# \*\*\*Security Kritik\*\*\*

[\*\*\*Security Kritik\*\*\* 1](#_Toc296263910)

[\*\*\*Neg\*\*\* 2](#_Toc296263911)

[1NC 1/6 3](#_Toc296263912)

[2NC Epistemology DA 9](#_Toc296263913)

[Securitization Link/Alternative 2NC—AT: Alt Fails 1/3 10](#_Toc296263914)

[1NC Asteroids Link 13](#_Toc296263915)

[Asteroids Link 1/2 14](#_Toc296263916)

[Planetary Destruction Link—Narrative Key—AT: Threat Real 16](#_Toc296263918)

[Space Leadership/Exploration Link 17](#_Toc296263919)

[Space Policy Link\*\* 1/2 18](#_Toc296263920)

[Impact—Superweapons—AT: Threat=Real 1/2 20](#_Toc296263921)

[Impact—NVL 22](#_Toc296263922)

[Impact/Alternative—Resistance Key 1/2 23](#_Toc296263923)

[AT: Permutation—Link Outweighs 25](#_Toc296263924)

[AT: Permutation 1/3 26](#_Toc296263925)

[AT: Threat Construction/Realism Good 29](#_Toc296263926)

[AT: Realism Inevitable 1/2 30](#_Toc296263927)

[AT: Predictions Good 32](#_Toc296263928)

[AT: Framework 33](#_Toc296263929)

[AT: Alternative Fails 34](#_Toc296263930)

[\*\*\*Aff\*\*\* 35](#_Toc296263931)

[Framework 36](#_Toc296263932)

[Discourse Doesn’t Shape Reality 37](#_Toc296263933)

[Realism Inevitable 38](#_Toc296263934)

[Specific Space Scenarios Outweigh 39](#_Toc296263935)

[Case Outweighs 40](#_Toc296263936)

[Case Turns Critique 41](#_Toc296263937)

[Aff Solves Impact 42](#_Toc296263938)

[No Root Cause 43](#_Toc296263939)

[Alternative Fails 1/2 44](#_Toc296263940)

[Predictions Good 1/2 46](#_Toc296263941)

[Threat Construction Good 48](#_Toc296263942)

\*\*note: aff’s should also use space militarizarion good as a source of answers to this argument

# \*\*\*Neg\*\*\*

## 1NC 1/6

### The Affirmative’s construction of cosmic threats makes militarization inevitable—their narrative is not a neutral depiction of the world, but instead actively constructs the need for technological domination.

**Felicity Mellor, Science Communication—Imperial College, 2007**

**“Colliding Worlds: Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space”, Social Studies of Science, 37(4), August, p. 499-502**

Since the late 1980s, a small group of astronomers and planetary scientists has repeatedly warned of the threat of an asteroid impacting with Earth and causing global destruction. They foretell a large impact causing global fires, the failure of the world’s agriculture and the end of human civilization. But, these scientists assure us, we live at a unique moment in history when we have the technological means to avert disaster. They call for support for dedicated astronomical surveys of near-Earth objects to provide early warning of an impactor and they have regularly met with defence scientists to discuss new technologies to deflect any incoming asteroids.

The scientists who have promoted the asteroid impact threat have done so by invoking narratives of technological salvation – stories which, like the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), promise security through a superweapon in space. The asteroid impact threat can therefore be located within the broader cultural history of fantasies about security and power, which, Bruce Franklin (1988) has argued, is inextricably linked to the century-old idea that a new superweapon could deliver world peace. Howard McCurdy (1997 78–82), in his study of the ways in which the US space programme was shaped by popular culture, has suggested that the promotion of the impact threat can be seen as the completion of Cold War fantasies, which had used a politics of fear to justify space exploration. McCurdy highlights the alignment between the promotion of the impact threat and works of fiction. In this paper, I consider the reconceptualization of asteroid science that this alignment entailed.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a complete history of the science of planetary impacts. My focus is on how a group of scientists moved from seeing impacts as significant events in Earth history to seeing them as threatening events in the human future – a move from historical to futurological narratives. Nor is there space to give a full account of the empirical developments that were used to support the construal of asteroids as a threat. Rather, I wish to make the case that these empirical developments were given meaning within a specific narrative context which drew civilian astronomers into contact with defence scientists, especially those working on SDI.

A number of studies (for example, McDougall, 1985; Forman, 1987; Kevles, 1990; DeVorkin, 1992; Leslie, 1993; Dennis, 1994) have revealed the ways in which US research programmes and nominally-civilian scientific institutions originated in military programmes. One aim of this paper is to demonstrate how the boundary between civilian and military science is blurred not just institutionally, but also at a fundamental conceptual level. The civilian scientists discussed here followed different working practices and traded in different forms of expertise than did the defence scientists. They were typically astronomers or planetary scientists who worked for NASA or on NASA-funded research programmes at universities and private institutes. They saw themselves as distinct from the defence scientists who were typically physicists and engineers working on new weapons systems or other technologies of national security at the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories or at armed services institutions. Yet the two groups came to share an interest in asteroids and with that a set of assumptions about the nature of human society, the role of technology and our place in outer space. As they came into contact, their differing backgrounds meant they disagreed over a number of issues, yet both sides pursued the collaboration despite the tensions.

Many studies of the interaction between military and civilian science have focused on sources of funding and shared technologies. Important as these are, they fail to capture fully the dynamic between the two communities. In particular, a cynical picture of scientists simply pursuing sources of funding on any terms cannot reveal the far-reaching ways in which civilian research can become entrenched in particular patterns of thinking which are supportive of militaristic programmes. For military/civilian collaborations to be sustained, civilian scientists need to share with their counterparts in the defence sector an understanding of the overall trajectory of their research. For shared technologies to be developed, they need first to be imagined. Military/civilian interactions are therefore predicated on, and mediated through, a shared technoscientific imaginary. Despite expressing concerns about the motives and methods of the weapons scientists, the civilian scientists who promoted the asteroid impact threat drew on narratives that configured a human role in space in a similar way to SDI. These narratives helped make asteroids conceivable as a threat, yet they also served to make acceptable, and even necessary, the idea of space-based weaponry. Despite their disagreements, at the level of their shared narratives the discourses of the civilian and defence scientists were mutually supportive.

<continues>

1NC 2/6

<continued>

Several studies of the role of narrative in the production of scientific knowledge have identified it as a means of generating coherence in science that both enables and constrains further research (Haraway, 1989; O’Hara, 1992; Rouse, 1996; Brown, 1998). Richard Harvey Brown is the most explicit about what constitutes a narrative, defining it as ‘an accounting of events or actions temporally that explains them causally or motivationally’ (Brown, 1998: 98). Brown’s definition of narrative fits with that of narrative theorists such as Mieke Bal (1997) who have stressed that narrative entails not a random unfolding of events but a sequenced ordering involving a transition from one state to another brought about or experienced by actors. One implication of this is the fundamental role of causality and agency. Another is that a narrative beginning always anticipates an ending – a resolution or closure to the events that have been set in motion. Historian Hayden White (1981: 23) has argued that the tendency to present history as narrative ‘arises out of a desire to have real events display the coherence, integrity, fullness, and closure of an image or life that is and can only be imaginary’. He finds that narrative closure involves a passage from one moral order to another. ‘Where, in any account of reality, narrativity is present, we can be sure that morality or a moralizing impulse is present too’ (White, 1981: 22). In this sense, narrative is inherently teleological and ideological. The inexorable movement of a narrative towards a predetermined end ensures that its many assumptions go unchallenged. An analytical approach to the interaction between military and civilian science that recognizes the ideological function of narrative can help sidestep some of the difficulties associated with the distortionist thesis often attributed to Paul Forman’s (1987) landmark paper on the military basis of US post-war physics. Forman has been criticized for implying that without military patronage, physics would have followed an ideal direction unaffected by outside interests (for example, Kevles, 1990). By looking at what sorts of narratives scientists draw on, we can avoid Forman’s supposed idealism. The question is not so much whether science has been distorted, but through which of many possible stories a research programme has been articulated. To ask which stories have been invoked is to ask which ideologies have implicitly been accepted. And to ask that is to allow that, on ideological grounds, some stories are preferable to others. Because narratives are shared within a research community, they are not always explicitly articulated in texts. Technical papers are most likely to hide the fundamental assumptions that underpin a research area. However, literature addressed to wider audiences is often more explicit. Grey literature, such as policy reports or review papers, and popularizations written by scientists are therefore useful sources for identifying the narrative context in which a science is framed, traces of which may also be found in technical papers. While always remembering that such accounts are written with particular persuasive or marketing goals in mind, these texts nonetheless reveal what, to the scientist-author, is both thinkable and compelling. In what follows, I draw on this full range of texts, from technical papers to popularizations, to show that the scientists promoting the impact threat have repeatedly turned to narratives of technological salvation that imagined the ultimate superweapon – a space-based planetary defence system that would protect the Earth from the cosmic enemy. I begin with a brief overview of earlier conceptions of asteroids before outlining the events through which asteroids were promoted as a threat and examining the narrative context in which this occurred. I finish by arguing that the narration of the impact threat entailed a reconceptualization of asteroids, space and astronomy and invoked a ‘narrative imperative’ that helped legitimize the militarization of space.

1NC 3/6

### And, their production of outer space as sphere for U.S. control produces militarisitic subjectivities—the politics of the aff ensures a never-ending war against alterity.

**Jackie Orr, Sociology at Syracuse, 2004**

**The Militarization of Inner Space, Critical Sociology, Sage Journals**

“[E]very American is a soldier” now, declared George W. Bush one month after September 11, 2001. 2 Speaking at the ﬁrst meeting of the new Homeland Security Council, whose opening order of business was to beef up U.S. border operations by tightening immigration surveillance and control, Mr. Bush’s pronouncement itself performed a consequential border crossing. His sweeping rhetorical induction of the entire U.S. citizenry into the ranks of military combatants obliterated the very boundary between ‘civilian’ and ‘soldier’ on which popular understandings of ‘terrorism’ fundamentally depend: would future attacks on U.S. civilians now be acknowledged as a targeted assault on U.S. soldiers? Mr. Bush’s border transgression, conducted in the midst and in the name of intensiﬁed border patrols, raises a few other urgent questions for the newly anointed civilian- soldier: When was I trained for battle? What are my weapons and how do they work? And where, precisely, stands this “home” which the new armies of civilians are asked to secure? Which borders are we really being asked to defend? What exactly is this war into which the U.S. civilian-soldier has been involuntarily drafted? The ‘war against terrorism’ is the repetitiously proffered answer to this last query. But a little bit of history and the website of the U.S. Space Command suggest another story. The U.S. Space Command was established in 1985 as the coordinating military body unifying Army, Navy, and Air Force activities in outer space. “As stewards for military space,” states General Howell M. Estes III, the Space Command’s ex-Commander in Chief, “we must be prepared to exploit the advantages of the space medium.” In Joint Vision 2010, an operational plan for securing and maintaining unchallengeable “space power,” the U.S. Space Command describes how “the medium of space is the fourth medium of warfare – along with land, sea, and air.” The end result of the “emerging synergy of space superiority with land, sea, and air superiority” is the achievement of Full Spectrum Dominance: the capacity of the U.S. military to dominate in any conﬂict, waged in any terrestrial or extraterrestrial medium. Or, in the Space Command’s words, displayed onscreen against the black, star- studded background of empty space: “U.S. Space Command – dominating the space dimension of military operations to protect U.S. interests and investment. Integrating Space Forces into warﬁghting capabilities across the full spectrum of conﬂict.” 3 The battles for which the U.S. Space Command is prepared are not futuristic science ﬁction scenarios. As the command center responsible for the protection and proliferation of military and commercial satellites, and for the rejuvenated National Missile Defense program, the Space Command is already a key player in the conduct of U.S. war. Satellite- mediated infotech warfare has arrived. The militarized use of space-based satellites to provide real-time ﬂows of information and imagery debuted in the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989, developed in the 1990s during the U.S.-led war against Iraq and in the killing ﬁelds of Kosovo, and is today an integral component of U.S. military activity in Afghanistan and Iraq (Gray 1997; Grossman 2001). “Space support to NATO’s operations in Kosovo was a perfect example of how the United States will ﬁght its wars in the future,” the Space Command reported in 2002, “Satellite- guided munitions, communications, navigation, and weather all combined to achieve military objectives in a relatively short amount of time and without the loss of a single U.S. troop.” 4 As home to an increasingly sophisticated and expensive infrastructure of satellites, and to a proposed network of (possibly nuclear-powered) space stations equipped with laser weaponry, ‘outer space’ is now the ﬁnal, fantastic frontier for the U.S. military’s imaginary and material battleﬁelds. With Full Spectrum Dominance as its ofﬁcial doctrine, the U.S. Space Command clearly articulates its 21st century mission: to ensure that the United States will remain a global power and exert global leadership during the current “globalization of the world economy.” Noting with admirable sociological acumen that this globalization will create a “widening between ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ . . . [and] [t]his gap will widen – creating regional unrest,” the U.S. Space Command announces that the new strategic situation requires “a global perspective to conduct military operations and support regional warﬁghting. . .” 5 The U.S. Space Command stands ready to serve. And we – we civilian-soldiers – where do we stand? In what space really do we wage our scrambled warfare, our civilian participation in the militarized state of the nation? Are we all soldiers now in the battle for Full Spectrum Dominance of the globe? South Asia. Eurasia. East Asia. Central Asia. What boot camp has prepared us for the rigors of a perpetually ambiguous, inﬁnitely expanding battleﬁeld? Across what geography is the ‘war against terrorism’ really mapped? Land. Sea. Air. Space. In how many dimensions must today’s civilian-soldier really move? The Bush administration’s ﬁrst National Security Strategy document, published in September 2002, offers the inquiring civilian-soldier some in- dication of the full scope of the battle plans. Twelve months after launch- ing its boundless war against terrorism, the administration introduced its new doctrine of preemptive strikes, unilaterally pursued, against perceived threats. National security now depends, the civilian-soldier learns, on “iden- tifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. . . [W]e will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively.” 6 Released just as the Bush administration stepped up its rhetorical and operational preparations for a military invasion and occu- pation of Iraq, the document leads even mainstream media commentators to note, with measured alarm, its imperial posture. An editorial published in The Atlanta Journal-Constitution a week after the document is made public describes it as a “plan for permanent U.S. military and economic domina- tion of every region on the globe.” The editorial warns:

<continues>

1NC 4/6

<continued>

“This war [against Iraq], should it come, is intended to mark the ofﬁcial emergence of the United States as a full-ﬂedged global empire, seizing sole responsibility and authority as planetary policemen.” 7 If the militarization of outer space is an essential component of Full Spectrum Dominance, and if the so-called ‘war against terrorism’ must be situated within broader U.S. ambitions for global empire, 8 it is perhaps useful for today’s civilian-soldier to wonder just how wide and deep is a “full spectrum” of dominance? What borders must be crossed to fully dominate such an inﬁnity of space? Perhaps the domination of outer space in the interests of militarized technologies and intelligence requires the militarization of a somewhat more covert spatial territory – a territory more spectral, less smoothly operationalized but no less necessary to global dominion. What happens in that elusive terrain of ‘inner space’ as outer space becomes an overt ﬁeld for fully militarized command posts? Is the ‘inner’ psychic terrain of today’s U.S. civilian-soldier another battleﬁeld on the way to full spectrum dominance of the globe? What kind of militarized infrastructure is needed ‘inside’ the soldierly civilian called upon to support the establishment of military superiority across the spectrum of spaces ‘outside’? To what extent might Full Spectrum Dominance depend intimately on commanding ‘space power’ in both outer and inner space? The psychology of the civilian-soldier, the networks of everyday emotional and perceptual relations, constitute an ‘inner space’ that is today, I suggest, one volatile site of attempted military occupation. But the occupying forces I’m concerned with here are not those of an invasive, enemy ‘other.’ Rather, a partial and urgent history of attempts by the U.S. government, media, military, and academy to enlist the psychological life of U.S. citizens as a military asset – this is the embodied story that occupies me here. The militarization of inner space, a complex, discontinuous story that nowhere crystallizes into the clear knot of conspiracy but which leaves its uneven traces throughout the scattered archives of the 20th century United States, is now as it has been before a major concern of those most responsible for the business of war. Militarization, deﬁned by historian Michael Geyer as “the contradictory and tense social process in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence,” constitutes at its core a border-crossing between military and civilian institutions, activities and aims (1989: 79). The militarization of inner space can be conceived, then, as the psychological organization of civil society for the production of violence, an important feature of a broader – tense and contradictory – social process. It is not my intention to reify ‘psychology’ or psychological processes as if they could be separated from social, historical, or economic contexts. Quite the contrary. By naming the constructed ‘inner space’ of psychological activities as increasingly militarized – with the events of September 11 serving as an accelerator and intensiﬁer of processes that are by no means new – my hope is to deepen a critical sociological commitment to contesting the ‘space’ of psychology as the radically social matter of political struggle, as one radically material weapon of war. Or its refusal. While I refer to this psychological space as ‘inner,’ it of course is not irreducibly individual, and is never conﬁned to a neat interiority. Inner space both produces and is produced by deeply social ways of seeing, profoundly cultural technologies of perception. And though I want to reject any notion of a homogeneous collective psyche, I do want to conjure the dense sociality and historicity of psychology spaces. Psychological life occupies a difﬁcult borderland, a ‘between-space’ where the question and human confusions of what is ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ are repetitiously experienced, and consciously and unconsciously lived. Indeed, the space of psychology is the very site where everyday sensations of what’s ‘inside’ and what’s ‘outside,’ what’s ‘them’ and what’s ‘us,’ what feels safe and what seems fatally frightening are culturally (re)produced or resisted; it is an intensely border-conscious space. The politics of borders – how they’re made and unmade, what they come to mean – is one shifting center of the politics of nationalism, of language, of memory, of race, gender, class, of terror. What has come in the modern West to be called the ‘psychological’ plays a dramatic, power-charged role within each of these entangled political ﬁelds. The militarization of psychological space can be imagined then as a strategic set of psychological border operations aimed at the organization of civil society for the production of violence.

