: a way of being which determines what we see [102]. This provides an explanation for the observed phenomena that problems come to be defined according to the technical solutions available [103]. As a technology, MUTPs are a particularly constructed solution which provides for the constitution of particular problems and needs that they are the solution of. There are several pointers to the nature of the art of government of MUTP in the literature already. Boyce [104] notes that at one level mega projects are much more about doing something rather than doing the right thing, and that they have a distinctly pharaonic flavour to them. This pharaonic flavour is described in a similar way to the notion of sovereign power; that which could be described as the mentality of ‘I am the king and my will be done’. Certainly the problems associated with displacement of persons in favour of these projects suggest a form of power where the imposition of the will of The Government on the people, or a group of people is justified. The fact that project proponents feel they need The Government investment and regulation to get these projects done indicates more of this type of mentality.

### \*\*\*\*BLOCK TRICKS\*\*\*\*

### Bio-politics DA

#### The aff’s foreign enemy construction requires maintenance of domestic identity—to justify the aff, the state rationalizes mass genocide and violence.

**Campbell, 2005** (David Campbell, American Quarterly, “The Biopolitics of Security: Oil, Empire, and the Sports Utility Vehicle”

Volume 57, Number 3, September, pp. 943-972)

As an imagined community, the state can be seen as the effect of formalized practices and ritualized acts that operate in its name or in the service of its ideals. This understanding, which is enabled by shifting our theoretical commitments from a belief in pregiven subjects to a concern with the problematic of subjectivity, renders foreign policy as a boundary-producing political performance in which the spatial domains of inside/outside, self/other, and domestic/ foreign are constituted through the writing of threats as externalized dangers. The narratives of primary and stable identities that continue to govern much of the social sciences obscure such an understanding. In international relations these concepts of identity limit analysis to a concern with the domestic influences on foreign policy; this perspective allows for a consideration of the influence of the internal forces on state identity, but it assumes that the external is a fixed reality that presents itself to the pregiven state and its agents. In contrast, by assuming that the identity of the state is performatively constituted, we can argue that there are no foundations of state identity that exist prior to the problematic of identity/difference that situates the state within the framework of inside/outside and self/other. Identity is constituted in relation to difference, and difference is constituted in relation to identity, which means that the “state,” the “international system,” and the “dangers” to each are coeval in their construction. Over time, of course, ambiguity is disciplined, contingency is fixed, and dominant meanings are established. In the history of U.S. foreign policy— regardless of the radically different contexts in which it has operated—the formalized practices and ritualized acts of security discourse have worked to produce a conception of the United States in which freedom, liberty, law, democracy, individualism, faith, order, prosperity, and civilization are claimed to exist because of the constant struggle with and often violent suppression of opponents said to embody tyranny, oppression, anarchy, totalitarianism, collectivism, atheism, and barbarism. This record demonstrates that the boundary-producing political performance of foreign policy does more than inscribe a geopolitical marker on a map. This construction of social space also involves an axiological dimension in which the delineation of an inside from an outside gives rise to a moral hierarchy that renders the domestic superior and the foreign inferior. Foreign policy thus incorporates an ethical power of segregation in its performance of identity/difference. While this produces a geography of “foreign” (even “evil”) others in conventional terms, it also requires a disciplining of “domestic” elements on the inside that challenge this state identity. This is achieved through exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the “inside” are linked through a discourse of “danger” with threats identified and located on the “outside.” Though global in scope, these effects are national in their legitimation.12 The ONDCP drugs and terror campaign was an overt example of this sort of exclusionary practice. However, the boundary-producing political performances of foreign policy operate within a global context wherein relations of sovereignty are changing. Although Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have overplayed the transition from modern sovereignty to imperial sovereignty in Empire, there is little doubt that new relations of power and identity are present. According to Hardt and Negri, in our current condition, Empire establishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers. Empire manages hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of command. The distinct national colors of the imperialist map of the world have merged and blended in the imperial global rainbow.13 As shall be argued here, the sense of fading national colors is being resisted by the reassertion of national identity boundaries through foreign policy’s writing of danger in a range of cultural sites. Nonetheless, this takes place within the context of flow, flexibility, and reterritorialization summarized by Hardt and Negri. Moreover, these transformations are part and parcel of change in the relations of production. As Hardt and Negri declare: “In the postmodernization of the global economy, the creation of wealth tends ever more toward what we will call biopolitical production, the production of social life itself, in which the economic, the political, and the cultural increasingly overlap and invest one another.”14 While the implied periodization of the term postmodernization renders it problematic, the notion of biopolitics, with its connecting and penetrative networks across and through all domains of life, opens up new possibilities for conceptualizing the complex relationships that embrace oil, security, U.S. policy, and the SUV. In Todd Gitlin’s words, “the SUV is the place where foreign policy meets the road.”15 It is also the place where the road affects foreign policy. Biopolitics is a key concept in understanding how those meetings take place. Michel Foucault argues that biopolitics arrives with the historical transformation in waging war from the defense of the sovereign to securing the existence of a population. In Foucault’s argument, this historical shift means that decisions to fight are made in terms of collective survival, and killing is justified by the necessity of preserving life.16 It is this centering of the life of the population rather than

### Biopolitics DA

the safety of the sovereign or the security of territory that is the hallmark of biopolitical power that distinguishes it from sovereign power. Giorgio Agamben has extended the notion through the concept of the administration of life and argues that the defense of life often takes place in a zone of indistinction between violence and the law such that sovereignty can be violated in the name of life.17 Indeed, the biopolitical privileging of life has provided the rationale for some of the worst cases of mass death, with genocide deemed “understandable” as one group’s life is violently secured through the demise of another group.18

#### Biopolitics subjugates life; causes extinction.

**Foucault, 1978** (Michel, professor of philosophy at the College de France, “The History Of Sexuality: An Introduction” Volume 1, p. 136-137)

Since the classical age the West has undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power. “Deduction” has tended to be no longer the major form of power but merely one element among others, working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, mak­ing them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them. There has been a parallel shift in the right of death, or at least a tendency to align itself with the exigencies of a life-adminis­tering power and to define itself accordingly. This death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life. Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations. But this formidable power of death—and this is perhaps what accounts for part of its force and the cynicism with which it has so greatly expanded its limits—now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to adminis­ter, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual’s con­tinued existence. The principle underlying the tactics of bat­tle—that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living—has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.

### Method first

#### The methods and representations we use in transportation are important- it determines what we determine to be a problem

Richard Wilson is a professor in the Department of Urban and Regional Planning, California State Polytechnic University, Transportation 28: 1–31, 2001 – http://www.uvm.edu/~transctr/pdf/willson\_article.pdf)

Transportation planners use language as if it mirrors the world. If language is a mirror, then, it is a neutral tool in the service of communicating information. In most transportation planners’ minds, language describes objective conditions, explains methodologies and expresses values. Numbers, moreover, are a precise form of language that provide unambiguous representations of reality. Are not measures of vehicle flows, level of service or cost effectiveness robust representations of reality? Gridlock is gridlock, right? For planning, however, gridlock is not gridlock until we have defined it as a problem and decided to do something to address it. Transportation plans depend on what gridlock means, and establishing meaning is an inherently social and linguistically based process. The way that transportation planners use language – understanding certain ideas and values and excluding others, hearing some things and not hearing others, and defining roles for themselves, their organizations, decision makers and the public – shapes knowledge, public participation, problem definition, process design and negotiation, and the outcome of planning. The perspective offered in this paper is that language profoundly shapes our view of the world.

### Ontology first

#### The critique outweighs the affirmative—refusing ontological questions in the face of extinction claims makes extinction inevitable. The critique is a prerequisite to the case impacts.

