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\*\*\*LINKS

# L: China

**The US-China relationship is an example in which security discourse has been incorporated into geopolitics.**

**Tuathail, 94**- Associate Professore, Department of Geography, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Gerard, 1994, “Problematizing Geopolitics: Survey, Statesmanship, and Strategy,” pg. 264, JSTOR)

Secondly, the imperative to contain fluctuating emotions' (euphoria, panic, etc.) leads Kissinger to describe geopolitics as foreign policy without sentimentalism. Geopolitics is a philosophy of foreign policy founded on the realities of power and not on the vagaries of personality or ideological guilt (which is invariably 'liberal guilt' in Kissinger; e.g. 1979, 192). To act geopolitically is to act in terms of 'hardheaded' power politics calculations and not in terms of idealistic global visions or personal whims. 'Our objective was to purge our foreign policy of all sentimentality' (1979, 191). The Chinese leadership, for example, learnt that 'our approach to foreign policy was unsentimental and geopolitical' (1979, 786). In describing Nixon's trip to China, Kissinger rationalizes Mao's 'preference for dealing with Richard Nixon over the wayward representatives of American liberalism' by quoting Bismarck: 'A sentimental policy knows no reciprocity' (1979, 1089). Thirdly, geopolitics is a foreign policy analytic by which local events and regional conflicts can be understood in all their global significance. To think geopolitically is to think of a global framework of power within which, Kissinger maintained, regional struggles take on a significance that extends far beyond the immediate geographical location. In explaining his approach as 'strategic and geopolitical', Kissinger (1979, 31) describes it thus: I attempted to relate events to each other, to create incentives or pressures in one part of the world to influence events in another. This was formalized by Kissinger into the doctrine of linkage, a doctrine whereby events in one part of the globe were linked to events in other parts in superpower negotiations (1979, 129). Gear6id O Tuathail Kissinger's rendering of geopolitics as a philoso-phy for the conduct of statecraft does not break from the panopticonism of geopolitics as survey. Kissinger writes frequently about Nixon and other leaders producing a tour d'horizon of global affairs (e.g. 1979, 93, 384). Kissinger brought to the analysis of international politics the same objectivist pretensions he employed to analyze the Congress of Vienna in his academic work. Once in power Kissinger was able to pass off his own philosophical interpretations of, for example, Soviet foreign policy or the significance of the Vietnam war, as objective descriptions of the state of global politics. These descriptions would then be reproduced and circulated by the US new media with whom Kissinger had a carefully developed relationship (Isaacson 1992, 573-586). Declarative statements of fact and imperative statements of policy are not separable in Kissinger's rhetoric but mutually legitimating. Through his skilled use of the Western media, Kissinger was able to exercise a profound influence over the writing of global politics in late Cold War culture. In order to problematize this writing of global political space, we need to reflect critically on how Kissinger has represented and experienced global diplomacy. First, a recurrent metaphor in White House years (1979) is that of the journey. Part one of the book is labelled 'Beginnings' and part two '1969: the start of the journey'. Detailed descriptions of various journeys undertaken by Kissinger and Nixon are presented throughout the book but, more significantly, the substantive conduct of foreign policy is understood as a type of journeying. History is movement and travel through space and time: 'History knows no resting places and no plateaus' (1979, 55). The establishment of a relationship with China, for example, begins with 'small steps' (Chapter VI: First steps towards China). Describing the US-China relationship at the end of Nixon's first year, Kissinger remarks (1979, 194): We still had a long way to go. But we were at last in the foothills of a mountain range that it would take us another eighteen months to traverse.

# L: Competitiveness

**The idea of competition between two entities is a social construct and a link**
**Rodney Bruce Hall, Sep 2006**

[member of the Editorial Board of the journal \*Oxford Development Studies\* and \*International Studies Quarterly\*, the flagship journal of the International Studies Association. He has taught previously at Brown University and the University of Iowa ,Journal of International Relations and Development. of International Relations and Development. Ljubljana: 2006. Vol. 9, Iss. 3; pg. 269]
Market behaviour and intersubjectivity Ambiguous or even empty as the concept of interest might have become in economics, Weber's sociology of legitimacy by no means exogenized interests from his ontology of social action, which 'can be driven by habit (tradition) and by emotions, as well as interests: most often ... it is driven by all three' (Swedberg 1998: 23). Neither does constructivism exogenize interests. Constructivists in IR theory seek to explore and explain interests rather than merely imputing them by definitional fiat. But interests in Weber's thought, as in constructivist thought, must be contextualized. Many constructivists agree with rationalists that actors have material interests, and these material interests have causal significance for their social action. But action is social only 'insofar as its subjective meaning *takes account of the behavior of others* and is thereby oriented in its course' (Swedberg 1998: 23, original emphasis). Taking account of the behaviour of others means that we do not blindly act upon our materially defined interests to maximize our materially defined utility. A sociological as opposed to economic theory 'analyzes economic action that is also oriented in its meaning to the behavior of others' ( *ibid* .). But we generally take account of how others will respond, even when we are engaged in *strategic* action. And we meaningfully orient our action towards others even when we are conducting *routine* economic transactions. And we generally rely upon culturally-specific norms and intersubjectively shared social meanings for the successful completion of those transactions. For example, when we make an offer to purchase an item at a specified price we would do well to first consider whether there are any local norms of co-ordination involved in the sort of market transaction in which we wish to engage. In the West, if we enter a department store to purchase an umbrella, we will select an umbrella from the available choices and offer payment of the price marked in exchange for the umbrella. We do not accost the salesperson and offer a price less than the price marked because it is intersubjectively understood on both sides of the transaction that the price marked is the price that reflects the profit margin at which the store is willing to execute the transaction. We can pay the price marked and acquire our umbrella, or we can depart and try to find the umbrella at a lower price involving the 'opportunity cost' of our time and the risk of getting wet outdoor in the interim, or we can wait in the hope the store will lower the price at a later date, at a higher risk of getting wet outdoor while we are waiting. However, it is intersubjectively understood between us and the sales staff that if we want to carry that umbrella away today we will pay the price marked. The sales staff are not authorized to set prices, and it is a norm of market behaviour in Western society that it is not legitimate to haggle over clearly marked, generally competitive prices of relatively inexpensive items in a department store. However, if we enter an automobile dealership, in North America for example, to purchase a vehicle, we will certainly haggle over the price. We expect to reduce the sticker price of the vehicle through the social convention of negotiation. The negotiation then constitutes a game of co-ordination to assist the parties to the transaction to bring it to a successful conclusion. This can involve a number of elaborate rituals, but at a minimum it requires norms of co-operation, in addition to strategies of negotiation, to complete the transaction on terms acceptable to both buyer and seller. As buyers, we might bring with us a quote for a similar vehicle from another dealership that is lower than the price listed at this one, or a consumer publication purporting to specify the dealer's true cost, to signal that we know very well the profit he hopes to glean by asking for the listed price. He will then show us a computer listing purporting to show a very different, and invariably higher, 'true dealer's cost' of the vehicle, and will offer an elaborate explanation of why the consumer publication is incorrect. The negotiations over the transaction will then move to a new stage, for a skilled buyer, who will at some point leave or threaten to leave the showroom and to terminate the negotiation. The seller will then most often draw the buyer back, and promise to go 'speak to his manager' about what might be done for the buyer in spite of the 'losses' the seller will suffer by selling the vehicle at a lower price. Upon cooling his heels in his office, and perhaps ringing his wife on the phone to inquire as to what he should bring home for supper, the salesman will then return with a slightly lower price from his 'manager' as his 'best and final offer' and so forth. A variety of strategies were deployed in this somewhat elaborate game of co-ordination, but also a number of norms of co-operation. At each stage each player, if he has been socialized into the game, generally knows the next move of his negotiating partner. However, the game deteriorates and the transaction falls apart if each player does not co-operate in letting the other player make his perfectly obvious next move. There is something almost comforting in watching him make it. This ritual is the game of co-ordination. The game is constituted by intersubjectively shared meanings of specific moves, and norms of co-operation, by which we buy a car in the West (or by which one buys nearly anything in parts of the East or Middle East). Classical economics and rationalist theory derived from it assumes we instead play the Prisoner's Dilemma, however, and that game only works when it is completely dominated by a payoff structure and completely devoid of norms of co-operation where self-interest alone rules (Hirschman 1982: 1470). However, norms of co-operation pre-existed the 'market society' in which classical economics would place us. And, contrary to the strictures of classical economics, they still exist, and we still rely upon them even to complete market transactions. Thus the neoclassical notion of how self-interest functions in human nature must be altered to account for the manner in which we actually do take into account the interests of others and rely upon intersubjectively shared understandings to successfully engage in economic activity. It should not surprise us that theories of international politics based upon the faulty, first-image understandings of self-interest in neoclassical economics similarly fail to generate an analytic cut into the social nature of 'transactions' and other social processes.

# L: Disease

**Human physical security is associated with national security, creating security discourse within disease.**

**Peterson, 2-** professor at College of William and Mary(Susan, winter 2002, “Epidemic disease and national security,” pg. 49, [http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/smpp/content~db=all~content=a749208694](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/smpp/content~db%3Dall~content%3Da749208694) )

Different terms—“human security” and “national security”—reflect disparate definitions and referents of security, as well as conflicting assessments of the significance of and appropriate response to IDs. Scholars and practitioners within the first tradition view catastrophic IDs as security problems by definition, since they threaten the lives of large numbers of people, while national security analysts and scholars gauge the degree of threat these diseases pose to the territorial integrity and political independence of the state. Members of the two schools talk past each other at nearly every turn, stymieing any serious engagement over whether and how IDs threaten security. Much of the recent surge in concern about IDs comes out of a desire to protect human security. This approach emphasizes the welfare of individuals or people collectively. As Roland Paris notes, “Human security is the latest in a long line of neologisms—including common security, global security, cooperative security, and comprehensive security—that encourage policymakers and scholars to think about international security as something more than the military defense of state interests and territory.”19 Most students of human security date the concept from 1994, when the United Nations Development Programme issued its annual *Human Development Report*, calling for …another profound transition in thinking—from nuclear security to human security. The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to people…. Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. For many of them, security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards.20 Theoretically, the human security approach harkens back at least as far as Barry Buzan’s distinction between individual and national security and his view of the state as a threat to individual security.21 Rothschild traces the understanding of security as an individual good to the late Enlightenment period.22 From these arguments, flow many contemporary analyses of so-called nontraditional security threats like epidemic disease. Public health advocates and students of IDs often champion increased mobilization against diseases that threaten security in the broad sense of human well-being. Indeed, these arguments often invoke the concept of “health security.”23 Implicitly or explicitly, health security advocates view IDs as threats to human security because of the enormous loss of life they cause.24 As Gore argued in his January 2000 UN speech, “the heart of the security agenda is protecting lives—and we now know that the number of people who will die of AIDS in the first decade of the 21st century will rival the number that died in all the wars in all the decades of the 20th century.”25 Linking disease and security is a means of highlighting a dire problem, capturing scarce resources, and accelerating national, international, and transnational responses.26 Peter Piot, executive director of UNAIDS, explains public health advocates’ tendency to invoke the security term this way: “Whether we conceptualize AIDS as a health issue only or as a development and human security issue is not just an academic exercise. It defines how we respond to the epidemic, how much is allocated to combating it, and what sectors of government are involved in the response.”27 In short, “sometimes national security says it all.”28 Sometimes, however, national security may say too much. The literature on environmental security suggests that arguments for linking security and disease have at least three flaws. First, they invite the question of whether *any* serious health, environmental, economic, or other problem automatically constitutes a security threat. They provide no guidance on how to make trade-offs among different security values, such as health and military defense, or between health security and other presumably nonsecurity values, such as conservation, environmental preservation, or economic development.29 Second, that the study of IDs has remained on the fringes of the international relations field despite countless calls for the two areas to be joined suggests that the security community remains cool to the idea of human security.30 From their positions on the margins, advocates of human security are unlikely to influence debates about national security. Unless a link is drawn between epidemic disease and national security, not human security, security elites will pay little attention. Third, it is not clear what is gained by linking epidemic disease and human security, rather than relying on public health, development, or humanitarian arguments.

# L: Disease

**Disease falsely threatens human existence by disrupting the balance of powers and creating security paradigms within the state.**

**Peterson, 2-** professor at College of William and Mary(Susan, winter 2002, “Epidemic disease and national security,” pg. 62, [http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/smpp/content~db=all~content=a749208694](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/smpp/content~db%3Dall~content%3Da749208694) )

Catastrophic ID may contribute to the outbreak of military conflict within or between states, although it is relatively unlikely to be a war-starter on its own. In theory, there are at least three paths by which IDs may provoke war—by influencing the relative balance of power among adversaries, generating disputes between nations over appropriate health and human rights policies, and engendering domestic instability. In practice, the last of these presents the most significant threat, but only to some states. For the United States, ID induced conflict poses only an indirect and long run security threat. The first hypothesized relationship between disease and war holds that catastrophic ID may alter the balance of power among competitors. Realist scholars of international politics maintain that shifts in the relative capabilities of states can precipitate war, particularly when national leaders perceive that the balance is shifting against them.45 Some students of environmental security similarly suggest that severe environmental threats can disturb the international balance of power and increase the risk of military conflict, including preventive war.46 A preventive war may be particularly likely during or following an ID outbreak if one nation remains relatively immune to the disease. One can imagine, for example, that the diminished size of native North American populations might have led Europeans to anticipate an easy victory in their attempt to conquer and settle the continent. The earliest European “discoverers” introduced epidemic diseases that killed as many as 95 percent of North American Indians between 1492 and the late 1600s, when European settlers arrived in significant numbers.47 There is little evidence, however, that these ID-induced power shifts played a role in the timing or outbreak of this or any other historical war of conquest. European conquerors did not know when they set out for the Americas that they carried deadly diseases that would prove more lethal than their swords. This incentive for war is less likely to emerge in the contemporary international system because of several differences between this and earlier periods. The major epidemics of our time strike entire regions, like sub-Saharan Africa, or strike simultaneously on different continents with little respect for national political boundaries. Partly, this is because high-speed travel and trade have exposed national populations to numerous epidemic diseases and conveyed immunity on diverse populations. Additionally, technological changes mean that the contemporary balance of power depends on numerous factors other than the size of a state’s military or general population, factors like weapons of mass destruction, advanced aircraft, and missile technology. Unlike other diseases, moreover, AIDS kills all its victims rather than conferring immunity on survivors. Nearly all individuals, therefore, are equally vulnerable to the disease if they are exposed to it via the dominant routes of transmission—sexual activity, blood or blood product exchange, transmission from mother to child during pregnancy, or intravenous (IV) drug use that involves sharing contaminated needles. These reasons would suggest that ID outbreak is relatively unlikely to prompt a preventive war. Unlike individuals, however, nations are not equally vulnerable. Differences in resources, state strength, the organization of society, and the relationship between state and society influence the way states respond to epidemics.48 Weak, resource-poor states are particularly susceptible to AIDS and other IDs, which may undermine political and economic stability and social cohesion. Below, I discuss the likelihood that this process will produce civil conflict. It is unlikely, however, given the reasons already discussed, that it will produce a preventive war between states. *Foreign policy conflict*. In theory, ID outbreaks may prompt disputes among states over appropriate policy responses in a number of areas, including freedom of movement for people and goods. Nineteenth-century leaders employed quarantine as their primary instrument of ID control. In the first decade of the AIDS epidemic, despite a half century of human rights advances, some people again viewed quarantine as a reasonable reaction to a frightening new scourge. Cuba instituted mandatory testing and compulsory isolation of its HIV-positive population in sanatoriums, and in 1987 the West German minister of the interior ordered border police to turn back any foreigner suspected of carrying HIV.49 The United States, which continues to deny entry to HIV-positive immigrants and visitors, bowed to international pressure in the 1990s and allowed waivers for short-term trips to visit family, receive medical treatment, conduct business, or attend scientific or health conferences. Another foreign policy dispute revolves around the issue of intellectual property rights. Major pharmaceutical companies and the U.S. government advocate protection of patents on AIDS drugs and oppose the production in other countries of inexpensive, generic versions of these medications.50 Nevertheless, states are unlikely to come into conflict with other states over such health-related foreign policy disputes for at least two reasons. First, and somewhat paradoxically, disease theoretically may reduce the likelihood of such conflicts arising. As disease increases, a society may devote a greater proportion of national budgets and human resources to disease control. Some states already weakened by disease may not want to bear the additional costs of lost trade and military conflict and so may respond to epidemics by turning inward to deal with this and related domestic issues.51 Second, disease actually may facilitate international cooperation. In the nineteenth century, for instance, disparate national quarantines produced international collaboration, not military conflict. States recognized the trade benefits of standardizing quarantine policies and met regularly to hammer out regulations on disease prevention and control. The current dispute over AIDS therapies suggests a similar lesson: Pharmaceutical corporations negotiate with foreign governments and companies to make their medications available at significantly lower prices in developing than in developed countries, while preserving their patents. David Gordon argues that, in the long run, the ID threat will “further energize the international community and most countries to devote more attention and resources to improved ID surveillance, response, and control capacity.

# L: Disease

**Epidemic disease threatens domestic stability, forcing the state to use security discourse in order to approach disease.**

**Peterson, 2-** professor at College of William and Mary(Susan, winter 2002, “Epidemic disease and national security,” pg. 66, [http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/smpp/content~db=all~content=a749208694](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/smpp/content~db%3Dall~content%3Da749208694) )

Indeed, none of the mechanisms illustrated in figure 1 immediately or directly threatens U.S. security. Large numbers of Americans die each year from IDs. In fact, the number of deaths from IDs in the United States doubled between 1980 and 1999.93 These numbers, however, pale in comparison to those in subSaharan Africa and other regions, and they do not threaten the state in the way they do in other countries. As Price-Smith points out, “the United States has less to fear from the direct threat of infectious disease (or other environmentally induced health threats) to its population than do developing countries with much lower endogenous capacity.”94 This does not mean, of course, that the United States can afford to bury its head in the sand. Epidemic disease may exacerbate domestic conflict in key states where vital U.S. interests are at stake. In Russia, for instance, HIV rates have risen dramatically in the past two years and are poised to explode. The 1999 infection rate in Moscow was three times that of all previous years combined.95 In fact, AIDS is spreading more quickly in Russia than in any other country in the world. According to a 2002 National Intelligence Council (NIC) estimate, between one and two million Russians (or 1.3–2.5 percent of the adult population) is currently infected, and that number is expected to increase to 5–8 million (or 6–11 percent) by 2010.96 Much of this increase is fueled by IV drug use, commercial sex, and, especially, the prison system, in which inmates may be held for up to two years before being charged and in which more than a million convicts are periodically released through amnesty programs. As Nicholas Eberstadt notes, “Russia’s prison system, in other words, functions like a carburetor for HIV— pumping a highly concentrated variant of the infection back through the general population.”97 In June 2001, Russia’s first deputy minister of health, Gennadi Onishchenko, called AIDS “a direct threat to the nation’s security.”98 This may be true for several reasons. First, AIDS will exacerbate Russia’s projected population decrease. In less than 25 years, it is estimated, Russia’s population will decline by 12–13 million, even if the nation faces only a mild HIV/AIDS epidemic. In the face of the more severe epidemic now feared, that decline will reach 25 million, with a concurrent drop of 11 million in Russia’s working-age population.99 By 2050, it is estimated, the population of the “superpower” may plummet by as much as one-third to 95–100 million people.100 The director of the Federal Research Center for AIDS Prevention in Moscow, Vadim Pokrovskii, sums up the problem this way: “In Africa, there are high birth rates, but in Russia the birth rate is low. If we have a rate of only three percent infected, population would fall by six percent…. In Russia, AIDS is scarier than in Africa. There the population is replaced. In Russia it will not be.”101 Second, and closely related, AIDS is likely to cause severe economic problems. A recent World Bank study predicts that HIV/AIDS will reduce annual economic growth in Russia by one percent by 2020.102 While Russia’s GNP per person of working age could be expected to increase by 50 percent by 2025 without HIV/AIDS, the disease will significantly reduce worker output and decimate the working-age population. The result, Ebertadt projects, is that under even the mildest epidemic-scenario now predicted, Russia’s future GNP will remain stagnant through 2025.103 Finally, these demographic and economic problems, combined with the disease’s effect on military readiness, may undermine political stability in Russia. The chairman of the Defense Ministry’s Medical Commission reports that 37 percent of all draft-age men in Russia cannot serve because of serious health problems. Fifty-five percent of those drafted can perform only limited duties because of poor health. In 2001, over 2,000 servicemen were dismissed from the Russian Army for being HIV-positive.104 In the not too distant future, in short, AIDS could further erode Russia’s ability to staff a conventional army and potentially lead Moscow to rely more on a deteriorating nuclear force to maintain its great power status.

# L: Environment

**The state uses the environment as a source of securitizing their relations with other states.**

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Two key dynamics now mark international environmental policy. First, while it is widely recognized that U.S. engagement and cooperation is not just important, but historically seen as essential for progress, other nations today seem willing to move ahead with or without the United States. Germany, for example, announced a national greenhouse gas emissions reduction target of 40 percent by 2020 and threatened to boycott the U.S. “major emitters” initiative launched outside the Kyoto framework. That the United States could have gotten itself crosswise with so many other nations on so many issues is unprecedented. As Jonathan Lash, President of the World Resources Institute, recently observed, the extraordinary degree of anger and confrontation on environmental matters “reflects increasing alarm on climate change and the level of frustration with the U.S.”2 At the same time, many U.S. governors and mayors have launched state and local initiatives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger in California has gone so far as to open talks with the European Union on how to link his state-level initiatives with Europe’s emerging carbon market. Second, the Bush Administration’s reflexive unilateralism on international concerns—whether environmental, economic, or security—represents a break with the prevailing presumption since World War II favoring cooperation and multilateralism through NATO, OECD, and other regional bodies, if not the UN. The “go-it-alone” approach is especially difficult to justify on issues that are inescapably global in scope, such as climate change. Even if the United States were able to eliminate its greenhouse gas emissions entirely, climate change would not be stopped. The build-up of atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide driven by rising emissions in China, India, Indonesia, and other developing countries would continue, leaving the United States exposed to the threat of global warming, increased intensity of windstorms, altered rainfall patterns, melting ice caps, and rising sea levels. These dynamics beg two questions: Can progress on any of the difficult global environmental issues be achieved without the participation and leadership of the United States? Conversely, can the United States shoulder the burden of addressing such concerns without the cooperation of the rest of the global community? In this article, we address these core questions. We argue that the next President of the United States must re-engage with other nations. Success in protecting the planet from climate change cannot be achieved by the United States acting on its own. International cooperation is essential. Similar collaborative efforts at the global scale will be required to protect the planet’s biological diversity, restore the vibrancy of the world’s fisheries, prevent the spread of persistent organic pollutants, conserve forests, and other issues that are inescapably trans-boundary in nature. We contend, moreover, that not only is U.S. participation critical, but U.S. leadership is crucial and necessary to achieve successful environmental outcomes. The U.S. environmental footprint is larger than any other country’s. The United States consumes a disproportionate share of the world’s energy and natural resources. With less than 5 percent of the world population, the United States uses 25 percent of the world’s fossil fuel resources—accounting for nearly 25 percent of the world’s annual coal burning, 26 percent of the world’s oil, and 27 percent of the world’s natural gas.3 It also accounts for 18.5 percent of the consumption of global forestry products and 13.7 percent of the world’s water usage. The United States is in a unique position. Given its economic and strategic power as well as its financial and technological prowess, U.S. leadership could influence international environmental policy and promote effective environmental governance. Conversely, the record of the past fifteen years has demonstrated that “when the United States declines to exercise leadership, the impact is significant.”4 Little progress is made without the United States. Reasserting global environmental leadership, however, will not be easy for the next U.S. president. There are considerable domestic challenges as the U.S. public remains deeply ambivalent about international entanglements and international organizations—even those related to protecting the planet.

# L: Environment

**The security discourse of the state is used as an excuse to prevent the threats of ecological trends.**

**Soroos, 94-** Department of Political Science and Public Administration, North Carolina State University (Marvin S., August 1994, “Global Change, Environmental Security, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma,” pg. 318)

For several decades the conventional use of the term 'security' in the realms of foreign policy and international studies has been to refer to the defense of sovereign states against violent attack, either from other states or from terrorist or revolutionary groups within their borders.4 More recently, a deepening sense of urgency about the threats that ecological trends posed to human welfare has prompted a coterie of scholars, activists, political figures to refer to 'environmental security'.5 The term environmental security has also entered the United Nations lexicon as pro-posals have been made for an Environmental Security Council, most notably by the former Soviet Union (see Shevardnadze, 1988; Schrijver, 1989). 'Environmental Security and Sustainable Development' is one of six general topics on the research agenda of the Human Dimensions of Global Environmen-tal Change Programme, sponsored by the International Social Science Council (Jacob-son & Price, 1990; Jacobson, 1992), as well as the subject of a program of the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo. An Inter-national Consortium for the Study of En-vironmental Security was established in 1990 to encourage research on the topic.6 En-vironmental security has also been the sub-ject of numerous academic conferences and projects (e.g. Pietras & Pietras, 1991). The case for adopting the term security in referring to environmental threats is usually based on one or more of the following four types of arguments: (1) conceptual, (2) theoretical, (3) political, and (4) normative. The conceptual argument suggests that en-vironmental imperatives are reason for a rethinking of the essence of security. In a generic sense, security implies freedom or protection from serious threats to human well-being. Thus, conceptual consistency dictates that whatever poses such a threat, be it in military, economic, resource, food, or environmental realms, becomes a security problem.7 Conventional notions of security focusing on military threats are viewed as an artifact of a world dominated by the East- West confrontation and the specter of nuclear armageddon, and thus too limited in view of contemporary realities, including global environmental changes (Ullman, 1983). Theoretical arguments focus on empirical cause-and-effect relationships, in particular the potential of major environmental changes to generate and intensify conflict between and within states (Gleick, 1989; Rowlands, 1991). For example, reductions in river flows due to greenhouse warming may cause tensions among the states or other groups that depend upon the increasingly scarce water resources (Myers, 1989). Large movements of 'environmental refugees' flee-ing drought conditions or rising sea levels may threaten the welfare of the societies upon whose territory they are encroaching (Homer-Dixon, 1991; Homer-Dixon et al., 1993). Nations or societies whose environ-ment is degraded by serious environmentaldisruptions, such as acid deposition from the long-range transport of air pollution, may become increasingly hostile to those con-sidered primarily responsible for these prob-lems (Lipschutz & Holdren, 1990). Adding an environmental dimension to security also draws attention to the impacts that war and other military activities have on the ecological health of the planet. Even during times of peace, armed forces are a major drain on natural resources, such as petroleum, and a substantial source of pollu-tion, including radioactive contamination (Westing 1988a, b). Actual warfare reeks a heavy toll on the environment, but the conse-quences of modern instruments of war can be particularly devastating and long-lasting. The ultimate war-caused environmental catastrophe would be 'nuclear winter' caused by the detonation of large numbers of nuclear weapons (Sagan & Turco, 1990). While the environmental damage associated with war is usually an inadvertent side effect, combatants have been known to alter the environment to achieve a military advan-tage, as in the defoliation and cloud-seeding operations of the United States in Indochina (Westing 1976). Environmental blackmail, the threat to cause environmental havoc, was attempted unsuccessfully by Iran to deter an allied response to its seizure of Kuwait (Joyner & Kirkhope, 1992). The political rationale seeks to advance environmental causes by taking advantage of the potency of the term security 'to legitimize exceptional measures of collective action', to borrow a phrase from Barry Buzan (1992, p. 1).8 Referring to environmental change as a security threat may bestow the problemati-que with a greater sense of urgency that elev-ates it to the realm of 'high politics' and a place near the top of national and inter-national agendas along with military pri-orities, which have heretofore had a virtual monopoly on the use of the concept (Dalby, 1992; Gleick, 1991, p. 18). To be fully secure implies anticipating 'worst-case' eventuali-ties, regardless of how likely they may be, a logic that has justified enormous military expenditures by the Cold War blocs. Simi-larly, worst-case analysis could be used to anticipate serious ecological threats that may not become manifest until it is too late to take action to prevent or lessen them (Romm, 1993, pp. 18-19). The normative case presumes the primacy of environmental values and the threat that modern civilization poses to them. The fail-ure to preserve life-supporting ecosystems undermines the realization of all other human values. Furthermore, the pursuit of other types of security, in particular military and economic security, has all too often been conducted in a single-minded manner with little regard paid to environmental conse-quences. Military operations in numerous countries have been routinely exempted from environmental assessments and rules that apply to most other sectors of society. Adding an environmental dimension to security thinking places societal values in a more appropriate hierarchy (Mische, 1989).

# L: Environment

**The forces of nature and its unpredictability are an excuse for the state to intervene using security discourse.**

**Soroos, 94-** Department of Political Science and Public Administration, North Carolina State University (Marvin S., August 1994, “Global Change, Environmental Security, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma,” pg. 317)

Through the ages, human beings have held nature in awe. Not only have they depended on nature for the necessities of life, but some of the primary sources of insecurity in their lives have been the seemingly random 'forces of nature', such as storms, earthquakes, typhoons, tidal waves, volcanic eruptions, infectious diseases, droughts, floods, insect hoards, and intense cold (Buzan, 1992, p. 14). In modern times a rapidly growing and industrializing human population has been seriously degrading the natural systems of the planet, thus bringing upon itself a new realm of environmental insecurities. In the 1990s the overriding ecological concern is a problematique of human-caused global environmental changes, or what is known more succinctly as 'global change'.' The essence of the global change problematique is that human beings, by virtue of their numbers and the magnitude of their activities, are causing biogeochemical changes in the Earth system that are taking place many times more rapidly than those that are occur-ring naturally (Price, 1989). Growing concentrations of several trace gases in the atmosphere are especially foreboding for the threat they pose to the stratospheric ozone layer that shields the planet's surface from harmful ultraviolet radiation and for the modifications they appear to be causing in the world's climates, which would have a myriad of other environmental and social consequences.2 In an earlier article in this journal, this author called attention to some implications of environmental degradation for peace research, including the conflicts that arise not only within but also between generations (Soroos, 1976). At the time, few within the peace research community took up the call to expand the agenda of peace research to include 'intergenerational peace'.3 With the passage of time, however, it has been widely acknowledged that demographic and environmental trends are a pertinent concern of peace research (Pirages, 1991). The environment has become a part of the agenda of peace research in several ways. First, peace research is concerned with en-vironmental or resource problems that may cause or exacerbate international or domestic tensions that may lead to war or armed conflict (Westing, 1986). Second, peace research seeks to prevent or minimize damage that military operations reek on the environment either as a result of the conduct of war or preparations for war (Westing 1988a, b), and now in the dismantling of armaments and conversion of arms indus-tries to other uses (see Gleditsch, 1992). Third, peace research is sensitive to the need to reconcile ecological imperatives with the economic needs of developing countries and to address injustices that arise from the ways poorer societies are affected by environmen-tal degradation caused by the consumptive habits of the highly industrialized nations (Lodgaard, 1992, pp. 123-4). Finally, peace research examines how environmental exi-gencies, by virtue of the way they transcend national political boundaries, may be alter-ing the war-prone, state-centric international political order that has prevailed for cen-turies (Byers, 1991; Brock, 1991).

# L: Geography

**Geopolitics is viewed through a security paradigm by the state.**

**Tuathail, 94-** Associate Professore, Department of Geography, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Gerard, 1994, “Critical Geopolitics and Development Theory: Intensifying the Dialogue,” pg. 228)

David Slater's article 'The geopolitical imagination and the enframing of development theory' brings together two concerns that are conventionally kept apart: geopolitics and development theory. The fact that the two are not considered together is the mark of a well-established social scientific division of labour which assumes that the domain of the (geo)political is discrete and separable from the supposedly economic and the technical domain of development. While discourses of development are never simply shorn of all politics, as Slater demonstrates in his review of the various codifications of development orthodoxy, the 'politics' of development for organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is a politics circumscribed and disciplined by an unquestioned adherence to Western notions of modernity, progress and development. In other words, 'politics', for Western development organizations, is a management problem of the transition to modernity, a sticky stage that requires 'nation-building' interventions so societies can graduate to the status of mature, adult Western democracies. Slater's article challenges this circumscription of the political by exposing the meta-politics that enframes orthodox developmental notions of the political. Part of this meta-politics is what Slater terms the 'geopolitical imagination'. His argument is a very general one (Slater 1993, 419): all the major conceptualizations of development in the postwar period contain and express a geopolitical imagination which has had a conditioning effect on the enframing of the meanings and relations of development. The purpose of my comments are not to disagree with this contention but to push Slater's arguments beyond their own limits and so, hopefully, provoke new questions and issues anticipated but not articulated by his paper. I wish to intensify the dialogue between critical geopolitics and critical develop-ment theory begun by Slater in two ways: first, by radicalizing our conventional understandings of geopolitics and, secondly, by provocatively pursuing the psychoanalytic reading that Slater's general claims invite but do not explicitly speak. The potential limitations of Slater's categories are briefly evaluated in conclusion.

**Identities of regions create a separation of states, forcing security discourse to be used when describing relations between each region.**

**Tuathail, 94-** Associate Professore, Department of Geography, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Gerard, 1994, “Critical Geopolitics and Development Theory: Intensifying the Dialogue,” pg. 229)

It can be argued that Slater remains caught in the very identities he seeks to undo and does not sufficiently emphasize the precariousness of North/ South, West/non-West identities (his implicit understanding of geopolitics as the rape - 'violation' - of the Third World/Other would seem to confirm this). In reading the work of Paul Virilio as concerned only with nuclear strategy and military technology, Slater misses his and other arguments about the lost dimensionality of space in the postmodern era (Virilio 1991). The implosion of the Second World of Communism, the globalization of previously discrete national economies and the informationalization of the mode of production has produced a spatiality of flows and movement not fixity and presence (Luke 1993; Thrift 1993). Population movements and migrations (Said 1993, 326-36) and the intensified informational flows of the eighties have led to the Third Worldization of certain regions in the devel-oped world. The Brazilianization of incomes and the South Africanization of cities in the developed world make a mockery of development spatiality, the notion that the Third World is 'out there' beyond 'our' borders. Global economic changes are blurring traditional notions of geographical identity and scale; the global and the local become the glocal. Luke (1994) has suggested that a new world order requires a new word order. Moving from place to flow, terrainst o streams,l and-scapes to cyberspaces, introduces nonperspectival, antihierarchical,an d disorganizational fragments to traditional spatial/industrial/nationalnot ions of sover-eignty. (Luke 1994) What is occurring is more radical than 'the differen-tial imbrication of spheres'; it is their complete dissolution of dimensionality and rearrangement of scale as we know it. We live in a condition of geopolitical vertigo. A critical geopolitics is one that refuses the spatial topography of First World and Third World, North and South, state and state; its emphasis is on the precariousness of these per-spectival identities and the increasing rarefaction of geopolitical identities. To frames it juxtaposes flows, to imaginations it juxtaposes vertigos. It withdraws organizing perspectival frames (Doel forthcoming) and undermines the subject that is supposed to know (Grosz 1990). In dialogue with critical development theory, it can intensify the deconstruction of official narrations of develop-ment, a necessary political project that David Slater's work has done so much to advance.

# L: geography

**The identity of map and territory creates principles of security within geopolitics theory.**

**Tuathail, 94**- Associate Professore, Department of Geography, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Gerard, 1994, “Problematizing Geopolitics: Survey, Statesmanship, and Strategy,” pg. 260, JSTOR)

Though the historical circumstances surrounding the production of surveys has changed in the twentieth century, the Western will to survey the territorities of the globe has remained. This will is institutionalized in a multiplicity of different sites in political and civil society, sites which enable the sighting (recognition and rendering visible), siting (the delimiting of global political space; e.g. the 'Middle East', 'Eastern Europe', etc.) and citing of a world (judging and textualizing of places by means of literatures of Orientalism, developmentalism, Sovietology, etc.) (Luke 1993; O Tuathail 1994). It finds expression, for example, in the cybernetic 'watching machines' of late modem states (spy satellites, electronic surveillance regimes, photo-graphic intelligence, etc.) and in Western mass media organizations whose dispersed networks of reported, electronic systems of access and global televisual eyes function as the surveying infrastruc-ture of informational empire (Virilio 1989; De Landa 1991). Built upon enormous electronic and cyber-netic streams of data, the panoptic surveying eyes of spy satellites and the global media (from print to the instantaneous global television of CNN) prom-ise the possibility of a world order more transparent than ever before (Vattimo 1992). New cyberetic surveying technologies hold out the possibility of an ever more exact reproduction of reality, of an increasingly total identity of map and territory. Indeed, as has been widely noted, the forms of reality generated by the technologies associated with the new mode of information make the very notion of the referent problematic (Poster 1990). In typically hyperbolical terms, Baudrillard (1983, 2) has suggested that traditional principles of represen-tational survey are giving way to principles of simulation, of representation without reference to an originary 'real'. Territory, he proclaims, no longer precedes the map, nor survives it. Hence-forth, it is the map which precedes the territory ... it is the map that engenders the territory. Caught in this disappearance of the referent are the institutional sites which produce geopolitical surveys of the territoriality of global politics, seeing sites such as universities, strategic institutes and area study centres. During the Cold War, these institutions produced many surveys under the name geopolitics. To produce a geopolitics ('the 261 geopolitics of X' where X=oil, energy, resources, information, the Middle East, Central America, Europe, etc.) signified an ability to create a compre-hensive strategic survey of global political space, to read the manifest features of that which was held to be 'external reality', and to speculate upon the meaning of the supposedly transparent features of global politics. Following Foucault, we can read this type of geopolitical knowledge production as a form of panopticonism, an institutionalized strategic gaze that examines, normalizes and judges states from a central observation point (Foucault 1979; Luke 1993; O Tuathail, forthcoming). The strategic gaze, like that described by Foucault, seeks to render the dynamics of states increasingly visible. It com-prises a form of surveillance that is both global and individualizing (or, better yet, in-state-ing), a surveillance that simultaneously sites (i.e. places in a schema of global political space) and cites (i.e. summonses before a court of knowledge and judge-ment) states. Its central point of observation and judgement is represented as detached and objective but its very functioning is dependent upon the naturalization of hegemonic ways of seeing, siting and citing.

**Geopolitics is state-crafted- therefore the security paradigm is apparent within its language.**

**Tuathail, 94**- Associate Professore, Department of Geography, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Gerard, 1994, “Problematizing Geopolitics: Survey, Statesmanship, and Strategy,” pg. 263. JSTOR)

Geopolitics is also the gathering point for a particular understanding of the practical conduct of state-craft. This conceptual understanding of geopolitics as the savoir faire of statesmanship is almost exclusively the legacy of Henry Kissinger, the German bor Harvard Professor who became US National Security Advisor and then Secretary of State under Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. Through his many newspaper columns, regular television interviews and extensive connections throughout the US foreign policy community, Kissinger continues to shape the meaning and practice of geopolitics (Isaacson 1992). In the first volume of his memoirs White House years (which address the first Nixon term), Kissinger (1979) makes his involvements in international diplomacy intelligible by constant recourse to the concept 'geopolitics' (which he never explicitly defines) and the qualifier 'geopolitical' (it qualifies 'interests', 'ambitions', 'points of view', 'realities', 'consequences' and 'challenges' amongst others) (Kissinger 1979; Hepple 1986). Kissinger's key expression, for Henrikson (1981, 398), is 'geopolitical insight', an idiom that reveals his reliance on the rhetorics of vision and visuality to describe 263 geopolitics (Kissinger 1979, 1204). Geopolitics is penetrative perception, the ability to breach with one's sight, to see inside, to strip away 'illusions' and 'surface appearances'. Henrikson (1981, 398) reads 'geopolitical insight' as indicating that political reality for Kissinger must not only be 'viewed objectively' but also 'subjectively penetrated': Statesmanship requires above all a sense of nuance and proportion, the ability to perceive the essential among a mass of apparent facts, and an intuition as to which of many equally plausible hypotheses about the future is likely to prove true. (Kissinger1 979, 31) The coding of statecraft as states-man-ship is not insignificant; geopolitical insight was a type of seeing coded in masculinist terms by Kissinger. Yet, ironically, his evocation of 'intuition' (traditionally coded as feminine) subverts his masculinist coding of in-sight. Kissinger's sense of geopolitics must be under-stood within the context of his reading of nineteenth-century continental European Realpolitik, particularly the foreign policy philosophies of Prince Metternich of Austria and Otto Von Bismarck of Prussia (Kissinger 1957). Three aspects of this reading are noteworthy: the understanding of (i) equilibrium, (ii) sentimentalism and (iii) the connectivity of events. First, geopolitics is a perspective which is premised on the so-called 'historical lesson' that there can be no peace without a balance of power amongst the great powers. A geopolitical foreign policy, therefore, is one that seeks to maintain equilibrium in global politics and thus maintain peace. In recalling his initial meeting with Nixon, Kissinger (1979, 12) notes how he stated that the overriding goal of US diplomacy should be to free our foreign policy from its violent historical fluctuations between euphoria and panic, from the illusion that decisions depended largely on the idiosyncrasies of decisionmakers. Policy had to be related to some basic principles of national interest that transcended any particular Administration and would therefore be maintained as Presidents changed.

