Security K 2010

Security K Shell 3

Security K Shell 4

Security K Shell 5

Link – Cooption 6

Link – Danger 7

Link - Disease 8

Link - Environment 9

Link - Environment 10

Link - Environment 11

Link – Economy 12

Link – State 13

Link – State 14

Link – Hegemony 15

Link – Terrorism 16

Link – Terrorism 17

Link – Terrorism 18

Link – Terrorism 19

Link – Accidents 20

Link – Kritikal Affs 21

Link – Japan 22

Link – Korea 23

Links – China 24

Links – China 25

Links – China 26

Links – China 27

A2: Link Turn – “We Decrease Troops” 28

A2: Link Turn – “We Decrease Troops” 29

A2: Link Turn – “We Decrease Troops” 30

A2: Link Turn – “We Decrease Troops” 31

A2: Link Turn – “We Decrease Troops” 32

A2: Link Turn – “We Decrease Troops” 33

A2: Link Turn – “We Decrease Troops” 34

Internal Link - Genocide 35

Internal Link - Genocide 36

Internal Link - Biopower 37

Internal Link - Militarism 38

Internal Link - Militarism 39

Internal Link – Value to Life 40

Internal Link – Value to Life 41

No Impacts – Threats are Constructed 42

No Impacts – Threats are Constructed 43

No Impacts – Threats are Constructed 44

No Impacts – Threats are Constructed 45

No Impacts – Threats are Constructed 46

A2: “Our Threats are Real” 47

A2: “Our Threats are Real” 48

A2: “Our Threats are Real” 49

Impact – Extinction 50

Impact – War 51

Impact – War 52

Impact – War 53

Impact – War 54

Impact – Value to Life 55

Impact – Value to Life 56

Impact – Value to Life 57

Impact – Value to Life 58

Impact – Value to Life 59

Impact – Biopower 60

Impact – Oppression 61

Impact – No Solvency 62

Impact – Militarism - Extinction 63

Impact - Militarism – War 64

Impact - Militarism – War 65

Impact – Korea Specific – Root Cause 66

Impact – Korea Specific – Root Cause 67

Ontology Precedes Epistemology 68

Ontology Precedes Ethics 69

Alt Solves – Generally 70

Alt Solves – Generally 71

Alt Solves – Generally 72

Alt Solves – Generally 73

Alt Solves – Ontology 74

Alt Solves – Ontology 75

Alt Solves – Ontology 76

Alt Solves – Ontology 77

Alt Solves – Ontology 78

Alt Solves – Discourse 79

Alt Solves – Discourse 80

Alt Solves – Discourse 81

Alt Solves – Value to Life 82

Alt Solves – Value to Life 83

Alt Solves – Value to Life 84

Alt Solves – Korea 85

Alt Solves – Korea 86

Alt Solves – A2: System Too Powerful 87

Alt Solves – A2: Individuals Don’t Matter 88

Alt Solves – A2: Individuals Don’t Matter 89

Alt Solves – A2: “K Doesn’t Affect World” 90

Alt Solves – A2: Discourse ≠ Reality 91

Alt Solves – A2: Discourse ≠ Reality 92

Alt Solves – A2: Discourse ≠ Reality 93

Alt Solves – A2: Discourse ≠ Reality 94

Alt Solves – A2: “You Reduce Everything to Language” 95

A2: Realism – Realism Bad 96

A2: Realism – Realism Bad 97

A2: Realism – Realism is Wrong – Generally 98

A2: Realism – Realism is Wrong – Generally 99

A2: Realism – Realism is Wrong – Generally 100

A2: Realism – Realism is Wrong – Generally 101

A2: Realism – Realism is Wrong – Generally 102

A2: Realism - Outdated 103

A2: Realism - Outdated 104

A2: Realism - Outdated 105

A2: Realism - 9/11 Proof 106

A2: Realism - 9/11 Proof 107

A2: Realism – Human Nature 108

A2: Realism – Human Nature 109

A2: Realism – A2: State-Focus Key 110

A2: Realism – A2: State-Focus Key 111

A2: Realism – A2: State-Focus Key 112

A2: Realism – A2: State-Focus Key 113

A2: Realism – A2: State-Focus Key 114

A2: Realism – A2: No Realism = War 115

A2: Realism – A2: No Realism = War 116

A2: Realism – A2: No Realism = War 117

A2: Realism – A2: Self-Correcting 118

A2: Realism – A2: History Proves 119

A2: Realism – A2: History Proves 120

A2: Realism – A2: History Proves 121

A2: Realism Inevitable 122

A2: Realism Inevitable 123

A2: Violence Inevitable 124

A2: “We’re a Different Kind of Realism” 125

A2: Mearsheimer 126

A2: Mearsheimer 127

A2: Mearsheimer 128

A2: Waltz 129

A2: Waltz 130

A2: Waltz 131

A2: Guzzini 132

A2: Perm 133

A2: Perm 134

A2: Perm 135

A2: Perm 136

A2: Perm 137

A2: Perm 138

A2: Perm - Discourse 139

A2: Perm - Discourse 140

A2: Perm – Authoritarianism Turn 141

A2: K trivializes State 142

A2: K Subjective- Rejection Key to Change 143

A2: K Exclusionary 144

Affirmative Answers 145

A2: Self-Fulfilling Prophecy 146

A2: Self-Fulfilling Prophecy 147

A2: Self-Fulfilling Prophecy 148

A2: Self-Fulfilling Prophecy 149

A2: Discourse First 150

AT: Security Discourse Bad 151

AT: Security Discourse Bad 152

Threats = Real – Generally and Historically 153

A2: Epistemology K 154

A2: Realism isn’t Viable 155

A2: Realism is Outdated 156

Perm Solves – Strategic Reversibility 157

Perm Solves – A2: Security is Totalizing 158

Perm Solves 159

Perm Solves 160

Perm Solves 161

Perm Solves 162

No Link – A2: State Bad 163

No Link – A2: State Bad 164

AT: No VTL 165

AT: No VTL 166

Fear Good 167

Action Good 168

Action Good 169

Predictions Good 170

A2: Calculation Bad 171

AT: Root Cause 172

AT: Root Cause 173

Alt Fails – Discourse 174

Alt Fails – Generally 175

Alt Fails – Generally 176

Alt Fails – Generally 177

Alt Fails – Generally 178

Alt Fails – State Link 179

Alt Fails – Ontology 180

Alt Fails – Value to Life 181

Alt Fails – Value to Life 182

Alt Turn - Exclusion 183

Alt Turn - Violence 184

Alt Fails – Reject Bad 185

Violence Inevitable 186

Violence Inevitable 187

Violence Inevitable 188

Violence Inevitable – A2: You Justify… 189

Postmodernism Fails 190

Postmodernism Fails 191

Postmodernism Fails 192

Deconstructionism Fails 193

Deconstructionism Fails 194

Realism Inevitable 195

Realism Inevitable 196

Realism Inevitable 197

Security K Shell

Their discourse of danger is preoccupied with eluding death, justifying atrocities and nuclear war in the name of avoiding security problems – This way of thinking reduces life to avoiding death, making it impossible to articulate a value to life

Campbell 98 (David- PHD, Prof of cultural & poli geog @ U of Durham, *Writing Security*, p.54-55,ET)

It requires an emphasis on the unfinished and endangered nature of the world. In other words, discourses of 'danger' are central to the discourses of the `state' and the discourses of `man.'43 In place of the spiritual certitude that provided the vertical intensity to support the horizontal extensiveness of Christendom, the state requires discourses of 'danger' to provide a new theology of truth about who and what 'we' are by highlighting who or what `we' are not, and what 'we' have to fear. This is not to suggest that fear and danger are modern constructs which only emerged after the relative demise of Christendom. On the contrary, the church relied heavily on discourses of danger to establish its authority, discipline its followers, and ward off its enemies. Indeed, although this disposition was important to the power of the church throughout its history, for the three centuries between the Black Death of 1348 and the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the agents of God propagated a woeful vision of life marked by a particular attitude towards death.' Thinking that western civilization was besieged by a horde of enemies (Turks, Jews, heretics, idolaters, and witches, to name but a few), the church saw the devil everywhere and encouraged introspection and guilt to such an extent that a culture of anxiety predominated. The literary tradition of contemptus mundi (`contempt for the world'), which was pivotal to the culture of anxiety and the acute sense of endangeredness it encouraged, bespoke hatred for the body and the world, the pervasiveness of sin, the fleeting nature of time, and the fragility of life. Moreover, it was this `evangalism of fear’ which produced a preoccupation with death. As the promise of an escape from earthly vices, the religious leitmotif of 'salvation' obliged all those who sought this transcendence 'to think continually about death in order to avoid sin, because sin plus death could land them in Hell.'" Meditation on death was thus the principal form of a moral pedagogy which sought to ensure salvation. In fostering an evangelism of fear, with death as its impetus and salvation as its goal, the cultural agents of the period were not simply responding to danger as an external condition. The required familiarity with death demanded of individuals an eternal vigilance against the self: 'One should always keep death in mind, just as one would always mount guard against an enemy who might suddenly appear' (indeed, for essayists like Montaigne, 'death' was a synonym for `enemy').47 But it was this vigilance against the self, encouraged by the experience of finitude, and required in the name of salvation, which constituted the conditions of contemptus mundi from which one sought salvation. In the Speculum peccatoris (`Sinner's Mirror') — a manuscript attributed to St Augustine — the author declares: `Consideration of the brevity of life engenders contempt for the world'; and Rethinking foreign policy continues: 'is there anything that can increase man's vigilance, his flight from injustice, and his saintly behavior in the fear of God more than the realization of his [future] alteration, the precise knowledge of his mortal condition and the consequent thought of his horrible death, when man becomes nonman?'48 The logic of the evangelism of fear thus ferments the very conditions which it claims necessitate vigilance against the enemies of the self; put simply, it produces its own danger. The evangelism of fear and its logic of identity is not a thing of the past, however. In our own time, argues Delumeau, we can witness its operation: Does not our own epoch help us to understand the beginnings of European modernity? The mass killings of the twentieth century from 1914 to the genocide of Cambodia — passing through various holocausts and the deluge of bombs on Vietnam — the menace of nuclear war, the ever-increasing use of torture, the multiplication of Gulags, the resurgence of insecurity, the rapid and often more and more troubling progress of technology, the dangers entailed by an overly intensive exploitation of natural resources, various genetic manipulations, and the uncontrolled explosion of information: Here are so many factors that, gathered together, create a climate of anxiety in our civilization which, in certain respects, is comparable to that of our ancestors between the time of the plague and the end of the Wars of Religion. We have reentered this 'country of fear' and, following a classic process of 'projection,' we never weary of evoking it in both words and images . . . Yesterday, as today, fear of violence is objectified in images of violence and fear of death in macabre visions.' To talk of the endangered nature of the modern world and the enemies and threats which abound in it is thus not to offer a simple ethnographic description of our condition; it is to invoke a discourse of danger through which the incipient ambiguity of our world can be grounded in accordance with the insistences of identity. Danger (death, in its ultimate form) might therefore be thought of as the new god for the modern world of states, not because it is peculiar to our time, but because it replicates the logic of Christendom's evangelism of fear.

Security K Shell

Security is a self-fulfilling prophecy—Discourse is the constitutive root of the fear that engenders conflict

Lipschutz 98 (*On Security*, Assistant Professor of Politics, Director of the Adlai Stevenson Program on Global Security, University of California, Santa Cruz Ronnie D. Lipschutz, editor)

How do such discourses begin? In his investigation of the historical origins of the concept, James Der Derian (Chapter 2: "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche and Baudrillard") points out that, in the past, security has been invoked not only to connote protection from threats, along the lines of the conventional definition, but also to describe hubristic overconfidence as well as a bond or pledge provided in a financial transaction. To secure oneself is, therefore, a sort of trap, for one can never leave a secure place without incurring risks. (Elsewhere, Barry Buzan has pointed out that "There is a cruel irony in [one] meaning of secure which is `unable to escape.' " 16 ) Security, moreover, is meaningless without an "other" to help specify the conditions of insecurity. Der Derian, citing Nietzsche, points out that this "other" is made manifest through differences that create terror and collective resentment of difference--the state of fear--rather than a preferable coming to terms with the positive potentials of difference. As these differences become less than convincing, however, their power to create fear and terror diminish, and so it becomes necessary to create ever more menacing threats to reestablish difference. For this purpose, Der Derian argues, reality is no longer sufficient; only the creation of a "hyperreal" world of computer and media-imaged and -imagined threats will do. Or, to cite Baudrillard, as Der Derian does: "It is no longer a question of a false representation of reality (ideology), but of concealing the fact that the real is no longer real." It is the imagined, unnamed party, with the clandestinely assembled and crude atomic device, and not the thousands of reliable, high-yield warheads mounted on missiles poised to launch at a moment's notice, that creates fear, terror, and calls for greater surveillance and enforcement. Yet, according to Der Derian, describing how the solitary computer wargaming of the Iraqi and American militaries were literally joined together in battle on the deserts of the Persian Gulf littoral, hyperreal threats do sometimes have an odd way of becoming material. The Gulf War created a "real" simulation, broadcast to the watching billions, that was later found out to have been a less-than-accurate representation. This does not mean that those who died suffered simulated deaths. Simulated threats may be imagined, but their ultimate consequences are all too real. What this process suggests is that concepts of security arise, to a great degree, out of discursive practices within states and, only secondarily, among states. 17 Ole Wæver (Chapter 3: "Securitization and Desecuritization") illuminates this aspect of security, framing it not as an objective or material condition, but as a "speech act," enunciated by elites in order to securitize issues or "fields," thereby helping to reproduce the hierarchical conditions that characterize security practices. Thus, according to Wæver, much of the agenda of "redefining security" is a process of bringing into the field of security those things that, perhaps, should remain outside (but this struggle to redefine a concept can also be seen as an effort by heretofore-excluded elites to enter the security discourse). He warns, therefore, that redefining security in a conventional sense, either to encompass new sources of threat or specify new referent objects, risks applying the traditional logic of military behavior to nonmilitary problems. This process can also expand the jurisdiction of already-expansive states as well. As Wæver puts it, "By naming a certain development a security problem, the `state' [claims] . . . a special right [to intervene]." In intervening, the tools applied by the state would look very much like those used during the wars the state might launch if it chose to do so. This contradiction was apparent in the initial landing of U.S. Marines in Somalia in December, 1992. Demonstrably, there was a question of matching force to force in this case, but the ostensible goal of humanitarian assistance took on the appearance of a military invasion (with the added hyperreality of resistance offered only by the mass(ed) media waiting on shore). This does not mean that Wæver thinks that "security as a speech act" should not be applied to anything at all; only that it is necessary to consider with care what is implied or involved if we are indiscriminate in doing so. Security is, to put Wæver's argument in other words, a socially constructed concept: It has a specific meaning only within a specific social context. 18 It emerges and changes as a result of discourses and discursive actions intended to reproduce historical structures and subjects within states and among them. 19 To be sure, policymakers define security on the basis of a set of assumptions regarding vital interests, plausible enemies, and possible scenarios, all of which grow, to a not-insignificant extent, out of the specific historical and social context of a particular country and some understanding of what is "out there." 20 But, while these interests, enemies, and scenarios have a material existence and, presumably, a real import for state security, they cannot be regarded simply as having some sort of "objective" reality independent of these constructions. 21 That security is socially constructed does not mean that there are not to be found real, material conditions that help to create particular interpretations of threats, or that such conditions are irrelevant to either the creation or undermining of the assumptions underlying security policy. Enemies, in part, "create" each other, via the projections of their worst fears onto the other; in this respect, their relationship is intersubjective. To the extent that they act on these projections, threats to each other acquire a material character. In other words, nuclear-tipped ICBMs are not mere figments of our imagination, but their targeting is a function of what we imagine the possessors of other missiles might do to us with theirs . 22

Security K Shell

Vote negative to reject the securitization of the 1AC. The logic of security legitimizes the holocaust and authoritarian measures – Only complete rejection solves.

**Neocleous 6** (Mark, August 2006, Brunel University, *Contemporary Political Theory*, p.147)

What follows from this is that we should resist any talk of 'balancing' liberty and security, for such talk of balance merely disguises a more fundamental commitment to the latter rather than the former. But maybe what also follows from this is that we should also avoid fooling ourselves that we can develop a 'radical' or 'critical' security politics. This is what is proposed by those aiming to 'Humanise' the security agenda, by turning into a security question issues such as migration, refugees, gender and the environment. Such positions rely ultimately on the assumption that, as Ken Booth (1991) puts it, since 'security' is the absence of threats and 'emancipation' is the freeing of people from human and physical constraints, 'security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin ... Emancipation, theoretically, is security'. This seems to me to be as about as mistaken as one can possibly be about security. Calling anything a security issue plays into the hands of the state, and the only way the state knows how to deal with threats to security is to tighten its grip on civil society and ratchet-up its restrictions on human freedoms. 'Speaking and writing about security is never innocent', Jef Huysmans comments. 'It always risks contributing to the opening of a window of opportunity for a "fascist mobilization" or an "internal security ideology"' (2002, 43). This is because the logic of 'security' is the logic of an anti-politics (Jayasuriya, 2004) in which the state uses 'security' to marginalize all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, the debates and discussions that animate political life, suppressing all before it and dominating political discourse in an entirely reactionary way. This is precisely the point alluded to by Marx in 1843 when he suggested that security was the supreme concept of bourgeois society: it's a concept that legitimizes any action by the state whatsoever, so long as the action is conducted in the name of security. And this explains why virtually every authoritarian measure since has been conducted in the name of security, from the reordering of international capital under the guise of national security (Neocleous, 2006b), to the reassertion of loyalty and consensus as the foundation of domestic order (Neocleous, 2006c), all the way down to the extermination camps of the holocaust, the first stage of which was to be taken into 'security confinement' by the security police.

Only the alt solves ecocide, genocide, and WMD war

Dillon 96 (Michael, Prof@Lancaster, *Politics of Security*, p. 2)JFS

Thought is therefore required if politics is to contribute to out-living the modern; specifically, political thought. The challenge to out-live the modern issues from the faltering of modern thought, however, and the suspicion now of its very own project of thought, as much as it does from the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the industrialisation and ecological despoliation of the planet, or the genocidal dynamics of new nationalisms The challenge to out-live the modern issues, therefore, from the modern condition of both politics and thought. This so- called suspicion of thought — I would rather call it a transformation of the project of thought which has disclosed the faltering of the modern project of thought — is what has come to distinguish continental thought in the last century. I draw on that thought in order to think the freedom of human being against the defining political thought of modernity; that ontological preoccupation with the subject of security which commits its politics to securing the subject.Motivated, therefore, by a certain sense of crisis in both philosophy and politics, and by the conviction that there is an intimate relation between the two which is most violently and materially exhibited globally in (inter)national politics, the aim of this book is to make a contribution towards rethinking some of the fundamentals of International Relations through what I would call the political philosophy of contemporary continental thought. Its ultimate intention is, therefore, to make a contribution toward the reconstruction of International Relations as a site of political thought, by departing from the very commitment to the politics of subjectivity upon which International Relations is premised. This is a tall order, and not least because the political philosophy of continental thought cannot be brought to bear upon International Relations if the political thought of that thought remains largely unthought.

Link – Cooption

Legitimizing the plan through security emergencies is coopted to justify on-going violence

Neocleous 6 (Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy, Brunel Business School, *Alternatives* 31 pg. 205-206)

At the same time, states constantly employ lawyers to explain and defend emergency tactics that might appear unlawful. A claim made in a House of Commons report on the law of occupation as it may pertain to the Iraq conflict is interesting in this regard. “In the case of Iraq, the main purpose of obtaining a mandate in the form of a Security Council resolution was to evade legal difficulties if the occupying powers sought to move beyond the limited rights conferred by the Hague Regulations and Geneva Convention IV to vary existing arrangements.”44 It was known that some “evading” of legal difficulties would be necessary; a Security Council resolution would simply have made it easier. The key is the acknowledgment that “evading legal difficulties” takes place. This evading often involves some real casuistry—one is reminded of the recent debates over the Geneva Convention regarding “prisoners of war” or the meaning of “torture”—but it is nonetheless legal casuistry: It involves serious attempts to interpret the law from within. And that, after all, is a practice lawyers constantly tell us needs doing. The manipulation of law to “evade legal difficulties” (internationally by the ruling powers, domestically by the ruling class) has a long history. Such manipulation does not, however, mean that the law is not operative; indeed, it tells us the very opposite. Thus one can debate whether this or that practice carried out in the name of emergency is legal or illegal. But ultimately, one has to bear in mind that the driving logic of emergency is the logic of national security and military necessity. And in the world of national security and military necessity, more or less anything can be justified. Cursory examination of the laws of war thus reveals that “despite noble rhetoric to the contrary, the laws of war have been formulated to deliberately privilege military necessity at the cost of humanitarian values. As a result, the laws of war have facilitated rather than restricted wartime violence.”45 The tactic of deliberately burying Iraqi troops alive during the 1990–1991 Gulf War and the “Turkey Shoot” on the road to Basra during the same conflict were defended as entirely legal by the Pentagon and international lawyers. The range of emergency practices carried during the more recent war on Iraq, such as detention without trial and torture, have been similarly defended.46 In other words, it is through law that violent actions conducted in “emergency conditions” have been legitimated.

Conservatives will hijack the plan to recreate the harms.

Villumsen and Büger 10 (Trine and Christian, PhD, University of Copenhagen and University of Duisburg-Essen, *Security Expertise after Securitization: Coping with Dilemmas of Engaging with Practice* pg. 2-3)

Moreover, the entanglement between analysis and policy was not just a post-world war II phenomenon. For some scholars the end of the Cold War was directly related (if not even caused) by the proliferation of new strategic thought by expert communities (Risse-Kappen 1994, Adler 1992). Also the study of contemporary issues – such as the securitization of migration (Bigo 2002, 2007), the contemporary human security discourse (Gaspers 2005), European Union Security and Defence policy (Mérand 2008) or transatlantic security (Villumsen 2008) – reveal heavy integration of security theory and practice. There is thus ample evidence for intensive exchanges between academics and security practitioners on various levels and in different points in time. It seems safe to conclude that contributions by security scholars make a difference to public policy-making in all its stages (agenda-setting, formulation and implementation) including the constitutive level. Hence, the much-debated gap‘ between theory and policy, which the discipline of International Relations (IR) is often so concerned about (George 1994, Eriksson and Sundelius 2005) is to a large extent a misrepresentation. Rather than living a quiet life on one side of a gap, security scholarship is an active player in a field of security which encompasses both theory and practice. This fact begs us to ponder about the consequences of academic practices rather than mourn the detachment and irrelevance of ivory tower scholarship. A range of studies argue that scientific knowledge and scholarly policy interventions can have hazardous consequences: they risk contributing to the escalation of violence, discrimination, exclusion or marginalization and legitimizing cuts in individual liberty. Further, they potentially limit policy options and hinder adequate problem solving. These consequences are neither always intended, nor steerable.

Link – Danger

Danger is life, “a call to being” – Controlling danger orders the living out of life

Campbell 98 (David- PHD, Prof of cultural & poli geog @ U of Durham, *Writing Security*, p.92-93,ET)

Danger, argues Mary Douglas, is always present at the border. Danger might involve pressure on the external boundaries; it might involve the violation of internal boundaries; it might be located in the margins of the boundary; or danger might arise with contradictions from within.29 Were there no borders, there would be no danger — but such a condition is at odds with the logic of identity, for the condition of possibility for experience entails (at least to some extent) the disciplining of ambiguity, the containment of contingency, and the delineation of borders. In other words, given that difference is a requisite for identity, danger is inherent to that relationship: 'Where there is no differentiation there is no defilement.'39 As such, danger is not an external condition that can be either tempered or transcended; danger is a part of all our relationships with the world. And as Jean Delumeau concluded with respect to fear, danger can be experienced positively as well as negatively: it can be a creative force, 'a call to being,' that provides access to the world.31 The issue, then, is how do we orient ourselves to danger, particularly at an historical juncture in which many novel dangers seem to abound? Can we do more than simply extend the old register of security to cover the new domains? What modes of being and forms of life could we or should we adopt? Do we have an alternative to the continued reproduction of sovereign communities in an economy of violence? However one might begin to fathom the many issues located within those challenges, our current situation leaves us with one certainty: because we cannot escape the logic of differentiation we are often tempted by the logic of defilement. To say as much, however, it not to argue that we are imprisoned within a particular and permanent system of representations. To be sure, danger is more often than. not represented as disease, dirt, or pollution. As one medical text argues: 'Disease is shock and danger for existence.'32 Or as Karl Jaspers maintains: 'Disease is a general concept of non-value which includes all possible negative values.'33 But such concerns have less to do with the intrinsic qualities of those conditions than the modernist requirements of order and stability: 'Dirt offends against order. Eliminating it is not a negative moment, but a positive effort to organize the environment.'34 One might suggest that it is the extent to which we want to organize the environment — the extent to which we want to purify our domain — that determines how likely it is that we represent danger in terms of dirt or disease. Tightly defined order and strictly enforced stability, undergirded by notions of purity, are not a priori conditions of existence; some order and some stability might be required for existence as we know it (i.e., in some form of extensive political community), but it is the degree of tightness, the measure of strictness, and the extent of the desire for purity which constitutes danger as dirt or disease.

Link - Disease

Disease is always seen as a threat from somewhere else, empirically acting to securitize people against other groups of people.

Campbell 98 (David- PHD, Prof of cultural & poli geog @ U of Durham, *Writing Security*, p. 98-99,ET)

What has been and remains central to the logic of socio-medical discourse is thus not the biological nature of disease, but a sense that disease is always from somewhere else. As Sontag notes, 'there is a link between imagining disease and imagining foreignness.' Indeed, when syphilis reached epidemic proportions in fifteenth-century Europe, 'It was the 'French pox' to the English, morbus Germanicus to the Parisians, the Naples sickness to the Florentines, [and] the Chinese disease to the Japanese.'62 But 'foreignness' does not necessarily coincide with places distant and removed: the foreign can also reside within; something that is evident when (as in the United States) disease is more readily diagnosed in the elderly, the poor, or the working class, even when other groups exhibit many more identifiably biological pathologies.63 In the same manner, we can note how various groups within American and European domestic society have been constituted as marginal through the figurations of socio¬medical discourse. Women, blacks, and Jews have at one time or another all been understood as uniquely susceptible to certain disorders. Women were diagnosed as exhibiting a high incidence of hysteria; Jews in general were believed to be prone to psychological disorders; Jewish men were thought to menstruate like women and thus be a source of social `pollution'; blacks were overwhelmingly considered insane. And for each of these groups, sexuality was medicalized as pathology and indicted as a threat to the integrity of the body politic." In sum, two things are particularly striking about these examples of the historical operation of socio-medical discourse. Firstly, it has often been able to function either without any empirical referent from which its valuations are theoretically derived, or it has accomplished its task in direct contradistinction to available empirical sources. The moral characteristics of leprosy lived on after its demise; neither women, nor blacks, nor Jews were any more vulnerable to psychological disorders than any other groups; and Jewish men certainly did not menstruate.65 Secondly, the modes of representation through which these groups are marked as social dangers effectively blend and fuse together various stigmata of difference, such that each figuration of difference functions, not as an image derived from a correspondence relationship, but as an indicator of the various images with which it has some perceived affinity. Or, as Hayden White suggests of metaphor generally, it 'functions as a symbol, rather than as a sign: which is to say that it does not give us either a description or an icon of the thing it represents, but tells us what images to look for in our culturally encoded Foreign policy and difference experience in order to determine how we should feel about the thing represented.'66

Disease is used to construct security threats- AIDS proves.

Campbell 98 (David- PHD, Prof of cultural & poli geog @ U of Durham, *Writing Security*, p. 99,ET)

In other words, by conflating the stigmata of difference, the tropes and metaphors of socio-medical discourse call to mind certain sensations, dispositions, impressions, and — given the negative valence of such representations — doubts, concerns, anxieties, and suspicions, to be associated with those groups who are the objects of attention. We need only consider contemporary representations of AIDS — in which iconography associated with syphilis, homosexuals, Africans, drug addicts, and inner-city residents is melded into an all-encompassing discursive formation so as to inscribe a boundary between the heterosexual, non-IV drug using, white community (i.e. those who are 'normal') and those at risk — to appreciate the continued saliency of these representations.67 Indeed, the boundary- producing effects of the discourse surrounding AIDS recently took a literal turn when the US Immigration and Naturalization Service overruled the Health and Human Services Department and reinstated the presence of HIV as grounds for excluding tourists and immigrants from the United States. With over one million Americans already infected with this virus, such an exclusion 'conveys the message that the danger is outside the US., is a foreigner, a stranger.'68 What we have been discussing here, then, is 'foreign policy': all those practices of differentiation implicated in the confrontation between self and other, and their modes of figuration. Although it has been argued that the representation of difference does not functionally necessitate a negative figuration, it has historically more often than not been the case — especially given the force of socio-medical discourse — that danger has been made available for understanding in terms of defilement. And given both the innately tropical nature of language and the multifarious sensibilities suffused within representations of danger, the depiction of difference is not carried out within the register of realism: we might say it takes places within an 'orrery of signification,' through which characteristics are ascribed to `others' on the basis of their associated valuations rather than on the basis of their ability to describe those being portrayed.69 In this context, foreign policy might be likened to an 'ethical power of segregation,' whereby moral distinctions can be made through spatial and temporal delineations, such that a 'geography of evil' is constituted, so that dangers can be calculated as originating from distinct and distant places.79 This is especially the case when we are considering the domain of Foreign Policy, where the temptation of otherness has been uncommonly compelling.

Link - Environment

Environmental management is an act of security- specifies threats that need to be secured.

Dalby 2 ( Simon- PHD, Prof @ Carleton U, *Environmental Security*, Intro- pg XXXII, 2, ET)

Environmental politics is very much about the politics of dis-course, the presentation of "problems," and of who should deal with the concerns so specified. These discourses frequently turn complex political matters into managerial and technological issues of sustainable development where strategies of "ecological modernization" finnesse the questions by promising technical solutions to numerous political difficulties and, in the process, work to co-opt or marginalize fundamental challenges to the contemporary world order.51 In Tim Luke's apt summation: "Underneath the enchanting green patina, sustainable development is about sustaining development as economically rationalized environment rather than the development of a sustaining ecology." Linking such themes to security, with its practices of specifying threats and its managerial modes for responding to dangers, suggests a broad congruency of discourse and practice.53 But what ought to be secured frequently remains unexamined, as does the precise nature of what it is that causes contemporary endangerments. Like other disciplinary endeavors, both environmental management and security studies have their practices for the delimitation of appropriate objects, methods, and procedures. Making these explicit and showing how they both facilitate and simultaneously limit inquiry is an unavoidable task for any study that takes Foucault's for-mulation of critique seriously. Challenging conventional wisdom is rarely easy, and disrupting geopolitical categories can be especially "unsettling." Asking unsettling questions about the identities of those who think in the conventional categories is not easy either. But it seems very necessary now, given the limitations of both the security and the environmental discourses we have inherited from the past and the pressing need to think intelligently about what kind of planet we are making.

Environmental thinking through sustaining of globalization is used as a manner of securitization.

Dalby 2 ( Simon- PHD, Prof @ Carleton U, *Environmental Security*, p 167- 168, 2, ET)

The globe, so often the symbol of endangerment in environmental thinking, has also been appropriated as a powerful icon by numerous advertisers to peddle all sorts of commodities and invoke a multiplicity of anxieties.8 Globalization is in this sense a cultural process relating to identities and the symbol of the globe itself, as well as an economic one.9 In television advertising in North America in the late 199os, Sprint Canada literally reduced the size of the spinning globe in its commercials that implied that reduced overseas phone call charges made the world a smaller place, and Malibu cars went four times around the world through numerous landscapes before they needed a tune-up. Perhaps most significant for the argument in this book were the Chevy Blazer sport utility vehicles (SUVs) seen negotiating numerous hazards on their journeys through a variety of environments before arriving unscathed either at a beach or at a large suburban home. The vehicles were sold with the slogan "a little security in an insecure world." Security is a matter of a safe space provided technologically to keep external dangers at bay. But this is an individualist's technological response to a "dangerous" world, a response that, however, only the global corporations can provide. It is one that uses technology to ensure that the autono-mous subject and family are not endangered. But there is a very powerful irony here in that the vehicle uses fossil fuels to propel itself and its passengers through storms, the frequency of which may be increased by the global climate changes brought on precisely by the use of fossil fuels. Big vehicles, specifically the popular sport utility vehicles like the Chevy Blazer, are fuel inefficient and, if buying trends at the turn of the century are maintained, will ensure that many states have little hope of meeting carbon dioxide emissions levels agreed to in international climate change agreements in the 199os. Kaplan's metaphor of the rich in their limousine might be updated to specify sport utility vehicles because the potholes are much worse. 3 This theme further links to the discussions of neoliberalism, to the contemporary reduction of state functions, and to the provision of public transport. Suburban families in the North increasingly use vehicles to transport children to schools and to numerous other so-cial events. The rationale for using vehicles is frequently an assumption of safety in a political culture of personal insecurity where either strangers are viewed as dangerous predators or vehicles themselves are understood as a threat to pedestrians. In environmental terms, this raises the question of whether the modern subject is sustainable, but it also points very directly to the assumptions about what is to be secured and how security is to be provided. In particular, it suggests once again that the suburban consumer lifestyle aspirations of modern autonomous citizens are premised on an unsustainable global economy.

Link - Environment

**Securitization hurts the environment**

Dalby 2 ( Simon- PHD, Prof @ Carleton U, *Environmental Security*, Intro- p 164-166, 2, ET)

To be effective in stimulating new thinking, concepts like the United Nations formulation of human security face a series of problems dealing with the legacy of cold war thinking and with contemporary geo-political understandings of security, which despite the broadening of the security agenda still frequently operate on assumptions of internal secure spaces kept separate from external threats by surveillance and technological acumen. That this assumption should be the starting point for security studies is not surprising. The geopolitical themes of protected inside and threatened outside is taken to its obvious conclusion in recent Hollywood movies (among others, Deep Impact, In-dependence Day, and Armageddon) where the earth is saved from external destruction by American ingenuity and, of course, nuclear weapons. This point is not a flippant reference to the distractions of popular entertainment, but rather a serious argument that security is part of the hegemonic understanding of who "we" who are insecure are. And who we are, and what metaphors our political leaders can use to invoke discourses of danger, are unavoidably matters of popular geopolitics and practical geopolitical reasoning. In discussing the politics of security discourse and its links to population concerns and neo-Malthusianism, Betsy Hartmann quotes An-drew Ross to make the point that in the 199os, despite a booming economy in the United States, fears of scarcity were a powerful part of the dominant neoliberal discourses of economics.2 Social scarcity is a powerful assumption in this context, and individual economic insecurities in a fast-changing economic system map onto neoliberal assumptions neatly. Ross makes the case that the coincidence of this neoliberal discourse and the assumptions of environmental scarcity in neo-Malthusianism fit together to support a security discourse that represents the impoverished South as both a natural phenomenon and a threat to American affluence. Whether as consumer or citizen, and the two identities are especially closely related in the contemporary discourses of neoliberalism as well as in many discourses of human rights, this autonomous knowledgeable being is both the ontological given and the political and economic desideratum in contemporary discussions of security and economy. Social and natural scarcity support each other in these political discourses of danger, nowhere more so than in the stark portrayal of environmentally induced dangers to American bucolic bliss encapsulated in the automobile advertisements that framed Robert Kaplan's prose in the Atlantic Monthly. The processes of commercialization have long had within their expanding economic reach a powerful theme of identity production and status aspiration. As Nicholas Xenos makes clear, the rising power of the merchant class in imperial Britain and their diffusion of London fashion into the countryside set in motion a system of status related to the possession of the latest styles and accoutrements of modernity.3 The newest, the fastest, the most exotic, the latest innovation is a mark of status and affluence, and of cultural accomplishment and aspiration as well, in the lives of those who consume.4 But once an item becomes widely dispersed in a population, it no longer has this cachet. Scarcity is key to this and a persistent, powerful assumption that drives desire and consequently consumption. Applied to those who are patently not like us, in terms of their possessing the cultural attributes of affluence or modernity, this assumption leads to the general specification of scarcity as the lot of all people, and hence to the Malthusian concept wherein other cultures are de-fined by their lack of modernity. Within the affluent "happy states," anxieties about appearances and keeping up with, or preferably get-ting ahead of, the Joneses play out in ambiguities about status, per-petual economic insecurity, and complex political debates about the role of the state in redistribution and the claims to numerous entitle-ments and rights.5 These anxieties are not removed from the larger question of moral order and the specifications of dangers to the polity. "So state policies that appear at one moment as legitimate and fair because they are universal and thus benefit oneself seem the next moment to be special pleading and unfair because they benefit those with whom one is in status competition. In the latter case, this reaction is likely to take the form of a moral appeal to the state to act as a disciplinary power, to impose an economizing reason upon those who are further down on the social order."6 Combined with neoliberal economic impulses, might this argument apply as well to immigrants to North America, where the huddled masses of the world's poor are no longer so welcome as they supposedly once were? It apparently applies widely to the conditionalities imposed on Southern states by the IMF and the World Bank.? It certainly applies to the insecurities mobilized by advertising agencies to sell all manner of contemporary commodities derived from all parts of the planet. It also applies to the tourism industry where visiting ever more exotic locales, playing a round on high-status golf courses, whether as ecotourists or not, is the status symbol of landscape consumption and the source of a considerable amount of "environmental" knowledge on the part of omnivores who wish states would deal with environmental threats to numerous things.

Link - Environment

Securitization leads to short-term solutions that increase enviro probs

Dalby 2 ( Simon- PHD, Prof @ Carleton U, *Environmental Security*, P 16-17 , 2, ET)

Discussions of the relationships between environment and security didn't start in 1989, although at least in the United States it is fair to say that the topic emerged in its contemporary form then." Against the backdrop of the long summer drought of 1988, alarmist reports of huge tropical forest destruction, especially in Brazil, renewed con-cern about global climatic change and stratospheric ozone depletion, the relaxation of the cold war, and the drastic rethinking of Soviet security policy, policy discussions in Washington were ripe for some new topics and thinking. Just as Francis Fukuyama was declaring the end of history and the triumph of liberalism, the environment, too, became part of the foreign policy discussion and the focus for discussions of endangerment.65 In 1989 Norman Meyers published an article linking environment and security in Foreign Policy, and Jessica Tuchman Mathews published one in Foreign Affairs that suggested that resources and population issues mattered as foreign policy priorities and should be incorporated in a reformulated understand¬ing of security. Mike Renner's Worldwatch paper of that same year also linked environment and security.66 In Britain Neville Brown published a paper on climate change and conflict in Survival, the journal of the influential International Insti tute of Strategic Studies; Peter Gleick reversed the process of intro-ducing environment into security considerations by writing about international security in the journal Climatic Change. Arthur Westing, the leading researcher on questions of the environmental disruptions caused by warfare, contributed a discussion of a comprehensive formulation of security. Josh Karliner suggested that the environmental difficulties in Central America amounted to a different form of warfare there.67 National sovereignty and the transboundary responsibilities for the global environment were also the topic for articles.68 Special issues of the journals Millennium and the Fletcher Forum on International Affairs followed in 1990. A little later Gwyn Prins introduced the discussion to wider British audiences in a book and television documentary with the memorably apt title of Top Guns and Toxic Whales.69 Daniel Deudney was quick to pen a paper arguing that all this was not necessarily a good idea. In what has probably become the most cited paper in this whole discussion, he argued that linking se-curity to ecology required a number of serious mismatches of means and ends as well as a misconstrual of the nature and significance of environmentalism.70 He argued that environmental problems are often diffuse and long-term while wars are concentrated and violent. Polarizing discourses to mobilize populations against identified antagonists is not similar to the kinds of social changes needed to deal with environmental difficulties. With rapid increases in international trade supplying raw materials from a diversity of sources, most resource conflicts were unlikely to lead to warfare. Before the debate had developed very far, one of the arguments Deudney made, that military institutions' frequently dreadful record on environmental matters in the past did not bode well for their handling matters of ecology in the future, was powerfully reinforced by pictures of blazing oil wells in Kuwait in the latter stages of the Gulf War in 1991. This image appeared on the cover of the issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that featured a debate between Deudney and Gleick in May that year about linking war and environment.71 Part of the difference of opinion can be explained by the focus on international organizations and cooperation by Gleick and Deudney's focus on national security institutions, but the disagreement over assumptions that resource difficulties would possibly lead to war was crucial. Lothar Brock and Patricia Mische followed this discussion with chapters

Link – Economy

Threats to global capitalism revolve around the idea that the poorer nations on earth are a threat to economic stability – They authorize wars in the name of finance

Lipschutz 98 (Ronnie D, Professor, Department of Politics @ The UC Santa Cruz, *On Security,* "8. Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millennium's End," Cioanet,http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz18.html, AD: 7/10/09) jl

Today, a similar set of circumstances, brought on by economic globalization, seems to be developing and imposing costs and risks on the very people it is intended to benefit. In this context, talk of "economic security" becomes, once again, a speech act that seeks to legitimate a policy that promises very real insecurity for many. The market is a place full of risks, and only those who are willing to take risks in the market are likely to reap great benefits; given the logic of the market, these same individuals also risk bankruptcy and personal economic insecurity (an outcome only too evident in Orange County California's declaration of bankruptcy and Mexico's economic travails).

Indeed, as Beverly Crawford's chapter seems to suggest, in a world of economic globalism, in which states must collaborate to foster global capitalism, and the processes of production, consumption, and accumulation become decoupled from individual states, it becomes more and more difficult to constitute an Other that might be transformed into a threatening enemy, thereby legitimating the differential degrees of personal and national security awarded by the market. We have seen some feeble efforts, based on notions of economic competitiveness and technological innovation, and given illustration in Michael Crichton's xenophobic and misogynistic Rising Sun , but these seem not to be very persuasive. A few argue that we (the United States) must become more like the Other (Japan) if we are to be made secure. [16](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz18.html#note16) How different this is from the world(s) of Morgenthau and Waltz!

Business and capital are only too aware of this paradox, whereas the world of states and military power seems blissfully oblivious to it. For capital, there are no enemies, only competitors; indeed, the market, while competitive, is a realm of cooperation , not conflict, as is often assumed. [17](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz18.html#note17) Markets are rule-governed institutions and, to get along, you must go along. In the marketplace, nonexclusive identities are prized, not shunned, and multiple identities are encouraged in the name of consumer taste and "autonomy." This world is, as Kenichi Ohmae puts it, truly "borderless." [18](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz18.html#note18) Not only are there no borders between countries, there are no borders between market and consumer, either. What can security possibly mean in such a world?

Not everyone is, of course, a participant in the market; indeed, there are billions of people and dozens of countries that are not. In spite of warnings about instability as the "enemy," these people and "states" are neither enemies nor threats to us in either an objective or intersubjective sense. Rather, the places in which many of them are found are more akin to realms constituted or consumed by chaos. The inhabitants of these zone participate in neither statist politics nor  global markets as we understand them, not so much out of choice or desire as out of the logic of economic globalization driven by capitalism and the industrial coalition. But these zones of chaos are not just places "outside" of space or time; paradoxically, perhaps, they are sites of political experimentation, from which are emerging "world systems" that, if successful, could ultimately undermine the relative orderliness of the peaceful zones of the industrial coalition.

Link – State

The aff uses the official story of the state to justify the actions of the plan.

**Chernus 1** (Ira, Relig. Stud’s @ UC-Boulder, http://spot.colorado.edu/~chernus/WaronTerrorismEssays/FightingTerror.htm)

Every war needs a good story. No one will go out to kill or to be killed without a persuasive story to explain why the bloodshed and sacrifice are necessary. The story need not be true, of course. War stories are rarely more than half-true; in storytelling as in war, truth is the first casualty. The story simply has to be satisfying. Why one story satisfies, while others do not, is the question at the heart of every war. On September 11, 2001, most Americans wanted to hear the story of World War II. Pearl Harbor had come again, and the fight was on. In this corner: the waving flags, the crowds singing "America the Beautiful," the heroic young people vowing to go when ordered. In that corner: the sneer of bin Ladin on every newsstand, the gas masks and antidote kits, the universal lament: "I no longer feel safe in my own homeland." Only Muslims were surprised when George W. Bush declared a new crusade to rid the world of the evildoers. Nine days later, in his major address to Congress and the nation, Bush narrated the official story of the war on terrorism. Although he spoke of "a new kind of war," it looked a lot like World War II: Al Qaeda’s "goal is remaking the world and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere.? They follow in the path of fascism, Nazism and totalitarianism? Freedom itself is under attack.? This is civilization's fight." The evil was easy to explain: "Americans are asking ‘Why do they hate us?’ They hate our freedoms." Bush offered no evidence to back up this explanation for the attacks. But it hardly mattered, since few Americans were looking for evidence. It seemed self-evident that, now as in the past, civilization and freedom are beset by enemies. If anyone cares to know why they hate us, evidence is easy enough to find. Osama bin Laden, for one, has been telling the U.S. for years why he hates us. He hates U.S. policies that dominate and oppress Muslims. Above all, he hates U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, Islam’s holiest land. Secondarily, he hates U.S. bombing and sanctions in Iraq, and (recently, at least) U.S. support for Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory. But all this has no place in the official story. In the peace movement’s alternative story, bin Laden’s words matter. There is no excuse for the murder of thousands, that story goes. The murderers must be condemned. Still, their complaints have some validity. Unless we listen to those complaints, more deaths are likely. If we simply strike back, without reconsidering the policies that caused the problem, we only insure that more innocents, including many Americans, will die. Two very different stories are available. One offers evidence. The other asks for none, because it needs none. The official story puts no responsibility on the U.S. It assumes the U.S. is wholly innocent. So it asks for no self-criticism, much less any change in policies. Moreover, since the official story invokes no facts to support its claim, it can not be falsified, or even disputed. So it puts America’s righteousness beyond dispute. The world is divided clearly between absolute good and absolute evil. And that requires an inhuman enemy, driven to world conquest out of irrational, inexplicable, implacable evil? just like the Nazis of World War II. If this was Pearl Harbor, Bush would be FDR, demanding unconditional surrender, waging apocalyptic war to purify the world.

Link – State

The security threat of danger is created through boundaries and constructions by the state.

Campbell 98 (David- PHD, Prof of cultural & poli geog @ U of Durham, *Writing Security*, p.85-86,ET)

Danger constitutes more than the boundary which demarcates a space; to have a threat requires enforcing a closure upon the community which is threatened. A notion of what 'we' are is intrinsic to an understanding of what 'we' fear. What this highlights is that there is an axiological level which proffers a range of moral valuations that are implicit in any spatialization.1 The construction of social space that emerges from practices associated with the paradigm of sovereignty thus exceeds a simple geographical partitioning: it results in a conception of divergent moral spaces. In other words, the social space of inside/outside is both made possible by and helps constitute a moral space of superior/inferior, which can be animated in terms of any number of figurations of higher/lower. For example, in delineating the domain of the rational, ordered polity from the dangerous, anarchic world in which it was situated, Hobbes did more than draw a boundary: he enumerated the character of each realm by arguing that the former was the residence of good, sane, sober, modest, and civilized people, while the latter was populated by evil, mad, drunk, arrogant, and savage characters. Identity is therefore more than something which derives its meaning solely from being positioned in contradistinction to difference; identity is a condition that has depth, is multi-layered, possesses texture, and comprises many dimensions. As such, identity is a condition for which there can be cataloged no single point of origin or myth of genesis; the manifold, diverse, and eclectic ingredients that comprise a settled identity cannot be reduced to any single spatial or temporal source. None of this diminishes the role of difference in the logic of identity. But it does suggest that we might consider all the characteristics or traits or distinctions which are understood as difference as being unequal in their identity-effects. Moreover, this might also suggest that some of the dispositions we combine under the category of 'difference' — especially insofar as that term is often used to refer to entries in a register of marginality, such as race, class, gender, ethnicity etc. — are basic to the construction of the discursive field upon which the dichotomy of identity/difference is itself erected. Whether or not these reflections might possess some veracity in terms of the general problematic of identity would need further consideration. But in terms of the question of state identity, they do allow us to bring to the fore the way in which the paradigm of sovereignty has historically inscribed parameters of the moral content of identity at the same time as it has disciplined ambiguity in terms of the spatial form of inside/outside. Most important in this regard is the gendered figure of 'reasoning man' high-lighted by Ashley. As described in chapter three, the figure of 'reasoning man' as origin of language, the maker of history, and the source of meaning — as transcendental, yet implicated in history — is the sovereign presence, the foundational premise, from which we derive the contours of our social and political life. To be sure, this articulation of our horizons is not determinative: the question of the more precise content and nature of identity that emerges from the operations of this modern sovereign is open. Indeed, there are in principle an almost endless range of possible inter-pretations of 'reasoning man,' and these are dependent upon the articula¬tion of the form of 'reasoning man' in specific historical contexts.2 But the figure of 'reasoning man' can be said to exhibit tendencies that favor the gendered understanding of reason, rationalism, and enlightenment values as the defining orientations of our existence.

Link – Hegemony

By defining security around the predominance of US influence, every conflict of interests becomes justification for militarization, escalating to war.

Campbell 98 (David, Professor International Politics at University of New Castle, *Writing Security; United States Foreign Policy the Politics of Identity,* 31-33)

Most important just as the source of danger has never been fixed, neither has the identity that it was said to threaten. The contours of this identity have been the subject of constant (re)writing; no rewriting in the sense of changing the meaning, but rewriting in the sense of inscribing something so that which is contingent and subject to flux is rendered more permanent. While one might have expected few if any references to national values or purposes in confidential prepared for the inner sanctum of national security policy (after all, don't they know who they are or what they represent?) the texts of foreign policy are replete with statements about the fulfillment of the republic, the fundamental purpose of the nation, God given rights, moral codes, the principles of European civilization, the fear of cultural and spiritual loss, and the responsibilities and duties thrust upon the gleaming example of America. In this sense, the texts that guided national security policy did more than simply offer strategic analysis of the "reality" they confronted: they actively concerned themselves with the scripting of a particular American identity. Stamped "Top Secret" and read by only the select and power few, the texts effaced the boundary between inside and outside with their quasi-Puritan figurations.

In employing this mode of representation, the foreign policy texts of the postwar period recalled the seventeenth-century literary genre of the jeremiad, or political sermon, in which Puritan preachers combined searing critiques with appeals for spiritual renewal. Later to establish the interpretive framework for national identity, these exhortations drew on a European tradition of preaching the omnipresence of sin so as to instill the desire for order but they added a distinctly affirmative moment:

The American Puritan jeremiad was the ritual of a culture on an errand - which is to say, a culture based on a faith in process. Substituting teleology for hierarchy, it discarded the Old War ideal of stasis for a New World vision of the future. Its function was to create a climate of anxiety that helped release the restless "progressivist" energies required for the success of the venture. The European jeremiad thrived on anxiety, of course. Like all "Traditionalist" forms of ritual, it used fear and trembling to teach acceptance of fixed social norms. But the American jeremiad went much further. It made anxiety its end as well as its means. Crisis was the social norm it sought to inculcate. The very concept of errand after all, implied a state of *un*fulfillment. The future, though divinely assured, was never quite there, and New England's Jeremiahs set out to provide the sense of insecurity that would ensure the outcome.

Whereas the Puritan jeremiads were preached b y religious figures in public, the national security planners entreated in private the urgency of the manifold dangers confronting the republic. But the refrains of their political sermons have occupied a prominent place in postwar political discourse. On two separate occasions (first in 1950, and t hen in 196), private citizens with close ties to the foreign policy bureaucracy established a "Committee on the Present Danger" to alert a public they perceived as lacking resolve and will to necessity of confronting the political and military threat of communism and the Society Union. More recently, with Pentagon planners concerned about the "guerillas, assassins, terrorists, and subversives" said to be "nibbling away" at the United States, proclamations that the fundamental values of the country are under threat have been no less insistent. As Oliver North announced to the U.S. Congress: "It is very important for the American people to know that this is a dangerous world; that we live at risk and that this nation is at risk in a dangerous world." And in a State Department report, the 1990s were foreshadowed as an era in which divergent political critiques nonetheless would seek equally to overcome the "corruption" and "profligacy" induced by the "loss" of "American purpose" in Vietnam the "moral renewal." To this end, the rendering of Operation Desert Shield-turn-Storm as an overwhelming exhibition of America's rediscovered mission stands as testament. The cold war, then , was both a struggle that exceeded the military threat of the Soviet Union and a struggle into which any number of potential candidates, regardless of their strategic capacity, were slotted as a threat. In this sense, the collapse, overcoming, or surrender of one of the protagonists at this historical junction does not mean "it" is over. The cold war's meaning will undoubtedly change, but if we recall that the phrase cold war was coined by a fourteenth century Spanish writer to represent the persistent rivalry between Christians and Arabs, we come to recognize that the sort of struggle the phrase demotes is a struggle over identity: a struggle that is no context-specific and thus not rooted in the existence of a particular kind of Soviet Union. Besides, the United States-led war against Iraq should caution us to the fact that the Western (and particularly American) interpretive dispositions that predominated in the post-World War II international environment - with their zero-sum analyses of international action, the sense of endangerment ascribed to all the activities of the other, the fear of internal challenge and subversion, the tendency to militarize all response, and the willingness to draw the lines of superiority/inferiority between us and them - were not specific to one state or ideology. As a consequence, we need to rethink the convention understanding of foreign policy, and the historicity of the cold war in particular.

Link – Terrorism

The threat of terrorism is constructed and leads to endless war and self-fulfilling prophecy

**Chernus 1** (Ira, Relig. Stud’s @ UC-Boulder, http://spot.colorado.edu/~chernus/WaronTerrorismEssays/FightingTerror.htm)

But the demise of the communist bloc did not make Americans feel more secure. On the contrary, a chorus of elite voices insisted that it made us less secure, because now the enemy could be anyone, anywhere. Moreover, the war on terrorism is a direct legacy of the cold war. Al-Qaeda and similar Muslim groups were enabled, perhaps even created, by the CIA. The grievances that brought them together were virtually all fallout from the U.S. effort to keep Soviet influence out of the Middle East. The U.S. role as the sole remaining superpower virtually insured that it would become the target of global attacks. Just as the outcome of World War I sowed the seeds of World War II, and the outcome of World War II the seeds of the cold war, so the outcome of the cold war sowed the seeds of the war on terrorism. And this newest war is already, quite visibly, sowing the seeds of insecurity to come. It may be most useful to view the whole period from the early cold war years through the present war as a single historical era: the era of the national insecurity state. Throughout that era, U.S. policy decisions made in the name of national security consistently breed a greater sense of vulnerability, frustration, and insecurity. It is not hard to see why. Four decades of cold war enshrined two fundamental principles at the heart of our public life: there is a mortal threat to the very existence of our nation, and our own policies play no role in generating the threat. The belief structure of the national insecurity state flows logically from these premises. If our nation bears no responsibility, then we are powerless to eradicate the threat. If others threaten us through no fault of our own, what can we do? There is no hope for a truly better world, nor for ending the danger by mutual compromise with "the other side." The threat is effectively eternal. The best to hope for is to hold the threat forever at bay. Yet the sense of powerlessness is oddly satisfying, because it preserves the conviction of innocence: if our policies are so ineffectual, the troubles of the world can hardly be our fault. And the vision of an endless status quo is equally satisfying, because it promises to prevent historical change. If peril is permanent, the world is an endless reservoir of potential enemies. Any fundamental change in the status quo portends only catastrophe. The only path to security, it seems, is to prevent change by imposing control over others. When those others fight back, the national insecurity state protests its innocence: we act only in self-defense; we want only stability. The state sees no reason to re-evaluate its policies; that would risk the change it seeks, above all, to avoid. So it can only meet violence with more violence. Of course, the inevitable frustration is blamed on the enemy, reinforcing the sense of peril and the demand for absolute control through violence. The goal of total control is self-defeating; each step toward security becomes a source of, and is taken as proof of, continuing insecurity.

Labeling terrorism in the name of national security sows the seeds of permanent insecurity, and justifies increasingly brutal US policies as the only available action.

**Chernus 1** (Ira, Relig. Stud’s @ UC-Boulder, http://spot.colorado.edu/~chernus/WaronTerrorismEssays/FightingTerror.htm)

Throughout that era, U.S. policy decisions made in the name of national security consistently breed a greater sense of vulnerability, frustration, and insecurity. From its first days, the war on terrorism fit the cold war mold. Not only is the enemy a permanent fact of life, but every step toward security opens up new risks of insecurity. U.S. policymakers must aid Pakistan to gain its support, perhaps by tolerating Pakistan’s nuclear buildup. But this alienates India. So they promise to support India’s "anti-terrorism" campaign in Kashmir, which alienates Pakistan. As a price for its support, Russia demands U.S. acquiescence in repressing the Chechen rebellion. This fuels anti-U.S. sentiment in volatile, yet vital, areas like Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan. Arab states will cooperate only if pressure is put on Israel. Does any U.S. administration risk angering Israel? In the national insecurity state, stability depends on global control. So the inevitable failure to gain full control will become further evidence of eternal instability, hence eternal peril. When allies are alienated by U.S. policies and refuse to cooperate fully in the war, that will become further evidence that the world is indeed a dangerous place, demanding more strenuous efforts at control. When U.S. actions provoke violent counter-actions, that will be seen, not as the inevitable give-and-take of war, but as further evidence of implacable hatred, not of what we do, but of what we are. Within the framework of the national insecurity state, the only available response is to proclaim anew our innocence and redouble efforts at stability and security, which means imposing greater control. Thus the spiral of violence grows higher. Every possible outcome of U.S. policies will end up confirming the premise of permanent insecurity.

Link – Terrorism

Construction of a terrorist threat justifies placing “security over liberty” and abuses of sovereign power.

Kohn 9 ( History@UNC-CH, Jan 9,  *Journal of Military History Vol 73 #1,* pg. 201- 202, ET)

The White House created military tribunals to try alien prisoners who might be involved with Al Qaeda or terrorism. The government labeled hundreds of foreign nationals "unlawful enemy combatants" in order to hold them indefinitely, without charges or access to counsel or the courts, incarcerating a few in secret prisons overseas and the rest mostly at the naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, so as to locate them beyond the reach of American courts. The label was applied to two American citizens, one transferred from Guantanamo and the other arrested in Chicago, both of whom were then imprisoned indefinitely in naval brigs without counsel, without charges, and without any contact with the world outside. Thousands of immigrants and resident aliens were rounded up after 11 September, and tried, released, or deported, most often in secret and without due process or adequate representation. As in wartime, Congress assigned virtual carte blanche to the executive to make war; and the Courts deferred to the military and the executive.90 [End Page 201] These changes occurred in the wake of the September 2001 attack when the government, in a panic over what further attacks were in train, and fearing the worst, tilted instinctively in favor of security over liberty in order to prosecute what topmost officials considered as an extremely difficult, ambiguous war against a ruthless, suicidal enemy with no "center of gravity," an enemy clearly capable of using the American legal system and the openness of American society to its advantage.

The perceived danger of terrorist attacks is used to justify increased force and securitization.

Kohn 9 ( History@UNC-CH, Jan 9,  *Journal of Military History Vol 73 #1,* pg. 202- 203, ET)

The great danger to the Republic lies in the reaction to another successful attack on the United States that wreaks great damage and kills thousands or even tens or hundreds of thousands of Americans. Seven years after the attacks in New York and Washington, the United States remains acutely vulnerable: the intelligence community still weak in clandestine agents and still separated into different agencies of uncertain cooperativeness; millions of uninspected containers flooding into American ports annually; borders that are porous; local officials, first responders, and public health systems still underfunded and unable to deal effectively with mass casualties and what public health officials call the "walking well but worried." Most frightening, the U.S. government and international community, despite declarations of priority, have not moved aggressively to control nuclear technology. "With the exception of the G8 initiative to enlist other states to help fund this activity, and the Proliferation Security Initiative to search vehicles suspected of transporting WMD [weapons of mass destruction] cargo, no one observing the behavior of the U.S. Government after 9/11 would note any significant changes in activity aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring the world's most destructive technologies," wrote the leading scholar on this subject in 2004. "Americans are no safer from a nuclear terrorist attack today than we were on September 10, 2001."95 [End Page 203] Tangled negotiations with North Korea and Iran since and statements about the primacy of the issue from leading retired national security officials suggest that the danger has only increased.96 The nuclear threat is only one of several cataclysmic dangers likely to result from the accelerated application of science and technology to war. "Annihilation from within is not a temporary peril, but the end point and ultimate impact of this elemental historic force that has gained ever more strength over two centuries," warned the defense scholar and former Undersecretary of Defense Fred Iklé. "Let us admit it: mankind became trapped in a Faustian bargain" and "our exuberance about unending progress is tempered by the premonition that our 'bargain with the devil' might end badly.

Link – Terrorism

**Labeling danger as terrorism creates a self-fulfilling prophecy of escalating violence and atrocities, committed for the protection of the state.**

**Chernus 1** (Ira, Relig. Stud’s @ UC-Boulder, http://spot.colorado.edu/~chernus/WaronTerrorismEssays/FightingTerror.htm)

The name of the danger changes from time to time; for now, its name is "terrorism." But the underlying reality remains the same. In the face of a massive shock to our cultural assumptions, that promise of continuity is immensely reassuring. This is the paradox that keeps so many millions trapped in the insecurity state. In order to feel culturally and psychologically secure, one must feel physically and politically insecure. The only path to security, it seems, is to prevent change by imposing control over others. When those others fight back, the national insecurity state protests its innocence: we act only in self-defense; we want only stability. The state sees no reason to re-evaluate its policies; that would risk the change it seeks, above all, to avoid. So it can only meet violence with more violence. Of course, the inevitable frustration is blamed on the enemy, reinforcing the sense of peril and the demand for absolute control through violence. The goal of total control is self-defeating; each step toward security becomes a source of, and is taken as proof of, continuing insecurity. This makes the logic of the insecurity state viciously circular. Why are we always fighting? Because we always have enemies. How do we know we always have enemies? Because we are always fighting. And knowing that we have enemies, how can we afford to stop fighting? In the insecurity state, there is no way to talk about security without voicing fears of insecurity, no way to express optimism without expressing despair. On every front, it is a self-fulfilling prophecy; a self-confirming and self-perpetuating spiral of violence; a trap that seems to offer no way out.

Labeling the threat of terrorism forces the state to use force to attempt to control it.

**Chernus 1** (Ira, Relig. Stud’s @ UC-Boulder, http://spot.colorado.edu/~chernus/WaronTerrorismEssays/FightingTerror.htm)

Today, the discourse of the national insecurity state is the nation’s most familiar structure. How natural, then, to reaffirm the fundamental truth of that discourse, especially when its truth seems to be so empirically proven. Certainly, there is a very real danger of more attacks on U.S. soil. But the magnitude of the danger is measured by cultural needs rather than empirical considerations. In the insecurity state, universal cries of alarm, massive preparations for future attack, and protestations that life is fundamentally changed all show how little has really changed. They serve to confirm the basic premise that danger is eternal and unavoidable. The name of the danger changes from time to time; for now, its name is "terrorism." But the underlying reality remains the same. In the face of a massive shock to our cultural assumptions, that promise of continuity is immensely reassuring. This is the paradox that keeps so many millions trapped in the insecurity state. In order to feel culturally and psychologically secure, one must feel physically and politically insecure. Thus the problem, the fear of terrorist attack, becomes the solution. The film of the towers bursting into flame is shown over and over again. The sheriffs stockpiling gas masks and anthrax vaccine are interviewed over and over again. "Experts" explain "the psychology of the terrorist" over and over again. All of this has a ritualistic quality, for it serves much the same function as every ritual. It acts out the basic worldview of the insecurity state, confirming that it endures in the face of a massive challenge. The dominant response to the tragedy in the U.S. also confirms that our own policies play no role in evoking the danger. This message takes ritual form in prayer meetings, civic gatherings, charity drives, and the Bush administration’s humanitarian gestures for starving Afghans. All enact the essential goodness of Americans. Even the most benign and laudable responses to the tragedy, the national pride in heroic rescue efforts, the outpouring of generous contributions, the genuine concern for the welfare of Muslim- and Arab-Americans are seized and twisted in the overpowering cultural grasp of the national insecurity state. As symbols of innocence, all reinforce the basic assumption that the U.S. is powerless to affect the sources of continuing insecurity. Bush has often stated the logical corollary of innocence if our policies are not relevant to the problem, there is nothing to negotiate. In other words, the U.S. will not contemplate policy changes that might lead to any fundamental change in political or economic power relationships. Therefore the only remaining course is to heighten the nation’s guard and use force to control the behavior of would-be attackers.

Link – Terrorism

The concept of terrorism and the actions that subsequently follow lead directly to militarism and the justification of its existence.

Kohn 9 ( History@UNC-CH, Jan 9,  *Journal of Military History Vol 73 #1,* pg. 197-198, ET)

National security pervaded American foreign relations with the same intensity as during the Cold War, and at the center lay military power because terrorism drove and even defined American foreign policy. "America is at war," asserted the President in the first words of his introduction to The National Security Strategy of the United States of America in March 2006, reflecting his first thoughts during the shock of the attacks on 11 September 2001 and his many statements since.75 The two National Security Strategy documents issued in 2002 and 2006 breathed an implicit bellicosity and unilateralism: the United States would promote what it declared to be the universal values and norms of democracy, freedom, liberty, and human rights as the only true safety against terrorism; and the United States possessed the right to invade countries or overturn governments suspected of developing or possessing weapons of mass destruction and harboring or cooperating with terrorists—and would do so on the basis of a military superiority it intended to maintain.76 In the summer of 2004, a senior defense official hinted to congressional staff that a second Bush administration might well apply its preemptive policy to as many as six other nations.77 The Pentagon created two new regional commands (for North America and Africa) and the latter, together with Southern Command [End Page 197] (covering Latin America), intended to focus more on broader political, economic, and security issues than on traditional war planning and fighting.78 In the summer of 2008, the Secretary of State explained that "our policy has been sustained not just by our strength but also by our values. The United States has long tried to marry power and principle—realism and idealism."Inside the United States, the war on terrorism reinforced much of the militarization of the previous seven decades: increased power in the presidency and corresponding weakness in Congress and the judiciary; increased weight for the military in government and policy-making; war language, images, assumptions, and approaches conspicuous in everyday discourse and thinking; national security prominent and sometimes paramount in national politics; war and security themes important in movies, literature, games, and other aspects of popular culture; and more. The only thing missing was the mobilization of the world and cold wars. The President urged the American people to return as much as possible to "normal" after the September 2001 attacks: no calls for expanding the armed forces, no draft, no rise in taxes (quite the opposite), no conversion to a war economy, comparatively little change in the government beyond consolidating a number of law enforcement and border security agencies into another department of defense called the Department of Homeland Security, and expanding the intelligence establishment. Missing was any rhetoric of sacrifice, leading to the normalization of war: "the military at war and America at the mall."

**Link – Accidents**

Accidents are inevitable and securitizing accidental war only makes them worse

Der Derian 5 (James, Director of the Global security Program and Research Professor of International Studies at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, October 1, *Harvard International Review,* Vol. 27 Issue 3, pg. 83-4)

At a news conference, Mr. Chertoff called the hurricane and subsequent flooding, an 'ultra-catastrophe' that exceeded the foresight of planners. Asked what the government's response signified about the nation's preparedness com for a potential terrorist attack, Mr. Chertoff said, 'If an ultra-catastrophe occurs, there's going to be some harmful fallout.' New York Times September 4, 2005 It often takes a catastrophe to reveal the illusory beliefs we continue to harbor in national and homeland security. To keep us safe, we place our faith in national borders and guards, bureaucracies and experts, technologies and armies. These and other instruments of national security are empowered and legitimated by the assumption that it falls upon the sovereign country to protect us from the turbulent state of nature and anarchy that permanently lies in wait offshore and over the horizon for die unprepared and inadequately defended. But this parochial fear, posing as a realistic worldview, has recently taken some very hard knocks. Prior to September 11, 2001, national borders were thought to be necessary and sufficient to keep our enemies at bay; upon entry to Baghdad, a virtuous triumphalism and a revolution in military affairs were touted as the best means to bring peace and democracy to the Middle East; and before Hurricane Katrina, emergency preparedness and an intricate system of levees were supposed to keep New Orleans safe and dry. The intractability of disaster, especially its unexpected, unplanned, unprecedented nature, erodes not only the very distinction of the local, national, and global, but, assisted and amplified by an unblinking global media, reveals the contingent and highly interconnected character of life in general. Yet when it comes to dealing with natural and unnatural disasters, we continue to expect (and, in the absence of a credible alternative, understandably so) if not certainty and total safety at least a high level of probability and competence from our national and homeland security experts However, between the mixed metaphors and behind the metaphysical concepts given voice by US Homeland security Director Michael Chertoff early into the Katrina crisis, there lurks an uneasy recognition that this administration-and perhaps no national government-is up to the task of managing incidents that so rapidly cascade into global events. Indeed, they suggest that our national plans and preparations for the "big one"-a force-five hurricane, terrorist attack, pandemic disease-have become part of the problem, not the solution.

**Link – Kritikal Affs**

The project of philosophy seeks to secure knowledge and being – this is the most dangerous type of security because it secures our fundamental values.

Dillon 96 (Michael, Prof@Lancaster, *Politics of Security*, p.20-21)JFS

The reduction of metaphysics, and so also of political understanding, to calculation, results from the very inception of metaphysical thought. Because the appearance of things is inevitably various, because we ourselves always encounter them from a manifold of perspectives and because, finally, we ourselves are also mortal and fallible creatures, whatever the secure ground of things is that metaphysics seeks, it cannot actually be the sensible world of the appearance of things themselves. For they are too . . . well, insecure. It has, ultimately, to be supra-sensible, situated outside the realm of the appearance of things, otherwise the ground that is sought would be as mutable (read insecure) as the coming and going, and apparently endless variation, of the world itself. It could not serve, therefore, as the guarantor which the answer to metaphysics' guiding question requires. Literally, it could not offer any security for the sensible world of appearances if it were already located within, and therefore also contaminated by, the very insecurity of the comings and goings of that world.Metaphysics, then, is the masque of mastery; securing some foundation upon which to establish the sum total of what is knowable with certainty, and conforming one's everyday conduct — public and private — to the foundation so secured. Such foundations may go by different names but that of the project itself does not. Hence, the responsibility, traditionally incumbent upon the philosopher — his 'true' mission — consisted in securing ultimate referents or principles. Philosophy was, as Nietzsche put it, a matter of valuation, 'that is, establishment of the uppermost value in terms of which and according to which all beings are to be'.14 In as much as these were precisely what were to be secured, for without them no beings would be, without them, it was said, where would we be? The philosopher therefore spoke as a security expert. A security expert not merely in respect of what the substantial values were, but increasingly only in terms of how they were to be secured, whatever they were to be taken to be; hence the rise of theory and of method.The philosopher became a security expert, then, in the sense of being able to tell you how to secure security. He or she was someone skilled in determining the means by which the invariable standards to establish meaning in discourse, soundness in mind, goodness in action, objectivity in knowledge, beauty in art, or value in life were to be secured (guaranteed). In such wise, whatever was said — meant; done; understood; esteemed; or valued — was authorised and secured by reference to such a standard, principle or reference. The philosopher's task had to be to tell you how to secure such a thing even after they had come-up with an essential value of one description or another. Their security project could not then cease, but only intensify. For having secured this secure value, the value then had to be located securely, and securely policed, so that it could never be forgotten or lost again. Even with Nietzsche, in order for the will to power, as the essence of the Being of beings, to secure itself it has continuously to extend itself; that is to say, it secures itself in its essence as never-ending increase continuously extending itself. Hence, though Nietzsche's will to power may be differentiated as self- overcoming — against the Darwinian, or even Spinozan, principle of self- preservation — it is arguable that this represents the security project a l'outrance.The charge levelled at philosophy at the end of metaphysics — the 'end of philosophy' thesis which has consequently turned philosophical thought into a contemplation of the limit; where limit is, however, thought liminally and not terminally — is that the philosopher has simply run out of things to say. It is that the philosopher cannot, in fact, secure any particular value for you and is, therefore, confronted with the manifest impossibility of discharging the traditional security function, other than to insist upon securing security itself. All that remains of the great project of Western philosophy, then, is the continuing, increasingly violent, insistence upon the need to secure security; hence its nihilism. The savage irony is that the more this insistence is complied with, the greater is the violence licensed and the insecurity engendered.The essence of metaphysics, then, is nihilistic, as the best of the realists fear that it is, precisely because it does not matter what you secure so long as security itself is secured. That is to say, so long as things are made certain, mastered and thereby controllable. Securing security does not simply create values. In essence indifferent to any particular value, and committed as it must ultimately be merely to rendering things calculable so that the political arithmetic of securing security can operate, it must relentlessly also destroy values when they conflict with the fundamental mathesis required of the imperative to secure. Its raison d'être, in other words, masquerading as the preservation of values, is ultimately not valuation at all but calculation. For without calculation how could security be secured? And calculation requires calculability. Whatever is must thereby be rendered calculable — whatever other value might once have been placed upon it — if we are to be as certain of it as metaphysics insists that we have to be if we are to secure the world.