**Dillon, 1996** (Michael, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, “The Politics of Security”)

To put it crudely, and ignoring for the moment Heidegger's so-called `anti humanist' (he thought 'humanism' was not uncannily human enough) hostility to the anthropocentrism of Western thought. As the real prospect of human species extinction is a function of how human being has come to dwell in the world, then human being has a pressing reason to reconsider, in the most ordinary way possible, notwithstanding other arguments that may be advanced for doing so, the derivation of its understanding of what it is to dwell in the world, and how it should comport itself if it is to continue to do so. Such a predicament ineluctably poses two fundamental and inescapable questions about both Philosophy and politics back to philosophy and politics and of the relation between them: first, if such is their end, what must their origins have been? Second, in the midst of all that is, in Precisely what does the creativity of new beginnings inhere and how can it be preserved, celebrated and extended? No matter how much we may want to elide these questions, or, alternatively, provide a whole series of edifying answers to them, human beings cannot ignore them, ironically, even if they remain anthropocentric in their concerns, if they wish to survive. Our present does not allow it. This joint regress of the philosophical and the political to the very limits of their thinking and of their possibility therefore brings the guestion of Being (which has been the question of philosophy, even though it has always been directed towards beings in the answers it has offered) into explicit conjunction with the question of the political once more through the attention it draws to the ontological difference between Being and beings, and emphasizes the abiding reciprocity that exists between them. We now know that neither metaphysics nor our politics of security can secure the security of truth and of life which was their reciprocating raison d'66tre (and, raison d'etat). More importantly, we now know that the very will to security - the will to power of sovereign presence in both metaphysics and modern politics - is not only a prime incitement to violence in the Western tradition of thought, and to the globalization of its (inter)national politics, but also self-defeating; in that it does not in its turn merely endanger, but actually engenders danger in response to its own discursive dynamic. One does not have to be persuaded of the destinal sending of Being, therefore, to be persuaded of the profundity - and of the profound danger- of this the modern human condition.

### Representations key

#### Representations control our understanding of reality—it’s impossible to analyze the policy without analyzing its discourse.

**Doty, 1996** (Roxanne Lynn Doty, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Arizona State University, “Imperial Encounters” 5-6)

This study begins with the premise that representation is an inherent and important aspect of global political life and therefore a critical and legitimate area of inquiry. International relations are inextricably bound up with discursive practices-that put into circulation representations that are taken as "truth." The goal-of-analyzing these practices is not to reveal essential truths that have been obscured, but rather to examine bow certain representations underlie the production of knowledge and, identities and how these representations make various courses of action possible. AS Said (1979: 21) notes, Mere is no such thing as a delivered presence, but there is a re-presence, or representation. Such an assertion does not deny the existence of the material world, but rather suggests that material objects and subjects are constituted as such within discourse. SO, for example, when U.S. troops march into Grenada, this is certainly "real: though the march of troops across a piece of geographic space is in itself singularly uninteresting and socially irrelevant outside of the representations that produce meaning. It is only when "American" is attached to the troops and "Grenada” to the geographic space that meaning is created. What the physical behavior itself is, though, is still far from certain until discursive practices constitute it as an "invasion; a 'show of force," "training exercise, “a "rescue, “and SO on. What is "really" going on in such a situation is inextricably linked to the discourse within which it is located. To attempt a neat separation between discursive and nondiscursive practices, understanding the former as purely linguistic, assumes a series of Dichotomies – thought/reality appearance essence, mind matter, word/world, subjective/objective - that a critical genealogy calls into Question. Against this, the perspective taken here affirms the material and performative character of discourse. 'In suggesting that global politics, and specifically the aspect that has to do with relations between the North and the South, is linked to representational practices 1 am suggesting that the issues and concerns that constitute these relations occur within a 'reality' whose content has for the most part been defined by the representational practices of the ‘first world'. Focusing on discursive practices enables one to examine how the processes that produce "truth" and "knowledge" work and how they are articulated with the exercise of political, military, and economic power.

### \*\*\*\*ALTERNATIVE\*\*\*\*

### Alternative

#### Individual rejection key—opens space for resistance and new form of security politics.

**Darby, 2006** (Tom Darby, Professor of Political Science at the University of Melbourne, Alternatives, “Security, Spatiality, and Social Suffering” Volume 31, Issue 4)

This grim reflection takes us back to security and serves to introduce a crucial proposition: the need to look to the everyday and to the understandings and experience of ordinary people. Proceeding in this way carries the prospect of loosening the linkage between security and the state. A space may thus be cleared for thinking security differently and for locating a politics of security within society, rather than above it. Such an approach brings into the ambit of security international processes that generate fear and suspicion and impinge on peoples' opportunities and well-being. Think, for instance, of the atomization of neoliberalism, the feminization of poverty, the rising stigma of social and cultural difference. So also, within nation-states, it brings into reckoning the role of state power in setting the forms of acceptable identity, the limits of dissent, and the parameters for exploring different forms of community. Against this background, the nub of our concern is to flesh out the ways in which the everyday constitutes a site for alternative security practices in which local people take the initiative or at least play a major role. An archive needs to be developed on neighborhood and more-dispersed practices of self-securing, the shaping and use of public space to provide meeting places, and on the role of dissent as a form of community building. By working along such lines, people who are usually left out of account would be brought into security discourse: victims, the marginalized, those in pain and suffering. (One might think of the process as analogous to taking account of the views of people defeated in war.) For the most part, the stories recounted are likely to be at some remove from the researcher's own experience. Issues of positionality are therefore involvedm and the research would need to go forward collaboratively. Although not concerned with security as such, the best source of which I am aware for work of this nature is Partha Chatterjee's account of what he calls "popular politics" in Calcutta. (21)

### A2 Realism

#### Realism cannot account for the shift from military to police—the critique accounts for this state function—voting negative allows for a better I.R. epistemology.

**Andreas and Price, 2001** (Peter Andreas and Richard Price, International Studies Review, “From War Fighting to Crime Fighting: Transforming the American National Security State” Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 31-52)

However fanciful (and troubling) such scenarios may seem, it is clear that the most advanced military apparatuses are being reconfigured for tasks that differ greatly from those that formed the basis for the mainstream paradigm of security during the Cold War period. Some of these tasks resemble historical precedents of state functions (dealing with piracy, for example), while others appear more novel (civilian police abroad). In either case, there has been an erosion of the sharp Cold War boundaries between internal (police) and external (military) coercion that provided the basis for the paradigm of traditional security studies. Consequently, it is less plausible to conceive of the state as a self-helping coercive actor that maximizes its relative power vis-a-vis other states. In the traditional conception of security, "'security' was the security of the state, threatened by the military power of other states, and defended by the military power of the state itself."7 6 The security goals include territorial defense and/or acquisition and are operationalized through the use of compellance, deterrence, strategic alliances, and the overwhelming application of deadly military force. There are certainly justifications for this traditional view. After all, the modern state was created as a warfighting machine. As Charles Tilly said, "States made war and war made states." 77 Yet state making is not an accomplished fact but a continuous process. To the extent that the coercive functions of states still help make the state, changes in those functions are changing the character and form of the most advanced wielders of military power. While prolonged, large-scale military conflict among advanced industrialized states appears to be declining,78 state policing is expanding. Part of this expansion has included a redefinition of law enforcement concerns as security concerns. As a result, the "low politics" of policing has now become "high politics." This shift generally is glossed over by those security specialists who insist that the end of the Cold War will necessarily lead to a return to military rivalry and conflict among advanced industrialized states.79

### Knowledge production/turns the case

#### The aff is wrong—security is a myth. The case constructs the threats it identifies.

**Lipschutz, 1995** (Ronnie Lipschutz, Director of Adlai Stevenson Program on Global Security, “On Security” p.10)

Security is, to put Waever’s argument in other words, a socially constructed concept: It has a specific meaning only within a specific social context.18 It emerges and changes as a result of discourses and discursive actions intended to reproduce historical structures and subjects within states and among them.19 To be sure, policymakers define security on the basis of a set of assumptions regarding vital interests, plausible enemies, and possible scenarios, all of which grow, to a not-insignificant extent, out of the specific historical and social context of a particular country and some understanding of what is “out there.”20 But, while these interests, enemies, and scenarios have a material existence and, presumably, a real import for state security, they cannot be regarded simply as having some sort of “objective” reality independent of these constructions.21 That security is a socially constructed does not mean that there are not to be found real, material conditions that help to create particular interpretations of threats, or that such conditions are irrelevant to either the creation or undermining the assumptions underlying security policy. Enemies, in part, “create” each other, via the projections of their worst fears onto the other; in this respect, their relationship is intersubjective. To the extent that they act on these projections, threats to each other acquire a material character. In other words, nuclear-tipped ICBMs are not mere figment s of our imagination, but their targeting is a function of what we imagine the possessors of other missiles might do to us with theirs.22

