# Neg

## Shell

### Security 1NC

A. Danger is manufactured through discourse that constitutes international relations

**Campbell**, professor of international politics at the University of Newcastle, **1998**

(David, has also taught at Keele University and Johns Hopkins University, *Writing Security*, University of Minnesota Press, pg 2-4)

Danger is not an objective condition. It [sic] is not a thing that ex­ists independently of those to whom it may become a threat. To illus­trate this, consider the manner in which the insurance industry assesses risk. In Franqois Ewald's formulation, insurance is a technology of risk the principal function of which is not compensation or repara­tion, but rather the operation of a schema of rationality distinguished by the calculus of probabilities. In insurance, according to this logic, danger (or, more accurately, risk) is "neither an event nor a general kind of event occurring in reality... but a specific mode of treatment of certain events capable of happening to a group of individuals." In other words, for the technology of risk in insurance, "Nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality. But on the other hand, anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyzes the danger, consid­ers the event. As Kant might have put it, the category of risk is a cat­egory of the understanding; it cannot be given in sensibility or intu­ition.” z In these terms, danger is an effect of interpretation. Danger bears no essential, necessary, or unproblematic relation to the action or event from which it is said to derive. Nothing is intrinsically more dangerous for insurance technology than anything else, except when interpreted as such.

This understanding of the necessarily interpretive basis of risk has important implications for international relations. It does not deny that there are "real" dangers in the world: infectious diseases, acci­dents, and political violence (among others) have consequences that can literally be understood in terms of life and death. But not all risks are equal, and not all risks are interpreted as dangers. Modern soci­ety contains a veritable cornucopia of danger; indeed, there is such an abundance of risk that it is impossible to objectively know all that threatens us.3 Those events or factors that we identify as dangerous come to be ascribed as such only through an interpretation of their var­ious dimensions of dangerousness. Moreover, that process of inter­pretation does not depend on the incidence of "objective" factors for its veracity. For example, HIV infection has been considered by many to be America's major public health issue, yet pneumonia and influ­enza, diabetes, suicide, and chronic liver disease have all been indi­vidually responsible for many more deaths 4 Equally, an interpreta­tion of danger has licensed a "war on (illegal) drugs" in the United States, despite the fact that the consumption level of (and the num­ber of deaths that result from) licit drugs exceeds by a considerable order of magnitude that associated with illicit drugs. And "terrorism" is often cited as a major threat to national security, even though its occurrence within the United States is minimal (notwithstanding the bombings in Oklahoma City and at the World Trade Center in New York) and its contribution to international carnage minor .5

Furthermore, the, role of interpretation in the articulation of dan­ger is not restricted to the process by which some risks come to be considered more serious than others. An important function of inter­pretation is the way that certain modes of representation crystallize around referents marked as dangers. Given the often tenuous relation­ship between an interpretation of danger and the "objective" inci­dence of behaviors and factors thought to constitute it, the capacity for a particular risk to be represented in terms of characteristics re­viled in the community said to be threatened can be an important impetus to an interpretation of danger. As later chapters will demon­strate, the ability to represent things as alien, subversive, dirty, or sick has been pivotal to the articulation of danger in the American experience. In this context, it is also important to note that there need not be an action or event to provide the grounds for an interpretation of dan­ger. The mere existence of an alternative mode of being, the presence of which exemplifies that different identities are possible and thus de­naturalizes the claim of a particular identity to be *the* true identity, is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of a threat.b In con­sequence, only in these terms is it possible to understand how some acts of international power politics raise not a whit of concern, while something as seemingly unthreatening as the novels of a South Amer­ican writer can be considered such a danger to national security that his exclusion from the country is warranted.' For both insurance and international relations, therefore, danger results from the calculation of a threat that objectifies events, disciplines relations, and sequesters an ideal of the identity of the people said to be at risk.

#### B. The affirmative’s constitution of security as an ideal and benevolent condition utilizes human life as a tool to calculate safety with response to a discursive ideal, not a material condition

**Dillon**, professor of security @ Lancaster, **2008**

(Michael, “Underwriting Security” *Security Dialogue* 32.3)

This essay enframes ‘**risk’ as a biopolitical security technology**. It explains how **biopolitics of security take life as their referent object of security, how the grid of intelligibility for biopolitics is economic** and how, in the second half of the 20th century, life also came to be understood as emergent being.  **Contingency is constitutive especially of the life of emergent being** and so the essay argues that **a biopolitics of security which seeks ‘to make life live’ cannot secure life against contingency but must secure life through governmental technologies of contingency**. Risk is one of these technologies. The essay also explains how it has come to pervade the biopolitics of security of the 21st century and how through the way in which risk is traded on the capital markets it has begun to acquire the properties of money. The essay closes by describing how **the biopolitics of security differ from traditional prophylactic accounts of security and how these biopolitics of security exceed the liberal political thinking which rationalises and legitimates them**.

#### Calculability results in the devaluation of human life

Michael Dillon, professor of politics and international relations at the University of Lancaster, April 1999, Political Theory, Vol. 27, No. 2, “Another Justice,” p. 164-5

Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism. They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability. Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, “we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure.” But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being.

#### C. Voting negative repudiates the affirmative’s prioritization of a secure world—saying no to the affirmative returns the Gift of Security. The effect is to open a space so that politics may be otherwise.

Neocleous, prof. of critique of political economy @ Brunei University, 2008 p. 185-186

(Mark, Critique of Security)

**The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded** in favour of the state **that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up**. **That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought** and thus **could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual**. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. **This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else**, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The **constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end - constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term**. That is, **as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated**, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, **in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed**. **Security politics simply removes this world**, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing **it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security**', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,141 dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. **We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives**. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael **William**s, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter **asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind**? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe **there is no hole**.142 **The mistake has been to think that there is a hole: and that this hole needs to be filled with a new mission or revision of security** in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered}g humanised or expanded or whatever. **All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up affirming the state as the terrain of modem politics**, the ground of security. **The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another dimension of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security an'q which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state.** That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political: language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while< much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as; the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism**, then to keep harping on! about insecurity and to keep demanding' more security' (while meekly**

**hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of**

**building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics**. **To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political .. issues, debilitating in the sense that' security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good**. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. **But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift**.143

## Discourse Key

### Language/Discourse Key

#### Attentions and priorities cannot escape discursive economies, especially in international relations

Shapiro, Hawaii political science professor, 1989 p. 12

(Michael, *International/Intertextual Relations*)

Given that **our understanding of conflict, war**, or more generally, the space within which **international politics** is deployed **is always mediated by modes of representation and thus by all the various mechanisms involved in text construction**—grammars, rhetorics, and narrativity—**we must operate with a view of politics that is sensitive to textuality**. While much of political thinking is exhausted by concern with the distribution of things thought to be meaningful and valuable, **our attention is drawn to another aspect of political processes, that aspect in which the boundaries for constituting meaning and value are constructed. Political processes are, among other things, contests over the alternative understandings** (often implicit) **immanent in the representational practices that implicate the actions and objects one recognizes and the various spaces**—leisure, work, political, private, public—within which persons and things take on their identities. Although it tends to operate implicitly, **the separation of the world into kinds of space is perhaps the most significant kind of practice for establishing the system of intelligibility within which understandings of global politics are forged**.

#### Focusing on the performative character of political ideologies is key

Doty, ‘96

(Arizona State Assistant Political Science Professor, Imperial Encounter, pp. 5-6)

This study begins with the premise that representation is an **inherent and important** aspect of global political life and therefore **a critical and legitimate area of inquiry** International relations are **in­extricably bound up** with discursive practices that put into circula­tion representations that are taken as "truth." The goal of analyz­ing these practices is not to reveal essential truths that have been" obscured, but rather to examine ***how* certain representations under­lie** the production of knowledge and identities and how these repre­sentations make various courses of action possible. As Said (1979; 2.1) notes, there is no such thing as a delivered presence, but there is *re-presence,* or representation. Such an assertion **does not deny** the existence of the material world, but rather suggests that material objects and subjects **are constituted as such within discourse**. So, for example, when U.S. troops march into Grenada, this is certainly "real," though the march of troops across a piece of geographic space is in itself singularly uninteresting and socially irrelevant out­side of the representations that produce meaning. It is only when "American" is attached to the troops and "Grenada" to the geo­graphic space that meaning is created. What the physical behavior itself *is,* though, is still far .from certain until discursive practices constitute it as an "invasion," a "show of force," a "training exercise," a "rescue," and so on. What is "really" going on in such a situation is **inextricably linked** to the discourse within which it is located. To attempt a neat separation between discursive and non-discursive practices, understanding the former as purely linguistic, assumes a series of dichotomies—thought/reality, appearance/essence, mind/matter, word/world, subjective/objective—-that a critical genealogy **calls into question .** Against this, the perspective taken here **affirms the material and performative nature of discourse.** In suggesting that global politics, and specifically the aspect that has to do with relations between the North and the South, is linked to representational practices I am suggesting that the issues and con­cerns that constitute these relations occur within a "reality" whose content has for the most part been defined by the representational practices of the "first world." Focusing on discursive practices enables one to examine how the processes that produce "truth" and “knowledge" work and how they are articulated with the exercise of political, military, and economic power.

## Links

### Hegemony

#### Idea of hegemony of America as inevitable and central is ideological: critique can break but only through rupture

Ornelas 2012 (Raul, Professor and activist, this essay was peer reviewed in *The South Atlantic Quarterly* Winter “Counterhegemonies and Emancipations: Notes for a Debate”)

The Characterization of Hegemony Some argue for the validity and strength of US hegemony. Among those who contend that this hegemony is in decline, there are two opposing arguments. The first pertains to the correlation of forces: if US hegemony is, in fact, weakening, it should be not considered relative to the place that the United States once occupied (for instance, at the end of World War II), but rather it should be considered with respect to the actually existing opposing forces. Thus, because no rival capitalizes on the hegemon’s weakness, we live in a state of unipolarity: “The weakening of North America’s hegemonic capacity corresponds not to the strengthening of the other pole, but to a rise in worldwide disorder.”3 The second argument, by contrast, refers to the multidimensional character of hegemony, such that even if the United States suffers significant recessions in the economic realm, we must still take into account its absolute dominance in the military sphere and, especially, in the cultural arena. Regarding the latter, the “American way of life” is the world paradigm of sociality, with no rival other than that of an unattractive Islamic fundamentalism. The New Terrain of Class Struggle The level of development attained by capitalist hegemony, particularly when new technologies combine with the absence of a noncapitalist alternative to that hegemony, has meant a dislocation of the boundaries of social conflict. As capital has tended to exceed the limits of nature (for instance, through genetic engineering) and even the limits of the planet (for example, through space exploration), the substratum of social conflict moves through the spaces of exploitation (the market, the factory) toward a politics of territory as such—that is, social conflict expands to all spheres of social life and tends to express itself most acutely in those areas that constitute the very basis of life: communities, their conditions of existence, and their geographical spaces and symbols.4 The transformation of capitalist hegemony signals profound changes in forms of social struggle. Institutions constructed through class struggle since the Industrial Revolution have tended to disappear, especially those related to social status and the population’s living and working conditions. Today, from the perspective of power and from that of the subjects who resist it, conflicts are presented as irreducible. Thus, as the temporality of resistance takes on more radical forms and strategies, repression increas ingly becomes the recourse of power. At the same time, there is a tendency toward increasing political polarization. In effect, new forms of domination leave scant room for those forms of opposition that emerged along the lines of social democracy, a form of politics that would seek to reinvigorate a form of capitalism that no longer exists. In this context Ana Esther Ceceña speaks of the militarization of social life, systematic counterinsurgency, and the diffusion of disciplinary spaces throughout the whole of society as the typical responses of hegemonic subjects.5 If hegemony becomes accentuated, the level of exclusion created by contemporary capitalism tends to increase its fragility: in truth, we are entering a period of latent insurrection. In a dispute that is as much for life as it is for territory, new forms of social conflict gradually acquire an anticapitalist horizon as the form of resistance. Addressing the fragility of hegemony reveals the force of resistance in social struggles. For authors such as John Holloway and Raúl Zibechi, the increasing aggressiveness of capital is a demonstration of its own weakness in the face of the excluded and of social struggle.6 Similarly, Ceceña argues that social struggles are the primary limit to capitalism, given that from the technological point of view it already has the resources to acquire massive profits and to intensify its domination.7 This perspective supports the view of hegemony as a social construction and social relation. It is important to emphasize this aspect so as not to become trapped by sole consideration for the strength and solidity of contemporary hegemony. Similarly, the processes of social insurrection and insurgency constitute the possibilities for rupture with capitalism, possibilities that, in the normal scope of struggle, cannot be observed.8 Yet, there will be no exit from the contemporary form of domination, referred to as neoliberalism, if there is no real and profound rupture with the prevailing situation.

#### Belief that some lives are worth more than others and that violence is justifies in pursuing this end creates calculable and excluded objects

Butler, professor of rhetoric at Berkeley, 2009 p. 50-53

(Judith, Frames of War)

One might, for instance, believe in the sanctity of life or adhere to a general philosophy that opposes violent action of all kinds against sentient beings, and one might invest powerful feelings in such a belief. But if certain lives are not perceivable as lives, and this includes sentient beings who are not human, then the moral prohibition against violence will be only selectively applied (and our own sentience will be only selectively mobilized). The critique of violence must begin with the question of the represemability of life itself: what allows a life to become visible in its precariousness and its need for shelter, and what is it that keeps us from seeing or understanding certain lives in this way? The problem concerns the media, at the most general level, since a life can be accorded a value only on the condition that it is perceivable as a life, but it is only on the condition of certain embedded evaluative structures that a life becomes perceivable at all. To perceive a life "is not quite the same as encountering a life as precarious. Encountering a life as precarious is not a raw encounter, one in which life is stripped bare of all its usual interpretations, appearing to us outside all relations of power. An ethical attitude does not spontaneously arrive as soon as the usual interpretive frameworks are destroyed, and no pure moral conscience emerges once the shackles of everyday interpretation have been thrown off. On the contrary, it is only by challenging the dominant media that certain kinds of lives may become visible or knowable in their precariousness. It is not only or exclusively the visual apprehension of a life that forms a necessary precondition for an understanding of the precariousness of life. Another life is taken in through all the senses, if it is taken in at all. The tacit interpretive scheme that divides worthy from unworthy lives works fundamentally through the senses, differentiating the cries we can hear from those we cannot, the sights we can see from those we cannot, and likewise at the level of touch and even smell. War sustains its practices through acting on the senses, crafting them to apprehend the world selectively, deadening affect in response to certain images and sounds, and enlivening affective responses to others. This is why war works to undermine a sensate democracy, restricting what we can feel, disposing us to feel shock and outrage in the face of one expression of violence and righteous coldness in the face of another. To encounter the precariousness of another life, the senses have to be operative, which means that a struggle must be waged against those forces that seek to regulate affect in differential ways. The' point is not to celebrate a full deregulation of affect, but to query the conditions of responsiveness by offering interpretive matrices for the understanding of war that question and oppose the dominant interpretations-interpretations that not only act upon affect, but take form and become effective as affect itself. If we accept the insight that our very survival depends not on the policing of a boundary-the strategy of a certain sovereign in relation to its territory-but on recognizing how we are bound up with others, then this leads us to reconsider the way in which we conceptualize the body in the field of politics. We have to consider whether the body is rightly defined as a bounded kind of entity. What makes a body discrete is not an established morphology, as if we could identify certain bodily shapes or forms as paradigmatically human. In fact, I am not at all sure we can identify a human form, nor do I think we need to. This view has implications for rethinking gender, disability, and racialization, to name a few of the social processes that depend upon the reproduction of bodily norms. And as the critique of gender normativity, able-ism, and racist perception have made clear, there is no singular human form. We can think about demarcating the human body through identifying its boundary, or in what form it is bound, but that is to miss the crucial fact that the body is, in certain ways and even inevitably, unbound-in its acting, its receptivity, in its speech, desire, and mobility. It is outside itself, in the world of others, in a space and time it does not control, and it not only exists in the vector of these relations, but as this very vector.11 In this sense, the body does not belong to itself. The body, in my view, is where we encounter a range of perspectives that mayor may not be our own. How I am encountered, and how I am sustained, depends fundamentally on the social and political networks in which this body lives, how I am regarded and treated, and how that regard and treatment facilitates this life or fails to make it livable. So the norms of gender through which I come to understand myself or my survivability are not made by me alone. I am already in the hands of the other when I try to take stock of who I am. I all already up against a world I never chose when I exercise my agency. It follows, then, that certain kinds of bodies will appear more precariously than others, depending on which versions of the body, or of morphology in general, support or underwrite the idea of the human life that is worth protecting, sheltering, living, mourning. These normative frameworks establish in advance what kind of life will be a life worth living, what life will be a life worth preserving, and what life will become worthy of being mourned. Such views of lives pervade and implicitly justify contemporary war. Lives are divided into those representing certain kinds of states and those representing threats to state-centered liberal democracy, so that war can then be righteously waged on behalf of some lives, while the destruction of other lives can be righteously defended.

#### Causes preemptive conflict and extermination of the Other

Lifton, visiting psychiatry professor at Harvard, 2003 p. 24-25

(Robert Jay, Superpower Syndrome)

Inseparable from this grandiosity is the paranoid edge of the apocalyptic mindset. Leader and followers feel them¬selves constantly under attack-threatened not just with harm but with annihilation. For them that would mean the obliteration of everything of value on this degraded planet, of the future itself. They must destroy the world in order to survive themselves. This is why they in turn feel impelled to label as absolute evil and annihilate any group that seems to impede their own sacred mission. Such a sense of paranoid aggressiveness is more readily detectable in the case of certified zealots like Asahara or bin Laden. But it is by no means absent from the minds of American strategists who, though possessing over¬whelming military dominance, express constant fear of national annihilation, and embark upon aggressive or "preemptive" military actions.

#### Fighting wars for some devalues the lives of others

Butler, professor of rhetoric at Berkeley, 2009 p. 37-38

(Judith, Frames of War)

To that end, I want to return to the question of the "we" and think first about what happens to this "we" during times of war. Whose lives are regarded as lives worth saving and defending, and whose are not? Second, I want to ask how we might rethink the "we" in global terms in ways that counter the politics of imposition. Lastly, and in the chapters to come, I want to consider why the opposition to torture is obligatory, and how we might derive an important sense of global responsibility from a politics that opposes the use of torture in any and all of its forms.2 So, one way of posing the question of who "we" are in these times of war is by asking whose lives are considered valuable, whose lives are mourned, and whose lives are considered ungrievable. We might think of war as dividing populations into those who are grievable and those who are not. An ungrievable life is one that cannot be mourned because it has never lived, that is, it has never counted as a life at all. We can see the division of the globe into grievable and ungrievable lives from the perspective of those who wage war in order to defend the lives of certain communities, and to defend them against the lives of others-even if it means taking those latter lives. After the attacks of 9/11, we encountered in the media graphic pictures of those who died, along with their names, their stories, the reactions of their families. Public grieving was dedicated to making these images iconic for the nation, which meant of course that there was considerably less public grieving for non-US nationals, and none at all for illegal workers.

#### Quests and claims for American dominance fail and constitute apocalyptic violence as a self-fulfilling prophecy

Lifton, visiting psychiatry professor at Harvard, 2003p. 10-11

(Robert Jay, Superpower Syndrome)

September 11 was a triumphant moment for Islamist fanatics-and a profoundly humiliating one for the leaders of the American superpower, who early on decided that their response would be "war" and a specifically American war at that. They then rejected a measured international response to terrorism, offered specifically by the secretary general of the United Nations, a response that would have included the use of force in focused ways short of war, to hunt down the terrorists and bring them to justice, while mobilizing the enormous outpouring of sympathy for our country expressed throughout the world. Instead, this administration chose to respond unilaterally with the rhet¬oric of war, making it clear that we alone would decide what levels of military force to apply and who to apply it to, accepting no restraints in the process. In that and other ways we have responded apocalypti¬cally to an apocalyptic challenge. We have embarked on a series of wars-first in Afghanistan, then in Iraq, with sug¬gestions of additional targeted countries in the offing¬because we have viewed the amorphous terrorist enemy as evil and dangerous. But our own amorphously extreme response feeds a larger dynamic of apocalyptic violence, even as it constructs a twenty-first-century version of American empire. That prospective empire is confusing to the world, to Americans, and perhaps even to those who espouse it. It does not follow prior imperial models of keeping an extensive bureaucracy in place in subject countries and thereby ruling territories extending over much of the earth. Instead, we press toward a kind of control from a distance: mobile forays of military subjugation with sub¬sequent governmental arrangements unclear. Crucial to this kind of fluid world control is our dominating war machine, backed by no less dominant nuclear stockpiles. Such an arrangement can lend itself to efforts at the remote control of history. Any such project, however, becomes enmeshed in fantasy, in dreams of imposing an omnipotent will on others, and in the urge to control his¬tory itself. Driven by superpower syndrome, such visions of domination and control can prove catastrophic when, as they must, they come up against the irredeemable stub¬bornness of reality'>

#### This rhetoric constitutes a self-fulfilling prophecy of an anarchic realist world gone made which makes conflict inevitable

Cheeseman, visiting politics fellow @ Univ. of New South Wales, 2005 p. 76-77

(Graeme, Critical Security Studies and World Politics Ed. By Ken Booth)

These contending world visions have different implications for the meaning of security-in particular who or what isbeing secured and against what-as well as the future roles of military force and armed forces. Traditional balance-of-power prognoses, whether stressing unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar structures, represent a continuation of existing priori¬ties and mindsets. These would continue to privilege the state as the key actor in international affairs and the use or threatened use of military force in the pursuit of national or global interests. Military conflict would still be posited as the most important issue affecting national and international security, armed forces would continue to be structured and trained primari¬ly for traditional war-fighting roles, and national strategic postures would continue to emphasize sovereignty defense, power-balancing, coalition warfare, and the management of alliances.63 The conduct of warfare and the organization of military forces within this realist world will continue to evolve to accommodate technological change and emerging social pres¬sures and expectations, but not radically or evenly across the globe. State¬based forces will be required to take part in UN-sanctioned peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and other nonmilitary operations, but these will be as ad hoc coalitions of the willing and able. Such operations, moreover, will not determine, except at the margins, the military structures or basic doctrines of their component forces. This future vision of international pol¬itics may be of comfort to those who fear or wish to control change, but it will also invoke unchecked security dilemmas, continuing militarization and conflict, arms-racing, and the prospect of wars between major powers or across major fault lines.

#### **The US is stuck in a Post-European past mind set left to deal with the hyped threats without thinking any other country can help**

Bialasiewicz 07, Luiza. Royal Holloway University of London, “Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US strategy.” sciencedirect.com 2007 AB)

Entitled ‘‘Power and Weakness’’, Kagan’s essay detailed what he argued was the increasingly evident disparity between American and European worldviews, particularly with regard to the conduct of international affairs. But his analysis, as we will argue here, constituted above all a justification for American power, and its exercise wherever and however necessary. Kagan’s analysis e as part of a wider ‘‘understanding’’ of the ways in which the post-Cold War world ‘‘works’’ developed by neoconservative intellectuals e would prepare the ground, indeed, make ‘‘indispensable’’, US unilateralism and its doctrine of pre-emptive action. Kagan’s article was highly influential, just as Fukuyama’s (1989, 1992) ‘‘The End of History?’’ had been 13 years before, because of his profile within the foreign policy establishment, and because Kagan (as Fukuyama) was speaking to friends and colleagues e and, in many ways, reiterating a set of shared understandings. Kagan’s claims have been widely discussed, lauded and refuted by academics and political leaders alike (see, for example those referenced in Bialasiewicz & Elden, 2006), so we will present them here only in brief. Kagan’s central claim was that Europeans and Americans no longer share a common view of the world and, moreover, that in essential ways they can be understood as occupying different worlds: ‘‘Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation’’. And while Europe has withdrawn into a mirage of Kantian ‘perpetual peace’, the US has no choice but to act in a Hobbesian world of perpetual war. This state of affairs, for Kagan, is not the result of the strategic choices of a single administration, but a persistent divide and the reflection of fundamentally different perspectives on the world and the role of Europe/ the US within it (Kagan, 2002: 1). Kagan spends a significant part of his paper (and later book) analyzing what he terms ‘‘the psychology of power and weakness’’. It is a deeply troubling argument, for Kagan claims, at base, that Europeans believe in diplomacy and multilateralism because they are ‘‘weak’’: ‘‘Europeans oppose unilateralism [.] because they have no capacity for unilateralism’’ (Kagan, 2002: 7). What is more, he claims, the construction of the European ‘‘paradise’’, the ‘‘geopolitical fantasy [of] a postmodern system [where] the age-old laws of international relations have been repealed; [where] Europeans have stepped out of the Hobbesian world of anarchy into the Kantian world of perpetual peace’’ (2002: 11) was made possible only by American power which assured the Cold War peace. America continues to hold this role because ‘‘post-historical Europe’’ will not and cannot; the US is forced to remain ‘‘stuck in history, left to deal with the Saddams and the ayatollahs, the Kim Jong Ils and the Jiang Zemins, leaving the happy benefits to others’’ (2002: 16). As we have argued elsewhere, the US is thus invoked into a number of positions: as global leader (faced with Europe’s failings/ withdrawal), but also the only state able, due to its power-position, to perceive threats clearly; the only one with a God’s eye view of international affairs. It is thus, at once, the world’s geo-politican and its geo-police; the only state with the ‘knowledge’ but also the capability to intervene.

Hegemony is a prime example of the logic of the securitizing mind set.

Levy and Thompson 10(William, Jack. Board of Governors' Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Proffessor of political science at the University of Washington. “Balancing on Land and at Sea Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power”? AB)

The many meanings of the balance of power concept and the multiple and often contradictory variations of the theory often preclude a rigorous and systematic empirical test.19 Most alliance behavior or military buildups can be interpreted as some state balancing against some kind of power or some kind of threat by some other state. Unless one species who balances against whom, in response to what levels of concentration of what kinds of power or what kinds of threats in what kinds of systems, it is impossible to construct an empirical test of balancing propositions.20 Despite their many disagreements, nearly all balance of power theorists would accept the following set of interrelated propositions: (1) the prevention of others from achieving a position of hegemony in the system is a primary security goal of states; (2) threats of hegemony generate great-power balancing coalitions; and (3) as a result, sustained hegemonies rarely if ever form in multistate systems.21 This consensus among balance of power theorists concerns counterhegemonic balancing by great powers, and that is our focus here. Balance of power theorists do not all agree that great powers balance against the strongest power in the system, irrespective of the magnitude of its advantage, 22 and they do not agree about the balancing behavior of weaker states in great power systems.23 Although these balance of power propositions about national-level preferences and strategies and about system-level outcomes appear to be uncontroversial, they are underspecied because they fail to identify the system over which hegemony might be established and the basis of power in that system. The balance of power literature generally neglects these distinctions, advances an undifferentiated conception of the great powers, and implies that balance of power propositions are universally valid in any historical system. We reject these arguments and contend that balance of power theories—like nearly all social science theories—are bound by certain scope conditions. It is critical to distinguish between autonomous continental systems, where land-based military power is dominant, and trans regional maritime systems, where naval strength and economic wealth are dominant. We give particular attention to the European continental system and the global maritime system, and we argue that power dynamics are different in these two systems. This distinction was implicitly recognized in the most influential balance of power literature in Western international theory developed during the last three centuries, which focuses almost exclusively on Europe, rejects its geostrategic context, and refers to balancing by European great powers against hegemonic threats to the European continent by land-based military powers.24 Hypotheses on balances and balancing can be applied outside of Europe, but scholars must be sensitive to whether the key assumptions underlying balance of power theory are applicable in other systems.25 British theorists, later reinforced by Americans (who had a Eurocentric security outlook until the late twentieth century), have had a particularly signal can’t impact on the development of balance of power theory. They have rejected the traditional dentition of British interests in terms of a balance of power on the European continent, not a balance of power in the global system, which Britain preferred to dominate based on its commercial, nancial, and naval power.26 The implicit Eurocentric bias in balance of power theory is closely related to the theory’s focus on land-based military power as the primary basis of power in the system.27 The concentrations of power that are implicitly assumed to be the most feared, and that are hypothesized to precipitate balancing behavior, are those that most directly and immediately threaten the territorial integrity of other states. States with large armies that can invade and occupy have traditionally been perceived as far greater threats than states that have large navies and economic empires. It is hardly a coincidence that when balance of power theorists talk about balancing against hegemonic threats, the historical examples to which they usually refer are European coalitions against the land-based military power of the Habsburgs under Charles V in the early sixteenth century, Philip II at the end of the sixteenth century, and the combined strength of Spain and Austria in the Thirty Years’ War; against France under Louis XIV and then Napoleon; and against Germany under Wilhelm II and then Hitler.28 There is little mention of balancing against leading global powers such as the Netherlands in the seventeenth century, Britain in the nineteenth century, or the United States in the twentieth century.29 Even recent critics of balance of power theory focus almost exclusively on the European system.30 The Eurocentric bias in balance of power theory is rejected in the general acceptance of the proposition that sustained hegemonies do not emerge from multistate systems. As recent research has reminded scholars, however, sustained hegemonies have sometimes emerged, as illustrated by the Qin and Han dynasties in ancient China and by the Roman Empire, among others.31 The relative frequency and duration of hegemonic and nonhegemonic systems have yet to be established, but the argument that sustained hegemonies rarely if ever form in international systems is untenable. Empirical research on balancing during the last quarter century is a welcome addition to a balance of power literature that had long been more anecdotal than systematic.32 This research made some important theoretical advances, but the evidence presented in nearly all of these cases suffers from an unacknowledged problem of selection bias in their research designs. A problem with nearly all empirical studies of balancing—by both proponents and critics of the balancing proposition—is that they focus on major wars and ask whether states balance against or ally with the strongest or the most threatening state. They do not examine periods of peace and ask whether the absence of war might result from the anticipation of balancing. Presumably, potential aggressors are more likely to initiate war when they anticipate that potential third-party adversaries will not balance, so that looking only at cases of wars leads to a systematic underestimation of the causal impact of balancing. Empirical studies of balancing must include peacetime as well as wartime behavior.33 In the next section, we develop our theoretical expectations regarding alliance behavior in response to concentrations of power at the global level.

The US will do anything to maintain its hegemony to keep security over hyped threats

Grant 10 (Greg, Speechwriter to the Secretary of Defense at Department of Defense and writer for DoDbuzz.com “New Strategy touts Soft Power, 5/27/10 <http://www.dodbuzz.com/2010/05/27/obama-releases-national-security-strategy/> AB)

The Obama administration has finally released its long awaited national security strategy. The 52-page document correctly identifies economic power as the foundation of U.S. national power and calls for a greater focus on economic growth, reducing deficits and rebalancing the instruments of statecraft away from the current over-reliance on the military. The new strategy advocates coalition building and acting in concert with and through international organizations such as the U.N. and NATO. It also puts heavy emphasis on the instruments of “soft power,” diplomacy, global partnerships and economic development. “When we overuse our military might, or fail to invest in or deploy complementary tools, or act without partners, then our military is overstretched, Americans bear a greater burden, and our leadership around the world is too narrowly identified with military force,” it says. “The burdens of a young century cannot fall on American shoulders alone – –indeed, our adversaries would like to see America sap our strength by overextending our power,” Obama writes in the introduction. “Our strength and influence abroad begins with the steps we take at home,” He calls for greater investment in education, scientific research and green industries. It identifies the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as the single greatest security challenge, “particularly the danger posed by the pursuit of nuclear weapons by violent extremists and their proliferation to additional states.” The U.S. is leading the global effort to secure loose nukes and is pursuing “new strategies” to protect against biological weapons. While ensuring the viability of the nuclear deterrent, the administration is also working to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it calls the “foundation of nonproliferation.” The strategy says Iran and North Korea will be held accountable for violations of their international obligations to disarm. The strategy also identifies attacks on computer networks in cyberspace as one of the most serious national security challenges. “Our digital infrastructure, therefore, is a strategic national asset, and protecting it—while safeguarding privacy and civil liberties—is a national security priority.” It calls for more spending on people and technology to increase the resilience of critical government and industry networks. The strategy identifies Afghanistan and Pakistan as the frontlines of the global fight against terrorism, “where we are applying relentless pressure on al-Qa’ida, breaking the Taliban’s momentum, and strengthening the security and capacity of our partners.” It also calls for attacking terrorist sanctuaries in Yemen, Somalia, the Maghreb and the Sahel. It also calls for boosting economic development and diplomatic “expeditionary capacity” and updating national security institutions for the 21st century. The strategy, in a return to classic Clausewitzian terms, calls for the use of soft power before the military is called in: “While the use of force is sometimes necessary, we will exhaust other options before war whenever we can, and carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against the costs and risks of inaction. When force is necessary, we will continue to do so in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our legitimacy, and we will seek broad international support, working with such institutions as NATO and the U.N. Security Council. The United States must reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend our nation and our interests, yet we will also seek to adhere to standards that govern the use of force. Doing so strengthens those who act in line with international standards, while isolating and weakening those who do not. We will also outline a clear mandate and specific objectives and thoroughly consider the consequences —intended and unintended—of our actions. And the United States will take care when sending the men and women of our Armed Forces into harm’s way to ensure they have the leadership, training, and equipment they require to accomplish their mission.”

Hegemony is thought of as a “struggle vs evil” and causes endless military conflict

Chernus 6 (Ira, Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Colorado-Boulder, Monsters to Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin 2006 AB)

Journalist Ron Suskind has noted that neocons always offer “a statement of enveloping peril and no hypothesis for any real solution.” They have no hope of finding a real solution because they have no reason to look for one. Their story allows for success only as a fantasy. In reality, they expect to find nothing but an endless battle against an enemy that can never be defeated. At least two prominent neocons have said it quite bluntly. Kenneth Adelman: “We should not try to convince people that things are getting better.” Michael Ledeen: “The struggle against evil is going to go on forever.”40 This vision of endless conflict is not a conclusion drawn from observing reality. It is both the premise and the goal of the neocons’ fantasy. Ultimately, it seems, endless resistance is what they really want. Their call for a unipolar world ensures a permanent state of conflict, so that the U.S. can go on forever proving its military supremacy and promoting the “manly virtues” of militarism. They have to admit that the U.S., with its vastly incomparable power, already has unprecedented security against any foreign army. So they must sound the alarm about a shadowy new kind of enemy, one that can attack in novel, unexpected ways. They must make distant changes appear as huge imminent threats to America, make the implausible seem plausible, and thus find new monsters to destroy.

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#### **The maintenance of our declining hegemony requires the United States to preempt enemies. This approach would be modeled by other countries**

Griffths 04

(Martin , 2004, senior lecturer in the School of Political and International Studies at the Flinders

University of South Australia, Beyond the Bush Doctrine American Hegemony and World Order, AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF AMERICAN STUDIES)

Obviously, much more could be said (and has been said) about these recent¶ shifts in American foreign policy.15 Rather than repeat what has been¶ elaborated at length by other commentators, or to defend multilateralism and deterrence *per se*, I will focus on the implications of the changes for¶ American hegemony. Ironically, whilst I suspect that they will ultimately¶ weaken American hegemonic influence, the changes are themselves made¶ possible by the fact that the United States is a unipolar power, a superpower¶ capable of conducting or organizing politico-military action anywhere in the¶ world. However, hegemony is present in a system when there is a unipolar¶ structure of *influence* to match the unipolar structure of *capabilities*. The¶ mismatch between military preponderance and declining hegemony is likely¶ to increase as a result of three main factors.¶ First, American grand strategy reinforces the image of the United States as¶ too quick to use military force and to do so outside the bounds of¶ international law and legitimacy. This can make it more difficult for the¶ United States to gain international support for its use of force, and over the¶ long term, may lead others to resist US foreign policy goals more broadly,¶ including its efforts to fight terrorism. Elevating pre-emption to the level of¶ a formal doctrine may also increase the Administration’s inclination to¶ reach for the military lever quickly, when other tools still have a good¶ chance of working. Other states may wish to emulate the precedent set by¶ the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq, at the same time reducing its¶ leverage to convince such countries not to use force. This concern is¶ theoretical at one level, since it relates to stated doctrine as opposed to¶ actual U.S. actions. But it is very real at another level. Today’s international¶ system is characterized by a relative infrequency of interstate war.¶ Developing doctrines that lower the threshold for pre-emptive action could **put that accomplishment at risk, and exacerbate regional crises already on**

**the brink of open conflict.**

#### **Exceptionalism fosters a racist hierarchy and justifies political exclusion** Vitalis 02

[Robert,2002, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, Hegemony or Empire? “The Redefinition of US Power under George W. Bush--The Global and Domestic

Implications of US Redefinition of Power”]

At least two problems or blind spots affect the understanding of America’s experience¶ or practice of empire. One is the problem of exceptionalism – a standard way of viewing¶ or narrating or thinking about the American experience.3 American exceptionalism¶ assumes the deep structural autonomy of that experience, that American history is¶ unlike and unconnected with all others. Exceptionalism grounds, shapes and frames¶ all the varieties of accounts purporting to prove American enterprise to be anything¶ but agents of empire, of America being empire’s antithesis, about the US acquiring¶ an empire late or, as many political scientists are beginning to claim now, America is¶ an empire but one that is unique in the annals of world politics**.¶ The second blind spot is with respect to the power and robustness of beliefs about¶ the naturalness of hierarchy to which Americans but not only Americans subscribe¶ – more and less coherent ideologies that assign collective identities and places in an¶ inegalitarian order on the basis of characteristics that people are purportedly ‘born¶ with’ or ‘inherit’ or ‘pass on’ to their offspring.4** Gender, ethnicity, nationality and¶ even religion have served as grounds for exclusion in American political life, but no¶ identity has mattered more than race in determining and justifying hierarchy. **Thus,¶ for the scholars who founded the discipline of international relations in the US at the¶ turn of the twentieth century, the so-called races were fundamental or constitutive¶ units of analysis. They treated the terms ‘international relations’ and ‘interracial¶ relations’ as synonyms. Critics of the hierarchies built on the basis of skin color¶ or facial features and the alleged inferior and superior abilities of such differently¶ marked bodies coined a new term in the 1930s to characterize such practices. They¶ called it ‘racism’, a variant on a term used first in the 1910s, ‘racialism’.¶ Racism is American exceptionalism’s Achilles heel, the great contradiction at¶ the heart of the ‘storybook truth’ about a country that Louis Hartz, the Harvard¶ University political theorist and author of *The Liberal Tradition in America* (1955),¶ imagined as ‘eternally different from everyone else’**.**5 A kindred contradiction runs¶ through the work of those who today unselfconsciously reproduce Hartz’s views in¶ their accounts of a uniquely liberal and benign hegemonic order built by Americans¶ after World War II** – the one threatened by George W. Bush ‘unbound’.6

#### Policy focused on increasing and maintaining hegemony is wrapped in a monolithic delusional ideology has no aversion to crushing lives and liberties in service of its goal

Derian 03

(James Der, James Der Derian is a Watson Institute research professor of international studies and professor of political science at Brown University. In July 2004, he became the director of the Institute’s Global Security Program. Der Derian also directs the Information Technology, War, and Peace Project in the Watson Institute’s Global Security Program., Decoding The National Security Strategy of the

United States of America)

Regardless of authorial (or good) intentions, the NSS reads more¶ like late—very late—nineteenth-century poetry than a strategic doctrine for¶ the twenty-first century. The rhetoric of the White House favors and clearly¶ intends to mobilize the moral clarity, nostalgic sentimentality, and uncontested¶ dominance reminiscent of the last great empires against the ambiguities,¶ complexities, and messiness of the current world disorder. **However,¶ the gulf between the nation’s stated cause (‘‘to help make the world not just¶ safer but better’’ [1]) and defensive needs (to fight ‘‘a war against terrorists of¶ global reach’’ [5]) is so vast that one detects what Nietzsche referred to as¶ the ‘‘breath of empty space,’’ that void between the world as it is and as we¶ would wish it to be,** which produces all kinds of metaphysical concoctions.¶ **In short shrift (thirty pages), the White House articulation of U.S.¶ global objectives to the Congress elevates strategic discourse from a traditional,¶ temporal calculation of means and ends, to the theological realm¶ of monotheistic faith and monolithic truth. Relying more on aspiration than¶ analysis, revelation than reason, the NSS is not grand but grandiose strategy.¶ In pursuit of an impossible state of national security against terrorist¶ evil, soldiers will need to be sacrificed, civil liberties curtailed, civilians¶ collaterally damaged, regimes destroyed. But a nation’s imperial overreach¶ should exceed its fiduciary grasp: what’s a full-spectrum dominance of the¶ battle space for? Were this not an official White House doctrine, the contradictions of¶ the NSS could be interpreted only as poetic irony. How else to comprehend¶ the opening paragraph, which begins with ‘‘The United States possesses¶ unprecedented—and unequaled—strength and influence in the world’’ and¶ ends with ‘‘The great strength of this nation must be used to promote a balance¶ of power that favors freedom’’** (1)? Perhaps the cabalistic Straussians¶ that make up the defense intellectual brain trust of the Bush administration¶ (among them, PaulWolfowitz, Richard Perle, and William Kristol) have come¶ up with a nuanced, indeed, anti-Machiavellian reading of Machiavelli that¶ escapes the uninitiated. But so fixed is the NSS on the creation of a world¶ in America’s image that concepts such as balance of power and imminent¶ threat, once rooted in historical, juridical, as well as reciprocal traditions,

**Multipolarity is the only way** **to achieve us interests attempting to ‘go it alone’ makes achieving US interests far more difficult destroys multipolar partnerships** and ultimately anti proliferation movement

Ikenberry 02

(John, 2002, The Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, “America’s Imperial Ambition”)

Pitfalls accompany this neoimperial grand strategy, however.¶ Unchecked U.S. power, shorn of legitimacy and disentangled from¶ the postwar norms and institutions of the international order, will¶ usher in a more hostile international system, making it far harder to¶ achieve American interests. **The secret of the United States’ long brilliant run as the world’s leading state was its ability and willingness¶ to exercise power within alliance and multinational frameworks,¶ which made its power and agenda more acceptable to allies and other¶ key states around the world. This achievement has now been put at¶ risk by the administration’s new thinking. The most immediate problem is that the neoimperialist approach is unsustainable.** Going it alone might well succeed in removing¶ Saddam Hussein from power, but it is far less certain that a strategy¶ of counter proliferation, based on American willingness to use unilateral¶ force to confront dangerous dictators, can work over the long term.**¶ An American policy that leaves the United States alone to decide¶ which states are threats and how best to deny them weapons of mass¶ destruction will lead to a diminishment of multilateral mechanisms—most important of which is the nonproliferation regime**. The Bush administration has elevated the threat of wmd to the top¶ of its security agenda without investing its power or prestige in fostering, monitoring, and enforcing nonproliferation commitments. The tragedy of September 11 has given the Bush administration the authority and willingness to confront the Iraqs of the world. But that will not be enough when even more complicated cases come along—¶ when it is not the use of force that is needed but concerted multilateral¶ action to provide sanctions and inspections. **Nor is it certain that a¶ preemptive or preventive military intervention will go well; it might¶ trigger a domestic political backlash to American-led and military focused¶ interventionism. America’s well-meaning imperial strategy¶ could undermine the principled multilateral agreements, institutional¶ infrastructure, and cooperative spirit needed for the long-term success¶ of nonproliferation goals**

### Power Vacuum

#### Power vacuums rhetoric makes intervention and power politics inevitable

Shimko, professor of political science at Purdue, 2004 p. 205-206

(Keith, in *Metaphorical World Politics* ed. By Beer and Landtsheer)

Yet another tried and true geopolitical metaphor is the concept of the "power vacuum." This wauld also be mobilized at various junctures during the Cold War. President Eisenhower (who appears to have had a particular fondness for geopolitical metaphors) observed after the 1956 Suez crisis that "the existing vacuum in the Middle East must be filled by the United States before it is filled by Russia."19 The metaphor of the power vacuum is .. a prime example af what I call a metaphor of power: it embodies a concep¬ tion of how the world works that is conducive to the exercise of great (pawer. Like many influential geopolitical metaphors, this one is drawn \ from the natural, physical, and biological sciences. Such metaphors imply .ithat the social world of international relatians operates according to certain :::laws, such as the laws of physics. Perhaps such analogies are so common because they provide a comforting vision of predictability for an unpre¬.dictable world. It is a world in which nations and decision makers are oddly robbed of volition and agency (and, thus, moral responsibility?). Na¬tlire abhors a vacuum. Vacuums will be filled; they will draw things in. This is inevitable and inexorable. As Eisenhower insists, the vacuum must" be filled. If it is not filled by the United States, it will be filled by the ;oviet Union: these are the only two aptions. And since it is a vacuum of 6wer, who else can fill it except those who possess power-for example, the United States. The notion that there exists these things called power vacuums that must be filled is a metaphor of power because it presents an understanding of how the world works that almost inevitably leads to the conclusion that those with power must expand to fill the vacuums. In fill¬ing power vacuums we are only doing what must inevitably be done-in fact, it is the vacuum itself that is to blame because it "draws" in power (and, thus, the powerful). The metaphor, of course, hides the obvious ob¬jection to the analysis and conclusion: perhaps no one has to "fill" the "vacuum" because it is not in fact a "vacuum" at all.

### Third World/Failed States/Developing World

#### Identifying these as the key locations for future instability participates in a politics of nationalism that denies the violent heart of Western politics

Duffield 2011 (Mark, Professor of Development Politics at the University of Bristol, “Envirnmental Terror: Uncertainty, Resilience, and the Bunker” Working Paper No. 06-11)

Concerns with more traditional external military threats from hostile states have receded. In their place, national security now focuses on a raft of new and diverse enemies ranging from terrorism, fragile states, infrastructure collapse, pandemics, biodiversity loss and natural disasters to the all-encompassing security nexus of climate change (Cabinet Office 2008; WEF 2010). Rather than the state and its military capacity as such, these largely non-state, transnational and social-ecological threats impact upon society and people’s lives from the cellular to the planetary: national security has expanded to embrace life in its totality (Rockstrom et al 2009). Given the comprehensive reshaping of life-world habits now deemed necessary to confront these interconnected threats, this paper considers the changed perception of national security from the perspective of rethinking total war. That is, from a blurring of distinction between governments, peoples and armies to a society-wide mobilisation against an environment increasingly experienced as terroristic. With the ending of the Cold War – and with it a real chance of societal extinction – this terror has, paradoxically, called forth a security apparatus that sees in the very neurological processes, engineered infrastructures, ecological systems and social networks that together make life possible, a reflection of its own limits, inner vulnerabilities and ultimate demise (Evans 2010; Virillo 2008). The paper begins with an examination of environmental terror as a modus operandi of war that targets the totality of an enemy’s supporting life-world. Originating in the Twentieth Century phenomenon of total war, environmental terror was explicated through a growing dialogue and increasing indistinction between war, nature and economy. Working through uncertainty and surprise, a key response to environmental terror has been the emergence of technologies of resilience. Breaking with modernist conceptions of social protection that are based upon knowing and protecting against the future through statistically derived forms of insurance, resilience positively embraces uncertainty and the ultimate unknowability of the future. An organism, an individual, an eco-system, a social institution, an engineered infrastructure, even a city – in fact, anything that is networked, evolving or ‘life-like’ in some way – is now said to be resilient in so far as it able to absorb shocks and uncertainty, or reconfigure itself in relation to such shocks while still retaining its essential functionality (Holling 1973; 2008). The paper explores the genealogy of resilience in the civil defence measures pioneered to survive nuclear attack, departures in ecology that broke with equilibriumbased models of range management and echoing developments in neoliberalism (Cooper & Walker 2010). Besides an adaptive resilience, however, the rise of environmental terror has also seen the appearance of a more spatial and defensive technology: the bunker. With origins in the military bunker, but now offering economic, political and cultural elites spaces of private refuge and consumption, in various forms and existing at different scales, the bunker has become neoliberalism’s signature urban architectural form. Environmental terror Associated with the World Wars of the Twentieth Century, especially WWII, total war is usually understood as the breakdown of earlier juridical distinctions between people, governments and armies (van Creveld 1991). These distinctions had earlier shaped the rules of war that protected people by ideally confining war, at least in Europe, to battles between comparable armies. The blurring of such differences was premised upon the industrialisation of war. During the Twentieth Century, whether as soldiers, workers or mothers, entire societies were directly mobilised for war. Rules and restraint evaporated as societies fought to the death in support of contrary world-views and moral systems. The burning cities, extermination camps, huddled refugees and mushroom clouds of WWII provide the iconic images of total war. Where total war is seen as relevant today, it is usually in relation to understanding the pathologies of the developing world. For some, the global South is now “...the locus classicus” of total war (Ibid: 58). Destructive civil wars, ethnic cleansing, systematic human rights abuse and violent excess mark its (geographically limited) continuation. Such views underpin, for example, the influential ‘new war’ thesis (Kaldor 1999) and have provided post-Cold War liberal interventionism with much of its moral justification (Boutrous Ghali 1992). We need to redress this Eurocentric and partisan view of total war, not only returning it to the beating heart of the developed world but also exposing its intrinsic expansionism from cellular life to the planetary level. Total war embodies the essence of terrorism. Rather than simply a blurring of juridical distinctions flowing from the industrialisation war, it involves a particular modus operandi of violence available to those with the technology to fabricate it. In this respect, the year 1915 is significant. In the context of WWI, it marks the first offensive use of chlorine gas against an opposing army (Sloterdijk 2009) and, in the form of the Zeppelin raids, the beginning of the aerial bombardment of urban centres (Meilinger 1996). These were elemental departures in Europe from the erstwhile ‘crossing of swords’ by equally matched armies. Indeed, the body of the enemy soldier itself was no longer the direct target of war. The objective was now the environment, in this case the atmosphere and urban infrastructure, which sustained enemy life. Targeting an enemy’s environmental life-world is “...the basic idea of terrorism in its more explicit sense” (Ibid: 14). Thus, terrorism “...can only be understood when grasped as a form of exploration of the environment from the perspective of its destructibility” (Ibid: 28). As a terroristic modus operandi total war involves “...an attack on the enemy’s primary, ecologically-dependent vital functions: respiration, central nervous regulations, and sustainable temperature and radiation conditions” (Ibid: 16). From this beginning environmental weapons of mass destruction have multiplied. Besides poison gas, they include blanket bombing, designer fire-storms, radiation weapons, biological pathogens, asphyxiation bombs and, more recently, attempts to geo-engineer weather patterns, alter the properties of the ionosphere and control outer-space for military purposes (Ibid; Peoples 2008; Gilbert 2004).