Link – Japan

Japanese threat labeling upholds the self-other hierarchy – justifying violence against the labeled “other.”

**Campbell 94** (David, Cult and Polit. Geo. @ U Durham, S.J. Rosow, N. Inayatullah, M. Rupert, *The Global Economy As Political Space*, p. 158)

Alternative modes of representation applied to the Japanese in the war years included the ascription of primitive, savage, tribal, and generally uncivilized behavior; the portrayal of them as children and the use of theories concerning childhood traumas and adolescent behavior to analyze them; and the description of them as being emotionally and mentally ill. In the aftermath of the Allied victory, these orientations to otherness were altered, but not in the ways that challenged the power relationship between the self and the other. Constitution and regeneration of the identity of the Western “self” has been made possible by the enactment of violence upon the inhuman “other”. The sentiments of the Japanese as lesser and like children meant that they could be subject to a master and amenable to learning. Primitives could be civilized and the mentally ill could be cured. The victor was now an analyst, healer, and teacher, rather than warrior, but remained confidently superior. The hierarchy between the American “self” and the Japanese “other” was retained because the other remained homogenous and undifferentiated. The virulent and violent interpretations employed during wartime quickly faded with the US occupation of Japan, indicating that seemingly fixed categories of bigotry potentially can have a soft underside. At the same time, there persisted in the postwar period a particular image of Japan – as made up of paradoxes, alien, insensitive to others, unpredictable, unstable and with a dubious commitment to democracy – which indicated that “the softer idioms often conceal a hard and potentially devastating edge” (Dower: 312). Nowhere is this more obvious than in the residual racism applied to the Japanese superhuman, who is now dressed in a business suit rather than jungle green.

Link – Korea

The Korean threat is constructed and discursive deployment of this threat empirically leads to militaristic policy prescriptions

Hassig & Oh 3 (Kongdan, Ralph C., Nonresident Senior Fellow, [Foreign Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy.aspx), [Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies](http://www.brookings.edu/cnaps.aspx)  Ralph Hassig, Adjunct Professor of Psychology, University of Maryland University College, *East Asia,* Volume 20, No. 2,"North Korean Military As A Security Threat")

As for intentions, it is not clear what role the KPA plays in policy and decision making, although it seems likely that Kim Jong-il holds most of the power in North Korea. The dual nature of the North Korean military- as a socially isolated organization nursing grudges from past defeats and perhaps eager for war, but also as a struggling business enterprise seeking profit and survival--makes it difficult to determine how threatening the military culture is. With these assumptions as a background (and they are better viewed as assumptions than as facts), what points can be made about the North Korean military threat and US security policy? First, the fact that **threats are constructions rather than photographs of reality** is worth keeping in mind. **What is seen as threatening at one time or to one person may not appear threatening at another time or to another person. Most threats are not self-evident. An excellent example of threat construction--and deconstrucfion-- is the case of North Korea** and Iraq, both included in the axis-of-evil triumvirate by President George W. Bush in his January 2002 State of the Union address. At the time, Iraq was continuing a decade-long evasion of required UN inspections. **North Korea**, on the other hand, **appeared to be honoring its 1994 nuclear freeze agreement** (although the President was aware of intelligence information suggesting that the North Koreans were cheating on that agreement by pursuing a clandestine uranium-enrichment program). **The threat theme for North Korea was containment. The threat theme for Iraq was terrorism and flagrant violation of UN sanctions. And so the Bush administration launched a highly publicized campaign to justify preparations for military action against Iraq. When in early October 2002 the North Koreans admitted to nuclear cheating, the raw material with which to construct a perception of North Korean threat was significantly augmented. And after the North Koreans began to unfreeze their nuclear installations in December 2002, everything pointed to the conclusion that North Korea was a more imminent threat to the United States than was Iraq**. North Korea's conventional military was much stronger than Iraq's; the North Koreans had nuclear materials, perhaps even nuclear weapons, along with the means to manufacture more in a short period of time; and the North Koreans had the demonstrated capability to manufacture long-range missiles that might deliver nuclear weapons to the United States. **But the Bush administration's carefully constructed threat theme was that Iraq was the greater threat, and so the North Korean threat had to be downplayed**. The administration's threat framing actors worked overtime to convince the public that the North Korean issue was not a crisis, and that it could be handled with diplomacy. But few bought the story, and framing actors in the domestic and foreign media questioned the administration's threat assessments**. The artificiality of threat perceptions, and the role of trade-offs in addressing threats, were clearly revealed**. The apparent reason that North Korea was not treated as a threat was that the United States did not have the military resources to fight two wars simultaneously. Beyond that consideration, it was widely suspected that even without an Iraqi challenge **the United States lacked the military means to effectively address a North Korean threat, giving rise to the paradoxical proposition that a provocation from a weak country is more likely to be framed as a threat than provocation from a strong country**.

Links – China

US conceptions of China as a threatening other create the “China threat” and spur the actions of policymakers.

**Pan 4** (Chengxin, Dept, of Poli Sci and Int. Rel’ts, Australian National University, *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, Vol. 29, No. 3, p. 306)

While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is," their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means. For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world." (2) Like many other China scholars, Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment." (3) Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt. I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "observation" of "where China is today," nor to join the "containment" versus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the "China threat" literature. More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature--themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions. These themes are of course nothing new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. They have been identified elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies, political science, and international relations. (4) Yet, so far, the China field in the West in general and the U.S. "China threat" literature in particular have shown remarkable resistance to systematic critical reflection on both their normative status as discursive practice and their enormous practical implications for international politics. (5) It is in this context that this article seeks to make a contribution.

**Links – China**

**The discursive construction of the “China threat” creates policies of containment and instigates the use of power politics.**

**Pan 4** (Chengxin, Dept, of Poli Sci and Int. Rel’ts, Australian National University, *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, Vol. 29, No. 3, p. 315)

The discursive construction of the U.S. self and the "Chinese threat" argument are(is) not (an) innocent, descriptive accounts of some "independent" reality. Rather, they are always a clarion call for the practice of power politics. At the apex of this power-politics agenda is the politico-strategic question of "what is to be done" to make the United States secure from the (perceived) threats it faces. At a general level, as Benjamin Schwarz proposes, this requires an unhindered path to U.S. global hegemony that “means not only that the United States must dominate wealthy and technologically sophisticated states in Europe and East Asia-- America's "allies"--but also that it must deal with such nuisances as Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic and Kim Jong Il, so that potential great powers need not acquire the means to deal with those problems themselves. And those powers that eschew American supervision--such as China--must be both engaged and contained. The upshot of "American leadership" is that the United States must spend nearly as much on national security as the rest of the world combined. (67)” This "neocontainment" policy has been echoed in the "China threat" literature. In a short yet decisive article titled "Why We Must Contain China," Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer insists that "containing China" and "undermining its ruthless dictatorship" constitute two essential components of "any rational policy toward a rising, threatening China." Not only is a policy other than containment considered irrational, but even a delay to implement it would be undesirable, as he urges that "containment of such a bully must begin early in its career." To this end, Krauthammer offers such "practical" options as strengthening regional alliances (with Vietnam, India, and Russia, as well as Japan) to box in China; standing by Chinese dissidents; denying Beijing the right to host the Olympics; and keeping China from joining the World Trade Organization on the terms it desires. (68) Containing China is of course not the only option arising from the "China threat" literature. More often than not, there is a subtle, business-style "crisis management" policy. For example, Bernstein and Munro shy away from the word containment, preferring to call their China policy management. (69) Yet, what remains unchanged in the management formula is a continued promotion of controlling China. For instance, a perusal of Bernstein and Munro's texts reveals that what they mean by management is no different than Krauthammer's explicit containment stance. (70) By framing U.S.-China relations as an issue of "crisis management," they leave little doubt of who is the "manager" and who is to be "managed." In a more straightforward manner, Betts and Christensen state that coercion and war must be part and parcel of the China management policy: “In addressing the China challenge, the United States needs to think hard about three related questions: first, how to avoid crises and war through prudent, coercive diplomacy; second, how to manage crises and fight a war if the avoidance effort fails; third, how to end crises and terminate war at costs acceptable to the United States and its allies. (71)” This is not to imply that the kind of perspectives outlined above will automatically be translated into actual China policy, but one does not have to be exceedingly perceptive to note that the "China threat" perspective does exert enormous influence on U.S. policy making on China. To illustrate this point, I want now to examine some specific implications of U.S. representations of the "China threat" for U.S.-China relations in relation to the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis and the "spy plane" incident of 2001.

**Links – China**

The aff leads to war and escalating violence – empirically proven.

**Pan 4** (Chengxin, Dept, of Poli Sci and Int. Rel’ts, Australian National University, *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, Vol. 29, No. 3, p. 330)

In the eyes of many U.S. China watchers, China's approach to the Taiwan question is a microcosm of its grand strategy to dominate Asia. The argument is that nowhere is the threatening ambition more palpable than in China's saber-rattling missile tests near Taiwan's coast in 1995-1996, in addition to its long-standing refusal to renounce the use of force as a last resort to settle the dispute. (72) While the 1995-1996 missile crisis has been a favorite "starting point" for many pundits and practitioners to paint a frightening picture of China and to justify U.S. firm response to it, what is often conveniently overlooked is the question of how the "China threat" discourse itself had played a constitutive role in the lead-up to that crisis. Limits of space forbid exploring this complex issue here. Simply put, the Taiwan question was created largely as a result of widespread U.S. perceptions of China as a "Red Menace" in the wake of the "loss of China" and the outbreak of the Korean War. To thwart what it saw as an orchestrated Communist offensive in Asia, the United States deployed the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait as part of its Cold War containment strategy, thereby effectively preventing the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China. While the United States abandoned its containment and isolation policy toward China in the 1970s and the two countries established full diplomatic relations in 1979, the conventional image of the "Red Menace" lingered on in the United States. To manage such a "threat," the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act shortly after the normalization of U.S.-China relations, renewing U.S. commitment to Taiwan's defense even though diplomatic ties with the island had been severed. (73) Thus, even in the face of such a potentially explosive incident, the self-fulfilling effect of the "China threat" discourse has not been acknowledged by mainstream U.S. China analysts. To the contrary, deterring and containing China has gained new urgency. For example, in the aftermath of this standoff, neoconservative columnists Robert Kagan and William Kristol (chairman of the Project for the New American Century) wrote that "not only is the sale of Aegis [to Taiwan] ... the only appropriate response to Chinese behavior; We have been calling for the active containment of China for the past six years precisely because we think it is the only way to keep the peace." (87) Although the sale of the Aegis destroyers was deferred, President George W. Bush approved an arms package for Taiwan that included so-called "defensive" weapons such as four Kidd class destroyers, eight diesel submarines, and twelve P-3C submarine-hunting aircraft, as well as minesweeping helicopters, torpedoes, and amphibious assault vehicles. On this arms sale, David Shambaugh, a Washington-based China specialist, had this to say: "Given the tangible threats that the Chinese military can present to Taiwan--particularly a naval blockade or quarantine and missile threats--this is a sensible and timely package." (88)

Paternalistic and securitizing US representations of China as ungrateful and menacing justify use of military might and diplomatic consequences.

**Foot 95** (Rosemary, Oxford U, *The Practice of Power; US Relations With China*, p. 23)

Yet, in the period after 1949, the United States more than any other state in the global system struck at the leaders’ sense that Chinese status had indeed been transformed. From their perspective, US and not Chinese actions diminished the country’s security (and) prevented its territorial unifications with Taiwan, and denied its fulfillment of a world role. The United States stationed its troops and most deadly weaponry around China’s borders, formed military and economic alliances with its regional enemies, threatened the country with nuclear destruction, and interfered in its internal affairs. Washington also obstructed Beijing’s establishment of diplomatic relations with a number of states, imposed a strict trading embargo upon it, and denied it entry into the United Nations – the most important international organization of the post-war era. Communist ideology dictates that the leading imperialist nation was doomed to extinction in the final stage before the transition to socialism, and Mao additionally argued that the United States, though it seemed so powerful, was in fact a ‘paper tiger’ because it lacked popular support; nevertheless, the longevity of imperialism was troubling and often required a prudent response from China in the short to medium term. Aspects of power have similarly suffused America’s relations with China, also a condition that has long historical roots. Nineteenth and early twentieth-century unequal encounters encouraged the United States in its paternalism and in its desire to make the Chinese behave or reform in ways that Americans found compatible with their vision of a modern and civilized country. With the communist victory on the mainland in 1949, the American way appeared to have been rejected, and the Sino-Soviet alliance seemed to confirm it. When the ‘ungrateful’ Chinese added to that ideological opposition by engaging directly in military conflict against US forces in Korea, attacking America’s ally on Taiwan, and marching into democratic India in 1962, it was a relatively easy task to depict China as powerful and menacing. In his study of American images of China, Harold Isaacs noted that the most pervasive image his respondents offered was that of China as a sleeping giant awakening, a civilization that had been ‘bottled up’ for so long ‘now bursting forth with tremendous energy’.

Links – China

Current US security discourse forces efforts to check or reform China’s power, likely escalating to violence.

**Chan 8** (Steve, Poli Sci @ U Colorado, *China, The US, and the Power-Transition Theory; A Critique*, p.8)

Given the prevailing view that international instability originates from a rising, revisionist state, it is unsurprising that much of the discourse in current US commentaries emphasizes efforts either to check China’s power ascent or to reform its regime and society. In Chapter 7 I take on a critical examination of the premises pertaining to the competing advice to contain China or to engage it. The proponents of containment appear to face several constraining considerations. Domestic factors tend to be more important sources of national growth that external factors. Moreover, the Phoenix phenomenon suggests that states previously defeated in a war are usually able to resume their prewar growth trajectory in a reasonably short time. In addition, the neighbors of a rising state do no typically form a coalition in order to balance it. This coalition usually results from repeated aggression by a state whose pattern of behavior exacerbates these neighbors’ security concerns to such an extent that they are energized to abandon their neutrality. As for the proponents of engagement, their logic is often (though not always) based not on hope of influencing a target regime’s values and interests, but to create points of bargaining leverage in order to obtain political compliance or conformity. The propositions that increased economic and cultural contact with the US will bring about a change in Beijing’s policy agenda and priorities, and that the implied threat to suspend this contact may be used to extract concessions for reform and raise important empirical and even normative issues, such as social penetration and cultural cooptation. Standard US analyses, especially those coming from the “China threat” school tend to assume that as China becomes stronger, it would adopt a more active and confrontational posture in opposing US interests and resisting American domination. I submit that Beijing’s management of US hegemony will not likely follow the typical emphasis placed on “internal balancing” (that is armament) or “external balancing” (that is, alliance formation) in standard realist writings on how states seek to enhance their security. Rather, I expect Beijing to pursue stratagems aimed at deflecting direct US pressure and avoiding a frontal collision. Evasion, entrapment, and even engagement are hypothesized to represent the more salient aspects of Beijing’s efforts to cope with US hegemony. Of course, avoiding direct US pressure will heighten US attempts at coercion. If this prognosis is correct, the Chinese leaders will not behave in the fashion of a cocky, rash upstart portrayed in some discussions of power transition. They would want to avoid provoking the US. Should a confrontation occur it would not be because Beijing has wanted to challenge the US. Rather, it would be because Beijing has been unable to prevent the US from becoming engaged, which is a likely scenario to lead to heightened confrontation and violence in the region. A parallel may be drawn from World War I. Far from seeking a confrontation with the UK, Germany had wanted but was unable to keep the UK on the sideline. My characterization of Beijing’s strategy for dealing with Washington’s pre-eminence and for managing its own ascent in the international system accords with some strong strands in traditional Chinese thought and with the revised logic applied to the power-transition theory.

A2: Link Turn – “We Decrease Troops”

While the aff facially attacks military power, it embraces the ideology that makes the smooth functioning of security politics inevitable

Gorelick 8 (Nathan, Ph.D. student of Comparative Literature at the State University of New York at Buffalo, *Theory and Event* Vol. 11 Issue 2)

It is, however, necessary to distinguish the context in which Coetzee invokes this idea from the political situation elaborated by the war on terror. His essay "Into the Dark Chamber: The Writer and the South African State" was written in 1986; Coetzee thus occupied the particular position of the participant observer, ruminating on the crisis in representation endemic to the apartheid state especially as it sat poised on the precipice of collapse. Here, as in the war on terror, this crisis can be understood not as a constraint against politics, nor as a hiccup in the otherwise smooth functioning of a violent totalitarian regime; rather the crisis in representation is constitutive of politics as such. Political legislation comes to be entirely preoccupied by the necessity to articulate and stabilize the limits of representation: "The response of South Africa's legislators to what disturbs their white electorate is usually to order it out of sight.... If the black townships are in flames, let cameras be banned from them. (At which the great white electorate heaves a sigh of relief: how much more bearable the newscasts have become!)"6 The constant policing of the line between the visible and the invisible becomes the essence of policy-making. While this policing function may operate -- with varying degrees of success -- within the war on terror, a principle distinction between this context and that of apartheid South Africa is that the existence of torture chambers in South Africa was well-known; the dark chamber was "offered like the Gorgon's head to terrorize the populace and paralyze resistance."7 The moral outrage in response to the scandal at Abu Ghraib, both domestically and internationally, suggests that here, for a regime which bills itself as the primary champion of representative democracy and human rights, the dark chamber is to be a tightly kept state secret. The Gorgon's head is symbolized not by the bare authority of the state, but rather by the specter of the terrorist -- the extremist, the savage, the ambitious theocratic despot whose identity is defined in opposition to every one of the ideals that the so-called free world purports to defend. Such a neatly organized and tightly managed dichotomy becomes profoundly unstable, and is therefore an untenable strategy of representation in justifying a war of good against evil,8 when representatives of the good are reluctantly exposed as participating in acts which supposedly comprise at least part of the line separating a benevolent "us" from a malevolent "them". Despite these essential differences, it is possible, through Coetzee's consideration of the danger of rendering the state's "vile mysteries the occasion of fantasy," to discern the properly ethical stakes involved in disrupting the prevailing politics of representation at work in instances of state violence.9 Intervention must be careful to avoid complicity with the institutionally determined limits of discourse as it attempts to challenge an abhorrent, authoritarian legitimacy codified through the deafening silence of apartheid's dark chambers, a challenge voiced on behalf of its smothered, suffering victims. Intervention in the politics of representation within the context of counterterrorism may similarly be understood as a matter of ethical concern; such an intervention might defer criticism of the historical foundations of both state and non-state violence by emphasizing specific aberrations like those of Abu Ghraib, risking an accidental complicity with larger world-ordering projects such as the war on terror. Or, intervention may prioritize the deficiencies and contradictions within a war-fighting narrative reliant upon simplistic moral judgments such as those discerning the "good" from the "evil" or "freedom" from "tyranny." Either strategy is necessarily insufficient. That is, in order to determine the nature of what might be called an ethical concern for the representational practices surrounding torture and the war on terror, it is not enough to simply expose the contradictions inherent in this new global conflict, to reveal the contents and practices of the dark chamber. Once the details of the United States' politics of vengeance and the disturbing visual representation of the sovereign right to punish bleed into the field of public discourse, the task of critique concerns how to respond to this broken silence without instantiating a new or more dangerous violence against that which was previously hidden.

A2: Link Turn – “We Decrease Troops”

Securitization is a speech act that removes an issue from contested debate – Even if the plan is good, their discourse justifies extreme measures

de Larrinaga 7 (Miguel School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, *Reading Canadian Foreign Policy: The “Weaponization of Space” and the Debate on Ballistic Missile Defense* pg. 5-8)

It should be clear from the above that the approach to reading foreign policy taken here eschews an “essentialist” reading of security issues. In other words, what is posited is that meaning and identity can never be fixed since there is, as Laclau and Mouffe suggest, no “underlying principle [or essence] fixing - and hence - constituting the whole field of differences.”16 In this sense, since meaning and identity are not intrinsic and are always relational, never self-present or self-engendered, they are unstable and in constant need of reiteration. What this enables, is an understanding of meaning and of the contestation over meaning(s) - such as that related to the weaponization of space discourse - that is intimately political. Within the context of security studies, and informed by the above, this approach is also intimately associated with an understanding of security as a speech act as developed by Ole Weaver and the Copenhagen School.17 In short, and in relation to the above discussion on essence, treating security as a speech act means, as Ole Weaver explains, that you do not understand it as “a sign that refers to something more real, the utterance itself is the act.”18 In other words, what makes a security issue a security issue is not the fact that the threat is itself intrinsically a security threat, but it is framed as such by calling it one. However, this does not simply mean that making an issue a security issue occurs solely in the ideational realm. On the contrary, by making an issue a security issue certain practices and technologies associated with security are deployed in order to neutralize what has been deemed a “security threat.” Understanding something as a security issue is thus never a neutral enterprise. Furthermore, through this understanding of security, more security is not always a good thing. Understanding security in this way has thus led to calls to either desecuritize certain issues or to not make an issue a security issue in the first place - e.g. immigration19 or the environment.20 In understanding security as a speech act, one understands the deployment of a security discourse as a way to bring a certain issue under the realm of state decision and control. As Weaver suggests, “[i]n naming a certain development a security problem the “state” can claim a special right, one that will, in the final instance, always be defined by the state and its elites.”21 In securitizing an issue, therefore, one fundamentally shifts it into a specific realm. For Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, this process is one of politicization, in that it becomes part of public policy and government decision or, at its extreme, it is deemed an existential threat which would require emergency measures. As the authors note: “Security” is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization.22 However, this is premised upon an understanding of the political as having to do with state policy - i.e. an issue becomes political once government decision and resource allocation is involved. If, however, we understand the political, as adumbrated above, in relation to a contestation over meaning, and, moreover, a social contestation over meaning, then making an issue a security issue is a depoliticizing move in that one removes this issue from social contestation. In this, my position on the relationship between securitization and the political is closer to that of Jenny Edkins who understands securitization in the following terms: When issues are “securitized” they are even more firmly constrained within the already accepted criteria of a specific social form.[...] Issues of “security” are more removed from public debate and decision than issues of “politics”; in most cases these issues are secret, and even the existence of such matters are concealed. Decisions about them are taken in technical terms, following the advice of experts in military affairs or defense. Securitization is technologization par excellence.23 The issue of securitization has been primarily addressed in terms of the broadening of security - i.e. of expanding the agenda of security beyond military security to include economic, environmental, and/or societal “threats.” From this standpoint, this type of broadening should be always treated with suspicion since securitizing such issues can lead to their depoliticization and their treatment through exceptional measures. In turn, taken as a whole, this can lead to securitizing and depoliticizing wider and deeper spheres of social and political space.

A2: Link Turn – “We Decrease Troops”

Their rationale for decreasing troops disciplines and regulates life

Reid 8 (Julian, Lecturer in International Relations at King's College ed – Micheal Dillion,, Andrew W. Neal, Professor of Politics at the Department of Politics and International Relations of the University of Lancaster, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Edinburgh, *Foucault on politics*, *security and war* pg. 92)

As the modern ideal of the establishment of a civil society was founded upon the task of the 'removal of war' from society, so, for Foucault, the source of the problem of war was found to be located in the nature of the forms of life that inhabit society. Specified so, the problem of war was identified from the outset as a problem of how to attain and exert power over life. How best to shape and make life to render it conducive to peace not war. Paradoxically, it was in the development of modern forms of military organisation, as Foucault shows us in Discipline and Punish, that the tactical mechanisms with which to wield power over life's aleatory indeterminacy found their most pronounced expressions. In turn, organisation for war provided regimes with model templates through which to subdue and shape life in the name of civil peace. The uniform docility of bodies afforded by disciplinary power over life in the name of peace in turn provided new resources of population for the mobilisation of societies in warfare with other rival forms. This is the great paradox and crisis of political modernity that Foucault identifies in The History of Sexuality. Modernity is characterised by a type of society that has sought refuge from the indeterminacy of life, its radical undecidability, in techniques of discipline, regulation and normalisation, which in turn have exacerbated unprecedented forms of warfare inter- socially. The problem of modernity was never that of the problem of war as such, but in the still prevalent forms of solution to war. That is to say in the ways modern societies construe peace. Understood thus, the imperative question of politics, which he specifies more clearly in "Society Must Be Defended", and which reiterates Fanon's original postco lonial critique, is that of how to disengage from the processes of subjectification by which life comes to be variably pacified and mobilised. What form does life take when it is no longer suborned to a modern teleology of peace achieved through the means of war? Yet, in detailing this imperative and posing this question, Foucault abandons us upon a word of prohibitive caution. Those many and long traditions of counter-opposing the imposition of peace by declaring it war, which find their culmination now in a multitude of 'dispersed and discontinuous' offensives, and among which he contextualises the thrust of his own earlier work, provide no substantial ground, he argues, from which to escape the peace/war schemata. If we desire a resolution of this fundamental paradox of political modernity we must establish other ways of construing the life of political being, ones which compromise its seemingly endless polemologies.

The aff resecures security – Using security ideas for new humanistic goals fails

Burke 2 (Anthony, School of Political Science and International Studies University of Queensland, Aporias of Security, *Alternatives* 27 pg. 2)

The answer is not to seek to close out these aporias; they call to us and their existence presents an important political opening. Rather than seek to resecure security, to make it conform to a new humanist ideal—however laudable—we need to challenge security as a claim to truth, to set its "meaning" aside, instead, we should focus on security as a pervasive and complex system of political, social, and economic power, which reaches from the most private spaces of being to the vast flows and conflicts of geopolitics and global economic circulation. It is to see security as an interlocking system of knowledges, representations, practices, and institutional forms that imagine, direct, and act upon bodies, spaces, and flows in certain ways—to see security not as an essential value but as a political technology. This is to move from essence to genealogy: a genealogy that aims, in William Connolly's words, to "open us up to the play of possibility in the present. . - . [to] incite critical responses to unnecessary violences and injuries surreptitiously imposed upon life by the insistence that prevailing forms are natural, rational, universal or necessary

A2: Link Turn – “We Decrease Troops”

Security is a rigged game that ensures state power – Securinig security is inconceivable so reductions in presence are a drop in the bucket

Campbell 98 (David- PHD, Prof of cultural & poli geog @ U of Durham, *Writing Security*, p.11-12,ET)

Indeed, much of the conventional literature on the nation and the state implies that the essence of the former precedes the reality of the latter: that the identity of a 'people' is the basis for the legitimacy of the state and its subsequent practices. However, much of the recent historical sociology on this topic has argued that the state more often than not precedes the nation: that nationalism is a construct of the state in pursuit of its legitimacy. Benedict Anderson, for example, has argued in compelling fashion that 'the nation' should be understood as an 'imagined political community' that exists only in so far as it is a cultural artifact that is represented textually.31 Equally, Charles Tilly has argued that any coordinated, hierarchical, and territorial entity should be only understood as a `national state.' He stresses that few of these national states have ever become or presently are 'nation-states' — national states whose sovereign territorialization is perfectly aligned with a prior and primary form of identification, such as religion, language, or symbolic sense of self. Even modern-day Great Britain, France and Germany (and, equally, the United States, Australia, Canada etc.) cannot be considered nation-states even though they are national states.32cThe importance of these perspectives is that they allow us to understand national states as unavoidably paradoxical entities which do not possess prediscursive, stable identities. As a consequence, all states are marked by an inherent tension between the various domains that need to be aligned for an 'imagined political community' to come into being — such as territoriality and the many axes of identity — and the demand that such an alignment is a response to (rather than constitutive of) a prior and stable identity. In other words, states are never finished as entities; the tension between the demands of identity and the practices that constitute it can never be fully resolved, because the performative nature of identity can never be fully revealed. This paradox inherent to their being renders states in permanent need of reproduction: with no ontological status apart from the many and varied practices that constitute their reality, states are (and have to be) always in a process of becoming. For a state to end its practices of representation would be to expose its lack of prediscursive foundations; stasis would be death. Moreover, the drive to fix the state's identity and contain challenges to the state's representation cannot finally or absolutely succeed. Aside from recognizing that there is always an excess of being over appearance that cannot be contained by disciplinary practices implicated in state formation, were it possible to reduce all being to appearance, and were it possible to bring about the absence of movement which in that reduction of being to appearance would characterize pure security, it would be at that moment that the state withers away.34 At that point all identities would have congealed, all challenges would have evaporated, and all need for disciplinary authorities and their fields of force would have vanished. Should the state project of security be successful in the terms in which it is articulated, the state would cease to exist. Security as the absence of movement would result in death via stasis. Ironically, then, the inability of the state project of security to succeed is the guarantor of the state's continued success as an impelling identity. The constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is thus not a threat to a state's identity or existence; it is its condition of possibility. While the objects of concern change over time, the techniques and exclusions by which those objects are constituted as dangers persist. Such an argument, however, is occluded by the traditional representations of international politics through their debts to epistemic realism and its effacement of interpretation. Grounded in an interrogation of discursive practices within the study of international relations and the conduct of United States foreign policy, this study seeks to show how these themes and issues are immanent to these domains. Through a rethinking of the practice and theory of foreign policy in chapters one, two, and three; a discussion in chapter four of the dominant modes of representing danger; and a consideration of the figuration of difference at various foundational moments in the American experience in chapter five; this book posits the validity (though not incontestability) of an alternative interpretation of the cold war, which is elaborated in chapter six. The hope is that this analysis can highlight some of the political issues at stake in the post-cold war era, as chapters seven, eight, and nine argue.

A2: Link Turn – “We Decrease Troops”

The aff resorts to legality to counter state violence which recreates the state of exception that makes violence intractable

Neocleous 6 (Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy, Brunel Business School, *Alternatives* 31 pg. 208-209)

In this context it is appropriate to turn briefly to Benjamin’s comment on the state of emergency as the rule rather than the exception. The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the “state of emergency” in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that accords with this insight. Then we will clearly see that it is our task to bring about a real state of emergency, and this will improve our position in the struggle against fascism.51 As I noted earlier, this comment has been cited time and again by those seeking to describe the current conjuncture as one of permanent emergency. But what tends to be omitted is Benjamin’s point that we learn about the permanent emergency not from the current conjuncture, either then or now, but from the tradition of the oppressed. If you want to know what emergency power looks like, read the history of the oppressed, for it is this history that reveals the permanent nature of the emergency. In other words, we should understand the state of emergency through a historical understanding of state power as class rule, not a contemporary reading of international relations. And this argument has political implications. If emergency powers are part and parcel of the exercise of law and violence (that is, law as violence), and if historically they have been aimed at the oppressed (in advanced capitalist states against the proletariat and its various struggles, in reactionary regimes against genuine politicization of the people, in colonial systems against popular mobilization), then they need to be fought not by demanding a return to the “normal” rule of law, but in what Benjamin calls a real state of emergency. As Slavoj Zizek puts it, “When a state institution proclaims a state of emergency, it does so by definition as part of a desperate strategy to avoid the true state of emergency and return to the ‘normal course of things.’”52 The permanent state of emergency carried out by the ruling class, then, is part and parcel of the struggle against the real state of emergency carried out by those seeking a real (global, local, political) alternative. Rather than being affronted by the permanent emergency and demanding a return to legality, then, we should be aiming to bring about a real state of emergency. And this is a task that requires violence, not the rule of law. As Benjamin saw, the law’s claim to a monopoly of violence is explained not by the intention of preserving some mythical “legal end” such as peace or normality but, rather, for “the intention of preserving the law itself.” But violence not in the hands of the law threatens it by its mere existence outside the law. A violence exercised not by the state, but used for very different political ends. For “if the existence of violence outside the law, as pure immediate violence, is assured, this furnishes proof that revolutionary violence, the highest manifestation of unalloyed violence by man, is possible.”53 That this possibility of and necessity for revolutionary violence is so often omitted when emergency powers are discussed is indicative of the extent to which much of the left has given up any talk of political violence for the far more comfortable world of the rule of law, regardless of how little the latter has achieved in just the last few years. But if the history of emergency powers tells us anything it is that the least effective response to state violence is to simply insist on the rule of law. Rather than aiming to counter state violence with a demand for legality, then, what is needed is a counter politics: against the permanent emergency, by all means, but also against the normality of everyday class power and the bourgeois world of the rule of law.

A2: Link Turn – “We Decrease Troops”

The aff’s criticism of security is coopted by powerful elites – Ontological approaches solve best

Burke 2 (Anthony, School of Political Science and International Studies University of Queensland, Aporias of Security, *Alternatives* 27 pg. 4-5)

Thus humanist critiques of security uncover an aporia within the concept of security. An aporia is an event that prevents a metaphysical discourse from fulfilling its promised unity – not a contradiction that can be brought into the dialectic, smoothed over, and resolved into the unity of the concept, bin an untotalizable problem at the heart of the concept, disrupting its trajectory, emptying our its fullness, opening out its closure. Derrida writes of aporia being an 'Impasse," a path that cannot be traveled; an "interminable experience" that, however, "must remain if one wants to think, to make come or to let come any event of decision or responsibility."13 As an event, Derrida sees the aporia as something like a stranger crossing the threshold of a foreign land: yet the aporetic stranger "does not: simply cross a given threshold" but 'affects the very experience of the threshold . . . to the point of annihilating or rendering indeterminate all the distinctive signs of a prior identity, beginning with the very border that delineated a legitimate home and assured lineage, names and language."11 Thus it is important to open up and focus on aporias: they bring possibility, the hope of breaking down the hegemony and assumptions of powerful political concepts, to think and create new social, ethical, and economic relationships outside their oppressive structures of political and epistemological order—in short, they help us to think new paths. Aporias mark not merely the failure of concepts but a new potential to experience and imagine the impossible. This is where the criti-cal and life-affirming potential of genealogy can come into play. My particular concern with humanist discourses of security is that, whatever their critical value, they leave in place (and possibly strengthen) a key structural feature of the elite strategy they oppose: its claim to embody truth and Fix the contours of the real. In particular, the ontology of security/threat or security/insecurity— which forms the basic condition of the real for mainstream discourses of international policy—remains powerfully in place, and security's broader function as a defining condition of human experience and modern political life remains invisible and unexamined. This is to abjure a powerful critical approach that is able to question the very categories in which our thinking, our experience, and actions remain confined. This article remains focused on the aporias that lie at the heart of security, rather than pushing into the spaces that lie beyond. The contours of this project are already becoming clearer.1"' What is still required is a properly genealogical account of security's ability to provide what Walker calls a "constitutive account of the political": as Walker says, "claims about common security, collective security, or world security do little more than fudge the contradictions written into the heart of modern politics: we can only become humans or anything else, after we have given up our humanity, or any other attachments, to the greater good of citizenship.""' Thus, before we can effectively rewrite security, we have to properly understand how security has written us—how it has shaped and limited our very possibility, the possibilities for our selves, our relationships, and our available images of political, social, and economic order. This, as Walker intriguingly hints, is also to explore the aporetic distance that modernity establishes between our "humanity" and a secure identity bounded and defined by the state. In short, security needs to be placed alongside a range of other economic, political, technological, philosophic, and scientific developments as one of the central constitutive events of our modernity, and it remains one of its essential underpinnings. Security derives its enormous cultural power from its place at the center of modern political thought—at the center of a thought that, after first establishing the founding myths of modern political society, has further sought to think the juridical basis and function of the state, its enabling relation to a broader cultural and economic modernity, and to the imagination of "progressive" forms of modern political and economic subjectivity. Just as Foucault sought, through the idea of governmentality, to trace the emergence of simultaneously totalizing and individualizing forms of state power, I would argue that security occupies a key enabling position at their junction. The remainder of this article elucidates security's "constitutive account of the political" through a reading of Hobbes, Locke, the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Be nth am, and Hegel, using Fou-cault's writings on governmental reason as a loose template.

A2: Link Turn – “We Decrease Troops”

Legal challenges to security discourse causes redeployment and illicit and more dangerous security practices

Gorelick 8 (Nathan, Ph.D. student of Comparative Literature at the State University of New York at Buffalo, *Theory and Event* Vol. 11 Issue 2)

Extraordinary rendition, torture, the war on terror and the security of the state are thus various nodal points within the larger epistemology of liberal humanism -- a humanism that produces its dark chambers in its flight from the black void at its own core. Césaire's "thingification" is the product of this flight. It would therefore be misguided to assume that the violence endemic to the war on terror can be cured by simply exposing its contradictions. If images from Abu Ghraib become a common rallying cry against American militarism for disparate political factions around the globe, this cry is unheeded. If legal challenges to abominable state violence are successful, inventive re-interpretations of the law emerge, or lawlessness is simply driven underground. Instead, it is necessary to challenge the systems of thought from which these practices emerge; the task of criticism must be to interrupt the epistemology of the burrow. The dark chamber (extraordinary rendition) ought to be understood as a metaphor for this epistemology, and ethical criticism must expose the totality of violence that this metaphor represents without enabling morally totalizing recuperations of the larger world ordering project currently embodied and deployed by the United States. Such a project entails a reconfiguration of the political terrain, or a reconstitution of the limits of political antagonism, but it also implies the need for an even more profound challenge to the ways in which discourses and representations of "self" and "other" are constituted. The task is not simple: as Michael J. Shapiro suggests, "Recognition of the extraordinary lengths to which one must go to challenge a given structure of intelligibility, to intervene in resident meanings by bringing what is silent and unglimpsed into focus, is an essential step toward opening up possibilities for a politics and ethics of discourse."45 If, however, an ethical regard is rendered possible through the work of rigorous critique -- through the establishment of a critical distance between the critic and the object of criticism -then the question for critique concerns the very nature of the ethical itself. Because the crisis in representation by which the dark chamber is constantly being suppressed is constitutive of politics as such, then the problem, as Coetzee reminds us, is "how not to play the game by the rules of the state, how to establish one's own authority, how to imagine torture and death on one's own terms."46 Coetzee's suggestion that torture and death might be "imagined" implies that an effective intervention should not adopt a strategy of representational verisimilitude -- the goal should not be to take and disseminate photographs of Uzbek or Russian torture chambers, or to produce comprehensive, anatomical descriptions of horrendous state-sanctioned violence. Such efforts risk a different kind of satisfaction than that which is demonstrated by a smiling prison guard at Abu Ghraib, a voyeuristic pleasure in consuming images of a suffering other and a dangerous appropriation of that suffering as something to be easily understood and made one's own. The image thus commodified, its subject's pain is reduced to a political bargaining chip, a source for aesthetic elaboration, a sensational news item; the singularly unrepresentable experience of torture -- the reason for which it is inexcusable -- is polluted by its representation. So, it is necessary to expose and criticize torture, but the brutality of the experience must somehow be represented in its unrepresentability. A criticism in search of ethical possibilities, in whatever form, must find ways to avoid "either looking on in horrified fascination as the blows fall or turning one's eyes away."47 It must situate itself at the level of epistemology, rather than fixating on singular eruptions of violence and state brutality. Otherwise, critique is already "play[ing] the game by the rules of the state," operating within the dialectic of visibility endemic to the epistemology of the burrow.

Internal Link - Genocide

The idea of security is deployed for genocide

Dillon and Neal 8 (Micheal,, Andrew W., Professor of Politics at the Department of Politics and International Relations of the University of Lancaster, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Edinburgh, *Foucault on politics, security and war,* pg. 10-11)

War and politics, by Foucault's account, therefore always seem to form complex, mutually informing and strategically interactive, grids of intelligibility for one another. He also observes, finally, that how ever pacified, marginalised and restricted to the right of the sovereign modern war became, in that very collection of processes it also became ever more lethal and destructive as well. Under the impetus, espe cially, of biopolitically driven and bio-economically organised global processes, the modern way of war was to become 'world war' and sov ereigns began waging war in the name less of the limited territorial and dynastic jousting of the eighteenth century and more in the name of life itself: 'Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sover eign who must be defended', Foucault added in a passage from The History of Sexuality, which is directly concerned with the issues raised in these lectures, they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire popula tions are mobilised for the purposes of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity; massacres have become vital.... The principle underlying the tactics of battle - that one has to become capable of killing in order to go on living - has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. (1990: p. 137) And then, in a passage of quite brilliant insight, Foucault brings the problematic he has been struggling to articulate in the lectures to a denouement whose force impinges on us even more powerfully today than it did back in the mid-1970s. It is a familiar passage, often quoted. We make no apologies for quoting it again. Here Foucault is not so much declaring an end to political modernity as concluding how it has become a terminal problem to itself. The implication is inescapable. The future of politics no longer lies in the realisation of the modern, if there is to be a future it lies in escaping the problem which modern politics now sets for itself. For, 'what might be called a society's "thresh old of modernity" has been reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies ... modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question' (1990: p. 143). This story, however novel and traditional in its re-telling by Foucault, and however dramatic in its climax, is nonetheless also critically lim ited. There is more we could have asked of Foucault in the re-telling of it. He does not give us any extended account, for example, of how the modern re-made war. Nor does he extend his interrogation of war into the relation of war to political economy as he pursues the translation of political economy into biopolitical governmentality. He does not ask, directly at least, how the strategical model of power relations he identifies conforms with the logic of both war and political economy as well. He does not directly observe that the strategical model of power may well be the very thing that links both war and political economy in the burgeoning mechanisms of biopower. Here, too, logistics surfaces but is not directly addressed. Do economy and war not combine in construing politics and power as a strategic game in which competition and violent conflict reduce 'mere life' to the logistics of a standing reserve? A reserve which, to the degree that it has encompassed the co- evolutionary exploitation of both 'men and things', is now critically depleted, fragile and ecologically vulnerable.

Securitization and calculation were the root cause of the Holocaust.

Dillon 99 (Michael, Sage Publications, Prof@Lancaster, *Political* Theory, Vol. 27, No.2, p. 165) JFS

Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability. Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of the holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value – rights – may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, “we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure.” But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being.

Internal Link - Genocide

Their threat rhetoric justifies neverending war and reduces life to violence, making life itself not worth living

Reid 8 (Julian, Lecturer in International Relations at King's College ed – Micheal Dillion,, Andrew W. Neal, Professor of Politics at the Department of Politics and International Relations of the University of Lancaster, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Edinburgh, *Foucault on politics, security and war* pg. 90)

The constitution of species life itself as the referent object of the security practices of state power allows for the specification of any and every form of life that can be held to install degenerative effects within the field of population as the enemy upon which war must be waged. Not necessarily a war of the military type, but a war of quiet extermination, carried out with the continual deployment of regulatory and normalising techniques. A war that rages at the heart of modern societies. A war of the 'biological type' (Foucault, 2003b: p. 255). At the same time, then, that we see wars of the military type addressed as a moral scandal and the major political problematic of modernity, so we see the legitimisation of new forms of warmaking as the right to kill becomes aligned in proximity to the new necessity to 'make live' (Foucault, 2003b: p. 256). In turn we see the emergence of new practices of colonisation justified on racial grounds. Subsequently we witness the emergence of fascist states and societies in which the power over life and death, adjudicated on explicitly racial criteria, is disseminated widely, to the point where everyone has the power of life and death over his or her neighbours, if only because of the practice of informing, which effectively means doing away with the people next door, or having them done away with. (Foucault, 2003b: p. 259) Likewise the emergence of socialisms based on the pursuit of the elimination of class enemies within capitalist society emit, for Foucault, an essential form of racism (Foucault, 2003b: pp. 261-2). These strategies of states, as well as counter-state, counter-hegemonic struggles, are all fundamentally tied up with this problem of the relations between war, life and security. Once politics is construed as the continuation of war, once war becomes conceived as a condition of possibility for life, for the pursuit of its security and the increase of its being, however that conception may be grounded, the conditions are created whereby life itself becomes the object for variable forms of destruction, annihilation and quiet exterminations.

Threat labeling leads to genocide.

Der Derian 99 (james, Brown U, research professor of international studies and professor of political science, *Angelaki: journal of the theoretical humanities* 4:2 pg. 59)

In our own shape-shifting "phase transition" between order and disorder (so far, the best non- mathematical description physicists have come up with for "complexity"), when rationalist methods appear inadequate, the temptation grows to use coercive interventions or technical fixes to seemingly intractable problems of subjectivity, like immigration, ethnic cleansing, fundamentalist politics. In his own way, Benjamin warns us of the dangers that attend such efforts. He helps us to understand (in ways that rationalist methods do not) how a "social problem," like the role of the other in society, can suddenly escalate into a life-and-death "security issue." By making ways of being and ways of knowing one and the same, Benjamin shows us how questions of violence are always already problems of identity. When a whole people become a "problem," violent final solutions result. I invoke Benjamin's work, life, and times for more than heuristic reasons. Many of us come from safe or de-traumatised zones of living and learning, where we are tempted, even trained, to ignore new dangers, for reasons that Zygmunt Bauman, a social theorist with intimate knowledge of these dangers, locates in the rationalist myth of modernity: None of the things that happened in this century were, however, more unexpected than Auschwitz and the Gulag, and none could be more bewildering, shocking and traumatic to the people trained, as we all have been, to see their past as the relentless and exhilarating progression of the ages of reason, enlightenment and emancipatory, liberating revolutions... What we learned in this century is that modernity is not only about producing more and travelling faster, getting richer and moving around more freely. It is also about - it has been about —fast and efficient killing, scientifically designed and administered genocide.2

Internal Link - Biopower

Security is the fundamental element in biopower’s cultivation of populations.

Dillon and Neal 8 (Micheal,, Andrew W., Professor of Politics at the Department of Politics and International Relations of the University of Lancaster, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Edinburgh, *Foucault on politics, security and war* pg. 10-11)

That said, Foucault cannot help making some novel points as well. Security is not a foundational political imperative. It is neither a biological drive nor ontology of fear stalking the state of nature. It is not a set of prophylactic measures either. On the contrary, while biopolitically driven; Foucault's key innovation of a dispositif de securite has less to do with protection and preservation than it does with circulation, cultivation, promotion and fructification. It has less to do with a people than a population. Little to do with will and more to do with statistics, patterns and behavioural regularities. Above all, Foucault's security has less to do with certainty than with contingency. Its problem space is no longer demarcated by discourses of certitude, but by calculations of the probable. In short Foucault historicises and governmentalises security. As a dispositif de securite, security is an ensemble of mechanisms by which the biopolitical imperative to make life live is operationalized govern mentally. And, then, these themes disappear from his lectures; which does not mean to say, however, that they need also disappear from our view. They are out there, and we are able to pick them up again; hence the purpose of this book.

The goal of security is control over the circulation of life

Dillon and Neal 8 (Micheal,, Andrew W., Professor of Politics at the Department of Politics and International Relations of the University of Lancaster, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Edinburgh, *Foucault on politics, security and war* Pg. 14-15)

If there is a logic, however understated, to these lectures, however, then it can be tracked. We have already observed that political economy shares a necessary relation with biopower. Governmentality becomes the orders of self-governance through which these are operationalised. What, then, of the claim made but not elaborated in the early lectures of Security, Territory, Population that biopolitics is simply a dispositif of securite? Well, if you take life as the referent object of security and power, such that the mechanisms of security and power must be gov erned by the properties of life, then attention turns to those properties. What properties distinguish life? Here we suggest is a way also of tying-in Foucault's preoccupation with circulation. Biologically, as well as economically, speaking, life is a process of circulation and exchange. It is also a transformative process. Through circulation life changes. Biologists and ecologists today say that it co-evolves with its environment. If you want to secure life you must therefore address yourself to how it circulates and how it changes, for these are the critical properties and processes of species life — etre biologique. Securing life thus becomes a matter of cultivating the processes by which biological life reproduces itself. Already here it is evident that the logic of Foucault's thinking carries you a long way from traditional geopolitical concerns with securing sovereignty and territory, and from traditional prophylactic under standings of security. Making live cannot be secured by locking-up life processes. Securing life poses a quite different game. It demands a quite different set of security mechanisms: a complex assembly of self- governing measures revolving, especially, around the circulations of life; in other words, a dispositif de securite.

Internal Link - Militarism

Securitization justifies militarism

Edkins 99 (Jenny, Professor of International Politics, *Poststructuralism & international relations: bringing the political back in*, Pg. 10-11 )

A second example in the field of international politics is the process of securitization.54 Securitization, or claiming that something is an issue of national security, removes it from one arena within which it is debated or contested in a certain way and takes it to another, where the priorities are different. Once something has been "securitized," this changes the terms of the debate. Certain questions can no longer be asked. In the security studies literature, securitization is seen as a further step beyond what is called there "politicization." Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde explain how they see "securitization": "Security" is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization. In theory any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from nonpoliticized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure).55 Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde's use of "politicized" is quite distinct from what mine would be.56 What they call "politicization" I would call "depoliticization": When an issue becomes, as they say, "part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations," it be comes for me part of "politics" and hence, as I have argued above, "de politicized." I would agree that securitization is a further step in the same direction, but for me that direction is one of depoliticization. When issues are "securitized," they are even more firmly constrained within the already accepted criteria of a specific social form. And that constraint is even more firmly denied. The state as a form of society has defined itself in large part around what it will consider as "security threat" and what mechanisms it will adopt for dealing with it. Issues of "security" are more removed from public debate and decision than issues of "politics"; in most cases these is sues are secret, and even the existence of such matters is concealed. Deci sions about them are taken in technical terms, following the advice of ex perts in military affairs or defense. Securitization is technologization par excellence.

Internal Link - Militarism

Threat labeling generates ‘virtuous’ militarism

Der Derian 3 (James, Fall, Brown, research professor of international studies and professor of political science, *boundary 2*, Volume 30, Number 3 pg. 25)

From the perspective of the NSS, even before the shock of 9/11, the end of the Cold War augured not global peace but a new world disorder. ‘‘New deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists’’ (13); and while they might not possess the might of the Soviet Union, they have the asymmetrical advantages garnered by weapons of mass destruction and the will to use them. Positing that traditional deterrence no longer works, the NSS presents axiomatically the right to preemptively strike against these new enemies: ‘‘The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack’’ (15). This is not a grand strategy; this is a blank check, to take whatever actions, whenever deemed necessary, against whoever fits the terrorist profile. Facing ‘‘an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world’s most destructive technologies,’’ the NSS sanctions a counterstrategy based on superior intelligence, ethics, and technological capability (15): ‘‘The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just’’ (16). In short, war will be virtuous. First auditioned in the Balkans, and dress-rehearsed in Afghanistan, virtuous war took center stage in the invasion of Iraq. Virtuous war projects a technological and ethical superiority in which computer simulation, media dissimulation, global surveillance, and networked warfare combine to deter, discipline, and, if need be, destroy the enemy. Ethically intentioned and virtually applied, drawing on the doctrines of just war when possible and holy war when necessary, virtuous war is more than a felicitous oxymoron. After September 11, as the United States chose coercion over diplomacy in its foreign policy, and deployed a rhetoric of total victory over absolute evil, virtuous war became the ultimate means by which the United States intended to resecure its borders, assert its suzerainty, and secure the holy trinity of international order: global capitalism (VI. Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade [17]); Western models of democracy (VII. Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy [21]); a hegemonic ‘‘balance of power’’ (VIII. Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power [25]); and preventive interventions. . . .

Internal Link – Value to Life

Security politics make the worst forms of violence and loss of value to life possible because they eliminate the value of the individual and continually seek the destruction of life’s inevitable insecurities.

Gorelick 8 (Nathan, Ph.D. student of Comparative Literature at the State University of New York at Buffalo, *Theory and Event* Vol. 11 Issue 2)

The problem with legal confrontations, though, is not simply that they continue to be side-stepped by the offending parties, but that they presuppose the legitimacy of the war on terror, a project which has become a floating signifier for neoconservative political agendas, easily attaching itself to any effort toward the advancement of Pax Americana, the geopolitical hegemony of a militarized, neoliberal United States. The most disturbing and violent of state secrets remain tenable, necessary war-fighting tactics precisely because they are secret, and they will not be revealed through any strategy of confrontation or representation that acquiesces to the ground rules for political participation laid out by the state. Any such strategy grants legitimacy to the violent state apparatus of which torture is only a small part, and strengthens the humanitarian legitimacy of neoimperialism. Prior to the publication of his report to the Council of Europe, Marty demonstrated the truth of this contention when he explained the "moral obligation" to reveal any illegal detention or interrogation activities: "We do not want to weaken the fight against terrorism... but this fight has to be fought by legal means. Wrongdoing only gives ammunition to the terrorists and their sympathizers."31 Here, Marty is clearly not criticizing the larger project underpinning the war on terror; rather the specific tactics through which this project attempts to actualize itself are considered in need of adjustment, so that the moral authority of American expansionism may be preserved. But if torture operates as a metaphor for brutal, authoritarian statism, this is so because it speaks to an entire epistemology of security wherein the life of the individual is only valuable insofar as it maintains some utility for the biopolitical population of which it is a part. The population, increasingly in need of protection from the disorderly world of threats, is harnessed in opposition to its dangerous others. This is particularly true for the war on terror; as Giorgio Agamben warned immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, "A state which has security as its only task and source of legitimacy is a fragile organism; it can always be provoked by terrorism to turn itself terroristic."32 Aimé Césaire noted this phenomenon in his articulation of the full brutality of colonialism, and in his equation, "colonization = thingification"; as extraordinary rendition demonstrates, the total securitization of everyday life, like colonization, conceptually transforms people into objects through (and against) which to define state authority.33 This radical objectification manifests as "force, brutality, cruelty, sadism... forced labor, intimidation, pressure... contempt, mistrust, arrogance, self-complacency, swinishness, brainless elites, degraded masses."34 Yet, as Césaire demonstrates, this "thingification" of life is not an accidental byproduct of European liberal humanism. Instead, the worst forms of violence are, in a very real sense, necessitated by the Enlightenment and the western metaphysical tradition of which it is a product. In Césaire's words, "through the mouths of the Sarrauts and the Bardes, the Mullers and the Renans, through the mouths of all those who considered -- and consider -- it lawful to apply to non-European peoples 'a kind of expropriation for public purposes' for the benefit of nations that were stronger and better equipped, it was already Hitler speaking!"35 Moreover, as Césaire and many other colonial and post-colonial thinkers suggest, the cultivation of the fundamental unit of political and moral account -- the sovereign subject -necessitates an other against which to define legitimate subjectivity. The other is constituted in opposition to everything that the sovereign, rational, autonomous self supposedly is not. The irrational other, thus devalued, can be abused, erased or exterminated with impunity. Extraordinary rendition contains all of these relations of domination -- the rational, calculating subject, in the interests of "national security" and under the auspices of a benevolent liberal humanism, attempts to forcibly extract information from the "subject supposed to know," but only by proxy; accountability for terror and for torture are thus excised from the state's own behavior. All of this, of course, takes place in the shadows of state secrecy. "This is info-war," notes Paul Gilroy, "and these terrorists will not be given the platform of a public trial. Their dubious struggle will not be sustained by 'the oxygen of publicity.'"36 So, what is at stake in the struggle to render visible the dark chambers of extraordinary rendition is not simply the legality or illegality of this particular practice; rather, this struggle is an attempt to disrupt the exclusive authority over the powers and limits of representation currently enjoyed by the agents of the war on terror, and by history's victors, the champions of the Enlightenment, in whose shadow this war is now being fought. If the violence contained within the dark chamber, as Coetzee suggests, is a metaphor "for relations between authoritarianism and its victims," then it ought to also stand as a metaphor for the dark, terrifying failure of the Enlightenment, for the violence which inevitably results from the grand project of world ordering that will never be rid of its disordered and dangerous others, despite increasingly paranoid and frenetic attempts to totally rigidify and control all things Other. <CONTINUED>

Internal Link – Value to Life

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Maurice Blanchot calls this failure the night, the other night, the void from which the light of the will to knowledge desperately attempts to escape. This other night is not a recognizable object; it is not the totalitarian communist or the uncontrollable terrorist -- the Manichean double, or dialectical antithesis, of liberal democracy -- who reacts to the violence of empire with empire's own obscene methods. Rather, it is the 'no-thing' of Being, the absence at the center of rationality, the irrationality and disorder against which knowledge and order are opposed and which their systems nevertheless and necessarily contain; it is the unknowable, unintelligible pebble of darkness which cannot be lighted by the force of reason; "it is what one never joins; it is repetition that will not leave off, satiety that has nothing, the sparkle of something baseless and without depth."37 It is the interminable insecurity at the heart of every systematic securitization. The United States' recent efforts -- following European colonialism's lead -- to constitute the globe as an impenetrable burrow, impervious to the other night and its "always more threatening threat," are ultimately efforts to hem liberal democracy into a coffin with this threat; security against the untamed outside, radical intimacy, draws the terror ever closer.38

No Impacts – Threats are Constructed

Bureaucratic biases mean you should be very skeptical of their impact claims

Huysmans 2 (Jef, Open University, UK, *Alternatives*, 27, p. 50)

In this final section, I introduce the agenda that theorizes the mobilization of the security formation from a sociological angle. Its main object of research is the institutionalization of threat environments. A modern society organizes danger by providing all institutional environment that plays a central role in the production and regulation of particular dangers. The military and rules of military engagement, including threat definitions, are an obvious example. This concept opens a window of opportunity to theorize the production of securitization in modern, Western societies. The construction of the transnational, bureaucratic network went hand in hand with the production of a new security configuration. The bureaucratic field relies on a process of securitization that is theorized as follows: Security professionals such as the police have a strong capacity to produce enunciations about the figure of the enemy and the relationship between us and them. The security knowledge they utter gradually defines a security continuum in which arbitrarily defined threats are connected in a global discourse that produces artificial homogeneity. As a result, the illegitimacy of terrorism and international crime can be transferred to questions of immigration and asylum, for example. The production of professional security knowledge is a key component constituting and regulation the transnational bureaucratic – that is professionalized - security field within which the different bureaucratic agents struggle for resources, reputation, recognition, and so forth. The transformative capacity of security professionals is a direct result of their institutional position, which empowers them to produce credible technical knowledge. The theorizations stress how an institutional structures (in the above cases, diplomacy and transnational police networks) and social processes (such as rationalization) rarefy security enunciations by empowering particular agents to speak security in a specific way. In other words, some agents have a strong capacity to construct security questions because of their position in an institutional structure. Security fields are thus entrenched in institutionalized patterns practices simultaneously empowering and constraining agents in terms of how and how powerfully they can utter security.

Their impacts are premised on a contrived consensus of leaders and academics – Be skeptical

Yeo 9 (September 3-6, Andrew, Assistant Professor Catholic University of America *Ideational Consensus and U.S. Alliance Management in the Asia-Pacific,* pg. 4-6)

As I elaborate on the concept of security consensus below, three important points are worth keeping in mind. First, the security consensus is an ideational rather than material concept. Second, the security consensus is intersubjective in nature. Third, the origins and persistence of the security consensus are based on both material and ideational factors. Figure 1 below illustrates several factors which help form and perpetuate an elite security consensus. External threat perceptions bear significant weight in the formation and persistence of the elite consensus. In addition to material capabilities, threat perceptions are informed by domestic and ideational variables such as identity, ideology, and historical legacies. This suggests that ideational factors indirectly shape the security consensus via threat perceptions. However, factors such as historical legacies, beliefs, ideology, and domestic institutions may also directly feed into and reinforce the security consensus. Hence, a shift in any one or combination of these factors could potentially lead to shifts in the security consensus. Likewise, an elite security consensus is shaped by both material-based threat capabilities such as the distribution of power at the global level, and non-material factors such as perceptions or identity at the domestic level. Other internal factors including domestic ideology, institutions, and historical legacies which reify or magnify threat perceptions also inform an elite consensus. For example, regarding ideology, Mark Haas writes, “Ideological variables shape leaders‟ understandings of the security environment in which they operate, in terms of which states constitute the greatest threats to leaders‟ key interests and the level of this perceived threat.”13 In addition to their intervening effect, however, these internal, domestic factors also directly shape or sustain the security consensus. Once formed, the security consensus profoundly affects the domestic and foreign policy choices of elites.

No Impacts – Threats are Constructed

Dangers are created entirely by sociopolitical practices in defining threats.

**Huysmans and Tsoukala 8** (Jef, Anastassia, Open University, UK, University of Paris, France, *Alternatives* 33, p. 133)

Underlying these analyses is a widely defined social-constructivist approach in security studies. The claim is that insecurities are politically and technologically constructed, hence dependent on the political, social, and economic contexts in which they are contested. The political significance and effects of violence depend on the logics, stakes, and methods of securitizing, rather than the act of violence itself. Therefore, the meaning of insecurity and danger is always a question rather than a given. This special issue begins with two contributions that address the evolving interactions between counterterrorism policies and the control of alleged security-threatening groups. These articles demonstrate how insecurity is, to a considerable degree, the product of sociopolitical processes. Processes of defining the threat, and the subsequent targeting of certain social groups according to risk- focused criteria and technologies, cannot be understood without considering the stakes involved in the functioning of domestic political and security fields. The question of identity that lies at the heart of these interactions is raised in both discursive and nondis- cursive ways. For example, identity is considered both the object of a discursive construction of sameness and otherness in contempo- rary Western societies, and as the legitimizing basis for the imple- mentation of an increasing control apparatus that covers delin- quent, deviant, and even ordinary behavior.

Overconfidence and false self-importance complicate the veracity of their impacts

**Stein 88** (Janice Gross, June 1988, Int. Soc. Of Polit. Psych., *Political Psychology*, Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 245)

A closely related bias of overconfidence further complicates the signalling and the perception of threat. People generally tend to be too confident of their capacity to make complex judgments and perform complicated mental operations (Fischoff et al., 1977). This bias can have dangerous consequences insofar as leaders tend to overestimate their ability to design and communicate appropriate threats and to assess the intentions of their adversary (Jervis, 1982). Leaders in the target state can also be overconfident in their perception of threat and insensitive to alternative explanations of action. During the Cuban missile crisis, there was widespread agreement that the Soviet Union had placed missiles in Cuba as part of a broadly based offensive strategy. No serious atten- tion was given to the alternative hypothesis that the Soviet Union was motivated in large part by new information that the United States knew of its strategic vulnerability. In November of 1961, the deputy secretary of defense, Roswell Gilpatric, publicly spoke of American strategic superiority and the weakness of the Soviet ICBM system. Soviet leaders thereby learned of the enhanced Ameri- can intelligence capability to assess Soviet forces. Even more to the point, they knew that the United States knew of their strategic weakness. Yet, the following year, Kennedy and almost all his advisors dismissed the proposition that the Soviet Union was motivated even in part by weakness. As subsequent evidence and argument would show, theirs was an overconfident and exaggerated percep- tion of the Soviet threat (Lebow, 1983, 1987). In this case, it is likely that the egocentric bias interacted with the propensity of overconfidence to shape the American perception of threat. In a skewed analysis, the United States saw itself as the primary determinant of Soviet action and, with little hesitation or doubt, expressed confidence in their assessment and excluded any other interpretation of their adversary's intentions.

No Impacts – Threats are Constructed

Threat descriptions are inherently based upon exaggeration.

**Stein 88** (Janice Gross, June 1988, Int. Soc. Of Polit. Psych., *Political Psychology*, Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 252)

Psychologists who study cognitive processes of attribution examine how people characteristically construct explanations. In their research they have iden- tified a fundamental error, people's tendency to exaggerate the importance of dispositional over situational factors when they explain undesirable behavior of others and the corresponding tendency to emphasize situational rather than dis- positional factors when they are explaining their own behavior (Jones and Nisbett, 1971; Kelley and Michela, 1980; Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Ross, 1977). This error in attribution contributes significantly to the overestimation of threat. Like the egocentric bias, it transforms effect into intent. Soviet officials tend, for example, to attribute the high level of American defense spending to the dispositional factor of the contradictions of capitalism and its inherent opposition to the Soviet Union. Their own defense spending, they insist, is situationally determined; it is a reaction to American militarism (Milburn et al., 1982). The dramatic increase in the perception of the Soviet threat by officials in the Carter administration also illustrates the impact of this fundamental error. In explaining the Soviet intervention, American officials gave almost no weight to the situa- tional factors which might have constrained the Soviet leadership, despite repeat- ed efforts by Soviet officials to convey to Washington the scope of their dilemma (Garthoff, 1985: 903,905,907). Rather they looked almost exclusively to dis- positional factors and estimated threatening intentions from Soviet action; mis- placed causation contributed significantly to the misperception of threat. In this case, moreover, the fundamental attribution error worked together with the ego- centric and proportionality biases to compound the perception of Soviet threat.

**The threats perceived by the aff are fabricated by shifts in the global balance of power.**

**Stein 88** (Janice Gross, June 1988, Int. Soc. Of Polit. Psych., *Political Psychology*, Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 258)

Closely related to the impact of the international security dilemma on the distortion of threat are unfavorable changes in the relative balance of power (Cohen, 1979; Knorr, 1976). When the trends in the balance of military ca- pabilities alter in favor of an adversary or leaders perceive an unfavorable shift the ensuing sense of vulnerability and fear promote an exaggerated estimate of threat. In the autumn of 1986, for example, some senior military officers in Israel estimated that Syria was preparing for imminent attack. Their perception of threat was in part a function of Syrian military activity in southern Lebanon but more broadly a response to their estimates of unfavorable trends in the balance of military capabilities. Vulnerability ensues not only from changes in relative capabilities but also from geostrategic conditions. Shallowness of space, unsettled borders, the ab- sence of strategic depth, repeated or protracted warfare, can all promote a collec- tive sense of vulnerability and an exaggerated perception of threat (Knorr, 1976; Cohen, 1979). Analysts of Israel's foreign policy have suggested, for example, that its acute preception of threat can only be understood in the context of its strategic vulnerability and its repeated experience of attack and war (Brecher, 1972; Yaniv, 1987). Leaders can exercise considerable care in the interpretation of changes in the relative strategic balance, mindful of the motivation to exaggerate threat under these kinds of conditions. They can be especially vigilant if they are aware that a "security dilemma" is at work, distorting and multiplying the perception of threat. In this kind of strategic environment, policies must be carefully de- signed to reduce spirals of mutual fear and reinforcing threat (Jervis, 1976: 58-113). Especially in this kind of environment, threat-based strategies like deterrence may not only be inappropriate but also provocative and dangerous (Lebow and Stein, 1987).

No Impacts – Threats are Constructed

The affirmative’s impact analysis fails because it assumes problematic values.

Krause 98 (Keith, Oxford, PhD Director of the Programme in Strategic and International Security Studies, The Research Program of Critical Security Studies, *Cooperation and Conflict* 33 (3) pg. 303-304)

But by treating the broadening of the concept of security as a 'political' rather than analytical move, the traditional view is positioned as an apolitical analytic stance that is not equally driven by (or established upon) a set of value commitments. As a result, alternative conceptions of security are judged by how well they fit within and contribute to the (purportedly objective) prevailing categories of the field — a concern with interstate violent conflict. Not surprisingly, the answer turns out to be that they are not really security issues at all. Although Levy admits it is possible to conceive of 'global security', he defines security as a situation where threats to a 'nation's most important values' come from the actions of 'foreigners' (Levy, 1995b: 40-1). Obviously, adopting the taken-for-granted political resolutions of orthodox security studies is not a neutral point against which alternative conceptions can be judged.

Their impacts are fabricated by the media – the alternative solves best.

Der Derian 99 (james, Brown U, research professor of international studies and professor of political science, *Angelaki: journal of the theoretical humanities* 4:2 pg. 56)

The spatialist, materialist - that is, realist - bias of thinking in international theory renders it less than adequate for a critical inquiry into the temporal, representational, deterritorial, and potentially dangerous powers of virtual technologies. Semiotic, critical, and discourse theories offer a better perspective, having led the way in tracing the reconfiguration of power into new representational, immaterial forms. They have helped us to understand how acts of inscription and the production of information can reify consciousness, float signifiers, and render concepts undecidable. However, as the realities of international politics increasingly are generated, mediated and simulated by successive technical means of reproduction, there is not so much a distancing from some original, truth-bearing source as there is an implosion, where meaning disappears into a media black hole of insignificance. As the globalisation and virtualisation of new media sunder meaning from conventional moorings, and set information adrift as it moves with alacrity and celerity from phenomenal to virtual forms, one searches for new modes of understanding.

No Impacts – Threats are Constructed

Threats are not objective, but are constructed worst case scenarios reified in speech acts.

Lipschutz 98 (*On Security*, Assistant Professor of Politics, Director of the Adlai Stevenson Program on Global Security, University of California, Santa Cruz Ronnie D. Lipschutz, editor Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millennium's End)

"Intersubjectivity" among the actors in international relations includes not only the mutually constituted relationship between two actors--in terms of the logic of the state system, between potentially hostile states--but also interpretations of position and responses to interpretations that arise from the logic of that relationship. In other words, the structure of the system as it is commonly understood provides the setting within which interpretations take place. So far, this is not very different from the neorealist notion that anarchy and self-help require the state to ensure its own security. What the condition of intersubjectivity adds to this is the idea that there is nothing "objective" about this arrangement; it grows out of the mutual interpretations and responses to one another by the actors constituting the system. The logic, the interpretation and the response together comprise the "speech act" of security. As Ole Wæver has put it, With the help of language theory, we can regard "security" as a speech act . In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more "real"; it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering "security," a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it. 2 What then, is the form and content of this speech act? The logic of security implies that one political actor must be protected from the depredations of another political actor. In international relations, these actors are territorially defined, mutually exclusive and nominally sovereign states. A state is assumed to be politically cohesive, to monopolize the use of violence within the defined jurisdiction, to be able to protect itself from other states, and to be potentially hostile to other states. Self-protection may, under certain circumstances, extend to the suppression of domestic actors, if it can be proved that such actors are acting in a manner hostile to the state on behalf of another state (or political entity). Overall, however, the logic of security is exclusionist: It proposes to exclude developments deemed threatening to the continued existence of that state and, in doing so, draws boundaries to discipline the behavior of those within and to differentiate within from without. The right to define such developments and draw such boundaries is, generally speaking, the prerogative of certain state representatives, as Wæver points out. 3 Of course, security, the speech act, does draw on material conditions "out there." In particular, the logic of security assumes that state actors possess "capabilities," and the purposes of such capabilities are interpreted as part of the speech act itself. These interpretations are based on indicators that can be observed and measured--for example, numbers of tanks in the field, missiles in silos, men under arms. It is a given within the logic--the speech act--of security that these capabilities exist to be used in a threatening fashion--either for deterrent or offensive purposes--and that such threats can be deduced, albeit incompletely, without reference to intentions or, for that matter, the domestic contexts within which such capabilities have been developed. Defense analysts within the state that is trying to interpret the meanings of the other state's capabilities consequently formulate a range of possible scenarios of employment, utilizing the most threatening or damaging one as the basis for devising a response. Most pointedly, they do not assume either that the capabilities will not be used or that they might have come into being for reasons other than projecting the imagined threats. Threats, in this context, thus become what might be done, not, given the "fog of war," what could or would be done, or the fog of bureaucracy, what might not be done. What we have here, in other words, is "worst case" interpretation. The "speech act" security thus usually generates a proportionate response , in which the imagined threat is used to manufacture real weapons and deploy real troops in arrays intended to convey certain imagined scenarios in the mind of the other state. Intersubjectivity, in this case, causes states to read in others, and to respond to, their worst fears. It is important to recognize that, to the extent we make judgments about possibilities on the basis of capabilities, without reference to actual intentions, we are trying to imagine how those capabilities might be used. These imagined scenarios are not, however, based only on some idea of how the threatening actor might behave; they are also reflections of what our intentions might be, were we in the place of that actor, constructing imagined scenarios based on what s/he would imagine our intentions might be, were they in our place. . . . and so on, ad infinitum . Where we cut into this loop, and why we cut into the loop in one place and not another, has a great deal to do with where we start in our quest to understand the notion of security, the speech act.