# L: Hegemony

**The pursuit of empire has risen in the 21st century through the security paradigm used by the state.**

**Michalowski, 5-** professor of International Relations at Northern Arizona University (Raymond, September 2005, “State Crime and Human Rights in the Transition to a New Imperial Age: Criminological Problematics from the Iraq War,” presented at the European Group for the Study of eviance and Control)

For most of the 20th century, the idea of *empire* was largely absent from both political rhetoric and social inquiry.[[1]](#footnote-2) With the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires at the end of World War I, the open pursuit of empire lost political legitimacy, and was replaced with a new discourse of free-trade and national self-determination as enshrined first in the Charter of the League of Nations, and later the United Nations charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Donnelly, 2003). At the beginning of the 21st century, however, empire once again occupies a central place within narratives of global relations. Where imperialism, as John Bellamy Foster (2002:1) notes, had once been “outside the acceptable range of political discourse within ruling circles of the capitalist world,” we now find U.S. political elites and intellectuals “warmly embracing an openly ‘imperialist’ or ‘neo-imperialist’ mission for the United States.” Similarly, Anatol Lieven (2003: 25) writes that: “Only a few years ago, to use this word [empire] to describe the United States would have branded you automatically as a member of the left. Today, it is being taken up by writers across the spectrum, and with unbridled pride by right-wingers.” Max Boot (2003), editor of the *Wall Street Journal,* for instance, opined that “a dose of U.S. imperialism may be the best response to terrorism,” while the *New York Times Magazine* foregrounded a article by Michael Ignatieff (2003) with a front cover proclaiming “American Empire: Get Used to It. Many associate the return of empire as both ideology and a topic of sociological inquiry to the militaristic response by the United States to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, particularly the promulgation of a new “national security strategy” based on a policy of global dominance through preventive war and the 21st century realities of invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. This, however, is an ahistorical understanding of American empire. As many scholars from Williams (1955) to Kramer and Michalowski (2005) have noted, the U.S. desire for empire dates back to the 18th century, and the fact of U.S. empire was well established, at least in the Western hemisphere and Pacific rim by the middle of the 19th century.

# L: North korea

**1.The US securitization paradigm creates a militaristic mindset towards North Korea.**

**Smith, 2k-** Royal Institute of International Affairs (Hazel, July, 2000, “Bad, Mad, Sad or Rational Actor? Why the ‘Securitization’ Paradigm Makes for Poor Policy Analysis of North Korea,” p. 593-617)

The securitization paradigm differs from a straightforward security-based analysis because of the former's overweening single-factor analysis and because of its heavy normative commitments. Although it accepts the classical security assumptions that military power and military instruments are ultimately the only significant factors of analysis in respect to Korea, it goes further than this by sublimating all other issues, including DPRK economic, cultural and humanitarian policies, within a military-based analysis. In addition, its inherent normative assumption is that the domestic and foreign politics of north Korea provide the root cause of all tensions on the Korean peninsula. The securitization paradigm permeates the literature on north Korea to a greater or lesser degree. It is most visible in the US think-tank community, where analysis coming from the American Enterprise Institute, the United States Institute for Peace and the Institute for International Economics is most overtly shaped by the paradigm. Two articles emanating from these institutes have shaped the policy debates in the United States and have also articulated the 'common-sense' view held by the US and international media.7 This 'commonsensical' view shapes all analysis of north Korea to the extent that scholarship representing a different position, however well supported by research, is sidelined or deemed questionable simply because it does not fit well with the sociological consensus of the research community.8 These assumptions are so pervasive that they also creep into analysis which does overtly share the world-view of the securitization prism, with the tendency to accept, unless proved otherwise, the securitization view of north Korea.

**2. Representations of North Korea in the 1AC are produced by flawed security logic- don't believe the hype**

**Smith, 2k-** Royal Institute of International Affairs (Hazel, July, 2000, “Bad, Mad, Sad or Rational Actor? Why the ‘Securitization’ Paradigm Makes for Poor Policy Analysis of North Korea,” p. 593-617)

North Korea is, within the 'bad' perspective, a 'garrison state' and 'the most militarized society on earth', with its population ever ready, willing and able to wage total war against its peace-loving neighbours.'7 This is because it spends 30 per cent of its budget on defence and up to 30 per cent of its population of 22 mi]]ion are either in the armed forces or in local militias. 8 This picture, however, leaves out what might be relevant data for any policy-maker interested in assessing, say, the comparative military strengths of south and north Korea. If, for instance, we refer to the International Institute of Strategic Studies' annual surveys of the military strength of the world's states, we find that the DPRK spent an estimated $2.4 billion on its armed forces in I998, compared to a south Korean military expenditure of $IO.2 billion. IISS data for I998/9 informs us that the north has 300,000 more personnel in active service that the south and the same number of reserves. This means, of course, that north Korea's army, with its very low level of per capita spending compared to south Korea's armed forces, is liable to be operationally weak in terms of hardware and software support. Its comparative advantage lies in its 3oo,ooo extra personnel in uniform; but this again is somewhat qualified by the much larger south Korean population which would be called on in time of war-44 million to 22 million in the north. Economically, north Korea's estimated GNP in I997 (the most recent date for which figures were available) was just $8 billion, compared to $443 billion for south Korea.'9 These figures hardly suggest that north Korea is an overwhelming military threat to the south. Indeed, south Korean President Kim Dae-Jung argues that south Korean-US combined forces are enough to prevent any offensive action from north Korea.20 The stated threat derives not only from the relative funding of northern and southern armed forces, but from the efficiency and sheer volume of north Korean forces. Here the securitization paradigm both underestimates and over- estimates north Korean military capacity. It does grasp the readiness for war of the DPRK's population. All the social organizations (women's, children's, business units) train their members on an annual basis so as to be prepared should war break out. The million or so adults who form the core of the 'permanent' army, however, remain in the armed forces for a maximum of five to eight years before they go on to be part-time members of the militias.2' This is to ensure that most adults receive some training in the event of war. The north Korean military structure therefore functions as a giant 'Home Guard' where the entire population (not just 30 per cent of it) could be mobilized if necessary. Neither the militias nor the armed forces are separate from the 'economic' structure, in that much of their time is spent in construction of 'civilian' infrastructure and fulfilling national requirements such as harvesting food. The 30 per cent of GDP cited for military expenditure must therefore include this more straight- forwardly 'economic' activity. That the military also takes part in non-military activity is recognized in some of the securitization literature, although there is little evidence of such information feeding back into the discussion of the global sums attributed to military expenditure.22

# L: terrorism

**Terrorist discourse is used to justify militarism and state-based violence**

**Der Derian and Shapiro, 89** Professor of Political Science at Brown University, Professor of Political Science at University of Hawaii at Manoa (James, Michael, “International/Intertextual Relations”, pg. 189, JPW)

The language of antiterrorism is by now a well-established and rehearsed refrain, one frequently heard in the voices that make up American political culture. This should worry us since, to a certain extent, the penetration of that discourse into our ordinary language is a measure of the increasing militarization of our common life. The greater the ease with which we invoke the terrorist-as-enemy in our shock over the violence surrounding us, the more this refrain stands as witness to the internalization that readies us for counterviolence. The more comfortable the language of antiterrorism is to us, the more familiar the terrorist figure who haunts us, the more entrenched that seizure of our political imagination becomes.

This assault on our thinking about international violence is not without purpose. We have come to understand that the language of antiterrorism is a critical part of that overall strategic discourse, or “grammar of governance,” that frames our thinking about international order in ways that frequently legitimate exploitive power. Far from being a prophylactic against the infection of world disorder, the language of antiterrorism is itself contaminated, embedded as it is in global operations of political surveillance, containment, and social control—the very operations, in fact, that “terrorist” acts are often designed to disrupt.

# North Korea-Turns Case

**The generalization of the DPRK as being hostile will lead to nuclear war.**

**Smith, 2k-** Royal Institute of International Affairs (Hazel, July, 2000, “Bad, Mad, Sad or Rational Actor? Why the ‘Securitization’ Paradigm Makes for Poor Policy Analysis of North Korea,” p. 593-617)

The hard version of this thesis argues that the north Korean state is unredeem- able. Writing on nuclear issues in the context of reunification, for instance, but from within a framework which is meant to apply as a generalization about the nature of the DPRK, Nicholas Eberstadt writes that 'The North Korean regime is the North Korean nuclear problem, and unless its intentions change, which is unlikely, that problem will continue as long as the regime is in place.'28 'Western governments' should 'unflinchingly' assess whether they can change the north Korean state.29 The inference is clear. Only eradication of the regime will do. The methods are not made explicit, but given north Korea's unwillingness to be bulldozed into a quick unification, the hastening of reunification as advocated by Eberstadt implies coercion which, in the circumstances of the Korean peninsula, would very likely mean war. If such a policy were to be implemented the result would be that south Koreans and US citizens (though not US policy analysts, of course) would have to 'unflinchingly' step forward to be called to fight and die (again) in Korea.30

**viewing North Korea through the aff’s lens sparks North Korean belligerence.**

**Smith, 2k-** Royal Institute of International Affairs (Hazel, July, 2000, “Bad, Mad, Sad or Rational Actor? Why the ‘Securitization’ Paradigm Makes for Poor Policy Analysis of North Korea,” p. 593-617)

The 'bad' thesis assumes that the DPRK pursues alien objectives which are normative anathema to the rest of the 'civilized' international system. The assumption that the north Korean state and its leadership are fundamentally outside the pale of the global community underpins the terminology sometimes used to describe north Korea as a 'rogue state'. From this perspective, the DPRK is motivated by malevolence and belligerence and its leadership's foreign and domestic policies can be ascribed to evil intent. Internationally, north Korea is ready to make war upon its neighbours, perhaps even to attack the United States itself and, in pursuit of these offensive aims, is constantly engaged in a furtive arms buildup. This perspective underlies much of the US foreign policy community and is exemplified in an unsourced November I998 United States Institute for Peace publication.9 The document's style conveys an extreme picture. Hostility is 'unremitting', diplomats 'demand', actions are 'all too clear' and north Korea is likened to the ultimate of US bogeymen, Saddam Hussein. The paper is premised on claims that the north Koreans were developing a clandestine nuclear site, claims which subsequent US inspections have found to be without foundation. The north Korean state is also presented as immoral, as resources are 'diverted' to the military instead of to a population which is suffering from severe food shortages; but the fact that the humanitarian community has found no evidence of a direct diversion of food to the military is not acknowledged. There is no argument, of course, that the DPRK maintains a military capacity;" but whether it sees this capacity as defensive and whether or not it sees its missile exports as a source of hard currency in order to be able to purchase necessary inputs into its economy (as most arms-producing Western states like Britain do) is probably a matter for interpretation.'2 Russian analysts working with US colleagues have pointed out that while DPRK arms production and development are undesirable because they increase tensions due to possible 'disproportionate countermeasures by the United States and Japan', nevertheless international law permits the DPRK to develop missiles for defence purposes and to use space for peaceful purposes.'3 This is quite unlike the case of Saddam Hussein's Iraq which, as a defeated power in war, is subject to UN resolutions prohibiting and controlling arms development. And finally, the impressive conviction of the authors' beliefs brooks no acknowledgement of the existence of alternative interpretations of DPRK policy.

\*\*\*HUMAN NATURE

# 2NC Human Nature- General

**Their assumptions about human nature literally cause extinction- most recent scientific evidence disproves them**

Jeremy **Rifkin** MA Tufts, Senior Lecturer @ Wharton 1-11-**10** http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeremy-rifkin/the-empathic-civilization\_b\_416589.html

The problem runs deeper than the issue of finding new ways to regulate the market or imposing legally binding global green house gas emission reduction targets. The real crisis lies in the set of assumptions about human nature that governs the behavior of world leaders--assumptions that were spawned during the Enlightenment more than 200 years ago at the dawn of the modern market economy and the emergence of the nation state era. The Enlightenment thinkers--John Locke, Adam Smith, Marquis de Condorcet et. al.--took umbrage with the Medieval Christian world view that saw human nature as fallen and depraved and that looked to salvation in the next world through God's grace. They preferred to cast their lot with the idea that human beings' essential nature is rational, detached, autonomous, acquisitive and utilitarian and argued that individual salvation lies in unlimited material progress here on Earth. The Enlightenment notions about human nature were reflected in the newly minted nation-state whose raison d'être was to protect private property relations and stimulate market forces as well as act as a surrogate of the collective self-interest of the citizenry in the international arena. Like individuals, nation-states were considered to be autonomous agents embroiled in a relentless battle with other sovereign nations in the pursuit of material gains. It was these very assumptions that provided the philosophical underpinnings for a geopolitical frame of reference that accompanied the first and second industrial revolutions in the 19th and 20th centuries. These beliefs about human nature came to the fore in the aftermath of the global economic meltdown and in the boisterous and acrimonious confrontations in the meeting rooms in Copenhagen, **with potentially disastrous consequences for the future of humanity and the planet.** If human nature is as the Enlightenment philosophers claimed, then we are likely doomed. It is impossible to imagine how we might create a sustainable global economy and restore the biosphere to health if each and every one of us is, at the core of our biology, an autonomous agent and a self-centered and materialistic being. Recent discoveries in brain science and child development, however, are forcing us to rethink these long-held shibboleths about human nature. Biologists and cognitive neuroscientists are discovering mirror-neurons--the so-called empathy neurons--that allow human beings and other species to feel and experience another's situation as if it were one's own. We are, it appears, the most social of animals and seek intimate participation and companionship with our fellows. Social scientists, in turn, are beginning to reexamine human history from an empathic lens and, in the process, discovering previously hidden strands of the human narrative which suggests that human evolution is measured not only by the expansion of power over nature, but also by the intensification and extension of empathy to more diverse others across broader temporal and spatial domains. The growing scientific evidence that we are a fundamentally empathic species has profound and far-reaching consequences for society, and may well determine our fate as a species. What is required now is nothing less than a leap to global empathic consciousness and in less than a generation if we are to resurrect the global economy and revitalize the biosphere. The question becomes this: what is the mechanism that allows empathic sensitivity to mature and consciousness to expand through history? The pivotal turning points in human consciousness occur when new energy regimes converge with new communications revolutions, creating new economic eras. The new communications revolutions become the command and control mechanisms for structuring, organizing and managing more complex civilizations that the new energy regimes make possible. For example, in the early modern age, print communication became the means to organize and manage the technologies, organizations, and infrastructure of the coal, steam, and rail revolution. It would have been impossible to administer the first industrial revolution using script and codex. Communication revolutions not only manage new, more complex energy regimes, but also change human consciousness in the process. Forager/hunter societies relied on oral communications and their consciousness was mythologically constructed. The great hydraulic agricultural civilizations were, for the most part, organized around script communication and steeped in theological consciousness. The first industrial revolution of the 19th century was managed by print communication and ushered in ideological consciousness. Electronic communication became the command and control mechanism for arranging the second industrial revolution in the 20th century and spawned psychological consciousness. Each more sophisticated communication revolution brings together more diverse people in increasingly more expansive and varied social networks. Oral communication has only limited temporal and spatial reach while script, print and electronic communications each extend the range and depth of human social interaction. By extending the central nervous system of each individual and the society as a whole, communication revolutions provide an evermore inclusive playing field for empathy to mature and consciousness to expand. For example, during the period of the great hydraulic agricultural civilizations characterized by script and theological consciousness, empathic sensitivity broadened from tribal blood ties to associational ties based on common religious affiliation. Jews came to empathize with Jews, Christians with Christians, Muslims with Muslims, etc. In the first industrial revolution characterized by print and ideological consciousness, empathic sensibility extended to national borders, with Americans empathizing with Americans, Germans with Germans, Japanese with Japanese and so on. In the second industrial revolution, characterized by electronic communication and psychological consciousness, individuals began to identify with like-minded others. Today, we are on the cusp of another historic convergence of energy and communication--a third industrial revolution--that could extend empathic sensibility to the biosphere itself and all of life on Earth. The distributed Internet revolution is coming together with distributed renewable energies, making possible a sustainable, post-carbon economy that is both globally connected and locally managed. In the 21st century, hundreds of millions--and eventually billions--of human beings will transform their buildings into power plants to harvest renewable energies on site, store those energies in the form of hydrogen and share electricity, peer-to-peer, across local, regional, national and continental inter-grids that act much like the Internet. The open source sharing of energy, like open source sharing of information, will give rise to collaborative energy spaces--not unlike the collaborative social spaces that currently exist on the Internet. When every family and business comes to take responsibility for its own small swath of the biosphere by harnessing renewable energy and sharing it with millions of others on smart power grids that stretch across continents, we become intimately interconnected at the most basic level of earthly existence by jointly stewarding the energy that bathes the planet and sustains all of life. The new distributed communication revolution not only organizes distributed renewable energies, but also **changes human consciousness.** The information communication technologies (ICT) revolution is quickly extending the central nervous system of billions of human beings and connecting the human race across time and space, allowing empathy to flourish on a global scale, for the first time in history. Whether in fact we will begin to empathize as a species will depend on how we use the new distributed communication medium. While distributed communications technologies-and, soon, distributed renewable energies - are connecting the human race, what is so shocking is that no one has offered much of a reason as to why we ought to be connected. We talk breathlessly about access and inclusion in a global communications network but speak little of exactly why we want to communicate with one another on such a planetary scale. What's sorely missing is an overarching reason that billions of human beings should be increasingly connected. Toward what end? The only feeble explanations thus far offered are to share information, be entertained, advance commercial exchange and speed the globalization of the economy. All the above, while relevant, nonetheless seem insufficient to justify why nearly seven billion human beings should be connected and mutually embedded in a globalized society. The idea of even billion individual connections, absent any overall unifying purpose, seems a colossal waste of human energy. More important, making global connections without any real transcendent purpose risks a narrowing rather than an expanding of human consciousness. But what if our distributed global communication networks were put to the task of helping us re-participate in deep communion with the common biosphere that sustains all of our lives? The biosphere is the narrow band that extends some forty miles from the ocean floor to outer space where living creatures and the Earth's geochemical processes interact to sustain

# 2NC Human Nature- General

each other. We are learning that the biosphere functions like an indivisible organism. It is the continuous symbiotic relationships between every living creature and between living creatures and the geochemical processes that ensure the survival of the planetary organism and the individual species that live within its biospheric envelope. If every human life, the species as a whole, and all other life-forms are entwined with one another and with the geochemistry of the planet in a rich and complex choreography that sustains life itself, then we are all dependent on and responsible for the health of the whole organism. Carrying out that responsibility means living out our individual lives in our neighborhoods and communities in ways that promote the general well-being of the larger biosphere within which we dwell. The Third Industrial Revolution offers just such an opportunity. If we can harness our empathic sensibility to establish a new global ethic that recognizes and acts to harmonize the many relationships that make up the life-sustaining forces of the planet, we will have moved beyond the detached, self-interested and utilitarian philosophical assumptions that accompanied national markets and nation state governance and into a new era of biosphere consciousness. We leave the **old world of geopolitics behind** and enter into a new world of biosphere politics, with new forms of governance emerging to accompany our new biosphere awareness. The Third Industrial Revolution and the new era of distributed capitalism allow us to sculpt a new approach to globalization, this time emphasizing continentalization from the bottom up. Because renewable energies are more or less equally distributed around the world, every region is potentially amply endowed with the power it needs to be relatively self-sufficient and sustainable in its lifestyle, while at the same time interconnected via smart grids to other regions across countries and continents. When every community is locally empowered, both figuratively and literally, it can engage directly in regional, transnational, continental, and limited global trade without the severe restrictions that are imposed by the geopolitics that oversee elite fossil fuels and uranium energy distribution. Continentalization is already bringing with it a new form of governance. The nation-state, which grew up alongside the First and Second Industrial Revolutions, and provided the regulatory mechanism for managing an energy regime whose reach was the geosphere, is ill suited for a Third Industrial Revolution whose domain is the biosphere. Distributed renewable energies generated locally and regionally and shared openly--peer to peer--across vast contiguous land masses connected by intelligent utility networks and smart logistics and supply chains favor a seamless network of governing institutions that span entire continents. The European Union is the first continental governing institution of the Third Industrial Revolution era. The EU is already beginning to put in place the infrastructure for a European-wide energy regime, along with the codes, regulations, and standards to effectively operate a seamless transport, communications, and energy grid that will stretch from the Irish Sea to the doorsteps of Russia by midcentury. Asian, African, and Latin American continental political unions are also in the making and will likely be the premier governing institutions on their respective continents by 2050. In this new era of distributed energy, governing institutions will more resemble the workings of the ecosystems they manage. Just as habitats function within ecosystems, and ecosystems within the biosphere in a web of interrelationships, governing institutions will similarly function in a collaborative network of relationships with localities, regions, and nations all embedded within the continent as a whole. This new complex political organism operates like the biosphere it attends, synergistically and reciprocally. This is biosphere politics. The new biosphere politics transcends traditional right/left distinctions so characteristic of the geopolitics of the modern market economy and nation-state era. The new divide is generational and contrasts the traditional top-down model of structuring family life, education, commerce, and governance with a younger generation whose thinking is more relational and distributed, whose nature is more collaborative and cosmopolitan, and whose work and social spaces favor open-source commons. For the Internet generation, "quality of life" becomes as important as individual opportunity in fashioning a new dream for the 21st century. The transition to biosphere consciousness has already begun. All over the world, a younger generation is beginning to realize that one's daily consumption of energy and other resources ultimately affects the lives of every other human being and every other creature that inhabits the Earth. The Empathic Civilization is emerging. A younger generation is fast extending its empathic embrace beyond religious affiliations and national identification to include the whole of humanity and the vast project of life that envelops the Earth. But our rush to universal empathic connectivity is running up against a rapidly accelerating entropic juggernaut in the form of climate change. Can we reach biosphere consciousness and global empathy in time to avert planetary collapse?

# AT: Aggression is Biological

**1. Their arguments don’t assume divergences from adaption – not all is genetic**

**Fuentes, ’04** - Professor of Anthropology; Director of the Institute for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts (ISLA) B.A., University of California, Berkeley (Agustin, American Anthropologist, Vol. 106, No. 4, December 2004, p. 711-712)

Another important factor in revising standard views of human evolution is the emerging recognition that environmental variation can lead to overestimates of the strength of natural selection. This means that location can have an impact on architecture (Kruuk et al. 2003). Many arguments for the evolution of specific traits or behavioral patterns rely on demonstrating the potential strength of specific selection pressures on the trait in question. Underlying most estimates of the power of natural selection on a trait is the assumption that there is a causal link between fitness (lifetime reproductive success potential) and the trait in question. It is becoming apparent that, in at least some cases, the fitness variation observed is in fact only associated with the environmental component of the trait (not the trait itself). Loeske E. B. Kruuk and colleagues (2003) present an example wherein birds that happen to be very healthy can breed early; early breeders can also produce large healthy broods. This differential birth outcome could result in an erroneous assumption of a positive fitness relationship between the behavior of early breeding and the resulting brood size, leading some to possibly argue that there has been selection of early breeding as a higher fitness behavior. However, there is an important intervening variable in this process: resource availability, which affects birds’ size and condition (health). In years in which resources are plentiful, more birds will be healthier and breed earlier than in resource-stressed years. We need not assume that early breeding is an adaptation— the result of a history of selective pressures. In cases such as this, the magnitude of selection may be grossly distorted and we may think we are seeing a behavioral adaptation (early breeding) when we are only seeing environmental variation. Thus, our assumptions about fitness-enhancing values and the “adaptiveness” of certain human behaviors, in some contexts, may overlook the influence of environmental variation and confounding factors (Cheverud 2004). This can mislead us to assume that a behavior is adaptive (like early breeding) whereas it is actually an environmentally based outcome (i.e., the behavior itself is not necessarily the product of focal selection but the state of the birds’ health resulting from climatological factors that influenced the behavior). This may be why natural selection rarely follows the modeled trajectories. These trajectories are constructed from optimality models or controlled responses to artificial selection and, thus, predict a fitness-maximizing equilibrium. In fact, most evolutionary outcomes include significant oscillations and can approach the border of chaos (Lansing 2003; Nowak and Sigmund 2004), especially when one integrates complex gene-behavior relationships and complex population structures into evolutionary models (Cheverud 2004; Wilson 2004). As Kinji Imanishi pointed out in 1941, understanding this may be an important caution when making simple Darwinian evolutionary predictions: Artificial selection may present an overly powerful model that is seldom realized in natural selection. We, therefore, need to be careful when we propose very tight-fitting models explaining fitness correlations for a specific human behavioral trait or pattern in the absence of clear data measuring the specific strength of selection (as assessed in fitness impact) and the normal range of effects of environmental variation on populations over time (Cheverud 2004).

**2. Their claims aren’t biological, they’re sociobiological; none of their studies cite hard data, just speculation**

**3. Humans are inclined to cooperation, not aggression**

**Goldstein, ’87** - Professor Emeritus of International Relations, American University (Washington, DC) Research Scholar, University of Massachusetts and Nonresident Sadat Senior Fellow, CIDCM, University of Maryland (Joshua S., International Studies Quarterly (1987) 31, 36, “The Emperor’s New Genes: Sociobiology and War,” University of Southern California)

Humans are not inherently aggressive but are more often cooperative. Dobzhansky (1962) suggests that "the fittest may also be the gentlest." 15 Morgan (1972: 58-59) and others point out that most human beings, even most males, never participate in wars (and even the participants act more like "sheep" than "wolves")-thus to "write of war as . . . a biological imperative like breathing and eating . . . is absurd." Montagu (1976: 3) rejects the idea that "human beings are inescapably killers" or "genetically and instinctively aggressive. '16 Indeed, the bias of biology is not toward aggression but cooperation, as Montagu (1976: 87, 185) states: In humans, cooperation and altruism have been at a much higher selective premium than in other primates. . Aggression, the existing evidence suggests, occurs only in cultures in which the individual is conditioned in aggressive behavior.

# AT: Human Nature = Violence

**Their individual theories are inaccurate – human nature is more complex than their oversimplification, and errs towards goodness**

**Fuentes, ’04** - Professor of Anthropology; Director of the Institute for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts (ISLA) B.A., University of California, Berkeley (Agustin, American Anthropologist, Vol. 106, No. 4, December 2004, p. 711-712)

The range of evidence available to anthropologists suggests that it would be wise to accept more broadly the possibility that there is no single answer to the question of what humans are patterned to do. The human adaptive zone is broad and cultural, therefore specific, limited adaptations shared across disparate populations are unlikely to have arisen in human ancestry. Given this, theories reliant on individual-based “selfish gene” perspectives (Dawkins 1976) are insufficient to effectively model human evolution. The human niche—our bioecological space (ecology) and the construction of a human place (the human interactive engagement with and impact on our environments)—is itself too complex for such simple, linear models (Scoones 1999). As much recent writing has indicated, the human ability to produce flexible phenotypic patterns of behavior within diverse social and ecological contexts has been central to human evolution and cannot be ignored (Ingold 2001; Klopfer 2001; Potts 1999, 2004; Scoones 1999; Simpson 1966; Sussman and Chapman 2004; Tomasello 1999; Washburn 1972; Wilson 1975). At the same time, models of human behavior that ignore the complexity of evolutionary biology are similarly shortsighted. Because humans are biocultural organisms, it may be difficult to articulate and model our evolutionary histories (Ingold 2001; Potts 1987, 2004; Tattersall 2001, 2004), but concepts emerging from ecology and evolutionary biology today provide a promising space to engage in such endeavors. They suggest that the old question “Are humans cooperative or competitive?” should be abandoned. Instead, we need to investigate the role of both competition and cooperation, relying on neither as the sole driver of what it means to be human. We need to look beyond individual strategies arising from classic neo-Darwinian theory to get a better handle on the multifarious facets of human evolution. Kin selection, reciprocal altruism, and individual fitness strategies are valid and important modalities of assessing evolutionary strategies. However, here I propose that looking at cooperative intergroup interactions, multilevel selection, and aspects of how intra- and intergroup interactions affect the selection pressures on individuals within those groups is also important.

**Exclusive focus on an individual modeling theory is inappropriate – their claims are based in singular, inaccurate logic**

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Couching this perspective against a backdrop of a history of assumptions about the primacy of competition and human aggression is appropriate. It is not clear that most anthropologists think frequently about complex evolutionary theory, or that when they do, they see cooperative interactions within and between groups in the context of multilevel evolutionary processes. Although it is true that many anthropologists are examining everyday lives and the complex patterns within them, are we effectively tying these facets into broader themes in evolutionary biology in a nonreductionist way? Much of the focus on the evolution of human patterns remains on interindividual or intergroup competition for access to resources (social, nutritional, etc.) or patterns of conflict and reconciliation within and between groups. I suggest that it is a worthwhile endeavor to refocus the inquiry away from an exclusive focus on individual fitness modeling to explain facets of cooperation and human evolution. We can move toward looking at the impact that groups have on their environment and how cooperation across groups (not just within groups) may be one human adaptive pattern. This is not arguing against the existence and importance of competition, just against its primacy in driving evolutionary change. The traditional neo-Darwinian perspective explains cooperation as having arisen as an adaptive mechanism to deal with competition (be it from other members within the same group or with other groups entirely). This may be an oversimplification of human evolutionary history and is a focus that may be obfuscating other potential adaptive patterns in human history. It privileges competition as the initial driver in evolutionary change and, thus, constrains the potential range of inquiry. Including the possibility of an alternative perspective based in emerging complexities in evolutionary theory can assist in our quest to model our evolutionary past.

# AT: Human Nature

**Their realist authors fail to take into account facilitation – means they don’t account for inevitable positive interaction**

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Although competition is a significant factor in the evolution of organisms, facilitation—positive interaction between species or potentially between groups within a species—also drives evolutionary change. Research from ecology, especially intertidal and plant ecosystems, demonstrates that the interactions between two or more species may alter the selective environments such that each of the groups does better when the other is also sharing the environment (Bruno et al. 2003). This pattern is seen in the distinction between realized and fundamental niches (Hutchinson 1957). The fundamental niche describes a range in which a species or population can live indefinitely in the absence of negative interspecific interactions. The realized niche is the space actually occupied by a species or population after exclusion or competition by other species or competitors. Research has demonstrated that facilitation can, in effect, expand the realized niche of many organisms in a shared system (Bruno et al. 2003). Hypothetically, we can envision an expansion of this concept to examine within-species or within-population level patterns. Although this research is currently focused on small animals and plants, the theoretical emphasis on examining multispecies, multigroup, or metapopulation interactions for patterns of facilitation in addition to competition can have dramatic impact on our models of what selective forces were acting on early humans. Interactions between human groups need not be defined exclusively in terms of contest competition (direct competition over resources) or scramble competition (temporally or spatially dispersed competition over the use or acquisition of resources). Instead, the concept of “facilitation” allows us to envision a complex of cooperative and competitive relationships varying over space and time among individual humans and human groups.

**Their arguments don’t assume divergences from adaption – not all is genetic**

**Fuentes, ’04** - Professor of Anthropology; Director of the Institute for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts (ISLA) B.A., University of California, Berkeley (Agustin, American Anthropologist, Vol. 106, No. 4, December 2004, p. 711-712)

Another important factor in revising standard views of human evolution is the emerging recognition that environmental variation can lead to overestimates of the strength of natural selection. This means that location can have an impact on architecture (Kruuk et al. 2003). Many arguments for the evolution of specific traits or behavioral patterns rely on demonstrating the potential strength of specific selection pressures on the trait in question. Underlying most estimates of the power of natural selection on a trait is the assumption that there is a causal link between fitness (lifetime reproductive success potential) and the trait in question. It is becoming apparent that, in at least some cases, the fitness variation observed is in fact only associated with the environmental component of the trait (not the trait itself). Loeske E. B. Kruuk and colleagues (2003) present an example wherein birds that happen to be very healthy can breed early; early breeders can also produce large healthy broods. This differential birth outcome could result in an erroneous assumption of a positive fitness relationship between the behavior of early breeding and the resulting brood size, leading some to possibly argue that there has been selection of early breeding as a higher fitness behavior. However, there is an important intervening variable in this process: resource availability, which affects birds’ size and condition (health). In years in which resources are plentiful, more birds will be healthier and breed earlier than in resource-stressed years. We need not assume that early breeding is an adaptation— the result of a history of selective pressures. In cases such as this, the magnitude of selection may be grossly distorted and we may think we are seeing a behavioral adaptation (early breeding) when we are only seeing environmental variation. Thus, our assumptions about fitness-enhancing values and the “adaptiveness” of certain human behaviors, in some contexts, may overlook the influence of environmental variation and confounding factors (Cheverud 2004). This can mislead us to assume that a behavior is adaptive (like early breeding) whereas it is actually an environmentally based outcome (i.e., the behavior itself is not necessarily the product of focal selection but the state of the birds’ health resulting from climatological factors that influenced the behavior). This may be why natural selection rarely follows the modeled trajectories. These trajectories are constructed from optimality models or controlled responses to artificial selection and, thus, predict a fitness-maximizing equilibrium. In fact, most evolutionary outcomes include significant oscillations and can approach the border of chaos (Lansing 2003; Nowak and Sigmund 2004), especially when one integrates complex gene-behavior relationships and complex population structures into evolutionary models (Cheverud 2004; Wilson 2004). As Kinji Imanishi pointed out in 1941, understanding this may be an important caution when making simple Darwinian evolutionary predictions: Artificial selection may present an overly powerful model that is seldom realized in natural selection. We, therefore, need to be careful when we propose very tight-fitting models explaining fitness correlations for a specific human behavioral trait or pattern in the absence of clear data measuring the specific strength of selection (as assessed in fitness impact) and the normal range of effects of environmental variation on populations over time (Cheverud 2004).

# AT: Human Nature

**Their authors blatantly exclude cooperation, as opposed to natural competition – invalidates their claims**

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It is not always clear how to go about asking questions about cooperation and competition from an evolutionary perspective. Studies of human behavior in the social and biological sciences have tended to model the role of competition and the appearance of aggression, trying to explain why humans fight, go to war, and otherwise engage in large scale competitive contests. But there is also a large body of literature that indicates that cooperation within groups was, and is, an important aspect of human behavior and societies. However, this focus on intragroup cooperation is frequently combined with a focus on intergroup competition. Rather than assuming that early human groups engaged repeatedly in competing with other groups in their area for resources and survival, I suggest that we think about populations and other forms of cultural clusters as potential arenas for vast and intricate ranges of behaviors including cooperation (but not just cooperation for more effective competition). This approach requires comparative studies across multiple levels of social interaction, which incorporate insights from ecology and evolutionary theory. We should engage in a complex interpretation of evolutionary processes, incorporating premises of DST and taking care when proposing specific, discrete adaptive scenarios for humankind that rely on strong selection and individual-fitness models. And we need cultural, behavioral, physiological, and archeological details to establish measures that go beyond assumptions of the primacy of competition and that enable us to add cooperative patterns to competitive ones in our toolkit for assessing our past. Finally, we need to retheorize both competition and cooperation in ways that move beyond dichotomous thinking. Studying the complex relationship between cooperative patterns, competition, and dynamic organism–environment interactions is an extremely important component of anthropological inquiry, an important place on which to focus our collective gaze.

# AT: Sociobiology

**1. Sociobiology is not a conclusive universal; they take a functionalist, controversial theory as undisputed**

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First, the universality of the sociobiological project—and specifically its applicability to the study of human behavior—is extremely controversial. Thayer downplays the serious disagreements by claiming that the study of humans is central to the sociobiological project (p. 130). In contrast, one commentator has noted that “most ‘sociobiologists’ . . . are quite uninterested in humans.”6 In particular, many biologists themselves dispute the applicability of sociobiological approaches to humans because of the central role of culture, language, and self-reflexivity in determining human behavior.7 Although advocates of human sociobiology acknowledge the dual influences of culture and genetics in shaping human behavior, no consensus exists on how to explain the complex interplay between these factors. Second, sociobiological explanations of human behavior are often unacceptably functionalist. Sociobiologists take a particular form of human behavior and account for it with reference to evolutionary fitness. Different sociobiologists explain behaviors ranging from selfishness to altruism and from monogamy to rape based on the claim that they confer a selective advantage to the individuals or groups who practice them. The quality of sociobiological explanations and the models used to demonstrate them vary tremendously, but such arguments generally fall into the trap of what Richard Lewontin and Stephen Jay Gould call “adaptationism,” the attempt to understand all the physiological and behavioral traits of an organism as evolutionary adaptations.8 Individual traits may in fact be the result of a complex web of design and development in the organism’s growth. The effects of individual genes may not be discernable in isolation from their interaction with other genetic traits and environmental factors. Traits may be nonadaptive and the product of allometry—the relative and incidental growth of a part of an organism in relation to the whole bundle of traits that constitute an organism. Thus a particular behavior may be “a consequence of adaptations rather than an adaptation in its own right.”9 The complexity and unpredictability of interactions between individual selection pressures and particular traits create intractable problems for researchers attempting to isolate the genetic foundations of behavior within variegated environmental and cultural contexts. In other words, even if we develop an account of how any given behavior is functional with reference to evolutionary fitness, we are a long way from being able to conclude that evolutionary mechanisms actually gave rise to that behavior. In this way, sociobiological accounts easily degenerate into examples of the post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy generally associated with other versions of functionalist explanations in the social sciences.10 This problem of isolating particular genetic traits is compounded within human populations, which are not generally divided into isolated, distinguishable gene pools and which, as mentioned above, attribute a large role to culture in determining socially acceptable and legitimate behavior.11 Third, sociobiologists themselves disagree over the unit of selection that should be emphasized during evolution—whether it be the gene, the individual, or the group.12 Because different sociobiological studies examine selection at different analytical levels, they frequently produce different and contradictory hypotheses about what behaviors should maximize fitness. Sociobiologists have not systematically examined how different units of selection interact analytically, and they disagree as to what level exerts the greatest degree of influence on evolution. For example, Maynard Smith argues that if fitness is exercised at an aggregate level, then group-level selection pressures must be sufficiently stringent and rapid so that incentives to maximize individual fitness will not supersede those of the group.13 Empirically assessing the relative degree and frequency of group selection pressures vis-à-vis individual or genetic factors is extraordinarily complex, however, and in the messy world of human political and cultural interaction, this task is practically impossible. This controversy is further muddied by disagreement over how to operationalize the theoretical concept of the gene. Many biologists dispute the notion that particular genes can be understood in isolation, and emphasize the importance of the interactions between genes in a complete, interconnected genome as well as to the environment in which they are embedded.14 Similarly, others criticize the fact that many sociobiologists do not actually link particular behavior with an individual gene, but rather rely on population genetics and statistical analysis to identify “hypothetical” genes that correlate with particular behaviors. These critics correctly view the highly stylized, formal results of sociobiology as suspect, because they are never able to control for all possible exogenous variables and they minimize the importance of controlled experimentation.15 In sum, numerous evolutionary biologists, anthropologists, and psychologists who, although extremely sympathetic to the scientific study of humans, regard sociobiology as simplistic and misleadingly erroneous.16 For this reason, sociobiology provides an unstable set of foundations on which to construct a rigorously scientific approach to the study of world politics, for its scientific status remains essentially contested.

**2. They mistake sociobiology for an actual science; it’s a pseudo-science, incapable of making biological predictions**

# AT: Sociobiology

**3. Human behavioral traits are shaped by culture, not by nature**

**Goldstein, ’87** - Professor Emeritus of International Relations, American University (Washington, DC) Research Scholar, University of Massachusetts and Nonresident Sadat Senior Fellow, CIDCM, University of Maryland (Joshua S., International Studies Quarterly (1987) 31, 36-37, “The Emperor’s New Genes: Sociobiology and War,” University of Southern California)

Human behavioral traits such as aggression or altruism are shaped not by genes but by culture. 17 Sahlins (1976) emphasizes "the million years in historical development of cultural forms" ignored by the "naked ape" writers.18 Reed (1970: 57, 48, 38) stresses that "we are a unique species which has outgrown animality." Humans took a "qualitative jump" away from the animal world with the emergence of toolmaking, cooperative production, speech, culture, art and science. 19 Gould writes off the whole "naked ape" approach as "pop ethology" (Lewontin et al., 1984: 239).20 Montagu (1976: 3-4) argues that "no specific behavior is genetically determined" -human beings are capable of a variety of aggressive or cooperative, selfish or noble behaviors which are not determined biologically. Lewontin et al. (1984: 251) argue that no one has ever been able to relate any aspect of human social behavior to any particular gene or set of genes. ... Thus, all statements about the genetic basis of human social traits are necessarily purely speculative....21 Campbell (1975: 1104) stresses "sociocultural evolution" in which social structures are ''retained through purely social modes of transmission, rather than in the genes." He has argued (Campbell, 1978: 41) that self-sacrificial dispositions, including especially the willingness to risk death in warfare, are, in man, a product of social indoctrination counter to rather than supported by genetically transmitted behavioral dispositions. Campbell (1975: 1115) sees biological evolution as selecting for individual selfish tendencies; and complicated sociocultural mechanisms as having been developed to counteract this. Ethical systems pull societies toward a pure ideal of altruism precisely because biology is pulling from the other side toward selfishness. A workable balance results 22 The argument for culture over genes can itself claim a biological basis. Human beings have evolved biologically into creatures with large and powerful brains, quite under- developed at birth. During an extraordinarily long childhood, speech, language, and culture are learned. Corning (1971: 333) argues that humans have "a far greater potential for behavioral variation (including . . . maladaptive behaviors) than any other species is capable of." In the same vein, Washburn (1978, quoted in Corning, 1983: 113) writes: Sociobiologists postulate genes for altruism and others for cheating, but it would be far more adaptive to possess genes for intelligence and be able to cheat or be altruistic as occasion demanded.