### Resource Wars/Resource Scarcity

#### Focus on the environment is a problem—causes mass violence and sanitizes complicity with structural violence by scapegoating

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“The Dilemma should by now be apparent; securitising environmental issues runs the risk that the strategic/realist approach will coopt and colonise the environmental agenda rather than respond positively to environmental problems.” (Barnett 2001:137) The realist take on ‘security’ in the post-WWII period still holds a firm grasp today, so that the state is still the referent object of security and it is still its sovereignty which is to be secured against the threat of states. The problem is that, in the context of the environment, this makes no sense because the traditional focus of national security (interstate violence) has nothing to do with the focus of environmental degradation (human impact on the environment). Furthermore, talking of national security is too restrictive because a state’s ecological footprint may cross its sovereign domain. The wealthiest 20% of the world’s population consume 84% of all paper, use 87% of the world’s vehicles and emit 53% of all C0². Yet those least responsible suffer the effects the most. This is because wastes are exported to and resources come from the Southern poorer countries, so that their lands experience resource depletion and extraction (Barnett 2001:13). A focus on national security selects the military, because environmental degradation is viewed as having the potential to destabilise regional balances of power (Hough 2004:13-16). One only wonders how the military alone could prevent the effects of depletion and extraction. The environmental-conflict literature is a good example where traditional national security concerns have been linked with the environment. The narrative within this discourse is that environment degradation will lead to resource scarcities, which will make the developing countries more militarily confrontational towards the industrialised states (Barnett 2001:38). Conflict over scarce resources undermines the security of the state (Detraz and Betsill 2009:305), so it is the state which is to be protected. Emphasis on such an account is undesirable for many reasons. Firstly, it is untrue that the only consequence of environmental degradation is conflict. Bogardi and Brauch have noted how environmental security involves freedom from want (economic and social security dimensions), freedom from hazard impacts (natural or human-induced hazards as effects of environmental degradation) and freedom from fear (violence and conflict)(Brauch 2008: 17-8). This demonstrates how conflict is but one consequence of degradation. Environmental-conflict literature ignores the root socioeconomic causes and hazard impact dimensions of environmental security; a focus on which would lead to conclusions of undertaking non-military efforts like disaster preparedness, adaptation, mitigation, early warning systems etc (Brauch 2008:17-8), and economic solutions like pricing goods to reflect the costs of their provision (Mathews (1989:172). Secondly, the assertion that environmental degradation is a primary reason of conflict is purely speculative (Barnett 2003:10). Barnett suggests that the ‘evidence’ provided in support is a collection of historical events chosen to support the conflict-scarcity storyline and reify the realist assumption that eventually humans will resort to violence (Barnett 2001:66). This is as opposed to acknowledging that humans are equally capable of adapting. Thirdly, research shows that it is abundance of resources which drives competition, not scarcity (Barnet 2003:11). This makes sense because any territorial conquest to obtain resources will be expensive. A poor country suffering from resource scarcity would not be able to afford an offensive war(Deudney 1990: 309-11). The second and third points mean that environmental-conflict literature counteracts any attempts at solving the problem of environmental degradation. The discourse attributes high intentionality to people-because of scarcity they decide to become violent. This ignores the fact that human actions are not intended to harm the environment. The high intentionality given to people prevents them from being seen as victims who need help. Instead they are pictured as threats to state security. This view can exacerbate ethnic tensions as the state uses minority groups as scapegoats for environmental degradation. It also means that only those involved in conflict are relevant to environmental security, not those who are vulnerable (Detraz and Betsill 2009:307-15). In this way the South is scripted as “primeval Other” (Barnett 2001:65), where order can only be maintained by the intervention of the North, rather than by the provision of aid. The North’s agency in creating the environmental problems is completely erased. Instead environmental degradation is seen from the perspective of the individual state, questioning how it could affect the state, i.e. increased migration (Allenby 2000:18) and this leads to the adoption of narrow policies. Saad has said that securitising the environment in this way allows the North to justify intervening and forcing developing nations to follow policies which encapsulate the North’s norms (Saad 1991:325-7). In this way the powerful become stronger, and the weak weaker. This view may affect the South’s relations with the North. For example, Detraz and Betsill have commented on tensions between the North and South in the 2007 United Nations Security Council debate on climate change. Only 29% of the Southern states compared to 70% of Northern speakers supported the idea of the Security Council being a place to develop a global response to climate change. The reasons for this difference was that shifting decision-making to the Security Council would make Southern states unable to promote efficiently their interests in obtaining resources for climate adaptation and mitigation plans. Furthermore, Egypt and India argued that in suggesting this Northern countries were avoiding their responsibilities for controlling greenhouse gases, by trying to “shift attention to the need to address potential climate-related conflict in the South” (Detraz and Betsill 2009:312). In this way environmental security becomes a barrier because the traditional (realist) concept of security is used to immobilise any action towards dealing with the root causes of environmental degradation.

### Competitiveness

#### Competitiveness links—rhetoric of competitiveness does not respect difference, and flattens the other into subjects of violence

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In recent years, regional development strategies have been subjugated to the hegemonic discourse of competitiveness, such that the ultimate objective for all regional development policy-makers and practitioners has become the creation of economic advantage through superior productivity performance, or the attraction of new firms and labour ([Bristow, 2005](http://cjres.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/153.full#ref-6)). A major consequence is the developing ‘ubiquitification’ of regional development strategies ([Bristow, 2005](http://cjres.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/153.full#ref-6); [Maskell and Malmberg, 1999](http://cjres.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/153.full#ref-39)). This reflects the status of competitiveness as a key discursive construct ([Jessop, 2008](http://cjres.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/153.full#ref-26)) that has acquired hugely significant rhetorical power for certain interests intent on reinforcing capitalist relations ([Bristow, 2005](http://cjres.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/153.full#ref-6); [Fougner, 2006](http://cjres.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/153.full#ref-11)). Indeed, the competitiveness hegemony is such that many policies previously considered only indirectly relevant to unfettered economic growth tend to be hijacked in support of competitiveness agendas (for example [Raco, 2008](http://cjres.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/153.full#ref-48); also [Dannestam, 2008](http://cjres.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/153.full#ref-10)). This paper will argue, however, that a particularly narrow discourse of ‘competitiveness’ has been constructed that has a number of negative connotations for the ‘resilience’ of regions. Resilience is defined as the region's ability to experience positive economic success that is socially inclusive, works within environmental limits and which can ride global economic punches ([Ashby et al., 2009](http://cjres.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/153.full#ref-2)). As such, resilience clearly resonates with literatures on sustainability, localisation and diversification, and the developing understanding of regions as intrinsically diverse entities with evolutionary and context-specific development trajectories ([Hayter, 2004](http://cjres.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/153.full#ref-16)). In contrast, the dominant discourse of competitiveness is ‘placeless’ and increasingly associated with globalised, growth-first and environmentally malign agendas (Hudson, 2005). However, this paper will argue that the relationships between competitiveness and resilience are more complex than might at first appear. Using insights from the Cultural Political Economy (CPE) approach, which focuses on understanding the construction, development and spread of hegemonic policy discourses, the paper will argue that the dominant discourse of competitiveness used in regional development policy is narrowly constructed and is thus insensitive to contingencies of place and the more nuanced role of competition within economies. This leads to problems of resilience that can be partly overcome with the development of a more contextualised approach to competitiveness. The paper is now structured as follows. It begins by examining the developing understanding of resilience in the theorising and policy discourse around regional development. It then describes the CPE approach and utilises its framework to explain both how a narrow conception of competitiveness has come to dominate regional development policy and how resilience inter-plays in subtle and complex ways with competitiveness and its emerging critique. The paper then proceeds to illustrate what resilience means for regional development firstly, with reference to the Transition Towns concept, and then by developing a typology of regional strategies to show the different characteristics of policy approaches based on competitiveness and resilience. Resilience is rapidly emerging as an idea whose time has come in policy discourses around localities and regions, where it is developing widespread appeal owing to the peculiarly powerful combination of transformative pressures from below, and various catalytic, crisis-induced imperatives for change from above. It features strongly in policy discourses around environmental management and sustainable development (see [Hudson, 2008a](http://cjres.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/153.full#ref-21)), but has also more recently emerged in relation to emergency and disaster planning with, for example ‘Regional Resilience Teams’ established in the English regions to support and co-ordinate civil protection activities around various emergency situations such as the threat of a swine flu pandemic. The discourse of resilience is also taking hold in discussions around desirable local and regional development activities and strategies. The recent global ‘credit crunch’ and the accompanying increase in livelihood insecurity has highlighted the advantages of those local and regional economies that have greater ‘resilience’ by virtue of being less dependent upon globally footloose activities, having greater economic diversity, and/or having a determination to prioritise and effect more significant structural change ([Ashby et al, 2009](http://cjres.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/153.full#ref-2); [Larkin and Cooper, 2009](http://cjres.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/153.full#ref-34)). Indeed, resilience features particular strongly in the ‘grey’ literature spawned by thinktanks, consultancies and environmental interest groups around the consequences of the global recession, catastrophic climate change and the arrival of the era of peak oil for localities and regions with all its implications for the longevity of carbon-fuelled economies, cheap, long-distance transport and global trade. This popularly labelled ‘triple crunch’ ([New Economics Foundation, 2008](http://cjres.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/153.full#ref-41)) has powerfully illuminated the potentially disastrous material consequences of the voracious growth imperative at the heart of neoliberalism and competitiveness, both in the form of resource constraints (especially food security) and in the inability of the current system to manage global financial and ecological sustainability. In so doing, it appears to be galvinising previously disparate, fractured debates about the merits of the current system, and challenging public and political opinion to develop a new, global concern with frugality, egalitarianism and localism (see, for example [Jackson, 2009](http://cjres.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/153.full#ref-23); [New Economics Foundation, 2008](http://cjres.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/153.full#ref-41)).

#### Language of competitiveness reproduces Hobbesian security logics by conflating economic strength with military conquest

Crawford 1998 (Beverly, Professor of Political Science at Berkeley, *On Security* ebook <http://library.northsouth.edu/Upload/On%20Security.pdf>)

During much of the Cold War, national security was defined primarily in terms of military threats to state, society, and industry. To this last category we can add concerns about oil and other raw materials, whose reliability of supply could never be assured with confidence through global markets. Those concerns have, for the most part, now disappeared, to be replaced by language focused on economic "competitiveness" (a modern variant of old Social Darwinist arguments) and threats to the nation-state by other countries. There are two perspectives embedded in discussions of this new "security dilemma." The first postulates declining national welfare if competitiveness is lost; the second, a threat to the American ability to prosecute major wars against unnamed adversaries. Advocates of the first perspective propose major government intervention into and control of research and development. Inasmuch as this remains ideological anathema in the United States, the second offers a more acceptable rationale for such intervention, invoking military security arguments that do not differ very much from those sometimes put forth during the Cold War.

#### Competitiveness leads to inefficient decision making

Krugman 94 (Paul:Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Insti¶ tute of Technology; his most recent book is *Peddling Prosperity: Economic¶ Sense and Nonsense in the Age of Diminished Expectations*. “Competitiveness: A dangerous Obsession.” <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20045917.pdf?acceptTC=true> 7/13/12)

Guess what? Delors didn't confront the problems of either the wel¶ fare state or the ems. He explained that the root cause of European¶ unemployment was a lack of competitiveness with the United States¶ and Japan and that the solution was a program of investment in infra¶ structure and high technology.¶ It was a disappointing evasion, but not a surprising one. After all, the¶ rhetoric of competitiveness?the view that, in the words of President¶ Clinton, each nation is "like a big corporation competing in the global¶ marketplace"?has become pervasive among opinion leaders through¶ out the world. People who believe themselves to be sophisticated about¶ the subject take it for granted that the economic problem facing any¶ modern nation is essentially one of competing on world markets?that¶ the United States and Japan are competitors in the same sense that¶ Coca-Cola competes with Pepsi?and are unaware that anyone might¶ seriously question that proposition. Every few months a new best-sell¶ er warns the American public of the dire consequences of losing the¶ "race" for the 21st century.1 A whole industry of councils on competi¶ tiveness, "geo-economists" and managed trade theorists has sprung up¶ inW ashington. Many of these people, having diagnosed America s eco¶ nomic problems in much the same terms as Delors did Europe's, are¶ now in the highest reaches of the Clinton administration formulating¶ economic and trade policy for the United States. So Delors was using¶ FOREIGN AFFAIRS March/April i994 [29]¶ 1¶ See, for just a few examples, Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Who's Bashing Whom: Trade¶ Conflict inH igh-Technology Industries,W ashington: Institute for International Econom¶ ics, 1992; Lester C. Thurow, Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle among Japan,¶ Europe,¶ and America, New York: Morrow, 1992; Ira C. Magaziner and Robert B. Reich,¶ Minding Americas Business: The Decline and Rise of the American Economy, New York:¶ Vintage Books, 1983; Ira C. Magaziner and Mark Patinkin, The Silent War: Inside the¶ Global Business Battles Shaping Americas Future, New York: Vintage Books, 1990;¶ Edward N. Luttwak, The Endangered American Dream: How to Stop theU nited Statefsr om¶ Becoming a Third World Country and How to Win the Geo-economic Struggle for Industrial¶ Supremacy, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993; Kevin P. Phillips, Staying on Top: The¶ Business Case for a National Industrial Strategy, New York: Random House, 1984; Clyde¶ V. Prestowitz, Jr., Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead, New York:¶ Basic Books, 1988W; illiam S. Dietrich, In the Shadow of the Rising Sun: The Political¶ Roots¶ of American Economic Decline, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press,¶ 1991; Jeffrey E. Garten, A Cold Peace: America, Japan, Germany, and the Struggle for¶ Supremacy, New York: Times Books, 1992; and Wayne Sandholtz et al., The Highest¶ Stakes: The Economic Foundations of theN ext Security System, Berkeley Roundtable on the¶ International Economy (brie), Oxford University Press, 1992.¶ Paul Krugman¶ a language that was not only convenient but comfortable for him and¶ a wide audience on both sides of the Atlantic.¶ Unfortunately, his diagnosis was deeply misleading as a guide to¶ what ails Europe, and similar diagnoses in the United States are¶ equally misleading. The idea that a country's economic fortunes are¶ largely determined by its success on world markets is a hypothesis,¶ not a necessary truth; and as a practical, empirical matter, that¶ hypothesis is flatly wrong. That is, it is simply not the case that the¶ world's leading nations are to any important degree in economic¶ competition with each other, or that any of their major economic¶ problems can be attributed to failures to compete on world markets.¶ The growing obsession in most advanced nations with international¶ competitiveness should be seen, not as a well-founded concern, but¶ as a view held in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence. And¶ yet it is clearly a view that people very much want to hold?a desire¶ to believe that is reflected in a remarkable tendency of those who¶ preach the doctrine of competitiveness to support their case with¶ careless, flawed arithmetic.This article makes three points. First, it argues that concerns about¶ competitiveness are, as an empirical matter, almost completely¶ unfounded. Second, it tries to explain why defining the economic¶ problem as one of international competition is nonetheless so attrac¶ tive to so many people. Finally, it argues that the obsession with com¶ petitiveness is not only wrong but dangerous, skewing domestic poli¶ cies and threatening the international economic system. This last¶ issue is, of course, the most consequential from the standpoint of¶ public policy. Thinking in terms of competitiveness leads, directly¶ and indirectly, to bad economic policies on a wide range of issues,¶ domestic and foreign, whether it be in health care or trade.

#### Competitiveness provides excuses for politicians and is evolving into a dangerous distort of economic policies

Krugman 94 (Paul:Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Insti¶ tute of Technology; his most recent book is *Peddling Prosperity: Economic¶ Sense and Nonsense in the Age of Diminished Expectations*. “Competitiveness: A dangerous Obsession.” <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20045917.pdf?acceptTC=true> 7/13/12)

Second, the idea that U.S. economic difficulties hinge crucially on¶ FOREIGN AFFAIRS-March/Aprili994 [39]¶ Paul Krugman¶ our failures in international competition somewhat paradoxically¶ makes those difficulties seem easier to solve. The productivity of the¶ average American worker is determined by a complex array of factors,¶ most of them unreachable by any likely government policy. So if you¶ accept the reality that our "competitive" problem is really a domestic¶ productivity problem pure and simple, you are unlikely to be opti¶ mistic about any dramatic turnaround. But if you can convince your¶ self that the problem is really one of failures in international compe¶ tition?that imports are pushing workers out of high-wage jobs, or¶ subsidized foreign competition is driving the United States out of the¶ high value-added sectors?then the answers to economic malaise may¶ seem to you to involve simple things like subsidizing high technolo¶ gy and being tough on Japan.¶ Finally, many of the world s leaders have found the competitive¶ metaphor extremely useful as a political device. The rhetoric of com¶ petitiveness turns out to provide a good way either to justify hard choic¶ es or to avoid them. The example of Delors in Copenhagen shows the¶ usefulness of competitive metaphors as an evasion. Delors had to say¶ something at the ec summit; yet to say anything that addressed the real¶ roots of European unemployment would have involved huge political¶ risks. By turning the discussion to essentially irrelevant but plausible¶ sounding questions of competitiveness, he bought himself some time¶ to come up with a better answer (which to some extent he provided in¶ December s white paper on the European economy?a paper that still,¶ however, retained "competitiveness" in its title).¶ By contrast, the well-received presentation of Bill Clintons initial¶ economic program in February 1993 showed the usefulness of compet¶ itive rhetoric as a motivation for tough policies. Clinton proposed a set¶ of painful spending cuts and tax increases to reduce the Federal deficit.¶ Why? The real reasons for cutting the deficit are disappointingly undra¶ matic: the deficit siphons off funds that might otherwise have been pro¶ ductively invested, and thereby exerts a steady if small drag on U.S. eco¶ nomic growth. But Clinton was able instead to offer a stirring patriotic¶ appeal, calling on the nation to act now in order to make the economy¶ competitive in the global market?with the implication that dire eco¶ nomic consequences would follow if the United States does not.¶ [40] FOREIGN AFFAIRS'Volume73N0.2¶ Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession¶ Many people who know that "competitiveness" is a largely mean¶ ingless concept have been willing to indulge competitive rhetoric pre¶ cisely because they believe they can harness it in the service of good¶ policies. An overblown fear of the Soviet Union was used in the 1950s¶ to justify the building of the interstate highway system and the expan¶ sion of math and science education. Cannot the unjustified fears about¶ foreign competition similarly be turned to good, used to justify serious¶ efforts to reduce the budget deficit, rebuild infrastructure, and so on?¶ A few years ago this was a reasonable hope. At this point, howev¶ er, the obsession with competitiveness has reached the point where it¶ has already begun dangerously to distort economic policies.

#### Competitiveness leads to wasteful governmental spending, protectionism, trade wars, and misallocation of resources

Krugman 94 (Paul:Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Insti¶ tute of Technology; his most recent book is *Peddling Prosperity: Economic¶ Sense and Nonsense in the Age of Diminished Expectations*. “Competitiveness: A dangerous Obsession.” <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20045917.pdf?acceptTC=true> 7/13/12)

Thinking and speaking in terms of competitiveness poses three¶ real dangers. First, it could result in the wasteful spending of government¶ money supposedly to enhance U.S. competitiveness. Second, it could¶ lead to protectionism and trade wars. Finally, and most important, it¶ could result in bad public policy on a spectrum of important issues.¶ During the 1950s, fear of the Soviet Union induced the U.S. gov¶ erment to spend money on useful things like highways and science¶ education. It also, however, led to considerable spending on more¶ doubtful items like bomb shelters. The most obvious if least worri¶ some danger of the growing obsession with competitiveness is that it¶ might lead to a similar misallocation of resources. To take an exam¶ ple, recent guidelines for government research funding have stressed¶ the importance of supporting research that can improve U.S. inter¶ national competitiveness. This exerts at least some bias toward inven¶ tions that can help manufacturing firms, which generally compete on¶ international markets, rather than service producers, which generally¶ do not. Yet most of our employment and value-added is now in ser¶ vices, and lagging productivity in services rather than manufactures¶ has been the single most important factor in the stagnation of U.S.¶ living standards.¶ A much more serious risk is that the obsession with competitive¶ ness will lead to trade conflict, perhaps even to a world trade war.¶ FOREIGN AFFAIRS March/April 1994 [41]¶ Paul Krugman¶ Most of those who have preached the doctrine of competitiveness¶ have not been old-fashioned protectionists. They want their countries¶ to win the global trade game, not drop out. But what if, despite its¶ best efforts, a country does not seem to be winning, or lacks¶ confidence that it can? Then the competitive diagnosis inevitably sug¶ gests that to close the borders is better than to risk having foreigners¶ take away high-wage jobs and high-value sectors. At the very least,¶ the focus on the supposedly competitive nature of international eco¶ nomic relations greases the rails for those who want confrontational¶ if not frankly protectionist policies.

#### Competitiveness distorts many domestic issues and converts them into an international issue

Krugman 94 (Paul:Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Insti¶ tute of Technology; his most recent book is *Peddling Prosperity: Economic¶ Sense and Nonsense in the Age of Diminished Expectations*. “Competitiveness: A dangerous Obsession.” <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20045917.pdf?acceptTC=true> 7/13/12)

Consider, for example, the issue of health care reform, undoubt¶ edly the most important economic initiative of the Clinton admin¶ istration, almost surely an order of magnitude more important to¶ U.S. living standards than anything that might be done about trade¶ [42] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Vo/umeyjNo.2¶ policy (unless the United States provokes¶ a full-blown trade war). Since health¶ care is an issue with few direct inter¶ national linkages, one might have¶ expected it to be largely insulated¶ from any distortions of policy¶ resulting from misguided con- Competitiveness risks distorting the¶ cerns about competitiveness.¶ 2We might also note the unusual process by which the health care¶ reform was developed. In spite of the huge size of the task force, rec¶ ognized experts in the health care field were almost completely¶ absent, notably though not exclusively economists specializing in¶ health care, including economists with impeccable liberal credentials¶ like Henry Aaron of the Brookings Institution. Again, this may have¶ reflected a number of factors, but it is probably not irrelevant that¶ anyone who, like Magaziner, is strongly committed to the ideology¶ of competitiveness is bound to have found professional economists¶ notably unsympathetic in the past?and to be unwilling to deal with¶ them on any other issue.¶ To make a harsh but not entirely unjustified analogy, a government¶ wedded to the ideology of competitiveness is as unlikely to make good¶ economic policy as a government committed to creationism is to¶ FOREIGN AFFAIRS \*¶ March/April 1994 [43]¶ Paul Krugman¶ make good science policy, even in areas that have no direct relation¶ ship to the theory of evolution.

#### **Competitiveness allows for the benefit of some to be at the expense of others**

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In the Star Trek movie as Mr. Spock lays dying, he explains to Captain Kirk that he gave¶ his life to save the crew of the starship Enterprise because the good of the many outweighs¶ the good of the one. This sentiment is the foundation for regional cooperation¶ in the United States and Western Europe. Regional cooperation involves networks of¶ local and regional public, private, and nonprofit bodies, working with higher tiers of¶ government, that focus their economic development efforts for the benefit of a region¶ or a group of regions as a whole.¶ Traditionally, competition among individual localities has been more prevalent,¶ especially in the United States (see, e.g., Hall and Hubbard 1998; Levy 1992; Wolman¶ 1996). Localities compete for private investment for goals such as jobs and tax base. Yet¶ this competition has drawbacks, including the enormous resources diverted into¶ incentives, instances of fewer gains for an economy than projected, the inequitable distribution¶ of the costs and benefits within cities, and poorer cities paying more, with the¶ costs outweighing the benefits for some (Peters and Fisher 1997; Rubin and Rubin¶ 1987). Because only one city can win, this competition is zero or negative sum at¶ national and supranational scales if it merely relocates investment between places at¶ public expense (Bartik 1991; Burstein and Rolnick 1995). If public funds are diverted¶ from education, technology, and the transportation and communications infrastructures,¶ cities become less competitive nationally and internationally.

**Economic Competitiveness is becoming obsessive.**

**Krugman**, PaulMarch19**94** Foreign Affairs;Mar/Apr94, Vol. 73 Issue 2, p28 Paul Robin Krugmanis an American economist, Professor of Economics and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and international affairs at Princeton University, Centenary Professor at the London School of Economics, and an op-ed columnist for the New York Times.

In June 1993, Jacques Delors made a special presentation to the leaders of the nations of the European Community, meeting in Copenhagen, on the growing problem of European unemployment. Economists who study the European situation were curious to see what Delors, president of the EC Commission, would say. Most of them share more or less the same diagnosis of the European problem: the taxes and regulations imposed by Europe's elaborate welfare states have made employers reluctant to create new jobs, while the relatively generous level of unemployment benefits has made workers unwilling to accept the kinds of low-wage jobs that help keep unemployment comparatively low in the United States. The monetary difficulties associated with preserving the European Monetary System in the face of the costs of German reunification have reinforced this structural problem.¶ It is a persuasive diagnosis, but a politically explosive one, and everyone wanted to see how Delors would handle it. Would he dare tell European leaders that their efforts to pursue economic justice have produced unemployment as an unintended by-product? Would he admit that the ems could be sustained only at the cost of a recession and face the implications of that admission for European monetary union?¶ Guess what? Delors didn't confront the problems of either the welfare state or the ems. He explained that the root cause of European unemployment was a lack of competitiveness with the United States and Japan and that the solution was a program of investment in infrastructure and high technology.¶ It was a disappointing evasion, but not a surprising one. After all, **the rhetoric of competitiveness -- the view that, in the words of President Clinton, each nation is "like a big corporation competing in the global marketplace" -- has become pervasive among opinion leaders throughout the world.** **People who believe themselves to be sophisticated about the subject take it for granted that the economic problem facing any modern nation is essentially one of competing on world markets** -- that the United States and Japan are competitors in the same sense that Coca-Cola competes with Pepsi -- and are unaware that anyone might seriously question that proposition. Every few months a new best-seller warns the American public of the dire consequences of losing the "race" for the 21st century. **A whole industry of councils on competitiveness, "geo-economists" and managed trade theorists has sprung up in Washington.** Many of these people, having diagnosed America's economic problems in much the same terms as Delors did Europe's, are now in the highest reaches of the Clinton administration **formulating economic and trade policy for the United States.** So Delors was using a language that was not only convenient but comfortable for him and a wide audience on both sides of the Atlantic.¶ Unfortunately, his diagnosis was deeply misleading as a guide to what ails Europe, and similar diagnoses in the United States are equally misleading. **The idea that a country's economic fortunes are largely determined by its success on world markets is a hypothesis, not a necessary truth; and as a practical, empirical matter, that hypothesis is flatly wrong.** That is, it is simply not the case that the world's leading nations are to any important degree in economic competition with each other, or that any of their major economic problems can be attributed to failures to compete on world markets. **The growing obsession in most advanced nations with international competitiveness should be seen, not as a well-founded concern, but as a view held in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence.** **And yet it is clearly a view that people very much want to hold -- a desire to believe that is reflected in a remarkable tendency of those who preach the doctrine of competitiveness to support their case with careless, flawed arithmetic.¶** This article makes three points. First, it argues that concerns about competitiveness are, as an empirical matter, almost completely unfounded. Second, it tries to explain why defining the economic problem as one of international competition is nonetheless so attractive to so many people. Finally, it argues that the obsession with competitiveness is not only wrong but dangerous, skewing domestic policies and threatening the international economic system. This last issue is, of course, the most consequential from the standpoint of public policy. Thinking in terms of competitiveness leads, directly and indirectly, to bad economic policies on a wide range of issues, domestic and foreign, whether it be in health care or trade.

**The appealed “thrill of competitiveness” causes it to look attractive but is actually mindless competition.**

**Krugman**, PaulMarch19**94** Foreign Affairs;Mar/Apr94, Vol. 73 Issue 2, p28 Paul Robin Krugmanis an American economist, Professor of Economics and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and international affairs at Princeton University, Centenary Professor at the London School of Economics, and an op-ed columnist for the New York Times.

**The competitive metaphor -- the image of countries competing with each other in world markets in the same way that corporations do -- derives much of its attractiveness from its seeming comprehensibility. Tell a group of businessmen that a country is like a corporation writ large, and you give them the comfort of feeling that they already understand the basics.** Try to tell them about economic concepts like comparative advantage, and you are asking them to learn something new. **It should not be surprising if many prefer a doctrine that offers the gain of apparent sophistication without the pain of hard thinking. The rhetoric of competitiveness has become so wide-spread, however, for three deeper reasons.¶ First, competitive images are exciting, and thrills sell tickets.** The subtitle of Lester Thurow's huge best-seller, *Head to Head,* is "The Coming Economic Battle among Japan, Europe, and America"; the jacket proclaims that "the decisive war of the century has begun . . . and America may already have decided to lose." Suppose that the subtitle had described the real situation: "The coming struggle in which each big economy will succeed or fail based on its own efforts, pretty much independently of how well the others do." Would Thurow have sold a tenth as many books?¶ **Second, the idea that U.S. economic difficulties hinge crucially on our failures in international competition somewhat paradoxically makes those difficulties seem easier to solve.** The productivity of the average American worker is determined by a complex array of factors, most of them unreachable by any likely government policy. **So if you accept the reality that our "competitive" problem is really a domestic productivity problem pure and simple, you are unlikely to be optimistic about any dramatic turnaround.** **But if you can convince yourself that the problem is really one of failures in international competition that -- imports are pushing workers out of high-wage jobs, or subsidized foreign competition is driving the United States out of the high value-added sectors -- then the answers to economic malaise may seem to you to involve simple things like subsidizing high technology and being tough on Japan.¶ Finally, many of the world's leaders have found the competitive metaphor extremely useful as a political device. The rhetoric of competitiveness turns out to provide a good way either to justify hard choices or to avoid them.** The example of Delors in Copenhagen shows the usefulness of competitive metaphors as an evasion. Delors had to say something at the Ec summit; yet to say anything that addressed the real roots of European unemployment would have involved huge political risks. By turning the discussion to essentially irrelevant but plausible-sounding questions of competitiveness, he bought himself some time to come up with a better answer (which to some extent he provided in December's white paper on the European economy -- a paper that still, however, retained "competitiveness" in its rifle).

**Increasing economic competitiveness risks the declaration of economic warfare.**

**Lipschutz**, Ronnie D. 19**98**. *On Security, Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millennium's End*. Columbia International Affairs Online, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz18.html (accessed July 13, 2012)

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Consider, once again, the tale told in chapter 1 of the Pershing-II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles, placed in Europe as a response to the Soviet SS-20s. There was, at the time, some controversy over why these latter missiles had been deployed in Eastern Europe. The widely accepted argument, and the one that became the basis for policy, was that it was done to take advantage of an escalatory gap. But others suggested that the deployment was simply the result of the arcane workings of the Soviet military-industrial complex, which had taken one stage off an unsuccessful, solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile, thereby turning it into a working intermediate-range one. The latter argument would, of course, have implied a state beset by bureaucratic conflict and economic inefficiency, rather than one bent on threatening Western Europe.¶ Another example of this can be found in the idea of "environmental security."[4](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz18.html#note4)If we apply the logic of security to the environment--and this is not really what the concept is intended to do--we might reasonably conclude that the major threats to the environment are the very people who seek security from the effects of a damaged environment. If we consider the concept in terms of societal and state disintegration, we are forced to conclude that the threat to security arises primarily from the activities of members of the society and the citizens of the affected state.[5](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz18.html#note5)We are then left with the state "coercing conservation" by its citizens. This approach might work under certain limited circumstances but, in effect, it targets as enemies the very people who live within the damaged ecosystems under state jurisdiction.[6](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz18.html#note6)¶ Much the same conclusion follows from the application of other similar concepts, such as "economic security." **So long as the economies of Great Powers were more-or-less autonomous from one another, they could exercise sufficient control over domestic economic conditions so as to reinforce such autonomy.** The nationality of corporations mattered. **Their behavior in time of peace and war was of concern to the state, and the state sought to discipline corporate behavior to its ends.** The great experiment in global liberalism has made such a condition a thing of the past. Today, as Beverly Crawford makes clear, **enforcing economic security in a traditional sense runs the risk of declaring economic warfare on the most productive and innovative actors in the economy.** The logic of the market is quite different from that of the military, a point to which I will return, below.

### Economy/Growth

#### Focusing on growth and economic competitiveness reproduces a sense of American exceptionalism while simultaneously creating a self-fulfilling prophecy of economic instability

Lipschutz 1998 (Ronnie, Professor of Politics at UC-Santa Cruz, *On Security* ebook <http://library.northsouth.edu/Upload/On%20Security.pdf>)

The struggle to define the parameters of a concept is only one part of the security problematique; of equal importance are very real questions about the referent object of security. What, in the final analysis, is being secured? If ozone holes are a threat, is the enemy us? If immigrants are a threat, do police become soldiers? If the economic competitiveness of our allies is a threat, is Corporate America to be protected against leveraged buyouts by foreign capital or against those who have been fired during self-protective downsizings? If one social group threatens the mores of another, are there front lines in the "culture wars?" Perhaps it is the unemployed college graduate who is most to be feared, since he or she has much time in which to plot the overthrow of the regime deemed responsible for that insecure status. 39 All of these possibilities raise questions about what is to be made secure through the security practices of the state. Paradoxically, perhaps, the particular phenomena alluded to above are all material consequences of a process of economic globalization that was first set in train by the Cold War security policies of the United States. Material processes have consequences for security, it would seem and, in today's world, the effort to (re)define security results not only from a changing world but also from changes in the state itself. 40 These changes, having primarily to do with the global economic system, affect material conditions within states--safety, welfare, sovereignty--in ways that serve to undermine the traditional roles of governments,41 making them less willing or able to protect their citizens from these forces or provide services that might mitigate their impacts. 42 These transformative forces also have effects on the capabilities of states, by creating contradictions between the accustomed practices of governments and the responses needed to buffer against those forces, as illustrated by the demise of the Soviet Union and the endless fiscal troubles suffered by the United States. Consider, then, the consequences of the intersection of security policy and economics during and after the Cold War. In order to establish a "secure" global system, the United States advocated, and put into place, a global system of economic liberalism. It then underwrote, with dollars and other aid, the growth of this system.43 One consequence of this project was the globalization of a particular mode of production and accumulation, which relied on the re-creation, throughout the world, of the domestic political and economic environment and preferences of the United States. That such a project cannot be accomplished under conditions of really-existing capitalism is not important; the idea was that economic and political liberalism would reproduce the American self around the world.44 This would make the world safe and secure for the United States inasmuch as it would all be the self, so to speak. The joker in this particular deck was that efforts to reproduce some version of American society abroad, in order to make the world more secure for Americans, came to threaten the cultures and societies of the countries being transformed, making their citizens less secure. The process thereby transformed them into the very enemies we feared so greatly. In Iran, for example, the Shah's efforts to create a Westernized society engendered so much domestic resistance that not only did it bring down his empire but also, for a time, seemed to pose a mortal threat to the American Empire based on Persian Gulf oil. Islamic "fundamentalism," now characterized by some as the enemy that will replace Communism, seems to be U.S. policymakers' worst nightmares made real,45 although without the United States to interfere in the Middle East and elsewhere, the Islamic movements might have never acquired the domestic power they now have in those countries and regions that seem so essential to American "security." The ways in which the framing of threats is influenced by a changing global economy is seen nowhere more clearly than in recent debates over competitiveness and "economic security." What does it mean to be competitive? Is a national industrial policy consistent with global economic liberalization? How is the security component of this issue socially constructed? Beverly Crawford (Chapter 6: "Hawks, Doves, but no Owls: The New Security Dilemma Under International Economic Interdependence") shows how strategic economic interdependence--a consequence of the growing liberalization of the global economic system, the increasing availability of advanced technologies through commercial markets, and the ever-increasing velocity of the product cycle--undermines the ability of states to control those technologies that, it is often argued, are critical to economic strength and military might. Not only can others acquire these technologies, they might also seek to restrict access to them. Both contingencies could be threatening. (Note, however, that by and large the only such restrictions that have been imposed in recent years have all come at the behest of the United States, which is most fearful of its supposed vulnerability in this respect.) What, then, is the solution to this "new security dilemma," as Crawford has stylized it?

#### Displacing our security concerns onto economic worries plays into the hands of the onto-theology of security

Der Derian 1998 (James, baller professor of IR and security, in *On Security* <http://library.northsouth.edu/Upload/On%20Security.pdf>)

We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." 1 From God to Rational Man, from Empire to Republic, from King to the People--and on occasion in the reverse direction as well, for history is never so linear, never so neat as we would write it--the security of the center has been the shifting site from which the forces of authority, order, and identity philosophically defined and physically kept at bay anarchy, chaos, and difference. Yet the center, as modern poets and postmodern critics tell us, no longer holds. The demise of a bipolar system, the diffusion of power into new political, national, and economic constellations, the decline of civil society and the rise of the shopping mall, the acceleration of everything --transportation, capital and information flows, change itself--have induced a new anxiety. As George Bush repeatedly said--that is, until the 1992 Presidential election went into full swing--"The enemy is unpredictability. The enemy is instability." 2

### Highways

#### Highways contribute to American exceptionalism and promote militarism

Gokulgski 2006 (Paul, analyst for construction firm, <http://www.construction-expert.com/blog/dwight-d-eisenhower-interstate-highway-system/>)

In 1919, a young Army Officer named Dwight Eisenhower conducted a test for military readiness which included commanding a convoy of vehicles crossing the country’s roads. It took 65 days to complete the mission. Later, after World War II, Eisenhower marveled at Hitler’s Autobahn’s which seemed to survive every attempted disruption from bombings, and were easily repaired. As President of United States, the lessons learned became a primary focus of Eisenhower’s administration, namely to connect every major city by a network of superhighways. The threat of nuclear war was real, and the need for both civil and military evacuation added urgency to the mission. Thus, today’s 42,000 mile Interstate Highway system became a reality. No one single achievement affected more people in the 20th century than the completion of the National Interstate Highway System. Taken for granted and barely applauded now, the fact is our Interstate Highway System is the most vital element to the American way of life next to the automobile itself. Linking the cities with superhighways did more much more than Eisenhower forecast. Indeed the military and civilian population was provided with egress for an emergency, but America’s growth developed on the Interstate Highways on an unprecedented scale. Out of this achievement came a way of life which other countries simply cannot duplicate. Urban development could not occur without the existence of a highway system which maintains strict control over access and upon which vehicles can travel 70 miles per hour. These were two of the criteria civil engineers used in its design. The standards for the Interstate Highways were highly regulated - lanes were required to be twelve feet wide, shoulders were ten feet wide, a minimum of fourteen feet of clearance under each bridge was required, grades had to be less than 3%, and the highway had to be designed for travel at 70 miles per hour. Although prior federal or state highways allowed any road to be connected to the highway, the Interstate Highways only allowed access from a limited number of controlled interchanges. Thus, despite the fact that one's farmstead lies next to an Interstate there was no way to enter the Interstate except through the few and far-between interchanges. But who could predict the effect? Urban sprawl may be cursed, but without the Interstate Highways, life as we know it, could not occur. Just like arteries in the human body, the Interstate Highway System acts like a channel for the life force of America to flow. Students of history know the value the Romans placed in their roads. Their achievements are legendary. The Roman Empire was no greater than their roads, which were built to establish dominance in a world order controlled from Rome. Few people equate the same significance to the Interstate Highway System; yet in many ways, indeed it is the same. For if commerce depended on existing federal highways or rail or air to achieve growth in a competitive world market, then what a barrier would have developed without the familiar red, white and blue Interstate signs to travel. We owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to the foresight and planning of the civil engineers in the 50’s who made it possible. Notwithstanding other achievements, can anyone rightfully claim more significance that our own Interstate System to our present quality of life?

#### The military uses highways to practice responses to threats of National security and defense.

Federal Highway Administration ’09 (“Coordinating Military Deployments on Roads and Highways”, http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/fhwahop05029/chapter\_3.htm)

National security strategy and, more recently, the global war on terrorism have increased the requirement for military deployments. Planning for national emergencies may require military forces to convoy to military seaports or aerial ports of embarkation for foreign deployment. Military national security missions may also require forces to convoy within the United States to protect borders, high-value targets, or critical infrastructure. This scenario requires every State to be prepared to facilitate and support the movement of military forces through their State to port locations or to DoD mission assignments. Planning for military deployments requires an understanding of deployment concepts and processes. State and local agency planners will find this chapter useful for understanding convoy terminology and concepts. Detailed supplemental materials about convoys are provided in Appendix B. This chapter begins with an overview of military deployment concepts. Subsequent sections highlight which agencies are involved at different points of a typical military deployment and provide a set of actions for supporting agencies to consider when developing procedures or plans. Self-assessment questions are enclosed at the end of this chapter for State agency reference. These questions may help agencies better prepare for a national emergency involving military convoys.

National emergency military deployment plans and procedures should document the convoy support process and provide a basis for training and execution. To complete the planning process, plans and procedures must be tested and adjusted annually (even more frequently if the volume and expected demand for military deployment is higher than historical averages) through periodic drills and exercises. Moreover, as State agencies develop and respond to requirements for the National Incident Management System (NIMS), these procedures will likely be integrated with or annexed to local, State, and regional plans and programs. Figure 8 illustrates the key ingredients for well-coordinated and executed military deployments.

#### The U.S. Highway System is key to US National Defense **FHWA Office of Operations ‘9** (Federal Highway Administration, March 27th, 2009, “Coordinating Military Deployments on Roads and Highways” <http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/fhwahop05029/chapter_1.htm>**)**

#### Strategic mobility and readiness are keys to the military’s ability to project power worldwide. Each of the military services—Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, as well as their component Reserve, National Guard, and Coast Guard counterparts—has made great strides in implementing the specific recommendations of the congressionally mandated 2001 Mobility Requirements Study and more recent findings from Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) as well as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).¶ The ability to deploy equipment and personnel rapidly is an imperative of the national military strategy. That strategy expects the military to defend the homeland, deter aggression in four regions of the world, swiftly defeat adversaries in two other conflicts, and conduct a limited number of small operations. Implied in these missions is the requirement to deploy forces within the United States and from the United States to anywhere in the world.¶ To assist the military services in their planning and better prepare for future operations, the Department of Defense has established an objective of being able to deploy to a theater within 10 days sufficient combat power to defeat an enemy during the next 30 days and be ready for the next fight within another 30 days. Key to meeting these deployment goals is the capability of units to move rapidly from their installations to land, sea, and aerial ports of embarkation or to designated locations within the United States.¶ Military units use various methods to move equipment and personnel to seaports. Heavy equipment usually will be shipped by rail; however, some equipment must be deployed on public roads, either driven by military personnel or consigned to commercial carriers, to arrive at the seaport on specific dates and times for loading onto ships. When the military uses public roads, it organizes the equipment into convoys for control and protection. Appendix B provides detailed information about the military's organization of convoys and standard highway procedures for convoys.¶

#### The Military uses highways when transporting equipment for shipping **Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation ’05** (“An Object-Oriented Architecture for the Simulation of Cargo Terminals”, April 2005, http://dms.sagepub.com/content/2/2/101.full.pdf+html)

Transportation logistics planning for military¶ operations is used to improve the flow of military cargo¶ through a cargo transportation network. The network¶ is comprised of a set of cargo terminals interconnected¶ by a transportation infrastructure. The cargo terminals¶ include points of origin and destination, intermediate¶ transfer points for transportation mode changes, and/¶ or points of intermediate storage. The *Port Simulation¶ Model (PORTSIM)* [4, 5, 6] addresses two modes of¶ military cargo operations: seaports of debarkation¶ (SPOD) and seaports of embarkation (SPOE). The¶ SPOE mode deals with the arrival of cargo at the port¶ via rail and highway transports, staging of cargo, and loading of a ship with cargo. The SPOD mode¶ focuses on the activities of unloading cargo from a¶ ship, staging, parking and inspection of the cargo, and¶ clearing the cargo from the port using rail and highway¶ transports. The *Configurable Port Simulation (CPortS)¶* [7–10] supports *PORTSIM* by providing the SPOD¶ capability and is the foundation of the work presented¶ here. *PORTSIM* suffers from mutually exclusive SPOE¶ and SPOD processes and fixed cargo flow. Other¶ examples of cargo terminal models are *TRANSCAP¶* [11, 12], which models offloading at installations, and¶ *TLoads* [13], which attempts to assess the capability of¶ tactical and sea-based distribution systems.¶ Past work has examined modeling the actual¶ transportation segments of the defense transportation¶ system. Such efforts include ELIST[14], which models¶ theater rail and highway infrastructure, and *MIDAS¶* [15] and *JFAST* [16], which model the strategic lift¶ segments. However, none are stochastic models. These¶ models study the restrictions of the transportation¶ infrastructure rather than the cargo terminals (nodes¶ in a network). They also aggregate the cargo, often¶ dealing with it as quantities in terms of weight, area,¶ or number of pieces rather than individual items. The¶ *AMP* model [17] acts as a shell to interconnect these¶ models into an end-to-end logistics model, but at a low¶ level of fidelity, again focusing more on the links than¶ the nodes within the network.