**A2: “Our Threats are Real”**

We’re not saying that the world isn’t dangerous – We’re saying it’s inevitably dangerous and management is counterproductive – Thinking solves best

Ashley 89 (Richard K.., Assoc. Prof. of Poli. Sci. at AZ State Univ., *International/Intertextual Relations*, eds -- Der Derian & Shapiro, pp. 312-313)

In posing these questions, one focuses upon modern statecraft as modern mancraft, the art of constructing a paradigmatic figure of sovereign man at the center of modern narratives of state and society through the representation of dangers that man will know to fear and desire to control. This figure of sovereign man becomes, not an authentic voice to be spoken by theory and in the justification of theory, but an effect whose inscription, transformations, and effectiveness in the disciplining of modern discourse is in need of a theoretical accounting. One analyzes how, amid the indeterminate transversal struggles of modern global life, paradigms of sovereign man are constituted and circulated as figures by which human beings discipline their interpretations of ambiguous local circumstances and orchestrate their knowing and exclusion of dangers. One analyzes how the inscription of ambiguous happenings under the signs of danger, including the sign of international politics, work to constitute paradigms of sovereign man. One analyzes how, amid the same transversal struggles, local movements that are uncertain of their identity, that speak in a quavering timbre, that would not project a sovereign voice of man in need of a state's violent protections, that know themselves to be neither domestic nor international, that find happiness in their historicity and know themselves to be always in process and in doubt—how such resistance movements might find in ambiguity not a source of peril but enabling opportunities to explore and disseminate new strategies of resistance to the disciplining practice of "man, the state, and war."" There will be those who say that such lines of inquiry are irresponsible— irresponsible to man. These questions put altogether too much under erasure at just the time when certainty is most required. The dangers are real, they will say, and we must not lose sight of them. We could all be dead tomorrow, and even if tomorrow is postponed for a while, we are nevertheless imprisoned by an unjust and exploitative order of domination today. What we can afford least is a diffuse questioning of limits. What we need most is a concerted will to bring dangers under control. Poststructuralists would certainly agree that the practices of modern life have brought the most serious of imaginable dangers to human beings. After all, beyond those limited "centers" of modern life where a narrative of progress still can be made to seem to contain an originary truth and a promise of certain deliverance, it is clear that dislocation, deprivation, suffering, and shortened lives are already the way in which "modernity" is experienced. But in general, the poststructuralist would hasten to add that if these perils are to be taken as seriously as they must be, the last thing that people should want to do is to stifle painstaking critical analysis—or, worse, replicate the practices that produce these dangers—by invoking the imperatives of some universal "we" whose proudly certain identity is in reality a projection of a diffuse fear of abjection. The better course, because it is likely to be the more effective course in answer to contemporary perils, is one that permits us to do a kind of work that is always, as Kristeva points out, "the work of a dissident," the work of thought*.* This is a work that becomes possible only when one cuts all ties and becomes a stranger to country, language, sex—indeed, any notion of a sovereign identity of man.85 In Foucault's words, it is a work that must begin "in the void" left by the disappearance of man as a sovereign figure, a transcendent origin of meaning. "For this void does not create a deficiency; it does not constitute a lacuna that must be filled. It is nothing more, and nothing less, than the unfolding of a space in which it is once more possible to think ”86

A2: “Our Threats are Real”

The system of knowledge production used by the aff is slanted to produce false threats

Mustapha 9 (Jennifer, Department of Political Science McMaster University

*An Analytical Survey of Critical Security Studies: Making the Case for a (Modified) Post-structuralist Approach*)

This sort of critique makes the useful observation that these types of **expert discourses “inevitably draw boundaries around themselves by celebrating certain kinds of statements while excommunicating others, which then take on the status of ‘subjugated knowledges’**” (ibid. p. 326). **Debates within the strategic studies community did occur, but they were ultimately channelled and contained so as not to challenge the larger context of the hegemonic Cold War narrative in which strategic discourse occurred**. This is similar to the point that Cohn makes regarding the “sealing off of discourse,” and **the exclusion of individuals and ideas that do not fit into the expert language of strategic studies**. **Gusterson concludes that, in line with realism’s strong ontology, many strategic theorists** at the time were presupposing the endurance of US-Soviet bipolarity to the point that they were simply unable to consider any of the scenarios where this could no longer be the case, short of mutual nuclear destruction. **These themes of critique all highlight the larger problem of theory *as* practice, i.e. of whether or not discourse on security plays a role in actually *constructing* the security environment, rather than merely describing and managing it as strategic studies claims to do**. The above interventions into strategic studies have all, in one way or other, revealed that its **discourse has constructive properties that simultaneously reinforce and re-create the presuppositions of the defense establishment**. As David Campbell asserts in *Writing Security (*1998), **state identity and perceived threats to that identity do not exist independently of the ways in which we “talk” about them**. Campbell reminds us that the “texts” of foreign policy are where threats are construed and located, and these texts are related to what he calls “the scripting of identity” (Campbell 1998, p. 31). Furthermore, this scripting of identity suggests that theory and discourse are to be understood *as* 7 Not to be confused with Wendtian Constructivism, with a capital *C*. 11 practice (ibid. p. 17). As such, understanding discourse helps us to see foreign policy (and by extension, policy related to security) as “all those practices of differentiation implicated in the confrontation between self and other, and their modes of figuration (which is often negative)” (Campbell, p. 88). **What,** then, *is* **security? If our understanding of security is a discursive construction, does that mean that there are no tangible threats to the state or to individual human life?** Is this even a fair question? **How can these tensions be reconciled with the fact that there are millions that face dangers to their corporal survival every day, be it from disease, famine, environmental catastrophe, domestic violence or war? Since we have established that orthodox strategic studies does not adequately account for these questions, it is the challenge of novel critical approaches to address them and to move forward from simply deconstructing the orthodoxy toward *re*constructing more appropriate conceptions of security. This further highlights the importance of ontology in understanding security studies.**

**A2: “Our Threats are Real”**

Even if their threats are real, the logic of the aff reduces human life to

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, June 2007, *What security makes possible: Some thoughts on critical security studies*)

Even if threats are credible and existential, I do not believe that they warrant invoking the ‘state of exception’, which has in our time been more commonly enacted in the detention and rendition of terrorism suspects, immigration detention centres and the use of arbitrary arrest and deportation powers. The ‘state of exception’ also haunts much legal innovation in counter-terrorism policy.33 And, as Agamben, Judith Butler and Arendt have argued, such approaches have their roots in processes (namely colonialism and the Holocaust) that systematically dehumanised their victims producing lives that were ‘bare’, ‘ungrievable’, ‘unliveable’ and ‘superfluous’.34 If nothing else, it ought to raise serious doubts as to how securitisation theory can be helpful in resignifying security as emancipation. It also precludes the ability to speak of human or environmental security in terms consistent with democratic political processes in a state of normalcy. The existential threat to human beings may be real enough, but it should generate a very different policy logic than outlined by the Copenhagen School. As Roxanne Lynn Doty and Karin Fierke have argued, the Copenhagen School’s conceptualisation blocks the path to human security.35 This would seem to be implicit in the way Wæver, in his 1995 article, attempts to provide security with an ontological grounding**. There he states that ‘as concepts, *neither individual nor international security exist*’: National security, that is the security of a state, is the name of an ongoing debate, a tradition, an established set of practices … there is no literature, no philosophy, no tradition of security in non-state terms ... the *concept* of security refers to the state.36** This is a powerful act of analytical closure, which is not softened by his use of an hourglass figure, with a ‘conceptual focus on state sovereignty’ at its centre, to which international and individual level ‘dynamics’ refer. As he states, ‘“security” has to be read through the lens of national security’.37 He in turn argues that it the survival of the unit as a basic political unit—the sovereign state—that is the key. Those issues with this undercutting potential must be addressed prior to all others because, if they are not, the state will cease to exist as a sovereign unit and all other questions will become irrelevant. This, then, provides us with a test point, and shows us what is lost if we ‘de-compose’ the state by individualising security … even if the challenges can operate on the different components of the state they must still pass through one focus: Do the challenges determine whether the state is to be or not to be?38 This formulation is consistent with the argument I make that security historically has taken ‘the form and promise of a metaphysical discourse: an overarching political goal and practice that guarantees existence itself, that makes the possibility of the world possible’.39 What seems especially clear in Wæver’s work is that such a space of possibility is limited to the nationstate, precluding the emergence of alternative conceptualisations of political community and existence such as cosmopolitanism or what we might call ‘non-ontologies’ of primally interconnected being, such as can be found in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and Martin Buber.40

Impact – Extinction

Security is a paradox. It tries to secure peace while creating endless war, which leads to extinction.

Dillon 96 (Michael, Routledge Publishers, Prof@Lancaster, Questia, *Politics of security: towards a political philosophy of continental thought*  p. 15) JFS

What truths about the human condition, he therefore prompted me to ask, are thought to be secreted in security? What work does securing security do for and upon us? What power-effects issue out of the regimes of truth of security? If the truth of security compels us to secure security, why, how and where is that grounding compulsion grounded? How was it that seeking security became such an insistent and relentless (inter)national preoccupation for humankind? What sort of project is the pursuit of security, and how does it relate to other modern human concerns and enterprises, such as seeking freedom and knowledge through representative-calculative thought, technology and subjectification? Above all, how are we to account—amongst all the manifest contradictions of our current (inter)national systems of security: which incarcerate rather than liberate; radically endanger rather than make safe; and engender fear rather than create assurance—for that terminal paradox of our modern (inter)national politics of security which Foucault captured so well in the quotation that heads this chapter. [5](http://www.questia.com/read/103092869) A terminal paradox which not only subverts its own predicate of security, most spectacularly by rendering the future of terrestrial existence conditional on the strategies and calculations of its hybrid regime of sovereignty and governmentality, but which also seems to furnish a new predicate of global life, a new experience in the context of which the political has to be recovered and to which it must then address itself: the globalisation of politics of security in the global extension of nihilism and technology, and the advent of the real prospect of human species extinction.

**Impact – War**

**A fear of death justifies all atrocities to secure our lives – it makes Others as enemies to be eliminated through endless war**

Odyssesos 2 (Louiza, *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27(3), Questia, no page numbers)JFS

The ontological premises of the Hobbesian account are hinged upon the occurrentness (substance or, in Heidegger's idiom, presence-at-hand) of entities, which enables Hobbes to make "ample use of it to structure his accounts of the human mind and of society." (81) The Hobbesian configuration of subjectivity links anxiety and death (in the form of the "anxious anticipation of death") to an external source, to the other, encountered as an enemy. (82) Enmity becomes omnipresent and "structural" in the context of the state of nature. The other-as-enemy is not truly other; it is not, in other words, considered as alterity because he is gathered into the fold of the same by Hobbes's account of human nature, where otherness mirrors sameness. Both reflect the quarrelsome disposition of man, his search for glory, and material security. Otherness is as knowable to the modern subject as itself: the Hobbesian theoretic construction achieves the equivalence of the Other with the Same. While the account of the primacy of conflict in the state of nature might be understood to signify some sort of initial relationality with "world" and other, upon reflection one can see that the political-theoretic intention of this primacy is precisely the opposite. It suggests the impossibility of "civil" relationality prior to regulatory government, reducing, in this way, coexistence to the sum of merely present, nonrelational, and dangerous entities. (83) In the presocial state of nature of Leviathan, the other serves to generate a suspicious and pessimistic heterology, where the fearful anticipation of death renders survival as the primary responsibility of the self, which might be called "an ethos of survival." (84) Death is to be avoided at all costs: in order to prevent violent death, understood as the self's demise, the subject rationally (that is, in recognition of its interest) agrees to a Covenant by which he gives up all his rights (except the right of self-preservation) for the safety provided by the Leviathan. There is a reiterative process of self-control and self-mastery at work here, and its theoretic result is an account of sociopolitical interaction in which "civil society ... [is considered] the result less of natural inclination than of design and planning." (85) What is equally important to note is that the subject's innate "flash of reason," through which it recognizes the need for government, is brought to the fore by the configuration of self-interest, reason, and anxiety induced by the fearful anticipation of death, resulting, as Leo Strauss has noted, in the self-interested subject rationally realizing that death is the common or real enemy. (86) Therefore, the configuration of the Hobbesian subject around security and self-control usefully results into a theory of controlled interaction.

Security otherizes and otherization is the root cause of war

Lipschutz 98 (*On Security*, Assistant Professor of Politics, Director of the Adlai Stevenson Program on Global Security, University of California, Santa Cruz Ronnie D. Lipschutz, editor Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millennium's End)

Defining oneself in such terms requires defining someone else in different terms; differentiation thus draws a boundary between the self and the Other. This Other is not, at first, necessarily a threat in terms of one's own continued existence, although ethnicity can and does become securitized. 12 But the peaceful acceptance of an Other requires that boundaries be drawn somewhere else, and that security, the speech act, specify another Other (as in, for example, South Slavs against the Hapsburgs, or Yugoslavia against the Soviet Union). There are always implicit risks in the peaceful acceptance of an Other as a legitimate ontology, because doing so raises the possibility, however remote, of accepting the Other's characteristics as a legitimate alternative and, consequently, of being taken over by the Other. Given this epistemology of threats, it does not take much to be "turned." 13 How else to account for the life and death character of the distinctions among Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia, which the untutored eye can hardly detect? 14 As James Der Derian puts it in his contribution to this volume, "The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us, not certain, not predictable." 15 The loss of an Enemy can be seen, therefore, as something of a catastrophe for an identity based on that Enemy, and it opens up a search for a new Other that can function as the new Enemy. And, make no mistake about it: While the myths underlying American identity are many, during the Cold War the strongest one had to do with not-being, and not-becoming, Communist, both individually and collectively. In a world dominated by Great Powers and balance-of-power politics, as was the case prior to World War II, losing one enemy was not a problem; there were others to be found. In the post-bipolar world, the search for enemies and new security threats is less easily solved, inasmuch as the disappearance of the only Other that counts leaves no other Others that can credibly fill its place.

**Impact – War**

Security leads to anxiety and fear which we externalize on the Other – This is the root cause of war

Odyssesos 2 (Louiza, *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27(3), Questia, no page numbers)JFS

Viewed phenomenologically, the subject's desire to secure itself against want indicates that the modern subject "wants to cover over its very being as needy, as Darbung," (95) In this vein, John Caputo suggests that "it is because factical life is disturbed by everyday concerns," because its Being is an issue for it, "that it seeks to secure itself against want"; the Hobbesian subject's will to making-secure arises from the need to "look whole not privatio ... as if it were without care, sine cura, secure--even though that very desire for security is itself a (deficient) mode of care [Sorge]." (96) Hobbesian subjectivity has a right to the world: man's natural right results in the creation of a perspective on the world as possessed and authored by the subject. This perspective denies an understanding of Dasein's Being as care (in the sense of concern and anxiousness for its being) and its ground as nothingness (in Heidegger's formulation "Being-the-basis-of-a-nullity"). The subject conceals the anxiety induce d both by being an entity thrown into a world not of its own making and by having no certain ground. It suppresses its anxiety about its Being by conceiving of the world as a state of nature, a "warre of all against all," whose structural conditions and the presence of widespread enmity lead to the externalization of anxiety about its own Being, and linking it to a fear of the other. When Heidegger's analysis of anxiety is brought to bear on the Hobbesian schema, Hobbes' schema becomes evident that it is confused, or better still, conflated with the phenomenon of fear. Anxiety, Heidegger insists, cannot be confused with the phenomenon of fear as, arguably, occurs in Leviathan. Heidegger agrees that "obviously these are kindred phenomena" and their confusion or conflation is further complicated "by the fact that for the most part they have not been distinguished from one another: that which is fear, gets designated as 'anxiety,' while that which has the character of the anxiety, gets called 'fear'." (97) While fear is an affect that corresponds to something in the world that is fearsome, and becomes more so as it approaches Dasein, what Heidegger designates as "anxiety" has no concrete worldly referent: "Anxiousness as attunement is a way of Being-in-the-world; that in the face of which we have anxiety is thrown Being-in-the-world; that which we have anxiety about is our ability to be in t he world. Thus the entire phenomenon of anxiety shows Dasein as factically existing Being-in-the-world." (98) Anxiety is generated from the general constitution of Dasein as care and as being-thrown, which cause Dasein to flee in the face of itself constituted as such. "In falling, Dasein turns away from itself. That in the face of which it thus shrinks back must, in any case, be an entity with the character of threatening; yet this entity has the same kind of Being as the one that shrinks back: it is Dasein itself." (99) It cannot, then, be fear that guides Dasein's falling, for fear is that affect that "comes from entities within-the-world." (100) The conflation of anxiety and fear in Hobbes results in the causal attribution of anxiety, which is related to Dasein's constitution as "care" (Sorge), to otherness. In seeking an external referent, fear is displaced toward the other. The encounter of the other-as-enemy and the assignment of fear to the other can be understood, then, within the framework of Dasein's inability to accept itself having no ground, as being the basis of a nullity. Othering is disclosed as an inauthentic response to Dasein's own anxious Being in an attempt to externalize the anxiety that emerges from Dasein's finitude and groundlessness and to direct it toward otherness. The heterophobia found in Hobbes's reworking of early modern subjectivity is shown to be displaced, from anxiety about Dasein's thrownness and care for its Being to the other. The assumption that the fear! anxiety is the result of the omnipresent other-as-enemy, moreover, leads to a political theory in which such fear/anxiety can be avoided through the right sort o f regulation and governance. "In the last instance," writes John Dunn, "humans' political authority is a rational response to the overwhelming motivational power of human fearfulness. It rests practically upon the systematization of the passion of fear." (101)

**Impact – War**

Security’s desire for ordering is the root cause of violence.

Neocleous 6 (Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy, Brunel Business School, *Alternatives* 31 pg. 208)

The question to ask, then, is less about how we can bring law to bear on violence than about what it is that the law permits emergency measures to accomplish.49 This rejects any supposed juxtaposition between legality and emergency and allows us to recognize instead the extent to which the concept of emergency is deeply inscribed within the law and the “normal” legal condition of the modern state. Emergency powers are permanent because they are part and parcel of the normal mode of governing. Once this is recognized then the supposed problematic of violence disappears completely. Emergency powers do not involve some kind of suspension of law while violence takes place, but are united with law for the exercise of a violence necessary for the permanent refashioning of order. Far from being a self-evident and peaceful good that might protect us from violence, the bloody and violent world around us is the product of the rule of law.50

Security mandates violence towards the Other.

Burke 2 (Anthony, School of Political Science and International Studies University of Queensland, Aporias of Security, *Alternatives* 27 pg. 6)

It is in this constitutive account of the political that we find the second aporia of security, which is opened up as an impasse within its basic conceptual structure. Sadly, this is a moral impasse that also possesses a malign functionality. This aporia occurs because despite their presumption to universality, realist structures of security have always argued that the security of the self (the individual, the nation, or the ''way of life") must be purchased at the expense of another. This was starkly laid out by the European political theorist R. N. Berki, who wrote in his Security and Society, "Seeking after security for oneself and being a cause of insecurity for others are not just closely related; they are the same thing, with no chance of either logical or existential -separation . . . when the chips are down, and to a certain degree, they are always down . . . it is my life, my freedom, my security versus the rest of the human race.\*\*17

The unthinking mantra of security prepares us to wage war on inevitable chaos.

Der Derian 98 (James, *On Security*, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Ronnie D. Lipschutz, editor)

No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted. We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." 1 From God to Rational Man, from Empire to Republic, from King to the People--and on occasion in the reverse direction as well, for history is never so linear, never so neat as we would write it--the security of the center has been the shifting site from which the forces of authority, order, and identity philosophically defined and physically kept at bay anarchy, chaos, and difference. Yet the center, as modern poets and postmodern critics tell us, no longer holds. The demise of a bipolar system, the diffusion of power into new political, national, and economic constellations, the decline of civil society and the rise of the shopping mall, the acceleration of everything --transportation, capital and information flows, change itself--have induced a new anxiety. As George Bush repeatedly said--that is, until the 1992 Presidential election went into full swing--"The enemy is unpredictability. The enemy is instability." 2 One immediate response, the unthinking reaction, is to master this anxiety and to resecure the center by remapping the peripheral threats. In this vein, the Pentagon prepares seven military scenarios for future conflict, ranging from latino small-fry to an IdentiKit super-enemy that goes by the generic acronym of REGT ("Reemergent Global Threat"). In the heartlands of America, Toyota sledge-hammering returns as a popular know-nothing distraction. And within the Washington beltway, rogue powers such as North Korea, Iraq, and Libya take on the status of pariah-state and potential video bomb-site for a permanently electioneering elite.

**Impact – War**

**Securitization uses the rhetoric of peace to justify war for our ‘safety’, anyone can be an enemy, and thus anyone can (and must) be eliminated.**

Dillon 8 (Michael, *Theory & Event*, 11(2), Prof@Lancaster U, Lethal Freedom:

Divine Violence and the Machiavellian Moment1, p. 15)JFS

What factical freedom ultimately requires to enact being factically free is thus a strategic calculus of necessary killing. But none such is available. Indeed, within the orbit of contingent time which enframes factical freedom, none such is possible; there is no law to time, time issues no law, and the signs of the times are radically undecidable. It would be profoundly mistaken, however, to think that therefore nothing can be done. Anything may be done. Anything is often done. Indeed, as it turns out, anything and everything must be done, if necessary. Such killing escalates because factical freedom is, in fact, incapable of answering the question how much killing is enough? The point, then, is that, for all the emphasis on his strategic savvy, when he kills Machiavellian man cannot know for sure what he does, does; hence the sobering reminder provided by the epigraph which heads this essay. Crossing the threshold of violence initiates independent dynamics beyond the strategic calculating and pre-cognition which Machiavellian man brings to it. What he views as instrumental, politically calibrated violence, is no such thing. It is an independent variable which shapes him more than he shapes it. Admitting as much, biographies and autobiographies of Machiavellian men often depict them as gamblers or tragic heroes; usually a mixture of both. We are now also in a position to understand two other closely related questions: why salus populi becomes the supreme law of republican freedom, and what happens to the discourse of peace when it does so. The Machiavellian moment of modern factical freedom is practically defined by the requirement to have a strategic calculus of necessary killing which will answer the question: How much killing is enough? A politics thus modelled on war, the logos of war becomes the logos of peace. How? Through the discourse of security: "to act in politics is to expose oneself to the insecurities of human power systems, to enter a world of mutability and peripeteia whose dimension is the history of political insecurity."84 Hence the full tag, salus populi suprema lex esto.85 Discourses of security are the everyday means by which the logos of peace is inscribed with the logos of war. When you hear politics and life described in terms of security, you are listening to politics and life described in terms of war. In the Machiavellian moment of modern factical freedom, peace therefore becomes the extension of war through securitisation of the everyday vivere civile of republican virtue. This sources the watch which the republic must permanently exercise on and against itself: "That a Strict Watch should be kept on the Doings of Citizens," titles Machiavelli in one of his discourses, "since under cover of Good Works there often arises the Beginning of Tyranny."86 Directed towards all actual and virtual enemies of the republic – any one and anything can be such – this impetus to instantiate and continuously re-secure the republic through approximating a form of power so great that it would work without use, and in thus prevailing without bloodshed thereby also expiate, bears down most, therefore, on the republican persona itself; individual and collective. For it is there that the Machiavelli teaches us that republican virtù is continuously won and lost. External threat may therefore aggravate and excite, or otherwise provide an outlet for, but it does not constitute the originary fear which constitutively stalks, the Machiavellian moment of modern factical freedom. That fear is sourced, instead, from the very ontopolitical conditions of evental temporality which provide factical freedom with its original warrant.87 Nothing is more corruptive of this freedom, however, in its continuous cycle of exhaustion and renewal, than the relentless surveillance and limitless violence required to reproduce and secure it. Herein, then, lies the intense aporia which also defines it.

Impact – Value to Life

Security politics, even as they predict peace, leave us vulnerable to a nihilistic disaster when confronted with chaos.

Der Derian 3 (James, Fall, Brown, research professor of international studies and professor of political science, *boundary 2*, Volume 30, Number 3 pg. 26-27)

The NSS calls for nothing less, nothing more, than a transformation of the ‘‘major institutions of American national security,’’ in which the military and the intelligence community are to lead the way (29). The various tenets of the ‘‘RMA’’—the revolution in military affairs—were fully evident in the Iraqi war, not only in the unfolding of the war plan, OPLAN 1003 VICTOR, but in the high values placed on flexibility, speed, and information. The opening decapitation strike, the info-war of ‘‘shock and awe,’’ the reliance on light ground forces and precision munitions for a ‘‘rolling start’’ all reflect Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s efforts to implement a radical transformation in how the United States fights and defends itself. Ultimately, however, real-world transformations exceed the grasp of the NSS. The war in Iraq put on full display just how effective the military could be in attaining its planned goals. But what falls outside the engineering and imaginary of the plan, what Edmund Burke called the ‘‘empire of circumstance,’’ is in the driver’s seat and beyond the cybernetic machinations of the NSS, as we see in the ‘‘peace’’ that followed. Many scholars saw the end of the Cold War as an occasion to debate the merits of a unipolar future as well as to wax nostalgic over the stability of a bipolar past. These debates continued to be state-centric as well as materialist in their interpretation of how power works. By such criteria, there was little doubt that the United States would emerge as the dominant military, economic, and, indeed, civilizational power. Even in PaulWolfowitz’s worst-case nightmares, it was difficult to identify a potential ‘‘peer competitor’’ on the horizon. But then came 9/11, and blueprints for a steady-state hegemony were shredded. Asymmetrical power and fundamentalist resentment, force multiplied by the mass media, prompted a permanent state of emergency. After the first responders came a semiotic fix with a kick, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. But from the tragedy of 9/11 to the farce of war in Iraq, after the multilateral hopes for a ‘‘safer and better world’’ were subverted by the unilateral nihilism of preventive war, the syntax of order and the code of the simulacrum began to break down. We caught a glimpse of a heteropolar matrix, in which actors radically different in identity and interests (states versus super-empowered individuals), using technologies in revolutionary ways (civilian airliners to create kamikaze weapons of mass destruction, the Internet to mobilize the largest antiwar demonstrations ever), were suddenly comparable in their capability to produce improbable global effects. It might be small solace, but out of this deeply nihilistic moment might yet come a real balance of power and truth, in which the Straussian reach of The National Security Strategy is foreshortened by a Nietzschean grasp of reality.

Impact – Value to Life

Security causes state-based brutality and a loss of value to life as sovereignty attempts to prevent all struggle and war.

Der Derian 99 (james, Brown U, research professor of international studies and professor of political science, *Angelaki: journal of the theoretical humanities* 4:2 pg. 53)

Some might invoke globalisation and the attendant death of sovereignty as the first step toward more peaceful forms of governance. I would not. I think Friedrich Nietzsche, seeing the coachman beat his horse at the Piazza Carlo Alberto, embraced the dying beast not out of madness but clairvoyance. He understood, probably better than any other philosopher, how the effects of the near-dead play on the not-yet alive. Faced by the uncertainties of life, we seek security from the dead, incurring debts that can never be repaid: Within the original tribal community ... the living generation always recognized a juridical duty toward earlier generations, and especially toward the earliest which founded the tribe. The conviction reigns that it is only through the sacrifices and accomplishments of the ancestors that the tribe exists - and that one has to pay them back with sacrifices and accomplishments: one thus recognizes a debt that constantly grows greater since these forebears never cease, in their continued existence, as powerful spirits, to accord the tribe new advantages and new strength.1 If the origins of sovereignty lie in an ancestral debt to the dead, how can we possibly surmise its end? Nietzsche neither disenchants nor flinches from the spectral effects of the state. Nietzsche links the obdurate violence of the state and the primal fear of death to a "moral prejudice" for security and sovereignty which has, literally and violently, outlived its lifetime. Nietzsche writes of the "idiosyncrasies of philosophers" who take any idea of becoming and "make a mummy" of it, hoping to find in a "gravedigger-mimicry" the certainty of being.2 Nowhere is this more in evidence than in the philosophers' conflation - and resulting moral confusion — of the "good" with certainty, predictability, and rationality, and the "evil" with fear, contingency, and the unknown.3 The "good life" becomes synonymous with the ideal of security against violence through sovereignty.4 Fear, once the spur to overcoming and life, becomes repressed and identified with death. At one time this might have been a "natural" state of affairs, but Nietzsche exhorts the modern, "Be grateful! - The greatest accomplishment of past mankind is that we no longer have to live in continual fear of wild animals, of barbarians, of gods and of our own dreams. "5 Herein lies the foundations of the modern international legal order, "thought of as sovereign and universal, not as a means in the struggle between power complexes, but as a means of preventing all struggle in general."6 In short, the sovereign state is an unnatural state. "Life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war," writes Nietzsche; but once denied and repressed, fear comes to provoke hostility and resentment in the moderns: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences..."7 Where lies the greatest certainty, the least change? Death, whose power is manifested in life as an unpayable debt to ancestors, remains the enforcer of sovereignty.8

Impact – Value to Life

The logic of security reduces life to objects making the impact to the aff impossible to articulate

Gorelick 8 (Nathan, Ph.D. student of Comparative Literature at the State University of New York at Buffalo, *Theory and Event* Vol. 11 Issue 2)

The problem with legal confrontations, though, is not simply that they continue to be side-stepped by the offending parties, but that they presuppose the legitimacy of the war on terror, a project which has become a floating signifier for neoconservative political agendas, easily attaching itself to any effort toward the advancement of Pax Americana, the geopolitical hegemony of a militarized, neoliberal United States. The most disturbing and violent of state secrets remain tenable, necessary war-fighting tactics precisely because they are secret, and they will not be revealed through any strategy of confrontation or representation that acquiesces to the ground rules for political participation laid out by the state. Any such strategy grants legitimacy to the violent state apparatus of which torture is only a small part, and strengthens the humanitarian legitimacy of neoimperialism. Prior to the publication of his report to the Council of Europe, Marty demonstrated the truth of this contention when he explained the "moral obligation" to reveal any illegal detention or interrogation activities: "We do not want to weaken the fight against terrorism... but this fight has to be fought by legal means. Wrongdoing only gives ammunition to the terrorists and their sympathizers."31 Here, Marty is clearly not criticizing the larger project underpinning the war on terror; rather the specific tactics through which this project attempts to actualize itself are considered in need of adjustment, so that the moral authority of American expansionism may be preserved. But if torture operates as a metaphor for brutal, authoritarian statism, this is so because it speaks to an entire epistemology of security wherein the life of the individual is only valuable insofar as it maintains some utility for the biopolitical population of which it is a part. The population, increasingly in need of protection from the disorderly world of threats, is harnessed in opposition to its dangerous others. This is particularly true for the war on terror; as Giorgio Agamben warned immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, "A state which has security as its only task and source of legitimacy is a fragile organism; it can always be provoked by terrorism to turn itself terroristic."32 Aimé Césaire noted this phenomenon in his articulation of the full brutality of colonialism, and in his equation, "colonization = thingification"; as extraordinary rendition demonstrates, the total securitization of everyday life, like colonization, conceptually transforms people into objects through (and against) which to define state authority.33 This radical objectification manifests as "force, brutality, cruelty, sadism... forced labor, intimidation, pressure... contempt, mistrust, arrogance, self-complacency, swinishness, brainless elites, degraded masses."34 Yet, as Césaire demonstrates, this "thingification" of life is not an accidental byproduct of European liberal humanism. Instead, the worst forms of violence are, in a very real sense, necessitated by the Enlightenment and the western metaphysical tradition of which it is a product. In Césaire's words, "through the mouths of the Sarrauts and the Bardes, the Mullers and the Renans, through the mouths of all those who considered -- and consider -- it lawful to apply to non-European peoples 'a kind of expropriation for public purposes' for the benefit of nations that were stronger and better equipped, it was already Hitler speaking!"35 Moreover, as Césaire and many other colonial and post-colonial thinkers suggest, the cultivation of the fundamental unit of political and moral account -- the sovereign subject -necessitates an other against which to define legitimate subjectivity. The other is constituted in opposition to everything that the sovereign, rational, autonomous self supposedly is not. The irrational other, thus devalued, can be abused, erased or exterminated with impunity. Extraordinary rendition contains all of these relations of domination -- the rational, calculating subject, in the interests of "national security" and under the auspices of a benevolent liberal humanism, attempts to forcibly extract information from the "subject supposed to know," but only by proxy; accountability for terror and for torture are thus excised from the state's own behavior. All of this, of course, takes place in the shadows of state secrecy. "This is info-war," notes Paul Gilroy, "and these terrorists will not be given the platform of a public trial. Their dubious struggle will not be sustained by the oxygen of publicity.'"36 So, what is at stake in the struggle to render visible the dark chambers of extraordinary rendition is not simply the legality or illegality of this particular practice; rather, this struggle is an attempt to disrupt the exclusive authority over the powers and limits of representation currently enjoyed by the agents of the war on terror, and by history's victors, the champions of the Enlightenment, in whose shadow this war is now being fought. If the violence contained within the dark chamber, as Coetzee suggests, is a metaphor "for relations between authoritarianism and its victims," then it ought to also stand as a metaphor for the dark, terrifying failure of the Enlightenment, for the violence which inevitably results from the grand project of world ordering that will never be rid of its disordered and dangerous others, despite increasingly paranoid and frenetic attempts to totally rigidify and control all things Other. Maurice Blanchot calls this failure the night, the other night, the void from which the light of the will to knowledge desperately attempts to escape. This other night is not a recognizable object; it is not the totalitarian communist or the uncontrollable terrorist -- the Manichean double, or dialectical antithesis, of liberal democracy -- who reacts to the violence of empire with empire's own obscene methods. Rather, it is the 'no-thing' of Being, the absence at the center of rationality, the irrationality and disorder against which knowledge and order are opposed and which their systems nevertheless and necessarily contain; it is the unknowable, unintelligible pebble of darkness which cannot be lighted by the force of reason; "it is what one never joins; it is repetition that will not leave off, satiety that has nothing, the sparkle of something baseless and without depth."37 It is the interminable insecurity at the heart of every systematic securitization. The United States' recent efforts -- following European colonialism's lead -- to constitute the globe as an impenetrable burrow, impervious to the other night and its "always more threatening threat," are ultimately efforts to hem liberal democracy into a coffin with this threat; security against the untamed outside, radical intimacy, draws the terror ever closer.38

Impact – Value to Life

Security is a fear that makes life not worth living – The alternative is crucial to avoid nihilism.

Der Derian 98 (James, *On Security*, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Ronnie D. Lipschutz, editor)

The ancestors of the most powerful tribes are bound eventually to grow to monstrous dimensions through the imagination of growing fear and to recede into the darkness of the divinely uncanny and unimaginable: in the end the ancestor must necessarily be transfigured into a god . 43 As the ancestor's debt becomes embedded in institutions, the community takes on the role of creditor. Nietzsche mocks this originary, Hobbesian moment: to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling One lives in a community, one enjoys the advantages of communality (oh what advantages! we sometimes underrate them today), one dwells protected, cared for, in peace and trustfulness, without fear of certain injuries and hostile acts to which the man outside , the "man without peace," is exposed . . . since one has bound and pledged oneself to the community precisely with a view to injury and hostile acts. 44 The establishment of the community is dependent upon, indeed it feeds upon, this fear of being left outside. As the castle wall is replaced by written treaty, however, and distant gods by temporal sovereigns, the martial skills and spiritual virtues of the noble warrior are slowly debased and dissimulated. The subject of the individual will to power becomes the object of a collective resentment. The result? The fear of the external other is transvalued into the "love of the neighbor" quoted in the opening of this section, and the perpetuation of community is assured through the internalization and legitimation of a fear that lost its original source long ago. This powerful nexus of fear, of external and internal otherness, generates the values which uphold the security imperative. Indeed, Nietzsche locates the genealogy of even individual rights, such as freedom, in the calculus of maintaining security: - My rights - are that part of my power which others not merely conceded me, but which they wish me to preserve. How do these others arrive at that? First: through their prudence and fear and caution: whether in that they expect something similar from us in return (protection of their rights); or in that they consider that a struggle with us would be perilous or to no purpose; or in that they see in any diminution of our force a disadvantage to themselves, since we would then be unsuited to forming an alliance with them in opposition to a hostile third power. Then : by donation and cession. 45 The point of Nietzsche's critical genealogy is to show that the perilous conditions that created the security imperative--and the western metaphysics that perpetuate it--have diminished if not disappeared; yet, the fear of life persists: "Our century denies this perilousness, and does so with a good conscience: and yet it continues to drag along with it the old habits of Christian security, Christian enjoyment, recreation and evaluation." 46 Nietzsche's worry is that the collective reaction against older, more primal fears has created an even worse danger: the tyranny of the herd, the lowering of man, the apathy of the last man which controls through conformity and rules through passivity. The security of the sovereign, rational self and state comes at the cost of ambiguity, uncertainty, paradox--all that makes a free life worthwhile. Nietzsche's lament for this lost life is captured at the end of Daybreak in a series of rhetorical questions: Of future virtues--How comes it that the more comprehensible the world has grown the more solemnities of every kind have decreased? Is it that fear was so much the basic element of that reverence which overcame us in the presence of everything unknown and mysterious and taught us to fall down before the incomprehensible and plead for mercy? And has the world not lost some of its charm for us because we have grown less fearful? With the diminution of our fearfulness has our own dignity and solemnity, our own fearsomeness , not also diminished? 47 It is of course in Nietzsche's lament, in his deepest pessimism for the last man, that one finds the celebration of the overman as both symptom and harbinger of a more free-spirited yet fearsome age. Dismissive of utopian engineering, Nietzsche never suggests how he would restructure society; he looks forward only so far as to sight the emergence of "new philosophers" (such as himself?) who would restore a reverence for fear and reevaluate the security imperative. Nietzsche does, however, go back to a pre-Christian, pre-Socratic era to find the exemplars for a new kind of security. In The Genealogy of Morals , he holds up Pericles as an example, for lauding the Athenians for their "rhathymia "--a term that incorporates the notion of "indifference to and contempt for security." 48 It is perhaps too much to expect Nietzsche's message to resonate in late modern times, to expect, at the very time when conditions seem most uncertain and unpredictable, that people would treat fear as a stimulus for improvement rather than cause for retrenchment. Yet Nietzsche would clearly see these as opportune times, when fear could be willfully asserted as a force for the affirmation of difference, rather than canalized into a cautious identity constructed from the calculation of risks and benefits.

Impact – Value to Life

Security turns life to its bare essentials, making it not worth living.

Dillon 3 (Michael, *Millenium Journal of International Studies*, Prof@Lancaster, pp. 533-534)JFS

Biologisation of life means life considered as a function, one comprising in addition a genealogy of its development and consideration of its co-evolution with its environment and other life forms. Biologisation also entails the reduction of life to its bare, so- called ‘biological’ essentials, survival paramount among them.Such bare essentials are then employed to provide foundational of accounts of life’s social and political ordering. In short, the biologisation of life supplies an onto-political resource for the techno-bio-logical ordering of life according to principles of development and formation said to govern its existence. These are ultimately elaborated through changing problematisations of security that seek to specify the conditions of possibility, conditions of operability and needs hierarchies that govern biologised life’s means of subsistence and survival. What Agamben fails to elaborate in detail however, is the specific correlation that exists between security and the biologisation of life. This correlation seems to operate in a bilateral way. Ostensibly, life, in the form of what Agamben calls ‘bare life’, is the foundational referent for modernity’s politics of security. One might thus say that security, together with its technologising strategisation of life, has a fundamental affinity with the life sciences because it is itself, in effect, a kind of life science. However it is done, security has to know life if it is to realise its mission to secure life. Life that remains not knowable, unknown or intractable to knowing for whatever reason — it might be a form of life that simply does not show up on the radars of knowing in acceptable ways, or, as an excess of being over-apprehension, it may simply not be knowable in principle — is the ultimate danger; that ‘uncertainty’ said, for example, to be the enemy that replaced the Soviet Union with the dissolution of the Cold War and whose manifestation now takes many other forms in the War on Terror. But, of course, the correlation works the other way as well. To fulfil its mission of securing life, politics of security have to reduce life to what is securable, namely bare life. Any politics of security must therefore have as its correlate an account of securable bare life. Biologisation is one means of reducing life to the kind of life, bare life, amenable to constant securitisation. Under the regimes of digitalisation and molecularisation it does so further by reducing bare life to informational code. Life defined as survival is thus always and necessarily central to the biologisation of life and thereby also to its politics of security. What life itself consists in, what its bare minimum subsistence and value requirements might be said to be, thereby become the scientific preoccupation of different problematisations of security, from military strategic security to critical security, social security and human security projects. These projects do not however simply represent the attributes said to constitute life, as if these pre-existed the power or knowledge by which they are specified, they must directly supply them. Biologised life is similarly also always developmental or evolutionary life; a life that evolves. In the process then, securing survival has increasingly also come to be glossed in terms of fitness.In the digitalised information age while becomes defined in informational exchange or genetic coding terms. A biologisation of life-as-survival necessarily also bequeaths us an account of the political subject as ‘survivor’, and of modes of political valuation therefore dependent upon metrics of survivability. This seems so self-evident as to be indisputable. But the logic of security elaborated above reminds us never to forget the peculiar retroactive operation of every politics of security — that any politics of security must have, as its first principle, the production of the very bare life over whose securing it claims supreme competence. The following reflection on the impact of digitalisation and molecularisation on security processes derives from these critical insights and focuses on the ways in which appeal is made to the confluence of digitalisation and molecularisation to invoke an onto-politics of code in which security increasingly goes bio-centric, becomes re-problematised biophilosophically and novel epistemological challenges are set for it in terms of how to specify and realise fitness and resilience. Confluence of the molecular and the digital means the many ways in which these sciences come together in terms especially of the promotion of an ontology of code. It is not meant to suggest that the two fields of endeavour are isomorphic. While they do share a great deal, and their histories have criss-crossed,8 molecularisation of biology and digitalisation of information and communication are nonetheless also distinct enterprises constituted by their own internal debates, controversies and trajectories of development.

Impact – Biopower

The search for a perfectly secure state leads to biopower, causing genocide and devastating wars.

**Duffield** 4 (Mark, Jan. 19 2004, Ptix + Int. Stud’s @ U of Lancaster, UK, *Danish Institute for International Studies,* Working Paper, p. 6)

Race and its modern codings underpin the division between valid and invalid life and legitim- ates the measures deemed necessary to secure the former against the later. In this sense, bio- politics is intrinsically connected with the security of populations, including global ones. This duality moreover underlies the paradox of bio-politics: as states have assumed responsibility for maintaining and developing life, wars have become increasingly more encompassing, devastating and genocidal for the populations concerned. Although the ending of the Cold War raised hopes of a ‘peace dividend’, the diagrammatic form of bio- power was to be re-inscribed in the ‘new wars’ of the 1990s and confirmed with the declara- tion of war on terrorism. As well as departing from a realist conception of power, the idea of global governance as a design of bio-power also breaks with the conventional view of what global governance is. That is, as an essentially benign undertaking involving state and non-state actors in a collective pursuit of global security, an open and inclusive economic system, effective legal and political instutions, global welfare and development, and a shared commitment to conflict resolution (Biscop 2004). From this perspective, security threats are usually seen as emerging independ- ently of global governance and, indeed, despite its best intentions. Global governance as a design of bio-power, however, rather than responding ‘out of the blue’ to external threats, directly fabricates its own security environment. In distinguishing between valid and invalid global life, it creates its own ‘other’ – with all its specific deviancies, singular threats and instances of mal- development – to which it then responds and tries to change. Consequently, it also shapes the terrain over which the bio-political logic of living through killing must operate.

Impact – Oppression

Securitization and strategization leads to oppressive power relations.

Dillon 3 (Michael, *Millenium Journal of International Studies*, Prof@Lancaster, pp. 551-552)JFS

As subjects are always subjects of power relations, digitalisation also installs new forms of subjectivity operating according to different principles of formation. Not those of the will, or those of interpellation posited by Adorno, but those expressed in network system terms, of fitness adaptability and the capacity to re-engender or re-engineer themselves informationally, co-evolving with and in response to changing fitness landscapes of inter-systemic behaviour. This leads some strategic thinkers to talk of the dynamics of military bodies in terms of swarms and swarming.50To be released from sovereign control is thus only an emancipation of sorts. To be engendered by, rather than simply enmeshed in, digitalised systems of informationally driven cybernetic control is another matter. Rather than simply being released from sovereign command, subjects remain subjects. But they become different kinds of subjects because they are subjects of different digitally ordered fields of power relations. The issues then become those of the productive, dynamic, epistemic and onto-political character of these digitalized power relations, their turbulent confluence with the old ones, and the changing moral as well as political cartographies that this poses to the study and practice of politics and (inter)national relations.The virtualisation of security in the age of digitalisation is therefore very much an onto-political as it is a military-technical development. Similarly it is very much a transformation in orders of power relations, introducing different orders of subjectivity rather than a mere digital empowerment of subjects, or release from sovereign forms of control. Here, then, one has also to underline how digitalisation and virtualisation effect a further dimension to the intersection between the geo- and the bio- political. There is no contesting, for example, how much the information and communications revolution enabled by digitalisation and virtualisation has increased and extended the geo-strategic power of the United States. There is no contesting, either, the extent to which other state actors seek to empower themselves militarily and economically through digitalisation. Precisely because digitalisation and virtualisation also take bodies and populations as their terrain of operation and cast these in radically informational terms, stitched into many complex informational systems of exchange, however, they simultaneously also extend the range and intensiveness of biopower as well.

Impact – No Solvency

Security generates insecurity – It mobilizes populations through fear

Burke 2 (Anthony, School of Political Science and International Studies University of Queensland, Aporias of Security, *Alternatives* 27 pg. 20-21)

This opens up significant questions about, the structure and operation of security as a concept: however much they disavow it, Derrida reminds us that all such metaphysical ideals exist in a relation of dependence to a subordinated term they claim to supersede or expel. Security is no different. While betraying pretensions to absolute self-presence, security only ever exists in relation to "insecurity": it thus operates according to the Hegelian economy that incorporates this dichotomy into a "dialectical" movement that poses the second term as the anathema of the first, which becomes an ideal state, or goal, toward which one aspires in a movement away from the second. Security then becomes a powerful signifier of an ideal political, economic, and cultural order, opposed to "others" designated as inferior or threatening. Yet its promise breaks down when we consider that, because "security" is bound into a dependent relation with "insecurity," it can never escape it: it must continue to produce images of "insecurity" in order to retain meaning. Deployed into a political technology that activates the exchange between the "individual" and the "total," this economy has two potent effects. At the level of the individual, it forms a powerful mechanism of subjectivity in which images of fear and insecurity (at either a personal, societal, or geopolitical level—often all at once) can be used to manipulate individuals and populations. As Michael Dillon suggests, "Don't ask what a people is . . . ask how an order of fear forms a people." Such images portray the state as patriarchal and protective, provoking feelings of allegiance, safety, and submission: activating the exchange between public and private, they tend to feminize the citizenry while reserving full masculine participation in the defense of the state for men. The argument that women are unsuitable for combat has served both to legitimate the exclusion of women from public life and to make men's participation in war the vehicle of a more "total" enactment of subjectivity. Moira Galens believes that this derives from the condition (dating from the Greeks or even "the original covenant between God and Abraham") for full admission to the\* political body being that one can make the appropriate forfeit. For Abraham, it was the "corporeal sacrifice" of his foreskin; for modern men it has too often been life in battle.

Impact – Militarism - Extinction

Attempts at militaristic solutions cause ever greater danger and suffering, eventually leading to the annihilation of humankind.

**Mészáros 3** (István, June 2003, Phil. @ U of Sussex, *Monthly Review* Volume 55, Number 2)

It is not for the first time in history that militarism weighs on the consciousness of the people as a nightmare. To go into detail would take far too long. However, here it should be enough to go back in history only as far as the nineteenth century when militarism, as a major instrument of policy making, came into its own, with the unfolding of modern imperialism on a global scale, in contrast to its earlier—much more limited—varieties. By the last third of the nineteenth century the British and French Empires were not the only prominent rulers of vast territories. The United States, too, made its heavy imprint by directly or indirectly taking over the former colonies of the Spanish Empire in Latin America, adding to them the bloody repression of a great liberation struggle in the Philippines and installing themselves as rulers in that area in a way which still persists in one form or another. Nor should we forget the calamities caused by “Iron Chancellor” Bismarck’s imperialist ambitions and their aggravated pursuit later on by his successors, resulting in the eruption of the First World War and its deeply antagonistic aftermath, bringing with it Hitler’s Nazi revanchism and thereby very clearly foreshadowing the Second World War itself. The dangers and immense suffering caused by all attempts at solving deep-seated social problems by militaristic interventions, on any scale, are obvious enough. If, however, we look more closely at the historical trend of militaristic adventures, it becomes frighteningly clear that they show an ever greater intensification and an ever-increasing scale, from local confrontations to two horrendous world wars in the twentieth century, and to the potential annihilation of humankind when we reach our own time. We are, thus, concerned with a set of interdeterminations which must be viewed as parts of an organic system. If we want to fight war as a mechanism of global government, as we must, in order to safeguard our very existence, then we have to situate the historical changes that have taken place in the last few decades in their proper causal framework. The design of one overpowering national state controlling all of the others, following the imperatives emanating from capital’s logic, can only lead to humanity’s suicide. At the same time it must be also recognized that the seemingly insoluble contradiction between national aspirations—exploding from time to time in devastating antagonisms—and internationalism can only be resolved if regulated on a fully equitable basis, which is totally inconceivable in capital’s hierarchically structured order. In conclusion, therefore, in order to envisage a historically viable answer to the challenges posed by the present phase of global hegemonic imperialism, we must counter the systemic necessity of capital for globally subjugating labor through whichever particular social agency can assume the role assigned to it under the circumstances. Naturally, this is feasible only through a radically different alternative to capital’s drive to monopolistic/imperialist globalization, in the spirit of the socialist project, embodied in a progressively unfolding mass movement. For only when it becomes an irreversible reality that “patria es humanidad,” to say it with JosE9 Marti’s beautiful words, only then can the destructive contradiction between material development and humanly rewarding political relations be permanently consigned to the past. For the weapons already available for waging the war or wars of the twenty first century are capable of exterminating not only the adversary but the whole of humanity, for the first time ever in history. Nor should we have the illusion that the existing weaponry marks the very end of the road. Others, even more instantly lethal ones, might appear tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. Moreover, threatening the use of such weapons is by now considered an acceptable state strategic device. Thus, put reasons one and two together, and the conclusion is inescapable: envisaging war as the mechanism of global government in today’s world underlines that we find ourselves at the precipice of absolute irrationality from which there can be no return if we accept the ongoing course of development.

Impact - Militarism – War

Militarism justifies endless war and violence

Kohn 9 (History@UNC-CH, Jan 9,  *Journal of Military History Vol 73 #1,* pg. 190-192, ET)

American politics from the late 1940s through the 1980s were shaped as much by the Cold War as any other single factor. Fears of internal subversion roiled the 1940s; antinuclear protest and antiwar demonstrations recurred in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. For the first time on a continuing basis, military preparedness and spending, weapons systems, and the shape and character of the military establishment periodically intruded into partisan politics and may have decided some elections. All sorts of domestic needs, from superhighways to the reform of education and even racial integration were justified by the overwhelming need to combat the communist menace. That threat filled the nation's newspapers, magazines, and airwaves early in the Cold War. The drumbeat continued in less obvious and more popular forums into the 1970s and 1980s. Many aspects of life in the United States came to be measured against the ability of Americans to compete [End Page 190] with communism: the divorce rate, race relations, worker productivity, the moral fiber of American youth, even the viability of the American family itself.45 Popular culture reflected and reinforced images of the United States at war. World War II created the genre of the combat film and following "something of a postwar lull," films of this kind "poured out of the major studios in 1949" to be supplemented with documentaries and then television series.46 Science fiction films in the 1950s expressed "both the deepest fear (the nuclear is everywhere, inescapable) and reassuring comfort (the nuclear is a recognizable fear in the form of such things as giant insects, uncanny doubles, and aliens from outer space)."47 Comic books provided reassurance to youth that the bomb aided American defense and that the "red menace" could be defeated.48 When civil defense and bomb shelters burst into national consciousness, schoolchildren practiced hiding under desks in case of atomic attack. Hundreds of movies, according to the leading historian of war films, "created the image of combat as exciting, as a place to prove masculinity, as a place to challenge death in a socially acceptable manner with the "result, until the late 1960s, of " portraying "the image of the American military as all-conquering, all-powerful, always right" and thus helping to "justify war and the use of violence to achieve national goals."49 John Wayne became not only the "symbolic, mythical American hero," "an American legend" whose "military image" came "to pervade American society and culture," but in many respects he came to represent the ideal American male and "a powerful influence on the nation's youth"—and by the 1970s, "Hollywood's all-time leading star."50 War infected language, not only as a metaphor for efforts to ameliorate major social problems but also in the everyday idioms of social life, from sport to business. The United States declared war on cancer, crime, drugs, and poverty; military terms became part of the common vocabulary; methods of military organization, planning, management, and operations influenced organizational behavior in business [End Page 191] and elsewhere.51 Even popular taste in sport reflected the pervasiveness of war and the military in American life, as football, with its violence, hierarchy, specialization, and similarity to battle rose in the 1960s to displace baseball as the most popular national team sport.52 To be sure, many factors prevented the United States from ever developing a command economy or anything approaching a garrison state.53 But there is little doubt that the vast expansion of the military and its spreading influence across society during and after World War II militarized many aspects of American life. "For better or worse, we now are all quasi-civilians in a quasi-military, quasi-civilian, society," concluded a former Pentagon official in 1971, one of the most balanced analysts of the impact of the military establishment. Another scholar offered a harsher assessment: "Once military spending began to escalate rapidly, . . . the nation simply lacked the policies, the institutional structures, the traditions, and the experience for controlling its war machine. The voice of the armed services would grow," concluded Paul Koistinen, "the military's influence would become pervasive throughout society, and various industries, whole communities, and entire regions would become economically dependent upon military spending for their prosperity, even their existence. Once that occurred, America would become a warfare state."55

Impact - Militarism – War

Militarism leads to peace time arms, greatly increasing probability of war.

Kohn 9 ( History@UNC-CH, Jan 9,  *Journal of Military History Vol 73 #1,* pg. 193-195, ET)

Without national discussion, the American people agreed to maintain a large military establishment so as to remain the dominant military power on the planet. In a now-famous draft of the Defense Policy Guidance in early 1992, Under-secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz suggested indirectly that the United States should strive for military capability superior to any other nation in the world and a leadership position of dominance beyond any competitor. While disavowed by the first Bush Administration, the policy nevertheless undergirded the spending and force structure throughout the decade.60 At the end of the 1990s, before the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, U.S. defense expenditures surpassed those of the next ten countries combined, seven of which were American allies, and the most thorough review of American national security in a generation concluded that the "United States will remain the principal military power in the world . . . both absolutely and relatively stronger than any other state or combination of states."61 American bases continued to ring the globe.62 The military was larger—and defense outlays three times the percentage of gross domestic product—than at any other peacetime period in American history. Rather than being demobilized or restructured as after prior American wars, the military was reduced in size but left essentially intact in its Cold War configuration.63 While foreign policy in the Clinton Administration in the 1990s focused upon economic relationships with the rest of the world, an increasing portion of diplomacy and bilateral relationships, particularly in the Pacific and the Middle East, were absorbed by the military, specifically by the regional commanders responsible for defense planning and security relationships around the world. Military-to-military exchanges, personal contacts, cooperative training missions, and joint and combined exercises increased so dramatically that on some of the most important political and alliance issues, the military displaced other government agencies as the chief tool of American foreign relations.64 The United States began to use the military much more frequently: to intervene in places and in ways heretofore avoided, for humanitarian as well as political and economic reasons; and to assert American primacy or warn or retaliate against enemies, seemingly because the instrument was available and effective at least in the short term, and because no rival existed to induce hesitation.65 "Look, many in the Russian leadership resent the United States," a Russian foreign policy expert told an American reporter in Moscow in the fall of 2003, explaining why Russia had not opposed the American invasion of Iraq more strenuously. However, "they have decided that it is better to adapt to American power . . . because the Middle East, Pakistan, and Iran—it can all go up in flames, in revolutions and wars . . . the United States is the only steamboat we can hitch ourselves to and go in the direction of modernity."

Militarism leads to such fear of opposition, even internally, that war becomes inevitable.

Kohn 9 ( History@UNC-CH, Jan 9,  *Journal of Military History Vol 73 #1,* pg. 196- 197, ET)

A Global War on Terrorism that may last a generation or more promises to continue and even intensify militarization. Such a war even poses the possibility of militarism—the domination of war values and frameworks in American thinking, public policy, institutions, and society to the point of dominating rather than influencing or simply shaping American foreign relations and domestic life. Today American foreign policy relies overwhelmingly on the military because it is so powerful and so effective—and so available. Immediately after the September 2001 attacks, the Bush Administration suggested that the struggle against terrorism would not be a traditional war. "We will direct every resource at our command—every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war—to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network," the President told Congress and the American people. "This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. . . . Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen."73 Foreign policy shifted dramatically to prosecuting this [End Page 196] struggle. Cooperation among national police and intelligence agencies to identify terrorist cells and abort their plans and arrest their members increased. So also did efforts to dry up their sources of money as well as prevent or disrupt their transfer of funds. But very quickly the military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq came to dominate American foreign policy in the minds of the American public and people around the world. The face of the United States overseas become war's stark simplicity: "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists," as the President put it in September 2001

**Impact – Korea Specific – Root Cause**

Enemy construction is the root cause of the Korean conflict

Bleiker 4 (Roland , Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, Brisbane, a former Swiss diplomat, *Asian Perspective*, Vol 28, No. 2, 2004 pp. 35-63)

Tensions over antagonistic and incompatible identity patterns tend to be either minimized or downright ignored in Korea, and not only by experts in security policy. Roy Richard Grinker refers to the prevalence of a “master narrative of homogeneity”: the belief that the division of the peninsula was imposed from the outside and that unification would immediately recover the lost national unity.7 Such a quest for national cohesion is understandable, both emotionally and historically. Many commentators draw attention to the remarkable degree of cultural homogeneity in Korea. They argue, for instance, that “the common language, culture, and history of the two Koreas, along with growing re-acquaintance and familiarity, are likely to predominate over the fifty-year interlude of separation.”8 They point out that “despite the bitterness between North Korea and South Korea, nothing can obscure the fact that they still have much to unite them—a shared past, a shared culture and a shared identity as Koreans.”9 Some even go as far as to present existing identity differences as “trivial compared to the amount and depth of the homogeneity accumulated for 1,000 years in the past.”10 The common aspects of Korean culture will undoubtedly prevail in the long run. The Sunshine policy, initiated in 1998 by President Kim Dae Jung, amply demonstrated that there is potential for cooperation and tolerance even in the context of a deep-seated conflict. Hope is thus very justified, not least because many features of the Sunshine policy, such as informal contacts between North and South, continued even at the height of the nuclear crisis since 2002. But major problems will persist if differences that have emerged over the last fifty years continue to be downplayed or ignored in academic and public discourses. Deeply entrenched antagonistic identity constructs cannot be changed overnight. They have penetrated virtually all aspects of life. They have long passed the stage of being mere ideology and propaganda. Categorizing people into friends and foes is a type of pathological illness that persists even if external images and circumstances change.11 This is why security dilemmas in Korea must be seen not only in conventional ideological terms, but also as a struggle over competing forms of identity. Indeed, recognizing the often neglected role of identity is perhaps one of the most important challenges today. It contains both the key to understanding the persistently recurring patterns of conflict and the potential to replace them with a more adequate and peaceful security arrangement.

**Impact – Korea Specific – Root Cause**

Neg reps cause tension and conflict in Korea.

Bleiker 4 (Roland , Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, Brisbane, a former Swiss diplomat, *Asian Perspective*, Vol 28, No. 2, 2004 pp. 35-63)

A criminology expert thus stresses that “if one instigates students to hatred towards the political enemy, one should not be surprised if such threat-images are then transposed to everything and everyone who is different.”61 Maaz speaks of a *Gefühlsstau*, of an “emotional blockage” that built up during years of experiences in an authoritarian education system that forbade feelings and preached discipline. A significant number of people then released this accumulated tension through aggressive behavior toward people in weak societal positions, especially if the latter looked and thought differently.62 The potential for violence contained in antagonistic identity constructs is far more dangerous in Korea than in Germany. The ensuing volatility can affect behavior at all levels of activity, from individuals to states. Paik Nak-chung, a prominent Korean public intellectual, warns precisely against these dangers.63 Two main reasons stand out. First, with the exception of occasional skirmishes and incidents related to the crossing of the “Iron Curtain,” inter-German relations were characterized by psychological cold-war tension rather than direct military confrontation. When incidents occurred, they were small-scale and isolated. They never led to either a general mobilization of the armed forces or to a direct and open conflict between the two opposing states. In the absence of such a conflict, antagonisms never spread far beyond the tensions and problems created by the competition of two incompatible ideological and social systems. The two Germanys never approached the levels of antagonism, mutual hatred, distrust, and ideological indoctrination that characterizes domestic politics and regime interaction in divided Korea, where the memory of the three-year war still dominates the political environment. Second, even during the height of the cold war, the Iron Curtain in Germany was never nearly as tight as the dividing line along the 38th parallel. Radio Free Europe successfully infiltrated Eastern Europe and most East Germans regularly watched West German television programs. Ever since Ostpolitik replaced the Hallstein doctrine in the 1970s, mail exchange between East Germany and the outside world was permitted and outside newspapers and magazines were relatively easily available. From 1970 to the early 1980s, between 1.1 and 1.6 million East Germans visited the West each year, while the number of West Germans traveling in the opposite direction ranged between 1.2 and 3.1 million. In 1987 alone three million East Germans visited the West.6 4 Contrast these two decades of détente with the situation in Korea, where there is virtually no exchange of mail, communication, and people between North and South. Both respective states continue to control virtually all aspects of intra-national relations, and thus also the ability to promote and diffuse antagonistic identity constructs.

Ontology Precedes Epistemology

**Ontology logically precedes other approaches to the world – it is the basis for those other approaches…**

**Tillich 60** (Paul, Harvard Divinity School, *Love, Power, Justice: Ontological Analysis and Ethical Applications*, p.18-19)

**Ontology does not try to describe the nature of beings**, either in their universal, generic qualities, or in their individual, historical manifestations. **It does not ask about stars and plants,** animals and men, **It does not ask about events** and those who act within these events. **This is the task of scientific analysis and historical description. But ontology asks the simple** and infinitely difficult **question: What does it mean to be?** What are the structures, common to everything that is, to everything that participates in being? **One cannot avoid this question** by denying that there are such common structures. **One cannot deny that being** in one **and that the qualities and elements of being constitute a texture of connected and conflicting forces.** **This texture** is one, in so far as it is and **gives the power of being to each of its qualities and elements**. It is one but it is neither a dead identity nor a repetitions sameness. It is one in the manifoldness of its texture. **Ontology is the attempt to describe this texture, to reveal its hidden nature** through the word which belong to being and in which being comes to itself. Yet let us not make a mistake: **ontology does not describe the infinite variety of beings, living and dead, subhuman and human. Ontology characterizes the texture of being itself**, which is effective in everything that is, in all beings, living and dead, subhuman and human. **Ontology precedes every other cognitive approach to reality. It precedes all sciences**, not always historically, but always **in logical dignity and basic analysis. One does not need to look** back **at past centuries** of far-removed parts of the world **to discover** the primacy of **the ontological question**. **The best method for discovering it to-day is a careful analysis of the writings of leading anti-ontological philosophers** or of anti-philosophical scientists and historians. One will easily discover that on almost every page of the writings of these men a certain number of basic ontological concepts are used, but surreptitiously and therefore often wrongly. **One cannot escape ontology if one wants to know!** For knowing means recognizing something as being. And **being is an infinitely involved texture, to be described by the never-ending task of ontology**.

Ontological analysis is prior to epistemology, because epistemology was shaped by ontology.

Hay 7 (Colin, UofBirmingham, *Politics* 27(2), Political Studies Association, p. 117)JFS

First, I think it is unfair to suggest that I assert the directional dependence and primacy of ontology over epistemology. Although I undoubtedly commit myself to such a position, this is a choice I justify. Note also that Bates and Jenkins neither challenge the claim itself nor the case I present to defend it. My argument, such as it is, is that no ontologically neutral epistemological claim can be made. In other words, to commit oneself to an epistemology is also to commit oneself to a position on a range of ontological issues. Moreover, as I define these terms, ontological claims logically precede epistemological claims. If, as I suggest, ontology ‘relates to the nature of the social and political world’ and epistemology ‘to what we can know about it’, then ontology is logically prior in the sense that the ‘it’ in the second term (the definition of epistemology) is, and can only be, specified by the first (the definition of ontology). This, I contend, is a point of logic, not of meta-theory.

Ontology Precedes Ethics

Ontology precedes ethics, we must know who the other is before we help them.

Nordgren 1 (Anders, Philosophy and Medicine, Kluwer Academic Publishers, *Responsible Genetics: The Moral Responsibility of Geneticists for the Consequences of Human Genetics Research,* Google Books, p. 13)JFS

I find Levinas’ view, that ethics precedes ontology, unacceptable. It could be that we have obligations to the other independently of the person’s particular characteristics. However, that the other is a person in the first place is also a matter of ontology. So, it seems clear that ontology precedes ethics logically as well as psychologically, not the other way around. Notwithstanding the difficulty of clearly defining a person, it is not self-evident that only persons have moral standing. Here, Niebuhr’s model might five some guidance. By comparing human response to organisms’ responses in general, he indicates a more promising approach. The different entities in the world actually exhibit a continuum of responses from mere reflex to full moral response. Conversely, it could be argued that human agents are responsible to all entities in the world with which they interact, not just to other humans. Moral responsibility, however, is present only in relation to certain entities (cf. Moran; 1996, pp.59-65). Somewhere along the line mere responsibility, in the sense of responsiveness to their influence on us, turns into moral responsibility. But the borderline is unclear and a matter of dispute. When does mere responsibility turn into moral responsibility?This implies that the proposed ‘modified’ social model must be even more modified. Responsibility is not merely a matter within the human community. We have responsibility to nonhuman entities as well, although not always a moral responsibility. Responsibility is assumed and ascribed by human agents in response to other human and nonhuman entities. Social models of responsibility commonly include a recognition of encounters with other humans. But an acceptable social model should also include encounters with other biological entities.

Alt Solves – Generally

Securitization and threat construction only have power over us if we give them that power. Rejecting the power of security solves

Beesy and Bellamy 3 (Mark, Alex, *The Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. 49, no page numbers, Questia)JFS

To avoid recreating the manichean divisions of the Cold War and entrenching a global order associated with enduring inequalities, it is necessary to re-think fundamentally the way that security is conceived and achieved in a global era. Rethinking the theory and practice of security after 11 September needs to be based on an acknowledgement that security is a normative goal rather than an instrumental object. "Securitisation" politics, (64) (the politics of making a political issue a security issue warranting special measures) depends upon identity (who or what are "we" trying to secure?), the construction of threat (what is it we are trying to secure ourselves against?) and delineation of appropriate measures to deal with the threat. All too often after 11 September, the US administration has reached for neo-realist answers to these questions, seemingly oblivious to the fact that it is a combination of its hegemonic position within the neo-liberal world order and the politics of estrangement produced by neo-realist security practices that made the USA the symbolic and actual focus for opposition to various aspects of globalisation. In order to pursue a security politics more appropriate for a global era it is important to move away from the assumption of objectivism that lies at the heart of neo-realism. Instrumental security policies which assume a world of unchanging objective variables cannot recognise, let alone address, the sorts of threats that are emerging from non-state actors and opponents of American power.The neo-realist security politics adopted by the Bush regime excludes politics by making the existence of threat and the appropriate solutions appear somehow natural. The world, as they see it, is full of "intractable security dilemmas". (65) But just as the "balance of power" only exists if states believe it exists and act upon it, so the existence of threat and the level of appropriate response is socially constructed and malleable. (66) Consequently, neo-realist security practices exacerbate (and in some cases create) the very problems they claim to be addressing: the politics of estrangement, boundary construction, and militarism contributes to the creation of self-fulfilling prophecies. In its "security dilemma" form (67) the USA builds up its military forces because it believes itself to be militarily threatened by other states, particularly so-called "rogues". But American militarism makes likely targets such as Iraq and North Korea feel insecure prompting them to develop their own defensive military capacities in whatever way they can. Paradoxically enough, therefore, USA policy is implicated in exacerbating conventional state-based security threats, whilst simultaneously paying insufficient attention to increasingly important ones that emanate from outside the conventional state-based order. Thus, neo-realist security practices have a limited capacity to comprehend or provide strategies for dealing with the types of problems encountered in a world of complex networks and "transversal" relationships. (68) Neo-realist security practices are predicated upon a conceptualisation of international order that remains centred on sovereign boundaries and clear distinctions between "self" and "other". What 11 September demonstrated is that not only are those boundaries theoretically and practically insecure, so too is the security politics that is based on them.

Alt Solves – Generally

Rejecting the logic of security solves

**Beesy and Bellamy 3** (Mark, Alex, *The Australian Journal of Politics and History*, no page numbers, Questia)JFS

A number of key insights flow from the foregoing analysis that can help us begin rethinking the way security ought to be pursued in a global era. Most fundamentally, we need to recognise that the contemporary international order is irredeemably post-Westphalian, and that the international is a socially constructed space in which the pursuit of security is a normatively-determined, spatially and historically contingent activity. What the events of 11 September demonstrate is that there are the limits to both American hegemony and security as it is currently configured. The values and norms that constitute international society and drive processes associated with globalisation remain contested. In such circumstances, three issues are central to any re-thinking of security. Firstly, it needs to be recognised that globalisation is not just about increased flows between territorially distinct units, but also represents a more fundamental challenge to the spatial logic of international relations. The weapons systems of 11 September were launched from the eastern seaboard of the USA, not from across its borders. The perpetrators and their supporters were citizens of numerous countries. Most of the perpetrators had been educated in the USA and some were even US citizens. The target was not the military capacity of the USA but the symbols of its global hegemony. The fact that so many victims were non-American also reminds us that US power is embedded in transnational networks that transcend national boundaries. A new security politics needs to recognise the increasingly meaningless separation of the domestic and the international that informs so much conventional security thinking. (69) Secondly, security needs to be pursued in ways that do not reify identity in terms of "self" and "other", "us" and "them". Much of what makes people insecure, such as malnutrition and environmental degradation, cannot be dealt with by a single political community and cannot be attributed to the deliberate actions of a single "other". Rather than "us and them", "good and evil", we need to appreciate that the world is tied together by complex networks and transactions that transcend or subvert borders, and which render simple binary oppositions redundant. Yet the insecurity felt as a result of 11 September is intimately linked to the continuing construction of opposing binary identities. Continuing to ignore the mutually constitutive aspects of security only exacerbates this problem by increasing the insecurity of others and hence ourselves. Because security is subjectively experienced, comprehensive security can only be built on the basis of inter-subjective agreement about what makes us insecure and how we can deal with it. The wider the agreement--in terms of the breadth and depth of a global dialogic security community--the "better" the knowledge claims it would produce. Ideally, such knowledge would be based on free and open dialogue between agents and the construction of transnational, indeed transversal, moral communities. (70) Only in this way can we escape the perpetual construction of bifurcated identities that foster insecurity. Finally, the provision of security in a global era requires approaches that go beyond traditional militarism and the zero-sum logic of neo-realism. When the most powerful military apparatus ever assembled is incapable of protecting its citizens from attack, it is hardly radical to question its efficacy or the appropriateness of the strategic doctrine that underpins it. Similarly, it is uncontroversial to suggest the new threats that confront the USA are generated in large part by enduring disparities of economic opportunity that American power is seen as having helped create. Strategies that attempt to respond to such threats without addressing their complex, multi-dimensional sources will consequently prove ineffective. At the economic level, therefore, the challenge will be to increase the degree of interdependence across the world, so that it resembles the wealthy western world's in both intensity and outcome. Paradoxically, economic globalisation may not have gone far enough. But unless the integration of hitherto marginalised parts of the international order occurs on a more equitable basis, and unless the same logic of interdependence can be extended to the construction of new transnational security communities that recognise security to be mutually constitutive and interdependent, security is likely to continue to prove elusive.

Alt Solves – Generally

A questioning disposition solves

Dillon 96 (Michael, Routledge Publishers, Prof@Lancaster, *Politics of security: towards a political philosophy of continental thought*, Questia, p. 15) JFS

Genealogy therefore allows me to formulate my preliminary question in respect of the political. But I am not interested in posing that question because I am interested in pursuing a genealogy. Instead, because it is an interrogatory disposition—a way of questioning, or even a life of questioning—genealogy allows me to stimulate a kind of pre-philosophical as well as a pre-political perplexity about security and politics. It does so because it immediately alerts us to the radically historical, ubiquitous, ambiguous, contradictory, generative and constitutive character of security and its relation to both philosophy and politics. Echoing and compacting Foucault, therefore, my question is: ‘Must we secure security?*’* [13](http://www.questia.com/read/103092870) As it focuses this pre-philosophical and pre-political perplexity, this question puts us in the mood to think about the political anew; or, rather, announces the mood expressed in a related question—*‘I*s *security the secure foundation of Justice it is claimed to be?’*—which demands that we think about the political anew. For a mood can express itself in a question, just as a question can excite a mood, and I want to do both; express and excite a mood through a question. But we can only approach the political anew after the question concerning security has been explored, and a path towards a recovery of the question of the political itself cleared, because I do not think that we are in a position yet even to formulate this, the primary question. For the moment then I remain confined within the scope of the question of security. But, because the project is one concerned with what is required in order to recover the question of the political, by asking must we secure security I refrain from any engagement with the enormous and secondary literature surrounding security—particularly the explosion of such literature in the last fifty years—because none of it can help me with this project. On the contrary, that literature proves a fundamental obstacle because it does not ask the question of security as such. It invokes security as a ground and seeks largely to specify what security is; how security might be attained; and which are the most basic, effective, or cost-effective means of doing so. Along the way, it occasionally notes a so-called security paradox; that my security project may excite your insecurity. What it does not do is realise that there is never security without insecurity and that the one always occurs in whatever form with the other. Indeed, of course, our politics of security does not ask after its own ground in terms of the question of the political either. We have, instead, to make security questionable, and go through that questioning process, in order to arrive at the threshold of the question of the political itself. Once we recognise that we have to think security and insecurity together, we have already moved beyond security thinking towards posing the thought of the obligatory freedom of human being itself. In short, it is only at that point that we find ourselves on the path of beginning to think the *aporia* of obligatory human freedom as it manifests itself in our own times, and have begun to think politically again. All this, then, necessarily points beyond genealogy. That security has a genealogy, and that this genealogy reveals how security variously and diversely operates in the production and dissemination of (international political order and identity, is a thought which provokes me. It is, in turn, one of the thoughts which I want to provoke in others. That this genealogy further amounts to being the political genealogy of the political tradition of the ‘West’ is the additional, much broader and more ambitious thought, which I want to provoke. This last thought follows from the way in which posing the security question necessarily calls into question the way thought itself has been thought. Hence, if one has to account for security’s entry into discourse at all, one has to address the very terms in which the political has been thought within the tradition of the ‘West’. It is that which points beyond genealogy towards the vexed but fundamental relationship between politics and philosophy.