### \*\*\*\*\*IMPACTS\*\*\*\*

### Impacts—war/extinction

#### Root cause and re-energize for endless wars.

**Recchia, 2007** (Stefano Recchia, Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory, “Restraining Imperial Hubris: The Ethical Bases of Realist International Relations Theory” Volume 15, No 4, EBSCO Host)

Robert Tucker was speaking for most of his fellow realists, when he insisted that “the American involvement in Vietnam represented, more than anything else, the triumph of an expansionist and imperial interest,” which had submerged the narrower and more conventional security interest expressed in the policy of containment.59 America’s leading realists understood fairly soon that this imperial intervention was inexorably doomed to failure, since one could not impose a hand-picked “democratic” government on an unwilling or at best indifferent people in a deeply divided country torn apart by social revolution. According to Kenneth Waltz, who emerged in recent decades as the leading neo-realist scholar, failure in Vietnam did ultimately not matter much internationally. However, it provides “a clear illustration of the limits of military force in the world of the present as always”; military force cannot impose an effective political order, the more so if a country is torn apart by factional warfare.60 Notwithstanding America’s debacle in Vietnam, the most pragmatic realists have now and again acknowledged that the deployment of American power abroad in the pursuit of moral goals is not necessarily doomed to failure in principle. The problem is rather that if foreign interventions are to succeed in toppling tyrannical regimes and establishing sustainable democratic institutions abroad, they need to be followed by lengthy occupations, implying great costs in terms of American lives and resources and at the risk of eliciting fierce nationalist reactions. One does not need to espouse Kennan’s conservative view that American public opinion is naturally fickle on foreign policy, to see that there might be problems in terms of sustaining the necessary political will for such protracted interventions, particularly when not everything is going as smoothly as initially planned.61 There is sufficient evidence to suggest that the messianic cosmopolitanism inherent in the American ethos, which can easily slip into military adventurism abroad, is much less reliable when it comes to sustaining an intervention over several years. However, such protracted interventions (or “peacebuilding operations” as they are now commonly called) have become all but necessary for the sake of sustainable institutional reconstruction and permanent pacification. It is for those reasons – even the most pragmatic realists conclude – that American efforts to advance moral goals abroad by means of military interventions are extremely unlikely to succeed in practice. The inherent problem has been nicely summarized by the realist IR scholar Robert Tucker, who saw a resurgent imperial temptation in American foreign policy at the end of the Cold War: The difficulty is not that our purpose of ordered liberty can never be effectively pursued through the use of force; the experience of the successful occupation imposed upon Germany and Japan in the aftermath of World War II demonstrates otherwise. But unless war is the only way to defend truly vital interests . . . it is unlikely that we will be willing to complete the circle and accept the responsibilities that the use of force imposes on us. [Recent experience shows. . .], that isolationist sentiments among the public, expressed above all in the desire to avoid casualties to American troops and to avoid protracted engagements, may nevertheless be combined with an interventionist disposition to produce an explosive mixture.62

### Impacts—value to life

#### Securitization negates life—only the alternative allows for an aesthetic affirmation of difference.

**Der Derian, 1995** (James Der Derian, professor of Political Science at Brown University, On Security, “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard” p. 33-34)

The will to power, then, should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual *desire* for power. It can, in its negative form, produce a reactive and resentful longing for *only* power, leading, in Nietzsche's view, to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a *positive* will to power, an active and affective force of becoming, from which values and meanings--including self-preservation--are produced which affirm life. Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic to life, for ". . . life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation--but why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages." [35](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note35) Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism in life: "life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war." [36](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note36) But the denial of this permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a consensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear. The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science , Nietzsche asks of the reader: "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the *instinct of fear* that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?"[37](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note37) The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in *The Twilight of the Idols* : The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?" shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a *particular kind of cause* --a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving. . . . That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation--that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most *habitual* explanations.[38](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note38) A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility--recycling the desire for security. The "influence of timidity," as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the "necessities" of security: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences." 39

### Impacts—war/extinction

#### Security politics makes all violence and war inevitable.

**Der Derian, 2001** (James Der derian, professor of Political Science at Brown University, Theory & Event, “The War of Networks”)

Without falling into the trap of 'moral equivalency', one can discern striking similarities. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and others have made much of the 'asymmetrical' war being waged by the terrorists. And it is indeed a canny and even diabolical use of asymmetrical tactics as well as strategies when terrorists commandeer commercial aircraft and transform them into kinetic weapons of indiscriminate violence, and then deploy commercial media to counter the military strikes that follow. Yet, a fearful symmetry is also at work, at an unconscious, possibly pathological level, a war of escalating and competing and imitative oppositions, a mimetic war of images. A mimetic war is a battle of imitation and representation, in which the relationship of who we are and who they are is played out along a wide spectrum of familiarity and friendliness, indifference and tolerance, estrangement and hostility. It can result in appreciation or denigration, accommodation or separation, assimilation or extermination. It draws physical boundaries between peoples, as well as metaphysical boundaries between life and the most radical other of life, death. It separates human from god. It builds the fence that makes good neighbors; it builds the wall that confines a whole people. And it sanctions just about every kind of violence. More than a rational calculation of interests takes us to war. People go to war because of how they see, perceive, picture, imagine, and speak of others: that is, how they construct the difference of others as well as the sameness of themselves through representations. From Greek tragedy and Roman gladiatorial spectacles to futurist art and fascist rallies, the mimetic mix of image and violence has proven to be more powerful than the most rational discourse. Indeed, the medical definition of mimesis is 'the appearance, often caused by hysteria, of symptoms of a disease not actually present.' Before one can diagnose a cure, one must study the symptoms -- or, as it was once known in medical science, practice semiology.

### \*\*\*\*PERM ANSWERS\*\*\*\*

### A2 perm

#### The permutation’s bridge to critical theory is corrupted by realist epistemology.

**Campbell, 1998** (David Campbell, professor of International politics at the University of Newcastle, “Writing Security: US Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity” p. 38-39)

The subfield of international relations that serves as the main body of literature on foreign is that of “comparative foreign policy,” a field indebted to the realist orthodoxy that underpins the discipline’s view of the cold war.4 A number of reviews have provided a clear insight to the entailments and assumptions of this dominant mode of understanding foreign policy. In the introduction to a collection that surveyed “new directions” in the study of foreign policy, James Rosenau noted with approval that the conspicuous absence of “ philosophical and methodological argumentation” in the collected essays was an indication of the field’s passage into a “more mature era of inquiry.” In contrast to earlier periods “the epistemological and methodological premises on which the analysis rest[s]…are largely taken for granted.”5 These assumptions give rise to a conventional and largely unquestioned substantive focus (for scholars rather than practitioners) in foreign policy analysis: the policies of states oriented toward the external world.6 Rosenau has provided an illuminating metaphor to describe this focus. Foreign policy analysis, he argued, “is a bridging discipline. It takes as its focus of study the bridges that whole systems called states to build to link themselves and their subsystems to the even more encompassing international systems of which they are a part.”7 In this understanding, global politics comprises states, their(domestic) subsystems, and international systems. These systems and subsystems exist independently of, and prior to, any relationship that results from their joining by the “bridge” of foreign policy. That bridge is consciously constructed by the state in an effort to make itself part of the larger system and to deal with the dangers and uncertainties that the larger system holds for its own security. As a phenomenon thought to be common to all states, we speak about foreign policy of state “x” or state “y,” Thereby indicating that the state is prior to the policy. Underpinned by a commitment to epistemic realism, this understanding depends on the “explicit and grounded... prior conceptualizations of variables and relationships.”8 These variables are the internal factors of the state and the external conditions of the international system. The relationships involve the structure of the internal factors ( the processes of decision making within the state, in which psychological interpretations act as an additional “bridge” between individuals and institutions)9 and the interaction of the internal factors and external conditions.10

### A2 Perm

#### The permutation’s attempt to solve is another link—the critique is a prior question and the plan is a predetermined answer.