#### Every instance of upholding national defense triggers securitization Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde ’98 (Barry, Ole, Jaap De, [Montague Burton Professor of International Relations](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montague_Burton_Professor_of_International_Relations) at the [London School of Economics](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_School_of_Economics) and honorary professor at the [University of Copenhagen](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Copenhagen) and [Jilin University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jilin_University), professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, [University of Copenhagen](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Copenhagen), Professor of International Relations and World Politics at the University of Groningen, “Security: A New Framework for Analysis, pages 27-28, 1998, [http://books.google.com/books?id=j4BGrElsp8C&printsec=frontcover&dq=barry+buzan&source=bl&ots=bMqbn0\_A5a&sig=41VqKH4cQgyyShB6TZHaE63c50&hl=en&sa=X&ei=V7b-T6T6BMuHqQHmleSLCQ&ved=0CDMQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=barry%20buzan&f=false](http://books.google.com/books?id=j4BGrElsp8C&printsec=frontcover&dq=barry+buzan&source=bl&ots=bMqbn0_A5a&sig=41VqKH4cQgyyShB6TZHaE63c50&hl=en&sa=X&ei=V7b-T6T6BMuHqQHmleSLCQ&ved=0CDMQ6AEwAA))

What we can study is this practice: Who can “do” or “speak” security successfully, on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effects? **It is important to note that the security speech act is not defined by uttering the word security. What is essential is the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special measure and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience.** There will be instances in which the word security appears without this logic and other cases that operate according to that logic with only a metaphorical security reference. As spelled out later, **in some cases securitization has become institutionalized. Constant drama does not have to be present, because it is implicitly assumed that when we talk of this** (typically, but not necessarily, defense issues), **we are by definition in the area of urgency: By saying “defense”** (or, in Holland, “dikes”), one has also implicitly said security and priority. We use this logic as a definition of security because it has a consistency and precision the word as such lacks. There is a concept of international security with this specific meaning, which is implied in most usages of the word. Our claim is that **it is possible to dig into practice connected to this concept of security in international relations** (which is distinct from other concepts of security) **and find a characteristic pattern with an inner logic. If we place the survival of collective units and principles—the politics of existential threat—as the defining core of security studies, we have the basis for applying security analysis to a variety of sectors without losing the essential quality of the concept.** This is the answer to those who hold that security studies cannot expand its agenda beyond the traditional military-political one without debasing the concept of security itself. Sectors are “views of the international system through a lens that highlights one particular aspect of the relationship and interaction among all of its constituent units” (Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993: 31). Given that the analytical purpose of sectors is to differentiate types of interaction (military, political, economic, societal, and environmental), it seems reasonable to expect (1) that one will find units and values that are characteristic of, and rooted in, particular sectors (although, like the state, they may also appear in other sectors); and (2) that the nature of survival and threat will differ across different sectors and types of unit. In other words, security is a generic terms that has a distinct meaning but varies in form. Security means survival in the face of existential threats, but what constitutes an existential threat is not the same across different sectors. One purpose of the following chapters is to unfold this sectoral logic of security more fully. **Securitization can be either ad hoc or institutionalized. If a given type of threat is persistent or recurrent, it is no surprise to find that the response and sense of urgency become institutionalized. This situation is most visible in the military sector, where states have long endured threats of armed coercion or invasion and in response have built up standing bureaucracies, procedures, and military establishments to deal with those threats.** Although such a procedure may seem to reduce security to a species of normal politics, it does not do so. **The need for drama in establishing securitization falls away, because it is implicitly assumed that when we talk of this issue we are by definition in the area of urgency. As in the case for defense issues in most countries** and for dikes in Netherlands, **urgency has been established by the previous use of the security move. There is no further need to spell out that this issue has to take precedence, that it is a security issue – by saying “defense”** or “dikes”, **one has also implicitly said “security” and “priority.”** This can be shown by trying to inquire about the rational decisions in these areas. Behind the first layers of ordinary bureaucratic arguments, one will ultimately find a – probably irritated – repetition of a security argument so well established that it is taken for granted. **Some security practices are not legitimized in public by security discourse, because they are not out in the public at all** (e.g., the “black programs” in the United States, which are not presented in the budget), **but this is actually a very clear case of the security logic. In a democracy, at some point it must be argued in the public sphere why a situation constitutes security and therefore can legitimately be handled differently. One could not take something out of the budget without giving a reason for the use of such and extraordinary procedure. When this procedure has been legitimized through security rhetoric, it becomes institutionalized as a package legitimization, and it is thus possible to have black security boxes in the political process.** The speech act reduces public influence on this issue, but in democracies one must legitimize in public why from now on details will not be presented publicly (because of the danger of giving useful information to the enemy and the like). In all cases, the establishment of secret services has some element of this logical sequence. **Not every act is presented with the drama of urgency and priority, because it has been established in a general sense that this is an entire field that has been moved to a form of treatment legitimate only because this area has been defined as security.**

#### **The U.S. belief that countries that are not democracies are a threat is flawed. The pursuit to change this violates the integrity of other sovereign state**

Luiza Bialasiewicz (an academic and senior lecturer in Human Geography within the Department of Geography), (David Campbell, Stuart Elden, Stephen Graham, Alex Jeffrey, and Alison J. Williams.) 2007 Performing Security: The Imaginative Geographies of Current Us Strategy. Ed. David Campbell (pg414-17)

he concept of integration, invoked in different ways and in different measures by both Kagan and Barnett, is similarly at the heart of the current administration’s foreign and domestic policies. The former Director of Policy at the US State Department, Richard Haass, articulated the central tenets of the concept when he wondered: Is there a successor idea to containment? I think there is. It is the idea of integration. The goal of US foreign policy should be to persuade the other major powers to sign on to certain key ideas as to how the world should operate: opposition to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, support for free trade, democracy, markets. Integration is about locking them into these policies and then building institutions that lock them in even more (Haass in Lemann, 1 April 2002, emphasis added). That the US is no longer prepared to tolerate regimes that do not mirror its own democratic values and practices, and that it will seek to persuade such major powers to change their policies and behaviours to ﬁt the American modus operandi, is not without historical precedent (Ambrosius, 2006). Nor does the differently imagined geography of integration replace completely previous Manichean conceptions of the world so familiar to Cold War politics. Rather, the proliferation of new terms of antipathy such as ‘axis of evil’, ‘rogue states’, and ‘terror cities’ demonstrate how integration goes hand in hand with e and is mutually constitutive of e new forms of division. Barnett’s divide between the globalised world and the non-integrating gap is reﬂected and complemented by Kagan’s divide in ways of dealing with this state of affairs. Much of this imagined geography pivots on the idea of ‘the homeland’. Indeed, in the imaginations of the security analysts we highlight here, there is a direct relationship and tension between securing the homeland’s borders and challenging the sanctity of borders elsewhere (see Kaplan, 2003: 87). Appreciating this dynamic requires us to trace some of the recent articulations of US strategy. Since September 11th 2001 the US government and military have issued a number of documents outlining their security strategy. Each recites reiterates and resigniﬁes both earlier strategic statements as well each other, creating a sense of boundedness and ﬁxity which naturalizes a speciﬁc view of the world. Initially there was The National Strategy for Homeland Security (Ofﬁce of Homeland Security, 2002), and then the much broader scope National Security Strategy (The White House, 2002b; see Der Derian, 2003). These were followed by the ‘‘National Strategy for Combating Terrorism’’ and particular plans for Military Strategy, Defense Strategy and the 414 L. Bialasiewicz et al. / Political Geography 26 (2007) 405e422‘‘Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support’’ (Department of Defense, 2005a, 2005b; Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004; The White House, 2002a). These are seen as an interlocking whole, where ‘‘the National Military Strategy (NMS) supports the aims of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and implements the National Defense Strategy (NDS)’’ (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004: 1); and the ‘‘Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support’’ builds ‘‘upon the concept of an active, layered defense outlined in the National Defense Strategy’’ (Department of Defense, 2005b: iii; see also diagram on 6). The updated National Security Strategy (The White House, 2006) presents a further re-elaboration and re-stating of these principles. As with the understandings we highlighted previously, it should be noted that key elements of these strategies pre-date September 11. Signiﬁcant in this continuity is the link between the Bush administration’s strategic view and the 1992 ‘‘Defense Planning Guidance’’ (DPG). Written for the administration of George H. W. Bush by Paul Wolfowitz and I. Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby, the DPG was the ﬁrst neoconservative security manifesto for the post-Cold War; a blue print for a one-superpower world in which the US had to be prepared to combat new regional threats and prevent the rise of a hegemonic competitor (Tyler, 8 March 1992; see Mann, 2004: 198ff, 212). Initial versions of the DPG were deemed too controversial and were rewritten with input from then Defense Secretary Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell (Tyler, 24 May 1992). Nonetheless, Cheney’s version still declared that, ‘‘we must maintain the mechanism for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role’’ (Cheney, 1993: 2). What we ﬁnd in this is the kernel of the policies implemented in the administration of George W. Bush, reworked through the Clinton period by such organizations as PNAC (discussed above). The assemblage of individuals and organizations both inside and outside the formal state structures e running from the DPG, through PNAC to the plethora of Bush administration security texts cited above (all of which draw upon well-established US security dispositions in the post-World War II era) demonstrates the performative infrastructure through which certain ontological effects are established, and through which certain performances are made possible and can be understood. As we argue throughout this paper, the distinctive thing about recent National Security Strategies is their deployment of integration as the principal foreign policy and security strategy. It is telling that Bush’s claim of ‘‘either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists’’ (Bush, 2001) relies not on a straightforward binary, as is sometimes suggested, but a process of incorporation. It is not simply us versus them, but with us, a mode of operating alongside, or, in the words of one of Bush’s most enthusiastic supporters, ‘‘shoulder to shoulder’’ (Blair, 2001; see White & Wintour, 2001). This works more widely through a combination of threats and promises, as in this statement about the Palestinians: ‘‘If Palestinians embrace democracy and the rule of law, confront corruption, and ﬁrmly reject terror, they can count on American support for the creation of a Palestinian state’’ (The White House, 2002b: 9). Likewise, it can be found in some of remarks of the British Prime Minister Blair (2004) about the signiﬁcance of democracy in Afghanistan, Africa and Iraq. Equally Bush’s notorious ‘axis of evil’ speech did not simply name North Korea, Iran and Iraq as its members, but suggested that ‘‘states like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world’’ (Bush, 2002a, emphasis added). A comparison of the like, alongside the ‘‘with the terrorists’’ is actually a more complicated approach to the choosing of sides and the drawing of lines than is generally credited. Simple binary oppositions are less useful to an understanding here than the process of incorporation and the policy of integration. These examples indicate the policy of integration or exclusion being adopted by the US and followed by certain allies. It warns those failing to adopt US values (principally liberal ‘representative’ democracy and market capitalism), that they will be excluded from an Americancentric world. The place of US allies in these representations is not unimportant. Indeed, the strength of the US discourse relies also on its reﬂection and reiteration by other key allies, especially in Europe. Above and beyond the dismissive pronouncements of Rumsfeld about Europe’s ‘‘Old’’ and ‘‘New’’ e a conception that was inchoately articulated as early as the 1992 DPGethe dissent of (even some) Europeansis a problem for the USinits world-making endeavours (seeBialasiewicz &Minca, 2005). Itis not surprising, then, that following his re-election, GeorgeW. Bush and Condoleeza Rice embarked almost immediately on a ‘‘bridge-building’’ tour across Europe, noting not trans-Atlantic differences but ‘‘the great alliance of freedom’’ that unites the United States and Europe (Bush, 2005). For although the United States may construct itself as the undisputed leader in the new global scenario, its ‘‘right’’ e and the right of its moral-political ‘‘mission’’ of spreading ‘‘freedom and justice’’ e relies on its ampliﬁcation and support by allies. The construction of the United States’ world role relies also on the selective placement and representation of other international actors who are ‘‘hailed’’ into speciﬁc subject positions (see Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson, & Duvall, 1999). Of course, different actors are granted different roles and different degrees of agency in the global script: the place of key European allies is different from that bestowed upon the peripheral and semi-peripheral states that make part of the ‘‘coalition of the willing’’. Both, however, are vital in sustaining the representation of the US as the leader of a shared world of values and ideals. Indeed, the ‘lone superpower’ has little inﬂuence in the absence of support Another important dimension of integration as the key strategic concept is its dissolution of the inside/outside spatialization of security policy. The concluding lines of the ‘‘Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support’’ are particularly telling. It contends that the Department of Defense can ‘‘no longer think in terms of the ‘home’ game and the ‘away’ game. There is only one game’’ (Department of Defense, 2005b: 40). In part this is directed at the previous failure to anticipate an attack from within: indeed, the Strategy remarks that the September 11th 2001 attacks ‘‘originated in US airspace and highlighted weaknesses in domestic radar coverage and interagency air defense coordination’’ (2005b: 22). In other words, the US needs to ensure the security of its homeland from within as much as without, to treat home as away. In part, however, such rhetoric also reﬂects a continuity with and reiteration of broader understandings with a much longer history, promoted by a range of US ‘‘intellectuals of statecraft’ since the end of the Cold War: understandings that speciﬁed increasingly hard territorialisations of security and identity both at home and abroad to counter the ‘‘geopolitical vertigo’’ (see O´ Tuathail, 1996) of the post-bipolar era. It is important to note here, moreover, that the 2002 National Security Strategy’s afﬁrmation that ‘‘today, the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing’’ (The White House, 2002b: 30) also involves the US treating away as a home, or at least, as a concern. From this we can see how the pursuit of integration enables the territorial integrity of other sovereign states to be violated in its name, as speciﬁc places are targeted to either ensure or overcome their exclusion (see Elden, 2005). As an example, consider this statement, which recalls the late 1970s enunciation of an ‘arc of crisis’ stretching from the Horn of Africa through the Middle East to Afghanistan: ‘‘There exists an ‘arc of instability’ stretching from the Western Hemisphere, through Africa and the Middle East and extending to Asia. There are areas in this arc that serve as breeding grounds for threats to our interests. Within these areas roguestates provide sanctuary to terrorists, protecting them from surveillance and attack’’ (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004: 5). In his foreword to the 2002 National Security Strategy, Bush declared that ‘‘we will defend the peace by ﬁghting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent’’ (Bush, 2002b: i). This notion of extension is crucial in understanding the explicitly spatial overtones of this strategy of integration: more than merely about values, democracy and capitalism, it is about a performative geopolitics. Put crudely, it is about specifying the geographies of world politics; it is about specifying ‘‘the ways the world (now) is’’ e a presumably descriptive ‘‘geopolitical exercise’’ but that, as all such exercises, also implicitly contains the prescription for putting the world ‘‘right’’.

### Interstate Links

#### **The plan supports securitization by investing in interstate**

Cox and love 96 (Wendell and Jean. Public policy consultants with the Wendell Cox Consultancy.¶ Both have worked on projects in the United States, Canada, Australia, Africa, Europe, and New Zealand. They have recently established an Internet public policy journal, The Public Purpose.¶ Mr. Cox was appointed to three terms (1977-85) on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission by Mayor Tom Bradley and has chaired national committees on energy conservation and urban transit planning. He also serves on the steering committee of the bi-ennial International Conference on Competition and Ownership in Surface Passenger Transport. He holds an MBA from Pepperdine University in Los Angeles.¶ Ms. Love has performed research in a variety of fields, and edited three editions of a comprehensive public policy manual (Legislative Issue Briefs). She organized the Third International Conference on Competition and Ownership in Surface Passenger Transport, held in Toronto in 1993. She earned a Masters degree from Southern Illinois University in Edwardsville.¶ They are co-authors of many books and papers, including Moving America Competitively, The Livable American City and People, Markets, and Government: A State Legislator's Guide to Economics. Their practice is based in the St. Louis area <http://www.publicpurpose.com/freeway1.htm#def>)

One of the principal reasons for building the interstate highway system was to support national defense. When the system was approved --- during one of the most instable periods of the Cold War, national security dictated development of an efficient national highway system that could move large numbers of military personnel and huge quantities of military equipment and supplies. The interstate highway system effectively performs that function, but perhaps more importantly, its availability provides the nation with a potential resource that could have been reliably called upon if greater military conflict had arisen. Throughout the Cold War (and even to today), America's strategic advantage in effective surface transportation was unchallenged. Even today, no constituent nation of the late Soviet Union has begun to develop such a comprehensive surface transportation system.¶ In the post-communist world, it may be tempting to underestimate the role of the interstate highway system in national defense. But the interstate highway system continues to play a critical role. The U.S. military's Strategic Highway Corridor Network (STAHNET) relies primarily on the interstate highway network, which represents 75 percent of network mileage. The U.S. Army cited that the system as being critical to the success of the 1990-1991 "Desert Shield-Desert Storm operation (the U.S. led operation to free Kuwait from Iraq):¶ Much of the success of the operation was due to our logistical ability to rapidly move troops to the theater. The capacity of the U.S. highway system to support the mobilization of troops and to move equipment and forces to U.S. ports of embarkation was key to successful deployment.¶ NOTE: "Statement of Lieutenant General Kenneth R. Wykle, United States Army, Deputy Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Surface Transportation Committee, United States House of Representatives, on the U.S. Department of Transportation's Recommended National Highway System" (Washington, DC: March 2, 1995).¶ The Army also noted the "modal redundancy" of the highway system, which provided rapid and effective movements of a military division when difficulties with a rail line precluded the planned transport by rail. This illustrates the fact that the interstate highway system continues to play an important role in national defense, even in the post-Cold War era.

#### **Current interstate systems still have a military sub purpose**

Weingroff 11 (Richard, member of the federal highway association <http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/96summer/p96su10.cfm>)

These standards, approved Aug. 1, 1945, did not call for a uniform design for the entire system, but rather for uniformity where conditions such as traffic, population density, topography, and other factors were similar. Designs, which would be based on traffic expected 20 years from the date of construction, would be adjusted to conditions. Most segments would have at least four lanes and full control of access would be provided where permitted by state law. But two-lane segments, limited access control, and at-grade railroad and highway crossings would be permitted where warranted by low traffic volumes. On Aug. 2, 1947, PRA announced designation of the first 60,640 km of interstate highways, including 4,638 km of urban thoroughfares. PRA reserved 3,732 km for additional urban circumferential and distributing routes that would be designated later. Construction of the interstate system moved slowly. Many states did not wish to divert federal-aid funds from local needs. Others complained that the standards were too high. Some of the heavily populated states, finding that federal-aid funding was so small in comparison with need, decided to authorize construction of toll roads in the interstate corridors. Also, by July 1950, the United States was again at war, this time in Korea, and the focus of the highway program shifted from civilian to military needs. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1952 authorized $25 million for the interstate system on a 50-50 matching basis. These were the first funds authorized specifically for interstate construction. However, it was a token amount, reflecting the continuing disagreements within the highway community rather than the national importance of the system. When President Dwight D. Eisenhower took office in January 1953, the states had completed 10,327 km of system improvements at a cost of $955 million - half of which came from the federal government. According to BPR, as it was again called, only 24 percent of interstate roadway was adequate for present traffic; that is, very little of the distance had been reconstructed to meet traffic expected 20 years hence. Long before taking office, Eisenhower recognized the importance of highways.

In October 1990, President George Bush - whose father, Sen. Prescott Bush of Connecticut, had been a key supporter of the Clay Committee's plan in 1955 - signed legislation that changed the name of the system to the "Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense Highways." This change acknowledged Eisenhower's pivotal role in launching the program. The key elements that constituted the interstate highway program - the system approach, the design concept, the federal commitment, and the financing mechanism - all came together under his watchful eye. Biographer Stephen E. Ambrose stated, "Of all his domestic programs, Eisenhower's favorite by far was the Interstate System." Eisenhower's 1963 memoir, Mandate for Change 1953-1956, explained why:¶ More than any single action by the government since the end of the war, this one would change the face of America.

#### **Interstate now is key to international military deployment and wars**

SAIC 07 ( Science Applications International Corporation, http://transportationfortomorrow.com/final\_report/volume\_3\_html/technical\_issues\_papers/paperb65b.htm?name=4f\_01)

The NHS is nearly 160,000 miles of roadway important to the nation's economy, defense, and mobility. The NHS was developed by the USDOT in cooperation with the States, local officials, and metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) 6 and DoD. Because of its national importance, STRAHNET was incorporated into the NHS. The NHS is a system of routes comprised of greatly varying standards that are eligible for Federal assistance,7 and includes five elements: The Eisenhower Interstate System of highways, a separate identity retained within NHS. Other principal arterials include highways in rural and urban areas that provide access between an arterial and a major port, airport, public transportation facility, or other intermodal transportation facility. The STRAHNET, comprising 61,044 miles, including the 45,376-mile Interstate System and 15,668 miles of other important public highways8 critical to the United States' strategic defense policy. The STRAHNET provides defense access, continuity, and emergency capabilities for defense purposes. Over time, the STRAHNET concept has evolved from the need for a paved heavy load-bearing system that accessed domestic military facilities and ports, to the rapid deployment needs of the Iraq wars, stressing high-volume movements between bases, equipment and munitions manufacturers, ports and airports. The most recent evolution is the importance being placed on military needs in the definition of intermodal connectors on the NHS.9 Figure 1 presents the STRAHNET system. Intermodal connector routes that provide access between major intermodal facilities and the other four NHS elements. Major strategic highway network connectors used to provide access between major military installations and ports to the STRAHNET. In December 1991, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-240) incorporated a "strategic highway network" and "major strategic highway network connectors" as an integral part of the NHS.10

### Terrorism

#### \*\*Concern over these threats is an attempt to impose a new way of thinking on a fundamentally disordered society\*\*

Bleiker, Professor of IR @ Queensland University, 2005 p. 189-190

(Roland, International Society and Its Critics Ed. Bellamy)

. Let us come back to contemporary world politics in an attempt to illuminate the intertwinement of order and disorder. Look at what happened after the collapse of the cold war order: once the danger of communism had vanished, security had to be articulated with reference to a new Peindbild, a new threatening other that could provide a sense of order, safety, and identity at home. Rogue states were among the new threat images that rose to prominence when cold war ideological schism gave way to a more blurred picture of global politics (Derrida 2003). This tendency to order the world intensified after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington of September 2001. The compulsion to extract the eternal out of an ever-more transient world-to use Baudelairean language-increased dramatically. US foreign and domestic policy sought to re-establish the sense of order and certitude that had existed during the cold war: an inside/outside world in which, according to the words of president George W. Bush (2001), 'you are either with us or against us'. Much like Ronald Reagan's depiction of the Soviet Union as an 'evil empire', the current US reaction to terror is couched in a rhetoric of 'good' versus 'evil'. 'Evil is real', stressed George W. Bush (2002) in his presidential State of the Union address. 'It must be opposed'. What must be stressed as well, though, is that evil here means more than merely 'doing harm or inflicting pain on innocents' (Katznelson 2002: 7). Terrorists are evil because they attack, as did the Soviet Empire, the very foundations of Western (and meanwhile quasi-globalized) order: a form of life based on the principles of liberal democracy and market-oriented capitalism. Few would, of course, question the need and desirability of defending order and democracy from the threat of terrorism. . But things are more complex.. The relationship between order and disorder is provocatively explored in a recent monograph by Alain Joxe. By sketching out changes in international politics over the last dozen years, Joxe offers an alternative characterization of the present global system. The picture he paints is grim: it is a world of increasing disorder, of constant conflict, rising inequalities, and lacking ethics. The key for Joxe is that .the United States has become an increasingly powerful global hegemon that refuses to take on socio-political responsibility. Traditionally, rulers exchanged obedience for protection. But the United States today, Joxe argues, demands the former without offering the latter. It represses the symptoms of despair while refusing to attack its (causes. We thus witness the emergence of a fundamentally new form of empire, one that does not occupy territories, but merely regulates them in two key domains: military and finance. An unprecedented level of military superiority gives the United States the ability to imprint its vision on the world. And this vision includes the promoition of a neoliberal economic order which, accordmg to Joxe, operates without any democratic control or accountability. The result, he stresses, is an empire of disorder: the generation of chaos that cannot be controlled, not even by the hegemon. The hegemon merely regulates disorder by imposing global norms of behaviour. Disorder itself is not new, but to day's chaotic world is different, Joxe (2002: 7-94) argues, insofar as disorder is not a transition period to a new order: it is the order itself.

#### **The idea of Terrorism and deterrence of a potential attacker is attempt to make a secure state to militarize**

Van Munster ‘05 (Rens Van Munster 2005/Logics of Security: The Copenhagen School, Risk Management and the War on Terror/Peer reviewer for international journals and publishers, Department of Political Science, Secretary for the Danish Association for European Studies, Expertise on Security and risk; catastrophic risks; critical IR-theory; EU & immigration; war on terror; EU justice and home affairs/<http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Om_SDU/Institutter/Statskundskab/Skriftserie/05RVM10.pdf>

Ergo, the point of departure for securitisation theory is that order is created through an exceptional decision that constitutes the border between friend and enemy. However, Bigo has rightly observed that such a conception of securitisation ignores the more every-day forms of securitisation (Bigo, 2001, 2002). Thus, as Williams claims, “to focus too narrowly on the search for singular and distinct acts of securitization might well lead one to misperceive processes through which a situation is gradually being intensified, and thus rendered susceptible to securitization, while remaining short of the actual securitizing decision” (Williams, 2003: 521). While everyday,r outine-like processes of securitisation may indeed lack the intensity of an exceptional decision, it would be wrong to assume that these therefore are without any real significance for an understanding of security in the current world order. To the contrary, the current war against terrorism shows that the central focus of security is no longer focused on existential threats alone, but also on potential threats or risks. Before discussing this in more detail, it is first necessary to point out that the shift from existential threats to potential threats is by no means absolute. The exceptional logic of a Schmittian securitisation, and the more routine logic of a securitisation in terms of risk, do not mutually exclude each other. Nevertheless, it is useful, for analytical purposes, to distinguish between both logics as it may provide a better insight into the different dynamics that can inform the practices of security within the international system In opposition to the period before 9/11, American security discourse in the 2002 National Security Strategy seems more concerned with prevention than defense: “We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries…To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively” (White House, 2002: 15) 1 The shift from defence to prevention takes its point of departure in the behavioural potentialities of states rather than their actual behaviour: “[T]he United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be unleashed by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first” (White House, 2002: 15). Whereas anticipatory self defence as it is understood in international law still operated with an image of reactive violence, the war on terrorism replaces this picture with that of proactive intervention: “We must deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed”

Security measures against Terrorism is a tool from the government for hegemonic purposes

Strøm 11(Kari Milner Strøm/ 2011/Political Science Major/TERRORISM, DEMOCRACY, AND THE APOCALYPTIC NARRATIVE/http://brage.bibsys.no/politihs/bitstream/URN:NBN:no-bibsys\_brage\_19533/1/terrorism%20democracy.pdf)

Given that the discussions taking place here primarily focus on liberal democratic states found within the geographical misnomer the ‘western world’, i.e. Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, it may at first glance seem obvious that an exploration of responses to terrorism involves contexts (1) and (2) outlined by Miller. At the same time the US ‘war on terror’ and terrorism-as-war approach may imply that the nation views contexts (1), (2) and (3) as equally relevant. Here context (2) refers both to the common perception that ‘our’ societies are under threat from ‘them’, and to the rhetoric that accompanies that state of mind, even if, freed from the political constructions of the apocalyptic narrative, context (1) would be a more accurate description. Examining the context in which terrorism takes place, as well as the factors that cause it, is as important to understanding terrorism as describing the effects of terrorism and counter-terrorism. From a historical perspective, the infliction of terror has been seen as a useful and effective tool by rulers, their enemies and by their subjects, imbuing the term with numerous meanings. Daniel Heradstveit and David Pugh identify a process whereby definitions of terrorism are made to serve political hegemony (2003). Similarly, to Jackson, the ‘Islamic Terrorism’ discourse is essentially a political technology in the service of hegemonic power (2007: 421). Focusing on philology, Jonathan Fine considers that terrorism originated as a linguistic, political term in the ancient world, with varying connotations, depending on whether it was being used by a perpetrator or a victim’ (2010: 284). Later, political rivalry in the twentieth century ‘succeeded in creating a constant shift between the roles of perpetrator and victim’ (Fine 2010: 284). Fine identifies another historical shift involving the distinction between ‘horror’ and ‘terror’, in which the former denotes ‘the feeling of revulsion that occurs after something frightening happens, whereas terror refers to feelings of dread and anticipation before a horrifying experience occurs’ (2010: 279 – original emphasis).

Creating an image of an enemy is product of governmental security measures against terrorism.

Bigo 6(Didier Bigo/ Professor at King's College London Department of War studies and MCU Research Professor at Sciences-Po Paris/ 03-07-2006/ Globalized (in)Security: the Field and the Ban-opticon/ http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ces/conferences/muslims/Bigo.pdf

The discourses that the United States and its closest allies have put forth asserting the necessity to globalize security have taken on an unprecedented intensity and reach. They justify themselves by propagating the idea of a global “(in)security,” attributed to the development of threats of mass destruction, thought to derive from terrorist or other criminal organizations and the governments that support them. This globalization is supposed to make national borders effectively obsolete, and to oblige other actors in the international arena to collaborate. At the same time, it makes obsolete the conventional distinction between the constellation of war, defence, international order and strategy, and another constellation of crime, internal security, public order and police investigations. Exacerbating this tendency yet further is the fact that, since September 11, there has been ongoing frenzied speculation throughout the Western political world and among its security “experts” on how the relations between defence and internal security should be aligned in the new context of global (in)security. Now, other works including mine have advanced a step further — some would say a step too far — by reconsidering the lines that have been traditionally drawn as the legitimate borders of academic knowledge. We have been particularly concerned to advance a political sociology of international relations that reintroduces international phenomena, by making them normal and banal social facts on a daily basis. When we break down the dichotomy between knowledge of the inside and the outside, the border between the police world and the military world appears to be more permeable. We can thus take account of all the intermediary agencies such as polices with military status, border guards, customs agents, or immigration agents, to better understand the links these agents establish among themselves and how the effects of their positions have implications on their respective narratives. Furthermore, breaking down this dichotomy allows us to understand how a semantic continuum is constructed, with the struggle against terrorism at one end and the reception of refugees at the other. The “deconstruction” of the boundaries between different disciplines of knowledge has allowed a coherent field of analysis to emerge, a configuration having its own rules and its own coherence — the field of professionals of the management of unease. The field becomes intelligible where previously one saw only marginal subjects confined by disciplines that mutually ignored one another and constructed themselves in opposition to one another, or at best at the intersection between different areas. Such new fields of intelligibility include police working beyond borders, international justice condemning military crimes, or the construction of the image of the enemy within by intelligence services, such that their profiling applies to certain groups of foreign residents within a country itself. With this theory of the field of the unease management professionals, one can thus cross the habitual line traced by the social sciences between internal and external, between problems couched in terms of defence and problems of the police, and between problems of national security and the problem of public order. This hypothesis indeed reunites the military as well as the police and all the other professionals of management of threats in its own terms of “figuration” (in the words of Norbert Elias) or habitus (to use the term of Pierre Bourdieu).

### Disease

**In order to preserve securitization of diseases, USFG reallocates funds from existing programs to justify the need to view diseases as a national issue**.

**Cook 10’ (**Alethia H; “Assistant Professor of Political Science and the Assistant Director of the Security Studies Program at East Carolina University; “Securitization of Disease in the United States: Globalization, Public Policy, and Pandemics Vol. 1: Iss. 1, Article 3 2010, Pg 11)

Of the Clinton Administration failed to convince the public that HIV/AIDS should be one of their security concerns. There are some scholars who would argue that this is for the best. Stefan **Elbe argued against securitization of AIDS because it would move it from the** altruistic **public health framework to one that is more state and power centered, it could shift funding priorities away from civilian populations to the military, and it may work against grassroots efforts to normalize the treatment of those living with the disease (**Elbe 2006, 129–131). **The** very **fact that Elbe’s piece** was published in 2006 **and questioned whether AIDS should be securitized or not is additional evidence that Clinton’s securitizing move had not changed public opinion about the threat posed by the disease**. Pandemic Influenza Potential **securitization activity is also found in the case of pandemic influenza**. The 1918 influenza pandemic is estimated to have killed between 50 and 100 million people (Morens and Fauci 2007, 1018). It struck down people in the prime of their lives. This was far different from normal, seasonal influenza, which typically hospitalizes about 200,000 and kills about 38,000 (most of those older than 65) per year in the U.S. (Garrett 2005, 3). Similarities between the 1918 flu virus and avian influenza have caused fear about avian influenza itself, as well as increasing concerns more generally about pandemic influenza. In November 2005, the U.S. Homeland Security Council issued **the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza,** which was followed in May 2006 by the *National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan* (Homeland Security Council 2005, 2006). The *Strategy* **argued that the** unique **impact of pandemics makes them “unique circumstance[s] necessitating a strategy that extends well beyond health and medical boundaries, to include** the sustainment of critical infrastructure, private sector activities, the movement of goods and services across the nation and the globe, and economic and **security considerations**” (Homeland Security Council 2005, 2). **This statement is taken further in the Implementation Plan, which** explicitly **states that preparing for pandemic necessitates that the U.S. Government “view pandemic preparedness as a national security issue”** (Homeland Security Council 2006 18).

Effects of securitization of diseases justified countries to use vaccines and medicine as a “bargaining chip” to gain benefits.

**Elbe 10** (Dr. Stefan, Head of International Relations, Professor of International Relations, School of Global Studies; “Haggling over Viruses: The Downside Risk of Securitizing Infectious Disease” Pg. 3)

This article argues that the ‘**securitization’ of highly pathogenic avian influenza has exacerbated the international virus sharing dispute in two ways. First**, **the anxiety surrounding H5N1 provoked an international scramble to stockpile anti-virals and vaccines around the world at a time when** their **global supply was insufficient to meet such a rapid surge** in demand. The **lack of** sufficient **supplies made** some developing countries realize that in the event of a pandemic there would inevitably be ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ populations, and that therefore there is also **a fundamental conflict of interest between** developed and developing **countries** when it comes to **maintaining existing forms of international health co-operation** such as the virus-sharing mechanism**. Second, the designation of H5N1 as an international security threat suddenly transformed Indonesia’s wild viruses into a very ‘valuable’ commodity given the crucial role they play in tracking the evolution of H5N1 viruses, and in developing new medical counter-measures. Realizing** just **how precious those viruses were**, **the Indonesian government became emboldened to use access to them as a diplomatic ‘bargaining chip’ in its attempts to negotiate better access to vaccines and other benefits** for developing countries. **Both effects of the securitization** of H5N1 have **made the virus sharing controversy more difficult to resolv**e and have entangled the dispute in a broader set of non-medical issues: the first by transforming virus sharing into a wider North-South issue, the second by making international health co-operation a matter of more narrow considerations of national interest. **The virus sharing controversy thus illustrates that there can also be unanticipated downside risks associated with a securitized response to infectious diseases, which must be balanced with the policy attractions of the global health security framework.**

**Disease pandemics emerged into an international frenzy through competitive races amongst governments to purchase stockpiles of medical treatments in the name of security**.

**Elbe 10 (**Dr. Stefan, Head of International Relations, Professor of International Relations, School of Global Studies; “Haggling over Viruses: The Downside Risk of Securitizing Infectious Disease” Pg. 11)

First, the frenzied international anxiety around **the threat posed by H5N1 generated a** fundamental **material conflict of interest between** developed and developing **countries. It did so by provoking a competitive race amongst many governments around the world to purchase medical counter-measures for this threat** when there were insufficient global supplies to meet that sudden surge in demand. **There are** actually many **different ways in which governments** could **respond to a pandemic, including non-pharmacological interventions ranging from isolation, quarantine and contact tracing, through to traveller screening, and implementing social distancing measures that minimize public gatherings by closing schools and cancelling mass spectator events**. Yet given the perceived level of the threat, **most governments** **thought** that **confronting H5N1 required** more than just the usual public health responses to communicable diseases. **Extraordinary measures – such as acquiring stockpile of medical treatments –** now needed to be undertaken. Indeed governments soon realized that in the event of a pandemic the best line of defence would probably be pharmacological interventions such as anti-virals and vaccines. Anti-virals like oseltamivir (brand name *Tamiflu*) can be used both to treat those infected with H5N1 (if taken within 48 hours), as well as a prophylactic given to those who have been in contact with people who have been infected. In addition to anti-virals, a 2005 report by the WHO also observed that ‘vaccines are universally regarded as the most important medical intervention for preventing influenza and reducing its health consequences during a pandemic’ (WHO 2005: 45). **For better or for worse, anti-virals and vaccines thus quickly became seen as the ‘magic bullet’ or ‘gold standard’ for countries to protect themselves against the threat of a possibly immanent human pandemic** caused by H5N1. That in turn stimulated immense international demand for those pharmacological products, not least because some governments felt that the only way to adequately protect their populations was to take the extraordinary step of pro-actively stockpiling those medicines to ensure rapidly available and adequate level of supplies in the event of a pandemic.

The fear of being a part of the “winner and loser” population in the event of a pandemic attack and labeling territories as precious commodity instills reasoning of securitization.

**Elbe 10** (Dr. Stefan, Head of International Relations, Professor of International Relations, School of Global Studies; “Haggling over Viruses: The Downside Risk of Securitizing Infectious Disease” Pg. 5-6)

This article argues that the **securitization of a potential human** H5N1 **pandemic exacerbated** that **dispute in** at least **two ways. First, the fear of** an immanent **pandemic provoked a competitive rush amongst governments around the world to secure access to pharmacological treatments** for H5N1 **when there were insufficient global supplies to meet that sudden surge in demand.** Given the context of insufficient supplies, some developing **countries realized that there would invariably be ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ populations in the event of a pandemic,** and that a profound conflict of interest therefore also exists between developed and developing countries **when it comes to maintaining existing forms of global health co-operation**. The international virus sharing mechanism may work well for developed countries that possess their own pharmaceutical manufacturing base, but the material benefits accruing from such co-operation for developing countries are far less evident. ¶ **Second, the** widespread **international anxiety** around H5N1 **suddenly also rendered the viruses circulating in Indonesia’s territory very ‘valuable’ because they were needed for tracking the evolution of the virus and for developing up-to-date pharmacological treatments** against the threat. **The** Indonesian governmentthus soon realized that it controlled a very **precious commodity**, which it **could deploy as a diplomatic bargaining chip for negotiating greater access to vaccines and other benefits.** Both effects of the securitizationof H5N1 have ultimately made the virus sharing dispute more difficult to resolve: the first has turned it into a wider North-South issue, and the second has rendered international health co-operation a matter of more narrow and calculated national interest. The evident benefits of the global health security framework in terms of mobilizing political leadership and resources for international health issues must thus be balanced with some of the downside risks associated with a securitized response to global public health that have emerged in the case of the virus sharing controversy.

**Securitization leads to an elevated level of statist discourse and control.**

**Enmark 07’ (**Christian, Associate Professor, Action Deputy Director (Academic, Outreach and Research) and PhD Coordinator at the National Security College; “Disease and Security: Natural Plague and Biological Weapons in East Asia, Pg.: 16)

In advancing the case for securitization, it is important to acknowledge that infectious disease threats could be securitized in an inappropriate and counterproductive fashion. In Turkmenistan, for example, some infectious diseases were recently elevated to the level of security, and thence consigned to obscurity. In 2004 the country’s dictator, Saparmurad Niyazoc, declared cholera, AIDS, plague and other diseases to be ‘illegal’ and forbade any mention of them. The Turkmenistan Anti-Epidemic Emergency Commission stated there were no cases of dangerous diseases when, in reality, plague was a particular threat in the country at the time. But rather than acknowledge that the disease was a problem, the Turkmen government made its health workers sign a pledge that

they would not use the world ‘plague.’ This case demonstrates that securitization, if not handled properly, can do more harm than good.

**The aff sole focus on disease trades off of serious health issues by resource allocations being driven by fear rather than morality.**

**Enmark 07’** (Christian, Associate Professor, Action Deputy Director (Academic, Outreach and Research) and PhD Coordinator at the National Security College; “Disease and Security: Natural Plague and Biological Weapons in East Asia, Pg.: 16)

From a more general perspective, a strong argument against the securitization proposed in this book would be a humanitarian one: that securitizing particular infectious disease threats would distort public health priorities and result in the neglect of other serious health issues. Recent high-profile events, such as the 2001 anthrax attack in the United States and the 2003 SARS outbreak; have energized the interest of many countries in infectious disease surveillance, improved diagnostics, and the development of new vaccines and antibiotics to defeat pathogenic micro-organ-organism. Arguably, this could result in the more commonly occurring problems of human health remaining relatively under-funded. In particular, some public health analysts have complained that resource allocation is being driven by fear rather than a concern to address the diseases that cause the greatest mortality. McInnes and Lee, for example, object to the recent increased to infectious diseases as a ‘new security threat’ which has mostly focused on selected diseases like SARS, Ebola and monkeypox because they have the potential to move from the developing to the developed world: ‘by constructing the links between infectious disease and security in this manner the global health agenda risks becoming inappropriately skewed in favor of the interests of certain populations over others. The use of the word ‘inappropriately’ is an implication that it is unjust to distribute resources to such diseases when more common infections such as diarrheal disease cause more death.

**Disease is viewed on the same securitized level as terrorism for it undergoes Foucault’s spatialization which is deployed through the means of increasing the benign roles to the political, agencies and professions with respect to violence.**

**Shapiro 12’** (Michael J, Professor of Political Science at the [University of Hawaii at Mānoa](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Hawaii), Political Theorist, Educator, Writer; “Discourse, Culture, Violence” <http://books.google.com/books?id=XBE91uJM7YcC&pg=PT360&lpg=PT360&dq=michael+shapiro+securitization&source=bl&ots=MVdwwyEjZE&sig=XTyO3R5VXS8yKl3KS2NtlkBMFTc&hl=en&sa=X&ei=iTUAUNnVKsS3rQHsvfm5Bw&ved=0CE8Q6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=michael%20shapiro%20securitization&f=true>)

Ultimately, the bio political dimensions of the USA’s anti-terrorism initiatives (the decisions about which lives to waste and which ones require exclusion or containment) are deployed on particular bodies; both those that are the targets and those that are the ones that must confront those bodies on dangerous terrains. But, it is the structed nature of the gaze on those bodies (among others) that situates the elaborate dynamic of the post-9/11 securitization. To locate and conceptualize the current anti-terrorism policies, I turn to one of Michael Foucault’s older, archaeological investigations, his treatment of medical perceptions, and apply his notion of the spatialization of disease to the spatialization of terrorism. At the outset of his investigation of the history of the medical gaze, Foucault (1993: 15) discerns three kinds of spatialization. At the primary level, disease exists in a classification, in “an area of homologies.” At a secondary level, it is located in “the space of the body;” it is focused on an assemblage of individuals. And, finally, and perhaps more relevant to the current intensification of surveillance of potential terrorism, when medicine becomes a “task for the nation,” with the development of a “medicine of epidemics,” a policing “supplement” is enjoined and doctors and patients are subject to “supervision” (Foucault 1993: 19). Displacing the old encounter between doctors and patients is an increasing institutionalize medical consciousness becomes linked to a lie beyond individual lives: it is deployed on “the life of the nation” (Foucault 1993: 30) ¶ Analogously, to treat the tertiary spatialization of terrorism is to note the increasing, officially sanctioned rapport among political, administrative, judicial, and military agencies, as well as agencies, organization, and professions that have heretofore had seemingly more benign roles with respect to violence (e.g. the U.S Environmental Protection Agency, universities, and various entertainment industries). This broad, political, administrative, and professional collusion is deployed through an elaborate expansion of the primary and secondary spatializations of terrorism. In terms of the primary or classificatory space, many more acts have been recruited into the designation of terrorism- for example, attending seminars or summer camps in “terrorist” venues or making charitable donation to a mosque whose subsequent allocations are along money trails that lead to “enemies” This later example can locate the donor in the category of one who has lent “material support” to terrorist.

### Alliance Links

#### Alliances are only instrumental tools within a realist framing of actors linking together their own security hierarchies

**Buzan and Waever 2009**, Barry Buzan is Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and honorary professor at the University of Copenhagen and Jilin University, Ole Waever is a professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Review of International Studies, “Macrosecuritisation and security constellations: reconsidering scale in securitization theory,” DA:7/11/12,http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=5502092&jid=RIS&volumeId=35&issueId=02&aid=5502088&bodyId=&membershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0260210509008511

It is not our intention in this article to attack the basics of this position, which we think are still sound. **We** do, however, **want to explore the space** between ‘the middle level’, **in which individual collectivities mainly engage in interdependent securitisations with other collectivities**, and the universal one, where the absence of an Other makes it difficult to securitise the total collective Self of humankind. We want to suggest that there is more of interest to be found there than the existing formulation suggests. Partly this is about looking at civilisations, mentioned above, but potentially **carrying the ‘middle level’ argument well beyond state and nation and towards a very large scale of collectivity**. But it is also about **recognising** larger scale patterns **where a set of interlinked securitisations become a significant part of the social structure of international society**. **Think of the way in which the Cold War securitisations of East and West constituted a package that not only framed the fundamental relationships of the superpowers and great powers for over forty years, but also defined and created political space for the third world**. It is easy to understand the GWoT, especially in its ‘long war’ formulation, as representing similar aspirations to provide an overarching securitisation that relates, organises and possibly subsumes a host of other middle-level securitisations. **Opening up this space exposes new ways of thinking about securitisation**. The existing ‘middle-level’ formulation emphasises the individual securitising actors and referent objects, and how securitising moves by such actors interact in ways that reinforce each other. This is certainly an important part of the picture, and one that contains an essential core of securitisation as a discursive practice. But it is not all there is. In a sense, **this middle level model is rather like crude realist thinking about the balance of power, where the national security concerns of states A, B, C, D, etc. interact with each other on the basis of materialist calculations of threat**. **Actors and their securitisations remain essentially egotistical and self-centred, and the system atomised. In such a system only alliances provide any scope for actors to link their securitisations together, and in the realist framing alliances are necessarily temporary and instrumental**. In some times and places this model comes close to reality. But when larger framings are in play, whether as secular or religious ‘universal’ ideologies, or as civilisational-scale identities, this purely egotistical model cannot capture the possibilities for large numbers of individual securitisations to become bound together into durable sets. **Just as in regional security complex theory, securitisations can be bound together positively** (**where a group of actors share**, or partly share, **a definition of threat and referent object**), **or negatively (where actors**, or groups of actors, **construct each other as threats) in the process forming potentially durable patterns of security interdependence.** We have already researched in detail how this type of security interdependence works at the regional level, 7 and part of what we want to do here is to push that logic beyond the regional level. Thinking along these lines opens the door to the concept of security constellations (hereafter, constellations) 8 which was designed to link across all of the levels and sectors in which securitisations occur. Constellations suggest strongly that larger patterns exist in the overall social structures of securitisation. Security constellations have not been much discussed in the CS literature, and one purpose of this article is to flesh out the content of the concept. So far, it has mostly been deployed in the context of discussion about regional security, where the idea is to set the regional level dynamics into those above and below them (for example, the India-Pakistan rivalry in the context of the Cold War above, and religious and ethnic divisions below). **A regional security complex is always embedded in, and thus dependent on, the constant reproduction of social identities at lower levels and often also bound up with regional-global and occasionally inter-regional relations**. **Thus, a regional security complex** – while its essential structure is defined by relations among units at the regional level and by the complex's external boundary – **always exists within and as the core of a wider constellation**. The concept of constellation serves to avoid a picture of isolated securitisations unrelated to social identities and political processes at other levels. At best, a securitisation analysis then includes the identity and political constitution of the particular referent object for an act of securitisation9, but since **identities, politics and security practices are relational, deep understandings of processes of securitisation demand a concept for the larger social formation**. In what follows we want to focus on, and elaborate, those elements of constellations that form on a scale above that of both the middle level and regions.

#### The US extensions to form alliances are always built around a common security guarantee

Tertrais 2010, Bruno Tertrais, Senior research fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Associate researcher at the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, The Washington Quarterly, “The changing nature of military alliances,” DA: 7/12/12, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1162/016366004773097759>

One is idealistic: nations commit themselves to fight alongside each other because of shared values and ideas. The other is realistic and rests on an analysis of costs and benefits: **alliances can save costs and multiply benefits through the division of responsibilities, the sharing of common assets, or simply the protection provided by having a stronger country as an ally**. Indeed**, because the United States has long been one of the world's main military powers, its alliances have often taken the shape of a positive security guarantee** and are thus unequal: one side (in this case the United States) protects the other. **Such alliances** nevertheless have been of great benefit to the United States because they have helped **ensure that the allied party will not employ an independent defense policy and will be less tempted to become a nuclear power. Alliances have further ensured influence** in the respective foreign policies of allied countries **and have provided bases for power projection**. **Military alliances** that **include a security guarantee** in case of aggression can be formal (a written agreement) or informal. **Formal alliances exist in two varieties: bilateral ones** (such as those existing between the United States and its Asian allies and between France and some African countries) **and multilateral ones (such as NATO** or the alliance among Russia and some of the former Soviet states). **Informal alliances do not take the shape of a treaty or accord but nevertheless imply a security guarantee**—such as the relationship between the United States and Taiwan; the United States and Saudi Arabia; and, arguably, the United States and Israel. Finally, although often misunderstood as a recent phenomenon, time-limited constructs that seek to answer a particular threat or risk, such as ad hoc coalitions or coalitions of the willing, are as old as warfare itself. **A broader definition** of military alliances would include those that do not imply a security guarantee. In today's parlance, **they are often called strategic partnerships and include the recognition of common security interests** as well as provisions for strong military cooperation to various degrees. Examples of such partnerships today include the United States and Russia, Turkey and Israel, Israel and India, and Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, as well as China and Asian states such as Pakistan or Burma. The United States maintains formal defense commitments to nearly 50 states, including most Latin American countries (Rio Treaty, 1947); most European countries and Canada (Washington Treaty, 1949); and South Korea, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, Liberia, and a few smaller states in the Pacific region. These alliances were forged in the second part of the last century to fight communism. Other countries that the United States would likely support in case of aggression include Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and New Zealand; these, along with **traditional U.S. allies** in the Asia- Pacific region, **have been designated** "major non-NATO **allies," a category forged in the 1980s to facilitate arms transfers and military cooperation**. The same could be said for some other countries with very close defense ties with the United States, such as Kuwait, Qatar, or Taiwan. More fuzzy and difficult cases include Pakistan, still linked with the United States by the 1954 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, and Saudi Arabia, with whom the United States has no formal alliance. Washington maintains friendly relationships with the current governments of these two countries, but it is by no means certain today that Washington would protect them if under attack. In the cases of Europe and South Korea, alliances have given birth to permanent multinational military command structures. Thus, although they come in multiple forms and shapes, **the United States today maintains by far the most extensive and developed network of military alliances**.

