# \*\*\*Traditional Security

## 1NC

#### Improving infrastructure is rooted in the securitization of objects – fear of infrastructure failure or enemy attack puts us in a constant state of preparing for catastrophe

#### Aradau 2010 - Senior Lecturer in International Relations and member of the Centre for the Study of Political Community <Claudia. “Security That Matters: Critical Infrastructure and Objects of Protection” Oct. 14, 2010. Sage Publications>

The securitization of critical infrastructure is pre-eminently about the protection of objects. Critical infrastructure protection is generally held to have emerged as a security issue in the mid-1990s and the terminology of ‘critical infrastructure’ itself to have been coined by Clinton administration in 1996. Critical infrastructure allegedly signifies a difference from earlier usages of ‘infrastructure’. While infrastructure was part of military strategy to weaken the enemy, its transformation into a matter of national security has been variously located either during the Cold War (Collier and Lakoff 2007) or after 9/11 (Center for History and New Media 2009). If military strategy could also involve the destruction of one’s own infrastructure, the securitization of critical infrastructure assumes an understanding of infrastructure as foundational. Societies are ‘grounded’ in infrastructure, their functioning, continuity and survival are made possible by the protection of infrastructure**.** A 1997 report by the Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection was symbolically entitled ‘Critical Foundations’ (Commission for Critical Infrastructure Protection 1997). Definitions of critical infrastructure list heterogeneous elements, from communications, emergency services, energy, finance, food, government, health, to transport and water sectors (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) 2009). The general argument about the necessity to protect critical infrastructure is framed along these lines (with little variation from a report to another and from an author to another): Our modern society and day to day activities are dependent on networks of critical infrastructure – both physical networks such as energy and transportation systems and virtual networks such as the Internet. If terrorists attack a piece of critical infrastructure, they will disrupt our standard of living and cause significant physical, psychological, and financial damage to our nation (Bennett 2007: 9). The UK’s Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure defines the effects of any failure in national infrastructure to lead to ‘severe economic damage, grave social disruption, or even large scale loss of life’ (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) 2009). Naming infrastructures as critical for the purposes of protecting them against terrorist attacks is a securitising move. Where critical infrastructure experts would look for the adequacy of representation to the reality of objects threatened – by drawing up lists of critical infrastructure as a result of risk assessment scenarios – a performative approach would consider the constitution of reality through the iterative speech acts that securitize infrastructure by naming as ‘critical’ and in need of protection against potential terrorist attacks and/or other hazards. The Centre for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure in the UK encapsulates this double move: The most significant threat facing the UK comes from international terrorism and its stated ambitions to mount ‘high impact’ attacks that combine mass casualties with substantial disruption to key services such as energy, transport and communications. This is a threat that is different in scale and intent to any that the UK has faced before (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) 2010b). Yet, for the Copenhagen School of security studies for example, objects are also relegated to the status of external conditions of speech acts. Objects that are generally held to be threatening (for example, tanks or polluted waters) play a facilitating role in the process of securitization (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998: 33). Energy blackouts, transport failures and so on could also be read as facilitating conditions of the speech act. In this approach, there is ontological and epistemological ambiguity about the role of objects**:** as they outside speech acts or the result of speech acts? As the next section will show, this approach cannot account for different materializations of critical infrastructure – the matter of critical infrastructure is not constant and given but varies depending on the agential cuts created.

#### This constructs threats that must be disciplined in the name of upholding the violence of the status quo

Jim **George,** Senior lecturer in international relations in the Department of Political Science, Australian National University, 19**94** (“Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations,” p. 222-223, AM)

This theme, integral to the attempts of the Greeks to (rationally) distance themselves from the traditional objects (Gods, static social forma­tions) of their world, was articulated, more explicitly, in the wake of the "death" of God, as Cartesian rationalism accelerated the modern search for a secular foundation for certainty in an increasingly uncertain world. In the European Enlightenment it became more intrinsically associated with the pursuit of an indubitable social reality, independent of the distortions of specific time and place but imbued with laws of thought and behavior anal­ogous to the axioms of natural science. From the nineteenth century on, it has energized the more precise quest for a social theory purged of (tradi­tional) metaphysics, from which analytical protocols might be gleaned and scientific, lawlike statements invoked about modern human life. This theme—the projection of reality in terms of a (rational) separation between that which is foundational, irreducible, and eternal and that which is preju­diced by history, culture, and language—remains at the ontological heart of modernist social theory and the dominant (Realist) Tradition and discipline of International Relations. In its various positivist-Realist guises (e.g., as Traditionalism, behavioralism, or neo-Realism), this theme has had some crucial implications for the way International Relations scholars and practitioners have framed their questions of global life and applied their answers to its complex problems. This, in general, has been a site of discursive primitivism, which has seen knowledge of global humanity reduced to a singular, self-affirming narrative of Western (primarily Western European) eternal wisdom, derived (crudely) from the scattered textual utterings of the Greeks, Christian theology, and post-Renaissance Europe. Articulated in logocentric terms, this narrative remains, in the 1990s, rigidly state-centric and centered on the opposition between a realm of (domestic) sovereign identity, rationality, and social coherence and a realm of (international) anarchy, fragmentation, < and threat "out there," which must be disciplined, ordered, and controlled for the common, systemic good. Under this discursive regime an "us" is easily identified and opposed to a "them"; a homogeneous "self" confronts a threatening Other; a free, open, pluralistic social system can be distin­guished from its closed, totalitarian counterparts; and a particular (Western, rational-scientific) way of knowing the world can be intellectually and institutionally legitimated in its struggle against the forces of ideology, irra­tionality, distortion, and untruth. The point, more precisely, is that this par­ticular discursive representation of human life at the global level has become International Relations, the positivist-Realist image of the world "out there" has become reality, and the foundationalist approach to knowl­edge has become the only legitimate way of understanding global human society.

#### The alternative is to vote negative as a means to refuse security. Desecuritization solves—minimizing security is possible and effective

**Wæver, 98** – Professor of International Relations at the University of Copenhagen (Ole, 1998, "Securitization and Desecuritization", On Security, Google Books, p. 55-57)

What then is security? With the help of language theory, **we** can **regard "security" as a speech act .** In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. **By saying it, something is done** (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). 23 By uttering "security," a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it. 24 The clearest illustration of this phenomenon--on which I will elaborate below--occurred in Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War, where "order" was clearly, systematically, and institutionally linked to the survival of the system and its elites. Thinking about change in East-West relations and/or in Eastern Europe throughout this period meant, therefore, trying to bring about change without generating a "securitization" response by elites, which would have provided the pretext for acting against those who had overstepped the boundaries of the permitted. Consequently, **to ensure that this mechanism would not be triggered, actors had to keep their challenges below a certain threshold and/or through the political process**--whether national or international--have the threshold negotiated upward. As Egbert Jahn put it, **the task was to turn threats into challenges; to move developments from the sphere of existential fear to one where they could be handled by ordinary means**, as politics, economy, culture, and so on. As part of this exercise, a crucial political and theoretical issue became the definition of "intervention" or "interference in domestic affairs," whereby change-oriented agents tried, through international law, diplomacy, and various kinds of politics, to raise the threshold and make more interaction possible. Through this process, two things became very clear. First, the word "security" is the act ; the utterance is the primary reality. Second, **the most radical and transformational perspective--which nonetheless remained realist--was one of minimizing "security" by narrowing the field to which the security act was applied** (as with the European détente policies of the 1970s and 1980s). After a certain point, the process took a different form and the aim became to create a speech act failure (as in Eastern Europe in 1989). Thus, the trick was and is to move from a positive to a negative meaning: Security is the conservative mechanism--but we want less security! Under the circumstances then existing in Eastern Europe, the power holders had among their instruments the speech act "security." The use of this speech act had the effect of raising a specific challenge to a principled level, thereby implying that all necessary means would be used to block that challenge. And, because such a threat would be defined as existential and a challenge to sovereignty, the state would not be limited in what it could or might do. Under these circumstances, a problem would become a security issue whenever so defined by the power holders. Unless or until this operation were to be brought to the point of failure--which nuclear conditions made rather difficult to imagine 25 --available avenues of change would take the form of negotiated limitations on the use of the "speech act security." Improved conditions would, consequently, hinge on a process implying "less security, more politics!" To put this point another way, security and insecurity do not constitute a binary opposition. "Security" signifies a situation marked by the presence of a security problem and some measure taken in response. Insecurity is a situation with a security problem and no response. Both conditions share the security problematique. **When there is no security problem, we do not conceptualize our situation in terms of security; instead, security is simply an irrelevant concern.** The statement, then, that security is always relative, and one never lives in complete security, has the additional meaning that, if one has such complete security, one does not label it "security." It therefore never appears. **Consequently, transcending a security problem by politicizing it cannot happen through thematization in security terms, only away from such terms. An agenda of minimizing security in this sense cannot be based on a classical critical approach to security**, whereby the concept is critiqued and then thrown away or redefined according to the wishes of the analyst. The essential operation can only be touched by faithfully working with the classical meaning of the concept and what is already inherent in it. **The language game of security is, in other words, a jus necessitatis for threatened elites, and this it must remain. Such a**n affirmative **reading, not at all aimed at rejecting the concept, may be a more serious challenge to the established discourse than a critical one, for it recognizes that a conservative approach to security is an intrinsic element in the logic of both our national and international political organizing principles**. By taking seriously this "unfounded" concept of security, it is possible to raise a new agenda of security and politics. This further implies moving from a positive to a negative agenda, in the sense that **the dynamics of securitization and desecuritization can never be captured so long as we proceed along the normal critical track that assumes security to be a positive value to be maximized**. That elites frequently present their interests in "national security" dress is, of course, often pointed out by observers, usually accompanied by a denial of elites' right to do so. Their actions are then labelled something else, for example, "class interests," which seems to imply that authentic security is, somehow, definable independent of elites, by direct reference to the "people." This is, in a word, wrong. All such attempts to define people's "objective interests" have failed. Security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites. All of this can be analyzed, if we simply give up the assumption that security is, necessarily, a positive phenomenon. Critics normally address the what or who that threatens, or the whom to be secured; they never ask whether a phenomenon should be treated in terms of security because they do not look into "securityness" as such, asking what is particular to security, in contrast to non-security, modes of dealing with particular issues. By working with the assumption that security is a goal to be maximized, critics eliminate other, potentially more useful ways of conceptualizing the problems being addressed. This is, as I suggested above, because security:insecurity are not binary opposites. As soon as a more nominalist approach is adapted, the absurdity of working toward maximizing "security" becomes clear. Viewing the security debate at present, one often gets the impression of the object playing around with the subjects, the field toying with the researchers. **The problematique** itself **locks people into talking in terms of "security," and this reinforces the hold of security on our thinking, even if our approach is a critical one. We do not find much work aimed at de-securitizing politics which, I suspect, would be more effective** than securitizing problems.

# Framework

## Security Interrogation 1st

**Security discourse functions as an instrument to bring social practices into an institutionalized framework**

**Huysmans, 02** - Professor of Security Studies at Open University (Jef, Jan/March 2002, "Defining social constructivism in security studies: the normative dilemma of writing security", http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_hb3225/is\_1\_27/ai\_n28906098/pg\_5/?tag=content;col1)

The normative dilemma does not fall out of the blue: it is a direct result of the interpretation of security as a social construction. I assume that the specific meaning of the normative dilemma is undeniably related to a specific conceptualization of security as an effect of mobilization. **Language plays a crucial role** in this mobilization. Although the process cannot be reduced to a linguistic one, the **social mobilization of security expectations relies** heavily **on the use of security language**; for example, that of security knowledge produced by police agencies and the military; the media's articulation of dangers; social movements' arguing over the reality of a threat and different forms of countering it. **Speaking** or writing about an issue **in security language has an integrative capacity**. It enables the connecting of isolated features such as, for example, migration, terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, drugs, and the European internal market into a meaningful whole (below, I will refer to this whole as a secu rity field). Thus, **language operates as a mediating instrument that brings social practices into a** particular communicative, **institutionalized framework**. **Language is** not just a communicative instrument used to talk about a real world outside of language; it is **a defining force, integrating social relations**. **The constructive quality of security utterances relies on a shift from a representational to a performative view of language** and on a generic understanding of language. First, **social constructivism moves away from the idea that utterances are primarily a representation of an extradiscursive reality**. The sentence "Drugs are a major security problem in our cities" is not the same speech act as that in "An apple falls from a tree"; it also has a performative force: "**Security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done** (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship)." (11) Just as a promise is an effect of language--that is, of successfully making the promise--**a security problem results from successfully speaking or writing security**. It is the utterance of "security" that politically introduces security questions in a publicly contested policy area. Thus, if successfully performed **the speech act makes a security problem.** (12)

The 1AC isn’t neutral—the alternative is the only framework to accurately assess the aff

Lockman, 04 – Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History at New York University (Zachary, 2004, Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism, Google Books, p. 4-5)

I should also acknowledge at the outset that **there** have been, and **con­tinue to be, scholars of the Middle East** and Islam (as well as scholars in other fields and disciplines) **who reject the entire notion of a politics of knowledge and insist that their own scholarly impartiality**, critical fac­ulties and good judgment, along with the use of tried-and-true scholarly methods, **allow them to produce knowledge that is not informed by any implicit or explicit theory**, model **or vision of the world but is simply and objectively true**. They might be said to take their motto from police sergeant Jack Webb’s favorite line in the old television series Dragnet: “Just the facts, ma’am.” **Adherents of this epistemological position**, which (depending on how it is formulated and implemented) may be characterized as empiricism or positivism, **insist that they simply examine the facts**, which are deemed to “speak for themselves,” and derive their analyses directly from them, without allowing any presuppositions, theory, political viewpoint, social values or personal prejudices to affect their judgment. In contrast, **they tend to see their epistemological opponents — those who see the produc­tion of knowledge as always involving some degree of interpretation** and judgment and as always influenced by historical contexts — **as wrongly injecting a distorting political and subjective element into what should be the politically neutral, objective world of scholarship**. Of course, scholars who see knowledge as socially produced or con­structed respond by insisting that **what we believe we know about the human world**, what we take to be true about whatever aspect of human social life past or present we are interested in, **is never simply the product of the direct observation of reality and our capacity for reasoning**. Rather, **attaining such knowledge always entails resort to some** (**often** implicit and **unacknowledged) theory, interpretive stance or exercise of judgment**. Nor do the facts ever really speak for themselves in any simple sense. **What we deem to be a fact, which facts we deem to be significant, which questions we want our data to help us answer, and how we go about producing an explanation** of something — **all these involve making choices, which again means interpretation, judgment**, some notion **or theory** or vision of how the world is put together and can be understood. Facts thus do not stand entirely on their own: they come to make sense within a theoreti­cal or interpretive framework which specifies that they are indeed facts, that is, true statements about reality, and that it is this set of facts and not some other that counts, that tells us what is really going on. And the emer­gence, dissemination and decline of the contending scholarly frameworks of interpretation, the many alternative possible **ways of comprehending the social world, are always bound up**, if in complex ways, **with broader contexts** and developments.1

## Serial Policy Failure

**Ethical obligation to vote neg—voting aff causes serial policy failure**

**Charrett, 09** - Ph.D. Candidate in International Politics at Aberystwyth University, MSc from the London School of Economics (Catherine, July 2009, "A Critical Application of Securitizing Theory: Overcoming the Normative Dilemma of Writing Security", http://www20.gencat.cat/portal/site/icip)

**The capacity to create ‘truth’ regarding threats and the ability depict what are deemed the necessary means to manage such threats awards the securitizing actor, the state elite, an advantage**d and position over the securitization of an object. Krebs and Lobasz offer a thorough examination of the securitization of terrorism, post-9/11 in the United States, which they affirm demonstrates the capacity of state elites to fix meanings and dominate policy. They argue that by virtue of his institutional position as president, **Bush enjoyed an advantaged place** in the rhetorical competition over the ‘meaning of 9/11’. **His bureaucratic power allowed for the ‘rhetorical coercion’ of the dissenting voices of the Democrats, thus allowing for the particular securitization of terrorism that later paved the way for the invasion of Iraq** (Krebs and Lobasz 2007).

## Methodology 1st

**Methodology key**

**Bartlett, 90** - Professor of Law at Duke University (Katherine T., 1990, "Feminist Legal Methods", Harvard Law Review, Lexis Nexis Law Review)

Feminists have developed extensive critiques of law and proposals for legal reform. Feminists have had much less to say, however, about what the “doing” of law should entail and what truth status to give to the legal claims that follow. These **methodological issues** matter because methods **shape one’s view of the possibilities for** legal practice and **reform. Method** “organizes the apprehension of truth; it **determines what counts as evidence and defines what is taken as verification**.” Feminists cannot ignore method, because **if they seek to challenge existing structures of power with the same methods that have defined what counts within those structures, they may instead “recreate the illegitimate power structures** [**that they are] trying to** identify and **undermine**.” Method matters also because without an understanding of methods, feminist claims in the law will not be perceived as legitimate or “correct.” I suspect that many who dismiss feminism as trivial or inconsequential misunderstand it. Feminists have tended to focus on defending their various substantive positions or political agendas, even among themselves. Greater attention to issues of the method may help to anchor these defenses,to explain why feminists agendas often appear so radical (or not radical enough), and even to establish some common ground among feminists. As feminists articulate their methods, they can become more aware of the nature of what they do, and thus do it better. Thinking about method is empowering. When I require myself to explain what I do, I am likely to discover how to improve what I earlier may have taken for granted. In the process, I am likely to become more committed to what it is that I have improved. This likelihood, at least, is a central premise of this article and its primary motivation.

## Epistemology 1st

Epistemology first

Agnew, 07 – Professor of Geography at UCLA (John, 5/14/07, "Know-Where: Geographies of Knowledge of World Politics", p. 143) PDF

**Various ‘‘social studies’**’ of science take these insights down to the level of the laboratory and the classroom. **In the context of world politics**, what they **suggest** is **that all knowledge, including that claiming the mantle of science, is at least socially conditioned by the rituals, routines, and recruitment practices of powerful educational and research institutions**. Thus, **the assumption of ‘‘anarchy’’ beyond state borders is not an objective fact about the world but a claim socially constructed by theorists and actors operating in conditioning sites and venues** (premier universities, think-thanks, government offices, etc.), **which unthinkingly reproduce the assumption drawing on unimpeachable intellectual precursors** (such as Machiavelli and Hobbes) irrespective of its empirical ‘‘truth’’ status (O´ Tuathail 1996). **Other ideas such as those of ‘‘rational choice’’ and ‘‘hegemonic succession’’ can be thought of similarly as reflecting the social and political experiences of particular theorists in specific places as much as objective truth about the world per se** (see, respectively, e.g., Grunberg 1990; Green and Shapiro 1996; Taylor 2006). If believed, of course, and if in the hands of those powerful enough, they can become guides to action that make their own reality.

## AT: Judge Choice

**Judge choice misses the boat—symbolic battles of representation are more important than the plan**

**Stanescu, 09** - Ph.D. Candidate for Philosophy at Bighamton University (James K., 11/8/09, "Reps Ks", http://wrongforum.wordpress.com/2009/11/08/reps-ks/)

Harrigan argues that the representations of the affirmative are not necessary components of the plan, and therefore the judge can choice to ignore them if they are problematic. He goes on to say that the most offensive person can have a good idea. However, Harrigan does not provide a guide for how we are to read the plan text. In Harrigan’s articulation, it seems as if the plan text is the only part of the 1AC that is solid, that is a proposition for action. Everything else in the 1AC seems to be so much chatter, so much ephemeral hints, so many ghosts. Under his view of the round, if someone were to propose not giving missile defense shields to Japan, and had as one of their advantages that our foreign policy should only be dictated by protecting Aryan civilizations, the judge could simply choose to ignore that because the affirmative had other, non-racist advantages. **What is missed by this view is that every 1AC, every speech, has many propositions. There are more propositions of what should be done than those under the heading of plan text, and there is no reason that the neg cannot focus on rejecting those propositions** (well, there are reasons of course, but that should be in the debate, not predetermined by the judge). Furthermore, **the plan text itself is never a full bill** (for good reason). But that means we never completely know the ways that a plan will be implemented and interpreted. **The representations of the 1AC give us a context, a way to read the plan text**. For example, you could have two different people advocating that abortion should be legal in some particular country. One person could be advocating greater social autonomy, more reproductive choices and rights for women, etc. Another person could be **advocating that abortion could be a tool for scientific eugenics. The reasons given for a policy could be a hint for the ways that a policy is intended to be implemented. There seems no reason to radically decontextualize plan text, because plan text always needs a contextualization. Also, the reasons given for pushing for a policy agenda could splinter groups, making the real world implementation of such a policy harder to come about**. To use the example above, think about the ways that such eugenicist discourses surrounding abortion supporters in the US not only made it hard to get support among women of color, but also further fragmented the feminist movement which has constrained their ability to make other goals. Lastly, it seems to me that **Harrigan ignores the importance of symbolic battles**. Harrigan seems to purpose that the only thing voted for at the end of the round is plan text. However, to use his example of a town hall meeting (which, I am not granting this is the right framework/analogy to understand debate, but to think within it for a bit), it isn’t just a plan that is being debated about, but an entire series of relays and rhetorics that support such a plan. If, for example, the Nazis really were suggesting health care reform to better protect Aryans, and I said, “Man, I hate Nazis and racism, but health care reform seems grand” I would be allowing the symbolic strength of the Nazis to increase by letting them win a battle of the importance of health care reform. The policy is not the only thing granted legitimacy, but the entire apparatuses and relays that garner support for the policy is also given legitimacy. I think it is perfectly reasonable to say that it might be more important to stop the Nazis and their racist agenda than it would be to pass the parts of the Nazi agenda I agree with. Every debate has a series of symbolic battles, that gather legitimacy through wins, and through the repetitions of those arguments. Now, I understand that all of the examples I give are extreme, but it seems that Harrigan invites such examples by saying that the worst sort can still have good ideas. In short, I think **the extreme examples give us an ability to determine if reps sometimes should win the day. And if we believe that, then the entire type of discussion shifts. Debaters give many representations, and many propositions, for their plan texts. They have many rounds at a tournament, and many tournaments in a year. If we want them to not repeat certain representations, we have to open up the possibility that they can lose a round based on such representations.** Otherwise, certain symbols are given more legitimacy at the end of the round, and others are given less. There are a lot of things that happen in the 1AC, and all of them are open for debate.

## AT: Empiricism

**And, our argument doesn’t deny that there’s empirical reality—the point of our argument is interrogating the way the assumptions and methods behind the plan shape the way we interact with that empirical reality**

**Ferguson and Mansbach, 07** - \*Professor of Political Science and Co-Director at the Division of Global Affairs at Rutgers University AND \*\*Professor of Political Science at Iowa State University (\*Yale H. AND \*\*Richard W., September 2007, A world of polities: essays on global politics, Google Books, p. 232)

Post-international theory merges to some extent with critical theorists and postmodernists with respect to the elusiveness of concepts and language generally and about the inherently normative nature of all scholarship. However, **post-internationalism parts company with extreme relativists among the postmodernists and some critical theorists epistemologically because it still regards the theoretical quest as being essentially an empirical enterprise. We insist** – and here we are in accord with Wendt and most constructivists – **that there is an objective ‘reality’ ‘out there’, however hard it is to analyse objectively because of inadequate information and ‘the spectacles behind the eyes’ we all wear. The subjective dimension of political life** – ideas, norms, identities, even language – **consists of empirical referents and**, though more difficult to scrutinise than the objective dimension, **is also ‘out there’**. This does not mean that we retain any lingering faith – unlike Rosenau – in the eventual triumph of ‘scientific’ analysis.61 We are more comfortable in the company of ‘soft’ social scientists and humanists than strict ‘scientists’ (which Rosenau himself today is not) and rational-choice gamers.

**Even the most seemingly obvious ‘knowledge’ is often only one possible interpretation of utterly contingent historical events**

**Crowe, 07** – Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at York University (Lori, 2007, "“The “Fuzzy Dream”: Discourse, Historical myths, and Militarized (in)Security - Interrogating dangerous myths of Afghanistan and the ‘West", p. 5-9) PDF

**Wallerstein has asserted that all history is myth**.10 Respected scholar and anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot has similarly argued that history is “necessarily a distortion of “historical facts” which “are not created equal.”11 The well known and celebrated tale of the discovery of the Americas is a useful illustration of these statements: The events of 1492 are often cited, mostly in certain feminist and post-colonial texts, as an example of how historiographical assumptions get reproduced and become historical and absolute “truth”, or the “ultimate history”.12 That is, as Carole Patemen reminds us, “When we read the history books given to children in the United States, it all starts with heroic adventure – there is no bloodshed – and Columbus Day is a celebration”.13 The enslavement, killing, plundering, rape, “total cruelty”, and ultimate genocide of the people and land of the newly discovered “Americas” by European “explorers” is not part of the “historical myth” retold around the Thanksgiving dinner table. Why not? **Disagreement around the production of knowledge has been at the heart of some of the most divisive debates within academia – that is, our relationship with knowledge and ‘knowing’ in general is highly mediated be myths: “Anything that has the status of knowledge” explains French philosopher Michele LeDoeff “can turn out to be riddled with mere beliefs, myths, or shocking representations”.14 Similarly, Peter Taylor employs the label “historical myth” or “Ossian”15 to indicate that what is commonly called history or knowledge are often institutionalized frameworks, cognitive blockages, ingrained discourse or social beliefs that have become ingrained in the collective epistemic imaginary**.16 Interestingly, ‘mythology’ was adopted by early folklorists to characterize the living systems of tales and beliefs of ‘primitive people’ such as Native American Indians. The earliest uses of the word are recorded in the form of the Greek word mythos; interestingly, in the llliad, reveals Trubshaw, the word is used 167 times usually to refer to a powerful male making boasts or giving orders.17 In the twentieth century, ‘myth’ began to refer to stories that were ‘sacred’ to a society – “metaphorical means of conveying ‘truths’ (or perceived truths within that society)” – which provided a sort of structure to that society: “They explained such matters as the origin and organization of the cosmos, social organization such as gender and kinship, and told of deities and heroes.”18 Myths are ‘alive and well’ in modern day ‘Western’ cultures, argues Trubshaw, and are intermeshed with political ideologies to provide a ‘deep structure’ to how we think about the world; they are essentially “narrative forms of ideology”. In the modern world, these myths manifest as “fragmentary references, indirect allusions, watchwords, slogans, visual symbols, echoes in literature, film, songs, public ceremonies, and other forms of everyday situations, often highly condensed and emotionally charged.”19 **The danger of myth is precisely its ability to attain the status of knowledge, gaining authenticity as comprehensive and total**. This is problematic because “Nothing”, as Eisenstein argues “escapes invention, interpretation, or subversion.”20 Let’s return momentarily to our example of 1492 and the ‘discovery’ of the Americas. A key “collective fiction” or myth that contributed to the ‘discovery’ and entitlement narratives regarding the New World land was the notion of terra nullius – the idea that prior to European occupation, the land was uninhabited and belonged to no one. In her article exploring the philosophical imaginations around Australia’s colonial past, Lloyd explains how such a dominant and determining fiction of a culture like terra nullius manufactured a myth of Australia’s sovereignty as built upon notions of discovery and peaceful settlement rather than violent invasion and conquest. The result, as in the Americas, is a history built on emotions of pride and a legitimization of the idea that the human presence that had inhabited the land was not ‘fully human’ or was ‘lesser human’ and had no ownership over the land.21 **Academia commonly uses the terms discourse or narrative in analyses that interrogate the power of language by deconstructing its utilization and its underpinnings**. I want to delineate between these terms and my deployment of the word myth. Discourse or discourse analysis is a social concept that is often linked to Michele Foucault and Jurgen Habermas (although each philosopher deploys the concept differently) and generally refers to an institutionalized way of thinking, writing, and speaking, or, in the words of Judith Butler “the limits of acceptable speech”.22 **Discourse affects our view of all things and can simultaneously constitute a social subject and can be performed by a subject. Discourse thus is infused with power relations and is intrinsically connected to the production of knowledge**.23 Narrative, in turn, is a story or part of a story recounted in any medium. Most commonly used in literary theory, a narrative is understood, by the creator and the reader, to have multiple points of view representing different participants and/or observers. For example: “In stories told verbally, there is a person telling the story, a narrator whom the audience can see and hear, and who adds layers of meaning to the text nonverbally. The narrator also has the opportunity to monitor the audience's response to the story and to modify the manner of the telling to clarify content or enhance listener interest.”24 Interestingly, Walter Fisher claimed in his theory the Narrative Paradigm, that all communication is in and of itself a form of storytelling.25 **I use the word myth then to denote a particular type of narrative that is imbued with discursive power (that is, intentionally deployed power-filled words, images, rhetoric, etc.) in order to communicate a specific worldview and with the intent of eliciting a certain response from the audience. I use it pejoratively as well; in popular use, the word myth arose as a label for religious beliefs and stories from cultures outside the West as being false.26 Myth then signifies a story, produced through narratives and propagated by discourse, which is believed to be true but which is created with an underlying agenda. There is a dangerous relationship between the construction and dissemination of myths through the deployment of discourse and the development of international policy. The political implications of failing to deconstruct myths that perpetuate and justify imperial intervention and militarized violence are severe. It is imperative that we learn to recognize and acknowledge collective imaginings/myths such as terra nullius because they are constitutive of our present social and political world, influencing how we perceive the past, constructing beliefs and attitudes in the present, and impacting the decisions and actions we make in the future.**

