# A2: Security K

## Security K 2AC

### Threats real and not constructed—rational risk assessment goes aff

Knudsen 1 - PoliSci Professor at Sodertorn (Olav, Post-Copenhagen Security Studies, Security Dialogue 32:3)

Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unimportant whether states ‘really’ face dangers from other states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors’ own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view, this emphasis on the subjective is a misleading conception of threat, in that it discounts an independent existence for whatever is perceived as a threat. Granted, political life is often marked by misperceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenomena do not occur simultaneously to large numbers of politicians, and hardly most of the time. During the Cold War, threats – in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger – referred to ‘real’ phenomena, and they refer to ‘real’ phenomena now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. Threats have to be dealt with both in terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening.

The point of Wæver’s concept of security is not the potential existence of danger somewhere but the use of the word itself by political elites. In his 1997 PhD dissertation, he writes, ‘One can view “security” as that which is in language theory called a speech act: it is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real – it is the utterance itself that is the act.’ The deliberate disregard of objective factors is even more explicitly stated in Buzan & Wæver’s joint article of the same year. As a consequence, the phenomenon of threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politics. It seems to me that the security dilemma, as a central notion in security studies, then loses its foundation. Yet I see that Wæver himself has no compunction about referring to the security dilemma in a recent article.

This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security studies to insignificant concerns. What has long made ‘threats’ and ‘threat perceptions’ important phenomena in the study of IR is the implication that urgent action may be required. Urgency, of course, is where Wæver first began his argument in favor of an alternative security conception, because a convincing sense of urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of ‘security’ and the consequent ‘politics of panic’, as Wæver aptly calls it. Now, here – in the case of urgency – another baby is thrown out with the Wæverian bathwater. When real situations of urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the problematic arising with the process of making security policy in parliamentary democracy. But in Wæver’s world, threats are merely more or less persuasive, and the claim of urgency is just another argument. I hold that instead of ‘abolishing’ threatening phenomena ‘out there’ by reconceptualizing them, as Wæver does, we should continue paying attention to them, because situations with a credible claim to urgency will keep coming back and then we need to know more about how they work in the interrelations of groups and states (such as civil wars, for instance), not least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them.

### Their alternative understates threat–their critique of “paranoia” is just a pathological avoidance of danger that leads to appeasement

Schweller 2004 (Randall, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at The Ohio State University, International Security, 29.2)

Despite the historical frequency of underbalancing, little has been written on the subject. Indeed, Geoffrey Blainey's memorable observation that for "every thousand pages published on the causes of wars there is less than one page directly on the causes of peace" could have been made with equal veracity about overreactions to threats as opposed to underreactions to them.[92](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v029/29.2schweller.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT92) Library shelves are filled with books on the causes and dangers of exaggerating threats, ranging from studies of domestic politics to bureaucratic politics, to political psychology, to organization theory. By comparison, there have been few studies at any level of analysis or from any theoretical perspective that directly explain why states have with some, if not equal, regularity underestimated dangers to their survival.

There may be some cognitive or normative bias at work here. Consider, for instance, that there is a commonly used word, paranoia, for the unwarranted fear that people are, in some way, "out to get you" or are planning to do oneharm. I suspect that just as many people are afflicted with the opposite psychosis: the delusion that everyone loves you when, in fact, they do not even like you. Yet, we do not have a familiar word for this phenomenon. Indeed, I am unaware of any word that describes this pathology (hubris and overconfidence come close, but they plainly define something other than what I have described).

That noted, international relations theory does have a frequently used phrase for the pathology of states' underestimation of threats to their survival, the so-called Munich analogy. The term is used, however, in a disparaging way by theorists to ridicule those who employ it. The central claim is that the naïveté associated with Munich and the outbreak of World War II has become an overused and inappropriate analogy because few leaders are as evil and unappeasable as Adolf Hitler. Thus, the analogy either mistakenly causes leaders [End Page 198] to adopt hawkish and overly competitive policies or is deliberately used by leaders to justify such policies and mislead the public.

