# K 1NC

Framing governmental support for infrastructure in terms of security legitimizes violence and wholesale destruction in the name of disciplinary control while framing humanity in terms of logistical life

Reid 8 (Julian – lecturer in International Relations at King’s College, visiting professor in International Relations at the University of Lapland, “Conclusion: The Biopolitics of Critical Infrastructure Protection,” Securing ‘the Homeland:’ Critical Infrastructure, Risk and (In)Security, Ed. Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Kristian Soby Kristensen, p. 178-179)

Therefore, the contemporary reification of critical infrastructure as an object for protection owes a significant debt to the development of new forms of political agency concerned with attacking liberal regimes by undermining specifically liberal sources of security and governance. All of these developments only serve to fuel liberal representations of the war on terror as a struggle between regimes tasked with promoting security for human life against enemies dedicated to its nihilistic destruction. Why would anyone seek to destroy infrastructure other than out of a profound antipathy for the fundamental conditions which human life requires for its prosperity and security? This volume, in opening up the debate on CIP to allow for the examination of the dehumanising dimensions and implications of the practices involved in CIP, and objectives at stake in it, throws a spanner into the works of such modes of representation. This is especially true for the chapters by Der Derian and Finkelstein (Chapter 4) as well as Bonditti (Chapter 6), both of which extend Michel Foucault's seminal analysis of the origins of liberal regimes in practices of discipline and biopolitics whereupon infrastructure was first objectified as a fundamental source of security to the state. Both of these chapters demonstrate in different ways why the rationalities informing CIP cannot be understood in simplistic terms of a desire for the protection of human beings from the risk of violent death at the hands of terrorists, but express a more technocratic will to defend infrastructures even at the cost and to the detriment of distinctly human capacities. Second they underline the fact that the waging of this war involves the deployment of tactics which, rather than simply securing the life of populations imperilled by terrorist tactics, deliberately target it with newly insidious techniques of discipline and control, all in the name of infrastructure protection. In doing so, the volume highlights what can justly be described as the biopolitical dimensions of the war on terror and the broader security strategies of liberal regimes that have been developed to prosecute it. In concluding this volume, then, I would like to extend and draw out what I read as being its most valuable contribution to our knowledge of this lugubrious phenomenon. If we believe our governments and most of the academic literature on the subject, both the security and quality of life is inextricably dependent on the protection of the critical infrastructures through which liberal regimes are organised. But the provision of such infrastructure protection requires the deliberate targeting of the human life that inhabits critical infrastructures with increasingly invasive techniques of governance. As a consequence of the declaration of the war on terror, and more especially as a result of the ways in which the threat of terrorism is being interpreted and understood by its proponents, the investment of regimes in the development of new techniques and technologies for the control of human life is increasing rapidly. Strategies for critical infrastructure protection are affording significant advances in the development of scientific knowledge and technological control of the evolutionary capacities and adaptive capabilities of the human. Amid the creation of plans for the provision of critical infrastructure protection, and in the establishment of new governmental agencies for the execution of those plans, the biological sciences in particular are undergoing a major renaissance (Cooper 2006). The implications of these new forms of knowledge and security technologies for the quality of human life are profoundly paradoxical. Human beings themselves do, of course, rely significantly on the operability and maintenance of infrastructures them¬elves. But it is a fact that human beings within critical infrastructures are also regarded as posing the greatest danger to them (Dunn 2005). In this context, the human can be seen to have become both the rogue element against which liberal regimes are today seeking to secure themselves, as well as the central resource on which they are attempting to draw in pursuit of their security. In order to afford their own protection, liberal regimes have learned historically to govern human life via its reduction to what I have called 'logistical life'. This term is apt because the techniques and practices of social control through which regimes of the eighteenth century learned to govern were drawn directly from the domains of war, military strategy, tactics and organisation (Reid 2006: 17-39). Logistical life is a life lived under the duress of the command to be efficient, to communicate one's purposes transparently in relation to others, to be positioned where one is required, to use time economically, to be able to move when and where one is told to, and crucially, to be able to extol these capacities as the values for which one will agree to kill and die for (Reid 2006: 13). In the eighteenth century, the deployment of techniques with which to increase the logistical efficiencies of societies was legitimised by regimes through the claim that it was necessary for the exceptional defence of the civil domain of society from its external enemies. Increased military efficiency and discipline was said to be necessary and beneficial to forms of civil life, the 'quality' of which was defined by their distinction from the warlike conditions that were said to prevail beyond the boundaries of the state. It is in critique of this type of legitimisation that Foucault's analysis, in its demonstration of the ways in which techniques for the increase of the logistical efficiency of armed forces impacted directly upon the everyday order of life within the civil domain of society, is so powerful. He exposes how the methods with which liberal regimes historically prepared for war with external enemies provided model templates with which to subject the life of their civilian populations to new insidious forms of control and manipulation, and how, in turn, liberal regimes have sought to legitimise their wars in the name of the defence and development of the very forms of logistical ways of living they were busy inculcating within and among their subjects. Now, in the twenty-first century and in the context of the war on terror, we are witnessing precisely the same methods of legitimisation being employed by liberal regimes, but with a radical twist. Today, the argument being deployed is not, as it was in the eighteenth century, that the increase of the logistical efficiency of societies is a necessary sacrifice in the interest of defending an otherwise distinctly civilian population. Today, it is deemed necessary to defend the logistical life of society from enemies that are deemed dangerous precisely because they target life in its logistical dimensions. Amid the global campaign against terrorism, the capacities of societies to practice a logistical way of life have become indistinguishable from conceptions of the 'quality of life' for human beings. Throughout, for example, the seminal US National Plan for Research and Development in Support of Critical Infrastructure Protection, one finds the quality of human life construed in terms of its logistical capacities. The docility and plasticity of human bodies, the manipulability of human dispositions, and the many ways in which human behaviour can be subjected to techniques of control, are conceptualised not just as a means for the protection of liberal societies, but as qualities that distinguish the uniqueness of the human species. As the Plan for Research and Development states: Part of the challenge of infrastructure protection is how to take full advantage of human capabilities. The Social, Behavioral and Economic (SBE) Working Group in the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) is focused on scientific research in the areas of sensory, motor, cognitive and adaptive capability of the human. Currently, the brain is unmatched by any technological system. The human brain is a semi-quantitative supercomputer that is programmable and reprogrammable by explicit training, previous experience, and on-going observations on a real-time, virtually instantaneous basis. (Department of Homeland Security 2004: 63) The quality of human life, we are told in forthright terms, is reducible to its superior amenability to logistical transformation. Its greater capacity for adaptation and transformation is what distinguishes it from other life forms. Contemporary accounts of this form of human superiority, understood in terms of humans' amenability to logistical techniques of transformation, recall in their depth and specificity the expressions of wonderment at life's malleability to be found in military texts of the eighteenth century that Foucault's original exploration of the disciplinary and biopolitical underpinnings of liberal modernity first exposed (1991: 135-69). Human eyes are capable of high-resolution, stereo-optical vision with immense range, and, integrated with a highly plastic brain, make humans uniquely capable of discovery, integration, and complex pattern recognition. Human hands constitute a dexterous, sensitive biomechanical system that, integrated with the brains and eyes, are unmatched by current and near-future robotic technologies. Humans operate in groups synergistically and dynamically, adjusting perceptions, relationships and connections as needed on a real-time and virtually instantaneous basis. Human language capabilities exist and operate within a dimensional space that is far more complex and fluid than any known artificial architectures. (Department of Homeland Security 2004: 63) As Foucault's original analysis of the development of liberal regimes of power revealed, the emergence of the military sciences in the eighteenth century was allied to as well as constitutive of the broader development of the life sciences. Developments in modern military science have consistently fed off and contributed to changes in the life sciences more generally. Now, in the twenty-first century, we can see this alliance being cemented in the development of new methods for the defence of liberal regimes in what is known as 'human factors engineering', or HF/E. HF/E is, as the National Plan describes, 'both a science of human performance and an engineering discipline, concerned with the design of systems for both efficiency and safety' (Department of Homeland Security 2004: 64). Developed since before the Second World War, its aim is to harness the 'cognitive, emotional and social capabilities of the human' in order to design more secure systems for the defence of critical infrastructures and to invest in such human capabilities with a view to creating systems of infrastructure that are resilient to 'deceptive behaviors', 'rogue activities', and to 'insider threats' said to endanger critical infrastructures (Department of Homeland Security 2004: 42). But in engineering, the means with which to secure infrastructures against the 'deceptions', 'rogues' and 'insider threats' aimed at it, human life today faces increasingly intense threats to its integrity. The radical indeterminacy of the human, its capacity for error, its creative capacities for thought and expression, are directly endangered by the increasingly insidious forms of control being wielded and asserted in strategies for the securing of critical infrastructures against terrorism. As the Plan informs its readership, 'Anyone can be presumed to be a candidate for insider threat' (Department of Homeland Security 2004: 43). Indeed, everyone is suspect of constituting this form of threat. Research and development in response to the fear of insider threats is aimed at the creation of what is called a 'National Common Operating Picture for Critical Infrastructure' (COP) not simply in order to 'sense rogue behavior' in pre-identified sources of threats to life, but in order to be able to 'sense rogue behaviour in a trusted resource or anticipate that they may be a candidate threat' (Department of Homeland Security 2004: 41). It is therefore deemed necessary 'that we presume any insider could conduct unauthorised or rogue activities' (Department of Homeland Security 2004: 42). Consequently, the movement of human life, each and every possible human disposition and expression, is becoming the target of strategies construed paradoxically for the defence of human well-being. In this context, any action or thought that borders on abnormality is to be targeted as a potential source of threat. As the Plan states, 'the same anticipation of overt damaging action by a purposeful threat can be used to anticipate an unfortunate excursion in thought or action by a well-meaning actor' (Depattment of Home¬land Security 2004: 44). The development of technologies and techniques for the analysis of 'what people do' and their 'deceptive behaviours' runs the risk not simply of outlawing fundamental conditions for quality of human life. It creates and indeed instantiates the risk of the violent destruction of forms of life, of human populations and individuals, who through no fault of their own are deemed to exhibit signs of anomalous and threatening behaviour. The deliberate murder of Jean Charles de Menezes, killed with five gunshots to the head fired at point-blank range by British police on 22 July 2005, is a case in point. This human being, described as an 'unidentified male' with 'dark hair beard/stubble', was targeted on account of the fact that his 'description and demeanour' matched the identity of a bomber suspect'. The simple fact of his leaving an apartment block thought to have been used by terrorist suspects, the simple fact that on his subsequent journey, he exited and re-entered the bus on which he travelled, and in spite of the fact that he walked and did not run, showed no sign of possessing weapons of destruction, and gave no signal of intent of any sort, was nevertheless deemed to represent a divergence from a normal pattern of behaviour so serious that he was targeted and killed with the most deliberate violence. In spite of the scale and intensity with which the aim of a complete mapping of human dispositions and behaviours has been pursued, and in spite of the urgency with which today it is being implemented, the most banal and everyday expressions of life continue to fall, tragically, outside its grasp. As it was in the eighteenth century that the fantasy of a society which functions as a type of socio-military machine, and 'that would cover the whole territory of the nation and in which each individual would be occupied without interruption but in a different way according to the evolutive segment, the genetic sequence in which he finds himself' (Foucault 1991: 165) emerged, so at the beginning of the twenty-first century, we can see that fantasy being given new forms in the shape of critical infrastructure protection. Making sense of what is at stake in this phenomenon requires a complete reversal of the terms in which its utility is currently being articulated by liberal regimes of power. Rather than conceptualise this present struggle in terms of a war on terror in the defence of a common humanity against an enemy that is inimical to life, we can better conceptualise it as a conflict over the political constitution of life itself. When the methods with which regimes are seeking to secure the life of their societies demand an incremental targeting of life, to the point where the most ordinary expressions of life are rendered objects of strategic intervention, it is necessary to question the ways of valorising life that create such paradoxical conditions. This volume, in my reading, creates important openings for the further exploration of such a line of questioning.

Security 1NC

The dream of security produces apocalypse– *constructions* of existential risk produce the annihilation they are meant to escape

Peter Coviello, Prof. of English @ Bowdoin, 2k [*Queer Frontiers*, p. 39-40]

Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is in any way postapocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed-it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques Derrida’s suitably menacing phrase) "remainderless and a-symbolic destruction," then in the postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, **always to an "other"** people whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous **contagion, threatening the safety** and prosperity **of a cherished "general population**." This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag's incisive observation, from 1989, that, 'Apocalypse is now a long-running serial: **not 'Apocalypse Now' but 'Apocalypse from Now On.""** The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss) is that apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it is ever useful. That is, through the perpetual threat of **destruction-through the constant reproduction of the figure of apocalypse**-agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first volume of The History of Sexuality addresses himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than productive, less life-threatening than, in his words, "life-administering." Power, he contends, "exerts a positive influence on life land, endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations?' In his brief comments on what he calls "the atomic situation;' however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means. For as "managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race," agencies of modern power presume to act 'on the behalf of the existence of everyone." Whatsoever might be construed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive or, indeed, **potentially annihilating**. "If genocide is indeed the dream of modem power," Foucault writes, "this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population." For a state that would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patterns and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, **seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.**

Reject the affirmative’s security logic – only resistance to the discourse of security can generate genuine political thought.

Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008 [*Critique of Security*, 185-6]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps **to eschew the logic of security altogether** - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it **marginalises all else, most notably** the constructive conflicts, **debates** and discussions **that animate political life**. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: **maybe there is no hole**."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an **alternative political language** which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to **blind ourselves** to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a **different conception of the good.** We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but **bracketing it out** and handing it to the state; **it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift**."'

# 2NC Blocks

### 2NC Impact Overview

#### The kritik outweighs and turns the case –

#### A. Extinction is inevitable in the world of the affirmative – that’s Coviello – the creation of “others” who construe threats to national security necessitates violence against them in the name of life itself and is the root cause of war – that traps us into an endless cycle of violence that the affirmative can’t escape from which means that if they fail to solve violence or extinction there’s no unique reason to vote affirmative

#### B. The 1AC’s system of valuation is bad – Coviello says that life becomes disposable under a system of security where it becomes a tool to be destroyed in the name of population survival

#### C. Their threats are manufactured – that’s Neocleous– their scenarios are the product of the elites who wield the power of security logic and use it for their advantage – that’ll be on the link debate

#### D. The kritik turns the case –

#### 1. The affirmative’s attempt to securitize inevitably creates “others” and produces the race towards extinction through creating more violence – that’s also Coviello – only resistance to the political idea of security as a tool can create change

#### 2. When we create infrastructure like the plan with an eye towards securitization, we’re less likely to make that infrastructure usable for the population because we perceive said infrastructure as at risk of an attack from external threats – the conception of users as the biggest threat to infrastructure brackets off access and destroys solvency – that’s Reid

### 2NC Alternative

#### It’s time to return the gift – The neocleous evidence indicates that complete rejection of security logic is critical to escaping the crisis of the politics of security – direct resistance to the government-issued ideal of security is the only way to break out of the cycle of death logic that has claimed the lives of millions – also the K doesn’t necessarily preclude the plan but it certainly does criticize the assumptions and justifications for the aff advantages – the plan can be done without their assumptions

#### A critical approach is key – a state based approach just re-encroaches us within the grasp of security

Neocleous 8 (Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy; Head of Department of Politics & History Brunel Univ, Critique of Security, 9)

To this end, the aim of the critique of security is not a set of proposals for democratizing security, humanizing security, balancing security with liberty, or any other policy proposal to improve the wonderful world of security. There are more than enough security intellectuals for that. The aim is to play a part in freeing the political imagination from the paralysis experienced in the face of security – to free ourselves from security fetishism by provoking and intriguing others to try and think politics without security. It is often said that security is the gift of the state; perhaps we ought to return the gift.

#### Alt solves- critique of representations breaks down security

McDonald ’08, Matt McDonald, Senior Lecturer in International Relations @ Queensland, 2008, “Securitization and the Construction of Security,” (http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/14/4/563, European Journal of International Relations, International Relations 18 (1)).

Analytically we need to recognize and explore the range of ways in which political communities and their values are positioned by different actors, and explore the contexts in which particular security visions ‘win out’ over others. We should also focus more on the understanding or discourse of security underpinning particular representations and practices rather than the act of ‘securitizing’ or ‘desecuritizing’. Such a research agenda is clearly less elegant and more unwieldy than the Copenhagen School’s securitization framework, whose attraction will always in part be the desire to simply apply a set of universal and ready-made tools to different social, historical and political contexts. But resisting this attraction means recognizing the breadth and complexity of the construction of security in global politics. A broader framework would therefore have analytical value, but would also have potentially progressive normative implications. In understanding how particular visions of security and the voices promoting them come to prominence, we can better understand how alternative security discourses (that reject militarism, statism and exclusion, for example) can replace them. Such a praxeological or normative concern with acknowledging possibilities for emancipatory change would work well if combined with that which the Copenhagen School is able to contribute: a sociological concern with pointing to important elements of the construction of the present.

### AT: Framework

#### They say framework –

#### 1. Counter interpretation – the Aff must defend the values and assumptions that structure the 1AC. The role of the ballot is to render a judgment on the 1AC as a text.

#### 2. It’s predictable – they choose how to write their 1AC. Our kritik is just an indict of their authors’ assumptions and methodology. We don’t shift the focus from the 1AC – we specifically interrogate it.

#### 3. Key to Education –

#### A) Focus on policymaking crowds out critical questioning.

Biswas 7 (Shampa, Professor of Politics – Whitman College, “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist”, Millennium, 36(1), p. 117-125)

The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be **seduced by power**.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of **intellectual orientation**. It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds **of ethical questions irreducible to formulaic ‘for or against’ and ‘costs and benefits’ analysis** can simply **not be raised**. In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of ‘intellectual relevance’ that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical and perhaps unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, that is about *politics* (rather than techno-expertise) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.21

#### B) That causes serial policy failure.

Dillon and Reid 00 (Michael, Professor of Politics – University of Lancaster, and Julian, Lecturer in International Relations – King’s College, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, January / March, 25(1))

More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure--the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it.

### AT: Perm

#### They say perm–

#### 1. Still links – the 1AC’s description of infrastructure as a means for protecting life authorizes disciplinary surveillance and targeting by constituting humanity as logistical life. Paying lip service to our criticism while including their policy wards off critique.

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer – School of Politics and Professor of International Relations – University of New South Wales, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 3-4)

These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on tei-ror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1 It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, but also their mainstream critiques - whether they take the form ofliberal policy approaches in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique.

#### I’ll do my link analysis here –

#### 2. No Net Benefit – the perm can’t reject security framing of infrastructure better than the Alt. No reason to prefer means you err Neg.

#### 3. Severs – abandons the 1AC’s promotion of infrastructure as a strategy of governance. Severance is a voting issue since it makes the Aff a moving target, jacking fairness and education.

#### 4. Perm doesn’t solve – the only way to solve is a complete rejection of security logic – that’s neocleous

### AT: Perm – Plan Then Alt

#### 1. No reason to prefer the permutation- our link evidence indicates that the advantage scenarios of the affirmative are constructed and not objectively true. This means there is no reason to do the permutation- the alternative solves back better for the harms of the Affirmative.

#### 2. Timeframe perms are illegitimate and a voting issue. They allow the Affirmative to spike out of any link, making any off-case argument unwinnable for the Negative and skewing the debate.

### AT: Perm – All Other Instances

#### 1. This perm has no function, there are no non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative. Our neocleous indicates that complete rejection is key to solvency. Any action of the plan risks this solvency.

#### 2. There is no net benefit to the permutation. The Affirmative’s advantages are a lie, constructed in order to perpetuate current power structures. There is no reason to do the permutation as opposed to the alternative.

#### 3. The perm is intrinsic- it adds a plank not found in the Affirmative or alternative. This creates a moving target for the negative and allows the Aff. to suck up Negative ground. Voter- reason to vote down the permutation, it is theoretically illegitimate.

### AT: Perm – Doublebind

#### 1) This argument doesn’t apply at the level of our interrogation of the objectivity of the harms. Even if they win that the alternative should be able to overcome the residual effects of the affirmative, there is literally no reason why the perm is preferable to the alt, because the harms aren’t real.

### AT: Perm – Do Alt

#### They say perm do the alt –

#### 1. Severance – the alt precludes the plan, meaning that the aff is severing out of the entirety of the aff, that makes the aff a moving target and kills clash – it’s a voter

### AT: Alt Doesn’t Do Plan

#### They say doesn’t do plan

#### 1. That’s correct – our Alt merely rejects the 1AC on the grounds that it’s rooted in a logic of security that authorizes war and genocide.

### AT: No link

#### They say no link –

#### 1. Framing infrastructure in terms of ranking and managing risk links –Reid says that doing so means we conceive of infrastructure as an asset to be protected through violence and exclusion.

#### 2. Their framing of their advantages also links –

#### A. The notion of competitiveness authorizes global violence.

Schoenberger, Geography and Envt’l Eng @ Johns Hopkins, 98. [Erica, “Discourse and practice in human geography.” Progress in Human Geography 22 (1) p.  2-5]

In what follows, I want to examine the meaning and use of the concept of `competitiveness'. The analysis claims, in essence, that the term is not merely an `objective' description of a fact of economic life, but also part of a discursive strategy that constructs a particular understanding of reality and elicits actions and reactions appropriate to that understanding. This is followed by a discussion of why the discourse has the power that it does and how it may influence how we think about and act in the world. I then work through some examples of how an unexamined acceptance of a discursive convention may obscure as much as it reveals. II Competitiveness as an economic category and discursive strategy I'm going to make this as simple as possible for myself by reducing the whole problem of discourse to one word: competitiveness. For economic geographers in general and for me in particular, the categories of competition, competitive strategy and competitiveness have a great deal of importance and might even be thought to pervade our work, even when they are not directly under analysis. All sorts of industrial and spatial economic outcomes are implicitly or explicitly linked to some notion of `competitiveness' (cf. Krugman, 1994). The rise and decline of particular industrial regions have something to do with the competitiveness of the labour force (generally understood in terms of comparative costs and unionization), which (for geographers if for no one else) has something to do with the competitiveness of the region in the first place, understood as its particular mix of resources, infrastructure, location and cost profile. More than that, though, `competitiveness' seems to me a term that has become truly hegemonic in the Gramscian sense. It is a culturally and socially sanctioned category that, when invoked, can completely halt public discussion of public or private activities. There is virtually no counterargument available to the simple claim that `doing X will make us uncompetitive,' whatever X and whomever `us' might be.2 In a capitalist society, of course, it is more than reasonable to be concerned with competition and competitiveness. No matter what your theoretical orientation, main- stream to Marxist, these must be seen as real forces shaping real outcomes in society. They are not just intellectual constructs that lend a false sense of order to a messy world. On the other hand, we can also analyse them as elements of a discursive strategy that shapes our understanding of the world and our possibilities for action in it. In that case, it seems to me the first questions to ask are whose discursive strategy is it, what do they really mean by it, where does its power come from, and what kinds of actions does it tend to open up or foreclose. 1 Whose discourse? The discourse on competitiveness comes from two principal sources and in part its power is their power. In the first instance, it is the discourse of the economics profession which doesn't really need to analyse what it is or what it means socially. The market is the impartial and ultimate arbiter of right behaviour in the economy and competitiveness simply describes the result of responding correctly to market signals. The blandness of this `objective' language conceals the underlying harshness of the metaphor. For Adam Smith, the idea of competition plausibly evoked nothing more disturbing than a horse race in which the losers are not summarily executed. Since then, the close identification of marginalist economics with evolutionary theory has unavoidably imbued the concept with the sense of a life or death struggle (cf. Niehans, 1990).3 In short, on competitiveness hangs life itself. As Krugman (1994: 31) defines it: `. . . when we say that a corporation is uncompetitive, we mean that its market position is . . . unsustainable ± that unless it improves its performance it will cease to exist.' As with evolutionary theory, our ability to strip the moral and ethical content from the concepts of life and death is not so great as the self-image of modern science suggests. Competitiveness becomes inescapably associated with ideas of fitness and unfitness, and these in turn with the unstated premise of merit, as in `deserving to live' and `deserving to die'. Secondly, competitiveness is the discourse of the business community and represents both an essential value and an essential validation. More generally, it serves as an all- purpose and unarguable explanation for any behaviour: `We must do X in order to be competitive.' Again, the implied `or else' is death. As hinted, though, the discourse of competitiveness has seeped out beyond these sources and is becoming socially pervasive. University presidents, hospital admin- istrators and government bureaucrats also discourse quite fluently now about compet- itiveness and its related accoutrements: customers, total quality, flexibility and so forth. It will be objected that competitiveness is a deeply ingrained social category and value in the USA and elsewhere and there is no particular reason to single out economists and business persons as culprits in its dissemination. That objection is true enough, and no doubt contributes to the general power of the discourse since it resonates so well with this broader heritage. But `competitiveness' in the sense of `deserving to live' is not what was commonly meant by this more diffuse social understanding. It is, however, what is meant in economic analysis and business life, and it is increasingly what is meant in other institutional and social settings as well.

### AT: Threats Real

#### They say threats real

#### 1. Begs the question – the fact that threats can exist in the abstract doesn’t mean we should frame policy exclusively around threat reduction or that the way they frame threats in their 1AC is valid. Their approach of worst-case scenario planning and constructing policies in terms of reducing insecurity forecloses all alternative approaches – extend Neocleus.

#### 2. Their impacts are manufactured and distorted by the threat industry.

Pieterse 7 (Jan, Professor of Sociology – University of Illinois (Urbana), “Political and Economic Brinkmanship”, Review of International Political Economy, 14(3), p. 473)

Brinkmanship and producing instability carry several meanings. The American military spends 48% of world military spending (2005) and represents a vast, virtually continuously growing establishment that is a world in itself with its own lingo, its own reasons, internecine battles and projects. That this large security establishment is a bipartisan project makes it politically relatively immune. That for security reasons it is an insular world shelters it from scrutiny. For reasons of ‘deniability’ the president is insulated from certain operations (Risen, 2006). That it is a completely hierarchical world onto itself makes it relatively unaccountable. Hence, to quote Rumsfeld, ‘stuff happens’. In part this is the familiar theme of the Praetorian Guard and the shadow state (Stockwell, 1991). It includes a military on the go, a military that seeks career advancement through role expansion, seeks expansion through threat inflation, and in inflated threats finds rationales for ruthless action and is thus subject to feedback from its own echo chambers. Misinformation broadcast by part of the intelligence apparatus blows back to other security circles where it may be taken for real (Johnson, 2000). Inhabiting a hall of mirrors this apparatus operates in a perpetual state of self hypnosis with, since it concerns classified information and covert ops, limited checks on its functioning.

### AT: No Impact

#### They say no impact –

#### 1. Kritik outweighs the case – drive toward security makes global war and violence inevitable – extend Reid

#### 2. Kritik’s key to value to life – framing infrastructure in terms of security makes massive curtailments of quality of life inevitable – extended **Reid**

#### 3. Kritik turns the case – the impulse to securitization constructs people and users as a threat to infrastructure – extend Reid

#### 4. Alt solves the case – rejecting security politics undermines the root cause of international violence – we’re the only sustainable solution to the impacts they outline – extend Neocleous

### AT: Emancipation

#### They say security’s key to emancipation –

#### 1) Aff doesn’t solve – Their 1AC conceives of security as a means of averting extinction, not fostering emancipation – that’s above.

#### 2) Alt solves – we don’t embrace extinction – our argument is that rejecting security politics is a prerequisite to reducing violence and bolstering the quality of life. That’s specifically true in the context of infrastructure – extend Reid.

#### 3) Security as emancipation fails – it authorizes violence in the name of security.

Neocleous 8 (Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy; Head of Department of Politics & History Brunel Univ, Critique of Security, 13)

Because liberalism has situated itself as the ideology, movement or party of liberty, and because it is so often reiterated in these terms, a common assumption is that if anyone should be defending liberty against security, it is the liberals. The classic formulation of this view if found in Benjamin Franklin’s claims that ‘they that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety’, a claim that has been repeated so many times in the twenty-first century that to list all references would be a research task in itself. This chapter suggests that there’s a certain myth-making going on when people talk of the search for the right ‘balance’ between liberty and security, and that this myth-making obscures some of the real history of liberalism. For while it make be that ‘the moral instinct of the liberal is typically to give some special status … to the protection of the basic liberties, which means that they cannot be traded away’, the political instinct lies firmly in the direction of security. So, building on one of Marx’s insights and on a key theme within Foucault’s work, I argue that rather than resist the push to security in the name of liberty, liberalism in fact enacts another form of political rationality that sets in place mechanisms for a ‘society of security’. ‘Security’ here straddles law and economy, police power and political economy, and becomes the dominant mode of what Foucault calls ‘governmental rationality’. Taking these ideas, I want to suggest that in encouraging an essential liberal mode of thought, the myth of a ‘balance’ between security and liberty opens the (back) door to an acceptance of all sorts of authoritarian security measures; measures which are then justified on liberal grounds. This argument is developed through a critical historical analysis of the relationship between security and liberty in the liberal tradition, which will then open the door to a wider discussion of security, emergency powers and liberal order-building in the chapters that follow.

### AT: Security Good

#### They say security’s positive

#### 1) Aff doesn’t solve – They frame their advocacy around a politics of survival and existential threats, not positive security – that’s above.

#### 2) Only the Alt solves – we advance a nuanced kritik of security that’s framed specifically in terms of their 1AC. Their defense of security is generic and limitless.

#### 3) We control uniqueness – security politics dominates in the squo – taking a critical approach is key to solve.

Neocleous 8 (Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy; Head of Department of Politics & History Brunel Univ, Critique of Security, 6-7)

Marx once described Capital as ‘a critique of economic categories or, if you like, a critical expose of the system of bourgeois economy’. He was critique as a method for simultaneously unmasking ideas and rooting them within the context of class society and the commodity form. This book is an attempt at a critique of one of the key political categories of our time, as a simultaneous critical expose of the system of bourgeois politics. In that sense it is meant as an unmasking of the ideology and a defetishing of the system of security. One of the features of ideology is that it imposes an obviousness or naturalness on ideas without appearing to do so – a double victory in which the obviousness of the ideas in question is taken as a product of their ‘naturalness’, and vice versa: their obviousness is obvious because they are so natural. This is nowhere truer than with security, the necessity of which appears so obvious and natural, so right and true, that it close off all opposition; it has to remain unquestioned, unanalyzed and undialectically presupposed, rather like the order which it is expected to secure. And if opposition to security is closed off, then so too is opposition to the political and social forces which have placed it at the heart of the political agenda. I want to write against this ideology by writing about the ways in which security has been coined, shaped and deployed by political, commercial, and intellectual forces. The book is therefore written against the security-mongering – in the literal sense of the ‘monger’ as one who traffics in a petty or discreditable way – that dominates contemporary politics. I will perhaps be charged with not taking insecurity seriously enough. But to take security seriously means to take it critically, and not to cower in the face of it monopolistic character. This is to hold true to the idea of critique as a political genre that aims to reset the course of a world which continues to hold a gun to the heads of human beings.

### AT: Epistemology Not First

#### They say epistemology’s not first –

#### 1. This argument is false – if they didn’t frame their 1AC around the politics of security our K wouldn’t apply, and we could proceed to discussing the best policy option.

#### 2. Infinite regress – this argument provides cover for any methodological flaws. They could say we need to build infrastructure for unicorns and then say our “unicorns don’t exist” argument is bad because it focuses on epistemology.

#### 3. It’s a question of the link – we’ve done specific work to point out why their advantages and evidence are flawed – that should be sufficient to warrant rejection.

#### 4. Only the Alt solves – criticizing security politics is a prerequisite to effective policymaking.

Bruce 96 (Robert, Associate Professor in Social Science – Curtin University and Graeme Cheeseman, Senior Lecturer – University of New South Wales, Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9)

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable **part of the problem** to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. **Before engaging in** the **policy debate** the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is **integral** to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has **direct practical implications** for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a **necessary prelude** to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, **then specific policies may follow**. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

### AT: Cede the Political

#### They say cede the political -

#### 1. We solve – true politics is about constant agitation, we make the world better by forcing the political system to adjust

#### 2. Turn – our poststructuralist stance is the only effective political strategy – the political has already been ceded to the right – broadening the scope of politics is key to effective engagement.

Grondin 4 [David, master of pol sci and PHD of political studies @ U of Ottowa “(Re)Writing the “National Security State”: How and Why Realists (Re)Built the(ir) Cold War,” http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/ieim/IMG/pdf/rewriting\_national\_security\_state.pdf]

A poststructuralist approach to international relations reassesses the nature of the political. Indeed, it calls for the **repoliticization of** practices of world **politics** that have been treated as if they were not political. For instance, limiting the ontological elements in one’s inquiry to states or great powers is a political choice. As Jenny Edkins puts it, we need to “bring the political back in” (Edkins, 1998: xii). For most analysts of International Relations, the conception of the “political” is **narrowly restricted to politics as practiced by politicians**. However, from a poststructuralist viewpoint, the “political” acquires a **broader meaning,** especially since practice is not what most theorists are describing as practice. Poststructuralism sees theoretical discourse not only as discourse, but also as political practice. Theory therefore becomes practice. The political space of poststructuralism is not that of exclusion; it is the political space of postmodernity, a dichotomous one, where one thing always signifies at least one thing and another (Finlayson and Valentine, 2002: 14). **Poststructuralism** thus **gives primacy to the political**, sinceit acts on us, while we act in its name, and leads us to identify and differentiate ourselves from others. This political act is never complete and celebrates undecidability, whereas decisions, when taken, express the political moment. It is a critical attitude which encourages dissidence from traditional approaches (Ashley and Walker, 1990a and 1990b). It does not represent one single philosophical approach or perspective, nor is it an alternative paradigm (Tvathail, 1996: 172). It is a nonplace, a border line falling between international and domestic politics (Ashley, 1989). The poststructuralist analyst questions the borderlines and dichotomies of modernist discourses, such as inside/outside, the constitution of the Self/Other, and so on. In the act of definition, difference – thereby the discourse of otherness – is highlighted, since one always defines an object with regard to what it is not (Knafo, 2004). As Simon Dalby asserts, “It involves the social construction of some other person, group, culture, race, nationality or political system as different from ‘our’ person, group, etc. Specifying difference is a linguistic, epistemological and, most importantly, a political act; it constructs a space for the other distanced and inferior from the vantage point of the person specifying the difference” (Dalby, cited in Tvathail, 1996: 179). Indeed, poststructuralism offers no definitive answers, but leads to new questions and new unexplored grounds. This makes the commitment to the incomplete nature of the political and of political analysis so central to poststructuralism (Finlayson and Valentine, 2002: 15). As Jim George writes, “It is postmodern resistance in the sense that while it is directly (and sometimes violently) engaged with modernity, it seeks to go beyond the repressive, closed aspects of modernist global existence. It is, therefore, not a resistance of traditional grand-scale emancipation or conventional radicalism imbued with authority of one or another sovereign presence. Rather, in opposing the large-scale brutality and inequity in human society, it is a resistance active also at the everyday, community, neighbourhood, and interpersonal levels, where it confronts those processes that **systematically exclude people from making decisions about who they are and what they can be**” (George, 1994: 215, emphasis in original). In this light, poststructural practices are used critically to investigate how the subject of international relations is constituted in and through the discourses and texts of global politics. Treating theory as discourse opens up the possibility of historicizing it. It is a myth that theory can be abstracted from its socio-historical context, from reality, so to speak, as neorealists and neoclassical realists believe. It is a political practice which needs to be contextualized and stripped of its purportedly neutral status. It must be understood with respect to its role in **preserving and reproducing the structures and power relations present in all language forms.** Dominant theories are, in this view, dominant discourses that shape our view of the world (the “subject”) and our ways of understanding it.

#### 3. Turn - criticism of securitized logic is critical to political thought, we formulate better policy by – that’s neocleous

#### 4. Only the Alt solves – criticizing security politics is a prerequisite to effective policymaking.

Bruce 96 (Robert, Associate Professor in Social Science – Curtin University and Graeme Cheeseman, Senior Lecturer – University of New South Wales, Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9)

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable **part of the problem** to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. **Before engaging in** the **policy debate** the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is **integral** to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has **direct practical implications** for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a **necessary prelude** to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, **then specific policies may follow**. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

### AT: Monolithic

#### 1) Aff doesn’t solve – They frame their advocacy around a politics of survival and existential threats, not positive security – that’s above.

#### 2) Only the Alt solves – we advance a nuanced kritik of security that’s framed specifically in terms of their 1AC. Their defense of security is generic and limitless.

#### 3) We control uniqueness – security politics dominates in the squo – taking a critical approach is key to solve.

Neocleous 8 (Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy; Head of Department of Politics & History Brunel Univ, Critique of Security, 6-7)

Marx once described Capital as ‘a critique of economic categories or, if you like, a critical expose of the system of bourgeois economy’. He was critique as a method for simultaneously unmasking ideas and rooting them within the context of class society and the commodity form. This book is an attempt at a critique of one of the key political categories of our time, as a simultaneous critical expose of the system of bourgeois politics. In that sense it is meant as an unmasking of the ideology and a defetishing of the system of security. One of the features of ideology is that it imposes an obviousness or naturalness on ideas without appearing to do so – a double victory in which the obviousness of the ideas in question is taken as a product of their ‘naturalness’, and vice versa: their obviousness is obvious because they are so natural. This is nowhere truer than with security, the necessity of which appears so obvious and natural, so right and true, that it close off all opposition; it has to remain unquestioned, unanalyzed and undialectically presupposed, rather like the order which it is expected to secure. And if opposition to security is closed off, then so too is opposition to the political and social forces which have placed it at the heart of the political agenda. I want to write against this ideology by writing about the ways in which security has been coined, shaped and deployed by political, commercial, and intellectual forces. The book is therefore written against the security-mongering – in the literal sense of the ‘monger’ as one who traffics in a petty or discreditable way – that dominates contemporary politics. I will perhaps be charged with not taking insecurity seriously enough. But to take security seriously means to take it critically, and not to cower in the face of it monopolistic character. This is to hold true to the idea of critique as a political genre that aims to reset the course of a world which continues to hold a gun to the heads of human beings.

### AT: Floating PIKs

#### They say floating PIKs bad –

#### 1. We aren’t a floating PIK – cross-x checks, you could’ve asked in the 1NC if we were a floating PIK, but you didn’t

### AT: V2L Args Bad

#### 1. Not the point—we’re not making the “no VTL= neg presumption” arg. Our argument is that your way of looking at life and those you’re attempting to save is based in the same logic that creates these problems in the first place.

#### 2. A focus on the quality of life is necessary – Quantitative analysis fails to account for our modern political situation where all meaning has been lost and all philosophical questions are fixed.

Ihde, ’93

(Don, Philosophy Prof – SUNY, Philosophy of Technology, p 93-4)

For example: is it apriori apparent that a sheerly quantitative analysis is either necessary or sufficient for resolving the issue? Some philosophers would argue that to give this much weight to a form of calculative reasoning is **already to have skewed the debate** into the arena of technoculture. Rather, the issues ought to be fought out on much more qualitative grounds having to do with the quality of life and the possible definitions of what a good life ought to be. They argue that to elevate sheerly quantitative considerations to the fore skews the debate **in such a way that qualitative factors are backgrounded**. Only when such qualities are isolated and affirmed does it make sense to judge what technoscience can and does do to enhance or detract from such life quality.

### AT: Realism

#### The LITANY of Departures From Realism and Failure of “Systemic Punishment” Disproves Their Theory.

Ronald R. Krebs, Faculty Fellow - Government @ University of Texas at Austin, Donald D. Harrington, Prof. of Political Science Univ. of Minnesota, ‘6 [Rhetoric, Strategy, and War: Language, Power, and the Making of US Security Policy, http://www.polisci.umn.edu/~mirc/paper2006-07/fall2006/Krebs.pdf]

Structural realists, focusing on the imperatives to security- or power-maximization that states must obey if they are to survive in the anarchic international system, are simply uninterested in domestic debate of any sort. They have long argued that these systemic imperatives, derived from the distribution of material power and perhaps geography, constitute an objective “national interest” that must be the chief driver of foreign policy.23 When states, for whatever reason, behave in contrary ways, they will eventually suffer punishment for their foolishness.24 But are there really such objective systemic dictates? The very fact that American structural realists frequently rail against US foreign policy suggests that departures from realist expectations are **hardly exceptional**. The typical realist response is that in these cases actors with more parochial or moralistic perspectives have hijacked policy, but realists, with their inattention to domestic politics, are then hard pressed to explain when such views hold sway.25 Moreover, the fact that such “hijackings” are so common suggests either that the system does **not often punish states for disobeying its rules**, in which case the **structural logic collapses**, or that **there are no such rules in the first place**. Structural realism imagines foreign policy as an exceptional realm above the political fray. Yet, even when the house is on fire, foreign policy lies in the realm of choice, not compulsion, and **thus very much in the realm of the political.**

#### Realism creates a death drive.

Der Derian 98 [JAMES, ON SECURITY, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html]

In epistemic realism, the search for security through sovereignty is not a political choice but the necessary reaction to an anarchical condition: Order is man-made and good; chaos is natural and evil. Out of self-interest, men must pursue this good and constrain the evil of excessive will through an alienation of individual powers to a superior, indeed supreme, collective power. In short, the security of epistemic realism is ontological, theological and teleological: that is, metaphysical. We shall see, from Marx's and Nietzsche's critiques, the extent to which Hobbesian security and epistemic realism rely on social constructions posing as apodictic truths for their power effects. There is not and never was a "state of nature" or a purely "self-interested man"; there is, however, clearly an abiding fear of violent and premature death that compels men to seek the security found in solidarity.

