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## 1NC

### Thesis – security is not a goal, but a *set of typical actions and justifications offered for those actions*. By describing the world as full of threats and by justifying the plan in terms of security, the affirmative paves the way for spirals of violence. Extending securitization into space must be rejected – instead, conflicts should be settles through ordinary political means.

Øyvind Jæger, @ Norweigian Institute of International Affairs and the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 2k [*Peace and Conflict Studies* 7.2, “Securitizing Russia: Discoursive Practice of the Baltic States,” http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.pdf#page=32]

Security is a field of practice into which subject matters can be inserted as well as exempted. Security is a code for going about a particular business in very particular ways**. By labelling an issue a security issue, that is, a threat to security, one legitimises the employment of extraordinary measures to counter the threat, because it threatens security**. In other words, security is a self-referential practice that carries its own legitimisation and justification. Security issues are allotted priority above everything else because everything else is irrelevant if sovereignty is lost, the state loses independence and ceases to exist. This makes for the point that **it is not security as an objective or a state of affairs that is the crux of understanding security, but rather the typical operations and modalities by which security comes into play**, Wæver (1995) notes.15 The typical operations are speech-acts and the modality threat defence sequences. That is, perceiving and conveying threats and calling upon defence hold back the alleged threat. This is also a self-referential practice with the dynamic of a security dilemma: Defensive measures taken with reference to a perceived threat cause increased sense of insecurity and new calls for defence, and so forth. Wæver’s argument is that this logic is at work also in other fields than those busying themselves with military defence of sovereignty. Moreover, viewing security as a speech act not only makes it possible to include different sectors in a study of security, and thus open up the concept. It also clears the way for resolving security concerns by desecuritising issues which through securitisation have raised the concern in the first place. Knowing the logic of securitisation and pinning it down when it is at work carries the possibility of reversing the process by advocating other modalities for dealing with a given issue unluckily cast as a matter of security. **What is perceived as a threat and therefore invoking defence, triggering the spiral, might be perceived of otherwise, namely as a matter of political discord to be resolved by means of ordinary political conduct,** (i.e. not by rallying in defence of sovereignty). A call for more security will not eliminate threats and dangers. It is a call for more insecurity as it will reproduce threats and perpetuate a security problem. As Wæver (1994: 8)16 puts it: "Transcending a security problem, politicizing a problem can therefore not happen through thematization in terms of security, only away from it." That is what de-securitisation is about.

### <INSERT AFF SPECIFIC LINK>>

### THE INABILITY TO ACCEPT THE INHERENT DISORDER OF EXISTENCE AND THE ARENA OF INTERNATIONAL" RELATIONS IN PARTICULAR RESULTS IN A VIOLENT STRUGGLE TO OVERCOME UNCERTAINTY IN THE NAME OF AN UNATTAINABLE SECURITY-THIS FUTILE QUEST HAS BROUGHT INTO EXISTENCE THE TECHNOLOGY TO ERADICATE LIFE ON EARTH AND THE POLITICAL CONTEXT THAT MAKES SUCH AN APOCALYPSE BOTH POSSIBLE AND NECESSARY.

David Campbell and Michael Dillon ‘93, professor of international politics at the University of Newcastle and professor of politics at Lancaster University, 1993 The Political Subject of Violence, p. 163-165

This interpretation of violence as constitutive of identity might, paradoxically, offer the only hope of some amelioration of the worst excesses of violence exhibited by the formation of (political) identity. The orthodox rendering of such violence as pre-modern abdicates its responsibility to a predetermined historical fatalism. For if these ethnic and nationalist conflicts are understood as no more than settled history rearing its ugly head, then there is nothing that can be done in the present to resolve the tension except to repress them again. In this view, the historical drama has to be enacted according to its script, with human agency in suspension while nature violently plays itself out. The only alternative is for nature to be overcome as the result of an idealistic transformation at the hands of reason. Either way, this fatalistic interpretation of the relationship between violence and the political is rooted in a hypostatised conception of man/nature as determinative of the social/political: the latter is made possible only once the former runs its course, or if it is overturned. It might have once been the case that the prospect of a transformation of nature by reason seemed both likely and hopeful—indeed, many of the most venerable of the debates in the political theory of international relations revolved around this very point. But, having reached what Foucault has called society’s ‘threshold of modernity’, ‘we’ now face a prospect that radically re-figures the parameters of politics: the real prospect of extinction. As Foucault argues, we have reached this threshold because the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies. For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity of a political existence: modern man is an animal whose politics place his existence as a living being in question. How the prospect of extinction might materialise itself is an open question. That increasingly it can be materialised, militarily, ecologically and politically, is not.

The double bind of this prospect is that modernity’s alternative of transformation through reason is not only untenable, it is deeply complicit in the form of (inter)national life that has been responsible for bringing about the real prospect of extinction in the first place. The capacity of violence to eradicate being was engendered by reason’s success; not merely, or perhaps even most importantly, by furnishing the technological means, but more insidiously in setting the parameters of the political (Ia politique, to use the useful terms of debate in which Simon Critchley engages) while fuelling the violent practices of politics (la politique). The reliance on reason as that which could contain violence and reduce the real prospect of extinction may prove nothing less than a fatal misapprehension. In support of this proposition, consider the interpretive bases of the Holocaust.

For all that politics in the last fifty years has sought to exceptionalise the Nazis’ genocide as an aberrant moment induced by evil personalities, there is no escaping the recognition that modern political life lies heavily implicated in the instigation and conduct of this horror. In so far as modernity can be characterised as the promotion of rationality and efficiency to the exclusion of alternative criteria for action, the Holocaust is one outcome of the ‘civilising process’. With its plan rationally to order Europe through the elimination of an internal other, its bureaucratised administration of death, and its employment of the technology of a modern state, the Holocaust ‘was not an irrational outflow of the not-yet-fully-eradicated residence of pre-modern barbarity. It was a legitimate resident in the house of modernity; indeed, one who would not be at home in any other house’.’°

The paradoxical nature of modernity is suggested by the emergence of a Holocaust from within its bosom. And there can be no better indication in contradistinction to those ‘modernists’ who would like to brand so-called ‘postmodernists’ with the responsibility for all and future Holocausts — that a reliance on established traditions of reason for ethical succour and the progressive amelioration of the global human condition may be seriously misplaced. The comfort we have derived from the etiological myth of modern politics has occluded the way in which the ‘civilising process’ of which that myth speaks has disengaged ethics from politics. As Bauman concludes: We need to take stock of the evidence that the civilizing process is, among other things, a process of divesting the use and deployment of violence from moral calculus, and of emancipating the desiderata of rationality from interference of ethical norms and moral inhibitions.”

### Alternative – undertake a critical geography of space.

### Such a project exposes the affirmative’s attempt to extend the logical of geopolitics into space – to turn space into a thoroughly militarized zone, suffused with the logic of power.

Fraser **MacDonald ‘7** School of Anthropology, Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia Progress in Human Geography 31(5) (2007) pp. 592–615

Stephen Graham, following Eyal Weizmann, has argued that geopolitics is a flat discourse (Weizmann, 2002; Graham, 2004: 12). It attends to the cartographic horizontality of terrain rather than a verticality that cuts through the urban landscape from the ad- vantage of orbital supremacy. Just as, for Graham, a critical geopolitics must urgently consider this new axis in order to challenge the practices and assumptions of urbicide, so too – I would argue – it must lift its gaze to the politics of the overhead. Our interest in the vertical plane must extend beyond terrestrial perspectives; we must come to terms with the everyday realities of space exploration and domination as urgent sub- jects of critical geographical inquiry. A pre- requisite for this agenda is to overcome our sense of the absurdity and oddity of space, an ambivalence that has not served human geography well. The most obvious entry point is to think systematically about some of the more concrete expressions of outer space in the making of Earthly geographies. For instance, many of the high-profile crit- ical commentaries on the recent war in Iraq, even those written from geographical per- spectives, have been slow to address the orbital aspects of military supremacy (see, for instance, Harvey, 2003; Gregory, 2004; Retort, 2005). Suffice to say that, in war as in peace, space matters on the ground, if indeed the terrestrial and the celestial can be sensibly individuated in this way.

