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1NC – Metaphysics Link (1/5)

Security is the metaphysical foundation for all modern political arrangements.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 12-14]

There is a preoccupation which links both the beginning and the end of metaphysics, and so also the beginning and the end of metaphysical politics. It is something which, because it furnishes the fundamental link between politics and metaphysics, affords me my entry into the relationship which obtains between them. That something is security. If the question of the political is to be recovered from metaphysical thinking, therefore, then security has to be brought into question first. Security, of course, saturates the language of modern politics. Our political vocabularies reek of it and our political imagination is confined by it. The hypocrisy of our rulers (whosoever ‘we’ are) consistently hides behind it. It would, therefore, be an easy task to establish that security is the first and foundational requirement of the State, of modern understandings of politics, and of International Relations, not only by reference to specific political theorists but also by reference to the discourses of States. But I want to explore the thought that modern politics is a security project for reasons which are antecedent to, and account for, the axioms and propositions of (inter)national political theorists, the platitudes of political discourse, and the practices of States, their political classes and leaders. Consequently, to conceive of our politics as a politics of security is not to advance a view held by particular thinkers or even by particular disciplines. It is to draw attention to a necessity (which Heidegger’s history of metaphysics will later allow us to note and explore) to which all thinkers of politics in the metaphysical tradition are subject. In pursuing this thought it follows that security turns-out to have a much wider register—has always and necessarily had a much wider register, something which modern international security studies have begun to register—than that merely of preserving our so-called basic values, or even our mortal bodies. That it has, in Chapter 1 Security, philosophy and politics 13 fact, always been concerned with securing the very grounds of what the political itself is; specifying what the essence of politics is thought to be. The reason is that the thought within which political thought occurs—metaphysics—and specifically its conception of truth, is itself a security project. For metaphysics is a tradition of thought defined in terms of the pursuit of security; with the securing, in fact, of a secure arche, determining principle, beginning or ground, for which its under-standing of truth and its quest for certainty calls. Security, then, finds its expression as the principle, ground or arche—for which metaphysical thought is a search—upon which something stands, pervading and guiding it in its whole structure and essence. Hence, as Leibniz wrote: If one builds a house in a sandy place, one must continue digging until one meets solid rock or firm foundations; if one wants to unravel a tangled thread one must look for the beginning of the thread; if the greatest weights are to be moved, Archimedes demanded only a stable place. In the same way, if one is to establish the elements of human knowledge some fixed point is required, on which we can safely rest and from which we can set out without fear.1 (emphasis added) It is for this reason, therefore, that metaphysics first allows security to impress itself upon political thought as a self-evident condition for the very existence of life—both individual and social. One of those impulses which it is said appears like an inner command to be instinctive (in the form, for example, of the instinct for survival), or axiomatic (in the form of the principle of self-preservation, the right to life, or the right to self defence), security thereby became the value which modern understandings of the political and modern practices of politics have come to put beyond question, precisely because they derived its very requirement from the requirements of metaphysical truth itself. In consequence, security became the predicate upon which the architectonic political discourses of modernity were constructed; upon which the vernacular architecture of modern political power, exemplified in the State, was based; and from which the institutions and practices of modern (inter)national politics, including modern democratic politics, ultimately seek to derive their grounding and foundational legitimacy. Thus, for example, and in a time other than our own, the security of an ecumene of belief in the ground of a divinely ordained universe promising salvation for human beings—something that, constituting the Christian Church, provided an ideal of community which continues to pervade the Western tradition—insisted: ‘extra ecclesiam nulla salus’2 (no salvation outside the Church). Salvation was the ultimate form of spiritual security. And that security was to be acquired

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1NC – Metaphysics Link (2/5)

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through being gathered back into where we belong; a belonging, in other words, to God. What is crucial here is not what happens to us after death, but salvation as the expression of the longing for the return to a pure and unadulterated form of belonging; a final closing-up of the wound of existence by returning to a lost oneness that never was. The reverse of Cyprian’s dictum was, of course, equally 14 Security, philosophy and politics true. No Church without salvation. The outcome of this project was a rejection of the world through the constitution of an ideal world which—not least because of the model it offered, the resentment which it fostered and the economy of salvation and cruelty which it instantiated—acted in the world to constitute a form of redeeming politics.3 In a way that indicates the continuity of the metaphysical tradition, however, this slogan can be, and was, easily adjusted to furnish the defining maxim of modern politics: no security outside the State; no State without security. And this, in its turn, has given rise to powerful forms of what I would call the disciplinary politics of Hobbesian thought and the actuarial politics of technologised thought. Each of these is also concerned to specify the principle, ground or rule that would satisfy the metaphysically sequestered compulsion for security; thus relieving human being of the dilemmas and challenges it faces to discover, in its changing circumstances, what it is to be—to act and live—as humans. The basic thought to be pursued is one which, in simultaneously drawing both our current politics and our tradition of political thought into question by challenging their mutual foundation in security, serves, in addition, to illustrate and explore some important aspects of the political implications of Heidegger’s thought. My thought, then, is that modern politics is a security project in the widest possible—ontological—sense of the term because it was destined to become so by virtue of the very character or nature of the thinking of truth within which, through which, and by continuous and intimate reference to which, politics itself has always been thought. What is at issue first of all, for me, therefore, is not whether one says yes or no to our modern (inter)national regimes of security, but what Foucault would have called the overall discursive fact that security is spoken about at all, the way in which it is put into political discourse and how it circulates throughout politics and other discourses. I think Heidegger’s account of metaphysics provides a means of addressing that fundamental question.

1NC – Calculation Internal Link (3/5)

Modern political relations are reduced to objects of calculation by the imperative to secure security; calculation replaces valuation, and we are confronted with the technologized arm of modern politics which would reduce us to cogs in the machine

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 20-22]

The reduction of metaphysics, and so also of political understanding, to calculation, results from the very inception of metaphysical thought. Because the appearance of things is inevitably various, because we ourselves always encounter them from a manifold of perspectives and because, finally, we ourselves are also mortal and fallible creatures, whatever the secure ground of things is that metaphysics seeks, it cannot actually be the sensible world of the appearance of things themselves. For they are too…well, insecure. It has, ultimately, to be suprasensible, situated outside the realm of the appearance of things, otherwise the ground that is sought would be as mutable (read insecure) as the coming and going, and apparently endless variation, of the world itself. It could not serve, therefore, as the guarantor which the answer to metaphysics’ guiding question requires. Literally, it could not offer any security for the sensible world of appearances if it were already located within, and therefore also contaminated by, the very insecurity of the comings and goings of that world. Metaphysics, then, is the masque of mastery; securing some foundation upon which to establish the sum total of what is knowable with certainty, and conforming one’s everyday conduct—public and private—to the foundation so secured. Such foundations may go by different names but that of the project itself does not. Hence, the responsibility, traditionally incumbent upon the philosopher—his ‘true’ mission—consisted in securing ultimate referents or principles. Philosophy was, as Nietzsche put it, a matter of valuation, ‘that is, establishment of the uppermost value in terms of which and according to which all beings are to be’.14 In as much as these were precisely what were to be secured, for without them no beings would be, without them, it was said, where would we be? The philosopher therefore spoke as a security expert. A security expert not merely in respect of what the substantial values were, but increasingly only in terms of how they were to be Security, philosophy and politics 21 secured, whatever they were to be taken to be; hence the rise of theory and of method. The philosopher became a security expert, then, in the sense of being able to tell you how to secure security. He or she was someone skilled in determining the means by which the invariable standards to establish meaning in discourse, soundness in mind, goodness in action, objectivity in knowledge, beauty in art, or value in life were to be secured (guaranteed). In such wise, whatever was said— meant; done; understood; esteemed; or valued—was authorised and secured by reference to such a standard, principle or reference. The philosopher’s task had to be to tell you how to secure such a thing even after they had come-up with an essential value of one description or another. Their security project could not then cease, but only intensify. For having secured this secure value, the value then had to be located securely, and securely policed, so that it could never be forgotten or lost again. Even with Nietzsche, in order for the will to power, as the essence of the Being of beings, to secure itself it has continuously to extend itself; that is to say, it secures itself in its essence as never-ending increase continuously extending itself. Hence, though Nietzsche’s will to power may be differentiated as self-overcoming— against the Darwinian, or even Spinozan, principle of self-preservation— it is arguable that this represents the security project à l’outrance. The charge levelled at philosophy at the end of metaphysics—the ‘end of philosophy’ thesis which has consequently turned philosophical thought into a contemplation of the limit; where limit is, however, thought liminally and not terminally—is that the philosopher has simply run out of things to say. It is that the philosopher cannot, in fact, secure any particular value for you and is, therefore, confronted with the manifest impossibility of discharging the traditional security function, other than to insist upon securing security itself. All that remains of the great project of Western philosophy, then, is the continuing, increasingly violent, insistence upon the need to secure security; hence its nihilism. The savage irony is that the more this insistence is complied with, the greater is the violence licensed and the insecurity engendered. The essence of metaphysics, then, is nihilistic, as the best of the realists fear that it is, precisely because it does not matter what you secure so long as security itself is secured. That is to say, so long as things are made certain, mastered and thereby controllable. Securing security does not simply create values. In essence indifferent to any particular value, and committed as it must ultimately be merely to rendering things calculable so that the political arithmetic of securing security can operate, it must relentlessly also destroy values when they conflict with the fundamental mathesis required of the imperative to secure. Its raison d’être, in other words, masquerading as the preservation of values, is ultimately not valuation at all but calculation. For without calculation how could security be secured? And calculation requires calculability. Whatever is must thereby be rendered calculable—whatever other value might once have been placed upon it—if we are to be as certain of it as metaphysics insists that we have to be if we are to secure the world. Western understanding of the political is, therefore, continuously suborned by metaphysics’ will to the calculative truth of correspondence, and its various regimes of power and knowledge to which Foucauldian genealogy alerts us. It is consequently Foucault’s indebtedness not only to Nietzsche but also to Heidegger which antecedes, while it remains nonetheless integrally related to, the task of genealogy.15 In order to pursue the recovery of the question of the political from metaphysics, therefore, I not only have to be able to pose the question which I have used Foucault to pose, I have to use it to bring security into question and explore that question through the sources which Foucault himself drew upon. Metaphysics is itself unwittingly an aid here, for it bears its own deconstruction within itself. Consider the outcome of the guiding question—why is there something rather than nothing?—for with its closure we are challenged to rethink the question.

1NC – Impact – Zero Point (4/5)

The economies of value created by the technologisation of the political allow for all subject to the political to be both valued and consequentially devalued, because death is the frame of reference within which these calculations operate any comparative devaluation of an aspect of humanity is justifiable, there is nothing abstract about this, this is the zero-point of the holocaust.

Dillon 1999 [Michael, “Another Justice,” *Political Theory* 27:2]

Philosophy's task, for Levinas, is to avoid conflating ethics and politics. The opposition of politics and ethics opens his first major work, Totality and Infinity, and underscores its entire reading. This raises the difficult question of whether or not the political can be rethought against Levinas with Levinas. Nor is this simply a matter of asking whether or not politics can be ethical. It embraces the question of whether or not there can be such a thing as an ethic of the political. Herein, then, lies an important challenge to political thought. It arises as much for the ontopolitical interpretation as it does for the under- standing of the source and character of political life that flows from the return of the ontological. For Levinas the ethical comes first and ethics is first phi- losophy. But that leaves the political unregenerated, as Levinas's own defer- ral to a Hobbesian politics, as well as his very limited political interventions, indicate.32 In this essay I understand the challenge instead to be the necessity of thinking the co-presence of the ethical and the political. Precisely not the subsumption of the ethical by the political as Levinas charges, then, but the belonging together of the two which poses, in addition, the question of the civil composure required of a political life. Otherness is born(e) within the self as an integral part of itself and in such a way that it always remains an inherent stranger to itself.33 It derives from the lack, absence, or ineradicable incompleteness which comes from having no security of tenure within or over that of which the self is a particular hermeneutical manifestation; namely, being itself. The point about the human, betrayed by this absence, is precisely that it is not sovereignly self-possessed and complete, enjoying undisputed tenure in and of itself. Modes of justice therefore reliant upon such a subject lack the very foundations in the self that they most violently insist upon seeing inscribed there. This does not, however, mean that the dissolution of the subject also entails the dissolution of Justice. Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ulti- mately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism.34 They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability.35 Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, "we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure."36 But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being. The event of this lack is not a negative experience. Rather, it is an encoun- ter with a reserve charged with possibility. As possibility, it is that which enables life to be lived in excess without the overdose of actuality.37 What this also means is that the human is not decided. It is precisely undecidable. Undecidability means being in a position of having to decide without having already been fully determined and without being capable of bringing an end to the requirement for decision. In the realm of undecidability, decision is precisely not the mechanical application of a rule or norm. Nor is it surrender to the necessity of contin- gency and circumstance. Neither is it something taken blindly, without reflection and the mobilisation of what can be known. On the contrary, know- ing is necessary and, indeed, integral to 'decision'. But it does not exhaust 'decision', and cannot do so if there is to be said to be such a thing as a 'dec- ision'. We do not need deconstruction, of course, to tell us this. The manage- ment science of decision has long since known something like it through the early reflections of, for example, Herbert Simon and Geoffrey Vickers.38 But only deconstruction gives us it to think, and only deconstructively sensible philosophy thinks it through. To think decision through is to think it as het- erogeneous to the field of knowing and possible knowing within which it is always located.39 And only deconstruction thinks it through to the intimate relation between 'decision' and the assumption of responsibility, which effect egress into a future that has not yet been-could not as yet have been-known: The instant of decision, if there is to be a decision, must be heterogeneous to this accumu- lation of knowledge. Otherwise there is no responsibility. In this sense only must the per- son taking the decision not know everything.40 Ultimately one cannot know everything because one is advancing into a future which simply cannot be anticipated, and into which one cannot see.

1NC – Alternative (5/5)

Our alternative is to question security. In order to politicize the system of technologically calculable objects that characterizes international relations, we must think the very foundations of that system.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 22-23]

Contesting our politics of security, therefore, not only requires more than a technical engagement over the meaning, range, efficiency, effectiveness, morality or accountability of conventional and nuclear, military and political, technologies of security, it also requires something in addition to genealogy as well; because genealogy, however politicising it might be—Foucault arguing, powerfully, that this politicising takes place for, or rather around, the battle over truth as ‘the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true’16—does not directly pose and seek to think the question of the political as such.17 However much it is therefore stimulated by the interrogatory disposition of the genealogist, my question, like any question, sets something else, or at least in addition, in train. It opens-up another world of thought and discloses the prospect also of another form of life, because that is how all questioning works. Such a world goes beyond the project which allowed the question to be posed in the first place. In the world that a question opens-up, the question itself multiplies and plurifies. It divides and sub-divides demanding more of you and provoking you to other thought. That is the way the world of a question builds. And in this burgeoning world not only do new considerations arise but all manner of other established issues are amplified and intensified in different ways. Not least of these is the way in which the question alerts us to that which is prior to the question, the source of the question itself to which the question is in fact responding. That which is prior here is that in which we are already immersed, the obligatory freedom of human being; what has happened to it, what might happen to it in the effort to secure it, and what might become of it now it is so secured by and within the security problematic. Hence, what ultimately concerns me is the very thought of security, rather than just its history or its genealogy, and how to let ourselves into the struggle of the duality which is entailed in security—that is to say, the indissoluble relation between security and insecurity which is, as you shall see, even contained within the word itself— from access to which we are secured for the moment, however, by security. This movement, integral to questioning, consequently carries us beyond the Security, philosophy and politics 23 genealogical. That is another reason why the question I have derived from it (‘Must we secure security?’) offers a way—I think, perhaps, the way—of opening-up the question of the political. ‘Must we secure security?’ is, then, not one question amongst many others. Neither is it a question that allows us to confine the response which it demands to genealogy or to the debates about the status of the International Relations of political Modernity. To embrace this question directs us towards an exploration of the link between the philosophical and the political in Western thought. It forces us to consider their current and shared predicament. It situates us right in the midst of the travails of the Western tradition, of the very differentiation between thought and action, and of all the questions which that separation poses. ‘Must we secure security?’ is therefore a question within whose realm the crisis of modern global politics reverberates and resonates with that of the crisis of modern thought. It forces us to think about the political at a time when the Western understanding of the political, having been globalised, has contributed to the formation of a world that it can no longer comprehend or command—to a world in which it is incapable of realising the very values which it is said to comprise—and that means thinking once more about the belonging together of security and insecurity.18

Uniqueness

Now is the key time for questioning security

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 3-4]

In its turn, such a reimagination invites new forms of (inter)national political analysis and political interventions. Their task, also, is newly to disclose the political character of human freedom in and for late modern times, against what is otherwise in danger of becoming a project of global technological ordering. I also think that there is no greater need for this thought than on the political site of what I will be calling our (inter)national politics of security, which is why I also think International Relations is capable of being rethought as the place where this thinking may take place. Moreover, I think there is no greater opportunity to engage in this project than on the site of International Relations. In order to capitalise upon that opportunity, however, we have to take the ‘inter’ of International Relations seriously. To do that, we have to ally it closely to the way in which the philosophical resources upon which I draw alert us to the political significance of the between as such; where plurality is insinuated into the very existing of beings, so that being, at all, is itself plural and not merely composed of a plurality of beings.

\*\*\*Link Debate\*\*\*

Security is Everything

Security is the political intuition which forms the modern political problematic—IR takes security as the given value by which all political events are to be understood, including the being of human subjects. We do not speak security—security speaks through us.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 14-15]

A logical way of pursuing this Foucauldian impulse would, therefore, have been to document the discursive facticity of security by discovering how security is spoken about, and who or what does the speaking. To consider historically, again a là Foucault, the propositions, viewpoints and assumptions from which they speak: to specify the institutions, and detail the various interlocking discursive practices, which produce, store and distribute the bulk of what is said (assembling it in great archives and policing what is true about it): to note as well the tensions and conflicts within the plural regime of security as it weaves the tight (inter)national/intertextual6 discursive economies which comprise the texture of modern global life: including those, for example, of the state; (inter)national organisations; parasitic public media; economic corporations; para-statal research institutions; teaching academies; and medical, informational, communicational, pedagogic and academic disciplines. For Foucault’s genealogical method was concerned to show how the theme of struggle only really becomes operative if one establishes concretely— in each particular case—who is engaged in struggle, what the struggle is about, and how, where, by what means and according to what rationality it evolves. In other words if one wants to take seriously the assertion that struggle is the core of relations of power, one must take into account the fact that the good old logic of ‘contradiction’ is no longer sufficient, far from it, for the unravelling of actual processes.7 Pursuing such a genealogical line of enquiry would have the virtue of enabling us to see that security is employable in any and every circumstance, and is invested with a plurality of meanings. It would reveal the extent, too, of the work that security does for and imposes upon us, and serve effectively to excite suspicion about the extraordinary valency and velocity which it has in the production and preoccupations of our forms of (inter)national life. We could not then escape noticing the way security impresses itself upon us as a kind of floating and radically inter-textual signifier which, by constant reference to all other signs of the times, transgresses disciplinary, political, corporeal and geographical boundaries as it courses throughout the defining technologically inspired discourses of Modernity: state security; national security; political security; global security; regional security; territorial security; economic security; financial security; individual security; collective security; personal security; physical security; psychological security; sexual security; social security; environmental security; food security…. These, then, would be some of the central considerations to which a genealogy would draw attention. For security, the genealogist would insist, is not a fact of nature but a fact of civilisation. It is not a noun that names something, it is a principle of formation that does things. It is neither an ontological predicate of being, nor an objective need, but the progenitor instead of a proliferating array of discourses of danger within whose brutal and brutalising networks of powerknowledge modern human being is increasingly ensnared and, ironically, radically endangered. Security is the word under which the manifold rationalities of the modern age march together—witness the serried ranks of security listed above— in a struggle which continuously threatens to overwhelm any other understanding of the political—and of the obligatory freedom of human being—than that concerned, one way or another, with securing security. Hence we are not only users of language, we are used, the genealogist would argue, by the language we use. We are not simply the people who employ discourses of security, we are the people who are ensnared in and used by them. Just as there therefore could be no history of security without a history of the (inter)national politics that seeks to define, pursue and prosecute order under the various names of security, so also any individual political formation would manifest its own particular order of fear. Don’t ask what a people is, the genealogist of security might say, ask how an order of fear forms a people. And, in particular, bearing the imprint of the way determinations of what is political have originated in fear, s/he would emphasise that security is a principal device for constituting political order and for confining political imagination within the laws of necessity of the specific rationalities thrown-up by their equally manifold discourses of danger.

Link – “Liberal” Securitization

Removing troops isn’t a link to the critique because our link is to the metaphysical foundations upon which their security politics rest. The modern security project transforms seemingly liberal political commitments into the dynamos of calculation.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 29-31]

While, therefore, not denying that modern (inter)national political discourses and practices have also sought to derive and provide a politics of rights, freedoms and interests out of metaphysics, and that these are in certain ways definitive of the modern condition, all such (inter)national politics are always already subject to a process of reduction to the determinants of security—foremost amongst which is calculability—in as much as they remain metaphysically conceived. This reduction arises not merely because of the way the exigencies of war and danger always acquire a powerful dynamic and logic of their own;37 something which Alexander Hamilton noted long before strategic theorists sought to make a political technology out of it via the principles of strategic thought or the rubrics of crisis management.38 ‘The violent destruction of life and property incident to war’, Hamilton observed, the continual effect and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at length become more willing to run the risk of being less free.39 But, more than this, because freedom is largely conceived in modern liberal democratic thought, indeed also with Hamilton himself, as something that can be secured ultimately only outside of the public realm of appearance, and is thus separated from politics itself. Thus, as Arendt notes: We need go no further than the political thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, who more often than not simply identified political freedom with security. The highest purpose of politics, ‘the end of government’, was the guarantee of security; security in turn made freedom possible, and the word freedom designated a quintessence of activities which occurred outside the political realm.40 For Arendt, in contrast, freedom is a ‘form’ of Heideggerian freedom. That freedom, to call something into being which did not exist before, which was not given, not even as an object of cognition or imagination, and which therefore, strictly speaking, could not be known,41 is something which is experienced and realised in the action allowed by the freedom of the (in)security of mortal life. It is precisely because it is conceived in subjectivist and utilitarian terms that modern liberal democratic thought can always be trumped by the superutilitarian— and super-subjectivist—claims of security. This is perhaps part of the explanation why liberal humanism displayed such an inability during the interwar period of the twentieth century to understand what Claude Lefort calls ‘the drama that was unfolding in the world, and in particular, its inability to understand the depths from which the collective identifications and death wishes sprang’. Its inability, then, to grasp ‘the link between the unbridled pursuit of individualism and economic competition, on the one hand, and the attractions of communist or fascist collectivism, on the other’,42 is something which, in its triumphalism over the dissolution of the Soviet empire, it is in danger of repeating; and not because of some simple policy omission, but because of the very way in which it seeks to ground itself through and through in representative-calculative thought. The more the dissociation of freedom from politics becomes pronounced, however, the more security is embraced as the foundation of politics; and the more obligatory freedom is suborned by security. Whereas the condition of the political is the freedom of (in)security, being thrown into a world which is determined neither by a unified logos nor a transcendental telos, security insists, instead, on being the condition which has to be secured so that freedom can be enjoyed; or even that it can release us altogether from the burden of freedom itself. It was not the celebration of this freedom which, therefore, stimulated and fuelled the desire of liberal revolutions for participation in government, but the fundamental lack of trust in the capacity and probity of government when it came to fulfilling what the dissociation of freedom from politics had established as its higher purpose; that raison d’être, as Spinoza defined it, which knew ‘no higher law than the safety of [its] own realm’.43 Hence our (inter)national politics of security are not merely concerned to document and detail that, and how, the exigencies of necessity operate. (We would not need the

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entire edifice of (inter)national security to tell us this, we confront necessity one way and another every day in our everyday lives. There is nothing especially realistic about the (inter)national security-mongers who trade in telling us so.) Nor do they merely claim to offer just another picture of political life. The point is that they claim utilitarianly to be most true of it. Security, philosophy and politics 31 Why? Referring back to my earlier point about politics and limits, and directly recalling the mathesis that governs the technological mode of being. It is not only because of the way freedom has been construed by them—something which Arendt has detailed so persuasively—but also because they claim to articulate the bottom line, the single figures and universal numbers, the final calculus (the limit condition conceived in terms of terminality and calculability—indeed the calculability of terminality, and the terminality of calculability—rather than liminality) that makes politics possible. They make a determinate claim both on the construal and the answering of the question of the political, because, in virtue of the mortal danger which it is their self-appointed distinctive competence to articulate, they claim to have found, and therefore possess, the mandate for the political. (Inter)national politics of security are, therefore, essentially a form of eschatology; politics thought in the light of the last things, the limit situation as a determinable and determining terminus. But because eschatology is ineluctably linked also, through diverse idioms (essence, cause, telos and revelation) to the beginning of things, this terminus also articulates the natality, the first cause, the ultimate goal, defining essence or revelatory initiation and fulfilment of the political as well. Specifying the end (the limit condition as the terminal and not the liminal),44 politics of security claim also to have discerned the advent of the political.45 That understanding of the political ultimately construes the political realm as a domain of calculability in which political practices become exercises in the political arithmetic of representation of the things to be secured and of the calculuses which will secure them. This makes of human being not merely an index of (inter)national security, but an index whose very indexicality has to be secured first if there is to be any (inter)national political arithmetic at all.