Alt Solves – Generally

The alt repoliticizes security politics

Edkins 99 (Jenny, Professor of International Politics, *Poststructuralism & international relations: bringing the political back in*)

Theories of international relations can be complicit in this process of concealment. As R. B. J. Walker has pointed out, they are "expressions of the limits of modern politics [that] reveal some of the crucial conditions under which modern political life is possible at all, as well as the conditions under which alternatives to the present have been rendered implausible or even unthinkable."79 Theories of international relations contribute to the de- politicization of the international and the domestic every time they take for granted the separation of the two, with the domestic realm within the sovereign state being seen as the realm of "political community" and the international arena as the domain of anarchy, where political or ethical community is replaced by power politics in some raw state of nature. This separation is for some (but by no means all) scholars the very self-definition of the "discipline," and it claims a past as well as a present; it traces its origins and analyzes its Westphalian genesis. The concept of sovereignty plays a crucial part in delimiting domestic "politics." As with the master signifier "politics," however, that of "sovereignty" erases the traces of its own historicity. In Walker's words again, international relations theory is a discourse that systematically reifies an historically specific spatial ontology, a sharp delineation of here and there, a discourse that both expresses and constantly affirms the presence and absence of political life inside and outside the modern state as the only ground on which structural necessities can be understood and new realms of freedom and history can be revealed.80 A repoliticization of international relations would involve at the very least not forgetting that sovereignty and the situating of politics within the state and anarchy outside is only one possible solution to the problem of political community. Moreover, addressing Hindess's argument (discussed in Chapter 1), it would acknowledge that political community is not the question in any case, that we need instead to find "a way to think about politics in the absence of its defining, constitutive fiction."81 The notion of "political community" itself implies a distinction from some other community—economic, social, and so forth—in other words, "political community" accepts as given the concept of "politics" as subsystem. It demands that we solve the problem within the confines of the existing social order and rules out "the political" moment. The distinctions it takes for granted are those very distinctions that reflect the political settlement within which present relations of power flourish and conceal its political, contingent, and violent nature. The power of "the role of fictional communities in the social and political thinking of western societies"82 is what should be problematized.

Alt Solves – Ontology

Ontology solves security; ontology would have solved every atrocity of the 21st century.

Dillon 99 (Michael, Sage Publications, Prof@Lancaster, *Political,* Vol. 27, No.2p. 165)

I take the defining feature of contemporary continental thought to be the return of the ontological. The return of the ontological has been developed in terms of a critical genealogy of political problematisisations consequent upon a fundamental reappraisal of the basic categories of philosophical modernity. Specifically, the modern understanding of narrative, order and justice, value, identity, and continuity, together with an aspiration to a rigorously methodological access to truth and totality, secured always from the perspective of the cogito (without asking about the sum), were all disrupted by the ontological turn. It was precisely because the ontological turn did devastatingly target the sum that the putatively secure ground of the cogito was radically unsecured. Because you cannot say anything about anything, that is, without always having made assumptions about the is as such, however, the return of the ontological has even wider ramifications than that of genealogy. For any thought, including, therefore, that of Justice, always already carries some interpretation of what it means to be, and of how one is as a being in being. To call these fundaments into question is to gain profound critical purchase upon the thought that underpins the thought and practices of distributive justice itself. We are at the level of those fundamental desires and fears which confine the imagination and breed the cruelties upon which it relies in order to deflect whatever appears to threaten or disturb its various drives for metaphysical security. Politics and philosophy have always been wedded since their first inception in the polis. The return of the ontological was therefore prompted by the twin political and philosopohical crises that assailed European civilization at the end of the nineteenth an dthe beginning of the twentieth centures. Hence the crisis of (inter)national politics (to which E H. Carr, for example, responded) was as much a crisis of thought as the crisis of thought, as expressed in debates about Empiricism, Positivism, Scientism, and Historicism at the time, was a crisis of politics. For what was at issue was a thinking way of life – complexly diverse and radically plural in its composition – that had hit the buffers in terms of the elevated universal expectations of reason and justice which its thought and politics had promised. Historicism’s failure to meet the challenges of Empiricism, Positivism, and Scientism nonetheless served to expose the crisis of political modernity itself: bureaucratization, rationalization, global industrialization, technologization, the advent of mass society, world war, and genocide. On the one hand, a return to “basics” was prompted by the ways in which the slaughter of the Great War, the holocaust of the Second World War, and the subsequent advent of the terminal dangers of the nuclear age undermined the confidence of a European civilization gone global. The “failure of nerve” was enhanced by the impact of its racial and economic imperialism, together with the subsequent experience of postcolonialism. On the other hand, the return of the ontological was indebted philosophically, amongst other influences to Nietzsche’s overturning of the metaphysical deceits of onto-theology, and to Heidegger’s early attempt to formulate a fundamental ontology. In neither instance am I claiming that the outcome of the ontological turn has resulted in some new orthodoxy or canon. Levinas, for example, thorough moves too complicated to retrace in this exercise, championed the metaphysical over against the ‘ontological’. Quite the contrary. The question of ontology has, instead, been split wide open, and the formulations, desires, institutions, and practices of our established ways of being – justice and Justice included = are shown to be suspended in that very opening.

Alt Solves – Ontology

Ontological analysis allows us to confront our human desire for security.

Odyssesos 2 (Louiza, *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27(3), Questia, no page numbers)JFS

Dasein's relationality, evident through its understanding as "thrown projection" on possibilities proper for its heteronomous constitution, can bring about "genuine failure": it relates Dasein's embeddedness in the world to the shattering of the sovereign self and helps to show that where subjectivity was effortlessly posited, phenomenological examination reveals only heteronomy. Confronting one's anxiety for its own being shatters the subject's will to security. As David Farrell Krell explains, becoming-proper can be likened to foundering or to the disintegration of modern subjectivity. But upon such "failure" of the will to security, Dasein can take itself up as anxious and ready for its possibilities. "Failure or foundering. Scheitern: Failure as a trembling or agitation to the point of disintegration. Erchutterung. In a word, shattering." (125) Failure to be a subject is the outcome of the phenomenological investigation of the structures of human existence, "whose very genuineness, the genuineness of its understanding, guaranteed precisely insofar as it genuinely shatters." (126) The incessant unworking of political subjectivity requires that the self ceases to be determined in unitary terms. To reverse the commonly held notion that interest-based decisions and agreements institute political relationality, explaining in this way the emergence of civil society and government, radical embeddedness in the world (Being-in-the-world) must be seen as primary, or at least as coappearing with more formal instances of "political association." When sociability itself and the heteronomous self are shown to jointly appear, there can be thought a "comparition" of phenomena of coexistence: "Comparition must therefore mean ... that 'appearing,' that is, coming into the world and being in the world, existence as such, is strictly inseparable, indissociable from the cum, from the with, wherein it finds not only its place and its taking-place, but also--and it is the same thing--its fundamental ontological structure." (127)

Alt Solves – Ontology

Ontological opposition to state-centricity solves securitization.

Beesy and Bellamy 3 (Mark, Alex, *The Australian Journal of Politics and History*, no page numbers, Questia)JFS

The great danger in constructing such different worlds is that it lends intellectual support to simplistic sloganeering. George W. Bush's attempt to demonise countries and regions as part of an "axis of evil" is a clear example of the way in which language can be utilised to construct or give shape to what might otherwise be frustratingly nebulous and elusive security threats. Indeed, it is also important to point out that the attacks on the symbolic centres of American power reflect a similar process of identity construction: American hegemony is associated with a morally corrosive world order that actively works against the interests of the third world generally and the Arab world in particular. (6) While both of these constructions may be little more than self-serving caricatures, they highlight the manner in which such discourses are mutually constitutive and construct powerful pictures of international society. At a time when the ontological status of a world populated by discrete national entities has become less certain as a consequence of pervasive transnational processes that are eroding national borders and control, (7) IPE-oriented scholars have recognised that deciding "who is us" has become an increasingly problematic exercise. (8) In both the practice and conceptualisation of security, by contrast, the increasingly uncertain and contested nature of nationally based identities is frequently ignored. Defining who "we" are not only helps shape "our" values, interests and behaviour, but it inevitably defines who "they" are as well, and the sorts of policies that might be appropriate as a consequence. Even this kind of simplistic discursive bifurcation has become more problematic and implausible, however. One of the most noteworthy shortcomings of much strategic theorising and practice is that it remains overwhelmingly state-centric. According to some observers, the USA is currently enjoying an unprecedented "unipolar moment", with the potential "to last for many decades". (9) The preservation of America's dominant position is predicated upon "reassuring and engaging potential challengers", who are invariably conceived as other states. (10) However, such analyses ignore some of the most striking qualities of the contemporary global era. Firstly, in a world haracterised by malleable borders and transnational networks, military might alone has been revealed as a blunt instrument incapable of achieving desired outcomes in conflicts as diverse as Vietnam, Yugoslavia, and Somalia. Secondly, and more fundamentally, opponents of the contemporary world order include transnational networks (such as the anti-globalisation network and al-Qaeda) that make use of the products of globalisation (the internet, porous borders, cheap travel and communication) in order to oppose it. The state-centric ontology that informs traditional ways of thinking about and pursuing security fails to recognise that states are embedded in a complex web of institutions (11) which, while delivering them tangible benefits, place constraints on their autonomy and expose them to new systemic vulnerabilities. The responsiveness of global stock-markets to security issues in the wake of 11 September highlights just how interconnected more traditional security issues are with a deeply interconnected, but surprisingly fragile, international economic system. There are other compelling reasons for questioning whether a state-centric focus remains analytically or pragmatically useful. In a post-Cold-War era in which direct conflict between the major powers is unthinkable, (12) any recourse to the sorts of military challenges that have shaped realist analyses of international contestation are quite simply edundant. (13) What the events of 11 September demonstrate with devastating clarity is that in the contemporary era threats against the USA and its allies will not emanate primarily from other states (not even "rogue" states like North Korea but from an array of forces that operate outside conventional state boundaries and auspices. The 11 September terror was not delivered by missiles or armies. The perpetrators arrived in the USA quite legally on scheduled international flights. The tools they used were American. Although commentators have argued that only an organisation with state sponsorship would be capable of such an attack, (14) the subsequent collapse of the Taliban made it clear that al-Qaeda was not dependent on the Taliban regime but that the Taliban regime (that is, the Afghan state) was in fact dependent on al-Qaeda (a transnational network). It has also become apparent that one of the more effective ways of combating such sub-state networks is by "following the money trail" and targeting the economic, rather than the military capacity of such organisations.

Alt Solves – Ontology

Ontological Discourse is needed to create change.

Fairclough 5 (Norman, [emeritus Prof. of Linguistic](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emeritus_Professor)s @ [Lancaster University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lancaster_University), "Discourse Analysis in Organization Studies: The Case for Critical Realism" European Group for Organizational Studies, *Organization Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 6 page  3)

Let me sum up my argument in this paper. First, studies of organization need to include analysis of discourse. Second, however, its commitment to postmodernism and extreme versions of social constructivism limits the value of one prominent tendency within current research on organizational discourse for organizational studies. Third, a version of CDA based on a critical realist social ontology is potentially of particular value to organization studies. I refer especially to its value in researching organizational change. I agree with those whose specific concern is research into organizational discourse that analysis of organizational discourse should be seen as an important part of organization studies. This follows from certain ontological assumptions about the nature of social (and therefore also organizational) life, namely, that social phenomena are socially constructed, i.e. people’s concepts of the world they live and act within contribute to its reproduction and transformation; and that social phenomena are socially constructed in discourse. As I have implied above, however, certain extreme forms of social constructivism should be rejected (I return to this issue below). Like others, I use the term ‘discourse’ for linguistic and other semiotic elements (such as visual images and ‘body language’) of the social, but I use it in a relational way, with a focus on *relations between* linguistic/semiotic elements of the social and other (including material) elements. ‘Discourse analysis’ is generally taken to be the analysis of ‘texts’ in a broad sense — written texts, spoken interaction, the multimedia texts of television and the Internet, etc. As I shall explain in more detail later, I take ‘texts’ to be the linguistic/ semiotic elements of social events, analytically isolable parts of the social process.1 But some versions of discourse analysis (which are typically Foucaultian in inspiration) limit themselves to identifying the presence and forms of combination of recurrent and relatively stable and durable ‘discourses’ in texts, whereas others carry our various forms of detailed linguistic analysis (e.g. analysis of grammar, semantics, vocabulary, metaphor, forms of argumentation or narrative, and so forth) and/or detailed analysis of other semiotic features of texts such as their visual aspects.

Alt Solves – Ontology

Ontological discourse key to change.

Fairclough 5 (Norman, [emeritus Prof. of Linguistic](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emeritus_Professor)s @ [Lancaster University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lancaster_University), "Discourse Analysis in Organization Studies: The Case for Critical Realism" European Group for Organizational Studies, *Organization Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 6 page 17)

The issues can be formulated in terms of evolutionary theory, which Jessop (2002) has integrated into a theoretical framework for researching changes in governance and the state which is consistent with critical realism and a dialectical-relational ontology. Social interaction inherently produces changes in discourse which add to social variation. But to account for the relationship between such change and change in pre-constructed objects such as persons (with their beliefs and habits of action) and organizations, one needs to address the factors and conditions which determine how particular variants are selected and retained, whereas others are not. I have argued above that the version of discourse analysis I am advocating is best deployed within transdisciplinary research on social change, providing a specifically discourse analytical perspective in researching ‘objects of research’ which are constituted on a transdisciplinary basis. This entails working as a discourse analyst in dialogue with the particular theoretical resources and frameworks drawn on in constituting objects of research for research topics. Let me refer to three examples in my own work. I have already mentioned the study of ‘New Labour’, in which the particular research questions formulated for a discourse analytical approach to New Labour were established through dialogue with social and political theories of which related change in the political field to economic globalization and the associated political project of neo-liberalism. Chiapello and Fairclough (2002) was an attempt to set up a dialogue between the ‘new sociology of capitalism’ (Boltanski and Chiapello 1999) and CDA, interpreting what Boltanski and Chiapello identify as the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ in discourse analytical terms as being in part a change in orders of discourse within business organizations, including for instance changes in the styles of managers and ‘leaders’. Fairclough (forthcoming a) is a study of ‘transition’ in post-communist countries focusing on Romanian strategies for building an ‘information society’ and ‘knowledge economy’, which formulated specific objects of research and specific research questions for discourse analysis on the basis of a theorization of ‘transition’ in terms of ‘new’ or ‘cultural’ political economy. None of these studies has addressed change in particular organizations, but they do I think begin to set out an approach to incorporating discourse analysis into transdisciplinary research on change which can be productively extended to organizational change. From what I have said so far, two central principles for such research have emerged: (1) that while change in discourse is a part of organizational changeconstructive effects of discourse on organizations, organizational change is not simply change in discourse, and relations between change in discourse and change in other elements of organizations are matters for investigation, which entails a clear and consistent analytical distinction between discourse and other social elements; (2) that while ongoing change in social process, in social interaction, can contribute to organizational change, the relationship between change in social interaction and change in organizational structures is complex and subject to conditions of possibility which need to be investigated, which entails a clear and consistent distinction between social process (including texts), social practices (including orders of discourse) and social structures.

Alt Solves – Discourse

Rejecting the discourse of security solves

Der Derian 5 (James, Director of the Global security Program and Research Professor of International Studies at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, October 1, "National Security: An Accident Waiting to Happen" *Harvard International Review,* Vol. 27 Issue 3)

His use of hyberbolic terms like "ultra-catastrophe" and "fall-out" is telling: such events exceed not only local and national capabilities, but the capacity of conventional language itself. An easy deflection would be to lay the blame on the neoconservativc faithful of the first term of US President George W. Bush, who, viewing through an inverted Wilsonian prism the world as they would wish it to be, have now been forced by natural and unnatural disasters to face the world as it really is-and not even the most sophisticated public affairs machine of dissimulations,  distortions, and lies can dose this gap. However, the discourse of the second Bush term has increasingly returned to the dominant worldview of national [security](http://www.allbusiness.com/buying_exiting_businesses/3580951-1.html), realism. And if language is, as Nietzsche claimed, a prisonhouse, realism is its supermax penitentiary. Based on linear notions of causality, a correspondence theory of truth, and the materiality of power, how can realism possibly account-let alone prepare or provide remedies-for complex catastrophes, like the toppling of the World Trade Center and attack on the Pentagon by a handful of jihadists armed with box-cutters and a few months of flight-training? A force-five hurricane that might well have begun with the flapping of a butterfly's wings? A northeast electrical blackout that started with a falling tree limb in Ohio? A possible pandemic triggered by the mutation of an avian virus? How, for instance, are we to measure the immaterial power of the CNN-effect on the first Gulf War, the AlJazeera-effect on the Iraq War, or the Nokia-effect on the London terrorist bombings? For events of such complex, non-linear origins and with such tightly-coupled, quantum effects, the national security discourse of realism is simply not up to the task. Worse, what if the "failure of imagination" identified by the 9/11 Commission is built into our national and homeland security systems? What if the reliance on planning for the catastrophe that never came reduced our capability to flexibly respond and improvise for the "ultra-catastrophe" that did? What if worse-case scenarios, simulation training, and disaster exercises-as well as border guards, concrete barriers and earthen levees-not only prove inadequate but might well act as force- multipliers-what organizational theorists identify as "negative synergy" and "cascading effects" -that produce the automated bungling (think Federal Emergency Management Agency) that transform isolated events and singular attacks into global disasters? Just as "normal accidents" are built into new technologies-from the Titanic sinking to the Chernobyl meltdown to the Challenger explosion-we must ask whether "ultra-catastrophes" are no longer the exception but now part and parcel of densely networked [systems](http://www.allbusiness.com/buying_exiting_businesses/3580951-1.html) that defy national management; in other words, "planned disasters." What, then, is to be done? A first step is to move beyond the wheel-spinning debates that perennially keep security discourse always one step behind the global event. It might well be uni-, bi-, or multi-polar, **but it is time to recognize that the power configuration of the states-system is rapidly being subsumed by a heteropolar matrix, in which a wide range of different actors and technological drivers are producing profound global effects through interconnectivity**. Varying in identity, interests, and strength, these new actors and [drivers](http://www.allbusiness.com/buying_exiting_businesses/3580951-1.html) gain advantage through the broad bandwidth of information technology, for networked communication systems provide the means to traverse political, economic, religious, and cultural boundaries, changing not only how we interpret events, but making it ever more difficult to maintain the very distinction of intended from accidental events. According to the legal philosopher of Nazi Germany, Carl Schmitt, when the state is unable to deliver on its traditional promissory notes of safety, security, and well-being through legal, democratic means, it will necessarily exercise the sovereign "exception:" declaring a state of emergency, defining friend from foe, and, if necessary, eradicating the threat to the state. But what if the state, facing the global event, cannot discern the accidental from the intentional? An external attack from an internal auto-immune response? The natural as opposed to the "planned disaster"? The enemy within from the enemy without? We can, as the United States has done since September 11, continue to treat catastrophic threats as issues of national rather than [global security](http://www.allbusiness.com/buying_exiting_businesses/3580951-1.html), and go it alone. However, once declared, bureaucratically installed, and repetitively gamed, national states of emergency grow recalcitrant and become prone to even worse disasters. As Paul Virilio, master theorist of the war machine and the integral accident once told me: "The full-scale accident is now the prolongation of total war by other means

**Alt Solves – Discourse**

**Discursive questioning resists the power of security**

Dillon 96 (Michael, Prof@Lancaster, *Politics of Security*, p.14-16)JFS

The way of sharpening and focusing this thought into a precise question is first provided, however, by referring back to Foucault; for whom Heidegger was the philosopher. Of all recent thinkers, Foucault was amongst the most committed to the task of writing the history of the present in the light of the history of philosophy as metaphysics.4 That is why, when first thinking about the prominence of security in modern politics, I first found Foucault's mode of questioning so stimulating. There was, it seemed to me, a parallel to be drawn between what he saw the technology of disciplinary power/knowledge doing to the body and what the principle of security does to politics.What truths about the human condition, he therefore prompted me to ask, are thought to be secreted in security? What work does securing security do for and upon us? What power-effects issue out of the regimes of truth of security? If the truth of security compels us to secure security, why, how and where is that grounding compulsion grounded? How was it that seeking security became such an insistent and relentless (inter)national preoccupation for humankind? What sort of project is the pursuit of security, and how does it relate to other modern human concerns and enterprises, such as seeking freedom and knowledge through representative—calculative thought, technology and subjectification? Above all, how are we to account — amongst all the manifest contradictions of our current (inter)national systems of security: which incarcerate rather than liberate; radically endanger rather than make safe; and engender fear rather than create assurance — for that terminal paradox of our modern (inter)national politics of security which Foucault captured so well in the quotation that heads this chapter.5 A terminal paradox which not only subverts its own predicate of security, most spectacularly by rendering the future of terrestrial existence conditional on the strategies and calculations of its hybrid regime of sovereignty and governmentality, but which also seems to furnish a new predicate of global life, a new experience in the context of which the political has to be recovered and to which it must then address itself: the globalisation of politics of security in the global extension of nihilism and technology, and the advent of the real prospect of human species extinction.A logical way of pursuing this Foucauldian impulse would, therefore, have been to document the discursive facticity of security by discovering how security is spoken about, and who or what does the speaking. To consider historically, again a /a Foucault, the propositions, viewpoints and assumptions from which they speak: to specify the institutions, and detail the various interlocking discursive practices, which produce, store and distribute the bulk of what is said (assembling it in great archives and policing what is true about it): to note as well the tensions and conflicts within the plural regime of security as it weaves the tight (inter)national/intertextual6 discursive economies which comprise the texture of modern global life: including those, for example, of the state; (inter)national organisations; parasitic public media; economic corporations; para-statal research institutions; teaching academies; and medical, informational, communicational, pedagogic and academic disciplines. For Foucault's genealogical method was concerned to show how the theme of struggle only really becomes operative if one establishes concretely — in each particular case — who is engaged in struggle, what the struggle is about, and how, where, by what means and according to what rationality it evolves. In other words if one wants to take seriously the assertion that struggle is the core of relations of power, one must take into account the fact that the good old logic of 'contradiction' is no longer sufficient, far from it, for the unravelling of actual processes.? Pursuing such a genealogical line of enquiry would have the virtue of enabling us to see that security is employable in any and every circumstance, and is invested with a plurality of meanings. It would reveal the extent, too, of the work that security does for and imposes upon us, and serve effectively to excite suspicion about the extraordinary valency and velocity which it has in the production and preoccupations of our forms of (inter)national life.

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**Alt Solves – Discourse**

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We could not then escape noticing the way security impresses itself upon us as a kind of floating and radically inter-textual signifier which, by constant reference to all other signs of the times, transgresses disciplinary, political, corporeal and geographical bound­aries as it courses throughout the defining technologically inspired discourses of Modernity: state security; national security; political security; global security; regional security; territorial security; economic security; financial security; indi­vidual security; collective security; personal security; physical security; psycho­logical security; sexual security; social security; environmental security; food security. . . .These, then, would be some of the central considerations to which a genealogy would draw attention. For security, the genealogist would insist, is not a fact of nature but a fact of civilisation. It is not a noun that names something, it is a principle of formation that does things. It is neither an ontological predicate of being, nor an objective need, but the progenitor instead of a proliferating array of discourses of danger within whose brutal and brutalising networks of power— knowledge modern human being is increasingly ensnared and, ironically, radically endangered. Security is the word under which the manifold rationalities of the modern age march together — witness the serried ranks of security listed above — in a struggle which continuously threatens to overwhelm any other understanding of the political — and of the obligatory freedom of human being — than that concerned, one way or another, with securing security.Hence we are not only users of language, we are used, the genealogist would argue, by the language we use. We are not simply the people who employ discourses of security, we are the people who are ensnared in and used by them. Just as there therefore could be no history of security without a history of the (inter)national politics that seeks to define, pursue and prosecute order under the various names of security, so also any individual political formation would manifest its own particular order of fear. Don't ask what a people is, the genealogist of security might say, ask how an order of fear forms a people. And, in particular, bearing the imprint of the way determinations of what is political have originated in fear, s/he would emphasise that security is a principal device for constituting political order and for confining political imagination within the laws of necessity of the specific rationalities thrown-up by their equally manifold discourses of danger

Alt Solves – Value to Life

The alternative is necessary to retain value to life in the face of the affirmative’s fear.

Der Derian 98 (James, *On Security*, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Ronnie D. Lipschutz, editor)

If security is to have any significance for the future, it must find a home in the new disorder through a commensurate deterritorialization of theory. We can no longer reconstitute a single Hobbesian site of meaning or reconstruct some Marxist or even neo-Kantian cosmopolitan community; that would require a moment of enlightened universal certainty that crumbled long before the Berlin Wall fell. Nor can we depend on or believe in some spiritual, dialectical or scientific process to overcome or transcend the domestic and international divisions, ambiguities, and uncertainties that mark the age of speed, surveillance and simulation. This is why I believe the philosophical depth of Nietzsche has more to offer than the hyperbolic flash of Baudrillard. Can we not interpret our own foreign policy in the light of Nietzsche's critique of security? As was the case with the origins of an ontotheological security, did not our debt to the Founding Fathers grow "to monstrous dimensions" with our "sacrifices"--many noble, some not--in two World Wars? Did not our collective identity, once isolationist, neutralist and patriotic, become transfigured into a new god, that was born and fearful of a nuclear, internationalist, interventionist power? The evidence is in the reconceptualization: as distance, oceans and borders became less of a protective barrier to alien identities, and a new international economy required penetration into other worlds, national interest became too weak a semantic guide. We found a stronger one in national security , as embodied and institutionalized in the National Security Act of 1947, as protected by the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, and as reconstructed by the first, and subsequent National Security Council meetings of the second, cold war. Nietzsche speaks a credible truth to increasingly incredible regimes. He points toward a way in which we might live with and recognize the very necessity of difference. He recognizes the need to assert heterogeneity against the homogenizing and often brutalizing forces of progress. And he eschews all utopian schemes to take us out of the "real" world for a practical strategy to celebrate, rather than exacerbate, the anxiety, insecurity and fear of a new world order where radical otherness is ubiquitous and indomitable.

Alt solves – problematizing security reconceptualizes the body and gets rid of bare life.

Dillon 3 (Michael, *Millenium Journal of International Studies*, Prof@Lancaster, pp. 535)JFS

If there is to be an account of political and ethical subjectivity that exceeds the subject-as-survivor narrative that underwrites modernity’s (inter)national politics of security going biocentric, politicising security must stage an encounter between the way securitisation operates as a generative field of formation for government and politics and the enigma of life as it now presents itself on the contested terrain of the life sciences themselves. If there is to be a revision of political modernity’s terminal reliance on its (inter)national politics of (in)security, now rapidly also going hyperbolic, that revision must enter the debate about life itself generated by the digitalised and molecularised life sciences. There are several reasons for doing so. Foremost among these are the changes induced by the confluence of the digital and molecular revolutions themselves — their impact on what a living thing, or a ‘body’, is understood to be — calling into question the very onto-politics of political modernity, the ways in which it revolves around ‘life’ and its securing. In profoundly challenging what life may be taken to be, what generative principles of formation are said to engender it, how its boundaries might be specified and what a body can do, the digital and molecular advance of the life sciences problematise the political certainties concerning the secure properties of bodies as such and the frequent caricaturing of them that characterises much state, and so- called human, politics of security. To posit that debate, to take up that challenge, is not to reject or oppose the biological. Quite the contrary. Bodies matter; although they matter most in their radical undecidability. The biopolitical sensibilities from which this paper draws much of its inspiration has been at the forefront of putting the body back onto the political agenda. The questions then include: What is a body? How do bodies matter? What currently and prospectively can be done with and to a body? And, what can bodies themselves do? It is not simply that the modernlife sciences have much to teach us about these issues. They directly challenge many things long taken for granted about them**.** The epistemic power and success of the molecular and digitalsciences not only pose these questions**,** retroactively they also wreak novel onto-political effects concerning what we take bodies to be**,** how they are to be investigated, to what interventions they may be subjectand thus what ethico-political challenges we acknowledgeand respect in relation to what it is now possible to do for, to and with them.

Alt Solves – Value to Life

The alt makes life livable, rejecting the totalizing ontology of security

Der Derian 98 (James, *On Security*, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Ronnie D. Lipschutz, editor)

Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. 33 Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness. Since Nietzsche has suffered the greatest neglect in international theory, his reinterpretation of security will receive a more extensive treatment here. One must begin with Nietzsche's idea of the will to power, which he clearly believed to be prior to and generative of all considerations of security. In Beyond Good and Evil , he emphatically establishes the primacy of the will to power: "Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength--life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the most frequent results." 34 The will to power, then, should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual desire for power. It can, in its negative form, produce a reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading, in Nietzsche's view, to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an active and affective force of becoming, from which values and meanings--including self-preservation--are produced which affirm life. Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic to life, for ". . . life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation--but why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages." 35 Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism in life: "life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war." 36 But the denial of this permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a consensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear. The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science , Nietzsche asks of the reader: "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" 37 The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols : The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?" shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause --a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving. . . . That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation--that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations. 38 A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility--recycling the desire for security. The "influence of timidity," as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the "necessities" of security: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences." 39

Alt Solves – Value to Life

The alternative is a commitment to opacity, a denial that the Other is knowable, which counters the panoptic violence of securitization.

Gorelick 8 (Nathan, Ph.D. student of Comparative Literature at the State University of New York at Buffalo, *Theory and Event* Vol. 11 Issue 2)

Because the current world crisis testifies to the legacy of colonialism, Postcolonial theory might provide a useful starting point for relevant ethical critique. Postcolonial critiques of the will to knowledge by which subject populations are devalued and rendered controllable indicate that merely rendering the dark chamber visible is simply not enough; a critical commitment to total visibility risks complicity with empire because it obfuscates the failure and frustration, the other night, at the core of any project in search of total intelligibility. Édouard Glissant suggests the possibility of an ethics of responsible relation here, in the question of representation; what is needed, according to Glissant, is a commitment not to intelligibility, but to opacity, to a respect for the unknowable and irreducible otherness of the other. Against liberal humanist panopticism and the obsession with rendering the universe knowable and governable by sovereign truths, "The thought of opacity distracts me from absolute truths whose guardian I might believe myself to be."48 This vision of ethical relation, abstract though it may be, is radical because "Thought of self and thought of other here become obsolete in their duality."49 But is such pure representational non-violence possible? For Shapiro, Emmanuel Levinas' notion of an infinite respect for alterity -- an ethical regard that "resists encompassing the Other solely within the already spoken codes of a universalizing vision of humankind," a radical openness to the Other that opposes the domestication of strangeness and that resists efforts to render fully intelligible that which exceeds measure -- provides a useful -- if admittedly problematic -- means by which to begin cultivating a "concern with the violence of representation," especially in relation to the politics of securitization endemic to the production of nation-state identities.50 Like Glissant, Levinas "enacted a linguistic war on the governing assumptions of western philosophy."51 However, Shapiro rightly demonstrates that a total commitment to representational non-violence impractically obfuscates the need for responsible intervention into already-existing systems of intelligibility. He supplements Levinas' thought with Jacques Derrida's injunction to negotiate the inevitability of representational violence, to recognize the inability to encounter any Other without some kind of pre-existing economy of sameness and difference.52 Thus, if a commitment to total non-violence is ethically problematic, it is because a politics and ethics of representation are always already compromised by their reliance upon language itself.

Alt Solves – Korea

Altering threat perceptions avoids the self-fulfilling prophecy in Korea

Hassig & Oh 3 (Kongdan, Ralph C., [Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies](http://www.brookings.edu/cnaps.aspx)  Ralph Hassig, Psychology, University of Maryland University College "North Korean Military As A Security Threat" *East Asia,* Volume 20, No. 2)

**The arbitrariness of threat perception--and the actions that are taken to counter threats--is illustrated by an exchange that President Bush had with a reporter at the end of December 2002.** Responding to the reporter's widely-shared observation that the United States was preparing for war with Iraq, the President remonstrated, "You said we're headed to war in Iraq--I don't know why you say that. I hope we're not headed to war in Iraq. I'm the person who gets to decide, not you. ''~8 **The President is, after all, the first threat framer. The counter-intuitive observation that threats are not self-evident is of more than academic interest, because those who feel threatened are inclined to devote their attention and resources to avoiding or eliminating what they fear most, and in doing so, they necessarily neglect other threats or endeavors.** To make the best decision in a trade-off situation, it is necessary to make a careful calculation of costs and benefits. And **because no single person or small group of persons can make such calculations with complete (or sometimes even acceptable) accuracy**, a transparent decision making process is needed to allow diverse input to be fed into the final decision. Such transparency is often lacking in both Washington and Pyongyang. *Oh and Hassig 19* It is well not to overlook the potential for triggering or exacerbating a conflict spiral, or in this case, a threat spiral. **Improvements in North Korean military capabilities, or a heightened threat rhetoric, may invite US-ROK military improvements and counter-threats ("axis of evil"), which in turn invite another round of responses from the North Korean military (Kim Jong-il vows to counter a US "hard line" with Pyongyang's own "ultra-hard line."** Measured responses and repeated attempts at communication are the best means to defeat such spirals. For North Koreans as well as for Americans, threats appear to be coming from all directions. The Kim Jong-il regime is convinced that its greatest foreign threat comes from the United States. The George W. Bush administration is not as clear about either the absolute or relative danger posed by North Korea**. For both countries, part of the threat perception, based as it is on subjective estimates of a potential adversary's intentions, is self-generated. Given the constructivist nature of threats, it is possible for both Americans and North Koreans to reconfigure their views of reality**. The tools that can be used to do this shaping include dialogue, propaganda, promises, and incentives, as well as threats, counter-threats, and the military means to back them up. **Policy makers in Pyongyang and Washington need to continuously monitor the environment for changes in threat contours, balancing the danger of over-reaction against the danger of complacency.**

**Rejecting securitized images solves the Korea conflict**

**Cho 9** (Young Chul, Political Science & International Studies, Yonsei University, August 10, "Collective identity formation on the Korean Peninsula" *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific,* Vol. 10)

In Wendt’s (1999) words, by implementing the Sunshine Policy, **South Korea as a driving force attempted to transform the ossified Hobbesian security culture into the Lockean (or even Kantian) security culture in Northeast Asia. This transformative process of security culture has required a shift in the distribution of shared ideas of perceiving friend and foe in the region**, which lead then to realign their collective identity among regional countries: that is, at least **North Korea must come to be the friendly Other of South Korea, the United States, and Japan, even if it cannot be part of liberal, democratic ‘us’. In this sense, Seoul’s Sunshine Policy is not simply South Korea’s tactical engagement demarche of coping with the on-going North Korean problem, but is the state-driven identity project reconfiguring the existing mapping of collective identity in Northeast Asia in the post-Cold War era of globalization. Related to the South’s engagement policy toward the North, therefore, the issue of collective identity is crucial to having a more in-depth understanding of South Korea’s national security** today, **and** of the increasing dynamic of **inter-Korean relations which project implications for security and diplomacy in Northeast Asia.** In traditional security studies, nonetheless, little is known of South Korea’s national security associated with the Sunshine Policy in terms of its evolving collective identity in the region. To contribute to filling this gap in the literature, by addressing the question of how a significant change in the international security environment affected South Korea’s national security during the Kim administration, this article is to explore the formation of South Korea’s collective identity which has, in turn, informed its interest and policy at the turn of the twenty-first century.More specifically, focusing on the US Clinton and Bush administration’s contrasting security policies and practices toward the Korean Peninsula, this article aims to examine how the two different external security environments shaped South Korea’s collective identity in relation, respectively, to the United States and North Korea, and the Sunshine Policy in different ways, with a temporal focus on the Kim administration (1998–2003)

Alt Solves – Korea

The alternative of Korean identity solves tension and conflict.

**Cho 9** (Young Chul, Political Science & International Studies, Yonsei University, August 10, "Collective identity formation on the Korean Peninsula" *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* Vol. 10)

In the context of sociological (or conventional) constructivism in IR, Katzenstein (1996, p. 2) argues that **‘security interests are defined actors who respond to cultural factors’. In this process, the concept of ‘identity’ is crucial, since it ‘functions as a critical link between environmental structures and interests’** (Jepperson et al., 1996, p. 59). **It is thus crucial** for sociological constructivists **to examine how a state identity**, which in turn informs its interest and policy, **are constructed, in relation to its cultural–institutional environment.** In addition, from a structuralist perspective, sociological constructivism is interested in ‘how structures of constructed meaning, embodied in norms and identities, affect what states do’ (Jepperson et al., 1996, p. 66). Yet, it should be note that the **structures serve to produce permissive conditions for state action, rather than determine it**. This article accepts the sociological constructivist ontological assumption that ‘states are ontologically prior to the states system, [and the] state is pre-social relative to other states in the same way that the human body is pre-social . . . systems of states presuppose states, and so if we want to analyze the structure of those systems we cannot “de-center” their elements all the way down’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 198, 244). In his theoretical work, Social Theory of International Politics, Wendt (1999, pp. 224–233) discusses four sorts of state identity: (1) corporate; (2) type; (3) role; and (4) collective. As Wendt (1999, p. 232) explains, ‘**the US cannot be a state without its monopoly on organized violence (corporate), a capitalist state without enforcing property rights (type), a hegemon without its clients (role), and a member of the West without its solidarity with other Western states (collective)’**.1 Of these, this article focuses **on the concept of collective identity to explore how South Korea’s social relations with the United States and North Korea** had been evolved during the Kim administration in the following section. According to Wendt (1999, p. 229), the collective identity is ‘a distinct combination of role and type identities, one with the causal power to induce actors to define the welfare of the Other as part of that of the Self, to be “altruistic”. Altruistic actors may still be rational, but the basis on which they calculate their interests in the group or “team.”’ In this sense, **constructing collective identity is more external than internal, being tied to the process of positive or negative identification among states.** Wendt’s well-known typology of anarchical culture – Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian – implies the different level of collective identity among states. **As such, the collective identity is the crucial intersubjective meanings that construct social fabric of international politics**. **This identity emerges from social interaction, and perhaps changes through social interactions in international relations. States interacting in a given culture come to know one another as the bearers of certain identities. When this happens, the states appeal to certain prospects as to each other’s actions based on these identities** (Wendt, 1999, pp. 318–343). In this respect, the collective identity subsumes reputation; having a particular collective identity is enough to supply the necessary diagnostic information about a state’s likely behavior with reference to other states in particular cultures (Hopf, 1998, p. 190). In short, collective identity matters in international politics, since **it informs not simply what states do and should be, but how states interpret other states’ intention and action under anarchy.**

Alt Solves – A2: System Too Powerful

The alternative is to remember the impossibility of total control and to recklessly take a stand against the depolitization of security, regardless of the consequences.

Edkins 99 (Jenny, Professor of International Politics, *Poststructuralism & international relations: bringing the political back in*)

In a sense, the duty of the critical intellectual is exactly this not forgetting, this drawing of attention to the "'produced,' artificial, contingent character"83 of any reigning master signifier. This is arguably the standpoint of any critical theory with a claim to an intellectual response or responsibility. The academic attitude, almost by definition, relies on the notion of an independence or distance from the accepted authority of the age, a notion of questioning what is "given." Foucault points to the distinction between the "specific" intellectual, caught up in "real, material, everyday struggles," and the "universal" intellectual, involved as a spokesperson of the universal, a figure of authority. The specific intellectual is the expert of technoscientific truth, and as such he or she is in a unique position to struggle at the level of the general regime of truth that underpins the social order. There is a battle "for truth"; or in Foucault's words: The essential political problem for the intellectual is . . . the political, economic, institutional regime of the production of truth. It's not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time. The political question . . . is truth itself.84 As Derrida's work makes clear, however, it is not easy to detach oneself from the existing phallogocentric regime of truth and retain any critical purchase, which would allow a political act or intervention. From a feminist perspective, Irigaray argues (as we saw in Chapter 2) that "there is no simple manageable way to leap to the outside of phallogocentrism."85 But she suggests that the power of logocentric "truth" relies as much on being taken seriously as anything else. In other words, it relies on forgetting the joke, forgetting the precariousness of logocentrism's seeming naturalness. Disrupting this claim to seriousness can help; this means "not to forget to laugh. Not to forget that the dimension of desire, of pleasure, is untranslatable, unrepresentable, irrecuperable, in the 'seriousness'—the adequacy, the univocity, the truth . . . —of a discourse that claims to state its meaning."86 Again the call is not to forget. To return to "the political," we must move away from the realm of truth and toward that of desire. Or rather, we must move toward a reconsideration of the desire for truth or certainty that conjures up the master signifier in the first place. Is there a possibility of escaping that desire for completion that produces the de- politicization we have seen? What does this mean for the call not to forget? To enact a repoliticization requires an acceptance of the impossibility of ontological fullness.87 This ontological paradox appears in theoretical physics, where two complementary properties of a subatomic particle are mutually exclusive—it is only possible to know one or the other to the necessary degree of accuracy. This notion of complementarity is reflected in the way "the subject is forced to choose and accept a certain fundamental loss or impossibility" in a Lacanian act.88 As ZiZek puts it, "My reflective awareness of all the circumstances which condition my act can never lead me to act: it cannot explain the fact of the act itself. By endlessly weighing the reasons for and against, I never manage to act—at a certain point I must decide to 'strike out blindly.'"89 The act has to take place without justification, without foundation in knowledge, without guarantee or legitimacy. It cannot be grounded in ontology; it is this "crack" that gives rise to ethics: "There is ethics—that is to say, an injunction which cannot be grounded in ontology—in so far as there is a crack in the ontological edifice of the universe: at its most elementary, ethics designates fidelity to this crack."90

Alt Solves – A2: Individuals Don’t Matter

Individuals can resist security politics by challenging everyday forms of discursive violence like the affirmative.

Burke 2 (Anthony, School of Political Science and International Studies University of Queensland, Aporias of Security, *Alternatives* 27 pg. 22-23)

It is perhaps easy to become despondent, but as countless struggles for freedom, justice, and social transformation have proved, a sense of seriousness can be tempered with the knowledge that many tools are already available—and where they are not, the effort to create a productive new critical sensibility is well advanced. There is also a crucial political opening within the liberal problematic itself, in the sense that it assumes that power is most effective when it is absorbed as truth, consented to and desired—which creates an important space for refusal. As Colin Gordon argues, Foucault thought that the very possibility of governing was conditional on it being credible to the governed as well as the governing. This throws weight onto the question of how security works as a technology of subjectivity. It is to take up Foucault's challenge, framed as a reversal of the liberal progressive movement of being we have seen in Hegel, not to discover who or what we are so much as to refuse what we are.01 Just as security rules subjectivity as both a totalizing and individualizing blackmail and promise, it is at these levels that we can intervene. We can critique the machinic frameworks of possibility represented by law, policy, economic regulation, and diplomacy, while challenging the way these institutions deploy language to draw individual subjects into their consensual web. This suggests, at least provisionally, a dual strategy. The first asserts the space tor agency both in challenging available possibilities for being and their larger socioeconomic implications. Roland Bleiker formulates an idea of agency that shifts away from the lone (male) hero overthrowing the social order in a decisive act of rebellion to one that understands both the thickness of social power and its "fissures," "fragmentation," and "thinness." We must, he says, "observe how an individual may be able to escape the discursive order and influence its shifting boundaries. ... By doing so, discursive terrains of dissent all of a sudden appear where forces of domination previously seemed invincible."\*^ Pushing beyond security requires tactics that can work at many levels—that empower individuals to recognize the larger social, cultural, and economic implications of the everyday forms of desire, subjection, and discipline they encounter, to challenge and rewrite them, and that in turn contribute to collective efforts to transform the larger structures of being, exchange, and power that sustain (and have been sustained by) these forms. As Derrida suggests, this is to open up aporetic possibilities that transgress and call into question the boundaries of the self, society, and the international that security seeks to imagine and police. The second seeks new ethical principles based on a critique of the rigid and repressive forms of identity that security has heretofore offered. Thus writers such as Rosalyn Diprose, William Connolly, and Moira Giatens have sought to imagine a new ethical relationship that thinks difference not on the basis of the same but on the basis of a dialogue with the other that might allow space for the unknown and unfamiliar, for a "debate and engagement with the other's law and the other's ethics"—an encounter that involves a transformation of the self rather than the other. Thus while the sweep and power of security must be acknowledged, it must also be refused: at the simultaneous levels of individual identity, social order, and macroeconomic: possibility, it would entail another kind of work on "ourselves"—a political refusal of the One, the imagination of an other that never returns to the same. It would be to ask if there is a world after security, and what its shimmering possibilities might be.

Alt Solves – A2: Individuals Don’t Matter

The alternative solves – Individuals impact state policy and threat perceptions

Marsh 98 (Pearl-Alice, *On Security*, Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies in Washington, D.C., Ronnie D. Lipschutz, editor)

I call the challenges to the state put forth by citizens' groups "grassroots statecraft." I define grassroots statecraft as encompassing the organized actions of citizens who are directly challenging the foreign policy of their government through contending discourses and "speech acts." Grassroots statecraft is rooted in the political processes that pit ideologies, values, strategies, and tactics of organized civil society against the foreign policy establishment of the state. It is the presence of overt public dissent within the political life of a community, in this case over national security policy. It is a process of forging political relations within civil society, and across national borders, sufficient to alter the terms of discourse within the formal political institutions and, in its strongest manifestation, to alter national security policy. It is what James Rosenau calls "stirrings at the micro level which are converted to macro outcomes." 2 Theories of international relations and foreign policy do not have much to say about the role of the citizenry in foreign policy: From realism to interdependence , we find either silence or outright hostility to citizen involvement. 3 To the extent that the high politics of foreign policy are understood to emerge from the state in a "single voice," dissenting voices are minimized or ignored as not possessing the data needed to make an "informed" and "objective" judgment. It is in the interest of the state to create the sense of monopoly over the information that forms the basis for the definition of national interests and the formulation of foreign policy. As Ole Wæver points out in chapter 3: "In naming a certain development a security problem, the `state' can claim a special right, one that will, in the final instance, always be defined by the state and its elites. . . . By uttering `security,' a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it." Indeed, the state will do all that is in its power to discredit contrary or oppositional security discourses. Samuel Huntington has gone so far as to suggest that citizens' involvement in foreign policy matters represents an " `excess of democracy' and threatens the democratic order." 4 This extreme view illustrates the strong anti-citizen nature of a state-centered approach and implies that an "anti-democracy" stance in foreign policy is necessary in order to preserve democracy!--a stunning suggestion if taken to its logical conclusion. In any event, the question of the "legitimacy" of citizens' actions, whether or not explicitly expressed, begs empirical observation: Citizens' groups are increasingly involved in the foreign policy process. Concerted citizens' actions range from the anti-apartheid movement in the United States to the environmentalist movements in Europe, each focused on interstate or transnational concerns and sharing common interests that lie beyond national political borders, beyond the range of conventional "domestic politics." 5 These groups seek not only to influence the foreign policy of the state, but also to conduct their own foreign policies, as well. There are three forms of citizens action movements that seek to alter the behavior of states: (1) those that attempt to influence the affairs of foreign governments by changing the behavior of their own government toward the former (e.g., the Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Sanctuary Movement); (2) those that assume responsibility for directly intervening in the affairs of the foreign government (e.g., human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, whose primary aim is to organize citizens around the world to apply pressure directly to individual governments 6 ); and (3) those that go beyond governments and nations to an anti-national form of organization (e.g., some of the activities of organizations such as Greenpeace 7 ). My concern here is primarily with movements and groups of the first type. While the objectives of groups involved in grassroots statecraft vary as widely as their professed political tendencies, they share some common features: (1) a moral or ideological code which justifies their concerns and actions; (2) an information dissemination and communication structure able to access the general public through traditional organizational channels, mediated through a network of core activists who share a wide range of political and technical skills; (3) an array of tactics and means involving mass action and/or direct public pressure on elected officials; (4) direct relations with foreign movements or governments for whom they claim a cause; and (5) access to resources sufficient to sustain the groups' activities and to help support the movement. The degree to which groups are or are not successful depends on each one's ability to maximize these five features. The difference between grassroots statecraft and the ordinary lobbying of Congress and the Executive by conventional interest groups is a critical one. Interest groups seek to alter the balance of forces within the federal government with respect to a particular policy issue. The questions they address include: Whom do we support? What should we give them? How much? Interest groups do not, however, question the fundamental premises of national security policy or the content of the security discourse. Threats are a given; responses are a necessity. Practitioners of grassroots statecraft seek to alter the very premises of national security discourse. They do not ask "whom should we should support?" but rather "is there a threat?" They do not accept as given the adversarial and conflictual nature of international politics but rather ask "What is in the best interests of the people involved?"

Alt Solves – A2: **“K Doesn’t Affect World”**

**The questioning of security goes beyond discourse and contributes to policy action via the marketplace of ideas.**

**Krause 96** ( Keith, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, February 18, "Critical Theory and Security Studies" *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 33, No. 3)

Since one of the main accusations leveled against **critical theory** (at least in International Relations) **is that it cannot get "beyond critique**," I intend to demonstrate that one can find lurking in the interstices of the discipline a wide range of **critical scholarship and research** that is "about" security (and its core subject matter), but which its authors, or the discipline, refuses to label as such. **Simply bring**ing **together these perspectives makes the challenges to orthodoxy more clear, and signals that critical approaches to security studies are more than a passing fad or the idiosyncratic obsession of a few scholars**. Ultimately, this is healthy for security studies as a whole. Security studies continues to be treated by many scholars as a theoretically-impoverished cousin to the sturdy children of International Relations, which could include (depending on your preference) liberal and radical approaches to International Political Economy, neoliberal institutionalist analyses, regime theory, foreign policy analysis and so forth.4 **Debate among competing approaches, and a greater conceptual clarity, can only strengthen the claims of security studies scholars for intellectual respect.** What is more, it is possible to argue that far from falling into desuetude with the end of the Cold War, many of the most interesting theoretical issues in International Relations - concerning, for example, **identity politics and communal conflict, multilateral security institutions, the development of norms and practices, and so-called new issues (such as the environment) - can be most usefully studied through a prism labelled "security studies**."

Alt Solves – A2: Discourse ≠ Reality

Throughout recent history, even modernists admit that the communication of threats has played a key role in how international relations play out.

Luke 89 (Timothy, W., Prof. of Poli. Sci. at Polytech Inst. of Virginia, *International/Intertextual Relations*, eds -- Der Derian & Shapiro, pp. 217-218)

Schelling's description of the "continuous dialogue of competitive armament," however, is the closest approximation to a semiotic-based and symbolic interactionist account of Soviet—U.S. relations in the existing tradition of deterrence theory.4° Keyed up on the importance of communi­cation by the hot-line link between Washington and Moscow, Schelling observes that "communication between enemies" has much historical precedent. In fact, he sees a "continuous dialogue" going on "all the time between the United States and the Soviet Union. Some of it is unconscious or inadvertent . . . the continuous process by which the USSR and the United States interpret each other's intentions and convey their own about the arms race."' In turn, Schelling suggests that the United States and Soviet Union celebrate "symbolic or psychological differences between nuclear and other weapons,"42 define arenas "in which signals may have been emitted,"43 or catch on to each others' moves "to perceive that a major program of their own . . . would provide motive, stimulation, or excuse in this country for pushing ahead with a comparable development."" In the field of ballistic-missile defense in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, Schelling sees each side tacitly bargaining with the other through displays of intentions and capabilities presented to be scanned by the other side. Thus, Schelling saw a communicative “feedback process in principle,” whose basic operation “depends on fidelity of perception and information, biases in the estimating process, lead time in military procurement decisions, and all of the political and bureaucratic influences that are brought to bear by interservice disputes, budgetary disputes, alliance negotiations, and so forth.” Likewise, the U.S.-Soviet interaction is rooted in these symbolic self-understandings and other-readings of each nation’s mutual indications and interpretations of meaningful objects in each other’s deterrence postures. As Schelling holds: That is, we must suppose that over an appreciable period of years, Soviet programs respond to what they perceive to be the “threat” to them, and in turn our programs respond to what they perceive to be the “threat” to us. Thus, by the end of the decade, we may be reacting to Soviet decisions that in turn were reactions to decisions early in the decade, and vice versa, The Soviets should have realized in 1957 that their military requirements in the middle 1960s would be, to an appreciable extent, a result of their own military programs and military public relations in the late 1950s… And in all of these processes of influence it is not the true facts but beliefs and opinions based on incomplete evidence that provide the motivating force. These insights into the semiotic-communicative qualities of action are quite important. Beyond, beneath, and behind spoken or written interstate communications, much more is being expressed in nuclear strategies, national security policies, domestic strategic debates, weapons designs, force postures, or operational military routines. Rather than being inert artifacts or unmeaningful activity, these factors are also contested textual fields for the expression and interpretation of meanings. Although these earlier studies of strategy sense the phenomenon, they mostly fail to articulate the dynamic in an appropriate theoretical idiom that intelligibly could disclose and fuse "the psychological" and "the symbolic" in a single powerful framework of interpretation. What choice-theoretic deterrence thinking ignores as "psy­chological" or essentially "unobservable cognitive processes" that are "almost impossible to operationalize" or "distinguish from nonlogical or irrational behavior,"4' a semiotic approach might make more comprehensible by disclosing the semiotic basis of symbolic understandings in strategic action. Such actions are partly rational and partly nonrational, tying together microlevel efficient reasoning with macrolevel symbolic interactions mediated through mesolevel semiotic conventions with the Ultranational aggregate of state actors defined by the United States and Soviet Union.

Alt Solves – A2: Discourse ≠ Reality

**In the nuclear age, military threats exist solely as semiological constructions.**

Luke 89 (Timothy, W., Prof. of Poli. Sci. at Polytech Inst. of Virginia, *International/Intertextual Relations*, eds -- Der Derian & Shapiro, pp. 223)

These structures of behavior in the global nuclear environment follow a reality principle based on *hyperreal simulation.* Today, "It is no longer a question of imitation, nor of reduplication, nor even of parody. It is rather a question of substituting signs of the real for the real itself, that is, an operation to deter every real process with its operational double . . . which provides all the signs of the real and short-circuits its vicissitudes." Since an all-out superpower nuclear war would destroy much of the planet, nuclear armaments create a military reality that only can be continued as a semiological play or structural simulation of conflict and competition. As signifiers, each nuclear weapon cites its own destruction, and the general annihilation circulates latently in every other nuclear charge as a sign in the deterrence system, masking the referent of nuclear doomsday if they all were used as real use values. As Baudrillard claims, it is essential to comprehend how this new political economy of symbolic exchange imposes "a form of a general code of rational abstraction," which, in turn, anchors "the circulation of values and their play of exchange in the regulated equivalence of values." In the deterrence system, both superpowers must continuously produce and display as well as scan and consume roughly equivalent signs of thermonuclear power, approximating an equilibrium of potential death and destruction. During crises, vague or explicit threats to "use" nuclear weapons have been made, or the impression of having this intention is managed by changing alert routines, drill patterns, or daily operations by the United States and Soviet Union to signal their concerns to each other.61 Still, this mutual deterrence of nuclear signs neutralizes the necessity of using them as nuclear weapons. The state leaderships of the United States and Soviet Union are simultaneously producers and consumers, displayers and scanners, actors and audiences, senders and receivers, circulating between themselves the encoded signs of weaponry that threaten use, and use threats assure mutual vulnerability and deter mutual destruction.

Modern defense systems exist only to create a symbol of death, rather than actual casualties – discourse is determining factor.

Luke 89 (Timothy, W., Prof. of Poli. Sci. at Polytech Inst. of Virginia, *International/Intertextual Relations*, eds -- Der Derian & Shapiro, pp. 223-224)

Nuclear arms have not been, and are not, called upon for use as weapons. Instead, they are made operational to be continually exchanged, as sign exchange values in "shows of force," "displays of capability," "proofs of credibility," or "displays of determination." In staging these encoded presentations, entire generations of nuclear weapons now have been designed, built, deployed, modernized, and, finally, scrapped without ever being "used" as weapons in nuclear war. The "testing" regime of warheads and delivery systems is taken as a guarantee that both do have "useful" potential. Still, for years if not decades, they are "operated" hourly or daily in deterrent displays that anchor nuclear peace. An elaborate mode of industrial production dedicated to the rationalized construction of these signs of nuclear destruction, in turn, has emerged in both the United States and Soviet Union. To create the public good of "defense," tremendous scientific, technical, and economic resources are mobilized to build objects of deterrence as well as to program requisite codes for their operational deployment. While the destructive use of these instruments would eliminate these modes of industrial production, their operation in deterrence enhances their continuing growth and development. The sign system encoded in the objects cannot be separated from the means of production that presents them as means of destruction. "Forces in being" when a nuclear exchange happens are the only forces that the United States and Soviet Union can count upon in their strategies. Hence, instead of being a "war industry," their defense-industrial networks are an institutionalized semimobilized "operations industry" already dedicated to producing the requisite forces of nuclear war in nuclear peace. And, not surprisingly, the battle of material production of conventional war has been transformed into a permanent battle of technological sophistication as both superpowers seek to produce superior "forces in being." As the superpowers scan each others' defense-industrial networks, then, the level of technological sophistication in weapon objects, their production, and their deployments are taken as aspects of their sign exchange value. Defense-industrial workers are increasingly highly skilled mechanical operatives, scientists, and engineers, producing fewer weapons at higher unit cost in smaller quantitative runs with greater technological intensification. All of these changes probably mean less military effectiveness. In a real war, having larger quantities of simple but reliable weapons made by unskilled workers at low cost is more cost-effective and desirable than a few expensive unreliable weapons of such complexity that highly skilled technical personnel must maintain and operate them. In the deterrence system, however, the defense-industrial network produces strategic weapon objects as signs more than as real engines of death. Ironically, over time in the West, even basic infantry gear, battle tanks, and small arms increasingly resemble nuclear weaponry systems in their high technology content and low-utility makeup.

Alt Solves – A2: Discourse ≠ Reality

The ballot matters – speech acts create hegemonies when their assertions are accepted.

Onuf 1 (NICHOLAS G., professor in the Department of International Relations at Florida International University, *Constructing international relations: the next generation*, ed - fierke & jorgensen Pg. 249-250)

Recall the series of assertions that I made, with obvious rhetorical intentions, at the beginning of this section. Milliken's careful representation of predicate analysis (in the first sense of the term) took the form of a series of assertions about discourse (representations, in the second sense). To be socially meaningful, language must have propositional content (I think that everyone agrees with this assertion), and it must do something systematic with that content (here Milliken and quite a number of other contributors would seem to part company with Wendt, for example). Assertions produce social meaning by securing their acceptance. When they succeed in doing so, hegemony reigns, at least to the limits of the discourse that accepted assertions may be said to produce. Indeed Milliken wishes "to explain how a discourse produces this [any social] world" (p. 132, her emphasis). Production is not just, or even chiefly, a material process. The term also suggests a theatrical event, all the more engrossing for not being deliberately staged. As a metaphor, it appeals to postmodern sensibilities about the properties of language, but it also is a metaphor that constructivists can favor when they assert that speech acts operate in different ways to bring about systematic social (and material) effects. Kratochwil made this point earlier in the book and drew several important conclusions, all of which are crucial to a fully developed constructivist position. Since I agree with him so emphatically, I will quote him at some length (p. 29). The discovery of speech acts has had revolutionary implications not only for linguistic theory but also for social science in general. Since it can be shown that speech acts are incredibly numerous, ranging from demanding, to appointing, to apologizing, to asserting, and threatening, etc., its relevance for the analysis of social life is hardly controversial. [The "etc." conspicuously includes promising, which Kratochwil turns to a little later.] The other point is that speech acts are constituted by norms [or rules, which speech acts in turn produce]. . . . Only within a practice governed by certain institutional rules will a certain utterance have any meaning. Finally, we can show that it is through such institutional arrangements that we, as members of society, constantly bridge the gap between the "is" and the "ought." .. . Discourse does indeed—in deed—produce the social world. The speech acts constituting discourse consist of much more than assertions, and they produce much more than hegemony. That they do produce (the rules that constitute) hegemony is always important to remember but never sufficient for critical scholarship. There is more to language than representation, and more to the social world than "the politics of representation" (Milliken, p. 124).

Alt Solves – A2: Discourse ≠ Reality

Representations can kill and regardless of the affirmative’s intent, war is at the core of sovereignty.

Der Derian 99 (James, Brown U, research professor of international studies and professor of political science, *Angelaki: journal of the theoretical humanities* 4:2 pg. 56-57)

Attenuated by cant and deemed too popular for serious scholarship, the virtual has already become an academic taboo. All the more reason, I believe, to extend the reach of critical approaches. Derrida and Nietzsche are valuable because they provide a philosophical perspective which links public space with a responsive as well as responsible private space. But they cannot keep up with the avant-garde of the war machine, which is continually at work to rupture that link, through state-sanctioned killing and patriotic dying. As much as I admire Nietzsche's transvaluation of realism and sovereignty, and Derrida's deft deconstruction of neoliberal triumphalism, we are still left with all-too-real effects of virtual violence: representations can kill. After Carl Schmitt exposed the illiberal exceptionalism of violence at the core of sovereignty, I think it is rather spurious to pretend that one can disenchant the violent if spectral power of sovereignty with a wave of the Weberian wand, or cure it with the stroke of the deconstructive scalpel. In spite of the call for new world orders, declarations of "democratic peace," celebrations of globalisation, even strenuous critical exorcisms, war continues to be the rule that proves the exceptionalism of sovereignty. By one estimate, in the recorded history of sovereign empires and states stretching over three millennia, there has been a total of twenty-nine years free of war.

Representation forms our imagination of the world and is prerequisite to political action.

Burke 2 (Anthony, School of Political Science and International Studies University of Queensland, Aporias of Security, *Alternatives* 27 pg. 14-15)

The technology security puts into anion here, which has been central to its extrusion from a relation between state and citizen to a principle for the actions of the body politic in the international arena, I have chosen to call the strategic imagination. This imagination is primarily spatial but not exclusively so, becoming powerfully linked with temporal discourses of racial superiority, political enlightenment, and cultural and economic progress. The strategic imagination is not so much an entry into a preexisting space as the production of a new one by a detailed political technology that seeks to make it meaningful as it orders and partitions it into the vehicle, effect, and arena of an industrial, political, and cultural economy. Through the mapping and traversing of this space by transport, its appropriation through sovereignty, its defense by acts and means of war, and its cultivation and exploitation by industry, agriculture, and commerce, the strategic imagination thus seeks to engender economically and politically useful arrangements of bodies, communities, and social institutions. In this sense, its space is never static and unchanging, but itself has a history: changes in technology introduce changes in its extent and permeability, changes in political doctrine change its meaning and in turn affect not only the economic and social possibilities of individuals but their psychic interiors Thus its representation is crucial: is this space threatening or safe, familiar or alien, masculine or feminine, productive or recalcitrant? What are its flows and boundaries? And, above all, what is our capacity for action within its geopolitical and psychic contours?

Alt Solves – A2: “You Reduce Everything to Language”

We don’t reduce everything to language, but language does impact policy

Campbell 98 (David- PHD, Prof of cultural & poli geog @ U of Durham, *Writing Security*, p.5-6,ET)

To suggest as much, however, is not to argue in terms of the discursive having priority over the non-discursive. Of course, this is the criticism most often mounted by opponents to arguments such as this; understandings apparent in formulations like 'if discourse is all there is,' `if everything is language,' or 'if there is no reality.'16 In so doing they unquestioningly accept that there are distinct realms of the discursive and the non-discursive. Yet such a claim, especially after the decades of debates about language, interpretation, and understanding in the natural and social sciences, is no longer innocently sustainable. It can be reiterated as an article of faith to rally the true believers and banish the heretics, but it acknowledged, projects like philosophy's traditional desire to see 'how language relates to the world' result in 'the impossible attempt to step outside our skins — the traditions, linguistic and other, within which we do our thinking and self-criticism — and compare ourselves with something absolute.'" The world exists independently of language, but we can never know that (beyond the fact of its assertion), because the existence of the world is literally inconceivable outside of language and our traditions of interpretation. 18 In Foucault's terms, 'we must not resolve discourse into a play of pre-existing significations; we must not imagine that the world turns toward us a legible face which we would only have to decipher; the world is not the accomplice of our knowledge; there is no prediscursive providence which disposes the world in our favour.'19 Therefore, to talk in terms of an analysis which examines how concepts have historically functioned within discourse is to refuse the force of the distinction between discursive and non-discursive. As Laclau and Mouffe have argued, 'The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition . . . What is denied is not that . . . objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside of any discursive condition of emergence.'2° This formulation seeks neither to banish arguments which authorise their positions through reference to `external reality,' nor to suggest that any one representation is as powerful as an other. On the contrary, if we think in terms of a discursive economy — whereby discourse (the representation and constitution of the 'real') is a managed space in which some statements and depictions come to have greater value than others — the idea of 'external reality' has a particular currency that is internal to discourse. For in a discursive economy, investments have been made in certain interpretations; dividends can be drawn by those interests that have made the investments; representations are taxed when they confront new and ambiguous circumstances; and participation in the discursive economy is through social relations that embody an unequal distribution of power. Most importantly, the effect of this understanding is to expand the domain of social and political inquiry: The main consequence of a break with the discursive/extra-discursive dichotomy is the abandonment of the thought/reality opposition, and hence a major enlargement of the field of those categories which can account for social relations. Synonymy, metonymy, metaphor are not forms of thought that add a second sense to a primary, constitutive literality of social relations; instead, they are part of the primary terrain itself in which the social is constituted.'

A2: Realism – Realism Bad

Realism is an ideology of death

Der Derian 99 (James, Brown U, research professor of international studies and professor of political science, *Angelaki: journal of the theoretical humanities* 4:2 pg. 54-55)

Nietzsche and Derrida offer a penetrating critique of sovereignty, yet ... it lives, most demonstrably in international theory and diplomatic statecraft, as, no less, the realist perspective. What do we mean by "realism"? It encompasses a world-view in which sovereign states, struggling for power under conditions of anarchy, do what they must to maintain and promote their own self-interests. But what do "we" mean by "realism"? We realists, constituted by and representing disciplinary schools of thought, diplomatic corps, intelligence bureaucracies, depict things as they really are, rather than as idealists might wish them to be. And what do "we" mean by "realism"? We mean what we say and say what we mean, in that transparent way of correspondence that provides the veridical, commonsensical, deadly discourses of realism, like mutual assured destruction assures our security, or "we had to destroy the village in order to save it." But with the end of the Cold War, and pace Nietzsche, why beat a dead horse? Precisely because realism does death so well, by refusing to acknowledge not only its ongoing complicity in the death of others but also the fact that it gave up the ghost a long time ago. How many times, after how many "revolutionary" transitions, have we heard that sovereignty is at bay, at an end, dead? There is always the easy deflection, that sovereignty is an "essentially contested concept," a "convenient fiction," that changes with the times. But the frequency of such death-notices, from politicians, military strategists and pundits, as well as academicians, leads one to suspect that something other than funerary oration, philosophical speculation, or a topic for a special issue is at work. Is there a darker, even gothic side to the sovereign state, a hidden power which resides in its recurrent morbidity? Take a look at some of the principle necroses. Realism has built a life out of the transformation of fictions, like the immutability of human nature and the apodictic threat of anarchy, into facticity. With a little digging, realism comes to resemble nothing so much as the undead, a perverse mimesis of the living other, haunting international politics through the objectification of power, the fetishisation of weaponry, the idealisation of the state, the virtualisation of violence, and the globalisation of new media. Now the fact of its own death lives on as a powerful fiction, as the morbid customs, characteristics, and habits of the living dead.

Realism is ideologically violent because it reduces subjects and objects to discrete units

Grondin 4 (Assistant Professor @ U of Ottowa, presented at the annual International Studies Association Convention, 17-20 Mar. 4, ET)

In explaining national security conduct, realist discourses serve the violent purposes of the state, as well as legitimizing its actions and reinforcing its hegemony. This is why we must historicize the practice of the analyst and question the “regimes of truth” constructed by realist discourses. When studying a given discourse, one must also study the socio-historical conditions in which it was produced. Realist analysts are part of the subfield of Strategic Studies associated with the Cold War era. Even though it faced numerous criticisms after the Cold War, especially since it proved irrelevant in predicting its end, this subfield retains a significant influence in International Relations – as evidenced, for instance, by the vitality of the journal International Security. Theoretically speaking, Strategic Studies is the field par excellence of realist analyses: it is a way of interpreting the world, which is inscribed in the language of violence, organized in strategy, in military planning, in a military order, and which seek to shape and preserve world order (Klein, 1994: 14). Since they are interested in issues of international order, realist discourses study the balancing and bandwagoning behavior of great powers. Realist analysts believe they can separate object from subject: on this view, it would be possible to abstract oneself from the world in which one lives and studies and to use value-free discourse to produce a non-normative analysis. As Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth assert, “[s]uch arguments [about American moderation and international benevolence that stress the constraints on American power] are unpersuasive, however, because they fail to acknowledge the true nature of the current international system” (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002: 31). Thus it would seem that Brooks and Wohlforth have the ability to “know” essential “truths”, as they “know” the “true” nature of the international system. From this vantage point it would even be possible “to set aside one’s own subjective biases and values and to confront the world on its own terms, with the hope of gaining mastery of that world through a clear understanding that transcends the limits of such personal determinants as one’s own values, class, gender, race, or emotions” (Klein, 1994: 16). However, it is impossible to speak or write from a neutral or transcendental ground: “there are only interpretations – some stronger and some weaker, to be sure – based on argument and evidence, which seems from the standpoint of the interpreter and his or her interlocutor to be ‘right’ or ‘accurate’ or ‘useful’ at the moment of interpretation” (Medhurst, 2000: 10). It is in such realist discourse that Strategic Studies become a technocratic approach determining the foundations of security policies that are disguised as an academic approach above all critical reflection (Klein, 1994: 27-28).

A2: Realism – Realism Bad

Realism is incorrect and causes violence

**Der Derian 95** (James, Poli Sci @ U Mass, *International Theory: Critical Investigations*, “A Reinterpretation of Realism”, p. 370-371)

How do genealogy, semiology, and dromology differ from past efforts to interpret realism? First, they offer new per-spectives on realism in a period of rapid change. The fail-ure of realism to anticipate or to explain the end of the Cold War, and its willingness in gravelly baritones to ra-tionalize the violence that ensued in Nagorno-Karabakh, Bosnia, Somalia and elsewhere, can be studied as signs of how the very inability of realism to represent and deceler-ate change necessitates the rationalization and ethical cleansing of violence. This is not a reiteration of the question whether realism reflects or belatedly rationalizes the harsh realities of an anarchical system. Nor is it a rehash of the realist— idealist debate of the 1930s. To be sure, some similarities — most explicitly in the Balkans and no less so in the Bal-tic — do cry out for a comparative appraisal of what states and international institutions must do to manage the post- Cold War better than the inter-war period. But first an in-tellectual effort is needed to demythologize the antimonies of realism that have from its beginnings constituted and so confounded International Relations.21 The three approaches that make up a critical pluralism continue the refiguring of realism begun by Richard Ashley, Hayward Alker, Rob Walker, Nicholas Rengger, Frederich Kratochwil, Nicholas Onuf, Alexander Wendt, Francis Beer, Robert Hariman, and a new generation of IR thinkers.22 This school, if it could be called such, differs from pre-vious ones because it interprets realism as an ongoing discursive struggle that cuts across the traditional theory— practice, idealist—realist, and other synchronic and schol-astic antinomies of world politics. It gives notice of how realism in its universalist philosophical form and particularist state application has figuratively and literally helped to constitute the discordant world it purports to describe.23 In other words, the scholars of this school do not seek to repudiate realism: they seek instead to dismantle a variety of epistemic privileges by which one form of realism domi-nates contesting forms.24 A critical, pluralist approach to realism should not, how-ever, be mistaken as one more policing action, to substi-tute a new disciplinary gaze for realism's para-philosophical guise. There is nothing to be gained by positing some 'new,' purer form of realism in opposition to older, corrupted ones. My aim, as perverse and colonial as it may sound, is to deconstruct realism in order to save it. This is an attempt to open up the hermeneutic circle, to enlarge the interpre-tive community, to break out of the prison-house of a reductive vocabulary that has so attenuated the ethico-political dimension of realism. The intent is to flood the protected marketplace of IR theory with a multiplicity of realisms, devalue its proprietary origins, and in the pro-cess break its traditional dependency upon an evil, utopian, or merely irrational other to maintain a pure identity. We might just then be able to reinterpret the value of realism in a period of rapid systemic change.