There is also, I think, scope for a wider agenda on the translation of particular Earthly historical geographies into space, just as there was a translation of early occidental geographies onto imperial spaces. When Donald Rumsfeld talks of a ‘Space Pearl Harbor’, there is plainly a particular set of historicogeographical imaginaries at work that give precedence, in this case, to American experience. Rumsfeld has not been slow to invoke Pearl Harbor, most famously in the aftermath of 11 September 2001; notably, in all these examples – Hawaii in 1941; New York in 2001; and the contemporary space race – there lurks the suggestion of a threat from the East.9 **All of this is a reminder that the colonization of space, rather than being a decisive and transcendent break from the past, is merely an extension of long-standing regimes of power**. As Peter Redfield suc- cinctly observed, to move into space is ‘a form of return’: it represents ‘a passage forward through the very pasts we might think we are leaving behind’ (Redfield, 2002: 814). This line of argument supports the idea that space is part and parcel of the Earth’s geography (Cosgrove, 2004: 222). We can conceive of the human geography of space as being, in the words of Doreen Massey, ‘the sum of relations, connections, embodiments and practices’ (Massey, 2005: 8). She goes on to say that ‘these things are utterly everyday and grounded, at the same time as they may, when linked together, go around the world’. To this we might add that they go around and beyond the world. The ‘space’ of space is both terrestrial and extraterrestrial: it is the relation of the Earth to its firmament. Lisa Parks and Ursula Biemann have de- scribed our relationship with orbits as being ‘about uplinking and downlinking, [the] translation [of] signals, making exchanges with others and positioning the self’ (Parks and Biemann, 2003). It is precisely this rela- tional conception of space that might help- fully animate a revised geographical under- standing of the Outer Earth. As has already been made clear, this sort of project is by no means new. Just as astro- politics situates itself within a Mackinderian geographical tradition, so a critical geography of outer space can draw on geography’s early- modern cosmographical origins, as well as on more recent emancipatory perspectives that might interrogate the workings of race, class, gender and imperialism. Space is already being produced in and through Earthly regimes of power in ways that undoubtedly threaten social justice and democracy. A critical geo- graphy of space, then, is not some far-fetched or indulgent distraction from the ‘real world’; rather, as critical geographers we need to think about the contest for outer space as being constitutive of numerous familiar oper- ations, not only in respect of international relations and the conduct of war, but also to the basic infrastructural maintenance of the state and to the lives of its citizenry.

## Hegemony Link

### Hegemony elevates security to a transcendental ideal—it creates a moral framework for violence that requires the elimination of all that is different or unpredictable.

**Der Derian 2003** [James Der Derian, Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Massachusetts Amherst, “Decoding The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, *boundary*, 2 30.3, 19-27]

From President Bush's opening lines of The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (*NSS*), the gap between rhetoric and reality takes on Browningesque proportions: "‘Our Nation's cause has always been larger than our Nation's defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent'" (1). Regardless of authorial (or good) intentions, the *NSS* reads more like late—very late—nineteenth-century poetry than a strategic doctrine for the twenty-first century. The rhetoric of the White House favors and clearly intends to **mobilize** the moral clarity, nostalgic sentimentality, and uncontested dominance reminiscent of the last great empires against the ambiguities, complexities, and messiness of the current world disorder. However, the gulf between the nation's stated cause ("to help make the world not just safer but better" [1]) and defensive needs (to fight "a war against terrorists of global reach" [5]) is so vast that one detects what Nietzsche referred to as the "breath of empty space," that void between the world as it is and as we would wish it to be, which produces all kinds of metaphysical concoctions. In short shrift (thirty pages), the White House articulation of U.S. global objectives to the Congress elevates strategic discourse from a traditional, temporal calculation of means and ends, to the theological realm of monotheistic faith and monolithic truth. Relying more on aspiration than analysis, revelation than reason, the *NSS* is not grand but grandiose strategy. In pursuit of an impossible state of national security against terrorist evil, soldiers will need to be sacrificed, civil liberties curtailed, civilians collaterally damaged, regimes destroyed. But a nation's imperial overreach should exceed its fiduciary grasp: what's a full-spectrum dominance of the battle space for? Were this not an official White House doctrine, the contradictions of the NSS could be interpreted only as poetic irony. How else to comprehend the opening paragraph, which begins with "The United States possesses unprecedented—and unequaled—strength and influence in the world" and ends with "The great strength of this nation must be used to promote a balance of power that favors freedom" (1)? Perhaps the cabalistic Straussians that make up the defense intellectual brain trust of the Bush administration (among them, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and William Kristol) have come up with a nuanced, indeed, *anti*-Machiavellian reading of Machiavelli that escapes the uninitiated. But so fixed is the NSS on the creation of a world in America's image that concepts such as balance of power and imminent threat, once rooted in historical, juridical, as well as reciprocal traditions, become free-floating signifiers. Few Europeans, "old" or "new," would recognize the balance of power principle deployed by the *NSS* to justify preemptive, unilateral, military action against not actual but "emerging" imminent threats (15). Defined by the eighteenth-century jurist Emerich de Vattel as a state of affairs in which no one preponderant power can lay down the law to others, the classical sense of balance of power is effectively inverted in principle by the NSS document and in practice by the go-it-alone statecraft of the United States. Balance of power is global suzerainty, and war is peace.

## Space Exploration Link

### **Expansion into space is a means to further securitize the US.**

IFPA, 2009 [Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) is an independent, nonpartisan research organization specializing in national security, foreign policy, and defense planning issues. They help senior government policy makers, industry leaders, and officials in the public policy community make informed decisions in a dynamic and unpredictable global security environment] <http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf>. Missile Defense,the Space Relationship,& the Twenty-First Century

“Space capabilities are inextricably woven into the fabric of American security, scientific and economic activity,” then-Lt. General Robert Kehler, deputy commander of U.S. Strategic Command, told a congressional subcommittee in 2006.1 In particular, the U.S. military has very effectively fused its ter­restrial warfighting capabilities with space-based communi­cations, navigation, and reconnaissance capabilities. Space systems support significant missions in (1) environmental monitoring; (2) communications; (3) position, navigation, and timing; (4) integrated tactical warning and attack as­sessment; and (5) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais­sance for the U.S. military. The successful integration of these missions into real-time use by American military forces has fundamentally changed the ways they train and fight

### Due to the dual use of space technology, any space exploration would have military implications to help securitize the US.

IFPA, 2009 [Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) is an independent, nonpartisan research organization specializing in national security, foreign policy, and defense planning issues. They help senior government policy makers, industry leaders, and officials in the public policy community make informed decisions in a dynamic and unpredictable global security environment] <http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf>. Missile Defense,the Space Relationship,& the Twenty-First Century

The United States is the leading space power, and as such it depends more on space than does any other nation, a situation that leads inevitably to both vulnerabilities and opportunities. The U.S. position in space has grown out of numerous strengths developed over more than five decades. These strengths fall into two broad, overlapping categories: (1) military force enhancement; and (2) commercial utiliza­tion of space. Because of the dual-use nature of these tech­nologies, it is not easy to separate their military applications from their commercial ones. Therefore, the failure of the United States to remain in the forefront of space technolo­gies would have both military and commercial implications. Advances in the military or civilian sectors will overlap, in­tersect, and reinforce each other. Consequently, the devel­opment in the United States of a dynamic and innovative private-sector space industry will be indispensable to fu­ture U.S. space leadership. Nevertheless, the ability of the U.S. military to contribute to, and benefit from, such a space technology base will depend on its focus and priorities. The availability of technologies does not lead inevitably to their exploitation. America may fail to move forward to exploit technological opportunities and breakthroughs. Such choic­es may be based on political or other considerations, whether well founded or the product of mistaken assumptions about what competitors or adversaries will or will not do.

## Mapping Links

### Mapping space allows it to be conquered, dominated, and controlled. But warfare in space is uniquely dangerous – the distance established between warriors and the victims makes space violence especially awful

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The historic relationship between know- ing a space and exerting political and stra- tegic dominion over it is entirely familiar to geographers. Just as the geographical knowledge of Empire enabled its military subjugation, colonization, and ultimately its ecological despoliation, this same pattern is being repeated in the twenty-first-century ‘frontier’.4 It is also worth remembering that the geographies of imperialism are made not given. In what follows, I want to examine how the geographies of outer space are being produced in and through contemporary social life on Earth. Such an account inevitably throws up some concerns about the politics and socialities of the new space age. Against this background, I set my argument on a trajectory which is intermittently guided by two key writers on technology with very different sensibilities. It is my intention to hold a line between the dark anticipations of Paul Virilio and the resplendent optimism of Nigel Thrift. This discursive flight may well veer off course; such are the contingencies of navigating space. The most striking aspect of the sociality of outer space is the extent to which it is, and always has been, thoroughly militarized. The 1967 UN Outer Space Treaty banned nuclear weapons in space, on the moon or on other celestial bodies, and contained a directive to use outer space ‘for peaceful purposes’. But its attempt to prohibit the ‘weaponizing’ of space was always interpreted in the loosest possible manner. The signatories to the OST in Washington, London and Moscow were in no doubt that space exploration was primarily about military strategy; that the ability to send a rocket into space was conspicuous evidence of the ability to dispatch a nuclear device to the other side of the world. This association remains strong, as the concern over Iran’s space programme (with its Shahab family of medium range missiles and satellite launch vehicles) makes clear. Several commentators in strategic affairs have noted the expanding geography of war from the two dimensions of land and sea to the air warfare of the twen- tieth century and more recently to the new strategic challenges of outer space and cyber- space (see, for instance, Gray, 2005: 154). These latter dimensions are not separate from the battle-‘field’ but rather they fully support the traditional military objectives of killing people and destroying infrastructure. **Space itself may hold few human targets but the capture or disruption of satellites could have far-reaching consequences for life on the ground**. Strictly speaking, we have not yet seen warfare in space, or even from space, but the advent of such a conflict does appear closer. In post-Cold-War unipolar times the stra- tegic rationale for the United States to main- tain the prohibition against weaponizing space is diminishing (Lambakis, 2003), even if the rest of the world wishes it otherwise. In 2000, a UN General Assembly resolution on the ‘Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space’ was adopted by a majority of 163–0 with 3 abstentions: the United States, Israel and the Federated States of Micronesia (United Nations, 2000). Less than two months later, a US Government committee chaired by Donald Rumsfeld5 issued a report warning that the ‘relative dependence of the US on space makes its space systems potentially attractive targets’; the United States thus faced the danger, it argued, of a ‘Space Pearl Harbor’ (Rumsfeld, 2001: viii). As space warfare was, according to the report, a ‘virtual certainty’, the United States must ‘ensure con- tinuing superiority’ (Rumsfeld, 2001: viii). This argument was qualified by obligatory gestures towards ‘the peaceful use of outer space’ but the report left little doubt about the direction of American space policy. Any difficult ques- tions about the further militarization (and even weaponization) of space could be easily avoided under the guise of developing ‘dual-use’ (military/civilian) technology and emphasizing the role of military applications in ‘peacekeeping’ operations. Through such rhetoric, NATO’s satellite-guided bombing of a Serbian TV station on 23 April 1999 could have been readily accommodated under the OST injunction to use outer space for ‘peaceful purposes’ (Cervino et al., 2003). Since that time new theatres of operation have been opened up in Afghanistan and Iraq, for further trials of space-enabled war- fare that aimed to provide aerial omniscience for the precision delivery of ‘shock and awe’. What Benjamin Lambeth has called the ‘accomplishment’ of air and space power has since been called into question by the all too apparent limitations of satellite intelligence in the tasks of identifying Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction or in stemming the growing number of Allied dead and wounded from modestly armed urban insurgents (Lambeth, 1999; Graham, 2004; Gregory, 2004: 205). For all its limitations, even this imagery has been shielded from independent scrutiny by the military monopolization of commercial satellite outputs (Livingstone and Robinson, 2003). Yet, far from undermining Allied con- fidence in satellite imagery or in a ‘cosmic’ view of war (Kaplan, 2006), it is precisely these abstract photocartographies of violence – detached from their visceral and bloodied ‘accomplishments’ – that have licensed, say, the destruction of Fallujah (Gregory, 2004: 162; Graham, 2005b). There remains, of course, a great deal more that can be said about the politics of these aerial perspectives than can be discussed here (see, for instance, Gregory, 2004; Kaplan, 2006).