Link – Technological Fascination

Modern politics can only obfuscate the nature of human being because it is obsessed with securing its own technical virtuosity.

Dillon 96 [Michael, *The Politics of Security*, 52-56]

Heidegger consequently not only challenges us to confront a way of thinking which refigures the claims which have allowed us to think in the ways that we habitually do think, he also senses, and seeks to make a sense of, a certain sensibility. That sensibility is the one which makes us think that these traditionalistic ways of thinking, together with the (inter)national politics derived from, and deeply implicated in, them have become dangerously out of touch with what it is to be human. There, the human appears in opposition to itself, as a self in denial of its freedom cut off from itself and from the renewing sources of the self, possessed of an epistemological hubris whose object is to confine it in, by securing it from, that obligatory freedom, and the profoundly ethico-political questioning continuously posed by it, precisely through a radical subjectification of it. Technology, one might therefore say, makes human being flat-footed in respect to its ethical comportment towards itself as the uncanny—both native and stranger to itself—being with others in the face of the Otherness that it is. The krisis of metaphysics—detailed in Heidegger’s thought through the way in which he asks the very question, the question of Being, which provoked it and drew it together as a tradition; and now more generally explored in what has come to be called the philosophy of the limit 57 —necessarily thereby calls for a recovery of the question of the political itself. This is a recovery which means going back over the tradition of metaphysical politics—including its putative inception in the Greek world—not because any definitive answer to the ‘inner problematic’ of the political lies there (what Heidegger says about the ‘inner problematic’ of philosophy may be adapted to that of the political; ‘Plato’s question’, he says ‘must be retrieved. This cannot mean that we retreat to the Greek’s answer’ 58 ), but to recover it; not only from (metaphysical) political philosophy but also from the area studies, regions and disciplines through which the study of politics in general, and that of International Relations in particular, now dissipates the concern with the political and substitutes, instead, a fascination with the manifold globalised and globalising technologies of order that have emerged to administer human being. For much of the project of contemporary political analysis itself displays technology’s own aspiration to technical virtuosity, preoccupation with concepts of method, system, rule and function, and obsession with the ideal schema through which every formal and thematic property (of politics) might be accounted for. Devoted to making politics intelligible according to the norms of representative-calculative thinking, it judges itself (and is judged) by whether it gives us back an image of ‘political man’ which is said to correspond with universal and determinable (hence closed) human nature, or has disclosed in its systematic workings the technical mastercode of politics as such. One is, therefore, inevitably brought to encounter the limits of ‘the school’, or ‘the discipline’, under the extra-curricular, or even non-curricular, impulse of Heidegger’s thought. Through it one can recognise, for example, the extent to which an understanding of politics is increasingly neither pursued nor taught in the ‘schools’ of politics. Rather, we introduce each other and our students to various spheres of (inter)national life in which the technology of calculative order operates, and insist upon the need for it while moralising in realistic and idealistic tones about the variously conceived necessities of it.

Link – Benign Imperialism

Withdrawal is still imperialism because imperialism is a way of thinking about the world, not merely a situation in which the world finds itself.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 92-93]

‘The political, which as politikon arose formerly out of the essence of the Greek polis’, Heidegger observes, ‘has come to be understood in the Roman way’. Consequently: Since the time of the Imperium, the Greek word ‘political’ has meant something Roman. What is Greek about it is now only its sound.37 Whereas the Latinisation of truth transformed the essence of truth into certainty and security, the Latinisation of the political correspondingly transformed the essence of the political from—in my terms—obligatory freedom’s tragic topos of encounter, into—his terms—an imperial project of dominion and domination. ‘The imperial’, he elaborates in a way which anticipates and, therefore, irresistibly and powerfully recalls Foucault’s notion of the disciplinary powerknowledge of modern reason, ‘springs forth from the essence of truth as correctness in the sense of the directive self-adjusting guarantee of the security of domination’.38 Thus, and in a way that further and equally powerfully recalls the politics of Hobbes’ Leviathan: The ‘taking as true’ of ratio, of reor, becomes a far reaching and anticipatory security. Ratio becomes counting, calculating, calculus. Ratio is the selfadjustment to what is correct.39 It is that, too, which subsequently becomes technology or the essence of technicity which he believes dominates the politics of the modern age as much as its understanding of truth. Because of their fundamental importance, a little further elaboration of these points is required. What happens, according to Heidegger, is that just as politics is imperialised as rule and dominion—in effect translating the ethos of the political which is obligatory freedom into the ethos of command which is rule—so also the ‘Justice’, or what he later in the Parmenides lectures calls the ‘ordering’, of the Greek dike is similarly imperialised by being translated into the justice of the Roman iustitia, the ‘to-be-in-the-right’ and ‘to have a right’ bestowed by the imperial ordering effected by command: ‘Accordingly, iustitia has a wholly different ground of essence than that of dike which arises from that of aletheia’.40 ‘Imperium’, he says, ‘is the command in the sense of commandment’.41 Furthermore: Imperium says im-parare, to establish, to make arrangements: prae-cipere, to occupy something in advance, and by this occupation to hold command over it, and so to have the occupied as territory…. The Roman law, ius—iubeo—is rooted in the same essential domain of the imperial command, and obedience. Command is the ground of the essence of domination: which is why a clearer and more proper translation of imperium is ‘high command’.42 It is also the territory founded and occupied in advance on the basis of this command. Command and dominion founds a certain kind of order of rule such that: The topos of encounter 93 the dominated are not kept down, nor simply despised, but, rather,…they themselves are permitted, within the territory of the command, to offer their services for the continuation of the domination.43

A/T: Perm – Mutual Exclusivity/Intelligibility

The very structure of the affirmative’s thinking makes questioning security impossible.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 24-26]

We now know that neither metaphysics nor our politics of security can secure the security of truth and of life which was their reciprocating raison d’être (and, raison d’état26). More importantly, we now know that the very will to security— Security, philosophy and politics 25 the will to power of sovereign presence in both metaphysics and modern politics— is not only a prime incitement to violence in the Western tradition of thought, and to the globalisation of its (inter)national politics, but also self-defeating;27 in that it does not in its turn merely endanger, but actually engenders danger in response to its own discursive dynamic. One does not have to be persuaded of the destinal sending of Being, therefore, to be persuaded of the profundity—and of the profound danger—of this the modern human condition. That, then, is why the crisis of Western thought is as much a fundamental crisis of (inter)national politics, as the crisis of (inter)national politics is a crisis of thought. Moreover, that is why in doubting the value of security, and doubting in a Nietzschean mode better than Descartes,28 we are also enjoined by the circumstances of this critical conjunction of the philosophical and the political to doubt metaphysical truth. For the political truth of security is the metaphysical truth of correspondence and adequation in declension to mathesis; the mere, but rigorously insistent, mensuration of calculability. To bring the value of security into question in the radical way required by the way it now, ironically, radically endangers us, correspondingly requires that we attend to metaphysics’ own continuous process of deconstruction. In doing this, however, we go beyond mere doubting—which, after all, is the mere counterpart of the desire for certainty— and find non-apocalyptic ways of affirming and so continuing to enjoy and celebrate (in)security; that is to say human being’s own obligatory freedom. Ultimately, now, our (inter)national politics of security is no longer even distinguished or driven by humanistic considerations. It is a security simply ordering to order. But it is only by virtue of the fact that our (inter)national politics of security has come to this end that we can in fact begin to consider the relationship between its end and its beginning. Through this we do not, in a sense, go back to anything at all. Neither does this turn disguise some covert nostalgia for a phantom past. Rather, attention is turned towards consideration of what is entailed in the preparation and inception of continuous new political growth. This is also why, at the limit, it is useful to think about these origins and limits again. Not because they hold an answer that is now lost but because, antecedent to metaphysics, they make us think about the very liminal character of origins and limits, of the relationship which obtains between them, and of what proceeds from them, in ways that are not utterly determined by metaphysics. That way we may get some clues to some ways of thinking that are not metaphysical; nor, indeed, pre-metaphysical, because we cannot be premetaphysical at the end of metaphysics. What happens, instead, is that the whole question of emergence and origination, of the very possibility of repeating ourselves, opens-up again; specifically in the sense of the historical possibilities of the obligatory freedom of human being now terminally endangered globally by its very own (inter)national ‘civilising’ practices. There is no going back, but there is also no stepping outside of this condition. Humankind has attained a certain limit here in our time and our thinking. And this limit, by virtue of the globalisation of Western thought and politics, now increasingly conditions the future of human being. Politics at the end, or rather in the extremis, of security consequently confronts the same tasks as philosophy at the end, or in the extremis, of metaphysics. That extremis, or limit, is the insecurity of security itself. Because there is no overcoming this limit, modern thought and modern politics are each an encounter, therefore, with that limit. An encounter that has to be designed to defer both the closure of thought and the termination of politics threatened by the terminal construal of limits in general, and of this limit in particular.29 That, critically, means thinking limits differently. This global conjunction of the limit of the philosophical and the political, therefore itself, constitutes a new political experience. It is one which compounds the deconstruction of the way political experience, or rather the understanding of political life, has hitherto been thought, because that new experience cannot be addressed—much less ‘resolved’—in the traditional terms and categories of political philosophy.

A/T: Perm – Mutual Exclusivity

One cannot even raise the uncanny question of security from within their framework

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 108-109]

What is uncanny about the political is precisely that the requirement to give things their due arises at all. What is, therefore, uncanny about human being is that it is the opportunity to do so. This uncanniness is not something which appears only once or occasionally. It shows itself everywhere, all the time, and within the everyday: the uncanny, or the extraordinary, shines throughout the familiar ambit of the beings we deal with and know, beings we call ordinary…its essence is the inconspicuous, the simple, the insignificant, which nevertheless shines in all beings…the simple which shines into the ordinary, and which does not stem from the ordinary, but nevertheless appears in advance in all that is ordinary, shining though it and around it.97 We ordinarily think of politics only in terms of the representation of subjects, presenting before themselves and others the objects (including other subjects) which they seek to grasp or master, and the ‘interests’ which they seek to pursue and realise.98 Here, politics is being thought, instead, even in respect of our sometimes viciously subjectivised politics, as to do with how human beings come to be integrally involved in taking-up their responsibility for their uncanny phenomenality and phenomenolising capacity in order to grant it its due. Not forgetting that this takes place with others in Otherness is what also distinguishes this acceding to Justice from some supposed unbridled exercise of the will. Not forgetting that this is an open way of being in openness, is what similarly distinguishes it from a programmatic prescription for its confinement within the bounds of some security project or other. Not exhausted by representation, consciousness, the merely phenomenal or even the poetic, it is essentially involved with the art required continuously to compose oneself in the freedom The topos of encounter 109 (mine yet shared) that one inhabits; which freedom brings inapparent Justice to presence in its absence in respect of the way we treat each other, other beings and Being as such.

A/T: Perm – Auseinandersetzung

We do not genuinely question if our answers do not risk our leaving everything behind [i.e., the aff becomes a question in the alt, but the aff remains unconditionally true in the permutation]

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 45-46]

Heidegger thus ontologises both phenomenology and hermeneutics, which hitherto had consequently been neither phenomenological nor hermeneutical enough for him, when enlisting them to deconstruct the philosophical tradition in order to get at what it covered-over; namely the ontological difference between Being and beings, presencing rather than presence, difference as such; the very uncanniness of Being and thus of human being and of Language, in which each is disclosed. Such destructuring—like the later Derridaean version of deconstruction32—was not, of course, a radical turn away from or step out of tradition, because tradition is not something which is first given and then decided upon. Tradition is only tradition in the act of taking something up in one way or another, which is to say also saying in the process what that something is. Destructuring was, therefore, a radical new turn towards the history of philosophy, or step back into it. Rather than disowning what has gone before, the tradition here becomes tradition in being re-won and newly owned. If the target of the destructive move of this deconstruction was consequently not the tradition as if it was some reified object but the processes of reception by which the tradition comes to be as tradition, its prize was a more original, thoughtful, and thoughtprovoking appropriation of that tradition. Heidegger’s way of doing this, Auseinandersetzung, was deliberately and forcefully agonistic: Auseinandersetzung brings philosophers into the sharpest focus and it unfolds their meaning in the history of philosophy by taking each thinker seriously as an adversary, as someone who demands that certain decisions be made about essential understandings of the world and of Being. By forcing a confrontation with one’s faith, ideas of nature, or ideals of political belonging, such decisions can wound, even kill, before they are complete in this duel—demanding that we defend, give-up or transfigure cherished beliefs and conceptions which order our lives. In confrontation, what—or rather how—we are is at stake. Without this principle of interpretation, a thinker cannot make out his own standpoint, so that he also cannot get at the opposition he wants.33 Here it is worth reinforcing the point that the contemporary thinker who has taken Heidegger’s method most to heart—and, indeed, practised it most directly and forcefully upon Heidegger himself, precisely because of the vital importance of what he thinks is at stake there—has been Emmanuel Levinas. While it seeks to rediscover something in the past, rather than of the past, like genealogy, however, a term which Heidegger uses twice, the critique of this deconstructive Auseinandersetzung is not ‘fault finding or underlining of errors’.34 Rather, it is an insistence upon formulating and meeting today’s challenges by posing more originally those questions the answers to which, having formed the present, threaten to entrap us, unsustainably and unsurvivably, within it if they are not reformulated and re-posed (recovered) in response to our present need to think and live-out our existence futurally. Such thinking is not only forcefully aimed at the present, therefore, it is also aimed at rethinking past questions and ways of posing questions, the answers to which have given rise to the present.35 For: ‘Every answer keeps its force as answer only so long as it is rooted in questioning’.36 The release of the present into a different future is, then, propelled less by new answers—architectonic principles and systems—or by the reoccupation of positions established by previous questions.37 Instead, it comes through new ways of formulating old questions or, rather, by the new questions which such reformulation poses in and to the challenges of a present which becomes a fatal cul de sac—deathly enclosure—if it cannot be renewed by such appropriative questioning.

\*\*\*Impact Debate\*\*\*

Impact – Extinction

Securitization produces the technological conditions for human species extinction

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 14-15]

What truths about the human condition, he therefore prompted me to ask, are thought to be secreted in security? What work does securing security do for and upon us? What power-effects issue out of the regimes of truth of security? If the truth of security compels us to secure security, why, how and where is that Security, philosophy and politics 15 grounding compulsion grounded? How was it that seeking security became such an insistent and relentless (inter)national preoccupation for humankind? What sort of project is the pursuit of security, and how does it relate to other modern human concerns and enterprises, such as seeking freedom and knowledge through representative-calculative thought, technology and subjectification? Above all, how are we to account—amongst all the manifest contradictions of our current (inter)national systems of security: which incarcerate rather than liberate; radically endanger rather than make safe; and engender fear rather than create assurance— for that terminal paradox of our modern (inter)national politics of security which Foucault captured so well in the quotation that heads this chapter.5 A terminal paradox which not only subverts its own predicate of security, most spectacularly by rendering the future of terrestrial existence conditional on the strategies and calculations of its hybrid regime of sovereignty and governmentality, but which also seems to furnish a new predicate of global life, a new experience in the context of which the political has to be recovered and to which it must then address itself: the globalisation of politics of security in the global extension of nihilism and technology, and the advent of the real prospect of human species extinction.

Impact – Calculation = Extinction, NV2L

Security politics drives us to make ourselves a species of calculation—calculation of life makes the valuation of life impossible and thus creates the conditions for human species extinction.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 26-27]

Everything, for example, has now become possible. But what human being seems most impelled to do with the power of its actions is to turn itself into a species; not merely an animal species, nor even a species of currency or consumption (which amount to the same thing), but a mere species of calculation. For only by reducing itself to an index of calculation does it seem capable of constructing that political arithmetic by which it can secure the security globalised Western thought insists upon, and which a world made increasingly unpredictable by the very way human being acts into it now seems to require. Yet, the very rage for calculability which securing security incites is precisely also what reduces human freedom, inducing either despair or the surrender of what is human to the de-humanising calculative logic of what seems to be necessary to secure security. I think, then, that Hannah Arendt was right when she saw late modern humankind caught in a dangerous world-destroying cleft between a belief that everything is possible and a willingness to surrender itself to so-called laws of necessity (calculability itself) which would make everything possible. That it was, in short, characterised by a combination of reckless omnipotence and reckless despair. But I also think that things have gone one stage further—the surrender to the necessity of realising everything that is possible—and that this found its paradigmatic expression, for example, in the deterrent security policies of the Cold War; where everything up to and including self-immolation not only became possible but actually necessary in the interests of (inter)national security. This logic persists in the metaphysical core of modern politics—the axioms of inter- State security relations, popularised, for example, through strategic discourse— even if the details have changed. What is most at issue here, then, is the question of the limit and of how to finesse the closure of the fatally deterministic or apocalyptic thinking to which the issue of limits ordinarily gives rise in onto-theological thought: as the authoritative specification of an eschaton; as the invocation of our submission to it; or in terms of the closure of what it is possible for us to say, do and be in virtue of the operation of it. The question of the limit has therefore to be posed in a way Security, philosophy and politics 27 that invokes a thinking which resists the siren calls of fatal philosophers and historians alike. That is why limits have to be thought differently, and why the question concerning limits has to be posed, instead, in terms of that which keeps things in play (for ‘[w]here demarcation is lacking nothing can come to presence as it is’30); exciting a thinking, in particular, which seeks continuously to keep ‘open the play of [political] possibility by subtracting the sense of necessity, completeness, and smugness from established organ-izations of life’,31 all of which are promoted by an insistence upon security. Metaphysics, therefore, becomes material in politics of security because metaphysically determined being has a foundational requirement to secure security. Hence our (inter)national politics of security are the municipal metaphysics of the Western tradition. That is why the fate of metaphysics and the fate of that politics of security are so inextricably intertwined. There is more than an academic interest at stake, therefore, in this modern conjunction between the philosophical and the political. How we think and what we do, what we think and how we are doing, condition one another. There is clearly more than a coincidence also in relying upon post-Nietzschean thought to argue for that reappraisal of both which requires a recovery of the question of the political. For between Hegel and Heidegger metaphysics exposed itself to its own deconstructive impulses. After Marx ‘one finds Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Freud, and Nietzsche turning philosophy upon itself, thereby unmasking its own taboos and twisted roots’;32 realising and exhausting its potential, according to Heidegger, in the advent of the epoch of technology. The same period also witnessed the exhaustion of the European State system’s modern metaphysical resolution of the question of the political—its profoundly ambiguous and deeply problematic inauguration as both a State of emergency and a certain kind of democratic project—through the very globalisation of the language, forms and practices of the politics of security upon which it was based. The advent of the globalised industrial nuclear age exhibits not only the hollowness of that system’s foundational promises to secure order, identity and freedom— hence the reason why the disciplines which promise to tell the truth about the operation of its orders and identities appear to be so peculiarly limited and unreal in their vaunted realistic representation of reality—but also, in the gulf that exists between what its (inter)national political prospectus offers and what its (inter)national politics provides; the exhaustion of its political imagination.33 For this was a period, in which World War One was critical, when that (inter)national politics of security finally realised the full potential of the self-immolative dynamic pre-figured in its very inception; the real prospect of human species extinction.34

Impact – Security Paradox

Can’t solve without first raising the question of security; security and insecurity go together insofar that modern politics attempts to secure security by endangering danger.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 27-29]

Although fundamental to that axiomatic privileging of security upon which Western understanding of the political relies, although fundamental to its common sense, fundamental questions concerning security nonetheless seem never to be pressed. When asked, especially by those branches of the study of politics that currently assert particular disciplinary claims on the word—political philosophy, whose modern inaugural moment paradigmatically occurs with Hobbes, and International Relations and Strategic Studies (currently the popular twin citadels of the metaphysical determination of the political), whose inaugural moment occurs in the global technologisation of the political that began once the idea of politics articulated in the post-Westphalian European state system exhausted its pre-figured possibilities in global militarisation and conquest35—they are never pursued beyond that point where its function as a ground is precisely what is at issue.36 There is, then, an exquisite paradox at work here. Our (inter)national politics of security hide what they most depend upon, by making it most obvious. The metaphysical dynamics and demands that determine them are securely secured— locked away and forgotten—by means of the very insistence upon security itself. The engagement with security has not, therefore, even begun. Securing security is, it seems, too immediate and too pervasive a preoccupation within our world. We have not, yet, been sufficiently separated from it. Locked in an intensely technologised epistemic preoccupation with it, we lack the dramatic distance needed for re-thinking the belonging together of security and insecurity and so, therefore, of a politics which operates in an understanding of their indissoluble, and indissolubly agonistic, connection in the condition of obligatory freedom. For some, the very pursuit of security is misguided, for others it is, inevitably, a first order priority. But I do not want to pose the question of whether we must secure security through this dichotomy, and the invitation it inevitably issues finally to resolve the relation between security and insecurity one way or another. But that does not mean that I think it is possible to settle, either, for a macho insouciance that would accept the so-called security paradox, as if this were the end of the matter rather than its beginning. Instead, I want to approach the question through the primordial and inescapable relation which adheres between the two of them. The questions about security, which the tradition ordinarily takes as its guide, ask: What ultimately secures us? What do we ultimately wish to secure? How can we secure security? or, What is the most secure way of securing security? The grounding question—What is the essence of security?—simply does not unfold in our politics of security at all; because it is taken to be the very ground of things itself, that unquestionable thing which anybody and anything needs in order for it to be at all. Neither then does the answer which begins to emerge from that question—that security and insecurity are inherently related—begin to be addressed. Rather, throughout the course of its successive transformations, Western political thought has been impelled by its metaphysical determination to secure the appropriate theoretical grounds and instrumental means by which security itself could be secured. The politics of Western thought has, therefore, been a security project in the fullest sense of the term. Driven by the requirement to secure security, it not only constituted an escape from politics but also, for reasons and in ways I will elaborate later, a form of tragic denial. Preoccupied with command and rule, rather than with politics, it has been substantially concerned in the modern period with specifying the conditions under which Security, philosophy and politics 29 rulers can guarantee their subjects a secure private existence. Along with that preoccupation, it has further found itself concerned to figure-out what price, in terms of obligations and duties, subjects ought to pay for this privilege; and with whether, and under what terms and conditions, they might determine that this utilitarian security contract has been rendered null and void, so leaving them free to conclude another. I, therefore, intend to examine the link between political thought and metaphysics by looking back at it from the vantage point at the end of metaphysics—that is to say, at the limit of what has so far made Western political thought possible—but to do so specifically from the vantage point which is afforded by my preliminary question concerning security. For the question concerning security is itself, of course, fundamentally a question concerning limits as well, specifically the limit of what it means to be mortal. Mortality, then, is where the questions both of security and of politics first arise.

Impact – Security Paradox

Security politics can only make us safe by committing violence at large. Unsurprisingly, violence leads to violence.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 150-151]

Only violence, it seems, can secure an end to violence, yet not even violence can do that securely because violence, of course, begets violence. Offered as the final guarantor, it is also the chief threat to order: ‘the practice of violence… changes the world, but the most probable change is to a more violent world’.76 It, like the being-in-common from which it arises is, therefore, also self-propagating. The political and the tragic 151 The conundrum of violence is consequently not one problem amongst many, it is intimately related to the conundrum of being-in-common itself. For, in its freedom, human being is always potentially a violent mortal puzzle to itself, because the violence which it can always threaten itself with, in consequence of the very differential composition of the life that it is, cannot be mastered and overcome by greater violence. (Another way of saying that danger is inherent to the free (in)security of human being, and not an externality to be exterminated.) More to the point. Neither can it be mastered and overcome by regimes, either of normalising surveillance or of policing love, premised alike upon the violent, and violence-inducing, denial of violence and difference.77 The political alone offers some way of addressing it short of the dissolution of all limits, particularly that threatened by those who dogmatically insist upon the violent, sovereign decidedness of their own limits. The political arises precisely because we are condemned by our mortal life to be free. Because we are free we have to enact ourselves. In enacting ourselves, we violently articulate standards and judgements. Herein lies the possibility of a politics of freedom in which the function of politics is to preserve that dangerous and violent freedom, to sustain that capacity to invent standards and exercise judgement—and to enlarge it where possible—against existing standards and judgements, while keeping the question of the very violence entailed in judgement open. That is why the political is always concerned with the remainder or the surplus that politics as rule produces, or relies upon, but is always committed against.

Impact – Der Derian (NV2L)

Security expresses a negative relation to life; life is itself insecurity, and the attempt to secure life removes all value to life.