A2: Realism – Realism is Wrong – Generally

Realism homogenizes political reality – It ignores virtuality, transformations, complexity, and atrocities

Der Derian 99 (James, Brown U, research professor of international studies and professor of political science, *Angelaki: journal of the theoretical humanities* 4:2 pg. 58-59)

Benjamin challenges the hegemony of realism in international politics with several critical insights. The first is obvious but often lost amidst post-Cold War optimism: mimesis can reproduce and spread social perceptions of violence, which runs against current conceits that sociability alone might be a guarantee of progressivist, pluralistic, or, for all the rhetoric of "partners in peace," pacifistic communities. It is of course a provocation to pretend that we might be, like Benjamin, living and writing "between wars." But there is good reason, indeed a necessity, to go back to a world marked by totalitarianism, genocide, and revolution, if only to counter the current world-view of western leaders which propagates the virtual rhetorics of a democratic peace and globalisation at a time when the majority of the world experiences a perpetuation of inequality, exploitation and what Virilio calls endocolonisation, or what happens when a sovereign power turns on its own people. Second, Benjamin provides a timely reminder of the dangerous consequences, unintended as well as intended, of a realism that purports to be realistic, yet takes no account of differing realities, whether they are culturally, historically, or virtually produced. Traditional realism assumes, and through mimesis, asserts a sameness of motives, human nature, geopolitics. In contrast, Benjamin posits the importance of recognising human alterity, and confronting it with imagination in politics. He deals perceptively with the sources of recurrent dangers in world politics, like the interrelationships of sovereignty, violence, nationalism, technology, and war, without recourse to the realist conceit of parsimony, which reduces all actors to single mimetic identity, the self-maximising unit. While this "ideal" typology of human behaviour might grant the parsimonious realist an advantage in explaining simple events in a disinterested way, it leaves him or her at a loss when it comes to virtual forms of representation, complex social issues, transformative political moments, and crimes against humanity - all of which have taken place over the last decade; all of which have defied the realist imagination (to the extent that there can be said to be one).

Realism relies on a fundamental atomism that does not accurately depict IR

**Der Derian 95** (James, Poli Sci @ U Mass, *International Theory: Critical Investigations*, “A Reinterpretation of Realism”, p. 380-381)

I suggest Nietzsche for this purpose, both because his ge-nealogical approach is a powerful investigatory tool, and because no one has more deeply charted the figurative and literal power of realism. Not, of course, the realism per se of IR, but the primordial form of natural, fundamental, or rational realism underlying it, that which holds there is a physical world independent of its perception or representa-tion. In The Wanderer and his Shadow he challenges the fundamental realist belief that the naming of something reveals its independent existence: The word and the concept are the most obvious reason why we believe in this isolation of groups of actions: we do not merely designate things by them, we originally believe that through them we grasp what is true in things. Through words and concepts we are now continually tempted to think of things as being simpler than they are, as separated from one another, as indivisible, each existing in and for itself. There is a philosophical mytho-logy concealed in language. In the Twilight of the Idols he exposes the origins of this mythology: 'Language belongs in it origins to the age of the most rudimentary form of psychology; we find ourselves in the midst of a rude fetishism when we call to mind the basic presuppositions of the metaphysics of language — which is to say, reason.'4° From its earliest moments reason had noble aims, but soon took on the characteristics of the forces which gave rise to it: If one needs to make a tyrant of reason, as Socrates did, then there must exist no little danger of something else playing the tyrant. Rationality was at that time divined as a saviour, neither Socrates nor his 'invalids' were free to be rational or not, as they wished — it was de rigueur, it was their last expedient. The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish or — be absurdly rational.41 The result is that 'the "real world" has been constructed out of the contradiction to the actual world: an apparent world indeed, in so far as it is no more than a moral—optical illusion.' This is not to say that Nietzsche — or his latter- day proponents — takes up an idealist position; rather, he is intent on dismantling the oppositional relationship with idealism from which realism derives its power and mean-ing. For it is within this destructive co-dependency that man takes revenge on life now and holds out for a better life later. In this modern condition the morality of idealism has little appeal and a limited power.

A2: Realism – Realism is Wrong – Generally

Realism fails – relies on social constructions of order and rationality

Der Derian 98 (James, *On Security*, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Ronnie D. Lipschutz, editor)

In these passages we can discern the ontotheological foundations of an epistemic realism, in the sense of an ethico-political imperative embedded in the nature of things. 28 The sovereign state and territoriality become the necessary effects of anarchy, contingency, disorder that are assumed to exist independent of and prior to any rational or linguistic conception of them. In epistemic realism, the search for security through sovereignty is not a political choice but the necessary reaction to an anarchical condition: Order is man-made and good; chaos is natural and evil. Out of self-interest, men must pursue this good and constrain the evil of excessive will through an alienation of individual powers to a superior, indeed supreme, collective power. In short, the security of epistemic realism is ontological, theological and teleological: that is, metaphysical. We shall see, from Marx's and Nietzsche's critiques, the extent to which Hobbesian security and epistemic realism rely on social constructions posing as apodictic truths for their power effects. There is not and never was a "state of nature" or a purely "self-interested man"; there is, however, clearly an abiding fear of violent and premature death that compels men to seek the security found in solidarity. The irony, perhaps even tragedy, is that by constituting the first science of security, Hobbes made a singular contribution to the eventual subversion of the metaphysical foundations of solidarity.

A2: Realism – Realism is Wrong – Generally

Realist theory is based on assumptions leading it to incorrectly explain international politics.

Cranmer 5 (Poli-Sci @ UNC Chapel Hill, Sep-22-5 p. 9- 10 *Realism and Liberalism Third Pass*, no journal, ET)

1. I have just examined the validity of the realist assumptions and found that all of them are at least partially false. While it is true that inference from incorrect assumptions can result in robust and accurate predictions (obviously not explanations), the probability of correct predictions is diminished compared to that of a theory with correct assumptions. 2. Given that the range of implications of realist theory are far too wide to examine comprehensively here, the primary task is to evaluate the degree of truth in the general implication that the security dilemma cannot be overcome. 3. The fact that war exists in approximately one percent of dyad years, as well as empirical findings such as the democratic peace, strongly suggest that in fact the security dilemma can be overcome. Evaluation Description 1. Realist theory makes very little effort to describe the state of the world. The closest it gets is the observation that the international system is anarchic (which, as I have discussed above, may be becoming less relevant over time). The rest of the foundation for realism is based on assumptions rather than observations. Prediction 1. Given its structure, predictive power is the only area in which realism has the capability of being a useful theory. According to authors such as Bennett and Stam (2004), tradition realist approaches do a rather poor job of predicting international events such as war. While the data are fare from conclusive in this regard, there is reason to be skeptical that the realist framework yields accurate predictions. Explanation 1. Realism fails almost entirely to explain events and processes in international politics by virtue of the fact that it begins with largely untrue assumptions; thus, it cannot explain international political phenomena.

A2: Realism – Realism is Wrong – Generally

Realism is false – security dilemma.

Cranmer 5 (Poli-Sci @ UNC Chapel Hill, Sep-22-5 p.7- 8 *Realism and Liberalism Third Pass*, no journal, ET)

Inherent pessimism: While this assumption is more definitional than functional, it seems unrealistic. While war certainly happens, it happens in less the one percent of dyad years since 1916. Such an empirical reality does not lend credit to the assumption that the security dilemma cannot be overcome. Prisoner’s Dilemma: This is an assumption which is flatly incredible. At face value, this assumption should imply that there is never a situation in international politics in which states value absolute gains. The evolution of the EU demonstrates this assumption to be false.

Realism is flawed – Terrorism, NGO’s

Grondin 4 (Assistant Professor @ U of Ottowa, presented at the annual International Studies Association Convention, 17-20 Mar. 4, ET)

Moreover, in realist theoretical discourses, transnational non-state actors such as terrorist networks are not yet taken into account. According to Brooks and Wohlforth, they need not be: “Today there is one pole in a system in which the population has trebled to nearly 200” (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002: 29). In their system, only states are relevant. And what of the Al-Qaida terrorist network? At best, realist discourses accommodate an interstate framework, a “reality” depicted in their writings as an oversimplification of the complex world in which we now live (Kratochwil, 2000).7

Realism is culturally determined – Their view is Western biased

Grondin 4 (Assistant Professor @ U of Ottowa, presented at the annual International Studies Association Convention, 17-20 Mar. 4, ET)

In their theoretical constructs, these analysts do not address national or state identity in any substantive way. Moreover, they do not pay attention to the security culture in which they as individuals are embedded8. They rarely if ever acknowledge their subjectivity as analysts, and they proceed as if they were able to separate themselves from their cultural environment. From a poststructuralist perspective, however, it is impossible to recognize all the ways in which we have been shaped by the culture and environment in which we were raised. We can only think or experience the world through a cultural prism: it is impossible to abstract oneself from one’s interpretive cultural context and experience and describe “the world as it is”. There is always an interpretive dimension to knowledge, an inevitable mediation between the “real world” and its representation. This is why American realist analysts have trouble shedding the Cold War mentality in which they were immersed. Yet some scholars, like Brooks and Wohlforth, consciously want to perpetuate it: “Today the costs and dangers of the Cold War have faded into history, but they need to be kept in mind in order to assess unipolarity accurately” (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002: 30).

A2: Realism – Realism is Wrong – Generally

Realism is unfalsifiable and unscientific

Vasquez , 97 (John A, December, Prof. of Political Science @ UOI, *The American Political Science Review* 91(4) pg 4)

"It should be clear that the criteria of adequacy involve the application of disciplinary norms as to what " and constitutes progress. The four indicators outlined 901 The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs December 1997 above provide reasonable and fairly explicit ways to interpret the evidence. Applying them to a body of research should permit a basis for determining whether a research program appears to be on the whole degenerative or progressive. It will be argued that what some see as theoretical enrichment of the realist paradigm is actually a proliferation of emendations that prevent it from being falsified. It will be shown that the realist paradigm has exhibited (1) a protean character in its theoretical development, which plays into (2) an unwillingness to specify what form(s) of the theory constitutes the true theory, which if falsified would lead to a rejection of the paradigm, as well as (3) a continual and persistent adoption of auxiliary propositions to explain away empirical and theoretical flaws that greatly exceed the ability of researchers to test the propositions and (4) a general dearth of strong empirical findings. Each of these four characteristics can be seen as "the facts" that need to be established or "denied to make a decision about whether a given research program is degenerating"

Realism is a poor theory – Too vague, broad, open-ended, and normative

Legro & Moravcsik 99 (Jeffrey W, Andrew, Autumn, Compton Prof. of World Politics and Chair; Co-direct. of the Gov America in a Global Era Program , a Prof. of Politics and direct. of the EUP @ [Princeton](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Princeton_University). *International Security*, 24(2) pg 53)

Perhaps the most useful way to judge the power of a social scientific paradigm is by examining what it is able to exclude. By this standard, the realist paradigm is degenerating. Its conceptual foundations are being "stretched" beyond all recognition or utility. There exists no set of shared nontrivial assumptions that can distinguish the arguments shared by realists today. Instead of challenging competing liberal, epistemic, and institutional theories, realists now regularly seek to subsume their causal mechanisms. Realism has become little more than a generic commitment to the assumption of rational state behavior. One result is ad hoc appeals to exogenous variation in national preferences, beliefs, and international institutions. Others, to be sure, elaborate more de- tailed midrange causal propositions about the causes and consequences of such variation, but the explicitness of these arguments serves only to highlight their liberal, institutional, or epistemic provenance. From the perspective of the realist paradigm with which we began this article, we ask, "Is anybody still a realist?" From the perspective of minimal realism the question becomes: "Is everybody now a realist?" Either way, realism is in need of reformulation. The tendency to label nearly all rationalist explanations of state behavior "realist" misstates the broader significance of the empirical research that self-styled realists have recently conducted. Its real significance lies not in the revitalization of core realist premises, to which its connection is tenuous at best. It lies instead in the empirical validation of assumptions about world politics that realists traditionally reject. The mislabeling of realism has obscured the major achievement of this research in the 1990s, namely to demonstrate in important areas of security studies the explanatory power of liberal, epistemic, and institutionalist theories. Here many of the realists considered above, as well as critics like Vasquez-all of whom explicitly defend adherence to real-ism, despite anomalies, because there appears to exist no alternative para-digm-understate the problem.133 The real problem is not simply the use of ad hoc arguments to patch anomalies, but the systematic use of arguments from existing alternative paradigms.Instead of acknowledging this trend, recent realist writings defend it by inviting us to return to the early 1940s-a period in which realists such as E.H. Carr convinced scholars that the central debate in international relations theory should be between "realists," who believe in rationality, prudence, and the importance of national self-interest, and "idealists," who believe in the uniform harmony of state interests, the power of altruistic motivations, or the possibil-ity of world government. Whether this dichotomy was a useful guide fifty years ago remains an open question. Its unsuitability today should be obvious to all. These two categories are too vague, too broad, too open-ended, too normative, and too dismissive of contemporary nonrealist theory to be of much use as a guide to social scientific theory and research.134 The major develop-ment in international relations theory over the past three decades is instead the emergence and firm establishment of more subtly differentiated rationalist. theories-variants of liberal, epistemic, and institutionalist theories. These are potent competitors to realist claims and should be recognized as such. Any categorization of international relations theories that fails to accord these a central and distinct place is profoundly misleading. One corrective to the degeneration of contemporary realism would be, of course, simply to jettison the term altogether. We believe it is too soon to contemplate such a radical solution. It would be preferable for realists and their interlocutors to observe greater precision in stating and applying its premises. A commitment to "realism" should signal far more than a belief in state rationality and international anarchy It should mark a commitment to a par-ticular rationalist theory of state behavior in anarchy, one stressing the resolu-tion of international conflict through the application of material power capabilities. The true role of such capabilities can be appreciated only through conceptual clarity, not conceptual stretching. Acceptance of our tripartite refor-mulation of realism would provide theoretical foundations clearly distinct from other rationalist theories, generate crisper empirical predictions, and contribute to more rigorous multicausal syntheses. Such a coherent and distinct realist paradigm would be fit to assume its rightful role in the study of world politics**.**

A2: Realism - Outdated

Realism is not timeless – it is reactionary to specific events and movements which are not applicable today

Donnelly 2K, (Jack, Prof. of Int. Studies at Univ. of Denver, *Realism and International Relations*, pp. 193-194)

The recurring patterns realists identify are not timeless laws of international relations. Realism identifies constraints, not unbreakable barriers. And other patterns and processes that are no less important to the study and practice of international relations are largely outside the scope of realism's comprehension. For example, granting Machiavelli's claim that men “will always give vent to the malignity that is in their minds when opportunity offers” (1970: Book I, ch. 3) no more suggests an amoral foreign policy than it implies that domestic law should treat the innocent and the guilty alike. As I have argued repeatedly, the need for caution must not be confused with the invariance or inevitability of that which demands caution. Many postwar realists admit the reactive, negative character of their work. Georg Schwarzenberger, in the preface to the second edition of Power Politics, noted that in 1941 “it was necessary to be on guard against naive day-dreaming on international politics. Now it is imperative to be so against the other pernicious extreme: unrestrained cynicism” (1951: xv). Carr similarly noted that “The Twenty Years' Crisis was written with the deliberate aim of counteracting the glaring and dangerous defect of … the almost total neglect of the factor of power. ” Therefore, some passages “state their argument with a rather one-sided emphasis” (1946: vii, viii). George Kennan, three decades after the initial publication of American Foreign Policy, admitted that “the problems of excessive legalism and moralism, as treated in the original lectures, are today, in large part, historical ones” (1984: vii). And the neorealist revival of the 1970s and 1980s was in significant part a reaction to approaches that stressed justice and change in international relations, such as dependency theory and the liberal internationalist emphasis on interdependence (Waltz 1970; 1979: chs. 2, 7).

A2: Realism - Outdated

The Cold War Political System leaves realism irrelevant and a bad model for the very altered international system.

Kegley 93 ( U of SC, *International Studies Quarterly vol 37,* Mar-27-93, pg 134-5, ET)

Turbulent times stimulate reexamination of orthodox theory and invigorate the search for reconstructed principles to guide thinking. We are now in such a turbulent time. Has the time arrived to revise, reconstruct, or, more boldly, reject orthodox realism? The post-Cold War world no longer has ideological fissures and an unrestrained arms race to preoccupy its attention and encourage a fixation on power politics. The vacuum has opened a window that exposes a view of world politics which realism largely ignores. The afterglow of the Cold War still flickers, but in its dwindling light are visible the outlines of a potentially new system in which the questions realism asks (and the answers it provides) may become increasingly less relevant. Instead, increasingly applicable and appropriate may be an image of world politics remarkably consistent with that portrayed by Woodrow Wilson seventy-five years ago. In many ways, Wilson was a visionary. At the end of World War I he responded to the opportunity and challenge to establish a peace. Yet in his endeavors Wilson conceived of a world that did not yet exist-that was still in its incipient stage of development (Knock, 1992). Consequently, Wilson was regarded by his contempo- raries as quixotic about the prospects for international cooperation and change and was dismissed by a subsequent generation of realists who thought him naive. Looking back, Wilson's quest to "stiffen ... moral purpose with a sense of responsi- bility for the practical consequences of ideals" (Osgood, 1953: 295) was arguably premature. But now the world may be in the throes of a fundamental transformation. As will be suggested below, its character may be a far more inviting home for the prin- ciples Wilson advocated to guide international conduct. In place of realism, there is today a visibly enthusiastic resurgence of interest in the Wilsonian program. In fact, his philosophy defines the issues that have risen to the top of the agenda in theoretical and policy discourse and the questions that now occupy our field's research activity. The long-term trajectories in world affairs appear to have con- verged to create a profoundly altered international system in which his ideas and ideals now appear less unrealistic and more compelling. Indicators abound that realism is losing its grip on the imagination of those writ- ing in our field and on policymakers' thinking. Our professional journals now fre- quently take "neo-Wilsonian" idealism (Fukuyama, 1992b), "idealpolitik" (Kober, 1990), "neo-idealism" (Kegley, 1988), and "neoliberalism" (Nye, 1988; Grieco, 1988, 1990) seriously; whereas attacks on "the poverty of realism" (Krauthammer, 1986), the "poverty of neorealism" (Ashley, 1984), and the dangers of realpolitik- based policies (Hitchens, 1991) have become a growth industry. Even the leading journal dedicated to policy analysis from a realist perspective, The National Interest, has found it necessary to explore whether realism is still relevant (Tucker, 1992-1993; Zakaria, 1992-1993). Realism, in short, is increasingly perceived to have "become an anachronism that has lost much of its explanatory and prescrip- tive power. . ." (Holsti, 1991:84). "The approach of classical realism," RobertJervis (1992:266) predicts, "will not be an adequate guide for the future of international politics...." The roots of contemporary dissatisfaction with realism also, it should be acknowl- edged, derive from forces well beyond the pull of external events and global trends. Context and environment are potent catalysts, but it would be hyperbolic to imply that the theoretical revolution potentially unfolding has been determined by such changes alone. Today's criticism derives from intellectual antecedents. Well before the Cold War began to thaw-in the period when realism appeared applicable and accurate-many scholars warned that realism was incomplete, misdirected, nonrigorous, inconsistent with scientific evidence, conceptually confused, and incapable of accounting for international behavior in all issue-areas including even controversies surrounding the high politics of conflict, war, and peace. The current wave of complaint is indebted to these pioneering attacks on the "power of politics" (Vasquez, 1983: 216ff.) and "the costs of realism" (Rothstein, 1972), and to those who then argued that realism's basic premises should be abandoned in favor of a truly different paradigm (e.g., Deutsch et al., 1957; Keohane and Nye, 1971; Burton, Groom, Mitchell, and Dereuck, 1974; Mansbach and Vasquez, 1981). The important contributions within this invisible college undoubtedly paved the way for the advent of an intellectual climate that is receptive to consideration of a new paradigm constructed on neo-Wilsonian premises.

A2: Realism - Outdated

Realism is false – can’t explain modern day security situations.

Nuruzzaman 6( Prof @ U of Alberta,  *International Studies Perspectives*, vol 7, p. 248,06, ET)

The realist opposition to the Iraq war, a careful analysis would suggest, was based on two specific groundsFirst, small states have little influence on the balance of power. In other words, maintaining balance of power between great and major powers is more important, and fights between great and weak powers should be avoided. Second, occupation is a hugely costly game not only in economic and military terms but also in terms of serious resistance to the occupation forces. Nationalism remains a mighty powerful force specifically in the Third World, and it leads to deadly insurgencies or struggles for freedom when countries like Vietnam or Iraq are occupied. This theoretical realist opposition is, however, more a prescription for restraint than an actual explanation of the Iraq war. The growing unease of the realists with the invasion and occupation of Iraq lends some degree of credence to the point that the existing realist theories or academic realism fall short of explaining this historic event satisfactorily. Perhaps, the concept of ‘‘neo-conservative realism,’’ which is related to the realist theories but uses a much wider concept of national interest involving security and the promotion of American ideology and values, can better explain how the Bush administration planned and executed the invasion of Iraq, unilaterally defying the opposition of the allies and the wider international community. As developed and elaborated in the next section, ‘‘neo-conservative realism,’’ like the academic realist theories, accepts the concept of national interest as a foundation stone but not in the strict sense of security or prosperity traditionally invoked by realists of all stripes. National interest, the neo-conservative realists would define, stands for an unchallenged American global leadership and the expansion of the American empire of liberty, democracy, and free market backed by a mighty military machine. The purpose of military power is to prop up the empire of liberty and freedom by challenging and eliminating anti-American regimes, organizations, and values.

New threats are based off of technology and radicalism - renders realism inaccurate for describing foreign relations

Nuruzzaman 6( Prof @ U of Alberta,  *International Studies Perspectives*, vol 7, p. 251,06, ET)

The September 11, 2001, attack on the American heartland, so long well protected by the vast body of waters of the Atlantic and the Pacific, ushered in some fundamental changes in the global security environment. The new structure of threats defined as the combination of ‘‘technology and radicalism,’’ the categories of threat agents mainly nonstate in nature and the identification of ‘‘rogue states’’ having connections to terrorist organizations, and allegedly developing weapons of mass destruction, are something new to the security planners worldwide. The realist theories command wide relevance to explain issues of wars and peace involving great and major powers. After the catastrophic attack of September 11, the changed nature of security environment, new nature of threats to global, or more specifically American security and the emergence of new threat agents have put the realist theories in an uncomfortable situation. It is not clear how the explanatory powers of the realist theories can fully account for such unique developments in the field. It seems quite relevant to argue that the two criteria, pointed out by Stephen Walt and reported in the introductory section of this paper, to judge any theory the explanatory power of a theory to account for real-world events, and the theory’s internal fertility to refine and expand itself to explain anomalies may not apply to the realist theories with regard to the war on terror and its extension to Iraq to replace the Saddam Hussein regime. It does not mean that realist theories are altogether irrelevant in the new context; rather, the objective is to report that the biggest anomaly of our time the war on terror directed against a nonstate shadowy actor and then a weak nonthreatening state is not amenable to a satisfactory explanation by realist theories. Walt’s second criterion the theory’s internal fertility for refinement and expansion to grab new but irregular developments arguably denies the realist theories a valid ground to expand and explain America’s war on terror.

A2: Realism - 9/11 Proof

Event of 9/11 has redefined international relations, rendering realism inapplicable.

Nuruzzaman 6( Prof @ U of Alberta,  *International Studies Perspectives*, vol 7, p. 245,06, ET)

Most international relations scholars and commentators share the view that the international security environment has undergone qualitative changes in the post– September 11, 2001, attack on New York and Washington, DC. Shortly after the attack, President George W. Bush delivered his State of the Union speech and declared a war on terror. This was a new kind of war aimed at defeating terror and getting the world rid of fear for good. The president emphatically said: Great harm has been done to us. . . . Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedomFthe great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every timeFnow depends on us. Our nationFthis generationFwill lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail. . . . The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them. (Bush 2001) The war on terror primarily meant a major war to dismantle the organizational networks of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and deny the Qaeda leadership any foothold elsewhere. The rationale of the war was outlined in a militarily very significant document of The National Security Strategy of the United States of America issued in September 2002. This document, which is also known as the Bush Doctrine, is in reality a compilation of President Bush’s different speeches delivered after the catastrophic attack. Chapter V: ‘‘Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction’’ outlines the Bush administration’s use of force approach and policy. It defines threat as the combination of ‘‘radicalism and technology.’’ In the words of President Bush: The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology, when that occurs, even weak states and small groups Beyond the Realist Theories could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. (National Security Strategy, p. 13) The new definition of threat marks a serious departure from the post–WorldWar II concept of security that defined security as the immunity of a state or nation to threats emanating from outside its boundaries. Nation-states, hostile to each other, were the principal sources of threats. The new definition, in contrast, singles out three sources of threat agents: terrorist organizations capable of striking anywhere in the globe, including the American heartland; weak states that harbor terrorist organizations; and rogue states that massacre their own people and are determined to acquire WMD. While the first two threat agents referred to Al-Qaeda and Afghanistan, the third threat agent specifically pointed to Iraq, the target of invasion after Afghanistan. The identification of terrorist organizations with access to deadly military technology, in particular, adds a serious element to the current international security environment. Another notable feature of the National Security Strategy 2002 is its repudiation of the Cold War concepts of deterrence and containment. Although deterrence still remains valid to prevent dangerous states from undertaking dangerous moves, it commands less value with regard to rogue states and terrorist organizations. The National Security Strategy states: ‘‘In the cold war we faced a generally status-quo, risk-averse adversary . . . But deterrence based only on threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their own people, and the wealth of their nations. . . . Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy’’ (National Security strategy, p. 15). Deterrence, according to this argument, fails exactly because terrorist organizations neither represent any particular people nor any exact chunk of territory. Rather, they carry out horrible acts of destruction and killings through the use of secret networks and communication channels. In his address to the West Point Military Academy in New York on June 1, 2002, President Bush emphasized: ‘‘Deterrence, the promise of massive retaliation against nations, means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend’’ (Bush 2002a). Clearly, the projection of new threats, the identification of a new set of threat agents, and the abandonment of the traditional deterrence theory to deal with new threats and threat agents are something new within the parlor of security studies. Terrorist organizations bent on realizing radical objectives or carrying out carnages are nothing new in international politics; what is new is their capacity to strike at the heart of the most powerful nation on earth. This unprecedented terrorist capacity not only changed the security environment, but it has also brought about some qualitative dimensions to the pattern of interstate relations. For example, the National Security Strategy 2002 poses a dangerous threat to the sovereign equality of nation-states enshrined in the United Nations Charter. In the wake of the September 11 attack, President Bush declared that America had the right to pursue terrorists anywhere and bring them before justice. The right to seek out and destroy terrorist organizations anywhere in the world grants the United States an imperial role while subjecting other states to the mercy of the American leadership. Even before the September 11 attack, President Bush sounded an arrogant unilateralism in American foreign policy; his administration refused to be a party to the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court but decided to move ahead with the National Missile Defense Program ignoring vigorous domestic and international opposition (Brooks and Wohlforth 2002; Mandelbaum 2002).

A2: Realism - 9/11 Proof

Realism is inapplicable post 9/11- it can no longer be applied to international relations accurately.

Nuruzzaman 6( Prof @ U of Alberta,  *International Studies Perspectives*, vol 7, p. 246-7,06, ET)

The invasion and occupation of Iraq by the Bush administration poses some challenges to all varieties of realist theories. The invasion took place at a time when the United States was the undisputed leader of the post–Cold War unipolar world, with Europe, Japan, the Russian Federation, and China falling far behind. Despite a relative decline compared with Japan and the European Union, America still tops the list of nations of the world in terms of economic, political, military, and cultural powers. The vast possession of both hard and soft powers, the choice of America as the hub of international investment, the acceptability of the American dollar as international currency, and high-quality diplomacy put America as the number one nation in the world. The Americans still command the globe’s most resources, produce 30% of world product, and their economy is still 40% larger than the nearest rival (see Cox 2001:21). The American supremacy was not definitely challenged by Saddam Hussein provoking hostile military acts by the current American leadership. Iraq, judged by any yardstick of power, was not a great or major power 246 Beyond the Realist Theories posing any serious challenges to American security or national interests. The UN sanctions imposed in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War already crippled Iraq and its military muscle, effectively blocking any possibility of WMD development by the Saddam Hussein regime. All variants of realist theories predict war between major and Great Powers, provided they perceive real challenges from each other and if wars are seen as necessary to improve relative power positions. The defensive realists support the status quo by arguing that defensive military postures strengthen national security of a state while posing no threats to its rivals. Expansions by powerful states, according to them, do not produce major benefits. The offensive camp of structural realism, in contrast, predicts that Great Powers may undertake opportunistic aggressions if conquests are deemed to produce benefits for the conquerors. The classical realists clearly state that human aggressiveness and anarchy might precipitate devastating warfare between nations. It can be argued that none of the realist positions clearly explains the catastrophic American invasion and occupation of Iraq.

A2: Realism – Human Nature

Realism can’t explain motivation

Broughton 5 (Public Policy Program, @ Australian Nat U, *Millennium - Journal of International Studies Vol 33*, p. 886-867, ET)

One particular strength of What Moves Man is the focus on recent advances in psychology and cognitive science to our understanding of ‘motivation’. Drawing on this literature, Freyberg-Inan introduces three motivational attitudes as relevant to understanding state behaviour and decision-making, in contrast to realism’s theoretical dependence solely on power. These sources of motivation are categorised as ‘power’, ‘achievement’ and ‘affiliation’ according to the primary need pursued. Together they can account for reasons of behaviour in more situations than could power alone. This includes situations for which an observer would otherwise struggle to provide a meaningful explanation (if relying solely on ‘power’), or where rational behaviour would otherwise seem irrational when viewed only against the power conception of motivation. What Moves Man presents a wide-ranging and interdisciplinary overview of the relevant literature. The book is presented on intertextual lines, with heavy use of quotation. Much of its critique of realism is not new. Nevertheless, it does an exemplary job of drawing together various veins of criticism to present a cogent assessment of the paradigm on two levels. The first is realism’s claim to be a serious scientific theory—with its resultant reputation and aura of legitimacy/ credibility—and what this means for its explanatory or predictive power. The second is realism’s reductionist psychological base, which is further confused by an alleged contradictory theoretical aim (‘descriptive’ versus ‘prescriptive’). Interestingly, Freyberg-Inan draws on realism’s hoariest old stalwarts to support her case. What Moves Man provides a sympathetic reading of Hobbes, Thucydides and even Machiavelli—deriding many realist readings of these seminal authors as naïve and out of context. Thucydides is given particular emphasis as an early writer who acknowledged the same three bases for motivation in foreign affairs (power, achievement and affiliation) that have been supported by the modern research Freyberg-Inan cites. The writings of Hobbes and Machiavelli are claimed as misunderstood normative works taken by modern realists as positivist studies.

Realism misreads psychological concepts like motivation and incentives – The theory is anti-scientific

Broughton 5 (Public Policy Program, @ Australian Nat *U,Millennium - Journal of International Studies Vol 33*, p. 885, ET)

In What Moves Man, Annette Freyberg-Inan contends that realism (including classical, structural, offensive, and other variants) has developed into the dominant ‘Kuhnian’ paradigm of IR, and that this is detrimental to the study and practice of the discipline. She argues that as a result of attaining paradigmatic status realism has dissipated its claims to ‘scientificicity’ as a falsifiable set of theories. She also argues that realism’s assumptions concerning human nature and motivation are biased in ways that adversely affect explanations of, and guidance for, the conduct of international politics. This bias ‘supports the selffulfilling prophecy of the realist paradigm’, and is maintained and escapes persistent scrutiny precisely because of realism’s paradigmatic status. She concludes: ‘It encourages distorted judgements of the motives of others and creates incentives to respond to their behaviour in exactly the ways predicted by the paradigmatic worldview’ (p. 151). Freyberg-Inan is not ‘anti-realist’, nor a proselytiser for one of realism’s rivals. Rather, she protests that no contemporary theory adequately explains international relations, and more importantly, that none offer an adequate guide for political action and decision-making. She suggests that the discipline needs new integrative frameworks crossing theoretical and disciplinary boundaries. Such integrative frameworks are essential to break the current paradigm, to avoid the bias identified in realism, and to keep pace with developments in other fields and their impact on our understanding of international relations. Freyberg-Inan sees some merit in aspects of the realist framework, but her concerns are for what she sees as substantial theoretical weaknesses that are hidden, or routinely protected, through ad hoc adjustments to its broad theoretical base. The example given concerns the continually adjusted definition of the concept of ‘power’, which is wielded in different ways by realists according to the phenomena they are purporting to explain. Such adjustments serve to obscure the ‘boldness’ of realism’s motivational assumptions, leading it to ignore all other possibly relevant motives for state action that do not fit the ‘fear-power’ nexus for determining national interest and the likely behaviour of other states.

A2: Realism – Human Nature

Realism ignores evolution and human action

Peterson and Runyan 99 ( Poli-SCi at U of AZ, Prof @ wright State of Women’s studies,*Global Gender Issues,* 99, p. 227-228, ET)

Avowedly modernist in orientation, realism claims to be rooted not in a theory of how international relations ought to work, but in a privileged reading of a necessary and predetermined foreign policy environment. 28 In its orthodox form political realism assumes that international politics are and must be dominated by the will to power. Moral aspirations in the international arena are merely protective coloration and propaganda or the illusions that move hopeless idealists. What is most revealing about this assessment of human nature is not its negativity but its fatalism. There is little if any place for human moral evolution or perfectibility. Like environmental determinism—most notably the social darwinism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—political realism presumes that human social nature, even if ethically deplorable, cannot be significantly improved upon. From the stationary perspective of social scientific realism in its pure form, the fatal environment of human social interaction can be navigated but not conquered. Description, in other words, is fate. All who dare to challenge the order—Carter’s transgression—will do much more damage than good. The idealist makes a bad situation much worse by imagining a better world in the face of immutable realities. As one popular saying among foreign policy practitioners goes: “Without vision, men die. With it, more men die.” 70 (continued) The implications of this social philosophy are stark. Tremendous human suffering can be rationalized away as the inevitable product of the impersonal international system of power relations. World leaders are actively encouraged by the realists to put aside moral pangs of doubt and play the game of international politics according to the established rules of political engagement. This deliberate limitation of interest excuses leaders from making hard moral choices. While a moralist Protestant like Jimmy Carter sees history as a progressive moral struggle to realize abstract ideals in the world, the realist believes that it is dangerous to struggle against the inexorable. The moral ambiguities of political and social ethics that have dogged philosophy and statesmanship time out of mind are simply written out of the equation. Since ideals cannot be valid in a social scientific sense, they cannot be objectively true. The greatest barrier to engaging the realists in serious dialogue about their premises is that they deny that these questions can be seriously debated. First, realists teach a moral philosophy that denies itself. There is exceedingly narrow ground, particularly in the technical vocabulary of the social sciences, for discussing the moral potential of humanity or the limitations of human action. Yet, as we have seen in the tragedy of Jimmy Carter, a philosophical perspective on these very questions is imparted through the back door. It is very hard to argue with prescription under the guise of description. The purveyors of this philosophical outlook will not admit this to themselves, let alone to potential interlocutors. [End Page 21] Second, and most importantly, alternative perspectives are not admitted as possibilities—realism is a perspective that as a matter of first principles denies all others. There is, as we have seen in the Carter narrative, alleged to be an immutable reality that we must accept to avoid disastrous consequences. Those who do not see this underlying order of things are idealists or amateurs. Such people have no standing in debate because they do not see the intractable scene that dominates human action. Dialogue is permissible within the parameters of the presumed order, but those who question the existence or universality of this controlling scene are beyond debate.

**The assumption that realism makes about human nature is not explicit for explaining the theory as a whole making the analysis from it illegitimate.**

Freyberg -Inan 4 (Annette, Assistant Prof. for International Relations and Comparative Politics @ the UvA Political Science Department, *What moves man: the realist theory of international relations and its Judgment of Human Nature,* State University of NY press) (pg6)

Motives are aroused by internal or external stimuli, such as hunger or provocation, and determine how human beings will react to such stimuli. Motive arousal may be explained as a function of three main variables: Motive dispositions, or needs, such as physical drives; characteristics of the incentive, that is, the opportunities that present themselves to fulfill these needs; and expectations of the attainability of goals, or the difficulty and likelihood of taking advantage of those opportunities. Thus, motives are related to , yet at least conceptually distinguishable from , needs incentives, and goals. It is useful to conceptualize the process of motivation as has been suggested by Russell Geen: Actors are always simultaneously confronted with their own needs and with external situations that affect what is achievable. Both need and situation determine which behavioral incentives the actor will perceive. The actor then defines his goals accordingly and will take action to achieve these goals. The assumptions that realism makes about the nature of human motivations are less easy to identify than some of the more commonly acknowledged postulates of the paradigm. Realist theories emphasize different aspects of the same realist view of human nature for different purposes, which allows them to achieve plausibility under a variety of circumstances. They also frequently on a precise and comprehensive definition of the realist view of human nature, nor an analysis of its role.

A2: Realism – A2: State-Focus Key

**Realist focus on state power is wrong – Power changes – Globalization Proves.**

Held 96 (David, December, Prof. of Political Science and co-direct. of the Centre for the Study of Global Governance within the Government Department @ the London School of Economics, "Realism vs. Cosmopolitanism" http://www.polity.co.uk/global/realism-vs-cosmopolitanism.asp)

I think 'the division' is certainly called into question. But I am in agreement with a great deal of what Barry has said. The realist focus on political power has been extremely important in illuminating the dynamic relations between states, the nature of the growth in relations among states, and the centrality of war in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. After all, the twentieth century, despite all its claims to civilisation, has been one of the most violent of all centuries, if not the most violent. But the perspective I take, the 'cosmopolitan perspective' for the purposes of the discussion, highlights a number of key things. One is that the single-minded focus on political power and the state, which is so much at the centre of realism, is insufficient to examine the complexity of the world in which we live. What the cosmopolitan perspective says is that if power is important, and it indeed is, it is to be found not just in relations within states and among states, but across other dimensions of social life as well. So I would say that an account of the structure of power must be a multi-dimensional account, looking at economic phenomena, political phenomena, social phenomena, technological phenomena, cultural phenomena, and so on. One finds power, power systems and power conflicts in all these realms. Contra realism, I would argue that state power is but one (albeit important) dimension of power; and that aspects of all of these dimensions need to be understood if the nature and prospects of state politics are themselves to be grasped satisfactorily. **A.Mc.:** How does this multidimensional account of power relate to the importance cosmopolitans, like yourself, attach to globalization. Is globalization transforming the state and state power? **D.H.:** The issue of globalization does raise particular questions about political power and nation-states. On the one hand, many people claim we live in a global world. I call these the 'hyperglobalizers', who assert that the nation-state is no longer central to the modern world: it is displaced; it is locked into a variety of complex processes; it's power is denuded by world markets, by the growth of regions, by changing structures of international law, by environmental processes and so on. I think this view exaggerates the nature of the global changes with which we live. We live at a moment that can indeed be characterized as 'a global age', but the hyperglobalizers have misunderstood the nature of this age. On the other hand, there are those who think that nothing fundamentally has changed for the last hundred years, that the world is no more international than it was, for example, during the gold standard era, and that the relations between states are, in some senses, less complex than they were during the British Empire. After all, the British Empire was an extraordinary political system which stretched across many regions and territories of the world. I think this sceptical view is also wrong but in order to tell you why, I ought to say something briefly about what globalization is and about the view that I take of it. For me globalization involves a shift in the spatial form of human organization and activity to transcontinental or interregional patterns of activity, interaction and the exercise of power. It is not a case of saying there was no globalization, there is now. Rather, it is a case of saying we can examine and distinguish different historical forms of globalization in terms of the extensity of networks of social relations and connections, the intensity of the flows and links within these networks, and the impact of these phenomena on particular communities. (In making these distinctions I am deploying concepts colleagues and I have been developing in research on globalization for some time (see David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*, Cambridge, Polity, 1999).) I believe if you trace out within this framework the changing structure of trade, finance and multinational corporations, to take just three phenomena, you can show how in the late twentieth century we live in a world in which states are more enmeshed in global processes and flows than they have ever been before. Political power, in other words, is being re-positioned, re-contextualized and, to a degree, transformed by the growing importance of other (less territorially based) power systems.

A2: Realism – A2: State-Focus Key

There is little analysis as to the reason why people, and nation states seek power which form the foundations of realism.

Snyder 2 (Glenn, Summer 02, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, *International Security*, 27(1) pp. 171)

The Tragedy of Great Power Politics is a pessimistic book, even as realist books go. Of course there is nothing wrong with pessimism if it is based on empirical truth and solid logic. The trouble here is in the logic: Although it is coherent and without obvious inconsistency, it is sometimes pushed to extremes. Exhibit A in this respect is the claim that all great powers all the time are primarily concerned with maximizing power so as to maximize their security. Can it really be true that the world is condemned to a future of constant conºict and power struggles simply because of its anarchic political system and the desire of its units to survive? Are great powers really as ambitious, self-centered, and single-minded as this hypothesis implies? Granted that security seeking will be natural in such a system, is there any compelling reason why the search must persist *à l’outrance* until the searcher dominates its neighbors?34 Mearsheimer’s unremitting focus on power-security competition among great powers necessarily means that many aspects of international politics normally considered essential are either given short shrift or omitted entirely. Conversely, the struggle for power assumes a bloated role far beyond what might be considered “realistic.” Most conspicuously slighted in the analysis are the nonsecurity interests of states, such as advancement of an ideology. There is no mention of transnational movements such as terrorism and religious and ethnic strife. The book slights norms, institutions, and most kinds of interstate cooperation. Domestic politics are entirely omitted. Some might argue that these are topics that Mearsheimer, as a realist, should not be required to address. That depends, however, on how much distortion has been introduced by omittingthem. In my view, too much, unless the power-maximizingclaim is considerably modiªed. There are two salient ways of modifying this claim: via a marginal utility calculation or an ideal-type model. In the worst, states weigh costs and risks against security and other benefits when they decide whether to attempt expansion. Some of the costs and risks, as well as some of the benefits, will normally be in nonsecurity coin. Some will be anticipations of costs that may be imposed by other actors in resistance. Some of the beneªts may be reduced, as security goals are pared down to match the limits of anticipated power. These considerations and qualifications amount to approaching security decisions as problems in maximizing marginal utility. The original hypothesis is dedicated to “great powers expand until marginal costs begin to exceed marginal benefits.” Such a hypothesis, obviously, is less extreme, more embracing, and more plausible— even if less parsimonious—than the original claim.35 The ideal-type model would grant the original claim the status of “initial working hypothesis”; something not intended as a statement of empirical truth but as a benchmark from which deviations might be identiªed and measured. Few social scientists present their theories explicitly in this form, and Mearsheimer does not do so. What they do, and what Mearsheimer does, is to state the theory as a sufªcient explanation of its subject matter, leavingit up to the reader to understand that it is really only a partial explanation (and to keep his grain of salt handy). The ideal-type model preserves the initial hypothesis intact, but only as a point of departure for more “realistic” estimates.

Realism assumes a world of power, when power itself is in constant flux.

Orford 2k (Anne Orford, August, "REVIEW ESSAY: Positivism and the Power of International Law: Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and Customary International Law by Michael Byers", 24 Melbourne U. L.R. 502, lexis law)

In a somewhat puzzling concluding chapter, Byers appears to distance himself from the assumptions of statism, realism and positivism upon which he has based his analysis, despite the fact that this trinity shapes the universe he imagines in these pages. His disconcerting conclusion imagines a future which seems to me to be the past. For example, Byers suggests that 'although this book has adopted a statist assumption for the purposes of its analysis, the dynamic character of international society may eventually render this assumption inappropriate even for methodological purposes.' [n83](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1275799756595&returnToKey=20_T9490056865&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.596481.9272994545#n83) Many scholars would argue that this has been the case for some time. [n84](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1275799756595&returnToKey=20_T9490056865&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.596481.9272994545#n84) Similarly, Byers describes a future in which it may be necessary to think about power in different ways: Were international society to change, the term power could easily be applied in an expanded manner to include all non-legal forms of power ... Although the sources of power which are of greatest importance to the customary process today involve the economic and military abilities of States, and legal obligation in the form of rules and principles of international law, the relative importance of different sources of power could also easily change. Indeed, they will have to change, should the State-centric character of international law be redefined. [n85](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1275799756595&returnToKey=20_T9490056865&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.596481.9272994545#n85) Yet, critical theorists have been arguing for decades that it is necessary to study power using new methodologies and that the relative importance of different sources of power had changed by the 19th century. [n86](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1275799756595&returnToKey=20_T9490056865&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.596481.9272994545#n86) By making his statist, positivist and realist assumptions the starting point of his analysis, Byers can forever defer the arrival of this future of methodological change. [n87](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1275799756595&returnToKey=20_T9490056865&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.596481.9272994545#n87) In the remainder of this review, I want to sketch some of the ways in which a broader conception of interdisciplinarity can open international law up to a different set of questions about power and responsibility

A2: Realism – A2: State-Focus Key

**Realists assume that power lies in the state to enact and project its authority but its focus on state power ignores local effects of power.**

Orford 2k (Anne Orford, August, "REVIEW ESSAY: Positivism and the Power of International Law: Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and Customary International Law by Michael Byers", 24 Melbourne U. L.R. 502, lexis law)

Let us not, therefore, ask why certain people want to dominate, what they seek, what is their overall strategy. Let us ask, instead, how things work at the level of on-going subjugation, at the level of those continuous and uninterrupted processes which subject our bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our behaviours etc. In other words, rather than ask ourselves how the sovereign appears to us in his lofty isolation, we should try to discover how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted. ... We should try to grasp subjection in its material instance as a constitution of subjects. [n139](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1275799756595&returnToKey=20_T9490056865&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.596481.9272994545#n139) It is important to stress that this argument does not imply that international lawyers and international relations scholars should forget the state in their theoretical work. Instead, the argument understands the meaning of state power differently. While sovereignty and the state must continue to be a focus of analysis for those who work in these disciplines, 'the power effects of the state must be radically retheorized'. [n140](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1275799756595&returnToKey=20_T9490056865&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.596481.9272994545#n140) A reconceptualisation of power along the lines proposed by Foucault suggests that while sovereign states, international organisations, superpowers, the global market and at times international law are certainly effects of power, they are not the sources of power. The sense that these entities are omnipotent is itself an effect of power relations. [n141](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1275799756595&returnToKey=20_T9490056865&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.596481.9272994545#n141) It is not that more coercive top-down models of power are useless in understanding international legal phenomena such as wars, violent military interventions, economic restructuring and the violence imposed in these ways. On the contrary, classical models of power and coercion are useful in understanding these phenomena. The exclusive adoption of that model of power, however, limits the capacity to explore other effects of the operation of power. For example, Foucault's model of power is useful in attempting to understand the 'private life of war', colonialism or capitalism within industrialised liberal democratic states. [n142](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1275799756595&returnToKey=20_T9490056865&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.596481.9272994545#n142) By abandoning sovereign power as the central premise of analysis, it becomes possible to analyse the ways in which local effects of power and local tactics combine to make what we are used to calling politics possible. In order to analyse the operation of power in any given situation, we can look to its local effects, rather than looking for, and reproducing in our analyses, some powerful sovereign figure from whom such power is supposedly emanating.  [\*524]  Given his argument that disciplinary power has emerged as the central mode of the exercise of power, Foucault suggests that we might have expected the theory of sovereign power to have disappeared or at least have been displaced. Yet, as he points out, the sovereign model of power is still fundamental to the way in which the operation of power is understood. As I have argued, this model of power is still central to international legal theory in particular. Foucault then asks why this theory of sovereignty has persisted. [n143](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1275799756595&returnToKey=20_T9490056865&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.596481.9272994545#n143) His answer is twofold. First, attacks on sovereign power operate as a means of critiquing any existing obstacles to the rise of disciplinary power. Second, the legal system based upon sovereign power is 'superimposed upon the mechanisms of discipline in such a way as to conceal its actual procedures'. [n144](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1275799756595&returnToKey=20_T9490056865&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.596481.9272994545#n144) The effect of focusing only on the juridical or sovereign form of power is to mask the operation of power in its disciplinary form and, thus, to make that form of power all the more effective. Sovereign power and disciplinary power may thus coexist in ways that are very productive. Gayatri Spivak has argued that Foucault's 'monist and unified access' to this new conception of power is itself 'made possible by a certain stage in exploitation'. [n145](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1275799756595&returnToKey=20_T9490056865&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.596481.9272994545#n145) For Spivak, the new disciplinary mechanism of power in operation in 17th- and 18th-century Europe 'is secured by means of territorial imperialism--the Earth and its products--"elsewhere".' [n146](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1275799756595&returnToKey=20_T9490056865&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.596481.9272994545#n146) Her argument is an important one for any attempt to use Foucault's reconceptualisation of power to think about international law. While disciplinary power may well provide a model for exploring the power effects of international legal discourse in states like Australia, the model of sovereign power and the focus on exploitation may better provide a means for considering the power effects of international law as it operates in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe. Let me give two examples of the relationship between disciplinary power, sovereign power and international law. The first example is the way in which legal texts about actions of the UN Security Council or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ('NATO') legitimise the use of force. These texts have an effect as cultural products. The new respectability of military intervention, like 19th-century imperialism and colonialism, is enabled through faith in the idea that 'certain territories and peoples require and beseech domination'. [n147](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1275799756595&returnToKey=20_T9490056865&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.596481.9272994545#n147) Whether through arguments about the need to control state aggression and increasing disorder, or through appeals to the need to protect human rights, democracy and humanitarianism, international lawyers paint a picture of a world in which increased intervention by international organisations is desirable and in the interest of those in the states targeted for intervention.

A2: Realism – A2: State-Focus Key

Realism focuses too much on the sole interest of nation states, ceding the political

Nayar 7 ( prof of Law @ U of Warwick, “*People’s Law: Decolonising Legal Imagination,” Law, Social Justice & Global Development Journal*, Issue I, pg 8, 6 Dec 7, ET)

The so-called ‘Realist’ perspective which is based on a world of dualisms - for example, the ‘national’ and the ‘ international’, the ‘political’ and the ‘economic’ – disguises this crucial historical truth of international relations, namely, that the evolution of the State as presently constituted has followed from the intimate mutuality of interests between domestic political forces and transnational economic interests. Being socially located in the international arena, the State is defined by the constant action and reaction of forces which form the networks of transnational social relations.[25](http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2007_1/nayar/" \l "sdendnote25sym" \o "sdendnote25anc) In contrast to the ‘Realist’ precept that the ‘State’ is the original constitutive unit of international relations, and therefore, that it is governed by some ‘internal’ logic of state-centred imperatives, studies on the political-economy of international relations have pointed to the conclusion that the state is a historically specific (re)construction that is the result of the interplay of ‘multiple logics’; the international State system, transnational class structures, the capitalist world economy and the social and cultural conditions prevailing at any given time, these are all factors which directly impinge on the actual functionings of the state.[26](http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2007_1/nayar/" \l "sdendnote26sym" \o "sdendnote26anc) Thus we obtain a view which reveals that the state has throughout been constructed and reconstructed to reflect the minority interests and motivations of ‘globalising elites’. Given this re-viewing of the political-legal landscape, a peoples-centred perspective would bring to the fore the apparent schism between the continued ideological justification for (corporate-)statist law and the realities of (non)-sovereignty (national, let alone peoples’). Seen from a peoples’ viewpoint, upon a constitutional pedestal, like a goddess, lies the proclamation of ‘We the Peoples’. Yet the pole-bearers of the caravan of world-order(ing) chant a different mantra and are driven by a different philosophical and operational guide. We can outline the conditions of non-sovereignty within the Mercury-Blob vision of international relations as follows: • An ideology of (US-dominated) ‘globalisation’ imposed by force rather than constitutionalism through democratic assent provides for the motivational drive for world order(ing). • The institutionalisation of global regimes of governance (including militaryviolence) that are distant from and unaccountable to the ‘ordinary-folks’ of the world provide for the ordering process. • The enforcement of these regimes of governance through coercive mechanisms which do indeed have the capacity to intervene in ways that supersede the proclaimed constitutional state in such matters that fall within their purported transnational purview.

The focus on power is flawed – Power is not critical to security

Cranmer 5 (Poli-Sci @ UNC Chapel Hill, Sep-22-5 p. 8 *Realism and Liberalism Third Pass*, no journal, ET)

Power is the means by which a state’s security is guaranteed: This assumption implies that power is the only means by which a state’s security may be guaranteed. This assumption is (at the very least) demonstrably false in the lower limit of power and internally contradictory at the upper limit. At the lower limit, Costa Rica and Switzerland both lack militaries and have for some time; neither of their security’s seem to be threatened nor do either of them seem to be concerned with a lack of security. Thus, the assumption is false in the lower limit. At the upper limit, realists cannot agree on the extent to which power guarantees security. Realists such as Waltz (1954, 1979) argue that when one state accumulates much more power than others, a balancing coalition will form against it, thus reducing the security of the state in the upper limits of power. Conversely, hegemonic stability theory (i.e. Gilpin (1981)) argues that when one state possesses more power than others (by a sufficiently large, but ill defined margin), no state or coalition will be willing to challenge the hegemon; by implication, the hegemon will be assured of its security in such a case. Thus, the assumption is theoretically contested at the upper limit of power. So, while we cannot conclusively demonstrate that the assumption about the primacy of power is universally false (evidence in the midrange is less clear), we can indeed demonstrate that the assumption about the primacy of power is not universally true.

A2: Realism – A2: State-Focus Key

Realism is too focused on balance of powers and quest for security to be correct.

Grondin 4 (Assistant Professor @ U of Ottowa, presented at the annual International Studies Association Convention, 17-20 Mar. 4, ET)

Committed to an explanatory logic, realist analysts are less interested in the constitutive processes of states and state systems than in their functional existence, which they take as given. They are more attentive to regulation, through the military uses of force and strategic practices that establish the internal and external boundaries of the states system. Their main argument is that matters of security are the immutable driving forces of global politics. Indeed, most realists see some strategic lessons as being eternal, such as balance of power politics and the quest for national security. For Brooks and Wohlforth, balance of power politics (which was synonymous with Cold War politics in realist discourses) is the norm: “The result — balancing that is rhetorically grand but substantively weak — is politics as usual in a unipolar world” (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002: 29). National security discourses constitute the “observed realities” that are the grist of neorealist and neoclassical realist theories. These theories rely upon U.S. material power (the perception of U.S. relative material power for neoclassical realists), balance of power, and the global distribution of power to explain and legitimate American national security conduct. Their argument is circular since they depict a reality that is constituted by their own discourse, in addition to legitimizing American strategic behavior. Realists often disagree about the use of force – on military restraint versus military intervention, for example – but the differences pertain to strategies of power, that is, means as opposed to ends. Realist discourses will not challenge the United States’ position as a prominent military power. As Barry Posen maintains, “[o]ne pillar of U.S. hegemony is the vast military power of the United States. […] Observers of the actual capabilities that this effort produces can focus on a favorite aspect of U.S. superiority to make the point that the United States sits comfortably atop the military food chain, and is likely to remain there” (Posen, 2003: 7).

Realism is wrong- States do not always resort to self help in the face of threats to balance power.

Schroeder 94 (Paul, Summer, American [historian](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historian) and professor emeritus of history @ the [University of Illinois](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Illinois_at_Urbana-Champaign), *International* *Security*, 19(1) pg 116)

Do all states, or virtually all, or all that really count, actually resort to self-help in the face of threats to their security and independence? Though Waltz does not clearly define self-help or describe its practice, one may reasonably infer, given the link frequently drawn between self-help and the balance of power, and given Waltz's insistence on the primacy of power and the struc-tural role of the potential and actual use of force in international politics, that self-help means, at least generally and primarily, the potential or actual use of a state's own power along with that of other units for the purposes of compellence, deterrence, and other modes of controlling the actions of one's opponents. By Waltz's rules for testing theories, neo-realist theory should correctly predict or confirm this kind of conduct in international politics throughout history, and Waltz clearly believes it does so. So, as discussed below, does Christopher Layne, and so do (and to some extent must) other realists. I do not. I cannot construct a history of the European states system from 1648 to 1945 based on the generalization that most unit actors within that system responded to crucial threats to their security and independence by resorting to self-help, as defined above. In the majority of instances this just did not happen. In each major period in these three centuries, most unit actors tried if they possibly could to protect their vital interests in other ways. (This includes great powers as well as smaller ones, undermining the neo-realist argument that weaker states are more inclined to bandwagon than stronger ones, as discussed below.) The reasons are clear. For one thing, most states, most of the time, could not afford a strategy of self-help of this kind. They were like landowners with valuable property which they knew they could not possibly insure, first because insurance premiums were ruinously expensive, second because against the most devastating dangers no insurance policy was available at any price, and third because the very attempt on their part to take out an insurance policy would encourage robbers to attack them. Hence the insurance policies they took out and maintained in the form of armed forces, alliances, and diplomacy were mostly intended to protect against minor risks and to deter casual attacks or vandalism, with the full knowledge that if something more serious threatened, another re-course would be necessary. Other strategies were available and often tried. One commonly employed was hiding from threats. This could take various forms: simply ignoring the threat or declaring neutrality in a general crisis, possibly approaching other states on one or both sides of a quarrel to get them to guarantee one's safety; trying to withdraw into isolation; assuming a purely defensive position in the hope that the storm would blow over; or, usually as a later or last resort, seeking protection from some other power or powers in exchange for dip-lomatic services, friendship, or non-military support, without joining that power or powers as an ally or committing itself to any use of force on its part.25 A strategy less common, but far from unusual or unknown, was transcending, i.e., attempting to surmount international anarchy and go be-yond the normal limits of conflictual politics: to solve the problem, end the threat, and prevent its recurrence through some institutional arrangement involving an international consensus or formal agreement on norms, rules, and procedures for these purposes. Efforts of this kind were made in every era of these centuries. Another strategy was bandwagoning, i.e., joining the stronger side for the sake of protection and payoffs, even if this meant insecurity vis-a-vis the protecting power and a certain sacrifice of independence. Against the views of some, such as Waltz and Stephen M. Walt,26 I see bandwagoning as historically more common than balancing, particularly by smaller powers. Finally comes the strategy which, according to Waltz and others, is dominant and structural in international politics: self-help in the form of balancing against an actual or potential hegemon.

A2: Realism – A2: No Realism = War

Their reading of the cause of war is wrong

Snyder 1 (Poli-Sci @ U of NC- CH,, *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 1, pg 167, ET)

Mearsheimer also employs his three structural models in an assessment of the causes of war. Bipolarity is the most peaceful, unbalanced multipolarity the most prone to conflict and war, and balanced multipolarity somewhere in between. The two multipolar systems are more unstable (defining instability as proneness to war) than bipolar ones for three reasons: (1) they have more potential conflict dyads, (2) the likelihood of power imbalances is greater, including two states ganging up on one, and (3) there is greater potential for miscalculation. This reasoning is similar to that of Waltz and other realists. Mearsheimer’s claim that unbalanced multipolarity is the most unstable system is original, however. By definition, an unbalanced multipolar system contains a potential hegemon. Such a state will push further, toward regional hegemony, “because hegemony is the ultimate form of security” (p. 345), and because it has the capability to achieve supremacy. Other states become more fearful and will take greater risks in attempting to correct the imbalance. These balancing efforts, however, will be viewed as “encirclement” by the would-be hegemon, who may take further steps to advance its security, setting off a spiral of mutual fear (p. 345) that is likely to culminate in war. Focusing the tools of offensive realism on Europe and Northeast Asia, Mearsheimer foresees greater instability, perhaps war, in these regions over the next 20 years. The prediction is based on two central variables that are themselves linked (1) whether U.S. troops remain deployed in these regions, and (2) possible changes in regional power structures. Mearsheimer shares the widespread belief that peace in these areas is currently being sustained by the “American pacifier,” the physical presence of U.S. troops.31 Much will depend, therefore, on whether the United States remains so engaged. But that will turn, he argues, on possible changes in the structure of power in each region, in particular, on whether a potential hegemon arises. If that does not occur, the United States eventually will withdraw its troops. The withdrawal would increase the potential for conflict, first by removing the “pacifier” and second by fostering change in the regional power structures.

The neorealist principle of "Balancing of threats" has no empirical reinforcement.

Vasquez 97 (John A, December, Prof. of Political Science @ UOI, *The American Political Science Review* 91(4) pg7 )

The degenerating tendency of the research program in this area can be seen in how Walt conceptualizes his findings and in how the field "refines" them further. "Balance of threat" is a felicitous phrase. The very phraseology makes states' behavior appear much more consistent with the larger paradigm than it actually is. It rhetorically captures all the connotations and emo-tive force of balance of power while changing it only incrementally. It appears as a refinement-insightful and supportive of the paradigm. In doing so, it strips away the anomalous nature and devastating potential of the findings for Waltz's explanation. This problemshift, however, exhibits all four of the characteristics outlined earlier as indicative of degen-erative tendencies within a research program. First, the new concept, "balance of threat," is introduced to explain why states do not balance in the way Waltz theorizes. The balance of threat concept does not appear in Waltz (1979) or in the literature before Walt introduced it in conjunction with his findings. Second, the concept does not point to any novel facts other than the discrepant evidence. Third, therefore this new variant of realism does not have any excess empirical content compared to the original theory, except that it now takes the discrepant evidence and says it supports a new variant of realism. These three degenerating characteristics open up the possibility that, when both the original balance of power proposition and the new balance of threat proposition (T and T', respectively) are taken as two versions of realism, either behavior can be seen as evidence supporting realist theory (in some form) and hence the realist paradigm or approach in general. Waltz (1979, 121) allows a clear test, because bandwag-oning is taken to be the opposite of balancing. Now, Walt splits the concept of balancing into two compo-nents, either one of which will support the realist paradigm (because the second is but "a refinement" of balance-of-power theory). From outside the realist paradigm, this appears as a move to dismiss discrepant evidence and explain it away by an ad hoc theoryshift. Such a move is also a degenerating shift on the basis of the fourth indicator, because it reduces the probability that the corpus of realist propositions can be falsified.

A2: Realism – A2: No Realism = War

They presume a stability in unipolarity which is empirically false

Hulsman 6 (Scholar @ German Council on Foreign Rel, *Open Democracy; Free Thinking For the World,* p. 3-4,20 Sep 6, ET)

Given how the Truman-Eisenhower team was proven largely right about the cold war, and the MacArthurs of this world were proven wrong, it is easy to see why the Bush administration and Democratic hawks would not want us to see this intellectual sleight of hand. But see it we do. For no one is questioning that pre-emption is part of a state's right to self-defense, enshrined in the United Nations charter . In 1967, Israel, on the eve of an imminent attack by the Egyptian air force the next day, struck first. So far, so good. But no one has said that Saddam Hussein, in his weakened state, was about to strike anyone. Rather, the logic went: "Saddam is a bad, bad guy. The sanctions regime (thanks to the Europeans) is falling apart. He has threatened us in the past. We should take him out when he is weak, rather than waiting for him to become strong once again." While this makes perfect sense as an immediate calculation, it certainly is not pre-emption. For preventive wars are wars of choice. And the problem is that if they are accepted, very quickly we will live in the jungle. If the United States can take out Saddam, what is to stop the Indians and the Pakistanis settling scores over Kashmir, the Russians regaining territory and influence in the Caucasus, or the Chinese lunging for Taiwan? All these nuclear states might just take the risk, justifying their actions in terms of the American adventure in Iraq. This heedless obsession with tactics rather than with strategy is what separated Truman from MacArthur in Korea. But, frighteningly, it is the neocons and their hawkish but tacit Democratic allies who are following the preventive teachings of Burnham, even after they were proven conclusively wrong so many years ago. Third, we lay out what the alternate philosophy of ethical realism would look like, concentrating on the thinking of Reinhold Niebuhr [16], Hans Morgenthau [17], and George Kennan, as well as the teachings of Edmund Burke, Thomas Aquinas, and Max Weber. Five core principles - humility, prudence, study, "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind", and patriotism - are at the core of the ethical realist creed. Following such a different philosophical course leads, inevitably, to very different foreign-policy outputs. Fourth, if the Truman-Eisenhower era provides us with a recent political example of what to do, the British empire in the 19th century, and the "great capitalist peace" that underlay its success, provides a historical precedent. Britain then, like the US today, was first among equals in the world, but it certainly was not alone. Other great powers - Germany, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Japan - at different points came to nip at London's heels. And yet for a century, from the dusk settling on the fields of Waterloo in 1815 until the "great war" of 1914 (the Crimean war excepted), there was no general European conflict. The British achieved this outcome by creating common goods that benefited them, but also the other great powers: protecting the sea lanes, sharing in the benefits of trade, building the largest navy and the most vibrant economy for much of the period, and using "soft power" (having Indian princes sent to be educated in England, and winning respect for British cultural norms as well as the inevitable resentment). These attributes are curiously similar to America's position in the world today. It is precisely such a great capitalist peace (now that all the major powers have embraced the capitalist system) that must be reconstructed today, using many of the same tools.

A2: Realism – A2: No Realism = War

Their turn relies on security dilemmas which are conceptually incogent – Realist thinking generates aggression, not vice versa

Snyder 2 (Glenn, Summer 02, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, *International Security*, 27(1) pp. 155)

A central concept in nearly all realist theory is that of the “security dilemma.” Mearsheimer quotes with approval John Herz’s original statement of the dilemma: “Striving to attain security from . . . attack, [states] are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competingunits, power competition ensues and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on” (p. 36).14 This, says Mearsheimer, is “a synoptic statement of offensive realism.” However, this is correct only in a limited sense: The great powers in offensive realism indeed are interested primarily in security, and their security moves do threaten others, causing them to take countermeasures, as in the security dilemma. But here the similarity begins to fade. The security dilemma, in most formulations (includingHerz’s), emphasizes how power and security competition can occur between states that want nothing more than to preserve the status quo.15 Although no one is actually aggressive, uncertainty about others’ intentions forces each to take protective measures that appear threateningto others. But there are no status quo powers in Mearsheimer’s world. All great powers are revisionist and “primed for offense” (p. 3). Mearsheimer does allow that states do not know each other’s intentions for sure, but he also says that they “are likely to recognize their own motives at play in the actions of other states” (p. 35). If all are revisionist and believe (correctly) that others are too, it is hard to see any “dilemma.” Each great power’s security measures present real threats to others, not merely hypothetical ones. Hence there is no question of “unnecessary” competition being generated by the need to ensure against uncertain threats. Moreover, security moves in the offensive realist scenario are moves of territorial expansion, which involve actually taking something from others, rather than merely preparing to do so, as with arms procurement or alliance formation. Because territorial expansion is itself predatory, it strongly implies future predatory intentions. Thus, even though the expanding state’s ultimate objective is “security,” its actual behavior on the way to achievingthis objective may be virtually indistinguishable from pure aggrandizement. In this world, security needs are bound to be incompatible; not everyone can increase their “share of world power” at the same time. There is a lot of security competition but little security “dilemma.”

A2: Realism – A2: Self-Correcting

**Realism provides a distorted world view on politics a concrete paradigm of realism is needed.**

Vasquez 97 (John A, December, Prof. of Political Science @ UOI, *The American Political Science Review* 91(4) pg11 )

The implication of the broader and more radical conclusion is to ask why a concept so long associated with realism should do so poorly and so misguide so many theorists. Could not its failure to pass neotradi-tional and historical "testing" (or investigation) be an indicator of the distorted view of world politics that the paradigm imposes on scholars? Such questions are reasonable to ask, especially in light of appraisals that have found other aspects of realism wanting (see Lebow and Risse-Kappen 1995, Rosecrance and Stein 1993, Vasquez 1983), but they are not the same as logically compelling conclusions that can be derived from the analysis herein. It has been shown only that one major research program, which has commanded a great deal of interest, seems to be exhibiting a degen-erating tendency. Such a demonstration is important in its own right, particularly if analysts are unaware of the collective effect of their individual decisions. In addition, it shows that what admirers of the realist paradigm have often taken as theoretical fertility and a continuing ability to provide new insights is not that at all, but a degenerating process of reformulating itself in light of discrep-ant evidence. Regardless of whether a narrow or broad conclusion is accepted, this analysis has shown that the field needs much more rigor in the interparadigm debate. Only by being more rigorous both in testing the dominant paradigm and in building a new one that can explain the growing body of counterevidence as well as pro-duce new nonobvious findings of its own will progress be made.

Realism isn’t self-correcting – It’s a rigged regime of truth/power

Freyberg -Inan 4, (Annette, Assistant Prof. for International Relations and Comparative Politics @ the UvA Political Science Department, *What moves man: the realist theory of international relations and its Judgment of Human Nature,* State University of NY press) (pg7)

For the most part, discussions of foreign policy have been carried on, since 1945, in the language of political realism that is, the language of power and interests rather ideals or norms" This book will show that realism has not achieved this status by following the logic of science but rather by subverting it. I argue that realism functions as a self-fulfilling prophesy by favoring such interpretation of political events that serve to confirm the assumptions initially adopted. Thus, the empirical validity of realist assumptions becomes difficult to judge. Realist theory, caught up in this circularity, becomes irrefutable. It is quite plausible that the paradigm may have become dominant by virtue of this lack of refutability, rather than by virtue of its superior "realism.". Realism has become the "normal science" of international relations and foreign policy. Thus, if we follow Thomas Kuhn, its status could only be weakened by the discovery of facts that contradict its central hypotheses. According to the Imre Lakatos, its theories can reign as the state of the art until replaced by others that are shown to possess superior explanatory power. The problem here is the following: First, the existence of facts that contradict central hypotheses of realist theory may simply not be acknowledged by staunch realists. Instead, they may be more likely to adopt ad hoc assumptions or adjust their own arguments in an ad hoc fashion to protect their theory from refutation. They do so, in the words of Karl Popper, "only at the price of destroying, or at least powering, its scientific status" by rendering it irrefutable. Second, as a father consequence, it becomes virtually impossible for rival theories to demonstrate superior explanatory power. After all, realism seems to explain everything, or at the very least as much as any of the rivals could. The motivational assumptions of realism play a crucial role in this strategy: First they are usually not made explicit, which makes possible their ad hoc modification and gives realist arguments increased flexibility and an unfair advantage over rival theories with explicit images of human nature. This is why it is important for the sake of progress in the discipline to established a general and maximally consensual definition of what realist motivational assumptions actually are. Second, realist motivational assumptions contain a bias in favor of that particular view of human nature which is consistent with the realist worldview as a whole. As a consequence, they function to support realist arguments ex post facto by favoring such interpretations of political events that are consistent with the same bias. This is why it is important to analyze the role played by these assumptions in realist theory. Finally, the circularity of the realists logic serves to uphold the traditional choice and usage of realist motivational assumptions in the discipline, which is a consequence of this tendency, increases the necessity to examine the effects of this choice and usage.

A2: Realism – A2: History Proves

Realism is not historically proven; realism actually prevents scholars from uncovering historical truths.

Schroeder 94 (Paul, Summer, American [historian](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historian) and professor emeritus of history at the [University of Illinois](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Illinois_at_Urbana-Champaign), *International Security*, 19(1) pp. 147)

The purpose of examining Layne's argument is not to contend that neo-realist theory falls simply because Layne's application of it cannot stand. The point is to show how a normal, standard understanding of neo-realist theory, applied precisely to the historical era where it should fit best, gets the motives, the process, the patterns, and the broad outcomes of international history wrong, and predicts things of major theoretical and historical importance which on closer examination turn out not to be so. It indicates the central problem of neo-realism with international history: that it prescribes and predicts a determinate order for history without having adequately checked this against the historical evidence. What led Layne astray was not any insufficiency in his historical research so much as his theoretical presup-positions. Armed with neo-realist theory, he knew what was essentially to be found in the historical record at the outset, and this helped him find it. International Security 19:1 1 148 Thus the main fault lies with neo-realist theory. Its insistence on the sameness effect and on the unchanging, structurally determined nature of international politics make it unhistorical, perhaps anti-historical.82 This has special deleterious effects on its handling of international history. Neo-realist theory not only prevents scholars from seeing and explaining the various strategies alternative to balancing, or the different functions and roles of various actors within the system, but even blocks a genuine historical un-derstanding of balancing conduct and the balance of power itself as a histor-ical variable, changing over time, conditioned by historical circumstances, and freighted with ideological assumptions.83 Other harmful effects may spread beyond international history to history in general. Rather than illuminating it, the kind of approach involved in neo-realist theory renders it incomprehensible. It obstructs new insights and hypotheses, leads scholars to overlook or explain away large bodies of inconvenient facts, flattens out vital historical distinctions. It may even encourage an attitude toward history not uncommon among scholars of many kinds: an unconscious disdain for it, a disregard of its complexity and subtleties and the problems of doing it well or using it wisely; an unexamined assumption that its lessons and insights lie on the surface for anyone to pick up, so that one can go at history like a looter at an archeological site, indifferent to context and deeper mean-ing, concerned only with taking what can be immediately used or sold.84 Whether neo-realist theory can be revised to apply usefully to all of inter-national history, and not simply the element of power-political competition which has always bulked large in it and still does, is a question best left to others, or at least to another time and place. This essay will close with advising international historians not to adopt the neo-realist paradigm, and theorists not to assume that the facts of international history support one.