### The growth of satellites for mapping and tracking in space creates a society of surveillance – the government can track anyone. The result is the militarization of everyday life.

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In this way, the gadgetry of space-enabled espionage is being woven into interpersonal as well as interstate and citizen–state relations. If the movements of a car can be tracked by a jealous boyfriend, they can also be tracked by the state for the purposes of taxation: this is surely the future of road tolls in the UK. A British insurance company is already using satellite technology to cut the premiums for young drivers if they stay off the roads between 11pm and 6am, when most accidents occur. Information about the time, duration and route of every single journey made by the driver is recorded and sent back to the company (Bachelor, 2006). The success of geotechnologies will lie in these ordinary re- configurations of life such as tracking parcels, locating stolen cars, transport guidance or

assisting the navigation of the visually im- paired. Some might argue, however, that their impact will be more subtle still. For instance, Nigel Thrift locates the power of new forms of positioning in precognitive sociality and ‘prereflexive practice’, that is to say in ‘various kinds of culturally inculcated corporeal automatisms’ (Thrift, 2004b: 175). In other words, these sociotechnical changes may become so incorporated into our uncon- scious that we simply cease to think about our position. Getting lost may become difficult (Thrift, 2004b: 188). Perhaps we are not at that stage yet. But one can easily envisage GPS technologies enhancing existing in- equalities in the very near future, such as the device that will warn the cautious urban walker that they are entering a ‘bad neigh- bourhood’. In keeping with the logic of the panopticon, this is less ‘Big Brother’ than an army of little brothers: the social life of the new space age is already beginning to look quite different. And it is to this incipient **militariza- tion of everyday life** that the emerging litera- ture on ‘military geographies’ (Woodward, 2004; 2005) must surely turn its attention.

## State Link

### Using the plan though the state will inevitably tie the plan to security

Øyvind Jæger, @ Norweigian Institute of International Affairs and the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 2k [*Peace and Conflict Studies* 7.2, “Securitizing Russia: Discoursive Practice of the Baltic States,” http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.pdf#page=20]

David Campbell (1992) has taken the discursive approach to security one step further. He demonstrates that security is pretty much the business of (state) identity. His argument is developed from the claim that foreign policy is a discourse of danger that came to replace Christianity’s evangelism of fear in the wake of the Westphalian peace. But the effects of a "evangelism of fear" and a discourse of danger are similar – namely to produce a certitude of identity by depicting difference as otherness. As the Peace of Westphalia signified the replacement of church by state, faith by reason, religion by science, intuition by experience and tradition by modernity, the religious identity of salvation by othering evil ("think continually about death in order to avoid sin, because sin plus death will land you in hell"17 – so better beware of Jews, heretics, witches and temptations of the flesh) was replaced by a hidden ambiguity of the state. Since modernity’s privileging of reason erased the possibility of grounding social organisation in faith, it had to be propped up by reason and the sovereign state as a anthropomorphic representation of sovereign Man was offered as a resolution. But 15 Page reference to the Working Paper version. 16 Page reference to the in the Working Paper version. 17 Campbell (1992) refers to Delumeau (1990) on this point. Øyvind Jæger 23 state identity cannot easily be produced by reason alone. The problem was, however, that once the "death of God" had been proclaimed, the link between the world, "man" and certitude had been broken (Campbell 1992: 53). Thus ambiguity prevailed in the modernist imperative that every presumption grounded in faith be revealed by reason, and on the other hand, that the privileging of modernity, the state, and reason itself is not possible without an element of faith. In Campbell’s (1992: 54) words: In this context of incipient ambiguity brought upon by an insistence that can no longer be grounded, securing identity in the form of the state requires an emphasis on the unfinished and endangered nature of the world. In other words, discourses of "danger" are central to the discourses of the "state" and the discourses of "man". In place of the spiritual certitude that provided the vertical intensity to support the horizontal extenciveness of Christendom, the state requires discourses of "danger" to provide a new theology of truth about who and what "we" are by highlighting who and what "we" are not, and what "we" have to fear. The mode through which the Campbellian discourse of danger is employed in foreign (and security) policy, can then be seen as practices of Wæverian securitisation. Securitisation is the mode of discourse and the discourse is a "discourse of danger" identifying and naming threats, thereby delineating Self from Other and thus making it clear what it is "we" are protecting, (i.e. what is "us", what is our identity and therefore – as representation – what is state identity). This is done by pointing out danger, threats and enemies, internal and external alike, and – by linking the two (Campbell 1992: 239):

## China Link

### The affirmative understanding of China as a threat relies upon false neorealist assumptions – it is part of the aff’s larger project of security

Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University, ‘4 [*Alternatives* 29, “The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,” p. ebsco]

Having examined how the "China threat" literature is enabled by and serves the purpose of a particular U.S. self-construction, I want to turn now to the issue of how this literature represents a discursive construction of other, instead of an "objective" account of Chinese reality. This, I argue, has less to do with its portrayal of China as a threat per se than with its essentialization and totalization of China as an **externally knowable** object, independent of historically contingent contexts or dynamic international interactions. In this sense, the discursive construction of China as a threatening other cannot be detached from (neo)realism, a positivist ahistorical framework of analysis within which global life is reduced to endless interstate rivalry for power and survival. As many critical IR scholars have noted, (neo) realism is not a transcendent description of global reality but is predicated on the modernist Western identity, which, in the quest for scientific certainty, has come to define itself essentially as the sovereign territorial nation-state. This realist self-identity of Western states leads to the constitution of anarchy as the sphere of insecurity, disorder, and war. In an anarchical system, as (neo) realists argue, "the gain of one side is often considered to be the loss of the other,"''5 and "All other states are potential threats."'•^ In order to survive in such a system, states inevitably pursue power or capability. In doing so, these realist claims represent what R. B. J. Walker calls "a specific historical articulation of relations of universality/particularity and self/Other."^^ The (neo) realist paradigm has dominated the U.S. IR discipline in general and the U.S. China studies field in particular. As Kurt Campbell notes, after the end of the Cold War, a whole new crop of China experts "are much more likely to have a background in strategic studies or international relations than China itself. ""^^ As a result, for those experts to know China is nothing more or less than to undertake a geopolitical analysis of it, often by asking only a few questions such as how China will "behave" in a strategic sense and how it may affect the regional or global balance of power, with a particular emphasis on China's military power or capabilities. As Thomas J. Christensen notes, "Although many have focused on intentions as well as capabilities, the most prevalent component of the [China threat] debate is the assessment of China's overall future military power compared with that of the United States and other East Asian regional powers."''^ Consequently, almost by default, China emerges as an absolute other and a threat thanks to this (neo) realist prism. The (neo) realist emphasis on survival and security in international relations dovetails perfectly with the U.S. self-imagination, because for the United States to define itself as the indispensable nation in a world of anarchy is often to demand absolute security. As James Chace and Caleb Carr note, "for over two centuries the aspiration toward an eventual condition of absolute security has been viewed as central to an effective American foreign policy."50 And this self-identification in turn leads to the definition of not only "tangible" foreign powers but global contingency and uncertainty per se as threats. For example, former U.S. President George H. W. Bush repeatedly said that "the enemy [of America] is unpredictability. The enemy is instability. "5' Similarly, arguing for the continuation of U.S. Cold War alliances, a high-ranking Pentagon official asked, "if we pull out, who knows what nervousness will result? "^2 Thus understood, by its very uncertain character, China would now **automatically constitute** a threat to the United States. For example, Bernstein and Munro believe that "China's political unpredictability, the always-present possibility that it will fall into a state of domestic disunion and factional fighting," constitutes a source of danger.s^ In like manner, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen write: If the PLA [People's Liberation Army] remains second-rate, should the world breathe a sigh of relief? Not entirely. . . . Drawing China into the web of global interdependence may do more to encourage peace than war, but it cannot guarantee that the pursuit of heartfelt political interests will be blocked by a fear of economic consequences. . . . U.S. efforts to create a stable balance across the Taiwan Strait might deter the use of force uner certain circumstances, but certainly not all.54