#### State-to-state military alliances are a throwback to previous notions of security; however, the modern day security alliance constitutes the form of development as well

Duffield 2001, Mark Duffield, research fellow and professor of development politics at the Institute for Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds, Disasters, (25)4: 308-320, “Governing the Borderlands: Decoding the Power of Aid,” DA: 7/13/12, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/1467-7717.00180/asset/1467-7717.00180.pdf?v=1&t=h4lc1tt8&s=9430d9095c6d3afcae7d51125e19f9d8831e3bee>

In understanding the governmental rationality of privatisation, it is necessary to question why, at an operational level at least, the internationalisation of public policy is dominated by non-state and private associations. In this respect, rather than metropolitan states becoming enfeebled, one has to hold out the possibility that **a radical reworking of international authority is taking place. The changing nature of security is central to the increasing governmental rationality of privatisation.** Traditionally, **state-based security hinged upon maintaining a balance of power between sovereign states**. During the cold war, for example, **re-armament programmes and changing international political alliances constituted the dominant security regime**. **It is a good example of state-based security realised through a shifting balance of power.** Even before the cold war ended, **however, a security system based on political alliance and arms superiority had shown itself vulnerable** to non-conventional warfare (Macrae, 2001). During the 1970s and1980s, guerrilla movements in places like Vietnam and Afghanistan proved to be more than a match for well-armed Superpowers (van Creveld, 1991). **The advent of asymmetrical warfare** based upon the intermingling of insurgents and civilians **has challenged the military and scientific superiority** metropolitan states have hitherto enjoyed. With the ending of the cold war, **strategic alliances** between metropolitan and Third World states, **an important aspect of the former balance of power**, also lost their political rationale. Rather than enfeeblement and paralysis, however, **out of the crisis of state-based security a new framework has taken shape**. **This security paradigm is not based upon the accumulation of arms and external political alliances between states**, but on changing the conduct of populations within them. **Within this new public-private security framework**, stability is achieved by activities designed to reduce poverty, satisfy basic needs, strengthen economic sustainability, create representative civil institutions, protect the vulnerable and promote human rights: **the name of this largely privatised form of security is development.**

### Proliferation

#### Proliferation rhetoric elides Western role in production of global weaponized violence

Mutimer, IR lecturer at Keele University, 1999 p. 122

(David, “Reconstituting Security? The Practices of Proliferation Control” *European Journal of International Relations* 4(1)

Extending practices analogous to those of the drug war rather than those of the nuclear nonproliferation regime would, therefore, entail a rather different object, and quite substantially different identities and interests. The problem would be recognized as a complex one) involving motives for supply and demand) and enmeshed in regional and global security and economic processes, as the drugs problem is enmeshed in the full range of social institutions within the neighbourhood. Most importantly, the suppliel's of arms would be identified as the primary culprits io the global cUstribution of arms, while not discounting the culpability of those who purchase and use arms (who, in the case of states, also include the suppliers). This last point is particularly important because it highlights the political consequences of the specific way in which proliferation control practices have been constructed. The United States is the largest producer of arms in the world. The United States also maintains the world's largest and most sophisticated arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. The largest suppliers of arms to others are also among the world's leading industrial states - most notably the United States and Germany, although also Russia and China. Despite the overwhelming responsibility of these states for the size and sophistication of the global arms trade, the villains of the proliferation control practices are the 'weapons states'. The weapons states are those in the Third vVodd which seek to enhance their military position through the acquisition of a ibction of the arms - both in terms of numbers and sophisticationlO - produced and consumed by the leading states in the system. Practices analogous to those of the war on drugs would highlight the responsibility of the producers and suppliers of arms, principally the United States, whereas the practices of proliferation control mask this responsibility by framing the producers as the vanguard of the control efforts.

#### Frames other’s possessions as a crime and the West’s as legitimate—causes colonialism and violent division

Gusterson, anthropology prof @ GMU, 1999 p. 113-114

(Hugh “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination” *Cultural Anthropology* 14.1)

According to the literature on risk in anthropology, shared fears often reveal as much about the identities and solidarities of the fearful as about the acual dangers that are feared (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Lindenbaum 1974). The immoderate reactions in the West to the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan, and to Iraq's nuclear weapons program earlier, are examples of an entrenched discourse on nuclear proliferation that has played an important role in structuring the Third World, and ourrelation to it, in the Western imagination. This discourse, dividing the world into nations that can be trusted with nuclear weapons and those that cannot, dates back, at least, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970.The Non-Proliferation Treaty embodied a bargain between the five coun¬tries that had nuc1ear weapons in 1970 and those countries that did not. Accord¬ing to the bargain, the five official nuclear states (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China)~ promised to assist other signa¬tories to the treaty in acquiring nuclear energy technology as long as they did not use that technology to produce nuclear weapons, submitting to international inspections when necessary to prove their compliance. Further, in Article 6 of the treaty, the five nuclear powers agreed to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" (Blacker and Duffy 1976:395). One hundred eighty-seven countries have signed the treaty, but Israel, India, and Pakistan have refused, saying it enshrines a system of global "nuclear apartheid." Al¬though the Non-Proliferation Treaty divided the countries of the world into nu¬clear and nonnuclear by means of a purely temporal metric4--designating only those who had tested nuclear weapons by 1970 as nuclear powers-the treaty has become the legal anchor for a global nuclear regime that is increasingly legitimating US military power in the face of developments in global politics-the co))apse of the Soviet threat and the recent war against Iraq, a nuclear-threshold nation in the Third WorJd-the importance of this discourse in organizing Western geopolitical understandings is only growing. It has become an increasingly important way oflegitimating U.S. mili¬tary programs in the post-Cold War world since the early 1990s, when U.S. military leaders introduced the term rogue states into the American lexicon of fear, identifying a new source of danger just as the Soviet threat was declining (Klare 1995).Thus in Western discourse nuclear weapons are represented so that "theirs" are a problem whereas "ours" are not. During the Cold War the Western dis¬course on the dangers of..nuclear proliferation" defined the term in such a way as to sever the two senses of the word proliferation. This usage split off the "ver¬tical" proliferation of the superpower arsenals (the development of new and im¬proved weapons designs and the numerical expansion of the stockpiles) from the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, presenting only the latter as the "proliferation problem." Following the end of the Cold War, the American and Russian arsenals are being cut to a few thousand weap¬ons on each side.s However, the United States and Russia have turned back ap¬peals from various nonaligned nations, especial1y India, for the nuclear powers to open discussions on a global convention abolishing nuclear weapons. Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty notwithstanding, the Clinton administration has declared that nuclear weapons will playa role in the defense of the United States for the indefinite futUre. Meanwhile, in a controversial move, the Clinton administration has broken with the policy of previous administrations in basi¬cal1y formalizing a policy of using nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states to deter chemical and biological weapons (Panofsky 1998; Sloyan 1998).The dominant discourse that stabilizes this system of nuclear apartheid in Western ideology is a specialized variant within a broader system of colonial and postcolonial discourse that takes as its essentialist premise a profound Oth¬erness separating Third World from Western countries.i$ This inscription of Third World (especial1y Asian and Middle Eastern) nations as ineradicably dif¬ferent from our own has, in a different context, been labeled "Orientalism" by Edward Said (1978). Said argues that orientalist djscourse constructs the world in terms of a series of binary oppositions that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: where "we" are rational and disciplined, .'they" are impul¬sive and emotional; where "we" are modern and flexible, "they" are slaves to an¬cient passions and routines; where ..we" are honest and compassionate, "they" are treacherous and uncultivated. While the blatantly racist orientalism of the high colonial period has softened, more subtle orientalist ideologies endure in contemporary politics. They can be found, as Akhil Gupta (1998) has argued, in discourses of economic development that represent Third World nations as child nations lagging behind Western nations in a uniform cycle of development or, as Lutz and CoBins (1993) suggest, in the imagery of popular magazines, such asNational Geographic. I want to suggest here that another variant of contempo¬rary Orientalism is to be found in Western national security discourse.

### Warming

#### Global warming can’t be solved within the contemporary global political circumstance—reconfigured national interest means it will be triage for the privileged and death for the “underdeveloped”

Duffield 2011 (Mark, Professor of Development Politics at the University of Bristol, “Envirnmental Terror: Uncertainty, Resilience, and the Bunker” Working Paper No. 06-11)

Many had hoped that science and the challenge of climate change would do what politics has hitherto failed to achieve, that is, force an equitable redistribution of the earth’s resources and genuinely sustainable patters of existence and trust. The long history of one-sided World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations, plus the failure of the world summit on climate change in Copenhagen in December 2009, is a reminder that these aims remain elusive. Instead, if we cast an eye on recent history, including the rise of liberal interventionism and militarism in defence of civilisational values, a more likely response to climate change is a continuing bunkerisation of the global North. The architecture of bunkers and camps gives important clues to how, in socialecological terms, the world is defensively fragmenting. Global cities and elite regions will continue to forge special arrangements, modes of privileged interconnection and private provision in a world where ecological services are becoming scare and increasingly seen as a central to national security. Under the impact of climate change, rather than a new deal, the global civil war seems set to intensify.

#### Plan is a Trojan horse for national security—policies designed to remedy climate change are part of an imperialistic endeavor by the United States to win hearts and minds and sanitize U.S. imperial violence—their claim to be reasoned and moderate predictions locks the link

Butts 2008 (Kent, Professor of Strategic Studies, *Global Climate Change: National Security Implications* <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub862.pdf>)

I would like to share a few thoughts with you today on environmental security and climate change and how they relate to combating terrorism. At the end of my talk, I will suggest how we might bring all the elements of national power to bear on the problem. There are a number of themes we should consider as we proceed: 1. Stability. Terrorism is rooted in regional instability which has posed the major threat to U.S. national security interests since the end of the Cold War. 2. Opportunities. Change, even global climate change, brings opportunities. 3. Legitimacy. Being able to meet the needs of the people is essential for any government. 4. Confidence building measures. Climate change phenomena provide opportunities to establish communication and cooperation both multilaterally and intrastate, and deescalate tensions. 5. The elements of power. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was quoted as saying, “What’s the point of having this superb military . . . if we can’t use it?” We can now see the downside of using the military element of power to effect regime change without also having a sound plan for using the other elements of national power to create a stable political system capable of meeting the demands placed on it. The United States must find creative ways to use all the elements of national power to deal with problems resulting from global climate change if it is to successfully manage terrorist insurgencies and ensure regional stability. Environmental Security and the National Security Strategies. Climate change is best understood through the lens of environmental security. Not all environmental issues are environmental security issues. Dr. Alan Hecht of the Environmental Protection Agency tells us that “Environmental Security is a process whereby solutions to environmental problems contribute to national security objectives.” A flood in which there is no human involvement or loss of resource wealth is not a security issue. However, a flood that displaces 100,000 people across a national border, overwhelming the resources of a fragile neighboring state, and destabilizing the region is a security issue. Global climate change is a subset of environmental security and because it can be a force multiplier for existing tensions, it will complicate the ability of the United States to manage threats to regional stability and preserve U.S. national security interests. Climate change brings opportunity because today’s science is so good that it can predict where the effects of climate change will be most pronounced and threaten regional stability. As the awareness of climate change effects becomes more widespread within the security community, the opportunity to synchronize the programs of the U.S. interagency in addressing them will offer an advantage. The National Security Strategy (NSS) report was designed to preclude U.S. involvement in conflicts around the world where its interests had not been properly defined. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DoD) Reorganization Act mandated this annual report to Congress. The NSS should clearly define U.S. national security interests and a strategy for achieving the objectives necessary to preserve those interests. The best and most useful NSS reports have defined U.S. national security interests by region, clarifying any threats to those interests, articulating a strategy for attaining objectives, and the resources necessary to do so. This is not a Defense document; it addresses the use of all elements of national power, including the interagency community, which largely represents the available resources. Each of the agencies, then, is supposed to develop its own strategic documents delineating how it will support the NSS intent. DoD, for example, develops the National Military Strategy and the National Defense Strategy, which provide guidance for DoD policymakers and guidance for military forces. A similar process takes place within the Department of State (DoS) providing guidance to the Embassies within which reside the important Regional Environment Offices or Hubs. The NSS will typically define U.S. national security interests to include combating terrorism, democratization, development of market economies, regional stability, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and a strong economy. Most of these have been on the list for the last 15 years, though their prominence may vary. Two of them will figure prominently in today’s talk—the fight against terrorism and the effort to create regional stability. Environmental security and climate change, although very important to these two interests, are not a priority of the current administration. Environmental security has figured prominently in most of the national security strategies generated over the last 20 years. First consider this quote from President Reagan’s 1988 document: “The dangerous depletion or contamination of natural endowments of some nations—soil, forest, water, and air—will create potential threats to the peace and prosperity that are in our national interests as well as the interests of the affected nations.” This NSS emphasizes the relevance of the land, man/land relationship to national security. In the Bush and Clinton administrations’ National Security Strategies of the 1990s, environmental security was recognized as an important variable: “The stress from environmental challenges is already contributing to political conflict” (1991); and “[Environmental security issues] pose a direct or indirect threat to U. S. National Security Interests” (1997); and “Environmental security issues often trigger and exacerbate conflict” (1997). Note the language used in these documents. As several of the speakers today have already noted, controversy does exist as to causality; if a statistical analysis cannot prove causality, the test will say so. Critics will often seize upon the results to suggest that the issue is not relevant to security, and thus does not warrant policymaker attention. This is particularly true in regions of existing tensions. Because policymakers are interested in relevance, not overstating causal relationships is important. Well-respected academic literature may rule out water as a cause of violent conflict, while a policymaker like Ariel Sharon will be quoted as saying that the 1967 War actually began 2 years earlier when Israel attacked the Arab Jordan River Headwater Diversion scheme to prevent the diversion of the Jordan River headwaters. Thus, it is often more useful and avoids needless controversy to characterize environmental challenges, to include climate change events, as triggers, stressors, multiplier effects, or having exacerbated pre-existing tensions. This issue has a direct bearing on the issue of terrorism and climate change. Does poverty cause terrorism? In Washington, DC, it is common to hear the phrase, “Poverty doesn’t cause terrorism.” This is justified in part because there are areas of the world where there is poverty and no terrorism. However, in Southeast Asia where terrorism and insurgency have a long history, national leaders such as Philippine President Gloria Arroyo and Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi speak with great conviction about the need to address the link between poverty and terrorism. Overreaching led in part to the current National Security Strategy stating that “Poverty does not, in and of itself, cause terrorism.” This diminishes the perceived U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) role as a resource for addressing terrorism. However, stating that poverty erodes governmenta legitimacy and contributes to conditions that terrorists seek to exploit invites the use of USAID’s substantial capacity to address the terrorist insurgency. Finally, note the emphasis in the current National Security Strategy, “We will harness the tools of economic assistance, development, aid, trade, and good governance to help ensure that new democracies are not burdened with economic stagnation or economic corruption” (2006). Once again, we see recognition at the highest level that development, economics, empowerment, and building capacity for our allies are important; and it is the relationship of climate change to these variables that defines its greatest relevance to regional security. The Military in Mitigation and Adaptation. It is not surprising to find that the military is often the largest agency in a government, with a correspondingly dominant budget. Many developing countries have bloated militaries that are remnants of the Cold War or past military threats to the state. Apropos, downsizing of these militaries is politically difficult, and many downsizing initiatives have resulted in unintended regime change. Thus, the regime may continue, but at a substantial opportunity cost for other agencies struggling to meet the demands placed upon the regime. In regions where climate change is predicted to affect weather patterns, crop production, disease, and clean water availability, and may do so disproportionately between states and within states, involving the military in providing support to other agencies tasked with addressing these issues may mean the difference between maintaining governmental legitimacy and a failed state. In a diagram of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs for a developing state, stewardship of the environment would likely be placed at the pinnacle of the triangle, as a goal to fulfill only after other demands upon the political system have been met. In fact, it really should be at the base, because sustaining the environment underpins success in the other seemingly more important base categories such as food and shelter, security from violence, economic growth, and development. Meeting all of these demands will contribute to maintaining a government’s legitimacy and providing for the human security needs of its people. Failure to do so leaves the government vulnerable to alternative visions and, in some countries very important to U.S. national security, to extremist ideology and terrorist insurgency. The military can contribute to developing a country’s resilience to climate change effects. Unlike many government agencies, the military has a presence on the frontier and relatively good transportation assets and fuel; it also has technical, medical, and civil works capabilities and a training and education program. Developing the capacity of the military to help in climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts in support of other agencies could enhance resilience, reduce systemic stress, and gain legitimacy for the government and the military. In order to have a stable world and continued prosperity, it will be necessary to find creative solutions for the effects of global climate change. In seeking these solutions, the host nations’ militaries should be seriously considered. Addressing global climate change is not just a matter for DoD. DoS is also very much involved in issues of environmental security. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, at the request of then Vice President Gore, created the system of environmental hubs. These bring the resources of powerful regional bureaus within DoS to bear on solving environmental security issues. There are 12 of these world-wide. In our work at the Center for Strategic Leadership, we work closely with the Combatant Commands to help them develop environmental security programs. When we put together a regional conference or activity on environmental security for those Commands, our first action is to contact the relevant environmental hub and seek their guidance and support. This has led to many areas of interagency cooperation and, quite often, to the Commands following the lead of the State environmental hubs in their efforts to develop regional capacity and promote multilateral cooperation. Currently we are working with the DoS environmental hub in Brasilia in response to a Brazilian Army request to support an environmental security conference for South America that focuses on alternative fuels. When we do this, we are bringing the substantial capabilities of the military element of power to bear on climate change issues that are a priority of the U.S. interagency community. Climate Change and Combating Extremist Ideologies. Climate change is affecting the efforts of the United States to combat the global insurgency and its underlying extremist ideologies in two ways: First, it provides a strategic communication windfall for the insurgency, allowing extremists and critics of the United States to claim that the United States does not care about the welfare of other countries. These countries, they say, must struggle with the rising energy costs and global warming that directly result from the high U.S. per capita consumption of energy resources. Second, climate change is complicating the ability of countries to meet the needs of their people, thus enhancing the appeal of extremist ideology by creating underlying conditions terrorists may exploit. The role of climate change in security ranges from the global to regional to local levels. The Russian geopolitical quest for dominance of the energy fields of the Arctic was spawned by the unexpectedly rapid melting of the polar ice cap. The coastal resources of Florida are threatened by saltwater incursion because of the drought affecting the Southeast; and there are many traditional security concerns that directly affect U.S. national security interests that are being influenced by climate change. These concerns are highlighted by two important studies. One was published in 2007: National Security and the Threat of Climate Change by the Center for Naval Analyses Corporation. The leader of the study’s research team, Tom Morehouse, discusses the highly influential study in Chapter 6. The National Intelligence Council (NIC) is preparing a National Intelligence Estimate on this subject. According to the NIC, the variables include: Conflict; Failed States; Terrorist Opportunities; Economics; Energy; Social Unrest and Migration; Humanitarian Crisis; and Unrest in Islamic Countries. We heard excellent presentations this morning about the cause of climate change. However, these two studies are not being conducted to contest critics who maintain climate change is not anthropogenic. They are moving beyond the causal debate and instead saying, “We represent the security community and we are convinced that we are facing an imminent threat, and we need to be prepared to deal with this threat. Many of the variables that these studies address are going to affect the ability of the United States to manage the terrorist insurgency and compete with extremist ideologies overseas. In 2003 when visiting the U.S. Army War College, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld conceded that the United States was not doing as well as it could in the war of ideas. If I were grading, I would say we probably deserve a “D” or a “D-plus” as a country as to how well we’re doing in the battle of ideas that’s taking place in the world today. I’m not going to suggest that it’s easy, but we have not found the formula as a country for countering the extremists’ message. The strategy must do a great deal more to reduce the lure of the extremist ideology by standing with those moderate Muslims advocating peaceful change, freedom, and tolerance. His point is salient. To defeat terrorist ideology, the United States requires a good message and the support of those who are trying to prove it to be accurate and appealing. Climate change undermines both of those objectives. To understand how, it is useful to review the U.S. strategy for combating terrorism. In February 2003, the National Security Council published the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT). This strategy had four pillars: defeat terrorist organizations with global reach; defend the interests, citizens, and territory of the United States both domestically and overseas; deny terrorist groups sponsorship, support, and sanctuary; and diminish the underlying conditions terrorist seek to exploit. The latter two are directly related to climate change. The United States sought to encourage other states to meet the terrorist threat by building their capacity and will, while winning the war of ideas by promoting state and regional stability through political, social, and economic development. The United States found it easy to take the moral high ground against the oppressive Soviet enemy of the Cold War: its message is no longer well-respected by the developing world. The invasion of Iraq and its mishandled aftermath, with such issues as Abu Ghraib and torture, was a propaganda gift to the insurgents and those opposing the moderate Muslim regimes upon which the U.S. combating terrorism strategy depends. So, too, is the U.S. position on climate change. The United States is perceived by the developing as having double standards double standards. It asks the developing world to preserve its forests to serve as carbon stores, and, though the largest per capita emitter of greenhouse gases, denies its responsibility for creating climate change stresses. These stresses are seen as giving rise to droughts, floods, disease, and the weakening monsoons that no longer feed the mountain glaciers providing essential water to many cities. They also complicate governmental legitimacy by overloading weak political systems and demonstrating the developing government’s weak economy and social infrastructure, and its inability to manage the resulting human security problems. The terrorist insurgency is rooted in the developing world and seeks to take advantage of weak or failed states and exploit the resulting ungoverned spaces to train insurgents and exert political control.

### China

#### Representing China as a source of instability constructs threat construction and makes violence a self-fullfing prophecy

Pan, Political Science and International Relations Professor at Australian National University, 2004

(Chengxin, *Alternatives*, “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics,” 6/1/2004)

I have argued above that the "China threat**"** argument in mainstream U.S. IR literature is derived, primarily, from a discursive construction of otherness. This construction is predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the U.S. self and on a positivist-based realism, concerned with absolute certainty and security, a concern central to the dominant U.S. self-imaginary. Within these frameworks, it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening, absolute other since it is unable to fit neatly into the U.S.-led evolutionary scheme or guarantee absolute security for the United States, so that U.S. power preponderance in the post-Cold War world can still be legitimated. Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding China as a dynamic, multifaceted country but it leads inevitably to a policy of containment that, in turn, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist extremism, and hard-line stance in today's China**.** Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations, as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident have vividly attested. In this respect, Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "a policy of containment toward **China** implies the possibility of war, just as it did during the Cold War vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of **China."** (93) For instance, as the United States presses ahead with a missile-defence shield to "guarantee" its invulnerability from rather unlikely sources of missile attacks, it would be almost certain to intensify China's sense of vulnerability and compel it to expand its current small nuclear arsenal so as to maintain the efficiency of its limited deterrence. In consequence, it is not impossible that the two countries, and possibly the whole region, might be dragged into an escalating arms race that would eventually make war more likely. Neither the United States nor **China** is likely to be keen on fighting the other. But as has been demonstrated, the "China threat**"** argument, for all its alleged desire for peace and security, tends to make war preparedness the most "realistic" option for both sides. At this juncture, worthy of note is an interesting comment made by Charlie Neuhauser, a leading CIA **China** specialist, on the Vietnam War, a war fought by the United States to contain the then-Communist "other." Neuhauser says, "Nobody wants it. We don't want it, Ho Chi Minh doesn't want it; it's simply a question of annoying the other side." (94) And, as we know, in an unwanted war some fifty-eight thousand young people from the United States and an estimated two million Vietnamese men, women, and children lost their lives. Therefore, to call for a halt to the vicious circle of theory as practice associated with the **"China** **threat"** literature, tinkering with the current positivist-dominated U.S. IR scholarship on China is no longer adequate. Rather, what is needed is to question this un-self-reflective scholarship itself, particularly its connections with the dominant way in which the United States and the West in general represent themselves and others via their positivist epistemology, so that alternative, more nuanced, and less dangerous ways of interpreting and debating China might become possible.

#### Competitiveness is seen as a zero sum game- all states are seen as a threat to the US

Pan 2k4 (Chengxin Pan was educated at Peking University and the Australian National University, where he received a PhD degree in Political Science and International Relations. He was a visiting scholar at the University of Melbourne and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. He is a member of the International Studies Association (ISA), the Chinese Studies Association of Australia (CSAA), and the editorial board of Series in International Relations Classics (World Affairs Press, Beijing). “The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics.” <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/40645119.pdf?acceptTC=true> 7/12/12)

Having examined how the "China threat" literature is enabled by and serves the purpose of a particular U.S. self-construction, I want to turn now to the issue of how this literature represents a discur- sive construction of other, instead of an "objective" account of Chi- nese reality. This, I argue, has less to do with its portrayal of China as a threat per se than with its essentialization and totalization of China as an externally knowable object, independent of historically contingent contexts or dynamic international interactions. In this sense, the discursive construction of China as a threat- ening other cannot be detached from (neo) realism, a positivist,¶ Chengxin Pan 315 ahistorical framework of analysis within which global life is reduced to endless interstate rivalry for power and survival. As many critical IR scholars have noted, (neo) realism is not a transcendent descrip- tion of global reality but is predicated on the modernist Western identity, which, in the quest for scientific certainty, has come to define itself essentially as the sovereign territorial nation-state. This realist self-identity of Western states leads to the constitution of anarchy as the sphere of insecurity, disorder, and war. In an anar- chical system, as (neo) realists argue, "the gain of one side is often considered to be the loss of the other,"45 and "All other states are potential threats."46 In order to survive in such a system, states inevitably pursue power or capability. In doing so, these realist claims represent what R. B. J. Walker calls "a specific historical artic- ulation of relations of universality/ particularity and self/ Other."47 The (neo) realist paradigm has dominated the U.S. IR disci- pline in general and the U.S. China studies field in particular. As Kurt Campbell notes, after the end of the Cold War, a whole new crop of China experts "are much more likely to have a background in strategic studies or international relations than China itself."48 As a result, for those experts to know China is nothing more or less than to undertake a geopolitical analysis of it, often by asking only a few questions such as how China will "behave" in a strategic sense and how it may affect the regional or global balance of power, with a particular emphasis on China's military power or capabilities. As Thomas J. Christensen notes, "Although many have focused on intentions as well as capabilities, the most prevalent component of the [China threat] debate is the assessment of China's overall future military power compared with that of the United States and other East Asian regional powers."49 Consequently, almost by default, China emerges as an absolute other and a threat thanks to this (neo) realist prism.

### Democracy

#### Democracy creates the real threat of fascism—that *within* the domestic order

Neocleous, prof. of critique of political economy @ Brunei University, 2008 p. 9

(Mark, Critique of Security)

A final introductory word on fascism. A number of writers have noted that there is a real Schmittian logic underpinning security politics: that casting an issue as one of' security' tends to situate that issue within the logic of threat and decision, of friend and enemy, and so magnifies the dangers and ratchets up the strategic fears and insecurities that encourage the construction of a certain kind of political reason centred on the molent clampdown of the moment of decision.35 'Speaking and writing about security is never innocent', says Jef Huysmans, 'it always risks contributing to the opening of a window of opportunity for a "fascist mobilisation"'.36 Events since 11 September 2001, bear witness to this. It seems abundantly clear that any removal of fascism would now come through the mobilisation of society in the name of security.37 This potential for fascist mobilis¬ation underlines once more that far from being a distinct political force outside of liberalism and capital, fascism is in fact liberal capitalism's doppelganger. The lesson of the twentieth century is that the crises of liberalism, more often than not expressed as crises threatening the security of the state and the social order of capital, reveal the potential for the rehabilitation of fascism; thriving in the crises of liberalism, the fascist potential within liberal democracy has always been more dangerous than the fascist tendency against democracy.38 The critique of security being developed here is intended as a reminder of the authoritarian, reactionary and fascist potential within the capitalist order and one of its key political categories.

Rhetoric and policy of hegemony commits us to endless exterminatory

#### Democracy provides the cover and the logic for the war making practices of the West- discursive criticism can contruibute to peace better

Grayson, Ph. D candidate @ York University, 2003 p.

(Kyle, “Democratic Peace Theory as Practice”)

http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/WP22-Grayson.pdf

The answer in part, is given that liberal democracy and the liberal democratic political system are firmly entrenched in the American national psyche, any suggestion that they are not wholly an ‘American’ (or at least ‘Western’) product is tantamount to a full scale attack on US national identity and the ontological presuppositions that form its foundations. This is particularly acute when Native Americans are involved, for they have traditionally been seen as the uncivilized and savage ‘other’ on the North American continent. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to demonstrate that **far from being just window-dressing** to (geo)strategic interests as argued by realists, **or the ultimate guarantor of peace** as argued by democratic peace adherents, **the American (and Western) conception of liberal democracy creates the binaries necessary for the war-making practices of the United States and other like minded allies** such as Canada. In order to substantiate this controversial claim, I will begin by deconstructing the democratic peace. **Liberal democracy should be seen** not just **as** a fundamental principle influencing the nature of state government and domestic rule, but as **a subjective tool to differentiate ‘friend’ from ‘foe’ and ‘opportunity’ from ‘threat’**. The notion of liberal democracy is an integral part of what Roxanne Lynn Doty has referred to as the ‘representational practices’ of the American (or Western) state.5 Viewing liberal democracy as an international relations practice within a representational framework clearly illuminates three significant points with regards to the theory and practice of the democratic peace that will be addressed in this paper. **First, is through a representational deconstruction, the ontological nature of war and of peace become apparent. Second, because war and peace can be just as much about ontology as strategy, war and peace may take place not only on the battlefield or in diplomatic chambers but also in classrooms** and media outlets (beyond the dissemination of propaganda) through the **production and reproduction of binaries and classification schemes. In other words, devastating wars are often fought equally with words as with weapons; conversely, peace can be achieved through discursive understanding as well as the laying down of arms**. Therefore, Limbaugh and Bork are not simply uninformed pundits, but are also combatants in an ontological battleground. **Finally, a representational view of the democratic peace helps to illustrate how democratic peace theory and practice can and perhaps even must be silent about other versions of democracy** like the Iroquois Confederacy.

#### Democratic peace is a lie- scholars conclude- and the call to democracy is a veiled call to political violence

Grayson, Ph. D candidate @ York University, 2003 p.

(Kyle, “Democratic Peace Theory as Practice”)

http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/WP22-Grayson.pdf

What is perhaps most interesting about **democratic peace theory** is not how its adherents have attempted to explain the phenomenon, but its resonance with the general public and policy-makers. Moreover, this pop-culture popularity **has occurred despite the general perception within the wider academic community that at best, it represents wishful thinking**. More importantly, the nuances of democratic peace theory have been lost as it has become enmeshed within popular political discourse in the West. Thus, **democratic peace theory has been transformed into a set of assertions that are constantly repeated by commentators and policy-makers at the first signs of conflict in the international arena**: **1. democracies are inherently peaceful** unless unjustly attacked (or threatened) by authoritarian regimes, **2. uses of force by democracies are justified** because they are directed against real threats launched by rogue actors intent on undermining the ‘democratic way of life’, **3. democracies by definition cannot go to war with one another** (as a result of assertion 1), **4. the best way to ensure global stability and peace is to promote the spread of democracy. The power of these four assertions is augmented by the fact that they are very easy to comprehend and thus disseminate to the population at large; they muster support and help to provide a basis of legitimacy for actions (including the large-scale use of violence) that may have otherwise generated internal apathy if not opposition. In particular, the spread of democracy has been touted by Western governments as the panacea to all global ills and has therefore been (mis)used as a rationale for the use of force** in several instances including NATO’s bombing of Serbia, the Coalition war against the Taliban, and the invasion of Iraq. The irony that one ‘brand’ of democracy is being promoted in the Post- Cold War world through the use of force rather than open discussion seems to be lost on many Western observers**. Given the prevalence of the democratic peace thesis and its rhetorical impact both in the policymaking community and popular Western political discourse, a critical international relations scholar is faced** with Robert Cox’s key theoretical questions: to paraphrase, ‘**for whom and for what purpose has democratic peace theory been constructed**’?13 From a slightly different angle, Ido Oren and Jude Hays have argued “regularities of foreign policy can only be found where the analyst searches for them, and **US political scientists tend to devote a disproportionate share of their resources and energy to searches around the categories of democracy and/or liberalism”.14 Thus far, too few international scholars have been able or willing to ask why?** By deconstructing the democratic peace as a representational practice, possible answers will be found.

### Genocide

#### Genocide is a rationale that papers over imperialism

Lind 2007 (Michael, Columnist for *The National Interest* and policy director of New American Growth Program, “Beyond National Hegemony” <http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2007/beyond_american_hegemony_5381>)

Michael Mandelbaum concedes, in his book The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World’s Government in the 21st Century, that the case for U.S. global hegemony might not "persuade the American public, which might well reject the proposition that it should pay for providing the world with government services. American citizens see their country’s foreign policy as a series of discrete measures designed to safeguard the interests, above all the supreme interest of physical security, of the United States itself. They have never been asked to ratify their country’s status as the principal supplier of international public goods, and if they were asked explicitly to do so, they would undoubtedly ask in turn whether the United States ought to contribute as much to providing them, and other countries as little, as was the case in the first decade of the twenty-first century." So he concludes that it may be necessary to keep the American public in the dark because "the American role in the world may depend in part on Americans not scrutinizing it too closely." Will Marshall, president of the Progressive Policy Institute, noted in a recent issue that "America is a global power with global reach and responsibilities" and that, as a result, "the United States inevitably will be called upon to act." Yet, unwilling to explain the actual reasons for military interventions flowing from America’s hegemonic strategy of reassuring allies, dissuading potential peer competitors and preventing proliferation, American presidents and their allies have relied on misleading public rationales: rogue states, terrorists, WMD and genocide.

#### Selective decisionmaking—we only intervene to solve genocides we conceive of as geopolitically relevant

Lind 2007 (Michael, Columnist for *The National Interest* and policy director of New American Growth Program, “Beyond National Hegemony” <http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2007/beyond_american_hegemony_5381>)

The point is not to argue that ethnic cleansing should not be discouraged and punished by the international community, or that proliferation is not a problem or that the regimes called rogue states are not threats to their neighbors and world order. The point is rather that these phenomena have been used as public rationales for recent wars and threatened wars whose real purpose was either the reassurance of regional allies like Germany and Japan or the dissuasion of potential enemies like Russia and China (Kosovo, North Korea), or the removal of regimes that threatened America’s military freedom of action as the post-Cold War hegemon of the Middle East (the Iraq War). The genocide in Rwanda was real, but the United States did not intervene because -- unlike America’s would-be permanent protectorates in Europe, Asia and the Middle East -- Africa contains no great powers or critical power resources, and therefore is marginal to the U.S. hegemony strategy. Pakistan fits the definition of a rogue state, but it is a U.S. ally -- and as long as it remains friendly to the United States, it can be permitted to retain nuclear weapons. This kind of hypocrisy is made inevitable by the hegemony strategy itself. Because the American public would not support wars and threats of war in the interest of reassuring allies, dissuading competitors and preventing proliferation, its supporters have a choice between abandoning the strategy or deceiving the public about the true ends of U.S. foreign policy. For the last 15 years, they have chosen the latter.

### Environment

#### Environmental and resource crises are inextricably part of the global international system of violence—insisting on a separation between the two locks the link—your framework arguments assume the ideological separation of climate and geopolitics, which is false

Ahmed 2011 (Nafeez, executive director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development and Ph.D in IR from Sussex, “The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society” in *Global Change Peace & Security* 23.3)

The twenty-ﬁrst century heralds the unprecedented acceleration and convergence of multiple, interconnected global crises – climate change, energy depletion, food scarcity, and economic instability. While the structure of global economic activity is driving the unsustainable depletion of hydrocarbon and other natural resources, this is simultaneously escalating greenhouse gas emissions resulting in global warming. Both global warming and energy shocks are impacting detrimentally on global industrial food production, as well as on global ﬁnancial and economic instability. Conventional policy responses toward the intensiﬁcation of these crises have been decidedly inadequate because scholars and practitioners largely view them as separate processes. Yet increasing evidence shows they are deeply interwoven manifestations of a global political economy that has breached the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which it is embedded. In this context, orthodox IR’s ﬂawed diagnoses of global crises lead inexorably to their ‘securitisation’, reifying the militarisation of policy responses, and naturalising the proliferation of violent conﬂicts. Global ecological, energy and economic crises are thus directly linked to the ‘Otherisation’ of social groups and problematisation of strategic regions considered pivotal for the global political economy. Yet this relationship between global crises and conﬂict is not necessary or essential, but a function of a wider epistemological failure to holistically interrogate their structural and systemic causes.

#### Must start with critique to solve—environmental crisis replicate and reified without systemic critique of violence of international system

Ahmed 2011 (Nafeez, executive director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development and Ph.D in IR from Sussex, “The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society” in *Global Change Peace & Security* 23.3)

In 2009, the UK government’s chief scientiﬁc adviser Sir John Beddington warned that without mitigating and preventive action ‘drivers’ of global crisis like demographic expansion, environmental degradation and energy depletion could lead to a ‘perfect storm’ of simultaneous food, water and energy crises by around 2030. 1 Yet, for the most part, conventional policy responses from national governments and international institutions have been decidedly inadequate. Part of the problem is the way in which these crises are conceptualised in relation to security. Traditional disciplinary divisions in the social and natural sciences, compounded by bureaucratic compartmentalisation in policy-planning and decision-making, has meant these crises are frequently approached as largely separate processes with their own internal dynamics While it is increasingly acknowledged that cross-disciplinary approaches are necessary, these have largely failed to recognise just how inherently interconnected these crises are. As Brauch points out, ‘most studies in the environmental security debate since 1990 have ignored or failed to integrate the contributions of the global environmental change community in the natural sciences. To a large extent the latter has also failed to integrate the results of this debate.’ 2 Underlying this problem is the lack of a holistic systems approach to thinking about not only global crises, but their causal origins in the social, political, economic, ideological and value structures of the contemporary international system. Indeed, it is often assumed that these contemporary structures are largely what need to be ‘secured’ and protected from the dangerous impacts of global crises, rather than transformed precisely to ameliorate these crises in the ﬁrst place. Consequently, policy-makers frequently overlook existing systemic and structural obstacles to the implementation of desired reforms.

#### Critique of national interest and security comes first—national interest and identity fractures coalitions necessary to solve global climate and environmental crises

Ahmed 2011 (Nafeez, executive director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development and Ph.D in IR from Sussex, “The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society” in *Global Change Peace & Security* 23.3)

In a modest effort to contribute to the lacuna identiﬁed by Brauch, this paper begins with an empirically-oriented, interdisciplinary exploration of the best available data on four major global crises – climate change, energy depletion, food scarcity and global ﬁnancial instability – illustrating the systemic interconnections between different crises, and revealing that their causal origins are not accidental but inherent to the structural failings and vulnerabilities of existing global political, economic and cultural institutions. This empirical evaluation leads to a critical appraisal of orthodox realist and liberal approaches to global crises in international theory and policy. This critique argues principally that orthodox IR reiﬁes a highly fragmented, de-historicised ontology of the international system which underlies a reductionist, technocratic and compartmentalised conceptual and methodological approach to global crises. Consequently, rather than global crises being understood causally and holistically in the systemic context of the structure of the international system, they are ‘securitised’ as ampliﬁers of traditional security threats, requiring counter-productive militarised responses and/or futile inter-state negotiations. While the systemic causal context of global crisis convergence and acceleration is thus elided, this simultaneously exacerbates the danger of reactionary violence, the problematisation of populations in regions impacted by these crises and the naturalisation of the consequent proliferation of wars and humanitarian disasters. This moves us away from the debate over whether resource ‘shortages’ or ‘abundance’ causes conﬂicts, to the question of how either can generate crises which undermine conventional socio-political orders and confound conventional IR discourses, in turn radicalising the processes of social polarisation that can culminate in violent conﬂict.

#### The insistence on a state-centric solution to environmental crises reproduces those crises while ignoring their systemic causes: the result is warfare against those who do not protect the environment and reification of the very international system that produces such crises

Ahmed 2011 (Nafeez, executive director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development and Ph.D in IR from Sussex, “The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society” in *Global Change Peace & Security* 23.3)

This analysis thus calls for a broader approach to environmental security based on retrieving the manner in which political actors construct discourses of ‘scarcity’ in response to ecological, energy and economic crises (critical security studies) in the context of the historically-speciﬁc socio-political and geopolitical relations of domination by which their power is constituted, and which are often implicated in the acceleration of these very crises (historical sociology and historical materialism). Instead, both realist and liberal orthodox IR approaches focus on different aspects of interstate behaviour, conﬂictual and cooperative respectively, but each lacks the capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider global system concurrently over-exploiting the biophysical environment in which it is embedded. They are, in other words, unable to address the relationship of the inter-state system itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration of global crises. They simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the economy in society and the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics. 84 Hence, they neglect the profound irrationality of collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this relationship, globalising insecurity on a massive scale – in the very process of seeking security. 85 In Cox’s words, because positivist IR theory ‘does not question the present order [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it’. 86 Orthodox IR sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason – thus rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence. Indeed, the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent to which both realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises. 87 By the same token, the incapacity to recognise and critically interrogate how prevailing social, political and economic structures are driving global crisis acceleration has led to the proliferation of symptom-led solutions focused on the expansion of state/regime military–political power rather than any attempt to transform root structural causes. 88 It is in this context that, as the prospects for meaningful reform through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nulliﬁed under the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining prevailing geopolitical and economic structures, states have resorted progressively more to militarised responses designed to protect the concurrent structure of the international system from dangerous new threats. In effect, the failure of orthodox approaches to accurately diagnose global crises, directly accentuates a tendency to ‘securitise’ them – and this, ironically, fuels the proliferation of violent conﬂict and militarisation responsible for magniﬁed global insecurity. ‘Securitisation’ refers to a ‘speech act’ – an act of labelling – whereby political authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of ‘security’, therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival itself. Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper ‘dual’ structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military– police measures in purported response to an existential danger. 89 The problem in the context of global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises generating ‘new security challenges’, and are thus entirely disproportionate. 90 All that remains to examine is on the ‘surface’ of the international system (geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on), phenomena which are dislocated from their structural causes by way of being unable to recognise the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social relations of which they are comprised. The consequence is that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises other than to reduce them to their symptoms. Indeed, orthodox IR theory has largely responded to global systemic crises not with new theory, but with the expanded application of existing theory to ‘new security challenges’ such as ‘low-intensity’ intra-state conﬂicts; inequality and poverty; environmental degradation; international criminal activities including drugs and arms trafﬁcking; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and international terrorism. 91 Although the majority of such ‘new security challenges’ are non-military in origin – whether their referents are states or individuals – the inadequacy of systemic theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily examined through the lenses of military-political power. 92 In other words, the escalation of global ecological, energy and economic crises is recognised not as evidence that the current organisation of the global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable, requiring urgent transformation, but as vindicating the necessity for states to radicalise the exertion of their military–political capacities to maintain existing power structures, to keep the lid on. 93 Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying factors that could mobilise the popular will in ways that challenge existing political and economic structures, which it is presumed (given that state power itself is constituted by these structures) deserve protection. This justiﬁes the state’s adoption of extra-legal measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics. In the context of global crisis impacts, this counter-democratic trend-line can result in a growing propensity to problematise potentially recalcitrant populations – rationalising violence toward them as a control mechanism.