# AT: Sociobiology

**4. Their concept of “state” aggression is inherently flawed, because the “state” is not a meaningful division of culture; thus, as behavioral traits cannot be transferred up the gradient from human to state, they cannot be transferred down the same gradient**

**Goldstein, ’87** - Professor Emeritus of International Relations, American University (Washington, DC) Research Scholar, University of Massachusetts and Nonresident Sadat Senior Fellow, CIDCM, University of Maryland (Joshua S., International Studies Quarterly (1987) 31, 37-38, “The Emperor’s New Genes: Sociobiology and War,” University of Southern California)

The human species is not divided into meaningful genetic subgroups, nations, races, and ethnic groups are not separate isolated gene pools. Montagu (1964: xi) rejects the idea that "there exist different populations of the same species which are distinguished from one another by the possession of certain distinctive hereditary traits. " Ehrlich and Holm (1964: 168) argue that different genetic groupings will result depending on whether individuals are classified by skin color, blood groups, hair type, body build, etc. Anthropological classifications of ethnic groups, from a biological perspective, "overemphasize differences. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the classification of human sub- species or 'races..' (Ehrlich and Holm, 1964: 162). Gould (1981: 322-323) points to the "lack of genetic differentiation among human groups." He argues that Homo sapiens does not contain "meaningfully different genetic capacities" and that "all modern human races probably split from a common ancestral stock only tens of thousands of years ago" -i.e., very recently on an evolutionary scale. Gould quotes Lewontin to the effect that if the holocaust comes and a small tribe deep in the New Guinea forests are the only survivors, almost all the genetic variation now expressed among the innumerable groups of our four billion people will be preserved. (Gould, 1981: 323) 4. Even if such subpopulations did exist, "inclusive fitness " would not explain the maximization of behavioral traits across them. Konner (1982: 13) refers to "the almost universal view among biologists that evolution proceeds primarily through competition among individuals and their [immediate] kindreds. The selection or elimination of larger population units is, at best, uncommon. "23 Boorman and Levitt (1980: 25, 233, 250) use an elaborate mathematical model to critique Hamilton's original model of inclusive fitness.24 They find that "Hamilton's original notion of kin selection as tending to maximize 'inclusive fitness' must be strongly qualified . . ." because of nonlinearities not captured in Hamilton's model. "Thus the principle of inclusive fitness . . . should be replaced by a more refined analysis.. . . " Boorman and Levitt's model indicates that, except in narrow conditions where Hamilton's equations hold, "kin selection does not generally maximize inclusive fitness'': Hamilton's . . . theory is very much a theory of pure kin selection effects. If any non-kin-selectionist effects become intermixed in the model . . . then Hamilton's conclusions fail to be robust. As far as the social behavior of higher vertebrates is concerned, one should expect adulteration of pure kin selection with the entry of reciprocal altruism as an additional evolutionary force. Corning (1983: 90, 104) argues that human society has evolved around just such adulterating influences-cooperation extending beyond immediate kin. He distinguishes various kinds of cooperative behavior, of which self-abnegating altruism is only one. Corning stresses the role of "egoistic cooperation" in which individuals them- selves (not just their kin) benefit through participation in cooperative social systems. In such cooperative systems, ". . . one's own and others' needs are simultaneously or serially satisfied by joint, coordinated, or reciprocal actions" (Corning, 1983: 103). Such egoistic cooperation, according to Corning, is generally not kin-based, and kin selection mechanisms are "not essential" for the emergence of cooperation.25 Corning criticizes Wilson's concept of altruism for downplaying egoistic cooperation, which "does not require a special genetic model or reductionist explanation":26 In assuming that social life is based mainly on altruism rather than on egoistic co-operation, Wilson . . . was forced to conclude, erroneously, that the more complex forms of social behavior must be based on kinship. Thus the concept of inclusive fitness represents a genetic boundary with limited scope for co- operation. (Corning, 1983: 115-116)

# AT: Thayer

**1. their evidence is a distortion of the scientific ideas it cites and reifies patriarchal systems of domination.**

Mark **Busser**, Masters Candidate at the Dept of Political Science at York University. Aug 200**6**. (“The Evolution of Security: Revisiting the Human Nature Debate in International Relations ”, <http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/documents/WP40-Busser.pdf>)

The political and philosophical debates that surround sociobiology in general are the least of the problems with Bradley Thayer’s article. In fact, Thayer’s argument is exactly the sort of reading of sociobiology about which its critics like Lewontin and Gould have been uncomfortably anticipating. Worse, Thayer’s exercise demonstrates a misreading of many evolutionary arguments drawing conclusions with which the theorists he cites would likely distance themselves. His argument about an egoistic human nature relies on a tiresomely common oversimplification of “a classic Darwinist argument,” crudely linking natural selection to the assumption that selfishness encourages evolutionary fitness; Even Thayer feels the need to qualify this argument in a footnote. 49 Thayer’s citation of Richard Dawkins’ selfish gene theory to provide “the second sufficient explanation for egoism” is also incredibly problematic.50 In The Selfish Gene, Dawkins suggests that at the beginning of micro-organic life genes that promoted survival were key to making basic life-forms into simple ‘survival machines.’ Rather than viewing genes as an organism’s tool for generating, Dawkins suggests that it is wiser to look at the development of complex organisms as genes’ method of replicating themselves. The word selfish is used as a shorthand to describe a more complex phenomenon: genes that give their organic vessel advantages in survival and reproduction are successfully transmitted into future generations.51 However, an important part of Dawkins’ work is that the ‘selfishness’ of genes translates into decidedly unselfish behaviours. Dawkins himself has had to distance himself from groups who interpreted his focus on kin selection as a reification of ethnocentrism: The National Front was saying something like this, “kin selection provides the basis for favoring your own race as distinct from other races, as a kind of generalization of favoring your own close family as opposed to other individuals.” Kin selection doesn’t do that! Kin selection favors nepotism towards your own immediate close family. It does not favor a generalization of nepotism towards millions of other people who happen to be the same color as you.52 [unquote] In light of a careful consideration of the intricacies of Dawkin’s thinking, Thayer’s treatment of his theories seems remarkably crude and shallow. Broad conclusions seem to materialize as if from thin air: “In general,” Thayer writes, “the selfishness of the gene increases its fitness, and so the behaviour spreads.”53 This line, crucial to Thayer’s point, is such a brazen oversimplification and misinterpretation of Dawkin’s work that Thayer’s arguments about a provable natural human egoism are rendered essentially baseless in terms of scientific evidence. Thayer’s argument about the ubiquity of hierarchical structures of power rely on a dichotomous hypothetical choice between eternal conflict and structures of dominance. The suggestion that the ubiquity of maledominated hierarchies ‘contributes to fitness’ in the present tense comes dangerously close to naturalizing and reifying patriarchal structures of human social organization.54 As presented, the argument reads very much like Hobbes’ Leviathan, in which pre-social actors sought the refuge and protection of a larger social order. In many ways, Thayer seems to be reconstructing the Leviathan using sociobiology rather clumsily to justify broad generalizations. It is certain that some mix of biology and culture have led to male-dominated cultures in the past, and there is a strong basis for the argument that humans have developed a need to belong to social groups. It is also clear that humans have the mental capacity to understand and technologies for operating within dominance hierarchies. Yet these possibilities together do not suggest, contrary to Thayer’s argument, that “humans readily give allegiance to the state, or embrace religion or ideologies such as liberalism or communism, because evolution has produced a need to belong to a dominance hierarchy.”55 If humans do depend on social connectedness, must this necessarily come in the form of hierarchical, patriarchal structures? The case is not made convincingly. As I shall discuss below, alternate understandings of the connection between basic human needs, human culture, and environmental stresses can provide an understanding of dominance hierarchies that does not naturalize their ubiquity.

**2. Modern warfare organized around the concept of a nation state is a recent creation- evolution can't explain rapid changes because it occurs over thousands of generations and hundreds of thousands of years**

# AT: THayer

**3. Thayer is wrong – he bases his theory off of Hume, but misses the point; he can only describe parts of the whole**

**Arnhart, ’06** - a Presidential Research Professor of Political Science at Northern Illinois University in DeKalb, Illinois (Larry, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Jun., 2006), pp. 435-436)

Thayer assumes that biological science cannot explain moral experience because science is concerned with factual claims rather than value judgments, and he attributes this fact/value distinction to David Hume. But Thayer misses Hume's point. Hume distinguishes is and ought in order to show that moral assessments are derived not from pure reason alone but from moral emotions. Hume believes that correct moral judgments are factual statements about the species-typical pattern of moral sentiments in specified circumstances. Darwin saw that the ethical naturalism of Smith and Hume allowed morality to become an object of scientific study, because scientists could study the natural roots of moral judgment in the evolved moral emotions of the human animal. Recently, biologists such as Edward 0. Wilson and economists such as Robert Frank have renewed Darwin's project for a scientific study of morality as founded on natural moral emotions. Thayer says that the question of whether rational choice theorists should include "moral commitment" as a factor in human behavior constraining egoism is "beyond the scope of this book" (p. 86). But a complete political science would need to explain the moral passions that drive political controversy. A biopolitical science would explain morality in politics as expressing the natural moral desires of evolved human nature. Such a science would study not only the genetic evolution but also the behavioral and cultural evolution of human beings and other political animals. Thayer tends to reduce human biology to genetics. But biology is much more than genetics. And a purely genetic science will not explain much about politics, which depends on higher levels of complexity far beyond the genes. DNA by itself does nothing. DNA acts through interactions at many levels of biological complexity-interactions within a cell, between cells, between organisms, and within ecological and social communities. These interactions determine the expression of genes, and the patterns of gene expression can evolve in response to behavioral and cultural evolution. Studying the genes by themselves would tell us almost nothing about politics. But studying the genetic inter-action with behavioral and cultural evolution would tell us quite a lot about politics. For example, Thayer stresses that warfare is not unique to human beings, because other animals (such as ants and chimpanzees) wage war in ways that resemble human warfare. But he does not indicate that the patterns in animal warfare show behavioral and cultural evolution. Primatologists have reported diverse behavioral traditions among various chimpanzee groups, not only in war but in other activities, and so it seems that each chimpanzee community has its own repertoire of cultural traditions. Thayer does emphasize the importance of environment or culture as "proximate causes." But he does not clearly indicate that cultural evolution is just as much a part of biology as genetic evolution. For a science of politics, we need a science of human nature that studies the coevolution of many causes at many levels of complexity-from genes to brains, then to behavior and culture, and finally to symbolic communication as the uniquely human adaptation. In that way, political science could become a true science by becoming a biopolitical science.

**4. Thayer concedes later in the article that he has only developed a possible theory, NOT a definitive conclusion-they've misrepresented their evidence**

**5. Thayer isn’t a biologist, and sociobiology isn’t a science, there’s no reason to prefer his opinion over our qualified authors**

# AT: Thayer

**6. Thayer concedes in his article that he cannot draw a specific link between Sociobiology and IR; even then, biological and cultural causalities cannot be effectively determined**

**Bell and MacDonald, 2k** - a doctoral candidate at the Center for International Studies, Cambridge University. He spent the past academic year as a Fulbright Scholar in the Department of Political Science, Columbia University; a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science, Columbia University (Duncan S.A. and Paul K., International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), pp. 191)

Even if sociobiologists were to find not merely plausible but testable linkages between specific behavioral dispositions and genetic selection, it is not clear that these would be of much use in explaining outcomes in international relations, which are the result of complex interactions between myriad human and collective actors. Appropriating sociobiological findings, at least in the cursory manner that Thayer outlines, provides little explanatory leverage for international relations theory in general, and realism in particular. Sociobiological accounts come in two versions. The first attempts to reduce human behavior to genetic imperatives.17 The second recognizes that social relations result from a complex interplay between inherited characteristics and environmental conditions, including material and cultural factors. Most sophisticated sociobiologists favor the latter version. As Wilson himself argues, “the problem [of sociobiology] can be more clearly cast in these terms: how have genetic evolution and cultural evolution interacted to create the development of the human mind?”18 But as we argued above, such a position makes it extremely difficult to methodologically distinguish between biological and environmental sources of observed behavior. Thayer concedes this point when he acknowledges that egoism and the drive to dominate may “result from other causes” (p. 130, n. 33) than evolution. Similarly, in his application of sociobiology to the origins of war , Thayer admits that “warfare . . . is greatly influenced by culture and the international system” (p. 144), while in his discussion of ethnic conflict, he grants that ethnocentric behavior can be “reinforced or weakened by environmental factors such as culture or religion” (p. 148).19

**7. There is no way to determine whether International Relations are determined by human nature or environmental factors; their author concedes**

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It follows that in international relations, we have no way to tell whether a particular outcome—for instance, the predilection for conflict or balancing behavior of an actor or group of actors—is a result of human nature or environmental factors. Thayer provides no scope conditions as to when one should expect genetics to trump environmental factors, nor does he specify mechanisms by which evolutionary and environmental factors combine to create particular patterns of human behavior. For this reason, sociobiology provides at best a limited and probabilistic account of the role of biology in human behavior. To make matters worse, Thayer’s conception of sociobiology generates contradictory predictions about what types of behavior evolutionary pressures generate. Because he avoids discussion of the sociobiological debate regarding the unit of selection, Thayer proposes inconsistent evolutionary mechanisms that exert influence at different analytical levels. For example, at the level of the individual, he draws on Richard Dawkins’s work to argue that humans will behave egoistically, placing their interests above all others (p. 132). Simultaneously, he argues that humans will often act submissively, sublimating their own interests to dominant individuals in “dominance hierarchies” (pp. 134–136). In his explanation of the origins of war, he contends that genetic pressures encourage individuals to behave altruistically, sacrificing themselves for the collectivity during warfare (pp. 143–144). As a microfoundation for understanding human behavior, therefore, Thayer’s account cannot tell us when individual humans will behave egoistically, submissively, or altruistically. Moreover, the diverse and contradictory sociobiological approaches that Thayer strings together cannot conclusively sketch the mechanisms by which these individual motivations aggregate to social groups. The lack of any discussion regarding how individual dispositions influence the behavior of institutionalized social groupings is particularly problematic, because the behaviors that Thayer seeks to explain occur exclusively at the level of the group. In other words, because sociobiology does not present analytically rigorous or empirically persuasive linkages between individual genetic predispositions and group behaviors, importing sociobiology into international relations theory does not help to illuminate the fundamental issue of international politics—the behavior and interactions of human aggregates, whether they be states, corporations, international organizations, or ethnic groups.

# xt: AT: Thayer

**Theoretical assumptions cannot be tested independent from the hypothesis that they generate – Thayer’s theory does not generate the necessary falsifiable results necessary**

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Thus, we disagree with Thayer’s contention that sociobiology provides a “better ultimate cause” (p. 137) for realist theory because both “its ultimate and proximate causes are testable” (p. 127). Most philosophers of science argue that, by definition, theoretical assumptions cannot be tested or evaluated independent from the hypotheses that they generate.21 The merit of a particular theory is not whether all of its elements are testable, but rather whether the hypotheses it generates are clear, falsifiable, internally consistent, and therefore amenable to empirical evaluation.22 Second, most contemporary variants of realism reject human nature assumptions in favor of structuralist or rational choice–based analytic categories. In this way, these approaches generally meet the broad methodological standards outlined above in the sense that both generate falsifiable, consistent, and empirically testable hypotheses from a set of theoretical presuppositions. For example, although a structural realist approach assumes away the theoretical importance off actors at the state level,23 it still generates falsifiable and testable predictions about how characteristics of the international system, such as its polarity, affect international stability.24 Similarly, although rational choice approaches ignore the degree to which state actors do not behave in a manner consistent with instrumental rationality,25 a rational choice approach can generate a series of deductively linked, eminently testable hypotheses about how idealized actors with assumed preferences respond to particular structural situations.26

**Thayer’s approach is not preferable to current approaches to political realism – his view is not accepted, and is by no means legitimates**

**Bell and MacDonald, 2k** - a doctoral candidate at the Center for International Studies, Cambridge University. He spent the past academic year as a Fulbright Scholar in the Department of Political Science, Columbia University; a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science, Columbia University (Duncan S.A. and Paul K., International Security, Vol. 26 No. 1 (Summer 2001), pp. 191)

Therefore one can make theoretical assumptions about what motivates human behavior when constructing theories and still generate hypotheses that are amenable to empirical evaluation. In this way, ultimate causes may be assumed such that testable theories of proximate influences can be hypothesized. Although Thayer may be correct that sociobiology can be tested and falsified, he is mistaken when he argues that sociobiology is superior to current approaches to political realism. In fact, current varieties of realism may generate microfoundations that are superior to sociobiology because they are not as indeterminate and inconsistent as the sociobiological alternative. Importing sociobiology into international relations does not accomplish any of the goals its proponents assert: Sociobiology does not provide a scientifically accepted view of human nature, the microfoundations it generates are indeterminate with regard to the role of material environment and culture, and the leaps that sociobiology makes between individual and group behaviors are underspecified and contradictory. Given the presence of plausible social scientific alternatives to sociobiology, including structural and rational actor analytical approaches, realist scholars should be extremely wary of importing the ethically charged and methodologically flawed sociobiological approach into the study of world politics.

# AT: Pinker

**Pinker ignores interplay between environment and genetics**

**Bateson, ’02** - emeritus professor of ethology at Cambridge University and president of the Zoological Society of London (Patrick, Science, New Series, Vol. 297, No. 5590 (Sep. 27, 2002), pp. 2212)

Behavioral genetics has established beyond all reasonable doubt that many individual differences in behavior can be attributed to genetic differences. However, the notion that the variability in behavior can be partitioned into genetic and environmental components is utterly misleading. Doing so ignores the rich and crucial interplay between the developing individual and his or her social and physical world. The estimates of heritability, with which Pinker seems completely comfortable, depend on the population of individuals and the range of environments sampled. Worse, the effects of a particular set of genes depend critically on the environment in which they are expressed, while the effects of a particular sort of environment depend on the individual's genes. Finally, heritability estimates say nothing about the ways in which genes and environment contribute to the biological and psychological processes of development. Walking on two legs is a fundamental property of being human, and it is one of the more obvious biological differences between humans and other great apes such as chimpanzees or gorillas. Although it depends heavily on genes, it has a heritability of zero because human variability in this respect de- pends on the vagaries of the environment. Pinker appears to miss the irony that the dependence of high heritibilities on human diversity conflicts with conclusions from the other modern subject he draws on for his at- tack on the social scientists—the evidence for human universals derived from the work by evolutionary psychologists. Like many biologists, I regard proposals about the evolution and current utility of behavior as helpful in making sense of behavior. But it does not follow that all examples of present-day behaviors that clearly benefit the individual in the modern world are products of evolution. The combination of oral linguistic ability and manual dexterity, both of which are doubtless derived from past evolutionary pressures, generated written language in several parts of the world in the last 6000 years. It is not at all likely that the different forms of written language are adaptive in the sense of having been shaped by Darwinian evolution. Moreover, proposals about past evolutionary pressures or current utility must leave open the question of how the behavior develops. Whether or not an individual's development involves some "instruction" from a normally stable feature of the environment, or whether it would be changed by altering the prevailing social and physical environment, cannot be deduced from even the most plausible evolutionary or functional argument. Part of the problem is that Pinker is so vague in his use of the term instinct, on which much of his conception of human nature depends. Apart from its colloquial uses, the term instinct has at least nine scientific meanings: present at birth (or at a particular stage of development), not learned, developed before it can be used, unchanged once developed, shared by all members of the species (or at least of the same sex and age), organized into a distinct behavioral system (such as foraging), served by a distinct neural module, adapted during evolution, and differences among individuals that are due to their possession of different genes. One use does not necessarily imply another even though people often assume, without evidence, that it does. Behavior that has probably been shaped by Darwinian evolution and appears, ready-formed, without opportunities for learning may be changed in form and the circumstances of expression by sub- sequent experience. The human smile is a good example. This matters because what Pinker happily calls human nature is in reality individual nature and depends critically on the circumstances of that person's life.

# AT: Shaw and Wong

**1. Shaw and Wong are wrong – they portray inclusive fitness as an axiom, not a disputed theory, and they have no theoretical or empirical warrants**

**Goldstein, ’87** - Professor Emeritus of International Relations, American University (Washington, DC) Research Scholar, University of Massachusetts and Nonresident Sadat Senior Fellow, CIDCM, University of Maryland (Joshua S., International Studies Quarterly (1987) 31, 40-42, “The Emperor’s New Genes: Sociobiology and War,” University of Southern California)

The article by Shaw and Wong, published in this issue of ISQ, restates the premises of Wilson's sociobiology, but contributes nothing new. There is no cumulation of knowledge or theory here. Shaw and Wong treat inclusive fitness not as a disputed theory but as an axiom. Other than restating old and questionable theories without addressing their critics, the article contains only two original aspects. First, seven mathematical equations are presented. Second, the authors conclude with some speculation about modern societies, which they hope to consider in the future. Shaw and Wong's restatement of controversial theories from sociobiology contains the following points: Humans form themselves into ethnic or "kinship" groups sharing a genetic stock. Genetic relatedness increases solidarity and internal order within a group. Human behavior is cooperative and even altruistic within a group; and competitive and hostile toward other groups.29 In-group cooperation and out-group enmity are explained by inclusive fitness (groups that can mobilize to prevail in conflict would have better prospects for long-term survival and reproduction). And individuals may "rationally" sacrifice themselves for the sake of preserving their genes in other members of the group.30 Shaw and Wong justify none of these assertions theoretically or empirically. They make no reference to the debates on aggression, nor those on the genetic basis of behavior. They ignore the arguments of Boorman and Levitt, and of Corning-both of which imply that Hamilton's "inclusive fitness" model would not extend to human societies. Furthermore, Shaw and Wong do not adequately acknowledge the difficulties of applying a kinship-based theory of war to a world that has been divided into genetically- mixed nation-states for centuries. Israel, for example, is a prime example of a modern nation-state showing strong in-group cohesion (out-group enmity) despite being genetically heterogeneous (half of IsraeliJews are more closely related genetically to the Arab world than to the other IsraeliJews). Shaw and Wong do not tackle such problems. Shaw and Wong do not show why biology, rather than solely culture, should explain: (1) the spread of warlike behavior; (2) the creation of "information networks;" (3) in- group cohesion and problems in cooperation between groups; or (4) the willingness to sacrifice for one's group.31 Shaw and Wong (p. 7) acknowledge that culture distinguishes human from animal behavior, a gap they claim to address in their article. But instead they presume that genetics defines groups, and exclude cultural considerations from their model altogether. Shaw and Wong's argument, then, consists of propositions borrowed from sociobiology, which they neither support with new evidence, nor elaborate in light of previous criticisms. What about the mathematical equations? They accurately reflect the propositions that Shaw and Wong advance. But what is gained from such formalisms in this instance? They are put to no significant cause, and seem only to seek legitimacy for a theory that otherwise lacks support. Everything said here in mathematical equations could be stated verbally in less space and with greater clarity. Equations [1]-[4] state that individuals compete ("e.g., undertake a war") only if their net gain (gains less costs) from doing so is less than from not doing so-a proposition taken from the rational choice model. The variable under study-to compete, to start a war, etc. -is completely vague in definition and does not take account of the many variations and interpretations of such acts and their meanings. Thus the mathematical language here encourages theoretical imprecision rather than forcing theoretical precision. Furthermore, the specification is wrong, because the comparison should not be "start a war" versus "do nothing" but rather "start a war versus a wide range of alternative types of behavior in the human repertoire. By excluding these nonwarlike behaviors, Shaw and Wong reveal a presumption that human beings are inherently pre- disposed toward war. Equation [5] says that the expected net gain from competition depends in part on the probability of winning the competition, the outcome being indeterminate ahead of time. This is a component of many "rational choice" models. But in itself it is trivial. Equation [6] states that gains from competition include gains to the individual's group, as well as to the individual. The group is defined, unnecessarily, by genetic relatedness. To include altruism toward a group as an individual utility in a rational choice model is reasonable; but even if so, that utility need not be genetically based. Equation [7] repeats that "competition" will be desirable if the net gains, as extended by Equations [5] and [6], are greater than the gains of not competing. What about the political aspects of this argument? Shaw and Wong (p. 12) claim that warlike behavior has been both "rational" and "positively functional in humanity's evolution." This is a political rather than scientific statement. Shaw and Wong seem to believe that war and racism are the natural order of things, and have contributed to human progress. If so, they should come out and say so in plain language, rather than couching their beliefs in scientific terms. In sum, Shaw and Wong reproduce the controversial theories of one side of a debate without giving us even a hint that these theories are in dispute both scientifically and politically.32 Instead, they are simply treated as axioms. It is a case of the "emperor's new clothes" '-naked assumptions, dressed up with scientific and mathematical language, that lack any real substance. The study of war can benefit from thoughtful perspectives from the life sciences,33 but those benefits will not be obtained by a superficial borrowing of disputed theories. As Wiegele (1979: 145, 154) suggests: When the potential exists to enhance explanations of political phenomena with variables from' the life sciences, we should not fail to realize that potential. .. [But] where the life sciences contribute nothing, we should not bend to employ them.

# AT: Inclusive Fitness

**1. The authors literally exclude every instance of human good will**

**2. Their authors blatantly exclude cooperation, as opposed to natural competition – invalidates their claims**

**Fuentes, ’04** - Professor of Anthropology; Director of the Institute for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts (ISLA) B.A., University of California, Berkeley (Agustin, American Anthropologist, Vol. 106, No. 4, December 2004, p. 711-712)

It is not always clear how to go about asking questions about cooperation and competition from an evolutionary perspective. Studies of human behavior in the social and biological sciences have tended to model the role of competition and the appearance of aggression, trying to explain why humans fight, go to war, and otherwise engage in large scale competitive contests. But there is also a large body of literature that indicates that cooperation within groups was, and is, an important aspect of human behavior and societies. However, this focus on intragroup cooperation is frequently combined with a focus on intergroup competition. Rather than assuming that early human groups engaged repeatedly in competing with other groups in their area for resources and survival, I suggest that we think about populations and other forms of cultural clusters as potential arenas for vast and intricate ranges of behaviors including cooperation (but not just cooperation for more effective competition). This approach requires comparative studies across multiple levels of social interaction, which incorporate insights from ecology and evolutionary theory. We should engage in a complex interpretation of evolutionary processes, incorporating premises of DST and taking care when proposing specific, discrete adaptive scenarios for humankind that rely on strong selection and individual-fitness models. And we need cultural, behavioral, physiological, and archeological details to establish measures that go beyond assumptions of the primacy of competition and that enable us to add cooperative patterns to competitive ones in our toolkit for assessing our past. Finally, we need to retheorize both competition and cooperation in ways that move beyond dichotomous thinking. Studying the complex relationship between cooperative patterns, competition, and dynamic organism–environment interactions is an extremely important component of anthropological inquiry, an important place on which to focus our collective gaze.

**3. Exclusive focus on an individual modeling theory is inappropriate – their claims are based in singular, inaccurate logic**

**Fuentes, ’04** - Professor of Anthropology; Director of the Institute for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts (ISLA) B.A., University of California, Berkeley (Agustin, American Anthropologist, Vol. 106, No. 4, December 2004, p. 711-712)

Couching this perspective against a backdrop of a history of assumptions about the primacy of competition and human aggression is appropriate. It is not clear that most anthropologists think frequently about complex evolutionary theory, or that when they do, they see cooperative interactions within and between groups in the context of multilevel evolutionary processes. Although it is true that many anthropologists are examining everyday lives and the complex patterns within them, are we effectively tying these facets into broader themes in evolutionary biology in a nonreductionist way? Much of the focus on the evolution of human patterns remains on interindividual or intergroup competition for access to resources (social, nutritional, etc.) or patterns of conflict and reconciliation within and between groups. I suggest that it is a worthwhile endeavor to refocus the inquiry away from an exclusive focus on individual fitness modeling to explain facets of cooperation and human evolution. We can move toward looking at the impact that groups have on their environment and how cooperation across groups (not just within groups) may be one human adaptive pattern. This is not arguing against the existence and importance of competition, just against its primacy in driving evolutionary change. The traditional neo-Darwinian perspective explains cooperation as having arisen as an adaptive mechanism to deal with competition (be it from other members within the same group or with other groups entirely). This may be an oversimplification of human evolutionary history and is a focus that may be obfuscating other potential adaptive patterns in human history. It privileges competition as the initial driver in evolutionary change and, thus, constrains the potential range of inquiry. Including the possibility of an alternative perspective based in emerging complexities in evolutionary theory can assist in our quest to model our evolutionary past.

# AT: Chimps

**1. Their concept of “state” aggression is inherently flawed, because the “state” is not a meaningful division of culture; thus, as behavioral traits cannot be transferred up the gradient from human to state, they cannot be transferred down the same gradient**

**Goldstein, ’87** - Professor Emeritus of International Relations, American University (Washington, DC) Research Scholar, University of Massachusetts and Nonresident Sadat Senior Fellow, CIDCM, University of Maryland (Joshua S., International Studies Quarterly (1987) 31, 37-38, “The Emperor’s New Genes: Sociobiology and War,” University of Southern California)

The human species is not divided into meaningful genetic subgroups, nations, races, and ethnic groups are not separate isolated gene pools. Montagu (1964: xi) rejects the idea that "there exist different populations of the same species which are distinguished from one another by the possession of certain distinctive hereditary traits. " Ehrlich and Holm (1964: 168) argue that different genetic groupings will result depending on whether individuals are classified by skin color, blood groups, hair type, body build, etc. Anthropological classifications of ethnic groups, from a biological perspective, "overemphasize differences. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the classification of human sub- species or 'races..' (Ehrlich and Holm, 1964: 162). Gould (1981: 322-323) points to the "lack of genetic differentiation among human groups." He argues that Homo sapiens does not contain "meaningfully different genetic capacities" and that "all modern human races probably split from a common ancestral stock only tens of thousands of years ago" -i.e., very recently on an evolutionary scale. Gould quotes Lewontin to the effect that if the holocaust comes and a small tribe deep in the New Guinea forests are the only survivors, almost all the genetic variation now expressed among the innumerable groups of our four billion people will be preserved. (Gould, 1981: 323) 4. Even if such subpopulations did exist, "inclusive fitness " would not explain the maximization of behavioral traits across them. Konner (1982: 13) refers to "the almost universal view among biologists that evolution proceeds primarily through competition among individuals and their [immediate] kindreds. The selection or elimination of larger population units is, at best, uncommon. "23 Boorman and Levitt (1980: 25, 233, 250) use an elaborate mathematical model to critique Hamilton's original model of inclusive fitness.24 They find that "Hamilton's original notion of kin selection as tending to maximize 'inclusive fitness' must be strongly qualified . . ." because of nonlinearities not captured in Hamilton's model. "Thus the principle of inclusive fitness . . . should be replaced by a more refined analysis.. . . " Boorman and Levitt's model indicates that, except in narrow conditions where Hamilton's equations hold, "kin selection does not generally maximize inclusive fitness'': Hamilton's . . . theory is very much a theory of pure kin selection effects. If any non-kin-selectionist effects become intermixed in the model . . . then Hamilton's conclusions fail to be robust. As far as the social behavior of higher vertebrates is concerned, one should expect adulteration of pure kin selection with the entry of reciprocal altruism as an additional evolutionary force. Corning (1983: 90, 104) argues that human society has evolved around just such adulterating influences-cooperation extending beyond immediate kin. He distinguishes various kinds of cooperative behavior, of which self-abnegating altruism is only one. Corning stresses the role of "egoistic cooperation" in which individuals them- selves (not just their kin) benefit through participation in cooperative social systems. In such cooperative systems, ". . . one's own and others' needs are simultaneously or serially satisfied by joint, coordinated, or reciprocal actions" (Corning, 1983: 103). Such egoistic cooperation, according to Corning, is generally not kin-based, and kin selection mechanisms are "not essential" for the emergence of cooperation.25 Corning criticizes Wilson's concept of altruism for downplaying egoistic cooperation, which "does not require a special genetic model or reductionist explanation":26 In assuming that social life is based mainly on altruism rather than on egoistic co-operation, Wilson . . . was forced to conclude, erroneously, that the more complex forms of social behavior must be based on kinship. Thus the concept of inclusive fitness represents a genetic boundary with limited scope for co- operation. (Corning, 1983: 115-116)

**2. They provide no substantial link to the behavior of chimps and the behavior of nation-states; prefer our specific link evidence**

# AT: Chimps

**3. Genetic determinism fails – we cannot be sure of our benchmark to which we evaluate human characteristics**

**Dawes, ’95** - Emeritus Professor of Psychology, Ph.D. University of Michigan (Robyn M., Political Psychology, Vol. 16, No. 1, Special Issue: Political Economy and Political

Psychology (Mar., 1995), pp. 82-83)

The problem is that our understanding of human characteristics must be evaluated relative to a benchmark that has been used ever since the first crude attempts at understanding, and while we have achieved some incremental progress relative to this benchmark, progress is only in specific areas and is slight in comparison to what we might wish. The benchmark consists of an understanding of the physical state of the human body during the life course, the importance of group membership and role in predicting social behavior, and the importance of the simple principle that the best predictor of future behavior within a group or role is past behavior. These predictive principles are far from perfect; age and physiology provide only a norm, with wide variability about that norm; behavior influenced by group memberships and roles is subject to change as cultures change, and the prediction from the past to the future is far from perfect; people change, although-as I will argue later-attempts to predict who will change, when, and how have met with little or no success. (Of course, various intellectuals and professionals claim to have such an ability; when these claims are subjected to the "show me" challenge, however, they fail it; when they are not substantiated purely on a post hoc basis of being able to "explain" what has already occurred, they are maintained only through biased feedback concerning predictions actually made-or even hypothetical feedback based on the simple assumption that one's predictions "must" be valid because the degree of predict-ability based on validated understanding i s considered to be inadequate.) Let me illustrate my positive answer to the question of whether we have gone beyond benchmark understanding by an example from the area of behavioral decision-making:A n understanding o f the fundamental attribution error in people's judgments of the importance of environmental factors versus personality factors in influencing human behavior. This example will simultaneously illustrate the limitations in our progress in surpassing the benchmark. Later, I will discuss another area of behavioral decision-making-that of predicting socially important human outcomes-to support the conclusion that even though we have achieved some understanding of specific characteristics, it cannot be termed an understanding of our basic nature. The fundamental attribution error is a systematic bias in the way in which we explain our own and others' behavior; it is important not just in itself, but also because such explanations form a basis of our decisions about how to respond, how to deal with problems posed by what others (or we) do, and even how we formulate political, social, and foreign policies (Dawes, 1991). What "we say to ourselves about ourselves and others" in large part influences what we do-although such attributions need not always be expressed in an explicit verbal manner. **What we say is biased.**

# AT: Cannibalism

**1. “Cannibalism” based on unreliable test results**

**The Scientist, ’06** (Melissa Lee Phillips, 1/9/06, TheScientist.com, “No cannibalism signature in human gene,” http://www.the-scientist.com/news/display/22927/)

The Science authors proposed that, throughout human evolution, prion disease transmitted through cannibalism encouraged balancing selection on several PRNP haplotypes, which then conferred heterozygous resistance to disease. However, in July 2004, Kreitman and Anna Di Rienzo, also of the University of Chicago, published a criticism of the Mead et al. paper in Trends in Genetics, citing an ascertainment bias in haplotype sampling. Mead and colleagues sequenced the full PRNP gene in a few people of European ancestry, and then used the single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) they discovered to genotype a larger, global population. But without resequencing every individual included in the final study, the authors likely biased their results toward common polymorphisms, the signature of balancing selection, Kreitman told The Scientist. "They had in fact excluded the low-frequency variants and only looked at the common ones, and then came to the conclusion that there are too many common ones," Kreitman said. In the new study, Soldevila and her colleagues completely sequenced the prion protein-coding region in 174 humans from various geographic regions. They ran multiple statistical tests and found no evidence of balancing selection either overall or among people from any continental region, said senior author Jaume Bertranpetit. The values of their statistical results suggest that positive selection may have acted upon the gene, Bertranpetit said, although complex scenarios, including episodes of both positive and purifying selection, may also explain the data. "This new study is very insightful," Christopher Seabury of Texas A&M University in College Station, who was not involved in the study, told The Scientist. However, "there's still a significant overabundance of PRNP codon 129 heterozygotes in the Fore women who engaged in cannibalistic feasts," he said. It's possible that balancing selection on the prion locus has taken place locally among the Fore or other small groups, Bertranpetit agreed, "but it has not been important in human history."

**2. Their specific cannibalism ceremonies were conducted out of respect for the dead, not human aggression – disproves their genetic claims**

**3. The cannibalism balancing-selection theory is flawed**

**Slodevilla et al., ’05** - Evolutionary Biology Unit, Faculty of Health Sciences and Life Sciences, Pompeu Fabra University (Marta, July, rends in Genetics, Volume 21, Issue 7, 389-391, 1 July 2005)

Ascertainment bias was suggested in a study by Mead et al.[3], who proposed that balancing selection was the mechanism that maintained a polymorphism in the gene encoding the human prion protein (PRNP; GenBank accession no. M13899) in codon 129 (M129V). Mead et al.[3] argued that repeated episodes of endocannibalism in ancient human populations could have produced the signatures of balancing selection that were observed. These signatures were characterized by an excess of DNA-sequence variants with intermediate frequencies and were detected as statistically significant positive values of Tajima's D [4]. Other evidence cited in support their hypothesis included: (i) the distribution of pairwise mutational differences among sequences; (ii) the McDonald and Kreitman (MK) test [5]; (iii) the estimated age of the 129 polymorphism; and (iv) the extremely high frequency of the 129V allele in the Fore population in Papua New Guinea. In this population, evidence for a recent episode of such balancing selection is particularly convincing and is the most extreme case of balancing selection ever reported in humans [6]. However, Kreitman and Di Rienzo [1] suggested that the strategy followed by Mead et al. could have biased the results by selectively excluding low-frequency variants and thus affect the main conclusions. Here we present our experimental results, which confirm their suggestions. We resequenced 2378bp from the human PRNP, corresponding to the entire exon two, in 174 humans (348 chromosomes from all of the main geographic regions of the world). We did not find any evidence to support balancing selection and demonstrate that the bias introduced by testing for selection on the basis of SNP typing [1], instead of analyzing complete sequences data, can severely impair the analysis. Although the region studied is smaller than that reported by Mead et al.[3], it includes all of exon two (i.e. most of the gene) and it is sufficiently large to provide adequate power to explore the evolutionary history of PRNP

\*\*\*Specific Author INDICTS

# AT: Guzzini

**Guzzini’s view of realism is inherently flawed**

**Rologas, 00** Professor of International Studies at the University of St. Andrews(Mitchell, 76 International Affiars 1, “Review (untitled)” (review of “Realism in international relations and international political economy: the continuing story of a death foretold”, by Stefano Guzzini), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2626202>, JPW)

This is a stimulating work which, for all the excellence of some of its individual components, nevertheless does not add up to a convincing whole. Guzzini's interpretation of realism as 'the attempt to translate the rules of the diplomatic practice of the nineteenth century into scientific rules of social science which developed mainly in the US' (p. ii) is plausible enough but his treatment of the historical assimilation is questionable. He repeats the tired old myth that there was an interwar 'debate' between idealism and realism (p. 32). Not only do scholars investigating the period find little evidence for such a debate, but they also have considerable difficulty in separating the idealists from the realists (see for example the essays in David Long and Peter Wilson, eds., Thinkers of the twenty-year crisis: inter-war realism reassessed, I995). Was Chamberlain an idealist or a realist? E. H. Carr, as Guzzini is aware, gave different answers to this question in consecutive editions of his Twenty-year crisis. Certainly, if we accept Guzzini's summary that 'in short, idealism holds that through reason alone mankind can overcome the state of nature in inter-state relations' (p. I7) we will be hard pressed to identify very many idealists at all. This is important because Guzzini wishes to resurrect the Kuhnian notion of 'paradigms' in suggesting that there was a paradigmatic shift from idealism to realism as the dominant paradigm after the Second World War. I doubt whether realism has ever enjoyed quite the unchallenged status that Guzzini ascribes to it, certainly nothing that would approach the Kuhnian state of 'normal science.' Hans Morgenthau-whose Politics among nations is described by Guzzini as 'the paradigmatic text of the emerging US social science' (p. i6)-had numerous detractors both within academe and in the broader policy-shaping networks.