### Threat construction is good–consensus that a particular hostile threat exists is necessary to prevent appeasement–their alternative would always appease hostile powers

Schweller 2004 (randall, associate professor in the department of political science at the ohio state university, international security, 29.2)

Balancing behavior requires the existence of a strong consensus among elites that an external threat exists and must be checked by either arms or allies or both. As the proximate causal variable in the model, elite consensus is the most necessary of necessary causes of balancing behavior. Thus, when there is no elite consensus, the prediction is either underbalancing or some other nonbalancing policy option. Developing such a consensus is difficult, however, because balancing, unlike expansion, is not a behavior motivated by the search for gains and profit. It is instead a strategy that entails significant costs in human and material resources that could be directed toward domestic programs and investment rather than national defense. In addition, when alliances are formed, the state must sacrifice some measure of its autonomy in foreign and military policy to its allies. In the absence of a clear majority of elites in favor of a balancing strategy, therefore, an alternative policy, and not necessarily a coherent one, will prevail. This is because a weak grand strategy can be supported for many different reasons (e.g., pacifism, isolationism, pro-enemy [End Page 171] sympathies, collective security, a belief in conciliation, etc.). Consequently, appeasement and other forms of underbalancing will tend to triumph in the absence of a determined and broad political consensus to balance simply because these policies represent the path of least domestic resistance and can appeal to a broad range of interests along the political spectrum. Thus, underreacting to threats, unlike an effective balancing strategy, does not require overwhelming, united, and coherent support from elites and masses; it is a default strategy.

### Only the perm allows us to reconfigure our relationship to IR while hedging our bets against catastrophe—err aff

Lott 4 Anthony, professor of political science at St. Olaf College, Creating Insecurity, p. 157

Similarly, studies employing political constructivism cannot be considered complete renditions of national security issues. Their emphasis on identity and culture, and their alternative forms of analysis, provide a necessary understanding of ideational threats and an emancipatory moment for changing state securitization. However, these reflexive critiques do not demonstrate an understanding of the role that material threats play in national security matters or the negative consequences of ignoring those material threats. Their alternative analytic focus often rejects the traditional state ‘security dilemma’ and its corresponding policy needs. The consistent deconstruction of identity performances and cultural givens may provide an opportunity for the emergence of a more democratic ethos, but the state is often marginalized in the process, Such an occurrence does not fulfill the requirements of a security framework that seeks theoretical rigor and policy relevance. It is a necessary (but insufficient) component of a more comprehensive understanding of security. The potentially positive political vision that emerges from political constructivism balances the negative vision provided by realism and suggests an opportunity to overcome culturally constructed threats.

### Reps focus devolves into deconstruction without concrete means of re-representing—tubes the alt and detaches academics from reality, destroying progressive reform

Kidner, professor of psychology at Nottingham Trent University and internationally renowned scholar on nature-culture relationships. 00 (nature and psyche p. 65-7)

In addition, the deconstructive bent of discursive approaches limits their capacity to challenge the structure of modern industrialism. Just as science has been reluctant to recognize the holistic qualities of nature, so we have been slow to appreciate that the power of industrialism and its resultant near-hegemony in the modern world is largely the result of its ability to integrate science, politics, and everyday social life within a structure that appears complete and self-sufficient. This structure cannot be challenged without reference to alternative structures. To celebrate choice and free play without also celebrating the frames of meaning within which they take place is simply to guarantee our assimilation to and absorption within industrialism, and so represents a philosophy of surrender. For example, “freedom” has little meaning in the absence of a framework of democratic laws which protect the vulnerable against the “freedom” of the powerful to exploit, intimidate, and mislead. Similarly, my freedom to explore an area of wilderness is negated if energy companies and off-road vehicle clubs also have the freedom to use the area as they see fit. Freedom is all to often interpreted as the absence of structure; and structure gives meaning and implies responsibilities and limitations. One of the most insidious aspects of the colonization of the world is industrialism's silent but lethal elimination of structures that could challenge it. The widespread lack of appreciation within academia of the way in which postmodern approaches involving deconstruction promote this insidious *conceptual* assimilation to industrialism is an index of the urgent need to develop a psychocultural dimension to our environmental understanding. Finally, we should not ignore the possibility that an emphasis on language serves particular defensive functions for the social scientist. Noam Chomsky has noted that it”it's too hard to deal with real problems,” some academics tend to “go off on wild goose chases that don't matter . . . [or] get involved in academic cults that are very divorced from any reality and that provide a defense against dealing with the world as it actually is.”71 An emphasis on language can serve this sort of defensive function; for the study of discourse enables one to stand aside from issues and avoid any commitment to a cause or idea, simply presenting all sides of a debate and pointing out the discursive strategies involved. As the physical world appears to fade into mere discourse, so it comes to seem less real than the language used to describe it; and environmental issues lose the dimensions of urgency and tragedy and become instead the proving grounds for ideas and attitudes. Rather than walking in what Aldo Leopold described as a “world of wounds,” the discursive theorist can study this world dispassionately, safely insulated from the emotional and ecological havoc that is taking place elsewhere. Like experimentalism, this is a schizoid stance that exemplifies rather than challenges the characteristic social pathology of out time; and it is one that supports Melanie Klein's thesis that the internal object world can serve as a psychotic substitute for an external “real” world that is either absent or unsatisfying.72 Ian Craib's description of social construction as a “social psychosis”73 therefore seems entirely apt. But what object relations theorists such as Klein fail to point out is the other side of this dialectic: that withdrawing from the external world and substituting an internal world of words or fantasies, because of the actions that follow from this state of affairs, makes the former even less satisfying and more psychologically distant, so contributing to the vicious spiral that severs the “human from the “natural” and abandons nature to industrialism.