### Environment/Resources

#### Your unilateral strategy for global environmental crises creates a self-fulfilling prophecy of mass militarization and self-interested perspectivism that destroys and chance of real climate cooperation

Ahmed 2011 (Nafeez, executive director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development and Ph.D in IR from Sussex, “The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society” in *Global Change Peace & Security* 23.3)

In one salient example, O’Keefe draws extensively on both offensive and defensive variants of neorealist theory, including the work of Jack Snyder, Robert Jervis and Kenneth Waltz, to argue for realism’s continuing relevance in understanding how the ‘biophysical environment plays a signiﬁcant role in triggering and prolonging the structural conditions that result in con ﬂict’. She notes that standard realist concepts such as ‘anarchy, security dilemmas, and the prisoner’s dilemma’ can be used to explain the emergence of environmental or resource-based violent conﬂicts largely within, and occasionally between, the weaker states of the South. ‘Environmental anarchy’ occurs in weak states which lack ‘active government regulation’ of the internal distribution of natural resources, leading to a ‘tragedy of the commons’. This generates resource scarcities which lead to ‘security dilemmas’ over ownership of resources, often settled by resort to violence, perpetuated by ‘the prisoner’s dilemma’. 56 Ultimately, this theoretical hypothesis on the causes of environmental or resource-related con ﬂict is incapable of engaging with the deeper intersecting global structural conditions generating resource scarcities, independently of insufﬁcient government management of the internal distribution of resources in weak states. It simplistically applies the Hobbesian assumption that without a centralised ‘Leviathan’ state structure, the persistence of anarchy in itself generates con ﬂict over resources. Under the guise of restoring the signiﬁcance of the biophysical environment to orthodox IR, this approach in effect actually occludes the environment as a meaningful causal factor, reducing it to a mere epiphenomenon of the dynamics of anarchy in the context of state failure. As a consequence, this approach is theoretically impotent in grasping the systemic acceleration of global ecological, energy and economic crises as a direct consequence of the way in which the inter-state system itself exploits the biophysical environment. The same criticism in fact applies to opposing theories that resource abundance is a major cause of violent conﬂict. Bannon and Collier, for instance, argue that resource abundance and greed, rather than resource scarcity and political grievances, generated intra-state conﬂicts ﬁnanced by the export of commodities in regions like Angola and Sierra Leone (diamonds) or West Africa (tropical timber). In other regions, abundance rather than shortages of oil, drugs and gold fuelled and ﬁnanced violent secessionist movements in the context of widespread corruption and poor governance. 57 Ultimately, this departs little from the theoretical assumptions above, with weak central state governance still blamed for generating anarchic conditions conducive to conﬂict over abundant resources. Furthermore, as Kaldor shows, this simplistic perspective overlooks the wider context of the global political economy – the evolution of regional ‘war economies’ was often enabled precisely by the devastating impact of neoliberal structural adjustment programmes, which eroded state structures and generated social crises that radicalised identity politics. 58 Under traditional neorealist logic, a strategic response to global environmental crises must involve the expansion of state-military capabilities in order to strengthen the centralised governance structures whose task is to regulate the international distribution of natural resources, as well as to ensure that a particular state’s own resource requirements are protected. Neorealism understands inter-state competition, rivalry and warfare as inevitable functions of states’ uncertainty about their own survival, arising from the anarchic structure of the international system. Gains for one state are losses for another, and each state’s attempt to maximise its power relative to all other states is simply a reﬂection of its rational pursuit of its own security. The upshot is the normalisation of political violence in the international system, including practices such as over-exploitation of energy and the environment, as a ‘rational’ strategy – even though this ultimately ampliﬁes global systemic insecurity. Inability to cooperate internationally and for mutual beneﬁt is viewed as an inevitable outcome of the simple, axiomatic existence of multiple states. The problem is that neorealism cannot explain in the ﬁrst place the complex interdependence and escalation of global crises. Unable to situate these crises in the context of an international system that is not simply a set of states, but a transnational global structure based on a speciﬁc exploitative relationship with the biophysical environment, neorealism can only theorise global crises as ‘new issue areas’ appended to already existing security agendas. 59 Yet by the very act of projecting global crises as security threats, neorealism renders itself powerless to prevent or mitigate them by theorising their root structural causes. In effect, despite its emphasis on the reasons why states seek security, neorealism’s approach to issues like climate change actually guarantees greater insecurity by promoting policies which frame these ‘non-traditional’ issues purely as ampliﬁers of quite traditional threats. As Susanne Peters argues, the neorealist approach renders the militarisation of foreign and domestic policy a pragmatic and necessary response to issues such as resource scarcities – yet, in doing so, it entails the inevitable escalation of ‘resource wars’ in the name of energy security. Practically, this serves not to increase security for competing state and non-state actors, but to debilitate international security through the proliferation of violent conﬂict to access and control diminishing resources in the context of unpredictable complex emergencies. 60 Neorealism thus negates its own theoretical utility and normative value. For if ‘security’ is the fundamental driver of state foreign policies, then why are states chronically incapable of effectively ameliorating the global systemic ampliﬁers of ‘insecurity’, despite the obvious rationale to do so in the name of warding off collective destruction, if not planetary annihilation? 61

#### Cannot separate energy crises and resource scarcity issues from the legacy of imperial violence—self-interested ideology of power aggrandizement better explains shortages than the weak aff internal link arguments—even if the plan produces resources we won’t distribute them

Ahmed 2011 (Nafeez, executive director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development and Ph.D in IR from Sussex, “The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society” in *Global Change Peace & Security* 23.3)

Global ecological, economic and energy crises thus expose a core contradiction at the heart of modernity – that the material progress delivered by scientiﬁc reason in the service of unlimited economic growth is destroying the very social and environmental conditions of modernity’s very existence. This stark contradiction between ofﬁcial government recognition of the potentially devastating security implications of resource scarcity and the continued abject failure of government action to mitigate these security implications represents a fundamental lacuna that has been largely overlooked in IR theory and policy analysis. It reveals an analytical framework that has focused almost exclusively on potential symptoms of scarcity. But a truly complete picture of the international relations of resource scarcity would include not only a map of projected impacts, but would also seek to grasp their causes by confronting how the present structure of the international system itself has contributed to the acceleration of scarcity, while inhibiting effective national and international responses. It could be suggested that the present risk-oriented preoccupation with symptoms is itself symptomatic of IR’s insufﬁcient self-reﬂection on its own role in this problem. Despite the normative emphasis on ensuring national and international security, the literature’s overwhelming preoccupation with gauging the multiplicity of ways in which ecological, energy and economic crises might challenge security in coming decades provides very little opening in either theory or policy to develop more effective strategies to mitigate or prevent these heightened security challenges. On the contrary, for the most part, these approaches tend to highlight the necessity to maximise national political–military and international regimes’ powers so that states might be able to respond more robustly in the event that new threats like resource wars and state failure do emerge. But the futility of this trajectory is obvious – a preoccupation with ‘security’ ends up becoming an unwitting accomplice in the intensiﬁcation of insecurity. The extent of orthodox IR theory’s complicity in this predicament is evident in its reduction of inter-state relations to balance-of-power dynamics, despite a lack of determinate bases by which to deﬁne and delineate the dynamics of material power. While orthodox realism focuses inordinately on a military–political conceptualisation of national power, conventional attempts to extend this conceptualisation to include economic dimensions (including the role of transnational corporations) – as well as production, ﬁnance, ideas and institutions beyond the state – do not solve the problem. 75 This Weberian proliferation of categorisations of the multiple dimensions of power, while useful, lacks a unifying explanatory order of determination capable of rendering their interconnections intelligible. As Rosenberg shows in his analysis of the dynamics of distinctive geopolitical orders from Rome to Spain – and Teschke in his exploration of the changing polities of continental Europe from the eighth to the eighteenth centuries – these orders have always been inseparably conjoined with their constitutive relations of production as structured in the context of prevailing social– property relations, illustrating the mutually-embedded nature of ‘economic’ and ‘extra-economic’ power. 76 In contrast, orthodox IR axiomatically fragments the ‘economic’ and ‘extra-economic’ (and the latter further into ‘military’, ‘political’, ‘cultural’, etc.) into separate, autonomous spheres with no grasp of the scope of their interconnection. 77 It also dislocates both the state, and human existence as such, from their fundamental material conditions of existence, in the form of their relationship to the biophysical environment, as mediated through relations of production, and the way these are governed and contested through social–property relations. 78 By externalising the biophysical environment – and thus human metabolism with nature – from state praxis, orthodox IR simply lacks the conceptual categories necessary to recognise the extent to which socio-political organisational forms are mutually constituted by human embeddedness in the natural world. 79 While further fragmenting the international into a multiplicity of disconnected state units whose behaviour can only be analysed through the limited lenses of anarchy or hierarchy, orthodox IR is incapable of situating these units in the holistic context of the global political economy, the role of transnational capitalist classes, and the structural pressures thereby exerted on human and state behaviour. 80 Indeed, the mediating structure of the global political economy – along with the beliefs and behaviour of agents within it (through which this structure is constructed) – play a critical role in the transformation of ecological or resource-related events into concrete politically-deﬁned conditions of ‘scarcity’ that lead to crisis or conﬂict. A powerful example is provided by Davis in his study of the impact of the El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO) – the vast oscillation in air mass and Paciﬁc Ocean temperature. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, ENSO created large-scale droughts in many countries peripheral to the European empires, including those in Asia (India, China, Java, the Philippines and Korea), and in Brazil, southern Africa, Algeria and Morocco. Davis shows that British ‘free market’ imperial policy converted these droughts into foreseeable but preventable deadly famines, multiplying death tolls to gross proportions without any historical precedent. 81 In 1874–76, northern harvests were more than sufﬁcient to provide reserves for the 1878 autumn crops deﬁcit. But most of the grain from north-western Indian subsistence farming was controlled by a captive export sector designed to stabilise British grain prices, which from 1876 to 1877 had increased due to poor harvests. This generated a British demand that absorbed almost the entirety of north-western India’s wheat surplus. Meanwhile, proﬁts from these grain exports were monopolised by wealthy property holders, moneylenders and grain merchants, as opposed to poor Indian farmers. India’s newly-constructed modern railway system shipped grain from drought areas ‘to central depots for hoarding’, leading to exorbitant price hikes that were ‘co-ordinated in a thousand towns at once’. Food prices rocketed out of the reach of ‘outcaste labourers, displaced weavers, sharecroppers and poor peasants’. Consequently, ‘the poor began to starve to death even in well-watered districts “reputed to be immune to food shortages”’. Thus, between 1877 and 1878, grain merchants exported a record 6.4 million hundredweight of wheat to Europe while between 5.5 and 12 million Indians starved to death. This catastrophe occurred ‘not outside the modern world system, but in the very process of being forcibly incorporated into its economic and political structures’. 82 As Dalby thus argues, ‘humans live in a complex interaction with environments that adapt and change in much more complex ways than is facilitated by linear thinking within the territorial boxes of contemporary administrative arrangements’. This suggests ‘that “global” markets and economic connections are essential to understanding the complex politics of “local” environments and struggles over access to speciﬁc resources in particular places’ – because the ‘geography of the domination of nature’ is precisely the continuing ‘history of colonisation and imperialism’. 83 Hence, environmental and energy crises are generated in the context of historically-speciﬁc sociopolitical systems – and whether or not they lead to conﬂict depends on existing relations of power at local, national and transnational scales, and on how those relations are conﬁgured by structures of resource ownership, mediated by ideas and values, and supported by military power.

#### Focusing on environmental crises and resource issues as issues of management trades off with understanding their systemic causes and roots in imperialist and self-interested political ideology

Ahmed 2011 (Nafeez, executive director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development and Ph.D in IR from Sussex, “The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society” in *Global Change Peace & Security* 23.3)

While recommendations to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism toward a ‘human security’ approach are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to ‘non-traditional’ security issues. 106 By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of global ecological, energy and economic crises, orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of ‘surface’ impacts of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity, such as international terrorism, violent conﬂict and population movements. Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks, groups and countries that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these ‘surface’ impacts – which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon energy resources, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the focus of state security planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad. The intensifying problematisation and externalisation of Muslim-majority regions and populations by Western security agencies – as a discourse – is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an epistemological failure to interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration in collective state policies (which themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures). This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the social relations of the perpetrators, in this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost – precisely because the efﬁcacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question. As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between natural resources and conﬂict per se. Neither ‘resource shortages’ nor ‘resource abundance’ (in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms) necessitate conﬂict by themselves. There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to con ﬂict. The ﬁrst is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution between different social groups and classes. Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms, in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to externalisation of those groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them. Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy ‘reform’ is woefully inadequate. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global ﬁnancial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation. Yet conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to (1) fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and (2) translate the social science implications of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence, lacking capacity for epistemological self-reﬂection and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse ‘Others’, newly constructed as traditional security threats enormously ampliﬁed by global crises – a process that guarantees the intensiﬁcation and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe. Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences – drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences – is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.

#### **The affirmative claiming to solve the “environmental threat, crisis, and/or issue” is a colonial understanding that operates on assumptions of an external nature whose resources are to be managed.**

SimonDalby, coeditor of The Geopolitics Reader, professor of geography and political economy at Carleton University in Ottawa, 2002 Environmental Security, p. 99-100)

The environmentalist arguments frequently focus on questions of the appropriate use of resources and the preservation of nature, species, and habitats. This native activist understands that the construction of “environment” is a colonial understanding, one that operates on the urban assumptions of an external nature whose resources are to be managed, rather than a context, place, or home that is to be lived in. But the insight is especially telling in light of Richard Grove’s ex­tensive historical investigations into the origins of contemporary en­vironmentalism, which, as noted in chapter 4, are linked directly to matters of colonial administration and anxieties about climate, de­forestation, and much else.53 The cultural construction of nature as external is of course an ex­tension of the etiology of the term “environ,” which literally refers to that which surrounds, and historically to that which surrounds a town.54 As the scale of the global economy expands, and as the popu­lation in cities makes ever larger demands on distant rural resources, the question of the appropriate designation of these processes becomes ever more critical. In Arturo Escobar’s terms this is so because they are incorporated into the world capitalist economy, even the most remote communities of the Third World are torn from their local context, redefined as ‘resources’ to be planned for, managed.”55 In discussing environmental security, the expansion of urban ex­propriation of rural resources has to be worked into the analysis if the appropriate geographical understandings are to be made part of the discussion. As chapter 4 has made clear, getting the geography of environmental security wrong does not help clarify matters. Geo­political reasoning may be a powerful mode of raising political con­cern about security issues, but as a mode of thinking intelligently about contemporary social and environmental processes, it leaves much to be desired, precisely because it so frequently perpetuates the patterns of development thinking and the geopolitical assumptions of separate competing polities that are the cause of so much difficul­ty in the first place.

#### Securitizing the environment removes us from nature and pits us against it.

Nina Graeger, Journal of Peace Research 1996 33: 109, [political scientist](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_scientist), IR scholar, senior researcher and head of the Department of International Politics, and doctorate of political science from the University of Oslo

Although the authors of the literature reviewed agree that there are linkages between the environment and security, several have questioned the analogy between the logic of the military and that of the environmental security concept. Some warn against a 'securitization' of environmental problems because this represents a militarization of our thinking about the relationship between humanity and the environment. The traditional logic of security involves threats issued among states with specific wills captured by nationalism or ideology. These are often directed against and conceptualized in terms of 'The Other' (Wrever, 1993, pp. 13-14). Securitization of the environment invites a state-centered thinking about security, with the ability to withdraw from or respond to environmental problems depending heavily on the character of the state in question. Politically unstable and/or economically poor or dependent states may have to choose between cheap and quick industrialization and environmental protection. The two strategies may be mutually exclusive but equally important to satisfy the international community.¶ Others have argued, on the contrary, that by including a non-military threat like the environment, the concept of environmental security represents a demilitarization of security thinking. The concept of environmental security acknowledges the need for a political leadership to ensure the security of its citizens above and beyond their military security. A wider concept of security may also increase the range of legitimate policy choices available (Ullman,¶ 1983, p. 133).¶ However, by securitizing environmental issues and making them part of high politics, the range of policy choices available is not increased but reduced. Securitization of the environment describes a way of handling environmental issues where threats to the environment are seen as urgent and immediate, requiring a quick response at top political level (Buzan et a!., 1995). Indeed, for politicians to devote themselves to a given issue, it helps a great deal if this issue falls within the realm of high politics. This is the most important political contribution of the concept of environmental security not its potential demilitarization of security thinking. Yet in the long run, desecuritization, or politicization, may be preferable to securitization. Politicization is 'a recognition of social-political responsibilities for changes in the quality of environmental conditions' which makes environmental issues part of the usual day-to-day political business (Buzan et a!., 1995, p. 15). When environmental concerns become part of ‘low politics' and lose their sense of political importance and urgency, they attract less public interest. Elections in Europe and in the USA in the 1990s show that the environment no longer triggers the same active public involvement as in the 1980s. Popular mobilization against environmental degradation seems to be at its peak in the case of potentially dangerous man-made environmental degradation, such as the French nuclear tests in French Polynesia. In the longer run, however, a positive mobilization basis of human aspirations, rather than fear, may be necessary if individual action is to be sustained (Deudney, 1990, p. 469). In any case, the degree of popular mobilization is likely to depend heavily on perceptions of its efficacy.

#### C**ountries categorize environmental issues if they are affected by it, enough studies have been done to dismiss and alarmism of ecowars**

Dalby, Simon (a professor of geography and political economy at Carleton University) 2002 "security and ecology in the age of globalization."

Many situations with a vaguely environmental designation now apparently endanger modern modes of life in the North (as the affluent industrialized parts of the world are now often called). Growing population pressures and environmental crises in the South—the poor and underdeveloped parts of the planet—have long concerned policymakers and academics. Many states have developed security and intelligence agencies, environmental ministries, and international treaty obligations that address population and environmental dynamics. Weather forecasts for many areas now include routine updates of ozone-depletion levels and the variable daily dangers of exposure to ultraviolet radiation. Some discussions address pollution as a technical matter and such phenomena as ozone holes in terms of risks or hazards rather than as security concerns. But since these matters are now also part of international political discourse and policy initiatives, environment cannot be separated from matters of what is now called “global” security. Environmental change and resource shortages are integral to these discussions, which have also taken place against a backdrop of important questions within the North-South political dialogue. In 1992, the largest summit of world leaders took place in Rio de Janeiro to deal with issues of environment and development. Although the level of high political attention to these issues does fluctuate, the global environment has clearly become a matter of continuing international political concern. Some alarmist accounts have even suggested that future security threats to the affluent North will come about because environmental degradation will lead to starvation and the collapse of societies in the South, leading in turn to a massive migration of “environmental refugees.” In 1994, Robert Kaplan garnered much attention in Washington and elsewhere with his alarming predictions of a “coming anarchy” premised on the assumption of resource shortages (Kaplan, 1994; see also Kaplan, 2000). Kaplan suggested that these resource shortages would occur in part because global population would grow faster than the ability of agriculture to support it (a traditional Malthusian argument). But Kaplan’s argument also fits into larger recent arguments about how resource shortages in general cause conflict—the so-called “neo-Malthusian” arguments that underlie a substantial part of environmental-security literature. The 1990s spawned two major interconnected discussions among Northern scholars on these themes. The first discussion centered on security—its definition and how it might be redefined after the Cold War. This debate included dialogue on which other threats (apart from those related to warfare) ought to be included in comprehensive definitions and policies; it also examined who and what was being secured in the process (Buzan, Wæver, & deWilde, 1998). The redefinition of security has prominently featured environmental considerations (Deudney & Matthew, 1999; Lowi & Shaw, 2000; Barnett, 2001). Second, a more empirical discussion looked at the narrower question of whether environmental change actually threatened (or could plausibly threaten) security for states in general and the North in particular (Diehl & Gleditsch, 2001). By the end of the 1990s, as the lengthy bibliographies in previous editions of ECSP Report attest, the results of this substantial body of empirical research work were appearing in print. Some researchers argue that the environment security debate has evolved in three stages (Ronnfeldt, 1997). First came the initial conceptual work that called for a broader understanding of security than that which dominated Cold War discourses. Second, theorists attempted to sketch out how to specify links between environment and insecurity in order to establish a practical research agenda for scholarly analysis. The third stage has featured a search for empirical verification or refutation of the initial postulates. While studies are still in progress, enough detailed field work had been done by 2000 to give at least a broad outline of the likely relationships between environment and security and to dismiss definitively much of the early alarmism about international conflict in the form of “ecowars.” It is now time to feed these conclusions back into the larger conceptual discussion that first set the field’s empirical research in motion. With the wisdom of a decade’s research to draw on, environmental security discussions can now move to a fourth stage of synthesis and reconceptualization (Dalby, 2002). In addition to this fourth stage, scholars and policymakers now have to consider current research on biospheric system and what is now called global change science in their effort to think clearly about both environment and security. Considering matters in these terms adds some crucial dimensions that the 1990s alarmist accounts of neo-Malthusian scarcities left out. Policymakers need to carefully consider both the context of security discussions as well as what their policymaking aims to secure; neither is as obvious as is frequently assumed. In particular, taking ecology seriously requires questioning more than a few conventional assumptions.

#### Policy makers attempt to secure itself from environmental threats have actually caused a continued spiral of doom causing violence and environmental insecurity

JonBarnett (Fellowship in the School of Social and Environmental Enquiry at University of Melbourne) 2001, *(The Meaning of Environmental Security: Ecological Politics and Policy in the New Security Era*, pg. 89)

Beneath current US initiatives 'and pronouncements on environ­mental security lies a resistance to meaningful change and a defence of the status quo. As Dalby notes, 'in so far as security is premised on maintaining the status quo it runs counter to the changes needed to alleviate many environmental and economic problems because it is precisely the status quo that has produced the problems' (Dalby 1994: 33). The US government's response to environmental security is not the new foreign and security policies we might have expected to flow from the concept; instead, it has responded with the usual approach to foreign policy based on inside/outside rationality. For the US, environmental security is about securing the very lifestyles and institutions that degrade the environment against the risks associated with this same degradation. This is a paradox lost 'on most, and a dangerous and counterproductive outcome which cannot be ignored by any proponent of environmental security. This President Bush's comment at Rio in 1,992 — that the lifestyle of the US negotiable —still holds true. Thus far US environmental security policy has done little to help minimize the causes of environmental insecurity, indeed it seems funda­mentally implicated in their perpetuation. It does not recognize that fundamental long-term changes in the structure of the global political economy are required; nor does it recognize that, if any single country needs to implement this reform, it is the US itself Instead, it holds to a singular belief that the best way to secure against threatening Others is to prepare for war; the irony in this strategy of securing against violence by advocating violence is well known. But, as we shall see in the following chapter, preparing for war is a significant cause of the very environmental degradation the US military finds so threatening, and so the outcome of these policies is a continued spiraling downwards of the interrelated prob­lems of direct violence, structural violence and environmental insecurity.

#### False views of the eco crisis are viewed as a norm creating solutions that worsen the very system that brought about the crisis in the first place.

Sung-UK Hwang 99 ( Ph. D. candidate in political science at the University of Connecticut.) (*Ecological panopticism; the problematization of the ecological crisis* pg.140-141)

Second, the declaration suggests that we are now faced with a crisis that we have not experienced before. It conveys the impression that the crisis is a recent phenomenon; it sounds as if one morning we awoke to find ourselves faced with air pollution, water contamination, toxic wastes, soil erosion, urban congestion, and the like. The declaration highlights the abrupt outburst of the crisis and buries in a politics of amnesia the ecological maelstrom our forebears have created and suffered from. The past disappears. In 1844 Friedrich Engels deplored the uninhabitable conditions of the English working class, such as infernal noise, adulterated food, raw sewage, foul odor, poisonous wastes, rampant cholera, and much more (1968). With regard to the spatial segregation in urban areas, he observed, "the bourgeoisie has only one method of solving the housing question after its fashion-that is to say, of solving it in such a way that the solution continually reproduces the question anew" (1935, 74; italics original). The wealthy with strong stomachs and weak nerves avoided the ecological hell-holes of the capitalist urbanization and ignored their existence. Only when the global character of ecological burdens allows no immunity to them does the discourse of ecological crisis come into being. Similarly, the ecological crisis, too obvious to be unnoticed by mainstream greens, does not care who has overused and overloaded the planet, and for what purpose. The ecological exigencies, which call for taking immediate measures, let bygones be bygones. The discourse of crisis forces us to focus on the present with no root in the past. "We" are hesitant to confront and transform the processes that gave rise to the problem, for all its comprehensive gravity. Otherwise, "we" usually summon false causalities. For instance, Paul Ehrlich has maintained that the population bomb exploded because ignorant people in the Third World have been breeding like rabbits. Three decades after he invented The Population Bomb (1968), he is better informed enough to admit "a world where U.S. consumption is so profligate that the birth of an average American baby is hundreds of times more of a disaster for Earth's life-support systems than the birth of a baby in a desperately poor nation" (Ehrlich & Ehrlich 1990, 10-11). But he quickly goes back to overpopulation as the chief cause underlying tropical forest fires, sewagesmeared beaches, drought-stricken farm fields, and life-threatening smog. Ehrlich does not take pains to consider historically how and why the "bomb" has been created. In early capitalist societies, more people meant more cheap labor, more production, more consumption, and more surplus profit. Nathan Keyfitz argued three decades ago that the rudimentary capitalism of the nineteenth century increased the world population by reaching out for raw materials in Africa and Asia in order to feed the capitalist machine (1967, 73). Marx says succinctly, "Accumulation of capital is therefore multiplication of the proletariat" (1976, 764). But this historical proletarianization of Third World people is now forgotten. Instead, "ignorant, dirty, poor, wild" people who destroy "our" rain forests are disparaged in the mass media. Another false causality ascribes the ecological degradation to the Cartesian dichotomy between subject and object (or, between society and nature), the dichotomy traced back to the Judaeo-Christian cosmology of man's mastery of nature. In turning away from the destructive vision of human hubris, Western greens (especially deep ecologists) often turn to the Asian metaphysical tradition in their arduous pursuit of”eco-friendly" wisdom. They expect that the distinct articulation of nature-loving in Taoism, Buddhism, and Hinduism will provide an escape route from the nature-dominating orientation of the Western metaphysics. However, an abstract theorem of the man-nature relation is nothing more than an aesthetic abstraction with little relationship to the nature of a real ecosystem. The outwardly admirable wisdom, while reclaiming a retrospective submission to the innocent self, undifferentiated from nature, does more to serve the needs of the social order than to address the problem of physical reality which persists in our everyday lives. The problem is not an ontological reciprocity which humanity has with nature, but a specific violence-the rapacious violence that inheres in capitalism-concrete enough to rapidly cause ecological destruction. Indeed, the ecological misconduct in Asian countries, denounced widely for its breadth and depth of irreversible damage, shows the inadequacy of the "Eastern turn" of epistemology. The ecological debacles of economic miracles in East Asia demonstrate that capitalism does not let the epistemic shift be realized. With these false causalities, the problematization of the ecological crisis, while attending exclusively the urgent predicament, distracts the attention from the main culprit of ecological pillage. While attracting public gaze to the direst scenes of ecological disasters, it turns a blind eye to those forces that have affected the plight. It questions neither how the population bomb was created, nor why the ecological equilibrium was destroyed. History proves that when capitalism rushes in, it capitalizes the rivers, forests, mountains, skies, birds, people of the pre-capitalist societies, and even the ideas of nature and culture on the model of the industrial factory. Whether incubated in a pre-existing society or imposed forcibly from outside, capitalism always disrupts the social mediation of man-nature relations. Its market nexus precludes the reproduction of nature (both physical and human) which are not themselves subject to exchange valuation. Profitability, as the motor of capital, replaces social needs-and ecological sustainability-in determining what to produce and how to distribute. As growth is the key to raising profits, the system continually engenders the expansion of production, consumption, and waste. The ecological crisis is not a surprising interlude to, but an ongoing process of capitalism. The naiveté in characterizing the crisis as ecological, however, obfuscates dangerously the inquiry into the true nature of the crisis and the understanding of why the response to the crisis has taken the form that it has-that is, of green capitalism. Above all, the demonstration of an ecological crisis requires the support of scientific evidence, afforded by advanced technology which is itself a major cause for the crisis. Yet modern technology, while validating a global warning of ecological catastrophe, provides a series of seeming breakthroughs which will allegedly forestall the impending disaster. For their parts, those technological contrivances induce a different set of problems whose effects may remain unnoticed for some time. For example, computers may reduce the consumption of pulp, but the Intel Corporation, in order to produce just one sixinch silicon wafer, creates 25 pounds of sodium hydroxide, 2,840 gallons of waste water, and 7 pounds of hazardous waste (Kaliner 1997, 17).

## Impacts

### Permanent War

#### Security thinking creates pockets of violence

Duffield ‘8 (Mark, Dept. of Politics, U. of Bristol, “Global Civil War: The Non-Insured, International Containment and Post-Interventionary Society,” Journal of Refugee Studies Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 161-162)

This essay began with the proposition that to complete the nexus between development and security, the term containment needs to be included; in the sense that you cannot have development or security without containing the circulation of underdeveloped life. Rather than emerging with the end of the Cold War, or even less convincingly with 9/11, the origins of this nexus can be traced to decolonization. While its constituent parts have an even longer history, decolonization publicly signalled the generic division of humankind into insured and non-insured species-life. It foregrounded the coexistence of a developed life, supported by the welfare bureaucracies associated with social insurance, with an underdeveloped life expected to be self-reliant. While the former was secure within the juridico-political framework of the nation-state, the latter was synonymous with deficient but aspiring states. As an appendage of this new world of states, decolonization also called forth a volatile world of peoples having, for the first time, the potential to circulate globally. In meeting this threat, since the 1960s, the resilience of consumer society has been regularly scored in terms of the ability of effective states to contain the circulatory effects of the permanent crisis of self-reliance, including political instability and the mobile poverty of irregular migration. In the intervening decades, containment has deepened and extended to constitute a virtual global ban on the free movement of spontaneous or non-managed migration. This necessity was first articulated in terms of the risks posed to community cohesion and the finite resources of the welfare state. Spurred by the threat of terrorism, such concerns have now been generalized to include the critical energy, transport and service infrastructures of mass consumer society. The international security architecture that emerged with decolonization interconnects the containment of irregular migration with measures to integrate migrant communities already settled within consumer society and, at the same time, state-led development initiatives to improve the self-reliance and stasis of underdeveloped life in situ. This episodic architecture has deepened with each crisis of global circulation. It marks out a terrain of a global civil war, or rather tableau of wars, which is being fought on and between the modalities of life itself. Through their associated modalities of circulation—and the need to police them—global civil war connects the livelihood conflicts of the global South with threats to critical infrastructure in the North. Since the end of the Cold War, the radical interdependence of world events has placed a renewed emphasis on the need for social cohesion at home while, at the same time, urging a fresh wave of intervention abroad to reconstruct weak and fragile states, or remove rogue ones. What is at stake in this war is the West’s ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means. Supported by the massed ranks of career politicians and big business, there is a real possibility that this disastrous formula for sharing the world with others will be defended to the death. Certainly, that a large part of humanity is deemed to be self-reliant and potentially sustainable—if limited to basic needs—must give hope to many in the environmental lobby. As a lived reality, however, it is less convincing. Reflected within the globalization of containment, imposing and maintaining this putative life-style has become increasingly violent and coercive. In one way or another, we are all involved in this war; it cannot be escaped since it mobilizes societies as a whole, including policy makers and academics. Because this war is being conducted in our name, however, we have a right as citizens to decide where we agree and disagree, and at what point, or over which issues, we need to establish our own terms of engagement.

### Militarism

#### Must reject militarism—key to solidarity with humanity

Carr 2010 (Matt, journalist and author residing in Derbyshire, this essay was peer reviewed, “Slouching toward dystopia: the new military futurism” in *Race and Class* 51.3)

Such developments are nevertheless entirely in keeping with the US military’s perception of itself as the last barrier against global disorder – a role which is clearly not limited to the ‘feral cities’ of the global South. US military strategies cover a wide gamut. At one end, there are the counterinsurgency intellectuals of the Iraqi ‘surge’, such as the Australian army officer David Kilcullen. At the other, there is the neoconservative pundit and former army officer Ralph Peters, the General Sherman of the war on terror, for whom the wars of the future are won by attrition and mass killing. In a discussion paper written for the NIC’s 2020 Project, Peters urged the US military to abandon its moral and ethical scruples and engage in merciless ‘virtuous destruction’ since ‘there is no substitute for shedding the enemy’s blood in adequate quantities’. 75 Mass killing should not be limited by any attempts to spare the enemy’s infrastructure, since: Such a policy not only complicates the achievement of victory, but extracts no serious price from the population. Consequences matter. Enemy populations must be broken down to an almost childlike state (the basic-training model) before being built up again. But war cannot be successfully waged – especially between civilizations, as is overwhelmingly the case at present – without inflicting memorable pain on the enemy. 76 In the course of the twentieth century, unchecked militarism killed millions of human beings, destroyed entire cities and placed the existence of humanity in jeopardy. Today, as the Pentagon seeks to use its vast military budgets to populate the future with robot armies, super soldiers and airborne drones that ‘see’ inside buildings and kill their occupants, the dark visions of the military futurists are providing a justification for endless global war against enemies that may never exist. In doing so, they are laying the foundations for a militarised and weaponised future, even as they shape the wars and conflicts of the present. All this suggests, if nothing else, that the future is too important to be left to the military. And if we are to avoid the bleak dystopias that the military futurists would impose upon us, we need, perhaps more than ever, to work towards a future where human beings, not robots and soldiers, can find their place on earth.

#### Continued militarism guarantees extinction

Kevin Clements, President of the International Peace Research Association, Director of the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason, April 3, 1996, Toda Institute Seminar, “The Future of Peace and Conflict Studies,” http://www.toda.org/Default.aspx?PageID=39

What I am suggesting by all of this is that peace and conflict studies in the past have been overwhelmingly biased by sets of Western middle class concerns. (I could also add white, male, reformist concerns.) This is not of itself a bad thing since it did result in the evolutionary of a new interdisciplinary field albeit around a rather narrow range of critical problems, e.g., analysis of the conditions for negative peace (or the absence of war and direct violence) or positive peace (the elimination of structural violence and the promotion of social and economic justice and fairness.) Both of these preoccupations, i.e., the causes of war and violence and the conditions for peace and justice remain at the heart of peace and conflict studies but they need to be broadened if we are to make a significant contribution to the survival of the species and if we are to develop a deepened enhancement of the quality of life for all peoples. So how do we wish to do this? In the first place we must build on the traditions that have been established in the field in order to eliminate militarism, national and global violent conflict and the threat of global destruction. In relation to nuclear weapons, for example, although the risk of nuclear confrontation has diminished considerably, there is continuing anxiety about the command and control of such weapons in Russia and far too many states that wish to cross the nuclear threshold to enhance their international bargaining power, e. g., Pakistan, India, Iran, and Iraq, etc. Generally, however, as the recently formed Canberra Commission notes, this is an opportune time to push for the total abolition of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction. They have no military utility and are increasingly seen as a political liability as well.

### Biopolitics

#### Risk understandings are the ontological basis of modern politics

Dillon, professor of security @ Lancaster, 2008

(Michael, “Underwriting Security” *Security Dialogue* 32.3)

The widespread popular and professional misconception of risk nonetheless distorts our political and governmental understanding of risk as a form of rule. It misconceives it from the beginning and blinds enquiry into the nature and operation of risk. The mistake is a fundamental and costly one. For risk has become one of the single most important security technologies of the age and to mistake its character is to mistake the way in which we have come to be ruled through risk and its allied governmental technologies. The political stakes involved in the misconception of risk could therefore not be higher. To misconceive risk is to misconceive the ontopolitics, the apparatuses of power/knowledge and techno-scientific devices by means of which western societies are now governmentally secured; from the macro calculations of geopolitical analysis – no matter how scandalously they misconduct their risk assessments (Iraq) – to the biopolitical micro management of individuals and populations. Rule through risk thus secures individuals and populations locally and globally by locating them in a general economy of the contingent in which ‘the event’ rather than ‘the will’ reigns supreme. What that means is that the very understanding of the real which underpins risk-based approaches to security, as well as the technologies which are used and the knowledge upon which these technologies rely, differs significantly form that presupposed by traditional security discourses.

#### Biopower is the root cause of war and conflict

Michel Foucault, Professor of History of Systems of Thought at the Collège de France, 1978, The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction, translated by Robert Hurley, p. 135-137

For a long time, one of the characteristic privileges of sovereign power was the right to decide life and death. In a formal sense, it derived no doubt from the ancient patria potestas that granted the father of the Roman family the right to “dispose” of the life of his children and his slaves; just as he had given them life, so he could take it away. By the time the right of life and death was framed by the classi­cal theoreticians, it was in a considerably diminished form. It was no longer considered that this power of the sovereign over his subjects could be exercised in an absolute and un­conditional way, but only in cases where the sovereign’s very existence was in jeopardy: a sort of right of rejoinder. If he were threatened by external enemies who sought to over­throw him or contest his rights, he could then legitimately wage war, and require his subjects to take part in the defense of the state; without “directly proposing their death,” he was empowered to “expose their life”: in this sense, he wielded an “indirect” power over them of life and death. But if someone dared to rise up against him and transgress his laws, then he could exercise a direct power over the offender’s life: as punishment, the latter would be put to death. Viewed in this way, the power of life and death was not an absolute privilege: it was conditioned by the defense of the sovereign, and his own survival. Must we follow Hobbes in seeing it as the transfer to the prince of the natural right possessed by every individual to defend his life even if this meant the death of others? Or should it be regarded as a specific right that was manifested with the formation of that new juridical being, the sovereign? In any case, in its modern form—relative and limited—as in its ancient and absolute form, the right of life and death is a dissymmetrical one. The sovereign exercised his right of life only by exercising his right to kill, or by refraining from killing; he evidenced his power over life only through the death he was capable of requiring. The right which was formulated as the “power of life and death” was in reality the right to *take* life or *let* live. Its symbol, after all, was the sword. Perhaps this juridical form must be re­ferred to a historical type of society in which power was exercised mainly as a means of deduction (*prelevement*), a subtraction mechanism, a right to appropriate a portion of the wealth, a tax of products, goods and services, labor and blood, levied on the subjects. Power in this instance was essentially a right of seizure: of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself; it culminated in the privilege to seize hold of life in order to suppress it. Since the classical age the West has undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power. “Deduction” has tended to be no longer the major form of power but merely one element among others, working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, mak­ing them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them. There has been a parallel shift in the right of death, or at least a tendency to align itself with the exigencies of a life-adminis­tering power and to define itself accordingly. This death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life. Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations. But this formidable power of death—and this is perhaps what accounts for part of its force and the cynicism with which it has so greatly expanded its limits—now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to adminis­ter, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire popula­tions are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual’s con­tinued existence. The principle underlying the tactics of bat­tle-that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living-has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.

### Imperialism/Militarism

#### On balance U.S. led world order is net worse for stability and results in an incredible body count along with mass global suffering

Boggs 2005 (Carl, Professor of Social Science at National University, *Imperial Delusions* p. x-xiii)

As, the United States moves to reshape the geopolitical terrain of the world, 'Nith hundreds of military bases in 130 countries added to hundreds of installations stretched across its own territorial confines, the vast majority of Americans refuse to admit their nation possesses anything resembling an Empire. Yet U.S. global expansion is far more ambitious than anything pursued or even imagined by previous imperial powers. It might be argued that the "new militarism" is rooted in a "new imperialism" that aspires to nothing short of world domination, a project earlier outlined by its exuberant proponents and given new life by the Bush II presidency, which has set out to remove all vestiges of ideological and material impediments to worldwide corporate power-by every means at its disposal. It is hard to resist the conclusion that the United States, its strong fusion of national exceptionalism, patriotic chauvinism, and neoliberal fundamentalism fully in place, has evolved into something of an outlaw, rogue state--the kind of fearsome entity conjured up by its own incessant propaganda. Celebrations of power, violence, and conquest long associated with warfare inevitably take its architects and practitioners into the dark side of human experience, into a zone marked by unbridled fanaticism and destructive ventures requiring a culture of lies, duplicity, and double standards. Militarism as a tool of global power ultimately leads to a jettisoning of fixed and universal values, the corruption of human purpose, the degradation of those who embrace it, and finally social disintegration. As Chris Hedges writes in liVtzr Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning: "War never creates the society or harmony we desire, especially the harmony we briefly attain during wartime."1 Here the critical observer is entitled to ask whether the staggering costs and consequences of U.S. imperial domination can possibly be worth any of the goals or ideals invoked as their political justification. We seem to have reached a point where U.S. leaders see themselves as uniquely entirled to carry out warfare and imperial agendas simply owing to the country's status as the world's lone superpower and its preponderance of military force. In the wake of 9/11 and the onset of Bush's war against terrorism, the trajectory of U.S. militarism encounters fewer limits in time and space as it becomes amorphous and endless, galvanized by the threat of far-flung enemies.As at the height of the cold war, the power structure embellishes an image of the globe where two apocalyptic forces-good versus evil, civilized versus primitiv~e locked in a batde to the death. U.S. expansionism is thereby justified through its quest, its apparent need, for an increase in both domestic and global power-a quest destined to bring the superpower to work against even its own interestsc Empires across history have disintegrated on the shoals of their boundless elite hubris, accelerated by global overreach, internal decay, and collapse oflegirimacy, and there is little reason to think that Pax Americana vv:ill be able to avoid the same fate. While a feverish nationalism might sustain elite domestic legitimacy temporarily, it cannot secure the same kind of popular support internationally, any more than could a United States-managed world economy that sows its own dysfunctions in the form of mounting chaos, poverty. and inequality. To the extent the United States is determined to set itself above the rest of the world, brandishing technologically awesome military power and threatening planetary survival in the process, it winds up subverting its own requirements for international stability and hegemony. In a perpetual struggle to legitimate their actions, American leaders invoke the familiar and trusted, but increasingly hollow, pretext of exporting democracy and human rights. With the eclipse of the Communist threat, U.S. foreign policy followed the path of "humanitarian intervention," cynically employing seductive motifs like multiculturalism, human rights, and democratic pluralism-all naturally designed for public consumption. Few knowledgeable observers outside the United States take such rhetoric seriously, so its propagandistic merit is confined mainly to the domestic sphere, although even here its credibility is waning. "Democracy" becomes another self-serving facade for naked U.S. geopolitical interests, even as its popular credibility has become nearly exhausted, all the more with the fraudulent claims invoked to justify the war on Iraq. Strikingly, the concept of democracy (global or domestic) receives litde critical scrutiny within American political discourse, the mass media, or even academia; the de~ocratic ~umanitarian motives of U.S. foreign policy have become an arncle of fa.tth, and not just among neoconservatives. Yet even the most cursory inventory of the postwar historical record demonstrates a pervasive legacy of U.S. support for authoritarian regimes across the globe and a rathe\_r flagr~t contempt for democracy where it hinders (imputed) nanonal mterests. Throughout the Middle East and Central Asia the United States has established close ties with a variety of dictators and monarchs willing to collaborate with American geopolitical and neoliberal agendas. The recent armed interventions in the Balkans, Mghanistan, and Iraq have left behind poor, chaotic, violence-ridden societies far removed from even the most generous definition of pluralist democracy. The case of Iraq is particularly instructive. Framing "preemptive" war as a strike against Saddarn Hussein's tyranny and for "liberation;' the Bush administration-its assertions regarding terrorist links, weapons of mass destruction, and inuninent Iraqi military threats shown to be liesscandalously trumpets the old myths while corporate boondoggles become more transparent by the day. The recent experience of U.S. involvement in Iraq reveals everything but democratic intent: support for Hussein throu~hout the 1980s, including his catastrophic wa.t against Iran; two devastanng military invasions; more than a decade of United States-led economic sanctions costing hundreds of thousands of lives; surveillance and bombings spanning more than a decade; repeated coup and assassination plots~ cynic~ use of the UN inspections process for intelligence and covert operatlons; atd to terrorist insurgents; an illegal, costly, and dictatorial military occupation. As elsewhere, U.S. ambitions in Iraq were never about democracy but were and are a function of resource wars, geopolitical strategy, and domestic pressures exerted by a powerful war machine. The Iraqi disaster, occurring fully within the general trajectory of American global power, illuminates perhaps even more the fragility and vulnerability of U.S. hegemony than its potency or invincibility, more the weaknesses than the strengths. A resurgent militarism is both cause and effect of the deepening crisis oflegitimacy that befalls domestic and international realms of U.S. imperial power. As I argue in the final chapter, the resort to overpowering military force in the service of expansionary U.S. economic and geopolitical goals is likely to be counterproductive, a sign of eventual if not immediate decline. Armed interventions, no matter how so phisticated their technology and logistics, cannot permit elites to shape world politics as they desire where mass support for that military action is weak or lacking. Great-power operations are bound to provoke challenges from subordinate or competing nations, not to mention blowback leading to local resistance and terrorism, thus restricting superpower maneuverability. And lopsided domestic spending priorities favoring a bloated Pentagon budget lead to accelerated decline of the public infrastructure: health services, education, housing, the environment, and broad social programs vital to the real strength of any society. Increasing assaults from Republi=s and Democrats on "government bureaucracy" at the very moment allocations for military, law enforcement, surveillance, and intelligence functions so dramatically increase will ouly hasten this downward trend, eventually calling the imperial mission itself into question. Historical experience suggests that an elite resort to coercive power works agairist the prospects for strong hegemony, notably where a legitimation crisis. is already present, since hegemony depends more on economic well-being, political stability, culnnal dynamism, and widespread civic engagement than on brute force. An elite preference for military action and authoritarian rule weakens the political, cconorrric, and cultural imperatives of effective governance. Those imperatives were adequately satisfied in the wake of 911, but the situation changed radically once Bush embraced the war on terrorism as a launching pad for the Iraq venture, at which point the ideological gulf between the lone superpower and the rest of the world deepened. We now face a predicament where the new militarism, taken up ;vith zeal by virtually every leading American politician, has through its awesome war-making power already contributed to destabilization of the same global system it aspires to dominate.

#### Refusing to acknowledge imperialism’s truth elides its millions of victims—militarism is an everyday structure that must be contested

Boggs 2005 (Carl, Professor of Social Science at National University, *Imperial Delusions* p. xxi-xxv)

The ceaseless global expansion of U.S. military power since the early 1940s is matched by an astonishing public refusal to incorporate an understanding of that power into the various discourses-political, educational, media, cultural. The more omnipresent that power has become, the more it permeates virtually every corner of international and domestic .life, the more it seems to be ignored or deflected, suppressed or forgotten, kept safely outside the established public sphere. The notion of a U.S. militarism appears to conflict witb two prevailing American mytbs: tbe idea that all societal institutions are open and democratic, and tbe belief that U.S. foreign policy is shaped by benign, even noble motives and interests. The undeniable legacy of militarism that has pervaded, in some ways transformed, tbe main arenas of American life--political, economic, cultural, intellectualhas been overwhelmed by the force of patriotic ideology, imperial arrogance, media spectacles, academic apologies, and (more recently) post-9/11 fears and insecurities over terrorism. As the world's lone superpower moves to consolidate its global domination, a stratagem laid out in many documents and statements and given life by elite interventions around the globe, critical analysis largely vanishes from sight, subordinated by an ensemble of celebratory and self-serving platitudes. If a recycled but upgraded Pax Americana departs somewhat from classical imperialism in a period of accelerated capitalist globalization, the pursuit of its agendas requires the broadened use of military force-or at least tbe threat of such force-which means that Empire will be sustained through what the well-worn maxim terms "by any means necessary"-with possibly horrific consequences for tbe world. Integral to tbe logic of a New World Order created and managed by the United States (and a few of its allies) is perpetual growth of tbe Pentagon system and tbe war economy, tbe greatest threat today to world peace and perhaps even planetary survival. Yet virtually the entire political culture remains in a state of denial regarding Empire, detached from all the risks, costs, and consequences of a militarism veering out of control. Sadly enough, this syndrome engulfS not only mainstream discourses but oppositional discourses as well. The contradictions between the actuality of U.S. military power and the insular public political environment it inhabits could not be more glaring. Never has such an awesome military machine so dominated the world or its own social order, its dimensions so vast that they have become easy to ignore, as if part of the natural landscape, a taken-for-granted reality. Strangely, even by the end of the twentieth century, the long and bloody legacy of U.S. imperialism and militarism-begirnting with the first westward push-was obscure to most Americans, whose view was distorted by school textbooks, official political discourse, the mass media, even scholarly writings, except for a few well-known criticS like Noam Chomsky, Howard Zinn, Michael Parenti, Edward Herman, Chalmers Johnson, and Michael Klare. The recent "discovery" of U.S. military power here and there across the ideological spectrum has been met by a chorus of grateful voices, hopeful that the Pentagon is up to slaying new dragons in th~ fotnl of rogue states and terrorists. The most systematic and critical earlier recognition of the Pentagon system carne from a scholar writing in the mid-1950s: C. Wright Mills, in his classic Power Elite (1956), anticipated the dangers of U.S. militarism to a degree scarcely matched even in intellectual works written much later-at a time when the military-industrial complex was far more ensconced and menacing than when Mills was writing. Mills' work, along v.rith the somewhat later contributions of Fred Cook, Seymour Melman, and Harry Magdoff, stood virtually alone in its uncompromising critique of the U.S. war economy, providing future ammunition to the new Left and succeeding antiwar movements. These conceptual breakthroughs, however, would be largely abandoned throughout the 1980s and 1990s owing in part to the famous "Vietnam syndrome," in part to the grov.ring backlash against movements of the 1960s, in part to an increasing focus on domestic issues. Aside from a small nucleus of radical intellectuals, it seemed no longer fashionable to indulge in discourses related to U.S. imperial power, now considered beyond the pale of rational debate. Much of what Mills wrote before his untimely death in 1963 was less a reflection on the existing state of affairs than a prophetic look to the future. Writing in the early days of the cold war, he was not entirely able to foresee the length and intensity of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry, the horrors of counterinsurgency war in Indochina, or later military interventions that would help legitimate American imperial expansion. Mills did, nonetheless, grasp a fundamental logic of U.S. capitalism grounded in relentless pursuit of wealth and power across the globe-a pursuit necessitating a huge military machine. For Mills, the power elite was comprised of people "in command of the major hierarchies and organizations of modern society. They rule the big corporations. They run the machinery of state and claim its prerogatives. They direct the military establishment."' As he put it: During modem times, and especially in the U.S., men had come to look upon history as a peaceful continuum interrupted by war. But now; the American elite does not have any real image of peace .... The only seriously accepted plan for "'peace" is the fully loaded pistol. In short war or a high state of war preparedness is felt to be the normal and seemingly permanent condition of the U.S.2 Mills saw that the Pentagon had already become a behemoth political and economic structure in its own right, its elites increasingly prepared to view world politics in distinctly military terms. And like Melman later, he understood the crucial role of science and teclmology in buttressing the war economy. Mills viewed the Pentagon system as far more than an instrument of foreign policy; it would be integral to the development of a militarized society and culture. Thus: "American militarism, in fully developed form, would mean the triumph in all areas oflife of the military metaphysics, and hence the subordination to it of all other ways oflife."3 That such tendencies were little more than embryonic at the time Mills vvas writing lends his insights even greater power. What Mills saw in the 1950s was, oddly enough, a military-industrial complex that few others were able to see-then or later. The structural and ideological features of the Pentagon system have been in place since roughly the time of Pearl Harbor. U.S. military spending remained more or less constant throughout the cold war years, at $300 billion in constant fiscal year 2000 dollars, fell modesdy and briefly during the 1990s, and then rose dramatically after 9/11, with projected levels of$500 billion by 2008. U.S. military forces remain scattered across the globe, in more than one hundred countries at nearly one thousand installations, with several hundred ships deployed in the major oceans and seas and a massive air fleet ready to attack at a moment's notice-all armed with enough nuclear weaponry to destroy the earth many times over. With Star \\lars, moreover, the United States is the only nation dedicated to a full-fledged militarization of space, enhancing its surveillance, intelligence, and strike capabilities. fu of 2003 the Pentagon accounted for nearlv 45 percent of total world military spending, triple what Russia and Clrina ~ogether allocate, more than the next nine nations combined, and roughly twenty-five times the military ourlays of all designated rooue states taken together. The United States is likely to spend hundreds of bifuons of dollars maintaining its armed presence in the Middle East, much · US cc " "th.e of it going to the occupatlon oflraq as part of the . . enort to remap region. Since 1990 the United States has sold nearly $200 billion m arms to 140 countries, and it plans vast new sales in connection wLth the eastvl~~d expansion of NATO. When framed by an increasingly aggressive geopolitlcal strategy, defined as full-spectrum dominance, 1t 15 easy to see how these elements of militarism have provided U.S. elites with enough power to block rival centers of power-yet another meaning of the New World Order. &, Mills was the first to foresee, the war economy, the Pentagon bureaucracy, and an aggressive foreign policy converge wii:P.in the same matrix of development; they share an identical logic. Since World War II the US military has provided an international shield for Western corporate and financialmterests, more globalized today than ever. At the same time, military Keynes1amsm as a tUun of state qit:ilism has furnished a major stimulus for domestic economic f!Towth on a foundation of scientific and technological innovation wedded to :normous corporate profits.&. Noam Chomsky observes, "It is difficult to imagine a system better designed for the benefit of the privileged few than the military system:'4 Legitimated by the need to wage global combat agamst a series of "enemies," the Pentagon system establishes a nearly 1deal umty of state, economy, and armed forces-a unity not matched by any other nation. The deflected and sublimated discourse of U.S. militarism has become one of the tragedies of American public life, obscuring from view the terrible costs and consequences of Empire: millions of human casualties resulting from a legacy of foreign interventions, trillions of dollars in resources drained from the national treasury, ecological devastation, ongoing threat of nuclear catastrophe, militarization of society, evisceration of democratic practices, corruption of international agencies and institutions. While such realities might seem obvious enough to any rational observer, they ha~e received little attention within the established public sphere, reflectlng a poverty of discourse that is simultaneously political, intellectual, and cultural. The post-9/11 milieu has simply deepened this retreat, even as the role of the U.S. military in world politics becomes the object of heightened (but uncritical) attention. What Mills viewed as rather axiomatic in the 1950s lS met today either ""With silence or celebratory acceptance. . This gulf between discourse and reality is nowhere more ob~ous th~ in an educational system that seems explicirly designed to mysnfy soc1al awareness; the topic of U.S. imperial and military power, except where occasl~ nally celebrated, is largely taboo. This is just as true for university-level reading as in high school or the lower grades. A survey of thirty-six widely used college texts m the fields of history, political science, and sociologythose disClplines expected to address the U.S. role in world affairs-reveals some fascinating but disturbing information. No fewer than twenty-seven of these required course readings, ranging in length from three hundred to six hundred pages, contain absolutely nothing about the American military m any of 1ts dimenswns. The nine remaining texts present only minimal references, usually no more than one paragraph and never more than three pages, all totally lacking in critical perspective. Such remarkable invisibility of U.S. military power extends beyond classroom texts to well-known history and social science volumes that set out to explore major issues in contemporary American historical development.