#### Realism operates as a state control mechanism – we’re told we are violent and hence we become violent.

Bleiker 2K [Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Page 16, Google Books]

Human agency is not something that exists in an a priori manner and can be measured scientifically in reference to external realities. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as human agency, for its nature and its function are, at least in part, determined by how we think about human action and its potential to shape political and social practices. The mutually constituted and constantly shilling relationship between agents and discourses thus undermines the possibility of observing social dynamics in a value-free way. To embark on such an endeavour nevertheless is to superimpose a static image upon a series of events that can only be understood in their fluidity. It is to objectivise a very particular and necessarily subjective understanding of agency and its corresponding political practices. The dangers of such an approach have been debated extensively. Authors such as Richard Ashley, Jim George and Steve Smith have shown how positivist epistemologies have transformed one specific interpretation of world political realities, the dominant realist one, into reality per se." Realist perceptions of the international have'. gradually become accepted as common sense. to the point that any critique against them has to be evaluated in terms of an already existing and obiectivised world-view. There are powerful mechanisms of control precisely in this ability to determine meaning and rationality. 'Defining common sense', Smith thus argues, is 'the ultimate act of political power'." It separates the possible from the impossible and directs the theory and practice of international relations on a particular path.

#### The alt solves their claims of IR inevitability – there is no objective way of viewing geopolitics. Actively questioning how we know what we know is necessary to understand all politics.

Grondin 4 [David, master of pol sci and PHD of political studies @ U of Ottowa “(Re)Writing the “National Security State”: How and Why Realists (Re)Built the(ir) Cold War,” http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/ieim/IMG/pdf/rewriting\_national\_security\_state.pdf]

Since realist analysts do not question their ontology and yet purport to provide a neutral and objective analysis ofa given world order based on military power and interactions between the most importantpolitical units, namely states, realist discourses constitute a political act in defense of the state. Indeed, “[…] it is important to recognize that to employ a textualizing approach to social policy involving conflict and war is not to attempt to reduce social phenomena to various concrete manifestations of language. Rather, it is an attempt to analyze the interpretations governing policy thinking. And it is important to recognize that policy thinking is not unsituated” (Shapiro, 1989a: 71). Policy thinking is practical thinking since it imposes an analytic order on the “real world”, a world that only exists in the analysts’own narratives. In this light, Barry Posen’s political role in legitimizing Americanhegemonic power and national security conduct seems obvious: U.S. command of the commons provides an impressive foundation for selective engagement. It is not adequate for a policy of primacy. […] Command of thecommons gives the United States a tremendous capability to harm others. Marryingthat capability to a conservative policy of selective engagement helps make U.S.military power appear less threatening and more tolerable. Command of thecommons creates additional collective goods for U.S. allies. These collective goodshelp connect U.S. military power to seemingly prosaic welfare concerns. U.S.military power underwrites world trade, travel, global telecommunications, andcommercial remote sensing, which all depend on peace and order in the commons”(Posen, 2003: 44 and 46).Adopting a more critical stance, David Campbell points out that “[d]anger is not anobjective condition. It (sic) is not a thing which exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat. […] Nothing is a risk in itself; [...] it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers the event” (Campbell, 1998: 1-2). In the same vein, national security discourse does not evaluate objective threats; rather, it is itself a product of historical processes and structures in the state and society that produces it.Whoever has the power to define security is then the one who has the authority to write legitimate security discourses and conduct the policies that legitimize them. The realistanalysts and state leaders who invoke national security and act in its name are the sameindividuals who hold the power to securitize threats by inserting them in a discoursethat frames national identity and freezes it.9Like many concepts, realism is essentially contested. In a critical reinterpretation of realism, James Der Derian offers a genealogy of realism that deconstructs the uniform realism represented in IR: he reveals many other versions of realism that are never mentioned in International Relations texts (Der Derian, 1995: 367). I am awarethat there are many realist discoursesin International Relations, but they all share a setof assumptions, such as “the state is a rational unitary actor”, “the state is the main actorin international relations”, “states pursue power defined as a national interest”, and soon. I want to show that **realism is one way of representing reality, not the reflection of reality**. While my aim here is not to rehearse Der Derian’s genealogy of realism, I dowant to spell out the problems with a positivist theory of realism and a correspondencephilosophy of language. Such a philosophy accepts nominalism, wherein language asneutral description corresponds to reality. This is precisely the problem of epistemic realism and of the realism characteristic of American realist theoretical discourses. Andsince for poststructuralists language constitutes reality, a reinterpretation of realism asconstructed in these discourses is called for.10These scholars cannot refer to the“essentially contested nature of realism” and then use “realism as the best language toreflect a self-same phenomenon” (Der Derian, 1995: 374). Let me be clear: I am notsuggesting that the many neorealist and neoclassical realist discourses in International Relations are not useful. Rather, I want to argue that these technicist and scientist forms of realism serve political purposes, used as they are in many think tanks and foreign policy bureaucracies to inform American political leaders. This is the relevance of deconstructing the uniform realism (as used in International Relations): it brings to light its locatedness in a hermeneutic circle in which it is unwittingly trapped (Der Derian, 1995: 371). And as Friedrich Kratochwil argues, “[…] the rejection of a correspondence theory of truth does not condemn us, as it is often maintained, to mere ‘relativism’ and/or to endless “deconstruction” in which anything goes but it leaves us with criteria that allows us to distinguish and evaluate competing theoretical creations” (Kratochwil, 2000: 52). Given that political language is not a neutral medium that gives expression to ideas formed independently of structures of signification that sustain political action and thought, American realist discourses belonging to the neorealist or neoclassical realisttraditions cannot be taken as mere descriptions of reality.We are trapped in theproduction of discourses in which national leaders and security speech acts emanatingfrom realist discourses develop and reinforce a notion of national identity as synony-mous with national security**.** U.S. national security conduct should thus be understoodthrough the prism of the theoretical discourses of American political leaders and realistscholars that co-constitute it. Realist discourses depict American political leaders actingin defense of national security, and political leaders act in the name of national security.In the end, what distinguishes realist discourses is that they depict the United States ashaving behaved like a national security state since World War II, while legitimating theidea that the United States should continue to do so. Political scientists and historians“are engaged in making (poesis), not merely recording or reporting” (Medhurst, 2000:17). Precisely in this sense, rhetoric is not the description of national security conduct; **it constitutes it.**

### AT: Realism Inevitable – Human Nature

#### Evolutionary theory is nothing without interpretation – cultural knowledge shapes responses by defining proper biology, only the alt can allow actual engagement with non-violent knowledge

Busser 6 [Mark, Master’s Candidate Department of Political Science, York University, The Evolution of Security: Revisiting the Human Nature Debate in International Relations, York Centre for International and Security Studies Working Paper Number 40, August, http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/documents/WP40-Busser.pdf]

Unfortunately for Bradley Thayer, **evolutionary arguments do not provide** a simple and **incontestable** ontological and epistemological **foundations for** revitalized **realism**. Since arguments like Thayer’s draw on controversial scientific branches of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, which arguably assume the basic features of human nature they seek to prove, the conclusions for political theory remain almost as scientifically arbitrary as Morgenthau’s assumption of an animus dominandi. In framing the problematic of their exploration, many of these arguments assume an individualistic and egoistic human nature and question how political relations might arise out of the mechanical dynamics of self-interest. As Mary Clark’s work demonstrates, this ignores important factors in the evolutionary development of the human being. Since interpersonal, cultural, political ,and social influences have had a large role in shaping the evolution of humans and our primate relatives, it is not such a simple task to explain human nature based on rational actor models and mathematical calculations. In contrast to the sociobiology and evolutionary psychology’s depiction of human nature as biologically determined, Clark argues that it is a society’s construction of a ‘story’ of human nature that affects how people will imagine ways to live together, fulfilling basic human needs or not. **Biology is not destiny**, she seems to argue, **but what we believe about our biology threatens to become our destiny** if we allow it. This highlights the possibility that seemingly universal traits like competition, aggression and egoism might be contingent on the weight we lend them and not biologically determined. If we have a choice in the matter, **it is possible to begin conceiving of political possibilities for global social orders that do not depend on a combative** and competitive **engagement with Others.** In turn, this allows a reconsideration of the conceptual lens through which to view security. If it is not programmed into our genes to be intolerant, ethnocentric, and aggressive, then we can find ways to abandon the traditions that have normalized such behaviours. Following Jim George and David Campbell, perhaps a new conception of international relationships would serve better than the current paradigm, which is based on traditional views of an aggressive and competitive human nature. It may be that, as Clark suggests, conflict can only be mitigated when basic human needs are met. Doing so, it seems, would require a rethinking of how differences are engaged with, interpreted and reconciled in both international and local societies. If we humans are not biologically destined to draw lines between ourselves and others, then it is possible for us to escape conceptions of security that necessitate aggression against, or protection from, outsiders. Perhaps the security long sought after in international relations will come not from making societies secure from difference, but making difference secure within and between states.

### AT: Realism Inevitable – Guzzini

#### Guzzini’s Analysis is a Reason to *Refuse the International System as natural* - Realist explanations are Politically Mandated.

Pinar Bilgin, Prof. of IR @ Bilkent, Berivan Elis, PhD Candidate in IR @ Ankara, ‘8 [Hard Power, Soft Power: Toward a More Realistic Power Analysis, http://www.bilkent.edu.tr/~pbilgin/Bilgin-Elis-IT-2008.pdf]

While the realist conception of power has come to shape mainstream accounts of world politics, critical scholars have pointed with vigor to the increasingly unrealistic analysis it delivers. Underscoring the limits of realist power analysis, Caporaso’s study of ‘structural power’56 points to the difference between dependence as a corollary of interstate relations and dependency as a structural feature of the existing world order; i.e. less developed countries find themselves in a ‘limited’ choice situation due to the structure of the capitalist international economy. Strange’s focus on international political economy highlights the role of global markets as an arena where power is exercised by actors other than the state in that ‘structural power decides outcomes (both positive and negative) much more than relational power does’.57 Guzzini, in turn, points to the ‘impersonal part of the power phenomena’, which he calls ‘governance’. Although both power and governance are needed for a comprehensive power analysis, he argued, the concept of power should remain attached to agents/actors so that an actor’s responsibilities and possible actions for emancipatory change would become more visible.58

With the aim of rendering power analysis more realistic, we should open up to **new research agendas** as required by the **multiple faces of power**. Power is **far too complex** in its sources, effects and production to be reduced to one dimension.59 Indeed, power is diffused and enmeshed in the social world in which people live in such a way that there are no relations exempt from power.60 Since power shapes the formation of actors’ consciousness, **no interest formation can be objective**;61 defining what an actor’s ‘real interests’ are is not free of power relations. That is to say, not only the mobilization of bias and agenda-setting but also the production and effects of all norms and values that shape human consciousness should be critically scrutinized. This, in turn, calls for not three- but four-dimensional power analysis – “Lukes plus Foucault” – as dubbed by Guzzini.62 Contra Lukes, whose three-dimensional power analysis rests on assumptions regarding (1) the possibility of uncovering power relations, and (2) B’s objective (‘real’) interests that A denies through various expressions of hard and soft power, Foucault maintains that ‘power and knowledge directly imply one another… [in that] there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations’.63 The academic field of International Relations constitutes a supreme example of the workings of the ‘fourth face of power’. Over the years, students of IR have studied international relations as an effect of power. It is only recently that they have begun to study power as an effect of international relations (as world politics) 64 and International Relations (as an academic field).65 However, as Booth reminds us, such silences, as with IR’s narrow conception of power, “are not natural, they are political. **Things do not just happen in politics, they are made to happen,** whether it is globalization or inequality. **Grammar serves power”.**66 One of the sites where the productive effects of grammar in the service of power is most visible is the ‘Third World’. This has been one of the central themes of postcolonial studies where “[f]rom Fanon to Jan Mahomed to Bhabha, the connecting theme is that Western representations construct meaning and ‘reality’ in the Third World. Concepts such as “progress”, “civilized” and “modern” powerfully shape the non-European world”.67 The ways in which grammar serves power becomes detectable through more realistic power analysis.

### AT: Conditionality

#### 1. Multiple worlds key to education

#### a) Strategic thinking – more worlds crowd out bad arguments such as no negative fiat.

#### b) Critique education – their world kills methodology and rhetoric focus which is uniquely debilitating.

#### 2. Negative flexibility – it’s better to punish the Aff instead of the neg because they get infinite prep, and the ability to collapse the debate down to one 2ac argument at any time. And the topic is inherently Aff biased because anything can be a social service and no disad is unique.

#### 4. All arguments are conditional– theory or perms are simply a no link claim.

#### 5. Dispo Worse –

#### a) Encourages less competitive counterplans like consult or delay or multiple planks to counterplan out of advantages forcing perms and leading to trivial debates

#### b) Dispo only works for 2 worlds, not 3 meaning they can't capture any education debating intersections between policy and k worlds.

# Links

### Airports

#### Airports are a representation of the securitized state

Salter 07

Mark Salter, Governmentalities of an Airport:Heterotopia and Confession, International Political Sociology(2007)1, 49–66

The modern international airport represents and reflects the intersecting forces that organize contemporary politics, facilitating transit while simultaneously securitizing identity. I take this site seriously and ask: how is the airport governed? I make use of two neglected notions from Foucault’s considerable body of work: the confessionary complex and the heterotopia. Modern subjects, according to Foucault, are conditioned by a Christian notion of continual, exhaustive confes- sion in the face of state apparatus, securing not only a docile body but also an anxious, self-disclosing citizen. The airport, while emancipatory and open for some, represents a locus of anxiety and interrogation for many others. In his lecture ‘‘Of Other Spaces,’’ Foucault proposes an examination of heterotopias, locations that are ‘‘in relation with all other sites, but in such a way to suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations that they happen to designate, mirror, or reflect’’ (1986:24). The airport connects the national and the international (also the national to itself), the domestic and the foreign, in a way that problematizes those connections. In particular, I argue that within this multifaceted environment dominated by doctrines of risk management and customer service, the confessionary complex facilitates the self-policing of transiting individuals and that the overlapping and obscured lines of authority subtly restrict the possibilities of resistance. International political sociology balances theoretical analysis and empirical material, with an overtly political but not prescriptive frame. By focusing on the system of policies, practices, and discourses that govern particular intersections of the local, national, and global, international political sociology explores the intersections of power and authority that shape the governance of these specific institutions. By eschewing a strict linguistic turn, international political sociology examines not simply the language of politics but also a wider notion of discourse including prac- tices, institutions, and authorities. Bigo’s attention to the rise of international risk consultancies and Walters’ examination of the deportation and decitizenship re- gimes provide new ways of looking at policing and security. International political sociology is well situated to reflect critically on the airport, taking as its subject matter not the grand structure of a universal politics, but more modest examin- ations of specific sites and institutions where politics are enacted, or as Foucault terms it ‘‘humble modalities, minor procedures, as compared with the majestic rituals of sovereignty or the great apparatuses of state’’

#### Airports are a key location for biopolitical organization

Salter 07 (Mark Salter, Governmentalities of an Airport:Heterotopia and Confession, International Political Sociology(2007)1, 49–66)

Train stations, ports, and airports Fall the sites of institutionalized mobility present the state with a policing challenge. Although he does not examine these transit sites in particular, Foucault is particularly useful in placing discussions of territory, population, and control within a theoretical frame that analyzes both sovereign and governmental modes of power. The airport represents a combination of the sovereign power to ban or exclude, and the disciplinary surveillance of mobile citizens. Throughout his work, Foucault illustrated an interest in the way that political and power relationships could be demonstrated or obscured through spatial arrangements. In modern Europe, Foucault argues that ‘‘architecture [. . .] is no longer built simply to be seen, or to observe the external space, but to general terms, an architecture that would operate to transform individuals: to act on those it shelters, to provide a hold on their conduct, to carry the effects of power right to them, to make it possible to know them, to alter them’’ (1977:172). He encourages the analysis of ‘‘heterotopias’’ as ‘‘spaces which are linked with all the others, which however contradict all the(se) sites . . .’’ (1986:24). Airports are an architectural shell in which mobility is channeled even as the buildings themselves are ‘‘in a constant state of flux, flirting with obsolescence, reshaping themselves, and adapting to new technologies’’ (Gordon 2004:167); though they remain ‘‘metastable: stable in their constant instability’’ (Fuller and Harley 2005:114). Analyses of these kinds of heterotopic spaces populate Foucault’s work on prisons, clinics, workhouses, and archives. He argues that ‘‘crisis heterotopias’’ such as convents, boarding schools, military academies, and so on, in which dangerous rites of pas- sage are spatially contained are being replaced by ‘‘heterotopias of deviation: those in which individuals whose behavior is deviant in relation to the required mean or norm are placed.’’ (1986:25). Although Foucault does not examine it, the airport certainly qualifies as this kind of heterotopia, both in terms of the isolation of the rites of passage of entry into and exit from the territory of the state, and in terms of the containment of deviant, mobile subjects. International mobility is deviance in a system of territorial nation-states. As Fuller and Harley aver, ‘‘transit-life’’ is a direct challenge to more placed notions of self and citizen (2005:38). Torpey (2000) and Noiriel (1996) examine how the machinery of government identification attempts to ‘‘know’’ the mobile population in order to control it. Where I gain the most traction, however, is in Foucault’s delineation of heterotopias as ‘‘capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several places, several sites that are in themselves incompatible’’ (1986:25). In an extension of Bigo’s mob ̈ıus ribbon metaphor, one might argue that in the airport the national, the international, and the non-national spaces of transit are all proximate if not coterminous in the space of the terminal. Further, ‘‘heterotopias always presuppose a system of opening and closing that both isolates them and makes them penetrable’’ (2001:26), as the airport is both separated from its own proximate urban space and connected to distant urban spaces (Adey 2006:343–345).

#### Airports are a key matrix for modern biopower

Salter 07 (Mark Salter, Governmentalities of an Airport:Heterotopia and Confession, International Political Sociology(2007)1, 49–66)

Airports are spaces that represent the policing power of the sovereign state, that contain the dangerous or risky elements of the unknown, and that render certain mobilities visible and others impossible or invisible. The trick of the modern airport is to present immobility as mobility, stagnancy as efficiency, and incarceration as freedom. Adey (forthcoming b) takes this interrogation of the space further to disrupt the common avowal of airports as exclusively spaces of flows. He argues that ‘‘passengers are often made relatively immobile, encourage to dwell and stay within specific areas of the airport space’’ (forthcoming b:3). Evaluating the intertwining commercial and managerial imperatives, Adey illustrates how airport design and function serve ‘‘to create relatively stationary passengers’’ (forthcoming b:10). The mobility machine creates dead time at odds with its aim of efficient transit (arriving 3 hours before departure), which is then consumed by shops and restaurants. The airport is not the place of the idle flaˆneur who strolls among the vaulted terminals that characterize modern airport architecture. Pedestrian movements and transit time are both structured by design to enable consumption, mobility, and social sorting. It should not surprise us that the same architects design modern airport terminals, shopping malls, and penitentiaries (Gordon 2004:238). Fuller and Harley argue that, similar to the prison or the clinic, the disciplinary tactics of the airport are made possible through a logic of exceptionality: ‘‘in our need to move, we submit to a series of invasive procedures and security checks that are becoming more pervasive and yet are still rationalized through a discourse of exception only at the airport’’’ (2005:44). Modern international airports are borders, where claims to citizenship, immigration, and refugee status are adjudicated. Moreover, the bordering or sorting process takes place throughout the terminal in the airline check-in lines for economy and business class travelers, the customs lines for foreigners and nationals, the frequent flyer lounges, and deportation holding cells. The utility of a heterotopic analysis, in the face of competing models of a ‘‘non-space’’ stems from the attention Foucault pays to the contradictory elements in these spaces. Following Lisle’s discussion of mediated power at the airport, heterotopias are deceptive in that they ‘‘seem to be pure and simple openings, but [. . .] hide curious exclusions’’ (2003:26). In the judicial trial, the accused is the author of his/her testimony, but not the final arbiter of truth about themselves. In the clinic, the patient is the author of the symptoms and history, but not the final arbiter of the diagnosis. So too in the airport, a traveler is the author of one’s identity, but not the final arbiter of his/her belonging or mobility. The space of transit is fragmented so that arriving, departing, accompanying, and supporting staff are all hidden from one another. The connection of domestic to foreign is also smoothed by an international uniform language of iconic signs, and in the cases of Ben Gurion and Incheon airports, great walls of stones that simulate a solid boundary between inside and outside. As engaged critics, we must take note not simply of travelers eager to limit their time in the airport through frequent flyer and trusted traveler programs but also those travelers reluctantly hustled out of the airport aboard ‘‘deportation class’’ (Walters 2002). **Although a primary function of the airport is security, the most fundamental policing functions are conducted out of sight. Many of the gates and check-points that structure mobilities in the airport are invisible** (Adey 2004a, 2004b). Indeed, given most airports’ detachment from urban space, travelers have already been ‘‘pre-cleared,’’ if only by their ability to arrive at the airport itself. Lloyd argues that the space of the airport has been configured into a space of consumption so that ‘‘the figure of global traveler is allied to the global consumer, whereas the national citizen’s ‘‘othered’’ figures, the homeless person and refugee, are precluded by consumption practices . . . This image scape of free mobility in the international terminal is markedly different from the backstage containment of national others in identity checks, detention, and deportation that takes place within the very same institution’’ (2003:106). The airport attempts to make all of these in- congruous forces appear smooth and systematic, as if all travelers were safe, all planes on time and all policing efficient. Analyzing the airport as a heterotopia leads to three insights: the disaggregation of sovereignty and territory, the importance of confession and surveillance at the airport, and the hidden dynamics of airport security screening.

### Balance

#### Searching for Balance in politics is really a mask for Securitization

Neocleous 8 (Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy; Head of Department of Politics & History Brunel Univ, Critique of Security, 12-13)

I will therefor take a very different approach by suggesting that the question of balance is an essentially liberal one. Ronald Dworkin and Andrew Ashworth have shown that the notion of balance is a rhetorical device of which one must be extremely wary. Aside from lacking any empirical evidence and often involving the giving-up of the liberties of others, usually minorities, the whole approach based on ‘balancing’ presupposes that ‘balance’ is self-evidently a worth goal – hence ‘balance of powers’, ‘balance of trade’, and so on – and thus acts as a substitute for real argument. I want to push this further and show that the idea of balance doesn’t just act as a substitute for real argument, but in fact functions as a mechanism for working any argument into a fundamentally liberal mode of thought. And behind this liberal mode of thought lies a set of fundamentally illiberal justifications for a range of extreme and dangerous ‘security measures’. Thus rather than take what has fast become the standard approach of criticizing security measures in terms of their threat to liberty, or of asking ‘how much liberty are we willing to sacrifice in the search for security?’, I suggest that what we need is an exploration of the ways the liberal project of ‘liberty’ is in fact a project of security.

### Competitiveness

#### The notion of competitiveness authorizes global violence.

Schoenberger, Geography and Envt’l Eng @ Johns Hopkins, 98. [Erica, “Discourse and practice in human geography.” Progress in Human Geography 22 (1) p.  2-5]

In what follows, I want to examine the meaning and use of the concept of `competitiveness'. The analysis claims, in essence, that the term is not merely an `objective' description of a fact of economic life, but also part of a discursive strategy that constructs a particular understanding of reality and elicits actions and reactions appropriate to that understanding. This is followed by a discussion of why the discourse has the power that it does and how it may influence how we think about and act in the world. I then work through some examples of how an unexamined acceptance of a discursive convention may obscure as much as it reveals. II Competitiveness as an economic category and discursive strategy I'm going to make this as simple as possible for myself by reducing the whole problem of discourse to one word: competitiveness. For economic geographers in general and for me in particular, the categories of competition, competitive strategy and competitiveness have a great deal of importance and might even be thought to pervade our work, even when they are not directly under analysis. All sorts of industrial and spatial economic outcomes are implicitly or explicitly linked to some notion of `competitiveness' (cf. Krugman, 1994). The rise and decline of particular industrial regions have something to do with the competitiveness of the labour force (generally understood in terms of comparative costs and unionization), which (for geographers if for no one else) has something to do with the competitiveness of the region in the first place, understood as its particular mix of resources, infrastructure, location and cost profile. More than that, though, `competitiveness' seems to me a term that has become truly hegemonic in the Gramscian sense. It is a culturally and socially sanctioned category that, when invoked, can completely halt public discussion of public or private activities. There is virtually no counterargument available to the simple claim that `doing X will make us uncompetitive,' whatever X and whomever `us' might be.2 In a capitalist society, of course, it is more than reasonable to be concerned with competition and competitiveness. No matter what your theoretical orientation, main- stream to Marxist, these must be seen as real forces shaping real outcomes in society. They are not just intellectual constructs that lend a false sense of order to a messy world. On the other hand, we can also analyse them as elements of a discursive strategy that shapes our understanding of the world and our possibilities for action in it. In that case, it seems to me the first questions to ask are whose discursive strategy is it, what do they really mean by it, where does its power come from, and what kinds of actions does it tend to open up or foreclose. 1 Whose discourse? The discourse on competitiveness comes from two principal sources and in part its power is their power. In the first instance, it is the discourse of the economics profession which doesn't really need to analyse what it is or what it means socially. The market is the impartial and ultimate arbiter of right behaviour in the economy and competitiveness simply describes the result of responding correctly to market signals. The blandness of this `objective' language conceals the underlying harshness of the metaphor. For Adam Smith, the idea of competition plausibly evoked nothing more disturbing than a horse race in which the losers are not summarily executed. Since then, the close identification of marginalist economics with evolutionary theory has unavoidably imbued the concept with the sense of a life or death struggle (cf. Niehans, 1990).3 In short, on competitiveness hangs life itself. As Krugman (1994: 31) defines it: `. . . when we say that a corporation is uncompetitive, we mean that its market position is . . . unsustainable ± that unless it improves its performance it will cease to exist.' As with evolutionary theory, our ability to strip the moral and ethical content from the concepts of life and death is not so great as the self-image of modern science suggests. Competitiveness becomes inescapably associated with ideas of fitness and unfitness, and these in turn with the unstated premise of merit, as in `deserving to live' and `deserving to die'. Secondly, competitiveness is the discourse of the business community and represents both an essential value and an essential validation. More generally, it serves as an all- purpose and unarguable explanation for any behaviour: `We must do X in order to be competitive.' Again, the implied `or else' is death. As hinted, though, the discourse of competitiveness has seeped out beyond these sources and is becoming socially pervasive. University presidents, hospital admin- istrators and government bureaucrats also discourse quite fluently now about compet- itiveness and its related accoutrements: customers, total quality, flexibility and so forth. It will be objected that competitiveness is a deeply ingrained social category and value in the USA and elsewhere and there is no particular reason to single out economists and business persons as culprits in its dissemination. That objection is true enough, and no doubt contributes to the general power of the discourse since it resonates so well with this broader heritage. But `competitiveness' in the sense of `deserving to live' is not what was commonly meant by this more diffuse social understanding. It is, however, what is meant in economic analysis and business life, and it is increasingly what is meant in other institutional and social settings as well.

#### Use of economic competitiveness discourse justifies trade wars and protectionism

Berger and Bristow (Thomas, Professor, Department of International Relations, Boston University, and Gillian, Senior Lecturer in Economic Geography at Cardiff) 09

(Thomas and Gillian, Competitiveness and the Benchmarking of Nations- A Critical Reflection, September 9, 2009. http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=1de2b04e-c758-4225-8cb3-396889ad585f%40sessionmgr14&vid=2&hid=10)

National competitiveness is also frequently conceptualized in terms of the ability to earn or the economy’s overall results in macroeconomic terms. In short, it is assumed that a higher degree of competitiveness leads to a higher GDP or income, and therefore to a higher standard of living (McFetridge 1995). The source for this is seen in productivity gains (Porter 1990). Indeed, Porter asserts that national competitiveness is equivalent to productivity. This reflects the close links which he believes exist between the microeconomic productivity of firms and the macroeconomic performance of the national economy. It follows that the ability to adjust through continuous innovation and flexibility to changing market demands is also deemed by some to be synonymous with national competitiveness. Finally, competitiveness is also increasingly conceived as reflecting a nation’s ability to attract outside investments in both financial capital and the skilled human resources required for development (Kovačič 2007, 555). This reflects the predominance of the discourse of globalization which has helped sediment that view that nations are engaged in fierce competition with one another for globally mobile capital, innovative firms, finite government resources and skilled, creative labour (Bristow 2005). A Growing Critique Porter’s so-called competitive ‘diamond’ has become one of the most influential frameworks for conceptualizing national economic competitiveness and identifying some of its key determinants, namely firm strategy, structure and rivalry; factor input conditions; demand conditions; and related and supporting industries. However, it falls short of providing a comprehensive theory capable of yielding testable predictions on the precise causal relationships shaping competitiveness performance (Lall 2001).As a consequence, there has been growing critique of the concept of national competitiveness and the rather flimsy theoretical base on which it rests. Krugman (1997, 7) summarizes the confusion which surrounds the meaning of national competitiveness with his assertion that it is largely defined in vague and approximate terms “as the combination of favorable trade performance and something else”. This is referring to the fact that most definitions—just like the one by the OECD (1992)—refer to the ability to sell concept. This is often accompanied with a call for a strategic management on the national level, focusing on high-value added activities, exports or innovation, depending on the underlying concept. The danger here is that such rhetoric is used to justify protectionism and trade wars. Krugman (1994, 1997) goes on to argue that national competitiveness is either a new word for domestic productivity or meaningless political rhetoric. Whilst nations may compete for investments if companies seek new business locations, this represents only a minor fraction of economic activities for bigger economies. Furthermore, this is often connected with subsidies or tax reductions to attract such investments. This strategic management for the attraction of investment and the fostering of exports is, according to Krugman, little more than political rhetoric, designed to promote an image rather than secure clear and unambiguous economic dividends,. Similarly, Cohen (1994, 196) describes the notion of national competitiveness in terms of “Presidential metaphors, [trying] to encapsulate complicated matters for purposes of political mobilization”, perhaps implying that national competitiveness might be better understood in the fields of political science and place marketing. Indeed, growing interest in the notion of competitiveness as a hegemonic construct or discourse provides further strength to the view that its value lies beyond that of an economic model or concept, but rests instead with its capacity to mobilize interest-related action (Bristow 2005). As such, this paper focuses on the utility of national indices of competitiveness, particularly for policymakers and key interest groups promoting it.

#### Discourse of Economic Competitiveness is based off of securitization of relative decline that leads to all forms of protectionism

**Cable** (Head of the International Economics Program, Royal Institute of International Affairs) **95**

(Vincent, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) , Vol. 71, No. 2 (Apr., 1995), pp. 305-324, April 1995, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2623436)

While it is difficult to see much evidence that Western governments are moving decisively towards 'geo-economic' thinking, there has been a powerful upsurge in populist forms of protectionism, fed by the idea- promulgated by the likes of Ross Perot and, more recently in Europe, by Sir James Goldsmith-that foreign trade is a threat to jobs and living standards. The fallacies embodied in these ideas have been set out in considered detail elsewhere.20 The practical consequence of their popularity is that geo- economic ideas can become embedded politically, in particular the belief that international economic integration is a win-lose, zero-sum game. Thus the groundwork is laid for protectionism in all its forms. The most pervasive danger in the competitiveness obsession is that it shifts the attention of policy-makers away from those things which affect absolute economic performance and living standards towards the 'threat' of relative decline. Thus Samuel Huntington worries that 'American influence in third countries declines relative to that of Japan ... Japan has supplanted the US as the largest provider of economic assistance.'2I In this sense, geo-economics is doomed to frustration, since technological catch-up and liberal policy reform mean that emerging market economies are almost certainly bound to grow faster than the US (or EU), which will consequently have a steadily shrinking share of world GNP and trade. Britain has had to get used to relative decline for a century or more and the process is by no means complete. Such relativities should be a matter of indifference but, in practice, states, like individuals, are often more agitated by differential than absolute performance. And in the context of geo-economics relativities trigger alarm because they are seen as affecting the capacities of countries to defend themselves. Geo-economic prescriptions-where this involves protectionism-may, however, actually make the problem, if it is one, worse.

### Economy

#### Securitization of the economy is another attempt to maintain power, but it leads to protectionist policies and destroys economic strength

Lipschutz 98 (Ronnie, Director – Politics PhD Program, UC Santa Cruz, 1998. “On Security” p. 11-12)

The ways in which the framing of threats is influenced by a changing global economy is seen nowhere more clearly than in recent debates over competitiveness and "economic security." What does it mean to be competitive? Is a national industrial policy consistent with global economic liberalization? How is the security component of this issue socially constructed? Beverly Crawford (Chapter 6: "Hawks, Doves, but no Owls: The New Security Dilemma Under International Economic Interdependence") shows how strategic economic interdependence--a consequence of the growing liberalization of the global economic system, the increasing availability of advanced technologies through commercial markets, and the ever-increasing velocity of the product cycle--undermines the ability of states to control those technologies that, it is often argued, are critical to economic strength and military might. Not only can others acquire these technologies, they might also seek to restrict access to them. Both contingencies could be threatening. (Note, however, that by and large the only such restrictions that have been imposed in recent years have all come at the behest of the United States, which is most fearful of its supposed vulnerability in this respect.) What, then, is the solution to this "new security dilemma," as Crawford has stylized it? According to Crawford, state decisionmakers can respond in three ways. First, they can try to restore state autonomy through self-reliance although, in doing so, they are likely to undermine state strength via reduced competitiveness. Second, they can try to restrict technology transfer to potential enemies, or the trading partners of potential enemies, although this begins to include pretty much everybody. It also threatens to limit the market shares of those corporations that produce the most innovative technologies. Finally, they can enter into co-production projects or encourage strategic alliances among firms. The former approach may slow down technological development; the latter places control in the hands of actors who are driven by market, and not military, forces. They are, therefore, potentially unreliable. All else being equal, in all three cases, the state appears to be a net loser where its security is concerned. But this does not prevent the state from trying to gain.

#### The foundations of state power have changed since the Cold War – Efforts to improve economic power represent attempts at securitization

Schweller, 11 (Randall Schweller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, “ Rational Theory for a Bygone Era”, Security Studies Vol. 20 Issue 3, 8/25/2011, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2011.599196, RM)

But geography and policies rooted in geopolitics have become less relevant to the formation of strategy and politics than they were when raw materials and land were the major prerequisites for state power. We no longer live in a world governed by the logic of the mercantilist age, when military conquest to control territory and achieve autarky (or a monopoly on goods) was the surest route to riches and power. Today, the traditional link between territory and wealth has been largely broken. The current era of high technology, instant communication, and nuclear weapons has significantly raised the benefits of peace and the costs of war. What matters most today is not a state's ability to exert direct control over resources but its capacity to purchase them in a free global market. Accordingly, the foundation of modern state power has shifted away from traditional military power toward an emphasis on economic production and a sustained capacity to generate ideas and commercial innovations that create wealth. To be perfectly clear on this point, innovation and economic growth remain key building blocks of military power; I am not suggesting otherwise. Rather, I am saying that military power is no longer an essential building block of economic growth and wealth creation; and this has deeply changed the nature of international politics and how the game is played.

### Emergency

#### Using emergency scenarios as an excuse to securitize creates a permanent sense of constant need for that security – it’s a self-fulfilling prophecy

Neocleous 8 (Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy; Head of Department of Politics & History Brunel Univ, Critique of Security, 8)

Much has been made recently of the idea that we have moved into a permanent ‘state of emergency’ following 9/11. My argument is that what is needed is less an analysis of the ‘state of emergency’ and much more an interrogation of the ways in which emergency powers became normalized through the twentieth century. As well as undermining any distinction between the ‘normality’ of the rule of law on the one hand and the ‘exception’ of the violence exercised through emergency powers on the other, this argument points us to the emergency created the platform for security to become the central category of liberal order-building in the twentieth century. To make this argument I trace the idea of ‘national security’ as it emerged in the late-1940s back to earlier debates about ‘social security’ in the 1930s. Introduced through the use of emergency powers, security created the grounds for a new liberal order-building domestically via social security and internationally via national security. Security could thus be used as a political technology on both the domestic and the international front, the basis of which was a particular vision of economic order.

### Environment

#### Catastrophic depictions of the environment embody the logic of security – they produce one-shot governmental solutions that utterly fail to resolve the underlying harm

Roe, 12 (Paul Roe, Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations and European Studies at Central European University, Budapest, “Is securitization a ‘negative’ concept? Revisiting the normative debate over normal versus extraordinary politics,” Security Dialogue vol. 43 no. 3, June 2012)

For the Copenhagen School, and particularly for Wæver, desecuritization (politicization) might be ‘more effective than securitizing problems’ (Wæver, 1995: 57; emphasis added). This is not just a matter of the context within which problems are dealt with, but also has to do with the long-term thinking that normal politics arguably brings with it. Although Wæver is by no means categorical in the claim that securitization is invariably worse than politicization, his thinking nevertheless suggests that securitizing problems may not always result in better outcomes.5 For example, Wæver (1995: 65) restates Barry Buzan’s assertion that some environmental issues might be tackled more effectively ‘by the process-type remedies of economics, than by the statist solutions of security logic’. Similarly, Daniel Deudney (1990: 465–7) has warned of the logic of security being appropriated to create a sense of urgency in relation to the need to address ecological problems: how some environmentalists endeavour to find a ‘moral equivalence to war’. In particular, Deudney draws attention to how national security’s propensity for short-term strategizing – the desire that affairs are quickly returned to normal – ‘is not likely to make much of a contribution to establishing patterns of environmentally sound behaviour’. Because ‘conventional national security organizations have short-term horizons’, the tendency not to operate on the basis of long-term thinking represents a ‘poor model for environmental problem solving’. Stefan Elbe has also raised questions over the efficacy of securitizing certain public health concerns.6 In Elbe’s treatment of (the more specific) normative debate over the linking of HIV/AIDS and security, he notes how framing the issue of HIV/AIDS as security ‘pushes responses to the disease away from civil society toward the much less transparent workings of military and intelligence organizations, which also possess the power to override human rights and civil liberties’ (Elbe, 2006: 128).7

#### Environmental issues become securitizing when extreme measures are taken to conserve it- when the environment becomes an apriori issues to any others

Buzan et al, 1998 (Barry Bzzan, Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and honorary professor at the University of Copenhagen and Jilin University, Ole Waever, a professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen Jaap de Wilde,  Professor of International Relations and World Politics at the University of Groningen., 1998 “Security: A New Framework for Analysis” p.38)

Nor do system-level referent objects always lose out. Thus far they have done so in the military and political sectors, where the security of humankind has generally had less appeal than that of the state. But the story is different in other sectors. The environment is becoming an interesting case, because groups are using a securitizing logic that exactly follows the format prescribed in the previous section: the environment has to survive: therefore, this issue should take priority over all others, because if the environment is degraded to the point of no return all other issues will lose their meaning. If the normal system (politics according to the rules as they exist) is not able to handle the situation, we (Greenpeace and especially the more extremist Eco terrorists) will have to take extraordinary measures to save the environment. Sustainability might be the environmentalist’s equivalent of the state’s sovereignty and the nation’s identity: it is the essential constitutive principle that has to be protected. If the is idea catches on the environment itself may be on the way to becoming a referent object- an object by reference to which security action can be taken in a socially significant way. We discuss this more fully in Chapter 4. Once this door is opened, one can see other plausible candidates for security referent objects at the system level. Humankind as a whole achieved some status as a referent object in relation to nuclear weapons and could do so again- perhaps more successfully- in relation to environmental disasters, such as new ice ages or collisions between the earth and one or more of the many large rocks that occupy near-earth space. The level of human civilization could also become the referent object in relations to environmental threats.