Der Derian 1998 [James, “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard,” in *On Security* ed. Ronnie Lipschutz. http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html]

Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. 33 Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness. Since Nietzsche has suffered the greatest neglect in international theory, his reinterpretation of security will receive a more extensive treatment here. One must begin with Nietzsche's idea of the will to power, which he clearly believed to be prior to and generative of all considerations of security. In Beyond Good and Evil , he emphatically establishes the primacy of the will to power: "Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength--life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the most frequent results." 34 The will to power, then, should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual desire for power. It can, in its negative form, produce a reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading, in Nietzsche's view, to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an active and affective force of becoming, from which values and meanings--including self-preservation--are produced which affirm life. Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic to life, for ". . . life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation--but why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages." 35 Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism in life: "life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war." 36 But the denial of this permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a consensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear. The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche asks of the reader: "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" 37 The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols: The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?" shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause --a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving. . . . That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and

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preferred kind of explanation--that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations. 38 A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility--recycling the desire for security. The "influence of timidity," as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the "necessities" of security: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences." 39 The unknowable which cannot be contained by force or explained by reason is relegated to the off-world. "Trust," the "good," and other common values come to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling of security such as the Christian possesses; he feels strong in being able to trust, to be patient and composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected by a god." 40 For Nietzsche, of course, only a false sense of security can come from false gods: "Morality and religion belong altogether to the psychology of error : in every single case, cause and effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effects of believing something to be true; or a state of consciousness is confused with its causes." 41 Nietzsche's interpretation of the origins of religion can shed some light on this paradoxical origin and transvaluation of security. In The Genealogy of Morals , Nietzsche sees religion arising from a sense of fear and indebtedness to one's ancestors: The conviction reigns that it is only through the sacrifices and accomplishments of the ancestors that the tribe exists --and that one has to pay them back with sacrifices and accomplishments: one thus recognizes a debt that constantly grows greater, since these forebears never cease, in their continued existence as powerful spirits, to accord the tribe new advantages and new strength. 42

Impact – Value to Life

The metaphysics of security have come to define the meaning of human flourishing, which turns out to be a very sad picture of life indeed.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 130]

Our metaphysical politics of security, I argue, are, however, impelled to make politics a matter of command; membership of a political community a matter of obedience; love synonymous with a policing order; order a function of discipline; and identity a narcissistic paranoia. Combined with the advances in science and technology, they have become deeply—potentially terminally—inimical to human flourishing. Not merely capable of species extinction—as the deterrent policies of the Cold War years first demonstrated—logically they come comprehensively to threaten it in consequence of the way they understand, organise, pursue, and legitimise the formation of political community and the purposes of political organisation. The dissolution of the Cold War has changed nothing here. Rather it has intensified the logic and disseminated it more pervasively. The capabilities have been proliferating globally in any event—Cold War or not—driven by the combination of technological, economic and military dynamics in association with which the (inter)national politics of security have been operating in modern times. Our civilisation is now quite capable of ending cataclysmically. I do not think that recognising this possibility necessarily results, however, in eschatological thought. On the contrary, that is why I am interested in the philosophy of the limit. The sensible thing to do in a world capable of effecting its own negation through its ability terminally to realise its limits as catastrophic ending, is to ally through deconstruction with that undecidability which continuously defers the terminal.

Impact – Love

Really? How can you outweigh love?

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 33-34]

In the thought of the limit there is therefore no escape from danger, no new programmatic schema or template for politics, no promise of final resolution of the human condition. But what it does offer in the caesura that announces the ‘end’ of metaphysical politics, includes the following. First, it alerts us to the inescapable violence and the dogmatic imperatives deeply sequestered within the most foundational valuing practices of our (inter)national political thought, as well as of our systems of rule. That includes, preeminently, security itself, of course. But it also includes security’s cognates. For security is a package which tells you what you are as it tells you what to die for; which tells you what to love as it tells you what to defend (dulce et decorum est pro patria mori); and which tells you what is right as it tells you what is wrong. Its cognates consequently include individual and collective identity, evil, goodness and justice. Most of all, and most neglected of all, however, its cognates include certain related understandings of love. Any love, that is to say, which proclaims an imperial yes to conceal a violent no. All those loves whose affirmative denials, denying the denials upon which we feed, so form and inform the space of our (international politics of security: love of liberty; love of order; love of country; love of church; love of one god; love of the people; love of the leader; love of the party; love of the nation; love of the individual; love of the very cult of the subject. Security always seems to come crenellated in the form of some obligatory, denying and self-denying love masquing the spirit of revenge. Chief amongst them is the so-called political realists’ narcissistic ‘primeval “love”’ of the real: Every feeling and sensation contains a piece of this old love; and some fantasy, some prejudice, some unreason, some ignorance, some fear, and ever so much else has contributed to it and worked on it.56 In consequence, the thought of the limit teaches us that our (inter)national politics of security are not only always already a politics of identity and difference57 but also a politics of desire. For in the process of saying what we are menaced by, and in the course of harnessing means for dealing with whatever that is said to be, a politics of security, constituting and mobilising difference, imparts form and character to human being and to its forms of life. It specifies who we are, and what we are allowed to be, by teaching us what to fear about what we are not. This is by no means a negative affair. Fear is an education in what we are not, what we do not have, what we are supposed to care for and to care about, whose lack, or the fear of it, is so integral to the pursuit of security. Ironically, such a course in fear and danger betrays the fact that difference is integral to what we are. A discursive economy of security is consequently not only a discursive economy of danger, it is also a discursive economy of the absence which invokes desire. Through the alliance of eros and thanatos effected by the politics of identity and difference integral to (inter)national security, we are therefore struck by accounts of ontological danger into postures of policing love.

\*\*\*Alternative Debate\*\*\*

Alternative – Question Security (1NC Quality)

The alternative is to question security: we can recover the political only if we can think the relationship between obligatory human freedom and the technological-calculative problematic of modern international relations. Only here can we break calculation’s spell over valuation.

The object of the recovery of the political within and from the putative and problematic tradition of the ‘West’ is, rather, the renewal of obligatory freedom itself. For, if it is possible to recall how things originate, specifically through recalling how they have originated within that tradition, because it is that tradition which has had—and is continuing to wreak—such dramatic global consequences, two important points follow. First, it becomes possible to recall how, downstream from those beginnings, we have ended up where we are; and how we are. Second, it becomes possible to explore the possibility of renewal in our own times from out of the very resources—dangers and circumstances—which that tradition (and for Heidegger, remember, human being is always already situated relationally in such a world of meaning and relevance) itself makes available, because it continuously bears the trace of renewal within itself. Third, without recalling ourselves to ourselves, and the Otherness which we harbour, in this way, ‘we’ cannot respect nor find respectful ways of relating to others. Heidegger is a thinker who in every sense, then, forces us to ask first and foremost, not ‘Where do we go?’ but, ‘How are we?’ How are ‘we’ situated? And, what possibilities of renewing our possibilities as human beings—so remembering and celebrating that we are and how we are human—lie exposed to thoughtful recovery within the very situation in which we find ourselves? Hence, contest over where to go is always a disguised contest over where we are at. For it is only when we understand where we are at that we can say in which way we need to be moved. Heidegger did not, therefore, step outside contemporary politics but sought, instead, and through these means, to step back into it, re-engaging post-Socratic understandings of the political theorised through philosophy by re-thinking philosophy itself. And what that meant, above all, was rethinking truth. That way, too, he sought to remember things about the political which metaphysical thematisation and current practice elide or conceal. In consequence, his thinking was, and remains, deeply at odds both with the conventional understandings of our tradition of political thought and with our contemporary political ideologies and forms of rule. Combine this with his devastatingly destitute commitment to the Nazi Party and it is no surprise that the relationship between Heidegger and ‘politics’ should have become such a confounded one; a prey both to the unthought political and philosophical baggage of many of those who have debated it, and the ancient project of preserving the love of wisdom (philosophia) free from political life (politeia). To clarify the distinction between the political and politics very crudely for the purposes of an introduction (while drawing also upon the distinction between le politique 59 and la politique 60 ), if we look to the ‘beginning’ and to the history of politics we are confronted with two basic options for understanding the political (le politique), the inner problematic or essence of politics. 61 Politics can be understood as a form of making or techne. As techne it is essentially conceived in Platonic terms as something that must be constructed, instituted or founded; the product of craftsmanship. Alternatively, politics may be understood as action—praxis. As praxis it is essentially conceived in Aristotelian terms to be a mode of action which takes place in a public world or public space—classically, the polis—concerned not simply with all the questions that arise in respect of living together, but with enacting who we are both individually and collectively. In this sense politics is neither making, nor mere problem solving, though such happens in and through it. Politics is the continuous opening of the space which allows human beings to appear—agonally to disclose themselves—in the fullness of what it is to be human. 62 But, even as it came to be enunciated by Aristotle, the sense of this understanding of politics, first articulated in tragedy rather than philosophy (and favoured by Heidegger, especially considering also the extensive influence of Aristotle on his early work), lost something in its thematisation because that thematisation subjected it to the grammar, and ultimately the logic, of thought required by metaphysics. Now, Heidegger complicates matters. He always does. For him this is a virtue. That was part of the way in which he understood the task of thinking and his vocation as a thinker. ‘The basic direction of philosophical questioning’, he wrote in one of his earliest essays ‘is not added on and attached to the questioned object, factical life, externally’. Rather ‘it is to be understood as the explicit grasping of a basic movement of factical life’. In as much as human being for him is a way of being that has to undertake its being—is concerned about its being even when it is trying to avoid that concern and make it easy on itself—it necessarily finds its being difficult to bear. It has to question, and answer to, itself in respect of its being because that is its own way of being. Life, then, is intrinsically troublesome because, comprising a question, it is an interrogative existence charged with questionability that must continuously answer for itself. It necessarily, therefore, does not merely encounter but also generates states of affairs which it confronts as problems. It’s tough, but that’s the way it is. Hence the purpose of thinking is not to proffer easy ways out—the business of snake-oil salesmen—but to elucidate, explicate and deepen, instead, one’s understanding of that toughness by questioning the more insistently and originally.

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Indeed, by continuously keeping open questioning itself, and not by trying to close it down for future generations, thought is the repetitive generation of questioning (all repetition is inventive), rather than the resolution of problems. Hence ‘the genuinely appropriate way of access’ to this difficult freedom, and of keeping faith with the truthfulness of it ‘can only consist in making it difficult’. ‘Philosophical research’, he says ‘must fulfill this duty, if it does not want to miss this object completely’. 63 Making difficult is not obscuring things, however, but continuously retrieving the translucent liveliness of life in, and on, its questioning way through questioning itself; a retrieval of life now from the technologising of it with which the (inter)national politics of political Modernity has become so deeply complicit. He complicates things here, first, therefore, because although often exhibiting a deep preoccupation with beginnings (especially with the poetic re-founding of a ‘world’, a ‘people’ or a ‘State’) that preoccupation is never expressed outside his concern with what he calls ‘the tradition’ of Western thought. He is equally preoccupied, therefore, with the character of a tradition, and especially with the prospect, which the very nature of tradition offers, for beginning again in virtue of the resources contained within the tradition itself. It is tempting to resolve the difficulty of classification which he poses to our established ways of thinking, therefore, and to return to terms which I discussed earlier, by labelling Heidegger either a radical—committed to providing the grounding practices which will found a new order—or a deeply conservative traditionalist—concerned only with working out what is feasible, necessary or good in the concrete circumstances of what is given. Many commentaries on Heidegger and politics rebound between these poles. But this does not work because, rather than aligning himself with either of these two things, Heidegger problematises the very interpretative schema within which radical and conservative arose as classificatory categories, and through which they are distinguished as such in contemporary thought and politics. Heidegger complicates matters, secondly, therefore, because his own thought is deeply hostile to this very binary form of thinking and choosing. Consequently, there is no facile way out of having to confront what he does say by classifying him in categories which already appear to make sense to us, for Heidegger subverts their very sense and forces us to think about them anew. Specifically, he forces us to think and talk in terms of the very duality of this riven existence of human being. You need bi-

focals, then, to read and think along with Heidegger, for his hostility to a unifocal view of Being and being is as profound and pervasive as is his commitment to thinking the radical duality of their mutually disclosive interdependence. Specifically, and thirdly, Heidegger makes things more complicated precisely because, though concerned for both making and acting, he challenges the understanding we currently have of each of these categories as well, and so also of the way in which they might be used to classify him politically. For Heidegger, it is neither making, revealing as techne, nor even action, understood in the traditional sense as the exercise of the will of a subject, which excites his thought. They do excite his concern, of course, because he sees them, especially in the modern cult of the subject and of subject/object thinking—or representative-calculative thought—as well as in the development of technology (what might better be called technicity or technics: which, as the positing, ordering and placing of all beings, including human being, at the disposal of an enframing mode of representative-calculative knowing and making, is itself a mode of being that increasingly cuts human being off from its free mode of being), as fundamentally impoverishing of what it is to be human. It might even be possible to say that making politics a world of responsible action in an age of technicity—where responsible action is a resolute openness to the obligatory freedom which is the truth of disclosure, or what Derrida has called ‘the non-passive endurance of the aporia…[of] the condition of responsibility and decision’ 64 —is the most radical project of all. 65 For such a responsible politics, in contradistinction to those which are derivable from a command ethic, becomes radical in a world where, because technology now allows us to make everything impossible possible, submission to a command ethic—any command ethic 66 —as Arendt noted in her analysis of Totalitarianism, 67 can and has summoned unimaginable evil into the world. Practically, it now also entails the real possibility of human extinction. However that may be, Heidegger struggles to speak a language which comprehends the integral duality of Being and beings (dis-closure, the play of revealing and concealing) and therefore also of human being. Insisting, first, upon the critical importance of the ontological difference between Being and beings, he proceeded eventually to stress the fundamental significance of difference, and of the event of differing, as such. That, as we shall see, is why he is also drawn, ineluctably, to the tragic. 68 Hence, just as all of Heidegger’s thinking might be characterised as an attempt to read Being and Time into one another, 69 in order to recover and re-pose the inner problematic of philosophy, the question of Being, so this book might be read as an attempt to read security and insecurity into one another, in order to re-raise and re-pose the inner problematic of the political—the question of human being’s obligatory freedom. Security and insecurity thus become convertible terms for me, too, as I seek to beat a path to re-raising the question of the political.

Alternative – Questioning Solves

Metaphysical conceptions of security are co-productive with securitized conceptions of politics which drive us to reduce political relations into objects of calculation—questioning security politicizes the reductive technological formulations of politics in the SQ.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 17-18]

Hence, just as political thought has its inception in metaphysics, so metaphysics has its inception in the polis*.* Each—metaphysics and traditional political thought— is an enterprise concerned with securing foundations because each has its inception in a question—whose Leibnizian formulation is: ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’—which imbues it with an endless security imperative. To pose our puzzlement about existence, and our desire for the truth of it, this way requires that it be shown how something is wrested from nothing and is prevented somehow against falling back into nothingness. In other words, it requires us to discover how secure (certain) things are—what secures them and how they can be secured— so that we can confidently take them to be the very things that we take them to be; or resolve disputes between us in respect of what they really are. A ground is sought that will explain the emergence of some-thing, allow us to judge exactly what it is, and measure the inevitable variation in its appearance against how that ground tells us it ‘really’ is. And, of course, if this is done, if we can securely determine how something is something rather than nothing, then we have mastered it. Naturally, the reverse also applies. We are driven to mastery of the world because of the way that we have expressed puzzlement about it, and comported ourselves towards it in search of a certain kind of truth about it, and each other within it. This is what directs us to make the world secure. If this is our question—the question in fact that makes us the ‘we’ of the ‘West’—then we must secure security. In securing security of all things, therefore, we must also, of course, secure the political as well; that is to say, not only make it certain and unquestionable, but also make of it an enterprise which is itself preoccupied with realising the securing of security. It comes to maturity as just that in the subjectivised and technologised theory and practice of the modern State. To recover the political, to repose the question of the political, does not, however, suppose that it was once properly understood but lost in the midst of time, so that we would have to travel back through those mists in order to rediscover it. To recover the political means to respond to that very subjectivising technologisation of politics as a security project, which has reached its apogee in the (international security politics of the modern State system, by calling into question the security imperative itself through recalling the obligatory freedom of human being. The question ‘Must we secure security?’ politicises the technologising anti-politics of our current (inter)national politics of security, therefore, grounded as it is in the insistence upon secure subjectivities of every invented description, because it responds to the absence of the political through the triumph of calculation in our current politics of security.

Alternative – Questioning Generally

Questioning is revolutionary because it frees us to the possibility of the creation of something absolutely new.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 41-42]

It also makes little sense to attempt to summarise Heidegger’s ‘relevance’, precisely because the whole of his thought makes us suspect the sense of contemporary thought, and the very limits through, and within which, such thought and politics currently define what is relevant and sensible. Albeit he proclaimed the ‘uselessness’ of philosophy and the centrality of ‘destiny’ we can never take Heidegger’s words at their face or conventional value. He is notorious for the way he struggles with, by inventing and punning within, Language. For the limit of Language was also integral to the philosophical point he was dedicated to making. Hence philosophy was nonetheless also for him the sovereign knowledge. As a kind of ‘radical’ philosophy, therefore, Heidegger’s thinking also holds out the prospect of a ‘radical’ politics relevant to the modern human condition. In a very particular sense—that of an understanding of how the question of the political would appear in the light of his way of thinking—that is exactly, I would argue, how Heidegger himself conceived of the very purpose of his philosophical questioning: For the decisive intention of our questioning is precisely to free us from the past…. We want to raise questions on the basis of our own present and future necessities.15 Moreover, he insisted upon the radicality of the relationship between his own thought and that of the tradition, the destructuring of which, on behalf of human ‘freedom’ in its relation to the event of Being, he made his project of thought: the original and genuine relation to the beginning is revolutionary, which, through the upheaval of the habitual, once again liberates the hidden law of the beginning.16 He was, therefore, entirely dismissive of the conservative relation to origins and to history: the conservative does not preserve the beginning—it does not even reach the beginning. For the conservative attitude transforms what has already become into the regular and the ideal, which is then sought ever anew in historiographical considerations.17 But herein lies the source of some of the deepest mistrust of, as well as the greatest frustration with, Heidegger; not to say of the confounding of his thought.

Alternative Solves – V2L

Vote negative: questioning security thinks of human being as a possibility, which is the founding thought of the political and value to life.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 1-2]

In making its contribution to out-living the modern, politics must be an art capable not only of applying existing moral and economic codes, or of administering the interests of existing subjectivities. It must be capable, also, of allowing new possibilities of political being to emerge out of the unstable, unjust and violently defended sediment of modern political existence. In the development of such a project, International Relations becomes more rather than less important. For the question of whether or not human being does out-live the modern is one posed in and through the interstitial politics of (inter)national politics. To conceive of politics as being concerned with making way for new possibilities of being requires reimagining politics itself. Specifically, it requires that politics be thought as something which arises from human being as a possibility. To understand human being as a possibility, however, means understanding that it consists in the improbable feat of always already containing more than it is possible to contain; understanding that there is always already in human being an excess of being over appearance and identity. Thought as a possibility rather than a fixed and determinate actuality, human being must necessarily also be thought as free; free to take-up the difficult and inescapable challenge it encounters in itself as a possibility, and make that possibility its own. For if the human were not free, in the condition of having its being as a possibility to be, there would be no action to take, no decisions to make, no dilemmas to face, no relations to relate, no loves to love, no fears to fear, no laws to make and no laws to break. There would, in short, be no politics. Consequently, the very project of politics is made possible by human being as a possibility. A possibility engendered by the freedom of human being as a possibility, the project of politics must then be the making way for the taking place of human being’s freedom as possibility. Such an account of politics would also make International Relations more rather than less important: albeit, it would make International Relations something which its orthodox proponents would not recognise.

Questioning security clears away the space occupied by calculation to make for the possibility of valuation.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 31-32]

Security cannot be taken as an unproblematic ontological predicate of the political because the question of ontology has itself become so problematical since the radical problematisation of the very tradition in which it has hitherto been thought. That problematisation, and its implications for thinking politics, is what I want to explore next. Consequently we cannot understand the inception and operation of (inter)national politics of security by reference to the expression of that predicate in self-consciousness, the biological individual, the community/ nation/people, or the egotistical subject. Just as certainty is never certain of itself, (inter)national security never succeeds in securing itself. For each consists in exactly the same demand, which redoubles with any act that might satisfy it. One of the virtues of approaching security through a philosophy of the limit lies in the way such thinking is concerned not with the discernment of metaphysical truth but the decipherment of value, not with the production of reliable knowledge but the exposure of the processes of valuation and the foreclosure of possibilities effected by regimes of truth as power-knowledge. Such a posture emphasises that (inter)national security names a process of valuation and so alerts us to what is being devalued as well. And that such a process is not a simple monolithic determination of values, but sets in motion a dynamic play of (de)valuation in its preoccupation with calculation. While we have no greater provocation than the terminal paradox of our (inter)national politics of security to doubt the truth and the value (the truthvalue) of security, it is perfectly obvious also that thinking the limit is itself, however, a dangerous game. For to doubt the truth and value of security seems to deny us the very means of survival in the most lethal of circumstances; particularly when it does not come equipped with a promise that we can secure an escape from (in)security, danger or a final overcoming of the violence which threatens, and is always threatened by, the agonal mortal life of human being. ‘There are no dangerous thoughts’, said one of the very few contemporary political philosophers—Hannah Arendt—whose work was deeply influenced by Heidegger.47 ‘Thinking itself’, she concluded, ‘is dangerous’.48 Heidegger, too, called the ontological difference—which is the very thought that re-opens the question of the political—‘the most dangerous matter for thought’.49 But ‘nonthinking’, Arendt nonetheless also cautioned, ‘which seems so recommendable a state for political and moral affairs, also has its perils’.50 To think and not to think, especially where the matter for thought is the question of the political, are therefore equally dangerous things to do. All this, then, is very dangerous talk.51 However, even if it is inevitably dangerous, it is dangerous in different ways and for different reasons.

Alternative Solves – Extinction

Must question security; modern politics’ answer to the question concerning being drives us to the technologization of being itself such that we now face the real prospect of human species extinction.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 23-24]

While philosophy and the polis were deeply implicated in one another from the outset of Western thought—the question of the Being of beings materialised and developed in the space of the polis just as much as in the sayings of Heraclitus, the poems of Parmenides, the teaching of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, or the history of Thucydides19—modern philosophy and politics continue to remain deeply implicated in one another.20 But now differently. During the course of the last hundred years it not only became impossible to continue to subscribe to the metaphysics of presence that has constituted Western thinking, it has become equally impossible to subscribe to an (inter)national politics predicated upon the securing of security.21 This coincidence was not merely coincidental, but neither does it offer itself to simple diagnosis. On the one hand, the very lethality and globality, and the potentially terminal paradox, of the modern political condition have not only called into question the specific institutional structures, vocabularies and practices which comprise our contemporary (inter)national politics of security. The late modern apprehension of danger also calls into question the entire political imagination that underpins that politics of security, the very limits provided by the grounds of its thinking. Our contemporary (inter)national politics of security drive us back, in other words, to the very presuppositions of the political itself. This metaphysical politics is at an end in the sense that it is now gathered—in the technology of our modern politics of security—into its own extreme possibilities.22 On the other hand, post-Nietzschean thought has called into question the metaphysical reserve of philosophy from which our political thinking has traditionally derived its very suppositional support. Consequently, while sensibility to the dangers which our contemporary civilisation has engendered demands that we ask how we came to be in the now terminal paradox of security, post- Nietzschean thought, responding to somewhat different impulses, complements this regress and pushes it one stage further. In asking directly about the Being in virtue of which there are beings at all, and without always falling into the metaphysical trap of representing it as a being (even a supreme Being, hence onto-theology, the other name for metaphysics)—recalling, in other words the ontological difference between Being and beings—it calls into question not simply the vocabulary or institutions of (international politics as such, but the very metaphysical grammar, or scheme, according to which the political has come to be variously thematised and schematised. The provocation for my question is, therefore, furnished both by material and philosophical concerns; by the conjunction of an ontic with an ontological crisis in which the one compounds the other, and a renewed violence, pertinency and urgency is lent to the conjunction of philosophy and politics. To put it crudely, and ignoring for the moment Heidegger’s so-called ‘antihumanist’ (he thought ‘humanism’ was not uncannily human enough) hostility to the anthropocentrism of Western thought.23 As the real prospect of human species extinction is a function of how human being has come to dwell in the world, then human being has a pressing reason to reconsider, in the most originary way possible, notwithstanding other arguments that may be advanced for doing so,24 the derivation of its understanding of what it is to dwell in the world, and how it should comport itself if it is to continue to do so. Such a predicament ineluctably poses two fundamental and inescapable questions about both philosophy and politics back to philosophy and politics and of the relation between them: first, if such is their end, what must their origins have been?25 Second, in the midst of all that is, in precisely what does the creativity of new beginnings inhere and how can it be preserved, celebrated and extended? No matter how much we may want to elide these questions, or, alternatively, provide a whole series of edifying answers to them, human beings cannot ignore them, ironically, even if they remain anthropocentric in their concerns, if they wish to survive. Our present does not allow it. This joint regress of the philosophical and the political to the very limits of their thinking and of their possibility therefore brings the question of Being (which has been the question of philosophy, even though it has always been directed towards beings in the answers it has offered) into explicit conjunction with the question of the political once more through the attention it draws to the ontological difference between Being and beings, and emphasises the abiding reciprocity that exists between them.