**Bartleson, 2000** (Jens Bartleson, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Stockholm, A Genealogy of Sovereignty, 47-8)

The synthesis advocated by structurationists and scientific realists not only holds out the hope of resolving conceptual conflicts within existing fields of knowledge. It also makes the breaching of disci­plinary boundaries look virtuous, since it promises to settle the ontolo­gical differences underlying their compartmentalization into distinct fields. What makes this promise look attractive is the quite naive assumption that the way a problem in political philosophy is formula­ted is independent of the way in which solutions to it are presented. The general incommensurability between agency and structure, first ele­vated into a problem of imperial proportions by structurationists, is then opened to a glorious peace-by-interdependence between con­flicting concepts and estranged fields of knowledge. From a decon­structive viewpoint, however, it is the 'undisputed truth' underlying the 'agent-structure problem' that is the real problem, since it is the former which makes the latter look like a chicken-and-egg debate. To say that all social and political life is ultimately composed of two kinds of stuff is simply to presuppose that essence is essential to social and political theory. Ontological questions invariably yield ontological answers, since they drag the political philosopher into a quest for firm foundations and proper origins. Starting with the assumption that agency and structure are radically different in essence, which it is necessary to do in order to depict all prior theoretical efforts to wrestle with this conceptual zero-sum game as vain, the structurationist then solves his problem by pointing to the fact that what is different always shares one thing in common, namely, the fact of being different. At this point, the 'agent-structure' debate seems to deconstruct itself; being centred on the quest for essence, it pushes us back in an infinite series of reversals. Whenever a structure is identified, its existence is conditioned by a prior agency, which in turn is made possible by yet another structure, and so forth. However far back we push in this series in search of a foundation, what appears as essential will always prove to be supplementary, in a way that deprives it of the authority of ontological simplicity. The attempted synthesis tries to overcome the same ontological difference that nourishes it: if the problem could be solved, the solution must also indicate that there was no problem in the first place. The reconceptualization of sovereignty that comes with the structu­rationist effort to relate the domestic inside and the international outside can be regarded as symptomatic of the quest for essence that governs it. The very problem that the conceptualization of sovereignty in relational terms hopes to solve, merely crops up again at a more certain depth, but now beyond the reach of critical concepts. To say that sovereignty is constitutive with respect to both the domestic and the international by being that which makes the internal internal and the external external, is either to turn sovereignty into an agency that structures or a structure that acts; in both cases the original problem is restored.

### A2 Perm

#### The perm is co-opted by realistic radicalism, which contributes to difference itself.

**Dillon, 1996** (Michael Dillon, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, The Politics of Security)

Reimagining politics is, of course, easier said than done. Resistance to it - especially in International Relations - nonetheless gives us a clue to one of the places where we may begin. For although I think of this project as a kind of political project, resistance to it does not arise from a political conservatism. Modern exponents of political modernity pride themselves on their realistic radicalism. Opposition always arises, instead, from an extraordinarily deep and profound conservatism of thought. Indeed, conservatism of thought in respect of the modern political imagination is required of the modern political subject. Remaining politics therefore means thinking differently. Moreover, the project of that thinking differently leads to thinking 'difference' itself. Thought is therefore required if politics is to contribute to out-living the modern; specifically, political thought. The challenge to out-live the modern issues from the faltering of modern thought, however, and the suspicion now of its very own project of thought, as much as it does from the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the industrialization and ecological despoliation of the planet, or the genocidal dynamics of new nationalisms. The challenge to out-live the modern issues, therefore, from the modern condition of both politics and thought. This so- called suspicion of thought - I would rather call it a transformation of the project of thought which has disclosed the faltering of the modern project of thought - is what has come to distinguish continental thought in the last century. I draw on that thought in order to think the freedom of human being against the defining political thought of modernity: that ontological preoccupation with the subject of security which commits its politics to securing the subject. Motivated therefore, by a certain sense of crisis in both philosophy and politics, and by the conviction that there is an intimate relation between the two which is most violently and materially exhibited globally in (inter)national politics, the aim of this book is to make a contribution towards rethinking some of the fundamentals of International Relations through what I would call the political philosophy of contemporary continental thought. Its ultimate intention is, therefore, to make a contribution toward the reconstruction of International Relations as a site of political thought, by departing from the very commitment to the politics of subjectivity upon which International Relations is premised. This is a tall order, and not least because the political philosophy of continental thought cannot be brought to bear upon International Relations if the political thought of that thought remains largely unthought.

### \*\*\*\*AFFIRMATIVE ANSWERS\*\*\*

### Realism—the assassin

#### Alt cant solve – behind closed doors elites like Bush will still speak the language of power you cant change their minds

John Mearsheimer, pub. date: 2001, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”

Because Americans dislike realpolitik, public discourse about foreign policy in the United States is usually couched in the language of liberalism. Hence the pronouncements of the policy elites are heavily flavored with optimism and moralism. American academics are especially good at promoting liberal thinking in the marketplace of idea. Behind closed doors, however, the elites who make national security policy speak mostly the language of power not that of principle and the United States acts in the international system according to the dictates of realist logic. In essence, a discernible gap separates public rhetoric from the actual conduct of American foreign policy

### Realism

#### State behavior is driven by security competition according to the dictates of offensive realism. Critical theory does not have the ability to unseat realism as the dominant discourse of IR

John J. Mearsheimer, realism heavyweight champion, 1995 International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1. (Summer 1995), pp. 82-93.

Realists believe that state behavior is largely shaped by the material structure of the international system. The distribution of material capabilities among states is the key factor for understanding world politics. For realists, some level of security competition among great powers is inevitable because of the material structure of the international system. Individuals are free to adopt non-realist discourses, but in the final analysis, the system forces states to behave according to the dictates of realism, or risk destruction. Critical theorists, on the other hand, focus on the social structure of the international system. They believe that "world politics is socially constructed," which is another way of saying that shared discourse, or how communities of individuals think and talk about the world, largely shapes the world. Wendt recognizes that "material resources like gold and tanks exist," but he argues that "such capabilities . . . only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded." Significantly for critical theorists, discourse can change, which means that realism is not forever, and that therefore it might be possible to move beyond realism to a world where institutionalized norms cause states to behave in more communitarian and peaceful ways. The most revealing aspect of Wendt's discussion is that he did not respond to the two main charges leveled against critical theory in "False Promise." The first problem with critical theory is that although the theory is deeply concerned with radically changing state behavior, it says little about how change comes about. The theory does not tell us why particular discourses become dominant, and others fall by the wayside. Specifically, Wendt does not explain why realism has been the dominant discourse in world politics for well over a thousand years, although I explicitly raised this question in "False Promise" (p. 42). Moreover, he sheds no light on why the time is ripe for unseating realism, nor on why realism is likely to be replaced by a more peaceful, communitarian discourse, although I explicitly raised both questions. Wendt's failure to answer these questions has important ramifications for his own arguments. For example, he maintains that if it is possible to change international political discourse and alter state behavior, "then it is irresponsible to pursue policies that perpetuate destructive old orders [i.e., realism], especially if we care about the well-being of future generations." The clear implication here is that realists like me are irresponsible and do not care much about the welfare of future generations. However, even if we change discourses and move beyond realism, a fundamental problem with Wendt's argument remains: because his theory cannot predict the future, he cannot know whether the discourse that ultimately replaces realism will be more benign than realism. He has no way of knowing whether a fascistic discourse more violent than realism will emerge as the hegemonic discourse. For example, he obviously would like another Gorbachev to come to power in Russia, but he cannot be sure we will not get a Zhirinovsky instead. So even from a critical theory perspective, defending realism might very well be the more responsible policy choice. The second major problem with critical theory is that its proponents have offered little empirical support for their theory. For example, I noted in "False Promise" that critical theorists concede that realism has been the dominant discourse in international politics from about 1300 to 1989, a remarkably long period of time. Wendt does not challenge this description of the historical record by pointing to alternative discourses that influenced state behavior during this period. In fact, Wendt's discussion of history is obscure. I also noted in "False Promise" that although critical theorists largely concede the past to realism, many believe that the end of the Cold War presents an excellent opportunity to replace realism as the hegemonic discourse, and thus fundamentally change state behavior. I directly challenged this assertion in my article, but Wendt responds with only a few vague words about this issue. Wendt writes in his response that "if critical theories fail, this will be because they do not explain how the world works, not because of their values." I agree completely, but critical theorists have yet to provide evidence that their theory can explain very much. In fact, the distinguishing feature of the critical theory literature, Wendt's work included, is its lack of empirical content. Possibly that situation will change over time, but until it does, critical theory will not topple realism from its commanding position in the international relations literature.