### Environment

#### This form of militarism is linked to the practice of ecocide – we don’t have to win that they lead to conflict to win our impact – their exclusion of peace time militarism justifies the worst violence against the environment

Cuomo**,** Professor of Philosophy, 1996 Chris, Hypatia 11.4, proquest

There are many conceptual and practical connections between military practices in which humans aim to kill and harm each other for some declared "greater good," and nonmilitary practices in which we displace, destroy, or seriously modify nonhuman communities, species, and ecosystems in the name of human interests. An early illustration of these connections was made by Rachel Carson in the first few pages of The Silent Spring (1962), in which she described insecticides as the inadvertent offspring of World War II chemical weapons research. We can now also trace ways in which insecticides were part of the Western-defined global corporatization of agriculture that helped kill off the small family farm and made the worldwide system of food production dependent on the likes of Dow Chemical and Monsanto.

Military practices are no different from other human practices that damage and irreparably modify nature. They are often a result of cost-benefit analyses that pretend to weigh all likely outcomes yet do not consider nonhuman entities except in terms of their use value for humans and they nearly always create unforeseeable effects for humans and nonhumans. In addition, everyday military peacetime practices are actually more destructive than most other human activities, they are directly enacted by state power, and, because they function as unquestioned "givens," they enjoy a unique near-immunity to enactments of moral reproach. It is worth noting the extent to which everyday military activities remain largely unscrutinized by environmentalists, especially American environmentalists, largely because fear allows us to be fooled into thinking that "national security" is an adequate excuse for "ecological military mayhem" (Thomas 1995, 16).

#### Militarism is the greatest threat to the environment – it perpetuates ecocide based in larger structures of oppression

**Cuomo,** Professor of Philosophy, **1996** Chris, Hypatia 11.4, proquest

In Scorched Earth: The Military's Assault on the Environment, William Thomas, a U.S. Navy veteran, illustrates the extent to which the peacetime practices of military institutions damage natural environments and communities. Thomas argues that even "peace" entails a dramatic and widespread war on nature, or as Joni Seager puts it, "The environmental costs of militarized peace bear suspicious resemblance to the costs of war" (Thomas 1995, xi).

All told, including peacetime activities as well as the immense destruction caused by combat, military institutions probably present the **most dramatic threat** to ecological well-being on the planet. The military is the largest generator of hazardous waste in the United States, creating nearly a ton of toxic pollution every minute, and military analyst Jillian Skeel claims that, "Global military activity may be the largest worldwide polluter and consumer of precious resources" (quoted in Thomas 1995, 5). A conventionally powered aircraft carrier consumes 150,000 gallons of fuel a day. In less than an hour's flight, a single jet launched from its flight deck consumes as much fuel as a North American motorist bums in two years. One F-16 jet engine requires nearly four and a half tons of scarce titanium, nickel, chromium, cobalt, and energy-intensive aluminum (Thomas 1995, 5), and nine percent of all the iron and steel used by humans is consumed by the global military (Thomas 1995, 16). The United States Department of Defense generates 500,000 tons of toxins annually, more than the world's top five chemical companies combined. The military is the biggest single source of environmental pollution in the United States. Of 338 citations issued by the United States Environmental Protection Agency in 1989, three-quarters went to military installations (Thomas 1995, 17).

The feminization, commodification, and devaluation of nature helps create a reality in which its destruction in warfare is easily justified. In imagining an ethic that addresses these realities, feminists cannot neglect the extent to which **military ecocide** is connected, conceptually and practically, to transnational capitalism and other forms of human oppression and exploitation. Virtually all of the world's thirty-five nuclear bomb test sites, as well as most radioactive dumps and uranium mines, occupy Native lands (Thomas 1995, 6). Six multinationals control one-quarter of all United States defense contracts (Thomas 1995, 10), and two million dollars per minute is spent on the global military (Thomas 1995, 7). One could go on for volumes about the effects of chemical and nuclear testing, military-industrial development and waste, and the disruption of wildlife, habitats, communities, and lifestyles that are inescapably linked to military practices.

### Structural Violence

#### Complicity with security mindset refuses to understand stability as a certain kind of mode of violence—guarantees structural and environmental suffering

Caygill, Professor of Cultural History at Goldsmith’s University of London, **19**93

(Howard, *Political Subject of Violence*, Manchester University Press, ed. Campbell and Dillon, pg 67-68)

The various beginnings of attempts to rethink the predicaments can be seen as responses to the collapse of the old predicaments upon the advent of world society. With this event, the space of reason co-extensive with civility can no longer be accepted as self-evident. Yet **philosophical modernity has largely confined itself within this space, concerning itself with securing the categories of knowledge in the face of theoretical doubt and elaborating an ethics and politics of civility; it is ill suited for reflection upon this space**. The self- possessed, self-disciplined and ‘rational’ subject of ethical and political civility is internally divided between civil and military identities; rational discipline is its norm in civilian life, disciplined violence the exception, used on and beyond the border and in times of emergency. The **space and time of the categories and the predicaments was secured by the co-existence of violence and reason, one which was possible by the deferral of violence spatially to the frontier, temporally to a time of emergency. This deferral was informed by a sovereignty which defined the limits of violence and civility; defined the place of ethical and political judgement**. But with the collapse of these limits, the place of judgement is no longer secured from the question of the implication of violence and reason. **Philosophical reflection conducted within the bounds of civility is thrown into crisis when faced with the mutual implication of reason and violence. The collapse of the spatial and temporal limits of violence with the advent of world society does not lead automatically to the rule of violence in totalitarian politics, nor does it necessarily entail the suspension of the ethical. The new space that has been opened no longer defers violence, no longer attempts to manage it in the old ways of doubt and securing the possessions of the categories**. New predicamants can be seen to be taking shape which raise the possibility of an ethical management of violence. This could not be based upon the neutral space of civility — the ‘level playing field’ — protected by sovereign violence, a space in which judgements are made within predicaments accepted by ‘common sense’. The new **practical judgements require predicaments which are not fixed or protected by an external sovereign violence**, but which acknowledge the ways in which they are informed by that violence. Under these circumstances, a political or an ethical judgement has to invent for itself anew its own ‘concept of reflection’ — it has to include within itself a reflection on the site, or the place from and in which judgement is made. The exercise of violence in judgement is no longer deferred to the borders of the space of judgement, but is placed in the act of judgement itself. This **reorientation of judgement and its predicaments is appropriate to a world in which violence has no place**, in which it is ubiquitous ranging beyond oppositions such as identity or difference, agreement and opposition, within and without, matter and form. **If the problems resulting from the ubiquity of violence** **continue to be thought within these obsolete predicaments, the result will be an intensification of violence, not only in the guise of military conquest, but also as global pollution, poverty, and hunger.**

#### **The prioritization of security justifies the abandonment of morality and legitimate authority under the guise of the common good Neocleous 07** (Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy Politics and History at Brunel University, “Security, Liberty and the Myth of Balance: Towards a Critique of Security Politics”, Contemporary Political Theory)

In this context, we can note that **Locke adopts a range of strategies from a decidedly non-liberal tradition: reason of state. This tradition holds that besides moral reason there is another reason — reason of state — independent of traditional (i.e. Christian) values and according to which power should 'not be wielded according to the dictates of good conscience' (**[**Guicciardini, 1965**](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/cpt/journal/v6/n2/full/9300301a.html#bib27)**, 54), but should be exercised according to whatever is needed to maintain the state. The doctrine is thus founded on principles and assumptions seemingly antithetical to the liberal idea of liberty — in either the moral or the legal sense. Courses of action that would be condemned as immoral if conducted by individuals could be sanctioned when they were undertaken by the sovereign power. 'When I talked of murdering or keeping the Pisans imprisoned, I didn't perhaps talk as a Christian: I talked according to the reason and practice of states',** says [Guicciardini (1994](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/cpt/journal/v6/n2/full/9300301a.html#bib28), 159); 'Romulus ... deserved excuse for the death of his brother and his companion [for] what he did was done for the common good', says [Machiavelli (1958](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/cpt/journal/v6/n2/full/9300301a.html#bib40), 218). Reason of state treats the sovereign as *autonomous* from morality; the state can engage in whatever actions it thinks right, so long as they are done according to 'necessity' and/or 'the public good'. **But this is to also suggest that the state might act beyond law and the legal limits on state power — *Salus populi suprema lex* — so long as it does so 'for the common good', 'for the good of the people' or the 'preservation of the state'.¶** In being able to legitimate state power in all its guises the doctrine of reason of state has been of enormous importance, becoming a weapon brandished in power games between states and eventually becoming the key ideological mechanism of international confrontation, because between the sixteenth and the twentieth centuries the doctrine gradually morphed into 'interest of state', 'security of state' and, finally, 'national security' ([Neocleous, 2003](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/cpt/journal/v6/n2/full/9300301a.html#bib49), 40–46). The doctrine thus identifies security — simultaneously of the people *and* the state (since these are always ideologically conflated) — as the definitive aspect of state power. *Security* becomes the overriding interest and the principle above all other principles. As such, the doctrine would therefore appear to be antithetical to liberalism if liberalism is identified as a doctrine which aims to tip the balance of power towards liberty rather than security. But in Locke's account of prerogative we see nothing less than a liberal argument for reason of state, albeit without the claims about the irrelevance of good conscience**. And out of this we can begin to trace what turns out to be nothing less than a liberal *prioritising of security*.**

#### **Security and liberty are mutually exclusive cannot be balanced, calling anything securtity plays into the hands of authoritarian regimes holocaust Neocleous 07** (Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy Politics and History at Brunel University, “Security, Liberty and the Myth of Balance: Towards a Critique of Security Politics”, Contemporary Political Theory)

**What follows from this is that we should resist any talk of 'balancing' liberty and security, for such talk of balance merely disguises a more fundamental commitment to the latter rather than the former.** But maybe what also follows from this is that we should also avoid fooling ourselves that we can develop a 'radical' or 'critical' security politics. This is what is proposed by those aiming to 'Humanise' the security agenda, by turning into a security question issues such as migration, refugees, gender and the environment. Such positions rely ultimately on the assumption that, as Ken [Booth (1991)](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/cpt/journal/v6/n2/full/9300301a.html#bib6) puts it, since 'security' is the absence of threats and 'emancipation' is the freeing of people from human and physical constraints, 'security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin ... Emancipation, theoretically, is security'. This seems to me to be as about as mistaken as one can possibly be about security. Calling anything a security issue plays into the hands of the state, and the only way the state knows how to deal with threats to security is to tighten its grip on civil society and ratchet-up its restrictions on human freedoms. 'Speaking and writing about security is never innocent', [Jef Huysmans](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/cpt/journal/v6/n2/full/9300301a.html#bib33) comments. 'It always risks contributing to the opening of a window of opportunity for a "fascist mobilization" or an "internal security ideology"' (2002, 43). This is because the logic of 'security' is the logic of an anti-politics ([Jayasuriya, 2004](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/cpt/journal/v6/n2/full/9300301a.html#bib37)) in which the state uses 'security' to marginalize all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, the debates and discussions that animate political life, suppressing all before it and dominating political discourse in an entirely reactionary way. This is precisely the point alluded to by Marx in 1843 when he suggested that security was the supreme concept of bourgeois society: it's a concept that legitimizes any action by the state whatsoever, so long as the action is conducted in the name of security. **And this explains why virtually every authoritarian measure since has been conducted in the name of security, from the reordering of international capital under the guise of national security (**[**Neocleous, 2006b**](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/cpt/journal/v6/n2/full/9300301a.html#bib51)**), to the reassertion of loyalty and consensus as the foundation of domestic order (**[**Neocleous, 2006c**](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/cpt/journal/v6/n2/full/9300301a.html#bib52)**), all the way down to the extermination camps of the holocaust, the first stage of which was to be taken into 'security confinement' by the security police.**

### Epistemology/Violence

**The impacts the aff advocates are subdued in a tactful presentation of being an existential threat. The discourse the aff engages in is used as a means to justify actions outside the normal bounds of political procedures.**

**Shwartz 09’** (Matthew Shwartz, M.A. Candidate in International Affairs, “*The Hyper Securitization of Identity and Protracted Social Conflicts*” pg 2) Matthew Schwartz is a Programs Associate at the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation in New York. Since 2011, he has been engaged in security and justice oriented programming in Eastern Africa and the Horn of Africa. Matt received a MA in International Affairs from The New School University's Graduate Program in International Affairs where he specialized in conflict and security analysis. He has published other books such as: *Fighting Terror Through Justice: Implementing the IGAD Framework for Legal Cooperation Against Terrorism*, *Militarism Under the Guise of Liberty: Coming to Grips with American Empire.*

According to Buzan and Wæver, for a phenomenon to be securitized, “the issue must be presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.” Michael Williams describes the Copenhagen School’s securitization concept as “the outcome of a specific social process” in which phenomena in the normative realm of political discourse are identified as threats and transferred into the realm of security. Once sufficiently subdued, countered or resolved, the securitized phenomenon hypothetically ceases to be a threat, going through the process of de-securitization and returning to the realm of normal public discourse.

**The aff creates a perpetual cycle of false threats to ensure their insecurity and safety.**

**Shwartz 09’** (Matthew Shwartz, M.A. Candidate in International Affairs, *The Hyper Securitization of Identity and Protracted Social Conflicts* pg. 4.) Matthew Schwartz is a Programs Associate at the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation in New York. Since 2011, he has been engaged in security and justice oriented programming in Eastern Africa and the Horn of Africa. Matt received a MA in International Affairs from The New School University's Graduate Program in International Affairs where he specialized in conflict and security analysis. He has published other books such as: *Fighting Terror Through Justice: Implementing the IGAD Framework for Legal Cooperation Against Terrorism, Militarism Under the Guise of Liberty: Coming to Grips with American Empire*.

In contrast to the centrality of speech acts in the process of securitization as discussed by the Copenhagen School, in the case of “hyper-securitization,” a speech act serves in the establishment of a systemic environment similar to what Jef Huysmans describes as political communities of insecurity. This idea is characterized by a perpetual cycle of identifying threats and offering reassurances, the establishment and upholding of mechanisms administering inclusion and exclusion, and structuring the alienation of the “other” which may predispose communities toward violence. In other words, insecure political communities are constantly reaffirming and reestablishing their insecurity and increasingly instituting measures that are perceived to increase their safety. They establish norms, rules and institutions to identify who belongs to the community and who does not; and, as such, insecure communities come to portray “others” or “outsiders” as threats to their safety, increasing the likelihood of violence between groups.

**Allocating to the state isn’t an improvement**

Ronnie D**. Lipschutz** **&** Ole **Wæver** **’98, *On Security* chapter 3**(Ole Wæver is a professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen. He has published and broadcast extensively in the field of international relations, and is one of the main architects of the so-called Copenhagen School in International Relations. Prior to his professorate at University of Copenhagen, Wæver was a senior research fellow at Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (1985-1999). His areas of research include: Theories of international relations The study of conflicts, what creates the conflict and how to mediate and resolve them Danish security and defense policy The history of concepts Security theory Wæver was a member of the Danish Government's Commission on Security and Disarmament Affairs between 1993 and 1995 and the replacement of the institute, the Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI), between 1995 and 2002. He is a member of the editorial board for European Journal of International Affairs, Security Dialogue, International Studies Perspective and the Cambridge Review of International Affairs. Wæver is director of the Danish Ph.D. School, Politologisk Forskerskole. He has written several pieces together with Barry Buzan. These include the two books: Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge University Press 2003. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers 1998. Wæver has also co-edited the following book with Iver B. Neumann, *The Future of International Relations: Masters In The Making?* London: Routledge, 1997.) (Ronnie D. Lipschutz is Professor of Politics at the University of California, Santa Cruz. He is a Velux Visiting Professor in the Department of Business and Politics at the Copenhagen Business School. He is a Professor of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway, University of London, and a Visiting Professor and Fellow in the Department of International Relations and Politics during 2002. Lipschutz received his Ph.D. in Energy and Resources from UC-Berkeley in 1987 and an SM in Physics from MIT in 1978. He has been a faculty member at UCSC since 1990.)

I could begin by expressing a certain discontent with the "traditional progressive" or "established radical" ways of dealing with the concept and agenda of security. The traditional progressive approach is: 1) to accept two basic premises of the established discourse, first that security is a reality prior to language, is out there (irrespective of whether the conception is "objective" or "subjective," is measured in terms of threat or fear), and second the more security, the better; and 2) to argue why security should encompass more than is currently the case, including not only "xx" but also "yy," where the latter is environment, welfare, immigration and refugees, etc. With this approach, one accepts the core meaning of "security" as uncontested, pushing instead in the direction of securitizing still larger areas of social life. Still, in the final analysis, is it all to the good that problems such as environmental degradation be addressed in terms of security? After all, in spite of all the changes of the last few years, security, as with any other concept, carries with it a history and a set of connotations that it cannot escape. At the heart of the concept we still find something to do with defense and the state. As a result, addressing an issue in security terms still evokes an image of threat-defense, allocating to the state an important role in addressing it. This is not always an improvement.

**All states will be effected  
Ronnie D**. Lipschutz& **Barry** Buzan ’98 *On Security* chapter 7 (Ronnie D. Lipschutz is Professor of Politics at the University of California, Santa Cruz. He is a Velux Visiting Professor in the Department of Business and Politics at the Copenhagen Business School. He is a Professor of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway, University of London, and a Visiting Professor and Fellow in the Department of International Relations and Politics during 2002. Lipschutz received his Ph.D. in Energy and Resources from UC-Berkeley in 1987 and an SM in Physics from MIT in 1978. He has been a faculty member at UCSC since 1990.) (Barry Buzan from 1988 to 2002 he was Project Director at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI). From 1995 to 2002 he was research Professor of International Studies at the University of Westminster, and before that Professor of International Studies at the University of Warwick. During 1993 he was visiting professor at the International University of Japan, and in 1997-8 he was Olof Palme Visiting Professor in Sweden. He was Chairman of the British International Studies Association 1988-90, Vice-President of the (North American) International Studies Association 1993-4, and founding Secretary of the International Studies Coordinating Committee 1994-8. Since 1999 he has been the general coordinator of a project to reconvene the English school of International Relations, and from 2004 he is editor of the European Journal of International Relations. In 1998 he was elected a fellow of the British Academy, and in 2001 he was elected as an Academician of the Association of Learned Societies in the Social Sciences. He is engaged as Advisor in Fair Observer, an online magazine covering global issues from a plurality of perspectives, on editorial policy and public policy issues.)

One assumption underlying this chapter is that differences in internal construction have a substantial

impact on how states define threats and vulnerabilities, and therefore on the whole construction of the security problematique. Given their fundamental character, all states (or at least all of those that are embedded in an international system--and it is only these that will be discussed here) will share bottom line security concerns about the maintenance of their territorial base and their political autonomy. If the threat is of external armed attack aimed at seizing territory or resources, or overthrowing the government, then, within the limits of resources, conceptions of security will tend to be similar in all states, and the effect of internal differences will be pushed into the background. Beyond that bottom line, however, internal differences can have radical effects on the construction of security, affecting both the breadth of the security agenda (what kinds of actions--military, political, economic, societal, environmental—are perceived as threats), and the definition of priorities for security policy.

**The aff contributes to homogenizing and often brutalizing forces of progress and we need to assert heterogeneity against it.**

Ronnie D**. Lipschutz** **&** Ole **Wæver** **’98, *On Security* chapter 3**(Ole Wæver is a professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen. He has published and broadcast extensively in the field of international relations, and is one of the main architects of the so-called Copenhagen School in International Relations. Prior to his professorate at University of Copenhagen, Wæver was a senior research fellow at Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (1985-1999). His areas of research include: Theories of international relations The study of conflicts, what creates the conflict and how to mediate and resolve them Danish security and defense policy The history of concepts Security theory Wæver was a member of the Danish Government's Commission on Security and Disarmament Affairs between 1993 and 1995 and the replacement of the institute, the Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI), between 1995 and 2002. He is a member of the editorial board for European Journal of International Affairs, Security Dialogue, International Studies Perspective and the Cambridge Review of International Affairs. Wæver is director of the Danish Ph.D. School, Politologisk Forskerskole. He has written several pieces together with Barry Buzan. These include the two books: Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge University Press 2003. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers 1998. Wæver has also co-edited the following book with Iver B. Neumann, *The Future of International Relations: Masters In The Making?* London: Routledge, 1997.) (Ronnie D. Lipschutz is Professor of Politics at the University of California, Santa Cruz. He is a Velux Visiting Professor in the Department of Business and Politics at the Copenhagen Business School. He is a Professor of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway, University of London, and a Visiting Professor and Fellow in the Department of International Relations and Politics during 2002. Lipschutz received his Ph.D. in Energy and Resources from UC-Berkeley in 1987 and an SM in Physics from MIT in 1978. He has been a faculty member at UCSC since 1990.)

This is why I believe the philosophical depth of Nietzsche has more to offer than the hyperbolic flash of Baudrillard. Can we not interpret our own foreign policy in the light of Nietzsche's critique of security? As was the case with the origins of an ontotheological security, did not our debt to the Founding Fathers grow "to monstrous dimensions" with our "sacrifices"--many noble, some not--in two World Wars? Did not our collective identity, once isolationist, neutralist and patriotic, become transfigured into a new god, that was born and fearful of a nuclear, internationalist, interventionist power? The evidence is in the reconceptualization: as distance, oceans and borders became less of a protective barrier to alien identities, and a new international economy required penetration into other worlds, national interest became too weak a semantic guide. We found a stronger one in national security , as embodied and institutionalized in the National Security Act of 1947, as protected by the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, and as reconstructed by the first, and subsequent National Security Council meetings of the second, cold war. Nietzsche speaks a credible truth to increasingly incredible regimes. He points toward a way in which we might live with and recognize the very necessity of difference. He recognizes the need to assert heterogeneity against the homogenizing and often brutalizing forces of progress. And he eschews all utopian schemes to take us out of the "real" world for a practical strategy to celebrate, rather than exacerbate, the anxiety, insecurity and fear of a new world order where radical otherness is ubiquitous and indomitable.

### Kill to Save

#### Security architecture enables kill to save mentality—critiquing counters this impulse

Neocleous, prof. of critique of political economy @ Brunei University, 2008 p. 4

(Mark, Critique of Security)

But what if at the heart of the logic of security lies not a notion of freedom or emancipation, but a means of modelling the whole of human society around a particular notion of order? What if security is little more than a semantic and semiotic black hole allowing authority to inscribe itself deeply into human experience? What if the magic word 'security' serves merely to neutralise political action, encouraging us to surrender ourselves to the state in a thoroughly conservative fashion ?20 And what if this surrender facilitates an ongoing concession to authority and the institutional molence which underpins the authority in question, and thus constitutes the first key step in learning how to treat people not as human beings, but as objects to be administered? In other words, what if the major requirement of our time is less an expanded, refined, or redefined msion of security, and nothing less than a critique of security? Corey Robin points out that when a particular idea routinely accompanies atrocities then some real critical engagement with the idea would seem to be in order.21 And since there is a clear and not particularly long line linking the idea of security and the atrocities being carried out in Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib and the other 'security centres' at which people are currently being held, never mind the long history of states slaughtering millions in the name of security, then the time must be right for a critique of security

### Instability/War

#### Realist security system produces WMD threats and structural violence

**Der Derian**, Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Massachusetts Amherst, **1998**

(James, *On Security*, Columbia University Press, Chapter 2: “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard,” Electronic Version at Columbia International Affairs Online, subscription service, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz.html, Accessed Sept 7 2005)

The rapidity of change in the international system, as well as the inability of international theory to make sense of that change, raises this question: **Of what value is security**? More specifically, just how secure is this preeminent concept of international relations? This evaluation of security invokes interpretive strategies to ask epistemological, ontological, and political questions--questions that all too often are ignored, subordinated, or displaced by the technically biased, narrowly framed question of what  it takes to achieve security. The goal, then, of this inquiry is to make philosophically problematic that which has been practically axiomatic in international relations. The first step is to ask whether the paramount value of security lies in its abnegation of the insecurity of all values. **No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical** **punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted. We have inherited an ontotheology  of security, that is, an a priori  argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it.** Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." [1](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note1) From God to Rational Man, from Empire to Republic, from King to the People--and on occasion in the reverse direction as well, for history is never so linear, never so neat as we would write it--**the security of the center has been the shifting site from which the forces of authority, order, and identity philosophically defined and physically kept at bay anarchy, chaos, and difference**. Yet the center, as modern poets and postmodern critics tell us, no longer holds. The demise of a bipolar system, the diffusion of power into new political, national, and economic constellations, the decline of civil society and the rise of the shopping mall, the acceleration of everything --transportation, capital and information flows, change itself--have induced a new anxiety. As George Bush repeatedly said--that is, until the 1992 Presidential election went into full swing--"The enemy is unpredictability. The enemy is instability." [2](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note2)

#### Realist discourse is a force multiplier for international violence, not the solution

Der Derian**,** director of the security studies program @ Brown University, **20**05

(James, in Harvard International Review 27.3)

However, between the mixed metaphors and behind the metaphysical concepts given voice by US Homeland security Director Michael Chertoff early into the Katrina crisis, there lurks an uneasy recognition that this administration-and perhaps **no national government-is up to the task of managing** incidents that so rapidly cascade into **global events**. Indeed, they suggest that **our national plans and preparations for the "big one**"-a force-five hu**rricane, terrorist attack, pandemic disease-have become part of the problem, not the solution**. His use of hyberbolic terms like "ultra-catastrophe" and "fall-out" is telling: such events exceed not only local and national capabilities, but the capacity of conventional language itself. An easy deflection would be to lay the blame on the neoconservativc faithful of the first term of US President George W. Bush, who, viewing through an inverted Wilsonian prism the world as they would wish it to be, have now been forced by natural and unnatural disasters to face the world as it really is-and not even the most sophisticated public affairs machine of dissimulations, distortions, and lies can dose this gap. However, the **discourse** of the second Bush term **has increasingly returned to** the dominant worldview of national security, r**ealism**. And if language is, as Nietzsche claimed, a prisonhouse, realism is its supermax penitentiary. Based on linear notions of causality, a correspondence theory of truth, and the materiality of power, **how can realism possibly account-let alone prepare or provide remedies-for complex catastrophes, like the toppling of the World Trade Center** and attack on the Pentagon by a handful of jihadists armed with box-cutters and a few months of flight-training? A force-five hurricane that might well have begun with the flapping of a butterfly's wings? A northeast electrical blackout that started with a falling tree limb in Ohio? A possible pandemic triggered by the mutation of an avian virus? How, for instance, are we to measure the immaterial power of the CNN-effect on the first Gulf War, the AlJazeera-effect on the Iraq War, or the Nokia-effect on the London terrorist bombings? For events of such complex, non-linear origins and with such tightly-coupled, quantum effects, the **national security discourse of realism is simply not up to the task**. Worse, what if **the "failure of imagination**" identified by the 9/11 Commission is **built into our national and homeland security systems**? What if the reliance on planning for the catastrophe that never came reduced our capability to flexibly respond and improvise for the "ultra-catastrophe" that did? **What if worse-case scenarios, simulation training, and disaster exercises**-as well as border guards, concrete barriers and earthen levees-not only prove inadequate but might well **act as force-multipliers-what organizational theorists identify as "negative synergy" and "cascading effects" -that produce the automated bungling** (think Federal Emergency Management Agency) t**hat transform isolated events and singular attacks into global disasters**? Just as "normal accidents" are built into new technologies-from the Titanic sinking to the Chernobyl meltdown to the Challenger explosion-we must ask whether "**ultra-catastrophes" are no longer the exception but now part and parcel of densely networked systems that defy national management; in other words, "planned disasters**." What, then, is to be done? **A first step is to move beyond the wheel-spinning debates that perennially keep security discourse always one step behind the global event**. It might well be uni-, bi-, or multi-polar, but it is time to recognize that **the power configuration of the states-system is rapidly being subsumed by a heteropolar matrix**, in which a wide range of different actors and technological drivers are producing profound global effects through interconnectivity. Varying in identity, interests, and strength, these new actors and drivers gain advantage through the broad bandwidth of information technology, for networked communication systems provide the means to traverse political, economic, religious, and cultural boundaries, changing not only how we interpret events, but making it ever more difficult to maintain the very distinction of intended from accidental events. According to the legal philosopher of Nazi Germany, Carl Schmitt, when the state is unable to deliver on its traditional promissory notes of safety, security, and well-being through legal, democratic means, it will necessarily exercise the sovereign "exception:" declaring a state of emergency, defining friend from foe, and, if necessary, eradicating the threat to the state. But what if the state, facing the global event, cannot discern the accidental from the intentional? An external attack from an internal auto-immune response? The natural as opposed to the "planned disaster"? The enemy within from the enemy without? We can, as the United States has done since September 11, continue to treat catastrophic threats as issues of national rather than global security, and go it alone. However, once declared, bureaucratically installed, and repetitively gamed**, national states of emergency grow recalcitrant and become prone to even worse disasters**. As Paul Virilio, master theorist of the war machine and the integral accident once told me: "**The full-scale accident is now the prolongation of total war by other means."**

#### On balance realism causes more wars than it stops

George, lecturer in international relations at the Australian National University, **19**94

(Jim, *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations*, pg. 226)

In their different ways, all of these **critical perspectives helped undermine the Realist proposition that its knowledge corresponds to a universal, essential reality** of global political life, which must be adhered to if the forces of anarchy and systemic disaster are to be kept at bay. In so doing these diverse approaches illustrated that those at the apex of the International Relations community do not understand the implications of the questions they ask of their (objectified) history, nor do they comprehend the meanings generated by their own historical/textual “fact.” Specifically, what a critical social theory perspective illustrates is that **power politics behavior is not endemic in global history, nor is the cause of “peace” greatly assisted by the Traditional solutions** (balancing strategies and alliance formations) when it does occur. Rather, the **dominant historical narrative in International Relations is both inaccurate**, in its own terms, **and highly dangerous**, in anyone’s terms, given that by Realism’s own literary account **the Realist “solution” to warlike activity in an anarchical world is to effectively accelerate the likelihood of war**.1

### American Exceptionalism/Imperialism Impact

#### Refuse to privilege American interests—to do otherwise supports existing power structures

Mignolo, argentinian semiotician and prof at Duke, 2007 p. online

(Walter, “The De-Colonial Option and the Meaning of Identity in Politics”)

The **rhetoric of modernity** (from the Christian mission since the sixteenth century, to the secular Civilizing mission, **to development and modernization** after WWII) occluded—under its triumphant rhetoric of salvation and the good life for all—the perpetuation of the logic of coloniality, that is, of massive appropriation of land (and today of natural resources), massive exploitation of labor (from open slavery from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, to disguised slavery, up to the twenty first century), and **the dispensability of human lives** from the massive killing of people in the Inca and Aztec domains to the twenty million plus people from Saint Petersburg to the Ukraine during WWII killed in the so called Eastern Front.4 **Unfortunately, not all the massive killings have been recorded with the same value and the same visibility. The unspoken criteria for the value of human lives is an obvious sign (from a de-colonial interpretation) of the hidden imperial identity politics: that is, the value of human lives to which the life of the enunciator belongs becomes the measuring stick to evaluate other human lives who do not have the intellectual option and institutional power to tell the story and to classify events according to a ranking of human lives**; that is, according to a racist classification.5

### Exclusive Community

#### Your insistence that the 1AC impacts come first belies your commitment to the imagined ideal of community instead of a real commitment against exclusionary violence—your claims to know which lives have value is political by itself

Ahmed 2011 (Nafeez, executive director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development and Ph.D in IR from Sussex, “The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society” in *Global Change Peace & Security* 23.3)

Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to any social group which might challenge prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The previous examples illustrate how securitisation paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a process of militarisation against social groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical and economic order. In other words, the internal reductionism, fragmentation and compartmentalisation that plagues orthodox theory and policy reproduces precisely these characteristics by externalising global crises from one another, externalising states from one another, externalising the inter-state system from its biophysical environment, and externalising new social groups as dangerous ‘outsiders’. Hence, a simple discursive analysis of state militarisation and the construction of new ‘outsider’ identities is insufﬁcient to understand the causal dynamics driving the process of ‘Otherisation’. As Doug Stokes points out, the Western state preoccupation with the ongoing military struggle against international terrorism reveals an underlying ‘discursive complex’, where representations about terrorism and non-Western populations are premised on ‘the construction of stark boundaries’ that ‘operate to exclude and include’. Yet these exclusionary discourses are ‘intimately bound up with political and economic processes’, such as strategic interests in proliferating military bases in the Middle East, economic interests in control of oil, and the wider political goal of ‘maintaining American hegemony’ by dominating a resource-rich region critical for global capitalism. 100 But even this does not go far enough, for arguably the construction of certain hegemonic discourses is mutually constituted by these geopolitical, strategic and economic interests – exclusionary discourses are politically constituted. New conceptual developments in genocide studies throw further light on this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It is now widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of primordial groups, one of which destroys the other on the basis of a preeminence in bureaucratic military–political power. Rather, genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a particular social group that has been socially constructed as different. 101 As Hinton observes, genocides precisely constitute a process of ‘othering’ in which an imagined community becomes reshaped so that previously ‘included’ groups become ‘ideologically recast’ and dehumanised as threatening and dangerous outsiders, be it along ethnic, religious, political or economic lines – eventually legitimising their annihilation. 102 In other words, genocidal violence is inherently rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and ‘Otherised’ in accordance with a speciﬁc socio-political programme. The very process of identifying and classifying particular groups as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of ‘inclusion’, justifying exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without which genocide would be impossible. 103 This recalls Lemkin’s recognition that the intention to destroy a group is integrally connected with a wider socio-political project – or colonial project – designed to perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological relations of the perpetrators in the place of that of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating their means of social reproduction. Only by interrogating the dynamic and origins of this programme to uncover the social relations from which that programme derives can the emergence of genocidal intent become explicable. 104

### A2: External Impacts

#### The critique’s impact accesses even those advantages which seem external

Dillon, senior lecturer in politics @ Lancaster, 1996

**(Michael, Politics of Security)**

The very alliance of security and knowledge, so characteristic of modern international politics is what excites my suspicion most and generates my sympathy for the geneaologist. Look insisted the first genalogist, isn’t our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover under everything strange, unusual and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us?” **Is it not the instinct of fear”** he asked—making explicit the crucial connection between the will to truth and the will to secure—**that bids us to know**? And is the jubilation of those who attain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security**. Hence: security as knowledge (certainty); security’s reliance upon knowledge (surveillance); security’s astonishing prouction of knowledge in response to its will to know (calculability): and the claim of knowledge which gives security its license to render all aspects of life’s transparent totality**. All these constitutive elements of our contemporary manifold **politics of security** excited my suspicion because they **comprise a monumental enterprise of power-knowledge whose insatiable maw threatens to consume not only all thought, and not only that relating to the question of the politics but of what it is to become human**.

#### Security outweighs everything—internal to thinkability of the whole world

Burke 2007 (Anthony, Australian IR Theorist of much repute, Critical Security Studies Working Paper <http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CIAO_Burke_criticalsecuritystudies.pdf>)

Certainly it is helpful to try to identify such potentials, but what if such ‘latent’ potentials no longer exist, or are in the process of being actively extinguished? If so, such arguments are ultimately disabling and risk denying the entire purpose of the critical project. It is precisely at times of the greatest pessimism when new potential are being shut down or normative change is distinctly negative—arguably true of the preset time—that the critical project is most important. In the face of such obstacles the critical project must think and conceive the unthought and its limiting test ought not to be realism but responsibility. I am continually haunted by George Orwell’s *1984* where the objective of the Party was to reduce the scope for human thought and action by removing concepts from the language until English disappeared in favour of newspeak. One of the questions I have long asked in my own work is whether the concept of security itself has not become a form of Newspeak whose hold on people’s minds drives away other possibilities of conceiving and enabling human existence on this planet. This fear has underpinned my own efforts to generate a deeper line of critique—of security as such—that I will return to later.

### Alt

### And the framing of the question of who “counts” in a political community is key—rejecting the psychic colonization of the debate allows for reformulation

Linklater, Intl Politics Prof. @ University of Wales, 2005 p. 118

(Andrew, Critical Security Studies and World Politics Ed. By Ken Booth)

For their part, **critical theorists do not underestimate the obstacles to global political reform; nor do they subscribe to any notion of inevitable and irreversible progress**. They argue **there is nothing in international anarchy that makes competition and conflict permanent features of world politics. The qualities of anarchy**, especially as neorealism characterizes that condition, **are** **at heart the attributes of the dominant power**s. This is why critical theory can start with the Kantian proposition that **everything hinges on how political community is constructed**, particularly in the most powerful regions. From this vantage point, **it is a profound mistake to ignore the respects in which states threaten their own citizens so that the study of international relations is free to develop its specific focus on the ways in which states interact with and threaten each other**. The important point is that societies that are quick to resort to strategic action in their internal relaions are improbable advocates of communicative action in world politics, unless foreign policy pragmatism suggests that commitments to dialogue will produce national advantages; conversely, societies that have standing commitments to communicative action domestically already have the potential to bring similar orientations to bear on relations with outsiders. Consequently, **critical theory does not begin with how independent political communities conduct their external relations but with the deeper question of how they are constituted in the first place**.

#### Your ballot as ideological intervention solves the false choice proposed by the aff

Booth, head of IR dept. @ University of Wales, 2005 p. 9

(Ken, *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, Ed. By Booth)

Robert Cox, in a much-quoted phrase, wrote in the early 1980s that **all theory is "for some one or for some purpose. "2! If this is the case, as I believe it is, then the political realism that created and dominated main¬ream security studies was also for someone and for some purpose. It represented a certain common sense about the world, but certainly not value¬free common sense**. This is still the case**. Realist-derived security studies continues to survive and flourish because the approach is congenial for those who prosper from the intellectual hegemony of a top-down, statist, power-centric, masculinized, ethnocentric, and militarized world view of security**. This **worldview is made up of some of the most powerful and plausible "facts by human agreement" and is legitimized by some of the most powerful and plausible fact-makers**.22 The power of this way of think¬ing is so deeply embedded that **its proponents are unable to recognize it as ideology**-such a powerful ideology indeed that it is often regarded as common sense, a timeless and self-evident truth. But **political realism is an ideology, and ideologies are human inventions: it is not the expression of biological destiny, or nature's law**, or the will of god(s), or a Supreme Truth. **Like all human inventions, the set of attitudes and behaviors constituted by political realism can be unlearned**, though it is never easy to overturn theories that serve the interests of the powerful.

## Framework

### Structural Violence First

#### Centralizing our “academic” insights about structural violence as key—only we can present a new vision of politics

Ornelas 2012 (Raul, Professor and activist, this essay was peer reviewed in *The South Atlantic Quarterly* Winter “Counterhegemonies and Emancipations: Notes for a Debate”)

The discussion of the horizons of social struggle is neither an academic issue nor, in the end, a theoretical one. The historical experience of social struggle, and especially the history of revolutionary processes, demonstrates that the points of reference that provide the strength and ideas that orient struggle and social transformation are of primary importance. While it is the workers and their organizations that through struggle constitute the subject of social transformation, what we call points of reference (organizations, but also newspapers, clubs, and more recently, groups of intellectuals) have been able to make important contributions in formulating analysis and strategies adequate to the historical moment insofar as they take into account the realities of the transformational subject. In this sense, we think it is very important to intensify the debate concerning the horizons of social struggle. This becomes even more relevant if, following Perry Anderson’s characterization of the Latin American social reality, “Here and only here, the resistance to neoliberalism and to neo-imperialism conjugates the cultural with the social and national. That is to say, it entails an emerging vision of another type of organization of society and another model of relations among states on the basis of these three different dimensions.”1

#### Contesting and critiquing common sense key

Bleiker, Professor of IR @ Queensland University, 2005 p. 179-180

(Roland, *International Society and Its Critics* Ed. Bellamy)

But **common sense is not always as commonsensical** as it seems, or at least **not** as **problematic and value-free**. This certainly is the case with English School assumptions about international society. Allow me to present the issue through an unusual foray into neuropsychology. Such a detour may reveal more than a direct look at world politics. Peter Brugger conducted a highly insightful series of studies that demonstrate how the brain seeks to discover rules and patterns even in circumstances where there )re only random events. In one of his behavioural tests, Brugger asked forty volubteers to participate in a game. They had to direct a cursor on a screen towards a target and open it as often as possible. Participants did not know that the target could be opened only after a certain period of time had expired-otherwise it simply remained locked. All participants managed to score repeatedly. But instead of simply waiting .unttil the respective time span was over, almost all participants moved their cursors '~cross the screen, searching for a correct route towards the target. Many developed Wighly complex theories about the most efficient ways of reaching [the target].'only two of the forty participants figured out that there was no correct route, that I strongly suspect that exactly the same is the case **in international relations scholarship: that we develop complex theories to visualize the exact outlines of an international society where there are in fact only blurred contours or none at all; that we project far more of ourselves onto the world of world politics than there actually is 'out there**'. As a result, **we may not only overestimate the existence of order in international relations, but also overvalue its importance**. In any case, the relationship between order and disorder is far more complex than the modern practice of dualistic conceptualizing has it**. Orders can sometimes be highly unjust, such as in** order-obsessed **Nazi Germany. Disorder can occasionally be required to promote orders that are more just**. Or, perhaps most importantly, **disorder can be both the only reality we have and a valuable source of ethical politics**. By probing these issues I am not looking for definitive answers. Rather, I would like to pose a few crucial questions about international society. The ensuing ruminations stake no claim to comprehensiveness. There will, for instance, be no engagement with various authors who are central to the English School. Neither will I discuss the controversial issue of who belongs to this tradition and who does not, except to demonstrate how these very discussions are a reflection of the modern compulsion to order the world. Finally, I must admit that I am neither English nor received 'formal' training in the English School. **But sometimes a look from the outside can reveal aspects that are difficult to see from within-a premise** upon which the contribution of this chapter rests.