Alternative Solves – Otherness

Ontological criticism regarding the nature of human being solves otherization

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 4-6]

Second, I refer to the continental thought upon which I draw as a philosophy of the limit. I do so because it is a body of thought that is intensely preoccupied with the way in which the limit of anything—that which gives it identity as the very thing that it is—nonetheless continuously also betrays an excess, or surplus, to which the very existence of that thing remains irremissibly indebted. As a philosophy of the limit, however, continental thought is not simply concerned merely with the difference between things, nor with the relationship between existing things. For example, it would be less concerned with intersubjectivity as with the operation of the ‘inter’—the very relationality—which gives subjects definition. That relationality always betrays identity’s indebtedness not just to other identities, but to the operation of an unassimilable difference or Otherness as such. To put the point another way. The philosophy of the limit is concerned with the operation of boundary. Not just the human making of boundaries, but the making of the human through the advent of boundary or difference as such: fundamentally, Introduction 5 that between being and not-being which is signalled by the limit of human mortality itself. Within the open space of that limit all other delineation takes place for human being. Thus the philosophy of the limit consequently sets itself to think the very ‘inter’ of the interval of being and not-being. From this perspective, always already relational, taking place also in a world of time and motion, all identity is not only plural but is continuously also being pluralised by its very delimited circumstances of existence. As a possibility of being, the human way of being is disclosed as always already engaged in that operation of limits which brings new possibilities of being into being. As such, it cannot but itself also disclose the irredeemable debt which it owes to the difference—radical alterity, or Otherness—that can never become the same. In short, as a possibility, human being appears as always already indebted to a surplus, indelibly traced in its own being, that it can nonetheless never master and make its own. It thus inevitably traces that difference in itself, often despite itself. The ‘inter’—relationality or between—is what therefore accounts not only for the plural, but the continuously pluralising character of all identity as it necessarily both summons and is summonsed by that which always exceeds it. Human being, its politics and its freedom, thereby arise for this thinking within, and as a discrete manifestation of, a donation to which they are challenged to remain hospitable. The issue, then, is how the political is to be thought in the light of this philosophy of the limit. It seems to follow naturally, at least to me, that this issue should become the issue of thought for that domain of political thought which already has ‘inter’ and ‘relation’ in its title because these are claimed to be definitive of it. In taking the ‘inter’, relationality or the between seriously this philosophy of the limit would insist, therefore, that we should take the cognate ‘inter’ of International Relations equally seriously. For ‘inter’ is the vantage point of estrangement, which is the vantage point of human beings as such. International Relations is, of course, no stranger to limits. Classically, its very definition is dependent upon limits. Indeed, it is dependent upon what is said to be the limit of political order itself; namely that limit prescribed by the juridically and territorially defined boundary of the sovereign State. Once more, it is not a matter of a simple gap, here, between International Relations and the political philosophy of continental thought. Neither is it a matter of pointing-out something that orthodox International Relations has overlooked; which may then be assimilated into its paradigms of thought. Rather, it is a basic attunement of thought which separates International Relations from the political philosophy of continental thought. International Relations is more concerned with the fixing and policing of stringent limits. It is preoccupied, also, with the matrices and dynamics of power associated with what it thinks of as existing—and, sometimes, even universal—political being. Such limits, it insists, are not just limits to political existence, but limits to what it is allowable to think as reasonable and realistic political analysis. And so, it instinctively allies itself to the project of delineating and enforcing limits. That, too, is why its basic political and intellectual sympathies have always predisposed it towards Princes and States. It is International Relations’ fundamental attunement to limits, therefore, which fundamentally limits it as a mode of political thought. This book is intended radically to exceed those limits. It does so, first, by thinking about politics through foregrounding the re-opening of the question of the limit as such. It does so, second, by reconfiguring the political as a necessarily plural ‘how’, rather than a singular ‘what’. A how, moreover, that is intimately related to the intrinsic relationality, and therefore excessiveness, of the human way of being as a possibility. As a possibility, human being is obliged to bring the possibility of its way of being into new possibilities of being. Its freedom as possibility is not only a difficult, it is therefore also an obligatory, freedom. There is no escaping it; because the human way of being is a responsive way of being, shared with others in Otherness, challenged by its very responsiveness as a being to assume its possibility of being. The political is the plural ‘how’ dedicated to keeping the taking place of that possibility open.

Alternative Solves – Ethics

Recognizing the obligatory character of human freedom breaks the dazzling spell of calculation—do not let our opponents apologize for their commitment to the politics of the status quo by saying that they have “no choice” in the matter. Calculation and rationality deprive us of the ability to choose—but questioning opens up the possibility of creating something new by admitting that our fallibility is where the saving power grows.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 202-204]

People may, therefore, do what they like in their fantasies. Certainly they can never act with impunity in the world no matter how immune they may think they are. But, pace Ricoeur, not even imagination is limitless. Rather, I would say, the imagination is distinguished as that faculty which is most attuned to the full power of liminal intimation, whose limits derive from the very surplus that they always already give away as limits. It is that inescapable liminality of limits which provides for the very possibility of things’ taking place differently at all. Similarly, the call of the ethical is heard only because, resounding throughout human being, it sounds out human being-there. The issue again, then, is less limitlessness or the absence of limits. It is, once Conclusion 203 more, their figuration and one’s composure in respect of them. The limit so necessary to the exercise both of imagination and ethical responsibility does, however, derive ultimately from the call of the other in the Otherness that we inhabit together. This is the condition that allows us to say ‘we’ the human, while keeping the openness of the human open to its very responsibility as responsiveness to its being. Now, if Heidegger’s thesis about the so-called end of philosophy is not only persuasive, when construed as a philosophy of the limit, but also profoundly important for the way in which we think the political, then we are merely brought to this limit and enjoined continuously to seek through it ways beyond its particular historical taking place. Here, this place is the place of the (inter)national politics of political Modernity, which International Relations claims for its distinctive competence. It is a place now, I claim, which we are challenged to out-live. International Relations may be reconfigured as the place where we can think differently about the taking place of this project. Liminally responsive to the way of the limit, the poetic does not merely inhabit that way, however; it makes way for it. The one houses the other. But, this is a fragile habitation, itself concerned with the fragile. Fragility—‘that is to say, what is perishable through natural weakness and what is threatened under the blows of historical violence’5—as a source of ‘the must’, nonetheless, therefore, obliges us. In making us experience a situation that is, but should not be—a definition of the human as fragile possibility, as much as of its multitudes of abject beings—it invokes our care. Such a care is distinguished as much by a generous ethic of cultivation as it is by traditional accounts of authorship and responsibility. For the fragile calls-out as possibility, and we are called to be responsible selves as much by how hospitably we respond to that call, as by the extent to which we acknowledge authorship of our actions. Indeed, cultivating the possibility of that which is fragile—including, above all, making way for the political life’s response to the call of Justice—imposes much greater demands upon us, because it entails much greater risks. Knowing that we are fallible, and that the world is a world of wrongdoing, standing-up for the possible by making way for it to be—however much that requires acknowledging also an indebtedness to what has been—is no mere retrospective. It is the wager we take upon the future of life itself. Fragility, therefore, does en-join us. As we share in it, it also enjoins us to let its possibilities and accomplishments flourish. Out-living the modern invokes the art of letting other possibilities of being be. That letting-be is a delicate, but nonetheless material and empowering, political art. Such an art is easily lost, overlooked or snuffed-out in the daily struggle to be. The way of the limit is, I have argued, the way of the ethico-political project of political life as well. Hence, the affinity I detect between the poetic and the political. Hence, too, their affinity with the fragile, and the indispensable bond between the poetic imagination and the ethical energy required to sustain the fragility of the very ethos of political life itself; namely the obligatory freedom of human being. Its very fragility in being attuned to the fragile call of the other, in the Otherness we share, requires the political to draw sustenance from its affinity with the poetic imagination. In doing so, it may furnish new figurations of politics and new inscriptions of political time that stand-up for Justice. Nowhere, it seems to me, is this call more fragile, yet nowhere does it issue more loudly, than in the inter of the (inter)national politics of late modern times. There, I believe, out-living the modern becomes the name for a new ethico-political project of human being.

Alternative – Solves Practical Ethics

Ontological analysis of human being shows that it is thrown unto the world in a specific, practical way—and from this thrownness an ethical relationship between Dasein and world can be formulated based on Dasein’s grounding possibility as being with Otherness.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 67-68]

Herein also lies Heidegger’s understanding of human being as free being. For the temporality which human being enjoys is, as a domain of possibility, a domain of freedom. Heidegger frequently calls it the Open. Hence, human being lives life in the Open, exists or stands out in it by virtue of it. This freedom, therefore, antecedes the freedom of subjectivisation in that it is the thrownness of human being into existence. As thrown existence, human being is traversed by the power of possibility that arises within the temporality it enjoys. It asks the question, ‘What is it to be?’ simply because it has its own being to be as an enterprise or project that it must continuously undertake. It is that kind of being, therefore, for whom its being is an issue at issue for it. That, for Heidegger, is the essence of its freedom. I call it an obligatory freedom for three reasons. First, because there is no choice in the matter. Second, because it obliges each human being to assume— take-up and take-on—that freedom one way or another. Third, because, as a being-with-others in Otherness, human being in assuming its freedom is necessarily, therefore, also obliged one way or another to have a ‘care’ for others and Otherness within the structure of care which is the fundamental part of its ontological constitution. Human being is not, however, thrown in some general, abstract or limitless way. Precisely to the contrary, it is thrown in the very specific and practical sense of having its own being to be, a being which it must struggle to make its own. That is to say, one way or another, it is in the position of having to assume its being, to take over the responsibility for it or give grounds for it; while, nonetheless, not being able to master that very freedom to be—granted by manifestation as such—which is its ‘ground’. As Heidegger says: The Self which as such has to lay the basis for itself, can never get that basis into its power; and yet, as existing, it must take over Being-a-basis.95 This freedom is, as he says in The Essence of Reasons, quite simply a ‘freedom for grounds’, or a ‘freedom for reasons’.96 It is, in my rendition of it, a freedom to be obliged to give reasons in respect of itself and other beings before the Otherness in which they arise, because: Dasein happens in man, so that he can understand obligation to himself in the essence of his existence, i.e., he can be a free self. Thus freedom reveals itself as that which makes bonds and obligations possible in the first place. And in as much as this Dasein of Heidegger’s, according to his own account of it, is differentially constituted in difference as a manifestation of the differing of manifestation as such, and is thus in itself an encounter not simply with others but with the very Otherness of this uncanny event, this obligation to itself cannot be dissociated from, and therefore cannot be thought without simultaneously also thinking the character and implications of, the constitutive, free and obligatory relationship of which it is actually comprised as a way of being with others within Otherness. The question of its being, and of its obligation to its being, can never be divorced, therefore, from its being with others and from the question of what this constitutive Otherness demands of it. For that demand does not arise as it were from outside the self. Rather, it arises with—or more precisely as—the advent of the self it-self, even as it necessarily always already exceeds the self. Thus in itself the self is neither an inside to be commanded by, nor prised open to, an outside. Rather, the self simply is as exteriority; an openness. Moreover, human being also finds itself always already inserted into some specific and determinate historical possibilities as it takes-up the issue of its being. Here, too, the compound lack at the heart of human being manifests itself again. First, because it never chooses the determinate situation in which it finds itself, but always inherits it. Second, because, as it decides, something must also always escape human being and remain hidden from it in the very act of its choosing; such that: …in having a potentiality-for-Being it always stands in one possibility or another: it constantly is not other possibilities, and it has waived these in its existential projection.97 All decision, in short, necessarily entails a no which is indissoluble from its yes. Because every yes contains a no, human being consequently also has to bear the absence of the possibilities forgone in the determinate possibility that it is, in the particular historical moment in which it finds itself thrown. Somehow human being has to find the resources to bear this existence and give it its due, for this gift ‘is more difficult to bear than any loss’.98

\*\*\*Framing Questions\*\*\*

A/T: Policymaking Good

Critique comes before policymaking: problem-solution models follow from epistemological and ontological assumptions about the world in which they function.

Dillon and Reed 2000 [Michael, Professor of Politics at Lancaster, and Julian, Lecturer in International Relations at Kings College, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, Complex Emergency,” in *Alternatives* 25:1]

As a precursor to global governance, governmentality, according to Foucault's initial account, poses the question of order not in terms of the origin of the law and the location of sovereignty, as do traditional accounts of power, but in terms instead of the management of population. The management of population is further refined in terms of specific problematics to which population management may be reduced. These typically include but are not necessarily exhausted by the following topoi of governmental power: economy, health, welfare, poverty, security, sexuality, demographics, resources, skills, culture, and so on. Now, where there is an operation of power there is knowledge, and where there is knowledge there is an operation of power. Here discursive formations emerge and, as Foucault noted, in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.[ 34] More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure—the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it. In consequence, thinking and acting politically is displaced by the institutional and epistemic rivalries that infuse its power/ knowledge networks, and by the local conditions of application that govern the introduction of their policies. These now threaten to exhaust what "politics," locally as well as globally, is about.[ 36] It is here that the "emergence" characteristic of governance begins to make its appearance. For it is increasingly recognized that there are no definitive policy solutions to objective, neat, discrete policy problems. The "subjects" of policy increasingly also become a matter of definition as well, since the concept population does not have a stable referent either and has itself also evolved in biophilosophical and biomolecular as well as Foucauldian "biopower" ways.

Ontology Comes First

**Ontology must come first, our actions and even our very selves are shaped by the ontology which we intentionally or unintentionally prescribe to. Especially in the context of the issues of modernity the foundations of all thought: political, philosophical, and technological are shaped by ontology.**

Campbell and Shapiro 96 eds., *Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999) pg. 96

As Heidegger-himself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the philosophical and the political-never tired of pointing out, the relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. For one cannot say anything about that is, without always already having made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought, in short, always already carries an ontology sequestered within it. What this ontological turn does to other-regional-modes of thought is to challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that review reverberate through the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy. With ontology at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline of thought as it does to the question of modernity as such, with the exception, it seems, of science, which, having long ago given up the ontological questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears now, in its industrialized and corporatized form, to be invulnerable to ontological perturbation. With its foundations at issue, the very authority of a mode of thought and the ways in which it characterizes the critical issues of freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how they inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in question. The very ways in which Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficulty, or *aporia*, for human being of decision and judgment. In other words, whatever ontology you subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe to will construe the problem of action for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mock-innocent political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making. While Certain continental thinkers like Blumenberg and Lowith, for example, were prompted to interrogate or challenge the modern’s claim to being distinctively “modern,” and others such as Adorno questioned its enlightened credentials, philosophers like Derrida and Levinas pursued the metaphysical implications (or rather the implications for metaphysics) of the thinking initiated by Kierkegaard, as well as by Nietzsche and Heidegger. The violence of metaphysics, together with another way of thinking about the question of the ethical, emerged as the defining theme of their work. Other, notably Foucault, Deleuze, Lyotard, Baudrillard, and Bataille turned the thinking of Nietzsche and Heidegger into a novel kind of social and political critique of both the regimes and the effects of power that have come to distinguish late modern times; they concentrated, in detail, upon how the violence identified by these other thinkers manifested itself not only in the mundane practices of modern life, but also in those areas that claimed to be most free of it, especially the freedom and security of the subject as well as its allied will to truth and knowledge. Questioning the appeal to the secure self-grounding common to both its epistemic structures and its political imagination, and in the course of reinterrogating both the political character of the modern and the modern character of the political, this problematization of modernity has begun to prompt an ontopolitcally driven reappraisal of modern political thought.

Ontology Comes First – Politics

Thought determines what does and does not count as political.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 84-86]

One has consequently always to give things more than their due if one is to do Justice to them.17 Freed into no escape from death we are nonetheless also free, however, to deny demission’s commission and are prone ordinarily to do so. Such is the common anti-political fallenness which technology has made its own, in its own specific enterprisingly narcotic way, from which the political has to be recovered in our age. The radical hermeneutical phenomenology which issues from Heidegger’s thinking and questioning shows how we understand as we do because we exist as we do. Understanding as we do in the way that we exist, we came, in the tradition The topos of encounter 85 of the ‘West’, to think metaphysically. Metaphysics asked about the truth of Being, of what is, but answered with an account of the truth of the Being of beings, that is to say of things we find present to hand. Truth was therefore thought to be lodged in the truthfulness of the assertion about the Being of beings. In the absence of God it came to be founded in the subject making the assertion. The result was the dominance of the representative-calculative thought of modern subjectivity in which truth is a measure of the adequation of the correspondence between the thinking subject’s assertions and entities themselves. (Such that: ‘For representational thinking everything comes to be a being’.18 Even Being.) Hence, the absolute centrality of the subject in the modern age. For a flakey subject— riven with Otherness and bearing difference within itself—becomes an absolute abhorrence to truth itself when truth and knowledge demand a secure and reliable subject for their certain foundation: ‘But not every way of being a self is subjectivity’.19 Heidegger’s entire corpus of thinking is tenaciously devoted to uncovering metaphysics’ missed ontology not only in the various projects (‘ontology’, epistemology, phenomenology)—and the core concept (correctness), method (logic) and epistemological ambition (theory, or the report of the sight of the truth)—of Western thought, but also in the very life of the ‘West’ itself (technicity). Show Heidegger a thinker, a thought, a practice or a way of life and he will go after the ontology—ontic (metaphysical) as well as fundamental—sequestered there. In this respect, his lecture course, Basic Questions of Philosophy. Selected ‘Problems’ of ‘Logic’, is a virtual text book on the way he habitually proceeds.20 In every epistemology, too, there is an ontology. Because we are as we understand and think, in our modern political practices as well as in our ‘political science’— or knowledge of politics where a well-founded modesty about scientific pretensions is expressed—there therefore lurks the ontology of metaphysics. Heidegger’s deconstruction of metaphysics consequently leads to the following chain of thought, in which we must also never lose sight of the mutually disclosive twofold duality of Being and beings. Thrown, we exist. Existing, we project and understand. Existing, understanding and projecting as thrown we are obliged to think.21 Thinking we think Being. Thinking Being, we have not only come to think (‘ontologically’) the Being of beings, but also the Being of Being as an, albeit Supreme, being (‘onto-theology’). Thrown into existing as understanding and thinking we inhabit worlds. The world we inhabit expresses the ways in which we have come to understand and think. The end of the way that we think—metaphysics—is technology. Technology is the mounting oblivion of the aletheic truth of the Being of human being, and the radical impoverishment of human being’s capacity to create and live in a world, a condition globalised by the ballistic power of technology’s trajectory. We, therefore, think the political in the way that we do because of the way that we think. Thinking the political in the way that we do because of the way that we think, the political too has become technologised such that politics threatens to become identical with technicity. The political problematic of the modern age, as Heidegger might have expressed it, is the globalisation of technology as politics and the globalisation of politics as technology. Thinking differently, Heidegger necessarily, therefore, came to think the political differently as well. Specifically, when he came to think differently about the political he inevitably did so through the different thought of the truth of Being, and the Being of truth, to which his entire deconstructive mode of thought was devoted. That different thought of truth was primarily expressed and explored through his rethinking of the Greek word for truth, aletheia, where truth is the truth of disclosure in which revealing and concealing are simultaneously involved. We cannot think with and against Heidegger’s thought of the political therefore without appreciating how the political arises for him through the aletheic character of truth. Truth and politics are as intimately related for Heidegger, therefore, as ever they are in modern thought.

Ontology Comes First – Knowledge

Ontology determines what does and does not count as an object of knowledge; critique aims toward a re-thinking of knowing as a relation between subjects rather than subjects and objects.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 86]

Thinking truth differently, Heidegger necessarily thought ‘origins’ differently because of the belonging together of truth and origins. Thinking truth and origins differently—as ‘the free’, or ‘the open’, of aletheic truth: ‘the freedom that first releases even space-time as an “open” extension and spread’22—he also thought the way of being human differently or, rather, the human way of being as such differently. Truth, origins and ways thought differently meant the existence and practices of those born into this freedom thought differently as well. ‘The “free of” and the “free for”,’ he notes of traditional accounts of freedom based upon the will, ‘already require a clearing in which a detachment and a donation constitute a more original freedom that cannot be grounded on the freedom of human comportment’.23 Given the sum of these things, he necessarily thought the origins, truth, existence and practices of politics differently also. In sum, in as much as Heidegger’s truth is such a radically different, antecedent, truth, so also the relationship between truth and the political—hence the truth of the political as such—arises differently for Heidegger. Human being is political, then, not because it has politics, much less power politics. Human being has politics because it simply is political in the freedom of aletheic truth: that is, it is the bearer of an uncanny, agonal and obligatory freedom, where the struggle to be is a continuous questioning of the questionability of what it is to be human that takes the form of a challenge to grant this existence its due in the worlds in which it realises its integral being-with. Much of its politics, especially its modern politics, is in fact designed to displace the essence of the political and the political essence of human being.24 The possibility of politics is, therefore, conditional on the existence of an entity for which not only its own being, but also Being as such, is an issue. This entity is the site of an absence or lack which is privative in that there is no determination, and yet also abundant in that there is the uncanniness of a radical excess. Such an entity has to be a site of, or, better to say—because of its temporal character—an encounter with, freedom. Should it seek to end questioning and the inescapably conditional character of its freedom by refusing its responsibility for it, it not only fails to be political, it threatens its own destruction.

Framework – Thought Key

Their “must act” mentality ignores the fact that the greatest dangers of the status quo derive from a way of thinking about the world.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 2]

Reimagining politics is, of course, easier said than done. Resistance to it— especially in International Relations—nonetheless gives us a clue to one of the places where we may begin. For although I think of this project as a kind of political project, resistance to it does not arise from a *political* conservatism. Modern exponents of political modernity pride themselves on their realistic radicalism. Opposition always arises, instead, from an extraordinarily deep and profound conservatism of *thought*. Indeed, conservatism of thought in respect of the modern political imagination is required of the modern political subject. Reimagining politics therefore means thinking differently. Moreover, the project of that thinking differently leads to thinking ‘difference’ itself. Thought is therefore required if politics is to contribute to out-living the modern; specifically, political thought. The challenge to out-live the modern issues from the faltering of modern thought, however, and the suspicion now of its very own project of thought, *as much as it does* from the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the industrialisation and ecological despoliation of the planet, or the genocidal dynamics of new nationalisms. The challenge to out-live the modern issues, therefore, from the modern condition of both politics and thought. This so-called suspicion of thought—I would rather call it a transformation of the project of thought which has disclosed the faltering of the modern project of thought—is what has come to distinguish continental thought in the last century. I draw on that thought in order to think the freedom of human being against the defining political thought of modernity; that ontological preoccupation with the subject of security which commits its politics to securing the subject. Motivated, therefore, by a certain sense of crisis in both philosophy and politics, and by the conviction that there is an intimate relation between the two which is most violently and materially exhibited globally in (inter)national politics, the aim of this book is to make a contribution towards rethinking some of the fundamentals of International Relations through what I would call the political philosophy of contemporary continental thought. Its ultimate intention is, therefore, to make a contribution toward the reconstruction of International Relations as a site of political thought, by departing from the very commitment to the politics of subjectivity upon which International Relations is premised. This is a tall order, and not least because the political philosophy of continental thought cannot be brought to bear upon International Relations if the political thought of that thought remains largely unthought. [Emphasis Added]

Framework – Thought Key

We must change the way we think about policy problems in order to solve the root cause of the harms of the affirmative.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 6-7]

Third, we not only think the political in the way that we do because of the way that we think, we necessarily also, of course, think International Relations in the way that we do because of the way that we think. Hence, International Relations is a tradition of (political) thought within a tradition of thought whose very foundational—ontological, epistemological and ethical—structures of thought are profoundly in question. Indeed, it is a tradition within a tradition whose very modern definition of thinking, as that which can ground itself, has realised its own failure. What has been happening to this failed project of thought is consequently of direct significance to the thought of International Relations as well, because it directly impacts upon the thought of the political as such. Hence, debates about Modernity and Post-modernity have now entered into the discourse of International Relations about International Relations. Although I see it as part of that movement of thought, this book is not, however, an introduction to those debates. Neither is it designed to champion one school of thought, there, over another. That is not to say, however, that the book is not partisan. Anybody who has read this far will already have recognised that it is. But, it exercises its partisanship in a particular way. It does not seek, for example, to persuade by entering into a debate which has already taken-on a certain shape. Rather, it tries to engage in a certain kind of thinking, that which I have called the political philosophy of continental thought. And it does so in a way that focuses very powerfully upon a Introduction 7 critical conceptual orthodoxy not just of International Relations, but of the tradition of thinking about politics within which International Relations has always stood. The book does not proceed, therefore, by surveying different schools of thought. Instead, it pursues a suspicion about security which develops into a particular thought. That thought is not, however, any thought. It is a thought with very considerable, and disturbing, potential. It is one which I also pursue doggedly until it develops into the very widest of arguments about the political itself. It is as a certain kind of exercise in thinking, therefore, that the book is offered as a contribution to a debate in which I have already taken sides, by virtue of electing to think in this way. It is precisely the way that we habitually think which has been most challenged by the philosophical resources upon which I draw. These have called the foundational assumptions of Western thinking as metaphysics into question, and sought deconstructively to contest the closure of thought always threatened by metaphysics. This is a closure effected more as a movement of thought integral to thought, than a moment in thought; although some argue it is that as well. Here, too, I would note, the foreclosure of politics which so distinguishes International Relations’ attunement to the limits of politics is not, first, a political response, but a closure of thought derived from the tradition within which it is very firmly located. One could even say that what most distinguishes International Relations is the way in which it so intimately allies itself to that closure of thought, in order to develop a highly technologised and instrumentalised account of (inter)national politics. Now, if we think the political in the way that we do because of the way that we think, and if the project of thought has taken a significantly different turn, then the entire range of our political concerns must take a different turn as well. The scope of that turn is such that it must traverse all of our traditional political concerns. It re-raises, for example, the thought of the political itself, in what I would call the politics of the thought of the political. It necessarily, also, re-poses the ancient concern with forms of government, in as much as it raises the question of the public space. It has direct purchase, also, upon what most preoccupies everyday politics; namely ‘policy’, or the moment of decision and judgement.