### Most conclusive studies post-9/11 prove reps don’t affect policies—prefer empirics

Boswell 6 [Christina Boswell is Senior Researcher for the Migration Research Group at Hamburg “Migration Control in Europe after 9/11: Explaining the Absence of Securitization,” Conference on Immigration Policy after 9/11: US and European Perspectives  UT Austin, 2-3 March 2006]

The events of 9/11 clearly caused a huge shock in Europe, and many European countries quite rapidly concluded that similar attacks could occur on their territory. There was an immediate recognition that the attacks involved an international network of activists operating across borders and moving between countries. As more information emerged in the days and weeks to follow, it also became clear that many of those behind the attacks were immigrants residing in European countries – much was made of the case of Mohammed Atta, a student who had been living in Hamburg. Nonetheless, over the first few weeks there was only a rather vague profiling of those involved. Epistemic uncertainty left a considerable window of opportunity for framing the issue in public debates. And there were several rather knee-jerk attempts to address the security threat through migration control policies. The UK Home Secretary David Blunkett insisted that Britain would not “offer hospitality to terrorists”, and announced provisions to facilitate the detention and removal of foreign nationals.6 The German Interior Minister Otto Schily made similar statements to the effect that asylum seekers and refugees suspected of terrorist activities should be immediately be deported. While EU member states announced the strengthening of external border controls, and the reintroduction of periodic checks at the borders between Schengen countries.7

However, the linkage between terrorism and illegal immigration was difficult to sustain, and from late 2001 onwards references to terrorism are almost wholly absent from debates on irregular migration and migration control in Europe. This emerges quite clearly if one looks at press reporting on migration issues in European countries from 2002 onwards. In Germany, both 9/11 and the Madrid bombings of 11 March 2004 occurred at a time of quite heated debate on a new Immigration Law. Shortly after the US attacks, Otto Schily decided to delay the debate on the bill, to make certain it was “watertight” against terrorism. But with the exception of a few isolated comments about the need to ensure terrorists were not abusing the German asylum system, and provisions to deport fundamentalist clerics, discourse on migration in Germany remained largely untouched by the issue of terrorism. The main critique of the draft Immigration Law remained concerns about increasing labour migration during a period of high unemployment in Germany, and the problem of integration.8 The press was quite preoccupied with the problem of Al-Qaida “sleeper cells” operating in Germany, and radicalisation amongst Germany’s roughly 3 million Muslims; but these questions were for the most part not linked to the issue of irregular immigration and migration control.

France, meanwhile, experienced an intensive discussion of the problem of irregular migration from late 2001 through 2002, focused on the *sans papiers*, many of whom were Muslims from the Maghreb. But there was scarcely mention in the press of possible links with terrorist organizations, even from the populist Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy. Indeed, Sarkozy announced plans for a regularisation in Autumn 2002: hardly a step that implied a hardening of migration control.9 There is a similar absence of any reference to terrorist networks in debates on reforming the asylum system to reduce the growing numbers of claimants. Nor does the question of terrorist activists feature in the argumentation about restricting the number of visas granted to Algerians in Spring 2003.10 Indeed, the latter was justified with reference to the problem of growing numbers of *sans papiers* – with a marked absence of any framing of the issue in terms of keeping tabs on possible Islamic fundamentalism. And yet it is easy to see how such a linkage could have been made – as indeed it was in US press coverage of migration issues in France.11

The absence of any linkage between migration control issues and terrorism is even more pronounced in the case of Spain. In the aftermath of the Madrid bombings of 11 March 2004, the vast majority of suspects held in connection with the attacks were Moroccan.12 Morocco was the major source country for Spain’s growing stock of sin papeles– in April 2004 it was estimated that there were around 200,000 irregular migrants of Moroccan origin living in Spain.13 Morocco was also the most important transit country for irregular migration from Africa; indeed, from Summer 2004 onwards, concerns about irregular migration started to focus on attempts of a number of people to cross into the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Moroccan territory. And yet in Spring 2004, days after the Madrid attacks, the new Prime Minister Zapatero announced a marked shift in migration policy away from a focus on security issues, instead emphasising labour market and economic needs. In Summer 2004 he put forward plans for a major amnesty for irregular migrants resident in Spain, which resulted in the legalization of more than 700,000 migrants between February–April 2005, the largest group of whom were Moroccan (19.3 %).14 To be sure, this relatively open approach was complemented with a fairly “securitarian” approach to border control. But there is no evidence that the government made any attempt to link the problem of irregular entry with the threat of terrorism: quite a remarkable fact, given the apparent incentives to do so after 11 March.