1NC 5/6

### Their preoccupied focus on the nation state results in a violent struggle to overcome uncertainty in the name of an unattainable security—this futile quest makes extinction inevitable

**David Campbell and Michael Dillon, professor of international politics at the University of Newcastle and professor of politics at Lancaster University, 1993**

**The Political Subject of Violence, p. 163-165**

This interpretation of violence as constitutive of identity might, paradoxically, offer the only hope of some amelioration of the worst excesses of violence exhibited by the formation of (political) identity. The orthodox rendering of such violence as pre-modern abdicates its responsibility to a predetermined historical fatalism. For if these ethnic and nationalist conflicts are understood as no more than settled history rearing its ugly head, then there is nothing that can be done in the present to resolve the tension except to repress them again. In this view, the historical drama has to be enacted according to its script, with human agency in suspension while nature violently plays itself out. The only alternative is for nature to be overcome as the result of an idealistic transformation at the hands of reason. Either way, this fatalistic interpretation of the relationship between violence and the political is rooted in a hypostatised conception of man/nature as determinative of the social/political: the latter is made possible only once the former runs its course, or if it is overturned. It might have once been the case that the prospect of a transformation of nature by reason seemed both likely and hopeful—indeed, many of the most venerable of the debates in the political theory of international relations revolved around this very point. But, having reached what Foucault has called society’s ‘threshold of modernity’, ‘we’ now face a prospect that radically re-figures the parameters of politics: the real prospect of extinction. As Foucault argues, we have reached this threshold because the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies. For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity of a political existence: modern man is an animal whose politics place his existence as a living being in question. How the prospect of extinction might materialise itself is an open question. That increasingly it can be materialised, militarily, ecologically and politically, is not.

The double bind of this prospect is that modernity’s alternative of transformation through reason is not only untenable, it is deeply complicit in the form of (inter)national life that has been responsible for bringing about the real prospect of extinction in the first place. The capacity of violence to eradicate being was engendered by reason’s success; not merely, or perhaps even most importantly, by furnishing the technological means, but more insidiously in setting the parameters of the political (Ia politique, to use the useful terms of debate in which Simon Critchley engages) while fuelling the violent practices of politics (la politique). The reliance on reason as that which could contain violence and reduce the real prospect of extinction may prove nothing less than a fatal misapprehension. In support of this proposition, consider the interpretive bases of the Holocaust.

For all that politics in the last fifty years has sought to exceptionalise the Nazis’ genocide as an aberrant moment induced by evil personalities, there is no escaping the recognition that modern political life lies heavily implicated in the instigation and conduct of this horror. In so far as modernity can be characterised as the promotion of rationality and efficiency to the exclusion of alternative criteria for action, the Holocaust is one outcome of the ‘civilising process’. With its plan rationally to order Europe through the elimination of an internal other, its bureaucratised administration of death, and its employment of the technology of a modern state, the Holocaust ‘was not an irrational outflow of the not-yet-fully-eradicated residence of pre-modern barbarity. It was a legitimate resident in the house of modernity; indeed, one who would not be at home in any other house’.’°

The paradoxical nature of modernity is suggested by the emergence of a Holocaust from within its bosom. And there can be no better indication in contradistinction to those ‘modernists’ who would like to brand so-called ‘postmodernists’ with the responsibility for all and future Holocausts — that a reliance on established traditions of reason for ethical succour and the progressive amelioration of the global human condition may be seriously misplaced. The comfort we have derived from the etiological myth of modern politics has occluded the way in which the ‘civilising process’ of which that myth speaks has disengaged ethics from politics. As Bauman concludes:

We need to take stock of the evidence that the civilizing process is, among other things, a process of divesting the use and deployment of violence from moral calculus, and of emancipating the desiderata of rationality from interference of ethical norms and moral inhibitions.”

1NC 6/6

### The affirmative’s securitizing narratives make a politics of permanent war inevitable. Voting negative to endorse of criticism of their securitizing narrative is the essential first step towards a peaceful approach to space science.

**Felicity Mellor, Science Communication—Imperial College, 2007**

**“Colliding Worlds: Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space”, Social Studies of Science, 37(4), August, p. 499-502**

The asteroid impact threat offered a scientifically validated enemy onto which could be projected the fears on which a militaristic culture depends. Far from providing a replacement outlet for weapons technologies, the promotion of the asteroid impact threat helped make the idea of war in space more acceptable and helped justify the continued development of spacebased weaponry. Arguably, with the Clementine and Deep Impact missions, the asteroid impact threat even facilitated the testing of SDI-style systems. The asteroid impact threat legitimized a way of talking, and thinking, that was founded on fear of the unknown and the assumption that advanced technology could usher in a safer era. In so doing, it resonated with the politics of fear and the technologies of permanent war that are now at the centre of US defence policy. In this post-Cold War period, scholars of the relation between military and civilian science need to examine carefully claims about ‘ploughshare’ or ‘conversion’ technologies. New technologies arise not just out of funding and policy decisions, but also out of the social imaginaries in which new weapons can be imagined and construed as necessary. Concepts such as ‘dual use’ or ‘cover’ also need to be assessed critically.35 One way of characterizing the Clementine missions would be as dual-use technologies whose scientific aims served as cover for the testing of SDI technologies. Yet this fails to reveal the ways in which these missions were just one concrete output of a more fundamental conceptual alliance between weapons designers and astronomers. In this paper, I have attempted to show that by also considering the narrative context in which such initiatives are located, it is possible to throw some light on the cultural web that binds civilian science to military programmes. But the focus on narrative also begs a question: Which stories would we prefer to frame our science? Should science be driven by fear or by curiosity? Should it be aimed at creating technologies of war or cultures of compassion? These are normative questions, but they are also precisely the questions that make the military influence on science such an important issue. Narratives are inherently ideological and a refusal to see them as such does no more to enhance the scholar’s objectivity than it does the scientist’s. The stories told by the asteroid scientists led them into collaborations with weapons scientists and helped fuel a discourse of fear that served a particular ideological purpose. This should be both recognized and challenged, not for the sake of regaining some impossible ideal of an undistorted science but because there are other stories, based on different ideological assumptions, that we could tell in order to guide science towards more peaceful ends.

## 2NC Epistemology DA

### their supposedly disinterested knowledge production necessitates genocidal violence—the other can only be a target for US bombs within their self-referential framework.

Rey Chow, Comparative Literature—Brown University, 2006

The Age of the World Target, p. 40-42

Often under the modest and apparently innocuous agendas of fact gathering and documentation, the "scientific" and "objective" production of knowledge during peacetime about the various special "areas" became the institutional practice that substantiated and elaborated the militaristic conception of the world as target.52 In other words, despite the claims about the apolitical and disinterested nature of the pursuits "I higher learning, activities undertaken under the rubric of area studies, such as language training, historiography, anthropology, economics, political science, and so forth, are fully inscribed in the politics and ideology of war. To that extent, the disciplining, research, and development of so-called academic information are part and parcel of a strategic logic. And yet, if the production of knowledge (with its vocabulary of aims and goals, research, data analysis, experimentation, and verification) in fact shares the same scientific and military premises as war‚—if, for instance, the ability to translate a difficult language can be regarded as equivalent to the ability to break military codes53‚—is it a surprise that it is doomed to fail in its avowed attempts to "know" the other cultures? Can "knowledge" that is derived from the same kinds of bases as war put an end to the violence of warfare, or is such knowledge not simply warfare's accomplice, destined to destroy rather than preserve the forms of lives at which it aims its focus? As long as knowledge is produced in this self-referential manner, as a circuit of targeting or getting the other that ultimately consolidates the omnipotence and omnipresence of the sovereign "self"/"eye"‚— the "I"‚—that is the United States, the other will have no choice but remain just that‚— a target whose existence justifies only one thing, its destruction by the bomber. As long as the focus of our study of Asia remains the United States, and as long as this focus is not accompanied by knowledge of what is happening elsewhere at other times as well as at the present, such study will ultimately confirm once again the self-referential function of virtual worlding that was unleashed by the dropping of the atomic bombs, with the United States always occupying the position of the bomber, and other cultures always viewed as the military and information target fields. In this manner, events whose historicity does not fall into the epistemically closed orbit of the atomic bomber‚—such as the Chinese reactions to the war from a primarily anti-Japanese point of view that I alluded to at the beginning of this chapter‚—will never receive the attention that is due to them. "Knowledge," however conscientiously gathered and however large in volume, will lead only to further silence and to the silencing of diverse experiences.54 This is one reason why, as Harootunian remarks, area studies has been, since its inception, haunted by "the absence of a definable object"‚—and by "the problem of the vanishing object."55 As Harootunian goes on to argue, for all its investment in the study of other languages and other cultures, area studies missed the opportunity, so aptly provided by Said's criticism of Oriental ism, to become the site where a genuinely alternative form of knowledge production might have been possible. Although, as Harootunian writes, "Said's book represented an important intellectual challenge to the mission of area studies which, if accepted would have reshaped area studies and freed it from its own reliance on the Cold War and the necessities of the national security state,"56 the challenge was too fundamentally disruptive to the administrative and instrumentalist agendas so firmly routinized in area studies to be accepted by its practitioners. As a result, Said's attempt to link an incipient neocolonial discourse to the history of area studies was almost immediately belittled, dismissed, and ignored, and his critique, for all its relevance to area studies' future orientation, simply "migrated to English studies to transform the study of literature into a full-scale preoccupation with identity and its construction."57

## Securitization Link/Alternative 2NC—AT: Alt Fails 1/3

### The affirmative’s attempts to establish U.S. space control and space colonization sanctions a dangerous Astropolitik—the ideal that outer space should be conceived in terms of military strategy suspends democratic engagement and relies on a virulent ethnocentric threat construction—only refusing the 1AC’s endorsement of extending earthbound geopolitical concerns to outer space can inject democratic accountability in space policy

**Fraser Macdonald, Professor of Human Geography at the University of Melbourne, 2007**

**Anti-Astropolitik: Outer Space and the Orbit of Geography, Online**

IV Critical astropolitics Two things should now be clear. First, outer space is no longer remote from our everyday lives; it is already profoundly implicated in the ordinary workings of economy and society. Secondly, the import of space to civilian, commercial and, in particular, military objectives, means there is a great deal at stake in terms of the access to and control over Earth’s orbit. One cannot overstate this last point. The next few years may prove decisive in terms of establishing a regime of space control that will have profound implications for terrestrial geopolitics. It is in this context that I want to briefly introduce the emerging field of astropolitics, defined as ‘the study of the relationship between outer space terrain and technology and the development of political and military policy and strategy’ (Dolman, 2002: 15).It is, in both theory and practice, a geopolitics of outer space. Everett Dolman is one of the pioneers of the field. An ex-CIA intelligence analyst who teaches at the US Air Force’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies, he publishes in journals that are perhaps unfamiliar to critical geographers, like the modestly titled Small Wars and Insurgencies. As what follows is uniformly critical of Dolman’s work, I should say that his Astropolitik: classical geopolitics in the space age (Dolman,2002) is unquestionably a significant book: it has defined a now vibrant field of research and debate. Astropolitik draws together a vast literature on space exploration and space policy, and presents a lucid and accessible introduction to thinking strategically about space. (In the previous section I drew heavily on Dolman’s description of the astropolitical environment). My critique is not founded on scientific or technical grounds but on Dolman’s construction of a formal geopolitics designed to advance and legitimate the unilateral military conquest of space by the United States. While Dolman has many admirers among neoconservative colleagues in Washington think-tanks, critical engagements (e.g.Moore, 2003; Caracciolo, 2004) have been relatively thin on the ground. Dolman’s work is interesting for our purposes here precisely because he draw’s on geography’s back catalogue of strategic thinkers, most prominently Halford Mackinder, whose ideas gained particular prominence in America in the wake oft he Russian Sputnik (Hooson, 2004: 377). But Dolman is not just re-fashioning classical geopolitics in the new garb of ‘astropolitics’; he goes further and proposes an ‘Astropolitik’ – ‘a simple but effective blueprint for space control’ (p.9) – modeled on Karl Hausofer’s Geopolitik as much as Realpolitik. Showing some discomfort with the impeccably fascist pedigree of this theory, Dolman cautions against the ‘misuse’ of Astropolitik and argues that the term ‘is chosen as a constant reminder of that past, and as a grim warning for the future’(Dolman, 2002: 3). At the same time, however, his book is basically a manual for achieving space dominance. Projecting Mackinder’s famous thesis on the geographical pivot of history (Mackinder, 1904) onto outer space, Dolman argues that ‘who controls the Lower Earth Orbit controls near-Earth space. Who controls near-Earth space dominates Terra [Earth]. Who dominates Terra determines the destiny of humankind’. Dolman sees the quest for space as already having followed classically Mackinderian principles (Dolman, 2002: 87). And like Mackinder before him, Dolman is writing in the service of his Empire. ‘Astropolitik like Realpolitik’ he writes, ‘is hardnosed and pragmatic, it is not pretty or uplifting or a joyous sermon for the masses. But neither is it evil. Its benevolence or malevolence become apparent only as it is applied, and by whom’(Dolman, 2002: 4). Further inspiration is drawn from Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose classic volume The Influence of Seapower Upon History, has been widely cited by space strategists (Mahan, 1890; Gray, 1996; see also Russell, 2006).Mahan’s discussion of the strategic value of coasts, harbours, well–worn seapaths and chokepoints has its parallel in outer space (see France, 2000). The implication of Mahan’s work, Dolman concludes, is that ‘the United States must be ready and prepared, in Mahanian scrutiny, to commit to the defense and maintenance of these assets, or relinquish them to a state willing and able to do so’ (Dolman, 2002: 37). The primary problem for those advancing Astropolitik is that space is not a lawless frontier. In fact the legal character of space has long been enshrined in the principles of the OST and this has, to some extent, prevented it from being subject to unbridled interstate competition. ‘While it is morally desirable to explore space in common with all peoples’ writes Dolman without conviction, ‘even the thought of doing so makes weary those who have the means’ (Dolman,2002: 135). Thus, the veneer of transcendent humanism with regard to spacegives way to brazen self-interest. Accordingly, Dolman describes the rescommunis consensus of the OST as ‘a tragedy’ that has removed any lega lincentive for the exploitation of space (137). Only a res nulliuslegal order couldconstruct space as ‘proper objects for which states may compete’ (138). Under the paradigm of res nullius and Astropolitik, the moon and other celestial bodies would become potential new territory for states. And here Dolman again parallels Karl Hausofer’s Geopolitik. Just as Hausofer desired a break from the VersaillesTreaty (Ó Tuathail 1996: 45), Dolman wants to see the US withdraw from the OST, making full speed ahead for the Moon (see also Hickman and Dolman,2002). Non-space-faring developing countries need not worry about losing out, says Dolman, as they ‘would own no less of the Moon than they do now’ (140).To his credit, Dolman does give some attention to the divisive social consequences of this concentrated power. Drawing on earlier currents of environmental determinism and on the terrestrial model of Antarctic exploration, he ponders the characteristics of those who will be first to colonise space.