# AT: Jarvis

Jarvis misreads and essentializes critical scholarship making his claims worthless

Michael J Shapiro, Professor of Politial Science at the University of Hawaii. International Studies Association review of Books 2001 p. 126-128

D. S. L. Jarvis's International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodern­ism: Defending the Discipline constitutes a radical alternative to Cochran's practice of critique. Manifesting a serious allergy to critique and especially to what he calls "postmodernism," Jarvis presumes that he must defend tradi­tional, neopositivist IR against (in the words of the book jacket) "the various postmodern and poststructuralist theories currently sweeping the discipline of International Relations."To put the matter simply at the outset, Jarvis appears to be almost **entirely ignorant** of the philosophical predicates of the critical IR literature he attacks. He **invents a model** of thought that he finds vulnerable and then proceeds with his method of argumentation, **mostly to scoff at the enemy he has invented.** But Jarvis's scoffing amounts to whistling in the dark. He has entered a field of critique with predicates that are mysterious to him, and he shows signs of being genuinely anxious about the consequences of critical work.**The monster Jarvis creates is a work of fiction**, for he begins with the pre­sumption that postmodern orientations are "sweeping" and therefore threaten­ing the discipline. (I estimate that roughly one percent of the papers at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association reference postructural­ist philosophy.) Returning to the Victorian genre of Gothic fiction in which the constitutive practice involves two primary roles—the monster and the victim—Jarvis portrays Richard Ashley as the Frankenstein monster and the victim as the entire IR discipline. Moreover, Jarvis's overwrought style of characteriza­tion of the dangers of postmodern IR fits Gothic fiction's motivational profile as well. As is noted in Fred Botting's treatment of the genre: "The terrors and horrors of transgression in Gothic writing become powerful means to reassert the values of society, virtue and propriety. . . . They warn of dangers by putting them in their darkest and most threatening form" (p. 5).Why fiction? Jarvis' makes "the postmodern" (which he seems to know primarily on the basis of rumor, for most of his citations are not to postructur­alist texts but to thinkers hostile to them) an elastic category that applies to everything that he perceives to be antagonistic to his pre-Kantian empiricism. It encompasses most of feminist IR and anything that uses interpretive method. Although the use of a deconstructive mode of critique is extremely rare in international studies (the major practitioner is David Campbell), Jarvis fre­quently uses the term "deconstruction" as a synonym for postmodernist method. He assumes, without showing any evidence that he has read a word of Jacques Derrida's writings, that deconstruction is hostile to theory building and is opposed to all forms of affirmation. This characterization is belied by Derrida's state‑ments and demonstrations and by Campbell's deconstruction-inspired writing on war, security, and the ethics of responsibility. Symptomatic of his woeful ignorance of critical work in general, Jarvis refers at one point to the expression "structure of feeling" as a "postmodern phrase" (p. 32). Structure of feeling is initiated in the work of Raymond Williams, the late (and famous—though not sufficiently to alert Jarvis) Marxist literary critic whose work cannot be remotely related to poststructuralist critique and has inspired such prominent postmod­ernism bashers as Terry Eagleton.Jarvis's ignorance is not confined to contemporary critical interpretive theory (postmodern or otherwise); it even extends to the neoempiricist philosophy of science. For example, he chides postmodernists for holding the outrageous view that theorizing constitutes fact (p. 27), while he wants to uphold a model in which the integrity of theory—in international studies or elsewhere—requires that the domains of theory and fact be understood as radically separate. One need not resort to a Foucauldian treatment of discourse as event or a Deleuzian **critique of representational thinking to challenge Jarvis's approach to theory**. Jarvis's view of the theory–data relationship was seriously impeached by enough neoempiricist philosophers by the 1960s to field a softball team (among the heavy hitters in the starting lineup would be Willard V. Quine, Patrick Suppes, and Norwood Russell Hanson).The critical work for which Jarvis has contempt is not the threat he imag­ines to "the discipline," unless we construct the IR discipline as a trained inat­tention to the problematics, within which the work of theory proceeds. The writings of Michel Foucault (some of whose work Jarvis seems to have read) have implications for a critical and affirmative perspective that does not com­promise the kind of theory building that IR empiricists do. It extends the arena—in which to theorize while encouraging a historical sensitivity—to regimes of discourse and suggests an ethico-politics of freedom from the impo­sitions of identity. Although Foucault's conception of the problematic points to how concepts and the modes of fact assigned to them are historically contin­gent, explicable in contexts of value, and complicit with modes of power and authority, this does not thereby invalidate theory. Rather, it opens the way to work on the ethico-political context of theory and, among other things, to theo­rize with a sensitivity to theory's constituencies (**beyond the policymakers** that seem to be **prized** by Jarvis). As Molly Cochran, whose work is based on knowl­edge and critique rather than rumor and contempt, implies, an important legacy of contemporary critical work is the expansion of political and moral inclusion. Finally, there is one other genre that is (regrettably) embedded in Jarvis's fable of the dangers of postmodernism, a biographical speculation about a five-year hiatus in Richard Ashley's publishing life. Obsessed with the dangers of postmodernism, Jarvis attributes these years of silence to the "deep resigna­tion" (p. 183) that he thinks Ashley's version of postmodern theorizing invites. Without insisting on a counterspeculation, I want to point out that Ashley's publishing hiatus coincides with the period shortly after an automobile accident claimed the life of his wife and seriously maimed his two sons. **At a minimum, the information renders Jarvis's biographical fable crass and uninformed—like the rest of the book.**

# AT: Murray

**Murray’s theories fail to solve any of realism’s flaws**

**Smith 99** Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard, Lecturer in Politics at Merton College, Assistant Professor of Government and Social Studies at Harvard, Professor of Political and Social Thought at the University of Virginia (Michael, 75 International Affairs 4, “Review: [untitled]” (review of “Reconstructing Realism”, by Alistair J. H. Murray), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2626286>, JPW)

If Trollope had written this thoughtful book, it would be called Realism redux, for not only does it seek to vindicate its protagonist-in this case the whole realist school of thought-in the face of unfair attacks, it also insists upon the hero's continuing importance, relevance, and wisdom. The author succeeds more fully in the first task than in the second. Realism may yet suffer from misinterpretation and oversimplification, but it remains difficult to see how it can provide a compass to guide us though the dilemmas of ethics and foreign policy. Murray's summary on the latter issue aptly restates the realist fondness for paradox, without really going beyond it: 'Realism teaches us that politics is, in the final analysis, a process of dealing with unending moral dilemmas; we must simply cope with them as best we can' (p. I 5 5). Realism invokes prudence, restraint, and is rightly sceptical of self-righteous crusades; at the same time it contains a 'universalist' element that Murray describes 'as existing in its own space, detached from both rationalism and reflectivism, beholden to neither'. But what defines this space? In the close readings of realist texts that comprise the most convincing parts of this book, Murray adopts an Augustinian reading of these texts that might provide a clue. And indeed there is much in the rich, interpretative chapters of this book that will repay careful reading. Students of realist thought, qua political theory, will now regard Murray as an essential addition to the literature. As a sometime foil for his views, I appreciate his careful and respectful readings-yet I still think he is too credulous of the realist invocation to synthesis without defining its specific content. Of course Weber says we should combine the ethic of conviction with the ethic of responsibility (p. I I I)-but how, precisely? Neither Weber nor Murray has much to say here.

# AT: Mearsheimer

**Mearsheimer rejects any possibility of diplomacy and peacemaking**

**Rosecrance, 02** Research Professor of Political Science at the University of California, former Professor in Public Policy at the University of Harvard (Richard, 55 World Politics 1, “Review: War and Peace”, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054212>, JSTOR, pg. 166, JPW)

In the future, as Mearsheimer sees it, the world will have to deal with a strong but uncertain China. But unlike Mearsheimer's prescription for restraining Beijing, the best way to assure Beijing's long-term cooperation is to couple de facto limits with an invitation to China to join a preponderant coalition of nations. Socializing China will not be an easy task, but it will become immensely more difficult if it is conjoined with an American attempt to cut the Chinese growth rate.94 There are better, positive ways to influence China's course. Historically speaking, the argument is clear. The benefits to a rising power of joining such a coalition are far greater than seeking to oppose all others by force of arms. Napoleon, the kaiser, and Hitler did not improve the international positions of their respective countries: they worsened and diminished them. Opposing nations, Great Britain, the United States, and for a while the Soviet Union, were longer-term beneficiaries of the aggressor's atavistic expansionism and ultimate isolation. China is among the most subtle of foreign observers, and we can scarcely conceal the benefits of joining such a group from her astute diplomatists. The same point applies to Mearsheimer. In his effort to account for the causes of war, Mearsheimer has neglected the potentiality for peace that diplomacy and inclusive alignments can bring to modern international politics.

**Mearsheimer’s theories can’t understand ideological, ethnic and religious conflicts**

**Seliktar, 08**  Professor of Political Science at Gratz College and Adjunct Professor at Temple University (Ofira, 2/28/2008, “Ignorance and Realism: A Critique of Mearsheimer-Walt”, <http://www.globalpolitician.com/24194-israel-jewish-lobby>, JPW)

Again, given their realist perspective, it is hard for Walt and Mearsheimer to understand a conflict that seems to defy their categories. After all, it would seem from a superficial examination that rational considerations would make Arab states want to end the struggle, while Palestinian leaders would be expected to seek to obtain a state even if this required considerable compromise. To them, then, the conflict would seem easy to solve and it would be in the U.S. interest--and within its capabilities--to solve it. Explaining how the United States failed to achieve this goal would therefore appear to require some malevolent force which pushed American policy off course. As a result, the authors argue that the Israel lobby has blocked the United States from resolving the conflict, thereby generating anti-American animosity in the region and beyond, since supposedly all Arab states and Muslims would also want to achieve a quick resolution. They assert that upon taking office, George W. Bush, "who understood that it is in the American national interest" to settle the conflict, tried but "has not come close to achieving that goal" because "there has been little change in the balance of power between Bush and the lobby. " Mearsheimer and Walt credited the effectiveness of Elliott Abrams, an official on the National Security Council, and two other lobby members, John Hanna and David Wurmser, with undermining the efforts of Condoleezza Rice to reach out to Arafat's successor, Mahmud Abbas. They charge that the same individuals, working with the Israeli government, prevented Rice from negotiating with Hamas, triggering the takeover of the Gaza Strip by the Islamists in 2007. "Absent the lobby" the United States "could hold out the promise of fulfilling their [Palestinians] dream of a viable state in the Occupied Territories coupled with massive long-term economic aid. " The authors suggest that the United States could have pressured Israel by withdrawing aid and, if necessary, isolated it as they did the apartheid regime in South Africa. [12] Again, this rationalist account shows little or no understanding of how Middle East politics and ideology works, nor does it comprehend the true interests of most Arab regimes. It treats the Palestinians as a unitary rational actor that seeks not Israel's elimination and total victory but merely wants to obtain a state as quickly and easily as possible. This view ignores or misrepresents the complexities of the Oslo process, the goals and governing style of PLO leader Yasir Arafat, and the nature of Palestinian political culture and ideology.

# AT: Mearsheimer

**Mearsheimer’s analysis only takes into account short-term needs, leading to longer-term wars and proliferation**

**Rosecrance, 02** Research Professor of Political Science at the University of California, former Professor in Public Policy at the University of Harvard (Richard, 55 World Politics 1, “Review: War and Peace”, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054212>, JSTOR, pg. 161-162, JPW)

This suggests a role for the United States very different from that recommended by Mearsheimer. Viewing America as an offshore balancer, Mearsheimer sees only short-term interests and would therefore have the United States withdraw even when it has no longer-term interest to do so.82 The presence of American forces in Europe and Northeast Asia surely deters conflict in those regions. Mearsheimer neglects the deterrent effects of these forces and sees only the likelihood that the U.S. would be drawn into wars not in its apparent immediate interest. In Europe, American withdrawal may lead to the nuclearization of Germany,83 creating a crisis within the European Union. In Asia, a U.S. withdrawal will leave Japan and Taiwan on their own to face Beijing. Both would then likely acquire nuclear weapons and delivery capabilities, perhaps stimulating the very conflict with China that Mearsheimer seeks to avoid. In a sentence that acknowledges the likelihood of an unnecessary American withdrawal Mearsheimer writes: "So the United States is likely to pull its troops back across the Atlantic Ocean in the years immediately ahead, if there is no significant chance in the present distribution of potential power, even though that move is likely to intensify security competition in Europe and render it less peaceful" (p. 395). Here Mearsheimer overlooks the deterrent values of stationing forces abroad, as brilliantly elaborated in Thomas Schelling's Arms and Influence and a host of other writings on the conventional and strategic balance during the cold war.84 There is little recognition of the fact that when Ernest Bevin, British foreign secretary, was fashioning the European invitation to the United States to create the North Atlantic alliance, he sensibly reasoned that if American forces had been committed to defend France in 1939-40, Hitler almost certainly would have hesitated.85 If U.S. divisions had been on the Marne (or the Somme) in 1914, Moltke would have had to abandon the Schlieffen Plan. In short Mearsheimer would have the United States receive the worst of all worlds, withdraw now and as a result have to fight later.86 Nor do his prescriptions deal with the omnipresent threat of terrorism.

**Mearsheimer’s theory is too offensive in nature and can’t predict periods of peace**

**Rosecrance, 02** Research Professor of Political Science at the University of California, former Professor in Public Policy at the University of Harvard (Richard, 55 World Politics 1, “Review: War and Peace”, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054212>, JSTOR, pg. 156, JPW)

Is the future likely to be as malign as Mearsheimer supposes? An important limitation of offensive realist theory is that it focuses on war more than on peace and also neglects past periods in which peace ob tained.64 This is not entirely surprising. The "tragedy" of offensive real ism consists in repetitive violence among great powers. Nations, though 61 aware of the tragedy, can do little to overcome it. Besides, a theory of war is obversely a theory of peace, so that in one sense Mearsheimer has already answered the question by empirically concluding that bipolarity and balanced multipolarity are associated with the fewest instances of major war. In addition, Mearsheimer's inability to find a secure theoretical foundation for peace is simply a reflection of the offensive cast of this theory.

\*\*\*2NC BLOCKS -Security

# 2NC AT: Science Good

**1.Their hegemonic conception of science is violent and exclusionary**

**Gunaratne, 10-** Minnesota State University Moorhead (Shelton A., 2010, “De-Westernizing communication/social science research: opportunities and limitations,” Pg. 474, <http://mcs.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/32/3/473.full.pdf> )

The situation is more glaring in the relatively new social science traditions of communication (which is distinguishable from the communication arts traditions of rhetoric, semiotics, phenomenology and critical studies), although a new wave of non-Western communication scholars have made a bold attempt to show how communication science/arts could aim to reach universal universalism by incorporating the axial philosophical approaches of the East (Gunaratne, 2005, 2008; Miike and Chen, 2007) while, at the same time, enriching communication arts with the alternative discourses of Nagarjuna (Dissanayake, 2007; see also Appendix 2), Gandhi (Starosta and Shi, 2007), Sankara (Jayaweera, 1988), Laozi (Combs, 2005) and others. However, in the short-run, this approach is unlikely to open up the portals of the oligopoly of social science powers – the United States and the United Kingdom (with France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands and Italy in the second tier)1 – whose scholars in general remain ignorant and contemptuous of the history, philosophy and civilization of the non-West. In the context of the superiority complex of the Western scholars, who are more concerned with instrumental benefits in the Habermasian sense, a more productive approach would be to demonstrate that de-Westernizing social scientific research does not mean the elimination of the corpus of work that scholars, both Western and non-Western, have produced to conform to the rules of ‘old science’ or the Cartesian–Newtonian paradigm of reductionism; that it means the addition of multiple approaches to investigate problems in their proper context, so that factors such as culture, environment, ideology and power are not omitted from the theoretical framework or held to be constant (*ceteris paribus*). The East’s commitment to the Chinese philosophical principle of the dialectical completion of relative polarities (Cheng, 1987), better known as the *yin–yang* principle, ensures the competitive coexistence of both Eastern and Western theories, or hybrids thereof, within the umbrella concept of communication.

**2. Perceived superiority of western science is the result of pernicious ethnocentrism**

**Gunaratne, 10-** Minnesota State University Moorhead (Shelton A., 2010, “De-Westernizing communication/social science research: opportunities and limitations,” pg. 476, <http://mcs.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/32/3/473.full.pdf> )

Asian, as well as African and Latin American scholars have clearly recognized the problem of Eurocentrism in social science although they have not become renowned for developing original non-Western social theories. In the context of the hegemony of the center (i.e. social science powers) over the so-called ‘periphery’ in the global academic/scholarship structure (Wallerstein, 2004, 2006), non-Western scholars from different social science disciplines have metatheorized the existence of several problems and disparities, which Alatas elucidates in his 2006 book *Alternative Discourses in Asian Social Science* (pp. 32–33): The almost exclusive influence of Anglo-American – and to some extent French and German – works on the ideas, models, problem selection, methodologies and research priorities of social science. The general neglect of indigenous literary and philosophical traditions as sources for social science theory building; and the lack of originality in generating novel concepts, new theoretical perspectives and innovative research methods. The uncritical adoption or imitation ofWestern social sciencemodels, including auto-Orientalism – the internalization of Orientalist constructions, which engendered an essentialist dichotomy between Western and non-Western societies – the latter identified as backward, barbaric and irrational. The apparent dominance of an elitist perspective in social science as evident from the absence of minority points of view, there being no tradition of recording minority voices (ethnic or underprivileged groups) in some societies. The continuation of the colonial period’s legacy of the alignment of the state with social science (e.g. anthropology, geography, mass communication) to promote national integration/culture, state policies, etc. These problems applied generally to the plight of social science – and, *ergo*, to media and communication studies as well – in the entire global ‘periphery’. Spanish influence initially dominated Latin American social science but today it has been replaced by a mixture of American, French and German intellectualism. Eurocentrism in the social sciences has come under heavy fire by minority groups in the hegemonic center as well, e.g. the AfricanAmerican scholars’ call for relevant Afrocentric interpretations (Asante, 1988, 1999). Two African scholars wrote: In mass communication, as in politics, economics, or cultural affairs, African scholars and those sympathetic to African aspirations have vehemently berated the old and dominant paradigms that have guided the study of communication problems yet they have not quite succeeded in constructing new models to replace them. (M’Bayo and Nwanko, 1989: 9)

# 2NC AT: Empiricism

**1. Empirical facts do not exist independent of our understanding of reality**

**Vasquez, 95-** Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University (John A., 1995, “International Relations Theory Today,” pg. 226)

The first area where some post-empiricists believe science has not been reconstructed is in still holding on to the 'naive' belief in 'an independent data base'. Post-empiricists rightly argue that facts do not simply exist in the world, but are the products of concepts, which in turn are a function of theories, or at least theoretical assumptions. It is argued that facts are not independent of theories, and therefore cannot be used to test theories. Since theories create facts, facts can always be found to support theories. These postpositivist philosophical claims in and of themselves are not definitive, but they are often treated that way to dismiss empirical findings. At first blush, this analysis, because it can be quite sophisticated, appears persuasive, but on further inspection it is at best paradoxical. While it is true that the way we see the world and what constitutes its facts are a function of the concepts we employ, this does not mean that no observations or puzzles existed before the theory. Theories and concepts often follow observations and are meant to explain or account for a pattern. Theorists are not so much interested in 'facts' *per se* as they are in the relationships between 'facts' (variables, etc.). Post-positivists argue, however, that because concepts create facts, any operational definition derived from concepts does not create an independent data base. All data are theory-laden. Any good social scientist would agree with this, but the word 'independent' means different things to each side. For the post-empiricist critic, it seems to mean that any data set will always be biased in favour of the theory that informed its collection. The implication here is that data sets will always produce confirmation rather than falsification of an explanation or theory. As Hawkesworth puts it: if what is taken to be the 'world', what is understood in terms of 'brute data' is itself theoretically constituted (indeed, constituted by the same theory that is undergoing the test), then no conclusive disproof of a theory is likely. For the independent evidence upon which falsification depends does not exist; the available evidence is preconstituted by the same theoretical presuppositions as the scientific theory under scrutiny. (1992, pp. 16-17) This view is widely accepted by political philosophers, and I venture to say that one reason it is, is that they have never really tried to test a hypothesis that was incorrect. If in fact this presumption were true, we should have thousands of strong findings in international relations. Instead we have hardly any! Data are not independent in the sense that they have no connection with concepts, but they are independent in the sense that they do not assure confirmation of theories. Data bases can be considered independent if two competing explanations of the same behaviour (i.e. set of observations) have the same chance of being rejected. We know this is often the case, because, in international relations the most frequent finding is the null finding.

**2. The epistemology of science needs to be reconstructed in order to avoid the faults of empiricism.**

**Vasquez, 95-** Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University (John A., 1995, “International Relations Theory Today,” pg. 228)

The second area where some post-empiricists think scientific enquiry still needs further reconstructing and where their criticisms are much more telling has to do with science's epistemological foundation. The early logical positivists had hoped science and its method could be established on logic, so that its conclusions would be *compelling.* No such epistemology and logical solution has been established. The most recent effort to do so and the focus of much post-empiricist criticism has been that of Popper (1959). He attempted to rest scientific criteria for acceptance of beliefs on the principle of falsification. However, as most are prepared to concede, Popper's efforts fall down because the principle of falsification, as well as the other standard criteria for rejecting theories, must be seen as decision rules, norms if you will, and not as logical conclusions compelling belief. From this view, science becomes a project for making decisions about belief according to fairly rigorous rules, norms and definitions. Establishing a consensus on rules becomes the basis for reconstructing science in the postmodern era. These rules and norms need not be seen as philosophically arbitrary because they are justified on the basis of good reasons. They also are not arbitrary at the practical level in that the rules they embody are applied to make appraisals in a rigorous manner that limits the intrusion of personal preferences. In this way, science can act as a self-correcting mechanism and is one of the few ways people have to save themselves from self-delusion. Although science is a language game, like all other language games in a culture, it can claim adherence over competing games because of its self-correcting mechanism and its ability to settle differences on empirical questions once its procedures are accepted. Ultimately, while science draws upon aspects of the correspondence and coherence theory of truth, it rests as a final check on the pragmatic theory of truth. Putting ideas to test and examining evidence are important strategies that should not be cavalierly discarded by those interested in political enquiry.

# 2NC AT: Empiricism

**3. Exclusive focus on empiricism makes scholarship deficient**

**Bleiker, ’09** (Roland, October 11, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No. 3, “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” pp. 518-519)

Second, and far more consequential: a relatively narrow, positivist and exclusive understanding of social science has come to dominate much of ir scholarship. In the extreme version, this approach holds that all hypotheses 'need to be evaluated empirically before they can make a contribution to knowledge'.40 Or so at least argue three prominent political science and ir scholars. The consequences of such positions are far-reaching. They have dramatically narrowed the scope of inquiries into world politics and the tools available to pursue them. They have elevated a few select faculties, reason in particular, and given them the power to order all others. The result is the erasure of a crucial location of political struggles, the domain of representation, from our purview. This is why Waltz's otherwise commendable attempt to move away from resemblance and recognition ends up in a science-driven process of abstraction that isolates a few select features and produces generalities from them. The problem here is not with abstraction per se, for abstraction is an inevitable component of any process of representation. 'We end up with abstraction whether we want "it" or not', Christine Sylvester stresses.41 But Waltzian abstraction is obsessed with deduction, categorisation and scientific legitimacy. Rather than celebrating the diversity of life and drawing from its sensual potentials, as abstraction in art seeks to do, the neorealist version 'blocks the construction of people in international relations and hinders our view of states as more than the proverbial empty boxes'.42 The result is a narrow and problematic form of common sense. This is why even the more moderate constructivist scholars rely on analytical tools that are largely confined to mimetic principles. Consider Wendt's highly indicative position that knowledge needs to be both systematic and scientific to be of any value. He stresses that '[p]oetry, literature and other humanistic disciplines...are not designed to explain global war or Third World poverty, and as such if we want to solve those problems our best hope, slim as it maybe, is social science'.43

4. **The impact to this exclusion is global war and poverty**

**Bleiker, ’09** (Roland, October 11, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No. 3, “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” pp. 519)

Hope for a better world will, indeed, remain slim if we put all our efforts into searching for a mimetic understanding of the international. Issues of global war and Third World poverty are far too serious and urgent to be left to only one form of inquiry, especially if this mode of thought suppresses important faculties and fails to understand and engage the crucial problem of representation. We need to employ the full register of human perception and intelligence to understand the phenomena of world politics and to address the dilemmas that emanate from them. One of the key challenges, thus, consists of legitimising a greater variety of approaches and insights to world politics. Aesthetics is an important and necessary addition to our interpretative repertoire. It helps us understand why the emergence, meaning and significance of a political event can be appreciated only once we scrutinise the representational practices that have constituted the very nature of this event.

# AT: Only realism Provides Testable Theories

**Burdens established by realist theories are not apolitical- they serve to justify the theory**

**Vasquez, 95-** Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University (John A., 1995, “International Relations Theory Today,” pg. 230)

The criteria of adequacy for scientific theory I present are based on the assumption that good theory must be true. The criteria are justified on the basis of the argument that following and using them increases the probability that a theory, research programme or paradigm that satisfies the criteria is less likely to be false than one that does not. If one prefers not to accept a philosophically realist view of theories (see Nagel, 1961, pp. 117-18, 141-52, 196), then in more instrumental terms, a theory that satisfies these criteria can be said to be more promising for achieving and making progress toward the ultimate goal of science, which is the acquisition of knowledge. There are six criteria (all of them standard in philosophy of science) that are relevant for international relations enquiry. 'Good' theories should be: 1 accurate; 2 falsifiable; 3 capable of evincing great explanatory power; 4 progressive as opposed to degenerating in terms of their research programme(s); 5 consistent with what is known in other areas; 6 appropriately parsimonious and elegant. I label these, respectively, the criteria of accuracy, falsifiability, explanatory power, progressivity, consistency and parsimony. Some of these criteria are more important than others. The first two are essential; if a theory is not accurate or falsifiable (in at least the broad sense of specifying at some point what evidence would lead the theorist to say the theory was inaccurate), it cannot be accepted regardless of how well it satisfies the other criteria. Having great explanatory power, which is defined here as being able to resolve puzzles and anomalies (theoretically) that could not be explained before, is of little use if the explanation turns out to be inaccurate or is non-falsifiable. Likewise, the case for parsimony is often given too much weight in international relations. Theories, as Craig Murphy (personal communication, 1993) argues, should have an appropriate degree of complexity. They should not include all possible variables without regard for their relative potency; nor should they leave out important factors to keep the explanation simple. What is crucial is that theories be able to pass tests - first in principle and then in fact. A criterion that is of great relevance to the inter-paradigm debate is that research programmes must be progressive rather than degenerative. This is the key criterion used by Lakatos (1970) to overcome some of the problems Kuhn (1970) identified about paradigms and their alleged incommensurability (on the latter see Scheffler, 1967). Lakatos shows that while it is logically compelling for one valid test to falsify a theory, there is no logical reason to prohibit a reformulation of a theory on the basis of an almost infinite number of auxiliary hypotheses. Thus, while specific theories or explanations may be falsified, it is very difficult to falsify a research programme with a single underlying theoretical perspective; i.e. what Kuhn would call a paradigm. Suffice it to say here that paradigms that are always developing *ad hoc* propositions and/or having their theories reformulated or emended because they are not passing empirical tests should be considered as degenerating and not as progressive. Finally, good theories should not contradict what is known in other fields of knowledge. Assumptions about motivation or cognition in international relations should be consistent with what is known (as opposed to theorized) in psychology, for example.

# 2NC Cede the political

**1. Critical theory does not cede the political: the affirmative’s claim serves to make critique impossible: only critique can break the conservative’s hold on the political sphere**

**Brown, 05** Professor of Political Science at Cal-Berkeley (Wendy, “Edgework”, pg. 4-5, JPW)

The rebuff of critical theory as untimely provides the core matter of the affirmative case for it. Critical theory is essential in dark times not for the sake of sustaining utopian hopes, making flamboyant interventions, or staging irreverent protests, but rather to contest the very senses of time invoked to declare critique untimely. If the charge of untimeliness inevitably also fixes time, then disrupting this fixity is crucial to keeping the times from closing in on us. It is a way of reclaiming the present from the conservative hold on it that is borne by the charge of untimeliness.

To insist on the value of untimely political critique is not, then, to refuse the problem of time or timing in politics but rather to contest settled accounts of what time it is, what the times are, and what political tempo and temporality we should hew to in political life. Untimeliness deployed as an effective intellectual and political strategy, far from being a gesture of indifference to time, is a bid to reset time. Intellectual and political strategies of successful untimeliness therefore depend on a close engagement with time in every sense of the word. They are concerned with timing and tempo. They involve efforts to grasp the times by thinking against the times. They attempt, as Nietzsche put it, to “overcome the present” by puncturing the present’s “overvaluation of itself,” an overcoming whose aim is to breathe new possibility into the age. If our times are dark, what could be more important.

**2. If we win that the alt solves this means nothing: if we can change discourse than there won’t be a conservative takeover**

**3. No impact: critical theory doesn’t cede the political or kill progressive projects**

**Brown, 05** Professor of Political Science at Cal-Berkeley (Wendy, “Edgework”, pg. 15, JPW)

On the one hand, critical theory cannot let itself be bound by political exigency; indeed, it has something of an obligation to refuse such exigency. While there are always decisive choices to be made in the political realm (whom to vote for, what policies to support or oppose, what action to take or defer), these very delimitations of choice are often themselves the material of critical theory. Here we might remind ourselves that prising apart immediate political constraints from intellectual ones is one path to being “governed a little less” in Foucault’s sense. Yet allowing thinking its wildness beyond the immediate in order to reset the possibilities of the immediate is also how this degoverning rearticulates critical theory and politics after disarticulating them; critical theory comes back to politics offering a different sense of the times and a different sense of time. It is also important to remember that the “immediate choices” are just that and often last no longer than a political season (exemplified by the fact that the political conundrums with which this essay opened will be dated if not forgotten by the time this book is published). Nor is the argument convincing that critical theory threatens the possibility of holding back the political dark. It is difficult to name a single instance in which critical theory has killed off a progressive political project. Critical theory is not what makes progressive political projects fail; at worst it might give them bad conscience, at best it renews their imaginative reach and vigor.

**4. This is a realist prediction based on current hegemonic discourse, if we win realism is flawed this claim holds no weight**

**5. They can’t point to one example of critical theory ceding the political or killing a project in the US: if they’re going to defend empirics as so awesome you should make them provide a couple**

# 2NC Cede the Political

**6. Critique is aimed at bettering the political sphere, not ignoring it**

**Brown, 05** Professor of Political Science at Cal-Berkeley (Wendy, “Edgework”, pg. 21-22, JPW)

From Socrates in the *Apology*, we have an argument that dissent from existing practices, even wholesale critique of the regime, is not merely compatible with love and loyalty to a political community, but rather is the supreme form of such love and loyalty. Moreover, it would seem that dissent can have this value even when it happens at the fringes of the regime, outside the domain of the officially political realm and thus outside the usual purview of citizenship, suggesting that it need not be a critique with immediate political efficacy where the political is equated with policy. Socrates makes the case for intellectual critique as the highest form of loyalty if and when this critique is aimed at improving the *virtue* of the citizens.

In arguing that his unconventional ways and venue of working permit the greatest expression of political loyalty to the city, Socrates implies that the conventional political and military domains are not so fertile for the practice understood as love—they are too fraught with immediate concerns of the day, with power politics, and above all, too inimical to the thoughtfulness that he takes as both the basis and the necessary content of this love; dutiful citizens carrying out an unjust policy or dutiful soldiers fighting an unjust war are presumably slavish and unthinking rather than loving in their loyalty. What is also striking about Socrates’ argument is that even as it is couched in terms compatible with modern Thoreauvian themes of individual conscience, he is making not a moral or ethical argument that citizenship consists of a relation to individual virtue, to justice, and thus, a relation of citizen to citizen rather than simply a relationship of citizen to state. Indeed, it is a casting of citizenship itself as a cultivation of virtue in oneself and others rather than as an orientation toward law and the state.

# 2NC Rorty

**1. Rorty’s argument assumes we aren’t trying to affect policy, all of our cards as to why representations affect policy are an answer to this**

**2. Critical theory helps pragmatic left-wing projects that Rorty advocates**

**Brown, 05** Professor of Political Science at Cal-Berkeley (Wendy, “Edgework”, pg. 15, JPW)

On the one hand, critical theory cannot let itself be bound by political exigency; indeed, it has something of an obligation to refuse such exigency. While there are always decisive choices to be made in the political realm (whom to vote for, what policies to support or oppose, what action to take or defer), these very delimitations of choice are often themselves the material of critical theory. Here we might remind ourselves that prising apart immediate political constraints from intellectual ones is one path to being “governed a little less” in Foucault’s sense. Yet allowing thinking its wildness beyond the immediate in order to reset the possibilities of the immediate is also how this degoverning rearticulates critical theory and politics after disarticulating them; critical theory comes back to politics offering a different sense of the times and a different sense of time. It is also important to remember that the “immediate choices” are just that and often last no longer than a political season (exemplified by the fact that the political conundrums with which this essay opened will be dated if not forgotten by the time this book is published). Nor is the argument convincing that critical theory threatens the possibility of holding back the political dark. It is difficult to name a single instance in which critical theory has killed off a progressive political project. Critical theory is not what makes progressive political projects fail; at worst it might give them bad conscience, at best it renews their imaginative reach and vigor.

**3. Ignoring critiques of political theory allows it to remain dominated by Western discursive hegemony**

**Brown, 05** Professor of Political Science at Cal-Berkeley (Wendy, “Edgework”, pg. 62, JPW)

Anti-essentialist perspectives and an appreciation of the fictional quality of knowledge categories are not the only insights from late modern critical theory relevant to our problem. There is also, for example, the matter of marked and unmarked signifiers. What is political theory…today? To pursue the question without the temporal qualifier would be to eschew not only the contingency of identity production but its relentlessly historical quality. To pursue the question without the temporal qualifier is already to take a stance within the battle for political theory’s future, one that aims for hegemony and refuses to avow its own dependencies and unconscious strategies. To let the temporal qualifier remain unspecified is also to propose to consider the nature and purpose of political theory in terms that disavow its **historically constructed and contingent nature from the start**, and thus to try to resurrect a truth undone by the enterprise of theory itself. So, then, what is political theory today…where? in the Anglo-American intellectual world? in western Europe or its eastern stepsibling? outside the metropoles of modernity? in the academy? in the streets? (whose streets?) To leave these matters unspecified **is to remain blinkered to the long elite past of political theory as well as the saturation by colonial European and postwar American hegemony that has conditioned the identity and contents of recognized political theory in the more recent past**. It is also to sustain, unreconstructed, the legacies of these pasts in the answer. And if we stipulate our question as “What is political theory today in the American academy?” we still need to ask about the work of that tiny verb, “is.” Are we asking what we do now, how we signify to others (which others?), or what we might become? And if we are not forthrightly blending normative desire into description—if we really endeavor to describe our activity rather than our own particular investments in it—what sleights of hand are we engaged in then?

**4. Rorty doesn’t assume the status quo with a liberal president and the massive liberal uprising following the Bush administration: the pragmatic Left is in full force now**

# 2NC Rorty

**5. Critique is aimed at bettering the political sphere, not ignoring it**

**Brown, 05** Professor of Political Science at Cal-Berkeley (Wendy, “Edgework”, pg. 21-22, JPW)

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# 2NC Predictions Good

**1. We don’t reject all predictions, just the worst-case thinking embodied by the affirmative: our evidence indicates this thinking throws analysis out of the window and justifies terrible policies**

**2. Worst-case planning is misguided and is used to justify flawed policies like the aff**

**McLean et. al, 09**  Acting Assistant Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; Financial consultant with multiple companies including US Navy, MLB, Anheuser-Busch, Hewlett-Packard, President of Mentore; Research Director at Parco Technological Institute (Craig, Alan Patterson, John Williams, “Risk Assessment, Policy-Making and the Limits of Knowledge: The Precautionary Principle and International Relations”, SAGE, <http://ire.sagepub.com/content/23/4/548>, pg. 557-558, JPW)

In a BBC TV documentary, the writer and producer Adam Curtis examined the war-on-terror policies of the US and British governments over recent decades.60 The documentary examined the threat from organised terror networks and asked whether they are an illusion. Curtis argued that there is a shift from evidence-based ‘what is’ decision-making to a speculative, imaginary ‘what if’, or worst-case scenario decision-making.61 Towards the end of the programme Curtis quotes the former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, as stating that the politician’s role in this new threat was to look into the future and imagine the worst that might happen and then act ahead of time to prevent it.62 Curtis then posed the idea that this statement means the Prime Minister was embracing the Precautionary Principle. It may be that precaution is actually a better characterisation of what the US government styles as ‘pre-emption’, but which most IR scholars see as preventive war, given the uncertainties involved. However, the level of those uncertainties is a very significant issue. In a famous example of taking precautionary thinking to its logical extremes, former US Vice President Dick Cheney propounded the ‘1 per cent doctrine’ – the idea that if there was a 1 per cent chance that Iran could acquire a nuclear weapons capability the US should act as though it were a certainty.63 This is an example of precautionary thinking, certainly, but it is also an example of an exceptional lack of analytical sophistication. **Suggesting that US policy on a crucial international issue should be based on a marginal possibility**, itself linking through to other marginal possibilities to do with the uses that Iran might make of such a capability, and that Iran’s behaviour might not be influenced by a whole range of deterrent strategies, **is misguided at best**. The Precautionary Principle is not about the elimination of risk, as Cheney’s doctrine appears to be, or Blair’s account of the changing nature of political responsibility might suggest. It is also easy to see how arguments such as Cheney’s or Blair’s also feed into the post-structural, governmentality analysis of the use of the language of risk. Instead, however, the Precautionary Principle is about the acceptance and management of risk. It is impossible to eliminate risk, but there needs to be, in policy-making and analysis, a balance of judgements about what are and are not acceptable risks, linked to the value of the putative outcomes of accepting certain risks and an awareness of the limitations of knowledge. **The view that the elimination of the possibility of highly unlikely but catastrophic risks, such as a nuclear attack by a terrorist organisation in a major city, is both an overwhelming political duty that can justify any policy promulgated and prosecuted in its name**, and the paradigmatic example of risk-based analysis and the deployment of the Precautionary Principle, **is seriously mistaken**. The need for awareness of the distinction between precaution in the face of hypothetical hazard and radical indeterminacy and the Precautionary Principle in the face of at least some reliable knowledge of the level of risk is an important if easily overlooked one.

**3. This thinking justifies flawed policy like military intervention in the Middle East and the PATRIOT Act: empirics go negative**

**4. Impact turn: Worst-case predictions lead to biopolitical governmental control**

**McLean et. al, 09**  Acting Assistant Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; Financial consultant with multiple companies including US Navy, MLB, Anheuser-Busch, Hewlett-Packard, President of Mentore; Research Director at Parco Technological Institute (Craig, Alan Patterson, John Williams, “Risk Assessment, Policy-Making and the Limits of Knowledge: The Precautionary Principle and International Relations”, SAGE, <http://ire.sagepub.com/content/23/4/548>, pg. 553, JPW)

It is noteworthy, though, that many of the efforts to incorporate risk into IR depart in important ways from the idea of risk as Beck deployed it, bringing it instead into contact with key notions drawn from contemporary continental political theory, and in particular Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’.33 This allies the idea of risk to a broadly critical and post-structural perspective that analyses risk in terms of its contribution to the ability of governments to establish narratives supportive of apparatuses of discipline and control. In particular, important and interesting recent work has used risk as a tool for assessing the significance of the war on terror as a particularly distinctive form of this logic of governmentality, taking the idea of the catastrophic level of risk associated with major terrorist attacks as the basis for extending technologies, techniques and discourses of surveillance and intelligence gathering to heights in the name of ‘precaution’.34 Thus the idea of precaution has begun to appear within this literature too, although in a way that is at odds with the form to be found in the Precautionary Principle.35 In this Foucauldian mode of understanding risk, precaution is about the governmental logic underpinning more and more stringent and extensive forms of intelligence gathering and surveillance in support of the need to meet the unattainable political imperative of reducing the risk of catastrophic terrorist attack to zero.36 This is used to justify various coercive forms, from indefinite detention through ‘extraordinary rendition’ and ‘enhanced interrogation’ (i.e. torture) to preventive war. These practices demonstrate logics or create forms and spaces that connect the notion of risk to other crucial critical concepts in post-structuralist analyses, such as the idea of the exception and the work of both Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben.37

# 2NC Predictions Good

**5. It’s a vicious cycle: Worst-case thinking makes fear and insecurity the norm**

**Furedi, 2009** Professor of Sociology at the University of Kent (Frank, “Precautionary Culture and the Rise of Possibilistic Risk Assessment”, 2 Erasmus Law Review 2, pg. 200-201, JPW)

The culture that has been described as the culture of fear or as precautionary culture encourages society to approach human experience as a potential risk to our safety.6 Consequently every conceivable experience has been transformed into a risk to be managed. One leading criminologist, David Garland, writes of the ‘Rise of Risk’ – the explosion in the growth of risk discourse and risk literature. He notes that little connects this literature other than the use of the word risk.7 However, the very fact that risk is used to frame a variety of otherwise unconnected experiences reflects a taken-for granted mood of uncertainty towards human experience. In contemporary society, little can be taken for granted other than an apprehensive response towards uncertainty. Arguably, like risk, fear has become a taken-for-granted idiom, even a cultural affectation for expressing confusion and uncertainty. The French social theorist Francois Ewald believes that the ascendancy of this precautionary sensibility is underwritten by a cultural mood that assumes the uncertainty of causality between action and effect. This sensibility endows fear with a privileged status. Ewald suggests that the institutionalisation of precaution ‘invites one to consider the worst hypothesis (defined as the “serious and irreversible” consequence) in any business decision’.8 The tendency to engage with uncertainty through the prism of fear and therefore anticipate the worst possible outcome can be understood as a crisis of causality. Riezler in his early attempt to develop a psychology of fear draws attention to the significant influence of the prevailing system of causality on people’s response to threats. ‘They have been taken for granted – and now they are threatened’ is how he describes a situation where ‘“causes” are hopelessly entangled’.9 As noted previously, the devaluation of people’s capacity to know has significant influence on the way that communities interpret the world around them. Once the authority of knowledge is undermined, people become hesitant about interpreting new events. Without the guidance of knowledge, world events can appear as random and arbitrary acts that are beyond comprehension. This crisis of causality does not simply deprive society from grasping the chain of events that has led to a particular outcome; it also diminishes the capacity to find meaning in what sometimes appears as a series of patternless events.