## Discourse Shapes Reality

**Discourse decides everything- there’s no alternative**

**George 94 –** Senior lecturer in international relations in the Department of Political Science, Australian National University, (Jim, “Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations,” p. 25-26, 1994, KTOP)

The question of reality and realism in postmodernist literature is confronted in terms similar to the (broadly) Hegelian approach of Berki and other criti­cal social theory approaches, including Habermas's Critical Theory. But, more unequivocally than these perspectives, postmodernists stress that real­ity is in a perpetual state of flux—of movement, change, and instability. This is not the common understanding of the nature of reality, of course. Social theory in general and International Relations in particular have, as noted earlier, understood reality in essentialist, unitary, and universalist terms. From a postmodernist perspective, this is not surprising, because, it is maintained, the notion of a singular, stable, knowable reality has been an integral part of a dominant post-Enlightenment story, in which the ascent of Western "rational man" is located as integral to the gradual historicophilo­sophic unfolding of the world's "real" nature. Like all other claims to know the world and its (singular, essential) reality, this is regarded as a narrative fiction, a story of certainty and identi­ty derived from a dominant discursive practice that reduces the flux of existence to a strategic framework of unity and coherence. Discourse in ' this context is not synonymous with language as such. It refers, rather, to a broader matrix of social practices that gives meaning to the way that people understand themselves and their behavior. A discourse, in this sense, generates the categories of meaning by which reality can be understood and explained. More precisely, a discourse makes "real" that which it pre­scribes as meaningful. So doing, a discourse of Realism, for example, establishes the sociolinguistic conditions under which realistic theory and practice can take place, and it establishes, simultaneously, that which, by discursive definition, does not correspond with reality. Understood this way, to be engaged in a discourse is to be engaged in the making and remaking of meaningful conditions of existence. A discourse, then, is not a way of learning "about" something out there in the "real world"; it is rather, a way of producing that something as real, as identifiable, classifiable, knowable, and therefore, meaningful. **Discourse creates the conditions of knowing** [emphasis added].80 This discursive representation of reality in the world is, for postmod­ernism, an integral part of the relations of power that are present in all human societies. Accordingly, the process of discursive representation is never a neutral, detached one but is always imbued with the power and authority of the namers and makers of reality—**it is always knowledge as power**. A major task for postmodernist scholars, consequently, is to interro­gate the conditions of knowledge as power. Discourse analysis seeks, in this way, to explain how power is constituted and how its premises and givens are replicated at all levels of society and to reveal its exclusionary practices in order to create space for critical thought and action. This, simply put, is what Derrida sought to do in locating the dominant modernist discourse in the post-Enlightenment search for an essential, uni­versal rationality. This he described as the logocentric process, a process of textual/social representation, derived, initially, from classical Greek schol­arship, which creates identity, unity, and universalized meaning by exclud­ing from the "meaningful" that which does not correspond to the logo (original, singular, authentic) conception of the rea1.81 In this way, at the core of Western history and philosophy is a textual "past" framed in terms of a whole series of dichotomies that demarcate that which is real and that which, by its definitional relationship with prescribed reality, cannot be. This story, aggregated and institutionalized via its articulations across the contemporary social theory disciplines, is the modernist metanarrative­the discourse of self/other, identity/difference, realism/idealism, illusory certitude, and Realist knowledge as International Relations.82

**Discourse constructs identity and directly influences policy implementation—this link is stabilized by both the initial construction and the response to it.**

**Hansen 06** Associate Professor, Director of the Ph.D. Program, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen**,** (Lene, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, p 26-27, 2006, KTOP)

Foreign policy, however, is not a closed system, like that of the body, but is formulated within a social and political space. This implies that the internal stability of a policy-identity construction cannot be determined in isolation from the broader social and political context within which it is situated. Whether a discourse articulates a stable relationship between identity and policy is to be posed not only as a question of internal stability but also as a matter of whether the discourse is supported or criticized by other discourses. Put in more programmatic terms, politically contextualized discourse analysis combines the analysis of how texts seek to create stability with analysis of whether these constructions are being accepted or contested within the political and public domain.11 For example, the extent to which Bush’s construction of the identities of ‘Saddam Hussein,’ ‘the Iraqi people,’ ‘the free world,’ and ‘America’ is seen as supporting the war against Iraq is to be analyzed both at the level of the textual construction of identities and how they are linked with policy and at the level of the wider responses to Bush’s policy and discourse. The contextualized and mutually adjusted character of the policy—identity constellation implies furthermore that their link is not a functionalist nor an essentialist one: stable links are constructed through and in response to discursive practices, practices which vary and depend on human agency, not on abstract functionalities. The construction of the link between identity and policy is more specifically confronted by a set of external constraints that impact the deliberation of identity as well as policy. Beginning with the construction of identity, the fact that foreign policy questions are always articulated within a partially structured discursive field is, as argued above, both enabling and constraining for those constructing foreign policies. This is not to say that established identities cannot be contested, rather that such contestations need to engage with the dominant construction of identity already in place (Wæver 1995:45). Moreover, as established discourses are mobilized anew, they reinforce and potentially modify the identity on which they are centered. For example, ‘The Balkans’ was powerfully employed within the Western debate of the 1990s as a representation of the war in Bosnia, and this representation drew upon a concept of ‘the Balkans’ which had been coined and developed from the late nineteenth century onwards (Todorova 1997; Goldsworthy 1998). Yet, through this deployment of ‘the Balkans,’ the ostensibly trans- historical concept was itself slightly modified.

**Discourse is a prior question**

**Bleiker 01 –** Senior lecturer and co-director of Rotary centre of International studies in Peace and Conflict resolution (Robert, “The Zen of International Relations”, edited by Stephen Chan, Peter Mandeville, and Ronald Blieker, p. 47, 2001, KTOP)

The doorkeepers of IR are those who, knowingly or unknowingly make sure that the discipline’s discursive boundaries remain intact. Discourses, in a Foucaultian sense, are subtle mechanisms that frame our thinking process They determine the limits of what can be, talked and written of in a normal and rational way. In every society the production of discourses is controlled, selected, organized and diffused by certain procedures. They create systems of exclusion that elevate one group of discourses to a hegemonic status while condemning others to exile. Although the boundaries of discourses change, at times gradually, at times abruptly, they maintain a certain unity across time, a unity that dominates and transgresses individual authors, texts or social practices. They explain, to come back to Nietzsche, why 'all things that live long are gradually so saturated with reason that their origin in unreason thereby becomes improbable'.32 Academic disciplines are powerful mechanisms that direct and control the production and diffusion of discourses. They establish the rules of intellectual exchange and define the methods, techniques and instru- ments that are considered proper for the pursuit of knowledge. Within these margins each discipline recognizes true and false propositions based on the standards of evaluation it established to assess them.” It is not my intention here to provide a coherent account or historical survey of the exclusionary academic conventions that have been estab- lished by the discipline of IR.” Instead, I want to illustrate the process o disciplining thought by focusing on an influential monograph by the well-placed academics, Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba. By outlining the methodological rules about how to conduct good scholarly research, they fulfil important and powerful doorkeeping functions. These functions emerge as soon as the authors present their main argument, that 'qualitative' and 'quantitative' research approaches do not differ in substance for both can (and must be) systematic and scientific.” One does not need to be endowed with the investigating genius of a Sherlock Holmes to detect positivist traits in these pages. One easily recognises an (anti)philosophical stance that attempts to separate subject and object, that believes the social scientist, as detached observer, can produce value-free knowledge. Such a positivist position assumes only that which is manifested in experience, which emerges from observing ‘reality’, of deserves the name know- ledge. All other utterances have no cognitive and empirical merit, they are mere value statements, normative claims, unprovable speculations.” Indeed, if the doorkeepers did not inform us that their methodological suggestions emerged from years of teaching a core graduate course at one of North America's foremost research institutions, one could easily mistake their claims as parodies of positivism. We are told that the goal of research is 'to learn facts about the real world' and that all hypothesis 'need to be evaluated empirically before they can make a contribution to knowledge' Which facts? Whose 'real' world? What forms of knowledge? I— The discursive power of academic disciplines, George Canguilhem argues, works such that a statement has to be 'within the true' before one can even start to judge whether it is true or false, legitimate or illegitimate.38 Hence the doorkeepers inform us that what distinguishes serious research about the 'facts' of the 'real world' from casual observa­tion is the search for 'valid inferences by the systematic use of well-established procedures ofjnaiiuyl.39 Such procedures not only suggest on what grounds things can be studied legitimately, but also decide what issues are worthwhile to be assessed in the first place. In other words, a topic has to fulfil a number of preliminary criteria before it can even be evaluated as a legitimate IR concern. The criteria of admittance, the doorkeepers notify us, are twofold. A research topic must 'pose a question that is "important" in the real world' and it must contribute to the scholarly literature by 'increasing our collective ability to construct verified scientific explanation of some aspect of the world'.40 The doorkeepers of IR remind the women and men from the country who pray for admittance to the temple of IR that only those who abide by the established rules will gain access. Admittance cannot be granted at the moment to those who are eager to investigate the process of knowing, to those who intend to redraw the boundaries of 'good' and 'evil' research, or to those who even have the audacity of questioning what this 'real world' really is. The warning is loud and clear: 'A pro­posed topic that cannot be refined into a specific research project per­mitting valid descriptive or causal inference should be modified along the way or abandoned.'41 And if you are drawn to the temple of IR after all, the doorkeepers laugh, then just try to go in despite our veto. But take note, we are powerful and we are only the least of the doorkeepers, for ultimately all research topics that have no 'real-world importance' will run 'the risk of descending to politically insignificant questions'.42 Or could it be that these allegedly unimportant research topics need to be silenced precisely because they run the risk of turning into politically significant questions? The dominant IR stories that door keeping functions uphold are sustained by a wide range of discipline related procedures linked to aspects such as university admittance standards teaching curricula, examination topics, policies of hiring and promoting teaching staff or publishing criteria determined by the major or journals in the field. At least the doorkeepers of IR have not lost a sense of (unintended) irony. They readily admit that we seek not dogma, but disciplined thought'. Academic disciplines discipline the production of discourses. They have the power separate from irrational from irrational stories. They force the creation and exchange of knowledge into preconceive spaces, called debates. Even if one is to engage the orthodox position in a critical manner, the outcome of the discussion is already circumscribed by the parameters that had been established through the iniital framing of the debates. Thus, as soon as one addresses academic disciplines on their own terms one has to oplay according to the rules of a discursive police which is reactivated each time one speaks.

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## Reps Key

**Representations are a critical component of International Relations and security discourse**

**George 94 –** Senior lecturer in international relations in the Department of Political Science, Australian National University, (Jim, “Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations,” 1994, KTOP)

This is not to suggest some simple cause-and-effect scenario, nor any conventional class/elite-based design at the core of U.S. theory as practice. But what Campbell's contribution suggests, as did Shapiro's, is that ques­tions of representation, systematically excluded from foreign policy dis­course, must be included if the United States, and the International Relations discipline centered therein, is to be more capable in the future of understanding itself and the world in which it lives. What it suggests, more generally in relation to the present discussion, is that modernist "theory" is intrinsic to the "practice" of International Relations and that postmodernist critical perspectives have something important to contribute to the opening of that theory as practice, in the post—Cold War era. This is particularly so in relation to the discourse of strategy and security. Accordingly, I want to turn briefly to some postmodern scholarship that seeks to reconceptualize the dominant security/strategic discourse in the era that has seen the demise of its Cold War raison d'etre.

# Links

## Proliferation

#### The affirmative’s securitization of proliferation ignores the United States broader role in the spread of nuclear weapons

Behnke 2k - Prof. of Poli Sci @ Towson [Andreas. January 2000, International Journal of Peace Studies 5.1, “Inscriptions of the Imperial Order,”http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol5\_1/behnke.htm]

The re-conceptualization of security to encompass 'soft issues' does not mean that NATO cannot identify 'hard' security problems. Above **all** the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) features prominently with the NATO/RAND discourse (NATO 1991; NATO 1998d; Solana 1997b; Solana 1997c). David Mutimer (1997) has argued that the use of the metaphor 'proliferation' carries certain entailments. That is to say, it structures our understanding and handling of the problem. In particular, he refers to the "image of a spread outward from a point or source", and the "technological bias" introduced in the discourse (Mutimer 1997:201-2). As concerns the first point, 'proliferation' presupposes a center at which WMD are to be held and controlled, and from which these weapons disseminate into the body of the international society. To the extent that this process gets out of the center's control, certain measures have to be taken to 'suffocate', limit, or curb the 'spread' of these weapons. As concerns the second point, Mutimer (1997:203) points out the peculiar agency implied in the concept: "Notice that the weapons themselves spread; they are not spread by an external agent of some form - say, a human being or political institution". The fact that a large number of these weapons were actually 'spread' by Western states is consequently hidden through this discursive structure. These points are also relevant for the Mediterranean Initiative. We can add a third entailment to the list which appears through a critical reading of the NATO/RAND narrative. As the RAND authors (1998:15) observe, "The mere existence of ballistic missile technology with ranges in excess of 1,000 km on world markets and available to proliferators around the Mediterranean basin would not necessarily pose serious strategic dilemmas for Europe." In fact, we might even agree with the neorealist proposition that 'more might be better', above all in terms of nuclear weapons. This is certainly the preferred solution of John Mearsheimer (1990) for the stabilization of European political order after the end of the cold war. After all, conventional wisdom has it that nuclear weapons and the threat of mutually assured destruction preserved stability and peace during the Cold War. The RAND authors, however, fail to grasp the irony in their identification of WMD proliferation, which ends up denying this central tenet of cold war strategy. According to them, "the WMD and ballistic missile threat will acquire more serious dimensions where it is coupled with a proliferator's revolutionary orientation. Today, this is the case with regard to Iran, Iraq, Libya, and arguably Syria" (RAND, 1998:16). What preserved the peace during the cold war -- mutual deterrence -- is now re-written as a strategic problem**:**

**Discourse around proliferation produces a vision of the East as irrational and dangerous – this leads to a heightened state of security**

Behnke 2k - Prof. of Poli Sci @ Towson [Andreas. January 2000, International Journal of Peace Studies 5.1, “Inscriptions of the Imperial Order,”http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol5\_1/behnke.htm]

As a result of proliferation trends, Europe will be increasingly exposed to the retaliatory consequences of U.S. and European actions around the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin, including the Balkans. ... As a political threat and a weapon of terror capable of influencing the NATO decisionmaking during a crisis, their significance [of conventionally armed ballistic missiles] could be considerable (RAND, 1998:16). Two implications of these arguments deserve elaboration. First, there is the reversal of the traditional relationship between WMD and rationality. For what makes the presence of WMD in the South so worrisome is the absence of the requirements of reason and rationality. Within NATO's discourse on the South, 'revolutionary orientation' accounts for the undesirability of distributing these weapons to such unfit hands. In order to qualify for their possession, reason and rationality must be present -- as they are obviously assumed to be in the West. The discourse of proliferation consequently produces a third entailment by constructing the relationship between West and South in 'orientalist' terms. In this rendition, the South becomes the quintessential antithesis of the West, the site of irrationality, passion, and terror **(**Said, 1995**).** Within this site, different rules apply, which are not necessarily subject to Western ideals of enlightened reason. 'Proliferation' articulates a hierarchical structure in global politics, with the West as the privileged site of from which to surveil, control, and engage the rest of the world. This privilege is further dramatized in the above complaint about the possibility of retaliation. For the South to achieve the possibility of influencing NATO decisionmaking is to violate the epistemic sovereignty of the West. 'U.S. and European actions' and interventions have to be unrestrained in order to constitute proper crisis management. NATO demands a docile subjectivity and accessible territory from the South, the latter's identity cannot be ascertained against the West. Its arms have to be surrendered, its retaliatory capabilities to be revoked. 'Information' is the third mode besides 'Securitization' and 'Proliferation' within which we can discern the subjugation of the South to the strategic Western gaze. A central purpose of the Mediterranean Initiative/Dialogue is to improve 'mutual understanding' and to 'dispel some of the misperceptions and apprehensions that exist, on both sides of the Mediterranean' (Solana, 1997a:5). And both the RAND Corporation and NATO put some emphasis on public information and perception. Yet the structure of this relationship proves to be unbalanced and virtually unilateral. As mentioned above, for NATO, the prime task is above all the "further refinement of its definition of security" **(**de Santis, 1998**).** The general identity of the South as a site of danger and insecurity is consequently never in question. Western perceptions are never problematized. Knowledge of the South is, it appears, a matter of matching more and better information with proper conceptual tools. On the other hand, (mis)perceptions take the place of knowledge in the South. NATO is perceived widely as a Cold War institution searching for a new enemy. That is why the best course to change the perception of NATO in these countries is to focus more on "soft" security, building mutual understanding and confidence before engaging in "hard" military cooperation. Measures should be developed with the aim of promoting transparency and defusing threat perceptions, and promoting a better understanding of NATO's policies and objectives (de Santis, 1998:34). To interpret political misgivings about NATO and its post-cold war diplomacy as 'misperceptions' which can be put straight by "educat[ing] opinion-makers in the dialogue-countries"(RAND, 1998:75) tends to naturalize and objectify the Western renditionof NATO's identity. The possibility that from the perspective of the 'Southern' countries NATO's political and strategic design might look quite different is lost in this narrative. NATO's identity is decontextualized and objectified, the productive role of different cultural and strategic settings in the establishment of identities and formulation of interests denied. To maintain such a lofty position becomes more difficult if we let the Mediterranean participants voice their concerns openly. Far from being 'misperceptions and misunderstandings', these countries' less than enthusiastic attitudes towards NATO are based on, for instance, the establishment of powerful Western military intervention capabilities off their beaches. Also, NATO's attempts to institutionalize a military cooperation is interpreted as an attempt to gain a strategic foothold in the region in order to monitor the flow of missile technology and the possession of WMD (Selim 1998:12-14). In other words, we encounter rather rational and reasonable security political and strategic concerns. The fact that NATO is unwilling or unable to acknowledge their concerns once again demonstrates the 'imperial' nature of the purported dialogue.

## **Soft Power**

#### **Rhetoric of U.S. soft power is rooted in the notion of the US having a moral high ground that is upheld by violence and scapegoating**

**Kaplan ‘3** - Prof. of English @ Univ. of Pennslyvania <Amy. American Quarterly 56.1, “Violent Belongings and the Question of Empire Today,” p. muse>

Another dominant narrative about empire today, told by liberal interventionists, is that of the “reluctant imperialist.”10 In this version, the United States never sought an empire and may even be constitution- ally unsuited to rule one, but it had the burden thrust upon it by the fall of earlier empires and the failures of modern states**,** which abuse the human rights of their own people and spawn terrorism. The United States is the only power in the world with the capacity and the moral authority to act as military policeman and economic manager to bring order to the world**.** Benevolence and self-interest merge in this narra- tive; backed by unparalleled force, the United States can save the people of the world from their own anarchy, their descent into an uncivilized state. As Robert Kaplan writes—not reluctantly at all—in “Supremacy by Stealth: Ten Rules for Managing the World”: “The purpose of power is not power itself; it is a fundamentally liberal purpose of sustaining the key characteristics of an orderly world. Those characteristics include basic political stability, the idea of liberty, pragmatically conceived; respect for property; economic freedom; and representative government, culturally understood. At this moment in time it is American power, and American power only, that can serve as an organizing principle for the worldwide expansion of liberal civil society.”11 This narrative does imagine limits to empire, yet primarily in the selfish refusal of U.S. citizens to sacrifice and shoulder the burden for others, as though sacrifices have not already been imposed on them by the state. The temporal dimension of this narrative entails the aborted effort of other nations and peoples to enter modernity, and its view of the future projects the end of empire only when the world is remade in our image. This is also a narrative about race. The images of an unruly world, of anarchy and chaos, of failed modernity, recycle stereotypes of racial inferiority from earlier colonial discourses about races who are inca- pable of governing themselves, Kipling’s “lesser breeds without the law,” or Roosevelt’s “loosening ties of civilized society,” in his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. In his much-noted article in the New York Times Magazine entitled “The American Empire,” Michael Ignatieff appended the subtitle “The Burden” but insisted that “America’s empire is not like empires of times past, built on colonies, conquest and the white man’s burden.”12 Denial and exceptionalism are apparently alive and well. In American studies we need to go beyond simply exposing the racism of empire and examine the dynamics by which Arabs and the religion of Islam are becoming racialized through the interplay of templates of U.S. racial codes and colonial Orientalism. These narratives of the origins of the current empire—that is, the neoconservative and the liberal interventionist—have much in com- mon. They take American exceptionalism to new heights: its paradoxi- cal claim to uniqueness and universality at the same time. They share a teleological narrative of inevitability, that America is the apotheosis of history, the embodiment of universal values of human rights, liberal- ism, and democracy, the “indispensable nation,**”** in Madeleine Albright’s words. In this logic, the United States claims the authority to “make sovereign judgments on what is right and what is wrong” for everyoneelse and “to exempt itself with an absolutely clear conscience from all the rules that it proclaims and applies to others**.”13** Absolutely protective of its own sovereignty, it upholds a doctrine of limited sovereignty for others and thus deems the entire world a potential site of intervention**.** Universalism thus can be made manifest only through the threat and use of violence. If in these narratives imperial power is deemed the solution to a broken world, then they preempt any counternarratives that claim U.S. imperial actions, past and present, may have something to do with the world’s problems. According to this logic, resistance to empire can never be opposition to the imposition of foreign rule; rather, resistance means irrational opposition to modernity and universal human values. Although these narratives of empire seem ahistorical at best, they are buttressed not only by nostalgia for the British Empire but also by an effort to rewrite the history of U.S. imperialism by appropriating a progressive historiography that has exposed empire as a dynamic engine of American history. As part of the “coming-out” narrative, the message is: “Hey what’s the big deal. We’ve always been intervention- ist and imperialist since the Barbary Coast and Jefferson’s ‘empire for liberty.’ Let’s just be ourselves.” A shocking example can be found in the reevaluation of the brutal U.S. war against the Philippines in its struggle for independence a century ago. This is a chapter of history long ignored or at best seen as a shameful aberration, one that American studies scholars here and in the Philippines have worked hard to expose, which gained special resonance during the U.S. war in Vietnam. Yet proponents of empire from different political perspectives are now pointing to the Philippine-American War as a model for the twenty-first century. As Max Boot concludes in Savage Wars of Peace, “The Philippine War stands as a monument to the U.S. armed forces’ ability to fight and win a major counterinsurgency campaign—one that was bigger and uglier than any that America is likely to confront in the future.”14 Historians of the United States have much work to do here, not only in disinterring the buried history of imperialism but also in debating its meaning and its lessons for the present, and in showing how U.S. interventions have worked from the perspective of compara- tive imperialisms, in relation to other historical changes and move- ments across the globe. The struggle over history also entails a struggle over language and culture. It is not enough to expose the lies when Bush hijacks word such as freedom, democracy, and liberty. It’s imperative that we draw on our knowledge of the powerful alternative meanings of these key words from both national and transnational sources. Today’s reluctant imperialists are making arguments about “soft power,” the global circulation of American culture to promote its universal values. As Ignatieff writes, “America fills the hearts and minds of an entire planet with its dreams and desires.”15 The work of scholars in popular culture is more important than ever to show that the Americanization of global culture is not a one-way street, but a process of transnational exchange, conflict, and transformation, which creates new cultural forms that express dreams and desires not dictated by empire. In this fantasy of global desire for all things American, those whose dreams are different are often labeled terrorists who must hate our way of life and thus hate humanity itself. As one of the authors of the Patriot Act wrote, “when you adopt a way of terror you’ve excused yourself from the community of human beings.”16 Although I would not minimize the violence caused by specific terrorist acts, I do want to point out the violence of these definitions of who belongs to humanity. Often in our juridical system under the Patriot Act, the accusation of terrorism alone, without due process and proof, is enough to exclude persons from the category of humanity. As scholars of American studies, we should bring to the present crisis our knowledge from juridical, literary, and visual representations about the way such exclusions from personhood and humanity have been made throughout history, from the treatment of Indians and slaves to the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. Thus the current discourse about the American Empire embodies fantasies of a global monolithic order extending outward from a national center. How can we draw on our knowledge of the past to bring a sense of contingency to this idea of empire, to show that imperialism is an interconnected network of power relations, which entail engage- ments and encounters as well as military might and which are riddled with instability, tension, and disorder—as in Iraq today? And we must further understand how empire doesn’t just take place in faraway battlefields, but how it exerts its power at home—in fact, in the interconnections between the domestic and the foreign, words already freighted with imperial meanings, and for which we need better vocabularies. The image of the American Empire also projects a fantasy about national identity: the war on terror, some would like to believe, has supplanted the so-called culture wars. The notion of empire recuperates a consensus vision of America as a unitary whole, threatened only by terrorists, but no longer contested and constituted by divisions of race, class, ethnicity, gender, or sexuality. We can see this through the use of the word homeland, a recent addition to the lexicon of U.S. national- ism, which gained currency along with empire, after 9/11, in the concept of homeland security. If empire insists on a borderless world, where the United States can exercise its power without limits, the notion of the homeland tries to shore up those boundaries. In the idea of America as the homeland we can see the violence of belonging

## Hegemony

**Hegemony makes all threats to the world order a threat the United States must subsume – justifies endless interventionism in the name of security**

Noorani, 2005. - Lecturer in Arabic Literature, Islamic and Middle East Studies, University of Edinburgh. <Yaseen. “The Rhetoric of Security,” The New Centennial Review 5.1, 2005.>

The U.S. government's rhetoric of global security draws its power from simultaneously instantiating Schmitt's vision of the political as non-normative national self-preservation and the liberal vision of the political as normative civil relations. The consequence is not that this rhetoric disavows political antagonism within the nation, as Schmitt would have it (though there is an element of this), but that it disavows political antagonism on the global level. I argued above that the positing of a non-normative situation of national self-preservation**,** the same as that of a person being murdered, is insupportable due to the inescapable presence of a moral ideal in defining the nation's self and deciding what threatens it. This applies to all justifications of action grounded in national security. The U.S**.** rhetoric of security, however, lifts the paradox to a global level, and illustrates it more forcefully, by designating the global order's moral ideal, its "way of life" that is under threat, as civil relations, freedom and peace, but then making the fulcrum of this way of life an independent entity upon whose survival the world's way of life depends—the United States. Just as an aggressor puts himself outside of normativity by initiating violence, so is the victim not bound by any norms in defending his life. As the location of the self of the world order that must be preserved, the United States remains unobligated by the norms of this orderas long as it is threatened by terrorism. So long as it struggles for the life of the world order, therefore, the United States remains external to this order, just as terrorism remains external to the world order so long as it threatens a universal state of war. Without the United States everyone is dead. Why should this be? The reason is that the United States fully embodies the values underlying world peace—"freedom, democracy, and free enterprise" (National Security 2002, i)—and is the key to their realization in the global domain. These values are [End Page 30] universal, desired by all and the standard for all. "[T]he United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere" (National Security 2002, 3). The fact that the United States "possesses unprecedented—and unequaled—strength and influence in the world" (1) cannot therefore be fortuitous. It cannot but derive from the very founding of the United States in universal principles of peace and its absolute instantiation of these principles. This results in "unparalleled responsibilities, obligations, and opportunity" (1). In other words, the United States as a nation stands, by virtue of its internal constitution, at the forefront of world history in advancing human freedom. It is the subject of history. Its own principle of organization is the ultimate desire of humanity, and the development of this principle is always at its highest stage in and through the United States. For this reason, the values of the United States and its interests always coincide, and these in turn coincide with the interests of world peace and progress. The requirements of American securityreflect "the union of our values and our national interests," and their effect is to "make the world not just safer but better" (1). The United States therefore is uniquely charged by history to maintain and advance world peace and universal freedom. America is a nation with a mission, and that mission comes from our most basic beliefs. We have no desire to dominate, no ambitions of empire. Our aim is a democratic peace—a peace founded upon the dignity and rights of every man and woman. America acts in this cause with friends and allies at our side, yet we understand our special calling: This great republic will lead the cause of freedom. (Bush 2004a) America can lead the cause of freedom because it is the cause of freedom. "American values and American interests lead in the same direction: We stand for human liberty" (Bush 2003b). For this reason, it has no "ambitions," no private national interests or aspirations that would run contrary to the interests of the world as a whole. It undertakes actions, like the invasion of Iraq, that further no motive but the cause of humanity as a whole. "We have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of [End Page 31] that country to its own people" (Bush 2003a). In this way, the United States is distinct from all other nations, even though all of humanity espouses the same values. Only the United States can be depended upon for ensuring the endurance of these values because they are the sole basis of its existence. "Others might flag in the face of the inevitable ebb and flow of the campaign against terrorism. But the American people will not" (NSCT 2003, 29). Any threat to the existence of the United States is therefore a threat to the existence of the world order, which is to say, the values that make this order possible. It is not merely that the United States, as the most powerful nation of the free world, is the most capable of defending it. It is rather that the United States is the supreme agency advancing the underlying principle of the free order. The United States is the world order's fulcrum, and therefore the key to its existence and perpetuation. Without the United States, freedom, peace, civil relations among nations, and the possibility of civil society are all under threat of extinction. This is why the most abominable terrorists and tyrants single out the United States for their schemes and attacks. They know that the United States is the guardian of liberal values. In the rhetoric of security, therefore, the survival of the United States, its sheer existence, becomes the content of liberal values**.** In other words, what does it mean to espouse liberal values in the context of the present state of world affairs? It means to desire fervently and promote energetically the survival of the United States of America. When the world order struggles to preserve its "self," the self that it seeks to preserve, the primary location of its being, is the United States. Conferring this status upon the United States allows the rhetoric of security to insist upon a threat to the existence of the world order as a whole while confining the non-normative status that arises from this threat to the United States alone. The United States—as the self under threat—remains external to the normative relations by which the rest of the world continues to be bound. The United States is both a specific national existence struggling for its life and normativity itself, which makes it coextensive with the world order as a whole. For this reason, any challenge to U.S. world dominance would be a challenge to world peace and is thus impermissible. We read in The National Security Strategy that the United States [End Page 32] will "promote a balance of power that favors freedom" (National Security 2002, 1). And later, we find out what is meant by such a balance of power.