### Ontology First

#### In IR, ontology comes before ethics and other calculations

**Odysseos**, IR Prof. @ U-Sussex, **2002** p. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20097799.pdf>

**Interstate relations** in a **dangerous ontology** Once order is brought about by the covenant and safeguarded by the Leviathan, danger is relegated to the outside of state boundaries, again in the form of others-as enemies. The **relation between anarchy and danger in the international sphere can be traced to the lack of principles** which have brought about order inside the Levia than. Arche, meaning principle, dominion and order, enables us to look at an-archy as that condition which still does not conform to the principles of a commonwealth. Thus, **danger recreates an an-archic, or unprincipled, environment** reminiscent of the pre-commonwealth state of nature, where the other-as-enemy is defined as a like entity, that is, as another Leviathan among many. The outside of the Leviathan remains in the state of nature and offers no security. Beate Jahn has claimed, more over, that understanding 'the international' as a state of nature 'is the defining claim of IR, its very raison d'etre'?1 Based on this logic, **realism propagates the notion that survival is the operating concept of 'the international'.** As Leo Strauss once noted in this regard, 'in Hobbes there is no question of a total negation of the political; according to his doctrine, the state of nature continues at least in the relationship between the nations'.38 James Der Derian concurs, noting that 'Hobbes's solution for civil war displaces the disposition for a "warre of every man against every man" to the international arena.'39 A parallel can be discerned where the state behaves in the international, the outside, in the same fashion as man behaved in the state of nature. The state acts as if it is the object and subject of its responsibility, creating what Der Derian calls 'an ethico-political imperative embedded in the nature of things'.40 Carl Schmitt, jurist and political thinker of the inter-war period, has offered a systematic challenge to the proposal that anarchical relations among states can be transcended. To this end, he reflected on the distinguishing features of 'the political' at the level of interstate interaction.41 Moreover, it is necessary to look at the thought of Schmitt, for he was among the conservative thinkers who had influenced political realists in IR, most notably, Hans Morgenthau.42 In his monograph The Concept of the Political, Carl Schmitt provided a clear, but not 'exhaustive', statement of the Interstate relations in a dangerous ontology Once order is brought about by the covenant and safeguarded by the Leviathan, **danger is relegated to the outside of state boundaries, again in the form of others-as enemies**. 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Working in the 1920s political climate where belief in law as the arbiter of international politics had become relatively promi nent,44 Schmitt wished to affirm thinking of the international realm as a state of nature. His political theory, exemplary of which is The Concept of the Political, is both an affirmation of Hobbes's observations and, at the same time, a challenge to the repercussions of the Hobbesian solution.45 Hobbes conceived of the state of nature as a 'state of war of all against all'. It was Schmitt's opinion, that inter national politics were best understood by employing a more nuanced understanding of the enemy, a concept which had been so broadly defined in Leviathan to enable transcendence of the state of nature. In the Hobbesian situation of 'war of all against all' every other is the enemy. 'War of all against all' translates otherness into enmity in a non-discriminatory way, although, for Hobbesian political philo sophy, this non-discrimination was essential, if the solution of a social contract was to succeed. In Leviathan there can exist no decision as to which otherness leads to enmity and danger. On the contrary, the element of decision is evident only in man's choice to transcend his nature by agreeing 'to lay downe a mans right to any thing'46 and to create a commonwealth 'to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will'.47 Thus, the decision in Hobbes is taken when man deems that anarchy is the condition which leads to danger, one which can be overcome by agreeing to a Covenant, whereby men give up their multiplicity of wills. Schmitt, however, addressed himself to a rather different political situation to that of Hobbes, where the authority of the Weimar Republic appeared threatened by the belief that international law and institutions could better regulate international political life, and where the irrevocable role of the state in the political, he felt, had to be reasserted. For such an assertion to be effective, 'the political' 'must therefore rest on its own ultimate distinctions, to which all action with a specifically political meaning can be traced'.48 This antithesis of friend/enemy, on which 'the political' rests, 'denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an associ ation or disassociation'.49 This antithesis revokes the notion of transcendence by restricting the occurrence of the state of nature to the moment when the political distinction between friend and enemy is made. For Schmitt, the distinction between friend and enemy is decided only in the extreme case, that is, it is an exception rather than the norm. The enemy is not omnipresent but can only be decided as an enemy if he poses an existential threat. The enemy, Schmitt writes, is 'the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible'.50 However, the enemy is not defined as every other one encounters in coexisting; on the contrary, Schmitt's reference to 'enemy' is to the public enemy, decided upon by the state and restricted to another collectivity. 'An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity.'51 The enemy is hostis, not inimicus, and, therefore, everyday political adversaries cannot be 'enemies'. The political antithesis of friend/enemy is only drawn when a distinct political entity is faced with the possibility of dying and of killing. By allowing the political to coalesce around the extreme case, Schmitt challenged the possibility of transcending the state of nature in international politics and, hence, called into question the very possibility that the liberal practice of law and the establishment of international institutions could promote peace and prevent war. If the state of nature can be transcended then 'the political' is threatened.52 The affirmation of the primacy of 'the political' in the extreme case eliminates, then, the possibility of transcendence. T**he impossibility of transcendence is further strength ened by the fact that, although every distinction draws upon other distinctions to reinforce itself, the political distinction remains autonomous**. The friend/enemy distinction may be asserted without such recourse to the moral, the aesthetic, the economic, the religious: the state is able to distinguish who is the enemy solely by judging whether the other 'intends to negate his opponent's way of life and therefore must be repulsed'.53 Thus, 'the political' has an objective and autonomous nature in the thinking of Schmitt, such that it can distinguish and act with regard to the friend/enemy distinction without needing to refer to other antitheses, such as moral or aesthetic considerations. With regards to 'morality', moreover, 'the political' is conceived as the moment of decision between friend/enemy, which is exempt from all justifications, where there is 'justification by mere existence'.54 The **existential threat of the enemy makes the political devoid of all other concerns**: 'the political' does not need to justify its existence by reference to other concerns. It is justified by the mere existence of an existential threat. The enemy raises the question of whether the collectivity, the 'we', wants to take responsibility for its existence. Again, the affirmation of 'the political' animates and validates the responsibility to survive. It is the collectivity's continued survival that justifies, 'by mere existence', the possibility of physical killing. Once the decision is taken, the enemy's presence accentuates the fact that the political entity has a responsibility to survive. Again, it must be noted that survival is not merely The article has, thus far, used the term ethos, tentatively defined as an attitude or mode of relating to the other, to illuminate the operation of an ethos of survival within the Hobbesian and Schmittian ontologies of danger. It is perhaps important to move, at this stage, towards a more coherent and grounded formulation of ethics The article has, thus far, used the term ethos, tentatively defined as an attitude or mode of relating to the other, to illuminate **the operation of an ethos of survival within** the Hobbesian and Schmittian **ontologies of danger**. It is perhaps important to move, at this stage, towards a more coherent and grounded formulation of ethics At the interstate level, Schmitt enabled a discriminatory decision towards survival, one that rests on the extreme case of existential threat. Furthermore, the emphasis on the distinction between friend and enemy as the moment of 'the political' relegates the relational schema, through which others outside the state are encountered, to the state's sovereign control. The **ethos of survival provides the state with the locus of responsibility** (itself, as contracted to by the state's subjects) and **allows the state to ignore responsibility** to any external others, as this would not directly pertain to the survival of the collectivity in question. Of significance to our thinking about ethics is not only the fact that the other is dangerous and conceptually encountered as an enemy. What is of greater importance, furthermore, is the linkage between responsibility and survival, where responsible action is understood to be related to the self's (be this a group or an individual) survival**. Realism, grounded as it is on the ontology of danger, employs a particular operative 'ethical' schema that can now be revealed as one of survival and self-preservation**. Arguably, **this ethos is in operation whenever the anarchic system is invoked**. Furthermore, it should be stated, the spacio-temporal transcendence of the state of nature does not amount to a negation of the ethos of survival. Rather, this ethos by which persons are related to each other in the state of nature, now becomes tran sposed onto the 'inside'. The social contract assigned the management of relations within the commonwealth to the Leviathan, which upholds the vigilant relationality of the inside in order to ensure that an-archy does not return. Hence, **the ethos of survival is retained as the operative ethical framework of the state**. The Covenant, by which we relinquish the state of nature, transposes the relational schema of survival to the 'we' or the 'within'. Those who subscribe to the Covenant and the common wealth are not enemies, by virtue of the creation of the Leviathan, who ensures that they are not. Consent to the contract is for Hobbes an ethical relation of the people to their fellow men of 'the inside', an ethical relation based on the responsibility for survival. Acceptance of the focus on 'survival' as proof of the lack of 'ethical' concern (the existence of an international moral code) obscures the 'self-relating schema at play. It fails, in other words, to

**(ODYSSEOS CONTINUES)**

recognize the presence of an implicit hostile relationality to the other, where man is both the subject and object of his own responsibility. This relationality is, what is more, transferred to the international level where states relate as enemies in extreme cases. The article, therefore, calls for **the recognition of the ethos of survival as that mode of relating to**

**others-as-enemies, which is operative within the anarchic ontology of danger.** As the following section discusses, this **has implications for the way international politics is conceptualized and its relation to ethical theorizing**. The illustration of the discursive creation of the ground of danger is not an isolated event of textual interest to historians of ideas alone. Rather, **the discursive creation of the dangerous ontology and the perpetuation of its particular ethos can be shown to have implications for ethical theorizing within the discipline of IR**. Specifically for the realists, and generally **for those who tacitly accept/operate within an ontology of an anarchic realm**, a parallel framing of self/other as self/enemy occurs in the case of ethics/IR. At the very least, **the unchallenged acceptance of this ontology legitimates, among realists primarily but not exclusively, the widely held belief that international relations and ethics are considered to be distinct and separate fields of study**. It enables realist scholars to treat ethics and IR as if constituted by and operating within a dichotomous relationship. In other words**, tacit or explicit acceptance of the The illustration of the discursive creation of the ground of danger is not an isolated event of textual interest to historians of ideas alone**. Rather, **the discursive creation of the dangerous ontology and the perpetuation of its particular ethos can be shown to have implications** for ethical theorizing within the discipline of IR. Specifically for the realists, and generally for those who tacitly accept/operate within an ontology of an anarchic realm, a parallel framing of self/other as self/enemy occurs in the case of ethics/IR. At the very least, **the unchallenged acceptance of this ontology legitimates, among realists primarily but not exclusively, the widely held belief that international relations and ethics are considered to be distinct and separate fields of study**. It **enables realist scholars to treat ethics and IR as if constituted by and operating within a dichotomous relationship**. In other words, **tacit or explicit acceptance of the ontology of danger effects a 'cross-roads mentality', where IR and ethics are con sidered to be distinct** domains of inquiry, which are brought together, and exist at this juncture, with great difficulty.64 The tentativeness of this juncture establishes, not only the distinct nature of these two allegedly discrete fields of inquiry but, also, the fact that international relations, by which I mean the 'reality' of relations between states as actors and agents, are not amenable to ethical thought and action. 'Ethics' is rendered as a domain with fixed meanings, with a specific, knowable, and noble intent, as John D. Caputo once remarked,65 yet one whose very concerns do not fit the 'reality' from which IR theories derive and to which their prescriptive injunctions must conform. The **historical 'colonization' of IR by this largely realist ontology constructs it as a discipline whose prime concern is to ensure that the state** (and its represented domestic constituency) **survives in a hostile environment consisting of like-minded actors with similar intentions and fears**. The juxtaposition of the 'noble intent' of ethics, understood as a moral code for international action, and the realist 'reminder' as to the certain incompatibility of their successful interaction, establishes a universalist and notably 'liberal' under standing of ethics, one that claims that states as moral agents ought to act according to principles designed for the individual moral agent. Gordon Graham concedes that '[t]he importance of the idea that nations have moral rights, of which the most important is the right to self-government, can hardly be exaggerated. It colours almost all thinking about ethics in international affairs.'66 **This fixity of the meaning of ethics can be readily discerned from the reactions to the problematic and caution ary insertion of 'ethics' into this dangerous ontology**. The mainstream, which claims to take an explanatory, descriptive, but not prescriptive approach to relations between states, views ethics as a restraining influence, one that demands that the (allegedly) self-interested actions of states be subjected to a moral or ethical code of action or behaviour. The **idea that ethics is a restraining factor in the way states act, as opposed to an enabling, motivating factor for action, is the result of the unproblem atized ontology of danger upon which such statements are made.** This is why calls for the resurgence of ethics in IR, or for recognition of the normative aspects of the subject matter,67 are seen by the mainstream as a surprising and tentative event, one that is aware of its transgression into 'dangerous' territory.68 **Scholars wishing to engage in ethical theorizing in IR ought to be aware,** we are warned, of **the harsh terrain of the discipline's subject matter, one not amenable to ethical restraint, and of the danger which we may unleash by being too successful in bringing 'ethics'** to TR'.

Ontology first—mediates all relations with other actors and agents

**Odysseos**, IR Prof. @ U-Sussex, **2002** p. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20097799.pdf>

Scholars of IR interested in theorizing 'ethical international relations' must seek to challenge the naturalness of the juncture of 'ethics and international relations'.72 Below and by way of conclusion, I outline two of the **repercussions of the failure to acknowledge that the ontology of danger**, and its attendant ethos, **frames realist thinking about the other**(s)?out there?for specific theoretical issues, as well as f**or practical purposes. First, it blinds IR theorizing to the fact that, within the parameters of such an ontology of danger, a relational schema towards the other is always already at pla**y. Analyses of situations which might require action or which might lead to inaction operate within a framework of relating**, where the other is dangerous** and where 'ethical' action is seen as an activity with the potential to return us to the anarchy that 'we' have responsibly transcended. I highlight 'responsibly' in an attempt to show that **this ethos of survival does not only underlie the relation to the other but also the positing of the subject and object of responsibility**. **Second, this operating relational framework encumbers current and future theorizing about relationality.** **Theorizing for an ethical international relations must initially proceed with disclosing the ethos of survival,** with understanding, in other words, ethics as IR and IR as ethics. To move beyond this schema, or ethos, **ethical theorizing must challenge the ground on which survival becomes the prime objective of responsibility. It must be understood, in other words, that the relational schema of the other-as-enemy does not appear in its normative dimensions and has come to be perceived as a pragmatic/prudent approach to world politics**. The result of such a naturalization is that IR is portrayed as a discipline where 'ethics' form a secondary concern. If one wished to be concerned about 'ethics', then one speaks of adding the normative back to the agenda of IR. Thus, it becomes obscured what are the ethics of the agenda of realist IR which is, as was argued above, the agenda of survival. I would finally suggest that this **schema must be denaturalized in order to reveal, first, that it has become prohibitive for ethical theorizing and second, to allow for the transcendence of the dichotomous relation of ethics/IR** and move us towards 'ethical international theorizing'.

## A2: Answers

### A2: Perms

#### The permutation fails—the affirmative’s 1AC poisons the possibility of an alternative imaginary

Burke, senior lecturer in Intl Politics @ University of Wales, 2007 p. 13-14

(Anthony, “What Security Makes Possible: Some Thoughts on Critical Security Studies)

Waever's claim here sets up a strange tension with his argument that **security is a 'speech act' that 'does not refer to something more real; the utterance is the act**. '41 In turn he argues, after Jeff Huysmans, that **successful securitisation only occurs when an audience accepts it as such**.42 In this formulation, security's meaning is contingent, contested and subject to the play of power: **'something is a security problem when elites declare it to be** SO'.43 And, in a somewhat Foucauldian vein, he argues that **'the way to study securitisation is to study discourse and political constellations**. The relevant question is: When does an argument with this pat1iclliar rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve a sufficient effect'744 This contradiction may explain Booth's characterisation of the Copenhagen School as **'a curious combination of liberal, post-structural and neorealist approaches' which 'pile(s] up** ... a bundle of conceptual problems and political issues' .45 My own hunch is that Wrever and his colleagues **baulk at the implications of their de-ontologising move: rather than pursuing its implications and h)'ing to direct that into the service of a normatively better** (if still discursively situated) **understanding of security, they offer a choice of whether to securitise some issues, but, once that occurs, anchor the process in a deeply essentialist and problematic Schmittian matrix where security is about existential threat, abnormal politics, elite decision, and legal and nonnative rule-breaking. The nation-state remains the ultimate referent and ontological ground for security**, even if there is a caution about the dangers involved in securitising some issues.46

#### Moments of critique are erased by any realist notions of an objective world: their textual strategies reify modernity even when combined with critical theory

Walker, professor of political science at the University of Victoria, **19**93

(R.B.J., editor of the journal *Alternatives* and all-round smart person, *Inside / Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge University Press, pg. 7-9)

Part of my aim in reading persistent claims about state sovereignty and political realism as attempts to resolve, or more usually to forget about, the spatiotemporal conditions of contemporary political practice, is to. explore some of the implications of recent attempts to canvass the possibility of an explicitly critical attitude within the theory of international relations. Few would argue that such an attitude is now flourishing. Many even seem to feel that such an attitude would be undesirable. Certainly, the absence of a moment of critique in this context has provided one of the conventional measures by which to distinguish international relations theory from most other areas of contemporary social and political analysis. In fact, I wifi argue, the absence of a critical edge to most theories of international relations is a rather special case. The distinction between theories of international relations and other forms of social and political analysis is itself an expression of the limits of a political practice that seeks to be other than what it has already become within the spatial horizons of the territorial state. While my analysis draws upon ideas and strategies of investigation that have become familiar from broad and still controversial literatures about postmodernity and poststructuralism, I am primarily concerned to show how moments of critique that are already present in modern theories of international relations have been lost or forgotten through textual strategies that conflate, polarise and reify specifically modern accounts of spatiotemporal relations. In this context, for example, I am interested not only in the pervasive discourses in which political realists constantly confront idealists and utopians, but also the manner in which the possibility of a critical theory of international relations has been erased by a privileging of epistemological and methodological prescriptions that simply take historically specific—modern—ontological options as a given. The spatial framing of the relation between an autonomous subject set apart from the objective world is especially crucial, for it resonates with the same modernist dichotomies that have been reified so smoothly within claims about state sovereignty and political realism. Epistemologies that simply affirm these dichotomies are not obviously the most appropriate place from which to investigate a world in which boundaries are so evidently shifting and uncertain. As a theory, or complex of theories, constituted through claims about sovereign identity in space and time, international relations simply takes for granted that which seems to me to have become most problematic. I prefer to assume that any analysis of contemporary world politics that takes the principle of sovereign identity in space and time as an unquestioned assumption about the way the world is — as opposed to an often very tenuous claim made as part of the practices of modern subjects, including the legitimation practices of modern states — can only play with analogies and metaphors taken from discourses in which this assumption is also taken for granted: hence much of the contemporary appeal of utilitarian micro-economic theory as a way of explaining patterns of conffict and cooperation between states. For all that they have been advanced under the banner of an epistemologically rigorous social science, utilitarian stories about rational action remain explicitly literary devices and carry enormous ontological and ideological baggage. Shifting allusions from that which is assumed to be known — the rational action of sovereign individuals in a market — to that which has to be explained — the rational /irrational action of sovereign states in an anarchical system,’ society — they especially have encouraged the uncritical affirmation of claims to sovereign identity in space and time that might be better placed under rather more critical suspicion

### A2: State Inevitable

#### Demanding state-centrism fails—our critique analyzes the state to change politics but your advocacies demand a state-centric framework which fails

Ornelas 2012 (Raul, Professor and activist, this essay was peer reviewed in *The South Atlantic Quarterly* Winter “Counterhegemonies and Emancipations: Notes for a Debate”)

By contrast, the perspective of emancipation emphasizes the role of the state as a pillar of domination. It is not a question of turning one’s back on the state, because it is clear that the state is, in many ways, an omnipresent reality for all social subjects. Instead, the perspective of emancipation suggests an attitude of detachment and emphasizes the dislocation of the state from the center of thinking and activities. The state is a factor, but it is neither the first, nor is it the most important, in the construction of a project for social emancipation. The best-known arguments for this position draw on those historical experiences, particularly clear in the neoliberal period, where state mediations have been so emptied of their content that they become illusory.18 The handover of sovereignty to global hegemonic powers by national governments has resulted in the subsequent loss of the means of action on the part of Latin American states. Thus, the performance of governments such as that of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil or of Cristina Kirchner in Argentina seems shackled to the neoliberal agenda that the governments continue to apply and in this regard underpins the attitude of skepticism regarding Latin American states. This argument is not, however, sufficient to explain the profound reversal of perspective posed by the emancipatory project with respect to the state. This position is rooted, rather, in the work and practice of recognition/ knowing [(re)conocimiento] and the self-reflection that characterizes the construction of the subject on the road to emancipation. It is the personal and collective synthesis of what the state represents in the life of the collectives and the communities that forms the basis for developing a distance from the state. There are two novel issues regarding the political sphere of the state that characterize the projects of emancipation: first, the rupture with realist pragmatism at the center of the political system, and second, the repudiation of the dividing role of the parties. The experience of political culture rooted in the exercise of power leads to the rejection of the traditional spaces and forms of politics, as well as a rejection of separations in general (managers from managed, manual work versus intellectual work, etc.). Among others, these are the arguments that relegate the question of the state to a lesser status: it is everyday life that transfers to the exterior factors that in normal political and social struggle are inside of the movements (such as the party form and the union form). This position represents an apparent paradox within the idea of emancipation. Critics of this conception argue that because it cannot block itself out from the actions of the state, emanci pation runs the risk of becoming functional to domination. In response to this critique, we can affirm that the emancipatory project includes diverse forms and degrees of dialogue with the state: from the rage of the piqueteros19 at being forced to accept state work plans to the Zapatista strategy to construct a national consensus on indigenous rights and culture. There is no idealism, understood as the loss of a sense of reality, in the course of emancipatory projects. The question resides in the scope and possibilities for expansion of this mode of resistance. This question does not depend exclusively on the positions adopted by the subjects that embody emancipation but instead on all social forces in contention, especially those contesting the prevailing order.

### A2: Scenario Planning

#### Scenario planning actually makes disasters into inevitable occurrences—only allows post-disaster triage instead of presupposing a world where disaster is not inevitable at all

Duffield 2011 (Mark, Professor of Development Politics at the University of Bristol, “Envirnmental Terror: Uncertainty, Resilience, and the Bunker” Working Paper No. 06-11)

Today, uncertainty is measured against the open acknowledgement that, given the range of possible threats, governments alone cannot protect people against all of them (Cabinet Office 2008: 42). However, according to the new risk orthodoxy, while we cannot fully protect ourselves against uncertainty, we can improve our preparedness for it. Through imaginative enactment, role-play, disaster rehearsal and other scenariobased techniques and hazard modelling tools, we can overcome our inability to predict by gaming our response capacities in relation to scientifically constructed future threat scenarios (Collier 2008). Originating in war, these techniques are now generalised as tools of strategic planning for the imagining potential futures “...and then managing their consequences” (Lentoz and Rose 2009: 236). Using such imaginative all-hazard tools, preparedness can be strengthened thus reducing potential exposure and vulnerability; an uncertain future can be brought into the present as a tangible object of policy (Cabinet Office 2001). Within the new risk orthodoxy, because emergencies cannot be fully predicted, preparedness will not stop them from happening. It will, however, help recovery from them. In this respect, the key term of art, now ever-present across the sciences and popular media, is resilience (Zebrowski 2009). In the space of a decade, resilience “...has become ubiquitous as an operational strategy of emergency preparedness, crisis response and national security” (Cooper and Walker 2010: 25). Resilience, however, is more than just recovery; it is the ability to survive through adaptability. A resilient system is capable of not only reforming around a new stability regime but, if necessary, moving between several such relative states, while still retaining essential functionality. For a resilient system, uncertainty is not a necessarily negative condition; it can also be positive and productive. Despite their downsides, disasters can also provide creative opportunities to establish something new; new ways of coping, living and, not least, making money (Cabinet Office 2008; Klein 2007).

### A2: Transitions

#### The transition DA assumes a binary between a then and now—but if disorder itself is a form of order, its embrace is the best alternative

Bleiker, Professor of IR @ Queensland University, 2005 p. 191

(Roland, *International Society and Its Critics* Ed. Bellamy)

**The values of order and disorder are**, then, **not as absolute and as diametrically opposed as suggested by dualistic Western thinking patterns. Disorder is certainly not as bad as its reputation has it. There is enough evidence, empirical and conceptual**, to back up Bull's suggestion **that at times social change can be promoted only at the expense of order.** Perhaps a citation from the world of science, somewhat ruthlessly taken out of context, captures this aspect of world politics best. Consider how the so-called Second Law of Thermodynamics states that 'all change is the consequence of the purposeless collapse of energy and matter into disorder' (see Atkins 2003: ch. 4). .. One must go one step **further: disorder can have positive effects not only as a route towards a more just order, but also as a state of affairs and a value in itself**, a possibility that Bull did not contemplate. **Consider the countless and continuously spreading new social movements, pressure groups, and other loose organizations that challenge various aspects of local, national, or global governance**. The state-centric nature of English School scholarship provides little space to recognize, yet alone appreciate the role of \these increasingly important transnational actors. Part of their importance stems \ from the fact that **these movements operate in a rather chaotic way. They come and ;go. They are neither centrally controlled** nor do they all seek the same objective. 'Some operate on the right end of the political spectrum. Others on the left. Some pppose globalization. Others hail it. Some seek more environmental regulations. .others defend neoliberal free trade. And **it is precisely through this lack of coherence, control, and certainty that the respective movements offer a positive contribution to the political**, and not only because their activities may contribute to an international :ociety even in the absence of a state-controlled order. These seemingly chaotic activties are perhaps the quintessential aspect of postmodern politics, of local resistance against orders that have become encroaching and unjust (see Walker 1988 and White '91: 10-12). They embody what William Connolly believes is the key to cultural:denocratization, perhaps even to a post-national notion of democracy: a certain yel of 'productive ambiguity, that is, the commitment to always resist 'attempts to low one side or the other to achieve final victory' (Connolly 1995: 153-5; White IOD: 106-50). **Without such political checks-and-balances, and the disorder they require to exist and thrive, any order will eventually undermine the sense of justice it originally supposed to promote and protect**.

#### Second presumption lies against the status quo—disorders better than the unjust order of IR

Bleiker, Professor of IR @ Queensland University, 2005 p. 186-187

(Roland, *International Society and Its Critics* Ed. Bellamy)

In view of the long modern compulsion of ordering it is hardly surprising that order is seen by and large as unproblematic and positive. One can say exactly the same { about order as Chris Brown (1995a: 90) said about the notion of an international community: it is always used in a positive way, never pejoratively, as if order itself would make the world a better place. It is thus also not surprising that English School} scholarship treats order not only as an analytical category, but also as a normative goal. Bull (1977: 96, p. xii) is among the few scholars who recognized the problematic' dimensions of this double assumption. While introducing his study as a detached, scholarly analysis of order as an empirical phenomenon in world politics, rather than. a presentation of order as a 'value, goal, or objective: he acknowledged that the two are difficult to separate: I have sought to avoid giving a 'persuasive definition' of the term 'order' that would prejudge the question of the value of order as a human goal. On the other hand, I do in fact hold that order is desirable, or valuable in human affairs. and a fortiori in world politics. Few would question that order is desirable and essential. Without order there can be no rule of law, no protection of human rights, no civilized life in general. But order does not necessarily equate with the good life. The recently proliferating antiglobalization movement, for instance, has drawn attention to the undersides of the current neoliberal world order. The merits of this body of knowledge and activism can be debated, but it is far more difficult to dispute that many if not most injustices in life, from domestic abuse to torture, are not the product of disorder, but of unjust orders. The horror of Nazi Germany, or of any authoritarian state, does not stem from absence of order, but from an obsession with order. Indeed, no society is more ordered than present-day North Korea: absolutely everything is regulated and controlled by an omnipresent and paranoid state apparatus. Few commentators would present this form of order as desirable. And yet, order remains an overwhelmingly positive and unproblematized category in scholarship about international society.

### A2: Realism

#### Claims about realism’s centrality lock the link to the critique—self-fulfilling prophecy

Neocleous, prof. of critique of political economy @ Brunei University, 2008 p. 3-4

(Mark, *Critique of Security*)

This **saturation of the political and social landscape with the logic of security has been accompanied by the emergence of an academic industry churning out ideas about how to defend and improve it**. Security has been defined8 and redefined.9 It has been re-msioned,1° re-mapped, gendered,12 refused.13 Some have asked whether there is perhaps too much security,14 some have sought its cimlisation,15 and thousands of others have asked about how to 'balance' it with liberty. **Much of this** redefining, revisioning and remapping and so on, **has come about through a more widespread attempt at widening the security agenda so as to include societal, economic and a broad range of other issues such as development or the environment**. These moves have sought to forge alternative notion saturations of' democratic' and 'human' security as part of a debate about whose security is being studied, the ontological status of insecurities and questions of identity, and through these moves security has come to be treated less as an objective condition and much more as the product of social processes. At the same time, **a developing body of work known as 'critical security studies' has emerged**. **This range of research** - now quite formidable, often impressive andsometimes drawn on in this book - **has a double lack. First, for all its talk about discourse, processes and the need for a critical edge, it still offers a relatively impoverished account of the different ways in which security and insecurity are imagined**.16 To speak of different' security fields' such as the environment, migration, energy, and so on, often fails to open up the analysis to the ways in which spaces and places, processes and categories, are imagined through the lens of insecurity and in turn appropriated and colonised by the project of security. **Given the centrality of the state to the political imagination, to imagine the whole social order through the lens of insecurity is to hand it over to the key entity which is said to be the ground of security, namely the state**.17 This is related to the second lack, which is that **for all the critical edge employed by the authors in question, the running assumption underpinning the work is that security is still a good thing, still necessary despite how much we interrogate it. The assumption seems to be that while we might engage in a critical interrogation of security, we could never quite be against it. 'Why we might want" security" after all' is how one of the most influential essays in this area ends.** IS As Didier Bigo points out, **how to maximise security always seems to remain the core issue.19 And so there is a danger that these approaches do not quite manage to shake off the managerialism prevalent in more traditional security studies: the desire to 'do' security better. The common assumption remains that security is the foundation of freedom, democracy and the good society, and that the real question is how to improve the power of the state to 'secure' us**.

#### Realism exists as a result of state behavior—not an eternal truth

Linklater, Intl Politics Prof. @ University of Wales, 2005 p. 118

(Andrew, Critical Security Studies and World Politics Ed. By Ken Booth)

For their part, **critical theorists do not underestimate the obstacles to global political reform; nor do they subscribe to any notion of inevitable and irreversible progress**. They argue **there is nothing in international anarchy that makes competition and conflict permanent features of world politics. The qualities of anarchy**, especially as neorealism characterizes that condition, **are** **at heart the attributes of the dominant power**s. This is why critical theory can start with the Kantian proposition that **everything hinges on how political community is constructed**, particularly in the most powerful regions. From this vantage point, **it is a profound mistake to ignore the respects in which states threaten their own citizens so that the study of international relations is free to develop its specific focus on the ways in which states interact with and threaten each other**. The important point is that societies that are quick to resort to strategic action in their internal relaions are improbable advocates of communicative action in world politics, unless foreign policy pragmatism suggests that commitments to dialogue will produce national advantages; conversely, societies that have standing commitments to communicative action domestically already have the potential to bring similar orientations to bear on relations with outsiders. Consequently, **critical theory does not begin with how independent political communities conduct their external relations but with the deeper question of how they are constituted in the first place**.

#### Voting negative is a cultural intervention that saps realism of its power and privilege

Cheeseman, visiting politics fellow @ Univ. of New South Wales, 2005 p. 80-81

(Graeme, Critical Security Studies and World Politics Ed. By Ken Booth)

In spite of the impressive amount of theoretical and empirical evidence brought against it, then, the realist-neorealist perspective continues to be the one most favored by national security planners across the globe and their mainstream advisers in academe. Indeed, since the inception of the war on terrorism under the administration of George W. Bush, **the space and incentives for alternative or critical thinking about security have been progressively closed down and its proponents ignored, marginalized, and stigmatized**. This return to tradition is occurring at a time, ironically, when **new ideas and new and critical approaches to security are most desperately needed**. Why is this happening? It is possible that the realist inclinations of Western security planners and policymakers are the most appropriate for the troubled times we are now in, although the clear and emerging policy failures in Israel, Afghanistan, Iraq, and parts of the former Soviet Union might suggest oth¬erwise. It is possible, too, that the sheer shock of September 11 generated within the policymaking fraternity (and the broader communities to which they belong) a kind of strategic reflex whereby reason gave way to more instinctual responses. **Faced with uncertain and troubling times, strategic planners, like drunkards and religious zealots, have turned to what they are most comfortable with**. Or, to paraphrase the Australian historian Henry Reynolds, admittedly in another but not entirely unconnected context, **when the chips are down, history and culture will always triumph over geography**.73 **The fact that security policymakers everywhere seem naturally predisposed toward realist understandings and solutions points to a number of other important (and related) factors and determinants**. The first is the crucial role of the **U.S. strategic studies mainstream and its military history wing, which have continued to dominate ways of viewing and responding to world affairs, acting as intellectual gatekeepers, and patrolling the boundaries of their disciplines repelling intruders and heretics.** Another is the ascendancy within Western democracies everywhere of neoconservative political forces and actors who have long been wedded; emotionally as well as intellectually, to realist political and strategic axioms and are prepared, ruthlessly, to invoke national military myths, exploit popular fears and prejudices, and spend as much of their national treasures as is necessary to advance their own particular personal or party political interests. Within such a closed environment, **traditional discourses of security, international relations, technological progress, and cultural relativism serve as useful and effective means of constituting reality in ways that can serve to advance or protect the interests not of peoples or humanity but those of the power holders themselves**. 74 A third and important factor is our own culpability in this process. We need to realize and accept that the siren calls of our politicians, teachers, and expert policy advisers connect as much to our emotional as our intellectual selves. As Martin Shaw has argued in Post-Military Society, **while the move toward a more harmonious, cooperative, and peaceful world depends, at one level, on the progressive weakening of the power of estab¬lished military (and militarized) institutions and thinking in favor of alter¬native structures and perspectives, these structural changes need also to be accomplished by a shift in societal values and beliefs**. As Shaw puts it, Beyond specific political tasks, **culture will remain the last refuge of militarism. A fulIy postmilitary citizenship will be achieved only when the ideas, values, and concepts of military culture, which permeate society at the deepest levels, have been genuinely domesticated.**75 **Any move beyond the strictures of realism will ultimately depend on us coming to terms with our own understandings and prejudices, how these have and continue to be shaped by our particular histories and experiences, and how they can be open to exploitation and manipulation**. Such knowl¬edge can provide us with a better and more informed understanding of who and what we are and, in the process, make us not only more resilient and discerning but also more open to humanity's common experiences, heritages, and destiny. These underlying processes of personal and community consciousness and empowerment are, for this writer at least, the essence of critical security thinking.

### AT: Guzzini

#### Guzzini concedes realism is ineffective and his theorizations regarding its inevitability are flawed; 7 reasons

Makinda, Prof. of IR @ Murdoch, **20**00 p. Proquest

(Samuel, Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 54 “Reading and Writing International Affairs”)

Guzzini concludes that realism cannot offer a proper understanding of world politics and that the `unity between diplomatic discourse and the discipline of International Relations, so self-evident in times of Morgenthau, can no longer be upheld' (p. 234). He believes that attempts `to save realism as the discipline's identity defining theory' have failed because currently there is no work that provides a meta-theoretically coherent realism (p. 235). Guzzini therefore posits that realist scholars face a fundamental dilemma. They can update the practical knowledge of a diplomatic culture, rather than science, and thereby risk losing scientific credibility. Alternatively, they can cast realist rules and culture into a scientific mould, but this will continue to distort the realist tradition. Guzzini argues that despite its crises, realism cannot be ignored because it is `part of the collective memory and selfdefinition of international actors, academics [and] politicians alike, which order thought, suggest analogies, and empower attitudes to political action' (p. 227). He concludes that `despite realism's several deaths as a general causal theory, it can still powerfully enframe action' (p. 235).

Guzzini presents a powerful argument, but his analysis raises several questions. First, in the light of the debates unearthed by Schmidt, part of Guzzini's argument looks like a distortion of IR history. Guzzini claims that IR in the US dates back to the 1940s. However, there is evidence that the discipline emerged long before the US became a superpower.

Second, Guzzini has placed too much emphasis on a symbiotic relationship between the American foreign policy establishment and the evolution of the discipline. Even Morgenthau, the so-called founding father of IR, was opposed to the US involvement in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s. While the external world cannot be ignored in a serious analysis of the evolution of IR, its effects on the core concepts have been more limited than Guzzini would like to suggest.

Third, I believe Guzzini has over-emphasised the identification of the entire discipline with realism. Guzzini's attempt to identify realism with IR has made it difficult for him to consider, for example, the works of theorists like Michael Doyle (1986) and James Lee Ray (1995), on the `democratic peace' thesis. By reducing all IR developments in the US to the evolution of realism, Guzzini has denied himself a chance to understand the rich tradition of liberal thought in American IR.

Fourth, I find Guzzini's discussion of the `inter-paradigm' debate a little problematic (cf. Waver 1996; Banks 1985). Guzzini makes very interesting points in relation to the 'banalisation' of Thomas Kuhn's concept of paradigm. However, his definition of realism is so wide that it captures virtually everyone, including those who believed they were offering alternatives to realism. For example, major contributors to the `inter-paradigm' debates included Keohane and Nye (1977), whose book, Power and Interdependence made a major breakthrough in IR theory by articulating the concept of `complex interdependence'. Guzzini argues that `their theory did not imply a departure from all realist thought, but a broadening of the International Relations agenda' (p. 112). While Guzzini's reading of Nye and Keohane is accurate, it is not the only proper reading of this book. The assumption that everyone who defends the role of the state in global politics is a realist can be misleading. Such an assumption would turn several critical and liberal theorists into realists!

Another weakness in Guzzini's taxonomy comes out when he analyses the implications of The Logic of Anarchy (Buzan et al. 1993). Like several other scholars, Guzzini regards this book as a major effort `to rescue the rich realist tradition out of neorealism ... a realist response to the crisis of both realism and neorealism' (p. 217). However, after delving into Jones's contribution, he remarks: `This is a neat description of main research programmes inspired by post-structuralism or constructivism ... It is less obvious, however, how this can fit realism' (p. 223). This underlines the indeterminacy of many labels in IR, including realism. One way of dealing effectively with this situation is to go for principled or self-conscious eclecticism.

#### The nation state is dying out- its becoming less relevant to discussions of international relations

Spegele, IR Prof. @ Monash University, 02 p. <http://ire.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/16/3/381>

(Roger D., “Emancipatory International Relations…” in *International Relations*)

For emancipatory international relations, **nation-states, and the state-systems of which they form the essential parts, are either anachronistic institutions which have no legitimacy** and which we should replace with something else (although there is no consensus on what that something might be) **or they have always involved repression, lacked legitimacy and marginalized the powerless.** In any case, **there is no place for nation-states or state-systems in any emancipatory conception of international relations**. For emancipatory international relations, the state and the state-system need to be replaced with other institutional structures, the kind and character of the substitute depending on the particular emancipatory theory in question. World socialism (Wallerstein); dialogic communities (Linklater); alternative world orders (Cox); international human rights regime (Booth); nongendered societies; global society (Albrow); maternalist society (Ruddick); homesteads (Slyvester); anarchy (Ashley and George) would be just some of the things that give content to what Kant called the Kingdom of Ends. Whatever the value of thinking in terms of radical goals that may not be realizable, one part of the emanc**ipatory international relationist’s claim seems to be solidly based: for, there is, after all, considerable support for the empirical claim that the authority, capacity and power of nation-states are rapidly diminishing in the face of globalization, interdependence and a just environmental order**. Clearly much more content would have to be given to the institutional envelopes that would be morally and practically superior to the nation-state. It will not do, for example, to talk in some vague way about the rise of the postmodern state.30

### A2: Benign Hegemon

#### Benign hegemony thesis wrong: U.S. is only benign on its own terms/those who do not agree will find themselves excluded and discriminated against

Wu 2001 (Xinbo, Professor at Center For American Studies at Fudan University, “A Response to Thomas. G. Moore” in *Asian Affairs* 21.3)

Is the United States a benign hegemon? For some countries the answer is "yes." Those countries rely on the economic opportunity created by American markets, technology, and investment, as well as access to the U.S.-led international economic system more generally. However, a benign hegemon does not mean an altruistic one. In allowing access to U.S. markets for goods, capital, and technology, Wash- ington seeks in return important political, economic, and security concessions from other countries. If they fail to meet U.S. demands, their access to the U. S. econo- my or to U.S.-controlled resources will be denied or reduced. Neither is the Unit- ed States an enlightened hegemon. If U.S. supremacy is challenged, its rivals willfind themselves running into hard times. This was true for both the former Soviet Union (in politico-military affairs during the latter stages of the Cold War) and for Japan (in the economic field in the late 1980s and early 1990s). In addition, the United States often fails to be a fair player in international economic activities. Indeed, there are many cases in which Washington has sought to set the rules of the game primarily to U.S. advantage and asked for concessions from other countries that go beyond the limits of international norms

#### Idea of U.S. as a benign hegemon is a neutral narrative used to justify continue dominance and violence

Wu 2001 (Xinbo, Professor at Center For American Studies at Fudan University, “A Response to Thomas. G. Moore” in *Asian Affairs* 21.3)

Moore suggests that American officials generally see themselves as working with, rather than striving to achieve dominance over, other countries. But many American officials also believe that the United States is the only qualified leader in the world. In that sense, leadership in world affairs has become a self-imposed destiny for America since the end of World War II. During the Cold War, that ambition was covered by concern in the West over the Soviet threat and the desire to defend the "free world." With the end of the Cold War, Washington has become much more vocal in endeavoring to build the Pax Americana. In fact, if there is an overarching goal in U.S. global strategy, it is to establish and maintain Amer- ican hegemonic stability. For that purpose, the United States needs to solidify and expand the camp of its followers, transform and constrain Russia and China, and punish and weaken the so-called rogue states. U.S. economic strategy in the Asia- Pacific, consistent with its security strategy in the region, serves the purpose of extending the imbalance of power. The real problem here is how the United States maintains its supremacy. Wash- ington may behave as a responsible power and play a constructive, leading role in world affairs. In that case, a U.S. hegemony may not be seen as especially threatening and destabilizing. In other words, refraining from excessively seek- ing relative gains and expanding the imbalance in material terms will serve to increase the moral power of the United States. Washington can also act as an irre- sponsible power, doing things for purely selfish purposes without considering their consequences. Such a United States will be regarded as a rogue superpower. It may gain materially, but it will lose morally. The current U.S. policy on nation- al missile defense is a case in point. Even Washington's close allies are concerned about its negative impact on global strategic stability and therefore advise the United States not to pursue that program. However, driven by the desire to seek unilateral and absolute security and pressured by the defense industry, Washing- ton seems likely to go ahead with this venture. Given the long-term impact of the program, the United States will pay a high price both morally and militarily for such a decision

#### This locks the link—American hegemony is only benign for those whose minds continue to be colonized by a neutral vision of U.S. strength

Boggs 2005 (Carl, Professor of Social Science at National University, *Imperial Delusions* p. xxxvi)

How could such a highly developed, prosperous, literate nation with vast resources in education and communication have arrived at such a disastrous state of affairs-for the United States and the world? How could the political process be so lacking in democratic sensibilities, in moral concerns, in global accountability? The answer must begin with the overarching theme presented in this book: the lack stems from public and intellectual failure to confront the actualities of U.S. military power and the Empire it supports, owing to a deep historical legacy of imperialism, racism, military conquest, and patriotism. Whatever its great advantages as a superpower, the United States has an embarrassingly impoverished and provincial political culture, most visible in global affairs. If this historical legacy seemed to wane after the Vietnam defeat, it has come back with a resurgence over the past decade, and especially since 9/11. In many ways Americ-an nationalism, denied by the pundits and intellectuals, constitutes the most powerful source of domestic legitimation. Surely chauvinism, xenophobia, and arrogance enable the vast majority of Americans to take on a cavalier attitude toward war, enabling them to largely ignore the vast costs and consequences involved. As -with Iraq, the visitation on other countries of callous feelings toward death and destruction becomes the norm. Elements of the right wing find intrinsic value, even catharsis, in warfare presumably waged for noble ends, while liberals join in the hunt for foreign devils, whether Communists or terrorists. For both, a blind, uncritical support of Israel combined with addiction to the war economy fits into the equation. Cold warriors, along with many on the progressive Left, have for years been obsessed with fighting the ghosts of Stalin and locating the most recent evil dictator to be destroyed by U.S. military force. They too are overcome by a violent, arrogant, patriotic mind-set. The bearers of liberalism, globalization theory, and postmodernism often distance themselves from the imperial outlook, but, as we have seen, their framework sidesteps the overwhelming reality of U.S. military power where it does no~ glorify such power. Meanwhile, the architects of imperial power and military aggression have more room to maneuver in pursuit of U.S. global domination.

### A2: Pinker

#### Pinker’s thesis is fundamentally wrong, defines violence in ways that sanitize the violence of the privileged West, and should be rejected

Hart, 2011 (David Bentley, theologian and publisher of numerous texts on theology in Yale University Press, <http://www.firstthings.com/article/2011/12/the-precious-steven-pinker>)

Whether Pinker himself does the tale justice, however, is debatable. He is definitely not an adept historian; his view of the past—particularly of the Middle Ages, which he tends to treat as a single historical, geographical, and cultural moment—is often not merely crude, but almost cartoonish (of course, he is a professed admirer of Norbert Elias). He even adduces two edited images from Das Mittelalterliche Hausbuch as illustrations of “the everyday texture of life in medieval Europe,” without noting that they come from a set of astrological allegories about planetary influences, from which he has chosen those for Saturn and Mars rather than, say, Venus and Jupiter. (Think what a collection of Saturnine or Martial pictures he might have gathered from more recent history.) It is perfectly fair for Pinker to call attention to the many brutal features of much of medieval life, but one would have more confidence in his evenhandedness if he acknowledged at least a few of the moral goods that medieval society achieved despite its material privations. He says nothing of almshouses, free hospitals, municipal physicians, hospices, the decline of chattel slavery, the Pax Dei and Treuga Dei, and so on. Of the more admirable cultural, intellectual, legal, spiritual, scientific, and social movements of the High Middle Ages, he appears to know nothing. And his understanding of early modernity is little better. His vague remarks on the long-misnamed “Wars of Religion” are tantalizing intimations of a fairly large ignorance. Perhaps such complaints miss the point, though. Pinker’s is a story not of continuous moral evolution, but of an irruptive redemptive event. It would not serve his purpose to admit that, in addition to the gradual development of the material conditions that led to modernity, there might also have been the persistent pressure of moral ideas and values that reached back to antique or medieval sources, or that there might have been occasional institutional adumbrations of modern “progress” in the Middle Ages, albeit in a religious guise. He certainly would not want to grant that many of his own moral beliefs are inherited contingencies of a long cultural history rather thandiscoveries recently made by the application of disinterested “reason.” For him, modern culture’s moral advances were born from the sudden and fortuitous advent of the “Age of Reason,” which—aided by the printing press—produced a “coherent philosophy” called “Enlightenment humanism,” distilled from the ideas of “Hobbes, Spinoza, Descartes, Locke, David Hume, Mary Astell, Kant, Beccaria, Smith, Mary Wollstonecraft, Madison, Jefferson, Hamilton and John Stuart Mill.” We know what he means: not the dark side of the “Enlightenment” and the printing press—“scientific racism,” state absolutism, Jacobinism, the rise of murderous ideologies, and so on—but the nice Enlightenment of “perpetual peace,” the “rights of man,” and so on. Well, each to his or her own tribalism, I suppose. It is pleasant to believe one’s society is more “enlightened” or “rational” than all others, and Pinker has every right to try to prove the point. He would be more convincing, though, if only the central claim of his book were not so entirely dependent upon a statistical fiction. That is to say, yes, of course modern societies have reduced certain kinds of brutality, cruelty, and injustice. Modern technology makes it far easier to control crime. We have weapons both too terrifying to use in open combat and so precise that we can kill at great distances, without great armies, out of sight and mind. We have succeeded at reforming our own nations internally in ways that make them ever more comfortable, less threatening, and more complacent. Our prison system is barbaric, but not overtly sadistic, and our more draconian laws rarely inconvenience the affluent among us. We have learned to exploit the labor and resources of poorer peoples not by enslaving them, but merely by making them “beneficiaries” of globalization. The violence we commit is more hygienic, subtler, and less inconvenient than that committed by our forebears. Even so, the numbers do not add up. Pinker’s method for assessing the relative ferocity of different centuries is to calculate the total of violent deaths not as an absolute quantity, but as a percentage of global population. But statistical comparisons like that are notoriously vacuous. Population sample sizes can vary by billions, but a single life remains a static sum, so the smaller the sample the larger the percentage each life represents. Obviously, though, a remote Inuit village of one hundred souls where someone gets killed in a fistfight is not twice as violent as a nation of 200 million that exterminates one million of its citizens. And even where the orders of magnitude are not quite so divergent, comparison on a global scale is useless, especially since over the past century modern medicine has reduced infant mortality and radically extended life spans nearly everywhere (meaning, for one thing, there are now far more persons too young or too old to fight). So Pinker’s assertion that a person would be thirty-five times more likely to be murdered in the Middle Ages than now is empirically meaningless. In the end, what Pinker calls a “decline of violence” in modernity actually has been, in real body counts, a continual and extravagant increase in violence that has been outstripped by an even more exorbitant demographic explosion. Well, not to put too fine a point on it: So what? What on earth can he truly imagine that tells us about “progress” or “Enlightenment”—or about the past, the present, or the future? By all means, praise the modern world for what is good about it, but spare us the mythology.

### A2: Human Nature

#### Your “human/nature” claims lock in realism’s status as supreme, and the alt can solve

Booth, head of IR dept. @ University of Wales, 2005 p. 2-4

(Ken, *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, Ed. By Booth)

There is one world, but many realities.! The one world is that progressively revealed by the natural sciences; the many realities consist of "facts by human agreement" in the social world, as John Searle puts it.2 It is these political and social realities-"**nations," "war," "gender," "capitalism," "sovereignty," "human nature**," and so on-that demand the primary attention of **students of security**. They **create the structures and processes by which humankind lives-or dies**. Critical explorations of the ideas that made us is part of trying to answer three fundamental questions about secu¬rity: What is reality? What is reliable knowledge? What might we do?The study of security has always been a central concern in the academ¬ic discipline of international relations (IR). This reflects the circumstances of the discipline's birth in the profound and shocking violence of World War I (1914-1918) and the concern of liberal opinion in the West that the cry "never again!" be supported by the systematic study of the causes of war and the potential foundations of lasting peace. The issue area of securi¬ty subsequently dominated the intellectual preoccupations of students of international relations, particularly in the aftermath of World War II and through the nearly half-century of the Cold War.3Compared with the period of the Cold War, international security ceased to be central to students of international relations in the West during the decade between the dismantling of the Soviet state and the destruction of the World Trade Center, the defining points of what we can now see as the brief interregnum of the post-Cold War era.4 Today, however, **security in all its manifestations is back at the top of the agenda and looks set to remain there for the foreseeable future**. In addition to traditional insecurities (the result of interstate rivalry, ethnic conflict, patriarchy, and so on), the **new threats generated by globalization together with the causes and consequences of the U.S.-led war on terrorism combine to ensure that human society will for a prolonged period live in an "Age of Anxiety**," a world "on the Edge," a "runaway world."5 Human society faces what threatens to be a "long hot century."6The subject of security studies as it developed in its orthodox form during the Cold War was constructed in the image of political realism (and for the most part a rather austere version of it). The academic project of **critical security studies** (CSS) involves **rethinking the common sense of this orthodoxy from the bottom up while exposing the extent to which discourse itself constitutes the political realist orthodoxy in security studies**. Ulrich Beck has described Max Weber's "iron cage" (in which he believed humanity was "condemned to live for the foreseeable future") as "a prison of categories and basic assumptions of classical social, cultural and political sciences."9 **Political realism has operated as such an iron cage in world politics; it has created a prison of categories and assumptions that have worked to create a world that does not work for most of its inhabitants**. To this extent**, political realism has not been in the global human interest; nor, incidentally, is it calculated to promote a more positive relationship between humans and the rest of the natural world**. The critical perspectives on security offered in this volume seek some liberation from realism's iron cage, though nobody should underestimate the theoretical and political obstacles.As the academic discipline of international relations grew, realism¬more accurately, political realism-was the label that was unhelpfully given to what became the orthodoxy about the nature and dynamics of politics among nations.1O **We continue to have to live with this misnomer, despite realism's blinkers when it comes to seeing the world's realities. Realist-derived security studies in the past half-century has attempted to impose just one image of reality on a world** that not only consists of many sovereign states but **also is multicultural, divided by gender and class, and made up of individuals, families, tribes, nations, and other collectivities**; there are also some solidarities across all these (and other) subdivisions of humanity. The **field of security studies, constructed out of political realism, continues to offer its students one image of reality, with predefined answers to key global questions. This makes it a serious liability in world politics, being an iron cage seeking to contain a liquid ecology. It is a textbook exemplar of a problem masquerading as the problem-solver**

# Aff

## \*\*\*LANGUAGE/DISCOURSE ANSWERS\*\*\*

### Discourse Not Key

#### Cold War disproves the link-language not key

Price and Reus-Smit, Profs. @ U Minnesota and Monasch U, 1998 p. online

(Richard and Christian “Dangerous Liasons?..” *European Journal of IR*)

Ironically, the end of the Cold War also exposed the limitations of Third Debate critical theory, bringing us to the second implication. The constitutive link critical theorists had drawn between the dominant discourse of international relations theory and international practice was clearly not as tight as many had suggested. If neorealism was a hegemonic discourse, then the end of the Cold War demonstrated that its constitutive influence was not as totalizing as often suggested. Significant realms of political practice, even narrowly defined international practice, displayed a remarkable degree of autonomy from the discourse of power politics. Overall, the analytical space opened by the failure of the dominant rationalist theories to explain international changes, and the destabilization of the assumed simple connection between theory and practice, compelled many critically-inclined theorists of international relations to shift their focus from disciplinary critique to substantive analysis.