A2: Realism – A2: History Proves

Realism cannot explain all of international history as it intends; Germany Proves.

Schroeder 94 (Paul, Summer, American [historian](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historian) and professor emeritus of history @ the [University of Illinois](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Illinois_at_Urbana-Champaign), *International Security*, 19(1) pg 118)

A concrete example illustrating these different strategies in practice is the crisis in Germany (the Holy Roman Empire or Reich) caused by the Austrian Emperor Joseph II's attempt in 1785 to carry through the exchange of the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium) for Bavaria. Almost all German states and principalities saw this move as a threat to the German "balance"-by which they meant not simply the balance of power between the German great powers, Austria and Prussia, and their respective clients, but even more importantly for some states, the balance provided by the Reich constitution between the sovereign powers of Germany's various states and the limits to individual state power and guarantees of corporate "liberties" (i.e., privi-leges) within those states. The reason the proposed move would threaten the independence and security of the Reich and its members was not just that it would strengthen Austria, but also and mainly that it would damage the Reich as a legal order guaranteeing the liberties of all its members (another indication of the ways in which a purely power-political view of international politics is too crude to capture vital elements of the process).29 Many units hid from the threat, i.e., simply ignored the issue or remained neutral, even though they knew the outcome might affect them critically. Some balanced against it. Prussia and Hanover, old rivals, joined to exploit an idea already current, that of forming a Protestant League of Princes to check the Catholic Emperor and his ecclesiastical princely clients.30 Some began by hiding out, then saw that Emperor Joseph would lose his nerve, and bandwagoned to the winning Prussian side. But some also tried to transcend; that is, certain lesser princes attempted to form a union of smaller states not to stop Prussia or Austria by force (which they knew was beyond their resources) or to balance with either great power or against both, but to rise above the quarrel, reviving and reforming the institutions and constitution of the Empire so as to provide guarantees for everyone's territorial rights, and a machinery for the arbitration of future disputes.31 This kind of scenario, in which different states perceiving the same threat or similar ones adopted differing strategies to meet them, is seen in almost every major crisis throughout the centuries in question. For this reason alone, neo-realist theory cannot accommodate the history of international politics as I know it; too many facts and insights vital for explaining broad devel-opments and results do not pass through its prism. To be sure, this assertion has been supported here only by example rather than proof; even after a thorough historical elaboration it would still remain controversial, given the debates over historical interpretation and the noto-rious difficulties of deciding which motives and strategies guided historical actors. Yet the problem of divergent strategies here indicated is not unknown to theorists. Stephen Walt proposes to meet it with an argument that states balance against threats rather than simply against power. This does not, however, really help answer the question of which of the four strategies-hiding, transcending, bandwagoning, or self-help-or which combination of them, prevailed in each instance. Walt's thesis, designed to help neo-realist theory explain why states so often join overwhelmingly powerful coalitions, actually makes it virtually impossible to distinguish between "balancing" and "bandwagoning" or to determine the real motives of actors, since any band-wagoning state is likely to claim that it is actually "balancing" against a threatening enemy. The argument thus begs the very question it is supposed to answer, namely, whether weaker states tend to balance or to bandwagon in the face of threats from more powerful states.32 Besides, states seldom choose a strategy unconditionally or without mixed motives, and in particular they consider what strategy will yield the greatest side payments (territorial gains, future alliances, political concessions, prestige, etc.).33 Even if no ironclad case can be made from history, I can back the assertion that neorealism is incorrect in its claims for the repetitiveness of strategy and the prevalence of balancing in international politics, with brief examples of how the various competing strategies were used in the face of threat in four major periods of war: the French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars (1792- 1815), the Crimean War (1853-56), the First World War (1914-18), and the Second World War (1939-45). These make a prima facie case against Waltz's generalizations.

A2: Realism – A2: History Proves

**Realism is not empirically proven critical studies indict the construction of realism from its roots in history.**

**Krause 96** ( Keith, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, February 18, "Critical Theory and Security Studies" *Cooperation and Conflict,* Vol. 33, No. 3)

**The first would be a belief that the differences between critical and other approaches can be arbitrated (and the most appropriate approach selected) in an *a priori* or logical deductive fashion. Mearsheimer's review steers perilously close to this in his presentation of what he calls the "realist world"** **when what are *assumptions* of a realist theory start to sound like *descriptions* of an actual world, which critical theory can somehow not explain. This is especially manifest when he asserts that "realism was the dominant discourse from about the start of the late medieval period in 1300 to at least 1989."**8 Aside from the curious use of "discourse," **no serious scholar working in a rationalist paradigm would make the error of confusing the assumptions of the theory, and the explanatory hypotheses these can generate, with the workings of the world**. C**ritical International Relations can (and does) offer an account of different features of these 700 years of history, and does not exclude the possibility of "critical realist" explanations.**9 The second reason might be the assumption that the ultimate test of our theories is some external and objective reality against which they stand or fall. As **Mearsheimer claims,** **"Realists maintain that there is an objective and knowable world**, which is separate from the observing individual."10 **This approach is self-contradictory, and fundamentally misunderstands the role of *theory* in "constructing" what we see and how we see it** - which Mearsheimer seems (if inadvertently) to recognize elsewhere when he says that "the debate is over which theory provides the best guide to understanding state behavior."11 If reality is objectively knowable, then why do we need to construct theories to organize or explain phenomena that present themselves to us? Conversely, if theories tell us what to look for (and more importantly, how to organize disparate phenomena under labels such as "bandwagoning" or "balancing," or "deterring" and "compelling") then reality is not "objectively" knowable without being mediated via theories. Suddenly the choice of theoretical lenses becomes important! The third assumption could be that there is only one "set" of things to be explained by International Relations, and that therefore critical approaches are judged by how well they (for example) account for 700 years (or more) of ceaseless competition between states. This follows Martin Wight's description of International Relations as the "realm of recurrence and repetition," and effectively denies that a *social* theory of world politics has any subject matter.12 But it is possible that critical and neorealist approaches represent *incommensurable* positions towards International Relations (or security studies), and hence that there is no "neutral" point from which disagreements can be arbitrated. The best one can hope for is to make a choice, dependent on what it is one is trying to explain, and what one thinks are the appropriate means to go about this. Although Mearsheimer seems to think this difference represents a trumping of ethical preferences or values over scholarly commitments, instead it represents a set of choices on a different level (which is where the debate must be engaged).13

A2: Realism Inevitable

**Realist thought structure is not inevitable – it is used to reach a particular end, and other structures can help gain a more accurate historical view.**

Donnelly 2K, (Jack, Prof. of Int. Studies at Univ. of Denver, *Realism and International Relations*, pp. 86-87)

More than two principles are required for broad, comprehensive historical comparisons. Thinking about alternative forms of order is likely to benefit from additional ordering principles as well. Some relatively narrow and specialized contemporary analytical or practical purposes also require additional ordering principles. For example, the Netanyahu government in Israel was at one point interested in the viability of a third kind of order, represented by a Palestinian Authority that was not, and would not become, a (fully) sovereign state. Realists can plausibly argue that these “exceptions” are of such limited global political significance that there usually is little cost to dispensing with additional ordering principles - especially at the high level of abstraction that Waltz pitches his theory. Others, however, may be no less reasonably interested in, concerned with, or impressed by these many and varied “exceptions. ” Deciding how many ordering principles to recognize is largely a matter of the particular purposes one has in mind. It is not imposed by an objective reality “out there.” There are theoretical costs and advantages to selecting categories that either highlight similarity and constancy or highlight diversity and change. But there is no theoretically or substantively neutral way of weighing the balance between costs and benefits. And that balance is likely to shift not only with time and place but with the changing purposes of analysts.

A2: Realism Inevitable

**The examples of Egypt and East Germany prove that realism cannot account for all instances international relations – it is not inevitable.**

Donnelly 2K, (Jack, Prof. of Int. Studies at Univ. of Denver, *Realism and International Relations*, pp. 87-88)

Waltz' preference for an anarchy-hierarchy dichotomy reflects his understandable desire to keep structure and process analytically separate. For example, he properly complains that “students are inclined to see a lessening of anarchy when alliances form” (1979: 114), rather than a nonstructural realignment of capabilities held by (distributed among) states. But Waltz goes overboard in trying to avoid this analytical confusion. Consider classic protectorates such as Egypt during and after World War I, or territories such as Andorra and Puerto Rico today. They rest on a particular arrangement of units; that is, structure, not process. They are sovereign internally but subordinate externally. For the purposes of domestic politics, they are hierarchical polities. But in international relations, they are subordinated to a “protecting” power. Rather than an alliance-like rearrangement of fundamentally like parts, there is a formal hierarchical arrangement of separate political entities with different rights and powers. Spheres of influence present even clearer, if informal, examples of mixed structures. The German Democratic Republic (East Germany) enjoyed the rights and powers of a sovereign state, both internally and externally, only within hierarchically imposed limits laid down by its forced membership in the communist bloc. 6 East Germany faced most other states in an anarchic order, but was largely - although not entirely – hierarchically subordinate to the Soviet Union. And its “special relationship” with the Soviet Union was not temporary, contingent, or accidental. It was a more or less permanent arrangement that lasted as long as the country itself and was based on a relatively clear and well-recognized differentiation of political powers and functions.

The EU proves that authority, not military power, can be a sustainable basis of international relationships.

Donnelly 2K, (Jack, Prof. of Int. Studies at Univ. of Denver, *Realism and International Relations*, pp. 90-91)

In anarchic orders, however, each state (unit) has a right to use force more or less when and how it sees fit. Any limits are matters of capability, not right. For Waltz, the special role of force in international relations thus arises not from a predilection of individuals or states to use force – this would be a first or second image (unit level) explanation, relying on the nature of human beings or the character of states - but from the authority of states to use force against one another. States are coordinate with, not subordinate to, one another. Waltz goes on to argue that in anarchy “authority” is largely reducible to power. “Whatever elements of authority emerge internationally are barely once removed from the capability [power] that provides the foundation for the appearance of those elements. Authority quickly reduces to a particular expression of capability” (1979: 88). Might makes right. Conversely, Waltz sees authority in hierarchic orders as more distanced from power, and typically even a source of power. Machiavelli, however, emphasizes the fact that Rome, the greatest state of all time, was founded through an act of fratricide (1970, I.9, 18[6–7]). No less a conservative than Edmund Burke reminded us that almost all governments, no matter how legitimate they may be today, can trace their origin to illegitimate acts of force (1955 [1790]: 25, 192). As John Herz puts it, “people, in the long run, will recognize that authority, any authority, which possesses the power of protection” (1976: 101). And at any given time, it is a simple matter - often depressingly easy - to find governments whose authority is “barely once removed from” the coercive power of a dominant elite. Consider, for example, Guatemala, El Salvador, Zaire, Ethiopia, and Cambodia in the 1970s and early 1980s, or Burma, Somalia, and Haiti in the early 1990s. The authority of these governments rested almost entirely on their control of the means of coercion. Conversely, the European Union (EU) today has considerable authority independent of its (meager) coercive capabilities. In fact, authority is clearly more important in relations between EU members today than it was, for example, between rulers and ruled in Guatemala in the early 1980s, when the government was killing hundreds, even thousands, of its citizens every month; or between the Khmer Rouge and the millions of Cambodians butchered in the Killing Fields. “Wars among states cannot settle questions of authority and right; they can only determine the allocation of gains and losses among contenders and settle for a time the question of who is the stronger” (Waltz 1979: 112). Perhaps. But military coups, which for extended periods have been the principal mechanism by which governments have changed in many countries, often can be described in the same terms. It simply is not the case, as Waltz would have it, that “nationally, relations of authority are established. Internationally, only relations of strength result” (1979: 112). There may be a greater reliance on relations of authority in most national political orders, most of the time, than in most anarchic orders. But the difference is a matter of degree rather than kind, and subject to considerable contingent empirical variation.

A2: Violence Inevitable

Violence inevitable arguments are a self-fulfilling prophecy that causes extinction

Kohn 88 (Alfie, June, M.A. from the University of Chicago, *PSYCHOLOGY TODAY*, Are Humans Innately Aggressive?)

The belief that violence is unavoidable, while disturbing at first glance, actually holds a curious attraction for many people, both psychologically and ideologically. “It does have that ‘let's face the grim reality’ flavor, which has a certain appeal to people,” says Robert Holt, a psychologist at New York University. It also allows us to excuse our own acts of aggression by suggesting that we really have little choice. “If one is born innately aggressive, then one cannot be blamed for being so,” says Montagu. The belief, he maintains, functions as a kind of pseudoscientific version of the doctrine of original sin. “In order to justify, accept and live with war, we've created a psychology that makes it inevitable,” Lown says. “It's a rationalization for accepting war as a system of resolving human conflict.” To accept this explanation for the war-is-inevitable belief is simultaneously to realize its consequences. Treating any behavior as inevitable sets up a self-fulfilling prophecy: By assuming we are bound to be aggressive, we are more likely to act that way and provide evidence for the assumption. People who believe that humans are naturally aggressive may also be relatively unlikely to oppose particular wars or get involved in the peace movement. Some observers insist that this belief functions only as an excuse for their unwillingness to become active. But others attribute some effect to the attitude itself. “The belief that war is inevitable leads people to rely on armament rather than working for disarmament,” says M. Brewster Smith, professor of psychology at the University of California, Santa Cruz. There is some empirical support for this position. In a 1985 Finnish study of 375 young people, Riitta Wahlstrom found that those who considered war to be part of human nature were less inclined to support the idea of teaching peace or of personally working for it. David Adams and Sarah Bosch got similar results with a smaller study of U.S. college students. Forty percent said they thought war was “intrinsic to human nature,” and those students were slightly less likely than others to have worked on a peace-related activity. Based on his own research during the Vietnam War, Granberg says, “If a war broke out tomorrow, the people protesting it would probably be those who did not believe that war is inevitable and rooted in human nature.” Those who do believe this are “more likely to accept the idea [of war] or at least unlikely to protest when a particular war occurs.” The evidence suggests, then, that we do have a choice with respect to aggression and war. To an extent, such destructiveness is due precisely to the mistaken assumption that we are helpless to control an essentially violent nature. “We live in a time,” Lown says, “when accepting this as inevitable is no longer possible without courting extinction.”

A2: “We’re a Different Kind of Realism”

Any possible change to realism the affirmative could advocate wouldn’t be extensive enough as long as the realist label is retained – the link still exists.

**Freyberg-Inan 4** (Annette, Director of Poli. Sci. at Univ. of Amsterdam, *What Moves Man: The Realist Theory of International Relations and Its Judgment of Human Nature,* pg. 152-153)

Stephen Brooks has observed that "neorealism's worst-case focus and emphasis on capabilities to the exclusion of other variables leads its proponents to see little hope for progress in international relations." He therefore. suggests that "postclassical realism" with its "probabilistic focus" should split off neorealist theory to form a separate approach.' As we have seen, Brooks's characterization of postclassical real­ism is similar to what is elsewhere called "defensive realism." Thus we may identify as another option open to realists the possibility of retaining their label while attempt­ing to evade the pessimistic determinism that stems from the axiomatic foundations on which the tradition rests. However, this would require a modification of basic as­sumptions extensive enough to call into question the retention of the realist label. This is why Bahman Fozouni has suggested that "if there is anything realism is worth salvaging it must first be saved from realists and neorealists."*3*

Defensive realism still leads to securitization – rogue states within this system still create an external threat.

Rose 98, (Gideon, Editor of *Foreign Affairs*, World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 149-150 )

Defensive realism, in contrast, assumes that international anarchy is often more benign--that is, that security is often plentiful rather than scarce--and that normal states can understand this or learn it over time from experience. 11 In the defensive realist world rational states pursuing security can often afford to be relaxed, bestirring themselves only to respond to external threats, which are rare. Even then, such states generally respond to these threats in a timely manner by "balancing" against them, which deters the threatener and obviates the need for actual conflict. The chief exception to this rule is when certain situations lead security-seeking states to fear each other, such as when prevailing modes of warfare favor the offensive. 12 Foreign policy activity, in this view, is the record of rational states reacting properly to clear systemic incentives, coming into conflict only in those circumstances when the security dilemma is heightened to fever pitch. But this dance is repeatedly interrupted, according to defensive realists, by rogue states that misread or ignore the true security-related incentives offered by their environment.

A2: Mearsheimer

Mearsheimer’s theory leaves room only for a massive securitized state- realism does not allow balance of power.

Snyder 1 (Poli-Sci @ U of NC- CH,, *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 1,pg 166-167, ET)

Nor does Mearsheimer have much to say about conciliatory policies toward an adversary. Appeasement is “fanciful and dangerous” because, like bandwagoning, it “shifts the balance of power” in the aggressor’s favor and thus “contradicts the dictates of offensive realism” (pp. 163–164). Mearsheimer explicitly rejects a definition of appeasement as “a policy designed to reduce tensions with a dangerous adversary by eliminating the cause of conict between them” (p. 463, n. 58). As in his definition of bandwagoning, this insistence on defining cooperation with an adversary as involving power sacrifice seems to reflect the author’s theoretical commitment to power maximization. He does allow for “special circumstances” in which a great power might concede power to another state without violating balance-of-power logic: making concessions to one so as to concentrate resources against another, or to buy time to mobilize resources internally (pp. 164–165). But these seem to be reluctant qualifications of a general bias toward a hard-line offensive stance. One can think of other ways in which conciliatory policies might be useful even to an expansionary state. For example, conciliatory tactics short of appeasement might appeal to an offensive-minded state as a means of discouraging the formation of balances against it, or of weakening opposing alliances. Diplomatic détente could be a useful policy during periods when a state’s power buildup has been frustrated by opposition. Mearsheimer’s brief treatment (five pages) attribute the differing pre-1914 and pre-1939 patterns to different beliefs about the inherent superiority of the offense or defense. However, although these beliefs may have played some role, I would argue that more fundamental determinants were alliance interdependence and commitment, as these matters were affected by tensions between adversaries. on “creating world order” and “cooperation among states” stands in conspicuous contrast to Morgenthau’s two chapters on “diplomacy” and Waltz’s whole chapter on “management” of the system by the great powers.29

Mearshimer groups radically different theorists together and ignores scholarship in his indicts.

Krause 98 (Keith, Oxford, PhD Director of the Programme in Strategic and International Security Studies, The Research Program of Critical Security Studies, *Cooperation and Conflict* 33 (3) pg. 301)

The post-Cold War world is a different, although not wholly unfamiliar, place. Borders still need to be patrolled, and although the material and psychological rewards of security studies have diminished, there is still turf to be defended. The most forthright speaker for the neorealist position has been Mearsheimer, and his presentation of 'critical theory' (in the context of his discussion of the 'false promise of international institutions') is an excellent starting-point. His 'who's who' of critical theorists in International Relations includes Richard Ashley, Robert Cox, Friedrich Kratochwil, John Ruggie, Yosef Lapid, Alexander Wendt, and perhaps Emanuel Adler, Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen (Mearsheimer, 1994/95: 37-47). This list is far from exhaustive, and, as Wendt points out, it blurs important distinctions between post-modernist, constructivist, neo-Marxist and feminist scholars (Wendt, 1995: 71). (In fact it ignores scholarship in most of these camps.) Perhaps the shared assumptions of these scholars are greater than their differences, but these shared assumptions are not necessarily what Mearsheimer thinks they are, and his choice of exemplars serves a different purpose, one shared by many critics of unorthodox scholarship.

A2: Mearsheimer

Realism is wrong - Mearsheimer is flawed because he ignores how the real world operates.

Hendrickson 3 (Poli-Sci @ CO College, *World Policy Institute, Spring 3, Vol. 20 # 1*, ET)

In methodology, the book has the positivist imprimatur characteristic of most work in the American science of international politics, an approach shared by many of the liberals with whom Mearsheimer does battle. That is to say, Mearsheimer aims at the identification of a simple law or law-like statement (states are power-maximizers), offers a parsimonious theory (they are this way because of the structure of the system), and then tries to show that 200 years of history bear out his thesis. In this world, states never learn lessons from their past misdeeds and catastrophes, or rather the lesson they learn (unless they decide to give up the great power game) is that they must supersize their power. Such positivist methods, deeply rooted in academia though they are, unfortunately have severe limitations. Greatly lauded in theory, parsimony in practice invariably yields a simplified view of the past, and passing all these materials through a single meat grinder makes, organizationally and stylistically, for much repetition. To show that the economic base matters (chapter 3), that land power is more important than seapower or airpower (chapter 4), that conquest pays (chapter 5), or that the international system is populated by revisionist powers (chapter 6), Mearsheimer trudges through the same material (the great power competition of the last two centuries), but with the unpleasing result that no single event is ever given a thorough or satisfying explanation.(n13) Mearsheimer's proclivity to make timeless assertions about the relative value of competing strategic arms (land, naval, air) is also dubious, for the resolution of that question depends on the political objectives they are meant to serve in any particular instance (which Mearsheimer typically leaves unspecified). Because Mearsheimer confines his focus to interactions among the "great powers," of whom there remain precious few, his treatment is curiously circumscribed. In considering naval power, for instance, he doesn't examine its political utility in circumstances short of war or its military significance in wars against states of inferior rank. Even committed continentalists and perceptive critics of "the British way of warfare" such as Sir Michael Howard and Paul Kennedy should certainly wince at Mearsheimer's systemic denigration of naval power and his cavalier dismissal of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett. Enthusiasts of airpower and of the "revolution in military affairs" will write him off as an old tank man feverishly re-gaming distant and now irrelevant wars.(n14) The most serious lacuna in this book is the absence of reflection on the nature and character of the legal, ethical, and institutional restraints that the leaders of states are obliged to observe. For Mearsheimer, there is no international society, or at least none that is relevant to the scientific study of international politics. He mentions such restraints only for the purpose of dismissing their significance, and he displays little knowledge of the role they have played in shaping international history. Exchange, reciprocity, good faith--as instruments both of securing interest and of soothing the asperities of interstate conflict--are given no recognition in Mearsheimer's conceptual world. International institutions, he affirms, are just "arenas for acting out power relationships"; that they have anything to do with legitimacy--or indeed that legitimacy itself is of any conceivable importance--is not a thought that occurs to the author. Though ostensibly "realistic," such an approach stands in direct opposition to our daily experience of political life, in which political actors are continually in competition for the moral high ground and battle fiercely for the mantle of legitimacy.(n15) A realism that shunts those factors aside is psychologically naïve as well as morally obtuse, for such factors are significant even if they are only observed hypocritically (as, admittedly, they often are). The failure to grapple with normative issues is also quite contrary to the richest vein in classical realism. The greatest of the realists, Thucydides, placed in continual dialectical antagonism the claims of power and justice, and his History is "above all an investigation and a testing of the Athenian thesis on justice and on the place of justice in the world of international politics."(n16) Indeed, Mearsheimer's dismissal of the normative dimension of international politics makes it difficult to understand why he describes international politics as tragic in character, for tragedy requires elevation of character and the choice between irreconcilable but otherwise commanding values. If a state dedicated to power maximization, and that alone, meets adversity in its inexorable advance toward domination, it is difficult to limn the tragic dimension of its misfortune. Is it tragic when the bad go bad? Related to Mearsheimer's ethical void is another shortcoming: in emphasizing power-maximization as the rational objective of the state, Mearsheimer is seemingly oblivious to the consideration that the people in constitutional democracies might fear not only threats from abroad but also overly centralized power at home. In the long history of reflection on the security predicaments of free states, as Daniel Deudney has shown, domestic hierarchy or tyranny is as significant a problem as international anarchy or conquest. That crucial theme, though missing from Mearsheimer, has long been at the core of the republican security theory to which Montesquieu and America's Founding Fathers made such distinguished contributions. That theory is far more sophisticated and relevant than Mearsheimer's offensive realism because it places the preservation of free institutions and the control of power at the core of its concern.(n17) Mearsheimer's apparent unawareness of this heritage is in keeping with his lack of interest in the history of international thought prior to the twentieth century, which lends to his work a parochial air. This unconsciousness of his predecessors is probably just as well, for if Mearsheimer belongs anywhere in the history of international and strategic thought, it is with the schools of Wilhelmine Machtpolitik and Geopolitik.

A2: Mearsheimer

Mearsheimer’s theory is incorrect, it fails to take into account other theories or actual historical happenings.

Cumings 2 (History @ of Chicago, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 58 # 3*, May/June 2, ET)

If you thought the twentieth century was cruel, with upwards of 100 million people killed in warfare, wait until the twenty-first: "This cycle of violence will continue far into the new millennium," writes John J. Mearsheimer, the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. "Hopes for peace will probably not be realized" because great power competition is the natural state of affairs--making for a world of sharp conflict that is nasty, brutish, and eternal. Mearsheimer offers his theory of "offensive realism" in "a handful of simple propositions" that come at the reader like staccato machine-gun fire. Great powers are those that can field a conventional army capable of conducting all-out war, and that have a survivable nuclear deterrent; they perpetually seek to maximize their share of world power in a zero-sum struggle with other powers doing the same thing; and their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon--"the only great power in the system." This state of affairs is tragic, according to Mearsheimer, precisely because it is unavoidable and ineluctable; it is neither designed nor intended by human beings, yet we are all caught up in it, inescapably and forever. This book does not have a tragic tone, however, because Mearsheimer is having too much fun explaining why we're all going to hell in a hand basket of our own (unconscious) design. This treatise is a milestone in the literature of realpolitik for its simplicity and directness, its unswerving commitment to a single handful of pithy, tried-and-true realist propositions, and its unalloyed, straightforward shoot'em-up style. Bullets seem to whiz by as Mearsheimer tells us that anarchy reigns in the international system; that the guy with the biggest gun wins ("the strongest power is the state with the strongest army"); it's a dog-eat-dog world and when you get into trouble there's no 911 to call; going democratic won't help either because regime type makes no difference (democracies fight each other, too); and a cruel fate awaits us all because for every human neck, "there are two hands to choke it." If this sounds like the Clint Eastwood theory of international affairs, Mearsheimer would only take that as a compliment. His fervid and often funny style will make the book standard reading in the classroom; indeed, generations of students will enjoy throwing brickbats at his arguments. The big powers, being big powers, are always on the march. If they aren't, well, they're just biding their time and building up their armies, looking for a chance to strike. The French will delight in Mearsheimer's account of modern German history, with Germans on the aggressive onslaught every day of the week from Bismarck through Hitler, just as Koreans will love his depiction of Japan's single-minded expansionist bent from 1868 to 1945. History is the place where Mearsheimer "tests" his propositions, and it's hard to fail the test: Even pasta and wine-loving modern Italy was constantly seeking "opportunities to expand"; its "hostile aims were ever-present." If Italy nonetheless wasn't going anywhere, it was because "its army was ill-equipped for expansion." You would think that the spectacle of the world's second-ranking superpower closing up shop and turning itself into 15 squabbling nations in 1991 would be a bit of a stretch for the tenets of "offensive realism," but no--the Soviet Union's self-liquidation was another instance of realism in action. Now the theory tells us that the great clash of the new century will be between the United States and China. But we don't need to worry about Japan and Germany: They may be the second and third largest economies in the world, but they haven't been great powers since 1945. Why? Because the United States keeps its troops on their soil. And if the troops should leave? Then they're great powers after all and all bets are off. It's nice to have a parsimonious theory that explains everything. The book is a bit too simple, however, in its confrontation with a narrow literature of international relations unique to the American experience and the American academic scene. There are only two theories, realism and liberalism (or idealism), as Mearsheimer tells us today, and as George Kennan told us half a century ago in his classic little book, American Diplomacy. The liberals are irremediably deluded, of course, but the only realists that capture Mearsheimer's attentions are his contemporaries in American political science like Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Krasner, and Stephen Walt, or renowned predecessors like E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau. Completely absent is the important literature in international relations that goes far beyond the simple dichotomies of realism and idealism, like the world economy theories of Karl Polanyi or Immanuel Wallerstein, important work on hegemony by Robert Cox and Stephen Gill, the realist political economy done by Susan Strange, or the application of critical theory to international relations by James Der Derian, Robert Latham, and others. The growing body of feminist work on international relations would be even more remote from Mearsheimer's concerns, but perhaps by now there is something refreshing in an author who never seems to have heard of the race-class-gender triptych.

A2: Waltz

Waltz’s assumption of the basis of a sovereign, rational man prevents his theories from being applied to true historical situations, since transversal struggles of such a paradigm have pervaded history.

Ashley 89 (Richard K.., Assoc. Prof. of Poli. Sci. at AZ State Univ., *International/Intertextual Relations*, eds -- Der Derian & Shapiro, pp. 294)

First, the text does not argue on behalf of a need to erect a specific sovereign figure of man as the source of order and meaning in global history. It does not carefully specify or attempt to justify the sovereign figure of man whose public voice it purports to speak. It does not spell out the historical limitations on knowing and doing that must be taken to be fundamental to the reasoning man who is at one with a universal "we." It does not name the supposedly extrahistorical limitations that man is obliged to honor as the very foundations of his free use of reason in history. This reticence, it must be said, is not a deliberate strategy of concealment on Waltz's part. Nor, by the same token, is it a theoretical mistake, a lapse that Waltz and other modern theorists might be expected to correct. Rather, as a statement of the quintessentially modern "theory of international politics," Waltz's text succeeds only because it sustians ambiguity regarding the paradigm of sovereign man to be invoked. The reason was indicated earlier. A paradigm of the sovereignty of man can be effectively put to work only on the condition that the question of its historicity is not entertained. It must be put to work as a foundational presence, an origin of reasoned inquiry that itself exists beyond the compass of reasoned criticism, a voice of truth and meaning whose right to speak is never questioned, never to be justified in contrast to alternative interpretations of the sovereignty of man.

Waltz admits that realism cannot possibly be the answer to all questions of foreign policy.

Rose 98, (Gideon, Editor of *Foreign Affairs*, World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 144-145 )

For two decades international relations theory has been dominated by the debate between neorealists and their various critics. 1 Much of the skirmishing has occurred over questions about the nature of the international system and its effect on patterns of international outcomes such as war and peace. Thus scholars have disputed whether a multipolar system generates more conflict than a bipolar one, or whether international institutions can increase the incidence of international cooperation. Because neorealismtries to explain the outcomes of state interactions, it is a theory of international politics; it includes some general assumptions about the motivations of individual states but does not purport to explain their behavior in great detail or in all cases. As Kenneth Waltz has written: [A] theory of international politics . . . can describe the range of likely outcomes of the actions and interactions of states within a given system and show how the range of expectations varies as systems change. It can tell us what pressures are exerted and what possibilities are posed by systems of different structure, but it cannot tell us just how, and how effectively, the units of a system will respond to those pressures and possibilities. . . .To the extent that dynamics of a system limit the freedom of its units, their behavior and the outcomes of their behavior become predictable . . . [but in general] a theory of international politics bears on the foreign policies of nations while claiming to explain only certain aspects of them. 2 From such a perspective, much of the daily stuff of international relations is left to be accounted for by theories of foreign policy. These theories take as their dependent variable not the pattern of outcomes of state interactions, but rather the behavior of individual states. Theories of foreign policy seek to explain what states try to achieve in the external realm and when they try to achieve it. Theory development at this level, however, has received comparatively little attention. Some, like Waltz himself, simply rule the subject out of bounds due to its complexity. Theories, he argues, must deal with the coherent logic of "autonomous realms." Because foreign policy is driven by both internal and external factors, it does not constitute such an autonomous realm, and therefore we should not strive for a truly theoretical explanation of it. Instead, we must rest content with mere "analyses" or "accounts," which include whatever factors appear relevant to a particular case. 3 Others have rejected such diffidence, and their recent efforts to construct a general theory of foreign policy fall into several broad schools.

A2: Waltz

Waltz’s Realism theories are false as they cannot predict interests, which makes studying international relations under this theory impossible.

Katzenstein 96 ( PHD- Harvard, Prof of Internat’l Rel @ cornell, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics,* 96, ET)

Structural neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism share a similar, underlying analytical framework, susceptible to the same weakness. Kenneth Waltz privileges systemic effects on national policy and sidesteps the motivations that inform policy. He argues that "neorealism contends that international politics can be understood only if the effects of structure are added to the unit level explanations of traditional realism. . . . The range of expected outcomes is inferred from the assumed motivation of the units and the structure of the system in which they act." [33](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/katzenstein/katz01.html#note33)   Since causes operate at different levels and interact with one another, explanations operating at either level alone are bound to be misleading. [34](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/katzenstein/katz01.html#note34)   Robert Keohane concurs when he writes that "institutional theory takes states' conceptions of their interests as exogenous: unexplained within the terms of the theory. . . . Nor does realism predict interests. This weakness of systemic theory, of both types, denies us a clear test of their relative predictive power." [35](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/katzenstein/katz01.html#note35)   The consequences of this shortcoming for both neorealism and neoliberalism are in Keohane's view far-reaching. "Without a theory of interests, which requires analysis of domestic politics, no theory of international relations can be fully adequate. . . . Our weak current theories do not take us very far in understanding the behavior of the United States and European powers at the end of the Cold War. . . . More research will have to be undertaken at the level of the state, rather than the international system." [36](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/katzenstein/katz01.html#note36)

Waltz is flawed- his understanding of war causation is empirically denied.

Mearsheimer 1 (Prof of poli- Sci at U of Chicago, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,* p. 19-20, ET)

Waltz does not emphasize, however, that the international system provides great powers with good reasons to act offensively to gain power. Instead, he appears to make the opposite case: that anarchy encourages [page 20] states to behave defensively and to maintain rather than upset the balance of power. “The first concern of states,” he writes, is “to maintain their position in the system.”38 There seems to be, as international relations theorist Randall Schweller notes, a “status quo bias” in Waltz’s theory.39 Waltz recognizes that states have incentives to gain power at their rivals’ expense and that it makes good strategic sense to act on that motive when the time is right. But he does not develop that line of argument in any detail. On the contrary, he emphasizes that when great powers behave aggressively, the potential victims usually balance against the aggressor and thwart its efforts to gain power.40 For Waltz, in short, balancing checkmates offense.41 Furthermore, he stresses that great powers must be careful not to acquire too much power, because “excessive strength” is likely to cause other states to join forces against them, thereby leaving them worse off than they would have been had they refrained from seeking additional increments of power.42 Waltz’s views on the causes of war further reflect his theory’s status quo bias. There are no profound or deep causes of war in his theory. In particular, he does not suggest that there might be important benefits to be gained from war. In fact, he says little about the causes of war, other than to argue that wars are largely the result of uncertainty and miscalculation. In other words, if states knew better, they would not start wars

A2: Waltz

The generalizations of neo-realism are not historically accurate.

Vasquez 97 (John A, December, Prof. of Political Science @ UOI, *The American Political Science Review* 91(4) pg11 )

This last point is demonstrated even more forcibly by the historian Paul Schroeder (1994a and b). He shows that the basic generalizations of Waltz-that anarchy leads states to balancing and to act on the basis of their power position-are not principles that tell the "real story" of what happened from 1648 to 1945. He demonstrates that states do not balance in a law-like manner but deal with threat in a variety of ways; among others, they hide, they join the stronger side, they try to "transcend" the problem, or they balance. In a brief but systematic review of the major conflicts in the modern period, he shows that in the Napoleonic wars, Crimean War, World War I, and World War II there was no real balancing of an alleged hegemonic threat-so much for the claim that this kind of balancing is a fundamental law of international politics. When states do resist, as they did with Napoleon, it is because they have been attacked and have no choice: "They resisted because France kept on attacking them" (Schroeder 1994a, 135; see also Schweller 1994, 92). A similar point also could be made about French, British, Soviet, and American resistance to Hitler and Japan. Basically, Schroeder shows that the historical record in Europe does not conform to neorealists' theoretical expectations about balancing power. Their main gen-eralizations are simply wrong. For instance, Schroeder does not see balancing against Napoleon, the prime instance in European history in which it should have occurred (see also Rosecrance and Lo 1996). Many states left the First Coalition against revolutionary France after 1793, when they should not have, given France's new power potential. Periodically, states band wagoned with France, especially after victories, as in late 1799, when the Second Coalition collapsed. According to Schroeder (1994a, 120-1), hiding or band wagoning, not balancing, was the main response to the Napoleonic hegemonic threat, the exact opposite of the assertions not only by Waltz but also by such long-time classical realists as Dehio (1961). For World War I, Schroeder (1994a, 122-3) argues that the balancing versus bidding for hegemony conceptualization simply does not make much sense of what each side was doing in trying to deal with security problems. With World War II, Schroeder (1994a, 123-4) sees a failure of Britain and France to balance and sees many states trying to hide or bandwagon.13 For Schroeder (1994a, 115, 116), neorealist theory is a misleading guide to inquiry: The more one examines Waltz's historical generalizations about the conduct of international politics throughout history with the aid of the historian's knowledge of the actual course of history, the more doubtful-in fact, strange-these generalizations become.... I cannot construct a history of the European states system from 1648 to 1945 based on the generalization that most unit actors 13 Numerous other deviant cases are listed in Schroeder (1994a, 118-22, 126-9, 133-47). 908 within that system responded to crucial threats to their security and independence by resorting to self-help, as defined above. In the majority of instances this just did not happen. All this suggests that the balancing of power was never the law Waltz thought it was. In effect, he offered an explanation of a behavioral regularity that never existed, except within the logic of the theory. As Schroeder (1994b, 147) concludes: [My point has been] to show how a normal, standard understanding of neo-realist theory, applied precisely to the historical era where it should fit best, gets the motives, the process, the patterns, and the broad outcomes of international history wrong ... it prescribes and predicts a determinate order for history without having adequately checked this against the historical evidence.

A2: Guzzini

Realism is wrong - Guzzini’s attempt to prove otherwise is flawed

Makinda 99 (School of Politics and Internatn’l Studies at Murdoch U, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 53 # 3, Nov 99, ET)

Guzzini observes that realism cannot offer a proper understanding of world politics. He argues that attempts 'to save realism as the discipline's identity defining theory' have failed because currently there is no work that provides a meta-theoretically coherent realism. Guzzini therefore posits that realist scholars face a fundamental dilemma. They can update the practical knowledge of a diplomatic culture, rather than science, and thereby risk losing scientific credibility. Alternatively, they can cast realist rules and culture into a scientific mould, but this will distort the realist tradition. Guzzini concludes that 'despite realism's several deaths as a general causal theory, it can still powerfully enframe action'. Guzzini presents a powerful and illuminating argument, but his analysis raises some questions. First, Guzzini's argument is basically another distortion of the evolution of IR. While Guzzini claims that IR dates back to the 1940s and attributes its establishment to Morgenthau, there is evidence that the discipline is much older and emerged as part of political science long before the US became a superpower. Second, Guzzini has placed too much emphasis on a symbiotic relationship between the American foreign policy establishment and the evolution of IR. Even Morgenthau, the so-called 'founding father' of IR, was opposed to the US involvement in Vietnam. Third, Guzzini has overemphasised the identification of IR with realism. His attempt to identify realism with IR has made it difficult for him to consider the works of theorists like Michael Doyle and Bruce Russett on the 'democratic peace' thesis. Indeed, what Guzzini has done is provide a reconstructed and partially distorted history of IR, which can be denigrated and maligned much more easily by post-structuralists, post-modernists, feminists and critical theorists.

A2: Perm

Their combination is logocentric which affirms the fundamental securitization criticized by the 1nc

Ashley 89 (Richard K.., Assoc. Prof. of Poli. Sci. at AZ State Univ., *International/Intertextual Relations*, eds -- Der Derian & Shapiro, pp. 288-289)

Indeed, herein is the secret of the procedure's ability to cast "international politics" as a domain of "recurrence and repetition" that might be said to have its own autonomous properties and to be a "constant" presence in its own right. Thanks to replications of the logocentric procedure exemplified in *Man, the State and War,* it becomes possible to assimilate the most consequential of global political changes to a figure of man who, though always in the process of change, can be recognized only as a fixed presence, an independent origin of meaning. It becomes possible, as well, always to say that there is a residual zone of historical contingency and chance that threatens man—a zone of anarchy and war constantly there. It becomes possible to do this even though the limitations that are "foundational" to man are never fixed, even though what counts as "domestic" is persistently in doubt, even though what count as "anarchic" dangers are always as much in the process of change as the meaning of the "man" and "domestic society" endangered. The continuity of "international politics" as a field of darkness and danger, one may say, is a perspectival effect. It is an effect of a procedure that takes to its center a changing and indeterminate figure of man—and then will know this figure, not in its historicity, but only as a continuous, identical, and determinate source of light.

The aff competes methodologically

Krause 98 (Keith, Oxford, PhD Director of the Programme in Strategic and International Security Studies, The Research Program of Critical Security Studies, *Cooperation and Conflict* 33 (3) pg. 302-303)

A more complex form of cooptation is methodological. Although this article will not dive into the thicket of methodological and episte-mological debates it is worth noting that some scholars attempt to judge the critical project by how well it meets (or does not) neorealist and rationalist canons of science, the foremost of which is probably the belief 'that there is an objective and knowable world, which is separate from the observing individual' (Mearsheimer, 1994/95: 41; see also Keohane, 1988). Stephen Walt (1991: 222) echoes this, arguing that 'security studies seeks cumulative knowledge about the role of military force', which requires that scholars 'follow the standard canons of scientific research', as does Helga Haftendorn (1991:12), who stresses the need 'to construct an empirically testable paradigm' that involves a 'set of observational hypotheses', a 'hard core of irrefutable assumptions', and a 'set of scope conditions that ... are required for a "progressive" research program'. But although the world may be in some sense 'objectively knowable', it is not immediately comprehensible: we (including rationalists!) still need to construct theories to organize and explain the phenomena that present themselves. And different theories 'see' different worlds. Hence, for example, when Mearsheimer (1994/95: 44) asserts that 'realism was the dominant discourse from about the start of the late medieval period in 1300 to at least 1989', and that critical approaches must be judged by how well they account for these 700 years of ceaseless competition between states (according to him, they fail), he misses the point that many critical scholars would dispute this characterization of international relations (Hall and Kratochwil, 1993; Schroeder, 1994, 1995). It is possible that critical and rationalist approaches represent incommensurable positions towards international relations (or security studies), and hence that there is no 'neutral point from which disagreements can be arbitrated.1

A2: Perm

The aff can’t turn security against itself – Powerful interests ensure that legal solutions generate a constitutive governmentality that securitizes

Neocleous 6 (Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy, Brunel Business School, *Alternatives* 31 pg. 206-208)

To criticize the use of emergency powers in terms of a suspension of the law, then, is to make the mistake of counterpoising normality and emergency, law and violence. In separating “normal” from “emergency,” with the latter deemed “exceptional,” this approach parrots the conventional wisdom that posits normalcy and emergency as two discrete and separable phenomena. This essentially liberal paradigm assumes that there is such a thing as “normal” order governed by rules, and that the emergency constitutes an “exception” to this normality. “Normal” here equates with the separation of powers, entrenched civil liberties, an ongoing debate about public policy and law, and the rule of law, while “emergencies” are thought to require strong executive rule, little time for discussion, and are premised on the supposedly necessary 206 The Problem with Normality suspension of the law and thus the discretion to suspend key liberties and rights. But this rests on two deeply ideological assumptions: first, the assumption that emergency rule is aberrational; and, second, an equation of the emergency/nonemergency dichotomy with a distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional action. Thus liberalism seeks to separate emergency rule from the normal constitutional order, thereby preserving the Constitution in its pristine form while providing the executive with the power to act in an emergency.47 But the historical evidence suggests that emergency powers are far from exceptional; rather, they are an ongoing aspect of normal political rule. Emergency, in this sense, is what emerges from the rule of law when violence needs to be exercised and the limits of the rule of law overcome. The genealogy of “emergency” is instructive here. “Emergency” has its roots in the idea of “emerge.” The Oxford English Dictionary suggests that “emerge” connotes “the rising of a submerged body out of the water” and “the process of coming forth, issuing from concealment, obscurity, or confinement.” Both these meanings of “emerge” were once part of the meaning of “emergency,” but the first is now rare and the second obsolete. Instead, the modern meaning of “emergency” has come to the fore, namely a sudden or unexpected occurrence demanding urgent action and, politically speaking, the term used to describe a condition close to war in which the normal constitution might be suspended. But what this tells us is that in “emergency” lies the idea of something coming out of concealment or issuing from confinement by certain events. This is why “emergency” is a better category than exception: Where “emergency” has this sense of “emergent,” exception instead implies a sense of ex capere, that is, of being taken outside. Far from being outside the rule of law, emergency powers emerge from within it. They are thus as important as the rule of law to the political management of the modern state. There is, however, an even wider argument to be made. The idea that the permanent emergency involves a suspension of the law encourages the idea that resistance must involve a return to legality, a return to the normal mode of governing through the rule of law. But this involves a serious misjudgment in which it is simply assumed that legal procedures, both international and domestic, are designed to protect human rights from state violence. Law itself comes to appear largely unproblematic. What this amounts to is what I have elsewhere called a form of legal fetishism, in which law becomes a universal answer to the problems posed by power. Law is treated as an independent or autonomous reality, explained according to its own dynamics. This produces the illusion that law has a life of its own, abstracting the rule of law from its origins in class domination and oppression and obscuring the ideological mystification of these processes in the liberal trumpeting of the rule of law.48 To demand the return to the “rule of law” is to seriously misread the history of the relation between the rule of law and emergency powers and, consequently, to get sucked into a less-than-radical politics in dealing with state violence. Part of what I am suggesting is that emergency measures, as state violence, are part of the everyday exercise of powers, working alongside and from within rather than against the rule of law, as part of a unified political strategy in the fabrication of social order.

A2: Perm

Security has become so totalizing that we view it is as a natural state. Working within these structures cannot form a resistance to security.

Dillon 8 (Michael, *Theory & Event*, 11(2), Prof@Lancaster U, p. 22)JFS

Aporias, like that of the Machiavellian moment, therefore take place. They are not abstract. They are acted-out. Acted-out in performative figures of political speech is the way in which they come to presence and constitute a world. They circumscribe a grid of political intelligibility and comprise a tropology as well as a topology of political life. Such a terrain of political self-enactment is as mobile as it is material, and it ramifies. For all it requires a strategic calculus of necessary killing, however, it is not possible for factical freedom therefore to determine how much killing is enough, politically, to resolve the emergency of its emergence. Its lethality thus mounts as its return to the promissory facticity of its freedom raises the political stakes by demanding new capacities to kill beyond even the industrial proportions acquired during the course of the 20th century. When it thus resorts to the invocation of divine violence, in the way that its military strategic discourse as well as its electoral and policy rhetoric, especially, now do, factical freedom betrays the very emancipatory promise for which it kills. So enthralled do 'we' seem to have become by the civic promise of the Machiavellian moment, however, that we have hardly begun to address, let alone develop effective analytical mechanisms for interrogating, the abiding religiosity and cultic violence which characterises its aleatory materialism most.

Security discourse inherently generates political ramifications beyond their control

**Huysmans 2** (Jef, Open University, UK, *Alternatives* 27, p. 41)

In this interpretation, speaking and writing about security is never innocent. It always risks contributing to the opening of a window of opportunity for a "fascist mobilization" or an "internal security-gap ideology." Moreover, this "danger" is always very pertinent in security studies since security analysis is mostly performed in already heavily politicized contexts. In other words, security writings participate in a political field where social questions are already contested in terms of crisis, threats, and dangers. Furthermore, like many social scientists, "all security studies scholars are engaged in intensely practical and political projects, whether these are defined as ‘policy relevant knowledge’ or ‘Praxis.’” Social-constructivist authors face a normative dilemma that is central to their research project. They are sensitive to how security "talk" about migration can contribute to its securitization – that is, it can render migration problematic from a security perspective. They may point out how criminological research establishes a relationship between crime and immigration; for example, by looking for a correlation between Turkish immigrants and trade in heroin, they establish a discursive link, irrespective of whether the correlation is confirmed or not. The discursive link is thus embedded in the very setup of the research; in other words, from the very beginning the research embodies an assumption, often already politicized, that a particular group of aliens may have a special relationship to crime. This observation is of course not a dilemma as such: it becomes a dilemma for social-constructivist authors only when they realize that this interpretation feeds back into their own research. They also produce security knowledge that therefore could as such be securitizing. If an author values a securitization of migration negatively, she faces the question of how to talk or write about the securitization of migration without contributing to a further securitization by the very production of this knowledge. The normative dilemma thus consists of how to write or speak about security when the security knowledge risks the production of what one tries to avoid, what one criticizes: that is, the securitization of migration, drugs, and so forth.

A2: Perm

Security crowds out the alt

**Neocleous 6** (Mark, August 2006, Brunel University, *Contemporary Political* Theory, p.135)

In this context, we can note that Locke adopts a range of strategies from a decidedly non-liberal tradition: reason of state. This tradition holds that besides moral reason there is another reason — reason of state — independent of traditional (i.e. Christian) values and according to which power should 'not be wielded according to the dictates of good conscience' (Guicciardini, 1965, 54), but should be exercised according to whatever is needed to maintain the state. The doctrine is thus founded on principles and assumptions seemingly antithetical to the liberal idea of liberty — in either the moral or the legal sense. Courses of action that would be condemned as immoral if conducted by individuals could be sanctioned when they were undertaken by the sovereign power. 'When I talked of murdering or keeping the Pisans imprisoned, I didn't perhaps talk as a Christian: I talked according to the reason and practice of states', says Guicciardini (1994, 159); 'Romulus ... deserved excuse for the death of his brother and his companion [for] what he did was done for the common good', says Machiavelli (1958, 218). Reason of state treats the sovereign as autonomous from morality; the state can engage in whatever actions it thinks right, so long as they are done according to 'necessity' and/or 'the public good'. But this is to also suggest that the state might act beyond law and the legal limits on state power — Salus populi suprema lex — so long as it does so 'for the common good', 'for the good of the people' or the 'preservation of the state'. In being able to legitimate state power in all its guises the doctrine of reason of state has been of enormous importance, becoming a weapon brandished in power games between states and eventually becoming the key ideological mechanism of international confrontation, because between the sixteenth and the twentieth centuries the doctrine gradually morphed into 'interest of state', 'security of state' and, finally, 'national security' (Neocleous, 2003, 40–46). The doctrine thus identifies security — simultaneously of the people and the state (since these are always ideologically conflated) — as the definitive aspect of state power. Security becomes the overriding interest and the principle above all other principles. As such, the doctrine would therefore appear to be antithetical to liberalism if liberalism is identified as a doctrine which aims to tip the balance of power towards liberty rather than security. But in Locke's account of prerogative we see nothing less than a liberal argument for reason of state, albeit without the claims about the irrelevance of good conscience. And out of this we can begin to trace what turns out to be nothing less than a liberal prioritising of security.

Security is totalizing – Only persistent resistance solves

Dillon 3 (Michael, *Millenium Journal of International Studies*, Prof@Lancaster, pp. 531-532)JFS

Giorgio Agamben ended his recent reflections on ‘Security and Terror’ by indicting political modernity’s terminal dependency on security as its generative principle of formation3: ‘Nothing is therefore more important’ he argued, ‘than a revision of the concept of security as the basic principle of state politics.’4 There are three good reasons for agreeing with Agamben. First is the way in which politics of security go imperial, driving out all other accounts or principles of formation for the establishment of political order, continuously subordinating alternatives to the overriding or foundational priority said to attach to security. Second is the need to free contemporary understandings and practices of politics from their defining preoccupation with security because of the ways in which — to employ a gloss on Foucault — the threshold of political modernity is reached when the stakes wagered by its security- dominated political strategies become the survival of the species. One might further gloss this by saying that if survival of the species is the hole into which modernity’s politics of security have dug us, then we had better stop digging. Third is the charge that politics of security depend upon the invocation of a state of emergency, continuous resort to which, combined with the globalising and imperial power of security politics, effectively promotes ‘worldwide civil war which destroys all civil coexistence’ and a ‘growing de-politicisation of society ... irreconcilable with democracy.

**A2: Perm**

The permutation fails - resistance must come from opposition to realist conservatism.

Dillon 96(Michael, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations @ the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security, page 2)*

A possibility engendered by the freedom of human being as a possibility, the project of politics must then be the making way for the taking place of human being’s freedom as possibility. Such an account of politics would also make International Relations more rather than less important: albeit, it would make International Relations something which its orthodox proponents would not recognise. Reimagining politics is, of course, easier said than done. Resistance to it—especially in International Relations—nonetheless gives us a clue to one of the places where we may begin. For although I think of this project as a kind of political project, resistance to it does not arise from a political conservatism. Modern exponents of political modernity pride themselves on their realistic radicalism. Opposition always arises, instead, from an extraordinarily deep and profound conservatism of thought. Indeed, conservatism of thought in respect of the modern political imagination is required of the modern political subject. Reimagining politics therefore means thinking differently. Moreover, the project of that thinking differently leads to thinking ‘difference’ itself. Thought is therefore required if politics is to contribute to out-living the modern; specifically, political thought. The challenge to out-live the modern issues from the faltering of modern thought, however, and the suspicion now of its very own project of thought, as much as it does from the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the industrialisation and ecological despoliation of the planet, or the genocidal dynamics of new nationalisms. The challenge to out-live the modern issues, therefore, from the modern condition of both politics and thought. This so-called suspicion of thought—I would rather call it a transformation of the project of thought which has disclosed the faltering of the modern project of thought—is what has come to distinguish continental thought in the last century. I draw on that thought in order to think the freedom of human being against the defining political thought of modernity; that ontological preoccupation with the subject of security which commits its politics to securing the subject. Motivated, therefore, by a certain sense of crisis in both philosophy and politics, and by the conviction that there is an intimate relation between the two which is most violently and materially exhibited globally in (inter)national politics, the aim of this book is to make a contribution towards rethinking some of the fundamentals of International Relations through what I would call the political philosophy of contemporary continental thought. Its ultimate intention is, therefore, to make a contribution toward the reconstruction of International Relations as a site of political thought, by departing from the very commitment to the politics of subjectivity upon which International Relations is premised.

**The perm is an example of “realistic radicalism”. It claims to be revolutionary, but works through existing structures of conservative thought, making it incapable of change.**

Dillon 96 (Michael, Prof@Lancaster, *Politics of Security*, p. 2)JFS

Reimagining politics is, of course, easier said than done. Resistance to it — especially in International Relations — nonetheless gives us a clue to one of the places where we may begin. For although I think of this project as a kind of political project, resistance to it does not arise from a political conservatism. Modern exponents of political modernity pride themselves on their realistic radicalism. Opposition always arises, instead, from an extraordinarily deep and profound conservatism of thought. Indeed, conservatism of thought in respect of the modern political imagination is required of the modern political subject. Reimagining politics therefore means thinking differently. Moreover, the project of that thinking differently leads to thinking ' difference' itself.

**A2: Perm**

The permutation is still driven by underlying assumptions of security.

Cambell and Dillion 93 (David, Michael, prof of international politics@ the University of Newcastle, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations @ the University of Lancaster, *The Political subject of violence* pg. 1-2)

But precisely where is the violence and technology of modern human being located in the politics of late modern times, such that we can confidently identify it as metaphysical and technological? How, particularly, does the ethic of technology manifest itself in the political discourse, institutions and practices of modernity? Where is it concretely located and how do we find it expressed in our contemporary world? If modern politics is determined metaphysically as technology because it takes its task definitionally to be the specific technology of the productive ordering of violence, then in what (extra)ordinary guise does it come disguised so that we fail to recognise its metaphysical character in the ubiquitous core value and everyday vocabulary upon which it relies and with which we must already be very familiar? What, to be crude and direct, is the precise name of the ethically deficient politics which mediates technology and violence in our times, and that we wish to indict? For if we cannot name it we cannot charge it. We cannot even frame the change well, deliver the summons, or proceed to substantiate it by calling it to a tribunal of questions that by its very structure and character it already suppresses. The answer, however, is a simple and an obvious one. It is 'The Politics of Security. As violence is the ultima ratio of politics, so security is the foundational value around which the political subject of violence revolves; from which it derives its teleological structure; and to which it constantly appeals in legitimation of its ordering way. Security, then as it orders and informs the political discourses of modernity, is the vehicle by which the ethic of technology is discreetly conveyed in modern politics. From that ethics derives the characteristic way in which the politics of security makes political order present in specific material conditions of social existence. Subject to scrutiny from within the interpretive frame of the end of philosophy, it turns out, however, that security is more than a mere goal, even the chief goal, of the rationally ordered means-ends calculus which defines the political subject of violence. It is, rather, the generative and immanent principle of formation of that political subject. To bring security into question, therefore is to bring the entire axiomatic foundation and architecture of this political construction into question. In the process, that questioning father problematises the foundation of epistemic realism which underpins the intellectual discourses which claim to account for and speak the truth about the political subject of violence; notable the discipline of international relations, whose disciplinary response to this un-securing of its own boundaries has naturally been to elicit, from the grip of epistemic realism in which it seeks to fasten itself ever more strongly, more security against its new enemies. It is security, then, which furnishes the foundation of the modern political subject; which subject is the political subject of violence. Security is the condition, better to say state (in order to allow the plan of this word to do further work for us), which that subject is ostensibly driven to seek for itself and, in pursuing its own security, seek to deny to its enemy. The polities of security has, therefore, to be summoned before the end of philosophy thesis also, and it is precisely that task which James Der Derian's chapter - 'The value of security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard' - commences. 'The goal of this inquiry', he notes, 'is to make philosophically problematical what has been practically axiomatic in international relations'. Adopting a Nietzschean voice, he begins by arguing that the first step is to ask, 'whether the paramount value of security lies in its abnegation of the insecurity of all values'.

A2: Perm - Discourse

The aff constructs a grid of intelligibility that overrides the resistance of the alt

**Milliken** **99** (Jennifer, Graduate Institute for International Studies, *European Journal of International Relations* (5)2 page 7)

The play of practice: the theoretical commitment of discourse productivity directs us towards studying dominating or hegemonic discourse, and their structuring of meaning as connected to implementing practices and ways of making these intelligible and legitimate. however, even if dominating discourses are 'grids of intelligibility' for large numbers of people, the third theoretical commitment is to all discourses as being unstable grids, requiring work to 'articulate' and 'rearticulate' their knowledge's and identities (to fix the 'regime of truth') and open-ended meshes, making discourses changeable and in fact historically contingent. As Roxanne Doty explains, Its [ a discourse's] exterior limits are constituted by other discourses that are themselves also open, inherently unstable and always in the process of being articulated. This understanding of discourse implies an overlapping quality to different discourse. Any fixing of a discourse and the identities that are constructed by it can only be a partial nature. It is the overflowing and incomplete nature of discourse that opens up spaces for change, discontinuity, and variation. (Doty, 1996:6) Following this commitment to 'the play of practice', as Ashley (1989) and Doty (1997) among others have called it, is a concern in the discourse literature for drawing out the efforts made to stabilizes and fix dominant meanings, as well as for studying 'subjugated knowledge's', alternative discourse excluded or silenced by a hegemonic discourse and explaining how these alternative discourses worked or work**,** perhaps in resistance to the dominant knowledge/power. At least in theory, this later aspect of discourse study differentiates discourse studies from other approaches, such as the study of norms in International Relations, which generally considers only the 'collective understandings of the proper behavior of actors' of western elites, other knowledge's apparently being presumed to be inconsequential (Legro, 1997:33). This commitment also entails a critique of conventional International Relations theory as providing 'ahistorical accounts of continuity and structural form' that ignore historical transformations, and concern for 'genealogies' exploring historical discontinuities and ruptures in International Relations that conventional theories have erased (walker, 1993: 110).

Their way of thinking fundamentally embodies the limits which make radical thought inconceivable

Dillon 96 (Michael, Prof@Lancaster, *Politics of Security*, p.5-6)JFS

The issue, then, is how the political is to be thought in the light of this philosophy of the limit. It seems to follow naturally, at least to me, that this issue should become the issue of thought for that domain of political thought which already has 'inter' and 'relation' in its title because these are claimed to be definitive of it. In taking the 'inter', relationality or the between seriously this philosophy of the limit would insist, therefore, that we should take the cognate 'inter' of International Relations equally seriously. For 'inter' is the vantage point of estrangement, which is the vantage point of human beings as such.International Relations is, of course, no stranger to limits. Classically, its very definition is dependent upon limits. Indeed, it is dependent upon what is said to be the limit of political order itself; namely that limit prescribed by the juridically and territorially defined boundary of the sovereign State. Once more, it is not a matter of a simple gap, here, between International Relations and the political philosophy of continental thought. Neither is it a matter of pointing-out something that orthodox International Relations has overlooked; which may then be assimil­ated into its paradigms of thought.Rather, it is a basic attunement of thought which separates International Relations from the political philosophy of continental thought. International Relations is more concerned with the fixing and policing of stringent limits. It is preoccupied, also, with the matrices and dynamics of power associated with what it thinks of as existing — and, sometimes, even universal — political being. Such limits, it insists, are not just limits to political existence, but limits to what it is allowable to think as reasonable and realistic political analysis. And so, it instinctively allies itself to the project of delineating and enforcing limits. That, too, is why its basic political and intellectual sympathies have always predisposed it towards Princes and States. It is International Relations’ fundamental attunement to limits, which fundamentally limits it as a political mode of thought. This book is intended to radically exceed those limits.

A2: Perm - Discourse

The first step in changing the flawed Security paradigm is a shift away from realist discourse and the acceptance of the heteropolar matrix and a world of global connectivity - Perm can't solve

Der Derian 5 (James,Director of the Global security Program and Research Professor of International Studies at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, October 1 " National Security: An Accident Waiting to Happen, *Harvard International Review,* Vol. 27 Issue 3)

His use of hyberbolic terms like "ultra-catastrophe" and "fall-out" is telling: such events exceed not only local and national capabilities, but the capacity of conventional language itself. An easy deflection would be to lay the blame on the neoconservativc faithful of the first term of US President George W. Bush, who, viewing through an inverted Wilsonian prism the world as they would wish it to be, have now been forced by natural and unnatural disasters to face the world as it really is-and not even the most sophisticated public affairs machine of dissimulations,  distortions, and lies can dose this gap. However, the discourse of the second Bush term has increasingly returned to the dominant worldview of national [security](http://www.allbusiness.com/buying_exiting_businesses/3580951-1.html), realism. And if language is, as Nietzsche claimed, a prisonhouse, realism is its supermax penitentiary. Based on linear notions of causality, a correspondence theory of truth, and the materiality of power, how can realism possibly account-let alone prepare or provide remedies-for complex catastrophes, like the toppling of the World Trade Center and attack on the Pentagon by a handful of jihadists armed with box-cutters and a few months of flight-training? A force-five hurricane that might well have begun with the flapping of a butterfly's wings? A northeast electrical blackout that started with a falling tree limb in Ohio? A possible pandemic triggered by the mutation of an avian virus? How, for instance, are we to measure the immaterial power of the CNN-effect on the first Gulf War, the AlJazeera-effect on the Iraq War, or the Nokia-effect on the London terrorist bombings? For events of such complex, non-linear origins and with such tightly-coupled, quantum effects, the national security discourse of realism is simply not up to the task. Worse, what if the "failure of imagination" identified by the 9/11 Commission is built into our national and homeland security systems? What if the reliance on planning for the catastrophe that never came reduced our capability to flexibly respond and improvise for the "ultra-catastrophe" that did? What if worse-case scenarios, simulation training, and disaster exercises-as well as border guards, concrete barriers and earthen levees-not only prove inadequate but might well act as force- multipliers-what organizational theorists identify as "negative synergy" and "cascading effects" -that produce the automated bungling (think Federal Emergency Management Agency) that transform isolated events and singular attacks into global disasters? Just as "normal accidents" are built into new technologies-from the Titanic sinking to the Chernobyl meltdown to the Challenger explosion-we must ask whether "ultra-catastrophes" are no longer the exception but now part and parcel of densely networked [systems](http://www.allbusiness.com/buying_exiting_businesses/3580951-1.html) that defy national management; in other words, "planned disasters." What, then, is to be done? A first step is to move beyond the wheel-spinning debates that perennially keep security discourse always one step behind the global event. It might well be uni-, bi-, or multi-polar, **but it is time to recognize that the power configuration of the states-system is rapidly being subsumed by a heteropolar matrix, in which a wide range of different actors and technological drivers are producing profound global effects through interconnectivity**. Varying in identity, interests, and strength, these new actors and [drivers](http://www.allbusiness.com/buying_exiting_businesses/3580951-1.html) gain advantage through the broad bandwidth of information technology, for networked communication systems provide the means to traverse political, economic, religious, and cultural boundaries, changing not only how we interpret events, but making it ever more difficult to maintain the very distinction of intended from accidental events. According to the legal philosopher of Nazi Germany, Carl Schmitt, when the state is unable to deliver on its traditional promissory notes of safety, security, and well-being through legal, democratic means, it will necessarily exercise the sovereign "exception:" declaring a state of emergency, defining friend from foe, and, if necessary, eradicating the threat to the state. But what if the state, facing the global event, cannot discern the accidental from the intentional? An external attack from an internal auto-immune response? The natural as opposed to the "planned disaster"? The enemy within from the enemy without? We can, as the United States has done since September 11, continue to treat catastrophic threats as issues of national rather than [global security](http://www.allbusiness.com/buying_exiting_businesses/3580951-1.html), and go it alone. However, once declared, bureaucratically installed, and repetitively gamed, national states of emergency grow recalcitrant and become prone to even worse disasters. As Paul Virilio, master theorist of the war machine and the integral accident once told me: "The full-scale accident is now the prolongation of total war by other means

A2: Perm – Authoritarianism Turn

Attempts to resist security with the threat rhetoric of the aff lead to authoritarianism.

**Neocleous 6** (Mark, August 2006, Brunel University, *Contemporary Political Theory*, p.138)

But this argument also has an even more problematic flip side, which brings us to contemporary 'security politics'. Holmes points out that no theory with security as its central concern can be dogmatically anti-statist. But then most liberals would reply that they never set themselves up as dogmatically anti-statist anyway. The real problem is that the commitment to security leaves liberalism with no defence against authoritarian or absolutist encroachments on liberty, so long as these are conducted in the name of security. It is on this basis that liberalism contains the possibility of distinctly non-liberal interventions into the lives of citizens (Dean, 1999, 137). Of course, the liberal position, and one all too easily aped by the political Left more broadly in its desperate attempt to participate in contemporary debates about security politics, is that any attempt to limit liberty on the grounds of security has to be couched in terms of the rule of law and basic rights. But this turns out to be a politically naive misunderstanding of both ruling class inventiveness with the concept of security and of liberalism's own history. Nowhere is this clearer than in the modern version under which 'prerogative' powers — though not many call them that any more — are exercised, namely the state of emergency. The concept of emergency has become increasingly popular recently, not least because of the influence on much contemporary political thought of Carl Schmitt's (1985) counter-liberal concept of sovereignty — that sovereign is he who decides on the exception — and Giorgio Agamben's (2005) reworking of this into an argument about the camp. But whatever value might appear initially to reside in Schmitt's critique of liberalism is undermined entirely by the fact that liberal democracies have in the past century been perfectly willing to exercise emergency powers in the name of security. As I have shown at length elsewhere, the historical evidence suggests that far from being aberrational or exceptional to liberal democracies, emergency powers have been exercised over and again in the last hundred years and more, becoming so fundamental to the political administration of capitalist modernity that they have, to all intents and purposes, become a permanent feature of liberal democratic polities (Neocleous, 2006a). As much as liberal concepts of liberty came to protect individuals from state power, the permanent crises of security management that allowed for their suspension became very quickly deeply written into the logic of the 'rule of law'. And, being written into the logic of the rule of law, liberty has come to be subsumed — and liberties suppressed — under the ideological discourse of security. While this loss of liberty 'for security reasons' is quite minor compared to, say, what takes place in a fascist regime, the practices involved, the wider state of emergency to which it gives rise, and the intensification of the security obsession, have a disquieting tendency to push contemporary politics further and further towards entrenched authoritarian measures. Liberalism is not only unable to save us from this possibility, but actually had a major role in its creation and continuation.

A2: K trivializes State

Critical theorists do not trivialize the state but rather recognize its power as an object of loyalty and a normative function. Critical Theorists believe that history is formed by ideas and are thus malleable.

**Krause 96,**( Keith, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, February 18, *Critical Theory and Security Studies*)

**The first "red herring" is the argument that critical theorists understate, ignore or "wish away" the importance of the state. In no way does the claim that the principle institutions of world politics are socially constructed imply this.** **Many critical scholars recognize that the state** (or at least the state system) has reached a historical high point**, and that it presents a powerful object of loyalty and aspiration that needs perhaps to be taken more seriously.**16 **Others are interested in examining the way in which the substantive and normative content of the concept of "state sovereignty" may have changed and be changing.**17 **Still others are interested in the transformation from the medieval to the modern, as a means of highlighting the ways in which the state was "constructed" out of the political, economic and ideational matrix of that period.**18 A related claim suggests that critical theorists are committed to a belief that identities (whether state or individual) are infinitely malleable, and can be changed like sets of clothing.19 **The most extreme version of this is the accusation that critical approaches represent pure "idealism" - the belief that ideas are the driving force of history, and that if our ideas are simply changed, so too will be the world.** This canard is the least fair of all, as even Mearsheimer recognizes in a footnote!20 It misinterprets the argument that the process of constituting political subjects (such as states) endows them with identities and interests that are not just "given." The only claim advanced here is that interests must be "endogenized" in our theories (Wendt's term), or rather, that **the "interests" of political subjects such as states are not given by structures, but are generated by social processes of interaction between them**.21 More importantly for critical International Relations, since **the state is an "abstraction" or construct (states don't choose, people do), the process of endowing states with interests is a social.**

**A2: K Subjective- Rejection Key to Change**

**The K's mythology takes neither an objective account of reality, but rather a rejection of an external reality contracted from a social understanding of the world.**

**Krause 96** ( Keith, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, February 18, *Critical Theory and Security Studies*)

A third "**red herring" that attacks critical methodology accuses it of "subjectivism,"** colloquially presented as the "anything goes" argument. **Mearsheimer latches onto this when he quotes Richard Ashley to the effect that "there are no constants, no fixed meanings, no secure grounds, no profound secrets, no final structures or limits to history...there is only interpretation**."23 It must be acknowledged that some variants (most often labelled post-modern) of critical scholarship would **adopt an "anything goes" position (and argue that all interpretations are arbitrary), but most scholars would not. The acceptance that our knowledge (as scholars) of the subjects, structures and practices of world politics is not "objective**," does not even lead all scholars to a rejection of naturalist models for science. **Some, such as Alex Wendt or Michael Barnett, "fully endorse the scientific project of falsifying theories against evidence."24 Others** accept neither Ashley's nor Wendt's position, and **argue that although social science should not emulate the methodology of the natural sciences, their commitment to an interpretive method does *not* imply rejection of the idea that there are better or worse interpretations - only a rejection of the idea that they are arbitrated against some external "reality" rather than against social actors' understandings of their world.25** The fourth point concerns stasis and change, and illustrates the "what you look for is what you see" nature of realist arguments. **A realist casts his or her eye over 700 years of history and sees a ceaseless repetition of state competition for power, suspicion and insecurity**. Some even go further back, and interpret the medieval world, or the world of Greek city-states, in similar terms. But when these claims are examined closely, they often turn out to rest upon tendentious or implausible readings of history that are little better than Whig or Toynbee-esque versions.26 The fallback position - that neorealists are not trying to make determinate predictions, but are trying to construct transhistorical, generalizable causal claims in order to explain a small number of big things - does not obviate these problems. First, **it assumes the possibility of transhistorical generalization - of uncovering some sort of "laws of history" - which historicist accounts deny, and which are in some disrepute in other fields of social science**.27 Second, **it opens the door for other (even critical) scholars to offer to account for a large number of perhaps equally important but "smaller" things. A critical or constructivist scholar sees over the 700 years of European history variation, change, evolution and decline. The rise and decline of absolutism, the rise of modern nationalism, imperialism, the advent of inter-state interactions in a complex web of ideas that gives practical (and shifting) content to understandings of interests.**28 This sort of contextual understanding and practical knowledge is what scholarship should aspire to, and since human agents are engaged in constructing their world (and their future), scientific models of explain-predict-control (the old Comte-ian formula) are at best misguided, and at worst pernicious.29 Hence it is no accident that Robert Cox, for example, eschews prediction, since he believes it neither possible nor desirable, except within a framework of "problem-solving theory" that takes the social and political order as fixed and works within this assumption via a determinist "if-then" self-determination and decolonization, and recent claims for democracy and human rights have all embedded inter-state interactions in a complex web of ideas that gives practical (and shifting) content to understandings of interests.28 logic that denies human agency.30 To claim then that a failure to make predictions is a weakness of critical theory is to miss the point entirely, and to evaluate it against other's goals

**A2: K Exclusionary**

**The K is not exclusionary it broadens and incorporates aspects left out by traditional views of the state and uncovering** transhistorical generalizations.