<continues>

Securitization Link/Alternative 2NC—AT: Alt Fails 2/3

<continued>

 They will be ‘highly educated, rigorously trained and psychologically screened for mental toughness and decision-making skills, and very physically fit’; ‘the bestand brightest of our pilots, technicians and scientists’; ‘rational, given to scientific analysis and explanation, and obsessed with their professions’ (26). In other words, ‘they are a superior subset of the larger group from which they spring’(27). As if this picture isn’t vivid enough, Dolman goes on to say that colonizers of space ‘will be the most capably endowed (or at least the most ruthlessly suitable, as the populating of America and Australia … so aptly illustrate[s])’ (27; myemphasis). ‘Duty and sacrifice will be the highest moral ideals’ (27). Society, he continues, must be prepared ‘to make heroes’ of those who undertake the risk of exploration (146). At the same time, ‘the astropolitical society must be prepared to forego expenditures on social programs … to channel funds into the national space program. It must be embued with the national spirit’ (146).Dolman slips from presenting what would be merely a ‘logical’ outworking of Astropolitik, to advocating that the United States adopt it as their space strategy.A long the way, he acknowledges the full anti-democratic potential of such concentrated power, detaching the state from its citizenry: ‘the United States can adopt any policy it wishes and the attitudes and reactions of the domestic public and of other states can do little to challenge it. So powerful is the United States that should it accept the harsh Realpolitik doctrine in space that the military services appear to be proposing, and given a proper explanation for employing it, there may in fact be little if any opposition to a fait accompli of total US domination in space’. 156. Although Dolman claims that ‘no attempt will be made to create a convincing argument that the United States has a right to domination in space’, in almost the next sentence he goes on to argue ‘that, in this case, might does make right’, ‘the persuasiveness of the case’ being ‘based on the self-interest of the state and stability of the system’ (156; my emphasis). Truly, this is Astropolitik: a veneration of the ineluctable logic of power and the permanent rightness of those who wield it. And if it sounds chillingly familiar, Dolman hopes to reassure us with his belief that ‘the US form of liberal democracy … is admirable and socially encompassing’ (156) and it is ‘the most benign state that has ever attempted hegemony over the greater part of the world’ (158). His sunny view that the United States is ‘willing to extend legal and political equality to all’ sits awkwardly with the current suspension of the rule of law in Guantanamo Bay as well as invarious other ‘spaces of exception’ (see Gregory, 2004; Agamben, 2005).Dolman’s astropolitical project is by no means exceptional. The journal Astropolitics, of which he is a founding editor, contains numerous papers expressing similar views. And it is easy, I think, for critical geographers to feel so secure in the intellectual and political purchase of Ó Tuathailian critiques (ÓTuathail, 1996), that we become oblivious to the undead nature of classical geopolitics. It is comforting to think that most geography undergraduates encountering geopolitics, in the UK at least, will in all likelihood do so through the portal of critical perspectives, perhaps through the excellent work of Joanne Sharp or Klaus Dodds (Dodds, 2005; Sharp, 2005). But the legacies of Mackinder and Mahan live on, and radical critique is as urgent as ever. While this is not theplace for a thoroughgoing reappraisal of astropolitics in the manner of Gearòid ÓTuathail, a few salient points from his critique can be brought out.

1. Astrography and astropolitics, like geography and geopolitics, constitute ‘apolitical domination and cultural imagining of space’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996:28). While commentators like Colin Gray have posited an ‘inescapable geography’ (e.g. ‘of course, physical geography is politically neutral’), a critical agenda conceives of geography not as a fixed substratum but as a highly social form of knowledge (Gray, 1999: 173; Ó Tuathail, 1999: 109).For geography, read ‘astrography’. We must be alert to the ‘declarative’(‘this is how the Outer Earth is’) and ‘imperative’ (‘this is what we mustdo’) modes of narration that astropolitics has borrowed from its terrestrial antecedent (Ó Tuathail, 1999: 107). The models of Mackinder and Mahanthat are so often applied to the space environment are not unchanging laws; on the contrary they are themselves highly political attempts to create and sustain particular strategic outcomes in specific historical circumstances.

2. Rather than actively supporting the dominant structures and mechanisms of power, a critical astropolitics must place the primacy of such forces always already in question. Critical astropolitics aims to scrutinise the power politics of the expert/think-tank/tactician as part of a wider project of deepening public debate and strengthening democratic accountability(Ó Tuathail, 1999: 108).

<continues>

Securitization Link/Alternative 2NC—AT: Alt Fails 3/3

<continued>

3. Mackinder’s ‘end of geography’ thesis held that the era of terrestrial exploration and discovery was over, leaving only the task of consolidating the world order to fit British interests (O’ Tuathail, 1996: 27). Dolman’svision of space strategy bears striking similarities. And like Ó Tuathail’scritique of Mackinder’s imperial hubris, Astropolitik could be reasonably described as ‘triumphalism blind to its own precariousness’ (O’ Tuathail,1996: 28). Dolman, for instance, makes little effort to conceal his tumescent patriotism, observing that ‘the United States is awash with power after its impressive victories in the 1991 Gulf War and 1999 Kosovocampaign, and stands at the forefront of history capable of presiding overthe birth of a bold New World Order’. One might argue, however, that Mackinder – as the theorist of imperial decline – may in this respect be an appropriate mentor (Ó Tuathail, 1999: 112). It is important, I think, to demystify Astropolitik: there is nothing ‘inevitable’ about US dominance in space, even if the US were to pursue this imperial logic.

4. Again like Mackinder, Astropolitik mobilizes an unquestioned ethnocentrism. Implicit in this ideology is the notion that America must beat China into space because ‘they’ are not like ‘us’. ‘The most ruthlessly suitable’ candidates for space dominance, we are told – ‘the most capably endowed’ – are like those who populated America and Australia (Dolman,2002: 27).5. A critical astropolitics must challenge the ‘mythic’ properties ofAstropolitik and disrupt its reverie for the ‘timeless insights’ of the so-called geopolitical masters. For Ó Tuathail, ‘geopolitics is mythic becauseit promises uncanny clarity … in a complex world’ and is ‘fetishistically concerned with …. prophecy’ (Ó Tuathail, 1999: 113). Ó Tuathail’s criticalproject, by contrast, seeks to recover the political and historical contexts through which the knowledge of Mackinder and Mahan has become formalized.

## 1NC Asteroids Link

### Asteroid threat discourse is part and parcel of violent technological narrative which transforms space into a warzone which needs to be conquered—their framework inevitably results in arms races and unending cycles of intervention.

**Felicity Mellor, Science Communication—Imperial College, 2007**

**“Colliding Worlds: Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space”, Social Studies of Science, 37(4), August, p. 499-502**

During the 1980s and 1990s, a small group of planetary scientists and astronomers set about actively promoting the asteroid impact threat. They drew on an expanded empirical base, but also on narratives of technological salvation. Despite their concerns that their warnings were greeted by a ‘giggle factor’ and that funding remained too low, they succeeded in capturing the attention of the media and of some policy-makers and in establishing the impact threat as a legitimate and serious topic for scientific study. By the eve of the new millennium, the meaning of asteroids had undergone a significant transformation. Asteroids had gone from being distant relics of Solar System history to being a hidden enemy that could strike at any time with catastrophic consequences. The reconceptualization of asteroids was accompanied by a reconceptualization of both space and astronomy. In Newtonianism, space had been conceived as an empty geometrical abstraction in which God’s handiwork was displayed to the knowing observer. Space was both predictable and distant. Now, with the promotion of the impact threat, space was configured as the source of an enemy against which we must defend ourselves. This threatening conception of space matched the conception of space as a theatre of war promoted by the supporters of SDI. Space had become a place, a technologized location for human action where wars could be fought and human salvation sought. Thus astronomy was also reconceptualized. Further developing the violent metaphors already appropriated by impact–extinction theory (Davis, 2001), astronomers recast their role as impassioned prophets of doom and saviours of mankind rather than as cold calculators of cosmic order. Traditionally, Solar System astronomy had dealt with the grand narratives of planetary history and the timeless certainties of celestial dynamics. The technologies of astronomy – telescopes and, later, space probes – were the tools through which new knowledge had been sought. They were not, on the whole, instruments of action. Now, however, astronomy was to be prophetic and interventionist. As comets had been in a far earlier period, both asteroids and comets were now treated as ‘monsters’ – portents of Earthly calamities. It was the purpose of planetary astronomy to watch for these portents. Equally, it was the duty of astronomers to warn the unsuspecting public and to intervene to save the world. Planetary astronomy was transformed from the passive observation of the heavens to the active surveillance of the heavens, and the instruments of astronomy were to be supplemented with the technologies of war. By the 1980s and 1990s, asteroid science, defence science and science fiction all presented space as an arena for technological intervention where an invisible enemy would be defeated for the greater good of mankind. Science fiction provided a culturally available resource that could give concrete form to the ideas of both asteroid scientists and weapons designers. Through narrative, the timeless and universal speculations of science could be converted into a specific sequence of events. By drawing on narratives of technological salvation, asteroid scientists made their case more compelling, but they also became dependent on narrative scenarios shared by the defence scientists. Even as the scientists themselves attempted to pull back from concrete proposals for weapons systems, their own discourse irresistibly drew them towards the militaristic intervention demanded by the narrative imperative. The identification of asteroids as a threat required a military response. Astronomer Duncan Steel (2000b), writing about the impact threat in The Guardian newspaper, put it most clearly when he stated that ‘we too need to declare war on the heavens’. Just as the overlap between science and science fiction was mutually supportive, so the overlap between impact science and defence helped legitimize both. The civilian scientists could draw on a repertoire of metaphors and concepts already articulated by the defence scientists to help make the case for the threat from space. They would no longer be a marginalized and underfunded group of astronomers, but would take on the ultimate role of defending the world. Similarly, in the context of the impact threat, the defence scientists could further develop their weapons systems without being accused of threatening the delicate nuclear balance of mutually assured destruction or, in the period between the fall of the Soviet Union and the 9/11 attacks, of irresponsibly generating a climate of fear in the absence of an identifiable enemy.

## Asteroids Link 1/2

### Asteroid threat discourse necessitates military cooption—their narrative framework subverts the good intentions of their policy.

**Felicity Mellor, Science Communication—Imperial College, 2007**

**“Colliding Worlds: Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space”, Social Studies of Science, 37(4), August, p. 499-502**

The construal of asteroids as acting agents, of astronomy as the means to salvation, and of human intervention in space as a moral cause, were also elements of the stories told in the fictional works. Direct references to works of science fiction in the writings of the asteroid scientists were therefore just the most explicit traces of the asteroid scientists’ dependence on narratives of technological salvation. Science and science fiction existed in a mutually reinforcing relationship in which civilian scientists, defence experts and science fiction writers all narrated the impact threat. As science and fiction became aligned, asteroids became incorporated into the world of narrative cause-and-effect with its movement towards closure. The asteroid scientists’ reliance on such narratives meant that they could not avoid the closure demanded by their stories – they were subject to a narrative imperative. Regardless of their personal feelings about weapons in space, they regularly met with defence scientists to discuss weapons technologies to deflect or destroy an incoming asteroid, for only this could provide a satisfactory resolution to their impact stories. Despite their suspicions about each other’s motives, the civilian and defence scientists’ dependence on similar narratives of technological salvation meant that they were both drawn towards the same endings.

Asteroids Link 2/2

### Their depiction of the threat of asteroid collision is coopted by defense planners to justify arms build ups—despite their best laid plans, the AFF will inevitably lead to development of new, violent, technologies.

**Felicity Mellor, Science Communication—Imperial College, 2007**

**“Colliding Worlds: Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space”, Social Studies of Science, 37(4), August, p. 499-502**

The asteroid impact threat was thus articulated within a narrative context that was closely aligned to science fiction and was shared by both civilian scientists and defence experts. As Veronica Hollinger (2000: 216–17) has noted, traditional science fiction is driven by an Aristotelian plot characterized by ‘a valorisation of the logic of cause and effect’. Impact narratives conformed to this traditional narrative logic: asteroids and scientists act by causing a series of events to unfold, from the approach of an asteroid and recognition of the threat through attempts at technological mitigation to resolution in salvation. These narratives configured asteroids as acting agents in human affairs and brought to asteroid science a structure in which human agents (and their technological proxies) solve the problem posed in the narrative and in so doing achieve closure. Allusions to impact narratives implied a direction and human-centredness to events that, once the narratives had been evoked, could not easily be suppressed. Despite their attempts to distance themselves from the weapons scientists, the civilian scientists experienced a ‘narrative imperative’ that drew them towards the same technologized ends as those promoting SDI. A sense of narrative agency was evoked even in texts that were not primarily narratival. Crucially, asteroids were no longer seen as signifiers of the mathematically exacting Newtonian system, distant objects moving through the empty backdrop of space. Rather, they were configured as proximate beasts, acting subjects that could turn against humanity at any moment. Thus in their many popular books on the subject, the scientists described technologies (for example, Ahrens & Harris, 1992; Melosh & Nemchinov, 1993; Ivashkin & Smirnov, 1995; Gritzner & Kahle, 2004). Even those scientists who warned that it was too early to draw up detailed blueprints of interception technologies accepted the narratival implication that there was a problem that needed addressing, that the problem could be addressed by human action, and that this action would involve a technological solution. Technology, in this picture, was configured as inherently progressive. As Morrison & Teller (1994: 1137) put it: ‘The development of technology in the past few centuries has been towards increasing understanding and control of natural forces in an effort to improve human life.’ Those scientists who argued against the immediate development of mitigation technology shared with its proponents a belief in the inexorable progress of technology. Future generations, they argued, would be better equipped than we are at the moment to meet the technological challenge of an impacting asteroid (for example, Ahrens & Harris, 1992). In contrast to traditional astronomical systems, which passively watched the skies, asteroid detection systems were to be surveillance systems that actively hunted the skies for objects of human import. The Spaceguard Survey was predicated on a will to action in a way in which the earlier Spacewatch Survey was not. Similarly, when it fired its impactor at Comet Tempel 1, NASA’s Deep Impact mission took a far more active intervention in space than did earlier generations of probes. This was not far from Edward Teller’s call for ‘experimentation’ with near-Earth objects to test defence technologies (Tedeschi & Teller, 1994; Teller, 1995), an idea dismissed at the time as extreme by some civilian scientists (Chapman, 1998). Likewise, one of the recommendations of the 2004 Planetary Defense Conference was that deflection techniques should be demonstrated on an actual asteroid (Ailor, 2004: 5).28 The technologization of space promoted in both the fictional works and the scientists’ technical proposals, also formed an integral part of the imagery and rhetoric that surrounded SDI, as its detractors highlighted when they re-named the project Star Wars. SDI was always premised on a vision of space as a technologized theatre of war. In the hands of a technoenthusiast such as Edward Teller, SDI was configured as a space-based technological extravaganza with few limits.29 In SDI, as in asteroid research and science fiction, space became a dynamic arena through which our technologies would move, in which our weapons would be placed, and across which our wars were to be waged.30

## Planetary Destruction Link—Narrative Key—AT: Threat Real

### Their advantages are self-serving fabrications used to justify scientific hero-worship—proves our cooption arguments are a prior question.

**Felicity Mellor, Science Communication—Imperial College, 2007**

**“Colliding Worlds: Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space”, Social Studies of Science, 37(4), August, p. 499-502**

As discussed in the introduction to this paper, narrative is an inherently teleological form. In conventional narratives, the action is moved towards closure by the heroes of the story. In the impact narratives, the heroes are technological heroes set the task of saving the world. By drawing on these narratives and following the call for human agency inherent in the narrative structure, the scientists implicitly accepted this role as a necessary one. Having shifted apocalypse from the realm of nuclear politics to that of natural science, the impact-threat scientists were able to position themselves as heroes whose combined far-sightedness and technological know-how would save us all. Emphasizing the role of the unacknowledged hero in a foreword to a volume of conference proceedings, astronomer Tom Gehrels (2002: xiii) claimed: ‘There is a beauty also in hazards, because we are taking care of them. We are working to safeguard our planet, even if the world does not seem to want to be saved.’ In a paper in another volume of conference proceedings, astrophysicist Eugene Levy was even more explicit about the scientists’ expanded role: In the arms race, the motivating dynamic was a political one. A dynamic in which scientists and engineers provided the technical tools, but, as a group, brought no special and unique wisdom to the table in making judgements about what to do. In the present case, the dynamic is different. The adversary is not another nation; the calculus is not one of political fears, anxieties, and motivations, for which we scientists have no special expertise. Rather the ‘adversary’ is the physical world. In assessing this adversary, we scientists have special and unique expertise. (Levy, 1994: 7; italics in original) Eclipsing the political dimension of the impact threat with their appeals to the natural, the scientists appropriated for themselves a heroic role. This technological hero was a moral hero – he would warn us of the danger and save us despite ourselves. Thus the scientists frequently quoted Representative George Brown’s opening statement to a Congressional hearing when he warned that if we were to do nothing about the impact threat, it would be ‘the greatest abdication in all of human history not to use our gift of rational intellect and conscience to shepherd our own survival and that of all life on Earth’.31 Through such claims, the issue of planetary defence became a moral frame through which other threats of more human origin could also be addressed. Increased knowledge and surveillance of asteroids, the scientists insisted, would help stop mistakes by the military decision-makers by preventing the misidentification of asteroid airbursts as enemy nuclear warheads (Chapman & Morrison, 1994: 39). At the same time, destroying asteroids would provide us with a way of using up those unwanted bombs. As John Lewis (1997: 215) put it: ‘The net result of the asteroid deflection is really a twofold benefit to Earth: a devastating impact would be avoided and there would be one less nuclear warhead on Earth.’ Similarly, Duncan Steel saw the use of SDI technologies in asteroid missions such as Clementine II as ‘a prime example of beating swords into ploughshares’ (quoted in Matthews, 1997).