### Realism

#### The inherent structure of the international system necessitates realist discourse- wheter this looks favorable or not doesn’t change the underlying roots of balance-of-power politics

John J. Mearsheimer 2001 *the tradegedy of great power politics*

The sad fact is that international politics has always been a ruthless and dangerous business, and it is likely to remain that way. Although the intensity of their competition waxes and wanes, great powers fear each other and always compete with each other for power. The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other states. But great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest of all the great powers, although that is welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon—that is, the only great power in the system. There are no status quo powers in the international system, save for the occasional hegemon that wants to maintain its dominating position over potential rivals. Great powers are rarely content with the current distribution of power; on the contrary, they face a constant incentive to change it in their favor. They almost always have revisionist intentions, and they will use force to alter the balance of power if they think it can be done at a reasonable price. At times, the costs and risks of trying to shift the balance of power are too great forcing, great powers to wait for more favorable circumstances. But the desire for more power does not go away, unless a state achieves the ultimate goal of hegemony. Since no state is likely to achieve global hegemony, however, the world is condemned to perpetual great-power competition. This unrelenting pursuit of power means that great powers are inclined to look for opportunites to alter the distribution of world power in their favor. They will seize these opportunities if they have the necessary capability. Simply put, great powers are primed for offense. But not only does a great power seek to gain power at the expense of other states, it also tries to thwart rivals bent on gaining power at its expense. Thus, a great power will defend the balance of power when looming change favors another state, and it will try to undermine the balance when the direction of change is in its own favor. Why do great powers behave this way? My answer is that the structre of the international system forces states which seek only to be secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other. Three features of the international system combine to cause states to fear one another: 1) the absence of a central authority that sits above states and can protect them from each other, 2) the fact that states always have some offensive military capability, and 3) the fact that states can never be wholly eliminated states recognize that the more powerful they are relative to their rivals, the better their chances of survival. Indeed, the best guarantee of survivial is to be a hegemon, because no other state can seriously threaten such a mighty power. The situation, which no one consciously designed or intended, is genuinely tragic. Great powers that have no reason to fight each other—that are merely concerned with their own survivial—nevertheless have little choice but to pursure power and to seek to dominate the other states in the system. This dilemma is captured in brutally frank comments that Prussian statesman Otto von Bismark made during the early 1860s, when it appeared that Poland, which was not an independent state at the time, might regain its sovereignty. “Restoring the Kingdom of Poland in any shape or form is tantamount to creating an ally for any enemy that chooses to attack us,” he believed, and therefore he advocated that Prussia should “smash those Poles till, losing all hope, they lie down and die; I have every sympathy for their situation, but if we wish to survivie we have no choice but to wipe them out.” Although it is depressing to realize that great powers might think and act this way it behooves us to see the world as it is not as we would like it to be. For example, one of the key foreign policy issues facing the United States is the question of how China will behave if its rapid economic growth continues and effectively turns China into a giant Honk Kong. Many Americans believe that if China is democratic and enmeshed in the global gapitalist system, it will not act aggressively; instead it will be content with the statuq quo in Northeast Asia. According to this logic, the United States should engage China in order to promote the latter’s integration into the world economy, a policy that also seeks to encourage China’s transition to democracy. If engagement succeeds, the United States can work with a wealthy and democratic China to promote peace around the globe.

### A2 Epistemology/method

#### Discursive focus generates epistemological blind spots and wont alter security structures

Adrian Hyde-Price (Professor of International Politics at Bath) 2001 “Europes new security challenges” p. 39

Securitization thus focuses almost exclusively on the discursive domain and eschews any attempt to determine empirically what constitutes security concerns. It does not aspire to comment on the reality behind a securitization discourse or on the appropriate instruments for tackling security problems. Instead, it suggests that security studies – or what Waever calls securitization studies –should focus on the discursive moves whereby issues are securitized. The Copenhagen school thus emphasizes the need to understand the “speech acts” that accomplish a process of securitization. Their focus is on the linguistic and conceptual dynamics involved, even though they recognize the importance of the institutional setting within which securitization takes place. The concept of securitization offers some important insights for security studies. However, it is too epistemologically restricted to contribute to a significant retooling of security studies. On the positive side, it draws attention to the way in which security agendas are constructed bgy politicians and other political actors. It also indicates the utility of discourse analysis as an additional tool of analysis for security studies. However, at best, securitization studies can contribute one aspect of security studies. It cannot provide the foundations for a paradigm shift in the subdiscipline. Its greatest weakness is its epistemological hypochondria. That is, its tendency to reify epistemological problems and push sound observations about knowledge claims to their logical absurdity. Although it isimportant to understand the discursive moves involved in perception of security in, say, the Middle East, it is also necessary to make some assessment of nondiscursive factors like the military balance or access to freshwater supplies. For the Copenhagen school, however, these nondiscursive factors are relegated to second place. They are considered only to the extent that they facilitate or impede the speech act. In this way, the Copenhagen school is in danger of cutting security studies off from serious empirical research and setting it adrift on a sea of floating signifiers.

### Alternative turns

#### Total rejection of security discourse causes war.

Charles F. Doran is Andrew W. Mellon Professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, Washington DC, “Is Major War Obsolete? An Exchange” Survival, vol. 41, no. 2, Summer 1999, pp. 139—52

The conclusion, then, is that the probability of major war declines for some states, but increases for others. And it is very difficult to argue that it has disappeared in any significant or reliable or hopeful sense. Moreover, a problem with arguing a position that might be described as utopian is that such arguments have policy implications. It is worrying that as a thesis about the obsolescence of major war becomes more compelling to more people, including presumably governments, the tendency will be to forget about the underlying problem, which is not war per Se, but security. And by neglecting the underlying problem of security, the probability of war perversely increases: as governments fail to provide the kind of defence and security necessary to maintain deterrence, one opens up the possibility of new challenges. In this regard it is worth recalling one of Clauswitz’s most important insights: A conqueror is always a lover of peace. He would like to make his entry into our state unopposed. That is the underlying dilemma when one argues that a major war is not likely to occur and, as a consequence, one need not necessarily be so concerned about providing the defences that underlie security itself. History shows that surprise threats emerge and rapid destabilising efforts are made to try to provide that missing defence, and all of this contributes to the spiral of uncertainty that leads in the end to war.

### Alternative turns

#### The alternatives fails and causes a spiral of insecurity that causes the most violent aspects of your impact claims – only taking strategic political action like the plan solves

P. H. Liotta (Professor of Humanities at Salve Regina University, Newport, RI, andExecutive Director of the Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy) 2005 “Through the Looking Glass” Sage Publications