**The attempt to secure American Hegemony leads to endless interventionism and conflict**

**Burke 7** - Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, ‘7 <Anthony. Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 231-2>

**Yet** the first act in America's 'forward strategy of freedom' was to invade and attempt to subjugate Iraq**,** suggesting that**,** if 'peace' is its object, its means is war: the engine of history is violence, on an enormous and tragic scale, and violence is ultimately its only meaning.This we can glimpse in 'Toward a Pacific Union', a deeply disingenuous chapter of Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man**.** This text divides the earth between a 'post-historical' world of affluent developed democracieswhere 'the old rules of power-politics have decreasing relevance'**,** and a world still 'stuck in history' and 'riven with a variety of religious, national and ideological conflicts'. The two worlds will maintain 'parallel but **separate existences' and** interact only along axes of threat, disturbance and crucial strategic interest: oil, immigration, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Because'the relationship between democracies and nondemocracies will still be characterised by mutual distrust and fear'**,** writes Fukuyama, the 'post-historical half must still make use of realist methods when dealing with the part still in history ... force will still be the ultima ratio in their relations'. For all the book's Kantian pretensions, Fukuyama naturalises war and coercion as the dominant mode of dealing with billions of people defined only through their lack of 'development' and 'freedom'. Furthermore, in his advocacy of the 'traditional moralism of American foreign policy'and his dismissal of the United Nations in favour of a NATO-style 'league of truly free states ... capable of much more forceful action to protect its collective security against threats arising from the non-democratic part of the world' wecan see an early premonition of the historicist unilateralism of the Bush administration. 72 In this light, we can see the invasion of Iraq as continuing a long process of 'world-historical' violence that stretches back to Columbus' discovery of the Americas, and the subsequent politics of genocide, warfare and dispossession through which the modem United States was created and then expanded - initially with the colonisation of the Philippines and coercive trade relationships with China and Japan, and eventually to the self-declared role Luce had argued so forcefully for: guarantor of global economic and strategic order after 1945. This role involved the hideous destruction of Vietnam and Cambodia, 'interventions' in Chile, El Salvador, Panama, Nicaragua and Afghanistan(or an ever more destructive 'strategic' involvement in the Persian Gulf that saw the United States first building up Iraq as a formidable regional military power, and then punishing its people with a 14-year sanctions regime that caused the deaths of at least 200,000 people),all of which we are meant to accept as proof of America's benign intentions, of America putting its 'power at the service of principle'.They are merely history working itself out, the 'design of nature' writing its bliss on the world.73 The bliss 'freedom' offers us, however, is the bliss of the graveyard, stretching endlessly into a world marked not by historical perfection or democratic peace, but by the eternal recurrence of tragedy, as ends endlessly disappear in the means of permanent war and permanent terror. This is how we must understand both the prolonged trauma visited on the people of Iraq since 1990, and the inflammatory impact the US invasion will have on the new phenomenon of global antiWestern terrorism. American exceptionalism has deluded US policymakers into believing that they are the only actors who write history, who know where it is heading, and how it will play out, and that in its service it is they (and no-one else) who assume an unlimited freedom to act. As a senior adviser to Bush told a journalist in 2002:'We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality . . We're history's actors."

#### The US discourse of empire is built on a false premise of invincibility that justifies violence against anything that threatens its power

**Kaplan ‘3** - Prof. of English @ Univ. of Pennslyvania <Amy. American Quarterly 56.1, “Violent Belongings and the Question of Empire Today,” p. muse>

The language of exposure is part of the current discourse of empire: “People are now coming out of the closet on the word empire,” said the conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer. “The fact is no country has been as dominant culturally, economically, technologically and militarily in the history of the world since the Roman Empire.”5 The metaphor of coming out is striking, part of a broader trend of appropriating the language of progressive movements in the service of empire. How outrageous to apply the language of gay pride to a military power that demands that its soldiers stay in the closet. Ferguson too writes that America “is an empire, in short, that dare not speak its name.”6 In praising Bush for speaking what Ferguson calls “The ‘E’ Word,” he is not referring to the love between men, but is showing that Bush isn’t a sissy, “unlike his predecessors, who thought peace could be brought by touchy-feely peace talks, Mr. Bush has grasped that military power is key: the magical spear that heals even as it wounds.”7 This inversion of peace and war also turns domination into victimization, masculine heterosexual violence into illicit sexuality, oppressed by the effeminate politically correct crowd. In this light it might not be surprising to read the following in the Wall Street Journal: “A decade ago, being against empire would have been like being against rape. To all but the perverse few who cheered for the wrong side in Star Wars movies, ‘empire’ was a dirty word. Today, it has re- emerged, newly laundered.”8 Can rape too be laundered? Is outing the empire a contemporary version of manifest destiny? This coming-out narrative, associated primarily with neoconservatives, aggressively celebratesthe United States as finally revealing its true essence—its manifest destiny—on a global stage.We won the Cold War, so the story goes, andas the only superpower, we will maintain global supremacy primarily by military means, by preemptive strikes against any potential rivals, and by a perpetual war against terror, defined primarily as the Muslim world. We need to remain vigilant against those rogue states and terrorists who resist not our power but the universal human values that we embody**.** This narrative is about time as well as space**.** It imagines an empire in perpetuity, one that beats back the question haunting all empiresin J. M. Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians: “One thought alone preoccupies the submerged mind of Empire: how not to end, how not to die, how to prolong its era**.”9** In this hypermasculine narrative there’s a paradoxical sense of invincibility and unparalleled power and at the same time utter and incomprehensible vulnerability—a lethal combination, which reminds us that the word vulnerable once also referred to the capacity to harm.

## Competitiveness

#### US competitiveness rhetoric leads to economic securitization used to justify larger conflicts and violence to protect its capital interests

**Berger and Bristow 9** - Thomas, Professor, Department of International Relations, Boston University, and Gillian, Senior Lecturer in Economic Geography at Cardiff <”Competitiveness and the Benchmarking of Nations—A Critical Reflection” International Atlantic Economic Society, 9 September 2009. Int Adv Econ Res (2009) 15:378–392>

As a consequence, there has been growing critique of the concept of national competitiveness and the rather flimsy theoretical base on which it rests. Krugman (1997, 7) summarizes the confusion which surrounds the meaning of national competitiveness with his assertion that it is largely defined in vague and approximate terms “as the combination of favorable trade performance and something else”. This is referring to the fact that most definitions—just like the one by the OECD (1992)—refer to the ability to sell concept. This is often accompanied with a call for a strategic management on the national level, focusing on high-value added activities, exports or innovation, depending on the underlying concept. The danger here is that such rhetoric is used to justify protectionism and trade wars. Krugman (1994, 1997) goes on to argue that national competitiveness is either a new word for domestic productivity or meaningless political rhetoric. Whilst nations may compete for investments if companies seek new business locations, this represents only a minor fraction of economic activities for bigger economies. Furthermore, this is often connected with subsidies or tax reductions to attract such investments. This strategic management for the attraction of investment and the fostering of exports is, according to Krugman, little more than political rhetoric, designed to promote an image rather than secure clear and unambiguous economic dividends,. Similarly, Cohen (1994, 196) describes the notion of national competitiveness in terms of “Presidential metaphors, [trying] to encapsulate complicated matters for purposes of political mobilization”, perhaps implying that national competitiveness might be better understood in the fields of political science and place marketing. Indeed, growing interest in the notion of competitiveness as a hegemonic construct or discourse provides further strength to the view that its value lies beyond that of an economic model or concept, but rests instead with its capacity to mobilize interest-related action (Bristow 2005). As such, this paper focuses on the utility of national indices of competitiveness, particularly for policymakers and key interest groups promoting it. In part, the growth in competitiveness indices and benchmarking is a product of the growing audit culture which surrounds the neo-liberal approach to economic governance in market economies. Public policy in developed countries experiencing the marketization of the state, is increasingly driven by managerialism which emphasizes the improved performance and efficiency of the state. This managerialism is founded upon economistic and rationalistic assumptions which include an emphasis upon measuring performance in the context of a planning system driven by objectives and targets (Bristow 2005). This is closely intertwined with assumptions about the increasingly global nature of economic activity. Thus, as the view that national economies are self-contained and self-regulating systems has been replaced with the view that national economies are locked in unyielding international competition, a new relationship between the economy, the state, and the society has emerged “in which their distinctive identities as separate spheres of national life are increasingly blurred . . . The result is increasing pressure to make relationships based on bureaucratic norms . . . meet the standards of efficiency that are believed to characterize the impersonal forces of supply and demand” (Beeson and Firth 1998, 220). This in turn leads to an increasing requirement for people, places and organizations to be accountable and for their performance and success to be measured and assessed. However, benchmarking competitiveness may also be viewed as a technology of government and a mechanism by which key international institutions in particular act to promote and disseminate its rationality. Cammack (2006, 120) describes the “rapid spread of surveillance, benchmarking and peer review through coercive or cooperative supranational mechanisms and close co-ordination between national competitive authorities” and explains how, according to the World Economic Forum, its Global Competitiveness Report is intended “to help national economies improve their competitiveness**”.** The first report, produced in 1979 then together with the IMD, covered only 16 European countries. The latest report covers 131 countries and introduces a new Global Competitiveness index with over 90 countries, showing how the system of mutual learning and surveillance has been perfected and extended considerably in recent years. Whereas the old index had 35 variables and covered only three ‘key drivers of growth’ (macroeconomic environment, quality of public institutions and technology’, the new index adds in a wider range of factors ‘seen as important determinants of competitiveness’, such as the functioning of labor markets, the quality of a country’s infrastructure, the state of education and public health, and the size of the market. Cammack (2006, 10) concludes “behind all the jiggery-pokery that this entails, the principal purpose of the annual league tables is to support national reformers, aiding and abetting the social/socio-psychological process of ‘locking-in’**” .**

## Nuclear terror

**Nuclear Terrorism rhetoric mobilizes threats of imaginary forces that cause endless interventionism and violence in the name of security**

**Masco in 6** –Professor of Anthropology at the University of Chicago. <Joseph. “The Construction of Nuclear Terror Ensures Radical US Interventionism, Everyone is a Target” The Nuclear Borderlands. 2006. p. 328-332>

 The post-Cold War period ended after September 11, 2001, with the formal conversion of the United Statesto acounterterrorism state. Americans who once thought the end of the Cold War had fundamentally transformed their relationship to the bomb were, after the terrorist strikes on September 11, once again witness to an escalating discourse of nuclear terror: the air¬waves were filled with stories of vulnerability, of unsecured ports through which a terrorist nuclear device could be smuggled, of unprotected nuclear power plants open to suicide attacks by airplane, of radiological dirty bombs, which might contaminate major U.S. cities, rendering them uninhabitable. A newly formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS) soon launched the first civil defense campaign in more than a generation, seemingly designed more to maintain nuclear fear than reduce it. The Ready.Gov campaign officially advised citizens to stockpile potassium iodide pills to deal with potential radioactive poisoning, while doing their best to avoid contact with an exploding nuclear device (see Figure 8.1). Meanwhile, a new Homeland Security Advisory System kept Americans at a state of "elevated" to "high" risk of terrorist attack, institutionaliz¬ing a new kind of official terror**,** buttressed by frequent speculations from the DHS and FBI about possibly imminent catastrophic attacks. By the fall of 2004, when asked in their first debate to identify the single greatest threat to the national security of the United States, both presidential candidates agreed it was the atomic bomb: Senator Kerry put it in the context of "nuclear proliferation," while President Bush stated the greatest danger to the United States was nuclear weapons "in the hands of a terrorist enemy."1 In the new century, nuclear insecurity once again formally linked the foreign and the domestic under the sign of apocalyptic nuclear risk, creating a political space in which anything seemed possible**.** National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice, for example, made a case for war with Iraq simply by stating that "we don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud."2 In doing so, she mobilized the threat of an imaginaryIraqinuclear arsenal to enable the most radical foreign policy decision in modern American history: a "preventative" war, which involved invading another country to eliminate a nuclear threat before it actually existed**.**3 In a few short years, nuclear fear writ large was politically mobilized into an enormously productive force in the United States, enabling a reconfiguration of U.S. military affairs (embracing covert action on a global scale), a massive bureaucratic reorganization of federal institutions (the Department of Homeland Security), a reconfiguration of civil liberties and domestic policing laws (the U.S.A. Patriot Act), and an entirely new concept of wa**r** (preemption).

## Environment

**Environmental impacts are premised in a securitize logic of geopolitics that presupposes the United States as responsible for saving the earth from destruction**

**Tuathall 96** - Professor of Government and International Affairs and Director of the Masters of Public and International Affairs program – Virginia Tech <Gearóid. “At The End of Geopolitics?” September 1996. http://www.nvc.vt.edu/toalg/Website/Publish/papers/End.htm>

Even within the much remarked upon emergence of "environmental security" and the sacred visions of green governmentalists like Al Gore, geography is post-territorial in-flowmations of ozone gases, acid rain, industrial pollution, topsoil erosion, smog emissions, rainforest depletions and toxic spills**.** Yet, the discourse of unveiled and primordial geographical regions persists also. In the place of Mackinder's natural seats of power, Gore presents the "great genetic treasure map" of the globe, twelve areas around the globe that "hold the greatest concentration of germplasm important to modern agriculture and world food production." Robert Kaplan's unsentimental journey to the "ends of the earth" where cartographic geographies are unravelling and fading has him disclosing a "real world" of themeless violence and chaos, a world where "[w]e are not in control." The specter of a second Cold War -- "a protracted struggle between ourselves and the demons of crime, population pressure, environmental degradation, disease and cultural conflict**"** -- haunt his thoughts**.** This equivocal environmentalization of strategic discourse (and visa versa) -- and the environmental strategic think tanks like the World Watch Institute which promote it **--** deserve problematization as clusters of postmodern geopolitics, in this case congealments of geographical knowledge and green governmentality designed to re-charge the American polity with a circumscribed global environmental mission to save planet earth from destruction.

## Infrastructure Terrorism

**The notion of a terrorist attack on U.S. infrastructure is rooted in geopolitical securitization of fluid international threats**

**Tuathall 96** - Professor of Government and International Affairs and Director of the Masters of Public and International Affairs program – Virginia Tech <Gearóid. “At The End of Geopolitics?” September 1996. http://www.nvc.vt.edu/toalg/Website/Publish/papers/End.htm>

A complex postmodern geopolitics entwining territory, media and machines was evident in the U.S. cruise missile attacks against Iraq in September 1996. The latest version of the U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile used in these attacks (made by the GM owned Hughes Aircraft Company at an estimated cost of $1 million apiece) employed not only a supposedly improved terrain "scene-matching" computer but also a complementary guidance system that used satellites to continually update the missile's location and target. (Many of the missiles still missed!). The unusual geopolitics of these attacks -- the use of drone weapons launched by warships in international waters and by B-52's based in Guam, a 20 hour flight away -- was necessitated both by territorial limits in the region, diplomatic restrictionson the use of airbases in Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and televisual limits at home, the Clinton administration's fear of the spectacle of U.S. military casualties in the run-up to a presidential election. The geopolitics of vision, in this case, was triangulated by technology, territory and television. A second cluster of postmodern geopolitics is that emerging from the efforts of intellectuals and institutions of statecraft to re-map the global strategic landscape after the Cold War. While the crude Manichean world of the Cold War may be gone for now, the preoccupation of the national security establishment with "rogue states and nuclear outlaws" is indicative of a persistent territorial conceptualization of danger in international security studies**.** Underwriting these territorializing specifications of danger are, of course, old-fashioned essentialist identities -- totalitarian states, Islamic fundamentalists, die-hard Communists,terrorists, criminals and devils (like Saddam Hussein) -- and a longstanding strategic commitment on the part of the Western security apparatus to pro-Western states like Israel, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The effort of NATO to extend this zone of strategic commitment and protection in Central Europe is evidence that a state-centric territorial geopolitics does persist, but increasingly it is also non-territorial "postmodern terrorist" threats in a speeding hybrid world that preoccupy the defense planners in the Pentagon, at NATO headquarters in Brussels, and elsewhere. Threats from contraband flows and proliferations -- the spread of nuclear weapons, plutonium, terrorists, drugs, illegal migrants, infectious diseases, money laundering, sensitive high-tech assets, biological and chemical agents, etc. -- and threats to vital official flows and ports -- oil pipelines, subways, world trading centers, airports, teleports, secret data archives, fiber-optic lines, international financial networks, and global sporting spectacles -- have brought into being a postmodern geopolitics of security where the geographies are in fluid flowmations not fixed formations. Ostensibly preoccupied by a geography of territorial fixities during the Cold War, security discourse has expanded to encompass the protection of fundamental spaces of flows from material attack or the immaterial terrorism of computer hackers and software viruses. The creation of a Belfast-style "ring of steel" and CCTV system around the City of London -- a strategic space of financial flows -- and the militarization of U.S. airports in response to recent spectacular bombings disclose a geopolitics that mixes traditional forms of containment and detainment with new panoptic surveillance and scanning technologies. Again, media vectors are also implicated in the creation of these landscapes, one of their "strategic" functions being the simulation of security and the containment of media borne viruses of panic and hysteria.

## State

**State authority reflects a doctrine of national security that overrides liberalism and justifies immorals acts in the name of the common good**

**Neocleous in 8** – Brunel University in the Department of Government <Mark. “Critique of Security” 2008. >

The doctrine of reason of state holds that besides moral reason there is another reason independent of traditional (that is, Christian) values and according to whichpower should be wielded, not according to the dictates of good conscience and morality, but according to whatever is needed to maintain the state. The underlying logic here is order and security rather than ‘the good’, and the underlying basis of the exercise of power is necessity, The doctrine is thus founded on principles and assumptions seemingly antithetical to the liberal idea of liberty- in either the moral or the legal sense. Courses of action that would be condemned as immoral if conducted by individuals could be sanctioned when undertaken by the sovereign power**.** ‘When I talked of murdering or keeping the Pisans imprisones, I didn’t perhaps talk as a Christian: I talked according to the reason and practice of states’ Hence for Machiavelli, Romulus deserved to be excused for the death of his brother and his companion because ’what he did was done for the common good'? The doctrine of reason of state thus treats the sovereign as autonomous from morality; the state can engage in whatever actions it thinks right — ’contrary to truth, contrary to charity contrary to humanity contrary to religion'” — so long as they are necessary and performed for the public good. But this is to also suggest that the state might act beyond law and the legal limits on state power so long as it does so for 'the common good', the ’good of the people' or the 'preservation of the state'. ln being able to legitimate state power in all its guises the doctrine of reason of state was of enormous importance, becoming a weapon brandished in power games between princes and then states, eventually becoming the key ideological mechanism of international confrontation as the doctrine gradually morphed into ’interest of state', ’security of state' and, finally ’national security’**.“** The doctrine identifies security — simultaneously of the people and the state (since these are always ideologically conflated) — as the definitive aspect of state power. Security becomes the overriding political interest, the principle above all other principles, and underpins interventions across the social realm in the name of reason of state.

## Economy

**Protection of the economy is grounded in the demand for security as a means of the upper class and its interests**

**Neocleous in 8** – Brunel University in the Department of Government <Mark. “Critique of Security” 2008. >

We are often and rightly told that security is intimately associated with the rise of the modem state. But we also need to note that it is equally intimately bound up with the rise of bourgeois property rights and a liberal order-building**,** and in later chapters we will see the extent of this intimacy. In this way liberalism's conception of security was intimately connected to its vision of political subjectivity centred 1 on the self-contained and property-owning individual. The reason liberty is wrapped in the concept of security, then, is because security is simultaneously wrapped in the question of property, giving us a triad of concepts which are usually run so close together that they are almost conflated ('liberty, security, property'), a triad found in Smith, j Blackstone, Paine, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, and in various other formulations elsewhere.' Thus as liberalism generated a new conception of 'the economy' as its founding political act, a conception which integrated the wealth of nations, the world market and the labour of the population, its notion of liberty necessitated a particular vision of security: the ideological guarantee of the egoism of the independent and self-interested pursuit of property. It is for this reason Marx calls security 'the supreme concept of bourgeois society'.' Marx spotted that as the concept of bourgeois society, security plays a double role: The progress of social wealth,' says Storch 'begets this useful class of society . . . which performs the most wearisome, the vilest, the most disgusting functions, which, in a word takes on its shoulders all that is disagreeable and servile in life, and procures thus for other classes leisure, serenity of mind and conventional**'** (c'est bon, ca) 'dignity of character'. Storch then asks himself what the actual advantage is of this capitalist civilization, with its misery and its degradation of the masses, as compared with barbarism. He can find only one answer: security! One side of this double role, then, is that security is the ideological justification for 'civilisation'(that is, capitalism) as opposed to 'barbarism' (that is, non-capitalist modes of production); hence Locke's need to move from the 'state of nature' to the state of civil society. The other side is that security is what the bourgeois class demand once it has exploited, demoralised and degraded the bulk of humanity. For all the talk of 'laissez faire', the 'natural' phenomena of labour, wages and profit have to be policed and secured. Thus security entails the concept of police, guaranteeing as well as presupposing that society exists to secure the conservation of a particular kind of subjectivity(known as 'persons') and the rights and property associated with this subjectivity." The non-liberal and non-capitalist may be 'tolerated' - that other classically liberal concept which also functions as a regulatory power - but they will also be heavily policed ... for 'security reasons'? The new form of economic reason to which liberalism gave birth also gave new content to the idea of reason of state and thus a new rationale for state action: the 'free economy'

## Military technology link

**Improvements in the military are justified by the need to secure American dominance – this justifies endless intervention and violence**

**Dalby in 8** – Professor of Geography and Political Economy at Carleton University <Simon. “Geopolitics, the Revolution in Military Affairs, and the Bush Doctrine” http://pi.library.yorku.ca/dspace/bitstream/handle/10315/1308/YCI0002.pdf?sequence=1]

 The potential to use this superiority to assert American dominance round the globe, to prevent future challenges to American dominance even emerging became a key theme in what subsequently emerged as the neo-conservative view of the appropriate place of American power in the post cold war world (Dalby 2006). Geopolitics had morphed from a concern with European battlefields and nuclear standoff with the Soviets into a more general concern with maintaining American global dominance. Technological superiority should allow American forces to intervene anywhere at relatively short notice. But the shambles in Mogadishu in 1993 took the lustre off assumptions that firepower and technological superiority was enough to ensure effective policing of the world’s trouble spots. Nonetheless American military force was soon again used in the Balkans, and repeatedly to degrade Iraqi military capabilities in the 1990s. Then came the events of September 11th 2001 when an unanticipated attack by Al Qaeda suicide flyers challenged the geopolitical premises of American thinking fundamentally. The focus in neo-conservative thinking in the 1990s had been on states, not international terror operations as the primary focus of danger to American dominance (Kagan and Kristol 2000). Afghanistan immediately became the locus for military action in an arena for which there were few plans. The combination of airpower and money to buy the loyalty of local warlords fairly quickly removed the Taliban regime but failed to either capture or kill key Al Qaeda operatives. The capabilities of special forces and guided bombs suddenly suggested that the RMA had indeed fundamentally changed warfare, and simultaneously that the cold war geography of conflict was irrelevant (Rumsfeld 2002). But quite why, when a few dissident Saudi Arabians and their Egyptian helpers hijacked some airliners in the United States, and crashed them into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, this necessarily required a ‘global war’ response was very far from clear (Dalby 2003). One spectacular violation of American sovereignty turned the whole globe explicitly into a combat zone in the updated map of American combatant commanders areas of responsibility (Dalby 2007a). New national security doctrine statements and defense strategy statements have subsequently emphasized the global reach of American forces and the apparent necessity to build new ever more capable weapons systems and new bases in many parts of the world to facilitate the rapid movement of forces to new zones of conflict. This new geopolitical specification of global dangers provides the rationale for these new forces, weapons, and basing arrangements.

## Rogue States

#### Rogue states and actors are framed as irrational actors and threats to security – this justifies the surveillance and control of the social body and its destruction

Reid 10 – Lecturer in International Relatoins, Department of War Studies, King’s College London <Julian. “On the Implications of Foucault’s Security, Territory, Population Lectures for the Analysis and Theorisation of Security in International Relations” September 2010. http://www.mcrg.ac.in/Development/draft\_Symposium/Julian1.pdf 6)

Intriguingly, the concept of the ‘rogue’ is regularly used to describe the various forms of threat posed to critical infrastructure in the social jurisdictions of liberal regimes. Not only rogue states, but non-state ‘rogue actors’ and even pre-individual ‘rogue behaviors’ are increasingly singled out as the sources of insecurity for a global liberal order the welfare of which is conceived in circulatory and infrastructural terms. In the nineteenth century the protection of liberal order from the threats posed by ‘rogues’ involved securing life, as Derrida describes, on ‘the street, in a city, in the urbanity and good conduct of urban life’. In the twenty-first century the ‘paths of circulation’ on which rogues are feared to roam are that much more complex and require that much more insidious methods of protection. The evaluation of threats is said to require ‘detailed analysis in order to detect patterns and anomalies, understanding and modeling of human behavior, and translation of these sources into threat information’. It is likewise said to require the development of new technologies able to provide ‘analysis of deceptive behaviors, cognitive capabilities, the use of everyday heuristics’ and ‘the systematic analysis of what people do and where lapses do – and do not – occur’. It requires not just the surveillance and control of the social body as a whole, or of the movements and dispositions of individuals, but rather, techniques which target and seize control of life beneath the molecular thresholds of its biological functioning and existence. While it is a fact that the biological imaginaries of liberal regimes have played a significant role in constituting the types of threat that they face, it is also a fact that the major adversaries of liberal regimes today base their strategies on the deliberate targeting of their circulatory capacities and ‘critical infrastructures’. Groupssuch as Al-Qaedaare regarded as significant threats precisely because they deliberately target the ‘critical infrastructures’ which enable the liberality of these regimes rather than simply the human beings which inhabit them**.** Indeed, key intelligence sources, such as the FBI, report that Al-Qaeda are making the targeting of critical infrastructures their tactical priority. In Iraq, the insurgency is defined by similar methods involving the targeting of key infrastructure projects. These strategies of protection, implemented by liberal regimes to secure themselves from terrorism, resemble acutely those with which liberal states of the early modern era sought to secure themselves from the threat of sedition**.** In the 18th century the rationale was that the prevention of sedition required the promotion of internal trade and the general improvement of circulation among the domestic population. As the political influence of liberalism developed from the late eighteenth century onwards, so the task of identifying, strengthening, and securing the hidden infrastructures of societies became an increasingly prevalent goal and practice among governments. This understanding of the sources of security was fast politicized in the development not just of liberal political and philosophical thought, but in the development of the new governmental practices with which states would seek to enhance the resilience of the infrastructures of relations which would become the benchmarks of both their geo- and bio-political power. Government became the art and technique by which life would be tactically distributed and circulated in the ‘network of relations’ comprising the infrastructures of liberalizing societies.