## Space Leadership/Exploration Link

### Their attempt to control orbital space constructs it as a zone of inclusive exclusion ripe for economic and political exploitation—the affirmative is nothing more than a form of primitive accumulation which serves to solidify the formation of a global capitalist sovereignty.

**Raymond Duvall, Political Science—University of Minnesota, and Jonathan Havercroft, Political Science—University of Oklahoma, 2008**

**“Taking sovereignty out of this world: space weapons and empire of the future,” Review of International Studies, 34, 755–775**

The doctrine of space control has emerged out of the belief that assets in space represent a potential target for enemies of the US.38 There are two kinds of vulnerable US assets: private-commercial; and military. One concern is that rivals may attack commercial satellites, thereby disrupting the flow of information and inflicting significant harm on global markets.39 Militarily, the concern is that, through increasing reliance on satellites for Earth-based military operations, the US has created an ‘asymmetrical vulnerability’. An adversary (including a non-state, ‘terrorist’ organisation) could effectively immobilise US forces by disabling the satellites that provide communication, command, and control capabilities. Consequently, the project of space control is designed to protect commercial and military satellites from potential attacks. Its broader purpose, however, is to prevent rivals from having any access to space for activities antithetical to US interests; this is the imperative for ‘denial of the use of space to adversaries’. Thus space control has dual functions – it is both a privatising of the commons of orbital space and a military exclusion – in a form of ‘inclusive exclusion’.40 Space control represents the extension of US sovereignty into orbital space. Its implementation would reinforce the constitutive effect identified in the previous section on missile defence, namely to reinscribe the ‘hard shell’ border of the US, now extended to include the ‘territory’ of orbital space. US sovereignty is projected out of this world and into orbit. Under Article II of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, ‘Outer Space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means’. The US project of space control would entail a clear violation of this article.41 In addition to expanding the scope of US sovereignty, however, this violation of international law has a second constitutive effect of importance, namely to produce a distinctly capitalist sovereignty. In Volume One of Capital, Marx chided classical political economists for their inability to explain how workers became separated from the means of production. Whereas political economists such as Adam Smith argued that a previous accumulation of capital was necessary for a division of labour, Marx argued that this doctrine was absurd. Division of labour existed in pre-capitalist societies where workers were not alienated from their labour. Instead, Marx argued that the actual historical process of primitive accumulation of capital was carried out through colonial relations of appropriation by force.42 While not a perfect analogy, because of the lack of material labour, the value of which is to be forcibly appropriated in orbital space, space control is like such primitive accumulation in constituting a global capitalist order through the colonisation of space as previously common property. One of the purposes of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty was to preserve a commons where all states, regardless of technical ability or economic or military power, could participate in the potential benefits space has to offer. In the years since this treaty was signed, the primary economic use of space has been for commercial communications satellites. This industry has expanded dramatically in the last two decades. Total revenues for commercial space-related industries in 1980 were $2.1 bn; by 2003 this figure had expanded to $91 bn and it was expected to increase at least as rapidly into the foreseeable future.43 Space control is about determining who has access to this new economy. Positions in orbit for satellites are a new form of ‘real estate’. By controlling access to orbital space the US would be forcibly appropriating the orbits, in effect turning them into primitively accumulated private property.44 In this way, the US becomes even more than it is now the sovereign state for global capitalism, the global capitalist state.

## Space Policy Link\*\* 1/2

### The affirmative’s attempt to project US power into space is part and parcel of an imperial logic that seeks to turn the entire globe into object of panoptic surveillance and control—the political subjectivity inaugurated by the 1AC is one which makes the worst forms of sovereign violence inevitable.

**Raymond Duvall, Political Science—University of Minnesota, and Jonathan Havercroft, Political Science—University of Oklahoma, 2008 “Taking sovereignty out of this world: space weapons and empire of the future,” Review of International Studies, 34, 755–775**

On 31 August 2006 President Bush authorised a new National Space Policy that called on the Secretary of Defense to ‘maintain the capabilities to execute the space support, force enhancement, space control and force application missions’ and to ‘develop capabilities, plans, and options to ensure freedom of action in space, and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries.’1 In addition the new policy states that ‘The United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit US access to or use of space. Proposed arms control agreements or restrictions must not impair the rights of the United States to conduct research, development, testing, and operations or other activities in space for US national interests.’2 This document signals an extension of the doctrine of American exceptionalism into a new geopolitical frontier – orbital space. The US demands the right to be unimpeded in any of its activities in space, up to and including those that would involve weapons systems, but it reserves the right to deny other states – particularly adversaries – an equal freedom of operation. Resisting the impulse to smirk contemptuously, or perhaps to laugh derisively, at the incredible arrogance of power represented in this policy, it is incumbent on us to treat such pronouncements seriously. They are, after all, expressive of a new geopolitical vision that is currently being actively pursued through the commitment of substantial resources.3 Coming on the heels of this new National Space Policy was China’s Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASAT) test on 11 January 2007.4 China’s actual motive in conducting this test remains unclear. Nevertheless, the test has strengthened the hand of more hawkish members of the US defence policy community. They have argued that in the light of China’s ASAT test the US must accelerate its space weapons programme so as to protect current US space dominance. For example, Ashley Tellis has argued, ‘the United States has no choice but to run and win this offense/defense space race if it is to uphold its security obligations in East Asia and elsewhere and deter increased Chinese investment in counter-space operations’.5 As such, China’s Anti-Satellite Weapons Test only seems to have accelerated the US defence establishment’s plan of seizing geopolitical control of orbital space under such rubrics as ‘missile defense’, ‘space control’, and ‘force application from space’. In the strategic planning of the US government space weapons, then, are no longer merely fantasy, an unrealisable fiction. They are seen as a very real (even relatively short-term) possibility, and, for the US, a strategic necessity. In this article, we inquire into the global political implications if that possibility were actualised. Specifically, we ask, how will a US monopoly in the deployment of weapons in orbital space affect the structure and character of modern international relations? The article opens with a general consideration of theoretical premises, both substantive and methodological, that inform our analysis. Substantively, we assume that technologies and cartographies of political killing have substantial political consequences. For this, we build on insights in the work of historical sociologists, especially Charles Tilly, and work by early international relations theorists, particularly John Herz and Hans Morgenthau. In very different ways, these thinkers argued that shifts in military technology (along with other processes) generate changes in the forms of political societies (for example, the consolidation of sovereign states in late-medieval Europe) and in the nature of relationships among them (for example, the (im)possibility of interstate warfare in a context of nuclear weapons). We extend that line of thinking and focus on constitutive effects that emerging space--the -weapons technologies will likely have on the ontology – the social being – of the political societies that compose the international system, which, in the modern era, is to say on sovereignty. The first section also addresses briefly a methodological premise of our argument, that (likely) constitutive effects in the future can be analysed through the discernment of structural logics revealed in the present. In asking what kinds of subjects are logically produced by specific forms of structured social relationships, we are engaged in a variety of constitutive analyses. This premise enables us to analyse constitutive effects of not-yet-realised weapons developments. Finally, we present and very briefly defend one additional substantive assumption – that the United States, alone, is apt to develop an effective space weapons project. We turn, in the second section, to the empirical ground for our analysis. We identify and briefly describe three types of space weapons programmes currently being pursued by the US: space-based missile defence, space control, and force application from orbital space. In discussing these programmes, we argue that existing literature tends to ignore important questions about the consequences of space weapons, focusing instead on issues of their technical feasibility and tactical utility. Where consequences are considered, they are almost always cast in terms of causal effects on strategic interaction, particularly impacts on power-balancing behaviour (such as space arms-racing) or cooperation (such as collaborative security). While acknowledging the importance of those questions, our concern is the constitutive effects of space-based military technologies on world political order, particularly its foundational ontology, sovereignty. In the third section, we develop the primary argument of the article:

<continues>

Space Policy Link\*\* 2/2

<continued>

 space weapons under the control of a single state logically constitute a new structure of imperial power through the counteracting forces of centralisation of sovereign power and deterritorialisation of sovereignty. Specifically, we explore the constitutive effects of each of the three types of space weapons discussed in section two. As many critics have argued, space-based missile defence undermines the logic of deterrence by simultaneously reinscribing the territorial borders of the United States and stripping from all other states the ability to deter attacks from the United States through missile-based retaliation. Space control, in denying potential adversaries access, privatises the commons of orbital space for (US) commercial and strategic interests, thereby expanding the frontier of American empire into low-earth orbit. Finally, force application from space enables the US as sole possessor of such weapons to project lethal force to any target, at any location on Earth, on very short notice. In addition to exploring the constitutive effects of each of these specific space weapons programmes separately, we consider, most importantly, their conjoint effects in constituting a new, historically unprecedented, type of global political rule, which is simultaneously centralised but deterritorialised – sovereign empire of the future.

## Impact—Superweapons—AT: Threat=Real 1/2

### Construction of interstellar threats empirically is used to build superweapons with the potential to destroy all life—their advantages are self-serving narratives used to justify in advance their technological triumphalism.

**Felicity Mellor, Science Communication—Imperial College, 2007**

**“Colliding Worlds: Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space”, Social Studies of Science, 37(4), August, p. 499-502**

Despite their disagreements over technical details and funding priorities, both civilian and defence scientists appealed to narratives of technological salvation. In his study of the superweapon in the American imagination, Bruce Franklin (1988) has shown how a century-long tradition of futurewar fiction shaped an apocalyptic ideology in which American technological genius was to put an end to all war and fulfil America’s manifest destiny. Franklin argues that this cultural fantasizing has been materially significant in producing actual superweapons and developing defence policy. As David Seed (1999) has also shown, SDI was made imaginable, and was explicitly defended, by science fiction writers. The impact-threat scientists took this cultural fantasizing a step further as they attempted to establish the reality of that threat. It was now nature, rather than any human foe, which was configured as the warring enemy whose technological defeat would bring Earthly harmony. Until the 1970s, most science fiction stories about asteroids imagined them as objects to be exploited for their mineral wealth.24 Scientists’ writings would occasionally reflect this interest.25 Indeed, the only paper in the 1979 volume Asteroids to allude to a future impact of an asteroid with Earth was framed in terms of the exploitation of asteroids. In a bizarre paper, which had been rejected for an earlier publication after being judged ‘outrageously innovative’ and ‘premature’, Samuel Herrick (1979) proposed that portions of the asteroid Geographos could be targeted at specific points on the Earth to produce ‘constructive’ effects, such as the excavation of a new Central American canal to join the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans However, by the time of Herrick’s technical fantasy, science fiction writers had begun to explore the more destructive consequences of an asteroid impacting with Earth. Most notably, Arthur C. Clarke, in his 1973 novel Rendezvous with Rama (Clarke, 1991 [1973]) described an asteroid impact in 2077. A detection survey called ‘Spaceguard’ is established in response to the impact and the rest of the story deals with the investigation of what actually turns out to be an alien spacecraft that is detected by the Spaceguard survey some 60 years later. Clarke developed the Spaceguard idea further in another novel, Hammer of God (Clarke, 1995) [1993] after writing a short story on the same theme for Time magazine the previous year (Clarke, 1992b). Clarke’s impact novels were well regarded by the scientists promoting the impact threat and were cited in some of their peer-reviewed papers and policy documents as well as in their popular books. For instance, in their influential paper in Nature, Chapman & Morrison (1994: 38) introduced the idea of deflecting a possible impactor with a reference to Hammer of God, noting that: ‘Just such a scenario … is the theme of a recent novel’ (see also Morrison et al., 1994: 84; Atkinson, 2000: 36). Indeed, the scientists named their own international survey the Spaceguard Survey and their promotional organization the Spaceguard Foundation in tribute to Clarke, as they acknowledged in their technical papers (for example, Milani et al., 2002: 55). Clarke became a Trustee Member of Spaceguard, and he was a personal friend of Duncan Steel and Tom Gehrels, and wrote the foreword for one of Steel’s popular books on the impact threat and the afterword for another one (Gehrels, 1988: 236; Steel, 1995, 2000a). As Clarke himself remarked in the acknowledgements for one of his novels, ‘the strands of fact and fiction are becoming inextricably entwined’ (Clarke, 1995 [1993]: 247). Also mentioned by the scientists was Larry Niven and Jerry Pournelle’s Lucifer’s Hammer. This 1977 novel is essentially a survivalist tale about the aftermath of a comet impact. In the lawless devastation following the impact, a former Senator sets up a community that attempts to re-establish a civilized, technologized society. This predominantly white community is attacked by various predominantly violent black gangs, one of which has turned to cannibalism as an initiation rite. Despite its racism, which always went unacknowledged in the scientists’ comments, they praised this novel in their popular books. For instance, planetary scientist John Lewis (1997: 151) stated that no novel had better visualized the effects of ocean impacts, and Steel cited it as an example of ‘good science fiction’ based on ‘real science’ (Steel, 2000a: 124). Acknowledging limits to the expertise of natural scientists, Clark Chapman and David Morrison (1989: 279) suggested that ‘estimating sociological responses to catastrophe are more nearly in the purview of sciencefiction writers, like Jerry Pournelle and Larry Niven, who addressed these matters in Lucifer’s Hammer (see also Morrison et al., 2004: 378). Like Clarke, Niven had direct contact with the scientists promoting the impact threat, attending the 2004 Planetary Defense Conference in California. Despite their very different political affinities, Clarke, Niven and Pournelle all portrayed technology as a force for good. With his proposal for a Spaceguard survey in Rendezvous with Rama and with the action of Hammer of God based on board a research space vessel charged with deflecting the incoming asteroid, Clarke’s impact novels promoted salvation through technology. Despite his earlier criticisms of SDI, in 1992 Clarke gave ‘two faint cheers for Son-of-SDI’, given certain provisos, because the technology might be needed to deflect an asteroid (Clarke, 1992a: 12). Niven and Pournelle also promoted an ideology of technological salvation in their novel, despite setting Lucifer’s Hammer in the technologically compromised aftermath of an impact. The story’s denouement has the Senator’s group defending a nuclear power station, which they see as offering the means to recover civilization – a civilization fully attainable only through its technological artefacts. In this, as in other impact narratives, technology offers not the source of destruction but the means of salvation. In addition to referring to these novels, the scientists studying the impact threat also acknowledged film treatments of the asteroid impact threat – including the 1979 film Meteor and the 1998 films Deep Impact and Armageddon. For instance, a paper in the journal Space Policy includes a general reference to ‘novels and Hollywood films’ (Garshnek et al., 2000: 218) and NASA’s Deep Impact probe shares its name with the film.