Although it seems attractive to focus on exclusionary concepts that insist on desecuritization, privileged referent objects, and the ‘belief’ that threats and vulnerabilities are little more than social constructions (Grayson, 2003), all these concepts work in theory but fail in practice. While it may be true that national security paradigms can, and likely will, continue to dominate issues that involve human security vulnerabilities – and even in some instances mistakenly confuse ‘vulnerabilities’ as ‘threats’ – there are distinct linkages between these security concepts and applications. With regard to environmental security, for example, Myers (1986: 251) recognized these linkages nearly two decades ago: National security is not just about fighting forces and weaponry. It relates to watersheds, croplands, forests, genetic resources, climate and other factors that rarely figure in the minds of military experts and political leaders, but increasingly deserve, in their collectivity, to rank alongside military approaches as crucial in a nation’s security. Ultimately, we are far from what O’Hanlon & Singer (2004) term a global intervention capability on behalf of ‘humanitarian transformation’. Granted, we now have the threat of mass casualty terrorism anytime, anywhere – and states and regions are responding differently to this challenge. Yet, the global community today also faces many of the same problems of the 1990s: civil wars, faltering states, humanitarian crises. We are nowhere closer toaddressing how best to solve these challenges, even as they affect issues of environmental, human, national (and even ‘embedded’) security. Recently, there have been a number of voices that have spoken out on what the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has termed the ‘responsibility to protect’:10 the responsibility of some agency or state (whether it be a superpower such as the United States or an institution such as the United Nations) to enforce the principle of security that sovereign states owe to their citizens. Yet, the creation of a sense of urgency to act – even on some issues that may not have some impact for years or even decades to come – is perhaps the only appropriate first response. The real cost of not investing in the right way and early enough in the places where trends and effects are accelerating in the wrong direction is likely to be decades and decades of economic and political frustration – and, potentially, military engagement. Rather than justifying intervention (especially military), we ought to be justifying investment. Simply addressing the immensities of these challenges is not enough. Radical improvements in public infrastructure and support for better governance, particularly in states and municipalities (especially along the Lagos–Cairo–Karachi–Jakarta arc), will both improve security and create the conditions for shrinking the gap between expectations and opportunity. A real debate ought to be taking place today. Rather than dismissing ‘alternative’ security foci outright, a larger examination of what forms of security are relevant and right among communities, states, and regions, and which even might apply to a global rule-set – as well as what types of security are not relevant – seems appropriate and necessary. If this occurs, a truly remarkable tectonic shift might take place in the conduct of international relations and human affairs. Perhaps, in the failure of states and the international community to respond to such approaches, what is needed is the equivalent of the 1972 Stockholm conference that launched the global environmental movement and established the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), designed to be the environmental conscience of the United Nations. Similarly, the UN Habitat II Conference in Istanbul in 1996 focused on the themes of finding adequate shelter for all and sustaining human development in an increasingly urbanized world. Whether or not these programs have the ability to influence the future’s direction (or receive wide international support) is a matter of some debate. Yet, given that the most powerful states in the world are not currently focusing on these issues to a degree sufficient to produce viable implementation plans or development strategies, there may well need to be a ‘groundswell’ of bottom-up pressure, perhaps in the form of a global citizenry petition to push the elusive world community toward collective action.Recent history suggests that military intervention as the first line of response to human security conditions underscores a seriously flawed approach. Moreover, those who advocate that a state’s disconnectedness from globalization is inversely proportional to the likelihood of military (read: US) intervention fail to recognize unfolding realities (Barnett, 2003, 2004). Both middle-power and major-power states, as well as the international community, must increasingly focus on long-term creeping vulnerabilities in order to avoid crisis responses to conditions of extreme vulnerability. Admittedly, some human security proponents have recently soured on the viability of the concept in the face of recent ‘either with us or against us’ power politics (Suhrke, 2004). At the same time, and in a bit more positive light, some have clearly recognized the sheer impossibility of international power politics continuing to feign indifference in the face of moral categories. As Burgess (2004: 278) notes, ‘for all its evils, one of the promises of globalization is the unmasking of the intertwined nature of ethics and politics in the complex landscape of social, economic, political and environmental security’. While it is still not feasible to establish a threshold definition for human security that neatly fits all concerns and arguments (as suggested by Owen, 2004: 383), it would be a tragic mistake to assume that national, human, and environmental security are mutually harmonious constructs rather than more often locked in conflictual and contested opposition with each other. Moreover, aspects of security resident in each concept are indeed themselves embedded with extraordinary contradictions. Human security, in particular, is not now, nor should likely ever be, the mirror image of national security. Yet, these contradictions are not the crucial recognition here. On the contrary, rather than focusing on the security issues themselves, we should be focusing on the best multi-dimensional approaches to confronting and solving them. One approach, which might avoid the massive tidal impact of creeping vulnerabilities, is to sharply make a rudder shift from constant crisis intervention toward strategic planning, strategic investment, and strategic attention. Clearly, the time is now to reorder our entire approach to how we address – or fail to address – security.

### A2 Self fulfilling prophecy

#### The self-fulfilling prophecy argument is backwards, failure to express our fears causes them happen. The aff security reps prevent the impacts from happening

Joanna Macy (general systems scholar and deep ecologist) 1995 Ecopsychology

There is also the superstition that negative thoughts are self-fulfilling. This is of a piece with the notion, popular in New Age circles, that we create our own reality I have had people tell me that “to speak of catastrophe will just make it more likely to happen” Actually, the contrary is nearer to the truth. Psychoanalytic theory and personal experience show us that it is precisely what we repress that eludes our conscious control and tends to erupt into behavior. As Carl Jung observed, “when an inner situation is not made conscious. It happens outside as fate” but ironically, in our current situation, the person who gives warning of a likely ecological holocaust is often made to feel guilty of contributing to that very fate

### A2 Representations key

#### Focus on language is a prison-house that kills human agency and makes real political action to stop violence and oppression impossible

David McNally (professor of political science at York University) 1997 “in defense of history” p. 26-7

We are witnessing today a new idealism, infecting large sections of the intellectual left, which has turned language not merely into an independent realm, but into an all pervasive realm, a sphere so omnipresent, so dominant, as virtually to extinguish human agency. Everything is discourse, you see and discourse is everything. Because human beings are linguistic creatures, because the world in which we act is a world we know and describe through language, it allegedly follows that there is nothing outsides language. Our language, or “discourse”, or “text” – the jargon varies but not the message – define and limits what we know, what we can imagine, what we can do. There is a political theory here too. Oppression is said to be rooted ultimately in the way in the way in which we are and others are defined linguistically, the way in which we are positioned by words in relation to other words, or by codes which are said to be “structured like a language.” Our very being, our identities and “subjectivites,” are constituted through langague. As one trndy literary theorist puts it in David Lodge’s novel Nice Work, it is not merely that you are what you speak; no, according to the new idealism, “you are what speaks of you,” Language is thus the final “prison-house”. Our confinement there is beyond resistance: It is impossible to escape from that which makes us what we are. This new idealism corresponds to a profound collapse of political horizons. It is the pseudoradicalism of a period of retreat for the left, a verbal radicalism of the world without deed, or, rather, of the word as deed. In response to actual structures and practices of oppression and exploitation, it offers the rhetorical gesture, the ironic turn of phrase. It comes as little surprise, then, when on of the chief philosophers of the new idealism, Jacques Derrida, tells us that he “would hesitate to use such terms as ‘liberation’” Imprisoned within language, we may play with words; but we can never hope to liberate ourselves from immutable structures of oppression rooted in language itself. The new idealism and the politics it entails are not simply harmless curiosities; they are an abdication of political responsibility, especially at a time of ferocious capitalist restructuring, of widening gaps between rich and poor, of ruling class offensives against social programs. They are also an obstacle to the rebuilding of mass movements of protest and resistance

### A2 Value to life

#### Existence is a prerequisite to ontological questioning

Paul Wapner (associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University) Winter 2003 “Leftist criticism of” http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=539

THE THIRD response to eco-criticism would require critics to acknowledge the ways in which they themselves silence nature and then to respect the sheer otherness of the nonhuman world. Postmodernism prides itself on criticizing the urge toward mastery that characterizes modernity. But isn't mastery exactly what postmodernism is exerting as it captures the nonhuman world within its own conceptual domain? Doesn't postmodern cultural criticism deepen the modernist urge toward mastery by eliminating the ontological weight of the nonhuman world? What else could it mean to assert that there is no such thing as nature? I have already suggested the postmodernist response: yes, recognizing the social construction of "nature" does deny the self-expression of the nonhuman world, but how would we know what such self-expression means? Indeed, nature doesn't speak; rather, some person always speaks on nature's behalf, and whatever that person says is, as we all know, a social construction. All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation.

#### Life without value is better than death.

Kenneth Waltz (Institute of War and Peace Studied; Father of realism) 1959 Man, The State, and War

St. Augustine had observed the importance of self-preservation in the hierarchy of human motivations. When we see that even the most wretched “fear to die, and will rather live in such misfortune than end it by death, is it not obvious enough,” he asks, “how nature shrinks from annihilation?”10 The desire for self-preservation is, with Augustine, an observed fact. It is not a principle sufficient to explain the whole of man’s behavior. For Spinoza, however, the end of every act is the self-preservation of the actor. The laws of nature are simply statements of what this single end requires: natural right, a statement of what it logically permits.11 The man who lives according to reason will demonstrate both courage and high-mindedness. That is, he will strive to preserve himself in accordance with the dictates of reason, and he will strive to aid other men and unite them to him in friendship. This is not a description of actual behavior; it is a description of behavior that is ideally rational. It is not because they are duties that the man who follows the dictates of reason behaves with courage and high-mindedness. Instead these characteristics are the necessary result of following reason.