**Krause 96,**( Keith, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, February 18, *Critical Theory and Security Studies*)

The practical *exclusionary* consequences of this are easy to find. Mark Levy, for example, in his review of the environment and security literature, characterizes these views as "existential" visions of the link between environment and security. He concedes the importance of ecological hazards to human well-being, but argues that the work is marked more by a desire to heighten the political profile of environmental issues by placing them within the rhetoric of security than by any sustainable status as "security issues."79 Likewise, **Robert Dorff argues that although a broader definition of security highlights significant contemporary "problems," these do not constitute "security" issues because "`problems' is not a concept...[it] provides us with no ordering of reality** that we can use to create a common understanding of what it is that we are talking about and the range of possible policy approaches to addressing those problems."80 **But by treating the broadening of the concept of security as a "political" rather than analytical move, the traditional view is positioned as an apolitical analytic stance that is not equally driven by (or established upon) a set of value commitments. As a result, alternative conceptions of security are judged by how well they fit within and contribute to the (purportedly objective) prevailing categories of the field - a concern with inter-state violent conflict**. Not surprisingly, **the answer turns out to be that they are not really security issues at all**. Although Levy admits it is possible to conceive of "global security," he defines security as "national security" - as a situation where threats to a "nation's most important values" come from the actions of "foreigners."81 But adopting the taken-for-granted political resolutions of orthodox security studies is not a neutral point against which alternative conceptions can be judged. The third disciplining move, *character assassination*, is by far the most difficult to pin down (and avoid polemics). I think, however, that it is not difficult to agree with Wendt that Mearsheimer's "discussion of [critical theorists'] research program [is] full of conflations, half-truths, and misunderstandings."82 **The goal of critical security studies is not to make "states, or more precisely, their inhabitants and leaders...care about concepts like `rectitude,' `rights,' and `obligations'"; its scholars are not naively committed to "replac[ing] realism with a discourse that emphasizes harmony and peace"; they are not "intolerant of other discourses about international politics**" (except perhaps when they themselves are not taken seriously as scholars); **and the phrase "intersubjective understandings and expectations" is not "jargon" (any more than any conceptual language).83 Of course, individual scholars may be guilty of turgid prose, or can be committed to one or another vision of a desirable future world** - just as Mearsheimer doubtless is - **but** this **is not** (as noted above) **the core of the project**. Finally, as I hope this paper amply demonstrates, the distinguishing feature of critical security studies literature is *not* its lack of empirical content. A more interesting version of this argument is presented by Stephen Walt, when he argues that while it is important to permit additions or amendments to the orthodox core of security studies, to challenge fundamentally its foundations is intellectually self-indulgent and even perhaps politically irresponsible. As he says, "issues of war and peace are too important for the field to be diverted into a prolix and self-indulgent discourse that is divorced from the real world."84 **One response from the critical camp is that the charge of political irresponsibility rests more strongly on those who place scholarship at the service of the state, or who attempt to uncover transhistorical generalizations at such a high level of abstraction that they eschew engagements with practical political problems (or which, if true, deny any scope for human agency).**

Affirmative Answers

**A2: Self-Fulfilling Prophecy**

The plan will not create violence because the action is defensive securitization, not offensive.

Montgomery 6 (Evan, Research Fellow at Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 151-185)

Defensive realists also rely on two particular variables—the offense-defense balance and offense-defense differentiation—to explain when states can and will reveal their motives.10 Specifically, when defense is distinguishable from and more effective than offense, benign states can adopt military postures that provide for their security without threatening others. Combining both variables yields six ideal-type conditions, yet only one—offense-defense differentiation and a neutral offense-defense balance—clearly allows security seekers to communicate their motives without increasing their vulnerability. Offense- defense differentiation is a necessary condition for reassurance without vulnerability, as benign and greedy states will each be able to choose military postures that visibly reflect their preferences.

Offensive vs defensive securitization actions can have very different impacts – defensive actions create reassurance of peace between nations.

Montgomery 6 (Evan, Research Fellow at Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 151-185)

Because a state’s military posture serves as an indicator of its likely behavior, the offense-defense balance also affects how states perceive their rivals. Defensive realists maintain that a state’s security policies are determined in part by its assessment of others’ intentions and motives.16 Hard-line strategies are generally chosen when others are thought to be hostile. For example, states are more likely to balance against than bandwagon with adversaries believed to be “unalterably aggressive.”17 Most realists would agree, moreover, that these beliefs are largely a function of a state’s military posture. Barry Posen notes that, “in watching one another, states tend to focus on military doctrines and military capabilities,” and “take these capabilities at face value.”18 This suggests that, at a minimum, the offense-defense balance communicates information about others’ immediate intentions. When offense has the advantage, states believe that others are more likely to attack. When defense has the advantage, states know that others are less likely to do so. The security dilemma can therefore be exacerbated or mitigated absent any knowledge of others’ underlying motives; the choice of offensive or defensive postures can indicate what a state will do, but those postures may themselves be the result of structural pressures rather than state preferences.

Defensive securitization efforts can lead to mutual assurance and certainty – Gorbachev proves.

Montgomery 6 (Evan, Research Fellow at Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 151-185)

Even before the reductions in strategic nuclear weapons achieved in the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Talks treaty, military reassurance played an important role in altering the prevalent belief that the Soviet Union was an aggressive state. Gorbachev’s concessions rejected the general logic of defensive realism—relative losses in capabilities could be accepted if an increase in security was the net result.126 The impact of offense-defense variables on Soviet re- assurance would also seem to be evident: the large defensive advantage afforded by nuclear deterrence allowed Gorbachev to sacrifice the Soviet Union’s offensive conventional capability, which helped to reduce uncertainty over Soviet motives while leaving its security undiminished. Gorbachev’s own views suggest this logic; possession of nuclear weapons implied that “if one country engages in a steady arms buildup while the other does nothing, the side that arms will all the same gain nothing.”127 Yet this cannot be entirely correct, because U.S. policymakers did not act as though defense was overwhelmingly strong or that nuclear weapons ruled out a military conflict. Rather, the success of Gorbachev’s efforts depended on the belief among NATO members that the Soviet Union’s conventional forces did indeed constitute an offensive capability that posed a genuine threat to Western Europe. If this were not the case, the reduction of those forces would have done little to make the United States and its allies less fearful and more secure and would not have demonstrated benign motives.

A2: Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

Modern security measures and discourses make war highly unlikely, and allow for peaceful reassurance between countries.

Jervis 1 (Robert, Prof. of International Politics at Columbia Univ., *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 96, No. 1, March 2002, pp. 1-14)

Predictions about the maintenance of the Community are obviously disputable (indeed, limitations on people’s ability to predict could undermine it), but nothing in the short period since the end of the Cold War points to an unraveling. The disputes within it do not seem to be increasing in number or severity and even analysts who stress the continuation of the struggle for world primacy and great power rivalries do not expect fighting [Huntington 1993; Kupchan forthcoming; Waltz 1993, 2000; however, Calleo (2001), Layne (2000), and Mearsheimer (1990, 2001) are ambiguous on this point]. If the United States is still concerned with maintaining its advantages over its allies, the reason is not that it believes that it may have to fight them but that it worries that rivalry could make managing world problems more difficult (Layne 2000; New York Times, March 8, 1992, 14; May 24, 1992, 1, 14). The Europeans’ effort to establish an independent security force is aimed at permitting them to intervene when the United States chooses not to (or perhaps by threatening such action, to trigger American intervention), not at fighting the United States. Even if Europe were to unite and the world to become bipolar again, it is very unlikely that suspicions, fears for the future, and conflicts of interest would be severe enough to break the Community. A greater threat would be the failure of Europe to unite coupled with an American withdrawal of forces, which could lead to “security competition” within Europe (Art 1996a; Mearsheimer 2001, 385–96). The fears would focus on Germany, but their magnitude is hard to gauge and it is difficult to estimate what external shocks or kinds of German behavior would activate them. The fact that Thatcher and Mitterrand opposed German unification is surely not forgotten in Germany and is an indication that concerns remain. But this danger is likely to constitute a self-denying prophecy in two ways. First, many Germans are aware of the need not only to reassure others by tying themselves to Europe, but also to make it unlikely that future generations of Germans would want to break these bonds even if they could. Second, Americans who worry about the residual danger will favor keeping some troops in Europe as the ultimate intra-European security guarantee. Expectations of peace close off important routes to war. The main reason for Japanese aggression in the 1930s was the desire for a self-sufficient sphere that would permit Japan to fight the war with the Western powers that was seen as inevitable, not because of particular conflicts, but because it was believed that great powers always fight each other. In contrast, if states believe that a security community will last, they will not be hypersensitive to threats from within it and will not feel the need to undertake precautionary measures that could undermine the security of other members. Thus the United States is not disturbed that British and French nuclear missiles could destroy American cities, and while those two countries object to American plans for missile defense, they do not feel the need to increase their forces in response. As long as peace is believed to be very likely, the chance of inadvertent spirals of tension and threat is low. Nevertheless, the point with which I began this section is unavoidable. World politics can change rapidly and saying that nothing foreseeable will dissolve the Community its not the same as saying that it will not dissolve (Betts 1992). To the extent that it rests on democracy and prosperity (see below), anything that would undermine these would also undermine the Community. Drastic climate change could also shake the foundations of much that we have come to take for granted. But it is hard to see how dynamics at the international level (i.e., the normal trajectory of fears, disputes, and rivalries) could produce war among the leading states. In other words, the Community does not have within it the seeds of its own destruction. Our faith in the continuation of this peace is in- creased to the extent that we think we understand its causes and have reason to believe that they will continue. This is our next topic.

A2: Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

Current international conditions make war unthinkable – the self-fulfilling prophecy claims are fundamentally false.

Jervis 1 (Robert, Prof. of International Politics at Columbia Univ., *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 96, No. 1, March 2002, pp. 1-14)

My explanation for the development and maintenance of the Community combines and reformulates several factors discussed previously. Even with the qualifica- tions just discussed, a necessary condition is the belief that conquest is difficult and war is terribly costly. When conquest is easy, aggression is encouraged and the security dilemma operates with particular vicious- ness as even defensive states need to prepare to attack (Van Evera 1999). But when states have modern armies and, even more, nuclear weapons, it is hard for anyone to believe that war could make sense. Of course statesmen must consider the gains that war might bring as well as its costs. Were the former to be very high, they might outweigh the latter. But, if anything, the expected benefits of war within the Community have declined, in part because the developed countries, including those that lost World War II, are generally satisfied with the status quo.16 Even in the case that shows the greatest strain—U.S.–Japanese relations—no one has explained how a war could pro- vide anyone much gross, let alone net, benefit: it is hard to locate a problem for which war among the Commu- nity members would provide a solution. The other side of this coin is that, as liberals have stressed, peace within the Community brings many gains, especially economic. While some argue that the disruption caused by relatively free trade is excessive and urge greater national regulation, no one thinks that conquering others would bring more riches than trad- ing with them. Despite concern for relative economic gain (Grieco 1990; Mastanduno 1991) and economic disputes, people believe that their economic fates are linked more positively than negatively to the rest of the Community. Of course costs and benefits are subjective, depend- ing as they do on what the actors value, and changes in values are the third leg of my explanation. Most political analysis takes the actors’ values for granted because they tend to be widely shared and to change slowly. Their importance and variability become clear only when we confront a case such as Nazi Germany, which, contrary to standard realist conceptions of na- tional interest and security, put everything at risk in order to seek the domination of the Aryan race. The changes over the last 50–75 years in what the leaders and publics in the developed states value are striking. To start with, war is no longer seen as good in itself (Mueller 1989); no great power leader today would agree with Theodore Roosevelt that “no triumph of peace is quite so great as the supreme triumph of war” (quoted by Harbaugh 1961, 99). In earlier eras it was commonly believed that war brought out the best in individuals and nations and that the virtues of dis- cipline, risk-taking, and self-sacrifice that war required were central to civilization. Relatedly, honor and glory used to be central values. In a world so constituted, the material benefits of peace would be much less important; high levels of trade, the difficulty of mak- ing conquest pay, and even nuclear weapons might not produce peace. Democracy and identity also operate through what actors value, and may be responsible in part for the decline in militarism just noted. Compromise, consideration for the interests of others, respect for law, and a shunning of violence outside this context all are values that underpin democracy and are reciprocally cultivated by it. The Community also is relatively homogeneous in that its members are all democracies and have values that are compatibly similar. It is important that the values be compatible as well as similar: a system filled with states that all believed that war and domi- nation was good would not be peaceful.17 One impulse to war is the desire to change the other country, and this disappears if values are shared. The United States could conquer Canada, for example, but what would be the point when so much of what it wants to see there is already in place? Central to the rise of the Community is the decline in territorial disputes. Territory has been the most com- mon cause and object of conflicts in the past, and we have become so accustomed to their absence within the Community that it is easy to lose sight of how drastic and consequential this change is (Diehl 1999; Hensel 2000; Huth 1996, 2000; Kacowicz 1998; Vasquez 1993; Zacher 2001). Germans no longer care that Alsace and Lorraine are French; the French are not disturbed by the high level of German presence in these provinces. The French, furthermore, permitted the Saar to return to Germany and are not bothered by this loss, and in- deed do not feel it as a loss at all. Although during the Cold War the West Germans refused to renounce their claims to the “lost territories” to the east, they did so upon unification and few voices were raised in protest. Today the United Kingdom is ready to cede Northern Ireland to the Irish Republic if a referendum in the six counties were to vote to do so.

A2: Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

Securitization is inevitable, but does not always create war, and this can be applied even more so to the US’ situation.

Taliaferro 1 (Jeffrey W., Assoc. Prof. of Political Science at Tufts Univ., *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 128-161)

The security dilemma is inescapable, but it does not always generate intense competition and war. In addition to the gross distribution of power in the international system, other material factors, which I refer to as “structural modifiers,” may increase or decrease the likelihood of conoict.27 These include the offense-defense balance in military technology, geographic proximity, access to raw materials, international economic pressure, regional or dyadic military balances, and the ease with which states can extract resources from conquered territory.28 Defensive realists assume that structural modifiers have a greater influence on the likelihood of international conflict or cooperation than does the gross distribution of power. The gross distribution of power refers to the relative share of the international system’s material capabilities that each state controls. Polarity, or the number of great powers in the international system, is the most common measure of the gross distribution of power. Structural modifiers, on the other hand, refer to the relative distribution of capabilities that enable individual states to carry out particular diplomatic and military strategies. This in turn influences the severity of the security dilemma between particular states or in regional subsystems. Thus one may think of the structural modifiers as mediating the effects of systemic imperatives on the behavior of states.29 Consider, for example, offense-defense theory and balance-of-threat theory. It makes little sense to speak of a systemwide offense-defense balance in military technology. The possession of particular military technologies and weapons systems influences the relative ease with which a state can attack or hold territory. The objective offense-defense balance affects the strategies of individual states and the interaction between pairs of states; it does not change the gross distribution of power in the international system.30 Similarly, balance-of- threat theory does not posit that states always balance against the greatest threat in the international system. Rather they generally balance against states that pose an immediate threat to their survival.31 Defensive realism, in both its neorealist and neoclassical realist variants, challenges notions that the security dilemma always generates intense conflict. In this respect, defensive realism corrects deductive flaws both in Waltz’s core model and in offensive realism. Waltz holds that anarchy and the need for survival often force states to forgo mutually beneficial cooperation. At a mini- mum, cooperation is difficult because states are sensitive to how it affects their current and future relative capabilities.32 Cooperation often proves to be impossible, particularly in the security arena, because states have every incentive to maintain an advantage over their competitors.33 Some offensive realists go further in arguing that cooperation can put a state’s survival in jeopardy. John Mearsheimer argues that anarchy leaves little room for trust because “a state may be unable to recover if its trust is betrayed.”34 Defensive realism faults these arguments for being incomplete. Cooperation is risky, but so is competition. States cannot be certain of the outcome of an arms race or war beforehand, and losing such a competition can jeopardize a state’s security. Waltz’s balance-of-power theory and Mearsheimer’s offensive realism require that states evaluate the risks of cooperation and competition, but they do not explain variation in competitive or cooperative behavior.35 This has implications for both foreign policy and international outcomes. The defensive variants of neorealism and neoclassical realism specify the conditions under which cooperative international outcomes and less competitive state behavior, respectively, become more likely. According to offense- defense theory proponents, at the operational and tactical level, improvements in firepower (e.g., machine guns, infantry antitank weapons, surface-to-air missiles, and tactical nuclear weapons) should favor the defense because attackers are usually more vulnerable and detectable than are well-prepared de- fenders. At the strategic level, the anticipated high costs and risks of conquests should deter even greedy leaders.36 The nuclear revolution—specifically the development of secure second- strike capabilities by the declared nuclear states—provides strong disincentives for intended war.37 This does not mean that pairs of nuclear-armed states will not engage in political-military competition in third regions or limited conventional conflict short of all-out war.38 Rather it suggests that intended (or premeditated) wars—wars that break out as the result of a calculated decision by at least one party to resort to the massive use of force in the pursuit of its objectives—become highly unlikely.39 Conversely, if the offense dominates, then states have an incentive to adopt aggressive strategies. Similarly, states’ abilities to extract resources from conquered territory influence the likelihood of international conflict. Where industrial capacity, strategic depth, or raw materials are cumulative, defensive realists would expect states to pursue expansionist policies.40 According to Mearsheimer, states must constantly worry about their survival because potential competitors may try to eliminate them at any time. He argues, “States operate in both an international political environment and an international economic environment, and the former dominates the latter in cases where the two come into conoict.”41 This implies that states will heavily discount the future by favoring short-term military preparedness over longer- term objectives, such as economic prosperity, when and if the two goals conoict.42 Again, defensive realism finds this argument lacking and specifies the conditions under which states are more likely to heavily discount the future and prefer short-term military preparedness to long-term economic prosperity. For example, where geography provides defense from invasion or blockade, defensive neoclassical realism would expect a state to favor long-term objectives. Similarly, a state with relatively weak neighbors can afford to take a longer- term perspective and devote a greater portion of its national resources to domestic programs. A relatively benign threat environment removes the incentives for the development of strong central institutions within the state. For example, geographic separation

from Europe and the relative weakness of Canada and Mexico allowed the United States to survive the last 150 years of its independence without developing strong state institutions (i.e., a large standing army, an efficient tax system, and a large central bureaucracy).43

A2: Discourse First

Discourse is not determinative

Mearsheimer 95 (John, Prof. of Poli Sci at the Univ. of Chicago, *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1994-1995, pp. 5-49)

Critical theory provides few insights on why discourses rise and fall. Thomas Risse- Kappen writes, "Research on. . . 'epistemic communities' of knowledge-based transnational networks has failed so far to specify the conditions under which specific ideas are selected and influence policies while others fall by the wayside."156Not surprisingly, critical theorists say little about why realism has been the dominant discourse, and why its foundations are now so shaky. They certainly do not offer a well-defined argument that deals with this important issue. Therefore, it is difficult to judge the fate of realism through the lens of critical theory. Nevertheless, critical theorists occasionally point to particular factors that might lead to changes in international relations discourse. In such cases, however, they usually end up arguing that changes in the material world drive changes in discourse. For example, when Ashley makes surmises about the future of realism, he claims that "a crucial issue is whether or not changing historical conditions have disabled longstanding realist rituals of power." Specifically, he asks whether "developments in late capitalist society;" like the "fiscal crisis of the state," and the "internationalization of capital," coupled with "the presence of vastly destructive and highly automated nuclear arsenals [has] de- prived statesmen of the latitude for competent performance of realist rituals of power?"157 Similarly, Cox argues that fundamental change occurs when there is a "disjuncture" between "the stock of ideas people have about the nature of the world and the practical problems that challenge them." He then writes, "Some of us think the erstwhile dominant mental construct of neorealism is inadequate to confront the challenges of global politics today."158 It would be understandable if realists made such arguments, since they believe there is an objective reality that largely determines which discourse will be dominant. Critical theorists, however, emphasize that the world is socially constructed, and not shaped in fundamental ways by objective factors. Anarchy, after all, is what we make of it. Yet when critical theorists attempt to explain why realism may be losing its hegemonic position, they too point to objective factors as the ultimate cause of change. Discourse, so it appears, turns out not to be determinative, but mainly a reflection of developments in the objective world. In short, it seems that when critical theorists who study inter- national politics offer glimpses of their thinking about the causes of change in the real world, they make arguments that directly contradict their own theory, but which appear to be compatible with the theory they are challenging.159

AT: Security Discourse Bad

**Treating security as a speech act means there are an infinite number of security threats, making it impossible to solve. The word “security” is not itself harmful, only when used by actors in positions to make security choices, it doesn’t apply to us.**

**Williams 3** (Michael C., university of Whales, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and

International Politics”, [*International Studies Quarterly*](http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublication?journalCode=intestudquar), Vol. 47, No. 4) CC

This stance allows the Copenhagen School to argue simultaneously for both an expansion and a limitation of the security agenda and its analysis. On the one hand, treating security as a speech-act provides, in principle, for an almost indefinite expansion of the security agenda. Not only is the realm of possible threats enlarged, but the actors or objects that are threatened (what are termed the "referent objects" of security) can be extended to include actors and objects well beyond the military security of the territorial state. Accordingly, the Copenhagen School has argued that security can usefully be viewed as comprising five "sectors," each with their particular referent object and threat agenda (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, 1998).6 In the "military" sector, for example, the referent object is the territorial integrity of the state, and the threats are overwhelmingly defined in external, military terms. In the "political" sector, by contrast, what is at stake is the legitimacy of a governmental authority, and the relevant threats can be ideological and sub-state, leading to security situations in which state authorities are threatened by elements of their own societies, and where states can become the primary threat to their own societies. Even further from an exclusively military-territorial focus is the concept of "societal" security, in which the identity of a group is presented as threatened by dynamics as diverse as cultural flows, economic integration, or population movements. Conversely, while treating security as a speech-act allows a remarkable broadening of analysis, securitization theory seeks also to limit the security agenda. Security, the Copenhagen School argues, is not synonymous with "harm" or with the avoidance of whatever else might be deemed malign or damaging (Buzan et al., 1998:2-5, 203-12). As a speech-act, securitization has a specific structure which in practice limits the theoretically unlimited nature of "security." These constraints operate along three lines. First, while the securitization process is in principle completely open (any "securitizing actor" can attempt to securitize any issue and referent object), in practice it is structured by the differential capacity of actors to make socially effective claims about threats, by the forms in which these claims can be made in order to be recognized and accepted as convincing by the relevant audience, and by the empirical factors or situations to which these actors can make reference. Not all claims are socially effective, and not all actors are in equally powerful positions to make them. This means, as Buzan and Waever put it, that the "Conditions for a successful speech-act fall into two categories: (1) the internal, linguistic-grammatical-to follow the rules of the act (or, as Austin argues, accepted conventional procedures must exist, and the act has to be executed according to these procedures); and (2) the external, contextual and social-to hold a position from which the act can be made ('The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked')" (Buzan et al., 1998:32). The claims that are likely to be effective, the forms in which they can be made, the objects to which they refer, and the social positions from which they can effectively be spoken are usually deeply "sedimented" (rhetorically and discursively, culturally, and institutionally) and structured in ways that make securitizations somewhat predictable and thus subject to probabilistic analysis (Waever, 2000)-and not wholly open and expandable. Finally, while empirical contexts and claims cannot in this view ultimately determine what are taken as security issues or threats, they provide crucial resources and referents upon which actors can draw in attempting to securitize a given issue.

Security discourse isn’t inherently bad—presenting it in debate allows the negative attributes to be avoided.

Williams 3 (Michael, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 47(4), AD: 7-10-9) BL

I have argued thus far that recognizing the roots of securitization theory within the legacy of a Schmittian-influenced view of politics explains a number of its key and most controversial features. Charges of an ethically and practically irresponsible form of objectivism in relation to either the act of securitization or the concept of societal security are largely misplaced. Locating the speech-act within a broader commitment to processes of discursive legitimation and practical ethics of dialogue allows the most radical and disturbing elements of securitization theory emerging from its Schmittian legacy to be offset. Seen in this light, the Copenhagen School is insulated from many of the most common criticisms leveled against it.

AT: Security Discourse Bad

**Treating Security as a speech act ruins the meaning of what security threats actually are and trivializes security, making it impossible to actually evaluate threats.**

**Williams 3** (Michael C., university of Whales, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and

International Politics”, [*International Studies Quarterly*](http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublication?journalCode=intestudquar), Vol. 47, No. 4) CC

A second major criticism of the Copenhagen School concerns the ethics of securitization. Simply put, if security is nothing more than a specific form of social practice-a speech-act tied to existential threat and a politics of emergency-then does this mean that anything can be treated as a "security" issue and that, as a consequence, any form of violent, exclusionary, or irrationalist politics must be viewed simply as another form of "speech-act" and treated "objectively"? Questions such as these have led many to ask whether despite its avowedly "constructivist" view of security practices, securitization theory is implicitly committed to a methodological objectivism that is politically irresponsible and lacking in any basis from which to critically evaluate claims of threat, enmity, and emergency.29 A first response to this issue is to note that the Copenhagen School has not shied away from confronting it. In numerous places the question of the ethics of securitization are discussed as raising difficult issues.

Threats = Real – Generally and Historically

Dogmatic realism leads us to universal truth- security threats exist.

Kwan and Tsang 1 (Kai-Man, Department of Religion and Philosophy, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong, Eric W. School of Business Administration, Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, U.S.A, December, *Strategic Management Journal*, Vol. 22, No. 12 (Dec., 2001), pp. 1163-1168, “Realism and Constructivism in Strategy Research: A Critical Realist Response to Mir and Watson”,) CH

The problem with Mir and Watson here is again their failure to distinguish different kinds of real- ism. It is important to distinguish a dogmatic realist from a critical realist. Both believe that theories can be true or false, and rigorous scientific research can move us progressively towards a true account of phenomena. Dogmatic realists further believe that current theories correspond (almost) exactly to reality, and hence there is not much room for error or critical scrutiny. This attitude is inspired by (but does not strictly follow from) a primitive version of positivism which believes in indubitable observations as raw data and that an infallible scientific method can safely lead us from these data to universal laws. In contrast, critical realists, though believing in the possibility of progress towards a true account of phenomena, would not take such progress for granted. Exactly because they believe that reality exists independently of our minds, our theories, observations and methods are all fallible. Critical realists also insist that verification and falsification are never conclusive, especially in social sciences. So critical testing of theories and alleged universal laws need to be carried out continuously. A more detailed description of critical realism, which is now a growing movement transforming the intellectual scene.

**A2: Epistemology K**

Their relativist approach is self-contradictory.

Kwan and Tsang 1 (Kai-Man, Department of Religion and Philosophy, Hong Kong Baptist University; Eric W., School of Business Administration, Wayne State University; *Strategic Management Journal*, Vol. 22, No. 12, Dec., 2001, pp. 1163-1168)

However, the blame for the confusion partly lies on the side of constructivists, who rarely make clear the above distinction. Mir and Wat- son have this problem too. Although they mention briefly the different types of constructivism, they do not state explicitly which type they subscribe to. Sometimes they speak as moderate constructivists. For example, they state that the ‘identification of some of the inadequacies of the realist paradigm must not be seen as a critique of realism itself’ (Mir and Watson, 2000: 947). They believe that ‘(c)onstructivist theories decenter the concept of a “natural” organizational science, but do not blindly embrace a philosophy of relativism’ (2000: 950). On the other hand, these disclaimers sometimes seem to be contradicted by their other sayings. For instance, they say, ‘According to constructivists, the philosophical positions held by researchers determine their findings’ (2000: 943). They further mention that such a constructivist approach suggests that ‘organizational “reality” (Astley, 1985) or the truth that academic disciplines avow (Can- nella and Paetzold, 1994) is socially constructed’ (2000: 943). If philosophical positions determine research findings, then reality has no input to and control over scientific research. Each and every one of various incommensurable philosophical positions will determine its own findings. No research findings can be neutrally assessed, criticized or falsified. Besides being rather implausible, this view quickly leads to epistemological relativism, as confirmed by their Fig. 11 (which includes epistemological relativism within the zone of constructivism). Furthermore, they quote Foucault approvingly: ‘We must conceive analysis as a *violence* we do to things, or in any case as a practice which we *impose upon* them’ (2000: 942, emphasis added), and later make a Foucaultian point themselves: ‘Researchers are never “objective” or value-neutral. Constructivists subscribe to the view that theory is discursive and power-laden’ (2000: 943). If it is the case, again it is hard to see how scientific research can be objective. So despite their disclaimers, Mir and Watson at times do lean towards an unacceptable form of antirealism and relativism. (Owing to space limitations, we are not going to discuss the reasons why relativism is unacceptable. Mir and Watson themselves also seem to have reservations about relativism.) In the end, because Mir and Watson fail to distinguish different types of constructivism, and to clarify where they stand exactly, their characterization of constructivism is shot through with internal contradictions.

Alt fails - Discursive focus generates epistemological blind spots and won’t alter security structures

Hyde-Price 1 (Adrian, Professor of International Politics at Bath, *Europes new security challenges*, page 39) KSM

Securitization thus focuses almost exclusively on the discursive domain and eschews any attempt to determine empirically what constitutes security concerns. It does not aspire to comment on the reality behind a securitization discourse or on the appropriate instruments for tackling security problems. Instead, it suggests that security studies – or what Waever calls securitization studies –should focus on the discursive moves whereby issues are securitized. The Copenhagen school thus emphasizes the need to understand the “speech acts” that accomplish a process of securitization. Their focus is on the linguistic and conceptual dynamics involved, even though they recognize the importance of the institutional setting within which securitization takes place. The concept of securitization offers some important insights for security studies. However, it is too epistemologically restricted to contribute to a significant retooling of security studies. On the positive side, it draws attention to the way in which security agendas are constructed by politicians and other political actors. It also indicates the utility of discourse analysis as an additional tool of analysis for security studies. However, at best, securitization studies can contribute one aspect of security studies. It cannot provide the foundations for a paradigm shift in the subdiscipline. Its greatest weakness is its epistemological hypochondria. That is, its tendency to reify epistemological problems and push sound observations about knowledge claims to their logical absurdity. Although it is important to understand the discursive moves involved in perception of security in, say, the Middle East, it is also necessary to make some assessment of nondiscursive factors like the military balance or access to freshwater supplies. For the Copenhagen school, however, these nondiscursive factors are relegated to second place. They are considered only to the extent that they facilitate or impede the speech act. In this way, the Copenhagen school is in danger of cutting security studies off from serious empirical research and setting it adrift on a sea of floating signifiers.

A2: Realism isn’t Viable

Realism, while not perfect, is the best available system.

Desch 99 (Michael C., Assoc. Prof of International Commerce at Univ. of Kentucky, *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 156-180)

I appreciate the opportunity to respond to the comments on “Culture Clash”1 by John Duffield, Theo Farrell, and Richard Price.2 I begin by briefly summarizing the main claims of my original article and pointing out several issues about which we more or less agree. The bulk of my response, however, examines what I see as the central issue in this debate—whether culturalism can supplant realism—and indicates why I and their arguments unconvincing. My main objective in writing “Culture Clash” was to assess the latest wave of cultural approaches to security studies. As the letters by Duffield, Farrell, and Price make clear, scholars who employ cultural approaches see themselves as challenging— and ultimately replacing—the dominant realist paradigm. By contrast, I concluded that although cultural theories might be able to supplement realism, there is little reason to believe they will supplant it. This is because cultural theories do not do a better job than realism at explaining how the world works. The letters by Duffield, Farrell, and Price raise four issues about which we do not in fact disagree. One charge is that I regard comparing theories as a “zero-sum game, where there is room for one, and only one, theory that must be declared the ‘best’ and ‘prevail’” (Price, p. 169). However, my argument that cultural theories could supplement realism explicitly acknowledges that both approaches may be of value. A second charge is that I employ a “double standard in assessing the relative merits of cultural and realist approaches” (Duffield, p. 156). In fact, I believe that rival theories should be held to the same standard.3 My preference for realism rests on its ability to outperform cultural theories even in those cases where cultural approaches should be at an advantage. The third charge is that I reject cultural theories because they exhibit various conceptual flaws (e.g., vague definitions of key terms, lack of generalizability, and contradictions within the cultural family of theories) while failing to acknowledge that realist theories display similar weaknesses. I did mention these potential conceptual problems in my article, but I explicitly stated that “they do not present insurmountable obstacles” to the development and testing of cultural theories.4 Moreover, I freely acknowledge that realism too has conceptual problems that I also believe can be surmounted through careful scholarship. A final charge (Farrell, p. 162) is that I advocate single case studies, a position supposedly incompatible with Imre Lakatos’s method of assessing rival research programs through “sophisticated falsiacation.”5 I did not advocate single cases instead of large-n studies but simply argued that when comparing rival theories, scholars must be sure to include cases in which competing theories make distinct predictions. This is a widely accepted principle among methodologists and not at all incompatible with Lakatos’s approach.6 The real issue in this debate is whether culturalism can supplant or merely supplement realism in explaining the real world of international politics. In other words, which approach is most consistent with the typical behavior of states?

A2: Realism is Outdated

Realism is still a viable system in the 21st century – power systems will stay unchanged.

Mearsheimer 2 (John, Prof. of Poli Sci at the Univ. of Chicago, *Realism and Institutionalism in International Studies,* pp. 23-33)

Despite the end of the cold war, the basic structure of the international system remains largely unchanged. States are still the key actors in world politics, and they continue to operate in an anarchic system. It is difficult to find a serious scholar who argues that the United Nations or any other international institution has coercive leverage over the great powers or is likely to have it anytime soon. Moreover, not only is there no plausible replacement for the state on the horizon, but there is little interest anywhere in the world for doing away with the state and putting an alternative political arrangement in its place. Nothing is forever, but there is good reason to think that the sovereign state’s time has not yet passed. If the basic structure of the system has not changed since, 1990, we should not expect state behavior in the new century to be much different from what it was in the past centuries. In fact, there is abundant evidence that states still care deeply about power and will compete for it among themselves in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the danger still remains that security competition might lead to war, neither of which has gone away with the disappearance of the Soviet Union. To illustrate this point, consider that the United States has fought two wars since the end of the Cold War- Iraq(1991) and Kosovo (1999)- and it came dangerously close to going to war against North Korea in 1994. Although the United States now spends more on defense than the next six countries combined, U.S. officials do not seem to think this is enough. Indeed, both candidates in the 2000 presidential campaign advocated spending even more money on the Pentagon. Thus, there is little reason to think that states no longer care about their security. Furthermore, it is hard to imagine anyone arguing that security competition and war are outmoded in (1) South Asia, where India and Pakistan are bitter enemies, are armed with nuclear weapons and are caught up in a raging dispute over Kashmir; (2) the Persian Gulf, where Iraq and Iran are bent on acquiring nuclear weapons and show no signs of becoming status quo powers; and (3) Africa, where interstate conflict appears to have increased since the end of the cold war. One might concede, however, that these regions remain mired in the old ways of doing business and argue instead that it is security competition and war among the system’s great powers, not minor powers such as Pakistan and Iran, that is passé. Therefore, Europe and Northeast Asia (NEAsia), where there are clusters of great powers are the places where realist logic no longer has much relevance. But this argument does not stand up to scrutiny. There is a large literature on security in North East Asia after the Cold War, and almost every author recognizes that power politics is alive and well in the region and that there is good reason to worry about armed conflict. The thought of Japan seriously rearming strikes fear in the heart of virtually every country in Asia, and if China continues to grow economically and militarily over the next few decades, there is likely to be intense security competition between China and its neighbors, as well as the United States. According to one expert, China “may well be the high church of realpolitik in the post-Cold War world.” Apparently the Chinese have not gotten the word that realism has been relegated to the scrap heap of history. Furthermore, the United States is in a position today where it might gind itself in a war with North Korea or with China over Taiwan. In short, NEAsia is a potentially dangerous place, where security competition is a central element of interstate relations. Possible the best evidence that power politics is still relevant in NEAsia is that the United States maintains one hundred thousand troops in the region and plans to keep them there for a long time. If NEAsia were a zone of peace, those American forces would be unnecessary and they could be sent home and demobilized, saving the U.S. taxpayer an appreciable sum of money. Instead, they are kept in place to help pacify a potentially volatile region.

Perm Solves – Strategic Reversibility

Power is strategically reversible – The resistance to state power counteracts the disciplinary power at the heart of their impacts

Campbell 98 (David- PHD, Prof of cultural & poli geog @ U of Durham, *Writing Security*, p.257-258,ET)

The possibility of rearticulating danger leads us to a final question: what modes of being and forms of life could we or should we adopt? To be sure, a comprehensive attempt to answer such a question is beyond the ambit of this book. But it is important to note that asking the question in this way mistakenly implies that such possibilities exist only in the future. Indeed, the extensive and intensive nature of the relations of power associated with the society of security means that there has been and remains a not inconsiderable freedom to explore alternative possibilities. While traditional analyses of power are often economistic and negative, Foucault's understanding of power emphasises its productive and enabling nature.36 Even more importantly, his understanding of power emphasizes the ontology of freedom presupposed by the existence of disciplinary and normalizing practices. Put simply, there cannot be relations of power unless subjects are in the first instance free: the need to institute negative and constraining power practices comes about only because without them freedom would abound. Were there no possibility of freedom, subjects would not act in ways that required containment so as to effect order.37 Freedom, though, is not the absence of power. On the contrary, because it is only through power that subjects exercise their agency, freedom and power cannot be separated. As Foucault maintains: At the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom. Rather than speaking of an essential freedom, it would be better to speak of an `agonism' — of a relationship which is at the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation which paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation.38 The political possibilities enabled by this permanent provocation of power and freedom can be specified in more detail by thinking in terms of the predominance of the `bio-power' discussed above. In this sense, because the governmental practices of biopolitics in Western nations have been increasingly directed towards modes of being and forms of life — such that sexual conduct has become an object of concern, individual health has been figured as a domain of discipline, and the family has been transformed into an instrument of government — the on-going agonism between those practices and the freedom they seek to contain, means that individuals have articulated a series of counter-demands drawn from those new fields of concern. For example, as the state continues to prosecute people according to sexual orientation, human rights activists have proclaimed the right of gays to enter into formal marriages, adopt children, and receive the same health and insurance benefits granted to their straight counterparts. These claims are a consequence of the permanent provocation of power and freedom in biopolitics, and stand as testament to the 'strategic reversibility' of power relations: if the terms of governmental practices can be made into focal points for resistances, then the 'history of government as the "conduct of conduct" is interwoven with the history of dissenting "counter- conducts" '.39 Indeed, the emergence of the state as the major articulation of 'the political' has involved an unceasing agonism between those in office and those they ruled. State intervention in everyday life has long incited popular collective action, the result of which has been both resistance to the state and new claims upon the state. In particular, 'The core of what we now call "citizenship" . . . consists of multiple bargains hammered out by rulers and ruled in the course of their struggles over the means of state action, especially the making of war.'40 In more recent times, constituencies associated with women's, youth, ecological, and peace movements (among others) have also issued claims upon society.

Perm Solves – A2: Security is Totalizing

Absolute claims about security must be questioned.

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, June 2007, *What security makes possible: Some thoughts on critical security studies*)

The Copenhagen School’s analyses open a door, however briefly, to an important insight. Security is contingent and not universal. However they fail to push beyond that into an analysis that could put the deeper ontological claims and construction of security into question, that could reveal its wider sociological function and power, and most importantly, that could be put into the service of a normatively progressive politics (whether that takes the name of security or not).49 Put briefly, this is the critical project which has motivated my own research over the last decade. This project requires walking a tricky path between what Matthew McDonald has called the ‘reconstructive’ and ‘deconstructive’ agendas in security studies.50 Many writers argue that they simply cannot be reconciled. From the reconstructive end, Booth has been sharply critical of some poststructuralist work on security which he thinks fails to acknowledge, or create space for, an agenda which resignifies security in terms of social justice or emancipation. He comments that: the poststructuralist approach seems to assume that security cannot be common or positive-sum but must always be zero-sum, with somebody’s security always being at the cost of the insecurity of others. [Hence] security itself is questioned as desirable goal … They also tend to celebrate insecurity, which I regard as a middle-class affront to the truly insecure.51 In some ways this critique—which cites writings by Michael Dillon and James Der Derian as examples—is appropriate. He might also have included in this list an article published in 2000 by Costas Constantinou.52 While in some ways he misunderstands what they are searching for (a route out of generalised politics of alienation and fear, which make them as critical of realism as he is) it is important to remind ourselves of the legitimate and almost universal concern of individuals and communities for secure and stable lives. It is for this reason that in my own work I have often endorsed the normative arguments of the Welsh School, Tickner, the Secure Australia Project or the UNDP’s 1994 *Human development report*. It might be possible to read Booth’s comments as a critique of my argument in the introduction to *In fear of security*, which challenges realist policy discourses for generating Orwellian practices of security that sacrifice the security of others. I, however, am implicitly working with a contrasting human security ideal. This, manifestly, is not a celebration of insecurity. The power of statist ontologies of security nevertheless led me to wonder if it might be better to speak of the human needs and priorities named by security in their specificity: conflict prevention and resolution, human rights, land and women’s rights, the right to control one’s own economic destiny, etc. My concern was, and remains, that security’s ‘perversion’ into a ‘metaphysical canopy for the worst manifestations of liberalmodernity’ has been too final and damaging.53 We live in a world where security will continue to remain one of the most powerful signifiers in politics, and we cannot opt out of the game of its naming and use. It must be defined and practiced in normatively better ways, and kept under continual scrutiny.

**Perm Solves**

**Emancipative goals must be combined with pragmatic policies to be beneficial. Singapore proves.**

Gurbachan 8 (Singh, Strategy Studies @ Harvard, MIT *Reconciling Emancipation and Critical Security Studies*)

If we were to ask whether Singapore is an emancipated society, most Singaporeans may initially grumble on certain issues, but in the main will agree that we have come a long way and are emancipated in our own ways. However internationally many may disagree as Singapore has often been on the news for it strict laws, the death penalty, caning, lack of a credible opposition, lack of tolerance for political dissent and the list can go on. Yet in a short span 40 years Singapore has progressed from a third world country to one of the most dynamic and advance nation in South-east Asia. How has this been possible?I would like to suggest that **the government of Singapore have taken a pragmatic as well as an emancipatory approach in its policies. When Singapore first gained independence, the priority then was to build a strong diversified economy and a credible defence capability.** Having recently separated from Malaysia in 1965, Singapore faced a significant communist insurgency and experienced racial violence. The threat to her security were real. Being small and having hardly any natural resources, with the exception of a deep-water port, **the economic situation was also extremely uncertain. The first Prime Minister** of Singapore, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, **then realized that what were needed were a strong government and a stable political environment, to quickly build up the economy and a credible defence capability**. Singapore has judiciously spent a sizable portion of about 31 % of its government operating expenditure or 5 % of GDP of defence. **Having a disproportionate and diverse racial mix, many of Singapore’s policies from the beginning have been emancipatory**. Although Singapore had a much larger Chinese population (fluctuating around 70%) the National language was from the beginning chosen to be Malay and the National Anthem until today is sung in Malay. Realizing that if the voting system was left alone and went along racial lines, the minority would have been left out of the political process. The Government introduced a then novel concept of Group Parliamentary Constituencies, where a 3-member team will need to have a member from the minority community to qualify to contest. While viewed with skepticism by certain quarters, the government created a President Office and non-constituency Member of Parliament to serve as a check and balance on its reserve commitments and policies. While initially focused only on allowing mother tongue education for Malay, Tamil and Chinese, the Government has in recent times allowed teaching of other mother languages like Punjabi and Hindi. **Realizing that a closely-knit multi-racial society is crucial for long term stability of the country, the government even made unpopular decisions to ensure the subsidised housing programme had a proportionate mix of the difference races. The government has also not hesitated to implement unpopular policies (for example the littering, chewing gum ban and smoking controls) that were deemed to be in the long-term interest or collective well being of the country. The government has judiciously provided a liberal private space for its diverse religious and ethnic groups while never hesitating to enforce a strict control on the shared common space.** Some of the policies on the common space that were initially viewed by western countries as encroaching on personal freedom are ironically nowadays being enforced in the western countries as well e.g. smoking ban in certain public places.To summarise, **had the government of Singapore not taken a largely pragmatic and emancipatory approach, this country may not have been able to achieve the economic success and national progress in such a short span of time. It had to always adopt a judicious balance of at times encroaching on certain civil liberties in the interest of the greater community and at other times even liberalising** the showing pornographic movies in a generally conservative society.

**Perm Solves**

**Perm solves by creating emancipation through pragmatic action.**

Gurbachan 8 (Singh, Strategy Studies @ Harvard, MIT *Reconciling Emancipation and Critical Security Studies*)

There is a need to adopt a more multidisciplinary and multicultural approach towards human emancipation. Some of the ideas of the postmodernist and indeed even as suggested by Alker the ‘antiessentialist ‘securitisation’ approach’(Alker 2005: 189) of the Copenhagen School. This could lead to a better managed and prioritized humanity security. **While the ultimate goal may be human emancipation, the way towards it will have to start from a perspective of pragmatic economic and social realities. Rather then freeing all humans from wants, it is felt that a better approach would be to free them from any lack of opportunities. Not everyone wants to be the President of United States of America or would feel emancipated by working hard all his life just to enjoy a rich lifestyle. Implicit in this approach is the need to achieve one’s desires according to ones’ effort. Also, from an entrepreneurial perspective, some degree of threat is useful in motivating self improvement. A complete removal of any threat could ultimately work against emancipation.** Mark Neufeld suggest that a useful strategy to adopt for emancipation is to focus on how security issues are framed in political discourse from both traditional and expanded perspectives and ‘how specific values are made socially concrete in this process, and how people both act and are acted upon in the process of history unfolding. The concern here is with identifying the political projects different notions of security may serve and, perhaps most importantly, the role of security discourse in policy-making, implementation and legitimation (Neufeld 2004: 109-123). **In this highly interdependent capitalist world order, we may all in one way or another become subservient to it.** This was probably why, in *Dialectic Enlightenment,* **Horkheimer and Adorno were pessimistic about humans ever achieving emancipation. Industrialization and the social norms may have brought us to a point of no return.** Indeed the only way ahead may seek the emancipatory echoes from of the arts.

Realism bridges the gap between the critique and the need for pragmatic action.

Murray 97 (Alastair J.H., Politics Department, University of Wales Swansea, *Reconstructing Realism* p.

202-3)

If the cosmopolitan‑communitarian debate seems at times to be avoiding practical questions by going around in circles, the critical literature seems at times to be utterly unsure whether there are such things as practical questions. Yet, unless international relations theory is to become a purely intellectual exercise devoid of practical relation, such concerns must be juxtaposed to a consideration of the problems posed by the current framing of international politics. Ultimately, the only result of the post‑positivist movement's self‑styled 'alternative' status is the generation of an unproductive opposition between a seemingly mutually exclusive rationalism and reflectivism. Realism would seem to hold out the possibility of a more constructive path for international relations theory. The fact that it is engaged in a normative enquiry is not to say that it abandons a concern for the practical realities of international politics, only that it is concerned to bridge the gap between cosmopolitan moral and power political logics. Its approach ultimately provides an overarching framework which can draw on many different strands of thought, the 'spokes' which can be said to be attached to its central hub, to enable it to relate empirical concerns to a normative agenda. It can incorporate the lessons that geopolitics yields, the insights that neorealism might achieve, and all the other information that the approaches which effectively serve to articulate the specifics of its orientation generate, and, once incorporated within its theoretical framework, relate them both to one another and to the requirements of the ideal, in order to support an analysis of the conditions which characterise contemporary international politics and help it to achieve a viable political ethic. Against critical theories which are incomprehensible to any but their authors and their acolytes and which prove incapable of relating their categories to the issues which provide the substance of international affairs, and against rationalist, and especially neorealist, perspectives which prove unconcerned for matters of values and which simply ignore the relevance of ethical questions to political action, realism is capable of formulating a position which brings ethics and politics into a viable relationship. It would ultimately seem to offer us a course which navigates between the Scylla of defending our values so badly that we end up threatening their very existence, and the Charybdis of defending them so efficiently that we become everything that they militate against. Under its auspices, we can perhaps succeed in reconciling our ideals with our pragmatism.

**Perm Solves**

The perm solves through critical realism

Fairclough 5 (Norman, [emeritus Prof. of Linguistic](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emeritus_Professor)s @ [Lancaster University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lancaster_University), "Discourse Analysis in Organization Studies: The Case for Critical Realism" European Group for Organizational Studies *Organization Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 6 page  3)

I shall take a critical stance towards one prominent tendency within the work which has been carried out in the study of organizational discourse, on the grounds that it equates a shift in focus towards discourse in organization studies with the adoption of postmodernist and extreme social constructivist positions. My position is that commitment to such positions does not in any way follow from a commitment to giving discourse analysis its proper place within organization studies. I shall argue instead for a critical realist position which is moderately socially constructivist but rejects the tendency for the study of organization to be reduced to the study of discourse, locating the analysis of discourse instead within an analytically dualist epistemology which gives primacy to researching relations between agency (process, and events — see note 1) and structure on the basis of a realist social ontology. I shall argue that this form of critical discourse analysis has more to offer organization studies than broadly postmodernist work on organizational discourse. In the final section of the paper, I shall justify this argument through a discussion of organizational change. So, in sum, this paper is simultaneously an argument that the analysis of discourse is an essential and unavoidable part of organization studies, and an argument against certain prominent forms of discourse analysis which are currently carried out within organization studies.

Perm Solves

**Perm solves best by implementing critical realism, which captures the best of both realism and critical theory while avoiding the link to the creation of external threats.**

Kwan and Tsang 1 (Kai-Man, Department of Religion and Philosophy, Hong Kong Baptist University; Eric W., School of Business Administration, Wayne State University; *Strategic Management Journal*, Vol. 22, No. 12, Dec., 2001, pp. 1163-1168)

We also agree with Mir and Watson ‘that theory and practice are fundamentally interlinked’ (2000: 943) but again this point is not particularly constructivist. They further emphasize that ‘(r)esearch occurs within a “community” of scholarship where mutually held assumptions are deployed to create “conversations” ’(2000:943). So‘research, and in particular strategic management research, is a public, social practice, and hence that knowledge is the product, not of isolated individuals, but of intersubjective relations between members of research communities’ (2000: 950). These sayings correctly draw us to the much neglected fact that knowledge is a communal endeavor. To take into account this fact, some philosophers are try-ing to develop a kind of social epistemology to replace traditional epistemology, which is heavily individualistic (Schmitt, 1987, 1994). Needless to say, we do not think that this development entails antirealism either. We agree that ‘(c)onstructivist historical analysis helps us place theories in context, rather than turn them into axioms that transcend the con- fines of time and space’ (2000: 950). However, we have already pointed out that critical realism also tries hard to avoid hasty overgeneralizations. To conclude, critical realism can accommodate the insights offered by Mir and Watson’s constructivism while eschewing the traps of radical constructivism or relativism. Mir and Watson’s argument that constructivism forms an improvement over realism is invalid, as far as critical realism is concerned. Before Mir and Watson can successfully clarify and resolve the problems of their constructivism, it is premature to move the constructivist tradition into the mainstream of strategy research.

Perm solves best by implementing defensive realism, allowing us to rationally analyze different situations and decide the best action for that situation – this avoids the link to traditional security thinking and threat creation.

Jervis 99 (Robert, Prof. of International Politics at Columbia Univ., *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 1, Summer ’99, pp. 42-63)

I have sought to clear away some of the underbrush obscuring the differences between realist and neoliberal schools of thought. The former, especially in its defensive variant, does not deny the possibility of cooperation. Cooperation does need to be explained, but it is a puzzle rather than an anomaly.53 That is, although realists do need to explain the conditions that lead to cooperation, its existence is not necessarily discrepant with the approach any more than the existence of conflict disconfirms neoliberalism. But neoliberals see more conflict as unnecessary and avoidable than do realists. The contrast is greater with offensive realists, who believe that the compelling nature of the international environment and the clash of states’ preferences over outcomes put sharp limits on the extent to which conflict can be reduced by feasible alternative policies. Defensive realists believe that a great deal depends on the severity of the security dilemma and the intentions of the actors, which leads these scholars to a position that is not only between the offensive realist and neoliberal camps but is also contingent, because prescriptions depend heavily on a diagnosis of the situation.

**No Link – A2: State Bad**

They can’t eliminate the state and non-statist solutions are unproductive deployments of power – They matter

Buzan 4 (Barry , December, Montague Burton Prof. of International Relations @ the London School of Economics and honorary prof. @ the University of Copenhagen, "Realism vs. Cosmopolitanism" http://www.polity.co.uk/global/realism-vs-cosmopolitanism.asp

**A.Mc.:** But would not a realist response be that the very issues David seeks to highlight are largely marginal to the central dilemmas of world politics: the critical issues of war and peace, life and death.

**B.B.:** Again, that is a difficult question for realism because in traditional realism there was a rather clear distinction between 'high' and 'low' politics, high politics being about diplomacy and war, and low politics being about economics and society and many issues like the weather and disease. And because of the change in the importance of the different sectors that I mentioned earlier, this becomes problematic for realism. But the realists have been fairly agile. The realist line of defence would be that in most areas of world politics - again the emphasis on politics - states are still the principle authorities. And there is nothing that stops them from co-operating with each other. Thus, realists, or at least a good proportion of realists, can live quite comfortably with the idea of international regimes in which states, as the basic holders of political authority in the system, get together sometimes with other actors, sometimes just with other states, to discuss issues of joint concern, and sometimes they can hammer out of a set of policies, a set of rules of the game, which enable them to co-ordinate their behaviour. Now, this certainly does not feel like traditional power politics realism. You can think of it to some extent in terms of power politics by looking at issue power; who are the big players in relation to any big issue? Who are the people who have any kind of control? Who loses out?, etc.. There is, therefore, an element of power politics in this whole notion of regimes, and it does retain a strong element of state centrism. I think the realist would say: if you discount the state, where is politics? Where is it located? You cannot eliminate politics, as some liberals sometimes seem to do. To wish the state away, to wish politics away, is not going to generate results. The good dyed-in-the-wool realist would argue that power politics is a permanent condition of human existence. It will come in one form or another, in one domain or another, in relation to one issue or another, but it will always be there. It will be politics and it will be about relative power. And at the moment the state is still an important player in the game.

States are the key actors who solve violence – plan accesses this best.

Weingast 9 (Barry, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and \Professor in the Department of Political Science at Stanford U, “Why are developing countries so resistant to the rule of law,” February 2009, accessed 7/10/09, http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/bitstream/1814/11173/1/MWP\_LS\_2009\_02.pdf ) KSM

All states must control the fundamental problem of violence. In natural states, a dominant coalition of the powerful emerges to solve this problem. The coalition grants members privileges, creates rents through limited access to valuable resources and organizations, and then uses the rents to sustain order. Because fighting reduces their rents, coalition members have incentives not to fight so as to maintain their rents. Natural states necessarily limit access to organizations and restrict competition in all systems. Failing to do so dissipate rents and therefore reduces the incentives not to fight. We call this order the natural state because for nearly all of the last 10,000 years of human history – indeed, until just the last two centuries – the natural state was the only solution to the problem of violence that produced a hierarchical society with significant wealth. In comparison with the previous foraging order, natural states produced impressive economic growth, and even today we can see the impressive wealth amassed by many of the early civilizations. In contrast to open access orders, however, natural states have significant, negative consequences for economic growth.

**No Link – A2: State Bad**

State-based approaches to violence exist and are successful at reducing violence.

UN Secretary General 6 (“Ending violence against women: from words to action,” October 9, 2006, Accessed 7/10/09, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/vaw/launch/english/v.a.w-exeE-use.pdf) KSM

Many States have developed good or promising practices to prevent or respond to violence against women. State strategies to address violence should promote women’s agency and be based on women’s experiences and involvement, and on partnerships with NGOs and other civil society actors. Women’s NGOs in many countries have engaged in innovative projects and programmes, sometimes in collaboration with the State. Generic aspects of good or promising practices can be extracted from a variety of experiences around the world. Common principles include: clear policies and laws; strong enforcement mechanisms; motivated and well-trained personnel; the involvement of multiple sectors; and close collaboration with local women’s groups, civil society organizations, academics and professionals. Many governments use national plans of action — which include legal measures, service provision and prevention strategies — to address violence against women. The most effective include consultation with women’s groups and other civil society organizations, clear time lines and benchmarks, transparent mechanisms for monitoring implementation, indicators of impact and evaluation, predictable and adequate funding streams, and integration of measures to tackle violence against women in programmes in a variety of sectors.

AT: No VTL

“No value to life” accepts the philosophical premise of Nazi Germany style murders and concentration camps that respect for life does not entail preserving life

Neeley 94 (Steven, Assistant Professor at Saint Francis College, “THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SUICIDE, THE QUALITY OF LIFE, AND THE "SLIPPERY-SLOPE": AN EXPLICIT REPLY TO LINGERING CONCERNS”, 28 Akron L. Rev. 53,) NS

The final solution in the United States and other western societies will be unlike the final solution in Nazi Germany in its details, but not unlike it in its horror. And I fear that some who now live will experience this final solution. They will live to see the day they will be killed. Variations of the "slippery-slope" argument as applied to suicide and euthanasia are abundant. Beauchamp has argued, for example, that at least from the perspective of rule utilitarianism, the wedge argument against euthanasia should be taken seriously. Accordingly, although a "restricted-active-euthanasia rule would have some utility value" since some intense and uncontrollable suffering would be eliminated, "it may not have the highest utility value in the structure of our present code or in any imaginable code which could be made current, and therefore may not be a component in the ideal code for our society . . . . For the disutility of introducing legitimate killing into one's moral code (in the form of active euthanasia rules) may, in the long run, outweigh the utility of doing so, as a result of the eroding effect such a relaxation would have on rules in the code which demand respect for human life. " Beauchamp then continues down a now-familiar path: If, for example, rules permitting active killing were introduced, it is not implausible to suppose that destroying defective newborns (a form of involuntary euthanasia) would become an accepted and common practice, that as population increases occur the aged will be even more neglectable and neglected than they now are, that capital punishment for a wide variety of crimes would be increasingly tempting, that some doctors would have appreciably reduced fears of actively injecting fatal doses whenever it seemed to them propitious to do so . . . . A hundred such possible consequences might easily be imagined. But these few are sufficient to make the larger point that such rules permitting killing could lead to a general reduction of respect for human life.

**Saying that life can be “valued” is intrinsically an act of commodification. It treats people like a nice car or house, justifying leaving people in the dust once they are no longer productive.**

**Davis 1** (Dena, Professor of bioethics at Cleveland State University, “Is Life of Infinite Value?”, *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 3) CC

The main reason that some people so resist the idea that life cannot be valued in quantified ways is the fear of two consequences. First, there is a fear that talking about life as something that can be valued, balanced against other things, and so on, leads to “commodification.” In other words, to place a value on life means bringing it into the marketplace as one more “thing,” like a car or a house, that can be traded at will. This seems disrespectful and inimical to the ways in which we do value life in our culture, whether it is valued in religious terms (as a gift from God), or in secular (as the sine qua non for every other valuable thing we experience, from pleasure to courage to family). Even the least religious among us can stand in awe of this thing that we humans are powerless to create. In this thinking, all value is market value; the only way to resist commodification is to insist that something is of infinite value. Second, there is the fear that, once life becomes value-able, it can be traded off by others in ways that will lead inevitably to a slippery slope wherein we cut off resources for those who are no longer “productive.”

AT: No VTL

Their “no value to human life” claim discursively replicates the logic for genocide – spain proves

Caldwell 96 (Julie Northern Kentucky University Law Review, 24 N. Ky. L. Rev. 81) NS

Calling Indians "savages" meant that "Indians were sufficiently different from whites to be regarded as less than persons and not protected by any moral or legal standards." Mohawk, supra note 6, at 54 (citing Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 49 (1987)). The fact that in 1550, the Spanish Crown held a debate "to determine whether or not Indians were true human beings" is incredibly ironic, considering the "unspeakable violence of the Spanish conquest" which resulted in the deaths of an estimated 70 million Natives. Id. at 4849. "None of the great massacres of the twentieth century can be compared to this hecatomb." Id. at 48 (citing Tzvetan Todorow, The Conquest of America 133 (Harper & Row) (1982)).

VTL argument reduces human life to a single quantifiable purpose and legitimizes a framework of state sanctioned violence

Coleson 97 (Richard J.D., *Issues in Law and Medicine*, Summer, 13 Issues L. & Med. 3) NS

Frustrated with the ethic of "preserving every existence, no matter how worthless," Dr. Alfred Hoche in 1920 wrote, expectantly: "A new age will arrive--operating with a higher morality and with great sacrifice--which will actually give up the requirements of an exaggerated humanism and overvaluation of mere existence." 8 Issues in Law & Med. at 265. Euthanasia proponents of our day, too, seek with great zeal to usher in a new age. They speak, in words echoing from a distant age, that it is cruel to deprive those who are suffering from their desired means to peace and freedom from pain. Like Binding, they scold: "Not granting release by gentle death to the incurable who long for it: this is no longer sympathy, but rather its opposite." Id. at 254. The early promoters of euthanasia appeared to be sincere in their belief in the virtues of merciful death. Today's promoters of physician-assisted suicide may also be sincere, but it is a sincerity born of an unpardonable carelessness. Unlike their predecessors, euthanasia proponents today have the benefit of the lesson of history, which has taught the true nature of physician-assisted killing as a false compassion and a perversion of mercy. History warns that the institution of assisted-death gravely threatens to undermine the foundational ethic of the medical profession and the paramount principle of the equal dignity and inherent worth of every human person.

VTL ignores rape victims

Edwards 96 (Daphne, Professor at the Golden Gate Law School, 26 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 241]) NS

For most of you, rape is the most serious life crisis you will have to face, with few exceptions. It is a time of overwhelming turmoil, confusion, and disorganization. You may be concerned about the way you are feeling in response to the rape. You've probably never felt the extreme and conflicting emotions you do now-the fears, the rage, the panic attacks, or the worthlessness. You may even be afraid that you are "going crazy," or that you will never recover and be able to go on with life again. But you will. What you are experiencing is normal after a very serious life crisis.

Fear Good

Fear of nuclear war is key to preventing it.

Futterman 94 (J. A. H., Physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, “Meditations on the Bomb,” http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke.html, AD: 7/11/09) jl

But the inhibitory effect of reliable nuclear weapons goes deeper than Shirer's deterrence of adventurer-conquerors. It changes the way we think individually and culturally, preparing us for a future we cannot now imagine. Jungian psychiatrist Anthony J. Stevens states, [15]

"History would indicate that people cannot rise above their narrow sectarian concerns without some overwhelming paroxysm. It took the War of Independence and the Civil War to forge the United States, World War I to create the League of Nations, World War II to create the United Nations Organization and the European Economic Community. Only catastrophe, it seems, forces people to take the wider view.

Or what about fear? Can the horror which we all experience when we contemplate the possibility of nuclear extinction mobilize in us sufficient libidinal energy to resist the archetypes of war? Certainly, the moment we become blasé about the possibility of holocaust we are lost. As long as horror of nuclear exchange remains uppermost we can recognize that nothing is worth it. War becomes the impossible option. Perhaps horror, the experience of horror, the consciousness of horror, is our only hope. Perhaps horror alone will enable us to overcome the otherwise invincible attraction of war."

Thus I also continue engaging in nuclear weapons work to help fire that world-historical warning shot I mentioned above, namely, that as our beneficial technologies become more powerful, so will our weapons technologies, unless genuine peace precludes it. We must build a future more peaceful than our past, if we are to have a future at all, with or without nuclear weapons — a fact we had better learn before worse things than nuclear weapons are invented. If you're a philosopher, this means that I regard the nature of humankind as mutable rather than fixed, but that I think most people welcome change in their personalities and cultures with all the enthusiasm that they welcome death — thus, the fear of nuclear annihilation of ourselves and all our values may be what we require in order to become peaceful enough to survive our future technological breakthroughs.

In other words, when the peace movement tells the world that we need to treat each other more kindly, I and my colleagues stand behind it (like Malcolm X stood behind Martin Luther King, Jr.) saying, "Or else." We provide the peace movement with a needed sense of urgency that it might otherwise lack.

Action Good

We have an ethical obligation to act – if the future is uncertain, we must do everything we can to intervene.

Kurasawa 4 (Fuyuki, Professor of Sociology @ York University of Toronto, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight,” http://www.yorku.ca/kurasawa/Kurasawa%20Articles/Constellations%20Article.pdf, AD: 7/11/09) jl

In addition, farsightedness has become a priority in world affairs due to the appearance of new global threats and the resurgence of ‘older’ ones. Virulent forms of ethno-racial nationalism and religious fundamentalism that had mostly been kept in check or bottled up during the Cold War have reasserted themselves in ways that are now all-too-familiar – civil warfare, genocide, ‘ethnic cleansing,’ and global terrorism. And if nuclear mutually assured destruction has come to pass, other dangers are filling the vacuum: climate change, AIDS and other diseases (BSE, SARS, etc.), as well as previously unheralded genomic perils (genetically modified organisms, human cloning). Collective remembrance of past atrocities and disasters has galvanized some sectors of public opinion and made the international community’s unwillingness to adequately intervene before and during the genocides in the ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda, or to take remedial steps in the case of the spiraling African and Asian AIDS pandemics, appear particularly glaring. Returning to the point I made at the beginning of this paper, the significance of foresight is a direct outcome of the transition toward a dystopian imaginary (or what Sontag has called “the imagination of disaster”).11 Huxley’s Brave New World and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, two groundbreaking dystopian novels of the first half of the twentieth century, remain as influential as ever in framing public discourse and understanding current techno-scientific dangers, while recent paradigmatic cultural artifacts – films like The Matrix and novels like Atwood’s Oryx and Crake – reflect and give shape to this catastrophic sensibility.12 And yet dystopianism need not imply despondency, paralysis, or fear. Quite the opposite, in fact, since the pervasiveness of a dystopian imaginary can help notions of historical contingency and fallibilism gain traction against their determinist and absolutist counterparts.13 Once we recognize that the future is uncertain and that any course of action produces both unintended and unexpected consequences, the responsibility to face up to potential disasters and intervene before they strike becomes compelling. From another angle, dystopianism lies at the core of politics in a global civil society where groups mobilize their own nightmare scenarios (‘Frankenfoods’ and a lifeless planet for environmentalists, totalitarian patriarchy of the sort depicted in Atwood’s Handmaid’s Tale for Western feminism, McWorld and a global neoliberal oligarchy for the alternative globalization movement, etc.). Such scenarios can act as catalysts for public debate and socio-political action, spurring citizens’ involvement in the work of preventive foresight. Several bodies of literature have touched upon this sea-change toward a culture of prevention in world affairs, most notably just-war theory,14 international public policy research,15 and writings from the risk society paradigm.16 Regardless of how insightful these three approaches may be, they tend to skirt over much of what is revealing about the interplay of the ethical, political, and sociological dynamics that drive global civil society initiatives aimed at averting disaster. Consequently, the theory of practice proposed here reconstructs the dialogical, public, and transnational work of farsightedness, in order to articulate the sociopolitical processes underpinning it to the normative ideals that should steer and assist in substantively thickening it. As such, the establishment of a capacity for early warning is the first aspect of the question that we need to tackle.

Action Good

We have an ethical responsibility to attempt to deter potential suffering – it’s the only way to express genuine solidarity

Kurasawa 4 (Fuyuki, Professor of Sociology @ York University of Toronto, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight,” http://www.yorku.ca/kurasawa/Kurasawa%20Articles/Constellations%20Article.pdf, AD: 7/11/09) jl

By contrast, Jonas’s strong consequentialism takes a cue from Weber’s “ethic of responsibility,” which stipulates that we must carefully ponder the potential impacts of our actions and assume responsibility for them – even for the incidence of unexpected and unintended results. Neither the contingency of outcomes nor the retrospective nature of certain moral judgments exempts an act from normative evaluation. On the contrary, consequentialism reconnects what intentionalism prefers to keep distinct: the moral worth of ends partly depends upon the means selected to attain them (and vice versa), while the correspondence between intentions and results is crucial. At the same time, Jonas goes further than Weber in breaking with presentism by advocating an “ethic of long-range responsibility” that refuses to accept the future’s indeterminacy, gesturing instead toward a practice of farsighted preparation for crises that could occur.30 From a consequentialist perspective, then, intergenerational solidarity would consist of striving to prevent our endeavors from causing large-scale human suffering and damage to the natural world over time. Jonas reformulates the categorical imperative along these lines: “Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life,” or “Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such life.”31 What we find here, I would hold, is a substantive and future-oriented ethos on the basis of which civic associations can enact the work of preventive foresight. Having suggested a way to thicken the normative foundations of farsighted cosmopolitanism, I would now like to discuss the socio-cultural strategies that global civil society participants have begun employing in order to create a sense of intergenerational solidarity. Both the moral imagination and reason constitute triggers of farsightedness that have entered public discourse in a variety of settings, with the objective of combatting the myopia of presentism.32 The first of these catalysts appeals to us to carefully ponder our epoch’s legacy, to imagine the kind of world we will leave to future generations (what will social life be like if today’s risks become tomorrow’s reality?). Left dystopianism performs just this role of confronting us with hypothetically catastrophic futures; whether through novelistic, cinematic, or other artistic means, it conjures up visions of a brave new world in order to spark reflection and inspire resistance.33 By way of thick description, dystopian tales call upon audiences’ moral imagination and plunge them into their descendants’ lifeworlds. We step into the shoes of Nineteen Eighty-Four’s Winston Smith or are strongly affected by The Handmaid’s Tale’s description of a patriarchal-theocratic society and The Matrix’s blurring of simulacra and reality, because they bring the perils that may await our successors to life.

Predictions Good

We must use realism to test the probability of theories and predict events in international relations – the world is our laboratory.

Mearsheimer 1 [John J. Prof. of Poli Sci at U Chicago. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. Pg 7-8] JL

Despite these hazards, social scientists should nevertheless use their theories to make predictions about the future. Making predictions helps inform policy discourse, because it helps make sense of events unfolding in the world around us. And by clarifying points of disagreement, making explicit forecasts helps those with contradictory views to frame their own ideas more clearly. Furthermore, trying to anticipate new events is a good way to test social science theories, because theorists do not have the benefit of hindsight and therefore cannot adjust their claims to fit the evidence (because it is not yet available). In short, the world can be used as a laboratory to decide which theories best explain international politics. In that spirit, I employ offensive realism to peer into the future, mindful of both the benefits and the hazards of trying to predict events.