#### The extension of security logic to the environment reinforces current environmental trends, and results in the destruction of human civilization and endangers our mere existence

Dalby 2002 (Simon, professor of geography and political economy at Carleton University, Environmental Security, 2002, pg. 144-6)

This observation makes the question of what is to be secured especially important. The possibility that the ecological costs of globalizing omnivorous consumption might drastically destabilize the biosphere is the rationale for many invocations to think about environmental security, as well as the related appeals for global environmental management that so worry "global ecology" thinkers like Wolfgang Sachs.2 While Peter Taylor calls such a program an eco-fascist world order, the World Order Models Project has discussed these matters in terms of eco-imperialism and made the argument that such practices are effectively already in action.3 Tim Luke's warning that environmentalists often, if sometimes inadvertently, support such projects in their zeal to monitor and encourage managerial responses to political crises extends these observations to once again emphasize the importance of the discursive politics of forms of ecocritique.4 From this it is clear that a program of environmental management will have to understand human ecology better than conventional international relations does if world politics in the global city is going to seriously tackle environmental sustainability. Accelerating attempts to manage planet Earth using technocratic, centralized modes of control, whether dressed up in the language of environmental security or not, may simply exacerbate existing trends. The frequent failures of resource management techniques premised on assumptions about stable ecosystems are even more troubling in the case of claims about the necessity of managing the whole planet. Given the inadequacy of many existing techniques, if these practices are to be extended to the scale of the globe, the results are potentially disastrous. In the face of extreme disruption, no comfort can be taken from biospheric thinking or the Gaia hypothesis. As James Lovelock has pointed out, the question for humanity is not just the continued existence of conditions fit for life on the planet. In the face of quite drastic structural change in the biosphere in the past, the climatic conditions have remained within the limits that have assured the overall survival of life-but not necessarily the conditions suitable for contemporary human civilization. The political dilemma and the irony here is that the political alternative to global managerial efforts, that of political decentralization and local control, which is often posited by green theory, frequently remains in thrall to the same limited political imaginary of the domestic analogy and avoids dealing with the hard questions of coordination by wishing them away in a series of geographical sleights of hand coupled to the rearticulation of the discourses of political idealism.5 Given that the ecological analyses of biospheric processes and the human ecology discussions of biospheric people suggest both the global scope of processes of disruption and the intrinsic instabilities of ecology, the importance of politics and the inadequacies of international relations to grapple with its complexities is only emphasized in the face of these calls for either global management or radical decentralization.6 The widespread failure of the omnivores to acknowledge the consequences of their actions is a crucial part of these concerns, and this responsibility is often obscured by the construction of security in terms of technological and modernist managerial assertions of control within a geopolitical imaginary of states and territorial entities, urbane civilization and primitive wilderness. But as the focus on human ecology demonstrates, nature is not just there anymore; it is also unavoidably here, in part a consequence of human activities, which, although often out of sight to urban residents, cannot remain out of mind in considering matters of world politics and the radical endangerment of human "being" as a result of the practices of securing modern modes of existence.

#### Construction of environmental threats produces securitizing measures but no real change- no solvency

Buzan et al, 1998 (Barry Buzan, Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and honorary professor at the University of Copenhagen and Jilin University, Ole Waever, a professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen Jaap de Wilde,  Professor of International Relations and World Politics at the University of Groningen., 1998 “Security: A New Framework for Analysis” p.73-74 )

It should be emphasized that the political agenda does not only address the more sensational, emotion manifestations of environmental issues but has also become a part of ordinary politics. Political parties, departments, and many firms must formulate environmental polities as a part of their ordinary activities, regardless of whether they believe in them. This situation constitutes politicization rather than securitization. As long as environmental concerns fall outside established economic and political practices and routines, their advocates tend to- and probably must- overemphasize the overwhelming importance of those values and issues. Many securitizing moves can be found in the reports that bridge both agenda, ranging from the Club of Rome reports to the work of the Brudtland Commission. These reports present Silent Spring-type lessons (de Wilde 1994: Carson 1962): It is not the actual disasters but their predictions that lead to securitization. Concepts such as resource scarcity and sustainability have successfully mobilized public concern. when picked up by governments and firms, however, these concerns are often merely politicized: they constituted a subagenda within the larger political context. The environmental sector displays more clearly than any other the propensity for dramatic securitizing moves but with comparatively little successful securitization effects (i.e. those that lead to extraordinary measures). this finding points to the unsettled standing of the environmental discourse as such within public debate.

#### The blending of environmental and national impacts supports a securitized logic of geopolitics, upholding the US as the only true global savior

Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Professor of Government and International Affairs and Director of the Masters of Public and International Affairs program – Virginia Tech, Sept 1996. “AT THE END OF GEOPOLITICS?.” http://www.nvc.vt.edu/toalg/Website/Publish/papers/End.htm

Even within the much remarked upon emergence of "environmental security" and the sacred visions of green governmentalists like Al Gore, geography is post-territorial in-flowmations of ozone gases, acid rain, industrial pollution, topsoil erosion, smog emissions, rainforest depletions and toxic spills. Yet, the discourse of unveiled and primordial geographical regions persists also. In the place of Mackinder's natural seats of power, Gore presents the "great genetic treasure map" of the globe, twelve areas around the globe that "hold the greatest concentration of germplasm important to modern agriculture and world food production." Robert Kaplan's unsentimental journey to the "ends of the earth" where cartographic geographies are unravelling and fading has him disclosing a "real world" of themeless violence and chaos, a world where "[w]e are not in control." The specter of a second Cold War -- "a protracted struggle between ourselves and the demons of crime, population pressure, environmental degradation, disease and cultural conflict" -- haunt his thoughts. This equivocal environmentalization of strategic discourse (and visa versa) -- and the environmental strategic think tanks like the World Watch Institute which promote it -- deserve problematization as clusters of postmodern geopolitics, in this case congealments of geographical knowledge and green governmentality designed to re-charge the American polity with a circumscribed global environmental mission to save planet earth from destruction.

### Hegemony

#### The impulse to preserve hegemony authorizes global violence along racial lines.

Amy Kaplan, Prof. of English @ Univ. of Pennslyvania, ‘3 [American Quarterly 56.1, “Violent Belongings and the Question of Empire Today,” p. muse]

Another dominant narrative about empire today, told by liberal interventionists, is that of the "reluctant imperialist." 10 In this version, the United States never sought an empire and may even be constitutionally unsuited to rule one, but it had the burden thrust upon it by the fall of earlier empires and the failures of modern states, which abuse the human rights of their own people and spawn terrorism. The United States is the only power in the world with the capacity and the moral authority to act as military policeman and economic manager to bring order to the world. Benevolence and self-interest merge in this narrative; backed by unparalleled force, the United States can save the people of the world from their own anarchy, their descent into an [End Page 4] uncivilized state. As Robert Kaplan writes—not reluctantly at all—in "Supremacy by Stealth: Ten Rules for Managing the World": "The purpose of power is not power itself; it is a fundamentally liberal purpose of sustaining the key characteristics of an orderly world. Those characteristics include basic political stability, the idea of liberty, pragmatically conceived; respect for property; economic freedom; and representative government, culturally understood. At this moment in time it is American power, and American power only, that can serve as an organizing principle for the worldwide expansion of liberal civil society." 11 This narrative does imagine limits to empire, yet primarily in the selfish refusal of U.S. citizens to sacrifice and shoulder the burden for others, as though sacrifices have not already been imposed on them by the state. The temporal dimension of this narrative entails the aborted effort of other nations and peoples to enter modernity, and its view of the future projects the end of empire only when the **world is remade in our image.**  This is also a narrative about race. The images of an unruly world, of anarchy and chaos, of failed modernity, **recycle stereotypes of racial inferiority** from earlier colonial discourses about races **who are incapable of governing themselves,** Kipling's "lesser breeds without the law," or Roosevelt's "loosening ties of civilized society," in his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. In his much-noted article in the New York Times Magazine entitled "The American Empire," Michael Ignatieff appended the subtitle "The Burden" but insisted that "America's empire is not like empires of times past, built on colonies, conquest and the white man's burden." 12 Denial and exceptionalism are apparently **alive and well**. In American studies we need to go beyond simply exposing the racism of empire and examine the dynamics by which Arabs and the religion of Islam are becoming racialized **through the interplay of templates of U.S. racial codes and colonial Orientalism.** These narratives of the origins of the current empire—that is, the neoconservative and the liberal interventionist—have much in common. They take American exceptionalism to new heights: its paradoxical claim to uniqueness and universality at the same time. They share a teleological narrative of inevitability, that America is the apotheosis of history, the embodiment of universal values of human rights, liberalism, and democracy, the "indispensable nation," in Madeleine Albright's words. In this logic, the United States claims the authority to "make sovereign judgments on what is right and what is wrong" for everyone [End Page 5] else and "to exempt itself with an absolutely clear conscience from all the rules that it proclaims and applies to others." 13 Absolutely protective of its own sovereignty, it upholds a doctrine of limited sovereignty for others and thus **deems the entire world a potential site of intervention.** Universalism thus can be made manifest only **through the threat and use of violence.** If in these narratives imperial power is deemed the solution to a broken world, then they preempt any counternarratives that claim U.S. imperial actions, past and present, may have something to do with the world's problems. According to this logic, resistance to empire can never be opposition to the imposition of foreign rule; rather, resistance means irrational opposition to modernity and universal human values. Although these narratives of empire seem ahistorical at best, they are buttressed not only by nostalgia for the British Empire but also by an effort to rewrite the history of U.S. imperialism by appropriating a progressive historiography that has exposed empire as a dynamic engine of American history. As part of the "coming-out" narrative, the message is: "Hey what's the big deal. We've always been interventionist and imperialist since the Barbary Coast and Jefferson's 'empire for liberty.' Let's just be ourselves." A shocking example can be found in the reevaluation of the brutal U.S. war against the Philippines in its struggle for independence a century ago. This is a chapter of history long ignored or at best seen as a shameful aberration, one that American studies scholars here and in the Philippines have worked hard to expose, which gained special resonance during the U.S. war in Vietnam. Yet proponents of empire from different political perspectives are now pointing to the Philippine-American War as a model for the twenty-first century. As Max Boot concludes in Savage Wars of Peace, "The Philippine War stands as a monument to the U.S. armed forces' ability to fight and win a major counterinsurgency campaign—one that was bigger and uglier than any that America is likely to confront in the future." 14 Historians of the United States have much work to do here, not only in disinterring the buried history of imperialism but also in debating its meaning and its lessons for the present, and in showing how U.S. interventions have worked from the perspective of comparative imperialisms, in relation to other historical changes and movements across the globe. The struggle over history also entails a struggle over language and culture. It is not enough to expose the lies when Bush hijacks words [End Page 6] such as freedom, democracy, and liberty. It's imperative that we draw on our knowledge of the powerful alternative meanings of these key words from both national and transnational sources. Today's reluctant imperialists are making arguments about "soft power," the global circulation of American culture to promote its universal values. As Ignatieff writes, "America fills the hearts and minds of an entire planet with its dreams and desires." 15 The work of scholars in popular culture is more important than ever to show that the Americanization of global culture is not a one-way street, but a process of transnational exchange, conflict, and transformation, which creates new cultural forms that express dreams and desires not dictated by empire. In this fantasy of global desire for all things American, **those whose dreams are** different are often labeled terrorists who must hate our way of life and thus hate humanity itself. As one of the authors of the Patriot Act wrote, "when you adopt a way of terror you've excused **yourself from the community of human beings**." 16 Although I would not minimize the violence caused by specific terrorist acts, I do want to point out the violence of these definitions of who belongs to humanity. Often in our juridical system under the Patriot Act, the accusation of terrorism alone, without due process and proof, is enough to exclude persons from the category of humanity. As scholars of American studies, we should bring to the present crisis our knowledge from juridical, literary, and visual representations about the way such exclusions from personhood and humanity have been made throughout history, from the treatment of Indians and slaves to the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II.

#### The portrayal of the U.S. as a benign hegemon justifies its violence in the name of peace. The U.S. forces its image of an ideal world onto the world order.

Noorani, 2005. Yaseen Noorani is a Lecturer in Arabic Literature, Islamic and Middle East Studies, University of Edinburgh. “The Rhetoric of Security,” The New Centennial Review 5.1, 2005.

The Bush administration perpetually affirms that the war against terrorism declared in response to the attacks of September 2001 is "different from any other war in our history" and will continue "for the foreseeable future." This affirmation, and indeed the very declaration of such a war, belongs to a rhetoric of security that predates the Bush administration and which this administration has intensified but not fundamentally altered. Rhetorically speaking, terrorism is the ideal enemy of the United States, more so than any alien civilization and perhaps even more so than the tyrannies of communism and fascism, terrorism's defeated sisters. This is because terrorism is depicted in U.S. rhetoric not as an immoral tactic employed in political struggle, but as an immoral condition that extinguishes the possibility of peaceful political deliberation. This condition is the state of war, in absolute moral opposition to the peaceful condition of civil society. As a state of war, terrorism portends the dissolution of the civil relations obtaining within and among nations, particularly liberal nations, and thus portends the dissolution of civilization itself. Terrorism is therefore outside the world order, in the sense that it cannot be managed within this order since it is the very absence of civil order. For there to be a world order at all, terrorism must be eradicated. In prosecuting a world war against the state of war, the United States puts itself outside the world order as well. The Bush administration affirms, like the Clinton administration before it, that because the identity of the United States lies in the values that engender peace (freedom and democracy), the national interests of the United States always coincide with the interests of the world order. The United States is the animus of the world order and the power that sustains it. For this reason, any threat to the existence of the United States is a threat to world peace itself, and anything that the United States does to secure its existence is justified as necessary for the preservation of world peace. In this way, the existence of the United States stands at the center of world peace and liberal values, yet remains outside the purview of these values, since when under threat it is subject only to the extra-moral necessity of self-preservation. I will argue that the symmetrical externality of the United States and terrorism to the world order lies at the foundation of the rhetoric of security by which the U.S. government justifies its hegemonic actions and policies. This rhetoric depicts a world in which helpless, vulnerable citizens can achieve agency only through the U.S. government, while terrorist individuals and organizations command magnitudes of destructive power previously held only by states. The moral-psychological discourse of agency and fear, freedom and enslavement invoked by this rhetoric is rooted in both classical liberalism and postwar U.S. foreign policy. The war of "freedom" against "fear" is a psychic struggle with no specific military enemies or objectives. It arises from the portrayal of the United States as an autarkic, ideally impermeable collective agent that reshapes the external world in its own image. The war of freedom against fear thereby justifies measures said to increase the defenses and internal security of the United States as well as measures said to spread freedom and democracy over the world. Now that the destructive capacity of warlike individuals can threaten the world order, the power of the United States must be deployed in equal measure to neutralize this threat throughout the world. The world as a whole now comes within the purview of U.S. disciplinary action. Any manifestation of the state of war, terrorist activity, anywhere in the world, is now a threat to the existence of the United States and to world peace.There is no “clash of civilizations,” but the Middle East, as the current site of the state of war, is the primary danger to the world and must be contained,controlled, and reshaped. The symmetrical externality of the United States and terrorism to the world order, then, allows its rhetoric to envision a historic opportunity for mankind—the final elimination of the state of war from human existence, and fear from the political psyche. Thiswill be achieved, however, only by incorporating the world order into the United States for the foreseeable future.

Hegemony link

#### The U.S. military strategy of creating a perfect safe world through its power is impossible. It futile attempts just create more violence in the name of liberty and peace.

Der Derian 2003 [James Der Derian, Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Massachusetts Amherst, “Decoding The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, boundary, 2 30.3, 19-27]

 Regardless of authorial (or good) intentions, the NSS reads more like late—very late—nineteenth-century poetry than a strategic doctrine for the twenty-first century. The rhetoric of the White House favors and clearly intends to mobilize the moral clarity, nostalgic sentimentality, and uncontested dominance reminiscent of the last great empires against the ambiguities, complexities, and messiness of the current world disorder. However, the gulf between the nation's stated cause ("to help make the world not just safer but better" [1]) and defensive needs (to fight "a war against terrorists of global reach" [5]) is so vast that one detects what Nietzsche referred to as the "breath of empty space," that void between the world as it is and as we would wish it to be, which produces all kinds of metaphysical concoctions.¶ ¶ In short shrift (thirty pages), the White House articulation of U.S. global objectives to the Congress elevates strategic discourse from a traditional, temporal calculation of means and ends, to the theological realm of monotheistic faith and monolithic truth. Relying more on aspiration than analysis, revelation than reason, the NSS is not grand but grandiose strategy. In pursuit of an impossible state of national security against terrorist evil, soldiers will need to be sacrificed, civil liberties curtailed, civilians collaterally damaged, regimes destroyed. But a nation's imperial overreach should exceed its fiduciary grasp: what's a full-spectrum dominance of the battle space for?¶ ¶ Were this not an official White House doctrine, the contradictions of the NSS could be interpreted only as poetic irony. How else to comprehend the opening paragraph, which begins with "The United States possesses unprecedented—and unequaled—strength and influence in the world" and ends with "The great strength of this nation must be used to promote a balance of power that favors freedom" (1)? Perhaps the cabalistic Straussians that make up the defense intellectual brain trust of the Bush administration (among them, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and William Kristol) have come up with a nuanced, indeed, anti-Machiavellian reading of Machiavelli that escapes the uninitiated. But so fixed is the NSS on the creation of a world in America's image that concepts such as balance of power and imminent threat, once rooted in historical, juridical, as well as reciprocal traditions, [End Page 20] become free-floating signifiers. Few Europeans, "old" or "new," would recognize the balance of power principle deployed by the NSS to justify preemptive, unilateral, military action against not actual but "emerging" imminent threats (15). Defined by the eighteenth-century jurist Emerich de Vattel as a state of affairs in which no one preponderant power can lay down the law to others, the classical sense of balance of power is effectively inverted in principle by the NSS document and in practice by the go-it-alone statecraft of the United States. Balance of power is global suzerainty, and war is peace.

#### The U.S. attempts to create a safe world do not always lead to the ideal world we hope for

Der Derian 2003 [James Der Derian, Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Massachusetts Amherst, “Decoding The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, boundary, 2 30.3, 19-27]

What significance should we make of the fact that the shortest section of the NSS (barely a page and a half) is on the "nonnegotiable demands of human dignity" and rights, including "free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property" (3). Are these rights so self-evident and inalienable that they do not warrant further clarification or justification? It would seem so: "History has not been kind to those nations which ignored or flouted the rights and aspirations of their people" (3). And yet this universalist avowal of rights requires a selective if not outright denial of history. Where was the U.S. support of freedom, justice, and religious and ethnic tolerance when it supported Saddam Hussein in his earlier war against Iran? When it provided intelligence, arms, and the precursors for chemical weapons of mass destruction? When it abandoned the Shiites in the south and the Kurds in the north of Iraq after the first Gulf War?¶ Most significant is that these rights are considered "nonnegotiable," making war, if not the first, certainly more of a viable option when these [End Page 21] rights are violated. In this regard, President Bush's NSS is a continuation rather than a repudiation of President Clinton's National Security Strategy of the United States 1994–1995: Engagement and Enlargement. To be sure, Clinton's National Security Strategy places greater emphasis on "preventive diplomacy" and multilateral intervention than Bush's preference for preemptive war and unilateralist predispositions. But the virtuous imperatives are in full evidence in the Clinton strategy: "All of America's strategic interests—from promoting prosperity at home to checking global threats abroad before they threaten our territory—are served by enlarging the community of democratic and free market nations. Thus, working with new democratic states to help preserve them as democracies committed to free markets and respect for human rights, is a key part of our national security strategy." 1¶ It is hardly surprising, then, that many liberals, both within the government and the university, supported the war against Iraq, and hardly unfair to question the extent to which Clinton and other moral interventionists prepared the high ground for this war. As a microcosm, consider one of the most visible splits in the ranks at top American universities, when such "moral" liberals as Joseph Nye, Michael Ignatieff, and Samantha Power came out in support of the war, whereas such "amoral" realists as Stanley Hoffmann, Steve Walt, and John Mearsheimer publicly opposed it. Nietzsche, who always detected the smell of the swamp in all talk of virtue, finds in The Twilight of the Idols a "bestowing virtue" in the realist's "courage in the face of reality": "My recreation, my preference, my cure from all Platonism has always been Thucydides. Thucydides, and perhaps the Principe of Machiavelli, are related to me closely by their unconditional will not to deceive themselves and to see reason in reality—not in ‘reason,' still less in ‘morality.' . . ."

#### Our national security strategy leaves us stuck in an endless war in which the world must either follow the U.S. or die

Der Derian 2003 [James Der Derian, Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Massachusetts Amherst, “Decoding The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, boundary, 2 30.3, 19-27]

The NSS might aim for peace, but it amounts to a blueprint for a permanent war. Gone is any trace of the humility that presidential candidate Bush invoked in his foreign policy addresses. In its place, hubris of an epic size obviates any historical or self-consciousness about the costs of empire. What ends not predestined by America's righteousness are to be preempted by the sanctity of holy war. The NSS leaves the world with two options: peace on U.S. terms, or the perpetual peace of the grave. The evangelical seeps through the prose of global realpolitik and mitigates its harshest pronouncements with the solace of a better life to come. We all shall be—as played by the band as the Titanic sank—"Nearer My God to Thee" (coincidently, written by Sarah Flower Adams, sister of the nineteenth-century poet Elizabeth Barrett, who secretly married . . .) .

#### The U.S.’s hope for peace and strive to stay a hegemon usually ends violently with more problems

Der Derian ‘03 [James Der Derian, Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Massachusetts Amherst, “Decoding The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, boundary, 2 30.3, 19-27]

Ultimately, however, real-world transformations exceed the grasp of the NSS. The war in Iraq put on full display just how effective the military could be in attaining its planned goals. But what falls outside the engineering and imaginary of the plan, what Edmund Burke called the "empire of circumstance," is in the driver's seat and beyond the cybernetic machinations of the NSS, as we see in the "peace" that followed. Many scholars saw the end of the Cold War as an occasion to debate the merits of a unipolar future as well as to wax nostalgic over the stability of a bipolar past. These debates continued to be state-centric as well as materialist in their interpretation of how power works. By such criteria, there was little doubt that the United States would emerge as the dominant military, economic, and, indeed, civilizational power. Even in Paul Wolfowitz's worst-case nightmares, it was difficult to identify a potential "peer competitor" on the horizon. [End Page 26]¶ But then came 9/11, and blueprints for a steady-state hegemony were shredded. Asymmetrical power and fundamentalist resentment, force-multiplied by the mass media, prompted a permanent state of emergency. After the first responders came a semiotic fix with a kick, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. But from the tragedy of 9/11 to the farce of war in Iraq, after the multilateral hopes for a "safer and better world" were subverted by the unilateral nihilism of preventive war, the syntax of order and the code of the simulacrum began to break down. We caught a glimpse of a heteropolar matrix, in which actors radically different in identity and interests (states versus super-empowered individuals), using technologies in revolutionary ways (civilian airliners to create kamikaze weapons of mass destruction, the Internet to mobilize the largest antiwar demonstrations ever), were suddenly comparable in their capability to produce improbable global effects. It might be small solace, but out of this deeply nihilistic moment might yet come a real balance of power and truth, in which the Straussian reach of The National Security Strategy is foreshortened by a Nietzschean grasp of reality.¶

#### The U.S. tries to maintain its power through preemptive actions. The U.S. is a paradox of both vulnerability and invincibility.

Kaplan 04 (Amy Kaplan, Prof. of English @ Univ. of Pennslyvania, ‘3 [American Quarterly 56.1, “Violent Belongings and the Question of Empire Today,”2004, p. muse]

This coming-out narrative, associated primarily with neoconservatives, aggressively celebrates the United States as finally revealing its true essence—its manifest destiny—on a global stage. We won the Cold War, so the story goes, and as the only superpower, we will maintain global supremacy primarily by military means, by preemptive strikes against any potential rivals, and by a perpetual war against terror, defined primarily as the Muslim world. We need to remain vigilant against those rogue states and terrorists who resist not our power but the universal human values that we embody. This narrative is about time as well as space. It imagines an empire in perpetuity, one that beats back the question haunting all empires in J. M. Coetzee's Waiting for the Barbarians: "One thought alone preoccupies the submerged mind of Empire: how not to end, how not to die, how to prolong its era." 9 In this hypermasculine narrative there's a paradoxical sense of invincibility and unparalleled power and at the same time utter and incomprehensible vulnerability—a lethal combination, which reminds us that the word vulnerable once also referred to the capacity to harm.

### Infrastructure

#### The protection of infrastructure is the essence of securitization – the protection of life at the level of mass society grounds the security state

Tom Lundborg Swedish Institute of International Affairs AND Nick Vaughan-Williams University of Warwick, 12/2011 [“Resilience, Critical Infrastructure, and Molecular Security: The Excess of ‘‘Life’’ in Biopolitics”, International Political Sociology 5, http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/vaughan-williams/ips\_dec\_2011.pdf]

A liberal biopolitical problematization of life entails security practices that can ‘‘pre-empt the emergence of life forms in the life process that may prove toxic to life’’ (Dillon and Reid 2009:87). For these reasons, as set out in the lengthy quotation above, the perceived nature of threats has changed along with the emergence of alternative problematizations of life. Threats are no longer viewed as straightforwardly actual, but what Dillon and Reid refer to as ‘‘virtual’’: ‘‘the very continuous and contingent emergency of emergence of life as being-information; becoming-dangerous’’ (Dillon and Reid 2009:44). To put it differently, the threat with which liberal biopolitics is obsessed is the potentiality of some life to become dangerous and therefore detrimental to what living should involve. It is in this context that Dillon and Reid uncover a paradox of liberalism: the factthat according to its own logic it needs to kill in order to make life live. Dillon and Reid deal with both aspects of this biopolitical ⁄necropolitical logic. Their discussion of the liberal way of war explores the various ways in which killing takes place, the aporia accompanying universal justiﬁcations of it, and the lethal criteria by which politics is reduced to mere ‘‘animal husbandry’’ (Dillon and Reid 2009:104). What is more pertinent for our purposes, however, is the equally signiﬁcant account they offer of attempts by liberal rule to make life live: If the vocation of biopolitics is to make life live, it must pursue that vocation these days **by making live life the emergency of its emergence ever more fully** 374 and ever more resiliently; detailing, clarifying, amplifying and otherwise drawing out the entailments of the emergency in the effort to make life live it even more animatedly in both virtual and actual terms. (Dillon and Reid 2009:89) It is in this context that we can return more explicitly to the role of resilient CIs because it is precisely these material apparatuses through which liberal rule secures the way of life it needs to reproduce its vision of ‘‘correct living’’ and also, therefore, the authorization of its own authority. Dillon and Reid pick up on Foucault’s inversion of Clausewitz’s famous aphorism—‘‘politics is the extension of war by other means’’—to argue that the liberal peace is extended throughout society via CIs. They claim it is no coincidence that since 9 ⁄ 11 CIs have become reiﬁed as referent objects of securitization. Strategically and symbolically, CIs perform vital roles in securing the liberal way of rule and its vision of what ‘‘quality of life’’ must mean: ...the defence of critical infrastructure is not about the mundane protection of human beings from the risk of violent death at the hands of other human beings, but about a more profound defence of the combined physical and technological infrastructures which liberal regimes have come to understand as necessary for their vitality and security in recent years. (Dillon and Reid 2009:130) On this basis, Dillon and Reid extend the biopolitical diagnosis of resilience offered by Lentzos and Rose. Not only is resilience about the design and management of the ‘‘system of systems’’ in such a way as to enable a smooth and expeditious return to ‘‘normal’’ conditions. More importantly, resilient CIs are also necessary for the optimalization of virtual (that is pre-emptive) tactics against the becoming-dangerous of bodies-in-formation: tactics upon which the ediﬁce of liberal rule ultimately rests. Moreover, Dillon and Reid shrewdly observe that the perception of ‘‘terrorist threats’’ in Western societies enables liberal regimes to further develop and entrench CIs, in turn extending and intensifying biopolitical control over life.

### Infrastructure Protection

#### Infrastructural development to avert catastrophe is a key securitizing move – it enables the mobilization of militarized violence

Claudia Aradau 2010 [Senior Lecturer in International Relations and member of the Centre for the Study of Political Community, *Security That Matters: Critical Infrastructure and Objects of Protection*, Oct. 14, Sage, RH]

The securitization of critical infrastructure is pre-eminently about the protection of objects. Critical infrastructure protection is generally held to have emerged as a security issue in the mid-1990s and the terminology of ‘critical infrastructure’ itself to have been coined by Clinton administration in 1996. Critical infrastructure allegedly signifies a difference from earlier usages of ‘infrastructure’. While infrastructure was part of military strategy to weaken the enemy, its transformation into a matter of national security has been variously located either during the Cold War (Collier and Lakoff 2007) or after 9/11 (Center for History and New Media 2009). If military strategy could also 9 involve the destruction of one’s own infrastructure, the securitization of critical infrastructure assumes an understanding of infrastructure as foundational. Societies are ‘**grounded’ in infrastructure, their functioning, continuity and survival are made possible by the protection of infrastructure**. A 1997 report by the Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection was symbolically entitled ‘Critical Foundations’ (Commission for Critical Infrastructure Protection 1997). Definitions of critical infrastructure list heterogeneous elements, from communications, emergency services, energy, finance, food, government, health, to transport and water sectors (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) 2009). The general argument about the necessity to protect critical infrastructure is framed along these lines (with little variation from a report to another and from an author to another): Our modern society and day to day activities are dependent on networks of critical infrastructure – both physical networks such as energy and transportation systems and virtual networks such as the Internet. If terrorists attack a piece of critical infrastructure, they will disrupt our standard of living and cause significant physical, psychological, and financial damage to our nation (Bennett 2007: 9). The UK’s Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure defines the effects of any failure in national infrastructure to lead to ‘severe economic damage, grave social disruption, or even large scale loss of life’ (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) 2009). Naming infrastructures as critical for the purposes of protecting them against terrorist attacks is a securitising move. Where critical infrastructure experts would look for the adequacy of representation to the reality of objects threatened – by drawing up lists of critical infrastructure as a result of risk assessment scenarios – a performative approach would consider the constitution of reality through the iterative speech acts that securitize infrastructure by naming as ‘critical’ and in need of protection against potential terrorist attacks and/or other hazards. The Centre for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure in the UK encapsulates this double move: The most significant threat facing the UK comes from international terrorism and its stated ambitions to mount ‘high impact’ attacks that combine mass casualties with substantial disruption to key services such as energy, transport and communications. This is a threat that is different in scale and intent to any that the UK has faced before (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) 2010b). Yet, for the Copenhagen School of security studies for example, objects are also relegated to the status of external conditions of speech acts. Objects that are generally held to be threatening (for example, tanks or polluted waters) play a facilitating role in the process of securitization (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998: 33). **Energy blackouts, transport failures and so on could also be read as facilitating conditions of the speech act**. In this approach, there is ontological and epistemological ambiguity about the role of objects: as they outside speech acts or the result of speech acts? As the next section will show, this approach cannot account for different materializations of critical infrastructure – the matter of critical infrastructure is not constant and given but varies depending on the agential cuts created.

### Investment

#### Capital investment props up the state.

Fernando et al Lucio Fernando Oliver Costilla, Lilia Barragan Alvarez and Carlos Perez “The Reconstitution of Power and Democracy in the Age of Capital Globalization” Jan., 2000 http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2634120.pdf pgs. 86-88

With the globalization of capital, the relations of domination have changed as worldwide oligopolies have become the dominant political and economic centers. "Multinational corporations and finance capital are estab- lished as supranational entities capable of combining the political-economic power of big capital on a planetary scale" (Sotelo, 1996: 28). These oligopo- lies are the culmination of the process of the centralization and concentration of capital, and their dominance has increased in the past 20 years with the reorganization of the global economy as the power of local capital and of unionized workers has diminished. That large pension funds are invested in financial speculation has led many scholars to believe that finance capital is dispersed, disaggregated, and fragmented, with no center dominating the dynamic of the globalization of capital. Statistics, however, show the intense concentration and centraliza- tion of capital in the major transnational corporations (Sotelo, 1996: 32-33): In fact, the transnational firms control the nucleus of technological progress and the cycle of innovations occurring in global industries, such as those of semiconductors, electronics, and telecommunications. It is estimated that 24 major transnational corporations generated 75 percent of world production by the mid-1980s.... Moreover, the predominant role of the major multinational corporations is the result of the process of concentration and centralization of capital occurring from the mergers, purchases, acquisitions, and cooperative agreements of the preceding period. In the United States between 1985 and 1991 the five major companies increased their share of domestic electronics from 80 percent to nearly 97 percent, and in the transportation sector they increased it from 61 percent to 75 percent.... What is occurring here takes on increased virulence in the financial, banking, and service sectors, where the major corporations have established their hegemony and their enterprises. The concentration and centralization of capital by the monopoly corporations and industries is especially intense in Latin America. The Latin American social sciences have fertile terrain before them in the study of oligopolies; it is important to know who and what they are, where they are, where they invest, and how they control. For our present study, it is suf- ficient for now to speak of an industrial-finance "group" (Chesnais, 1996: 72): Although the Division of Transnational Firms of UNCTAD in its 1994 report listed the existence of 37,000 multinationals, it clarified three pages later that the core of the analysis would concentrate on the 100 major transnational groups.... In 1990, those 100 groups concentrated in their hands close to one- third of the total global direct external investments (DEI), possessing assets with an accumulated value of US$3.2 trillion, with close to 40 percent of them located outside of the country of origin. With few variations, these groups are the same ones that we find in the 300 major world industrial groups that are listed annually in Fortune and that figure, along with the major banks and financial institutions, among the 1,000 major worldwide groups that are nor- mally itemized by Business Week. These are the real multinationals. In spite of the complexity achieved by these oligopolistic groups and the diversity of their investments, one can still recognize their sources. Those that arise from oil are Royal Dutch, Shell, Exxon, British Petroleum, Mobil, and Elf Aquitaine; from automobile manufacturing, Ford, General Motors, Fiat, Volkswagen, and Toyota; from information and electronic technology, IBM, Phillips Electronics, Matsushita Electric, Siemens, Sony, Mitsubishi, Gen- eral Electric, and Alcatel Alsthom; from chemicals, Du Pont, Bayer, Rhone Poulenc, BASF, Ferruzi Montedison; from food and agriculture, Nestle, Uni- Oliver Costilla lever, Philip Morris; from heavy industry, Asea Brown Boveri; from com- merce, Mitsui; from publishing, the News Corporation; and from tobacco, Bat Industries (see Chesnais, 1996: 74, Table 1). The level of dominance achieved by these oligopolistic groups in their own branches of production is also significant: in the auto industry 12 compa- nies are responsible for 78 percent of worldwide production, in data process- ing 10 companies are responsible for 100 percent of production, in medical materials 7 companies are responsible for 90 percent of production, in petro- chemical products (polypropylene) 8 companies are responsible for 50 per- cent of production, in polystyrene 8 companies are responsible for 69 percent of production, in automobile parts 7 companies are responsible for 88 percent of production, and in tires 6 companies are responsible for 85 percent of worldwide production. Despite their global dimensions and reach, the oligopolistic groups have national bases. Furthermore, although they may have their origins in particu- lar industries, they do not now exclusively focus on them (Chesnais, 1996: 73, 81): The multinational company invariably began as a major industry on a national level, and this implies a more or less long and complicated process of capital concentration and centralization that frequently diversified before beginning its internationalization. The multinational company has a national origin, and therefore the weak and strong points of its national base and the support it has received from its state are components of its strategy and its competitiveness. In general, that company is a group whose contemporary juridical form is that of the international holding company. Finally, that group has strategies and an organization created for functioning on a worldwide scale.... In the case of an industrial group, the valorization-and, therefore, the increase-of capital from one stage to the next is based in the first place on the organization and use of wage labor for production (not only of goods but also of services). Secondly, it encompasses an increasing number of operations in financial mar- kets.... There exist, also organization created for functioning on a worldwide scale.... In the case of an industrial group, the valorization-and, therefore, the increase-of capital from one stage to the next is based in the first place on the organization and use of wage labor for production (not only of goods but also of services). Secondly, it encompasses an increasing number of operations participation in production. The participation of oligopolistic groups in the global economy, the restructuring of production, the flexibilization of labor, the new way of man- aging companies, worldwide administrative reorganization, new interna- tional communications, and new worldwide financial centers are more than technical and economic matters. Underlying them is a new capacity for power, domination, and control by these groups in all fields. A new configu- ration of domination in the world is concentrated in huge industrial-finance oligopolies (corporations whose capital has simultaneous ramifications in industry, commerce, services, and finance). Alongside their growing interpenetration, they maintain a degree of fragmentation and competition among themselves. The oligopolies also control the creation and application of technology, mass media, and administration that, united with production, markets, and finance, allow them to determine the rhythm of the global economy from America to Asia via Europe. They decide not only on the principal external and internal investments, direct as well indirect, but also on the inclusion or exclusion of workers, industries, and countries in the dynamic of accumula- tion. The transnational oligopolistic capitalists are the powerful new class in globalization. This does not mean, however, that other dominant, although subordinated, classes have ceased to exist. The local Latin American capital- ists, who previously defended their right to national accumulation and domi- nation, have had to decide whether to compete or subordinate themselves. Their decision to remain minor partners is evidenced by their unanimity in adopting the politics of neoliberal structural adjustment.

#### Investment is neoliberal mechanism that empowers the state

Duane Swank Department of Political Science Marquette University “The Spread of Neoliberalism: U.S. Economic Power and the Diffusion of Market-Oriented Tax Policy” December 2004 http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/publications/docs/pdfs/Swank.pdf

Neoliberal reforms in public policies and economic institutions have proliferated across the developed democracies and the globe in the latter decades of the twentieth century. 1 National structures of taxation have not been immune to neoliberalism. Beginning in the early 1980s, policymakers throughout the OECD significantly altered the content of tax policies. The relative priority accorded equity and growth goals, the use of investment and behavioral incentives, and the level of tax rates were all notably changed: marginal income and corporate profits tax rates were scaled back, the number of brackets were cut and inflation-indexed, and tax-based investment incentives were eliminated or reduced to broaden the tax base. Why have nearly all developed nations enacted this set of market-conforming tax policies? To answer this question, I build on my recent work on the determinants of change in tax policy in the developed democracies and explore the dynamics of diffusion of the neoliberal tax policy paradigm. 2 I advance the case that the highly visible 1986 market-conforming tax policy reform by the United States creates a set of costs and benefits surrounding adoption and non-adoption of these tax policy reforms by policymakers in other polities. As I detail below, asymmetric competition for mobile assets and the substantial demonstration effects and information externalities associated with U.S. reforms significantly influence national policymakers in other polities in their assessments of how to achieve their efficiency, revenue, and political goals. My central argument is, however, that while the incentives to adopt U.S. tax reform are substantial, the relative weight assigned the costs and benefits of reform and, in turn, the pace and degree of adoption by individual nations of the market-conforming tax paradigm is fundamentally dependent on features of the domestic political economy. Economics should matter: levels of general international openness, linkage with U.S. markets, and the magnitude of domestic economic stress should significantly influence policy maker assessments of reform. Domestic politics should also be important: the degrees to which the median depth of tax policy change. The character of a nation’s production regime is also crucially important: the extent to which the domestic political economy is composed of coordinated or uncoordinated market institutions should shape the assessment by national policymakers of the benefits and costs of adoption and non-adoption of the new tax policy regime. I organize my analysis of these hypotheses as follows. First, I briefly discuss recent trends in taxation, review theories about contemporary tax policy change, and elaborate my arguments about why tax policy reform is likely to be an interdependent process where innovations are diffused—subject to domestic political economic factors—across the developed democratic world. I then develop empirical models of statutory and effective tax rates on capital and assess these with 1981 to 1998 data from sixteen nations. I conclude with a summary of what we know about the forces driving tax policy change and a discussion of the implications of the present research for understanding of the diffusion of neoliberal policies in an era of globalization. Tax Policy Change in the Developed Democracies Beginning in the early 1980s, incumbent governments significantly altered national policies on the taxation of corporate profits and capital income. The near universal system of relatively high marginal statutory tax rates and extensive use of tax instruments to target investment (and otherwise shape the behavior of economic agents in accord with national policy goals) was significantly reformed in nearly all nations. Table 1 summarizes the most significant features of changes in corporate voter has shifted right and right-of-center parties have governed in recent years should be consequential for the pace and and capital taxation. Policymakers reduced statutory corporate tax rates on average from 45 percent in 1981 to 34 percent in 1998. They also commonly eliminated or reduced various investment credits, exemptions, and grants that 1 See, among others, Campbell and Pedersen 2001 and the introduction to this volume. 2 Swank 1998; Swank and Steinmo 2002. 4 had significantly lowered effective corporate tax rates on reinvested profits. As Table 1 illustrates, the general investment tax credit was eliminated by 1992 in all nations that had employed it. 3

### Risk

#### The development of infrastructure is organized around the production of social risk

Claudia Aradau, Department of War Studies King's College London,2010[“Security that matters: critical infrastructure and objects of protection”, Security Dialogue vol. 42, no.5:491-514, http://oro.open.ac.uk/26408/1/Aradau\_security\_materiality\_SD.pdf]MW

Yet, for the Copenhagen School of security studies for example, objects are also relegated to the status of external conditions of speech acts. Objects that are generally held to be threatening (for example, tanks or polluted waters) play a facilitating role in the process of securitization (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998: 33). Energy blackouts, transport failures and so on could also be read as facilitating conditions of the speech act. In this approach, there is ontological and epistemological ambiguity about the role of objects: as they outside speech acts or the result of speech acts? As the next section will show, this approach cannot account for different materializations of critical infrastructure – the matter of critical infrastructure is not constant and given but varies depending on the agential cuts created. The Foucault-inspired literature on the biopolitics of security and risk has also paid scant attention to the materiality of infrastructures. For Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, for example, biopolitics takes ‘species life as its referent object, and the securing of species life becomes the vocation of a novel and emerging set of discursive formations of power/knowledge’ (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008: 267). While they show how a dispositif of security is dependent upon the development of life sciences and they locate historical transformations of biopolitics given the changes in scientific knowledge about the nature of living material (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008: 273), materiality as such is not discussed. The things in the security dispositif are relegated to the margins of analysis. As noted previously, a dispositif is a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of the said as much as the unsaid, ‘things’ are relegated to the margins of analysis and the focus of analysis is shifted upon institutions, economic and social processes, systems of norms, techniques, types of classification, modes of characterization (Foucault 2002: 49). Critical infrastructure protection as a dispositif would similarly bring together a heterogeneous array of discourses about terrorism, natural disasters, protection, risk management, security institutions alongside architecture, design, and construction experts, new regulations and laws, administrative measures, scientific knowledge about materials, and moral propositions about ‘objects of protection’. As a methodological and epistemological tool, the dispositif could shed light on how critical infrastructure protection emerges as a heterogeneous construction. At the same, critical infrastructure is, in a sense, subsumed to the logic of circulatory practices. The securitization of critical infrastructure is ultimately deriving from the practices that separate good from bad circulations and the associated forms of life. This it remains unclear how the materiality of infrastructure is both generative and generated in Barad’s terms. Even when focusing on the rationalities and technologies that make-up particular dispositifs of security, materialities of nonhuman objects are not explicitly theorized (e.g. Aradau and van Munster 2007; Huysmans 2006; Lippert and O'Connor 2003). Although the dispositif has material effects of forming risk groups, dividing the population and placing groups ‘at risk’ under surveillance or treatment (Dean 1999; Rose 1999), matter is univocally given. The effects of risk management appear to have little to do with how infrastructure is built, rebuilt, retrofitted, how materials are selected, their fluidity, stability or fixity, their forms of agency and the differential reconfigurations of the world that are created through intra-actions with other material-discursive practices. As Barad reminds us, matter is not univocal. As light can behave as both a wave and a particle depending on the experimental and laboratory set-up, critical infrastructure is materialized in different ways, depending on how rationalities and technologies of risk management intra-act with other social and political practices, discourses, forms of knowledge, and materialities.