## Global Warming

#### Attempts to solve global warming under the current international framework produces securitization- countries compete against each other to reduce, or avoid reducing their emissions

Buzan et al, 98 - Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and honorary professor at the University of Copenhagen and Jilin University (Barry., Ole Waever, a professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen Jaap de Wilde, Professor of International Relations and World Politics at the University of Groningen., 1998 “Security: A New Framework for Analysis” p.86)

The third sequence of questions is decisive, because it is here that a political constellation of mutual security concerns is formed. Who feels threatened? Who must those parties cooperate with if action is to be effective? Effects and causes are significant conditions in disposing who will become involved with whom and how, but they do not fully determine our outcomes. Securitization always involves political choice: thus, actors might choose to ignore major causes for political or pragmatic reasons and therefore may form a security constellation that is different from what one would expect based on one’s knowledge of effects and causes. Occasionally , pragmatism may prescribe global action, but even then it is necessary to subdivide global issues according to the context of their causes and effects. Dealing with the causes of, for instance, global warming require a global contest. The fossil CO2 emissions that contribute to the greenhouse effect occur worldwide are therefore a global problem, even though important regional differences should be realized. Meeting the causes of global warming points to the urgency of a global regime, which was recognized at UNCED where the climate treaty that became effective in March 1994 was signed. It is telling, however tat at the follow-up conference in Berlin (28 March-7 April 1995), saving the intentions declared at UNCED was the optimum goal. Further decision making and regime formation were postponed to the third Climate Summit, to be held in Tokyo in 1997. This postponement is in part a result of the fact that those who have to pay the price for prevention are different from those who pay the price of failure.

## Infrastructure

#### Improving infrastructure is rooted in the securitization of objects – fear of infrastructure failure or enemy attack puts us in a constant state of preparing for catastrophe

#### Aradau 2010 - Senior Lecturer in International Relations and member of the Centre for the Study of Political Community <Claudia. “Security That Matters: Critical Infrastructure and Objects of Protection” Oct. 14, 2010. Sage Publications>

The securitization of critical infrastructure is pre-eminently about the protection of objects. Critical infrastructure protection is generally held to have emerged as a security issue in the mid-1990s and the terminology of ‘critical infrastructure’ itself to have been coined by Clinton administration in 1996. Critical infrastructure allegedly signifies a difference from earlier usages of ‘infrastructure’. While infrastructure was part of military strategy to weaken the enemy, its transformation into a matter of national security has been variously located either during the Cold War (Collier and Lakoff 2007) or after 9/11 (Center for History and New Media 2009). If military strategy could also involve the destruction of one’s own infrastructure, the securitization of critical infrastructure assumes an understanding of infrastructure as foundational. Societies are ‘grounded’ in infrastructure, their functioning, continuity and survival are made possible by the protection of infrastructure**.** A 1997 report by the Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection was symbolically entitled ‘Critical Foundations’ (Commission for Critical Infrastructure Protection 1997). Definitions of critical infrastructure list heterogeneous elements, from communications, emergency services, energy, finance, food, government, health, to transport and water sectors (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) 2009). The general argument about the necessity to protect critical infrastructure is framed along these lines (with little variation from a report to another and from an author to another): Our modern society and day to day activities are dependent on networks of critical infrastructure – both physical networks such as energy and transportation systems and virtual networks such as the Internet. If terrorists attack a piece of critical infrastructure, they will disrupt our standard of living and cause significant physical, psychological, and financial damage to our nation (Bennett 2007: 9). The UK’s Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure defines the effects of any failure in national infrastructure to lead to ‘severe economic damage, grave social disruption, or even large scale loss of life’ (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) 2009). Naming infrastructures as critical for the purposes of protecting them against terrorist attacks is a securitising move. Where critical infrastructure experts would look for the adequacy of representation to the reality of objects threatened – by drawing up lists of critical infrastructure as a result of risk assessment scenarios – a performative approach would consider the constitution of reality through the iterative speech acts that securitize infrastructure by naming as ‘critical’ and in need of protection against potential terrorist attacks and/or other hazards. The Centre for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure in the UK encapsulates this double move: The most significant threat facing the UK comes from international terrorism and its stated ambitions to mount ‘high impact’ attacks that combine mass casualties with substantial disruption to key services such as energy, transport and communications. This is a threat that is different in scale and intent to any that the UK has faced before (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) 2010b). Yet, for the Copenhagen School of security studies for example, objects are also relegated to the status of external conditions of speech acts. Objects that are generally held to be threatening (for example, tanks or polluted waters) play a facilitating role in the process of securitization (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998: 33). Energy blackouts, transport failures and so on could also be read as facilitating conditions of the speech act. In this approach, there is ontological and epistemological ambiguity about the role of objects**:** as they outside speech acts or the result of speech acts? As the next section will show, this approach cannot account for different materializations of critical infrastructure – the matter of critical infrastructure is not constant and given but varies depending on the agential cuts created.

## Relations

**International relations rely on static identities of other countries that leads to enemy creation and arbitrary violence**

**Campbell 98** - professor of international politics at the university of Newcastle <David. “Writing Security. 1998. Pg 16-17.>

For the past fifty years American foreign policy has been formed in response to the threat posed by this country’s opponents and enemies... Now danger emanating from Moscow is no longer the dri¬ving force of the debate. This country has to decide what role it wishes to play in the world where there is no overwhelming dan¬ger to national security and no clearly identifiable enemy.6 In terms of the nonessentialistic character of danger discussed in the Introduction, however, the objectification and externalization of danger that are central to contemporary assessments of security and politics in the post—cold war era need to be understood as the effects of political practices rather than the conditions of their possibility. Ac¬cordingly, one appropriate response at this historical juncture is to undertake a reflexive consideration of the past as a means of highlight¬ing the historically constituted nature of international order in the present. It will be asserted here and argued in chapter 2 that one way of historicizing our understanding of the cold war is to reconceptu¬alize foreign policy and reinterpret United States foreign policy in the postwar period. If we problematize the conventional understand¬ing of foreign policy as being no more than the external orientation of preestablished states with fixed identities, and problematize the un¬derstanding that United States foreign policy in the postwar period was no more than a reaction to the dictates of an independent and hostile world, the form of international order we know as the cold war might be understood in terms of the need to discipline the ambi¬guity of global life in ways that help to secure always fragile identities. Aside from the impetus of this historical juncture, this argument is incited by a strain of intellectual ferment premised on fundamen¬tal ontological assumptions that can be associated with the logic of interpretation and the reconceptualization of identity and the state (outlined in the Introduction). It is difficult to overstate the implica¬tions of this ferment for the understanding of international relations, because it goes to the very heart of how “international relations” are constituted and understood, and how the discipline of international relations understands its own history and contemporary role**.** Hedley Bull once argued that the theory of international relations was con¬cerned with general propositions that may be advanced about the po¬litical relations among states? Such a proposition would seem to many to be so obvious as to verge on the banal, but it resolves the process of understanding global life in a particular way, through the demarca¬tion of a theory/practice divide so that theory is outside of the world it purports to simply observe. The interpretive approach, in contrast, sees theory as practice: the theory of international relations is one in¬stance of the pervasive cultural practices that serve to discipline ambiguity. Experience has to be arrested, fixed, or disciplined for social life to be possible. The form that emerges through this process is thus both arbitrary and nonarbitrary: arbitrary in that it is one possibility among many, and nonarbitrary in “the sense that one can inquire into the historical conditions within which one way of making the world was dominant so that we now have a world that power has con-vened.”8 The “world” we so often take for granted as a foundation for knowledge and politics thus came to be, through multiple politi¬cal practices, related as much to the constitution of various subjectiv¬ities as to the intentional action of predetermined subjects.

## China

#### US conceptions of the “China threat” create a self-fulfilling prophecy and spur policymaker action

**Pan 4** (Chengxin, Department of Political Science and International Relations at Australian National University, *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, Vol. 29, No. 3, p. 306)

While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is," their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empiricallyrevealed by scientific means. For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world." (2) Like many other China scholars, Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment." (3) Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States**,** they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt**.** I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "observation" of "where China is today," nor to join the "containment" versus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the "China threat" literature. More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representativesof the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problemit purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature--themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions. These themes are of course nothing new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. They have been identified elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies, political science, and international relations. (4) Yet, so far, the China field in the West in general and theU.S. "China threat**"** literature in particular have shown remarkable resistance to systematic critical reflection on both their normative status as discursive practice and their enormous practical implications for international politics. (5) It is in this context that this article seeks to make a contribution.

#### The US paints China as a threat because it fills the enemy role needed to sustain US hegemonic power

**Pan 4** (Political Science, Australian National U,Chengxin, Department of Political Science at Australian National University, “The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics”, Alternatives, June-July, ebscohost)

What does this U.S. self-knowledge have to do with the way in which it comes to know others in general and China in particular? To put it simply, this self-knowledge is always a powerful analytical framework within which other societies are to be known. By envisioning a linear process of historical development with itself at its apex, the United States places other nations on a common evolutionary slope and sees them as inevitably traveling toward the end of history that is the United States. For example, as a vast, ancient nation on the other side of the Pacific, China is frequently taken as a mirror image of the U.S. self. As Michael Hunt points out, we imagine ourselves locked in a special relationship with the Chinese, whose apparent moderation and pragmatism mirror our own most prized attributes and validate our own longings for a world made over in our own image. If China with its old and radically different culture can be won, where can we not prevail? Yet, in a world of diversity, contingency, and unpredictability, which is irreducible to universal sameness or absolute certainty, this kind of U.S. knowledge of others often proves frustratingly elusive. In this context, rather than questioning the validity of their own universalist assumptions, the people of the United States believe that those who are different should be held responsible for the lack of universal sameness. Indeed, because "we" are universal, those who refuse or who are unable to become like "us" are no longer just "others," but are by definition the negation of universality, or the other. In this way, the other is always built into this universalized "American" self. Just as "Primitive ... is a category, not an object, of Western thought," so the threat of the other is not some kind of "external reality" discovered by U.S. strategic analysts, but a ready-made category of thought within this particular way of U.S. self-imagination. Consequently, there is always a need for the United States to find a specific other to fill into the totalized category of otherness.

#### The US “objective” view of China is essentialist and racist

**Pan 4** (Chengxin, Department of Political Science and International Relations at Australian National University, “The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics”, Alternatives, June-July)

Having examined how the "China threat" literature is enabled by and serves the purpose of a particular U.S. self-construction, I want to turn now to the issue of how this literature represents a discursive construction of other, instead of an "objective" account of Chinese reality. This, I argue, has less to do with its portrayal of China as a threat per se than with its essentialization and totalization of China as an externally knowable object, independent of historically contingent contexts or dynamic international interactions. In this sense, the discursive construction of China as a threatening other cannot be detached from (neo)realism, a positivist. ahistorical framework of analysis within which global life is reduced to endless interstate rivalry for power and survival. As many critical IR scholars have noted, (neo) realism is not a transcendent description of global reality but is predicated on the modernist Western identity, which, in the quest for scientific certainty, has come to define itself essentially as the sovereign territorial nation-state. This realist self-identity of Western states leads to the constitution of anarchy as the sphere of insecurity, disorder, and war. In an anarchical system, as (neo) realists argue, "the gain of one side is often considered to be the loss of the other,"'' and "All other states are potential threats."' In order to survive in such a system, states inevitably pursue power or capability. In doing so, these realist claims represent what R. B. J. Walker calls "a specific historical articulation of relations of universality/particularity and self/Other." The (neo) realist paradigm has dominated the U.S. IR discipline in general and the U.S. China studies field in particular. As Kurt Campbell notes, after the end of the Cold War, a whole new crop of China experts "are much more likely to have a background in strategic studies or international relations than China itself. "" As a result, for those experts to know China is nothing more or less than to undertake a geopolitical analysis of it, often by asking only a few questions such as how China will "behave" in a strategic sense and how it may affect the regional or global balance of power, with a particular emphasis on China's military power or capabilities. As Thomas J. Christensen notes, "Although many have focused on intentions as well as capabilities, the most prevalent component of the [China threat] debate is the assessment of China's overall future military power compared with that of the United States and other East Asian regional powers."'' Consequently, almost by default, China emerges as an absolute other and a threat thanks to this (neo) realist prism.

#### Securitizing US representations of China justify the use of military power

**Foot 95** (Rosemary, Professor of International Relations at Oxford University, *The Practice of Power; US Relations With China*, p. 23)

Yet, in the period after 1949, the United States more than any other state in the global system struck at the leaders’ sense that Chinese status had indeed been transformed. From their perspective, US and not Chinese actions diminished the country’s security (and) prevented its territorial unificationswith Taiwan, and denied its fulfillment of a world role. The United States stationed its troops and most deadly weaponry around China’s borders, formed military and economic alliances with its regional enemies**,** threatened the country with nuclear destruction, and interfered in its internal affairs.Washington also obstructed Beijing’s establishment of diplomatic relationswith a number of states, imposed a strict trading embargo upon it, and denied it entry into the United Nations – the most important international organization of the post-war era. Communist ideology dictates that the leading imperialist nation was doomed to extinction in the final stage before the transition to socialism, and Mao additionally argued that the United States, though it seemed so powerful, was in fact a ‘paper tiger’ because it lacked popular support; nevertheless, the longevity of imperialism was troubling and often required a prudent response from China in the short to medium term. Aspects of power have similarlysuffused America’s relations with China, also a condition that has long historical roots. Nineteenth and early twentieth-century unequal encounters encouraged the United States in its paternalism and in its desire to make the Chinese behave or reform in ways that Americans found compatible with their vision of a modern and civilized country. With the communist victory on the mainland in 1949, the American way appeared to have been rejected, and the Sino-Soviet alliance seemed to confirm it. When the ‘ungrateful’ Chinese added to that ideological opposition by engaging directly in military conflict against US forces in Korea, attacking America’s ally on Taiwan, and marching into democratic India in 1962, it was a relatively easy task to depict China as powerful and menacing. In his study of American images of China, Harold Isaacs noted that the most pervasive image his respondents offered was that of China as a sleeping giant awakening, a civilization that had been ‘bottled up’ for so long ‘now bursting forth with tremendous energy’.

## Russia

#### **Depictions of Russia as dangerous and unstable lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy and violence**

Jæger **2k (**Øyvind, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, *Peace and Conflict Studies* 7.2, “Securitizing Russia: Discursive Practice of the Baltic States,” <http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.pdf#page=18>]

The Russian war on Chechnya is one event that was widely interpreted **in the Baltic** as a ominous sign of what Russia has in store the Baltic states (see Rebas 1996: 27; Nekrasas 1996: 58; Tarand 1996: 24; cf. Haab 1997). The constitutional ban in all three states on any kind of association with post-Soviet political structures is indicative of a threat perception that confuses Soviet and post- Soviet, conflating Russia with the USSR and casting everything Russian as a threat through what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) call a discursive "chain of equivalence". In this the value of one side in a binary opposition is reiterated in other denotations of the same binary opposition.. Thus, the value “Russia”in a Russia/Europe-opposition is also denoted by “instability,” "Asia", "invasion", "chaos,” "incitement of ethnic minorities", "unpredictability,” “imperialism,” "slander campaign", "migration", and so forth. The opposite value of these markers (“stability,” “Europe,” “defense,” “order,” and so on) would then denote the Self and thus conjure up an identity. When identity is precarious, this discursive practice intensifies by shifting onto a security mode, treating the oppositions as if they were questions of political existence, sovereignty, and survival. Identity is (re)produced more effectively when the oppositions are employed in a discourse of insecurity and danger. that is, made into questions of national security and thus securitised in the Wæverian sense. In the Baltic cases, especially the Lithuanian National Security Concept is knitting a chain of equivalence in a ferocious discourse of danger. Not only does it establish "[t]hat the defence of Lithuania is total and unconditional," and that "[s]hould there be no higher command, self-controlled combat actions of armed units and citizens shall be considered legal." (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 1, 2) It also posits that [t]he power of civic resistance is constituted of the Nation’s Will and self-determination to fight for own freedom, of everyone citizen’s resolution to resist to [an] assailant or invader by all possible ways, despite citizen’s age and [or] profession, of taking part in Lithuania’s defence (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 4). When this is added to the identifying of the objects of national security as "human and citizen rights, fundamental freedoms and personal security; state sovereignty; rights of the nation, prerequisites for a free development; the state independence; the constitutional order; state territory and its integrity, and; cultural heritage," and the subjects as "the state, the armed forces and other institutions thereof; the citizens and their associations, and; non governmental organisations,"(National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 2, Sc. 1, 2) one approaches a conception of security in which the distinction between state and nation has disappeared in all-encompassing securitization. Everyone is expected to defend everything with every possible means. And when the list of identified threats to national security that follows range from "overt (military) aggression", via "personal insecurity", to "ignoring of national values,"(National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 10) the National Security Concept of Lithuania has become a totalising one taking everything to be a question of national security. The chain of equivalence is established when the very introduction of the National Security Concept is devoted to a denotation of Lithuania’s century-old sameness to "Europe" and resistance to "occupation and subjugation" (see quotation below), whereby Russia is depicted and installed as the first link in the discursive chain that follows. In much the same way the "enemy within" came about in Estonia and Latvia. As the independence-memory was ritualised and added to the sense of insecurity – already fed by confusion in state administration, legislation and government policy grappling not only with what to do but also how to do it given the inexperience of state institutions or their absence – unity behind the overarching objective of independence receded for partial politics and the construction of the enemy within. This is what David Campbell points out when he sees the practices of security as being about securing a precarious state identity. One way of going about it is to cast elements on the state inside resisting the privileged identity as the subversive errand boys of the prime external enemy.

#### US conception of Russian nuclear threat results in a self fulfilling prophecy

**Rumer and Sokolsky 1** (Eugene B, National Security Council and Rand Corporation, and Richard D, director of the Office of Strategic Policy and Negotiations in the Department of State. “Normalizing U.S.-Russia Relations.” April 2001)

Ten years after the end of the Cold War, mutual hopes that a comprehensive partnership would replace containment as the major organizing theme in U.S.-Russian relations have not been realized. The record of the 1990s has left both Russia and the United States unsatisfied. Russia looks back at the decade with bitterness and a feeling of being marginalized and slighted by the world’s sole remaining superpower. It is also disappointed by its experience with Western-style reforms and mistrustful of American intentions. The United States is equally disappointed with Russia’s lack of focus, inability to engage effectively abroad, and failure to implement major reforms at home. A comprehensive partnership is out of the question. Renewed competition or active containment are also not credible as organizing principles. Russia’s economic, military and political/ideological weakness makes it an unlikely target of either U.S. competition or containment. Not only is Russia no longer a superpower, but its status as a regional power is in doubt. Current thinking about Russia is divided among four basic approaches: Forget Russia, Enfant Terrible Russia, Evil Russia, and Russia First. The Forget Russia view holds that Russia is too weak, too corrupt, and too chaotic to matter. After 10 years of trying to help Russia, the United States should focus its resources and attention on more deserving and important world issues. The Enfant Terrible view holds that, although Russia has been an irresponsible and irritating partner, it is too weak to hurt the United States and therefore need not be feared in earnest. President Vladimir Putin’s visits to Cuba and North Korea, courtship of Slobodan Milosevic, and welcoming of Iranian President Mohammad Khatami to Moscow are of little strategic consequence and thus not worth our attention. This view presupposes the existence of an important U.S.-Russian bilateral agenda and the need to protect it from childish and irresponsible Russian grandstanding. The Evil Russia view holds that Russian courtship of Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea is a deliberate effort to undermine U.S. influence in the world and recreate the Soviet empire. Analysts embracing this view take less notice of Russia’s diminished capabilities than of ambitious rhetoric by Russian politicians. Given Russia’s evil purposes, the United States is already on a collision course with it and might as well do everything it can to box Russia in. The Russia First view holds that Russia still is the most important issue on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. It accepts the premise that the two sides have shared interests and that Russia, once reborn as a stable, prosperous democracy, can be a U.S. partner and ally. Therefore, the United States should actively assist Russia in its transformation and engage it in a broad and intense relationship with renewed vigor and creativity. There are shortcomings in all of these approaches. Notwithstanding its precipitous decline, to Forget Russia is clearly not an option: the country’s geographic expanse, nuclear arsenal, and proliferation potential simply make it impossible for U.S. policymakers to ignore. The Enfant Terrible view fails to take Russia seriously and ignores the very real problems that exist between the two countries. The Evil Russia view risks inflating the threat and making the myth of evil Russia a self-fulfilling prophecy. The Russia First view is not grounded in reality. After a decade of failure, it should be clear that neither the specter of Russia’s past nor the promise of its future warrants a position near the top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda. The Need for Normalcy Russia’s external weakness and internal problems have left the United States without an effective interlocutor, either as partner or competitor. Thus, the United States should deal with Russia on a case-by-case basis to advance our interests, in much the same way we deal with most other countries. This path will sometimes lead toward partnership with Rus- sia and at other times toward competition. It may even result in a situation where Russia and the United States find themselves as partners and competitors simultaneously in different parts of the world or on different issues. Given its size, history, strategic nuclear capabilities, and future potential, one is tempted to overstate the importance of relations with Russia and put them at the top of the U.S. national security agenda. Except for geography and nuclear weapons, however, there is little at this stage to justify making relations with Russia a top priority. Undoubtedly, Russia can inflict unacceptable damage on the United States. But fear of Russian nuclear weapons should not be the driving element of the relationship. The hostility and ideological differences that divided the superpowers during the Cold War are gone. The prospect of Russia consolidating and rebuilding itself under a militant authoritarian, nationalist regime is remote. Therefore, fears of a deliberate surprise (attack on the United States are unjustified. Despite a number of bilateral undertakings outside the Cold War-style security agenda, ranging from regional diplomacy in the Balkans to investment, U.S. engagement with Russia, with the notable exception of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Initiative, is limited.

## Indo-Pak

#### Indo-Pakistani conflict is a direct result of western constructionist ideals

**Nayak 2** (Meghana V, Professor of Political Science at Pace University. “Orientalism of Mapping Bodies and Borders: Postcolonial (in) Security and Feminist Contentions On the India-Pakistan Border.” <http://www.southwestern.edu/academics/bwp/pdf/2003bwp-nayak.pdf>)

In the contemporary Indianelectoral scene**,** voter banks are no longer beefed up by accommodating minorities but by promises to teach Pakistan tough lessons and to insist on the political construction of religious minorities as Hindu citizens. India‘s security imaginary is under constant threat by scheming, lurking Muslims who emerged during Partition. The politics of mapping the Indo-Pakistan border, then, participates in and draws upon Orientalist logic.I would go so far as to say that the mapping of the border would not be possible without Orientalism.

## Iraq

#### Iraq is socially constructed by US hegemonic discourse

**Pezdirc 10** (Marjetka, MA School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Exeter, “Construction and Deconstruction of a Just War: War on Terror Revisited” Ethnopoltics Paper no 1)

Terrorist discourse is where violent powers and insurgent meanings clash (Der Derian 1992, 96) and most importantly, where the insurgents can easily lose the battle. Roland Barthes’ textual analysis investigates the consequence of discursive applications of certain attributes to individuals, institutions and actions regardless of the actual essence they posses. In the case of ‘War on Terror’ it is not so important whether for instance Iraq is actually a rogue state in possession of WMD prepared to sell them to terrorist networks. The importance lies in what the U.S**.** government, other allied governments and subsequently the media say about Iraqand what people end up believing is true. Iraqi identity is socially constructed since the hegemonic discourse has the power to construct political reality. (Fortin 1989, 190-192) It is transmitted through the mass media to the mass audiences, which are thus persuaded to accept the securitizing move of the government and approve the launch of another war for peaceand a terrorist-free world. Especially powerful tool of such manipulation is posing terrorism inappropriately high on the public agenda. This is made possible by the media framing of world policy issues in accordance to the U.S foreign policy agenda (Tehranian 2002, 77)

#### Iraq represents the security politics in which the state constructs threats to justify intervention

Neocleous 8 [Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy; Head of Department of Politics & History of Brunel University, *Critique of Security*, Edinburgh University Press Ltd, page 2]

Well before 11 September 2001, Michael J. Shapiro suggested that in the modern period talk about security is wholly intelligible, and proposed that we ask after the conditions of this intelligibility. 3 In fact, the examples suggest that talk about security is often unintelligible. Take, as another example, the 2003 House of Commons Research Paper on the law of occupation in Iraq. Describing one of the main tasks during the ‘war on terror’ as overcoming the resistance of the Iraqi security forces, it also suggests reforming those same security services**.** This is ‘to demonstrate to the Iraqi people that our quarrel is not with them and that their security and well-being is our concern’**.** At the same time, the Report suggests that the task is to secure the sites of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ and to ‘provide for the security of friendly forces’**. 4** Taken in a literal sense – that is, if we remove for a moment the politics behind the Iraq debacle – the argument seems to be: security forces must be removed in order to improve security; something that does not exist (the weapons of mass destruction) must be secured; that which must also be secured we must first partially destroy; that which is called security is not security. The whole thing is unintelligible**.**

## Middle East

#### The 1ac’s cry of instability embeds the Middle east in a language of universalism, dooming us to a violent cycle of global intervention

Noorani 5 (Yaseen, Lecturer in Arabic Literature, Islamic and Middle East Studies, University of Edinburgh. “The Rhetoric of Security,” The New Centennial Review 5.1, 2005.)

Bush here invokes the recurrent American anxiety that Americans are too individualistic, too materialistic, and therefore lacking in solidarity and conviction. This is the worry that America has become a collection of self-centered consumers motivated by private wants rather than real agency. The war on terror allows America to show that this is not so, and to make it not so. Through the war on terror, Americans can manifest their agency and solidarity by empowering the U.S. government to fulfill their agency and solidarity by leading the world to peace. To do this, however, they must engage in the war themselves by recognizing the threat of terrorism and by feeling the fear for it, deeply. Only in this way can they redeem themselves from this fear through the moral struggle waged on their behalf by the government. Conversely, it is no accident that the Middle East is the source of the threat they must fear. Recall that Schmitt stipulates that the enemy is "the other, the stranger . . . existentially something different and alien" [End Page 36] (1996, 27). This is the irreducible enemy, whom one can only, if conflict arises, fight to the death. The Middle East can be cast as this sort of enemy because it can be easily endowed with characteristics that make it the antipode of the United States, intrinsically violent and irrational. But it is, at the same time, a region of peoples yearning for freedom who can be redeemed through their submission to moral order and brought into the fold of civilization. So in order to redeem the Middle East and ourselves from fear and violence, we must confront the Middle East for the foreseeable future with fear and violence. It is important to recognize that the rhetoric of security with its war on terrorism is not a program for action, but a discourse that justifies actions. The United States is not bound to take any specific action implied by its rhetoric. But this rhetoric gives the United States the prerogative to take whatever actions it decides upon for whatever purpose as long as these actions come within the rhetoric's purview. Judged by its own standards, the rhetoric of security is counterproductive. It increases fear while claiming that the goal is to eliminate fear. It increases insecurity by pronouncing ever broader areas of life to be in need of security. It increases political antagonism by justifying U.S. interests in a language of universalism. It increases enmity toward the United States by according the United States a special status over and above all other nations. The war against terror itself is a notional war that has no existence except as an umbrella term for various military and police actions. According to a report published by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army, "the global war on terrorism as currently defined and waged is dangerously indiscriminate and ambitious" (Record 2003, 41). This assessment assumes that the actions comprehended under the rubric of the "war on terrorism" are designed to achieve a coherent military objective. The impossible "absolute security," feared by the report's author to be the "hopeless quest" of current policy (46), may be useless as a strategic objective, but it is eminently effective in organizing a rhetoric designed to justify an open-ended series of hegemonic actions. The rhetoric of security, then, provides the moral framework for U.S. political hegemony through its grounding in the idea of national agency and in the absolute opposition between the state of civility and the state of [End Page 37] war. Designating the United States as the embodiment of the world order's underlying principle and the guarantor of the world order's existence, this rhetoric places both the United States and terrorism outside the normative relations that should inhere within the world order as a whole. The United States is the supreme agent of the world's war against war; other nations must simply choose sides. As long as war threatens to dissolve the peaceful order of nations, these nations must submit to the politics of "the one, instead of the many." They must accept the United States as "something godlike," in that in questions of its own security—which are questions of the world's security—they can have no authority to influence or oppose its actions. These questions can be decided by the United States alone. Other nations must, for the foreseeable future, suspend their agency when it comes to their existence. Therefore, the rhetoric of security allows the United States to totalize world politics within itself in a manner that extends from the relations among states down to the inner moral struggle experienced by every human being.