## Russia Link

### Descriptions of Russian Danger are Constructed and Reproduce a Self/Other Distinction - Their Dream of Total Security becomes total violence

Øyvind Jæger, @ Norweigian Institute of International Affairs and the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 2k [*Peace and Conflict Studies* 7.2, “Securitizing Russia: Discoursive Practice of the Baltic States,” http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.pdf#page=18]

The Russian war on Chechnya is one event that was widely interpreted in the Baltic as a ominous sign of what Russia has in store for the Baltic states (see Rebas 1996: 27; Nekrasas 1996: 58; Tarand 1996: 24; cf. Haab 1997). The constitutional ban in all three states on any kind of association with post-Soviet political structures is indicative of a threat perception that confuses Soviet and post- Soviet, conflating Russia with the USSR and casting everything Russian as a threat through what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) call a discursive "chain of equivalence". In this the value of one side in a binary opposition is reiterated in other denotations of the same binary opposition. Thus, the value "Russia" in a Russia/Europe-opposition is also denoted by "instability", "Asia", "invasion", "chaos", "incitement of ethnic minorities", "unpredictability", "imperialism", "slander campaign", "migration", and so forth. The opposite value of these markers ("stability", "Europe", "defence", "order", and so on) would then denote the Self and thus conjure up an identity. When identity is precarious, this discursive practice intensifies by shifting onto a security mode, treating the oppositions as if they were questions of political existence, sovereignty, and survival. Identity is (re)produced more effectively when the oppositions are employed in a discourse of in-security and danger, that is, made into questions of national security and thus securitised in the Wæverian sense. In the Baltic cases, especially the Lithuanian National Security Concept is knitting a chain of equivalence in a ferocious discourse of danger. Not only does it establish "[t]hat the defence of Lithuania is total and unconditional," and that "[s]hould there be no higher command, self-controlled combat actions of armed units and citizens shall be considered legal." (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 1, 2) It also posits that [t]he power of civic resistance is constituted of the Nation’s Will and self-determination to fight for own freedom, of everyone citizen’s resolution to resist to [an] assailant or invader by all possible ways, despite citizen’s age and [or] profession, of taking part in Lithuania’s defence (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 4). When this is added to the identifying of the objects of national security as "human and citizen rights, fundamental freedoms and personal security; state sovereignty; rights of the nation, prerequisites for a free development; the state independence; the constitutional order; state territory and its integrity, and; cultural heritage," and the subjects as "the state, the armed forces and other institutions thereof; the citizens and their associations, and; non governmental organisations,"(National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 2, Sc. 1, 2) one approaches a conception of security in which the distinction between state and nation has disappeared in all-encompassing securitisation. Everyone is expected to defend everything with **every possible means**. And when the list of identified threats to national security that follows range from "overt (military) aggression", via "personal insecurity", to "ignoring of national values,"(National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 10) the National Security Concept of Lithuania has become a totalising one taking everything to be a question of national security. The chain of equivalence is established when the very introduction of the National Security Concept is devoted to a denotation of Lithuania’s century-old sameness to "Europe" and resistance to "occupation and subjugation" (see quotation below), whereby Russia is depicted and installed as the first link in the discursive chain that follows. In much the same way the "enemy within" came about in Estonia and Latvia. As the independence-memory was ritualised and added to the sense of insecurity – already fed by confusion in state administration, legislation and government policy grappling not only with what to do but also how to do it given the inexperience of state institutions or their absence – unity behind the overarching objective of independence receded for partial politics and the construction of the enemy within. This is what David Campbell (1992) points out when he sees the practices of security as being about securing a precarious state identity. One way of going about it is to cast elements on the state inside resisting the privileged identity as the subversive errand boys of the prime external enemy.

## Asteroids Link

### The affirmative crafts space into a place of violence with asteroid discourse to justify securitization.

Felicity Mellor, 2007. [Dr. Felicity Mellor is a Lecturer in Science Communication at Imperial College London. Her research interests include the popularization of physics, the representation of science] Colliding Worlds : Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space. Social Studies of Science, August 2007; vol. 37, 4: pp. 499-531.

The construction of asteroids as the enemy was accompanied by a range of other militaristic metaphors. In the popular books, asteroids became ‘missiles’, ‘pieces of ordnance’ or ‘stealth weapons’ (Lewis, 1997: 37), which bombard the Earth with a ‘death-dealing fusillade’ (Clube & Napier, 1990: 7). In a technical paper, too, they were construed as ‘astral assailant[s]’ (Simonenko et al., 1994: 929). Where the military and the politicians talked of rogue states,27 the scientists talked of ‘rogue asteroids’ (Steel, 1995; Ailor, 2004: 3). This analogy was further reinforced by the construction of scenarios in which a small impact might be mistaken for the detonation of a nuclear warhead. One technical paper speculated on what would have happened during the first Gulf War if an atmospheric explosion that had been caused by a meteor burning up over the Pacific had actually occurred over Baghdad or Israel (Tagliaferri et al., 1994). The authors suggested that such an event would have been mistaken for a missile detonation by the opposing state. In such scenarios, the actions of interplanetary bodies were not just compared with those of rogue states but came to be identified with them. With the swarming asteroids filling space, space itself was also resignified. What had been an abstract mathematical space became a narrative place, the location where particular and contingent events occurred. Although the scientists continued to appeal to the predictability of celestial dynamics – it was this that would enable a survey of near-Earth objects to identify any that might pose a threat – they also noted that chaotic processes disturbed the orbits of comets and also, to a lesser degree, asteroids (for example, Yeomans & Chodas, 1994; Milani et al., 2000). The inherent unpredictability of the orbits was enhanced by the current state of scientific uncertainty. These chaotic and uncertain processes were projected onto space itself, construed as a place of random violence. In the popular books, the Solar System became a ‘dangerous cosmic neighbourhood’ (Sumners & Allen, 2000b: 3), ‘a capricious, violent place’ (Verschuur, 1996: 217), a place of ‘mindless violence’ (Verschuur, 1996: 18) and ‘wanton destruction’ (Levy, 1998: 13). Even in a peer-reviewed paper, Chapman (2004: 1) described space as a ‘cosmic shooting gallery’.

### Creation of asteroids threats becomes a tool to further other securitization measures.

Felicity Mellor, 2007. [Dr. Felicity Mellor is a Lecturer in Science Communication at Imperial College London. Her research interests include the popularization of physics, the representation of science] Colliding Worlds : Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space. Social Studies of Science, August 2007; vol. 37, 4: pp. 499-531.

Through such claims, the issue of planetary defence became a moral frame through which other threats of more human origin could also be addressed. Increased knowledge and surveillance of asteroids, the scientists insisted, would help stop mistakes by the military decision-makers by preventing the misidentification of asteroid airbursts as enemy nuclear warheads (Chapman & Morrison, 1994: 39). At the same time, destroying asteroids would provide us with a way of using up those unwanted bombs. As John Lewis (1997: 215) put it: ‘The net result of the asteroid deflection is really a twofold benefit to Earth: a devastating impact would be avoided and there would be one less nuclear warhead on Earth.’ Similarly, Duncan Steel saw the use of SDI technologies in asteroid missions such as Clementine II as ‘a prime example of beating swords into ploughshares’ (quoted in Matthews, 1997).

### The affirmative’s use of discourse furthers the misconception of asteroids as monsters that dates back to the late 1900s. The alternative is key to stop this misconception.

Felicity Mellor, 2007. [Dr. Felicity Mellor is a Lecturer in Science Communication at Imperial College London. Her research interests include the popularization of physics, the representation of science] Colliding Worlds : Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space. Social Studies of Science, August 2007; vol. 37, 4: pp. 499-531.