# 2NC Predictions Inevitable

**1. Not a justification of the affirmative: if we win our case turns you still vote negative**

**2. Critical theory does not cede the political: the affirmative’s claim serves to make critique impossible: only critique can break the conservative’s hold on the political sphere**

**Brown, 05** Professor of Political Science at Cal-Berkeley (Wendy, “Edgework”, pg. 4-5, JPW)

The rebuff of critical theory as untimely provides the core matter of the affirmative case for it. Critical theory is essential in dark times not for the sake of sustaining utopian hopes, making flamboyant interventions, or staging irreverent protests, but rather to contest the very senses of time invoked to declare critique untimely. If the charge of untimeliness inevitably also fixes time, then disrupting this fixity is crucial to keeping the times from closing in on us. It is a way of reclaiming the present from the conservative hold on it that is borne by the charge of untimeliness. To insist on the value of untimely political critique is not, then, to refuse the problem of time or timing in politics but rather to contest settled accounts of what time it is, what the times are, and what political tempo and temporality we should hew to in political life. Untimeliness deployed as an effective intellectual and political strategy, far from being a gesture of indifference to time, is a bid to reset time. Intellectual and political strategies of successful untimeliness therefore depend on a close engagement with time in every sense of the word. They are concerned with timing and tempo. They involve efforts to grasp the times by thinking against the times. They attempt, as Nietzsche put it, to “overcome the present” by puncturing the present’s “overvaluation of itself,” an overcoming whose aim is to breathe new possibility into the age. If our times are dark, what could be more important.

**3. Worst-case thinking makes bad policy, institutionalizes insecurity and leads to social paralysis**

**Furedi, 2010** Professor of Sociology at the University of Kent (Frank, “This shutdown is about more than volcanic ash”, http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php/site/article/8607/, JPW)

I am not a natural scientist, and I claim no authority to say anything of value about the risks posed by volcanic ash clouds to flying aircraft. However, as a sociologist interested in the process of decision-making, it is evident to me that the reluctance to lift the ban on air traffic in Europe is motivated by worst-case thinking rather than rigorous risk assessment. Risk assessment is based on an attempt to calculate the probability of different outcomes. Worst-case thinking – these days known as ‘precautionary thinking’ – is based on an act of imagination. It imagines the worst-case scenario and then takes action on that basis. In the case of the Icelandic volcano, *fears* that particles in the ash cloud could cause aeroplane engines to shut down automatically mutated into a*conclusion* that this would happen. So it seems to me to be the fantasy of the worst-case scenario rather than risk assessment that underpins the current official ban on air traffic. Many individuals associated with the air-travel industry are perturbed by what they perceive to be a one-dimensional overreaction. Ulrich Schulte-Strathaus, secretary-general of the Association of European Airlines, observed that ‘verification flights undertaken by several of our airlines have revealed no irregularities at all’. He believes that ‘this confirms our requirement that other options should be deployed to determine genuine risk’. Giovanni Bisignani, director-general of the International Air Transport Association, describes the ban as a ‘European embarrassment’ and a ‘European mess’. Also, individuals associated with Europe’s air-control authorities have conceded that they have been interpreting international guidelines ‘more rigorously’ than, say, their American counterparts. British forecasters claimed the volcanic ash cloud could hit the eastern Canadian coast. Whatever the risks of flying in the wake of the volcano, it seems clear that it is not evidence but speculation that is fuelling the current flight ban. The reluctance actually to weigh up the evidence and act on the basis of probabilities is motivated by fear of making a wrong decision. Of course when lives are at stake it is essential to weigh up the evidence carefully – but at the end of the day, our leaders have a responsibility to make decisions and live with the consequences. The slowness with which EU ministers responded to this crisis indicates that worst-case thinking discourages responsible decision-making. Yet as Giovanni Bisignani said, the decision to close airspace ‘has to be based on facts and supported by risk assessment’, not on the politics of decision-avoidance. Tragically, this failure of nerve in relation to the volcanic ash is the inevitable outcome of the institutionalisation of worst-case policymaking. This approach, based on the unprecedented sensitivity of contemporary Western society to uncertainty and unknown dangers, has led to a radically new way of perceiving and managing risks. As a result, the traditional association of risk with probabilities is now under fire from a growing body of opinion, which claims that humanity lacks the knowledge to calculate risks in any meaningful way. Sadly, critics of traditional probabilistic risk-assessments have more faith in speculative computer models than they do in science’s capacity to use knowledge to transform uncertainties into calculable risks. The emergence of a speculative approach towards risk is paralleled by the growing influence of ‘possibilistic thinking’ rather than probabilistic thinking, which actively invites speculation about what could possibly go wrong. In today’s culture of fear, frequently ‘what could possibly go wrong’ is confused with ‘what is likely to happen’. Numerous critics of old forms of probabilistic thinking call for a radical break with past practices on the grounds that we simply lack the information to calculate probabilities. This rejection of probabilities is motivated by a belief that the dangers we face are just too overwhelming and catastrophic – the Millennium Bug, international terrorism, swine flu, climate change, etc – and we simply cannot wait until we have all the information before we calculate their possible destructive effects. ‘Shut it down!’ is the default response. In any case, it is argued, since so many of the threats are ‘unknown’ there is little information on which a realistic calculation of probabilities can be made. One of the many regrettable consequences of this outlook is that policies designed to deal with threats are increasingly based on feelings and intuition rather than on evidence or facts. Worst-case thinking encourages society to adopt fear as of one of the key principles around which the public, the government and various institutions should organise their lives. It institutionalises insecurity and fosters a mood of confusion and powerlessness. Through popularising the belief that worst cases are normal, it also encourages people to feel defenceless and vulnerable to a wide range of future threats. In all but name, it is an invitation to social paralysis. The eruption of a volcano in Iceland poses technical problems, for which responsible decision-makers should swiftly come up with sensible solutions. But instead, Europe has decided to turn a problem into a drama. In 50 years’ time, historians will be writing about our society’s reluctance to act when practical problems arose. It is no doubt difficult to face up to a natural disaster – but in this case it is the all-too-apparent manmade disaster brought on by indecision and a reluctance to engage with uncertainty that represents the real threat to our future.

# 2NC Predictions Inevitable

**4. This is just a flawed realist argument: if we win realism is flawed it doesn’t matter**

**5. Doesn’t assume the status quo with a liberal president and the massive liberal uprising following the Bush administration: there’s no risk of a right-wing takeover**

**6. We don’t reject all predictions, just the worst-case thinking embodied by the affirmative: our evidence indicates this thinking throws analysis out of the window and justifies terrible policies**

# XT: Critical Theory Solves Politics

**1.** **Identifying problems in political theory fixes it rather than alienates it**

**Brown, 05** Professor of Political Science at Cal-Berkeley (Wendy, “Edgework”, pg. 62, JPW)

All of which is to say the familiar: if the very existence of political theory depends on contingent designations of what is not political and what is not theoretical, then political theory is a fiction, constituted by invented distinctions and a range of rivalries and conceits, each of which is mutable and puncturable, and which vary across time and place, not to mention investment and interest. To identify political theory’s contrived nature, however, does not reduce or devalue the enterprise; rather, such identification helps set the stage for considering the possibilities and challenges it faces in a particular time and place. An understanding of what political theory arrays itself against today, how it differentiates itself from what is intellectually proximate to it, and what wolves it fears at its door may help us grasp not only what political theory imagines itself to be and to be for but also what anxieties and uncertainties it has about this identity, and what limits it places on itself to maintain coherence and purpose in the face of its potential undoing.

**2. Critical security theory changes politics**

**Nunes, No Date** PhD in International Relations, University of Wales (Joao, no date, “ POLITICS, SECURITY, CRITICAL THEORY:

A CONTRIBUTION TO CURRENT DEBATES ON SECURITY”, <http://archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Nunes-joaonunes-politicssecuritycriticaltheory.pdf>, pg. 4-5, JPW)

Thus, CSS was, from the beginning, a political endeavor that attempted to open up the way for a problematization of the concept of security that could provide the intellectual background against which reflection and debate about desirable practices could be undertaken. The different critical approaches within CSS have assumed this commitment in different ways, but the intention of politicization can be deemed omnipresent. Wæver, whose ‘securitization theory’ has been accused of being conservative and thus only marginally critical (Booth 2005c:271), explicitly stated that ‘[t]he securitization approach points to the inherent political nature of any designation of security issues and thus it points an ethical question at the feet of analysts, decision-makers and political activists alike: why do you call this a security issue? What are the implications?’ (1999:334). Wæver highlights the ultimately political and ethical standpoint upon which security analysis is undertaken1. Although departing from different understandings about the security-politics nexus, as will be seen in section II of this paper, Booth’s and the Welsh School’s conception of security as derivative of prior political conceptions points to the same interdependency between security analysis and a political/normative intention. Finally, the sociological explorations undertaken or inspired by the Paris School are clear attempts to provide security analysis with a ‘thick’ political content – it is no surprise that concepts such as ‘field’, ‘capital’ and ‘struggle’ acquire particular importance.

# XT: Aff Re-entrenches Squo Politics

**1. Ignoring critiques of political theory allows it to remain dominated by Western discursive hegemony**

**Brown, 05** Professor of Political Science at Cal-Berkeley (Wendy, “Edgework”, pg. 62, JPW)

Anti-essentialist perspectives and an appreciation of the fictional quality of knowledge categories are not the only insights from late modern critical theory relevant to our problem. There is also, for example, the matter of marked and unmarked signifiers. What is political theory…today? To pursue the question without the temporal qualifier would be to eschew not only the contingency of identity production but its relentlessly historical quality. To pursue the question without the temporal qualifier is already to take a stance within the battle for political theory’s future, one that aims for hegemony and refuses to avow its own dependencies and unconscious strategies. To let the temporal qualifier remain unspecified is also to propose to consider the nature and purpose of political theory in terms that disavow its **historically constructed and contingent nature from the start**, and thus to try to resurrect a truth undone by the enterprise of theory itself. So, then, what is political theory today…where? in the Anglo-American intellectual world? in western Europe or its eastern stepsibling? outside the metropoles of modernity? in the academy? in the streets? (whose streets?) To leave these matters unspecified **is to remain blinkered to the long elite past of political theory as well as the saturation by colonial European and postwar American hegemony that has conditioned the identity and contents of recognized political theory in the more recent past**. It is also to sustain, unreconstructed, the legacies of these pasts in the answer. And if we stipulate our question as “What is political theory today in the American academy?” we still need to ask about the work of that tiny verb, “is.” Are we asking what we do now, how we signify to others (which others?), or what we might become? And if we are not forthrightly blending normative desire into description—if we really endeavor to describe our activity rather than our own particular investments in it—what sleights of hand are we engaged in then?

# XT: Predictions = Biopower

**1. Worst-case policymaking justifies biopower and loss of rights**

**McLean et. al, 09**  Acting Assistant Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; Financial consultant with multiple companies including US Navy, MLB, Anheuser-Busch, Hewlett-Packard, President of Mentore; Research Director at Parco Technological Institute (Craig, Alan Patterson, John Williams, “Risk Assessment, Policy-Making and the Limits of Knowledge: The Precautionary Principle and International Relations”, SAGE, <http://ire.sagepub.com/content/23/4/548>, pg. 553-554, JPW)

The virtues and insights of such forms of analysis are many and varied, and the use of the notion of risk within post-structural analyses of international relations is an important move in turning back on itself as a tool of critique an important element of the justification of exceptional, even unlawful, policies in the name of defraying or even defeating the risks posed by fundamentalist transnational terrorism. Policymaking is revealed as reliant on an ostensibly impartial, even quasi-scientific, notion of risk and risk management that is neither of these things. Instead, this veneer hides a process of power accumulation and deployment that is changing the nature of surveillance and intelligence-gathering in ways that undermine liberty and centralise control over permissible framings of political challenges.38 Policy analyses deploying a more conventional understanding of the Precautionary Principle are also subject to critique as a part of the problem because of the way that they buy into the idea that we can attain a degree of independent, even apolitical, knowledge about these risks that will enable us to devise effective strategies of risk management.

# XT: Predictions = Flawed Policy

**1. Worst-case predictions ignore probabilities and create flawed policies based on speculation and fear**

**Furedi, 2009** Professor of Sociology at the University of Kent (Frank, “Precautionary Culture and the Rise of Possibilistic Risk Assessment”, 2 Erasmus Law Review 2, pg. 205-207, JPW)

Rumsfeld’s deliberation on unknown unknowns resonates with a radically new orientation towards the perception and management of risks in Western societies. The traditional association of risk with probabilities is now contested by a growing body of opinion that believes that humanity lacks the knowledge to calculate them. Numerous critics of probabilistic thinking call for a radical break with past practices on the ground that we simply lack the information to calculate probabilities. Environmentalists have been in the forefront of constructing arguments that devalue probabilistic thinking. They claim that the long-term irreversible damage caused to the environment cannot be calculated and therefore a probability-based risk analysis is irrelevant. ‘The term “risk” is very often confused with “probability”, and hence used erroneously’ writes an opponent of genetic modification.17 Of course once risk is detached from probabilities it ceases to be a risk. Such phenomenon is no longer subject to calculation. Instead of risk assessment the use of intuition is called for. The emergence of a speculative approach towards risk is paralleled by the growing influence of possibilistic thinking, which invites speculation about what can possibly go wrong. In our culture of fear, frequently what can possibly go wrong is equated with what is likely to happen. The shift towards possibilistic thinking is driven by a powerful sense of cultural pessimism about knowing and an intense feeling of apprehension about the unknown. The cumulative outcome of this sensibility is the routinisation of the expectation of worst possible outcomes. The principal question posed by possibilistic thinking, ‘what can possibly go wrong’, continually invites the answer ‘everything’. The connection between possibilistic and worse-case thinking is self-consciously promoted by the advocates of this approach. The American sociologist Lee Clarke acknowledges that ‘worst case thinking is possibilistic thinking’ and that it is ‘very different’ from the ‘modern approach to risk’ which is ‘based on probabilistic thinking’.18 However he believes that the kinds of dangers confronting humanity today require us to expect the worst and demand a different attitude towards risk. He claims that: Modern social organization and technologies bring other new opportunities to harm faraway people. Nuclear explosions, nuclear accidents, and global warming are examples. We are increasingly ‘at risk’ of global disasters, most if not all of which qualify as worst cases.19 Warning us about ‘how vulnerable we are to worst case events’, Clarke concludes that ‘we ought to prepare for possible untoward events that are out of control and overwhelming’.20 Politicians and their officials have also integrated worse-case thinking into their response to terrorism and to other types of catastrophic threats. Appeals to the authority of risk assessment still play an important role in policy-making. However, the prevailing culture of fear dictates that probabilistic-led risk management constantly competes with and often gives way to possibilistic-driven worst-case policies. As an important study of Blair’s policy on terrorism notes, he combines an appeal to risk assessment with worse-case thinking. David Runciman, the author of this study, observed that in his response to the threat of terrorism, ‘Blair relied on expert risk assessment and on his own intuitions’. Runciman added that Blair ‘highlighted the importance of knowing the risk posed by global terrorism, all the while insisting that when it comes to global terrorism the risks are never fully knowable’.21 In practice, the co-existence of these two forms of threat assessment tends to be resolved in favour of the possibilistic approach. The occasional demand for a restrained and low-key response to the risk of terrorism is overwhelmed by the alarmist narrative of a worse-case scenario.22 The swing from probabilistic to possibilistic thinking is closely linked to changing society-wide attitudes and perceptions of the future. The future is perceived increasingly as predetermined and independent of present human activities. It is an unknown world of hidden terror. The amplification of threat and of fear is inextricably linked with possibilistic thinking. As Lipschutz argues, the ‘paradox of unknowability’ leading to ‘worst case analysis’ reinforces the ‘narratives of fear’ of terrorism.23 The future of the world appears to be a far darker and frightening one when perceived through the prism of possibilities rather than probabilities. Probabilities can be calculated and managed, and adverse outcomes can be minimised. In contrast, worse-case thinking sensitises the imagination to just that – worst cases. Clarke acknowledges the contrast between these two ways of perceiving the future. He notes that ‘if we imagine the future in terms of probabilities, then risks look safe’ but ‘if we imagine the future in terms of possibilities, however, horrendous scenarios appear’.24 While it is simplistic and inaccurate to suggest that probability analysis works towards portraying the future as safe, it is definitely true that worst-case thinking strives to highlight the worst. A possibilistic interpretation of problems works to normalise the expectation of worse possible outcomes and fosters a onesided and fatalistic consciousness of the future. Why? Because it minimises the potential for understanding a threat. Since understanding is a precondition for countering a problem, the declaration of ignorance intensifies a sense of impotence, which in turn augments the threat. That is why alarmist campaigns that warn of unbounded dangers tend to embrace possibilistic thinking. ‘Consequential, possibilistic thinking has been commonplace among antinuclear activists and other environmentalists for years’, writes Clarke.25 Other interests advocating this approach are the counter-terrorism industry and fear entrepreneurs who actively promoted a mood of panic about the millennium bug. Probabilistic thinking has become an anathema to fear entrepreneurs because it offers a problem-solving and positive orientation towards calculating and managing risks and securing safety. Those who regard uncertainty with apprehension and dread experimentation and innovation depict probabilistic thinking as irresponsible and dangerous. This rejection of probabilities is motivated by the belief that the dangers that we face are so overwhelming and catastrophic that we simply cannot wait until we have the information to calculate their destructive effects. From this standpoint the procedure of acting on the basis of the worst-case scenario makes more sense than waiting for the information necessary to weigh up probabilities. In any case, it is argued that since so many of the threats are unknown, there is little information on which basis a realistic calculation of probabilities can be made. One of the many regrettable consequences of this procedure is that **policies designed to deal with threats are increasingly based on feelings and intuition rather than on evidence or facts.**

# XT: Predictions = Flawed Policy

**2. Possibilistic thinking demands constant military intervention, institutionalizes insecurity, creates failed policies, and increases terrorism**

**Furedi, 2009** Professor of Sociology at the University of Kent (Frank, “Precautionary Culture and the Rise of Possibilistic Risk Assessment”, 2 Erasmus Law Review 2, pg. 210-212, JPW)

Since possibilistic thinking presents the future through the prism of worst-case scenario, it creates a demand for immediate action. In this catastrophic perspective there is no time to wait for evidence. The entirely unknown quality of the threat is itself proof of the danger ahead. That is why, instead of properly evaluated evidence, worse-case thinking is often the driver of anti-terrorist policy. The anticipation of catastrophic consequences continually demands that something be done. As Durodie explained, ‘act now, find the evidence later’ is the imperative driving this form of thinking.28 The logic of worst-case thinking is used by the US Government to justify the adoption of its pre-emptive security strategy. According to this doctrine the greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.29 US officials frequently argue that they cannot wait until they have proof of some catastrophic threat, since by that time action would be too late. As President Bush argued, America must not ignore the threat gathering against us … we cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.30 And he added that ‘we have every reason to assume the worst, and we have an urgent duty to prevent the worst from occurring’. Anticipating the worst rather than weighing up the risks also informed the approach of the Blair regime. ‘This is not a time to err on the side of caution; nor time to weigh the risks to an infinite balance’ declared Blair.31 The security policies associated with possibilistic thinking have been accurately interpreted as the application of the precautionary principle to terrorism by a group of critical scholars.32 Advocates of the possibilistic approach, such as Clarke, explicitly endorse the precautionary principle. He believes that ‘we may find that the precautionary principle is most useful for urging policy-makers to try to think about unexpected interactions and unintended consequences’.33 The Precautionary Principle that Clarke characterises as ‘quintessentially worst case thinking’ claims action should be taken to protect the environment even if there is no evidence of harm. The Precautionary Principle, which has been adopted by the EU, states that when confronted with uncertainty and possible destructive outcomes it is always better to err on the side of caution. A similar pre-occupation informed the advice of the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy when it proposed that ‘some version’ of the Precautionary Principle should be found a place in the Constitution.34 As Stern and Wiener explain, ‘the Precautionary Principle holds that uncertainty is no excuse for inaction against serious or irreversible risks’ and that the absence of evidence should not bar preventive action.35 This perspective informed the approach of the European Environment Agency when it insisted in January 2002 that ‘forestalling disasters usually requires acting before there is strong proof of harm’.36 The translation of this approach in the ‘war against terrorism’ is pre-emptive warfare, justified by Bush’s claim that the US cannot hold back military action until there is ‘the final proof’. In their discussion of the legitimating role of the Precautionary Principle for justifying the war in Iraq, Stern and Wiener show the similarity of the language used by advocates of EU environmental regulation and American supporters of the war on terror. Bush’s warning that if ‘we wait for threats to materialize, we will have waited too long’ echoes the EU’s Environment Commissioner Margot Wallstorm’s statement that ‘if you smell smoke, you don’t wait until your house is burning down before you tackle the cause’.37 In both cases the language of caution is used to minimise the status of evidence. The intuitively arrived-at conclusion that the threat is far too great to wait for leads to the exhortation for immediate action. The precautionary approach does not necessarily encourage cautious behaviour. In its search for worst-case scenarios, it continually raises the stakes and fuels the demand for action. If as in the case of terrorism we fear the worst, then swift action is called for. As Aradau and van Munster note, the precautionary principle ‘privileges a politics of speed based on the sovereign decision of dangerousness’.38 In the domain of security policy, it promotes a highly interventionist and pre-emptive approach. Paradoxically, a casual approach towards caution is implicit in policies underpinned by a precautionary approach towards managing uncertainty. Jessica Stern has characterised the interventionist imperative contained within the precautionary approach as that of ‘action bias’. She argues that, perversely, **the ‘precautionary approach as applied to Iraq has made the world more dangerous and more uncertain’**.39 The institutionalisation of worst-case thinking through official policy is constantly defended on the ground that the stakes are so high that something must be done. ‘The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction’ observes the US Government’s 2002 National Security Strategy assessment. It also notes that ‘if we wait for threats to fully materializes, we will have waited too long’.40 Outwardly this call for military action bears all the hallmarks of an aggressive militarist ethos. But a close examination of the doctrine indicates an intense sense of defensiveness and anxiety towards a threat of catastrophic dimension. The precautionary approach towards the danger of terrorism is justified on the ground that it represents a threat to our existence. In light of such a grave threat, policy-makers feel entitled to abandon traditional forms of evidence-based policy-making. As Runciman writes: The trouble with the precautionary principle is that it purports to be a way of evaluating risk, yet it insists that some risks are simply not worth weighing in the balance. This could only make sense if it were true that some risks are entirely off the scale of our experience of danger.41 However, if the threat of terrorism is perceived as beyond society’s capacity to manage, it has come close to triumphing over its targets. One of the unfortunate consequences of the worst-case approach is that it inflates the power of terrorism. And once terrorism is depicted as a threat of such cosmic proportions, every precautionary act becomes justifiable. As Stern argues, one disturbing consequence of this perspective has been ‘the temptation to imagine that the threats we face are so extreme that ordinary moral norms and laws do not apply’.42

# XT: Predictions = Flawed Policy

**3. Worst-case predictions devalue knowledge and evidence and create bad policies**

**Furedi, 2009** Professor of Sociology at the University of Kent (Frank, “Precautionary Culture and the Rise of Possibilistic Risk Assessment”, 2 Erasmus Law Review 2, pg. 214-216, JPW)

Possibilistic thinking succeeds in transmitting the philosophy of fear entrepreneurs in a coherent form. This form of thinking successfully captures and expresses the dominant mood of cultural pessimism. In the name of directing the public’s attention to its worst fears, it adopts a cavalier stance towards the authority of knowledge and of evidence. A philosophy that objectifies the idea that the absence of evidence is not an evidence of absence conveys the proposition that acting on the basis of an absence of evidence is as valid as evidence-based action. Indeed this proposition provides the rationale for the sentiment that it is precisely the absence of evidence that constitutes the proof that precautionary action needs to be taken. This enthronement of ignorance has been described as ‘you never knowism’ by two critics of worst-case thinking. Friedman and Sapolsky explain that ‘You Never Knowism earns its name from its insistence on planning around what we do not know rather than what we do’.49 The significance that precautionary anti-terrorism attaches to the status of the unknown has the pernicious consequence of **systematically devaluing the status of knowledge**. It exhorts society to take what we do not know as seriously as what we do. Indeed it sometimes appears that what we do not know plays a greater role in influencing policy-makers than what we do know. Furthermore, by suggesting that many future threats are unknowable **it fundamentally calls into question people’s capacity to reason and to understand**. **Not knowing or ignorance become as much a driver of policy as hard-won evidence**. As the experience of the Millennium Bug showed, the precautionary approach displaces evidence-based policy with revelation-based calls to action. What is unknown is not an obstacle to action. Apprehension about the unknown continually invites action that is oriented towards the worst case. Worse-case thinking encourages society to adopt fear as of one of the dominant principles around which the public, its government, and institutions should organise their life. It institutionalises insecurity and fosters a mood of confusion and powerlessness. Through popularising the belief that worst cases are normal, it incites people to feel defenceless and vulnerable to a wide range of future threats. In all but name it constitutes an invitation to terror. The elevation of terrorism into an existential threat is one of the disturbing accomplishments of precautionary-driven policies. Once the threat of terrorism is perceived according to the possibilistic paradigm, real live terrorists do not have to do very much to achieve their objectives. Societies that are wedded to fantasising worst cases soon learn to live them. Commentators often associate current military action and antiterrorist policies with a narrow neo-conservative agenda promoted by Bush and a small circle of ideologues. However, what this analysis overlooks is that these policies draw on cultural resources that influence attitudes towards uncertainty and risk in general. Fear entrepreneurs promoting campaigns around public health issues, child safety, or global warming are equally responsible for encouraging the expansion of the empire of the unknown. The devaluation of knowledge and the enthronement of ignorance are systematically conveyed through policy statements and popular culture. Speculation and worse-case thinking resonate with a cultural imagination that feels so uncomfortable engaging with uncertainty. Indeed, the readiness with which today’s elites are prepared to defer to the unknown is evidence of a pervasive sense of cultural pessimism.

# XT: Predictions = Insecurity

**1. Worst-case thinking makes bad policy, institutionalizes insecurity and leads to social paralysis**

**Furedi, 2010** Professor of Sociology at the University of Kent (Frank, “This shutdown is about more than volcanic ash”, http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php/site/article/8607/, JPW)

I am not a natural scientist, and I claim no authority to say anything of value about the risks posed by volcanic ash clouds to flying aircraft. However, as a sociologist interested in the process of decision-making, it is evident to me that the reluctance to lift the ban on air traffic in Europe is motivated by worst-case thinking rather than rigorous risk assessment. Risk assessment is based on an attempt to calculate the probability of different outcomes. Worst-case thinking – these days known as ‘precautionary thinking’ – is based on an act of imagination. It imagines the worst-case scenario and then takes action on that basis. In the case of the Icelandic volcano, *fears* that particles in the ash cloud could cause aeroplane engines to shut down automatically mutated into a*conclusion* that this would happen. So it seems to me to be the fantasy of the worst-case scenario rather than risk assessment that underpins the current official ban on air traffic. Many individuals associated with the air-travel industry are perturbed by what they perceive to be a one-dimensional overreaction. Ulrich Schulte-Strathaus, secretary-general of the Association of European Airlines, observed that ‘verification flights undertaken by several of our airlines have revealed no irregularities at all’. He believes that ‘this confirms our requirement that other options should be deployed to determine genuine risk’. Giovanni Bisignani, director-general of the International Air Transport Association, describes the ban as a ‘European embarrassment’ and a ‘European mess’. Also, individuals associated with Europe’s air-control authorities have conceded that they have been interpreting international guidelines ‘more rigorously’ than, say, their American counterparts. British forecasters claimed the volcanic ash cloud could hit the eastern Canadian coast. Whatever the risks of flying in the wake of the volcano, it seems clear that it is not evidence but speculation that is fuelling the current flight ban. The reluctance actually to weigh up the evidence and act on the basis of probabilities is motivated by fear of making a wrong decision. Of course when lives are at stake it is essential to weigh up the evidence carefully – but at the end of the day, our leaders have a responsibility to make decisions and live with the consequences. The slowness with which EU ministers responded to this crisis indicates that worst-case thinking discourages responsible decision-making. Yet as Giovanni Bisignani said, the decision to close airspace ‘has to be based on facts and supported by risk assessment’, not on the politics of decision-avoidance. Tragically, this failure of nerve in relation to the volcanic ash is the inevitable outcome of the institutionalisation of worst-case policymaking. This approach, based on the unprecedented sensitivity of contemporary Western society to uncertainty and unknown dangers, has led to a radically new way of perceiving and managing risks. As a result, the traditional association of risk with probabilities is now under fire from a growing body of opinion, which claims that humanity lacks the knowledge to calculate risks in any meaningful way. Sadly, critics of traditional probabilistic risk-assessments have more faith in speculative computer models than they do in science’s capacity to use knowledge to transform uncertainties into calculable risks. The emergence of a speculative approach towards risk is paralleled by the growing influence of ‘possibilistic thinking’ rather than probabilistic thinking, which actively invites speculation about what could possibly go wrong. In today’s culture of fear, frequently ‘what could possibly go wrong’ is confused with ‘what is likely to happen’. 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It is no doubt difficult to face up to a natural disaster – but in this case it is the all-too-apparent manmade disaster brought on by indecision and a reluctance to engage with uncertainty that represents the real threat to our future.

# 2NC AT: Realism Inevitable

1. Purported objectivity and inevitability of realism sanctions mass violence- human history disproves this kind of determinism. Viability and inevitability of realism are linguistic constructs

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Given the claimed inevitability of realism's description of international politics, one might think that nations need not look to expert guidance because power interests will inevitably determine governmental policy. But the realists, while embracing determinism, simultaneously argue that human nature is repeatedly violated. One traditional claim has been that America, because of its unique history, has been ever in danger of ignoring the dictates of the foreign policy scene. This argument is offered by Henry Kissinger in his avowedly Morgenthauian work Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. 21 Realists also argue that there are idealists in all human societies who refuse to see the reality of power. As Richard W. Cottam, a trenchant critic of orthodox realism, explained the argument: "Every era has its incorrigible idealists who persist in seeing evil man as good. When they somehow gain power and seek to put their ideas into effect, Machiavellians who understand man's true nature appear and are more than willing and more than capable of exploiting this eternal naivete." 22 Cottam was referring to one of the central ideological constructs of international relations theory—the realist/idealist dichotomy. First explicated in detail by Morgenthau in his Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, 23 this dichotomy is used to discredit leaders who dare to consider transcending or transforming established patterns of global competition. This construct is enriched by the narratives of failed idealists—most prominently Tsar Alexander the First, Woodrow Wilson, Neville Chamberlain, and Jimmy Carter—men who, despite and in fact because of their good intentions, caused untold human suffering. After World War II, realists built their conception of leadership on a negative caricature of Woodrow Wilson. 24 As George Kennan, one of the primary architects of Cold War policy, warned in 1945: "If we insist at this moment in our history in wandering about with our heads in the clouds of Wilsonean idealism . . . we run the risk of losing even that bare minimum of security which would be assured to us by the maintenance of humane, stable, and cooperative forms of society on the immediate European shores of the Atlantic." 25 Wilson's supposed idealism was said by the emerging realist scholars to have led to the unstable international political structure that caused World War II [End Page 6] and now threatened the postwar balance of forces. Despite convincing refutations by the leading historians of Wilson's presidency, most recently John Milton Cooper Jr. in his definitive study of the League of Nations controversy, realists continue to caricature Wilson as a fuzzy-headed idealist. 26 Idealists, in realist writings, all share a fatal flaw: an inability to comprehend the realities of power. They live in a world of unreality, responding to nonexistent scenes. As Riker put it, "Unquestionably, there are guilt-ridden and shame-conscious men who do not desire to win, who in fact desire to lose. These are irrational ones in politics." 27 It is here that the realist expert comes in. It is assumed that strategic doctrine can be rationally and objectively established. According to Kissinger, a theorist who later became a leading practitioner, "it is the task of strategic doctrine to translate power into policy." The science of international relations claims the capacity to chart the foreign policy scene and then establish the ends and means of national policy. This objective order can only be revealed by rational and dispassionate investigators who are well-schooled in the constraints and possibilities of power politics. Realism's scenic character makes it a radically empirical science. As Morgenthau put it, the political realist "believes in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion—between what is true objectively and rationally supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only subjective judgement." Avowedly modernist in orientation, realism claims to be rooted not in a theory of how international relations ought to work, but in a privileged reading of a necessary and predetermined foreign policy environment. 28 In its orthodox form political realism assumes that international politics are and must be dominated by the will to power. Moral aspirations in the international arena are merely protective coloration and propaganda or the illusions that move hopeless idealists. What is most revealing about this assessment of human nature is not its negativity but its fatalism. There is little if any place for human moral evolution or perfectibility. Like environmental determinism—most notably the social darwinism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—political realism presumes that human social nature, even if ethically deplorable, cannot be significantly improved upon. From the stationary perspective of social scientific realism in its pure form, the fatal environment of human social interaction can be navigated but not conquered. Description, in other words, is fate. All who dare to challenge the order—Carter's transgression—will do much more damage than good. The idealist makes a bad situation much worse by imagining a better world in the face of immutable realities. As one popular saying among foreign policy practitioners goes: "Without vision, men die. With it, more men die." 70 (continued) The implications of this social philosophy are stark. Tremendous human suffering can be rationalized away as the inevitable product of the impersonal international system of power relations. World leaders are actively encouraged by the realists to put aside moral pangs of doubt and play the game of international politics according to the established rules of political engagement. This deliberate limitation of interest excuses leaders from making hard moral choices. While a moralist Protestant like Jimmy Carter sees history as a progressive moral struggle to realize abstract ideals in the world, the realist believes that it is dangerous to struggle against the inexorable. The moral ambiguities of political and social ethics that have dogged philosophy and statesmanship time out of mind are simply written out of the equation. Since ideals cannot be valid in a social scientific sense, they cannot be objectively true. The greatest barrier to engaging the realists in serious dialogue about their premises is that they deny that these questions can be seriously debated. First, realists teach a moral philosophy that denies itself. There is exceedingly narrow ground, particularly in the technical vocabulary of the social sciences, for discussing the moral potential of humanity or the limitations of human action. Yet, as we have seen in the tragedy of Jimmy Carter, a philosophical perspective on these very questions is imparted through the back door. It is very hard to argue with prescription under the guise of description. The purveyors of this philosophical outlook will not admit this to themselves, let alone to potential interlocutors. [End Page 21] Second, and most importantly, alternative perspectives are not admitted as possibilities—realism is a perspective that as a matter of first principles denies all others. There is, as we have seen in the Carter narrative, alleged to be an immutable reality that we must accept to avoid disastrous consequences. Those who do not see this underlying order of things are idealists or amateurs. Such people have no standing in debate because they do not see the intractable scene that dominates human action. Dialogue is permissible within the parameters of the presumed order, but those who question the existence or universality of this controlling scene are beyond debate. Third, the environmental determinism of political realism, even though it is grounded in human social nature, is antihumanist. Much of the democratic thought of the last 200 years is grounded on the idea that humanity is in some sense socially self-determining. Society as social contract is a joint project which, over time, is subject to dialectical improvement. Foreign policy realism, as we have seen, presupposes that there is an order to human relations that is beyond the power of humans to mediate. 71 When you add to this the moral imperative to be faithful to the order (the moral of the Carter narrative), then democratic forms lose a great deal of their value. Indeed, there has been a great deal of hand wringing in international relations literature about how the masses are inexorably drawn to idealists like Carter and Wilson. Morgenthau states this much more frankly than most of his intellectual descendants: [the] thinking required for the successful conduct of foreign policy can be diametrically opposed to the rhetoric and action by which the masses and their representatives are likely to be moved. . . . The statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived as power among other powers. The popular mind, unaware of the fine distinctions of the statesman's thinking, reasons more often than not in the simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil. 72 Some realists, based on this empirical observation, openly propose that a realist foreign policy be cloaked in a moral facade so that it will be publicly palatable. Kissinger's mistake, they say, was that he was too honest. Morgenthau concludes that "the simple philosophy and techniques of the moral crusade are useful and even indispensable for the domestic task of marshaling public opinion behind a given policy; they are but blunt weapons in the struggle of nations for dominance over the minds of men." If one believes that social scientists have unique access to an inexorable social reality which is beyond the control of humanity—and which it is social suicide to ignore—it is easy to see how democratic notions of consent and self-determination can give way to the reign of manipulative propaganda. 73 There is another lesson that can be drawn from the savaging of Carter in international relations scholarship for those who seek to broaden the terms of American foreign policy thought and practice. Those who would challenge the realist orthodoxy [End Page 22] face a powerful rhetorical arsenal that will be used to deflect any serious dialogue on the fundamental ethical and strategic assumptions of realism. Careful and balanced academic critiques, although indispensable, are unlikely to be a match for such formidable symbolic ammunition. Post-realism, if it is to make any advance against the realist battlements, must marshal equally powerful symbolic resources. What is needed, in addition to academic critiques aimed at other scholars, is a full-blooded antirealist rhetoric.

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It must be said, in the strongest possible terms, that realism engenders an attitude of cynicism and fatalism in those who would otherwise engage the great moral and political questions of our age. 74 History is replete with ideals that, after much time and effort, matured into new social realities. In the not-so-distant past, republican governance on a mass scale and socially active government were empirical impossibilities. However halting and imperfect these historical innovations may be, they suggest the power of ideals and the possibility of human social transformation. On the other hand, fatalism fulfills itself. The surest way to make a situation impossible is to imagine it so. This is a tragic irony we should strive to avoid, no matter how aesthetically fitting it may be.