### Rogue States

#### The discourse of ‘rogue’ states implies irrationality and danger, allowing the state to justify life and death in the name of safety

Reid 10 (Julian, Lecturer in International Relations, Department of War Studies, King’s College London, “On the Implications of Foucault’s Security, Territory, Population Lectures for the Analysis and Theorisation of Security in International Relations,” September, 2010, http://www.mcrg.ac.in/Development/draft\_Symposium/Julian1.pdf 6)

Intriguingly, the concept of the ‘rogue’ is regularly used to describe the various forms of threat posed to critical infrastructure in the social jurisdictions of liberal regimes. Not only rogue states, but non-state ‘rogue actors’ and even pre-individual ‘rogue behaviors’ are increasingly singled out as the sources of insecurity for a global liberal order the welfare of which is conceived in circulatory and infrastructural terms. In the nineteenth century the protection of liberal order from the threats posed by ‘rogues’ involved securing life, as Derrida describes, on ‘the street, in a city, in the urbanity and good conduct of urban life’. In the twenty-first century the ‘paths of circulation’ on which rogues are feared to roam are that much more complex and require that much more insidious methods of protection. The evaluation of threats is said to require ‘detailed analysis in order to detect patterns and anomalies, understanding and modeling of human behavior, and translation of these sources into threat information’. It is likewise said to require the development of new technologies able to provide ‘analysis of deceptive behaviors, cognitive capabilities, the use of everyday heuristics’ and ‘the systematic analysis of what people do and where lapses do – and do not – occur’. It requires not just the surveillance and control of the social body as a whole, or of the movements and dispositions of individuals, but rather, techniques which target and seize control of life beneath the molecular thresholds of its biological functioning and existence. While it is a fact that the biological imaginaries of liberal regimes have played a significant role in constituting the types of threat that they face, it is also a fact that the major adversaries of liberal regimes today base their strategies on the deliberate targeting of their circulatory capacities and ‘critical infrastructures’. Groups such as Al-Qaeda are regarded as significant threats precisely because they deliberately target the ‘critical infrastructures’ which enable the liberality of these regimes rather than simply the human beings which inhabit them. Indeed, key intelligence sources, such as the FBI, report that Al-Qaeda are making the targeting of critical infrastructures their tactical priority. In Iraq, the insurgency is defined by similar methods involving the targeting of key infrastructure projects. These strategies of protection, implemented by liberal regimes to secure themselves from terrorism, resemble acutely those with which liberal states of the early modern era sought to secure themselves from the threat of sedition. In the 18th century the rationale was that the prevention of sedition required the promotion of internal trade and the general improvement of circulation among the domestic population. As the political influence of liberalism developed from the late eighteenth century onwards, so the task of identifying, strengthening, and securing the hidden infrastructures of societies became an increasingly prevalent goal and practice among governments. This understanding of the sources of security was fast politicized in the development not just of liberal political and philosophical thought, but in the development of the new governmental practices with which states would seek to enhance the resilience of the infrastructures of relations which would become the benchmarks of both their geo- and bio-political power. Government became the art and technique by which life would be tactically distributed and circulated in the ‘network of relations’ comprising the infrastructures of liberalizing societies.

### Terrorism

#### The term “terrorism” is so meaningless and manipulated that it works to justify endless violence and racism in the name of security by the US

Greenwald 10 (Glenn, American lawyer, worked as a constitutional and civil rights litigator prior to becoming a contributor (columnist and blogger) to Salon.com, where he focuses on political and legal topics, “Terrorism: the most meaningless and manipulated word”, Feb 19, <http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/02/19/terrorism/index.html>)

Despite all that, The New York Times' Brian Stelter documents the deep reluctance of cable news chatterers and government officials to label the incident an act of "terrorism," even though -- as Dave Neiwert ably documents -- it perfectly fits, indeed is a classic illustration of, every official definition of that term. The issue isn't whether Stack's grievances are real or his responses just; it is that the act unquestionably comports with the official definition. But as NBC's Pete Williams said of the official insistence that this was not an act of Terrorism: there are "a couple of reasons to say that . . . One is he’s an American citizen." Fox News' Megan Kelley asked Catherine Herridge about these denials: "I take it that they mean terrorism in the larger sense that most of us are used to?," to which Herridge replied: "they mean terrorism in that capital T way." All of this underscores, yet again, that Terrorism is simultaneously the single most meaningless and most manipulated word in the American political lexicon. The term now has virtually nothing to do with the act itself and everything to do with the identity of the actor, especially his or her religious identity. It has really come to mean: "a Muslim who fights against or even expresses hostility towards the United States, Israel and their allies." That's why all of this confusion and doubt arose yesterday over whether a person who perpetrated a classic act of Terrorism should, in fact, be called a Terrorist: he's not a Muslim and isn't acting on behalf of standard Muslim grievances against the U.S. or Israel, and thus does not fit the "definition." One might concede that perhaps there's some technical sense in which term might apply to Stack, but as Fox News emphasized: it's not "terrorism in the larger sense that most of us are used to . . . terrorism in that capital T way." We all know who commits terrorism in "that capital T way," and it's not people named Joseph Stack. Contrast the collective hesitance to call Stack a Terrorist with the extremely dubious circumstances under which that term is reflexively applied to Muslims. If a Muslim attacks a military base preparing to deploy soldiers to a war zone, that person is a Terrorist. If an American Muslim argues that violence against the U.S. (particularly when aimed at military targets) is justified due to American violence aimed at the Muslim world, that person is a Terrorist who deserves assassination. And if the U.S. military invades a Muslim country, Muslims who live in the invaded and occupied country and who fight back against the invading American army -- by attacking nothing but military targets -- are also Terrorists. Indeed, large numbers of detainees at Guantanamo were accused of being Terrorists for nothing more than attacking members of an invading foreign army in their country, including 14-year-old Mohamed Jawad, who spent many years in Guantanamo, accused (almost certainly falsely) of throwing a grenade at two American troops in Afghanistan who were part of an invading force in that country. Obviously, plots targeting civilians for death -- the 9/11 attacks and attempts to blow up civilian aircraft -- are pure terrorism, but a huge portion of the acts committed by Muslims that receive that label are not. In sum: a Muslim who attacks military targets, including in war zones or even in their own countries that have been invaded by a foreign army, are Terrorists. A non-Muslim who flies an airplane into a government building in pursuit of a political agenda is not, or at least is not a Real Terrorist with a capital T -- not the kind who should be tortured and thrown in a cage with no charges and assassinated with no due process. Nor are Christians who stand outside abortion clinics and murder doctors and clinic workers. Nor are acts undertaken by us or our favored allies designed to kill large numbers of civilians or which will recklessly cause such deaths as a means of terrorizing the population into desired behavioral change -- the Glorious Shock and Awe campaign and the pummeling of Gaza. Except as a means for demonizing Muslims, the word is used so inconsistently and manipulatively that it is impoverished of any discernible meaning. All of this would be an interesting though not terribly important semantic matter if not for the fact that the term Terrorist plays a central role in our political debates. It is the all-justifying term for anything the U.S. Government does. Invasions, torture, due-process-free detentions, military commissions, drone attacks, warrantless surveillance, obsessive secrecy, and even assassinations of American citizens are all justified by the claim that it's only being done to "Terrorists," who, by definition, have no rights. Even worse, one becomes a "Terrorist" not through any judicial adjudication or other formal process, but solely by virtue of the untested, unchecked say-so of the Executive Branch. The President decrees someone to be a Terrorist and that's the end of that: uncritical followers of both political parties immediately justify anything done to the person on the ground that he's a Terrorist (by which they actually mean: he's been accused of being one, though that distinction -- between presidential accusations and proof -- is not one they recognize). If we're really going to vest virtually unlimited power in the Government to do anything it wants to people they call "Terrorists," we ought at least to have a common understanding of what the term means. But there is none. It's just become a malleable, all-justifying term to allow the U.S. Government carte blanche to do whatever it wants to Muslims it does not like or who do not like it (i.e., The Terrorists). It's really more of a hypnotic mantra than an actual word: its mere utterance causes the nation blindly to cheer on whatever is done against the Muslims who are so labeled. UPDATE: I want to add one point: the immediate official and media reaction was to avoid, even deny, the term "terrorist" because the perpetrator of the violence wasn't Muslim. But if Stack's manifesto begins to attract serious attention, I think it's likely the term Terrorist will be decisively applied to him in order to discredit what he wrote. His message is a sharply anti-establishment and populist grievance of the type that transcends ideological and partisan divisions -- the complaints which Stack passionately voices are found as common threads in the tea party movement and among citizens on both the Left and on the Right -- and thus tend to be the type which the establishment (which benefits from high levels of partisan distractions and divisions) finds most threatening and in need of demonization. Nothing is more effective at demonizing something than slapping the Terrorist label onto it.

#### **Terrorism and the idea of Rouge States are developed due to the security logic engrained within our society.**

Reid 10 (Julian, Lecturer in International Relations, Department of War Studies, King’s College London, “On the Implications of Foucault’s Security, Territory, Population Lectures for the Analysis and Theorisation of Security in International Relations,” September, 2010, [http://www.mcrg.ac.in/Development/draft\_Symposium/Julian1.pdf 4-5](http://www.mcrg.ac.in/Development/draft_Symposium/Julian1.pdf%204-5))

The security discourses of the global liberal order reproduce so many of the tropes and signatures of the early modern liberal state which Foucault analyses in these lectures. He demonstrates how the liberal state of the early modern era, on account of its problematisation of life as the referent object of security, invented entire new species of enmity and threats. Once the referent object of security became the life of the population so the circulatory infrastructures on which the life properties and processes of the populations of states were said to rely became identified as sites of insecurity and threat. So, new domains and practices of regulation concerned with the governance of roads and highways, the suppression of vagrancy, and so on, came into existence. The development of the contemporary global liberal order is generative of new and yet very comparable forms of security problems. An excellent example of this is the current discourse surrounding so- called ‘rogue states’, the constitutions of which are represented as hostile to the smooth functioning of the circulatory infrastructures of global liberal order. Indeed the extension of this discourse of the rogue and of roguery to the international suggests, as Jacques Derrida has also demonstrated, continuities with liberal regimes of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. In a brilliant analysis which I think in many ways can be read as a supplement to Foucault’s, delivered not long before his death, Derrida demonstrated the genealogical intertwinements of the word ‘rogue’ and its equivalents in French, ‘voyeur’ and ‘roué’, with concepts of humanity and animality, and its roles in the development of liberal practices of security and order. In English the word ‘rogue’ designates deviance in both human and non- human life forms. Derrida demonstrates this by quoting from an article in which ‘a rogue is defined as a creature that is born different...incapable of mingling with the herd, which keeps itself to itself, and can attack at any time, without warning’. Crucially, this concept of the rogue and of roguery derived from early modern theories of biology. In reference to the vegetable kingdom, Charles Darwin in Origin of Species referred to 'roguing' as the practice by which nurserymen would weed out plants that deviated from the proper standard of plants in seed-beds, literally pulling-up what they called the 'rogues'. He then adapted the concept of roguing to describe the process by which natural selection functions throughout living systems to maintain order among species. In French, Derrida argues, the word has a more human resonance, for ‘the word voyou has an essential relation with the voie, the way, with the urban roadways (voirie), the roadways of the city or the polis, and thus with the street (rue), the waywardness (dévoiement) of the voyou consisting in making ill use of the street, in corrupting the street or loitering in the streets, in “roaming the streets”’ Politically, Derrida shows, the representatives of liberal order have consistently tried ‘to present as vo yous all rebels, agitators, and insurgents, indeed all revolutionaries, regardless of whether they come from bad neighbourhoods, or from the suburbs’. Thus, the rogue is marked by its inhumanity, aggression, non-conformity, and disorder, while always being ‘a part of mankind, always human, of our kind.’ The concept of the ‘rogue state’ has, during the post-Cold War era, become a regularly deployed reference for regimes said to threaten the boundaries of global liberal order. This proliferation of the discourse of roguery from the biological to the social to the international tells us a lot about the increasing complexities of liberal security practices as well as their continuities with the early modern era. It tells us also a lot about the power of their biological imaginaries upon the conceptions of fear and danger which have motivated the development of the security practices of liberal regimes historically, and which are proving definitive of their strategic response to the new threats posed by terrorism. In their responses to terrorism, liberal regimes of the present have made the protection of global architectures of circulation and infrastructure a strategic priority. The conduct of the Global War on Terror has been defined in particular by the development of strategies for the protection of ‘critical infrastructure’. In the US, for example, George W. Bush has provided a series of presidential directives in response to the attacks of September 11 for the development of what is termed a National Infrastructure Protection Plan. The response to the directive is expressed in The National Plan for Research and Development in Support of Critical Infrastructure Protection published by the US Department of Homeland Security in 2004. In Europe, the European Union is pursuing what it terms a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection ‘to enhance European prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks involving critical infrastructures’. The United Nations is seeking meanwhile to identify the critical infrastructure needs of member states globally, as well as continuing to ‘explore ways to facilitate the dissemination of best practices’ with regard to critical infrastructure protection.

#### **Rhetoric of terrorism is strategically deployed to create a sense of vulnerability within the lives of citizens**

Reid 10 (Julian, Lecturer in International Relations, Department of War Studies, King’s College London, “On the Implications of Foucault’s Security, Territory, Population Lectures for the Analysis and Theorisation of Security in International Relations,” September, 2010, http://www.mcrg.ac.in/Development/draft\_Symposium/Julian1.pdf 6-7)

The liberal conception of society as an organism comprising networks and infrastructures of relations gathered apace throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, culminating in the prevailing conception of a networked world society held together and empowered economically, social, politically, and militarily by the density of its critical infrastructures. Likewise the principle that the regimes which govern such societies are vulnerable on account of their reliance on the vitality of those networked infrastructures, the principle governing Al-Qaeda’s strategy, developed simultaneously within liberal regimes themselves. This was evident not least in the development of the practice of interstate warfare. The increasing investment in the strategic value of airpower in the UK, the US, and France during the twentieth century worked on the assumption that enemies could be defeated by inflicting critical damage on the infrastructures on which their security depended. Today we see the same logic being applied not just within the domain of liberal regimes themselves, but in the violent intervention and enforced reconstruction of illiberal states and societies. The solution to Terror is presumed to lie in the destruction of illiberal regimes, in the regeneration of their socio-economic infrastructures of circulation, with a view to reinserting them into the networks of exchange and flows which constitute the global liberal polity. This is especially true of the strategies which are currently and errantly being applied to the so-called rogue states of Afghanistan and Iraq. NATO, for example, once a military alliance to protect Western European states from the geopolitical threat of the former Soviet Union, is currently engaged in a strategy which stands and falls on their ability to convince Afghanis to give up their reliance on poppy seed for an economy centred on the production of grain. The irony of this will not be lost on the reader of Security, Territory, Population. For such military strategies of the liberal present depend on precisely the same assumption that classical liberal strategies against sedition depended in the historical eras which Foucault analysed. That is the assumption that historically constituted peoples can be politically suborned and transformed into the utile stuff of population in accordance with the needs and interests of governmental regimes seeking security from those selfsame peoples.

### Timeframe

#### The incantation of timeframe is a key move of securitization discourse

Roe, 12 (Paul Roe, Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations and European Studies at Central European University, Budapest, “Is securitization a ‘negative’ concept? Revisiting the normative debate over normal versus extraordinary politics,” Security Dialogue vol. 43 no. 3, June 2012)

For the Copenhagen School, the undesirability (as opposed to ineffectiveness) of securitization is the result of the ‘failure to deal with issues as normal politics. Ideally, politics should be able to unfold according to routine procedures without this extraordinary elevation of specific threats’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 29). Concern here lies in the very nature of the context within which issues are handled. For such issues, the Copenhagen School’s (or perhaps, more specifically, Ole Wæver’s) commitment is to an Arendtian (not a Schmittian) politics: a space constituted by open discussion between ordinary citizens (together with, or through, their elected representatives) in a bid to solve collective problems. Although the distinction between normal and extraordinary politics is not explicit in the Copenhagen School’s theorizing, it is widely accepted that it derives largely from the context of (Western) liberal democratic states (see, for example, Jackson, 2006; Wilkinson, 2007; Vuori, 2008; Barthwal-Datta, 2009). Extraordinary politics is, in this sense, what normal politics is not. And normal politics is how things are ordinarily done in liberal democracies. As Aradau (2004: 392) puts it, ‘it is in relation to the procedural “normalcy” of democratic politics that the “exceptionalism” of security can be theorized’. Normal politics thus refers to the notion of ‘routine procedures’. In liberal democratic states, policymaking operates according to established mechanisms. Proposed measures are marked by debate and deliberation. Decisionmaking is open in the sense that legislatures and other bodies are able to scrutinize the executive. In the Copenhagen School’s rendering of securitization, the security speech act necessitates that things be done quickly. After all, our very survival (in some shape or form) is at stake. If we do not do something now, we may not be around later to regret not having acting speedily enough. Thus, Jef Huysmans remarks on how securitization (which he equates with the notion of ‘exceptionalism’) institutionalizes speed against the relative slowness of normal politics. Referring to the 2001 Patriot Act in the USA and the UK’s 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA), Huysmans (2004: 332) notes that exceptionalism puts representation under pressure by speeding up decisions. Security responses, especially after dramatic events such as 9/11, often articulate a need for swift and decisive counter-measures…. Calls for speed not only question the viability of deliberation and a contest of opinion; they also support strengthening executive-centred government, and suppress dissent.

### Transportation

#### Expanding the freedom of travel is intrinsically linked to expanding securitization

Bonham 06 (Jennifer, lecturer in Geographical and Environmental Studies at the University of Adelaide, “Part Two Governing Automobility: Transport: disciplining the body that travels,” The Sociological Review, Volume 54, Issue Supplement s1, pages 55–74, October 2006, 64-65)

The rising rate of deaths and injuries was taken up as an issue by both oppo- nents and proponents of the new motoring technologies. If motors were to be used on the public streets, the problem of safety had to be addressed. This section examines the mechanisms through which knowledge was produced about crashes and travelling bodies as well as the techniques deployed to disci- pline those who travelled. The disciplining of the body – which continues through to the present day – has been fundamental in enabling the government of travel through self-regulation and the desire for freedom (see also Packer, 2003). Throughout the early decades of the 1900s, travellers, travel practices, and conduct upon the street more generally were scrutinized for their potential to cause accidents. Following Foucault, the data accumulated in the day-to-day reporting procedures of agencies both within and beyond the State – the police, the coroner, hospitals, insurance companies, passenger and freight companies – provided a basis for a new sub-field of knowledge on road accidents (eg, South Australia Parliament, 1916, 1921, 1926, 1930, 1931, 1936). These agencies recorded information on the age and gender of those involved in the crash as well as where each crash occurred: in which localities; on which streets; the precise point on the street – at intersections, on foot-crossings, near the kerb or the centre of the streets. They also obtained data on the conditions and cir- cumstances under which crashes occurred: the actions of those immediately prior to the crash; the weather conditions – cloudy, rainy, sunny; the time of the day – dawn, dusk, night; the condition of the road and so forth. This informa- tion could be aggregated to calculate frequencies and determine patterns of distribution in where and when crashes occurred, the characteristics of those involved, and the attributes of those at fault (South Australia Parliament, 1930: 23–4, 1931: 26, 1936: Tables 1-16; State Records Office, 1927, 1932). This infor- mation was taken up and deployed by engineers as they designed roads con- ducive to speedy, but safe, journeys (Cardew, 1922: 14–6). Through the analysis of crash records, travel practices were separated out, sorted, and classified according to their potential to lead to accidents. Driving through or stopping at intersections, passing stationary trams, backing out from the kerb, weaving back and forth across the road, walking behind stationary vehicles, driving in the rain, standing on or walking along the road, stepping off the kerb, signalling one’s intentions to other travellers, looking along the street before stepping off the kerb could all be ranked as more or less hazardous prac- tices (State Records Office, 1927, 1932). As the body of knowledge grew about the actions and behaviours that led to or averted accidents, so a range of pro- grams and strategies were devised to guide the traveller in the performance of the journey. Through the first decades of the twentieth century, street spaces and travel practices were simultaneously ordered and intervened upon to secure the safe conduct of travel. The safety measures that could be introduced were delim- ited by the imperative to travel economically. The desire for economical travel was (and continues today as) a **largely unstated assumption of the discourse on safety**. Interventions related to safety reinforced and entrenched practices related to speed. Those travellers who resisted the ordering of the speedy street could be positioned as irrational because they simultaneously resisted the order of safety. Not only were the actions, interactions, and conditions surrounding the accident examined but road crashes led researchers deeper into the body of the traveller. Knowledges produced in the fields of Psychometrics, Industrial Psychology, and Medicine were readily deployed in the study of motor crashes. Researchers in these areas either used machines to investigate human actions and capacities (eg, reflexes, eyesight, and hearing) or examined the interactions of human beings with machines (Rabinbach, 1992; Crary, 1999). Industrial psy- chologists analysed the employee records of freight and passenger companies to determine the crash rates of individual employees and the personal character- istics of those involved in crashes (Miles and Vincent, 1934: 245–57). Transport workers were subjected to examinations to determine the characteristics, capac- ities and competencies necessary to motoring. Researchers set about measuring, recording, and comparing phenomena such as muscular movements, neuro- muscular co-ordination, intelligence, temperament, and attention span (eg, Little, 1934: 730–1; Miles and Vincent, 1934: 245–57; Myers, 1935: 740–2; Selling, 1937: 93–5; *Medical Journal of Australia,* 1937: 635–6). These researchers also identified factors that could optimize or undermine the perfor- mance of the motoring body – fatigue, alcohol, narcotics and so forth (Educa- *tion Gazette,* 1931: 187–8). This knowledge provided a basis for interventions that would develop the body’s capacities and optimize efficiency of movements. Speedy travellers required speedy responses.

#### The rise in transportation accounted for a new form of discourse to emerge that allowed for the rise of security concerns. This is a from of bio politics that we often concede to since it is the norm

Bonham 06 (Jennifer, lecturer in Geographical and Environmental Studies at the University of Adelaide, “Part Two Governing Automobility: Transport: disciplining the body that travels,” The Sociological Review, Volume 54, Issue Supplement s1, pages 55–74, October 2006, 70-71)

The first part of this chapter focused upon the objectification of, and interven- tions into, the spaces and uses of the street from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries. It was argued that these interventions reinforced each other to produce the street not just as a site of movement but as a site of efficient movement. The logic of the economic journey provided the basis for designat- ing street space for a new order of mobility. The second part of the chapter focused upon the objectification of the travelling body and the human capaci- ties necessary to fast, orderly movement. As these capacities were identified, norms were established and individual travellers could be positioned in relation to these norms. Those bodies that fell outside of the norm were excluded from particular travel practices such as driving. Nonetheless, all travellers were targeted to conduct themselves efficiently both at the micro level of their own bodies and in reference to the journeys made by others. The ordering of street uses and street spaces within discourses on urban planning and engineering coalesced with the ordering of travelling bodies within discourses on psychology and medicine to value the efficient body and secure the economical operation of the city. It was through the first half of the twentieth century that the street was entrenched as a site of economical travel and travellers disciplined to this order- ing of movement. As this order was established, it became meaningful to produce knowledge about journeys and innovations in the travel survey made this practicable. The origin-destination survey enabled transport planners to identify the precise points in the urban environment between which people moved – the point-to-point journey, or ‘trip’, was no longer an abstraction. These surveys, in turn, enabled the elaboration of the journey in terms of the timing and duration of journeys, the routes along which people travelled and the mode of travel. Norms could then be established in relation to each of these ‘trip criteria’ (origin, destination, duration, route). Transport planners used these criteria to determine which modes of travel maximized choice and they intervened in the urban environment to secure the conditions necessary for these travellers (Bonham, 2002). The new field of transport enabled the elaboration of a range of mechanisms (safety programmes, regulatory devices such as traffic lights, street and vehicle designs) to structure the field of action of the ‘free’ urban traveller toward the efficient conduct of the journey. The ordering of urban movement established in the first part of the twentieth century was (and still is) fundamental to the field of urban transport and the present-day conduct of travel. The focus of transport experts on efficient movement fails to take into account the many other motivations and meanings that people attach to their travel. The travelling subject constituted within transport (and many other expert) discourses is not necessarily taken up by the being that travels in any straightforward way. The simple observation that many people are prepared to sit in automobiles when train, tram or bicycle journeys might be more efficient indicates a certain dissonance between the subject of transport and the body that travels. The fact that in cities such as Adelaide (where travel by motor car is often more efficient than other means of travel) people continue to resist the use of an automobile also indicates the poverty of the transport story. Certainly, transport behaviouralists have examined a range of factors which might influ- ence the modal choices people make; however, transport experts continue to comprehend these factors within the framework of the efficient journey. Confining the study of urban travel to a story about transport has silenced a multiplicity of travel stories which spill out and are beyond the origin and des- tinations of each trip. Travel stories might be told in many different ways. They might emphasize the experiences of journeys, the social interactions (pleasant and unpleasant) which take place through (and outside) the journey, or the way in which racialized and gendered identities are worked upon and elaborated through the journey. Here I am thinking of the stories that teenagers might tell about their journeys on the school bus, the interactions of children and parents in the family car (Blakely, 1986). I am also thinking about the way in which travel experiences are gendered by middle-aged male security experts as these latter claim the right to speak on behalf of women about safety in public spaces. If travel stories could be told in more complex and diverse ways than transport experts allow then the present day ordering and prioritization of certain trav- ellers (specifically motorists) would be called into question. Perhaps this might ease the ongoing proliferation of automobiles.

#### Transportation investment is a rigged game – the security framework serves to benefit only those who already live securely

RICHARD WILLSON, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, 2001 “Assessing communicative rationality as a transportation planning paradigm” http://www.springerlink.com/content/u7786878328j6852/fulltext.pdf

Transportation planning practitioners might envisage that communicative rationality would result in time consuming, unrepresentative and expensive planning processes that will not move beyond expressions of individuals’ self interest. Transportation planners may shudder at the thought of “opening up” transportation planning, thinking that the only way to move policy forward is to control discourse enough so that a working consensus can be created. Transportation planning, by virtue of the large capital investment and impact on land value, attracts powerful interests who seek to manipulate communication to their advantage. Without the authority achieved by claiming scientific expertise, transportation planners may be unable to resist projects that are ill-conceived or wasteful but nonetheless linguistically appealing (e.g., when a nostalgia for rail transit supports a light rail project that is not cost effective). For many transportation planners, science is more important than words in counteracting special interest lobbying. Critics of communicative rationality might also challenge the notions advanced for ideal discourse. For example, sincerity is at odds with conventional technocratic behavior (e.g., since planners claim objectivity, sincerity is irrelevant). As has been said, planners are sometimes directed to be inaccurate. Such critics might even argue that transportation planners should distort language in a strategic manner. First, communicative distortions are a source of power in an environment where the planner’s influence is sometimes outweighed by special interests. Second, more subtly, if the only way a reasonable consensus for action can be achieved is by watering down and mystifying policy language, distorted communicative practices may in fact allow progress to be achieved. Finally, is it too much to ask to expect practitioners to not manipulate information and language to gain advantage for their organizations and themselves? Friedmann (1987) criticizes communicative action as being disconnected from action and power. His comment that communicative action is “the ideal of a graduate seminar” suggests that it is too idealistic for the reality of interests, power relationships and politics. Practicing transportation planners may also ask if they can actually guide the communicative processes that swirl around planning Adopting a communicative rationality model will undermine traditional forms of professional authority for transportation planners. Transportation planners receive good salaries in part because of their linkages with engineering and a scientific approach. As well, the technocratic role provides distance from potentially career-threatening political conflict. Decision-makers want to control the discourse environment surrounding planning and may see no advantage is allowing planners more authority in this area. Finally, the broadest concern with this approach comes from those who reject the philosophical underpinnings of communicative action. For transportation planners basing their work on a positivist tradition, whose problem frame is “getting the prices right” and protecting freedom of choice, communicative rationality may sound like a recipe for coercion of the many by the few. To the postmodern critic of transportation planning, the hope for a reinvigorated modernism based on communicative rationality may seem naive and ill suited to a fragmented, diverse society.

#### Improvements in transportation are the essence of biopolitics – the management of life is made possible through the regularization of transit

Douglas 97 (Ian Robert Douglas, Teaching Fellow, Department of Media & Modern Culture / Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown, November 14, 1997, http://ianrobertdouglas.com/1997/11/14/calm-before-the-storm/)

In Flesh and Stone, Foucault’s friend and collaborator, Richard Sennett, describes how this medical perception of movement came to define the organization of Classical and Baroque urban space. In doing so, Sennett, like Foucault, makes the crucial link between the organization of bodies and that of the broader ‘body-politic’. New principles of city planning and policing were emerging based upon the medical metaphors of ‘circulation’ and ‘flow’.[3] The health of the body became the comparison against which the greatness of cities and states would be measured. The ‘veins’ and ‘arteries’ of the new urban design were to be freed from all sources of possible blockage: Enlightened planners wanted the city in its very design to function like a healthy body, freely flowing as well as possessed of clear skin. Since the beginnings of the Baroque era, urban planners had thought about making cities in terms of efficient circulation of the people on the city’s main streets … The medical imagery of life-giving circulation gave a new meaning to the Baroque emphasis of motion. Instead of planning streets for the sake of ceremonies of movement toward an object, as did the Baroque planner, the Enlightenment planner made motion an end in itself.[4] The regularisation of cleanliness and sanitation, and the removal of madmen, beggars, vagabonds and idlers from the highway can be related to the question of the efficiency of movement that dominated the historical imaginary of the Classical age.[5] As Julien Offray de La Mettrie would remark, only organised matter was endowed with the principle of motion.[6] We may also add that matter endowed with the principle of motion was increasingly regarded as ‘ordered’. What was emerging was a particular relation between politics, space and time. In the words of Guillaute (a French police officer writing in 1749): “Public order will reign if we are careful to distribute our human time and space between the city and the country by a severe regulation of transit; if we are attentive to schedules as well as to alignments and signal systems; if by environmental standardization the entire city is made transparent, that is, familiar to the policeman’s eye.”[7]

### Transportation – Movement

#### The emphasis on movement is a key disciplinary tool – the constant flow produces an idealized model of normal conditions which justifies the state’s biopolitical control

Tom Lundborg Swedish Institute of International Affairs AND Nick Vaughan-Williams University of Warwick, 12/2011 [“Resilience, Critical Infrastructure, and Molecular Security: The Excess of ‘‘Life’’ in Biopolitics”, International Political Sociology 5, http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/vaughan-williams/ips\_dec\_2011.pdf]

Lentzos and Rose (2009) seek to address the issue of how the political rationalities of advanced liberal democracies have become replaced by new technologies animated by the telos of security. In other words, they take as their starting point a curiosity about the nature of the contemporary relationship between governance in the West and security: a curiosity that Foucault had already begun to develop in his series of lectures at the Colle`ge de France published recently as Society Must Be Defended (2004). Lentzos and Rose cite Foucault’s animating distinction between centripetal disciplinary mechanisms on the one hand and centrifugal biopolitical apparatuses on the other. The former isolates and closes off space in order to regulate bodies within that given area; the latter, by contrast, works with movements in ever-wider circuits in order to manage complex realities. In recent years, a number of authors have worked with and developed Foucault’s insights about how security can be made compatible with circulation in this way (Amoore 2006; Bigo 2007; Kavalski 2009; Salter 2006). As such, it is unnecessary to rehearse these relatively well-known arguments here, except to stress, as Lentzos and Rose do, that what is valued in liberal democratic societies is precisely the ability to keep people, services, and goods constantly on the move. The necessity to maintain these centrifugal forces therefore takes the analysis of security practices beyond simple (disciplinary) notions of prevention, ‘‘big-brother’’ style surveillance, and barricades. Instead, biopolitical apparatuses of security are shown to work with complexity, embrace and identify patterns in flows, and govern through the management of these dynamics. It is within this context that Lentzos and Rose situate what they call a ‘‘logic of resilience,’’ understood as ‘‘a systematic, widespread, organizational, structural and personal strengthening of subjective and material arrangements so as to be better able to anticipate and tolerate disturbances in complex worlds without collapse’’ (Lentzos and Rose 2009:243). On this view, therefore, resilience encompasses technologies of security that recoil from shocks to (and within) the ‘‘system of systems’’ they constitute, in order to ensure a return to ‘‘normal’’ conditions of circulation as quickly as possible.

### Transportation – Speed

#### The pace of transportation is woven into the discourse of security – all improvements are done in the name of social discipline

Jennifer Bonham Social Science at the University of Chester as a Senior Lecturer and Peter Cox Social Science at the University of Chester as a Senior Lecturer, 6/2010[“The disruptive traveller? A Foucauldian analysis of Cycleways”, Road and Transport Research]MW

In cities across the world, the contemporary division and regulation of the public space of the street (and road) has been guided by a transport rationalisation of urban travel (Bonham 2000). Streets have been divided lengthwise and travellers allocated space according to the speed and order with which they travel (Bonham 2000). The mobile body has been incited to move at speed to ensure the efficient operation of the city. However, in the early twentieth century, widespread concern over motor vehiclerelated deaths and injuries underpinned debate over prioritising speed or safety. The debate was resolved (but never quite fixed) in favour of speed, with ‘vulnerable’ road users giving way to the fast (Bonham 2002). The slow and disorderly – pedestrians, horses and carts – were removed to the margins, checked by the fast and orderly, or excluded altogether. Overall efficiency, measured in time, could only be assured if each traveller agreed to be orderly – hence all those road safety techniques and programs that train bodies in ‘correct movement’ (Bonham 2006). The public space of the street, often identified in political discourse as a site available to all citizens, effectively becomes an economic space where the subject of transport discourse, conducting the economical journey, gains primacy. Subjugating oneself within the discourse on transport – becoming the efficient or economical traveller, which in the twentieth century has meant taking up the subject position of the motorist – is rewarded with priority in the use of public space. These individual rewards invoke wider social rewards through the increase in the reproduction of capital through the facilitation of movement (Cox 2010). Indeed, an entire literature on globalisation has employed this metaphor of increased flows in speed, volume and depth to describe globalisation of capitalism from the end of the twentieth century (Boran and Cox 2007). Transport discourses are thus woven into discourses on the nature of public good and of socio-economically responsible behaviour, reinforcing the linkage between travel behaviours and ‘responsible citizens’. The knowledge produced about individual travellers is not only enabled by the exercise of power but also facilitates the further exercise of power. Power–knowledge relations operate at a micro-scale subjectivising singular bodies while, at a macro-scale, the subjectivities constituted within different disciplines (e.g. economics, demography) are deployed in the government of populations (Foucault 1981, 1982, 1991). Further, the aggregation of data about singular bodies not only allows the calculation of norms (and deviations from those norms) but in liberal societies, where citizens are constituted as free and incited to exercise freedom of choice (Huxley 2008), this knowledge is central to government as populations are guided rather than directed toward particular ends (Rose 1990; Gordon 1991; Rose and Miller 1992). In terms of transport, knowledge produced about individual travellers and singular journeys is combined into knowledge of urban populations and used to guide the choices of the population toward economical movement and the economical operation of the city. This process values speed and prioritises the reduction of travel time ahead of the impacts on health, environment and social exclusion that accompany increases in speed and travel energy consumption (Lohan and Wickham 1998; Whitelegg 1993, 1997).

### Transportation – Planning

#### The affirmative’s justifications of transportation planning are bio-political and disguise security discourse as necessary.

RICHARD WILLSON, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, 2001 “Assessing communicative rationality as a transportation planning paradigm” http://www.springerlink.com/content/u7786878328j6852/fulltext.pdf

The theory of knowledge, or epistemology, that is implied by instrumental rationality is scientific objectivism. Drawing from the natural sciences, engineering and certain of the social sciences, this view assumes that objective facts can be known and that the analyst is able to observe a system without participating in it or effecting it. Furthermore, it is assumed that facts can be separated from subjective information and abstracted from complex social settings. Data analysis and modeling results provide the primary information upon which alternatives are evaluated, information such as level of service, air quality conditions or cost effectiveness. Objectivist epistemology and instrumental rationality method go hand-in-hand – if one element cannot be supported it is difficult to justify the other. Some aspects of the practice of transportation planning are well suited to the traditional focus described above. Many transportation conditions are quantifiable and certain aspects of travel behavior are quite predictable (e.g., traveler 5 Figure 1. Conventional planning process. route selection). Most plans involve complex technical aspects that are suited to a scientific approach. If there is a social consensus about ends and the range of alternatives is within an aspect of travel behavior that is predictable, then the traditional model has much to recommend it. Indeed, the efficiency with which people and goods are moved in developed countries is a testament to the efficiency of these methods. Criticisms of the conventional model It is not new to observe that the practice of transportation planning does not follow the classic instrumental rationality model. It important to review those criticisms, however, because they illustrate the possibilities for communicative rationality. Conventional transportation planning practice reflects a tension between the espoused theory just described and a theory-in-use of strategic rationality. By strategic rationality, I mean a form of rationality that is oriented toward achieving political action. One of the realities of practice is that transportation planners are frequently not able to achieve a consensus concerning the ends of planning. The multiple stakeholders to transportation planning often have different goals and objectives; in recent decades the range of goals for transportation have widened significantly. Instead of acting as advisors to a rational actor decision-maker who is functioning in a closed system, transportation planners find competing interest groups in an organizationally defined and differentially empowered setting. Instead of well-defined problems, they find multiple, perhaps ideologically defined problems. Instead of perfect information and analytic certainty, they find contested, ideological information and models that are stretched to represent complex behavioral realities. The transportation planner’s challenge is to reconcile the espoused theory with these conditions to find practical wisdom and a process that will lead to decision-making and plan adoption. The conventional model is not helpful in this regard. Furthermore, transportation scholarship has abandoned the issue except for offering postmortem on failed processes. The claims for objectivity in data and models that underpin instrumental rationality have been challenged from numerous standpoints. Quantification draws attention to some things and hides other things, such as equity issues or qualitative considerations. For example, studies of travel patterns by gender reveal differences formerly hidden in aggregate data. Wachs (1985) points out that models are also manipulated to produce predetermined outcomes. More broadly, Throgmorton (1993) argues that analytic techniques do not present an objective truth, but instead act as figures of speech and argument. In other words, a survey instrument or model does not exist disconnected from speech in a place and time. Surveys and models have an audience, they respond to what came before, they construct the roles of planners and others and they are built on language concepts. Finally, Harvey (1985) suggests that transportation models must respond to the fact that “values are invoked and mediated through the process, rather than resolved at an early stage” (pp. 458). When models ignore this reality, as they often do, their results become less relevant to decision making. Yet model results and analytic data are often presented as “findings” rather than a form of discourse.