<continues>

Impact—Superweapons—AT: Threat=Real 2/2

<continued>

The report of the UK’s Task Force on near-Earth objects lists the release of all three films, as well as the publication of Clarke’s Rendezvous with Rama, as significant events in a chronology of the understanding of asteroids and comets (Atkinson, 2000: 36–37). These films were themselves influenced by the scientific work of the day. Meteor was inspired by the 1967 student project at MIT (Kleiman, 1979 [1968]) and the 1998 films used scientists as consultants (Davis, 2001). As David Kirby (2003) has argued, as well as enabling film studios to claim that their films are scientifically accurate, such consultancy work provides scientists with opportunities to promote a particular version of reality. The scientists also used narrative to present the impact threat in their own writings. The popular books written by the asteroid scientists often included narrative accounts of particular asteroid impacts that are hard to distinguish from the accounts found in fictional texts. For instance, in his popular book Rain of Fire and Ice, planetary scientist John Lewis described the approach of an asteroid as seen from ships in the North Atlantic sealanes just off England.26 The following lines give a flavour of the narrativized style through which he establishes a causally connected sequence of events: [The] crews, watching the brilliant fireball approaching them almost head-on, are at first dazzled by the light, but the vastly brighter flare of the final explosion literally burns out their eyes. Ships … fill with smoke as they careen on, unpiloted, into hell. (Lewis, 1997: 195–96) This is one of several scenarios, which, Lewis says, are narrative accounts of computer simulations ‘just as they came off the computer’ (Lewis, 1997: 188). However much Lewis might wish to credit his computer with the authorship of these narratives, by naming real places, fixing times, establishing a causal sequence of events and alluding to proto-characters, he converts the generalized predictions of collision statistics and asteroid properties into concrete narrative scenarios familiar to his readers. Through such narration, the data of a speculative science becomes a realistic and immediate threat. Technical reports of similar computer simulations, while lacking the colour of Lewis’s popular account, allude to similar narrative scenarios. For instance, a conference paper by two Los Alamos scientists combines the particularity of place with the immediacy of the present tense: ‘The East Coast of the United States is hit very hard by the surge. …Delaware, Long Island, and all of Maryland below the Piedmont Plateau are completely inundated as are all coastal cities in this area’ (Hills & Mader, 1995; see also Hills & Goda, 1999). Like Lewis’s narratives, this is an account of events that have not happened – events which are construed out of computer models of possible kinetic energies, rock densities and atmospheric resistance applied to real locations in a possible future present. Despite their own use of the narrative form and their explicit references to works of science fiction, the asteroid scientists expressed concerns about the proximity of their science to science fiction. They frequently complained of a ‘giggle factor’ (Verschuur, 1996: vi; Lewis, 1997: 220; Ailor, 2004: 6; Morrison et al., 2004: 354) and would insist on a clear separation between ‘science fact’ and ‘science fiction’ (Steel, 1995: 2, 247; Kring,2000: 169). This double strategy of appealing to science fiction while creating distance from it is also found in popularizations of other areas of science. As I have argued elsewhere (Mellor, 2003), this appeal to science fiction should not simply be dismissed as a popular hook aimed to draw readers into the ‘real’ science. As noted above, in the case of impact-threat science, although the references to science fiction are more common in popular accounts, they can also be found in some peer-reviewed papers and policy documents. The means of framing a text, be it popular or technical, is not some innocent bolt-on device, but fundamentally structures how we conceptualize the subject. Articulating a science of asteroids necessarily involves imagining asteroids. The asteroid scientists’ references to fictional narratives suggest that the technoscientific imaginary on which they drew was shared with, and informed by, the narratives of science fiction. Like the civilian scientists, the US defence scientists interested in the impact threat also worked in a community influenced by science fiction. Indeed, in some sectors of the military planning community, including those in which the promoters of SDI moved, explicit links with science fiction authors were cultivated regularly. As Chris Hables Gray (1994) has noted, ‘militaristic science fiction and military policy coexist in the same discourse system to a surprising degree’ (see also Franklin, 1988; James, 1994: 200). The Air Force Academy held annual ‘Nexus’ conferences on science fiction and military policy, and other conferences, such as the ‘Futurist’ conferences, also brought together military policy-makers and science fiction authors. At one typical conference held in 1985 at Ohio Air Force base, the authors present included prominent proponents of SDI such as Jerry Pournelle (Seed, 1999: 192). Pournelle was director of ‘organizational support’ for the Heritage Foundation’s High Frontier project, which campaigned for SDI, and he was chair of a panel that in 1984 had published the pro-SDI tract, Mutually Assured Survival (Gray, 1994). He was also, for many years, the editor of the annual anthology series ‘There Will Be War!’, which mixed pro-war science fiction stories with pro-SDI non-fiction to claim that war was inevitable.

## Impact—NVL

### Space weaponization renders all life imminently disposable—there is no value to life within the framework of the affirmative.

**Raymond Duvall, Political Science—University of Minnesota, and Jonathan Havercroft, Political Science—University of Oklahoma, 2008**

**“Taking sovereignty out of this world: space weapons and empire of the future,” Review of International Studies, 34, 755–775**

Each of the three forms of space weapons has important constitutive effects on modern sovereignty, which, in turn, are productive of political subjectivities. Exclusive missile defence constitutes a ‘hard shell’ of sovereignty for one state, while compromising the sovereign political subject status of other states. Space control reinforces that exclusive constitution of sovereignty and its potentiality for fostering unilateral decision. It also constitutes the ‘space-controlling’ state, the US, as sovereign for a particular global social order, a global capitalism. Space weapons capable of direct force application obliterate the meaning of territorial boundaries for defence and for distinguishing an inside from an outside with respect to the scope of policing and law enforcement – that is an authorised locus for deciding the exception. States, other than the exceptional ‘American’ state, are reduced to empty shells of de jure sovereignty, sustained, if at all, by convenient fiction – for example, as useful administrative apparatuses for the governing of locals. And their ‘citizens’ are produced as ‘bare life’ subject to the willingness of the global sovereign to let them live. Together and in conjunction, these three sets of effects constitute what we believe can appropriately be identified as an empire of the future, the political subjects of which are a global sovereign, an exceptional ‘nation’ linked to that sovereign, a global social order normalised in terms of capitalist social relations, and ‘bare life’ for individuals and groups globally to participate in that social order. If our argument is even half correct, the claim with which this article began – that modes of political killing have important effects – would be an understatement!

## Impact/Alternative—Resistance Key 1/2

### The worst violence in history is inevitable within the affirmative’s securitizing mindset—you should use your ballot to align yourself with strategies of resistance in the face of the ever-accelerating logic of technological sovereignty.

**Raymond Duvall, Political Science—University of Minnesota, and Jonathan Havercroft, Political Science—University of Oklahoma, 2008**

**“Taking sovereignty out of this world: space weapons and empire of the future,” Review of International Studies, 34, 755–775**

Given these grim prospects for a deterritorialised global rule,69 what are the possibilities for resistance? Historically, every advance in the weaponry of imperial powers has been met with an advance in counter-hegemonic strategy. Most recently, insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq have been able to counter the technological superiority of US forces with very simple yet effective Improvised Explosive Devices. In these instances, those subjugated by the technologies and scientific knowledge linked to emerging weapons systems have reappropriated these weapons systems to resist their imperial overlords. As such, it is reasonable to conclude that space weaponry could be countered through a variety of asymmetrical tactics such as: disabling space weapons while in orbit through kinetic energy, or even nuclear anti-satellite attacks; destroying the facilities where space weapons are produced or launched, or the research and development centres (such as universities) that are integral to the production of these systems; organising strikes for the workers involved in harvesting the necessary raw materials; and refusing to pay taxes to the political apparatuses that control these systems. While it is difficult to imagine what precise forms resistance to space weapons might take, it is not unreasonable to conclude that even in a context of space-based empire, some form of political and military resistance will be possible, and will occur. Indeed, China’s recent launch of an Anti-Satellite system is an example of a state actor at the boundaries of imperial order engaging in such a reappropriation of a weapons technology. One of the reasons Chinese military strategists have given for developing Anti-Satellite technology is that this technology exposes an asymmetrical vulnerability in the US military structure. The US military is already dependent on satellite systems to co-ordinate its communications and weapons targeting systems. By developing a technology that can disable US communications and targeting satellites, the Chinese military would hope to disrupt the operational abilities of conventional US forces should an actual shooting war between the two powers take place.70 The development gives us some idea of how state and non-state actors at the margins of an empire of the future might resist space power by reappropriating its technologies. Sovereignty as strategy Yet, even as China’s ASAT test points to one possible way of resisting the empire of the future it also points to one way in which this empire is currently being constituted. Within US strategic planning circles China’s ASAT test has been used as an impetus to increase funding to American space weapons research and development initiatives. This reaction by the US defence policy establishment is indicative of the strategic logic at work in the empire of the future. This strategic logic accelerates processes of deterritorialisation by pursuing the development of technologies that make the control of territory irrelevant; yet the logic simultaneously pursues the reterritorialisation of the US and orbital space as areas that should be off-limits to non-American actors. We are explicitly drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation here.71 In their writings deterritorialisation refers to ‘the movement by which ‘‘one’’ leaves the territory’. Reterritorialisation is the process that accompanies deterritorialisation, whereby the sovereign state apparatus recombines the deterritorialised elements to constitute a new assemblage. This is precisely the logic of the singular control by the US of weapons in Earth’s orbital space. The strategy of the empire of the future undermines the binary logic of a states-system predicated either on territorially bounded sovereign states or a globally diffused, decentralised and deterritorialised biopolitical Empire as proposed by Hardt and Negri. Our analysis reveals a third possibility: in the empire of the future space power combines a set of otherwise heterogeneous processes. Space based missiledefence strips all states – except the possessor of the system – of their hard shells by eroding nuclear deterrence capabilities, while providing the possessor of missile defence with a territory more secure from nuclear attack. Space control denies all states with the exception of the controlling power unfettered access to space. Furthermore it annexes orbital space as a territory of the space power. Finally, force application from orbital space makes any point on earth a potential target for the military force of empire of the future. This makes the traditional imperial imperative to project force through controlling territory no longer necessary.

<continues>

Impact/Alternative—Resistance Key 2/2

<continued>

Empire of the future combines strategies of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation to simultaneously undermine some features of state sovereignty and reinforce others. Therefore the current assumption that many IR theorists make that international society must be based on either a collection of sovereign territorial states or deterritorialised biopolitical apparatuses ignores the possibility that these two processes can be co-constitutive. In the empire of the future the locus of authority is centralised but this authority governs a deterritorialised political entity. While this new constellation of political power will present new possibilities for resistance, we should not underestimate how this empire’s new modes of killing will constitute structures of domination potentially more terrifying than anything humanity has yet encountered.

## AT: Permutation—Link Outweighs

### The link takes out perm solvency—once the technostrategic frame has been accepted, attempts to go back inevitably fail—SDI proves our argument.

**Felicity Mellor, Science Communication—Imperial College, 2007**

**“Colliding Worlds: Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space”, Social Studies of Science, 37(4), August, p. 499-502**

The civilian scientists attempted to still their consciences in their dealings with the defence scientists by suggesting that, with the end of the Cold War and the demise of SDI, the latter had lost their traditional role. This argument was naive at best. In fact, as we have seen, the US defence scientists had taken an interest in the impact threat since the early 1980s, from the time that SDI had greatest political support during the defence build-up of the Reagan era. Even at the time of the fractious Interception Workshop, George H.W. Bush was maintaining SDI funding at the same level as it had been during the second Reagan administration. If outwardly the Clinton administration was less supportive when it took office in 1993 and declared that SDI was over, many of those involved in the programme felt that it would actually go on much as before (FitzGerald, 2000: 491). SDI was renamed, and to some extent reconceived, but funding continued and was soon increased when the Republicans gained a majority in Congress.33 After George W. Bush took office in 2001, spending on missile defence research was greatly increased, including programmes to follow on from Brilliant Pebbles (Wall, 2001a; 2001b).

## AT: Permutation 1/3

### Any risk of link takes out solvency—a complete rejection of sovereignty is key

**Jenny Edkins, International Politics Professor at the University of Wales Aberystwyth, and Veronique Pin-Fat, Director the MA Human Rights in the Centre for International Politics at the University of Manchester, 2004**

**Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics, p. 11-12**

One potential form of resistance to sovereign power consists of a refusal to draw any lines between zoe and bios, inside and outside, human and inhuman. As we have shown, sovereign power does not involve a power relation in Foucauldian terms. It is more appropriately considered to have become a form of governance or technique of administration though relationships of violence that reduce political subjects to mere bare or naked life. As Michael Dillon puts it, "Sovereign power [is] a form of rule gone global [that] has come to develop and deploy modes of destruction whose dissemination it finds increasingly impossible to control because these have become integral to its propagation and survival."

In asking far a refusal to draw lines as a possibility of resistance, then, we are not asking for the elimination of power relations and, consequently, we are not asking for the erasure of the possibility of a mode of political being that is empowered and empowering, is free and that speaks: quite the opposite. Following Agamben, we are suggesting that it is only through a refusal to draw any lines at all (and, indeed, nothing less will do) that sovereign power (as a form of violence) can be contested and a properly political power relation can be reinstated.

We could call this escaping the logic of sovereign power. Our overall argument is that we can escape sovereign power and reinstate a form of power relation by contesting its assumption of the right to draw lines, that is, by contesting the sovereign ban. Any other resistance always inevitably remains within this relationship of violence. To move outside it (and return to a power relation), we need not only contest its right to draw lines in particular places, but also resist the call to draw any lines of the sort sovereign power demands.

AT: Permutation 2/3

### Criticism of the narratives which justify securitizing politics is an ethical and political necessity—the permutation’s surface level politics systemically wards off critique.

**Anthony Burke, IR—University of New South Wales, 2007**

**Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 3-4**

These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on tei-ror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1 It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, but also their mainstream critiques - whether they take the form of liberal policy approaches in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique.

AT: Permutation 3/3

### Inclusion of their initial framing guts permutation solvency—you must forget the 1AC.

**Roland Bleiker, Rotary Centre of International Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution, 2001 The Zen of International Relations, Ed. Chan, Mandeville, and Bleiker, p. 38-9**

The power to tell stories is the power to define common sense. Prevalent IR stories have been told for so long that they no longer appear as stories. They are accepted as fact for their metaphorical dimensions have vanished from our collective memories. We have become accustomed to our distorting IR metaphors until we come to lie, as Nietzsche would say “herd-like in a style obligatory for all. As a result dominant ir stories have successfully transformed one specific interpretation of world political realities, the realist one, into reality per se. Realist perceptions of the international have gradually become accepted as common sense, to the point that any critique against them has to be evaluated in terms of an already existing and objectified world view. There are powerful mechanisms of control precisely in this ability to determine meaning and rationality. 'Defining common sense', Steve Smith argues, 'is the ultimate act of political power.’8 It separates the possible from the impossible and directs the theory and practice of international relations on a particular path. The prime objective of this essay is to challenge prevalent IR stories. The most effective way of doing so, the chapter argues, is not to critique but to forget them, to tell new stories that are not constrained by the boundaries of established and objectified IR narratives. Such an approach diverges from many critical engagements with world politics. Most challenges against dominant IR stories have been advanced in the form of critiques. While critiquing orthodox IR stories remains an important task, it is not sufficient. Exploring the origins of problems, in this case discourse of power politics and their positivist framing of the political practice, cannot overcome all the existing theoretical and practical dilemmas. By articulating critique in relation to arguments advanced by orthodox IR theory, the impact of critical voices remains confined within the larger discursive boundaries that have been established through the initial framing of debates. A successful challenge to orthodox IR stories must do more than merely critique their narrow and problematic nature. To be effective, critique must be supplemented with a process of forgetting the object of critique, of theorizing world politics beyond the agendas, issues and terminologies that are prest by orthodox debates. Indeed the most powerful potential of critical scholarship may well lie in the attempt to tell different stories about IR, for once theres stories have become validated , they may well open up spaces for a more inclusive and less violence prone practice of real world politics.

## AT: Threat Construction/Realism Good

### Their methodology fails and causes global catastrophe—their methodology structurally reproduces the very effects it seeks to suppress.

**James Der Derian, IR—Brown, 2006**

**“An Accident Waiting to Happen”, Harvard International Review, 27(3), Fall, http://hir.harvard.edu/ predicting-the-present/national-security**

However, the discourse of the second Bush term has increasingly returned to the dominant worldview of national security, realism. And if language is, as Nietzsche claimed, a prisonhouse, realism is its supermax penitentiary. Based on linear notions of causality, a correspondence theory of truth, and the materiality of power, how can realism possibly account—let alone prepare or provide remedies—for complex catastrophes, like the toppling of the World Trade Center and attack on the Pentagon by a handful of jihadists armed with box-cutters and a few months of flight-training? A force-five hurricane that might well have begun with the flapping of a butterfly’s wings? A northeast electrical blackout that started with a falling tree limb in Ohio? A possible pandemic triggered by the mutation of an avian virus? How, for instance, are we to measure the immaterial power of the CNN-effect on the first Gulf War, the Al-Jazeera-effect on the Iraq War, or the Nokia-effect on the London terrorist bombings? For events of such complex, non-linear origins and with such tightly-coupled, quantum effects, the national security discourse of realism is simply not up to the task. Worse, what if the “failure of imagination” identified by the 9/11 Commission is built into our national and homeland security systems? What if the reliance on planning for the catastrophe that never came reduced our capability to flexibly respond and improvise for the “ultra-catastrophe” that did? What if worse-case scenarios, simulation training, and disaster exercises—as well as border guards, concrete barriers and earthen levees—not only prove inadequate but might well act as force-multipliers—what organizational theorists identify as “negative synergy” and “cascading effects” —that produce the automated bungling (think Federal Emergency Management Agency) that transform isolated events and singular attacks into global disasters? Just as “normal accidents” are built into new technologies—from the Titanic sinking to the Chernobyl meltdown to the Challenger explosion—we must ask whether “ultra-catastrophes” are no longer the exception but now part and parcel of densely networked systems that defy national management; in other words, “planned disasters.” What, then, is to be done? A first step is to move beyond the wheel-spinning debates that perennially keep security discourse always one step behind the global event. It might well be uni-, bi-, or multi-polar, but it is time to recognize that the power configuration of the states-system is rapidly being subsumed by a heteropolar matrix, in which a wide range of different actors and technological drivers are producing profound global effects through interconnectivity. Varying in identity, interests, and strength, these new actors and drivers gain advantage through the broad bandwidth of information technology, for networked communication systems provide the means to traverse political, economic, religious, and cultural boundaries, changing not only how we interpret events, but making it ever more difficult to maintain the very distinction of intended from accidental events.