### A2 Biopolitics

#### Biopower is not that bad.

John Parry (Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law) 2005 “Society Must be Regulated” November, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=854564 ]

That said, I want to close by suggesting that biopolitics, while perhaps not necessarily good, is at least not wholly bad. Absent realistic alternatives, this claim is certainly worth considering. Foucault, for example, never charted a way out of biopolitics beyond developing an individual aesthetic of self-discipline and regulation—the “care of the self.”94 Other writers speak of achieving something like a “new politics,” which usually means some combination of personal freedom that includes the substance—but often not the legal baggage—of individual human rights, combined with an ideal of community that fits uneasily with the ideal of personal freedom (thus the “politics,” which are likely to be anything but new), as well as a more egalitarian economic arrangement and the social safety net of the modern welfare state, but without the modern state itself. Even assuming this vision is desirable, no one has any practical idea how to make it happen.95 My basic assertions are that the ills laid at the feet of biopolitics are not entirely its fault and that they are in any event the costs of “progress.” Consider, first, the charges. Critics point out that in the modern, centralized, biopolitical state, our individuality is suppressed to the larger goal of managing the population. As a result, we become detached and alienated, even as we are disciplined and regulated. At best we can resort to coping strategies, but larger transformation of our social environment is impossible.96 The flaw in this diagnosis is that it treats the alienated individual as problematic, as if there were an acontextual, dehistoricized thing known as “an individual” that is capable of being alienated or not, with the result that we should try to make it less, rather than more, alienated. Far more likely is that the idea of the individual developed in the modern period along with the modern state and that alienation is part of what defines an individual. To the extent the “problem” of the alienated individual has significance in the contemporary world, in other words, it is a direct consequence of the enlightenment and can only be solved through biopolitics. Indeed, biopolitics simply reflects the enlightenment project of promoting reason in place of “superstition” and arbitrary power. Social structures have become rationalized, so that governments are more likely to operate by articulated policy instead of fiat, the rule of law instead of whim, and democracy instead of hereditary rule or warlordism. The creation of the individual—a rational, rights-bearing but also alienated entity—is critical to all of these developments. Importantly, under this account, these changes may not be liberating in any objective sense, because the freedoms they create come with real costs—the costs of being free in this way as well as the consequences of being part of a power structure in which these particular freedoms are defined, managed, and subject to suspension. Still, this process leads not only to centralization and state violence but also to rights that channel the exercise of state power, to pervasive regulation of our lives and environment but also to a significant amount of predictability and security for many people. Our modern anxiety can be imperfectly assuaged by the comforts that flow from management and technology, and there is no reason to believe we are any less happy than people were in the past—although neither is it clear that we are any happier. How the costs and benefits of the enlightenment and biopolitics shake out, and whether that should even be the way we assess them (it appears to be a loaded standard, after all), are political and moral issues. Even more, however, they are questions of aesthetics. The comforts and controls of biopolitics will appeal to many people. Others will find fulfillment in acts of resistance along a variety of fronts. Beyond that, and what the future will bring, who can say?

### A2 Biopolitics

#### Institutional checks prevent their impact.

Edward Ross Dickinson (University of Cincinnati) March 2004 "Biopolitics, Facism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About 'Modernity,'" Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1

One answer might be to argue— as Michael Schwartz and Peter Fritzsche have suggested— that regimes that arise for reasons having little to do with this aspect of modernity “choose” their biopolitics to suit their needs and principles. Victoria de Grazia, for example, has suggested that differing class coalitions determine regime forms, and that regime forms determine the “shape” of biopolitics.111 This is obviously not the approach that has predominated in the literature on Germany, however,which has explored in great depth the positive contribution that modern biopolitics made to the construction of National Socialism. This approach may well exaggerate the importance of biopolitics; but, in purely heuristic terms, it has been extremely fruitful. I want to suggest that it might be equally fruitful to stand it on its head, so to speak. One could easily conclude from this literature that modern biopolitics “fits” primarily authoritarian, totalitarian, technocratic, or otherwise undemocratic regimes, and that democracy has prevailed in Europe in the teeth of the development of technocratic biopolitics. Again, however, the history of twentieth-century Germany, including the five decades after World War II, suggests that this is a fundamentally implausible idea. A more productive conclusion might be that we need to begin to work out the extent and nature of the positive contribution biopolitics has made to the construction also of democratic regimes. Why was Europe’s twentieth century, in addition to being the age of biopolitics and totalitarianism, also the age of biopolitics and democracy? How should we theorize this relationship? I would like to offer  ve propositions as food for thought. First, again, the concept of the essential legitimacy and social value of individual needs, and hence the imperative of individual rights as the political mechanism for getting them met, has historically been a cornerstone of some strategies of social management. To borrow a phrase from Detlev Peukert, this does not mean that democracy was the “absolutely inevitable” outcome of the development of biopolitics; but it does mean that it was “one among other possible outcomes of the crisis of modern civilization.”112 Second, I would argue that there is also a causal fit between cultures of expertise, or “scientism,” and democracy. Of course, “scientism” subverted the real, historical ideological underpinnings of authoritarian polities in Europe in the nineteenth century. It also in a sense replaced them. Democratic citizens have the freedom to ask “why”; and in a democratic system there is therefore a bias toward pragmatic, “objective” or naturalized answers— since values are often regarded as matters of opinion, with which any citizen has a right to differ. Scienti c “fact” is democracy’s substitute for revealed truth, expertise its substitute for authority. The age of democracy is the age of professionalization, of technocracy; there is a deeper connection between the two, this is not merely a matter of historical coincidence. Third, the vulnerability of explicitly moral values in democratic societies creates a problem of legitimation. Of course there are moral values that all democratic societies must in some degree uphold (individual autonomy and freedom, human dignity, fairness, the rule of law), and those values are part of their strength. But as people’s states, democratic social and political orders are also implicitly and often explicitly expected to do something positive and tangible to enhance the well-being of their citizens. One of those things, of course, is simply to provide a rising standard of living; and the visible and astonishing success of that project has been crucial to all Western democracies since 1945. Another is the provision of a rising standard of health; and here again, the democratic welfare state has “delivered the goods” in concrete, measurable, and extraordinary ways. In this sense, it may not be so simpleminded, after all, to insist on considering the fact that modern biopolitics has “worked” phenomenally well. Fourth, it was precisely the democratizing dynamic of modern societies that made the question of the “quality” of the mass of the population seem— and not only in the eyes of the dominant classes — increasingly important. Again, in the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the expected level of the average citizen’s active participation in European political, social, cultural, and economic life rose steadily, as did the expected level of her effective in uence in all these spheres. This made it a matter of increasing importance whether the average person was more or less educated and informed, more or less moral and self-disciplined,more or less healthy and physically capable,more or less socially competent. And modern social reform — “biopolitics” defined very broadly—seemed to offer the possibility of creating the human foundation for a society ordered by autonomous participation, rather than by obedience. This too was part of the Machbarkeitswahn of modernity; but this was potentially a democratic “Wahn,” not only an authoritarian one. Fifth, historically there has been a clear connection between the concept of political citizenship and the idea of moral autonomy. The political “subject” (or citizen — as opposed to the political subject,who is an object of state action) is also a moral subject. The citizen’s capacity for moral reasoning is the legitimating postulate of all democratic politics. The regulation of sexual and reproductive life has long been understood in European societies to be among the most fundamental issues of morality. There is, therefore, a connection between political citizenship on the one hand, and the sexual and reproductive autonomy implied in the individual control that is a central element of the modern biopolitical complex, on the other. The association in the minds of conservatives in the late imperial period between democracy and declining fertility was not a panicky delusion; panicky it certainly was, but it was also a genuine insight into a deeper ideological connection.113 Perhaps it should not be surprising, therefore, that the first great homeland of eugenic legislation was the United States — the first great homeland of modern democracy. In fact the United States served both as a kind of promised land for racial and eugenic “progressives” in Germany, and as a worst-case scenario of “regression into barbarism” for those opposed to coercive eugenic measures. 114 Nor should it be surprising that, apart from Nazi Germany, the other great land of eugenic sterilization in Europe in the 1930s was Scandinavia, where democratic governments heavily influenced by social democratic parties were busily constructing the most ambitious and extensive welfare states in the world.115 The lesson is not that modern democracy is “dangerous” or destructive, much less that it is crypto-fascist — that, as Jacques Donzelot put it, the 1930s was the age of “social fascism” and our own age that of “social sector fascism.” 116 The relevant message is, rather, that it is time to place the less familiar history of modern democratic biopolitics alongside the more familiar history of modern totalitarian biopolitics. The dream of perfectibility — Machbarkeitswahn — is central to modernity. But social engineering, the management of society, can be organized in different ways. Historically, totalitarian biopolitics was a self-destructive failure. Democratic biopolitics has, in contrast, been— not in any moral sense, but politically —a howling success. For the historian interested in modernity, that story is no less interesting or important than the story of the implosion of the Nazi racial state.