Given the importance of regional cooperation on migration control it is also worth briefly considering how the linkage between migration and terrorism was treated in political rhetoric at the EU level.15 The Council of Ministers in the area of Justice and Home Affairs held extraordinary meetings following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, as well as 11 March and 7 July 2005 in London. In their 20 September 2001 Declaration, the Council did state the need to “strengthen controls at external borders”; but the only explicit linkage to migration was the “risk of large-scale population movements as a result of heightened tensions following the attacks on the US”.16 In the 19 March 2004 meeting to discuss the Madrid bombing there was again a reference to “strengthening border controls”, and the initiative to create “an integrated borders management agency” was mentioned as relevant to counter-terrorism activities. But migration control was not otherwise mentioned, except in the context of the problem of support for religious extremism amongst members of EU countries,17 a theme that received reinforced attention in the statement following the London bombings. EU discussions on migration policy, meanwhile, continued to follow the timetable and goals set out in European Council conclusions that pre-dated 9/11. Migration control remained high on the list of priorities, but the explicit rationale for this focus was the need to combat trafficking, and better protect Europe’s external borders from unwanted immigration. The most significant European Council document emerging from the period after 2001, the Hague Programme, again failed to draw a link between terrorism and migration control. It stressed the need for better managed migration in order to prevent “humanitarian disasters” – but again, migration control was emphatically not defined as a means of excluding potential terrorists.18

In light of the securitization thesis, these observations seem to be quite anomalous. Why did politicians and the media not exploit concerns about terrorism to mobilise support and legitimise more extensive powers for migration control? One possible answer is that the profiles of international terrorists that emerged after 9/11 did not correspond in any obvious way with established framing irregular migrants in Europe. The debate on Al-Qaeda networks from Autumn 2001 onwards depicted terrorists as single-minded fanatics, who were able to cleverly exploit European rules on entry and stay to achieve their fundamentalist goals, but who otherwise had little regard for the welfare or employment benefits European countries might have to offer.19 The typical image was of a network of sleeper cells operating in highly organised way, well-trained and with access to ample resources. This hardly fitted the image of large numbers of destitute and desperate migrants arriving on the shores of southern Europe, or the “economic migrants” keen to cheat welfare systems and take low-skilled jobs from native workers. The image of these generally well-educated religious fundamentalists was also fairly incongruous with images of organised criminal networks involved in trafficking women and children for prostitution – although of the three types of irregular migration, this was the one most frequently associated with terrorist activities.20

Perhaps even more undermining for such a linkage, though, were the emerging revelations that European nationals were involved in terrorist attacks. In this sense, any discursive opportunities to link migration and terrorism were constrained not just by a “stickiness” or lag in adapting established patterns of framing the migration control problem (Hansen 2002). They were also blocked by the growing body of information on the profile of the European Muslims involved. We can elucidate this point through considering in more detail a case where a European government *did* attempt to draw such a linkage, and was thwarted for these reasons: the UK Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCS), 2001.

### Effective anti-militarism’s impossible – structural societal attachment’s to the nuclear option makes sustained political success impossible

Daniel Deudney, Associate Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins, 1998 On Security, p.108-9

The third consequence of the public's relationship to nuclear weapons is that it will not provide good support for the emergence of a critical mass of sustained intellectual critique. The Italian Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci, in analyzing the formation of consciousness conducive to revolutionary change, spoke about the formation of "organic intellectuals" whose ideas and theories would provide the strategies and designs for systemic alternatives.[39](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz14.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22note39) The relationship between nuclear weapons and civil society is, in particular, not especially conducive to the generation of organic intellectuals devoted to creating and disseminating nuclear structural alternatives. When the public is quiescent, the state and its derivative organs-- including extra-governmental "think tanks" and academics concerned with nuclear security--will tend to monopolize discourse on nuclear issues. In this situation, experts inclined to be fundamentally critical of the status quo will lack institutional support and so will be relatively few in number compared to the legions of state-supported and state-supporting experts. In order to remain relevant, experts critical of the status quo will be forced to work only on incremental alternative measures that have credibility with statist representatives. Absent an agent to implement their schemes, organic intellectuals offering models of nuclear security orders congruent with public safety, rather than state interests, will be regarded as "utopian," as were socialists prior to the emergence of the working class.