# **Impacts**

## China Specific

#### China threat construction leads to an endless cycle of enemy creation, leading to the death of millions

**Clark, 06** (Gregory, vice president of Akita International University and former Australian diplomat.“No Rest for 'China Threat' Lobby”, Japan Times, Jan. 7, 2006, <http://taiwansecurity.org/News/2006/JT-070106.htm>).

For as long as I have been in the China-watching business (more than 40 years now), there has always been a China "threat." It began with the 1950-53 Korean civil war, which initially had nothing to do with China. Even so, Beijing was blamed and, as punishment, the United States decided to intervene not only in Korea but also in China's civil war with Taiwan, and later threaten a move against China by sending troops close to China's borders with Korea. When China reacted to that move by sending in its own troops, the China-threat people moved into high gear. The next China threat was supposed to operate via the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Coping with it meant the West had to prop up a range of incompetent, corrupt rulers in the area, and intervene cruelly to suppress revolts by local Chinese against discrimination in Malaya and then in Sarawak. It also meant that the U.S., Britain and Australia had to work very hard and covertly to prevent the 1959 election of an intelligent Chinese, Lee Kwan Yew, to the Singapore premiership. Lee was then seen, amazingly, as a front for those dreaded Chinese Communists. The China-threat lobby moved into overdrive over Vietnam in the early 1960s. There a clearly nationalist-inspired civil war supported more by Moscow than by Beijing was denounced by Washington and Canberra as the first step in planned Chinese "aggression" into Asia. In Moscow in 1964, I had to accompany an Australian foreign minister, Paul Hasluck, in a foolish, U.S.-instigated bid to persuade the Soviet Union to side with the West against those aggressive Chinese. Hasluck gave up only after a bemused Soviet prime minister, Alexei Kosygin, told him point-blank that Moscow was doing all it could to help North Vietnam, would continue to give help, and that it would like to see Beijing doing a lot more. In 1962, as China desk officer in Canberra, I had to witness an extraordinary attempt to label as unprovoked aggression a very limited and justified Chinese counterattack against an Indian military thrust across the Indian-claimed border line in the North East Frontier Area. Threat scenarios then had China seeking ocean access via the Bay of Bengal. The London Economist even had Beijing seeking to move south via Afghanistan. Then came the allegations that China was seeking footholds in Laos, northern Thailand and Myanmar -- all false. U.S., British and Australian encouragement for the 1965 massacre of half a million leftwing supporters in Indonesia was also justified as needed to prevent China from gaining a foothold there. So too was the U.S. and Australia's 1975 approval for Indonesia's brutal takeover of East Timor. Since then we have seen Beijing's claims against Taiwan condemned as aggressive, despite the fact that every Western nation, including the U.S., has formally recognized or accepted China's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. China's efforts to assert control over Tibet are also branded as aggression even though Tibet has never been recognized as an independent entity. And so it continues to the present day. With the alleged Soviet threat to Japan having evaporated, we now have an army of Japanese and U.S. hawks -- Foreign Minister Aso included -- ramping up China as an alleged threat to Japan and the Far East. Much is made of Beijing's recent increases in military spending. But those increases began from a very low level; until recently its military were more concerned with running companies and growing their own vegetables. And Beijing faces a U.S.-Japan military buildup in East Asia that is avowedly anti-China and that spends a lot more than China does. Of course, if the Chinese military were placing bases and sending spy planes and ships close to the U.S. coast, and were bombing U.S. embassies, the U.S. role in that buildup might be justified. But so far that has not happened. Tokyo's claims to be threatened by China in the East China Sea are equally dubious. So far, the only shots fired in anger in that area have been Japan's, in a legally dubious huntdown and sinking of a North Korean vessel. Tokyo makes much of China's challenge to Japan's claimed EEZ (exclusive economic zone) median line of control in the East China Sea (Beijing says the EEZ border should be based on the continental shelf extending close to the Ryukyu islands and proposes joint development between the two claim lines). But international law on EEZ borders still does not firmly support Japan's median line position. And the recent Australia-East Timor agreement on joint development of continental shelf oil/gas resources in the Timor Sea, and the 1974 Japan-South Korean agreement for joint development in the East China Sea continental shelf, both strongly suggest that Beijing's joint development proposal is not entirely unreasonable. But no doubt these details will be dismissed as irrelevant. Our powers-that-be need threats to justify their existence. As we saw during the Cold War, and more recently over Iraq, once they declare that such and such a nation is a threat, it becomes impossible to stop the escalation. The other side naturally has to show some reaction. The military-industrial- intelligence complex then seize on this as the pretext further to expand budgets and power. Before long the media and a raft of dubious academic and other commentators are sucked into the vortex. Then when it is all over and the alleged threat has proved to be quite imaginary, the threat merchants move on to find another target. But not before billions have been spent. And millions have died.

## Violence

**This constructs threats that must be disciplined in the name of upholding the violence of the status quo**

Jim **George,** Senior lecturer in international relations in the Department of Political Science, Australian National University, 19**94** (“Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations,” p. 222-223, AM)

This theme, integral to the attempts of the Greeks to (rationally) distance themselves from the traditional objects (Gods, static social forma­tions) of their world, was articulated, more explicitly, in the wake of the "death" of God, as Cartesian rationalism accelerated the modern search for a secular foundation for certainty in an increasingly uncertain world. In the European Enlightenment it became more intrinsically associated with the pursuit of an indubitable social reality, independent of the distortions of specific time and place but imbued with laws of thought and behavior anal­ogous to the axioms of natural science. From the nineteenth century on, it has energized the more precise quest for a social theory purged of (tradi­tional) metaphysics, from which analytical protocols might be gleaned and scientific, lawlike statements invoked about modern human life. This theme—the projection of reality in terms of a (rational) separation between that which is foundational, irreducible, and eternal and that which is preju­diced by history, culture, and language—remains at the ontological heart of modernist social theory and the dominant (Realist) Tradition and discipline of International Relations. In its various positivist-Realist guises (e.g., as Traditionalism, behavioralism, or neo-Realism), this theme has had some crucial implications for the way International Relations scholars and practitioners have framed their questions of global life and applied their answers to its complex problems. This, in general, has been a site of discursive primitivism, which has seen knowledge of global humanity reduced to a singular, self-affirming narrative of Western (primarily Western European) eternal wisdom, derived (crudely) from the scattered textual utterings of the Greeks, Christian theology, and post-Renaissance Europe. Articulated in logocentric terms, this narrative remains, in the 1990s, rigidly state-centric and centered on the opposition between a realm of (domestic) sovereign identity, rationality, and social coherence and a realm of (international) anarchy, fragmentation, < and threat "out there," which must be disciplined, ordered, and controlled for the common, systemic good. Under this discursive regime an "us" is easily identified and opposed to a "them"; a homogeneous "self" confronts a threatening Other; a free, open, pluralistic social system can be distin­guished from its closed, totalitarian counterparts; and a particular (Western, rational-scientific) way of knowing the world can be intellectually and institutionally legitimated in its struggle against the forces of ideology, irra­tionality, distortion, and untruth. The point, more precisely, is that this par­ticular discursive representation of human life at the global level has become International Relations, the positivist-Realist image of the world "out there" has become reality, and the foundationalist approach to knowl­edge has become the only legitimate way of understanding global human society.

**Existence predicated on violent dichotomies results in brutal control methods to “civilize” the rest of the world**

Jim **George,** Senior lecturer in international relations in the Department of Political Science, Australian National University, 19**94** (“Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations,” p. 31-32, AM)

Consequently, postmodernists have argued (since the European Enlightenment in particular), modernist history and philosophy have become a "hermeneutics of suspicion," a search for the hidden, underlying, essential meaning of life.85 More specifically, the overwhelming purpose of modernist thinking has become the search for an Archimedean point upon which we can ground our knowledge of the real world.86 And while belief in Archimedean points or external gods or the pursuit of ultimate founda­tions for reality might not be particularly dangerous phenomena, postmod­ern scholars (following Nietzsche's lead) have pointed to some of the dan­gerous dimensions emanating from such beliefs and purposes. Of particular concern is the connection between the knowledge that assumes a single foundation for reality in the world and the power regimes characterized by closure, intolerance, and the suppression of "difference." The argument here is that in the post-Enlightenment era, modernist theory and practice, set upon scientific foundations, has become more and more intolerant of Otherness, of that which cannot be "rationally" controlled." Accordingly, one modern tradition after another has legitimated its own foundationalist position, by reducing nearly three millennia of discursive struggle to a series of simple oppositions in which (our) "facts" are distinguished from (their) mere "values," (our) "rationality" from (their) "irrationality," (our) identity from (their) "difference," (our) "reality" from (their) "idealism/ utopianism." Critical attention has been particularly focused on the way that the post-1945 discipline of International Relations has framed its understand­ing of reality in this manner, in reducing the complexities of global life through the ages to a series of simplistic dualisms (e.g., Realism/idealism, order/anarchy, domestic/international), with each coupling legitimating a range of power politics practices. This concern with the knowledge/power nexus has a number of dimensions. At one level, it focuses on discourses that define and exclude the "subversive" and the "terrorist" and that, simul­taneously, legitimate their destruction on behalf of the sovereign state, the central government, the vanguard of the party. The more general concern is with a modernist knowledge form that, in its quest to master the natural and social worlds, has transformed the lives of peoples and cultures in every corner of the planet. The modernist authority vested in "rational man," for example, has been used to liberate, to empower, to revolutionize—but at a cost. For in spreading the word of the (post-Cartesian) death of God, and in proclaim­ing its new secular rational-scientific substitute, Western theory as practice has, often brutally, invoked its strategies of control, its discipline, its uni­fied frame of reference about the good life, its singular reality, its insistence on sovereignty, and its bulwarks against nihilism. It is in this quest—to impose a singular, foundational reality upon miscreants and unbelievers—that the post-Enlightenment "will to knowledge" has quite literally become the "will to power."

## Self-fulfilling prophecy

**Worst case scenarios constructed out of fear create a self fulfilling prophecy of destruction**

Michael C. **Williams**, Senior Lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth 200**5**

(The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, ed. by Steve Smith (managing editor) et al., page 26)

From this perspective, perceptions of reality (and thus actions) are determined not by current material circumstances alone, but by projec- tions of future developments which – precisely because they are ‘imag- ined’ – give rise to fears and actions that bear little necessary relation to current realities or developments, and which may be out of all propor- tion to the ‘real’ situation facing actors. Acting within the logic of worst case scenarios, Hobbesian individuals create an anarchic state of nature in part out of their fear of future harm rather than the calm appraisal of current realities. In so acting, they create the very conditions of dis- trust that they fear. Logic, so necessary for prediction and preservation, becomes the source of a destructive self-fulfilling prophecy: an illogical war of each against all.

## War

**The assumption of the other being a rational actor creates multiple scenarios for extinction turning case**

[Victor D. Cha](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v027/27.1cha.html#authbio), is D. S. Song Professor and Director of Asian Studies at Georgetown University. He served as Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council from 2004 to 2007 and as Deputy Head of the U.S. delegation to the six-party talks from 2006 to 2007, 2002, “Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula” “Project Muse”

The conventionally argued threats to peace on the Korean Peninsula have been (1) the "irrationality" of the DPRK and (2) the potential for regime collapse. **The first derives from the opacity of the North Korean regime and the perceived recklessness and unpredictability of its leadership**. North Korea has done "crazy" things in the past and, despite its weakened state, may do so again given its forward-deployed forces, heavy artillery, long-range missiles, and nuclear-biological-chemical weapons potential. The second argument held sway particularly in the early 1990s, when the DPRK started to register negative economic growth and revealed the extent of its chronic **food and energy shortages**. These conditions, coupled with questions about the political transition after Kim Il-sung's death, raised serious concerns about the possibility of a Romania-type regime collapse in North Korea and what this would mean for regional stability. [11](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v027/27.1cha.html#FOOT11) As regional and military experts have argued, however, a premeditated all-out North Korean assault on South Korea remains unlikely. [12](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v027/27.1cha.html#FOOT12) The U.S. security guarantee to the ROK is firm; Beijing and Moscow no longer support aggression by Pyongyang; and the military balance on the peninsula favors the combined U.S.-ROK forces in terms of both quality and firepower. Thus the conditions that prompted Kim Il-sung to exploit windows of vulnerability in June 1950 are now tightly shut. A renewal of hostilities would no doubt be bloody; in the end, however, it would amount to a U.S.-ROK war-winning exercise in which the regime in Pyongyang would ultimately collapse. Furthermore, despite the many premature eulogies written about the regime in the early 1990s, the DPRK has been able to "muddle through" largely because no state (including South Korea) has wanted to deal with the potential consequences of its collapse, especially the huge costs that absorption, for example, would entail. Food aid from China and international relief agencies as well as interim fuel supplies from the United States have kept the regime on "life-support" in a crippled but less ominous state. [13](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v027/27.1cha.html#FOOT13) The logic of these counterarguments is powerful. Implicit is the view that the North Korean leadership still values state survival and that U.S.-ROK efforts to convey deterrent threats are understood in Pyongyang. The regime collapse scenario, though plausible, lacks the internal and external conditions necessary to make it highly probable. Moreover, it still leaves unanswered the question of what circumstances or actions by Pyongyang might trigger such an event. I argue that the North Korea leadership could perceive some use of limited force as a rational, even optimal, choice despite recognition that the DPRK has little chance of winning. The danger is not that the regime would commit suicide knowingly, but that it could regard "lashing out" as its only option—the unintended consequence of which (given the likely U.S. and ROK military responses) would be collapse.

# Alternative

## Alt Solvency

**The alternative is to vote negative as a means to refuse security. Desecuritization solves—minimizing security is possible and effective**

**Wæver, 98** – Professor of International Relations at the University of Copenhagen (Ole, 1998, "Securitization and Desecuritization", On Security, Google Books, p. 55-57)

What then is security? With the help of language theory, **we** can **regard "security" as a speech act .** In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. **By saying it, something is done** (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). 23 By uttering "security," a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it. 24 The clearest illustration of this phenomenon--on which I will elaborate below--occurred in Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War, where "order" was clearly, systematically, and institutionally linked to the survival of the system and its elites. Thinking about change in East-West relations and/or in Eastern Europe throughout this period meant, therefore, trying to bring about change without generating a "securitization" response by elites, which would have provided the pretext for acting against those who had overstepped the boundaries of the permitted. Consequently, **to ensure that this mechanism would not be triggered, actors had to keep their challenges below a certain threshold and/or through the political process**--whether national or international--have the threshold negotiated upward. As Egbert Jahn put it, **the task was to turn threats into challenges; to move developments from the sphere of existential fear to one where they could be handled by ordinary means**, as politics, economy, culture, and so on. As part of this exercise, a crucial political and theoretical issue became the definition of "intervention" or "interference in domestic affairs," whereby change-oriented agents tried, through international law, diplomacy, and various kinds of politics, to raise the threshold and make more interaction possible. Through this process, two things became very clear. First, the word "security" is the act ; the utterance is the primary reality. Second, **the most radical and transformational perspective--which nonetheless remained realist--was one of minimizing "security" by narrowing the field to which the security act was applied** (as with the European détente policies of the 1970s and 1980s). After a certain point, the process took a different form and the aim became to create a speech act failure (as in Eastern Europe in 1989). Thus, the trick was and is to move from a positive to a negative meaning: Security is the conservative mechanism--but we want less security! Under the circumstances then existing in Eastern Europe, the power holders had among their instruments the speech act "security." The use of this speech act had the effect of raising a specific challenge to a principled level, thereby implying that all necessary means would be used to block that challenge. And, because such a threat would be defined as existential and a challenge to sovereignty, the state would not be limited in what it could or might do. Under these circumstances, a problem would become a security issue whenever so defined by the power holders. Unless or until this operation were to be brought to the point of failure--which nuclear conditions made rather difficult to imagine 25 --available avenues of change would take the form of negotiated limitations on the use of the "speech act security." Improved conditions would, consequently, hinge on a process implying "less security, more politics!" To put this point another way, security and insecurity do not constitute a binary opposition. "Security" signifies a situation marked by the presence of a security problem and some measure taken in response. Insecurity is a situation with a security problem and no response. Both conditions share the security problematique. **When there is no security problem, we do not conceptualize our situation in terms of security; instead, security is simply an irrelevant concern.** The statement, then, that security is always relative, and one never lives in complete security, has the additional meaning that, if one has such complete security, one does not label it "security." It therefore never appears. **Consequently, transcending a security problem by politicizing it cannot happen through thematization in security terms, only away from such terms. An agenda of minimizing security in this sense cannot be based on a classical critical approach to security**, whereby the concept is critiqued and then thrown away or redefined according to the wishes of the analyst. The essential operation can only be touched by faithfully working with the classical meaning of the concept and what is already inherent in it. **The language game of security is, in other words, a jus necessitatis for threatened elites, and this it must remain. Such a**n affirmative **reading, not at all aimed at rejecting the concept, may be a more serious challenge to the established discourse than a critical one, for it recognizes that a conservative approach to security is an intrinsic element in the logic of both our national and international political organizing principles**. By taking seriously this "unfounded" concept of security, it is possible to raise a new agenda of security and politics. This further implies moving from a positive to a negative agenda, in the sense that **the dynamics of securitization and desecuritization can never be captured so long as we proceed along the normal critical track that assumes security to be a positive value to be maximized**. That elites frequently present their interests in "national security" dress is, of course, often pointed out by observers, usually accompanied by a denial of elites' right to do so. Their actions are then labelled something else, for example, "class interests," which seems to imply that authentic security is, somehow, definable independent of elites, by direct reference to the "people." This is, in a word, wrong. All such attempts to define people's "objective interests" have failed. Security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites. All of this can be analyzed, if we simply give up the assumption that security is, necessarily, a positive phenomenon. Critics normally address the what or who that threatens, or the whom to be secured; they never ask whether a phenomenon should be treated in terms of security because they do not look into "securityness" as such, asking what is particular to security, in contrast to non-security, modes of dealing with particular issues. By working with the assumption that security is a goal to be maximized, critics eliminate other, potentially more useful ways of conceptualizing the problems being addressed. This is, as I suggested above, because security:insecurity are not binary opposites. As soon as a more nominalist approach is adapted, the absurdity of working toward maximizing "security" becomes clear. Viewing the security debate at present, one often gets the impression of the object playing around with the subjects, the field toying with the researchers. **The problematique** itself **locks people into talking in terms of "security," and this reinforces the hold of security on our thinking, even if our approach is a critical one. We do not find much work aimed at de-securitizing politics which, I suspect, would be more effective** than securitizing problems.

## Solves Crises

**The alt can solve actual crises – continual questioning means effective action can be reached – Bosnia proves**

**Smith 5 –** Pro Vice Chancellor (Academic Affairs) and Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales Aberystwyth. Vice Chancellor of the University of Exeter (2002) President of the International Studies Association in 2003-2004 (Steve, “The Contested Concept of Security” Book: Critical Security Studies and World Politics; Edited by Ken Booth, pg. 51, 2005, KTOP)

In a later book, National Deconstruction, Campbell offers an illuminating account of the Bosnian war using Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida to discuss the nature of responsibility to the Other. Campbell argues that Levinas's work makes it impossible for anyone to say that the Bosnian war was not their concern. This is because Levinas's conception of responsibility toward the Other is not an add-on to already existing identities and subjectivities. Rather, "subjects are constituted by their relationship with the Other."122 By reconfiguring subjectivity in this way, that is, by making it an effect of the relationship with the Other, Levinas also reconfigures ethics. Thus, the war in Bosnia gives us a lack of choice; we cannot opt out of involvement, because ethics "has been transformed from something independent of subjectivity—that is, from a set of rules and regulations adopted by pregiven, autonomous agents—to something insinuated within and integral to that subjectivity."123 Campbell argues that this form of thinking "can help identify and energize the political ethos through which the development of a political life adequate to the complexities of Bosnia might be possible."124 Crucially, Campbell shows how a deconstructive approach can say something detailed about what to do in a case like Bosnia, and he argues powerfully that deconstructive thought allows politics to be politics rather than a "predetermined technology or an undemocratic program hostile to the ethos of the Enlightenment."125 In contrast to the international community's response, based on realism, which furthered the violence in Bosnia, he believes that "a range of political options informed by deconstructive thought might possibly better address the conflict."126 He gives two reasons for this claim: the first is that whereas others might see contradictions as obstacles to a just politics, deconstructive approaches see these as the contradictions "necessary for a politics, and as such they have to be contested and negotiated rather than transcended and escaped."127 The second, and, he claims, the more important, reason is that all political proposals "have to be preceded by the qualification of a 'perhaps' and followed by an insistent and persistent questioning."128 In other words, deconstructive thought is never satisfied with claims that a lasting solution to problems can be, or has been, reached.

## Solves VTL

**The alternative achieves true security – this allows increasing time for the world populace to exploring possibilities and increasing their value to life**

**Booth 5 –** E.H. Carr Professor and head of the Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth (Ken, Critical Security Studies and World Politics; Edited by Ken Booth, pg. 23, 2005, KTOP)

The best starting point for conceptualizing security lies in the real conditions of insecurity suffered by people and collectivities. Look around. What is immediately striking is that some degree of insecurity, as a life-determining condition, is universal. To the extent an individual or group is insecure, to that extent their life choices and chances are taken away; this is because of the resources and energy they need to invest in seeking safety from domineering threats—whether these are the lack of food for one's children or organizing to resist a foreign aggressor. The corollary of the relationship between insecurity and a determined life is that a degree of security creates life possibilities. Security might therefore be conceived as synonymous with opening up space in people's lives. This allows for individual and collective human becoming—the capacity to have some choice about living differently—consistent with the same but different search by others. Two interrelated conclusions follow from this. First, security can be understood as an instrumental value; it frees its possessors to a greater or lesser extent from life-determining constraints and so allows different life possibilities to be explored. Second, security is not synonymous simply with survival. One can survive without being secure (the experience of refugees in long-term camps in war-torn parts of the world, for example). Security is therefore more than mere animal survival (basic animal existence). It is survival-plus, the plus being the possibility to explore human becoming. As an instrumental value, security is sought because it frees people(s) to some degree to do other than deal with threats to their human being. The achievement of a level of security—and security is always relative—gives to individuals and groups some time, energy, and scope to choose to be or become, other than merely surviving as human biological organisms. Security is an important dimension of the process by which the human species can reinvent itself beyond the merely biological. One of the things security allows people(s) to choose, paradoxically, is danger. Elective dangers, however threatening, are to be distinguished from structural and contingent insecurities. It is important here to distinguish between security threats and bodily risks. At the level of the individual, a person might choose to engage in a dangerous (threatening) activity—such as rock climbing or skydiving—but these activities can only be pursued by a person with the time, energy, education, and resources to participate in such activities; the risks to one's life in these cases are elective, not determined. These particular bodily risks are not part of life's inexorable insecurities. Likewise, a great power choosing to attack and invade a foreign country, when it is not directly threatened itself, is engaged in elective danger; it is not acting out of insecurity, as would be the case when fighting in self-defense following an invasion of its territory. It is motivated by ambition—like the rock-climber—but for increased economic, military, or political power as opposed to individual challenge and adventure. Troops and interests are put at risk, not core values. In rock-climbing or long-distance aggression, the risks are chosen, not imposed; they are the dangers elected as a result of the possibilities created by security, not the dangers imposed by domineering threats. Because the condition of security is of such importance to societies— because it is primordial and deeply politicized—to have something labeled security is to give it priority on the agenda. Security, above all, is a powerful political concept; it is the sort of word that energizes opinion and moves material power. This is because it represents instrumental and political value and demands the committing of appropriate collective resources. It is something over which people(s) have been willing to fight. The traditional definition of security in the literature of international politics emphasizes the protection of the territory and core values of states against foreign imposition.1 From the discussion above, and in Chapter 1, it should be clear that a critically informed definition will be much broader and deeper than any offered by the mainstream. Accordingly, my definition is as follows: Security in world politics is an instrumental value that enables people(s) some opportunity to choose how to live. It is a means by which individuals and collectivities can invent and reinvent different ideas about being human.

# \*\*\*Nietzsche Security

*There is an ancient story that King Midas hunted in the forest a long time for the wise Silenus, the companion of Dionysus. . . . When Silenus at last fell into his hands, the king asked what was the best and most desirable of all things for man. Fixed and immovable, the demigod said not a word, till at last, urged by the king, he gave a shrill laugh and broke out into these words: "Oh, wretched ephemeral race, children of chance and misery, why do you compel me to tell you what it would be most expedient for you not to hear? What is best of all is utterly beyond your reach: not to be born, not to be, to be nothing. But the second best for you is—to die soon." –The Birth of Tragedy*

# Shells

## 1NC

#### They view life as something to be fixed—suffering is inevitable, they destroy the essence of existence by negating an intrinsic aspect of life

Kain, 2k7 (Philip J., “Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence”, Journal of Nietzsche Studies, issue 33, Penn state University, Muse)//RSW

Nietzsche simply dismisses the designed cosmos, which few believe in anymore anyway (WP 12a). On the other hand, Nietzsche takes the perfectible cosmos very seriously. He resists it with every fiber of his being.5 For Nietzsche, we must stop wasting time and energy hoping to change things, improve them, make progress (see, e.g., WP 40, 90, 684)—the outlook of liberals, socialists, and even Christians, all of whom Nietzsche tends to lump together and excoriate. For [End Page 50] Nietzsche, we cannot reduce suffering, and to keep hoping that we can will simply weaken us. Instead, we must conceal an alien and terrifying cosmos if we hope to live in it. And we must develop the strength to do so. We must toughen ourselves. We need more suffering, not less. It has "created all enhancements of man so far . . ." (BGE 225, 44; WP 957; GM II:7). If we look deeply into the essence of things, into the horror of existence, Nietzsche thinks we will be overwhelmed—paralyzed. Like Hamlet we will not be able to act, because we will see that action cannot change the eternal nature of things (BT 7). We must see, Nietzsche says, that "a profound illusion . . . first saw the light of the world in the person of Socrates: the unshakeable faith that thought . . . can penetrate the deepest abysses of being, and that thought is capable not only of knowing being but even of correcting it. This sublime metaphysical illusion accompanies science as an instinct . . ." (BT 15). In Nietzsche's view, we cannot change things. Instead, with Hamlet we should "feel it to be ridiculous or humiliating that [we] should be asked to set right a world that is out of joint" (BT 7; cf. TI "Anti-Nature," 6). Knowledge of the horror of existence kills action—which requires distance and illusion. The horror and meaninglessness of existence must be veiled if we are to live and act. What we must do, Nietzsche thinks, is construct a meaning for suffering. Suffering we can handle. Meaningless suffering, suffering for no reason at all, we cannot handle. So we give suffering a meaning. We invent a meaning. We create an illusion. The Greeks constructed gods for whom wars and other forms of suffering were festival plays and thus an occasion to be celebrated by the poets. Christians imagine a God for whom suffering is punishment for sin (GM II:7; cf. D 78). One might find all this unacceptable. After all, isn't it just obvious that we can change things, reduce suffering, improve existence, and make progress? Isn't it just obvious that modern science and technology have done so? Isn't it just absurd for Nietzsche to reject the possibility of significant change? Hasn't such change already occurred? Well, perhaps not. Even modern environmentalists might resist all this obviousness. They might respond in a rather Nietzschean vein that technology may have caused as many problems as it has solved. The advocate of the perfectible cosmos, on the other hand, would no doubt counter such Nietzschean pessimism by arguing that even if technology does cause some problems, the solution to those problems can only come from better technology. Honesty requires us to admit, however, that this is merely a hope, not something for which we already have evidence, not something that it is absurd to doubt—not at all something obvious. Further technology may or may not improve things. The widespread use of antibiotics seems to have done a miraculous job of improving our health and reducing suffering, but we are also discovering that such antibiotics give rise to even more powerful bacteria that are immune to those [End Page 51] antibiotics. We have largely eliminated diseases like cholera, smallpox, malaria, and tuberculosis, but we have produced cancer and heart disease. We can cure syphilis and gonorrhea, but we now have AIDS. Even if we could show that it will be possible to continuously reduce suffering, it is very unlikely that we will ever eliminate it. If that is so, then it remains a real question whether it is not better to face suffering, use it as a discipline, perhaps even increase it, so as to toughen ourselves, rather than let it weaken us, allow it to dominate us, by continually hoping to overcome it. But whatever we think about the possibility of reducing suffering, the question may well become moot. Nietzsche tells a story: "Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is dispersed into numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of 'world history,' but nevertheless, it was only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths, the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had to die" (TL 1, 79). Whatever progress we might think we are making in reducing suffering, whatever change we think we are bringing about, it may all amount to nothing more than a brief and accidental moment in biological time, whose imminent disappearance will finally confirm the horror and meaninglessness of existence. The disagreement here is not so much about the quantity of suffering that we can expect to find in the world but, rather, its nature. For proponents of the designed cosmos, suffering is basically accidental. It is not fundamental or central to life. It is not a necessary part of the nature of things. It does not make up the essence of existence. We must develop virtue, and then we can basically expect to fit and be at home in the cosmos. For the proponents of a perfectible cosmos, suffering is neither essential nor unessential. The cosmos is neutral. We must work on it to reduce suffering. We must bring about our own fit. For Nietzsche, even if we can change this or that, even if we can reduce suffering here and there, what cannot be changed for human beings is that suffering is fundamental and central to life. The very nature of things, the very essence of existence, means suffering. Moreover, it means meaningless suffering—suffering for no reason at all. That cannot be changed—it can only be concealed.