#### Language not deterministic—inclusion/exclusion not objectionable

Price and Reus-Smit, Profs. @ U Minnesota and Monasch U, 1998 p. online

(Richard and Christian “Dangerous Liasons?..” *European Journal of IR*)

Do such claims contradict the interpretive ethos of critical international theory? For two reasons, we argue that they do not. First, the interpretive ethos of critical international theory is driven, in large measure, by a normative rejection of totalizing discourses, of general theoretical frameworks that privilege certain perspectives over others. One searches constructivist scholarship in vain, though, for such discourses. With the possible exception of Wendt’s problematic flirtation with general systemic theory and professed commitment to ‘science’, constructivist research is at its best when and because it is question driven, with self-consciously contingent claims made specifically in relation to particular phenomena, at a particular time, based on particular evidence, and always open to alternative interpretations. Second, the rejection of totalizing discourses based on ‘big-T’ Truth claims does not foreclose the possibility, or even the inevitability, of making ‘small-t’ truth claims. In fact, we would argue that as soon as one observes and interacts in the world such claims are unavoidable, either as a person engaged in everyday life or as a scholar. As Nietzsche pointed out long ago, we cannot help putting forth truth claims about the world. The individual who does not cannot act, and the genuinely unhypocritical relativist who cannot struggles for something to say and write. In short, if constructivists are not advancing totalizing discourses, and if making ‘small-t’ truth claims is inevitable if one is to talk about how the world works, then it is no more likely that constructivism per se violates the interpretive ethos of critical international theory than does critical theory itself.

#### Discursive turn rejected—alt fails

Finlayson, IR Prof. @ U of Wales, 2004 p. 529

(Albert, “Political Science, political ideas…” Economy and Society Vol. 33 #4)

One might expect the discipline of politics to have taken an interest: to realize it could learn from and contribute to this. But the rhetorical turn had, and continues to have, almost no effect whatsoever on political science4 and, of the many works that analyse government from a rhetorical perspective, few are written by those working within, or knowledgeable about, political science.5 Rhetorical and linguistic approaches, indeed, interpretivism in general, are not widely adopted approaches to the study of contemporary government (particularly in Britain where there are no large departments of rhetoric or speech communication).6

#### Critical IR misunderstands discourse as an effect—but practical utilization of these structures is the point, not focus on discourse itself

Pouliot, phd in political science from Toronto U, 2008

(Vincent, “Security Community In and Through Practice” Dissertation)

Despite its clear added value, however, the meaning-attachment logic of constructivism runs into a crucial problem to which I already alluded in chapter II: the representational bias. In separating the material (physical) from the ideational, constructivism reduces materiality to the role of an object to be interpreted, that is, the (physical) support on which meanings are attached. As Andreas Reckwitz correctly notices, in this scheme “[t]he material world exists only insofar as it becomes an object of interpretation within collective meaning structures. ... Material entities exist as carriers of meaning, as ‘objects of knowledge.’”11 I contend that this contemplative understanding of materiality is disconnected from practical logics. In social life, material things are not, first and foremost, to be interpreted but to be used. In other words, materiality is not primarily about representation but about practice. In fact, it could be argued that the meaning-attachment logic of constructivism suffers from textualism in a way similar to postmodernism. In chapter II, I contended that postmodernism typifies the representational bias by willfully distorting practical logics as if social life could be “read” from a disembedded position. While objectification may certainly yield scientific advances, it also mistakes the things of logic for the logic of things, to paraphrase Bourdieu. In reducing materiality to the role of physical support for ideas, many constructivists commit the same textualist mistake. By contrast, I argue that “things” are not simply objects of interpretation but primarily tools to be handled. They must be used within certain practical limits.

#### Discourse alt fails—objects in the international world resist turn to pure discourse

**Pouliot**, phd in political science from Toronto U, **2008**

(Vincent, “Security Community In and Through Practice” Dissertation)

Taking a practice turn in constructivist theorizing has a simple but profound implication: it is not only people who attach meanings to things—things also attach meanings to people! The non-plastic things of social and international life often acquire an epistemic life of their own that may affect in turn the very people that constructed them. The social world may be the creature of human beings, but it also escapes their control. This is because “things” inscribe meanings beyond minds, going through the flow of history more or less independently of those who crafted them. In IR, William Walters takes inspiration from Bruno Latour to theorize what he calls “inscription”—“the material practices of making distant events and processes visible, mobile and calculable in terms of documents, charts, forms, reports, signs and graphs.”14 Things are inscribed with meanings that are non-plastic because they are not located in people’s minds. As Walters asserts: “Our agency is not just a product of the ideas that influence us, for ideas are not always strong enough or persistent enough. We need to consider the myriad, banal ways in which we are reminded and prompted, as it were.”15 Once inscribed in things, ideas can become “symbolic technologies”16—that is, non-plastic meanings that drive thought more than they derive from it. From that perspective, material (non-plastic) determination stems not from physicality but from practice, which congeals meanings through iteration.

### Discourse Not Key

#### Realism incorporates this insight—it understands power can be linguistic as well as material

**Mattern**, International Relations Prof @ Lehigh, **2004**

(Janice, , Bridging the Gap: Towards a Realist-Constructivist Dialogue” *International Studies Review* 6)

For those of us who see the possibility for a fruitful realist-constructivist com-bination, this result is disappointing. However, it need not (and should not) be the end of the story. A number of different ways exist to formulate the parameters of uch a combination so that it does ‘‘move beyond’’ what can be offered by extant frameworks for analysis. For instance, a realist-constructivist approach could begin, as realism does, with the conviction that power is impossible to transcend in in- ternational life (Waltz 1979). In addition, like classical realism in particular, it could recognize that power comes in a multiplicity of forms such as moral authority, force, and even careFand can be expressed in a multiplicity of fashions for instance through material, ideational, symbolic, and linguistic means (Carr 1964; Machiavelli 1994). Furthermore, this approach would recognize that each of these forms of power affects the conduct and dynamics of international politics differ- ently. Finally, like constructivism whether liberal, postmodern, or otherwise this realist-constructivist approach should recognize that the very conduct and dynamics of international politics are intersubjectively and culturally constituted constructs (Campbell 1992; Wendt 1999).

#### Language has a role to play but does not completely determine IR

**Mutimer**, prof. of security studies @ York University, **2000** p. 19-20

(David, *The Weapons State*: *Proliferation and the Framing of Security*)

It is not entirely common to think that metaphor has much to do with the making of policy in general and of security policy in particular. Security policy concerns the serious matter of war; its subject is troops, not tropes. Nevertheless, it would seem even policymakers bent on waging war recognize the occasional utility of an apt metaphor. Hidden in a footnote is a report by Chris Hables Gray on a small change in the language surround­ing the war in the Gulf: "Originally, the attack on Iraq and occupied Kuwait was to be called Desert Sword, but it was decided to portray the war as more of a natural force."22 Gray's contention rings true, as Desert Sword fits more obviously with the prior operation, Desert Shield, than does Desert Storm. Somebody in the Pentagon, however, recognized that swords are wielded by hands whose owners can then be held responsible; storms are acts of nature or of God, not of people. Although the clear in­tention of this use of metaphor is political in the narrowest sense-we might even say it is meant as public relations-the *means* by which metaphors function is independent of such intention. Swords and storms carry different meanings; that is, they have different entailments and as such shape a labeled object, such as a military action, in different ways.23 Paul Chilton recently used metaphor as an analytic starting point to examine the heart of Cold War security discourse. In the conclusion to *Security Metaphors,* Chilton explains how metaphor relates to policy; Metaphor is an element in the discourse of policymaking; it does not drive policy. . . . It would be absurd to reduce the Cold War to the influ¬ence of metaphor. However, both cognitive analysts of policymaking and historians of the Cold War have noted the part played by analogical rea¬soning and by metaphor. Whatever distinctions might be drawn between the two terms "analogy" and "metaphor," they can both be treated as manifestations of the cognitive process whereby one thing is seen in terms of another.24

#### Their use is inevitable—the best we can do is work within them

Shimko, professor of political science at Purdue, 2004 p. 213

(Keith, in *Metaphorical World Politics* ed. By Beer and Landtsheer)

Some research on the cognitive elements of foreign-policy decision making reveals strong judgmental tendencies: oh, how stupid could the decision makers be to think that this crisis resembles Munich or that nations fall like dominoes? There is an emphasis on misperception, misunderstanding, and the inappropriate use of analogies (though explicit thought is rarely de¬ voted to the question of how we differentiate a perception from a misper¬ ception). This essay has probably not avoided this tendency altogether, but this was not my intention. There is a place for such critiques of prevailing constructs. As Susan Sontag pointed out, even if metaphorical thinking is inevitable, this does not mean that there aren't certain metaphors we shouldn't "retire." In the final analysis, however, we are not going to be able avoid to the use of metaphors. As Garrett Hardin explains, "since metaphorical thinking is inescapable it is pointless to weep about our human limitations. We must learn to live with them, to understand them, and to control them. "42

### A2: Floating PICS

#### The state will not listen to demands framed in terms of rights- only the logic of security induces action

Lawler, Chair of IR @ Berry College, 2005 p. 421-449

(Peter, “The Good State…” Review of International Studies #31)

Although in recent years there have been robust articulations of a communitarian response to cosmopolitanism, these have had relatively little impact upon contemporary international political theory. This is arguably because the bulk of the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate in political theory is simply not focused on the international. When communitarianism is applied to international politics it can easily be read, and not entirely unfairly, as merely a normative supplement to realism or as an apologia for self-regarding statism and international moral relativism. Central to realist moral scepticism, of course, is the claim that sovereign states remain the key actors in international politics since no decisive logic of global transformation can be discerned, claims about globalisation’s transformative impact notwithstanding. Furthermore, even if the prevalence of chronic global inequity or horrific forms of large-scale violence generates widespread demands that something be done, be it by the ‘international community’ or individual states, for the realist, international public opinion carries little force, little or no international community exists beyond rhetoric, and the idea of states acting in response primarily to moral dictates is usually tainted by egoistic national self-interest. When states claim to be acting in a ‘cosmopolitan-minded’ manner, realism suggests that this is more likely to reflect concerns about ‘prestige or image’, or ‘hard interests’ which are ‘convenient to subsume under the category of ‘‘humanitarian’’ ’.

#### Cannot generate political support and momentum for change

Mutimer, prof. of security studies @ York University, 2000 p. 105

(David, *The Weapons State*: *Proliferation and the Framing of Security*)

Here, then, is both the greatest potential and the greatest problem posed by a "disarmament" frame. With such a different object and set of identities, a "disarmament" image would enable a rather different series of practices. But on the other hand, the politics of instituting those practices would become somewhat more difficult because of the entailments of the "disarmament" image. Although considerable rhetorical support has been expressed for the goal of disarmament from the earliest days of the nuclear age and before, concrete disarmament practices have been difficult to achieve. Part of the problem has been a series of discursive and practical links enabled by the "disarmament" image. The first and perhaps most damaging has been the connection between the language of disarmament and the program of general and complete disarmament. Although many analysts and even policymakers might be willing to concede the value of eliminating some weapons-notice the ability to generate support for bans on land mines and both chemical and biological weapons-and possibly even all nuclear weapons, few are willing to express support for a goal they characterize as hopelessly utopian.13 The utopian features of general and complete disarmament gesture to¬ward another politically difficult entailment of "disarmament"-the link between disarmament and weakness. Several unfortunate links are created by the language of "disarmament" that inculcate an entailment of weakness. The first is the characterization of those pressing for general and complete disarmament as pacifist, lefty, or even wimp by those entrusted with the arsenals of, certainly, the United States. The second problematic link is with the practices of tl1e enforced disarmament that follows wars: losers are disarmed, so to disarm is to be a loser. This is not a promising way to generate political support. Finally, arms, in both senses of the word, are intimately tied to concepts of power and masculinity. To be dis¬amed is to be rendered powerless, to be emasculated. Even if tl1e process of eliminating weapons produces enhanced security, the entailments of powerlessness and emasculation are difficult obstacles to overcome.

### \*\*Critique Fails\*\*

#### Securitization critique fails—discursive fetishization impoverishes its lens for viewing the world

Hyde-Price, professor at the Institute for German Studies @ Birmingham, 2001 p. 38-39

(Adrian, Europe’s New Security Challenges)

Another conceptual innovation from the Copenhagen school—one associated in particular with Ole Waever—is the notion of securizitation. This concept has been presented as the solution to the problems involved in broadening the definition of security without thereby robbing it of its analytical utility. Waever and his colleagues start from the assumption that security is not a concept with a fixed meaning or a determinate social condition. Security, in other words, cannot be objectively defined. Rather, they argue that it constitutes a distinctive form of politics. To securitize an issue means to take it out of the normal realm of political discourse and to signal a need for it to be addressed urgently and with exceptional means. Moreover, security is not just any threat or problem. Rather, security issues are “existential threat s toa r efferent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind. Securtitization thus focuses almost exclsuvely on the discursive domain and eschews any attempt to determine empirically what constitutes security concerns. It does not aspire to comment on the reality behind a securitization discourse or on the appropriate instruments for tackling security problems. Instead it suggests that security studies—or what Waever calls securitization studies—should focus on the discursive moves whereby issues are securitized. The Copenhagen school thus emphasizes the need to understand the speech acts that accomplish a process of securitization. Their focus is on the linfguistic and conceptual dynamics involved, even though they recognize the importance of the institutional setting withi which securitization takes place. The concept of securitization offers some important insights for security studies. However, it is too epistemologically restricted to contribute to a signiciant retooling of security studies. On the positive side, it draws attention to the waty in which security agendas are constructed by politicians and other political actors. It also indicates the utility of discourse analysis as an additional tool of analysis for security studies. However, at best, securitization studies can constitute one aspect of security studies. It cannot provide the foundations for a paradigm shift in the sudiscipline. Its greatest weakness is its epistemological hypochrondria, that is, its tendency to reify epistemological problems and push sound observations about knowledge claims to their loigical absurdty. Although it is important to understand the discursive moves involved in perceptions of security in, say, the Middle East, it is also encesary to make some assessment of nondiscursive actotrs like the military balance or access to freshwater supplies. For the Copenhagen school, however, these nondiscursive factors are relegated to second place. They are considered only to the extent that they facilitate or impede the speech act. In this way, the Copenhagen school is in danger of cutting security studies off from serious empirical research and setting it adrift on a sea of floating signifiers.

### Critique Fails—Power Reductionism

#### Reducing everything to power reduces its utility as an analytic heuristic for IR

Barkin, political science prof. @ Florida, 2004

(J., , Bridging the Gap: Towards a Realist-Constructivist Dialogue” *International Studies Review* 6)

One caveat to this constructivist understanding of power should, however, be noted: to define everything as power is to undermine the analytic utility of the concept. Furthermore, to use power to explain all social interaction risks traveling beyond what Ole Waever E. H. (1996:169) calls the ‘‘boundary of negativity.’’ An exclusive focus on power can tell us nothing about the ends to which power is used. It is this observation that Carr (1964) focused on in speaking of a dialectic of power and utopiaFof power and ideals. This dialectic is another part of the conversation on realist constructivism implicit in this Forum. This dialectic is involved in the conversation in two ways. The first is through the mechanics of the dialectic itself; the second is through the relationship between idealism and liberalism.

#### Distinctions amongst exercises of power best—prefer our advantages

Palan, British Political Theorist, 2000 p. 592-593

(Ronen, Review of International Studies 26 “A world of their making…”)

Prus effectively conflates a methodology with a theory: the need to attend to the interactionist nature of social order and to the fluidity of social truth cannot be equated with the notion that society is an interactionist bubble. The theory is not false, but it is not right either. Just as the general laws of thermodynamics cannot provide us with a full explanation for the formation of clouds, so general theories of interactionist order cannot provide an explanation for the specificity of an order, which oddly enough is unequal, repressive, alienating, and strangely, perceived as such by a good deal of the population—and even odder, accepted even by those who perceive it to be unjust. On this point the symbolic interactionists are simply silent. Theirs is a phlegmatic society—a harmonious society based on laws and norms. with no vice, hysteria, cruelty, love; theirs is a theory that has no explanation for these sentiments. Even if we are prepared to accept the view that ‘feeling’ ‘senses’ and belief in ‘just cause’, and membership of the ‘nation’ are social constructions, why are there variations in social constructions? Why and how does a symbolic interactionist society produce a Caligula, a Nero, a Hitler or an Assad? Why does it produce the Mother Theresas of this world? Why and how has it produced capitalism, feudalism and slavery? When symbolic interactionism—now labelled constructivism—is used as a theory of International Relations, it serves therefore as the new ‘Cave! Dragone!’ exorcizing any form of social critique from the narrative. It tells us that while neorealists think that world politics are ‘mean and nasty’, in fact it is not.86 In the context of International Relations, therefore, symbolic interactionism may appear radical whereas it is not.

#### Rejection Alt Fails

#### Totalizing rejection fails – negative oversimplifies international system

Price and Reus-Smit, Profs. @ U Minnesota and Monasch U, 1998 p. online

(Richard and Christian “Dangerous Liasons?..” *European Journal of IR*)

In sum, the sound and fury of metatheoretical debates at times would have us believe that alternative approaches on different sides of the various divides could not possibly make any valuable contributions to understanding world politics given their erroneous ontological, epistemological and methodological presumptions. Such denials are not tenable from those arguing from the Nietzschean perspectivism that informs much of critical theory; those in the critical tradition cannot insinuate that their work is to replace wholesale other traditions of inquiry and types of explanations insofar as that would merely substitute one totalizing discourse for another. All accounts of the world are partial, whether they be rationalist or constructivist, and the best that can be claimed on behalf of either is that they illuminate aspects of an event or phenomena that are required for an adequate understanding of the explanandum in question.

#### Kritik terminates in political passivity—no institutional action

**Spegele**, IR Prof. @ Monash University, **2002** p. <http://ire.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/16/3/381>

(Roger D., “Emancipatory International Relations…” in *International Relations*)

Contrary to a certain popular belief, there is something new under the sun, and it consists of something I, among others,33 call emancipatory international relations. It is, when appropriate account is taken of its Kantian and Marxian sources, dramatically different from any naturalistic, positivist or positivist-empiricist conception of international relations.34 One can elide those differences for sociological, psychological or epistemological reasons but it is not at all clear that we international relationists would gain greater perspicuity about the nature of this new kid on the block under the sun. Moreover, refusing, whether explicitly or implicitly, to hand out entry cards at the heavenly gate of the so-called new debate rushing to Jerusalem to be born as the only debate in town pace Katzenstein et al. does not enhance reflective thought.35 For, in a countermove derived from Kant, such gambits fall into a dogmatism that leads to scepticism and indifference. And this in turn leads to the well-known ‘do your own thing’ de facto relativism, which disease should not be conflated with a healthy scepticism or even healthier pluralism. At the same time and by a somewhat related token, we would fall into a similar trap of dogmatism if we accepted, as we should not, the unacceptable face of arguments by certain emancipatory international relations scholars, alluded to above, who in rejecting all forms of empiricism are evidently led to reject the very notion that thoughts about the empirical world are answerable to the world’s tribunal of experience, failing which one would have every right to wonder about whether the thought could actually count as a well-formed thought at all. But if we cannot eliminate that sort of dogmatism, then has our spade been turned? Not quite, for there is a tertium quid which I mean to foreshadow here as a propadeutic to the sequel. To get this into our picture requires making, surprisingly perhaps, certain concessions to positivist-style thinking; to the idea in fact that there is a difference between naturwissenschaft and sozialwissenschaft and that one advantage of the former over the latter is that one can take up some approximation of the view from nowhere, that is a view which finds no place for the qualitative aspects of things or, more to the point, to the internal character of events such as President Clinton’s decision to intervene against Kosovo in the way that he did or the Argentinian generals decision to ‘disappear’ their political opponents and for all practical purposes live in a context in which they are not required to account for their moral culpability and moral negligence. To get at these events we cannot follow a rigorous form of naturalism (masquerading as Rationalism) which has no space for the first-person perspective, the internal, the subjective, the ethical on the false grounds that these matters cannot be understood objectively because they cannot be understood from the third-person perspective. But at the same time, we cannot give up our external perspective either, as it is this perspective that moves us, and the scientific world (which is our world), to treat others not in terms of their attributive characteristics but as rational intelligent animals.

### \*\*Link Answer: General\*\*

#### Representing the potential for conflict and death does NOT reproduce the architecture of the security establishment nor result in violent calculation

**Alker**, IR professor @ USC, **2005** p. 197-198

(Howard. *Critical Security Studies and World Politics* Ed. By Ken Booth)

It is key to Waever's conception that the securitizing speech act, which has traditionally legitimated the use of force, has also invoked the right of a "state to mobilize, or take special powers, to handle existential threats." As Buzan, Wrever, and de Wilde carefully illustrate, such invocations can be regarding political, economic, cultural, societal, or environmental sectors of a domestic or international society; just as clearly, the mere invocation of the words "security" or "defense" or "survival" does not, by itself, make something a security/securitized issue or threat.Previous case studies of security-enhancing successes, or breakdowns, need to be reanalyzed in these terms in order to derive more perceptive andpractically useful ways to prevent debilitating and/or unsuccessful securitization dynamics. And the approach needs to be extended critically to include the much richer existing literature on strategies for crossing thresholds of violent collective behavior in ways that effectively allow for relatively prompt returns. And when reliably generalizable ways of characterizing emancipation are available, we can develop and better defend empirical generalizations linking or delinking emancipation, securitization, and human well-being.The securitization approach is constructively and practically oriented toward the multileveled analysis of the variety of security-needing social entities I have just proposed.29 It certainly does not discredit the evaluative study of their impacts on ordinary human lives! It responds constructively, discursively, to the transnationalizing of concerns and the broadening of possibilities for reconceptualizing threats clearly present in, and encouraged by, critical security studies.30 Moreover, I find this discursive, intersubjectively oriented, community-linked, yet coherent approach suggestive of how to proceed in further decentering the statist bias of conventional security/strategic studies, without denying the relevance of states' contributions to vital topics like nuclear arms control, Napoleonic neighbors, and civil wars. Refocusing critical security studies to point toward existential threats to important groups, nations, practices, organizations, or technologies within particular transnational or interna¬tional societies or places gives concrete meanings to freedom from fear. Whether or not securitization helps achieve that goal-at what price for discursive communal-will formation-must be answered empirically, his¬torically, discursively. The corresponding search within relevant societies and communities for remedial, preferably nonsecuritized or desecuritizing, emancipatory, or redemptive practices is based on the pacifist belief that peace is best waged by peaceful means rather than the alternative maxim: to secure peace, prepare for war.31

### No Link--Reflective

#### Realism’s ambiguity dodges the link and the transition fails

**Murray**, PoliSci Prof @ U Wales, **1997** p. 200-201

(Alistair, Reconstructing Realism)

The principal implication of this analysis is the need to ask some serious questions about the current direction of international relations theory. As I said in the Introduction and have sought to illustrate throughout the book, the neorealist attempt to lay claim to the legacy of realism is fundamentally problematic. Neorealism abandons the core of realism, the concern to reconcile the ideal and real in international politics; and centres itself instead around one particular image of the real. Neorealism ultimately represents not the reformulation of the realist research agenda, but the refocusing of this agenda around one very narrow concern. Neorealists, it is true, would probably suggest that it is the power political logic of the anarchic international system which is the proper focus of international relations theory, and that the normative concerns of realism are little more than a distraction 'tom the real business of the `discipline'. Yet, even if we put aside the problems with the neorealist account of the structure of the international system, the absence of such normative concerns in neorealism renders it inherently incapable of providing a satisfactory basis on which to address the problem of action in international affairs. To define this problem solely in terms of structural constraints, in terms of I reified `logic of anarchy', is rather to miss the point. It is the values and beliefs A the thinking subjects who inhabit this anarchy which inform and motivate international political action - indeed, which ultimately characterize the task of molding such action to the `logic of anarchy' as a problem in the first place. If .we can accept that it is important to take account of the type of constraints that neorealism emphasises, international political practice is also centrally about the values that we hold and about building a framework of international order which -eflects and supports such values. To ignore them is to create a theory just as divorced from the reality of the international as the idealist approaches which concerned themselves only with the normative. If ethics divorced from an understanding of politics are irrelevant and, in their irrelevance, counter-productive, the )ther side of the equation is that politics divorced from any understanding of ethical -criteria are not only undesirable, but also impractical. International relations theory has effectively swung dramatically away from its point of origin, abandoning the normative concerns which marked its initial phase. international society which is greatly superior to traditional conceptions, emphasizing the essential ambiguity of any structure of international order, thus allowing ; to avoid the temptation to moralise order unconditionally, whilst not abandoning the recognition of the need to treat with order in moral terms. With regard to most-international debates, it becomes apparent that the critiques which have been :directed at realism from the reflectivist camp are misguided. Realism appears to be a form of conservative rationalism than a fundamentally ambiguous approach, straddling the divide between rationalists and refiectivists, and offering us a basis n which to contemplate their reconciliation. Its frank acceptance of the ambiguity t the political would seem to offer us an orientation towards the international .which is far more productive than that offered by either rationalist or reflectivist :theories alone. The principal implication of this analysis is the need to ask some serious questions about the current direction of international relations theory. As I said in the introduction and have sought to illustrate throughout the book, the neorealist attempt to lay claim to the legacy of realism is fundamentally problematic. 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### Specific Solvency O/W

#### Permutation best—marries post-structural insights with realism’s focus on contingency

**Sterling-Folker**, political scientist at Connecticut, **2004**

(Jennifer, Bridging the Gap: Towards a Realist-Constructivist Dialogue” *International Studies Review* 6)

To be fair, Barkin understands this to a large extent, but his vision of realist- constructivism remains deeply problematic. To argue, as Barkin (2003:337) does, that a realist-constructivist combination will allow us to ‘‘examine skeptically from a moral perspective the interrelationships between power and international norms’’ is to ignore the fact that the moral perspective to which he is referring is actually liberalism. As Roger Spegele (2001) has argued, moral skepticism derives not from realism’s recognition of difference, but from liberalism’s refusal of it. Hence, what is morally distinct about realism is not a skepticism about power and universal norms, but an insistence that morality is contextually specific and so particularism must be respected. Combining realism with constructivism should not suddenly lead to the sort of moral skepticism that is inherent in liberalism. It should instead lead to a moral perspective that demands that particularism and univer-salism be, somehow, simultaneously respected. It should produce ‘‘an ethical way of being’’ that recognizes ‘‘the very necessity of heterogeneity for understanding our- selves and others’’ (Der Derian 1997:58, emphasis in original), and a position that ‘‘accepts the indispensability of identity and lives within the medium of identity while refusing . . . to live its own identity as the truth’’ (Connolly 1989:331, emphasis in original).

### A2: Calculation Bad

#### T/- Calculation good- responds to Otherness in a responsible way- the zero point is not reached but instead difference is protected

**Williams 2005** (Michael, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales—Aberystwyth,

The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, p. 165-166)

Yet it is my claim that the wilful Realist tradition does not lack an understanding of the contingency of practice or a vision of responsibility to othemess. On the contrary, its strategy of objectification is precisely an attempt to bring together a responsibility to otherness and a responsibility to act within a wilfully liberal vision. The construction of a realm of objectivity and calculation is not just a consequence of a need to act — the framing of an epistemic context for successful calculation. It is a form of responsibility to othemess, an attempt to allow for diversity and irreconcilability precisely by — at least initially — reducing the self and the other to a structure of material calculation in order to allow a structure of mutual intelligibility, mediation, and stability. It is, in short, a strategy of limitation: a wilful attempt to construct a subject and a social world limited — both epistemically and politically — in the name of a politics of toleration: a liberal strategy that John Gray has recently characterised as one of modus vivendi. If this is the case, then the deconstructive move that gains some of its weight by contrasting itself to a non- or apolitical objectivism must engage with the more complex contrast to a sceptical Realist tradition that is itself a constructed, ethical practice. This issue becomes even more acute if one considers Iver Neumann’s incisive questions concerning postmodern constructions of identity. action, and responsibility. As Neumann points out, the insight that identities are inescapably contingent and relationally constructed, and even the claim that identities are inescapably indebted to otherness, do not in themselves provide a foundation for practice, particularly in situations where identities are ‘sedimented’ and conflictually defined. In these cases, deconstruction alone will not suffice unless it can demonstrate a capacity to counter in practice (and not just in philosophic practice) the essentialist dynamics it confronts. Here, a responsibility to act must go beyond deconstruction to consider viable alternatives and counter-practices. To take this critique seriously is not necessarily to be subject yet again to the straightforward ‘blackmail of the Enlightenment’ and a narrow ‘modernist’ vision of responsibility.85 While an unwillingness to move beyond a deconstructive ethic of responsibility to othemess for fear that an essentialist stance is the only (or most likely) alternative expresses a legitimate concern, it should not license a retreat from such questions or their practical demands. Rather, such situations demand also an evaluation of the structures (of identity and institutions) that might viably be mobilised in order to offset the worst implications of violently exclusionary identities. It requires, as Neumann nicely puts it, the generation of compelling ‘as if’ stories around which counter-subjectivities and political practices can coalesce. Wilful Realism, I submit, arises out of an appreciation of these issues, and comprises an attempt to craft precisely such ‘stories’ within a broader intellectual and sociological analysis of their conditions of production, possibilities of success, and likely consequences. The question is, to what extent are these limits capable of success, and to what extent might they be limits upon their own aspirations toward responsibility? These are crucial questions, but they will not be addressed by retreating yet again into further reversals of the same old dichotomies.

#### Must use calculative thought

David **Campbell**, professor of international politics at the University of Newcastle, Moral Spaces: Rethinking

Ethics and World Politics, ed. by Campbell and Shapiro, **1999**, p. 56

Levinas has also argued for a politics that respects a double injunction. When asked "Is not ethical obligation to the other a purely negative ideal, impossible to realize in our everyday being-in-the-world," which is governed by "ontological drives and practices"; and "Is ethics practicable in human society as we know it? Or is it merely an invitation to apolitical acquiescence?" Levinas's response was that "of course we inhabit an ontological world of technological mastery and political self-preservation. Indeed, without these political and technological structures of organization we would not be able to feed [hu]mankind. This is the greatest paradox of human existence: we must use the ontological for the sake of the other, to ensure the survival of the other we must resort to the technico-political systems of means and ends."

### A2: Ontology

#### Preventing widespread death precedes ontological questioning

Davidson ‘89

(Arnold L., Associate Prof Philosophy – U Chicago, Critical Inquiry, Winter, p. 426)

I understand Levinas’ work tosuggest another path to the recovery of the human, one that leads through or toward other human beings: “The dimension of the divine opens forth from the human face… Hence metaphysics is enacted where the social relation is enacted- in our relations with men… The Other is not the incarnation of God, but precisely by his face, in which he is disincarnate, is the manifestation of the height in which God is revealed. It is our relations with men… that give to theological concepts the sole signification they admit of.” Levinas places ethics before ontology by beginning with our experience of the human face: and, in a clear reference to Heidegger’s idolatry of the village life of peasants, he associated himself with Socrates, who preferred the city where he encountered men to the country with its trees. In his discussion of skepticism and the problem of others, Cavell also aligns himself with this path of thought, with the recovery of the finite human self through the acknowledgement of others: “As long as God exists, I am not alone. And couldn’t the other suffer the fate of God?… I wish to understand how the other now bears the weight of God, shows me that I am not alone in the universe. This requires understanding the philosophical problem of the other as the trace or scar of the departure of God [CR, p.470].” The suppression of the other, the human, in Heidegger’s thought accounts, I believe, for the absence, in his writing after the war, of the experience of horror. Horror is always directed toward the human; every object of horror bears the imprint of the human will. So Levinas can see in Heidegger’s silence about the gas chambers and death camps “a kind of consent to the horror.” And Cavell can characterize Nazis as “those who have lost the capacity for being horrified by what they do**.**” Where was Heidegger’s horror? How could he have failed to know what he had consented to? Hannah Arendt associates Heidegger with Paul Valery’s aphorism, “Les evenements ne sont que l’ecume des choses’ (‘Events are but the foam of things’).” I think one understands the source of her intuition. The mass extermination of human beings, however, does not produce foam, but dust and ashes; and it is here that questioning must stop.

#### It’s impossible to determine an answer to being –-- ontological questioning results in an infinite regress and total political paralysis

#### Levinas and Nemo ‘85

(Emmanuel, Professor of Philosophy, and Philippe, Professor of New Philosophy, Ethics and Infinity, p. 6-7)

Are we not in need of still more precautions? Must we not step back from this question to raise another, to recognize the obvious circularity of ask­ing what isthe “What is . .?“ question? It seems to beg the question. Is our new suspicion, then, that Heidegger begs the question of metaphysics when he asks “What is poetry?” or “What is thinking?”? Yet his thought is insistently anti-metaphysical**.** Why, then, does he retain the metaphysical question par excellence? Aware of just such an objection, he pro­poses, against the vicious circle of the *petitio principi,* an alternative, productive circularity: hermeneutic questioning. To ask “What is. . .?“ does not partake of onto-theo-logy if one acknowledges (1) that the answer can never be fixed absolutely, but calls essen­tially, endlessly, for additional “What is . . .?“ ques­tions. Dialectical refinement here replaces vicious circularity. Further, beyond the openmindedness called for by dialectical refinement, hermeneutic questioning (2) insists on avoiding subjective impositions, on avoid­ing reading into rather than harkening to things. One must harken to the things themselves, ultimately to being, in a careful attunement to what is. But do the refinement and care of the herme­neutic question — which succeed in avoiding onto­theo-logy succeed in avoiding all viciousness? Certainly they convert a simple fallacy into a produc­tive inquiry, they open a path for thought. But is it not the case that however much refinement and care one brings to bear, to ask what something is leads to asking what something else is, and so on and so forth, ad infinitum*?* What is disturbing in this is not so much the infinity of interpretive depth, which has the virtue of escaping onto-theo-logy and remaining true to the way things are, to the phenomena, the coming to be and passing away of being. Rather, the problem lies in the influence the endlessly open horizon of such thinking exerts on the way of such thought. That is, the problem lies in what seems to be the very virtue of hermeneutic thought, namely, the doggedness of the “What is . . .?“ question, in its inability to escape itself, to escape being and essence**.**

### A2: Campbell

**Focus on national identity obscures political motives for violence- renders critique impotent**

**Laffey**, Lecturer in International Politics U of London, **2000** p. 429-444

(Mark, “Locating Identity…” Review of International Studies 26)

These features of Campbell’s account of the social undercut his efforts to explain state action. For example, Campbell makes strong claims about why the US and its allies intervened when Iraq invaded Kuwait: ‘The war with Iraq revealed how orthodox international political practice is premised upon an ethical principle—the principle of sovereignty’.88 Intervention against Iraq was made possible because that conflict could be ‘enframed’ as nothing other than a territorial invasion and hence a violation of sovereignty. The norm of sovereignty made intervention possible because it enabled the US and its allies to shore up their own subjectivities and to ascribe responsibility only to Iraq, thus licensing violence against the Other.89 Campbell’s only reference to the suggestion that US intervention was linked to oil is to observe that the significance of oil for the US is related to past energy policy: ‘In the case of oil, the threat of an unfriendly hegemon in the Gulf is an issue for the United States principally because it has abandoned a national energy policy and doubled its reliance on imported oil in the past decade’.90 This raises the question of just why the US has no such policy—although it overlooks the possibility that lack of an official policy might in fact be the policy—as well as the origins and implications of US dependence on ‘foreign oil.’ Campbell does not pursue such questions. Instead, he uses the observation that the US does not have a national energy policy further to motivate his larger point that the Self and the Other are mutually implicated and that therefore it is unethical to attribute evil only to the Other; we are both, Self and Other, responsible. Campbell identifies a proximate condition of intervention—representation of the situation in the Gulf as a defence of sovereignty—but fails adequately to locate the social context of that representation. For instance, he misses the ways in which the norm of sovereignty is reworked by other sites of social power such as a global division of labour.91 Campbell does not trace out a genealogy of US and Western representations of oil, and of oil in relation to the Middle East as a region, of the kind that he offers for the Iraq-Kuwait border, for example. Instead he attributes intervention to the norm of sovereignty alone and ignores the ways in which other social logics such as those associated with the world oil market or the ways in which the US constituted force beyond its borders are articulated with it.92 To understand the relative significance of sovereignty and oil for the decision to intervene against Iraq requires both a detailed reconstruction of the relations between the security apparatus of the US state and those of client regimes such as Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, as well as a reconstruction of the world oil market and its relation to US hegemony. Regimes such as Iran under the Shah or Iraq under Saddam Hussein laid claim to sovereignty in their region but evident in their dealings with the US is a more complicated relation with that norm. The Shah, for example, mounted the Peacock Throne partly as the result of a CIA-backed coup against Mossadegh.93 One reason for US interest in the region and its repeated violation of local sovereignties was the strategic role of oil in the world economy. It was recognition of this role that led Franklin Roosevelt in 1944 to draw ‘a rough sketch’ of the Middle East for the British ambassador Lord Halifax: ‘Persian oil,’ he told the Ambassador, ‘is yours. We share the oil for Iraq and Kuwait. As for Saudi Arabian oil, it is ours’.94 Failure to explore these other social relations, in part because of a (selective) fixation on sovereignty and the national, leaves Campbell unable to identify the effects of representations of the Gulf War—by US state managers and others—as a defence of the norm of sovereignty. This renders his explanation partial and unpersuasive

### A2: Butler

#### Butler supports the plan

**Butler**, professor of rhetoric at Berkeley, **2009** p. 13

(Judith, *Frames of War*)

To say that a life is precarious requires not only that a life be apprehended as a life, but also that precariousness be an aspect of what is apprehended in what is living. Normatively construed, I am arguing that there ought to be a more inclusive and egalitarian way of recognizing precariousness, and that this should take form as concrete social policy regarding such issues as shelter, work, food, medical care, and legal status. And yet, I am also insisting, in a way that might seem initially paradoxical, that precariousness itself cannot be properly recognized. It can be apprehended, taken in, encountered, and it can be presupposed by certain norms of recognition just as it can be refused by such nonns. Indeed, there ought to be recognition of precariousness as a shared condition of human life (indeed, as a condition that links human and non-human animals), but we ought not to think that the recognition of precariousness masters or captures or even fully cognizes what it recognizes. So although I would (and will) argue that norms of recognition ought to be based on an apprehension of precariousness, I do not think that precariousness is a function or effect of recognition, nor that recognition is the only or the best way to register precariousness.

#### Concrete political institutional action good

**Butler**, professor of rhetoric at Berkeley, **2009** p. 23

(Judith, *Frames of War*)

Thus, the conclusion is not that everything that can die or is subject to destruction (i.e., all life processes) imposes an obligation to preserve life. But an obligation does emerge from the fact that we are, as it were, social beings from the start, dependent on what is outside ourselves, on others, on institutions, and on sustained and sustainable environments, and so are, in this sense, precarious. To sustain life as sustainable requires putting those conditions in place and militating for their renewal and strengthening. Where a life stands no chance of flourishing, there one must attend to ameliorating the negative conditions of life. Precarious life implies life as a conditioned process, and not as the internal feature of a monadic individual or any other anthropocentric conceit. Our obligations are precisely to the conditions that make life possible, not to "life itself," or rather, our obligations emerge from the insight that there can be no sustained life without those sustaining conditions} and that those conditions are both our political responsibility and the matter of our most vexed ethical decisions.

### A2: Dillon

#### Rejecting the concept of security fails—better to improve its normative valencing

**Burke**, senior lecturer in Intl Politics @ University of Wales, **2007** p. 16

(Anthony, “What Security Makes Possible: Some Thoughts on Critical Security Studies)

In some ways this critique-which cites writings by Michael Dillon and James DerDerian as examples-is appropriate. He might also have included in this list an m1icle published in 2000 by Costas Constantinou.52 While in some ways he misunderstands what they are searching for (a route out of generalised politics of alienation and fear, which make them as critical of realism as he is) it is imp0l1ant to remind ourselves of the legitimate and almost universal concern of individuals and communities for secure and stable lives. It is for this reason that in my own work I have often endorsed the normative arguments of the Welsh School, Tickner, the Secure Australia Project 01' the UNDP's 1994 Human development report. It might be possible to read Booth's comments as a critique of my argument in the introduction to In/ear o/security, which challenges realist policy discourses for generating Orwellian practices of security that sacrifice the security of others. I, however, am implicitly working with a contrasting human security ideal. This, manifestly, is not a celebration of insecurity. The power of statist ontologies of security nevel1heless led me to wonder if it might be better to speak of the human needs and priorities named by security in their specificity: conflict prevention and resolution, human rights, land and women's rights, the right to control one's own economic destiny, etc. My concern was, and remains, that security's 'perversion' into a 'metaphysical canopy for the worst manifestations of liberal modernity' has been too final and damaging. 53 We live in a world where security will continue to remain one of the most powerful signifiers in politics, and we cannot opt out of the game of its naming and use. It must be defined and practiced in normatively better ways, and kept under continual scrutiny.

#### Dillon’s critique fails

**Booth 2005** (Ken, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales–Aberystwyth,

Critical Security Studies and World Politics, p. 270-71, footnote on 277)

Postmodern/poststructural engagement with the subject of security in international relations has been characterized by some of the general problems of the genre, notably obscurantism, relativism, and faux radicalism.26 What has particularly troubled critics of the postmodern sensibility has been the latter's underlying conception of politics.27 Terry Eagleton, for one, has praised the "rich body of work" by postmodern writers in some areas but at the same time has contested the genre's "cultural relativism and moral conventionalism, its scepticism, pragmatism and localism, its distaste for ideas of solidarity and disciplined organization, [and] its lack of any adequate theory of political agency."28 Eagleton made these comments as part of a general critique of the postmodern sensibility, but I would argue that specific writing on security in international relations from postmodern and poststructuralist perspectives has generally done nothing to ease such concerns. Eagleton's fundamental worry was how postmodernism would "shape up" to the test of fascism as a serious political challenge. Other writers, studying particular political contexts, such as postapartheid South Africa, have shown similar worries; they have questioned the lack of concrete or specific resources that such theories can add to the repertoire of reconstruction strategies.29 Richard A. Wilson, an anthropologist interested in human rights, has generalized exactly the same concern, namely, that the postmodernist rejection of metanarratives and universal solidarities does not deliver a helpful politics to people in trouble. As he puts it, "Rights without a metanarrative are like a car without seat-belts; on hitting the first moral bump with ontological implications, the passenger's safety is jeopardised."30 The struggle within South Africa to bring down the institutionalized racism of apartheid benefited greatly from the growing strength of universal human rights values (which delegitimized racism and legitimized equality) and their advocacy by groups in different countries and cultures showing their political solidarity in material and other ways. Anxiety about the politics of postmodernism and poststructuralism is provoked, in part, by the negative conceptualization of security projected by their exponents. The poststructuralist approach seems to assume that security cannot be common or positive-sum but must always be zero-sum, with somebody's security always being at the cost of the insecurity of others. At the same time, security itself is questioned as a desirable goal for societies because of the assumption of poststructuralist writers that the search for security is necessarily conservative and will result in negative consequences for somebody. They tend also to celebrate insecurity, which I regard as a middle-class affront to the truly insecure.31

*Cut to footnote on page 277—*

31. Examples of the approach are Dillon, *The Politics of Security*; and Der Derian, “The Value of Security,” in Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security*.

In the shadow of such views, it is not surprising that the postmodern/poststructuralist genre is sometimes seen as having affinities with realism. Political realists and poststructuralists seem to share a fatalistic view that humans are doomed to insecurity; regard the search for emancipation as both futile and dangerous; believe in a notion of the human condition; and relativize norms. Both leave power where it is in the world: deconstruction and deterrence are equally static theories.

## A2: Resource K

**A lack of resources can affect a community’s ecology and ideology**

Hitztaler 04 Stephanie Hitztaler, The Relationship between Resources and Human Migration Patterns in Central Kamchatka during the Post-Soviet Period Population and Environment , Vol. 25, No. 4, Unforeseen Consequences of Policy Decisions (Mar., 2004), pp. 355-375

**When the resources in an area are vast, and individuals are able to gather plentiful amounts, we should see in-migration to this area. When resources become limited, the converse should be true. Economic conditions are closely tied to the state of the resource base. Because both economic and ecological resources are mandatory for family formation (for instance, marriage and reproduction), l make the following predictions: An outflow of people from all of the villages in my study site during the post-Soviet period should be observed as a consequence of the countrywide socio-economic crisis that has acutely affected rural dwellers in Russia's peripheral regions. Likewise, a decrease in the number of in-migrants should be recorded. Against the general backdrop of growing out-migration and shrinking in-migration numbers in the central Kamchatka River valley, I expect to find distinct variation in migration patterns among the populations in my study site. This variation stems from each village or region's differing socio-economic conditions and future prospects, which are influenced both by ecological and historical factors. Specifically out-migration rates should be higher and in-migration rates lower in villages dependent wholly on logging activities. Moreover, overall higher out-migration and lower in-migration numbers should characterize recently founded, and thus less well-established, villages. Following the collapse of collectivized reindeer herding in the early 1990s, many indigenous peoples lost the last vestiges of their nomadic way of life; therefore, indigenous in-migration to the villages of Esso and Anavgai should increase during the post-Soviet period.**

**Resource imbalance causes a socioeconomic and violent outbreak**

**Tamas 03 Pal Tamas, *Water Resource Scarcity and Conflict: Review of Applicable Indicators and Systems of Reference*, SC 2003**

**The abundance or scarcity of resources decides the direction a society will take in development. Imbalances, not only of scarcity but of abundance, may distort environmental and socioeconomic policies, leading to social friction, though newer approaches to social problems do not see scarcity as leading necessarily to conflict. Problems may be mitigated by factors such as leadership and social capital, but it is not easy to identify the factors which lead to a spiral of degradation. Other studies indicate how conflict may arise through the efforts of elites to capture scarce resources, or through the debilitating effect on innovation that scarcity entails. Countries heavily dependent on exports of primary commodities are more liable to conflict. The “honey pot” of abundant resources may be a focus for greed that determines civil conflict.**

### Security Discourse Works

Threats Real

Buzan 06 (Barry Buzan/ 2-11-06/Will the ‘global war on terrorism’ be the new Cold War? Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and honorary professor at the University of Copenhagen and Jilin University [**http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2006/82\_61101-18.pdf**](http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2006/82_61101-18.pdf))

Immediately following 9/11 NATO invoked article 5 for the ﬁrst time, thereby helping to legitimize the GWoT securitization. Since then leaders in most western countries, but also, conspicuously, in Russia, China and India, have associated themselves and their governments with the view that international terrorism is a common threat. In the case of Russia, China, Israel and India, the move has been to link their own local problems with ‘terrorism’ to the wider GWoT framing. Part of the GWoT’s relative success can be attributed to the way in which it has tied together several longstanding security concerns arising within the liberal order, most notably crime and the trades in drugs and the technologies for weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Within the frame of the liberal international economic order (LIEO), it is well understood that while opening state borders to ﬂows of trade, ﬁnance, information and (skilled) people is generally to be promoted, such opening also has its dark side in which illiberal actors, mainly criminals and terrorists, can take advantage of liberal openness in pursuit of illiberal ends. The problem is that the liberal structures that facilitate business activity cannot help but open pathways for uncivil society actors as well. Concern about criminal activity (particularly the drugs trade) has—at least within the United States—been framed in security terms (the ‘war on drugs’) for some decades. And concern about trade in WMD is institutionalized in the nuclear non-proliferation regime as well as in conventions about chemical and biological weapons technology. The securitizing moves supporting the GWoT have linked all of these issues. Within the United States, the link between terrorism and drugs seeks to graft a newer securitization on to an older one The link predates 2001, and its essence is the charge that terrorists engage in the drugs trade as a principal source of funding for their activities, one of which is seeking WMD:

### A2: Disease K

#### Disease threats real and cataclysmic

Peterson 02’ (Susan, Associates Professor at The College of William & Mary, Department of Government; “Epidemic Disease and National Security” Pg. 20)

How might these political and economic effects produce violent conflict? Price-Smith offers two possible answers: Disease .magnif[ies].both relative and absolute deprivation and hasten[s] the erosion of state capacity in seriously affected societies. Thus, infectious disease may in fact contribute to societal destabilization and to chronic low-intensity intrastate violence, and in extreme cases it may accelerate the processes that lead to state failure..83 Disease heightens competition among social groups and elites for scarce resources. When the debilitating and deadly effects of IDs like AIDS are concentrated among a particular socio-economic, ethnic, racial, or geographic group, the potential for conflict escalates. In many parts of Africa today, AIDS strikes rural areas at higher rates than urban areas, or it hits certain provinces harder than others. If these trends persist in states where tribes or ethnic groups are heavily concentrated in particular regions or in rural rather than urban areas, AIDS almost certainly will interact with tribal, ethnic, or national differences and make political and military conflict more likely. Price-Smith argues, moreover, that .the potential for intra-elite violence is also increasingly probable and may carry grave political consequences, such as coups, the collapse of governance, and planned genocides.