These features of the public's relationship to deep structural nuclear realities mean that moments of public eruption are less likely to give birth to enduring institutional change. When public nuclear concern suddenly does emerge in full force, the intellectual groundwork for alternatives will not have been prepared, and those experts concerned with nuclear alternatives will see their incremental agendas swamped by possibilities they are unprepared to exploit. Furthermore, the absence of organic nuclear survival intellectuals means that the leadership of the eruptive moments will tend to pass into the hands of other elites outside the state apparatus with the resources at hand to lead. But these elites will have their own orientations and agendas that will tend to become conflated with nuclear issues, and will tend to employ public concern to further their established goals.

### Rejection can’t solve – humble geopolitical calculation overcomes the pitfalls of realism and the marginalization of their rejection

Ronald Stone, Professor of Christian Ethics and Pitt Theological Seminary, 2005 Prophetic Realism: Beyond Militarism and Pacificism in the Age of Terror, p. 119-21

 Prophetic realism" is situated between the Bush administration's realpolitik and just peacemaking's more visionary or transformative perspective on foreign policy. Until just peacemaking incorporates more attention to power, national definitions of purpose\* diplomacy, and biblical realism derived from the prophets, it will remain too idealistic. Bush's imperial realpolitik is making the world worse than the one we had.

First, if the just peacemaking paradigm is to succeed, it needs to engage the classical realism of North American theology and international relations more deeply than it has. It needs to bring into its theory more than it has the fact that very significant political leadership does not want conflict resolution, nonviolent social change, democracy, or a stronger United Nations. Significant American political actors are insecure and naive about international relations and religion, and they favor the promotion of their own economic well-being and their own oligarchic-class interests. All of us who work in international relations and ethics are self-interested, somewhat provincial sinners, and we must account for this truth in our analysis.

Second, many of our allies and competitor nations are governed by people no better than we are, and their perspectives arc limited by Communist, Hindu, Muslim, African, Latin American, and European prejudices. Nations arc organized so as to be driven by many factors other than the concern for peace. National interests built into the governing structures of societies simply cannot be neglected when thinking about international relations. The insecurities of the elites ruling various societies are expressed not only by their personalities but by their armed forces, diplomats, corporate organization, and international relations.

Finally, even as the political scientists of the just peacemaking committee recognized, international relations arc a mixture of anarchical and cooperative trends. There is not enough community in the world to build international institutions that would promote order in the world and abolish war. The world is not a Hobbesian world of war of all against all, but neither is it a world where the people of the United States, Saudi Arabia, Rwanda, Switzerland, and China support common goals toward peace.

Gazing into the ruins of the World Trade Center confirmed for me the above response to just peacemaking theory. The ruins, of course, have no single originating event, but the humiliation of islam, the pride of the son of the greedy bin Laden family, the failure of the U.S. ambassador to warn Sadam Hussein that Kuwait was a vital interest to the Bush administration, the Clinton carelessness about foreign policy, the failure of the second Bush administration to take seriously the Middle East, and the violent tendencies of some sectarian movements of Islam all combined to topple the towers of pride.

The deep-seated origins of organized violence in the human soul require more analysis of just peacemaking theory and a more profound recognition of sin. Probably all in the Society of Christian Ethics learned from Darwin's theory of evolution, Freud's theory of civilization, Marx's theory of class, Rauschenbusch s theory of human solidarity, and Niebuhr's theory of sin, if not from the more recent writings of Rene Girard and Marjoric Suchocki of the deep connections of our human essence and violence.

Just peacemaking theory can supplement Christian or prophetic realism well. It seems unlikely to displace it. The practices of peacemaking are all useful, but they will not bring universal peace or the abolition of war. Realism needs reforming. The religious base of the realism called moral or Christian or prophetic needs to be emphasized. This prophetic realism derived from the Bible needs to be distinguished from realpolitik derived from Thucydides and Machiavelli. The realists' understandings of national interest and power need to be clarified and related to both values and ontology. The whole underlying moral perspective of prophetic realism needs to be explicated. The provisional division between international politics and international economy suggested by Hans Morgenthau needs to be undone and reconceptionalized. The real history of prophetic moralism, through its exponents from Amos, Augustine, Calvin, and Wesley to Niebuhr and beyond, needs a fresh narration. Finally, the deep connections between realism and peacemaking need to be explained.