**2. Proclaimed inevitability shuts down self reflection and excludes alternative insights- theory is not natural or inevitable, it is always contingently produces**

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The positivist conception of the world and reality typifies much of mainstream international relations theory in the 1990s despite the emergence of the 'third debate' or the so-called post-positivist revolution. This understanding of the world allows the possibility of thinking that defining specific referents or identities as the central issues in international relations theory is not a particularly political or epistemologically significant act; it is merely one of choice. In other words, the choice of referent is seen as a neutral activity by positivists. Waltz can choose to study states, wars and the activity of leaders, others can look at the situation of women or whatever group they wish. Each then collects data and facts about the chosen group and ultimately develops theories about them. Jim George calls this the 'spectator theory of knowledge, in which knowledge of the real world is gleaned via a realm of external facts' (1993, p. 204). Mark Neufeld similarly talks about 'truth as correspondence' (1993, p. 55). This involves believing that there is a distinct separation between 'theory' and the 'real' world, 'the former, the realm of "internally" generated "invention" - the latter, the "external" repository of laws which theories (retrospectively) explain, order and systematise . . . theory . . . always remains distinct from that world' (George, 1993, p. 209). The key point to be taken from this is that theory is represented as a 'cognitive reaction to reality rather than integral to its construction. Theory, in this context, takes place after the fact' (p. 213).But theory does *not* take place after the fact. Theories, instead, play a large part in constructing and defining what the facts are. This is a central claim made by those scholars working on postpositivist perspectives in international relations theory but it is not a new claim. Albert Einstein once pointed out that 'on principle it is quite wrong to try founding a theory on observable magnitudes alone. In reality, the very opposite happens' (quoted in MacKinnon, 1989, p. 106). However, it is a claim resisted strongly by mainstream international relations theory, which remains, despite recent claims to the contrary, entrenched in a realist-positivist paradigm (Runyan and Peterson, 1991; Peterson, 1992b; George, 1993). When vilified for serving the interests of the powerful and preserving the status quo, classical and neo-realists simply reply that they are 'telling things the way they are' (Runyan and Peterson, 1991, p. 70). It may be becoming somewhat of post-positivist cliche to claim that we are living in a complex world and thus simplistic theories will be of little explanatory or descriptive use. But if we are trying to understand more about the world and in particular those events which cause pain and destruction, why would anyone not want to include insights which might help us do that? If realist scholars want genuinely to investigate the causes of war in a sophisticated and systematic manner, why not investigate the construction and internalization of certain images of masculinity in military ideology? If they want to argue that students be better equipped, intellectually and conceptually, to understand international politics, why not extend their analyses to include concepts of identity? There may, of course, be ideological resistance to thinking about these issues. The assumption is made that sexual identity or gender identity can have nothing to do with the causation and enactment of war. But although these are just assumptions they do a great deal of work in defining what is and is not relevant to consider. When this ideological commitment is linked with a limited epistemological understanding of the construction of reality, it becomes easy for scholars within international relations to think that such things as the politics of identity can have no real importance to our understanding of the international system. Additionally, it implies a lot more work in the sense that more books have to be read (ones that many realist scholars might think irrelevant), new methodological tools have to be learned and old positions have to be rethought. iCKal Holsti (1993) is one who laments the increasing theoretical expansion of the discipline of international relations. This expansion, he argues, is not necessarily evidence of progress. Unless we can agree on, at least, the purposes of the theoretical enterprise and on what some of the fundamental problems in the real worldare, the 'menu [of international relations theory] threatens to become tasteless for all but the few that inhabit the rarefied sanctuaries of the Universities' (p. 408). Why should this be the case? If, as Holsti suggests, our 'consumers' are students and policy-makers and what they want most of all is to know 'what is going on in the real world' (p. 407), it seems to make eminent sense to find out more about how that 'real world' works by asking more, deeper and searching questions. What apparently seems to be 'staring us in the face' (p. 407) in the world may well be an example of what psychologists call a perceptual illusion. In these illusions what stares one person in the face cannot be seen at all by another person. The same can be true when we move from a psychologist's drawing to the 'reality' of politics on a global scale. The simple questions 'Who am I?' and 'Who defines who I am?' might be as revolutionary for the discipline of international relations as that of the little boy who questioned not the magnifi- \_ cence of the Emperor's clothes, but whether he had any at a l l ! ^ 3 *°* \*\* In a global age, one characterized by a global menu, global music and global time, the resurgence of claims to identity might be seen as a response to a fear of disappearing into bland sameness. We can drink Coke, eat sushi and watch *Neighbours* and be in practically any country in the world. The fight for identity may, at one level, be an example of resistance to such an image of global uni-identity. Alternatively, the struggle for identity may be a reaffirmation

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of belonging, in a postmodern, post-local age. This desire may be fuelled by nostalgia, a nostalgia for 'tradition', which might be construed as a nostalgia for the nation-state, the icon of modernity. Identities in this view may be increasingly fluid and multiply at ever more rapid rates as we approach the twentyfirst century. But those properties do not make them analytically irrelevant to the international relations analyst. Who we are, how we are, who defines us, how international processes and events are moulded and manipulated by identities: these are all questions relevant to international politics. Anyone trying to make sense of international political trends in the near future who treats these maddeningly complex and infuriatingly dynamic identities as a mere mosquito to be swatted away risks being surprised.

**3. Perceived inevitability of violence and need for an enemy are the result of projection, disidentification, and transference. Interrogating the psychic processes of enemy creation allow peace forms of conflict resolution to replace war**

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The problem of warfare which includes genocide, and its most recent manifestation, international terrorism, brings into focus the need to understand how the individual is placed in the social and the social in the individual. Psychoanalytic theories of superego aggression, splitting, projection, and projective identification may be useful in helping us to understand the psychic links involved. It seems vital to me writing in the Middle East in September 2002 that we examine our understanding of what it is we understand about war, including genocide and terrorism. Some psychoanalysts argue that war is a necessary defence against psychotic anxiety (Fornari xx; Volkan), and Freud himself first advanced the idea that war provided an outlet for repressed impulses. ("Why War?"197). The problematic of these views is the individual's need to translate internal psychotic anxieties into **real external dangers so as to control them**. It suggests that culturally warfare and its most recent manifestation, international terrorism and the so-called ''war on terrorism," may be a necessary object for internal aggre ssion and not a pathology. Indeed, Fornari suggests that "war could be seen as an attempt at therapy, carried out by a social institution which, precisely by institutionalizing war, increases to gigantic proportions what is initially an elementary defensive mechanism of the ego in the schizo-paranoid phase" (xvii-xviii). In other words, the history of war might represent the externalization **and articulation of shared unconscious fantasies.** This idea would suggest that the culture of war, genocide, and international terrorism provides objects of psychic need. If this is so, with what can we replace them? If cultural formations and historical events have their sources in our psychic functioningthat is to say, in our unconscious fears and desires, and culture itself provides a framework for expressing, articulating, and coming to terms with these fears and desires, then psychoanalysis may help to reveal why war **seems to be an inevitable and ineradicable** part of human history. SUPEREGO AS AN AGENT OF AGGRESSION In "The Ego and the Id," Freud formulated a seemingly insoluble dilemma in the very essence of the human psyche; the eternal conflict between the dual instincts of eros, the civilizing life instinct, and the indomitable death instinct (thanatos). He also identified some aspects of the death instinct with superego aggression, suggesting that the superego was the agent of the death instinct in its cruel and aggressive need for punishment and that its operative feeling was frequently a punitive hatred, while other aspects of the superego were protective. As we know, Freud thought the source of the superego was the internalization of the castrating Oedipal father. In chapter seven of Civilization and its Discontents, he theorized that when de-fusion or separation of the dual instincts occurred, aspects of aggression frequently dominated and that it was the purpose of the ego to find objects for eros and/or aggression either in phanta sv or reality. The role phantasy plays in projective identification is something to which I shall return. Other theorists, such as Melanie Klein, trace the beginning of the superego back to early (infant) oral phantasies of self-destruction, which is a direct manifestation of the death instinct. Klein transformed the oedipal drama by making the mother its central figure and thus playing a vital role in object-relations theory, about which I shall say more later in this essay. Although Klein's work relied on the dual instinct theory postulated by Freud, she re-defined the drives by emphasizing the way in which the destructive instincts attached themselves to the object, in particular the good-bad breast. Thus for Klein, the site of the superego is derived from oral Incorporation of the good/bad breast, contrary to Freud, for whom the site of the superego is the paternal law. Although the formation of the superego is grounded on the renunciation ofloving and hostile Oedipal wishes, it is subsequently refined, by the contributions of social and cultural requirements (education, religion, morality). My argument in this paper is three-fold: (1) These social and cultural requirements in which the superego is grounded may be used by the superego of the state and/or its leader to mobilize aspects of the individual's aggression during war-time in a way that does not happen in peace-time. (2) Klein's theory of splitting and projective identification plays an important role in the concept of difference and otherness as enemy. (3) Bion's development of Klein's theory into what he called the "container" and the "contained" may offer some way out of the psychic dangers of projective identification by suggesting that we may be able to access our internal psychic world as a transformative power to combat violence both internal and external. In an early attempt to define war neuroses, or how war mentally traumatizes the psyche, Freud wrote of the conflict "between the soldier's old peaceful ego and his new warlike one" becoming acute as soon as the peace-ego realizes what danger it runs in losing its own life to the rashness of its newly formed parasitic double" (SE 17 209). Accepting the violence that is within ourselves as well as in the other, the so-called enemy, is a difficult lesson to learn, and learning to displace our instinctual destructive aggression peacefully is enormously more difficult. To the extent the individual superego is connected to society, which assumes its functions particularly in wartime, the problem of war brings into focus the psychoanalytic problem of the partial defusion (separation) of eros and psychic aggression brought about by war through specifically social processes. These social processes involve the mechanisms by which aspects of the violent and aggressive social superego of the State mobilizes and appropriates some of the dynamic aspects of the individual's superego aggression: the need to hate, and to punish, for its own purposes, such as genocide or so-called "ethnic cleansing," and for territorial and economic reasons. Many of these actions are often masked as defending civilization, or an idealized State and/or its leader. This is also true of the "holy jihads" that are rapidly becoming an enormous threat to the world. In his book Enemies and Allies, Vamik Volkan suggests that the individual may see the superego of the State as his/her own idealized superego. And indeed, this may in turn help to explain how during war-time the social superego is placed in the individual and how in turn the individual is positioned in the social. In Civilization and its Discontents, to which I have already referred, Freud wrote about the ways in which the regulations and demands of a civilized society harbor the risk of the death instinct (aggression) being released at any favorable opportunity, especially when combined with Eros i.e., under the pretext of idealism and patriotism. This is especially true when t here is a leader who elicits strong emotional attachments from a group or nation. Of course, I am not arguing that there are not some important aspects of the social superego that are beneficial, for example the ethical and moral laws which shape society and protect its citizens; nevertheless, in wartime and its most recent manifestation, international terrorism, it is precisely these civilizing aspects of the social superego that are ignored or repressed. It seems to me that the failure of civilization historically to control the aggression, cruelty, and hatred that characterize war urgently requires a psychoanalytic explanation. Of course, I am speaking of psychic, not biological (survival of the fittest), aggression. In wartime the externalized superego of the stare sanctions killing and violence that is not allowed in peace-time (in fact, such violence against others during peacetime would be considered criminal) sanctions, in fact, the gratification ofwarring aggression, thus ensuring that acts of violence need not incur guilt. Why do we accept this? Psychoanalysis posits the idea that aggression is not behavioral but instinctual; not social but psychological. To quote Volkan, who follows Freud, "It is man's very nature itself." Obviously, it is vital that humanity find more mature, less primitive ways of dealing with our hatred and aggression than war, genocide, and international terrorism. The most characteristic thing about this kind of violence and cruelty is its collective mentality: war requires group co-operation, organization, and approval. Some theorists argue that one of the primary cohesive elements binding individuals into institutionalized human association is defence against psychotic anxiety. In Group Psychology Freud writes that "in a group the individual is brought under conditions which allow him to throw off the repressions of his unconscious instinctual impulses. The apparently new characteristics he then displays are in fact the manifestation of this unconscious, in which all that is evil in the human mind is contained as a predisposition" (74). Later in the same essay, when speaking of the individual and the group mind, Freud quotes Le Bon : "Isolated, he may be a cultivated individual; in a crowd, he is a barbarian that is, a creature acting by instinct. He possesses the spontaneity, the violence, the ferocity, and also the enthusiasm and heroism of primitive beings" (77). War is a collective phenomenon that mobilizes our anxieties and allows our **original sadistic fantasies of destructive omnipotence to be re-activated and projected onto "the enemy**." Some critics have argued that we "need" enemies as external stabilizers of our sense of identity and inner control. It has also been argued that the militancy a particular group shows toward its enemies may partly mask the personal internal conflicts of each member of the group, and that they may therefore have an emotional investment in the maintenance of the enmity. In other words, they need the enemy and are unconsciously afraid to lose it. This fits in with the well known phenomenon of inventing an enemy when there is not one readily available. The individual suicide bomber, or suicide pilot, is just as much part of this group psychology each bomber, each terrorist, is acting for his/her group, or even more immediately his or her family, from whom he/she derives enormous psychic strength and support. Just as importantly, she/he is acting in the name of his/her leader. All of these identifications require strong emotional attachments. Freud writes, "The mutual tie between members of a group is in the nature of an identification, based upon an important emotional common quality. . . . This common quality lies in the nature of the tie to the leader" (Group 1078). In Learning from Experience, Bion theorizes that a social groupfunctions to establish a fixed social order of things (the establishm ent), and that the individual has to be contained by the establishment of the group. Sometimes the rigidity of me system crushes the individual's creativity; alternatively, certain special individuals erupt in the group, which goes to pieces under their influence (Bion cites Jesus within the constraints of Israel). A final possibility is the mutual adaptation of one to the other, with a development of both the individual and the group. The development of a sense of self, its integration, its separation, and its protection all begin, or course, in early childhood. Psychoanalyses like Klein, Winnicott, and Bion have explored these ideas in what is known as object relations theory. Volkan writes that the concepts of enemy and ally and the senses of ethnicity and nationality are largely bound up with the individual's sense of self, and that individuals within an ethnic or national group tend to see their group as a privileged "pseudo-species" (Erikson) and enemy groups as subhuman (262). Of course enemies are threatening and do generate a reactive need for defenses; however, a basic psychoanalytic question might be to what extent the degree of defensiveness characteristic of war behavior represents personal, emotional needs of individuals for an enemy to hate, so that they can keep their conflicted selves together, and to what extent the State superego plays a role here. Our capacity for splitting and projection plays an important part in how we see others and feel about others, and through the process of projective identification, how we make others feel about ourselves and themselves. Projective identification involves a deep split, displacing onto and into others the hateful, bad parts of ourselves, and frequently making them feehateful to themselves through

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their own introjection of our hatred. This hatred is often racial or religious, frequently both. Moreover, in the process of projective identification, parts of the self are put into the other, thus depleting the ego. (This process can be a vicious circle, and it is a profoundly disturbing and characteristic pathology, often involving envy and/or rivalry, both corrosive, poisonous forces.) These Kleinian ideas, developed by other theorists, such as Winnicott and Bion, are hugely relevant to the problem of war and genocide, and most recently, of terrorism. Klein argues that in the paranoid schizoid position there is a splitting of good and bad objects, with the good being introjected and the bad being externalized and projected out into someone or onto something else. As with the infant and child, so with the adult, mechanisms of splitting and protection play upon negative and feared connotations of the other, of the enemy, and of difference; projection prevents warring nations from exploring and thus understanding what it is that actually divides them; it prevents mutual response and recognition by promoting exclusivity. As already mentioned, analysts such as Volkan and Erikson have written about the processes by which an enemy is dehumanized so as to provide the distance a group needs from its perceived enemy. First the group becomes preoccupied with the enemy according to the psychology of minor differences. Then mass regression occurs to permit the group to recover and reactivate more primitive methods. What they then use in this regressed state tends to contain aspects of childish (pre-oedipal) fury. The enemy is perceived more and more as a stereotype of bad and negative qualities. The use of denial allows a group to ignore the fact that its own externalizations and projections are involved in this process. The stereotyped enemy may be so despised as to be no longer human, and it will then be referred to in non-human terms. History teaches us that it was in this way that the Nazis perceived the Jews as vermin to be exterminated. As I write, Al Qaeda terrorist groups view all Americans as demons and infidels to be annihilated, and many Americans are comforted by demonizing all of

bearded Islam. Many Israelis consider most Palestinians as dirt beneath their feet subhuman and most Palestinians think of most Israelis as despoilers of the land they are supposed to share. In other words, the problem of the mentality of war and of terrorism mobilizes our anxieties in such a way so as to **prevent critical reality testing**. If we could learn the enormously difficult and painful task of re-introjection, of taking back our projections, our hatreds, anxieties, and fears of the other and of difference, long before they harm the other, there might be a transition, a link, from the state sanctioned violence of war back to individual violence. We might learn to **subvert negative projective identification into a positive identification as a means of empathizing with the other** and thus containing difference. The violence of the individual could then be contained and sublimated in peaceful ways, such as reconciling and balancing competing interests by asking what exactly these opposing interests are and exploring what the dynamics, conscious and unconscious, are for the hatred of deep war-like antagonisms. In other words, we would need to change our relationship with the other, giving up the dangerously irresponsible habit of splitting, projective identification, and exclusivity by recognizing difference not antagonistically but through an inclusive process that recognises the totalitv of human relationships in a peaceful world. We might substitute for the libidinal object-ties involved in projective identification the re-introjection of the object into the ego, and thus reach a common feeling of sharing, of being part of the other, of empathy, in short. As Freud pointed our, the ego is altered bv introjection, as suggested by his memorable formulation: " The shadow of the object has fallen on the ego."

**4. Inevitability is a self fulfilling prophecy**

Samuel S **Kim,** Dept of Poli Sci Monmouth College, Global Violence and a Just World Order, Journal of Peace Research, no 2, 19**84** p. 187

This pacified and disarmed consciousness or alienation in Marxian terms - has allowed the managers of the national security superstate to shift both their military doctrine and hardware toward making nuclear war more thinkable, more fightable, and more 'winnable'. The resultant expectations of nuclear war do not augur well, for, as social psychologist Gordon Allport put it: 'The greatest menace to the world today are leaders in office who regard war as inevitable and thus prepare their people for armed conflict. For by regarding war as inevitable, it becomes inevitable. Expectations determine behavior' (Allport 1968, p. 11).

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**The alternative is key to break down the walls of their realist ideologies**

**Bleiker, ’09** (Roland, October 11, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No. 3, “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” pp. 531)

Aesthetic explorations of sensibilities may well offer insights that cannot be reached or even comprehended by way of mimetic recognition of external appearances. It is important that they do not get lost in a political environment that tends to reduce strategic discussions to interactions among a few select members of the policy community. Especially at moments of incomprehension and despair, what is needed is not a return to the familiarity of past habits, reassuring as such a move may seem at first sight. Innovative solutions to entrenched political problems are unlikely to emerge from the mindset that has come to frame existing political interactions. What is needed is a more fundamental aesthetic encounter that explores, as James Der Derian suggests, 'how reality is seen, framed, read, and generated in the conceptualisation and actualisation of the global event'.95 Decisions that emerge from encounters between imagination and technological reason can never be based on certainty. That is, indeed, the very essence of a decision: that it is a leap of faith beyond the known. A decision is a terrible thing, S0ren Kierkegaard already knew, because its consequences cannot be calculated at the moment it is taken.96 Knowledge cannot absolve us from taking responsibility. But our decisions would be better informed, and our political options would broaden significantly, if we found more ways of appreciating the insight of those who aesthetically explore, with whatever means available to them, the multitude of interactions that exists between different faculties, including those that had been banished or subjugated by the prevalence of techno logical reason.

**Their realist “alt fails” cards are irrelevant – operating from a flawed epistemology**

**Bleiker, ’09** (Roland, October 11, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No. 3, “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” pp. 520)

How, then, is one to legitimise approaches to thought, knowledge and evidence that contradict virtually every central principle that has guided ir scholarship since its inception as an academic discipline? Knowledge communicated through artistic, philosophical and historical insights cannot always be verified by methodological means proper to science. Indeed, the significance of aesthetic insight is located precisely in the fact that it 'cannot be attained in any other way'.47 It produces what can be called an 'excess' experience; that is, an experience, sensuous at times, which cannot be apprehended or codified by non-aesthetic forms of knowledge. Indeed, aesthetic understanding is based on the very acknowledgement that signification is an inherently incomplete and problematic process.48 And this is why aesthetic truth claims need to be validated by means other than empirical evidence and scientific falsification procedures. They require productive and respectful interactions among different faculties or, as Hans Georg Gadamer puts it, an investigation into the very phenomenon of understanding.49 The remaining parts of this essay now explore efforts at such forms of legitimisation in the context of ir scholarship.

# 2NC AT: Offensive Realism

**Offensive realism fails to understand terrorism**

**Rosecrance, 02** Research Professor of Political Science at the University of California, former Professor in Public Policy at the University of Harvard (Richard, 55 World Politics 1, “Review: War and Peace”, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054212>, JSTOR, pg. 161, JPW)

Regarding the United States as a pinned-down "offshore balancer," Mearsheimer offers today's America an unattractive set of policies. Mearsheimer prescribes and predicts U.S. withdrawal from NATO and perhaps even an end to the organization.80 As long as there is no de nominated enemy, the U.S. should and will decamp from both Europe and Northeast Asia, to return only if China acts up. Both the premature withdrawal and the later reintervention are unattractive options. In fact September 11 and the international terrorist threat suggests the need for the United States to stay engaged around the world. But U.S. engagement is not likely to cause great power opposition, for most other major powers face similar threats and are willing to cooperate with the United States to deal with them. America is also dependent on others. The United States needs foreign intelligence, overflight rights, bases, and onshore support to deal with terrorism. As Joseph Nye argues: "The threat of terrorism ... is merely the most alarming 77 example of why we must seek constructive relations with nations weak and strong. Now, more than ever, as technology spreads and non governmental organizations ranging from transnational corporations to terrorists increase their power, American leadership must reorient itself toward the global community."81 In these perilous times a coalition of nations including Russia, China, Japan, European nations, and key Middle Eastern states is needed to help the United States do the job. In fact the international threat of terrorism today focuses the great powers and fosters agreement, as the Napoleonic wars did two centuries ago. If great powers become divided again, regional aggressors and terrorists will profit and resume their actions with worse consequences to follow. The emergence of terrorism as a major factor in international politics is particularly inconsistent with Mearsheimer's theory: his "tragedy of great power politics" refers only to the threat that powers pose to each other, not to a threat from below that can undermine them all.

**Offensive realism treats all countries as morally the same, hurts morality: aggression of Nazi Germany is as acceptable as aggression of US**

**Rosecrance, 02** Research Professor of Political Science at the University of California, former Professor in Public Policy at the University of Harvard (Richard, 55 World Politics 1, “Review: War and Peace”, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054212>, JSTOR, pg. 143, JPW)

The first criticism of this view, a problem that besets all realist theory, is that it assumes that history is rationality, even to some degree that history limits or determines the possibility of morality. Since all countries are actual or potential military expansionists, their use of power does not differentiate them in moral or legal terms.21 Aggression cannot be evil since all countries would be aggressors if they could. There is therefore no difference in moral terms between the aggressive policies of Nazi Germany and Japan and the reactive and liberal-democratic policies of the United States and Britain. During the cold war the United States and the Soviet Union were morally equivalent, since each was striving to increase its power at the expense of the other. That one side favored democratic elections, liberal economies, and human rights does not enter into the equation, since moral judgments cannot be applied where power dictates the outcome. The application of morality requires at least the possibility of choice among alternatives.

**Offensive realism fails to account for relatively nonaggressive powers such as the US and Great Britain**

**Rosecrance, 02** Research Professor of Political Science at the University of California, former Professor in Public Policy at the University of Harvard (Richard, 55 World Politics 1, “Review: War and Peace”, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054212>, JSTOR, pg. 143-144, JPW)

Yet a closer reading of history would suggest different conclusions. Nations do have choices that are actuated by more than considerations of rational power. The major difficulty with Mearsheimer's whole analysis is that he fails to recognize that there are powerful but nonaggressive states. The United States and Britain really have been less aggressive, ceteris paribus, than many other equally powerful countries.24 And some smaller states like Vietnam in the 1970s or eighteenth-century Prussia have been more aggressive than their power base would appear to permit. In Mearsheimer's hands all states are equally aggressive, leaving us with the conclusion that Monaco would really like to conquer the globe. But we know in the real world that Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan were more aggressive than most other states.25 Some strong states, by contrast, are not only self-abnegatory but actually very generous. A state can decide to help another state even though its only long-term benefit may come in the form of some indefinable "good will."26 States can even give other great powers their most high-level military technology.27 If nations are free to choose their actions independently of the compulsions of interest, those choices can be evaluated from both moral and legal points of view. There remains a realm in which moral judgment can operate.

# 2NC AT: Offensive Realism

**Offensive realism doesn’t account for friendships and political alliances**

**Rosecrance, 02** Research Professor of Political Science at the University of California, former Professor in Public Policy at the University of Harvard (Richard, 55 World Politics 1, “Review: War and Peace”, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054212>, JSTOR, pg. 148, JPW)

But however their hesitancy is explained, the notion that Britain and the United States could not have done more against other great powers is not credible. Between 1840 and 1850 England was the only industrial nation, and its technological standing revealed at the Crystal Palace Exhibition in 1851 was far ahead of anyone else's. While Russia kept up in total GDP, Britain was far superior in per capita GDP and could have turned her talents to military expansion had she chosen to do so. Later on the United States might have adopted an aggressive stance since her GDP equaled that of Britain and Germany combined and her technology revealed at the Philadelphia Exposition in 1876 was superior to all others. But like Britain, the United States held back.45 Furthermore, it was not water that stopped the two insular states. Nor did water prevent twentieth-century Japan from attacking the largest land powers: China, Russia, and the United States.46 It did not stop England from waging the Crimean War against Russia, and it did not prevent the United States from invading Europe in 1944.47 Today combined armaments, naval, air, and ground, can invade many inland areas of the world across vast bodies of water. Naval and air superiority make the transport of troops as feasible across oceans as across land. If the United States were so inclined, it could expand on the European continent as well. But the United States does not seek European territory because, as Mearsheimer knows very well, America and its European allies share a common culture, democratic institutions, and strong economic ties. These exist entirely aside from the balance of power and would continue irrespective of the decline of the Russian threat. Emphasizing such common orientations, the European Union has already obviated war among its member nations, and the burgeoning links with the United States have effectively done the same. "Friendship" has proved to be more durable than the balance of power and offensive realism would allow.48 If this were not true, then surely, on good realist grounds, there would already have been a world combination of power directed against the United States, for in power terms, the United States is the only country with the possibility of seeking world hegemony. This does not occur because America does not threaten other great powers.49 Rather, it seeks to work with them to attain common goals.50

**Even other realists conclude offensive realism fails**

**Rosecrance, 02** Research Professor of Political Science at the University of California, former Professor in Public Policy at the University of Harvard (Richard, 55 World Politics 1, “Review: War and Peace”, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054212>, JSTOR, pg. 155, JPW)

Equally, other realists and many nonrealists disagree with the restless and expansionist cast of Mearheimers offensive analysis. If countries aiming at hegemony can expect to encounter opposition, conflict, and war, their enlightened and longer-term self-interest would be to limit their ambitions. Where "the further the weaker"61 obtains, nations should seek to diminish the opportunity costs of war and to achieve the otherwise forgone advantages of peaceful economic growth and trade.62 Marc Trachtenberg writes: "Policies that are rational in power political terms are not the fundamental source of international conflict: in themselves, by and large, they help make for a stable international order. To understand why this is the case is to understand why realism is at its heart a theory of peace, and why it ought to be recognized as such."63

# AT: Realism - Rational

**The idea of being rational is a complete social construct**

**Rodney Bruce Hall, Sep 2006**

[member of the Editorial Board of the journal \*Oxford Development Studies\* and \*International Studies Quarterly\*, the flagship journal of the International Studies Association. He has taught previously at Brown University and the University of Iowa ,Journal of International Relations and Development. of International Relations and Development. Ljubljana: 2006. Vol. 9, Iss. 3; pg. 269]
Rationality An obvious place to begin is with the first-image assumptions of neoclassical economics concerning the nature of human rationality. In spite of abundant empirical evidence that norms of co-operation pre-exist what Polanyi (1944/1957) has termed 'market society', neoclassical economics is a theoretical endeavour that is predicated on the assumption that individuals make perfectly rational choices without regard to the welfare of others in accordance with a strictly utilitarian understanding of rationality. This understanding of rationality necessarily reduces the human social actor to a 'self-seeking animal' in a highly teleological fashion through the theoretical construct of 'revealed preference'. However, as Sen (1977: 322) rather caustically suggested, if *you are observed to choose x rejecting y , you are declared to have 'revealed' a preference for x over y . Your personal utility is then defined as simply a numerical representation of this 'preference,' assigning a higher utility to a 'preferred' alternative. With this set of definitions you can hardly escape maximizing your own utility, except through inconsistency.* To the problem of teleology in this theory of revealed preference, neoclassical economics adds the deductive holism of the 'equilibrium hypothesis'. This hypothesis essentially asserts that a general equilibrium is established in economics systems and restored if perturbed by some economic force. A number of micro-level subsidiary hypotheses that carry within them assumptions about human nature must obtain 'before the equilibrium hypothesis can even conceivably be true' (Fullbrook 2004: 72). These necessary subsidiary hypotheses include perfectly competitive markets, perfect information and divisibility of goods and the determinism of the 'independently "chosen" behaviour of individual economic agents' ( *ibid* .) over all outcomes. Perfect competition must be assumed to buttress the normative claim built into neoclassical economics of allocative efficiency and the general maximization of welfare resulting from the pursuit of self-interest in Smith. This is a highly asocialized view of markets because under perfect competition 'there is no room for bargaining, negotiation, remonstration, or mutual adjustment' (Hirschman 1982: 1464). Unfortunately, neorealist and most neoliberal systems theory in IR draw directly upon this model, likening the competition of states in anarchy to the competition of firms in a perfectly competitive marketplace. These first-image micro-foundations enjoy no empirical grounding. The mode of reasoning is clearly deductive rather than inductive. As the economist Edward Fullbrook (2004: 72) suggests, neoclassical economics adheres to the equilibrium hypothesis and inquires as to 'what kind of individual behavior might make the equilibrium hypothesis conceivably true, and then having limited the definition of "rational behavior" to it [...] it declares -- no empirical research please -- that "rationality" generally characterizes the actual behavior of economic agents.' When these first-image micro-foundations are put to empirical tests, as they have been during recent developments in experimental economics, they sometimes clearly fail (Nowak *et al.* 2000; Henrich *et al.* 2001; Sigmund *et al.* 2002). Herbert Gintis (2000: 316) finds, for example, that far from being 'self-regarding' actors with exogenously given and determinate preferences, actual human subjects in controlled laboratory situations are 'strong reciprocators' who are predisposed to co-operate in strategic economic interaction, but punish non-reciprocity (defection, in game-theoretic terms) even at significant personal cost. Rather than being voracious utility maximizers, they are loss averse rather than gain seeking (2000: 315). Gintis (2000: 320) finds that the understanding of human rationality in disciplinary economics 'implies self-interest, outcome-orientation, and time-consistency,' but his laboratory experience suggests that 'were this a valid description of human economic rationality we would have to call real-life humans hopelessly irrational.' From his experimental evidence, he proposes inductively an alternative definition of a human rational agent as 'one who draws conclusions logically from given premises, whose premises are defensible by reasoned argument, who uses evidence dispassionately in evaluating factual assertions, and more technically, who optimizes subject to constraints under conditions of limited information and costly decision-making' ( *ibid* .). Thus, it is incumbent upon the social scientist to explore (rather than assume) the premises from which a 'rational agent' proceeds to reason, and to assess that which 'reasoned argument' constitutes for that agent given the premises from which s/he begins in order to assess what s/he might 'rationally' conclude. Economics thus views behaviour *as* action. In other words, economics views behaviour that conforms to the expectations of rational, instrumental logics as the only salient action that the actor can take (or the only 'move' the 'player' can make) in the interactions that these assumptions structure. But as Charles Taylor (1971: 13, emphasis added) observed, not all human action is rational in the sense that it avoids a contradiction or confusion of purpose: *[...] even contradictory, irrational-action is 'made sense of' when we understand why it was engaged in ... when there is a coherence between the actions and the meanings of ... [an actor's] ... situation to him.* These questions of social meanings for actors are crucial for assessing the conditions in which action observed as behaviour is rational. These questions must be explored theoretically and their answers assessed empirically. These answers may not be assumed if we are to have confidence that we apprehend the social action intended by the actors' observed behaviour. Such questions are central to the constructivist research programme. At the heart of every 'rational action' are socially and historically contingent, intersubjectively shared social meanings. What counts as 'rational action' is constituted with reference to these shared meanings.

# 2NC AT: Threats Real

**1. The most recent psychological evidence confirms our K- the affirmatives enemy creation is not based on objective reality, but a paranoid need for certainty. Rejecting their media doomsaying in favor of acceptance of uncertainty solves better**

Tom **Jacobs,** Professional Journalist for 20 years, 3-8-**10** <http://www.miller-mccune.com/politics/the-comforting-notion-of-an-all-powerful-enemy-10429/>

We have seen the enemy, and he is powerful. That’s a recurring motif of contemporary political discourse, as generalized fear mutates for many into a fixation on a ferocious foe. Partisan rhetoric has turned increasingly alarmist. President Obama has difficulty getting even watered-down legislation passed, yet he is supposedly establishing a socialist state. The Tea Party is viewed as a terrifying new phenomenon, rather than the latest embodiment of a recurring paranoid streak in American politics. Osama bin Laden is likely confined to a cave, but he’s perceived as a threat large enough to justify engaging in torture. According to one school of thought, this tendency to exaggerate the strength of our adversaries serves a **specific psychological function**. It is less scary to place all our fears on a single, strong enemy than to accept the fact our well-being is largely based on factors beyond our control. An enemy, after all, can be defined, analyzed and perhaps even defeated. The notion that focusing our anger on a purportedly powerful foe helps mitigate our fears was first articulated by cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker in his 1969 book Angel in Armor. It has now been confirmed in a timely paper titled “An Existential Function of Enemyship,” just published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. A research team led by social psychologist Daniel Sullivan of the University of Kansas reports on four studies that suggest people are “motivated to create and/or perpetually maintain clear enemies to avoid psychological confrontations with an even more threatening chaotic environment.” When you place their findings in the context of the many threats (economic and otherwise) people face in today’s world, the propensity to turn ideological opponents into **mighty monsters** starts to make sense. In one of Sullivan’s studies, conducted during the 2008 presidential campaign, a group of University of Kansas undergraduates were asked whether they believed enemies of their favored candidate (Obama or John McCain) were manipulating voting machines in an attempt to steal the election. Prior to considering such conspiracy theories, half were asked to consider the truth of statements such as “I have control over whether I am exposed to a disease,” and “I have control over how my job prospects fare in the economy.” The other half were asked to assess similar statements on relatively unimportant subjects, such as “I have control over how much TV I watch.” Those who were forced to contemplate their lack of control over significant life events “reported a stronger belief in opponent-led conspiracies,” the researchers report. In another study, the student participants were randomly assigned to read one of two essays. The first stated that the U.S. government is well-equipped to handle the economic downturn, and that crime rates are declining due to improved law enforcement. The second reported the government is not at all competent to cope with the recession, and crime rates are going up in spite of the authorities’ best efforts. They were then presented with a list of hypothetical events and asked to pick the most likely cause of each: A friend, an enemy, or neither (that is, the event happened randomly). Those “informed” that the government was not in control were more likely to view a personal enemy as responsible for negative events in their lives. In contrast, those told things are running smoothly “seemed to defensively downplay the extent to which enemies negatively influence their lives,” the researchers report. These studies suggest it’s oddly comforting to have someone, or something, you can point to as the source of your sorrows. This helps explain why Americans inevitably find an outside enemy to focus on, be it the Soviets, the Muslims or the Chinese. Given that society pays an obvious price for such illusions, how might we go about reducing the need for “enemyship?” “If you can somehow raise people’s sense that they have control over their lives and negative hazards in the world, their need to ‘enemize’ others should be reduced,” Sullivan said in an e-mail interview. “In our first study, for instance, we showed that people who feel dispositionally high levels of control over their lives did not respond to a reminder of external hazards by attributing more influence to an enemy. Any social structure or implementation that makes people feel more control over their lives should thus generally reduce (though perhaps not completely eliminate) the ‘need’ or tendency to create or attribute more influence to enemy figures. “In our third study, we showed that if people perceived the broader social system as ordered, they were more likely to respond to a threat to personal control by boosting their faith in the government, rather than by attributing more influence to an enemy. So, again, we see that the need to perceive enemies is reduced when people are made to feel that they are in control of their lives, or that there is a reliable, efficient social order that protects them from the threat of random hazards. “One could imagine, then, that circumstances which allow all citizens to be medically insured, or to have a clear sense of police protection, could reduce the tendency to seek out enemy figures to distill or focalize concerns with **random, imminent threats.”** Sullivan also offers two more personal potential solutions. “If people have such inherent needs for control and certainty in their lives, they should try to channel those needs as best they can into socially beneficial pursuits,” he says. “Lots of people pursue science, art and religion — just to give a few examples — as means of boiling down uncertainty about the world into clear systems of rules and engagement with reality, creating small domains for themselves in which they can exert a sense of mastery. Insofar as these pursuits don’t harm anyone, but still provide a sense of control, they can reduce the need for enemyship. “A final solution would be to encourage people to simply accept uncertainty and lack of control in their lives,” he adds. “Some meaning systems — Taoism for example — are rooted in this idea, that people can eventually accept a certain lack of control and eventually become resigned to this idea to the extent that they no longer react defensively against it.” So there, at least, is a practical place to begin: Less MSNBC and more meditation.

**2. Discourse of danger is not apolitical- our understanding of the world and identity shape threat perceptions. Recognition that realism is only one version of reality and not reality itself doesn't mean we can never recognize threats, but it does mean that we must deconstruct paranoiac fear mongering like the 1AC- thats Grondin**

# 2NC AT: Threats real

**3. The aff’s representations of Self and Other reinforce domination and hierarchies, turning case-threat assessments are contingent, not natural**

**Der Derian and Shapiro, 89** Professor of Political Science at Brown University, Professor of Political Science at University of Hawaii at Manoa (James, Michael, “International/Intertextual Relations”, pg. xv-xvi, JPW)

The deconstructionist basically tackles the fiction that a thing can be known only by what it is not. First, a deconstructive theorist observes that a particular text or argument depends on an oppositional structuring. The author, or the text, reasons by antinomies, opposing terms to one another with no analysis of middle categories or alternative or plural terms; for example, “peace” will be opposed to “war,” “truth” to “fiction,” “chaos” to “order,” and so on. Oppositions such as these have been common, pervasive, and even fundamental to philosophical argument: a priori/empirical, intelligible/sensible, general/particular, transcendent/immanent, mind/body, cognitive/affective, rational/irrational, logical/illogical, culture/nature, self/other, determinate/indeterminate, form/matter, fact/value, real/ideal, and the like. While some of these are cast as oppositions about truth (rational/irrational, true/false), most are opposed in the sense that they are different and mutually exclusive. Not merely differentiated and set in opposition to each other, the terms are also differently weighted, one having more power than the other. Thus, as deconstructionists see it, a hierarchical struggle attends such terminological exchanges. The denigrated term essentially functions to highlight the other term’s significance; its formal function is to signify, or identify, the dominant term. The very differentiation and exclusion of this subordinate “opposite” defines the dominant term, which, as it were, draws a boundary around itself and declares: “*This* I am, and not That.” “That,” outside the boundary, is the Other, the not-self, upon which “This” depends for its identity. This operation (which at once differentiates one term from another, prefers one to the other, and arranges them hierarchically, displacing the subordinate term beyond the boundary of what is significant and desirable in context) typifies the logocentric procedure. From ancient Greek philosophy through the present time, logocentrism has been the dominant operation for constructing meaning in Western thought. What deconstructive thinkers “deconstruct” is the structuring of paired concepts as inevitably opposed and as opposed in a zero-sum relation. Derrida explains that the deconstructive operation requires essentially two moves: to reverse the hierarchy and to undo the pairing. The reversal is one part of the deconstructive move. The other part is to displace the entire logocentric system for that particular text or context. Derrida deliberately uses political and martial metaphors to describe the logocentric procedure, saying that the terms are set in “violent” opposition, one “dominating” the other, “occupying” a “commanding position.” The aptness of these metaphors for describing a linguistic meaning-making procedure—and one to which people can have passionate commitments—has led many people to hypothesize that Derrida’s work provides some evidence that we do shape our world somehow in accord with our discursive structures; therefore, changing the latter might help us to change the former. What a deconstructive analysis leaves in place is a confirmation that the “meaning” of a term or concept comes into being only relative to at least one other term. However, while meaning is utterly dependent on the presence of at least one other signifier, that second or third term by which we can know the meaning of the first is not given by nature. The mistake that logocentrism makes is in not seeing the cultural contingency of its philosophical categories. Meaning is then a dynamic process, much more like an interaction between particles—a spark, a field of conductivity, the play of signifiers—than a steady light emitted from a solitary beacon.