During the 1980s and 1990s, a small group of planetary scientists and astronomers set about actively promoting the asteroid impact threat. They drew on an expanded empirical base, but also on narratives of technological salvation. Despite their concerns that their warnings were greeted by a ‘giggle factor’ and that funding remained too low, they succeeded in capturing the attention of the media and of some policy-makers and in establishing the impact threat as a legitimate and serious topic for scientific study. By the eve of the new millennium, the meaning of asteroids had undergone a significant transformation. Asteroids had gone from being distant relics of Solar System history to being a hidden enemy that could strike at any time with catastrophic consequences. The reconceptualization of asteroids was accompanied by a reconceptualization of both space and astronomy. In Newtonianism, space had been conceived as an empty geometrical abstraction in which God’s handiwork was displayed to the knowing observer. Space was both predictable and distant. Now, with the promotion of the impact threat, space was configured as the source of an enemy against which we must defend ourselves. This threatening conception of space matched the conception of space as a theatre of war promoted by the supporters of SDI. Space had become a place, a technologized location for human action where wars could be fought and human salvation sought. Thus astronomy was also reconceptualized. Further developing the violent metaphors already appropriated by impact–extinction theory (Davis, 2001), astronomers recast their role as impassioned prophets of doom and saviours of mankind rather than as cold calculators of cosmic order. Traditionally, Solar System astronomy had dealt with the grand narratives of planetary history and the timeless certainties of celestial dynamics. The technologies of astronomy – telescopes and, later, space probes – were the tools through which new knowledge had been sought. They were not, on the whole, instruments of action. Now, however, astronomy was to be prophetic and interventionist. As comets had been in a far earlier period, both asteroids and comets were now treated as ‘monsters’ – portents of Earthly calamities. It was the purpose of planetary astronomy to watch for these portents. Equally, it was the duty of astronomers to warn the unsuspecting public and to intervene to save the world. Planetary astronomy was transformed from the passive observation of the heavens to the active surveillance of the heavens, and the instruments of astronomy were to be supplemented with the technologies of war.

### The aff uses the narrative of science fiction to create the image of an asteroid as a threat—they only use it as an excuse to further securitization.

Felicity Mellor, 2007. [Dr. Felicity Mellor is a Lecturer in Science Communication at Imperial College London. Her research interests include the popularization of physics, the representation of science] Colliding Worlds : Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space. Social Studies of Science, August 2007; vol. 37, 4: pp. 499-531.

By the 1980s and 1990s, asteroid science, defence science and science fiction all presented space as an arena for technological intervention where an invisible enemy would be defeated for the greater good of mankind. Science fiction provided a culturally available resource that could give concrete form to the ideas of both asteroid scientists and weapons designers. Through narrative, the timeless and universal speculations of science could be converted into a specific sequence of events. By drawing on narratives of technological salvation, asteroid scientists made their case more compelling, but they also became dependent on narrative scenarios shared by the defence scientists. Even as the scientists themselves attempted to pull back from concrete proposals for weapons systems, their own discourse irresistibly drew them towards the militaristic intervention demanded by the narrative imperative. The identification of asteroids as a threat required a military response. Astronomer Duncan Steel (2000b), writing about the impact threat in The Guardian newspaper, put it most clearly when he stated that ‘we too need to declare war on the heavens’. Just as the overlap between science and science fiction was mutually supportive, so the overlap between impact science and defence helped legitimize both. The civilian scientists could draw on a repertoire of metaphors and concepts already articulated by the defence scientists to help make the case for the threat from space. They would no longer be a marginalized and underfunded group of astronomers, but would take on the ultimate role of defending the world. Similarly, in the context of the impact threat, the defence scientists could further develop their weapons systems without being accused of threatening the delicate nuclear balance of mutually assured destruction or, in the period between the fall of the Soviet Union and the 9/11 attacks, of irresponsibly generating a climate of fear in the absence of an identifiable enemy.

## Colonization Link

### The need for colonization is based on the flawed metaphor of space exploration that is empirically linked to the need to securitize.

Linda Billings 06. [ Billings has more than 30 years of experience in the field of communication and 25 years of experience in aerospace. She also works as a researcher, journalist, freelance writer, communication specialist and consultant to the government. ]How shall we live in space? Culture, law and ethics in spacefaring society . [Space Policy](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/02659646) [Volume 22, Issue 4](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=PublicationURL&_tockey=%23TOC%235774%232006%23999779995%23637381%23FLA%23&_cdi=5774&_pubType=J&view=c&_auth=y&_acct=C000052790&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=1458830&md5=9ba79a4889ba35df74df2d53fc4bdb5d), November 2006, Pages 249-255. <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964606000749#secx4>

The metaphor of the frontier, with its associated images of pioneering, homesteading, claim-staking and taming, has been persistent in American history.[8](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964606000749" \l "fn8) In the rhetoric of space exploration, the idea of the frontier has been, and still is, a dominant metaphor. ‘Space frontier’ may mean different things to different people, however, and thinking about the range of meanings invoked by the metaphor may be useful in considering what values are, could be, or should be embodied in the human endeavor of space exploration; and what sort of society and culture humans could, or should, establish in space. Historian Frederick Jackson Turner's 100-year-old essay, ‘The significance of the frontier in American history’ [[21]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964606000749" \l "bib21), is perhaps the best-known articulation of the metaphor. Later historians of the American West have deemed the idea of the frontier a ‘myth’, embodying a world-view in which the USA is “a wide-open land of unlimited opportunity for the strong, ambitious self-reliant individual to thrust his way to the top” [[22]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964606000749" \l "bib22). Historian Patricia Nelson Limerick has observed that space advocates tend to cling to the frontier metaphor, conceiving “American history [as] a straight line, a vector of inevitability and manifest destiny linking the westward expansion of Anglo-Americans directly to the exploration and colonization of space.” Critiquing this frontier vision of a human future in space, Limerick has warned: “In using this analogy, space advocates have built their plans for the future on the foundation of a deeply flawed understanding of the past, [and] the blinders worn to screen the past have proven to be just as effective at distorting the view of the future” [[23]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964606000749" \l "bib23). Historian Stephen Pyne has examined space exploration as a “cultural invention” (p. 18) that “reinforces and reinterprets…myths, beliefs, and archetypes basic to its originating civilization” [[24]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964606000749" \l "bib24). Modern Western (European and American) exploration functioned as “a means of knowing, of creating commercial empires, of outmaneuvering political, economic, religious, and military competitors—it was war, diplomacy, proselytizing, scholarship, and trade by other means” [[25]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964606000749" \l "bib25). The postmodern exploration of space is different, Pyne argues. Rationales advanced for space settlement, he says, are ultimately “historical, culturally bound, and selectively anecdotal: that we need to pioneer to be what we are, that new colonies are a means of renewing civilization…with neither a rambunctious imperialism nor an eager Enlightenment”, he concludes, “the case for space colonization is not compelling” [[25]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964606000749" \l "bib25). 6. Exploration and the ethics of planetary protection History thus offers space advocates and policy makers useful insights into the functions and the dangers of frontier rhetoric. The drive to conquer and develop bumps up against the need to preserve and protect. One place in the area of space policy where legal and ethical considerations of preservation and protection intersect with the drive to explore—and where frontier rhetoric is notably absent—is in planetary protection policy. NASA and the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) of the International Council of Science have long-standing national and international planetary protection policies in place directing solar system exploration missions to take steps to prevent the transport of terrestrial biological contamination to extraterrestrial environments and the transport of possible extraterrestrial biological contamination to Earth through solar system sample returns [[26]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964606000749" \l "bib26).

### Colonization is merely a means of securitization from the threat of Earth’s destruction.

Lynda Williams, 2010 [Lynda Williams has a M.S. in Physics and is a physics faculty member at Santa Rose Junior College in Northern California. Lynda is also a science entertainer who is devoted to nuclear disarmament and the proliferation of peace on earth and in space.]Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 22:4–8. Irrational Dreams of Space Colonization

Since Sputnik was launched over fifty years ago and the first human walked on the moon twelve years later, we have associated the exploration and colonization of space, specifically the moon and Mars, as a necessary pursuit to guarantee our survival as a species, and to satisfy an evolutionary drive to explore and inhabit worlds beyond our own. Space enthusiasts claim that it is our manifest destiny, an expression of the human spirit, to explore and colonize the solar system. World-renowned scientists such as Stephen Hawking have made calls to colonize the moon and Mars, in order to preserve the species, in the face of Earth’s inevitable doom from either warfare, plague, or environmental destruction. Commercial space developers promise private trips to space and beyond, infusing dreams of space wanderlust and enthusiasm for space travel in citizens who could never even afford such expensive and lofty excursions. Corporate space interests promise the certainty of achieving these goals, along with new technological advances and resource riches from space exploration that will rival those gained from the Apollo moon missions. This essay will examine the validity of these threats and promises, as well as their environmental and ethical consequences to life on Earth.

## SPS Link

**SBSPs are used to securitize the US from conflict**

NSSO , 2007 [ This report was done as an Interim Assesment for the National Security Space Office—and executive agent for Space in the DoD.] <http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/final-sbsp-interim-assessment-release-01.pdf>. Space‐Based Solar Power As an Opportunity for Strategic Security

Consistent with the US National Security Strategy, energy and environmental security are not just problems for America, they are critical challenges for the entire world. Expanding human populations and declining natural resources are potential sources of local and strategic conflict in the 21st Century, and many see energy scarcity as the foremost threat to national security. Conflict prevention is of particular interest to security‐providing institutions such as the U.S. Department of Defense which has elevated energy and environmental security as priority issues with a mandate to proactively find and create solutions that ensure U.S. and partner strategic security is preserved. The magnitude of the looming energy and environmental problems is significant enough to warrant consideration of all options, to include revisiting a concept called Space Based Solar Power (SBSP) first invented in the United States almost 40 years ago. The basic idea is very straightforward: place very large solar arrays into continuously and intensely sunlit Earth orbit (1,366 watts/m2) , collect gigawatts of electrical energy, electromagnetically beam it to Earth, and receive it on the surface for use either as baseload power via direct connection to the existing electrical grid, conversion into manufactured synthetic hydrocarbon fuels, or as low‐intensity broadcast power beamed directly to consumers. A single kilometer‐wide band of geosynchronous earth orbit experiences enough solar flux in one year to nearly equal the amount of energy contained within all known recoverable conventional oil reserves on Earth today. This amount of energy indicates that there is enormous potential for energy security, economic development, improved environmental stewardship, advancement of general space faring, and overall national security for those nations who construct and possess a SBSP capability.