**T**ransportation planning gives power to the state to marginalize the population

RICHARD WILLSON, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, 2001 “Assessing communicative rationality as a transportation

planning paradigm” http://www.springerlink.com/content/u7786878328j6852/fulltext.pdf

The problems with instrumental rationality are not unique to transportation planning – they stem from changes in the larger social context for planning. The changes, in turn, touch on the most basic questions in philosophy and social theory. Instrumental rationality and objectivism are part of traditional notions of modernism and progress, yet these foundational elements have been transformed. Starting in the 1950s, critiques of scientific social science emerged in sociology and planning (see Guhathakurta (1999) for an overview). Yet in practice and research, transportation planning has followed a schizophrenic path – acknowledging problems in instrumental rationality but continuing to employ it in research, practice and teaching. In the recent years, social theorists use the term postmodernism to describe changes that undermine traditional modernist notions, including instrumental rationality and objectivism. Stated simply, postmodernism recognizes that there is not longer a single organizing narrative around which a plan can optimize (e.g., a consensus notion of what constitutes progress). Without such an organizing narrative, a plan cannot optimize means with respect to ends, and many assumptions of rational transportation planning come apart. 4 Milroy’s (1991) four observations about the implications of postmodernism for planning are used here to discuss the context for transportation planning. First, a postmodern perspective questions conventional beliefs and seeks to understand the power relations beneath them. The changing notions about the appropriateness of mobility as a transportation planning goal are an example of this. Mobility (taken here to mean vehicle throughput) was once assumed to be the general aim of transportation planning, but now there are competing ideas about such goals (e.g., mobility versus accessibility, and recently, restricting travel opportunity). Transportation planning rarely optimizes around a single goal; it usually balances multiple, often contradictory goals. In addition, more is understood about who benefits and who loses from differing goals definitions, so terms and ideas that were formerly uncontroversial become contested. Second, a postmodernism perspective challenges the notion of universals as bases of truth. Mobility enhancement used to be associated with a general notion of progress. Just as old postcards show factories billowing smoke as a sign of economic prosperity, the freedom to live and work where one chooses was a cornerstone of American land use and transportation policy. Although that freedom is still sought, the question of progress is now contested, not consensual. In the realm of project evaluation criteria, the cost/benefit calculus of economic evaluation is not offered as the sole decision criterion as it might have been in the past. Third, a postmodernism perspective asserts that a clear delineation between subjective and objective is not possible. There is, for example, recognition that objective analysis leaves out forms of knowing important to understanding travel behavior and making policy choices, such as qualitative factors, aethestics and morals. For example, Talvitie (1997) challenges the economic theory that underlies transportation models by introducing psychoanalytic understandings of travel behavior, aspects outside the realm of traditional notions of objectivity. He calls for examination of the “dark” side of transportation behavior instead of focusing solely on utility maximization. And finally, a postmodernism perspective is said to value plurality and difference. Recent research shows how transportation systems function differently for women, people of color, children, the elderly, the disabled, the poor and other groups. As we begin to recognize the perspectives and claims of a more diverse society, a type of planning that is “clean, calculating and homogenizing” seems a poor fit with the likely planning and decision-making environment.

### Utilitarianism

#### Utilitarianism and the concept of Liberty are fundamentally rooted in security

Neocleous 8 (Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy; Head of Department of Politics & History Brunel Univ, Critique of Security, 26-27)

It is clear that by the end of the eighteenth century security was a common theme for all writers on politics and law. And it was this conception of the priority of security that shaped the concept of liberty, for liberty and security were by no means in opposition or in need of balance. ‘Liberty’ was in fact so bound up with security in the liberal mind that, if anything, they were synonyms rather than antonyms. Liberty is subsumed under security. Security becomes the cornerstone of the liberal mind, which identifies security with the freedom and liberty to pursue one’s individual self-interest. In being framed in terms of the mechanisms of security in this way liberty becomes part of the deployment of security rather than a political end in itself. Hence the development of liberal constitutionalism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries would be accompanied by the establishment, extension or professionalization of a whole range of ‘security institutions’ – police and armed forces, security services, welfare mechanisms (‘social security’) – that would rival anything found in the police science of the cameralists. Thus when in Utilitarianism (1861) John Stuart Mill describes security rather than liberty as ‘the most vital of all interests’ he is mrely restating what had by then become a liberal commonplace. Our interests, he comments, vary enormously from person to person depending on our characters and desires; that is why we must respect liberty.

### Warming

#### Attempting to halt global warming produces securitization- countries compete against each other to reduce, or avoid reducing their emissions

Buzan et al, 1998 (Barry Buzan, Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and honorary professor at the University of Copenhagen and Jilin University, Ole Waever, a professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen Jaap de Wilde,  Professor of International Relations and World Politics at the University of Groningen., 1998 “Security: A New Framework for Analysis” p.86)

The third sequence of questions is decisive, because it is here that a political constellation of mutual security concerns is formed. Who feels threatened? Who must those parties cooperate with if action is to be effective? Effects and causes are significant conditions in disposing who will become involved with whom and how, but they do not fully determine our outcomes. Securitization always involves political choice: thus, actors might choose to ignore major causes for political or pragmatic reasons and therefore may form a security constellation that is different from what one would expect based on one’s knowledge of effects and causes. Occasionally , pragmatism may prescribe global action, but even then it is necessary to subdivide global issues according to the context of their causes and effects. Dealing with the causes of, for instance, global warming require a global contest. The fossil CO2 emissions that contribute to the greenhouse effect occur worldwide are therefore a global problem, even though important regional differences should be realized. Meeting the causes of global warming points to the urgency of a global regime, which was recognized at UNCED where the climate treaty that became effective in March 1994 was signed. It is telling, however tat at the follow-up conference in Berlin (28 March-7 April 1995), saving the intentions declared at UNCED was the optimum goal. Further decision making and regime formation were postponed to the third Climate Summit, to be held in Tokyo in 1997. This postponement is in part a result of the fact that those who have to pay the price for prevention are different from those who pay the price of failure.

###

# Impacts

### Extinction

#### The aff’s technocratic quest for security in an insecure world guarantees extinction and devaluates man into useable energy

Burke 7 (Anthony, lecturer of IR at U New South Wales, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” December 7, <http://www.hopkins-debate.com/pdf/Burke.pdf>)

Bacon thought of the new scientific method not merely as way of achieving a purer access to truth and epistemological certainty, but as liberating a new power that would enable the creation of a new kind of Man. He opened the Novum Organum with the statement that 'knowledge and human power are synonymous', and later wrote of his 'determination...to lay a firmer foundation, and extend to a greater distance the boundaries of human power and dignity'.67 In a revealing and highly negative comparison between 'men's lives in the most polished countries of Europe and in any wild and barbarous region of the new Indies' -- one that echoes in advance Kissinger's distinction between post-and pre-Newtonian cultures -- Bacon set out what was at stake in the advancement of empirical science: anyone making this comparison, he remarked, 'will think it so great, that man may be said to be a god unto man'.68 # We may be forgiven for blinking, but in Bacon's thought 'man' was indeed in the process of stealing a new fire from the heavens and seizing God's power over the world for itself. Not only would the new empirical science lead to 'an improvement of mankind's estate, and an increase in their power over nature', but would reverse the primordial humiliation of the Fall of Adam: For man, by the fall, lost at once his state of innocence, and his empire over creation, both of which can be partially recovered even in this life, the first by religion and faith, the second by the arts and sciences. For creation did not become entirely and utterly rebellious by the curse, but in consequence of the Divine decree, 'in the sweat of thy brow thou shalt eat bread'; she is now compelled by our labours (not assuredly by our disputes or magical ceremonies) at length to afford mankind in some degree his bread...69 # There is a breathtaking, world-creating hubris in this statement -- one that, in many ways, came to characterise western modernity itself, and which is easily recognisable in a generation of modern technocrats like Kissinger. The Fall of Adam was the Judeo-Christian West's primal creation myth, one that marked humankind as flawed and humbled before God, condemned to hardship and ambivalence. Bacon forecast here a return to Eden, but one of man's own making. This truly was the death of God, of putting man into God's place, and no pious appeals to the continuity or guidance of faith could disguise the awesome epistemological violence which now subordinated creation to man. Bacon indeed argued that inventions are 'new creations and imitations of divine works'. As such, there is nothing but good in science: 'the introduction of great inventions is the most distinguished of human actions...inventions are a blessing and a benefit without injuring or afflicting any'.70 # And what would be mankind's 'bread', the rewards of its new 'empire over creation'? If the new method and invention brought modern medicine, social welfare, sanitation, communications, education and comfort, it also enabled the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust and two world wars; napalm, the B52, the hydrogen bomb, the Kalashnikov rifle and military strategy. Indeed some of the 20th Century's most far-reaching inventions -- radar, television, rocketry, computing, communications, jet aircraft, the Internet -- would be the product of drives for national security and militarisation. Even the inventions Bacon thought so marvellous and transformative -- printing, gunpowder and the compass -- brought in their wake upheaval and tragedy: printing, dogma and bureaucracy; gunpowder, the rifle and the artillery battery; navigation, slavery and the genocide of indigenous peoples. In short, the legacy of the new empirical science would be ambivalence as much as certainty; degradation as much as enlightenment; the destruction of nature as much as its utilisation. Doubts and Fears: Technology as Ontology # If Bacon could not reasonably be expected to foresee many of these developments, the idea that scientific and technological progress could be destructive did occur to him. However it was an anxiety he summarily dismissed: ...let none be alarmed at the objection of the arts and sciences becoming depraved to malevolent or luxurious purposes and the like, for the same can be said of every worldly good; talent, courage, strength, beauty, riches, light itself...Only let mankind regain their rights over nature, assigned to them by the gift of God, and obtain that power, whose exercise will be governed by right reason and true religion.71 # By the mid-Twentieth Century, after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, such fears could no longer be so easily wished away, as the physicist and scientific director of the Manhattan Project, J. Robert Oppenheimer recognised. He said in a 1947 lecture: We felt a particularly intimate responsibility for suggesting, for supporting and in the end in large measure achieving the realization of atomic weapons...In some sort of crude sense which no vulgarity, no humor, no over-statement can quite extinguish, the physicists have known sin, and this is a knowledge they cannot lose.72 # Adam had fallen once more, but into a world which refused to acknowledge its renewed intimacy with contingency and evil. Man's empire over creation -- his discovery of the innermost secrets of matter and energy, of the fires that fuelled the stars -- had not 'enhanced human power and dignity' as Bacon claimed, but instead brought destruction and horror. Scientific powers that had been consciously applied in the defence of life and in the hope of its betterment now threatened its total and absolute destruction. This would not prevent a legion of scientists, soldiers and national security policymakers later attempting to apply Bacon's faith in invention and Descartes' faith in mathematics to make of the Bomb a rational weapon. # Oppenheimer -- who resolutely opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb -- understood what the strategists could not: that the weapons resisted control, resisted utility, that 'with the release of atomic energy quite revolutionary changes had occurred in the techniques of warfare'.73 Yet Bacon's legacy, one deeply imprinted on the strategists, was his view that truth and utility are 'perfectly identical'.74 In 1947 Oppenheimer had clung to the hope that 'knowledge is good...it seems hard to live any other way than thinking it was better to know something than not to know it; and the more you know, the better'; by 1960 he felt that 'terror attaches to new knowledge. It has an unmooring quality; it finds men unprepared to deal with it.'75 # Martin Heidegger questioned this mapping of natural science onto the social world in his essays on technology -- which, as 'machine', has been so crucial to modern strategic and geopolitical thought as an image of perfect function and order and a powerful tool of intervention. He commented that, given that modern technology 'employs exact physical science...the deceptive illusion arises that modern technology is applied physical science'.76 Yet as the essays and speeches of Oppenheimer attest, technology and its relation to science, society and war cannot be reduced to a noiseless series of translations of science for politics, knowledge for force, or force for good. # Instead, Oppenheimer saw a process frustrated by roadblocks and ruptured by irony; in his view there was no smooth, unproblematic translation of scientific truth into social truth, and technology was not its vehicle. Rather his comments raise profound and painful ethical questions that resonate with terror and uncertainty. Yet this has not prevented technology becoming a potent object of desire, not merely as an instrument of power but as a promise and conduit of certainty itself. In the minds of too many rational soldiers, strategists and policymakers, technology brings with it the truth of its enabling science and spreads it over the world. It turns epistemological certainty into political certainty; it turns control over 'facts' into control over the earth. # Heidegger's insights into this phenomena I find especially telling and disturbing -- because they underline the ontological force of the instrumental view of politics. In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger's striking argument was that in the modernising West technology is not merely a tool, a 'means to an end'. Rather technology has become a governing image of the modern universe, one that has come to order, limit and define human existence as a 'calculable coherence of forces' and a 'standing reserve' of energy. Heidegger wrote: 'the threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affected man in his essence.'77 # This process Heidegger calls 'Enframing' and through it the scientific mind demands that 'nature reports itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and remains orderable as a system of information'. Man is not a being who makes and uses machines as means, choosing and limiting their impact on the world for his ends; rather man has imagined the world as a machine and humanity everywhere becomes trapped within its logic. Man, he writes, 'comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall...where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile Man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth.'78 Technological man not only becomes the name for a project of lordship and mastery over the earth, but incorporates humanity within this project as a calculable resource. In strategy, warfare and geopolitics human bodies, actions and aspirations are caught, transformed and perverted by such calculating, enframing reason: human lives are reduced to tools, obstacles, useful or obstinate matter.

### Biopower

#### The call to securitize always implies an enemy: against the sacred population in need of salvation is placed an unstable other who must be resisted at all costs. The only possible result is annihilation.

Campbell, 1998. David, professor of international politics at the University of Newcastle. Writing Security, 1998. (199 – 202)

Security and subjectivity are intrinsically linked, even in conven­tional understandings. Traditional discourses of international relations maintain that alliance is one where security is a goal to be achieved by a number of instrumentalities deployed by the state (defense and foreign policy, for example). But the linkage between the two can be understood in a different light, for just as Foreign Policy works to constitute the identity in whose name it operates, security functions to instantiate the subjectivity it purports to serve. Indeed, security (of which foreign policy/Foreign Policy is a part) is first and foremost a performative discourse constitutive of political order: after all, "se­curing something requires its differentiation, classification and defi­nition. It has, in short, to be identified."21 An invitation to this line of thought can be found in the later work of Michel Foucault, in which he explicitly addresses the issue of security and the state through the rubric of "governmental ratio­nality."22 The incitement to Foucault's thinking was his observation that from the middle of the sixteenth century to the end of the eigh­teenth century, political treatises that previously had been written as advice to the prince were now being presented as works on the "art jf government." The concern of these treatises was not confined to the requirements of a specific sovereign, but with the more general problematic of government: a problematic that included the govern­ment of souls and lives, of children, of oneself, and finally, of the state by the sovereign. This problematic of governance emerges at the intersection of central and centralizing power relationships (those located in principles of universality, law, citizenship, sovereignty), and individual and individualizing power relationships (such as the pas­toral relationships of the Christian church and the welfare state).23 Accordingly, the state for Foucault is an ensemble of practices that are at one and the same time individualizing and totalizing: I don't think that we should consider the "modern state" as an en­tity which was developed above individuals, ignoring what they are and even their very existence, but on the contrary as a very so­phisticated structure, in which individuals can be integrated, under one condition: that this individuality would be shaped in a new form, and submitted to a set of very specific patterns. In a way we can see the state as a modern matrix of individualization.24 Foucault posited some direct and important connections between the individualizing and totalizing power relationships in the conclu­sion to *The History of Sexuality, Volume I.* There he argues that start­ing in the seventeenth century, power over life evolved in two com­plementary ways: through disciplines that produced docile bodies, and through regulations and interventions directed at the social body. The former centered on the body as a machine and sought to maxi­mize its potential in economic processes, while the latter was con­cerned with the social body's capacity to give life and propagate. To­gether, these relations of power meant that "there was an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations, marking the beginning of an era of 'bio-power.' " This era of bio-power saw the art of government develop an overtly constitutive orientation through the deployment of technologies concerned with the ethical boundaries of identity as much (if not more than) the territorial borders of the state. Foucault supported this argument by reference to the "theory of police." Developed in the seventeenth century, the "theory of police" sig­nified not an institution or mechanism internal to the state, but a gov­ernmental technology that helped specify the domain of the state.26 In particular, Foucault noted that Delamare's *Compendium* — an eigh­teenth-century French administrative work detailing the kingdom's police regulations — outlined twelve domains of concern for the police: religion, morals, health, supplies, roads, town buildings, public safety, the liberal arts, trade, factories, the supply of labor, and the poor. The logic behind this ambit claim of concern, which was repeated in all treatises on the police, was that the police should be concerned with "everything pertaining to men's happiness," all social relations carried on between men, and all "living."27 As another treatise of the period declared: "The police's true object is man." The theory of police, as an instance of the rationality behind the art of government, had therefore the constitution, production, and maintenance of identity as its major effect. Likewise, the conduct of war is linked to identity. As Foucault argues, "Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of slaughter in the name of life necessity." In other words, countries go to war, not for the purpose of defending their rulers, but for the purpose of defending "the nation," ensuring the state's security, or upholding the interests and values of the people. Moreover, in an era that has seen the development of a global system for the fighting of a nuclear war (the infrastructure of which remains intact despite the "end of the cold war"), the paradox of riskingindi­vidual death for the sake of collective life has been pushed to its logi­cal extreme. Indeed, "the atomic situation is now at the end of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the under­side of the power to guarantee an individual's continued existence." The common effect of the theory of police and the waging of war in constituting the identity in whose name they operate highlights the way in which foreign policy/Foreign Policy establishes the gen­eral preconditions for

Continued…

Impact – biopower

Continued…

a "coherent policy of order," particularly as it gives rise to a geography of evil.30 Indeed, the preoccupation of the texts of Foreign Policy with the prospects for order, and the concern of a range of cultural spokespersons in America with the dangers to order, manifest how this problematic is articulated in a variety of sites distinctive of the United States. Most important, though, it is at the intersection of the "microphysics" and "macrophysics" of power in the problematic of order that we can locate the concept of security. Security in this formulation is neither just an essential precondition of power nor its goal; security is a specific principle of political method and practice directed explicitly to "the ensemble of the population.This is not to suggest that "the population" exists in a prediscursive domain; on the contrary, "one of the great innovations in the tech­niques of power in the eighteenth century was the emergence of 'pop­ulation' as an economic and political problem."

Furthermore, Foucault argues that from the eighteenth century onward, security becomes the central dynamic in governmental ratio­nality, so that (as discussed in chapter 6) we live today, not in a narrowly defined and overtly repressive disciplinary society, but in *a* "society of security," in which practices of national security and practices of so­cial security structure intensive and extensive power relations, and constitute the ethical boundaries and territorial borders of inside/ outside, normal/pathological, civilized/barbaric, and so on. The theory of police and the shift from a sovereign's war to a popula­tion's war thus not only changed the nature of "man" and war, it constituted the identity of "man" in the idea of the population, and articulated the dangers that might pose a threat to security. The ma­jor implication of this argument is that the state is understood as hav­ing no essence, no ontological status that exists prior to and is served by either police or war. Instead, "the state" is "the mobile effect of a multiple regime of governmentality," of which the practices of police, —— and foreign policy/Foreign Policy are all a part.

### Value to Life

#### Nuclear security’s risk calculus relies on faulty universalizations that cannot account for any value to life

Bryan Hubbard, MA in Political Science @ ASU, ’97 [*Rhetorical Analysisis of Two Contemporary Atomic Campaigns*, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA327948]

The escalation of risk to life-threatening risk makes a particular value statement that suggests all people prioritize risks to life over risks to quality of life. This practice repeats universalizing discourse of modernity despite other appeals toward difference. The automatic escalation of risk discussion to life-threatening risk ignores a plethora of values short of life and death and universalizes criteria for decision making**.** Experience shows social practices often occur for reasons outside the evaluation of life-threatening risk based on individualized cultural perceptions, tastes and values. People disagree over what they consider a risky activity because of differences in value systems and multiple decision-making heuristics not considered by traditional risk communication which envisions one uniform rational-world paradigm. This difference involves very specific value judgments. Different activities will receive different risk characterization despite their statistical similarity. Ravetz (1980) suggests, "the variety in the public perceptions of acceptable risk partly reflects the variety of life itself in its many dimensions of experience" (p. 47). This does not necessarily point to the failure of risk communication to inform individuals of risk but indicates other criteria also inform decisions that traditional risk communication ignores. To date, the bulk of academic literature on risk communication seems to have an invested interest in the future of the nuclear industry and modernity. Largely based on social science, the literature has tried to quantify public perception and acceptance of technological risk (Bassett, Jenkins-Smith, & Silva, 1996; Cohen 1995; Farr, 1992; Fischoff, 1995; Garrick & Gekler, 1989; McBeth & Oakes, 1996; McCormick, 1981; McDaniels, Axelrod, & Slovic, 1995; Sokolowska & Tyszka, 1995; Weinberg, 1991). The results are mixed. Waterstone (1992) reviews this line of study and notes, it "has taken a mechanistic, deterministic view of events and behavior; has been scientific and technocratic; has largely downplayed, if not ignored, the role of social and economic factors in affecting risk; and has represented an ideology of the status quo**"** (p. 2). Risk communicators, who share a rational-world vision with these social scientists, employ this line of research and disregard public failure to conform as examples of an ignorant irrational publics. This perception decreases policy-makers faith in democratic decision making while creating resentment toward technocrats from the general public who can read the insensitivity toward their concerns. The institutionalization of risk communication as previously conceptualized sanctions nuclear communication as an **exclusive technocratic discourse** which results in **polarizing one-way communication.**

### Depoliticization

#### The Aff’s Descriptions of Security Removes Policy From Politics – The Seeming Need For Instant Solutions is Product of This Rhetoric.

Benjamin Berboth et. al., Prof. of Poli. Sci @ Johann Wolfgang Goeth-University, ‘7 [*Norface Seminar*, “Secur(itizing)ing the West: The Transformation of Western Order,” http://www.soz.uni-frankfurt.de/hellmann/projekt/Draft\_Final\_West\_DVPW\_BISA\_08.pdf]

While securing the West by securitizing its existence has been the ordering macro-structure during the heydays of the Cold War, the decline of the Soviet empire as the threatening other has made room for the question how the Western identity and security discourse might change as a result. In many ways the macro-political transformation of the 'East-West conflict' went hand in hand with the rise of discursive approaches in JR. When the "linguistic turn" (Rorty 1969) had finally arrived at IR's disciplinary edge attention turned on processes of signification and the constitution of meaning by language in use (for an introduction in the field of JR see Fierke 2003, 2002). Especially the concept of security has aroused special attention (Baldwin 1997, Wolfers 1952, Walt 1990, Krause/Williams 1996, Kolodziej 1992, Lipschutz 1995). The conceptual work of the Copenhagen School, especially as far as the work of Barry Buzan and Ole Wver were concerned, departed from the rather narrow focus of a 'wide'-vs.-'narrow' definition of security by advocating an explicitly constructivist / linguistic perspective! In this view security is neither an objective fact (like rationalist approaches assume) nor just a subjective perception (like soft constructivism and cognitive approaches suggest). Rather security rests on an intersubjective understanding (Buzan/Wver/de Wilde 1998: 29-31). Buzan, Wver and de Wilde argue that **security is essentially a speech a**ct - a performative act with a specific grammar (Buzan et al. 1998: 23-26; Wver 1995: 55). As a performative act, security is a self-referential practice with a specific rhetorical structure: Security is about the survival of a threatened referent object. Because the survival of the referent object is considered a just cause securitization justifies the use of **extraordina!y measures**, including the use of force, to protect it. To be successful, this move of securitization has to be accepted as legitimate and appropriate by an audience. As an ordering mechanism, securitization entails far reaching political and ethical consequences because ,,[s]ecurity is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as **above politics**" (Buzan/Wver/deWilde 1998: 23). While po1iticiation presents an issue as a matter of choice, ie. normal politics, securitiation frames an issue as urgent and existential calling for extraordinary measures which reduce the possibility of choice **to an either-or level**, ie. **whether we act or not**. Especially Wever has stressed the "antidemocratic implications" of securitization (Wver 2003: 12; see also Wver 2005; Buzan/Wver/deWilde 1998) because it represents a failure of handling challenges politically, ie. within the normal procedure of (democratic) politics. This is what the opposite of securitization, desecuritization - ie. the process of actually **moving issues "off the security agenda and back into the realm of** (...) 'normal' **political dispute and accommodation**" (Williams 2003: 523) - is supposed to refer to. In many ways the result of de-securitization, normal politics, is of particular interest to the process of the transformation of the West since it entails the key question whether (and if so: to what extent) global politics can be politicized (and civilized) rather than securitized. Yet the securitization literature is to a certain extent ambivalent in this regard. While Wver himself (eg. 1998: 92) is quite evasive, others have argued that (unlike politicization) desecuritization presupposes a grammar of security itself and is therefore unable to escape the problem of speaking security (cf. Aradau 2001).b0 Here Carl Schmitt's notion of exception resonates where the act of speaking security constitutes the community by the radical differentiation between friend and foe (Schmitt 1996 [19321, see also Odysseos/Petito 2007, Behnke 2004, 2005; for a critical standpoint see Herborth 2005, Huysmans 2006: 127141).

### Violence

#### Their dependence on the security logic transforms the ambiguity of life into a quest for truth and rationality, causing violence against the unknown and domesticating life.

Der Derian, 93. James Der Derian, “The value of security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard,” The Political Subject of Violence, 1993, pp. 102-105

The desire for **security is** manifested as **a collective resentment of** difference **that which is not** us, not certain, not **predictable**. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, **the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable**, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science Nietzsche asks of the reader: Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" **The fear of the unknown and** the **desire for certainty** combine to **produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the** highest sign of a sovereign self, the **surest protection** against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces and is sustained by the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols: A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, **the unknown becomes** identified as **evil**, and evil provokes hostility - **recycling the desire for security**. The 'influence of timidity,' as Nietzsche puts it, **creates** a **people** who are **willing to subordinate** affirmative **values to the 'necessities' of security**: 'they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences'." The point of Nietzsche's critical genealogy is to show the perilous conditions which created the security imperative - and the western metaphysics which perpetuate it - have diminished if not disappeared; yet the fear of life persists: 'Our century denies this perilousness, and does so with a good conscience: and yet it continues to drag along with it the old habits of Christian security, Christian enjoyment, recreation and evaluation." Nietzsche's worry is that the collective reaction against older, more primal fears has created an even worse danger: the tyranny of the herd, the lowering of man, the apathy of the last man which controls through conformity and rules through passivity. The **security** of the sovereign, rational self and state **comes at the cost of ambiguity, uncertainty, paradox - all that makes life worthwhile**. Nietzsche's lament for this lost life is captured at the end of Daybreak in a series of rhetorical questions:

### War

#### Securitization and its mediation ensures total war and genocide – Their Representations ensure large scale violence

Karsten Friis, UN Sector @ the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2k[*Peace and Conflict Studies* 7.2, “From Liminars to Others: Securitization Through Myths,” http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.pdf#page=2]

The problem with societal securitization is one of representation. It is rarely clear in advance who it is that speaks for a community. There is no system of representation as in a state. Since literately anyone can stand up as representatives, there is room for entrepreneurs. It is not surprising if we experience a struggle between different representatives and also their different representations of the society. What they do share, however, is a conviction that they are best at **providing (a new) order**. If they can do this convincingly, they gain legitimacy. What must be done is to make the uncertain certain and make the unknown **an object of knowledge.** To present a discernable Other is a way of doing this. The Other is represented as an Other -- as an unified single actor with a similar unquestionable set of core values (i.e. the capital “O”). They are objectified, made into an object of knowledge, by re-presentation of their identity and values. In other words, the representation of the Other is depoliticized in the sense that its inner qualities are treated as given and non-negotiable. In Jef Huysmans (1998:241) words, there is both a need for a mediation of chaos as well as of threat. A mediation of chaos is more basic than a mediation of threat, as it implies making chaos into a meaningful order by a convincing representation of the Self and its surroundings. It is a mediation of “ontological security”, which means “...a strategy of managing the limits of reflexivity ... by fixing social relations into a symbolic and institutional order” (Huysmans 1998:242). As he and others (like Hansen 1998:240) have pointed out, the importance of a threat construction for political identification, is often overstated. The mediation of chaos, of being the provider of order in general, is just as important. This may imply naming an Other but not necessarily as a threat. Such a dichotomization implies a necessity to get rid of all the liminars (what Huysmans calls “strangers”). This is because they “...connote a challenge to categorizing practices through the impossibility of being categorized”, and does not threaten the community, “...but the possibility of ordering itself” (Huysmans 1998:241). They are a challenge to the entrepreneur by their very existence. They confuse the dichotomy of Self and Other and thereby the entrepreneur’s mediation of chaos. As mentioned, a liminar can for instance be people of mixed ethnical ancestry but also representations of competing world-pictures. As Eide (1998:76) notes: “Over and over again we see that the “liberals” within a group undergoing a mobilisation process for group conflict are the first ones to go”.The liminars threaten the ontological order of the entrepreneur by challenging his representation of Self and Other and his mediation of chaos, which ultimately undermines the legitimacy of his policy. The liminars may be securitized by some sort of disciplination, from suppression of cultural symbols to ethnic cleansing and expatriation. This is a threat to the ontological order of the entrepreneur, stemming from inside and thus repoliticizing the inside/outside dichotomy. **Therefore** the liminar must disappear. It must be made into a Self, as several minority groups throughout the world have experienced, **or it must** be forced out of the territory. A liminar may also become an Other, as its connection to the Self is cut and their former common culture is renounced and made insignificant. In Anne Norton’s (1988:55) words, “The presence of difference in the ambiguous other leads to its classification as wholly unlike and identifies it unqualifiedly with the archetypal other, denying the resemblance to the self.” Then the liminar is no longer an ontological danger (chaos), but what Huysmans (1998:242) calls a mediation of “daily security”. This is not challenging the order or the system as such but has become a visible, clear-cut Other. In places like Bosnia, this naming and replacement of an Other, has been regarded by the securitizing actors as the solution to the ontological problem they have posed. Securitization was not considered a political move, in the sense that there were any choices**. It was a necessity:** Securitization was a solution based on a depoliticized ontology.10 This way the world-picture of the securitizing actor is not only a representation but also made into reality. The mythical second-order language is made into first-order language, and its “innocent” reality is forced upon the world. To the entrepreneurs and other actors involved it has become a “natural” necessity with a need to make order, even if it implies making the world match the map. Maybe that is why war against liminars are **so often** total; it attempts a total expatriation or a total “solution” (like the Holocaust) and not only a victory on the battlefield. If the enemy is not even considered a legitimate Other, the door may be more open to a kind of violence that is way beyond any war conventions,any jus in bello.This way, securitizing is legitimized: The entrepreneur has succeeded both in launching his world-view and in prescribing the necessary measures taken against it. This is possible by using the myths, by speaking on behalf of the natural and eternal, where truth is never questioned.

Impact – war

#### Geopolitical discourse propagate the possibilities for war.

Cairo 04 (Heriberto Cairo, Department of Political Science and Administration III Faculty of Political Science and Sociology, 2004, “The Field of Mars: heterotopias of territory and war”, 1011-1012)

Our way of ‘‘visualizing global space’’ (Agnew, 2003: 15) is central to the understanding of war. The way we order things in planetary space is constitutive of what we see and what we conceal: ‘‘proletarian internationalism’’, ‘‘national liberation’’, ‘‘territorial integrity’’ are all dimensions of geopolitical discourses that inform the actions of combatants who try to make them intelligible to a wider audience. War, in this sense, is not a matter of rational interest, ‘‘[p]eople go to war because of how they see, perceive, picture, imagine, and speak of others: that is, how they construct the di!erence of others as well as the sameness of themselves through representations’’ (Der Derian, 2002a). Understanding war is fundamental to appreciate the relevance of geo-political considerations in its analysis. And in order to deﬁne the current social understanding of war, we should take into account the regularity of its enunciation, which nowadays leads to us to regard war as a kind of violent group behavior organized on a large scale. Strictly speaking, war is considered a conﬂict, but more speciﬁcally it is usually deﬁned as: (1) a conﬂict developed using weapons which surpass a determined threshold of violence; (2) a violence of a political kind, because politics is a fundamental part of the action; (3) a violence related to a state, because one of the opponents in wars in the modern world system is usually a state, or at least desires to become a state; 3 (4) a territorial behavior, not only because it is conducted in a particular space, but because the contenders also aim to control the opponent’s territory in full or in part. This deﬁnition applies to the so-called ‘‘civil’’ war as well as to the inter-state war, but, obviously, excludes some different kinds of violent behavior: robberies or passionate murders clearly do not ﬁt, just as what are referred to as ‘‘terrorism’’ and ‘‘insurgency’’ do not qualify as war (although the aftermath of September 11 and the American ‘‘War on terrorism’’ launched by the Bush administration suggests an important shift). In fact, the dominant discourse of war is basically geopolitical and state-centered, and, as Shapiro states, ‘‘the map of global warfare changes dramatically when one departs from the language of sovereignty’’ (Shapiro, 1999: 61). For instance, struggles involving indigenous peoples constitute more than half of the wars that Bernard Nietschmann includes in ‘‘the Third World War,’’ which is ‘‘hidden from view because the ﬁghting is against peoples and countries that are often not even on the map’’ (quoted in Shapiro, 1999: 61). It is also important to stress the historical, constructional and ‘‘constellational’’ character of war and its legitimation. Firstly, war is a human behavior, which has obviously occurred since early times; that is why we cannot consider it exclusive to our age. 4 As Harvey points out, ‘‘capitalism did not invent war any more than it invented writing, knowledge, science or art. Not all wars, even in the contemporary era, can be truly regarded as capitalist wars, and war will not necessarily disappear with the demise of capitalism’’ (Harvey, 1985: 162–163). In other words, war has happened in other economic and political contexts. Different kinds of power relations also variously lead to war, and usually it is not the outcome of a single process. War is not caused by any one thing. Its origins are in what we could call a ‘‘bellical constellation’’ 5 of factors and processes, which make each war a unique, but not a singular, event. Notwithstanding, we are able to ﬁnd constants in the issues of peace and war, and social scientists should consider that we can hardly discuss the ‘‘mode of warfare’’ (Kaldor, 1981, 1982) that is, the way in which societies organize for war without making assumptions about the world order from which these wars arise (Shaw and Creighton, 1987: 7). And, lastly, in such a world order it is possible to distinguish different elements of political, economic, symbolic and legal character, that produce and are produced by ‘‘a constantly evolving sequence of spatialities’’ (Soja, 1985: 94).

### Serial Policy Failure

#### Their reliance on security suffers from serial policy failure – and the attendant endless production of new threats to be countered creates an endless politics of war

Dillon and Reed 09 (IR professor @ Lancaster University; Lecturer @ King’s College London, “The Liberal Way of Killing: Killing to Make Live”)

There is, third, the additional critical attribute of contingency. It is this feature which does not merely add governing through contingency to the political rationalities and governmental technologies of contemporary liberal rule. It lends its own distinctive infection to them; one which has had a profound impact on the nature of liberal rule and war in relation, especially, to its current hyperbolicization of security and its newly problematized and proliferating accounts of dangers, threats and enemies. For if the biopolitical imperative is that of making life live, the martial expression of that imperative, the drive to liberal war, is preparedness to make war on the enemies of life. The biopoltiical imperative to make life live finds its expression today, however in making life live the emergency of its emergence; for that is what species life is now said to be. The liberal way of rule and war has thus become the preparedness to make war on whatever threatens life’s capacity to live the emergency of its emergence. For allied to the radical contingency of species existence is an account of species existence as a life of continuous complex adaptation and emergence. From the perspective of security and war, in particular, such a pluripotent life, characterized by its continuously unfolding potential, is a life that is continuously becoming-dangerous to itself, and to other life forms. Such danger is not merely actual; because life itself, here has become not merely actual. The emphasis in the problematization of danger which accompanies such a politics of life itself therefore also shifts dramatically from the actual to the virtual. Only this explains the astonishing degree to which the historically secure lives of the Atlantic basin have come to construe themselves, politically, as radically endangered by as many unknown as there are unknowable dangers; a point regularly and frankly admitted, officially, from terror to health mandarins, nationally and internationally. Many have observed that the societies of the Atlantic basin are now increasingly ruled by fear; that there is a politics of fear. But they interpret this politics of fear in political naïve ways, as the outcome of deliberate machination by political and economic elites. They may well be correct to some degree. But what is perfectly evident, also, is that the elites themselves are governed by the very grid of intelligibility furnished by the account of life as an emergency of emergence. It is not simply a matter, therefore, of leaders playing on fears. The leadership itself is in the grip of a conjugation of government and rule whose very generative principle of formation is permanent emergency. In other words, fear is no longer simply an affect open to regular manipulation by leadership cadres. It is, but it is not only that, and not even most importantly that. More importantly (because this is not a condition that can be resolved simply by ‘throwing the rascals out’) in the permanent emergency of emergence, fear becomes a generative principle of formation for rule. The emergency of emergence therefore poses a found crisis in western understandings of the political, and in the hopes and expectations invested in political as opposed to other forms of life. Given the wealth and given the vast military preponderance in weapons of mass destruction and other forms of global deployed military capabilities of the societies of the Atlantic basin, notably, of course, the United States, this poses a world crisis as well. In short, then, this complex adaptive emergent life exists in the permanent state of emergence. Its politics of security and war, which is to say its very foundational politics of rule as well, now revolve around this state of emergency. Here, that in virtue of which a ‘we’ comes to belong together, its very generative principle of formation (our shorthand definition of politics), has become this emergency. What happens, we also therefore ask of the biopoliticization of rule, when emergency becomes the generative principle of formation of community and rule? Our answer has already been given. Politics becomes subject to the urgent and compelling political economy, the logistical and technical dynamics, of war. No longer a ‘we’ in virtue of abiding by commonly agreed rules of government, it becomes a ‘we’ formed by abiding by commonly agreed rules of government, it becomes a ‘we’ formed by the rule of the emergency itself; and that is where the political crisis, the crisis of the political itself is that a ‘we’ can belong together not only in terms of agreeing to abide by the rule of its generative principles of formation but also by the willingness to keep the nature of operation of those generative principles of formation under common deliberative scrutiny. **You cannot, however, debate emergency. You can only interrogate the futile demand it makes on you**, and all the episteme challenges it poses, acceding to those demands according both to how well you can come to know them, and how well you have also adapted you affects to suffering them, or perish. The very exigencies of emergency thus militate profoundly against the promise of ‘politics’ as it has been commonly understood in the western tradition; not simply as a matter of rule, but as a matter of self-rule in which it was possible to debate the nature of the self in terms of the good for and of the self. Note, also, how much the very idea of the self has disappeared from view in this conflation of life with species life. The only intelligence, the only self-knowledge, the only culture which qualifies in the permanence of this emergency is the utilitarian and instrumental technologies said to be necessary to endure it. We have been here before in the western tradition and we have experienced the challenges of this condition as tyranny (Arendt 1968). The emergency of emergence, the generative principle of formation, the referential matrix of contemporary biopolitics globally, is a newly formed, pervasive and insidiously complex, soft totalitarian regime of power relations made all the more difficult to contest precisely because, governing through the contingent emergency of emergence, it is a governing through the transactional freedoms of contingency.

Impact – serial policy failure

#### Claims of insecurity are self-fulfilling prophecies – fights over security inevitably degrade into fascism

Neocleous 8 (Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy; Head of Department of Politics & History Brunel Univ, Critique of Security, 9)

A final introductory word on fascism. A number of writers have noted that there is a real Schmittan logic underpinning security politics: that casting an issue as one of ‘security’ tends to situate that issue within the logic of threat and decision, of friend and enemy, and so magnifies the dangers and ratchets up the strategic fears and insecurities that encourage the construction of a certain kind of political reason centered on the violent clampdown of the moment of decision. ‘Speaking and writing about security is never innocent’, says Jef Huysman, ‘it always risks contributing to the opening of a window of opportunity for a “fascist mobilization”’. Events since 11 September 2001, bear witness to this. It seems abundantly clear that any revival of fascism would now come through the mobilization of society in the name of security. This potential for fascist mobilization underlines once more that far from being a distinct political force outside of liberalism and capital, fascism is in fact liberal capitalism’s doppelganger. The lesson of the twentieth century is that the crises of liberalism, more often than not expressed as crises of liberalism, the fascist potential within liberal democracy has always been more dangerous than the fascist tendency against democracy. The critique of security being developed her is intended as a reminder of the authoritarian, reactionary and fascist potential within the capitalist order and one of its key political categories.

#### Security discourse cannot resolve itself – there will always be another threat

Michael Dillon, Professor of Political Science at Lancaster and internationally renowed author and Julian Reid, lecturer on international relations and progessor of political Science at King’s College in Longon, 2k (Alternatives, Volume 25, Issue 1: Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency)

As a precursor to global governance, governmentality, according to Foucault's initial account, poses the question of order not in terms of the origin of the law and the location of sovereignty, as do traditional accounts of power, but in terms instead of the management of population.The management of population is furtherrefined in terms of specific problematics to which population management may be reduced. These typically include but are not necessarily exhausted by the following topoi of governmental power:economy, health, welfare, poverty, security, sexuality, demographics, resources, skills, culture, and so on. Now**,** where there is an operation of power there is knowledge, and where there is knowledge there is an operation of power**.** Here discursive formations emerge and, as Foucault noted, in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.[ 34] More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains.Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs.**"** Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated**,** bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becominga policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations.Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption**.** And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions**.** Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim**.** What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure--the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate**.** As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure**.**

### Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

#### The securitizing act constructs the social being in terms of hostility – this requires the endless production of new enemies in order to ground stability

Roe, 12 (Paul Roe, Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations and European Studies at Central European University, Budapest, “Is securitization a ‘negative’ concept? Revisiting the normative debate over normal versus extraordinary politics,” Security Dialogue vol. 43 no. 3, June 2012)

Aradau’s (2004, 2008) work, however, rejects Floyd’s proposition. Aradau views security’s production of ‘us’ and ‘them’ categories as something negative: whatever the categories, there will always be winners and losers. This approach reflects a more deontological ethics, inasmuch as judgment rests as much on an understanding of what security is as on what security does. Aradau’s thinking in this respect derives from the assumption that the Copenhagen School’s extraordinary politics is again reflective of Schmitt’s notion of the political – particularly its emphasis on the production of an intense antagonism that constitutes and delineates bodies of friend and enemy.8 Aradau’s view as to the necessary production of ‘us’ and ‘them’ is shared, for example, by Huysmans. In its identification of existential threat and the nature of the referent thus brought into question, Huysmans (1998: 571) notes how, in terms of Schmittian political realism, ‘securitisation turns into a technique of government which retrieves the ordering force of fear of violent death by a mythical replay of variations of the Hobbesian state of nature’. Read in this way, ‘fear of violent death’ – anxiety over the extinction of the referent (and the human life it contains) – constructs the political community in a particular way: ‘securitization makes the kind of politics that defines the self on the basis of hostility’ (Huysmans, 1998: 576). Andreas Behnke (2006: 650) similarly contends that without the process of identifying and excluding Others, order in itself is made impossible: ‘Inclusion and community can only be had at the price of exclusion and adversity.’ While Williams (2003: 522) notes that, in much the same way as Schmitt, members of the Copenhagen School ‘view securitization as a social possibility intrinsic to political life’.