#### Furthermore, reducing humanity as something that needs to be saved makes its extinction desirable

Nietzsche 1886[fredrich, “beyond good and evil”, aph # 225, pg. 342]

Whether hedonism, or pessimism, or utilitarianism, or eudaimonianism (6)—all these ways of thinking, which measure the value of things according to pleasure and pain, that is, according to contingent circumstances and secondary issues, are ways of thinking in the foreground and naïveté, which everyone who knows about creative forces and an artistic conscience will look down on, not without ridicule and not without compassion. Compassion for yourself—that is, of course, not compassion the way you mean the term: it's not pity for social "needs," for "society" and its sick and unlucky people, with those depraved and broken down from the start, and with the way they lie on the ground all around us—even less is it compassion for the grumbling oppressed, the rebellious slave classes, who strive for mastery—they call it "Freedom." Our compassion is a higher compassion which sees further—we see how man is making himself smaller, how you make him smaller—and there are moments when we look at your compassion with an indescribable anxiety, where we defend ourselves against this compassion—where we find your seriousness more dangerous than any carelessness. You want, if possible—and there is no wilder "if possible"—to do away with suffering. What about us? It does seem that we would prefer it to be higher and worse than it ever was! Well being, the way you understand it, that's no goal. To us that looks like an end, a condition which immediately makes human beings laughable and contemptible, something which makes their destruction desirable! The culture of suffering, of great suffering, don't you realize that up to this point it is only this suffering which has created all the things which raise man up?

#### Our alternative is to “Do nothing in the instance of the plan.” The refusal to act accepts the inevitability of struggle, allowing us to understand pain positively.

Nietzsche, ‘78 The anti-christ Human, All too Human. Aphorism #284 1878

*The means to real peace*.— No government admits any more that it keeps an army to satisfy occasionally the desire for conquest. Rather the army is supposed to serve for defense, and one invokes the morality that approves of self-defense. But this implies one's own morality and the neighbor's immorality; for the neighbor must be thought of as eager to attack and conquer if our state must think of means of self-defense. Moreover, the reasons we give for requiring an army imply that our neighbor, who denies the desire for conquest just as much as does our own state, and who, for his part, also keeps an army only for reasons of self-defense, is a hypocrite and a cunning criminal who would like nothing better than to overpower a harmless and awkward victim without any fight. Thus all states are now ranged against each other: they presuppose their neighbor's bad disposition and their own good disposition. This presupposition, however, is inhumane, as bad as war and worse. At bottom, indeed, it is itself the challenge and the cause of wars, because, as I have said, it attributes immorality to the neighbor and thus provokes a hostile disposition and act. We must abjure the doctrine of the army as a means of self-defense just as completely as the desire for conquests. And perhaps the great day will come when people, distinguished by wars and victories and by the highest development of a military order and intelligence, and accustomed to make the heaviest sacrifices for these things, will exclaim of its own free will, "We break the sword," and will smash its entire military establishment down to its lowest foundations. Rendering oneself unarmed when one had been the best-armed, out of a height of feeling—that is the means to real peace, which must always rest on a peace of mind; whereas the so-called armed peace, as it now exists in all countries, is the absence of peace of mind. One trusts neither oneself nor one's neighbor and, half from hatred, half from fear, does not lay down arms. Rather perish than hate and fear, and twice rather perish than make oneself hated and feared—this must someday become the highest maxim for every single commonwealth. Our liberal representatives, as is well known, lack the time for reflecting on the nature of man: else they would know that they work in vain when they work for a "gradual decrease of the military burden." Rather, only when this kind of need has become greatest will the kind of god be nearest who alone can help here. The tree of war-glory can only be destroyed all at once, by a stroke of lightning: but lightning, as indeed you know, comes from a cloud—and from up high.

# Links

## Suffering

#### The negation of suffering is the negation of life—only this view can overcome crippling nihilism

Clark 12 (Maudemarie; Ph.D. and professor of philosophy @ the University of Wisconsin-Madison“Suffering and the Affirmation of Life”; The Journal of Nietzsche Studies Volume 43 Number 1; MUSE)//RSW

But how much of Schopenhauer's view did Nietzsche actually agree with? Certainly not with the claim about what we really want or about what happiness is, as Reginster would agree; but I must admit that I am not entirely sure what premises Reginster thinks he accepts from Schopenhauer. He rightly sees The Gay Science 357 as crediting Schopenhauer with recognizing "the nihilistic consequences of the death of God," namely, the necessity of raising the question as to whether life has any meaning at all. But he also takes this as evidence of Nietzsche's recognition that what is at stake in the question as to whether life has a meaning is the place and significance of suffering in human existence. That is, given the death of God, nihilism is a problem unless we find a way to value or see meaning in suffering. That seems fair enough, but Reginster thinks that Nietzsche thought a revaluation of "the dominant, life-negating values" must do more than that, specifically, that "it must show that those aspects of human life condemned by the nihilist, in particular suffering, are not only bearable, but also desirable, and not only derivatively, but for their own sake" (AL 15). Otherwise put, "to affirm life, we must therefore show that suffering is good for its own sake" (AL 15). And this is exactly what Reginster thinks that Nietzsche pulled off with his doctrine of the will to power, his account of which is another major feature of his book. Here he explicitly accepts much of my account of the will to power—that Nietzsche does not regard it as the nature of life or reality and that when he seems to, he is simply looking at the world from the viewpoint of what he values, namely, the psychological drive that is the will to power. Further, Reginster agrees with my claim that this psychological drive is a second-order drive, a drive concerning other drives, each of which has an object other than power. Therefore, the desire or will to power cannot be the only desire—when Nietzsche seems to claim that it is, he is simply viewing human psychology from [End Page 92] the viewpoint of what he values.9 But Reginster also disagrees with me, claiming that all previous accounts of the psychological drive that is the will to power mistake "a by-product or consequence of the pursuit of the will to power [for] what the will to power consists of" (AL 105). I claimed that the object of the will to power, what it aims at, is the capacity to satisfy other (first-order) desires. A sense of power would therefore be a sense of one's effectiveness, of one's ability to impose the conditions required for the satisfaction of one's first-order desires on the world. Such ability is, on Reginster's interpretation, a mere by-product of what the will to power really aims at, which is the "overcoming of resistance in the pursuit of determinate [i.e., first-order] desires" (AL 126). He thinks the claim that we have such a second-order desire, a will to power, offers a better explanation of boredom than does Schopenhauer's second-order desire to desire and a better explanation of why the will to power is an "indefinite striving" than my account can offer (AL 128). But how is it supposed to help Nietzsche overcome nihilism? The idea is basically that if we will power, and if power consists in overcoming resistance, then we must will suffering, because (following Schopenhauer) suffering is simply the experience of resistance to our will. With his theory of the will to power, then, Nietzsche can accept Schopenhauer's claim that life is essentially suffering and yet affirm life. As Reginster puts it, Nietzsche's "ethics of power welcomes the inescapability of suffering in human life. It would consider wretched an existence in which there is no resistance to be overcome, no challenges to be met—that is to say, an existence devoid of suffering" (AL 267).

## Moral/Ethics

#### Universal morals and ethics alienate human life – imposes a model unto us that has no grounding to the individual. The alternative creates individual ethical appeals to affirm life

Daigle 6 -PHD and professor of Philosophy at Brock University

(Christine, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 32,2006, 1-21, Muse, MT)

In this section, I will delineate Nietzsche's own brand of virtue ethics. It should be clear that Nietzsche does indeed share the critical program of virtue ethicists. His attacks against the traditional view of morality and the nihilism he proposes make clear that, for him, traditional morality is alienating to any human life. In The Gay Science he says: "In the main all those moral systems are distasteful to me which say: 'Do not do this! Renounce! Overcome thyself!' On the other hand I am favorable to those moral systems which stimulate me to do something, and to do it again from morning till evening, to dream of it at night, and think of nothing else but to do it well, as well as is possible for me alone! [. . .] I do not like any of the negative virtues whose very essence is negation and self-renunciation" (§304). Elsewhere, in Twilight of the Idols, he talks about a sin of morality: "The most general formula at the basis of every religion and morality is: 'Do this and this—and you will be happy! Otherwise. . . .' Every morality, every religion is [End Page 6] this imperative—I call it the great original sin of reason, immortal unreason" ("Errors" 2). Nietzsche's view of traditional morality can be found throughout his writings; however, I think these quotations are satisfactory for our purpose. These two clarify the spirit with which Nietzsche approaches morality. The problem with traditional morality is that it does not take into consideration human nature. It does not look at the individual as he is and aim to embrace what he is but, rather, aims to impose a model on him that has no ground in the reality of the human. This model is of a transcendent nature and does not fit the immanent nature of the human being. Let us remember the three points under criticism in the critical program of virtue ethicists: the overreliance on rule models of moral choice, the overly rationalistic accounts of moral agency, and the formalism inherent in such theories. If we did not know that we are talking about virtue ethicists, we would readily say that this pertains to Nietzsche. Nietzsche does reject rule models. His ethics of creativity argues that one must create values for oneself and not rely on any external (transcendent) rule. Nietzsche also fiercely rejects the rationalistic account of moral agency. He struggles to rehabilitate the repressed parts of human nature, claiming that reason is but a very small part of ourselves. He talks of the human being in terms of a fiction (see D 105). We are wronged in the conception of ourselves: we are led to believe that we are neatly divided between reason and instinct. But this division is illusory. The human being is a "social structure of many 'souls'" (BGE 19). We possess a soul that is a "social structure of the instincts and passions" (BGE 12). Nietzsche says further that "[i]f we desired and dared an architecture corresponding to the nature of our soul (we are too cowardly for it!)—our model would have to be the labyrinth!" (D 169). We are indeed very far from the traditional picture of the self and also far from the superiority of reason that is proposed by traditional philosophical approaches and moralities in particular. Last, it is also evident that Nietzsche rejects the formalism inherent in traditional moralities as he would generally reject any formalism in thought. Nietzsche does share the critical program of virtue ethicists. The nihilism he proposes is supposed to remedy the alienating traditional philosophical (and religious) discourse. But does he stop at the nihilistic moment? Is his program purely nihilistic, as Leiter suggests? I have argued elsewhere that far from being purely nihilistic, Nietzsche's philosophy is entirely constructive.19 His challenge consists in rejecting the existing morality to construct anew. The old system's deficiencies cannot be adjusted by reorganization. One must erase everything and start from scratch. This is where his attacks on morality come into play. In this moment Nietzsche announces the death of God and its metaphysical import. Nietzsche is clear about his self-attributed immoralism: "At bottom my expression immoralist involves two denials. I deny first a type of man who has hitherto counted as the highest, the good, the benevolent, beneficent; I deny secondly a [End Page 7] kind of morality which has come to be accepted and to dominate as morality in itself—décadence morality, in more palpable terms Christian morality" (EH "Destiny" 4). His rejection of morality is thus clearly identified by him as a rejection of traditional morality. He also says of fellow immoralists, they "see [their] honor in affirming" (TI "Morality" 6).20 There is no question of abandoning ethics. Ethics is needed and will be his preoccupation for the first steps of his reconstruction, for it was a preoccupation before his reconstruction as it lead to the rejection of the defective ethics. Nihilism is a necessary step toward this reconstruction. As he says in The Gay Science: "We deny, and must deny, because something in us wants to live and affirm itself, something which we perhaps do not as yet know, do not as yet see!" (307). What is it that wants to affirm itself? In Schopenhauer as Educator, Nietzsche says that "We are accountable to ourselves for our own existence; consequently, we also want to be the real helmsmen of our existence and keep it from resembling a mindless coincidence" (1). The Übermensch, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, is the figure who is successful in becoming his own master. He is an Overman, more than a man, a human being that is human and more. Why more? The Übermensch is the individual who has overcome the fragmentation inherent in tradition. It is the person who has reunited himself, who has decided to live fully as he is. It is also the person who knows that life is will to power and that he himself is an instance of this will to power. Accordingly, he wishes to embody and respect the will to power within himself. In addition to all of this, he accepts the eternal return hypothesis. He is ready to suppose that the actions and decisions he makes during his life will return eternally the same. The change from man to Übermensch is tremendous. So much so that we cannot talk about an elevation from man to Übermensch but really of a transfiguration, as Nietzsche himself refers.21 Even the highest type of human being present in Nietzsche's writings, the strong man, is far below the Übermensch. He says: "Your souls are so unfamiliar with what is great that the Superman would be fearful to you in his goodness! And you wise and enlightened men, you would flee from the burning sun of wisdom in which the Superman joyfully bathes his nakedness! You highest men my eyes have encountered! This is my doubt of you and my secret laughter: I think you would call my Superman—a devil!" (Z "Manly Prudence"). The Übermensch is an ideal type of human being. Every individual should emulate this figure as an illustration of what one can become if only one were to engage oneself in the way of creation. When I speak of an ideal type, the Übermensch, I mean that it is a figure toward which one must strive, not to be confused as a state one can reach. For one thing, it is not clear in Nietzsche's mind whether there will ever be Übermenschen. For another thing, I think we should interpret the figure he presents to us as a dynamic state of being. If the Übermensch accepts life and himself as an instance of the will to power, he will [End Page 8] be in constant becoming. The drive for more power, characteristic of Nietzsche's being, will lead the individual into a continuous flux and constant overcoming of oneself. This is how one should understand the Über of Übermensch. But even if we are talking about a "state of flux," this is a state that one should strive to acquire while engaging in the process of attainment. According to Nietzsche, there are certain things that one must do in order to approach this excellence and in turn become an Übermensch. Among these things are the creation of oneself and the creation of values that is essential in supporting a new ethics. The human being should be the creator of oneself. She should be her own master and define her own rules (which is what is truly meant by the famous, or infamous, "Master morality").22 Once the sky of values has been emptied, the task is to fill it again for oneself. The individual should no longer rely on any transcendent to provide these values, as the previous experiment of Christianity and its transcendent morals has proven that its only possible result is alienation. Human beings must create an ethics for human beings. The individual must create an ethics that respects one's nature as human and as will to power. This is expressed in Nietzsche's maxim: "What Saith thy Conscience?—Thou shalt become what thou art" (GS 270). You must flourish! Note that there is nothing in Nietzsche's writings until Beyond Good and Evil that indicates that the way of the Übermensch is bared for certain individuals. He makes clear that this potentiality exists in every individual. It is only a matter of the individual choosing to actualize his or her own self as will to power.23 Thus the emphasis is placed on the flourishing of the agent via the adoption of certain virtues in line with one's own being. To this, one must add the vitalism of Nietzsche's philosophy. This is expressed most clearly in Antichrist §2 where he says: "What is good?—All that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man. What is bad?—All that proceeds from weakness. What is happiness?—The feeling that power increases—that a resistance is overcome." As Hunt argues, according to Nietzsche, "Life is the only thing that is good in itself, and is the standard by which the value of everything else is to be measured."24 We could state his fundamental moral principle in the following manner: "Anything that affirms, creates, and augments life is good." Values chosen by individuals must be chosen with this principle in mind because, as Hunt puts it, "all the goods that human beings seek are only good to the extent that in some sense they promote life."25 In that, human beings will only promote themselves and their own being as an instance of life. The individual will be true to him- or herself. Only then can one be said to flourish as a human being. So we are right to say, along with Hunt, that even if one fundamental rule can be derived from the will to power, Nietzsche's focus is on the development of character and not on rules.

## Security

#### Their will to power creates a false view of rationality in which our fear of suffering justifies the embracement of Security’s nihilism

Der Derian 93 ( James, Watson Institute research professor of international studies and professor of political science at Brown University 1993“The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard\*” http://library.northsouth.edu/Upload/On%20Security.pdf)

The will to power, then, should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual desire for power. It can, in its negative form, produce a reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading, in Nietzsche's view, to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an active and affective force of becoming, from which values and meanings--including self-preservation--are produced which affirm life. Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic to life, for ". . . life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation--but why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages." 35 Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism in life: "life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war." 36 But the denial of this permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a consensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear. The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science , Nietzsche asks of the reader: "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" 37 The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols : The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?" shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause --a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving. . . . That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation--that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations.38 A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility--recycling the desire for security. The "influence of timidity," as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the "necessities" of security: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences." 3

## War

#### The Affirmative is a rejection of the positive suffering that is caused by war, only by embracing war can there be hope of lasting peace.

Nietzsche 83 – Professor of Classical Philology at the University of Basel

[THE Fredrich Nietzsche former Professor of Classical Philology at the University of Basel, 1883 Thus Spake Zarathustra First Part “10. War and Warriors”, translated by Thomas Common in 1909, http://4umi.com/nietzsche/zarathustra; WBTR]

By our best enemies we do not want to be spared, nor by those either whom we love from the very heart. So let me tell you the truth! My brethren in war! I love you from the very heart. I am, and was ever, your counterpart. And I am also your best enemy. So let me tell you the truth! I know the hatred and envy of your hearts. Ye are not great enough not to know of hatred and envy. Then be great enough not to be ashamed of them! And if ye cannot be saints of knowledge, then, I pray you, be at least its warriors. They are the companions and forerunners of such saintship. I see many soldiers; could I but see many warriors! "Uniform" one calleth what they wear; may it not be uniform what they therewith hide! Ye shall be those whose eyes ever seek for an enemy—for your enemy. And with some of you there is hatred at first sight. Your enemy shall ye seek; your war shall ye wage, and for the sake of your thoughts! And if your thoughts succumb, your uprightness shall still shout triumph thereby! Ye shall love peace as a means to new wars—and the short peace more than the long. You I advise not to work, but to fight. You I advise not to peace, but to victory. Let your work be a fight, let your peace be a victory! One can only be silent and sit peacefully when one hath arrow and bow; otherwise one prateth and quarrelleth. Let your peace be a victory! Ye say it is the good cause which halloweth even war? I say unto you: it is the good war which halloweth every cause. War and courage have done more great things than charity. Not your sympathy, but your bravery hath hitherto saved the victims. "What is good?" ye ask. To be brave is good. Let the little girls say: "To be good is what is pretty, and at the same time touching." They call you heartless: but your heart is true, and I love the bashfulness of your goodwill. Ye are ashamed of your flow, and others are ashamed of their ebb. Ye are ugly? Well then, my brethren, take the sublime about you, the mantle of the ugly! And when your soul becometh great, then doth it become haughty, and in your sublimity there is wickedness. I know you. In wickedness the haughty man and the weakling meet. But they misunderstand one another. I know you. Ye shall only have enemies to be hated, but not enemies to be despised. Ye must be proud of your enemies; then, the successes of your enemies are also your successes. Resistance—that is the distinction of the slave. Let your distinction be obedience. Let your commanding itself be obeying! To the good warrior soundeth "thou shalt" pleasanter than "I will." And all that is dear unto you, ye shall first have it commanded unto you. Let your love to life be love to your highest hope; and let your highest hope be the highest thought of life! Your highest thought, however, ye shall have it commanded unto you by me—and it is this: man is something that is to be surpassed. So live your life of obedience and of war! What matter about long life! What warrior wisheth to be spared! I spare you not, I love you from my very heart, my brethren in war!— Thus spake Zarathustra.

# Impacts

## Non-Unique

#### The fallacy of the affirmative is that they fail to realize that suffering and antagonism are inevitable parts of human existence. Their focus on the elimination of instability and difference paradoxically codify a constant state of emergency into politics

Saurette 96 - Professor of Political Studies at University of Ottawa

(Paul, Prof of Political Studies @ UOttawa, “I Mistrust All Systematizers and Avoid Them: Nietzsche, Arendt, and the Crisis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory” Millenium 25.1)

According to Nietzsche, the philosophical foundation of a society is the set of ideas which give meaning to the phenomenon of human existence within a given cultural framework. As one manifestation of the Will to Power, this will to meaning fundamentally influences the social and political organisation of a particular community.5 Anything less than a profound historical interrogation of the most basic philosophical foundations of our civilization, then, misconceives the origins of values which we take to be intrinsic and natural. Nietzsche suggests, therefore, that to understand the development of our modern conception of society and politics, we must reconsider the crucial influence of the Platonic formulation of Socratic thought. Nietzsche claims that pre-Socratic Greece based its philosophical justification of life on heroic myths which honoured tragedy and competition. Life was understood as a contest in which both the joyful and ordered (Apollonian) and chaotic and suffering (Dionysian) aspects of life were accepted and affirmed as inescapable aspects of human existence.6 However, this incarnation of the will to power as tragedy weakened, and became unable to sustain meaning in Greek life. Greek myths no longer instilled the self-respect and self-control that had upheld the pre-Socratic social order. 'Everywhere the instincts were in anarchy; everywhere people were but five steps from excess: the monstrum in animo was a universal danger'.7 No longer willing to accept the tragic hardness and self-mastery of pre-Socratic myth, Greek thought yielded to decadence, a search for a new social foundation which would soften the tragedy of life, while still giving meaning to existence. In this context, Socrates' thought became paramount. In the words of Nietzsche, Socrates saw behind his aristocratic Athenians: he grasped that his case, the idiosyncrasy of his case, was no longer exceptional. The same kind of degeneration was everywhere silently preparing itself: the old Athens was coming to an end—And Socrates understood that the world had need of him —his expedient, his cure and his personal art of self-preservation.8 Socrates realised that his search for an ultimate and eternal intellectual standard paralleled the widespread yearning for assurance and stability within society. His expedient, his cure? An alternative will to power. An alternate foundation that promised mastery and control, not through acceptance of the tragic life, but through the disavowal of the instinctual, the contingent, and the problematic. In response to the failing power of its foundational myths, Greece tried to renounce the very experience that had given rise to tragedy by retreating/escaping into the Apollonian world promised by Socratic reason. In Nietzsche's words, '[rationality was divined as a saviour.,,it was their last expedient. The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational.,.,,9 Thus, Socrates codified the wider fear of instability into an intellectual framework. The Socratic Will to Truth is characterised by the attempt to understand and order life rationally by renouncing the Dionysian elements of existence and privileging an idealised Apollonian order. As life is inescapably comprised of both order and disorder, however, the promise of control through Socratic reason is only possible by creating a 'Real World' of eternal and meaningful forms, in opposition to an 'Apparent World' of transitory physical existence. Suffering and contingency is contained within the Apparent World, disparaged, devalued, and ignored in relation to the ideal order of the Real World. Essential to the Socratic Will to Truth, then, is the fundamental contradiction between the experience of Dionysian suffering in the Apparent World and the idealised order of the Real World. According to Nietzsche, this dichotomised model led to the emergence of a uniquely 'modern understanding of life which could only view suffering as the result of the imperfection of the Apparent World. This outlook created a modern notion of responsibility in which the Dionysian elements of life could be understood only as a phenomenon for which someone, or something, is to blame. Nietzsche terms this philosophically-induced condition ressentiment and argues that it signalled a potential crisis of the Will to Truth by exposing the central contradiction of the Socratic resolution. This contradiction, however, was resolved historically through the aggressive universalisation of the Socratic ideal by Christianity. According to Nietzsche, ascetic Christianity exacerbated the Socratic dichotomisation by employing the Apparent World as the responsible agent against which the ressentiment of life could be turned. Blame for suffering fell on individuals within the Apparent World, precisely because they did not live up to God, the Truth, and the Real World. As Nietzsche wrote, '1 suffer: someone must be to blame for it' thinks every sickly sheep. But his shepherd, the ascetic priest tells him: 'Quite so my sheep! someone must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for yourself,—you alone are to blame for yourself '—This is brazen and false enough: but one thing is achieved by it, the direction of ressentiment is altered." Faced with the collapse of the Socratic resolution and the prospect of meaninglessness, once again, 'one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational....'12 The genius of the ascetic ideal was that it preserved the meaning of the Socratic Will to Power as Will to Truth by extrapolating ad absurdium the Socratic division through the redirection of ressentiment against the Apparent World! Through this redirection, the Real World was transformed from a transcendental world of philosophical escape into a model towards which the Apparent World actively aspired, always blaming its contradictory experiences on its own imperfect knowledge and action. This subtle transformation of the relationship between the dichotomised worlds creates the Will to Order as the defining characteristic of the modern Will to Truth. Unable to accept the Dionysian suffering inherent in the Apparent World, the ascetic ressentiment desperately searches for 'the hypnotic sense of nothingness, the repose of deepest sleep, in short absence of suffering".n According to the ascetic model, however, this escape is possible only when the Apparent World perfectly duplicates the Real World. The Will to Order, then, is the aggressive need increasingly to order the Apparent World in line with the precepts of the moral Truth of the Real World. The ressentiment of the Will to Order, therefore, generates two interrelated reactions. First, ressentiment engenders a need actively to mould the Apparent World in accordance with the dictates of the ideal, Apollonian Real World. In order to achieve this, however, the ascetic ideal also asserts that a 'truer', more complete knowledge of the Real World must be established, creating an ever-increasing Will to Truth. This self-perpetuating movement creates an interpretative structure within which everything must be understood and ordered in relation to the ascetic Truth of the Real World. As Nietzsche suggests, [t]he ascetic ideal has a goal—this goal is so universal that all other interests of human existence seem, when compared with it, petty and narrow; it interprets epochs, nations, and men inexorably with a view to this one goat; it permits no other interpretation, no other goal; it rejects, denies, affirms and sanctions solely from the point of view of its interpretation.14 The very structure of the Will to Truth ensures that theoretical investigation must be increasingly ordered, comprehensive, more True, and closer to the perfection of the ideal. At the same time, this understanding of intellectual theory ensures that it creates practices which attempt to impose increasing order in the Apparent World. With this critical transformation, the Will to Order becomes the fundamental philosophical principle of modernity

## Impacts Inev

#### Ressentiment destroys the ability to value human life- makes their impacts inevitable.

Nietzsche 87 [“Genealogy of Morals”, second essay “Guilt…” pg. 497 in “The Basic Writings of Nietzsche”]

How can one create a memory for the human animal? How can one impress something upon this partly obtuse, partly flighty mind, attuned only to the passing moment, in such a way that it will stay there? One can well believe that the answers and methods for solving this primeval problem were not precisely gentle perhaps indeed’ there was nothing more fearful and uncanny in the whole prehistory of man than his mnemotechnics. “If something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in: only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory”—this is a main clause of the oldest (unhappily also the most enduring) psychology on earth. One might even say that wherever on earth solemnity, seriousness, mystery, and gloomy coloring still distinguish the life of man and a people, something of the terror that formerly attended all promises, pledges, and vows on earth is still effective: the past, the longest, deepest and sternest past, breathes upon us and rises up in us whenever we become “serious.” Man could never do without blood, torture, and sacrifices when he felt the need to create a memory for himself; the most dreadful sacrifices and pledges (sacrifices of the first-born among them), the most repulsive mutilations (castration, for example), the cruelest rites of all the religious cults (and all religions are at the deepest level systems of cruelties) —all this has its origin in the instinct that realized that pain is the most powerful aid to mnemonics. In a certain sense, the whole of asceticism belongs here; a few ideas are to be rendered inextinguishable, ever-present, unforgettable, “fixed,” with the aim of hypnotizing the entire nervous and intellectual system with these “fixed ideas”—and ascetic procedures and modes of life are means of freeing these ideas from the competition of all other ideas, so as to make them “unforgettable.” The worse man’s memory has been, the more fearful has been the appearance of his customs; the severity of the penal code provides an especially significant measure of the degree of effort needed to overcome forgetfulness and to impose a few primitive demands of social existence as present realities upon these slaves of momentary affect and desire.