# 2NC AT: Threats Real

**4. The 1AC turns us into consumers of institutionalized danger- recognition of the contingent nature of representations is crucial to prevent global violence that remains hidden by logistical experts**

**Der Derian and Shapiro, 89** Professor of Political Science at Brown University, Professor of Political Science at University of Hawaii at Manoa (James, Michael, “International/Intertextual Relations”, pg. 21, JPW)

As a first step in this direction, it is important to note that the context for textualizing modernity’s subjects, objects, and thematic is a recognition that what is unusual about the present is the degree of distance between experience and knowledge such that one must increasingly depend on knowledge agents nominated within modernity’s knowledge-related discourses (the prevailing, authoritative representational practices through which experience is mediated and evaluated). Thus, what the scenario concerning the genealogy of beliefs provides, among other things, is an intimation of how representational practices relate to policy issues. More specifically, because we live in a world in which danger is institutionalized, persons interested in relating their fears to situations of danger have to become consumers of representations from institutions that have the legitimacy to produce interpretations of danger. However, when something is recognized as a representational *practice* rather than an authoritative description, it can be treated as contentious. It is simply the case that most traditional forms of political analysis help to naturalize reigning interpretations rather than registering their meaning- and value-constituting effects. In contrast with such unreflective modes is Paul Virilio’s analysis of the modern text within which problems of international danger are produced. According to Virilio, the modern text of international danger is scripted by logistical experts, for we are in what he calls “the age of logistics,” in which all seemingly nonmilitary social processes are “vectorized” in accordance with preparation for war. In this era, in which logistical thinking is highly technicalized, the “civilian” is given no status in the discourse within which defense against nuclear surprise attack (one of the primary interpretations of the danger) is presented. As Virilio puts it: “The civilian finds himself discriminated against in favor of a kind of crystallization of the scientific and military.” The preeminence of this mode of military intelligence amounts to a depoliticizing of international danger insofar as it deprivileges anything but a scientific/military standpoint as valid knowledge. Among the most prominent concepts that belong to this logistical mode of representing nuclear danger is that of deterrence. The age of deterrence, in which planning is skewed in the direction of reducing the threat of sudden nuclear annihilation, is characterized by the masking of other kinds of war or modes of violence between states that, ironically, deterrence thinking encourages. Deterrence thinking is thus what Virilio calls an “intelligence of war that eludes politics.” The mystifying of the state of war that now exists is the illusion that war itself is only full-scale nuclear combat. While logistical thinking preoccupies itself with the avoidance of such catastrophies, the armed hostilities that go on are represented not as war but as some form of “interstate delinquencies,” as “state terrorism.” The modern politics of preoccupation with extermination amounts, then, to a depoliticizaiton of all violent confrontations that stop short of nuclear combat. This pattern of representation allows, increasingly, what Virilio calls “acts of war without war:” the taking or rescue of hostages, retaliatory raids for ship movements interpreted as hostile or transgressive, and so on. The point is that these acts of violence, which elude the obloquy of being “acts of war,” operate within a mystified zone, within representations monopolized within logistical thinking and thus outside of a broader, politicizing impetus.

# AT: Utopian

**The alternative is possible- historical epistemologies prove you should be hopeful about the prospects of change**

**Vasquez, 95-** Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University (John A., 1995, “International Relations Theory Today,” pg. 221)

The second contribution of postmodernism is the realization that what exists in the world is choice posing as truth. This insight flows naturally from the first; for if it is the case that nothing is necessary (because historicist conditions or positivist causes do not determine things as they are), it follows that the arrangements that do exist were created by human beings either consciously or unconsciously. Such constructions were in fact choices that were made. How much freedom went into the choices is a matter for historical research, but they were choices in the sense that other arrangements could have been selected by struggles within history. Human beings, however, have not been satisfied to call these outcomes choices that were contingent on preference, cultural biases or political fights. Instead they have sought to cloak them as the outcome of metaphysical categories - God, Reason or History. Rather than seeing things as arbitrary choices coming out of power and interests, the victors have justified their choices in terms of divine law, natural law or scientific analysis. Even when choice is recognized, these warrants make any other choices sinful, unnatural and unreasonable, or unscientific. Such claims when seen in the context of Enlightenment beliefs about the inevitability of progress take on an added weight. The postmodernist denies all of this.

**It’s not impossible to think of the unthinkable**

**Bleiker, ’09** (Roland, October 11, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No. 3, “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” pp. 530-31)

This is why one of the main political challenges today may consist not of retaining the autonomous sphere of art, but of rendering the aesthetic central again as a way of promoting non-coercive relationships among different faculties. It is essential that ensuing legitimisation processes reach beyond the Western sources and values that still dominate most approaches to aesthetics. This process is, thus, intrinsically linked with the challenge of internationalising the aesthetic, with redeeming the unthought cultural insights that remain eclipsed by the present obsession with the occidental gaze.

Indeed, the sensibility that the aesthetic promotes, and that technological reason is unable to apprehend, revolves precisely around the unknown, the unseen and the unthought. For Walter Benjamin this is the very task of art: to generate a demand for which a sense of need has not yet arisen.93 To think of the unthinkable, however, is not as far-fetched as it seems at first sight. Most people experience moments when the language available to them is not adequately suited to express exactly what they feel. For Gadamer, this common occurrence is particularly pronounced when we are faced with a work of visual art; a confrontation that highlights the extent to which our desire and capacity for understanding goes beyond our ability to communicate them through verbal statements and propositions.

# AT: Security Good

**Alt Solves – empirically, security reconstruction has led to minimal war**

**Lloyd Axworthy. 2001** [ served as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet chaired by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. Axworthy is currently President of the University of Winnipeg, and is a member of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poorsecurity and global governance: Putting people first

Global Governance. Boulder: -2001. Vol. 7, Iss. 1; pg. 19,]

The meaning of security is being transformed. Security traditionally has focused on the state because its fundamental purpose is to protect its citizens. Hobbled by economic adversity, outrun by globalization, and undermined from within by bad governance, the capacity of some states to provide this protection has increasingly come into question. This incapacity is particularly obvious in war-torn societies. The state has, at times, come to be a major threat to its population's rights and welfare-or has been incapable of restraining the warlords or paramilitaries-rather than serving as the protector of its people. This drives us to broaden the focus of security beyond the level of the state and toward individual human beings, as well as to consider appropriate roles for the international system to compensate for state failure. The present discourse of security reflects this change in the global reality and the change in perspective that goes with it. No longer are we limited to discussions of states' rights and national sovereignty. Protecting civilians, addressing the plight of war-affected children and the threat of terrorism and drugs, managing open borders, and combating infectious diseases are now part of a dialogue. This shift reflects a growing recognition that the protection of people must be a principal concern. But the term is not really new. A recognition that people's rights are at least as important as those of states has been gaining momentum since the end of World War II. The Holocaust forced a serious examination of the place of international moral standards and codes in the conduct of world affairs. It also caused us to rethink the principles of national sovereignty. The Nuremberg trials acknowledged that grotesque violations of people's rights could not go unpunished. The United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Genocide and Geneva conventions all recognized the inherent right of people to personal security. They challenge conventional notions of sovereignty when serious violations of rights occur. Human security today puts people first and recognizes that their safety is integral to the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security. The security of states is essential, but not sufficient, to fully ensure the safety and well-being of the world's peoples. Several current challenges are particularly compelling. One concerns the evolution of new links between local conflict and the international economy and the impact of these perverse linkages on vulnerable communities. Doubtless, high-value commodities like diamonds or oil can prolong and intensify conflict. Angola and Sierra Leone demonstrate the extreme impact of personal greed on vulnerable populations. The Security Council embargo on rough diamonds from Sierra Leone is a positive first step toward preventing the use of profits from diamond sales to finance wars and crimes against civilians. Another challenge is the suffering of vulnerable populations in war, one particularly painful aspect of which is the issue of children. At the September 2000 International Conference on War-Affected Children in Winnipeg, over 130 countries along with youth, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and experts gathered in common cause to improve the plight of war-affected children. Governments adopted a fourteen-point agenda to be taken to the UN special session on children in 2001. Governments also made specific concrete commitments, including greater program investment, diplomatic initiatives, and support for international legal instruments. The compelling need for a permanent court to judge crimes against humanity has been underlined by ongoing events in Kosovo and Sierra Leone. In June 1999, coalitions of like-minded states and NGOs produced the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. This court is a significant new international institution in the battle against war crimes and genocide, a major step toward real international accountability. This international discourse on human security is beginning to effect change on the institutions and practice of global governance. In this interconnected world, our own security is increasingly indivisible from that of our neighbors-at home and abroad. Globalization has made individual human suffering an irrevocable universal concern. While governments continue to be important, global integration of world markets and instant communication have given a role and a profile to those in business, civil society, and NGOs and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Synergies between issues and the new coalitions that result have produced new forms of diplomatic action. Coalition building among like-minded states and nonstate actors is one dynamic element of this "new diplomacy." The Human Security Network, which now includes over a dozen countries from all regions of the world, working in concert with civil and intergovernmental organizations, originally grew out of a bilateral arrangement between Canada and Norway-the "Lysoen" partnership. The network has promoted international support for UN efforts to protect civilians and identified opportunities for collective action, like the UN Conference on Small Arms in 2001. It is also bringing international attention to such emerging issues as making armed groups comply with international humanitarian and human rights law. Another example of how the dialogue on security has changed can be seen in the Group of 8 (G-8). Five years ago the discussion was on liberalizing trade. In 2000, at the foreign ministers' meeting in Miyazaki and at the Okinawa Summit itself, issues such as conflict prevention, arms control and disarmament, terrorism, crime, and the environment were front and center on the agenda. Ministers agreed upon an ambitious plan to help nurture a "culture of prevention." This has meant improving development policies to address the causes of conflict, but also, most immediately, stemming the uncontrolled and illegal transfer of small arms and light weapons. These armaments have had a tragic impact on civilian populations caught up in armed conflict. Thus, the means of war can be restricted by limiting access to and availability of these weapons. Yet there will continue to be instances when conflict prevention diplomacy or the deterrent effect of new international law does not succeed. In these cases, the international community must be prepared to end suffering. Deciding when intervention is warranted poses serious questions. Under whose auspices? By what criteria? Recognizing what standards? Using what tools? Canada has sponsored the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, under the leadership of Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, which will submit a report to the secretary-general in 2001. Spanning a range of perspectives and experiences, the commission will examine legal, political, ethical, and operational dimensions of the complex question in collaboration with a network of scholars, experts, and NGOs around the world. The need to rethink intervention leads inevitably to necessary reforms of international institutions. Using the UN Security Council to effectively address human security requires a broadening of the security concept, new operating methods, and transparency. Canada, during its tenure on the council, has pushed for the inclusion of civilian protection initiatives in peacekeeping mandates, child rights monitors, rapid deployment capacity, and much more. But whether as a result of permanent member prerogatives or the secrecy of council deliberations, too many pressing security issues are excluded from the agenda, and too many voices that should be heard are not. In a time of increasing attention to "codes of conduct," it is striking that the Security Council has never formally adopted rules of procedure. Preserving the discretionary power of the permanent members has not always served the interests of the council's global constituency. Adding to the permanent membership of the Security Council will not result in a more accountable and representative body. Instead, the focus should be on increasing the elected membership as a way of asserting greater democracy and accountability in the world's paramount peace and security body. Opening up the council to more systematic and wide-ranging input from civil society would help. Too often, national or regional interests, as well as bureaucratic inertia, get in the way of the UN's ability to fulfill its charter. The recent crisis in Sierra Leone is a perfect example. When Canada and Norway offered staff to bolster the UN Mission in Sierra Leone's (UNAMSIL's) planning capacity at the height of the crisis, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations remained silent. Gratis personnel had become politically unacceptable because a coalition of nations unable to provide such free support had collaborated in the General Assembly a year earlier to prevent any country from doing so. This does not serve the UN well, nor did it help the people of Sierra Leone. Without the capacity to deploy rapidly, the UN depends on the willingness of individual states or regional alliances to carry out the work of maintaining international peace and security. The effort of some states to prevent the United Nations from developing standby force arrangements is particularly unhelpful. The Brahimi Report, which presented a blunt appraisal of UN peacekeeping operations, offers a way to get back on track. Promoting human security globally also requires that governments work more closely with the nongovernmental sector. Increasingly, the private sector is recognizing the value of developing corporate social responsibility initiatives for its domestic and international operations. In 1997, a coalition of Canadian companies enunciated an International Code of Ethics for Canadian business. The activities of corporations make a positive contribution to the economic and social development of communities and human security by advancing human rights, good governance, and democracy. At the same time, the purely extractive and exploitative behavior of some private firms can endanger human security. By developing clearly enunciated principles and guidelines regarding corporate social responsibility, companies will be better prepared to navigate some of the difficult ethical decisions that businesses can face when operating internationally. Forums such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the G-8, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have been working with corporations on developing social responsibility guidelines. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in particular is playing a leadership role on this issue through its revised Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. The need to work in partnership with civil society and the NGO community is perhaps more important now than ever before. NGOs can play a variety of important roles: they bring technical expertise and experience to the policymaking process, often work with government to implement international agendas, inform citizens about challenges and choices on the international agenda, mobilize human and financial resources to help solve local and global problems, work to end human suffering, and hold governments accountable. One need only look at the Ottawa process leading to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention to see the benefits of this new type of coalition between international and nongovernmental organizations and states. Similar issue-specific coalitions have formed to stem the spread of small arms, protect war-- affected children, and secure justice for war crime victims through the International Criminal Court, with similarly positive results. State-civil society partnerships on global issues are not necessarily smooth, as was evident in the disruption of the World Trade Organization summit in Seattle in 1999. Activism is enhanced by information technology. Integrated networks and e-commerce are having a profound impact on how business is conducted worldwide. Information systems can change the politics of human security, but the potential of this new tool is immense. Yet the public sector's use of the new tools of the new economy has been primitive and unsophisticated. These tools represent a chance to leap forward, to connect better, to better articulate our ideas and take action. Actualizing the concept of human security requires all actors-- states, international organizations, NGOs, and businesses-to act responsibly. This includes developing codes of conduct where appropriate, working to establish new international norms regarding the protection of peoples, and incorporating the human dimension into the work of international organizations. At the start of this new century, the protection of peoples is among the most important issues before us. Peace and security-national, regional, and international-are possible only if they are derived from peoples' security.

# 2NC Method Key

**1. Only the alternative can solve – the affirmative is trapped in mimetic thought that re-entrenches a flawed system**

**Bleiker, ’09** (Roland, October 11, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No. 3, “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” pp. 511-12)

Before exploring the significance of aesthetic insights it is necessary to juxtapose them, if only briefly, to the prevailing wisdom of ir scholarship. One perhaps could, with Jacques Derrida, speak of two fundamentally different approaches. The first seeks to discover a truth or an origin that somehow escapes the necessity of interpretation. The second accepts or even affirms that representing the political is a form of interpretation that is, by its very nature, incomplete and bound up with the values of the perceiver.7

Much of ir scholarship has, undoubtedly, been conducted in the former, mimetic mode of representation. The most influential contributions to the discipline, particularly in North America, continue to adhere almost exclusively to social scientific conventions. They uphold the notion of a neutral observer and a corresponding separation of object and subject. J. David Singer proudly announced during the behavioural revolution that 'there is no longer much doubt that we can make the study of international politics into a scientific discipline worthy of the name'.8 Much has changed since then, of course, but representation is still widely seen as process of coping which, ideally, erases all traces of human interference so that the 'artistic' end-product looks just like the original. Realism has made 'the real' into an object of desire, Hayden White would say.9 Or, as one of the most influential contemporary methodology textbooks in political sciences states: 'the goal is to learn facts about the real world'.10 Mimetic approaches do not pay enough attention to the relationship between the represented and its representation. Indeed, they are not really theories of representation.11 They are theories against representation. But political reality does not exist in an a priori way. It comes into being only through the process of representation. A political event, for instance, cannot determine from what perspective and in what context it is seen. Our effort to make sense of this event can, thus, never be reduced to the event itself. This is why representation 'always raises the question of what set of true statements we might prefer to other sets of true statements'.12 It is a process through which we organise our understanding of reality. Note as well that even if the ideal of mimesis—a perfect resemblance between signifier and signified—was possible, it could offer us little political insight. It would merely replicate what is, and thus be as useless as 'as a facsimile of a text that is handed to us in answer to our question of how to interpret that text'.13 Aesthetic approaches, by contrast, embark on a direct political encounter, for they engage the gap that inevitably opens up between a form of representation and the object it seeks to represent. Rather than constituting this gap as a threat to knowledge and political stability, aesthetic approaches accept its inevitability. Indeed, they recognise that the difference between represented and representation is the very location of politics. What is at stake, then, is 'the knowability of the world', as Elaine Scarry puts it, and the fact that 'knowability depends on its susceptibility to representation'.14

**2. The alternative is key to endorsing a shift towards focusing on “how” questions.
Smith, 95-** Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. He has previously taught at the State University of New York and at the University of East Anglia. His most recent books are, as joint author, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (1990) and, as co-editor, *European Foreign Policy* (1994). He is editor of the Cambridge University Press/British International Studies Association series *Studies in International Relation* (Steve, 1995, “International Relations Theory Today,” pg. 9)

What does adopting a genealogical approach to international theory involve? Richard Ashley has noted five overlapping aspects of a genealogical attitude. First, it involves a shift away from uncovering structures of history and towards a focus on 'the movement and clashes of historical practices that would impose or resist structure . . . With this shift. . . social inquiry is increasingly disposed to find its focus in the posing of "how" questions, not "what" questions' (1987, p. 409). Second, all history is seen as the clash of multiple wills, even history which produces order. In this light, discursive practices 'are to be understood as containing their own exemplary and replicable strategies and technologies for the disciplining of plural historical practices in the production of historical modes of domination' (p. 409). Third, a genealogical attitude is particularly concerned with how discursive practices emerge and are disciplined. Boundaries are seen as especially problematic, as are claims of unity, identity and autonomy within a field of practice. In short, academic disciplines are to be seen as the results of multiple practices and as historically constituted, and not at all as autonomous and natural or given. They are fields of battle between rival interpretations: 'the "autonomy" and "identity" of a field [are] a consequence of the play of power among plural elements. One is disposed to look for the strategies . . . by which multiple themes . . . are excluded, silenced, dispersed . . . thereby to privilege some elements over others, impose boundaries, and discipline practice in a manner producing just this normalized division of practical space' (p. 410). Fourth, there are no transcendental subjects with existences formed prior to practice. Instead, subjects 'emerge in consequence of the power political struggle among concepts, themes, and modes of practice. As such, the subject is itself a site of power political contest' (p. 410). Finally, academic approaches which claim to provide access to the universal truths, hidden essences, underlying structures or moral imperatives are seen as 'political practice intimately engaged in the interpretation, production, and normalization of modes of imposed order, modes of domination. They are seen as means by which practice is disciplined and domination advances in history' (pp. 410-11). A genealogical approach is, therefore, one which analyses both descent and emergence. As Smart (1985, pp. 56-60) points out, the analysis of descent questions notions of unity and identity, and attacks the assumption of an unbroken continuity of history. The study of emergence looks at how historical forms are merely transitory manifestations of subjugation and domination. What it means for international theory is that it calls into question the selfimages of the discipline, whereby international theory is portrayed as a developing discursive field with clear boundaries and transcendental concerns. Rather than being a 'natural' and 'autonomous' discipline with a series of unfolding debates which get ever closer to explaining reality, from a genealogical perspective international theory appears as a historical manifestation of a series of conflicting interpretations, whose unity and identity are the product of a victory in this conflict. Crucially, a genealogical analysis focuses our attention on to the picture of the discipline that the discipline tells itself. What is the self-image of international theory that dominates debates, and which graduate students are given as *the* history of international thought? What assumptions are hidden in the way that the history of the discipline is presented? What voices are silenced and which marginalized in the canon of international theory? Above all, what power-political practices infuse the selfimages of international theory?

# 2NC Method Key

**3. A peaceful, cooperative community is key to the individualization of human beings through liberal thought.**

**Brown, 95-** Professor of Politics at the University of South Hampton (Chris, 1995, “International Relations Theory Today,” pg. 104)

But from a communitarian perspective, this account of the growth of society and community is highly misleading because it rests on the characteristically liberal assumption that the individual co-operators who venture together for mutual advantage have a pre-social existence, and pre-social interests and values, that they bring with them to the process. By contrast, the communitarian perspective suggests, first, that human beings become 'individuals' only by the process of relating to one another in societies and, second, that, by extension, the kind of individuals they become will be a product of the kind of society within which this takes place. Thus, the sense of community that emerges from kinship group or tribe is not simply quantitatively different from that which is shaped by the modern state. There is a qualitative difference here. By situating the family within the context of civil society - a location within which the individual learns to make his or her way in the world - and by situating civil society within a constitutional context wherein law is seen as ultimately self-created rather than an external, alien force, the modern state makes possible the creation of individuals whose potentiality is far greater than that possessed by those whose individuality is constituted by societies in which these institutions are not differentiated - such at least is the position of communitarians of a Hegelian disposition. From this perspective the sequence 'kin, tribe, city, state' is not simply a sequence of ever larger political and social units: it is a sequence of progressively differentiated entities, each adding something to the constitution of human beings that its predecessor could not offer. At this point, the obvious next step is to ask whether a *world* community would continue this process by providing something that the modern state does not - and the classic communitarian answer, given by Hegel and Rorty in the introduction to this chapter in statements which could be replicated from a variety of other sources, is that it would not. From the communitarian perspective, the modern state could already provide the individual with the basis for a life lived in freedom, dealing justly with all, and there is, thus, no necessity to go beyond this to any allegedly higher form of community, even if such a move were possible. World community cannot be seen as a *necessary* step, because it could not provide any resource for the creation of individuality and personality on top of those already to hand in the modern state. However, and this point cannot be stressed too strongly, the fact that these resources are to hand does not mean that they are actually employed, and the perspective outlined here does *not* underwrite a conservative acceptance of the status quo; indeed, the fact that a rational, ethical community is possible yet nowhere exists signposts the imperative need for a change in the way we live. Thus, communitarians of this Hegelian or neo-Hegelian persuasion have no difficulty in explaining the indeterminate nature of the struggle between the forces of global solidarity and those of local particularism. This global struggle has no obvious shape and is leading in no clearly defined direction because the underlying logic which created community at 'lower' levels of social organization does not operate on this terrain. Local struggles *can* be understood in communitarian terms, and neo-Hegelians *do* believe that the modern state is a superior form of social organization to its alternatives but even here, without the metaphysical assurance provided to their predecessors by the notion of *Geist,* there can be no guarantee that the good will in the end drive out the bad. In any event many modern communitarians would be less willing than the neo-Hegelians to make this kind of comparative judgement, believing that different political forms will be appropriate to different communities (Walzer, 1983). For many, the difficulty with this latter form of communitarianism is that it tends in the direction of relativism, and an apparent refusal to judge and condemn in circumstances where judgement and condemnation seem mandatory - for example, in assessing the policies of genocidal leaders such as Hitler or Pol Pot. There is some justice to the general charge of relativism, and Walzer attempts to meet it by positing a kind of 'minimal and universal moral code' (1987, p. 24), which, while not sufficient for human beings to live by, is specific enough to allow us to say that some ways of life - those based on large-scale human sacrifice is the example he offers - are clearly wrong. But in any event, even a relativist who does not endorse such an escape clause (Rorty, for example) need not feel obliged to refrain from condemning genocidal maniacs. Relativists do not believe that social practices can be considered in isolation; their belief is that 'forms of life' taken as wholes cannot be judged against criteria drawn from one another or from some universalist 'view from nowhere' (Nagel, 1986; see also the discussion in Part II of Nussbaum and Sen, *The Idea of World Community* 105 1993). There is no reason to see this position as providing cover for the activities of, for example, the Khmer Rouge or the Nazis, because there is no reason to believe that these groups are or were authentic representatives of their cultures or forms of life. Pol Pot's position was, and is, explicitly to reject Cambodia's past, while the version of Germany's history promulgated by Hitler was largely spurious. Clearly, it *is* possible that there will be cases where social practices which appear to be authentically grounded in a locally approved way of life *do* offend moral standards which most modern Westerners want to preserve - the case of the treatment of women in Islamic societies comes to mind - and here there is a genuine dilemma for the communitarian relativist whose personal values and sympathies are, broadly, liberal. For such a person, the hope is that, since no long-lived and complex culture is monolithic, made up of social practices which always in all circumstances work in the same direction, the effect of social criticism from critics working *within* the culture in question and teasing out its contradictions will be, in the end, subversive of the undesirable practice. A model here is provided by the way in which (eventually) slavery of- and (much later) legal discrimination against - non-Westerners has come to be seen by Western societies as contrary to Western values. It is only a 'hope' that this process will work in any particular situation, but from the perspective of the communitarian relativist the alternative of intervention to bring about change constitutes an act of cultural imperialism which will almost always be unjustifiable. The point of this, perhaps overlong, digression has been to show that there are different kinds of communitarian theory ranging from the Hegelian 'metanarrative' of *Geist,* via the quasi-relativism of a Walzer, to the out-and-out postmodernism of a Rorty. However, each approach holds this in common: that there is no sufficient reason to believe that a world of communities will be, or even could be, transcended by a world community. The line of argument espoused here clearly flies in the face of a great deal of conventional rhetoric, and seems in particular to contradict socialist, communist and (some) liberal hopes for the emergence of a universal commonwealth, a solidarity which encompasses the whole of humanity. However, it needs to be asked whether the values articulated by such aspirations might not find expression in different forms, and, indeed, a refusal to think in universalist terms opens up the possibilities of a pluralistic conception of world order, an openness to the recognition and acceptance of difference, which may actually signal a more practical and less ethnocentric understanding of human solidarity than conventional radicalism has to offer - such, at least, is the promise of late modernist thinkers such as Connolly (1991). It is here that the notion of international society becomes important, because it is plausible to suggest that many of the positive features that a putative world community might provide could be found within the scope of an association of communities founded on the rule of law but not united in any global project international society as a practical association, in the terminology of Nardin (1983). Such an association could be based on the recognition of a general duty to relieve suffering by mutual aid and assistance and, thus, would mandate substantial redistributions of income and wealth, but the basic premise would be that the pursuit of social justice and a deeper sense of community is something that makes more sense locally than on a global scale that the most important 'spheres of justice' are those which are internal to particular societies rather than cross-cultural in aspiration (Walzer, 1983). The goal would be an association of socially just communities which was, itself, constructed on socially just lines. In so far as this notion involves the setting of standards that can serve as goals of political change in a non-ideal world it is as much a product of 'ideal theory' (Beitz, 1979, p. 156) as the notion of a world community with its own substantive ends - but the ideal of a plurality of morally autonomous, just communities relating to one another in a framework of peace and law seems rather more appropriate to today's world than does its alternative.

# 2NC AT: State Inevitable

**Practical theory helps ethically direct the state- means the alternative solves.**

**Vasquez, 95-** Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University (John A., 1995, “International Relations Theory Today,” pg. 233)

I call this the criterion of empirical soundness. To the extent to which practical theory has an empirical domain, and almost all do, it can be evaluated by some of the scientific criteria of adequacy, especially accuracy. However, practical theory needs its own criteria to ensure that it is satisfactorily meeting its own purpose, which is different from that of scientific theory despite the narrowing of the philosophical differences between empirical and normative analyses. The criterion of goodness is the most fundamental in that it is a prerequisite for the rest. The key is in defining 'good', which can be determined (or contested) only by the larger ethical, religious, professional or organizational goals guiding the group or, in foreign policy, the state. One of the contributions of postempiricism and critical theory is to invite more discourse on this topic. What are and should be the purposes of foreign policy; what are the consequences of policy; and do the consequences live up to certain ethical or other social standards? The criterion of practicability acknowledges that there are many fine theories, but that they lose much when they are implemented; i.e. their most interesting aspects cannot be implemented. Likewise, the criterion of completeness recognizes that some theories, like the realist notion of national interest, provide general rules, but no advice as to how to apply the rule in a specific situation. Realism, for example, provides little guidance as to how to determine which option in a crisis is really in the national interest or what a rational choice might be before the fact. Although no general advice can be entirely complete, analysts must have some clear way of deriving guidance in a specific situation, if the theory is to be of any use. Ultimately, practical theories tend to be judged by their success or failures. Dramatic failures, like Munich in 1938, destroy a policy and the theory associated with it, even when that might not be legitimate. Likewise, once a practical theory is in place, only a dramatic failure leads to its displacement, even if all the other criteria have been flouted. From the lists above, it is clear that one of the main differences between normative and empirical analysis remains the criteria used to accept or reject statements. In addition, since normative analysis involves a variety of values in defining 'good' and scientific analysis assumes the truth is the highest value, the criteria for practical theory are going to accept a variety of positions, approaches and lifestyles as fairly adequate. There is nothing necessarily wrong with this. In the areas of meaning, interpretation and lifestyle, variety may be seen as an intrinsic good - a diversity many postmodernists celebrate. Nevertheless, the criteria provide some basis for a reasonable discussion among alternatives. In empirical matters, the commitment to truth applies more stringent criteria, especially that of accuracy, which makes rejection of theories more possible. Although the criteria make truth more of a process than an end product, the very idea of truth implies ultimately a single accurate explanation rather than a plethora of equally true theories. These empirical criteria can be used to place scientific enquiry on a new foundation, answering some of the major criticisms of post-empiricism and avoiding the potential relativism of postmodernism. In the concluding section I discuss the implications of the post-positivist debate for the future of the inter-paradigm debate.

**Our dissent can change the political order by questioning the arbitrary delineation between debater and state**

**Bleiker, ’04** (Roland, Cambridge University Press, “Popular Dissent, Human Agency, and Global Politics,” pp. 8-9)

Transversal dissident practices can be seen as forms of thought and action that not only transgress, but also challenge the political order which has developed around the assertion of national sovereignty. They either question the arbitrariness of this division and its corres- ponding system of exclusion, or simply reveal how inadequate it has become in a world that has undergone fundamental change since the state system emerged with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. This is why transversal alternatives to prevalent state-centric perspectives must be recognised as legitimate aspects of international theory. To dismiss them as reductionist, as Waltz suggests,23 and to relegate them to some other sphere of inquiry, is to run the risk of entrenching the very dilemmas that international relations scholars are trying to address and overcome. It is thus with both an analytical and a normat- ive objective that the present inquiry seeks to demonstrate the relev- ance of transversal dissent to an international relations audience. This effort is as much an expression of the need to understand the complex- ities and the changing nature of contemporary global politics, as it is a desire to heed and engage a variety of counter-narratives that may well give rise to ideas and practices that engender political trans- formation in international spheres.

# 2NC AT: State Inevitable

**States are not key to the facilitation of international relations.**

**Zalewski and Enloe, 95-** \*Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Wales \*\*Professor of Government at Clark University (Marysia and Cynthia, 1995, “International Relations Theory Today,” pg. 284)

Thus, while for generations international relations researchers have made the state, the government, their privileged referent, that analytic choice is questionable (Tickner, 1992; Peterson, 1992a; Peterson and Runyan, 1993). The ending of the Cold War and the consolidation of the European Community, the emergence of private multinational giants, the dependence on UN peacekeeping forces for international stability, all have compelled even some mainstream international relations theorists to have second thoughts about relying on states as the principal actors. Whereas the old, and still widely used, security agenda was about states and their sovereignty, expressed chiefly through the accumulation of military power, the new security agenda, as identified by some Western scholars, is about societies and their complex and fluid webs of identity. 'Societies are fundamentally about identity', according to Barry Buzan, identity for him being 'what enables a group of people to refer to themselves as "we"' (Wasver et al., 1993, pp. 5-6). The desire and ability of a society to sustain its traditional patterns of language, culture, association, religious and national identity and custom are perceived as central to the new security agenda. Changing the referent therefore changes what we think of as 'us' and thereby changes what we perceive as threats to 'us'. Ann Tickner underscores this point by challenging her colleagues in international relations to give up their comfortable notion that states are sovereign entities. For this assumption of sovereignty is suspiciously akin to the assumption that men as fathers and husbands are the 'heads of households', an assumption that for years has lured policy-makers into their naive view that the 'family' acts as a single cohesive unit and that the adult male can always speak for the desires of all members of the family. Thus, becoming curious about identity formation below the state and surrendering the simplistic assumption that the state is sovereign will, Tickner (1992) suggests, make us much more realistic describers and explainers of the current international system.

**Globalization and the subnational revolt are making the state structure weak- the alternative is now.**

**Linklater, 95-** Professor of International Relations at Keele University (Andrew, 1995, “International Relations Theory Today,” pg. 251)

A related argument concerns the impact of international interdependence upon the sovereign state and its willingness to cooperate with others and comply with the rules established within international organizations. Robert Keohane (1989) accepts the neo-realist postulate that states are rational egoists but employs game-theoretical resources to explain how states can widen their conception of self-interest through their involvement in international institutions. There are parallels between this approach and English rationalism in that both think the concept of anarchy is of limited explanatory value (Keohane, 1990). The international system is anarchic but it is normatively regulated too. From the vantage point of these perspectives, neo-realism has underesti mated the role of normative constraints upon states in the past and the potential for further development in the future. Greater opportunities for moving towards multilateral forms of global governance exist in the post-bipolar world, but it is clear that the transfer of power and authority from states to global institutions is not the only challenge to lie ahead. The nation-state is under pressure on two fronts - because globalization has seriously reduced its scope for independent action and because subnational groups demand greater representation and autonomy. As Aron (1968) noted many years ago, nationalism and globalization travel in tandem: inequalities of progress fragment the human race. The rapid demise of bipolarity is the most dramatic shift in world politics in forty years but the collapse of state socialist societies must be understood in conjunction with these dual patterns of change - the subnational revolt and the process of globalization - which are eroding the foundations of the Westphalian system.

# AT: No Alt Agent

**Their “no agent” argument assumes the need for a state actor – there are no boundaries between inside and outside this debate**

**Bleiker, ’04** (Roland, Cambridge University Press, “Popular Dissent, Human Agency, and Global Politics,” pp. 6-7)

Debates about the role of human agency display similar state-centric tendencies. There are disagreements on various fronts, but virtually all discussions on agency in international theory remain focused on conceptualising state behaviour. Alexander Wendt, who has been instrumental in bringing issues of agency to the study of international relations, has been equally influential in directing ensuing discussions on a state-centric path. He explicitly and repeatedly acknowledges ‘a commitment to states as units of analysis’ and constructs much of his theoretical work around an examination of states and the constraints within which they operate.16 Here too, the logic behind adapting a state-centric form of representation rests on the assumption that ‘as long as states are the dominant actors in international politics, it is appropriate to focus on the identity and agency of the state rather than, for example, a transnational social movement’.17 Questions of agency in international theory should not and cannot be reduced to analyses of state behaviour. This book demonstrates how an instance of transversal dissent may influence global politics at least as much as, say, a diplomatic treatise or a foreign policy decision. At a time when processes of globalisation are unfolding and national boundaries are becoming increasingly porous, states can no longer be viewed as the only consequential actors in world affairs. Various scholars have thus begun to question the prevalent spatial modes of representation and the artificial separation of levels of analysis that issues from them. They suggest, as mentioned above, that global life is better understood as a series of transversal struggles that increasingly challenge what Richard Ashley called ‘the paradigm of sovereign man.’ Transversal struggles, Ashley emphasises, are not limited to established spheres of sovereignty. They are neither domestic nor international. They know no final boundaries between inside and out- side.18 And they have come to be increasingly recognised as central aspects of global politics. James Rosenau is among several scholars who now acknowledge that it is along the shifting frontiers of trans- versal struggles, ‘and not through the nation state system that people sort and play out the many contradictions at work in the global scene’.19

# XT: Forgetting Alt

**Our alternative is to forget IR theory to open up possibilities for a dialogical understanding of our present and past**

**Bleiker, ’09** (Roland, October 11, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No. 3, “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” pp. 523)

My suggestion is, thus, to 'forget IR theory', to see beyond a narrowly defined academic discipline and to refuse tying future possibilities to established forms of life.57 Instead of seeking nostalgic comfort and security in the familiar interpretation of long gone epochs, even if they are characterised by violence and insecurity, conscious forgetting opens up possibilities for a dialogical understanding of our present and past. Rather than further entrenching current security dilemmas by engaging with the orthodox discourse that continuously gives meaning to them, forgetting tries to escape the vicious circle by which these social practices serve to legitimise and objectivise the very discourses that have given rise to them.

# AT: Self-Marginalization

**Their self-marginalization turns don’t apply; abstraction produces the most real-world theories**

**Bleiker, ’09** (Roland, October 11, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No. 3, “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” pp. 517-518)

Some of these tensions between the mimetic and the aesthetic have insinuated themselves into prevalent ir scholarship. Kenneth Waltz, in one of his relatively frequent escapes from mimetic conventions, stresses that theories result from a process of abstraction and are, thus, distinct from the realities they seek to explain. He goes as far as arguing that 'explanatory power is gained by moving away from reality, not by staying close to it'.35 In some passages, Morgenthau too acknowledges that representation is an imperfect process, that mimesis is by definition impossible. He does so by likening the difference between the practice of international politics and the attempt to derive a rational theory from it to the difference between a photograph and a painting. The photograph, Morgenthau argues, 'shows everything that can be seen by the naked eye'. The painting, by contrast, does more. '[I]t shows, or it seeks to show, one thing that the naked eye cannot see: the human essence of the person portrayed'.36 The most explicit contemporary extension of this approach is perhaps found in Alexander Wendt's attempt to theorise unobservables through scientific realism.37

# Geneology Good

**Genealogy key to discourse**

**Edkins, 99**- lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth; coeditor of Sovereignty and Subjectivity and author of Famines and Modernity: Pictures of Hunger, Concepts of Famine, Practices of Aid (Jenny, 1999, "Poststructuralism &International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In," 47)

The question of the objects of discourse is closely related to that of the unity of discourse, as we have seen: Objects are constituted and trans- formed in discourse. The aim of an archaeological approach is to substitute for the enigmatic treasure of "things" anterior to discourse, the regular formation of objects that emerge only in discourse. To define these objects without reference to the *ground, the foundation of things,* but by relating them to the body of rules that enable them to form as ob- jects of a discourse and thus constitute the conditions of their historical appearance. To write a history of discursive objects that does not plunge them into the common depth of a primal soil, but deploys the nexus of regularities that govern their dispersion.34 Foucault's description of genealogy suggests a similar approach: Ge- nealogy "opposes itself to the search for 'origins.'"35 He characterized the latter as "an attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their carefully protected identities, because [it] assumes the existence of immobile forms that precede the external world of acci- dent and succession. This search is directed to 'that which was already there,' the image of a primordial truth."36 Whereas the search for origins involves "the removal of every mask to ultimately disclose an original identity," the work of the genealogist finds something quite different: "not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that [things] have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms."37 The search for origins is ideological; it is based on a conception of birth as a moment of perfection, before the Fall, when things "emerged dazzling from the hands of a creator."38 The way in which discourses constitute their objects is crucial to an understanding of discourse itself, as opposed to language: Discourses are not "groups of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or repre- sentations) but. . . practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak."39 Discourses are composed of signs, but "what they do is more than use these signs to designate things."40 This is what makes them something more than language or speech.

**An alternative of genealogy will solve**

**Edkins, 99**- lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth; coeditor of Sovereignty and Subjectivity and author of Famines and Modernity: Pictures of Hunger, Concepts of Famine, Practices of Aid (Jenny, 1999, "Poststructuralism &International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In," 100)

The constitution of identity in this way is a performative, ideological operation. For Zizek, discourse is always to be seen as authoritarian or "po- litical": To form a consistent field of meaning, previously free-floating sig- nifies are quilted by the master signifier, seen as a paradoxical element that stands for "lack," in "a non-founded founding act of violence."64 In this, he distinguishes a Lacanian position from that of Jiirgen Habermas. In Lacan the master signifier distorts the symbolic field in the very process of estab- lishing it (temporarily) as a discursive field. Without this distortion, the field of meaning would disintegrate: The role of the paradoxical element is constitutive. As Zizek puts it, the master is an impostor—anyone who finds him- or herself at the place of the constitutive lack in the structure will do—but the place it occupies cannot be abolished. It can only be rendered visible as empty. For Habermas, in contrast, disturbances or distortions of rational argument are contingent; discourse itself is inherently nonauthori- tarian, and prejudices can be gradually removed to reach an ideal situation of rational exchange of views. For Lacan, if the structural role of the master signifier is suspended, this leads to a state of undecidability.65 What appears to be a hindrance, blocking the constitution of the social whole or disrupting rational discourse, is in fact the condition of possibil- ity of any sort of social order or discourse at all. Ideology conceals the constitutive antagonism or lack. This is where ideology critique comes in: "The criticism of ideology must . . . look at the element which holds to- gether the ideological edifice [and] recognise in it the embodiment of a lack, of a chasm of non-sense gaping in the midst of ideological mean- ing."66 In ideological discourse the gap between what we wanted to achieve and what happened—the "surplus" of result over intention—is accounted for by what Zizek calls a "meta subject."67 Examples would be di- vine providence; the "cunning of reason" as in Hegel; the invisible hand of the market; the objective logic of history; the Jewish conspiracy; patri- archy. This hidden agency, which is (pre)supposed to account for the "sur- plus," is what Lacan calls the master signifier. It is radically ambivalent, both reassuring and threatening.