The containment and limitation on human violence on the international scene for as long as international politics continues will require not only the balancing of power, diplomacy, international organization, and moral limitation but also sometimes the pursuit of peace through war. So even as our own society drifts into greater injustice, we will work for peace by building world community, providing international human economic aid, balancing power, supporting the United Nations, organizing locally for peace and justice, promoting international morality, reducing religious militancy, working for international law, struggling for ecojustice, advocating disarmament, seeking international courts, securing democratic allies, improving diplomacy, teaching our children, and saying our prayers.

### Pure rejection reproduces sovereignty and exploitation.  Only political action can end global oppression

Anna M. Agathangelou, Dir. Global Change Inst. And Women’s Studies Prof @ Oberlin, and L.H.M. Ling, Inst. For Social Studies @ Hague, Fall 1997, Studies in Political Economy, v. 54, p 7-8

Yet, ironically if not tragically, dissident IR also paralyzes itself into non-action. While it challenges the status quo, dissident IR fails to transform it. Indeed, dissident IR claims that a "coherent" paradigm or research program - even an alternative one - reproduces the stifling parochialism and hidden power-mongering of sovereign scholarship. "Any agenda of global politics informed by critical social theory perspectives," writes Jim George "must forgo the simple, albeit self-gratifying, options inherent in ready-made alternative Realisms and confront the dangers, closures, paradoxes, and complicities associated with them.t'-' Even references to a "real world," dissidents argue, repudiate the very meaning of dissidence given their sovereign presumption of a universalizable, testable Reality." What dissident scholarship opts for, instead, is a sense of disciplinary crisis that "resonates with the effects of marginal and dissident movements in all sorts of other localities.">

Despite its emancipatory intentions, this approach effectively leaves the prevailing prison of sovereignty intact.f It doubly incarcerates when dissident IR highlights the layers of power that oppress without offering a heuristic, not to mention a program, for emancipatory action." Merely politicizing the supposedly non-political neither guides emancipatory action nor guards it against demagoguery. f At best, dissident IR sanctions a detached criticality rooted (ironically) in Western modernity. Michael Shapiro, for instance, advises the dissident theorist to take "a critical distance" or "position offshore" from which to "see the possibility of change."? But what becomes of those who know they are burning in the hells of exploitation, racism, sexism, starvation, civil war, and the like while the esoteric dissident observes "critically" from offshore? What hope do they have of overthrowing these shackles of sovereignty? In not answering these questions, dissident IR ends up reproducing, despite avowals to the contrary, the sovereign outcome of discourse divorced from practice, analysis from policy, deconstruction from reconstruction, particulars from universals, and critical theory from problem-solving.

### There’s no root of violence and war – moderation requires case-by-case approach

Victor Davis Hanson, Senior Fellow at Hoover, 2002 Wishing War Away?, <http://victorhanson.com/articles/hanson040502.html>

Unfortunately, wars are not as rare as lasting periods of peace. More people have perished in conflict since the Second World War than the 60 million who died during that horrific bloodletting. Americans should remember that even in the last two decades of "peace" we have still fought small wars in Grenada, Libya, Panama, the Gulf, Serbia, and Afghanistan. The democratic Athenians in the fifth century — the greatest hundred years of their culture — fought three out of every four years against Persians, Aegean Islanders, Cypriots, Egyptians, Spartans, Syracusans, and a host of other smaller city-states. Plato, who saw firsthand the last two decades of it all, summed up the depressing truth best when he said peace was but "a parenthesis" — as every state was always in an undeclared state of war with another.

About the only prolonged period of real peace in civilization's history occurred during the second century A.D., when for nearly a hundred years, under the so-called "Five Good Emperors," Rome's government defeated most of its enemies, ran the Mediterranean world, and pretty much treated its own people humanely. Unfortunately, we can be assured that war will never be eliminated or outlawed — only that it can be delayed or, in some cases and for long periods, prevented. In the context of the Middle East, we are on the verge of War No. 5 of the last 55 years (1947, 1956, 1967, 1973, 2002). Afghanistan has not really been at peace for a quarter-century. Iraq in a single decade has invaded Iran and Kuwait, sent missiles into Israel, and killed thousands of Kurds and Shiites.