Framework – Education

Their conception of knowledge is securitized; they think knowledge is that which grounds the possibility of a human relationship to truth.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 17-18]

The very alliance of security and knowledge, so characteristic of modern (inter)national politics, is what excites my suspicion most, and generates my sympathy for the genealogist.9 ‘Look,’ insisted the first genealogist, ‘isn’t our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover under everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us?’ ‘Is it not the instinct of fear’, he asked—making explicit the crucial connection between the will to truth and the will to secure—‘that bids us to know?’: And is the jubilation of those who attain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security.10 Hence: security as knowledge (certainty); security’s reliance upon knowledge (surveillance); security’s astonishing production of knowledge in response to its will to know (calculability); and the claim of knowledge which gives security its licence to render all aspects of life transparent (totality). All these constitutive elements of our contemporary manifold politics of security excited my suspicion because they comprise a monumental enterprise of power-knowledge whose insatiable maw threatens to consume not only all thought, and not only that relating to the question of the political, but of what it is to be human. Rather, and by first noting and questioning the already hypertrophic register of security, I want to call the entire scheme of security into question. For that way lies a modest contribution to making ‘our way back from the world to the life already betrayed by knowledge; knowledge that delights in its theme and is absorbed in the object to the point of losing its soul and its name there, of becoming mute and anonymous’.11 ‘Foucault’s genius is evidenced not in the pasting together of unrelated anecdotes’, a recent Foucault commentator noted, but in illustrating that historical coherences are formed from the confluence of multiple strategies and tactics of power and knowledge. History, he shows, is not the product of grand narratives with teleological movements but of diverse struggles that nonetheless become organised into coherent (that is to say, more or less continuous) patterns of domination, subjectification, and government.12 One of those constellations of struggles, however, indeed the one which informs all others, is the recurring struggle for the political itself. For whatever politics is allowed or taken to be—how it is captured, fixed and determined in its foundations; in short secured—is a decisive element in all power struggles. And yet I think that the very surfeit of information about politics which academic and media technologies create has made us so ignorant of the political, and the way that it is secured, that we are hardly even capable of formulating, much less posing and pursuing, the question of the political itself.

Framework – Education

Their conception of knowledge attempts to cover up the *aporia* of human being as a mode of knowing; this epistemology will always attempt to simplify the world in the name of reducing the complexity and freedom of being to a calculable object, reproducing the problematic of modern political philosophy.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 75-76]

I recognise the danger that this movement of mine could be taken to excuse paying insufficiently close attention to Heidegger’s texts, or of failing to understand enough about what Heidegger has tried to say, and of similarly failing to do justice to these other complex and important thinkers. Such a danger will always exist, of course, especially when dealing with a thinker who is not only as difficult and subtle, not to say obscure, as Heidegger, but whose thought also evolved in important ways, exciting powerful responses from other eminent philosophers. Although I may very well fail on all these counts I do not intend, however, to take any liberties either with Heidegger or with the others. Rather, I am mindful, here, of Robert Bernasconi’s wise observation. Issued specifically in respect of Heidegger, it has a certain relevance to these other thinkers as well. ‘One cannot readily say what Heidegger says’, Robert Bernasconi notes, for the simple reason that Heidegger overcomes the ‘what’ of essentia by transforming the way of saying. Hence all writing about Heidegger should begin and end with a disclaimer. The disclaimer, in attempting to be faithful to what claimed [my emphasis] Heidegger, must at the same time disregard his warnings and lift the silence about silence.118 My object, then, is not to provide myself with excuses in advance but to explain instead both how I have tried to go about this work, and that—as I pursued what claimed my attention; specifically the aporia of obligatory freedom as it is simultaneously both disclosed and endangered through the preoccupation with security—the very path of my own thinking, as well as the content of it, began to change. ‘What happens’, Gerald Bruns asks, ‘when you try to follow Heidegger up or down one of his paths of thinking, studying him, trying out his moves, finding yourself caught up in him?’ His response seems to me to be an exemplary one. One of the things that happens, he says, ‘is that you begin to appreciate why people are careful to confine themselves to forms of mental activity that have no history’. By that he meant: purely analytical programs like formal logic, philosophy of language, linguistics, semiotics, most forms of literary criticism, perhaps most of what gets taught in school: programs you can get in and out of quickly and cleanly without the burden of having done anything more blameworthy than test, or apply, a certain method, skill, technique, or training.119 Precisely because it is so dangerous—and dangerous precisely because it is so intimately connected with history—there is often an almost desperate, and even violent, insistence that politics, too, both as a practice and as an object of study, be reduced in this way. In short, technologised. So-called political ‘realists’ and ‘idealists’ alike, for example, and for similar reasons, would reduce the political to the formulaic so as to settle its hash once and for all. I take their responses, however, to be symptomatic of a persistent and ancient desire to escape the sheer difficulty as well as the historically and singularity of the political.

Framework – Education

Their framework conceives of knowledge as a relation to the world whereby we *appropriate* the world—this inevitably reproduces the calculative and technological relationship to the world which reproduces the dangers of the security paradox. Instead, we need to think of knowledge as an ethical encounter.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 48-49]

Appropriation usually means to take into one’s possession. In Heidegger it has the additional senses of being taken over, or caught-up by, as well as of entering into and making one’s own, and it occurs as he tries to think more about the presencing of things and the intimate way human being belongs to that presencing. Human beings, therefore, exist in the sense that they are ‘given-to’, simultaneously in receipt of and captured by, existence (in the way that some are given-to drink). Hence, Ereignis is the event of that play of existing in which there is an ineradicable belonging together of Being and the ‘there’ of Being, namely human being (hence the term Dasein), in which human beings find themselves ‘given-to’ existence, and wherein their own existence is at play as they find themselves challenged to make it their own in accordance with it as a possibility which has continuously to be assumed. The play, of course, is deadly serious; although it has its funny side— funny peculiar, as well as funny ‘ha! ha!’. Truth, then, is no longer a property of thought or discourse. Neither is it any longer a product of representative-calculative technique. Rather, it is a heterogeneous event of disclosure with which untruth is integrally involved as well; hence the originary and radical uncanniness of the opening whose lighting (revealing presencing) is always also traversed by darkness (the concealment of the superabundance of what is not).43 In other words, for beings to be there has to be a space or clearing for them to be in. For there to be the presence of things there has not only to be presencing as such but also, integral to that presencing, concealment; because to be manifest means not to be concealed, or to have been brought out of concealment, where concealment is the plenitude of what is not. Because Heidegger does not give-up on this crucial point, however, you cannot give-up on it either if you are to respond seriously to his thinking. But that does not mean that you must rest with Heidegger’s account of, or rather with what seems most to preoccupy him about, the clearing; namely, what many charge him with, his privileging of Being, his essentialising of Being and his particular brand of mythologising. Caputo, for example, taking his cue from Emmanuel Levinas, radicalises this declension of truth as disclosure into the event of manifestation by lifting it out of Heidegger’s history of Being, wherein he suspects it of a mythologising privileging of a certain historical epoch (that of the Greeks), and gives it a new critical function on behalf of Justice by insisting that every time is a manifestation of manifesting. Thus ‘possessed of its own grace and its own malice’, each time, including of course our own, is a time of presencing, argues Caputo, in which the event of the obligatory freedom of human being has to be responsibly assumed and Justice is called for.44 Even with Heidegger, however, it is nonetheless powerfully evident that this Radical hermeneutical phenomenology 49 clearing is a site of ethical encounter. For, in calling the entire epistemological background and ambitions of contemporary philosophy into question, Heidegger was attempting to provide a radical—‘that meant a more ethical’45—understanding of human being-in-the-world. It must be emphasised that ‘ethical’, here, does not mean a system of ethics in the form of a regional ontology of metaphysical thought. Nor is it a command ethic specified and handed down by some sovereign unappealable authority exegetically elaborated through theology. Just as Heidegger was attacking the epistemological hubris of contemporary philosophy by insisting that his hermeneutical phenomenology was a way of indicating the general structures of being-in-the-world for a being that had nonetheless to take-up its being in its own ways—and that he was therefore not attempting to offer a secure, or securing, epistemological account of such a being—so also the very ethicality of that being equally derives from being thrown into the world in a way that obliges it to takeup its being there. In each instance, Heidegger is showing something not claiming, or aspiring to, adequation between his concepts and the thing itself, simply because the thing itself here, namely human being, necessarily exceeds the concept.

Framework – Education

Their conception of knowledge is intimately related to certainty which betrays its commitment to political securitization.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 90-91]

If we think the political in the way that we do because of the way that we think, the way that we think truth is most decisive for the way in which we think the political because the way that we think truth, for Heidegger, determines our being. More than that. Because we are not dealing with a unifocal concept of truth, here, but with a complex bi-focal belonging together of both truth and untruth, in which the issues of freedom and Justice also arise, it is the way in which we think that complex which matters most. For the way in which we think truth and untruth stages the entire problematic not only of politics but also of law and freedom. Heidegger’s entire life’s work was devoted to exploring what he thought of as a transformation in the essence of truth in the tradition of the ‘West’. Indeed, the extent to which one can talk about ‘the tradition’ or ‘the West’ depends upon this story about truth, its emergence in the Greek world and its transformation through the Roman and Medieval worlds into the Modern. The point about the transformation of the essence of truth is that it is a story about the transformation of the essence of politics, law and freedom as well, because of the ways in which these all depend upon how truth is disclosed, what truth is understood to be and how such a disclosive understanding pervades and grounds a way of life or a world. A transformation in the essence of truth necessarily, therefore, also entails a transformation in the essence of politics, and it is this story which Heidegger The topos of encounter 91 recounts in an extraordinarily dense fashion in the Parmenides lectures. That is the only place in which he connects-up the transformation in the essence of truth to the transformation in the essence of politics in any extended way. Even then, the argument is cryptic and undeveloped. But the conclusion to which it points is, nonetheless, very clear. Whereas the Greek polis is founded on, or grounded in the understanding of truth as *aletheia*, the transformation in the essence of truth means that politics is no longer determined upon the basis of *aletheia* but on the understanding of truth as certainty and correctness. It is there also, therefore, that he demonstrates how the transformation in the essence of truth is intimately connected with security. For, in addition to arguing that the essence of truth as disclosure first becomes lost, and then transformed through its Latinisation, so also he argues further that: The inception of the metaphysics of the modern age rests on the transformation of the essence of *veritas* into *certitudo*. The question of truth becomes the question of the secure, assured and self-assuring use of *ratio*.35

Framework – V2L Comes Before Education

We live before we know: the value of education is determined by the political calculations we make of it. Vote neg to change our relationship to life and truth.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 49-50]

It does so, first, because for Heidegger, as a ‘phenomenologist’, the brute fact of factical life is that we exist. But this existing is not the brute factical life of being a prey to so-called mere sense data, it is existing always already in a domain of meaning and value whatever we may yet come to think about it. In a cognitive sense he thinks we only come to think about it formally when it breaks down. Hence, we first live. Therefore we know how to live. Thus we live before we ‘know’. Consequently there is a fore-knowing in living. Seeing this is not merely phenomenological seeing whose task is to point out the fore-knowing and retrieve it for us again. It is precisely hermeneutical phenomenology because it is concerned to bring this fore-knowing, or pre-hension of existing which life itself has, forward through an interpretive act. This is not an epistemology of cognitive conceptualisation but the how of human being as such. Thus ‘The primary relation to Dasein is not that of contemplation, but being it’.46 Secondly, in having its being to be human being is both responding to the Otherness which, in harbouring it, human being is nonetheless also exceeded by, and to the call to take-up its being in a project the specific realisation of which happens to take place in particular historical circumstances. Thus: As uttered sentences, all expressions about the being of Dasein…have the character of indication: they only indicate Dasein, though, as uttered sentences, they at first mean something present-at-hand…but they indicate the possible understanding of the structures of Dasein and the possible conceptualising of them that is accessible in such an understanding. (As sentences indicating such a hermeneuein, they have the character of hermeneutical indication.)47 In this hermeneutical phenomenology of manifest being, existence is, therefore, nothing but being possible: ‘Dasein as human life is primarily being possible’.48 The singular and the possible thus comprise human being-in-the-world and are consequently always already higher than the general and the actual which derive from a certain kind of cognitive reflection (that, now, of representative-calculative thought) upon it. This is why the concept can never be adequate to existence.

Framework – Ethics Outweighs

Security politics reduces institutional relationships to a technologized decisional administration of things; we must question security in order to think of our relationship with others ethically.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 7-8]

In respect of the question of public space, the turn of thought insists upon a bifocal interpretation of the limits set by the institutional delineation of public space, and the necessary play of both presence and absence which takes place there. For its borders both separate and join—differentiate as they individuate— constitute the politically abject as they constitute the politically subject. That bifocality, alert to their relationality, emphasises also the undecidability of borders. Necessary but contingent, material but mutable, precise but porous, they are prone to violent foreclosure which excites its own resistance. This is not a question of refusing people individual or collective identity, enframed and sustained by institutional practices. Rather, it is a matter of construing the institutional question of the political in a way, consistent with the openness of human being, that cultivates its freedom to be. A freedom to be that can only be enjoyed within mutably habitable, rather than viciously and unsustainably circumscribed, limits. Limits, too, which are on terms with the ineradicable and irreducible Otherness human beings encounter within themselves as well as with others, because they are indebted to it. This turn of thought also re-poses the question of policy. It does so as the moment of ethical encounter for human beings; beings which, however rooted they may think that they are, are always already *en route,* out in the open and on the move. Exposed to, and constituted by, an Otherness they share with others, human beings are always already both decided, and in a position of having to decide, in respect of themselves with others in that Otherness. Their mode of decision *en route* (simultaneously deciding and being decided) is consequently their ethos. However much this moment is rendered, politically, as a technologised decisional administration of things, there is, in fact, no escape from encountering it as an ethical encounter. For a way of being that is gratuitously given its being to be, that being is a free being which has responsibly to assume its taking place in the world as a responsive being. Short of death, there is no way out of this predicament, other than to immerse ourselves in the routinised everyday in the hope that we will never have to confront it. Ironically, because the everyday has a disturbing habit of breaking-down, such a recourse is always unsafe. Generalised routines never satisfactorily fit the singular case, old habits are continuously overwhelmed by the new, or the body inevitably begins to age and crack-up. We are temporal beings and temporality is a motility which treats the everyday like a vagrant. Given no peace, it is continuously told to move-on.

\*\*\*Misc\*\*\*

A/T: “Can’t have value to life if we’re all dead”

Death is the ground of freedom in life—our decisions have no meaning if they are not framed by human finitude. Treating death as a mere event to be avoided reduces our ability to choose to mere calculation. Rather dead than ontologically damned, then.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 82-84]

Whereas tragic denial is willful blindness to this conflict, ‘to go through life with one’s eyes open’ means ‘to see tragic denial shape the entire morphological scope of the law’.14 To go through life with one’s eyes open requires a commitment, The topos of encounter 83 also, however, to explore the tragic topos of the encounter that human being has in its own being of obligatory freedom with the uncanniness of Being as such, and the demitted call of Justice which resounds throughout it. Such is the special place of the political that political thought has to think: ‘it is more salutary for thinking to wander in estrangement than to establish itself in the comprehensible’.15 It is a matter for it, then, of remaining faithful to phenomena as they constantly and continuously display this occulting phenomenalising manifested through a temporal being freed by birth into no escape from death, continuously challenged to accord Justice to that condition in the living of it, distinguished by always already knowing beforehand the not-mere in the there of its very own there-being. It is precisely here also that the uncanny question of Otherness arises, because: From the singularity of being follows the singularity of Not belonging to it, and consequently the singularity of the other. The one and the other are binding.16 Yes and No, in short, are equi-primordial, co-originary. Yes, there is manifestation and, No, there is…what? Something absolutely crucial arises now because the ‘No’ here is no simple no, no mere symmetrical dialectical negation of the—‘No, there is no manifestation’—capable of realising some final synthesis. Rather, it is the ‘No’ of—‘No there is no manifestation of manifestation’— in which the superfluity of the very absence of manifestation, its retraction or withdrawal as Heidegger calls it, is what makes way for beings to have their very possibility to be at all. Withdrawal it has to be, then, if the overdose of manifesting is to be liminal rather than terminal. For if we were always already in receipt of the full dose, let alone overdosed, what would there be left for us to have and to be, to do and to see? If our standing was already commanded or guaranteed—rather than given to be assumed—why should we have to stand at all? Underway through time’s making way—the taking place of Being—human being has to find its own way of way-making consonant with the uncanny challenge to be of its specific and concrete, historical passage in truth. Born to die we always already pre-hend this No in every Yes—this Not-being in anything and everything—by virtue of our very own mortal existing. For we die. Just as visibility never becomes visible, manifestation never becomes manifest. And yet we are manifest because we dwell in manifestation. There has, therefore, to be visibility for things to appear, manifesting for things to stand-out, which is not itself a thing. This is what Heidegger means when he says that Being is Nothing. This is what he means when he talks of the withdrawal or the retraction of Being. There has similarly to be Being for beings to be, but Being is never manifested as such, for that would be the final trip. Co-originary, the No and the Yes of the Being of being which we experience in and as our existence—our own standing-out in Being, in which the hiddenness of Being takes place, stands-out, in its hiddenness through its questioning by us— are not, however, co-equal. Equiprimordial but without equipoise, there is a radical asymmetry in which the No outweighs the Yes. For, remember, the No—or to be precise, the Not—is no simple negation. Recall how Heidegger insists upon it as superfluity, as the possible that always already stands higher than the actual, as that the essence of which is ‘to come’; which, like death is for us, dis-locates, dispossesses, individualises and singularises. For born free there is no way out, either, of our mortality and no one can suffer anyone else’s death. Only I can die my death. Knowing that singularises me, removes me from the world and deprives me of any certain meaning other than that of the opaque mystery of not being. And whereas this has often been taken to be either a mystical and mystifying anthropology or, worse still, another account of atomistic individuality, it is of course neither. For this singular being singularised by its birthing-towards-death (its mortal natality and natal mortality) is nonetheless also, it has to be recalled, a being-in-the-world and a being-with-others in unassimilable Otherness. However much the paths of Heidegger’s thought may wind through singularisation, world, the other, the four-fold and the very uncanniness which being there at all brings to light, there is no remit for forgetting that it is this composite uncanny phenomenolising—in which human beings share an integral and, as far as we know distinctively responsible, share—which is at issue.

A/T: Heidegger = Nazi

We would never deny that philosophy and politics go together; we deny that any answers to their relationship come ready-made and determined by our preconceptions of philosophy and politics.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 42-43]

Mistrust, because when he chose his own radical politics he chose disastrously. If we cannot escape his philosophy neither can we escape his politics. That he seems to have recognised what a disastrous choice he had made, has not detracted from the terrible fact that he made it; neither has the fact that in thinking about technology or technicity, he devoted much of the rest of his work to thinking through that nihilism of which Nazism was an expression in a way that consequently remains a powerful resource for critical political thinking in the age of technology. Frustration, on the other hand, arises most amongst those who expect their politics to arrive ready-made, in self-assembly packs or, at least, as an intelligible set of instructions. Such is not on offer with Heidegger. Instead, his call to think anew about the established ways in which we have come to think at all, makes us think anew about the very limits of politics, and about the political as the liminal operation of limit in the assumption by human beings of their peculiar mode of free being. It is not politics, as it has come to be understood in an increasingly technologised global life, which arises as a positive concern through Heidegger’s thinking, therefore, but what he would no doubt have called the very essence of the political. There are no instructions, however, especially after his association Radical hermeneutical phenomenology 43 with the Nazis, as to how this may resolve itself in terms of specific political commitments. Quite the contrary. Given the character of his thought, such commitments cannot, however, be determined in advance of the particular circumstances in which human being, at determinate times and in determinate places, is challenged to free itself from the closures which are threatened by such specific historical circumstances. For Heidegger, what distinguishes the predicament of contemporary human being is the determinate technological emplacing of late modern times. In necessarily broaching the question of the essence of the political once more, because he questions the thought in which it was first thought,18 I find that there is a sensibility in Heidegger’s thought which thoroughly informs the very structure of it. That sensibility has a very special purchase on, and provides a very particular means of disclosing the entire question of, the political. Although he speaks of it rarely and with restraint—‘even in his reading of Nietzsche’,19 and of Hölderlin— this sensibility and structure is that of what he also referred to as the highest form of ‘Saying’ the tragic.20 But we cannot begin to appreciate the character and the significance of this sensibility without making our way to it, however summarily, via the route of that radical phenomenology of hermeneutical questioning by which means Heidegger opened-up philosophy’s question of Being; and disclosed the mutually disclosive relationship between Being and human being as the there of Being (Dasein) in a way that has so profoundly influenced the thought of the freedom of human being.

A/T: Heidegger = Nazi

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 131-132]

Here, with his very political fallibility, arises a particular reason why it does so. There is a pressing need to recover the question of the political as much from Heidegger-the-Nazi, who seems to corrupt it, as from Heidegger the philosopher who appears to elide it. A refurbished interrogation and understanding of the political is consequently one of the prizes to be prised-out of an engagement with Heidegger.7 The preface for such an engagement, which is all I have been attempting here, must, I have been arguing, proceed through security by way of the tragic. We cannot, therefore, go the route which Heidegger himself first took and against which his subsequent thinking was quite clearly and critically devoted. That is precisely the technological nemesis to which his own thought alerts us and from which the recovery of the political will always be required. The matter of Heidegger’s ‘silence’—that is to say, his refusal to repudiate the Nazi period publicly, to ‘atone’ for his membership of the Nazi Party, and his silence concerning the fate of European Jewry—is particularly relevant here. I could say that I do not have the space to give it all the thought and close attention it deserves, but in fact I do not know precisely what amount of space it would require. For this conventional genuflection to seriousness implies that somehow I do know, or could know. But I do not. And yet it is not a matter of me not knowing. I simply think it is not knowable. The question will never be answered and so it will never be settled. This is in fact what allows me to go on about it, and with it. Given the importance attached to silence in all of Heidegger’s thought, this ‘silence’ cannot be mere omission.8 In his lectures on Parmenides, for example, he says, ‘to keep silent’ is not merely to say nothing. Without something essential to say, one cannot keep silent. Only within essential speech, and by means of it alone, can there prevail essential silence, having nothing in common with secrecy, concealment, or ‘mental reservations’.9 Manifestly, it is not a simple oversight either, because silence always resounds for Heidegger, and so perhaps it is also something even more than a ‘radical failure of thought’.10 For, in his thinking, Heidegger systematically and consistently elevated reticence and comportment even above thought. Or, rather, consonant with his radical hermeneutical phenomenology, and with his history of Being and its preoccupation with the hidden and the inconspicuous, Heidegger made of thought something which was fundamentally related to dwelling in a pious attentiveness to the mystery of Being. Hence, one might suspect that his association with the Nazis was no mere ‘deficiency’ of thought, but a consequence of his own ‘disposition’ or comportment.11 And it is precisely this, though worked through his thought in detailed ways, which John Caputo concludes is Heidegger’s scandal.12

A/T: Heidegger = Nazi

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 132-133]

Somehow Heidegger, here on this site and with respect to the site-ing of the political, seemed unwilling to think through the fundamental belonging together of dwelling and displacement: that we are all strangers native born, and so always already dwelling en route; that routes and roots are ineradicably intertwinned; hence, that to found and be a people (even, in his terms, with the assignment of the word) is an exclusionary practice; that indigeneity, however useful it may be as a device to protect some from the violence of Modernity and its modernisers, is a certain sort of violent claim; and that to circumscribe and inhabit a ‘place’ simultaneously also poses the question of the one who is thereby estranged from that place, or comes to that place as a stranger. All of this, of course, is, nonetheless, however, precisely what his entire account of mortal existence also proclaims. For Heidegger, par eminence, is the philosopher of pathways. His very thought—especially where it concerns ‘Homecoming’, because homecoming (always already referring to an originary dispossession or being-out-of-place, rather than any simple-minded geographical repatriation) is a continuous cherishing re-calling of what it is to be human13—insists that displacement is a pre-condition of dwelling.14 Homecoming, not staying but lingering a while, is only ever an episode in wandering. Moreover, and despite misguided criticisms that have been directed at him to this effect, while this exile in freedom is a continuous struggle to be, and to preserve the law of the possible which freedom entails, it is an exile without nostalgia. Consequently, and though it nonetheless appears as if it also entails some failure of thought, this lacuna in Heidegger makes thought resound, and resounds to thought as well, in its own distinctive way; precisely because it always leaves the The political and the tragic 133 question of judgement open.15 Heidegger seemed to make, take and accept no judgement upon himself. Did he evade judgement? More than that. Is the question—that is to say philosophy’s question, the question of Being—itself a way of evading judgement? Or, on the contrary, but in ways with which we are unfamilar, does it not necessarily always already belong together with judgement, which it poses as a certain sort of aporia that summons the resoluteness entailed in de-cision? In noting the possibility of such a double evasion ‘we’ are, therefore, always confronted with having to say what it is we are judging, whom we are to judge, who we are who judge, what judgement is, on what authority and in whose name it is exercised, and whether it is sufficient merely to judge, when confronting Heidegger-the-Nazi. His silence thus exposes how a ‘we’ is comprised by judgement (de-cision); how large an excess beyond judgement judgement, nonetheless, leaves-out for further account; and the violence against that remainder which judgement necessarily creates because there are no innocent alternatives (which is not the same as saying that all alternatives must therefore be equally ‘guilty’, or to explore what ‘guilt’ is).16 It exposes, too, the way rhetorics of moral indignation and ritual purification provide an easy way out of the matter for thought—and so therefore of judgement and decision—which Heidegger-the-Nazi presents. While Being poses the aporia of judgement for human being in its very mortal freedom, does confining oneself to the question of Being become a way of evading judgement; of securing oneself through a subtle strategem from the intractable inescapable burden of judgement? Or, instead, does it effect a radically different disposition in and towards the aporia of judgement? Was Heidegger struggling all along, therefore, to escape the violent, dirty, debt-incurring, business of judgement whose aporetic difficulty his own thought of Being had nonetheless illuminated? Or, considering his reflections on silence as well as his silence, are ‘we’ more forcefully directed towards the burden of response-ability we carry in the freedom into which we are thrown after Heidgger—the heavy political mortgage of the twentieth century? Did he intend or anticipate any or all, and more, of this? Of course I do not even pretend to know. But whatever reasons he may, or may not have had, for keeping silent, he must have done. He was too smart not to know. Do we, in any event, need to know that he knew for all the thoughts which his silence prompts to matter? For they do matter. Very much. And they matter, ultimately, more than Heidegger’s life and thought, however much that life and thought forces us to endure this burden of judgement ourselves. Consequently, what is important for me in this affair is that, in the process of enduring the knowledge of Nazism as well as of Heidegger’s association with it, it is possible for us to recognise ‘ourselves’ illuminated also in the aporia of judgement. Such a recognition is itself an assumption of response-ability for—which is the same as being open to, or freed as—a being-in-common that always and everywhere, in its openness, remains capable of Holocaust.