A2: Calculation Bad

Just because we can’t know the future doesn’t mean we shouldn’t try and prevent disaster – The Future is a result of actions we make now, including crisis prevention

Kurasawa 4 (Fuyuki, Professor of Sociology @ York University of Toronto, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight,” http://www.yorku.ca/kurasawa/Kurasawa%20Articles/Constellations%20Article.pdf, AD: 7/11/09) jl

When engaging in the labor of preventive foresight, the first obstacle that one is likely to encounter from some intellectual circles is a deep-seated skepticism about the very value of the exercise. A radically postmodern line of thinking, for instance, would lead us to believe that it is pointless, perhaps even harmful, to strive for farsightedness in light of the aforementioned crisis of conventional paradigms of historical analysis. If, contra teleological models, history has no intrinsic meaning, direction, or endpoint to be discovered through human reason, and if, contra scientistic futurism, prospective trends cannot be predicted without error, then the abyss of chronological inscrutability supposedly opens up at our feet. The future appears to be unknowable, an outcome of chance. Therefore, rather than embarking upon grandiose speculation about what may occur, we should adopt a pragmatism that abandons itself to the twists and turns of history; let us be content to formulate ad hoc responses to emergencies as they arise. While this argument has the merit of underscoring the fallibilistic nature of all predictive schemes, it conflates the necessary recognition of the contingency of history with unwarranted assertions about the latter’s total opacity and indeterminacy. Acknowledging the fact that the future cannot be known with absolute certainty does not imply abandoning the task of trying to understand what is brewing on the horizon and to prepare for crises already coming into their own. In fact, the incorporation of the principle of fallibility into the work of prevention means that we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs of disaster and for responses that provoke unintended or unexpected consequences (a point to which I will return in the final section of this paper). In addition, from a normative point of view, the acceptance of historical contingency and of the self-limiting character of farsightedness places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely on the shoulders of present generations. The future no longer appears to be a metaphysical creature of destiny or of the cunning of reason, nor can it be sloughed off to pure randomness. It becomes, instead, a result of human action shaped by decisions in the present – including, of course, trying to anticipate and prepare for possible and avoidable sources of harm to our successors. Combining a sense of analytical contingency toward the future and ethical responsibility for it, the idea of early warning is making its way into preventive action on the global stage. Despite the fact that not all humanitarian, technoscientific, and environmental disasters can be predicted in advance, the multiplication of independent sources of knowledge and detection mechanisms enables us to foresee many of them before it is too late. Indeed, in recent years, global civil society’s capacity for early warning has dramatically increased, in no small part due to the impressive number of NGOs that include catastrophe prevention at the heart of their mandates.17 These organizations are often the first to detect signs of trouble, to dispatch investigative or fact-finding missions, and to warn the international community about impending dangers; to wit, the lead role of environmental groups in sounding the alarm about global warming and species depletion or of humanitarian agencies regarding the AIDS crisis in sub-Saharan Africa, frequently months or even years before Western governments or multilateral institutions followed suit. What has come into being, then, is a loose-knit network of watchdog groups that is acquiring finely tuned antennae to pinpoint indicators of forthcoming or already unfolding crises. This network of ‘early warners’ are working to publicize potential and actual emergencies by locating indicators of danger into larger catastrophic patterns of interpretation, culturally meaningful chains of events whose implications become discernable for decision-makers and ordinary citizens (‘this is why you should care’).18 Civic associations can thus invest perilous situations with urgency and importance, transforming climate change from an apparently mild and distant possibility to an irreversible and grave threat to human survival, and genocide from a supposedly isolated aberration to an affront to our common humanity.

AT: Root Cause

Focus on the root cause of war is ineffective and increases conflict

Woodward 7 (Susan, senior research fellow at the Centre for Defense Studies, King's College, London, and from 1990 to 1999, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution “Do the Root Causes of Civil War Matter? On Using Knowledge to Improve Peacebuilding Interventions”, *Journal of Intervention and State Building*, volume 1, No. 2, AD: 7-11-09)MT

In sum, the policy interest in stopping the violence of civil wars has led to substantial advances in what we know about their causes, but current policies tend to be based on research that has been superseded and that, in any case, proposed competing arguments. If effective peacebuilding depends on addressing ‘root causes’ and the knowledge on which those policies are based is wrong, then our interventions may do more harm than we would by ignoring causes altogether.

Furthermore, if the root causes of any civil war lie in international factors, even partially \_/ for example, the changing global economic context, the instability of a neighbourhood, the strategic policies of major powers, the economic policies supported by donors and banks, the conditions for aid or trade \_/ then the focus of peacebuilding must include those international conditions or actions, not just domestic transformation. While the regional security context of a country in conflict has been incorporated into some peacebuilding strategies, such as the regional stabilization annex (1B) of the Dayton peace accord for Bosnia-Herzegovina and its implementation by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and further regional arms

control negotiations in Vienna, or the agreement on cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbours facilitated by Lakhdar Brahimi in 2002, for the most part the international conditions and policies that figure most prominently in analyses of root causes are beyond the reach of a peace operation or worse,

the external actors who would have to make changes will not and insist that local actors bear full responsibility for the violence. Most important, the parties themselves will not agree about the ‘root causes’ of their war. That is the nature of civil war. Not only is civil war a highly complexphenomenon, such that there is no single cause in the sense promoted by thethree influential schools of explanation, but the fuel that provokes and prolongs a war includes fundamental disagreements over its cause (and thus respectiveresponsibilities for its start and resolution). Crucial to the way a conflict ends are the parties’ campaigns to win external support (including intervention) for their side by shaping outsiders’ perceptions of the cause of the war. Academic expertsoften lend their support to these campaigns without full disclosure that theyhave taken on an advocacy role. One reason that military victories tend to be

more stable than negotiated or assisted endings (Licklider 1993) may be that victors impose their explanation and can, thus, terminate the competition over cause and responsibility. Otherwise, the politics of the immediate post-war period is suffused with (if not actually driven by) a continuing contest over

interpretations, relative responsibilities and guilt, and search for external support for one origin and cause over others. While policy makers tend(impatiently, one must acknowledge) to dismiss academic research on groundsthat ‘experts do not agree’, these disagreements pale in intensity andconsequence in the face of the inevitable disagreements among the parties.

AT: Root Cause

There is no root cause of war- too many factors to consider

Smith 89 (Robert, *Warfare and Diplomacy in Pre-Colonial West Africa*, pg. 141, AD: 7-11-09) MT

As Quincy Wright concludes, Wars arise because of the changing relations of numerous variables- technological, physic, social, and intellectual. There is no single cause of war. This multiplicity of variables which characterizes most human situation, suggests that the search for generalizations about the causes of war, in pre-colonial West Africa or elsewhere, or at any time, has only a limited value and interest.

Alt Fails – Discourse

Their alt can’t solve the aff discourse or the overall regime of truth described by realist thought

Williams 3 (Michael, Prof. of International Politics at the Univ. of Wales, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 511-531)

This stance allows the Copenhagen School to argue simultaneously for both an expansion and a limitation of the security agenda and its analysis. On the one hand, treating security as a speech-act provides, in principle, for an almost indefinite expansion of the security agenda. Not only is the realm of possible threats enlarged, but the actors or objects that are threatened (what are termed the ‘‘referent objects’’ of security) can be extended to include actors and objects well beyond the military security of the territorial state. Accordingly, the Copenhagen School has argued that security can usefully be viewed as comprising five ‘‘sectors,’’ each with their particular referent object and threat agenda (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998).6 In the ‘‘military’’ sector, for example, the referent object is the territorial integrity of the state, and the threats are overwhelmingly defined in external, military terms. In the ‘‘political’’ sector, by contrast, what is at stake is the legitimacy of a governmental authority, and the relevant threats can be ideological and sub-state, leading to security situations in which state authorities are threatened by elements of their own societies, and where states can become the primary threat to their own societies. Even further from an exclusively military-territorial focus is the concept of ‘‘societal’’ security, in which the identity of a group is presented as threatened by dynamics as diverse as cultural flows, economic integration, or population movements. Conversely, while treating security as a speech-act allows a remarkable broadening of analysis, securitization theory seeks also to limit the security agenda. Security, the Copenhagen School argues, is not synonymous with ‘‘harm’’ or with the avoidance of whatever else might be deemed malign or damaging (Buzan et al., 1998:2–5, 203–12). As a speech-act, securitization has a specific structure which in practice limits the theoretically unlimited nature of ‘‘security.’’ These constraints operate along three lines. First, while the securitization process is in principle completely open (any ‘‘securitizing actor’’ can attempt to securitize any issue and referent object), in practice it is structured by the differential capacity of actors to make socially effective claims about threats, by the forms in which these claims can be made in order to be recognized and accepted as convincing by the relevant audience, and by the empirical factors or situations to which these actors can make reference. Not all claims are socially effective, and not all actors are in equally powerful positions to make them. This means, as Buzan and Wæver put it, that the ‘‘Conditions for a successful speech-act fall into two categories: (1) the internal, linguistic-grammatical-to follow the rules of the act (or, as Austin argues, accepted conventional procedures must exist, and the act has to be executed according to these procedures); and (2) the external, contextual and social-to hold a position from which the act can be made (‘The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked’)’’ (Buzan et al., 1998:32). The claims that are likely to be effective, the forms in which they can be made, the objects to which they refer, and the social positions from which they can effectively be spoken are usually deeply ‘‘sedimented’’ (rhetorically and discursively, culturally, and institutionally) and structured in ways that make securitizations somewhat predictable and thus subject to probabilistic analysis (Wæver, 2000)Fand not wholly open and expandable. Finally, while empirical contexts and claims cannot in this view ultimately determine what are taken as security issues or threats, they provide crucial resources and referents upon which actors can draw in attempting to securitize a given issue.

Alt Fails – Generally

Security discourse is inevitable.

Williams 3 (Michael, Prof. of International Politics at the Univ. of Wales, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 511-531)

The first, and simplest point is that in some ways the Copenhagen School treats securitization not as a normative question, but as an objective process and possibility. Very much like Schmitt, they view securitization as a social possibility intrinsic to political life. In regard to his concept of the political, for example, Schmitt once argued,

It is irrelevant here whether one rejects, accepts, or perhaps finds it an atavistic remnant of barbaric times that nations continue to group themselves according to friend and enemy, or whether it is perhaps strong pedagogic reasoning to imagine that enemies no longer exist at all. The concern here is neither with abstractions nor normative ideals, but with inherent reality and the real possibility of making such a distinction. One may or may not share these hopes and pedagogic ideals. But, rationally speaking, it cannot be denied that nations continue to group themselves according to the friend–enemy antithesis, that the distinction still remains actual today, and that this is an ever present possibility for every people existing in the political sphere (1996 [1932]: 28).30 In certain settings, the Copenhagen School seems very close to this position. Securitization must be understood as both an existing reality and a continual possibility. Yet equallyclearly there is a basic ambivalence in this position, for it raises the dilemma that securitization theory must remain at best agnostic in the face of any securitization**,** even, for example, a fascist speech-act (such as that Schmitt has often been associated with) that securitizes a specific ethnic or racial minority. To say that we must study the conditions under which such processes and constructions emerge and become viable is important but incomplete, for without some basis for avoiding this process and transforming it the Copenhagen School appears to risk replicating some of the worst excesses made possible by a Schmittian understanding of politics.

Critical theory is not able to predict the outcome of desecuritization – the alternative is nothing more than wishful thinking.

Mearsheimer 95 (John, Prof. of Poli Sci at the Univ. of Chicago, *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1994-1995, pp. 5-49)

There is another problem with the application of critical theory to international relations. Although critical theorists hope to replace realism with a discourse that emphasizes harmony and peace, critical theory per se emphasizes that it is impossible to know the future. Critical theory, according to its own logic, can be used to undermine realism and produce change, but it cannot serve as the basis for predicting which discourse will replace realism, because the theory says little about the direction change takes. In fact, Cox argues that although "utopian expectations may be an element in stimulating people to act ... such expectations are almost never realized in practice."160 Thus, in a sense, the communitarian discourse championed by critical theorists is wishful thinking, not an outcome linked to the theory itself. Indeed, critical theory cannot guarantee that the new discourse will not be more malignant than the discourse it replaces. Nothing in the theory guarantees, for example, that a fascist discourse far more violent than realism will not emerge as the new hegemonic discourse.

Alt Fails – Generally

Saying that states can cooperate if securitization discourse were to stop is unrealistic and naïve – it wishes away the fundamental problem of uncertainty, which would lead back into realism.

Copeland 2K (Dale C., Assoc. Prof. in Dept. of Govt. and Foreign Affairs at Univ. of Virginia, *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 2, Fall 2000, pp. 187-212)

The question of uncertainty is critical to understanding the differences between structural realism and constructivism, and where Wendt’s analysis misses the mark. Consider first uncertainty regarding the other’s present intentions. Wendt is aware that this kind of uncertainty challenges his point that the current distribution of interests drives the way anarchy plays itself out. He counters that, at least in the modern environment, the “problem of other minds” is not much of a problem. States today can indeed learn a great deal about what the other is doing and thinking. That knowledge may not be “100 percent certain,” Wendt argues, “but no knowledge is that” (p. 281, emphasis in original). To assume a worst-case scenario and to treat the other as hostile may be more dangerous than adopting a conciliatory policy, because it creates a self-fulfilling prophecy of mutual mistrust (pp. 281, 107–109, 360). This counterargument has serious flaws. In essence, it is an effort to assume away the problem—that there really is no problem of other minds—and it is weak on three grounds. First, Wendt’s view that states typically know a lot about the other’s motives is an unsupported empirical statement based only on a reading of the contemporary situation. Even if it were true for the majority of states today—and it certainly does not capture the reality between the states that count, such as the United States and China—his point cannot be retrofitted into the previous five centuries that constitute the focus of Wendt’s analysis. In sum, if uncertainty about present intentions was rampant during these five hundred years, it (along with shifts in relative power) may explain a great deal about changes in conflict and cooperation over time. Second, Wendt’s view is inconsistent with his recognition that states often do have difficulty learning about the other. The very problem Ego and Alter have in first communicating is that “behavior does not speak for itself.” It must be interpreted, and “many interpretations are possible” (p. 330). This point is reinforced by Wendt’s epistemological point of departure: that the ideas held by actors are “unobservable” (chap. 2). Because leaders cannot observe directly what the other is thinking, they are resigned to making inferences from its behavior. Yet in security affairs, as Wendt acknowledges, mistakes in inferences—assuming the other is peaceful when in fact it has malevolent intentions—could prove “fatal” (p. 360). Wendt accepts that the problem facing rational states “is making sure that they perceive other actors, and other actors’ perception of them, correctly” (p. 334, emphasis in original). Yet the book provides no mechanism through which Ego and Alter can increase their confidence in the correctness of their estimates of the other’s type. Simply describing how Ego and Alter shape each other’s sense of self and other is not enough.22 Rational choice models, using assumptions consistent with structural realism, do much better here. In games of incomplete information, where states are unsure about the other’s type, actions by security-seeking actors that would be too costly for greedy actors to adopt can help states reduce their uncertainty about present intentions, thus moderating the security dilemma.23 Wendt cannot simply argue that over time states can learn a great deal about other states. It is what is not “shared,” at least in the area of intentions that remains the core stumbling block to cooperation. Third, Wendt’s position that the problem of other minds is not much of a problem ignores a fundamental issue in all social relations, but especially in those between states, namely, the problem of deception. In making estimates of the other’s present type, states have reason to be suspicious of its diplomatic gestures—the other may be trying to deceive them. Wendt’s analysis is rooted in the theory of symbolic interactionism, but he does not discuss one critical aspect of that tradition: the idea of “impression management.” Actors in their relations exploit the problem of other minds for their own ends. On the public stage, they present images and play roles that often have little to do with their true beliefs and interests backstage.24 In laying out his dramaturgical view of Ego and Alter co-constituting each other’s interests and identities, Wendt assumes that both Ego and Alter are making genuine efforts to express their true views and to “cast” the other in roles that they believe in. But deceptive actors will stage-manage the situation to create impressions that serve their narrow ends, and other actors, especially in world politics, will understand this.25 Thus a prudent security-seeking Ego will have difficulty distinguishing between two scenarios: whether it and Alter do indeed share a view of each other as peaceful, or whether Alter is just pre- tending to be peaceful in order to make Ego think that they share a certain conception of the world, when in fact they do not.26 Wendt’s analysis offers no basis for saying when peaceful gestures should be taken at face value, and when they should be discounted as deceptions.27 When we consider the implications of a Hitlerite state deceiving others to achieve a position of military superiority, we understand why great powers in history have tended to adopt postures of prudent mistrust.

Alt Fails – Generally

The alternative’s focus on interpretations leads to an endless, useless cycle of “floating signifiers” that results in a nihilistic world.

Jarvis 2K (Darryl S. L., Assoc. Prof. of Public Policy at Univ. of Singapore, *International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism,*, pp. 199-200)

As scholars reconstituted under this "appropriate posture," or in later writings a "critical posture of estrangement," we would be condemned to read, to play with words, to interpret without purpose, and to sit amid a solipsistic intertext where words, meanings, referents, signifiers, authors, and subjects have no meaning or reality other than those we would con¬struct individually." With the knowledge that there is no true knowledge because of the absence of secure ground upon which to build knowledge, we would abandon the Enlightenment project and squander away our time in linguistic play as "floating signifiers" vied for our attention among the simulacra of images that each of us consumed. Knowing that we could not know, the task at hand would devolve into one of repudiating the entire stock of knowledge, understanding, and practices that constitute International Relations and developing instead an historical amnesia that favored "a view from afar, from up high."" Even interpretation, Ashley insists, a method permissible to most postmodernists, would eventually have to be abandoned along with theory." Since "there is no there there" to be explained, and since interpretation would be but another method of affixing intrinsic meaning to a metaphysical nonreality, it too would have to be abandoned. In this newly constituted enterprise, nothing would await discovery, nothing would have intrinsic meaning, nothing would actually be present other than "absence," and hence nothing could be named. The state would not really exist, subjects would be transcendental fabrications who chase their empty identity throughout history, and history would be a mere interpretation, yet another "practice of domination."44 Within this nihilistic chasm, subversive postmodernists would have us devolve our disciplinary enterprise into a form of philosophical mentalism, an attempt "to resist the metaphysical temptation in our culture, to assume that something so important must be namable and that the name must indicate a definite referent, an already differentiated identity and source of meaning that just awaits to be named."'" Only minds situated amid their various contexts would exist and reality would be constituted not through the "realm of immediate sense experience" or "by direct observation of an independently existing world of 'facts," but through the thoughts of the mind." What, then, would we be left with and what could this newly constituted enterprise offer? As Ashley freely admits, it could offer little. It could not "claim to offer an alternative position or perspective" since there would be no secure ontological ground upon which these could be established.47 Nor could it offer alternative interpretations save it would attempt to impose "interpretation upon interpretation" and capture history by imposing fixed meanings and understandings. Least of all could it offer theory, the very tyranny of modernist narratives that tends to "privilege" and "marginalize." Absent any theoretical legacy or factual knowledge, we would be forced into an endless intertextual discourse predicated on the consumption of words and the individual thoughts they evoke: a kind of purified anarchism albeit in a perpetual state of self-dispersal." We would live in a world of relativistic knowledge claims, each "true" to those that think it, but its truthfulness unobtainable to those who would read it or wish to communicate it. Above all, we would be left without theory- knowledge as a basis for decision, judgment, prescription, and action, sur¬rendering us to "a view from afar, from up high." But as Nicholas Onuf asks, "What does this leave for dealing with those close at hand?'

Alt Fails – Generally

By trying to prevent security, we secure the status quo.

Dillon 96 (Michael, Prof@Lancaster, *Politics of Security*, p.30-31)JFS

Security cannot be taken as an unproblematic ontological predicate of the political because the question of ontology has itself become so problematical since the radical problematisation of the very tradition in which it has hitherto been thought. That problematisation, and its implications for thinking politics, is what I want to explore next. Consequently we cannot understand the inception and operation of (inter)national politics of security by reference to the expression of that predicate in self-consciousness, the biological individual, the community/nation/people, or the egotistical subject. Just as certainty is never certain of itself, (inter)national security never succeeds in securing itself. For each consists in exactly the same demand, which redoubles with any act that might satisfy it.One of the virtues of approaching security through a philosophy of the limit lies in the way such thinking is concerned not with the discernment of meta­physical truth but the decipherment of value, not with the production of reliable knowledge but the exposure of the processes of valuation and the foreclosure of possibilities effected by regimes of truth as power—knowledge. Such a posture emphasises that (inter)national security names a process of valuation and so alerts us to what is being devalued as well. And that such a process is not a simple monolithic determination of values, but sets in motion a dynamic play of (de)valuation in its preoccupation with calculation.While we have no greater provocation than the terminal paradox of our (inter)national politics of security to doubt the truth and the value (the truth-value) of security, it is perfectly obvious also that thinking the limit is itself, however, a dangerous game. For to doubt the truth and value of security seems to deny us the very means of survival in the most lethal of circumstances; particularly when it does not come equipped with a promise that we can secure an escape from (in)security, danger or a final overcoming of the violence which threatens, and is always threatened by, the agonal mortal life of human being.`There are no dangerous thoughts', said one of the very few contemporary political philosophers — Hannah Arendt — whose work was deeply influenced by Heidegger.47 'Thinking itself', she concluded, 'is dangerous'.48 Heidegger, too, called the ontological difference — which is the very thought that re-opens the question of the political — 'the most dangerous matter for thought'.49 But 'non- thinking', Arendt nonetheless also cautioned, 'which seems so recommendable a state for political and moral affairs, also has its perils'.50 To think and not to think, especially where the matter for thought is the question of the political, are therefore equally dangerous things to do. All this, then, is very dangerous talk.51 However, even if it is inevitably dangerous, it is dangerous in different ways and for different reasons.

Alt Fails – State Link

**Crit. Sec. Studies criticizes the idea of security, but contradicts itself by still maintaining the power of the state to securitize an issue. It does not change the root of the problem but rather shifts the focus to the essential character of identity.**

Gurbachan 8 (Singh, Strategy Studies @ Harvard, MIT *Reconciling Emancipation and Critical Security Studies*)

**The Copenhagen School has been criticized for not going far enough to totally break away from the realist state centric notion of security**. Together with Wæver and de Wilde, **Buzan have retained state–centrism by arguing that to securitize an issue is to render it** “so important that it should not be exposed to the normal haggling of politics but **should be dealt with decisively by top leaders prior to other issues**” (Buzan, Ole Wæver & Wilde 1998: 29). **The School is also accused of merely shifting to other positivist epistemology by labeling identity as having an ‘essential character’** (McSweeney 1996: 84) or as a given. **While the military and political sectors, the referent object may be the state, in the societal sector the referent object is identity**, or ‘more specifically, **it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions** for evolution, **of traditional patterns** of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom’ (O. Wæver et al. 1993: 23). While acknowledging that **through a ‘speech act’ any referent object could be under threat and become a security concern, addressing of the threat by the state is to solve a security problem and not necessarily to encourage/realise emancipatory tendencies.** Booth counters the state or society centric notion of security of the Copenhagen School by highlighting that ‘it is illogical to spend excessive amounts of money and effort to protect the house against flood, dry rot and burglars if this is at the cost of the well-beings of the inhabitants’(Booth 1991: 320).

Alt Fails – Ontology

Reconstructive Ontological claims within Security become problematic because there can be no objective Truth meaning no alternative ground that can be established.

Mustapha 9 (Jennifer, Department of Political Science McMaster University

*An Analytical Survey of Critical Security Studies: Making the Case for a (Modified) Post-structuralist Approach*)

Nevertheless, while The amoral nihilist straw-figure is an over-represented caricature, the real question is whether or not it is actually a danger. I would argue that the answer is *yes*. There is relevance in these broader concerns, and they cannot be simply brushed off as the folly of two ships passing in the night, where critiques of postmodernism are made on the basis of fundamentally different “external grounds”. **Too often, in response to critique, postmodern theorists appear to counter that their critics simply “don’t get it” and demur any engagement with them**. This is deeply unsatisfying and is actually at odds with the larger post-structuralist ethic that recognizes contingency, subjectivity and indeterminacy. It is arguable that the proponents of a postmodern or more broadly post-structuralist ethic must themselves engage with these concerns in order to remain intellectually genuine. In what follows, I attempt to do so. As mentioned, the particular postmodern approach in question eschews the making of ontological claims on the basis that to do otherwise is to be inconsistent with the project of deconstruction**. Furthermore, ontological claims are seen as inherently problematic because all knowledge is situated knowledge, and there is nothing that can be objectively known to be True. In other words, all constructed foundations are seen as being inherently modernist and necessarily invoking unreflexive claims about what “Is”, and this is seen as anathema to the postmodern project. Moreover, this perspective sees all post-structuralist critique as necessarily arriving at this postmodern place.** As Richard K. Ashley (1989) argues, “post-structuralism cannot claim to offer an alternative position or perspective, **because there is no alternative ground upon which it might be established**” (p. 278, emphasis added). He goes on to assert that “the task of post-structural social theory is not to impose a general interpretation, a paradigm of the sovereignty of man, as a guide to the transformation of life on a global scale… post-structuralism eschews grand designs, transcendental grounds, or universal projects of human-kind” (Ashley 1989, p. 284). Ashley is unabashed about his position that the “better course” (p. 313) is to persistently ask questions of the “how” rather than the “what” (pp. 281-283) and that the “work of thought” (p. 313, emphasis in original) is paramount. This type of postmodern deconstruction then, becomes an end in and of itself, rather than a means to the end of reconstructing novel ontologies. As such, its epistemological and methodological commitments become its ontological commitments.

**Alt Fails – Value to Life**

The alt can’t restore value to life

Gurbachan 8 (Singh, Strategy Studies @ Harvard, MIT *Reconciling Emancipation and Critical Security Studies*)

We only have this one Earth. **Time is running out for us to seriously address the future challenges of Earth’s finite resources, large population growths, urbanization and meeting humanitarian needs.** The times of infighting are over; **there is in the distant future a looming catastrophe of even greater proportion then the global nuclear war**. Hopefully with the recent emergence of the major global energy crisis the world leaders will be more serious in advancing a more humanity oriented critical approach towards a more cooperative and peaceful world order. **The term emancipation** while useful in advancing the critical human perspective, unfortunately **suffers from being culturally from a western origin. One man’s emancipation may be another’s sense of insecurity. It also conjures a notion of utopian idealism that could lose touch with current realities**. However, emancipation is sine qua non to the critical security thinking of at least the Frankfurt and Welsh School, and some might want to argue ultimately all critical approaches. **Indeed ultimately emancipation may be the only justification in providing an alternative to the positivist traditional theory of state and military centric power dominated anarchic world order. Without the ability to claim that a better world is possible or even conceivable, there is no means by which the present can be criticized.**Critical Security Studies will need to start delving in the specifics and take a more practical approach in advancing the approach. While there are signs that indeed this is being done by Booth and Vale in South Africa and also by Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd in Northern Ireland(Joseph Ruane & Todd 2005: 14), more needs to be done ‘if critical security studies are to flourish and lead to a revisioning of security in world politics’(Eli Stamnes & Jones). **In the pursuit of emancipation, proponents of CSS must also be mindful of not building another world order that is also far detached from the current or future reality.**

**Alt Fails – Value to Life**

Their conception of the value to life is culturally specific and undesirable because it ignores equally powerful desire for order

Gurbachan 8 (Singh, Strategy Studies @ Harvard, MIT *Reconciling Emancipation and Critical Security Studies*)

The main criticism levied against emancipation is that it conjures a sense of utopian ideal that is far detached from the practical real world. In this real world of scarce resources, emancipation could well create anarchy. There are practical difficulties in trying to achieve that notion that ‘I am not truly free until everyone is free’ (Booth 1991: 322) across nations. With finite and disproportionate endowment of resources in the world, how will it be practically possible to get countries to liberate all mankind without jeopardizing their own survivability in the long run? By asking the well endowed nations or citizens to part with some of their wealth could in some cases create the very fear that emancipation was meant to eradicate. The concept also assumes that humans are by nature good and that their tendencies towards greed, lust survival and lying are controllable. Tarry argues that it is an ‘excessively broad conceptualization that encompasses the perceptions of all people, the definition becomes analytically meaningless as a tool for understanding the phenomena it is intended to capture. Secondly, in practice, the emancipation of humanity could be used to create a condition of anarchy, where violence is legitimized, and existing divisions between people are exacerbated’(Tarry 1998). Mohammed Ayoob criticizes Booth’s definition as it ‘refuses to acknowledge that a society or group can be emancipated without being secure or vice versa….Such semantic acrobatics tend to impose a model of contemporary Western politics…that are far removed from Third World realities. ‘To posit emancipation as synonymous with security and panacea for all the ills plaguing Third World states can be the height of naivete’ (Ayoob 1997: 121-146). Here, it is difficult to disagree with Ayoob as the origin of the phrase ‘emancipation’ indeed has direct links to western theology or symbolises the eradicating of slavery in America. A possible way ahead may be to change it to ‘Humanism’ or any other universal phrase. Sarah Tarry argues that since Booth ‘characterizes states as being "means and not ends," he would consider the Canadian State to be a threat to the distinct Québecois identity. This emancipation of the sovereigntists would, however, be in fierce opposition to Québec nationalists and the ROC who would freely choose to have Québec remain within the federation. As both choices are equally legitimate among equal individuals, it is difficult to imagine how this contradiction could be resolved in such a manner as to not make all Canadians more insecure’(Tarry 1998). Similar contradictory arguments could also be advanced for Kashmir, Kosovo and even post-war Iraq. It could therefore be argued that while the notion of emancipation in the abstract may be promising, it has often failed to offer a practical way forward in specific situations. Tan See Seng argues that while ‘the desire for such an end to all power is understandable in the light of liberal proclivity to valuate power in negative terms, it nonetheless seems to me a fallacy to imagine the possibility of political thinking and acting without power (Tan May 2001). Adopting a purely normative approach also runs the risk of adopting those norms that were historically acceptable and could be argued to be more humane, depending on the perspective. Slaves in the past or in today’s context housemaids (at least the way they are often being abused) may still stand a better chance towards emancipation with their employers than in their own poverty stricken countries. There also is serious conflict of interest between the capitalism and emancipation. One aims to maximize returns and profits while the other aims to maximize distribution of wealth. While not necessarily totally world apart, there are major challenges. Flat organizational trends suggest that more wealth could be created by less power or hierarchy, more creativeHowever, I felt that Booth may not have gone far enough in being specific as what is universal or common humanity? Granted that power and order are secondary to emancipation, how can a community determine and know for sure that it has struck the right balance between power and emancipation such that its would not create another potentially anarchic situation. How can a community distinguish between what are needs and what are desires? The desires of human can be unending. How can we practically reconcile the differences between cultural value systems that belief and those that do not belief in the death penalty as a form of deterrence? Whatever the decision, someone will be feeling insecure. How do we reconcile a belief system that claims that theirs is the only real God and all other images and manifestation of God are evil spirits? What happens if the cost of an emancipated solution far outweighs the benefits to the whole community? I believe the way ahead, as has been alluded to but not emphasized by Ken Booth is a managed diffusion of power. However this should be done without compromising overall efficiency necessary for the long term survival of the community. In this real world there are more pressing problems of economic growth and development. Countries will need to prioritize industrial and infrastructure development to sustain the economic growth rather then strive to prioritise to meet the unique and often conflicting needs of all communities. Critical Studies proponents must be mindful that in the short run this approach will inevitably require some compromising of the emancipatory logic.

Alt Turn - Exclusion

Their critical approach to security necessarily turns in on itself – it recreates the exclusions that it attempts to cross over by targeting specific audiences.

Mutimer 9 (David, Assoc. Prof. of Poli Sci at York Univ., *Studies in Social Justice*, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 9-22)

Most critical scholarship in International Relations begins, in some sense, f**rom Robert Cox’s observation that all theory is for someone and for some purpose.** (Cox, 1986, p. 207) **It is rarely noted that this means, necessarily, that theory is also against someone and against their purposes.** While rarely noted**, it would generally not be seen as overly problematic by critical theorists if it were, because the assumption is that critical theory is for the oppressed, for the excluded, and is therefore against the oppressor, against those on the inside keeping the deserving out**. But who are the deserving? Our reflex is that they are any that are kept out, but here is the point at which the discussion I have just followed gains its significance. The various forms of critical theorizing about security identify those deserving by identifying whom it is their theory is for. By effecting exclusions from the critical project, the different forms of theorizing produce some as doubly excluded: they are outside, but not deserving. Emancipatory critical theory is revealed to be against not only the oppressors, those inside guarding the gates, but against some of those on the outside as well. As Christine Sylvester puts it:When critical people of all persuasions and locations forget to recognize that critical comes in many forms, when they designate some critical analysts as ‘other participants’, fall into the habit encouraged by camp IR to focus narrowly and rally around a few thinkers, when they forget that feminists are dissidents too and that women are in security peril the world round . . . they are in trouble . . . ” (Sylvester, 2007, p. 556) The conclusion is unavoidable, then, that each of the positions I have surveyed is “in trouble,” as each effects just such exclusions of other forms of critique and the insecure outsiders for whom those others speak. Booth’s post-Marxism privileges those excluded on the basis of class, but the disparagement of post-structuralism effects an excision of not only the writers but the varied forms of identity for whom they write. These multiple and overlapping forms of identity include, but are not limited to, those constituted by race, sexual orientation and, of course, gender. The CASE Collective, even in its aim to be inclusive, excludes feminists and the insecure women for whom they write, as well as the non-Europeans who may also write for subjects other than those that are the focus of European authors. The question that remains, of course, is whether we can escape the production of exclusions in our attempts at critical (security) scholarship. My answer is that no, we cannot. By speaking for some we necessarily speak against others, and the range of those who face oppression, those for whom critical scholarship is written, is too great for them all to be written for at once. My corollary to this observation is that there will be different outsiders who most need critical theory at different times and in different places. In taking this step, I make clear my own choice amongst the inclusions and exclusions I have surveyed, for from this corollary follows a post- structural critical ethos. While we cannot avoid effecting exclusions in our work, we can resist the temptation to effect them *a priori.* Rather, we need to turn our critical gazes constantly on ourselves to ask if, at each time and in each place, we are theorizing for those most in need. Doing so acknowledges that other outsiders will be excluded by our choices, but has at least the benefit of doing so in a limited and contingent fashion.

Alt Turn - Violence

Security discourse is inevitable—rejection risks replicating the harms.

Williams 3 (Michael, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 47(4), AD: 7-10-9) BL

It is irrelevant here whether one rejects, accepts, or perhaps finds it an atavistic remnant of barbaric times that nations continue to group themselves according to friend and enemy, or whether it is perhaps strong pedagogic reasoning to imagine that enemies no longer exist at all. The concern here is neither with abstractions nor normative ideals, but with inherent reality and the real possibility of making such a distinction. One may or may not share these hopes and pedagogic ideals. But, rationally speaking, it cannot be denied that nations continue to group themselves according to the friend–enemy antithesis, that the distinction still remains actual today, and that this is an ever present possibility for every people existing in the political sphere (1996 [1932]: 28).30 In certain settings, the Copenhagen School seems very close to this position. Securitization must be understood as both an existing reality and a continual possibility. Yet equally clearly there is a basic ambivalence in this position, for it raises the dilemma that securitization theory must remain at best agnostic in the face of any securitization, even, for example, a fascist speech-act (such as that Schmitt has often been associated with) that securitizes a specific ethnic or racial minority. To say that we must study the conditions under which such processes and constructions emerge and become viable is important but incomplete, for without some basis for avoiding this process and transforming it the Copenhagen School appears to risk replicating some of the worst excesses made possible by a Schmittian understanding of politics.

**Rejecting security discourse replicates radical realpolitik.**

Williams 3 (Michael, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 47(4), AD: 7-10-9) BL

I would like to suggest that it is in response to these issues, and in regard to the realm of ethical practice, that the idea of security as a speech-act takes on an importance well beyond its role as a tool of social explanation. Casting securitization as a speechact places that act within a framework of communicative action and legitimation that links it to a discursive ethics that seeks to avoid the excesses of a decisionist account of securitization. While the Copenhagen School has been insufficiently clear in developing these aspects of securitization theory, they link clearly to some of the most interesting current analyses of the practical ethics of social-constructivism. As Thomas Risse (2000) has recently argued, communicative action is not simply a realm of instrumental rationality and rhetorical manipulation. Communicative action involves a process of argument, the provision of reasons, presentation of evidence, and commitment to convincing others of the validity of one’s position. Communicative action (speech-acts) are thus not just given social practices, they are implicated in a process of justification. Moreover, as processes of dialogue, communicative action has a potentially transformative capacity. As Risse puts it: Argumentative rationality appears to be crucially linked to the constitutive rather than the regulative role of norms and identities by providing actors with a mode of interaction that enables them to mutually challenge and explore the validity claims of those norms and identities. When actors engage in a truth-seeking discourse, they must be prepared to change their own views of the world, their interests, and sometimes even their identities. (2000: 2)31 As speech-acts, securitizations are in principle forced to enter the realm of discursive legitimation. Speech-act theory entails the possibility of argument, of dialogue, and thereby holds out the potential for the transformation of security perceptions both within and between states. The securitizing speech-act must be accepted by the audience, and while the Copenhagen School is careful to note that ‘‘[a]ccept does not necessarily mean in civilized, dominance-free discussion; it only means that an order always rests on coercion as well as on consent,’’ it is nonetheless the case that ‘‘[s]ince securitization can never only be imposed, there is some need to argue one’s case’’(Buzan et al., 1998: 23), and that ‘‘[s]uccessful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security speech-act: does the audience accept that something is an existential threat to a shared value? Thus security (as with all politics) ultimately rests neither with the objects nor with the subjects but among the subjects’’(1998:31). It is via this commitment to communicative action and discursive ethics, I would like to suggest, that the Copenhagen School seeks to avoid the radical realpolitik that might otherwise seem necessarily to follow from the Schmittian elements of the theory of securitization. Schmitt appeals to the necessity and inescapability of decision, enmity, and ‘‘the political.’’ He appeals to the mobilizing power of myth in the production of friends and enemies, and asserts the need for a single point of decision to the point of justifying dictatorship. He mythologizes war and enmity as the paramount moments of political life.32

Alt Fails – Reject Bad

Resistance Fails.

D’Cruz 1 (Carolyn LaTrobe University, Australia, “What Matter Who's Speaking?" Authenticity and Identity in Discourses of Aboriginality in Australia,” *Jouvert*, Volume 5, Issue 3, http://english.chass.ncsu.edu/jouvert/v5i3/cdcr.htm AD: 7/11/09) NS

When Hollinsworth tackles the problem of essentialism, he argues that identifying an Aboriginal essence in terms of 'biological descent,' for instance, can unintentionally lend itself to right-wing populism, which creates a hierarchy of authenticity based on racist assumptions about categorisations such as full blood, half caste, and so on. This effectively derides some Aboriginal people with 'mixed ancestry.' He argues that there are similar problems of creating a hierarchy of authenticity with definitions of identity that situate an Aboriginal essence in terms of 'cultural continuity' (cultural commonalities in terms of heritage, and ways of doing things). While Hollinsworth does show an awareness that the means of defining Aboriginality is seeped in Australia's racist history, he curiously acts as if it were possible to simply choose the most appropriate way for authenticating identity, by rejecting the above classifications for what he calls 'Aboriginality as resistance.' This latter category professedly describes an 'oppositional culture' to common experiences of dispossession and racism. Though he warns against the tendency to essentialise this 'discourse' of resistance, Hollinsworth contends that 'Aboriginality as resistance' is "the most inclusive, dynamic and least readily domesticated by state co-option" ("Discourses" 151). Yet his choice to settle on a preferred category begs the question as to how such a selection can disentangle itself from its complicity with state co-option, as it is such domestication of identity that has *produced* such resistance and opposition in the first place.

Rejection is counterproductive. Realism synthesizes critical theories in order to provide for the possibility of transition.

Murray 97 (Alastair J.H. Politics Department, University of Wales Swansea, *Reconstructing Realism*, p. 178-9) NS

In Wendt’s constructivism, the argument appears in its most basic version, presenting an analysis of realist assumptions which associate it with a conservative account of human nature. In Linklater's critical theory it moves a stage further, presenting an analysis of realist theory which locates it within a conservative discourse of state‑centrism. In Ashley's post‑structuralism it reaches its highest form, presenting an analysis of realist strategy which locates it not merely within a conservative statist order, but, moreover, within an active conspiracy of silence to reproduce it. Finally, in Tickner's feminism, realism becomes all three simultaneously and more besides, a vital player in a greater, overarehing, masculine conspiracy against femininity. Realism thus appears, first, as a doctrine providing the grounds for a relentless pessimism, second, as a theory which provides an active justification for such pessimism, and, third, as a strategy which proactively seeks to enforce this pessimism, before it becomes the vital foundation underlying all such pessimism in international theory. Yet, an examination of the arguments put forward from each of these perspectives suggests not only that the effort to locate realism within a conservative, rationalist camp is untenable, but, beyond this, that realism is able to provide reformist strategies which are superior to those that they can generate themselves. The progressive purpose which motivates the critique of realism in these perspectives ultimately generates a bias which undermines their own ability to generate effective strategies of transition. In constructivism, this bias appears in its most limited version, producing strategies so divorced from the obstacles presented by the current structure of international politics that they threaten to become counter‑productive. In critical theory it moves a stage further, producing strategies so abstract that one is at a loss to determine what they actually imply in terms of the current structure of international politics. And, in post‑modernism, it reaches its highest form, producing an absence of such strategies altogether, until we reach the point at which we are left with nothing but critique. Against this failure, realism contains the potential to act as the basis of a more constructive approach to international relations, incorporating many of the strengths of reflectivism and yet avoiding its weaknesses. It appears, in the final analysis, as an opening within which some synthesis of rationalism and reflectivism, of conservatism and progressivism, might be built.

Violence Inevitable

Us vs. Them mentality is genetically encoded and inevitable.

Fisbein and Dess 3 (Harold D., Nancy, Ph. D. University of Cincinnati psychology, Ph.D. Occidental College psychology *Evolutionary psychology and violence: a primer for policymakers and public policy advocates* Ed. - Richard W. Bloom, Nancy Kimberly Dess pg.157-158)

This chapter deals with an evolutionary analysis of intercultural conflict. The core assumption is that genes determine some aspects of human social behavior Our genes make all of our social behavior possible, but because of our evolutionary design—as social primates and, later, as tribally organized hunters and gatherers—we have inherited a genetic structure that makes certain kinds of attitudes and social behavior inevitable. Further, the occurrence of some of these attitudes and behaviors makes the development of prejudice and discrimination toward members of other cultures highly likely. These attitudes and behaviors constitute an "us versus them" psychology that is genetically determined. On the basis of the current state of knowledge, it is highly likely that particular processes are genetically coded that normally ensure that the evolved social behaviors (phenotypic characteristics) will develop. For example, neither English nor Spanish is coded in the genes, but language-inducing processes are. If a child is reared in an English-speaking community, she'll learn English. If she's reared in an American Sign Language (ASL) community, she'll learn ASL. Either outcome can occur because language-inducing processes that have evolved in the species have developed in the individual. Although debate continues over whether these processes are modular or generic and about exactly how human communication is unique, that children's great facility for learning human language is an evolutionary legacy is clear

Violence Inevitable – History.

Shaw and Wong 89 (R. Paul, Yuwa, Ph.D. Senior population and development economist UNPF, Ph.D. Simon Fraser University *Genetic Seeds of Warfare: Evolution, Nationalism, and Patriotism* pg. 3)

What kinds of evidence convey war proneness? Some social scientists view the frequency of warfare among "primitive” tribes and "modern" nations as the most persuasive data. Montagu (1976) cites evidence of some 14,500 wars during the last 5,600 years of recorded history, or 2.6 wars per year. From his tally, only 10 of 185 generations have known uninterrupted peace. Burke (1975) makes a similar point; there have been only 268 years of peace during the last 3,400 years of history. Peace thus comprises only 8% of the entire history of recorded civilization. More recently, the Correlates of War Project at the University of Michigan shows there is virtually no evidence of a secular trend up or down in the incidence of warfare between 1816 and 1977 (Singer and Small 1972; Singer 1981). This suggests that war proneness is a "constant" in modern history. Since World War II, Valzelli (1981) notes there have been more than 150 wars, scrimmages, coups d'etat, and revolutions. During this period of "deceitful peace," he reports an average of 12 acts of war occurring simultaneously per year, with only 26 days of actual peace. Some 25 million humans were killed during the last 35 years, more than the total number of soldiers killed during the two world wars.

Violence Inevitable

Conflict serves multiple evolutionary functions.

Shaw and Wong 89 (R. Paul, Yuwa, Ph.D. Senior population and development economist UNPF, Ph.D. Simon Fraser University *Genetic Seeds of Warfare: Evolution, Nationalism, and Patriotism* pg. 10-11)

Do ritualized aggression and lethal conflict serve similar functions among humans? Alcock (1978), an evolutionary biologist, concludes that most threatening or violent disputes are employed to resolve contested ownership over scarce or potentially limiting resources. Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1979), an ethologist, interprets intergroup aggression as a means of sorting out territorial disputes or status in a ranking order, van den Berghe (1978), a sociologist, sees primitive and early societal warfare as a rational means of gaining livestock, women and slaves, gaining or keeping territory, or gaining, controlling, and exploiting new territory. Among nations, Knorr {1966, 1977), a political scientist, argues that the use of force is an allocative mechanism by which competition among states is resolved. Choucri and North (1975) demonstrate that much international conflict is the result of the interactive effects of population and technology demanding resources beyond national borders. And two military historians, Wright (1935) and Gray (1974), conclude that warfare and arms races seek to preserve solidarity under the status quo by augmenting nations\* influence, prestige, and power over social and economic resources in the world community. Perhaps the most outstanding testimony that modern warfare serves accepted functions is its institutionalization — to the extent that it now operates within a cadre of laws defining states of war and peace and prescribes rules of conduct for each. Several military historians define war as a legal condition which permits two or more hostile groups to carry on conflict by armed force. Emphasis on the term legal connotes societal acceptance and approval (Wright 1935; Kennedy 1972; J.T.Johnson 1981). Margaret Mead (1968) observes that modern warfare requires an organization for killing, the willingness of individuals to die on behalf of other members, the approval of individuals within the societies concerned, and an agreement that it is a legitimate way of solving problems. If we strip away the vagaries of different analytical approaches and academic jargon, we find that most anthropologists, sociologists, historians, economists, and political scientists agree that modern-day arms races, military threats, and use of violence by groups at various levels of organization serve to enforce, protect, or extend power (for example, Andreski 1968; von Clauscwitz 1976; Garnett 1970; Blaincy 1973; Hammond 1975; Midlarsky 1975; Falger 1987). And, in this context, any distinction between economic and political power is unreal. Every conflict involves power, and power depends on control over scarce or potentially limiting physical and nonphysical resources.

Violence is inevitable – Evolution.

Shaw and Wong 89 (R. Paul, Yuwa, Ph.D. Senior population and development economist UNPF, Ph.D. Simon Fraser University *Genetic Seeds of Warfare: Evolution, Nationalism, and Patriotism* pg. 12,14)

An evolutionary approach is essential to understanding humanity’s propensity for warfare for one reason. Behavioral strategies to enhance biological goals of survival, reproduction, and genetic fitness have not evolved independently of humanity's environment — they have coevolved. To decipher the "deep structure" of warfare propensities it is thus crucial to bear in mind that evolution always involves adaptation to past, not present, environments. Moreover, most genetic evolution of human behavior has occurred over a span of hundreds of thousands of years prior to civilization (see Figure 1.3). This means that a legacy of aggression and lethal conflict has adapted to serve humans for 99% of their existence. During the same period, structures of the brain and processes of cognition that are attuned to aggress ion/war fare have evolved. Viewing the coevolution of genes, mind, and culture with this legacy in mind suggests that the cultural explosion of modern times may not, as yet, have fully taken on a life of its own. Why? Because modern culture and many of its uses may be constrained or guided by humanity's evolutionary legacy including adaptations which have evolved to serve previous environments. Some of these formerly adaptive predispositions may well be maladaptive today. As we shall see, merely recognizing this possibility is not likely to be sufficient for their abandonment.

Violence Inevitable

Understanding violence as an aberration in human behavior prevents us from predicting it.

Fox 94 (Robin, University Professor of Social Theory at Rutgers, *The Challenge of Anthropology: Old Encounters and New Excursions*, pg. 88-89)

The assumption that violence is a disease is to make it the analog of diarrhea. But, what if it is in fact an analog of digestion, or of some subprocess like metabolization, ingestion, or excretion? There is no future, in this case, in looking for its “causes” since it doesn’t have any. It is just what the organism does as part of its routine of living. One can examine sequences within the routine and see where it fits (what its “functions” are); or, one can ask “ethological” questions about how it came to be there in the first place – evolutionary and adaptational questions. What is it for? What are its adaptational advantages? What survival value does it give the organism? – and so on. But “causal” questions are simply inapplicable. If we make this analytical mistake when looking at sequences of behavior involving violence at some point, then we will ask, What caused this violence to occur? and expend a lot of mental energy trying to find an answer on the analogy of, Why did diarrhea occur? But if we look at the same sequence in the ethological framework – as we do in “agonistic encounters” between animals of the same species, for example – we can predict fairly accurately when, in the escalation process, violence will occur. It is a natural, expectable, predictable, inevitable part of the process. It is not diarrhea. It is metabolization, if you like.

Conflict inevitable – power imbalances.

Horgan 9 (John, May, Scientific American Journalist, Taming Humanity's Urge to War: Must lethal conflict be an inevitable part of human culture?, *Scientific American,* May 2009 )

Harvard University anthropologist Richard Wrangham agreed with de Waal that primate violence is not compulsive, or “instinctual,” but is “extremely sensitive to context.” One of the most robust predictors of violence between two groups of primates, Wrangham proposed, is an imbalance of power. Chimps from one troop invariably attack individuals from a rival troop when the attackers have an overwhelming number advantage and hence a minimal risk of death or injury. Although humans are much less risk-averse than chimps, Wrangham asserted, human societies—from hunter-gatherers to modern nations such as the U.S.—also behave much more aggressively toward rival groups when they are confident they can prevail. Reducing imbalances of power between nations, Wrangham said, should reduce the risk of war.

War inevitable – culture.

Angier 3 (Natalie, November 11, *New York Times*, Is War Our Biological Destiny?)

Archaeologists and anthropologists have found evidence of militarism in perhaps 95 percent of the cultures they have examined or unearthed. Time and again groups initially lauded as gentle and peace-loving -- the Mayas, the !Kung of the Kalahari, Margaret Mead's Samoans, -- eventually were outed as being no less bestial than the rest of us. A few isolated cultures have managed to avoid war for long stretches. The ancient Minoans, for example, who populated Crete and the surrounding Aegean Islands, went 1,500 years battle-free; it didn't hurt that they had a strong navy to deter would-be conquerors. Warriors have often been the most esteemed of their group, the most coveted mates. And if they weren't loved for themselves, their spears were good courtship accessories. This year, geneticists found evidence that Genghis Khan, the 13th century Mongol emperor, fathered so many offspring as he slashed through Asia that 16 million men, or half a percent of the world's male population, could be his descendants. Wars are romanticized, subjects of an endless, cross-temporal, transcultural spool of poems, songs, plays, paintings, novels, films. The battlefield is mythologized as the furnace in which character and nobility are forged; and, oh, what a thrill it can be. ''The rush of battle is a potent and often lethal addiction,'' writes Chris Hedges, a reporter for The New York Times who has covered wars, in ''War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning.'' Even with its destruction and carnage, he adds, war ''can give us what we long for in life.'' ''It can give us purpose, meaning, a reason for living,'' he continues. Nor are humans the only great apes to indulge in the elixir. Common chimpanzees, which share about 98 percent of their genes with humans, also wage war: gangs of neighboring males meet at the borderline of their territories with the express purpose of exterminating their opponents. So many males are lost to battle that the sex ratio among adult chimpanzees is two females for every male.

Violence Inevitable – A2: You Justify…

We don’t justify atrocities, don’t moralize facts.

Fisbein and Dess 3 (Harold D., Nancy, Ph. D. University of Cincinnati psychology, Ph.D. Occidental College psychology *Evolutionary psychology and violence: a primer for policymakers and public policy advocates* Ed. - Richard W. Bloom, Nancy Kimberly Dess pg.159)

Finally, that certain psychological processes are genetically determined does not mean that the attitudes and behaviors arising from those processes are morally correct. Whether moral rectitude can be derived from evolutionary reasoning is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, even scholars who argue that inquiry into human evolution is morally informative (e.g., Arnhart, 1998) do not suggest that a genomic basis, ancestral adaptive advantage, or species-wide inclination constitutes moral justification, and no such suggestion is made here. The issue is whether the psychological processes underlying in-tercultural conflict are illuminated by understanding our species' natural history and, if so, how this understanding might inform attempts to modify or redirect them in ways deemed socially useful through legitimate means. Specifically, we assume here that reducing violence and increasing intergroup harmony will be socially useful, and that influencing public policy is a legitimate means of advancing this agenda.

**Postmodernism Fails**

**Postmodernism is trapped by its own obscurity and contradictions – the alternatives can’t be discerned.**

Jarvis 2K (Darryl S. L., Assoc. Prof. of Public Policy at Univ. of Singapore, *International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism,*, pp. 55-56)

Such textual and intellectual sabotage, however, serve their purpose, perplexing modernists who often seem bereft of responses to it. Traditional theorists like Christopher Norris or Alex Callinicos, for instance, display bewilderment at the ethereality, theoretical brevity, and reluctance of postmodernists to enunciate their epistemic motif beyond the errant practices of deconstruction." Above all they are disenchanted at the unwillingness of postmodernists to abide by established rules for intellectual engagement: how does one rationally assess postmodern theory when postmodernists eschew all references to rationalist discourse? But they miss the point. Confusion, dissonance, and disruption are the point of postmodern discourse. Postmodernism can thus be understood as political resistance rather than theoretical innovation; a means of stepping outside the established practices of (Western) scholarship and infusing it with critical insight. The incorporeal nature of language destabilization, for example, allows post- modernists to attack the rigidities of modernist discourse, particularly the sanctums of logic and reason, and escape the "victimization" which they argue has led to their "exile," "marginalization," and "disempowerment." Ethereality therefore becomes a political act of nonconformity, and textual deconstruction a way of "undoing" and challenging the power hierarchy of modernist theory that presupposes conformity in method, logic, knowledge, and interpretation. One of the primary objectives of much postmodernist scholarship thus concerns itself with a form of deconstructive pluralism, deliberately designed to destabilize, or at least to challenge, the system(s) of knowledge premised upon Western rationalism and derived from the Enlightenment. Where the project of modern political theory might be said to concern itself with the good society, to inventing rules, norms, standards, and defining objectives on the basis of some master blueprint or universal grand strategy, postmodern theory might be said to be its arch rival, committed to seeing an end to this (modernist) project. Yet the alternatives it offers are all but invisible, especially when its aetiological basis is hidden beneath a complicated developmental historiography punctuated only by a disposition toward continental philosophy (in particular, French post- structuralist theory). Instead, postmodernists prefer the ether of the unspecified to the vexed realities of inscribed practices, disciplinary specialization, or concision in method and technique, and appeal to an as-yet unspecified set of other criteria as the appropriate vehicles for understanding postmodern theory. Consequently, postmodernism continues to suffer from ill-defined parameters that betray an incomplete conception of itself and an inclination to self-contradiction, discursiveness, irreverence, and complicated forms of expression and self-explanation."

Postmodernism assumes the moral high-ground to shield itself from criticism while casting contradictory insults on other thought processes.

Jarvis 2K (Darryl S. L., Assoc. Prof. of Public Policy at Univ. of Singapore, *International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism,*, pp. 123)

As Robert Gilpin points out, to believe Ashley is to believe that realists, realism, modernists, and those who profess rationalistic thinking practices "are all card-carrying members of an insidious and rather danger­ous conspiracy that, like Socrates, is indoctrinating youth (read graduate stu­dents) in false and dangerous ways of thinking."" For Gilpin, Ashley has assumed the mantle of a kafkaesque prosecutor who, in a self-enclosed, self- absorbed treatise, insulated as much by obtuse logic as needless jargon, has accused realists and modernists alike with intellectual treachery that approaches a pernicious evil. Collectively, however, such allegations have served their purpose, intimidating those who would protest against the pro­testers by closing off, silencing, or ascribing pejorative overtones to certain topics, debates, or issues now considered modernist, hierarchical, statist, sov­ereignist, realist, patriarchal, technical, structuralist, objectivist, positivist, foundationalist, or rationalist. These words are now lumped together into an amorphous whole, assumed inseparable and issued in condemnation. As Gilpin again notes, this "is polemical innuendo designed to scare easily cor­ruptible graduate students away from the likes of such alleged protofascists as Bob Keohane and George Modelski."" And this, I think, is the crux of the matter: political sophistry disguised as theoretical discourse. Ashley, along with Walker, has executed an exceedingly clever political maneuver by invoking the theme of victimization, allowing them the freedom to allege horrendous crimes but in the absence of any substantive evidence. Indeed, this has become a trademark of their discourse where, against alleged intel­lectual treachery, they assume the moral highground, all the time sheltering from the probing eye of criticism by labeling themselves victims Only the truly treacherous would dare bully the victim, subject them to yet more heinous ridicule, "violence," and "threats." Only the truly foolish would dare incur the wrath of the new vigilantism of political correctness. Presented with such options, few have felt compelled to reply to the likes of Ashley and Walker, and those who have are roundly dismissed for their intellectual impurity and moral culpability.

**Postmodernism Fails**

**Postmodernism defeats its own legitimacy through its insistence on relativism.**

Jarvis 2K (Darryl S. L., Assoc. Prof. of Public Policy at Univ. of Singapore, *International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism,*, pp. 130-131)

While the relevance of Ashley's poststructuralist theory is cause for con­cern, more disconcerting is its implicit nihilism. Not unexpectedly, Ashley rejects this, insisting that his discourse is not nihilistic but antifoundation­alist. Upon closer inspection, however, this position proves both unsus­tainable and self-defeating. By rejecting foundationalism and all truth claims derived through the application of reason, Ashley unwittingly aban‑dons theory, knowledge, and human practices to the ether of relativism and subjectivism. And by insisting that there "is no extratextual referent that can be used as a basis for adjudicating theoretical disputes," Ashley depreciates thought, theory, and knowledge to the particular outcomes of certain linguistic, interpretivist, and textual techniques." Ashley is thus forced to conclude that truth, purpose, and meaning can only be textually inferred and never universally or eternally proclaimed. One theory becomes as good as any another theory and a particular truth claim no bet­ter or worse than other truth claims Objective evaluation becomes impos­sible and, with it, any claim to a science of international politics. All that we might hope for is a subjective interpretivism, where, amid a vacuous intersection of texts, we each reach our own conclusions. This position is both alarming and perplexing: alarming in that it moves us closer to the abyss of ethical relativism and perplexing since it undermines the intelligibility, legitimacy, and logic of Ashley's own writ­ings. As Chris Brown notes, postmodern approaches end up destroying themselves. Demolishing the thought of modernity by rejecting founda­tionalism is a self-subverting theoretical stance since it prevents "any new thought taking the place from which the old categories have been ejected."' Tony Porter is even more adamant, noting that the poststruc­tural rejection of foundationalism inevitably reduces concepts like truth and reality to subjective intertextual interpretations. Intellectual thought, let alone the possibility of an intersubjective consensus on issues like pur­pose, meaning, ethics, or truth, becomes impossible. Rather than create new thought categories or knowledge systems, poststructuralists simply devolve knowledge into a series of infinitesimal individual interpretations. Yet the issue is at best a mute one. Refuting the notion of truth is non­sensical. As William Connolly observes, "Do you not presuppose truth (reason, subjectivity, a transcendental ethic, and so on) in repudiating it? If so, must you not endorse the standard unequivocally once your own presupposition is revealed to you?" Obviously, notes Connolly, the answer is a resounding "yes, yes, yes, yes."'

**Postmodernism Fails**

Postmodernism’s insistence on interpretations can never translate into the real world – the oppression that it claims to solve still remains.

Jarvis 2K (Darryl S. L., Assoc. Prof. of Public Policy at Univ. of Singapore, *International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism,*, pp. 196-198)

Let us for a moment, however, reflect on this "research program," on the importations of textual analysis and deconstructive theory, and what they might do to theoretical endeavor and the discipline of International Relations. Let us, for example, pose a few rudimentary questions that, despite their simplicity, go to the very essence of subversive postmod­ernism's relevance and utility to the study of international politics. What, for example, is "ambiguous" about war or "ironic" about peace? How does the admission of uncertainty change the face of theory, or how does textuality alter our experiences of the realities of international politics, of death squads, civil war, or autocratic rule? Why, suddenly, are irony, uncertainty, ambiguity, and textuality the prized attributes of theoretical endeavor? Are these to be our new epistemological motifs by which we judge the quality and usefulness of theory and research programs in Inter­national Relations? Are the problems of international politics and the answers to them hidden amid literary devices like paradox or the textual chicanery of double entendre? Will the practices of regional aggression dis­played by Saddam Hussein, for example, be thwarted through textual rereadings of security texts, or the acrimonious diplomatic exchanges between the United States and Iraq? Can we change the course of politi­cal outcomes, avert the use of force, or persuade others to disavow aggres­sion though textual reinterpretation? If we believe Ashley, Hoffman, Walker, Sylvester, or James Der Der­ian, for example, then the answer is yes, in which case international theory must transpose itself into a form of literary criticism and employ the tools of textual deconstruction, parody, and the style of discontinuous narratives as a means of pondering the depths of interpretation. In doing so, how­ever, we would approach the writings of Richard Ashley, who, utilizing such methods, can apprise students of international politics only of the fact that "there are neither right interpretations nor wrong," there are just "interpretations imposed upon interpretations.""In what sense, however, can this approach be at all adequate for the subject of International Relations? What, for example, do the literary devices of irony and textuality say to Somalian refugees who flee from famine and warlords or to Ethiopian rebels who fight in the desert plains against a government in Addis Abbaba? How does the notion of textual deconstruction speak to Serbs, Croats, and Muslims who fight one an­other among the ruins of the former Yugoslavia? How do totalitarian nar­ratives or logocentric binary logic feature in the deliberations of policy bureaucrats or in the negotiations over international trade or the formula­tions of international law? Should those concerned with human rights or those who take it upon themselves to study relationships between nation- states begin by contemplating epistemological fiats and ontological disputes? How does the reification of interpretivism and relativism assist such people in their understandings, problems, judgments, negotiations, and disputes? Is Ashley, for example, suggesting that we simply announce to those in the fray of international politics that there are neither right interpretations nor wrong, there are just interpretations imposed upon interpretations. Is this to be the epiphany of subversive postmodern international theory, its penultimate contribution to those who suffer on the margins for whom they professes great concern? I am, of course, being flippant. Yet we do have a right to ask such questions of subversive postmodernists if only because they portend to a moral highground, to insights otherwise denied realists, modernists, positivists, and mainstream international relations scholars. We have every right to ask, for example, how subversive postmodern theory speaks to the practical problems endemic to international relations, to the actors and players who constitute the practices of world politics, or how literary devices and deconstructive readings help us better picture world society.

Deconstructionism Fails

Postmodernist Deconstructionism creates real world apathy and ends in the fictional world of discourse.

Mustapha 9 (Jennifer, Department of Political Science McMaster University

*An Analytical Survey of Critical Security Studies: Making the Case for a (Modified) Post-structuralist Approach*)

Importantly, I seek to highlight **the relevance of ontological theorizations in debates about the meaning and definition of “security.”** In doing so, I hope to **call attention to the many nuances of the critical security** **studies literature** and ultimately argue the benefits of employing a (modified) post-structuralist approach to understanding security. **This “modification” is necessary because there is an inclination within some critical post-structuralist approaches to conflate epistemological commitments with ontological ones**. This can be observed in what is arguably an unsustainable leap of reasoning, **where** acknowledgement of **the indeterminacy of competing truth claims turns into an unwillingness to make any claims at all. In other words, the subject of security risks becoming invisible in the wake of continuous contestations about the dangers of essentialism and about the meaning of security itself.** This is problematic on several fronts, such as in the context of critical approaches that make emancipatory declarations on behalf of the individual. The good news is that this is not necessarily the logical end-point of post-structuralist critiques, nor is it an indictment against the overall benefit of employing them. Furthermore, this analysis is not meant to detract from the core intention of a post-structuralist ethic, which seeks to interrogate and deconstruct the very meaning of security and the ways in which it is talked about. Nevertheless, I argue that **deconstruction is only a first step**, and as Baudrillard and Lotringer (1987) have observed “discourse is discourse, but the operations, strategies, and schemes played out there are real.” I hope to demonstrate why **this reflection is crucial to an intellectually genuine post-structuralist ethic and is an important corrective against the straw-figure postmodernist who becomes an amoral nihilist trapped in discourse, unwilling to meaningfully engage the status quo on the basis of our allegedly inherent inability to make Truth claims**. While this straw-figure is often disingenuously and unfairly evoked in critiques of “postmodernism”, this does not absolve the proponents of critical post-structuralist security approaches from engaging with these concerns. That is part of what this essay seeks to do. Using Stephen K. White’s (2000) arguments for the viability of “weak ontologies,” I suggest that **a critical post-structuralist approach need not be anathema to the making of claims, nor should it be seen as suffering from a paralytic disjuncture from the “real world”.** Rather, maintaining critical commitments can mean being reflexive about the inter-subjectivity and indeterminacy of the claims that *are* ultimately made, and of being accountable to them. Notably, due to the emphasis on ontology, the “map” of critical security studies employed here looks different from the more common formulations of the field, such as those employed by Ken Booth (2005) and Krause and Williams (1996).

Deconstructionism Fails

Critical Securities studies are trapped within the confines of discourse, unable to meaningfully engage with the status quo.

Mustapha 9 (Jennifer, Department of Political Science McMaster University

*An Analytical Survey of Critical Security Studies: Making the Case for a (Modified) Post-structuralist Approach*)

**In critical security studies**, this type **of postmodern approach often goes beyond simply challenging the presuppositions of realism via deconstruction, and further argues that *any* construction or affirmation of ontological foundations is itself problematic and undesirable, as is any re-visioning of alternative security futures. This is because the modernist trap of reification/ essentialism is seen as intrinsic to *any* ontology, and therefore, ontological claims in and of themselves are to be avoided**. Furthermore, any revisioning of alternative security futures is understood to necessarily cause violences. Hence, while much of critical security studies is preoccupied with the construction of alternative security futures, the anti-essentialist postmodern approach tends to see that the appropriate role of theory resides solely in destabilizing the concepts of modernity. “Security,” then, is seen less as something that must be sought out and more as a practice that must be interrogated. This is because it is the practice of security, ostensibly that of the state, which is understood to be the source insecurity. Notably however, this postmodern approach also tends to avoid the term “insecurity” since it is too often deployed in its modernist incarnations. In fact, the idea of “insecurity” cast in a postmodern light is equated with uncertainty and contingency rather than corporal danger; as such it can be seen as part and parcel of the human condition, and is not necessarily something than can or should be avoided (Huysmans 1998). Instead, the focus in postmodern critical security is shifted towards the underlying structural violences and unequal power relations of modernity. This is a powerful contribution to security studies, as many other critical approaches are not equipped to engage with these questions on such a basic foundational level. Again, it is difficult to lump together so many complex ideas under one banner, but there *are* shared themes that emerge in a “postmodern” reading of critical security, many of which are laudable. Nevertheless, the postmodern approach I have outlined is not without its problems- **most notably surrounding the question of ontology- which has ethical and political implications.** In my introduction, I **evoked the straw-figure postmodern “who becomes an amoral nihilist trapped in discourse, unable to meaningfully engage with the status quo.” I pointed out that this straw-figure is often unfairly evoked by those that wish to disingenuously deny the contributions of poststructuralist deconstruction and postmodern critique**.13

Realism Inevitable

The realist balance of power is a concept created from diplomatic necessity – no alternative system can fill that same role.

Guzzini 98 (Stefano, Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies, *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy*, pp. 231)

Hedley Bull (1977) writes that although we do, of course, know that there is no such a thing as a balance of power, it is a concept we cannot do without. He is right in a double sense. First, the balance of power is a concept that diplomats use to make their trade. Second, for the first reason and only this, the observer cannot do without it. Power might not be fungible, but diplomats work on measures to give power a translatable meaning. Traditional compensation politics must rely on some measure across different power sectors. Before diplomats can count, they must decide what counts. Hence, the balance of power or any equilibrium idea of this kind is based upon a social construction, sometimes an agreemen,. of the diplomatic community. They share a common measure of power although they would be hard-pressed to define it exactly. Hence, as with the security discourse, measurement of power is a political act. The diplomats who represent states endowed with one particular power resource will do their best to enhance the Uitler's value. The Soviet government's stress on military, and not economic, factors was a case in point. The rush for mass-destructive weapons is as much a concern of security as a question of power in the sense of acquiring a resource which is commonly considered to be at the top rank. The prestige, in turn, is traded for particular compensations or attentions. Sometimes, such agreements on measures and treatments, if generally shared, might diplomatically recreate something similar to the supposedly mechanical balance of power (Kivi 1996). On the second level of observation, the existence of balance of power as a social construct means that we cannot simply forget about it because we found out that no mechanical balance exists. The concept does not refer to anything in the objective structures of the international system. It is a fallacy to think that since it is reproduced in the diplomatic culture, it must correspond to an objectified reality, a fallacy which has daunted much realist writings, both scientific and classical. But it is a device used by diplomats, and as such it exists, and is consequential for international politics. In his inaugural lecture in Zurich, the Swiss scholar Daniel Frei (1969) urged his fellow political scientists to help practical policy with a neutral and measurable concept of power. He was perfectly aware both of the practical needs of such a concept and of its difficult scientific underpinning. This lucid text shows the political value of concepts which travel between the academic and the political community. Power is a device used by academics and as such has effects on the production of knowledge and the reproduction of the traditional diplomatic culture.

**Realism Inevitable**

**The power politics of realism enter into any possible system – even a critical approach leads back into realism.**

Murray 97 (Alastair J.H., Prof. of Poli. Theory at Univ. of Edinburgh, *Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics*, pp. 130)

The other members of the group varied in their emphases, but there are clear parallels to this formulation in their conceptions which suggest its employment as a framework to assist understanding. The extent to which power infuses all social relations, the extent to which all social structures are marred by relations of domination and subordination, forms a pervasive theme throughout their work. It was this awareness of the intrusion of power into all social relations that generated their emphasis on 'the inevitable imperfections of any organization that is entangled with the world. l 1 " As Morgenthau once put it, the ideal 'can never be fully translated into political reality but only at best approximated ... there shall always be an element of political domination preventing the full realization of equality and freedom'. "9 The principal focus of this critique of the corrupting influence of power was, of course, international relations. Here, economic and legal mechanisms of domination are ultimately reduced to overt violence as the principal mechanism of determining political outcomes. The diffusion of power between states effectively transforms any such centrally organized mechanisms into simply another forum for the power politics of the very parties that it is supposed to restrain. As Kennan put it: ‘The realities of power will soon seep into anv legalistic structures which we erect to govern international life. They will permeate it. They will become the content of it; and the structure will replace the form.' 1:1 The repression of such power realities is, however, impossible; the political actor must simply 'seek their point of maximum equilibrium'. This conception of the balance of ultimately aimed, in Morgenthau’s words, 'to maintain the stability of the system without destroying the multiplicity of the elements composing it'. First, it was designed to prevent universal domination, to act as a deterrent to the ambitions of any dominant great power and as a safeguard against any attempt to establish **its** sway over the rest of the system.]-'4 Second, it was designed to preserve the independence and freedom of the states of the system, particularly the small states. **1"** I Only through the operation of the balance of power between great powers can small powers gain any genuine independence and any influence in the international system.1-" However, as Morgenthau pointed out, whilst, in domestic society, the balance of power operates in a context characterized by the existence of a degree of consensus and by the presence of a controlling central power, these factors are lacking in international relations and, thus, the balance is both much more important and yet much more flawed, the maintenance of equilibrium being achieved at the price of large-scale warfare and periodic eliminations of smaller states.] 7

Realism Inevitable

States inherently compete with each other through any means necessary – realism is the only possible system.

Mearsheimer 1 (John, Prof. of Poli Sci at the Univ. of Chicago, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*,  
pp. 35)

All states are influenced by this logic, which means that not only do they look for opportunities to take advantage of one another, they also work to ensure that other states do not take advantage of them. After all, rival states are driven by the same logic, and most states are likely to recognize their own motives at play in the actions of other states. In short, states ultimately pay attention to defense as well as offense. They think about conquest themselves, and they work to check aggressor states from gaining power at their expense. This inexorably leads to a world of constant security competition, where states are willing to lie, cheat, and use brute force if it helps them gain advantage over their rivals. Peace, if one defines that concept as a state of tranquility or mutual concord, is not likely to break out in this world.

States naturally act based upon external influences of competition – this forces realism to be the only viable system of international relations.

Mearsheimer 1 (John, Prof. of Poli Sci at the Univ. of Chicago, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*,  
pp. 17)

This gloomy view of international relations is based on three core beliefs. First, realists, like liberals, treat states as the principal actors in world politics. Realists focus mainly on great powers, however, because these **states dominate and shape international politics and they also cause the deadliest wars.** Second, realists believe that **the behavior of great powers is influenced mainly by their external environment, not by their internal characteristics**. The structure of the international system, which all slates must deal with, largely shapes their foreign policies. Realists tend mint to draw sharp distinctions between “good” and “bad” states, because **all great powers act according to the same logic regardless of their culture, political system, or who runs the government**.27 It is therefore difficult to discriminate among states, save for differences in relative power. In essence, great powers are like billiard balls that vary only in size.28 Third, realists hold that **calculations about power dominate states’ thinking, and** that **states compete for power among themselves. That competition sometimes necessitates going to war,** which is considered an acceptable instrument of statecraft. To quote Carl von Clausewitz, the nineteenth-century military strategist, **war is a continuation of politics by other means**.29 Finally, a zero-sum quality characterizes that competition, sometimes making it intense and unforgiving. **States may cooperate with each other on occasion, but at root they have conflicting interests.**