**Creation of SPS will be used to solve for US Securitization**

NSSO , 2007 [ This report was done as an Interim Assesment for the National Security Space Office—and executive agent for Space in the DoD.] <http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/final-sbsp-interim-assessment-release-01.pdf>. Space‐Based Solar Power As an Opportunity for Strategic Security

It has been nearly a decade since a US Government agency last officially examined the feasibility of SBSP as a strategic source of clean, renewable energy (NASA’s 1995‐1997 “Fresh Look” Study). A significantly changing global energy and environmental security situation, combined with an exponentially accelerating pace of technological change, merit a revisit of this concept by the nation’s primary security institution, the Office of the Secretary of Defense. While OSD currently has no official position on SBSP, OSD does acknowledge the need to proactively find and create solutions that ensure the United States’ strategic energy, economic, space, environmental and national security are preserved. Utilizing an innovative, web‐based collaborative format that invited the voluntary contributions of over 170 international SBSP experts over a 5‐month period, the National Security Space Office initiated a no‐cost phase‐0 architecture feasibility review to determine if the United States and partners could retire all of the technical, legal, policy, and logistical challenges over the next several decades such that a credible business case could be made to proceed with full‐scale commercial development of this energy source as a national or international project. This interim report is being published to reveal findings to date and recommend whether additional, more detailed US Government study and action relative to SBSP is warranted.

**Desire for SPS is advocated for use by the military to further securitize the US against threats.**

NSSO , 2007 [ This report was done as an Interim Assesment for the National Security Space Office—and executive agent for Space in the DoD.] <http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/final-sbsp-interim-assessment-release-01.pdf>. Space‐Based Solar Power As an Opportunity for Strategic Security

For the DoD specifically, beamed energy from space in quantities greater than 5 MWe has the potential to be a disruptive game changer on the battlefield. SBSP and its enabling wireless power transmission technology could facilitate extremely flexible “energy on demand” for combat units and installations across an entire theater, while significantly reducing dependence on vulnerable over‐land fuel deliveries. SBSP could also enable entirely new force structures and capabilities such as ultra long‐endurance airborne or terrestrial surveillance or combat systems to include the individual soldier himself. More routinely, SBSP could provide the ability to deliver rapid and sustainable humanitarian energy to a disaster area or to a local population undergoing nation‐building activities. SBSP could also facilitate base “islanding” such that each installation has the ability to operate independent of vulnerable ground‐based energy delivery infrastructures. In addition to helping American and Allied defense establishments remain relevant over the entire 21st Century through more secure supply lines, perhaps the greatest military benefit of SBSP is to lessen the chances of conflict due to energy scarcity by providing access to a strategically security energy supply.

## Satellites Link

**Satellites are used for mapping and securitizing**

### **Dalby 10** [Simon, a Professor in the Department of Geography and Environmental Studies at Carleton University, “Recontextualising violence, power and nature: The next twenty years of critical geopolitics?”,Volume 29, Issue 5, June 2010, Pages 280-288, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0962629810000144>]

After the cold war critical geopolitics flourished in the 1990s when the geopolitical divides were fluid and the binary logics of nuclear strategy and fears of a “central war” were no longer so obviously relevant to many situations. The metropolitan debates about global security shifted the focus of danger from the Soviet Union to matters of development and insecurity in the fringes of the global political economy. New insecurities were posited as dangerous and discourses of wild zones and failed states intruded on the discussions of security in many policy-making bureaucracies (O'Tuathail & Luke, 1994). These formulations were suddenly very much more urgent on September 12th 2001. Mapping dangerous places once again got the attention of military cartographers. Now these places were known through satellite surveillance systems and coded with GIS coordinates which all too easily turn into target sets just as soon as social relations are rendered a matter of war (Galgano, 2006). The whole planet is potentially a battlefield in the “global” war on terror, and hence a target set as Gregory (2006a) and (Graham, 2004), (Graham, 2010a) and (Graham, 2010b) in particular have repeatedly reminded us of late. Simultaneously critical geopolitics proliferated into discussions of Iraq and Bosnia ([Ó Tuathail, 2003] and [Ó Tuathail, 2005]), cultures and the identities constructed in the discourses of geopolitics ([Dittmer, 2005], [Hannah, 2006] and [Sharp, 2000]), the historical dimension of geopolitical traditions (Dodds & Atkinson, 2000), into movie criticism ([Dodds, 2003] and [Power and Crampton, 2007]), and crucially into how gender matters in all these things ([Hyndman, 2001] and [Hyndman, 2004]). The recent appearance once again of geographical publications relating to war and militarism ([Cowen and Gilbert, 2008], [Flint, 2005], [Graham, 2004], [Gregory and Pred, 2007], [Kobayashi, 2009] and [Woodward, 2004]) raises questions about the specificity of critical geopolitics in this larger scholarship. Of late (Agnew, 2003) and (Agnew, 2009a) work in particular might be understood to be critical geopolitics but he doesn't usually situate his work as such. Recently he has also noted that there are various precursors to the literature of the last two decades, which with the benefit of hindsight might now too be termed critical geopolitics (Agnew, 2009b)! Using critical geopolitics as a label to encompass so many things has, it seems, in the last few years, lead to a distracting dilution of its original purpose concerning the writing of global space, and a lack of clarity as to how to proceed.

### Satellites are an important element of geopolitics

### Warf 07 [ Barney Warf, is Professor of Geography at the University of Kansas. He has diverse interests in the broad domain of human geography, particularly political economy and social theory, and has published papers concerning elections, the U.S. electoral college, and voting technology, “Geopolitics of the Satellite Industry”, Volume 98, Issue 3, pages 385–397, July 2007]

Satellites reflect, and in turn feed back into, terrestrial politics in many ways. Born of Cold War rivalry, satellites played a key role in the militarisation of space. Although the military's role in the satellite industry has declined, it continues to remain an important segment distinct from civilian applications. In civilian markets, satellites play a key role as communication devices in international transmissions of voice, video and data traffic, all of which reflect the growth of information societies around the world and their steady integration through the global market. Castells’ (1996) well-known ‘space of flows’ would be impossible without the skein of earth stations and orbital platforms that lie at the heart of this industry. The geography of large international earth stations reflects the schism between the developed and underdeveloped worlds, and, to a lesser extent, the legacy of the Cold War. Hence, while satellites float thousands of kilometres overhead, the determinants of access and use are firmly grounded in terrestrial politics. To minimise externalities and allocate prime orbital slots, global flows of information require international forms of regulation. The largest organisation for the provision of international satellite services is Intelsat, traditionally perceived as a mechanism for the assertion of US hegemony over the industry during the Cold War. Digital neoliberalism and the worldwide deregulation of the industry eroded Intelsat's monopoly status and shifted control over the technology from national monopolies to private capital. Thus, the power of capital to allocate satellite resources has expanded while national security concerns, the industry's traditional raison d’être, have been progressively eclipsed, but not removed entirely. In short, satellites, whether military or corporate, do not simply reflect the world's geopolitics, they are simultaneously constitutive of it, blurring the boundaries between earth and space, the global and the local, the public and the private.

## Space Debris Link

### Efforts to clean up space debris is spurred out of fear of the threat to national security.

Joseph S. Imburgia 2011 [Lieutenant Colonel Joseph S. Imburgia is a Judge Advocate in the United States Air Force and is presently assigned as a legal exchange officer to the Directorate of Operations and International Law] Space Debris and Its Threat to National Security: A Proposal for a Binding International Agreement to Clean Up the Junk. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law [Vol. 44:589]

These gloomy prognostications about the threats to our space environment should be troubling to Americans. The United States relies on the unhindered use of outer space for national security.151 According to a space commission led by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “[t]he [United States] is more dependent on space than any other nation.”152 According to Robert G. Joseph, former Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security at the State Department, “space capabilities are vital to our national security and to our economic well-being.”153 Therefore, a catastrophic collision between space debris and the satellites on which that national security so heavily depends poses a very real and current threat to the national security interests of the United States. Since “the [1991] Gulf War, the [United States] military has depended on satellites for communications, intelligence and navigation for its troops and precision-guided weapons.”154 Satellites are also used for reconnaissance and surveillance, command and control, and control of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.155 According to the United States Space Command’s Fact Sheet: Satellites provide essential in-theater secure communications, weather and navigational data for ground, air and fleet operations and threat warning. Ground-based radar and Defense Support Program satellites monitor ballistic missile launches around the world to guard against a surprise missile attack on North America. Space surveillance radars provide vital information on the location of satellites and space debris for the nation and the world. Maintaining space superiority is an emerging capability required to protect our space assets.156