IF WARS ARE SO FREQUENT, WHAT CAUSES THEM? A number of great philosophers, political scientists, and historians have written vast treatises on the subject. While there is no general agreement, few believe that they arise simply out of real material "grievances" — the inequity and oppression that leave thousands of innocents poor, sick, and hungry. Make everyone literate and well fed, and war might become less common — but it would not go away. Hannibal as a child swore eternal enmity toward Rome not because of an impoverished Carthage, but to restore the pride of his clan and country after the humiliation of the First Punic War.

### Policy prescription’s devoid of consequentialism excuse sacrificial war and violence in the name of ethical purity

Lewy, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts A, 1988 (Gunther, “Peace & Revolution”, p. 241-243)

Pacifists, committed to the supreme value of nonviolence, remind the rest of us who are not pacifists of the link between means and ends. Their personal “No” to killing carries an important ethical message. The pacifist vision of a world free of the threat of war can help build support for the development of an ordered political community at the international level able to resolve conflicts peacefully and justly. However, at the moment that pacifists enter the political arena to seek to influence the policies of their nation, they cease to speak as pacifists and become subject to what Weber called the “ethic of responsibility,” which takes account of the realities of power and the likely consequences of political decisions. The personal “No” of pacifists, representing an act of conscience, is morally unassailable if this act of refusal does not jeopardize the survival and well-being of others. In view of the fact that pacifists are usually a small minority of a country’s population, this condition will be met in most cases. On the other hand, the national policies proposed by pacifists must like all policies, be judged in terms of foreseeable results. As the Catholic theologian George Weigel has correctly pointed out, “the morality of political judgment must include a consequential criterion. To argue, for example, that unilateral disarmament is the sole moral option, even if its results would be to make war more likely, is not an act of prophetic witness, but a moral absurdity.

The pacifist is entitled to participate in the political process and to propose policies like any other citizen. He should recognize, however, that when entering the policy arena he must adopt standards of judgment distinct from those he applies in his personal life. He should not urge a course of action that, if implemented, would leave his country undefended or would tip the balance of power in the world in favor of expansionist and aggressor nations. As Reinhold Niebuhr argued during World War II, it may be noble for an individual to sacrifice his life rather than participate in the defense of order and justice, but one cannot ignore the ‘distinction’ between an individual act of self-abnegation and a policy of submission to injustice, whereby lives and interests other than our own are defrauded or destroyed.” Individual perfection is not a basis on which to build a political platform. Pacifists have every right to avoid the moral dilemmas posed by the world of statesmanship and statecraft and seek individual salvation through ethical absolutism and purty, but they have no right to sacrifice others for the attainment of this vocation.

American pacifist organizations today do not adhere to these principles. Worse still, they are less than candid about the muddled Marxist ideology that they have embraced and that they clothe in innocent-sounding humanitarian slogans. Pacifist groups counsel policies that are couched in the language of peace and justice, but that in fact support and promote some of the most brutal and ruthless forces in the world. Instead of openly acknowledging that they have become partisans of Communist revolution in the Third World, they call themselves “progressives” and speak of working for the establishment of a new economic world order. Instead of admitting that they seek the unilateral disarmament of the United States, they criticize the use of money for defense rather than social welfare. Seeking to convince themselves and others that national defense is no longer possible, they paint hysterical scenarios of total war in which every recourse to force is seen leading to nuclear Armageddon. In order to soothe the country’s concern about the military might of the Soviet Union and its messianic drive for world revolution, the spokesman for American pacifism attack what they call “the myth of the Soviet threat.” In 1940 Niebuhr criticized American churches and their periodicals for not telling the true story of Japanese aggression and of German tyranny in Europe for fear of arousing the “war spirit.” Similarly, American pacifist organizations today decry talk about Soviet expansionism and its evil empire on the grounds that it may stimulate a new cold war.

### Non-violence fails more often than not

J. A. H. Futterman, Ph.D. from UT-Austin and Physicist at the University of California's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, “Obscenity and Peace: Meditations on the Bomb,” 1990-94, <http://www.dogchurch.com/scriptorium/nuke.html>,

That said, I admit that I admire non-violent resistance. [[4]](http://www.dogchurch.com/scriptorium/nuke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%224) Remember, however, that non-violent resistance is a sophisticated technique that works only when used by the "right" people at the "right" time against the "right" opponents. For example, the Indians successfully used non-violent resistance to persuade the British to end the Raj, because the British eventually acknowledged that the Indians, led by the British-educated Gandhi, were human beings like themselves.