A/T: Schmitt

Schmitt understands Otherness as something outside rather than the transcendental ground of the political self; this guarantees securitized violence against the Other.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 97-98]

Now, it follows that if the political for Heidegger derives from and is intimately associated with the aletheic character of truth, the essence of the political will also display the fundamental agonism of truth. If now, however, as the word indicates, aletheia possesses a conflictual essence, which appears also in the oppositional forms of distortion and oblivion, then in the polis as the essential abode of man there has to hold sway all the most extreme counter-essences, and therein all excesses, to the unconcealed and to beings, i.e. counter-beings in the multiplicity of their counter-essences.61 Hence: the frightfulness, the horribleness, the atrociousness of the Greek polis. Such is the rise and the fall of man in his historical abode of essence—upsipolisapolis— far exceeding abodes, homeless as Sophocles (Antigone) calls man. It The topos of encounter 97 is not by chance that man is spoken of in this way in Greek tragedy. For the possibility, and the necessity, of ‘tragedy’ itself has its single source in the conflictual essence of aletheia.62 Here others and Otherness is always already on the inside, integral to political life, and not something which is thought to exist only on the outside against which the inside must be secured by extirpating the enemy—the radically other—within and without. No greater contrast could be found than, for example, with the Schmittian definition of the political. For Heidegger the political problematic arises out of the ineradicable constitutiveness of the other and of Otherness to politics within the polis. For Schmitt: The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy.63 The political enemy he elaborates, need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him in business transactions. But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible.64 It is evident with Schmitt that it is not so much the scale of the threat of the other but its existential possibility that is so threatening; and precisely because of the way political community itself is conceived as an ‘organised political entity, internally peaceful, territorially enclosed and impenetrable to aliens’65 (my emphasis). In consequence the defining need of the political for Schmitt sets up a requirement to eliminate all ‘unwanted perturbations or unwanted needs’.66 Similarly, whereas the traditional idea of truth has been taken to be that which is beyond all conflict, so the truth of politics has traditionally been to align politics with the secure and certain core of that truth; if not to achieve perpetual peace (perhaps Kantian as well as Christian), or an (Hegelian) end to history, then at least to secure a measure of tranquillity at home and a winning streak abroad against the egoistic war of all against all. Projects which, one way or another, must seek to move the ineradicable other and Otherness to the outside and keep it there; in order to secure the lasting order and certain truth they seek to install in their practices because, in fact, they assume it as their foundation; which is why so much of their practice, necessarily repeating the inaugural moment which they take to be their foundation, exposes the violence of it.

FYI – Freedom and Ethics, for Dillon

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 61-63]

Because it is concerned with a being, namely human being, whose very essence according to Heidegger is that it is a continuously interrogatory being which is simultaneously also a being-with other beings, the free being of human beingwith- others is construed through this thinking as an ethical encounter. That is so because it is fundamentally concerned with how that being is to dwell in the world in respect of its obligations to its very own possibility of being; which being, one must not forget, is not only always already a being-with-others but also a being with Otherness itself. Constituted as openness to Being it is traversed by the Otherness of Being in its own being, namely the ontological difference. Hence, exteriority and transcendence are not contrived additions but integral and constitutive features of it, and the obligation it finds itself compelled to undertake in having its being to be is consequently, therefore, an obligation in Otherness to the other. Thus, and to quote him at some length as he takes issue with Kant’s account of freedom: We can characterise the essence of freedom more originally by explaining it in terms of transcendence than by defining it as spontaneity, i.e., as a type of causality. To say that a free act is one that is ‘initiated by itself’ or ‘begins with itself is merely to offer a negative way of characterising freedom. It is merely to say that no determining cause can be said to lie behind the free act. Above all, it is to err on an ontological level in making no distinction between ‘initiating’ and ‘happening’ and in failing to characterise what it means to be ‘a cause’ in terms of the peculiar mode of Being of the being which exists as cause, namely Dasein. Spontaneity (‘being initiated by itself) can serve as an essential feature of the ‘subject’ only on two conditions: 1. Selfhood must be ontologically clarified in order to provide an appropriate manner of reading the phrase ‘by itself’. 2. The same clarification of selfhood, if it is to be able to define the sort of ‘move’ involved in ‘initiating’, must somehow explain the ‘eventful’ character of the self. But the selfhood of the self, which lies at the basis of all spontaneity, itself lies in transcendence…. Only because freedom constitutes transcendence can it announce itself in existing Dasein as a distinctive kind of causality. In interpreting freedom as ‘causality’, however, we work on a peculiar understanding of reasons that precedes and suggests the interpretation. As transcendence, freedom is not merely a particular ‘kind’ of reason but the origin of reasons [grounds] in general. Freedom is freedom for grounds [reasons].83 What is crucial about this understanding of being as a way of being, and of the very event of Being as such disclosed through it, is that freedom and the ethical are necessarily and intimately tied together. The ethical here does not arise as a command ethic issuing from an original causative source. Rather it is the event of freedom itself. For the question, ‘What is it to be?’ is the question that distinguishes the human way of being. Indeed, it arises in and as the very interrogatory freedom of that being, a being distinguished as such by the fact that it has to ask this question of itself in the circumstances—always historical, not deterministically socialised—in which it necessarily always already finds itself, simply because that is its way of being. ‘What is it to be?’ is also, of course, fundamentally an ethical question. Given the account of this freed self as not only bearing difference within itself but also as a manifestation of difference and consequently, therefore, in addition, an unavoidable encounter with Otherness, the care of this self, it-self, necessarily entails having a care for Otherness; although the self is necessarily also free, of course, to refuse or renounce this obligation, and ordinarily falls short of its demands (something Heidegger, in the form of fallenness or inauthenticity, thinks of as the everyday condition of human being from which a more authentic relationship to its freedom has to be won back). The recovery of the political is, therefore, inescapably bound-up with the recovery of the ethical as well. For, to concur, and at some length, with Caputo’s Levinasian forcing of this thought in directions which Heidegger would no doubt have resisted: On the view I am defending ethics is always already in place, is factically there as soon as there is Dasein, as soon as there is world. Ethics is not something fitted into a world that is somehow constituted prior to it. Ethics constitutes the world in the first place…. If you want to think what truly ‘is’ you have to start with ethics and obligation, not add it on later. To put it in terms that I would prefer, the space of obligation is opened up by factical life, by the plurality of living bodies, by the commerce and intercourse of bodies with bodies, and above all, in these times, in the times of holocausts and of killing fields, by bodies in pain—but no less by thriving and flourishing bodies, by bodies at play.84 Later, albeit only in a sketch, I will therefore argue that the political is precisely this: the continuous challenge to put human freedom as an ethical encounter with others, and within the Otherness that is integral to its own constitution as a way of being, into work in the world. To put to work, even indeed to put into a work, is not to aestheticise politics. Rather, it is to construe politics as being concerned with responding to the call of Radical hermeneutical phenomenology 63 the obligatory freedom of human being which is a kind of irrepressible ethical insurgency always already at work in the being of human being that operates against all architectonic impulses; not least those of State builders as well as those which comprise traditional political philosophy itself. The political, here, I argue Heidegger-like, is thus disclosed in a mood, but the mood is that of outrage at the injustice of the world in the obligatory freedom which calls us incessantly to give things their due as the things that they are and not as mere raw material at the disposal specifically, now, of the politico-economic structures and practices of the (inter)national politics of political Modernity. Just as the political has always to be put to work because it is a possibility, and not the subsistent object of a regional ontology, so also Justice has to be continuously reinvented, for it does not exist as a subsistent object either. It is not a code transparent to revelation. Neither is it already encrypted in the timeless wisdom of a tradition, decodable through the arcane hermeneutical arts of a specialist caste of traditionalists. Similarly, it is not an object discernible and specifiable through the operation of communicative rationality. It is, instead, the obligatory commission of the event of freedom itself. And nowhere is it more called-for, or called forth, than in the (inter)national politics of political Modernity. Human freedom is obligatory because it cannot be escaped. As Heidegger says, Dasein is thrown. There is no choice about whether or not to be here; if you are, why then you are. It is obligatory also, however, because there is always already also an obligation to choose the ways in which that freedom is to be taken-up. Differentially constituted, each human being is a being which is not only manifested in the manifesting to which the ontological difference testifies, it is a being face to face with others in Otherness; to combine both the Heideggerian and the Levinasian prefixes in a way that does some violence to each.85 To be is to be obligated to respond freely to this belonging together which is constitutive of the way of being of human being. Because there is this obligation to respond freely, human being is called before Justice to do Justice to this way of being. Here I use Justice to function somewhat in the way that Levinas uses Law. I prefer to use Justice, however, because I am suspicious of the way in which Levinas, seeking to reintroduce an albeit re-tooled command ethic, places freedom at odds with Law in a way that threatens to return the question of freedom and politics back to those who have always been disposed to think it in terms of rule and violence rather than response-ability to the call of Justice.

\*\*\*Oedipus Affirmative\*\*\*

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Scene One: The Status Quo

The TNWs in Turkey are a byproduct of United States militarism and deterrence policies.

Kibaroglu, 2005 (Mustafa, Professor and Vice Chair, International Relations Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey, “Isn’t it Time to Say Farewell to Nukes in Turkey?,” European Security, Vol. 14, No. 4, December)

The sub-strategic and tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Turkey have become a topic of public debate even though they have never been part of the official discourse.1 There are differing views among Turks extending from outright opposition to their presence on Turkish territory, to appreciation of their deterrent capability against actual and potential rivals in the region, especially in the Middle East. Turkish officials have always been careful to make no official public statements on the existence of nuclear weapons in Turkey, or to comment on their role in Turkey’s security. Turkish officials maintain that, even though the nuclear weapons play an essential role in NATO’s military strategy, the ambiguity principle should apply regarding their status. Therefore, officials suggest, ‘when asked about the presence of US nuclear weapons in the territory of NATO allies in general, and in Turkey in particular, the answer would be neither to deny nor to confirm.’2 Notwithstanding the silence of officials, experts in the field who have access to various reliable sources discuss the current and future status of nuclear weapons deployed in Turkey.3 It is reported that there are in total some 90 nuclear (gravity) bombs kept at the Incirlik base near Adana on Turkey’s eastern Mediterranean shore, and in the Murted Air base of the Turkish Air Force in the environs of Ankara.4 Hence, this paper aims to discuss the role that US nuclear weapons have played in Turkey’s security both throughout the Cold War period and in its aftermath, and why this role must be terminated. Accordingly, the paper will first discuss the reasons why Turkey originally agreed to host US nuclear weapons on its soil in the early 1960s despite the ensuing delicate situation in its relations with the neighboring Soviet Union. Then a section will be devoted to explaining Turkey’s position with regard to the universal arms control and disarmament agreements and similar multilateral initiatives. In this context, Turkey’s general stance vis-a`-vis the nuclear strategies of NATO will also be highlighted. A discussion will follow about the reasons why Turkish officials wanted to retain the US nuclear weapons in Turkey after the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union; at this time most of them were withdrawn from the territories of other NATO allies.5 Finally, the paper will discuss the reasons why the US tactical nuclear weapons should now be withdrawn from Turkey. The Role of US Nuclear Weapons in Turkey’s Security After the creation of NATO with the signing of the Washington Treaty on 4 April 1949, the US vigorously supported Turkey’s desire for membership. The Americans believed that, due to its geographical location, Turkey could play a very important role in their strategic vision for the post-Second World War period. However, Western European allies were not equally enthusiastic about the idea. The defense of Turkey was the key issue of contention between Europeans and Americans as they did not have identical lists of enemy states against which the allied territories would have to be defended. No country is explicitly cited in the text of the Washington Treaty as the ‘enemy’ of NATO.6 However, Article 6 of the Treaty delineated the territory that would have to be defended collectively against attacks from outside; the Soviet Union and its satellite countries were implied as the potential aggressor(s) at that time. Whereas the Europeans were mainly concerned about the Soviet threat, the American concern was much wider, encompassing countries in the Middle East, especially those hostile to Israel. When the US suggested preparing contingency plans encompassing the Persian Gulf region, the West European members of NATO generally opposed the idea as the threat perceived from Eastern Europe was of primary importance for them. In other words, the Middle East was ‘out-of-area’ of their defense commitment.7 Turkey, on the other hand, was a member of the Western camp, but having neighbors like Syria, Iraq and Iran (after the Islamic revolution) prompted it to closely watch the security situation in the Middle East. There were basically three reasons for the divergence of views within the Alliance vis-a`-vis the Middle East. First of all, countries like Syria and Iraq were not posing a serious threat to the Western European members of NATO, even though they had had intensive relations with the Soviet Union since the 1970s. Secondly, most of the countries in the region were either actual or potential trade partners of Western European countries. A third factor was the degree of historical relations between the Middle Eastern countries and the key European allies. The European members of NATO had no desire to be put in a quandary because of an ally’s (Turkey’s) conflict with its southern neighbors; such a conflict could eventually escalate into a superpower rivalry and nuclear exchange that could devastate all of Europe. Therefore, in informal gatherings, leading European members of NATO have made it clear, time and again, that their loyalty to the Article 5 commitment (alliance solidarity) of the Washington Treaty would cover only these situations where Turkey had to be defended against its northeastern neighbor, namely the Soviet Union.8 The discrepancy between the views of Europeans and Americans concerning ‘which territory to defend against whom’ has been lingering on within the Alliance since Turkey’s membership in 1952. Due to the selective attitude of the European allies in matters pertaining to the defense of Turkey, it was the Americans who most of the time prevailed in the debates within the Alliance on these matters. As such, for many Turks NATO meant the US and vice versa, and Turkish\_/American relations evolved as an alliance within the Alliance throughout the Cold War.9 When Turkey joined NATO, the parties tacitly agreed that the Turks would help contain the Soviet Union. Should deterrence fail, Turkey would have made its facilities available to NATO and would have distracted as many Soviet forces as possible from a campaign in Central Europe.10 The military thinking of the Alliance focused on the central front as the main area of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat, putting an overwhelming emphasis on the contingency of a massive attack through Germany into Western Europe.11 Therefore, defending Turkey would be vitally important to the Europeans as it would retard, or even prevent, a powerful Soviet assault on Western Europe. Indeed, as a NATO ally, Turkey risked its own devastation by virtue of its location in the immediate neighborhood of the Soviet Union. During the 1960s and well into the 1970s, the Soviet threat was felt more explicitly both in Turkey and in the US as the Soviet Union closed the gap with the US in the nuclear arms race. The Soviets increased their military presence and capabilities in conventional and unconventional weaponry along Turkey’s eastern frontier as well as their naval presence in the Mediterranean. That period also witnessed

intensifying relations between the Soviets and Syria in all respects, including the military field. The Soviet Union’s growing military presence both in quantitative and qualitative terms across the southern flank of NATO prompted the Alliance in general and Turkey in particular to rely extensively (though gradually) on nuclear forces. The Washington Treaty did not involve specific requirements for the member states regarding the deployment of nuclear weapons. The Turkish political and security elite considered these weapons to be a credible deterrent against the Warsaw Treaty Organization (the Warsaw Pact) in general, and the huge military might of the Soviet Union in particular. Hence, nuclear weapons were deployed according to the mutual commitments of Turkey and NATO.12 Fully aware of the overwhelming superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries in conventional weapons systems, Turkey opposed the proposal to establish a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in the Balkans. The proposal for a nuclear weapons-free Balkans was first put forward by the Soviet Union on 25 June 1959, when the deployment of US medium range nuclear missiles to Turkey was on the horizon. The Soviets initiated counter-measures at the international level, and ‘recommended’ to the Turks that they not accept these weapons, which could hit targets in the Soviet Union and would therefore be targeted by the Soviet nuclear missiles. But Turkey did not give in to the Soviet threats. The non-deployment or removal of nuclear weapons from Turkey would expose the country to a very difficult military situation. For Turkey, the existence of nuclear weapons on its soil meant the active presence and full backing of NATO and the US in contingency plans involving the Warsaw Pact countries. Hence, Turkish officials did not support the idea of establishing a nuclear weapon-free Balkans even though this proposal had political advantages for some countries in the region because of the opportunities it presented to conduct ‘high politics’ with the help of disarmament rhetoric.13 Turkey and Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements Even though nuclear weapons have been deployed in Turkey for nearly half a century, the fundamental thrust of Turkish foreign and security policy has been to become a state party to international nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements. Turkey signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 28 January 1969, and subsequently ratified it on 17 April 1980. Turkey’s rather late ratification of the NPT may raise the question of whether Turkish politicians wanted to keep the nuclear option open. The conventional wisdom suggests that this is unlikely. However, the traditional influence of the military on matters relating to national security was probably a factor that delayed ratification. During the 1970s, there was a growing interest in nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in neighboring countries like Iran, Iraq, and Syria; at that time the Turkish military might not have wanted to give the impression, by means of a hasty ratification, that Turkey would definitely forgo the nuclear option. Although they had no real nuclear intention, Turkish officials wished to leave the issue ambiguous as a deterrent against regional rivals and enemies. Other factors in Turkey should also be mentioned. In the second half of the 1970s, Turkey went through a period of chaos ending in the military intervention of 1980; many political analysts feel this rescued the country from the brink of an all-out civil war. Ratification of the NPTwas not a priority for the Turkish Grand National Assembly at a time when the country was struggling with anarchy and there was no non-proliferation culture. In addition to this, the nuclear infrastructure of Turkey was not significant. Two small-scale nuclear research and training reactors were probably not considered by policymakers as compelling reasons for speeding up the ratification process that would then require Turkey to conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA). In line with its general stance toward international arms control and disarmament initiatives, Turkey has also become state party to the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 by ratifying it in November 1974. Turkey signed the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993 that was followed by its ratification by the Turkish Grand Assembly in April 1997. Moreover, Turkey has taken several steps, especially since the mid-1990s, to become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); this finally happened in June 2000.14 Turkey has also speeded up the process of adjusting its national export control regime (i.e., laws and regulations) to that of the NSG countries. Turkey has undertaken the same stance toward the Zangger Committee and became a member almost as an automatic outcome of formal accession to the NSG.15 Turkey also became a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in April 1997, which aims to demonstrate to actual and potential proliferants that there is a solid block of like-minded nations which are unified in their determination to fight proliferation.16 Turkey also signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 and ratified it in 2000. It is one of 44 states whose ratification was necessary for the treaty to become effective because it has two small nuclear research reactors. As a member of the Conference on Disarmament, ‘Turkey is pleased to have joined the overwhelming majority of nations in the effort to conclude a CTBT.’17 The complete ban on nuclear testing, the core function of the Treaty, is thought by the Turkish officials to be an effective measure to control nuclear weapons technology and an important step towards the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Turkey never sought to acquire weapons of mass destruction; it also contributed to international efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and participated actively in the process of enhancing the IAEA’s verification system with a view to making the safeguards inspections more stringent. As for the Additional Protocol that was released by the IAEA as a result of ‘Programme 93\_/2’; Turkey ratified the document in July 2000.18 Indeed, following the adoption of the Protocol, there were some concerns among policymakers in Turkey that the right of access given to IAEA inspectors would be virtually unlimited, leading to UNSCOM-like applications in chosen countries. Diplomatic negotiations led to the resolution of potential problem areas and ratification was granted. Turkey and the Nuclear Strategy of NATO From a general perspective, Turkish officials view the abolition of nuclear weapons as a noble aim, one that should stay on the agenda. However, officials argue that the international context requires them to acknowledge that this aim can only be reached in stages. Moreover, Turkey endorses NATO’s ‘first-use’ strategy, which has been in effect, at least on paper, since the first decisions taken within the Nuclear Planning Group of the Alliance. In order to avoid any confusion or misinterpretation of the terms, Turkish officials emphasize that NATO’s ‘first use’ strategy does not imply ‘pre-emptive use’, which means the use of nuclear weapons before any aggression occurs. Rather, ‘first-use’ implies that NATO may be the first to use nuclear weapons during an aggression, if no other option can provide a better way of defending the allies against the aggressor(s). When the Soviet Union declared in 1982, as part of a peace offensive, that it would not be the first to resort to nuclear weapons and initiated a ‘no-first-use’ strategy, Turkey considered the Soviet pledge to be a mere propaganda tool. During the East\_/West rivalry, NATO countries relied on their nuclear capability to offset the superiority of theWarsaw Pact countries in conventional weaponry.19 Because it was envisaged that NATO might not win a war without resorting to nuclear weapons, whereas the Warsaw Pact countries might, with their conventional superiority. In the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, even though simple logic might have suggested that NATO with its indisputable superiority in conventional forces might have adopted the ‘no-first-use’ strategy. But things were not so simple. NATO had a number of constraints as far as the threat of proliferation of WMD, especially in the Middle East was concerned. In the mid-1990s, it was anticipated that European capitals would soon be within the range of ballistic missiles from the Middle East, and that the southern members of NATO would be the first to feel the political and military consequences of proliferation trends on Europe’s periphery.20 Therefore, in June 1996, NATO foreign and defense ministers endorsed a comprehensive approach to counter the military risks posed by such threats.21 NATO’s efforts to adapt itself to meet the challenges of the new security environment have produced guidelines for appropriate responses to proliferation. The overarching principles were determined to be to ‘maintain freedom of action and demonstration to any potential adversary that the alliance will not be coerced by the threat or use of WMD.’ Contending Views on Draw-Down of US Nukes from Turkey Dramatic changes have taken place in the international security environment over the last decade. These changes, however, are being assessed differently among officials and experts regarding the role of nuclear weapons. The viability as well as the credibility of the nuclear posture of NATO, including the implicit ‘first use’ strategy of the Alliance, is still of utmost importance for