# Pluralism Good

**Pluralism as a factor of individualism is key to the cobweb of state interaction in international politics.**

**Zalewski and Enloe, 95-** \*Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Wales \*\*Professor of Government at Clark University (Marysia and Cynthia, 1995, “International Relations Theory Today,” pg. 297)

What about the possibilities for theorizing about identity within the pluralist paradigm? Pluralism differs from realism in that nonstate actors, such as multinational corporations, and bodies such as the United Nations and the European Community, are regarded as relevant to the study of international politics. The state itself is not seen as a unitary actor but as something which has competing demands and interests both within the state itself and from nonstate actors. The hierarchy of world issues is also subject to change and not dominated by matters of military security. Key concepts within the pluralist paradigm are interdependence and transnationalism. A classic example of the pluralist approach is the world society or 'cobweb' model of the world put forward by John Burton (1972). Within the pluralist paradigm international relations theorists are able to widen the agenda of what is considered relevant. Does this mean we can adequately think about identity within this paradigm? Essentially the widening of the agenda is largely at an empirical level and, as Whitworth suggests, this might imply that the study of women and international relations is allowed for within the pluralist paradigm (1989, p. 269). Similarly, we might include other identifiable groups such as ethnic or religious groups. This clearly represents an advance for those scholars who regard the realist depiction of international relations as too narrow. But again the positivistic underpinnings of pluralism make it doubtful that there would be any space for theorizing about the construction of gender identity or sexual identity or racial identity and the enactment of international events and processes. Within the structuralist/globalist paradigm, the main actors in the international system include a mixture of states, societies and non-state actors which are seen to operate largely within the parameters of a capitalist world system. In this sense all actors are viewed within an overarching capitalist global structure. International relations are viewed from a historical perspective, especially the continuous development of world capitalism. The focus is on patterns of dominance within and among societies, with economic factors assuming prime importance. ^As with the pluralist perspective, structuralism/globalism allows for a widening of the empirical agenda which might permit the consideration of some identities not included on the realist agenda. But essentially all three paradigms are ontologically, and ideologically, committed in relatively stringent ways, which restricts the view of what can be considered as relevant to the study of international relations. Clearly, the three perspectives are not mutually exclusive. As Viotti and Kauppi (1993, p. 11) note, realists such as Robert Gilpin do not deny the importance of economic factors in international relations; he would merely differ with pluralists and structuralists/globalists as to the relative importance of political-military factors compared to economic factors. C. Essentially, realists are far too committed to states and military political affairs; pluralists are far too committed to the empirical nature of transnational processes; structuralists/globalists are far too committed to economics and classes to allow much room for the consideration of questions of identity in international relations as we have raised them. All three paradigms are too restricted ontologically, methodologically and epistemologically, and in ways which ultimately render them unable to theorize or think adequately about identity. This suppression of the investigation of issues like identity undermines their claims to have an accurate picture of 'what does the work' in world politics. Earlier in this chapter we stated that methodological and theoretical developments within the subject since the 1980s have brought new questions on to the agenda. It is to those developments that we now turn in a concluding discussion of identity and international relations theory.

\*\*\*Permutation ANSWERS

# 2NC AT: Permutation

**1. Perm doesn’t solve: accepting the tenants of realist discourse makes critique impossible**

**Der Derian and Shapiro, 89** Professor of Political Science at Brown University, Professor of Political Science at University of Hawaii at Manoa (James, Michael, “International/Intertextual Relations”, pg. 208-209, JPW)

Here is the problem in national security affairs. The activities that Smoke describes, as well as the discursive conventions that he adopts, usually are accepted unconsciously at face value. If we stop here, contained by the existing theory and prevailing practice of national security analysis, then we are left, like Smoke and countless others, with the task of treating seriously all of it on these terms. The arcane in theories of deterrence or plans for using nuclear weapons, then, also must be regarded as representing the real psychic states and true moral intentions of their creators or users. By accepting the obvious conventions of understanding projected upon the “technical and situational context” of the Soviet—U.S. competition for global hegemony, one slips into the same rut Smoke decries, namely, an unconcern for or neglect of “general conclusions” or “developing theory.” We become trapped on the discursive planes of ordinary policy analysis—sorting out the meaning of security problems, determining the validity of given policies and programs for addressing these problems, and debating the representativeness of political processes for discharging policies and programs in the hermetic discourses about nuclear security conducted by “the counsels of war” or “the wizards of Armageddon.” There are no grounds for privileging one mode of discourse over another in the interpretation of nuclear strategy. The awareness of Clemenceau and de Gaulle, as Aron recalls, that “war is too serious a matter to be left to the generals” and “politics is too serious a matter to be left to the politicians” affirms the contested quality of these discourses. It marks the awareness among all concerned that national security policies are too serious a matter to be left to the defense intellectuals. If the issues involved are too important to be left to generals, politicians, and defense intellectuals, then their established modes of reasoning, discourse, and analysis also cannot go unchallenged. Actually, the larger questions of peace and war in the nuclear era are answered in a mosaic of discourses, produced by multiple producers from many sources for a diverse array of consumers. Speaking and thinking about “national security affairs” as a “class of policy problems” and as “a field of study,” therefore, should be approached as “discourse” or a “social text”. Here, we might look beyond, beneath, and behind the face value of its conceptual currencies, seeking the ironies, unintended consequences, and suppressed alternative visions of how the United States and Soviet Union produce national security. By taking this approach, one can explore some latent logics in the post-1945 technical and situational context of superpower nuclear deterrence. Rather than accepting the theoretical and practical conventions of national security affairs as being meaningful *as such,* this perspective examines their interactive social production and consumption, seeking another account of how and why they are regarded as meaningful by those who practice and theorize about them in the post-1945 deterrence regime.

**2. Their singular logic conflates knowledge with thought and forcloses other alternatives**

**Bleiker, ’09** (Roland, October 11, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No. 3, “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” pp. 513-14)

One of the most insightful and politically relevant extensions of Kantian aesthetics can be found in the work of Gilles Deleuze. He too detects problems with the prevailing mimetic image of thought, but conceptualises them in a slightly different way. Orthodox approaches, Deleuze stresses, are based on the principle of recognition, which he defines, in Kantian terms, as 'the harmonious exercise of all the faculties upon a supposed same object'.20 Such a harmonious state is possible if all faculties (such as perception, memory, reason, imagination and understanding) collaborate along the same model of recognition towards a particular object. The object itself is assumed to remain the same independently of whether it is perceived through sensual, rational, memorial or other forms of representation. The ensuing construction of common sense is problematic, for it conflates thought with knowledge and supposes that knowledge is ultimately based on recognising external appearances.21 The consequences are far-reaching, because a few dominant forms of insight, usually those emerging from reason, are being given the power to coordinate and synchronise a variety of otherwise rather disparate faculties. Harmonious as the resulting notion of common sense may be, it can neither explain its emergence nor become aware (and critical) of its own values. As a result, the established mode of thought makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to locate and explore a wide range of other and potentially very valuable insights into the political.

# 2NC AT: Permutation

**3.** **The perm is a rhetorical apology for militarism- it fails to challenge the 1AC rhetoric of apocalypse that sustains violent militarism**

James B **Rule**, PhD Harvard, MA Oxford, BA Brandeis, The Military State of America and the Democratic Left, Dissent Vol. 57 No 1, Winter 20**10**

The U.S. military budget is just there. Sometime in the years following the Second World War, the ancestors of today's neoconservatives sold the idea that military expenditure should have an open-ended claim on a huge chunk of this country's national budget. Historian and retired U.S. Army colonel Andrew Bacevich attributes this historic turn largely to the influence of Paul Nitze, author of the classified report drafted for President Harry Truman known as NSC 68: Five years after the end of World War II, the United States stood at the very zenith of its own power and influence. Still, according to NSC 68, it now found itself in 'deepest peril', with **'the destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself suddenly looming** as a real possibility. Apocalyptic visions like Nitze's, soon embellished by the insinuations of Senator Joseph McCarthy, fueled an open-ended program of permanent militarization that continues down to the present. That momentum seemed at least potentially in jeopardy after the embarrassing collapse of the Soviet Union - embarrassing when we learned that the Evil Empire had actually been running on empty for some time. But the military and its civilian allies can now thank the well-hyped menace of Islamo-fascism for **pulling their chestnuts out of the fire.** So voracious are the domestic constituencies of American militarism as to threaten even the ability of the executive branch to manage military affairs. Like those forest fires so intense that they generate the very winds that fan them, grassroots lust for military expenditures burns wildly out of control. At this writing, Barack Obama and his holdover secretary of defense have just succeeded in defeating congressional efforts to appropriate some $1.75 billion to produce seven additional F-22 fighter planes. The administration held that this expenditure was simply not cost effective; none of the more than one hundred such aircraft now in existence has ever flown in war. But in the summer the president was unable to block inclusion in the spending bill of more than two billions dollars' worth of other unneeded military contracts. Heatedly defending these appropriations, largely directed to his own district and supporters, was Democratic representative John Murtha. Murtha was outraged at not getting more. According to the New York Times, Murtha cited the need to create jobs in his home state of Pennsylvania; he inveighed that "the state had sent a disproportionate number of soldiers to Iraq and Afghanistan compared with the level of military contracts it had typically received." The logic of this interpretation leaves one breathless. Communities invest their young people by sending them off to deadly adventures abroad; returns on these investments come in the form of military contracts directed to the home districts. The malignant militarization of American life reaches well beyond the legislative process, **disabling the very public discourse that might make authentic debate on it possible.** Early in his primary campaign for president, candidate Obama took a verbal beating for referring to the lives of American forces "wasted" in the Iraq War. Set upon at once by the opposition, he quickly apologized. In so doing, of course, he **diminished possibilities for critical public debate** that might reduce further waste of life in this and other foreign military exploits.

**4.** **Reform strategies fail- merely address symptoms**

Samuel S **Kim,** Dept of Poli Sci Monmouth College, Global Violence and a Just World Order, Journal of Peace Research, no 2, 19**84** p. 189-90

As a non-Machiavellian and non-Marxist alternative to global transformation, our orientation shies away from managerial quick fixes of (liberal) reformist strategy as well as political-structural quick fixes of (Marxist) revolutionary strategy. The liberal reformist strategy of social change, concentrating on the injection of technocratic prescriptions into the established policies, practices, and institutions, **merely alleviates symptomatic pains of system pathology in specific situations**. On the other hand, the resort to revolutionary violence is a form of political-structural quick fix. The power to kill and destroy is not the same as the power to overcome and win, just as the power to capture the state apparatus is not the same as the power to transform social structure and process. Yet the Marxist-Leninist strategy of social transformation is often premised on such mistaken equation of different kinds of power. There is a third alternative - a nonviolent revolutionary praxis for the transition from value commitment to principled action. Both Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., have given concrete political expression to nonviolent protest, nonviolent noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention. The key to nonviolent revolutionary praxis for transition politics is not winning political power but generating the political consciousness and mobilization required to challenge and transform and unjust social order rooted in violence.

# Blieker Perm Fails

**1. The permutation fails – cannot just add another layer of interpretation**

**Bleiker, ’09** (Roland, October 11, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No. 3, “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” pp. 510)

The key challenge ahead consists of finding ways to reclaim the political value of the aesthetic. To do so is no easy task, for the modern triumph of technological reason has by and large eclipsed the aesthetic from our political purview.5 Overcoming the ensuing construction of common sense would amount to far more than simply adding an additional, sensual layer of interpretation. The aesthetic turn reorients our very understanding of the political: it engenders a significant shift away from a model of thought that equates knowledge with the mimetic recognition of external appearances towards an approach that generates a more diverse but also more direct encounter with the political. The latter allows for productive interactions across different faculties, including sensibility, imagination and reason, without any of them annihilating the unique position and insight of the other.

**2. Our 1NC alt evidence explicitly indicates that, in order to effectively question our epistemological and aesthetic foundations, we must put existing strategies aside**

**3. Only the alternative can solve – the affirmative is trapped in mimetic thought that re-entrenches a flawed system**

**Bleiker, ’09** (Roland, October 11, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No. 3, “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” pp. 511-12)

Before exploring the significance of aesthetic insights it is necessary to juxtapose them, if only briefly, to the prevailing wisdom of ir scholarship. One perhaps could, with Jacques Derrida, speak of two fundamentally different approaches. The first seeks to discover a truth or an origin that somehow escapes the necessity of interpretation. The second accepts or even affirms that representing the political is a form of interpretation that is, by its very nature, incomplete and bound up with the values of the perceiver.7

Much of ir scholarship has, undoubtedly, been conducted in the former, mimetic mode of representation. The most influential contributions to the discipline, particularly in North America, continue to adhere almost exclusively to social scientific conventions. They uphold the notion of a neutral observer and a corresponding separation of object and subject. J. David Singer proudly announced during the behavioural revolution that 'there is no longer much doubt that we can make the study of international politics into a scientific discipline worthy of the name'.8 Much has changed since then, of course, but representation is still widely seen as process of coping which, ideally, erases all traces of human interference so that the 'artistic' end-product looks just like the original. Realism has made 'the real' into an object of desire, Hayden White would say.9 Or, as one of the most influential contemporary methodology textbooks in political sciences states: 'the goal is to learn facts about the real world'.10 Mimetic approaches do not pay enough attention to the relationship between the represented and its representation. Indeed, they are not really theories of representation.11 They are theories against representation. But political reality does not exist in an a priori way. It comes into being only through the process of representation. A political event, for instance, cannot determine from what perspective and in what context it is seen. Our effort to make sense of this event can, thus, never be reduced to the event itself. This is why representation 'always raises the question of what set of true statements we might prefer to other sets of true statements'.12 It is a process through which we organise our understanding of reality. Note as well that even if the ideal of mimesis—a perfect resemblance between signifier and signified—was possible, it could offer us little political insight. It would merely replicate what is, and thus be as useless as 'as a facsimile of a text that is handed to us in answer to our question of how to interpret that text'.13 Aesthetic approaches, by contrast, embark on a direct political encounter, for they engage the gap that inevitably opens up between a form of representation and the object it seeks to represent. Rather than constituting this gap as a threat to knowledge and political stability, aesthetic approaches accept its inevitability. Indeed, they recognise that the difference between represented and representation is the very location of politics. What is at stake, then, is 'the knowability of the world', as Elaine Scarry puts it, and the fact that 'knowability depends on its susceptibility to representation'.14

# Blieker Perm fails

**4. Alternative must be enacted alone – we must shift from common sense to ensure a political encounter**

**Bleiker, ’09** (Roland, October 11, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No. 3, “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” pp. 519-520)

To broaden our knowledge of the international does, however, require more than simply adding a few additional layers of interpretation. What is needed is a more fundamental reorientation of thought and action: a shift away from harmonious common sense imposed by a few dominant faculties towards a model of thought that enables productive flows across a variety of discordant faculties. For Deleuze, this difference amounts to a move from recognition to a direct political encounter, from approaches that affirm appearances without disturbing thought towards approaches that add to our understanding and, indeed, force us to think.44 An illustration from the world of art may help: consider how the significance of Picasso's Guernica as a form of insight into and historical memory of the Spanish Civil War is located precisely in the fact that the painter aesthetically engaged the difference between the represented and its representation. Guernica allows us to move back and forth between imagination and reason, thought and sensibility, memory and understanding, without imposing one faculty upon another. Abstraction here seeks to free our senses from the compulsion to equate knowledge with the rational recognition of external appearances. This sensual transgression of mimetic conventions is perhaps at its most extreme in those visual instances where figuration is given up altogether. Abstraction then draws attention to the fact that a figurative painting runs the risk of leading the eye to the temptation of recognition. Abstraction, by contrast, projects an immediacy of sensation that is not linked to direct representational tasks. To preserve political relevance in such a process is, of course, far from self-evident. And yet, abstraction has taken on very explicit political dimensions, as the close association of Abstract Expressionism with Cold- War politics amply demonstrated.45 This is why the Australian painter David Rankin, whose abstract canvasses engage political themes from the Holocaust to the Tienanmen massacre, stresses that the paintings of Paul Klee and other seemingly non-political artists 'were political in an exciting way because they were leading to shifts of sensibility within society'.46

# AT: Cozzette

**Realism has no self critical potential**

**Bleiker, ’09** (Roland, October 11, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No. 3, “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” pp. 517-518)

Why, then, are there significant problems with the mimetic conventions of prevalent approaches to international political theory? Two points are particularly crucial here. First, most of the prevailing approaches fail to recognise and deal with their own aesthetic. Mimesis in Realist scholarship contains few if any elements of irony or self-reflection. Social science, as a result, is not presented as a form of interpretation. Instead, the main objective remains to elicit recognition and to close or ignore the gap between a representation and what is represented therewith. The complexities mentioned above fade when it comes to affirming the core values and purpose of ir research. While acknowledging limits to what 'the naked eye' can observe about the political, Morgenthau nevertheless is convinced that it is possible to capture the 'essence' of politics and society, namely the 'objective laws that have their roots in human nature'.38 Wendt, likewise, believes that 'epistemological issues are relatively uninteresting' because 'the point is to explain the world, not to argue how we can know it'.39

# XT: Error Replication

**Their technological discourse turns case – recreates every impact their 1AC specifies**

**Bleiker, ’09** (Roland, October 11, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No. 3, “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” pp. 529)

The political value of the aesthetic needs to be reclaimed; not because it can offer us an authentic or superior form of insight, but because the modern triumph of technological reason has eclipsed creative expression from our political purview. The dilemmas that currently haunt world politics, from terrorism to raising inequalities, are far too serious not to employ the full register of human intelligence to understand and deal with them. Indeed, solutions to entrenched political problems can by definition not be found through the thinking patterns that have created them in the first place. A sustained and critical engagement with technological reason, Heidegger stresses, 'must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different from it'.85

\*\*\*FRAMEWORK

# FW: Critical Theory Good

**Critical theory illuminates political theory: must come first**

**Brown, 05** Professor of Political Science at Cal-Berkeley (Wendy, “Edgework”, pg. 80-81, JPW)

Why can’t theory meet the demand for applicability or usefulness without being sacrificed? What is it about theory that is destroyed by such a demand? The question of theory’s nature and purview today is fiercely contested; even as a question, it is markedly fragmented—no two disciplines or subfields mean the same thing by theory or value it in the same way. Within political science alone, the appellation of *theory* has been appropriated for an extraordinary range of work—from rational choice and game theory to cultural and literary theory to analytic philosophy to hermeneutics to historical interpretations of canonical works. But in all cases, just as politics and political theory define themselves against and through their hypothesized others, so too theory is not the problem. Instead, it is a contemporary anxiety about theory’s difference as such, and in particular about its enigmatic and otherworldly character, that we would do well to allay rather than submit to.

Theory is not simply different from description; rather, it is incommensurate with description. Theory is not simply the opposite of application but carries the impossibility of application. As a meaning-making enterprise, theory depicts a world that does not quite exist, that is not quite the world we inhabit. **But this is theory’s incomparable value, not its failure**. Theory does not simply decipher the meanings of the world but recodes and rearranges them in order to reveal something about the meanings and incoherencies that we live with. To do this revelatory and speculative work, theory must work to one side of direct referents, or at least it must disregard the conventional meanings and locations of those referents. Theory violates the self-representation of things in order to represent those things and their relation—the world—differently. Thus, **theory is never “accurate” or “wrong”; it is only more or less illuminating**, more or less provocative, more or less of an incitement to thought, imagination, desire, possibilities for renewal.

There is another reason that theory cannot be brought to the bar of applicability. Insofar as theory imbues contingent or unconscious events, phenomena, or formations with meaning and with location in a world of theoretical meaning, theory is a sense-making enterprise of that which often makes no sense, of that which may be inchoate, unsystematized, inarticulate. It gives presence to what may have a luminal, evanescent, or ghostly existence. Thus theory has no kinship with the project of “accurate representation”; its value lies instead in the production of a new representation, in the production of coherence and meaning that it does not find lying on the ground but which, rather, it forthrightly fashions. Similarly, theory does not simply articulate needs or desires but argues for their existence and thus literally brings them into being. As theory interprets the world, it fabricates that world (*pace* Marx! especially Marx!); as it names desire, it gives reason and voice to desire, and thus fashions a new order of desire; as it codifies meaning, it composes meaning. Theory’s most important *political* offering is this opening of a breathing space between the world of common meanings and the world of alternative ones, a space of potential renewal for thought, desire, and action. And it is this which we sacrifice in capitulating to the demand that theory reveal truth, deliver applications, or solve each of the problems it defines. In responding to the pressures of professionalism, then, a double counterpoint is needed to counter the deflection of political theory’s attention from contemporary political life and its anxiety about its “difference” from other modes of inquiry—its remove from the empirical, from facticity, from accurate representation, from Truth. While perhaps contradictory at first blush, the projects of retrieving the world as an object of theory and of recovering the value of theory as a distinctive form of figuring the world not only both resist current troubling influences on the discipline but are also compatible in the attempt to renew the identity of political theory: they connect our work to political theory’s rich canonical past while honing it for the work of understanding a singular present.

# FW: Critical Theory Good

**International theory ignores social reality in the world of the affirmative.**

**Smith, 95-** Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. He has previously taught at the State University of New York and at the University of East Anglia. His most recent books are, as joint author, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (1990) and, as co-editor, *European Foreign Policy* (1994). He is editor of the Cambridge University Press/British International Studies Association series *Studies in International Relation* (Steve, 1995, “International Relations Theory Today,” pg. 7)

The significance of Bauman's comments on sociology's silence about the Holocaust for a discussion of international theory may at first sight seem unclear; but I want to argue that what Bauman, Adorno and Horkheimer have to say about the Enlightenment and about reason resonates with theorizing within the discipline of international relations. The connection is that the ways in which international theory has been categorized, and the debates within it presented, fail to acknowledge the link between social practice and the constitution of social knowledge. International theory tends to speak of international practice as if the 'reason' of theoretical understanding can be opposed to, or separated from, the 'unreason' or 'irrationality' of the anarchy of international society: the discipline comments on, or observes, or evaluates, or explains an empirical domain; it does not constitute it. Yet, just as sociology remains silent about the Holocaust, so international theory remains silent about massive areas of the social reality of the international, treating it as a realm of pre-modern barbarism or as a temporal and spatial domain isolated from cultural identity and interpretation. It is *a* domain, defined by its own practices and, in an important sense, trans-historical, totalizing and given. It is a distinct and separate realm of enquiry in which regularities in behaviour are seen as proof of the very separateness that needs to be questioned. What, in short, are the silences of international theory, and what is the relationship between the study of international relations and *a particular view* of what constitutes international practice? What international theory rarely accepts, although there have been important, and always marginalized, exceptions throughout its history (for example, the work within peace studies or much of the inter-war work on improving inter-state relations), is that our rationalization of the international is itself constitutive of that practice. The selfsame 'reason' which rules our thinking also helps constitute international practice. In short, international theory is implicated in international practice because of the way that theory, in the main, divorces ethics from politics, and instead promotes understanding via a 'reason' separated from ethical or moral concerns. There are exceptions to this general trend, most notably the work of many writing before the establishment of a separate discipline of international relations, and many traditional realists such as Niebuhr, Wolfers and Carr. But in the received wisdom of the discipline, these normative and ethical elements tend to be played down or seen as implying a specific realist interpretation. My claim is that the dominant strain in international theory has been one which sees ethics as applicable to the kind of community that international society cannot be. Thus, in the name of enlightenment and knowledge, international theory has tended to be a discourse accepting of, and complicit in, the creation and re-creation of international practices that threaten, discipline and do violence to others. Nuclear strategy, and especially its treatment of arms races as natural phenomena, is merely the most explicit example of this tendency; the other areas of international thought confirm it. It is 'reason' which is implicated in the re-creation and reaffirmation of international practices of domination and subordination, and through which the identity of others is legitimized.

# Discourse Focus Key

**A reevaluation of our International Relations discourse is key to solve for the kritik**

**Edkins, 99**- lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth; coeditor of Sovereignty and Subjectivity and author of Famines and Modernity: Pictures of Hunger, Concepts of Famine, Practices of Aid (Jenny, 1999, "Poststructuralism &International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In," 138-140)

In this sense, "politics" as master signifier performs a function similar to that served by the notion of "sovereignty"; the two are perhaps interre- lated insofar as the modern nation-state is viewed as an element in the in- ternational system. Sovereignty holds the place of the master signifier around which the sovereign state of contemporary political life is founded.76 The metaphorical significance of "politics" explains why the notion of a *generalized* politics, like Derrida's generalized writing, is such a threat and why it is resisted. Politics as subsystem reflects (and conceals) the way that the social order is *& particular* resolution of the antagonism at the root of the social: "The stable network of 'sub-systems' is the very form of harmony of one pole in the social antagonism, the 'class peace' the very index of the hegemony of one class in the class struggle."77 Any de- construction of the notion of politics, any attempt at a repoliticization or a displacement by the notion of a generalized "political," where "everything is political," threatens that order and the relations of power that it embodies. Such a move is in its nature more of a challenge than a reversal or in- terchange of the hierarchy of "politics" and "economics" as explanatory factors, for example, might be. The crucial point is that the status of "pol- itics" as metaphor or ideological clement vanishes once the social order is produced. The subsystem of "politics" loses its distinctiveness and be- comes one among a number of subsystems of the social order: What is lost once the network of "sub-systems" is stabilised—that is to say, once the "new harmony" is established, once the new Order "posits its presuppositions," "sutures" its field—is the *metaphoricity* of the ele- ment which represents its genesis: this element is reduced to being "one among the others"; it loses its character of *One which holds the place of* If the metaphoricity or ideological status of "politics" as element can be made visible again—or in other words, if what we call the political system can be repoliticized—the stability of the whole system, the existing social order, can be challenged. Otherwise challenges in the name of "politics" do not address the system as such; rather than challenging it, they paradoxi- cally reinforce and re-produce it by reinstalling perpetually the invisibil- ity of the foundational moment. They contribute to its naturalization, tech- nologization, and depoliticization. Theories of international relations can be complicit in this process of concealment. As R. B. J. Walker has pointed out, they are "expressions of the limits of modern politics [that] reveal some of the crucial conditions under which modern political life is possible at all, as well as the conditions under which alternatives to the present have been rendered implausible or even unthinkable."79 Theories of international relations contribute to the de- politicization of the international and the domestic every time they take for granted the separation of the two, with the domestic realm within the sov- ereign state being seen as the realm of "political community" and the in- ternational arena as the domain of anarchy, where political or ethical com- munity is replaced by power politics in some raw state of nature. This separation is for some (but by no means all) scholars the very self-definition of the "discipline," and it claims a past as well as a present; it traces its origins and analyzes its Westphalian genesis. The concept of sovereignty plays a crucial part in delimiting domestic "politics." As with the master signifier "politics," however, that of "sovereignty" erases the traces of its own historicity. In Walker's words again, international rela- tions theory is a discourse that systematically reifies an historically specific spatial on- tology, a sharp delineation of here and there, a discourse that both ex- presses and constantly affirms the presence and absence of political life inside and outside the modern state as the only ground on which struc- tural necessities can be understood and new realms of freedom and his- tory can be revealed.80 A repoliticization of international relations would involve at the very least *not forgetting* that sovereignty and the situating of politics within the state and anarchy outside is only one possible solution to the problem of political community. Moreover, addressing Hindess's argument (discussed in Chapter 1), it would acknowledge that political community is not the question in any case, that we need instead to find "a way to think about politics in the absence of its defining, constitutive fiction."81 The notion of "political community" itself implies a distinction from some other com- munity—economic, social, and so forth—in other words, "political com- munity" accepts as given the concept of "politics" as subsystem. It de- mands that we solve the problem within the confines of the existing social order and rules out "the political" moment. The distinctions it takes for granted are those very distinctions that reflect the *political* settlement within which present relations of power flourish and conceal its political, *Nothing* (of radical negativity). contingent, and violent nature. The power of "the role of fictional com- munities in the social and political thinking of western societies"82 is what should be problematized.

# Discourse Focus Key

**They mischaracterize our argument as a critique, and a critique alone – this is a flawed assumption: we provide new ways to understand IR**

**Bleiker, ’09** (Roland, October 11, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No. 3, “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” pp. 523-24)

The process of forgetting the restraining boundaries of conventional ir scholarship is well on its way. One could, indeed, speak of a second aesthetic turn. This more recent shift in knowledge-production is characterised by various scholarly attempts to understand or depict world politics in ways other than through the languages and concepts of social theory. By moving away from established forms of representation, scholars seek to explore, as Costas Constantinou puts it, 'theoretically playful—but plausible—narrative[s] through which to reread and revise the picture of world politics'.59 The purpose, then, is not primarily, or at least not only, one of critique. Rather, the key objective revolves around finding new ways to understand the dilemmas of world politics.

**In order to challenge securitization, we have to interrupt our discourse**

**Edkins, 99**- lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth; coeditor of Sovereignty and Subjectivity and author of Famines and Modernity: Pictures of Hunger, Concepts of Famine, Practices of Aid (Jenny, 1999, "Poststructuralism &International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In," 59)

This repoliticization takes place in part through a challenge to the framework that regards truth as having grounds outside the political; this proceeds through an analysis of particular discursive formations that points to their shifting, historical, contingent, and political character. Each of Foucault's substantive books takes a specific area of discourse as its ob- ject of study. But the aim in every case is to interrupt *actualite* (the pres- ent) and to make it impossible to continue the same depoliticized discourse in the future. For Foucault, "all discourse must be rendered intolerable," as discourse is always a question of the production or legitimation of power, and all power (though inevitable and necessary) is ultimately illegiti- mate.110 Discourse serves to conceal, to cover up, that illegitimacy. As we shall see in Chapter 5, Zizek regards the aim of what he calls the "critical intellectual" in a very similar light. According to Zizek: The duty of the critical intellectual . . . is precisely *to occupy all the time,* even when the new order . . . stabilizes itself and again renders invisible the hole as such, *the place of this hole,* i.e., to maintain a distance toward every reigning Master-Signifier. The aim is precisely to "produce" the Master Signifier, that is to say, to render visible its "produced," artificial, contingent character.111 As we shall see, "social reality" as such requires an organizing "master signifier," or, in Foucauldian terms, "discourse" as such produces an or- ganizing "legitimation of power." The critique of ideology tries to make it impossible to conceal this and to "naturalise" or depoliticize the social structure. In this way, *actualite* is interrupted, continuation of the dis- course is rendered problematic, and the promise of repoliticization be- comes possible. For Foucault, resistance is implicit in all relations of power; the politi- cal in that sense cannot be extinguished, and the subject remains "free." For Derrida, in a homologous way, deconstruction happens: the discursive prac- tices of logocentrism contain within themselves their own instability, their own points of resistance. Despite the resistance implicit in discursive and disciplinary practices, however, it is through these practices, and most of all, perhaps, through techniques of self-subjectification, that power is translated into technology. Relations of power, subject to processes of legitimization, become a program that is applied by experts and justified by a regime of truth: Truth replaces legitimacy as technologization replaces the political.

**The alternative’s problematization of the way we understand reality is critical to breaking the “virtual realities” of conflict**

**Bleiker, ’09** (Roland, October 11, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No. 3, “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” pp. 524-25)

An aesthetic move beyond the comfort of academic disciplines inevitably highlights the problematic dimensions of representation. Indeed, the closer one observes political struggles on the ground the more one realises the manipulations of realities that are part of the very essence of politics. Look at how Michael Ignatieff has learned not from academic ruminating, but from extensive on-the- ground-experiences that 'all exercises in political judgement depend on the creation of "virtual realities", abstractions that simplify causes and consequences'.61 Indeed, the unproblematised understanding of reality-as-it-is, which permeates all mimetic approaches, can make sense only as long as it stays within the detached and neatly delineated boundaries of academic disciplines. As soon as one confronts the actual realities of conflict zones, it becomes evident that 'war is the easiest of realities to abstract', and that this abstraction process is intrinsically linked to whatever representational practices prevail at the time.62

# XT: Reps Key

**1. Their discourse defines their representations**

**Bleiker, ’09** (Roland, October 11, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No. 3, “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” pp. 521-522)

A slightly different way of conceptualising postmodern approaches would be to draw attention to their aesthetic qualities. From such a perspective postmodern scholarship has started an important engagement with what David Campbell called 'the manifest consequences of [choosing] one mode of representation over another'.53 What is significant here is the recognition that language is the precondition for representation and, by extension, all meaningful knowledge of the world. It is in this sense that postmodern scholarship has taken the 'linguistic turn' and recognised that our understanding of the world is intrinsically linked to the languages we employ to do so; languages that express histories of human interaction; languages that have successfully established and masked a range of arbitrary viewpoints and power relations.54 Linked to this insight into representation is a more broadly conceived discussion of positivism and its relationship to the theory and practice. Contrary to prevalent social science wisdom, aesthetic approaches stressed that our comprehension of facts cannot be separated from our relationship with them, that thinking always expresses a will to truth, a desire to control and impose order upon events that are often random and idiosyncratic. Positivism, whether based in science or not, is, thus, presented as an approach that ignores the process of representation and holds the problematic belief that the social scientist, as detached observer, can produce value-free knowledge.55

**2. Representations filter our perceptions of reality**

**Bleiker, ’09** (Roland, October 11, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No. 3, “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” pp. 515)

Representation is always an act of power. This power is at its peak if a form of representation is able to disguise its subjective origins and values. Realism has been unusually successful in this endeavour: it has turned one of many credible interpretations into a form of representation that is not only widely accepted as 'realistic', but also appears and functions as essence. Realism has been able to take historically contingent and political motivated commentaries—say by E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau about how to deal with the spread of Nazi Germany, or by Kenneth Waltz about how to interpret the 'logic' of 'anarchy' during the Cold War—and then turn them into universal and a-historic explanations that allegedly capture the 'essence' of human nature and international politics.27 Expressed in other words, Realism has managed to suppress what Kant would have called the 'aesthetic quality' of politics, that is, the elements which are 'purely subjective in the representation of an object, i.e., what constitutes its reference to the subject, not to the object'.28

**3. Their representations do not provide an accurate view of the world; we must step back, and evaluate ALL representations before making decisions**

**Bleiker, ’09** (Roland, October 11, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No. 3, “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” pp. 532)

No representation, even the most systematic empirical analysis, can be identical with its object of inquiry. Any form of representation is inevitably a process of interpretation and abstraction. The power of aesthetics, and its political relevance, lies in this inevitability. This is why the discipline of ir could profit immensely, both in theory and in practice, from supplementing its social scientific conventions with approaches that problematise representation. Paraphrasing Gadamer, we could then recognise how we make every interpretation of world politics into a picture.98 We chose a particular representation, detach it from the world it came from. We then frame it and hang it on a wall, usually next to other pictures that aesthetically resemble them. We arrange them all in an exhibition and display them to the public. In this manner we have all admired 'blockbuster' exhibitions of realist and liberal masterpieces of world politics. Some of us may have visited the occasional smaller exhibit of, say feminist and postmodern sketches of the international. Or perhaps we have stumbled upon an opening of a new postcolonial gallery, or caught the occasional glimpse of a radical experimental installation. Such aesthetic adventures do not tend to be very popular with a public used to figurative eye- pleasers. The most admired paintings remain the old masterpieces: the massive and heroic realist canvases. Indeed, we love them so much that we have embarked on extensive and costly attempts to restore the gargantuan Thucydides and Machiavelli frescos that adorn the intellectual temples of our discipline. Some parts of the original paintings were faded, damaged or at times effaced altogether. Fortunately, though, the skilful restoring experts interpreted the missing brush strokes confidently and repainted them with gusto. All new and shiny again, our old and cherished masterpieces have meanwhile been displayed so often and admired for so long that their figurative form of representation has come to be viewed as real. We have forgotten that they too are, in essence, abstractions: representations of something that is quite distinct from what they represent. And in the age of globalisation and mechanical reproduction we have come to see these celebrated artistic representations multiply ad infinitum: reprinted in catalogues and books and posters and projected unto T-shirts and public buses and transposed into songs and films and other cultural memory banks."

# AT: Reps Inevitable/Already Out there

**They misunderstand their own argument – we must encounter the political and reject bad representations in every instance, to demystify ourselves, so that we can reassess IR**

**Bleiker, ’09** (Roland, October 11, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No. 3, “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” pp. 525-26)

Aesthetic insight is one of the tools we can employ against such forms of numbing regularity and complacency. Confronting the massive tragedy of the Bosnian War, Ignatieff looks for help in the example of Goya's Horrors of War and Picasso's Guernica, 'which confront [the] desire to evade the testimony of our own eyes by grounding horror in aesthetic forms that force the spectator to see if as for the first time'.66 Furthermore, high art is not the only location of such aesthetic encounters with the political. John Docker, for instance, suggests that significant critical potential is hidden in the seemingly homogenising and suffocating forces of popular culture, where he detects, carnivalesque challenges to the narrow and single representation of reason in the pubic sphere.67 Direct aesthetic encounters with the political can contribute to a more inclusive and just world order, for they challenge our very notion of common sense by allowing us to see what may be obvious but has not been noted before. This is why we have a responsibility, both as numbed spectators of televised realities and as scholars wedded to social scientific conventions, to engage our representational habits and search for ways of heeding to forms of thought that can reassess the realities of world politics.

**Their representations do not provide an accurate view of the world; we must step back, and evaluate ALL representations before making decisions**

**Bleiker, ’09** (Roland, October 11, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No. 3, “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” pp. 532)

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# Deconstruction Good

**Deconstructive analysis solves the exclusionary discourse of the squo**

**Der Derian and Shapiro, 89** Professor of Political Science at Brown University, Professor of Political Science at University of Hawaii at Manoa (James, Michael, “International/Intertextual Relations”, pg. 14-15, JPW)

Textualist or poststructuralist modes of analysis emphasize “discourse” rather than language because the concept of discourse implies a concern with the meaning- and value-producing practices in language rather than simply the relationship between utterances and their referents. In the more familiar approaches to political phenomena (including the empiricist and phenomenological), language is treated as a transparent tool; it is to serve as an unobtrusive conduit between thought or concepts and things. In contrast, a discourse approach treats language as opaque and encourages an analysis of both the linguistic practices within which various phenomena—political, economic, social, biological, and so on—are embedded and of the language of inquiry itself. That analysis can be primarily structural (emphasizing the grammatical, rhetorical, and narrative mechanisms responsible for shaping the phenomena treated as the referents of statements in various disciplines) or more historical (emphasizing the events through which various phenomena have found their way into language).

In either case, once the transparency metaphor for language is exchanged for the opacity metaphor, analysis becomes linguistically reflective and serves to overcome a delusion that a view of language has been elaborated by Derrida under the rubric of phonocentrism. Derrida argues that because of our proximity to the process of signification as we speak, we tend to think that our utterances are wholly present to us: “The subject can hear or speak to himself and be affected by the signifier he produces without passing through an external detour, the world, the sphere of what is not ‘his own’.”

Much of Derrida’s analysis has been devoted to disclosing this delusion of the ownership of meaning. He locates control over meaning in a prescripted structure of signification upon which speakers must draw to be intelligible rather than in the speaking subject. In support of this, he has shown, for example, that the linguist Benveniste was deluded into thinking that he was inquiring into the question of whether thought and language can be regarded as distinct, while he had unwittingly already accepted the distinction; he employed a philosophical vocabulary, including the concept of the category, that already holds them to be distinct.

This form of analysis, known as a deconstructive method of critique, is more than a corrective to what Derrida has called “the metaphysics of presence.” Given that among the political processes that take place in an order is one of legitimating its structures of meaning, Derrida’s deconstructive criticism can be shown to disclose how every social order rests on a forgetting of the exclusion practices through which one set of meanings has been institutionalized and various other possibilities—other possible forms of meaning—have been marginalized. One way to capture this process is to avoid the familiar epistemological vocabulary and become rhetorically impertinent. We can use a financial rhetoric to speak of the legitimation language that support prevailing institutions. Working with this rhetoric, Wlad Godzich has argued that in order to maintain their legitimacy, “institutions behave as if they did not carry this debt”; instead of acknowledging it, they “collect interest on it, thereby fostering the formation and maintenance of a privileged class.”

# AT: Indicts of Deconstruction

**The alternative does not get trapped in its own discourse**

**Edkins, 99**- lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth; coeditor of Sovereignty and Subjectivity and author of Famines and Modernity: Pictures of Hunger, Concepts of Famine, Practices of Aid (Jenny, 1999, "Poststructuralism &International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In," 74)

This leads to problems, of course. The criticism that deconstruction is a self-defeating method because it has to speak the language it is trying to critique is difficult to counter. Derrida argues that there is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics. We have no language—no syntax and no lexicon— which is foreign to this history: we can pronounce not a single destruc- tive proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest. . . . Every particular borrowing brings along with it the whole of meta- physics.43 It is possible to argue that this is why deconstruction has to operate in the way it does: "If the traditional logic of meaning as an unequivocal struc- ture of mastery *is* Western metaphysics, the deconstruction of metaphysics cannot simply combat logocentric meaning by opposing some other mean- ing to it. *Differance* is not a 'concept' or 'idea' that is 'truer' than pres- ence. It can only be a process of textual work, a strategy of writing."44 The approach proceeds by "the careful teasing out [of] the warring forces of signification within the text itself."45 It is a form of critique. It is not an examination of the flaws or imperfections of the theoretical text but an analysis that seeks to explore the grounds of possibility of the text: "The critique reads back from what seems natural, obvious, self-evident or uni- versal, in order to show that these things have their history, their reasons for being the way they are, their effects on what follows from them, and that the starting point is not a (natural) given but a (cultural) construct, usually blind to itself."46 The question asked is not, "What does it mean?" but, "What does it presuppose?" It is this use of metaphysics that allows "intervention." By using con- cepts from metaphysics, "borrowing" them in order to name what cannot be named within the closure of philosophy, the concepts suffer a mutation, and this permits an intervention within the discourse of philosophy: "The necessity of borrowing one's resources from the logic to be deconstructed is not only no inconvenience or calamity, as some have believed, but is rather the very condition of finding a foothold in the discourse to be de- constructed."47 Or as Derrida puts it in *Writing and Difference:* "We can- not give up this metaphysical complicity without also giving up the cri- tique we are directing against this complicity."48

1. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)