The Nazis, who with their "Master Race" ideology admitted only so-called "Aryans" to the category of human, provide an example counter to that of the British. There were some successful acts of non-violent confrontation against the Nazis, like King Christian of Denmark's public declaration that he would wear the yellow star if it were introduced in his country. He did so in response to the Nazi practice of ordering Jews to wear yellow-starred armbands so that the Nazis could more easily isolate them from their surrounding society. That many Danes followed their king's example helped camouflage many Jews until they could escape to Sweden in fishing boats. [[5]](http://www.dogchurch.com/scriptorium/nuke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%225) Now this resistance worked partly because the Nazis considered the Danes to be "Aryans" like themselves. Had the Poles tried the same thing, the Nazis would have been perfectly happy to use the event as an excuse for liquidating more Poles. Rather than awaken the Nazis' moral sense, non-violent confrontation on the part of the Poles would probably have enabled the Nazis to carry out their agenda in Poland more easily. The other reason these acts succeeded was that overwhelming violence of the Allies had stretched the Nazi forces too thin to suppress massive action by a whole populace, and eventually deprived the Nazis of the time they needed to find other ways to carry out their "final solution."

In other words, non-violence resistance alone would have been very slow to work against the Nazis, once they had consolidated their power. And while it slowly ground away at the evil in the Nazi soul, how many millions more would have died, and how much extra time would have been given to Nazi scientists trying to invent atomic bombs to go on those V-2 rockets? The evil of Nazism may well have expended itself, but perhaps after a real "thousand-year Reich," leaving a world populated only by blue-eyed blondes. In other words, if the world had used non-violence alone against the Nazis, the results may have been much worse those of the war.[[6]](http://www.dogchurch.com/scriptorium/nuke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%226)

### Must back up non-violence with the threat of violence – action of MLK and Malcolm X prove this solves best

J. A. H. Futterman, Ph.D. from UT-Austin and Physicist at the University of California's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, “Obscenity and Peace: Meditations on the Bomb,” 1990-94, <http://www.dogchurch.com/scriptorium/nuke.html>,

Even when non-violence does succeed, it does so by rallying the majority of the population toward whom it is directed to stop the direct perpetrators of injustice by force — the force of law in the form of the police, the prisons, and the polls — force that necessarily includes the threat of violence. In other words, non-violent resistance harnesses (or co-opts), rather than eliminates violence.

In fact, non-violence is sometimes even helped by the threat of violence to achieve its objectives. The non-violence of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was complemented by the willingness to use "any means necessary" of Malcolm X. These two men were sending white America the same message concerning justice and racial equality. If whites failed to respond to the message stated gently, whites would be given the opportunity to respond to it stated violently. It took both statements to achieve the progress made thus far.

## AT: KAPPELER

### Kappeler’s narrow analysis on her own method of analysis of violence and dismissal of alternative modes of human behavior – dooms the kritik to failure

Kath Gelber, The will to oversimplify, Review of The Will to Violence: The Politics of Personal Behaviour By Susanne Kappeler, This article was posted on the Green Left Weekly Home Page, 1995, <http://www.greenleft.org.au/back/1995/198/198p26b.htm>

Kappeler's thesis is that violence in all these cases is caused in the final instance by one overriding factor — the individual choice to commit a violent act. Of course, in one sense that is true. Acknowledging alternative models of human behaviour and analyses of the social causes of violence, Kappeler dismisses these as outside her subject matter and exhorts her readers not to ignore the "agent's decision to act as he [sic] did", but to explore "the personal decision in favour of violence".

Having established this framework, she goes on to explore various aspects of personal decisions to commit violence. Ensuing chapters cover topics such as love of the "other", psychotherapy, ego-philosophy and the legitimation of dominance.

However, it is the introduction which is most interesting. Already on the third page, Kappeler is dismissive of social or structural analyses of the multiple causes of alienation, violence and war. She dismisses such analyses for their inability to deal with the personal decision to commit violence.

For example, "some left groups have tried to explain men's sexual violence as the result of class oppression, while some Black theoreticians have explained the violence of Black men as a result of racist oppression". She continues, "The ostensible aim of these arguments may be to draw attention to the pervasive and structural violence of classism and racism, yet they not only fail to combat such inequality, they actively contribute to it" [my emphasis].

Kappeler goes on to argue that, "although such oppression is a very real part of an agent's life context, these 'explanations' ignore the fact that not everyone experiencing the same oppression uses violence", i.e. the perpetrator has decided to violate.

Kappeler's aim of course was to establish a framework for her particular project: a focus on the individual and the psychological to "find" a cause for violence. However, her rejection of alternative analyses not only as of little use, but as actively contributing to the problem, frames her own thesis extremely narrowly. Her argument suffers from both her inability, or unwillingness, to discuss the bigger picture and a wilful distortion of what she sees as her opponents' views.