Turkish officials.23 However, the very nature of the emerging threats, especially since the 9/11 attacks, requires a thorough revision of the ways and means of dealing with them. Admittedly, nuclear weapons have become inappropriate in the face of the new threats posed to the free world by terrorist organizations. Retaining them simply increases the probability of theft and the use by terrorists of some crude radiological devices or even nuclear weapons. Therefore, in addition to taking tighter measures to safeguard nuclear and radiological material in places where they are stored, bolder steps must be taken by concerned countries to ultimately get rid of nuclear weapons. Such steps should begin with drawing-down the US nuclear weapons deployed in allied countries overseas including Turkey. Nevertheless, the official view is diametrically opposed to their withdrawal. Below is an account of why this is the case. ‘Nukes Should Stay’ Turkish officials consider nuclear weapons more as political weapons than as having a significant military value; they do not seriously think of contingencies where nuclear weapons could or even should be used. Having said that, they do believe in the deterrent value of US nuclear weapons stationed in Turkey. It is true that the Middle East and adjacent regions are far from being peaceful or stable; this situation is unlikely to change soon. Adding to the unrest arising from the political situation in Iraq, and the Palestine\_/Israel conflict, is Iran’s substantial nuclear development program that may have weapons development potential. Uncertainty about Iran’s capabilities as well as its intentions further complicate threat assessments by Turkish officials. Hence, retaining US nukes in Turkey ‘to be on the safe side’ sounds like a better option to them. However, the fundamental reason why Turkish officials want to keep the weapons has more to do with the nature and the scope of Turkish\_/American relations in particular, and Turkey’s place in the Western alliance in general. First and foremost, the deployment of the remaining tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey is believed to strengthen the bonds between the US and Turkey; these bonds were severely strained during and after the crisis in Iraq in late 2002 and neither party got what it wanted.24 Withdrawing the US nuclear weapons from Turkey during such a delicate period could weaken the bonds in the longstanding strategic alliance (or the ‘partnership’ as many Turkish and American analysts would prefer to term it). Turkish officials also see the deployment of these weapons as part of the ‘burden sharing’ principle within the Alliance. They would prefer that some other allies also continue to host US nuclear weapons on their soil, if only in symbolic numbers. Then Turkey would not stand out as the only country in NATO that retains US nuclear weapons in Europe. Reportedly, there are some 480 tactical US nuclear weapons that are still deployed in a handful of NATO allies.25 The significance of retaining American nuclear weapons in Europe is said to be to ‘anchor the US to the Continent’ especially in an age when the transatlantic ties are seemingly weakened due to the diverging views over the US war on Iraq. Otherwise, it is feared that the ‘isolationist’ view and those who advocate the idea of ‘disengagement’ in the US may have the upper hand in American domestic politics. It is believed that such an eventuality could cause further deterioration in transatlantic relations, and might not make either side better off politically, economically or militarily. Having expressed their desire to keep US nuclear weapons in Turkey at the expense of the political and economic burden attached to them, Turkish officials also point out a serious concern regarding the true desire of the American administration. They worry that the US may have secretly developed (or may be in the process of developing) new weapons systems, which may not necessitate overseas deployment. Should this be the case, Turkish officials fear that the solidarity principle may be seriously hurt and the Alliance may lose its spirit and its ‘raison d’eˆtre’.26 ‘Nukes Must Go’ The above-cited views of Turkish officials contain very valid points in explaining why Turkey has long favored the deployment of US nuclear weapons and still wants to keep them. However, any discussion of nuclear weapons must also incorporate a description of the peculiarities as well as the possible effects of these weapons. Whether it is about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East; or nuclear arms reduction treaties between the US and the Russian Federation; or the implications of a draw-down of US tactical nuclear weapons from the territories of NATO allies, such discussions mostly revolve around the notion of deterrence as well as the nature of bilateral relations with the US. It is true that nuclear weapons are the most powerful weapons so far invented and developed by mankind. However, nuclear weapons may have unprecedented consequences for mankind as well as the environment if and when they are used deliberately or accidentally.27 Thus, approaching the nuclear weaponsrelated issues merely from the perspective of the concept of balance of power or the notion of deterrence would be both incomplete and misleading. Even the civil or military leaders, who have the authority to resort to nuclear weapons if deterrence based on the threat of use of these weapons fails, may not necessarily have a clear idea about the catastrophic consequences of their decision. Nuclear weapons were used for the first\*/and hopefully the last\*/time in wartime conditions on 6 and 9 August 1945 in Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the US.28 Since then, nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons that are thousands of times more powerful than the ones used against Japan have been produced and stockpiled by a number of states.29 Over time, both the types and the delivery platforms of nuclear weapons have become more diversified. Then the so-called ‘second-strike capabilities’ of the superpowers were developed; this maintained stability during the Cold War. It was virtually impossible for one of the parties to launch a surprise attack with a view to disarming the other. Well-protected nuclear stockpiles, multi-megaton-yield nuclear warheads on long-range missiles in nuclear submarines, strategic-range bomber aircraft and ground-based ICBMs that could reach each others’ strategic assets (both military and civilian) reduced the likelihood of war almost to zero. Since it was impossible to fight, the parties had to deter each other. Since the world has seen the effects of the ‘primitive’ nuclear weapons that were detonated in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the fear of a nuclear catastrophe served well the purpose of a perfect deterrent during the Cold War.30 However, the sui generis conditions of the superpower rivalry during the Cold War period cannot be used as a pretext for keeping the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons or for developing new ones when the international security environment is undergoing dramatic changes. The perception of threat to states has been subject to thorough revision especially in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the US. Almost every state has started to seriously consider how to deal with the threat posed by the so-called ‘non-state actors’ which are believed to have the capability to build weapons of mass destruction or to have unauthorized access to ready-made weapons of that sort.31 Therefore, it becomes more and more irrelevant to consider nuclear weapons as a symbol of prestige or national pride, or as a perfect deterrent against other states. The probability of use of elaborate or crude nuclear devices by states or non-state actors increases as more and more actors on the world political stage have the capability and/or the intention to build such weapons. To avoid a nuclear catastrophe in the future, every nation must start thinking about effective ways of getting rid of the remaining nuclear weapons or further limiting their numbers and deployment sites. These steps must be taken regardless of previously held policies in order to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorist organizations which may use them with no thought for the consequences. Fewer pretexts or justifications may be created for new states to aspire de facto nuclear weapons status.

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The tactical nuclear weapons currently based in Turkey are tools used by the West to defend against the growing uncertainty in the Middle East in a hubristic attempt to deter and preempt irrationality itself.

Chussodvosky, 2k8 (Michel, professor of economics at the [University of Ottawa](file:///C:\wiki\University_of_Ottawa), “The US-NATO Preemptive Nuclear Doctrine: Trigger a Middle East Nuclear Holocaust to Defend ‘The Western Way of Life’”, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=8048)

What the Western allies face is a long, sustained and proactive defence of their societies and way of life. To that end, they must keep risks at a distance, while at the same time protecting their homelands. International terrorism today aims to disrupt and destroy our societies, our economies and our way of life. … These different sources of [Islamist] propaganda and/or violence vary in their intellectual underpinnings, sectarian and political aims, … . But what they have in common isan assault on the values of the West– on its democratic processes and its freedom of religion… Notwithstanding the common perception in the West, the origin of Islamist terrorism is not victimhood, nor an inferiority complex, but a well-financed superiority complex grounded in a violent political ideology. If the irrational and fanatical [Islamist organizations] get out of hand, there is a risk that, … the rise of fundamentalisms and despotisms will usher in a new, illiberal age, in which the liberties that Western societies enjoy are seriously jeopardized. The threats that the West and its partners face today are a combination of violent terrorism against civilians and institutions, wars fought by proxy by states that sponsor terrorism, the behaviour of rogue states, the actions of organised international crime, and the coordination of hostile action through abuse of non-military means. Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World: Renewing Transatlantic Partnership”. Group report by former chiefs of staff General John Shalikashvili, (US), General Klaus Naumann (Germany), Field Marshal Lord Inge (UK), Admiral Jacques Lanxade (France) and Henk van den Breemen (The Netherlands), published by the Netherlands based Noaber Foundation, December 2007, (emphasis added) The controversial NATO sponsored report entitled “Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World: Renewing Transatlantic Partnership“ calls for a first strike use of nuclear weapons. The preemptive use of nukes would also be used to undermine an “increasingly brutal World” as a means to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction: “They [the authors of the report] consider that nuclear war might soon become possible in an increasingly brutal world. They propose the first use of nuclear weapons must remain “in the quiver of escalation as the ultimate instrument to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction”.(Paul Dibb, Sidney Morning Herald, 11 February 2008) The group, insists that the option of first strike of nuclear weapons is “indispensable, since there is simply no realistic prospect of a nuclear-free world.” (Report, p. 97, emphasis added): Nuclear weapons are the ultimate instrument of an asymmetric response– and at the same time the ultimate tool of escalation. Yet they are also more than an instrument, since they transform the nature of any conflict and widen its scope from the regional to the global. … …Nuclear weapons remain indispensable, and nuclear escalation continues to remain an element of any modern strategy. Nuclear escalation is the ultimate step in responding asymmetrically, and at the same time the most powerful way of inducing uncertainty in an opponent’s mind. (Ibid, emphasis added) The Group’s Report identifies six key “challenges”, which may often result as potential threats to global security: • Demography. Population growth and change across the globe will swiftly change the world we knew. The challenge this poses for welfare, good governance and energy security (among other things) is vast. • Climate change. This greatly threatens physical certainty, and is leading to a whole new type of politics – one predicated, perhaps more than ever, on our collective future. • Energy security continues to absorb us. The supply and demand of individual nations and the weakening of the international market infrastructure for energy distribution make the situation more precarious than ever. • There is also the more philosophic problem of the rise of the irrational –the discounting of the rational. Though seemingly abstract, this problem is demonstrated in deeply practical ways. [These include] the decline of respect for logical argument and evidence, a drift away from science in a civilization that is deeply technological. The ultimate example is the rise of religious fundamentalism, which, as political fanaticism, presents itself as the only source of certainty. • The weakening of the nation state. This coincides with the weakening of world institutions, including the United Nations and regional organizations such as the European Union, NATO and others. • The dark side of globalization … These include internationalized terrorism, organized crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but also asymmetric threats from proxy actors or the abuse of financial and energy leverage. (Ibid)

Deterrence and Pre-emption According to the Report, a new concept of deterrence is required directed against both State and non-state actors, This “new deterrence” is based on pre-emption as well as on the ability to “restore deterrence through [military] escalation”. In this context, the Report contemplates, what it describes as: “escalation dominance, the use of a full bag of both carrots and sticks—and indeed all instruments of soft and hard power, ranging from the diplomatic protest to nuclear weapons.” (Report, op city, emphasis added). Iran In much the same terms as the Bush administration, the NATO sponsored report states, without evidence, that Iran constitutes “a major strategic threat”: “An Iranian nuclear weapons capability would pose a major strategic threat – not only to Israel, which it has threatened to destroy, but also to the region as a whole, to Europe and to the United States. Secondly, it could be the beginning of a new multi-polar nuclear arms race in the most volatile region of the world.” (Report, op. cit., p. 45) Careful timing? The controversial NATO sponsored report calling for a preemptive nuclear attack on Iran was released shortly after the publication of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report entitled Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. The latter denies Iran’s nuclear capabilities. The NIE report, based on the assessments of sixteen US intelligence agencies, refutes the Bush administration’s main justification for waging a preemptive nuclear war on Iran. The NIE report confirms that Iran “halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003.” “These findings constitute a damning indictment of the Bush administration’s relentless fear-mongering in relation to an alleged nuclear threat from Iran. They demonstrate that just as in the buildup to the war against Iraq five years ago, the White House has been engaged in a systematic campaign to drag the American people into another war based on lies.” (See Bill van Auken, 24 January 2008) It should be noted that this recently declassified intelligence ( pertaining to Iran contained in the 2007 NIE report) was known by the White House, the Pentagon and most probably NATO since September 2003. Ironically, US military documents confirm that the Bush Administration initiated its war preparations against Iran in July 2003, two months prior to the confirmation by US intelligence that Iran did not constitute a nuclear threat. The July 2003 war scenarios were launched under TIRANNT: Theater Iran Near Term. The justification for TIRANNT as well as for subsequent US war plans directed against Iran ( which as of 2004 included the active participation of NATO and Israel), has always been that Iran is developing nuclear weapons and plans to use them against us. Following the publication of the 2007 NIE in early December, there has been an avalanche of media propaganda directed against Tehran, essentially with a view to invalidating the statements of the NIE concerning Tehran’s nuclear program. Moreover, a third sanctions resolution by the UN Security Council, was initiated with a view to forcing Iran to halt uranium enrichment. The proposed UNSC resolution, which is opposed by China and Russia includes a travel ban on Iranian officials involved in the country’s nuclear programs, and inspections of shipments to and from Iran “if there are suspicions of prohibited goods” (AFP, 11 February 2008). Meanwhile, French President Nicolas Sarkozy together with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, have been calling for a unified EU sanctions regime against Iran. Contradicting the US national intelligence estimate (NIE), Bush’s most recent speeches continue to portray Iran as a nuclear threat: “I feel pretty good about making sure that we keep the pressure on Iran to pressure them so they understand they’re isolated, to pressure them to affect their economy, to pressure them to the point that we hope somebody rational shows up and says, okay, it’s not worth it anymore,” Bush said.

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The result is a violent ontology that refuses to question itself in favor of remaining a champion certainty and arbiter metaphysical truths guaranteeing systematic error replication and conservativism

Burke, 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory and Event, 10.2, Muse)

By itself, such an account of the nationalist ontology of war and security provides only a general insight into the perseverance of military violence as a core element of politics. It does not explain why so many policymakers think military violence works. As I argued earlier, such an ontology is married to a more rationalistic form of strategic thought that claims to link violent means to political ends predictably and controllably, and which, by doing so, combines military action and national purposes into a common -- and thoroughly modern -- horizon of certainty. Given Hegel's desire to decisively distil and control the dynamic potentials of modernity in thought, it is helpful to focus on the modernity of this ontology -- one that is modern in its adherence to modern scientific models of truth, reality and technological progress, and in its insistence on imposing images of scientific truth from the physical sciences (such as mathematics and physics) onto human behaviour, politics and society. For example, the military theorist and historian Martin van Creveld has argued that one of the reasons Clausewitz was so influential was that his 'ideas seemed to have chimed in with the rationalistic, scientific, and technological outlook associated with the industrial revolution'.54 Set into this epistemological matrix, modern politics and government engages in a sweeping project of mastery and control in which all of the world's resources -- mineral, animal, physical, human -- are made part of a machinic process of which war and violence are viewed as normal features. These are the deeper claims and implications of Clausewitzian strategic reason. One of the most revealing contemporary examples comes from the writings (and actions) of Henry Kissinger, a Harvard professor and later U.S. National Security Adviser and Secretary of State. He wrote during the Vietnam war that after 1945 U.S. foreign policy was based 'on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in emerging countries'. This 'scientific revolution' had 'for all practical purposes, removed technical limits from the exercise of power in foreign policy'.55 Kissinger's conviction was based not merely in his pride in the vast military and bureaucratic apparatus of the United States, but in a particular epistemology (theory of knowledge). Kissinger asserted that the West is 'deeply committed to the notion that the real world is external to the observer, that knowledge consists of recording and classifying data -- the more accurately the better'. This, he claimed, has since the Renaissance set the West apart from an 'undeveloped' world that contains 'cultures that have escaped the early impact of Newtonian thinking' and remain wedded to the 'essentially pre-Newtonian view that the real world is almost entirely internal to the observer'.56 At the same time, Kissinger's hubris and hunger for control was beset by a corrosive anxiety: that, in an era of nuclear weapons proliferation and constant military modernisation, of geopolitical stalemate in Vietnam, and the emergence and militancy of new post-colonial states, order and mastery were harder to define and impose. He worried over the way 'military bipolarity' between the superpowers had 'encouraged political multipolarity', which 'does not guarantee stability. Rigidity is diminished, but so is manageability...equilibrium is difficult to achieve among states widely divergent in values, goals, expectations and previous experience' (emphasis added). He mourned that 'the greatest need of the contemporary international system is an agreed concept of order'.57 Here were the driving obsessions of the modern rational statesman based around a hunger for stasis and certainty that would entrench U.S. hegemony: For the two decades after 1945, our international activities were based on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in "emerging countries". This direct "operational" concept of international order has proved too simple. Political multipolarity makes it impossible to impose an American design. Our deepest challenge will be to evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world, to base order on political multipolarity even though overwhelming military strength will remain with the two superpowers.58 Kissinger's statement revealed that such cravings for order and certainty continually confront chaos, resistance and uncertainty: clay that won't be worked, flesh that will not yield, enemies that refuse to surrender. This is one of the most powerful lessons of the Indochina wars, which were to continue in a phenomenally destructive fashion for six years after Kissinger wrote these words. Yet as his sinister, Orwellian exhortation to 'evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world' demonstrated, Kissinger's hubris was undiminished. This is a vicious, historic irony: a desire to control nature, technology, society and human beings that is continually frustrated, but never abandoned or rethought**.** By 1968 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the rationalist policymaker par excellence, had already decided that U.S. power and technology could not prevail in Vietnam; Nixon and Kissinger's refusal to accept this conclusion, to abandon their Cartesian illusions, was to condemn hundreds of thousands more to die in Indochina and the people of Cambodia to two more decades of horror and misery.59 In 2003 there would be a powerful sense of déja vu as another Republican Administration crowned more than decade of failed and destructive policy on Iraq with a deeply controversial and divisive war to remove Saddam Hussein from power. In this struggle with the lessons of Vietnam, revolutionary resistance, and rapid geopolitical transformation, we are witness to an enduring political and cultural theme: of a craving for order, control and certainty in the face of continual uncertainty. Closely related to this anxiety was the way that Kissinger's thinking -- and that of McNamara and earlier imperialists like the British Governor of Egypt Cromer -- was embedded in instrumental images of technology and the machine: the machine as both a tool of power and an image of social and political order. In his essay 'The Government of Subject Races' Cromer envisaged effective imperial rule -- over numerous societies and billions of human beings -- as best achieved by a central authority working 'to ensure the harmonious working of the different parts of the machine'.60 Kissinger analogously invoked the virtues of 'equilibrium', 'manageability' and 'stability' yet, writing some six decades later, was anxious that technological progress no longer brought untroubled control: the Westernising 'spread of technology and its associated rationality...does not inevitably produce a similar concept of reality'.61

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A securitized relationship to knowledge destroys what it means to be human.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 17-18]

The very alliance of security and knowledge, so characteristic of modern (inter)national politics, is what excites my suspicion most, and generates my sympathy for the genealogist.9 ‘Look,’ insisted the first genealogist, ‘isn’t our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover under everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us?’ ‘Is it not the instinct of fear’, he asked—making explicit the crucial connection between the will to truth and the will to secure—‘that bids us to know?’: And is the jubilation of those who attain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security.10 Hence: security as knowledge (certainty); security’s reliance upon knowledge (surveillance); security’s astonishing production of knowledge in response to its will to know (calculability); and the claim of knowledge which gives security its licence to render all aspects of life transparent (totality). All these constitutive elements of our contemporary manifold politics of security excited my suspicion because they comprise a monumental enterprise of power-knowledge whose insatiable maw threatens to consume not only all thought, and not only that relating to the question of the political, but of what it is to be human. Rather, and by first noting and questioning the already hypertrophic register of security, I want to call the entire scheme of security into question. For that way lies a modest contribution to making ‘our way back from the world to the life already betrayed by knowledge; knowledge that delights in its theme and is absorbed in the object to the point of losing its soul and its name there, of becoming mute and anonymous’.11 ‘Foucault’s genius is evidenced not in the pasting together of unrelated anecdotes’, a recent Foucault commentator noted, but in illustrating that historical coherences are formed from the confluence of multiple strategies and tactics of power and knowledge. History, he shows, is not the product of grand narratives with teleological movements but of diverse struggles that nonetheless become organised into coherent (that is to say, more or less continuous) patterns of domination, subjectification, and government.12 One of those constellations of struggles, however, indeed the one which informs all others, is the recurring struggle for the political itself. For whatever politics is allowed or taken to be—how it is captured, fixed and determined in its foundations; in short secured—is a decisive element in all power struggles. And yet I think that the very surfeit of information about politics which academic and media technologies create has made us so ignorant of the political, and the way that it is secured, that we are hardly even capable of formulating, much less posing and pursuing, the question of the political itself.

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Thus the plan: The US federal government should withdraw its tactical nuclear weapons from Turkey.

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Scene 2: The Lens

Our argument is that Oedipus offers a way to the US relationship to Turkey in a way that questions our belief in knowing, truth, calculating and totalizing security politics through Turkey. Thus we present a cutting of Sophocles’ play:

[Translated by F. Storr, at the *Internet Classics Archive*, http://classics.mit.edu/Sophocles/oedipus.html]

**OEDIPUS**

Teiresias, seer who comprehendest all,   
Lore of the wise and hidden mysteries,   
High things of heaven and low things of the earth,   
Thou knowest, though thy blinded eyes see naught,   
What plague infects our city; and we turn   
To thee, O seer, our one defense and shield.   
The purport of the answer that the God   
Returned to us who sought his oracle,   
The messengers have doubtless told thee--how   
One course alone could rid us of the pest,   
To find the murderers of Laius,   
And slay them or expel them from the land.   
Therefore begrudging neither augury   
Nor other divination that is thine,   
O save thyself, thy country, and thy king,   
Save all from this defilement of blood shed.   
On thee we rest. This is man's highest end,   
To others' service all his powers to lend.

**TEIRESIAS**

Alas, alas, what misery to be wise   
When wisdom profits nothing! This old lore   
I had forgotten; else I were not here.

**OEDIPUS**

What ails thee? Why this melancholy mood?

**TEIRESIAS**

Let me go home; prevent me not; 'twere best   
That thou shouldst bear thy burden and I mine.

**OEDIPUS**

For shame! no true-born Theban patriot   
Would thus withhold the word of prophecy.

**TEIRESIAS**

Thy words, O king, are wide of the mark, and I   
For fear lest I too trip like thee...

**OEDIPUS**

Oh speak,   
Withhold not, I adjure thee, if thou know'st,   
Thy knowledge. We are all thy suppliants.

**TEIRESIAS**

Aye, for ye all are witless, but my voice   
Will ne'er reveal my miseries--or thine.

**OEDIPUS**

What then, thou knowest, and yet willst not speak!   
Wouldst thou betray us and destroy the State?

**TEIRESIAS**

I will not vex myself nor thee. Why ask   
Thus idly what from me thou shalt not learn?

**OEDIPUS**

Monster! thy silence would incense a flint.   
Will nothing loose thy tongue? Can nothing melt thee,   
Or shake thy dogged taciturnity?

**TEIRESIAS**

Thou blam'st my mood and seest not thine own   
Wherewith thou art mated; no, thou taxest me.

**OEDIPUS**

And who could stay his choler when he heard   
How insolently thou dost flout the State?

**TEIRESIAS**

Well, it will come what will, though I be mute.

**OEDIPUS**

Since come it must, thy duty is to tell me.

**TEIRESIAS**

I have no more to say; storm as thou willst,   
And give the rein to all thy pent-up rage.

**OEDIPUS**

Yea, I am wroth, and will not stint my words,   
But speak my whole mind. Thou methinks thou art he,   
Who planned the crime, aye, and performed it too,   
All save the assassination; and if thou   
Hadst not been blind, I had been sworn to boot   
That thou alone didst do the bloody deed.

**TEIRESIAS**

Is it so? Then I charge thee to abide   
By thine own proclamation; from this day   
Speak not to these or me. Thou art the man,   
Thou the accursed polluter of this land.

**OEDIPUS**

Vile slanderer, thou blurtest forth these taunts,   
And think'st forsooth as seer to go scot free.

**TEIRESIAS**

Yea, I am free, strong in the strength of truth.

**OEDIPUS**

Who was thy teacher? not methinks thy art.

**TEIRESIAS**

Thou, goading me against my will to speak.

**OEDIPUS**

What speech? repeat it and resolve my doubt.

**TEIRESIAS**

Didst miss my sense wouldst thou goad me on?

**OEDIPUS**

I but half caught thy meaning; say it again.

**TEIRESIAS**

I say thou art the murderer of the man   
Whose murderer thou pursuest.

**OEDIPUS**

Thou shalt rue it   
Twice to repeat so gross a calumny.

**TEIRESIAS**

Must I say more to aggravate thy rage?

**OEDIPUS**

Say all thou wilt; it will be but waste of breath.

**TEIRESIAS**

I say thou livest with thy nearest kin   
In infamy, unwitting in thy shame.

**OEDIPUS**

Think'st thou for aye unscathed to wag thy tongue?

**TEIRESIAS**

Yea, if the might of truth can aught prevail.

**OEDIPUS**

With other men, but not with thee, for thou   
In ear, wit, eye, in everything art blind.

**TEIRESIAS**

Poor fool to utter gibes at me which all   
Here present will cast back on thee ere long.

**OEDIPUS**

Offspring of endless Night, thou hast no power   
O'er me or any man who sees the sun.

**TEIRESIAS**

No, for thy weird is not to fall by me.   
I leave to Apollo what concerns the god.

**OEDIPUS**

Is this a plot of Creon, or thine own?

**TEIRESIAS**

Not Creon, thou thyself art thine own bane.

**OEDIPUS**

O wealth and empiry and skill by skill   
Outwitted in the battlefield of life,   
What spite and envy follow in your train!   
See, for this crown the State conferred on me.   
A gift, a thing I sought not, for this crown   
The trusty Creon, my familiar friend,   
Hath lain in wait to oust me and suborned   
This mountebank, this juggling charlatan,   
This tricksy beggar-priest, for gain alone   
Keen-eyed, but in his proper art stone-blind.   
Say, sirrah, hast thou ever proved thyself   
A prophet? When the riddling Sphinx was here   
Why hadst thou no deliverance for this folk?   
And yet the riddle was not to be solved   
By guess-work but required the prophet's art;   
Wherein thou wast found lacking; neither birds   
Nor sign from heaven helped thee, but I came,   
The simple Oedipus; I stopped her mouth   
By mother wit, untaught of auguries.   
This is the man whom thou wouldst undermine,   
In hope to reign with Creon in my stead.   
Methinks that thou and thine abettor soon   
Will rue your plot to drive the scapegoat out.   
Thank thy grey hairs that thou hast still to learn   
What chastisement such arrogance deserves.