### A2 Ontology first

#### Ontology does not precede policy – it just distracts.

David McClean (philosopher, writer and business consultant, conducted graduate work in philosophy at NYU) 2001 “The cultural left and the limits of social hope” http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm

There is a lot of philosophical prose on the general subject of social justice. Some of this is quite good, and some of it is quite bad. What distinguishes the good from the bad is not merely the level of erudition. Displays of high erudition are gratuitously reflected in much of the writing by those, for example, still clinging to Marxian ontology and is often just a useful smokescreen which shrouds a near total disconnect from empirical reality. This kind of political writing likes to make a lot of references to other obscure, jargon-laden essays and tedious books written by other true believers - the crowd that takes the fusion of Marxian and Freudian private fantasies seriously. Nor is it the lack of scholarship that makes this prose bad. Much of it is well "supported" by footnotes referencing a lode of other works, some of which are actually quite good. Rather, what makes this prose bad is its utter lack of relevance to extant and critical policy debates, the passage of actual laws, and the amendment of existing regulations that might actually do some good for someone else. The writers of this bad prose are too interested in our arrival at some social place wherein we will finally emerge from our "inauthentic" state into something called "reality." Most of this stuff, of course, comes from those steeped in the Continental tradition (particularly post-Kant). While that tradition has much to offer and has helped shape my own philosophical sensibilities, it is anything but useful when it comes to truly relevant philosophical analysis, and no self-respecting Pragmatist can really take seriously the strong poetry of formations like "authenticity looming on the ever remote horizons of fetishization." What Pragmatists see instead is the hope that we can fix some of the social ills that face us if we treat policy and reform as more important than Spirit and Utopia.

### Impact turns

#### Enemy creation is critical to avoid a violent state of psychosis that creates comparatively more violence

Kenneth Reinhard (professor at UCLA) 2004 “Towards a Political Theology of the Neighbor” http://www.humnet.ucla.edu/humnet/jewishst/Mellon/Towards\_Political\_Theology.pdf

If the concept of the political is defined, as Carl Schmitt does, in terms of the Enemy/Friend opposition, the world we find ourselves in today is one from which the political may have already disappeared, or at least has mutated into some strange new shape. A world not anchored by the “us” and “them” binarisms that flourished as recently as the Cold War is one subject to radical instability, both subjectively and politically, as Jacques Derrida points out in The Politics of Friendship: The effects of this destructuration would be countless: the ‘subject’ in question would be looking for new reconstitutive enmities; it would multiply ‘little wars’ between nation-states; it would sustain at any price so-called ethnic or genocidal struggles; it would seek to pose itself, to find repose, through opposing still identifiable adversaries – China, Islam? Enemies without which … it would lose its political being … without an enemy, and therefore without friends, where does one then find oneself, qua a self? (PF 77) If one accepts Schmitt’s account of the political, the disappearance of the enemy results in something like global psychosis: since the mirroring relationship between Us and Them provides a form of stablility, albeit one based on projective identifications and repudiations, the loss of the enemy threatens to destroy what Lacan calls the “imaginary tripod” that props up the psychotic with a sort of pseudo-subjectivity, until something causes it to collapse, resulting in full-blown delusions, hallucinations, and paranoia. Hence, for Schmitt, a world without enemies is much more dangerous than one where one is surrounded by enemies; as Derrida writes, the disappearance of the enemy opens the door for “an unheard-of violence, the evil of a malice knowing neither measure nor ground, an unleashing incommensurable in its unprecedented – therefore monstrous – forms; a violence in the face of which what is called hostility, war, conflict, enmity, cruelty, even hatred, would regain reassuring and ultimately appeasing contours, because they would be identifiable” (PF 83).

### Impact turns

#### International politics is a cold-hearted system of selfish intentions- securitization is necessary. For short-term and long-term survivial

John J. Mearsheimer 2001 *the tradgedy of great power politics*

States in the international system also aim to guarantee their own survival. Beacause other states are potential threats, and because there is no higher authority to come to their rescue when they dial 911, states cannot depend on others for their own security. Each state tends to see itself as vulnerable and alone, and therefore it aims to provide for tis own survivial. In intentional politics, God helps those who help themselves. This emphasis on self-help does not preclude states from forming alliances. But alliances are only temporary marriages of convenience: today’s alliance partner might be tomorrow’s enemy, and today’s enemy might be tomorrow’s alliance partner. For example, the United States fought with China and the Soviet Union against Germany and Japan in World War II, but soon thereafter flip-flopped enemies and partners and allied with West Germany and Japan against China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. States operating in a self-help world almost always act according to their own self-interest and do not subordinate their interests to the interests of other states, or to the interests of the so-called international community. The reason is simple: it pays to be selfish in a self-help world. This is true in the short term as well as in the long term, because if a state loses in the short run, it might not be around for the long haul.

### Permutation

#### Perm solves—includes realism.

**Recchia, 2007** (Stefano Recchia, Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory, “Restraining Imperial Hubris: The Ethical Bases of Realist International Relations Theory” Volume 15, No 4, EBSCO Host)

In conclusion, twentieth-century realism represents a rich and inspiring, although largely negative tradition of argument in international ethics: it counsels against imperial hubris by advocating prudence and moral restraint, and it displays an overall healthy skepticism concerning the perfectibility of social and political relationships. However, the utter pessimism on human nature and politics more broadly – often bordering on outright cynicism – of influential realist figures, such as Morgenthau in particular, appears largely unwarranted today and was probably in large part a disillusioned reaction to the experience ofWorldWar II. Perhaps most crucially from a normative viewpoint, the traditional realists all greatly underestimated our moral duties towards other fellow human beings across national borders. Given the awareness of such duties by American citizens, and the influence this awareness has had on U.S. foreign policy, the traditional realists’ quite dogmatic denial that such international duties exist ultimately reduced their ability to engage in a fruitful dialogue on the ethical underpinnings of U.S. foreign policy. As E.H. Carr, the founder of modern Anglo-American realism and one of the most eclectic IR theorists ever put it roughly seventy years ago: in order to develop “purposive or meaningful” international thought, followed by action that aims beyond mere self-preservation, realist notions of prudence and restraint ultimately need to be supplemented with the aspirations of liberal universalism; in other words, “utopianism” needs to penetrate the citadel of realism.75 Contemporary realists ought to cherish this advice, by reengaging with and further developing the normative theory of their forebears, to ensure the paradigm’s continued relevance in the future.

#### Critiquing existing security structures isn’t enough – political action is necessary and the perm solves

Pinar Bilgin (Department of International Relations Bilkent University Ankara) 2005 “Regional Security in the Middle East” p. 60-1

Admittedly, providing a critique of existing approaches to security, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies, is only a first step. In other words, from a critical security perspective, self-reflection, thinking and writing are not enough in themselves. They should be compounded by other forms of practice (that is, action taken on the ground). It is indeed crucial for students of critical approaches to re-think security in both theory and practice by pointing to possibilities for change immanent in world politics and suggesting emancipatory practices if it is going to fulfil the promise of becoming a 'force of change' in world politics. Cognisant of the need to find and suggest alternative practices to meet a broadened security agenda without adopting militarised or zero-sum thinking and practices, students of critical approaches to security have suggested the imagining, creation and nurturing of security communities as emancipatory practices (Booth 1994a; Booth and Vale 1997). Although Devetak's approach to the theory/practice relationship echoes critical approaches' conception of theory as a form of practice, the latter seeks to go further in shaping global practices. The distinction Booth makes between 'thinking about thinking' and 'thinking about doing' grasps the difference between the two. Booth (1997:114) writes: Thinking about thinking is important, but, more urgently, so is thinking about doing…. Abstract ideas about emancipation will not suffice: it is important for Critical Security Studies to engage with the real by suggesting policies, agents, and sites of change, to help humankind, in whole and in part, to move away from its structural wrongs. In this sense, providing a critique of existing approaches to security, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies, is only a first (albeit crucial) step. It is vital for the students of critical approaches to re-think security in both theory and practice.

1. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)