## Turns Case – Endless Violence

#### Disorder is inevitable, the drive to secure culminates in endless violence.

Der Derian 98 – Prof Political Science at University of Mass.

[James, Political Science Professor, University of Massachusetts, 1998. On Security, ed: Lipschitz, The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard, Decentering Security.]

No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted. We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." From God to Rational Man, from Empire to Republic, from King to the People--and on occasion in the reverse direction as well, for history is never so linear, never so neat as we would write it--the security of the center has been the shifting site from which the forces of authority, order, and identity philosophically defined and physically kept at bay anarchy, chaos, and difference. Yet the center, as modern poets and postmodern critics tell us, no longer holds. The demise of a bipolar system, the diffusion of power into new political, national, and economic constellations, the decline of civil society and the rise of the shopping mall, the acceleration of everything --transportation, capital and information flows, change itself--have induced a new anxiety. As George Bush repeatedly said--that is, until the 1992 Presidential election went into full swing--"The enemy is unpredictability. The enemy is instability." One immediate response, the unthinking reaction, is to master this anxiety and to resecure the center by remapping the peripheral threats. In this vein, the Pentagon prepares seven military scenarios for future conflict, ranging from latino small-fry to an IdentiKit super-enemy that goes by the generic acronym of REGT ("Reemergent Global Threat"). In the heartlands of America, Toyota sledge-hammering returns as a popular know-nothing distraction. And within the Washington beltway, rogue powers such as North Korea, Iraq, and Libya take on the status of pariah-state and potential video bomb-site for a permanently electioneering elite.

## Turns Case – Nihilism

#### The will to desire a better world free of suffering is nihilism – it rejects the ability to create value

White, 90 (Alan, Professor of Philosophy Williams College, “Delusion Frames, From Within Nietzsche’s Labyrinth,” http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/WNL%20web/Delusion%20frames.htm,)

I take as my starting point Nietzsche's assertion that the emergence of nihilism as a "psychological state" is bound up with the failure of the attempt to endow the world with value by at­tributing to it an ultimate "purpose," "unity," or "truth" (N:11[99] / WP:12).  This failure leads to nihilism as "the radi­cal rejection of value, meaning, and desirability" (N:2[127] / WP:1).  These descriptions suggest that nihilism has its origin in a negation, i.e., in the failure of an attempt, or in the rejection of a purported value.   Yet neither of these negations can be the first step towards nihilism, because neither is a first step at all.  The failure of an attempt presupposes that it has been made, and any rejection presupposes either prior accept­ance or, at least, prior awareness of a question.I therefore suggest that the first step towards nihilism -- a step that, in Nietzsche's view, leads historically to the second -- is the step taken with the judgment that the existence of our world of becoming would be justified only through a pur­pose that guides it, through an "infinitely valuable" unity that underlies it, or through another world, a "true world" or "world of being" that is accessible through it (N:11[99] / WP:12).  This step, like the step to rejection, is a negation in that it con­tains, at least implicitly, the judgment that our "world of becom­ing" as it presents itself, in isolation from such purpose, unity, or truth, "ought not to exist" (N:9[60] / WP:585); the step presupposes the judgment that without some such source of worth, which cannot be contained within the flux of a "world of becoming," that world -- our world -- would be worthless. Is the person who has taken this first step -- who has judged that the world requires justification -- a nihilist?  Cer­tainly not an avowed one:  this person will use the appellation "nihilist," if at all, only for others.  Nevertheless, this per­son is "nihilistic" in a way that one who simply accepts the world of becoming is not.  From the Nietzschean perspective, those who posit the extraneous source of value are nihilists in that (1) they judge of our world that it ought not to be (on its own), and (2) they believe in a world that is, despite their beliefs to the contrary, "fabricated solely from psychological needs," a world to which we have "absolutely no right" (N:11[99] / WP:12).  To be sure, they are not aware that the world of their belief is a mere fabrication; that is why they will deny being nihilists.  For this reason, if it is appropriate to term them "nihilists" at all, an essential qualification must be added:  their nihilism is unconscious.  Or, to adopt a more Nietzschean term, they are religious nihilists:  their affirmation of another world or source of value is a consequence of their denial of our world as bearer of its own value.Nihilism becomes conscious -- avowed or, in a Nietzschean term, "radical" -- with a second step, the step taken with the judgment that the sources of value are absent, that the three categories of value remain uninstantiated.  "Radical nihilism," in Nietzsche's explicit definition, is the conviction of an absolute untenability of existence when it is a matter of the highest values that one recognizes; plus the in­sight that we have not the slightest right to posit a being or an in-itself of things that would be 'divine' or incarnate morality. (N:10[192] / WP:3)

## Turns Case – Value to Life

#### The will to order the affirmative engages in condemns all that is beautiful in life

White 90 (Alan, Professor of Philosophy Williams College, “Delusion Frames, From Within Nietzsche’s Labyrinth,” http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/WNL%20web/Delusion%20frames.htm,)

What is the secret?  Art is generally supposed to be concerned with beauty, science with truth, and morality with good­ness, yet Nietzsche suggests, directly, that science may be a defense against truth, an attempt to disguise the truth; he also suggests, indirectly, that morality may be a defense against goodness, an attempt to avoid acknowledging what true goodness would require.  The mechanism that allows these defenses to work is a "new and unprecedented treasuring Hochschätzung] of knowledge and insight."  Clear evidence for the novelty of this valuation is provided by Socrates's admission of his own ig­norance, and his amazement that others -- great statesmen, orators, poets, and artists -- are governed by instinct rather than by knowledge. “Only from instinct":  with this expression, we touch the heart and midpoint of the Socratic tendency.   With it, Socraticism condemns existing art as well as existing ethics:  wherever he directs his examining glance, he sees the lack of insight and the power of delu­sion [Wahn]; from this lack, he concludes that what exists is inter­nally perverse [verkehrt] and reprehensible [verwerflich]. (BT:13) In condemning all that exists, including current art and ethics, Socrates condemns both what is and what has been; given this rejection of past and present, he can be "detained in life" only by the delusion that he can make the future radically dif­ferent.  He consequently views his own task as one of therapy; he is to "heal the wound of existence" by "correcting existence" (BT:13).  This correction or healing is a practical project, but it requires a theoretical foundation:  the replacement of custom by morality presupposes a replacement of instinct with knowledge.  The result of the two replacements is a transformation of pessimism into optimism:Socrates is the prototype [Urbild] of the theoretical optimist who, with his already characterized faith in the fathomability [Ergründlichkeit] of the nature of things, ascribes to knowledge and cognition the force of a panacea, and conceives error as evil in itself.  To penetrate into every ground [Grund] and to separate true cognition from semblance and from error strikes the Socratic man as the most noble human calling, indeed the only truly human calling. (BT:15). The Socratic legacy -- hence, the functioning of the Socratic illusion -- is clearest in the paradigm [Typus] of a form of existence unheard of before Socrates:  that of the theoretical man, who embraces Socrates's project, "to make existence appear comprehensible and thereby as justified" (BT:16), and thereby also Socrates's "profound delusion [Wahnvor­stellung]," the "unshakable faith that thinking, following the guideline of causality, reaches into the deepest abysses of being, and that thinking is in a position not merely to know being, but even to correct it" (BT:15).  The "essence of the spirit of science," then, combines "faith in the fathomability [Ergründlichkeit] of nature and in knowledge as panacea [an die Universalheilkraft des Wissens]" (BT:17).  Life is worth living, for those possessed of this spirit, only because it is perfectible.

## Takes Out Solvency

#### The K takes out solvency – the affirmative thinks they control policy by creating a “Real” world – that’s Nietzsche. This attempts to escape suffering kills their potential to have effective change and negates life – that’s an independent disad.

Turanli 2k3 [aydan, “nietzsche and the later wittgenstein”, journal of nietzsche studies, issue 26, p. 61-2, muse]

The craving for absolutely general specifications results in doing metaphysics. Unlike Wittgenstein, Nietzsche provides an account of how this craving arises. The creation of the two worlds such as apparent and real world, conditioned and unconditioned world, being and becoming is the creation of the ressentiment of metaphysicians. Nietzsche says, “to imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer: the ressentiment of metaphysicians against actuality is here creative” (*WP* III 579). Escaping from this world because there is grief in it results in asceticism. Paying respect to the ascetic ideal is longing for the world that is pure and denaturalized. Craving for frictionless surfaces, for a transcendental, pure, true, ideal, perfect world, is the result of the ressentiment of metaphysicans who suffer in this world. Metaphysicians do not affirm this world as it is, and this paves the way for many explanatory theories in philosophy. In criticizing a philosopher who pays homage to the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche says, “he wants *to escape from torture*” (*GM* III 6). The traditional philosopher or the ascetic priest continues to repeat, “‘My kingdom is not of *this* world’” (*GM* III 10). This is a longing for another world in which one does not suffer. It is to escape from this world; to create another illusory, fictitious, false world. This longing for “the truth” of a world in which one does not suffer is the desire for a world of constancy. It is supposed that contradiction, change, and deception are the causes of suffering; in other words, the senses deceive; it is from the senses that all misfortunes come; reason corrects the errors; therefore reason is the road to the constant. In sum, this world is an error; the world as it ought to be exists. This will to truth, this quest for another world, this desire for the world as it ought to be, is the result of unproductive thinking. It is unproductive because it is the result of avoiding the creation of the world as it ought to be. According to Nietzsche, the will to truth is “the impotence of the will to create” (*WP* III 585). Metaphysicians end up with the creation of the “true” world in contrast to the actual, changeable, deceptive, self-contradictory world. They try to discover the true, transcendental world that is already there rather than creating a world for themselves. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the transcendental world is the “denaturalized world” (*WP* III 586). The way out of the circle created by the ressentiment of metaphysicians is the will to life rather than the will to truth. The will to truth can be overcome only through a Dionysian relationship to existence. This is the way to a new philosophy, which in Wittgenstein’s terms aims “to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle” (*PI* §309).

#### Reality as we experience it is only an interpretation – predictive politics can never guarantee solvency

Nietzsche 1873 [“On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense”, pg 7]

The free intellect copies human life, but it considers this life to be something good and seems to be quite satisfied with it. That immense framework and planking of concepts to which the needy man clings his whole life long in order to preserve himself is nothing but a scaffolding and toy for the most audacious feats of the liberated intellect. And when it smashes this framework to pieces, throws it into confusion, and puts it back together in an ironic fashion, pairing the most alien things and separating the closest, it is demonstrating that it has no need of these makeshifts of indigence and that it will now be guided by intuitions rather than by concepts. There is no regular path which leads from these intuitions into the land of ghostly schemata, the land of abstractions. There exists no word for these intuitions; when man sees them he grows dumb, or else he speaks only in forbidden metaphors and in unheard-of combinations of concepts. He does this so that by shattering and mocking the old conceptual barriers he may at least correspond creatively to the impression of the powerful present intuition.

# A2

## AT: Permutation

#### The perm fails. The moment we are willing to make the value-for-less suffering trade is the moment we become slaves to it. Our eternal return framework means that if we win the direction of the link, the differentials are meaningless

Kain, 2k7 (Philip J., “Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence”, Journal of Nietzsche Studies, issue 33, Penn state University, Muse)//RSW

I think we are now in a position to see that for eternal recurrence to work, for it to have the effect that it must have for Nietzsche, we must accept without qualification, we must love, every single moment of our lives, every single moment of suffering. We cannot allow ourselves to be tempted by what might at first sight seem to be a much more appealing version of eternal recurrence, that is, a recurring life that would include the desirable aspects of our present life while leaving out the undesirable ones. To give in to such temptation would be to risk losing everything that has been gained. To give in to such temptation, I suggest, would allow the suffering in our present life to begin to reassert its psychological stranglehold. We would start to slip back into subjugation. We would again come to be dominated by our suffering. We [End Page 57] would spend our time trying to minimize it, or avoid it, or ameliorate it, or cure it. We would again become slaves to it. For the same reason, I do not think it will work for us to accept eternal recurrence merely because of one or a few grand moments—for the sake of which we are willing to tolerate the rest of our lives. Magnus holds that all we need desire is the return of one peak experience.21 This suggests that our attitude toward much of our life, even most of it, could be one of toleration, acceptance, or indifference—it could even be negative. All we need do is love one great moment and, because all moments are interconnected (Z IV: "The Drunken Song" 10; WP 1032), that then will require us to accept all moments. This would be much easier than actually loving all moments of one's life—every single detail. The latter is what is demanded in Ecce Homo, which says that amor fati means that one "wants nothing to be different" and that we "[n]ot merely bear what is necessary . . . but love it" (EH "Clever" 10, emphasis added [except to love]). We want "a Yes-saying without reservation, even to suffering. . . . Nothing in existence may be subtracted, nothing is dispensable . . ." (EH "BT" 2). If we do not love every moment of our present life for its own sake, those moments we do not love, those moments we accept for the sake of one grand moment, I suggest, will begin to wear on us.22 We will begin to wish we did not have to suffer through so many of them, we will try to develop strategies for coping with them, we will worry about them, they will start to reassert themselves, they will slowly begin to dominate us, and pretty soon we will again be enslaved by them. Our attitude toward any moment cannot be a desire to avoid it, change it, or reduce it—or it will again begin to dominate us. Indeed, in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche says that he had to display a "Russian fatalism." He did so by tenaciously clinging for years to all but intolerable situations, places, apartments, and society, merely because they happened to be given by accident: it was better than changing them, than feeling that they could be changed—than rebelling against them. Any attempt to disturb me in this fatalism, to awaken me by force, used to annoy me mortally—and it actually was mortally dangerous every time. Accepting oneself as if fated, not wishing oneself "different"—that is in such cases great reason itself. (EH "Wise" 6) Eternal recurrence is an attempt to deal with meaningless suffering. It is an attempt to do so that completely rejects an approach to suffering that says, Let's improve the world, let's change things, let's work step by step to remove suffering—the view of liberals and socialists whom Nietzsche so often rails against. If it is impossible to significantly reduce suffering in the world, as Nietzsche thinks it is, then to make it your goal to try to do so is to enslave yourself to that suffering. [End Page 58]

## AT: Util

#### Nietzsche rejects the herd mentality and demands that people consider their actions in terms of individual moral judgment

Millen, 97 – Professor of Religion at Wittenberg University

(Rochelle L. Millen, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/modern_judaism/v017/17.1br_santaniello.html> Review: Nietzsche, God, and The Jews: His Critique of Judeo-Christianity in Relation to the Nazi Myth, MT).

In criticizing the herd morality of Christianity, Nietzsche's concern is the complacency, the lack of rationality, the predominance of the follower instinct that led to a tradition he viewed as bankrupt. Christian morality entraps one in a sense of guilt and sinfulness, precluding the flourishing of true human creativity. Nietzsche also uses the figure of Jesus to support his claim that works, not faith, are the way of the Christian life. Jesus's legacy was his behavior, an existential disposition rather than a set of beliefs. Thus Nietzsche's reading of Jewish (i.e., biblical) theology leads to his holding Judaism responsible for the slave morality characteristic of Christian society, yet simultaneously and paradoxically he admires Jewish culture. The centrality of doctrine in Christianity has another negative implication. By definition, it leads not only to repressed individuals and a herd morality, but also to religious bigotry. Christianity for Nietzsche, Santaniello explains, has "degenerated into German nationalism with a streak of vengeance" (p. 56). Thus part of Nietzsche's critique of Christianity is political: democracy, socialism, and Christianity encourage mass conformity and project their discontent on the Jews. Nietzsche disparages German nationalism, the Lutheran state-church, and the notion of the *Volk*, all of which--like Christian doctrine itself--preclude the development of healthy cultures

## AT: Framework

#### New link: fairness becomes a mouthpiece for ressentiment by negating positive value to life

Nietzsche 1887 (“Thus Spake Zarathustra,” online at project gutenburg, “The Trantulas”)

Thus do I speak unto you in parable, ye who make the soul giddy, ye preachers of EQUALITY! Tarantulas are ye unto me, and secretly revengeful ones! But I will soon bring your hiding-places to the light: therefore do I laugh in your face my laughter of the height. Therefore do I tear at your web, that your rage may lure you out of your den of lies, and that your revenge may leap forth from behind your word "justice." Because, FOR MAN TO BE REDEEMED FROM REVENGE--that is for me the bridge to the highest hope, and a rainbow after long storms. Otherwise, however, would the tarantulas have it. "Let it be very justice for the world to become full of the storms of our vengeance"--thus do they talk to one another. "Vengeance will we use, and insult, against all who are not like us"—thus do the tarantula-hearts pledge themselves. "And 'Will to Equality'--that itself shall henceforth be the name of virtue; and against all that hath power will we raise an outcry!" Ye preachers of equality, the tyrant-frenzy of impotence crieth thus in you for "equality": your most secret tyrant-longings disguise themselves thus in virtue-words! Fretted conceit and suppressed envy--perhaps your fathers' conceit and envy: in you break they forth as flame and frenzy of vengeance. What the father hath hid cometh out in the son; and oft have I found in the son the father's revealed secret. Inspired ones they resemble: but it is not the heart that inspireth them-- but vengeance. And when they become subtle and cold, it is not spirit, but envy, that maketh them so. Their jealousy leadeth them also into thinkers' paths; and this is the sign of their jealousy--they always go too far: so that their fatigue hath at last to go to sleep on the snow. In all their lamentations soundeth vengeance, in all their eulogies is maleficence; and being judge seemeth to them bliss. But thus do I counsel you, my friends: distrust all in whom the impulse to punish is powerful! They are people of bad race and lineage; out of their countenances peer the hangman and the sleuth-hound. Distrust all those who talk much of their justice! Verily, in their souls not only honey is lacking. And when they call themselves "the good and just," forget not, that for them to be Pharisees, nothing is lacking but--power! My friends, I will not be mixed up and confounded with others. There are those who preach my doctrine of life, and are at the same time preachers of equality, and tarantulas. That they speak in favour of life, though they sit in their den, these poison-spiders, and withdrawn from life--is because they would thereby do injury. To those would they thereby do injury who have power at present: for with those the preaching of death is still most at home. Were it otherwise, then would the tarantulas teach otherwise: and they themselves were formerly the best world-maligners and heretic-burners. With these preachers of equality will I not be mixed up and confounded. For thus speaketh justice UNTO ME: "Men are not equal." And neither shall they become so! What would be my love to the Superman, if I spake otherwise?

## A2 We Solve Suffering

#### Questions about “decreasing” suffering miss the point of the criticism – steps toward a perfectible cosmos are bad because we cannot eliminate suffering, only mask it. It’s better to embrace that suffering rather than run away from it.

Kain 7 (Philip J, Professor of philosophy at University of Santa Clara, "Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence," the Journal of Nietzsche Studies, muse, AD: 7/2/09)

One might find all this unacceptable. After all, isn't it just obvious that we can change things, reduce suffering, improve existence, and make progress? Isn't it just obvious that modern science and technology have done so? Isn't it just absurd for Nietzsche to reject the possibility of significant change? Hasn't such change already occurred? Well, perhaps not. Even modern environmentalists might resist all this obviousness. They might respond in a rather Nietzschean vein that technology may have caused as many problems as it has solved. The advocate of the perfectible cosmos, on the other hand, would no doubt counter such Nietzschean pessimism by arguing that even if technology does cause some problems, the solution to those problems can only come from better technology. Honesty requires us to admit, however, that this is merely a hope, not something for which we already have evidence, not something that it is absurd to doubt—not at all something obvious. Further technology may or may not improve things. The widespread use of antibiotics seems to have done a miraculous job of improving our health and reducing suffering, but we are also discovering that such antibiotics give rise to even more powerful bacteria that are immune to those antibiotics. We have largely eliminated diseases like cholera, smallpox, malaria, and tuberculosis, but we have produced cancer and heart disease. We can cure syphilis and gonorrhea, but we now have AIDS. Even if we could show that it will be possible to continuously reduce suffering, it is very unlikely that we will ever eliminate it. If that is so, then it remains a real question whether it is not better to face suffering, use it as a discipline, perhaps even increase it, so as to toughen ourselves, rather than let it weaken us, allow it to dominate us, by continually hoping to overcome it. But whatever we think about the possibility of reducing suffering, the question may well become moot. Nietzsche tells a story: "Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is dispersed into numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of 'world history,' but nevertheless, it was only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths, the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had to die" (TL 1, 79). Whatever progress we might think we are making in reducing suffering, whatever change we think we are bringing about, it may all amount to nothing more than a brief and accidental moment in biological time, whose imminent disappearance will finally confirm the horror and meaninglessness of existence. The disagreement here is not so much about the quantity of suffering that we can expect to find in the world but, rather, its nature. For proponents of the designed cosmos, suffering is basically accidental. It is not fundamental or central to life. It is not a necessary part of the nature of things. It does not make up the essence of existence. We must develop virtue, and then we can basically expect to fit and be at home in the cosmos. For the proponents of a perfectible cosmos, suffering is neither essential nor unessential. The cosmos is neutral. We must work on it to reduce suffering. We must bring about our own fit. For Nietzsche, even if we can change this or that, even if we can reduce suffering here and there, what cannot be changed for human beings is that suffering is fundamental and central to life. The very nature of things, the very essence of existence, means suffering. Moreover, it means meaningless suffering—suffering for no reason at all. That cannot be changed—it can only be concealed. Nietzsche does not reject all forms of change. What he rejects is the sort of change necessary for a perfectible cosmos. He rejects the notion that science and technology can transform the essence of things—he rejects the notion that human effort can significantly reduce physical suffering. Instead, he only thinks it possible to build up the power necessary to construct meaning in a meaningless world and thus to conceal the horror of existence, which cannot be eliminated. We cannot prove the opposite view, and I do not think we can dismiss Nietzsche's view simply because it goes counter to the assumptions of [End Page 52] Christianity, science, liberalism, socialism, and so forth. And we certainly cannot dismiss this view if we hope to understand Nietzsche. At any rate, for Nietzsche, we cannot eliminate suffering; we can only seek to mask it.

## AT: Cede the Political

#### We don’t cede the political – the affirmation of life creates transformative politics

Daigle 6 -PHD and professor of Philosophy at Brock University

(Christine, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 32,2006, 1-21, Muse, MT)

 Could it be that in political matters as well as in moral matters we need a reevaluation of values? In morality, one of the tasks that Nietzsche takes on is to criticize and reject existing values. He also criticizes and rejects morality. All morality? No, as we saw earlier, only a certain kind of morality is rejected, that is, morality that is detrimental to the human. So Nietzsche reevaluates morality in order to present it in a new form. The idea of a morality, then, is not thrown overboard, but only a certain particular conception is done away with. Could it be the same with democracy? What if Nietzsche really is criticizing and rejecting a certain particular form of [End Page 14] democracy? What if he wants to get to a political regime that would favor the flourishing of all (who would choose to flourish, i.e., an equality of opportunities)? His best choice is a democratic form of government. But democracy as he saw it in his days leads to mediocrity. Democracy breeds the mediocre individual and favors the cultivation of Christian virtues, virtues for the weak. But does it need to be that way? Nietzsche thinks that there is an adequation between the two, democracy and Christianity. But we can conceive of a transfigured democracy at least as much as we can conceive of a transvaluation of values in the realm of morality. A democracy that would adhere to the new morality that Nietzsche advocates would not end up breeding a weaker kind of individual. Instead, it would be the kind of regime that embodies the virtue politics we need in order to cohere with Nietzschean virtue ethics. To my opinion, this is the only way we can equate the political Nietzsche and the ethical Nietzsche.

## AT: Nazism

#### Nazism was a deliberate and massive distortion of Nietzsche.

Millen 97 – Professor of Religion at Wittenberg University

(Rochelle L. Millen, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/modern_judaism/v017/17.1br_santaniello.html> Review: Nietzsche, God, and The Jews: His Critique of Judeo-Christianity in Relation to the Nazi Myth, MT).

From 1891 onward, Elisabeth, Nietzsche's sister, compiled (and then published) what she claimed were the previously unpublished notes of her famous brother. In fact, until her death in 1935, Elisabeth was responsible for feeding to the leading ideologues of what became National Socialism--including Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Dietrich Eckhart, Joseph Goebbels, Alfred Rosenberg, and Hitler himself--presumed statements of Nietzsche's professed love of Christianity, allegiance to Aryan racial supremacy, and (after 1923) loyalty to the Nazi Party. These are clearly antithetical to Nietzsche's critiques of Christianity, anti-Semitism, and Wagnerism. Under Elisabeth's control, the Nietzsche Archive in Weimar became a propaganda tool for fascist politics and National Socialism. As Santaniello confirms, Nietzsche never wrote a book entitled *The Will to Power*; it was, rather, a compilation of distorted statements of Nietzsche's put together by Elisabeth herself in 1901, a year after Nietzsche's death. One might speculate that Elisabeth needed to justify her own powerful anti-Semitic leanings, and in true Freudian style, could not do it in a better fashion than by deliberately twisting her brother's thought. Thus she could cover up Nietzsche's violent break with her mentor, Richard Wagner, in 1876 and with herself in 1884; she could appropriate his genius for her purposes, camouflaging her own shallowness, complacency, and racism. In truth, Elisabeth's false representations of Nietzsche's philosophy represent the very aspects of Christianity and German culture that Nietzsche so deeply despised. This is especially evident in her skewed two-volume biography of her brother,*The Life of Nietzsche* (much of which was written between 1895-1904) and its later popular adaptations,*The Young Nietzsche* and*The Lonely Nietzsche* (1912-1915). By the time of Elisabeth's death in 1925, Nietzsche's appropriation by the Nazis was complete, and he was continually depicted as a well known anti-Semite of long standing. In the light of her meticulous biographical and psychological analysis in Part 1 and textual analyses in Part 2, Santaniello is concerned to emphasize the "crucial fact that Nietzsche was a staunch opponent of antisemitism and that his extremely rare position during his time did not win for him many popularity contests" (p. 150). This is significant in that Santaniello unequivocally demonstrates that the Nazis' deliberate manipulations of the Nietzsche corpus were based not on their misunderstanding but rather on their astute comprehension of his work. They understood only too well that Nietzsche defended the Jews and defied many of the precursors of National Socialism: the Wagners, Ernest Renan, Chamberlain, Gobineau, Stöcker, and the Forsters, his own sister and brother-in-law. By adapting and distorting Nietzsche's works, the Nazis effectively silenced his voice.

## AT: Empiricism

#### Empiricism ignores context in which truths are created. The skepticism is a correction of this flawed logic

Welshon 9 - Professor of Philosophy at University of Colorado

(Rex, Professor of Philosophy at University of Colorado, "Saying Yes to Reality: Skepticism, Antirealism, and Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Epistemology," The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Issue 37, Spring, p. 32)

The perspectival nature of justification helps us understand Nietzsche's ambivalent attitude toward the science of his day (for additional analyses of Nietzsche's relation to science, see, among others, [Clark 1990](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/journals/journal_of_nietzsche_studies/v037/37.welshon.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22b7); [Cox 1998](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/journals/journal_of_nietzsche_studies/v037/37.welshon.html#b8); [Moore 2002](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/journals/journal_of_nietzsche_studies/v037/37.welshon.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22b16); [Richardson 2004](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/journals/journal_of_nietzsche_studies/v037/37.welshon.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22b23); [Schacht 1983](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/journals/journal_of_nietzsche_studies/v037/37.welshon.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22b25)). It is certainly true that science is preferable to many other perspectives—religion and morality in particular—but Nietzsche has a number of complaints about science that entail that it cannot be uniquely privileged over every other kind of knowledge. One criticism is directed against scientists themselves, focusing on their character flaws. Scientists myopically root around in their specialties, digging "quietly under their molehills" (*D* 41), blissfully uncritical about the value of their work and never connecting it to the larger personal and social contexts in which it occurs. This trait distinguishes scientists from philosophers, for whom nothing is impersonal (*BGE* 6). A second, more serious complaint is that scientists are ascetics. The ascetic ideal is a kind of self-mortifying decadence. Nietzsche argues in *GM* that the unquestioned faith in the value of truth found in science makes truth a stand-in divinity for God after he has died. Truth becomes the object to which all sacrifices must be made; hence, scientists are humble in the face of the truth, and by suppressing their desires in order to devote their lives to their research, their labs, and their books, they live a life of chastity and poverty, reminiscent of priests. Thus is the practice of science a practical asceticism. Nietzsche also complains about science itself. It is, for example, mistakenly governed by a set of mechanistic principles that are false (see, for example, *GS* 373). Now, to the extent that science reduces to mechanism, to that extent this criticism is sound. However, one might think that since mechanism was more widespread in the nineteenth century than it is now, this criticism is not as relevant now as then. But this glib response misses Nietzsche's more trenchant objection, which is to reductionism in science, the view that we can identify fundamental categories and explain everything in terms of them (see especially [Cox 1998](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/journals/journal_of_nietzsche_studies/v037/37.welshon.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22b8)). If anything, reductionism in science has accelerated since the nineteenth century. If you doubt it, simply review the last hundred years of psychology. Until the so-called cognitive revolution in the 1960s, the most widespread theoretical framework in psychology was reductionist behaviorism, according to which the domain of psychology was exhausted by observable behavior. Behaviorism was in turn replaced by computationalism, according to which all cognition was a kind of computation. Computationalism is now also thought by most to be false, since computers are qualitative zombies and we are not. There is *something* that *our* psychology has—phenomenological character to our experiences—that computers lack. But we still have not learned the Nietzschean lesson, for there are now two new reductionist trends in psychology: cognitive neuroscience, according to which a psychological phenomenon is reducible to neural activity, and evolutionary psychology, according to which a psychological phenomenon is reducible to survival value. Again, Nietzsche's larger point that science is routinely blinkered and self-interested seems to be forgotten again and again.