## AT: Realism Inevitable 1/2

### Their inevitability argument is wrong and legitimizes mass violence

**Robert Alexander Kraig, Communication—UW Milwaukee, 2002 “The Tragic Science: The Uses of Jimmy Carter in Foreign Policy Realism”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 5(1), Spring**

Given the claimed inevitability of realism's description of international politics, one might think that nations need not look to expert guidance because power interests will inevitably determine governmental policy. But the realists, while embracing determinism, simultaneously argue that human nature is repeatedly violated. One traditional claim has been that America, because of its unique history, has been ever in danger of ignoring the dictates of the foreign policy scene. This argument is offered by Henry Kissinger in his avowedly Morgenthauian work Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. 21 Realists also argue that there are idealists in all human societies who refuse to see the reality of power. As Richard W. Cottam, a trenchant critic of orthodox realism, explained the argument: "Every era has its incorrigible idealists who persist in seeing evil man as good. When they somehow gain power and seek to put their ideas into effect, Machiavellians who understand man's true nature appear and are more than willing and more than capable of exploiting this eternal naivete." 22 Cottam was referring to one of the central ideological constructs of international relations theory—the realist/idealist dichotomy. First explicated in detail by Morgenthau in his Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, 23 this dichotomy is used to discredit leaders who dare to consider transcending or transforming established patterns of global competition. This construct is enriched by the narratives of failed idealists—most prominently Tsar Alexander the First, Woodrow Wilson, Neville Chamberlain, and Jimmy Carter—men who, despite and in fact because of their good intentions, caused untold human suffering. After World War II, realists built their conception of leadership on a negative caricature of Woodrow Wilson. 24 As George Kennan, one of the primary architects of Cold War policy, warned in 1945: "If we insist at this moment in our history in wandering about with our heads in the clouds of Wilsonean idealism . . . we run the risk of losing even that bare minimum of security which would be assured to us by the maintenance of humane, stable, and cooperative forms of society on the immediate European shores of the Atlantic." 25 Wilson's supposed idealism was said by the emerging realist scholars to have led to the unstable international political structure that caused World War II [End Page 6] and now threatened the postwar balance of forces. Despite convincing refutations by the leading historians of Wilson's presidency, most recently John Milton Cooper Jr. in his definitive study of the League of Nations controversy, realists continue to caricature Wilson as a fuzzy-headed idealist. 26 Idealists, in realist writings, all share a fatal flaw: an inability to comprehend the realities of power. They live in a world of unreality, responding to nonexistent scenes. As Riker put it, "Unquestionably, there are guilt-ridden and shame-conscious men who do not desire to win, who in fact desire to lose. These are irrational ones in politics." 27 It is here that the realist expert comes in. It is assumed that strategic doctrine can be rationally and objectively established. According to Kissinger, a theorist who later became a leading practitioner, "it is the task of strategic doctrine to translate power into policy." The science of international relations claims the capacity to chart the foreign policy scene and then establish the ends and means of national policy. This objective order can only be revealed by rational and dispassionate investigators who are well-schooled in the constraints and possibilities of power politics. Realism's scenic character makes it a radically empirical science. As Morgenthau put it, the political realist "believes in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion—between what is true objectively and rationally supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only subjective judgement." Avowedly modernist in orientation, realism claims to be rooted not in a theory of how international relations ought to work, but in a privileged reading of a necessary and predetermined foreign policy environment. 28 In its orthodox form political realism assumes that international politics are and must be dominated by the will to power. Moral aspirations in the international arena are merely protective coloration and propaganda or the illusions that move hopeless idealists. What is most revealing about this assessment of human nature is not its negativity but its fatalism. There is little if any place for human moral evolution or perfectibility. Like environmental determinism—most notably the social darwinism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—political realism presumes that human social nature, even if ethically deplorable, cannot be significantly improved upon. From the stationary perspective of social scientific realism in its pure form, the fatal environment of human social interaction can be navigated but not conquered. Description, in other words, is fate. All who dare to challenge the order—Carter's transgression—will do much more damage than good. The idealist makes a bad situation much worse by imagining a better world in the face of immutable realities. As one popular saying among foreign policy practitioners goes: "Without vision, men die. With it, more men die." 70 (continued) The implications of this social philosophy are stark. Tremendous human suffering can be rationalized away as the inevitable product of the impersonal international system of power relations. World leaders are actively encouraged by the realists to put aside moral pangs of doubt and play the game of international politics according to the established rules of political engagement. This deliberate limitation of interest excuses leaders from making hard moral choices. While a moralist Protestant like Jimmy Carter sees history as a progressive moral struggle to realize abstract ideals in the world, the realist believes that it is dangerous to struggle against the inexorable. The moral ambiguities of political and social ethics that have dogged philosophy and statesmanship time out of mind are simply written out of the equation. Since ideals cannot be valid in a social scientific sense, they cannot be objectively true. The greatest barrier to engaging the realists in serious dialogue about their premises is that they deny that these questions can be seriously debated. First, realists teach a moral philosophy that denies itself. There is exceedingly narrow ground, particularly in the technical vocabulary of the social sciences, for discussing the moral potential of humanity or the limitations of human action.

<continues>

AT: Realism Inevitable 2/2

<continued>

Yet, as we have seen in the tragedy of Jimmy Carter, a philosophical perspective on these very questions is imparted through the back door. It is very hard to argue with prescription under the guise of description. The purveyors of this philosophical outlook will not admit this to themselves, let alone to potential interlocutors. [End Page 21] Second, and most importantly, alternative perspectives are not admitted as possibilities—realism is a perspective that as a matter of first principles denies all others. There is, as we have seen in the Carter narrative, alleged to be an immutable reality that we must accept to avoid disastrous consequences. Those who do not see this underlying order of things are idealists or amateurs. Such people have no standing in debate because they do not see the intractable scene that dominates human action. Dialogue is permissible within the parameters of the presumed order, but those who question the existence or universality of this controlling scene are beyond debate. Third, the environmental determinism of political realism, even though it is grounded in human social nature, is antihumanist. Much of the democratic thought of the last 200 years is grounded on the idea that humanity is in some sense socially self-determining. Society as social contract is a joint project which, over time, is subject to dialectical improvement. Foreign policy realism, as we have seen, presupposes that there is an order to human relations that is beyond the power of humans to mediate. 71 When you add to this the moral imperative to be faithful to the order (the moral of the Carter narrative), then democratic forms lose a great deal of their value. Indeed, there has been a great deal of hand wringing in international relations literature about how the masses are inexorably drawn to idealists like Carter and Wilson. Morgenthau states this much more frankly than most of his intellectual descendants: [the] thinking required for the successful conduct of foreign policy can be diametrically opposed to the rhetoric and action by which the masses and their representatives are likely to be moved. . . . The statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived as power among other powers. The popular mind, unaware of the fine distinctions of the statesman's thinking, reasons more often than not in the simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil. 72 Some realists, based on this empirical observation, openly propose that a realist foreign policy be cloaked in a moral facade so that it will be publicly palatable. Kissinger's mistake, they say, was that he was too honest. Morgenthau concludes that "the simple philosophy and techniques of the moral crusade are useful and even indispensable for the domestic task of marshaling public opinion behind a given policy; they are but blunt weapons in the struggle of nations for dominance over the minds of men." If one believes that social scientists have unique access to an inexorable social reality which is beyond the control of humanity—and which it is social suicide to ignore—it is easy to see how democratic notions of consent and self-determination can give way to the reign of manipulative propaganda. 73 There is another lesson that can be drawn from the savaging of Carter in international relations scholarship for those who seek to broaden the terms of American foreign policy thought and practice. Those who would challenge the realist orthodoxy [End Page 22] face a powerful rhetorical arsenal that will be used to deflect any serious dialogue on the fundamental ethical and strategic assumptions of realism. Careful and balanced academic critiques, although indispensable, are unlikely to be a match for such formidable symbolic ammunition. Post-realism, if it is to make any advance against the realist battlements, must marshal equally powerful symbolic resources. What is needed, in addition to academic critiques aimed at other scholars, is a full-blooded antirealist rhetoric. It must be said, in the strongest possible terms, that realism engenders an attitude of cynicism and fatalism in those who would otherwise engage the great moral and political questions of our age. 74 History is replete with ideals that, after much time and effort, matured into new social realities. In the not-so-distant past, republican governance on a mass scale and socially active government were empirical impossibilities. However halting and imperfect these historical innovations may be, they suggest the power of ideals and the possibility of human social transformation. On the other hand, fatalism fulfills itself. The surest way to make a situation impossible is to imagine it so. This is a tragic irony we should strive to avoid, no matter how aesthetically fitting it may be.

## AT: Predictions Good

### Aff “worst case” predictions validate security logic --- causes violent escalation and destroys policymaking

Bruce Schneier 10 (Bruce, Security Technologist, Author, MA in Computer Science – American University, “Worst-Case Thinking”, 3-13, http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/05/worst-case\_thin.html)

At a security conference recently, the moderator asked the panel of distinguished cybersecurity leaders what their nightmare scenario was. The answers were the predictable array of large-scale attacks: against our communications infrastructure, against the power grid, against the financial system, in combination with a physical attack. I didn't get to give my answer until the afternoon, which was: "My nightmare scenario is that people keep talking about their nightmare scenarios." There's a certain blindness that comes from worst-case thinking. An extension of the precautionary principle, it involves imagining the worst possible outcome and then acting as if it were a certainty. It substitutes imagination for thinking, speculation for risk analysis, and fear for reason. It fosters powerlessness and vulnerability and magnifies social paralysis. And it makes us more vulnerable to the effects of terrorism. Worst-case thinking means generally bad decision making for several reasons. First, it's only half of the cost-benefit equation. Every decision has costs and benefits, risks and rewards. By speculating about what can possibly go wrong, and then acting as if that is likely to happen, worst-case thinking focuses only on the extreme but improbable risks and does a poor job at assessing outcomes. Second, it's based on flawed logic. It begs the question by assuming that a proponent of an action must prove that the nightmare scenario is impossible. Third, it can be used to support any position or its opposite. If we build a nuclear power plant, it could melt down. If we don't build it, we will run short of power and society will collapse into anarchy. If we allow flights near Iceland's volcanic ash, planes will crash and people will die. If we don't, organs won’t arrive in time for transplant operations and people will die. If we don't invade Iraq, Saddam Hussein might use the nuclear weapons he might have. If we do, we might destabilize the Middle East, leading to widespread violence and death. Of course, not all fears are equal. Those that we tend to exaggerate are more easily justified by worst-case thinking. So terrorism fears trump privacy fears, and almost everything else; technology is hard to understand and therefore scary; nuclear weapons are worse than conventional weapons; our children need to be protected at all costs; and annihilating the planet is bad. Basically, any fear that would make a good movie plot is amenable to worst-case thinking. Fourth and finally, worst-case thinking validates ignorance. Instead of focusing on what we know, it focuses on what we don't know -- and what we can imagine. Remember Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's quote? "Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns -- the ones we don't know we don't know." And this: "the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence." Ignorance isn't a cause for doubt; when you can fill that ignorance with imagination, it can be a call to action. Even worse, it can lead to hasty and dangerous acts. You can't wait for a smoking gun, so you act as if the gun is about to go off. Rather than making us safer, worst-case thinking has the potential to cause dangerous escalation. The new undercurrent in this is that our society no longer has the ability to calculate probabilities. Risk assessment is devalued. Probabilistic thinking is repudiated in favor of "possibilistic thinking": Since we can't know what's likely to go wrong, let's speculate about what can possibly go wrong. Worst-case thinking leads to bad decisions, bad systems design, and bad security. And we all have direct experience with its effects: airline security and the TSA, which we make fun of when we're not appalled that they're harassing 93-year-old women or keeping first graders off airplanes. You can't be too careful! Actually, you can. You can refuse to fly because of the possibility of plane crashes. You can lock your children in the house because of the possibility of child predators. You can eschew all contact with people because of the possibility of hurt. Steven Hawking wants to avoid trying to communicate with aliens because they might be hostile; does he want to turn off all the planet's television broadcasts because they're radiating into space? It isn't hard to parody worst-case thinking, and at its extreme it's a psychological condition. Frank Furedi, a sociology professor at the University of Kent, writes: "Worst-case thinking encourages society to adopt fear as one of the dominant principles around which the public, the government and institutions should organize their life. It institutionalizes insecurity and fosters a mood of confusion and powerlessness. Through popularizing the belief that worst cases are normal, it incites people to feel defenseless and vulnerable to a wide range of future threats." Even worse, it plays directly into the hands of terrorists, creating a population that is easily terrorized -- even by failed terrorist attacks like the Christmas Day underwear bomber and the Times Square SUV bomber. When someone is proposing a change, the onus should be on them to justify it over the status quo. But worst-case thinking is a way of looking at the world that exaggerates the rare and unusual and gives the rare much more credence than it deserves. It isn't really a principle; it's a cheap trick to justify what you already believe. It lets lazy or biased people make what seem to be cogent arguments without understanding the whole issue. And when people don't need to refute counterarguments, there's no point in listening to them.

## AT: Framework

### Representations of space shape space political realities

**David Grondin, Political Studies—University of Ottawa, 2006**

**The (Power) Politics of Space: The U.S. Astropolitical Discourse of Global Dominance in the War on Terror**

Space was seen as a sanctuary during the Cold War. But because of the context of the War on Terror, the US now seems to be ready to go against the second Article of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 that stipulates that “Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means”, the treaty which set out the principle that Space is to be used for “the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind” (Article 1). In effect, since 2001, the US wished to be the one responsible for setting new rules in Outer Space and for creating the conditions of its military dominance of Space. For instance, the merger of the US Space Command with the Strategic Command in January 2004 stems from this logic that wishes Space operations to be integrated in all domains of US military power. Because the US still possesses control over much of the information gathering in Space, it is interested in securitizing and Americanizing the “last frontier”, especially in the context of the War on Terror. As it stands, the US neoliberal geopolitics discourse of the Bush Administration on Space power still leads to Space weaponization. US sovereignty is placed as higher than any other forms of rule and the US prepares itself militarily, just in case Outer Space would turn into a battlefield. In Donald Rumsfeld’s words: “Our goal is not to bring war into space, but rather to defend against those who would” (Rumsfeld, quoted in Waldrop 2005 [2002]: 39). This participates in the discourse of a global security state that sees Outer Space as the most “global” of space. “Insofar as the weaponization of space represents the ‘cutting edge’ and highest ambitions of military primacy, it also represents the height of this folly” (Huntley 2005: 83). If we consider that political rhetoric creates political reality that may serve as bases for decisions, it appears fundamental to assess how the US wishes to securitize Outer Space with its will to achieve full-spectrum dominance in all battlespaces, as stated in the 2004 and 1997 National Military Strategies. Deeply anchored in the War on Terror cartography, where 9/11 serves as the ultimate justification since “one must prepare militarily for the worst since the worst has happened” (or so it goes), the US places itself in a state of insecurity by saying that even if no one may inflict them casualty in Space, nothing can guarantee that it will not happen in the future. This is why they prefer to try this likelihood and securitize Outer Space as part of the homeland security strategy. The paradox of the securitization and Americanization of Outer Space is that it could lead to its very opposite by allowing space weaponization to still be possible, if not inevitable.