#### **Security Dilemmas inevitably fuel conflict – only a step away from security logic can avoid spiraling arms races**

Mitzen and Schweller, 11 (Jennifer Mitzen and Randall Schweller, Mitzen and Schweller are professors of Political Science at Ohio State University, “ Knowing the Unknown Unknowns: Misplaced Certainty and the Onset of War”, 3/15/2011, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2011.549023, RM)

An intense security dilemma engenders powerful preemptive incentives and spiraling arms races; it is the proverbial powder-keg situation, where any spark can explode into war. 43 The security dilemma is most acute when offense has the advantage and is indistinguishable from defense. Here, the impossibility of signaling one's own benign intentions combined with the staggering costs of guessing wrong about the intentions of others explains how uncertainty, via security dilemmas, can lead to aggressive behavior and preemptive wars that no one wants. Such conditions give rise to the “reciprocal fear of surprise attack” and other preemptive incentives that compel all states to act like aggressors and assume the worst of others. 44 States operating in an environment of large first-strike advantages confront the same problem faced by two gunslingers in a small town lacking a capable sheriff. Both gunslingers may prefer a bargain whereby each leaves the other alone, but neither side can credibly commit not to shoot the other in the back. 45 Security dilemmas also generate spiraling arms competitions. Because states exist in a self-help environment and can never be entirely certain about others’ intentions and future capabilities, they build arms to protect themselves from the potential harm of others. When offensive weapons have a significant advantage over defensive ones, states uncertain of others’ intentions build arms and respond immediately to each others’ arms increases by building more arms. This action-reaction dynamic fuels an arms race that leaves all the participants less secure than they were at the outset. 46 It is the familiar case of individual rationality producing collectively suboptimal outcomes. Uncertainty about future capabilities exacerbates the situation by triggering overreactions in weapon's acquisitions because states tend to plan their forces against greater-than-expected threats, and the development of new weapons systems requires long lead times. 47

Impact – self-fulfilling prophecy

#### Representations become reality- threat construction becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy

Lipschutz ’98, Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Columbia International Affairs Online, *On Security, On Security*. Lipschutz, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz11.html

Security is, to put Wæver's argument in other words, a socially constructed concept: It has a specific meaning only within a specific social context. 18 It emerges and changes as a result of discourses and discursive actions intended to reproduce historical structures and subjects within states and among them. 19 To be sure, policymakers define security on the basis of a set of assumptions regarding vital interests, plausible enemies, and possible scenarios, all of which grow, to a not-insignificant extent, out of the specific historical and social context of a particular country and some understanding of what is "out there." 20 But, while these interests, enemies, and scenarios have a material existence and, presumably, a real import for state security, they cannot be regarded simply as having some sort of "objective" reality independent of these constructions. 21 That security is socially constructed does not mean that there are not to be found real, material conditions that help to create particular interpretations of threats, or that such conditions are irrelevant to either the creation or undermining of the assumptions underlying security policy. Enemies, in part, "create" each other, via the projections of their worst fears onto the other; in this respect, their relationship is intersubjective. To the extent that they act on these projections, threats to each other acquire a material character. In other words, nuclear-tipped ICBMs are not mere figments of our imagination, but their targeting is a function of what we imagine the possessors of other missiles might do to us with theirs.

###

### Structural Violence

#### Securitization removes structural violence from the realm of politics – makes it impossible to face real threats

Michael Sheehan, Assistant-Secretary-General at the United Nations, Master of Science in Foreign Service from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, 2005, “International Security An Analytical Survey”

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the expression "national security" was coined to describe the area of public policy concerned with the preservation of state independence and autonomy. National security, deemed synonymous with security as such, was seen as being related to the need for states to maintain their political independence and freedom of national decisionmaking. The instruments for pursuing this objective included the armed forces, the diplomatic service, and the intelligence services. In addition, other levers of influence could be brought to bear, such as a state"s economic strength or the symbolic strength represented by cultural influence. However, diplomacy and conventional warfare were seen as the primary means by which states sought to protect themselves from the threat represented by the armed forces of other states. During the Cold War, "deterrence" of nuclear and conventional attack through contingent threats of nuclear retaliation was added to the repertoire of the nuclear weapon states and their alliance systems. This was a clear, straightforward, and limited approach to security. That which needed to be secured (the object of security) was the state, and the mechanism by which security would be achieved was the manipulation of military capability in relation to actual or potential adversaries. David Baldwin argues that security was not what Cold War security specialists were actually interested in. Their focus was on military statecraft and they saw as security issues only those for which military statecraft was relevant (1997: 9). This was a very narrow and limited way of thinking about security. It underpinned decades of military confrontation between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, in which governments based their policies of deterrence upon contingent threats to incinerate the civilian populations of the opposing alliance. It was an interpretation that denied to the vast majority of the world"s population the resources and attention from governments that might have dramatically improved their quality of life. While it is true that for most of the Cold War period this conception of security was not successfully challenged from within the mainstream academic and policy communities, it is not true that there were no such challenges at all.

# Alternatives

### Representations – C&B

#### Vote negative to critique the aff’s discourse of security as a prior question – that’s essential to challenging discursive processes

Cheeseman and Bruce 96 (Graeme Cheeseman, Senior Lecturer @ New South Wales, and Robert Bruce, editor, widespread author on security, Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9)

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable part of the problem to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific policies may follow. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

### Performative Resistance - Campbell

#### Our criticism’s a performative political resistance allows for the creation of a new mode of politics—the securitization inherent in the affirmative’s representations offers a unique place in which to deconstruct subjectivity

Campbell, 1998. David Campbell, professor of international politics at the university of Newcastle, Writing Security, 1998,

Even more important, his understanding of power emphasizes the of freedom presupposed by the existence of disciplinary and normalizing practices. Put simply, there cannot be relations of power unless subjects are in the first instance free: the need to institute neg­ative and constraining power practices comes about only because without them freedom would abound. Were there no possibility of freedom, subjects would not act in ways that required containment so as to effect order.37 Freedom, though, is not the absence of power. On the contrary, because it is only through power that subjects exer­cise their agency, freedom and power cannot be separated. As Fou­cault maintains: At the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly provok­ing it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of free­dom. Rather than speaking of an essential freedom, it would be better to speak of an “agonism” — of a relationship which is at the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle; less of a face-to--face confmnta­lion which paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation.38 The political possibilities enabled by this permanent provocation of power and freedom can be specified in more detail by thinking in terms of the predominance of the “bio-power” discussed above. In this sense, because the governmental practices of biopolitics in West­ern nations have been increasingly directed toward modes of being and forms of life — such that sexual conduct has become an object of concern, individual health has been figured as a domain of discipline, and the family has been transformed into an instrument of govern­ment — the ongoing agonism between those practices and the free­dom they seek to contain means that individuals have articulated a series of **counterdemands** drawn from those new fields of concern. For example, as the state continues to prosecute people according to sexual orientation, human rights activists have proclaimed the right of gays to enter into formal marriages, adopt children, and receive the same health and insurance benefits granted to their straight coun­terparts. These claims are a consequence of the permanent provoca­tion of power and freedom in biopolitics, and stand as testament to the “strategic reversibility” of power relations: if the terms of govern mental practices can be made into focal points for resistances, then the “history of government as the ‘conduct of conduct’ is interwoven with the history of dissenting ‘counterconducts.”’39 Indeed, the emer­gence of the state as the major articulation of “the political” has in­volved an unceasing agonism between those in office and those they rule. State intervention in everyday life has long incited popular col­lective action, the result of which has been both resistance to the state and new claims upon the state. In particular, “the core of what we now call ‘citizenship’ . . . consists of multiple bargains hammered out by rulers and ruled in the course of their struggles over the means of state action, especially the making of war.”40 In more recent times, constituencies associated with women’s, youth, ecological, and peace movements (among others) have also issued claims on society.41 These resistances are evidence that the break with the discur­sive/nondiscursive dichotomy central to the logic of interpretation undergirding this analysis is (to put it in conventional terms) not only theoretically licensed; it is empirically warranted. Indeed, expanding the interpretive imagination so as to enlarge the categories through which we understand the constitution of “the political” has been a necessary precondition for making sense of Foreign Policy’s concern for the ethical borders of identity in America. Accordingly, there are manifest political implications that flow from theorizing identity As Judith Butler concluded: “The deconstruction of identity is not the deconstruction of politics; rather, it establishes as political the very terms through which identity is articulated.”42

### Intellectuality – Owen

#### Reject the affirmative’s complicity with biopolitics. As specific intellectuals, we should endorse a mode of politics which functions through analysis and criticism of specific situations.

Owen 97 (David Owen, professor of social sciences at Southampton University, “Maturity and Modernity: Nietszche, Weber, Foucault and the ambivalence of reason,” Routledge publishers, published July 22, 1997)

In our reflections on Foucault’s methodology, it was noted that, like Nietszche and Weber, he commits himself to a stance of value-freedom as an engaged refusal to legislate for others. Foucault’s critical activity is oriented to human autonomy yet his formal account of the idea of autonomy as the activity of self-transformation entails tat the content of this activity is specific to the struggles of particular groups and individuals. Thus, while the struggle against humanist forms of power/knowledge relations denotes the formal archiectonic interest of genealogy as critique, the determination of the ‘main danger’ which denotes the ‘filling in’ of this interest is contingent upon the dominant systems of constraint confronted by specific groups and individuals. For example, the constitution of women as ‘hysterical,’ of blacks as ‘criminal,’ of homosexuals as ‘perverted’ all operate through humanist forms of power/knowledge relations, yet the specificity of the social practices and discourses engaged in producing these ‘identities’ entails that while these struggles share a general formal interest in resisting the biopolitics of humanism, their substantive interests are distinct. It is against this context that Foucault’s stance of value-freedom can be read as embodying a respect for alterity. The implications of this stance for intellectual practice became apparent in Foucault’s distinction between the figures of the ‘universal’ and ‘specific’ intellectual. Consider the following comments: In a general way, I think that intellectuals-if this category exists, which is not certain or perhaps even desirable- are abandoning their old prophetic function. And by that I don’t mean only their claim to predict what will happen, but also the legislative function that they so long aspired for: ‘See what must be done, see what is good, follow me. In the turmoil that engulfs you all, here is the pivotal point, here is where I am.’ The greek wise man, the jewish prophet, the roman legislators are still models that haunt those who, today, practice the profession of speaking and writing. The universal intellectual, on Foucault’s account, is that figure who maintains a commitment to critique as a legislative activity in which the pivotal positing of universal norms (or universal procedures for generating norms) grounds politics in the ‘truth; of our being (e.g. our ‘real’ interests). The problematic form of this type of intellectual practice is a central concern of Foucault’s critique of humanist politics in so far as humanism simultaneously asserts and undermines autonomy. If, however, this is the case, what alternative conceptions of the role of the intellectual and the activity of critique can Foucault present to us? Foucault’s elaboration of the figure of the ‘specific’ intellectual provides the beginnings of an answer to this question: I dream of the intellectual who destroys evidence and generalities, the one who, in the inertias and constraints of the present time, locates and marks the weak points, the openings, the lines of force, who is incessantly on the move, doesn’t know exactly where he is heading nor what he will think tomorrow for he is too attentive to the present. The historicity of thought, the impossibility of locating an Archimedean point outside of time**,** leads Foucault to locate intellectual activity as an ongoing attentiveness to the present in terms of what is singular and arbitrary in what we take to be universal and necessary. Following from this, the intellectual does not seek to offer grand theories but specific analyses, not global but local criticism. We should be clear on the latter point for it is necessary to acknowledge that Foucault’s position does not entail the impossibility of ‘acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our historical limits’ and, consequently, ‘ we are always in the position of beginning again’ (FR p. 47). The upshot of this recognition of the partial character of criticism is not, however, to produce an ethos of fatal resignation but, in far as it involves a recognition that everything is dangerous, ‘a hyper-and pessimistic activism’ (FR p. 343). In other words, it is the very historicity and partiality of criticism which bestows on the activity of critique its dignity and urgency. What of this activity then? We can sketch the Foucault account of the activity of critique by coming to grips with the opposition he draws between ‘ideal’ critique and ‘real’ transformation. Foucault suggests that the activity of critique ‘is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are’ but rather ‘of pointing out what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, uncontested modes of thought and practices we accept rest’ (PPC p. 154). This distinction is perhaps slightly disingenuous, yet Foucault’s point is unintelligible if we recognize his concern to disclose the epistemological grammar which informs our social practices as the starting point of critique. This emerges in his recognition that ‘criticism (and radical criticism) is absolutely indispensable for any transformation’: A transformation that remains within the same mode of thought, a transformation that is only a way of adjusting the same thought more closely to the reality of things can merely be a superficial transformation. (PPC p. 155) The genealogical thrust of this critical activity is ‘to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident is no longer accepted as such’ for ‘as soon as one can no longer think things as one formerly thought them, transformation becomes both very urgent, very difficult, and quite possible’ (PPC p. 155). The urgency of transformation derives from the contestation of thought (and the social practices in which it is embedded) as the form of our autonomy, although this urgency is given its specific character for modern culture by the recognition that the humanist grammar of this thought ties us into the technical matrix of biopolitics.

### Prerequisite – Doty

#### Our criticism proceeds the affirmative- the racialized logic of securitization upon which the plan relies is the root of their harms claims -- You have an ethical obligation to oppose this frame.

Roxanne Doty, Prof. of Political Science @ ASU [Woot], 1996 [Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Reprsentations in North-South Relations, p. 166-71]

One of the deadly traces that has been deposited in our current "reality" and that figures prominently in this study is "race." The inventory of this trace has been systematically ignored by international relations scholarship. It seems fair to suggest that most international relations scholars as well as makers of foreign policy would suggest that "race" is not even a relevant issue in global politics. Some might concede that while "race" may have been a significant factor internationally during particular historical periods-as a justification for colonialism, for example - "we" are past that now. The racial hierarchy that once prevailed internationally simply no longer exists. To dwell upon "race" as an international issue is an unproductive, needless rehash of history. Adlai Stevenson rather crudely summed up this position when he complained that he was impatiently waiting for the time "when the last black-faced comedian has quit preaching about colonialism so the United Nations could move on to the more crucial issues like disarmament" (quoted in Noer 1985: 84). This view is unfortunately, although subtly, reflected in the very definition of the field of international relations, whose central problems and categories have been framed in such a way as to preclude investigation into categories such as "race" that do not fit neatly within the bounds of prevailing conceptions of theory and explanation and the legitimate methods with which to pursue them. As Walker (1989) points out, current international relations research agendas are framed within an understanding that presumes certain ontological issues have been resolved. Having already resolved the questions of the "real" and relevant entities, international relations scholars generally proceed to analyze the world with an eye toward becoming a "real science." What has been defined as "real" and relevant has not included race. As this study suggests, however, racialized identities historically have been inextricably linked with power, agency, reason, morality, and understandings of "self" and "other."' When we invoke these terms in certain contexts, we also silently invoke traces of previous racial distinctions. For example, Goldberg (1993: 164) suggests that the conceptual division of the world whereby the "third world" is the world of tradition, irrationality, overpopulation, disorder, and chaos assumes a racial character that perpetuates, both conceptually and actually, relations of domination, subjugation, and exclusion. Excluding the issue of representation enables the continuation of this and obscures the important relationship between representation, power, and agency. The issue of agency in international affairs appears in the literature in various ways, ranging from classical realism's subjectivist privileging of human agents to neorealism's behavioralist privileging of the state as agent to the more recent focus on the "agent-structure problem" by proponents of structuration theory (e.g., Wendt [19871, Dessler 119891). What these accounts have in common is their exclusion of the issue of representation. The presumption is made that agency ultimately refers back to some prediscursive subject, even if that subject is socially constructed within the context of political, social, and economic structures. In contrast, the cases examined in this study suggest that the question of agency is one of how practices of representation create meaning and identities and thereby create the very possibility for agency. As Judith Butler (1990: 142-49) makes clear and as the empirical cases examined here suggest, identity and agency are both effects, not preexisting conditions of being. Such an antiessentialist understanding does not depend upon foundational categories -an inner psychological self, for example. Rather, identity is reconceptualized as simultaneously a practice and an effect that is always in the process of being constructed through signifying practices that expel the surplus meanings that would expose the failure of identity as such. For example, through a process of repetition, U.S. and British discourses constructed as natural and given the oppositional dichotomy between the uncivilized, barbaric "other" and the civilized, democratic "self" even while they both engaged in the oppression and brutalization of "others." The Spector of the "other" was always within the "self." The proliferation of discourse in times of crisis illustrates an attempt to expel the "other," to make natural and unproblematic the boundaries between the inside and the outside. This in turn suggests that identity and therefore the agency that is connected with identity are inextricably linked to representational practices. It follows that any meaningful discussion of agency must perforce be a discussion of representation. The representational practices that construct particular identities have serious ramifications for agency. While this study suggests that "race" historically has been a central marker of identity, it also suggests that identity construction takes place along several dimensions. Racial categories often have worked together with gendered categories as well as with analogies to parent/child oppositions and animal metaphors. Each of these dimensions has varying significance at different times and enables a wide variety of practices. In examining the construction of racialized identities, it is not enough to suggest that social identities are constructed on the basis of shared understandings within a community: shared understandings regarding institutional rules, social norms, and selfexpectations of individuals in that community. It is not enough to examine the shared social criteria by which one identity is distinguished from another. Two additional elements must be considered: power and truth. "Race" has not just been about certain rules and resources facilitating the agency of some social groups and denying or placing severe limitations on the agency of other social groups. Though it has been about these things, this is only one aspect of

Continued…

Alternative – prerequisite to action

Continued…

what "race" has historically been about. "Race" has most fundamentally been about being human. Racist discourses historically have constructed different kinds and degrees of humanness through representational practices that have claimed to be and have been accepted as "true" and accurate representations of "reality." Racist discourses highlight, perhaps more than any other, the inextricable link between power and truth or power and knowledge. A theory of agency in international relations, if it is to incorporate issues such as "race," must address the relationship between power and truth. This realization in turn implies a reconceptualization of power and how it works that transcends those present in existing theories of international relations. The cases examined in this study attest to the importance of representational practices and the power that inheres in them. The infinity of traces that leave no inventory continue to play a significant part in contemporary constructions of "reality." This is not to suggest that representations have been static. Static implies the possibility of fixedness, when what I mean to suggest is an inherent fragility and instability to the meanings and identities that have been constructed in the various discourses I examined. For example, to characterize the South as "uncivilized" or "unfit for self-government" is no longer an acceptable representation. This is not, however, because the meanings of these terms were at one time fixed and stable. As I illustrated, what these signifiers signified was always deferred. Partial fixation was the result of their being anchored by some exemplary mode of being that was itself constructed at the power/ knowledge nexus: the white male at the turn of the century, the United States after World War II. Bhabha stresses "the wide range of the stereotype, from the loyal servant to Satan, from the loved to the hated; a shifting of subject positions in the circulation of colonial power" (1983: 31). The shifting subject positions-from uncivilized native to quasi state to traditional "man" and society, for example -are all partial fixations that have enabled the exercise of various and multiple forms of power. Nor do previous oppositions entirely disappear. What remains is an infinity of traces from prior representations that themselves have been founded not on pure presences but on differance. "The present becomes the sign of the sign, the trace of the trace," Derrida writes (1982: 24). Differance makes possible the chain of differing and deferring (the continuity) as well as the endless substitution (the discontinuity) of names that are inscribed and reinscribed as pure presence, the center of the structure that itself escapes structurality. North-South relations have been constituted as a structure of deferral. The center of the structure (alternatively white man, modern man, the United States, the West, real states) has never been absolutely present outside a system of differences. It has itself been constituted as trace-the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates itself, displaces itself, refers itself (ibid.). Because the center is not a fixed locus but a function in which an infinite number of sign substitutions come into play, the domain and play of signification is extended indefinitely (Derrida 1978: z8o). This both opens up and limits possibilities, generates alternative sites of meanings and political resistances that give rise to practices of reinscription that seek to reaffirm identities and relationships. The inherently incomplete and open nature of discourse makes this reaffirmation an ongoing and never finally completed project. In this study I have sought, through an engagement with various discourses in which claims to truth have been staked, to challenge the validity of the structures of meaning and to make visible their complicity with practices of power and domination. By examining the ways in which structures of meaning have been associated with imperial practices, I have suggested that the construction of meaning and the construction of social**,** political, and economic power are inextricably linked. This suggests an ethical dimension to making meaning and an ethical imperative that is incumbent upon those who toil in the construction of structures of meaning. This is especially urgent in North-South relations today: one does not have to search very far to find a continuing complicity with colonial representations that ranges from a politics of silence and neglect to constructions of terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, international drug trafficking, and Southern immigration to the North as new threats to global stability and peace. The political stakes raised by this analysis revolve around the question of being able to "get beyond" the representations or speak outside of the discourses that historically have constructed the North and the South. I do not believe that there are any pure alternatives by which we can escape the infinity of traces to which Gramsci refers. Nor do I wish to suggest that we are always hopelessly imprisoned in a dominant and all-pervasive discourse. Before this question can be answered-indeed, before we can even proceed to attempt an answer-attention must be given to the politics of representation. The price that international relations scholarship pays for its inattention to the issue of representation is perpetuation of the dominant modes of making meaning and deferral of its responsibility and complicity in dominant representations.

### Exilic Intellectualism - Biswas

#### Rejecting their demand for immediate yes/no policy response is the only way to raise critical ethical questions about the discourse and practice of ir in the middle east.

Shampa **BISWAS** Politics @ Whitman **‘7** “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist” *Millennium* 36 (1) p. 117-125

The recent resuscitation of the project of Empire should give International Relations scholars particular pause.1 For a discipline long premised on a triumphant Westphalian sovereignty, there should be something remarkable about the ease with which the case for brute force, regime change and empire-building is being formulated in widespread commentary spanning the political spectrum. Writing after the 1991 Gulf War, Edward Said notes the US hesitance to use the word ‘empire’ despite its long imperial history.2 This hesitance too is increasingly under attack as even self-designated liberal commentators such as Michael Ignatieff urge the US to overcome its unease with the ‘e-word’ and selfconsciously don the mantle of imperial power, contravening the limits of sovereign authority and remaking the world in its universalist image of ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’.3 Rashid Khalidi has argued that the US invasion and occupation of Iraq does indeed mark a new stage in American world hegemony, replacing the indirect and proxy forms of Cold War domination with a regime much more reminiscent of European colonial empires in the Middle East.4 The ease with which a defence of empire has been mounted and a colonial project so unabashedly resurrected makes this a particularly opportune, if not necessary, moment, as scholars of ‘the global’, to take stock of our disciplinary complicities with power, to account for colonialist imaginaries that are lodged at the heart of a discipline ostensibly interested in power but perhaps far too deluded by the formal equality of state sovereignty and overly concerned with security and order. Perhaps more than any other scholar, Edward Said’s groundbreaking work in *Orientalism* has argued and demonstrated the long and deep complicity of academic scholarship with colonial domination.5 In addition to spawning whole new areas of scholarship such as postcolonial studies, Said’s writings have had considerable influence in his own discipline of comparative literature but also in such varied disciplines as anthropology, geography and history, all of which have taken serious and sustained stock of their own participation in imperial projects and in fact regrouped around that consciousness in a way that has simply not happened with International Relations.6 It has been 30 years since Stanley Hoffman accused IR of being an ‘American social science’ and noted its too close connections to US foreign policy elites and US preoccupations of the Cold War to be able to make any universal claims,7 yet there seems to be a curious amnesia and lack of curiosity about the political history of the discipline, and in particular its own complicities in the production of empire.8 Through what discourses the imperial gets reproduced, resurrected and re-energised is a question that should be very much at the heart of a discipline whose task it is to examine the contours of global power. Thinking this failure of IR through some of Edward Said’s critical scholarly work from his long distinguished career as an intellectual and activist, this article is an attempt to politicise and hence **render questionable** the **disciplinary traps** that have, ironically, circumscribed the ability of scholars whose very business it is to think about global politics to actually think *globally* and *politically*. What Edward Said has to offer IR scholars, I believe, is a certain kind of global sensibility, a critical but sympathetic and felt awareness of an inhabited and cohabited world. Furthermore, it is a profoundly political sensibility whose globalism is predicated on a cognisance of the imperial and a firm non-imperial ethic in its formulation. I make this argument by travelling through a couple of Said’s thematic foci in his enormous corpus of writing. Using a lot of Said’s reflections on the role of public intellectuals, I argue in this article that IR scholars need to develop what I call a ‘global intellectual posture’. In the 1993 Reith Lectures delivered on BBC channels, Said outlines three positions for public intellectuals to assume – as an outsider/exile/marginal, as an ‘amateur’, and as a disturber of the status quo speaking ‘truth to power’ and self-consciously siding with those who are underrepresented and disadvantaged.9 Beginning with a discussion of Said’s critique of ‘professionalism’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ as it applies to International Relations, I first argue the importance, for scholars of global politics, of taking *politics* seriously. Second, I turn to Said’s comments on the posture of exile and his critique of identity politics, particularly in its nationalist formulations, to ask what it means for students of global politics to take the *global* seriously. Finally, I attend to some of Said’s comments on humanism and contrapuntality to examine what IR scholars can learn from Said about *feeling and thinking globally* concretely, thoroughly and carefully. IR Professionals in an Age of Empire: From ‘International Experts’ to ‘Global Public Intellectuals’ One of the profound effects of the war on terror initiated by the Bush administration has been a significant constriction of a democratic public sphere, which has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent and a sharp delineation of national boundaries along with concentration of state power. The academy in this context has become a particularly embattled site with some highly disturbing onslaughts on academic freedom. At the most obvious level, this has involved fairly well-calibrated neoconservative attacks on US higher education that have invoked the mantra of ‘liberal bias’ and demanded legislative regulation and reform10, an onslaught supported by a well-funded network of conservative think tanks, centres, institutes and ‘concerned citizen groups’ within and outside the higher education establishment11 and with considerable reach among sitting legislators, jurists and policy-makers as well as the media. But what has in part made possible the encroachment of such nationalist and statist agendas has been a larger history of the corporatisation of the university and the accompanying ‘professionalisation’ that goes with it. Expressing concern with ‘academic acquiescence in the decline of public discourse in the United States’, Herbert Reid has examined the ways in which the

university is beginning to operate as another transnational corporation12, and critiqued the consolidation of a ‘culture of professionalism’ where **academic bureaucrats** **engage in bureaucratic role-playing,** minor academic **turf battles mask the larger managerial power play** on campuses and the increasing influence of a relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular ‘expert cultures’ have led to academics relinquishing their claims to public space and authority.13 While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, there is much reason for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward Said has written extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces, ‘the one public space available to real alternative intellectual practices: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today’15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains that ‘the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)’16. The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be **seduced by power**.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of **intellectual orientation**. It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds **of ethical questions irreducible to formulaic ‘for or against’ and ‘costs and benefits’ analysis** can simply **not be raised**. In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of ‘intellectual relevance’ that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical and perhaps unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, that is about *politics* (rather than techno-expertise) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.21

#### Exilic intellectualism accommodates those suffering oppression by showing respect for all humanity

Shampa **BISWAS**, Prof – Politics, Whitman, 20**07** "Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist" Millennium 36 (1)

The kind of globalism that Said advocates involves a felt and sympathetic awareness of an in- and co-habited world. In an interview with Bruce Robbins, Said is at pains to underscore that the rootlessness and exilic marginality he promotes are not detached, distant positions that exclude ‘sympathetic identification with a people suffering oppression ... [e]specially when that oppression is caused by one’s own community or one’s own polity’.47 The exilic orientation ‘involves the crossing of barriers, the traversing of borders, the accommodation with various cultures, not so much in order to belong to them but at least so as to be able to feel the accents and inflections of their experience’.48 It is a globalism that is very much linked to Said’s unabashed defence of ‘humanism’. At the heart of this defence is a commitment to an aware and felt ethic of ‘humanity’ that emerges from a sense of ‘worldliness’ (i.e. a sense of ‘the real historical world’49) and knowledge of difference. A central defining pole of (Said’s) humanism, says Akeel Bilgrami in the foreword to Said’s posthumously published collection of essays in Humanism and Democratic Criticism, is ‘the yearning to show regard for all that is human, for what is human wherever it may be found and however remote it may be from the more vivid presence of the parochial’.50 Said himself criticises the rampant use of the word ‘human’ in much of the current discourse on ‘humanitarian intervention’, which, as he points out, is conducted largely by visiting violence on distant humans.51 His humanism is an attempt to retrieve the humanity of those distant humans by developing a genuinely globalist ethic. This globalist ethic is not based on a crass abstract universalism, but is very much a concrete, grounded ethic that takes the local seriously.

### A-Priori – Nayar/Dalby

#### Assumptions are a-priori to questions of politics.

Jayan Nayar, shape-shifter, horse whisperer, 1999 (“SYMPOSIUM: RE-FRAMING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: Orders of Inhumanity” **Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems Fall, 1999) Lexis**

The description of the continuities of violence in Section II in many ways is familiar to those who adopt a critical perspective of the world. "We" are accustomed to narrating human wrongs in this way. The failures and betrayals, the victims and perpetrators, are familiar to our critical understanding. From this position of judgment, commonly held within the "mainstream" of the "non-mainstream," there is also a familiarity of solutions commonly advocated for transformation; the "marketplace" for critique is a thriving one as evidenced by the abundance of literature in this respect. Despite this proliferation of enlightenment and the profession of so many good ideas, however, "things" appear to remain as they are, or, worse still, deteriorate. And so, the cycle of critique, proposals for transformation and disappointment continues. Rightly, we are concerned with the question of what can be done to alleviate the sufferings that prevail. But there are necessary prerequisites to answering the "what do we do?" question. We must first ask the intimately connected questions of "about what?" and "toward what end?" These questions, obviously, impinge on our vision and judgment. When we attempt to imagine transformations toward preferred human futures, we engage in the difficult task of judging the present. This is difficult not because we are oblivious to violence or that we are numb to the resulting suffering, but because, outrage with "events" of violence aside, processes of violence embroil and implicate our familiarities in ways that defy the simplicities of straightforward imputability. Despite our best efforts at categorizing violence into convenient compartments--into "disciplines" of study and analysis such as "development" and "security" (health, environment, population, being other examples of such compartmentalization)--the encroachments of order(ing) function at more pervasive levels. And without doubt, the perspectives of the observer, commentator, and actor become crucial determinants. It is necessary, I believe, to question this, "our," perspective, to reflect upon a perspective of violence which not only locates violence as a happening "out there" while we stand as detached observers and critics, but is also one in which we are ourselves implicated in the violence of ordered worlds where we stand very much as participants. For this purpose of a critique of critique, it is necessary to consider the "technologies" of ordering.

#### Critique is necessary to discussions of politics

Simon Dalby, Profesor @ Carleton University, September 2008, “GEOPOLITICS, GRAND STRATEGY AND CRITIQUE: TWENTY YEARS AND COUNTING” Paper for presentation to the "Critical Geopolitics 2008" conference Durham University Google Scholar

In so far as critical geopolitics does these things it contributes to the larger political conversation about the human condition and the possible futures we collectively make. But in doing this it is an intellectual practice that is more than research understood in narrow quasipositivist sense of specialized knowledge applied to social "problems" in need of a technical solution. Neither is it just a matter of historical scholarship alone but a contribution to the larger intellectual discussion of humanity's condition in general and its violent cartographies in particular (Shapiro 2007). But none of these questions can be divorced from either the larger historical legacies of the cultures that produce contemporary geographers nor the ontological structures that shape the categorizations which subsequently become the objects for epistemological reflection. Critique is part of the intellectual activity in which we are all involved and being clear about this is essential to discussions of geography as well as politics (Dalby 2007).

Alternative – K prior

#### We must critique security – that is critical to a more peaceful world

Simon Dalby, Profesor @ Carleton University, September 2008, “GEOPOLITICS, GRAND STRATEGY AND CRITIQUE: TWENTY YEARS AND COUNTING” Paper for presentation to the "Critical Geopolitics 2008" conference Durham University Google Scholar

My own attempt to do all these things has been to address the key that links violence, wars, strategy and identity in the discussions of security and, over the decades, write a series of critical essays pointing out the political choices implicit in how danger is articulated to various identities. In doing so it seems to me essential to take the geographical formulations in these arguments seriously and use these as the starting points for analyzing how these discursive formations work. It also seems important to understand how these discussions play out in popular culture (Dalby 2008b), the practical geopolitical reasoning of policy makers and the writings of the journalists who legitimize these practices. Geopolitics works in all these places and hence is worth tackling in many genres; this is precisely what the proliferation of critical geopolitical analyses have been doing in this decade, and in that sense at least, this critical work has become the normal way of doing geographical scholarship. But all this is premised on the assumption that war as either a tool of policy or a permanent social relation is unethical, that in the long run in a small biosphere that humanity is rapidly destabilizing, nuclear weapons and strategies to use them are untenable. In Burke’s (2007) terms we all need to start from formulations of an ethical peace rather than from assumptions that war is just. Doing so requires tackling the big hard questions about violence, questions which have been made more pressing of late by the insistence by the most powerful state on the planet that it is at war, in an aggressive “long war” as part of its struggle to end tyranny on the planet. Its this prior condition of war that is the most important point that needs critique, but after twenty years the contributions to this discussion are now widespread and at times somewhat inchoate, not least because war and domination sometimes get forgotten. The sub discipline looks very different now in comparison to what existed in the 1980s when this all got started (Dalby 2008a). The current discussion of audience reception, fandom and how popular readers and viewers extends the analysis of critical geopolitics further in another useful direction, and offers considerable possibilities for critical engagement with the framing of larger political debates (Dodds 2006; Dittmer and Dodds 2008). But it seems that if we are to take Sparke's (2007) arguments about a post-foundational ethic seriously as geographers we do need to tie his concerns not only to matters of identities and spaces, but to the other major traditional theme of geography too, matters of nature, environment and the biosphere as the home of humanity. While much of the discussion of social nature, of hybrids and cyborgs, commodity chains and animal geographies has updated these themes, at the largest scale, that of the geopolitical, matters that concern us here, much more work remains to be done on these themes (Dalby 2007). Not least in linking war, identity, geography and ecology together much more closely in contemporary thinking while simultaneously looking to the alternatives for a more peaceful world.

### Policy Breakout - CASE

#### The Criticism is Necessary for Alternative Discourses and Practices – Continuing Traditional Security Ensure Repeated Political failure.

C.A.S.E. Collective 6 [*Security Dialogues* 37.4, “Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto,” Sage Political Science, p. 464]

To take this discussion one step further, we need to ask ourselves, as researchers and as a collective, what the claim of being ‘critical’ and repre- senting a ‘collective intellectual’ entails for our engagement with the political. This question naturally can be extended to all CASE scholars. First, what do we mean by ‘critical’? Are not all theories by definition critical (of other theories)? In virtue of which principle, as a networked collective, would we allow ourselves to be self-labelled as critical? What is so critical about the general perspective we are collectively trying to defend here? From the Kantian perspective to the post-Marxist Adornian emancipatory ideal, from Hockheimer’s project to the Foucaldian stance toward regimes of truth, being critical has meant to adopt a particular stance towards taken-for- granted assumptions and unquestioned categorizations of social reality. Many of these critical lines of thought have directly or indirectly inspired this critical approach to security in Europe. Being critical means adhering to a rigorous form of sceptical questioning, rather than being suspicious or dis- trustful in the vernacular sense of those terms. But, it is also to recognize one-self as being partially framed by those regimes of truth, concepts, theories and ways of thinking that enable the critique. To be critical is thus also to be reflexive, developing abilities to locate the self in a broader heterogeneous context through abstraction and thinking. A reflexive perspective must offer tools for gauging how **political orders are constituted**. This effort to break away from naturalized correspondences between things and words, between processes framed as problems and ready-made solutions, permits us to bring back social and political issues to the realm of the political. Being critical therefore means, among other things, to disrupt depoliticizing practices and **discourses of security in the name of** exception- ality, **urgency or** bureaucratic **expertise**, and bring them back to political dis- cussions and struggles. This goal can partly be achieved through a continuous confrontation of our theoretical considerations with the social practices they account for in two directions: constantly remodelling theoretical considerations on the basis of research and critical practice, and creating the possibilities for the use of our research in political debate and action. This raises questions about the will- ingness and modalities of personal engagement. While critical theories can find concrete expressions in multiple fields of practice, their role is particularly important in the field of security. Since engaging security issues necessarily implies a normative dilemma of speaking security (Huysmans, 1998a), being critical appears **as a necessary moment** in the research. The goal of a critical intellectual is not only to observe, but also to actively open spaces of discussion and political action, as well as to provide the analytical tools, concepts and categories **for possible alternative discourses and practices.** However, there are no clear guidelines for the critical researcher and no assessment of the impact of scholarship on practice – or vice versa. Critical approaches to security have remained relatively silent about the role and the place of the researcher in the political process, too often confining their posi- tion to a series of general statements about the impossibility of objectivist science.19 The networked c.a.s.e. collective and the manifesto in which it found a first actualization may be a first step toward a more precisely defined modality of political commitment while working as a researcher. Writing collectively means assembling different types of knowledge and different forms of thinking. It means articulating different **horizons of the unknown**. It is looking at this limit at which one cannot necessarily **believe in institutionalized forms of knowledge any longer**, nor in the regimes of truth that are too often taken for granted. It is in this sense that being critical is a question of limits and necessities, and writing collectively can therefore help to critically define a modality for a more appropriate engagement with politics.

### Resistance – Charrett/McDonald

#### Discussion and understanding of security discourse is key to challenge it – policy solutions fail

Catherine Charrett, BA at the University of British Columbia International Catalan Institute for Peace, December 2009, “A Critical Application of Securitization Theory: Overcoming the Normative Dilemma of Writing Security”, http://www20.gencat.cat/docs/icip/Continguts/Publicacions/WorkingPapers/Arxius/WP7\_ANG.pdf / KX

Critics of the CS have challenged its fixed conceptualization of security and its “apparent unwillingness to question the content or meaning of security” (Wyn Jones 1999: 109). The role of the critical securitization analyst therefore, is to do exactly what the CS has not, and that is to deconstruct and politicize security as a concept. In order to develop ‘new thinking’ about security it is essential to understand how dominant modes of approaching security have previously ordered subjectivities and how these subjectivities continue to regenerate certain emotions or actions such as political ‘othering’ or social exclusion, or how they reinforce particular forms of governing. Walker argues that “security cannot be understood, or reconceptualized or reconstructed without paying attention to the constitutive account of the political that has made the prevailing accounts of security seem so plausible” (Walker 1997: 69). Here Walker asserts that it is necessary to understand how notions of sovereignty and statism have delimited conceptualizations of security and how modern accounts of security “engage in a discourse of repetitions, to affirm 33 over and over again the dangers that legitimize the sovereign authority that is constituted precisely as a solution to dangers” (Walker 1997: 73). Modern accounts of security therefore remain firmly embedded in a typically realist understanding of international relations which has structured approaches to securitization and security policy. In order to demonstrate the restrictive approaches to security during the Cold War, for example, Klein explores the clutch of ‘containment’ thinking through an examination of Robert McNamara’s discussion of the shortcomings of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations’ approach to the Vietnam War. The argument posited here is that the “prevailing mind-set of decision makers working within the operational code of the Containment allowed no room for critical inquiry” into the failings of the Vietnam War. Klein argues that there was a complete “lack of imagination” of how to respond to security threats and an incapacity to critique or learn from policy decisions embraced during this period (Klein 1997: 361). We should therefore, not be surprised when we see similar security approaches repeated decades later, argued here to be the result of restraining realist subjectivities and the reinforcement and repetition of hegemonic modes of approaching security. Bellamy et al. argue that America’s response to 9/11 for instance, can be characterized “by a return to dualistic and militaristic thinking patterns that dominated foreign policy during the Cold War” (Bellamy et al 2008: 3). As was noted above realist orientated approaches to security embedded in a subjectivity of statism often have negative implications for individual or global security, therefore an application of securitization which does not challenge dominant modes of statist thinking will only serve to reinforce negative securitization practices. In order to overcome the normative dilemma of writing security the securitization analyst must gain a nuanced understanding of the symbolic power of security, how it shapes subjectivities and how they may be reoriented to promote alternative approaches to securitization.