**CHORUS**

To us it seems that both the seer and thou,   
O Oedipus, have spoken angry words.   
This is no time to wrangle but consult   
How best we may fulfill the oracle.

**TEIRESIAS**

King as thou art, free speech at least is mine   
To make reply; in this I am thy peer.   
I own no lord but Loxias; him I serve   
And ne'er can stand enrolled as Creon's man.   
Thus then I answer: since thou hast not spared   
To twit me with my blindness--thou hast eyes,   
Yet see'st not in what misery thou art fallen,   
Nor where thou dwellest nor with whom for mate.   
Dost know thy lineage? Nay, thou know'st it not,   
And all unwitting art a double foe   
To thine own kin, the living and the dead;   
Aye and the dogging curse of mother and sire   
One day shall drive thee, like a two-edged sword,   
Beyond our borders, and the eyes that now   
See clear shall henceforward endless night.   
Ah whither shall thy bitter cry not reach,   
What crag in all Cithaeron but shall then   
Reverberate thy wail, when thou hast found   
With what a hymeneal thou wast borne   
Home, but to no fair haven, on the gale!   
Aye, and a flood of ills thou guessest not   
Shall set thyself and children in one line.   
Flout then both Creon and my words, for none   
Of mortals shall be striken worse than thou.

**OEDIPUS**

Must I endure this fellow's insolence?   
A murrain on thee! Get thee hence! Begone   
Avaunt! and never cross my threshold more.

**TEIRESIAS**

I ne'er had come hadst thou not bidden me.

**OEDIPUS**

I know not thou wouldst utter folly, else   
Long hadst thou waited to be summoned here.

**TEIRESIAS**

Such am I--as it seems to thee a fool,   
But to the parents who begat thee, wise.

**OEDIPUS**

What sayest thou--"parents"? Who begat me, speak?

**TEIRESIAS**

This day shall be thy birth-day, and thy grave.

**OEDIPUS**

Thou lov'st to speak in riddles and dark words.

**TEIRESIAS**

In reading riddles who so skilled as thou?

**OEDIPUS**

Twit me with that wherein my greatness lies.

**TEIRESIAS**

And yet this very greatness proved thy bane.

**OEDIPUS**

No matter if I saved the commonwealth.

**TEIRESIAS**

'Tis time I left thee. Come, boy, take me home.

**OEDIPUS**

Aye, take him quickly, for his presence irks   
And lets me; gone, thou canst not plague me more.

**TEIRESIAS**

I go, but first will tell thee why I came.   
Thy frown I dread not, for thou canst not harm me.   
Hear then: this man whom thou hast sought to arrest   
With threats and warrants this long while, the wretch   
Who murdered Laius--that man is here.   
He passes for an alien in the land   
But soon shall prove a Theban, native born.   
And yet his fortune brings him little joy;   
For blind of seeing, clad in beggar's weeds,   
For purple robes, and leaning on his staff,   
To a strange land he soon shall grope his way.   
And of the children, inmates of his home,   
He shall be proved the brother and the sire,   
Of her who bare him son and husband both,   
Co-partner, and assassin of his sire.   
Go in and ponder this, and if thou find   
That I have missed the mark, henceforth declare   
I have no wit nor skill in prophecy.

*Exeunt TEIRESIAS and OEDIPUS.*

1AC

Oedipus’ altercation with the blind prophet Teiresias shows that the political crisis of security is a crisis of truth; Oedipus embodies a calculative relationship to truth which drives him to think of truth as something to be appropriated by techne. Because he is constantly trying to *secure* the truth, the truth of his being will destroy him.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 172-175]

(The crisis of the polis is a crisis of security, is a crisis of the King and is also a crisis of truth. They are the same. The Chorus reels before its implications and the decisions it presents. It sets the scene for the way the crisis deepens and spreads in the encounters which now ensue between Oedipus and Teiresias; Oedipus and Creon; and Oedipus and Jocasta. In the process, Oedipus’ politics of security dissolves into a letting-be as his fear is transformed into anxiety.) A long hymn from the Chorus follows. Extolling the gods, and detailing how the plague blights all procreation, it calls upon them, bloodthirstily, to save the city. Oedipus returns and commends their praying, but recalls them to current practicalities. Describing himself as a stranger at the time to the crime, and to Thebes, he can nonetheless answer their prayers now and save them by discovering the secret of Laius’ murderer; indeed, he implies (irony piled upon irony) the Oedipus Asphaleos 173 problem would never have arisen had he been around then. Should the murderer give himself up voluntarily, he would suffer nothing worse than exile. Anyone who knows the identity of the killer will be rewarded if he reveals it, banished if he does not. The killer himself is, however, violently cursed, and that curse unrestrainedly extends to anybody who impedes the investigation, even to Oedipus’ own house should the culprit prove to be somehow connected with it. And so the cold trail (trial) is picked-up once more, with Oedipus beginning by interrogating the Chorus. It knows nothing…except that the oracle itself must know, and that the only person who can see eye to eye with the oracle is the blind prophet Teiresias. He is, therefore, likely to have some special insight into the identity of the murderer. Seeing eye to eye with the oracle (‘oront’ epistamai’55) means, of course, that the prophet must be on the same level as it, shares its status. The issue is not, then, one of simple vision—Teiresias is, of course, blind—as of the seer’s sight, of his standing and of his relation to the ground; which ground is the divided ground of mortality itself. Presciently, however, and on Creon’s insistence, Oedipus has seen to this— the trail (trial) is not as cold as it might seem—and in prospect now is a clash of sight and truth; of different forms of truth, of truth as the correspondence we claim to be able to see between things and the idea, or their true form, and of the disclosive truth of aletheia in which what is given for true also discloses a remainder that is always closed-off to us. Simultaneously, Oedipus’ fear—of losing power, of discovering the truth and of discovering the truth of the truth—mount until, the truth disclosed and his being exposed, he is brought to the threshold of resolution through the radical anxiety which this exposure in disclosure brings about. Teiresias has already been summoned to the palace. His entrance, led-in in an immemorial sign of wisdom by a boy, is announced by the Chorus. Here, it declares, is the one in whom truth is in-born (this time not orthotes or any of its cognates but talethes,56 from aletheia). The blind man of truth (aletheia) and the sighted man of knowledge (orthotes) clash violently. Each as imperious as the other in this encounter, Teiresias at first seeks, nonetheless, to avoid the irruption that is now imminent by refusing to say what he knows and proclaiming that he and Oedipus (the same difference) should bear their respective burdens of humanness separately. This obduracy appears to endanger the city. Enraged, in keeping with the threats he has just made against any obstruction of justice, Oedipus precipitately accuses Teiresias of murdering Laius. ‘Is that the truth?’ scorns Teiresias (‘alethes’57), and finally bursts-out that, on the contrary, Oedipus is the pollutant. The King condemns him for the accusation, insisting that his status will not protect the prophet from the consequences of issuing such a slander. Teiresias counters that he is indeed protected by the truth (‘talethes’58) to which his own being bears witness. Oedipus, discerning a political conspiracy behind the prophet’s astonishing declaration, and inadvertently hitting the point that being strong in the truth of disclosure (aletheia) is not acquired through some kind of techne,59 wants to know who taught him this art (‘pros tou didachtheis? ou gar ek ge tes technes’60). The passion grows as the argument proceeds. Oedipus always intensifies his insecurity as he seeks to secure knowledge about his origins (from his first bout with the drunken courtier in Corinth, through his response to the oracle’s pronouncement, and now to a succession of clashes in Thebes, first here with Teiresias and soon with Creon and Jocasta). For Oedipus the Prince, the master of political techne, there can be only one explanation for Teiresias’ accusation. There is a conspiracy against his power, and Creon, who first advised sending for Teiresias, must be the prophet’s coconspirator. He has to move fast to nip this in the bud or else he will be outmanoeuvred. What seems to anger him most is not so much the threat to

his survival—powerful and violent, despite his foot, he is clearly a fearless man—as the threat to his reputation and the insult to his pride. Who in hell do they think they are, full of envy for the crown he was freely given, arch manipulators (masters of techne, ‘techne technes’) seeking to out-wit him in the battlefield of life (‘O ploute kai turanni kai techne technes huperpherousa to poluzelo bio’61). Creon perhaps worst of all, repaying familial loyalty with political betrayal. In a great burst of political invective Oedipus demonstrates his understanding of politics as techne, an art of making; a construction of calculative representations and judgements in which the very puzzle of representation itself—winess his defeat of the Sphinx—has been solved by Oedipus himself. He rails against the prophet accusing the old sage of being a master of political conspiracy rather than a true seer (‘keen-eyed, but in his proper art stone-blind’; ‘dedorke, ten technen d’ ephu tuphlos’62). Where was he, Oedipus asks, when the city needed someone to solve the riddle of the Sphinx? And what price his prophesying? Was it not Oedipus’ calculative wit, unskilled in the prophetic arts, that did the trick? Yet, the play has already suggested, both through the Priest’s appeal to Oedipus in the opening and now here in the form of the truth to which Teiresias bears witness, that the truth of the political is in some obscure way nothing ‘political’; that the essence of the thing is not confined to the mundane practice of it. Indeed Oedipus’ politics are the conveyance which bears him and Thebes towards doom. The political, then, is concerned, instead, with that tragic condition of human being itself—being-in-common; xunoikounton—to which the sighted Oedipus seems blind, and whose existence he threatens, but to whose truth Teiresias testifies; even, indeed, in his violent and intemperate opposition to Oedipus. He bears his witness through lines 408 to 428 (Storr Translation) and simultaneously defends himself against Oedipus’ charge of conspiracy, condemning the king’s own blindness. His question to Oedipus—‘do you know your lineage?’ (‘ar’ oisth’ aph’ on ei’63)—is both ontological as well as genealogical. For Thebes’ problem—the political problem; the security problematic—does not come from outside. It is integral to the house of Oedipus (the house of Laius too, of course, because it is one and the same house) and so to all human dwelling; we are all children of ‘Laius’ ill-starred race’.64 With eyes of tragic denial the king currently sees right (truth as orthotes), but soon will see only endless night (‘Bleponta nun men orth’, epeita de skoton’65). After a further violent exchange, Oedipus dismisses Teiresias and returns to the palace. The Oedipus Asphaleos 175 prophet, however, closes the scene by depicting Oedipus’ forthcoming fate. Playing not only on the images of blindness but also on those of standing and stooping, and of the transformation of Oedipus’ crutch and murder weapon, quite literally his instrument of office, into a blind man’s stick (each a skeptron; a skeptron was also, of course, the baton passed to an orator to authorise him to speak), Teiresias proclaims that his own truth and truth-telling power will be vindicated.

1AC

Oedipus’ will to certainty is what brings about his demise; he searches for a truth that he cannot bear because that truth is his radically divided nature. Because he treats the pursuit of truth as a calculative enterprise, the weight of his truth will crush him.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 158-159]

While Oedipus’ life and career describe a constant political passage, a journeying to and fro which revolves around the polis, his very talent for puzzle solving is indicative of the political intelligence which brought him to power because it once secured the polis, and he continues to rule through it. As Bernard Knox demonstrated so well, one of the dominant motifs of the play is that of a politico-legal inquiry.106 One in which Oedipus’ forensic intellectual skills and will to truth combine not only in pursuit of Laius’ murderer and that of his own obscure genealogy, but also to smell conspiracy and betrayal. Oedipus the champion hermeneut is, however, an irresolvable hermeneutical puzzle to himself; ‘an expert at decoding difficult messages, the hero cannot decode the meaning of his own name’.107 The resolution of that puzzle precipitates a selfblinding which signifies the advent for him of a different kind of self-recognition. Language, knowledge and power—the complexities and mysteries of identity, appearance and misrecognition—are, therefore, all intermeshed in this account of the rise, fall and transformation of the securer of the polis. Oedipus’ selfrecognition is the acceptance of the riddle of human being; a being-in-common that is both friend and enemy to itself, united in its division and diversity, yet in receipt of that being by virtue of something whose necessarily absent trace it bears. The political and the tragic 159 Oedipus thus continuously beats the bounds which comprise all that the political is, and entails, including fundamentally the very laws of consanguinity. He makes space for the polis through the play both of his presence and his absence. Oedipus’ self-exclusion from the polity is consequently neither total nor is it irredeemable and exclusively sacrificial.108 For, whereas ritual is conservative and confirmatory in regard to existing order, tragedy is polysemous, questioning and innovative; its unity a doubling and re-doubling renewal quite unlike the one-ness of the metaphysical impulse.109 There is, therefore, neither sacrifice, understood in the Judeo-Christian sense, nor scape-goating, understood in the anthropological or sociological sense, here. What there is, is a precise figuration of Dionysian overcoming, or what Nietzsche described in his essay ‘Homer’s Contest’, as the spiritualisation of otherness upon which the very agon of life itself depends. Oedipus’ will to know is precisely what trips him up. Yet, while he cannot forbear trying to master himself through the calculus of his knowing, the play’s message is not as simple as insisting that the will to know must be denied. Oedipus cannot escape his doom by ceasing to question, as he is advised to do on no less than four occasions.110 Failure at it, indeed the failure of it, is somehow also the path to a new understanding and transformation of the knower through a refining of his questioning capacity. Ignorance, rationalism’s most despised heresy, but actually the liminal limit of knowing, has nevertheless to be learnt and understood in its own, and for its own, liminality; and precisely because it is liminal the limit of not knowing is not fixed.

1AC

The tragic politics of Oedipus the King demonstrates for us that there is in life always a surplus which exceeds: a surplus which exceeds our truths, our politics, our commitments, and even our loves. This surplus grounds, however, a genuine politics which recognizes that ethical relations arise from considering human being as a possibility.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 157-158]

The play, then, is about the extremity which both creates and threatens the possibility of politeia. But it is equally concerned with how what lies beyond the polis, which is nonetheless also displayed in the mortal life of human being, limits the political as well. Thus, though they come close to it, neither the city nor Oedipus is deified but, rather, sanctified. Moreover, the threatening Otherness which Oedipus represents is not merely banished from the city, rather it is spiritualised in Oedipus’ transformation from King to exile and sanctified interment at Colonus. The fate of the King, therefore, demarcates the liminal limit of the political and emphasises the fact that, despite the intricate and deep complicity of knowledge and politics, the question of the political is not exhausted by the question of the calculative knowledge of making; as it was newly understood, then, in terms of the rational analysis and manipulation of the representation of what comes to presence—of appearance—and as it has now traditionally come to be understood. That it is indeed threatened by its reduction to a certain techne because it originally concerns, instead, the question of the very creativity entailed by limits. For even as he comes to learn that he has been ignorant all along, Oedipus learns something new; acquires a different form of understanding.104 Moreover, the (political) duality of Oedipus’ (a)politicality is fundamentally played-out in terms of security and, specifically, in terms of the play on words which the Greek word for security (asphaleia) allows. The strength of the play, read politically, is therefore precisely not that ‘man’ is a political animal. Neither is it that ‘man’ is an a-political animal (much less that he is an animal rationale). The point is that he is both at once and, more, that there is always already something beyond the polis as well that politeia must continuously respect. It is in that very ambiguity that the inherently liminal character of the political, and the challenges to it, continuously arise. Here we have the recognition of both the possibility and impossibility—the (im)possibility—of the polis,105 in virtue of the identity and difference that inheres in both human being and Logos, explored through the character of knowing and being, and of the way that each (being, knowing, and their relationship) is integrally involved in the constitution and maintenance of a political community. It is a masterpiece not so much of political analysis as of the analysis of the whole ambiguous phenomenon of the political, as it liminally arises at the limit in respect of the dissolution of limits; one which surpasses in subtlety and range—while being concerned with many of the same essential questions of truth, appearance, prudence, machination, ground and calculation—even that provided, for example, by Machiavelli. It therefore ably advances a related and more general proposition, that there are many more provocative, and many more important, ways of thinking about the political, and about security and insecurity, than those to which the tradition specifically of International Relations and Strategic Studies would so rigidly and impoverishingly confine us.

Solvency

Sophocles’ first play of the Oedipus Cycle ends with Oedipus coming to grips with his having not known—known about his origin, about the essence of the political, about being-with others—and this clears the ground for making the impossible possible. In not knowing, genuine creativity is possible.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 197-198]

In this final scene Oedipus comes finally to know his facticity in not having known— and ultimately for all human being it is a matter of not being able to know—his own original provenance. Whereas that had once been a problem which he had set before himself to be resolved, it is now understood as a condition which effects a transformation in his very being. He does not know from whence he came or where he is finally headed, even as he necessarily always projects ahead of himself in the living that he does. This lack is not an add-on to his being. Integral to him, it is what constitutes him as a differentially constituted duality. Thrown into existence he must necessarily, therefore, bear the consequences both of his choices and his non-choices because he did not have any choice in the matter of his birth, nor in its patrimony which he has just lived-out. Hence he is deeply indebted to that which he undergoes— his very being (t)here—but for which, at least in the usual sense of the term, he was not responsible. He is indebted, moreover, not because of this or that situation or event whose account he might settle, but originally and forever. And, yet, here at the play’s end, he comes to understand that he must assume this ‘archi-debt’, respond to and take responsibility for it, and thereby transfigure it without ever being able finally to discharge it altogether. That transformation effects a similar shift in his solicitude for others. His earlier concern to stand-in for the Thebans was ultimately one of power and domination. Standing-up for and before them in the polis at the end of the play, however, it becomes a solicitude which ‘leaps ahead and liberates’.135 Liberates in the sense not of relieving them of all care (most especially of the particular care which having been with him has given to them) but of freeing them for it by not obstructing that freedom through putting himself in their place. Heidegger’s inconspicuous law of the possible, which demands that one act so that the possibility of the impossible not be made actual, is operating here.136 In a world radically endangered by politics of security now capable of making the impossible happen, human being must learn politically how to follow this inconspicuous law of the possible or finally realise its own impossibility. That is the challenge which, successfully met, might inaugurate a new mise en for me (mise en scene/mise en sens) of the political. Failed, it is capable now, in our world, of accomplishing the end of the world; the very closure which it is Oedipus’ destiny both to threaten and yet, ultimately also, to forestall.

Solvency

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 160-161]

Instead of dissecting the dead tissue of the question of the political, therefore, tragedy offers the prospect of a radical hermeneutical phenomenology of the political, disclosing it in all its living form and force. In the process it educates politically because it is capable of radically shifting perspectives and so changing its audience’s relation to the issues with which they are presented; the way it sees them, the way it approaches them, and the expectations which are engendered in respect of them. Integral to the political and religious life of the polis, tragedy was not just intensely but essentially concerned with movement: with reversals and revolutions; with rises and falls; speed and deliberation; comings and goings; setting things up and knocking them down; with the changing perspectives and moods of human being; with the changing landscapes and fear-scapes which they inhabit; with temporality itself; and, utimately, with the dance of the Chorus. If Oedipus’ life revolved around the polis, the life of the polis (politeia) revolved around tragedy; hence Oedipus Rex. As Sallis notes: for Nietzsche one does not, in the face of tragedy, become a disinterested, pure will-less subject, but rather one is shaken, made to tremble at the edge of the abyss…it is no mere, temporary masking of the source of human misery but rather a disclosure capable of leading one back from pessimism to affirmation.114 Tragedy depicted human being finding its way back to itself out of the depths of its shaken-ness. It was thereby capable of shifting the political world on its axis because, in a literal sense, it actually helped to comprise the very pivot of the political itself. It was not merely a means of political education but, in effect, a critical element of the very polos of the polis; that which made it polis and not stasis.115 Through it, the ontological dualities of power and powerlessness116 (which inevitably arise as a consequence of the ontological difference) are neither denied nor shifted on to something or someone else. Neither is the projection of the movement that they impart to life resisted. By turning them up, around, and over so that they could be explored and acknowledged, and by following that movement, tragedy was a means for effecting a solidarity of the shaken; holding them together in their very difference. It was itself, as Sallis calls it, a pivotal spacing; the clearing of a place, both in the imagination and in the living of a being that bears freeing difference within itself, for such a being-in-common to find a way to live freely with itself in its differences. Here, then, political human being is explored at the limit in order to examine not only the violence and fragility of its very liminality, but also that play of Otherness within it which instigates the liminality. The question of the political is, thereby, posed and addressed not in terms of how can human being be ordered and domesticated, but in terms of what is required of a civilising movement through which human beings can accept and accommodate the freed uncanny thing that human being itself is, without betraying the uncanniness of that freedom. Because it continuously insists on posing that question in extremis, because it arises in The political and the tragic 161 virtue of limits, the tragic thereby enlarges our political and ethical sensibility beyond the moralistic boundaries within which a politics confined to representational-calculative thought would secure it. It is for this reason, too, that it remains so desperately pertinent to the extremity of our own current world.117 If the recovery of the political provoked by the philosophy of the limit requires a recovery of the tragic as well, then reading Oedipus Rex as a tragic masterpiece which explores the question of the political by exploring the question of limits in relation to the possibility of political life is one way of beginning to explore what is involved in that recovery. Moreover this play offers itself as a perfect place to start because Oedipus was a ‘Prince’ and Thebes was a polis; apolis in a crisis and on the point of extinction. The play is as much concerned with the fate of the polis, therefore, as it is with that of this phenomenal human being—their fates being, of course, inseparable— and so, more precisely, with politeia. And that fate revolves around (in)security, because the threat to the existence of both Oedipus and Thebes is the pollution of Oedipus himself.118 ‘The menace which assails man’s nature’, Heidegger wrote, ‘arises from that nature itself’. But, he reminds us, ‘human nature resides in the relation of Being to man’.119 The ontological difference is a parting between Being and being. Such a parting between may be a parting from, which, in the belonging together of Being and being, allows freedom to each; to human being, of course, but also to Being in as much as human being does not anthropomorphise it as a supreme being. A parting-between nonetheless always threatens to become a parting-against in which human being loses its relation to the Being of its own being and thus to Being altogether. This, set in the openness of the polis, is the tragedy of mortal human being, Oedipus Rex.

Framework

The moral character of Oedipus is a question of his ability to remain distinct from the other characters in the play; his *hubris* is his self-identification with Thebes. This parallels debate—when we identify ourselves with the sovereign power of the modern political decision (i.e., the ability to proffer a rational choice between the aff and status quo, the aff and the counterplan), we betray the political decadence of the activity.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 154-155]

We have especially to remember, therefore, not only that Oedipus is a representation of mortal human being—which, though deathbound like a beast and creative like a God, is neither beast nor God and therefore free, thus capable of its own particular kind of greatness—but also that his parricidal and incestuous pollution is a complex sign, too, of the mortal condition of a being divided within itself whose very condition of life is the capacity for duplication and re-duplication which it bears within itself. From the perspective of the political reading of the play which I present, incest represents the immanence and imminence of that endless cycle of reciprocal violence which threatens to overwhelm that being through effacing the difference which constitutes it. Mortal being lives in duplication and re-duplication, directly participating in the begetting of itself in the caesura, replicated throughout its own being, in which its being arises. As with Oedipus, so with all human being, ‘the sower is not only the sower’ s/he is sown and is ‘also the seed’.88 Incest draws attention to the inherent duality of the human condition, however, by signifying a perversity which threatens the very composition of our being-in-common. For one of the features which distinguishes human being from other beings, and from Being, is the way human being is freed to take responsibility for the The political and the tragic 155 regulation of the self-producing procreative power of which it is a manifestation, by remaining open to, preserving and respecting, its own freeing duality. That way mortal being seeks the means of respecting the immanent alterity within its very own singularity, and so ensures its possibility of repetition, or new-found composition. Thus, while Oedipus is the paradigmatic figure of the immanence of alterity in every human being, he is also a progenitor, as René Girard says, of ‘formless duplications, sinister repetitions, a dark mixture of unnamable things’.89 He threatens the very differential composition of the ‘unstable arithmetic’90 of the self itself, because his own example of scandalous equivalence—‘a slayer of distinctions’91—threatens the difference within the ‘self’. Oedipus, therefore, violates the boundaries of self and other in his own self; husband and son; son and parricide; native and stranger. He ‘collapses what should be distinct and plural [even in the self itself] into a perverse singularity’.92 Incest consequently does not only signify, as Euben notes, ‘a political disease as much as a familial one’.93 Because it effaces that viable system of relations of difference necessary for a being which bears freeing difference within itself, threatening to obliterate all distinctions including critically those co-joined within that self, it subverts the very possibility of such a being. It therefore signifies, in the strongest and most immediate way possible, the fundamental link between the loss of distinction and the violent chain of reciprocal violence which conducts a general offensive against the freedom, and hence the very possibility, of a political being-in-common. Incest, then, is a paradigmatic representation of that non-difference which Oedipus threatens in all his relationships, including also those with other members of the polis; his persistent identification of himself with Thebes and of Thebes with himself is, for example, forcefully contested by Creon. Its fusion of singularity is, therefore, a cardinal offence against being-in-common, because the sovereign oneness which it symbolises fatally abuses the immanent alterity which is integral to the freeing differential constitution of mortal life. A fatal corruption of the intrinsic corruption (duality) of origination, incest subverts the entire social order because it assails the very condition of being-in-common.