## AT: Utopian

#### The Alternative is not Utopian – It’s questioning that produces individual virtues to create an affirmation of life

Daigle 6 -PHD and professor of Philosophy at Brock University

(Christine, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 32,2006, 1-21, Muse, MT)

 What about virtues? Hunt suggests that, according to Nietzsche, "no list of the virtues could be complete. [. . .] Each occurrence of a virtue is different in [End Page 9] kind from all others. There really is no virtue other than 'the peculiar virtue of each man'" (GS 120).26 As Hunt points out, we can find two lists of virtues in Nietzsche: in Daybreak and Beyond Good and Evil. In these works, Nietzsche proposes courage, generosity, politeness, honesty, insight, sympathy, and solitude as virtues. However, one senses that more virtues exist, because the lists are not exhaustive and there is no recipe on how to be virtuous as there is in traditional moralities that say: acquire these virtues and you will be virtuous. In Nietzsche's mind, virtues are relative to the individual. However, virtues can conflict with one another. All the virtues that one adopts for oneself in Nietzsche's new ethics are adopted in view of one's own accomplishments, in view of one's own flourishing. In addition to this, we can see how central the notion of character is in relation to that of virtue. Virtues are adopted in view of the development of character. Character is what needs improving. We can determine if it is good when we examine the question as to how it enhances the will to power. The actions that are then accomplished by the virtuous agent are good because of the agent being virtuous, and some will be good in themselves as actions that promote life. This is how vitalism comes to be articulated with the virtue ethics. Besides the Übermensch and the will to power, the notion of the eternal return plays a major role in Nietzsche's ethical thought. I will begin by saying that I do not think that we should see the eternal return as an ontological notion. Nietzsche does not want to say what the world is like; rather, he wants to produce a thought experiment that could serve as a guide for action.27 It is an ethical hypothesis. As such, it serves to validate the choice of action. The individual must ask himself whether the course of action he is about to undertake is something that he would like to see coming back eternally. One must choose as if that choice is going to recur eternally. Under the perspective of the eternal return, I cannot choose something that would make me unhappy or that would make me resentful because this unhappiness and resentment would haunt me in this life and forever! Further, unhappiness or resentment cannot lead to a flourishing life. So, one's choice must be made in view of the flourishing life; thus will it be a good choice, that is, one that we will want to eternally recur. In the determination of what a good human life is, that toward which every human must strive, the notions of will to power and eternal return serve as guides for choice. A choice will be good if it promotes life as will to power. A choice will also be good if one can will that it eternally recurs. The two considerations go hand in hand, as one can will that one's choice eternally recur only if it leads to the flourishing life one pursues, a flourishing life that will come about through the realization of ourselves as will to power. Nietzsche's injunctions and prescriptions (if we can call them that) do not seem to be fit for a perfect world. He requires of us that we become who we are, but he also demands of us that we become strong. Our flourishing does not lie in quiet satisfaction but, rather, in [End Page 10] a constant overcoming. His virtue ethics and the requirements it has for human agents are indeed very demanding.

# Alternatives

## Affirmation

#### In the face life, we have two options:

#### 1) the world of the 1AC — which predicates the Will to Power on attempting to realize a world without suffering, or

#### 2) the alternative — accept that eliminating suffering is impossible, refuse the call to action, and affirm life as it is.

Owen and Ridley, 2000 (David Owen is Reader in Political Philosophy and Deputy Director of the Centre for Post-Analytic Philosophy at the University of Southampton. He is the author of numerous books and articles in social and political philosophy with a focus on Nietzsche. Aaron Ridley is a professor of Philosophy at the School of Humanities at the University of Southampton. He has also written multiple books about Nietzschean ethics. Why Nietzsche still? page 149-54)

The threat here is obvious: What is to be feared, what has a more calamitous effect than any other calamity, is that man should inspire not profound fear but profound *nausea;* also not great fear but great *pity.* Suppose these two were one day to unite, they would inevitably beget one of the uncanniest monsters: the "last will" of man, his will to nothingness, nihilism. And a great deal points to this union. *(GM* III:I4) So suicidal nihilism beckons. The one response to the situation that is absolutely ruled out is the one that has so far proved most successful at addressing problems of this sort, namely, adoption of the ascetic ideal, because the present crisis is caused by the self-destruction of that ideal. But Nietzsche argues that two plausible responses to the crisis are nonetheless possible for modern man. Both of these involve the construction of immanent ideals or goals: one response is represented by the type the Last Man, the other by the type the *Ubermensch.* The first response recognizes the reality of suffering and our (post-ascetic) inability to accord transcendental significance to it and concludes that the latter provides an overwhelming reason for abolishing the former to whatever extent is possible. This has the effect of elevating the abolition of suffering into a quasi-transcendental goal and brings with it a new table of virtues, on which prudence figures largest. In other words, this response takes the form of a *rapport a soi* characterized by a style of calculative rationality directed toward the avoidance of suffering at any cost, for example, of utilititarianism and any other account of human subjectivity that accords preeminence to maximizing preference satisfaction. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* Nietzsche portrays this type as follows: "What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?" thus asks the Last Man and blinks. The earth has become small, and upon it hops the Last Man, who makes everything small. His race is as inexterminable as the flea; the Last Man lives longest. "We have discovered happiness," say the Last Men and blink. They have left the places where living was hard: for one needs warmth. One still loves one's neighbor and rubs oneself against him: for one needs warmth. Sickness and mistrust count as sins with them: one should go about warily. He is a fool who still stumbles over stones or over men! A little poison now and then: that produces pleasant dreams. And a lot of poison at last, for a pleasant death. They still work, for work is entertainment. But they take care the entertainment does not exhaust them. Nobody grows rich or poor any more: both are too much of a burden. Who still wants to rule? Who obey? Both are too much of a burden. No herdsman and one herd. Everyone wants the same thing, everyone is the same: whoever thinks otherwise goes voluntarily into the madhouse "Formerly all the world was mad," say the most acute of them and blink. They are clever and know everything that has ever happened: so there is no end to their mockery. They still quarrel, but they soon make up-otherwise indigestion would result. They have their little pleasure for the day and their little pleasure for the night: but they respect health. "We have discovered happiness," say the Last Men and blink. *(Z:* I "Prologue" 5) Nietzsche's hostility to this first form of response is evident. His general objection to the Last Man is that the Last Man's ideal, like the ascetic ideal, is committed to the denial of chance and necessity as integral features of human existence. Whereas the ascetic ideal denies chance and necessity per se so that, while suffering remains real, what is objectionable about it is abolished, the Last Man's ideal is expressed as the practical imperative to abolish suffering, and hence, a fortiori, what is objectionable about it – that is, our exposure to chance and necessity. This general objection has two specific dimensions. The first is that the Last Man's ideal is unrealizable, insofar as human existence involves ineliminable sources of suffering-not least our consciousness that we come into being by chance and cease to be by necessity. Thus the Last Man's ideal is predicated on a neglect of truthfulness. The second dimension of Nietzsche's objection is that pursuit of the Last Man's ideal impoverishes and arbitrarily restricts our understanding of what we can be and, in doing so, forecloses our future possibilities of becoming otherwise than we are. Thus the Last Man's ideal entails an atrophying of the capacities (for self-overcoming, etc.) bequeathed by the ascetic ideal. Nietzsche brings these two dimensions together in *Beyond Good and Evil:* "You want, if possible – and there is no more insane 'if possible' – to *abolish suffering.* ... Well-being as you understand it – that is no goal, that seems to us an *end,* a state that soon makes man ridiculous and contemptible – that makes his destruction *desirable" (BGE 225).* The second response to the nihilistic threat posed by the selfdestruction of the ascetic ideal is definitive of the *Ubermensch* type. This response recognizes both the reality and the ineliminability of suffering and concludes that an affirmation of chance and necessity must therefore be built into the very conception of what it is for something to function as a (postascetic) ideal. So this response, insofar as it cultivates an affirmation of chance and necessity (i.e., *amor fati),* overcomes the (ascetic) hatred of or (modern) dissatisfaction with this-worldly existence. Yet the success of this overcoming is conditional on the exercise and development of the very capacities and disposition that are the bequest of the ascetic ideal. The disposition to truthfulness is a condition of recognizing the ineliminability of chance and necessity. But actually to recognize, let alone affirm, this awful fact about human existence requires the exercise of the capacities for self-surveillance (so that one can monitor oneself for the symptoms of self-deception in the face of this fact), self-discipline (so that one can resist the understandable temptation to deceive oneself about this fact), and self-overcoming (so that one can develop, in the face of this temptation, one's capacities for self-surveillance and self-discipline). Thus the ascetic ideal provides the tools required to overcome the crisis precipitated by its own self-destruction. In other words, the *Ubermensch's* ideal simply is the exercise and cultivation of the capacities and the disposition required to affirm the fact that chance and necessity are ineliminable. And because chance and necessity are ineliminable, and therefore require perpetually to be affirmed anew, such exercise and cultivation must itself be perpetual, a process without the slightest prospect of an end. The contrast with the Last Man's ideal is stark. Whereas the latter offers a feeling of power to its devotees by positing as realizable the unrealizable ideal of no more suffering-that is, of a fixed, final, *completed* state of being – the *Ubermensch’s* ideal offers a feeling of power predicated only on the continual overcoming of the desire for any such state. What the Last Man longs for, in other words., the *Ubermensch* distinguishes himself by unendingly and truthfully refusing to want. It is of the first importance that the Ubermensch's ideal should represent a process as inherently valuable, rather than a product (such as the Last Man's completed state of life without suffering). There are two reasons for thinking this important. The first is the one mentioned above given that chance and necessity are ineliminable features of living a life, a life oriented to the affirmation of this fact must recognize the ineliminably processual character of such an affirmation, and hence the ineliminably processual character of an ideal that serves rather than denies "the most fundamental prerequisites of life" *(GM* III:28). The other reason is that this ideal exhibits the form of practical reasoning that Nietzsche's genealogy itself deploys. By contrast with, say, Kant's conception of practical reasoning, which centers on an opposition between the real and the ideal (between the heteronomous and the autonomous), and denies "the most fundamental prerequisites of life," Nietzsche's conception involves a continual process of movement from the attained to the attainable; and it is precisely this that the *rapport a soi* constitutive of the *Ubermensch* exhibits. Thus, while Kant offers a juridical conception of practical reasoning structured in terms of the idea of *law,* Nietzsche offers a medical or therapeutic conception articulated through the idea of the type or exemplar. Which is to say, Nietzsche's genealogical investigation (at its best, i.e., its most self-consistent) exemplifies precisely that commitment to the affirmation of life which it recommends, that is, to an *Ubermenschlich rapport a soi.* Process, not product; Dionysus, not Apollo.

## Diceroll

#### The 1AC mirrors a system of politics that seeks to justify ressentiment through a structuring of the event of existence. You must refuse to concern yourself with the affirmative’s incessant paranoia about our insecure world instead affirming chance as necessary to love life.

Nietzsche 1879 [“Human, all too human”, maxim 284]

*The means to real peace*.— No government admits any more that it keeps an army to satisfy occasionally the desire for conquest. Rather the army is supposed to serve for defense, and one invokes the morality that approves of self-defense. But this implies one's own morality and the neighbor's immorality; for the neighbor must be thought of as eager to attack and conquer if our state must think of means of self-defense. Moreover, the reasons we give for requiring an army imply that our neighbor, who denies the desire for conquest just as much as does our own state, and who, for his part, also keeps an army only for reasons of self-defense, is a hypocrite and a cunning criminal who would like nothing better than to overpower a harmless and awkward victim without any fight. Thus all states are now ranged against each other: they presuppose their neighbor's bad disposition and their own good disposition. This presupposition, however, is inhumane, as bad as war and worse. At bottom, indeed, it is itself the challenge and the cause of wars, because, as I have said, it attributes immorality to the neighbor and thus provokes a hostile disposition and act. We must abjure the doctrine of the army as a means of self-defense just as completely as the desire for conquests. And perhaps the great day will come when people, distinguished by wars and victories and by the highest development of a military order and intelligence, and accustomed to make the heaviest sacrifices for these things, will exclaim of its own free will, "We break the sword," and will smash its entire military establishment down to its lowest foundations. Rendering oneself unarmed when one had been the best-armed, out of a height of feeling—that is the means to real peace, which must always rest on a peace of mind; whereas the so-called armed peace, as it now exists in all countries, is the absence of peace of mind. One trusts neither oneself nor one's neighbor and, half from hatred, half from fear, does not lay down arms. Rather perish than hate and fear, and twice rather perish than make oneself hated and feared—this must someday become the highest maxim for every single commonwealth. Our liberal representatives, as is well known, lack the time for reflecting on the nature of man: else they would know that they work in vain when they work for a "gradual decrease of the military burden." Rather, only when this kind of need has become greatest will the kind of god be nearest who alone can help here. The tree of war-glory can only be destroyed all at once, by a stroke of lightning: but lightning, as indeed you know, comes from a cloud—and from up high.

#### The singular event of the diceroll contains all of determination in destiny but throws it to chance in a capricious act of life’s affirmation. This act precedes life as an act of contingency.

Deleuze 83 [Gilles,, “Nietzsche and Philosophy”, ‘The Dicethrow’, p. 29-30]

Whereas the thrown dice affirm chance once and for all, the dice which fall back necessarily affirm the number or the destiny which brings the dice back. It is in this sense that the second moment of the game is also the two moments together or the player who equals the whole. The eternal return is the second moment, the result of the dicethrow, the affirmation of necessity, the number which brings together all the parts of chance. But it is also the return of the first moment, the repetition of the dicethrow, the reproduction and reaffirmation of chance itself. Destiny in the eternal return is also the “welcoming” of chance, “I cook every chance in *my* pot. And only when it is quite cooked do I welcome it as *my* food. And truly, many a chance came imperiously to me; but my *will* spoke to it even more imperiously, then it went down imploringly on its knees - imploring shelter and love with me, urging in wheedling tones; ‘Just see, 0 Zarathustra, how a friend comes to a friend!’ “(Z III “Of the Virtue that makes small” 3 p. 191). This means that there are fragments of chance which claim to be valid in themselves, they appeal to their probability, each solicits several throws of the dice from the player; divided among several throws, having become simple probabilities, the fragments of chance are slaves who want to speak as masters.24 But Zarathustra knows that one must not play or let oneself be played, on the contrary, it is necessary to affirm the whole of chance at once (therefore boil and cook it like the player who warms the dice in his hands), in order to reunite all its fragments and to affirm the number which is not probable but fatal and necessary. Only then is chance a friend who visits a friend, a friend who will be asked back, a friend of destiny whose destiny itself assures the eternal return as such.

## Disarm

#### Our alternative is to “Do nothing in the instance of the plan.” The refusal to act accepts the inevitability of struggle, allowing us to understand pain positively.

Nietzsche, ‘78 The anti-christ Human, All too Human. Aphorism #284 1878

*The means to real peace*.— No government admits any more that it keeps an army to satisfy occasionally the desire for conquest. Rather the army is supposed to serve for defense, and one invokes the morality that approves of self-defense. But this implies one's own morality and the neighbor's immorality; for the neighbor must be thought of as eager to attack and conquer if our state must think of means of self-defense. Moreover, the reasons we give for requiring an army imply that our neighbor, who denies the desire for conquest just as much as does our own state, and who, for his part, also keeps an army only for reasons of self-defense, is a hypocrite and a cunning criminal who would like nothing better than to overpower a harmless and awkward victim without any fight. Thus all states are now ranged against each other: they presuppose their neighbor's bad disposition and their own good disposition. This presupposition, however, is inhumane, as bad as war and worse. At bottom, indeed, it is itself the challenge and the cause of wars, because, as I have said, it attributes immorality to the neighbor and thus provokes a hostile disposition and act. We must abjure the doctrine of the army as a means of self-defense just as completely as the desire for conquests. And perhaps the great day will come when people, distinguished by wars and victories and by the highest development of a military order and intelligence, and accustomed to make the heaviest sacrifices for these things, will exclaim of its own free will, "We break the sword," and will smash its entire military establishment down to its lowest foundations. Rendering oneself unarmed when one had been the best-armed, out of a height of feeling—that is the means to real peace, which must always rest on a peace of mind; whereas the so-called armed peace, as it now exists in all countries, is the absence of peace of mind. One trusts neither oneself nor one's neighbor and, half from hatred, half from fear, does not lay down arms. Rather perish than hate and fear, and twice rather perish than make oneself hated and feared—this must someday become the highest maxim for every single commonwealth. Our liberal representatives, as is well known, lack the time for reflecting on the nature of man: else they would know that they work in vain when they work for a "gradual decrease of the military burden." Rather, only when this kind of need has become greatest will the kind of god be nearest who alone can help here. The tree of war-glory can only be destroyed all at once, by a stroke of lightning: but lightning, as indeed you know, comes from a cloud—and from up high.

## Embrace Suffering

#### Our deaths are inevitable; the only question is how we face it. Only by embracing the violence of the 1AC can we truly affirm life. The aff attempt to solve these problems only traps us in a cycle of resentment that makes this very security inevitable.

Faulkner 8 – ARC Research Fellow in the School of History and Philosophy at the University of New South Wales

 (Joanne Spring/Autumn 2008, “The Innocence of Victimhood Versus the “Innocence of Becoming”: Nietzsche, 9/11, and the “Falling Man””, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Project MUSE, umn-rks )

Most significantly, for the purposes of this essay, we can perhaps see now how for Nietzsche agency is compatible with innocence. Indeed, innocence— regarded as what is unsullied by moral thinking—is integral to the skillful exercise of agency. Understood in these terms, innocence is neither a precious ideal to be protected from the forces of chance nor a moralistic instrument for the meting of punishment to those who threaten society. Rather, innocence is conceived as a style of existence that becomes active by claiming to itself what chance throws up before it. Innocence would here suggest a resistance to passivity and victimhood and a choice to take part in the inevitability of the moment—even if this agency ultimately extinguishes the subject through which it is performed. Perhaps at this point, then, we might attempt a return to the acts of the 9/11 jumpers, who in the light of the above can be understood as agents of their own demise but in a manner that nonetheless does not compromise their innocence. The visions of falling bodies from the Twin Towers do not sit well with orthodox imagery surrounding 9/11 because they invoke an uncomfortable ambiguity with respect to their victim status. In their final moments of animation and on the precipice of death, these bodies occupy a middle space between life and death that renders us uncomfortable in our own mortality. But they also mark a cleavage between innocence and guilt: their decision to seize the opportunity to escape confinement within their smoky “tombs” signals a confusing complicity with the terrorists who had perpetrated the attacks. In the terms that Nietzsche (and Spinoza) set out above, the jumpers took an active part in the causes that led to their deaths—causes that originate in a terrorist plot against America. And in the eyes of some, this exposed them as irresolute, and even disloyal, in the face of what later emerged to be a monumental national threat. In theological terms also—and keeping in mind the religious frame through which many in the United States view global politics—Drew’s photograph, especially, resonates with a near-godly defiance of death: the subject’s fall can be read as the taking of a liberty against God, who claims a privilege with respect to determining who lives or dies. The image may thus evoke to the viewing public humanity’s primal scene and the original sin that it demonstrates: the taking of the fruit of knowledge that marks a new beginning for humanity. Even the photograph’s title would seem to suggest a proximity to the guilt through which humanity is engendered, by means of its irreparable separation from innocence. Likewise, its subject is separated from the other victims of the attacks who (more appropriately) awaited divine sanction on their lives and have thus continued to be redeemed (drawn back into the community’s fold) by means of the various ceremonies and purification rites since performed at Ground Zero. The resigned posture of the subject of “The Falling Man” surely gives the viewer pause: it looks like a suicide attempt, and the suicide cannot be connected to a redemptive innocence. Yet, according to Nietzsche’s refiguring of agency, the decision to die can be reconciled with innocence: and moreover, innocence comes to be the very condition of an agency—as opposed to (fictitious) free will—an agency that, rather, refuses the moralizing economy of guilt and punishment. The decision to jump hundreds of meters to one’s death from a burning building might seem a limited, and somewhat undesirable, instance of agency. Clearly, it is a choice these people would not have made on any other morning and in any other circumstance. In the light of Nietzsche’s account of agency as conditioned by context and circumstance, however, it is possible to count the jumpers among the innocents lost to 9/11—and to do so in full recognition of their specific choice to take their lives into their own hands. In the context of Nietzsche’s innocence of becoming, we may understand innocence as a suspension of moral judgment rather than as prior to (and separate from) social existence. Nietzschean innocence emerges from within existence and gives rise to an agency that responds to the chance necessities life occasions. Likewise, the innocence of becoming is not grounded in opposition to guilt but, rather, undercuts the understanding of social relations in terms of guilt and debt. For this reason, Nietzsche’s innocence of becoming furnishes the jumpers’ decision with a sense that would be otherwise unavailable, at least within the narrow parameters according to which moral action and worth are conventionally adjudged. In the absence of an acknowledgment of the jumpers’ choice (and of the possibility of making a decision to die in one’s own way, where the choice to live is unavailable), we will continue to misunderstand their relationship to these events and thus to limit their political agency. In the context of the 9/11 attacks, the innocent—understood through the vista of Judeo-Christian moral tradition—has become an eternally aggrieved icon of national identity: a perennially threatened and victimized creature of ressentiment who “in order to exist first needs a hostile external world” ( GM I:10). 32 Although it is important to acknowledge the suffering of those affected, and this may indeed include the nation as a whole, what Nietzsche’s innocence of becoming reveals is that the relationship to one’s suffering is far from straightforward. If we subscribe too readily to the status of innocent-to-be-protected—thus recoiling from suffering and requiring that the debts of enemies be paid in full—then we also deny the possibility of freedom opened by the affirmation of becoming. And such a predicament is all too well reflected in the erosion of civil liberties that is ongoing since the end of 2001 in the United States and elsewhere. But were we to allow ourselves to imagine being trapped within those buildings and to contemplate the possibility that one might still make a choice, perhaps identification with the falling man might open the citizen to a new kind of agency in relation to government and nationhood. Remembering that the imagination furnishes us with knowledge of our situation—by means of the traces of interactions impressed upon memory—then we are able to develop a capacity for agency by using our imaginations to understand the decisions of those who have lived through what we have not. Through the rubric offered by the jumper’s predicament, we might then imagine a mode of resistance against attack, wherein strength is reappropriated from the enemy—even in death. Our reinterpretation of the falling man as innocent thus allows for a conception of freedom with respect to the chance events that constrain action. But moreover, it also allows us to develop a resistance to governments’ attempts to render us passive subjects by means of the moral mantle of innocence by which we are both idealized and contained. Such a modest and situated exercise of agency would involve attentiveness to the diffuse and unexpected opportunities that arise in one’s locality, to actively participate in the causes of change. For instance, one could organize a demonstration, write letters to political representatives and newspapers, meet with others who share one’s values, walk to work, or recycle. Each of these activities, however humble or ambitious, contributes to the determination of life and prevents one being the mere passive object of external causes—disempowered and separated from agency. Such attunement to one’s situation, however, requires above all engaging one’s imagination: the site of ethical understanding—of what empowers the body and what the body should avoid. In this vein, we might reimagine the falling man as a figure of the active resistance that Nietzsche’s innocence of becoming teaches. And we can understand his final act of agency as such, without casting him out of the sanctum of human virtue. With respect to this reinterpretation of innocence, as a sensitivity to the specific opportunities that life grants, I will leave the last word to one who, mourning the loss of his wife, finds it within himself to understand her final decision: “Whether she jumped, I don’t know. I hoped that she had succumbed to the smoke but it doesn’t seem likely. In some ways it might just be the last element of control, that everything around you is happening and you can’t stop it, but this is something you can do. To be out of the smoke and the heat, to be out in the air … it must have felt like flying.” 33

## Nihilism

#### Alternative: Vote Negative to reject the affirmative truth claims in favor of complete nihilism.

White 90 – Professor of Philosophy at Williams College

(Alan, Professor of Philosophy at Williams College, “Within Nietzsche’s Labrynth,” 1990, <http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/WNL%20web/WNL%20contents.htm> )

All of this suggests that radical nihilism remains "something to be overcome." The questions arise: by whom, and how? A passage already introduced provides a hint concerning the first: what I have been calling radical nihilism results when "all one has left are the values that pass judgment." This sug­gests that one for whom those values have "devalued themselves" must be left with nothing at all. Etymologically, it would cer­tainly make sense to call such a person a "nihilist." In addi­tion, Nietzsche suggests that one who is left with nothing in this manner has gained rather than lost: in denying that the world requires "purpose," "unity," or "truth" of the sort posited by religious nihilists and despaired of by radical nihilists, one may regain the world of becoming in its original innocence:one cannot judge, measure, compare, or even deny the whole! Why not? -- For five reasons, all accessible even to modest intel­lects; for example, because there is nothing besides the whole [weil es nichts gibt ausser dem Ganzen]. [...] And, once again, this is a tremendous restorative, for herein lies the innocence of all existence. (N:15[30] / WP:765; cf. TIVI:8) The Nietzschean term that suggests itself for the resulting position is "complete [vollendeter] nihilism," but this term must be used with care. I take it from Nietzsche's description of him­self as "Europe's first complete nihilist, who, however, has him­self already lived nihilism through to its end, within himself -- who has it behind him, beneath him, outside of him" (N:11[411] / WP:P). The wording of this passage indicates that Nietzsche, al­though Europe's first complete nihilist, is no longer a nihilist. I will nevertheless characterize this position as "complete nihilism" in the sense of completed nihilism, nihilism that has been lived through entirely, "the logic of our great values and ideals, thought through to its end" (N:11[411] / WP:P). My use of the term receives some justification from Nietzsche's claim of having brought nihilism to its end, albeit only within himself; its advent within the world at large, he tells us, is to dominate "the history of the next two centuries." Following those two centuries, "in some future or other," there will be a countermovement, a transvaluation, that will "absolve [ablö sen] this complete nihilism" (N:11[411] / WP:P). If Nietzsche cannot accomplish this transvaluation, he can at least foresee it, and thereby, within himself, bring nihilism to its end; but, again, he can be aware of doing so, can be aware that the end is end, only if he is beyond the end, only if he sees that what fol­lows the end is no longer nihilism. One is a complete nihilist only when one has completed nihilism, thereby ceasing to be a nihilist. And indeed, in the continuation of the passage defining nihilism as the condition of one who has left only "the values that pass judgment -- nothing else," Nietzsche describes the "problem of strength and weakness" in terms that clearly place the strongest beyond the so-defined nihilism:(1) the weak collapse (2) the stronger destroy what does not collapse; (3) the strongest overcome the values that pass judgment. (N:9[107] / WP:37) The religious nihilist, unlike the radical nihilist, denies being a nihilist; what about the complete nihilist? Certainly, the latter acknowledges that our world does not correspond to the traditional "highest values," and that we "have no right" to any other world; but this acknowledgment is paired with the denial that any other world "ought to be," and that our "world of becoming" ought not to be. For the complete nihilist, denigrating the world for its lack of purpose is as senseless as denigrating a philosophical treatise for its lack of plot, a symphony for its lack of text, or a painting for representing, rather than containing, motion or depth. In non-Nietzschean terms: the complete nihilist considers nihilism itself to be the result of a category mistake. The complete nihilist thus returns to a position abandoned with the step to religious nihilism: the complete nihilist "deifies becoming and the apparent world as the only world, and calls them good" (N:9[60] / WP:585).