## AT: Alternative Fails

### Critical interrogation of the politics of astropolitik is crucial to creating emancipation in the future—how we position the self in relation to others is necessary to prevent space from being dominated by a militaristic poiltics

**Fraser Macdonald, Professor of Human Geography at the University of Melbourne, 2007**

**Anti-Astropolitik: Outer Space and the Orbit of Geography, Online**

Stephen Graham, following Eyal Weizmann, has argued that geopolitics is a flat discourse (Graham, 2004: 12; Weizmann, 2002). It attends to the cartographic horizontality of terrain rather than a verticality that cuts through the urban landscape from the advantage of orbital supremacy. Just as, for Graham, a critical geopolitics must urgently consider this new axis in order to challenge the practices and assumptions of urbicide, so too – I would argue – it must lift its gaze to the politics of the overhead. Our interest in the vertical plane must extend beyond terrestrial perspectives; we must come to terms with the everyday realities of space exploration and domination as urgent subjects of critical geographical enquiry. A prerequisite for this agenda is to overcome our sense of the absurdity and oddity of space, an ambivalence that has not served human geography well. The most obvious entry point is to think systematically about some of the more concrete expressions of outer space in the making of Earthly geographies. For instance, many of the high profile critical commentaries on the recent war in Iraq, even those written from geographical perspectives, have been slow to address the orbital aspects of military supremacy (see for instance, Harvey, 2003; Gregory, 2004; Retort, 2005). Suffice to say that, in war as in peace, space matters on the ground, if indeed the terrestrial and the celestial can be sensibly individuated in this way. There is also, I think, scope for a wider agenda on the translation of particular Earthly historical geographies into space, just as there was a translation of early occidental geographies onto imperial spaces. When Donald Rumsfeld talks of a ‘Space Pearl Harbor’, there is plainly a particular set of historico–geographical imaginaries at work that give precedence, in this case, to American experience. Rumsfeld has not been slow to invoke Pearl Harbour, most famously in the aftermath of September 11; notably, in all these examples – Hawaii in 1941; New York in 2001; and the contemporary space race – there lurks the suggestion of a threat from the East. All of this is a reminder that the colonisation of space, rather than being a decisive and transcendent break from the past, is merely an extension of longstanding regimes of power. As Peter Redfield succinctly observed, to move into space is ‘a form of return’: it represents ‘a passage forward through the very pasts we might think we are leaving behind’ (Redfield, 2002: 814). All of this supports the idea that space is part and parcel of the Earth’s geography (Cosgrove, 2004: 222). We can conceive of the human geography of space as being, in the words of Doreen Massey, ‘the sum of relations, connections, embodiments and practices’ (Massey, 2005: 8). She goes on to say that ‘these things are utterly everyday and grounded, at the same time as they may, when linked together, go around the world’. To this we might add that they go around and beyond the world. The ‘space’ of space is both terrestrial and extra- terrestrial: it is the relation of the Earth to its firmament. Lisa Parks and Ursula Biemann have described our relationship with orbits as being ‘about uplinking and downlinking, [the] translation [of] signals, making exchanges with others and positioning the self’ (Parks and Biemann, 2o03). It is precisely this relational conception of space that might helpfully animate a revised geographical understanding of the Outer Earth. As has already been made clear, this sort of project is by no means new. Just as astropolitics situates itself within a Mackinderian geographical tradition, so a critical geography of outer space can draw on geography’s early modern cosmographical origins, as well as on more recent emancipatory perspectives that might interrogate the workings of race, class, gender and imperialism. Space is already being produced in and through Earthly regimes of power in ways that undoubtedly threaten justice and democracy. A critical geography of space, then, is not some far-fetched or indulgent distraction from the ‘real world’; rather, as critical geographers we need to think about the contest for outer space as being constitutive of numerous familiar operations, not only in respect of international relations and the conduct of war, but also to the basic infrastructural maintenance of the state and to the lives of its citizenry.

# \*\*\*Aff\*\*\*

## Framework

### Policy relevance is important – we should roleplay

Roe, Director of the Center for Sustainable Resource Development at UC Berkeley, ’99 (“Except Africa”)

Second, the conjunction of politics and complexity places up-front the core dilemma many power advocates have been happy to obscure. The social scientist or cultural theorist who finds, for example, that power is more complex than commonly supposed can leave the matter at that. No need to make anything like a practical recommendation about what real people with real problems in real time should do, now that things have been shown to be more complex. Their critique is policy relevant simply by virtue of being a critique of power, and what is more policy relevant than power, right? Wrong. This trick won’t work in a politics of complexity. Here you can’t criticize your way to policy relevance. A politics that starts with complexity has always to ask: how do we underwrite and stabilize the assumptions for policy-making in the face of that complexity? How can we make policy choices in the presence of recurrent surprise and persistent unpredictability? Chapter 1 outlined six answers to the questions, while the bulk of Except-Africa has focused on one, the counternarrative option. Each option, however, shares the same implications. Each means avoiding the person who believes that the real objective of analysis is to critique and destabilize without obligation to provide an alternative to that which is being criticized. Each means avoiding people who automatically assume their analysis is policy relevant, who wouldn’t ever dirty their hands in such low-life things as having to choose the losers of a public policy, who in other words couldn’t care less whether they had access to policy makers who treated their work seriously and used it in making decisions. Each means, finally, avoiding people who think that just because something can be criticized, something needs to be criticized. In short—and this is the sobering part—it means avoiding precisely many advocates of the polarized power narrative. Again: there can be no development without being committed to providing counternarratives. The distaste that many power advocates in African studies have for working in or with government, a.k.a. the state, is palpable. Plucking up “development” between the tweezers of twin scare quotes is about as close as these critics want to get to something so power-saturated that it stinks from every direction. If government builds the road it planned, it is criticized for doing “development”; if it fails to build the road, it is criticized because its plans are based on wrong assumptions. In either case, government is not doing its job, because it can’t have a job worth doing. Thus, the Wonderland of Permanent Critique identified in chapter 4: if a government policy actually succeeds, then it’s a disaster or a misuse of power. The fact that a policy’s implementation frequently falls short of what was originally planned is, however, never enough to make the failed policy a “success.” In the critics’ view, the real success would have been ensuring that government did not have the power to undertake the policy in the first place. Yet, if the criterion for success is government not undertaking a bad policy, then why aren’t governments praised by critics for the many bad policies they have considered but not undertaken? But no critic wants to praise “state power,” thank you very much! In their Wonderland, the critics’ role is always to stand in opposition to the state, no matter if this stance raises nettlesome questions like, Just how does permanent critique determine when the future is better than the present, the present better than the past? But who needs alternatives, when you don’t believe in “development” at all!

## Discourse Doesn’t Shape Reality

### Changing representational practices won’t alter policy—looking to structures and politics is more vital

**Tuathail, Professor of Geography at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 96 (Gearoid, Political Geography, Vol 15 No 6-7, p. 664, Science Direct)**

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decision- makers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problem- solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post- structuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self- interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

## Realism Inevitable

### Their representations critique cannot challenge the inevitability of realism—and if they succeed in getting rid of realism, there is no way to know if the alt would be better.

**John Mearsheimer, Political Science—University of Chicago, 1995 International Security, p. 91-2**

The most revealing aspect of Wendt’s discussion is that he did not respond to the two main charge leveled against critical theory in “False Promise.” The first problem with critical theory is that although the theory is deeply concerned with radically changing state behavior, it says little about how change comes about. The theory does not tell us why particular discourses become dominant and other fall by the wayside. Specifically, Wendt does not explain why realism has been the dominant discourse in world politics for well over a thousand years, although I explicitly raised the question in “False Promise” (p. 42). Moreover, he shed no light on why the time is ripe for unseating realism, nor on why realism is likely to be replaced by a more peaceful, communitarian discourse, although I explicitly raised both questions. Wendt’s failure to answer these questions has important ramifications for his own arguments. For example, he maintains that if it is possible to change international political discourse and alter state behavior, “then it is irresponsible to pursue policies that perpetuate destructive old orders [i.e., realism], especially if we care about the well-being of future generation.” The clear implication here is that realists like me are irresponsible and do not care much about the welfare of future generations. However, even if we change discourses and move beyond realism, a fundamental problem with Wendt’s argument remains: because his theory cannot predict the future, he cannot know whether the discourse that ultimately replaces realism will be more benign than realism. He has no way of knowing whether a fascistic discourse more violent than realism will emerge as the hegemonic discourse. For example, he obviously would like another Gorbachev to come to power in Russia, but a critical theory perspective, defending realism might very well be the more responsible policy choice.

## Specific Space Scenarios Outweigh

### The Critique doesn’t disprove the 1AC—the truth of the advantages is an empirical scientific question which can only be disproved technically.

**Eliezer Yudowsky, Research Fellow and Director – Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, 2006**

 **“Cognitive Biases Potentially Affecting Judgment of Global Risks”, Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, ed. Bostrum, 8-31, http://www.singinst.org/ourresearch/publications/cognitive-biases.pdf**

Every true idea which discomforts you will seem to match the pattern of at least one psychological error. Robert Pirsig said: "The world's biggest fool can say the sun is shining, but that doesn't make it dark out." If you believe someone is guilty of a psychological error, then demonstrate your competence by first demolishing their consequential factual errors. If there are no factual errors, then what matters the psychology? The temptation of psychology is that, knowing a little psychology, we can meddle in arguments where we have no technical expertise - instead sagely analyzing the psychology of the disputants. If someone wrote a novel about an asteroid strike destroying modern civilization, then someone might criticize that novel as extreme, dystopian, apocalyptic; symptomatic of the author's naive inability to deal with a complex technological society. We should recognize this as a literary criticism, not a scientific one; it is about good or bad novels, not good or bad hypotheses. To quantify the annual probability of an asteroid strike in real life, one must study astronomy and the historical record: no amount of literary criticism can put a number on it. Garreau (2005) seems to hold that a scenario of a mind slowly increasing in capability, is more mature and sophisticated than a scenario of extremely rapid intelligence increase. But that's a technical question, not a matter of taste; no amount of psychologizing can tell you the exact slope of that curve. It's harder to abuse heuristics and biases than psychoanalysis. Accusing someone of conjunction fallacy leads naturally into listing the specific details that you think are burdensome and drive down the joint probability. Even so, do not lose track of the real-world facts of primary interest; do not let the argument become about psychology. Despite all dangers and temptations, it is better to know about psychological biases than to not know. Otherwise we will walk directly into the whirling helicopter blades of life. But be very careful not to have too much fun accusing others of biases. That is the road that leads to becoming a sophisticated arguer - someone who, faced with any discomforting argument, finds at once a bias in it. The one whom you must watch above all is yourself. Jerry Cleaver said: "What does you in is not failure to apply some high-level, intricate, complicated technique. It's overlooking the basics. Not keeping your eye on the ball." Analyses should finally center on testable real-world assertions. Do not take your eye off the ball.

## Case Outweighs

### Our extinction impact outweighs—must evaluate the debate in magnitude times probability framework

Matheny ‘7 [Jason, Department of Health Policy and Management, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University. “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction.” Risk Analysis. Vol 27, No 5, 2007, http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/resources/publications/2007\_orig-articles/2007-10-15-reducingrisk.html]

In this article, I discuss a subset of catastrophic events—those that could extinguish humanity.1 It is only in the last century, with the invention of nuclear weapons, that some of these events can be both caused and prevented by human action. While extinction events may be very improbable, their consequences are so grave that it could be cost effective to prevent them. A search of EconLit and the Social Sciences Citation Index suggests that virtually nothing has been written about the cost effectiveness of reducing human extinction risks.2 Maybe this is because human extinction seems impossible, inevitable, or, in either case, beyond our control; maybe human extinction seems inconsequential compared to the other social issues to which cost-effectiveness analysis has been applied; or maybe the methodological and philosophical problems involved seem insuperable. Certainly, the problems are intimidating. Because human extinction is unprecedented, speculations about how and when it could occur are highly subjective. To efficiently spend resources in reducing extinction risks, one needs to estimate the probabilities of particular extinction events, the expected duration of humanity in an event’s absence, the costs of extinction countermeasures, and the relative value of current and future human lives. Here, I outline how one might begin to address these problems. 2. Humanity’s Life Expectancy We have some influence over how long we can delay human extinction. Cosmology dictates the upper limit but leaves a large field of play. At its lower limit, humanity could be extinguished as soon as this century by succumbing to near-term extinction risks: nuclear detonations, asteroid or comet impacts, or volcanic eruptions could generate enough atmospheric debris to terminate food production; a nearby supernova or gamma ray burst could sterilize Earth with deadly radiation; greenhouse gas emissions could trigger a positive feedback loop, causing a radical change in climate; a genetically engineered microbe could be unleashed, causing a global plague; or a high energy physics experiment could go awry, creating a “true vacuum” or strangelets that destroy the planet (Bostrom, 2002; Bostrom & Cirkovic, 2007; Leslie, 1996; Posner, 2004; Rees, 2003). Farther out in time are risks from technologies that remain theoretical but might be developed in the next century or centuries. For instance, self-replicating nanotechnologies could destroy the ecosystem; and cognitive enhancements or recursively self-improving computers could exceed normal human ingenuity to create uniquely powerful weapons (Bostrom, 2002; Bostrom & Cirkovic, 2007; Ikle, 2006; Joy, 2000; Leslie, 1996; Posner, 2004; Rees, 2003). Farthest out in time are astronomical risks. In one billion years, the sun will begin its red giant stage, increasing terrestrial temperatures above 1,000 degrees, boiling off our atmosphere, and eventually forming a planetary nebula, making Earth inhospitable to life (Sackmann, Boothroyd, & Kraemer, 1993; Ward & Brownlee, 2002). If we colonize other solar systems, we could survive longer than our sun, perhaps another 100 trillion years, when all stars begin burning out (Adams & Laughlin, 1997). We might survive even longer if we exploit nonstellar energy sources. But it is hard to imagine how humanity will survive beyond the decay of nuclear matter expected in 1032 to 1041 years (Adams & Laughlin, 1997).3 Physics seems to support Kafka’s remark that “[t]here is infinite hope, but not for us.” While it may be physically possible for humanity or its descendents to flourish for 1041 years, it seems unlikely that humanity will live so long. Homo sapiens have existed for 200,000 years. Our closest relative, homo erectus, existed for around 1.8 million years (Anton, 2003). The median duration of mammalian species is around 2.2 million years (Avise et al., 1998). A controversial approach to estimating humanity’s life expectancy is to use observation selection theory. The number of homo sapiens who have ever lived is around 100 billion (Haub, 2002). Suppose the number of people who have ever or will ever live is 10 trillion. If I think of myself as a random sample drawn from the set of all human beings who have ever or will ever live, then the probability of my being among the first 100 billion of 10 trillion lives is only 1%. It is more probable that I am randomly drawn from a smaller number of lives. For instance, if only 200 billion people have ever or will ever live, the probability of my being among the first 100 billion lives is 50%. The reasoning behind this line of argument is controversial but has survived a number of theoretical challenges (Leslie, 1996). Using observation selection theory, Gott (1993) estimated that humanity would survive an additional 5,000 to 8 million years, with 95% confidence. 3. Estimating the Near-Term Probability of Extinction It is possible for humanity (or its descendents) to survive a million years or more, but we could succumb to extinction as soon as this century. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, U.S. President Kennedy estimated the probability of a nuclear holocaust as “somewhere between one out of three and even” (Kennedy, 1969, p. 110). John von Neumann, as Chairman of the U.S. Air Force Strategic Missiles Evaluation Committee, predicted that it was “absolutely certain (1) that there would be a nuclear war; and (2) that everyone would die in it” (Leslie, 1996, p. 26). More recent predictions of human extinction are little more optimistic. In their catalogs of extinction risks, Britain’s Astronomer Royal, Sir Martin Rees (2003), gives humanity 50-50 odds on surviving the 21st century; philosopher Nick Bostrom argues that it would be “misguided” to assume that the probability of extinction is less than 25%; and philosopher John Leslie (1996) assigns a 30% probability to extinction during the next five centuries. The “Stern Review” for the U.K. Treasury (2006) assumes that the probability of human extinction during the next century is 10%. And some explanations of the “Fermi Paradox” imply a high probability (close to100%)of extinction among technological civilizations (Pisani, 2006).4 Estimating the probabilities of unprecedented events is subjective, so we should treat these numbers skeptically. Still, even if the probability of extinction is several orders lower, because the stakes are high, it could be wise to invest in extinction countermeasures.

## Case Turns Critique

### Case impacts take out alternative solvency—violent conflict derails the changes in world view necessary for them to deconstruct security.

Linklater 90 (Andrew, Senior Lecturer in Politics – Monash University, Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations, p. 32)

These theoretical disagreements with Marxism generate major differences at the practical level. It is necessary to conclude that a post-Marxist critical theory of international relations must concede that technical and practical orientations to foreign policy are inescapable at least at this juncture. Such an approach must appreciate the need for classical realist methods of protecting the state under conditions of insecurity and distrust, and recognise the importance of the rationalist defence of order and legitimacy in the context of anarchy. It is important to take account of the rationalist claim that order is unlikely to survive if the major powers cannot reconcile their different national security interests. In a similar vein, a critical approach to international relations is obliged to conclude that the project of emancipation will not make significant progress if international order is in decline. One of its principal tasks would then be to understand how the community of states can be expanded so that it approximates a condition which maximises the importance of freedom and universality. In this case, a critical theory of international relations which recognises the strengths of realism and Marxism must aim for a political practice which deals concurrently with the problem of power, the need for order and the possibility of emancipation through the extension of human community.