#### Examinations like the alt key to challenging security reps

McDonald ’08, Matt McDonald, Senior Lecturer in International Relations @ Queensland, 2008, “Securitization and the Construction of Security,” (http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/14/4/563, European Journal of International Relations, International Relations 18 (1)).

Ultimately, those interested in the construction of security must pay attention to the social, political and historical contexts in which particular discourses of security (even those defined narrowly in terms of the designation and articulation of threat) become possible. Why are some political communities more likely to view certain actors and dynamics as threatening? What role do narratives of history, culture and identity have in underpinning or legitimating particular forms of securitization? To what extent is political possibility defined by the target audience of speech acts? How are some voices empowered or marginalized to define security and threat? These highly contextual factors, I would suggest, are central to understanding how security works in different contexts, but are ultimately given short shrift in the securitization framework. The appeal of universalism in the development of a conceptual framework goes some way towards explaining the neglect of contextual factors, but the failure also to draw out the ways in which securitizing actors and audiences interact beyond the broad and amorphous recognition of ‘facilitating conditions’ and being ‘backed up’ by relevant audiences is unsatisfying.

#### Alt solves- critique of representations breaks down security

McDonald ’08, Matt McDonald, Senior Lecturer in International Relations @ Queensland, 2008, “Securitization and the Construction of Security,” (http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/14/4/563, European Journal of International Relations, International Relations 18 (1)).

Analytically we need to recognize and explore the range of ways in which political communities and their values are positioned by different actors, and explore the contexts in which particular security visions ‘win out’ over others. We should also focus more on the understanding or discourse of security underpinning particular representations and practices rather than the act of ‘securitizing’ or ‘desecuritizing’. Such a research agenda is clearly less elegant and more unwieldy than the Copenhagen School’s securitization framework, whose attraction will always in part be the desire to simply apply a set of universal and ready-made tools to different social, historical and political contexts. But resisting this attraction means recognizing the breadth and complexity of the construction of security in global politics. A broader framework would therefore have analytical value, but would also have potentially progressive normative implications. In understanding how particular visions of security and the voices promoting them come to prominence, we can better understand how alternative security discourses (that reject militarism, statism and exclusion, for example) can replace them. Such a praxeological or normative concern with acknowledging possibilities for emancipatory change would work well if combined with that which the Copenhagen School is able to contribute: a sociological concern with pointing to important elements of the construction of the present.

### Marginality – McDonald

#### Marginal voices must be incorporated into critiques of security

McDonald ’08, Matt McDonald, Senior Lecturer in International Relations @ Queensland, 2008, “Securitization and the Construction of Security,” (http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/14/4/563, European Journal of International Relations, International Relations 18 (1)).

In many ways this focus on dominant voices in the construction of security is not a problem for the Copenhagen School alone. Traditional security proponents and some post-structuralists limit the number of actors deemed important in security terms in focusing on either state policy or dominant discourses. While Copenhagen School proponents allow the possibility for security actors and ‘securitizers’ other that state political leaders (Buzan et al., 1998: 31–3), this move is ultimately closed off by the dual suggestions that security is ultimately about states (e.g. Wæver, 1989: 314; Wæver, 1995: 47–9) and that security is articulated from a position of institutional power (Wæver, 1995: 57; Buzan et al., 1998: 32–3). The default position here is therefore a focus on the political leaders of states and their designations of threat. The methodological focus on speech acts might also be seen as relevant to this bias. As Jennifer Milliken (1999: 243–5) has argued, the tendency to ignore subjugated knowledge or voices is a general inclination within discourse analytical approaches to international relations. In short, the focus only on dominant voices and their designation of security and threat is normatively problematic, contributing to the silencing of marginal voices and ignoring the ways in which such actors have attempted precisely to contest these security constructions. But it also has problematic implications analytically. First, and echoing criticisms noted above, it pays insufficient attention to the means through which particular articulations of security and threat become possible: how, for example, are marginal actors and their articulations of security silenced or marginalized? Focusing on these marginalized or subjugated actors could point to some of the ways in which ‘securitization’ becomes possible, expanding the emphasis on ‘contexts’ noted in the previous section. Second, it arguably encourages the particular logic of security which the Copenhagen School embraces. A range of (often marginal) actors contest dominant logics or discourses of security and threat through articulating alternative (even emancipatory) discourses of security and threat rather than simply arguing for ‘desecuritization’. Amnesty International’s campaign on human rights violations against Kurdish populations in Turkey in the 1990s, for example, particularly questioned the justification of these violations on the grounds of ‘security’. This was reflected in the title of its publication, Turkey: No Security Without Human Rights. For such actors, security (defined in non-statist, non-exclusionary and non-militaristic ways) can be a means for — or site of — emancipatory change. For the so-called Welsh School of critical security studies, focusing on the marginalized and ‘voiceless’ (Wyn Jones, 1999: 159) points to the ways in which potentially exclusionary, statist and militaristic security discourses can be challenged and replaced without simply giving up on security as a political category. Here, it could be argued that the choice within the Copenhagen School to ultimately limit attention to powerful actors and voices blinds its proponents to the role of security as a site of competing discourses or images of politics, and even potentially as a site for emancipation. Narrowness in this context has important normative implications that those using the framework would do well to reflect upon.

### Outside State – Neocleous

#### A critical approach is key – a state based approach just re-encroaches us within the grasp of security

Neocleous 8 (Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy; Head of Department of Politics & History Brunel Univ, Critique of Security, 9)

To this end, the aim of the critique of security is not a set of proposals for democratizing security, humanizing security, balancing security with liberty, or any other policy proposal to improve the wonderful world of security. There are more than enough security intellectuals for that. The aim is to play a part in freeing the political imagination from the paralysis experienced in the face of security – to free ourselves from security fetishism by provoking and intriguing others to try and think politics without security. It is often said that security is the gift of the state; perhaps we ought to return the gift.

# Framework/Answers To

### 1AC Epistemology Bad

#### Security Discourse Assumes Threats As Natural – Their Harms and Solvency Claims are Products of a Particular Ideology.

David Shim, Phd Candidate @ GIGA Institute of Asian Studies, ‘8 [Paper prepared for presentation at the 2008 ISA, Production, Hegemonization and Contestation of Discursive Hegemony: The Case of the Six-Party Talks in Northeast Asia, www.allacademic.com/meta/p253290\_index.html]

The notion of discourse draws on the concept elaborated by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001). 7 Discourses are treated as productive (social, linguistic, non-linguistic) practices, which construct objects and subjects and define the very conditions of meaningful statements and actions (Laffey/Weldes 2004: 28; Torfing 2005b: 161). Discourse enables one to know and to make sense of the world (Doty 1996: 6). The underlying themes of poststructural discourse theory are the assumptions that the meanings of objects and subjects are not fixed and not pre-given by nature, god or reason, but are rather “contextual, relational, and contingent” (Howarth 2005: 317).8 Things, events or **actions do not ‘tell their own tale’**, but it is the discursive practices that produce meaning, which, for instance, makes a tank a means of aggression or defense. The mere existence of brute facts does not have any intrinsic meaning, which could arise from itself. They become meaningful only in discourse (Waever 2004: 198). So, the task for discourse analysts is to unveil the structures of meaning and examine how they are constituted and changed.9 9 In the words of Janice Bially Mattern (2005: 5), discourse analysts do not seek for discoveries, which suggest finding new facts of the world, but for uncoveries, which imply “an excavation from underneath layers of ossified or never problematized knowledge” (see also Roland Bleiker 2005: xlviii). Laclau and Mouffe (2001: 112) understand discourses as the (temporary) fixation of meaning around certain signs, which they call nodal points. Meaning is produced through articulatory practices, which establish a particular relationship between other signs and those nodal points, so that their meanings are mutually modified (ibid. 105). For instance, as it is shown in section 4, **‘peace’ or ‘stability’ acquire their specific meanings in relation to ‘denuclearization’, ‘non-proliferation’ or ‘normalization’ in the discourse** of the Six-Party Talks. The study of language is seen crucial for discursive analyses although the latter is not limited to the former (Neumann 2002). The common understanding of language in IR and other disciplines regarding its significance is to refer to it as a transparent medium which merely reflects the world as it is. Moreover, in traditional accounts of IR, such as (neo)realism, liberalism, institutionalism and conventional constructivism the significance of language is ignored or treated as marginal.10 What counts, are (social inter-)actions. ‘Talk is cheap’ and ‘one cannot be sure if s/he really means what s/he says’ are commonly shared understandings.11 In contrast to that, discourse theoretical approaches consider language – defined as any collective sign system – not just as a mirror or mediator of the world, **but as its very creator** (cf. Campbell 1998; Howarth 2000; Hansen 2006). Basically it is stated that subjects, objects and concepts do not exist or rather do not have any meaning unless they are talked (but also acted and interacted) into existence through certain linguistic, non-linguistic and social practices.12 As Janice Bially Mattern (2005: 92) puts it, “the world is not real in any socially meaningful sense unless actors find ways to communicate about it”.

#### The affirmatives predictions are based in misplaced certainty – they have compiled indeterminate evidence and generated a singular, likely inaccurate reading

Mitzen and Schweller, 11 (Jennifer Mitzen and Randall Schweller, Mitzen and Schweller are professors of Political Science at Ohio State University, “ Knowing the Unknown Unknowns: Misplaced Certainty and the Onset of War”, 3/15/2011, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2011.549023, RM)

Taking the definitional question first, we define misplaced certainty as a situation where a decision maker has eliminated uncertainty prematurely. Thus understood, misplaced certainty is comprised of two equally important dimensions. First, the decision-maker's subjective probability estimate of one does not line up with the way the world really is, that is, with the objective probability, which is less than one. The decision maker has made a mistake. In some sense, mistakes are inevitable—decision makers can never know all of the relevant information and are, to some extent, always placing bets. Seen in this light, international politics is like the stock market: longs bet that a stock will go up, while shorts bet that it will go down; both sides cannot be correct. 63 Both have some degree of confidence in their assessment, but one of the traders must be misestimating the future price of the stock. Most everyday decisions are low-risk, low-cost bets under uncertainty, and mistakes are common. Misplaced certainty, however, is not merely a mistake. With misplaced certainty a decision maker places a bet without really acknowledging it is only a bet. The evidence is indeterminate, but the decision maker imposes a singular reading of the situation on which the bet is based. This suggests the second dimension of misplaced certainty—persistence. The decision maker holds tight to those estimates, acting as if they are accurate readings of a situation. As Arie Kruglanski and Donna Webster describe it, the mind “seizes and freezes.” 64 A mistake is a case where the decision maker decides, perhaps even is certain about a course of action, but then realizes that the initial judgment was mistaken and changes course. With misplaced certainty, in contrast, if the decision maker encounters new information that objectively undermines the initial judgment he or she does not, as a result, become less certain about it. Rather, as time passes, certainty about the initial judgment or decision hardens, and incoming information, even when contradictory, is assimilated to it. 65

Truth claims / epistemology

#### Threat perception is rooted in stimulation; not reality.

James der Derian ’90, James Der Derian is a Watson Institute research professor of international studies. He was a director of the Institute's Global Security Program and founder of the Information Technology, War, and Peace Project and the Global Media Project. The (S)pace of International Relations: Simulation, Surveillance, and Speed, International Studies Quarterly, Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The International Studies Association. Vol. 34, No. 3, Sep., 1990, Page [295] of 295-31

After analyzing the political economy of the sign and visiting Disneyland, Jean Baudrillard, the French master of edifying hyperbole, notified the inhabitants of advanced mediacracies that they were no longer distracted by the technical repro- duction of reality, or alienated and repressed by their over-consumption of its spec- tacular representation. Unable to recover the "original" and seduced by the simula- tion, they had lost the ability to distinguish between the model and the real: "Abstrac- tion today is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror or the concept. Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal" (1983a: 2). Baudrillard exceeds Nietzsche in his interpretation of the death of god and the inability of rational man to fill the resulting value-void with stable distinctions be- tween the real and the apparent, the true and the false, the good and the evil. In the excessive, often nihilistic vision of Baudrillard, the task of modernity is no longer to demystify or disenchant illusion-for "with the real world we have also abolished the apparent world" (see Nietzsche, 1968: 40-41; Der Derian, 1987: Ch. 9)-but to save a principle that has lost its object: "Disneyland is presented as imaginary in order to make us believe that the rest is real, when in fact all of Los Angeles and the America surrounding it are no longer real, but of the order of the hyperreal and of simula- tion. It is no longer a question of false representation of reality (ideology), but of concealing the fact that the real is no longer real, and thus of saving the reality principle" (1983a: 25).9

The representation of international relations is not immune to this development. In a very short period the field has oscillated: from realist representation, in which world-historical figures meant what they said and said what they meant, and diplo- matic historians recorded it as such in Rankean fashion ("wie es eigentlich gewesen ist"); to neorealist, in which structures did what they did, and we did what they made us do, except of course when neorealists revealed in journals like the International Studies Quarterly and International Organization what they "really" did; to hyperrealist, in which the model of the real becomes more real than the reality it models, and we become confused.'

What is the reality principle that international relations theory in general seeks to save? For the hard-core realist, it is the sovereign state acting in an anarchical order to maintain and if possible expand its security and power in the face of penetrating, de-centering forces such as the ICBM, military (and now civilian) surveillance satel- lites, the international terrorist, the telecommunications web, environmental move- ments, transnational human rights conventions, to name a few of the more obvious. For the soft-core neorealist and peace-research modeler, it is the prevailing pattern of systemic power which provides stable structures, regime constraints, and predicta- ble behavior for states under assault by similar forces of fragmentation. Before we consider how simulations in particular "work" to save the reality princi- ple, we should note the multiple forms that these simulations take in international relations. From the earliest Kriegspiel (war-play) of the Prussian military staff in the 1830s, to the annual "Global Game" at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, simulations have been staged to prepare nation states for future wars; by doing so, as many players would claim, they help keep the peace: qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum. Simulations are used at other defense colleges, such as the strategic and counterterrorist games played at the National Defense University or the more tactically oriented computerized "Janus" game perfected at the Army War College." Then there are the early academic models, like Harold Guetzkow's seminal InterNa- tion Simulation (INS), which spawned a host of second- and third-generation models: SIPER (Simulated International Processes), GLOBUS (Generating Long- term Options by Using Simulation), and SIMPEST (Simulation of Military, Political, Economic, and Strategic Interactions).'2 Many simulations are now commercially available: the popular realpolitik computer game Balance of Power; the remarkably sophisticated video games modeled on Top Gun, the Iranian hostage rescue mission, and other historical military conflicts; and the film/video WarGames, in which a hacker taps into an Air Force and nearly starts World War III. And then there are the ubiquitous think-tank games, like those at the Rand Corporation, that model everything from domestic crime to nuclear war, as well as the made-to-order macro- strategic games, like the war game between Iraq and Iran that the private consulting company BDM International sold to Iraq (the

[CONTINUED…NO TEXT REMOVED]

Truth claims / epistemology

[CONTINUED…NO TEXT REMOVED]

highest bidder?). It may grate on the ears of some of the players to hear "gaming," "modeling," and"simulation" used

interchangeably.'3 Yet in the literature and during interviews I found users using all three terms to describe practices that could be broadly defined as the continuation of war by means of verisimilitude (Allen, 1987: 6-7). Conventionally, a game uses broad descriptive strokes and a minimum of mathematical abstraction to make generalizations about the behavior of actors, while simulation uses algorithms and computer power to analyze the amount of technical detail considered necessary to predict events and the behavior of actors. Judging from the shift in the early 1980s by the military and think-tanks to mainly computerized games-reflected in the change of the Joint Chiefs of Staff gaming organization from SAGA (Studies, Analy- sis, and Gaming Agency) to JAD (Joint Analysis Directorate)-it would seem that simulation is becoming the preferred "sponge" term in international relations. "Sim- ulation" also has the obvious advantage of sounding more serious than "gaming" and of carrying more of a high-tech, scientific connotation than "modeling." The object of this inquiry is not to conduct an internal critique of the simulation industry, nor to claim some privileged grounds for disproving its conclusions.'4 Rather, the intent is to show how, in the construction of a realm of meaning that has minimal contact with historically specific events or actors, simulations have demon- strated the power to displace the "reality" of international relations they purport to represent. Simulations have created a new space in international relations where actors act, things happen, and the consequences have no origins except the artificial cyberspace of the simulations themselves.

Over the last four years I have collected numerous examples of this new phenome- non; I will share two of them here. 15 The first is the case of the U.S.S. Vincennes which shot down an Iranian civilian airliner on July 3, 1988, in the mistaken belief that it was a military aircraft. The Vincennes was equipped with the most sophisticated U.S. naval radar system, the Aegis, which according to a later military investigation functioned perfectly.'6 It recorded that the Iranian Airbus was on course and flying level at 12,000 feet, not descending towards the Vincennes as the radar operator, the tactical information coordinator, and one other officer reported at the time. Some- how, between machine and man, a tragic misreading took place which resulted in the death of 290 people. One possible cause is stress: the Vincennes and its crew had never been in combat and were engaged with Iranian speedboats when the Airbus was first detected. Yet stress has many origins, and the military shows signs of ignoring the most serious one. The Vincennes trained for nine months before it went into the Persian Gulf. That training relied heavily on tapes that simulate battle situations, none of which included overflights by civilian airliners-a common occur- rence in the Gulf.17

To be sure, much more was involved in the decision to fire at the Airbus, not least the memory of the U.S.S. Stark which was nearly destroyed in the Persian Gulf by an Exocet missile from an Iraqi warplane. But I would like to suggest that the reality of the nine months of simulated battles displaced, overrode, absorbed the reality of the Airbus. The Airbus disappeared before the missile struck: it faded from an airliner full of civilians to an electronic representation on a radar screen to a simulated target. The simulation overpowered a reality which did not conform to it.

### 2NC Fiat Bad

#### Fiat usage trades off with individual agency – absolves us of responsibility for actions we are complicit in

Kappeler 95 (Susanne, former lecturer in English at the University of East Anglia, former Associate Professor at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Al Akhawayn University, “The Will to Violence: The Politics of Personal Behaviour”, 1995, pgs. 10-11)

We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equival­ent of a universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective `assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent `powerlessness’ and its accompanying phe­nomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls `organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually or­ganized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers: For we tend to think that we cannot `do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like `I want to stop this war', `I want military intervention', `I want to stop this backlash', or `I want a moral revolution." 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our `non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we `are' the war in our `unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' our readiness, in other words, to build ident­ities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the `others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape `our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence. “destining” of revealing insofar as it “pushes” us in a certain direction. Heidegger does not regard destining as determination (he says it is not a “fate which compels”), but rather as the implicit project within the field of modern practices to subject all aspects of reality to the principles of order and efficiency, and to pursue reality down to the finest detail. Thus, insofar as modern technology aims to order and render calculable, the objectification of reality tends to take the form of an increasing classification, differentiation, and fragmentation of reality. The possibilities for how things appear are increasingly reduced to those that enhance calculative activities. Heidegger perceives the real danger in the modern age to be that human beings will continue to regard technology as a mere instrument and fail to inquire into its essence. He fears that all revealing will become calculative and all relations technical, that the unthought horizon of revealing, namely the “concealed” background practices that make technological thinking possible, will be forgotten. He remarks: The coming to presence of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the unconcealedness of standing-reserve. (QT, 33) 10 Therefore, it is not technology, or science, but rather the essence of technology as a way of revealing that constitutes the danger; for the essence of technology is existential, not technological. 11 It is a matter of how human beings are fundamentally oriented toward their world vis a vis their practices, skills, habits, customs, and so forth. Humanism contributes to this danger insofar as it fosters the illusion that technology is the result of a collective human choice and therefore subject to human control.

### AT: Perm

#### The plan cannot be detached from its discursive underpinnings. The noble effort to restrict violence is enframed by a larger structure of security logic that writes the effort into a broader system of hegemonic power and economic domination.

Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, ‘7 [*Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence*, p. 3-4]

These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on terror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1

It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis **relate not only to the** most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, **but also to their available** (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, **but also their mainstream critique**s - whether they take the form **of liberal policy approaches** in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement **about major concepts**, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically **wards off critique.**

AT: Perm

#### Reconstructing security discourse fails. They change the content but maintain the imperialist form. Identifying current policy as a threat to stability strengthens the exlusionary constructions of security.

Anthony **Burke**, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, **‘7** [*Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence*, p. 30-1]

Second, the force of such critiques shattered Realism's claim to be a founding and comprehensive account of security: scattering its objects, methods, and normative aims into an often contradictory and antithetical dispersal. What was revealed here was not a universality but a field of conflict - as much social as conceptual. This creates some serious problems for a more radical and inclusive language of security, however important its desire for justice. This was recognised later by Walker, who argued in 1997 that 'demands for broader accounts of security risk inducing epistemological overload'." Indeed Simon Dalby argues that security, as a concept, may no longer be viable. He thinks that radical reformulations suggest that: 'the political structures of modernity, patriarchy and capitalism are the sources [rather than the vulnerable objects] of insecurity ... [are] so different as to call into question whether the term itself can be stretched to accommodate such reinterpretations. Inescapably, it puts into question the utility of the term in political discourse after the Cold War."'

Thus humanist critiques of security uncover an aporia within the concept of security. An aporia is an event that prevents a metaphysical discourse from fulfilling its promised unity: not a contradiction which can be brought into the dialectic, smoothed over and resolved into the unity of the concept, but an untotalisable problem at the heart of the concept, disrupting its trajectory, emptying out its fullness, opening out its closure. Jacques Derrida writes of aporia being an 'impasse', a path that cannot be travelled; an 'interminable experience' that, however, 'must remain if one wants to think, to make come or to let come any event of decision or responsibility' 14

As an event, Derrida sees the aporia as something like a stranger crossing the threshold of a foreign land: yet the aporetic stranger 'does not simply cross a given threshold' but 'affects the very experience of the threshold to the point of annihilating or rendering indeterminate all the distinctive signs of a prior identity, beginning with the very border that delineated a legitimate home and assured lineage, names and language •'•1 With this in mind, we can begin to imagine how a critical discourse (the 'stranger' in the security state) can challenge and open up the self-evidence of security, its self- and boundary-drawing nature, its imbrication with borders, sovereignty, identity and violence. Hence it is important to open up and focus on aporias: they bring possibility, the hope of breaking down the hegemony and assumptions of powerful political concepts, to think and create new social, ethical and economic relationships outside their oppressive structures of political and epistemological order - in short, they help us to think new paths. Aporias mark not merely the failure of concepts but a new potential to experience and imagine the impossible. This is where the critical and life-affirming potential of genealogy can come into play.

My particular concern with humanist discourses of security is that, whatever their critical value, they leave in place (and possibly strengthen) a key structural feature of the elite strategy they oppose: its claim to embody truth and to fix the contours of the real. In particular, the ontology of security/threat or security/insecurity which forms the basic condition of the real for mainstream discourses of international policy - remains powerfully in place, and security's broader function as a defining condition of human experience and modern political life **remains invisible and unexamined**. This is to abjure a powerful critical approach that is able to question the very categories in which our thinking, our experience and actions remain confined.

This chapter remains focused on the aporias that lie at the heart of security, rather than pushing into the spaces that potentially lie beyond. This is another project, one whose contours are already becoming clearer and which I address in detail in Chapters 2 and 3•16 What this chapter builds is a genealogical account of security's origins and cultural power, its ability to provide what Walker calls a 'constitutive account of the political' - as he says, 'claims about common security, collective security, or world security do little more than fudge the contradictions written into the heart of modem politics: we can only become humans, or anything else, after we have given up our humanity, or any other attachments, to the greater good of citizenship' .17 Before we can rewrite security we have to properly understand how security has written us how it has shaped and limited our very possibility, the possibilities for our selves, our relationships and our available images of political, social and economic order. This, as Walker intriguingly hints, is also to explore the aporetic distance that modernity establishes between our 'humanity' and a secure identity defined and limited by the state. In short, security needs to be placed alongside a range of other economic, political, technological, philosophic and scientific developments as one of the central constitutive events of our modernity, and it remains one of its essential underpinnings.

### AT: Perm – Pragmatism

#### Focus on feasibility destroys our critical project. Their perm shores up the exclusivist discourse of security.

Burke 7 (Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 21-2]

A further argument of the CSS thinkers, one that adds a sharply conservative note to their normative discourse, needs comment. This states that proposals for political transformation must be based on an identification of 'immanent possibilities' for change in the present order. Indeed, Richard Wyn Jones is quite, militant about this: [D]escriptions of a more emancipated order must focus on realizable utopias ... If [critical theorists] succumb to the temptation of suggesting a blueprint for an emancipated order that is unrelated to the possibilities inherent in the present ... [they] have no way of justifying their arguments epistemologically. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that a vision of an emancipated order that is not based on immanent potential will be politically efficacious. 47 Certainly it is helpful to try to identify such potentials; but whatever the common sense about the practicalities of political struggle this contains, I strongly reject the way Jones frames it so dogmatically. Even putting aside the analytical ambiguities in identifying **where immanent possibilities exist**, such **arguments are ultimately disabling and risk denying the entire purpose** of the critical project. It is precisely at times of the greatest pessimism, when new potentials are being shut down or normative change is distinctly negative arguably true of the period in which I am writing - that the critical **project is most important**. To take just one example from this book, any reader would recognise that my arguments about the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be extremely difficult to 'realise' (even though they endorse a negotiated two-state solution). This only makes it more important to make them because the available contours of the present, confined as they are within the masculinist ontology of the insecure nation-state, **fail to provide a stable platform** either for peace or a meaningful security. In the face of such obstacles the critical project must think and conceive the unthought, and its limiting test **ought not to be realism but responsibility.** The realism underlying the idea of immanent possibility sets up an important tension between the arguments of this book and the normative project of cosmopolitanism which was most famously set out by Kant in his Perpetual Peace as the establishment of a 'federation of peoples' based on Republication constitutions and principles of universal hospitality, that might result in the definitive abolition of the need to resort to war. 41 However, Kant's image of universal human community and the elimination of war exists in fundamental tension with its foundation on a 'pacific federation' of national democracies. **With two terrible** centuries' hindsight we know that republics have not turned out to be pacifistic vehicles of cosmopolitan feeling; instead, in a malign convergence of the social contract with Clausewitzian strategy, they have too often formed into exciusivist communities **whose ultimate survival is premised upon violence**. Is the nation-state the reality claim upon which cosmopolitanism always founders? Could a critique of security, sovereignty and violence, along the lines I set out here, help us to form a **badly needed buttress** for its structure?

#### Arguments based on necessity produce the worst violence in the name of security

Neocleous 8 (Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy; Head of Department of Politics & History Brunel Univ, Critique of Security, 33-34)

The key problem with all such claims is that by presenting such measures to us as the ‘lesser evil’ they become increasingly normalized and legitimized, an issue we shall take up at much greater length in Chapter 2. The point here, however, is that running through such arguments is the belief that although such practices may not be desirable, they are necessary: ‘necessity may require the commission of bad acts’, says Ignatieff. This is a modern version of an idea that has underpinned ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments through the centuries: where historically it was said that ’necessary’ cruelty is not really cruelty, now it is said that ‘necessary’ interrogation is not really torture. Here liberalism once again merely reiterates rather than rebuffs a central principal of reason of state, for which ‘necessity’ was frequently used to overcome concerns about the justness of a particular action – if something is absolutely ‘necessary’ then the question of whether it is just or not is merely a philosophical dispute. As Hannah Arendt puts it: Necessity, since the time of Livy and through the centuries, has meant many things that we today would find quite sufficient to dub a war unjust rather than just. Conquest expansion, defense of vested interests, conservation of power in view of the rise of new and threatening powers, or support of a given power equilibrium – all these well-known realities of power politics were not only actually the causes of the outbreaks of most wars in history, they are also recognized as ‘necessitates’. Not only does this circumvent philosophical disputes about the just war (for Livy ‘the war that is necessary is just’), but it also circumvents philosophical debate about the justness of a whole range of other actions taken by the state: the action that is ‘necessary’ is thought either to be just or to be so necessary that questions of justice are irrelevant. It is not difficult to see that ‘necessity’ easily becomes little more than window-dressing for reason of state. In so doing it becomes the justification for prerogative actions of virtually any kind, and contains its own justification: the notion implies that something has to be done and will be done; necessity is an ‘irresistible action’ that ‘double the parts of indispensable and inevitable’. Hence the implication that acts of necessity must be carried out regardless of the legal or moral restrictions or implications.

### AT: Good Forms of Security

#### \*The security framing infects all noble goals. For every person made secure, many others are dragged into the system

Roe, 12 (Paul Roe, Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations and European Studies at Central European University, Budapest, “Is securitization a ‘negative’ concept? Revisiting the normative debate over normal versus extraordinary politics,” Security Dialogue vol. 43 no. 3, June 2012)

Many writers acknowledge that the panic politics of securitization is analogous to traditional national-security behaviour. Although this does not mean that successfully securitized issues will necessarily be ‘militarized’, it does mean that they will reflect a national security ‘mode’ or, as Wæver (1995: 54) puts it, a ‘logic of war’ – that is, a logic of ‘challenge–resistance(defense)–escalation–recognition/defeat’. Given Wæver’s formulation, again, it is difficult to get away from the equation of securitization with Schmitt’s concept of the political: the logic of war is the very product of the fear of the extinction of the referent, and exactly the kind of politics that, to repeat Huysmans (1998: 576), defines the self ‘on the basis of the expectation of hostility’. And it is this understanding of Schmittian political realism that fundamentally informs Aradau’s critique of the Aberystwyth’s School’s notion of security as emancipation.17 For Aradau, the potential for emancipation to transform social relations is necessarily hindered by virtue of its security framing. Reflecting on Booth’s (and also Richard Wyn Jones’s)18 normative commitment to tackle insecurities such as human and minority rights abuses, poverty, and violence against women, Aradau (2008: 72) argues that security as emancipation forgets that ‘**security itself institutes a particular kind of ordering** [of] political communities’. ‘Rather than the “other” of power’, she goes on, ‘**security practices buttress institutional arrangements and legitimize forms of domination and exclusion’**. Aradau contends that **someone made secure inevitably entails someone else made dangerous.** ‘On which grounds’, she asks, ‘can one privilege such a construction of security, the security of migrants over the security of racists, the security of HIV-positive people over those at risk of being infected?’ (Aradau, 2004: 399).

#### \*The security framing is structurally divisive – positive articulations are impossible because of the logic of exclusion

Roe, 12 (Paul Roe, Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations and European Studies at Central European University, Budapest, “Is securitization a ‘negative’ concept? Revisiting the normative debate over normal versus extraordinary politics,” Security Dialogue vol. 43 no. 3, June 2012)

Concentrating instead on the societal sector of security, Aradau maintains that since security utterances are constitutive of who belongs to the (political) community and who does not, non-divisive referents are (at least for societal security) **rendered unattainable** – that is, **the inherent boundary-making function of security necessarily hinders the inclusionary intent of other, positive approaches**. For example, referring to some feminist approaches to security, Aradau (2008: 73) contends that J. Anne Tickner’s attempt to move beyond enemy Others to ‘the preservation of life’ itself as an ultimate value fails to acknowledge the practices brought by existing hegemonies of power:

The life of refugees and asylum seekers can be valued as they are provided with food, shelter, and even medical assistance, but are in principle excluded from the political community. They are to be saved from sinking boats only to be deported to their country of origin. By bringing the condition of politics upon the precondition for acting as a political subject, the discourse of life preservation closes down struggles about the kind of life that people can live.

In other words, ‘we can help you, but you are not one of us and so you are not welcome here’. In this sense, Aradau (2008: 162) refers to security as ‘barred universality’, inasmuch as exclusion and subordination are ‘intrinsic to its practices’. And this leads her to the rather provocative conclusion that ‘the horizon of security is, ultimately, fascism, the community that draws impermeable boundaries’ (Aradau, 2008: 162–3).

#### Using policies to disentangle ourselves from security discourse fails – it merely encroaches us deeper into that discourse

Neocleous 8 (Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy; Head of Department of Politics & History Brunel Univ, Critique of Security, 13)

Because liberalism has situated itself as the ideology, movement or party of liberty, and because it is so often reiterated in these terms, a common assumption is that if anyone should be defending liberty against security, it is the liberals. The classic formulation of this view if found in Benjamin Franklin’s claims that ‘they that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety’, a claim that has been repeated so many times in the twenty-first century that to list all references would be a research task in itself. This chapter suggests that there’s a certain myth-making going on when people talk of the search for the right ‘balance’ between liberty and security, and that this myth-making obscures some of the real history of liberalism. For while it make be that ‘the moral instinct of the liberal is typically to give some special status … to the protection of the basic liberties, which means that they cannot be traded away’, the political instinct lies firmly in the direction of security. So, building on one of Marx’s insights and on a key theme within Foucault’s work, I argue that rather than resist the push to security in the name of liberty liberalism in fact enacts another form of political rationality that sets in place mechanisms for a ‘society of security’. ‘Security’ here straddles law and economy, police power and political economy, and becomes the dominant mode of what Foucault calls ‘governmental rationality’. Taking these ideas, I want to suggest that in encouraging an essential liberal mode of thought, the myth of a ‘balance’ between security and liberty opens the (back) door to an acceptance of all sorts of authoritarian security measures; measures which are then justified on liberal grounds. This argument is developed through a critical historical analysis of the relationship between security and liberty in the liberal tradition, which will then open the door to a wider discussion of security, emergency powers and liberal order-building in the chapters that follow.

#### Trying to Reappropriate security fails – it gives more power to the state which neutralizes all political value

Neocleous 8 (Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy; Head of Department of Politics & History Brunel Univ, Critique of Security, 3-4)

This range of research – now quite formidable, often impressive and sometimes drawn on in this book – has a double lack. First, for all its talk about discourse, processes and the need for a critical edge, it still offers a relatively impoverished account of the different ways in which security and insecurity are imagined. To speak of different ‘security field’ such as the environment, migration, energy, and so on, often fails to open up the analysis to the ways in which spaces and places, processes and categories, are imagined thought the lens of insecurity and in turn appropriated and colonized by the project of security. Given the centrality of the state to the political imagination, to imagine the whole social order through the lens of insecurity is to hand it over to the key entity which is said to be the ground of security, namely the state. This is related to the second lack, which is that for all the critical edge employed by the authors in question, the running assumption underpinning the work is that security is still a good thing, still necessary despite how much we interrogate it. The assumption seems to be that while we might engage in a critical interrogation of security, we could never quite be against it. ‘Why we might want “security” after all’ is how one of the most influential essays in this area ends. As Didier Bigo points out, how to maximize security always seems to remain the core issue. And so there is a danger that these approaches do not quite manage to shake off the managerialism prevalent in more traditional security studies: the desire to ‘do’ security better. The common assumption remains that security is the foundation of freedom, democracy and good society, and that the real question is how to improve the power of the state to ‘secure’ us. But what if at the heart of the logic of security lies not a vision of freedom or emancipation, but a means of modeling the whole of human society around a particular vision of order? What if security is little more than a semantic and semiotic black hole allowing authority to inscribe itself deeply into human experience? What if the magic word ‘security’ serves merely to neutralize political action, encouraging us to surrender ourselves to the state in a thoroughly conservative fashion? And what if this surrender facilitates an ongoing concession to authority and the institutional violence which underpins the authority in question, and thus constitutes the first key step in learning how to treat people not as human beings, but as objects to be administered? In other words, what if the major requirement of our time is less an expanded, refined, or redefined vision of security, and nothing less than a critique of security? Corey Robinson points out that when a particular idea routinely accompanies atrocities then some real critical engagement with the idea would seem to be in order. And since there is a clear and not particularly long line linking the idea of security and the atrocities being carried out in Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and other ‘security centres’ at which people are currently being held, never mind the long history of states slaughtering millions in the name of security, then the time must be right for a critique of security.

### AT: Response to Existing Threats

#### The claim to knowledge of existing threats is the most dangerous form of securization. It invokes the logic of the discourse without even the benefit of clearly defending the practice

Roe, 12 (Paul Roe, Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations and European Studies at Central European University, Budapest, “Is securitization a ‘negative’ concept? Revisiting the normative debate over normal versus extraordinary politics,” Security Dialogue vol. 43 no. 3, June 2012)

The view that securitization is bad for democracy is also given salience by the so-called Paris School. Inspired predominantly by the work of Pierre Bourdieu, the Paris School has sought to illuminate how the practices of various agencies – the police, border guards, etc. – serve to reveal certain processes that do not necessarily derive from identifiable security speech acts. Often focusing on the securitization of migration, the work of perhaps the most prominent of the Paris School’s members, Didier Bigo, shows how ‘security professionals’ – those officials and bureaucrats who, empowered with privileged information, purport to authoritatively define threats, rather than responding to such threats ‘out there’ – exaggerate or provoke existing fears for the purpose of promoting their own institutional interests (Bigo, 2002: 64). Rather than the ‘politics of exception’ that is characteristic of the Copenhagen School’s formulation, Bigo’s security professionals are enabled by a ‘politics of unease’ (Huysmans and Buonfino, 2008). The politics of unease is not concerned with existential threats to political autonomy and territorial integrity, but with other dangers that are nonetheless to be policed, linking together various policy fields (e.g. counter-terrorism, trafficking and illegal immigration) in order to warrant the introduction of governmental technologies such as racial profiling and ID cards. The important point here is that through more ordinary – that is to say, more discreet and surreptitious – mechanisms, the politics of unease can create contexts for securitization within which there is no clear discursive framing of threat.4 As Huysmans (2011: 376) has written more recently, if instead of the moment of securitization ‘we have a myriad of decisions in a process that is continuously made and remade, then what is left of the … political critique of securitizing that is invested in the notion of speech act?’ In other words, if you cannot locate a securitization, if you cannot identify who is responsible, how can you scrutinize the policy? This presents a particular kind of challenge for open and accountable government.

### AT: Cede the Political

#### Turn – our poststructuralist stance is the only effective political strategy – the political has already been ceded to the right – broadening the scope of politics is key to effective engagement.

Grondin 4 [David, master of pol sci and PHD of political studies @ U of Ottowa “(Re)Writing the “National Security State”: How and Why Realists (Re)Built the(ir) Cold War,” http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/ieim/IMG/pdf/rewriting\_national\_security\_state.pdf]

A poststructuralist approach to international relations reassesses the nature of the political. Indeed, it calls for the **repoliticization of** practices of world **politics** that have been treated as if they were not political. For instance, limiting the ontological elements in one’s inquiry to states or great powers is a political choice. As Jenny Edkins puts it, we need to “bring the political back in” (Edkins, 1998: xii). For most analysts of International Relations, the conception of the “political” is **narrowly restricted to politics as practiced by politicians**. However, from a poststructuralist viewpoint, the “political” acquires a **broader meaning,** especially since practice is not what most theorists are describing as practice. Poststructuralism sees theoretical discourse not only as discourse, but also as political practice. Theory therefore becomes practice. The political space of poststructuralism is not that of exclusion; it is the political space of postmodernity, a dichotomous one, where one thing always signifies at least one thing and another (Finlayson and Valentine, 2002: 14). **Poststructuralism** thus **gives primacy to the political**, sinceit acts on us, while we act in its name, and leads us to identify and differentiate ourselves from others. This political act is never complete and celebrates undecidability, whereas decisions, when taken, express the political moment. It is a critical attitude which encourages dissidence from traditional approaches (Ashley and Walker, 1990a and 1990b). It does not represent one single philosophical approach or perspective, nor is it an alternative paradigm (Tvathail, 1996: 172). It is a nonplace, a border line falling between international and domestic politics (Ashley, 1989). The poststructuralist analyst questions the borderlines and dichotomies of modernist discourses, such as inside/outside, the constitution of the Self/Other, and so on. In the act of definition, difference – thereby the discourse of otherness – is highlighted, since one always defines an object with regard to what it is not (Knafo, 2004). As Simon Dalby asserts, “It involves the social construction of some other person, group, culture, race, nationality or political system as different from ‘our’ person, group, etc. Specifying difference is a linguistic, epistemological and, most importantly, a political act; it constructs a space for the other distanced and inferior from the vantage point of the person specifying the difference” (Dalby, cited in Tvathail, 1996: 179). Indeed, poststructuralism offers no definitive answers, but leads to new questions and new unexplored grounds. This makes the commitment to the incomplete nature of the political and of political analysis so central to poststructuralism (Finlayson and Valentine, 2002: 15). As Jim George writes, “It is postmodern resistance in the sense that while it is directly (and sometimes violently) engaged with modernity, it seeks to go beyond the repressive, closed aspects of modernist global existence. It is, therefore, not a resistance of traditional grand-scale emancipation or conventional radicalism imbued with authority of one or another sovereign presence. Rather, in opposing the large-scale brutality and inequity in human society, it is a resistance active also at the everyday, community, neighbourhood, and interpersonal levels, where it confronts those processes that **systematically exclude people from making decisions about who they are and what they can be**” (George, 1994: 215, emphasis in original). In this light, poststructural practices are used critically to investigate how the subject of international relations is constituted in and through the discourses and texts of global politics. Treating theory as discourse opens up the possibility of historicizing it. It is a myth that theory can be abstracted from its socio-historical context, from reality, so to speak, as neorealists and neoclassical realists believe. It is a political practice which needs to be contextualized and stripped of its purportedly neutral status. It must be understood with respect to its role in **preserving and reproducing the structures and power relations present in all language forms.** Dominant theories are, in this view, dominant discourses that shape our view of the world (the “subject”) and our ways of understanding it.