### The aff constructs panic to clean up space debris by threatening US national security

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Simply put, the United States depends on space-based assets for national security, and those assets are vulnerable to space debris collisions. As Massachusetts Democratic Congressman Edward Markey stated, “American satellites are the soft underbelly of our national security.”161 The Rumsfeld Commission set the groundwork for such a conclusion in 2001, when it discussed the vulnerability of U.S. space-based assets and warned of the Space Pearl Harbor.162 Congress also recognized this vulnerability in June 2006, when it held hearings concerning space and its import to U.S. national power and security.163 In his June 2006 Congressional Statement, Lieutenant General C. Robert Kehler, then the Deputy Commander, United States Strategic Command, stated that “space capabilities are inextricably woven into the fabric of American security.”164 He added that these space capabilities are “vital to our daily efforts throughout the world in all aspects of modern warfare” and discussed how integral space capabilities are to “defeating terrorist threats, defending the homeland in depth, shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads and preventing hostile states and actors from acquiring or using WMD.”165 Because so much of the United States’ security depends on satellites, these integral space-based capabilities would, therefore, be costly to lose. That loss would be felt in more than just the security arena. Due to the steep price tags attached to some of the national space security platforms, the economic loss of a satellite due to space debris would also be significant. For example, a pair of new Global Positioning Satellites (GPS), which provides valuable targeting and battle space awareness to military commanders, costs $1.5 billion.166 Accordingly, if a piece of space debris destroys one of these satellites, $750 million could be lost instantly. Additionally, NASA invests billions of dollars annually in space assets. Congress provided NASA with $18.3 billion to spend on space utilization and exploration for fiscal year 2010, and it provided $17.7 billion for fiscal year 2011.167 Air Force General (retired) Ronald E. Keys, former Commander of Air Combat Command, summed it up best, stating that a great deal “rides on space-borne satellites.”168 Because these space capabilities are so costly yet so vital to the United States’ national security and economic well-being, the preservation of these space capabilities should also be vital.

## At: Perm

**Only the alternative alone solves – security must be rejected before it can be reconfigured. The perm is doomed to failure**

**Burke, 2k7** (Anthony, lecturer at Adelaide University School of History and Politics, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence: *War against the Other*, p. 31)

<This chapter remains focused on the aporias that lie at the heart of security, rather than pushing into the spaces that potentially lie beyond. This is another project, one whose contours are already becoming clearer and which I address in detail in Chapters 2 and 3.16 What this chapter builds is a genealogical account of security's origins and cultural power, its ability to provide what Walker calls a 'constitutive account of the political’ – as he says, 'claims about common security, collective security, or world security do little more than fudge the contradictions written into the heart of modern politics: we can only become humans, or anything else, after we have given up our humanity, or any other attachments, to the greater good of citizenship'.17 Before we can rewrite security we have to properly understand how security has written us – how it has shaped and limited our very possibility, the possibilities for our selves, our relationships and our available images of political, social and economic order. This, as Walker intriguingly hints, is also to explore the aporetic distance that modernity establishes between our 'humanity' and a secure identity defined and limited by the state. In short, security needs to be placed alongside a range of other economic, political, technological, philosophic and scientific developments as one of the central constitutive events of our modernity, and it remains one of its essential underpinnings.>

**Any risk of a link means that “working within the system” becomes a smokescreen for a failed critical investigation.**

**Burke, 2k7** (Anthony, lecturer Adelaide University School of History and Politics, “What makes security possible,” *Working Paper 2007/1*, p. 8-9)

<Booth's version of this is to make two moves: first, a movement of radical questioning and opening drawing on Horkheimer and Robert Cox, where the aim is to avoid the 'negative consequences of problem-solving theories, particularly the legitimizing and replicating of the regressive aspects of prevailing situations'. This task 'begins with critique: a radical rethinking of the theories and practices that have shaped political life is an essential foundation for the reinvention of human society' .26 Second, however, he echoes Wyn Jones by stating that 'in the strategic action undertaken to attempt to bring change about' we must discover 'latent potentials in situations on which to build political and social progress. This means building with one's feet on the ground, not constructing castles in the air. '27 Certainly it is helpful to try to identify such potentials, but what if such `latent' potentials no longer exist, or are in the process of being actively extinguished? If so, such arguments are ultimately disabling and risk denying the entire purpose of the critical project. It is precisely at times of the greatest pessimism, when new potentials are being shut down or normative change is distinctly negative—arguably true of the present time—that the critical project is most important. In the face of such obstacles the critical project must think and conceive the unthought, and its limiting test ought not to be realism but responsibility. I am continually haunted by George Orwell's 1984, where the objective of the Party was to reduce the scope for human thought and action by removing concepts from the language until English disappeared in favour of 'Newspeak'. One of the questions I have long asked in my own work is whether the concept of `security' itself has not become a form of 'Newspeak' whose hold on people's minds drives away other possibilities of conceiving and enabling human existence on this planet. This fear has underpinned my own efforts to generate a deeper line of critique—of security as such—that I will return to later. There is a residual ontological realism at work in their thinking here that works against the constructivist basis of their theorising, and it runs the risk of being both disabling and disingenuous. It could be disabling because it risks forcing an emancipatory politics to choke off its effort of critique and imagination prematurely, to accept the boundaries of the given at some level. (For example, what would be a 'concrete utopia' for asylum seekers and refugees? Would it be found by tinkering with the concept of sovereignty or the international conventions on refugees, or by a more profoundly human-centred reformulation of sovereignty and international society at once?)>

# \*\*\*Impact

## Violence

**Secutization leads to violence in space.**

**Columba Peoples** (20**11**): The Securitization of Outer Space:

Challenges for Arms Control, Contemporary Security Policy, 32:1, 76-98

<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13523260.2011.556846>

From a Controlling the Means of Violence perspective, however, it may be that a thicker understanding of space security – contributing to a transformatory politics with regard to outer space – is required. Some have, for instance, suggested a consequentialist approach to securitization that distinguishes between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ forms of securitization (and desecuritization).111 In parallel with debates on the merits and disadvantages of environmental security more generally,112 on this understanding securitization might be viewed as positive where it mobilizes more fundamental attempts to understand and control the means of violence in and from space based on greater awareness of space as an environment. In this light, it could be argued that a less anthropocentric (or, certainly, less state-centric) form of securitization, aimed at preserving space as an environment in its own right rather than simply a resource to be used for terrestrial goals, might be productively employed. In spite of his stated preference for treating use of space as a fundamentally political task, Moltz elsewhere seems to encourage this kind of positive securitization and sees it as an historical driver of previous international cooperation: ‘In space, interdependence was not a lofty, ideologically motivated goal but a practical concern brought on by environmental factors such as orbits, debris and mutual vulnerability.’113 Where securitizing moves highlight the inherent fragility of space-based assets within this environment they might be regarded as a potential supplement to controlling the means of violence in and from space, and to promoting a culture of peace based on space environmentalism rather than space militarism. In the current context of generally low global public awareness and significant apathy on the uses of outer space, securitizing moves of this kind could potentially mobilize and sensitize public opinion.114 No doubt suggestions in UN debates for a common security approach to uses of outer space agreed to by all states, as well as appeals for public declarations by space-faring nations against the use of weapons in and from space already goes some way in this direction.115 However, as illustrated in the analysis above, even the common or global nature of states’ attempts to securitize outer space regularly slide into more narrow claims that reserve rights to particular military uses of outer space. Even if these uses fall short of outright or deliberate weaponization of space, they nevertheless preserve the military utility of outer space and – in the process – its vulnerability to familiar terrestrial security dilemma dynamics of threat and defence. In this sense the key goal of a CMV approach, as distinct from existing arms control perspectives, should be to try and establish a conception of space security that goes beyond the particularism of a state and regional interests. Crucially, such a form of positive securitization would also need to engage a global audience rather than simply assuming it as a passive, acquiescent and indistinct entity as in the policy discourses discussed above. Working through the ways in which non-state and global civil society actors might identify space as a security issue that transcends and challenges military concerns, and how they might in turn mobilize a global public audience, is the biggest challenge facing a CMV approach in this regard. It is, though, also arguably the greatest hope in relation to establishing a genuine culture of peace in relation to outer space.