## Aff Solves Impact

### Confronting threats early solves escalation—the aff solves the impact to the critique

**Yoon Kwan, Professor of International Relations at Seoul National University; former Foreign Minister of South Korea, 2003**

**“Introduction: Power Cycle Theory and the Practice of International Relations”, International Political Science Review 2003; vol. 24; p. 7-8**

In history, the effort to balance power quite often tended to start too late to protect the security of some of the individual states. If the balancing process begins too late, the resulting amount of force necessary to stop an aggressor is often much larger than if the process had been started much earlier. For example, the fate of Czechoslovakia and Poland showed how non-intervention or waiting for the “automatic” working through of the process turned out to be problematic. Power cycle theory could also supplement the structure-oriented nature of the traditional balance of power theory by incorporating an agent-oriented explanation. This was possible through its focus on the relationship between power and the role of a state in the international system. It especially highlighted the fact that a discrepancy between the relative power of a state and its role in the system would result in a greater possibility for systemic instability. In order to prevent this instability from developing into a war, practitioners of international relations were to become aware of the dynamics of changing power and role, adjusting role to power. A statesperson here was not simply regarded as a prisoner of structure and therefore as an outsider to the process but as an agent capable of influencing the operation of equilibrium. Thus power cycle theory could overcome the weakness of theoretical determinism associated with the traditional balance of power. The question is often raised whether government decision-makers could possibly know or respond to such relative power shifts in the real world. According to Doran, when the “tides of history” shift against the state, the push and shove of world politics reveals these matters to the policy-maker, in that state and among its competitors, with abundant urgency. (2) The Issue of Systemic Stability Power cycle theory is built on the conception of changing relative capabilities of a state, and as such it shares the realist assumption emphasizing the importance of power in explaining international relations. But its main focus is on the longitudinal dimension of power relations, the rise and decline of relative state power and role, and not on the static power distribution at a particular time. As a result, power cycle theory provides a significantly different explanation for stability and order within the international system. First of all, power cycle theory argues that what matters most in explaining the stability of the international system or war and peace is not the type of particular international system (Rosecrance, 1963) but the transformation from one system to another. For example, in the 1960s there was a debate on the stability of the international system between the defenders of bipolarity such as Waltz (1964) and the defenders of multi-polarity such as Rosecrance (1966), and Deutsch and Singer (1964). After analyzing five historical occasions since the origin of the modern state system, Doran concluded that what has been responsible for major war was not whether one type of system is more or less conducive to war but that instead systems transformation itself led to war (Doran, 1971). A non-linear type of structural change that is massive, unpredicted, devastating to foreign policy expectation, and destructive of security is the trigger for major war, not the nature of a particular type of international system.

## No Root Cause

### Their root cause arguments are wrong—their impact claims are overblown and reductionist.

**Dr. Inis Claude, Government and Foreign Affairs—the University of Virginia, 1988**

**States and the Global System**

Our tendency to exaggerate the power of states owes a great deal to our dread of war. Although we overestimate the competence of states in all respects, it is their power to make war that most concerns us. The notion that the state has vast military potential leads directly to the proposition that the state is incorrigibly warlike; the myth of the almighty state has as its correlate the myth of the bloodthirsty state. Every sophisticated student of international politics must begin with Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes. He can hardly avoid emerging from all that with the shrewd conviction that the international arena is the scene of the war of all against all. States have a lust for dominance, a ruthless disregard for any value except success in the endless struggle for power, and an ineradicable bellicosity. A system of states is a war system; it can be nothing else. Thus, we develop a picture of the state as a military machine, straining for action, itching for a fight, watching for an opportunity to demolish its rivals. One may associate this image especially with Realists, those inveterate and dedicated pessimists who can bear to confront a fact or a circumstance only if it is grim and foreboding. Indeed, Realists have delighted in assuring us that the struggle for power is the name of the only possible game in a multistate system, and many a young person has rested a pretension of intellectual superiority on his precocious understanding that domestic life is a rat-race and international life is a dog-fight. Naive cynicism of this sort, however, is no more typical of Realists than of Idealists. In undertaking to justify and to spread to others their zeal for reforming or for effecting the revolutionary transformation of the multistate system, Idealists vie with Realists in asserting the belligerent propensities of states in the existing system. The two groups have different views as to what can and should be done about the situation, but their depictions of the working of the international system as a war system are often indistinguishable. Most of us, in fact, whatever our labels, operate on the supposition that states are fundamentally warlike entities. Note the general acceptance of deterrence theory, with its underlying presumption that states are likely to attack each other unless strong incentives for restraint are created and conspicuously displayed. Let me suggest that the state as Roaring Tiger is frequently less in evidence than the state as Pussy Cat. Trigger-happiness shares the international stage with gun-shyness. Bellicosity is matched by various shades of pacifism. Clearly, these qualities vary from state to state, from time to time and from circumstance to circumstance. Some wars seem almost inevitable and will occur unless effective means are adopted to prevent them. Other wars are almost inconceivable and will not occur unless some extraordinary cause intrudes. Make no mistake about it: warlike tendencies are sufficiently widespread and strong to make the problem of maintaining world order a crucial one for us all, but we will not promote the solution of that problem by misstating the character of the states that constitute the global system.

## Alternative Fails 1/2

### The alternative cannot solve—critical theory cannot translate into political action.

**Richard Wyn Jones, International Politics—University of Wales, 1999**

**Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, CIAO, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/wynjones/wynjones06.html**

Because emancipatory political practice is central to the claims of critical theory, one might expect that proponents of a critical approach to the study of international relations would be reflexive about the relationship between theory and practice. Yet their thinking on this issue thus far does not seem to have progressed much beyond grandiose statements of intent. There have been no systematic considerations of how critical international theory can help generate, support, or sustain emancipatory politics beyond the seminar room or conference hotel. Robert Cox, for example, has described the task of critical theorists as providing “a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order” (R. Cox 1981: 130). Although he has also gone on to identify possible agents for change and has outlined the nature and structure of some feasible alternative orders, he has not explicitly indicated whom he regards as the addressee of critical theory (i.e., who is being guided) and thus how the theory can hope to become a part of the political process (see R. Cox 1981, 1983, 1996). Similarly, Andrew Linklater has argued that “a critical theory of international relations must regard the practical project of extending community beyond the nation–state as its most important problem” (Linklater 1990b: 171). However, he has little to say about the role of theory in the realization of this “practical project.” Indeed, his main point is to suggest that the role of critical theory “is not to offer instructions on how to act but to reveal the existence of unrealised possibilities” (Linklater 1990b: 172). But the question still remains, reveal to whom? Is the audience enlightened politicians? Particular social classes? Particular social movements? Or particular (and presumably particularized) communities? In light of Linklater’s primary concern with emancipation, one might expect more guidance as to whom he believes might do the emancipating and how critical theory can impinge upon the emancipatory process. There is, likewise, little enlightenment to be gleaned from Mark Hoffman’s otherwise important contribution. He argues that critical international theory seeks not simply to reproduce society via description, but to understand society and change it. It is both descriptive and constructive in its theoretical intent: it is both an intellectual and a social act. It is not merely an expression of the concrete realities of the historical situation, but also a force for change within those conditions. (M. Hoffman 1987: 233) Despite this very ambitious declaration, once again, Hoffman gives no suggestion as to how this “force for change” should be operationalized and what concrete role critical theorizing might play in changing society. Thus, although the critical international theorists’ critique of the role that more conventional approaches to the study of world politics play in reproducing the contemporary world order may be persuasive, their account of the relationship between their own work and emancipatory political practice is unconvincing. Given the centrality of practice to the claims of critical theory, this is a very significant weakness. Without some plausible account of the mechanisms by which they hope to aid in the achievement of their emancipatory goals, proponents of critical international theory are hardly in a position to justify the assertion that “it represents the next stage in the development of International Relations theory” (M. Hoffman 1987: 244). Indeed, without a more convincing conceptualization of the theory–practice nexus, one can argue that critical international theory, by its own terms, has no way of redeeming some of its central epistemological and methodological claims and thus that it is a fatally flawed enterprise.

Alternative Fails 2/2

### Rethinking fails—degenerates into endless theorizing which cannot confront immediate crises.

**Kenneth Booth, International Politics – University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 1999**

**International Relations Theory Today, Ed. Booth & Smith, p. 330**

The implications of saying ‘Dare not to know’ in international relations are profound. They entail a revolution in the ontology, epistemology and agenda of the discipline. Dare not to know means: re-examining basic concepts; opening up to what has been closed out; rehumanizing what has been dehumanized; de-gendering what has been gendered; celebrating confusion rather than certainty; dethroning the logic of anarchy with the logics of anarchy; denaturalizing established common sense; populating the frontier zones between international relations and other academic disciplines; ideologizing the supposedly ‘objective’; re-imagining the humanly constituted; contextualizing the tradition; making normativity a norm; and listening carefully to the subject’s ‘screaming silences’. To accept such a programme obviously entails the risk of academic international relations being sucked into the black hole of philosophy. Thinking about thinking always threatens to undermine any confidence we may have in what we know and how we act. This is particularly disturbing for a subject such as international relations, which has always been thought about as a policy science, intimately concerned with decisions and their consequences. Implicitly, international relations has operated on the old principle that ‘there is nothing so practical as a good theory’. A reinvented future for the subject requires consideration of the interplay of practice and theory. Dreams that are not operationalized leave the world as it is. Putting all this together, politically speaking, means that we cannot wait for philosophy to deliver final judgements about beauty and truth. The world is confronted by numerous immediate and long-term problems, so we have to demonstrate the ‘courage of our confusions’ if we hope to get from here to the future in good shape. For several reasons, the year 2045 can be taken as the symbolic marker of the future.

## Predictions Good 1/2

### Our predictions are accurate and don’t link to the criticism.

**Ruud van der Helm Dutch Policy Officer in the Aid Effectiveness and Policy Department, 2009**

**Futures – Volume 41, Issue 2, Pages 67-116 (March 2009)**

Futurists build and discuss statements on future states of affairs. When their work is challenged, they cannot defend ‘‘what may come to be’’ with robust forms of proof. They have no direct observation, can design no experiments, and cannot accumulate data sets. All the work, all the discussions of validity, have to rely on indirect reasoning based on current and past observations, experiments and data. Such reasoning is fragile and subject to considerable uncertainty. Ever since the field emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, futurists have been acutely aware of the special challenge this implies, including two most obvious consequences. First, even the most serious work is vulnerable to potentially devastating criticism. This has triggered an on-going effort of theoretical justification that has accompanied the development of the Futures field. Second, in relation to this, sound methodology is crucially important to provide support when exploring such insecure ground as professional and academic speculation on possible futures. It is not surprising that methodology has constantly been one – and often the – central concern of the field, sometimes to a point of excess. As early as 1980, De´coufle´ could warn companion futurists against the urge ‘‘to jump steps in the long and difficult progression towards the still hypothetical scientificity of conjectural work by displaying inappropriate complacency for issues of method’’. Whether or not some futurists do ‘jump steps’, the Futures field has consistently shown much reflexivity on its theoretical foundations and its methodological procedures. However, the nature of the theoretical and methodological challenges to be addressed by such reflexivity changes over time. The doctrines, the methodological resources, the knowledge-base, the organisation of discussion in the field, that once provided the basis for successfully meeting the challenges of a given era may become inadequate or irrelevant if the context comes to change in a major way. Our argument in this special issue is that such a major change in the challenges that have to be met by our field is now well under way, calling for a major re-examination and renewal of the theoretical underpinnings of futures work.1 Deepening and refining the diagnosis of the changing context of FS is of course one part of the task ahead of us. But to launch the effort, and show its necessity, let us just sketch a rough picture of the situation, by reviewing three important aspects of the development of the Futures field: (1) practical necessity and finalisation, (2) peculiarity and separation, and (3) methodology-based development. Confronted with strident criticism on the possibility and legitimacy of any serious study of future situations, the strongest argument put forward by many pioneers of the Futures field was that studying possible futures was necessary for action and decision-making. As expressed by Bertrand de Jouvenel (1964): ‘‘One always foresees, without richness of data, without awareness of method, without critique nor cooperation. It is now urgent and important to give this individual and natural activity a cooperative, organised character, and submit it to growing demands of intellectual rigor’’. This has proved a decisive basis for the development of the field, fromthe1960s to thep resent day. It has led to a situation where most works on futures are legitimised through their connection to business management, to public decision-making, or both. The success of foresight in the recent years is an illustration of the strength of this covenant between futures methodology and the needs of long-term, strategic, management and policy. The downside of thus using the contribution to decision-making as the main theoretical justification and as the backbone of methodological design in futures work has been, and is now, a constant weakening of the effort to explore and develop other bases for theoretical foundation and methodological development. Although many such avenues have been opened, they have not been explored very far, because the evaluation of new methods has been based on their adequacy in serving studies designed for the preparation of decision-making, or of collective action.

Predictions Good 2/2

### Their critique of predictions is politically debilitating—the alternative has no strategy for dealing with global problems.

**Dr. Richard Slaughter, the president of Foresight International, in Brisbane, Australia, 2008**

**Futures – Volume 40, Issue 10, Pages 853-926 (December 2008) – obtained via Science Direct**

I take the view that the futures field is at an advanced stage of development internally with a broad suite of tools, methods, practitioners and an impressive literature. But its applications are very uneven, the bulk of its work remains doggedly conventional and its most advanced expressions have yet to make their mark. Apart from the pressing need for greater social legitimation, one of the most significant stumbling blocks probably has more to do with human nature than with futures and foresight per se. It can be seen in the way that the differences that exist between practitioners of different persuasions often seem to become more important and divisive than the pressing concerns for humanity’s future that supposedly underlie them. Perhaps this is inevitable in any field, the games and traps of the human ego being what they are. Yet, at the same time, the challenge has never been greater to transcend conflicts, disputes and divisions and to re-focus on the dynamics of the transitions ahead. Two works that achieve this with distinction are Andy Hines and Peter Bishop’s book on Thinking About the Future: Guidelines for Strategic Foresight, which should be read by everyone, and Will Steffan’s book Global Change and the Earth System: A Planet Under Pressure [10]. What is certain is that a succession of non-negotiable factors will test humanity as never before. It is headed for a perfect storm comprised global warming and sea level rise, peak oil and its aftermath, regional environmental collapse, economic and financial instability, and social upheavals and migrations on a scale never seen before. In this context what the world needs is not inter-tribal rivalry but a coherent, convincing and capable futures/foresight community to assist with two key tasks. The first task is the need to ‘wake up’ to humanity’s predicament; the second is to more consciously and effectively manage the multiple transitions from growth (which further inscribes the ‘overshoot and collapse’ trajectory) to sustainability (which requires very different values, assumptions and practices across the board). Quite possibly the most accurate and succinct statement about these prospects were penned a few years ago by biologist E.O. Wilson who wrote: We have entered the Century of the Environment, in which the immediate future is usefully conceived as a bottleneck. Science and technology, combined with a lack of self-understanding and a Paleolithic obstinacy, brought us to where we are today. Now science and technology, combined with foresight and moral courage, must see us through the bottleneck and out [11]. The futures/foresight profession, vocation or field stands at these very crossroads. Whatever the future actually holds, the journal Futures, and others like it, have a major hand in resourcing us for this exceptionally challenging journey into new territory.

## Threat Construction Good

### Debating about threats is key to effective policy making—risk assessment is possible and good.

**Stephen Walt, Political Science—University of Chicago, 1991 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, p. 229-30**

A recurring theme of this essay has been the twin dangers of separating the study of security affairs from the academic world or of shifting the focus of academic scholarship too far from real-world issues. The danger of war will be with us for some time to come, and states will continue to acquire military forces for a variety of purposes. Unless one believes that ignorance is preferable to expertise, the value of independent national security scholars should be apparent. Indeed, history suggests that countries that suppress debate on national security matters are more likely to blunder into disaster, because misguided policies cannot be evaluated and stopped in time. As in other areas of public policy, academic experts in security studies can help in several ways. In the short term, academics are well placed to evaluate current programs, because they face less pressure to support official policy. The long-term effects of academic involvement may be even more significant: academic research can help states learn from past mistakes and can provide the theoretical innovations the produce better policy choices in the future. Furthermore, their role in training the new generation of experts gives academics an additional avenue of influence.

### Risk is inevitable—our scenario-planning is key

**Harvard Nuclear Study Group 1983 Living with Nuclear Weapons, p.16-7**

When President John F. Kennedy was shown irrefutable evidence of the Soviet missile emplacement – U-2 photographs of the missile bases in Cube – he and his advisors discussed the matter for six days before deciding on an American response to the challenge. The decision, to place a naval blockade around the island, was not a risk-free response. This, Kennedy honestly admitted to the nation the night of October 22, 1962: My fellow citizens, let no one doubt this is a difficult and dangerous effort on which we have set out. No one can foresee precisely what course it will take… But the great danger of all would be to do nothing. Why did the president believe that “to do nothing” about the missiles in Cuba would be an even greater danger than accepting the “difficult and dangerous” course of the blockade? He accepted some risk of war in the long run, by discouraging future Soviet aggressive behavior. Inaction might have led to an even more dangerous future. This the president also explained that night in his address to the nation: [This] sudden, clandestine decision to station weapons for the first time outside Soviet soil – is a deliberate provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted by either friend or foe. The 1930’s taught us a clear lesson: Aggressive conduct, if allowed to grow unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war. The American government managed the 1962 crisis with skill and restraint – offering a compromise to the Soviets and giving them sufficient time to call back their missile-laden ships, for example – and the missiles were withdrawn from Cuba. The president carefully supervised American military actions to ensure that his orders were not misunderstood. He did not push his success too far or ignore the real risks of war. The point here is not, to make the blockade a model for American action in the future: different circumstances may call for different policies. Rather the point is to underline the persistence of risk in international affairs. Every proposed response to the Soviet action – doing nothing, enforcing the blockade, or invading Cuba – entailed some risk of nuclear war. Kennedy’s task – and we think his success – was to weigh accurately the risks entailed in each course and decide on policy accordingly.