AT: Cede the political

#### The political has already been ceded – try or die for the alternative.

Grondin 4 [David, master of pol sci and PHD of political studies @ U of Ottowa “(Re)Writing the “National Security State”: How and Why Realists (Re)Built the(ir) Cold War,” http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/ieim/IMG/pdf/rewriting\_national\_security\_state.pdf]

As American historian of U.S. foreign relations Michael Hogan observes in his study on the rise of the national security state during the Truman administration, “the national security ideology framed the Cold War discourse in a system of symbolic representation that defined America’s national identity by reference to the un-American ‘other,’ usually the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, or some other totalitarian power” (Hogan, 1998: 17). Such a binary system made it difficult for any domestic dissent from U.S. policy to emerge – it would have “amounted to an act of disloyalty” (Hogan, 1998: 18).15While Hogan distinguishes advocates from critics of the American national security state, his view takes for granted that there is a given and fixed American political culture that differs from the “new” national security ideology. It posits an “American way”, produced by its cultural, political, and historical experience. Although he stresses that differences between the two sides of the discourse are superficial, pertaining solely to the means, rather than the ends of the national security state, Hogan sees the national security state as a finished and legitimate state: an American state suited to the Cold War context of permanent war, while stopping short of a garrison state: Although government would grow larger, taxes would go up, and budget deficits would become a matter of routine, none of these and other transformations would add up to the crushing regime symbolized in the metaphor of the garrison state. The outcome instead would be an American national security state that was shaped as much by the country’s democratic political culture as it was by the perceived military imperatives of the Cold War (Hogan, 1998: 22). I disagree with this essentialist view of the state identity of the United States. The United States does not need to be a national security state. If it was and is still constructed as such by many realist discourses, it is because these discourses serve some political purpose. Moreover, in keeping with my poststructuralist inclinations, I maintain that **identity need not be, and indeed never is, fixed**. In a scheme in which “to say is to do”, that is, from a perspective that accepts the performativity of language, culture becomes a relational site where identity politics happens rather than being a substantive phenomenon. In this sense, culture is not simply a social context framing foreign policy decision-making. Culture is “a signifying part of the conditions of possibility for social being, […] the way in which culturalist arguments themselves secure the identity of subjects in whose name they speak” (Campbell, 1998:221). The Cold War national security culture represented in realist discourses was constitutive of the American national security state. There was certainly a conflation of theory and policy in the Cold War military-intellectual complex, which “were observers of, and active participants in, defining the meaning of the Cold War. They contributed to portray the enemy that both reflected and fueled predominant ideological strains within the American body politic. As scholarly partners in the national security state, they were instrumental in defining and disseminating a Cold War culture” (Rubin, 2001: 15). This national security culture was “a complex space where various representations and representatives of the national security state compete to draw the boundaries and dominate the murkier margins of international relations” (Der Derian, 1992: 41). The same Cold War security culture has been maintained by political practice (on the part of realist analysts and political leaders) through realist discourses in the post-9/11 era and once again **reproduces the idea of a national security state.** This (implicit) state identification is neither accidental nor inconsequential. From a poststructuralist vantage point, the identification process of the state and the nation is always a negative process for it is achieved by exclusion, violence, and margina-lization. Thus, a deconstruction of practices that constitute and consolidate state identity is **necessary:** the writing of the state must be revealed through the analysis of the discourses that constitute it. The state and the discourses that (re)constitute it thus frame its very identity and impose a fictitious “**national unity” on society**; it is from this fictive and arbitrary creation of the modernist dichotomous discourses of inside/outside that the discourses (re)constructing the state emerge. It is in the creation of a Self and an Other in which the state uses it monopolistic power of legitimate violence – a power socially constructed, following Max Weber’s work on the ethic of responsibility – to construct a threatening Other differentiated from the “unified” Self, the national society (the nation).16 It is through this very practice of normative statecraft,17 which produces threatening Others, that the international sphere comes into being. David Campbell adds that it is by constantly articulating danger through foreign policy that the state’s very conditions of existence are generated18.

AT: Cede the political

#### We don’t cede the political – the alt opens up new, better space for political practices

Gunhild Hoogensen and Kirsti Stuvøy, Department of Political Science, University of Tromsø, Norway, June 2006, “Gender, Resistance and Human Security”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 37 No. 2, pg. 221-222 / KX

Human security can direct analytical attention to security as a life-world phenomenon in a societal context and, inspired by gender theory, provides an epistemological attitude for engaging practices of security in non-state domains, exploring contextually dependent securities and insecurities. The characterization of human security as people-centred and vested in the individual but realized intersubjectively in specific local contexts forms the core of our understanding of human security as an epistemic attitude to empirical security studies. It suggests that the way to understand and to establish knowledge about security in empirical terms is to enter people’s life-worlds and access local experiences of in/securities. Such an approach to studying world politics resonates in the work of Tétreault, who criticizes the limited imaginary that informs the narrow conceptualization of political space as structures (e.g. rules, beliefs, laws, acts, agencies) that constrain the domain of the political to the nation-state, thereby marginalizing other forms of political practice (see, for example, Tétreault, 2005: 180). Political practices are comprehended as institutionalized practices. To the contrary, Tétreault argues that political practice constitutes all actions initiated to challenge the management of politics. Political space is established as a common enterprise of humans: ‘Speech and action create politics, spaces of appearance in which people have the power to make the world. People matter!’ (Tétreault, 2005: 185). Analysis of world politics, therefore, concerns how social individuals enter political space and create support and legitimacy for their political projects (Tétreault, 2005: 181). In the context of security studies, this concern with creating political space directs attention to the actors, whose practices aim at creating secure spaces (Hoogensen, 2005a: 125). Security is not only about the recognition of threats but also about building capacities to create secure spaces. This focus on agency reflects upon the fundamental commitment of gender theory pertaining to the investigation of women’s lives ‘within states or international structures in order to change or reconstitute them’ (Tickner, 2005: 7). In terms of an epistemic attitude to empirical studies of human security, the analytical focus should therefore be on practices of capacity-building and enabling in specific life-world contexts.

#### Focusing on policy relevance obscures sources of suffering in search for political threats – it elevates realist ontology above individual security

Alex J. Bellamy and Matt McDonald, School of Political Science and International Studies, at the University of Queensland, September 2002, “The Utility of Human Security’: Which Humans? What Security? A Reply to Thomas & Tow” Security Dialogue Vol. 33 No. 3, pg. 374 / KX

Second, Thomas & Tow’s understanding of human security prioritizes ‘death by politics’ over ‘death by economics’.3 This shift comes when they argue that the hu-man security agenda needs to ‘provide tan-gible threat parameters’ (p. 181). In order to prevent human security from becoming ‘too amorphous and therefore question-able’, Thomas & Tow propose demarcating between general and specific threats, which they confess means emphasizing the threat from terrorism over and above the threat from malnutrition. Thus, they argue that humanitarian intervention and peacebuild-ing operations are the most effective practi-cal strategies for responding to human se-curity threats. By fortunate coincidence, such strategies ‘dovetail’ with the continua-tion of a statist conception of security. It appears that the sole criterion used by Tho-mas & Tow for singling out ‘specific’ over ‘general’ threats, and statist rather than non-statist solutions, is so-called ‘policy relevance’. This is deeply problematic, be-cause it allows realist ontology to ‘trump’ the security of individuals. If we were to follow Thomas & Tow, therefore, we would argue that the needs of human security dic-tated that terrorism, which kills fewer than 5,000 people per year – even in a year as unusually bloody as 2001 – should be given political priority (and hence more re-sources) over the ‘general’ threat of malnu-trition, which kills over 40,000 people every day. Thomas & Tow focus their analysis on areas of human security prioritized by the West in terms of ‘death by politics’ and the strategies for addressing those threats in terms of intervention. What they overlook, however, is that the threats they identify are not the most prescient ones globally, nor will the interventionist strategies they advocate deal with the global human inse-curity predicament. Although the West be-came more interventionist in the 1990s, the result has not been an easing of the human insecurity predicament. Rather, while there are certainly more elections around the world, there is also more inequality, more malnutrition, more refugees and more pre-ventable disease than there was before Western states became ‘good international citizens’. It is also worth bearing in mind that the Third World pays nine times more to the West in debt servicing than the West gives to the Third World in humanitarian assistance and development aid.

### AT: Security = Monolithic

#### Challenging the doctrine of security is the only way to break apart its monolithic hold on politics

Neocleous 8 (Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy; Head of Department of Politics & History Brunel Univ, Critique of Security, 6-7)

Marx once described Capital as ‘a critique of economic categories or, if you like, a critical expose of the system of bourgeois economy’. He was critique as a method for simultaneously unmasking ideas and rooting them within the context of class society and the commodity form. This book is an attempt at a critique of one of the key political categories of our time, as a simultaneous critical expose of the system of bourgeois politics. In that sense it is meant as an unmasking of the ideology and a defetishing of the system of security. One of the features of ideology is that it imposes an obviousness or naturalness on ideas without appearing to do so – a double victory in which the obviousness of the ideas in question is taken as a product of their ‘naturalness’, and vice versa: their obviousness is obvious because they are so natural. This is nowhere truer than with security, the necessity of which appears so obvious and natural, so right and true, that it close off all opposition; it has to remain unquestioned, unanalyzed and undialectically presupposed, rather like the order which it is expected to secure. And if opposition to security is closed off, then so too is opposition to the political and social forces which have placed it at the heart of the political agenda. I want to write against this ideology by writing about the ways in which security has been coined, shaped and deployed by political, commercial, and intellectual forces. The book is therefore written against the security-mongering – in the literal sense of the ‘monger’ as one who traffics in a petty or discreditable way – that dominates contemporary politics. I will perhaps be charged with not taking insecurity seriously enough. But to take security seriously means to take it critically, and not to cower in the face of it monopolistic character. This is to hold true to the idea of critique as a political genre that aims to reset the course of a world which continues to hold a gun to the heads of human beings.

### AT: Threats Real

#### Even if their impacts are true, injection of security politicizes engagement and dooms solvency.

Huysman 98 [JEF HUYSMANS is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Studies (POLIS) at the Open UniversitySecurity! What Do You Mean?: From Concept to Thick Signifier European Journal of International Relations 1998; 4; 226]

Approaching security as a thick signifier pushes the conceptual analysis further. It starts from the assumption that the category security implies a particular formulation of questions, a particular arrangement of material. But, instead of stopping at the conceptual framework by means of which the material can be organized into a recognizable security analysis, one searches for key dimensions of the wider order of meaning within which the framework itself is embedded. In a thick signifier analysis, one tries to understand how security language implies a specific metaphysics of life. The interpretation does not just explain how a security story requires the definition of threats, a referent object, etc. but also how it defines our relations to nature, to other human beings and to the self. In other words, interpreting security as a thick signifier brings us to an understanding of how the category 'security' articulates a particular way of organizing forms of life.

For example, Ole Wver has shown how security language organizes our relation to other people via the logic of war (Wver, 1995); James Der Derian has indicated how it operates in a Hobbesian framework by contrasting it with Marx's, Nietzsche's and Baudrillard's interpretation of security (Der Derian, 1993; also Williams, forthcoming); Michael Dillon has argued that our understanding of security is embedded in an instrumental, technical understanding of knowledge and a particular conception of politics by contrasting it with the concept of truth as aletheia and politics as tragedy in the Greek sense (Dillon, 1996); J. Ann Tickner has outlined the gendered nature of security by disclosing how security studies/policies privilege male security experiences while marginalizing the security feelings of women (Tickner, 1991: 32 5, 1992).

A thick signifier approach is also more than a deepening of the conceptual approach. While conceptual analyses of security in JR assume an external reality to which security refers an (in)security condition in a thick signifier approach 'security' becomes self referential. It does not refer to an external, objective reality but establishes a security situation by itself. It is the enunciation of the signifier which constitutes an (in)security condition. 5 Thus, the signifier has a performative rather than a descriptive force. Rather than describing or picturing a condition, it organizes social relations into security relations. For example, if a society moves from an economic approach of migration to a security approach, the relation between indigenous people and migrants and its regulation change (among others, instead of being a labour force, migrants become enemies of a society) (Huysmans, 1995, 1997). Since the signifier 'security' does not describe social relations but changes them into security relations, the question is no longer if the security story gives a true or false picture of social relations. The question becomes: How does a security story order social relations? What are the implications of politicizing an issue as a security problem? The question is one of the politics of the signifier rather than the true or false quality of its description (or explanation).

Security is not just a signifier performing an ordering function. It also has a 'content' in the sense that the ordering it performs in a particular context is a specific kind of ordering. It positions people in their relations to themselves, to nature and to other human beings within a particular discursive, symbolic order. This order is not what we generally understand under 'content of security' (e.g. a specific threat) but refers to the logic of security. This is not a configuration (such as the Cold War) or a form (such as the framework that a conceptual analysis explores) but an ensemble of rules that is immanent to a security practice and that defines the practice in its specificity (Foucault, 1969: 63). I will use the Foucaultian concept 'discursive formation' to refer to this ordering logic which the signifier articulates.' Different dimensions of this formation have been explored by Walker, Wver, Der Derian, Dillon, Dalby and others. In the next section I will try to contribute to this literature by interpreting security as a strategy constituting and mediating our relation to death.

The thick signifier approach also formulates a separate research agenda in security studies. In that sense it is more ambitious than a conceptual analysis or a definition. The latter serve an already existing agenda and concentrate on correctly defining and explaining security questions in International Relations. This agenda exists largely independently of the conceptual interest in the meaning of security. This is not the case in the thick signifier approach. It implies in itself a security studies agenda which interprets security practices by means of interpreting the meaning of security, that is, the signifying and, thus, ordering work of security practices. How does security order social relations? What does a security problematic imply? What does the signifier do to the discussion of the free movement of persons in the EU, for example? Rather than being a tool of clarification serving an agenda, the exploration of the meaning of security is the security studies agenda itself. The main purpose is to render problematic what is mostly left axiomatic, what is taken for granted, namely that security practices order social life in a particular way. This brings two important elements into security studies which are not present in the traditional agenda supported by definitions and Wolfers' and Baldwin's conceptual analyses. First, as already argued, it adds an extra layer to the exploration of the meaning of security. It introduces the idea that besides definitions and conceptual frameworks, the meaning of security also implies a particular way of organizing forms of life. It leads to interpretations of how security practices and our (IR) understandings of them are embedded in a cultural tradition of modernity (Walker, 1986). Second, interpreting security as a thick signifier also moves the research agenda away from its techno instrumental or managerial orientation. The main question is not to help the political administration in its job of identifying and explaining threats in the hope of improving the formulation of effective counter measures. Rather, the purpose of the thick signifier approach is to lay bare the political work of the signifier security, that is, what it does, how it determines social relations.

This introduces normative questions into the heart of the agenda. The way these questions are introduced differs from the normative dimension of security policies which Classical Realists sometimes discussed. For example, Arnold Wolfers' classic piece (1962: 147 65) on national security argues that security is a value among other social values, such as wealth. This implies that a security policy implicitly or explicitly defines the importance of security in comparison with other values (to put the question crudely how much do we spend on nuclear weapons that we cannot spend on health care?). The policy also has to decide the

level of security that is aspired to (for example, minimum or maximum security (see also Herz, 1962: 237 41)). But, this normative 'awareness' does not capture the basic normative quality of security utterances that the thick signifier approach introduces. If security practices constitute a security situation, a normative question is introduced which, in a sense, precedes the value oriented decisions Wolfers refers to. One has to decide not only how important security is but also if one wants to approach a problem in security terms or not. 7 To make the point in oversimplified terms (especially by bracketing the intersubjective character of the politics of the signifier) once security is enunciated, a choice has been made and the politics of the signifier is at work. The key question, then, is how to enunciate security and for what purpose.

#### Policies that claim to know the truth of a situation fall into the trap of misplaced certainty and take overly-bold steps against imaginary threats – think WMD’s in Iraq

Mitzen and Schweller, 11 (Jennifer Mitzen and Randall Schweller, Mitzen and Schweller are professors of Political Science at Ohio State University, “ Knowing the Unknown Unknowns: Misplaced Certainty and the Onset of War”, 3/15/2011, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2011.549023, RM)

It is not surprising that decision makers dealing with enormous complexity and uncertainty sometimes mistake spiral situations for deterrent ones and vice versa. What is puzzling is that we frequently observe these problems decisively resolved in the minds of leaders. Faced with actions of great consequence and uncertainty, leaders might be expected to be indecisive or to adopt a classic hedging strategy, making incremental judgments and letting experience accumulate with an open mind. In security dilemma and spiral model cases, however, things go terribly wrong because leaders form very strong opinions and take bold and decidedly non-incremental actions. Why does this seem to happen so often? IR scholarship pays more attention to uncertainty as a cause of war than it does to misplaced certainty. In this paper we have challenged this “uncertainty bias” in two ways. First, we show that misplaced certainty matters. We argued that certainty rather than uncertainty triggers security dilemmas and arms spirals. Indeed, we see it as a necessary condition for these logics to produce war in most cases. The centrality of misplaced certainty is apparent in the three key elements that define security dilemmas and spiral dynamics: (1) there cannot be any real underlying conflicts of interest that explain the conflict; (2) leaders, nevertheless, become convinced that the state confronts a real threat that requires mobilization and risks of war to counter the “certain” danger; and (3) their threat perceptions and assessments of the other's hostile intentions must be incorrect. Like paranoia, then, conflict spirals and their associated dynamics are driven by firmly held but delusional beliefs of persecution and harm, that is, by misplaced certainties of external danger. Second, we distinguished three different types of uncertainty and argued that the risk approach in IR cannot accommodate fundamental uncertainty, which makes it an unrealistic premise for at least some important situations in world politics. Our confidence model of certainty, which assumes fundamental uncertainty, thus better accounts for both the phenomenology and prevalence of misplaced certainty. This model is not intended to replace the risk approach—the “as if” assumptions of the risk model have been theoretically productive, and exposing its empirical boundaries does not diminish that usefulness. But because the boundaries of risk are such that some important decision environments of world politics slip through the cracks, it also leaves room for theories with more realistic assumptions to give insight; and so we offer the confidence model as a way of beginning that conversation.

### AT: Schmitt

#### Schmitt’s wrong – he neglects the strategic location of security

Thomas Moore , Department of Social and Political Studies, University of Westminster, 2007, “Epistemic Security Regimes”, pg. 24-30 / KX

Schmitt is more interested in the metaphorical or fictive landscape of the leviathan than in examining the epistemic foundations of a security regime through complex processes of authorization. Where Hobbes constructs a nuanced understanding of the way in which security is authorized within the state, Schmitt presumes that auctoritas and summa potestas do not require such authorization. In keeping the substantive questions of authorization off the political agenda (especially those dealing with contract) the state is able to enforce the security regime, Page 25 of 30 turning citizens into docile subjects: ‘If protection ceases, the state ceases, and every obligation to obey ceases’ (Schmitt, [1938] 1996: 50). Risk builds the Schmittian security regime. But whereas Schmitt thinks that Hobbes has solved the problem of political order (by instituting a legal order which guarantees security) we should keep in mind the way in which risk is contingently constructed. In this regard, we are well served by Ulrich Beck’s account of ‘world risk society’ in which the management of risk becomes the core mission of the state. Schmitt’s need to justify the existence of absolute command within the state, an apologia for both summa auctoritas and summa potestas, is not sufficiently critical to question the difference between security as a condition and security as a regime. World risk society thus becomes, as Beck details, ‘how to feign control over the uncontrollable’ (Beck, 2002: 41). Schmitt treats security as a condition, something to be attained rather than, as the word ‘regime’ suggests, a network of power relations which determines the conditions under which a system occurs or is maintained. In this respect, we should reject Schmitt’s naturalisation of Hobbesian political epistemology, because it neglects the strategic location of ‘security’ in justifying the state. A state which seeks to build friendship across and between other states (as distinct from the state which builds alliances) is met with condemnation by Schmitt. For Schmitt, ‘it would be a mistake to believe that a nation could eliminate the distinction of friend and enemy by declaring its friendship for the entire world or by voluntarily disarming itself’ (Schmitt, [1932] 1996: 52). The failure of the state to define the enemy concretely endangers the Hobbesian reason of state; namely, the mutual relation between protection and obedience. This leads Schmitt to claim that ‘protego ergo obligo is the cogito ergo sum of the state’ (Schmitt, [1932] 1996: 52). Page 26 of 30 Taking protego ego obligo as the reason of state involves the marginalisation of the contractual foundations of the security regime. Christopher Hill’s call for academic international relations to open itself up to the vox populi can only succeed if the contractual basis of the security regime is scrutinized (Hill, 1999: 122). Schmitt’s unidirectional understanding of security looks in admiration at the armature of the modern state – the army, the police, the legal system – but fails to appreciate the epistemic foundations of security. Foucault’s observation that political theory has ‘never ceased to be obsessed with the person of the sovereign’ provides an illuminating critique of Schmittian state theory (Foucault, 1980: 121). Schmitt cannot imagine security without the logic of the friend and enemy grouping. Forged through the binary of antagonism, his security regime pays little heed to the Arendtian concept of excellence – aretē and virtus – in the public sphere. Whilst Arendt’s account of excellence unduly reinforces the division of space into public and private there is utility in considering how Schmitt’s public political space (the state) narrows the opportunity for innovation, excellence, and creativity. Arendt intimates that the ‘public realm, as the common world, gathers us together and yet prevents us falling over each other, so to speak’ (Arendt, 1958: 52). Schmitt’s security regime, carried metaphorically through the leviathan, is less benign than the account of the public realm offered by Arendt. Were Schmitt to talk of the state in terms of ‘gather us together’ it would be to signal the need for democratic homogeneity across a political community. The technology of this political community is the state, supported by the leviathan which Schmitt describes as potentially ‘the most total of all totalities’ (Schmitt, [1938] 1996: 82). Page 27 of 30 Schmitt is troubled by the fact that the leviathan, the most total of all totalities, no longer commands the respect it enjoyed in the early modern period. This is because the modern state has become a site in which the expression of the political is characterised by heterogeneity rather than homogeneity. Multiple expressions of the political undermine the binding force of the leviathan. This means that the security regime is unable to function in terms of summa auctoritas and summa potestas. The leviathan is now a ‘museum curiosity’ which can ‘no longer make a sinister impression’ (Schmitt, [1938] 1996: 82). The decline of the leviathan image is due to the fact that in becoming the dominant technology of the state the ‘huge whale’ was eventually caught (Schmitt, [1938] 1996: 82). The capacity of the leviathan image to regulate conduct now comes to an end as democratic pluralism unleashes itself on the popular imagination. If democratic homogeneity aimed at the unitary expression of the political, defining the friend and enemy grouping without ambiguity, then democratic pluralism withdraws itself from the security regime. The leviathan lost signals the colonisation of the Hobbesian reason of state by ‘political’ liberalism. Measured against the Schmittian concept of the political the liberal reason of state is weak. Its right to be called ‘political’ reason is

Continued…

AT: Schmitt / friend-enemy good

Continued…

doubtful, owing to the fact that in expanding the points at which decisions are to be made it delegitimates the summa auctoritas and summa potestas of the leviathan. Schmitt admires the technology of power instituted through Hobbesian legal positivism. Yet Schmitt simplifies the Hobbesian theory of state, transposing the image of leviathan directly onto the contours of the modern state. The dilemmas of authorization, are left off the agenda. Page 28 of 30 The generic rendering of security in realist international relations presumes that there is only ‘one way to skin a cat’. Joseph S. Nye, for example, once commented that it is not ‘very helpful when some realists urge NATO expansion while others deplore it’ (Nye, 1998: 167). When traditions are so concerned with defending themselves against their critics that they neglect the different ways in which political claims are justified then extensive excavation of traditions is, in fact, required. Looking back to Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt should not be regarded as a form of ‘heritage’ international relations (Booth, 1995: 108). The increasing literature on Carl Schmitt demonstrates that international relations has not lost its capacity to generate dangerous, risky questions. Jeffrey C Isaacs famously remarked that ‘political theory fiddles while the fire of freedom spreads, and perhaps the world burns’ (Isaac, 1995: 649). According to Isaacs the professionalisation of academia has meant that theorists have ‘become ensnared in their various disciplinary matrices. Preoccupied with situating ourselves vis-à-vis the writing of Strauss and Arendt, Adorno and Lyotard, we have become puzzle solvers of the problems of others, focusing on approved topics, following academic conventions’ (Isaac, 1995: 642). Taking Carl Schmitt as a foundation for investigating the epistemic status of security regimes is not an inward looking act. Schmitt has never been an approved topic in international relations. Nor does Schmitt present the international system as a puzzle ready to be solved. Positioning Schmitt vis-à-vis Hobbes tests the limits of authorization within a security regime. If a security regime is treated exclusively in terms of danger—involving the perpetual working out of pre-agreed understandings of the form and content of danger, risk and security—then international relations itself Page 29 of 30 is destined to overlook the way in which security constitutes itself authoritatively through fiction.

### AT: Realism

#### The LITANY of Departures From Realism and Failure of “Systemic Punishment” Disproves Their Theory.

Ronald R. Krebs, Faculty Fellow - Government @ University of Texas at Austin, Donald D. Harrington, Prof. of Political Science Univ. of Minnesota, ‘6 [Rhetoric, Strategy, and War: Language, Power, and the Making of US Security Policy, http://www.polisci.umn.edu/~mirc/paper2006-07/fall2006/Krebs.pdf]

Structural realists, focusing on the imperatives to security- or power-maximization that states must obey if they are to survive in the anarchic international system, are simply uninterested in domestic debate of any sort. They have long argued that these systemic imperatives, derived from the distribution of material power and perhaps geography, constitute an objective “national interest” that must be the chief driver of foreign policy.23 When states, for whatever reason, behave in contrary ways, they will eventually suffer punishment for their foolishness.24 But are there really such objective systemic dictates? The very fact that American structural realists frequently rail against US foreign policy suggests that departures from realist expectations are **hardly exceptional**. The typical realist response is that in these cases actors with more parochial or moralistic perspectives have hijacked policy, but realists, with their inattention to domestic politics, are then hard pressed to explain when such views hold sway.25 Moreover, the fact that such “hijackings” are so common suggests either that the system does **not often punish states for disobeying its rules**, in which case the **structural logic collapses**, or that **there are no such rules in the first place**. Structural realism imagines foreign policy as an exceptional realm above the political fray. Yet, even when the house is on fire, foreign policy lies in the realm of choice, not compulsion, and **thus very much in the realm of the political.**

#### Realism creates a death drive.

Der Derian 98 [JAMES, ON SECURITY, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html]

In epistemic realism, the search for security through sovereignty is not a political choice but the necessary reaction to an anarchical condition: Order is man-made and good; chaos is natural and evil. Out of self-interest, men must pursue this good and constrain the evil of excessive will through an alienation of individual powers to a superior, indeed supreme, collective power. In short, the security of epistemic realism is ontological, theological and teleological: that is, metaphysical. We shall see, from Marx's and Nietzsche's critiques, the extent to which Hobbesian security and epistemic realism rely on social constructions posing as apodictic truths for their power effects. There is not and never was a "state of nature" or a purely "self-interested man"; there is, however, clearly an abiding fear of violent and premature death that compels men to seek the security found in solidarity.

#### Realism operates as a state control mechanism – we’re told we are violent and hence we become violent.

Bleiker 2K [Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Page 16, Google Books]

Human agency is not something that exists in an a priori manner and can be measured scientifically in reference to external realities. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as human agency, for its nature and its function are, at least in part, determined by how we think about human action and its potential to shape political and social practices. The mutually constituted and constantly shilling relationship between agents and discourses thus undermines the possibility of observing social dynamics in a value-free way. To embark on such an endeavour nevertheless is to superimpose a static image upon a series of events that can only be understood in their fluidity. It is to objectivise a very particular and necessarily subjective understanding of agency and its corresponding political practices. The dangers of such an approach have been debated extensively. Authors such as Richard Ashley, Jim George and Steve Smith have shown how positivist epistemologies have transformed one specific interpretation of world political realities, the dominant realist one, into reality per se." Realist perceptions of the international have'. gradually become accepted as common sense. to the point that any critique against them has to be evaluated in terms of an already existing and obiectivised world-view. There are powerful mechanisms of control precisely in this ability to determine meaning and rationality. 'Defining common sense', Smith thus argues, is 'the ultimate act of political power'." It separates the possible from the impossible and directs the theory and practice of international relations on a particular path.

AT: Realism

#### The alt solves their claims of IR inevitability – there is no objective way of viewing geopolitics. Actively questioning how we know what we know is necessary to understand all politics.

Grondin 4 [David, master of pol sci and PHD of political studies @ U of Ottowa “(Re)Writing the “National Security State”: How and Why Realists (Re)Built the(ir) Cold War,” http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/ieim/IMG/pdf/rewriting\_national\_security\_state.pdf]

Since realist analysts do not question their ontology and yet purport to provide a neutral and objective analysis ofa given world order based on military power and interactions between the most importantpolitical units, namely states, realist discourses constitute a political act in defense of the state. Indeed, “[…] it is important to recognize that to employ a textualizing approach to social policy involving conflict and war is not to attempt to reduce social phenomena to various concrete manifestations of language. Rather, it is an attempt to analyze the interpretations governing policy thinking. And it is important to recognize that policy thinking is not unsituated” (Shapiro, 1989a: 71). Policy thinking is practical thinking since it imposes an analytic order on the “real world”, a world that only exists in the analysts’own narratives. In this light, Barry Posen’s political role in legitimizing Americanhegemonic power and national security conduct seems obvious: U.S. command of the commons provides an impressive foundation for selective engagement. It is not adequate for a policy of primacy. […] Command of thecommons gives the United States a tremendous capability to harm others. Marryingthat capability to a conservative policy of selective engagement helps make U.S.military power appear less threatening and more tolerable. Command of thecommons creates additional collective goods for U.S. allies. These collective goodshelp connect U.S. military power to seemingly prosaic welfare concerns. U.S.military power underwrites world trade, travel, global telecommunications, andcommercial remote sensing, which all depend on peace and order in the commons”(Posen, 2003: 44 and 46).Adopting a more critical stance, David Campbell points out that “[d]anger is not anobjective condition. It (sic) is not a thing which exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat. […] Nothing is a risk in itself; [...] it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers the event” (Campbell, 1998: 1-2). In the same vein, national security discourse does not evaluate objective threats; rather, it is itself a product of historical processes and structures in the state and society that produces it.Whoever has the power to define security is then the one who has the authority to write legitimate security discourses and conduct the policies that legitimize them. The realistanalysts and state leaders who invoke national security and act in its name are the sameindividuals who hold the power to securitize threats by inserting them in a discoursethat frames national identity and freezes it.9Like many concepts, realism is essentially contested. In a critical reinterpretation of realism, James Der Derian offers a genealogy of realism that deconstructs the uniform realism represented in IR: he reveals many other versions of realism that are never mentioned in International Relations texts (Der Derian, 1995: 367). I am awarethat there are many realist discoursesin International Relations, but they all share a setof assumptions, such as “the state is a rational unitary actor”, “the state is the main actorin international relations”, “states pursue power defined as a national interest”, and soon. I want to show that **realism is one way of representing reality, not the reflection of reality**. While my aim here is not to rehearse Der Derian’s genealogy of realism, I dowant to spell out the problems with a positivist theory of realism and a correspondencephilosophy of language. Such a philosophy accepts nominalism, wherein language asneutral description corresponds to reality. This is precisely the problem of epistemic realism and of the realism characteristic of American realist theoretical discourses. Andsince for poststructuralists language constitutes reality, a reinterpretation of realism asconstructed in these discourses is called for.10These scholars cannot refer to the“essentially contested nature of realism” and then use “realism as the best language toreflect a self-same phenomenon” (Der Derian, 1995: 374). Let me be clear: I am notsuggesting that the many neorealist and neoclassical realist discourses in International Relations are not useful. Rather, I want to argue that these technicist and scientist forms of realism serve political purposes, used as they are in many think tanks and foreign policy bureaucracies to inform American political leaders. This is the relevance of deconstructing the uniform realism (as used in International Relations): it brings to light its locatedness in a hermeneutic circle in which it is unwittingly trapped (Der Derian, 1995: 371). And as Friedrich Kratochwil argues, “[…] the rejection of a correspondence theory of truth does not condemn us, as it is often maintained, to mere ‘relativism’ and/or to endless “deconstruction” in which anything goes but it leaves us with criteria that allows us to distinguish and evaluate competing theoretical creations” (Kratochwil, 2000: 52). Given that political language is not a neutral medium that gives expression to ideas formed independently of structures of signification that sustain political action and thought, American realist discourses belonging to the neorealist or neoclassical realisttraditions cannot be taken as mere descriptions of reality.We are trapped in theproduction of discourses in which national leaders and security speech acts emanatingfrom realist discourses develop and reinforce a notion of national identity as synony-mous with national security**.** U.S. national security conduct should thus be understoodthrough the prism of the theoretical discourses of American political leaders and realistscholars that co-constitute it. Realist discourses depict American political leaders actingin defense of national security, and political leaders act in the name of national security.In the end, what distinguishes realist discourses is that they depict the United States ashaving behaved like a national security state since World War II, while legitimating theidea that the United States should continue to do so. Political scientists and historians“are engaged in making (poesis), not merely recording or reporting” (Medhurst, 2000:17). Precisely in this sense, rhetoric is not the description of national security conduct; **it constitutes it.**

### AT: Realism Inev – Human Nature

#### Evolutionary theory is nothing without interpretation – cultural knowledge shapes responses by defining proper biology, only the alt can allow actual engagement with non-violent knowledge

Busser 6 [Mark, Master’s Candidate Department of Political Science, York University, The Evolution of Security: Revisiting the Human Nature Debate in International Relations, York Centre for International and Security Studies Working Paper Number 40, August, http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/documents/WP40-Busser.pdf]

Unfortunately for Bradley Thayer, **evolutionary arguments do not provide** a simple and **incontestable** ontological and epistemological **foundations for** revitalized **realism**. Since arguments like Thayer’s draw on controversial scientific branches of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, which arguably assume the basic features of human nature they seek to prove, the conclusions for political theory remain almost as scientifically arbitrary as Morgenthau’s assumption of an animus dominandi. In framing the problematic of their exploration, many of these arguments assume an individualistic and egoistic human nature and question how political relations might arise out of the mechanical dynamics of self-interest. As Mary Clark’s work demonstrates, this ignores important factors in the evolutionary development of the human being. Since interpersonal, cultural, political ,and social influences have had a large role in shaping the evolution of humans and our primate relatives, it is not such a simple task to explain human nature based on rational actor models and mathematical calculations. In contrast to the sociobiology and evolutionary psychology’s depiction of human nature as biologically determined, Clark argues that it is a society’s construction of a ‘story’ of human nature that affects how people will imagine ways to live together, fulfilling basic human needs or not. **Biology is not destiny**, she seems to argue, **but what we believe about our biology threatens to become our destiny** if we allow it. This highlights the possibility that seemingly universal traits like competition, aggression and egoism might be contingent on the weight we lend them and not biologically determined. If we have a choice in the matter, **it is possible to begin conceiving of political possibilities for global social orders that do not depend on a combative** and competitive **engagement with Others.** In turn, this allows a reconsideration of the conceptual lens through which to view security. If it is not programmed into our genes to be intolerant, ethnocentric, and aggressive, then we can find ways to abandon the traditions that have normalized such behaviours. Following Jim George and David Campbell, perhaps a new conception of international relationships would serve better than the current paradigm, which is based on traditional views of an aggressive and competitive human nature. It may be that, as Clark suggests, conflict can only be mitigated when basic human needs are met. Doing so, it seems, would require a rethinking of how differences are engaged with, interpreted and reconciled in both international and local societies. If we humans are not biologically destined to draw lines between ourselves and others, then it is possible for us to escape conceptions of security that necessitate aggression against, or protection from, outsiders. Perhaps the security long sought after in international relations will come not from making societies secure from difference, but making difference secure within and between states.

### AT: Realism Inev - Guzzini

#### Guzzini’s Analysis is a Reason to *Refuse the International System as natural* - Realist explanations are Politically Mandated.

Pinar Bilgin, Prof. of IR @ Bilkent, Berivan Elis, PhD Candidate in IR @ Ankara, ‘8 [Hard Power, Soft Power: Toward a More Realistic Power Analysis, http://www.bilkent.edu.tr/~pbilgin/Bilgin-Elis-IT-2008.pdf]

While the realist conception of power has come to shape mainstream accounts of world politics, critical scholars have pointed with vigor to the increasingly unrealistic analysis it delivers. Underscoring the limits of realist power analysis, Caporaso’s study of ‘structural power’56 points to the difference between dependence as a corollary of interstate relations and dependency as a structural feature of the existing world order; i.e. less developed countries find themselves in a ‘limited’ choice situation due to the structure of the capitalist international economy. Strange’s focus on international political economy highlights the role of global markets as an arena where power is exercised by actors other than the state in that ‘structural power decides outcomes (both positive and negative) much more than relational power does’.57 Guzzini, in turn, points to the ‘impersonal part of the power phenomena’, which he calls ‘governance’. Although both power and governance are needed for a comprehensive power analysis, he argued, the concept of power should remain attached to agents/actors so that an actor’s responsibilities and possible actions for emancipatory change would become more visible.58

With the aim of rendering power analysis more realistic, we should open up to **new research agendas** as required by the **multiple faces of power**. Power is **far too complex** in its sources, effects and production to be reduced to one dimension.59 Indeed, power is diffused and enmeshed in the social world in which people live in such a way that there are no relations exempt from power.60 Since power shapes the formation of actors’ consciousness, **no interest formation can be objective**;61 defining what an actor’s ‘real interests’ are is not free of power relations. That is to say, not only the mobilization of bias and agenda-setting but also the production and effects of all norms and values that shape human consciousness should be critically scrutinized. This, in turn, calls for not three- but four-dimensional power analysis – “Lukes plus Foucault” – as dubbed by Guzzini.62 Contra Lukes, whose three-dimensional power analysis rests on assumptions regarding (1) the possibility of uncovering power relations, and (2) B’s objective (‘real’) interests that A denies through various expressions of hard and soft power, Foucault maintains that ‘power and knowledge directly imply one another… [in that] there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations’.63 The academic field of International Relations constitutes a supreme example of the workings of the ‘fourth face of power’. Over the years, students of IR have studied international relations as an effect of power. It is only recently that they have begun to study power as an effect of international relations (as world politics) 64 and International Relations (as an academic field).65 However, as Booth reminds us, such silences, as with IR’s narrow conception of power, “are not natural, they are political. **Things do not just happen in politics, they are made to happen,** whether it is globalization or inequality. **Grammar serves power”.**66 One of the sites where the productive effects of grammar in the service of power is most visible is the ‘Third World’. This has been one of the central themes of postcolonial studies where “[f]rom Fanon to Jan Mahomed to Bhabha, the connecting theme is that Western representations construct meaning and ‘reality’ in the Third World. Concepts such as “progress”, “civilized” and “modern” powerfully shape the non-European world”.67 The ways in which grammar serves power becomes detectable through more realistic power analysis.

### AT: Aff -> Public Participation

#### They conflate participation with public consumption – the public are just appreciative bystanders to exploration

Jordan '3 -- Assistant Professor of Communication at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (John W., 2003, "Kennedy's Romantic Moon and Its Rhetorical Legacy for Space Exploration," Rhetoris & Public Affairs, 6(2), p. 209-231, MUSE, RG)

Several scholars have offered reasons for the decline of both the public's interest in space exploration and presidential abilities to rekindle such interest. 63 This analysis of the Rice University address suggests an additional explanation that focuses on an element of strength in Kennedy's rhetoric that later became a problem for those who sought to emulate it: the role of the public in space initiatives. **Following Kennedy, the role of the people in space exploration was transformed from active participants to appreciative bystanders**. This transformation can be viewed as a particular instance of what G. Thomas Goodnight has discussed as **the disappearance of public knowledge**. 64 As space rhetoric made its "pragmatic" turn, space programs were proposed and discussed more in terms of technological innovations—building a reusable space shuttle, creating more efficient satellites—than inspirational missions. As the public observed the technological accomplishments of NASA, their own role in the nation's space program was left to wilt. To be sure, the public benefited from space innovations, but these benefits were presented in a way that invited public consumption more than participation. The public no longer was asked for their sacrifice and commitment, which were key elements in Kennedy's call for support. The technological complexity of the Apollo program made Kennedy's attention to the public sphere an important rhetorical element that subsequent space advocates seemed unable to incorporate into their own messages, either because of oversight or circumstance. If Kennedy's rhetoric said to the public, "We need your help, we must all lend our support," then post-Kennedy space rhetoric went in a different direction, saying, "**Don't worry, it's being handled by experts**." The Rice University address demonstrated how and why romantic frontier rhetoric must provide a role for the public even in highly complex technological endeavors, thereby moving the space program into the public realm of knowledge and enabling everyday people to feel a part of the project. In other words, Kennedy's romantic space rhetoric worked because it allowed the people to be romanced by it.