## At: Dolman

Reject their Dolman evidence – he inappropriately applies realist logic to space, is racist, and endorsing his ideas makes wars in space inevitable

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Dolman’s astropolitical project is by no means exceptional. The journal Astropolitics, of which he is a founding editor, contains numerous papers expressing similar views. It is easy, I think, for critical geographers to feel so secure in the intellectual and political purchase of Ó Tuathailian critiques (Ó Tuathail, 1996), that we become oblivious to the undead nature of classical geopolitics. It is comforting to think that most geography undergraduates encountering geopolitics, in the UK at least, will in all likelihood do so through the portal of critical perspectives, perhaps through the excellent work of Joanne Sharp or Klaus Dodds (Dodds, 2005; Sharp, 2005). But the legacies of Mackinder and Mahan live on, and radical critique is as urgent as ever. While this is not the place for a thoroughgoing reappraisal of astropolitics in the manner of Gearòid Ó Tuathail, a few salient points from his critique can be brought out. (1) Astrography and astropolitics, like geo- graphy and geopolitics, constitute ‘a pol- itical domination and cultural imagining of space’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996: 28). While com- mentators like Colin Gray have posited an ‘inescapable geography’ (eg, ‘of course, physical geography is politically neutral’), a critical agenda conceives of geography not as a fixed substratum but as a highly social form of knowledge (Gray, 1999: 173; Ó Tuathail, 1999: 109). For geography, read ‘astrography’. We must be alert to the ‘declarative’ (‘this is how the Outer Earth is’) and ‘imperative’ (‘this is what we must do’) modes of narration that astropolitics has borrowed from its terrestrial antecedent (Ó Tuathail, 1999: 107). The models of Mackinder and Mahan that are so often applied to the space environ- ment are not unchanging laws; on the con- trary they are themselves highly political attempts to create and sustain particular strategic outcomes in specific historical circumstances. (2) Rather than actively supporting the dominant structures and mechanisms of power, a critical astropolitics must place the primacy of such forces always already in question**. Critical astropolitics aims to scrutinize the power politics of the expert/ think-tank/tactician as part of a wider project of deepening public debate and strengthening democratic accountabilit**y (Ó Tuathail, 1999: 108). (3) Mackinder’s ‘end of geography’ thesis held that the era of terrestrial exploration and discovery was over, leaving only the task of consolidating the world order to fit British interests (Ó Tuathail, 1996: 27). Dolman’s vision of space strategy bears striking similarities. Like Ó Tuathail’s critique of Mackinder’s imperial hubris, Astropolitik could be reasonably described as ‘triumphalism blind to its own precarious- ness’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996: 28). Dolman, for instance, makes little effort to conceal his tumescent patriotism, observing that ‘the United States is awash with power after its impressive victories in the 1991 Gulf War and 1999 Kosovo campaign, and stands at the forefront of history cap- able of presiding over the birth of a bold New World Order’. One might argue, however, that Mackinder – as the theorist of imperial decline – may in this respect be an appropriate mentor (Ó Tuathail, 1999: 112). It is important, I think, **to demystify Astropolitik: there is nothing ‘inevitable’ about US dominance in space, even if the USA were to pursue this im- perial logic**. (4) Again like Mackinder, **Astropolitik mobilizes an unquestioned ethnocentrism**. Implicit in this ideology is the notion that America must beat China into space because ‘they’ are not like ‘us’. ‘The most ruthlessly suitable’ candidates for space dominance, we are told – ‘the most capably endowed’ – are like those who populated America and Australia (Dolman, 2002: 27). (5) A critical astropolitics must challenge the ‘mythic’ properties of Astropolitik and disrupt its reverie for the ‘timeless insights’ of the so-called geopolitical masters. For Ó Tuathail, ‘geopolitics is mythic because it promises uncanny clarity ... in a complex world’ and is ‘fetishistically concerned with .... prophecy’ (Ó Tuathail, 1999: 113). Ó Tuathail’s critical project, by con- trast, seeks to recover the political and historical contexts through which the knowledge of Mackinder and Mahan has become formalized.

# \*\*\*Alternative

## Solves

**Rejecting the logic of security is necessary – it is necessary to prevent the planet from being turned into a global battlefield. Embracing critical geopolitics means rejecting the extension of realist logic into space – this is the move the alternative endorses.**

### **Dalby 10** [Simon, a Professor in the Department of Geography and Environmental Studies at Carleton University, “Recontextualising violence, power and nature: The next twenty years of critical geopolitics?”,Volume 29, Issue 5, June 2010, Pages 280-288, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0962629810000144]

After the cold war critical geopolitics flourished in the 1990s when the geopolitical divides were fluid and the binary logics of nuclear strategy and fears of a “central war” were no longer so obviously relevant to many situations. The metropolitan debates about global security shifted the focus of danger from the Soviet Union to matters of development and insecurity in the fringes of the global political economy. New insecurities were posited as dangerous and discourses of wild zones and failed states intruded on the discussions of security in many policy-making bureaucracies (O'Tuathail & Luke, 1994). These formulations were suddenly very much more urgent on September 12th 2001. Mapping dangerous places once again got the attention of military cartographers. Now these places were known through satellite surveillance systems and coded with GIS coordinates which all too easily turn into target sets just as soon as social relations are rendered a matter of war (Galgano, 2006). The whole planet is potentially a battlefield in the “global” war on terror, and hence a target set as Gregory (2006a) and (Graham, 2004), (Graham, 2010a) and (Graham, 2010b) in particular have repeatedly reminded us of late. Simultaneously critical geopolitics proliferated into discussions of Iraq and Bosnia ([Ó Tuathail, 2003] and [Ó Tuathail, 2005]), cultures and the identities constructed in the discourses of geopolitics ([Dittmer, 2005], [Hannah, 2006] and [Sharp, 2000]), the historical dimension of geopolitical traditions (Dodds & Atkinson, 2000), into movie criticism ([Dodds, 2003] and [Power and Crampton, 2007]), and crucially into how gender matters in all these things ([Hyndman, 2001] and [Hyndman, 2004]). The recent appearance once again of geographical publications relating to war and militarism ([Cowen and Gilbert, 2008], [Flint, 2005], [Graham, 2004], [Gregory and Pred, 2007], [Kobayashi, 2009] and [Woodward, 2004]) raises questions about the specificity of critical geopolitics in this larger scholarship. Of late (Agnew, 2003) and (Agnew, 2009a) work in particular might be understood to be critical geopolitics but he doesn't usually situate his work as such. Recently he has also noted that there are various precursors to the literature of the last two decades, which with the benefit of hindsight might now too be termed critical geopolitics (Agnew, 2009b)! Using critical geopolitics as a label to encompass so many things has, it seems, in the last few years, lead to a distracting dilution of its original purpose concerning the writing of global space, and a lack of clarity as to how to proceed.

## Must reject security in space

**To solve for securitization, we need social change; states see space as something they can exploit for self-interests through sovereignty now.**

**Wang 9** [Sheng-Chi works for the Department of Political and Social Sciences, Free University of Berlin, Germany, “The Making of New ‘Space’: Cases of Transatlantic Astropolitics”, Geopolitics, Volume 16, Issue 2, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14650040802693820]

Sovereignty can be defined as the exclusive authority and autonomy of a political entity on its own affairs. The impact of globalisation decreases the extent of European and US autonomy in outer space activities, but not their authority for outer space policy making. Outer space remains a state-dominated and geopolitically demarcated realm, although non-state actors are active in international politics. Europe and the US, self-perceived as unitary sovereign actors, pursue geopolitical interests with respective cost-effective strategy. Transatlantic astropolitics is principally conducted by the institutions and governments of Europe and the US. Outer space facilities and resources are also under governmental disposition. Sovereignty remains a crucial component of transatlantic astropolitics. Seizing pivotal position in outer space facilitates states to define outer space agenda, gain a greater share of outer space resources, and control this new ‘space’. Advanced outer space technology is the key instrument facilitating state’s policy goal of seizing pivotal position in outer space. Governments can focus resources to develop desired technology. And advanced technology may offer greater flexibility and broader range of policy options than in the past. The ‘pluralistic security community’ proposition regards the transatlantic order as a particular social structure based on common interest, institutions, norms and identities, which renders a **remedy for competition over material power**. To wit, intensive economic interdependence, shared norms and collective identities embedded in institutional settings determine the very solidarity of the transatlantic security community. This is also the liberal constructivist assumption about the post–Cold War sustainability of the transatlantic alliance.

## Cooperation Possible

**Internationally cooperating and denying self-interest works**

Wang **9** [Sheng-Chi works for the Department of Political and Social Sciences, Free University ofBerlin, Germany, “The Making of New ‘Space’: Cases of Transatlantic Astropolitics”, Geopolitics, Volume 16, Issue 2, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14650040802693820]

A cogent example occurred during the Cold War, when the U.S. enjoyed outer space supremacy and European dependence. Before the success of European Ariane launcher, France turned to the Soviet Union for launching the Franco-German Symphonie communication satellites in 1971, just because the U.S. proviso for launch was that these satellites can only be used for experimental but no commercial purposes, which seriously undermined European freedom of action and outer space capability development. The demands of independent access to pivotal positions in outer space and autonomous use of satellites prompted Europe to develop its own Ariane launcher. Besides, cooperation in outer space application program even occurred between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, which again denounced the discursive constitution of collective identities, shared norms, and common culture on European and U.S. outer space strategy. The first international human spaceflight cooperation – Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) in 1975 – not only represented U.S. and Soviet convergent symbolic policy preferences to reduce the Cold War tensions, but also satisfied their functional policy preferences that the U.S. obtained a firsthand glance of Soviet capability and the Soviet Union obtained access to U.S. outer space technology and know-how. Outer space cooperation between the US and Russia reached a pinnacle by the inclusion of Russia in the ISS programme in 1993. The US departed from its strict policy guidelines of outer space cooperation to transfer funds from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to Russia because the US needed critical technology and hardware of the Russian Mir space station, while Russia needed US funds to operate its outer space programmes. However, the US adamantly restricted sensitive technology and funds transfer to Europe in the same programme. These examples are not exhaustive. European and US practices indicate that the differentiation between ‘us’ and ‘others’ in transatlantic astropolitics is determined by the most cost-effective way to satisfy respective geopolitical interests rather than the constitutive effect of transatlantic security community discourse.